RAJENDRA S/O RAMDAS KOLHE versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 740, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
* Author
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 740 : 2024 INSC 422
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe 
v. 
State of Maharashtra
(Criminal Appeal No. 2281 of 2011)
15 May 2024
[Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
By the judgment and order dated 15.11.2010, the High Court relied 
upon the written dying declaration of the deceased Ex. 59 recorded 
by PW-6 and also the oral dying declarations of the deceased 
made before PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-7 and PW-8 and thereafter 
upheld the judgment of conviction of the trial court. The appellant 
was convicted for committing an offence punishable u/s. 302 r/w. 
s.34 of the IPC and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment. Whether 
the dying declaration (Ex.59), in the instant case, was the valid 
piece of evidence.
Headnotes
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32(1) – Dying Declaration – Conviction 
under – Prosecution case that victim was confined at her house 
and assualted – It was alleged that appellant-husband and 
brother-in-law of victim tied her legs with a towel and her hands 
with a gamcha – The husband poured kerosene all over her 
body and set her ablaze – Hearing her scream, people gathered 
outside her house and extinguished flames – Thereafter, she 
was taken to hospital and after few days she died – However, 
she gave a dying declaration (Ex.59) and clearly stated about 
the role played by her husband and brother-in-law – The trial 
Court convicted appellant-husband u/ss. 302 r/w. s.34 of IPC 
– The said conviction was upheld by the High Court:
Held: In her dying declaration (Ex. 59), the victim-deceased clearly 
stated about the role played by the husband (appellant) and the 
brother-in-law in the incident which led to her burn injuries – The 
contents of the dying declaration have been proved by PW-6, 
PW-12 and PW-13 – Though there are certain inconsistencies in 
their evidence – However, those are not material and do not affect 
the sub-stratum of her statement – The incident had occurred on 
22.07.2002 with the dying declaration recorded on the same day
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
741
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
within a couple of hours whereas the evidence was tendered in 
court by the above witnesses after 5 years – Such inconsistencies 
are bound to be there – In fact, identical statements by the material 
witnesses may create doubt in the mind of the court about the 
credibility of such evidence, as being tutored – The attending 
doctor had certified that the deceased was capable of narrating 
her statement – The substance of the dying declaration is also 
borne out by the medical history of the patient recorded by the 
doctor which has also been proved in evidence – Further, though 
there are inconsistencies and improvements in the version of 
the prosecution witnesses, there is however convergence with 
the core of the narration of the deceased made in the dying 
declaration and the medical history recorded by the doctor – That 
being the position, the evidence on record, particularly Ex. 59, 
clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable 
doubt – That being the position, this Court is inclined to accept 
the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex. 59) as a valid piece 
of evidence. [Paras 24, 35]
Evidence – Dying Declaration – Sole basis for conviction:
Held: Once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring 
confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and 
can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration – 
However, before accepting such a dying
declaration, court must be 
satisfied that it was rendered voluntarily, it is consistent and credible 
and that it is devoid of any tutoring – Once such a  conclusion is 
reached, a great deal of sanctity is attached to a dying declaration 
then it can form the sole basis for conviction. [Para 25]
Case Law Cited
Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay [1958] 1 SCR 552 : AIR (1958) 
SC 22;  Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh 
[1993] 2 SCR 666 : (1993) 2 SCC 684; Sher Singh v. State of 
Punjab [2008] 2 SCR 959 : (2008) 4 SCC 265; Sudhakar v. State 
of Madhya Pradesh [2012] 7 SCR 128 : (2012) 7 SCC 569 – 
relied on.
Paniben (Smt.) v. State of Gujarat [1992] 2 SCR 197 : (1992) 2 
SCC 474; Amol Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2008] 8 SCR 
956 : (2008) 5 SCC 468; Lakhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2010] 
9 SCR 705 : (2010) 8 SCC 514; Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra 
[2013] 1 SCR 115 : (2013) 2 SCC 224 – referred to.
742
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860
List of Keywords
Evidence; Dying declaration; Dying declaration as sole basis 
of conviction; Correctness of dying declaration; Consistent and 
credible dying declaration; Voluntary dying declaration; Section 
32(1) of Evidence Act, 1872.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2281 
of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2010 of the High Court of 
Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in CRLA No.635 of 2008
Appearances for Parties
Sudhanshu S. Choudhary, Sr. Adv., Ms. Rucha A. Pandey, Vatsalya 
Vigya, Advs. for the Appellant.
Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla, 
Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Raavi Sharma, Advs. for the 
Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Ujjal Bhuyan, J.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.	
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 
15.11.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay, 
Bench at Aurangabad (hereinafter ‘the High Court’) dismissing 
Criminal Appeal No. 635 of 2008, Rajendra Ramdas Kolhe Vs. 
State of Maharashtra, filed by the appellant thereby confirming the 
judgment and order dated 23.07.2008 passed by the 3rd Ad Hoc 
Additional Sessions Judge, Ambajogai (‘trial court’ hereinafter) in 
Sessions Case No. 60/2006.
2.1.	
It may be mentioned that by the judgment and order dated 
23.07.2008, the trial court had convicted the
appellant for 
committing an offence punishable under Section 302 read
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
743
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and 
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of 
Rs. 25,000/- with a default stipulation. The appeal filed by 
the appellant against the aforesaid conviction and sentence 
was dismissed by the High Court.
3.	
The prosecution case in brief is that wife of the appellant Rekha was 
a police constable and lived in the police colony at Ambajogai. Her 
husband i.e. the appellant was serving in the army. He had come 
home on leave.
3.1.	
On 22.07.2002, at about 08:30 PM, Rekha had sustained 
burn injuries in the quarter where she was residing. According 
to the prosecution, she was subjected to cruelty by her 
husband Rajendra and brother-in-law Suresh. She was also 
subjected to sustained cruelty at the hands of her other 
in-laws including father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-
law. On the fateful day, Rekha was beaten by her husband 
Rajendra and brother-in-law Suresh. They tied her hands 
with a gamcha and her feet by a towel. Then the husband 
gagged her face. Brother-in-law got a match box and a bottle 
of kerosene. Husband poured the kerosene on her person and 
lit the matchstick. In the process, she got completely burnt. 
She was taken to the hospital by the neighbours where her 
dying declaration was recorded by PW-6 being Ex. 59 on the 
basis of which Ambajogai Police Station registered Crime 
No. 182/2002 under Sections 307,
498A, 342, 323 and 504 
read with Section 34 IPC.
3.2.	
Investigation of the crime was conducted by PW-10. He broke 
open the locked room where the incident had taken place 
and seized partially burnt lady’s clothes, a bottle containing 
residue of kerosene, broken mangalsutra etc. Later on, another 
dying declaration of the victim was recorded by the Special 
Executive Magistrate being Ex. 65. On 24.07.2002, at about 
11:00 PM, Rekha expired due to the burn injuries. Following 
the same, Section 302 IPC was added to the FIR.
3.3.	
On completion of investigation, chargesheet was submitted by 
the police. Appellant alongwith the father-in-law, mother-in-law 
and sister-in-law of the deceased were arrayed as accused. 
In so far brother-in-law Suresh is concerned, he was found to
744
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
be a juvenile. Therefore, his case was segregated and sent 
to the Juvenile Justice Board.
3.4.	
In the trial of the appellant and the three others, prosecution 
examined in all 13 witnesses. Statements of the accused 
including the appellant were recorded under Section 313 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC). Stand of the 
defence was that it was not a case of homicide but a case 
of suicide. In addition to the above, appellant also tendered 
evidence of a doctor. 
3.5.	
After considering the evidence on record and the rival 
contentions, the trial court came to the conclusion that 
prosecution could not prove that the accused persons in 
furtherance of their common intention had subjected the 
deceased to harassment and cruelty and thereby committed 
an offence punishable under Section 498A IPC read with 
Section 34 thereof. The trial court also did not find any material 
against the father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law of the 
appellant for committing murder of Rekha. However, the trial 
court accepted the contents of both the dying declarations Ex. 
59 and Ex. 65 coupled with the evidence of the prosecution 
witnesses and held that death of Rekha was homicidal and 
not accidental. While acquitting the father-in-law, mother-
in-law and sister-in-law of the appellant, the trial court held 
that prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt 
that accused No. 4 i.e. the appellant alongwith his
minor 
brother Suresh had in furtherance of their common intention 
committed murder of Rekha. Therefore, the trial court held 
the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 
302 IPC. After a separate hearing, the trial court sentenced 
the appellant as above.
4.	
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence, 
appellant preferred appeal before the High Court. By the judgment 
and order dated 15.11.2010, the High Court relied upon the written 
dying declaration of the deceased Ex. 59 recorded by PW-6 and 
also the oral dying declarations of the deceased made before PW-2, 
PW-3, PW-4, PW-7 and PW-8 and thereafter upheld the judgment 
of conviction of the trial court. Holding that the trial court judgment 
warranted no interference, the appeal was dismissed.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
745
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
5.	
This Court by order dated 16.08.2011 had issued notice. Thereafter 
vide order dated 02.10.2011, leave was granted. However, prayer 
for bail was rejected at that stage.
6.	
By order dated 30.06.2016, this Court noted that appellant had already 
undergone about nine years of sentence. Therefore, the sentence 
was suspended and bail was granted to the appellant.
7.	
Learned senior counsel for the appellant strenuously argued that 
there are material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution 
witnesses. That apart, the High Court had rightly not relied upon 
Ex. 65 i.e. the dying declaration recorded by the Special Executive 
Magistrate as that was not proved. In so far Ex. 59 dying declaration 
is concerned, he submits that PW-12, the doctor, had given the time 
of recording the dying declaration as 11:45 PM, both as the starting 
point as well as the time of conclusion which is a significant lacuna. 
It casts a serious doubt about the credibility of the declaration. He 
submits that since the courts below had discarded the theory of 
domestic violence, there could be no other reason for the appellant 
to commit murder of his wife. As a matter of fact, it has come on 
record that the appellant had tried to save the deceased and in the 
process had got burnt on his right hand. He had taken the deceased 
alongwith his brother to the hospital. That being the position, the 
conviction and sentence
is liable to be interfered with.
7.1.	
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent 
supports the conviction and sentence of the appellant. He 
submits that the evidence on record clearly establishes beyond 
any reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant. Prosecution 
could successfully prove the guilt of the appellant beyond 
any reasonable doubt. The dying declaration Ex. 59 is too 
significant to be overlooked. Minor discrepancies here and 
there cannot impeach the prosecution case. Therefore, there 
is no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction as 
affirmed by the High Court. The appeal should be dismissed.
8.	
Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received 
the due consideration of the Court.
9.	
At the outset, it would be apposite to dilate on the evidence tendered 
by the material prosecution witnesses before we proceed to the 
written dying declaration Ex. 59.
746
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
10.	 PW-2 is Rajendra, a police constable. In his examination in chief, he 
stated that the deceased was serving as a lady police constable at 
Ambajogai Police Station. She was residing in a quarter in the police 
colony in front of his quarter. On the date and time of the incident, he 
saw many ladies residing in the police colony standing near the quarter 
of the deceased alongwith a few police constables. PW-2 went there 
and made enquiries. One constable Rajgire, who was his neighbour, 
told him that husband and brother-in-law of Rekha had set her on 
fire by pouring kerosene. She was taken to the S.R.T.R. Hospital at 
Ambajogai for treatment. Thereafter PW-2 alongwith Sayyed Aslam 
went to the hospital and saw Rekha taking treatment in the OPD. 
Police constable Sayyed Chand was present in the OPD. He asked 
Rekha in the presence of PW-2 and his friend as to how she had 
sustained the burn injuries. Rekha told that her husband and brother-
in-law had set her on fire by pouring kerosene. According to her, she 
got married about two years ago. She was treated properly for about 
15 days. Thereafter, her father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law and 
brother-in-law used to instigate her husband whenever he used to 
come home on leave from the army. They used to tell him that she 
was retaining her entire salary instead of handing over the same to 
her in-laws. They also raised questions on her character which was 
cited
as the reason for not handing over her salary to them. On such 
instigation, the husband used to abuse and assault her.
10.1.	 Though she was selected for the police sports competition 
at Beed on 14.07.2002, her husband did not allow her to 
participate in the sports competition. On the day of the incident, 
she was not allowed to come out of the house for the whole 
day. Between 08:30 PM to 09:00 PM, her husband and brother-
in-law tied her hands with a gamcha; they also tied her legs 
with a towel. The brother-in-law brought a bottle of kerosene 
and a matchbox and gave to the husband. Thereafter, her 
husband gagged her mouth by one hand and poured kerosene 
on her person by the other hand. The husband then lighted 
the matchstick from the matchbox and set her on fire.
10.2.	 PW-2 stated that when he had gone to the hospital, the 
husband and brother-in-law of Rekha were not present.
10.3.	 In his cross-examination, PW-2 stated that in his statement 
before the police, it was not recorded that the in-laws of Rekha
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
747
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
had told her husband that she was not paying the salary for 
which Rekha was abused and assaulted. In the statement 
under Section 161 Cr.P.C., it was also not recorded that Rekha 
was selected for the police sports competition on 14.07.2022. 
The statement made by him that Rekha’s husband i.e. the 
appellant had closed her mouth by one hand and poured 
kerosene by the other hand, was also found not mentioned 
in the Section 161 statement. However, he stated that PW-6 
Assistant Sub Inspector Dake had recorded the statement 
of Rekha in detail in the hospital when PW-2 was present.
11.	 PW-3 Kausalyabai is the mother of the deceased Rekha. She stated 
that after marriage, Rekha was properly treated by her husband and 
other in-laws for about 15 days. Thereafter, they started ill-treating 
her on the ground that she did not part with her salary. Her elder 
daughter Shyamla had telephoned her and told her that Rekha was 
set on fire by her husband Rajendra and her brother-in-law Suresh. 
She came to the hospital at Ambajogai along with her son and 
daughter-in-law and met Rekha. Rekha told PW-3 that her husband 
and brother-in-law had poured kerosene and set her on fire. At that 
time, her mother-in-law, father-in-law and sister-in-law were present. 
Rekha had told her that her neighbours had shifted her to the hospital 
while her husband and in-laws fled away. 
11.1.	 In her cross-examination, she stated
that police had recorded 
her statement after the death of Rekha. She acknowledged 
that police had not recorded in her Section 161 statement 
that her daughter Rekha was subjected to cruelty by her 
husband and in-laws; and on the day of the incident, she was 
confined to the house. It was also not recorded that accused 
Rajendra and Suresh had set her on fire by pouring kerosene. 
She had not stated before the police when Rekha’s husband 
and brother-in-law had set her on fire; that father-in-law and 
sister-in-law were also present and that all of them ran away. 
According to her, though she had stated before the police that 
all the accused were present in the house and after setting 
Rekha on fire, all of them fled from the house, the same was 
not recorded.
12.	 Brother of the deceased, Milind, is PW-4. In his examination-in-
chief, he stated that the in laws, brother-in-law and sister-in-law of
748
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
deceased Rekha had suspected her character. They used to incite 
the appellant about the character of the deceased and non-sharing 
of her salary with them. He stated that husband and brother-in-law 
of Rekha had killed her by setting her on fire. When he came to 
know about the incident, he alongwith his wife, children and mother 
came to Ambajogai on the same night i.e. on 22.07.2002 and met 
Rekha in the hospital. When he made enquiries with her, she told 
him that her husband and brother-in-law had set her on fire. In the 
hospital, none of her in-laws were present. On their arrival in the 
hospital, PW-4 found his sister Shyamla near Rekha. While taking 
treatment, Rekha died on 24.07.2002.
12.1.	 In his cross-examination, he stated that when he had gone to 
the hospital, his sister (the deceased) was completely burnt 
and was groaning. He stated that the police had recorded his 
statement as per his say. Though he had stated before the 
police that in the hospital, his sister Rekha had informed him 
that her husband and brother-in-law had set her on fire, he could 
not assign any reason why the police did not record the same.
13.	 We may now turn to the evidence of PW-7, Sayyed Chand, who 
was also a policeman serving in the Ambajogai Police Station and 
residing in the police colony. In his evidence-in-chief, he stated that 
at about 09:00 PM, he heard hue and cry in the colony. When he 
came out of his house, he saw
people gathered near the quarter 
of lady police constable Dhokne i.e. the deceased. Police head 
constable Rajgire and women members in the crowd informed him 
that lady police constable Dhokne was set on fire by her husband 
and her brother-in-law. He and Rajgire entered into the house of 
Dhokne and extinguished the fire. Both the hands of Rekha were 
tied by a towel. Rajgire untied the hands. At that time, the husband 
and brother-in-law were present in the house. Somebody brought 
an auto-rikshaw in which Dhokne, her husband and brother-in-law 
went to the hospital. He went to the hospital on the motorcycle of 
another person whose name he did not know. But when he reached 
the hospital, the husband and brother-in-law were not present. He 
got Dhokne (Rekha) admitted in the hospital. When he enquired with 
Dhokne (Rekha), she told him that her mother-in-law and father-in-
law had told her husband that she was not behaving properly and 
was not sharing her salary with them. Therefore, her husband and 
brother-in-law set her on fire.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
749
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
13.1.	 In his cross-examination, PW-7 stated that police had recorded 
his statement on 23.07.2002 in the morning at the police 
station. According to him, though he had stated before the 
police that he and Rajgire had entered the house of Dhokne 
where they found her hands and legs were tied by a towel, 
whereafter they had extinguished the fire while Rajgire untied 
the hands and legs of Rekha, the same was not reduced to 
writing by the police. He had also stated that at that time, 
the husband and brother-in-law of Rekha were present in 
the house but this was also not recorded by the police. His 
statement that Rekha’s mother-in-law and father-in-law used 
to inform her husband that she was not behaving properly, 
was also not recorded by the police.
14.	 Police head constable Rajgire is PW-8. In his examination-in-chief, 
he stated that as he was serving in the Ambajogai Police Station, 
he used to reside in the police colony. 22.07.2002 was his weekly 
holiday. Therefore, he was at home. The quarter of Rekha Dhokne, 
lady police constable, was in front of his quarter in the police colony. 
On 22.07.2002, between 08:30 PM to 09:00 PM, he heard cries of 
a lady from the house of Dhokne. On hearing the cries, he and his 
wife came out of his house and entered the house of Dhokne. At that 
time, Dhokne was completely burnt. He and his wife poured water 
on her person and extinguished the fire. At
that time, husband and 
brother-in-law of Rekha Dhokne were standing near the door of the 
house. Rekha was saying loudly that her husband and brother-in-
law had set her on fire. When somebody brought an auto-rikshaw, 
her husband and brother-in-law took her to the S.R.T.R. Hospital 
in the said auto rikshaw. On 24.07.2002, Rekha Dhokne died while 
taking treatment in the hospital. His supplementary statement was 
recorded by the police on 25.07.2002. According to him, he had 
learnt that the in-laws of Rekha were demanding that she should 
part with her salary and since she was unwilling to do that, she 
was set on fire.
14.1.	 In his cross-examination, PW-8 stated that though he had told 
the police that when he and his wife had extinguished the 
fire, the husband and brother-in-law of Rekha were present 
near the door of the house, this is not reflected in his police 
statement. However, his statement that when his wife was 
pouring water on the person of Dhokne, husband Rajendra
750
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
and brother-in-law Suresh were standing nearby, was recorded 
in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
15.	 PW-10 is Uttam, the police inspector, who had investigated the case. 
He stated that he had visited the crime scene alongwith two panchas. 
He had seized half burnt parker petticoat, gown, one water bottle 
smelling of kerosene, one half burnt stick, broken mangalsutra, lock 
etc. The seizure list was prepared by him and signed by the panchas.
15.1.	 In his cross-examination, he stated that on receiving information 
from the medical officer of the hospital that Rekha Dhokne 
had sustained burn injuries, he had directed PW-6 to record 
the dying declaration of her, entry of which was made in the 
station diary. In so far the Section 161 statement of PW-2 
is concerned, he stated that PW-2 did not state before him 
that Rekha had told him that her husband had gagged her 
mouth by one hand and had poured kerosene on her person 
by the other hand. Regarding the Section 161 statement of 
PW-3, he stated that PW-3 did not say that the accused were 
demanding money from Rekha and that they were subjecting 
her to cruelty by not providing her food, confining her to the 
house and on the day of the incident, accused Rajendra 
and Suresh had set her on fire by pouring kerosene. He 
further stated that PW-3 Kausalyabai had not stated in her 
Section 161 statement that Shyamla had informed her that 
accused Rajendra and his
brother Suresh had killed Rekha 
by setting her on fire. Further, PW-3 did not say before him 
that all the accused ran away from the house after setting 
Rekha on fire. Regarding PW-4, he stated that PW-4 in his 
Section 161 statement did not mention that his sister Rekha 
had told him that her husband and brother-in-law had set 
her on fire. As regards PW-7 Sayyed Chand, PW-10 stated 
that PW-7 did not state in his Section 161 statement that he 
and Rajgire had entered into the house of Dhokne, that both 
her legs and hands were tied by a towel and that they had 
extinguished the fire. PW-7 did not say that Rajgire had untied 
the legs and hands of Rekha and at that time her husband 
and brother-in-law were present. PW-7 also did not state that 
Rajgire and the women members in the crowd had informed 
him that Rekha’s husband and brother-in-law had set her 
on fire. PW-8 in her Section 161 statement, also did not say
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
751
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
that the husband and brother-in-law were present at the time 
when Rekha was burning.
16.	 Dr. Prashant Mohan Kedari is PW-12. On 22.07.2002, he was on 
duty as a resident medical officer in the S.R.T.R. Medical College 
and Hospital at Ambajogai having completed his MBBS that year 
with one year internship. He was incharge of burn ward No. 14 that 
day. PW-9 Bilkis Kachhi, the Special Executive Magistrate, came 
to the hospital to record the dying declaration of the patient Rekha 
who was being treated there. On her enquiry, PW-12 examined the 
patient and found that she was conscious and able to give statement. 
Statement of the patient in Ex. 65 was recorded by PW-9 (however, 
we need not go into this aspect of the matter as the High Court did 
not accept Ex. 65 as a valid piece of evidence). Thereafter, he was 
shown Ex. 59 which is another dying declaration of the deceased. 
He stated that there are two endorsements and signatures in Ex. 
59. The signatures below the endorsements at both the places were 
of Dr. Kiran Kurkure i.e. PW-13.
16.1.	 In his cross-examination, he stated that he had not made 
any endorsement regarding his examination of the patient on 
22.07.2002 in any document. At about 11:30 PM, he started 
clinical examination of the patient which went on for about 
10 minutes.
17.	 Dr. Kiran Kurkure is PW-13. At the relevant point of time, he was 
serving as medical officer in the
S.R.T.R. Medical College and 
Hospital at Ambajogai. At about 10:15 PM on 22.07.2002, a patient 
by the name Rekha, wife of Rajendra Kolhe, was brought to the 
hospital by the police. Though she was having 99% burns, she 
was conscious. Her statement was recorded at 11:45 PM. At that 
time, he was present. He stated that at the time of recording of her 
statement, the patient Rekha was conscious and was in a position 
to give statement. He further stated that he had put an endorsement 
on the statement (Ex. 59). It also bore his endorsement to the effect 
that the patient was fit for giving statement at present which was 
signed by him. He stated that the contents of Ex. 59 were correct. 
He proved his endorsements and the signatures on Ex. 59. He 
also stated that he had put an endorsement before recording the 
statement and another endorsement after recording the statement; 
the endorsement date and time was in his handwriting. Regarding
752
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
the second endorsement after recording of the statement, he stated 
that the endorsement was his but by mistake he had mentioned the 
time as 11:45 PM. He also stated that at the time of admission of 
the patient, he had recorded the history narrated by her. The patient 
had informed him that her husband had set her on fire. He asserted 
that he had correctly recorded the history as narrated by the patient. 
It was in his own handwriting, the contents of which were proved 
by him (Ex. 117).
17.1.	 Though PW-13 was extensively cross-examined, nothing 
inconsistent or contradictory to what he had stated in his 
evidence-in-chief could be extracted.
18.	 We will analyze the evidence of PW-12 and PW-13 at the time of 
examination of Ex. 59. Before proceeding to Ex. 59, let us briefly 
analyze the evidence of the prosecution witnesses discussed thus far. 
19.	 In his evidence-in-chief, PW-2 stated that constable Rajgire was in 
the crowd in front of the residence of Rekha and that he had told 
him that the husband and brother-in-law of Rekha had set her on fire 
by pouring kerosene on her person. While Rekha was undergoing 
treatment in the hospital, constable Sayyed Chand asked her in the 
presence of PW-2 as to how she had sustained the burn injuries. In 
response, Rekha stated that her husband and brother-in-law had set 
her on fire by pouring kerosene. She had further stated that her in-laws 
used to instigate her husband
whenever he used to come home on 
leave from the army, raising question marks over her character and 
citing that as the reason for not parting with her salary. This would be 
enough for the husband to abuse and assault her which ultimately led 
to the incident in question. However, in his cross-examination, PW-2 
admitted that police had not included in his Section 161 statement 
that the in-laws of Rekha had told her husband that she was not 
handing over her salary to them for which Rekha was abused and 
assaulted. It was also not mentioned in the statement under Section 
161 Cr.P.C. that the appellant had gagged the mouth of Rekha by 
one hand and poured kerosene on her person by the other hand. 
However, he stated that he was present in the hospital when PW-6 
had recorded the statement of Rekha in detail (Ex. 59).
19.1.	 Likewise, in her cross-examination, PW-3 admitted that it was 
not mentioned in her statement recorded under Section 161 
Cr.P.C. that her daughter Rekha was subjected to cruelty by
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
753
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
her husband and in-laws. It was also not recorded that Rekha 
was confined to the house on the day of the incident. She 
had also not stated before the police that Rekha’s husband 
and brother-in-law had set her on fire. 
19.2.	 Similarly, in the statement of PW-4 recorded under Section 
161 Cr.P.C., there was no mention that Rekha had informed 
him that her husband and brother-in-law had set her on fire. 
19.3.	 There was also no mention in the statement of PW-7 before 
the police that he and Rajgire had entered the house of Rekha 
where they found her legs and hands were tied by a towel 
whereafter they had extinguished the fire and untied her. 
The said statement also did not contain that husband and 
brother-in-law of Rekha were present in the house while she 
was burning. It was also not recorded that the mother-in-law 
and father-in-law used to inform the husband that Rekha was 
not behaving properly. 
19.4.	 In his cross-examination, PW-8 admitted that he did not 
mention in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that when 
PW-8 and his wife had extinguished the fire, the husband 
and brother-in-law of Rekha were present near the door of 
the house. However, it was mentioned that when his wife 
was pouring water on the person of Rekha, her husband and 
brother-in-law were standing nearby. 
19.5.	 The above improvements in evidence by the prosecution 
witnesses were brought on record during the
cross-
examination of PW-10, the investigating officer. Therefore, in 
addition to certain contradictions here and there, there is clear 
improvement in the version of the prosecution witnesses when 
they tendered evidence before the court. However, even in his 
cross-examination, PW-2 stated that PW-6 had recorded the 
statement of Rekha in detail in the hospital. This now brings 
us to the statement of Rekha made in the hospital which was 
recorded by PW-6 i.e. Ex. 59. While examining Ex.59, we will 
also analyze the evidence of PW-12 and PW-13.
20.	 In Ex.59, the deceased had stated that she was appointed as lady 
police constable in the police department on 12.12.1996. About three 
months prior to the date of the incident, she got transferred to the
754
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Ambajogai Police Station. She had married the appellant about two 
years ago. Appellant was employed in the army and posted at Jodhpur. 
About eight days prior to the date of the incident, he had come home 
on leave of fifteen days. She used to stay alongwith her in-laws in a 
quarter in the police colony at Ambajogai. After marriage, she was 
treated well for only about fifteen days. Thereafter, her mother-in-law 
and brother-in-law accused her of bad behaviour and suspected her 
character. She was subjected to verbal and physical abuse. The in-
laws demanded that she should handover her salary to them. When 
she declined, they would harass and abuse her as to why she needed 
her salary. The brother-in-law would instigate her other in-laws and 
her husband(appellant) as and when he was at home on leave that 
she was behaving badly for which the appellant should leave her. 
Because of such instigation, the husband(appellant) used to beat 
her. Though she was selected for the police sports competition at 
Beed, appellant refused to allow her to participate therein. 
20.1.	 On 22.07.2002, appellant and her brother-in-law Suresh did 
not allow the deceased to go out of the house. Confining her 
to the house, she was physically assaulted. In the evening, 
they tied her legs with a towel and her hands with a gamcha. 
While her husband gagged her mouth, the brother-in-law got 
a matchbox and a bottle of kerosene. The husband
poured 
the kerosene all over her body and lit a matchstick which 
set her ablaze. Her gown got burnt and, in the process, she 
suffered severe burns. At that time, the right hand of her 
husband(appellant) also got burnt. 
20.2.	 When she screamed, the husband and brother-in-law 
opened the door and ran away. Somehow, she could come 
outside. Then, people who had gathered outside her house 
extinguished the flames, put her in an auto and took her to 
the hospital. 
21.	 PW-6 was serving as Assistant Sub-Inspector in the Ambajogai Police 
Station. He was on duty on 22.07.2002. In his evidence, he stated 
that the Police Station Officer of the police station had asked him 
to record the statement of Rekha who was admitted in the S.R.T.R. 
Hospital for burns. He made inquiries with the nurses serving in 
the burn ward where Rekha was being treated. He had visited 
the hospital at about 11:30 PM. Within 5 to 10 minutes, he started
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
755
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
recording the statement of Rekha. Before recording the statement, 
he had requested the nurses to call the doctor whereafter Dr. Kiran 
Kurkure, PW-13, came. PW-13 examined Rekha and certified that she 
was in a position to give her statement. Thereafter, PW-6 recorded 
the statement of Rekha. But before recording her statement, he 
ensured that Rekha was in a position to give the statement. In his 
evidence, he narrated what Rekha had told him and what he had 
recorded. He stated that he had correctly recorded the statement 
of Rekha as per her say. He had read over the contents of the 
statement narrated by her and recorded by him to Rekha and she 
said that those were correct. As she was unable to sign or put her 
thumb impression because she was severely burnt, PW-6 obtained 
the toe impression of her right leg. PW-13 had put his endorsements 
with signatures both prior to recording her statement and at the 
conclusion of her statement. Thereafter, PW-6 put his signature on 
both the pages. In his evidence, he proved the statement of Rekha 
which was shown to him. 
22.	 PW-12 Dr. Prashant Kedari stated in his evidence that the two 
endorsements and signatures on Ex. 59 were that of Dr. Kiran 
Kurkure, PW-13. 
23.	 PW-13 in his evidence stated that the statement of Rekha was 
recorded at 11:45 PM and he was present. Rekha was conscious 
and was in a position to give her statement. He proved his two
endorsements and signatures below the endorsements. He also 
proved the correctness of the contents of Ex. 59. He explained that 
in the second endorsement, he had mentioned the time as 11:45 
PM by mistake. He also asserted that at the time of admission of 
Rekha in the hospital, he had recorded the medical history narrated 
by Rekha. He proved the contents thereof (Ex. 117). 
24.	 From the above, it is evident that in her dying declaration (Ex. 59) 
Rekha clearly stated about the role played by the husband (appellant) 
and the brother-in-law in the incident which led to her burn injuries. 
The contents of the dying declaration have been proved by PW-6, 
PW-12 and PW-13. Though there are certain inconsistencies in 
their evidence, it is quite natural. Moreover, those are not material 
and do not affect the sub-stratum of her statement. The incident 
had occurred on 22.07.2002 with the dying declaration recorded 
on the same day within a couple of hours whereas the evidence
756
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
was tendered in court by the above witnesses after 5 years. Such 
inconsistencies are bound to be there. In fact, identical statements 
by the material witnesses may create doubt in the mind of the court 
about the credibility of such evidence, as being tutored. That being 
the position, we are inclined to accept the dying declaration of the 
deceased (Ex. 59) as a valid piece of evidence.
25.	 The law relating to dying declaration is now well settled. Once a 
dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the 
court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis 
for conviction without any corroboration. However, before accepting 
such a dying declaration, court must be satisfied that it was rendered 
voluntarily, it is consistent and credible and that it is devoid of any 
tutoring. Once such a conclusion is reached, a great deal of sanctity 
is attached to a dying declaration and as said earlier, it can form the 
sole basis for conviction. 
26.	 Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with dying 
declaration. Since the said provision is relevant, it is extracted 
hereunder: 
[32.] Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person 
who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant. – 
Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by 
a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who 
has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose 
attendance cannot be procured
without an amount of 
delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the 
case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves 
relevant facts in the following cases:-
(1) When it relates to cause of death. – When the 
statement is made by a person as to the cause of his 
death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction 
which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause 
of that person’s death comes into question. 
Such statements are relevant whether the person who 
made them was or was not, at the time when they were 
made, under expectation of death, and whatever may 
be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of 
his death comes into question.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
757
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
26.1.	 Section 32 says that statements made by a person who is 
dead or who cannot be found etc., be it in written form or oral, 
are themselves relevant facts. As per situation(1), when the 
relevant facts relate to the cause of death, such a statement 
would be relevant whether the person who made it was or 
was not at the time of making the statement under expectation 
of death. Such a statement would be relevant whatever may 
be the nature of the proceedings in which the cause of his 
death comes into question. The relevancy is not confined to 
the cause of his death but also to the circumstances of the 
transaction which resulted in his death. 
27.	 In Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay1, this Court examined the 
principles governing acceptance of dying declaration. After examining 
the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and various judicial 
pronouncements, this Court laid down the following conclusions: 
(i)	
it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying 
declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it 
is corroborated;
(ii)	
each case must be determined on its own facts, keeping in view 
the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made;
(iii)	 it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying 
declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of 
evidence;
(iv)	 a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another 
piece of
evidence. It has to be judged in the light of surrounding 
circumstances and with reference to the principles governing 
weighing of evidence;
(v)	
a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent 
Magistrate in the proper manner stands on a much higher footing 
than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony 
which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and 
human character;
(vi)	 in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the court has 
to keep in view various circumstances including the condition 
1	
[1958] 1 SCR 552 : AIR 1958 SC 22
758
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
of the person concerned to make such a statement; that it has 
been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result 
of tutoring by interested parties. 
28.	 The above conclusions were reiterated by this Court in Paniben (Smt.) 
vs. State of Gujarat2. This Court declared that there is neither any 
rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be acted 
upon without corroboration. However, the court has to scrutinize the 
dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is 
not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination; the deceased 
should be in a fit and proper state to make the declaration. But once 
the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, 
it can base conviction on it without corroboration. 
29.	 This Court highlighted the significance of a dying declaration in 
Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam vs. State of Andhra Pradesh3. The 
general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. Unless 
the evidence tendered is tested by cross-examination, it is not 
creditworthy. However, Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an 
exception to this general rule. This Court observed as under:
18.            *              *              *              *              * 
A dying declaration made by person on the verge of his 
death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a 
person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The 
shadow of impending death
is by itself the guarantee of 
the truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding 
the causes or circumstances leading to his death. A dying 
declaration, therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, 
as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth 
of the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying 
person and the evidence of the witnesses testifying to the 
same passes the test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it 
becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence 
and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true 
and free from any embellishment such a dying declaration, 
by itself, can be sufficient for recording conviction even 
without looking for any corroboration. * * * * *
2	
[1992] 2 SCR 197 : (1992) 2 SCC 474
3	
[1993] 2 SCR 666 : (1993) 2 SCC 684
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
759
Rajendra S/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra
30.	 Elaborating further, this Court in Sher Singh vs. State of Punjab4 
held that acceptability of a dying declaration is greater because 
the declaration is made in extremity. When a party is on the verge 
of death, one rarely finds any motive to tell falsehood. It is for this 
reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are 
dispensed with in the case of a dying declaration. 
31.	 In Sudhakar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh5, this Court observed thus:
20. The “dying declaration” is the last statement made by a 
person at a stage when he is in serious apprehension of his 
death and expects no chances of his survival. At such time, 
it is expected that a person will speak the truth and only 
the truth. Normally in such situations the courts attach the 
intrinsic value of truthfulness to such statement. Once such 
statement has been made voluntarily, it is reliable and is not 
an attempt by the deceased to cover up the truth or falsely 
implicate a person, then the courts can safely rely on such 
dying declaration and it can form the basis of conviction. 
More so, where the version given by the deceased as 
dying declaration is supported and corroborated by other 
prosecution evidence, there is no reason for the courts to 
doubt the truthfulness of such dying declaration. 
32.	 When there are more than one dying declaration, this Court in 
Amol Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh6, clarified
that it is not the 
plurality of the dying declarations that matter. On the contrary, it is 
the reliability of a dying declaration which is significant. If there are 
inconsistencies between one dying declaration and the other, the 
court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, i.e., whether 
those are material or not. 
33.	 In Lakhan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh7, this Court held that where 
there are multiple dying declarations with inconsistencies between 
them, the court would have to scrutinize the facts very carefully and, 
thereafter, take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth 
reliance. 
4	
[2008] 2 SCR 959 : (2008) 4 SCC 265
5	
[2012] 7 SCR 128 : (2012) 7 SCC 569
6	
[2008] 8 SCR 956 : (2008) 5 SCC 468
7	
[2010] 9 SCR 705 : (2010) 8 SCC 514
760
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
34.	 Again, in Ashabai vs. State of Maharashtra8, this Court observed that 
when there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration 
has to be separately assessed and evaluated independently on 
their own merit as to the evidentiary value of each. One cannot be 
rejected merely because of certain variations in the other. 
35.	 As already discussed above, there is no reason for us to doubt 
the correctness of the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex. 59) 
which has been proved in evidence. Attending doctor has certified 
that the deceased was capable of narrating her statement. The 
substance of the dying declaration is also borne out by the medical 
history of the patient recorded by the doctor which has also been 
proved in evidence. Further, though there are inconsistencies and 
improvements in the version of the prosecution witnesses, there is 
however convergence with the core of the narration of the deceased 
made in the dying declaration and the medical history recorded by the 
doctor. That being the position, the evidence on record, particularly 
Ex. 59, clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant beyond all 
reasonable doubt. 
36.	 We are mindful of the fact that appellant is on bail since the year 
2016. Nevertheless, having sieved through the evidence carefully, we 
have no hesitation in our mind that appellant is guilty of committing 
the offence and that the guilt has been proved beyond all
reasonable 
doubt. 
37.	 In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed. Appellant is directed 
to surrender before the trial court within a period of two weeks from 
today to carry out his sentence. 
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
Result of the case: 
Appeal dismissed.
8	
[2013] 1 SCR 115 : (2013) 2 SCC 224