KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA & ORS. versus NANJUNDASWAMY & ORS.
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 153, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 153 : 2023 INSC 964
153
CASE DETAILS
KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA & ORS.
v.
NANJUNDASWAMY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7413 of 2023)
OCTOBER 31, 2023
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA AND 
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Correct application of the principle 
underlying the rejection of plaints u/Or.VII, r.11, Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908, to the facts of the case and the legality of rejection of a plaint in part.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.VII, r.11 – Rejection of Plaints 
– Principle underlying – Application of – Plaintiﬀ s and the Defendants 
no.1-3 were members of a joint family owning properties mentioned 
in Schedule A and B of the plaint – Plaintiﬀ s ﬁ led plaint for partition 
and separate possession – Defendants’ application for rejection of the 
plaint u/Or.VII, r.11, CPC was dismissed by Trial Court – High Court 
allowed the application in part, and rejected the Plaint with respect to 
Schedule-A property observing that the property described therein was 
sold way back in 1919 via a registered Sale Deed and the Plaintiﬀ s did 
not deny the sale – Legality:
Held: The true test is ﬁ rst to read the plaint meaningfully and as a whole, 
taking it to be true – Upon such reading, if the plaint discloses a cause of action, 
then the application u/Or.VII,r.11 must fail – The plaint shall be rejected where it 
does not disclose a cause of action – In the present case, High Court committed 
error by examining the merits of the
matter – It pre-judged the truth, legality and 
validity of the sale deed under which the Defendants No. 4 to 14 claim title – 
High Court could not have anticipated the truth of the averments by assuming 
that the alleged previous sale of the property is complete or that it has been 
acted upon – Approach adopted by the High Court is incorrect and contrary
154 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
to the well-entrenched principles of considering an application u/Or.VII Rule 
11 – High Court erred in rejecting the plaint in part with respect to Schedule-A 
property and permitting the Plaintiﬀ s to prosecute the case only with respect to 
Schedule-B property – This approach is impermissible – Impugned the judgment 
passed in revision petition set aside – Application u/Or.VII, r.11 dismissed, the 
suit even with respect to properties mentioned under Schedule A of the Plaint 
restored. [Paras 7, 10-13]
LISTS OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (2020) 7 SCC 366: [2020] 
5 SCR 694; Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd (2018) 11 SCC 
780: [2017] 7 SCR 557; Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd (2019) 
7 SCC 158: 2019 8 SCR 1058 – relied on.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.7413 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.11.2015 of the High Court of 
Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRP No.158 of 2010.
Appearances:
P V Yogeshwaran, M. A. Chinnasamy, Mrs. C. Rubavathi, C. 
Raghavendren, V. Senthil Kumar, Devendra Pratap Singh, Ashis Upadhay, 
Advs. for the Appellants.
S. Nandakumar, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Ashok Kumar Singh, 
Rajeev Gupta, Naresh Kumar, Advs. for the respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. 
1. Leave granted.
2.  In this appeal, we are called upon
to decide two questions. The 
ﬁ rst relates to the true and correct application of the principle underlying
155
the ‘rejection of plaints’ under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 
19081, to the facts of the case. The second question relates to the legality of 
rejection of a plaint in part. For the reasons to follow, we have held that the 
High Court has committed an error in passing the order impugned, on both 
counts. First, by misapplying the well-established principles informing Order 
VII Rule 11 of the CPC, and second, by rejecting the plaint in part, which 
is again contrary to the law on the subject. We have, therefore, allowed the 
appeal and dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. We 
will ﬁ rst indicate the necessary facts.
3. Mr. P V Yogeshwaran, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, 
assisted by Mr. M.A. Chinnasamy, Mrs. C Rubavathi, Mr. C Raghavendren, 
Mr. V Senthil Kumar, Mr. Devendra Pratap Singh and Mr. Ashis Upadhay 
submitted that the Plaintiﬀ s along with the Defendants No. 1 to 3 are 
members of a joint family owning properties mentioned in Schedule A and 
B of the plaint. He has taken us through the plaint where it is averred that 
the karta of the family, late Shri Munivenkata Bhovi had many properties 
and was in a habit of temporarily mortgaging properties for raising ﬁ nances 
by executing what are referred to as ‘nominal sale deeds’. Once dues were 
cleared, reconveyance deeds were executed. It is speciﬁ cally averred that this 
practice was adopted by the karta to maintain the family and the persons in 
whose favour
these documents were executed were also close acquaintances 
of the family. As such, the possession of the joint family properties was 
never parted. It is also pleaded that when the Plaintiﬀ s asked for partition, 
initially the Defendants did not deny it, but instead, only asked the Plaintiﬀ s 
to wait till the revenue records were updated so that actual partition could 
be eﬀ ected. Hence, Plaintiﬀ s presented a plaint for partition and separate 
possession.
4. Four years after the suit was instituted, the Defendants ﬁ led a petition 
seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. While the 
Trial Court dismissed the application on the ground that the plaint does 
disclose a cause of action, the High Court, by the impugned order, observed 
that the property in survey No. 76/1 (described in schedule A of the plaint) 
1 
Hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’.
KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY 
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]
156 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
was sold way back in 1919 via a registered Sale Deed. The High Court 
reasoned that the Plaintiﬀ s did not deny the sale, but only urged that there 
was a subsequent re-conveyancing of the property back to the joint family, 
without a corresponding mutation of revenue records. Impressed by the fact 
that the Plaintiﬀ s neither produced any evidence to challenge the Sale Deed 
from 1919, nor sought any declaratory relief against the Sale Deed, High 
Court proceeded to allow the application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC 
in part, and rejected the Plaint with respect to Schedule-A property. Shri 
Yogeshwaran submitted that the High Court committed an error in allowing 
the Revision and consequently, the application under Order VII Rule 11, 
CPC.
5. Shri S. Nandakumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, 
with the assistance of Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh, 
Mr. Rajeev Gupta and Mr. Naresh Kumar, on the other hand, supported the 
reasoning and conclusion of the High Court.
6. Before considering the legality of the approach adopted by the High 
Court, it is necessary to consider Order VII Rule 11, CPC2 and the precedents 
on the subject. The relevant principles have been succinctly explained in a 
recent decision of this Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali,3 
as follows:
2 
  11. Rejection of plaint.—The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases—
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiﬀ , on being required by the 
court to correct the valuation within a time to be ﬁ xed by the court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper 
insuﬃ  ciently stamped, and the plaintiﬀ , on being required by the court to supply the 
requisite stamp paper within a time to be ﬁ xed by the court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

(e) where it is not ﬁ led in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiﬀ  fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9:

Provided that the time ﬁ xed by the court for the correction of the valuation or supplying 
of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be 
recorded, is satisﬁ ed that the plaintiﬀ  was prevented by any cause of an exceptional 
nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case 
may be, within the time ﬁ xed by the court and that refusal to extend such time would 
cause grave injustice to the plaintiﬀ .
3 
(2020) 7 SCC 366.
157
“23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special 
remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at 
the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting 
a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisﬁ ed that the 
action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this 
provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no 
cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under 
Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiﬀ  to unnecessarily 
protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be 
necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial 
time is not wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 
1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja 
v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823] this 
Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this 
provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound 
to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the 
court, in the following words : (SCC p. 324, para 12)
 “12. … The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to 
ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove 
abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, 
and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles 
need
not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without 
point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court 
readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose 
any cause of action.”
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, 
however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 
11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine 
whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the 
averments in the plaint [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. 
M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] , read in conjunction with the 
documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.
KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY 
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]
158 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
...
23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would 
determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory 
law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the 
plaint at the threshold is made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written 
statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would 
be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. 
[Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137]
23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is that 
if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction 
with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree 
being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & 
I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. 
Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads as : (SCC 
p. 562, para 139)
“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is 
essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not 
must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said 
purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must 
be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments 
made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a 
decree would be passed.”
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. [Hardesh Ores (P) 
Ltd.
v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that it 
is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it 
in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has 
to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without 
addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint 
prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an 
enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran 
v. R.V. Janakiraman [D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999) 
3 SCC 267; See also Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, 
AIR 1962 SC 941] .
159
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit 
is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a 
right to sue, the court would be justiﬁ ed in exercising the power under 
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by 
the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, 
or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of 
the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. 
State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 
1 SCC 557] . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must 
necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain 
case [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed 
in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC 
OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823]. 
23.15. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states 
that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds speciﬁ ed in 
clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court ﬁ nds that the plaint does 
not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, 
the court has no option, but to reject the plaint”
7. In simple terms, the true test is ﬁ rst to read the plaint meaningfully 
and as a whole, taking it to be true. Upon such reading, if the plaint discloses 
a cause of action, then the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC 
must fail. To put it
negatively, where it does not disclose a cause of action, 
the plaint shall be rejected.
8. Following this clear principle, we will now consider the averments 
made in the plaint. The relevant portions of the plaint are as follows: 
“The plaintiﬀ s submit that the said joint family of late Muniventkata 
Bhovi was in the habit of raising ﬁ nance whenever it was needed on 
the strength of the said land in survey number 76/1 later renumbered 
as 76/2 by executing nominal sale deeds and used to clear the same 
and used to get necessary reconveying documents... the same habit 
continued even after the death of late Munivenkata Bhovi by his wives... 
the said landing survey number 76/2 always continued to be and is in 
possession of the joint family of the plaintiﬀ s...
KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY 
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]
160 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
The plaintiﬀ s submit that many times even after clearing the debts 
due to the said ﬁ nanciers, there was reconveyance deeds or release 
deeds in favour of the plaintiﬀ s joint family in its favour since they had 
immense conﬁ dence in Karibasappa’s family and there was no trouble 
regarding their joint possession of the said joint family properties...
The plaintiﬀ s submit that the attitude of defendants 1 to 3 towards 
plaintiﬀ s’ welfare became disinterested and they started neglecting 
them ... some of the plaintiﬀ s tried to make the defendants 1 to 3 to 
take some steps ... the said defendants 1 to 3 advised them and other 
plaintiﬀ s to have patience as lot of documents and revenue entries 
have to be updated before dividing the suit schedule properties and 
give separate possession to each sharers including plaintiﬀ s ... 
The plaintiﬀ s submit that the said joint family has no debts and the 
suit schedule properties are available for partition ...
Plaintiﬀ s 1 to 6 submit that instead of partitioning the said suit schedule 
properties among the plaintiﬀ s and the defendants 1 to 3, the said 
defendants have started making eﬀ orts to alienate the same to others 
in the month of May 2005 ... they even made it clear that the heirs of 
Karibasappa and themselves will create all sorts of problems to the 
plaintiﬀ s for daring to question them and they claimed that several 
documents have been created in respect of the suit
schedule properties 
and revenue records and built up in the names of their own man and 
they will cause all sorts of obstructions to the plaintiﬀ s in realising 
their shares and even create third party interests therein and induct 
others into the possession thereof...”
It is apparent from the above that, the Plaintiﬀ s speciﬁ cally pleaded 
that various sales were executed through ‘nominal sale deeds’, but were not 
acted upon. The plaint of the joint family property speciﬁ cally addressed the 
issue of the revenue records and averred that although the RTC records stood 
in the name of the ﬁ nanciers, the joint family continued to be in undisrupted 
possession of the property.
9.  If the statements in the plaint are taken to be true, the joint family 
properties may enure to the beneﬁ t of its members and they may well be 
available for partition. This is a matter of trial, the result of which would
161
depend upon the evidence adduced by the Plaintiﬀ . At this stage, we are 
not concerned with the correctness of the averments, except to state that the 
Plaintiﬀ s have the carriage of the proceedings, and have to discharge the 
heavy burden of proving their case. In so far as the application under Order 
VII Rule 11 of CPC is concerned, this Court will proceed only that far, to 
examine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, and no further. 
10. The High Court committed an error by examining the merits of the 
matter. It pre-judged the truth, legality and validity of the sale deed under 
which the Defendants No. 4 to 14 claim title. This is not to say that the 
Plaintiﬀ s have any less burden to prove their case or even that their case is 
probable. Simply put, the High Court could not have anticipated the truth 
of the averments by assuming that the alleged previous sale of the property 
is complete or that it has been acted upon. The approach adopted by the 
High Court is incorrect and contrary to the well-entrenched principles of 
considering an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. Under these 
circumstances, we set aside the judgment and the order passed by the High 
Court and dismiss the application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, and 
restore the suit even with respect to properties mentioned under Schedule 
A of the Plaint.
11. There is yet another reason why the judgment of the High Court 
is not sustainable. In an application under Order VII Rule
11, CPC a plaint 
cannot be rejected in part. This principle is well established and has been 
continuously followed since the 1936 decision in Maqsud Ahmad v. Mathra 
Datt & Co4. This principle is also explained in a recent decision of this Court 
in Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd,5 which was again followed 
in Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd.6 The relevant portion of 
Madhav Prasad (supra) is extracted hereinunder:
“10. We do not deem it necessary to elaborate on all other arguments 
as we are inclined to accept the objection of the appellant(s) that the 
relief of rejection of plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 
11(d) CPC cannot be pursued only in respect of one of the defendant(s). 
4 
  AIR 1936 Lahore 1021
5 
  (2018) 11 SCC 780.
6 
  (2019) 7 SCC 158.
KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY 
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]
162 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
In other words, the plaint has to be rejected as a whole or not at all, in 
exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. Indeed, the learned 
Single Judge rejected this objection raised by the appellant(s) by 
relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the same High Court. 
However, we ﬁ nd that the decision of this Court in Sejal Glass Ltd. 
[Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd., (2018) 11 SCC 780 
: (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 256] is directly on the point. In that case, an 
application was ﬁ led by the defendant(s) under Order 7 Rule 11(d) 
CPC stating that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. The civil court 
held that the plaint is to be bifurcated as it did not disclose any cause 
of action against the Director’s Defendant(s) 2 to 4 therein. On that 
basis, the High Court had opined that the suit can continue against 
Defendant 1 company alone. The question considered by this Court was 
whether such a course is open to the civil court in exercise of powers 
under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The Court answered the said question 
in the negative by adverting to several decisions on the point which 
had consistently held that the plaint can either be rejected as a whole 
or not at all. The Court held that it is not permissible to reject plaint 
qua any particular portion of a plaint including against some of the 
defendant(s) and continue the same against the others. In no uncertain 
terms the Court has held that if
the plaint survives against certain 
defendant(s) and/or properties, Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC will have no 
application at all, and the suit as a whole must then proceed to trial.
...
12. Indubitably, the plaint can and must be rejected in exercise of 
powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC on account of non-compliance 
with mandatory requirements or being replete with any institutional 
deﬁ ciency at the time of presentation of the plaint, ascribable to 
clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC. In other words, the plaint 
as presented must proceed as a whole or can be rejected as a whole 
but not in part...” 
(emphasis supplied)
12. In view of the above referred principle, we have no hesitation in 
holding that the High Court committed an error in rejecting the plaint in part 
with respect to Schedule-A property and permitting the Plaintiﬀ s to prosecute
163
the case only with respect to Schedule-B property. This approach while 
considering an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC is impermissible. 
We, therefore, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court even on 
this ground.
13. For the reasons stated above, the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP 
(C) No. 8147 of 2016 is allowed and the impugned judgment and order of 
the High Court of Karnataka in Civil Revision Petition No. 158 of 2010 
dated 09.11.2015, is set-aside.
14. In view of the fact that the present proceedings arise out of a suit 
instituted in 2005, we request the Trial Court to take up the trial and dispose 
of the suit expeditiously. 
15. Parties will bear their own costs.
Headnotes prepared by:  
Appeal allowed.
Divya Pandey
KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY 
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]