M/S AJAY PROTECH PVT. LTD. versus GENERAL MANAGER & ANR.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 850, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 850 : 2024 INSC 889
M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. 
v. 
General Manager & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 13004 of 2024)
22 November 2024
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and  
Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as to whether the application for extension can be 
entertained if it is filed after the expiry of the Arbitral Tribunal’s 
mandate; and whether the application filed u/s.29A(4) of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for extension of the mandate 
of the arbitral tribunal ought to have been allowed by the High Court.
Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.29A(4) – Time limit 
for arbitral award – Extension of time – Application u/s.29A(4), 
for extension of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal – High 
Court, if ought to have allowed the same:
Held: Wording of s.29A(4) clearly and explicitly enables a court 
to extend the Tribunal’s mandate after expiry of the statutory and 
extendable period of 18 months – Application for extension can be 
filed either before or after the termination of the Tribunal’s mandate 
upon expiry of the statutory and extendable period – As per s.29A(5), 
the decision to extend the time is an exercise of discretion by the 
court and must be done on sufficient cause being shown, and on 
such terms and conditions that the court deems fit – Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act adopts the well-known language of limitation 
statutes and provides that the Court can extend the time if it finds 
that there is
sufficient cause – Primary objective in rendering an 
arbitral award is to resolve disputes through the agreed dispute 
resolution mechanism as contracted by the parties – Thus, 'sufficient 
cause' should be interpreted in the context of facilitating effective 
dispute resolution – On facts, the pandemic had commenced 
even before the expiry of 12 months from the completion of 
pleadings, this Court excluding the period between 15.03.2020 
to 28.02.2023 in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation’s 
* Author
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case, and the agreement between the parties on 05.05.2023 to 
seek extension of time by filing an application before the Court, 
there is sufficient cause for extension of the period for making of 
the award – Reasoning adopted by the High Court in holding that 
there is a delay of 2 years, 4 months in filing the application is 
erroneous – Order and judgment passed by the High Court set 
aside – Period for making of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal is 
extended. [Paras 2, 8, 10, 11, 12-18]
Case Law Cited
In re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation [2021] 2 SCR 640 : 
(2022) 3 SCC 117; Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger 
Paints India Ltd. [2024] 9 SCR 473 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 
2494 – relied on.
List of Acts
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords
Application for extension of mandate of arbitral tribunal; Time 
limit for arbitral award; Arbitral award; Sufficient cause; COVID 
pandemic; Period of limitation; Delay; Efficiency in the conduct of 
arbitral proceedings; Dispute resolution remedy through arbitration; 
Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation case.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 13004 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.11.2023 of the High Court 
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in MCA No. 1 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Gaurav Agrawal, Sr. Adv., C. George Thomas, Manan Daga,  
Ms. Kaarunya Lakshmi, Ansh Mittal, Advs. for
the Appellant.
Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Ms. Nisha Bagchi, Sr. Adv., Amrish 
Kumar, Siddharth Sinha, Shubendu Anand, Navanjay Mahapatra, 
Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Bhuvan Kapoor, Ashok Panigrahi, Sandeep 
Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
1.	
Leave granted.
2.	
The short issue in this appeal is whether the application filed by the 
appellant under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 
19961 for extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal ought to 
have been allowed by the High Court. The text of Section 29A was 
sufficient for us to come to the conclusion that the Court has the 
power and jurisdiction to extend the period. Further, in the facts and 
circumstances of the case, we found that there is ‘sufficient cause’ 
for the Court to extend the period for making the Award. Thus, we 
have allowed the appeal and extended the time till 31st December, 
2024 to make the Award. In this context, we have also explained the 
purport of the expression sufficient cause employed in this section.
3.	
The brief facts are as follows. The appellant entered into a works 
contract with respondent no. 1. Subsequently when disputes arose, 
appellant sought resolution through arbitration by issuing a notice 
on 12.02.2018. Appellant’s application under Section 11 of the Act 
for appointment of a sole arbitrator was allowed by the High Court 
by orders dated 08.02.2019 and 15.02.2019. 
3.1	 After the first meeting of the Arbitral Tribunal on 24.06.2019, 
parties were given time to complete their pleadings, which 
were in-fact completed on 09.10.2019. The statutorily stipulated
12-month period under Section 29A(1) for making the award 
commences from this date, and would expire on 08.10.2020. 
Further, as the parties can extend this period by another 6 
months by mutual consent as per Section 29A(3), upon such 
mutual extension the time for making the award got extended till 
09.04.2021. Therefore, the 18-month period, which commenced 
from 09.10.2019, would have naturally expired on 09.04.2021. 
3.2	 However, before the expiry of the said period, in fact even 
before the first stretch of 12 months, the nation was affected by 
1	
Hereinafter “the Act”.
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M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr.
the COVID pandemic. Taking note of this situation, this Court 
in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation by order dated 
10.01.2022 passed orders declaring that the period between 
15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022 shall be excluded in computing 
periods of limitation under Sections 23(4) and 29(A) of the Act.2 
The relevant portion of the said order is as under:
“5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced 
by the learned counsel and the impact of the surge 
of the virus on public health and adversities faced 
by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it 
appropriate to dispose of MA No. 21 of 2022 with 
the following directions:
***
5.4. It is further clarified that the period from  
15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall also stand excluded 
in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 
23(4) and 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act, 1996, Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts 
Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any 
other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for 
instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the 
court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination 
of proceedings.”
3.3	 Returning to the arbitral proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal framed 
issues on 21.11.2019 and posted the matter for arguments for 
December 2019 and January 2020 but was compelled to adjourn 
the proceedings due to the
pandemic. The record reveals that 
the proceedings resumed in the year 2022, and in fact, the 
hearing was concluded on 05.05.2023. It is an admitted fact 
that the parties to the arbitration agreement have submitted 
before the Arbitral Tribunal that they would move the Court under 
Section 29A(4) of the Act for appropriate orders for extension 
of time for making the award. In furtherance of the undertaking, 
an application under Section 29A(4) was filed by the appellant 
before the Gujarat High Court on 01.08.2023. 
2	
In re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (2022) 3 SCC 117.
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4.	
By the order dated 03.11.2023 impugned before us, the High Court 
dismissed the application. The High Court reasoned that the initial 
statutory period of 12 months expired on 08.10.2020, and the same 
was extended by the mutual consent of the parties till 09.04.2021. 
Noting that the application for extension was preferred only in August 
2023, High Court held that there is no explanation for a delay of 
more than 2 years, 4 months in approaching it. The High Court 
held that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal stood terminated on 
09.04.2021, at which point there was not even an application for 
extension of time pending before it. In this view of the matter, the 
application was found to be misconceived, and was dismissed by 
the order impugned before us.
5.	
We have heard Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned senior counsel for 
the appellant, and Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned ASG for the 
respondents. 
5.1	 Relying on this Court’s declaration Re: Cognizance for Extension 
of Limitation dated 10.01.2022 extending limitation on account 
of the pandemic,3 Mr. Agrawal submits that the High Court 
ought to have excluded the period between 15.03.2020 and 
28.02.2022 while determining the date on which the Tribunal’s 
mandate stood terminated. Further, he submits that the 
respondent had agreed to apply for extension of time before 
the Arbitral Tribunal, as is recorded in the Minutes of Arbitral 
Meeting dated 05.05.2023. 
5.2
Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, submits that even if the benefit of 
this Court’s order is considered, the Tribunal’s mandate expired 
on 31.10.2022, and there is still a nine-month delay in filing the 
application. Further, placing reliance on a recent decision of this 
Court in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India 
Ltd.,4 he submits that an application under Section 29A(4) must 
be filed before the mandate of the Tribunal expires. It cannot be 
subsequently filed as the provision stipulates termination of the 
Tribunal’s mandate on expiry of the statutory and extendable 
period.
3	
ibid. 
4	
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494.
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M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr.
6.	
Having heard learned senior counsel and the learned ASG, there 
are two issues that we must consider:
i.	
Whether the application for extension can be entertained if it is 
filed after the expiry of the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate? 
ii.	
If yes, do the facts and circumstances warrant an extension in 
the present case?
7.	
When must an application under Section 29A(4) be filed. The first 
issue is no longer res integra in view of a recent decision of this 
Court in Rohan Builders (supra). Despite Mr. Banerjee’s reliance on 
this decision, we find that it squarely covers the issue against him. 
Before dealing with this decision, it is necessary to take note of the 
text and wording of the relevant portion of Section 29A of the Act:
“29A. Time limit for arbitral award.— (1) The award in 
matters other than international commercial arbitration 
shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of 
twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings 
under sub-section (4) of section 23: 
Provided that the award in the matter of international 
commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously as 
possible and endeavor may be made to dispose of the 
matter within a period of twelve months from the date of 
completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23. 
***
(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified 
in sub-section (1) for making award for a further period 
not
exceeding six months.
(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in 
sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-
section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate 
unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of 
the period so specified, extended the period: 
Provided that while extending the period under this sub-
section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been 
delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal,
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then, it may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not 
exceeding five per cent. For each month of such delay:
Provided further that where an application under sub-
section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall 
continue till the disposal of the said application: 
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an 
opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced. 
(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-section (4) 
may be on the application of any of the parties and may 
be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms 
and conditions as may be imposed by the Court.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.	
The effect of the provision is that if the arbitral award is not made 
within 12 months from when the pleadings are completed, extendable 
by a further 6 months by mutual consent of parties, the Tribunal’s 
mandate will terminate, unless the court either prior or after the expiry 
of the period, extends it. The wording of sub-section (4) clearly and 
explicitly enables a court to extend the Tribunal’s mandate after expiry 
of the statutory and extendable period of 18 months. 
9.	
This Court in Rohan Builders (supra) has held that the application 
for extension of time can be filed even after the expiry of the period 
in sub-sections (1) and (3).5 Even if sub-section (4) provides for the 
termination of the Tribunal’s mandate on the expiry of the period, 
it recognises party autonomy to move an
application before the 
Court for further extension.6 Thus, the termination of mandate under 
the provision is only conditional on the non-filing of an extension 
application, and cannot be taken to mean that the mandate cannot 
be extended once it expires.7 The relevant portion of the judgment 
is extracted:
“6. Section 29A(4) is the provision which requires 
interpretation. It states that where the award is not made 
5	
Rohan Builders (supra), para 6.
6	
ibid, paras 10 and 11. 
7	
ibid, para 12.
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within the specified period of twelve or eighteen months, 
the mandate of the arbitral tribunal will terminate. However, 
this provision does not apply if the court has extended 
the period, either before or after the expiry of the initial 
or the extended term. In other words, Section 29A(4) 
empowers the court to extend the period for making of 
the arbitral award beyond a period of twelve months or 
eighteen months, as the case may be. The expression 
“either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified” 
is unambiguous. It can be deduced by the language that 
the court can extend the time where an application is filed 
after the expiry of the period under subsection (1) or the 
extended period in terms of sub-section (3). The court has 
the power to extend the period for making an award at 
any time before or after the mandated period.”
(emphasis supplied) 
10.	 The wording of Section 29A(4) and the decision in Rohan Builders 
(supra) clearly answer the first issue in favour of the appellant, i.e., 
an application for extension can be filed either before or after the 
termination of the Tribunal’s mandate upon expiry of the statutory 
and extendable period.
11.	 Whether extension must be granted. The next question is whether 
an extension of time should be granted in the present case. As per 
Section 29A(5), the decision to extend the time is an exercise of 
discretion by the court and
must be done on sufficient cause being 
shown, and on such terms and conditions that the court deems fit.8 
This Court, in Rohan Builders (supra), has held:
“14. In our opinion, a restrictive interpretation would lead 
to rigour, impediments and complexities. A party would 
have to rush to the court even when the period of arbitral 
mandate of twelve months has not expired, notwithstanding 
the possibility of a consent-based extension of six months 
under Section 29A(3). Narrow interpretation presents an 
additional challenge by relegating a faultless party to a fresh 
8	
ibid, para 15.
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reference or appointment of an arbitrator under the A&C Act, 
2015, thereby impeding arbitration rather than facilitating 
it. The legislature vide the 2015 Amendment envisions 
arbitration as a litigant-centric process by expediting 
disposal of cases and reducing the cost of litigation. A 
narrow interpretation will be counterproductive….
15. Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) highlights that 
an interpretation allowing an extension application post 
the expiry period would encourage rogue litigants and 
render the timeline for making the award inconsequential. 
However, it is apposite to note that under Section 29A(5), 
the power of the court to extend the time is to be exercised 
only in cases where there is sufficient cause for such 
extension. Such extension is not granted mechanically on 
filing of the application. The judicial discretion of the court 
in terms of the enactment acts as a deterrent against any 
party abusing the process of law or espousing a frivolous or 
vexatious application. Further, the court can impose terms 
and conditions while granting an extension. Delay, even 
on the part of the arbitral tribunal, is not countenanced. 
The first proviso to Section 29A(4) permits a fee reduction 
of up to five percent for each month of delay attributable 
to the arbitral tribunal.”
12.	 The issue before us is not whether the application under Section 
29A(4) is filed within the permissible time for
seeking extension, 
i.e., 12 months, followed by another 6 months at the consent of 
the parties. The real issue is whether there is a sufficient cause 
for the Court to extend the period for making of the award. For 
considering whether there is a sufficient cause or not, it is necessary 
to take into account the following events. As indicated earlier, even 
before expiry of the period of 12 months under Section 29A(1), 
commencing from 09.10.2019 (date of completion of pleadings), 
the COVID pandemic had started. The period between 15.03.2020 
and 28.02.2022 is anyways mandated to be excluded from periods 
of limitation.9 Therefore, from the date of completion of pleadings 
till 15.03.2020, only a period of 5 months is taken. If the remainder 
9	
In re, Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra), para 5.4.
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M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr.
of the 18 months period is reckoned from 28.02.2022, the said 
period would expire on 31.03.2023. In other words, the appellant 
would have been within the period specified under Section 29A(1) 
read with Section 29A(3) had it filed the application by such date. 
However, the problem arose because the application was filed on 
01.08.2023. Really speaking, it is the period commencing from 
31.03.2023 to 01.08.2023 that the Court is to take into account for 
considering whether there is sufficient cause to exercise the power 
under Section 29A(5) to extend the period. 
13.	 In view of the above, it is clear that the reasoning adopted by the 
High Court in holding that there is a delay of 2 years, 4 months in 
filing the application is erroneous. 
14.	 We will have to consider if there is sufficient cause for not filing 
the application before 31.03.2023. In the application for extension, 
the appellant has submitted that the reasons for extension of 
time are as follows: (i) the Arbitral Tribunal proceeded with online 
hearings in 2022, but was required to adjourn the proceedings on 
several occasions at the request of the respondents’ counsel as the 
panel from which the arbitrator was appointed had been changed. 
(ii) That the dispute involved technical and legal questions, and the 
record of the case is bulky. (iii) That the delay is neither attributable 
to the parties, nor to the Arbitral
Tribunal, who have acted in a 
prompt and cautious manner. (iv) The hearing is complete, and 
only the award needs to be declared, thereby leading to hardship 
to the parties if the time for making the award is not extended. On 
these grounds, the appellant prayed for a one-month extension 
under Section 29A(4). 
15.	 Efficiency in the conduct of arbitral proceedings is integral to the 
effectiveness of the dispute resolution remedy through arbitration. 
Efficiency is inextricably connected with expeditious conclusion of 
arbitral proceedings. While the statute incorporates party autonomy 
even with respect to the conduct and conclusion of arbitral 
proceedings, there is a statutory recognition of the power of the 
Court to step in wherever it is necessary to ensure that the process 
of resolution of the dispute is taken to its logical end, if according to 
the Court, the circumstances so warrant. It is in this context that the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act adopts the well-known language of
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limitation statutes and provides that the Court can extend the time 
if it finds that there is sufficient cause. 
16.	 The meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ for extending the time to make an 
award must take colour from the underlying purpose of the arbitration 
process. The primary objective in rendering an arbitral award is to 
resolve disputes through the agreed dispute resolution mechanism 
as contracted by the parties. Therefore, ‘sufficient cause’ should be 
interpreted in the context of facilitating effective dispute resolution. 
17.	 Having taken note of the fact that the pandemic had commenced 
even before the expiry of 12 months from the completion of pleadings, 
this Court excluding the period between 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2023 in 
Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra), and the agreement 
between the parties on 05.05.2023 to seek extension of time by filing 
an application before the Court, we are of the opinion that there is 
sufficient cause for extension of time. 
18.	 In view of the above, we allow the Civil Appeal arising out of 
SLP (C) No. 2272/2024 and set aside the order and judgment passed 
by the High Court in MCA No. 1/2023 dated 03.11.2023, and extend 
the period for making of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal till 31st 
December, 2024. 
19.	 The parties shall bear their own costs.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain