RAMACHANDRAN & ORS. versus VIJAYAN & ORS.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1013, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1013 : 2024 INSC 885
Ramachandran & Ors.
v.
Vijayan & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 2161 of 2012)
22 November 2024
[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose with respect to the devolution of property by way of 
Marumakkathayam law. Nature and character of the scheduled 
properties. Whether the property obtained by a female and her 
children after partition would be considered their separate property 
or would it belong to her tharwad; whether, in the present facts, 
‘PA’ had the legal right to transfer the entire property of her son 
to her daughter-in-law and grandchildren by way of a mortgage 
deed or was her right only limited to one-sixth of the property as 
contended by the original defendants.
Headnotes†
Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932 – ss.3(j)(i), 38 – 
‘thavazhi’ – The Travancore Nayar Regulation, II of 1100 – 
s.2(3) – Cochin Nayar Act, XXIX of 1113 – Parties governed 
by the Marumakkathayam law – Right of marumakkathayee 
female on partition – Whether the property obtained by a 
female and her children after partition would be considered 
their separate property or would it belong to her tharwad 
(a Marumakkathayam joint family comprising of a female 
ancestor, her children, her daughter’s children, her daughter’s 
daughter’s children and all such other descendants, however 
remote, in the female line):
Held: The minority opinion of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court 
in Mary Cheriyan case correctly holds that if at
the time of partition 
the female is single, she continues to hold the property as her own, 
even if she has children in the future – Partition alters the nature 
of the property from, at one point being jointly held property or 
tharwad to a property held solely by her – In order for a thavazhi 
(branches of tharwad) to be formed, there has to be at least one 
female and her successive generation, either male or female, in 
*Author
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the generation immediately succeeding and thereafter progeny 
of the female line – The majority view in Mary Cheriyan falters 
for in their understanding one single female is sufficient to form a 
thavazhi – ‘PA’ and her descendants formed a thavazhi and had 
received the scheduled properties under item No.1 collectively (two 
sets of scheduled properties being item No.1 and item No.2) – 
Further, the divergence of opinion between the minority and majority 
was in respect of single female(s) receiving property in partition 
which is not the case here – All five Judges were ad idem when 
it comes to property being received at partition by females and 
members of her thavazhi – Since the properties were received 
by the thavazhi and not by a woman who is single, the property 
is unquestionably tharwad property – The fact that branch 5 (‘PA’ 
and her children) held the property jointly is supported by the fact 
that the compromise deed, which granted them the said property, 
was never challenged – The appointment of one of the sons of ‘PA’ 
as karanavan also manifests the intention that the parties wished 
to jointly hold the property as tharwad – The original defendants’ 
reliance on the minority view is thus, misplaced as the difference 
of opinion was only with respect to inheritance by single females 
and not thavazhis – Though on the point of law, the minority view 
of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mary
Cheriyan case 
is upheld, on facts, the finding about which all five judges were 
ad idem applies – The pronouncement of law in this judgment to 
apply prospectively – Preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court 
and upheld by the High Court affirmed. [Paras 32, 43, 45-47, 58]
Marumakkathayam law – Devolution of property – Whether, in 
the present facts, ‘PA’ had the legal right to transfer the entire 
property of her son to her daughter-in-law and grandchildren by 
way of a mortgage deed or was her right only limited to one-sixth 
of the property as contended by the original defendants:
Held: ‘PA’, after the death of her son ‘P’, received the property in 
her own right – Apart from a few transactions, no other evidence 
was placed on record to prove that property was Putravakasha and 
not Marumakkathayam - ‘PA’ executed the mortgage deed in favour 
of her daughter-in-law and her minor children – The possession 
was given to the mortgagee and it was never redeemed – Trial 
Court held that as per the evidence on record the plaint schedule 
second item property also belonged to the tavazhy of ‘PA’ – Findings 
with respect to schedule properties in item No.2 concurred by High 
Court – Concurrent findings of fact not disturbed. [Paras 49, 53, 57]
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
Constitution of India – Article 136 – Exercise of power under, 
interference with concurrent findings of fact – When  – 
Discussed.
Marumakkathayam Customary Law – Concepts of – Discussed.
Words and Phrases – ‘Partition’ – Discussed – Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956.
Case Law Cited
Mary Cheriyan & Anr. v. Bhargavi Pillai Bhasura Devi & Anr, 
1967 SCC OnLine Ker 68 – minority view held correct.
Achuthan Nair v. Chinnamu Amma [1966] 1 SCR 454 : 1965 SCC 
OnLine SC 303; Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and Ors. 
[1951] 1 SCR 277 : 1951 SCC 136; Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jieu 
Thakur v. Pratapmal Bagaria [1951] 1 SCR 332 : AIR 1951 SCC 
214; Addagada Raghavamma And Anr v. Addagada Chenchamma 
[1964] 2 SCR 933 : 1964 AIR SC 136; Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. 
Mohd. Ibrahim Naina [1985] 2 SCR 102 : (1985) 1 SCC 251; Indira 
Kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor (1988) 2 SCC 488; Mithilesh Kumari & 
Anr vs Prem Behari Khare [1989] 1 SCR 621 : (1989) 2 SCC 95; 
Sardar Jogendra Singh v. State of U.P. (2008) 17 SCC 133; Guljar 
Singh v. Dy. Director (Consolidation) [2009] 5 SCR 1080 : (2009) 
12 SCC 590; Ghisalal v. Dhapubai [2011] 1 SCR 651 : (2011) 2 
SCC 298; Sukhbiri Devi & ors v. Union of India & Ors. [2022] 13 
SCR 523 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
K. Sreedhara Variar Marumakkathayam and Allied Systems of law 
in the Kerala State, First Edition, 1969; Advanced Law Lexicon, 
Third Edition; Travancore
Nayar Regulation.
List of Websites
https://www.merriam-webster.com/; https://www.collinsdictionary.
com/
List of Acts
Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932; The Travancore Nayar 
Regulation, II of 1100; Cochin Nayar Act, XXIX of 1113; Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956.
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List of Keywords
Marumakkathayam law; ‘tharwad’; ‘thavazhi’; ‘thavazhy’; 
‘karanavan’; Scheduled properties; Devolution of property; Partition; 
Separate property; Mortgage deed; Marumakkathayee female; 
Minority opinion; Majority opinion; ad idem; Jointly held property; 
Single females; Inheritance by single females; Putravakasha; 
tavazhy; Divergence of opinion; Hindu Law; Mitakshara school of 
law; Descendants; Ancestral joint family property; Coparcenary 
property; Prospectively.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2161 of 2012
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.08.2009 of the High Court 
of Kerala at Ernakulam in AS No.563 of 1999
Appearances for Parties
CS Vaidyanathan, Chitambaresh, Sr. Advs., A. Raghunath, Babu 
Malayil, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms Vishnu Shankar, Atul Shankar Vinod, Dileep Pillai, Kannan 
Gopal Vinod, M. P. Vinod, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
1.	
The instant appeal, preferred by the original defendants, assails the 
judgment dated 27.08.2009 passed by the High Court of Kerala in 
A.S. No. 563 of 1999 whereby the appeal was dismissed and the 
preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court in O.S.631/1999 was 
affirmed. 
MARUMAKKATHAYAM CUSTOMARY LAW - AN INTRODUCTION
2.	
The present appeal concerns the devolution of property by way 
of traditional Marumakkathayam law. Prior to delving into the 
legal
niceties, an understanding of certain foundation concepts is 
necessary.
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
3.	
The Hindu community being a vast and diverse community is governed 
by different schools of personal laws. Apart from the dominant 
Mitakshara school of law, some communities among Hindus have 
their own system of personal law like the Marumakkathayam law, the 
Nambudiri law or the Aliyasantana law. In the issue at hand, parties 
are admittedly governed by the Marumakkathayam law. With respect 
to Marumakkathayam law, this Court has stated in Achuthan Nair 
v. Chinnamu Amma1:
“6. …The said law [Marumakathayam law] governs a 
large section of people inhabiting the West-Coast of 
South India. “Marumakkathayam” literally means descent 
through sisters’ children. There is a fundamental difference 
between Hindu law and Marumakkathayam law in that, 
the former is founded on agnatic relationship while the 
latter is based on matriarchate. The relevant principles 
of Marumakkathayam law are well settled and, therefore, 
no citation is called for...”
4.	
Under this law, tharwad, thavazhi, karanavan are dominant concepts 
with respect to joint family. A tharwad is a Marumakkathayam joint 
family comprising of a female ancestor, her children, her daughter’s 
children, her daughter’s daughter’s children and all such other 
descendants, however remote, in the female line. By necessary 
exclusion, only the immediate male heir is part of the tharwad while 
his progeny are not. A person belongs to tharwad of his or her
mother 
only.2 Membership of a tharwad is acquired by virtue of birth alone 
and on death, his interest devolves upon the other members of the 
tharwad. Members of a tharwad do not have a fixed interest but a 
fluctuating one, subject to change as per the number of members of 
the tharwad. Unlike coparcenary in Mitakshara law which extends to 
three generations succeeding the last male holder of the property, 
the Marumakkathayam system gives equal rights to all persons, 
however remote.
1	
[1966] 1 SCR 454 : 1965 SCC OnLine SC 303
2	
K. Sreedhara Variar Marumakkathayam and Allied Systems of law in the Kerala State, First Edition, 1969
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5.	
A tharwad is a larger body which holds within itself many branches. 
These branches are known as thavazhi which is a group of 
descendants in the female line of a female common ancestor. A 
thavazhi can own properties, separate and distinct from tharwad 
properties. In other words, a marumakkathayee woman alongwith 
her children and further descendants, how low-soever, in a female 
line constitute thavazhi.
The concepts discussed above would be best explained by way of 
illustrations as under:
ILLUSTRATION :
A
AH
AD1
AD2
C
C1
C2
B
AS
AS1
A is married to AH. They have three children- two daughters, 
AD1 and AD2, and a son, AS. All members shown above with the 
exception of AS1 form the tharwad of A. This is in line with the 
matrilineal succession or in other words, the female being the ‘stock 
of descent’. AD2 with her children C, the daughter and B, the son 
and grandchildren C1 and C2 forms a thavazhi. 
6.	
A karanavan is a manager of a joint family property. It is the oldest 
male member of the family. However, this customary position does 
not exclude a woman from managing the affairs of the tharwad or 
thavazhi if no male member is capable of taking up the required duties. 
Under Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932, it is defined as under:
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
“ Section 3(c) ‘karanavan’ means the oldest male member 
of a tarwad or tavazhi, as the case may be, in whom 
the right to management of its properties vests or, in the 
absence of a male member, the oldest female member 
or where by custom or family usage the right to such 
management vests in the oldest female member, such 
female member;”
7.	
This Court explained the position of karanavan in Achuthan Nair 
v. Chinnamu Amma (supra)3:
“7. ..The management of a tarwad or tavazhi ordinarily 
vests in the eldest male member of the tarwad or tavazhi, 
as the case may be. But there are instances where the 
eldest female member of a tarwad or a tavazhi is the 
manager thereof. The male manager is called the karnavan 
and the female one, karnavati. A karnavati or karnavan 
is a representative of the tarwad or tavazhi and is the 
protector of the members thereof. He or she stands in a 
fiduciary relationship with the members thereof. … But it 
is settled law that if a property is acquired in the name 
of the karnavan, there is a strong presumption that it is a 
tarwad property and that the presumption must hold good 
unless and until it is rebutted by acceptable evidence.” 
(Emphasis supplied)
It is to be noted that, the position does not grant any special rights in 
the property and these rights standard part with any other member 
of the joint family. 
BRIEF FACTS
8.	
The facts which are necessary to dispose of the
appeal are presented 
hereinbelow. For ease of understanding, a chart representing the 
genealogy is produced:
3	
[1966] 1 SCR 454 : 1965 SCC OnLine SC 303

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1021
Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
9.	
The dispute relates to the property of one Parukutty Amma. Parukutty 
Amma had four children namely Karunakara Menon, Neelakanta 
Menon, Narayani Amma and Amukutty Amma. Narayani Amma 
had four children namely, Kamalakshy, Aravindakshy Amma, 
Ramachandran and Padmavathi Amma. The husband and children 
of one of these four, Padmavathi Amma, are the plaintiffs. All other 
children and grandchildren of Parukutty Amma are the defendants 
except Padmavathy Amma. The defendants, having concurrently 
lost before all the courts below, are appellants herein. For ease of 
reference, the parties shall be referred, as per their position before 
the Trial Court.
10.	 A suit for partition and separate possession (O.S. No.631/1993) 
was filed by Plaintiffs no. 1-8 against Defendants before the Addl. 
Sub Court, Ernakulam4 for dividing the plaint scheduled properties 
belonging to Andipillil Tharwad by metes and bounds into 16 
shares. Before us, the challenge pertains to two sets of scheduled 
properties- Item no.1 and Item no.2. Some preliminary understanding 
is required of how the properties subject matter of dispute came to 
be divided into two heads. 
10.1	Item No.1: The property is situated in Ponnurunni Desom of 
Poonithura village and was part of the erstwhile Cochin state. 
It was gifted by one Krishna Menon in favour of 11 members 
of the same tharwad vide gift deed no.1223/1099. One of the 
donees, Ayyappa Menon
filed a suit for partition5 of the said 
property against other donees. During the pendency of the 
suit, parties thereto entered into a compromise, and a partition 
deed giving effect to such compromise was executed dated 
1.11.1950. The property was divided amongst nine donees as 
two, namely, Ravunni Nair and Madhavi Amma had passed 
away and it was mutually allotted to five branches as shown 
below:-
4	
hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’
5	
(O.S.77/1125)
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Ayyapa 
Menon (Branch 1)
Parameswara 
Menon
(Branch 2)
Govinda
 Meon 
 (Branch 3)
Raghava 
Menon 
(Branch 4)
Branch 5 
Parukutty Amma and her children namely, 
Karunakara Menon, Neelakanda Menon, 
Narayani Amma and Ammukutty Amma
10.2	Item no.2: There was one Sankar Padmanabhan, on his demise, 
half of his property devolved on his wife, Parukutty Amma and 
their children; and another half on his mother, Parvathy Amma. 
His mother subsequently transferred her interest in the said 
property in favour of Parukutty Amma and her children through 
a mortgage deed.
TRIAL COURT
11.	 The Trial Court framed as many as eleven issues. Below is a tabulated 
representation of the eleven issues and their corresponding findings.
Sr. 
No.
Issue
Finding
Decision
1.
Whether the 
suit is time 
barred?
The plaintiffs can ignore the 
partition deeds since they 
are not binding on them, as 
execution of partition deeds by 
some of the members will not 
take away their right.
No
2.
Whether the 
suit is bad for 
non-joinder 
of necessary 
parties?
The assignees of a partition of 
the plaint schedule properties 
were impleaded as additional 
defendants after the issues were 
framed.
No
3.
Whether 
the plaint 
schedule 
first item 
property was 
the property 
of Andippillil 
Taravadu?
The executants of the partition 
deed formed a natural group of 
Marumakkathayees, that is, the 
matrilineal heirs, and this led to 
the conclusion that the property
was tharwad property.
Decided 
in 
FAVOUR 
of the 
Plaintiffs.
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
4.
Whether 
the Plaint 
Schedule 
second item 
property was 
the property 
of Andippillil 
Taravadu?
Property belonged to the 
thavazhi of Parvathy, as it 
was allotted to her and her 
son as per the recitals in the 
mortgage deed. The plaint 
schedule second item property 
thus belonged to the thavazhi 
of Parukutty Amma (through 
Parvathy’s son, Padmanabhan), 
as the property, obtained through 
a mortgage deed, was in the 
possession and enjoyment of the 
children of Parakutty Amma. 
Decided 
in 
FAVOUR 
of the 
Plaintiffs.
5.
Whether the 
alienations 
made by 
Neelakanta 
Menon are 
valid?
In Ammalu Amma and others v. 
Lakshmi Amma and other (1966 
KLT 32) a Full Bench of the High 
Court held that the undivided 
interest of a member of a 
thavazhi cannot be alienated. 
So the alienations made by 
Neelakanta Menon are void.
No
6.
Whether 
partition deed 
No.6143/1981 
is binding on 
the plaintiffs?
Both items 1 and 2 were 
thavazhi properties the partition 
deed executed by 3 members 
alone does not bind the other 
members of the thavazhi.
No
7.
Whether the 
alienations 
made by 
defendants 
1 and 2 are 
binding on the 
plaintiffs?
The executants of partition deed 
did not have exclusive title to the 
properties and that document 
is not binding on the other 
members of the thavazhi. Hence, 
the subsequent transactions are 
also not binding on the other 
members.
No
8.
Whether the 
alienation 
made by the 
8th
defendant 
is binding on 
the plaintiffs?
This transaction is also not 
binding on the other members 
of the thavazhi, as the property 
was a thavazhi property.
No

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9.
What is the 
share (if any) 
to which 
each of the 
co-owners 
is entitled 
in the plaint 
schedule 
properties?
Defendants 1 to 8 and plaintiffs 
1 to7 are entitled to 1/15 shares. 
1/15 
share
10.
What is the 
amount (if 
any) to which 
defendants 13 
and 15 to 17 
are entitled 
as value of 
improvements?
There is no evidence to 
show that they have made 
improvements to the properties 
thus, no relief can be granted 
to them even if there was any 
entitlement.
None
11.
What is the 
order as to 
costs?
--
Costs to 
be borne 
out of 
the 
estate.
12.	 It was concluded that the properties were tharwad property. A 
preliminary decree was passed allotting one share each to defendants 
1-7 and plaintiffs 2-8 and one share to defendants 9-14 altogether. 
The relevant extract reads thus:
“In the result, a preliminary decree is passed in the 
following terms :-
1.	
The plaint schedule properties will be divided by 
metes and bounds into 15 shares.
2.	
Defendants 1 to 7 and plaintiffs 2 to 8 are entitled 
to one share each. Additional defendants 9 to 14 
together are entitled to one share.
3.	
The plaintiffs will be put in possession of their joint 
7/15 share. 
4.	
The fifth defendant will be put in possession of her 
share.
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
5.	
The plaintiffs and fifth defendant are allowed to 
realize their share of income out of the shares of 
the other co-owners who will be liable proportionate 
to their shares. 
6.	
The quantum of the share of income will be decided 
in the final decree proceedings 
7.	
The costs shall come out of the estate”
13.	 For adjudication of the dispute before this Court, the findings returned 
in issues 3 and 4 are pertinent and the same are discussed in detail 
in the coming paragraphs. 
14.	 In respect of item No.1, it was held that even though there was no 
evidence as to the original source of the property gifted by Krishna 
Menon, but the fact that the partition deed was executed by a natural 
group of Marumakkatayees led to the conclusion that the property 
was tharwad property. Parukutty Amma and her children forming part 
of a thavazhi and therefore being entitled to the property as members 
of the fifth branch is strengthened by the fact that the fifth branch 
comprising them was mentioned in the partition deed as a branch 
of Karunakaran Menon who was the Karnavan of the thavazhy. As 
such the conclusion drawn was that the property under item No. 1 
was the thavazhi property of the fifth branch.
15.	 Issue no.4 before the Trial Court was in regard to item No.2. While 
answering in the affirmative, it was held that the said property would 
be tharwad property. Reasoning therefor was derived from the deed
executed by Parvathy Amma in favour of Parukutty Amma and her 
children. The deed records that the former became the absolute 
owner of the property once Sankaran Padmanabhan died. Having 
become the absolute owner, she executed the said mortgage deed. 
Since Parvathy Amma was the absolute owner, she transferred the 
said property to her daughter-in-law and her successors.
HIGH COURT
16.	 The High Court, qua item No.1, has held that the share allotted to a 
female on partition retains the tharwad characteristic. It further held 
that since after the passing away of Madhavi Amma and Ravunni 
Nair, two of the eleven persons upon whom the property originally 
devolved, it was divided amongst nine surviving co-donees in 1950.
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It is clear that even at this point in time, the method adopted for 
succession was in line with the property being thavazhi in nature. It 
also relied on the testimony of DW-1 who deposed that Parukutty 
Amma and her children were separated as one thavazhi in the 
above-mentioned partition of 1950.
17.	 Qua item No.2, it was observed:
“The document is in favour of Parukutty Amma and her 
minor children. This mortgage was never redeemed by 
Parvathy Amma. Under the Prestine Marumakkathayam 
Law acquisition of a property in the name of mother 
and children who form a natural group had always been 
presumed to be on behalf of the tavazhi and even the 
existence of an original nucleus was not considered 
essential.
…Since the acquirers under Ext.A2 mortgage namely 
Parukutty Amma and her minor children formed a natural 
group, the property would enure to all the members of the 
tavazhi of Parukutty Amma. It is pertinent in this connection 
to note that in Ext.B3 partition dated 28-10- 1981 as per 
which Karunakara Menon, Narayani Amma and Ammukutty 
Amma are alleged to have divided the property to the 
exclusion of the other tavazhi members including the 
plaintiffs, the title which is traced to plaint A schedule 
item No. 2 is ExtA2 mortgage and not ExtB 11 gift deed. 
This also re-inforces the plaintiffs’ case that this item was 
acquired by Parukutty Aroma and her children as per 
ExtA2 mortgage.”
and then concluded that
since the acquirers under mortgage deed, 
namely, Parukutty Amma and her children formed a natural group 
the property would enure to all the members of the thavazhy of 
Parukutty Amma. 
18.	 In terms of the above, the decree of the Trial Court stood confirmed 
by the High Court.
ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES
19.	 Learned Senior Counsel Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan for the original-
defendants/appellants submitted that the scheduled properties are
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
not thavazhy property. It is submitted that item No.1 is a co-ownership 
property and item No.2 is a Putravakasam property. In so far as 
scheduled properties under item No.1 are concerned, the learned 
senior counsel submitted that the minority view expressed by the 
full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mary Cheriyan & Anr. v. 
Bhargavi Pillai Bhasura Devi & Anr.6 should, in fact, be held as 
the correct view having regard to the difficulties of law noted by this 
Court in Achuthan Nair (supra).
20.	 For properties mentioned under item No.2, it is submitted that the 
property originally belonged to Kadangad Sankaran Padmanabhan 
and his mother could only execute gift deed as well as mortgage 
deed only to the extent of her own share and not the share of 
Padmanabhan. 
21.	 Learned Counsel Mr. M.P. Vinod for the original plaintiffs/respondents 
submitted that a new tharwad is formed when a female member 
and all her children jointly receive properties by gift from another 
Marumakathayee. With respect to item No.1, it is submitted that 
when a share was allotted to the natural thavazhy vide partition 
deed dated 01.11.1950, then such natural thavazhy will also have 
the characteristics of a tharwad property. For item No.2, reliance is 
placed on partition deed 6143/1981 wherein it is specifically stated 
that Parvathy Amma became the sole owner after the death of her 
son thus she could validly transfer her
share to Parukutty Amma 
and her children. 
ISSUES
22.	 We have gone through the detailed pleadings of the parties. The 
bone of contention is the nature and character of the scheduled 
properties. After carefully going through the pleadings, the following 
two questions require adjudication :
1.	
Whether the property obtained by a female and her children 
after partition would be considered their separate property or 
would it belong to her tharwad?
2.	
Whether, in the present facts, Parvathy Amma had the legal 
right to transfer the entire property of her son to her daughter-
6	
1967 SCC OnLine Ker 68
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in-law and grandchildren by way of a mortgage deed or was 
her right only limited to one-sixth of the property as contended 
by the original defendants?
APPRECIATION OF LAW
23.	 The case of plaintiffs is that scheduled properties being tharwad 
properties and they being members of the same are entitled to seek 
partition whereas defendants deny this claim. 
Issue 1
24.	 This issue deals with the right of marumakkathayee female on 
partition. Partition is a process by which joint ownership is reduced 
to individual ownership. It puts an end to the joint status, separating 
members who hold their respective shares, which, on their death, 
will devolve upon their heirs. Under mitakshara law, if a member 
continues to be joint with his own male issue then the share allotted 
to him retains the characteristic of coparcenary property. 
25.	 However, in Marumakkathayam law, as per the original defendants 
the position of law has been incorrectly settled. 
26.	 The answer to the first question (supra), was answered, favouring the 
latter by the majority of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Mary 
Cheriyan (supra) but since the original-defendants are placing their 
reliance on minority opinion, we deem it necessary and appropriate 
to discuss all opinions expressed therein. 
27.	 P.T. Raman Nayar, J., who penned the majority opinion, held that 
property obtained by a Nair female towards her share under an 
outright partition
in her tharwad continues to retain its character as 
tharwad property. He propounded that on partition, a tharwad breaks 
up into separate units with each unit a tharwad by itself, called a 
thavazhi. Indubitably, the members added to a multi-member unit 
are entitled to the property obtained by tharwad partition the moment 
they become members thereof. While placing the multi-member unit 
at par with a single-member unit, he observed that a single-member 
unit formed in a tharwad partition could add to its members by birth 
or adoption and thus become a joint family. Following this line of 
thought, he further opined that when a tharwad breaks up into units, 
the property allotted to a multi-member unit undisputedly shares the 
same character, so that members born into it thereafter get a right by
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
birth. And as such, a similar right must be given to a single sharer 
(female) in the partition. The nature of tharwad property retains its 
character in the hands of the divided units after partition, thereby 
securing rights in the said property for persons yet to be born. 
28.	 He further emphasized that, unlike Mitakshara law, which has a 
religious flair, Marumakkathayam law is read with a secular tone and 
thereby every member of a tharwad how low-so-ever in degree gets 
a right by birth, which extends even to the right by birth in property 
taken on partition. Under the Marumakkattayam system, “a female is 
a stock of descent while the male is not”, which is why the children 
of a sole male sharer get no right to the property obtained by him on 
the partition, whereas a sole female sharer has to take it as tharwad 
property in which she must concede a share to her children, if she 
gives birth to any. Further, reliance was placed on Section 38 of the 
Madras Marumakkathayam Act before its amendment in 1958, which 
clarifies in its explanation that a sole sharer in a partition whether a 
male or a female, takes the share with the incidents of tharwad property. 
29.	 However, the said opinion was not accepted by Govindan Nair, J., 
who observed that in Hindu Law, if ancestral joint family property 
is divided and a share taken by a father, a son born to that father 
after partition will only get an interest
in that property by birth. The 
son takes such an interest by birth only because it is ancestral and 
not by reason of the fact that the property was joint family property 
or because it has retained its character as joint property. When an 
individual member obtains a share for themselves, the property 
ceases to be joint property after partition, thereby changing the 
nature of the property. He differed with the interpretation of the 
majority opinion and by dissenting, opined that the statute enacted 
does not lay down or declare any general principle for the nature of 
property remaining a tharwad after the partition. The explanation to 
Section 38(2) of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932, before it 
was amended in 1958, only permitted a thavazhi partition and the 
absence of such an explanation in the Cochin Nayar Act, XXIX of 
1113, which was enacted after the Madras Marumakkathayam Act 
further proves the intent of legislation to change the nature of property 
after the partition. He rejected the principle of “once a tarwad always 
a tarwad” as an outmoded concept.
30.	 Another minority opinion was expressed by Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J., 
who propounded that property obtained by a Nair female towards
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her share vide partition in her tharwad continues to be her separate 
property, notwithstanding the birth of a child to the female after the 
date of the partition. The result of partition is to convert, what was 
originally joint family non-ancestral property, into separate property. 
Further, reliance was placed on Mitakshara school of Hindu Law, which 
distinguishes the character of the property obtained by a co- parcener 
in the division of ancestral property and the shares received in the 
division of joint family property, not being ancestral property.
OUR VIEW
31.	 We have perused the judgments professing both the majority and 
minority views. The main point of disagreement between three 
learned judges on one side and two on the other, pertains to the 
question as to whether a female who, at the time of partition did 
not have any heirs, retains such property as her own or as tharwad 
property which she would have to eventually part with in favour of 
her children or descendants. 
32.	 The majority, as is evident from the above, holds that a female 
who is single at the time of partition holds the property received in 
partition as tharwad by way of her being a single member thavazhi, 
thereby securing the right of persons who may become a member 
thereof either by way of adoption or birth in future. Per contra, the 
minority holds that if at the time of partition the female is single, she 
continues to hold the
property as her own, even if she has children 
in the future. This is for the reason that partition, by its very essence, 
alters the nature of the property from, at one point being jointly held 
property or tharwad to a property held solely by her. 
33.	 Having given anxious consideration to both views, we conclude that 
the minority has, in fact, understood the position correctly. Partition 
is an act by which the nature of the property is changed, reflecting 
an alteration in ownership. At this juncture, we may take note of how 
the word partition is defined:
"-	
to divide into parts or shares
-	
to divide (a place, such as a country) into two or 
more territorial units having separate political status7
….
7	
https://www.merriam-webster.com
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
1.	
a division into parts; separation
2.	
something that separates, such as a large screen 
dividing a room in two
3.	
a part or share
4.	
a division of a country into two or more separate 
nations
5.	
property law
a division of property, esp realty, among joint owners.8”
34.	 The Advanced Law Lexicon, Third Edition defines partition in the 
following terms:
“Partition is a division between co-owners (whether 
coparceners, joint-tenants in common) of lands, tenements 
and heriditaments held by them, the effect of such division 
being that the joint ownership is terminated, and the shares 
of the parties vested in them in severalty;
[in mitakshara law, it] is the adjustment of diverse rights 
regarding the whole by distributing them on particular 
portions of the aggregate.
Is a separation between joint owners or tenants in common 
of their respective interests in land, and setting apart such 
interest, so that they may enjoy and possess the same 
in severalty.”
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in the explanation to Section 6 
provides that a partition is a partition in terms of this Law if it is 
made by way of a partition deed recognised under the Registration 
Act, 1908 or by a decree of Court.
35.	 It may be that a parcel of land for instance, may at one time, be 
owned by fourteen people but after partition is affected between 
them, with two people wanting no longer to be associated, the size 
of the land owned
alongside the number of persons registered as 
owners both being reduced. What flows from this instance is that the 
two persons who separated from this collection of fourteen are now 
8	
https://www.collinsdictionary.com
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sole owners of their respective portions - the nature of the ownership 
being changed from joint to single. 
36.	 In the present context, the difference of opinion referred to above 
hinges on who may constitute a membership of a thavazhi. The majority 
says a single person can be a thavazhi whereas the minority says not. 
The Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932 under Section 3(j)(i) defines 
thavazhi (in context of females) as a group of persons consisting of 
that female, her children and all her descendants in the female line.
37.	 Similarly, The Travancore Nayar Regulation, II of 1100 under Section 
2(3) defines thavazhee of a female as a group of persons consisting 
of that female and her issue how-low-so-ever in the female line or 
such of that group as are alive. The same definition is employed in 
the Cochin Nayar Act, XXIX of 1113.
38.	 The common thread between the three definitions is that all of them 
refer to a group of persons, which includes the main female and 
her future generations. This necessarily implies that in order for 
a thavazhi to be formed, there has to be at least one female and 
her successive generation, either male or female, in the generation 
immediately succeeding and thereafter progeny of the female line. 
39.	 The majority, here in our view, falters for in their understanding one 
single female is sufficient to form a thavazhi. For the reason above 
discussed and another which we shall
come to in the following 
paragraphs, we are unable to agree with this view.
40.	 The second reason is the amendment to Section 38 of the 
Marumakkattayam Act, 1932 (Madras) carried out in 1958. The same 
is reproduced hereunder:
Prior to Amendment by Act 26 of 1958 :
“38.(1) Any tavazhi represented by the majority of its major 
members may claim to take its share of all the properties 
of the tarwad over which it has power of disposal and 
separate from the tarwad:
Provided that no tavazhi shall claim to be divided 
from the tarwad during the lifetime of an ancestress 
common to such tavazhi and to any other tavazhi 
or tavazhis of the tarwad except with the consent of 
such ancestress, if she is a member of the tarwad.
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(2) The share obtained by the tavazhi shall be taken by 
it with the incidents of tarwad property.
Explanation — For the purpose of this Chapter, a male 
member of a tarwad or a female member thereof without 
any living child or descendant in the female line, shall be 
deemed to be a tavazhi if he or she has no living female 
ascendant who is a member of the tarwad.”
Post Amendment
“38. Right of member of tarwad or tavazhi to claim 
partition. - Any member of a tarwad or tavazhi may claim 
to take his or her share of all the properties of the tarwad 
or tavazhi over which the tarwad or tavazhi has power of 
disposal and separate from the tarwad or tavazhi.
Explanation 1.- Nothing in this section shall be a bar for 
two or more members belonging to the same tarwad or 
tavazhi claiming their shares of the properties and enjoying 
the same jointly with all the incidents of tarwad property.
Explanation 2.- The member or members who claim 
partition under this section or the member who claims or 
is compelled to take his or her shares under section 39 
shall be entitled to such share or shares of the tarwad 
or tavazhi properties as would fall to such member or 
members, if a division Per Capita were made among the 
members of the tarwad or tavazhi then living.
Explanation 3.- The provisions of the section shall apply to 
a tarwad notwithstanding the fact that immediately before 
the commencement of the Madras
Marumakkattayam 
(Amendment) Act, 1958, the tarwad was included in 
the Schedule or that the tarwad had been registered as 
impartible. 
Explanation 4.- The provisions of this section shall apply 
to all suits for partition, appeals and other proceedings 
arising therefrom filed or proceeded with by members 
or their legal representatives and pending in the Courts 
immediately before the commencement of the Madras 
Marumakkattayam (Amendment) Act, 1958, and such
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suits, appeals and other proceedings shall be disposed 
of in accordance with the provisions of this section as if 
this section were in force at the time of the institution of 
such suits, appeals and other proceedings.”
41.	 The majority placed its reliance on the pre-amendment version 
whereunder by virtue of sub-section (2) the position of law was that 
the share obtained by a thavazhi shall be taken by it with all incidents 
of it being a tharwad property. The above-mentioned amendment 
removes the contents of sub-section (2) which demonstrates 
legislative intent to change the existing position of law. That apart, per 
the discussion made above, a single person cannot form a thavazhi 
and, therefore, even the unamended section 38 cannot be read to 
be placing an obligation upon a single female inheriting property by 
way of partition, to hold it as tharwad property. We are in complete 
agreement with what Govindan Nair, J., observed in Para 56 of his 
dissenting judgment, which reads thus :
“56. The same rule cannot apply to the case of an individual 
member who obtain his share for himself. The property 
in such cases ceases to be joint property after partition. 
What really happens on partition is that the joint nature 
of the property is destroyed. I conceive that right by birth 
can be taken in property by a Marumakkathayee only if 
that property at the time of his birth was joint property. The 
property allotted
to a roup will be joint property and so 
children born in that group who normally take an interest 
in tarwad property acquire an interest in the property 
allotted to the group. But the same cannot be said when 
an individual member holds property, for such property 
has ceased to be joint property. On partition (forgetting for 
the moment those groups who take jointly) what happens 
is the destruction of the joint nature of the property. This 
happens even when there is only a division in status.”
42.	 Encapsulating the above discussion with reference to the illustration 
given earlier, it follows that neither the majority nor the dissenting 
Judges of the Full Bench have any qualms with the fact that upon 
partition AD2 would hold the property as tharwad property, thereby 
protecting the interest of C, B and other future generations. The 
disagreement stems when the devolution of property on partition 
upon AD1 is considered. The majority held that AD1 would become
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
a single-member thavazhi and hold the property received by her as 
tharwad property protecting the interests of any children which, she 
may have in the future whereas the dissenting Judges held that 
since at the time of devolution AD1 did not have any children, she 
would acquire the property only in her own right.
43.	 Turning our attention back to the instant facts, it is not in dispute that 
Parukutty Amma and her descendants formed a thavazhi and had 
received the scheduled properties under item No.1 collectively. As 
we have already noticed above, the divergence of opinion between 
the minority and majority was in respect of single female(s) receiving 
property in partition. That obviously is not the case here. All five 
Judges appear to be ad idem when it comes to property being 
received at partition by females and members of her thavazhi. Since 
the properties were received by the thavazhi and not by a woman 
who is single, the property is unquestionably tharwad property. Para 
55 of the dissenting view expressed by Govindan Nair, J. captures as 
to how groups inherit property post-partition and how such property 
continues to hold tharwad characteristics. It runs as under:
“55. It is true that a tarwad need not always break up into 
its ultimate components; there may be branch divisions 
or some members may continue joint and continue to 
hold property and there may be several such groups and 
there can
be a mixture of individuals holding property 
obtained on partition along with groups who hold jointly 
property allotted to each of those groups. The distinction 
to notice is that those groups hold property allotted to each 
group jointly. No member of that group has any separate 
interest which he can claim as his own. His interests in the 
property allotted to the group is of an identical nature as 
the interests he had in the entire tarwad property before 
partition. In other words, the group holds the property with 
all the incidents of tarwad property as joint property. It is 
because property is so held as joint tarwad property that 
future tarwad members born in that group take an interest 
in the property allotted to that group.”
(Emphasis supplied)
44.	 Since there is no difference of opinion in this regard and further 
since the case before us is the inheritance of property by a group
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(branch 5), it falls in the second category (i.e. the category about 
which there is no dispute) no question arises as to determining the 
correctness of the view expressed, as is desired for us to do by the 
original-defendants. 
45.	 Another aspect raised in connection with properties under item 
No.1 is that the property in question is held by co-owners and 
is not tharwad in nature. In our view, the High Court is correct 
in dismissing such an argument for, had it indeed been property 
co-owned, the heirs of the two deceased donees, Madhavi Amma 
and Ravunni Nair, would have also inherited their respective 
shares. However, across all judicial fora the fact that the property 
devolved upon nine co-donees as opposed to eleven, as it was 
originally intended, has remained undisturbed. We find no reason 
to take a different view. Our conclusion that branch 5 held the 
property jointly is supported by the fact that the compromise deed, 
which granted them the said property, was never challenged before 
any Court of law. The parties consisting the 5th branch are : – Parukutty 
Amma and her children, namely, 5-Karunaka Menon, 6-Neelakanda 
Menon, 7-Parukutty herself, 8-Narayani Amma and 9-Ammukutty 
Amma. This branch is known by the name of Karunakara Menon, 
who is one of the sons of Parukutty Amma as shown by the following 
words:
‘A scheduled item No.5 having value of Rs.750 and B 
schedule item no.3,4,5 debt is allotted
to the share of 5th 
branch Karunakara Menon and others and the separate 
allocated share is taken possession by each branches…’ 
46.	 The appointment of Karunakara Menon as karnavan manifests 
the intention that the parties wished to jointly hold the property as 
tharwad. Karanavan, as eluded to earlier, is the manager of a joint 
family property similar in position to karta, however, not exactly the 
same. The person appointed to such a position is generally the eldest 
male member of the thavazhi. 
47.	 In terms of the above conclusion, it appears that the original 
defendants’ reliance on the minority view may be misplaced 
as, at the cost of repletion, we may state that the difference of 
opinion was only with respect to inheritance by single females 
and not thavazhis.
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
Issue 2
48.	 Now adverting to the next issue, learned counsel for the petitioners 
make claim that the property under item No.2 is not governed by 
Marumakkathayam law but instead it is a puthravakasam property 
belonging to one Padmanabhan. The said fact is disputed by 
record as in a mortgage deed No.3181 executed by the mother of 
Padmnabhan, Parvathy Amma in favour of Purukutty Amma and her 
children, it is clearly stated that:
“The property described in the schedule is assigned in my 
favour as Pandaravaka puthuval pattom and I obtained 
pattayam and accordingly myself and son deceased 
Padmanabhan along with other branch members have 
executed partition deed…… and accordingly myself and 
the said Padmanabhan had obtained possession and 
after the death of Padmanabhan his every right over the 
property is inherited by me.”
(Emphasis supplied)
49.	 The above-extracted portion shows that Parvathy Amma, after 
the death of her son Padmanabhan, received the property in her 
own right. Apart from a few transactions, no other evidence was 
placed on record to prove that property was Putravakasha and not 
Marumakkathayam. Parvathy Amma executed the mortgage deed in 
favour of her daughter-in-law and her minor children. The possession 
was given to the mortgagee and it was never redeemed.
50.	 Learned Counsel for the petitioners also rely on partition deed 
No.6143/1981 executed by children of Padmanabhan and
Parukutty 
Amma to hold that partition took place as putravaksham property 
but we find this argument misplaced. A relevant extract of the deed 
is reproduced below :
“ Properties acquired in Survey 573 of Punnurunny Desom 
Poonithura Village by virtue of Document No. 1492/1950 
of Thrippunithura SRO. (Book 1 Volume 600 Pages 389 
onwards) and in Survey 691/2.690/1C of Vattekkunnam 
Kara Thrikkakara North Village by virtue of Document No. 
3177/1096 of Alangad SRO. Were acquired by us along 
with our brother Late. Neelakandamenon alias Appu and
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mother Parukutty Amma and was in the joint possession 
and living together..….After the death of our mother 
Parukutty Amma, all her rights are vested on us and the 
said properties are in the joint possession of us and we 
decided to partition….”
(Emphasis supplied)
51.	 A perusal of this deed shows that the said properties were acquired 
by them through different documents but nowhere it states that it 
devolved upon them after death of their father. 
52.	 It is further pleaded that on the death of Padmanbhan, his wife and 
each of the children got an equal share by virtue of Section 22(1) of 
the Travancore Act as the said section deals with property acquired 
by gift or bequest from husband or father. No evidence is placed on 
record to show that the said property was gifted by Padmanbhan 
to his wife or children. 
53.	 The Trial Court in regard to these properties (item No.2) held that: 
“19. The second item property allegedly belonged to the 
tavazih of Parukutty Amma, the plaintiff’s predecessor, 
as per document No.3181/1096. The contention is 
that property belonged to Parukutty Am ma’s husband, 
Sankaran Padmanabhan of Kadangat taravadu, and not 
to Andippillil taravadu and the plaintiffs have no right over 
it. Padmanabhan and Parukutty Amma were the parents 
of deceased Neelakanda Menon and defendants 1,7 and 
8. It is contended that Neelakanda Menon and defendants 
1, 7 and 8 became entitled to the property as
the legal 
heirs of their parents.
20. Ext. A2 Mortgage Deed is the document relied on by 
the plaintiffs. It is seen from the recitals in the document 
that the plaint schedule second item property was allotted 
to the share of Parvathy and her son Padmanabhan, 
husband of Parukutty Amma, in a partition and on the 
death of Padmanabhan Parvathy became its exclusive 
owner. It means that the property belonged to the tavazhy 
of Parvathy. It is mentioned in the document that Parukutty 
Amma of Andippillil tarvadu had been given possession 
of this item of property even before the execution of
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Ramachandran & Ors. v. Vijayan & Ors.
Ext. A2 mortgage deed Parukutty Amma was the great 
grandmother of the plaintiffs.
In 1116 M.E. Parukutty Amma’s son Neelakanda Menon 
executed a document in favour of his brother Karunakara 
Menon the 8th defendant in respect of this property. Ext. 
B1 is a copy of the registered deed. In the document it is 
mentioned that the property was obtained as per Ext. A2 
mortgage deed and it was in the possession and enjoyment 
of the children of Parukutty Amma. So this document 
confirms that Neelakanda Menon and other claimed right 
over the property only under Ext. A2 mortgage deed. In 
1981 the children of Parukutty Amma executed Ext. B3 
partition deed dividing the plaint schedule 2nd item property 
amongst themselves. The recitals in this document prove 
that they claimed right over the property only under Ext A2 
mortgage deed (the -number of the document is wrongly 
shown as 3177). So the executants of Ext. B3 partition 
deed do not claim to have obtained right over the property 
independent of Ext. A2 mortgage deed. The contention of 
the defendants that the property belonged to Sankaran 
Padmanbhan is correct only to an extent; he had right 
only as a member of the marumakkathayam tavazhy 
of his mother. When Sankaran Padmanabhan died his 
mother, Parvathy, became its absolute owner. She put it 
in the possession of Parukutty Amma and later executed 
Ext. A2 mortgage deed. The plaintiffs are descendants of
Parukutty Amma in the female line. The evidence proves 
that the plaint schedule second item property also belonged 
to the tavazhy of Parukutty Amma.” 
54.	 The observations of the High Court are already reflected in Para 16 
of this judgment. 
55.	 It is evident from the above that findings with respect to schedule 
properties in item No.2 are concurrent. This Court has reiterated many 
times9 that concurrent findings of fact are not to be generally interfered 
9	
Srinivas Ram Kumar vs. Mahabir Prasad and Ors. 1951 SCC 136; Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jieu Thakur 
v. Pratapmal Bagaria, AIR 1951 SCC 214; Addagada Raghavamma And Anr v. Addagada Chenchamma 
1964 AIR SC 136; Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina (1985) 1 SCC 251; Indira Kaur v. 
Sheo Lal Kapoor (1988) 2 SCC 488; Mithilesh Kumari & Anr vs Prem Behari Khare (1989) 2 SCC 95;
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with unless special circumstances are shown warranting such 
interference. The scenarios in which exercise of power under Article 
136 of the Constitution of India would be proper, non- exhaustively, 
can be culled out as thus:
55.1	Interference in concurrent findings has been termed justified 
if the finding -
a)	
recorded does not emanate from the pleadings;
b)	
is foreign to or entirely divorced from the evidence on 
record;
c)	
is reached on the basis of the evidence which is irrelevant 
or extraneous and material evidence is ignored affecting 
its sanctity;
d)	
runs contrary to any provision of law;
e)	
is such that a reasonable judicial mind could not have 
arrived at it and/or the same is arbitrary;
f)	
arrived at is perverse and the soundness of reason is 
compromised.
55.2	Apart from the above-mentioned scenarios, a Court would also 
be justified in interfering with findings concurrent in nature if it 
is of the view that they cause undue hardship to the parties.
55.3	Additionally, when the findings are such that the conscience of 
the court is shocked, interference would be called for.
56.	 While the above are some contexts in which the Court may exercise 
its plenary power, the following overarching principles should always 
be considered prior to delving into such exercise:
56.1	The power has to be used sparingly and only when grave 
injustice is being caused to the parties of the dispute;
56.2	The burden of
proof to show that concurrent findings are unjust, 
warranting interference by this Court is on the appellant. 
Sardar Jogendra Singh v. State of U.P. (2008) 17 SCC 133; Guljar Singh v. Dy. Director (Consolidation) 
(2009) 12 SCC 590; Ghisalal v. Dhapubai (2011) 2 SCC 298; Sukhbiri Devi & ors v. Union of India & Ors. 
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322
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56.3	Interference would not be warranted merely because in a given 
set of facts, a view different from the one which stands taken 
by the courts below, is possible.
56.4	It is not within the realm of practicality that all possibilities be 
mapped out, as to when invocation of this power would be 
felicitous. The court has to take such a call having employed 
its wisdom, reason and judicial thought. 
57.	 The above discussion on when interference in concurrent findings of 
fact will be justified demonstrates that while keeping in view the factors 
discussed in Para 51, any of the situations mentioned in Para 50 or 
other such similar situations, have to be met. In the present facts, we 
are of the considered view that none of the above scenarios appear 
to be so met. In that view of the matter, the findings of fact in respect 
of scheduled properties under item No.2 remain undisturbed.
58.	 The question of law, i.e., the difference of opinion between the 
majority and minority in Mary Cheriyan (supra) is resolved holding 
that the minority posited the correct view. However, it is clarified that 
the pronouncement of law in this judgment shall apply prospectively. 
For the purposes of ample clarity, we state that any transaction 
concluded or ongoing will not be disturbed by way of this judgment 
and the position of law as stated herein shall apply only henceforth. 
59.	 In conclusion, even though we have, on the
point of law upheld the 
minority view of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, in the facts 
of the present case, the finding about which all five judges were 
ad idem applies. The views of the Trial Court and the High Court 
therefore requires no interference by this Court. 
60.	 Appeal stands dismissed. The preliminary decree passed by the Trial 
Court and upheld by the High Court is affirmed. The Trial Court to 
proceed further as per law.
61.	 No costs.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey