R.A.H. SIGURAN versus SHANKARE GOWDA @ SHANKARA & ANR.
[2017] 7 S.C.R. 754, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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[2017] 7 S.C.R. 754 
R.A.H. SIGURAN 
v. 
SHANKARE GOWDA @ SHANKARA & ANR. 
(Crimina1Appea1No.1439of 2017) 
AUGUST 18, 2017 
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.I 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
s.482 - Case against 
respondent no.l was that he procured minor girls and sent them for 
C prostitution through co-accused - Quashing of the proceedings 
against respondent no.l sought on the ground that Investigating 
officer who conducted the investigation was not authorised to do 
so under Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 - Held: It is well 
settled that even if investigation is not conducted by authorised 
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officer. the trial is not vitiated unless prejudice is shown - High 
Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings merely on the 
ground that the investigation was not valid - Trial court is directed 
to proceed with the matter in accordance with law - Immoral Traffic 
(Prevention) Act, 1956. 
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H.N. Rishbud and Anr. v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 
196: [1955) 1 SCR 1150; Union of India and Ors 
represented through Superintendent of Police v. 
T. 
Nathamuni (2014) 16 SCC 285:1 20141 12 SCR 297 -
relied on. 
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Delhi Administration v. Ram Singh AIR 1962 SC 63 : 
(1962) 2 SCR 694 - referred to. 
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Case Law Reference 
[19621 2 SCR 694 
[1955) 1 SCR 1150 
(2014] 12 SCR 297 
referred to 
relied on 
relied on 
Para6 
Para 10 
Para 12 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 
No.1439 of2017. 
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R.A.H. SIGURAN v. SHANKARE GOWDA@ SHANKARA 
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From th\: final Judgment and Order dated 03.02.2016 passed by 
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the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Petition No.5330/ 
2015. 
A. Philips, Ms. Lityi M. Noshi, Ms. Arnita Singh Kalka!, Advs. for 
the Appellant. 
Anil V. Katarki, Anil C. Nishani, T.R.B. Sivakumar, V.N. 
Raghupathy, Advs. for the Respondents. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered: 
ORDER 
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1. Leave granted. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 
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2. The question for consideration is whether the High Court was 
justified in quashing the proceedings against Respondent No.1 on the 
ground that Investigating Officer who conducted the investigation was 
not authorized to do so under the provisions of Immoral Traffic 
(Prevention) Act, 1956 (the Act). 
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3. The case of the prosecution is that a raid was conducted on the 
night of 27th August, 2010 in a lodge and it was found that.Respondent 
No.1 had procured minor girls and sent them for prostitution through his 
co-accused. He was indulging in prostitution with the aid of co-accused. 
· After investigation, charge-sheet was filed under Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
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and 9 of the Act read with Sections 366A; 372 IPC read with Section 34 
IPC on 20th August, 2011. 
4. The Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court. The 
charges were framed on 23rd April, 2015. 
5. The prosecution examined PW-1 on 14th July, 2015 but the 
cross-examination of PW-1 was deferred at the
request of Respondent 
No.l. 
6. Thereafter, Respondent No.1 filed an application under Section 
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482 Cr.PC before the High Court on the ground that Investigating Officer 
was not competent to investigate. He was not a Special Police Officer 
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covered by notification issued by the Government of Karnataka under 
the Act. Reliance was placed on judgment of this Court in Delhi 
Administration versus Ram Singh1· 
'(1962) 2 SCR 694, AIR 1962 SC 63 
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[2017] 7 S.C.R. 
7. The High Court allowed the.petition as follows:-
" 14. The investigation since not steered by Special Officer 
appointed by Section 13 of the Act is illegal and vitiated, though 
the trial has already begun, having noticed the basic infirmity 
allowing the proceedings to continue any more is abuse of the 
process of the Court itself. On that count, the petition is liable to 
be quashed under the jurisdiction of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 
The petition is allowed. The criminal proceedings in S.C.No. 
219/2013 pending on the file ofVIIIAdditional District and Sessions 
Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengal um, is hereby quashed." 
8. No doubt, this Court in Ram Singh (supra) held by majority 
that the Act was a complete code and certain provisions of the Act 
could not be complied with by the regular police. Arrest without warrant 
may be made only by Special Police Officer under the proviso to Section 
14 of the Act and not by a regular police. Search without a warrant can 
also be done only by a Special Police Officer. Thus, only a Special Police 
Officer could conduct the investigation. 
9. However, this conclusion was not enough for the High Court to 
quash the proceedings. It is well settled law that even if investigation is 
not conducted by authorized officer, the trial is not initiated unless a 
prejudice is shown. 
10. In H.N. Rishbud and Anr. versus State of Delhi2 the 
question considered by this Court was
whether after the court takes 
cognizance, trial can be held to be initiated merely on the ground that 
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investigation was invalid. Answering in the negative, this Court held that 
if the plea ofinvalidity of investigation is raised at sufficiently early stage, 
the court, instead of taking cognizance direct reinvestigation by competent 
investigating officer. But, after cognizance is taken the trial cannot be 
quashed for invalidity ofinvestigation. 
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11. The observations in the said judgment are:-
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"9. The question then requires to be considered whether and to 
what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. 
2AIR 1955 SC 196, (1955) I SCR 1150
R.A.H. SIGURAN v. SHANK.ARE GOWDA @ SHANKARA 
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Now, trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by 
investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in 
respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow 
that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based 
thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach 
of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure 
of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference 
to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an 
illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A 
defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct 
bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance 
or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation 
is provided in Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as 
the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be 
maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of 
the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. Section 190 of 
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the Code of Criminal Proi:i:dure is one out of a group of sections D 
under the heading "Conditions requisite for initiation of 
proceedings". The language of this section is in marked contrast 
with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading 
i.e. Sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate 
the competence of the
Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain 
cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does 
not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 
190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not 
possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is 
prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an invalid report may 
still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether 
it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in 
any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a 
proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is in the following terms 
is attracted: 
"Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, 
sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction 
shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account 
of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, 
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warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment' or other 
proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other 
proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission or 
irregularity, has in fact occasioned a failure of justice." 
If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report 
vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to 
investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the 
trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality 
in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a 
miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course 
ofinvestigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction 
of the Court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in 
Prabhu v. Emperor (AIR 1944 PC 73) and Lumbhardar 
Zutshi v. King (AIR 1950 PC 26). These no doubt relate to the 
illegality of arrest in the course of investigation while we are 
concerned in the present cases with the illegality with reference 
to the machinery for the collection of the evidence. This distinction 
may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of 
justice, but both the cases clearly show that invalidity of the 
investigation has no relation to the competence of the Court. We 
are, therefore, clearly, also, of the opinion that where the 
cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has 
proceeded to termination, the
invalidity of the precedent 
investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice 
has been caused thereby. 
l 0. It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the 
investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during trial. 
When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the 
knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, 
while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary 
steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering 
such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case 
may call for. Such a course is not altogether outside the 
contemplation of the scheme of the Code as appears from Section 
202 under which a Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint 
can order investigation by the police. Nor can it be said that the
R.A.H. SIGURAN v. SHANKARE GOWDA @ SHANKARA 
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adoption of such a course is outside the scope of the inherent 
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powers of the Special Judge, who for purposes of procedure at 
the trial is virtually in the position ofa Magistrate trying a warrant 
case. When the attention of the Court is called to such an illegality 
at a very early stage it would not be fair to the accused not to 
obviate the prejudice that may have been caused thereby, by 
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appropriate orders, at that stage butto leave him to the ultimate 
remedy of waiting till the conclusion of the trial and of discharging 
the somewhat difficult burden under Section 537 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of making out that such an error has in fact 
occasioned a failure of justice. It is relevant in this context to 
observe that even if the trial had proceeded to conclusion and the 
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accused had to make out that there was in fact a failure of justice 
as the result of such an error, explanation to Section 537 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that the fact of the objection 
having been raised at an early stage of the proceeding is a pertinent 
factor. To ignore the breach in such a situation when brought to 
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the notice of the Court would be virtually to make a dead letter of 
the peremptory provision which has been enacted on grounds of 
public policy for the benefit of such an accused. It is true that the 
peremptory provision itself allows an officer of a lower rank to 
make the
investigation if permitted by the Magistrate. But this is 
not any indication by the Legislature that an investigation by an 
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officer of a lower rank without such permission cannot be said to 
cause prejudice. When a Magistrate is approached for granting 
such permission he is expected to satisfy himself that there are 
good and sufficient reasons for authorising an officer of a lower 
rank to conduct the investigation. The granting of such permission 
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is not to be treated by a Magistrate as a mere matter of routine 
but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to the 
policy underlying it. In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach 
is brought to the notice of the Court at an early stage of the trial 
the Court have to consider the nature and extent of the violation 
and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as may be . G 
called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer as it considers 
appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5-A of 
the Act. It is in the light of the above considerations that the validity 
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or otherwise of the objection as to the violation of Section 5(4) of 
the Act has to be decided and the course to be adopted in these 
proceedings, determined." 
(emphasis added) 
12. The above view has been repeatedly followed in subsequent 
decisions of this Court. In Union of India and ors. represented 
through Superintendent of Police versus T. NathamunP· the 
position was discussed as follows:-
"12. It is clear that in the case of investigation under the Delhi 
Special Police Establishment Act, an officer below the rank of 
Inspector cannot investigate without the order of a competent 
Magistrate. In the present case, order of the Special Judge was 
obtained by filing an application. That order dated 24-9-2009 shows 
that it was passed on request and in the interest of justice, 
investigation pursuant to such order did not suffer from want of 
jurisdiction and hence, in the facts of the case, the High Court 
erred in law in interfering with such investigation more so when it 
was already completed. 
13. The question raised by the respondent is well answered by 
this Court in a number of decisions rendered in a different 
perspective. The matter of investigation by an officer not authorised 
by law has been held to be irregular. Indisputably, by the order of 
the Magistrate investigation was conducted by the Sub-Inspector, 
CBI who, after completion of investigation, submitted the charge-
sheet. It was
only during the trial, objection was raised by the 
respondent that the order passed by the Magistrate permitting the 
Sub-Inspector, CBI to investigate is without jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the investigation conducted by the officer is vitiated 
in law. Curiously enough the respondent has not made out a case 
that by reason of investigation conducted by the Sub-Inspector a 
serious prejudice and miscarriage of justice has been caused. It is 
well settled that invalidity of the investigation does not vitiate the 
result unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. 
14. In M.C. Sulkunte v. State of Mysore [(1970) 3 SCC 513], 
the main question raised by the appellant in an appeal against the 
'(2014) 16 sec 2ss 
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order of conviction was that the sanction to investigate the offence 
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given by the Magistrate was not proper inasmuch as he had not 
recorded any reason as to why he had given permission to the 
Inspector of Police to investigate the offence of criminal 
misconduct of obtaining illegal gratification. Considering Section 
5-A of the Act, Their Lordships observed: (SCC p. 517, para 15) 
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"15. Although laying the trap was part of the investigation and 
it had been done by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy 
Superintendent of Police, it cannot on that ground be held that 
the sanction was invalid or that the conviction ought not to be 
maintained on that ground. It has been emphasised in a number c 
of decisions of this Court that to set aside a conviction it must 
be shown that there has been miscarriage of justice as a result 
of ai i rregul a- i nvesti gati on. The observations in State of M.P. 
v. Mubarak Ali [ 1959 Supp (2) SCR 201 ], at pp. 210-11 to 
the effect that when the Magistrate without applying his mind 
only mechanically issues the order giving permission the 
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investigation is tainted cannot help the appellant before us." 
15. ln Muni Lal v. Delhi Admn [(1971) 2 SCC 48], this Court 
was considering the question with regard to the irregularity in 
investigation for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption 
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Act. Following earlier decisions, this Court held: (SCC p. 52, para 
14)
"1'4. From the above proposition it follows that where 
cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case 
has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the preceding 
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investigation will not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of 
justice has been caused thereby and the accused has been 
prejudiced. Assuming in favour of the appellant, that there was 
an irregularity in the investigation and that Section 5-A of the 
Act, was not complied with in substance, the trial by the Special 
Judge cannot be held to be illegal unless it is shown that 
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miscarriage of justice has been caused on account of illegal 
investigation. The learned counsel for the appellant has been 
unable to show us how there has been any miscarriage of 
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justice in this case and how the accused has been prejudiced 
by any irregular investigation." 
16. In State of Haryana v .. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 
335], this Court while considering Section 5-A of the Act, held as 
under: (SCC pp. 384-85, para 119) 
"119. It has been ruled by this Court in several decisions that 
Section 5-A of the Act is mandatory and not directory and the 
investigation conducted in violation thereof bears the stamp of 
illegality but that illegality committed in the course of an 
investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction 
of the court for trial and where the cognizance of the case has 
in fact been taken and the case is proceeded to termination, 
the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the 
result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. 
See (1) H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [AIR 1955 SC 196], 
(2) Major E.G Barsayv. State ofBombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762], 
(3) Munnalal v. State of U.P [AIR 1964 SC 28], (4) 
Sailendranath Bose v. State ofBihar [AIR 1968 SC 1292], (5) 
Muni Lal v. Delhi Admn. [(1971) 2 SCC 48] and (6) Khandu 
Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 786]. 
However, in Rishbud case [AIR 1955 SC 196] and Muni Lal 
case ((1971) 2 sec 48], it has been ruled that if any breach of 
the said mandatory proviso relating to investigation is brought 
to the notice of the court at an early stage of the
trial, the court 
will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and 
pass appropriate orders as may be called for to rectify the 
illegality and cure the defects in the investigation." 
17. In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Admn ((1973) I SCC 726], 
provisions of Section 5-A were again considered by this Court 
and held as under: (SCC p. 735, para 15) 
"15. As the foregoing discussion shows the investigation in the 
present case by the Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot 
be considered to be in any way unauthorised or contrary to 
law. In this connection it may not be out of place also to point
R.A.H. SIGURAN v. SHANK.ARE GOWDA @ SHANKARA. 
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out that the function ofinvestigation is merely to collect evidence A 
and any irregularity or even illegality in the course of collection 
of evidence can scarcely be considered by itself to affect the 
legality of the trial by an otherwise competent court of the 
offence so investigated. In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi 
[AIR 1955 SC 196], it was held that an illegality committed in 
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the course of investigation does not affect the competence 
and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where cognizance of 
the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to 
termination of the invalidity of the preceding investigation does 
not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been 
caused thereby. When any breach of the mandatory provisions C 
.relating to investigation is brought to the notice of the court at 
an early stage of the trial the Court will have to consider the 
nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders 
for such reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, 
and by such officer as it considers appropriate with reference 
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to the requirements of Section 5-A of the Prevention of 
,Corruption Act, 1947. This decision was followed in Munnalal 
v. State ofU.P. [AIR 1964 SC 28] where the decision in State 
ofM.P. v. MubarakAli [AIR 1959 SC 707], was distinguished. 
The same view was taken in State of A.P. v. N. Venugopal 
[AIR 1964 SC 33] and more
recently.in Khandu Sonu Dhobi 
v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 786]. The decisions of 
the Calcutta, 
Punjab and Saurashtra High Courts reli~d 
upon by Mr Anthony deal with different points: in any event to 
the extent they contain any observations against the view 
expressed by this Court in the decisions just cited those 
observations cannot be considered good Jaw." 
· 13. In view of the above, we are satisfied that the High Court 
was not justified in quashing the proceedings merely on the ground that 
the investigation was not valid. It is not necessary for this Court to go 
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into the question raised by learned counsel for the appellants that there 
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was no infirmity in the investigation. 
14. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aSlde the impugned 
· order and direct the trial court to proceed with the matter in accordance 
with law. 
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15. The parties are directed !O appear before the trial court for 
further proceedings on 22nd September, 2017. 
Devika Gujral 
Appeal allowed.