NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX versus DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS
[2016] 6 S.C.R. 1, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
NABAM REBJA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
If an Assembly or Legislature has been prorogued in a State, the 
matter may be raised in the Lok Sabha and the Speaker may, in 
certain circumstances, allow a discussion thereon. 
Dissolution of the Assembly 
Normally a Governor should exercise the power of dissolution on 
the advice of the Council of Ministers. If a Chief Minister who 
enjoys majority support advises dissolution, the Governor must 
accept the advice, but if he advises dissolution after losing his 
majority, the Governor need accept his advice only ifthe Ministry 
suffers a defeat on a question of major policy and the ChiefMinister 
wishes to appeal to the electorate fora mandate on that policy. In 
the case of a Chief Minister heading a single party Government 
which has been returned by the electorate in absolute majority, if 
the ruling party loses its majority because of defection by at least 
one-third of its members and the Chief Minister recommends 
dissolution so as to enable him to make a fresh appeal to the 
electorate, the Governor may grant a dissolution. The mere fact 
that some members of the pmty·have defected does not necessarily 
prove that the pa1ty has lost the confidence of the electorate. lf 
there is a no-confidence motion against a Ministry and the chief 
Minister, instead of facing the Assembly, advises the Governor to 
dissolve the Assembly, the Governor need not accept such advice, 
but should
ask the ChiefMinisterto get the verdict of the Assembly 
on the no-confidence motion. 
In a case where the Chief Minister recommends dissolution of 
the Assembly when the Budget has not been voted and the Ministry 
claims majority support, the Ministry in such a situation should 
face the Assembly and get the Budget passed before seeking 
dissolution for whatever reason. If, on the other hand, there is· 
reason to believe that the Chief Minister no longer commands 
majority support, it is clearly open to the Governor to take steps to 
ascertain if it is possible to install another Minist1y which is able to 
command majority support and get the Budget passed. Failing 
both, the Governor has no alternative except to make a report to 
the President under article 356 because Parliament alone could 
then sanction appropriation for canying on the administration of 
the State. 
A Governor is not bound to accept the advice ofa Chief Minister 
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to dissolve the Assembly ifthe Chief Minister has lost the majority 
support." 
48. In order to appreciate and effectively interpret Article 174, it was 
submitted, that it is necessary to examine draft Article 153 drawn by the 
Drafting Committee. The same is reproduced below: 
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"153. Sessions of the State Legislature, propagation and 
dissolution.-(!) The House or Houses of the Legislature of the 
State shall be summoned to meet twice at least in every year, and 
six months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one 
session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next 
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(2) Subject to the provisions of this article, the Governor may, 
from time to time -
(a) summon the Houses or either House to meet at such time and 
place as he thinks fit; 
(b) prorogue the House or Houses; 
(c) dissolve the Legislative Assembly. 
(3) The functions of the Governor under sub-clauses (a) and (c) 
of clause (2) of this article shall be exercised by him in his 
discretion." 
In the written comments submitted to draft Article 153, Jayaprakash 
Narayan suggested, that clause (3) of Article 153 should be deleted. It 
was his submission, that there was no reason why the Governor in his 
discretion, should be permitted to summon or dissolve the House, when 
no such discretionary power was being extended to the President (-with 
regard to summoning and dissolution, of the Parliament). Another
reason 
expressed by him for deleting the aforesaid clause (3) was, the changed 
position of selection of Governors, whereby Governors are to be nominated 
by the President, instead of being elected, as hitherto before. When 
draft Article 153 came up for debate, Mohd. Tahir suggested, addition of 
the following words at the end of sub-clause ( c) of clause (2) - "If the 
Governor is satisfied that the administration is failing and the Ministry 
has become unstable". It was canvassed, that merely because a Governor 
did not subscribe to the views of the majority party, he should not have 
the discretion to dissolve the House. It was asserted, that there could be 
no other reason forthe dissolution of a House, except mal-administration
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
and instability of the Government. It was therefore, that Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar moved, that clause (3) of draft Article 153 be omitted, as the 
same was inconsistent with the scheme of a "constitutional" Governor. 
When put to vote, the amendment suggested by Mohd. Tahir was rejected, 
and the one suggested by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was adopted. The above 
draft Article was renumbered as Article 174 of the Constitution. 
49. Based on a collective reading of draft Article 153, and Article 
174 of the Constitution, according to learned counsel, it was apparent 
that the original intention of the Constituent Assembly, to vest personal 
discretion with the Governor, for summoning, proroguing and dissolving 
. the House, was overruled. The above historical background, it was 
urged, should not be overlooked, and that, Article 17 4 should be interpreted 
in a manner as would exclude the personal discretion of the Governor, in 
the matter of summoning, proroguing or dissolving the House(s) of the 
State Legislature, in consonance with the obvious intention of the framers 
of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the appellants, suggested while 
concluding, that the Governor in the present case, having no discretion 
to unilaterally sµmmon the Assembly, having done so, while passing the 
order dated 9.12.2015, had acted unconstitutionaJly. Consequently, 
according to learned counsel, all steps taken by
the Assembly, pursuant 
to the order dated 9.12.2015 were liable to be set aside, as unconstitutional 
and void. 
50. The appellants also assailed the validity of the message of the 
Governor, dated 9.12.2015. In order to demonstrate the contours of the 
authority of the Governor under Article 175, it was pointed out, that the 
precursor to Article 175, was Section 63 of the Government of India 
Act, 1935, which is extracted below: 
"63. Right of Governor to address, and send messages to, 
Chambers.-(!) The Governor may in his discretion address the 
Legislative Assembly or, in the case of a Province having a 
Legislative Council, either Chamber of the Provincial Legislature 
or both Chambers assembled together, and may for that purpose 
require the attendance of members. 
(2) The Governor may in his discretion send messages to the 
Chamber or Chambers of the Provincial Legislature, whether with 
respect to a Bill then pending in the Legislature or otherwise, and 
a Chamber to whom. any message is so sent shaJI with aJI 
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convenient dispatch consider any matter which they are required 
by the message to take into consideration." 
Referring to the words "in his discretion" used in sub-section (2) 
of Section 63, it was submitted, that Article 175 vests no such discretion, 
with the Governor. It was therefore contended, that the framers of the 
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Constitution, did not intend to confer any discretion with the Governor, in 
the matter of sending messages (envisaged under Article 175). 
Accordingly, it was submitted, that no authority is vested with the Governor 
under Article 175(2), to send messages in respect of the functioning of 
the House, at his own. It was pointed out, that there was no question of 
.. any right being vested with the Governor, to interfere with the legislative 
C · autonomy of the House, by addressing a message to the House under 
Article 175. It was submitted, that the message of the Governor dated 
9.12.2015, was beyond the purview of Article 175(2), and therefore, 
was liable to be declared unconstitutional. 
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51. It was also asserted, that the message of the Governor dated 
9.12.2015, contained directions to the House. The aforesaid directions, 
according to learned counsel, would not fall .within the purview of 
messages contemplated under Article 175(2). It was pointed out, that 
the 'Conduct of Business Rules' framed under Article 208, assigned no 
such role to the Governor. A Governor, according to learned
counsel, 
cannot determine or interfere with, any issue with reference to the conduct 
of business, within the Legislative Assembly. In support of the above 
proposition, reliance was placed on Rule 21, of the 'Conduct of Business 
Rules', which is extracted below: 
"Arrangement of Business, Provisional Programme and List of 
Business. 
(a) Arrangement of Business: 
21. Arrangement of Govt. business. On days allotted for the 
transaction of Government business, such business shall have 
precedence and the Secretary shall arrange that business In such 
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order as the Speaker may, after consultation with the Leader of 
the House, determine: 
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Provided that such order of business shall not be varied on the 
day that business is set down for disposal unless the Speaker is 
satisfied that there is sufficient ground for such variation."
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Based on Rule 21, it was submitted, that a Governor has no right 
to determine the agenda of the business of the House. Or even, the 
sequence in which the business of the House, was to be conducted. To 
the above extent, it was submitted, that the message of the Governor 
dated 9.12.2015, was not only unconstitutional, but also violative of Rule 
21. It was therefore submitted, that it was not open to the Governor, to 
have directed the House, through his message dated 9.12.2015, to take 
up the resolution for removal of the Speaker, as the first item on the 
agenda, on 16.12.2015. A reference was also made to Rules 152 to 154 
of the 'Conduct of Business Rules', which are extracted below: 
"152. Leave of House to take up resolution.- (I) Subject to the 
provisions of Article 181 of the Constitution, the Speaker or the 
Q'W.!J.!J'_fuleaker or such oth~r person as is referred to in clause 
(2) ofArticle 180 of the Constitution shall preside when a motion 
under rule 151 is taken up for consideration. 
(2) The member in whose name the motion stands on the list of 
business shall, except when he wishes to withdraw it, move the 
motion when called upon to do so, but no speech shall be pem1itted 
at th is stage. 
153. Inclusion of Resolution in the list of.- On the appointed day 
the Resolution shall be included in the list of business to be taken 
up after the questions and before any other
business for the day is 
entered upon. 
154. Time limit for speeches. - Except with the permission of the 
Speaker or the 11erson presiding, a speech on the Resolution shall 
not exceed fifteen minutes in duration: 
Provided that the mover of the Resolution when moving the same 
may speak for such longer time as the Speaker or the person 
presiding may permit." 
Based on the above Rules, it was urged, that the entire proceedings in 
the Assembly, are to be regulated by the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker), 
and that, the Governor has no role in the proceedings of the House. 
52. It was also co1ttended, that the Governor is neither a member 
of the State Legislative Assembly, nor an officer of the State Legislature, 
and therefore, a Governor can have no jurisdiction in the functioning, 
and affairs of the House. It was accordingly asserted, that the intent 
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expressed in Article 168, should not be determined from a cursory reading 
thereof, but should be visualised from the scheme of the surrounding 
provisions. The Governor's connectivity and relationship with the House, 
according to learned counsel, was based on the aid and advice of the 
Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. 
53. It was submitted, that the Governor has no authority 
whatsoever, to get embroiled with matters falling under the Tenth 
Schedule. It was urged, that the Speaker, was the sole adjudicatory 
authority, under the Tenth Schedule, and his actions ~h·reunder cannot 
be interfered with, by or at the behest of the Governor. !twas submitted, 
that even the Legislative Assembly itself, could not interfere with the 
Speaker's determination, under the Tenth Schedule. It was urged, that 
on the same analogy, even the Deputy Speaker of the House, had no 
authority whatsoever, to set aside an order passed by the Speaker under 
the Tenth Schedule. It was pointed out, that even the Speaker himself 
had no power or discretion to review the order of disqualification dated 
15.12.2015 (as in the present case). In this behalf, reliance was placed 
on the following observations recorded in Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi v. The 
Speaker7: 
"49. The power of review which, it is suggested by counsel for 
the respondents, inheres in the Speaker by necessary implication 
has to be found in the
provisions made in the Tenth Schedule 
alone, and not elsewhere. Para 7 has to be treated as non-existent 
in the Tenth Schedule from the very inception, as earlier indicated. 
As held by the majority in Kihoto Hollohan 1992 Supp (2) SCC 
651,judicial review is available against an order of disqualification 
made by the Speaker under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule, 
notwithstanding the finality mentioned therein. It is on account of 
the nature of finality attaching by virtue of para 6, that the judicial 
review available against the Speaker's order has been labelled as 
limited in para 110 (at page 711 ofSCC) of the decision in Kihoto 
Hollohan and the expression has to be understood in that sense 
distinguished from the wide power in an appeal, and no more. As 
held in Kihoto Hollohan, the Speaker's order is final being subject 
only to judicial review, according to the settled parameters of the 
exercise of power of judicial review in such cases, which it is not 
necessary to elaborate in the present context. The existence of 
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NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGD!SH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
judicial review against the Speaker's order of disqualification made 
under para 6 is itself a strong indication to the contrary that there 
can be no inherent power of review in the Speaker. read in the 
Tenth Schedule by necessary implication. The need for correction 
of errors in the Speaker's order.made under the Terith Schedule 
is met by the availabilitv of judicial review against the same. as 
held in Kihoto Hollohan. · 
50. In our opinion there is no merit in the submission that the 
power of review inheres in the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule 
as a necessary incident of his jurisdiction to decide the question of 
disqualification; or that such a power existed till November 12, 
1991 when the decision in Kihota Hollohan (1992) I SCC 309 
was rendered: or at least a limited power of review inheres in the 
Speaker to correct any palpable error outside the scope of judicial 
review." 
54. It was the pointed assertion of learned senior counsel, that the 
order of the Deputy Speaker dated 16.12.2015, quashing the Speaker's 
order dated 15.12.2015 (disqualifying 14 members of the House, 
belonging to the INC}, was totally without jurisdiction. It was also urged, 
that if any individual including the Deputy Speaker of the Assembly and/ 
or the other 13 disqualified members of the House were aggrieved, they 
could have legitimately taken recourse to judicial review, either before 
the
jurisdictional High Court under Article 226, or before this Court under 
Article 32. It was pointed out, that the disqualified MLAs had actually 
assailed their disqualification orders before the High Court. It was 
accordingly submitted, that the decision of the Deputy Speaker, quashing 
the order of the Speaker dated 15.12.2015 (disqualifying 14 MLAs of 
the INC), was per se unconstitutional, it lacked jurisdictional authority, 
and as such, was unacceptable in law. 
55. In addition to the above, it was submitted, that the Deputy 
Speaker of the Assembly - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok was one of the 14 
INC MLAs of the Assembly disqualified by the Speaker vide his order 
dated 15.12.2015. As such, it was urged, that it was not open to the 
Deputy Speaker, to set aside the order of his own disqualification. It was 
submitted, that the aforesaid determination at the hands of the Deputy 
Speaker, amounted to the Deputy Speaker acting as a judge in his own 
cause. It was pointed out, that not only his action was illegal, but the 
same was also violative of the rules of natural justice. With reference to 
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the importance of the validity (or invalidity) of the order of the Deputy 
Speaker dated 16.12.2015, it was pointed out, that in case the above 
order was found by this Cou1t to be unacceptable in law, the paiticipation 
of the 14 disqualified MLAs belonging to the INC, in the proceedings of 
the House on 16.12.2016 - and thereafter, was liable to be considered 
as non est in the eyes of law. It is important for us to record, that the 
validity of above order of the Deputy Speaker, is sub-judice before the 
jurisdictional High Cou1t at Guwahati. 
56. It was submitted, that the proceedings of the Assembly held 
with effect from 16.12.2015, till the House was prorogued on 18.12.2015 
with the participation of the 14 disqualified MLAs belonging to the INC, 
was nothing but an ove1t political act of the BJP MLAs, supported by 
the Governor, to undermine the democratic process in the State. It was 
submitted, that once the Governor had summoned the leader of the 
political pa1iy, having the largest strength amongst the different political 
parties, to form Government, without any suppo1t from any other political 
party, the action of the Governor expressed through the order and message 
dated 9.12.2015 was absolutely undemocratic, and unconstitutional. 
57. Mr. F.S. Nariman, learned Senior Advocate entered 
appearance, in support of the claim raised by the appellants. He 
represented Bamang Felix - Deputy Chief
Whip of the INC. In his 
opening statement, Mr. Nariman adopted the factual and the legal 
submissions advanced on behalf ofNabam Rebia. He pointed out, that 
he affirmed the submissions advanced by Mr. Kapil Sibal, but would 
assist the Court, by projecting some further constitutional aspects. 
58. In the first instance, learned senior counsel placed reliance on 
two repo1ts. The first - the Justice Sarkaria Commission report, on 
"Centre-State Relations", and the second - the Justice M.M. Punchh! 
Commission report, on "Constitutional Governance and Management of 
Centre-State Relations". It was pointed out, that in the Justice Sarkaria 
Commission report, Chapter 5 was attributed to the role of the Governor. 
And in the Justice M.M. Punchhi Commission report, Chapter 4 was 
ascribed to the role .of the Governor. It was asse1ted, that reference to 
both the reports would be repetitive, inasmuch as, the conclusions drawn 
in the Justice Sarkaria Commission repo1t, had been substantially affirmed 
and reiterated in the Justice M.M. Punchhi Commission report. It was 
therefore, that learned counsel placed reliance only on the Justice M.M. 
Punchhi Commission report. He invited our attention to paragraph 4.1.03,
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
of the report, wherein the Commission adopted the reasoning expressed 
during the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly for arriving at its 
conclusions. Reference was also made to paragraphs 4.2.09 to 4.2.15 
high!ightingthe fact, thatthe Governor in exercise of his fi.111ctions, cannot 
act in his individual capacity, especially when the function sought to be 
discharged (by the Governor), is in the realm of executive dispensation. 
Reliance was also placed on paragraph 4.3 of the report (in its entirety), 
which expounds the proposition, that it is not expected of the Governor 
to embroil himself in day-to-day activities ofrival political parties, and 
that, Governors are expected to be independent, and to act in a manner 
devoid of any political consideration. It was pointed out, that independence 
of such actions would include, keeping the State Legislature and the 
political executive, shielded from the political will of the Union Government. 
Especially when the concerned State and the Union were not being 
governed by the same political party/conglomerate. Last of all, reliance 
was placed on paragraph 4.5, and more particularly, on sub-paragraph 
4.5.03, to demonstrate, that a reading of the constitutional provisions had 
resulted in the two Commissions very clearly expounding, that the 
Governor was bound to act in consonance with the aid and advice tendered 
to him, by the
Council ofMinistersand the Chief Minister. It was pointed 
out, that the aforesaid mandate was also applicable to situations, where 
provisions of the Constitution had used expressions I ike "he thinks fit". 
It was pointed out, that only in situations, where a constitutional provision 
expressly requires the Governor to exercise his fui1ctions in his own 
discretion, it is open to the Governor to do so. Only then, the exercise of 
such discretion, will be deemed to have been constitutionally exercised. 
Paragraphs of the Justice M.M. Punchhi Commission report, relied upon 
by learned senior counsel, are extracted hereunder: 
"4.1.03 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, highlighted the Constitutional role of 
the Governor in following terms: 
"The Governor un.QerJh~S::Qrn;tltution has no functions which he 
can discharge fil' himself: no functions at all. While he has no 
functions, he has certain duties to perform, and I think the House 
will do well to bear in mind this distinction. This Article (Article 
167) certainly, it should be borne in mind, does not confer upon 
the Governor the power to overrule the Ministry on any particular 
matter. Even under this Article, the Governor is bound to accept 
the advice of the Ministry ... This Article, nowhere, either in clause 
(a) or clause (b) or clause (c1 savs that the Governor in any 
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particular circumstances may overrule the Ministry. Therefore. 
the criticism that has been made that this Article somehow enables 
the Governor to interfere or to upset the decision of the Cabinet is 
entirely beside the point, and completely mistaken. 
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A distinction has been made between the functions of the Governor 
and the duties which the Governor has to perform. My submission 
is that although the Governor has no functions still, even the 
Constitutional Governor, that he is, has certain duties to perform. 
His duties according to me, may be classified in two parts. One is, 
that he has to retain the Ministry in office. Because, the Ministry 
is to hold office during his pleasure, he has to see whether and 
when he should exercise his pleasure against the Ministry. The 
second duty which the Governor has, and must have, is to advice 
the Ministry, to warn the Ministry, to suggest to the Ministry an 
alternative and to ask for a reconsideration. I do not think that 
anybody in this House will question the fact that the Governor 
should have this duty cast upon him; otherwise, he would be an 
absolutely unnecessary functionary: l}O good at all. He is the 
representative not of a party; he is the representative of the people 
as a whole of the State. It is in the name of the people that he 
carries on the administration. He must see thatthe administration 
is carried on at a level which may be regarded
as good, efficient. 
honest administration. I submit that he cannot discharge the 
constitutional functions of a Governor which I have just referred 
to unless he is in a position to obtain the information ... It is to 
enable the Governor to discharge his functions in respect of a 
good and pure administration that we propose to give the Governor 
the power to call for any information ... 
4.2.09 The Governor does not exercise the executive functions 
individually or personally. The State Government at various levels 
takes executive action in the name of the Governor in accordance 
with the rules of business framed under Article 166(3). Hence, it 
is the State Government and not the Governor who may sue or be 
sued in respect of any action taken in the exercise and performance 
of the powers and duties of his office [Articles 361. 299(2) and 
300]. 
4.2.10 The Governor enjoys the same privileges as the President 
does under Article 361 and he stands, in this respect, on the same 
footing. Article 361 states that neither the President nor the
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
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AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Governor can be sued for executive actions of the Government. 
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The reason is that neither the President nor the Governor exercises 
the executive functions individually or personally. 
4.2.11 The Governor is not answerable to any court for the exercise 
and the performance of the powers and duties of his office, or for 
'any act done or purporting to be done by him' in the exercise and 
performance of those duties. The words 'purporting to be done 
by him' are of very wide import, and even though, the act is outside 
the scope of his powers, so long it is professed to be done in 
pursuance of the Constitution, the Governor will be protected. 
4.2.12 Lack of bona-fide vitiates executive action, but due to the 
operation of Article 361 the Governor is not personally responsible. 
Even where the Governor's bonafide is in question while exercising 
his discretionary powers, such as appointment and dismissal of 
Chief Minister, he cannot be called to enter upon defense. The 
Madras High Court had held that a combined reading of Articles 
154, 163 and 361 would show that the immunity against 
answerability to any Court is regarding functions exercised by the 
Governor qua Governor and those functions in respect of which 
he acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers or in his discretion. 
4.2.13 In the recent case of Rameshwar Prasad, Chief Justice 
Sabharwal, while stating the
majority opinion held: The immunity 
granted to the Governor under Article 361 ( 1) does not affect the 
power of the Court to judicially scrutinize the attack made to the 
proclamation issued under Article 361 (1) of the Constitution of 
India on the ground of mala fides or it being ultra vi res. It would 
be for the Government to satisfy the court and adequately meet 
such ground of challenge. A mala fide act is wholly outside the 
scope of the power and has no existence in the eyes of law. Even, 
the expression "purporting to be done" in Article 361 (I) does not 
cover acts which are mala fide or ultra vires and, thus, the 
Government supporting the proclamation under Article 361 ( 1) shall 
have to meet the challenge. 
The personal immunity from answerability provided in Article 
36](1) does not barthe challenge that may be made to their actions. 
Under law, such actions including those actions where the challenge 
may be based on the allegations ofmala fides are required to be 
defended by Union of India or the State, as the case may be. 
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Even in cases where the personal mala fides are alleged and 
established; it would not be open to the Governments to urge that 
the same cannot be satisfactorily answered because of the 
immunity granted. In such an eventuality, it is for the respondent 
defending the action to satisfy the Court either on the basis of the 
material on record or even filing the affidavit of the person against 
whom such allegation of personal mala fides are made. Article 
361(1) does not bar filing ofan affidavit ifone wants to file on his 
own. The bar is only against the power of the Court to issue 
notice or making the President or the Governor answerable. In 
view of the bar, the Court cannot issue direction to President or 
Governor for even filing of affidavit to assist the Court. 
4.2.14 In a ve1y limited field. howe\~JJb.eS!.\wernoi: .. ill!!Y exercise 
certain functio_ns in his dis~n~tion~_provided ii] Article 163( I). 
The first part of Article 163( 1) requires the Governor to act on 
the advice of his Council of Ministers. There is. however. an 
exce12tion in the latter part of the clause in regard to matters where 
he is by or under the Constitution required to function in his 
discretion. The exP.ression "required" signifies that the Governor 
can exercise his discretionary powers only if there is a compelling 
necessity to do so. It has been held that the expression "by or 
under the Constitution" means that the
necessity to exercise such 
powers may arise from any express provision of the Constitution 
or by necessary implication. We would like to add that such 
necessity may also arise from rules and orders made "under" the 
Constitution." 
4.2.15 Thus, the scope of discretiona1y powers as provided in the 
exception in clause ( 1) and in clause (2) of Article 163 has been 
limited by the clear language of the two clauses. It is an accepted 
principle that in a parliamentary democracy with a responsible 
form of government, the powers of the Governor as Constitutional 
or formal head of the State should not be enlarged at the cost of 
the real executive, viz. the Council of Ministers. The scope of 
discretionary powers has to be strictly construed, effectively 
dispelling the apprehension, if any, that the area for the exercise 
of discretion covers all or any of the functions to be exercised by 
the Governor under the Constitution. In other words, Article 163 
does not give the Governor a general discretionary power to act 
against or without the advice of his Council of Ministers. The
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
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AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
area for the exercise of his discretion is limited. Even this limited 
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area. his choice of action should not be arbitrary or fanciful. It 
must be a choice dictated by reason, actuated by good faith and 
tempered by caution. 
4.3 Role of Governor in Management of Centre-State Relations 
4.3.0 I The role of the Governor has been a key issue in the matters 
of Central State relations. The Constitution of India envisages 
three tiers of Government - the Union, State and the Local Self-
Government. In the light ofa volatile Political system prevailing 
today, it is pertinent to recognize the crucial role played by the 
Governors in the working of the democratic framework. 
Addressing the Conference of Governors in June 2005, the 
President of India, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam stressed the relevance 
of recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission and observed 
that "While there are many checks and balances provided by the 
Constitution, the office of the Governor has been bestowed with 
the independence to rise above the day-to-day politics and override 
compulsions either emanating from the central system or the state 
system. "The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh on the same 
occasion noted that "you are the representatives of the centre in 
states and hence, you bring a national perspective to state level 
actions and activities". The then Vice-President oflndia, Shri G.S. 
Pathak, had
remarked in 1970 that "in the sphere which is bound 
by the advice of the Council of Ministers, for obvious reasons, the 
Governor must be independent of the center" as there may be 
cases "where the advice of the Center may clash with advice of 
the State Council of Ministers" and that "in such cases the 
Governor must ignore the Centre's "advice" and act on the advice 
of his Council ofMinisters.". 
4.3.02 One highly significant role which he (Governor) has to play 
under the Constitution is of making a report where he finds that a 
situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot 
be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
The Governor is not amenable to the directions of the Government 
of India, nor is he accountable to them forJhe manner in which he 
carries out his functions and duties. He is an independent 
constitutional office which is not subject to the control of the 
Government of India. 
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4.3.03 The Court in Rameshwar Prasad case affirmed the 
following views of the Sarkaria Commission that the Governor 
needs to discharge "dual responsibility" to the Union and the State. 
Further, most of the safeguards as regards the working of the 
Governor will be such as cannot be reduced to a set of precise 
rules of procedure or practice. This is so because of the very 
nature of the office and the role of the Governor. The safeguards 
have mostly to be in the nature of conventions and practices, to 
be understood in their proper perspective and faithfully adhered 
to, not only by the Union and the State Governments but also by 
the political parties. 
4.5 Powers of the Governor in the Context of Harmonious Centre-
State Relations 
Article 163 of the Constitution, unlike Article 74. carves out two 
ways in which the power of the Governor must be exercised. 
One, in which the Governor has to act in accordance with the aid 
and advice of the Council of Ministers and two. where he exercises 
his personal discretion. The concept of the Governor acting in his 
discretion or exercising independent judgment is not alien to the 
Constitution. The normal rule is that the Governor acts on the aid 
and advice of the Council of Ministers, but there are exceptions 
under which the Governor can act in his own discretion. The 
powers in exercise of which the Governor has to use his personal 
discretion have now been
settled through judicial pronouncements. 
In relation to other powers, even though the Constitution uses 
phrases like "he thinks fit" and "in exercise of his discretion", the 
Governor must act on the aid and advise of the Council of 
Ministers. 
Article 163(2) gives an impression that the Governor has a wide, 
undefined area of discretionary powers even outside situations 
where the Constitution has expressly provided for it. Such an 
impression needs to be dispelled. The Commission is of the view 
that the scope of discretionary powers under Article 163(2) has 
to be narrowly construed, effectively dispelling the apprehension, 
if any. that the so-called discretionary powers extends to all the 
functions that the Governor is empowered under the Constitution. 
Article 163 does not give the Governor a general discretionary 
power to act against or without the advice of his Council of· 
Ministers. In fact. the area for the exercise of discretion is limited
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
97 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
and even in this limited area. his choice of action should not be nor 
A 
appear to be arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice dictated by 
reason. activated by good faith and tempered by caution. 
The Governor's discretionary powers are the following: to give 
assent or withhold or refer a Bill for Presidential assent under 
Article 200; the appointment of the Chief Minister under Article 
164; dismissal of a Government which has lost confidence but 
refuses to quit. since the Chief Minister holds office during the 
pleasure of the Governor; dissolution of the House under Article 
174; Governor;s report under Article 356; Governor's responsibilitv 
for certain regions under Article 371-A, 371-C. 371-E, 371-H etc. 
These aspects are now considered below: 
4.5.03 Dismissal of the Chief Minister 
It has already been stated that the Council of Ministers occupy 
office upon the pleasure of the Governor. Further. Article 164 
states that Council ofMinisters shall be collectively responsible to 
the Legislative Assembly of the State. So the question arose as to 
whether the discretion of the Governor or his pleasure is curtailed 
by the fact that the Ministers no longer enjoy the confidence of 
the House. Courts have time and again clarified that the discretion 
of the Governor is not fettered by any condition or restriction. It 
was held thatthe Assembly could only express want
ofconfidence 
in the Ministry; it can go no further. The power to dismiss solely 
and entirely rests with the Governor. However, the fact that the 
Ministry has lost confidence is a major consideration for its 
dismissal. 
The Sarkaria Commission recommended that if a Government 
loses its majority, it should be given a chance to prove whether it 
has a majority or not on the floor of the House. The Governor 
should not dismiss a Council of Ministers, unless the Legislative 
Assembly has expressed on the floor of the House its want of 
confidence in it. He should advise the ChiefMinisterto summon 
the Assembly as early as possible. If the Chief Minister does not 
accept the Governor's advice, the Governor may, summon the 
Assembly for the specific purpose of testing the majority of the 
Ministry. The Assembly should be summoned to meet early within 
a reasonable time. What is "reasonable" will depend on the 
circumstances of each case. Generally, a period of 30 days will 
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be reasonable, unless there is very ur.gent business to be 
transacted, such as passing the Budget, in which case, a shorter 
period may be indicated. On the question of dismissal of a Chief 
Minister, the Governor should invariably insist on the Chief Minister 
proving his majority on the floor of the House for which he should 
prescribe a time limit. This view of the Sarkaria Commission ought 
to be considered in the form ofa Constitutional Amendment. 
4.5.04 Summoning, proroguing and dissolution of the legislative 
assembly 
Article 174 of the Constitution empowers the Governor to summon, 
prorogue or dissolve the House. It is a well-recognised principle 
that, so long as the Council of Ministers enjoys the confidence of 
the Assembly, its advice in these matters, unless patently 
unconstitutional must be deemed as binding on the Governor. It is 
only where such advice, if acted upon, would lead to an 
infringement of a constitutional provision, or where the Council of 
Ministers has ceased to enjoy the confidence of the Assembly, 
that the question arises whether the Governor may act in the 
exercise of his discretion. The Sarkaria Commission recommended 
that, if the Chief Minister neglects or refuses to summon the 
Assembly for holding a "Floor Test", the Governor should summon 
the Assembly for the purpose. As regar~roroguing a House of 
Legislature, the Governor should normally act on the advice of
the ChiefMinister. But where the latter advises prorogation when 
a notice of no-confidence motion against the Ministry is pending, 
the Governor should not straightaway accept the advice. If he 
finds that the no-confidence motion represents a legitimate 
challenge from the Opposition, he should advice the Chief Minister 
to postpone prorogation and face the motion. As far as dissolution 
of the House is concerned, the Governor is bound by the decision 
taken by the Chief Minister who has majority. However, if the 
advice is rendered by a Chief Minister who doesn't have majority, 
then the Governor can try to see if an alternate government can 
be formed and only if that isn't possible, should the house be 
dissolved. This Commission reiterates the recommendations of 
the Sarkaria Commission in this regard.,. 
59. Learned senior counsel then placed reliance on Article 166, 
which postulates the manner of conducting the executive business of
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
the State Government. It was pointed out, that the Governor, has been 
assigned the responsibility of framing rules under Article 166. For the 
State of Arunachal Pradesh, these rules were notified on 9 .4.1987::.. the 
Arunachal Pradesh Rules of Executive Business, 1987 (hereinafter 
referred to as, the Rules of Executive Business). It was submitted, that 
Part-I of the Rules of Executive Business containing Rules 4 to 12 are 
clustered under the heading - "Allocation and Disposal of Business". 
Whereas Part-II containing Rules 13 to 21, are grouped under the ·. 
heading- "Procedure of the Cabinet". Learned counsel thereupon, invited 
our attention to Rule 4 from Part-I and Rules 13 and ·14 from Part-II, 
which are being extracted hereunder: 
Part I 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
Rule4 
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"4. The business of the Government shall be transacted in -its 
different departments. Allocation of subjects among the· 
departments shall continue to be as set out in the Government of 
D 
.· Arunachal Pradesh (Allocation) Rules, 1975 (as notified from time . 
to time) until new Rules are prescribed." 
xxx 
Rules 13 and 14 
Part II 
xxx 
"13. The Chief Secretary shall be the Secretary to the Cabinet· 
and another officer shall be designated to ee the Joint Secretary 
to the Cabinet. In the· absence of both the Chief Secretary and 
the Joint Secretary to the Cabinet the Chief Minister may appoint 
for this
purpose any other Secretary to f.unction as the Secretary 
to the Cabinet. 
· 14. All cases referred to as in the schedule shall, after consideration 
by the Minister be sent to the §ecretary with a view to obtaining 
orders of the Chief Minister for circulation of the-case.under Rule 
16 or for bringing it for consideration at a meeting of the Cabinet." 
60. Learned counsel then drew our attention to the Schedule 
referred to in Rules 8 and 14, and further invited our attention, to item 
no.4 in the said Schedule which is extracted below: 
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"Proposals to summon, prorogue or dissolve the legislature of the . · · 
State". 
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[2016] 6 S.C.R. 
It was urged on behalf of the appellants, that in the matter of summoning 
the House for 16.12.2015, the procedure contemplated under Rules 8, 
13 and 14 ought to have been adopted. But the same was breached. 
Learned senior counsel further pointed out, that while passing the order 
dated 3.11.2015 (when the same Governor had summoned the 6th session 
of the House to meet at 10 a.m. on 14.1.2016), the procedure 
contemplated under Rules 8 and 14 was duly followed. Learned counsel 
then referred to the summoning particulars to demonstrate, that the 
proposal to summon the 6th.s~ssion of the House, had emanated from 
the Chief Minister. The Court's attention was also invited to the fact, 
that the Speaker of the Assembly had also been consulted, on the matter, 
as also the duration of the 6th session, whereupon, the Chief Minister 
submitted the outcome on the matter to the Governor. It was pointed 
out, that the Governor had duly accepted the proposal, and had scheduled 
the 6th session of the Assembly, to meet at I 0 a.m. on 14.1.2016. It was 
asserted, that the above rules framed under Article 166 were binding 
and every constitutional authority, including the Governor of the State, 
who js bound to carry out his functions/duties in compliance therewith. 
61. In addition to the above, our attention was invited to the 
'Conduct of Business Rules', framed under Article 208. Learned senior 
counsel pointedly
drew our attention to Rule 3, which is extracted 
hereunder: 
"3. The Chief Minister shall, in consultation with the Speaker, fix 
the date of commencement and the duration of the session, advise 
the Governor for summoning the Assembly under Article 174 of 
the Constitution." 
A perusal of the above rule, according to learned senior counsel, postulates 
a procedure, similar to the one-contemplated under the Rules of Executive 
Business, framed under Article 166. It was submitted, that in view of 
the clear mandate of Rule 3 extracted above, not only the Rules of 
Executive Business, framed under Article 166 must be deemed to have 
been breached by the Governor(through his order dated 9.12.2015), the 
Governor must also be deemed to-have breached Rule 3 of the Conduct 
of Business Rules, framed under Article 208. It was therefore the 
contention of learned counsel for the appellants, that the order of the 
Governor dated 9.12.2015, preponing the 6th session of the Assembly 
from the earlier determined date - 14.01.2016, by summoning it for 
16.12.2015, was in breach of the rules framed under the Constitution, 
and was liable to be set aside.
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 101 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
The foundation of the respondents' case: 
The third sequence of facts: 
62. A notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker - Nabam 
Rebia, was moved on 19.11.2015. This factual position is not in dispute. 
The authors of this notice were 13 MLAs- 11 belonging to the BJP and 
2 Independent MLAs. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants, that 
a notice of resolution dated 16.11.2015 was moved by 16 MLAs, all 
belonging to the INC, for the removal of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing 
Norbu Thongdok. This factual position is disputed at the hands of the 
respondents. The claim of the respondents before this Court was, that 
no such resolution had been moved under Article 179, forthe removal of 
the Dep~ty Speaker. During the course of hearing, we ventured to 
determine the factual position. In support Qf their assertion, learned 
counsel for the appellants invited our attention to a xerox copy of the 
notice dated 16.11.2015, which is reproduced below: 
''To, 
The Secretary' 
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly 
Naharlagun. 
Sub: Resolution for Removal of Deputv Speaker, under Article 
179(c) of Constitution of India and Rule 151 (Chapter XX) of 
Rules of procedure and conduct of Business AP Legislative 
Assembly. 
Sir, 
We the Members of the 61h Arunachal Pradesh Legislative 
Assembly do here by move this resolution as per the Articles and 
Rules quoted in the subject cited
above. The specific Charges 
against the incumbent Deputy Speaker warranting his removal 
from the post are as below: 
· 
. 
. 
1. The Deputy Speaker is absent from attending his office 
continuously for a period three months which shows disability to " 
hold the post of Deputy Speaker 
2. The Deputy Speaker is involved in active political dissidence 
activity and thereby demeaning the office of the Deputy Speaker 
and also there by the neutrality and sanctity of the Legislative 
Assembly is at stake. 
Therefore, we request you to kindly accept this resolution and 
initiate necessary action immediately. 
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Yours Sincerely" · H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 6 S.C.R. 
All 16 MLAs had affixed their signatures, below theabove notice. Having 
perused the aforesaid document, and having found no clear endorsements 
thereon (depicting the receipt thereof, in the office of the Secretary, 
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly), we called.for the original. 
During the hearing, learned counsel representing the appellants adopted 
the stance, that the original resolution was in the custody of the 
respondents, whereas, learned counsel for the respondents pleaded to 
the contrary, namely, that the same was in the custody of the appellants. 
It is therefore apparent, that even though the Court desired to peruse the 
original resolution mpved by 16 MLAs for the removal of the Deputy 
Speaker, the same was never produced for consideration. For sure the 
appellants, ifnothing else, could have filed an affidavit of the concerned 
16 MLAs, along with a copy of the resolution. But they did nothing of 
the sort. 
63. Despite the above, it was asserted on behalf of the 
respondents, that there was substantial material on the record of the 
case, to demonstrate that such a resolution had never been moved. In 
order to establish that the notice dated 16.11.2015 was actually submitted, 
learned counsel for the appellants referred to a letter dated· 7.12.2015 
addressed by the.Deputy Secretary - Minik Damin (attached to the 
Governor), to the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. The above
communication which bore reference number GS/I-115/00 (Vol.II)/6742, 
is being extracted hereunder: 
"To 
The Secretary,, 
· Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, 
Arunachal Pradesh, 
Naharlagun. 
Sub: Notice of Resolution for removal of Deputy Speaker. 
Sir, 
I am directed to inform you that there is a Notice of Resolution 
for removal of Deputv Speaker. A copy of the resolution may 
kindly be forwarded to this Office for information and perusal of 
His Excellency the Governor. The Hon'ble Governor would also 
like to have the following information on the above stated resolution 
at the earliest. 
I. Date ofreceipt of the notice of the resolution in the Legislative 
H 
Assembly.
'. 
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER I 03 
·AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
2. Action taken by the Legislative Assembly on the notice: 
A 
3. Highlight of the precedents, if any. 
' 
. 
' 
Kindly ensure that replies of above points are sent latest by 8'• 
December, 2015. 
Yours faithfully, 
signed(illegible) 
B 
07.12.2015 
(MinikDamin) 
Deputy Secretary to Governor" 
The aforesaid communication, according to learned counsel for the 
appellants, was responded to by the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly 
on the following day, i.e., 8.12.2015. The response is extracted below: 
"To, 
The Secretary to Governor, 
. Governor's Secretariat, 
RajBhawan, 
Itanagar. 
Sub: Notice of Resolution of Removal ofHon'ble Deputy Speaker. 
Sir, . 
With reference to your letter No. GS/1-115/00 (Vol-II) 6742 
dated 7"' December, 2015 on the above mentioned subject, I am 
to furnish the following information required by you for kind peruSal 
of His Excellency, the Governor. 
. 
. 
I. 
o.t~ of Receipt of !I'• 
!6th November. 2015. 
Notice of the Resofu11on 
of 
the 
Legislative 
Assembly. 
2. 
Action Taken 
by 
!he 
Legislative Assembly on 
Notice 
·· 
3. 
Highlightoflhe precedent 
Signed (illegible) 8/12115' 
Fl le 
processed 
and 
\!!!der 
consideration 
of 
Hon'ble 
Speaker. 
Nill 
Yours faithfully, 
signed 
8/XII/15 
(M.LASA) 
Secretary, 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly, 
Naharlag\!!!. 
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[2016) 6 S.C!l( 
Further it is learned that Hon'ble speaker is en tour in his home 
con-sti1uency. He is: likely to return late night today. 
For information please. 
Di. Secretary to Governor 
_, 
H.E. maY like to Peruse Please. 
Illegjble 
signed 
08.12.IS" 
Signed 
8.12.1 s 
D.S. 
signed (illegible) 
(Tage Ha bung) SP 
A DC to G ovcrnor 
•
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 105 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Based on the note/endorsement extracted above, it was submitted, that 
even though the Deputy Secretary to the Governor, through his 
communication dated 7.12.2015, had sought "A copy of ... " the notice of 
resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu 
Thongdok, the same was not furnished to the Governor. Further more, it 
was pointed out from the note/endorsement dated 8.12.2015 (of the 
Superintendent of Police-cum-ADC to the Governor), that even on his 
visit to the office of the Speaker, when he had met the Secretary, the_ 
Additional Secretary and the Officer-on-Special Duty to the Speaker, 
he was not furnished with a copy of the notice of resolution for the 
removal of the Deputy Speaker. Rather he was informed, that the same 
was in the personal custody of the Speaker, who was on tour in his home 
constituency. Learned counsel for the respondents wishes us to draw a 
very important inference, from their instant assertion. That, the factum 
of the custody of the notice of resolution for the removal of the Deputy 
-;· Speaker, was allegedly in the custody of the Speaker of the House, and 
that, the Speaker never ever produced the original t-hereof. And the 
Speaker, who is one of the appellants before this Court, did not produce 
_ the same, even when it was called for by the Court. And secondly, despite 
repeated efforts made by the Governor, to obtain a
copy of the notice of 
.resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu 
Thongdok, no such copy was ever furnished to him, by the office of the 
Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. 
66. More important than the factual inferences drawn in the 
foregoing paragraph, was the assertion at the hands of the respondents, 
that the letter addressed by the Secretary of Legislative Assembly dated 
8.12.2015, to the Secretary to the Governor extracted hereinabove, was 
a forged and fabricated document. The accusation was aimed at the 
appellants, who alone could be beneficiaries of the above resolution. To 
demonstrate, that the communication dated 8.12.2015 was a forged and 
fabricated document, the Court's attention was drawn towards a similar 
intimation, about the notice ofresolution for the removal of the Speaker, 
on the very same day- 8.12.2015. The above communication, bearing 
endorsement number LA/Leg.26/2015, is extracted hereunder:-
To, 
The Secretary to Governor, 
Governor Secretariat, 
"Dated Naharlagun, the 8th Dec, 
2015. 
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106 
" , SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
·. [2016) 6 S.C.R; ': · 
A-
Raj Bhawan Itanagar, 
Arunachal Pradi;sh. 
Sub:- Notice of Resolution for Removal ofHon'ble Speaker • 
. Sir, 
With reference to your Letter No.GS/1-115/00 (Vol.II) 6743, 
B 
Dated 07112/2015, on the above mentioned subject, I am to furnish 
the following information required by you for kind perusal of His 
Excellency the Governor. 
c 
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I. 
2. 
3. 
Date ofrecejpt of the notice 
of the resolution of the 
Legislative Assembly. 
. Action 
taken 
by 
the 
Legislative Assembly on 
the notice 
Highlight of the precedents, 
if any. 
19/1 l/2(JJ5 
File processed and · 
under consideration 
ofHon'ble Speaker 
Nil. 
Yours faithfully, 
signed 
(M. Lasa) 
Secretary, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Legislative 
Assembly 
Naharlagun." 
It was the submission oflearned senior counsel forthe respondents, that · 
the letter-head on which the two communications were add~essed by 
c the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly on 8.12.2015, depicting details 
F 
of the resolutions for the removal of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, 
even though addressed on the same day, were different. Having perused · 
the same, we hereby affirm the assertion. It was also pointed out, that· 
the seal of the receipt affixed by the Governor's Secretariat, on the two 
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letters were markedly different, inasmuch as, the seal of the Governor's 
Secretariat on the letter bearing no.LA/LEG-24/2015 (pertaining to the 
notice ofresolutionJor
the removal of the Deputy Speaker) was oflong 
and almost twice the size of the seal on .the letter bearing no. LA/LEG-
26/2015 (pertaining to the notice of resolution for the removal of the 
Speaker), ·which was circular. The former letter merely recorded in 
writing the date 8.12.20 IS on the receipt, whereas the latter bears a 
printed receipt number, as also, a printed date of receipt, which we were
NAB AM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER I 07 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
informed, is the usual practice adopted in the Secretariat of the Governor. 
A 
67. To contest the above accusation, it was submitted on behalf 
of the appellants, that no receipt number was depicted even in the former 
letter bearing no. LA/LEG-24/2015, dated 8.12.2015, which the 
respondents acknowledge as genuine. The respondents therefore placed 
reliance on a third communication, which was also addressed by the 
B 
Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, to the Commissioner to the 
Governor, on the subject of preponement of the 6th Legislative Assembly. 
The instant communication, bearing endorsement number LA/LEG-23/ 
2015, is extracted below: 
~ 
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The Commissioner, 
to the Governor, 
Arunachal Pradesh, 
Itanagar. 
Sub.: Preponing of Sixth Legislative Assembly. 
Sir., 
D 
Please refer Deputy Secretary's letter NO.GS/1-11/00 (Vol. 
- Il/6778 dated 10.12.2015 forwarding (i) Order modifying 
summons dated 3'd November, 2015 under 174( 1) of the 
Constitution oflndia; and (ii) Message under article 175 (2) of the 
Constitution oflndia. 
E 
This office had issued summons for the Sixth Session of Sixth 
Legislative Assembly conveying the order dated 03.11.2015 of 
His Excellency. Accordingly, this office has swung in to action 
and initiated all necessary steps for conducting the Session with 
effect from I 41h January, 2015. In the meantime we have received 
F 
a communication
referred above from the Deputy Secretary, 
Governor's Secretariat preponing the assembly session and fixing 
the agenda for the Session. 
I am to state that as per normal practice and procedure the 
notice for summoning of the Assembly Session should reach the 
G 
Legislative Assembly Secretariat through the Department of 
Parliamentary Affairs Department of the State Govt. Secondly. 
under article 174 there is no provision to prepone or postpone 
Assembly Session without consulting the Govt/Speaker. Article 
175 clearly relates that His Excellency can address and send 
messages to when the House in Session. 
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[20 I 6] 6 S.C.R. 
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It may be mentioned here that as per rules and procedure of 
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Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly agenda for any session 
is finalized by the Business Advisorv Committee as per order of 
precedence in the Rules. 
However. Legislative Assembly Secretariat has obtained legal 
opinion and advice from the Learned Advocate General of 
Arunachal Pradesh which is enclose herewith for your perusal 
and guidance. 
Recd at 
3 pm. Please 
put up on file 
expeditiously. - US (NN) to 
receive.a copy 
signed 
14/12 
US <NNl 
D.S. 
State Cabinet in its meeting held today at I 000 hrs has also conveyed its 
resolution which is reproduced below for your perusal "We have also 
received the opinion of the Ld. Advocate General dated 12.12.2015 on 
the said Order and Message. The Cabinet has per used the said opinion 
and is in complete agreement with views the Ld. Advocate General. 
The said order dated 09.12.2015 issued by His Excellency the 
Governor of Arunachal Pradesh is in contradiction to Article 174 read 
with Article 163 of the Constitution oflndia and Rule 3 of the Rules of 
P{ocedure and Conduct of Business ("Rules"). Similarly, the message 
is contrary to Article 175 of the Constitution read with Rule 245 of the 
Rules. 
We, therefore advice the Hon'ble Speaker not to take any action 
on the said Order and Message. The concerned officers are accordingly 
directed to take necessary action." 
· 
· 
In view of
above, we have no other alternative but to stick to the 
earlier order of His Excellency to convene the Sixth Assembly Session 
with effect from I 4"' to 18"' January, 2015 excluding the ho! idays. 
Yours faithfully, 
signed (illegible) 
(M. Lasa) 
Secretary, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Legislative Assembly"
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 109 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
68. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents, that the seal on 
the receipt of the instant communication in the Governor's Secretariat, 
is identical to the receipt of the notice of resolution for the removal of 
the Speaker. This communication, according to learned counsel for the 
respondents, was a genuine communication, which was duly received at 
the Governor's Secretariat. The reliance on the instant communication 
dated 14.12.2015, according to learned senior counsel, is of utmost 
significance to determine, that fraud had been played by the appellants. 
This assertion was sought to be demonstrated, by depicting the numbers 
assigned to the three communications of the office of the Secretary of 
the Legislative Assembly, coupled with the date of issuance thereof. 
We may tabulate the position as under: 
SI. 
Letter Nos. 
No. 
Dated 
Receipt No. and date 
thereof 
at 
the 
Governor's 
Secretariat 
I. 
LA/LEG-2312015 
14'h December, 2015 
Receipt 
No. 
6246 
dated 14.12.2015 
2. 
LNLEG-2412015 
8
1h December, 2015 
3. 
LA/Leg.26/2015 
81h December, 2015 
Receipt 
No. 
Nil, 
dated 8.12.2015 
Receipt 
No.6127 
dated 8.12.2015 
The three letters to which our attention was drawn bore numbers 23, 24 
and 26. The first communication which bears no. LA/LEG-23/2015 was 
dated 14.12.2015. The said communication was addressed by M. Lasa 
- Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, to
Commissioner to the Governor, 
Arunachal Pradesh. It pertained to the preponement of the 6th Legislative 
Assembly. In seriatim, the second communication bearing no. LNLEG-
24/2015 was dated 8.12.2015. The said communication was also 
addressed by M. Lasa - Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, to the 
Secretary to the Governor. The above noted communications pertained 
to the notice of resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker. 
Sequentially, the third communication bearing no. LNLEG-26/2015 was' 
also dated 8.12.2015. The said communication was addressed by M. 
Lasa - Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, to Secretary to the 
Governor. The above noted communications pertained to the notice of 
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resolution for the removal of the Speaker. It was pointed out, that the 
above two letters were issued on the same Jetter-head(s), and their 
receipts were recorded under the seal of the Governor's Secretariat, 
bearing not only the number of the receipt(s), but also the date(s) of the 
receipt. Whereas, the communication pertaining to the notice of resolution 
for the removal of the Deputy Speaker, was not only on a different 
letter-head, but was also with a different seal, and bore no receipt number. 
But most importantly, sequentially, the first letter referred to above, was 
dated 14.12.20 I 5, whereas the next two communications with the 
succeeding reference numbers bore the date 8. I 2.2015. It was pointed 
out, that the letter bearing no. LA/LEG-23/2015 having been issued on 
14.12.2015, the other two letters bearing nos. LA/LEG~24/2015 and LA/ 
LEG-26/2015 could not bear a date preceding 14.12.2015. 
69. We were of the view, that the factual positio11 needed to be 
verified, as the inference suggested was logical. We therefore, required 
the officer, who was in custody of the despatch register of the office of 
the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, to produce the same for our 
perusal. Having perused the original record, and having heard the 
explanation tendered by the officer, all ofus were individually satisfied, 
that the numbers jumble suggested on behalf of the respondents, was
not sufficient to lead to the suggested inference. All that can be stated 
in conclusion however is, that the material produced by the rival parties 
for our consideration, with reference to the alleged resolution moved on 
16.11.2015 by 16 members of the House belonging to the INC, for the 
removal of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, is not 
sufficient to render a clear determination on the matter, one way or the 
other. 
The fourth sequence of facts: 
'I 
70. 
Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel entered appearance 
on behalf of respondent nos. 2 to 15, and also, on behalf of respondent 
noS:J I to 3 7. Respondent nos. 2 to 15 are the 14 MLAs belonging to the 
INC, who were disqualified by the Speakeron 15.12.2015. Respondent 
nos. 3 I to 37, are 7 more MLAs also belonging to the INC. The first set 
of 14 MLAs and the second set of? MLAs referred to above, constitute 
the group of 2 I MLAs who had originally been elected on the INC 
ticket, and comprise the breakaway group of dissidents, who desired a , 
change in the political leadership in the Assembly. They had demanded 
the removal ofChiefMinister-Nabam Tuki. It would also be relevant
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 111 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
. to mention, that respondent nos.31 and 3 7 - Wanglam Sawin and Gabriel 
D. Wangsu, were stated to have tendered their resignations, which were 
accepted. Thereupon, the constituencies represented by them, were 
declared vacant. It may also be noted, that respondent nos. 31 and 37 
had assailed the acceptance of their resignations before the High Court, 
but the challenge raised by them, was rejected by the High Court. We 
are informed, that a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal filed by them 
before this Court, assailing the above order of the High Court, has also 
been dismissed. 
71. The submissions advanced on behalf of the respondents, 
require us to record another sequence of facts. It was submitted by 
learned counsel, that the 5th session of the Assembly was concluded on 
21.10.2015. The Governor issued an order on).11.2015 summoning the 
6th session, and scheduled its commencement for 14.1.2016. In the 
interregnum 13 MLAs - 11 belonging to the BJP and 2 Independent 
MLAs, issued a notice (-dated 19.11.20L5) of resolution forthe removal 
of the Speaker - Nabam Rebia. The above factual position was 
confirmed by the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly - M. Lasa, to 
Secretary to the Governor on 8.12.2015. Having issued the above notice, 
the concerned 13 MLAs addressed a letter to the Governor (dated, 
19.11.2015) for the preponement of the meeting/proceeding of the House.
The aforesaid communication, which was received in the office of the 
Governor' on 20.11.2015, is reproduced below: 
,''REQUEST TO GOVERNOR FOR PREPONING THE 
NEXT SESSION OF APLA TO CONSIDER AND VOTE 
ON THE RESOLUTION FOR REMOVAL OF THE 
SPEAKER 
Honourable Governor Saheb 
Naharlagun 
19-11-2015 
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We, the undersigned members of the Arunachal Pradesh 
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Legislative Assembly. 13 in number, wish to table a notice of 
resolution for removal of Shri Nabam Rebia from the Office of 
Speaker in exercise of our powers under article 179 read with 
article 181 of the Constitution of India further read with Rules 
151to154 of the Rules of Procedure of the House. 
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The notice of Resolution for removal of the Speaker, signed 
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by all of us and addressed to the Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly and endorsed to the Speaker and Deputy 
Speaker of the Assembly is enclosed. 
As this Resolution is not a resolution under the Rules of 
~rocedure of the House, but a resolution under article 179 read 
with article 181 of the Constitution oflndia, the said Resolution, 
as soon as it is given notice of, requires to be disposed of by the 
Legislative Assembly immediately after the completion of the 
mandatory time period of 14 days prescribed in the Constitution. 
You are aware, sir, that generally sessions of the House are 
convened on the recommendation of the Government of the day, 
so that matters related to governance are considered by the House. 
The matter relating to removal of the incumbent from the Office 
of Speaker is not a matter of governance but limited to the confines 
of Legislature with which Government of the day is not concerned. 
Since a Speaker enjoys and sustains his office with the support of 
the ruling party which now, in the present case, stands reduced to 
only 25, even extraordinarily also, no Government recommendations 
would be forthcoming for a session to consider the resolution for 
removal which we tabled. 
You have however called the next session on the 61h Arunachal 
Pradesh Legislative Assembly to meet on J 4!h January, 2016 but
this Resolution for removal for which notice once given, cannot 
wait for nearly two months time. Since the Constitutional imperative 
has to be complied with, a session at the earliest becomes 
indispensable. 
We therefore beseech you sir that you may be pleased to 
rescind the summons issued forthe House to meet on J4!h January, 
2016 and re-issue the summons for the House to meet at an 
emergent date so that the Resolution aforesaid is considered and 
disposed at the earliest in accordance with the scheme, purpose 
and timeframe envisaged by the Constitution makers. Any delay 
in this behalf would gravely and irreversibly affect the ends of 
justice as guaranteed in the said Constitutional provisions and Rules. 
You are also aware how recent reports in the newspapers 
about the alleged moral turpitude of the incumbent in the office of
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
113 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Speaker as evidenced by the criminal complaint of a women 
against him, that has brought down the esteem of the office of the 
Speaker.,, The dignity of the Speaker's office needs thus to be 
restored with the utmost dispatch through your hands of calling a 
session at the earliest in lieu of the session that has been summoned 
to meet on 14.1.2016. 
You also have the power to modify your summons by merely 
preponing the date of the meet from 14 January 2016 to any date 
immediately after completion of the 14 days period. As all notices 
given after issue of summons are valid. you may be pleased to 
prepone the session to a date immediately after 14 days of the 
date of notice of our resolution for removal of the Speaker. 
' 
We pray your honour accordingly with the hope that you would 
save democracy from peril at the hands of the Speaker. 
sd/-
-
(T~MIYO TAGA) 
LEADER OF OPPOSITION 
(JAPU DERU) 
MLA" 
A perusal of the aforesaid communication reveals, that the concerned 
13 MLAs had sought the removal of the Speaker - Nabam Rebia under 
Articles 179 and 181. It was also pointed out, that in consonance with 
the procedure of the House, such a resolution was required to be 
considered and disposed of, by the Assembly immediately after the 
minimum mandatory period of 14 days. It was also 'urged, that the ruling 
political party-the INC, was no longer enjoying majority in the House,
as its strength stood reduced to only 25 out of a total of 60 members. It 
was in this background, that a prayer was made by the concerned 13 
legislators to the Governor, to cancel the summoning of the 6th session 
of the Assembly for 14.1.2016, and to re-summon the House at the 
earliest, so that the resolution could be settled without any delay. It was 
submitted, that the 13 MLAs had advised the Governor, that he had the 
- power to modify the earlier summons, and prepone the date of summoning 
of the Asse!llbly. 
72. It is also relevant to mention, that on 27.11.2015 the 
Commissioner to the Governor, addressed a letter to the Secretary of 
the State Legislative Assembly, that the Governor was in receipt of a 
resolution signed by 13 members of the House, seeking the removal of 
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the Speaker of the Assembly. On behalf of the Governor, the 
Commissioner sought the following information through the aforesaid 
communication: 
"I. Date ofreceipt of the notice of the resolution in the Legislative 
Assembly. 
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2. Action being taken by the Legislative Assembly on the notice. 
3. Highlights of precedents, if any. 
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Kindly ensure that replies to above points are sent at the earliest." 
73. Even though the aforesaid information was sought expeditiously, 
when no such information was furnished by the Secretary of the State 
Legislative Assembly, the Deputy Secretary to the Governor, addressed 
another letter dated 3.12.2015 to the above Secretary, seeking the same 
information again. The aforesaid communication also remained 
unanswered. Whereupon, a third communication dated 7.12.2015 was 
addressed to the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly for the same 
purpose. An extract of the letter dated 7.12.2015 is reproduced hereunder: 
"To, 
The Secretary, 
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, 
Arunachal Pradesh, 
Naharlagun. 
Sub: Notice of Resolution for removal of Speaker. 
Sir, 
I am directed to refer to our letter of even number dated 
27.11.2015 and 03.12.2015 on the above subject wherein you have 
been requested to furnish the following information to this office 
for kind perusal of His Excellency the Governor. 
I. Date ofreceipt of the notice of the resolution in the Legislative
Assembly. 
2. Action taken by the Legislative Assembly on the notice. 
3. Highlight of the precedents, if any. 
Required information have not been received from your end till 
date. 
Kindly ensure that replies of above points are sent latest by 81h 
December, 2015."
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
74. In the sequence of events, noticed above, it is also pertinent to 
mention, that the Chief Whip of the INC- Rajesh Tacho, filed a petition 
on 7.12.2015 seeking disqualification of 14 members of the House 
(respondent nos. 2 to 15), belonging to the INC, under Artie.le 191(2) 
read with paragraphs 2(l)(a), 6(1) and (2) of the Tenth Schedule, read 
with Rules 3(7) and 6 of the Members of the Arunachal Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 
1987. 
75. It was also pointed out, that the Secretary of the Legislative 
Assembly, through a communication dated 8.12.2015, informed the 
Governor that a notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker -
Nabam Rebia, had been received in his office on 19.11.2015. !twas the 
case of the respondents, that on confirmation of the fact that 13 MLAs 
had issued a notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker on 
19.11.2015, the Governor sought legal opinion, with reference to the 
proceedings of disqualification initiated by the Chief Whip of the INC, 
and also, aboutthe validity and legitimacy of the Speaker sitting in judgment 
over the adjudication of the disqualification proceedings under the Tenth 
Schedule, during the pendency of the notice ofresolution for his own 
removal. Based on the advice tendered to him, the Governor entertained 
an impression, that there was an attempt to subvert the
provisions of the 
Constitution. The Governor therefore, it was urged, exercised his power 
under Article 174( I) suo motu, without any aid and advice, and 
rescheduled the 6th session of the House by preponing it from 14.1.2016 
to 16.12.2015. 
The first installment oflegal submissions, on behalf of the respondents: 
76. Based on the factual premise recorded above, it was the 
contention of Mr. Vikas Singh, and also, Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned 
Senior Advocates, that the actions of high constitutional functiornii:~ 
referred to above, were a clear testimony of the fact, that the democratic 
process in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, was being subverted and 
undermined. As such, it became the constitutional obligation of the 
Governor, to ensure that the constitutional functioning was restored, as 
would re-establish the purity of the democratic process. Additionally, it 
was the submission oflearned counsel, that the action taken in this case, 
was akin to the one where the Governor requires the ruling party (or 
combination) to demonstrate its majority/strength, on the floor of the 
House. The instant action of the Governor, according to learned counsel, 
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originated from the same logic and rationale, and th_erefore, could not 
have been dealt with differently. Accordingly it was urged, that this 
Court shou Id not find fault with the legality or constitutionality of the 
action of the Governor, and also, with the Governor's bona fides, ill 
having issued the order, and the message dated 9.12.2015. 
77. It was the contention ofMr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior 
Advocate, th_at the House could have been summonea for any day after 
3.12.2015. This because, the minimum notice period of! 4 days mandated 
through the first proviso under Article 179, expired on 3.12.2015. And 
yet, the Governor did not feel the urgency of summoning the House by 
preponing the meeting of the House. It was submitted, that the sense of 
urgency and compulsion, for convening the House assumed a different 
complexion when the Chief Whip of the INC - Rajesh Tacho, filed a 
petition for the disqualification ofrespondent nos. 2 to 15, on 7 .12.2015. 
It was therefore, and in the above background, the urgency of the cause 
assumed significance. In conjunction with the above, the fact that the 
office of the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly confirmed on 
8 .12.2015, that he was in receipt of the notice ofresolution for the removal 
of the Speaker-Nabam Rebia, dated 19.11.2015, revealed that a political 
dimension was bei_ng created, which was clearly undemocratic. The 
Governor,
according to learned counsel, was well within his rights, in the 
above background, to take such action as he in his discretion considered 
appropriate, to re-establish the purity of the democratic process. By the 
order dated 9.12.2015, the Governor preponed the meeting of the 6th 
session of the Asset'nbly originally scheduled for 14.1.2016, to 16.12.2015. 
For taking his order to its logical conclusion, according to learned counsel, 
the Governor through his message dated 9.12.2015, regulated the 
procedure of the House, as would not subvert or undermine the 
democratic process. 
The fifth sequence of facts: 
78. It was urged on behalf of the respondents, that the challenge 
raised by the appellants, to the order of the Go~ernor dated 9.12.2015 
(preponing the-summoning of the House fr01!1 14.1.2016 to 16.12.2015), 
and to other connected issues, before the High Court by filing Writ 
Petition nos.7745 of2015 and 7998 of2015 (on 17.12.2015 and 
22.12.2015, respectively), was not only unfair and unreasonable, but was 
also illegitimate, and constituted a misuse of the jurisdiction of the High
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
117 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Court. It was the contention of learned senior counsel, that the office of 
the Governor received a letter dated 14.12.2015, from the Speaker of 
the Assembly-Nabam Rebia, recording his objection to the order of the 
Governor dated 9.12.2015 preponing the summoning of the House from 
14.1.2016 to 16.12.2015. In his above letter dated 14.12.2015, the Speaker 
also contested the validity of the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015 
(providing the manner in which, proceedings of the 6th session of the 
Assembly should be conducted). 
79. On the same day, i.e., 14.12.2015, the Commissioner to the 
Governor received a letter from the Officer on Special Duty to the Chief 
Minister, seeking a meeting of the Chief Minister and his Council of 
Ministers, and some other MLAs, with the Governor. The said letter 
was received by the Commissioner at 10.15 p.m. on 14.12.2015, and 
was endorsed to the.SSP/ADC to the Governor, on 15.12.2015 at 7.45 
a.m. It was also pointed out, that the aforesaid communication was 
brought to the notice of the Governor at I 0 a.m. on 15.12.2015. Hp.ving 
accepted the aforesaid request, the Governor granted audience to the 
Council of Ministers at 6 p.m. on 15.12.2015 itself. It was submitted, 
that 9 Ministers including the Chief Minister came to meet the Governor 
.at 6.15 p.m. on 15.12.2015, and committed acts of serious misbehaviour. 
Insofar as the details
of their alleged misdemeanour are concerned, the 
same were disclosed by the Governor, to the High Court in IA No.29 of 
2016, in the following words: 
" ..... that at around 6:15 P.M. 9 (nine) ministers including the 
Chief Minister Shri Nabam Tuki came to meet the Governor and 
the Chief Minister initiated the discussion, all of a sudden few 
ministers more particularly the Education Minister Shri. Tapang 
Taloh and Transport Minister without any proyocation started 
abusing the Governor forcing his security personnel to interfere. 
There was infact an attempt to assault the Governor to force him 
to withdraw his order. The Commissioner to the Governor duly 
informed the incident to the Director General of Police which 
was videographed." 
It was also submitted, that a meeting of the Cabinet was heid on 
14.12.2015, with reference to the preponement of the Assembly Session 
from 14.1.2016 to 16.12.2015, whereupon the Cabinet passed the 
following resolution: 
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"MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE CABINET HELD 
ON 14rn DECEMBER, 2015 AT 1000 HRS IN THE 
CONFERENCE HALL OF THE HON'BLE CHIEF 
MINISTER'S RESIDENTIAL OFFICE, ARUNACHAL 
PRADESH, ITANAGAR 
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS PRESENT:-
Shri Nabam Tuki, Chief Minister (In Chair) 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Shri Tanga Byaling, Minister (Home, etc.) 
Shri Tapang Tai oh, Minister (Education, etc.) 
Shri Gojen Gadi, Minister (PWD, etc.) 
Shri Takam Pario, Minister (PHED&WS, etc.) 
Shl·i Rajesh Tacho, Minister (Health & PW, etc.) 
7. Shri Phurpa Tsering;Minister (AH&V, etc.) 
8. Shri Jomde Kena, Minister (Transport, etc.) 
9. Shri TirongAboh, Minister(DoTCL, etc.) 
IN ATTENDANCE 
I. Shri Ramesh Negi, Chief Secretary and Cabinet Secretary 
2. Shri Tajom Taloh, Commissioner & Jt. Secretary to the Cabinet 
3. Shri Onit Panyang, Secretary (Law & Parliamentary Affairs) 
The Cabinet Secretary welcomed the Hon'ble Chief 
Minister and his Council of Ministers. 
AGENDA ITEM NO. I. DISCUSSION ON THE MESSAGE 
DATED 9rn DECEMBER, 2015 OF THE GOVERNOR OF 
ARUNACHAL PRADESH FOR PRE-PONEMENT OF THE 
ASSEMBLY SESSION FROM 14m JANUARY 2016 TO 16rn 
DECEMBER, 2015. 
The Cabinet has discussed the opinion rendered by the Learned 
Advocate General dated 12.12.2015 on the constitutionality of 
the order and message of HE, the Governor. After careful 
examination, the Cabinet has resolved as under: 
, 
The State Cabinet at its meeting held
on L4lh December. 2015 
at I 000 hrs in CM's conference hall again discussed in detail the 
Order and the Message dated 09.12.2015 of His Excellency the 
Governor of Arunahal Pradesh. 
Cabinet has received the opinion of the Ld. Advocate General
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 119 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.) 
dated 12.12.2015 and other legal experts on the said Order and 
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Message. The Cabinet has perused the said opinion and is in 
complete agreement with views of the Ld. Advocate General. 
The said Order dated 09.12.2015 issued by His Excellency 
the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh is in contradiction to Article 
174 read with Article 163 of the Constitution oflndia and Rules 3 
B 
and 3A of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the 
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Similarly, the Message 
is contrary to Article 175 of the Constitution read with Rule 245 
of the said Rules. Moreover, the Hon'ble High Court ofGauhati 
has fixed the hearing of the case of resignation of2 MLAs from 
the Assembly on 16!!! December, 2015. 
Therefore, the Cabinet resolves .. ;, His Excellency, the 
Governor of Arunachal Pradesh to recall and cancel the Order 
and the Message dated 9!!! December, 2015 and allow the Session 
to be convened on 14!!! January, 2016 as already ordered and 
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scheduled. 
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The Cabinet also resolves to endorse a copy each of this 
resolution and legal advice of the Ld. Advocate General to the 
.Hon'ble Speaker. 
. .. Secretary (Cabinet)" 
80. It was reiterated during the course of hearing, that the meeting 
of the Governor with the Chief Minister and Ministers on 15.12.2015 
was duly video-graphed. It was urged, that the entire episode as it had 
occurred, can be
shown to this Court. The fact that an attempt was 
made by the Chief Minister- Nabam Tuki and his Ministers, to assault 
the Governor, in order to force him to withdraw the order/message dated 
9.12.2015, it was submitted, was duly brought to the notice of the Director 
General of Police, by the Commissioner to the Governor. 
81. Insofar as the request which the Chief Minister and some 
Ministers had made, in their letter dated 14.12.2015 is concerned, it was 
submitted, that the same was an absolute eyewash, because members 
of the INC still supporting the Chief Minister, had already taken a decision 
not to allow the House to meet, as required by the Governor's order 
dated 9.12.2015. In order to substantiate this assertion, learned counsel 
placed reliance on a letter dated 14.12.2015 addressed by the then 
Speaker- Nabam Rebia, to the Minister (Home)- Tanga Byaling. The 
aforesaid letter, which has been extracted in the impugned order passed 
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by the High Court, is reproduced below: 
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"Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly 
Speaker's Cell 
MOST URGENT 
As the Govt. is aware of the fact that a serious law and order 
problem is likely to take place on 16'h of December, 2015, in view 
of the unconstitutional and unprecedented summoning of the Sixth 
Session of Sixty Legislative assembly of Aruifo,;;:il Pradesh by 
the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh. It is ghen to learn that 
thousand Of anti-social elements are taking shelter in the state 
Capital with the motive to create law and order problem on that 
particular date. Illegal arms and ammunition are also reported to 
have been collected for the purpose. Sources have revealed that 
the main target of the anti-social elements would be to burn 
down the legislative building of the state Assembly atNaharlagun. 
I would therefore request the Hon'ble Minister (Home) Govt. 
of Arunachal Pradesh to provide full-proof securitv in and around 
the Assembly building w.e.f. J S!l! - J S!l! December, 2015 on top-
most priority basis. It is also requested that no individual including 
the Hon'ble Legislators be allowed to enter the Assembly building 
premises on JS!l!,J_Q!l!,_U!l! and J S!l! Dec' 15. 
Please treat this as most urgent. 
Urgent 
lllegible 
SP/City 
Deploy sufficient force 
with monitoring system with 
the administration of IRBN + 
CPMF" 
Sd/-
14.12.15 
(NABAM REBIA) 
Speaker 
A perusal of the
aforesaid communication reveals, that the Speaker asked 
the Home Minister to provide foolproof security and to protect the building 
of the State Legislative Assembly. And that, no one, not even MLAs be 
permitted to enter the building from 15.12.2015 to 18.12.2015. 
Accordingly, the Superintendent of Police (City), Itanagar, in compliance 
with the directions issued by the Director General of Police, sufficient 
number of IRBN personnel were deployed, to secure the Assembly
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
121 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
building premises from 15.12.2015 to 18.12.2015, so that no individual 
including legislators, could enter the same. It was pointed out, that the 
Speaker himself(whose continuation in the State Legislative Assembly 
was to be voted upon, on 16.12.2015), being aware of his position, was 
making all out efforts, to circumvent the holding of the said meeting. 
82. In addition to the letter of the Speaker, referred to above, the 
Speaker also addressed a letter on the same day - 14.12.2015, to the 
Governor, wherein he contested the decision of the Governor, to summon 
the House by preponing the summoning date from 14.1.2016 to 
16.12.2015. In the above letter of the Speaker - Nabam Rebia it was 
highlighted, that the provisions of the Constitution, did not authorize the 
Governor, to exercise his powers at his own free will. It was asserted, 
that all the powers of the Governor were to be exercised on the aid and 
advice of the Council of Ministers. Forthis, the Speaker had invited the 
Governor's attention to Article 163( I). It was also pointed out, that there 
was no provision either under the Constitution or the 'Conduct of Business 
Rules', which empowered the Governor to summon a meeting of the 
House, by preponing the date already fixed, in consultation with the Chief 
Minister and his Council of Ministers. In this·behalf, reliance was placed 
on Rule 3 of the 'Conduct of
Business.Rules'. It was pointed out, that 
the 'Conduct of Business Rules' had been framed under Article 208, 
and were binding, not only on the MLAs, but also on the Governor. The 
Governor was accordingly urged by the Speaker, not to press for the 
implementation of the order passed by him summoning the House for · 
16.12.2015, "in the interest of upholding the high moral principles enshrined 
in the Constitution". It was also pointed out, that while preponing the 
session of the- House, the secretariat of the Legislative Assembly had 
not been afforded sufficient time, to make necessary arrangements, for 
holding the preponed session. W~threspect to the order/mes1;age issued 
by the Governor, it was asserted, that the same was unconstitutional, 
and that, it impinged upon the functions of the "Business Advisory 
Committee", constituted under Rule 244 of the 'Conduct of Business 
Rules'. It was urged, that the Governor's attention was invited to the 
fact, that it was the function of the "Business Advisory Committee" 
alone, to schedule the business of the House, and that, it was not within 
the realm of the Governor to require, the notice of resolution for the 
removal of the Speaker, to be taken up as the first item, on the agenda 
for the day. The Speaker - Nabam Rebia also invited the attention of 
the Governor to the resolution of the State Cabinet, in the meeting held 
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on 14.12.2015. It was submitted, that for all the above reasons, the 
Governor was requested to refrain from interfering with the functioning 
of the Legislative Assembly. Based on the above communications, it 
was submitted, that the Speaker was bent upon frustrating, any final 
consideration on the notice ofresolution for his removal. 
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A further instalment oflegal submissions, on behalf of the respondents: 
83. It was submitted by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior 
counsel, that the appel !ants were fully justified in their reference to Article 
154 which deals with the "executive power" of the Mate, ang which 
also explicates, that the same is vested with the Governor. He also 
acknowledged, that the above "executive power" can be exercised by 
the Governor, in the manner expressed in Article 163 - on the aid and 
advice of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head. 
It was however submitted, that the exercise of functions by the Governor 
at his own discretion, is recognized in Article 163(2) itself, which 
contemplates constitutional decision making "in his discretion" without 
any aid and advice. 
84. It was urged, that insofar as the present controversy is 
concerned, a correct understanding of Afticle 163(2) would be of extreme 
relevance. Under Article 163(2), according to learned counsel, the 
Governor has the authority to act on his own, in respect of matters where 
the
Governor is mandated to act in his own discretion "by or under" the 
Constitution. It was further submitted that when a question arises, as to 
whether such discretion is vested with the Governor "by or under" the 
Constitution, the decision of the Governor, on the above question, is fipal 
and binding. It was submitted, that Article 163(2) postulates three 
situations where, as an exception to the general rule, the Governor can 
act at his own will and discretion. Firstly, when he is required to discharge 
his functions by the mandate of some provision of the Constitution itself, 
in his own discretion. Secondly, when the Governor is assigned functions 
on the basis of enactments made under the Constitution, where he is 
mandated to discharge his functions by exercising his own discretion. 
And thirdly, where he is impliedly required to act in his own discretion. 
85. It was pointedly contended, that in the present controversy, 
the question that needs to be determined is, whether Article 174 which 
vests the Governor with the authority to summon the Assembly, can be 
envisioned as one of the provisions, which requires the Governor to 
impliedly act at his own discretion? Learned counsel acknowledged, that
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 123 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
the exercise of discretion by the Governor in the present case did not fall 
within the first two categorizations, postulated in his submission. Insofar 
as the implied power of the Governor with reference to the summoning 
of the House (vi de order dated 9.12.2015) is concerned, the first and 
foremost submission canvassed was, that a clear distinction needed to 
be drawn between Article 174(1), which postulates the authority to 
summon the House, and Article 174(2) which vests the authority to 
prorogue or dissolve the Assembly. In dealing with the distinction between 
the two, it was pointed out, that the process of summoning a House can 
never be considered to be anti-democratic. Summoning the House, 
according to learned counsel, inevitably supports the cause of the 
democratic process. The same, according to learned counsel, may not 
be true with reference to proroguing or dissolving the House. When a 
House is prorogued or dissolved, the democratic process is sought to be 
deferred for the time being, or till the re-election of the members of the 
Legislative Assembly, respectively. 
86. Learned senior counsel also pointedly focused on Article 179, 
and more particularly, sub-article (c) thereof. It was submitted, that an 
incumbent Speaker (or Deputy Speaker) can be removed under sub-
article ( c) of Article 179, by a resolution of the Assembly passed by a 
majority of " ...
all the then members ... " of the Assembly. It was 
submitted, that the issue of removal of the existing Speaker (or Deputy 
Speaker) contemplated under Article 179, should not be confused with 
the exercise of "executive power" of the State. It was asserted, that 
the functions of an Assembly could be placed in two entirely separate 
categories. Firstly, its purely legislative activities. Legislative activity, 
according to learned counsel, included the responsibility of the "executive 
power of the State" represented through the Chief Minister and his 
Council of Ministers, to determine the field and nature oflegislation, to 
be brought before the House for legislation. It was submitted, that in the 
discharge of the aforesaid activity, the Governor can have no role 
whatsoever. The realm of legislative activity, ac ~ording to learned 
counsel, also included the actual consideration ofa Bill. Herein again, it 
was submitted, that the Governor would have no role, except to the 
extent contemplated under Article 200, wherein, when a Bill is passed 
by the House, the same has to be approved by the Governor. And only 
when the Governor gives his assent to the Bill, the same assumes the 
status of a legislative enactment. It was pointed out, that Article 200 
contemplates a situation, where the Governor can return the Bill with a 
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message, requiring the House to reconsider the same, by examining the 
suggestions made by the Governor. This limited responsibility cast on 
the Governor, it was contended, fell within the legislative process. The 
Governor before whom a Bill (passed by the Legislative Assembly) is 
placed, has also the right to reserve the Bill, for the consideration of the 
President. This action of the Governor, according to learned counsel, 
must be accepted as a further responsibility of the Governor within the 
legislative process. It was submitted, that in all the functions vested 
with the Governor under Article 200, are to be discharged by the Governor, 
in his independent discretion, and not on any guidance or advice. This, 
according to learned counsel, illustrates the third category of the 
Governor's functions, wherein the Governor is impliedly required to act 
in his own discretion, even though he is not expressly so required, by any 
written mandate emerging from Article 200. 
87. Secondly, it was submitted, that there are functions and 
activities of the House, which are separate and distinct from its legislative 
functioning. The said activities may have no role, of the Chief Minister 
or his Council of Ministers. Illustratively, it was contended, that the 
issue of removal of a Speaker(or Deputy Speaker) under Article l 79(c) 
is an exclusive function of the House, but is independent of its legislative
business. Insofar as the issue of removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy 
Speaker) is concerned, it was acknowledged, that neither the Chief 
Minister nor his Council of Ministers has any determinative role in the 
matter. The Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker) can be removed from his 
office, only" ... by a resolution of the Assembly passed by a majority of 
all the then members of the Assembly.". Insofar as the present 
controversy is concerned, it was pointed out, that the notice of resolution 
for the removal of the Speaker, dated 19.11.2015, was brought by 13 
members of the House. According to learned counsel, it is necessary to 
understand, the aforesaid submission, in the background of the position 
occupied by the Speaker. It was emphasized, that a Speaker is a neutral 
arbiter, between the ruling Government (which has the majority in the 
Assembly), and the opposition parties (which constitute the minority). 
88. In continuation, learned senior counsel, invited our attention to 
Article 180. It was pointed out, that sub-article ( l) thereof provides, 
that if the office of the Speaker is vacant, the duties of "the office" of 
Speaker, are to be performed by the Deputy Speaker. And if the office 
of the Deputy Speaker is also vacant, the duties of"the office" of Speaker,
NABAM REBlA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
are to be performed by a person appointed by the Governor, out of the 
existing MLAs. It was highlighted, that in the above exigency, where 
the question of discharging duties of the Speaker arises, the Governor 
has been expressly vested with a constitutional responsibility. Based on 
the above analysis, it was submitted, that insofar as the non-legislative 
duties of the Assembly are concerned, the Governor has also be·en 
ascribed some specific responsibilities. And since the Chief Minister 
and the Council of Ministers have no role in the aforestated action/activity, 
the Governor need not make the choice of the person, to discharge the 
duties of Speaker, on the basis ofany aid and advice of the Chef Minister 
and his Council of Ministers. 
89. 1t was asserted, that the position prevailing after the conclusion 
of the 5th session of the Assembly on 21. I 0.2015, did occasion the 
applicability of sub-article (2) of Article 180, in the peculiar facts of this 
case. As such, it was urged, that it would be wholly incorrect to assume, 
that the action taken by the Governor with reference to the office of 
Speaker was extraneous, specially when considered with reference to 
the relevant provisions of the Constitution. 
· 
90. Learned senior counsel seriously questioned the action of the 
Speaker in locking the premises of the Assembly, and thereby, consciously 
stalling the democratic
process of the House. It was asserted, that ifthe 
Speaker was desirous of enforcing the order of disqualification (of 14 
MLAs) by himself, under the Tenth Schedule, he may well have prevented 
the entry of the said 14 disqualified members into the premises of the 
House. It was submitted, that the action of the Speaker in disallowing 
the consideration of the notice of resolution for his removal, by preventing 
entry of all the legislators, into the building of the House, was really an 
action aimed at frustrating the democratic process. And, an escape 
route with reference to the notice of resolution for his own removal. It 
was pointed out, that the Speaker being an elected member of the 
Assembly, discharges vital legislative and non-legislative functions. His 
non-legislative functions include the duties as head of the Secretariat of 
the Assembly, and in addition thereto, his quasi-judicial functions are 
those postulated under the "Tenth Schedule", of the Constitution. The 
legislative functions, as well as, the duties vested with the Speaker under 
the Tenth Schedule, have a direct nexus to the democratic process, and 
as such, the discharge of the above responsibilities, while his position as 
a Speaker of the House was under challenge, constituted a serious 
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constitutional impropriety. 
91. On the duties assigned to the Governor under Article 174, it 
was submitted, that it was improper and unjustified to describe the action 
of the Governor in summoning the House vide order dated 9.12.2015, as 
anti-democratic. According to learned counsel, only anti-democratic 
forces would contest a decision of the Governor, in summoning the House. 
It was asserted, that a Government which is confident of its majority on 
the floor of the House, would have nothing to fear, when the House is 
summoned. The summoning of the House by the Governor, at his own 
discretion, would be inconsequential when;~ the Government can establish 
its numbers. For exactly the same reason, it was submitted, that the 
action of the Governor in summoning the House, for the consideration of 
a notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker would be 
inconsequential, ifthe Speaker enjoyed the support of the majority of the 
members of the House. It was pointed out, that the action of shying 
away and stalling consideration, of a resolution for the removal of the 
Speaker, is an action which could be justifiably described as anti-
democratic. It was submitted, that a party in power which claims to 
e1~oy the majority, cannot be aggrieved in a situation where the Governor 
requires the Government to establish its majority, through a floor test. 
Likewise, a Speaker who enjoys the confidence of
the House, cannot be 
an aggrieved party, when the Governor calls for the consideration of a 
notice ofresolution for his removal. 
92. Referring to the action of the Governor, based on the order 
dated 9.12.2015, it was submitted, that even in the worst case scenario, 
the action of the Governor could not be described, as an action in conflict 
with any provision of the Constitution, or even a constitutional norm/ 
propriety. It was submitted, that the notice ofresolution for the removal 
of the Speaker was submitted on 19.11.2015. The Governor had made 
repeated efforts in writing, to confirm, whether such a notice had actually 
been submitted to the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. Initiating 
action for summoning the House, by ordering its preponement, according 
to learned senior counsel, could be an option only if, the concerned 13 
MLAs had actually submitted the above notice dated 19.11.2015, to the 
Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. Merely because a copy thereof 
had been furnished to the Governor, he could not have initiated any action. 
In spite of the high office of the Governor, and despite repeated 
communications were sent by the Governor, seeking information about
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
127 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
the factual position, whether a notice ofresolution for the removal of the 
Speaker - Nabam Rebia had been received, the same remained 
unanswered. Finally, the factual position came to the notice of the 
Governor, only on 8.12.2015, on the receipt of a communication from 
the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. By this time the postulated 
14 days' notice period, before such notice could be taken up for 
consideration, had expired (on 3.12.2015). Allowing the Speaker to 
discharge functions pertaining to the Secretariat of the Assembly, or 
under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, while his own position was 
under challenge, would not only be unconstitutional, but also 
undemocratic. It was urged, that it was in the aforesaid background, 
and based on the aforesaid understanding, and also to ensure that the 
functioning of the House was carried out in consonance with established 
democratic norms, that the Governor (in exercise of the powers vested 
~ith him under Article 174), had ordered the summoning of the House 
for 16.12.2015 (by preponing the 6th session of the Assembly, earlier 
scheduled for 14.1.2016). It was therefore contended, that the submissions 
advanced at the behest of learned counsel for the appellants, deserved 
to be rejected. 
93. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel, having concluded 
his submissions with reference to the order of the Governor
dated 
9.12.2015, similarly endeavoured to justify the message of the Governor 
dated 9.12.2015. His submissions to support the message dated 9.12.2015, 
were the same as in support of the order of the Governor dated 9.12.2015. 
According to learned counsel, the message was clear, that the Governor 
had authorised the House, to permit the resolution for removal of the 
Speaker to be moved. The message required the members of the 
Assembly, to discuss and put the same to vote, as" ... the first item on 
the agenda of the House at the first sitting of the Sixth Session ... ". The 
Governor also required the Deputy Speaker, to hold the proceedings 
peacefully.and truthfully, so as to ensure that they were conducted fairly. 
The message of the Governor, required the proceedings to be video-
graphed. It was submitted, that the message of the{Jovernor, would not 
only secure the enforcement of the democratic process, but would also 
ensure transparency and fairness. It was therefore the assertion oflearned 
senior counsel, that no fault whatsoever could be found with the message 
of the Governor. 
94. Having submitted thus far, learned senior counsel, pointedly 
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referred to p~ragraph 5 of the message dated 9.12.2015. It was conceded, 
that the contents of paragraph 5, were instructions to the House, that 
until the 6th session (to commence on 16.12.2015) of the Legislative 
Assembly was prorogued, no Presiding Officer would alter the party 
composition of the House. 
It was acknowledged, that this could 
only be understood to mean, that disqualification proceedings under the 
"Tenth Schedule", would have to await the outcome of the motion against 
the Speaker under Article 179( c ). In order to demonstrate the propriety 
and constitutional validity of paragraph 5 of the message, it was submitted, 
that once it is concluded (- that is, if this Court, on accepting the 
submissions advanced on behalf of the respondents, so concludes), that 
the Governor had the discretion to summon or prepone the sitting of the 
Assembly under Article 174(1) read with Articles 163 and l 79(c), then it 
would also be up to the Governor to decide when and/or where, the 
House should meet. It was pointed out, that the Governor is undisputedly 
a high constitutional functionary. And as such, his decisions could neither 
be taken lightly, nor be easily interfered with. By inviting the Court's 
attention to Article 174, it was urged, that the above provision vests 
responsibility in the Governor to summon, prorogue or dissolve the 
Assembly. The Governor is mandated to summon the
Legislative 
Assembly "at such time and place as he thinks fit". The instant 
connotation in Article 174, makes it abundantly clear, that the Governor 
has to discharge the above function, as he in his own discretion, considers 
appropriate. Premised on the aforesaid· foundation, it was contended, 
that the instant discretion conferred on the Governor, could not be 
subservient to any aid and advice. It was pointed out, that the fixation of 
time for sitting of the Legislative Assembly, determined by the Governor 
under Article 174, was an issue on which reasonable persons could differ 
widely. As such, .it would not be proper for any Court to interfere with, 
the time and place fixed by the Governor in summoning the Assembly. 
95. On the subject of the power of the judicial review, with 
-- reference to the exercise of discretion by the President (in relation to 
the removal of a Governor), it has to be accepted, that the power of 
judicial review has to be limited to situations wherein, it could be 
established that the President had exercised his discretion wantonly, 
whimsically or arbitrarily. It was urged that the same position would 
apply to decisions of Governors as well. It was submitted, that the 
appellants before this Court, were obliged to establish, that the Governor 
had acted deliberately in an unprincipled manner, and that, the action of
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
the Governor would impair the constitutional trust assigned to him. On 
the present aspect of the matter, learned senior counsel placed reliance 
on 8.P. Singhal v. Union oflndia8, and invited our attention to the following 
observations recorded therein: 
"71. When a Governor holds office during the pleasure of the 
Government and the power to remove at the pleasure of the 
President is not circumscribed by any conditions or restrictions, it 
follows that the power is exercisable at any time, without assigning 
any cause. However, there is a distinction between the need for a 
cause for the removal, and the need to disclose the cause for 
removal. While the President need not disclose or infonn the cause 
for his removal to the Governor, it is imperative that a cause must 
exist. If we do not proceed on that premise, it would mean that 
the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers, may make 
any order which may be manifestly arbitrary or whimsical or mala 
fide. Therefore, while no cause or reason be disclosed or assigned 
for removal by exercise of such prerogative power, some valid 
cause should exist for the removal. Therefore, while we do not 
accept the. contention that an order under Article 156 is not 
justiciable. we accept the contention that no reason need be 
assigned and no cause need be shown and no notice need be 
issued to the Governor before removing a
Gove.mar. 
xxx 
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76. This Court has examined in several cases, the scope of judicial 
review with reference to another prerogative power -
power of 
the President/Governor to grant pardon, etc. and to suspend, remit 
or commute sentences. The view of this Court is that the power 
to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and net an-act of 
grace as in England. It is a constitutional responsibility to be 
exercised in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the 
context. It is not a matter of privilege but a matter of perfonnance 
of official duty. Al 1 pub! ic power including constitutional power, 
shall never be_ exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide. While the 
President or the Governor may be the sole Judge of the sufficiency 
of facts and the propriety of granting pardons and reprieves, the 
power being an enumerated power in the Constitution, its limitations 
must be found in the Constitution itself. The Courts exercise a 
• (2010) 6 sec 331 
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limited power of judicial review to ensure that the President 
considers all relevant materials before coming to his decision. As 
the exercise of such power is of the widest amplitude, whenever 
such power is exercised, it is presumed that the President acted 
properly and carefully after an objective consideration of all aspects 
of the matter. Where reasons are given, the Court may interfi;re 
ifthe reasons are found to be irrelevant. However, when reasons 
are not given, the Court may interfere only where the exercise of 
power is vitiated by self-denial on wrong appreciation of the full 
amplitude of the power under Article 72 or where the decision is 
arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide [vidl! Maru Ram v. Union of 
India 1981 (I) SCC I 07, Kehar Singh v. Union of India 1989 (I) 
sec 204, etc.]. 
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82. The President in exercising power under A11icle 156(1) should 
act in a manner which is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. 
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In the event of challenge of withdrawal of the pleasure, the Court 
will necessarily assume that it is for compelling reasons. 
Consequently, where the aggrieved person is not able to establish 
a prima facie instance of arbitrariness or malafides, in his removal, 
the Court will refuse to interfere. However, where a prima facie 
E 
case of arbitrariness or malafides is made out, the Court can 
require the Union Government to produce records/materials to 
satisfy itself
that the withdrawal of pleasure was for good and 
compelling reasons. What will constitute good and compelling 
reasons would depend upon the facts of the case. Having regard 
to the nature of functions of the Governor in maintaining centre-
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state relations, and the flexibility available to the Government in 
such matters, it is needless to say that there will be no interference 
unless a very strong case is made out. The position, therefore, is 
that the decision is open to judicial review but in a very limited 
extent. 
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83. We summarise our conclusions as under: 
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(i) Under Article 156( 1 ), the Governor holds office during the 
pleasure of the President. Therefore, the President can remove 
the Governor from office at any time without assigning any reason 
and without giving any opportunity to show cause.
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 131 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
(ii) Though no reason need be assigned for discontinuance of the 
pleasure resulting in removal, the pow.er under Article 156( I) cannot 
be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner. 
The power will have to be exercised in rare and exceptional 
circumstances for valid and compelling reasons. The compelling 
reasons are not restricted to those enumerated by the petitioner 
(that is physical/mental disability, corruption and behaviour 
unbecoming of a Governor) but are of a wider amplitude. What 
would be compelling reasons would depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. 
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(iii) A Governor cannot be removed on the ground that he is out of 
sync with the policies and ideologies of the Union Government or 
the party in power at the Centre. Nor can he be removed on the 
ground that the Union Government has lost confidence in him. It 
follows therefore that change in government at Centre is not a 
ground for removal of Governors holding office to make way for 
others favoured by the new government. 
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(iv) As there is no need to assign reasons, any removal as a 
consequence of withdrawal of the pleasure will be assumed to be 
valid and will be open to only a limited judicial review. If the 
aggrieved person is able to demonstrate prima facie that his 
removal was either arbitrazy. malafide, capricious or whimsical. . E 
the Courtwill call upon
the Union Government to disclose to the 
Court, the material upon which the President had taken the decision 
to withdraw the pleasure. If the Union Government does not 
disclose any reason, or if the reasons disclosed are found to be 
irrelevant, arbitrary, whimsical, or malafide, the Court will interfere. 
However. the court will not interfere merely on the ground that a 
different view is possible or that the material or reasons are· 
insufficient." 
Based on the legal position declared by this Court, it was submitted, that 
the prayer addressed by the appellants, to interfere with the discretion 
exercised by the Governor in his order, and his message dated 9.12.2015, 
ought to·be rejected. 
96. Learned senior counsel further contended, that interference 
with the action of the Governor could not be based on any alleged personal 
malafides. It was asserted, that established malice in law only, could 
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lead to an adverse inference. In this behalf, reliance was placed on S.R. 
Bommai v. Union of Jndia9 , wherein it has been held as under: 
"~90. We find ourselves unable to agree with the High Court except 
on points (I) and (2). To begin with, we must say that question of 
'personal bonafides' of Governor is really irrelevant. 
391. We must also say that the observation under point (7) is 
equally misplaced. It is true that action under Article 356 is taken 
on the basis of satisfaction of the Union Council of Ministers but 
on that score it cannot be said that 'legal malafides' of the Governor 
is irrelevant. When the article speaks of the satisfaction being 
formed on the basis of the Governor's report, the legal malafides, 
if any, of the Governor cannot be said to the irrelevant. The 
Governor's report may not be conclusive bttt its relevance is 
undeniable. Action under Article 356 can be based only and 
exclusively upon such report. Governor is a very high constitutional 
functionary. He is supposed to act fairly and honestly consistent 
with his oath. He is actually reporting against his own government. 
It is for this reason that Article 356 places such implicit faith in his 
report. If, however: in a given case his report is vitiated by legal 
malafides, it is bound to vitiate the President's action as well. 
' 
Regarding the other points made in the judgmenfof the High Court, 
we must say that
the High Cou1t went wrQng in law in approving. 
and upholding the Governor's report and the action of the President 
under Article 356. TJ1e Governor's repo11 is vitiated by more than 
one assumption totally unsustainable in law. The Constitution does 
not create an obligation that the political party forming the ministry 
should necessarily have a majority in the Legislature. Minority 
Governments are not unknown. What is necessary is that that 
government should enjoy the confidence of the House. This aspect 
does not appear to have been kept in mind by the Governor. Secondly 
and more importantly, whether the Council of Ministers has lost 
the confidence of the House is not a matter to be determined by 
the Governor or for that matter anywhere else except the floor of 
the House. The principle of democracy underlying our Constitution 
necessarily means that any such question should be decided on 
the floor of the House. The House is the place where the 
democracy is in action. It is not for the Governor to determine the 
said question on his own or on his own verification. This is not a 
9 (1994)3sec1
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NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 133 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
matter within his subjective satisfaction. It is an objective fact 
capable of being established on the floor of the House. It is 
gratifying to note that Sri R. Venkataraman, the former President 
oflndia has affirmed this view in his Rajaji Memorial Lecture 
(Hindustan Times dated February 24, 1994)." 
Based on the above proposition declared by this Court, it was urged, that 
the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants do not justify any 
interference, with the impugned actions of the Governor. 
97. On the issue of discretion, learned senior counsel, placed 
reliance on Article 163(2). ,Based thereon, it was submitted; that the 
Governor's discretion, for all intents and purposes, must be deemed to 
be final. It was submitted, since Article 163(2) itself postulates, that 
"the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the 
validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question 
on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion", 
by itself absolves the Governor from a challenge to the discretion 
exercised by him. It was submitted, that Article. 163(2) was neither a 
defunct nor a redundant provision, and as such, it could neither be 
overlooked nor ignored. It was contended, that the words employed in 
Article 163(2) must be given due ~eightage. And ifthat was to be done, 
there could be no doubt, thatthe
discretion exercised by the Governor 
under Article 163(2), would have to be considered in-a manner, as would 
protect it from the scope of any challenge. 
98. With reference to the Governor's message dated 9.12.2015, 
it was submitted, that the same was justified under Article 175(2), 
whereunder, the Governor's message can be "with reference to a Bill 
then pending in the Legislature or otherwise". Article 175(2) by itself 
makes it abundantly clear, that messages are not limited to the Bills 
pending before the House. But could extend to and include other matters. 
Learned counsel clarified, that the authority vested with the Governo~ 
under Article 200, should not to be confused by reference to the words 
"or otherwise" usect"in Article 175(2). The message sent by the Governor 
can also re.late to a Bill under Article 200, as is apparent on from the 
expression "with respect to a Bill then pending in the Legislature" used 
in Article 175(2). It was submitted, that reliance plac;ed by the appellants 
on Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary1°, for asserting that 
the Governor could not send any message under Article 175(2), with 
'" ( t 979) J sec 344 
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regard to a resolution pending before the Legislative Assembly, was 
wholly misconceived. It was pointed out, that the controversy dealt with 
in the above judgment pertained to Article 252, and in the context of the 
above provision, this Court held, that the State Legislature meant only 
the House of the Legislature. Insofar as the present controversy is 
concerned, it was submitted, that the same pertained to a notice of 
resolution for the removal of the Speaker under Article 179( c ). It was 
pointed out, that the words "or otherwise" referred to in Article 175(2) 
had a wide import, and that, there was no justification whatsoever to 
limit the same, so as to unnecessarily curtail the authority of the Governor, 
to that which is contemplated under Article 200. It was submitted, that 
if the power of the Governor with reference to messages, was to be 
limited to the responsibility enshrined in him under Article 200, then the 
words "or otherwise" expressed in Article 175(2) would be superfluous 
and otiose. Additionally it was contended, that Article· 175(2) also 
mandates, that the Legislative Assembly would deal with a message 
received from the Governor "with all convenient despatch", and would 
take a call th!<.reon, as may be "required by the message to betaken into 
consideration". It was therefore contended, that a message addressed 
by the Governor under Article 175(2), to the State Legislative
Assembly, 
was not actually in the nature of a command. And yet, the same was 
bound to be taken into consideration "with all convenient despatch". In 
the above view of the matter, it was submitted; that the term "or 
otherwise" could not be ascribed a narrow or limited meaning, but was 
bound to be extended the widest amplitude, in harmony with the related 
provisions of the Constitution. 
99. It was pointed out,. that in the past also messages sent by the 
Governor were assailed through judicial proceedings. In this behalf, 
reference was made to K.A. Mathialagan v. P. Srinivasan 11 , wherein 
also, the message sent by the Governor pertained to a vote of no 
confidence against the Speaker. Reference was also made to Pratapsing 
Raojirao Rane v. Governor ofGoa
1 ~, wherein also, the message of the 
Governor pertained to a notice ofresolutlon for the removal of the Speaker. 
It was submitted, that the message (dated 9.12.2015) which has been 
assailed by the appeJlants in the present case, suggested that the House 
should not be adjourned, till the notice of resolution for the removal of 
the Speaker stood determined finally, one way or the other. It was 
11 AIR 1973 (Madras) 371 
" AIR 1999 (Born.) 53
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 135 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.) 
submitted, that one of the proposed requirements contained in the message 
of the Governor was, that the notice ofresolution for the removal of the 
Speaker would be taken up as the first item on the agenda. It was 
pointed out, that the Governor's message was merely to bring to the 
notice of the House the procedure that the House, was required to fo)low. 
It was urged, that under Rule 153 of the 'Conduct of Business Rules' a 
notice ofresolution for the removal of the Speaker, had to be included in 
the list of business before any other business for the day, could be taken 
up. Reference was also made to Rule 151 of the 'Conduct of Business 
Rules', which mandates that after a notice ofresolution for the removal 
of a Speaker is tabled, the House would not be adjourned till the motion 
of no confidence had been finally disposed of. In the above view of the 
matter, it was pointed out, that requiring the Assembly to take up the 
notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker, as the first item in 
the agenda (in the message dated 9:12.2015), cannot be termed as an 
action atthe hands of the Governor, based on his own whims and fancies. 
It was urged, that the message needed to be viewed as an advice tendered 
to the Assembly, so as to deal with an important issue, in consonance 
with the provisions of the 'Conduct of Business Rules'. 
100. Learned senior counsel then invited the
Court's attention to 
the second direction in the message dated 9.12.2015, whereby the Deputy 
Speaker was obliged to preside over the House, from the Jirst moment 
of the first sitting of the House. It was submitted, that the above noted 
action was also in the nature of an advice, so as to make sure that the 
procedure adopted before the House would not infringe Article 181 (I) 
read with Article 182. lt"was pointed out, that the above provisions 
postulate inter alia, that the Speaker would not preside over the 
proceedings of the Assembly, wherein a resolution for his own removal, 
was to be considered. As such, it was submitted, that during the period 
when the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker - Nabam 
Rebia, was under consideration of the House, the Deputy Speaker was 
liable to preside over the proceedings of the House. In this behalf, while 
it was acknowledged, that even the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu 
Thongdok, should similarly be treated as being debarred from presiding 
over the proceedings of the House, because a resolution for his (the 
Deputy Speaker's) removal from office was pending consideration. It 
was however submitted, that the above factual position is not correct, as 
no notice ofresolution forthe removal of the Deputy Speaker, had actually 
been moved. It was submitted, that the fact that a notice of resolution 
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for the removal of the Deputy Speaker (alleged to have been presented 
to the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, on 16.11.2015), was a 
complete falsity, as despite repeated reminders addressed by the 
Governor, seeking a copy of the notice of resolution for the removal of 
the Deputy Speaker, the same was not furnished to him. It was 
emphasized, that even before this Court, the appellants have failed to 
establish, that such a notice ofresolution for the removal of the Deputy 
Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, had ever been moved. It was 
therefore urged, that it was wholly legitimate fo~ the G·wernor, in the 
facts of the present case, to require the Deputy Speaker 0fthe Assembly, 
to preside over the proceedings, of the notice ofresolution for the removal 
of the Speaker -.Nabam Rebia. 
I 01. It was-also the contention of learned senior counsel, that 
Speakers against whom resolutions for their removal have been moved, 
are known to have resorted to unsavoury means, to defer consideration 
thereon. In this behalf, learned counsel placed reliance on State of Punjab 
v. Satya J:al Dang13, the K.A. Mathialagan case 11 , and Nipamacha Singh 
v. Secretary, Manipur Legislative Assembly!•. 
I 02. It was also submitted, that the Tenth Schedule, was added to 
the Constitution, by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 
which came into force with effect from 1.3 .1985. It was pointed out, 
that
under the Tenth Schedule power is vested with Speaker alone, for 
exercising quasi-judicial functions (under Paragraph 6, of the Tenth 
Schedule). It was contended, that any misuse of the power vested with 
the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule, could result in derailing the 
democratic process of the concerned State. Insofar as the present 
controversy is concerned, it was pointed out, that the concerned Speaker 
- Nabam Rebia, issued notices to 14 MLAs belonging to the INC, for 
their disqualification on 7.12.2015, and thereby, took active steps to derail 
the democratic process, specially when, a resolution for his own removal 
had already been moved (on 19.11.2015). It was asserted, that the 
action of the Governor in requiring, that".~. no Presiding Officer shall 
alter the party composition in the House" in the message dated 9.12.2015, 
was only aimed at preserving the democratic process, so that the Speaker 
1 by exercising his quasi-judicial powers under the Tenth Schedule, would 
'not so change the composition of the House, as would favourably tilt the 
motion for his removal, in his own favour. It was accordingly asserted, 
13 AIR 1969 SC 903 
1' AIR 2002 (Gauhati) 7
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX .v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 137 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
that no motive should be attributed to the messl!ge of the Governor dated 
9.12.2015, more particularly, paragraph 5 thereof. lt was submitted, 
that save and except the ultimate desire of the Governor to preserve the 
democratic process, the message dated 9.12.2015 had no other fall out/ 
consequence. It was also contended, that as the question of removal of 
the Speakerwas pending consideration before the Hou5€, it would have 
been a serious constitutional impropriety on the part of the Speaker, to 
carry on presiding over the proceedings of the House, and more 
particularly, to conduct or continue with the quasi-judicial functions vested 
with him, under the Tenth Schedule. In conclusion, it was pointed out, 
that the action proposed by the Governor, through paragraph 5 of the 
message dated 9.12.2015, was merely aimed at maintaining the 
constitutional integrity of the House, and preserving the constitutional 
morality expected of the Speaker of the House. 
I 03. It was asserted by learned senior counsel, that it was apparent 
from the facts and circumstances of the present case, that the Speaker 
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had entertained a petition for disqualification, against 14 MLAs belonging. D 
to the INC on 7.12.2015, well after, the Governor had sought information, 
about the notice for the removal of the Speaker. It was submitted, that in 
the first instance, the Secretary of the
Legislative Assembly, maintained 
complete silence, and chose not to respond to the letter(s) of the 
Governor. Finally through a communication dated 7.12.2015, the 
Secretary of the Legislative Assembly wrote to the Governor, informing 
him that the Speaker was on tour, and the notice of resolution for his 
own removal (for the removal of the Speaker - Nabam Rebia), as well 
as, that of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, were in the 
personal custody of the Speaker - Nabam Rebia. In the above view of 
the matter, it was submitted, that it was natural for the Governor to have 
addressed the message dated 9.12.2015, with a clear description of the 
manner in which the proceedings of the House were to be conducted, 
when the 6th session commenced on 16.12.2015. This was done by the 
Governor, according to learned counsel, only to ensure that procedure 
adopted by the House, was in consonance witf1 the provisions of the 
Constitution, and the 'Conduct of Business Rules'. 
104. Based on the aforementioned submissions, it was the 
contention of Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel, that the 
prayers made by the appellants before this Court, being qevoid of any 
merit, deserved to be rejected. 
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I 05. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned Senior Advocate, entered 
appearance on behalf of respondent no. 16 - the Governor of the State 
of Arunachal Pradesh. It would be pertinent to mention, that the 
Governor had entered appearance before the High Court, by moving an 
interlocutory application, for the limited pur-pose of justifying his order 
and message dated 9.12.2015, and also, in order to demonstrate that he 
was unaware of the notice of the resolution dated 16.11.2015, moved 
for the removal of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbo Thongdok. 
The sixth sequence of facts: 
I 06. It was contended by learned senior counsel, that there had 
been political turmoil in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, since March/ 
April, 2015. It was pointed out, thatthe situation got worst in September, 
2015, when a group of 21 MLAs belonging to the INC, clamoured for a 
change of guard, which was targeted at the Chief Minister - Nabam 
Tuki. It was submitted, that the above 21 MLAs had camped in Delhi 
for three months, so as to press their claim before the central leadership 
(of the National Congress Party). During the above period, all the 21 
MLAs belonging to the INC, had refused to attend meetings of the 
Congress Legislature Party in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. This 
factual position, according to learned senior counsel, has been 
acknowledged by the appellants themselves, even before this Court. 
107. It was
submitted, that on 14.9.2015, 17 of the 21 MLAs 
belonging to the INC, were invited for an informal dinner by the Chief 
Minister-Nabam Tuki, at his official residence. At the aforesaid dinner, 
they were coerced into signing identically worded resignation letters. It 
was submitted, that the Speaker - Nabam Rebia, was also present at 
the dinner hosted by the Chief Minister. It was brought out, that rather 
than accepting all the 17 resignation letters, the Speaker- Nabam Rebia, 
accepted resignation letters of only two of the MLAs -Gabriel D. Wangsu 
and Wanglam Sawin. Having accepted the two resignation letters, the 
Speaker issued a notification on I. I 0.2015, declaring that their respective 
Assembly segments, had been rendered vacant (under Article 190). It 
was pointed out, that on 11.10.2015, the aforesaid MLAs addressed a 
letter to the Governor complaining about the manner in which their 
resignation letters were got signed under coercfon, as also, the illegal 
acceptance thereof. It was pointed out, that the aforesaid letter(s) were 
available on the record. The letters referred to, are not being extracted 
herein for reasons of brevity. It was submitted, that the said two members
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 139 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH .SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
of the House, whose resignations were accepted, approached the Gauhati 
High Court, by filing Writ Petition (C) No.6193 of2015. On 7.10.20J5, 
the High Court passed an interim order staying the orders accepting 
their resignations. The above writ petition, it was submitted, was 
dismissed by the High Court on 12.1.2016, and a Petition for Special 
Leave to Appeal assailing the same, was dismissed by this Court. It 
was pointed out, that the subsequent dismissal of the judicial proceedings 
by the High Court, and by this Court, were inconsequential, inasmuch 
as, at the relevant juncture, the High Court having found prima facie 
merit in the claim raised by the two MLAs, against the acceptance of 
their resignation letters, had stayed the operation of the order by which 
their resignation letters had been accepted. It was urged, that it was 
relevant to keep in mind the impression which would have been created 
in the mind of the Governor, by the said interim directions. --
108. It was submitted, that immediately after the resignation of 
the two MLAs was accepted, 21 MLAs belonging to the INC, wrote to 
the Governor on 11.10.2015, that th'e Chief Minister-Nabam Tuki, did 
not enjoy_the majority of the House, and as such, was running a minority 
government. Shortly after the receipt of the communication dated 
11.10.2015, 13 MLAs (II from the BJP, and 2 Independent MLAs) 
issue~ a
notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker - Nabam 
Rebia, under Article 179( c) on 19.11.2015. It was submitted, that the 
aforesaid notice ought to have been taken up at the earliest, and in any 
case, soon after the expiry of 14 days (expressed iri the first proviso, 
under Article 179). It was highlighted, that on the same day on which 
the notice was moved, a copy of the resolution (dated 19.11.2015) was 
endorsed by the MLAs to the Governor. And on the same day -
19.11.2015, all the 13 signatories to the resolution for removal of the 
Speaker, made a·written request, to the Governor, seeking preponement 
of the 6th session of the House. And for an urgent consideration by the · 
House, of the resolution for the removal of the Speaker-Nabam Rebia. 
(this communication, has been extracted above). 
I 09. It was further the submission oflearned senior counsel, that 
in order to derail the action initiated by the 13 MLAs, seeking removal of 
the Speaker, the Chief Whip of the Congress Legislature Party-Rajesh 
Tacho, petitioned the Speaker under Article 191 (2) on 7.12.2015, to 
disqualify 14 MLAs, belonging to the INC, on account of their having 
allegedly given up their allegiance/membership to the politicar party 
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(-the INC) on whose ticket they had been elected to the House. The 
above petition, called for their disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. 
It was submitted, that the Governor having viewed the developments 
referred to hereinabove, found it appropriate to exercise his discretion 
under Article 174, to prepone the 6th session of the Assembly, from 
14.1.2016 to 16.12.2015. It was asserted, that the aforesaid action of 
the Governor, would enable the House to consider the notice of resolution 
for the removal of the Speaker - Nabam Rebia, at the earliest, in 
consonance with Article 179( c) and Rules 151 to 153 of the 'Conduct of 
Business Rules'. 
l!O. It was submitted, that the factual position depicted 
hereinabove, had not been invented by the Governor, in order to satisfy 
the High Court or this Court, on the then prevailing political conditions, 
which necessitated the passing of the order and the message dated 
9.12.2015, but was apparent from the monthly letters, addressed by the 
Governor to the President. It was pointed out, that the first of the above 
letters, was addressed by the Governor to the President on 17. I 0.2015. 
An extract of the same is reproduced hereunder: 
"No. GS/I(C)-129/2014 (Vol-II) 
l 7'h October, 20 I 5 
Hon'ble Shri Pranab Mukherjee Ji, 
This is a Special Report on the latest significant political 
developments in my State of Arunachal Pradesh. 
In view of the
prevailing political imbroglio in the State arising -
out of growing dissidence in the Congress, the Congress Legislators 
seem to be divided into two groups, due to internal infighting among 
them for power and position and also one group demanding 
resignation of the Chief Minister Shri Nabam Tuki for alleged 
failure. Media reports'indicate that, the dissident group has been 
camping at New Delhi to appeal to the AICC Central Leadership 
for a change of leadership in the State, but AICC has not yet 
responded to their appeal. As per media report, Shri Kalikho Pu!, 
the former Finance Minister of the State and sitting MLA is 
allegedly leading the dissident group and about 3 7 Legislators in 
the 60-Member State Assembly have agreed to support Shri Kalikho 
Pu l's bid for leadership. The State BJP termed it as unfortunate 
and demanded the resignation of Chief Minister Shri Nabam Tuki, 
.accusing him of failing to honour the people's mandate alleging
NABAM REBIA, AND-BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 141 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SlNGH KHEHAR, J.] ' 
that, as a result, the developmental activities continued to be 
adversely affected due to the existing political scenario. It is 
pertinent to mention here that Arunachal Pradesh has a 60-
Member Assembly, out of which Congress has 47, BJP-11 and 2 
Independent Legislators. However, the Arunachal Pradesh 
Congress Committee Chief Shri Padi Richo said that the report 
was false, fabricated and misleading. 
It is reported that, in a high political drama, on J 6!h September. 
2015. Shri Gabriel Denwang Wangsu and Shri Wanglam Sawin. 
both Congress MsLA, were invited to a dinner party at the 
residence ofShri Nabam Tuki. Chief Minister where 17 MsLA of 
the Congress party attended. Some loyalists of Shri Nabam Tuki 
compelled them to sign in resignation letters without even reading 
the content therein, in front ofShri Nabam Tuki. Chief Minister. 
Shri Nabam Rebia. Speaker of the State Assembly and the 
President of Pradesh Congress Committee. On I fil October, 2015 
the Secretary, Legislative Assembly notified the resignation of 
two Legislators- Shri Gabriel Denwang Wangsu. MLA Kanubari 
and Shri Wanglam Sawin, MLA Khonsa (East) have resigned 
from the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and the Speaker 
has accepted their resignations under the provision of Rules of 
Procedure and Conduct of Business of the Assembly. The 
Notification further informed that consequent upon their
resignation, the seats of55-Khonsa East (ST)AC and 58-Kanubari 
(ST) AC respectively have fallen vacant. (Notification at 
Annexure-1). The two MsLA in a written complaint dated J J!h 
October, 2015 to the Governor informed about their being coerced 
to submit typed resignation letters addressed to the Speaker "under 
complete duress" and requested for instituting an enquiry into the 
whole 'resignation incident' through an agency like the CBI. A 
copy of Joint Complaint letter dated 11 rh October, 2015, addressed 
to the Governor by Shri Gabriel Denwang Wangsu, MLA Kanubari 
and Shri Wanglam Sawin, MLA Khonsa (East) is enclosed at 
Annexure-11 for your kind perusal. 
They also submitted another complaint stating that some 
anti-social elements and local miscreants frequently visited their 
official residences at Itanagar and private property giving mental 
agony and raising fears in them and their families. In view of the 
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above, I advised the State Home Minister with copies to the State 
Chief Minister, Chief Secretary and DGP to look into the issue 
and direct all concerned to provicje necessary security to Shri 
Wanglam Sawin, MLA and Shri Gabriel D. Wangsu, MLA and 
also to their family members, and that the miscreants I culprits 
involved in the intimidation cases be apprehended and brought to 
justice, at the earliest. (Copy at Annexure-III). 
While condemning the move to obtain resignation letter of 
17 MsLA by coercing them and putting them under duress, the 
People's Party of Arunachal (PPA) termed the alleged forced 
resignation as 'murder of democracy' and demanded immediate 
intervention of the Governor on the matter to ascertain that the 
two Legislators should get back their constitutional rights. 
Opposition Leader Shri Tamiyo Taga (BJP), who himself was 
once the Speaker of the State Assembly, questioned the role of 
the Speaker Shri Nabam Rebia, for misusing his power and position 
by creating political drama over the resignation of two sitting 
MsLA, and stated that the MsLA resigned from the State Assembly 
under duress. 
Aggrieved by the Order of the Hon'ble Speaker, Sarvashri 
Wangsu and Sawin filed Writ Petition before the Hon 'ble Gauhati 
High Court vide WP(C} 6193/2015 praying for relief. The Hon 'ble 
Gauhti High Court on 7m October, 2015 stayed the Notification of 
the Speaker of Arunachal Pradesh
Legislative Assembly dated 
0 I. I 0.2015 accepting the resignation letters of the two Congress 
MsLA and declaring the seats vacant in their respective 
constituencies, and directed that the Election Commission shall 
not take any action on the basis of the Notification to hold bye-
election. fn another development, in a joint letter addressed to the 
Governor, the Arunachal Students' Federation (ASF) and the 
Wancho Students' Union (WSU) urged to impose President's Rule 
in the State, following the disclosure of the resignation of two 
Ms LA. 
Meanwhile, Shri Kalikho Pul, MLA recently complained to 
me about threats being issued to him by unknown miscreants and 
also threats meted out to his family members by a group of 
miscreants I criminals at his Official Bungalow. He requested for 
providing adequate security to him and his family members as he
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 143 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
apprehended grave threats to their lives. I advised the State Home 
Minister with intimation to the Chief Minister, Chief Secretary 
and DGP to take immediate steps to provide necessary security 
to Shri Pu! and his family and also to direct the Police authorities 
to take up investigation of the Case, identify and arrest the culprits 
and bring them to book under the Law, at the earliest. 
xxxxxx 
xxx 
For kind infonnation of Hon 'ble President oflndia please. 
With Esteemed Regards, 
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Yours sincerely,_ 
C 
signed (illegible) 
(J.P. Rajkhowa)" 
111. The second of the letters addressed by the Govemo~ to the 
President was dated I 9.11.2015. An extract of the same is reproduced 
hereunder: 
"No. GOV-AP/SPL-REP/20 I 5 
19'h November, 2015 
Hon'ble Shri Pranab Mukherjeeji, 
This is a Special Report highlighting some latest significant 
D 
developments in my State of Arunachal Pradesh. 
E 
ln continuation to my Special Report on Political 
Development in the State vide No.GS/l(C)-129/2014 (Vol-II) dated 
17'h October, 2015 and my subsequent Monthly Report for the 
Month of October, 2015 No. G/ML/2015 dated I "November 2015, 
it has been observed that the political imbroglio in the State has 
been storming with growing dissidence amongst the Congress 
Legislators, including some Ministers due to internal infighting for 
changing ofleadership in the State. 
The Congress Legislature
Party (CLP) with 47 MsLA in a 
60-Member House has cracked into two rival factions in the recent 
past. It was reported that the Congress Legislature Party (CLP) 
Meeting was held at Rajiv Gandhi Bawan, Itanagar on S•h 
November, 2015, which was attended by 25 Congress Legislators 
including Shri Nabam Tuki, ChiefMinister, Shri V. Narayanasamy, 
General Secretary, AICC and Dr. K. Jaya Kumar, Secreary, AICC, 
both In-Charge of Arunachal Pradesh also attended the Meeting 
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along with Shri Padi Richo, Aunachal Pradesh Congress 
Committee (APCC), Office Bearers of APCC, and prominent 
leaders of!NC Party from all the Districts of Arunachal Pradesh. 
Those in support of Shri Nabam Tuki are stationed in Itanagar, 
the Capital City, making occasional appearances before the media 
with the Chief Minister, while the dissidents group, comprising 21 
Congress Legislators. seeking a change' of leadership, citing 
"ineffective governance'', financial mismanagement, corruption 
and autocratic way offunctioning of the ChiefMinister Shri Nabam 
Tuki, have been camping in Delhi for the past two months or so. 
The Legislators present in the Meeting condemned the 
dissident Legislators for abstaining from the CLP Meeting. The 
Legislators who attended the CLP Meeting were, (I) Shri Nabam 
Tuki, Chief Minister, (2) Shri Tanga Byaling, Home Minister, (3) 
Shri Gojen Gadi, Minister PWD & Election, ( 4) Shri Rajesh Tacho, 
Minister Health & Family Welfare & Parliamentary Affairs, (5) 
Shri Tapang Taloh, Minister, Education, Libraries, Textile, Handloom 
& Handicrafts & Depai1ment of Water Resources Development, 
(6) Shri Jomde Kena, Minister, Transport and Civil Aviation, 
Cooperation, (7) Shri Pburpa Tsering, Minister, Animal Husbandry 
& Veterinary, Power (Civil), (8) Shri Tirong Aboh, Minister, 
Department of Development of Tirap, Changlang Districts and 
Mines with additional department of
Civil Supplies and Consumer 
Affairs, (9) Shri Takam Pario, Minister, Public Health Engineering 
& Water Supply, Department of Disaster Management, ( 10) Shri 
Techi Kaso, Parliamentary Secretary, (11) Shri Kumsi Sidisow, 
Parliamentary Secretary, ( 12) Shri Alo Li bang, Parliamentary 
Secretary, ( 13) Shri Mama Natung, Parliamentary Secretary, ( 14) 
Shri JambeyTashi, Parliamentary Secretary, ( 15) Shri Tapuk Taku, 
Parliamentary Secretary, (16) Shri Pani Taram, Parliamentary 
Secretary, (17) Shri Nikh Kamin, Parliamentary Secretary, (18) 
Shri Dikto Yekar, P_arl iamentary Secretary, ( l 9)"Smt. Gum Tayeng, 
Parliamentary Secretary, (20) Shri Karya Bagang, Parliamentary 
Secretary, (21) Shri Bamang Felix, Parliamentary Secretary, (22) 
Shri Nyamar Karbak, Parliamentary Secretary, (23) Shri Punji 
Mara, Parliamentary Secretary, (24) Shri Likha Saaya, 
Parliamentary Secretary & (25) Shri Tatung Jam oh, Parliamentary 
Secretary.
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
145 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
As per the media report, Shri V. Narayanasamy, AICC In-
charge Arunachal Pradesh declared Shri Nabam Tuki, Chief 
Minister as the undisputed leader and claimed the State 
Government I 00% stable. He termed the absence of2 I dissident 
MsLA in CLP Meeting as an act of indiscipline and alleged State 
BJP and Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Shri Kiren 
Rijijii to be behind this open defiance arid have been creating 
disturbance and hurdles in developmental activities. In the Meeting, 
it was reportedly decided to initiate disciplinary action against the 
dissident Legislators, who did not attend the CLP Meeting. He 
also reportedly stated that he would submit a report to the Party 
High Command on the situation and suggest disciplinary action 
against th.e 21 · MsLA. Prominent among the 21 Legislators 
included former Ministers Shri Kalikho Pu!, Shri Chowna Mein, 
Shri Kumar Waii, Shri Wanglin Lowangdong, Shri Thangwang 
Wangham, Shri Kam lung Mossang, most of whom were dropped 
from the Ministry led by Shri Nabam Tuki-recently. 
The State BJP strongly condemned the above unwarranted 
statements ofShri Narayanasamy as political statements not based 
on truth and out of frustration due to their failure to put their house 
in order. 
Meanwhile, State BJP Legislators have submitted a 
Memorandum dated !2!h November, 2015 to the Governor 
apprising him the recent political crisis
in the State and requested 
to take appropriate and proactive action on the issue (copy at 
Annexure-I). They alleged that the "stretched" political stalemate 
has put the State under "complete darkness" and the continuation 
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of the present Congress Government has made each and every 
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citizen very "vulnerable". In the Memorandum they claimed that 
in the House of total 60 Members, any Legislature Party to form 
a Government must enjoy the confidence or support of minimum 
31 Members of the House, but the Government led by Shri Nabam 
Tuki commands the support and confidence of only 25 Legislators .. 
They also requ-ested the Governor to ask the State Government 
G 
not to take any major decisions in financial matters because Chief 
Minister Shri Nabam Tuki's Government has been reduced to a 
minority. The State _BJP also reiterated its demand that the ruling 
Congress Government in the state should surrender paving way 
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for new regime to take over. Highlighting the present political 
situation in the state, the BJP, in a Press Statement, claimed that 
the long political stalemate in the rebel-plagued Government has 
. brought all developmental activities to a grinding halt and the long 
absence of the rebel MLAs. from the state has totally paralyzed 
the State. 
In the meantime, Peoples' Party of Arunachal (PPA) in a 
Press Statement said that the Leader of the Opposition should 
immediately call upon the Governor of the State and urge him to 
instruct the Chief Minister to prove his majority or step down, 
owning moral responsibility. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
I will keep you informed of the subsequent developments, if 
any, on the above issues, in my subsequent Report. 
With Esteemed Regards, 
Yours sincerely, 
signed (illegible) 
. (J.P. Rajkhowa)" 
112. The last letter addressed by the Governor to the President, 
before the issuance of the order, and the message dated 9.12.2015 was 
dated 1.12.2015. An extract of the same is reproduced hereunder: 
Hon' ble Shri Pranab Mukherjee j i, 
"No. G/ML/2015 
01 Dec,2015 
My report for the nio.nth of November, 2015, briefly giving an 
outline of various events in Arunachal Pradesh is placed below 
for your kind perusal. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
On 19th November, 2015, thirteen Legislators submitted a 
Memorandum to the Governor, praying to rescind the Summons 
issued for the House to meet on 14th
January, 2016 and re-issue 
the Summons for the House to meet at an emergent date so that 
the Resolution aforesaid is considered and disposed at the earliest 
in accordance with the scheme, purpose and timeframe envisaged 
· by the Constitutfon makers." (Copy at Annexure-1). 
Further, 13 Members of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative 
Assembly (APLA), addressing a letter to the Secretary of the 
Assembly, issued a Notice of the following Resolution, under Article
-, I 
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
147 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
I 79(c) read with Article 181 of the Constitution oflndia and Rules 
A 
151 to \314 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of 
APLA, for removal of the present Speaker. 
"That this House removes Shri Nabam Rebia from the Office of 
the Speaker of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly with 
immediate effect." The signatories have given five grounds, in 
B 
justification, including one of committing the "moral turpitude of 
the highest order thereby making him ineligible to occupy the high 
office of the Speaker", since he was reportedly "caught in an 
ugly scandal involving a woman from the State" who lodged an 
FIR on 15-11-2015 in the Women Police Station, Itanagar. (copy 
at Annexure-ll). 
C 
of Arunachal 
Legislative Assembly slated to be held from J4!ll Januai:y. 2016, 
alleging that the present Nabam Tuki led Govt. has completely 
lost the confidence of the people and has been reduced to a minority 
D 
and hence needs to prove his majority in the floor of the House. 
It is pertinent to mention here that the present political scenario of 
such a long-drawn impasse extending over nearly three months, 
with 21 Congress Legislators camping in Delhi to impress upon 
the party Central Leadership for removing Shri Nabam Tuki from 
the post of Chief Minister, is not at all in the interest of the people 
and the State, which requires urgent and immediate redressal.
keeping in mind that political stability is ofutmost importance for 
the welfare of the_ people of this strategic border State. 
The attention of the Raj Bhavan has been drawn to the news 
item in one of the local dailies, the Dawnlit Post, with headline 
'Tuki led Government is 100 percent stable: Narayanasamy; 
Eastern Sentinel, with Headline 'Tuki, undisputed leader: 
Narayanasamy'; Arunachal Front, with a headline 'AICC top 
brasses elicit 25 CLP Ms LA view to report to Delhi', where it 
states that 'Modi replaced all the Governors by RSS men and the 
present State Governor wrote a letter against the Hollongi 
Greenfield Airport without consulting the CM which was 
unconstitutional. The Governor has turned the Raj Bhavan into 
BHP Hqs, Narayanasamy alleged. I expressed strong disapproval 
to such wild allegation by a former Union Minister of State, Shri 
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A 
V. Narayanasamy, who is one of the senior leaders of one of the 
major political parties of the country. A copy of the Press Release 
issued from the Raj Bhavan is attached vi de Annex-' B '. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
During the month under report, the insurgent activities, like forcible 
B 
tax collection by three factions ofNSCN (K), NSCN (IM) and 
NSCN (R) in three Districts, i.e. Tirap, Changlang and Longding 
are still continuing. 
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The Detailed Report is enclosed herewith. 
With kindest regards, 
Yours sincerely, 
signed (illegible) 
(J.P. R~jkhowa)" 
113. Based on the three monthly reports submitted by the 
Governor to the President, it was contended, that there was sufficient 
material before the Governor to arrive at the conclusion, that the Speaker 
was likely to discharge his duties in a manner as would result in extending 
political favours to the INC. It was submitted, that it was legitimately 
apprehended (- by the Governor), that the Speaker who was facing a. 
notice of resolution for his removal, would exercise his powers under 
the Tenth Schedule, to disqualify the dissident MLAs (belonging to the 
INC), and thereby stage manage his majority in the House, with the 
support of the Chief Minister. This in turn, it was urged, would ward off 
the threat to the position of the Chief Minister, as well. It was submitted 
that, it was in the above background, that the Governor expressed in his 
message dated
9.12.2015, that the Presiding Officer during the course 
of consideration of the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker, 
would not alter the party composition in the House. It was submitted, 
that the aforesaid apprehension entertained by the Governor, came out 
to be true, when the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, issued notices 
on 7.12.2015 (returnable for 14.12.2015)forthe removal of the said 14 
MLAs, belonging to the INC. It was pointed out, that even though none 
of the above MLAs were served, proceedings against them were simply 
adjourned to the following day - 15.12.2015. Even the adjourned date 
was not to the knowledge of the MLAs proceeded against. And despite 
the fact, that none of the MLAs whose disqualification was sought, had 
been served or had entered appearance in the proceedings, they were 
all disqualified by the Speaker, on 15.12.2015. According to learned
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 149. 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
senior counsel, this action of the Speaker resulted in depletion of the 
strength of the Assembly. This depleted strength had the effect ofreviving 
and securing his own majority, which was sufficient to effectively defeat 
the notice of resolution for his removal. It was submitted, that it is 
evident that the order, and the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, 
were based on good and sound reasons, and were aimed at preserving 
an honest democratic process in the State. 
The next instalment, of the legal response, on behalfofthe respondents: 
114. Relying on the decisions rendered by this Court in the 
Samsher Singh case', and in Madhya Pradesh Special Police 
Establishment v. State of Madhya Pradesh'5, as also, in State of Gujarat 
v. Justice R.A. Mehta 16, and especially in the Satya Pal Dang case'3, it 
was submitted, that the Governor's power to prorogue the Legislative 
Assembly under Article 174(2) was absolute, and without any restriction 
· and restraint, and that, the Governor could exercise his said power, in his 
own discretion without any aid or advice. 
115. Having invited our attention .to Article 163(2), it was 
submitted, that the powerofthe Governor with reference to a situation, 
in which he is to act in his own discretion is not only final, but also that, 
the validity of the exercise of such discretion by the Governor, cannot be 
called in question, before
any Court. It was asserted, that no one 
whatsoever had the right to determine, whether the Governor ought or 
ought not to have acted, in his discretion. It was submitted, that the only 
situation, where the exercise of discretion by the Governor, can be called 
in question is, when it can be established, that the Governor's action was 
perverse or capricious or fallacious or extraneous or for a motivated 
consideration. In other words, w·hen the exercise of discretion, can be 
described as mala fide. Then, and then alone, according to learned 
counsel, the same can be questioned by adopting a process of judicial 
review. It was submitted, that the scope of interference in the discretion 
of the Governor under Article 163(2), has to be accepted as extremely 
limited. It was pointed out, that Article 163(2) is a unique provision. It 
was acknowledged, that its ambit and scope had not yet been determined 
by this Court. It was urged, that the power of the Governor to exercise 
functions on his own, without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers 
headed by the Chief Minister, is well known. Illustratively, reference 
" (2004) s sec 788 
"(2013) 3 sec 1 
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was made to Articles 200, 239(2), 356, 371(2), 371A(l)(b), 371C(I), 
3 71 F(g), and in addition thereto, the powers vested with the Governor 
under Paragraph 9 of the Sixth Schedule. It was further urged, that 
there were other situations also, wnerein discretion to act independently, 
has been conferred on the Governor, even though not specifically 
B 
expressed, by or under any provision of the Constitution. Reference 
was made to the selection of the Chief Minister, after fresh elections 
under Article 164; the authority to obtain a fresh vote of co~fidence; 
. where it appears to the Governor that the Chief Minister and his Council 
of Ministers no longer enjoy the majority in the House. Refer~nce was 
also made to.the Sam sher Singh case' (paragraph 154-.-already ~tracted 
c 
ab91ve), wherein this Court referred to obvious situa,tions, irl \'fhich.the 
!." Governorwouldactathisown. 
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116. Reference was also made to the Madhya Pradesh'-special 
Police Establishment case'', wherein this Court recognised the fact, that 
,i 
there would be many situations where, for reasons c;ifperil to democratic 
D 
principles, the Governor was liable to act at his own, without subjecting 
himself to the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of 
Ministers. It was explained, that in matters where the Governor is of 
the view, that the advice of the Council of Ministers wasJikely to
b.e 
biased or partisan, or where there is a conflict of interest between the 
E 
Council of Ministers on the issue under consideration, it would be .open 
to a Governor to act at his own, And in such cases, even if advice is 
. tendered by the Council of Ministers, the Governor could legitimately 
ignore the same. It was pointed out, that the above position was 
reiterated in the Justice R.A Mehta case16, wherein this Court while 
interpreting Article 163(2) concluded, that it would be permissible for 
; 
F 
the Governor to act without ministerial advice, even in the absence of an 
express provision in the Constitution. 
117. Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, learned 
senior counsel asserted, that Article 174 itself vests the power with the 
Governor, to summon, prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Assembly. It 
G 
was submitted, that a perusal of Article 174 reveals, that there are no 
·restrictions on the powers of the Governor, in the above matters. The 
Governor's decision determining the place and time, where and when 
'the House would meet, according to learned counsel, is also demonstrative 
of the determination of the same, by himself. It was submitted, that 
H 
summoning the Assembly is a part of the discretion referred to in Article
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
151 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
163( 1 ), where the Governor can act without the aid and advice of the 
Council of Ministers. And further that, the decision of the Governor in 
the above matter is final, and cannot be questioned, because it is so 
mandated, under Article 163(2). It was therefore asserted, that the 
discretion exercised by the Governor in preponing the meeting of the 
Assembly from 14.1.2016 to 16.12.2015, was fully justified and within 
the individual domain of the Governor. 
118. On the subject of judicial review, in respect of the discretion 
exercised by the Governor under Article 163(2), it was submitted, that. 
this Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala 17, held that the 
provisions of the Constitution cannot be amended, so as to alter the 
basic structure of the Constitution. It was acknowledged,.that the power 
of judicial review has been recognised as a part of the basic structure of 
the Constitution. It was submitted, that the concept of the basic structure, 
is not applicable to the original provisions of the Constitution. It was 
emphasized, that Article 163(2) is an original provision of the Constitution, 
and therefore, it cannot be tested on the touchstone of the concept of 
the basic structure. It was pointed out, that the founding fathers of the 
Constitution, desired to vest absolute discretion with the Governor, to 
determine whether he ought to act in his discretion.
It was urged, that 
the founding fathers made it explicitly clear, that the decision of the 
Governor taken in his discretion would be final, and additionally, anything 
done by the Governor while exercising liis discretion under Article 163(2), 
would not be called in question. It was subinitted, that a plain reading of 
the above provision, leaves no room for any doubt, that the framers of 
the Constitution vested with the Governor an unambiguous authority to 
exercise his discretion under the provisions of the Constitution. The 
founding fathers also desired, that such discretion exercised by the 
Governor should be final. It was therefore submitted, that the very 
suggestion at the hands of the appellants, that the order and message of 
the Governor dated 9.12.2015, were subject to judicial review, was liable 
to be rejected. 
· 
119. In order to demonstrate the uniqueness of the position of 
the Governor, learned senior counsel desired this Court to contrast Article 
163 with Article 74. It was pointed out, that Article 74 requires the 
President, to exercise his functions in accordance with the aid and advice 
tendered to him by the Council of Ministers (with the Prime Minister as 
11 (1973) 4 sec 2s 
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the head). And under no circumstances, in his own discretion. It was 
urged, that while examining the scope of functions vested with the 
Governor, it needs to be visualized that Article 163( 1) postulates situations, 
wherein the Governor is to exercise his functions, as provided for by or 
under the Constitution, in his own discretion. It was highlighted, that 
under Article 163(2), in case of a dispute, whether or not a particular 
function could or could not be exercised by the Governor in his own 
discretion, the Governor and the Governor alone, is mandated to take 
call on the matter. And his decision on the matter, is final. According to 
learned senior counsel, in the discharge of functions under the Constitution, 
the determination at the hands of the Governor is different from that of 
the President. The Governor has clear discretionary powers, whereas 
the President has none. Furthermore, as noticed above, Article 163(2) 
assigns finality to the determination by the Governor, as to whether he 
was required by or under the Constitution to act in his own discretion. 
Not only that, the said determination by the Governor" ... shall not be 
called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted 
in his discretion ... ". 
120. It was therefore submitted, that in all matters where, by a 
constitutional provision, the Governor is required to discharge a particular 
function, the
manner in which that function is to be discharged, would 
have to be determined by the Governor himself. It was submitted, that 
that could be the only legitimate conclusion, on an effective comparison 
and understanding of Articles 74 and 163. It was in the instant background, 
that learned senior counsel drew our attention to Article 174, which 
according to him, unambiguously vests in the Governor, the responsibility 
to summon the State Legislature. Not only that, it was submitted, that 
the Governor is also vested with the responsibility to determine "as he 
thinks fit", when and where the House would meet. Likewise, the 
Governor is authorized to prorogue and dissolve the House, from time to 
time, as he may choose. It was therefore submitted, that in the facts 
and circumstances of the present case, when the Governor by his order 
dated 9.12.2015, took the decision by exercising his discretion, to summon 
the House by preponing the 6th session of the Assembly from 14.1.2016 
(as earlier fixed), to 16.12.2015. The above discretion exercised by the 
Governor was bound to be accepted as final, a11d could not be called in 
question. It was submitted, that judicial review of the above order, was 
clearly barred, except if it could be shown, that the above discretion was 
not exercised by the Governor bona fide and on due consideration. It
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 153 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
was submitted, that the exercise of discretion at the hands of the Governor 
under Article 163(2), was an area of non-justiciability. And that, it was 
impossible to get over the bar, except to the limited extent referred to 
hereinabove. 
121. In the above view of the matter, for exactly the same reasons 
expressed by learned counsel with reference to the order dated 9.12.2015, 
it was submitted, that the discretion exercised by the Governor in 
addressing the message dated 9.12.2015 under Article 175, was also in 
exercise of due discretion, without any oblique motives, and to further 
the democratic process, in consonance with the provisions of the 
Constitution, as also, the 'Conduct of Business Rules' (framed under 
Article 208). It was therefore the vehement contention of learned senior 
counsel, that the prayers made by the appellants against the impugned 
order of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, as well as, the impugned message 
of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, deserved to be rejected. 
The last segment of legal submissions, on behalf of the respondents: 
122. Mr. Ashok H. Desai, Senior Advocate entered appearance 
last ofall. His representation was on behalf ofrespondent nos. 21 to 30. 
He assisted the Court by primarily expounding the·constitutional 
·parameters contemplated under Articles 163 and 174. Learned counsel 
examined the aforesaid provisions, to highlight his
understanding of the 
scope and powers of the Governor. In order to broadly demonstrate the 
functions of the Governor, it was submitted, that the Constitution has 
vested with the Governor executive, as well _as, legislative functions. It 
was submitted, that Article 154 postulates the range of the executive 
power of the State, accorded to the Governor. He placed reliance on 
A1ticle 168, which declares the office of the Governor, to be a component 
of the State Legislature. It was also pointed out, that the Governor was 
bestowed with legislative power under Article 213, which authorized 
him to promulgate Ordinances, during the period the State Legislature 
was not in session. As against the above, it was submitted, that all 
executive actions of the State Government, are expressed in the name 
of the Governor, under Article 166. According to learned counsel, Article 
166 also requires the Governor to make rules for the conven ienttransaction 
of business of the State Government, and for the allocation of 
governmental business amongst Ministers. It was also highlighted, that 
the Governor of a State has the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites 
or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute sentences 
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of persons convicted of offences relating to matters to which the 
executive power of the State extends under Article 161. It was submitted, 
that under Article 174, the. Governor is required to summon Houses of 
the State Legislature, at such time and place as he thinks fit. The Governor 
likewise, has the authority to prorogue and dissolve the Assembly. It 
was pointed out, that in a State Legislature having both a Legislative 
Council and a Legislative Assembly, the Governor is authorized to make 
rules relating to procedure, with respect to the business of the House, 
under Article 208. It was submitted, that no Bill can be passed by State 
Legislature(s) to become law, unless on being presenteo to the Governor 
under Article 200, the Governor accords his assent to the same. It was 
urged, that even though Article 163 provides, that a Governor would 
exercise his functions on the aid and advice of a Council of Ministers 
with the Chief Minister as the head, yet the same Article notably authorizes 
the Governor to carry out certain functions in his own discretion, without 
any aid and ·advice. It was pointed out, that it was inter alia on the 
receipt of a report from the Governor of a State, that the President may, 
in case of failure of the constitutional machinery, declare that the power 
of the Legislature of the State, would be exercised under the authority 
of the Parliament. It was contended, that
the power and position of the 
Governor and the contours, while interpreting the scope and extent of 
his powers and functions, should be' determined on the basis of the 
responsibilities and the functions assigned to him under different provisions 
of the Constitution. 
123. It was urged by learned senior counsel, that a Governor is 
required to discharge the functions assigned to him, keeping in mind the 
true scope and ambit of each of the functions. It was pointed out, that in 
case of conflict between the views expressed by the Union Government 
and a concerned State Government, the Governor must assume the 
position of an impartial/neutral umpire. It was submitted, that the State 
of Arunachal Pradesh (of which respondent no.17, was the Governor), 
could not be handled in the same manner as other States recognized by 
the Indian Constitution. It was submitted, that the State of Arunachal 
Pradesh is located in the north-east of India, and has one of the longest 
international boundaries of any State. It was urged, that the State had 
been subjected to recurrent insurgencies from within, as also, from outside 
tthe country. It was also pointed out; that China which has a common 
border with the State of Arunachal Pradesh, is claiming a large part of 
the Indian territory falling in the State. It was submitted, that Article
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
155 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.) 
371H recognizes the special position of the Governor of the State of 
Arunachal Pradesh. Article 371H is extracted hereunder: 
"3 71 H. Special provision with respect to the State of Arunachal 
Pradesh.-Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-
(a) the Governor of Aru-nachal Pradesh shall have special 
responsibility with respect to law and order in the State of 
Arunachal Pradesh and in the discharge of his functions in relation 
thereto, the Governor shall, after consulting the Council of 
Ministers, exercise his individual judgment as to the action to be 
taken: 
Provided that if any question arises whether any matter is or is 
not a matter as respects which the Governor is under this clause 
required to act in the exercise ofhis individual judgment, the decision 
of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of 
anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on 
the ground that he ought or ought not to have ac~eg in the exercise 
ofhis individualjudgment:. 
Provided further that if the President on receipt of a report from 
the Governor or otherwise is satisfied that it is no longer necessary 
for the Governor to have special responsibility with respect to law 
and order in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, he may by order 
direct that the Governor shall cease to have such responsibility 
with effect from such date as may be specified in
the order; 
(b) the Legislative Assembly of the State of Arunachal Pradesh 
shall consist of not less than thirty members." 
Based on the aforesaid provision, it was pointed out, that the Governor 
of the State of Arunachal Pradesh, is provided with special responsibilities 
with respect to law and order. It was submitted, that the Governor, after 
consulting the Council of Ministers, is authorized to exercise his individual 
judgment, as to the action to be takei1, with respect to maintaining law 
and order in the State. And that, any such action taken by the Governor 
in his individual judgment, has been assigned the status of being final and 
binding, so as not be called in question, on the plea that he ought or 
ought not to have acted, in exercise of his individual judgment. It was 
however acknowledged, that the exercise of the responsibility by the 
Governor under Article 371H would remain, so long as, the approval for 
the same continues to be accorded by the President. 
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124. On the pointed interpretation of Article 163( I), it was 
asserted, that a Governor would ordinarily exercise his functions on the 
aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the 
head. It was however pointed out, that under the very same provision, 
the Governor is authorised by the Constitution "to exercise his functions 
or any of them in his discretion''. It was urged, that the constitutional 
powers which the Governor is mandated to exercise under Article 163( 1 ), 
extend to situations provided for expressly "by or under" the provisions 
of the Constitution. It was asserted, that besides the functions assigned 
to a Governor under the Constitution, a Governor may be required to 
discharge functions and exercise powers, under ordinary legislative 
enactments. It was submitted, that the authority exercised by the 
Governor under a statutory provision, may or may not be required to be 
performed, on any aid and advice. Relying on the judgment in the Samsher 
Singh case 1, it was urged, that a seven-Judge Bench by way of illustration 
indicated, a number of situations, where the Governor could act without 
any aid and advice. It was highlighted, that in the Samsher Singh case 1 
the Court emphasized, that the instances depicted in the judgment were 
only illustrative, and not exhaustive. A relevant extract of the above 
judgment is reproduced hereunder: 
"54. The provisions
of the Constitution which expressly require 
the Governor to exercise his powers in his discretion are contained 
in Articles to which reference has been made. To illustrate, 
Article 239(2) states that where a Governor is appointed an 
Administrator of an adjoining Union Territory he shall exercise 
his functions as such administrator independently of his Council 
of Ministers. The other Articles which speak of the discretion of . 
the Governor are paragraphs 9(2) and 18(3) of the Sixth Schedule 
and 
Articles 371A(l)(b), 
37IA(l)(d) and 371A(2) 
(b) and 371 A(2)(t). The discretion conferred on the Governor 
means that as the Constitutional or formal head of the State the 
power is vested in him. In this connection, reference may be made 
to Article 356 which states that the Governor can send a report to 
the President that a situation has arisen in which the government 
of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions 
of this Constitution. Again Article 200 requires the Governor to 
reserve for consideration any Bill which in his opinion if it became 
law, would so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to 
endanger the position which the High Court is designed to fill
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
157 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
under the Constitution. 
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55. In making a report under A1iicle 356 the Governor will be 
justified in exercising his discretion even against the aid and advice 
of his Council of Ministers. The reason is that the failure of the 
constitutional machinery may be because of the conduct of the 
Council of Ministers. This discretionary power is given to the 
Governor to enable him to report to the President who, however, 
must act on the advice of his Council of Ministers in all matters. 
In this context Article 163(2) is explicable that the decision of the 
Governor in his discretion shall be final and the validity shall not 
be called in question. The action taken by.the President-on sucl.1 a 
report is a different matter. The President acts on the advice of 
his Council of Ministers. In all other matters where' the Governor 
acts in his discretion he will act in harmony with his Council of 
Ministers. The Constitution does not aim at providing a parallel 
administration within the State by allowing the Governor to go 
against the advice of the Council of Ministers. 
56. Similarly Article 200 indicates another instance where the 
Governor may act irrespective of any advice from the Council of 
Ministers. In such matters where the Governor is to exercise his 
discretion he must discharge his duties to the best of his judgment. 
The Governor is required to pursue such courses which are
not 
detrimental to the State. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
154. We declare the law of this branch of our Constitution to be 
that the President and Governor, custodians of all executive and 
other powers under various Articles, shall, by virtue of these 
provisions, exercise their formal constitutional powers only upon 
and in accordance with the advice of their Ministers save in a 
few well-known exceptional situations. Without being dogmatic 
or exhaustive, these situations relate to (a) the choice of Prime 
Minister (Chief Minister), restricted though this choice is by the 
paramount consideration that he should command a majority in 
the House; (b) the dismissal of a Government which has lost its 
majority in the House, but refuses to quit office; (c) the dissolution 
of the House where an appeal to the country is necessitous, 
although in this area the Head of State should avoid getting involved 
in politics and must be advised by his Prime Minister (Chief 
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Minister) who will eventually take the responsibility forthe step. 
We do not examine in detail the constitutional proprieties in these 
predicaments except to utter the caution that even here the action 
must be compelled by the peril to democracy and the appeal to 
th.e House or to the country must become blatantly obligatory. We 
have no doubt that de Smith's statement regarding royal assent 
holds good for the President and Governor in India: 
Refusal of the royal assent on the ground that the Monarch strongly 
disapproved of a Bill or that it was intensely controversial would 
nevertheless be unconstitutional. The only circumstances in which the 
withholding of the royal assent might be justifiable would be if the 
Government itself were to advise such a course-a highly improbable 
contingency-or possibly if it was notorious that a Bill had been passed 
in disregard to mandatory procedural requirements; but since the 
Government in the later situation would be of the opinion that the deviation 
would not affect the validity of the measure once it had been assented 
to, prudence would suggest the giving of assent." 
Reliance was also placed on State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas 
Nayak18, and our attention was drawn to the following observations 
recorded therein: 
"10. We may add, there is nothing before us to think that any such 
mistake occurred, nor is there any ground taken in the petition for
grant of special leave that the learned Judges proceeded on a 
mistaken view that the learned counsel had made a concession 
that there might arise circumstances, under which the Governor 
in granting sanction to prosecute a minister must act in his own 
discretion and not on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The 
statement in the judgment that such a concession was made is 
conclusive and, if we may say so, the concession was rightly made. 
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we have no 
doubt in our mind that when there is to be a prosecution of the 
Chief Minister, the Governor would, while determining whether 
sanction for such prosecution should be granted or not under 
Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as a matter of 
propriety. necessarily act in his own discretion and not on the 
advice of the Council of Ministers." 
Our attention was also drawn to the Madhya Pradesh Special Police 
1' ( J 982) 2 sec 463
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 159 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Establishment case 1\ where this Court held as under: 
"12 ...... Thus, as rightly pointed _out by Mr. Sorabjee, a seven-
Judge Bench of this Court has already held that the normal rule is 
that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of 
Ministers and not independently or contrary to it. But there are 
exceptions under which the Governor can act in his own discretion. 
Some of the exceptions are as set out hereinabove. It is, however, 
clarified that the exceptions mentioned in the judgment are not 
exhaustive. It is also recognized that the concept of the Governor 
acting in his discretion or exercising independent judgment is not 
alien to the Constitution. It is recognized that there may be 
situations where by reason of peril to democracy or democratic 
principles an action may be compelled which from its nature is 
not amenable to Ministerial advice. Such a situation may be where 
bias is inherent and/or manifest in the advice of the Council of 
Ministers. 
xxx 
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19. 
Article 163 has been extracted above. Undoubtedly, in a 
matter of grant of sanction to prosecute the Governor is normal!) 
required to act on aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and 
not in his discretion. However, an exception may arise whilst 
considering grant of sanction to prosecute a Chief Minister or a 
Minister where as a matter of propriety the Governor may have 
to act in
his own discretion. Similar would be the situation ifthe 
Council of Ministers disables itself or disentitles itself." 
Learned counsel a)s(') invited the Court's attention to the conclusions 
drawn by this Court in the Justice R.A. Mehta case 16, wherefrom he 
laid emphasis on the following observations 
"3 7. In M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State ofM.P., (2004) 
8 sec 788, the question that arose was whether, for the purpose 
of grant of sanction for the prosec~tion of Ministers, for offences 
under the Prevention of Corruption Act and/or, the Penal Code, 
the Governor, while granting such sanction, could exercise his 
own discretion, or act contrary to the advice rendered to him by 
the Council of Ministers. The Court, in this regard, first consi_dered 
the object and purpose of the statutozy provisions. which are aimed 
at achieving the prevention and eradication of acts of corruption 
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by public functionaries. The Cou11 then also considered, the 
provisions of Article 163 of the Constitution, and took into 
consideration with respect to the same, a large number of earlier 
judgments of this Court, including Samsher Singh v. State of 
Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 and State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas 
Shrinivas Nayak, (1982) 2 SCC 463, and thereafter, came to the 
conclusion that, in a matter related to the grant of sanction required 
to prosecute a public functionary, the Governor is usually required 
to act in accordance with the aid and advice rendered to him by 
the Council of Ministers, and not upon his own discretion. However, 
an exception may arise while considering the grant of sanction 
required to prosecute the Chief Minister, or a Minister, where as 
a matter ofptopriety, the Governor may have to act upon his own 
discretion. Similar would be the situation in a case where, the 
Council of Ministers disables or disentitles itself from providing 
such aid and advice. Such a conclusion by the Cou11, was found 
to be necessary, for the reason that the facts and circumstances 
of a case involving any of the aforementioned fact situations, may 
indicate the possibility of bias on the part of the Chief Minister, or 
the Council of Ministers. This Court carved out ce11ain exceptions 
to the said provision. For instance. where bias is inherent or 
apparent, or, where the decision of the
Council of Ministers is 
wholly irrational. or. where the Council of Ministers, because of 
some incapacity or other situation, is disentitled from giving such 
advice, or, where it refrains from doing so as matter of propriety, 
or in the case of a complete break down of democracy. 
38. Article 163(2) of the Constitution provides that it would be 
permissible for the Governor to act without ministerial advice in 
ce11ain other situations, depending upon the circumstances therein, 
even though they may not specifically be mentioned in the 
Constitution as discretionary functions e.g. the exercise of power 
under Article 356( 1 ), as no such advice will be available from the 
Council of Ministers, who are responsible for the breakdown of 
constitutional machinery, or where one Ministry has resigned, and 
the other alternative Ministry cannot be formed. Moreover, clause 
2 of Article 163 provides that the Governor himself is the final 
authority to decide upon the issue of whether he is required by or 
under the Constitution, to act in his discretion. The Council of 
Ministers therefore, would be rendered.incompetent in the event
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
of there being a difference of opinion with respect to such a 
question, and such a decision taken by the Governor, would not 
be justiciable in any court. There may also be circumstances 
where, there are matters, with respect to which the Constitution 
does not specifically require the Governor to act in his discretion, 
but the Governor, despite this, may be fullyiustified to act so e~g. 
the Council of Ministers may advise the Governor to dissolve a 
House, which may be detrimental to the interests of the nation. In 
·such circumstances, the Governor would be justified in refusing 
to accept the advice rendered to him, and act in his discretion. 
There may even be circumstances where ministerial advice is not 
available at all, i.e. the decision regarding the choice of Chief 
Minister under Article 164( I), which involves choosing a Chief 
Minister after a fresh election, or in the event of the death or 
resignation of the Chief Minister, or dismissal of the Chief Minister 
who loses majority in the House and yet refuses to resign, or 
agree to· dissolution. The Governor is further not required to act 
on the advice of the Council of Ministers, where some other body 
has been referred for the purpose of consultation i.e. Article 192(2) 
as regards decisions on questions related to the disqualification of 
Members of the State Legislature." 
Last of all, learned counsel placed reliance
on the judgment of th is Court 
in Rajendra Singh Verma v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi) 19, and our 
attention was invited to the following observations made therein: 
"135. Thus, it is fairly well settled by a cat~na of decisions of this 
Court that in the matter of compulsory retirement of a Judicial 
Officer the Governor cannot act on the aid and the advice of 
Council of Ministers but has to act only on the recommendation 
of the High Court. Though the Lt. Governor is a party to these 
appeals, he has not raised any plea that the recommendation made 
by the Delhi High Court was not binding on him and he could 
have acted in the matter only on the aid and advice of his Council 
of Ministers. Thus the order of the Lt. Governor compulsorily 
retiring the appellants without seeking aid and advice of his Council 
of Ministers is neither ultra vires nor illegal and is rightly sustained 
by the High Court. The Governor could not have passed any order 
on the aid and advice of Council of Ministers in this case. The 
19 (201 I) IO sec I 
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advice should be of no other authority except that of the High 
Court in the matter of judicial officers. This is the plain implication 
of Article 235." 
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Based on the declared position oflaw by this· Court, in the judgments on 
which reliance was placed by learned .aounsel, it was submitted, tl:tat 
where constitutional issues arise, because of an unacceptable and 
constitutionally impermissible conduct of the Council of Ministers, or in 
case of a disputation relating to the choice of the Chief Minister, or with 
I 
reference to the resolution of the House, or on account of the democratic 
process being undermined, it was open to a qiovernor to a,ct on his own, 
without any aid and advice. It was urged, that th~ individual determination 
of the Governor would extend to issues where propriety requires him to 
discharge his functions in his own discretion, as for instance, ~nction df 
prosecution of a ChiefMinister or a Memberofthe Council ot"Minister~. 
125. It was urged, that the sequence of facts narrated by the 
learned counsel representing the respondents has highlighted a situation, 
where MLAs 'belonging to the INC did not support their own Chief 
Minister - Nabam Tuki. It was also highlighted, that the Speaker -
Nabam Rebia, who ought to have been functioning as a neutral arbiter in 
the activities of the House, was demonstrating a partisan attitude by 
siding with the Chief Minister - Nabam
Tuki. And in order to support 
the Chief Minister, the Speaker had endeavoured to misuse the power 
vested with him, under the Tenth Schedule. It was therefore submitted, 
that the action taken by the Governor, through his order dated 9.12.2015 
and his message dated 9.12.2015, was surely aimed at restoring balance 
in the democratic process, and as such, could not have been performed 
on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister 
as the head. It was pointed out, that not only the Council of Ministers 
and the Chief Minister, but also the Speaker were misusing the 
constitutional powers vested with them, to derail the democratic process, 
and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Governor was well 
· within his rights in exercise of the discretion vested with him under Article 
163, to endeavour to preserve the democratic process without himself 
interfering therewith. 
126. Learned senior counsel then placed reliance on the first, 
third, fourth, fifth and sixth sequences of facts, to contend that the 
constitutional turmoil which prevailed in the State of Arunachal Pradesh 
was of a nature, wherein it was futile to seek the aid and advice of the
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 163 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head. In fact, it was 
his pointed contention, that the situation which prevailed in the Legislative 
Assembly of the State of Arunachal Pradesh, had erupted on account of 
the complicity between the Chief Minister and the Speaker, neither of 
whom enjoyed the confidence of the House. It was submitted, that the 
democratic process was in peril. It was urged, that the Governor in 
compliance with the oath subscribed to by him, at the time of assumption 
of office under Article 159, had passed the order dated 9.12.2015, as 
also, issued the message dated 9.12.2015, which were aimed at 
preserving, protecting and defending the Constitution, and the laws. It 
was submitted, that there was no question of seeking any aid and advice, 
for the purpose of preponing the 6th session of the Assembly, in exercise 
of the power. vested with the Governor under Article 174. It was 
submitted, that his exercise of discretion to prepone the 6th session of 
the Assembly from 14.1.2016 to 14.12.2015, was in consonance with 
the discretion vested with him under Article 163(2). In order to justify 
his above contention, it was submitted, that there was no cause for the 
Governor to consult the Chief Minister - Nabam Tuki, who had lost 
support of the majority of the MLAs. It was asserted, that in the same 
manner, as the Governor can summon the House for
a floor test, to 
determine whether or not the ruling party had support of the majority, so 
also, the Governor was well within his rights, to determine whether or 
not the Speaker, continued to enjoy majority support. It was submitted, 
that the right of a Speaker to conduct proceedings against MLAs (who 
had been proceeded against under the Tenth Schedule), can be considered 
to be constitutionally justified, only ifthe Speaker enjoys majority support. 
Once the Governor entertained the belief, that the Speaker - Nabam 
Rebia, had lost support of the majority of the MLAs, he could not be 
permitted to discharge the onerous constitutional responsibility, under 
the Tenth 'Schedule. It was urged, that it was in the aforestated 
background, that the Governor had in his own discretion, summoned the 
Assembly underArticle 174. It was submitted, that the instant situation 
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is comparable to the other circumstances, wherein, even though the 
Governor has not been so e)(_pressly authorized (to deal with a matter in 
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his own discretion), not doing so, would amount to defeating the 
constitutional purpose sought to be achieved. In the above view of the 
matter, it was reiterated, that in the backdrop of the vast and onerous 
functions vested with the Governor, it cannot be' doubted, that the 
Governor has the power to summon the Assembly, in exercise of his 
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