ONGC LTD. versus PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION & ORS.
[2015] 5 S.C.R. 474, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
c 
[2015] 5 S.C.R. 474 
ONGCLTD. 
V. 
PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 3727 of 2015) 
APRIL 17,2015 
[V. GOPALA GOWDAAND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.] 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Regularisation- Claim for 
- Appointment of workmen by Corporation initially through 
contractors, subsequently, through Co-operative Society -
Thereafter, policy decision by the Corporation to entrust security 
D work to Cl SF to protect their installations - During pendency of 
the sanction from Central Government of the policy decision, 
Corporation issuing memorandum of appointment directly to each 
one of the concerned workmen on term basis and thereafter, 
employed continuously without written orders by the Corporation 
E - Workmen claiming regularization of services in the Corporation 
- Award passed by the tribunal directing the Corporation to 
regularize the services of the workmen since they had completed 
480 days of work as required - Said award upheld by the High 
Court- On appeal, held: Order passed by the High Court is legal 
F and valid - Policy decision is neither valid nor applicable- Certified 
Standing Order of Corporation apply to the workmen and overrides 
the policy decision - Workmen have acquired their right to be 
regularised as per the Act as well as the provision of cl 2(ii) of the 
G 'Certified Standing Orders since they have rendered more than 
240 days of service in a calendar year from the date of the 
memorandum of appointment issued- It would be
unjust and unfair 
to deny them regularisation in their posts for the error committed 
by the Corporation in the procedure to appoint them in the posts-
H Their appointment in their posts and continuing them in their 
474
0.N.GC. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
475 
services definitely cannot be termed as illegal, at best it can be A 
called irregular- Even though plea is not taken regarding unfair 
labour practice being committed by the Corporation, the Labour 
Court/High Court have got the power to record the finding of fact 
to ensure that there shall be effective adjudication of the industrial 
dispute- Thus, the Corporation to regularize the services of the 
B 
workmen and pay their back wages and other benefits- Certified 
Standing Orders for Contingent Employees of the Oil and Natural 
Gas Commission. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
c 
HELD: 1.1 The tribunal rightly adjudicated the P.oint 
as regards jurisdiction of the tribunal to direct the 
Corporation to regularize the services of the con.cerned 
workmen in the posts, on the basis of the facts, D 
circumstances and evidence on record and passed an award 
directing the Corporation that the services of the concerned 
workmen should be regularized. The submission that the 
tribunal has no power to pass such an award compelling the 
Corporation to regularise the services of the concerned E 
workmen is wholly untenable in law. [Para 26] [495-C-E] 
1.2 The plea of the Corporation t.hat the reason for 
not regularising the concerned workmen under the Certified 
Standing Orders of the Corporation is allegedly due to the. F 
fact that the appointment of the concerned workmen was 
made without following due procedure under the
Recruitment Rules and that their appointments were illegal, 
cannot be accepted since the Corporation cannot deny the G 
rights of the workmen by taking the plea that their initial 
appointment was contrary to Articles 14 and 16 of the 
Constitution. Though due procedure was not followed by 
the Corporation for the appointment of the concerned 
workmen, this does not disentitle them of their right to seek H
476 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A regularisation of their services by the Corporation under the 
provisions of the Certified Standing Orders, after they have 
rendered more than 240 days of service in a calendar year 
from the date of the memorandum of appointment issued to 
each one of the concerned workmen in the year 1988. The 
B alleged "policy decision" to appoint CISF personnel to the 
security post is on deputation basis and cannot be called 
appointment per se. Whereas, the concerned workmen have 
acquired their right to be regularised under the provision of 
C Clause 2(ii) of the 'Certified Standing Orders for Contingent 
Employees of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission'. [Para 
28, 29) [503-A-C, E-H] 
D 
Ajaypa/ Singh v. Haryana Warehousing Corporation 2014 
(13) SCALE 636 - relied on. 
1.3 For the Corporation to implement a provision which 
affects the service conditions of its employees, it is 
necessary f9r1fle ~oration to first modify the Certified 
Standing Orders by following the procedure provided under 
E Section 10 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) 
Act, 1946 as the same is a Special enactment and therefore, 
prevails over the provisions under the ONGC Act and 
Recruitment Rules. The Corporation undisputedly has not 
F made any such modification to its Certified Standing Orders 
by following the procedure for modification of conditions of 
service as per Section 10 of the Industrial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The
alleged policy decision 
taken to induct the CISG for the purpose of providing security 
G to its project by the Corporation under Section 30A of the 
ONGC Act does not prevail over the Standing Orders Act 
framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) 
Act, 1946, which is the Special Enactment. Therefore, the 
alleged "policy decision" taken by the Corporation is neither 
H valid in law nor applicable in the case on hand. [Para 32, 33) 
[505-E-G; 510-D-E]
O.N.GC. v. PETROLEUMCOALLABOURUNION 
477 
1.4 The sanction letter by the Central Government is A 
• for the creation of temporary posts for the security coverage 
of ONGC installation and not to depute CISF specifically into 
security posts in the Corporation, therefore, the reliance 
placed on the same is misplaced as the same is wholly 
untenable in law as the same is not reflected in the sanction B 
letter. Further, the stated guidelines cannot be considered 
to be the policy of the Central Government as it is not framed 
in accordance with the relevant 'Business Transaction Rules' 
of the Central Government. [Para 36] [515-D-G] 
c 
1.5 The Standing Orders of the Corporation certainly 
apply to the concerned workmen as they have been rendering 
their services in the Corporation even prior to the year 1985, 
being appointed through contractors, the Co-operative D 
Society and directly thereafter vide memorandum of 
appointment in the year 1988 by issuing appointment orders 
on different dates during that year on the condition that the 
Certified Standing Orders of the ONGC will not be applicable 
to them. Such a condition incorporated In the appointment E 
orders issued to the concerned workmen is not valid in law 
and the same is void for the reason that they are workmen 
for the purpose of the Certified Standing Qrders and 
therefore, the said condition has to be ignored. When the 
concerned workmen were appointed by issuing the F 
memorandum of appointment to work in
the posts of the 
Corporation, providing them with monthly salaries, it cannot 
arbitrarily and unilaterally state that the Certified Standing 
Orders of the Corporation are not applicable to the 
concerned workmen. The concerned workmen cannot be G 
denied their legitimate, statutory and fundamental right to 
be regularised in their posts as provided under Clause 2 (ii) 
of the Certified Standing Orders. It would be unjust and 
unfair to deny them regularisation in their posts for the error H
478 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A committed by the Corporation in the procedure to appoint 
them in the posts. Further, the Corporation cannot use the 
alleged "policy decision" as a veil to justify its action which 
includes inaction on its part in not regularising the concerned 
workmen in their services under cl 2(ii) of the Certified 
B Standing Orders. [Para 38] [517-C-H; 518-A-E] 
1.6 The procedure of appointments adopted by the 
Corporation with respect to the concerned workmen initially 
appointed through contractors, subsequently through the 
C Co-operative Society, and then vide memorandum of 
appointment issued to each one of the concerned workmen 
in the year 1988 and thereafter, continuing them in their 
services in the posts by the Corporation without following 
0 
any procedure which is untenable in law and their 
appointment can be said as irregular appointments but not 
as illegal as the same was not objected to by any other 
Authority of the Corporation at any point of time. But their 
appointment in their posts and continuing them in their 
E services is definitely cannot be termed as illegal, at best it 
cari be called irregular. Therefore, the Certified Standing 
Orders of the Corporation by all means apply to the 
concerrn~d workmen. The submission of the Corporation that 
the statutory right claimed by the concerned workmen under 
F Clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders of the 
Corporation for regularizing them in their posts as
regular 
employees after rendering 240 days of service in a calendar 
is not an absolute right conferred upon them and their right 
is only to consider their claim, cannot be accepted since the 
G Corporation is bound by law to take its decision to regularise 
the services of the concerned workmen as regular 
employees as provided under Clause 2(ii) of the Certified 
Standing Orders after thair completion of 240 days of service 
H in a calendar year as they have acquired valid statutory right. 
This should have been positively considered by the
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
479 
Corporation and granted the status of regular employees of A 
the Corporation for the reason that it cannot act arbitrarily 
and unreasonably deny the same especially it being a 
Corporate Body owned by the Central Government and an 
instrumentality of the State in terms of Article 12 of the 
Constitution and therefore, it is governed by Part Ill of the B 
Constitution. The Corporation should exercise its power 
fairly and reasonably in accordance with law. Therefore, the 
concerned workmen have approached the tribunal by raising 
an industrial dispute regarding the regularisation of their C 
services in the Corporation. The same has been properly 
adjudicated by the tribunal based on pleadings, evidence 
on record and in accordance with law. Further, all of the 
concerned workmen barring just one of the concerned 
workmen have all the qualifications required to be o 
regularised in the permanent posts of the Corporation as 
regular employees. [Para 39, 40][518-F-H; 520-G-H; 521-C-D] 
1. 7 The submission that in the absence of any plea 
taken by the workmen in their claim statement regarding E 
unfair labour practice being committed by the Corporation 
against the concerned workmen, the Single Judge and the 
Division Bench ought not to have entertained the said plea 
since such plea must be pleaded and established by a party 
who relies before the tribunal, is wholly untenable in law. F 
The workmen have been appointed on term
basis vide 
memorandum of appointment issued to each .one of the 
concerned workmen in the year 1988 by the Corporation who 
continued their services. for several years. There.after, they 
were denied their legitimate right to be regularised in the G 
permanent posts of the Corporation. The said fact was duly 
noted by the High Court and held on the basis of facts and 
evidence on record that the same attracts entry Item No.10 
of Schedule V of the Act, in employing the concerned H 
workmen as temporary employees against permanent posts
480 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A who have been doing perennial nature of work and continuing 
them as such for number of years. The same is affirmed as it 
is a clear case of an unfair labour practice on the part of the 
Corporation as defined under Section 2(ra) of the Act, which 
is statutorily prohibited under Section 25T of the Act and the 
B said action of the Corporation warrants penalty to be imposed 
upon it under Section 25U of the Act. In fact, the said finding 
of fact has been recorded by both the Single Judge and the 
Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment 
C on the ground urged on behalf of the Corporation. Even if, 
this Court eschews the said finding and reason recorded in 
the impugned judgment accepting the hyper technical plea 
urged on behalf of the Corporation that there is no plea of 
unfair labour practice made in the claim statement, this Court 
o in this appeal cannot interfere with the award of the Tribunal 
and the impugned judgment and order of the High Court for 
the other reasons assigned by them for granting relief to 
the concerned workmen. Even in the absence of plea of an 
act of unfair labour practice committed by the Corporation 
E against the concerned workmen, the Labour Court/High 
Court have got the power to record the finding of fact on 
the basis of the record of the conciliation officer to ensure 
that there shall be effective adjudication of the industrial 
dispute to achieve industrial peace and
harmony in the 
F industry in the larger interest of public, which is the prime 
object and intendment of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the 
instant case, the commission of an unfair labour practice in 
relation to the concerned workmen by the Corporation is 
G ex-facie clear from the facts pleaded by both the parties and 
therefore, the courts have the power to adjudicate the same 
effectively to resolve the dispute between the parties even 
in the absence of plea with regard to such an aspect of the 
case. [Para 41) [521-E-H; 522-A-H; 523-A-B] 
H
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
481 
1.8 The judgments and orders of both the Single A 
Judge and Division Bench of the High Court in favour of the 
concerned workmen are legal and valid. The High Court 
rightly dismissed the appeal of the Corporation by affirming 
the award passed by the tribunal. Since the industrial dispute 
between the parties has been litigated for the last 25 years, 
B 
the Corporation is directed to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the award passed by the Tribunal and regularise 
the services of the concerned workmen in their posts and 
compute the back-wages, monetary benefits and other C 
consequential monetary benefits including terminal benefits 
payable to the concerned workmen on the basis of the 
periodical revision of pay scales applicable from the date of 
their entitlement, namely, by regularizing them in their 
services after their completion of 240 days of service in a D 
alendar year in the Corporation; and if the Corporation fails 
to om ply with the given directions, the back-wages shall be 
pai to the concerned workmen with an interest at the rate 
of 9° per annum. [Para 42) [523-C-H; 524-A-B) 
Air India Statutory Corporation & Ors. v. United Labour Union 
& Ors. 1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 579: (1997) 9 SCC 377; 
Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Uma Devi (3) & 
Ors. 2006 (3) SCR 953: (2006) 4 SCC 1; Steel Authority of 
India Ltd. & Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers & 
Ors. 2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 343: (2001) 7 sec
1; 
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. v. 
Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karamchari Sanghatan§J (2009) 
8 SCC 556; U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Bijli 
Mazdoor Sangh & Ors. 2007 (5) SCR 256: (2007) 5 SCC 
755; Hari Nandan Prasad & Anr. v. Employer l/R To 
Management of Food Corporation of India & Anr. 2014 (2) 
SCR 955: (2014)7SCC190; TheBharatBank Ltd., Delhiv. 
The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi & the Bharat 
E 
F 
G 
H
482 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A 
Bank Employee's Union, DelhiAIR 1950SC 188: 1950 SCR 
459; Life Insurance Corporation Of India v. D. J. Bahadur & 
Ors. 1981 (1) SCR 1083: (1981) 1SCC315; The U.P. State 
Electricity Board & Anr. v. Hari Shankar Jain & Ors. 1979 
B 
(2) SCR 355: (1978) 4 SCC 16; Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. 
Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. & Ors.1984(3) SCR 325: (1984) 
3 SCC 369; Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal 
Corporation and Ors. 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 51: (1985) 3 
SCC 545; Siemens Limited &Anr. v. Siemens Employees 
c 
Union & Anr. 2Q11 (15) SCR 1157: (2011) 9 SCC 775 -
referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 579 
Referred to 
·Para 9 
D 2006 (3) SCR 953 
· Referred to 
Para 10 
2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 343 
Referred to 
Para 16 
(2009) 8 sec 556 
Referred to 
Para 17 
2·007 (5) SCR 256 
Referred to 
Para 17 
E 
20'14 (2} SCR 955 
Referred to 
Para26 
1950SCR459 
Referred to 
Para 27 
1981(1)SCR1083 
Referred to 
Para27 
F 2014 (13) SCALE 636 
Referred to 
Para28 
1979 (2) SCR 355 
Referred to 
Para32 
1984 (3) SCR 325 
Referred to 
Para33 
G 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 51 
Referred to 
Para39 
2011 (15) SCR 1157 
Referred to 
Para 41 
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3727 
of2015 
H
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
483 
Fro~ the Judgment and Order dated 11.08.2011 of the A 
High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 1006 of 
2011 
P. P. Rao, V. N. Koura, Aruna Mathur, Paramjeet Benipal, 
Yusuf Khan (ForArputh§!mAruna & Co.) for the Appellant. 
B 
C. U. Singh, V. N. Subramaniam, Dhaval Mehrotra, Rishi 
Gautam, Satish Kumar, Santosh Krishnan, Deeptakirti Verma for 
the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted. 
c 
2. The appellant-Corporation has questioned the 
correctness of the judgment and order dated 11.08.2011 passed D 
by the High Court of Judicature at Madras whereby the High Court 
dismissed the Writ Appeal No. 1006 of 2011 filed by the appellant-
Corporation against the dismissal of their W.P. No. 1846 of 2000 
challenging the award dated 26.05.1999 passed by the Industrial 
Tribunal, Tamil Nadu, in l.D. No.66of1991, wherein it was held 
E 
that non-regularisation of the concerned workmen in the dispute 
is not justified and directed the appellant-Corporation to regularise 
the services of the concerned workmen with effect from 
14.01.1990, the date on which all of them completed 480 days. 
3. The relevant facts are briefly stated hereunder to 
appreciate the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties 
in this appeal. 
F 
The appellant-Corporation is a Public Sector Undertaking G 
of the Government of India in the name of Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation Limited
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'). 
The Corporation has a project in the Cauveri Basin, situated in 
and around Karaikal, Union Territory of Puducherry and about 1050 H
484 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A employees have been regularly employed by the Corporation for 
its pro.ject. For the purpose of the Corporation's security 
requirement for the project, it initially employed the concerned 
workmen some of whom are members of the respondent-Union, 
as security guards and security supervisors through contractors. 
B However, on the notification dated 08.12.1976 issued by the 
Government of India under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour 
(Abolition and Regulation) Act, 1970, abolishing contract labour 
for watch and ward, dusting and cleaning jobs in the Corporation, 
C the concerned workmen were employed as per the settlement 
arrived at between the Trade Union and the Management of the 
Corporation under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 
1947 (for short 'the Act'), under which it was agreed to form a Co-
operative Society in the name of 'Thai Security Service 
o Priyadarshini Indira Cooperative Society' (for short 'the Co-
operative Society') for the welfare of such erstwhile contract 
workmen. The services were utilised by the Corporation through 
the Co-operative Society to meet its requirements and for the time 
period for which required, thus dispensing with intermediary 
E contractors. 
4. On 24.11.1982 subject to sanction by the Government 
of India, the Corporation passed a resolution by its policy decision 
to entrust security work to the Central Industrial Security Force 
F (CISF) to protect their
installations. The said resolution was 
sanctioned by the President of India on 16.12.1985 for creation of 
posts for security coverage of the Corporation. 
5. This decision of the Corporation was challenged by the 
G T.lmilnadu National Industrial and Commercial Employees Union 
by filing W.P. No. 9688of1987 and W.P. No. 11964of1987 was 
filed by the Petroleum Industrial Casual Contract Labour Union 
before the High Court of Madras on the ground of breach of 
settlement arrived at under Section 18(1) of the Act and prayed for 
H a consequential direction to absorb the workmen as regular
O.N.GC. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
485 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
employees. The workmen obtained an interim order dated A 
6.10.1987 restraining the Corporation from dispensing with the 
services of the workmen. The learned single Judge of the High 
Court upheld the policy decision of the Corporation even in the 
absence of the copy of the policy framed by the Central 
Government and dismissed the aforesaid writ petitions vide order B 
dated 5.1.1988 holding that the workers were not entitled for 
regularisation and rejected the contentions of the workmen in these 
writ petitions. 
6. On 8.9.1987, the Corporation sent a letter to the Co-
C 
operative Society to withdraw the services of the security personnel 
of the Co-operative Societyw.e.f. 19.10.1987 after handing over 
charge of the Corporation Unit to CISF personnel. An order was 
passed by the Director General, CISF, releasing 52 posts with D 
immediate effect for induction of CISF personnel in the Corporation. 
7. Thereafter, since the induction of the CISF personnel 
into security posts of the Corporation was still awaiting sanction 
from the Central Government, the Corporation issued 
memorandum of appointment directly to each one of the concerned 
E 
workmen appointing them in the posts of 'Watch and Ward Security' 
on term basis from 13.1.1988 to 29.2.1988 and also on the 
condition that the 'Certified Standing Orders for Contingent 
Employees of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission' (for short 'the 
F 
Certified
Standing Orders') will not apply to them. The concerned 
workmen were paid a monthly salary of approximately Rs.445/-
per month to security guards and Rs.675/- per month to security 
supervisors. After completion of the above mentioned term, the 
concerned workmen were continued by the Corporation in their G 
respective posts as a stop gap measure without formal written 
orders. As a result of which, the concerned workmen who were 
engaged through contractors and those who were members of 
the Co-operative Society became employees of the Corporation 
on temporary basis. 
H
486 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A 
8. Thereafter, the concerned workmen raised an industrial 
dispute claiming regularisation of their services in the Corporation 
and on 10.10.1991, the Central Government in exercise of its power 
under Section 10 of the Act, 194 7 referred the same to the Industrial 
Tribunal, Chennai, Tamil Nadu (for short 'the Tribunal') to adjudicate 
B the dispute on the following two questions: 
c 
D 
"(i) whether the management of ONGC is justified in not 
regularising the workmen in the instant dispute, and, if not, 
to what relief the workmen are entitled to? 
(ii) whether the management of ONGC is justified in not 
paying equal wages to the workmen in the instant dispute 
on par with that of the regular workmen and, if not, to what 
relief the workmen are entitled to?" 
9. The reference was taken on file by the Tribunal as l.D. 
No.66of1991. On 28.04.1993, the Trade Union filed a memo stating 
that question no.(ii) of the dispute had been settled out of Court 
and no further adjudication was required in that regard by the 
E Tribunal. The Tribunal, adjudicated the industrial dispute on question 
no.(i) referred to it on the basis of facts, circumstances and 
evidence on record and passed an award dated 26.05.1999, 
directing the Corporation to regularise the services of the concerned 
workmen by relying on the legal principles laid down by this Court 
F in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation & Ors. v. United 
Labour Union &
Ors.1 and further held that the concerned 
workmen were entitled for regularisation of their services since 
they had completed 480 days of work as required under Tamil 
G Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status 
toWorkmen)Act, 1981. 
H 
10. Aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal, the 
Corporation challenged the same by filing W.P. No.1846 of 2000 
before the learned single Judge, inter alia, contending ttiat the 
1 (1997) 9 sec 377
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
487 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
Tribunal has erroneously exercised its jurisdiction and passed A 
an award directing the Corporation to regularise the services of 
the concerned workmen. It was further contended by the 
Corporation that the concerned workmen were originally engaged 
through contractors, without following any procedure of selection 
and appointment, therefore, their services cannot be regularised. 
8 
In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the decision 
of this Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. 
v. Uma Devi (3) & Ors. 2 
11. On behalf of the concerned workmen, it was contended C 
before the single Judge of the High Court that the dispute falls 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the provisions of the 
Act and that the Tribunal had sufficient jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the dispute referred to it. It was further contended on behalf of the 0 
co1. ::erned workmen that they have been working on temporary 
basis from th·e year 1988 and continuing their services on 
temporary basis is an unfair labour practice on the part of the 
Corporation. Therefore, it was contended that the Tribunal was 
right in directing the concerned workmen to be regularized and 
E 
that the law laid down in the case of Uma Devi (supra) had no 
application to cases of industrial adjudication. 
12. The learned single Judge on appreciation of the facts, 
circumstances and the legal contentions urged on
behalf of both 
F 
the parties held that the dispute between the parties regarding 
non-regularisation of the concerned workmen falls within the scope 
of industrial dispute as defined under Section 2(k) of the Act. It is 
further held that the concerned workmen are all victims of unfair 
labour practice having been employed by the Corporation for G 
several years on temporary basis and even though they were not 
appointed by following the procedure laid down by the Corporation 
for recruitment to such posts, they were entitled for regularisation 
and that their appointment cannot be stated to be illegal. With the 
2 (2006) 4 sec 1 
H
488 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A above findings, the writ petition was dismissed on merits by the 
learned single Judge of the High Court by its judgment and order 
dated 04.01.2011. 
13. The said judgment and order of the learned single Judge 
B was challenged by the Corporation by filing Writ Appeal No. 1006 
of 2011 before the Division Bench of the High Court raising certain 
questions of law. After considering the facts, circumstances and 
nature of the evidence on record which was placed before the 
Tribunal the same was appreciated by the learned single Judge, 
C the learned Division Bench of the High Court held that the 
appointment of the concerned workmen by the Corporation cannot 
bE~ termed as illegal appointment, but was only an irregular 
appointment and therefore, they were entitled for regularisation in 
D their services having been employed on temporary basis and having 
completed more than 240 days in the calendar year subsequent 
to 13.1.1988. Therefore, it was held by the learned Division Bench 
of the High Court that no justifiable or reasonable grounds were 
found for it to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the 
E learned single Judge of the High Court, The writ appeal of the 
Corporation was dismissed accordingly. Hence, the Corporation 
filed this appeal by framing certain substantial questions of law for 
consideration of this Court. 
F 
14. It has been contended by Mr. P.P. Rao, the learned senior 
counsel for the
Corporation that the concerned workmen have no 
right to be regularised as they have been appointed on term basis 
without following due procedure as per the Recruitment and 
Promotion Regulations, 1980 of the Oil and Natural Gas 
G Commission. The direction contained in the award of the Tribunal 
to regularise the workmen w.e.f. 1.4.1990 is contrary to the law 
declared by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Secretary, 
State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi (supra) having regard to the 
following aspects of the case on hand: 
H
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
489 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
a) 
The appointments of workmen were illegal not irregular, 
A 
as they were made without proper competition among 
qualified persons 
b} 
The concerned workmen do not possess tile 
qualifications and training required for discharging 
B 
duties as security guards against attacks by armed 
gangs or terrorists. 
c) 
They were not working against sanctioned posts. 
d) 
The sanction obtained subsequently was only for 
c 
deployment of members of the CISF. 
e) 
The concerned workmen were, as a stop gap 
arrangement, though not qualified but found physically 
D 
fit, were employed for a short period anticipating the 
posting of CISF personnel. 
t) 
They were not allowed to continue voluntarily by the 
management without intervention of any mandatory 
E 
provision of law or orders of Tribunal and Courts. They 
could not be discharged and had to be allowed to 
continue only on account of legal compulsion, i.e. 33(1) 
of the LO.Act 1947 and the interim orders of the learned 
single Judge and the Division Bench. 
F 
g) 
The management cannot be compelled by judicial order 
to regularise the services of unqualified and untrained 
workmen as security guards for discharging duties 
which only qualified and trained members of an 
G 
organised armed force could competently discharge. 
15. Further, it has been contended by Mr. Rao that in any event, 
since the workmen themselves having sought regularisation only 
from
1.4.1991, the Tribunal was not at all justified in directing H 
regularisation with effect from 1.4.1990 and the High Court also
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A erred in directing regularisation of workmen with retrospective effect 
from 1.4.1990. 
16. It is further contended by him that the award of the 
Tribunal is unsustainable in law by placing reliance on Air India 
B Statutory Corporation (supra) which has been subsequently 
overruled by the Constitution Bench in Steel Authority of India 
Ltd. & Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors. 3. In 
fact, the concerned workmen were not contract labourers when 
the industrial dispute was referred to the Tribunal for its adjudication. 
c 
17. It has been further contended by him that the courts 
below have erred in holding that though the procedure 
contemplated in the Certified Standing Orders of the Corporation 
was not followed when the workmen were appointed on temporary 
D basis they are still entitled for regularisation in their services by 
the Corporation. It is further contended by the learned senior 
counsel that the very appointment itself having been illegal, no 
order of regularisation of the services of the concerned workmen 
could be passed by the Tribunal. The Corporation would term the 
E appointment of the concerned workmen as illegal appointment as 
they were appointed in the said post either through a contractor or 
through the Co-operative Society, without following the procedure 
contemplated for selection as per the Recruitment Rules and 
F appointments were given to the concerned workmen as per the
Certified Standing Orders of the Corporation. In support of the said 
contention reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the 
case of Uma Devi (supra). Further, it has been contended by him 
that the law declared in the case of Maharashtra State Road 
G Transport Corporation & Anr. v. Casteribe Raj ya Parivahan 
Karamchari Sanghatana4 was per incuriam as the same is 
inconsistent with the earlier coordinate Bench decision in U.P. 
3 (2001) 7 sec 1 
H 4 (2009) a sec 556
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
491 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
Power Corporation Ltd. & Am: v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh & Ors. 5 A 
wherein it was declared that the Tribunal cannot give relief to the 
workmen which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India 
and the concept of regularisation explained in Uma Devi's case 
(supra). 
B 
18. Further, it has been contended that the Certified Standing 
Orders cannot prevail over Uma Devi's case or Article 14 of the 
Constitution of India; therefore, the concerned workmen cannot 
rely upon such orders to seek regularisation. In any case, the 
Certified Standing Orders only confer the right of consideration C 
and therefore, it is not a vested right for the concerned workmen 
for regularisation in their services. The reliance placed on the 
Certified Standing Orders by them is misconceived, hence the 
award and judgments are vitiated in law and liable to be set aside 0 
by allowing this appeal. 
19. On the other hand, Mr. C. U. Singh, the learned senior 
counsel on behalf of the concerned workmen has strongly rebutted 
each one of the above contentions put forth by Mr. Rao the learned 
E 
senior counsel on behalf of Corporation, by erroneously placing 
reliance on the right of the Corporation to implement the alleged 
"policy decision" to induct the CISF personnel in the posts of the 
Corporation inter a/ia contending that it is an admitted position 
that this opening ground taken by the Corporation was neither F
canvassed before the learned single Judge nor the Division Bench 
of the High Court. Nonetheless, it is to be noted that while raising 
this ground, the Corporation has not placed on record any 
document evidencing the so-called "policy decision" of the Central 
Government to induct the CISF personnel in the posts of the G 
Corporation. 
20. Mr. Santosh Krishnan, the learned counsel also 
appearing for the concerned workmen has contended that a "policy 
s (2001) s sec 755 
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A decision" cannot alter the Certified Standing Orders of the 
Corporation except in terms of Section 10 of the Standing Orders 
Act, 1946. Further, it is urged by him that the only relevant document 
on record is the letter dated 8.9.1987, which states that the "policy 
decision" is of the Central Government and not of the Corporation. 
B However, the Corporation did not even amend its Recruitment 
Rules or Certified Standing Orders to implement this "policy 
decision" only to.recruit the CISF personnel for Watch and Ward 
SeNices posts of the Corporation. This has been further affirmed 
C by the Tribunal in its findings of fact that the said defence of the 
Corporation is only a ruse. The Tribunal has held while answering 
the question referred to it in the order of reference that the "policy 
decision" taken by the Corporation is a misnomer as the 
Corporation may be controlled by the Central Government, 
o however, by no means does it enjoy the power or the privilege to 
make any policy decisions as understood by the courts below. 
Merely by characterising an act or omission as a "policy decision" 
does not absolve the Corporation from acting in accordance with 
law and regularise the services of the concerned workmen as 
E regular workmen as per Clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing 
, Orders of the Corporation. 
21. Further, on the contention of the Corporation that the 
Judgment and order dated 5.1.1988 in W.P. Nos. 9688
of 1987 
F and 11964 of 1987 forecloses the rights of the concerned 
workmen, it is rebutted by the learned senior counsel on behalf of 
the concerned workmen that the said ground was not canvassed 
either before the learned single Judge or the Division Bench of the 
High Court. A perusal of judgment and order would reveal that 
G none of the concerned workmen, specifically the answering 
respondents were party to the aforesaid proceedings and the 
Corporation itself claimed that only "some of the respondent 
workmen had filed WP No. 9688of1987 for absorption". Further, 
H it is urged by him that assuming without conceding that judgment
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
493 
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
and order dated 5.1.1988 in W.P. Nos. 9688of1987 and 11964 of A 
1987 related to regularisation of the concerned workmen, a crucial 
fact separates those proceedings from the present proceedings 
as the Corporation on 13.1.1988 admittedly ordered in favour of 
the workmen by appointing them on "term basis". As a result of 
such appointment orders issued in favour of each one of the 
B 
concerned workmen, they became employees of the Corporation 
albeit on "term basis", therefore, the industrial dispute raised by 
the concerned workmen acquired different rights than the challenge 
in W.P. 9688 and 11964of1987. It is further urged thatthe above C 
submission can also be seen in the light of the Certified Standing 
Orders of the Corporation, wherein the employees such as the 
concerned workmen can claim regularisation once they fulfil 240 
days of continuous service in twelve calendar months and possess 
minimum qualification. The concerned workmen were found to o 
have completed 240 days of work in a calendar year subsequent 
to 13.1.1988, therefore, the judgment and order dated 5.1.1988 in 
W.P. Nos. 9688 of 1987 and 11964 of 1987 do not bear any 
relevance to this litigation as the legal status of the parties stood 
modified subsequent to the said judgment. Further, the judgment E 
rendered by the High Court in W. P. Nos. 9688of1987 and 11964 
of 1987 without the policy decisions of the Central Government
being produced and examined in those proceedings, any 
observation made in that regard is wholly untenable in law. 
F 
22. Further, it is contended by the learned counsel for the 
concerned workmen that the Corporation cannot disclaim the 
legality of its own Certified Standing Orders by stating that it cannot 
prevail over Uma Devi's case (supra) or Article 14 of the 
Constitution and that the Standing Orders only confer the right of G 
consideration and not a vested right for regularisation. It is 
contended by him that for the last 24 years, the Corporation has 
not considered and in any case will not consider the concerned 
workmen for regularisation to the post of the Corporation if the H
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A same is left to their own discretion. Further, it is urged by him that 
failure to honour the Standing Orders for so many years is what 
constitutes "unfair trade practice" on the part of the Corporation in 
the present case. 
B 
23. Rebutting the contention urged on behalf of the 
Corporation that the concerned workmen are not qualified to be 
regularized, it has been contended by the learned senior counsel 
for the concerned workmen that the Tribunal has noted that the 
concerned workmen are far more qualified than the existing 
C security personnel of the Corporation and that they are qualified to 
be appointed as security guards and supervisors, except one of 
them. The learned counsel on behalf of the concerned workmen 
contended that the Recruitment Rules are not amended 
0 
prescribing that only the CISF personnel are qualified for guard 
work. 
24. It is further contended by him that in the case of Uma 
Devi (supra), this Court had the occasion to deal with the issue of 
"litigious employment". Admittedly, the concerned workmen were 
E voluntarily appointed by the Corporation initially on term basis. It is 
by virtue of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act that the 
Corporation is prevented from terminating the employment of the 
concerned workmen during the pendency of the industrial dispute. 
F The decision of the Tribunal was rendered on 26.05.1999 and 
during the period 1990-1999, the concerned workmen did not
enjoy 
any litigious employment but were beneficiaries of a statutorily 
mandated protection and the Corporation has the right under 
Section 33(i)(a) of the Act to seek permission from the conciliation 
G officer/Tribunal to remove them from their services but that has 
not been done by it. Therefore, it would be an improper and 
misleading contention of the Corporation to describe this scenario 
as litigious employment, which contention of it does not stand for 
judicial scrutiny of this Court. 
H
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
495 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
25. We have heard the factual and rival legal contentions A 
urged by the learned senior counsel on behalf of both the parties 
and answer the same as discussed below. 
26. Whether jurisdiction of the Tribunal to direct the 
Corporation to regularise the services of the concerned workmen 
B 
in the posts is valid and legal? 
The Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 
10 of the Act referred the existing Industrial Dispute between the 
concerned workmen and the Corporation to the Tribunal which c 
rightly adjudicated point (i) of the dispute (supra) on the basis of 
the facts, circumstances and evidence on record and passed an 
award dated 26.5.1999 directing the Corporation that the services 
of the concerned workmen should be regularised with effect from 
the date on which all of them completed 480 days, subsequent to D 
their appointment by the memorandum of appointment. The 
contention urged on behalf of the Corporation that the Tribunal 
has no power to pass such an award compelling the Corporation 
to regularise the services of the concerned workmen is wholly 
untenable in law. Even if we consider the same, the said contention 
E 
is contrary to the legal principles laid down by this Court in the 
case of Hari Nandan Prasad & Anr. v. Employer llR To 
Management of Food Corporation of India & Anr. 6, wherein 
the decisions in U.P. Power Corporation v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh F 
& Ors. and
Maharashtra Road Transport Corporation v. 
Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karamchari Sanghathana and Uma 
Devi (all referred to supra) were discussed in detail. The relevant 
paragraphs are extracted hereunder: 
"25. While accepting the submission of the appellant therein 
viz. U .P. Power Corpn., the Court gave the following reasons: 
(UP PowerCorpn. Case, SCC pp. 758-59, paras 6-8) 
"6. It is true as contended by the learned counsel for the 
6 c2014) 7 sec 1so 
G 
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A 
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respondent that the question as regards the effect of the 
industrial adjudicators' powers was not directly in issue 
in Umadevi case. But the foundational logic in Umadevi 
case is based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 
Though the industrial adjudicator can vary the terms of 
the contract of the employment, it cannot do something 
which is violative of Article 14. If the case is one which is 
covered by the concept of regularisation, the same cannot 
be viewed differently. 
7. The plea of the learned counsel for the respondent 
that at the time the High Court decided the matter, decision 
in Umadevi case was not rendered is really of no 
consequence. There cannot be a case of .regularisation 
without there being employee-employer relationship. As 
noted above the concept of regularisation is clearly linked 
with Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if in a case 
the fact situation is covered by what is stated in para 45 
of Umadevi case the industrial adjudicator can modify 
the relief, but that does not dilute the observations made 
by this Court in Umadevi case about the regularisation. 
8. On facts it is submitted by the learned counsel for the 
appellants that Respondent 2 himself admitted that he 
never worked as a pump operator, but was engaged as 
daily labourer on daily-wage basis. He also did not 
possess the requisite qualification. Looked at from any 
angle, the direction for
regularisation, as given, could not 
have been given in view of what has been stated in 
Umadevi case." 
It is clear from the above that the Court recognized the 
underlying message contained in Umadevi case to the effect 
that regularisation of a daily-wager, who has not been 
appointed after undergoing the proper selection procedure,
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
etc. is impermissible as it was violative of Article 14 of the 
Constitution of India and this principle predicated on Article 
14 would apply to the Industrial Tribunal as well inasmuch 
as there cannot be any direction to regularise the services 
of a workman in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.As 
we would explain hereinafter, this would mean that the 
Industrial Court would not issue a direction for 23regularising 
the services of a daily-wage worker in those cases where 
such regularisation would tantamount to infringing the 
provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. But for tha!.J1 
would not deter the Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts from 
issuing such direction. which the industrial adjudicators 
otherwise possess. having regard to the provisions of the 
Industrial Disputes Act specifically conferring suc1:ill9wers. 
497 
A 
B 
c 
This is 24recognized by the Court even in the aforesaid 
o 
judgment. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
30. Detailed reasons are given in support of the conclusion 
stating that the MRTU and PULP Act provides for and 
empowers the Industrial/Labour Courts to decide about the 
unfair labour practice committed/being committed by any 
person and to declare a particular practice to be unfair labour 
practice if it so found and also to direct such person to cease 
and desist from unfair labour practice. The provisions 
contained in Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act giving 
such a
power to the Industrial and Labour Courts vis-a-vis 
the ratio of Umadevi are explained by the Court in the following 
terms: (Maharashtra SRTC case, SCC pp. 573-74, paras 
32-33 & 36) 
"32. The power given to the Industrial and Labour Courts 
under Section 30 is very wide and the affirmative action 
mentioned therein is inclusive and not exhaustive. 
E 
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Employing bad I is, casuals or temporaries and to continue 
them as such for years, with the object of depriving them 
of the status and privileges of permanent employees is 
an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under 
Item 6 of Schedule IV. Once such unfair labour practice 
on the part of the employer is established in the complaint. 
the Industrial and Labour Courts are empowered to issue 
preventive as well as positive direction to an erring 
employer. 
33. The provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act and the 
powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts provided 
therein were not at all under consideration in Umadevi. 
As a matter of fact, the issue like the present one 
pertaining to unfair labour practice was not at all referred 
to, considered or decided in Umadevi. Unfair labour 
practice on the part of the employer in engaging 
employees as badlis, casuals or temporaries and to 
continue them as such for years with the object of 
depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent 
employees as provided in Item 6 of Schedule IV and the 
power of the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 
30 of the Act did not fall for adjudication or consideration 
before the Constitution Bench. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
36. Umadevi does not denude the Industrial and Labour 
Courts of their statutory power under Section 30 read with 
Section 32 of the MRTU and PULP Act to order permanency 
of the wor1<ers
who have been victims of unfair labour practice 
on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV 
where the posts on which they have been working exist. 
Umadevi cannot be held to have overridden the powers of 
the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order
O.N.GC. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
499 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
under Section 30 of the MRTU and the PULP Act, once unfair 
A 
labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of 
Schedule IV is established." 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
33. In this backdrop, the Court in Maharashtra SRTC case 
was of the opinion that the direction of the Industrial Court to 
accord permanency to these employees against the posts 
which were available, was clearly permissible and within 
B 
the powers, statutorily conferred upon the Industrial/Labour 
c 
Courts under Section 30(1)(b) of the MRTU and PULP Act, 
1971 which enables the industrial adjudicator to take 
affirmative action against the erring employer and as those 
powers are of wide amplitude abrogating (sic including) within 
their fold a direction to accord permanency." 
D 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
27. Further, it is very clear from the facts that all the 
concerned workmen have got the qualifications required for their E 
regularisation, except one of them and have been employed by 
the Corporation even prior to 1985 in the posts through various 
irregular means. The Tribunal has got every power to adjudicate 
an industrial dispute and impose upon the employer new 
obligations to strike a balance and secure industrial peace and 
F 
harmony between the employer and workmen and ultimately 
deliver social justice which is the constitutional mandate as held 
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in a catena of cases. This
above said legal principle has been laid down succinctly by this 
Court in the case of The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The G 
Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi & the Bharat 
Bank Employee's Union, De/hf, the relevant paragraph of the 
said case is extracted hereunder: 
7 AIR 1950 SC 188 
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"61.We would not examine the process by which an Industrial 
Tribunal comes to its decisions and I have no hesitation in 
holding that the process employed is not judicial process at 
all. In settling the disputes between the employers and the 
workmen, the function of the Tribunal is not confined to 
administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer 
rights and privileges on either party which it considers 
reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the 
terms of any existing agreement. It has not merely to interpret 
or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the 
parties. It can create new rights and obligations between 
them which it considers essential for keeping industrial 
p13ace. An industrial dispute as has been said on many 
occasions is nothing but a trial of strength between the 
employers on the one hand and the workmen's organization 
on the other and the Industrial Tribunal has got to arrive at 
some equitable arrangement for averting strikes and lock-
outs which impede production of goods and the industrial 
development of the country. The Tribunal is not bound by 
the rigid rules of law. The process it employees is rather an 
extended form of the process of collective bargaining and is 
more akin to administrative than to judicial function. In 
describing the true position of an Industrial Tribunal in dealing 
with labour disputes, this Court in
Western India Automobile 
Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, and others[1949] 
F.C.R. 321 quoted with approval a passage from Ludwig 
Teller's well known work on the subject, where the learned 
author observes that 
"industrial arbitration may involve the extension of an 
existing agreement or the making of a new one or in 
general the creation of new obligations or modification of 
old ones, while commercial arbitration generally concerns
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
501 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
itself with interpretation of existing obligations and disputes 
A 
relating to existing agreements." 
The views expressed in these observations were adopted 
in its entirety by this Court. Our conclusion, therefore, is that 
an Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes 
8 
Act is not a judicial tribunal and its determination is not a 
judicial determination in the proper sense of these 
expressions." 
It has been further held by this Court in the case of Life c 
Insurance Corporation Of India v. D. J. Bahadur & Ors. 8, as 
follows: 
"22. The Industrial Disputes Act is a benign measure, which 
seeks to pre-empt industrial tensions, provide the mechanics 
o 
of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary 
infrastructure, so that the energies of the partners in 
production may not be dissipated in counter-productive 
battles and the assurance of industrial justice may create a 
climate of goodwill .... " 
E 
Thus, the powers of an Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court to 
adjudicate the industrial dispute on the points of dispute referred 
to it by the appropriate government have been well established by 
the legal principles laid down by this Court in a catena of cases 
F 
referred to supra. Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly passed an 
award directing the Corporation to regularise the services of the 
concerned workmen. 
28. Whether the appointment of the concerned workmen in G 
the services of
the Corporation is irregular or illegal? 
In the case on hand, the concerned workmen were employed 
by the Corporation initially through contractors. Thereafter, on 
s (1981) 1 sec 315 
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A issuance of notification dated 08.12.1976 by the Central 
Government abolishing contract labour for the posts of Watch and 
Ward, dusting and cleaning jobs in the Corporation under Section 
10(1) of the Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act, 1970, 
the Corporation and the concerned workmen arrived at a settlement 
B under Section 18(1) of the Act, wherein a Co-operative Society 
was formed in the name of 'Thai Security Service Priyadarshini 
Indira Cooperative Society' for their welfare, thus dispensing with 
intem1ediary contractors. During the pendency of the sanction from 
C the Central Government of the alleged "Policy decision", the 
concerned workmen were appointed directly from 13.1.1988 to 
29.2.1988 and thereafter, they were employed continuously without 
written orders by the Corporation. It is the contention of the learned 
senior counsel on behalf of the Corporation that the services of 
o the concerned workmen cannot be regularised as their appointment 
was originally and initially through contractors and thereafter, without 
following any procedure of selection and appointment as per the 
Recruitment Rules and therefore, the same is illegal by placing 
reliance on the decision of this Court in para 43 of Uma Devi 
E case (supra). Further, this Court in the case of Ajaypa/ Singh 
v. Hatyana Warehousing Corporation9 opined that when a 
workman is initially appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of 
the
Constitution of India, then the employer at the time of re-
employment of the retrenched workman cannot take the plea that 
F the initial appointment was in violation of the abovementioned 
provisions. The relevant paragraph of the Ajaypal Singh 
case( supra) is extracted hereunder: 
"19. The provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and the powers 
G 
of the Industrial and Labour Courts provided therein were 
not at all under consideration in Umadevi's case. The issue 
pertaining to unfair labour practice was neither the subject 
matter for decision nor was it decided in Umadevi's case." 
H 
9 2014(13)SCALE636
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
503 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
The plea of the Corporation that the reason for not A 
regularising the concerned workmen under the Certified Standing 
Orders of the Corporation is allegedly due to the fact that the 
appointment of the concerned workmen was made without 
following due procedure under the Recruitment Rules and that 
their appointments were illegal. This plea cannot be accepted by 8 
us in view of the legal principle laid down by this Court in the above 
decision, wherein it is clearly laid down that the Corporation cannot 
deny the rights of the workmen by taking the plea that their initial 
appointment was contrary to Articles 14and16 of the Constitution. C 
29. It is also contended on behalf of the Corporation that the 
right to be considered for regularisation by the Corporation as 
provided under Clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders of the 
Corporation does not mean right to regularisation and the discretion 0 
to regularise the workmen is with the Corporation as the same 
has to be exercised keeping in mind the interest of the organization 
by implementing the alleged "policy decision" of appointing the 
CISF personnel to the security posts. This contention urged on 
behalf of the learned senior counsel for the Corporation cannot be E 
accepted by us for the reason that even though due procedure 
was not followed by the Corporation for the appointment of the 
concerned workmen, this does not disentitle them of
their right to 
seek regularisation of their services by the Corporation under the 
provisions of the Certified Standing Orders, after they have F 
rendered more than 240 days of service in a calendar year from 
the date of the memorandum of appointment issued to each one 
of the concerned workmen in the year 1988. The alleged "policy 
decision" to appoint CISF personnel to the security post is on 
deputation basis and cannot be called appointment per se. G 
Whereas, the concerned workmen have acquired their right to be 
regularised under the provision of Clause 2(ii) of the 'Certified 
Standing Orders for Contingent Employees of the Oil and Natural 
Gas Commission', which states thus: 
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A 
"2. (i) Classification of workmen. 
The contingent employees of the Commission shall hereafter 
be classified as :-
8 
a) 
Temporary, and 
b) 
Casual 
(ii) A workman who has been on the rolls of the 
c 
Commission and has put in not less than 180 days of 
attendance in any period of 12 consecutive months shall be 
a temporary workman. provided that a temporary workman 
who has put in not less than 240 days of attendance in any 
~riod of 12 consecutive months and who possesses the 
D 
minimum qualifications prescribed by Commission may be 
considered for conversion as regular employee. 
E 
(iii) A workman who is neither temporary nor regular 
shall be considered as casual workman." 
30. The above emphasised portion of Clause 2(ii) of the 
Certified Standing Orders states that a temporary workman who 
has put in not less than 240 days of attendance in any calendar 
period of 12 consecutive months, which is actually contrary to the 
F provision under Section 25B(2)a of the Act, which states that a 
workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an 
employer for a period of one year, ifthe workman, during a period 
of twelve calend.ar months preceding the date with reference to 
which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the 
G employer for not less than one hundred and ninety days in the 
case of a workman employed below ground in a mine and two 
hundred and forty days in any other case. In any case, it
is clear 
that the concerned workmen have clearly completed more than 
H 240 days of services subsequent to the memorandum of
O.N.GC. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
505 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
appointment issued by the Corporation in the year 1988 in a period A 
of twelve calendar months, therefore, they are entitled for 
regularisation of their services into permanent posts of the 
Corporation as pertheActas well as the Certified Standing Orders 
of the Corporation. 
31. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel on 
behalf of the Corporation that the policy decision to induct the CISF 
B 
for the purpose of providing security to its projects passed by the 
Corporation is an act by the Central Government under Section c 
30A of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959 (for short 
'the ONGC Act'), which the Parliament by way of enactment No.23 
of 1977 inserted after Section 30 of the principle Act. The said 
provision states that the Corporation shall be bound by such 
directions, including directions regarding reservation of posts for D 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, as the Central 
Government may from time to time, for reasons to be recorded in 
writing, give to the Corporation in respect of its affairs. 
32. For the Corporation to implement such a provision which 
E 
affects the service conditions of its employees, it is necessary for 
the Corporation to first modify the Certified Standing Orders by 
following the procedure provided under Section 10 of the Industrial 
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 as the same is a Special 
enactment and therefore, prevails over
the provisions under the 
F 
ONGCAct and Recruitment Rules. The Corporation undisputedly 
has not made any such modification to its Certified Standing 
Orders by following the procedure for modification of conditions 
of service as per Section 10 of the Industrial Employment (Standing G 
Orders) Act, 1946. The scope of the said act has been succinctly 
laid down by this Court in the case of The U.P. State Electricity 
Board & Anr. v. Hari Shankar Jain & Ors. 10, upon which decision 
the learned senior counsel Mr. C.U. Singh has rightly placed 
10 (1978)4 sec 16 
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[2015) 5 S.C.R. 
A reliance, the relevant paragraphs of the said case are extracted 
hereunder: 
B 
c 
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F 
G 
H 
6. Let us now examine the various statutory provisions in 
their proper context with a view to resolve the problem before 
us. First, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 
1946. Before the passing of the Act, conditions of service 
of industrial employees were invariably ill-defined and 
were hardly ever known with even a slight degree of 
precision to the employees. There was no uniformity of 
conditions of service for employees discharging identical 
duties in the same establishment. Conditions of service 
were generally ad-hoc and the result of oral arrangements 
which left the employees at the mercy of the employer. 
With the growth of the trade union movement and the 
right of collective bargaining, employees started putting 
forth their demands to end this sad and confusing state 
of affairs. Recognising the rough deal that was being 
given to workers by employers who would not define their 
conditions of service and the inevitability of industrial strife 
in such a situation, the legislature intervened and enacted 
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. It was 
stated in the statement of objects and reasons: 
"Experience has shown that 'Standing Orders', 
defining the conditions of recruitment, discharge, 
disciplinary action, holidays, leave etc., go a long way 
towards minimising friction between the
management 
and workers in industrial undertakings. Discussion on 
the subject at the tripartite Indian Labour Conferences 
revealed a consensus of opinion in favour of 
legislation. The Bill accordingly seeks to provide for 
the framing of 'Standing Orders' in all industrial 
establishments employing one hundred and more 
workers."
0.N.GC. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
It was, therefore, considered, as stated in the preamble 
"expedient to require employers in industrial 
establishments to define with sufficient precision the 
conditions of employment under them and to make the 
said conditions known to workmen employed by them". 
The scheme of the Act, as amended in 1956 and as it 
now stands, requires every employer of an industrial 
establishment as defined in the Act to submit to the 
Certifying Officer draft Standing Orders, that is, "Rules 
relating to matters set out in the Schedule", proposed by 
him for adoption in his industrial establishment. This is 
mandatory. It has to be done within six months after the 
commencement of the Act. Failure to do so is punishable 
and is further made a continuing offence. The draft 
Standing Orders are required to cover every matter set 
out in the schedule. The Schedule enumerates the matters 
to be provided in the Standing Orders and they include 
classification of workmen, shift working, attendance and 
late coming, leave and holidays, termination of 
employment, suspension or dismissal for misconduct, 
means of redress for wronged workmen etc. Item 11 of 
the Schedule is "Any other matter which may be 
prescribed". By a notification dated November 17, 1959 
the Government of Uttar Pradesh has prescribed "Age 
of superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or any 
other facility which the employer may like to extend or 
may be
agreed upon between the parties" as a matter 
requiring to be provided in the Standing Orders. On 
receipt of the draft Standing Orders from the employee, 
the Certifying Officer is required to forward a copy of the 
same to the trade union concerned or the workmen 
inviting them to prefer objections, if any. Thereafter the 
Certifying Officer is required to give a hearing to the 
employer and the trade union or workmen as the case 
507 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
508 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
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may be and to decide "whether or not any modification 
of or addition to the draft submitted by the employer is 
necessary to render the draft Standing Orders certifiable 
under the Act". Standing Orders are certifiable under the 
Act only if provision is made therein for every matter set 
out in the schedule, if they are in conformity with the 
provisions of the Act and if the Certifying Officer 
adjudicates them as fair and reasonable. The Certifying 
Officer is invested with the powers of a civil court 'for the 
purposes of receiving evidence, administering oaths, 
enforcing the attendance of witnesses etc. etc. The order of 
the Certifying Officer is subject to an appeal to the prescribed 
Appellate Authority. The $t?.nding Orders as finally certified 
are required to be entered in a register maintained by the 
Certifying Officer. The employer is required to prominently 
post the Certified Standing Orders on special boards 
maintained for that purpose. This is the broad scheme of 
the Act. The Act also provides for exemptions. About that, 
later. The Act, as originally enacted, precluded the Certifying 
Officer from adjudicating upon the fairness or 
reasonableness of the Draft Standing Orders submitted by 
the employer but an amendment introduced in 1956 now 
casts a duty upon the Certifying Officer to adjudicate upon 
the fairness or reasonableness of the draft Standing Orders. 
The scheme of the Act
has been sufficiently explained by 
this Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v.P.D. Vyas~. 
Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of 
U.P., and Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen. The 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is thus seen 
to be an Act specially designed to define the terms of 
employment of workmen in industrial establishments, to give 
the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of 
employment and to subject the terms of employment to the 
scrutiny of quasi-judicial authorities by the application of the
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
509 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
test of fairness and reasonableness. It is an Act giving 
A 
recognition and form to hard-won and precious rights of 
workmen. We have no hesitation in saying that it is a special 
Act expressly and exclusively dealing with the schedule-
enumerated conditions of service of workmen in industrial 
establishments. 
B 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
10. We have already shown that the Industrial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Act is a special Act dealing with a 
specific subject, namely the conditions of service, 
enumerated in the schedule, of workmen in industrial 
establishments. It is impossible to conceive that 
Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of the 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act embodying 
as they do hard-won and precious rights of workmen and 
prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure, including 
a quasi-judicial determination, by a general, incidental 
provision like Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act. 
It is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the 
Standing Orders Act when it passed the Electricity Supply 
Act and Parliament never meant that the Standing Orders 
Act should stand pro tanto repealed by Section 79(c) of 
c 
D 
E 
the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of the view that 
F 
the provisions of the Standing Orders Act must prevail 
over Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. in regard 
to matters to which the Standing Orders Act applies. 
xxx 
xxx
xxx 
13. Next. we turn to the submission based on the 
notification made under Section 13-B of the Standing 
Orders Act. Section 13-B reads as follows: 
G 
H
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B 
c 
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"13-B. Nothing m this Act shall apply to an industrial 
establishment in so far as the workmen employed therein 
are persons to whom the Fundamental and 
Supplementary Rules. Civil Services (Classification. 
Control and Appeal) Rules. Civil Services (Temporary 
Service) Rules. Revised Leave Rules. Civil Service 
Regulations. Civilians in Defence Service (Classification. 
Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway 
Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that 
may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate 
Government in the Official Gazette. apply." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
33. In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in 
D the above said case, the alleged policy decision taken under 
Section 30A of the ONGC Act does not prevail over the Standing 
Orders Act framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act, 1946, which is the Special Enactment. Therefore, 
the alleged "policy decision" taken by the Corporation is neither 
E valid in law nor applicable in the case on hand. The legal principle 
la~d down in the case of The U.P. State Electricity Board & Anr. 
v. Hari Shankar Jain were reiterated by this Court in the case of 
Sudhir Chandra Sarkarv. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. & Ors.11, 
F wherein it was held thus: 
G 
H 
"The Parliament enacted the Industrial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 ('1946 Act' for short). The long 
title of the Act provides that it
was an act to require employers 
in industrial establishments formdy to define conditions of 
employment under them. The preamble of the Act provides 
that it is expedient to require employers in industrial 
establishments to define with sufficient precision the 
conditions of employment under them and to make the said 
11 (1984) 3 sec 369
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
conditions known to workmen employed by them. By 
Section ~. a duty was cast on the employer governed by the 
Act to submit to the Certifying Officer draft standing orders 
proposed by him for adoption in his industrial establishment. 
After going through the procedure prescribed in the Act, the 
Certifying Officer has to certify the draft standing orders. 
Section § requires the Certifying Officer to keep a copy of 
standing orders as finally certified under the Act in a register 
to be maintained for the purpose. Sub-section 2 of 
Section 13 imposes a penalty on employer who does any 
act in contravention of the standing orders finally certified 
under the Act. The act was a legislative response to the 
laissez fairs rule of hire and fire at sweet will. It was an attempt 
at imposing a statutory contract of service between two 
parties unequal to negotiate, on the footing of equality. This 
was vividly noticed by this Court in Western India Match 
Company Ltd. v. Workmen as under: 
In the sunny days of the market economy theory people 
sincerely believed that the economic law of.demand and 
supply in the labour market would settle a mutually 
beneficial bargain between the employer and the 
workmen. Such a bargain they took it for granted, would, 
secure fair terms and conditions of employment to the 
workman. This law they venerated as natural law. They 
had an abiding faith in the verity of this law. But the
experience of the working of this law over a long period 
has belied their faith. 
The intendment-underlying the Act and the provisions of the 
Act enacted to give effect to the intendment and the scheme 
of the Act leave no room for doubt that the Standing Orders 
certified under the 1946 Act become part of the statutory 
terms and conditions of service between the employer and 
511 
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512 
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[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
his employee and they govern the relationship between the 
parties. Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. 
of India (P) Ltd. v. Management and Ors. Workmen in 
Buckinghan and Carnatic Mills Madras v. Buckingham and 
Carnatic Mills and Mis. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. The 
Presiding Officer. Labour Court. Meerut and Ors." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
34. Further, on the direction of this Court after concluding 
c the submissions made in this appeal, the learned counsel on behalf 
of the Corporation was directed to submit a copy of the Policy of 
the Government of India for the year 1982 along with the affidavit 
of the responsible officer of the Corporation. The learned counsel 
has according!Y produced the 'Government Policies and Guidelines 
D for Public Sector Enterprises and Perceptions on Public Sector 
of PSE Chiefs & the Scope (Vol. I) compiled by Dr. Raj Nigam' 
containing a gist of BPE O.M. No. 2(97)/72-BPE(GM-I) dated 
5th December, 1972 and BPE O.M. No. 2(38)/75-BPE(GM-I) 
dated 17th May 1975 in Guideline Nos. 421 and 422 
E respectively, as per the direction of this Court vide order dated 
25.03.2015. In this regard, to examine the tenability of the 
submission of the learned senior counsel on behalf of the 
Corporation the relevant portion of the above mentioned 
F document is extracted hereunder to consider the contention 
urged in this regard: 
"421. Security Arrangements in Public Enterprises:
Ministries etc. are aware that a force called the Central 
G/ 
Industrial Security Force has been constituted under the 
Ministry of Home Affairs for the security of industrial 
undertakings of the Central Government. 
The question of evolving a uniform procedure in regard 
H 
to the deployment of the Force and in providing security
O.N.GC. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
arrangements in the various undertakings has been 
under consideration of the Government particularly with 
a view to ensuring better coordination between the 
l.G.C.l.S.F. and the administrative Ministries/Public 
Enterprises. It has been decided that the following steps 
should be taken in this regard: 
(i) There should be close Association between CISF 
and a Public Enterprise, right from its inception. In other 
words as soon as a new Enterprise is sanctioned, 
information about such sanction should be sent 
automatically to the l.G.,C.l.S.F. so that he can start 
liaison from the very outset, with the concerned officials 
in the Ministry concerned and the Chief Executive of 
the project as soon as he is appointed. 
(ii) No new Enterprise should appoint its own Watch 
and Ward Security staff, even during construction 
stage unless a clearance has been obtained from the 
l.G.,C.l.S.F. that he is not in a position to take over the 
security functions of the Enterprise from the very 
beginning. 
(iii) Whenever an investment decision is cleared at 
the level of the Public Investment Board an intimation 
that such a project has been cleared, should be sent 
to l.G.,C.l.S.F. 
Ministries etc. are to take necessary action accordingly. 
513 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
422. Security Arrangements in Public Enterprises: 
G 
The DIG CISF in a recent communmation to the Bureau 
of Public Enterprises has pointed out ~t a number of
undertaking have been employing their oWl\ Watch and 
H
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[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A 
Ward personnel without obtaining clearance from CISF 
Hqrs., in contravention of the Guidelines issued vide BPE 
B 
c 
D 
O.M. No.2(97)/72-BPE(GM-I) dated 5th December, 1972. 
It is once again reiterated that it is the statutory duty not 
only of the CISF but also of the Public Sector 
Undertakings to induct CISF for better protection and 
security of the industrial undertakings. 
The administrative Ministries may impress upon the 
public units under their administrative control not covered 
in the enclosed list (not given here), the need for the early 
induction of the CISF force in the units provide better 
security arrangements. The units may be advised to 
contact IG, CISF, 183 Jor Bagh, New Delhi without any 
further delay for finalising the arrangements" 
35. Further, the learned counsel on record for the 
Corporation has also submitted the Sanction letter for creation 
E of temporary posts for the security coverage of ONGC 
installation by Central Government, the relevant portion of which 
is extracted hereunder: 
F 
G 
H 
"To 
The Director General, 
Central Industrial Security Force, 
13-CGO's Complex, 
Lodhi Road, 
New Delhi-110003. 
Subject-Creation of temporary posts for the security 
coverage ·of ONGC installations at Madras, 
Visakhapatnam and Nursapur & Razole Area. 
With reference to your U.O. No. 29013/6/85-lnd-I 
dated31.10.1985.lamdirected to convey the sanction
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
of the President to the creation of the following temporary 
posts for the security coverage of ONGC Installations at 
Madras, Vishakapatnam and Nursapur & Razole Area 
in the existing pay scales with usual allowances from the 
date(s) and the post(s) are filled in till the 281h 
February, ........ . 
515 
A 
B 
This issue with the concurrence of Integrated Finance 
Division vide their Dy. No.3057/85-Fin. Ill (D-1) dated 
c 
12.12.1985. 
Yours faithfully, 
(N.B.Kumar) 
Under Secretary to the Government of India" 
36. We have perused the above two documents. The 
above mentioned sanction letter by the Central Government 
is for the creation of temporary posts for the security coverage 
D 
of ONGC installation and not to depute CISF specifically into 
security posts in the Corporation, therefore, the reliance placed E 
on .the same in support of the contention urged by the learned 
senior counsel on behalf of the Corporation is misplaced as 
the same is wholly untenable in law as the same is not reflected 
in the sanction letter referred to supra. Further, the above 
mentioned guidelines cannot be considered to be the policy F 
of the Central Government as it is not framed in accordance 
with the relevant 'Business Transaction Rules' of the Central 
Government. Therefore, we are of the considered view that 
even if for the sake of argument, the decision to employ the G 
CISF personnel into security posts of the
Corporation is 
considered as the policy decision of the Corporation, the 
provision under Clause 2(ii) of Certified Standing Orders surely 
overrides the policy decision, as the said clause is not 
amended by following the provisions of the Act of 1946 and H
• 516 
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[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A therefore, the said argument does not hold water as the 
Certified Standing Orders of the Corporation as per the 
Judgments of this Court referred to supra and the principle of 
law laid down in those cases are aptly applicable to the fact 
situation of the concerned workmen for their regularisation in 
B the security posts of the Corporation. 
37. As we have already stated that the alleged policy 
documents produced by the Corporation as per the direction 
of this Court is traceable to Section 30A of the ONGC Act 
C enacted by the Parliament as per the contention urged on 
behalf of the Corporation. Therefore, the contention that the 
said Policy is binding upon the Corporation and the concerned 
workmen is wholly untenable in law for more than one reason 
0 which we have stated above. The said document cannot be 
said to be the Policy framed by the Central Government 
represented by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 
which is an independent ministry having the power to formulate 
and administer various Central laws rel8ting to Petroleum and 
E Natural Gas, however, the same must be executed in the name 
of the President of India and shall be authenticated in such a 
manner as specified in the relevant 'Business Transaction 
Rules'. In the instant case, the alleged Policy formulated by 
the Central Government has not been issued by following the 
F due procedure as provided under the 'Business Transaction 
Rules'.
For this reason also, the said document produced by 
the learned counsel for the Corporation to justify the alleged 
Policy being applicable to the concerned workmen cannot be 
called as tt:le policy document passed under Section 30A of 
G the Act by the Central Government and moreover, the same 
, was not incorporated by way of an amendment to the Certified 
Standing Orders of the Corporation by following the procedure 
as provided under Section 10 of the Industrial Employment 
H (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
517 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
The reliance placed upon these documents by the A 
Corporation in justification of their claim that the concerned 
workmen are not entitled to be regularised in their services as 
permanent employees in their posts as per the award passed 
by the Tribunal is misplaced and wholly untenable in law. 
Therefore, the same cannot be accepted by this Court. Hence, 
B 
the said contention is liable to be rejected and is accordingly 
rejected. 
38. Further, it was contended by the learned senior 
counsel that the Certified Standing Orders of the Corporation C 
do not apply to the concerned workmen to claim regularisation 
in their posts as regular employees as provided under Clause 
2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders of the Corporation. The 
said contention is wholly untenable in law as the Standing 0 
Orders of the Corporation certainly apply to the concerned 
workmen as they have been rendering their services in the 
Corporation even prior to the year 1985, being appointed 
through contractors, the Co-operative Society and directly 
thereafter vide memorandum of ~ppointment in the year 1988 It 
by issuing appointment orders on different dates during that 
year on the condition that the Certified Standing Orders of the 
ONGC will not be applicable to them. Such a condition 
incorporated in the appointment orders issued to the 
concerned workmen is not valid in law and the same is void 
F 
for the reason that
they are workmen for the purpose of the 
Certified Standing Orders and th&refore, the above said 
condition has to be ignored. When the concerned workmen 
were appointed by issuing the memorandum of appointme111t 
to work in the posts of the Corporation, providing them with 
G 
monthly salaries, it cam1ot arbitrarily and unilaterally state that 
the Certified Standing Orders of the Corporation are not 
applicable to the concerned workmen. The concerned 
workmen cannot be denied their legitimate, statutory and 
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[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
A fundamental right to be regularised in their posts as provided 
under Clause 2 (ii) of the Certified Standing Orders on the 
basis of the above said contention urged on their behalf and 
also because the Corporation did not follow the due procedure 
as provided under the Appointment and Recruitment Rules 
8 
for appointment of the concerned workmen in the Corporation. 
The said contention urged by the learned senior counsel on 
behalf of the Corporation is an afterthought to justify their 
irregular act of appointing them as temporary workmen and 
C continuing them as such for a number of years though they are 
entitled for regularisation under Clause 2(ii) of the Standing 
Orders of the Corporation, which action of it amounts to an 
unfair labour practice as defined under Section 2(ra) of the 
Act, read with the provisions of Sections 25T and 25U of the 
D Act, which prohibits such employment in the Corporation. It 
would be unjust and unfair to deny them regularisation in their 
posts for the error committed by the Corporation in the 
procedure to appoint them in the posts. Further, the 
Corporation cannot use the alleged "policy decision" as a veil 
E to justify its action which included inaction on its part in not 
regularising the concerned workmen in their services under 
Clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders. 
39. In light of the above said discussion and legal 
F principles laid down by this Court in the cases
referred to supra, 
we are of the considered view that the procedure of 
appointments adopted by the Corporation with respect to the 
concerned workmen initially appointed through contractors, 
subsequently through the Co-operative Society, and then vide 
G memorandum of appointment issued to each one of the 
concerned workmen in the year 1988 and· thereafter, continuing 
them in their services in the posts by the Corporation without 
following any procedure as contended by the learned senior 
H counsel on behalf of the Corporation whose contention is
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
519 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
untenable in law and their appointment can be said as irregular A 
appointments but not as illegal as the same was not objected 
to by any other Authority of the Corporation at any point of time. 
But their appointment in their posts and continuing them in 
their services is definitely cannot be termed as illegal, at best 
it can be called irregular. Therefore, the Certified Standing B 
Orders of the Corporation by all means apply to the concerned 
workmen. The legal contention urged on behalf of the 
Corporation that the statutory right claimed by the concerned 
workmen und~r/Clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders C 
of the Corpor.ltion for regularizing them in their posts as regular 
employees after rendering 240 days of service in a calendar 
is not an absolute right conferred upon them and their right is 
only to consider their claim. This plea of the learned senior 
counsel cannot again be accepted by us for the reason that o 
the Corporation is bound by law to take its decision to 
regularise the services of the concerned workmen as regular 
employees as provided under Clause 2(ii) of the Certified · 
Standing Orders after their comp!Eition of 240 days of service 
~n a calendar year as they have acquired valid statutory right. 
E 
This should have been positively considered by the 
Corporation and granted the status of regular employees of 
the Corporation for the reason that it cannot act
arbitrarily ar:id 
unreasonably deny the same especially it being a Corporate 
Body owned by the Central Government and an instrumentality F 
of the State in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution and 
therefore, it is governed by Part lfl of the Constitution. The 
Corporation should exercise its power fairly and reasonably 
in,A(ccordance with law. This has not been done by the G 
Corporation as per the law laid down by this Court in the case 
of Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and 
Ors.12wherein it was held as under:-
12 (1985)3 sec 545 
H
520 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
"40. Just as a mala fide act has no existence in the eye 
of law, even so, unreasonableness vitiates law and 
procedure ·alike. It is therefore essential that the 
procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of 
his fundamental right, in this case the right to life, must 
conform to the norms of justice and fairplay. Procedure, 
which is unjust or unfair in the circumstances of a case, 
attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating 
the law which prescribes that procedure and 
consequently, the action taken under it. Any action taken 
by a public authority which is invested with statutory 
powers has. therefore, to be tested by the application of 
two standards: the action must be within the scope of 
the authority conferred by law and secondly, it must be 
reasonable. If any action, within the scope of the authority 
conferred by law, is found to be unreasonable, it must 
mean that the procedure established by law under which 
that action is taken is itself unreasonable. The substance 
of the law cannot be divorced from the procedure which 
it prescribes for, how reasonable the law is, depends 
upon how fair is the procedure prescribed by it. Sir 
Raymond Evershed says that, "from the point of view of 
the ordinary citizen, it is the procedure that will most 
strongly weigh with him. He will tend to form his judgment 
of the excellence or otherwise of the legal system from 
his personal
knowledge and experience in seeing the 
legal machine at work". Therefore, "He that takes the 
procedural sword shall perish with the sword." 
G Therefore, the concerned workmen have approached the 
Tribunal by raising an industrial dispute regarding the 
regularisation of their services in the Corporation. The same 
has been properly adjudicated by the Tribunal based on 
H pleadings, evidence on record and in accordance with law.
O.N.GC. v. PETROLEUMCOALLABOURUNION 
521 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
Therefore, the same cannot be found fault with by this Court in 
A 
this appeal. 
40. Further, the contention urged on behalf of the 
Corporation that the concerned workmen do not possess the 
required qualifications for their respective posts, in this regard, 
B 
we have gone through the facts recorded by the Courts below 
in comparison with the 'Recruitment and Promotion 
Regulations, 1980 of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission' 
framed and published with previous approval of the Central 
Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under C 
Section 32 of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959, 
and we are fully satisfied that all of the concerned workmen 
barring just one of the concerned workmen have all the 
qualifications required to be regularised in the permanent posts 0 
of the Corporation as regular employees. 
41. Further, it has been contended by the learned senior 
counsel on behalf of the Corporation that in the absence of 
any plea taken by the workmen in their claim statement 
regarding unfair labour practice. being committed by the E 
Corporation against the concerned workmen, the learned 
single Judge and the Division Bench ought not to have 
entertained the said plea as it is a weU settled principle of law 
that such plea must be pleaded and established by a party 
F 
who relies before the Tribunal. In support of the above 
contention reliance was placed by him on the decision
of this 
Court in Siemens Limited & Anr. v. Siemens Employees 
Union & Anr. 13 
G 
The said contention of the learned senior counsel on 
behalf of the Corporation is wholly untenable in law and the 
reliance placed on the aforesaid case is misplaced for the 
. 
. 
. . . 
reason that it is an undisputed fact that the workmen have been 
13 (2011) s sec 775 
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[2015] 5 S.C.R. 
·A appointed on term basis vide memorandum of appointment 
issued to each one of the concerned workmen in the year 1988 
by the Corporation who continued their services for several 
years. Thereafter, they were denied their legitimate right to be 
regularised in the permanent posts of the Corporation. The 
8 said fact was duly noted by the High Court as per the contention 
urged.on behalf of the Corporation and held on the basis of 
facts and evidence on record that the same attracts entry Item 
No.10 of Schedule V of the Act, in employing the concerned 
C workmen as temporary employees against permanent posts 
who have been doing perennial nature of work and continuing 
them as such for number of years. We affirm the same as it is 
a clear case of an unfair labour practice on the part of the 
Corporation as defined under Section 2(ra) of the Act, which 
o is statutorily prohibited under Section 25T of the Act and the 
said action of the Corporation warrants penalty to be imposed 
upon it under Section 25U of the Act. In fact, the said finding of 
fact has been recorded by both the learned single Judge and 
the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment 
E on the ground urged on behalf of the Corporation. Even if, this 
Court eschews the said finding and reason recorded in the 
· impugned judgment accepting the hyper technical plea urged 
on behalf of the Corporation that there is no plea of unfair labour 
practice
made in the claim statement, this Court in this appeal 
F cannot Interfere with the award of the Tribunal and the 
impugned judgment and order of the High Court for the other 
reasons assigned by them for granting relief to the concerned 
workmen. Even in the absence of plea of an act of unfair labour 
G practice committed by the Corporation against the concerned 
workmen, the Labour Court/High Court have got the power to 
record the finding of fact on the basis of the record of the 
conciliation officer to ensure that there shall be effective 
adjudication of the industrial dispute to achieve industrial 
H peace and harmony in the industry in the larger interest of
O.N.G.C. v. PETROLEUM COAL LABOUR UNION 
523 
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
public, which is the prime object and intendment of the Industrial A 
Disputes Act. This principle of law has been well established 
in a catena of cases of this Court. In the instant case, the 
commission of an unfair labour practice in relation to the 
concerned workmen by the Corporation is ex-facie clear from 
the facts pleaded by both the parties and therefore, the courts B 
have the power to adjudicate the same effectively to resolve 
the dispute between the parties even in the absence of plea 
with regard to such an aspect of the case. 
42. For the reasons recorded in this judgment, we hold C 
that the judgments and orders of both the learned single Judge 
and Division Bench of the High Court in favouroftbe concerned 
workmen are legal and valid. The High Court has rightly 
dismissed the appeal of the Corporation by affirming the award 0 
passed by the Tribunal. 
Therefore, this appeal must fail and accordingly, the same 
is dismissed. Since the industrial dispute between the parties 
has been litigated for the last 25 years, it would be just and E 
proper for this Court to give directions as hereunder: 
(i) The Corporation is directed to comply with the terms 
and conditions of the award passed by the Tribunal and 
regularise the services of the concerned workmen in their 
posts and compute the back-wages, monetary benefits 
and other consequential monetary benefits including 
terminal benefits
payable to the concerned workmen on 
the basis of the periodical revision of pay scales 
applicable from the date of their entitlement, namely, by 
regularizing them in their services after their completion 
of 240 days of service in a calendar year in the 
Corporation as provided under Clause 2 (ii) of the 
Certified Standing Orders, within eight weeks from the 
date of receipt of the copy of this Judgment; 
F 
G 
H

524 
A 
B 
c 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2Q,15] 5 S. C.R. 
(ii) If the Corporation fails to comply with the above given 
directions, the back-wages shall be paid to the 
concerned workmen with an interest at the rate of 9% 
per annum. The Corporation is further directed to submit 
the compliance report for perusal of this Court after the 
expiry of the said eight weeks. There shall be no order 
as to costs. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal dismissed.