DR. JANET JEYAPAUL versus SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 1049, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 1049 
DR. JANET JEYAPAUL 
v. 
SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal.No. 14553 of 2015) 
DECEMBER 15, 2015 
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABHAY MANOHAR 
SAPRE JJ.] 
A 
B 
Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 226, 12 -
Writ 
jurisdiction - Amenability to - Writ petition u!Art.226 by C 
appellant-Senior lecturer against respondent No. 1-University 
- Maintainability of - Held: Writ petition u!Art. 226 against 
respondent No. 1 is maintainable - Respondent No. 1 is 
discharging "public function" by way of imparting education D 
- It is notified as a "Deemed University" by the Central 
Government and as such all the provisions of the UGC Act 
are made applicable to respondent No. 1, which provides for 
effective discharge of the public function, education for the 
benefit of public - Once respondent No. 1 is declared as E 
"Deemed University" whose all functions and activities are 
governed by the UGC Act, alike other universities' then it is 
an "authority" within the meaning of Art. 12 and thus, is 
amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court u!Art. 226 -
University Grants Commission Act, 1956. 
F 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The Division Bench of the High Court 
erred in holding that respondent No. 1 is not subjected 
to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article G 
226 of the Constitution. In other words, it should have 
been held that respondent No.1 is subjected to the writ 
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the 
Constitution.
Firstly, resporident No. 1 is engaged in 
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A imparting education in higher studies to students at 
large. Secondly, it is discharging "public function" by 
way of imparting education. Thirdly, it is notified as a 
"Deemed University" by the Central Government under 
Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act. 
B Fourthly, being a "Deemed University", all the provisions 
of the UGC Act are made applicable to respondent No. 1, 
which inter alia provides for effective discharge of the 
public function - namely education for the benefit of 
public. Fifthly, once respondent No. 1 is declared as 
C "Deemed University" whose all functions and activities 
are governed by the UGC Act, alike other universities then 
it is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the 
Constitution. Lastly, once it is held to be an "authority" 
0 
as provided in Article 12 then as a necessary 
consequence, it becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction 
of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, 
the finding rendered· by the Division Bench cannot be 
concurred and accordingly while setting aside the 
E finding it is held that the appellant's writ petition under 
Article 226 of the Constitution against respondent No.1 
is maintainable. [Paras 21-23] [1063-G-H; 1064-A-F] 
1.2 In normal course, the submission that even 
F assuming that the appellant's writ petition is 
maintainable, yet it should not be entertained for hearing 
on merits and instead the appellant be granted
liberty to 
approach the tribunal would have been accepted. But 
in the instant case, the Single Judge not only entertained 
G the appellant's writ petition but allowed the writ petition 
on merits whereas the Division Bench held the writ 
petition as not maintainable and thus declined to 
examine the merits of the controversy involved in the 
writ petition. It is not proper to direct the appellant at this 
H stage to approach the tribunal and file a dispute before
DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS. 
1051 
the tribunal. Instead, it is just and proper to remand the A 
case to the Division Bench of the High Court to decide 
the respondent's appeal on merits on the question as to 
whether the Single Judge was justified in allowing the· 
writ petition on merits. The impugned order is set aside. 
[Paras 25, 26 and 28] [1065-C-H] 
B 
Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 
(2005) 4 sec 649 - relied on. 
Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas 
Swami Suvama Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust 
& Ors. vs. \I. R. Rudani & Ors. ( 1989) 2 SCC 691 : 
1989 (2) SCR 697; T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. 
VS. State of Kamataka & Ors. (2002) 8 sec 481 -: 
referred to. 
Breen vs. A.E.U. (1971) 2 QB 175; R. vs. Panel 
on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Pie 
and another (Norton Opax Pie and another 
intervening) (1987) 1 All ER 564; E.S. Evans vs. 
Charles E. Newton 382 US 296 (1966)-referred 
to. 
Judicial Review by De Smith 7th Edn. pp 127, 135; 
Administrative law by H. W.R. Wade and C.F. 
Forsyth 101h Edn. - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
1989 (2) SCR 697 
2005 (1) SCR 913 
2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587 
Referred to Para 8, 17, 19 
Relied on. 
Para 21 
Referred to. Para 24 
c 
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[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
14553of2015 
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.07.2013 of the 
High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 932 of 
B 2013 
c 
Dr. Janet Jeyapaul, Appellant-In-Person 
Sanjay R. Hegde, S. Nithin, Anil Kumar Mishra-I for the 
Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted. 
D 
2: This appeal is filed by the appellant-in-person against 
the judgment and order dated 04.07.2013 passed by the High 
Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 932 of 2013 
whereby the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ 
appeal filed by the respondents herein against the order 
E dated 08.04.2013 passed by the Single Judge of the High 
Court in W.P. No.12676 of 2012 and, in consequence, 
dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant herein as 
being not maintainable. 
F 
3 .. ln order to appreciate the controversy involved in this 
appeal, which lie in a narrow compass, it is necessary to set 
out the relevant facts. 
· 
(a) The S.R.M.University-respondent No.1 herein is the 
lnstitutionengaged in imparting high education in various 
G subjects. The Central Government has, therefore, on the advise 
of University Grants Commission (in short "UGC") declared 
respondent No.1 as "Deemed University" by issuing a 
notification under Section 3 of the University Grants 
H Commission Act, 1956 (in short "the UGC Act").
Respondent
DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS. 
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[ABHAY MANOHAR SAP RE, J.] 
No.1 is, therefore, subjected to ensuring compliance of all the A 
provisions of UGCAct in its functioning. 
(b) The appellant is holding M.Sc. and P.hd. in applied 
Biology. She was appointed as a Lecturer in the 
Department of Bio-technology in the Faculty of Sciences B 
and Humanity in the SRM University-respondent No.1. 
By order dated 05.05.2010, she was promoted as Senior 
Lecturer w.e.f. 01.04.2010. 
(c) On 14.02.2012, the appellant was served with a c 
memo calling· upon her to show cause as to why 
disciplinary action should not be taken against her for 
the alleged failure to take classes of the students of B.Sc. 
Third Year degree course and M.Sc. First Year degree 
course. The appellant submitted her replies ori 
D 
15.02.2012 and 20.02.2012 denying the allegations 
and claiming that she took classes for both the courses. 
(d) Thereafter, another memo dated 22.02.2012 was 
issued by the Registrar in-charge of the University E 
referring certain complaints given against her by the 
students. Refuting the charges, the appellant submitted 
her reply on 29.02.2012. 
(e) Dissatisfied with the explanation given by the F 
appellant, respondent No.1-SRM University constituted 
an Enquiry Committee and the appellant appeared 
before the said Committee on 02.03.2012 and stated 
that she was not furnished the documents and the copies 
of the complaints. Thereafter she submitted a detailed G
explanation on 26.03.2012. 
(f) Thereafter the appellant received a notice dated 
04.04.2012 mentioning therein that the same shall be 
treated as one month's notice and she would be relieved 
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[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
from the services w.e.f. 04.05.2012. According to the 
appellant, she received the notice on 16.04.2012. 
(g) Challengi_ng the said notice, the appellant filed Writ 
Petition No. 12676 of 2012 before the High Court. By . 
order dated 08.04.2013, the Single Judge of the High 
Court allowed the writ petition, quashed tl]e termination 
notice and directed the respondents to reinstate the 
appellant into service. 
(h) Against the said order, respondent No.1 herein filed 
Writ Appeal No. 932 of 2013 before the High Court. By 
impugned judgment dated 04.07.2013, the Division 
Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal. It was held 
that the writ petition filed by the appellant against 
respondent No.1 was not maintainable as according 
to the Division Bench, respondent No.1 is neither a State 
nor an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of 
the Constitution of India and hence it cannot be subjected 
to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of 
the Constitution to examine the legality and correctness 
of the dismissal order. The Division Bench, therefore, 
did not examine the merits of the case made out by the 
appellant successfully before the Single Judge. The 
Division Bench, however, granted liberty to the appellant 
to approach the Tribunal for ventilating of her grievance 
on merits. 
(i) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has 
preferred this appeal by way of special leave
before 
this Court. 
4. Heard appellant-in-person and Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, 
learned senior counsel for the respondents. 
5. Since the appeal involved a legal issue and the 
appellant had no legal assistance, we requested Mr. Harish 
H Salve, learned senior counsel, who was present in Court, to
DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS. 
1055 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
assist the Court to enable us to properly appreciate and A 
decide the issues arising in the case. 
6. We record our deep sense of appreciation for the 
valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Harish Salve with his 
usual fairness and industry and also for submitting his written B 
note on the conclusion of the case on our request. 
7. Submissions of Mr. Harish Salve were many fold. 
According to him, while deciding the question as to whether 
the writ lies under Article 226 of the Constitution of India c 
against any person, juristic body, organization, authority 
etc., the test is to examine in the first instance the object and 
purpose for which such body/authority/organization is formed 
so also the activity which it undertakes to fulfill the said 
object/purpose. 
D 
8. Pointing out from various well known English 
commentaries such as De Smith's Judicial Review, 7tti 
Edition, H.W.R.Wade and C.F. Forsyth Administrative 
law, 10th Edition, Michael J. Beloff in his article. Pitch, E 
Pool, Rink, ...... Court? Judicial Review in the Sporting 
World, 1989 Public Law 95, English decisions in Breen 
vs. A.E.U. (1971) 2 QB 175, R. vs. Panel on Take-overs 
and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Pie and another (Norton 
Opax Pie and another intervening) ( 1987) 1 All ER 564, 
F 
E.S. Evans vs. Charles E. Newton 382 US 296 (1966) 
and of this Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee 
Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti
Mahotsav Smarak Trust 
& Ors. vs. V.R. Rudani & Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 691 and Zee 
Telefilms Ltd. vs. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649, Mr. G 
Harish Salve submitted that perusal -of these authorities/ 
decisions would go to show that there has been a consistent 
view of all the learned authors and the Courts all over the world 
including in India that the approach of the Court while deciding 
such issue is always to test as to whether the concerned body H
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A Is formed for discharging any "Public function" or "Public 
duty" and if so, whether it is actually engaged in any public 
function or/and performing any such duty. 
9. According to _learned counsel, if the aforesaid twin 
B test is found present in any case then such person/body/ 
organization/a'uthority, as the case may be, would be 
subjected to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 
226 of the Constitution. 
c 
10. Learned senior counsel elaborated his submission 
by pointing out that the expression "any person or 
authority" used in Article 226 are not confined only to 
statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State but 
may in appropriate case include any other person or body 
o performing "public function/duty". Learned counsel urged 
that emphasis is, therefore, always on activity undertaken and 
the nature of the duty imposed on such authority to perform 
and not the form of such authority. According to Mr. Harish 
Salve, once it is proved that the activity undertaken by the 
E authority has a public element then regardless of the form 
of such authority it would be subjected to the rigor of writ 
jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution. 
11. Learned counsel then urged that in the light of several 
F decisions of this Court, one cannot now perhaps dispute that 
"imparting education to students at large" is a "public 
function" and, therefore, if any body or authority, as the 
case may be,
is found to have been engaged in the 
activity of imparting education to the students at large then 
G irrespective of the status of any such authority, it should be 
made amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under 
Article 226 of the Constitution. 
12. Learned counsel further pointed out that the case in 
H hand clearly shows that respondent No. 1 - a juristic body is
DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS. 
1057 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
engaged in imparting education in higher studies and what is A 
more significant is that respondent No. 1 is conferred with a 
status of a "Deemed University" by the Central Government 
under Section 3 of the UGCAct. These two factors, according 
to Mr. Harish Salve, would make respondent No. 1 amenable 
to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 because B 
it satisfies the twin test laid down for attracting the rigor of writ 
jurisdiction of the High Court. 
13. In reply, Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior counsel 
for respondent No. 1 while supporting the impugned order C 
contended that if this Court holds that respondent No. 1 is 
amenable to writ jurisdiction then apart from employees 
even those who are otherwise dealing with respondent No. 1 
would start invoking writ jurisdiction which, according to learned 
counsel, would open the flood gate of litigation in courts. 
D 
14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on 
perusal of the record of the case, we find force in the 
submissions urged by Mr. Harish Salve. 
15. To examine the question urged, it is apposite to take 
note of what De Smith, a well-known treaty, on the subject 
"Judicial Review" has said on this question [See De 
Smith's Judicial Review, 7th Edition, page 127 (3- 027) 
E 
and page 135 (3-038)]. 
F 
"AMENABILITY TEST BASED ON THE SOURCE OF 
POWER 
The courts have adopted two complementary
approaches to determining whether a function falls G 
within the ambit of the supervisory ·jurisdiction. 
First, the court considers the legal source of power 
exercised by the impugned decision-maker. In 
• 
identifying the "classes of case in which judicial H
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review is available", the courts place considerable 
importance on the source of legal authority 
exercised by the defendant public authority. 
Secondly and additionally, where the "source of 
power" approach does not. yield a clear or 
satisfactory outcome, the court may consider 
the characteristics of the function being performed. 
This has enabled the courts to extend the reach 
of the supervisory jurisdiction to some activities 
of non-statutory bodies (such as self-regulatory 
organizations). We begin by looking at the first 
approach, based on the source of power." 
"JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS 
The previous section considered susceptibility to 
judicial review based on the source of the power: 
statute or prerogative. 
The courts came to 
recognize that an approach based solely on the 
source of the public authority's power was too 
restrictive. Since 1987 they have developed an 
additional approach to determining susceptibility 
based on by the type of function performed by 
the decision-maker. The "public function" 
approach is, since 2000, reflected in the Civil 
Procedure Rules: CPR.54.1(2)(a)(ii), defines a claim 
for judicial review as a claim to the lawfulness of 
"a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the 
exercise of a public function." (Similar terminology 
is used in the Human Rights Act 1998 s.6(3)(b) 
to define a public authority as "any person certain 
of whose
functions are functions of a public 
nature", but detailed consideration of that 
provision is postponed until later). As we noted at 
the outset, the term "public" is usually a synonym 
for "governmental"."
DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS. 
1059 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
16. The English Courts applied the aforesaid test in R. A 
vs. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin 
Pie and another (Norton Opax Pie and another 
intervening) (1987) 1 All ER 564, wherein Sir John 
Donaldson MR speaking for three-judge Bench of Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division), after examining the various case law B 
on the subject, held as under: 
"In cletermining whether the decisions of a 
particular body were subject to judicial review, the 
court was not co~fined to considering the source C 
of that body's powers and duties but could also 
look to their nature. Accordingly, if the duty imposed 
on a body, whether expressly or by implication, was 
a public duty and the body was exercising public 
law functions the court had jurisdiction to D 
entertain an application for judicial review of that 
body's decisions ....... " 
17. In Andi Mukta's case (supra), the question before 
this Court arose as to whether mandamus can be issued at E 
the instance of an employee (teacher) against a Trust 
registered under Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 which was 
running an educational institution (college). The main legal 
objection of the Trust while opposing the writ petition of their 
employee was that since the Trust is not a statutory body and 
F 
hence it cannot be subjected to the writ jurisdiction of the 
High Court. The High Court accepted the writ petition and 
issued mandamus
directing the Trust to make payments 
towards the employee's claims of salary, provident fund and 
other dues. The Trust (Management) appealed to this Court. G 
18. This Court examined the legal issue in detail. Justice 
K. Jagannatha Shetty speaking for the Bench agreed with the 
view taken by the High Court and held as under: 
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[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
"11. Two questions, however, remain for 
consideration: (i) The liability of the appellants to 
pay compensation under Ordinance 120~E and 
(ii) The maintainability of the writ petition for 
mandamus as against the management of the 
college ........ . 
12. The essence of the attack on the maintainability 
of the writ petition under Article 226 may now be 
examined. It is argued that the management of the 
college being a trust registered under the Bombay 
Public Trust Act is not amenable to the writ 
jurisdiction of the High Court. The contention in 
other words, is that the trust is a private institution 
against which no writ of mandamus can be issued. 
In support of the contentic;>n, the counsel relied 
upon two decisions of this Court: (a) Executive 
Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. 
Lakshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 and (b) Deepak 
Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instructions, 
(1987) 2 SCC 252. In the first of the two cases, the 
respondent institution was a Degree College 
managed by a registered cooperative society. A 
suit was filed against the college by the dismissed 
principal for reinstatement. It was contended that 
the Executive Committee of the college which 
was registered under the Cooperative Societies Act 
and affiliated to the Agra University (and 
subsequently to Meerut University) was a 
statutory body. The importance of this contention 
lies in the fact that in such a
case, reinstatement 
could be ordered if the dismissal is in violation 
of statutory obligation. But this Court refused to 
accept the contention. It was observed that the 
management of the college was not a statutory
DR. JANET JEY1-\PAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS. 
1061 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE,J.] 
body since not created by or under a statute. It A 
was emphasised that an institution which adopts 
certain statutory provisions will not become a 
statutory body and the dismissed employee 
cannot enforce a contract of personal seritice 
against a non-statutory body. 
B 
15. If the rights are purely of a private character no 
mandamus can issue. If the management of the 
college is purely a private body with no public 
duty mandamus will not lie. These are two c 
exceptions to mandamus. But once these are 
absent and when the party has no other equally 
convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. 
It has to be appreciated that the appellants trust 
was managing the affiliated college to which public D 
money is paid as government aid. Public money 
paid as government aid plays a major role in the 
control, maintenance and working of educational 
institutions. The aided institutions like government 
institutions discharge public function by way of E 
imparting education to students. They are subject 
to the rules and regulations of the affiliating 
University. Their activities are closely supervised 
by the University authorities. Employment in such 
institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public F 
character.3 So are the service conditions of the 
academic staff. When the University takes a 
decision regarding their pay scales, it will be 
binding on the management. The service G
conditions of the academic staff are, therefore, not 
purely of a private character. It has super-added 
protection by University decisions creating a 
legal right-duty relationship between the staff 
and the management. When there is existence of H
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A 
this relationship, mandamus cannot be refused 
to the aggrieved party. 
20. The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the 
·context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the 
B 
term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for 
the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights 
under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the 
High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the 
fundamental ~ights as well as non-fundamental 
c 
rights. The words "any person or authority" used 
in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only 
to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the 
State. They may cover any other person or body 
performing public duty. The form of the body 
D 
concerned is not very much relevant. What is 
relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the 
body. The duty must be judged in the light of 
positive obligation owed by the person or authority 
to the affected party. No matter by what means the 
E 
duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists 
mandamus cannot be denied." 
19. This issue was again examined in great detail by the 
Constitution Bench in Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union 
F of India & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 649 wherein the question 
which fell for consideration was whether the Board of Control 
for cricket in India (in short "BCCI") falls within the definition 
of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. This Court 
approved the ratio laid down in Andi Mukta's
case(supra) 
G but on facts of the case held, by maj~rity, that the BCCI does 
not fall within the purview of the term State. This Court, 
however, laid down the principle of law in Paras 31 and 33 as 
under: 
H
DR. JANET JE:. ./,f';'\ 1 IL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS. 
1063 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
"31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the A 
Board does discharge some duties like the 
selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the 
activities of the players and others involved in the 
game of cricket. These activities can be said to be 
akin to public duties or State functions and ifthere B 
is any violation of any constitutional or statutory 
obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved 
party may not have a relief by way of a petition 
under Article 32. But that does not mean that the 
violator of such right.would go scot-free merely C 
because it or he is not a State.Under the Indian 
jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for the 
violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy 
under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party 0 
can always seek a remedy under the ordinary 
course of law or by way of a writ petition under 
Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much 
wider than Article 32. 
33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body E 
exercises its public functions even if it is not a 
State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only 
under the ordinary law but also under the 
Constitution, by way of a writ petitio~ under Article F 
226 ...................... " 
20. 
It is clear from reading of the ratio de~idendi of 
judgment in Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra) that firstly, it is held 
therein that the BCCI discharges public duties
and secondly, 
an aggrieved party can, for this reason, seek a public law G 
remedy against the BCCI under Article 226 of the Constitution 
of India. 
21. Applying the aforesaid principle of law to the facts of 
the case in hand, we are of the considered view that the H
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[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A 
Division Bench of the High Court erred in holding that 
respondent No. 1 is not subjected to the writ jurisdiction of 
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In other 
words, it should have been held that respondent No.1 is 
subjected to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under 
B Article 226 of the Constitution. 
22. This we say for the reasons that firstly, respondent 
No. 1 is engaged in imparting education in higher studies to 
students at large. Secondly, it is discharging "public 
C function" by way of imparting education. Thirdly, it is 
notified as a "Deemed University" by the Central Government 
under Section 3 of the UGC Act. Fourthly, being a "Deemed 
University", all the provisions of the UGC Act are made 
applicable to respondent No. 1, which inter alia provides for 
D effective discharge of the public function - namely education 
for the benefit of public. Fifthly, once r~spondent No. 1 is 
declared as 
"Deemed University" whose all functions 
and activities are governed by the UGC Act, alike other 
universities then it is an "authority" within the meaning of 
E Article 12 of the Constitution. Lastly, once it is held to be an 
"authority" as provided in Article 12 then as a necessary 
consequence, it becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction of 
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 
F 
23. 
In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot 
G 
concur with the finding rendered by the
Division Bench and 
accordingly while reversing the finding we hold that the 
appellant's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution 
against respondent No. 1 is r.naintainable. 
24. This takes us to the next argument urged by learned 
counsel for the respondents. Placing reliance on para 231 of 
the decision of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. 
vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2002) 8 SCC 481, learned 
H counsel contended that even assuming that the appellant's writ
DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS. 
1065 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.) 
petition is maintainable, yet it should not be entertained for A 
hearing on merits and inste-ad the appellant be granted 
liberty to approach the District Judge/Additional District 
Judge of the concerned District which is designated as 
Tribunal till formation of regular Tribunal for redressal of her 
grievances as directed by the Constitution Bench in Para 
B 
231 ofT.M.A. Pai's case (supra). 
25. In normal course, we would have been inclined to 
accept this submission made by learned counsel for the 
respondents and would have also granted liberty to the C 
appellant to approach the Tribunal in term of the directions 
given by the Constitution Bench of this Court. But since in this 
case, the Single Judge not only entertained the appellant's 
writ petition but he allowed the writ petition on merits whereas 
the Division Bench held the writ petition as not maintainable D 
and thus declined to examine the merits of the controversy 
involved in the writ petition. 
26. We do not consider it proper to direct the appellant 
at this stage to approach the Tribunal and file a dispute before 
E 
the Tribunal. Instead, we consider it just and proper to remand 
the case to the Division Bench of the High Court to decide the 
respondent's appeal on merits on the question as to whether 
the Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition on 
merits. 
F 
27. Before parting, we consider it apposite to
state that 
we have not examined the controversy raised by the appellant 
in her writ petition on merits and confined our examination 
to the question whether the writ petition against respondent G 
No. 1 was maintainable or not. 
28. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds 
and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. WritAppeal 
No. 932 of 2013 out of which this appeal arises is restored 
H

1066 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A to its original number. The Division Bench is requested to 
decide the appeal expeditiously on merits in accordance 
with law without being influenced by any of our observations. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal allowed.