LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
[2023] 12 S.C.R. 159, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
CASE DETAILS
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR.
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2644 of 2016)
SEPTEMBER 06, 2023
[SURYA KANT AND J.K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issues for consideration: Whether the impugned judgment of the 
High Court negating the plea of land owner seeking ‘lapse’ of the acquisition 
proceedings in terms of s. 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act is liable to be 
interfered with; whether decision of Nagpur Improvement Trust refusing to 
grant alternative plot, as directed by the High Court, requires interference; and 
what suitable relief could be granted to land owner on account of delay caused in 
determination of compensation despite time bound directions by the High Court.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s. 11-A – Nagpur Improvement Trust 
Act, 1936 – Acquisition under the State Act-NIT Act with the aid of LA 
Act – Applicability of s. 11-A in the acquisition proceedings under the NIT 
Act – On facts, notiﬁ cation issued u/s. 39 of the NIT Act in 1962, possession 
was taken in the year 1970 and the road was constructed, in the year 1986 
award passed in case of the other land owners and in 2013 an ex-parte award 
passed – Plea of lapsing of acquisition proceedings by the land owner:
Held: Provisions of s. 11-A of LA Act which provides for lapsing of the 
land acquisition proceedings, would not be applicable where acquisition was 
made under NIT Act – In view thereof, no error committed by the High Court in 
negating the plea of lapsing of
acquisition proceedings as raised by land owner. 
[Paras 13 and 15]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 
– Rejection of the request of the land owner for grant of alternate piece of 
land by the Nagpur Improvement Trust, as directed by the High Court – 
Interference with:
[2023] 12 S.C.R. 159 : 2023 INSC 818
159
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
160
Held: By the impugned order passed by the High Court, directions 
were issued to NIT to consider the prayer for the grant of alternate land 
to the land owner – Said prayer was rejected by the NIT, inter-alia stating 
that grant of alternate land in lieu of compensation was not possible in the 
absence of any provisions in the Act – Said plea does not have any statutory 
backing under NIT Act, thus, refusal made by NIT does not warrant any 
interference – After the rejection of the representation to grant alternate 
land particularly in absence of any statutory backing, there is no inclination 
to entertain the said plea – Nonetheless, the said prayer was not seriously 
pressed by the land owner and prayer was conﬁ ned to grant of adequate 
compensation. [Para 16]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 
– Delay caused in determination of compensation despite time bound 
directions by the High Court – Publication of preliminary notiﬁ cation 
in 1962, the possession of the subject land taken in 1970 and the road 
was constructed which is in public use since then – Award passed in 
1986, in the case of other land owners, discriminating the instant land 
owner wherein even after directions of the High Court in 2009 to pass 
an award, prayer for the grant of alternate plot was rejected by NIT, 
and ‘ex-parte’ award was passed in 2013 during pendency of the instant 
appeal and as such land owners could not get
compensation of the land 
since last ﬁ ve decades – Grant of suitable relief to the land owner:
Held: In view of the said chain of events, the delay cannot be attributed 
to the land owner – Value of the land which may be on the date of preliminary 
notiﬁ cation cannot be equated on the date of passing of ‘ex-parte’ award 
– As per s. 48-A of LA Act, if the award is not passed within a period of 
two years from the date of ﬁ nal notiﬁ cation, compensation for the damages 
suﬀ ered due to delay is to be determined as prescribed therein – Thus, to 
meet the ends of justice, it is appropriate to mould the relief – ‘Ex-parte’ 
award would not be given eﬀ ect to – Land Acquisition Oﬃ  cer to determine 
the compensation afresh taking the market value of the subject land as on the 
date of passing of ‘ex-parte’ award – Land owner also entitled to all other 
statutory beneﬁ ts as per the provisions of the LA Act to be calculated from 
the date of preliminary notiﬁ cation, as also be entitled to compensation for 
damages suﬀ ered in view of delay. [Paras 21, 27, 34 and 35]
161
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 
1936 – s. 67 – Award of tribunal how to be determined – Acquisition of 
land under NIT Act – Determination of compensation – Passing of an 
award – Applicability of the said provisions of the LA Act:
Held: s. 67 makes it clear that for determining the compensation and to 
pass an award, the provisions of the LA Act would be applicable – Thus, LA 
Act has its application to such extent for land acquired by the NIT subject to 
the modiﬁ cations made under the NIT Act – Applicability of s. 11 of LA Act 
which deals with enquiry and award, and s. 16 of LA Act which deals with 
power of Collector to take possession, even in acquisition under the NIT 
Act is ‘sine qua non’ – While making an inquiry u/s. 11, the applicability of 
s. 9 which deals with issuance of notice to persons interested, is an integral 
procedure in the proceedings – Thus, for determination of compensation to 
pass an award in case of acquisition of land under NIT Act, the applicability 
of the said provisions of the LA Act has been duly recognised in s. 67 of 
the NIT Act. [Para 17]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 
1936 – Compulsory acquisition of land – Inordinate delay in granting 
compensation to the land owner from the date of taking over of 
possession – Duty of the State and the authorities:
Held: Eminent domain of the State cannot be doubted – Right of the 
land owner enshrined u/Art. 300-A and Art. 31-A has been
recognized as a 
human/civil right , thus if any individual is to be divested or deprived of the 
said right by the State, it ought not be done without giving compensation 
in accordance with law for the land so acquired for public purpose – While 
striking a balance between eminent domain of the State and human/civil 
rights of an individual, an obligation is on the State and its authorities to pass 
an award within a reasonable time – On compulsory acquisition of land, if 
the award is not passed within a reasonable time duly compensating such an 
individual, it would cause grave hardship and it would adversely aﬀ ect the 
livelihood of the land loser – Delay in determining compensation uproots 
the land losers, however, to meet the ends of justice and to rationalize the 
equity, switching the date of market value in determining compensation is 
found necessary. [Para 32]
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
162
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao and Others, (2002) 7 SCC 657 
: [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 636; Bankatlal v. Special Land Acquisition Oﬃ  cer 
and Another, (2014) 15 SCC 116 : [2014] 7 SCR 879 – relied on.
Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others through Power-of-Attorney Holder 
v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, (2013) 1 
SCC 353 : [2012] 13 SCR 29; Bhimandas Ambwani (Dead) through LRs v. 
Delhi Power Company Limited, (2013) 14 SCC 195 : [2013] 1 SCR 996; 
Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. State of U.P. and Another, 
(2022) SCC Online SC 1408; K. Krishna Reddy and Others Vs. Special 
Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra 
Pradesh, (1988) 4 SCC 163:[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 853 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2644 of 2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.09.2009 of the High Court of 
Bombay at Nagpur in WP No. 2022 of 1992.
Appearances:
Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., Gagan Sanghi, Ms. Farah Hashmi, 
Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Dr. Prashant Pratap, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. 
for the Appellant.
Dama Sheshadri Naidu, Sr. Adv., Satyajit A. Desai, Abhinav K. 
Mutyalwar, Gajanan N. Tirthkar, Vijay Raj Singh Chauhan, Ms. Anagha S. 
Desai, Sachin Patil, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, 
Bharat Bagla, Ms. Kirti Dadheech, Geo Joseph, Risvi
Muhammed, Durgesh 
Gupta, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.
1. This appeal has been ﬁ led against the order dated 29.09.2009 
passed in Writ Petition No. 2022 of 1992 by the High Court of Judicature
163
of Bombay at Nagpur Bench. The said Writ Petition was ﬁ led by the father 
of the appellant/land owner (now deceased) seeking writ in the nature of 
mandamus to declare the action of the respondents in taking over possession 
of the subject land owned by him pursuant to acquisition made by respondent 
no. 2 as illegal, arbitrary and without any authority of law. The land owner 
also sought compensation @ Rs. 400-500/- per sq. ft. with commensurate 
damages caused on account of mental agony suﬀ ered in last several years, 
or in alternate, allotment of plot of equal dimension in the same vicinity. 
During the pendency of the petition, the original writ petitioner died and 
his legal heir (appellant herein) was substituted. 
2. The High Court observed that possession of land was taken in 
1970 and the award in case of other land owners was passed in year 1986, 
separating the case of appellant. Therefore, partly allowing the writ petition, 
High Court directed respondent nos. 2 and 3 to complete the exercise for 
grant of alternate plot on or before 31.01.2010 or otherwise determine 
compensation on or before 30.04.2010 and pay damages as per Section 48-A 
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘LA Act’) in 
accordance with law.
3. For ready reference and convenience, hereinafter we shall refer 
the deceased father of the appellant as ‘land owner’; his legal heir as 
‘appellant’; Respondent No. 1/State of Maharashtra as ‘State’; Nagpur 
Improvement
Trust/Respondent No. 2 as ‘NIT’ and Respondent No. 3/
Special Land Acquisition Oﬃ  cer as ‘SLAO’.
4. The facts succinctly stated are that, in an auction dated 26.02.1943 
held by the Commissioner Court of Wards, the landowner purchased two 
plots bearing No. 8 admeasuring 9800 sq. ft. of Khasra No. 35/8 and No. 
18 admeasuring 7248 sq. ft. of Khasra No. 35/9 at Mouza Khamla, District 
Nagpur, Maharashtra on payment of Rs. 880/-. The said plots previously 
belonged to ‘Ex-Malguzar Pande’. The sale deeds of both the plots were 
executed by the representative of the Court of Wards in favour of the 
landowner on 02.03.1944. Vide order dated 09.05.1962 passed by S.D.O., 
Nagpur, the revenue records were corrected and those plots were mutated 
in the name of the landowner. NIT required the said land for ‘Ajni Street 
Scheme’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Scheme’) for which the notiﬁ cation 
under Section 39 of Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 (hereinafter 
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
164
referred to as ‘NIT Act’) akin to Section 4 of the LA Act was published 
on 12.07.1962 specifying Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2 only. The ﬁ nal 
declaration under Section 45 of the NIT Act akin to Section 6 of the LA 
Act was published on 16.01.1969. After ﬁ nal declaration, NIT vide letter 
dated 10.10.1969 requested the State for transfer of Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 
35/2 to it for the Scheme, as it presumed the land to be Government Nazul 
land. Sometime in the year 1970, NIT constructed the road on 5390 sq. ft. 
of land of Khasra No. 35/8 which included plot No. 8 belonging to the land 
owner. Thus, admittedly, after taking of possession of subject land, road was 
constructed in 1970 on it and is in public use since then.
5. In reply to letter dated 10.10.1969 written by NIT, the Collector, 
District Nagpur on 31.05.1972 informed that transfer of land of Khasra 
Nos. 35/1 & 35/2 is not possible because it is not Government land; in 
fact, the said land belonged to and was occupied by Ex-Malguzar Pande. 
Therefore, NIT was instructed to submit valuation report of the remaining 
land. The land owners also received ‘no objection’ to sell other plot No. 18 
of Khasra No. 35/9 from NIT on 21.02.1976 and sold it to one Anil Hinge 
on 08.03.1976. For the sake of clarity, it is only ‘plot No. 8’, i.e., Khasra 
no. 35/8 which is the subject land in the present appeal and not plot No. 18 
of Khasra No. 35/9. 
6. The ﬁ rst notice dated 18.07.1974
issued by SLAO under Section 
9(3) of LA Act was served to landowner and second notice dated 07.09.1974 
was also served, however, none of the said notices speciﬁ ed that Khasra 
No. 35/8 is also under acquisition. Nevertheless, the land owner without 
prejudice to his rights, ﬁ led his statement of claim in Revision Case No. 
82-86/71-72. The NIT in reference to its previous letter dated 10.10.1969, 
again wrote to SLAO on 02.02.1977, requesting him to determine the 
interests of land owners on Khasra nos. 35/1 and 35/2. Thereafter, third 
notice dated 18.10.1977 under Section 9(3) of the LA Act was served to 
the landowner, however, again there was no mention of Khasra no. 35/8. In 
the said scenario, the landowner in reply to the notice, requested SLAO to 
discharge his land from the acquisition proceedings primarily on the ground 
that Khasra No. 35/8 was not reﬂ ected in all three notices. The said prayer 
was opposed by NIT by response dated 19.04.1979, contending that Khasra 
No. 35/8 was part of Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2. However, the SLAO vide
165
order date 01.08.1981 separated the papers of the land owner. It is also on 
record that NIT in furtherance to its letter dated 02.02.1977, informed SLAO 
on 03.11.1981 that proposal for acquisition of Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2 
had been submitted and the interest of various persons shall be determined 
including the land owner, however, the proposal with respect to Khasra No. 
35/8 was still not submitted. 
7. The land owner awaiting a proposal from NIT, ﬁ led a claim on 
25.11.1981 requesting grant of alternate plot in the same vicinity on the 
ground that the possession of his land was taken in 1970 and as on date, 
road is already constructed on the same. In response, NIT vide letter dated 
02.06.1982 asked the land owner to prove his title without considering its 
own reply dated 19.04.1979. Meanwhile, on 22.09.1986, SLAO passed an 
award for adjoining pieces of land in Khasra Nos. 35/3 and 35/4 and since 
the papers of land owner were separated, no award was passed with respect 
to Khasra No. 35/8. Corrected city survey record dated 26.09.1986, recording 
name of land owner in Khasra No. 35/8 was supplied to him. In view of the 
corrected records, landowner again submitted a representation to NIT on 
17.01.1987 and requested for alternate plot. In reply letter dated 06.03.1987, 
NIT informed landowner that plot No. 8 in Khasra No. 35 belonging to land 
owner was under acquisition, and alternate plot cannot be allotted. The land 
owner was directed to approach SLAO
for compensation for the said plot. 
Having no clear response, the land owner sent a legal notice dated 02.09.1987 
to NIT and sought details of acquisition proceedings under which his land 
was acquired, however, it was of no avail. In the meantime, the land owner 
made a representation to the Guardian Minister seeking allotment of an 
alternate plot, which was forwarded to NIT. Pursuant thereto, NIT vide reply 
dated 19.12.1988 to Guardian Minister admitted that the land of the land 
owner is under acquisition but grant of alternative plot is not possible. Be 
that as it may, correspondences were exchanged and ﬁ nally NIT vide letter 
dated 15.01.1990 apprised the land owner regarding pending acquisition 
proceedings of his land. Land owner again submitted representation dated 
25.07.1990 and 09.04.1991 for grant of alternate plot as compensation, but 
again to no avail.
8. Aggrieved by the inaction of authorities and delayed response 
to his representations, on the advice of the advocate, land owner ﬁ led a 
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
166
complaint before Consumer Forum, Nagpur, which was withdrawn for want 
of jurisdiction. Thereafter, the land owner on 29.04.1992 ﬁ led ‘Writ Petition 
No. 2022/1992’ before High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench praying the 
above said reliefs. The State did not ﬁ le any reply, however, SLAO ﬁ led a 
reply and did not dispute the land acquisition notiﬁ cation for the Scheme. 
The issuance of three notices under Section 9(3) of LA Act; the order dated 
01.08.1981 passed by SLAO separating the papers of land owner as evident 
from the records; the passing of the award dated 22.09.1986 in the case of 
landowners of other Khasra Nos. 35/3 and 35/4 were neither denied nor 
disputed. More so, the SLAO in its reply did not raise any plea of delay and 
laches in ﬁ ling the writ petition by landowner. 
9. So far as stand of NIT before the High Court is concerned, the 
issuance of notiﬁ cations for land acquisition was not controverted. It was 
stated that Khasra No. 35 mentioned in the ﬁ nal Notiﬁ cation consisted of 
total area of 8.56 acres of Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2 out of which, 6.56 
acres was Government land and the remaining land was of Ex-Malguzar 
Pande. It was stated that the west side of High Court Road was laid down in 
the compelling public need for the city of Nagpur. All the communications 
between NIT, State, SLAO and land owner were not disputed. It was stated 
that the request for a grant of the alternate plot was rightly
declined and 
the order passed by SLAO on 01.08.1981 was not an order of discharge. 
Therefore, the land owner on the anvil of said order cannot contest that 
his land was not acquired. The passing of the award on 02.09.1986 for 
the land of other land holders was not denied. With respect to prayer for 
grant of compensation @ Rs. 400 to Rs. 500 per. sq. ft., it was said that the 
actual value of land may hardly be Rs. 125 to Rs. 150 per sq. ft. at relevant 
time, hence, the compensation as sought is on the higher side. It was lastly 
submitted that the writ petition has been ﬁ led after inordinate delay, therefore, 
it ought to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 
10. The High Court by the impugned order partly allowed the writ 
petition as referred above. Being aggrieved, the appellant is before this 
Court assailing the said judgment. After notice in this appeal, NIT ﬁ led 
counter aﬃ  davit, whereas, the prayer of the State to ﬁ le counter aﬃ  davit 
was declined vide order dated 07.12.2012 with the liberty to ﬁ le additional 
documents. During the pendency, the counsel for appellant on 03.07.2013
167
without prejudice gave up his claim of alternative plot provided NIT is 
prepared to pay compensation as per current market rate. On request, time 
was granted to counsel for NIT to seek instructions. In reply, additional 
aﬃ  davit was ﬁ led by NIT stating that compensation as per market rate 
is not possible, since it is a public body and informed the award granting 
compensation @ Rs. 54,717/- has been passed. 
11. The appellant ﬁ led additional aﬃ  davit along with a valuation 
report dated 16.07.2013 showing the current market value of land as in the 
year 2013 as Rs. 3,93,45,696/-. In view of the inordinate delay in passing 
of award from the date of notiﬁ cation and taking over of possession, prayer 
is made to mould the relief in exercise of the powers under Article 142 of 
the Constitution of India. 
12. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and in the facts 
of the case, in our view, the following questions arise for consideration:
i) Whether the impugned judgment of the High Court negating the plea 
of appellant seeking ‘lapse’ of the acquisition proceedings in terms of 
Section 11-A of LA Act is liable to be interfered with? 
ii) Whether decision of NIT refusing to grant alternative plot, as 
directed by the High Court, requires interference in this appeal?
iii) Whether in the peculiar facts of the case, delay caused in 
determination of compensation despite time bound directions by the 
High Court, what suitable relief can be granted to
appellant?
IN REFERENCE TO QUESTION NO. 1
13. It is not in dispute that the notiﬁ cation was issued under Section 
39 of the NIT Act on 12.07.1962. Although the said notiﬁ cation is not on 
record, but looking at the material brought, it is clear that the land of Khasra 
No. 35/1 and 35/2 only, without mentioning Khasra No. 35/8 in the said 
notiﬁ cation was proposed for acquisition. The ﬁ nal notiﬁ cation was issued 
with same details. The possession of Khasra No. 35/8 was taken in the year 
1970 and the road was constructed on 5390 sq. ft. utilising the entire land 
of 9800 sq. ft of the said Khasra. It is relevant to note that vide Act of 68 
of 1984, amendment in the LA Act was introduced adding Section 11-A, 
whereby passing an award determining the compensation within period of 
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
168
two years was made necessary. In case the award has not been passed within 
the speciﬁ ed period, it shall result in lapsing of acquisition proceedings. In 
the present case, the acquisition was under the State Act, i.e., NIT Act with 
the aid of LA Act, however, it’s applicability in such acquisition requires 
consideration. 
14. The said issue of applicability of Section 11-A of the LA Act in 
an acquisition proceeding carried under NIT Act has been decided by this 
Court in the case of “Nagpur Improvement Trust Vs. Vasantrao and Others, 
(2002) 7 SCC 657”, wherein it was clariﬁ ed that the subsequent amendment 
made by Act No. 68 of 1984 will have no eﬀ ect on the acquisition made 
under the State Act, which means the lapsing provision under Section 11-A 
introduced by Act of 68 of 1984, does not apply to acquisition of land by 
Nagpur Improvement Trust under NIT Act. The same principle has been 
reiterated in “Bankatlal Vs. Special Land Acquisition Oﬃ  cer and Another, 
(2014) 15 SCC 116”, wherein it was held that the NIT Act is a complete code 
in itself, except to apply the provisions of the LA Act that stood legislatively 
incorporated in the said Act, and other provisions would not apply. It was 
held that the subsequent amendment made by Act 68 of 1984 inserting 
Section 11-A would have no eﬀ ect on the acquisition made under NIT Act. 
15. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the 
provisions of
Section 11-A of LA Act which provides for lapsing of the land 
acquisition proceedings, would not be applicable where acquisition was 
made under NIT Act. In view of the foregoing discussion and settled law, 
we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has not committed any 
error in negating the plea of lapsing of acquisition proceedings as raised 
by the appellant.
IN REFERNECE TO QUESTION NO. 2
16. By the impugned order dated 29.09.2009 passed by the High 
Court, directions were issued to NIT to consider the prayer for the grant of 
alternate land to the appellant. The said prayer was rejected by the Chairman, 
NIT on 31.12.2009, inter-alia stating that grant of alternate land in lieu of 
compensation is not possible in the absence of any provisions in the Act. 
The said rejection has not been separately challenged by the appellant 
and has attained ﬁ nality. In our view also, the said plea does not have any 
statutory backing under NIT Act, therefore, refusal made by NIT does not
169
warrant any interference. Be that as it may, on 03.07.2013, counsel for the 
appellant without prejudice to his right made a statement that to amicably 
resolve the controversy, the appellant was willing to give up the claim of 
grant of alternate plot provided NIT is prepared to pay the current market 
price as on 03.07.2013. Thereafter, time was sought by counsel for NIT to 
seek instructions. After instructions, NIT ﬁ led its response on 02.08.2013 
wherein the grant of an alternative plot was denied. As discussed, after the 
rejection of the representation to grant alternate land particularly in absence 
of any statutory backing, we are not inclined to entertain the said plea. 
Nonetheless, the said prayer was not seriously pressed by the appellant and 
prayer was conﬁ ned to grant of adequate compensation. Therefore, question 
no. 2 is answered accordingly. 
IN REFERNECE TO QUESTION NO. 3
17. In the case at hand, compulsory acquisition of the subject land was 
initiated issuing preliminary notiﬁ cation in 1962 and ﬁ nal notiﬁ cation in 
January 1969 under the provisions of NIT Act with the aid of LA Act. As 
per Section 59 of NIT Act, for any scheme, the NIT may acquire the land 
with the previous sanction of the State Government under the LA Act as 
modiﬁ ed by NIT Act. As per Section 61(b) of NIT Act, for the purpose of 
acquiring the land, the provisions of LA Act shall apply subject to further 
modiﬁ cations as indicated in the Schedule. As per Section 67 of the
NIT 
Act, the provisions of the LA Act are made applicable for determination 
of award for the land so acquired. The Schedule as referred to in Section 
61 has made the modiﬁ cation in the LA Act. Some of the modiﬁ cations 
made in clause 6 adding Section 17-A and clause 14 adding Section 48-A 
are relevant for the purpose of this case, in addition to other provisions as 
referred hereinabove. Therefore, for ready reference, they are reproduced 
as thus –
“17-A. Transfer of land to Trust –
In every case referred to in section 16 or section 17, the Collector 
shall, upon payment of the cost of acquisition, make over change of 
the land to the Trust and the land shall thereupon vest in the Trust, 
subject to the liability of the Trust to pay any further costs which may 
be incurred on account of its acquisition.”
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
170
“48-A. Compensation to be awarded when land not acquired within 
two years –
(1) If within a period of two years from the date of the publication of 
the declaration under section 6 in respect of any land, the Collector 
has not made an award under section 11 with respect to such land, 
the owner of the land shall, unless he has been to a material extent 
responsible for the delay, be entitled to receive compensation for the 
damage suﬀ ered by him in consequence of the delay. 
(2) The provisions of Part III of this Act, shall apply so far as may be, 
to the determination of the compensation payable under this section.”
Section 67 of the NIT Act makes it clear that for the purpose of 
determining the compensation and to pass an award, the provisions of the LA 
Act would be applicable. Thus, LA Act has its application to such extent for 
land acquired by the NIT subject to the modiﬁ cations made under the NIT 
Act. In view of the provisions of the NIT Act, the preliminary notiﬁ cation 
of the land acquisition shall be under Section 39, and the ﬁ nal Notiﬁ cation 
shall be under Section 45 for compulsory acquisition as speciﬁ ed in Section 
59 of the NIT Act. It is to be noted here that, Section 16 of the LA Act deals 
with the power of Collector to take possession of the land after he has made 
an award under Section 11 and the said land shall thereupon vest absolutely 
in the Government free from all encumbrances. Section 17 of LA
Act deals 
with the special powers in case of urgency, but the said provision is not 
relevant in the facts of the present case. Further, Section 17-A of the LA 
Act as modiﬁ ed in the Schedule referred to in Section 61 of NIT Act adopts 
the procedure speciﬁ ed in Section 16 or 17 of the LA Act. Section 17-A 
prescribes that the Collector upon payment of the cost of acquisition shall 
make over change of the land to the Trust and the land shall thereupon vest 
in the Trust subject to discharge of liability and payment of any further cost 
which may be incurred on account of acquisition. Therefore, the applicability 
of Section 11 of LA Act which deals with enquiry and award, and Section 
16 of LA Act which deals with power of Collector to take possession, even 
in acquisition under the NIT Act is ‘sine qua non’. While making an inquiry 
under Section 11, the applicability of Section 9 which deals with issuance 
of notice to persons interested, is an integral procedure in the proceedings. 
Hence, for the purpose of determination of compensation to pass an award in
171
case of acquisition of land under NIT Act, applicability of the said provisions 
of the LA Act has been duly recognised in Section 67 of the NIT Act.
18. As per Section 16 of the LA Act, the Collector on making an award 
may take possession of the land to vest it in the Government. Similarly, 
under Section 17-A added to Schedule of NIT Act, passing of an award is 
a necessary pre-condition to vest the land with NIT. Further, Section 48-A 
speciﬁ es that if award is not passed by the Collector within a period of two 
years from the date of ﬁ nal notiﬁ cation, the land owner, if not responsible 
for delay to a material extent, shall be entitled to receive compensation for 
damages suﬀ ered by him in consequence of delay. The said damage would 
be determined as per the provisions of Part-III of LA Act. 
19. In view of the said basic provisions if we see the facts of this case, 
then it is not in dispute that the subject land was occupied by Ex-Malguzar 
Pande. The land owner purchased the land in auction and sale deed was 
executed in his favour by the Court of Wards. As per the order dated 
09.04.1962 passed by the SDO, Nagpur, the revenue records were corrected 
recording his name before issuance of preliminary notiﬁ cation. In the said 
notiﬁ cation as well as in the ﬁ nal notiﬁ cation dated 16.01.1969, Khasra No. 
35/8 was not mentioned. The NIT had taken possession and constructed 
the road on the west side entrance of the High Court which is in public 
use. After ﬁ
nal notiﬁ cation, statutory notice under Section 9 of LA Act was 
issued to all the persons interested. As per the mandate of law, such notice 
shall contain particulars of the land needed for acquisition with an intent 
to ask the aﬀ ected parties to submit their respective claims and interests. 
20. In the instant case, three notices were issued to the land owners 
including deceased land owner Loonkaran Gandhi on 18.07.1974, 
07.09.1974 and 18.10.1977. However, as stated above, the said notices did 
not mention Khasra No. 35/8. Since Khasra No. 35/8 was not mentioned, 
land owner filed the application seeking discharge from acquisition 
proceedings. Pursuant thereto, SLAO separated the claim of land owner 
from other claimants emanating out of same notiﬁ cation. It is pertinent to 
note that NIT vide letter dated 10.10.1969 informed the Collector, Nagpur 
that Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2 are Government Nazul land and asked for 
transfer of such land in favour of NIT for the Scheme. In reply, the Collector, 
Nagpur on 31.05.1972 informed that such land cannot be transferred since 
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
172
it is not a government land and belongs to Ex-Malguzar Pande. Therefore, the 
Collector requested NIT to submit a valuation report of the remaining land. The 
NIT vide letter dated 02.02.1977 acknowledged and requested the SLAO to 
determine the interest of the persons from Khasra Nos. 35/8 to 35/12. Later, NIT 
submitted proposals for Khasra No. 35/1 and 35/2, but it is not on record why the 
proceedings to determine compensation of Khasra No. 35/8 of the land owner 
were not commenced. 
21. The correspondence also reflects that in absence of initiation of 
proceedings for determination of compensation, land owner submitted a 
representation to allot alternate land equal to the land of Khasra No. 35/8 in the 
same locality which was denied on 06.03.1987. As per material placed, in cases 
of other landowners, the award was passed on 22.09.1986 by SLAO with respect 
to Khasra Nos. 35/3 and 35/4. Thus, it is apparent that possession was taken from 
land owner without payment of compensation and the prayer for alternate piece 
of land was rejected. It is also apparent that even up to ﬁ ling the writ petition, 
proceedings to award compensation of the land of Khasra No. 35/8 were not 
commenced. On ﬁ ling the Writ Petition, even during its’ pendency, action to 
determine compensation was not started. Therefore, the High Court by the 
impugned order directed NIT to consider the prayer for the grant of an alternate 
plot, otherwise, SLAO
to pass award on or before 30.04.2010. As directed by 
the High Court, prayer for the grant of alternate plot was rejected by NIT, but 
the award was not passed within the time given in the order by the High Court. 
22. In the given facts, the appellant ﬁ led this Special Leave Petition, wherein, 
notice was issued on 22.03.2010. The NIT ﬁ led its counter-aﬃ  davit on 18.06.2012 
contesting the case. On 03.07.2013, this Court passed an order as under –
“Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner 
made a statement that without prejudice to his rights and with a view to 
amicably resolve the controversy, his client is willing to give up his claim 
provided the competent authority of the Nagpur Improvement Trust is 
prepared to pay the current market price.
Shri Satyajit A. Desai, learned counsel appearing for the Nagpur 
Improvement Trust requests for an adjournment to seek instructions from 
the concerned authorities.
Put up after two weeks.”
173
23. Later, on 22.07.2013, the NIT further sought time to seek 
instructions in view of the statement made by the counsel for the appellant. 
Thereafter on 02.08.2013, NIT ﬁ led additional aﬃ  davit in which reference 
to ‘ex-parte’ award passed on 30.04.2013 was made for the ﬁ rst time and 
it was stated that a sum of Rs. 54,717/- has been awarded to the appellant. 
On 21.10.2013, during arguments, this Court found that there was an 
inordinate delay in passing the award dated 22.09.1986 in the case of other 
land owners. Therefore, an explanation was sought for delay of 17 years, 
8 months and 13 days. The said order dated 21.10.2013 is relevant and 
therefore reproduced as thus –
“After the arguments were heard for some time, Shri Uday Dube, 
learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra made a request for short 
adjournment to enable his client to ﬁ le an additional aﬃ  davit to explain 
17 years 8 months and 13 days delay between issue of notiﬁ cation under 
Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust, 1936 and passing of the 
award. Shri Dube further stated that he shall instruct the concerned 
oﬃ  cer to explain as to why appropriate award was not passed within 
the time speciﬁ ed in order dated 29.09.2009 passed by the High Court. 
The request of Shri Dube is accepted and the case is adjourned to 
1.11.2013..”
24. In view of the above order, time to ﬁ le additional aﬃ  davits and to 
explain the delay was allowed to SLAO and NIT, which were ﬁ led by them 
on
11.11.2013 and 04.12.2013 respectively. In the said additional aﬃ  davits, 
the SLAO and NIT, both attributed delay to each other and also against the 
appellant. Therefore, the Court after hearing passed the order on 03.01.2014, 
which is reproduced as under – 
“The case was taken up on 21st October, 2013, the Court had passed 
the following order: 
“After the arguments were heard for some time, Shri Uday Dube, 
learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra made a request 
for short adjournment to enable his client to ﬁ le an additional 
aﬃ  davit to explain 17 years, 8 months and 13 days delay between 
issue of notiﬁ cation under Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement 
Trust, 1936 and passing of the award. Shri Dube further stated 
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
174
that he shall instruct the concerned oﬃ  cer to explain as to why 
appropriate award was not passed within the time speciﬁ ed in 
order dated 29.09.2009 passed by the High Court.
The request of Shri Dube is accepted and the case is adjourned 
to 1.11.2013.”
Pursuant to the said order, explanation has been ﬁ led by the State which 
shows that there was disputes between the respondents due to which 
there was a delay of 17 years, 8 months and 13 days between issue of 
notiﬁ cation under Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust, 1936 
and passing of the award. 
In the circumstances, respondents are directed to explain as to why 
this Court will not grant suitable relief to the petitioners by directing 
the respondents as to allot equivalent alternative plots in the adjoining 
area or to pay the compensation on the basis of market value as on 
the date of award with solatium and interest, as per law. 
Aﬃ  davit may be ﬁ led within three weeks. Reply, if any, be ﬁ led within 
two weeks thereof. 
Post the matter after six weeks.”
25. In response to the order, neither the State Government nor SLAO 
submitted any explanation. It is only NIT who ﬁ led an additional aﬃ  davit 
on 25.01.2014, inter-alia, stating that allotment of alternate plots in the 
adjoining area is not possible and denied the payment of compensation as 
per market value as existing on 03.07.2013. It was stated that it is only the 
appellant who can be blamed for
inordinate delay. In the said aﬃ  davit, the 
causes of delay were crystallized in three slots, viz. between the issuance 
of notiﬁ cations till ﬁ ling of writ petition; delay during the pendency of writ 
petition; and delay between the date of order in the writ petition and passing 
the award. On ﬁ ling the said explanation and upon hearing the parties on 
22.07.2014, this Court passed the following order – 
“Heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade learned senior counsel and Mr. Gagan 
Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Marlapalle learned 
senior counsel for Respondent No. 1 and Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned 
senior counsel for Respondent No. 2 in part.
175
The learned counsel for the parties shall ﬁ le respective charts 
precisely putting forth why there was enormous delay in passing the 
award. We have asked learned counsel for the parties to undertake 
this exercise as we are of considered opinion that the compensation 
that is allowable under Section 48-A of the Nagpur Improvement Trust 
Act, 1936 may be applicable if a case is made out.
List on 5th August, 2014.”
26. In furtherance to the said order, it is only the appellant who ﬁ led 
the chart and explained as to how and in what manner, the delay is caused. 
It was further stated that only respondents are responsible for not passing the 
award despite time bound directions given by the High Court. Conversely, 
the SLAO passed an ex-parte award that too without any intimation or notice 
as mandated by Section 12(2) of LA Act.
27. After hearing the parties and upon perusal of the averments made 
in the additional aﬃ  davits ﬁ led in furtherance of orders dated 03.07.2013, 
21.10.2013 and 22.07.2014, it is clear that Respondents have taken more 
than six and half years to issue ﬁ nal notiﬁ cation which was published on 
16.01.1969. The possession had been taken immediately and the three 
notices under Section 9 of LA Act were issued on 18.7.1974, 07.09.1974 
and 18.10.1977 respectively. The award was passed in the case of other 
land owners on 22.09.1986, leaving the case of land owner/appellant 
herein. Thus, it is apparent that the period of seven years has been taken
to 
issue the notice under Section 9 to the appellant after the date of taking the 
possession and the award was passed in the case of other land owners after 
more than 17 years, separating the claim of the appellant. In view of the 
said chain of events, the delay cannot be attributed to the appellant. More 
so, the writ petition ﬁ led by land owner before High Court on 29.04.1992 
was decided on 29.09.2009, i.e., after about 17 years. During the pendency 
of the writ petition, the delay, if any, occurred, cannot be attributed to the 
appellant, but it may reﬂ ect on conduct of respondents for not passing the 
award even during such pendency. It is not out of place to observe that the 
High Court has not outrightly disregarded the claim of the appellant for grant 
of alternate plot in adjoining area and directed the NIT to take a decision. 
In case, the allotment of plot was not possible, respondents were directed 
to pass an award within the time frame. The NIT denied the alternate plot, 
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
176
but even thereafter, the award was not passed within the time limit ﬁ xed by 
the High Court. The award on record was passed by SLAO only when this 
Court had taken cognizance in the matter. Therefore, even after the order of the 
High Court, there is a delay of more than three years in passing of the award. 
Thus, in our considered opinion, the delay cannot be said to be attributable 
to the appellant.
28. As per discussion made above and in the facts of this case, what 
amount of compensation may be directed to the appellant herein needs to 
be looked into. In this regard, in the case of compulsory acquisition of land, 
the eminent domain of the State cannot be doubted. Simultaneously, right 
of the land owner enshrined under Article 300-A and Article 31-A of the 
Constitution of India which has been recognized as a human/civil right cannot 
be overlooked. Therefore, if any individual is to be divested or deprived of 
the said right by the State, it ought not be done without giving compensation 
in accordance with law for the land so acquired for public purpose. 
29. In the above context, we can proﬁ tably refer the judgment of this 
Court in the case of “Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others through Power-of-
Attorney Holder Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and 
Others, (2013) 1 SCC 353”. In the said case, this Court had the occasion to 
consider the principles of eminent domain, absolute power and deprivation 
of the
rights to property of an individual. The relevant paragraphs of the said 
judgment are reproduced as thus –
“11. …..There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between 
the principle of “eminent domain” and “police power” of the State. 
Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used 
temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly 
shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question 
then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State 
entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts 
to encroachment, in exercise of “absolute power” which in common 
parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further 
clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated 
the landowner as a “subject” of medieval India, but not as a “citizen” 
under our Constitution.

*

*

*

*
177
17. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties was a clear 
violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory 
authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there 
is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The 
non-fulﬁ lment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said 
uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national 
activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such 
ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to 
uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/
human rights, under the garb of industrial development.
18. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for 
about half a century. In such a fact situation, we fail to understand 
for which class of citizens the Constitution provides guarantees and 
rights in this regard and what is the exact percentage of the citizens of 
this country, to whom constitutional/statutory beneﬁ ts are accorded, 
in accordance with the law.
19.…..Even under valid acquisition proceedings, there is a legal 
obligation on the part of the authorities to complete such acquisition 
proceedings at the earliest, and to make payment of requisite 
compensation……” 
30. The said judgment has been referred in the case of “Bhimandas 
Ambwani (Dead) through LRs Vs. Delhi Power Company Limited, (2013) 
14 SCC 195”, wherein this Court had considered the
aspect of inordinate 
delay of about ﬁ ve decades in not granting the compensation to the land 
loser from the date of taking over of possession and directed the respondent 
to make the award treating the date of Section 4 notiﬁ cation as on the date 
of order passed by this Court. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph 
is reproduced as thus – 
“14. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment in 
Tukaram case [(2013) 1 SCC 353] and thus, entitled for restoration of 
possession of the land in dispute. However, considering the fact that 
the possession of the land was taken over about half a century ago 
and stood completely developed as Ms Ahlawat, learned counsel has 
submitted that a full-ﬂ edged residential colony of the employees of 
DESU has been constructed thereon, therefore, it would be diﬃ  cult 
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
178
for Respondent 1 to restore the possession. In such a fact situation, 
the only option left out to the respondents is to make the award 
treating Section 4 notiﬁ cation as, on this date i.e. 12-2-2013 and 
we direct the Land Acquisition Collector to make the award after 
hearing the parties within a period of four months from today. For 
that purpose, the parties are directed to appear before the Land 
Acquisition Collector c/o the Deputy Commissioner, South M.B. 
Road, Saket, New Delhi on 26-2-2013. The appellants is at liberty 
to ﬁ le a reference under Section 18 of the Act and to pursue the 
remedies available to him under the Act. Needless to say that the 
appellants shall be entitled to all statutory beneﬁ ts.
31. Recently, the similar approach was adopted in the case of “Delhi 
Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Another, 
(2022) SCC Online SC 1408”, wherein 3-Judge Bench of this Court 
in a reference while dealing with the divergent views of two Judges 
relating to taking over of possession without following the mandate of 
Section 17 of the LA Act, vis-a-vis violation of constitutional guarantee 
to a citizen under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, the Court 
answered the said reference as thus – 
25. On weighing all aspects of the matter, we deem it appropriate 
that it will serve the ends of justice to direct the respondents to 
determine the market value insofar as the appellant’s land
is 
concerned by reckoning the relevant date as 09.06.2008 (i.e. the 
date on which the award was ultimately passed), by applying the 
yardstick under Act, 1894. It is made clear that only the market 
value be determined as on that date but for awarding the statutory 
benefits, it shall be calculated from the date of the original 
notiﬁ cation since admittedly the appellant has been dispossessed 
on 04.02.2003 pursuant to the notiﬁ cation dated 17.04.2002. 
Further, from the date on which the fresh award is passed pursuant 
to this judgment, the appellant would get the cause of action for 
seeking reference if dissatisﬁ ed with the quantum of compensation 
awarded. It is made clear that the determination of compensation, 
in this case, shall not give rise to any right in favour of any other 
land loser whose land was acquired under the same notiﬁ cation,

179
to seek for re-determination of compensation where the same has 
already attained ﬁ nality.
* 
* 
* 
*
27. In the result, we pass the following order: 
(i) The provision contained in Section 11A of Act, 1894 shall be applicable 
to cases in which the acquiring authority has not complied with the 
requirement of sub-section (3A) to Section 17 of Act, 1894 by tendering 
and paying eighty per centum of the estimated compensation before taking 
possession since possession in such cases cannot be considered to be taken 
in accordance with law and the vesting is not absolute. 
(ii) If the requirement is complied and possession is taken after tendering 
and paying eighty per centum, though there is need to pass an award 
and pay the balance compensation within a reasonable time, the rigour 
of Section 11A of Act, 1894 will not apply so as to render the entire 
proceedings for acquisition to lapse in the context of absolute vesting. 
The right of land loser in such case is to enforce passing of the award 
and recover the compensation. 
(iii) In the instant case though Section 11A of Act, 1894 has become 
applicable, in the changed circumstance we deem it proper to mould the 
relief instead of holding the acquisition to have lapsed. 
Hence for the reasons stated above, we direct as follows: 
(a) The respondents shall construe 09.06.2008 as the relevant date 
and determine the market value prevailing as on that date applying the 
yardstick under Act, 1894 in respect of the acquired land. 
(b) To calculate the statutory beneﬁ ts on such amount including interest, 
the same
shall be determined by taking into consideration the date of 
the Section 4 notiﬁ cation dated 17.04.2002 since the appellant was 
dispossessed on 04.02.2003 pursuant to the same. 
(c) The date on which the fresh award is passed pursuant to this judgment 
and communicated shall be the date of cause of action for seeking 
enhancement of compensation if the appellant is dissatisﬁ ed with the 
quantum of compensation oﬀ ered. 
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
180
(d) The compensation determined in this case shall not give the cause 
of action to any other land loser whose land is acquired under the same 
notiﬁ cation to seek re-determination of compensation. 
(e) The appellant shall be entitled to the cost incurred in these 
proceedings.”
32. In view of the judgments referred above, this Court while striking 
a balance between eminent domain of the State and human/civil rights of an 
individual, has put an obligation on the State and its authorities to pass an 
award within a reasonable time. It is observed that, on compulsory acquisition 
of land, if the award is not passed within a reasonable time duly compensating 
such an individual, it would cause grave hardship and it would adversely aﬀ ect 
the livelihood of the land loser. In the said judgments, because of inordinate 
delay in passing the awards, the Court had changed the date of preliminary 
notiﬁ cation ordinarily applicable in determining the market value of land for 
assessing amount of compensation, to the date of the judgment of the Court, 
and/or the date of award passed belatedly. This Court has recognized the 
right of the citizen after taking possession of the land without payment of 
compensation. As observed, the delay in determining compensation uproots 
the land losers, however, to meet the ends of justice and to rationalize the 
equity, switching the date of market value in determining compensation by 
the orders of
the Court is found necessary. 
33. In the case of “K. Krishna Reddy and Others Vs. Special Deputy 
Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, 
(1988) 4 SCC 163”, this Court has conceptualized the effect of non-
determination and payment of compensation immediately to a land loser. The 
Court observed that if there is inordinate delay in determination as well as 
payment of compensation, it diminishes the purchase power as well as value 
of Rupee due to rising inﬂ ation. Therefore, the utility to compensate such 
land loser with equal value cannot be ruled out. In the said case, the Court 
has observed as thus – 
“12. …..After all money is what money buys. What the claimants could 
have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, 
not even one half of it. It is a common experience that the purchasing 
power of rupee is dwindling. With rising inﬂ ation, the delayed payment 
may lose all charms and utility of the compensation. In some cases,
181
the delay may be detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian 
agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon 
land. If uprooted, they will ﬁ nd themselves nowhere. They are left high 
and dry……..”
34. If we take clue from the above referred judgments and the 
observations made, the principles as enunciated squarely applies in the case 
on hand. For the sake of clarity and at the cost of repetition, looking to the 
records before us, it is clear that the preliminary notiﬁ cation was published 
on 12.07.1962 followed by ﬁ nal notiﬁ cation on 16.01.1969. The possession 
of the subject land was taken in 1970 and the road was constructed which is 
in public use since then. In the case of other land owners, award was passed 
on 22.09.1986, discriminating the land owner/appellant herein. Even after 
directions of the High Court in order dated 29.09.2009 to pass an award by 
30.04.2010, it was passed ‘ex-parte’ after three years on 30.04.2013 during 
pendency of this appeal without adhering to the mandate of Section 12(2) of the 
LA Act. Consequently, appellant could not get compensation of the land since 
last ﬁ ve decades. In view of the said conduct, we are of the considered view 
that the value of the land which may be on the date of preliminary notiﬁ cation 
cannot be equated on the date of passing of ‘ex-parte’ award. As per Section 
48-A of LA Act, which is legislatively applicable as per the Schedule of NIT 
Act, it is clear that if the
award is not passed within a period of two years 
from the date of ﬁ nal notiﬁ cation, compensation for the damages suﬀ ered 
due to delay is required to be determined as prescribed therein. Therefore, 
in the peculiar facts of this case and to meet the ends of justice, we deem it 
appropriate to mould the relief and direct that the SLAO shall pass a fresh 
award taking market value as on the date when the ‘ex-parte’ award was 
passed, i.e., 30.04.2013. Needless to observe that, other statutory beneﬁ ts 
shall be reckoned and payable from the date of preliminary notiﬁ cation as per 
the provisions of the LA Act. We are also of the ﬁ rm view that the appellant 
shall be entitled for compensation for damages due to delay as speciﬁ ed under 
Section 48-A of the LA Act within a period of four months. 
35. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is 
allowed in part with the following directions – 
1. As the land has been acquired under the NIT Act, therefore, in view of 
judgment of Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) & Bankatlal (supra), 
LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF 
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
182
the beneﬁ t of Section 11-A of LA Act (lapse of land acquisition 
proceedings), shall not be available to the appellant and the ﬁ ndings 
in this regard recorded by the High Court are hereby aﬃ  rmed. 
2. The rejection of request of appellant for grant of alternate piece of 
land by NIT, does not warrant any interference in the facts of this 
case.
3. The ‘ex-parte’ award dated 30.04.2013 shall not be given eﬀ ect to 
and the SLAO is hereby directed to determine the compensation 
afresh. For the said purpose, SLAO shall take the market value 
of the subject land as on the date of passing of ‘ex-parte’ award, 
i.e., 30.04.2013 and determine the compensation aﬀ ording an 
opportunity to the appellant and NIT. 
4. The appellant shall also be entitled to all other statutory beneﬁ ts as 
per the provisions of the LA Act which shall be calculated from the 
date of notiﬁ cation as prescribed by law.
5. The appellant shall also be entitled to compensation for damages 
suﬀ ered in view of delay as per Section 48-A of LA Act as modiﬁ ed 
by Schedule of NIT Act.
6. The said exercise be completed by the SLAO within a period of 
four months from the date of appearance, for which the parties are 
directed to appear on 25.09.2023. 
7. Pursuant to this judgment and on passing the award as directed, if 
the appellant is dissatisﬁ ed, the cause of action to seek reference for 
enhancement shall be from the date of communication of the fresh 
award.
8. The other land owners whose land were acquired under the same 
notiﬁ cation and who have received compensation will not be entitled 
to seek re-determination of compensation in view of this judgment. 
36. All the pending applications, if any, shall stand dismissed. No order 
as to costs.
Headnotes prepared by:  
Appeal partly allowed.
Nidhi Jain