NAGABHUSHAN versus THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
[2021] 2 S.C.R. 595, Supreme Court of India, 2021
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
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NAGABHUSHAN
v.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 443 of 2020)
MARCH 08, 2021
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD AND
M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
Indian Penal Code, 1860 – s.300(fourthly); ss.498A, 302 r/w
34 – Dowry death – Dying declaration – Accused persons acquitted
by trial Court – Acquittal of appellant-accused reversed by High
Court – On appeal, held: There are two dying declarations, Exhibit
P5 and Exhibit D2 – As per dying declaration Exhibit P5, it has
been proved that the deceased was set ablaze by pouring kerosene
on her – Prosecution is successful in proving that the appellant
poured kerosene on the deceased – Act of the accused falls in clause
fourthly of s.300 – Merely because thereafter he might have tried
to extinguish the fire, that will not bring the case out of clause
fourthly of s.300 – High Court rightly convicted the accused for
offence u/s.302 – No reason to interfere with the impugned judgment
– Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.378.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The High Court has specifically observed and
held that the finding recorded by the trial Court discarding and/
or not believing the dying declaration (Exhibit P5) is perverse
and contrary to the evidence on record. The High Court has given
cogent reasons while believing dying declaration (Exhibit P5) and
has also considered in detail what is stated in the later dying
declaration (Exhibit P5), vis-à-vis, the medical evidence and the
injuries sustained by the
deceased. Therefore, as such, the High
Court has not committed any error in reappreciating the entire
evidence on record and thereafter interfering with the judgment
and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, having found the
finding recorded by the trial Court perverse. In the present case
there are two dying declarations, (i) Exhibit P5 and (ii) Exhibit
D2. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying
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declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated on its
own merits. The High Court in the impugned judgment and order
has given cogent reasons to rely upon and believe the second
dying declaration – Exhibit P5. The High Court has also taken
note of the fact that the second dying declaration is reliable and
the version in the second dying declaration is supported by the
circumstances, namely, the injuries sustained by the deceased;
no stove was found at the place of occurrence. The High Court
has also taken note of the fact that in the second dying declaration,
the deceased has explained her first statement that it was a case
of accident and she categorically stated in the second dying
declaration that at the time when she gave first statement that it
was a case of accident, she was given threats by the appellant
herein – original accused no.1 that he will kill her children also.
She also stated in the second dying declaration that after her
parents came, she got the courage to tell the truth. Therefore, as
such, the High Court rightly believed the second dying declaration
– Exhibit P5. [Paras 6-8][609-E-H; 610-A-C]
1.2 The plea put forth by the defence that it was a case of
an accident and while pouring the kerosene from kerosene can
to the bottle, the same had fallen on the clothes placed on the
ground and when the deceased tried to remove the clothes from
that place, the candle fell on the ground, as a
result, her clothes
caught fire and she sustained burn injuries is disbelieved by the
High Court considering the circumstances noted by the High
Court that the deceased sustained injuries on the face, chest and
back and to the upper limbs. The main injuries are found on the
upper limbs of the body. Therefore, as rightly observed by the
High Court, the aforesaid injuries can be possible when the
kerosene is poured on the deceased. According to the defence
and as per the evidence of DW1-A1, while putting the kerosene
into the stove, accidentally the kerosene had fallen on the ground
and also on her clothes, and thereafter when the candle fell on
the ground, the same had come in contact with her clothes and
kerosene. If that is the case, there would have been injuries to
her feet also. However, no burn injuries are found on her feet.
No stove was found at the place of occurrence. Therefore, the
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defence came out with a false case of accidental fire, which, as
such, is not supported by any other reliable evidence. On the
contrary, this evidence speaks otherwise. Therefore, when A1
came with a false defence and the dying declaration-Exhibit P5 is
corroborated by other surrounding circumstances and evidence
and after independent evaluation of Exhibit P5 and Exhibit D2,
when the High Court has found that Exhibit P5 is reliable and
inspiring confidence and thereafter when the High Court has
convicted the accused, it cannot be said that the High Court has
committed any error. In the present case the prosecution is
successful in proving that the accused-appellant herein poured
kerosene on the deceased. As per dying declaration Exhibit P5,
it has been proved that the deceased was set ablaze by pouring
kerosene on her. The act of the accused falls in clause fourthly of
Section 300 IPC. The accused poured kerosene on the deceased
and not only poured kerosene but also set her ablaze by the
matchstick. Therefore, after pouring kerosene on the deceased
and thereafter setting her ablaze, thereafter merely because the
accused might have tried to extinguish the fire will not take the
case out of the clutches of clause fourthly of Section 300 of the
IPC. The act of the accused pouring kerosene on the deceased
and thereafter setting her ablaze by matchstick is imminently
dangerous which, in all probability, will cause death. Therefore,
the High Court has rightly
convicted the accused for the offence
under Section 302 IPC. No reason to interfere with the impugned
judgment and order of conviction passed by the High Court. [Paras
9-11][610-F-H; 611-A-D; 611-E-F; 616-B-C]
Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : [2010] 9
SCR 1039; Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police
(1999) 2 SCC 10; Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of
Karnataka (2019) 5 SCC 436 : [2019] 6 SCR 994;
Nallam Veera Stayanandam v. Public Prosecutor (2004)
10 SCC 769; Kashmira Devi v. State of Uttarakhand
(2020) 11 SCC 343:[2020] 1 SCR 152; Ashabai v. State
of Maharashtra (2013) 2 SCC 224 : [2013] 1 SCR 115;
Santosh v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 7 SCC 641:
[2015] 4 SCR 962 – relied on.
NAGABHUSHAN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
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Case Law Reference
[2010] 9 SCR 1039
relied on
para 5.2.1
(1999) 2 SCC 10
relied on
para 5.2.3
[2019] 6 SCR 994
relied on
para 5.3
(2004) 10 SCC 769
relied on
para 8
[2020] 1 SCR 152
relied on
para 8
[2013] 1 SCR 115
relied on
para 8
[2015] 4 SCR 962
relied on
para 10
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
443 of 2020
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.10.2019 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Appeal No. 525 of 2013.
Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Suraj Kaushik, Agam Sharma, Dharm
Singh M/S. Nuli & Nuli, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order of conviction dated 11.10.2019 passed by the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Appeal No. 525/2013, by which the
High Court has allowed the said appeal preferred by the respondent –
State of Karnataka and has reversed the judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court insofar as the appellant – original accused
no.1 is concerned for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and
302 read with 34 of the IPC and consequently convicted the appellant
herein – original accused no.1 for the aforesaid offences, original accused
no.1 has preferred the present appeal. However, the High Court has
confirmed the judgment and order of acquittal insofar as original accused
nos. 2 and 3 are concerned.
2. As
per the case of the prosecution, original accused no.1 married
the deceased, the daughter of PW3 & PW4 nine years ago, prior to the
date of the incident. That the deceased was subjected to the mental
cruelty and there was demand of dowry from the parents of the deceased
Rekha. In that regard, mediation was also held and thereafter PW3 &
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PW4 gave Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 20,000/- on two occasions. On 24.06.2010
at about 9 p.m. in the matrimonial home, appellant herein – original
accused no.1 took up quarrel with his wife Rekha (deceased) and at
that time, he took kerosene and poured the same on her and lit the fire.
The deceased was taken to the hospital. That based on the information,
the investigating officer went to the hospital and recorded her statement
on 27.06.2010 (Exhibit P5). It is alleged that even earlier also on
25.06.2010, the statement of the deceased was recorded by the police
(Exhibit D2). On conclusion of the investigation, the investigating officer
filed the chargesheet against all the accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 498A and 302 read with 34 of the IPC. The case was
committed to the Court of Sessions. The accused pleaded not guilty and
therefore all of them came to be tried by the learned Sessions Court for
the aforesaid offences.
2.1 To prove the case against the accused, the prosecution
examined in all 14 witnesses and brought on record the documentary
evidences including Exhibit P5 – dying declaration and the medical
evidence. That after closure of the evidence on the side of the prosecution,
further statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C. were
recorded. Appellant herein – original accused no.1 examined himself as
DW1 and also examined a witness as DW2. The accused relied upon
the earlier statement of the deceased (Exhibit D2). That on
appreciation
of the evidence and not believing the dying declaration – Exhibit P5 and
having found contradictions in two dying declarations Exhibit P5 and
Exhibit D2, the learned trial Court acquitted all the accused for the
offences for which they were tried.
3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court, the State of
Karnataka preferred appeal before the High Court. By the impugned
judgment and order, the High Court has reversed the order of judgment
and order of acquittal insofar as the appellant herein – original accused
no.1 is concerned and has convicted the appellant herein – original
accused no.1 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 302
read with 34 of the IPC. The judgment and order of acquittal for original
accused nos. 2 & 3 has been confirmed by the High Court.
3.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order of the High Court reversing the judgment and order of acquittal
and convicting the appellant herein – original accused no.1 for the offences
NAGABHUSHAN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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punishable under Sections 498A & 302 read with 34 of the IPC, original
accused no.1 has preferred the present appeal.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has
vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the High Court has committed a grave error in reversing the well-reasoned
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court.
4.1 It is submitted that while reversing the order of acquittal passed
by the learned trial Court, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction
vested in it under Section 378 of the Cr. P.C.
4.2 It is submitted that as there were material contradictions in
two dying declarations and Exhibit D2 was the dying declaration first in
time which came to be believed by the learned trial Court, the learned
trial Court committed no error in acquitting the accused.
4.3 It is submitted that the learned trial Court on appreciation of
evidence, more particularly two dying declarations, disbelieved the
subsequent dying declaration (Exhibit P5) and thereby acquitted the
accused, the same was not required to be interfered with by the High
Court in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction against the judgment and
order of acquittal.
4.3 It is further submitted that while believing the dying declaration
vide Exhibit P5, the High Court has not appreciated that the same was
recorded by PW10 in the presence of PW13, PW8 and parents of the
deceased.
4.4 It
is submitted that the High Court ought to have appreciated
that the earlier dying declaration vide Exhibit D2, which was recorded
on 25.06.2010, was recorded immediately on the next day of the incident
wherein deceased Rekha has specifically stated that it was an accidental
fire due to which she sustained burn injuries. It is submitted that even in
the history which was recorded in the hospital, when the deceased Rekha
was admitted, it was stated that the deceased had suffered accidental
burn injuries.
4.5 It is submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciated
the fact that the dying declaration (Exhibit P5) was recorded later on
and that too after the parents of the deceased reached to the hospital.
4.6 It is submitted that possibility of tutoring the deceased Rekha
so as to make statement against the accused persons cannot be ruled
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out. It is submitted that therefore at least the appellant is entitled to the
benefit of doubt.
4.6 It is submitted that the High Court has not at all appreciated
and/or considered the defence version that on the date of incident there
was no power supply in the house and therefore the deceased went to
the kitchen to prepare the food and found that the gas was empty and
thereafter she told the appellant that she would use the kerosene stove
to prepare the food, and that while she was preparing the food with the
help of candle light and when the same was almost exhausted, she tried
to lit another candle but the same had fallen on the ground where the
kerosene was already spread while pouring the kerosene to the stove
and as a result of which the fire was caught on her clothes.
4.7 It is submitted that even thereafter when the deceased
screamed, the appellant – original accused no.1 rushed to the spot and
tried to extinguish the fire and while extinguishing the fire, he also sustained
burn injuries in his right hand. It is submitted that the aforesaid
circumstances which were considered by the learned trial Court while
acquitting the accused have not been considered and/or appreciated by
the High Court while reversing the order of acquittal passed by the learned
trial Court and convicting the accused – appellant herein.
4.8 It is submitted that as such when it was an appeal against the
judgment and order of acquittal, the High Court was not justified in
reappreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence. It is submitted
that only in a case where the findings recorded by the learned trial Court
are found to be perverse, the interference by the appellate court against
the order of acquittal is warranted. It is submitted that in the present
case, as such, the view taken by the learned trial Court was a plausible
view, which was on appreciation of the evidences on record and therefore
the High Court has committed a grave error in reversing the judgment
and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court and convicting
the accused -appellant herein.
5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant at length.
5.1 Being the statutory appeal against the judgment and order of
the High Court reversing the acquittal and thereby convicting the appellant
herein – original accused no.1, we have reappreciated the entire evidence
on record.
NAGABHUSHAN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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5.2 Before considering the appeal on merits, the law on the appeal
against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the
interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal is required
to be considered.
5.2.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC
189, this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal
against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is
observed and held as under:
12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the
High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily
set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are
possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more
probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the
appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so
as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court
were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is
entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the
trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence
and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record
contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may
also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide
Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219,
Shambhoo Missir
v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17, Shailendra Pratap v. State
of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761, Narendra Singh v. State of M.P
(2004) 10 SCC 699, Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC
731, State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102, S.
Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535, Arulvelu
v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206, Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State
of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P (2010)
2 SCC 445)
13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the
Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404)
“… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and
consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge
as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not
weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3)
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the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the
slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived
at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.”
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed
by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1,
Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216, M.G.
Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200, Khedu
Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450, Sambasivan v.
State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, Bhagwan Singh v. State of
M.P(2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran
(2007) 3 SCC 755)
15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415,
this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para
42)
“(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate
and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion,
both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling
reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong
circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to
emphasise the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty
by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured
his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
NAGABHUSHAN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450, this
Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court
in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted
the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal
bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court
must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial
court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the
demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the
Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid
down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20)
“20. … an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with
even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out
the finger towards the accused.”
18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court
gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would
be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High
Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28)
“(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view
of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
(ii) The
High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and
documents on record;
(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the
evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
(iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and
unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of
the case;
(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration
to the findings of the High Court;
(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a
case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have
recorded an order of acquittal.”
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A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v.
State (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that in exceptional cases where there are compelling
circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be
perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption
of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s
acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference
in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be
avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”
(emphasis supplied)
5.2.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to
be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the
aforesaid decision, which reads as under:
“20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be
perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to
be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984)
4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing
Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni
Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya
Din v. Hanuman Prasad
(2001) 1 SCC 501, Aruvelu v. State
(2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State
of A.P (2009) 10 SCC 636).”
(emphasis supplied)
5.2.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this
Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999)
2 SCC 10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or
thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon
it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record
which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions
would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered
with.
NAGABHUSHAN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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5.3 In the case of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka,
(2019) 5 SCC 436, this Court again had an occasion to consider the
scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in
an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions
of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed
and held as under:
“31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court
in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228. In the case before
this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal
passed by the learned trial court on re-appreciation of the entire
evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing
the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned
trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment
of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as
under: (SCC p. 233)
“10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order
of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the
entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion.
Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the
opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after
proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be
applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has
made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and
clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.”
31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, the
High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned
trial court and held the accused guilty on re-appreciation of the
entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record
its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial
court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the
conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming
the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on
reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after
being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned
trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court
declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the
High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by
the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p.
416)
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“8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain
whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned
principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded
in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi
v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its
conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial
court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the
conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone
will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High
Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting
all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-
compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under
appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach
of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment
of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal
passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the
approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was
patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably
unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court
is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court
judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is
obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgment should
be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the
conclusion that the judgment of the trial
court does not suffer
from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference
by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified;
then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to
be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support
of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above
discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the
trial court in this case.”
31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999)
3 SCC 309, after observing that though there is some substance
in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons
given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this
Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the
High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions
Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the
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conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several
aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as
the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/
material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court,
therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and
record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of
the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial
court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not
at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the
evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and
therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an
order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807, in para 5, this
Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-10)
“5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant
that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High
Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the
evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the
conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In
our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court
in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that
the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not
set aside that order.
It has been
laid down by this Court that it is open to the High
Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the
entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course,
keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of
innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by
the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the
advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose
evidence have been recorded in its presence.
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers
of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of
acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction,
subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which
the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to
the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due
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weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order
of acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those
principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment
cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the
very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR
1952 SC 52; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122)
In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on
behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in
reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.
31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355,
this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to
be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for
slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but
barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere
in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought
to ridicule.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand and the findings recorded by
the High Court, the High Court has specifically observed and held that
the finding recorded by the learned trial Court discarding and/or not
believing the dying declaration (Exhibit P5) is perverse and contrary to
the evidence on record. The High Court has given cogent reasons while
believing dying declaration (Exhibit
P5) and has also considered in detail
what is stated in the later dying declaration (Exhibit P5), vis-à-vis, the
medical evidence and the injuries sustained by the deceased. Therefore,
as such, the High Court has not committed any error in reappreciating
the entire evidence on record and thereafter interfering with the judgment
and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court, having found the
finding recorded by the learned trial Court perverse.
7. Now so far as the merits of the appeal are concerned, it cannot
be disputed that in the present case there are two dying declarations, (i)
Exhibit P5 and (ii) Exhibit D2. The High Court in the impugned judgment
and order has given cogent reasons to rely upon and believe the second
dying declaration – Exhibit P5. The High Court has also taken note of
the fact that the second dying declaration is reliable and the version in
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the second dying declaration is supported by the circumstances, namely,
the injuries sustained by the deceased; no stove was found at the place
of occurrence. The High Court has also taken note of the fact that in the
second dying declaration, the deceased has explained her first statement
that it was a case of accident and she categorically stated in the second
dying declaration that at the time when she gave first statement that it
was a case of accident, she was given threats by the appellant herein –
original accused no.1 that he will kill her children also. She also stated in
the second dying declaration that after her parents came, she got the
courage to tell the truth. Therefore, as such, the High Court rightly
believed the second dying declaration – Exhibit P5.
8. At this stage, the decisions of this Court in the cases of Nallam
Veera Stayanandam v. Public Prosecutor (2004) 10 SCC 769;
Kashmira Devi v. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 11 SCC 343; and
Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 2 SCC 224 are required to
be referred to. In the aforesaid decisions, this Court had an occasion to
consider the cases where there are multiple dying declarations. In the
aforesaid decisions, it is held that each dying declaration has to be
considered independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and
one cannot be rejected because of the contents of the other. It is also
held that the Court has to consider each of
them in its correct perspective
and satisfy itself which one of them reflects the true state of affairs.
When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has
to be separately assessed and evaluated on its own merits.
9. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand, and on evaluation of both
dying declarations independently, dying declaration recorded as Exhibit
P5 reflects the true state of affairs and the contents are supported by
the medical evidence and the injuries sustained by the deceased. The
plea put forth by the defence that it was a case of an accident and while
pouring the kerosene from kerosene can to the bottle, the same had
fallen on the clothes placed on the ground and when the deceased tried
to remove the clothes from that place, the candle fell on the ground, as a
result, her clothes caught fire and she sustained burn injuries is disbelieved
by the High Court considering the circumstances noted by the High
Court that the deceased sustained injuries on the face, chest and back
and to the upper limbs. The main injuries are found on the upper limbs of
the body. Therefore, as rightly observed by the High Court, the aforesaid
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injuries can be possible when the kerosene is poured on the deceased.
According to the defence and as per the evidence of DW1-A1, while
putting the kerosene into the stove, accidentally the kerosene had fallen
on the ground and also on her clothes, and thereafter when the candle
fell on the ground, the same had come in contact with her clothes and
kerosene. If that is the case, there would have been injuries to her feet
also. However, no burn injuries are found on her feet. No stove was
found at the place of occurrence. Therefore, the defence came out with
a false case of accidental fire, which, as such, is not supported by any
other reliable evidence. On the contrary, this evidence speaks otherwise.
Therefore, when A1 came with a false defence and the dying declaration
– Exhibit P5 is corroborated by other surrounding circumstances and
evidence and after independent evaluation of Exhibit P5 and Exhibit D2,
when the High Court has found that Exhibit P5 is reliable and inspiring
confidence and thereafter when the High Court has convicted the
accused, it cannot be said that the High Court has committed any error.
10. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that
even thereafter he tried to extinguish the fire and he also sustained injuries
and therefore it cannot be said that the appellant has committed an offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC is concerned, at the outset, it is required
to be noted that in the present case the prosecution is
successful in
proving that the accused – appellant herein poured kerosene on the
deceased. As per dying declaration Exhibit P5, it has been proved that
the deceased was set ablaze by pouring kerosene on her. The act of the
accused falls in clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC. It emerges from the
evidence on record that the accused poured kerosene on the deceased
and not only poured kerosene but also set her ablaze by the matchstick.
Merely because thereafter the A1 might have tried to extinguish the fire,
that will not bring the case out of clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC.
A somewhat similar submission was made before this Court in
the case of Santosh v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 7 SCC 641. In
the case before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused
who poured kerosene on the deceased and set her ablaze by matchstick
that thereafter they tried to save the deceased by pouring water on her
and therefore it was contended on behalf of the accused that by that
conduct it cannot be said that the intention of the accused was to cause
death of the deceased. The aforesaid has been negated by this Court by
observing in paragraphs 9 to 18 as under:
NAGABHUSHAN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
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“9. Insofar as the first contention that the appellant is not
responsible for the death of deceased Saraswatibai, the defence
made an attempt to contend that the fire was accidental and that
the appellant tried to extinguish the fire in order to save her and in
that process, he also suffered burn injuries. The prosecution has
adduced cogent evidence to prove that the appellant has caused
the death of deceased Saraswatibai. The accused suspected the
deceased of infidelity and picking up a fight over it, he kicked her
and inflicted fist-blows and further set her on fire by pouring
kerosene over her person. PW 6, doctor certified that the deceased
was in a fit mental condition to make the statement and PW 7, the
Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration Ext. 1. In
the said dying declaration, the deceased had categorically stated
that on the date of incident, the appellant poured kerosene over
her person and set her on fire. That accused poured kerosene on
the deceased and set her on fire is corroborated by the oral
testimony of PW 3, Sindhu Sunil Ingole (sister-in-law) of the
deceased. PW 1 Raju Janrao Gavai, neighbour of the deceased
who accompanied the deceased to the hospital to whom the
deceased is said to have made a statement about the overt act of
the accused, had only stated that the deceased told him that the
accused beat her and also kicked her. PW 1 had not supported
the statement of the deceased in
the dying declaration that the
accused poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. However,
the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused by Ext. 1
dying declaration and the oral evidence of the mother (PW 2) and
the sister-in-law (PW 3) and the same cannot be doubted.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that there
was no premeditation and the appellant had poured kerosene from
the lamp nearby and thereafter the appellant attempted to extinguish
the fire by pouring water on her and himself getting burn injuries
in the process. It was submitted that the conduct of the appellant
in trying to extinguish the fire immediately after the incident would
clearly show that there was no intention on the part of the appellant
to commit the murder. In support of his contention, he placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court in Kalu Ram v. State of
Rajasthan [(2000) 10 SCC 324 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 86] .
11. The question falling for consideration is whether the act of the
accused pouring water would mitigate the offence of murder.
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Where the intention to kill is present, the act amounts to murder,
where such an intention is absent, the act amounts to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. To determine whether the
offender had the intention or not, each case must be decided on
its facts and circumstances. From the facts and circumstances of
the instant case, it is evident that : (i) there was a homicide, namely,
the death of Saraswatibai; (ii) the deceased was set ablaze by
the appellant and this act was not accidental or unintentional; and
(iii) the post-mortem certificate revealed that the deceased died
due to shock and septicaemia caused by 60% burn injuries. When
the accused poured kerosene on the deceased from the kerosene
lamp and also threw the lighted matchstick on the deceased to set
her on fire, he must have intended to cause the death of the
deceased. As seen from the evidence of PW 5, panch witness, in
the house of the appellant, kerosene lamp was prepared in an
empty liquor bottle. Whether the kerosene was poured from the
kerosene lamp or from the can is of no consequence. When there
is clear evidence as to the act of the accused to set the deceased
on fire, absence of premeditation will not reduce the offence of
murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Likewise,
pouring of water will not mitigate the gravity of the offence.
12. After attending to nature’s call, the deceased returned to the
house a little late. The accused questioned her as to why she was
coming late and he also suspected her fidelity. There was no
provocation for the accused to pour kerosene and set her on fire.
The act of pouring kerosene, though on the spur of the moment,
the same was followed by lighting a matchstick and throwing it on
the deceased and thereby setting her ablaze. Both the acts are
intimately connected with each other and resulted in causing the
death of the deceased and the act of the accused is punishable
for murder.
13. Even assuming that the accused had no intention to cause the
death of the deceased, the act of the accused falls under clause
Fourthly of Section 300 IPC that is the act of causing injury so
imminently dangerous where it will in all probability cause death.
Any person of average intelligence would have the knowledge
that pouring of kerosene and setting her on fire by throwing a
lighted matchstick is so imminently dangerous that in all probability
such an act would cause injuries causing death.
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14. Insofar as the conduct of the accused in attempting to extinguish
fire, placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Kalu Ram
case [(2000) 10 SCC 324 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 86] , it was contended
that such conduct of the accused would bring down the offence
from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
In Kalu Ram case [(2000) 10 SCC 324 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 86] , the
accused was having two wives. The accused in a highly inebriated
condition asked his wife to part with her ornaments so that he
could purchase more liquor, which led to an altercation when the
wife refused to do as demanded. Infuriated by the fact that his
wife had failed to concede to his demands, the accused poured
kerosene on her and gave her a matchbox to set herself on fire.
On her failure to light the matchstick, the accused set her ablaze.
But when he realised that the fire was flaring up, he threw water
on her person in a desperate bid to save her. In such facts and
circumstances, this Court held that the accused would not have
intended to inflict the injuries which she sustained on account of
the act of the accused and the conviction was altered from Section
302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.
15. The decision in Kalu Ram case [(2000) 10 SCC 324 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 86] cannot be applied in the instant case. The element
of inebriation ought to be taken into consideration as it considerably
alters the power of thinking. In the instant
case, the accused was
in his complete senses, knowing fully well the consequences of
his act. The subsequent act of pouring water by the accused on
the deceased also appears to be an attempt to cloak his guilt since
he did it only when the deceased screamed for help. Therefore, it
cannot be considered as a mitigating factor. An act undertaken by
a person in full awareness, knowing its consequences cannot be
treated on a par with an act committed by a person in a highly
inebriated condition where his faculty of reason becomes blurred.
16. Within three months of her marriage, the deceased died of
burn injuries. In bride burning cases, whenever the guilt of the
accused is brought home beyond reasonable doubt, it is the duty
of the court to deal with it sternly and award the maximum penalty
prescribed by the law in order that it may operate as a deterrence
to other persons from committing such offence.
17. This Court on various occasions has stressed the need for
vigilance in cases where a woman dies of burn injuries within a
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short span of her marriage and that stern view needs to be adopted
in all such cases. In Satya Narayan Tiwari v. State of U.P. [(2010)
13 SCC 689 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 393] , this Court in paras 3 and
9 has held as under : (SCC pp. 692 & 693)
“3. Indian society has become a sick society. This is evident
from the large number of cases coming up in this Court (and
also in almost all courts in the country) in which young women
are being killed by their husbands or by their in-laws by pouring
kerosene on them and setting them on fire or by hanging/
strangulating them. What is the level of civilisation of a society
in which a large number of women are treated in this
horrendous and barbaric manner? What has our society
become—this is illustrated by this case.
***
9. Crimes against women are not ordinary crimes committed
in a fit of anger or for property. They are social crimes. They
disrupt the entire social fabric. Hence, they call for harsh
punishment. Unfortunately, what is happening in our society is
that out of lust for money people are often demanding dowry
and after extracting as much money as they can they kill the
wife and marry again and then again they commit the murder
of their wife for the same purpose. This is because of total
commercialisation of our society, and lust for money which
induces people to commit murder of the wife. The time has
come when we have to stamp out this evil from our society,
with an iron hand.”
18. Upon analysis of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution,
the courts below recorded concurrent findings that the accused
caused the death of deceased Saraswatibai and convicted the
appellant. It is well settled that concurrent findings of fact cannot
be interfered with unless the findings are perverse and
unsupportable from the evidence on record. This view has been
reiterated in Dhananjay Shanker Shetty v. State of
Maharashtra [(2002) 6 SCC 596 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1444] . In the
totality of the facts and circumstances, in our view, the concurrent
findings of facts recorded by the courts below are based on
evidence and we see no infirmity in the impugned judgment
warranting interference”.
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Therefore, after pouring kerosene on the deceased and thereafter
setting her ablaze, thereafter merely because the accused might have
tried to extinguish the fire will not take the case out of the clutches of
clause fourthly of Section 300 of the IPC. The act of the accused pouring
kerosene on the deceased and thereafter setting her ablaze by matchstick
is imminently dangerous which, in all probability, will cause death.
Therefore, the High Court has rightly convicted the accused for the
offence under Section 302 IPC.
11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeal fails. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned
judgment and order of conviction passed by the High Court. The appeal
deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.
Divya Pandey
 Appeal dismissed.