SATISH SHETTY versus STATE OF KARNATAKA
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 145, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 145 
SATISH SHETTY 
v. 
STATE OF KARNATAKA 
(Criminal Appeal No.1358 of2008) 
JUNE 3, 2016 
[DIPAK MISRA AND SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 498A, 306 - Dowry Prohibition Act, 
1961 - Commission of suicide by 25 year old women within two 
and a half years of marriage - Victim having 10 month old son and 
a pregnancy of twenty ll'eek - Acquittal of husband and his parents 
for offences punishable u!ss. 3, 4, 6 of the 1961 Act and ss. 498A 
and 304B - However, the High Court convicted the husband u!s. 
498A with rigorous imprisonment of three years and u!s. 306 with 
RI for five years - 011 appeal, held: There was good explanation 
for the delay in lodging the FIR - Victims closest telation-mother 
was a poor helpless lady and deceased had left behind children, 
thus, the factum of delay to be dealt with sympathetically - Judgment 
of the trial court Sl!tfered from such gross errors in approach and 
appreciation that it could not be saved on the principle that if two 
views are possible, there should be no inte1ference with a judgment 
and order of acquittal - Furthe1; since the High Court recorded a 
finding against the husband of causing cruelty to the deceased for 
his conviction u/s. 498-A, all the essential ingredients for raising· of 
presumption uls. l l 3A clearly made out - High Court gave good 
reasons on the basis of facts brought on record through evidence 
for exercising the discretion of invoking the presumption uls. l l 3A 
-
Husband failed to rebut the presumptions raised against him u!s. 
l l 3A - Tims, the order passed by the High Court is upheld -
Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 113A. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 On the basis of relevant facts the High Court 
appears to be justified in holding that there is good explanation for 
the delay in lodging the FIR because PW-15 delayed the inquest 
proceedings without valid reasons leading to delay in the 
postmortem examination as well and only on knowledge of the 
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[2016] 3 S.C.R. 
injuries etc. the mother of the deceased gathered strength to lodge 
the FIR. When the deceased died leaving a son of ten months old 
the mother of the deceased had many other things to worry for, 
including cremation of the dead body and in such circumstances 
the High Court was justified in criticizing the trial court for its hyper 
technical approach in blaming the mother of the deceased for lodging 
a delayed complaint. Delay in lodging the FIR or complaint is not 
fatal in all cases. The Court must show some sensitivity in cases of 
the instant nature where the victim's closest relation - mother is a 
poor helpless lady. Even a well to do person may suffer a state of 
mental confusion when struck by such a tragedy. The prosecution 
in such cases is likely to be delayed further if the deceased has left 
behind children. The issues relating to their safety and custody 
often require higher priority. Occurrences of the present nature 
require lodging of criminal case against persons who are already 
in the category of relation by virtue of matrimonial ties through the 
deceased and it is not always easy to take a decision whether to 
lodge a criminal case against a relation or not. Hence in such cases 
the factum of delay has to be dealt with sympathetically keeping in 
mind the mental condition of the close relations of the victim. (Para 
11] (152-E-H; 153-A-B( 
1.2 There is no merit in the submission
that the judgment and 
order of the acquittal was not perverse or that it required no 
interference of the High Court. The views of the High Court are 
sound and it is accepted that the judgment of the trial court suffered 
from such gross errors in approach and. appreciation that it could 
not be saved on the principle that if two views are possible, there 
should be no interference with a judgment and order of acquittal. 
Hence, High Court proceeded to convict the appellant for the 
offences u/ss. 498-A and 306 IPC. [Paras 13, 23) [153-F-G; 157-G) 
1.3 In the instant case, after noticing the injuries on the person 
of victim which is not at all explained by the appellant husband 
although in the fateful night he and the deceased slept together in 
the same room before she consumed poison, the High Court came 
to a well considered finding that the deceased was being harassed 
both physically and mentally and in direct as well as indirect ways 
for non compliance with the demand of the accused for Rs.1,00,000/ 
- for investment in his wine business. The High Court found that 
such harassment falls squarely under clause (b) of the explanation
SATISH SHETTY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
of Section 498-A IPC. There is no good reason to take a different 
view. [Para 17) [155-G-H; 156-A-B) 
1.4 Since the High Court had recorded a finding against the 
appellant of causing cruelty to the deceased for his conviction 
under Section 498-A, all the essential ingredients for raising of 
presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act were clearly 
made out. But as regards the issue whether the High Court was 
justified in resorting to exercise such a discretion as was available 
to it under Section 113A or not, that the Court has a discretion in 
the matter of resorting to presumption is clear from the plain 
words used in that Section-"the Court may presume". [Paras 19 
and 201 J156-E-FJ 
1.5 Once the prosecution succeeds in establishing the 
component of cruelty leading to conviction u/s. 498A, only in a 
r.are case, the Court can refuse to invoke the presumption of 
abetment, if other requirements of Section 113A of the Evidence 
Act stand satisfied. In the instant case, the High Court gave good 
reasons on the basis of facts brought on record through evidence 
for exercising the discretion of invoking the presumption u/s. 
113A. The High Court found the later explanations unacceptable 
and the initial explanation that the deceased committed suicide 
because she was not permitted to go to her mother's place does 
not inspire confidence and was rightly rejected by the High Court. 
Only for such a trivial matter, a hale and
hearty young woman 
having a ten months old son and a pregnancy of twenty weeks is 
not at all expected to take her life. The appellant not only gave 
absolutely no explanation for the injuries on the person of the 
deceased, rather he chose to conceal them by keeping mum. 
Clearly the appellant failed to rebut the presumptions raised 
against him u/s. 113A of the Act. [Para 24) [157-H; 158-A-D] 
Pedda Narayana and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh 
(1975) 4 SCC 153 : 1975 (0) Suppl. SCR 84; K. Prema 
S. Rao and another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and others 
(2003) 1 SCC 217 : 2002 (3) Suppt SCR 339; Hans 
Raj 1( State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257 : 2004 (2) 
SCR 678; Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh (2010) 1 SCC 750 : 2010 (1) SCR 7; M. 
Mohan v. State (2011) 3 SCC 626 : 2011 (3) SCR 437; 
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A 
Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana (2014) 12 SCC 595 : 
2014 (4) SCR 988; Narayanamurthy v. State of 
Karnataka (2008) 16 SCC 512 : 2008 (8) SCR 403 -
referred to. 
B 
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Case Law Reference 
1975 (0) Suppl. SCR 84 
referred to 
Para 10 
2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 339 
referred to 
Para 14 
200_4. (2) SCR 678 
referred to 
Para 21 
2010 (1) SCR 7 
referred to 
Para 21 
201.1. (3) SCR 437 
referred to 
Para 22 
2014_(4) SCR 988 
referred to 
Para22 
2008 (8) SCR 403 
referred to 
Para 23 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
1358 of2008. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2007 of the High Court 
of Karnataka at Bangalore, in Criminal Appeal No. 1409 of2000. 
P. Vishwanatha Shetty, Sr. Adv., Ms. A. Sumathi, Adv. for the 
Appellant. 
V. N. Raghupathy, Adv. for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. I. This appeal by special leave is 
directed against judgment and order dated 13.09.2007 passed by a 
Division Bench of High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal 
Appeal No. 1409 of2000 preferred by the State against judgment dated 
16.09.2000 by First Additional Sessions Judge, D.K. Mangalore in SC 
No. 150194 whereby the appellant and both his parents were acquitted 
foroffences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition 
Act and under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code 
(!PC). By the impugned order High Court has reversed
the judgment of 
acquittal in part. It has convicted the appellant, the husband of the victim 
lady, for the offence under Section 498-A with punishment of rigorous 
imprisonment (RI) of three years and a fine ofRs.5000/- with a default 
clause. The appellant has also been convicted for the offence under 
Section 306 of the IPC with RI for five years and a fine of Rs. I 0,000/-
, again with a default clause. Both the sentences are to run concurrently.
SATISH SHETTY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
[SHIVA KIRT! SINGH, J.] 
If realized, the tine amount is to be paid to PW-6 Gulabi, mother of the 
deceased, if she is alive. 
2. Learned senior counsel Mr. P. Vishwanatha Shetty appearing 
for the appellant has raised three main contentions to assail the judgment 
and order under appeal. According to him, the judgment and order of 
acquittal was not a perverse judgment and required no interference by 
the High Court. Secondly, it is contended that in absence of any charge 
framed under Section 306 of!PC by the trial court the High Court should 
not have convicted the appellant under that Section. Lastly but not the 
least, is the contention that there is no evidence on record to justify the 
conviction of the appellant by the High Court for any of the charges. 
3. Mr. V. N. Raghupathy learned counsel for the respondent has, 
on the other hand, strenuously refuted all the aforesaid three submissions 
and has placed reliance on the relevant materials on record as well as 
the discussions made by the High Court in the impugned order to fully 
support that judgment and order reversing the acquittal of the appellant 
to the extent indicated above. 
4. Before adverting to specific contentions for deciding the main 
issue whether the impugned judgment and order requires interference, it 
will be useful and relevant to take note of the factual matrix of this case. 
The story of the deceased young lady, aged about 25 years who was 
forced to
commit suicide by the unfortunate situation and circumstances 
surrounding her life, resembles the tale of so many similar young ladies 
who end their life due to untold miseries and hardships faced by them 
within the confines of the four walls of their matrimonial home. All of 
them enter such home with hope of leading a long and blissful married 
life but this hope, invariably, does not last long, nor their life. In the present 
case the victim left behind a son then aged about ten months and she 
was also mothering a life of twenty weeks in her womb. The deceased 
Rekha @ Baby was married with the appellant on 5.06.1991 and 
immediately she began her stay in matrimonial home with her husband 
and in-laws and a son was also born to them who on the date of her 
death i.e. 19. 11.1993 was aged about ten months. There is no dispute 
regarding her death and even as per the Unnatural Death Report (UDR) 
exhibit Ex.P.20, lodged by the appellant with the local police station on 
19.11.1993 at 9.45 a.m, she died of some poison which she had consumed 
allegedly because the appellant forbade her from going to her mother's 
place in the morning hours of 18.11.1993. As described in the said report, 
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the victim had consumed a poison which was kept for spray In the fields. 
She had been taken to hospital but expired there at around 8 a.m. As 
per version of the occurrence given by the appellant, the deceased and 
he were living a very happy life. He was satisfied with the money and 
gold given at the time of marriage as dowry and was apparently at a loss 
as to why the deceased consumed poison. 
5. The records have been carefully noticed by the High Court and 
they reveal that the police/the investigating agency, soon after learning 
about the occurrence made a request to the Tehsildar (Executive 
Magistrate), PW-15 to conduct inquest proceedings under Section 174 
of Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court has rightly condemned the 
Tehsildar's action in causing undue delay and holding the inquest two 
days later on 22.11.1993. It was after the inquest that the mother of the 
deceased, Gulabi, PW-6 lodged the complaint with the police on 
22.11.1993 and on that basis police registered a Criminal Case No. 136/ 
93 for offences under Section 498-A, 304-B of the !PC and Sections 3 
and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. After investigation police submitted 
chargesheet against the husband of the deceased and his parents only. 
Subsequently another relation was summoned as accused no. 4 under 
Section 319 of Cr PC. 
6. Dr. M.R. Shetty, PW-8 has proved the postmortem report. He 
has deposed that he conducted the autopsy
on the deceased in the 
afternoon of22. l l .1993 along with another Doctor and found the following 
wounds on the dead body: 
I. 
Transverse contusion across the lower part of the rt. Thigh 2" 
abovethekneejoint2" in length. 
F 
2. 
Haematoma 6" x 3" on the lower part of the left thigh with 
abrasion of different sizes on it; 
3. 
Abrasion on the rt. Lumbar region 2-1/2"; 
4. 
Abrasion on the back of the 11. Thigh 2-1/2"; 
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5. 
Multiple small abrasions on the rt. Hand of different sizes; and 
H 
6. 
Blood strained fluid from the nostrils. 
He had found a twenty weeks embryo in the womb of the deceased. 
He deposed that as per subsequent chemical lab report of the viscera, 
the death was because of consumption ofOrgano phosphorous chemical.
SATISH SHETTY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
[SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.] 
The Doctor has also deposed that the wounds were ante-mortem caused 
by hard and blunt object but they did not cause the death. The unnatural 
death of the victim within seven years of marriage is not in dispute. 
7. The High Court has scrutinized the deposition of mother of the 
deceased PW-6 and her two younger brothers PW-9 and PW-20 for 
coming to a finding that at the time of marriage they had to arrange 
money to meet the demand of the husband of the deceased for payment 
of dowry in cash and gold. The witnesses on this aspect were found 
trust-worthy and not indulging into exaggeration or false allegations. The 
trial court on the other hand went into unnecessary details to discuss this 
issue on the basis of capacity of the complainant to pay, source of money 
arranged by her and whether actually money had been paid at the 
professed place or not. Though there is difference in the amount but 
nonetheless in the UDR complaint in Ex.P20 the appellant has admitted 
of taking Rs.25,000/- as dowry. The High Court has rightly held that the 
trial court should not have gone into further details. The only relevant 
issue was initial payment of dowry and not its quantum. But this aspect 
need not be pursued further because the High Court has also, while 
relying on the evidence of the prosecution that one year after the marriage 
during her visit to her mother the deceased had infonned that the accused 
were
harassing her by making a demand for additional dowry of 20 
sovereigns of gold and Rs.1,00,000/- for investment by the appellant in a 
wine shop, has held that such subsequent demand being unrelated to 
marriage, need not be accepted as demand for dowry and therefore the 
offence under Section 304 of the IPC is not attracted. In this regard it 
was noticed that in Section 304 of the !PC as per the explanation, "dowry" 
shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Pro~ibition 
Act, 1961. 
8. The High Court has considered the issue whether Section 498-
A and 306 of the !PC are attracted or not and after extracting the relevant 
provisions as well as Section I 13A of the Evidence Act, has held the 
appellant guilty of the offences under Section 498-A and 306 of the !PC. 
For that the High Court has relied upon relevant materials consisting of 
oral evidence available on record as well as documentary evidence in 
the forms of letters. Before discussing whether the High Court has 
committed any error of facts or law on this issue, it is useful to examine 
the first contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the High 
Court should not have interfered with the acquittal of appellant. 
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9. As already noticed, on the issue whether the marriage was 
performed after demanding and accepting dowry, the High Court found 
the approach of the trial court totally erroneous. The findings were found 
to be vitiated on account of trial Judge ignoring the glaring facts emerging 
from deposition of PW-6, 9 and 20 as well as PW 13 and 16 and also by 
ignoring the admission of the accused in the UDR complaint at Ex.P.20. 
I 0. The High Court has further rightly held that the trial Judge 
failed to look for the relevant documents already available on the record 
and wrongly drew inference against the prosecution for not producing 
the statements of PW-6 and other relations of the deceased recorded by 
Taluka Executive Magistrate under Section 174 CrPC proceedings. 
Presently it is not disputed that those statements were/are available on 
record along with the inquest report. It is noted that such erroneous 
approach of the trial court had strong influence on its judgment rendering 
it perverse. In fact, had the trial court applied its mind to the scope of 
Section 174 of the Cr Pc as explained by this Court in the case of Pedda 
Narayana and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh', such gross error 
could have been avoided because such statements do not have much 
legal weight as they are beyond the scope of inquest proceedings under 
Section 174 ofCrPC. 
11. On the basis of relevant facts the High Court
appears to be 
justified in holding that there is good explanation for the delay in lodging 
the FIR on 22.11.1993 because PW-15 delayed the inquest proceedings 
without valid reasons leading to delay in the postmortem examination as 
well and only on knowledge of the injuries etc. the mother of the deceased 
gathered strength to lodge the FIR. When the deceased died leaving a 
son often months old the mother of the deceased had many other things 
to worry for, including cremation of the dead body and in such 
circumstances the High Court was justified in criticizing the trial court 
for its hyper technical approach in blaming the mother of the deceased 
for lodging a delayed complaint. It will be useful to remember that delay 
in lodging the Fl R or complaint is not fatal in all cases. The Court must 
show some sensitivity in cases of present nature where the victim's 
closest relation - mother is a poor helpless lady. Even a well to do person 
may suffer a state of mental confusion when struck by such a tragedy. 
The prosecution in such cases is likely to be delayed further ifthe deceased 
has left behind children. The issues relating to their safety and custody 
1 (1975)4 sec 153 =AIR 1915 sc 1252
SATISH SHETTY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
[SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.] 
often require higher priority. Occurrences of the present nature require 
lodging of criminal case against persons who are already in the category 
of relation by virtue of matrimonial ties through the deceased and it is 
not always easy to take a decision whether to lodge a criminal case 
against a relation or not. Hence in such cases the factum of delay has to 
be dealt with sympathetically keeping in mind the mental condition of the 
close relations of the victim. The trial court miserably failed on this count 
too. 
12. The evidence of PW-6 mother of the deceased is well supported 
by PW-7 Pratap, a cousin of the deceased who had visited the deceased 
during Dushera holidays, a month prior to her death. He found that the 
deceased was getting continuous ill-treatment by her husband. He has 
deposed to the extent that the deceased requested PW-7 not to disclose 
the ill-treatment to her mother because she would get upset. The letters 
contained in Ex P-7 dated 27.9.1993 and exhibit D-3 dated 28.10.1993 
have been discussed by both the Courts below. We are in agreement 
with the views of the High Court that those letters written respectively 
by the deceased to her mother and by sister of the deceased to the 
deceased, do not help the defence at all. The trial court had clearly 
adopted a perverse approach in appreciating those letters as if they are 
in favour of the defence. Further, the correct and logical
inferences 
from these documents were rejected by the trial court in paragraph 37 
of the judgment by again resorting to adverse inference on the incorrect 
ground that statements of PW-6 and PW-9 recorded by the Tehsildar at 
the time of conducting inquest were not produced before the Court. As 
already noticed earlier, these statements formed part of the inquest report 
and were available on record. 
13. In view of aforesaid discussions we find no merit in the first 
contention that the judgment and order of the acquittal was not perverse 
or that it required no interference of the High Court. The views of the 
High Court on this issue are sound and we are in agreement that the 
judgment of the trial court suffered from such gross errors in approach 
and appreciation that it could not be saved on the principle that if two 
views are possible, there should be no interference with a judgment and 
order of acquittal. 
14. So far as the second contention is concerned, the same needs 
to be noticed only for rejection. To be fair to the learned counsel, he has 
not dealt on this contention at any length nor has cited any judgment. 
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The High Court on the other hand dealt with the issue of conviction 
under Section 306 of the IPC in absence of a charge under that head in 
detail in paragraphs 44 and 45. It has also noticed some judgments of the 
Kamataka High Court and this Court in paragraph 44. The issue is 
definitely not res integra in view of judgment of this Court in somewhat 
similar circumstances in the case of K. Pre ma S. Rao and another v. 
Yadia Srinivasa Rao and others~. In that case the acquittal of the 
husband of the deceased under 304-B IPC was not reversed but this 
Court while upholding the conviction of the all the three accused under 
Section 498-A IPC, further convicted the husband of the victim under 
Section 306 IPC after discussing issues relating to absence of a charge 
under Section 306 IPC in a case of suicide when the relevant and material 
facts are already part of charge under Section 498-A and 304-B of the 
IPC. That judgment rendered tJy a Bench of Three Judges in somewhat 
identical facts, in our view leaves no scope for accepting the second 
contention on behalf of the appellant. 
15. The last contention on behalf of the appellant that there is no 
evidence to justify the conviction of the appellant for any of the charges, 
indirectly stands negated by our discussions and findings in respect of 
the first contention itself. However to consider the legality of the view 
taken by the High Court we propose
to deal with this issue further after 
taking note of the relevant provisions oflaw i.e. Sections 498-A and 306 
of the lPC as well as Section I 13A of the Evidence Act which are 
extracted below: 
"Section 498-A. Husba11d or relative of husband of a 11•0111a11 
subjecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the husband or the 
relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty 
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend 
to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, 'cruelty' means-
( a) any ll'iljul conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to 
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or 
danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the 
woman; or 
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a 
view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any 
----
H 
'(2003)JSCC217
SATISH SHETTY v. STATE OF KARNAT1~KA 
[SHIVA Kf1cffl SINGH, J.] 
unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on 
account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet 
such demand." 
Section 306. Abetment of suicide.-lf any person commits 
suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which 
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
Section 113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a 
marriedwoman.-When the question is whether the commission 
of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any 
relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed 
suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her 
marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband 
had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having 
regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide 
had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. 
Expla11atio11.-For the purposes of this section, 'cruelty' shall 
have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the Indian Penal 
Code." 
16. On a plain reading of Section 498-A it transpires that if a married 
woman is subjected to cruelty by the husband or his relative, the offender 
is liable to be punished with the sentence indicated in the Section. But 
cruelty can be of different types and therefore what kind of cruelty 
would constitute offence has been defined
under the explanation. As 
per first definition contained in clause (a)- it means a willful conduct of 
such a nature which is likely to drive the victim woman to commit suicide 
or to cause grave injuries to health and life, limb or health (mental or 
physical). The other definition of cruelty is in clause (b) and is attracted 
when a woman is harassed with a view to coercing her or any of her 
relation to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security 
or is on account of failure to meet such demand. 
17. In the present case after noticing the injuries on the person of 
victim which is not at all explained by the appellant husband although in 
the fateful night he and the deceased slept together in the same room 
before she consumed poison, the High Court has come to a well 
considered finding in paragraph 42 of the impugned judgment that the 
deceased was being harassed both physically and mentally and in direct 
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as well as indirect ways for non compliance with the demand of the 
accused for Rs.1,00,000/- for investment in his wine business. The High 
Court found that such harassment falls squarely under clause (b) of the 
explanation of Section 498-A of the IPC. We find no good reason to 
take a different view. 
18. The High Court after recording the aforesaid finding proceeded 
to consider whether Section 306 of the IPC is also attracted against the 
appellant or not. Since the High Court had, on relevant material returned 
a finding of guilt under Section 498-A of the !PC, it found the 
circumstances of the case right and proper for resorting to Section 113A 
of the Evidence Act which permits raising of presumption as to abetment 
to suicide by a married woman. Such a statutory presumption though 
discretionary, may be presumed by the Court in appropriate cases where 
the question of abetment of suicide by a woman is under consideration 
in respect of her husband or any of his relative and if the suicide has 
been committed within seven years of marriage, provided the husband 
or such relative had subjected her to cruelty. 
19. Since the High Court had recorded a finding against the appellant 
of causing cruelty to the deceased for his conviction under Section 498-
A, all the essential ingredients for raising of presumption under Section 
l 13A of the Evidence Act were clearly made out. But the issue raised 
before
us is whether the High Court was justified in reso11ing to exercise 
such a discretion as was available to it under Section I 13A or not. 
20. That the Court has a discretion in the matter of resorting to 
presumption is clear from the plain words used in that Section - "the 
Court may presume" (emphasis supplied). The law on this issue is also 
well settled and therefore needs no elaborate discussion but at this stage 
the relevant case laws cited by learned senior counsel for the appellant 
need to be taken note of. 
21. Reliance has been placed on behalfofappellant on the judgment 
of this Court in the case of Hans Raj v. State ofHaryana3• In this case 
it was reiterated that Section l l 3A of the Evidence Act vests a discretion 
in the Court to raise such a presumption having regard to all the other 
circumstances of the case. On evidence and facts of that case it was 
found that the nature of cruelty proved in that case was not such as is 
likely to drive the women to commit suicide or to cause grievous injury 
H 
' (2004) 12 sec 2s1
SATISH SHETTY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
[SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.] 
etc. Reliance was also placed upon the case ofGangula Mohan Reddy 
v. State of Andhra Pradesh". The facts of that case were entirely 
different and required interpretation of the term "abetment" as defined 
under Section I 07 of the IPC. In that case the victim was a servant of 
the accused and the case did not require any examination of inter-
dependence and inter-connectivity of Section 498A and 306 of the !PC 
or of Section I I 3A of the Evidence Act. 
22. Reliance was also placed upon case of M. Mohan v. State5• 
The Court followed the general law with regard to ingredients of abetment 
in the context of Section 306 of the IPC and quashed the prosecution of 
some of the relations of the husband on the peculiar facts of the case 
which disclosed that there was no allegation of any dowry demand or 
instigation against those appellants although they were relatives of the 
husband. In the case of Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana6, this Court 
acquitted the appellant who was husband of the deceased forthe offences 
under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC on the ground that the 
prosecution had not succeeded in establishing the offences. The accused 
had merely left the deceased wife in the matrimonial home in the company 
of his parents while proceeding to report for duty as a constable to another 
place. This Cou1i held that such action would not amount to abetment to 
commit suicide. 
23. The aforesaid case laws do
not lay down any proposition of 
law which may warrant interference with the views of the High Court in 
the impugned judgment. In the case of Narayanamurthy v. State of 
Karnataka' the law was reiterated that if on appreciation of evidence 
two views are possible then the appellate court should not interfere with 
the judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused. There is no quarrel 
with the said proposition. The High Court was aware of such legal principle 
and keeping the same in mind, it has discussed the evidence for coming 
to a conclusion that the findings of the trial court leading to acquittal 
were fully unwarranted and it is not a case where two views are possible. 
Hence the High Court proceeded to convict the appellant for the offences 
under Sections 498-A and 306 of the !PC. 
24. Once the prosecution succeeds 'in establishing the component 
't201oi 1 sec 750 
'(2011 l 3 sec 626 
"(2014) 12 sec 595 
't2oosi 16 sec s12 
157 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
158 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 
of cruelty leading to conviction under Section 498A, in our view only in 
a rare case, the Court can refuse to invoke the presumption of abetment, 
if other requirements of Section 113A of the Evidence Act stand satisfied. 
This proposition is amply supported by the view taken by the three-
Judge Bench of this Court in the case of K. Prema S. Rao and Anr. 
(Supra). Further, the High Court has given good reasons on the basis of 
facts brought on record through evidence for exercising the discretion 
of invoking the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act 
and thereafter it has discussed in detail the explanations given by the 
appellant in the initial version by way of Unnatural Death Report as well 
as the later explanations. The High Court found the later explanations 
unacceptable and the initial explanation that the deceased committed 
suicide because she was not permitted to go to her mother's place does 
not inspire confidence and has rightly been rejected by the High Court. 
Only for such a trivial matter, a hale and hearty young woman having a 
ten months old son and a pregnancy of twenty weeks is not at all expected 
to take her life. The appellant not only gave absolutely no explanation 
for the injuries on the person of the deceased, rather he chose to conceal 
them by keeping mum. Clearly the appellant failed to rebut the 
presumptions raised against him under Section I I 3A of the Evidence
Act. Having gone through the relevant facts and the reasonings of the 
trial court we are not persuaded to take a different view. 
25. In the result the appeal must fail. We order accordingly. As a 
consequence, the bail bonds of the appellant are cancelled. He be taken 
into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining pa11 of the sentence as 
per law. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal dismissed.