LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 731, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 731 
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED 
v. 
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No.6223 of2016) 
OCTOBER 18,2016 
[A.K. SIKRI AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.] 
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B 
Building and other Construction Workers (Regulation of 
Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 - Buildings and 
other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act,) 996 - Appellants· C 
undertaking construction activity wherein they had planned to set 
up their factories - ln the process of construction of civil works, 
construction workers engaged - Case of respondent authorities 
that the appellants to pay the cess for the welfare of the said workers 
engaged in the construction work since the provisions of the BOCW 
Act and the Welfare Cess Act meant for construction workers became 
applicable - Case of the appellants that provisions of the Factories 
Act apply to the construction of building/project of the appellants -
Held: Construction workers are not covered by the Factories Act -
Thus, they are entitled to the welfare measures provided for such 
workers under BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act - Appellants to pay 
cess for the welfare of the said workers - Factories Act, 1948. 
Dismissing the appeals and the petitions, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The construction workers are not covered by 
the Factories Act, 1948 and, therefore, welfare measures 
specifically provided for such workers under the Building and 
other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and 
Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 and the
Buildings and other 
Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996 cannot be denied. 
[Para 34)(759-F-G] 
1.2 On the conjoint reading of section 2(m), 2(k) & 2(1) of 
the Factories Act, it becomes clear that "factory" is that 
establishment where manufacturing process is carried on with or 
without the aid of power. Carrying on this manufacturing process 
or manufacturing activity is thus a prerequisite. It is equally 
pertinent to note that it covers only those workers who are 
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engaged in the said manufacturing process. Insofar as these 
appellants are concerned, construction of building is not their 
business activity or manufacturing process. In fact, the building 
is being constructed for carrying out the particular manufacturing 
process, which, in most of these appeals, is generation, 
transmission and distribution of power. Obviously, the workers 
who are engaged in construction of the building also do not fall 
within the definition of 'worker' under the Factories Act. On these 
two aspects there is no cleavage and both parties are at ad idem. 
What follows is that these construction workers are not covered 
by the provisions of the Factories Act. [Para 21)(753-D-G) 
1.3 Having regard to the above, if the submission of the 
appellants is accepted, the construction workers engaged in the 
construction of building undertaken by the appellants which is to 
be used ultimately as factory, would stand excluded from the 
provisions of BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act as well. This could 
not be the intention while providing the definition of 'building 
and other construction work' in Section 2(d) ofBOCW Act. [Para 
22)(753-G-H; 754-A] 
1.4 The High Court was right in observing that merely 
because the appellants have obtained a licence under Section 6 
of the Factories Act for registration to work a factory, it would 
not follow therefrom that they answer the description of the
"factory" within the meaning of the Factories Act. A bare reading 
of the definition of factory, thereof makes it abundantly clear that 
before this stage, when construction of the project is completed 
and the manufacturing process starts, 'factory' within the meaning 
of Section 2(m) of the Factories Act does not come into existence 
so as to be covered by the said Act. [Para 23)[754-B-C) 
1.5 Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act dealing with the building 
or construction work is in three parts. In the first part, different 
activities arc mentioned which are to be covered by the said 
expression, namely, construction, alterations, repairs, 
maintenance or demolition. Second part of the definition is aimed 
at those buildings or works in relation to which the aforesaid 
activities are carried out. The third part of the definition contains 
exclusion clause by stipulating that it docs not include 'any 
building or other construction work to which the provisions of
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH 
the Factories Act, 1948, or the Mines Act, 1952 applies'. Thus, 
first part of the definition contains the nature of activity; second 
part contains the subject matter in relation to which the activity 
is carried out and third part excludes those building or other 
construction work to which the provisions of Factories Act or 
Mines Act apply. [Para 24)(754-D-F] 
1.6 The construction of the projects of the appellants is 
covered by the definition of"building or other construction work" 
as it satisfies first two ~lements of the definition. In order to see 
whether exclusion clause applies, the words 'but does not include 
any building or other construction work to which the provisions 
of the Factories Act apply are to be interpreted. The provisions 
of the Factories Act do not apply to the construction of building/ 
project of the appellants. The provisions of the Factories Act 
would "apply" only when the manufacturing process starts for 
which the building/project is being constructed and not to the 
activity of construction of the project. That is how the exclusion 
clause is to be interpreted and that would be the plain meaning of 
the said clause. [Para 25)(754-G-H; 755-A-B] 
Orf{ano Chemical Industries v. Union of India 1980 (1) 
SCR 61 : (1979) 4 SCC 573 - referred to. 
1. 7 The said meaning attributed to the exclusion clause of 
the definition is also in consonance with the objective and purpose 
which is
sought to be achieved by the enactment of BOCW Act 
and Welfare Cess Act. If the construction of this provision as 
suggested by the appellants is accepted, the construction workers 
who are engaged in the construction of buildings/projects would 
neither get the benefit of the Factories Act nor of BOCW Act/ 
Welfare Cess Act. That could not have been the intention of the 
Legislature. BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act are pieces of social 
security legislation to provide for certain benefits to the 
construction workers. [Para 26] [755-F-H] 
1.8 Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration 
legislation is an imperative, irrespective of anything else. 
'Superior purpose' contained in BOCW Act and Welfare Cess 
Act has to be kept in mind when two enactments - the Factories 
Act on the one hand and BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act on the 
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other hand, are involved, both of which are welfare legislations. 
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[Paras 27, 32)(756-A-B) 
Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank 2000 (2) SCR 1102 : 
(2000) 4 sec 406 - relied on. 
Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia 1988 (2) Suppl. 
SCR 528 : (1988) 4 SCC 284; MP. Mineral Industry 
Association v. Regional Labour Commr. (Central) AIR 
1960 SC 1068 : 1960 SCR 476; Surendra Kumar Verma 
v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal 1981 (1) 
SCR 789 : (1980) 4 SCC 443; Workmen of American 
Express v. ManaKement <?(American Express (1985) 4 
SCC 71; Carew and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India 1976 
(1) SCR 379 : (1975) 2 SCC 791; Bombay Anand 
Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director. Employees' State 
Insurance Corporation & Anr. (2009) 9 SCC 61; 
Pegasus Assets Reconstruction P. Ltd. v. Mis. Haryana 
Concast Limited & Anr 2016 (1) SCALE 1; Richa 
Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others 2016 (1) 
SCR 316 : (2016) 4 SCC 179; Shailesh Dhairyawan v. 
Mohan Balkrishna Lu/la 2015 SCR 70 : (2016) 3 SCC 
619 - referred to. 
1.9 The submission that while granting permission under 
the Factories Act, various conditions are imposed which the 
appellants are required to fulfill and these conditions are almost 
the same which are contained in BOCW Act, cannot be accepted. 
Registration under the Factories Act becomes necessary in view 
of provisions contained in Section 6 of the said Act as this Section 
requires taking of
approval and registration of factories even at 
preparatory stage i.e. at the stage when the premises where 
factory is to operate has to ensure that construction will be done 
in such a manner that it takes care of safety measures etc. which 
arc provided in the Factories Act. This means to ensure that 
construction is carried out in such a manner that provisions in 
the Factories Act to ensure health, safety and provisions relating 
to hazardous process as well as welfare measures are taken care 
of. It is for this reason that even after the building is completed 
before it is occupied, notice under Section 7 is to be given by the 
occupier to the Chief Inspector of Factories so that a necessary
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH 
inspection is carried out to verify that all such measures are in 
place. Therefore, when the permissions for construction of 
factories is given, the purpose is altogether different. [Para 
33)(759-C-F) 
1.10 It is made clear that insofar as objection to the 
calculation of cess as contained in the show cause notices is 
concerned, it would be open to the appellants to agitate the same 
before the adjudicating authorities. [Para 35][760-A-B) 
Punjab Land Development and Reclamation 
Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, 
Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others 1990 (3) SCR 
111 : (1990) 3 SCC 682; B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi 1979 
(2) SCR 409 : (1979) 1 SCC 361; Shri Hariprasad 
Shivshanker Shukla and another v. Shri A.D. Divelkar 
and others 1957 SCR 121; Regional Director, Employees 
State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja 
Match Industries 1985 (2) SCR 119 : (1985) 1 SCC 
218; Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu and 
Others 2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 60 : (2001) 7 SCC 71; 
Shyam Sunder and others v. Ram Kumar and another 
2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 115 : (2001) 8 SCC 24; Grasim 
Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay 2002 
(2) SCR 945 : (2002) 4 SCC 297; Deepal Girishbhai 
Soni and Others v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 
Baroda 2004 SCR 213 : (2004) 5 SCC 385; Bhikusa 
Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and another 
1964 SCR (1) 860; Dewan Chand Builders and 
Contractors v. Union of India and
Others 2011 (13) 
SCR 214 : (2012) 1 SCC 101- referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
1990 (3) SCR 111 
referred to 
Para 10 
1979 (2) SCR 409 
referred to· 
Para 10 
1957 SCR 121 
referred to 
Para 10 
1985 (2) SCR 119 
referred to 
Para 10 
2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 60 
referred to 
Para 10 
2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 115 
referred to 
Para 10 
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2902 (2) SCR 945 
referred to 
Para 10 
2004 SCR 213 
referred to 
Para 10 
1964 _S(:R (1) 860 
referred to 
Para 13 
2011 (13) SCR 214 
referred to 
Para 16 
B 
1980 (1) SCR 61 
referred to 
Para25 
1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 528 
referred to 
Para27 
1960 SCR 476 
referred to 
Para28 
1981 (1) SCR 789 
referred to 
Para 28 
c 
(1985) 4 sec 11 
referred to 
Para 29 
1976 (1) SCR 379 
referred to 
Para30 
(2009) 9 sec 61 
referred to 
Para 31 
2000 (2) SCR 1102 
relied on 
Para32 
D 
2016 (1) SCALE 1 
referred to 
Para32 
2016 (1) SCR 316 
referred to 
Para32 
2015 SCR 70 
referred to 
Para32 
E 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6223 
of2016 
WITH 
Civil Appeal Nos. 10187-10188of2016 
W.P. (C) No. 64 of2012 
F 
W.P. (C) No. 848 of2013 
W.P. (C) No. 385 of2014 
Civil Appeal No. 6569of2014 
G 
T.P. (C) No. 342 of2014 
T.C. (C) No. 29 of2015 
W.P. (C) No. 174 of2016 
W.P. (C) No. 311 of2016 
H 
Civil Appeal No. 6571 of2014
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
737 
PRADESH 
T.C. (C) No. 38 of2016 
CivilAppealNo.10186of2016 
W.P. (C) No. 698 of2016 
CivilAppealNo.10189of2016. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.04.2015 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Tax No. 772of2011. 
Ms. Pinki Anand, ASG, C. A. Sundaram, Gaurab Banerji, Ravindra 
Srivastava, Rana Mukherj i, Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Sr. Advs., Akhil 
Sibal, Deepak Khurana, Ms. Aditi Sharma, Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Amar 
Dave, Mahesh Agarwal, Ankur Saigal, Ms. Sadapurna Mukherjee, 
Satyendra Kumar, E. C. Agrawala, Vikrant Panchnanada, Mahesh 
Agarwal, Ms. Neha Nagpal, Shashank Mani sh, Ms. Vaidehi Misra, Sahil 
Tagotra, 8. S. Banthia, Prashant Shukla,Alok Hoonka, Nitin Gupta, Kush 
Agrawal, Nikilesh Ramachandran, Neeraj Shekhar, Arunabh Chowdhury, 
Rahul Pratap, Parshanto Chandra Sen, Shivanshu Singh, Udayan Verma, 
Ms. Sana Batta, A. Venayagam Balan, T. G Narayanan Nair, K. Raghava 
Charyulu, Kai lash Pandey, Vaibhav Shukla, Ranjeet Singh, Ms. J. Kataria, 
K. V. Sreekumar, Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Rajeev Dubey, Pulkit Tare, 
Sh_reekant N. Terdal, Shibashish Misra, Alok K. Agarwal, Sanjeev Kr. 
Singh, Kumar Dushyant Singh, Puneet Taneja, Mishra Saurabh, Ankit 
Kr. Lal, Ms. Atka Agarwal, R.R. Rajesh, A. K. Sharma, Franklin Caesar 
Thomas, Chand Qureshi, M. P. Siddiqui, Upendra Prasad, Naveen 
Chawla, T. Mahipal, T. A. Khan, Rajesh Ranjan, Mukhesh Kumar 
Maroria, Advs. for the appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by 
A.K. SIKRI, J. I. Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 29105-29106 
of201 l, SLP (C) No. 26363 of2016 and SLP (C) No. 26330 of2016. 
Since pure question oflaw is involved, we allow the transfer petition and 
transfer cases and also take up, along with these appeals, the writ petitions 
which were filed before the respective High Courts. 
2. These appeals are filed by the appellants challenging the orders 
passed by different High Courts i.e. High Court of Allahabad, High Court 
ofOrissa, High Court of Madhya Pradesh and High Court ofKarnataka. 
These High Courts, however, are unanimous in their approach and have 
reached the same conclusion. In all these cases, appellants were issued 
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show cause notices by the concerned authorities under the provisions of 
the Building And Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment 
and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'BOCW 
Act') and Buildings And Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 
1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'Welfare Cess Act'). They had 
challenged those notices by filing writ petitions in the High Courts on the 
ground that the provisions of BOCW Act or Welfare Cess Act were not 
applicable to them because of the reason that they were registered under 
the Factories Act, 1948. It may be mentioned that at the relevant time 
no manufacturing operation had commenced by the appellants. In fact, 
all these appellants were in the process of construction of civil works/ 
factory buildings etc. wherein they had planned to set up their factories. 
As the process of construction of civil works was undertaken by the 
appellants wherein construction workers were engaged, the respondent 
authorities took the view that the provisions of the aforesaid Acts which 
were meant for construction workers became applicable and the 
D. 
appellants were supposed to pay the cess for the welfare of the said 
workers engaged in the construction work. The appellants had submitted 
that Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act which defines 'building or other 
construction work' specifically states that it does not include any building 
or
construction work to which the provision of the Factories Act, 1948 
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or the Mines Act, 1952 apply. Since the appellants stood registered 
under the Factories Act, they were not covered by the definition ofbuilding 
or other construction work as contained in Section 2( d) of the Act and, 
therefore, said Act was not applicable to them by virtue of Section 1(4) 
thereof. All the High Courts have negated the aforesaid plea of the 
appellants on the ground that the appellants would not be covered by the 
definition of factory defined under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act in 
the absence of any operations/ manufacturing process and, therefore, 
mere obtaining a licence under Section 6 of the Factories Act would not 
suffice and rescue them from the'!r liability to pay cess under the Welfare 
Cess Act. This is, in nutshell, the subject matter of all these appeals. 
However, in order to understand the full implication of the issue involved 
and to answer the said issue, it would be apt to take note of certain facts 
from one of these appeals. This factual canvass is suitably available in 
the events that have occurred leading to the filing of Civil Appeal No. 
6223/2016. 
3. In this appeal, the appellant proposed to set up a 2X600
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
Megawatt capacity coal-based thermal power project namely "Anpara 
C" at Anpara in District Sonebhadra, Uttar Pradesh ("the Project"), 
pursuant to being selected in a tariff-based competitive bidding initiated 
by the Uttar Pradesh Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (UPRVUNL) 
on behalf of the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. (UPPCL). The 
project consists of two Steam Turbine Generators (STG) each having 
capacity of 600 MW and two pulverised coal fired steam generators 
and the balance of plant. The appellant, in respect of the aforesaid 
project, made an application to the Director of Factories, Uttar Pradesh, 
submitting the layout/drawings of the proposed plants and requesting for 
registration of the project as a factory under the provisions of the Factories 
Act, 1948 and the Uttar Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950. The appellant 
was granted registration and licence under Section 6 of the Factories 
Act, 1948 read with Uttar Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950 for the said 
Project, as a factory. Respondent -ND. I notified the 1,Jttar Pradesh 
Building and other Construction Workers (R!!gulation of Employment 
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2009 (for short 'BOCW Rules') on 
04.02.2009. Immediately thereafter, the appellant received a notice of 
even date issued by respondent No. 2, intimating that the Chief Secretary, 
Government ofUttar Pradesh had directed that "establishments" engaged 
in
construction activities were required to get themselves registered under 
the provisions of the BOCW Act and the BOCW Rules. Simultaneously, 
a letter of even date was also received from the District Collector, 
Sonebhadra, Uttar Pradesh, calling upon the appellant to get itself/its 
contractors registered under the provisions of the BOCW Act and the 
BOCW Rules. The appellant, vide its letter of even date, replied to the 
aforesaid communication dated 19.04.20 I 0 of the District Collector, 
Sonebhadra, stating that the appellant was undertaking the construction 
activity of the Project under the provisions of the Factories Act and as 
such, in view of Section 2( I )(d) of the BOCW Act, the Project was 
exempted from the application of the BOCW Act, and consequently the 
Welfare Cess Act and BOCW Rules inasmuch as the provisions of the 
Factories Act apply to the Project. 
4. The respondents were not satisfied with the aforesaid stand 
taken by the appellant. Thus, show cause notice dated 17.02.2011 was 
issued by respondent No. 2 as to why action be not taken against the 
appellant for failing to get itself registered under BOCW Act. It was 
followed by another notice of even dale stating that the appellant had 
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[2016) 5 S.C.R. 
A · not furnished requisite information relating to construction activities 
undertaken by it as required under Section 4 of the Welfare Cess Act 
read with Rule 6 of the Welfare Cess Rules. Some more notices were 
issued to the similar effect with regard to the construction activities in 
respect of the township in Anpara, undertaken by the appellant. Insofar 
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as township is concerned, appellant got itself registered through its 
principal contractors under Welfare Cess Act and started paying the 
cess. However, in respect of constn1ction activity and factory premises, 
the appellant reiterated its stand that by virtue of Section 2( I)( d) of the 
BOCW Act, it was excluded from the coverage thereof. The contention 
of the appellant was rejected by the respondents which led to issuance 
offurther notices demanding cess. 
5. At this juncture, the appellant filed the writ petition in the High 
Court of Judicature at Allahabad challenging tile validity of notices dated 
14.03.2011and02.04.2011 demanding payment of cess, on the following 
grounds: 
(i) That the appellant is not amenable to assessment of liability 
under the Welfare Cess Act inasmuch as the Factories Act is 
applicable to the Project, and the Project is as such, exempt from 
the applicability of the said Act by virtue of the exclusionary cause 
contained in Section 2(1 )( d) of the BOCW Act. 
(ii) That respondent No. 2, vide impugned notice dated
02.04.2011, 
was proceeding to calculate the alleged cess payable by the 
appellant on the basis of the cost of the Project, and not on the 
cost of construction of the said Project, whereas under the scheme 
of the Cess Act, cess is payable only o'i1 the cost of construction 
' . incurred annually, and not on the entire project cost, which includes 
several other components apart from civil construction works. 
6. The respondents filed their counter affidavit contesting the 
petition. After hearing, the writ petition has been dismissed by the High 
Court vide judgment dated 28.04.2015, gist whereof has already been 
G . . taken note of above. 
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7. Emphatic submissions were made by Mr. Sundaram, learned 
senior counsel appearin'g in some of these ·appeals, questioning the 
·approach and conclusion reached by the High Court. Other senior counsel 
Mr: Gaurab Banerji and Mr. Akhil Sibal supplemented those submissions 
lending their candour thereto. These submissions were further
(' 
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
supplemented by Mis. Prashant Shukla, Arunabh Chowdhury and K. 
Raghava Charyulu, Advocates. It may not be necessary to take note of 
individual submissions made by these counsel. Instead, for the sake of 
brevity, we are reproducing the submissions of these counsel in 
consolidated form hereinafter. 
8. These counsel have led two prong attacks on the demands 
raised by the respondents for payment of cess under BOCW Act read 
with Welfare Cess Act, which is as under: 
i) In the first instance, it is argued that BOCW Act does not apply 
to those undertakings which are registered under the Factories 
Act. To support this submission, emphasis was laid on the definition 
of "building or other construction work" as contained in Section 
2(1 )( d) of BOCW Act, which reads as under: 
"Section 2(1)(d) : "building or other construction work" 
means the construction, 'alternation, repairs, maintenance 
or demolition ofor, in relation to, buildings, streets, roads, 
railways, tramways, airfields, irrigation, drainage, 
embankment and navigation works, flood control works 
(including storm water drainage works), generation, 
transmission and distribution of power, water works 
(including channels for distribution of water), oil and gas 
installations, electric lines, wireless, radio, television, 
telephone, telegraph and overseas communication dams, 
canals, reservoirs, watercourses, tunnels, bridges, viaducts,
aquaducts, pipelines, towers, cooling towers, transmission 
towers and such other work as may be specified in this 
behalf by the appropriate Government, by notification but 
does not include any building or other construction work to 
which the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (63of1948). 
or the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), apply. 
(emphasis added)" 
(ii)· Second submission, which in fact flows from first submission 
noted above, was that the approach of the High Court in dealing with the 
matter was contrary to law. In this behalf, it was pointed out that the 
High Court has rejected the case of the appellants herein on the ground 
that even if the appellants had obtained a licence under the Factories 
Act for registration to work a factory, the appellants were still not excluded 
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from the provisions of Welfare Cess Act as no manufacturing process 
or factory operation had started by the appellants and, therefore, 
appellants did not answer the description of'factol)'' within the meaning 
of Factories Act. As per the High Court, since the appellants had only 
undertaken the process of construction of premises which are to be 
ultimately used as factories, and since such power project has not started 
and there was no operation for which the licence was obtained under 
the Factories Act till the production commences, it could not be said that 
"factory" has come into existence and, therefore, the appellants were 
not entitled to take advantage of mere registration under the Factories 
Act. 
Dubbing the aforesaid approach as erroneous, it was the argument 
.· of the appellants that the High Court ignored the pertinent aspect that 
even when the building was under construction, the establishments which 
were covered by the Factories Act stood excluded by virtue of definition 
contained in Section 2( d) of BOCW Act which pertained to construction 
of building and, therefore, specifically covered the stage of construction 
itself. It was argued that matter should have been seen from that angle. 
Advancing this argument further, it was also submitted that the Legislature 
is alive to the fact that the facto!)' is not running at the stage when 
building or other construction work is going
on. However, it still chose to 
exclude those buildings or other construction work to which the provisions 
of Factories Act apply. 
9. Expanding the aforesaid submissions, the appellants even gave 
the rationale in couching the definition of Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act 
in that specific manner by submitting that once the provisions of Factories 
Act apply, all the benefits which are admissible to the workers under the 
BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act are granted under the Factories Act 
as well. This submission was buttressed by pointing out the provisions/ 
conditions stipulated while granting the permission under the Factories 
Act. It was submitted that the safety measures and facilities which the 
appellants were obligated under those conditions were the same as 
stipulated in BOCW Act. 
I 0. Taking support ofinterpretative tools to support the aforesaid 
twin submissions, it was submitted by the counsel for the appellants that 
Section 2(d} had to be given literal meaning, in the absence of any 
ambiguity in the said provision and number of judgments were cited in 
this behalf, Some_ of those judgments are as under:
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.) 
i) In Punjab Lmrd Development mu/ ReclanratiOn Corporation 
Ltd., Clwmligar/1 v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 
. Chandigarh and Ot/1ers1, this Court while interpreting the word 
'means' observed thatifthe definition has used the word 'means',· 
it shall include certain things or acts and the definition has used . 
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the word 'means', it shall include certain things or acts and the 'B 
definition is a hard-a_nd-fast definition and no other meaning can· 
be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition. This 
Court further observed that if the· words of the statute are in . 
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no· inore can be 
necessary .than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary 
sense. The words themselves alone do; in such case, best declare 
C 
the intention of the law. This Court after making reference to its 
judgment in B.N. Mutto v. T.K. NamiP observed that "the Court 
has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If 
the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, 
then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in 
their ordinary a1id natural sense''. It was further observed that · D 
"the cardinal rule of construction of statute is to read statutes 
literally, that is, by giving t-0 the words their .ordinary, naturafand 
grammatical meaning." 
· 
ii) In S/1ri Hariprasad Shivs/ranker Shukla andanot/1er v. Sltri
.A.D. Divelkar and otliers3, it was held that ''there is no doubt 
that when the Act itself provides a dictionary for the words used, · 
we must look irito that dictionary first for an interpretation of the 
words used' in the statute. We ~re not concerned with, any 
.. presumed intention of the legislature; our task is to get at the 
intention as expressed in the statute". . 
. 
iii) In Regional Director, Enrployeef State Insurance 
Corporation, Tric/1ur v. Rmna11uja Matcil /11dustries\ the Court 
pointed out that "there is no doubt that beneficial legislations should 
have liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative 
intent but where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its 
.·own there is no warrant for the Court to travel beyond the scheme 
and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending 
1 (1990) 3 sec 682 . 
'll979) 1 sec 361 
3 1957 SCR 121 
• (1985) 1 sec 218 
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the statutory benefit to those who are not covered by the scheme". 
iv) In Dadi Jaganntullmm v. Jammu/u Ramulu and Otlters5, 
this Court, while interpreting the provisions that fell for 
consideration, made the following observations in paragraph 13: 
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"13 ..... The settled principles of interpretation are that the 
court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature 
did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to 
do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction 
which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. 
Undoubtedly ifthere is a defect or an omission in the words 
used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to 
correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add 
words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, 
especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible 
result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective 
phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, 
make up deficiencies which are there." 
v) In S/1yam Sunder and otlters v. Ram Kumar and anot/1e~, 
this Court explained as to how to interpret the provisions of an 
enactment in the following words: 
E 
" ... when the words used in a statute are capable of only 
one meaning. In such a situation, the courts have been 
hesitant to apply the rule of benevolent construction. But if 
it is found that the words used in the statute give rise to 
more than
one meaning, in such circumstances, the courts 
are not precluded from applying such rule of construction. 
F 
The third situation is when there is no ambiguity in a provision 
of a statute so construed. If the provision of a statute is 
plain, unambiguous and does not give rise to any doubt, in 
such circumstances the rule of benevolent construction has 
no application." 
G 
H 
vi) Similarly in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, 
Bombay', the Constitution Bench of this Court explained the 
principle ofliteral interpretation as under: 
'(2001) 1sec11 
'<2001) s sec 24 
1 (2002) 4 sec 297
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
''10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be 
said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of 
interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one 
word and.pay too little attention to other words. No provision 
in the statute and no word in any section can be construed 
in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked 
at generally and in the context in which it is usecl. It is said 
that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The 
elementary principle of interpreting any word while 
considering a statute _is to gather the mens or sententia legis 
of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is 
no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of 
the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the 
court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating 
(sic altering) the statutory provisions. Wherever the language 
is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered 
from the language used. While doing so, what has been 
said.in the statute as also what has not been said has to be 
noted. The construction which requires for its support 
addition or substitution of words or which resultsiin rejection 
of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council 
in Crmiford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1 : 4 MIA 
179] "we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of 
an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by
construction make 
up deficiencies which are left there". In case of an ordinary 
word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase 
of general application. Attention should be confined to what 
is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle 
is too well settled and reference to a few decisions of this 
Court would suffice. (See: Gwalior Rayons Silk M&. 
(Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests [1990 
Supp SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747], Union of India v. 
Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (I) SCC 323: 1992 
sec (L&S) 248 : {1992) 19 ATC 219 : AIR 1992 SC 96] 
,Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v, Price;.,· 
Waterhouse [(1997) 6 SCC 312] and Harbhajan Singh v. 
Pre,_ss Council of India [(2002) 3 SCC 722 : JT (2002) 3 
SC 21])'' 
. 
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vii) In Deepal Girisltblwi Soni and Otlters v. United India 
Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda8, while interpreting the provisions 
that fell for consideration, the principle was applied even in the 
context of beneficial legislation, when the language was plain, 
depicting clear intention of the legislature, in the following terms: 
"53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves 
liberal construction with a view to implementing the 
legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial 
legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness 
or doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond the same 
and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of 
extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered 
thereby. (See Regional Director, ES/ Corpn. v. Ramanuja 
Match Industries [( 1985) I SCC 218 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 
213 : AIR 1985 SC 278])." 
Relying upon all the aforesaid judgments, the forceful exhortation 
was to follow this literal construction while interpteting Section 2(d) of 
BOCW Act in the manner appellants suggested to us. 
11. Mr. Rana and Mr. Srivastava countered the aforesaid 
submissions giving equally salubrious response. Their fervent plea was 
that the view taken by the High Court while interpreting the provisions 
of Section 2(d) of BOCW Act was perfectly justified and any other 
interpretation as suggested by the appellants would defeat the very 
purpose
of these Acts. It was argued that mere registration under the 
Factories Act would be of no consequence inasmuch as definition of 
'factory' contained in Section 2(m) of the Act unambiguously suggest 
that the· provisions of the said Act would apply only when manufacturing 
process is actually carried on. It was further submitted thatthe definition 
of 'worker' under the Factories Act does not include construction 
workers and, therefore, construction workers would not be entitled to· 
various benefits whiCh are contained in different provisions of the 
Factories Act. It is for this reason at the stage of construction of the 
building, which is to be ultimately used as a factory, the provisions of 
BOCW Act would be applied. It was also emphasised that while 
interpreting the provisions of these two Acts, "superior purpose" behind 
therein had to be kept in mind and this enactment which is for the welfare 
' <2004) s sec 385
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
of the weaker section, i.e. workers of unorganised sector, had to be 
liberally construed by giving that construction which accords them the 
benefit eschewing the other approach which would preclude them from 
getting the benefit under the Acts. In this hue, the learned counsel strongly 
urged upon this Court to invoke the principle of purposive interpretation, 
which is in vogue, to do complete justice in the matter. It was also 
argued that exclusion provision contained in Section 2(d) ofBOCW Act 
had to be construed narrowly as per the settled proposition of law. 
12. We have bestowed our due and serious consideration to the 
submissions made of both sides, which these submissions deserve. The 
central issue is the meaning that is to be assigned to the language of 
Section 2(d) of the Act, particularly that part which is exclusionary in 
nature, i.e. which excludes such building and construction work to which 
the provisions of Factories Act apply. Before coming to the grip of this 
central issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to the objectives with 
which the Factories Act and BOCW Act were enacted, as that would 
be the guiding path to answer the core issue delineated above. 
13. Insofar as Factories Act is concerned, its Preamble mentions 
that it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in 
factories. It is enacted primarily with the object of protecting workers 
employed
in factories against industrial and occupational hazards. For 
that purpose it seeks to impose upon the owners or occupiers certain 
oblig'ltions to protect workers unwary as well as negligent and to secure 
for them employment in conditions conducive to their health and safety. 
This Act also requires that the workers should work in healthy and sanitary 
conditions and for that purpose it provides that precautions should be 
taken forthe safety of workers and prevention of accidents. Incidental 
provisions in Factories Act are made for securing information necessary 
to ensure that the objects are carried out and the State Governments are 
empowered to appoint Inspectors, to call for reports and to inspect the 
prescribed registers with a view to maintain effective supervision. The 
duty of the employer under this Act is to secure the health and safety of 
workers and extends to providing adequate plant, machinery and 
appliances, supervision over workers, healthy and safe premises, proper 
system of working and extends to giving reasonable restrictions. Detailed 
provisions are, therefore, made in diverse chapters of the Act imposing 
oblig'ltions upon the owners of the factories to maintain inspe~ting staff 
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and for maintenance of health, cleanliness, prevention of overcrowding 
and provision for amenities such as lighting, drinking water, etc. Provisions 
are also made for safety of workers and their welfare, such as restrictions 
on working hours and on the employment of young persons and females, 
and grant of annual leave with wages. In Bltikus" Yam"s" Ks/1(1/riy" 
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India and m10tl1er9, this Court highlighted the 
necessity and rationale behind legislating this Act and the objectives which 
it sought to achieve, in the following manner: 
"9. The Factories Act, as the preamble recites, is an Act to 
consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. 
The Act is enacted primarily with the object of protecting 
workers employed in factories against industrial and 
occupational hazards. For that purpose it seeks to impose 
upon the owners or the occupiers certain obligations to 
protect workers unwary as well as negligent and to secure 
forthem employment in conditions conducive to their health 
and safety. The Act requires that the workers should work 
in healthy and sanitary conditions and for that purpose it 
provides that precautions should be taken for the safety of 
workers and prevention ofaccidents. Incidental provisions 
are made for securing information necessary to ensure that 
the objects are carried out and the State Governments are 
empowered to appoint Inspectors,
to call for reports and to 
inspect the prescribed registers with a view to maintain 
effective supervision. The duty of the employer is to secure 
the health and safety of workers and extends to providing 
adequate plant, machinery and appliances, supervision over 
workers, healthy and safe premises, proper system of 
working and extends to giving reasonable instructions. 
Detailed provisions are therefore made in diverse chapters 
of the Act imposing obligations apurrthe owners of the 
factories to maintain inspecting staff and for maintenance 
of health, cleanliness, prevention of overcrowding and 
provision for amenities such as lighting, drinking water, etc. 
etc. Provisions are also made for safety of workers and 
their welfare, such as restrictions on working hours and on 
the employment of young persons and females, and grant 
9 !964 SCR (I) 860
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
of annual leave with wages. Employment in a manufacturing 
process was at one time regarded as a matter of contract 
between the employer and the employee and the State was 
not concerned to impose any duties upon the employer. It is 
however now recognised that the State has a vital concern 
in preventing exploitation of labour and in insisting upon 
proper safeguards for the health and safety of the workers. 
The Factories Act undoubtedly imposes numerous 
restrictions upon the employers to secure to the workers 
adequate safeguards for their health and physical we! I-being. 
But imposition of such restrictions is not and cannot be 
regarded, in the context of the modem outlook on industrial 
relations, as unreasonable .... " 
14. Coming to BOCW Act, its Statement of Objects and Reasons, 
depicting the legislative intent, reads as under: 
"(I) It is estimated that about 8.5 million workers in the 
country are engaged in building and other Construction 
works. Building and other construction workers are one of 
the most numerous and vulnerable segments of the 
unorganised labour in India. The building and other 
construction works are characterized by their inherent risk 
to the life and limb of the workers. The work is also 
characterised by its casual nature, temporary relationship 
between employer and employee, uncertain working hours, 
. lack of basic amenities and inadequacy of welfare
facilities. 
In the absence of adequate statutory provisions, the requisite 
information regarding the number and.nature of accidents 
is also not forthcoming. In the absence of such information, 
it is difficult to fix responsibility or to take any corrective 
action. 
(2) Although the provisions of certain Central Acts are 
applicable to the building and other construction workers 
yet a need has been felt for a comprehensive Central 
Legislation for regulating their safety, health, welfare and 
other conditions of service. ft had been considered 
necessary to levy a cess on the cost of construction incurred 
by the employers on the building and other construction 
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works for ensuring sufficient funds for the Welfare Boards 
to undertake the social security schemes and welfare 
measure.s." 
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15. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act itself, it 
was considered necessary to levy a cess on the cost of construction 
incurred by the employers while constructing building etc. This led to 
passing of Welfare Cess Act. The Statement of Objects and. Reasons 
behind this Act was to provide for the levy and collection of a cess on 
the cost of construction incurred by the employers for augmenting the 
resources of the Building, and Other Construction Workers' Welfare 
Boards constituted by the State Governments under the Building and 
Other Construction Workers' (Regulation of Employment and Conditions 
of Service) Ordinance, 1995. 
16. Scheme of BOCW Act came up for consideration by this 
Court in the Dewan Cltantl B11iltlers and Contractors v. Union .of 
India and Otllers 10• Recognising that the noble purpose behind the 
said Act is to ensure welfare of the building and construction wo.rkers in 
order to provide basic human dignity enshrined in Article 21 of the 
Constitution, the Court observed as under: 
"I 0. It is thus clear froni the scheme of the BOCW Act . 
that its sole aim is the welfare of building and construction 
workers, directly relatable to their constitutionally recognised 
right to live with basic human dignity, enshrined in Article 
2! of the
Constitution oflndia. It envisages a network of 
authorities at the Central and.State levels to ensure that the 
· benefit of the legislation is made available 'to every building 
and construction worker, by constituting Welfare Boards 
and clothing them with sufficient powers to ensure 
enforcement of the primary purpose of the BOCW Act. 
The means of generating revenues for making effective 
th-;: welfare provisions of the BOCW Act is through the 
Cess Act, which is questioned in these appeals as 
unconstitutional. 
xx 
xx 
xx 
17. It is manifest from the overarching schemes of the 
BOCW Act, the Cess Act and the Rules made thereunder 
H 
1'' (2012) 1 sec 101
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
that their sole object is to regulate the employment and 
· conditions of service of building and other construction 
workers, traditionally exploited sections in the society and 
to provide for their safety, health and other welfare 
measures. The BOCW Act and the Cess Act break new 
ground in that, the liability.to pay cess falls not only on the 
owner of a building or establishment, but under Section 
2(l)(i)(iii) of the BOCW Act 
"in relation to a building or other construction work carried 
on by or through a contractor, or by the employment of 
building workers supplied ?.Ya contractor, the contractor"; 
The extension of the liability on to the contractor is with a 
view to ensure that, if for any reason it is not possible to 
collect cess from the owner of the building at a stage 
subsequent to the completion of the construction, it can be 
recovered from the contractor. The Cess Act and the Cess 
Rules ensure that the cess is collected at source from the 
bills of the contractors to whom payments are made by the 
owner. In short, the burden of cess is passed on from the 
owner to the contractor." 
· (emphasis supplied) 
I 7. Keeping in view the aforesaid objective of the respective Acts, 
we now deal with the scope and ambit of Section 2( d) of BOCW Act. 
As noticed above, one of the submissions of the appellants is that literal 
interpretation needs to be given to the said provision as it
categorically 
excludes those building or construction work to which Factories Act 
apply. In this very hue, it is argued that as the benefit under the Factories 
Act are already given to the construction workers who are involved in 
the construction work, there is no need for covering the construction 
workers who are engaged in building or construction work of the appellants 
under BOCW Act or Welfare Cess Act. 
18. Before dealing with the argument predicated on literal 
constructiOn, we would like to deal with the second aspect as the answer 
· to that would facilitate the answer to this aspect as well. Section 2(m) 
of the Factories Act defines 'factory' in the following manner: 
"(m) "factory" means any premises including the precincts 
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(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were 
working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in 
any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried 
on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or 
(ii) Whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were 
working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in 
any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried 
on without the aid of power, or is ordfoarily so carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of[the 
Mines Act, 1952 (35of1952)] or [a mobile unit belonging 
to the armed forces of the Union, a railway running shed or 
a hotel, restaurant or eating j)lace]. 
[Explanation [I] - For computing the number of workers 
for the purposes of this clause all the workers in [different 
groups and relays] in a day shall be taken into account;] 
[Explanation H - For the purposes of this clause, the mere 
fact that an Electronic Data Processing Unit or a Computer 
Unit is installed in any premises or part thereof, shall not be 
construed to make it a factory if no manufacturing process 
is being carried on in such premises or part thereof;] ... " 
19. Section 2(k) of the Factories Act defines 'manufacturing 
process' in the following manner: 
(k) "manufacturing process" means any process for-
F 
(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing,. 
packing, oiling, washing, cleaning,
breaking up, demolishing, 
or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance 
with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, 
or 
G 
(ii) [pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; 
or] 
H 
(iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or 
(iv) [composing types for printing, printing by letter press, 
lithography, photogravure or other simi Jar process or book
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
753 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
binding;] [or] 
A 
(v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing 
or breaking up ships or vessels;[ or] 
(vi) [preserving or storing any article in cold storage;] 
20. It is also necessary to take note of the definition of 'worker', 
which is contained in Section 2(1) of the Factories Act. It reads as 
under: 
(I) "worker" means a person &[employed, directly or by or 
through any agency (including a contractor) with or without 
the knowledge of the principal employer, whether for 
remuneration or not], in any manufacturing process, or in 
cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a 
manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work 
incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, 
or the subject of the manufacturing process 7[but does not 
include any member of the armed forces of the Union]; 
21. On the conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it becomes 
clear that "factory" is that establishment where manufacturing process 
is carried on with or without the aid of power. Carrying on this 
manufacturing process or manufacturing activity is thus a prerequisite. 
It is equally pertinent to note that it covers only those workers who are 
engaged in the said manufacturing process. Insofar as these appellants 
are concerned, construction of building is not their business activity or 
manufacturing process. In fact, the building is being constructed
for 
carrying out the particular manufacturing process, which, in most of 
these appeals, is generation, transmission and distribution of power. 
Obviously, the workers who are engaged in construction of the building 
also ao not fall within the definition of 'worker' under the Factories Act. 
' 
. 
·-----...... _ 
' 
, On these two aspects there is no' cleavage and both parties are at ad 
-idem. What follows is that these construction workers are not covered 
- by the provisions of the Factories Act. 
22. Having regard to the above, ifthe contention of the appellants 
is accepted, the construction workers engaged in the construction of 
building undertaken by the appellants which is to be used ultimately as 
factory, would stand excluded from the provisions ofBOCW Act and 
Welfare Cess Act as well. Could this be the intention while providing 
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the definition of' bui !ding and other construction work' in Section 2( d) of 
BOCW Act? Clear answer to this has to be in the negative. 
23. We may mention at this stage that High Court is right in 
observing that merely because the appellants have obtained a licence 
under Section 6 of the Factories Act for registration to work a factory, it 
would not follow therefrom that they answer the description of the 
"factory" within the meaning of the Factories Act. We have reproduced 
the definition of 'factory' and a bare reading thereof makes it abundantly 
clear that before this stage, when construction of the project is completed 
and the manufacturing process starts, 'factory' within the meaning of 
Section ?.(m) of the Factories Act does not come into existence so as to 
be covered by the said Act. 
24. We now advert to the core issue touching upon the construction 
of Section 2(d) ofthe BOCW Act. The argument of the appellants is 
that language thereof is unambiguous and literal construction is to be 
accorded to find the legislative intent. To our mind, this submission is of 
no avail. Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act dealing with the building or 
construction work is in three parts. [n the first part, different activities 
are mentioned which are to be covered by the said expression, namely, 
construction, alterations, repairs, maintenance or demolition. Second 
part of the definition is aimed at those
buildings or works in relation to 
which the aforesaid activities are carried out. The third part of the 
definition contains exclusion clause by stipulating that it does not include 
'any building or other construction work to which the provisions of the 
Factories Act, 1948 (63of1948), or the Mines Act, I 952 (35 of I 952), 
appl.ies'. Thus, first part of the definition contains the nature ofactivity; 
second part contains the subject matter in relation to which the activity 
is carried out and. third part excludes those building or other construction 
work to which the provisions of Factories Act or Mines Act apply. 
25. It is not in dispute that construction of the projects of the 
appellants is covered by the definition of"building or other construction 
work" as it satisfies first two elements of the definition pointed out above. 
In order to see whether exclusion clause applies, we need to interpret 
the words 'but does not include any building or other construction work 
to which the provisions of the Factories Act ............ apply'. The 
question is as to whether the provisions of the Factories Act apply to the 
construction of building/project of the appellants. We are of the firm
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
opinion that they do not apply. The provisions of the Factories Act would 
"apply" only when the manufacturing process starts for 'which the 
building/project is being constmcted and not to the activity of construction 
of the project. That is how the exclusion clause is to be interpreted and 
that would be the plain meaning of the said clause. This meaning to the 
exclusion clause ascribed by us is in tune with the approach adopted by 
this Court in Organo Cltemica/ Industries v. Union of lndiaL. Two 
separate, but concurring, opinions were given by Justice V.R. Krishna 
Iyer and Justice A.P. Sen, and we reproduce here below some excerpts 
from both opinions: 
"Justice A.P. Sen (para 23) 
Each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the 
light of general purpose of the Act itself. A bare mechanical 
interpretation of the words 'devoid of concept or purpose' 
will reduce much of legislation to futility. It is a salutary 
rule, well established, that the intention of the legislature 
must be found by reading the statute as a whole. 
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer (para 241) 
A policy-oriented interpretation, when a welfare legislation 
falls for determination, especially in the context of a 
developing country, is sanctioned by principle and precedent 
and is implicit in Article 37 of the Constitution since the 
judicial branch is; in a sense, part of the State. So it is 
reasonable to assign to
'damages' a larger, fulfilling 
meaning." 
26. The aforesaid meaning attributed to the exclusion clause of 
the definition is also in consonance with the objective and purpose which 
is sought to be achieved by the enactment of BOCW Act and Welfare 
Cess Act. As pointed out above, if the construction of this provision as 
suggested by the appellants is accepted, the construction workers who 
are engaged in the construction of buildings/projects will neither get the 
benefit of the Factories Act nor of BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act. That 
could not have been the intention of the Legislature. BOCW Act and 
Welfare Cess Act are pieces of social security legislation to provide for 
certain benefits to the construction workers. 
11 (1979) 4 sec 573 
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27. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is 
an imperative, irrespective of anything else. This is so eloquently brought 
out in the following passage in the case of Atma Ram Mittal v. ls/1war 
Singlt Punia
1 ~: 
"9. Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed 
in finding what is the intention of Parliament or in other 
words, the will of the people. Blackstone tells us that the 
fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the 
legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the 
· law was made, by signs most natural and probable. And 
these signs are either the words, the context, the subject-
matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and 
reason of the law. (emphasis by the court) See 
Commentaries on the Lmvs of England (facsimile of I st 
Edn. of I 765, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 
59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, in 
Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras [AIR 1953 SC 274: 
1953 SCR 677: 1953 Cri LJ 11 OS: (1953) 4 STC 188) said 
that each word, phrase or sentence was to be construed in 
the light of purpose of the Act itself. But words must be 
construed with imagination of purpose behind them said 
Judge Learned Hand, a long time ago. It appears, therefore, 
that though we are concerned with seeking of intention, we 
are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the 
legislature has
used and the true meaning of what words 
[Ed.: Lord Reid in the aforecited case had observed: (All 
ER p. 814) "We often say that we are looking for the 
intention of Parliament, but this is not quite accurate. We 
are seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament 
used. We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the 
true meaning of what they said."] as was said by Lord 
Reid in Black-Clm1·so11 Jnternational Ltd. v. Papierwerke 
Waldhoj-AschaffenburgA.G [1975 AC 591, 613: (1975) 
I All ER 810: (1975) 2WLRS13) . We are clearly of the 
opinion that having regard to the language we must find the 
reason and the spirit of the law." 
12 (t988J 4 sec 284
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
28. How labour legislations are to be interpreted has been stated 
and restated by this Court time and again. In M.P. Mineral Industry 
Association v. Regional Labour Commr. (Centra/)1 3, this Court while 
dealing with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed 
. that t'1is Act is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to 
workmen employed the scheduled employments by prescribing minimum 
rates of wages for them, and so in construing the said provisions the 
court should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficent rule of 
construction. 
In Surendra Kumar Verma v. Tlte Central 
Government Industrial Tribunal1\ this Court reminded that semantic 
luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of'bread and butter'.statutes. 
Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where 
legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the 
Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions. 
29. We would also like to reproduce a passage from Workmen of 
American Express v. Management of American Express 1;, which 
provides complete answer to the argument of the appellants based on 
literal construction: 
"4. The principles of statutory construction are well settl.~d. 
Words occurring in statutes ofliberal import such as social 
welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to 
be put in Procrustean. beds or
shrunk to Liliputian 
dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture 
ofliteral construction must be avoided and the prodigality 
of its misapplication must be recognised and reduced. Ju4ges 
oughtto be more concerned with the "colour", the "content" 
and the "context" of such statutes (we have borrowed the 
words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. 
Simmonds [(1971) 3 All ER 237] ). In the same opinion 
Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind 
in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire 
beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in 
which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely 
on internal linguistic considerations ... " 
30. In equal measure is the message contained in Carew and Co. 
" AIR 1960 SC 1 068 
"(1980) 4 sec 443 
1' (1985) 4 sec 11 
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Ltd. v. Union of lndia' 6 : 
"21. The law is not "a brooding omnipotence in the sky" 
but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is an operational 
art controlling economic life, and interpretative effort must 
be imbued with the statutory purpose. No doubt, grammar 
is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate ... " 
31. The sentiments were echoed in Bombay Anand Bliavan 
Restaurant v. Deputy Director, Employees' State Insurance 
Corporation & Anr. 17 in the following words: 
"20. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a beneficial 
legislation. The main purpose of the enactment as the 
Preamble suggests, is to provide for certain benefits to 
employees of a factory in case of sickness, maternity and 
employment injury and to make provision for certain other 
matters in relation thereto. The Employees' State Insurance 
Act is a social security legislation and the canons of 
interpreting a social legislation are different from the canons 
of interpretation of taxation law. The courts must not 
countenance any subterfuge which would defeat the 
provisions of social legislation and the courts must even, if 
necessary, strain the language of the Act in order to achieve 
the purpose which the legislature had in placing this legislation 
on the statute book. The Act, therefore, must receive a 
liberal construction so as to promote its objects. 
32. In taking the aforesaid view, we also agree with
the learned 
counsel for the respondents that 'superior purpose' contained in BOCW 
Act and Welfare Cess Act has to be kept in mind when two enactments 
- the Factories Act on the one hand and BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act 
on the other hand, are involved, both of which are welfare legislations. 
(See Allallabad Bank v. Ctmara Bank' 8, which has been followed in 
Pegasus Assets Reconstruction P. Ltd. v. Mis. Haryana Concast 
Limited &Anr. 19 in the context ofSecuritization and Reconstruction of 
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and 
Companies Act, 1956. Here the concept of 'felt necessity' would get 
1• (1975) 2 sec 191 
11 (2009) 9 sec 61 
'" (2000J 4 sec 406 
19 2016 (I) SCALE I
LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
triggered and as per the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in 
BOCW Act, since the purpose of this Act is to take care of a particular 
nece~sity i.e. welfare ofunorganised labour class involved in construction 
activity, that needs to be achieved and not to be discarded. Here the 
doctrine of Purposive Interpretation also gets attracted which is explained 
in recent judgments of this Court in Riclut Misltra v. State of 
Chhattisf(arh and Ot/1ers~
0 and Slutiles/1 D/utiryawan v. Mo/tan 
Balkrislma Lu/la~'. 
33. We are left to deal with the argument of the appellants that 
whil{: granting permission under the Factories Act, various conditions 
are imposed which the appellants are required to fulfill and these 
conditions are almost the same which are contained in BOCW Act. We 
are not convinced with this submission either. It is already held that 
provisions of Factories Act are not applicable to these construction 
workers. Registration under the Factories Act becomes necessary in 
view of provisions contained in Section 6 of the said Act as this Section 
requires taking of approval l!.nd registration of factories even at 
preparatory stage i.e. at the stage when the premises where factory is 
to operate has to ensure that construction will be done in such a manner 
that it takes care of safety measures etc. which are provided in the 
Factories Act. This means to ensure that construction is
carried out in 
such a manner that provisions in the Factories Act to ensure health, 
safety and provisions relating to hazardous process as well as welfare 
measures· are taken care of. It is for this reason that even after the 
building is completed before it is occupied, notice under Section 7 is to 
be given by the occupier to the Chief Inspector of Factories so that a 
necessary inspection is carried out to verify that all such measures are 
in place. Therefore, when the permissions for construction of factories 
is given, the purpose is altogether different. 
34. It is stated at the cost of repetition that construction workers 
are not covered by the Factories Act and, therefore, welfare measures 
specifically provided for such workers under the BOCW Act and Welfare 
Cess Act cannot be denied. 
35. We, thus, hold that all these appeals are bereft of any merit. 
Accordingly, these appeals, along with the writ petitions filed before this 
20 (2C 16) 4 SCC 179 at Page No. 197 
21 (2016) 3 sec 619- Para 31 
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Court as also those which are the subject matter of the transfer petition 
and-transfer cases, are dismissed with cost. We, however, make it clear 
that insofar as objection to the calculation of cess as contained in the 
show cause notices is concerned, it would be open to the appellants to 
agitate the same before the adjudicating authorities. 
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36. No costs. 
Nidhi Jain 
Matters dismissed.