RAVEESH CHAND JAIN versus RAJ RANI JAIN
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 1096, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
[2015) 1 S.C.R. 1096 
RAVEESH CHAND JAIN 
v. 
RAJ RANI JAIN 
(Civil appeal no. 1822 of 2015} 
FEBRUARY 12, 2015 
[M.Y. EQBAL AND SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.] 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or.XII r. 6 - Suit for 
recovery of possession and for damages against appellant 
C who was respondent-plaintiffs son alleging that suit property 
was purchased by plaintiff from her own funds and she was 
absolute owner - Appellant-defendant opposed the suit 
contending that the suit property was a HUF property having 
been purchased in the name of the respondent using the 
o funds of his grandfather, father and himself - Respondent 
filed application u!Or.Xll r.6 stating that a suit for partition filed 
by appellant earlier on the same ground that suit property was 
HUF was dismissed and same amounted to unequivocal 
admission by the appellant that the respondent was entitled 
E to possession - Trial court dismissed' the application - High 
Court held that the suit for partition having been dismissed, 
the same will operate as res judicata and decreed the suit -
Held: High Court was correct in decreeing the suit so far as 
recovery of possession was concerned in view of question of 
F ownership having been already decided in earlier suit - The 
second question with regard to recovery of Rs. 5,55,0001- and 
future damages admittedly was not decided either in the 
earlier suit or in this suit - In that view of the matter, decreeing 
the entire suit on the basis of ownership of the
respondent 
already decided in the earlier suit, the decree for recovery of 
G damages ought not to have been passed by the High Court 
- However, while admitting the SLP the court had directed 
appellant to deposit Rs. 5 lacs and notice was issued only 
confining to the question as to whether the decree passed u/ 
H 
1096
RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN 
1097 
Or. XII r. 6 was justified - Hence matter need not be remanded 
A 
back to trial court for deciding the issue as to the quantum of 
damages- The amount of Rs. 5 lacs held to be just and 
proper. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
B 
HELD: 1. The High Court not only decreed the suit 
for possession but also directed the plaintiff I respondent 
to file an affidavit .giving details of the cost of litigation 
since the appeal was allowed with cost. There is no 
dispute that Order XII Rule 6 confers wide discretion on 
C 
the Court to pass judgment either at the stage of the suit 
on the basis of admission of the facts made in the 
pleadings or otherwise, but the Court shall later on 
decide the other questions which arise for consideration 
in the Suit.It is equally well settled that the provision of D 
Order XII Rule 6 of the Code is not a mandatory provision 
rather discretionary. While exercising power of passing 
judgment on admission made in the pleading or 
otherwise, the Court must keep the matter pending for 
adjudication so far as other issues are concerned. [Paras 
E 
14, 15 and 16] [1105-B-E] 
2. The view taken by the High Court was correct 
having regard to the question of ownership already 
decided in the earlier suit filed by the defendant/ 
appellant. The said issue need not have to be decided 
afresh and hence on the basis of the finding of ownership 
decided in favour of the plaintiff/respondent, the suit has 
F 
to be
decreed so far as the recovery of possession is 
concerned.So far as the second question with regard to 
the entitlement of the plaintiff/respondent to claim a 
G 
decree for recovery of a sum of Rs. 5,55,000/- and future 
damages @ Rs.15,000/- per month was concerned, 
admittedly this question was not decided either in the 
earlier suit or in this suit. In that view of the matter, 
decreeing the entire suit on the basis of ownership of the 
H
1098 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 1 S.C.R. 
A plaintiff/respondent already decided in the earlier suit, the 
decree for recovery of damages ought not to have been 
passed by the High Court. However, in the instant case, 
since at the time of admission of this Special Leave 
Petition, the orde~ was passed that in the event the 
B appellant deposit a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- in the account 
of his mother-Respondent, notice was issued only 
confining to the question as to whether the decree 
passed under the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC was 
justified. In compliance of the said order, the appellant 
c had already deposited the said amount. Hence, taking 
into consideration the relationship of the appellant and 
the respondent being mother and son, it is not proper to 
again remand the matter to the trial court for deciding the 
issue as to the quantum of damages the respondent is 
D entitled to get from the appellant for his unauthorized 
possession of the suit property. Therefore, the amount 
of Rs.5,00,000/- would be just and proper so far as the 
claim for damages is concerned. [Paras 18 to 21] [1105-
G-H; 1106-A-C-G-H] 
E 
Karan Kapahi and Ors. v. Lal Chand Public Charitable 
F 
Trust and Anr. 2010 (4) Sec 753: 2010 (4) SCR 422 - Relied 
On. 
Case Law Reference: 
2010 _(4) SCR 422 
relied on 
Para 11 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 
1822 of 2015. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.08.2014 of the 
G High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C. R. P. No. 113
of 2014. 
Sushil Kumar Jain, Khushbu Jain, Ms Pratibha Jain for the 
Appellant. 
Randhir Singh Jain, Ruchika Jain, Dhananjai Jain for the 
H Respondent.
RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
M. Y. EQBAL, J.1. Leave granted. 
1099 
A 
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the 
judgment and order dated 28.8.2014 of the High Court of Delhi 
allowing the revision petition preferred by the respondent/ 
B 
plaintiff against the order of the trial court which has dismissed 
her application in a suit for recovery of possession and 
damages with respect to a portion of the property being in 
unauthorized occupation of the appellant/defendant. 
3. The factual matrix of the case is that the plaintiff-
respondent filed a suit against the defendant/appellant who is 
her son, for recovery of possession and damages alleging that 
she had purchased the suit property out of her own fund and 
c 
she is the absolute owner, but part of the property was under 
D 
the illegal occupation of the appellant-defendant, who opposed 
the suit contending that the suit property was a Hindu Undivided 
Family property having been purchased in the name of the 
respondent using the funds of his grandfather, father and himself 
and not purchased by the respondent as she was a housewife 
E 
having no income. Appellant-defendant further pleaded that 
though there was a dispute regarding his ownership and 
possession, the same was settled between all the family 
members vide compromise deed dated 22.10.199?. 
4. The respondent filed an application under Order XII Rule 
F 
6 of the Code of Civil Procedure
for passing a decree in her 
favour on the ground that a suit for partition, which had earlier 
been filed by the appellant on the same ground i.e. that the suit 
property was a HUF property, had been dismissed by the 
District Court vide judgment dated 8.9.2003 and affirmed by 
G 
the High Court vide judgment dated 12.9.2011 and the 
respondent contended that the same amounted to an 
unequivocal admission by the appellant that the respondent was 
entitled to possession. 
H
1100 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
5. The trial court held that though the judgment dated 
8.9.2003 of the District Court and judgment dated 12.9.2011 
of the High Court had rejected the plea of the appellant that the 
suit property was a HUF property, these findings were made 
in a suit for partition whereas the present suit was filed for 
B recovery of possession and damages. The trial court further 
held that for passing a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the 
defendant had to make an unequivocal and unqualified 
admission. The appellant herein h~s not made such an 
admission regarding his liability to pay the damages claimed 
c by the respondent. The trial court dismissed the application vide 
judgment dated 7.6.2013. 
6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, the 
respondent filed a revision petition before the High Court. The 
High Court while allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit with 
D costs held that the pleas taken by the appellant-defendant 
regarding the contribution made by his grandfather, father and 
himself in the purchase of the suit property had been rejected 
by the High Court vide judgment dated 12.9.2011 and the 
same will operate as res judicata. The High Court further held 
E that while there was no evidence for holding the suit property 
to be a HUF property, the title deeds of the suit property and 
the land records stood in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. The 
High Court noted that the only new plea taken by the
defendant 
in his written statement was that he was a co-ow:ier vide 
F compromise deed dated 22.10.1997 and held that this plea 
was barred on the grounds·of constructive res judicata having 
not been raised ear1ier in the partition suit filed by the defendant. 
The High Court accordingly set as;de the order passed by the 
trial court and decreed the suit. 
G 
H 
7. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the 
defendant-son. 
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Mr. 
Sushil Kumar Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for the
RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN 
1101 
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.] 
appellant, assailed the order passed by the High Court manly 
A 
on the ground that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction 
under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According 
to the learned senior counsel there is categorical denial that 
the appellant's possession in the suit property is not that of a 
trespasser but on the basis of his own right. Learned senior 
B 
counsel submitted that for passing a judgment under Order XII 
Rule 6 CP.C there must be unequivocal admission by the 
defendant in the pleading. According to the learned counsel 
judgment should not have been passed by applying the 
principles of res"judicata inasmuch as the issue of res judicata c 
does not arise in a case of judgment passed under Order XII 
Rule 6, CPC. 
9. In order to appreciate the submission made by the 
learned senior counsel we would like to quote Order XII Rule 6 
CPC, which\ reads as under:-
D 
"Judgment 'on admissions.- (1) \Nhere admissions of 
fact have been made ei(her in the pleading or otherwise, 
whether orally o~ in writing, the court may at any stage of 
the suit, either on the application of an party or of its own 
motion and without waiting for the determination of any 
other question between the parties, make such Order or 
give such judgment as It may think fit, having regard to such 
aC:missions. 
(2) When.ever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) 
a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with
the 
judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the 
judgment was pronounced." 
E 
F 
10. The bare perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it 
G 
clear that it confers wide discretion on the court to pass a 
judgment at any stage of the suit on the basis of admission of 
facts made in the pleading or otherwise without waiting for the 
determination of any other question arose between the parties. 
Since the Rule permits the passing of judgment at any stage 
H
1102 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 1 S.C.R. 
A without waiting for determination of other question, it follows that 
there can be more than one decree that may be passed at 
different stages of the same suit. The principle behind Order 
XII Rule 6 is to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment so 
that either party may get rid of the rival claims which are not in 
B controversy. 
11. The provision of Order XII Rule 6 has been discussed 
by this Court in the case of Karam Kapahi and Others vs. Lal 
Chand Public Charitbale Trust and Another, (2010) 4 SCC 
C 753, wherein this Court observed:-
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
"39. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an 
amendment was suggested to enable the court to give a 
judgment not only on the application of a party but on its 
own motion. It is thus clear that the amendment was 
brought about to further the ends of justice and give these 
provisions a wider sweep by empowering the Judg~s to 
use it "ex debito justitiae", a Latin term, meaning a debt 
of justice. In our opinion the thrust of the amendment is that 
in an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the 
other party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal 
right. However, the court always retains its discretion in the 
matter of pronouncing judgment. 
40. If the provision of Order 12 Rule 1 is compared 
with Order 12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision 
of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider inasmuch as the provision of 
Order 12 Rule 1 is limited to admission by
"pleading or 
[pic]otherwise in writing" but in Order 12 Rule 6 the 
expression "or otherwise" is much wider in view of the 
words used therein, namely: "admission of fact ... either 
in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing". 
41. Keeping the width of this provision (i.e. Order 12 
Rule 6) in mind this Court held that under this Rule 
admissions can be inferred from the facts and 
circumstances of the case (see Charanjit Lal Mehra v.
RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN 
1103 
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.] 
Kamal Saroj Mahajan, SCC at p. 285, para 8). 
A 
Admissions in answer to interrogatories are also covered 
under this Rule (see Mullas's Commentary on the Code, 
16th Edn., Vol. 11, p. 2177). 
42. In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United 
8 
Bank of India this Court, while construing this provision, 
held that the Court should not unduly narrow down its 
application as the object is to enable a party to obtain 
speedy judgment." 
12. Coming back to the instant case there is no dispute 
C 
that the plaintiff/respondent filed the suit for possession of the 
suit property and also for recovery of Rs.5,55,000/- and future 
damages at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month. The plaintiff/ 
respondent claimed title in the suit property and averred that 
the appellant is in unauthorized occupation of the suit property 
D 
without any authority or justification. In the plaint it was 
specifically pleaded that the ownership right in the suit property 
has already been decided in favour of the respondent and 
against the appellant by judgment and decree dated 8.9.2003 
and the appeal filed by the appellant was also dismissed vide 
E 
judgment dated 12.9.2011. Hence, the appellant is in illegal 
possession of the suit property. 
13. On an application filed by the plaintiff/respondent under 
Order XII Rule 6 CPC seeking a judgment in the suit, the trial 
court dismissed the application stating that there is no 
unequivocal
admission for passing a judgment in the suit. The 
High Court, however, reversed the order passed by the trial 
court and held that considering the earlier judgment deciding 
F 
the ownership of the suit property in favour of the appellant, the 
suit for possession ought to have been decreed by the trial court. 
G 
Consequently, the High Court decreed the suit. Paras 6 and 7 
of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court are quoted 
herein below:-
"6. The only new aspect urged in the present written 
H
A 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
1104 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
statement is that the respondent/defendant claimed that he 
received ownership share in the suit property by virttie of 
a written compromise entered into before the police station 
Anand Vihar on 22.10.1997, however, it is noted that the 
earlier suit, which was a suit for partition filed by the 
respondent/defendant, the issue as regards the claim of 
the respondent/defendant to the ownership rights in the suit 
property was very much in issue, and hence the 
respondent/defendant had to urge in the earlier 
proceedings all the basis of his claims of ownership rights 
in the suit property and if that was not done the 
respondent/defendant is now barred by the principle of 
constructive res judicata from raising any claims which 
ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings. The 
principle with respect to doctrine of res judicata is that 
there must be finality achieved to litigation and parties 
must not be harassed over and over again merely by 
changing certain facts with respect to the main relief 
claimed viz., of ownership rights in the suit property. 
7. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 7.6.2013 
is completely illegal and the issues in the present case 
stand covered against the respondent I defendant by the 
principle of res judicata enshrined in Section 11 CPC. So 
far as the relief of possession is concerned, suit of the 
plaintiff/petitioner/mother will hence stand decreed
against 
the respondent/defendant for the portion so in pos$ession 
of the respondent/defendant as per the site plant filed. 
Since the respondent I defendant I son is harassing the 
mother from 1998 and today we are in the year 2014, this 
appeal is allowed with actual cost. Petitioner I plaintiff will 
file an affidavit in this Court supported by certificate of fees 
of her counsels in this appeal with respect to the fees paid 
to the counsels, and such fees paid will be the cost which 
will be payable by the respondent I defendant to the 
petitioner I plaintiff. The aforesaid affidavit accompanied -
by the certificate of the fees of the counsels be filed by the
RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN 
1105 
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.] 
petitioner within a period of four weeks and costs be paid 
A 
thereafter within a period of four weeks." 
14. From the reading of para 7 of the order, as quoted 
hereinabove, it reveals that the High Court not only decreed the 
suit for possession but also directed the plaintiff I respondent 
8 
to file an affidavit giving details of the cost of litigation since 
the appeal was allowed with cost. 
15. As discussed hereinabove, there is no dispute with 
regard to the law settled by this Court that Order XII Rule 6 
confers wide discretion on the Court to pass judgment either 
C 
at the stage of the suit on the basis of admission of the facts 
made in the pleadings or otherwise, but the Court shall later 
on decide the other questions which arise for consideration in 
the Suit. 
16. It is equally well settled that the provision of Order XII 
Rule 6 of the Code is not a mandatory provision rather 
discretionary. While exercising power of passing judgment on 
admission made in the pleading or otherwise, the Court must 
keep the matter pending for adjudication so far as other issues 
are concerned. 
17. Indisputably, the plaintiff/respondent filed the suit for 
following relief:-
(i) A decree for possession of the suit property; 
(ii) A decree for recovery of Rs.5,55,000/- and future 
damages @ Rs.15,000/- per month against the defendant. 
D 
E 
F 
18. So far as the first relief for a decree for possession is
concerned, we are in full agreement with the view taken by the 
G 
High Court having regard to the question of ownership already 
decided in the earlier suit filed by the defendant/ appellant. The 
said issue need not have to be decided afresh and hence on 
the basis of the finding of ownership decided in favour of the 
H
1106 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A plaintiff/respondent, the suit has to be decreed so far as the 
recovery of possession is concerned. 
19. So far as the second question with regard to the 
entitlement of the plaintiff/respondent to claim a decree for 
8 
recovery of a sum of Rs. 5,55,000/- and future damages @ 
Rs.15,000/- per month is concerned, admittedly this question 
has not been decided either in the earlier suit or in this suit. In 
that view of the matter, decreeing the entire suit on the basis 
of ownership of the plaintiff/respondent already decided in the 
C earlier suit, the. decree for recovery of damages ought not to 
have been passed by the High Court. 
D 
E 
20. However, in the instant case, at the time of admission 
of this Special Leave Petition, the following order was passed 
on 12.11.2014:-
"In the event the petitioner deposit a sum of 
Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) in the account of his 
mother-Respondent, notice shall be issued only confining 
to the question as to whether the decree passed under the 
provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC is justified. The amount 
to be deposited within four weeks from today. 
Put up the case on 11.12.2014. 
Till then, status quo, as on today, shaJI be 
F 
maintained." 
21. In compliance of the aforesaid order, the appellant had 
already deposited the aforesaid amount. Hence, taking into 
consideration the relationship of the appellant and the 
respondent being mother and son, we do not think it proper
to 
G again remand the matter to the trial court for deciding the issue 
as to the quantum of damages the respondent is entitled to get 
from the appellant for his unauthorized possession of the suit 
property. We, therefore, hold that the amount of Rs.5,00,000/-
would be just and proper so far as the claim for damages is 
H concerned.

RAVEESH CHAND JAIN v. RAJ RANI JAIN 
1107 
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.] 
22. We, therefore, think it fit not to interfere with the order 
A 
passed by the High Court. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. 
However, we allow the appellant to remain in possession of the 
suit property till 31.12.2015 on payment of Rs.10,000/- per 
month by way of damages for use and occupation of the suit 
property. It is made clear that in the event the appellant fails to 
B 
vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the suit property 
and also fails in payment of monthly damages as fixed 
hereinabove on or before 31.12.2015, respondent will be 
entitled to execute the decree for recovery of possession and 
also for damages. 
c 
Devika Gujral 
Appeal dismissed.