STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS versus R.K.B.K. LTD. & ANR.
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 309, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 309 
STATE OF WEST BENGALAND OTHERS 
A 
v. 
R.K.8.K. LTD. &ANR. 
(Civil Appeal No.2825 of 2015) 
SEPTEMBER 04, 2015 
[DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.] 
West Bengal Kerosene Oil Control Order, 1968: 
8 
Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9- Competent authority to initiate C 
disciplinary action in terms of Paragraph 9-Against the agent 
holding licence for carrying on business of superior kerosene 
oil - Show Cause Notice issued to the agent by Sub-
Divisional Controller, Food and Supplies (SCFS) (who 
represents the District Magistrate) - Seeking explanation D 
about the discrepancy found in distribution of superior 
kerosene oil- Explanation submitted- SCFS forwarded the 
record to Director of Consumer Goods - Director passed 
order imposing penalty in exercise of power conferred on him 
under paragraph 9(ii) - Jurisdiction of Director questioned E 
by the agent- Held: The power to grant a licence to an agent 
as per Paragraph 5 is Director and to a dealer as per 
Paragraph 6 is the Director or the District Magistrate 
[including the authon"ties mentioned in Paragraph 3(e)]- But F 
the power to cancel or suspend such licence is given to the 
Director as well as the District Magistrate (including authon"zed 
officer) by a composite paragraph- s.21 of General Clauses 
Act also indicates that issuing authority would exercise the 
n"ght to cancel or suspend the licence unless the statute G 
provides to the contrary- Therefore, it would be incongruous 
to hold that
even when the licence of an agent is granted by 
a superior authority (Director), a District Magistrate in 
309 
H
310 
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction can cancel or suspend that 
licence - Such an interpretation of Paragraph 9 would be 
contrary to legislative intent and would lead to absurdity and 
anomaly- Instead of adopting literal interpretation, a logical 
and reasonable interpretation, in consonance with the 
B principles of harmonious construction has to be adopted -A 
harmonious reading of Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 leads to the 
interpretation of Paragraph 9 that it is Director alone who had 
authority to show cause notice and pass an order in terms of 
Paragraph 9 -
Interpretation of Statutes -
Literal 
C interpretation; Harmonious construction - General Clauses 
Act, 1897-s. 21. 
Paragraphs 9 and 10 - Limitation for passing order 
under Paragraph 9 - Prescribed as 30 days from the date 
D the show cause notice was issued - The order in question 
was passed within 30 days but communicated after 30 days 
- High Court held that passing an order on the file would not 
tantamount to an order unless communicated; and that the 
order having not been communicated within 30 days was not 
E within limitation and hence null and void - On appeal held: 
An order comes into effect only when it is communicated -
The words "date of the order" used in Para 10 has to be given 
purposive meaning- The expression "date of the order" would 
F construe the date on which the order comes into effect i.e. 
the date of its communication to the agent or
dealer -
Declaring the order as nullity being barred by limitation, would 
not serve the purpose of the Control Order or Essential 
CommoditiesAct, 1955. 
G 
H 
Interpretation of Statues - Purposive interpretation -
Held: The purpose of any Act or Rule or Order has its own 
sanctity - While interpreting the same, the text and context 
have to be kept in mind. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court
STATE OF WEST BENGALAND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD.311 
HELD: 1.1 As the scheme of the Control Order would A 
reflect, there is a distinction between an "agent" and a 
"dealer", for the agent is granted licence under 
paragraph 5 of the Control Order whereas dealer is 
granted licence under paragraph 6 of the Control Order. 
Paragraph 7 provides for renewal of licences, licence B 
fees, etc. The power conferred on the Director and the 
District Magistrate are different, for the Director is a higher 
authority and the rule clothes him with more authority. It 
. is clear from paragraph 5 that the Director alone is 
authorised to grant a licence to an agent whereas a C 
dealer's licence can be granted either by the Director or 
by the District Magistrate. Sub-para 3 of Paragraph 5 of 
the Control Order is also indicative of the fact that the 
agent operates at a larger scale than the dealer. Sub-
0 
para 2 of Paragraph 6 of the Control Order is differently 
worded as it postulates that conditions can be specified 
by the Director or the District Magistrate having the 
jurisdiction. The conditions imposed may vary from time 
to time for the sake of fair distribution of kerosene. The E 
authorities are also different as per the dictionary clause. 
[Paras 17 and 18] [326-E-F; 328-A-D] 
1.2 Paragraph 9 of the Control Order is rather loosely 
and ambiguously worded. While paragraph 5 deals with F 
grant of licence to an agent by the Director, paragraph 6 
deals with grant of licence to
a dealer by the Director or 
the District Magistrate. The term "District Magistrate" as 
per paragraph 3(e) of the Control Order includes 
authorities mentioned therein. Paragraph 9 which G 
pertains to cancellation or suspension of licence is a 
composite paragraph and stipulates when and who can 
cancel or suspend a licence of an agent or a dealer. The 
said power is exercised, when an agent or dealer has 
indulged in any kind of malpractice or contravened any H
312 
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[2015) 9 S.C.R. 
A provision of the Control Order or conditions applicable, 
etc. A literal reading of paragraph 9, may convey that 
Director as well as the District Magistrate including the 
authorised officers mentioned in paragraph 3(e), have 
concurrent jurisdiction to cancel or suspend the licence 
B granted to an agent or a dealer. However, such an 
interpretation could not be occurred with the legislative 
intent and would lead to absurdity and anomaly. 
Therefore, such kind of an interpretation has to be 
C avoided. [Para 19] [328-D-H; 329-A,B] 
1.3 To place a construction on Paragraph 9 that the 
Director as well as the District Magistrate would have 
concurrent jurisdiction would be inapposite. A logical 
and reasonable interpretation to paragraph 9 of the 
D Control Order has to be preferred instead of adopting 
the loose meaning in the literal sense. Such an 
interpretation would be in consonance with the 
principles of harmonious construction, that is, 
harmonious reading of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 of the 
E Control Order. It is based on the premise that the 
authority who has the right to grant licence has the 
authority to suspend or cancel the licence. [Para 19] [329-
D-F] 
F 
Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and 
Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 424: 1987 (2) 
SCR 1 - relied on. 
1.4 The intent of the Control Order is to totally prohibit 
G creation of any kind of situation which will frustrate the
proper distribution of kerosene oil. The purpose of any 
Act or Rule or Order has its own sanctity. While 
interpreting the same, the text and context have to be 
kept in mind. The words of a statute, when there is a 
H doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the 
sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of
STATE OF WEST BENGALAND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD.313 
the enactment and the object which the legislature has A 
in view. Therefore, it would be incongruous to hold that 
even when the licence of an agent at the State level is 
Qranted and issued by the Director, a District Magistrate, 
as defined in paragraph 3(e) of the Control Order, in 
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction can suspend or B 
cancel the State level licence. As per Section 21 of the 
General Clauses Act, power to. issue notification/ order/ 
rules/bye-laws, etc. includes the power to amend/ vary 
or rescind. The said provision is indicative that generally 
unless the statute or rule provides to the contrary, either C 
expressly or impliedly, issuing or appointing authority 
would also exercise the right to cancel or suspend the 
licence. [Paras 20 and 21] [330-F-G; 331-B, D-F] 
Workmen v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate AIR 1958 SC 353: D 
1958 SCR 1156 - relied on. 
1.5 The expres"sion "District Magistrate having 
jurisdiction" in Paragraph 6, reflects the legislative intent 
that District Magistrate having jurisdiction under E 
paragraph 9 would be the same District Magistrate or 
authority which has the power to grant licence to a dealer 
in Form B under paragraph 6. Read in this manner, it is 
· the Director alone who could have issued the show 
cause notice under paragraph 9 and has the authority F 
and jurisdiction to pass an order in terms of paragraph 
9 of the Control Order. The earlier notice issued by SCFS 
has
to be regarded at best a show cause notice to 
ascertain and affirm facts alleged and it ensured a 
response and reply from the first respondent. The said G 
notice by SCFS could not have culminated in the order 
under paragraph 9, for he has no authority and 
jurisdiction to pass an·order suspending or cancelling 
the licence. Therefore, the matter was rightly referred to H
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A the Director for action, if required, in terms of paragraph 
9 of the Control Order. (Para 21) (332-A-D] 
· 
2.1 Paragraph 9 of the Control Order requires the 
competent authority to pass an order within 30 days from 
B the date. of serving the show cause notice or the 
suspension of licence. The word used is "shall". 
Paragraph 10 of the Control Order enables the aggrieved 
person to prefer an appeal against an order passed 
under Paragraph 8 or 9 within 30 days to the State 
C Government in Food and Supplies Department [Para 24) 
[335-8-D] 
2.2 It is desirable that the authority shall pass an 
order within 30 days from the date of show cause. The 
o order will take effect from the date when it is served. The 
order passed by the authority comes into effect when it 
is communicated. An order passed in file in case of this 
nature would not be an effective order, for it is adverse 
to the interest of the dealer or agent and, therefore, 
E .paragraph 10 has to be given a purposive meaning. It 
has to convey that 30 days from the date of the order 
which is an effective order and that is the date of 
communication. Unless such an interpretation is placed, 
the intention of the rule making authority and also the 
F intention behind the object and reasons behind the 
Control Order and the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 
would be frustrated. Apart from above, the words used 
in Paragraph 10 are "date of the order". There has to be
a purposive construction of the words "from the date of 
G order". To place a construction that the date of an order 
would· mean passing of the order, though not made 
effective, would lead to an absurdity. In the scheme of 
the Control Order, the order comes into effect from the 
H date of receipt by the agent or the dealer. Once that 
becomes the decision, the commencement of limitation
STATEOFWESTBENGALANDOTHERSv. R.K.B.K. LTD.315 
of 30 days for the purpose of Paragraph 10 would be the A 
date when the order is effective. If it is held that the order 
would become a nullity, it really does not serve the 
purpose of the Control Order. On the contrary, it 
frustrates it and, therefore, the interpretation placed by 
the High Court on Paragraph 9 in juxtaposition with B 
Paragraph 10 to treat the order as null and void is neither 
correct nor sound. [Paras 28 and 29] [340-G-H; 341-A] 
2.3 The respondent No.1 is granted liberty to prefer 
an appeal within the prescribed period before the State C 
·Government. The Control Order has been amended in 
2014 whereby the period of limitation has been extended. 
However, it is directed that the period of limitation shall 
commence from the date of this judgment. [Para 31] [342-
D-E] 
D 
MCD v. Qimat Rai Gupta and Ors. (2007) 7 SCC 309: 
2007 (8) SCR 570; Kai/ash v. Nankhu andOrs. (2005) 4 SCC 
480; CCE v. M.M. Rubber and Co. (1992) Supp. (1) SCC 
471; Surendra Singh v. State of U. P AIR 1954 SC 194: 1954 E 
SCR 330; Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition 
Officer AIR 1961SC1500: 1962 SCR 676; K.Bhaskaran v. 
Sankaran Vaidhya Ba/an (1999) 7 SCC 510: 1999 (3) Suppl. 
SCR 271 - relied on. 
Rani Safi Kerosene Supply Company and Ors. vs. The 
State of West Bengal and Ors. 2005 (4) CHN 264 - held 
inapplicable. 
F 
3. As the Director alone has the jurisdiction to pass G 
the order, the passed by SCFS in a fresh
show cause 
notice for the self-satne alleations order remains a valid 
order and can be challenged in an appeal under 
Paragraph 10 and the appellate authority would be the 
State Government. [Para 30] [342-C-D] 
H

316 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
Case Law Reference 
200·5 (4) CHN 264 
held inapplicable. Paras 7 
and 26 
1987 (2) SCR 1 
relied on. 
Para 19 
1958 SCR 1156 
relied on. 
Para 20 
2007 (8) SCR 570 
relied on . 
Para 24 
. 
(1992) Supp. (1) sec 471relied on. 
Para 24 · 
1954 SCR 330 
relied on. 
Para 25 
1962 SCR 676 
relied on. 
Para 25 
1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 271 relied on. 
Para 25 
1966 SC 1313 
relied on. 
Para 25 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
2825 of 2015. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.08.2014 of the 
High Court of Calcutta in AST No.177 of2013. 
Mohan Parasaran, Anip Sachthey, Saakaar Sardana for 
F the Appellants. 
G 
Vivek K. Tankha, Ramanand Agarwal, Pijush K. Roy, 
Nibedita Pal, Kakali Roy, Rajan K. Chourasia for the 
Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J.1. In this appeal, by special leave, the 
legal substantiality and acceptability of the judgment and order 
dated 29.08.2014 passed by the Division Bench of the High 
H Court of Calcutta in AST No. 17712013 whereby it has
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 317 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
overturned the decision of the learned Single Judge requiring 
A 
the respondent-writ petitioner to knock at the doors of the 
alternative forum by way of appeal, on the foundation that the 
authority that had passed the adverse order against the first 
respondent had no jurisdiction, and assuming he had the 
jurisdiction, it stood extinguished by expiration of the time limit B 
stipulated in certain paragraphs of the West Bengal Kerosene 
Oil Control Order, 1968 (for brevity, 'the Control Order'), is 
called in question. 
2. The facts which need to be exposited for adjudication C 
of this appeal are that the first respondent was granted the 
licence for carrying on the business of superior kerosene oil 
as an agent by the Joint Director of Consumer Goods, West 
Bengal in accordance with the paragraph 5(1) of the Control 
Order. The monthly allocation of public distribution system of D 
superior kerosene oil to the said respondent was fixed by the 
Director of Consumer Goods, West Bengal at 1,82,000 litres 
per month. On 10.8.2012 a physical inspection was carried 
out by the Area Inspector attached to the office of the Sub 
Divisional Controller, Food and Supplies, Burdwan (for short, 
E 
"SCFS") at the depot of the respondent. The concerned 
Inspector submitted the report to the SCFS stating that 71,494 
litres of superior kerosene oil had been delivered in excess 
by the dealer. On 8.4.2013, the SCFS
issued a notice seeking 
F 
explanation about the discrepancy pointed out by the Area 
Inspector. On receipt of the said show cause notice, the first 
respondent submitted his explanation on 16.4.2013. The 
SCFS afforded an opportunity of personal hearing to the dealer 
on 3.5.2013 and the same was availed of. After conducting G 
the enquiry, the SCFS forwarded the entire record to the 
District Controller, Food and Supplies Department, Burdwan, 
who in turn sent the entire case records to the Director of 
Consumer Goods for appropriate decision. After scrutiny of 
the records, the Director of Consumer Goods issued a show H
318 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
cause notice to the dealer on 26.6.2013. The first respondent 
replied to the same on 28.6.2013 through his counsel stating, 
inter alia, that under the Control Order, after the licence is 
issued to an agent by the Office of the Director, the District 
Magistrate having jurisdiction or any officer authorised by him, 
B is alone empowered to look into the functioning of the said 
agency and to give directions to him and/or initiate action 
against the concerned agent. Additionally, it was also put forth 
that the second show cause notice on the self-same allegations 
was untenable in law and accordingly prayer was made to 
C withdraw and/or rescind the notice and take steps for disposal 
of the matter in terms of the provisions of the Control Order. 
3. As the factual matrix would further undrape, the Director 
of Consumer Goods, vide order dated 22. 7.2013 narrated the 
D facts in detail and came to hold that SCFS has the authority to 
ask for explanation regarding distribution of superior kerosene 
oil in his jurisdiction; and that the Director of Consumer Goods 
being the Licensing Authority, can exercise the power to issue 
show cause notice and after giving the delinquent agent a fair 
E opportunity of being heard, pass appropriate orders. The said 
order also would reflect that the counsel for the first respondent 
had appeared before the Director on 17.7.2013. The 
concerned Director analysed the factual matrix and in
exercise 
F of power conferred on him under paragraph 9(ii) of the Control 
Order imposed a penalty of Rs.26,08,816.00 and further 
directed reduction of monthly allocation of superior kerosene 
oil of the agent by 12,000 litres for a period of one year. 
4. The order passed by the Director was assailed by the 
G agent in W.P.No. 25204 (W) of 2013. The learned Single Judge 
vide order dated 22.08.2013 referred to paragraph 10 of the 
Control Order which provides for an appeal to be preferred 
and accordingly directed that if the agent prefers an appeal by 
H 6.9.2013, the appellate authority shall dispose of the same by 
31.12.2013. The learned Single Judge further directed that
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 319 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
the agent shall maintain with utmost care an inventory of stocks A 
and accounts for periodical submission to the authorities and 
the penalty amount should be deposited by 6.9.2013 and the 
said penalty amount shall be kept in a separate interest bearing 
account. 
5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the 
respondents 1 and 2 preferred an appeal being AST No. 177 
B 
of 2013 before the Division Bench. It was urged in the intra-
court appeal that the proceeding before the Director of 
Consumer Goods was p~tently without jurisdiction, for power C 
of cancellation or suspension could only be exercised by the 
Director or District Magistrate having jurisdiction and in the 
case at hand the District Magistrate, Burdwan is the competent 
authority to exercise the power under paragraph 9 of the 
Control Order and not the Director of Consumer Goods; that D 
assuming the Director had jurisdiction, the proceeding that was 
initiated had lapsed after expiry of 30 days after the date of 
issuance of the show cause notice by the Director; and that in 
any case the proceeding was initiated by SCFS and he could 
not have sent the record to the Director after expiry of 30 days E 
when the proceeding stood lapsed. It was also urged that the 
order in question was served on the first respondent on 
12.8.2013 and, therefore, the date mentioned in the order could 
not validate the same as it was not dispatched
within 30 days. 
F 
The submissions put forth by the first respondent before the 
Division Bench of the High Court were seriously contested by 
the learned counsel for the Department. 
6. The Division Bench posed the following two questions:-
"a. 
Who is the competent authority to take 
disciplinary action either by cancellation or suspension of 
the licence of a S.K. Oil agent appointed in a district 
outside the Calcutta? 
G 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
b. \/Vhether the order of cancellation or suspension of 
licence in terms of Paragraph 9 of the West Bengal 
Kerosene Control Order will become effective on the date 
of passing of the said order or when the said order is 
B 
communicated to the concerned party?" 
7. After posing the aforesaid two questions, the Division 
Bench took note of the fact that the respondent-dealer was 
authorised to carry on the business as an agent of super 
kerosene oil in the district of Burdwan and the SCFS had 
C issued a show cause to the respondent and instead of taking 
the final decision himself, forwarded the records to the Director 
of Consumer Goods for necessary action who issued a fresh 
show cause notice on the self-same allegations and passed a 
order on 22.07.2013 which was without jurisdiction in view of 
D ·the conjoint reading of the language employed in paragraphs 
8, 9 and 10 of the Control Order. Thereafter, the Division Bench 
proceeded to deal with the issue whether the Director had 
passed the order imposing penalty within 30 days from the 
date of serving the show cause notice in terms of paragraph 9 
E of the Control Order, for the same was served on the dealer on 
12.8.2013. The Court took note of the contention of the 
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants therein that 
the order under Paragraph 9 passed by the competent 
F authority in writing within 30 days from the date of serving the 
show cause notice
should mean the communication of the 
order in writing within the said period of 30 days and not from 
the signing of the order and accepted the same. To arrive at 
the said conclusion, the appellate Bench placed reliance on 
G Rani Sati Kerosene Supply Company and Others v. The 
State of West Bengal and Others1• It referred to paragraphs 
27 and 29 of the said decision and thereafter came to hold 
thus:-
H 
1 2005 (4) CHN 264
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 321 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
"For the reasons discussed hereinabove, we hold thatthe A 
Sub-Divisional Controller, Food and Supplies. Burdwan 
lawfully initiated the proceeding against the appellanVwrit 
petitioner no. 1 by issuing show cause notice but did not 
conclude the same within 30 days as required under 
paragraph 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 
B 
1968. 
We further hold that the Director of Consumer Goods had 
no jurisdiction and/or authority to initiate any proceeding 
against the appellanVwrit petitioner no. 1 in terms of C 
paragraph 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order 
since the licence was granted to the appellant/writ 
petitioner no. 1 for carrying on business as S.K. Oil agent 
in the district of Burdwan which is outside Calcutta. 
In the result, the impugned order dated 22nd July, 2013 
passed by the Director of Consumer Goods cannot survive 
and is liable to be set aside since the said Director had 
D 
no authority and/or jurisdiction to pass any order under 
paragraph 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 
E 
1968 in respect of S.K. Oii agent of Burdwan. Therefore, 
the impugned order dated 22nd July, 2013 issued by the 
Director of Consumer Goods in respect of the appellant/ 
writ petitioner no. 1 is quashed." 
Being of this view, it allowed the appeal and set aside the 
judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court. 
F 
8. We have heard Mr. Mohan.Parasaran, learned senior
counsel along with Mr. Anip Sachtey, learned counsel for the G 
appellants and Mr. Vivek K. Tankha, learned senior counsel 
along with Mr. Rajan K. Choursia, learned counsel for the first 
respondent. 
9. At the outset, it is obligatory on our part to state that H 
when the final hearing of the appeal took place, we were
322 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A apprised at the Bar that SCFS who represents the District 
Magistrate, has issued a fresh show cause notice in respect 
of self-same lis and accordingly the following. order was 
passed:~ 
B 
"In course of hearing we have been apprised that the Sub-
Divisional Controller, Food and Supplies, Burdwan, who 
represents the District Magistrate, Burdwan, has issued 
a fresh show cause notice on the self-same lis and against 
its notice to show cause, an appeal has been preferred 
C 
before the Director of Consumer Goods in Kolkata. Be it 
noted, the show cause number is Memo No. 4159/ 
SCF&S/BDN/14. The appeal arisen out of the said show 
cause notice before the appellate authority, shall remain 
D 
stayed till the pronouncement of the judgment." 
10. We shall advert to the legal permissibility of the second 
show cause in respect of the same alleged deviation by the 
agent at a later stage, if required. As the factual foundation 
would exposit, the thrust of the controversy is whether the 
E Director of Consumer Goods, Food and Supplies Department 
has the jurisdiction to take action in the manner he has taken; 
and whether the order has to be passed and communicated 
within 30 days under the Control Order and the consequence 
of failure in such a situation. The Control Order was brought 
F into force on 26.6.1968 in exercise of powers conferred by 
sub-section 1 of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 
1955 read with clauses
(d), (e), (h) and 0) of sub-section 2 of 
that Section and Section ?'(1) of the said Act and the Order 
No. 26(11)-Com.Genl/66, dated ·1a1h June, 1966 feeling the 
G necessity and expediency for proper maintenance of supplies 
and for securing the equitable distribution and availability at 
fair prices of kerosene in West Bengal. Paragraph 3(a) of the 
Control Order defines "agent" which reads as under:-
H 
"3(a) "agent" means a person who has been appointed
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 323 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
as an agent of an oil distributing company by such company A 
and has been granted a licence under paragraph 5 of this 
Order." 
11. Paragraph 3( c) of the Control Order defines "dealer" 
which reads as follows:-
B 
"3(c) "dealer" means a person who has been granted a 
licence under paragraph 6 of this Order authorising him 
to carry on trade in kerosene. 
12. Paragraphs 3(d) and 3(e) of the Control Order define C 
the "Director" and the "District Magistrate" respectively, which 
reads as follows:-
3(d) "Director" means the Director of Consumer Goods, 
Department of Food and Supplies, Government of West D 
Bengal and includes any officer, not below the rank of 
Assistant Director, Directorate of Consumer Goods, Food 
and Supplies Department, Government of West Bengal 
who can perform all the functions of the Director and this 
order including cancellation of licence. 
E 
3(e) "District Magistrate" includes the Deputy 
Commissioner of a district and also includes any person 
not below the rank of a Sub-divisional Controller of Food 
and Supplies in the Department of Food and Supplies, 
F 
Government of West Bengal, authorised by the District 
Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, 
in writing to perform all or any of the functions of the District 
Magistrate under this Order." 
13. Paragraph 5 of the Control Order deals with grant of 
licence to an agent. It reads as under:-
G 
"5. Grant
of licence to agent - (1) The Director may 
grant a licence to any agent in West Bengal authorising 
H
324 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
him to carry on trade in kerosene as such agent. 
(2)Alicence granted under sub-paragraph (1) shall be in 
Form A and shall be subject to such conditions as are 
specified therein and such other conditions as the Director 
B 
may lay down from time to time in the interest of fair 
distribution of kerosene within the State. 
(3) No agent shall sell, supply or transfer kerosene to any 
person other than a dealer duly licensed under paragraph 
c 
6 of this Order, or a holder of a permit or delivery order 
issued under paragraph 11 of this Order." 
14. Paragraph 6 deals with grant of licence to a dealer. It 
is as follows:-
D 
"6. Grant of licence to dealer- (1) the Director or the 
District Magistrate having jurisdiction may grant a licence 
to any person authorsing such person to carry on trade in 
kerosene as a dealer. 
E 
(2)A licence granted under sub-paragraph (1) shall be in 
Form B and shall be subject to such conditions as are 
specified therein and such other conditions as the Director 
or the District Magistrate having jurisdiction may impose 
from time to time for the sake of fair distribution of 
F 
kerosene." 
G 
15. Paragraph 9 of the Control Order deals with 
cancellation or suspension of licence. The same being of 
significance, is reproduced in entirety herein below:-
"9. Cancellation or suspension of licence - If it 
appears to the Director or the District Magistrate having 
jurisdiction that an agent or a dealer
has indulged in any 
malpractice or contravened any provision of this Order or 
H 
any condition of the licence or any direction given under
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 325 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
paragraph 12 of this Order, he may forthwith as the Agent A 
or Dealer to show cause for violations made or suspend 
the licence: 
Provided that the agent or the dealer who has been asked 
to show-cause or whose licence has been suspended 
B 
shall be given an opportunity of being heard and the 
Director or the District Magistrate having jurisdiction shall 
pass an order in writing within 30 days from the date of 
serving the show-cause notice or suspension of the 
licence taking any or all of the actions given below. 
C 
(i) 
He may let off the Agent or Dealer if sufficient cause 
has been shown. 
(ii) 
He may pass an order by imposing a penalty which 0 
according to the gravity of the violations made will 
not be less than Rs.10,000/- in case of an Agent and 
Rs.2,000/- in case of a Dealer and revoke the 
suspension order if already served. 
(iii) He may cancel the licence: 
Provided that the order shall be passed ex parte if the 
Agent or the Dealer whose licence has been so 
suspended or on whom show-cause notice has been 
served fails to appear at the hearing." 
16. Paragraph 10 of the Control Order which provides for 
appeal is extracted hereunder:-
E 
F 
"10. Appeal - (a) Any person aggrieved by an Order G 
passed under paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of this Order, 
may within 30 days from the date of the order, prefer an 
appeal to the State Government in the Food and Supplies 
Department. 
H
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
(b) elsewhere, -
B 
c 
(i) where the order is passed by the District Magistrate or 
the Deputy Commissioner of a district, to the State 
Government, 
(ii) where the order is passed by any other officer 
authorised by the District Magistrate or the Deputy 
· Commissioner of a district under clause (e) of paragraph 
3, to the District Magistrate or the Deputy Commissioner, 
as the case may be, of the district. 
17. We have reproduced the relevant paragraphs of the 
Control Order to understand the schematic purpose and effect 
of the Control Order. Paragraph 5, as it envisages, empowers 
D the Director to grant licence to any ag_ent in West Bengal 
authorising him to carry on trade in kerosene as such agent. 
Paragraph 6 empowers the Director or the District Magistrate 
having jurisdiction to grant the licence to any person as a 
dealer. As the scheme would reflect there is a distinction 
E between an "agent" and a "dealer", for the agent is granted 
licence under paragraph 5 of the Control Order whereas dealer 
is granted licence under paragraph 6 of the Control Order. 
Paragraph (7) provides for renewal of licences, licence fees, 
etc. The relevant part of the said paragraph is as follows:-
F 
G 
H 
"7. Renewal of licences, licence fees, etc. - ( 1) Every 
licence issued under paragraph 5 or paragraph 6 of this 
Order shall be valid up to 31s1 December next following 
the date of issue and may, at the discretion of the authority
by which the licence was granted, be renewed for 
successive periods of one year on an application made 
in that behalf to such authority in the manner provided 
hereinafter before the expiry of the date of validity of the 
licence: 
Provided that -
STATE OFWEST BENGALAND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 327 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
(i) the Director may, by notification in the Official Gazette, 
A 
extend the period of validity of existing agents' licences 
issued under paragraph 5 of this Order for such period, 
... 
not exceeding 60 days, beyond the 31st December, 
hereinbefore mentioned, as he may, for reasons to be 
recorded in writing, think fit; and 
B 
(ii) the Director, or the District Magistrate having 
jurisdiction, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, 
extend the period of validity of existing dealers' licences 
issued under paragraph 6 of this Order for such period, 
C 
not exceeding 60 days beyond the 31st December, 
hereinbefore mentioned, as he may; for reasons to be 
recorded in writing, think fit: Provided further that the 
Director or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, 
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend the time 
D 
for filing of application for renewal of licences: 
Provided also that on an application made by a licensee 
in that behalf, the authority by which the licence was issued 
may, if he considers it expedient so to do, renew a licence 
E 
issued under paragraph 5 or paragraph 6 of this Order, 
for a maximum period of three years at a time on payment 
in non-judicial stamps of the fees for renewal of licences 
referred to in sub-paragraph (3) of this paragraph, for each 
year of renewal or part thereof. 
F 
(2) Every application for the issue of licence under 
paragraph
5 or paragraph 6 of the Order or for the renewal 
of such licence under this paragraphs shall be made to 
the appropriate authority in Form C". 
G 
18. On a reading of that paragraph it is clear that power 
conferre·d on the Director and the District Magistrate are 
different, for the Director is a higher authority and the rule 
clothes him with more authority. Needless to say, the said 
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[2015) 9 S.C.R. 
A 
paragraph has to be read in juxtaposition with other 
paragraphs. It is clear from paragraph 5 that the Director alone 
is authorised to grant a licence to an agent whereas a dealer's 
licence can be grc:inted either by the Director or by the DistriG1 
Magistrate. Sub-para 3 of Paragraph 5 of the Control Order 
B is also indicative of the fact that the agent operates at a larger 
scale than the dealer. An agent can sell, supply or transfer 
kerosene to a dealer, holder of a permit or delivery order and 
no other person. Sub-para 2 of Paragraph 6 of the Control 
Order is differently worded as it postulates that conditions can 
C be specified by the Director or the District Magistrate having 
the jurisdiction. The conditions imposed may vary from time 
to time for the sake of fair distribution of kerosene. The 
authorities are also different as per the dictionary clause. 
D 
19. In this backdrop, we are required to understand the 
language employed in paragraph 9 of the Control Order. The 
said paragraph, as we perceive, is rather loosely and 
ambiguously worded. It becomes obvious when we appreciate 
the Control Order on the bedrock of schematic interpretation. 
E It is worth noting that while paragraph 5 deals with grant of 
licence to an agent by the Director, paragraph 6 deals with 
grant of licence to a dealer by the Director or the District 
Magistrate. The term "District Magistrate" as per paragraph 
F 3(e) of the Control
Order includes authorities mentioned 
therein. Paragraph 9 which pertains to cancellation or 
suspension of licence is a composite paragraph and stipulates 
when and who can cancel or suspend a licence of an agent or 
a dealer. The said power is exercised, when an agent or dealer 
G has indulged in any kind of malpractice or contravened any 
provision of the Control Order or conditions applicable, etc. 
On a literal reading of paragraph 9, it may convey or one may 
be emboldened to urge that Director as well as the District 
Magistrate including the authorised officers mentioned in 
H paragraph 3(e), have concurrent jurisdiction to cancel or
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 329 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
suspend the licence granted to an agent or a dealer. However, 
A 
such an interpretation could not be occurred with the legislative 
intent and would lead to absurdity and anomaly. Therefore, such 
kind of an interpretation has to be avoided. We are disposed 
to think so inasmuch as an agent, as noted above, is appointed 
by the Director and has the authority to carry on trade of B 
kerosene within the entire State. But a dealer, cannot supply, 
sell or transfer kerose.ne to any person other than a holder of a · 
permit, delivery order or through a dealer specified in 
paragraph 6. That apart, it is noticeable that sub-paragraph 
(e) of paragraph (3) a District Magistrate would include a sub-
C 
Divisional Controller of Food and Supplies, authorised by the 
District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner and District 
Magistrate is for a specified small area within the State. He 
cannot exercise jurisdiction in respect of an area beyond the 
geographical boundaries of the. area/district. In.such a situation 
D . 
to place a construction on Paragraph 9 that the Director as 
well as the District Magistrate would have concurrent 
jurisdiction would be inapposite. In our considered view, a 
logical and reasonable interpretation to paragraph 9 of the E 
Control Order has to be preferred instead of adopting the loose 
meaning in the literal sense. Such an interpretation would be 
in consonance with the principles
of harmonious construction, 
that is, harmonious reading of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 of the 
Control Order. It is based on the premise that the authority who 
F 
has the right to grant licence has the authority to suspend or 
cancel the licence. In this regard, we may fruitfully reproduce 
a passage from Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General 
Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Others2, wherein it 
has succinctly been stated thus:-
"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. 
They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if 
2 (1987) 1 sec 424 
G 
H
330 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. 
Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That 
interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation 
match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when 
we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the 
statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by 
section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by 
word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, 
with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such 
context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and 
words may take colour and appear different than when 
the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by 
the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as 
a whole and discover what each section, each clause, 
each phrase and each word is meant and designed to 
say as to f~t into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a 
statute and no word of a statute can be construed in 
isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word 
has a place and everything is in its place." 
20. We have referred to the said passage, for the Control 
Order was brought into force for maintenance of supplies and 
for securing the equitable distribution and availability of 
kerosene at fair prices in West Bengal. It has controlling 
F 
measures and it subserves the public purpose. The intent of 
the Control Order is to totally prohibit
creation of any kind of 
situation which will frustrate the proper distribution of kerosene 
oil. The purpose of any Act or Rule or Order has its own sanctity. 
While interpreting the same, the text and context have to be 
G kept in mind. In this regard, we may usefully .refer to an 
authority in Workmen v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate3, wherein the 
three-Judge Bench while interpreting the expression "any 
person" occurring in Section 2(k) of the Industrial DisputesAct, 
H ' AIR 1958 SC 353
STATE OF WEST BENGALAND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 331" 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
194 7 observed that the definition clause must be read in the A 
context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and 
consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. 
Elaborating further, the Court proceeded to state:-
"lt is well settled that "the words of a statute, when there is 
B 
a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the 
sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the 
enactment and the object which the legislature has in view. 
Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly 
grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor C 
even in its popul<ir use, as in the subject or in the occasion 
on which they are used, and the object to be attained". 
(Maxwell, lnterp1etationofStatutes, 9th Edn., p. 55)." 
21. Keeping in view the aforesaid rule of interpretation, 
D 
we are constrained to think that it would be incongruous to 
hold that even when the licence of an agent at the State. level is 
granted and issued by the Director, a District Magistrate, as 
defined in paragraph 3( e) of the Control Order, in exercise of 
concurrent jurisdiction can suspend or cancel the State level 
E 
licence. Be it noted, as per Section 21 of the General Clauses 
Act, power to issue notification/ order/rules/bye-laws, etc. 
includes the power to amend/ vary or rescind. Though the said 
provision is not applicable, yet it is indicative that generally 
unless the
statute or rule provides to the contrary, either F 
expressly or impliedly, issuing or appointing authority would 
also exercise the right to cancel or suspend the licence. As 
has been stated earlier. on a cursory reading it may appear 
that paragraph 9 confers concurrent jurisdiction. The said 
paragraph deals with suspension or cancellation of licence G 
and is a composite paragraph; which applies to licence granted 
to an agent as well as the dealer. It refers to the power of a 
Director and District Magistrate having jurisdiction. The words 
"District Magistrate having jurisdiction" are also used in 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A paragraph 6. The expression "District Magistrate having 
jurisdiction" reflects the legislative intent that District Magistrate 
having jurisdiction under paragraph 9 would be the same 
District Magistrate or authority which has the power to grant 
licence to a dealer in Form B under paragraph 6. Read in this 
B manner, we have no hesitation in holding thatit is the Director 
alone who could have issued the show cause notice under 
paragraph 9 and has the authority and jurisdiction to pass an 
order in terms of paragraph 9 of the Control Order. The earlier 
notice issued by SCFS has to be regarded at best a show 
C cause notice to ascertain and affirm facts alleged and it 
ensured a response and reply from the first respondent. The 
said notice by SCFS could not have culminated in the order 
under paragraph 9, for he has no authority and jurisdiction to 
D pass an order suspending or cancelling the licence. Therefore, 
the matter was rightly referred to the Director for action, if 
required, in terms of paragraph 9 of the Control Order. 
22. Having held that, we think it appropriate to refer to the 
aspect of communication pertaining to period as prescribed 
E in paragraphs 9 and 10. The High Court has taken note of the 
fact that SCFS had issued the notice of show cause to which 
the agent had replied. The said authority has forwarded the 
matter to the Director, Consumer Goods for his perusal and 
F 
necessary action, who in
exercise of his authority had passed 
the order on 22.7.2013 which was received by the first 
respondent on 12.8.2013. The Division Bench has opined that 
as per Paragraph 9, the order has to be passed within 30 
days after the issue of the notice to show cause and same has 
G to be communicated within the said period and passing an 
order on the file would not tantamount to an order. 
23. The Division Bench, as it appears, has been guided 
by the decision in Rani Sati Kerosene Supply Company 
H and Others (supra). In the said case the agent had challenged 
the order of suspension-cum-show cause notice and the order
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 333 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
of cancelling the agency licence. The High Court had taken A 
note of the contention that assuming the Director had 
Jurisdiction, the order having been communicated beyond 30 
days from the issue of the order of suspension, it was liable to 
be set aside. After stating the facts, the earlier Division Bench 
proceeded to interpret Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Control B 
Order and opined thus:-
"29. After going through the aforesaid two paragraphs, I 
find that against an order of cancellation of licence, there 
is a provision of appeal to be availed of within 30 days C 
from the date of the order. There is, however, no power 
conferred upon the appellate authority to entertain such 
appeal after the period of limitation by condoning the delay. 
If I accept the contention of Mr. Chakraborty, the learned 
Counsel appearing for the State that the date of D 
communication of the order is insignificant, in that case, 
the right of appeal conferred upon the aggrieved agent 
against an order of cancellation can easily be frustrated 
by communicating the order after th~ expiry of 30 days 
from the date of the order. Therefore the phrase "by an· E 
order in writing to be made" appearing in the proviso to 
the Paragraph 9 is to be construed as "by an order in writing 
to be communicated" and so long the order is not 
communicated, it should be presumed that the order has 
F 
not been passed and consequently, a duty
is cast upon 
the authority concerned to communicate the order to the 
aggrieved, eitber direct or constructively. Mere passing 
of an order and keeping it in the file will not fulfil the 
requirement of the said Paragraph 9. 
G 
30. Mr. Banerjee, the learned advocate appearing for the 
petitioners, has in this connection placed strong reliance 
upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of 
Assistant Transporl Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh v. 
H 
Nand Singh, [reported in 179 ELT (510) where the Apex
334 
A 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
Court while considering Section 35 of the Central Excise 
and Salt Act, 1944 heid that the date of communication of 
the order will be the starting point of limitation for filing an 
appeal and not the date of the order. because, the order 
would be effective against the person affected by it only 
when it comes to the knowledge either direct or 
constructively, otherwise not. The Supreme Court further 
held that mere writing of an order in the file, kept in the 
office of the authorities, is no order in the eye of law. 
31. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court supports 
the contention of the petitioners that the order of 
cancellation, for all practical purposes, should be deemed 
to have been passed on January 30, 2004 when the same 
was faxed for communication to the petitioners and served 
upon them. Thus, the order of cancellation of licence was, 
in the eye of law, passed beyond 30 days from the date of 
passing the order of suspension and consequently, the 
order of suspension had automatically ceased to have any 
effect from January 10, 2004, and the order of cancellation 
not having been passed in accordance with law within 30 . 
days from December 10, 2003, the Director could not 
pass any such order beyond that date. Thus, the order 
impugned is liable to be quashed also on the aforesaid 
ground." 
The said judgment is the fulcrum of reasoning of the 
impugned judgment. 
24. The aforesaid
decision, as is evident, lays down that 
G 
passing of the order and communication thereof must be within 
30 days and on that basis has opined that the order passed 
on the file and not communicated to the person aggrieved is 
not an order that can be taken cognizance of. There can be 
no scintilla of doubt that unless an adverse order is 
H communicated that does not come into effect. Passing of an
STATE OF WEST BENGALAND OTHERS v R.K.B.K. LTD. 335 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
order on the file does not become an order in the eye of law. 
A 
But the core question would be, if an order is passed within 30 
days and. communicated thereafter, what would be the effect. 
In the instant case, as the factual matrix would unveil, the order 
was passed before expiration of 30 days, but the same was 
served on the first respondent beyond 30 days. The thrust of B 
the matter is whether the order has to be passed and 
communicated within 30 days. Paragraph 9 of the Control 
Order requires the competent authority to pass an order within 
30 days from the date of serving the show cause notice or the 
suspension of licence. The word used is "shall". Paragraph C 
10 of the Control Order enables the aggrieved person to prefer 
an appeal against an order passed under Paragraph 8 or 9 
within 30 days to the State Government in Food and Supplies 
Department. ·in this context, reference to the authority in r.t/CD 
D 
v. Qimat Rai Gupta and others4 is of significance. In the said 
case, the Court was interpreting the word "made" occurring in 
Section 126(4) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, 
which stipulated that no amendment under sub-section 1 shall 
be made in the assessment list in relation to certain aspects. 
E 
It was contended before this Court on behalf of the Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi that the use of the expression "made" 
occurring in the said sub-section would
necessitate 
communication of the order. It was contended before this Court 
by the Corporation that the distinction must be made between 
F 
communication of order and making thereof inasmuch as 
whereas communication may be necessary so as to enable 
an assessee to prefer an appeal against the order of 
assessment but only signing of the order would subserve the 
purpose of saving the period of limitation. The submission G 
was that the expression "no amendment under sub-section ( 1) 
shall be made" should be given a liberal interpretation. 
Reliance was placed on the pronouncement in CCE v. M.M. 
• (2007) 7 sec 309 
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(2015) 9 S.C.R. 
A Rubber and Co. 5 The said stand was controverted on the 
ground that the Act having been enacted for the purpose of 
controlling the abuse of power on the part of the Commissioner, 
the same should be given purposive meaning so as to fulfil the 
purport and object of the legislation. While dealing with the 
B period of limitation, the Court observed:-
"16. In interpreting a provision dealing with limitation, a 
liberal interpretation in a situation of this nature should be 
given. Although an order passed after expiry of the period 
C 
of limitation fixed under the statute would be a nullity, the 
same would not mean that a principle of interpretation 
applied thereto should not (sic) be such so as to mean 
that not only an order is required to be made but the same 
D 
is also required to be communicated. 
17. When an order is passed by a high ranking authority 
appointed by the Central Government, the law presumes 
that it would act bona fide. Misuse of power in a situation 
of this nature, in our opinion, should not be readily inferred. 
E 
It is difficult to comprehend that while fixing a period of 
limitation, Parliament did not visualise the possibility of 
abuse of power on the part of the statutory authority. It 
advisedly chose the word "made" and not "communicated". 
They, in ordinary parlance, carry different meanings." 
F 
25. After so stating, the Court proceeded to interpret the 
term "made" and observed that
meaning of a word depends 
upon the text and context and it will also depend upon the 
purport and object it seeks to achieve. The two-Judge Bench 
G referred to Surendra Singh v. State of U.P.6, Harish Chandra 
Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer7 and 
s (1992) supp. (1) sec 471 
6 AIR 1954 SC 194 
H 
1 AIR 1961SC1500
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 337 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
K.Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhya Ba/an6• The Court A 
reproduced paragraphs 12 and 18 from M.M. Rubber and 
Co. (supra). They read as follows:-
" 12. It may be seen therefore, that, if an authority is 
authorised to exercise a power or do an act affecting the 
B 
rights of parties, he shall exercise that power within the 
period of limitation prescribed therefor. The order or 
decision of such authority comes into force or becomes 
operative or becomes an effective order or decision on 
and from the date when it is signed by him. The date of C 
such order or decision is the date on which the order or 
. decision was passed or made: that is to say when he 
ceases to have any authority to tear it off and draft a 
different order and when he ceas~s to have any locus 
paetentiae. Normally that happens when the order or D 
. · decision is made public or notified in some form or when 
it can be said to have left his hand. The date of 
communication of the order to the party whose rights are 
affected is not the relevant date for purposes of 
determining whether the power has been exercised within 
E 
the prescribed time." 
)()()()()( 
xxxxx 
)()()()()( 
"18. Thus ifthe intention or design of the statutory provision 
F 
was to protect the interest of the person adversely affected, 
by providing a remedy against the order or decision any 
period of limitation prescribed with reference to invoking 
such remedy
shall be read as commencing from the date 
of communication of the order. But if it is a limitation for a G 
competent authority to make an order the date of exercise 
of that power and in the case of exercise of suo motu 
power over the subordinate authorities' orders, the date 
• (1999) 7 sec s10 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
on which such power was exercised by making an order 
are the relevant dates for determining the limitation. The 
ratio of this distinction may also be founded on the principle 
that the Government is bound by the proceedings of its 
officers but persons affected are not concluded by the 
B 
decision." 
Eventually, the Court came to hold thus: 
· "An order passed by a competent authority dismissing a 
C 
government servant from services requires communication 
thereof as has been held in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh 
Harika9 but an order placing a government servant on 
suspension does not require communication of that order. 
(See State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram10.) What is, therefore, 
D 
necessary to be borne in mind is the knowledge leading 
to the making of the order. An order ordinarily would be 
presumed to have been made when it is signed. Once it 
is signed and an entry in that regard is made in the 
requisite register kept and maintained in terms of the 
E 
provisions of a statute, the same cannot be changed or 
altered. It, subject to the other provisions contained in the 
Act, attains finality. Where, however, communication of an 
order is a necessary ingredient for bringing an end result 
to a status or to provide a person an opportunity to take 
F 
recourse to law if he is aggrieved thereby, the order is 
required to be communicated." 
26. We have referred to the aforesaid authority in extenso 
as the Division Bench
has in one line stated that the said 
G decision makes it clear that communication of an order is 
necessary ingredient for bringing an end result to a status or 
to provide a person an opportunity to take recourse to law if 
• 9 AIR 1966 SC 1313 
H 
10 (1969) 3 sec 20 
\
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 339 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
he is aggrieved thereby, then the said order is required to be A 
communicated. To arrive at the said conclusion, as has been 
stated earlier, the Division Bench has found support from Rani 
Sati Kerosene Supply Company and Others (supra) 
wherein it has been held that if an order is communicated after 
30 days, an ·order of cancellation can easily be frustrated and, 
B 
therefore, the phrase by an order in writing to be made 
appearing in proviso to Paragraph 9 of the Control Order is to 
be construed as by an order in writing to be communicated. 
27. The Division Bench has read the prescription of 30 C 
days passing of an order in writing within 30 days from the 
date of serving the show cause notice or suspension of licence 
to be mandatory. To elaborate, if the order is not passed within 
the said period, the a.uthority cannot pass any order or if it 
passes an order, it is a nullity. In this context, we may fruitfully D 
refer to a passage from G.P. Singh's book, as has been 
reproduced by the three-Judge Bench in Kai/ash v. Nankhu 
and others11 • It reads as under:-
"Justice G.P. Singh notes in his celebrated work Principles 
E 
of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edn., 2004) while dealing 
with mandatory and directory provisions: 
"The study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead 
to formulation of any universal rule except this that language 
F 
alone most often is not decisive, and regard
must be had 
to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory 
provision in question, in determining whether the same is 
mandatory or directory. In an oft-quoted passage Lord 
Campbell said: 'No universal rule can be laid down as to G 
whether mandatory enactments shall be considered 
directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for 
disobedience. It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get 
11 (2005) 4 sec 480 
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B 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending 
to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.'" (p. 
338) 
" 'For ascertaining the real intention of the legislature', 
points out Subbarao, J. 'the court may consider intera/ia, 
the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences 
which would follow from construing it the one way or the 
other; the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity 
of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; 
the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a 
contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions; the 
fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is 
not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial 
consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether 
the object of the legislation will be· defeated or furthered'. 
If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the 
same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas 
if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience 
will be created to innocent persons without very much 
furthering the object of enactment, the same will be 
construed as directory." (pp. 339-40)" 
28. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, if it is held 
that the order would become a nullity, it really does not serve 
F the purpose of the Control Order. On the contrary, it frustrates 
it and, therefore, the interpretation placed by the High Court 
on
Paragraph 9 in juxtaposition with Paragraph 10 to treat the 
order has null and void is neither correct nor sound. It is 
desirable that the authority shall pass an order within 30 days 
G from the date of show cause. Be it noted that there are two 
contingencies when the show cause is issued for violation or 
when an order of suspension is passed. There can be no 
trace of doubt that the order will take effect from the date when 
H it is served. The order, unless it is served, definitely neither 
the agent nor the dealer would suspend its activities or obey
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS v. R.K.B.K. LTD. 341 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
any order, for he has not been communicated. Regard being A 
had to this aspect, it is to be seen whether the prescription of 
30 days from the date of order as provided in Paragraph 10 
would make the order null and void. The order passed by the 
authority comes into effect when it is communicated. An order 
passed in file in case of this nature would not be an effective B 
order, for it is adverse to the interest of the dealer or agent 
and, therefore, paragraph 10 has to be given a purposive 
m_eaning. It has to convey that 30 days from the date of the 
order which is an effective order, and that is the date of 
communication. Unless such an interpretation is placed, the C 
intention of the rule making authority and also the intention 
behind the object and reasons behind the Control Order and 
the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 would be frustrated. 
Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the view expressed 0 
by the High Court on this score also is absolutely incorrect 
and wholly unsustainable. 
29. Apart from above, the words used in Paragraph 10 
are "date of the order". In the scheme of the Control Order, the 
order comes into effect from the date of receipt by the agent E 
or the dealer. Once that becomes the decision, the 
commencement of limitation of 30 days for the purpose of 
Paragraph 1 O would be the date when the order is effective. 
The High Court in Rani Sati Kerosene Supply
Company F 
and Others (supra) has opined that if the order of cancellation 
is not served on the affected person and the appeal period 
expires, there is the possibility that the adverse order would 
become unassailable. The reasoning is totally fallacious. An 
appeal can only be preferred when the order is effective. The G 
ineffective order, that is to say, uncommunicated order cannot 
be challenged. Therefore, the reasoning given by the court in 
earlier judgment is erroneous and hence, the reliance 
thereupon by the impugned order is faulty. There has to be a 
purposive construction of the words "from the date of order". 
H
342 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
To place a construction that the date of an order would mean 
passing of the order, though not made effective would lead to 
an absurdity. 
30. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the 
B irresistible conclusion that the High Court has erroneously 
interpreted Paragraph 9 and 10 of the Control Order and that 
is why it has arrived at an erroneous conclusion. When we 
had reserved the judgment, we were apprised that a fresh show 
cause notice had been issued for the self-same allegation by 
C the SCFS and an appeal has been preferred against them. 
D 
As we have held, the Director alone has thejurisdiction to pass 
the order, the said order remains a valid order and can be 
challenged in an appeal under Paragraph 10 and the appellate 
authority would be the State Government. 
31. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the order 
passed by the Division Bench in AST No. 177/2013 is set aside 
and the respondent no.1 is granted liberty to prefer an appeal 
within the prescribed period before the State Government. Be 
E 
it noted, the Control Order has been amended in 2014 whereby 
the period of limitation has been extended. Be that as it may, 
we direct that the period of limitation shall commence from 
today. There shall be no order as to costs. 
F 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal allowed.