SATISH CHANDER AHUJA versus SNEHA AHUJA
[2020] 12 S.C.R. 189, Supreme Court of India, 2020
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
273
consider the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S.
Sheriff case [AIR 1954 SC 397] as well as Sections 40 to 43 of
the Evidence Act.
34. In the present case, after remand by the High Court, civil
proceedings as well as criminal proceedings are required to be
decided on the evidence, which may be brought on record by the
parties.”
146. We have noticed above judgment of this Court in Shanti
Kumar Panda (supra) while considering the provisions under Sections
145 and 146 Cr.P.C. in context of suit filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction in paragraphs 15 and 21 following was laid down:-
“15. It is well settled that a decision by a criminal court
does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court
binds the criminal court. (See Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edn., p.
845.) A decision given under Section 145 of the Code has relevance
and is admissible in evidence to show: (i) that there was a dispute
relating to a particular property; (ii) that the dispute was between
the particular parties; (iii) that such dispute led to the passing of a
preliminary order under Section 145(1) or an attachment under
Section 146(1), on the given date; and (iv) that the Magistrate
found one of the parties to be in possession or fictional possession
of the disputed property on the date of the preliminary order. The
reasoning recorded by the Magistrate or other findings arrived at
by him have no relevance and are not admissible in evidence before
the competent
court and the competent court is not bound by the
findings arrived at by the Magistrate even on the question of
possession though, as between the parties, the order of the
Magistrate would be evidence of possession. The finding recorded
by the Magistrate does not bind the court. The competent court
has jurisdiction and would be justified in arriving at a finding
inconsistent with the one arrived at by the Executive Magistrate
even on the question of possession. Sections 145 and 146 only
provide for the order of the Executive Magistrate made under
any of the two provisions being superseded by and giving way to
the order or decree of a competent court. The effect of the
Magistrate’s order is that burden is thrown on the unsuccessful
party to prove its possession or entitlement to possession before
the competent court.
SATISH CHANDER AHUJA v. SNEHA AHUJA
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
274
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
21. The order of the Magistrate under Sections 145/146 of
the Code is not only an order passed by the criminal court but is
also one based on summary enquiry. The competent court in any
subsequent proceedings is free to arrive at its own findings based
on the evidence adduced before it on all the issues arising for
decision before it. At the stage of judgment by the civil court the
order of the Magistrate shall have almost no relevance except for
the purpose of showing that an enquiry held by the Magistrate
had resulted into the given declaration being made on a particular
date. The competent court would be free to record its own findings
based on the material before it even on the question of possession
which may be inconsistent with or contrary to the findings arrived
at by the Magistrate.”
147. We may observe that the observations made by this Court in
Shanti Kumar Panda (supra) were in reference to statutory scheme
under Sections 145 and 146 Cr.P.C. and had to be read in reference to
statutory scheme which came for consideration before this Court.
148. We may notice a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court
in Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr.,
(2005) 4 SCC 370 where the Constitution Bench laid down that there
is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings
recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the
other, as both the cases have to
be decided on the basis of the evidence
adduced therein. In paragraph 32, following was laid down:-
“32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be
made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal
courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required
in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are
decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a
criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof
beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any
statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded
in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other,
as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence
adduced therein………………
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX”
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
275
149. In Seth Ramdayal Jat Vs. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC
545, this Court had occasion to consider the provisions of Sections 41 to
43 of Indian Evidence Act where this Court laid down that a judgment in
a criminal court is admissible for a limited purpose. After noticing the
provisions of Sections 40 to 43 of Indian Evidence Act, this Court laid
down following in paragraph 13:-
“13. XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
A judgment in a criminal case, thus, is admissible for a limited
purpose. Relying only on or on the basis thereof, a civil proceeding
cannot be determined, but that would not mean that it is not
admissible for any purpose whatsoever.”
150. It was further held that a decision in a criminal case is not
binding in a civil case. In paragraph 15, following was laid down:-
“15. A civil proceeding as also a criminal proceeding may
go on simultaneously. No statute puts an embargo in relation
thereto. A decision in a criminal case is not binding on a civil
court. In M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [AIR 1954 SC 397], a
Constitution Bench of this Court was seized with a question as to
whether a civil suit or a criminal case should be stayed in the
event both are pending. It was opined that the criminal matter
should be given precedence. In regard to the possibility of conflict
in decisions, it was held that the law envisages such an eventuality
when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court
binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain
limited
purposes, such as sentence or damages. It was held that the only
relevant consideration was the likelihood of embarrassment.”
151. In Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Sapra, (2009) 13 SCC
729, this Court again reiterated that a judgment of a criminal court in
civil proceedings will have only a limited application and finding in a
criminal proceeding by no stretch of imagination would be binding in a
civil proceeding. Referring to Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act, this
Court laid down following in paragraph 23:-
“23.  XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
This principle would, therefore, be applicable, inter alia, if the suit
is found to be barred by the principle of res judicata or by reason
of the provisions of any other statute. It does not lay down that a
SATISH CHANDER AHUJA v. SNEHA AHUJA
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
276
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
judgment of the criminal court would be admissible in the civil
court for its relevance is limited. (See Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi
Prasad [(2009) 11 SCC 545]. The judgment of a criminal court in
a civil proceeding will only have limited application viz. inter alia,
for the purpose as to who was the accused and what was the
result of the criminal proceedings. Any finding in a criminal
proceeding by no stretch of imagination would be binding in a civil
proceeding.”
152. A Two Judge Bench of this Court in Kishan Singh (Dead)
Through LRs. Vs. Gurpal Singh and Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 775 after
noticing the several earlier judgments concluded that finding of fact
recorded by the civil court do not have any bearing so as the criminal
case is concerned and vice versa. In paragraph 18, following was laid
down:-
“18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands
crystallised to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the
civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is
concerned and vice versa. Standard of proof is different in civil
and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities
while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There
is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded
by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding
between the same parties while dealing with the same subject-
matter and both the
cases have to be decided on the basis of the
evidence adduced therein. However, there may be cases where
the provisions of Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872,
dealing with the relevance of previous judgments in subsequent
cases may be taken into consideration.”
153. We take an example to further illustrate the point. In the
plaint of suit giving rise to this appeal, the plaintiff has pleaded that the
wife of the plaintiff has been subjected to various threat and violence in
the hands of the defendant on several occasions. In event, the suit is
filed by wife of the plaintiff against the defendant for permanent injection
and also praying for reliefs under Section 19[except Section 19(1)(b)].
The suit be fully maintainable and the prayers in the suit can be covered
by the reliefs as contemplated by Section 19 read with Section 26 of the
Act, 2005.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
277
154. By a written statement, the defendant is sure to resist the
suit on the ground that she had already filed an application under Section
12 where plaintiff Dr. Prem kant Ahuja(mother-in-law of the defendant)
is one of the respondent and she may also place reliance on the interim
order dated 26.11.2016 restraining the respondents which included
Dr. Prem Kant Ahuja from dispossessing the applicant except without
obtaining an order of competent Court. The order dated 26.11.2016 which
was passed by the Magistrate under D.V. Act, 2005, shall be relevant
evidence and fully admissible in the civil suit, but the above order shall
only be one of the evidence in the suit but shall neither preclude the civil
court to determine the issues raised in the suit or to grant the relief
claimed by the plaintiff Dr. Prem Kant Ahuja. The Civil Court in such
suit can consider the issues and may grant relief if the plaintiff is able to
prove her case. The order passed under D.V. Act whether interim or
final shall be relevant and have to be given weight as one of evidence in
the civil suit but the evidentiary value of such evidence is limited. The
findings arrived therein by the magistrate are although not binding on the
Civil Court but the order having passed under the Act, 2005, which is an
special Act has to be given its due weight.
155. We need to observe that in event a judgment of criminal
court is relevant as per Sections 40 to 43 of Evidence Act in civil
proceedings,
the judgment can very well be taken note of and there is no
embargo on the civil court to place reliance upon it as a corroborative
material. We may notice a judgment of Madras High Court in
K. Subramani Vs. Director of Animal Husbandry, Chennai, (2009)
1 MLJ 363 where Madras High Court has made following observations
in paragraph 7:-
“7. A decision of the Criminal Court does not have the
effect of binding nature on the proceedings before the Civil Court
including the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for the reason that
the proof in both the Civil and Criminal cases are having two
different categories of standards. In criminal cases, guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, while in civil
cases, the rights of the parties or matter in issue shall be decided
on preponderance of probabilities. If a party to the case relies
upon a decision of the criminal Court and insists the Civil Court to
give credence to the said decision, it is incumbent upon the party
to gather further materials in the case, which would support the
SATISH CHANDER AHUJA v. SNEHA AHUJA
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
278
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
observations and the decisions of the criminal Court. If any material
is available in the case, which would corroborate or strengthen
the decision of the criminal Court, then, there is no embargo for
the Civil Court to place reliance upon it.”
156. We are in full agreement with the above view. There is no
embargo in referring to or relying on an admissible evidence, be of a civil
court or criminal court both in civil or criminal proceedings.
157. From the above discussions, we arrive at following
conclusions:-
(i)
The pendency of proceedings under Act, 2005 or any order
interim or final passed under D.V. Act under Section 19
regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating
or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject
matter of order interim or final passed in proceedings under
D.V. Act, 2005.
(ii)
The judgment or order of criminal court granting an interim
or final relief under Section 19 of D.V. Act, 2005 are relevant
within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and
can be referred to and looked into by the civil court.
(iii) A civil court is to determine the issues in civil proceedings on
the basis of evidence, which has been led by the parties before
the civil court.
(iv) In the facts of the present case, suit filed in civil court for
mandatory and permanent injunction was fully maintainable
and the issues raised by the appellant as well as by the
defendant claiming a right
under Section 19 were to be
addressed and decided on the basis of evidence, which is led
by the parties in the suit.
158. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered
opinion that High Court has rightly set aside the decree of the Trial
Court and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. With the
observations as above, the appeal is dismissed. No Costs.
Devika Gujral
Appeal dismissed.