JOSE @ PAPPACHAN versus THE SUB-LNSPECTOR OF POLICE, KOYILANDY &  ANOTHER
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 115, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 115 
JOSE @ PAPPACHAN 
v. 
THE SUB-lNSPECTOR OF POLICE, KOYILANDY & 
ANOTHER 
(Criminal Appeal No. 919 of2013) 
OCTOBER 03, 2016 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860: s.302 - Death of appellant's wife by 
hanging - Prosecution case that appellant alo11g with his brother 
murdered his wife - Conviction of appellant only u/s.302 - Acquilla/ 
of appellant and brother-accused u/s.498-A -
Conviction 
challenged by appella11t - Held: The evidence of witnesses when 
considered in conjunction with the testimony of the doctor did not 
link the appellant directly or indirectly with the actual act leading 
to the unnatural death of the deceased - The circumstantial evidence 
adduced by the prosecution fell short of the require111e11t i11 law to 
return a .finding of guilt against the appellant ll'ithout any element 
of doubt whatsoever - The fact that both the accused persons were 
exonerated of the charge of cruelty u/s. 498A and that the co-
accused, who allegedly had assisted the appellant in the 
perpetration of the crime had been fully acquitted by the courts 
below of all the charges also weakens the prosecution case - The 
facts and circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt in favour of 
appellant - Benefit of doubt grarited to him. 
Criminal jurisprudence: Suspicion of commission of crime -
Held: Suspicion however grave cannot take the place of proof -
Prosecution in order to succeed on a criminal charge cannot afford 
to lodge its case
in the realm of "may be true" but has to essentially 
elevate it to the grade of "must be true". 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. Admittedly there is no eye-witness to the incident. 
The testimony of PWs 1, 6 and 7 would evince that when the 
persons sent by the appellant had reached the house of the 
appellant to fetch the medical records of his brother, they found 
the door open and when the deceased did not respond to their 
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call, they entered through the door and found her in a hanging 
posture with movements, whereupon they raised alarm for which 
the appellant and others rushed to the place and the body of the 
deceased was brought down by cutting the saree. Though the 
conduct and the movements of the appellant prior thereto had 
been somewhat unusual and disoriented, the same per se does 
not irrefutably establish his culpability. The medical evidence also 
does not decisively establish the case to be of homicidal hanging. 
The unchallenged expositions of the doctor performing the post-
mortem examination highlighting the absence of the characteristic 
attributes attendant on death due to homicidal hanging following 
strangulation further reinforce the possibility of suicide. The 
absence of definite medical opinion about the homicidal death of 
the deceased is a serious set back to the prosecution. [Paras 45, 
47 and 48] [132-G; 133-E-G] 
2. The evidence of the witnesses when considered in 
conjunction with the testimony of the doctor does not link the 
appellant directly or indirectly with the actual act leading to the 
unnatural death of the deceased. In absence of any persuasive 
evidence to hold that at the relevant time the appellant was 
present in the house, it would also be impermissible to cast any 
burden on him as contemplated under Section 106 of the Evidence 
Act. The consistent testimony of the appellant and
his son to the 
effect that after alighting from the bus on their return from Pota, 
the deceased was made to accompany DWl back home while the 
appellant did go in search of labourers for works in his compound 
on the next day and that thereafter till the time DWl had departed 
for his ancestral house, the appellant did not return home, 
consolidates the defence plea of innocence of the appellant. This 
version of the appellant and his son is in accord with the statement 
made by the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as well. The 
reasoning of the courts below to dismiss the testimony of DWl 
as untrustworthy on the ground that he feigned ignorance about 
the lady with whom his father allegedly had extra marital affairs 
and towards the appellant and thus insensitive to the death of his 
mother cannot be accepted. This witness at the time of
1his 
deposition was a major with the required maturity in the life's 
perspectives, and expectedly would not have lied for the appellant,
JOSE @ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
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KOYILANDY 
his father, only to see him through, though knowing him to be the A 
real perpetrator of the crime. This is more so when the deceased 
was his own mother. [Paras 49, 50)(133-H; 134-A-E] 
3. The prosecution plea that the appellant had resigned from 
the service in the police depa11ment to move out to Jeddah/Saudi 
Arabia with the intention to perpetuate his illicit association with 
the lady thereat and that in a way he had deserted the deceased 
and the children, is also not borne out definitively by the materials 
on record. On the other hand, a plain perusal of the letters written 
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by the deceased to the appellant while he was abroad, do not 
reveal anguished outbursts of a wife otherwise expected in such 
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a situation or any fervent insistence for early return. Instead the 
contents thereof reveal narration of mundane happenings of day 
to day life, emphasis on the need for his required stay thereat for 
enhanced savings together with somewhat intimate feelings 
expected of a married couple physically estranged by compulsion 
of circumstances. The letters for the least, do not suggest any 
bitterness, disappointment, frustration and seething indignation 
of the deceased for the appellant being away at Jeddah/Saudi 
Arabia and allegedly with the lady. Instead there are traces of 
cheer for his expected return in near future. The authenticity of 
these letters and also of the records relied upon by the
defence 
to demonstrate that the appellant while abroad used to remit 
money for the sustenance of the family, has not been impeached. 
On an overall consideration of the evidence available on record, 
it would be wholly unsafe to hold the appellant guilty of the charge 
of murder of his wife. The circumstantial evidence adduced by 
the prosecution falls short of the requirement in law to return a 
finding of guilt against the appellant without any element of doubt 
whatsoever. The fact that both the accused persons had been 
exonerated of the charge of cruelty under Section 498A IPC and 
that the co-accused, who allegedly had assisted the appellant in 
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the perpetration of the crime had been fully acquitted by the courts 
below of all the charges also takes away the wind from the sails 
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of the prosecution. [Paras 51, 52][134-F-H; 135-A-D] 
4. In a criminal prosecution, the court has a duty to ensure 
that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal 
proof and in a situation where a reasonable doubt is entertained 
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in the backdrop of the evidence available, to prevent miscarriage 
of justice, benefit of doubt is to be extended to the accused. Such 
a doubt essentially has to be reasonable and not imaginary, fanciful, 
intangible or non-existent but as entertainable by an impartial, 
prudent and analytical mind, judged on the touch stone of reason 
and common sense. It is also a primary postulation in criminal 
jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the evidence 
available, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other 
to his innocence, the one favourable to the accused ought to be 
adopted.The facts as obtained in the present case present a jigsaw 
puzzle in which several frames are missing to permit an 
unreserved opinion of the complicity of the appellant. The 
evidence adduced by the prosecution constituting circumstantial 
evidence in support of the charge docs not furnish an unassailable 
basis to hold the appellant guilty of the charge of murder levelled 
against him. The facts and circumstances admit of a reasonable 
doubt in his favour. The circumstances brought forth by the 
prosecution do not rule out in absolute terms the hypothesis of 
the innocence of the appellant. It is wholly unsafe to maintain 
his conviction as recorded by the courts below. Therefore he is 
extended benefit of doubt to him. (Paras 53, 54,62 and 63)(135-
E-H; 138-E-F] 
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
(1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1985 (1) SCR 88; R. Rajendran 
Nair _v. State qf Kera/a (1998) SCC (Crl.) 254; Sujit 
Bi.~was v. State qf Assam (2013) 12 SCC 406 : 2013 (3) 
SCR 830; Dhan Raj @ Dhand v. State of Haryana 
(2014) 6 SCC 745 : 2014 (7) SCR 476 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
1985 (1) SCR 88 
referred to 
Para 43 
(1998) sec (Crt.) 254 
referred to 
Para 43 
2013 (3) SCR 830 
referred to 
Para 60 
2014 (7) SCR 476 
referred to 
Para 61 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURfSDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
919 of2013. 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 2 l .1 l.20l2 of the High Court
JOSE @ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
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KOYILANDY 
ofKerala at Ernakulam, in Criminal Appeal No. 668 of2008. 
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Basant R., Raghenth Basant, M. F. Philip, KartikAshok,Abhishek 
Tiwari (For Senthil Jagadcesan), Advs. for the Appellant. 
G. Prakash, Jishnu M. L., Mrs. Priyanka Prakash, Mrs. Beena 
Prakash, Manu Srinath, Nishe Rajen Shonker,Advs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
AMITAVA ROY, J. 1. The appellant stands sequentially 
convicted by the both the Courts below under Section 302 of the Indian 
Penal code (for short, hereinafter to be referred to as "IPC") and 
resultantly sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and also to pay fine 
of Rs. 10000/-. 
2. At the trial. he along with his brother Benny Joseph, were 
indicted under Sections 498A/Section 302 lPC read with Section 34 
lPC for having murdered his wife Neena. The Trial Court however 
acquitted both of them of the charge under Section 498A !PC. The co-
accused was also acquitted of the other charge. To reiterate, the 
conviction of the appellant under Section 302 !PC having been sustained 
by the High Court, he seeks panacean intervention in the instant appeal. 
3. We have heard Mr. Basant R., learned senior counsel for the 
appellant and Mr. G. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondents. 
4. To appropriately outline the factual premise, apt it would be at 
the threshold to present the fascicule of the rival projections. 
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5. The appellant was a
police constable at the time of marriage 
with the deceased on 19 .6.1986 as per their customary rites whereafter 
they set up their matrimonial home to start with at their family house and 
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thereafter at the places of his postings in service. Allegedly, he developed 
an extra-marital relationship with one lady named Darly for which he 
used to ill-treat and harass his wife both physically and mentally whenever 
she used to express her reservations and objections to such alliance. 
According to the prosecution, under the influence of the said lady, the 
appellant even resigned from his job and proceeded for Jeddah in the 
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year 1997 where he and the said Darly lived as husband and wife. It is 
alleged that in order to legalise the relationship, the appellant plotted to 
eliminate the deceased and with that end in view, returned to India on 
22.8.2000. He thereafter accompanied Neena, the deceased, for a 
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spiritual retreat to "Potta Divine Retreat Centre" but abruptly cut sho11 
their stay thereat and returned home on 19.9.2000. The accusation is 
that after their return on that date, sometime in between 6.30 to 8.30 
p.m., the appellant smothered the deceased inside the room of his house, 
strangulated her by using a plastic rope and then hanged her from a 
hook of the roof of the work area of the house by using a saree and thus 
brutally murdered her. The prosecution has imputed that in this heinous 
act, the co-accused his brother, who since has been acquitted, had assisted 
him. 
6. The information of this i11cident was lodged by Mr. Cheriyan@ 
Papputy with the Koonachundu Police Station whereafter the the 
appellant and the co-accused, his brother were arrested on 21.9.2000 
and 15.11.2000 respectively. On the closure of the investigation, charge-
sheet was laid against both the accused persons under Sections 498A/ 
302 read with Section 34 IPC and eventually, the case was committed 
for trial to the Sessions Court, Kozhikod. 
7. The accused persons denied the charge and claimed to be tried, 
whereafter the prosecution examined 25 witnesses including the doctor, 
who performed the post-mortem examination on the dead body as well 
as the investigating officer. Several documents were also proved and 
exhibited. The accused persons were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 
They stood by their denial and
refuted the correctness of the incriminating 
circumstances with which they were confronted. They also examined 
three witnesses in defence. 
8. The Trial Court, to reiterate, on a scrutiny of the evidence of 
the record and after analysing the rival contentions, acquitted both of 
them of the charge under Section 498A but held the appellant guilty of 
the offence of murder of his wife Neena and convicted him under Section 
302 JPC and sentenced him as above. The co-accused was exonerated 
of the charge under Section 302 IPC as well. The appellant failed to 
secure his acquittal before the High Court, which by the verdict impugned, 
has sustained the determination of the Trial Court. 
9. Before adverting to the evidence adduced, it would be expedient 
to notice the defence plea for a purposeful appreciation thereof. 
10. It is the assertion of the appellant that being compelled by 
financial distress and with the consent and approval of the deceased, he 
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JOSE@ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
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KOYILANDY [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
after resigning from his service from the State Police Department. He 
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claimed that his relationship with his wife had always remained very 
fond and affectionate and that out of the wedlock, they had two sons. To 
endorse this contention, he referred amongst others to the letters written 
by the deceased in particular to him while he was abroad. He maintained 
that he used to remit finances for the sustenance of the deceased and 
the children and that on his return to the country, he on the request of the 
deceased had accompanied to a divine retreat on 16.9.2000 to Potta, 
wherefrom they returned on 19.9.2000. 
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11. According to him, they alighted from the bus from Potta at 
their destination at about 7 .30 pm. when they saw their elder son going - c 
for purchase of house hold a1ticles. He then sent the deceased home 
with his son and he went in search for labourers to work on his property 
on the next day. He mentioned that in the process, he met Mullakkara 
Kunhumon, Sainaba, Jameela and Palliparambil Thankan and finalised 
with them for such work. According to him, he thereafter with Thankan 
went to the house of Edattankuzhi Jose and Cheriyan@ Papputty but 
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found that Jose was away for a meeting. He thereafter proceeded 
towards his house and on the way was pushed down by two persons 
hurriedly coming from the opposite direction. On his hue and cry, persons 
from the locality
rushed to the place and searched for these two persons, 
but in vain. As in the process, the co-accused, his brother suffered 
chest pain, the appellant requested Joy (PW7) and Cheriyan @ Papputty 
(PW I) to bring the necessary medical documents from his wife. 
12. These two persons after reaching the house of the appellant, 
raised alarm and on hearing the cry, he (appellant) along with Anikkal 
Babu and Thankan, who were present there, rushed to his (appellant) 
house whereupon they saw Neena in a hanging posture from a hook in 
the roof of the work area of the house and that Joy and Cheriyan @ 
Papputty were holding her legs to lift the body upwards. The appellant 
thereafter took a knife (koduval) from his kitchen and brought down the 
body by snapping the saree by which the body was hanging. They then 
rushed Neena to the Medical College Hospital where she was declared 
to be dead. The appellant while insisting that he was innocent, laid the 
blame on the relations of the deceased to have foisted a false case 
against him. 
13. As referred to hereinabove, the First Information Report was 
lodged by Cheriyan @ Papputty at 9.30 a.m. on the next day i.e. 
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20.9.2000, his version being that about 10 P.M. on 19.9.2000, while 
Benny (co-accused and brother of the appellant) was sitting in the tea 
shop of Pulluparambil Mathew (PW6), he suffered an epileptic attack 
for which he along with Mathew, on being requested by the appellant, 
went to his house to secure the medical papers from Neena. It was 
mentioned that when they reached the house, they found the door open 
with a lantern lit inside. As on their calls, the deceased Neena did not 
respond, they entered the house and found her in a hanging position 
from the hook on the ceiling at the work area at the rear side of the 
house and that she was struggling for life. They having raised alarm by 
that sight, the appellant and his neighbourers including Kunjumon, Regi 
and Thankan arrived at the spot, whereafter the appellant cut the saree 
by which Neena was hanging and took her in a jeep to a Medical College 
Hospital where she was declared dead. 
14. In course of the investigation, the police conducted the inquest 
of the dead body and in the process also recorded the statement of PW6 
Mathew who was present. His statement, as recorded on the date of 
the inquest i.e. 20.9.2000, is to the effect that on 19.9.2000 at about 9 
p.m., while he was preparing to sleep, the appellant loudly called him as 
well as his brother Benny to come hurriedly. When the witness reached 
the place from where the appellant had
shouted, he found the appellant 
asking somebody to stop and also abusing someone. When enquired, 
the appellant, stated to have seen two persons who had pushed him 
down and had ran away. They thereafter engaged themselves in search 
of the persons refereed to by the appellant but in vain. According to the 
witness, the appellant's brother Benny started feeling sick for which 
Kunjumon, who was present, was asked by the appellant to cal 1 a jeep to 
take him to the hospital. The appellant simultaneously asked the witness 
to go to his house and fetch the medical prescription from his wife Neena. 
The witness along with PW! Cheriyan @ Papputty then went to the 
house of the appellant and when Neena did not respond to their calls, 
they open the door which was not bolted and on reaching the kitchen 
area, they found the deceased in a hanging position from a hook atop the 
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kitchen veranda by a saree, but was gasping for breath. On seeing this, 
both of them loudly raised alarm and raised Neena upwards by holding 
her legs. The witness further stated that by that time, the appellant and 
others came running by hearing their cries and the appellant brought a 
knife from the kitchen, cut the saree, brought down the body and then 
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JOSE @ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
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KOYILANDY [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
they took Neena thereafter in a jeep to Thalayada Hospital where the 
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nurse there recommended that she be taken to the Medical College 
Hospital, They did so, but the doctor there declared her to be dead. 
15. The version in the FIR and the version of the informant, PW 1 
Cheriyan @ Papputty and PW6 Mathew, made at the earliest point of 
time after the incident, to start with, appear to be substantially consistent. 
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16. PW! Cheriyan @ Papputty testified that at 9.30 p.m. on 
19.9.2000, he had gone to sleep after dinner, when he was awakened by 
PW7 Joy to be told that Neena had committed suicide. PW7, according 
to the witness, then was accompanied by the appellant and PW6 Mathew. 
He confirmed that prior to the date, the appellant and Neena had gone c 
together for retreat at Potta, leaving their children at their ancestral house. 
On being questioned, the appellant divulged that they had returned the 
same evening as Neena was adamant to come back. 
17. The witness stated that on getting the news, he along with 
those present, including the appellant, ran to his house and on the way, 
the appellant stopped a car that was passing and sent in it, the co-accused 
Benny, his brother. The appellant thereafter sent Joy to bring a jeep. 
When they reached the work area of the back of the house of the 
appellant, they found Neena hanging from the hook attached to the 
ceiling by a saree. The
appellant brought a knife from the kitchen, cut 
the saree and brought the body down with the help of others. The 
witness stated that in the meantime, Joy had come with the Jeep. They 
all carried Neena firstly to a private hospital where a nurse, on being 
told that it was a case of suicide, advised that the patient be taken to the 
Medical College Hospital. When they reached the hospital, the doctor 
on examining the Neena declared her to be brought dead. 
18. The witness mentioned about the injuries above the nose and 
side of the eyebrow and also swelling on the forehead of the Neena. 
When the witness asked about the injuries, the appellant told him that 
those might have been caused in the process of cutting the saree to 
bring the body down. The information about the incident was lodged on 
the next day by him and he proved the same as Ex. P-1. The witness 
also confirmed that the appellant had later married one lady named Darly 
and that he had been living with her thereafter. 
I 9. In the cross-examination, this witness disclosed that about 3/ 
1/2 years before the incident, the appellant had resigned from his service 
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in the police department and had gone to the Gulf leaving behind Neena 
and children in the house built by him. He also mentioned about the 
ancestral house of the father of the appellant about 200 meters away 
from his house. The witness admitted as well that the co-accused Benny, 
brother of the appellant, had been then suffering from epilepsy and on 
the date of the incident as well, he had a bout of attack thereof. 
20. In the course of the cross-examination, this witness was sought 
to be discredited by referring to his earlier statements made in the course 
of the investigation. This was, as imputed by the defence as the principal 
witnesses PWI Cheriyan, PW6 Mathew and PW7 Joy had been 
examined twice by the police, the last being on 22.1.2004 on the eve of 
submission of the charge-sheet, with an endeavour to highlight that the 
earlier statements had been tailored as desired and suggested by the 
appellant. Noticeably, the time lag between the date of the incident and 
that of the second recording of the statement of these witnesses on 
22.1.2004, is nearly four years. 
21. PW6 Mathew deposed on oath that at the relevant time, he 
was running a tea shop in the locality which was very near the house 
where the appellant and the deceased used to reside. According to this 
witness, on the date of the incident at about 7 p.m., he had closed his 
shop to attend a meeting from where he returned at about 8.30 p.m.
He 
found present at the shop, Jose, (nephew of the appellant) along with 
others. After some time they dispersed therefrom. 
22. According to the witness, later in the evening, when he had 
gone to sleep, the appellant came to his house at about 9 p.m. and called 
him. He also called his brother Benny and seemed to shout abuses at 
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someone. The witness along with Jose ran towards the appellant and 
by that time, they reached the place, they found others gathered as well. 
The appellant disclosed to him that while he was returning to his house, 
he was pushed down by two persons on the way. The group assembled 
there, then tried to search for these persons but could not trace them. 
At that time, Benny, the brother of the appellant developed chest pain 
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and he was taken to the shop of the witness. The appellant then requested 
the witness to go to his ancestral house to fetch tablets for Benny 
whereupon he along with Jackson did so. While passing by the front of 
the house ofappellant, they noticed thatthe lantern inside was lit butthe 
door was open. They did not see any movement in the house. 
The 
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witness stated that when . he returned with the tabl~ts, the appellant
JOSE @ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
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KOYILANDY [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
enquired about the admit card and prescription for extending treatment 
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to Benny. On the request of the appellant thereafter, the witness along 
with Joy PW7 went to the house of the appellant and when they reached 
there, they called out for Neena, but she did not respond. On this, they 
entered the house and found Neena hanging from hook in the roof of the 
work area at the rear end of the house. He and Joy thereafter ran back 
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to the shop to inform about the incident, whereupon the appellant and 
PW! accompanied them back to the house. The appellant asked Joy 
PW7 to bring a jeep to take Neena to the hospital. They then retrieved 
the body and took Neena to the hospital where she was declared dead. 
The witness mentioned that he had given the earlier statement as per 
the instructions of the appellant and that when he was interrogated by 
the Investigating Officer for the second time, he stated the correct facts. 
23. In the cross-examination, the witness was confronted with 
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the earlier statement that when he and PW6 had first seen Neena 
hanging, she was struggling and that they raised her upward and raised 
alarm on listening which the appellant and others had come running. He 
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however denied the suggestion that he had departed from the earlier 
statement on being influenced by the family members of the Neena. 
24. PW7 Joy was a taxi driver at the relevant time and had a
jeep. 
This witness stated as well that at about 10 p.m. in the fateful night, 
while he was sleeping in his house, two persons namely; Kunjumon and 
Palliparambil called him and on being asked, requested him to come 
with his jeep as Benny, brother of the appellant was unwell. On this, the 
witness reached the shop by PW6 Mathew with his jeep and found 
Benny sitting on the bench with the support on the desk. He met the 
appellant who told him that Jackson and Mathew had gone to fetch 
tablets for Benny and on their return, he (Benny) would be taken for 
medical treatment. The witness further stated that when Jackson and 
Mathew returned with the medicines, the appellant enquired of them 
about the admit card and prescription which they stated had not been 
brought. On this, the appellant requested them to get those papers from 
his house, whereupon the witness and PW6 proceeded towards the house 
of the appellant. This witness stated that on reaching the house of the 
appellant, they saw the front door thereof to be halfopen but the kerosene 
lantern inside was alight. As Neena did not respond to their calls, the 
witness and PW6 entered the house and eventually found Neena hanging 
from the roof of the service area with a saree. The witness stated that 
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they ran back, by seeing this to the shop of Mathew where they informed 
the appellant about the incident. On hearing this, the witness, PW! and 
PW6 rushed to the house of the appellant. On the way, the appellant 
stopped a car and sent Benny together with Jackson and others to the 
Medical College Hospital. The witness stated that at that point of time, 
the appellant asked him to bring the jeep to his house whereafter PW!, 
the appellant and others took Neena in his jeep to the hospital where she 
was declared dead. This witness admitted that the Investigating Officer 
had recorded his statement twice. He conceded that in the earlier 
statement, he disclosed that it was PW! who had first seen Neena in a 
hanging position. He added that such a statement was made on the 
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instruction of the appellant. 
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25. In cross-examination, this witness stated that his first statement 
was recorded on 22/23.9.2000 at the Police Station and by then the 
appellant had been arrested on 21.9.2000. This witness too was 
confronted with his earlier statements. 
26. PW20 Dr. Hitesh Sankar had conducted the post-mortem 
examination on the dead body and recorded swelling on the left side of 
the forehead together with dried blood stains on the upper part of the 
nose. Apart from pressure abrasion on the neck and fracture of the 
greater horn ofhyoid bone of the left side, he deposed about contusions 
and abrasions on the
forehead, eye brow, nose and jaw. He mentioned 
about scalp contusions as internal injuries. 
27. In his opinion, as expressed in his examination in chief, the 
findings in the post mortem were consistent with death due to 
strangulation fol lowed by hanging and further that the facial injuries were 
suggestive of attempted smothering. He thereafter answered in the 
affirmative to various leading questions to indicate amongst others that 
the I in ear abrasion under the neck could be caused by applying a plastic 
rope as per the material exhibit shown to him. He also responded to 
one of the leading queries that the fracture of thyroid bone could be due 
to strangulation. 
28. In his cross-examination, the witness however in categorical 
terms conceded that he could not say as to whether it was a case of 
suicidal or homicidal hanging. The witness conceded that he had not 
noticed any blood stain on the material exhibit i.e. plastic rope or any 
stretch mark thereon. He also admitted of not noticing any fibre particle
JOSE @ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
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KOYILANDY [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
on the rope or on the neck of the deceased. He conceded as well that 
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there was no contusion/laceration on the inner aspect of the lips which 
are normal feature in the case of smothering. He .also negatived the 
presence of other attendant signs in case of death due to asphyxia 
preceded by smothering. He however affirmed that the ligature mark 
or the abrasion found on the neck was suggestive of hanging. He admitted 
B 
as well that hyoid and thyroid fracture could be caused due to pull up of 
heightened noose moving up during hanging. He admitted of not having 
mentioned any injury of nail mark in the post-mortem certificate. 
29. Apart from the fact that the nylon rope Ex.M04 and the broken 
pieces of glass bangles had been recovered and seized from under a cot 
in the dining room, away from the site of hanging, the report of the 
chemical examiner Ex.P20 did not disclose any blood stain on the plastic 
rope. Though was indicated presence of hairs of human origin on the 
said rope, it was clarified that no definite opinion could be given as to 
whether the hairs belonged to a male or a female. To reiterate, the 
doctor, PW20 also had affirmed that he did not notice any blood stain on 
the nylon rope and instead added that neither was there any stretch 
mark thereon nor did he notice any fibre particle thereof on the neck of 
the deceased. 
30. Though the prosecution had examined
several other witnesses, 
their testimony being not of any decisive relevance would not be dilated 
upon. The Investigating Officer of the case, however, in his evidence 
amongst others admitted that the nylon rope and the bangle pieces were 
recovered from the dining room. This also finds support from the seizure 
list Ex. P-4. 
31. The appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in 
reply to the incriminating circumstances laid before him, stated that he 
had resigned from police service as per the wishes ofNeena and due to 
financial stringency and had gone to Saudi Arabia on 12.9.1997 and had 
returned on 21.8.2000. According to him, there was an abiding and 
affectionate relationship between the couple and that they had two sons 
Akhil and Nikhil. He referred to the letters written by Neena to him 
while he was abroad, amongst others to demonstrate the veracity of his 
statement about the warm relationship which he shared with Neena. 
He also asserted to have sent money to Neena and the children for their 
sustenance and also referred to the relevant documents in endorsement 
thereof. He mentioned about their visit to Potta on 16.9 .2000 and their 
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return on 19.9.2000. He narrated the defence version as adverted to 
herienabove and claimed that death ofN eena had occurred due to suicide 
committed by her and denied the charge levelled against him and his 
brother Benny. He however admitted that after six years of the incident, 
on the insistence of his parents, he had married with one lady named 
Anna. He alleged that the prosecution had been launched by her in-
laws who were hostile towards him. 
32. The appellant in his defence, examined his son Akhil as OW I, 
who at the relevant time, had finished his studies and was working in the 
production section at Fortune Hotel, Kozhikode. He deposed on oath 
that during his academic years, he resided with his mother and his younger 
brother named Nikhil. He stated that the appellant, his father was 
initially in the police service from where he resigned and went to Gulf 
for work in the year 1997 and had returned in August, 2000. He deposed 
that during the time his father was away, he used to stay with his mother 
and younger brother in their house at Edattankuzhiyil. He confirmed 
that the relationship between his mother and father was very cordial. 
He denied the appellant's association with a lady named Darly and as a 
matter of fact expressed ignorance about her. The witness admitted 
that the appellant used to send money while he was away by drafts and 
that he along with his mother used to go to the
bank for that purpose. 
He also affirmed that the appellant used to be in touch with them through 
letters and phone calls. The witness proved two letters marked Ex 04 
& D4A which he admitted to have been written by his mother to the 
appellant. He testified that as well that even after the return of the 
appellant from the Gulf, his dealings with the mother and vice versa 
were warm and endearing. 
33. This witness endorsed the'fact as well that he met his parents 
on 19.9.2000 at about 7.30 p.m. when they alighted from the bus from 
Potta and were proceeding towards their house. He stated that at that 
point of time, he was also returning home with some household articles 
and thus he accompanied his mother back home while his father, the 
appellant went in search of labourers for the next day work in his 
compound. The witness stated that on their return, his mother prepared 
snacks, whereafter she told her to carry some articles to the ancestral 
house and accordingly he did so. 
The witness however added that 
though he waited for his parents to come to the ancestral house, they 
did not do so and he came to learn about the death of his mother in the
JOSE @ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
KOYILANDY [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
next morning. 
34. In cross-examination, though this witness categorically denied 
the suggestions put on behalf of the prosecution to project him to be 
untruthful, he disclosed that on the date of the incident, he found his 
mother to be under some mental stress. He however, in definite terms, 
denied that when he met the appellant and his mother together for the 
last time, there did not appear to be any strained feelings between 
them. 
35. The testimony of the appellant on oath as DW2 is the 
replication of the defence version as already outlined and does not call 
for reiteration. He however proved the two letters dated 28.2.2000 and 
7.G.2000 written by the deceased to him and marked as Ex. 04 and 
D4A. He however mentioned that Neena was not happy for the early 
return from the divine retreat and repeated that having disembarked 
from the bus at 7.30 p.m., he sentNeena with his elder son Akhil back 
home, while he went in search of labourers for~the next day's work. He 
stated that while he was proceeding towards his house later in the evening, 
two persons came from the optJOSite direction, whom he failed to identify, 
pushed him down for which he suffered injuries on his hand. He thereafter 
shouted to attract people so as to apprehend these persons, but in vain. 
· lk referred to the illness of his brother at that point of time and repeated 
the facts pertaining to the events that
occurred thereatler leading to the 
discovery that Neena had hanged herself from the hook of the ceiling 
of the work area of their house. 
36. In cross-examination, amongst others, he admitted to have 
brought down Neena by cutting the noose with the help of other persons. 
He admitted as well his second marriage with Anna @ Darly. 
37. DW3 Babu stated about the search made in the evening of 
the date of the incident of the persons, who according to the appellant, 
had pushed him down on his way to his house. He also stated about the 
chest pain of Benny, brother of the appellant while the search was in 
progress. 
38. As the i1npug11edjudgement would disclose, the High Com1 
took note ·amongst others of the factum of second marriage of the 
appellant with the lady Anna @ Darly as stated to be proved by the 
evidence adduced. It also took note of the fact that the couple had gone 
for the divine retreat for a week by arranging the stay of the children at 
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the ancestral house but returned early. It dis be I icved the testimony of 
D\V 1, the son of the appellant, construing it to be parti~an in favour of 
the appellant in order to save him, in the circumstances. His testimony 
was discarded as not of a prudent son otherwise cxp~ctcd to be sensitive 
to the death of his mother. The High Court denounced the OW I to be 
untruthful, for having expressing his ignorance about the second wife of 
the appellant Anna@ Darly. It thus concluded that sans the evidence of 
DWI, there is nothing on record to demonstrate that the appellant did 
not accompany his wife to the house that evening, whereafter she was 
not found alive. 
39. Apart from the "last seen together" index, the High Court 
accepted the other perceived incriminating circumstances against the 
appellant namely his illicit intimacy with Anna@ Darly, absence of 
explanation of his whereabouts after 7 P.M .. till his presence in the shop 
of PW6 Mathew, r~covery of broken bangles of the deceased from the 
dining room indicating a struggle, nail mark found on the forehead of 
the appella11t suggesting resistance from the deceased and want of 
sat is factory explanation as to under what circumstances the deceased 
was found hanging in the house of the couple. 
40. The High Court rejected the defence story of two persons 
pushing the appellant down on his way to his house in the evening and 
also commented on
his conduct of not rushing to the house as a prudent 
husband and instead arranging forthe conveyance of his brother to take 
him to the hospital even after being told that his wife had been found 
hanging in the house. On a consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances, the High Colll1 thus deduced that the death of Neena 
was l:omicidal and ~1ffirmed the conviction of the appellant as recorded 
by theTrial Court. 
41. In ,l;is cuntcntious backdrop, Mr. Brrs:111t has emphatically 
urged that in the absence of any eye witness of the occurrence and a 
convincing and complete chain of circumstantial evidence unerringly 
attesting the guilt of the appellant, his conviction for murder, in the teeth 
of the acquittal of the co-accused Benny, his brother, is patently illegal. 
Asserting that the evidence as a whole does unmistakably demonstrate 
that the deceased had committed suicide, the learned senior counsel has 
urged that the acquittal of the appellant and his co-accused of the charge 
under Section 498A !PC also belies the imputation of his extra-marital 
association with the lady Dnrly as alleged by the prosecution. According
JOSE @ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
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to him, the narration in the first information report authored by PW! 
and the statement of PW6 in the inquest report at the earliest point of 
time though authenticate the correct state of affairs, the attempt on the 
part of the investigating agency to improve thereon by re-recording of 
the statements of these witnesses along with that of PW? was only to 
frame the appellant in particular at the behest of his in-laws. 
42. In any view of the matter, Mr. Basant has urged that the 
interrogation of these witnesses after time lag of almost four years and 
too on the eve of submission of the charge-sheet, lays-bare the stratagem 
of the investigating agency to prosecute him on otherwise unfounded 
allegations. The learned senior counsel has insisted that not only the 
testimony of PW!, PW6, PW? and PW20, the doctor who had perfonned 
the post-mortem examination is consistent with the innocence of the 
appellant, it is apparent from the documentary evidence more 
particularly the letters Ex. 04 and D4A written by the deceased to him 
that there was a subsisting loving and affectionate relationship between 
them till the demise of the former. He has argued that the medical 
evidence having failed to convincingly prove that the deceased had died 
of homicidal hanging, the seizure of the nylon rope and broken pieces of 
bangles from under the cot of the adjoining dining room pales into 
insignificance.
It has been urged that the evidence of the son of the 
appellant, who was a major at the time of his deposition with the desired 
maturity of understanding, overwhelmingly establishes his innocence, 
there being no persuasive reason forthe witness to lie in his favour and 
against his mother. 
43. According to Mr. Basant, the courts below grossly erred in 
discarding his evidence being unworthy of credit, branding him to be 
insensitive to the death of his mother and pretentious in faking ignorance 
of the lady named Anna @ Darly and her alleged extra-marital 
relationship with the appellant, The learned senior counsel has maintained 
that in absence of any concrete evidence of the alleged illicit nexus 
between the appellant and the lady named Anna @ Darty, his marriage 
with her did not ipso facto establish the imputation. Mr. Basant has 
urged that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution is 
incoherent and insufficient in form, continuity and content and falls short 
of the legally prescribed standards to return a finding of guilt on the 
basis thereof. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court 
in Sl"'r"d Birdltic/1mul S(lr</(I vs. S/(l/e of Mallaraslttr" (1984)4 
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SCC 116 and R. Rajemlran Nair vs. State of Kera/a (] 998) SCC 
(Crl.) 254 
44. In refutation, the learned counsel for the respondents has 
maintained that the circumstantial evidence available on the record does 
amply establish the complicity of the appellant in the gruesome murder 
of the deceased, his wife by strangulation with the aid of a nylon rope 
seized and then suspending her from the roof of the work area by using 
a saree as a ligature. The guilt of the appellant, according to the learned 
state counsel, inter alia is unerringly deducible from his unusual conduct 
of not rushing back home even after being informed of the incident and 
instead in arranging for a conveyance for his brother to the hospital. 
Further, he did not act as a prudent husband, even if his story of being 
pushed down by two strangers is believed in not hurrying back to his 
house to ensure the safety of his wife, the deceased. It has been argued 
that deceased was seen alive last in the company of the appellant when 
they alighted from the bus at 7.30 p.m. in the same evening. According 
to the learned state counsel, the testimony of DWI, the son of the appellant 
is wholly untrustworthy, it being partisan and untruthful and in that view 
of the matter, the mishap having occurred inside the house in which the 
couple used to live, the appellant, in absence of any explanation for the 
episode, has been rightly held to be
guilty of the offence charged by both 
the courts below. It has been argued that the medical evidence fully 
substantiates the charge of murder level led against the appellant and the 
prosecution having been able to prove that the motive therefor being to 
eliminate the deceased in order to facilitate the consummation of the 
otherwise illicit relationship of his with Anna@Darly, no interference 
with his conviction is warranted in the facts and circumstances of the 
case. The fact that the appellant eventually married the said lady, amply 
establishes the charge as well, he urged. 
45. The arguments exchanged have received our anxious 
consideration cumulatively with the evidence on record. Admittedly there 
is no eye-witness to the incident. The endeavour of the prosecution, 
however has been to demonstrate that after the couple had returned 
from Pota in the evening of the date of the episode, they returned home 
and thereafter the appellant had committed the murder of his wife Neena 
by first strangulating her with the nylon rope that was recovered from 
under the cot in the dining room and then had hanged her from the hook 
of the roof of the service area by using a saree as a ligature. This
JOSE@ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
133 
KOYILANDY [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
inference, according to the prosecution, is inevitable from the attendant 
A 
facts and circumstances. The quality and the decisiveness of such 
evidence, therefore, would be of determinative relevance. 
46. Aside the aspect that PW s I, 6 and 7 had been examined 
twice by the investigating agency at the interval of almost four years, 
we have been left unconvinced by the peripheral variations in their 
statements so as to infer the complicity of the appellant on the basis of 
their attempted departure from their versions recorded at the earliest 
point of time. Though these witnesses have been sought to be discredited 
by the prosecution vis-a-vis their earlier statements allegedly made at 
the behest of the appellant, the essence of their testimony qua the incident 
and the attendant facts and circumstances has remained the same barring 
a few inconsequential inconsistencies. Noticeably, there is no reason 
forthcoming for re-examining these witnesses after almost four years 
and on the verge of the submission of the charge-sheet. The plea of 
false implication at the instance of the inimical members of the family of 
the deceased in this context thus assumes significance. 
4 7. Suffice it to recount that the testimony of PW s I, 6 and 7 
would evince that when the persons sent by the appellant had reached 
the house of the appellant to fetch the medical records of his brother 
Benny, they
found the door open and when the deceased did not respond 
to their call, they entered through the door and found her in a hanging 
posture with movements, whereupon they raised alarm for which the 
appellant and others rushed to the place and the body of the deceased 
was brought down by cutting the saree. Though the conduct and the 
movements of the appellant prior thereto had been somewhat unusual 
and disoriented, the same per se in our estimate does not irrefutably 
establish his culpability. 
48. The medical evidence as elaborated hereinabove also does 
not decisively establish the case to be of homicidal hanging. The 
unchallenged expositions of the doctor performing the post- mortem 
examination highlighting the absence of the characteristic attributes 
attendant on death due to homicidal hanging following strangulation further 
reinforce the possibility of suicide. The absence of definite medical opinion 
about the homicidal death of the deceased in our comprehension is a 
serious set back to the prosecution. 
49. The evidence of the eye-witnesses when considered in 
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conjunction with the testimony of the doctor does not link the appellant 
directly or indirectly with the actual act leading to the unnatural death of 
the deceased. Jn absence of any persuasive evidence to hold that at the 
relevant time the appellant was present in the house, it would also be 
impermissible to cast any burden on him as contemplated under Section 
106 of the Evidence Act. The consistent testimony of the appel !ant and 
his son to the effect that after alighting from the bus on their return from 
Pota, the deceased was made to accompany DWI back home while the 
appellant did go in search oflabourers for works in his compound on the 
next day and that thereafter till the time DWI had departed for his 
ancestral house, the appellant did not return home, consolidates the 
defence plea of innocence of the appellant. 
50. This version of the appellant and his son is in accord with the 
statement made by the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as well. 
Though the courts below have dismissed the testimony of DWI as 
untrustworthy, he having feigned ignorance about the lady Darly with 
D 
whom his father allegedly had extra marital affairs and was construed 
to be partisan towards the appellant and insensitive to the death of his 
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'mother, we are unable to lend our concurrence to these reasonings. 
This witness atthe time of his deposition was a major with the required 
maturity in the life's perspectives,
and in our assessment expectedly 
would not have lied forthe appellant, his father, only to see him through, 
though knowing him to be the real perpetrator of the crime. This is more 
so when the deceased was his own mother. 
51. The prosecution plea that the appellant had resigned from the 
service in the police department to move out to Jeddah/Saudi Arabia 
with the intention to perpetuate his illicit association with the lady Darly 
thereat and that in a way he had deserted the deceased and the children, 
is also not borne out definitively by the materials on record. On the 
other hand, a plain perusal of the letters Ex. D4 and Ex.D4A written by 
the deceased to the appellant while he was abroad, do not reveal 
anguished outbursts of a wife otherwise expected in such a situation or 
G any fervent insistence for early return. Instead the contents thereof 
reveal narration of mundane happenings of day to day life, emphasis on 
the need for his required stay thereat for enhanced savings together 
with somewhat intimate feelings expected of a married couple physically 
estranged by compulsion of circumstances. The letters forthe least, do 
not suggest any bitterness, disappointment, frustration and seething 
H
JOSE@ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
135 
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. 
indignation of the deceased for the appellant being away at Jeddah/ 
A 
Saudi Arabia and allegedly with the lady, Darty. Instead there are traces 
of cheer for his expected return in near future. The authenticity of 
these letters and also of the records relied upon by the defence to 
demonstrate that the appellant while abroad used to remit money for the 
sustenance of the family, has not been impeached. 
B 
52. On an overall consideration of the evidence available on record, 
it would be, in our view, wholly unsafe to hold the appellant guilty of the 
charge of murder of his wife by strangulating her with the nylon rope as 
seized and then hanging her from the roof with the saree to complete the 
act. The circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in our c 
assessment falls short of the requirement in law to return a finding of 
guilt against the appellant without any element of doubt whatsoever. 
The fact that both the accused persons had been exonerated of the 
charge of cruelty under Section 498A !PC and that the co-accused, 
who allegedly had assisted the appellant in the perpetration of the crime 
had been fully acquitted by the courts below of all the charges also 
D 
takes away the wind from the sails of the prosecution. 
53. It is a trite proposition oflaw, that suspicion however grave, it 
cannot take the place of proof and that the prosecution in order to 
succeed on a
criminal charge cannot afford to lodge its case in the realm 
of"may be true" but has to essentially elevate it to the grade of"must be 
true". In a criminal prosecution, the court has a duty to ensure that 
mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place oflegal proofand in 
a situation where a reasonable doubt is entertained in the backdrop of 
the evidence available, to prevent miscarriage of justice, benefit of doubt 
is to be extended to the accused. Such a doubt essentially has to be 
reasonable and not imaginary, fanciful, intangible or non-existent but as 
entertainable by an impartial, prudent and analytical mind, judged on the 
touch stone ofreason and common sense. It is also a primary postulation 
in criminal jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the evidence 
available, one pointing to the gui It of the accused and the other to his 
innocence, the one favourable to the accused ought to be adopted. 
54. The facts as obtained in the present case present a jigsaw 
puzzle in which several frames are missing to permit an unreserved 
opinion of the complicity of the appellant. 
55. The inalienable interface of presumption of innocence and the 
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A 
burden of proof in a criminal case on the prosecution has been succinctly 
. expounded in the following passage from the treatise "The Law of 
Evidence" fifth edition by Ian Dennis at page 445: 
"The presumption of innocence states that a person is 
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. In one sense 
B 
this simply restates in different language the rule that the 
burden of proof in a criminal case is on the prosecution to 
prove the defendant's gui It. As explained above, the burden 
of proof rule has a number of functions, one of which is to 
provide a rule of decision for the factfinder in a situation of 
uncertainty. Another function is to allocate the risk of 
C 
misdecision in criminal trials. Because the outcome of 
wrongful conviction is regarded as a significantly worse 
harni than wrongful acquittal the rule is constructed so as 
to minimise the risk of the former. The burden of 
overcoming a presumption that the defendant is innocent 
D 
therefore requires the state to prove the defendant's guilt." 
56. The above quote thus seemingly concede a preference to 
wrongful acquittal compared to the risk of wrongful conviction. Such is 
the abidingjurisprudential concern to eschew even the remotest possibility 
ofunmerited conviction. 
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57. This applies with full force particularly in fact situations where 
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the charge is the sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. 
These enunciations are so
well entrenched that we do not wish to burden 
the present narration by referring to the decisions of this Court in this 
regard. 
58. Addressi1rg this aspect, however, is the following extract also 
from the same treatise "The Law of Evidence" fifth edition by fan 
Dennis at page 483: 
"Where the case against the accused depends wholly or 
partly on inferences from circumstantial evidence, 
. factfinders cannot logically convict unless they are sure 
that inferences of guilt are the only ones that can reasonably 
be drawn. If they think that there are possible innocent 
explanations for circumstantial evidence that are not "merely 
fanciful", it must follow that there is a reasonable doubt 
about guilt. There is no rule, however, that judges must
JOSE @ PAPPACHAN v. THE SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 
KOYILANDY [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
direct juries in terms not to convict unless they are sure 
that the evidence bears no other explanation than guilt. It 
is sufficient to direct simply that the burden on the 
prosecution is to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt, 
or so that they are sure. 
The very high standard of proof required in criminal cases 
minimises the risk ofa wrongful conviction. It means that 
someone whom, on the evidence, the factfinder believes is 
"probably" guilty, or "likely" to be guilty will be acquitted, 
since these judgements of probability necessarily admit that 
the factfinder is not "sure". It is generally accepted that 
some at least of these acquittals will be of persons who are 
in fact guilty of the offences charged. and who would be 
convicted if the standard of proof were the lower civil 
standard of the balance of probabilities. Such acquittals 
are the price paid for the safeguard provided by the "beyond 
reasonable doubt" standard against wrongful conviction." 
59. A reference in the passing however to the of quoted decision 
in Slumul Birdlticlumd Sarda (supra) construed to be locus classicus 
137 
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on the relevance and decisiveness of circumstantial evidence as a proof E 
of the charge of a criminal offence would not be out of place. The 
relevant excerpts from paragraph 153 of the decision is extracted herein 
below. 
"153.(2) The facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused ... they 
should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except 
that the accused is guilty. 
(3) the circumstances should be ofa conclusive nature and 
tendency. 
* 
* 
* 
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not 
to leave any reasonable !!round for the conclusion 
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show 
that in all human probability the act must have been done 
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by the accused." 
60. As recent as in Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam (2013) I 2 
SCC 406, this Court also in the contextual facts constituting circumstantial 
evidence ruled that in judging the culpability of an accused, the 
circumstances adduced when collectively considered must lead to the 
8 
only irresistible conclusion that the accused alone is the perpetrator of a 
crime in question and the circumstances established must be of a 
conclusive nature consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the 
accused. 
61. In Dlla11 Raj@ Dlumd vs. State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 
C 745, one of us (Hon. Ghose,J.) while dwelling on the imperatives of 
circumstantial evidence ruled that the same has to be of highest order 
to satisfy the test of proof in a criminal prosecution. It was underlined 
that such circumstantial evidence should establish a complete unbroken 
chain of events so that only one inference of guilt of the accused would 
ensue by excluding all possible hypothesis of his innocence. It was held 
D further that in case of circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must 
be proved beyond reasonable doubt by independent evidence excluding 
any chance of surmise or conjecture. 
62. Judged on the above parameters, we are of the unhesitant 
opinion that the evidence adduced by the prosecution constituting 
E circumst.antial evidence in support of the charge does not furnish an 
unassailable basis to hold the appellant
guilty of the charge of murder 
levelled against him. The facts and circumstances admit ofa reasonable 
doubt in his favour. 
63. The circumstances brought forth by the prosecution do not 
F 
rule out in absolute tenns the hypothesis of the innocence of the appellant. 
We thus consider it to be wholly unsafe to maintain his conviction as 
recorded by the courts below. We are therefore inclined to extend benefit 
of doubt to him. The conclusions drawn by the courts below are not 
tenable on the basis of the evidence available. The appeal is thus al lowed 
and the conviction and sentence recorded by the courts below is hereby 
G set aside. The appel !ant be released from the jai I forthwith if he is not 
required in any other case. 
Devika Gujral 
Appeal allowed. 
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