"IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT,  2004" versus .
[2016] 11 S.C.R. 15, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Reference answered
Segment: Ratio
[2016j 11S.C.R.15 
"IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
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2004" 
(Special Reference No. I of 2004) 
NOVEMBER 10, 2016 
[ANIL R. DAVE, PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, SHIVA KIRTI 
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SINGH, ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.) 
Conslilution of India: 
Art.143 - Reference unde1; with regard to constitutional 
validity of Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004 - Sia/es of 
Pu11jab, Haryana and Rajasthan entered into an agreement dated 
31" Decembe1; 1981 in terms whereof !he said Sia/es agreed 011 
reallocation of Ravi and Beas Waters - Agreement not acted upon 
by the State of Punjab - Suit by Stale of Hwyana before Supreme 
Court, decreed directing the State of Punjab to discharge its 
obligations under the 1981 Agreement - Decree not complied with 
by the State of Punjab - Execution petition by the State of Haryana 
for enforcement of the decree, allowed- Howeve1; the State of Punjab 
enacted the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004 terminating 
the 1981 Agreement and also nullifying the aforesaid decrees of 
the Supreme Court against it - Held: The Punjab Termination of 
Agreements Act, 2004 cannot be considered to be legal and valid -
A party to the litigation cannot unilaterally act in a manner to nullify 
the effect of the decree passed by a Court of law - A litigating 
person cannot become judge in its own cause - The 1981 Agreement 
was about sharing of waters of Ravi and Beas rivers and thus could 
not have been unilaterally terminated by one of the
parties to the 
Agreement by exercising its legislative power - Such unilateral 
action of the State of Punjab to terminate the I 981 Agreement or 
nullify the decree of the highest Court of the country is comrwy to 
the Constitution of India - Inter State Water Disputes Act, 1956 -
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s.14 - Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966 - s. 78 - Pimjab Satluj 
Yamuna Link Canal Land (fransfer of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2016. . G 
Art.143 - Reference under - To be on question of fact or 
question of law - Held: A bare perusal of Art.143 would show that 
the Presidenl of India is authorized to refer to Supreme Court a 
question of law or fact, which in his/her opinion is of such a 
nature and of such a public importance that it is expedient to obtain 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
f2016l 11 S.C.R. 
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the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it - The Article does not 
restrict the President to obtain opinion only on a pure question of 
law. 
Art.143 - Reference under -
Whether Supreme Court 
obligated or not to render its opinion - Held: It is within the discretion 
B of Supreme Court. suNect to certain parameters, to decide whether 
to refuse to answer a question on a reference. 
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Answering the referred questions in the negative, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 
2004 cannot be considered to be legal and valid and the State of 
Punjab cannot absolve itself from its duties/liabilities arising out 
of the Agreement dated 31" December, 1981. [Para 31] [34-E-F] 
l.2 It was not disputed that there was a litigation between 
the State of Punjab and the State of llaryana and ultimately a 
decree was made whereby the arrangement with regard to sharing 
of water as per the 1981 agreement was made. There was thus a 
legal sanction to the said arrangement and once a binding decree 
was passed by a Court of law, a party to the litigation cannot 
unilaterally act in a manner to nullify the effect of the decree. 
(Para 32] [34-F-G] 
1.3 In the instant case, instead of a1Jproaching the 
appropriate authority, namely, the Tribunal under the Inter-State 
River Water Disputes Act, 1956 for appropriate relief, the State 
of Punjab exercised its legislative power by enacting the 2004 
Punjab
Act so as to nullify the effect of the Decree. It is pertinent 
to note that the water dispute, which the State of Punjab and State 
of Haryana had, had been referred to the Tribunal as per the 
provisions of Section 14 of the 1956 Act. After considering the 
relevant provisions, the Tribunal had taken a judicial decision 
and the said decision is also sought to be dist.urbed by virtue of 
enactment of the 2004 Punjab Act. (Paras 33, 391 (34-G-H; 38-A-
B J 
1.4 A litigating person cannot become judge in its own cause. 
The 1981 Agreement was about sharing of waters of Ravi and 
Beas rivers. The said Agreement could not have been unilaterally 
terminated by one of the parties to the Agreement by exercising
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
17 
2004 
its legislative power and if any party or any State does so, such 
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unilateral action of a particular State has to be declared contrary 
to the Constitution of India as well as the provisions of the 1956 
Act. [Paras 36, 39] [36-F; 38-B-C] 
1.5 For the afore stated reasons, the 2004 Punjab Act cannot 
be said to be in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution 
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oflndia and by virtue of the said Act, the State of Punjab cannot 
nullify the judgment and decree referred to hereinabove and 
terminate the 1981 Agreement. [Para 41] [38-E] 
Re: Cauve1y Water Disputes Tribunal (1993) 1 Supp. 
SCC 96 (II) : 1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497; State of 
C 
Tamil Nadu v. State of Kera/a and Another (2014) 12 
SCC 696 : 2014 (12) SCR 875 - relied on. 
Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference 
No.1of2012 2012 (10) SCC 1 : 2012 (9) SCR 311 -
referred to. 
D 
Case Law Reference 
2012 (9) SCR 311 
relied on 
Para 23 
1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497 
referred to 
Para 26 
2014 (12) SCR 875 
relied on 
Para 34 
ADVISORY JURISDICTION : Special Reference No. I of2004. 
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Under Article 143 (I) of The Constitution of India. 
Ranjit Kumar,SG., Ram Jethmalani, R.S. Suri, Jagdip Dhankhar, 
Shyam Divan, J.S. Attri, C.S. Vaidyanathan, Ms. Indira Jaising, Sr. Advs., 
Anish Kumar Gupta, A nil Grover, S.S. Shamshery, AA Gs., S. Wasim A. 
Qadri, Ms. Madhvi Diwan, Ajay Shanna, Zaid Ali, S.S. Rawat, Ms. Anil 
Katiyar, Prabal Bagchi, Akash
Jindal (For Ms. Sushma Suri, & D.S. 
Mahra), Arun Kathpalia, Mohan V. Katarki, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Vinay 
K. Shailendra, Saksham Maheshwari, Ms. Pallavi Tyal Chadha, Ajay 
Awasti, Vaibhav Asthana, Devashish Bharuka, Ravi Bharuka, Ms. Arpita 
Bishnoi, Chandra Shekhar Suman, Ms. Dcepshikha Bhati, Ms. Priyanka 
Parida, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Chandra Nand Jha, Vikramj it Banerjee, 
Amit Sharma, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Chirag M. Shroff, Ms. Meher Dev (for 
Suresh Chandra Tripathy), Sunil Fernandez, Ms. Astha Sharma, 
Ms. Puneeth K.G., Ms. Mithu Jain, Dinesh Kumar Garg, Advs., for the 
appearing parties. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
r20161 11 S.C.R. 
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The Judgments of the Court were delivered by 
ANIL R. DAVE, .J. 1. By a Reference dated 22nd July, 2004, 
Hon'ble the President oflndia made a request for an advisory opinion to 
this Court under Article 143 (I) of the Constitution oflndia, in relation to 
enactment of the Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004 (hereinafter 
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referred to as "the Punjab Act") by the State of Punjab. 
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2. The text of the Reference referred to for the consideration 
& opinion of this Court is as follows:-
·'WHERAS the Indus Basin comprises the rivers Indus, 
Jhelum. Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej; 
WHEREAS the lndus Water Treaty 1960 was entered into 
between the Governments of India and Pakistan on 19th 
September, 1960, under which India is entitled to the free, 
unrestricted use of the waters of the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej till 
they finally cross into Pakistan; 
WHEREAS while at the time of signing the said treaty, the 
waters of Sutlej had already been planned to be utilised for the 
Bhakra-Nangal Project, the surplus flow ofrivers Ravi and Beas, 
over and above the pre-partition use, was allocated by the 
Agreement in 1955 between the concerned states as follows 
namely:-
Punjab 
7.20 MAF 
(Including 1.30 MAF for Pepsu) 
Rajasthan 
Jammu & Kashmir 
8.00MAF 
0.65 MAF 
15.85 MAF 
WHEREAS after the afore-said allocation, there was a 
reorganisation of the State of Punjab under the Punjab 
Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966)
as a result of which 
successor states, namely, State of Punjab and State of Haryana 
were created and it became necessary to determine the 
respective shares of the successor states out of the quantum of 
water which could become available in accordance with aforesaid
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
2004 [ANIL R. DAVE, J.] 
allocation for use in the erstwhile State of Punjab and when the 
successor states failed to reach an agreement, a notification dated 
24th March, 1976 was issued by the Central Government under 
Section 78 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 under which 
State of 1-laryana was allocated 3.5 MAF quantity of water; 
WHEREAS to give effect to the allocation of3.5 MAF of water 
to the State of Haryana under the said 1976 notification, 
construction ofSatluj-Yamuna Link Canal (hereinafter called SYL 
Canal) was started by the State of Haryana in their portion after 
the 1976 notification. The construction of SYL Canal was also 
started by Punjab in their portion in early eighties; 
WHEREAS the States of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan 
entered into agreement dated 3 1.12.1981, by which the States 
of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan, in view of overall national 
interest and optimum utilisation of the waters, agreed on the 
reallocation of the waters among the States as follows:-
Share of Punjab 
4.22 MAF 
Share of Haryana 
3.50 MAF 
Share of Rajasthan 
8.60MAF 
Quantity earmarked 
for Delhi water supply 
0.20MAF 
Share of J & K 
0.65 MAF 
............... 
Total 
17.17 MAF 
............... 
WHEREAS it was also agreed under the aforesaid 1981 
agreement that the SYL Canal project could be completed in a 
time bound manner with a maximum period of two years from 
the date of signing of the agreement so that
the State of Haryana 
is enabled to draw its allocated share of water. This agreement 
is in use for deciding the periodical distribution of waters among 
the concerned states by the Bhakra Beas Management Board; 
WHEREAS an accord called the "Punjab Settlement" was signed 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] 11 S.C.R. 
on 24th July, 1985 to resolve the issues relating to the State of 
Punjab; 
WHEREAS paragraph 9.1 of the 'Punjab Settlement' provide 
that the farmers of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan will continue 
to get water not less than what they are using from the Ravi-
Beas System as on 1.7.1985, though waters used for consumptive 
purposes will also remain unaffected and that quantum of usage 
claimed shall be verified by the Tribunal referred to in Paragraph 
9.2 of the settlement under which the claims of Punjab and 
Haryana regarding their shares in the remaining waters will be 
referred for adjudication to a Tribunal; 
WHEREAS to give effect to paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the 
'Punjab Settlement', Section 14 was inserted in the Inter-State 
water Disputes Act, 1956 under which Eradi Tribunal was 
constituted for verification of the quantum of usage of water 
claimed by the farmers of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan 
regarding shares in their remaining waters. The Tribunal 
forwarded a report in January, 1987. References of the States 
of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan and Central Government 
seeking clarification/ guidance on certain points of the report 
was made to the Tribunal in August, 1987 under relevant 
provisions of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956. 
These references are under the consideration of the Tribunal at 
present; 
WHEREAS it was also agreed under paragraph 9.3 of the 'Punjab
Settlement' that the construction of the SYL Canal shall continue 
and it shall be completed by 15th August, 1986; 
WHEREAS the SYL Canal could not be completed as the works 
came to a halt following the killings of Chief Engineer and a 
Superintending Engineer of the project in July, 1990 and were· 
not resumed by the Government of Punjab subsequently and the 
State of Haryana filed Suit No. 6 of 1996 before this Hon 'ble 
Court praying for early completion of the SYL Canal in Punjab 
territory; 
WHEREAS the said suit was decreed by this Hon'ble Court by 
its order dated 15.01.2002, by relying on the 3 I . 12.1981 agreement 
and the State of Punjab was directed to make the SYL C~nal
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
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2004 [ANIL R. DAVE, J.) 
functional within a period of one year; 
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WHEREAS the State of Punjab filed a Suit (O.S. No. 1 of2003) 
seeking discharge/ dissolution of the obligation to construct the 
SYL Canal as directed and Suit O.S. No. I of2003 was dismissed 
by this Hon 'ble Court by its judgment and order dated 4.6.2004. 
The Union of India was directed in the said judgment and order 
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dated 4.6.2004 to mobilise a central agency to take control of 
the canal works within a period of one month and the State of 
Punjab was directed to handover the works to the Central Agency 
within two weeks thereafter; 
WHEREAS on 12th July, 2004, the State of Punjab has enacted 
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the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004 (herein after 
called Punjab Act, 2004) terminating and discharging the 
Government of Punjab from its obligations under the agreement 
dated 3 1.12.1981 and all other agreements relating to waters of 
Ravi-Beas. 
WHEREAS on 15th July, 2004, the Union of India filed an 
application for taking on record subsequent facts and 
developments after the passing of the order of the Hon 'ble 
Supreme Court dated 4.6.2004 and requesting the Hon'ble Court 
to pass such other and further orders as deemed fit in the interest 
of justice; 
.WHEREAS doubts have been expressed with regard to the 
constitutional validity of the Punjab Act, 2004 and its provisions 
and also whether the agreement dated 31.12.1981 can be said to
have been validly terminated by the State of Punjab and whether 
the State of Punjab has been lawfully discharged from the said 
agreement; 
AND whereas in view of the aforesaid, it appears that there is 
likelihood of the constitutional validity of the provisions of the 
Punjab Act 2004 being challenged in Courts of law involving 
protracted and avoidable litigation, that the differences and doubts 
have given rise to public controversy which may lead to 
undesirable consequences and that a question of law has arisen 
which is of such a nature and of such public importance that is 
expedient to obtain the opinion of the Hon 'ble Supreme Court of 
India thereon; 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] ll S.C.R. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of powers conferred upon me 
by clause ( l) of Article 143 of the Constitution of India, I, A.P.J. 
Abdul Kalam, President of India, hereby refer the following 
questions to the Supreme Court of India for consideration and 
report thereon, namely: 
i) Whether the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004 
and the provisions thereof are in accordance with the provisions 
of the Constitution oflndia; 
ii) Whether the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004 
and the provisions thereof are in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 14 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, Section 
78 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 and the Notification 
dated 24th March, 1976 issued there under; 
iii) Whether the State of Punjab had validly terminated the 
agreement dated 31.12.1981 and all other agreements relating 
to the Ravi-Beas waters and is discharged from its obligation 
under the said agreement(s); and 
iv) Whether in view of the provisions of the Act; the State of 
Punjab is discharged from its obligations from the judgment and 
decree dated 15.01.2002 and the judgment and order dated 
4.6.2004 of the Supreme Court oflndia.'' 
3. In pursuance of notice issued, the learned Attorney General for 
India appeared and made introductory submissions with regard to the 
Reference and thereafter, by an order dated 2nd August, 2004, this Court, 
issued notices to the Union of
India and States of Punjab, Haryana, 
Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir and the NCT of Delhi 
through their respective Chief Secretaries. 
4. Virtually, all relevant facts which are necessary for rendering 
ouropinion on the issues referred to this Court have been duly incorporated 
in the Reference and in the circumstances, we would not like to burden 
our opinion by reiterating the facts. Suffice it to state that by vi11ue of 
the provisions of Article 143 of the Constitution oflndia this Court has to 
examine the validity of the Punjab Act, 2004 and we have also to examine 
whether the State of Punjab had validly terminated the Agreement dated 
31" December, 1981 and other agreements relating to Ravi-Beas waters 
so as to discharge it from the obligations which it had to discharge under 
certain valid orders passed by appropriate authorities. However, for
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
2004 [ANIL R. DAVE, J.] 
further clarity we may incorporate facts with regard to certain litigation, 
in a nutshell, which are as under: 
The States of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan entered into an 
Agreement dated 3 1" December, 1981 which has been referred to 
hereinabove in the Reference, by virtue of which the States of Pubjab, 
Haryana and Rajasthan, in view of overall national interest and optimum 
utilization of Ravi and Beas waters had agreed on re-allocation of Ravi 
and Beas waters but as the said agreement was not being acted upon by 
the State of Punjab, the State of Haryana had instituted Suit No.6 of 
1996 before this Court under Article 131 of the Constitution of India 
impleading the State of Punjab and Union oflndia, seeking the following, 
among other, reliefs:-
"( a) pass a decree declaring that the order dated 24-3-1976, the 
Agreement of 3 1-12-1981 and the Settlement of 24-7-1985 are 
final and binding inter alia on the State of Punjab casting an 
obligation on Defendant I to immediately restmt and complete 
the portion of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal Project as also make 
it usable in all respects, not only under the aforesaid order of 
1976,Agreement of 1981 and Settlement of 1985 but also pursuant 
to a contract established by conduct from 1976 till date; 
(b) pass a decree of mandatory injunction compelling defendant 
I (failing which defendant 2 by or through any agency) to 
discharge its/their
obligations under the said Notification of 1976, 
the Agreement of 1981 and the Settlement of 1985 and in any 
case under contract established by conduct, by immediately 
restarting and completing that portion of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link 
Canal Project in the State of Punjab and otherwise making it 
suitable for use within a time bound manner as may be stipulated 
by this Hon 'ble Court to enable the State of Haryana to receive 
its share of the Ravi and Beas waters;" 
5. This Court after examining all the legal aspects and provisions, 
passed a decree in the said Suit No. 6of1996 vi de judgment dated 15th 
January, 2002, relevant portion of which is extracted herein below:-
"18 ......... The State Governments having entered into 
agreements among themselves on the intervention of the Prime 
Minister of the country, resulting in withdrawal of the pending 
suits in the Court, cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] 11 S.C.R. 
to the agreements arrived at between themselves. We are also 
of the considered opinion that it was the solemn duty of the Central 
Government to see that the terms of the agreement are complied 
with in toto. That apart, more than Rs. 700 crores of pub! ic revenue 
cannot be allowed to be washed down the drain, when the entire 
portion of the canal within the territory ofHaryana has already 
been completed and major portion of the said canal within the 
territory of Punjab also has been dug, leaving only minor patches 
within the said territory of Punjab to be completed. If the 
apprehension of the State is that on account of digging of the 
canal, the State of Haryana would draw more water than that 
which has been allocated in its favour, then the said apprehension 
also is thoroughly unfounded inasmuch as the source for drawing 
of water is only from the reservoir, which lies within the territory 
of Punjab and a drop of water will not flow in the canal unless 
the connecting doors are open. But the quantity of water that 
has already been allocated in favour of the State of Haryana, 
must be allowed to be drawn and that can be drawn only ifthe 
additional link canal is completed inasmuch as the existing Bhakra 
Main Canal has the capacity of supplying only 1.62 MAF of 
water. This being the position, we unhesitatingly hold that the 
plaintiff-State of Haryana has made out a case for issuance of 
an
order ofinjunction in the mandatory form against the State of 
Punjab to complete the portion of SYL Canal, which remains 
incomplete and in the event the State of Punjab fails to complete 
the same, then the Union Government-defendant 2 must see to 
its completion, so that the money that has already been spent 
and the money which may further be spent could at least be 
utilized by the countrymen. We have examined the materials from 
the' stand point of existence of a prima facie case, balance of · 
convenience and irreparable loss and injury and we are satisfied 
that the plaintiff has been able to establish each one of the 
aforesaid criteria and as such is entitled to the injunction sought 
for. This issue is accordingly answered in favour of the plaintiff 
and against the defendants. We, therefore, by way of a mandatory 
injunction, direct the defendant-State of Punjab to continue the 
digging ofSutlej-Yamuna Link Canal, portion of which has not 
been completed as yet and make the canal functional with in one 
year from today. We also direct the Government of India -
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
2004 [ANIL R. DAVE, J.] 
defendant 2 to discharge its constitutional obligation in 
implementation of the aforesaid direction in relation to the digging 
of canal and if within a period of one year the SYL Canal is not 
completed by the defendant-State of Punjab, then the Union 
Government should get it done through its own agencies as 
expeditiously as possible, so that the huge amount of money that 
has already been spent and that would yet to be spent, will not 
be wasted and the plaintiff-State of Haryana would be able to 
draw the full quantity of water that has already been allotted to 
its share. Needless to mention, the direction to dig SYL Canal 
should not be construed by the State of Haryana as a license to 
permit them to draw water in excess of the water that has already 
been allotted and in the eventthe tribunal, which is still considering 
the case of re-allotment of the water, grants any excess water 
to the State of Haryana, then it may also consider issuing 
appropriate directions as to how much of the water could be 
drawn through SYL Canal. 
19. The Plaintiff's suit is decreed on the aforesaid terms. There 
will be no order as io costs." 
[Emphasis Supplied] 
6. The State of Punjab did not comply with the decree dated 15th 
January, 2002 passed by this Court in Suit No. 6of1996. On 18th January, 
2002, the State of Punjab filed an application for review of said judgment 
dated 15th January, 2002 which was
dismissed by this Court on 5th 
March, 2002. On 18th December, 2002, an application was filed by the 
State of Haryana for enforcement of the judgment and decree dated 
15.01.2002 and the said application was registered as IA No. I of2002. 
7. On 13th January, 2003; the State of Punjab filed suit No. I of 
2003 under Article 131 of the Constitution of India before this Court 
seeking inter-alia the following reliefs:-
( a) To discharge/dissolve the obligation to construct SYL Canal 
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imposed by the mandatory injunction decreed by this Hon'ble 
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Court in its judgment/decree dated 15.01.2002 in OS No.6/ 1996 
for the reasons set out in the plaint; 
(b) To declare that the judgment/decree dated 15.01.2002 in OS 
No. 611996 is not binding or enforceable since the issues raised 
in that suit could only have been decided by a Constitution Bench 
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[2016] 11 S.C.R. 
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in terms of A11icle 145(3) of Constitution oflndia; 
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(c) To declare that Section 14 of the Act, 1956 is ultra-vires the 
Constitution oflndia; 
(d) To declare that Section 14 of the Act, 1956 is no longer 
enforceable for the reasons set out in the plaint; 
(e) To declare the Punjab Settlement (Raj iv Longowal Accord) 
is not enforceable under the changed circumstances as set out 
in the Plaint: 
In the alternative; 
in case it is held by this Hon'ble Court that the Punjab Settlement 
dated 24.07.1985 is an enforceable Agreement then direct 
enforceability and compliance with other l 0 issues and to keep 
in abeyance obligation to construct SYL canal till other conditions 
set out in the settlement are implemented and/or the Water 
Disputes arising from the reallocation of Ravi-Beas waters are 
resolved under the Act, 1956. 
(f) Declare that Section 78(1) of the Act, 1966 is ultra vires the 
Constitution of India, and that all acts, deeds and things done 
pursuant thereto or in consequence thereof including all 
Notifications, Agreements, etc. are null and void including the 
notification dated 24.03 .1976 and the Agreement dated 
31.12.1981 as non-est and void ab initio. 
8. By judgment and order dated June 4, 2004; this Court 
dismissed the suit filed by the State of Punjab and allowed the execution 
petition filed by the State ofHaryana by passing inter-alia the following 
order:-
"96. The residuary
power under Section 5l(e) allows a Court 
to pass orders for enforcing a decree in a manner which would 
give effect to it. The period specified in the decree for completion 
of the canal by Punjab is long since over. The Union of India has 
said that it had worked out a contingent action plan during this 
period. The contingency in the form of expiry of the one year 
period in January 2003 has occurred. We have not been told 
whether the contingency plan has been put into operation. 
Although it appears that the Cabinet Committee on Project 
Appraisals had approved the proposal for completion of the SYL
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
2004 [ANIL R. DAVE, J.) 
canal by BRO and at a meeting convened as early as on 20-2-
1991, the then Prime Minister directed that BRO take over the 
work for completion of the SYL Canal in the minimum time 
possible, BRO is not now available for the purpose. After the 
decree the Central Water Commission Officials have inspected 
the canal on 9-10-2002. The report has assessed a minimum 
period of about two years for removing silt deposits, clearing of 
trees and bushes, completing the damaged and balance works 
and making the canal functional and has estimated an amount of 
about Rs.250 crores for this purpose excluding the liabilities of 
Punjab. In the circumstances we direct the Union of India to 
carry out its proposed action plan within the following time frame: 
I) The Union of India is to mobilize a Central agencv to take 
control of the canal works from Punjab within a month from 
todav. 
2) Punjab must hand over the works to the Central Agency within 
2 (Two) weeks thereafter. 
3) An empowered committee should be set up to coordinate and 
facilitate the early implementation of the decree within 4 (four) 
weeks from today. Representatives of the States of Haryana 
and Punjab should be included in such Committee; 
4) Il1e construction of the remaining portion of the canal including 
the survey, preparation of detailed estim_ates and other preparatory 
works such as repair, desilting, clearance of vegetation etc. are 
to
be executed and completed by the Central Agency within 
such time as the High Powered Committee will determine. 
5) The Central and the Punjab Governments should provide 
adequate security for the staff of the Central Agency. 
97. We conclude this chapter with a reminder to the State of 
Punjab that "Great states have a temper superior to that of private 
litigants, and it is to be hoped that enough has been decided for 
patriotism, the fraternity of the Union, and mutual consideration 
to bring it to an end". 
[Emphasis Supplied] 
9. In.the aforestated background, on l 21h July, 2004, the State of 
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Punjab enacted the Punjab Act, 2004 with an intention to terminate the 
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[2016) 11 S.C.R. 
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Agreement dated 31st December, 1981 and all other Agreements relating 
to sharing of waters of rivers Ravi and Beas. Intention behind the said 
enactment was also to discharge the Government of Punjab from the 
obligations arising under the aforestatedAgreement dated 31" December, 
1981 and to nullify the decrees of the Court referred to hereinabove. 
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I 0. The aforestated facts will give some fm1her idea about the 
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facts and circumstances in which the President oflndia has referred the 
aforestated questions to this Cot111 for its opinion. 
11. At this juncture, we would like to refer to ce11ain unwarranted 
developments which took place after we sta11ed hearing this Reference. 
The legislature for the State of Punjab introduced Punjab Satluj Yamuna 
Link Canal Land (Transfer of Proprietary Rights) Bill, 2016. No assent 
ofGovermor till date and therefore, it is not a legislation and will remain 
Bill passed by Legislative Assembly. By virtue of the aforestated 
legislation, the State of Punjab proposed to act in clear violation of the 
Agreement dated 31" December, 1981 which has been referred to in 
the Reference. 
12. The State of Punjab had an intention to de-notify the land 
acquired for the purpose of construction of Sutlej Yamuna Link Canal 
(hereinafter referred to as "the SYL Canal") in Punjab and in pursuance 
of the said enactment, the State of Punjab had started returning 
possession of the land
already acquired to its landlords and earth moving 
equipments had been mobilized to level, destroy and fill up the SYL 
Canal which was in the process of construction. 
13. In the aforestated circumstances, I.A. No.7 of2016 had been 
filed by the State of Haryana praying that the operation and 
implementation of Punjab Satluj Yamuna Link Canal Land (Transfer of 
Proprietary Rights) Act, 2016 be suspended so that the entire proceedings 
initiated in pursuance of the Reference may not be frustrated. After 
hearing the concerned parties, on 17.3.2016, this Court was constrained 
to pass the following order:-
" I.A. No.7/2016 - for appropriate directions. Taken on 
Board. Upon perusal of the contents of the application and upon 
hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, prima facie, 
it appears that an effort has been made to see that execution of 
a decree of this Court is being made inexecutable and this Com1 
cannot be a silent spectator of the said fact and therefore, we
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
2004 [ANIL R. DAVE, J.] 
direct that status quo shall be maintained by the parties with 
regard to the following properties referred to in para ( d)(ii) of 
the application: 
"(dXii) lands, works, property and portions of the SYL canal and 
all lands within the alignment of the SYL canal within the territories 
of the State of Punjab which are covered by the judgments of 
this Court in State ofHaryana v State of Punjab, (2002) 2 SCC 
507 (paragraphs 18 and 19) and State of Haryana v State of 
Punjab, (2004) 12 SCC 712 (paragraph 96),". 
In the circumstances, it is further directed that (i) The 
· Secretary, Home Department, Union of India, (ii) The Chief 
Secretary, State of Punjab, and (iii)The Director General of 
Police, State of Punjab are appointed as Court Receivers as 
prayed for in para ( d)(ii) and all the properties referred to in the 
said para shall be deemed to have vested in them and they shall 
also see that status quo is maintained with regard to the properties 
referred to herein-above. Counter affidavits to the application 
be filed on or before 28th March, 2016". 
14. We have heard the learned Solicitor General oflndia appearing 
for the Union of India and learned counsel appearing for the States of 
Punjab, ljaryana, Jammu and Kashmir (J & K), Rajasthan, Himachal 
Pradesh and the NCT of Delhi at length. Several judgments were cited 
by the learned counsel so as to substantiate their arguments. We do not
propose to refer to all the judgments cited; e'specially in view of the fact 
that the law laid down by this Court, which has been referred to by the 
learned counsel cannot be disputed and there are some judgments which 
refer to all the issues with which we are concerned. We have considered 
all the submissions and substance of all the judgments referred to by 
them and we are referring to the submissions made by them in a nutshell 
herein below. 
15. As all the questions referred to this Court are interlinked, for 
the sake of convenience, we have discussed the same together instead 
of dealing with them separately. 
16. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Punjab 
vehemently submitted that this Reference is not maintainable under the 
provisions of Article 143(1) of the Constitution oflndia. He submitted 
that several issues with regard to facts not on record are also involved 
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and that is one of the reasons for which this Court should not render its 
opinion. He further submitted that it is not obligatory on the part of this 
Court to give its opinion in each and every matter which might be refeJTed 
to this Court by the President oflndia. According to him, looking at the 
facts of this case, especially when several other incidental facts are 
involved in the issue referred to this Court, this Court should refuse to 
give its opinion. He also referred to some of the judgments which lay 
down law to the effect that it is not obligatory on the part of this Court to 
give opinion as and when a Reference is made by the President oflndia 
under the provisions of Article 143( I) of the Constitution oflndia. 
17. He further submitted that this Court must take into account 
the fact that the circumstances have changed substantially in the last 
few years. According to him, after this Court had decreed the suit filed 
by the State of Haryana referred to hereinabove, the actual position 
with regard to the supply of water in the rivers has remarkably changed 
as supply of water has been substantially reduced, which has created 
problems for the State of Punjab and in view of the changed 
circumstances, according to him, it was necessary for the State of Punjab 
to take a different stand and in the new set of circumstances, the Punjab 
Act, 2004 had to be enacted and it is imperative on the
part of the Statutory 
Authorities and this Court to consider the said changed circumstances 
and therefore, the Punjab Act, 2004 cannot be said to be invalid or ultra 
vi res the Constitution of India. He further submitted that in view of the 
fact that under the provisions of Section 14 of The Inter-State River 
Water Disputes Act, 1956 the Tribunal has already been constituted, it 
would be expedient to refer the entire matter to the Tribunal so that the 
Tribunal can consider all the relevant facts and take an appropriate 
decision. 
18. He further submitted that the State of Punjab has already 
filed a suit with a prayer to constitute a Tribunal so that the dispute can 
be referred to the Tribunal and in the aforestated circumstances, the 
Reference should not be answered. Moreover, he also submitted that 
the law on the subject is crystal clear to the effect that whenever there 
·is any decision with regard to sharing of waters, the decision should be 
reviewed periodically when the circumstances get changed i.e. when 
the flow of water or supply of water is changed. According to him, in 
the changed circumstances comp! iance of all earlier orders should not 
be insisted upon and a fresh decision based on the ground realities should
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
31 
2004 [ANIL R. DAVE, J.] 
be taken with regard to sharing of the waters. The sum and substance 
A 
of the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the State of 
Punjab was that this Reference is not at all maintainable as the law 
enacted by the State of Punjab is within its statutory powers. 
19. In reply to the main issue with regard to the validity of the 
Reference the learned counsel appearing for the State of Haryana and 
B 
those suppo11ing him submitted that the Reference is maintainable and 
the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the State of 
Punjab did not have any substance. 
20. So as to examine whether such a Reference can be made, let 
us consider the provisions of Article 143 of the Constitution of India, 
c 
which reads as under:-
"Article 143: Power of President to consult Supreme 
Court.---
(1) If at any time it appears to the President that a question of 
law or fact has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a 
nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain 
· the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, he may refer the question 
to that Court for consideration and the Court may, after such 
hearing as itthinks fit, report to the President its opinion, thereon. 
(2) The President may, notwithstanding anything in the proviso 
·to Article 131, refer a dispute of the kind mentioned in the said 
proviso to the Supreme Cou11 for opinion and Supreme Court
shall, after such hearing as it thinks fit, report to the President its 
opinion thereon." 
21. A bare perusal of Article 143 of the Constitution would show 
that the President is authorized to refer to this Court a question oflaw or 
fact, which in his/her opinion is of such a nature and of such a public 
importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court 
upon it. The Article does not restrict the President to obtain opinion only 
on a pure question oflaw. The submission made by the learned counsel 
appearing for the State of Punjab that several questions of fact are involved 
in the Reference is thus hardly relevant, for the reason that an opinion 
can be sought on question of law and even on question of fact. 
22. It is true that it in for this Court to decide whether to render its 
opinion to the President and it is also true that such a view has been 
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taken by this Court and in a given case this Court can refuse to give its 
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23. While considering the same issue, this Court in the case of 
Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No.1 of 
20122012(10) SCC I has observed as under: 
"35. Insofar as the impact of filing and withdrawal of the review 
application by the Union oflndia against the decision in 2G case 
on the maintainability of the instant Reference is concerned, it is 
a matter ofrecord that in the review petition, certain aspects of 
the grounds for review which have been stated in the recitals of 
the Reference as well as in some questions, were highlighted. 
However, there is a gulf of difference between the jurisdiction 
exercised by this Court in a review and the discretion exercised 
in answering a reference under Article 143( I) of the Constitution. 
A review is basically guided by the well-settled principles for 
review of a judgment and a decree or order passed inter se 
parties. The Court in exercise of power ofreview may entertain 
the review under the acceptable and settled parameters. But, 
when an opinion .of this Court is sought by the executive taking 
recourse to a constitutional power, needless to say, the same 
stands on a different footing altogether. A review is lis specific 
and the rights of the parties to the controversy are dealt with 
therein, whereas a reference is answered keeping in view the
tenns of the reference and scrutinising whether the same satisfies 
the requirements inherent in the language employed under Article 
143( I) of the Constitution. In our view, therefore, merely because 
a review had been filed and withdrawn and in the recital the 
narration pertains to the said case, the same would not be an 
embargo or impediment for exercise of discretion to answer the 
reference". 
24. Thus, .it is within the discretion of this Court, subject to certain 
parameters to decide whether to refuse to answer a question on a 
reference. Looking at the facts of this Case, in our opinion this is not a 
case where this Court would like to refuse,to give its opinion to the 
President undeF the provisions of Article 143 of the Constitution oflndia 
as there is no good reason for the same. 
25. In the circumstances, we do not agree with the submission 
made by the learned counsel for the State of Punjab to the effect that
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
2004 [ANIL R. DAVE, J.] 
we sliould not give our-opinion simply because we are not bound to give 
our opinion under the provisions of Article 143 of the Constitution of 
India. 
26. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State 
of Haryana narrated the history of the litigation of different States on 
the issue of water sharing of the rivers concerned and submitted in a 
nutshell that by enacting the Punjab Act, 2004, the State of Punjab wanted 
to nullify the effect of the decrees passed by this Court against the said 
State. l'Ie further submitted that by a legislative act, a party to the 
litigation cannot enact a Statute which would nullify the effect ofa decree 
passed by a Court oflaw and if such a thing is permitted, governance of 
our democracy as per rule of law would be in jeopardy because the 
Constitution oflndia provides forthe manner in which the dispute among 
the States has to be adjudicated. If in a federal structure like ours, one 
State against whom a decree has been passed by this Court is permitted 
to enact law to nullify the decree, it would result into very hazardous 
consequences and mutilate the finality of a judicial verdict leading to 
uncertainty and that may result into legal chaos in the country. He mainly 
relied upon the judgments delivered by this Court in the case of Re: 
Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, (1993) I Supp. SCC 96 (II) and 
State of Tamil Nadu v. State ofKerala
and Another, (2014) 12 SCC 
696. He submitted that our Constitution provides for separation of powers 
and the method of adjudication of disputes among the States. If the law 
incorporated in the Constitution is not followed there would not be rule 
of law in the country. He referred to some other judgments so as to 
substantiate his case, mainly to the effect that such a law would adversely 
affect the functioning of different branches of the Government. He also 
submitted that it would not be within the power of a legislature to enact 
law to nullify the decree of the Supreme Court. 
27. He further submitted that once an Agreement with regard to 
sharing -0f waters had been executed, it becomes duty of each State, 
which is a party to the Agreement, to respect the Agreement and to act 
accordingly. In the instant case, there is not only an agreement but there 
are decrees of this Court, which would be nullified if such an Act is 
implemented. He, therefore, submitted that this Court should opine against 
the constitutionality of the Punjab Act, 2004 and should also opine that it 
is obligatory on the part of the State of Punjab to act as per the Agreement 
entered into by it. 
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28. He further submitted that iffor any reason the State of Punjab 
has a feeling that because of the changed circumstances, it is not possible 
to share waters of the rivers in the proportion decided under the 
Agreement or any decree, the State of Punjab or any other State, which 
is a party to the agreement should approach the Tribunal for getting an 
appropriate order so that the needful can be done for reviewing the 
proportion on the basis whereof the water sharing agreement had been 
executed. Instead of doing so, according to him, the State of Punjab has 
tried to exercise its legislative powers so as to nullify the decree of this 
Court, which is contrary to settled law. 
29. He further submitted that even our federal structure would be 
adversely affected if a State is permitted to !lCt in a wav which would 
nullify the decree passed by a competent Court. He strenuously submitted 
that such an Act would result into lawlessness and breaking down of the 
legal system. 
30. The other counsel appearing for different States have supported 
the learned counsel appearing for the State of Haryana and they have 
also submitted that the State of Punjab could not have enacted the Punjab 
Act so as to nullify the decree of a competent Court and to unilaterally 
absolve itself from its liability under the Agreement. 
31. Upon hearing the learned counsel and going through the record 
pertaining to the case and
upon perusal of the judgments cited by the 
learned counsel, we are of the view that the Punjab Act cannot be 
considered to be legal and valid and the State of Punjab can not absolve 
itself from its duties/liabilities arising out oftheAgreement in question. 
32. As stated hereinabove, it is not in dispute that there was a 
litigation between the State of Punjab and the State of Haryana and 
ultimately a decree was made whereby the arrangement with regard to 
sharing of water as per the agreement dated 3 I" December, 1981 had 
been made. There is thus a legal sanction to the said arrangemeot and 
once a binding decree has been passed by a Court of law, a party to the 
litigation cannot unilaterally act in a manner which would nullify the effect 
of the decree. 
33. In the instant case, instead of approaching the appropriate 
authority, namely, the Tribunal for appropriate relief, the State of Punjab 
exercised its legislative power by enacting the Punjab Act so as to nullify 
the effect of the Decree.
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
. 
. 
2004 (ANIL R. DAVE, J.] 
34. Dealing with a similar issue, this Cou11 in the case of State of 
Tamil Nadu (supra), has held that a State "cannot through legislation do 
an act in conflict with the judgment of the highest Court which has attained 
finality. If a legislation is found to have breached the established 
constitutional limitation such as separation of powers, it has to go and 
cannot be allowed to remain" (Para 146). 
35. It has been fm1her observed by this Cou11 as under:-
"147. 
It is true that the State's sovereign interests provide the 
foundation of the public trust doctrine but the judicial function is 
also a very impo11ant sovereign function of the State and the 
foundation of the rule of law. The legislature cannot by invoking 
"public trust doctrine" or "precautionary principle" indirectly 
control the action of the courts and directly or indirectly set aside 
the authoritative and binding finding of fact by the court, 
particularly, in situations where the executive branch 
(Government of the State) was a pm1y in the litigation and the 
final judgment was delivered after hearing them. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
149. This Court in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum 
v. Union oflndia ((2006) 3 SCC 643], after hearing the State of 
Kerala, was not persuaded by Kerala's argument that the 
Mullaperiyar Dam was unsafe or storage of water in that Dam 
cannot be increased. Rather, it permitted Tami I Nadu to
increase 
the present water level from 136 ft to 142 ft and restrained Kerala 
from interfering in Tamil Nadu's right in increasing the water 
level in the Mullaperiyar Dam to 142 ft. Thus, a judgment has 
been given by this Court in contest between the two States in 
respect of safety ofMullaperiyar Dam for raising the water level 
to 142 ft. The essential element of the judicial function is the 
decision of a dispute actually arising between the parties and 
brought before the com1. Necessarily, such decision must be 
binding upon the parties and enforceable according to the 
decision. A plain and simple judicial decision on fact cannot be 
altered by a legislative decision by employing doctrines or 
principles such as "public trust doctrine", "precautionary 
principle", "larger safety principle" and, "competence of the State 
Legislature to override agreements between the two States". 
The constitutional principle that the legislature can render judicial 
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decision ineffective by enacting validating law within its legislative 
field fundamentally altering or changing its character 
retrospectively has no application where a judicial decision has 
been rendered by recording a finding of fact. Under the pretence 
of power, the legislature, cannot neutralise the effect of the 
judgment given after ascertainment of fact by means of evidence/ 
materials placed by the parties·to the dispute. A decision which 
disposes of the matter by giving findings upon the facts is not 
open to change by legislature. A final judgment, once rendered, 
operates and remains in force until altered by the court in 
appropriate proceedings. 
150. The 2006 (Amendment) Act plainly seeks to nullify the 
judgment of this Court which is constitutionally impermissible. 
Moreover, it is not disputed by Kerala that the 2006 (Amendment) 
Act is not a validation enactment. Since the impugned law is not 
a validating law, it is not required to inquire whether in making 
the validation the legislature has removed the defect which the 
Court has found in existing law. The 2006 (Amendment) Act in 
its application to and effect on the. Mullaperiyar Dam is a legislation 
other than substantially legislative as it is aimed at nullifying the 
prior and authoritative decision of this Court. The nub of the 
: infringement consists in the Kerala Legislature's revising the final 
judgment of this Court in
utter disregard of the constitutional 
principle that the revision of such final judgment must remain 
exclusively within the discretion of the court." 
36. It has been further observed in the said judgment that a litigating 
person cannot become judge in its own cause. The said well known 
principle has been clearly depicted in paragraph 158 of the said judgment 
as under:-
"158. There is yet another facet that in federal disputes, the 
legislature (Parliament and State Legislatures) cannot be judge 
in their own cause in the case of any dispute with another State. 
The rule of law which is the basic feature of our Constitution 
forbids the Union and the States from deciding, by law, a dispute 
between two States or between the Union and one or more States. 
If this was permitted under the Constitution, the Union and the 
States which have any dispute between them inter se would 
enact law establishing its claim or right against the other and that 
would lead to contradictory and irreconcilable laws. The
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
2004 [ANIL R. DAVE, J.] 
Constitution makers in order to obviate any likelihood of 
contradictory and irreconcilable laws being enacted has provided 
for independent adjudication of federal disputes. Article 131 of 
the Constitution confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in 
relation to the disputes between the Government of India and 
one or more States or between the Government oflndia and any 
State or States on one side and one or more States on the other 
or between two or more States insofar as dispute involves any 
question on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. 
The proviso appended to Article 13 l carves out an exception to 
the jurisdiction of this Court to a dispute arising out of treaty, 
agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar 
instrument which have been entered into or executed before the 
commencement of the Constitution and continues in operation 
after such commencement, which are political in nature. In 
relation to dispute relating to waters of inter-State river or river 
valleys, Article 262 provides for creation of tribunal or forum for 
their adjudication. In federal disputes, Parliament or State 
Legislatures by law, if seek to decide a dispute between the two 
States or between the Union and one or more States directly or 
indirectly, the adjudicatory mechanism provided in Articles 131 
and 262 of the Constitution would be rendered nugatory and, 
therefore,
such legislation cannot be constitutionally 
countenanced being violative of separation of powers doctrine." 
37. Finally, on the subject on hand, this Court observed as under 
in paragraph 160: 
· 
"160. Where a dispute between two States has already been 
adjudicated upon by this Court, which it is empowered to deal 
with, any unilateral law enacted by one of the parties that results 
in overturning the final judgment is bad not because it is affected 
by the principles of res judicata but because it infringes the 
doctrine of separation of powers and rule oflaw, as by such Jaw, 
the legislature has clearly usurped the judicial power." 
38. Looking at the aforestated legal position, in our opinion, the 
State of Punjab had exceeded its legislative power in proceeding to nullify 
the decree of this Court and therefore, the Punjab Act cannot be said to 
be a validly enacted legislation, as held by this Court in terms the 
aforestated judgments. 
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39. It is pertinent to note that the water dispute, which the State 
of Punjab and State of Haryana had, had been referred to the Tribunal 
as per the provisions of Section 14 of the Inter State Water Disputes 
Act, 1956. After considering the relevant provisions, even with regard to 
Section 78 of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966, the Tribunal had 
taken a judicial decision and the said decision is also sought to be disturbed 
by virtue of enactment of the Punjab Act. The Agreement dated 3 1st 
December, 1981 is about sharing of waters of Ravi and Beas rivers. 
The said Agreement could not have been unilaterally terminated by one 
of the parties to the Agreement by exercising its legislative power and if 
any party or any State does so, looking at the law laid down by this Court 
in the case of State of Tamil Nadu (supra), such unilateral action of a 
particular State has to be declared contrary to the Constitution oflndia 
as well as the provisions of the Inter State Water Disputes Act, 1956. 
40. Once a conclusion is arrived at to the effect that one State, 
which is a party to the litigation or an Agreement, cannot unilaterally 
terminate the Agreement or nullify the decree of the highest Court of 
the country, the State of Punjab cannot discharge itself from its obligation 
which arises from the judgment and decree dated l 5'h January, 2002 
and the judgment and order dated 4'h January, 2004 of the
apex Court. 
41. For the aforestated reasons, in our opinion, the Punjab Act 
cannot be said to be in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution 
oflndia and by virtue of the said Act the State of Punjab cannot nullify 
the judgment and decree referred to hereinabove and terminate the 
Agreement dated 31st December, 1981. 
42. Thus, in our view, all the questions referred to this Court are 
answered in the negative. 
43. This opinion shall be transmitted to the President of India in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Part V of the Supreme 
Court Rules, 2013. 
SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. Having gone through the exceedingly 
well formulated judgment of Anil Dave, J., I record my respectful 
agreement with the same. But at the same time I am tempted by the 
facts and nature of controversy involved in this Reference to remind all 
the stakeholders interested in the healthy upkeep oflndian Constitutional 
set-up, and particularly the States which form part of the Indian Federal 
structure, of the peculiar and essential features of our federal set-up.
IN RE: THE PUNJAB TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT ACT, 
2004 [SHIVA KIRT! SINGH, J.] 
Awareness of these features is essential to keep the system healthy and 
transact constitutional powers - legislative, executive and judicial on 
proper tracks to foster the spirit of constitutional ism. 
2. It is not at all necessary to refer to a catena of judgments that 
tell us in most unambiguous terms that the Indian Constitution envisages 
a federal form of governance but with a pronounced bias and obvious tilt 
towards the Centre. Historically, the States were not having absolute 
sovereignty. The territories of States can be altered or totally taken 
away and even their names can be changed. Despite the distribution of 
legislative power by Article 246, leave aside the situations of emergency, 
even during normal times provisions like Articles 248, 249, 251, 252, 253 
and 254 run counter to the normal legislative powers of States. Over 
subjects covered by the Concurrent List, in the case .of any repugnancy, 
the laws by Parliament have superiority and prevail over those by State 
Legislature. Executive powers are understandably co-terminus with 
the legislative powers. 
3. Of utmost significance, in the context at hand is supremacy of 
the Constitution. Even to the permissible extent, it can be amended only 
by the Union Parliament. The Constitution grants and recognizes 
supreme authority to the courts to not only interpret but also to protect 
the Constitution and the laws. Regardless
of other features showing the 
Indian model to be only a quasi-federal, the Indian Constitution is very 
explicit and emphatic in creating checks and balances by providing for a 
strong and independent judiciary and a well defined constitutional 
mechanism for resolving conflicts between the executive and legislative 
authority of the Union and those of the States. Indians have given to 
themselves a single Constitution and single citizenship. Judicial power is 
exercisable by a single set of courts with in their territorial jurisdictions. 
High Courts are final courts at State level with constitutional powers 
under Articles 226 and 227. Supreme Court is undoubtedly the apex 
court in the hierarchy with amalgam of ultimate powers over decisions 
of all courts - civil, criminal, revenue and quasi-judicial tribunals. Its 
powers and duties are enormous not only on the appellate side but under 
Article 32 of the Constitution and other original jurisdictions such as 
Constitutional References and also original suits where the disputes may 
be between the States or between Union and States etc. 
4. From the abovementioned set up under our Constitution, there 
is no difficulty in concluding that no Government, whether Central or 
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f20161 11 S.C.R. 
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State can usurp the powerofadjudicating disputes vested in the Judiciary 
including High Courts and the Supreme Court. Further, as a corollary, 
the judgments and decrees which are the end product of exercise of 
judicial power cannot be set at naught by the process of legislative 
declaration in respect of facts and circumstances. As explained already 
in the main judgment, the situation is somewhat different when a 
competent legislature engages itself in the exercise of validating a law 
declared defective or invalid for reasons which are curable. 
5. An observation necessitated by the somewhat disturbing facts: 
delay in execution of a final judgment or decree, more so when it is of 
C 
the Apex Court, should never be countenanced by any authority because 
- it would surely tend to undermine people's faith in the judicial system of 
the country, entailing in turn avoidable harm to all the institutions and 
functionaries under the Constitution, may be even to the Constitution 
itself. 
D 
Divya Pandey 
Referred questions answered.