.11.5.9 Sustained Load 
Creep 
Deformation and 
Stress Cracking 
[AMR-95] For Class B parts, if applicable to part design and required for structural assessment, the material response under 
sustained load conditions leading to creep mechanisms, crazing, or stress cracking shall be evaluated from AM material 
produced to an appropriate QMP, with lot requirements per section 6.5 of this NASA Technical Standard. 

6.11.5.10 Joining [AMR-96] For Class B parts, material properties for joining polymer AM products shall be developed to a statistical 
significance comparable to the base AM material properties using AM product manufactured from the same QMPs and 
incorporated into the applicable MPS. 

7. Part Production 
Plan (PPP) 
[AMR-97] A PPP for each AM part shall be developed by the CEO to address all requirements of this section, subject to 
review and approval by NASA. 


Section Description Requirement in this Standard 
Applicable 
(Enter Yes 
or No) 

Comments 
7.1 Part-Specific 
Information 
[AMR-98] For Class A and Class B parts, the PPP shall list the following minimum general information, or may reference 
other configuration-controlled documentation that is available to NASA on request: 
a. Drawing number and part name. 
b. Illustrations and/or CAD model views (with scale). 
c. The purpose of the part in context to the system. 
d. The operational environments (e.g., temperatures, fluids, radiation, etc.). 
e. Referenced build file name contained in the digital thread. 
f. Material (including material specifications, if applicable). 
(1)  Feedstock material specification. 
(2)  Part material specification (or equivalent). 
g. Identification of the QMP specified for production. 
h. Identification of a specific MPS for the associated material used for part assessment, including influence factors, if 
applicable. 
i. Serialization, part marking, and methodology for tracking individual parts, if applicable.  
j. Cleanliness, if special considerations or requirements apply (e.g., oxygen service, optical surfaces, delicate electronics, 
etc.). 
k. Qualification plan, when applicable. 

7.2 Part Classification 
and Associated 
Rationale 
[AMR-99] The PPP shall state the part classification and provide a detailed rationale for the classification given.    
7.3 Integrated 
Structural 
Integrity 
Rationale 
[AMR-100] For Class A and B parts, the PPP shall have an integrated structural integrity rationale that provides justification 
of part integrity commensurate with its consequences of failure and associated requirements, and addresses or describes, at a  
minimum, the following: 
 Key results and any limitations identified in the strength and fracture analyses.  
 Areas of high structural demand and high AM risk per section 4.3.2 of this NASA Technical Standard.  
 Application of influence factor data in the assessment. 
 Rationale for the mitigation of residual stresses or how they are accounted for in the part assessment.  
 NDE, acceptance criteria, degree of coverage, and limitations. 
 Proof test operations, including the role in integrity rationale, method of analysis, and cove rage or limitations. 
 Residual risks identified to date. 
 Reference to all supporting analysis and documents. 
 Summary of fracture control implementation, if applicable. 

7.4 AM Part 
Production 
Summary 
[AMR-101] For Class A and B parts, the PPP shall provide a summary list or table with primary production steps, critical to 
successful part production and performance, in sequence as governed by the production engineering record. 


Section Description Requirement in this Standard 
Applicable 
(Enter Yes 
or No) 

Comments 
7.4.1 Witness Testing [AMR-102] The PPP shall describe the witness testing for the part, meeting the requirements in section 4.11 of this NASA 
Technical Standard or deviations therein, including the specimen types, designs, and quantities, and their layout in the buil d 
volume, test methods, and acceptance criteria. 

7.4.2 Planned 
Interruptions 
[AMR-103] For Class A and B parts, the PPP shall document all planned interruptions of the AM build, including allowable 
build height range(s) for the interruption and planned post-build evaluations of the process restart interface. 

7.4.3 Post-Build 
Operations 
Requiring 
Specific Controls 
[AMR-104] For Class A and B parts, the PPP shall describe or reference any specific controls required for post-build part 
processing operations that are process sensitive. 

7.5 Preproduction 
Article 
Requirements 
[AMR-105] For Class A and B parts, the PPP shall describe a preproduction article evaluation verifying quality of part and 
material. 

7.6 End Item Data 
Package (EIDP) 
Information 
[AMR-106] For Class A and B parts, the PPP shall include a complete list of all items that will be required for the part 
acceptance as part of the EIDP, including, but not limited to: 
 Build designation. 
 Post-build processing records (e.g., thermal treatment). 
 Witness testing report. 
 Cleaning verification. 
 Dimensional inspection report. 
 NDE report. 
 Feedstock certification. 
 Proof testing report. 
 List of all nonconformances and records of their disposition (including unplanned build interruptions and repairs; see 
sections 4.7 and 4.10 of this NASA Technical Standard). 

7.7 Part Production 
Plan (PPP) 
Revisions 
[AMR-107] A revision to the PPP shall be submitted to NASA for review and approval, for any of the following:  
 Changes to QMP(s) specified for production. 
 Changes to part classification (e.g., Class B to C, or Class B1 to B3, etc.). 
 Changes to part geometry. 
 Changes to build layout. 
 Changes to witness testing. 
 Changes to preproduction article. 
 Any other change that impacts the form, fit, or function of the part. 

7.7.1 Rebuild of 
Preproduction 
Article 
[AMR-108] For all Class A and B parts, a new build of the preproduction article shall be evaluated when a new QMP is used 
for part production, or the QMP specified by the QPP requires requalification due to changes of the QMP definition, per 
section 8.4 of this NASA Technical Standard. 


Section Description Requirement in this Standard 
Applicable 
(Enter Yes 
or No) 

Comments 
8. Qualified Part 
Process (QPP) 
[AMR-109] An AM Readiness Review, defining a qualified part process, shall be conducted for all Class A and B parts.   
8.1 AM Production 
Readiness Review 
(AMRR) 
[AMR-110] The CEO shall conduct an AMRR at the completion of all activities outlined in the PPP and prior to the 
production of the first deliverable AM part, meeting the following criteria: 
a. Attendees, including, but not limited to: 
(1) CEO (chair). 
(2) Discipline representatives for Class A and B parts: 
A. Design. 
B. Structures. 
C. M&P. 
D. AM manufacturing production. 
E. Safety and mission assurance/quality assurance. 
(3) NASA M&P representative or delegate (with a minimum of 14 calendar days’ notice): 
A. Attendance is required for all Class A1 and A2 parts.  
B. Attendance is at NASA’s discretion for Class A3, A4, and B parts.  
C. NASA only needs to be notified at the completion of an AMRR or the establishment of a QPP for Class C 
parts.  
b. Topics, including, but not limited to: 
(1) Maturity of all manufacturing controls (e.g., QMP) and AM performance (e.g., MPS).  
(2) Results from the preproduction article. 
(3) Validation that part will meet minimum project requirements. 
c. Required minimum approvals: CEO.  

8.2 Additive 
Manufacturing 
Readiness Review 
(AMRR) 
Documentation 
and Approval 
[AMR-111] The outcome of the AMRR shall be documented in the relevant QMS, subject to review and approval by the 
CEO, including, but not limited to, the following copies of reviewed materials: 
 Presentation materials. 
 Attendance. 
 Minutes. 
 Actions. 
 Concurrences. 
 Dissenting opinions. 

8.3 Qualified Part 
Process (QPP): 
Establishment 
[AMR-112] The QPP shall be established following approval of the AMRR by the CEO, or as defined in the AMCP for Class 
C parts, with no further changes to the build configuration, its electronic files, or post -build processes permitted without the 
written approval of the CEO. 


Section Description Requirement in this Standard 
Applicable 
(Enter Yes 
or No) 

Comments 
8.4 Qualified Part 
Process (QPP): 
Modifications 
[AMR-113] For Class A and B parts, the CEO shall define the methodology for changing and requalification of the part 
production process when changes to a QPP are required, including when the AMRR process is u sed to reestablish the QPP 
following any modifications. 

8.5 Build Execution [AMR-114] For both preproduction and production builds, the production engineering record for the QPP shall be controlled 
by the QMS and contain steps that are fully traceable to procedures and checklists governing setup and initiation of builds. 

8.6 Control of Digital 
Thread for Part 
Production 
[AMR-115] The QPP shall document the digital thread.   


APPENDIX B 

NON-CREWED AND ROBOTIC MISSION TAILORING 
GUIDELINES 
B.1  OVERVIEW 

This Appendix is intended to cover the recommended tailoring for NASA-STD-6030 for non-
crewed space applications, which includes science missions and launch vehicles for said missions, 
as well as related hardware. This Appendix is not a mandatory part of the standard, and the 
information contained herein is intended for guidance only. 

B.2 TAILORING RECOMMENDATIONS 

All tailoring contained in this Appendix should be done in consultation with NASA Materials and 
Processes (M&P) Engineering, and in the case of a hosted payload, with the cognizant NASA M&P 
Engineering staff on the primary payload system. A NASA M&P engineer will be best suited to 
ensure the appropriate balance between the technical needs and risk tolerance of the program. If AM 
subject matter expertise is not immediately available to the program, please contact the NASA 
Engineering and Safety Center for assistance. Failure to seek out such expertise will likely result in 
significant programmatic risks (e.g., cost, schedule, and technical). 

Recommended tailoring for non-crewed space flight programs is limited almost exclusively to the 
topics of allowable technologies in section 1.4.2 and part classification in section 4.2 of this NASA 
Technical Standard. More specifically, the recommendations for tailoring apply to defining “down” 
the classification of any given part. By adjusting the definition of what is and is not a Class A, B, or 
C part, M&P engineers and programs are able to minimize the overall tailoring of this document. 
This decreases project management complexity and increases the likelihood that different projects 
and different Centers are able to leverage the experiences and technologies within NASA, its 
developers, and the overall supply chain. Said another way, by minimizing the tailoring of these 
requirements, current projects are more likely to be able to manufacture Class A parts to previously 
approved processes. 

B.3 RISK ASSESSMENTS 

A part whose failure could lead to personal injury or loss of life should always be classified as Class 
A, regardless of the size or risk posture of the program. This requirement should not be tailored. 
Additionally, this explicitly covers hardware that is not intended for flight (e.g., ground support 
equipment) but poses a significant risk to the mission such as NASA critical infrastructure and 


personnel. The total usage of the equipment has to be considered (e.g., will it be subjected to 
vibration or other testing providing an opportunity for failure). 

Non-crewed missions are encouraged to consider more explicitly defining for their own purposes 
what constitutes “Mission Critical.” Most non-crewed missions have both “primary mission 
objectives” and “secondary mission objectives” (or similar). For the least Risk Tolerant Missions 
(i.e., Class A or Class B as defined by NPR 8705.4), programs are encouraged to retain, at a 
minimum, the requirement that if failure of a component would result in the loss of a primary 
mission objective, that part will be defined as Class A. In this scenario, if failure of a component 
would result in the loss of a secondary mission objective, and not otherwise meet the criteria of 
Class C, that part will be defined as Class B.  

For more risk tolerant missions (i.e., Class C and D as defined by NPR 8705.4), failure of a part that 
would lead to the loss of a primary mission objective could be classified as Class B and the loss of a 
secondary mission objective as Class C, with all other parts that do not pose a risk to safety also 
being Class C. The most risk tolerant projects (i.e., Class D as defined by NPR 8705.4, NPR 7120.8, 
“Do No Harm”, etc.), all parts whose failure does not pose a safety hazard could be classified as 
Class C, or these requirements could be omitted altogether. The risk characterization for Class C 
parts is governed by section 4.3.13 of NASA-STD-6030. However, given the alternate risk postures 
for non-crewed spacecraft, a recommended tailoring approach for those requirements for various 
mission classes is listed in Table 21. The recommended approach denotes sections which should not 
be tailored for a given mission class.  

In cases of hosted payloads, which are often more risk tolerant than prime spacecraft, the risk 
postures of the prime spacecraft and its myriad requirements have to be taken into consideration. For 
example, the cleanliness requirements of the prime spacecraft will translate into requirements for the 
Class C or Class D hosted payloads, which cannot waive those requirements. Similarly, “do no 
harm” risk postures have to be adapted to the characterization and risk tolerance of the additively 
manufactured hardware as it relates to the prime mission. This concurs with the typical NASA 
approach, such as the requirements levied upon CubeSats per LSP-REQ-317.01. Similar approaches 
are defined for Department of Defense systems (e.g., launch systems) per MIL-STD-882E, System 
Safety. 

Given the different risk postures that can be tailored for non-crewed missions, more leeway can be 
given for use of alternate additive manufacturing technologies. Table 22, Listing of Requirements 
that Can and Cannot be Tailored for Class C Part Characterization, contains a listing of the risk 
postures recommended by NASA; the risks that a given project is willing to undertake have to be 
discussed with the relevant NASA M&P Engineering Staff prior to choosing a less-well-
characterized processing approach. 


Table 22—Listing of Requirements that Can and Cannot be Tailored for Class C Part 
Characterization; Specifications that Can be Tailored are Denoted “Y” 
Section 4.3.13 Requirements Mission 
Class 
Subsection A/B C D 
Failure of part does not lead to any form of hazardous or unsafe condition N N N 
Failure of part does not adversely affect mission objectives N N N 
Failure of part does not adversely affect other systems or operations N N N 
Failure of part does not alter structural margins or related evaluations on other 
hardware 
N N N 
Failure of part causes only minor inconvenience operations N N N 
Failure of part does not cause debris or contamination concerns N N Y 
Failed part would not require repair or replacement N Y Y 
Part is not a protoflight article N N Y 
Load environments are defined N Y Y 
Part is not exposed to environment with potential for material degradation over 
the expected service life 
N Y Y 
Part is not primary structure N Y Y 
Part does not serve as redundant structure for fail-safe criteria per NASA-STD-
5019 
N Y Y 
Part is not designated “Non-Hazardous Leak Before Burst” per NASA-STD-5019 N Y Y 
Part does not serve as primary or secondary containment N Y Y 
Part is not subjected to impact loads N Y Y 
Part has no printed threads N Y Y 
Part is not a fastener nor does it serve the purpose of a fastener N Y Y 
If a structural analysis is required, margin of safety ultimate tensile strength 
(UTS) >6 on local maximum principal tensile stress 
N Y Y 

B.4 FRACTURE CONTROL 

The fracture control assessment methodology remains consistent for all part classes, per NASA-
STD-5019A. This applies to all systems, regardless of mission class, for applications such as 
propellant tanks and is governed by range safety requirements at NASA’s launch sites. Regardless 
of additive manufacturing process methodology, the same screening approach applies; see Figure 7, 
Fracture Control Classification logic Diagram (NASA-STD-5019A). The risk classification 
methodology above for Class C parts is intentionally designed to avoid allowing fracture critical 
hardware to be downrated to a lower risk posture, so that it does not conflict with other NASA 
policies. Any questions regarding appropriate fracture control classification should be directed, early 
in the design process, to the relevant NASA M&P Engineering staff, for appropriate adjudication. 
Not all NASA Centers maintain active Fracture Control Boards, so expertise may be required from 
another NASA Center to properly rate a piece of hardware. 


Figure 7—Fracture Control Classification Logic Diagram (NASA-STD-5019A) 


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