currences. 
 Dissenting opinions. 

[Rationale:  A thorough documentation of the outcome of the AMRR is vital in the event there are 
issues during fabrication of production parts or performance issues after delivery.] 

8.3 Qualified Part Process (QPP):  Establishment 

[AMR-112] The QPP shall be established following approval of the AMRR by the CEO, or as 
defined in the AMCP for Class C parts, with no further changes to the build configuration, its 
electronic files, or post-build processes permitted without the written approval of the CEO. 

[Rationale:  Establishing the QPP formally defines and places the process for part production 
under configuration control provided by the QMS. The quality and consistency of AM parts cannot 
be assured without establishing a QPP.]  

For Class A and B parts, approval of the AMRR by the CEO, as specified in section 8.2 of this 
NASA Technical Standard, can serve as approval of the QPP. For Class C parts, a different 
mechanism for approval needs to be defined in the AMCP since a formal AMRR is not required for 
Class C parts. 

The establishment of a QPP is the technical authorization to proceed with part production. 

This requirement intends that the content of the build cannot be altered relative to that used in the 
preproduction article qualification process—no parts, supports, or specimens are added, 
subtracted, rearranged, or altered in the build. 


8.4 Qualified Part Process (QPP):  Modifications 

[AMR-113] For Class A and B parts, the CEO shall define the methodology for changing and 
requalification of the part production process when changes to a QPP are required, including when 
the AMRR process is used to reestablish the QPP following any modifications. 

[Rationale:  It is acknowledged that occasionally circumstances arise where changes to the fixed 
process are necessary. Defining in the AMCP the methodology for requalifying the part production 
process following a change ensures that rigorous, proportionate, and consistent requalification 
procedures are followed.] 

A QMP is considered nominally similar if it can meet the Sub-QMP commonality criteria as stated 
in section 5.5.1 of this NASA Technical Standard. Incremental or partial requalification schemes 
are allowed for minor changes. Changes that impact the part geometry or support structures or that 
may otherwise impact the manufacturing process are expected to repeat the preproduction article 
process. The AMRR process is intended to be used to reestablish the QPP following any 
modifications. 

Allowing additional AM machines (QMPs) to produce parts under the QPP is a common 
modification; the following criteria may be included in the AMCP as a preapproved method for a 
QPP change for additional QMPs. 

Additional QMPs may be added to a QPP under the following scenario: 

a. The addition of the new QMP is the only change to the QPP. 

b. The new QMP is to be used by the same AM part producer and facility for which the 
QPP was established. 

c. The new QMP is nominally similar to the baseline QMP. 

d. The new QMP is properly registered to the MPS for the part. 

e. The new QMP has documentation of a successful preproduction article evaluation of the 
part. 

For this requirement, the digital product definition (DPD) includes any electronic data source or 
record that would be needed to fully reproduce the build as it was defined at the time the part 
process was qualified as a QPP, including any manually set parameters in software used to process 
the part from CAD to the final, assembled build file, which includes support structures, witness 
specimens, and any other content in the build. 


Each file necessary to create the build is identified by filename and its cryptographic hash as part of 
the QPP definition. To maintain traceability, electronic data are archived with necessary 
safeguards against loss as required by the QMS. 

Electronic data that contains information considered proprietary or controlled under regulations 
such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations should be marked and controlled according to 
regulation. Note that these rules require appropriate access control to data marked with such 
restrictions at all stages of producing AM parts. 

8.5 Build Execution 

[AMR-114] For both preproduction and production builds, the production engineering record for 
the QPP shall be controlled by the QMS and contain steps that are fully traceable to procedures and 
checklists governing setup and initiation of builds. 

[Rationale:  Reliable part production can only occur with properly controlled production planning.]  

See section 4.14 of this NASA Technical Standard for additional information regarding the 
production engineering record. 

8.6 Control of Digital Thread for Part Production  

[AMR-115] The QPP shall document the digital thread. 

[Rationale:  The QPP has to contain or reference the complete digital thread to maintain part 
production integrity.] 

See section 4.13 of this NASA Technical Standard for additional information regarding the digital 
thread.


APPENDIX A 
REQUIREMENTS COMPLIANCE MATRIX 
A.1 PURPOSE 
Due to the complexity and uniqueness of space flight, it is unlikely that all of the requirements in a NASA Technical Standard will 
apply. The Requirements Compliance Matrix below contains this NASA Technical Standard’s technical authority requirements and 
may be used by programs and projects to indicate requirements that are applicable or not applicable to help minimize costs. Enter 
“Yes” in the “Applicable” column if the requirement is applicable to the program or project or “No” if the requirement is not 
applicable to the program or project. The “Comments” column may be used to provide specific instructions on how to apply the 
requirement or to specify proposed tailoring. 


Section Description Requirement in this Standard 
Applicable 
(Enter Yes 
or No) 

Comments 
4.1 Tailoring of this 
NASA Technical 
Standard’s 
Requirements 
[AMR-1] Program and/or project managers shall formally document and approve all tailoring of requirements in this NASA 
Technical Standard with the concurrence of the responsible NASA Materials and Processes (M&P) organization and the 
delegated Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 
Requirements, or NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements.  

4.2 Additive 
Manufacturing 
Control Plan 
(AMCP) 
[AMR-2] The CEO responsible for the design, acquisition, and conformance of AM hardware shall submit a consolidated 
AMCP addressing all applicable AM processes for review and approval by the responsible NASA program or project, with 
concurrence from the responsible NASA M&P organization, that does the following: 
a. Documents the means of conformance and method of implementation for each of the requirements of this NASA 
Technical Standard and NASA-STD-6033 (see section 4.5 of this NASA Technical Standard). 
b. Documents and provides rationale for any tailoring of the requirements of this NASA Technical Standard . 
c. Provides for complete governance for the implementation of AM on the program or project such that, once approved, 
the AMCP becomes the controlling document for implementation and verification of AM requirements of this NASA 
Technical Standard. 

4.2.1 Applicable 
Documents, 
AMCP 
[AMR-3] All applicable documents cited in the AMCP shall be controlled by the QMS, subject to configuration control, and 
made available for review when requested by NASA, the CEO, or any designated representatives.  


Section Description Requirement in this Standard 
Applicable 
(Enter Yes 
or No) 

Comments 
4.2.2 Supplier 
Compliance with 
the AMCP 
[AMR-4] The CEO shall ensure flow-down of the requirements of this NASA Technical Standard, as tailored per the AMCP, 
through all relevant tiers of the supply chain and ensure that the relevant documents controlled by subtier suppliers are mad e 
available to NASA upon request. 

4.3.1 Primary 
Classification 
[AMR-5] The CEO shall assign a primary classification (i.e., Class A, B, or C) to all AM parts in accordance with the content 
of Figure 4. 

Figure 4—AM Part Classification 

4.3.1.1 Class A Parts [AMR-6] A part shall be designated as Class A, High Consequence of Failure, if failure of the part leads to a catastrophic, 
critical, or safety hazard and/or the part is defined as mission critical by the program or project. 

4.3.1.1.1 Class A Part 
Restrictions 
[AMR-7] Class A parts shall not: 
a. Be made from polymeric materials. 
b. Be fasteners. 
c. Contain printed threads. 


Section Description Requirement in this Standard 
Applicable 
(Enter Yes 
or No) 

Comments 
4.3.1.2 Class B Parts [AMR-8] Parts not designated Class A or Class C shall be designated as Class B.   
4.3.1.2.1 Class B Part 
Restrictions 
[AMR-9] Class B parts shall not: 
a. Be fasteners. 
b. Contain printed threads 

4.3.1.3 Class C Parts [AMR-10] A part shall be designated as Class C, Negligible Consequence of Failure, provided that ALL of the following 
criteria are satisfied: 
a. Failure of part does not lead to any form of hazardous condition. 
b. Failure of part does not eliminate a critical redundancy.  
c. Part does not serve as primary or secondary containment. 
d. Part does not serve as redundant structures for fail-safe criteria per NASA-STD-5019, Fracture Control Requirements 
for Spaceflight Hardware. 
e. Part is not designated “Non-Hazardous Leak Before Burst” per NASA-STD-5019. 
f. Failure of part does not cause debris or contamination concerns, as defined by the Non -Fracture Critical Low-Release 
Mass classification per NASA-STD-5019, NASA-STD-6016, and/or other project/program requirements. 
g. Failure of part causes only minor inconvenience to crew or operations. 
h. Failure of part does not alter structural margins or related evaluations on other hardware.  
i. Failure of part does not adversely affect other systems or operations. 
j. Failure of part does not affect minimum mission operations. 

4.3.1.4 Exempt Parts [AMR-11] A part shall be designated as Exempt provided that all of the following criteria are satisfied and it meets all criteria 
for Class C (see section 4.3.1.3), which exempts it from all other requirements in this NASA Technical Standard:  
a. The part does not require any form of structural assessment. 
b. The part does not permanently interface to, or attach to, the launch vehicle, spacecraft, habitable module, or any 
subsystems thereof. 
c. Except for use in habitable crew spaces, the part does not provide any functionality or serve any purpose to the 
launch vehicle, spacecraft, or any subsystems thereof. 

4.3.2 Secondary 
Classification 
[AMR-12] For Class A and B parts, a secondary classification shall be assigned based on structural demand and AM risk, 
according to Table 2, Structural Demand, Metallic AM Parts, Table 3, Structural Demand, Polymeric AM Parts, and Table 4, 
Assessment Criteria for Additive Manufacturing Risk (also see Figure 4). 


Table 2—Structural Demand, Metallic AM Parts 
Analysis Input/Material Property Criteria for Low Structural Demand 
Load cases Well-defined or bounded loads environment 


Section Description Requirement in this Standard 
Applicable 
(Enter Yes 
or No) 

Comments 
Environmental degradation Only due to temperature 
Ultimate strength Minimum margin* ≥0.3 
Yield strength Minimum margin* ≥0.2 
Point strain Local plastic strain <0.005 
High cycle fatigue, improved surfaces Cyclic stress range (including any required factors) ≤80% of applicable 
fatigue limit  
High cycle fatigue, as-built surfaces  Cyclic stress range (including any required factors) ≤60% of applicable 
fatigue limit  
Low cycle fatigue No predicted cyclic plastic strain 
Fracture mechanics life 20x life factor 
Creep strain No predicted creep strain 
*Margin = [design/(operation * safety factor)] – 1 (see commentary) 


Table 3—Structural Demand, Polymeric AM Parts 
Analysis Input/Material Property Criteria for Low Structural Demand 
All materials 
Load cases Well-defined or bounded loads environment 
Environmental Degradation 
Only allowed due to temperature and moisture, if specific 
environmental performance data exist. Design environment 
temperature does not cross the Tg. 
Fatigue Cyclic stress range (including any required factors) ≤50% of 
applicable fatigue limit  
Sustained stress/creep strain No sustained stress† and no predicted creep strain 
Material with elongation at failure ≥3% in application environment 
Ultimate strength Minimum margin* ≥0.5 
Yield strength‡ Minimum margin* ≥0.3 


Material with elongation at failure <3% in application environment 
Ultimate strength# Minimum margin* ≥2.0 
†Includes assembly stress (tight snap fit connections, shrink fits, fastener preloads) and operational stress . 
‡Yield strength defined by secant modulus to specified strain, by specified offset strain, or as otherwise defined by structural 
assessment requirements. 
#Ultimate strength assessed against local maximum principal stress at stress concentrations (brittle material design rules) for 
low ductility materials. 
*Margin = [design/(operation * safety factor)] – 1 (see commentary following Table 2) 


Table 4—Assessment Criteria for Additive Manufacturing Risk 
 Metallic Polymer   
  L-PBF DED L-PBF Score For   
Additive Manufacturing Risk       Yes No Score 
All surfaces and volumes can be reliably inspected, 
or the design permits adequate proof testing1 based 
on stress state? 
X X X 0 5  
As-built surface can be fully removed on all fatigue-
critical surfaces2? X X  0 3  
Surfaces interfacing with support structures are fully 
accessible and the as-built surface removed? X X X 0 3  
Structural walls or protrusions are the equivalent of 
≥8 trace, (e.g., melt pool, bead, scan path) widths in 
cross section? 
X  X 0 2  
Structural walls or protrusions are the equivalent of 
≥2 trace, (e.g., melt pool, bead, scan path) widths in 
cross section? 
 X  0 2  
Critical regions of the part do not require support 
structure? X X X 0 2  
1 In the context of the assessment of AM risk, the adequacy of a proof test is determined by the degree to which the test 
meets its assigned objectives. For a workmanship proof test, at any given location in the part the proof test is considered 
adequate when the state of stress in the part during the proof test exceeds the state of stress in the part during operation by 
the required proof factor. If the proof test conditions do not fully replicate the operational environment, as is typically the 
case, the proof and operational stresses are compared using directional stress components with any needed corrections for 
environment. For the rare case of quantitative flaw screening by proof test as an anchor to fracture control requirements, 


Section Description Requirement in this Standard 
Applicable 
(Enter Yes 
or No) 

Comments 
the adequacy of the proof test is determined only by the ability of the applied proof test stress conditions to screen the 
critical initial flaw size for operation by causing failure, leak, or other clearly detectible damage to the part during the 
proof test. Just as in the workmanship proof test, the adequacy of a proof test for quantitative flaw screening is likely to 
vary throughout the part. Demonstrating the adequacy of a quantitative proof test is non-trivial and must be coordinated 
intently with the structures and fracture control communities. 
2 Fatigue-critical surfaces are locations where fatigue analysis and surface condition assumptions influence the outcome of 
the structural assessment. 

4.4.1 Quality 
Management 
Systems 
[AMR-13] A QMS compliant to SAE AS9100, Quality Management Systems – Requirements for Aviation, Space, and 
Defense Organizations, or an alternate QMS approved by the CEO and NASA, documented or referenced in the AMCP, shall 
be in place for all entities involved in the design, production, and post-processing of AM hardware. 

4.5 Equipment and 
Facility Control 
Plan (EFCP) 
[AMR-14] All equipment integral to the AM process, and facility-specific processes and procedures, shall be under the control 
of a CEO-approved EFCP developed in accordance with NASA-STD-6033, Additive Manufacturing Requirements for 
Equipment and Facility Control, prior to the production of flight hardware. 

4.6 Fracture Control [AMR-15] All AM parts used in hardware subject to fracture control shall be classified and assessed to NASA-STD-5019 with 
the following limitations: 
a. AM parts are not to be categorized as non-fracture critical low-risk parts, per NASA-STD-5019. 
b. AM parts are not to be categorized as fracture critical lines, fittings, and other pressurized components, per NASA-
STD-5019, section 7.2.4, and instead are to follow the general approach for assessing fracture critical metallic parts 
per NASA-STD-5019, section 7.3. 

4.7 Unplanned 
Interruptions 
[AMR-16] Any unplanned build interruption, including planned interruptions occurring outside approved limits, shall be 
documented as a nonconformance and traceable via a records management system controlled by the QMS.  

4.8.1.1 Quantitative NDE [AMR-17] All Class A parts shall receive quantitative NDE with full coverage of the surface