BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD.  versus PAWAN KUMAR GUPTA
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 402, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
[2015] 11S.C.R.402 
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. 
v. 
PAWAN KUMAR GUPTA 
(Civil Appeal No. 1085 of 2008) 
SEPTEMBER 16, 2015 
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Limitation Act, Art. 112 -Applicability of- Do T entitled 
c to file suit within thirty years under the period of /imitation 
provided u!Art. 112-Assets and liabilities transferred by Do T 
(of Central Government) to appellant-company - Suit filed 
by appellant-company beyond the period of 3 years against 
the respondent-subscriber for the amount due from the 
D installation of telephone connection - Whether benefit of 
Art.112 accrue in favour of appellant-company - Held: 
Appellant Company is a statutory authority, it is not 
synonymous with the Central Government - It is distinctly 
independent and separate entity- Not entitled to benefit ul 
E Article 112- General Clauses Act, 1897- s.3(8)- Transfer 
of Property Act- s. 3. 
F 
Words and phrases: Expression 'Central Government' 
- Meaning of. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: The assets and liabilities are transferred by 
the erstwhile DoT in favour of the appellant-company, 
including the debts due from the subscribers, the 
G respondents, an asset which is registered with the 
company pursuant to the transfer of assets and liabilities 
as provided under Section 130 of the TP Act. 
Undisputedly the suit claims against the debtors/ 
H subscribers are beyond the period of three years of 
402
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR 
403 
GUPTA 
limitation which is available. Therefore, contention that A 
the benefit accrued in favour of the Central Government 
under Article 112 of the Limitation Act is attracted to the 
fact situation, has a far reaching consequences for the 
reason that, though the Company is a statutory authority, 
it is not synonymous with the Central Government. The B 
expression 'Central Government' under the General 
Clauses Act is clearly defined. By a reading of the 
definition, the appellant-company which is registered 
under the Companies Act, though having share capital 
of the company owned in the name of the President is C 
100% cannot be construed as the Central Government. 
It is for the reason that the appellant-company by 
registration under the Companies Act, no doubt is under 
the control of the Central Government as it is financed D 
and its administration is under the absolute control of 
the Central Government, nonetheless, the appellant-
company is a separate legal entity. It also cannot claim 
that it is entitled to the benefit under Article 112 of the 
Limitation Act on the ground that a debt recoverable from E 
the subscriber is an actionable claim in terms of Section 
3 of the TP Act, even if the same has been transferred 
under Section 130 of the TP Act by execution of the Office 
Memorandum, thereby vesting in it the rights and the 
remedies vis-a-vis the same. No doubt, by execution of F 
the said instrument, it has
got the actionable claim 
transferred, the assets that must be recoverable debts 
from the debtors and subscribers. By virtue of Article 
112, a suit can be instituted by or on behalf of the Central 
Government. It is not the case of the appellant that it G 
has filed the suit on behalf of the Central Government. 
This is for the reason that the appellant-company has 
instituted the suit on the basis of the instrument of Office 
Memorandum wherein the DoT has transferred its assets 
H
404 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A and actionable claims. The appellant is a company, a 
distinctly independent and separate entity. Therefore, the 
reliance placed upon the Article 112 of the Limitation Act 
to claim that there would be thirty years of limitation 
period as the asset transferred is an actionable claim due 
B to the DoT is wholly misconceived in law. Article 112 of 
the Limitation Act speaks of the Central Government or 
the State Government. Its agencies or instrumentalities 
are not incorporated under Article 112 of the Limitation 
Act. Therefore argument on behalf of the appellant-
C company that it is an agency or instrumentality under 
the Central Government which falls within the inclusive 
definition as defined under Section 3(8) of the General 
Clauses Act is wholly misconceived. [Para 9 and 10] [410-
D E-F, H; 411-A-G; 412- 0-H~ 413-A] 
E 
Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. vs. State 
of T. N. and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533: 2002 (2) 
SCR 383; AK. Bindal and Anr. vs. U. 0.1. & Ors. 
(2003) s sec 163: 2003 (3) SCR 928; Food 
Corporation of India vs. Municipal Committee, 
Jalalabad & Anr. (1999) 6 SCC 74- referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
F · 2002 (2) SCR 383 
2003 (3) SCR 928 
(1999) s sec 74 
referred to. 
Para 10 
referred to. 
Para 11 
referred to. 
Para 11 
G 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
1085 of2008 
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.07 .2007 of the 
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. 
H No. 835
of 2007

BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR 
405 
GUPTA 
With 
A 
C.A. No. 3420of2012 
C.A. No. 2409 of 2009 
R. D.Agrawala, Pavan Kumar, Maneesha Dhir, Gagan B 
Gupta, Abhishek Kumar, K. Vijay Kumar for the Appellant. 
Upamanyu Hazarika, Dharitry Phookan, Paul Roy P., 
Tatini Basu, Suyodhan B., G. Ramakrishna Prasad fo~ the 
Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 
Civil Appeal Nos. 1085/2008 and 2409/2009: 
c 
D 
1. Since the issue involved in both the appeals is 
common and facts are identical, we dispose of both the 
appeals by this common judgment. 
2. Heard Mr. R.D. Agrawala, learned senior counsel 
appearing forthe appellant in both the appeals and Ms. Tatini 
E 
Basu, learned counsel for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 
2409/2009. Despite service of notice on the sole-respondent 
in Civil Appeal No. 1085/2008, he remained unrepresented. 
3. For the sake of convenience, the facts are taken from 
F 
the leading case i.e. Civil Appeal No. 1085/2008. This appeal 
arises out of the judgment and order dated 12.07.2007 passed 
by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana dismissing Regular 
Second Appeal No. 835/2007 by affirming the judgment and 
decree dated 2.09.2006 passed by the learned District Judge, G 
. Bhiwani in dismissing the original suit filed by the appellant 
herein against the respondent on the ground that the suit claim 
is barred by limitation. The correctness of the same is 
questioned in this appeal(s), urging various
grounds. 
H
406 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
4. Mr. RD. Agrawala, learned senior counsel appearing 
for the appellant, inter alia contends that the appellant being a 
Central Government Undertaking, a Company, which is an 
instrumentality of the State, has got vested rights on the 
execution of th~ instrument, Office Memorandum dated 
B 30.09.2000 wherein the Department of Telecommunication 
(hereinafter referred to as the "DoT"), of the Central 
Government represented by its S&cretary has executed the 
said Office Memorandum by transferring the assets and 
liabilities in respect of the business currently being carried out 
C on account of the Government to the appellant-company on 
the book value thereof. The book value of the assets comprising 
of the business transferred in favour of the appellant-company 
has been provisionally assessed at Rs. 63,000/- Crores. 
D Therefore, learned senior counsel for the appellant submits 
that it is an actionable claim as defined under Section 3 of the 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the 
"TP Act") which means a claim to any debt which is an asset 
under Section 130 of the TP Act. The said actionable claim, 
E according to the learned senior counsel, has been transferred 
in favour of the appellant-company by the execution of 
instrument i.e. Office Memorandum, referred to supra, 
therefore, all the rights and remedies of the transferor-Do T vests 
with the transferee-company. Hence, the appellant-company
F is entitled to recover or enforce such debts or actionable claim 
against the respondent-subscriber. 
5. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has fUrther 
placed reliance upon the book, titled "Accounting Standards 
G and Corporate Accounting _Practices" by Dr. T.P. Ghosh in 
support of the contention that the current assets include assets 
(such as inventories and trade receivables). He placed strong 
reliance upon the meaning of the word 'vested' from the 
Webster's Dictionary in support of his contention and submits 
H that by virtue of the execution of the aforesaid Office
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR 
407 
GUPTA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
Memorandum, the transfer of all the rights and remedies in A 
relation to the actionable claim, which is a debt legally 
recoverable from the subscribers, are vested with the appellant-
company, and therefore, the benefit of Article 112 of the 
Limitation Act, 1963 of instituting a suit within thirty years from 
the date of the cause of action is available for the appellant-
B 
company or in the alternative three years from the date of 
incorporation of the company. He also placed strong reliance 
upon Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which 
defines 'Central Government' as under: 
"3(8). 'Central Government' shall,-
( a) in relation to anything done before the 
commencement of the Constitution, mean the 
Governor General or the Governor General in 
Council, as the case may be; and shall include,-
(i) in relation to functions entrusted under sub-section 
(1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 
1935, to the Government of a Province, the 
Provincial Government acting within the scope of 
the authority given to it under that sub-section; and 
(ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief 
Commissioner's 
Province, 
the 
Chief 
Commissioner acting within the scope of the 
authority given to him under sub-section (3) of 
section 94 of the said Act; and 
(b) in relation to anything done or to be done after 
the commencement of the Constitution, mean the 
President; and shall
include,-
(i) in relation to functions entrusted under clause 
(1) of article 258 of the Constitution, to the 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
408 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
Government of a State, the State Government acting 
within the scope of the authority given to it under 
that clause; 
(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State 
B 
(before the commencement of the Constitution 
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, the Chief 
Commissioner or the Lieutenant - Governor or the 
Government of a neighbouring State or other 
authority acting within the scope of the authority 
C 
given to him or it under article 239 or article 243 of 
the Constitution, as the case may be; and 
(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union 
territory, the administrator thereof acting within the 
o 
scope of the authority given to him under article 239 
of the Constitution." 
6. Further, the learned senior counsel by placing strong 
reliance upon the definition of the 'Central Government', which 
E is an inclusive definition, submits that the Central Government 
also includes such authorities as are indicated therein. Since 
the appellant-company is incorporated under the Companies 
Act and it has acquired the assets and liabilities of the DoT, 
as an instrumentality of the Central Government, the appellant 
F 
being a company having a separate and distinct entity from 
the Central Government, its functioning is controlled by the 
Central Government and, therefore, it is entitled to avail the 
benefit under Section 112 of the Limitation Act. Alternatively, it 
is contended by the learned senior counsel for
the appellant 
G that the suit claim is not barred by limitation if its cause of action· 
arose for the appellant-company either on 30.09.2000 i.e. the 
date of execution of the Office Memorandum transferring the 
assets and liabilities or on 01.10.2010, the date of its 
incorporation, as the case may be. Taking either of the said 
H dates into consideration, the suit claim is within three years
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR 
409 
GUPTA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
and maintainable and, therefore, the courts below were not A 
right in dismissing the suit claim made in the original suit 
proceedings before the various courts, which is contrary to 
law. He, therefore, requested this Court to set aside the 
impugned judgments and decrees passed by the trial court 
and affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal/civil B 
revision petition. 
7. The query that falls for our scrutiny in that, though, in 
respect of the claim against the respondent-subscriber, the 
amount due from the installation of the telephone connection C 
i.e. 29.01.1992 till its disconnection on 16.03.1998 is 
Rs.25,296/-, the DoT of the Central Government is entitled to 
file a suit within thirty years under the period of limitation 
provided under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, whether this 
benefit will accrue in favour of the appellant-company either D 
from the date of the execution of the Office Memorandum, 
referred to supra, transferring the assets and liabilities and 
remedies, or the date of its incorporation. This aspect of the 
matter is examined by us very carefully in the light of the 
provisions of Section 3 and Section 130 of the TP Act and in 
E 
the backdrop of the Office Memorandum vis-a-vis the Office 
Memorandum dated 30.09.2000 executed in favour of the 
appellant-company transferring its assets.and liabilities and 
also remedies available for the transferor in favour
of the F 
appellant-company, the legal contention urged is that by virtue 
of the said transfer an actionable claim, i.e. a claim to any 
debt from the subscriber should be recoverable debt from the 
subscriber by the company. Reliance is placed upon the 
Accounting Standards and Corporate Accounting, referred to G 
supra, and the clarification given in the said extracts, to contend 
that the actionable claim/ current assets includes the inventories 
and trade receivables and the said principle is applicable to 
the appellant-company, being a registered company under the 
provisions of the Companies Act. Section 133 of the H
410 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
Companies Act, 2013 which provides that the Central 
Government would prescribe accounting standards and 
Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, which relevant 
provision is extracted hereinabove, have been relied upon to 
substantiate the cor' ·'ion that the appellant-company is an 
B agency or instrumentality of the Central Government as it is 
being financed and controlled by the Central Government, and 
therefore, the benefit accrued in favour of the Do T of the Central 
Government under Article 112 of the Limitation Act would stand 
extended to the appellant-company, it being an instrumentality 
C of the Central Government for the reason that 100% share 
capital of the company is owned in the name of the President 
of India, and therefore, it partakes the character of Central 
Government. It is urged that this aspect of the matter has not 
D been properly examined and considered by the courts below 
while rendering the impugned judgments and decrees. 
8. These contentions cannot be accepted by this Court 
for the following reasons: 
E 
9. No doubt, the assets and liabilities are transferred by 
the erstwhile Do Tin favour of the appellant-company, including 
the debts due from the subscribers, the respondents herein, 
an asset which is registered with the company pursuant to the 
transfer of assets and liabilities as provided under Section 
F 
130 of the TP Act upon which reliance is placed by the learned 
senior
counsel. What requires to be carefully examined is that 
the actionable claim, a claim to any debt from a subscriber-
debtor after the assets and liabilities are transferred by an 
instrument, the Office Memorandum, referred to supra, in favour 
G of the appellant-company, is a legally recoverable debt to avail 
the remedy which is transferred in favour of the appellant-
company. It could be seen from the undisputed facts, which 
are adverted to in the impugned judgment that i.mdisputedly 
H the suit claims against the debtors/subscribers are beyond
BHARATSANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR 
411 
GUPli:-· '.\f r,oPALAGOWDA, J.] 
the period of three years of limitation which is available. · A 
Therefore, contention of the learned senior counsel on behalf 
of the appellant-company that the benefit accrued in favour of 
the Central Government under Article 112 of the Limitation Act 
is attracted to the fact situation, has a far reaching 
consequences for the reason that, though the Company is a 
B 
statutory authority, it is not synonymous with the Central 
Government. The expression 'Central Government' under the 
General Clauses Act is clearly defined, which relevant provision 
is extracted in the aforestated portion of this judgment. By a 
reading of the aforestated definition, at no stretch of C 
imagination it can be construed that the appellant-company 
which is registered under the Companies Act, though share 
capital of the company owned in the name of the President is 
100 per cent, it cannot be construed as the Central Government 0 
forthe reason that the appellant-company by registration under 
the Companies Act, no doubt it is under the control of the Central 
Government as it is financed and its administration is under 
the absolute control of the Central Government, nonetheless, 
it shall not be construed as the Central Government for the E 
reason that the appellant-company is a separate legal entity. It 
also cannot claim that it is entitled to the benefit under Article 
112 of the Limitation Act on the
ground that a debt recoverable 
from the subscriber is an actionable claim in terms of Section 
3 of the TPAct, even ifthe same has been transferred under F 
Section 130 of the TP Act by execution of the Office 
Memorandum, referred to supra, thereby vesting in it the rights 
and the remedies vis-a-vis the same. No doubt, by execution 
of th~ said instrument it has got the actionable claim 
transferred, the assets that must be recoverable debts from G 
the debtors and subscribers. As could be seen from the claim, 
the undisputed facts of these appeals are that on the date of 
the transfer, some of the claims were time barred, therefore, 
the company cannot construe that the time barred debts are 
H
412 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A also an actionable claim by way of transfer in its favour, which 
entitles it to avail the benefit of Section 112 of the Limitation 
Act i.e. the period of thirty years to institute suits for recovery 
of the same. Such an interpretation is contrary to Article 112 of 
the Limitation Act, 1963. A careful reading of Article 112 of the 
B Limitation Act clearly reveals that in any suit (except a suit 
before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original 
jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any 
State Government, including the Government of the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir, the period of limitation would be thirty 
C years. The period of limitation time from which the period 
begins to run is mentioned under Column 3 of the above Article 
of the Limitation in the Schedule, which reads as follows. "When 
the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against 
0 a like suit by a private person." 
10. By a careful reading of the aforesaid Article, it makes 
abundantly clear, that a suit can be instituted by or on behalf of 
the Central Government. It is not the case of the appellant herein 
that it has filed the suit on behalf of the Central Government. 
E This is for the reason that the appellant-company has instituted 
the suit on the basis of the instrument of Office· Memorandum 
wherein the DoT has transferred its assets and actionable 
claims. It cannot be said that it has filed the suit on
behalf of 
F the Central Government because the appellant/plaintiff is a 
company, a distinctly independent and separate entity. 
Therefore, the reliance placed upon the aforesaid Article 112 
of the Limitation Act to claim that there would be thirty years of 
limitation period as the asset transferred is an actionable claim 
G due to the DoT is wholly misconceived in law. The other 
argument advanced by the learned senior counsel on behalf 
of the appellant-company that it is an agency or instrumentality 
under the Central Government which falls within the inclusive 
definition as defined under Section 3(8) of the General Clauses 
H Act is wholly misconceived for the reason that Article 112 of
BHARATSANCHARNIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR 
413 
GUPTAl\/. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
the Limitation Act speaks of the Central Government or the A 
State Government. Its agencies or instrumentalities are not 
incorporated under Article 112 of the Limitation Act. Such an 
argument is contrary to the Constitution Bench judgment of 
this Court in the case of Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and 
Ors. vs. State ofT.N. and Ors. reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533. 
B 
In paragraph 14 of the said judgment it is categorically stated 
that the legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial 
interpretative process and the Court cannot do the legislative 
functions. Para 14 of the said judgment reads thus: 
. "14. While interpreting a provision the Court only 
interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a 
provision of law is misused and subjected to the 
abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to 
amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. 
(See RishabhAgro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital 
Services Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 515. The legislative 
casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial 
interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) 
is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for 
reading something into it, as was done in 
Narasimhaiah's case. (1996) 3 SCC 88. In 
Nanjudaiah's case, (1996) 10 SCC 619. the period 
was further stretched to have the time period run 
from date of service of High Court's order. Such a 
view cannot be reconciled with the language of 
Section 6( 1 ). If
the view is accepted it would mean 
that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) 
and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1 ), but also 
by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be 
the legislative intent." 
(Emphasis supplied by this Court) 
c 
·D 
E 
F 
G 
H
414 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
11. In the connected matter i.e. Civil Appeal No. 2409/ 
2009, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has 
placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in the cases of 
A.K. Bindal &Anr. vs. U.0.1. & Ors., (2003) 5SCC163 paras 
5, 14 and 17 and Food Corporation of India vs. Municipal 
B Committee. Jalalabad &Anr., (1999) 6 SCC 74, in support of 
the contention that the expressions 'Central Government' or 
'State Government' in terms of Section 3(8) and Section 3(60) 
of the General Clauses Act do not include in their purview or 
definition their agencies or instrumentalities. 
c 
12. In view of the aforesaid judgments of this Court, the 
legal contention urged by the learned senior counsel appearing 
on behalf of the appellant that the appellant being the agency 
. or instrumentality of the Central Government is entitled to 
D maintain the suit claims within thirty years as provided under 
Article 112 of the Schedule in the Limitation Act or alternatively, 
whatever the limitation period which was available for the 
Central Government, within three years from the date of 
execution of the agreement are wholly unsustainable in law. 
E 
F 
13. For the aforegoing reasons, in the instant cases, even 
a question of law does not arise, not to speak of a substantial 
question of law. The appeals must fail. Accordingly, the appeals 
are dismissed. No costs. 
14. Since the appellant had deposited a sum of 
Rs. 
25,000/- in
terms of this Court's Order dated 28.01.2008 
towards the costs of litigation of respondent, as he remained 
absent despite service of notice upon him, the appellant is 
G permitted to withdraw the said money along with interest, if 
any. 
Civil Appeal No. 3420/2012: 
H 
[B.S.N.L. &Anr. vs. Tata Communications Ltd.:
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR. 
415 
GUPTA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
15. This statutory appeal is arising out of the judgment A 
and order dated 16.11.2011 passed by the Telecom Disputes 
Settlement and.Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, hereinafter 
referred to as 'the Tribunal', Petition No. 423 of 2010 filed by 
the respondent, wherein it has sought for setting aside of the 
demand notices dated 28.10.2010 and 12.11.2010 relating 
B 
to a demand of Rs.1,36,74,762/- containing an amount of 
Rs.1,29,89,326/, Rs.3, 11,950/- and Rs.3,73,486/- of the 
Appellant No.1 herein, which was allowed by the Tribunal by 
adverting to certain relevant clauses of the interconnect 
agreement between the parties. 
C 
16. While setting aside the impugned demand notices, 
the Tribunal inter alia held as under: 
"26. In view our finding in Petition No.186 of 2010, 
D 
the respondent cannot raise the demand for a 
period more than 3 years as per the Limitation Act. 
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the demand 
raised prior to period October 2007 will not be 
admissible. Further, in view of the rival contentions 
E 
about the different bills after October 2007, there 
is a need for reconciliation of account between the 
petitioner and the respondent for the period 
November 2007 to October 2009. If any amount is 
outstanding, the petitioner will be liable to pay the 
F 
same amount to the respondent and vice versa. 
Both the parties are directed to reconcile the 
amount within four
weeks." 
17. It is clear from the aforesaid order of the Tribunal that G 
it had already answered the issues in Petition No. 186 of 201 O 
wherein it held that the appellant cannot raise the demand for 
a period of more than three years as per the Limitation Act. 
Therefore, it opined that the demand raised by the appellant 
H
416 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A company prior to period October, 2007 will not be admissible. 
Further, the Tribunal having said so, has further stated, keeping 
in view the rival contentions about the different bills after 
October, 2007, that there is a need for reconciliation of account 
between the parties for the period November, 2007 to October, 
B 2009. It has further ordered that, if any amount is outstanding, 
the respondent would be liable to pay the same amount to the 
appellant herein and vice-versa and both the parties were 
directed to reconcile the account within four weeks. It has also 
awarded interest at the rate of 12% per month from the date of 
C deposit of Rs.60,00,000/-, which amount was deposited 
pursuant to interim order dated 16.12.2010 passed by the 
Tribunal thereby staying the disconnection of electricity to th~ 
respondent. It was made clear, that the said direction of deposit 
0 was subject to payment of interest. Therefore, by clarificatory 
order on the same day, the Tribunal has stated that till the 
outcome of the measure of reconciliation, as directed in the 
impugned judgment and order by the parties, the amount would 
carry with it interest at the rate of 12% per month from the date 
E of of deposit till the date of refund by the appellant Company. 
The correctness of the said judgment is questioned by the 
appellant Company by filing an appeal under Section 18 of 
the TRAI Act. Section 18 of the TRAI Act provides a
statutory 
appeal against the judgment and order of the appellate tribunal 
F to this Court on one or more grounds specified in Section 100 
of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'CPC'). That means, 
that the statutory appeal under Section 18 of the TRAI Act would 
lie only on a substantial question of law. According to the 
appellant-Company, it has framed a number of questions of 
G law which are, according to the learned counsel, substantial 
questions of law. The same are reproduced hereinbelow: 
"a) WhethertheAppellant being an instrumentality 
of the Central Government was entitled to the 
H 
protection of Article 112 of the Limitation Act and
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR 
GUPTA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
thus the claim of the Appellant was covered by the 
limitation period of 30 years? 
b) Whether the Ld. TDSAT erred in holding that in 
view of its findings in Petition No.186 of 2010, the 
Appellant cannot raise the demand for a period 
more than three years as per the Limitation Act and 
that the demand raised prior to October 2007 will 
not be admissible? 
c) Whether the grant of interest by Ld. TDSAT from 
the date of decree was by way of a clerical or 
arithmetical mistake which could be corrected in 
exercise of its power under Section 152 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure? 
d) Whether the Ld. TDSAT can grant interest to the· 
Respondent who has not filed either review or an 
application seeking grant of interest in the main 
judgment? 
e) Whether the notices dated 28.10.2010 and 
12.11.2010were in the nature of fresh demands or 
mere reminders to make good the short payments 
from July 2005 to October 2009 especially in view 
of the fact that the bills issued during the said period 
were never disputed by the Respondent? 
f) Whether the stand taken by the Respondent that 
all billing issues for the period between July 2005 
to October 2009 have been settled and closed 
since there was no claim/dispute raised by the 
Appellant is contrary to the various documents on 
record?" 
417 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
18. In our considered view, the questions a, d, e and f 
framed by the appellant Company in the
Memorandum of H
418 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A its statutory appeal having regard to the undisputed fact that 
the Tribunal has recorded the finding of fact on the basis of the 
relevant clauses of the interconnect agreement between the 
parties and also with reference to the legal contentions urged 
on behalf of the appellant that it, being an instrumentality of the 
B Central Government, is entitled to the protection under Article 
112 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, it was covered by the 
limitation period of 30 years: The said contention is not tenable 
in law for the reasons already enumerated in the earlier part of 
this judgment. 
c 
19. Therefore, the findihg of fact recorded rejecting the 
aforesaid contention by the Tribunal is perfectly legal and valid. 
The same cannot be re-agitated by the appellant Company by 
framing the substantial questions of law namely a, d, e and f. 
D The said finding is based on proper interpretation of undisputed 
facts and the relevant clauses of the interconnect agreement 
and relevant clauses of the Schedule in the Limitation Act. 
Insofar as the substantial questions framed at b & c in the 
memorandum of appeal filed are concerned, they also cannot 
E be termed as substantial question of law as it is a question of 
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal particularly having 
regard to the undisputed fact that the Tribunal on the same 
day of pronouncement of judgment, has awarded interest on 
F the amount of Rs.60,00,000/-
payable after the reconciliation 
of the account that is required to be done by the parties. The 
said amount was deposited by virtue of an interim order granted 
by the Tribunal not to disconnect the connection of the 
respondent, as the discdnnection notice issued by the appellant 
G Company was stayed by the Tribunal and such direction was 
subject to payment of interest etc. on the amount of deposit 
repayable by the appellant Company after reconciliation and 
adjustment of the amount legally due to the respondent. That 
means, the claim of the appellant is not within the period of 
H limitation and therefore, the same do not constitute and cannot

BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR 
419 
GUPTA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
be termed as substantial questions of law for consideration of A 
this Court and answer thereof. 
20. For the reasons stated supra, there is no substantial 
questions of law, which would arise for consideration of this 
Court and the appeal must fail, which we order. Accordingly, s 
the appeal is dismissed. 
.. 
21. Since we have dismissed the appeal, the question 
of passing an order on the other application to''give direction 
on ttie application does not arise in these proceedings. If the c 
appellant is required to pay any amount due to the respondent 
it is open for the respondent to pursue the same in the manner 
known to law. With this liberty I.A. No.2 is also disposed of. 
Devika Gujral 
' . 
' 
Appeal dismissed. D 
·~.