CHAIRMAN/MANAGING DIRECTOR, U.P. POWER CORPORATION LTD. & OTHERS versus RAM GOPAL
[2020] 3 S.C.R. 514, Supreme Court of India, 2020
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 3 S.C.R.
CHAIRMAN/MANAGING DIRECTOR, U.P. POWER
CORPORATION LTD. & OTHERS
v.
RAM GOPAL
(Civil Appeal No. 852 of 2020 etc.)
JANUARY 30, 2020
[S. A. BOBDE, CJI, B. R. GAVAI AND SURYA KANT, JJ.]
Service Law:
Termination of service – On account of finding irregularities
in the selection process of the employees including that of the
respondent – One of the terminated candidates was granted relief
of continuation of his service – Thereafter respondent filed writ
petition challenging termination of his service – Writ Petition was
allowed by Single Judge of High Court holding that the respondent’s
case was squarely covered by the case of the other employee who
was granted relief by the Court – Special appeal by the employer
was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court – Appeal to
Supreme Court – Held: Termination order cannot be said to be non-
reasoned – Termination order of the respondent could not have
been set aside drawing parity from the case of another employee,
as the case of another employee was decided on equitable grounds
– Equity acts in personam and not in rem – Equity.
Limitation:
Limitation in filing writ petitions – Held: Limitation does not
strictly apply to proceedings u/Ars. 32 or 226 of the Constitution –
However, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable
lapse of time – Writ Courts ought to be reluctant in exercising their
discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs
and allowed illegalities to foster – However, such principles do not
apply to the judgments delivered in-rem – In the present case, the
judgment granting relief to the other employee in setting aside his
termination order, does not have the ingredient of a judgment in-
rem, hence cannot come to respondent’s rescue.
[2020] 3 S.C.R. 514
514
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
515
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The impugned order of the High Court is legally
untenable. The Division Bench’s finding that “no reason has been
assigned in the order of cancellation of appointment of the
respondent”, is vividly erroneous. Termination of another
candidate was held legal only on account of pending litigation and
interim directions of courts that he had spent 17 years in
employment of UPPCL-employer. Paying heed to these equitable
considerations, and not as a matter of any legal right, the High
Court had urged the employer to sympathetically consider the
case of that employee for retention in employment. This
conclusion of the High Court has undoubtedly attained finality.
Whereas that employee had remained in service for over
seventeen years (except a brief period between August to
November in 1978) and had fought his case tooth and nail, the
respondent has not been in the employment of UPPCL since 1978.
The fact-situation in that case was unique and altogether different
from that of the respondent and there arises no reason to seek
or grant parity. Even otherwise, it is a settled canon of common
law that equity acts in personam and not in rem. Hence, there
could be no extension of parity between them. [Paras 10, 11, 12
and 13][519-D-F; 520-A-E]
2.1 Services of the respondent were terminated within
months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the respondent made
a representation and served UPPCL with a legal notice in 1982,
however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap between when
the cause of action arose and he chose to seek its redressal (in
1990). The prolonged delay of many years ought not to have been
overlooked or condoned. [Para 14][520-F-G]
2.2 Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to
proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India,
nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an
unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays
and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions,
and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their
discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over
wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-sitters cannot be
CHAIRMAN/MANAGING DIRECTOR, U.P. POWER
CORPORATION LTD. & OTHERS v. RAM GOPAL
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
516
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 3 S.C.R.
allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their
convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike
with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been
restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which
writ remedies can be enforced. These principles may not,
however, apply to judgments which are delivered in-rem. The
State and its instrumentalities are expected in such category of
cases to
themselves extend the benefit of a judicial
pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing
each person to individually knock the doors of courts. The order
passed by the High Court for retention of another employee in
service, does not possess any ingredient of a Judgment in-rem.
The above cited exception, therefore, does not come to the
respondent’s rescue. It has neither been pleaded nor is it apparent
from the material on record that the respondent was unable to
approach the court-of-law in time, on account of any social or
financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have
availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances
in a timely manner. [Paras 16, 18 and 19][521-E-G; 522-E; 523-
G-H; 524-A]
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava
(2015) 1 SCC 347 : [2014] 12 SCR 193 – relied on.
P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (1975) 1
SCC 152 : [1975] 2 SCR 356; SS Balu v. State of Kerala
(2009) 2 SCC 479 : [2009] 1 SCR 196;
Vijay Kumar
Kaul v. Union of India (2012) 7 SCC 610 : [2012] 6
SCR 128 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1975] 2 SCR 356
referred to
Para 15
[2009] 1 SCR 196
referred to
Para 16
[2012] 6 SCR 128
referred to
Para 17
[2014] 12 SCR 193
relied on.
Para 18
CIVIL/CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No.852 of 2020
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Special Appeal
No. 643 of 2007.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
517
With
Crl. A. No. 204/2020.
Pradeep Misra, Adv. for the Appellants.
Farrukh Rasheed and Asim Chandra, Advs. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered :
1. Leave granted.
2. Uttar Pradesh Power Corp. Ltd. (hereinafter, “UPPCL”) has
preferred this appeal, assailing an order dated 29.04.2016 passed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow
Bench) which in turn upheld the order dated 05.04.2016 passed by a
learned Single Judge whereby Ram Gopal (Respondent)’s writ petition
for setting aside his termination order and directing his consequent re-
instatement, was allowed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. UPPCL conducted selections for certain Class IV positions of
Junior Meter Tester & Repairer, Mate and Meter Coolie/Chaukidar and
declared results on 31.08.1978 through an Office Memorandum. The
Respondent emerged as one of the successful candidates for being
appointed as Meter Cooli/Chaukidar. Owing to subsequent discovery of
certain irregularities in the selection process, UPPCL cancelled these
selections on 03.11.1978 and consequently terminated services of all
appointees on 07.11.1978.
4. Shyam Behari Lal, another successful candidate whose
services too had been terminated, promptly approached the jurisdictional
High Court which allowed his writ petition on 26.10.1989 observing that
no reasons had been assigned for the termination. UPPCL unsuccessfully
filed an intra-court appeal, and thereafter
approached this Court by way
of Civil Appeal No. 7123 of 1993 (U.P. State Electricity Board and
Others v. Shyam Behari Lal). The said appeal was allowed vide order
dated 22.11.1993 with an observation that the reason for termination
was ‘writ large’ on the order itself, namely, “cancellation of result of
selection of operating staff”, and the matter was accordingly remitted
to the High Court for disposal on merits.
5. Thereafter, a Division Bench of the High Court considered
Shyam Behari Lal’s case and held that though the writ petition was
CHAIRMAN/MANAGING DIRECTOR, U.P. POWER
CORPORATION LTD. & OTHERS v. RAM GOPAL
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 3 S.C.R.
liable to be dismissed on merits, however, considering the peculiar
circumstances wherein Shyam Behari Lal had already served the UPPCL
for 17 years, rendering him jobless might be too harsh a consequence.
The relevant operative part of the order dated 30.05.1997 reads as
follows:
“In view of what has been discussed above, is true that the
petitioner is liable to be dismissed, but in the peculiar
circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that the
petitioners are continuing in service for last seventeen years,
it would be too harsh to render him jobless at this stage. We
would, therefore, only provide that the opposite parties may
consider his continuance in service and take a suitable
decision as may be thought appropriate in the facts and
circumstances of the case expeditiously.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. After the initial round of litigation in which Shyam Behari Lal
had obtained relief from the High Court in 1989, the present Respondent
also filed WP No. 7897 of 1990 in July, 1990, impugning the order dated
07.11.1978 terminating his services. A learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad summarily allowed the Respondent’s
writ petition on 05.04.2007 on the premise that the matter was “squarely
covered” by the decision of the High Court dated 26.10.1989 in Shyam
Behari Lal’s case.
7. The aggrieved UPPCL preferred Special Appeal No. 643 of
2007 which was dismissed by a Division Bench vide
the impugned order
dated 29.04.2016. Although the Court noted that the order of 1989 relied
upon by the learned Single Judge had been set-aside by this Court and
during fresh consideration of the matter a co-ordinate Bench had held
Shyam Behari Lal’s case being devoid of any merit; yet it laid emphasis
on the equitable considerations which were pressed into aid in Shyam
Behari Lal’s case for his resultant continuation in service. The Division
Bench, thus, dismissed UPPCL’s appeal and held as follows:
“The case of the respondent is similarly situated as his
appointment pertains to the same selection and no reason has
been assigned in the order of cancellation of appointment of
the respondent. Therefore, learned Single Judge has rightly
extended the parity of the aforesaid judgment and order to
the respondent while allowing the Writ Petition.”
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
519
CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES
8. Vehemently refuting the Respondent’s claim of illegal
termination, UPPCL has preferred this Civil Appeal both against the
Division Bench’s order dated 29.04.2016, as well as the contempt
proceedings initiated before the High Court by the Respondent. UPPCL
has painstakingly urged that there is no correlation in law or any similarity
in facts between the  case of Shyam Behari Lal and the present case of
Ram Gopal.
9. On the other hand, counsel for the Respondent defends the
judgment of the Division Bench, maintaining that both Shyam Behari Lal
and Ram Gopal were recruited through the same office memorandum,
and their services were terminated through the same order. It was urged
that what holds true for one candidate must necessarily also hold true
for the other; and it would be iniquitous and unequal to give rise to a
situation where similarly placed persons end up in vastly different
situations.
ANALYSIS
10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at a considerable
length, we find that the impugned order of the High Court is legally
untenable and cannot be sustained for at least three glaring reasons.
i)Erroneous conclusion of termination order being non-
speaking
11. First, the Division Bench’s finding that “no reason has been
assigned in the order of cancellation of appointment of the
respondent”, is vividly erroneous. This Court had earlier vide order
dated 22.11.1993 passed in Civil Appeal No. 7123 of 1993 overruled
the
High Court’s finding of non-reasoned termination in Shyam Behari
Lal’s case and had held that the termination order was in fact a speaking
order, with the reason for termination being writ large and clearly given.
The High Court’s findings thus undoubtedly fall foul of the observations
made by this Court and the impugned order hence ought to be set-aside
on this count alone.
ii) Lack of similarity between Shyam Behari Lal and Ram
Gopal
12. Second, Quite palpably, the High Court has erred in concluding
that the Respondent’s claim fell squarely within the four corners of its
CHAIRMAN/MANAGING DIRECTOR, U.P. POWER
CORPORATION LTD. & OTHERS v. RAM GOPAL
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 3 S.C.R.
previous decision in Shyam Behari Lal’s case. The relied-upon judgment
dated 30.05.1997 determined unequivocally that there was no merit in
the writ petition and that Shyam Behari Lal’s claim was “liable to be
dismissed”. It was only on account of pending litigation and interim
directions of courts that Shyam Behari Lal had spent 17 years in
employment of UPPCL. Paying heed to these equitable considerations,
and not as a matter of any legal right, the High Court urged the employer
to sympathetically consider his case for retention in employment. This
conclusion of the High Court was not appealed by any party and has
undoubtedly attained finality. Hence, it is clear in law that Shyam Behari
Lal’s termination was legal, and that he had no right of continuation in
service, let alone reinstatement as sought in the present case. The only
question which thus survives is whether the Respondent, Ram Gopal,
could seek parity?
13. At the outset, it is apparent that Shyam Behari Lal and Ram
Gopal share little similarity. Whereas the former had remained in service
for over seventeen years (except a brief period between August to
November in 1978) and had fought his case tooth and nail, the Respondent
has not been in the employment of UPPCL since 1978. The fact-situation
in Shyam Behari Lal’s case was unique and altogether different from
that of Ram Gopal, and there arises no reason to seek or grant parity.
Even otherwise, it is a
settled canon of common law that equity acts in
personam and not in rem. Hence, there could be no extension of parity
between the case of Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal (Respondent).
iii) Inordinate delay in filing writ petition
14. Finally, the prolonged delay of many years ought not to have
been overlooked or condoned. Services of the Respondent were
terminated within months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the
Respondent made a representation and served UPPCL with a legal notice
in 1982, however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap between
when the cause of action arose and he chose to seek its redressal(in
1990).
15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the
Respondent  has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a
civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent,
would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 1990. In a similar
situation where the appellant belatedly challenged the promotion of his
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
521
junior(s), this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu1,
held as follows:
“2.  … if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have
approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two
representations made by him had failed to produce any result.
One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court
questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. … In effect he
wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for
the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the
rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in
the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957,
cannot be reproduced now. …It is not that there is any period
of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under
Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the
Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a
certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise
exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their
extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons
who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand
by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court
to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled
matters…...”
16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to
proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India,
nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse
of time. Consideration of unexplained
delays and inordinate laches would
always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be
reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those
who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-
sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at
their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with
mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there
are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced.
In SS Balu v. State of Kerala2, this Court observed thus:
“17. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats
equity”. …It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner
1 (1975) 1 SCC 152.
2 (2009) 2 SCC 479
CHAIRMAN/MANAGING DIRECTOR, U.P. POWER
CORPORATION LTD. & OTHERS v. RAM GOPAL
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 3 S.C.R.
approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed
for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches
irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the
other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Similarly, in Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India3 this Court
while considering the claim of candidates who, despite being higher in
merit, exercised their right to parity much after those who were though
lower in merit but were diligently agitating their rights, this Court observed
that:
“27. …It becomes an obligation to take into consideration
the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition
or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter
of great significance that at one point of time equity that
existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and
paves the path of extinction with the passage of time.”
18. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however,
apply to judgments which are delivered in-rem. The State and its
instrumentalities are expected In such category of cases to themselves
extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed
employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors
of courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to
judgments delivered in-rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar
Srivastava4, laying down that:
“22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of
employees is given relief by the court, all other identically
situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that
benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and
would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
This principle needs to be applied in service matters more
emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this
Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated
persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule
would be that merely because other similarly situated persons
did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated
differently.
3 (2012) 7 SCC 610
4 (2015) 1 SCC 347
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
523
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised
exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as
acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the
wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same
and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that
their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in
time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot
claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of
similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would
be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the
acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases
where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment
in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated
persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such
a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities
to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated
persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter
of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme
of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of
India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 :
1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment
of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said
judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and
such an intention is stated expressly in the
judgment or it can
be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the
judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said
judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their
petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or
acquiescence.”
                        (Emphasis applied)
19. The order passed by the High Court for retention of Shyam
Behari Lal in service, does not possess any ingredient of a Judgment in-
rem. The above cited exception, therefore, does not come to the
Respondent’s rescue. It is also pertinent to mention that neither has it
been pleaded nor is it apparent from the material on record that the
Respondent was unable to approach the court-of-law in time on account
of any social or financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to
have availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a
CHAIRMAN/MANAGING DIRECTOR, U.P. POWER
CORPORATION LTD. & OTHERS v. RAM GOPAL
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 3 S.C.R.
timely manner. Instead, he seems to be under the assumption that the
termination order is illegal, that he consequently has a right to be
reinstated, and that he can agitate the same at his own sweet-will. Neither
of these three assumptions are true, as elaborated by us earlier.
CONCLUSION
20. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeals are allowed. The
impugned order delivered by the learned Single Judge on 05.04.2007 as
well as the order dated 29.04.2016 of the Division Bench upholding it,
are set aside. Respondent’s writ petition is consequently dismissed. As a
sequel thereto, the High Court’s interim order dated 02.11.2016 in
Contempt No. 1271 of 2016, which is under challenge in SLP (Crl.) No.
2014 of 2017, is also quashed and the contempt petition stands dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy
Appeals allowed.