KOLKATA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ANR. versus BIMAL KUMAR SHAH & ORS
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 831, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
* Author
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 831 : 2024 INSC 435
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. 
v. 
Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024)
16 May 2024
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
State Municipal Corporation having claimed to have acquired the 
property of respondent-land bearer in exercise of powers u/s.352 
of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, the High Court, 
if justified in holding that there was no such power of compulsory 
acquisition of immovable property u/s.352 of the Act.
Headnotes†
Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 – s. 352 – Power to 
acquire lands and buildings for public streets and for public 
parking places – Interpretation of s. 352 – If there is power of 
compulsory acquisition of immovable property u/s. 352 – On 
facts, Kolkata Municipal Corporation claims to have acquired 
the property of respondent-land bearer in exercise of powers 
u/s. 352 – Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court 
concurrently held that there was no such power of compulsory 
acquisition of immovable property u/s. 352 – Interference with:
Held: Not called for – Scheme of the Act makes it clear that s. 352 
empowers the Municipal Commissioner to identify the land required 
for the purpose of opening of public street, square, park, etc. and u/s. 
537, the Municipal Commissioner has to apply to the Government 
to compulsorily acquire the land – Upon such an application, the 
Government may, in its own
discretion, order proceedings to be 
taken for acquiring the land – s. 352 is thus, not the power of 
acquisition – It cannot be said that s. 352 enables the Municipal 
Commissioner to acquire land – s. 352 is only intended to enable 
the Municipal Commissioner to decide whether a land is to be 
acquired for public purpose – Power of acquisition is in fact vested 
with the State u/s. 537 and it will exercise it, in its own discretion, 
whenever the Municipal Commissioner makes an application to that 
effect – s. 363 is not a provision for compensation for compulsory 
acquisition – Valid power of acquisition coupled with the provision
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for fair compensation by itself would not complete and exhaust the 
power and process of acquisition – Prescription of the necessary 
procedures, before depriving a person of his property is an integral 
part of the ‘authority of law’, u/Art. 300A and, s. 352 of the Act 
contemplates no procedure whatsoever – Thus, the exercise of 
the power is illegal, illegitimate and caused great difficulty to the 
respondent-land-bearer – Single Judge held that the appellant-
Corporation acted in blatant violation of statutory provisions – High 
Court justified in rejecting the case of the Corporation acquiring 
land u/s. 352 – Costs quantified at Rs. 5,00,000/- to be paid to the 
respondent no. 1-land bearer. [Paras 22, 23, 32-35]
Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 – Scheme of the Act – 
Explained. [Paras 14-23]
Constitution of India – Art. 300 A – Right to property – Net of 
intersecting rights – Seven sub-rights or procedures to right 
to property:
Held: Under the constitutional scheme, compliance with a fair 
procedure of law before depriving any person of his immovable 
property is well entrenched – Art 300A which declares that “no 
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law” 
has been characterised both as a constitutional and also a human 
right – Twin conditions of the acquisition being for a public purpose 
and subjecting the divestiture to the payment of compensation 
in lieu of acquisition were
mandated – Although not explicitly 
contained in Art 300A, these twin requirements have been read in 
and inferred as necessary conditions for compulsory deprivation 
to afford protection to the individuals who are being divested of 
property – Furthermore, binary reading of the constitutional right 
to property must give way to more meaningful renditions, where 
the larger right to property is seen as comprising intersecting 
sub-rights, each with a distinct character but interconnected to 
constitute the whole – Seven such sub-rights can be identified, 
albeit non-exhaustive – These are, the right to notice; the right 
to be heard; the right to a reasoned decision; the duty to acquire 
only for public purpose; the right of restitution or fair compensation; 
the right to an efficient and expeditious process; and the right of 
conclusion – These seven rights are foundational components of 
a law that is tune with Art. 300A, and the absence of one of these 
or some of them would render the law susceptible to challenge – 
These seven sub-rights may be procedures, but they do constitute
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the real content of the right to property u/Art. 300A, non-compliance 
of these would amount to violation of the right, being without the 
authority of law – Seven principles are integral to the authority of 
law enabling compulsory acquisition of private property – Union 
and State statutes have adopted these principles and incorporated 
them in different forms. [Paras 24-29]
Constitution of India – Art. 300 A – Right to property – 
Compulsory acquisition of immovable property – Principle of 
right to notice – Importance of:
Held: Prior notice informing the bearer of the right that the State 
intends to deprive them of the right to property is a right in itself – 
Its a linear extension of the right to know embedded in Art. 19(1)
(a) – Constitution does not contemplate acquisition by ambush – 
Notice to acquire must be clear, cogent and meaningful – s. 4 of 
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, s. 3(1) of the Requisitioning and 
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, s. 11 of the Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Act, 2013, and s. 3A of the National Highways 
Act, 1956 reflect statutory incorporation of the right to notice before 
initiation of the land acquisition proceedings. [Para 30.1]
Constitution of India – Art. 300 A – Right to property – 
Compulsory acquisition of immovable property – Principle of 
right to be heard
– Importance of:
Held: Right to be heard against the proposed acquisition must 
be meaningful and not a sham – Property-bearer has right to 
communicate his objections and concerns to the authority acquiring 
the property – s. 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, s. 3(1) of the 
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, s. 
15 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and s. 3C 
of the National Highways Act, 1956, are the statutory embodiments 
of this right. [Para 30.2]
Constitution of India – Art. 300 A – Right to property – 
Compulsory acquisition of immovable property – Principle of 
right to a reasoned decision – Importance of:
Held: It is incumbent upon the authority to take an informed decision 
and communicate the same to the objector – Authorities have 
heard and considered the objections is evidenced only through 
a reasoned order – Declaration of the decision to acquire, is
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mandatory, failing which, the acquisition proceedings would cease 
to have effect – s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, s. 3(2) of the 
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, s. 
19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and s. 3D of 
the National Highways Act, 1956, are the statutory incorporations 
of this principle. [Para 30.3]
Constitution of India – Art. 300 A – Right to property – 
Compulsory acquisition of immovable property – Principle of 
duty to acquire only for public purpose – Importance of:
Held: Acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an 
important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire – This 
requirement, which conditions the purpose of acquisition must 
stand to reason with the larger constitutional goals of a welfare 
state and distributive justice – If the court arrives at a conclusion 
that that there is no public purpose involved in the acquisition, 
the entire process can be set-aside – ss. 4 and 6 of the Land 
Acquisition Act, 1894, ss. 3(1) and 7(1) of the Requisitioning and 
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, ss. 2(1), 11(1),15(1)
(b) and 19(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and 
s. 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 depict the statutory 
incorporation of the public
purpose requirement of compulsory 
acquisition. [Para 30.4]
Constitution of India – Art. 300 A – Right to property – 
Compulsory acquisition of immovable property – Principle 
of right of restitution or fair compensation – Importance of:
Held: Person’s right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part to 
the constitutional right u/Art 300A – Deprivation or extinguishment 
of that right is permissible only upon restitution, in the form of 
monetary compensation, rehabilitation or other similar means – 
Compensation is an integral part of the process of acquisition – 
Fair and reasonable compensation is the sine qua non for any 
acquisition process – s. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, 
ss. 8 and 9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable 
Property Act, 1952, s. 23 of the Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Act, 2013, and ss. 3G and 3H of the National Highways Act, 1956 
are the statutory incorporations of the right to restitute a person 
whose land has been compulsorily acquired. [Para 30.5]
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Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
Constitution of India – Art. 300 A – Right to property – 
Compulsory acquisition of immovable property – Principle of 
right to an efficient and expeditious process – Importance of:
Held: Acquisition process is traumatic for the administrative 
delays in identifying the land, conducting the enquiry and 
evaluating the objections, leading to a final declaration, consume 
time and energy – Further, passing of the award, payment of 
compensation and taking over the possession are equally time 
consuming – It is necessary for the administration to be efficient 
in concluding the process and within a reasonable time – This 
obligation must necessarily form part of Art. 300A – ss. 5A(1), 
6, 11A, and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ss. 6(1A) and 
9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property 
Act, 1952, ss. 4(2), 7(4), 7(5), 11(5), 14, 15(1), 16(1), 19(2), 25, 
38(1), 60(4), 64 and 80 of the Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Act, 2013 and ss. 3C(1), 3D(3) and 3E(1) of the National Highways 
Act, 1956, prescribe for statutory frameworks for the completion 
of individual steps in the process of acquisition of land within 
stipulated timelines. [Para 30.6]
Constitution of India – Art. 300 A – Right to property – 
Compulsory acquisition of immovable property – Principle of 
right of conclusion – Importance of:
Held: Upon conclusion of process of acquisition and payment of 
compensation, the State takes possession of the property in normal 
circumstances – With the taking over of actual possession after the 
normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested and 
the right, title and interest in the property, along-with possession 
is vested in the State – Without final vesting, the State’s, or its 
beneficiary’s right, title and interest in the property is inconclusive 
and causes lot of difficulties – After taking over possession, the 
process of land acquisition concludes with the vesting of the land 
with the concerned authority – Obligation to conclude and complete 
the process of acquisition is also part of Article 300A – s. 16 of the 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ss. 4 and 5 of the Requisitioning and 
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, ss. 37 and 38 of the 
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and ss. 3D and 3E of 
the National Highways Act, 1956, statutorily recognise this right of 
the acquirer. [Para 30.7]
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Case Law Cited
State of Kerala v. T.N. Peter [1980] 3 SCR 290 : (1980) 3 SCC 
554; Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra [2011] 3 SCR 
1 : (2011) 3 SCC 1; Bankatlal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 
[2014] 7 SCR 879 : (2014) 15 SCC 116; Nagpur Improvement Trust 
v. Vithal Rao [1973] 3 SCR 39 : (1973) 1 SCC 500; Lachhman 
Dass v. Jagat Ram [2007] 2 SCR 980 : (2007) 10 SCC 448; Vidya 
Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2020] 1 SCR 749 : (2020) 
2 SCC 569; State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar 
Singh of Darbhanga [1952] 1 SCR 889  : (1952) 1 SCC 528; 
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai 
[2005] Supp. 3 SCR 388 : (2005) 7 SCC 627; K.T. Plantation Pvt. 
Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [2011] 13 SCR 636 : (2011) 9 SCC 1; 
Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P. [1970] 3 SCR 278 : (1970) 1 
SCC 125; State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib [1973] 1 SCR 
856 : (1973) 3 SCC 196; Narinderjit Singh and Ranjit Singh v. 
State of U.P. [1973] 2 SCR 698 : (1973) 1 SCC 157; Competent 
Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory [2005] Supp. 5 SCR 421 : 
(2005) 13 SCC 477; Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. [1964] 
3 SCR 425 : AIR (1964) SC 1217; Union of India v. Shiv Raj 
[2014] 8 SCR 751 : (2014) 6 SCC 564; Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. 
v. State of W.B. [2011] 13 SCR 529 : (2012) 2 SCC 25; Gojer 
Bros. (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [2013] 12 SCR 489 : (2013) 16 
SCC 660; Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India
[1996] Supp. 8 SCR 569 : (1997) 9 SCC 132; Project Director, 
Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy [2020] 14 
SCR 86  : (2021) 3 SCC 572; Somawanti v. State of Punjab 
(1962) SCC OnLine SC 23; Daulat Singh Surana v. First Land 
Acquisition Collector [2006] Supp. 8 SCR 1076 : (2007) 1 SCC 
641; Union of India v. Jaswant Rai Kochhar [1996] 3 SCR 206 : 
(1996) 3 SCC 491; D. Hanumanth SA v. State of Karnataka [2010] 
12 SCR 1098 : (2010) 10 SCC 656; Munshi Singh v. Union of 
India [1973] 1 SCR 973 : (1973) 2 SCC 337; Madhya Pradesh 
Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi [1992] 1 SCR 657 : (1992) 2 
SCC 168; State of U.P. v. Manohar [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 911 : 
(2005) 2 SCC 126; M. Naga Venkata Lakshmi v. Visakhapatnam 
Municipal Corpn. [2007] 10 SCR 12 :(2007) 8 SCC 748; NHAI v. 
P. Nagaraju [2022] 8 SCR 1070 :(2022) 15 SCC 1; Roy Estate 
v. State of Jharkhand [2009] 7 SCR 343 : (2009) 12 SCC 194; 
Union of India v. Mahendra Girji (2010) 15 SCC 682; Mansaram v.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
837
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
S.P. Pathak [1984] 1 SCR 139 : (1984) 1 SCC 125; Kerala State 
Housing Board v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. [1994] Supp. 2 SCR 
338 : (1994) 5 SCC 672; Ram Chand v. Union of India [1993] 
Supp. 2 SCR 558 : (1994) 1 SCC 44; Ambalal Purshottam v. 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. [1968] 3 SCR 207 : (1968) 3 SCR 
207; Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P. [1976] 3 SCR 1 : (1976) 1 
SCC 843; State of W.B. v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd. 
[2002] 2 SCR 557 : (2002) 4 SCC 134; Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar 
v. State of Gujarat [1994] 1 SCR 807:1995 Supp 1 SCC 596; 
P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P. [1994] Supp. 2 SCR 426 : (1994) 
5 SCC 486; Delhi Development Authority v. Reena Suri [2016] 
2 SCR 396 : (2016) 12 SCC 649; Fruit & Vegetable Merchants 
Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust [1957] 1 SCR 1 :1956 SCC 
OnLine SC 37; Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [2019] 13 SCR 
49 : (2019) 9 SCC 304 – referred to.
Sweet v. Rechel, 159 US 380 (1895) : 40 L.Ed. 188; Delaware 
L. & W.R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 US 182 (1928) : 72 L.Ed. 523; 
United States v. Caltex (Philippines), 344 US 149 (1952) : 97 
L.Ed. 157 – referred to.
List of Acts
Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980; Constitution of India; Land 
Acquisition Act, 1894; Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable 
Property Act, 1952; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; 
National Highways Act,
1956.
List of Keywords
Power of compulsory acquisition of immovable property; Public 
purpose; Fair compensation; Costs; Right to property; Net of 
intersecting rights; Seven sub-rights or procedures to right to 
property; Right to notice; Right to be heard; Right to a reasoned 
decision; Duty to acquire only for public purpose; Right of restitution 
or fair compensation; Right to an efficient and expeditious process; 
Right of conclusion.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.2019 of the High Court 
at Calcutta in APO No. 523 of 2017
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Appearances for Parties
Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Adv., Sujoy Mondal, Satish Vig, Partha Sil, Ms. 
Sayani Bhattacharya, Abhiraj Choudhary, Chirag Joshi, Sanjiv Kr. 
Saxena, Advs. for the Appellants.
Mukul Rohatgi, Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Advs., Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, 
Sagnik Majumdar, Rishabh Karnani, Ms. Shrika Gautam, Ms. 
Madhumita Bhattacharjee, Sandeep, Ms. Srija Chodhury, Ms. 
Osheen Bhat, Ms. Nitipriya Kar, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Shreyas 
Awasthi, Ms. Ripul Swati Kumari, Ms. Astha Sharma, Advs. for the 
Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
TABLE OF CONTENTS*
Introduction...................................................................................
1
Facts .............................................................................................
2
Submission of Counsels ............................................................
7
Scheme of the Act ......................................................................
8
The Right to property: A net of intersecting rights ................
15
The Right to notice ..................................................................
19
The Right to be heard .............................................................
20
The Right to a reasoned decision .........................................
21
The Duty to acquire only for public purpose .......................
22
The Right of restitution or fair compensation .....................
23
The Right to an efficient
and expeditious process ..............
24
The Right of conclusion ........................................................
26
Conclusions ................................................................................
28
Judgment
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
1.	
Leave granted.
Introduction: The Kolkata Municipal Corporation claims to have 
acquired the property of respondent no. 1 in exercise of powers under 
Section 352 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. A single 
Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court have concurrently held 
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
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839
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
that there is no such power of compulsory acquisition of immovable 
property under Section 352. While upholding the decision of the High 
Court, we have given our additional reasons by interpreting the text 
and the context in which Section 352 is placed in the Act. Rejecting 
the alternative argument of the appellant-Corporation that there is also 
a provision for compensation under Section 363 of the Act when land 
is acquired under Section 352, we have examined the constitutional 
position of acquisition of immovable property whereunder the mere 
presence of power to acquire coupled with a provision for payment 
of fair compensation by itself is not sufficient for a valid acquisition. 
Interpreting “authority of law” in Article 300A of the Constitution, 
we have held that a minimum content of a constitutional right to 
property comprises of seven sub-rights or procedures such as the 
right to notice, hearing, reasons for the decision, to acquire only for 
public purpose, fair compensation, efficient conduct of the procedure 
within timelines and finally the conclusion. These sub-rights have 
synchronously formed part of our laws and have attained judicial 
recognition. Therefore, as Section 352 does not provide for these 
sub-rights or procedures, it can never be a valid power of acquisition. 
Before we deal with the submissions and analyse the provisions, we 
will first narrate the
necessary facts.
2.	
Facts: The property in question, Premises No. 106C, situated 
at Narikeldanga North Road, Kolkata – 7000111, belongs to Mr. 
Birinchi Bihari Shah2 having succeeded it through a deed of 
settlement executed by his father. As Birinchi Shah was minor at 
the time when his father passed away, his elder brother managed 
and administered the Property and, in that process, he also let 
out the premises admeasuring 2 bighas 18 kathas 6 chitaks and 
40 square feet in favour of one M/s Arora Film Corporation. Upon 
attaining majority, the Property was mutated in the name of Birinchi 
Shah in the assessment book of the appellant-Corporation. It is 
affirmatively stated that all municipal dues including taxes with 
respect to the Property were paid regularly. It is also stated that 
the appellant-Corporation acknowledged the same and by its letter 
dated 07.04.2000 admitting that there are no outstanding dues with 
respect to property tax.
1	
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Property”.
2	
Hereinafter, referred to as “Birinchi Shah”.
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3.	
In the year 2009, when an attempt was made by the appellant-
Corporation to forcefully enter and occupy the Property, Birinchi 
Shah filed a writ petition being W.P. No. 126 of 2009 before the High 
Court seeking a restraint order against the appellant-Corporation. 
4.	
As there was no real contest about the title in the Property and the 
appellant-Corporation having not filed any affidavit-in-opposition, the 
High Court disposed of the writ petition by an order dated 17.09.2009 
directing that the appellant-Corporation must hold an enquiry about 
the encroachments. The High Court further directed the appellant-
Corporation not to make any construction over the Property.
5.	
In July 2010, Birinchi Shah received information that the appellant-
Corporation had deleted his name from the category of owner and 
had inserted its own name in the official records. Aggrieved, he 
approached the High Court by filing a writ petition bearing W.P. 
No. 981 of 2010, not only for correction of the entries but also to 
restrain the appellant-Corporation from interfering with his peaceful 
possession over the Property. What happened in this writ petition is 
of seminal importance. The learned single Judge, by an order dated 
08.01.2015, recorded the statement of the appellant-Corporation 
that they are unable to controvert the averments made in the writ 
petition with respect to title and ownership of the Property. The writ 
petition was
disposed of restraining the appellant-Corporation from 
interfering with the possession of Birinchi Shah and also injuncted 
them from giving effect to the wrongful recording of its name in the 
official records. The appellant-Corporation was also directed to remove 
its men and material from the Property within two weeks from the 
date of the said order. The specific finding of the High Court that 
the appellant-Corporation could not establish its right and the title 
in the Property is significant.
6.	
Dissatisfied, the appellant-Corporation filed a writ appeal bearing 
A.P.O. No. 51 of 2015 against the order of the single Judge and 
contended that their affidavit-in-opposition could not be filed before 
the Single Judge as the records were misplaced. It is more or less 
an admitted fact that a plea of acquisition was taken for the first time 
before the Division Bench, and this seems to be the reason for the 
Division Bench to remand the matter back to the single Judge after 
imposing a cost of Rs. 50,000/- on the appellant-Corporation. After 
remand, the appellant-Corporation filed an affidavit-in-opposition
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Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
before the single Judge claiming that the land was acquired. In view 
of new developments, Birinchi Shah sought permission to withdraw 
the pending writ petition with the liberty to file a fresh writ petition. 
The High Court permitted this by an order dated 11.08.2016.
7.	
Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 930 of 2016 was filed by the respondent 
no. 1, the executor to the estate of Birinchi Shah, inter alia, seeking 
an order quashing the alleged acquisition as illegal and to restore 
their name as owners in the official records. 
8.	
The learned single Judge of the High Court, allowing the writ petition 
by order dated 14.09.2017, formulated two questions. The first 
question relates to the maintainability of the writ petition, which was 
answered in the affirmative. As there is no contest to this issue, we will 
not deal with it. The second issue relates to the legality and validity 
of acquisition of the Property in exercise of power under Section 
352 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 19803. Answering the 
second question, the learned single Judge held that the appellant-
Corporation purported to acquire the Property under Section 352(a) 
of the Act when there is no power of compulsory acquisition therein. 
The learned single Judge therefore quashed and set-aside the alleged 
action of acquisition.
9.	
The appellant-Corporation as well as the respondent no. 1 assailed 
the order
of learned single Judge in writ appeals bearing APO No. 
523 of 2017 and APO No. 210 of 2018, respectively.
10.	 The Division Bench of the High Court, by the judgment impugned 
herein, affirmed the order of the Single Judge and accordingly, 
disposed of the appeals with a direction that the appellant-Corporation 
may initiate acquisition proceedings for the Property under Section 
536 or 537 of the Act, within five months, or in the alternative, restore 
the name of the last recorded owner as the owner of the Property.
11.	 It is against this judgment and order of the Division Bench of the 
High Court, that the appellant-Corporation is in appeal before us. 
12.	 Submission of Counsels: Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior 
counsel, representing the appellant-Corporation, has submitted 
that the appellant-Corporation has the requisite statutory power to 
3	
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Act”.
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acquire a property under Section 352 of the Act for the purposes of 
constructing a park, as is the case here. He has referred to Section 
363 of the Act provisioning compensation for acquisitions made 
under Section 352 of the Act and submitted that acquisition under 
this chapter is therefore complete and stands on its own footing. He 
contended that the single and division benches of the High Court 
erred in concluding that Section 537 of the Act is the only provision 
for acquisition. Relying on State of Kerala v. T.M. Peter4, he would 
submit that for differential schemes and purposes of acquisition, 
different compensation structures will not violate Article 14 of the 
Constitution. On the same point, he also relied on the decisions 
of this Court in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra5, and 
Bankatlal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer6. 
13.	 Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsels, 
appearing for the respondents, while supporting the judgment of the 
High Court, impugned herein, submitted that the power of acquisition 
is only in Section 537 of the Act and that invocation of Section 352 
read with Section 363 is illegal and violative of Article 300A of the 
Constitution. In support of their submissions, they relied on the 
judgment of this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao7.
14.	 Scheme of the Act: The Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 
extends to 636 Sections,
followed by 9 Schedules. It has IX Parts, 
of which we are concerned only with Part VI of which Chapter 
XXI – relating to Streets and Public Places and Part VIII of which 
Chapter XXXIII – relating to Acquisition and Disposal of Property. 
As the appellant-Corporation invoked Section 352 of the Act to 
acquire the Property for the purpose of opening a park and ward 
office, we need to examine the provision. Section 352 of the Act 
provides as under:
“Section 352:- Power to acquire lands and buildings 
for public streets and for public parking places:– 
The Municipal Commissioner may, subject to the other 
provisions of this Act –
4	
[1980] 3 SCR 290 : (1980) 3 SCC 554
5	
[2011] 3 SCR 1 : (2011) 3 SCC 1
6	
[2014] 7 SCR 879 : (2014) 15 SCC 116
7	
[1973] 3 SCR 39 : (1973) 1 SCC 500
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Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
(a)	 acquire any land required for the purpose of opening, 
widening, extending or otherwise improving any public 
street, square, park or garden or of making a new one, 
together with any building standing upon such land;
(b)	 acquire, in relation to any land or building as aforesaid, 
such land with building thereon outside the regular 
line or the projected regular line of such public street;
(c)	
acquire any land for the purpose of laying out or 
making a public parking place.”
15.	 The appellant-Corporation has also relied on Section 363 of the Act 
relating to payment of compensation. The said provision is as under:
“Section 363-Compensation to be paid:– (1) 
Compensation shall be paid by the Corporation to the 
owner of any building or land acquired for a public street, 
square, park or garden under the provisions of this Chapter:
Provided that any increase or decrease in the value of 
the remainder of the property, of which building or the 
land so acquired formed part, likely to accrue from the 
setting back to the regular line of a public street, shall 
be taken into consideration in determining the amount of 
such compensation.
(2) If any additional land, which will be included in the 
premises of any person permitted or required by an order 
under sub-section (2) of section 360 to set forward a 
building to the regular line of a public street, belongs to the 
Corporation, such
order shall be a sufficient conveyance 
to the owner of such land; and the price to be paid to the 
Corporation by the owner for such additional land and the 
other terms and conditions of the conveyance shall be set 
forth in such order.
(3) The Corporation shall pay compensation in respect 
of land or building acquired under this Chapter at the 
following scale:
(i)….
(ii)….”
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16.	 A close examination of the text of Section 352 of the Act coupled with 
the context with respect to the placement of the section in the Act, 
clarifies the purpose and object of the provision. The text of Section 
352 of the Act provides that the Municipal Commissioner may acquire 
any land required for the purpose of opening, widening, extending, 
etc. of a street, square, park, etc. The purpose of this provision is 
to declare that if the Municipal Commissioner is of the view that any 
land is required for the purpose of opening a street, park, etc., such 
a land may be acquired. Once the Municipal Commissioner takes the 
decision to acquire a piece of land, what would then be the process 
of acquisition is not provided in Section 352. It is provided in Section 
535 occurring in Chapter XXXIII of Part VIII of the Act which relates 
to ‘Acquisition of Property’.
17.	 Before we deal with the Section 535, it is sufficient to conclude 
that Section 352 merely contemplates the power and duty of the 
Municipal Commissioner to identify the land intended for opening 
of a street, park etc., and once that decision is taken, the Municipal 
Commissioner would take steps to acquire such a property, for a 
public purpose.
18.	 The context in which Section 352 is located in Chapter XXI of Part 
VI of the Act relating to ‘streets for public place’, also makes the 
position clear that this provision relates to vesting of public
street, 
squares, parks and gardens in the appellant-Corporation but does 
not provide for the power of acquisition. In the following paragraph, 
we have explained how the text and the context of the expression, 
‘The Municipal Commissioner may acquire’ in Section 352 is not at 
all the power of acquisition. 
19.	 Upon arriving at a decision to acquire any land for the purpose of 
opening a street, square, park, etc., under Section 352, the Municipal 
Commissioner will then apply to the Government under Section 
537 of the Act to initiate the process of acquisition. Section 537 is 
located in Chapter XXXIII Part VIII of the Act relating to ‘Acquisition 
of Property’. This Chapter commences with Section 535 which 
specifically provides that the appellant-Corporation shall have the 
power to acquire and hold immovable property. It is followed by the 
power to acquire properties through an agreement under Section 
536 of the Act or in the alternative, through compulsory acquisition 
of immovable property as provided in Section 537 of the Act.
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20.	 The position is thus, clear. Upon application of the Municipal 
Commissioner under Section 537 for the acquisition of land for 
opening of a street, square, park etc., the Government may order 
proceedings to be taken for acquiring land on behalf of the appellant-
Corporation as if the land is needed for a public purpose within the 
meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
21.	 Sections 535, 536 and 537 of the Act are extracted hereinbelow for 
ready reference:
“Section 535. Acquisition of property. – The Corporation 
shall, for the purposes of this Act, have power to acquire 
and hold movable and immovable property or any interest 
therein, whether within or outside the limits of Kolkata.
Section 536. Acquisition of immovable property by 
agreement.— 
(1) Whenever it is provided in this Act that the Municipal 
Commissioner may acquire, or whenever it is necessary 
or expedient for any purpose of this Act that the Municipal 
Commissioner shall acquire, any immovable property, such 
property may be acquired by the Municipal Commissioner 
on behalf of the Corporation by agreement on such 
terms and at such rates or prices or at rates or prices 
not exceeding such maxima as may be approved by the 
Mayor-in-Council either generally for any class of cases 
or specially in any particular case.
(2) Whenever, under any provision of this Act, the Municipal 
Commissioner is authorised to agree
to pay the whole or 
any portion of the expenses of acquiring any immovable 
property, he shall do so on such terms at such rates or 
prices or at rates or prices not exceeding such maxima as 
may be approved by the Mayor-in-Council either generally 
or in particular as aforesaid.
(3) The Municipal Commissioner may on behalf of the 
Corporation acquire by agreement any easement affecting 
any immovable property vested in the Corporation and 
the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply to 
such acquisition.
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Section 537. Procedure when immovable property 
cannot be acquired by agreement. – (1) Whenever the 
Municipal Commissioner is unable under section 536 to 
acquire by agreement any immovable property or any 
easement affecting any immovable property vested in 
the Corporation or whenever any immovable property or 
any easement affecting any immovable property vested 
in the Corporation is required for the purpose of this 
Act, the State Government may, in its discretion, upon 
application of the Municipal Commissioner, made with 
the approval of the Mayor-in-Council and subject to other 
provisions of this Act, order proceedings to be taken for 
acquiring the same on behalf of the Corporation, as if 
such property or easement were land needed for public 
purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894 (I of 1894)
(2)…..
(3) For the purpose of acquisition of immovable property 
under this section, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall 
be subject to the amendment that the market value of any 
land or building to be acquired shall be deemed, for the 
purpose of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Act, to be 
the market-value determined according to the disposition 
of such immovable property at the date of declaration 
under sub-section (1) of section 4 thereof in respect of 
such immovable property.
(4) The amount of compensation awarded and all other 
charges incurred in the acquisition of any such property
shall, subject to all other provisions of this Act, be forthwith 
paid by the Municipal Commissioner and thereupon such 
property shall vest in the Corporation.”
22.	 The scheme of the Act makes it clear that Section 352 empowers the 
Municipal Commissioner to identify the land required for the purpose 
of opening of public street, square, park, etc. and under Section 
537, the Municipal Commissioner has to apply to the Government 
to compulsorily acquire the land. Upon such an application, the 
Government may, in its own discretion, order proceedings to be
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taken for acquiring the land. Section 352 is therefore, not the power 
of acquisition. We, therefore, reject the submission on behalf of 
the appellant-Corporation that Section 352 enables the Municipal 
Commissioner to acquire land.
23.	 We will now deal with the other submission of Mr. Jaideep Gupta 
that there is also a provision for compensation under Section 363 
where land is acquired under Section 352. In so far as Section 363 
relating to payment of compensation is concerned, the High Court 
has clarified that this provision relates to payment of compensation 
upon an agreement and not for compulsory acquisition. We are in 
agreement with this finding of the High Court.
24.	 The Right to property: A net of intersecting rights: There is 
yet another aspect of the matter. Under our constitutional scheme, 
compliance with a fair procedure of law before depriving any person 
of his immovable property is well entrenched. We are examining 
this issue in the context of Section 352 of the Act which is bereft 
of any procedure whatsoever before compulsorily acquiring private 
property. Again, assuming that Section 363 of the Act provides for 
compensation, compulsory acquisition will still be unconstitutional if 
proper procedure is not established or followed before depriving a 
person of their right to property. We find it compelling to clarify that 
a rather undue emphasis is laid on
provisions of compensation to 
justify the power of compulsory acquisition, as if compensation by 
itself is the complete procedure for a valid acquisition. 
25.	 While it is true that after the 44th Constitutional Amendment8, the right 
to property drifted from Part III to Part XII of the Constitution, there 
continues to be a potent safety net against arbitrary acquisitions, 
hasty decision-making and unfair redressal mechanisms. Despite 
its spatial placement, Article 300A9 which declares that “no person 
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law” has been 
characterised both as a constitutional and also a human right10. 
To assume that constitutional protection gets constricted to the 
8	
Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
9	
300A of the Constitution: “Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. – No person 
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”
10	
Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram (2007) 10 SCC 448; Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 2 
SCC 569
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mandate of a fair compensation would be a disingenuous reading 
of the text and, shall we say, offensive to the egalitarian spirit of 
the Constitution.
26.	 The constitutional discourse on compulsory acquisitions, has 
hitherto, rooted itself within the ‘power of eminent domain’. Even 
within that articulation, the twin conditions of the acquisition being 
for a public purpose and subjecting the divestiture to the payment of 
compensation in lieu of acquisition were mandated11. Although not 
explicitly contained in Article 300A, these twin requirements have 
been read in and inferred as necessary conditions for compulsory 
deprivation to afford protection to the individuals who are being 
divested of property12. A post-colonial reading of the Constitution 
cannot limit itself to these components alone. The binary reading 
of the constitutional right to property must give way to more 
meaningful renditions, where the larger right to property is seen as 
comprising intersecting sub-rights, each with a distinct character 
but interconnected to constitute the whole. These sub-rights weave 
themselves into each other, and as a consequence, State action 
or the legislation that results in the deprivation of private property 
must be measured against this constitutional net as a whole, and 
not just one or many of its strands. 
27.	 What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi 
constitutional fabric constituting the
right to property? Seven such 
sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are: i) duty 
of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property 
– the right to notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to 
the acquisition – the right to be heard, iii) the duty of the State to 
inform the person of its decision to acquire – the right to a reasoned 
decision, iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition 
is for public purpose – the duty to acquire only for public purpose, 
v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate – the right of 
restitution or fair compensation, vi) the duty of the State to conduct 
the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines 
of the proceedings – the right to an efficient and expeditious process, 
11	
State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (1952) 1 SCC 528
12	
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627; K.T. Plantation Pvt Ltd 
v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1
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and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting – the 
right of conclusion.
28.	 These seven rights are foundational components of a law that is 
tune with Article 300A, and the absence of one of these or some of 
them would render the law susceptible to challenge. The judgment 
of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra)13 declares that the law 
envisaged under Article 300A must be in line with the overarching 
principles of rule of law, and must be just, fair, and reasonable. It is, 
of course, precedentially sound to describe some of these sub-rights 
as ‘procedural’, a nomenclature that often tends to undermine the 
inherent worth of these safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be 
procedures, but they do constitute the real content of the right to 
property under Article 300A, non-compliance of these will amount to 
violation of the right, being without the authority of law.
29.	 These sub-rights of procedure have been synchronously incorporated 
in laws concerning compulsory acquisition and are also recognised 
by our constitutional courts while reviewing administrative actions 
for compulsory acquisition of private property. The following will 
demonstrate how these seven principles have seamlessly become an 
integral part of our Union and State statutes concerning acquisition 
and also the constitutional and administrative law culture that our 
courts have evolved from
time to time. 
30.	 Following are the seven principles:
30.1.	The Right to notice: (i) A prior notice informing the bearer 
of the right that the State intends to deprive them of the right 
to property is a right in itself; a linear extension of the right 
to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does 
not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire 
must be clear, cogent and meaningful. Some of the statutes 
reflect this right. 
(ii) Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1) 
of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property 
Act, 1952, Section 11 of the Right to Fair Compensation 
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
13	
K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1
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Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3A of the National 
Highways Act, 1956 are examples of such statutory 
incorporation of the right to notice before initiation of the land 
acquisition proceedings. 
(iii) In a large number of decisions, our constitutional courts 
have independently recognised the right to notice before any 
process of acquisition is commenced14.
30.2.	The Right to be heard: (i) Following the right to a meaningful 
and effective prior notice of acquisition, is the right of the 
property-bearer to communicate his objections and concerns 
to the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard 
against the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not 
a sham. 
(ii) Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1) 
of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property 
Act, 1952, Section 15 of the Right to Fair Compensation 
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3C of the National 
Highways Act, 1956, are some statutory embodiments of this 
right. 
(iii) Judicial opinions recognizing the importance of this right are 
far too many to reproduce. Suffice to say that that the enquiry 
in which a land holder would raise his objection is not a mere 
formality15. 
14	
In Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P. (1970) 1 SCC 125, it was held that a notification under Section 4 of 
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, even in urgent cases falling
under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894 is the sine qua non of the process of acquisition. In State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib (1973) 
3 SCC 196, it was held that a notice under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is necessary for 
completing the land acquisition process. In Narinderjit Singh and Ranjit Singh v. State of U.P. (1973) 1 
SCC 157, this Court held that the notice under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory 
and if no notice is published, the entire process of land acquisition is vitiated. In Competent Authority v. 
Barangore Jute Factory (2005) 13 SCC 477, this Court held that if the initial notification under Section 
3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 is bad, the entire process which is followed in pursuance of it is 
vitiated.
15	
In Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1217, this Court has held the right under Section 
5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be a substantial one and it cannot be taken away. In Hindustan 
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627, this Court has held that the right 
of submitting objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a valuable right and the 
hearing given in pursuance of exercise of this right must not be rendered to a mere formality. In Union of 
India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564, this Court held that the rules of natural justice have been ingrained 
in the scheme of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In
Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute 
Factory (2005) 13 SCC 477, this Court observed that in the process from the initial notification to the final
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30.3.	The Right to a reasoned decision: i) That the authorities 
have heard and considered the objections is evidenced only 
through a reasoned order. It is incumbent upon the authority 
to take an informed decision and communicate the same to 
the objector.
(ii) Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(2) of the 
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, 
Section 19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 
and Section 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956, are the 
statutory incorporations of this principle. 
(iii) Highlighting the importance of the declaration of the 
decision to acquire, the Courts have held that the declaration 
is mandatory, failing which, the acquisition proceedings will 
cease to have effect16.
30.4.	The Duty to acquire only for public purpose: (i) That the 
acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an 
important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire. 
This requirement, which conditions the purpose of acquisition 
must stand to reason with the larger constitutional goals of a 
welfare state and distributive justice. 
(ii) Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 
3(1) and 7(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable 
Property Act, 1952, Sections 2(1), 11(1),15(1)(b) and 19(1) of 
the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and 
Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 depict the 
statutory incorporation of the public purpose requirement of 
compulsory acquisition.
declaration, objections play a vital road. In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. (2012) 2 SCC 25, this 
Court quashed the land acquisition proceedings when a proper hearing under Section 5A of the Land 
Acquisition Act, 1894 was not accorded. In Gojer Bros. (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. (2013) 16 SCC 660, this 
Court held quashed the land acquisition proceedings when it was observed that a mere formality was 
rendered in the name of a hearing under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 
16	
In Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India (1997) 9 SCC 132, this Court held that 
publication of a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory. In Project 
Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy (2021) 3 SCC 572, this Court held that 
if a declaration is not published under Section 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956 then the initial 
notification and resultantly, the acquisition proceedings cease to have effect.
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(iii) The decision of compulsory acquisition of land is subject 
to judicial review and the Court will examine and determine 
whether the acquisition is related to public purpose. If the court 
arrives at a conclusion that that there is no public purpose 
involved in the acquisition, the entire process can be set-aside. 
This Court has time and again reiterated the importance of the 
underlying objective of acquisition of land by the State to be 
for a public purpose17.
30.5.	The Right of restitution or fair compensation: (i) A 
person’s right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part 
to the constitutional right under Article 300A. Deprivation or 
extinguishment of that right is permissible only upon restitution, 
be it in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation or 
other similar means. Compensation has always been considered 
to be an integral part of the process of acquisition. 
(ii) Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 8 and 
9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property 
Act, 1952, Section 23 of the Right to Fair Compensation 
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3G and 3H of the National 
Highways Act, 1956 are the statutory incorporations of the right 
to restitute a person whose land has been compulsorily acquired.
(iii) Our courts have not only considered that compensation 
is necessary, but have also held that
a fair and reasonable 
compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition process18.
17	
In Somawanti v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 23, this Court held that the Constitution permits 
acquisition of private land by the State only for a public purpose. The rationale of taking away private 
land by the State for a public purpose is that private interest must give way to public interest as observed 
by the Court in Daulat Singh Surana v. First Land Acquisition Collector (2007) 1 SCC 641. In Union of 
India v. Jaswant Rai Kochhar (1996) 3 SCC 491 and D. Hanumanth SA v. State of Karnataka (2010) 
10 SCC 656, this Court held acquisition proceedings to be valid even if there was a change in the 
public purpose, so long as there is a public purpose for which the land is acquired. The importance of 
the communication of public purpose as an ingredient of the notification for acquisition was reiterated 
by this Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (1973) 2 SCC 337 when acquisition proceedings were 
set aside since the public purpose was mentioned as “planned development of the area” which was 
observed to be wholly insufficient and conveyed no idea as to the specific purpose. Similarly, in Madhya 
Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi (1992) 2 SCC 168, wherein this Court quashed the acquisition 
proceedings on the ground that the public purpose was mentioned as “residential” which was too vague. 
18	
In State of U.P. v. Manohar (2005) 2 SCC 126, this Court held that
payment of compensation is an 
integral part of the process of land acquisition. In M. Naga Venkata Lakshmi v. Visakhapatnam Municipal 
Corpn. (2007) 8 SCC 748, this Court held that wherever promised, compensation is ought to be paid. In 
NHAI v. P. Nagaraju (2022) 15 SCC 1, this Court held that compensation must be adequate and must be 
arrived at keeping in mind the market value of the acquired land. In Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. (2020) 2
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30.6.	The Right to an efficient and expeditious process: (i) The 
acquisition process is traumatic for more than one reason. 
The administrative delays in identifying the land, conducting 
the enquiry and evaluating the objections, leading to a final 
declaration, consume time and energy. Further, passing of the 
award, payment of compensation and taking over the possession 
are equally time consuming. It is necessary for the administration 
to be efficient in concluding the process and within a reasonable 
time. This obligation must necessarily form part of Article 300A. 
(ii) Sections 5A(1), 6, 11A, and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894, Sections 6(1A) and 9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition 
of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Sections 4(2), 7(4), 7(5), 11(5), 
14, 15(1), 16(1), 19(2), 25, 38(1), 60(4), 64 and 80 of the Right 
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and Sections 3C(1), 
3D(3) and 3E(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, prescribe 
for statutory frameworks for the completion of individual steps 
in the process of acquisition of land within stipulated timelines. 
(iii) On multiple occasions, upon failure to adhere to the timelines 
specified in law, the courts have set aside the acquisition 
proceedings19.
30.7.	The Right of conclusion: (i) Upon conclusion of process of 
acquisition and payment of
compensation, the State takes 
SCC 569, this Court held that even though compensation is not expressly provided for under Article 300A 
of the Constitution, it can be inferred therein. In the American jurisprudence, payment of compensation 
has been made part of due process (See Sweet v. Rechel [159 US 380 (1895) : 40 L.Ed. 188], Delaware 
L. & W.R. Co. v. Morristown [276 US 182 (1928) : 72 L.Ed. 523] and United States v. Caltex (Philippines) 
[344 US 149 (1952) : 97 L.Ed. 157).
19	
In Roy Estate v. State of Jharkhand (2009) 12 SCC 194; Union of India v. Mahendra Girji (2010) 15 SCC 
682 and Union of India v. Mahendra Girji (2010) 15 SCC 682, this Court has underscored the importance 
of following the timelines fixed by the statute. In Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak (1984) 1 SCC 125, this Court 
has held that the powers relevant to the land acquisition process must be exercised within a reasonable 
time. In Kerala State Housing Board v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. (1994) 5 SCC 672, this Court has 
held that if the concerned legislation does not stipulate the time-frames within which the process or its 
components are to be completed, it amounts to a violation of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution. 
In Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44, this Court has acknowledged the realisation of the 
Parliament that the authorities are not completing the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time 
and thus, the Parliament has introduced time-limits. In Ambalal Purshottam
v. Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corpn. (1968) 3 SCR 207, this Court held that a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894 must be followed by a proceeding for determination of compensation without any unreasonable 
delay. In Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P. (1976) 1 SCC 843, this Court held that excessive intervening 
delay between notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, keeping the 
landowner in suspense throughout, is illegal.
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possession of the property in normal circumstances. The 
culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment 
of compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical 
possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition 
is not complete. With the taking over of actual possession after 
the normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is 
divested and the right, title and interest in the property, along-
with possession is vested in the State. Without final vesting, the 
State’s, or its beneficiary’s right, title and interest in the property 
is inconclusive and causes lot of difficulties. The obligation to 
conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part 
of Article 300A.
ii) Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 4 and 
5 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property 
Act, 1952, Sections 37 and 38 of the Right to Fair Compensation 
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3D and 3E of the 
National Highways Act, 1956, statutorily recognise this right 
of the acquirer. 
iii) This step of taking over of possession has been a matter 
of great judicial scrutiny and this Court has endeavoured to 
construe the relevant provisions in a way which ensures non-
arbitrariness in this action of the acquirer20. For that matter, after 
taking over possession, the process of land acquisition concludes 
with
the vesting of the land with the concerned authority. The 
culmination of an acquisition process by vesting has been a 
matter of great importance. On this aspect, the courts have 
given a large number of decisions as to the time, method and 
manner by which vesting takes place21.
20	
In State of W.B. v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd. (2002) 4 SCC 134, this Court held that possession 
can be resumed by the acquirer only in a manner known to or recognised by law and it cannot resume 
possession otherwise than in due course of law. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995 
Supp (1) SCC 596, this Court held that though eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of 
property remaining in the Government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity, 
even then the right to take possession of a private property must be exercised in the manner directed by 
the Constitution and the laws of the State, since deprivation of property must take place after following 
the procedure of law and upon ensuring due process.
21	
In Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 3 SCC 1, this Court held that under the Land 
Acquisition Act, 1894, upon the payment of compensation and taking of possession of a land so acquired, 
the land is vested in the State free of encumbrances and the completion of such vesting of the land in 
the State amounts to the transfer of title from the owner to the State by a legal fiction. In P. Chinnanna v.
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31.	 The seven principles which we have discussed are integral to 
the authority of law enabling compulsory acquisition of private 
property. Union and State statutes have adopted these principles 
and incorporated them in different forms in the statutes provisioning 
compulsory acquisition of immovable property. The importance of 
these principles, independent of the statutory prescription have been 
recognised by our constitutional courts and they have become part 
of our administrative law jurisprudence. 
32.	 Conclusions: Returning to the legal submissions of the counsel for 
the appellant-Corporation, as we have noticed that Section 352 does 
not provide for any procedure whatsoever, we reject the contention that 
it contemplates the power of acquisition. We have already held that 
Section 352 is only intended to enable the Municipal Commissioner 
to decide whether a land is to be acquired for public purpose. The 
power of acquisition is in fact vested with the State under Section 537 
and it will exercise it, in its own discretion, whenever the Municipal 
Commissioner makes an application to that effect. We have also 
agreed with the decision of the High Court that Section 363 is not 
a provision for compensation for compulsory acquisition. In this 
context, we have also held that a valid power of acquisition coupled 
with the provision for fair compensation by itself would not
complete 
and exhaust the power and process of acquisition. Prescription of 
the necessary procedures, before depriving a person of his property 
is an integral part of the ‘authority of law’, under Article 300A and, 
Section 352 of the Act contemplates no procedure whatsoever.
33.	 We are not referring to the detailed facts of the case involving multiple 
rounds of litigation where the respondents have taken inconsistent 
stands about the ownership and acquisition of the Property. There 
is no doubt in our mind that the exercise of the power is illegal, 
illegitimate and has caused great difficult to the respondent-land-
State of A.P. (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Delhi Development Authority v. Reena Suri (2016) 12 SCC 649, this 
Court held that mere passing of award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will not suffice to vest the 
land in the State since taking possession is of utmost importance. In Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union 
v. Delhi Improvement Trust, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 37, this Court held that once the land is vested in 
the State, it is vested neither for a limited purpose nor for a limited duration. Further, in Union of India v. 
Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304, this Court observed that the National Highways Act, 1956 has an object 
of reducing delay in the process of land acquisition in order to speedily implement projects pertaining 
to highways. It is in this context that this Court held that under Section 3D of the National Highways 
Act, 1956, the land to be
acquired vests in the Union upon the publication of a notification declaring the 
acquisition, which is done after the disposal of objections of the land-owner, if any.
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bearer. It is necessary to refer to the findings of the learned single 
Judge that the appellant-Corporation acted in blatant violation of 
statutory provisions, these findings are as follows:
“The facts disclosed by the Corporation in the Affidavit-in-
Opposition evidently shows that the acquisition was made 
by invoking Section 352(a) of the said Act by exercising 
the power of eminent domain. There was a doubt in 
the mind of some of the Municipal Authorities whether 
such sovereign power can be exercised by the Statutory 
Authority like the Corporation and a legal opinion was 
sought by the Chief Municipal Law Officer from one of the 
Senior Advocates. The Senior Advocate, however, doubted 
over the said exercise of power and also highlighted the 
anomalies in such action. On the basis of such opinion 
the Chief Municipal Officer made the following remark: -
“Doubt has arisen in the past on the question whether the 
Municipal Commissioner could under Section 352(a) of 
the CMC Act, 1980 straightway compulsorily acquire any 
land by giving notice to owner/occupiers also in contract 
Newspapers and pay compensation under Section 363(3) 
of the Act. The former Ch. Mpl. Law Officer had referred 
the question to Mr. P.K. Ghoah Senior Advocate for his 
opinion. A copy of his opinion is placed below for persual. I 
have nothing more to add. If in spite of the anomalies in the 
statute pointed out by Mr. P.K.Ghosh the Mpl.
Commissioner 
proceeds to take possession of the land in question, I have 
no comment to make. If the aggrieved party moves the 
Court, then the Court will resolve the anomalies.”
It is curious to note that despite the same, the then 
Mayor put a note that the Corporation may proceed to 
acquire the property by invoking powers under Section 
352(a) and the note of the Chief Municipal Law Officer 
was simply kept in the file. It would further appear from 
the subsequent noting of the Chief Municipal Law Officer 
put on 08.01.1991 wherein it is noted that the act is silent 
as to when the possession is to be taken either before 
or after the payment of compensation under Section 
363 and according to him, the possession can only be
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
857
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
taken after the payment of compensation under Section 
363(3) of the said Act. Despite the aforesaid noting, the 
Municipal Commissioner passed an order of acquisition 
on 18.01.1991 directing to acquire the subject land under 
Section 352(a) of the Act with immediate effect and the 
possession should also be taken immediately. There is a 
serious dispute whether the possession was in fact taken 
in terms of the said order of the Municipal Commissioner or 
not. However, it is seen from the notes put on 16.03.1991 
that the possession was taken. The fact remains that no 
compensation has been paid as yet. The Corporation has 
further disclosed a letter allegedly written by the recorded 
owner on 14.11.1991 wherein it is categorically stated that 
the possession has not been taken. Though it appears 
from the noting that the possession was taken way back 
in 1991 but the record maintained by the Corporation was 
not altered and/or corrected and in fact the Corporation 
continued to accept the property tax paid by the recorded 
owner in respect of the said property. Even in the year 
2000, the Corporation mutated the name of the Birinchi 
Behari Shaw and also issued the No Due Certificate to 
him. It is only in the year 2010 the Corporation deleted 
the name of the said owner and incorporated its name 
as owner thereof. Yet, showing the huge outstanding on 
account of property tax with
interest and penalty in the 
letter of intimation issued on 17.07.2010. The explanation 
is sought to be offered that there is no synchronization 
between the two departments of the Corporation and a 
mistake has been committed, which cannot confer any 
equity or right in favour of the Petitioner.
I am unable to persuade myself to agree with such 
explanation. For the sake of argument, if it is accepted 
that possession was taken way back in 1991, there was 
no occasion to accept the property tax for more than a 
decade without altering the entries made in the assessment 
register.
This Court, therefore, finds that the Corporation acted 
blatantly in violation of the statutory provision in acquiring 
the property as such acquisition should have been
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facilitated by approaching the State under Section 537(1) 
of the said Act. The entire action concerning the acquisition 
of property by invoking Section 352(a) of the Act is per se 
illegal, invalid and in clear contravention to the provisions 
of the Act and are hereby quashed and set aside.”
34.	 In the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the High 
Court was fully justified in allowing the writ petition and rejecting the 
case of the appellant-Corporation acquiring land under Section 352 
of the Act. The impugned judgment does not brook interference on 
any count.
35.	 Having considered the matter in detail, we dismiss the appeal arising 
out of SLP (C) No. 4504 of 2021 filed by the appellant-Corporation 
against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in APO No. 523 
of 2017 dated 17.12.2019 with costs quantified at Rs. 5,00,000/-, to 
be paid to respondent no. 1 within a period of sixty days from today.
36.	 Pending application(s), if any, shall be disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain