STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. versus LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH & ORS.
[2016] 4 S.C.R. 816, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
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[2016] 4 S.C.R. 816 
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
v. 
LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH & ORS. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 171 of2016) 
JUNE29,2016 
[DIPAK MISRA AND SHIVA KffiTI SINGH, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 432 and 433 - Remis-
sion under - Respondent was convicted under the provisions of 
TADA by .the Designated Court in the State of Gujarat and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment - Conviction was confirmed by Supreme 
Court - On the request of the respondent-convict, he was trans-
ferred from the jail in Gujarat to the jail in Punjab -Application by 
the convict for remission of sentence - Rejected by the State of 
Gujarat - Writ petition challenging the order of refusal - High Court 
directed the State of Gujarat to reconsider the representation of the 
convict to release him premature - On appeal, held: The High Court 
has not found that the order passed by the State was bereft of ap-
propriate consideration of necessary facts or in violation of prin-
ciples of equality - Therefore, the direction of the High Court to the 
State to reconsider the case of remission, is not correct - However, 
the appropriate Government for exercising power u/ss. 432 and 
433 would not be State of Gujarat, but the Central Government as 
the sentence was imposed under a law with respect to which the 
Executive Power of the Union extends - Liberty granted to the con-
vict to submit application for premature release before the compe-
tent authority of the Central
Government. 
Parole - Direction by High Court (in exercise of its jurisdic-
tion u/Art. 226) to release life convict on parole - Held: Constitu-
tional court before directing the temporary release, should form an 
opinion that request has been unjustifiably refused or where inter-
est of justice so warrants - However, such jurisdiction should be 
sparingly exercised - In the present case, an abrupt direction has 
been issued to release the convict on parole without resorting to 
legal principles. 
Judicial Discipline - Judicial restraint - A Judge is expected 
816
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH@ MANJIT SINGH 817 
& ORS. 
to act in consonance with the legal principles - He has to remain 
embedded to constitution and laws - He cannot assume the power 
on the basjs of the individual perception or notion. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The High Court has not found that the order 
passed by the State of Gujarat was bereft of appropriate consid-
eration of necessary facts or there has been violation of prin-
ciples of equality. The High Court has not noticed that the order 
is bereft of reason. It has been clearly stated in the impugned 
order that the convict was involved in disruptive activities, crimi-
nal conspiracy, smuggling of arms, ammunitions and explosives 
and further he had also been involved in various other activities. 
It has also been mentioned that the prisoner had wide-spread 
network to cause harm and create disturbance to National Secu-
rity. Because of the aforesaid reasons remission was declined. 
In such a fact situation, the view expressed by the High Court to 
consider the case on the basis of the observations made by it in 
the judgment is not correct. [Para 32] [837-B-D] 
Laxman Naskar v. State of West Bengal (2000) 7 SCC 
626 : 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 62 - relied on. 
2.1 The constitutional court, before directing the temporary 
release where the request is made to be released on parole for a 
specified reason and for a specified period should form an opin-
ion that request has been unjustifiably
refused or where the in-
terest of justice warranted for issue of such order of temporary 
release. Jurisdiction has to be sparingly exercised by the Court 
and even when it is exercised, it is appropriate that the Court 
should leave it to the administrative or jail authorities to pre-
scribe the conditions and terms on which parole is to be availed. 
[Para 33] [837-F-G] 
2.2 In the present case, an abrupt direction has been issued 
to release the first respondent on parole for a period of three 
months. It is well settled that a Judge is expected to act in con-
sonance and accord with the legal principles. He cannot assume 
the power on the basis of his individual perception or notion. 
While using the power he has to bear in mind that "discipline" 
and "restriction" are the two basic golden virtues within which a 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 4 S.C.R. 
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Judge functions. He has to remain embedded to constitution 
and the laws. [Para 341 [838-B-CJ 
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Sunil Fu!chand Shah v. Union of India and Ors. (2000) 
3 SCC 409: 2000 (1) SCR 945 - followed. 
3. While deciding as to which will be appropriate Govern-
ment for exercising power u/ss. 432 and 433 Cr.P.C., the first 
test should be whether the offence for which the sentence was 
imposed was under a law with respect to which the Executive 
Power of the Union extends. For instance, if the sentence was 
imposed under TADA Act, as the said law pertains to the Union 
Government, the Executive Power of the Union alone will apply 
to the exclusion of the State Executive Power, in which case, 
there will be no question of considering the application of the 
Executive Power of the State." The High Court has opined that 
the State of Gujarat is the appropriate Government. It is be-
cause it has been guided by the principle that the first respon-
dent was convicted and sentenced in the State of Gujarat. [Paras 
29, 31 and 32) [835-D; 836-F-HJ 
Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors 2015 
(13) SCALE 165; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ajit Singh 
& Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 616; Hamm/ant Dass v. Vinay 
Kumar & Ors. (1982) 2 SCC 177 : 1982 (3) SCR 595; 
Govt. of A.P. and Ors. v.MT. Khan (2004) 1 SCC 616 
: 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 490; G. V. Ramanaiah v. The 
Superintendent of Central Jail, Rajahmundry and Ors. 
(1974) 3 SCC 531: 1974
(1) SCR 852 - relied on. 
Lal Singh v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (2001) 3 SCC 
221 : 2001 (1) SCR 111; State of Haryana v. Mahender 
Singh (2007) 13 sec 606:2007 (11) SCR 932; u. T. 
Chandigarh v. Charanjit Kaur 1996 (7) SCC 492 : 1996 
(2) SCR 735; Laxman Naskar v. State qf West Bengal 
(2000) 7 SCC 626 : 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 62; Santa 
Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 : 1977 (1) 
SCR 229; Kuljeet Singh v. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1982 
(1) SCC 417 : 1982 (3) SCR 58; Kehar Singh v. Union 
of India 1989 (1) SCC 204 : 1988 (3) Suppl. SCR 1102; 
Mohd Munna v. Union of India and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH@ MANJIT SINGH 819 
&ORS. 
417 : 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 233; Maru Ram v. Union 
of India and Ors. 1981 (1) SCC 107; Swaran Singh v. 
State of UP. and Ors. 1998 (4) SCC 75 : 1998 (2) SCR 
206; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ratan Singh and Ors. 
(1976) 3 sec 470 : 1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 552; Gopal 
Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra (1961) 3 SCR 
440; Naib Singh s/o Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab 
and Ors. (1983) 2 SCC 454; K.M Nanavati v. State of 
Maharashtra 1962 Supp (1) SCR 567; Kishori Lal v. 
Emperor AIR 1945 PC 64; Bikas Chatterjee v. Union 
of India and Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 634; Satpal v. State of 
Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 170 : 2000 (3) SCR 858; Epuru 
Sudhakar and Anr. v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. (2006) 8 
SCC 161; Swamy Shraddananda (2) alias Murali 
Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 
767 : 2008 (11) SCR 93; V. Sriharan alias Murugan v. 
Union of India and Ors. (2014) 4 SCC 242 - referred 
to. 
Case Law Reference 
2001 (1) SCR 111 
referred to 
Para3 
2007 (11) SCR 932 
referred to 
Paras 
]996 (2) SCR 735 
referred to 
Para6 
2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 62 
relied on 
Para6 
]977 (1) SCR 229 
referred to 
Para 11 
1982 (3) SCR 58 
referred to 
Para 11 
1988 (3) Suppl. SCR 1102 referred to 
Para 11 
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 233 
referred to 
Para 11 
]981 (1) sec 101 
referred to 
Para 12 
]998 (2) SCR 206 
referred to 
Para 12 
1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 552 
referred to 
Para 16 
(1961) 3 SCR 440 
referred to 
Para 16 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016) 4 S.C.R. 
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(1983) 2 sec 454 
referred to 
Para 17 
1962 Supp (1) SCR 567 
referred to 
Para 21 
AIR 1945 PC 64 
referred to 
Para 21 
(2004) 7 sec 634 
referred to 
Para 25 
B 
20QO (3) SCR 858 
referred to 
Para 25 
0006) 8 sec 161 
referred to 
Para26 
2015 (13) SCALE 165 
relied on 
Para28 
c 
2Q08 (11) SCR 93 
referred to 
Para28 
(~014) 4 sec 242 
referred to 
Para28 
0976) 3 sec 616 
referred to 
Para30 
l~f!2 (3) SCR 595 
referred to 
Para30 
D 
2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 490 referred to 
Para 30 
1~~4 (1) SCR 852 
referred to 
Para30 
2QOO (1) SCR 945 
followed 
Para 33 
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CRIMIN AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
171 of2006. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.08.2012 in Crl. W. P. No. 
1620 of 2011 passed by the High Co mi of Punjab & Haryana at 
Chandigarh 
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WITH 
W. P. (Cr!.) No. 181 of2012. 
V. Madhukar, AAG, D. N. Ray, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal 
Wahi, Ms. Sunita Sharma, Ms. Anvita Cowshish, Kuldip Singh, Ms. 
Naresh Bakshi, Advs. for the appearing parties. 
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. I. The present appeal, by special leave, is 
directed against the judgment and order dated August 23, 2012 passed 
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal 
H 
Writ Petition No. 1620of2011 whereby the High Court entertaining the
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH 821 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
Writ Petition had opined that the order dated 26.07.2011 passed by the 
Government of Gujarat declining to grant the benefit of premature release 
to the first respondent herein is illegal and further directed the State 
Government to reconsider his case and take a fresh decision in the light 
of the discussions made in the impugned order and further to release 
him on parole for a period of three months on furnishing personal bond/ 
security bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/-· to the satisfaction of the concerned 
Jail Superintendent. 
2. The facts which are essential to be stated are that the first 
respondent along with 20 other accused was tried in TADA Cases Nos. 
2, 7 of I 993 and 2of1994. The Designated Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) 
at Mirzapur, Ahmedabad convicted the first respondent and some others 
for the offences punishable under Section 3(3) of the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention)Act, I 987 (for short, "the TADA Act") 
and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. I 0,000/ 
- each and in default to suffer RI for 6 months; under Section I 20-8( 1) 
IPC sentenced to suffer RI for I 0 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/ 
- each, in default to suffer RI for 3 months; under Section 5 of the 
TADA Act sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of 
Rs. I 0,000/- and in default to suffer RI for 6 months; under Section 5 of 
the Explosive
Substances Act to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default 
to undergo RI for 3 months; under Section 25( I-A) of the Arms Act 
sentenced to suffer RI for 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, 
in default, to suffer RI for 3 months. Be it stated, he was also convicted 
for the offence punishable under Section 3(3) of the TADA Act read 
with Section 120-8 !PC but no separate sentence was awarded. All the 
sentences were directed to run concurrently. 
3. The first respondent preferred Criminal Appeal No. 2I9of1997 
and the said appeal was heard along with the appeals preferred by other 
convicts. This Court in Lal Singh v. State of Gujarat anti another' 
scrutinized the evidence in detail and ultimately dismissed the appeal 
preferred by the first respondent and confirmed the conviction and the 
sentence as imposed by the learned Judge, Designated Court. 
4. During the pendency of the criminal appeal before this Court, 
the first respondent sought transfer from the Central Prison, Ahmedabad 
to the Central Prison, Jalandharon the ground that his family is based in 
1(2001) 3 sec 221 
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[2016] 4 S.C.R. 
Punjab; his old parents were suffering from number of ailments; and 
further the financial condition of the family was precarious. Considering 
the reasons ascribed in the representation, the State Government vide 
order dated 11.11.1998 consented to transfer the first respondent from 
Central Prison, Ahmedabad to the Central Prison, Jalandhar. A condition 
was stipulated by the State of Gujarat that tight security and proper 
police escort arrangement was to be ensured. 
5. The first respondent on 19.0l.2004 sought premature release 
under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) on 
the ground that he would complete 14 years of actual sentence in jail. 
His prayer for premature release was considered by the competent 
authority of the State of Gujarat which vi de order dated 26.10.2006 
considering the over all aspects of the matter rejected the said application. 
The said order was assailed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 505 of 2007 
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which vide order dated 
25.08.2008 disposed of the Writ Petition with the direction to the State 
of Gujarat to reconsider the case of the first respondent for premature 
release considering the applicability of Section 433 CrPC, Section 3 of 
the Transfer of Prisoner Act and the decision in State of Harymw v. 
Maliender Singli 2• 
6. Keeping in view the order passed by the High Court, the State 
Government
considered the prayer of the first respondent for premature 
release on 06.03.2009 and considered all aspects that have to be taken 
note of as per the direction of the High Court along with all other factors 
and the decisions in U. T. Clwndigarlt v. C/ummjit Kaur3 and Laxnwn 
Naskar v. State of West Bengat• and eventually rejected the application. 
The grievance of rejection compelled the first respondent to prefer a 
Misc. Criminal Application No. 6515 of 2009 before the Punjab and 
Haryana High Court which was eventually withdrawn vide order dated 
16.03.2009 wherein it was observed that it was open to the said respondent 
to approach the concerned authority. The order dated 06.03.2009 was 
again challenged in Special Criminal Application No. 1274. of2009 under 
Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia which was dismissed by the High 
Court. 
2 2007 (4) RCR (Criminal) 909: (2007) 13 SCC 606 
'n 1996 (3) sc 30: 1996 (7) sec 492 
4 AIR 2000 SC 2762 : (2000) 7 sec 626 
..
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH 823 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
7. Remaining indefatigable the first respondent preferred Writ 
Petition No. 677 of 20 I 0 praying for a writ of habeas corpus on the 
ground that he had already suffered requisite period of sentence and 
hence, he was entitled to be released as per Sections 432, 433 and 433-
A CrPC and para 431 of the New Punjab Jail Manual. A grievance was 
put forth that his representation had not been considered by the State 
Government. On 20.04.20 I 0, the High Court disposed of the matter 
directing the State Government to pass a speaking order within a period 
of two months. Be it stated, when the High Court passed the said order, 
it had not issued notice to the State of Gujarat. However, regard being 
had to the direction issued by the High Court, the competent authority 
took up the matter for reconsideration and after obtaining the opinion 
from the appropriate quarters as required under the manual, the State 
Government declined to grant premature release to the first respondent 
vide order dated 30.12.20 I 0. The said order was assailed before the 
High Court in Writ Petition No. 158 of 20I1 and the High Court vi de 
judgment and order dated 25.05.2011 directed the State to reconsider 
the premature release taking note of the actual sentence of 14 years and 
three months and more than 21 years including remission. The High 
Court had directed the first respondent to be released on parole subject
to certain conditions. Pursuant to the order passed by the High Court, 
the State Government took up the case for reconsideration and keeping 
in view the statutory provisions ofCrPC, Rule No. 1448 of the Bombay 
Jail Manual which governs the State of Gujarat, the opinion of the advisory 
board and keeping in view the number of cases the first respondent was 
really involved, the gravity and nature of the crime and its impact on the 
society, it rejected the proposal for release vi de order dated 26.07.2011. 
8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the first respondent 
invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the 
Constitution of India. It was contended on behalf of respondent No. I 
before the High Court that provisions of Punjab Jail Manual, 1996 are 
applicable to him since he had been transferred to the State of Punjab as 
per the Transfer of Prisoners Act, 1950 and as there had been a 
recommendation by the competent authority under the Punjab Jail Manual 
that he was entitled to the benefit of the premature release but the same 
has been declined by the State of Gujarat and hence, the whole action 
was arbitrary and illegal. It was also urged that as per the Bombay Jail 
Manual which is applicable in State of Gujarat, he was also entitled to 
premature release as he had already undergone more than I 4 years of 
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sentence. It was also argued that refusal to entertain the prayer for 
premature release was contrary to the concept of Article 21 of the 
Constitution and, therefore, the order passed by the State Government 
was 11011 est in law. 
9. The stand of the first respondent was controverted by the State 
of Gujarat contending, inter alia, that the recommendations of the 
competent authority under the Punjab Jail Manual are not binding on it 
which is the sole authority to decide the matter relating to premature 
release; that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana had no jurisdiction 
to issue a writ of habeas corpus; that the factual background as depicted 
by the State do not make out a case for premature release and, therefore, 
the Court should not exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction on the said 
score. It was also contended that the first respondent having acceded 
to the earlier orders of rejection by the High Court, was debarred from 
approaching the Court in subsequent petitions. 
I 0. The learned single Judge posed five questions for consideration. 
They read as under:-
"i) Which is the appropriate Government empowered to consider 
the case of premature release of the petitioner? 
ii) Whether earlier dismissal of the petition for premature release 
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by a High Court operates as bar and estoppels to the filing of 
subsequent petitions? 
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iii) Whether the High Court where prisoner is transferred has
jurisdiction to entertain the criminal writ petition? 
iv) Whether non-release of a convict is worse sanction than the 
death sentence, resultant encroachment upon the life and personal 
liberty by the executive? 
v) Whether order dated 26.07.2011 is subject to judicial review 
and is arbitrary, whimsical and against the provisions of Article 21 
of the Constitution oflndia?" 
11. Answering the first question, the High Court held that it is the 
Government of Gujarat which is the appropriate Government for passing 
the order with regard to premature release to the first respondent. 
Answering the question No. 2, the High Court opined that dismissal of 
the earlier petitions did not operate as a bar to file fresh petition nor do 
they operate as estoppel when fresh cause of action arises. Dealing
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH 825 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
with the third facet, the High Court opined that it had the jurisdiction to 
entertain the Writ Petition keeping in view the ambit and scope under 
Article 226 of the Constitution. While dealing with question No. 4, the 
High Court referred to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 
21 of the Constitution, the view expressed by this Court in Santa Singlt 
v. State of Punjab;, Kuljeet Singlt v. Lt. Governor of Dellti6, Ke/tar 
Singh v. Union of lndia7, Ma/tender Singlt (supra), Moltd. Munna v. 
Union of India and others• and certain other authorities and came to 
holdthus:-
"In the light of the above discussions, facts and circumstances of 
the cases in hand, the arguments of the counsel for the Government 
of Gujarat that life imprisonment means natural life of the prisoner 
is against the provisions of the Constitution and the International 
Human Rights Documents and will amount to arbitrary exercise 
of power rejecting the premature release of petitioners. I have no 
doubt that indeterminate life imprisonment and non-release of a 
convict - prisoner is worse sanction than the death sentence, 
resultant encroachment upon the life and personal liberty by the 
executive. A barbaric crime does not have to be met with a 
barbaric penalty which may upset the mental balance of a person 
who may realize that he will never be out of prison. The reasonable 
determination period of
imprisonment with regard to offences 
where life imprisonment is provided is a necessity and call for 
appropriate amendment for prescribing determinate punishment 
keeping in view the gravity of the offence. This Court feels that 
it is the primary obligation of the Legislature to carry out necessary 
amendments in the cases where imprisonment for life is provided · 
to make aware the convict/prisoner how much period he has to 
undergo in prison. Otherwise, the approach of reformative, 
rehabilitative and corrective system will be only a futile exercise. 
Otherwise also, to keep a prisoner behind bars is a financial burden 
on the State exchequer and for that reason it is imperative to fix 
some determinate punishment by making amendments." 
12. While adverting to the fifth issue, the High Court referred to 
'AIR 1976 SC 2386: (1976) 4 sec 190 
'' 1982 (I) sec 417 
1 1989 (I) sec 204 
'{2005) 1sec417 
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the decisions in Kelutr Singft (supra), the Constitution Bench decision 
in Maru Ram v. Union of India and otfters• and Swartm Singft "· 
State of U.P. am/ others1" and came to hold that the power of judicial 
review of the order passed hy the President or the Governor under Article 
72 or Article 161 is available on limited grounds. Thereafter the High 
Court opined that the State of Gujarat while considering the representation 
of the first respondent seeking premature release had not taken into 
consideration the reports of the District Magistrate and the Senior 
Superintendent of Pol ice, Kapmthala as well as the Superintendent 
Maximum Security Jail, Nabha where the first respondent was undergoing 
the sentence and no reason for discarding such repo1ts had been ascribed. 
The High Court further opined that it is not recorded in the order how 
the Advisory Committee of Gujarat has come to a conclusion for not 
recommending the case of premature release of the first respondent. 
That apart, it has been observed that no evidence or material had been 
placed before the Court to reject the recommendations of the transferee 
State, that is, the Government of Punjab. Thereafter, the learned single 
Judge proceeded to state thus:-
" ... The petitioner more than 20 years had never been in the 
jurisdiction of District Magistrate and District Superintendent of 
Police of the concerned District of Gujarat, how their
reports can 
outweigh the reports of the transferee State. The absence of 
obligation to convey reason to the petitioner for rejecting the 
recommendations of the State of Punjab where the petitioner 
permanently resides does not mean that there should not be 
legitimate and relevant reasons for passing order of rejection. 
Furthennore, no such material has been placed on the paper book 
nor any record has been shown to the Cou11 which had formed 
the basis for rejecting the claim of the petitioner. The obligation 
to supply reasons is entirely different to apprise the Court about 
the reason for the action when the same is challenged in Court. .. '' 
13. Eventually, the High Court directed to .-econsider the first 
respondent's representation in the light of the discussion made in that 
order and further to release him forthwith on parok for a period of three 
months. The sa;d ord~r ;s !he subject matter of assail in this appeal by 
special leave. 
• 1981 (I) sec 101 
H 
•·• 1998 (4) sec 75
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH@ MANJIT SINGH 827 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
14. We have heard Mr. D.N. Ray and Ms. Hemantika Wahi, learned 
counsel forthe State of Gujarat, Ms. Sunita Sharma, learned counsel for 
the first respondent and Mr. V. Madhukar, learned Additional Advocate 
General for the State of Punjab. 
15. To appreciate the controversy specially in the backdrop of the 
judgment delivered by the High Court, it is necessary to restate the law 
pertaining to sentence of imprisonment for life and the concept of 
remission as envisaged under CrPC. 
16. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rata11 Singh and others" a 
two-Judge Bench speaking through Fazal Ali, J., after adverting to the 
decision in Gopa/ Vinayak Godse v. State of Malwrashtra 12 and other 
decisions and the provisions ofCrPC, has opined that that a sentence of 
imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the end of 20 
years including the remissions, because the administrative rules framed 
under the various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act cannot supersede 
the statutory provisions of the Indian Penal Code. A sentence of 
imprisonment for life means a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner 
unless the appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to 
remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under Section 401 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure. 
I 7. In Naib Singh s/o Mak/um Singh v. State of Punjab am/ 
otliers13 the Court was dealing with a writ petition
preferred under 
Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the continued detention of the 
convict petitioner in jail and seeking an order in the nature of habeas 
corpus claiming that he had served more than the maximum sentence of 
imprisonment prescribed under law and therefore he should be released. 
The petitioner therein was c.onvicted under Section 302 IPC and 
sentenced to death but on a mercy petition preferred by him, his death 
sentence was commuted by the Governor of Punjab to imprisonment 
for life. After serving rigorous imprisonment of more than 22 years, a 
petition was filed seeking the release. The Com1 referred to Sections 
53 and 55 !PC and Section 433 CrPC., various decisions of the High 
Court and then concept of transportation for life and eventually held that 
it is well settled position in law that the sentence of imprisonment for life 
11 \1976) 3 sec 470 
" ( 1961) 3 SCR 440 : AIR 1961 SC 600 
"\1983) 2 sec 454 
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has to be equated to rigorous imprisonment for life and ultimately the 
claim of the petitioner to immediate release was declined in the absence 
of any order of commutation being passed either under Section 55 IPC 
or Section 433(b) CrPC. 
18. In this regard, we may fruitfully refer to a two-Judge Bench 
decision in Laxman Naskar (supra). In the said case, after referring to 
the earlier decisions, the Court opined that though under the relevant 
Rules a sentence for imprisonment for life is equated with the definite 
period of 20 years, that is no indefeasible right of such prisoner to be 
unconditionally released on the expiry of such a particular terms, including 
remissions and that is only forthe purpose of working out the remissions 
that the said sentence is equated with definite period and not for any 
other purpose. The Court proceeded to state thus:-
" ... In view of this legal position explained by this Court it may 
not help the petitioner even on the construction placed by the 
learned counsel for the petitioner on Section 61 (I) of the West 
Bengal Correctional Services Act 32 of 1992 with reference to 
explanation thereto that for the purpose of calculation of the total 
period of imprisonment under this section the period of 
imprisonment for life shall be taken to be equivalent to the period 
of imprisonment for 20 years. Therefore, solely on the basis of 
completion ofa term in jail serving
imprisonment and remissions 
earned under the relevant Rules or law will not entitle an automatic 
release, but the appropriate Government must pass a separate 
order remitting the unexpired portion of the sentence." 
19. It is essential to state here that while so stating the Court adverted 
F 
to the issue whether there had been due consideration of the case of the 
petitioner by the Government. The Court took note of the fact that earlier 
on the Court had directed the Government to reconsider the cases for 
premature release of all life convicts who had approached the Court. 
The Court took note of the fact that the Government had constituted a 
G 
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Review Committee consisting of certain members, and enumerated the 
guidelines issued earlier to form the basis on which a convict can be 
released prematurely. The said guidelines read as under:-
"This Court also issued certain guidelines as to the basis on which 
a convict can be released prematurely and they are as under: 
"(i) Whether the offence is .an individual act of crime without
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH 829 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
affecting the society at large. 
(ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of 
committing crime. 
(iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing 
crime. 
(iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict 
any more. 
(v) Socio-economic condition of the convict's family." 
20. The Court analysed the reasons given by the Review Committee 
and opined that the reasons given by the Government are palpably 
irrelevant or devoid of substance and accordingly remitted the matter to 
the Government again for examination in the light of what has been 
stated by the Court. 
21. In Moltd. Munna (supra) a two-Judge Bench was dealing with 
a Writ Petition wherein the prayer was made for issuance of a writ of 
habeas corpus to set the petitioner at liberty on the ground that he had 
remained in detention for more than 21 years. It was contended that the 
length of the duration of imprisonment for life is equivalent to 20 years' 
imprisonment and that too subject to further remission admissible under 
law. The two-Judge Bench referred to various provisions ofIPC, earlier 
decisions in the field including K.M. Nanavali v. State of Malmras/1/ra 14 
and Kislwri Lal v. Emperor1" and the law laid down in Gopa/ Vinayak 
Godse (supra) and held that:-
"The Prisons Rules are made under the Prisons Act and the 
Prisons Act by itself does not confer any authority or power
to 
commute or remit sentence. It only provides for the regulation of 
the prisons and for the terms of the prisoners confined therein. 
" 
The Court further observed that the petitioner was not entitled to 
be released on any of the grounds urged in the writ petition so long as 
there was no order of remission passed by the appropriate Government 
in his favour. 
22. In Maru Ram (supra) the constitutional validity of Section 433-A 
" 1962 Supp (I) SCR 567 : AIR 1962 SC 605 
"AIR I 945 PC 64 
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CrPC which had been brought in the statute book in the year 1978 was 
called in question. Section 433-A CrPC imposed restrictions on powers 
of remission or commutation in certain cases. It stipulates that where a 
sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person 
for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by 
laws, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been 
commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such 
person shall not be released from prison unless he has served at least 
fourteen years of imprisonment. The majority in Maru Ram (supra) 
upheld the constitutional validity of the provision. The Court distinguished 
the statutory exercise of power of remission and exercise of power by 
the constitutional authorities under the Constitution, that is, Articles 72 
and 161. In that context, the Court observed that the power which is the 
creature of the Code cannot be equated with a high prerogative vested 
by the Constitution in the highest functionaries of the Union and the 
States, for the source is different and the substance is different. The 
Court observed that Section 433-A CrPC cannot be invalidated as 
indirectly violative of Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution. Elaborating 
further, the majority spoke to the following effect:-
" ... Wide as the power of pardon, commutation and release 
(A11icles 72 and 161) is, it
cannot run riot; for no legal power can 
run unruly like John Gilpin on the horse but must keep sensibly to 
a steady course. Here, we come upon the second constitutional 
fundamental which underlies the submissions of counsel. It is that 
all public power, including constitutional power, shall never be 
exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide and, ordinarily, guidelines for 
fair and equal execution are guarantors of the valid play of power. 
" 
23. In Kellar Singh (supra) the Constitution Bench opined that the 
power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme and it should be so 
treated in the Indian Republic. The Court further observed that it is a 
constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when 
occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the 
context. It has also been held that the power to pardon rests on the 
advice tendered by the Executive to the President who, subject to the 
provisions of Article 74( I), must act in accordance with the advice. 
Dealing with the justiciability of exercise of power under At1icle 72, the 
Court after due deliberation ruled that the question as to the area of the
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH 831 
& ORS. [DJPAK MISRA, J.] 
President's power under Article 72 falls squarely within the judicial domain 
and can be examined by the court by way of judicial review. In this 
context, the larger Bench ruled thus:-
" ... The ma:111er of consideration of the petition lies within the 
discretion of the President, and it is for him to decide how best he 
can acquaint himself with all the information that is necessary for 
its proper and effective disposal. The President may consider 
sufficient the information furnished before him in the first instance 
or he may send for further material relevant to the issues which 
he considers pertinent, and he may, if he considers it will assist 
him in treating with the petition, give an oral hearing to the parties. 
The matter lies entirely within his discretion. As regards the 
considerations to be applied by the President to the petition, we 
need say nothing more as the law in this behalf has already been 
laid down by this Court in Maru Ram (supra)." 
24. In Swara11 Singh (supra) a three-Judge Bench was called 
upon to deal with the non-justiciability ofan order passed by the President 
oflndia under Article 72 of the Constitution or by the Governor of the 
State under Article 161 thereof. The Court referred to the Constitution 
Bench decision in Kelwr Singh (supra) where the principles stated in 
Maru Ram (supra) were followed and culled out the principles that in 
Kehar Singh
(supra) a point has been stressed to the effect that the 
power being of the greatest moment, cannot be a law unto itself but it 
must be informed by the finer canons of constitutional ism. The Court 
adverted to the facts of the case and held thus:-
"In the present case, when the Governor was not posted with 
material facts such as those indicated above, the Governor was 
apparently deprived of the opportunity to exercise the powers in a 
fair and just manner. Conversely, the order now impugned fringes 
on arbitrariness. What the Governor would have ordered if he 
were apprised of the above facts and materials is not for us to 
consider now because the Court cannot then go into the merits of 
the grounds which persuaded the Governor in taking a decision in 
exercise of the said power. Thus, when the order of the Governor 
impugned in these proceedings is subject to judicial review within 
the strict parameters laid down in Maru Ram case and reiterated 
in Kehar Singh case we feel that the Governor shall reconsider 
the petition ofDoodh Nath in the light of those materials which he 
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had no occasion to know earlier." 
25. In Bikas Chatterjee v. Union of India and otlters16 the 
Constitution Bench while dealing with the power of judicial review in 
respect of order passed under Article 72 of the Constitution held that the 
powers are very very limited. Relying on Maru Ram (supra), the Court 
observed that it is only a case of no consideration or consideration based 
on wholly irrelevant grounds or an irrational, discriminatory or mala fide 
decision of the President which can provide ground for judicial review. 
Dealing with the powers of the Governor, the Court referred to the 
authority in Satpal v. State of Haryana 17 and opined that:-
"In a Division Bench decision of this Court in Satpal v. State of 
Haryana (supra) these very grounds have been restated as: (i) 
the Governor exercising the power under Article 161 himself 
without being advised by the Government; or (ii) the Governor 
transgressing his jurisdiction; or (iii) the Governor passing the 
order without application of mind; or (iv) the Governor's decision 
is based on some extraneous consideration; or (v) mala tides. It is 
on these grounds that the Court may exercise its power of judicial 
review in relation to an order of the Governor under Article 161, 
or an order of the President under Article 72 of the Constitution, 
as the case may be." 
Be it stated, the Court dee! ined to entertain the writ petition on the 
ground
that there was no justification to assume that the President of 
India had not applied his mind to all the relevant facts and accordingly 
rejected the petition. 
26. At this juncture, reference to a two-Judge Bench decision in 
Epurtt Sudliakar mu/ another v. Govt. of A.P. and otflers18 would be 
apposite. In the said case, the convict was granted remission of the 
unexpired period of sentence under Article 161 of the Constitution. The 
convict was granted remission of unexpired period of about seven years 
imprisonment. The same was challenged by the son of the deceased. 
The question ofinterference by the Court arose for consideration. Arij it 
Pasayat, J. placed reliance on the authority in Swtmm Singlt (supra) 
wherein Maru Ram (supra) and Ke/Utr Singlt (supra) were referred to 
1' (2004 l 7 sec 634 
1' (2000J ~ sec 110 
H 
1' (2006) s sec 161
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH '833 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
and dealt with and reiterated the view that ifthe power is exercised in 
an arbitrary or malafide manner or in absolute disregard of finer canons 
ofconstitutionalism, the order can be scrutinized in exercise of powerof 
judicial review and the judicial hands can be stretched to it. 
27. In the concurring opinion, S.H. Kapadia, J. (as His Lordship 
then was) opined thus:-
"Exercise of executive clemency is a matter of discretion and yet 
subject to certain standards. It is not a matter of privilege. It is a 
matter of performance of official duty. It is vested in the President 
or the Governor, as the case may be, not for the benefit of the 
convict only, but for the welfare of the people who may insist on 
the performance of the duty. This discretion, therefore, has to be 
exercised on public considerations alone. The President and the 
Governor are the sole judges of the sufficiency of facts and of the 
appropriateness of granting the pardons and reprieves. However, 
this power is an enumerated power in the Constitution and its 
limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution itself. 
Therefore, the principle of exclusive cognizance would not apply 
when and ifthe decision impugned is in derogation of a constitutional 
provision. This is the basic working test to be applied while granting 
pardons, reprieves, remissions and commutations." 
And, again:-
" ... The Rule of Law is the
basis for evaluation of all decisions. 
The supreme quality of the Rule of Law is fairness and legal 
certainty. The principle of legality occupies a central plan in the 
Rule of Law. Every prerogative has to be subject to the Rule of 
Law. That rule cannot be compromised on the grounds of political 
expediency. To go by such considerations would be·subversive of 
the fundamental principles of the Rule of Law and it would amount 
to setting a dangerous precedent. The Rule of Law principle 
comprises a requirement of"Government according to law". The 
ethos of"Government according to law" requires the prerogative 
to be exercised in a manner which is consistent with the basic 
principle of fairness and certainty. Therefore, the power of 
executive clemency is not only for the benefit of the convict, but 
while exercising such a power the President or the Governor, as 
the case may be, has to keep in mind the effect of his decision on 
the family of the victims, the society as a whole and the precedent 
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We respectfully concur with the aforesaid expression pertaining to 
the constitutional norm and the concept of rule of law. 
28. In this context, reference to Union of India v. V. Srilutrm1@ 
Murugan & Ors 19 is quite seemly. The majority in the Constitution 
Bench referred to the authority in Maru Ram (supra) and opined that 
constitutional power of remission provided under Articles 72 and 161 of 
the Constitution will always remain untouched, inasmuch as, though the 
statutory power of remission, etc., as compared to constitutional power 
under Articles 72 and 161 looks similar, yet they are not the same. Be it 
stated, the Court was dealing with imposition of sentence oflife by fixing 
a period of25 or 30 years without remission. The Court after analyzing 
various aspects held that it is permissible and the law laid down in Swamy 
Sliraddananda (2) alias Murali Manolutr Mishra v. State of 
Karnataka211 deserved acceptance. The Com1 referred to the decision 
in V. Srilutran alias Murugan v. Union of India mu/ others21 wherein 
commuting the sentence of death into one of life clearly laid down that 
such commutation was independent of the power ofremission under the 
Constitution as well as the statute. Elaborating the proposition the Court 
while dealing with the power ofremission in the context of Article 21 of 
the Constitution, the majority said:-
" ... It may also arise while
considering wrongful exercise or 
perverted exercise of power of remission by the Statutory or 
Constitutional authority. Certainly there would have been no scope 
for this Court to consider a case of claim for remission to be 
ordered under Article 32 of the Constitution. In other words, it 
has been consistently held by this Court that when it comes to the 
question of reviewing order of remission passed which is patently 
illegal or fraught with stark illegality on Constitutional violation or 
rejection of a claim for remission, without any justification or 
colourful exercise of power, in either case by the Executive 
Authority of the State, there may be scope for reviewing such 
orders passed by adducing adequate reasons. Barring such 
exceptional circumstances, this Com1 has noted in numerous 
19 2015 (13) SCALE 165 
211 (2oosi 13 sec 767 
H 
' 1 (2014) 4 sec 242
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH 835 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
occasions, the power of remission always vests with the State 
Executive and this Court at best can only give a direction to consider 
any claim for remission and cannot grant any remission and provide 
for premature release. It was time and again reiterated that the 
power of commutation exclusively rest with the Appropriate 
Government. ... " 
29. After so stating the Court referred to series of judgments, 
analysed the scope of constitutional provisions and the statutory provisions 
and opined thus:-
"Therefore, it must be held that there is every scope and ambit 
for the Appropriate Government to consider and grant remission 
under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
even if such consideration was earlier made and exercised under 
Article 72 by the President and under Article 161 by the Governor. 
As far as the implication of Article 32 of the Constitution by this 
Court is concerned, we have already held that the power under 
Sections 432 and 433 is to be exercised by the Appropriate 
Government statutorily, it is not for this Court to exercise the said 
power and it is always left to be decided by the Appropriate 
Government, even if someone approaches this Com1 under At1icle 
32 of the Constitution .... " 
30. In the said case, the question arose with regard to appropriate 
Government in the context of Section 432(7) CrPC. The majority referred 
to the authorities in
Ratan Singh (supra), State of Madhya Pradesh v. 
Ajit Singh mu[ otlwrs22, llll111111w11t Dass v. Vinay Kumllr mul 
otllersc3, Govt. of A.P. and others v. M. T. Khanu and G V. Ra11u11wiali 
v. The Superintendent of Central Jail, Rajahmumlry and ot/1ers25 
and eventually held thus:-
"The status of Appropriate Government whether Union 
Government or the State Government will depend upon the order 
of sentence passed by the Criminal Court as has been stipulated 
in Section 432(6) and in the event of specific Executive Power 
22 (1976) 3 sec 616 
" l 1982) 2 sec 111 
"(2004) 1 sec 616 
"AIR 1974SC31 :(1974)3SCC531 
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conferred on the Centre under a law made by the Parliament or 
under the Constitution itself then in the event of the conviction 
and sentence covered by the said law of the Parliament or the 
provisions of the Constitution even ifthe Legislature of the State 
is also empowered to make a law on the same subject and 
coextensive, the Appropriate Government will be the Union 
Government having regard to the prescription contained in the 
proviso to Article 73(1 )(a) of the Constitution. The principle stated 
in the decision in G.V. Ramanaiah (supra) should be applied. In 
other words, cases which fal I within the four corners of Section 
432(7)(a) by virtue of specific Executive Power conferred on the 
Centre, the same will clothe the Union Government the primacy 
with the status of Appropriate Government. Barring cases falling 
under Section 432(7)(a), in all other cases where the offender is 
sentenced or the sentence order is passed within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the concerned State, the State Government would 
be the Appropriate Government." 
3 I. Be it stated, the aforesaid part forms a part of the conclusion. 
In course of analysis, the Court has opined that when it comes to the 
question of primacy to the Executive Powerofthe Union to the exclusion 
of the Executive Power of the State, where the power is co-extensive, 
in the first instance, it wi II have to be seen again whether, the sentence
ordered by the Criminal Court is found under any law relating to which 
the Executive Power of the Union extends. In that context, the Court 
stated thus:-
" ... In that respect, in our considered view, the first test should be 
whether the offence for which the sentence was imposed was 
under a law with respect to which the Executive Power of the 
Union extends. For instance, ifthe sentence was imposed under 
TADA Act, as the said law pertains to the Union Government, 
the Executive Power of the Union alone will apply to the exclusion 
of the State Executive Power, in which case, there will be no 
question of considering the application of the Executive Power of 
the State." 
32. ln the instant case, the High Court has opined that the State of 
Gujarat is the appropriate Government. It is because it has been guided 
by the principle that the first respondent was convicted and sentenced in 
the State of Gujarat. As we find from the discussion, there has been no
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. v. LAL SINGH @ MANJIT SINGH 837 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
reference to the authority in G V. Ranumaia/1 (supra). That apart, the 
issue was not raised before the High Court. The most important thing is 
that the High Court has referred to, as has been indicated earlier, many 
aspects of human rights and individual liberty and, if we allow ourselves 
to say so, the whole discussion is in the realm of abstractions. The 
Court has not found that the order passed by the State of Gujarat was 
bereft of appropriate consideration of necessary facts or there has been 
violation of principles of equality. The High Court has not noticed that 
the order is bereft of reason. It has been clearly stated in the impugned 
order that the convict was involved in disruptive activities, criminal 
conspiracy, smuggling of arms, ammunitions and explosives and further 
he had also been involved in various other activities. It has also been 
mentioned that the prisoner under disguise of com.mon name used to 
purchase vehicles for transportation and his conduct showed that he had 
wide spread network to cause harm and create disturbance to National 
Security. Because of the aforesaid reasons remission was declined. In 
such a fact situation, the view expressed by the High Court to consider 
the case on the basis of the observations made by it in the judgment is 
not correct. 
33. So far as direction for grant of parole is concerned, we find that 
the learned Judge has
directed parole to be granted for three months 
forthwith. In Sunil F11/c/1a11d Shall v. U11io11 of India and otllers26 
the Constitution Bench while dealing with the grant of temporary release 
or parole under Section 12( 1) and Section 12( 1-A) of the Conversation 
of Foreign Exchange and Prevention ofSmugglingActivities Act, 1974 
(COFEPOSA Act) had observed that the exercise of the said power is 
administrative in character but it does not affect the power of the High 
Court under Article 226 oftlie Constitution. However, the constitutional 
court before directing the temporary release where the request is made 
to be released on parole for a specified reason and for a specified period 
should form an opinion that request has been unjustifiably refused or 
where the interest of justice warranted for issue of such order of 
temporary release. The Court further ruled that jurisdiction has to be 
sparingly exercised by the Court and even when it is exercised, it is 
appropriate that the Court should leave it to the administrative or jail 
authorities to prescribe the conditions and terms on which parole is to be 
availed of by the detenu. 
" (2000J 3 sec 409 
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34. We have referred to the aforesaid authority only to highlight 
the view expressed by the Constitution Bench with regard to grant of 
parole. The impugned order, as we notice, is gloriously silent and, in 
fact, an abrupt direction has been issued to release the first respondent 
on parole for a period of three months. It is well settled in law that a 
Judge is expected to act in consonance and accord with the legal 
principles. He cannot assume the power on the basis of his individual 
perception or notion. He may consider himself as a candle of hope but 
application of the said principle in all circumstances is not correct because 
if may have the effect potentiality to affect the society. While using the 
power he has to bear in mind that "discipline" and "restriction" are the 
two basic golden virtues within which a Judge functions. He may be 
one who would like to sing the song of liberty and glorify the same 
abandoning passivity, but his solemn pledge has to remain embedded to 
constitution and the laws. There can be deviation. 
35. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment 
and order of the High Court is set aside and liberty is granted to the first 
respondent to submit a representation/application before the competent 
authority of the Union of India within a period of eight weeks and the 
authority shall consider the same as expeditiously as possible in 
accordance with law and the
guidelines framed for premature release . 
E 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
.. 
Appeal allm1 ed.