N. THAJUDEEN versus TAMIL NADU KHADI AND VILLAGE INDUSTRIES BOARD
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 952, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 952 : 2024 INSC 817
N. Thajudeen 
v. 
Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board 
(Civil Appeal No. 6333 of 2013)
24 October 2024
[Pankaj Mithal* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the registered gift deed was duly acted upon 
and accepted and is a valid document which continue to exist 
despite its revocation as the donor had not reserved the right to 
revoke the same.
Headnotes†
Gift – Gift deed – Revocation – When attracted – Execution 
of gift deed by the appellant in favour of the respondent, 
gifting the property for the purpose of manufacturing and the 
same was accepted by the respondent – However, revoked 
after five years – Four years later, the respondent filed suit 
for declaration of title over the property and recovery of 
possession on basis of the gift deed – Suit dismissed by the 
trial court holding that the gift deed was not valid as it was 
never accepted and acted upon – However, the first appellate 
court and the High Court held in favour of the respondent 
holding that the gift deed was acted upon and in absence 
of any clause authorizing revocation, it could not have been 
revoked as alleged vide the revocation deed – Correctness:
Held: Gift deed was duly acted upon and accepted by the 
respondent, as such the said gift deed cannot be held to be 
invalid for want of acceptance – On the basis of the gift deed, 
the respondent acquired absolute right and title over the suit 
property – None of the
exceptions permitting revocation of the 
gift deed as stated in s.126 of the 1882 Act attracted, thus, the 
gift deed, which was validly made, could not have been revoked 
in any manner – Revocation deed is void ab initio and of no 
consequence – Non-utilisation of the suit property for manufacturing 
for the purpose set out in the gift deed, and keeping the same 
* Author
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N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board
as vacant may be a disobedience of the object of the gift but that 
by itself would not attract the power to revoke the gift deed – No 
stipulation in the gift deed that if the suit property is not so utilised, 
the gift would stand revoked or would be revoked at the discretion 
of the donor – As regards, the suit filed by the respondent being 
hit by limitation, once it is held that the gift deed was validly 
executed resulting in the absolute transfer of title in favour of the 
respondent, the same is not liable to be revoked, and as such 
the revocation deed is meaningless especially for the purposes 
of calculating the period of limitation for instituting the suit –  
Suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further 
relief for recovery of possession – When in a suit for declaration 
of title, a further relief is claimed, the relief of declaration would 
only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would 
be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed –  
Though the limitation for filing a suit for declaration of title 
is three years as per Art.58 but for recovery of possession 
based upon title, the limitation is 12 years from the date the 
possession of the defendant becomes adverse in terms of Art.65 –  
Thus, the suit for the relief of possession was not actually barred 
and the court of first instance could not have
dismissed the entire 
suit as barred by time – No error or illegality on part of the first 
appellate court and the High Court in decreeing the suit of the 
respondent – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Limitation Act, 
1963 – Arts.58, 65. [Paras 10, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26]
Case Law Cited
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 67 : 
AIR 1961 SC 808 – referred to. 
List of Acts
Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Limitation Act, 1963.
List of Keywords
Gift deed; Revocation; Revocation of gift deed; Revocation 
deed; Power to revoke gift deed; Execution of gift deed; Suit for 
declaration of title; Suit for recovery of possession; Acceptance;  
Disobedience of the object of the gift; Limitation; Transfer of title; 
Calculation of period of limitation.
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Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6333 of 2013
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2011 of the High Court of 
Madras in SA No. 1905 of 1997
Appearances for Parties
Ms. T.Archana, K. K. Mani, Rajeev Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
Vipin Kumar Jai, Mrs. Gurinder Jai, Ms. Sanjna Dua, Advs. for the 
Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Pankaj Mithal, J.
1.	
Ms. T. Archana, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Vipin 
Kumar Jai, learned counsel for the respondent were heard at length. 
2.	
The plaintiff-respondent, Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries 
Board, instituted a suit for declaration of its title over the suit property 
measuring about 3750 square feet comprising in Survey No. 16/1 
situated in Kotlambakkam Panchayat, District Cuddalore and for 
recovery of its possession. The said suit was filed on the basis of 
a registered gift deed dated 05.03.1983 allegedly executed by the 
defendant-appellant which was said to have been accepted by the 
plaintiff-respondent.
3.	
The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court vide Judgment and order 
dated 23.08.1994 primarily on the ground that the alleged gift deed 
was not valid as it was never accepted and acted upon. Aggrieved 
by the aforesaid decision, the plaintiff-respondent preferred an appeal 
before the District Judge which was allowed vide Judgment and order 
dated 05.08.1997. The appellate Court reversed the
judgment and 
order of the court of first instance and decreed the suit. The second 
appeal filed by the defendant-appellant was dismissed on 11.01.2011 
by the High Court. In decreeing the suit, the gift was held to be valid 
with a finding that it was acted upon and accepted and as such in 
the absence of any clause in the gift deed authorizing revocation, 
it could not have been revoked as alleged vide revocation deed 
dated 17.08.1987.
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4.	
The delay of 207 days in filing the Special Leave Petition was 
condoned and the leave to appeal was granted vide order dated 
05.08.2013. Thus, the civil appeal has come up for consideration 
before us. 
5.	
The moot question which arises for our consideration in this appeal 
is whether the registered gift deed dated 05.03.1983 was duly acted 
upon and accepted and is a valid document which continue to exist 
despite its revocation on 17.08.1987 as the donor had not reserved 
the right to revoke the same. 
6.	
The registered gift deed dated 05.03.1983 is Exhibit A-1. It has been 
executed by the defendant-appellant. A perusal of the gift deed 
reveals that the donor has gifted the suit property in favour of the 
plaintiff-respondent for the purposes of manufacturing of Khadi Lungi 
and Khadi Yarn etc., with the condition that the plaintiff-respondent 
shall not transfer the suit property for its own self-interest. The gift 
deed stipulates that neither the donor nor his legal heirs have any 
right or interest or will continue to have any right or interest in the 
suit property from the time and date of the gift deed. The gift deed 
further states that the gift is with full consent of the donor and that 
from the date of the gift itself, the plaintiff-respondent accepts the 
suit property for the use as aforesaid. 
7.	
A simple and complete reading of the aforesaid gift deed would
reveal that the gift is absolute with no right reserved for its revocation 
in any contingency. The only purpose stipulated therein is that the 
property gifted shall be used for manufacturing Khadi Lungi and 
Khadi Yarn etc.
8.	
It is worth noting that the gift deed itself states that from the date of 
the gift deed the suit property is accepted by the plaintiff-respondent 
for the purpose of manufacturing Khadi Lungi and Khadi Yarn etc., 
which duly proves that the gift was accepted. It was also acted upon 
as pursuant thereof the plaintiff-respondent had applied for mutation 
to the revenue authorities. In addition to the above, the plaintiff-
respondent issued a memo on 16.09.1983, Exhibit A-4 which also 
proves that the possession of the suit property was taken over and 
that it proceeded to raise construction thereon.
9.	
Exhibits A-2 to A-4 prove that the possession of the suit property was 
taken over by the plaintiff-respondent on the date of the gift itself
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which is sufficient evidence that the gift was acted upon and accepted 
by the plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff-respondent, pursuant to 
the aforesaid gift deed and its acceptance has even applied to the 
revenue authorities for the mutation of its name which further fortifies 
the fact that the gift was duly accepted. 
10.	 Considering the above, in view of the findings recorded by the 
first appellate Court and the High Court that the gift deed was 
duly acted upon and accepted by the plaintiff-respondent, the 
conclusion is that the said gift deed cannot be held to be invalid 
for want of acceptance. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid gift 
deed, the plaintiff-respondent acquired absolute right and title over 
the suit property. 
11.	 Now the question arises as to whether the aforesaid gift deed has 
been validly revoked vide revocation deed dated 17.08.1987, and if 
so, what would be its impact upon the rights of the plaintiff-respondent 
in respect of the suit property. 
12.	 No doubt, the gift validly made can be suspended or revoked under 
certain contingencies but ordinarily it cannot be revoked, more 
particularly when no such right is reserved under the gift deed. 
In this connection, a reference may be made to the provisions of 
Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 18821 which provides 
that a gift cannot be revoked except for certain contingencies 
enumerated therein. 
13.	 It is important to
reproduce Section 126 of the Act, which reads as 
follows:
“126. When gift may be suspended or revoked.- 
The donor and donee may agree that on the happening 
of any specified event which does not depend on the will 
of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a 
gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or 
in part, at the mere will of the donor, is void wholly or in 
part, as the case may be.
1	
 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’
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A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want 
or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, 
it might be rescinded.
Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked.
Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect 
the rights of transferees for consideration without notice.”
14.	 Section 126 of the Act is drafted in a peculiar way in the sense 
that it contains the exceptions to the substantive law first and then 
the substantive law. The substantive law as is carved out from the 
simple reading of the aforesaid provision is that a gift cannot be 
revoked except in the cases mentioned earlier. The said exceptions 
are three in number; the first part provides that the donor and donee 
may agree for the suspension or revocation of the gift deed on the 
happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will 
of the donor. Secondly, a gift which is revocable wholly or in part with 
the agreement of the parties, at the mere will of the donor is void 
wholly or in part as the case may be. Thirdly, a gift may be revoked 
if it were in the nature of a contract which could be rescinded. 
15.	 In simpler words, ordinarily a gift deed cannot be revoked except 
for the three contingencies mentioned above. The first is where 
the donor and the donee agree for its revocation on the happening 
of any specified event. In the gift deed, there is no such
indication 
that the donor and donee have agreed for the revocation of the gift 
deed for any reason much less on the happening of any specified 
event. Therefore, the first exception permitting revocation of the 
gift deed is not attracted in the case at hand. Secondly, a gift deed 
would be void wholly or in part, if the parties agree that it shall 
be revocable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor. In the 
present case, there is no agreement between the parties for the 
revocation of the gift deed wholly or in part or at the mere will of 
the donor. Therefore, the aforesaid condition permitting revocation 
or holding such a gift deed to be void does not apply. Thirdly, a 
gift is liable to be revoked in a case where it is in the nature of a 
contract which could be rescinded. The gift under consideration is 
not in the form of a contract and the contract, if any, is not liable to 
be rescinded. Thus, none of the exceptions permitting revocation
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of the gift deed stands attracted in the present case. Thus, leading 
to the only conclusion that the gift deed, which was validly made, 
could not have been revoked in any manner. Accordingly, revocation 
deed dated 17.08.1987 is void ab initio and is of no consequence 
which has to be ignored.
16.	 The non-utilisation of the suit property for manufacturing Khadi 
Lungi and Khadi Yarns etc., the purpose set out in the gift deed, and 
keeping the same as vacant may be a disobedience of the object 
of the gift but that by itself would not attract the power to revoke 
the gift deed. There is no stipulation in the gift deed that if the suit 
property is not so utilised, the gift would stand revoked or would be 
revoked at the discretion of the donor. 
17.	 In the end, we come to another limb of the argument that the suit as 
filed by the plaintiff-respondent is hit by limitation and as such the 
first appellate court and the High Court manifestly erred in decreeing 
the same. 
18.	 In context with the point of limitation, the court of first instance has 
formulated issue no. 4 which reads as under: “Whether the suit is 
barred by limitation?” 
19.	 Admittedly, the present suit for declaration and recovery of possession 
of the suit property was filed by the plaintiff-respondent on 25.09.1991. 
The court of first instance held that as the same was not filed within 
three years from the date of revocation of the gift deed, i.e.,
17.08.1987 
(Exhibit B-2), the suit is barred by limitation.
20.	 Once it is held that the gift deed was validly executed resulting in 
the absolute transfer of title in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, the 
same is not liable to be revoked, and as such the revocation deed 
is meaningless especially for the purposes of calculating the period 
of limitation for instituting the suit.
21.	 The limitation for a suit for declaration is provided under Part III 
of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. It is governed by 
Articles 56-58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Under all the 
aforesaid three Articles, the limitation for a suit for declaration is three 
years. The limitation provided under Articles 56 and 57 of the Schedule 
to the Limitation Act is in respect to declaration regarding forgery
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of an instrument issued or registered and validity of the adoption 
deed. Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes the 
limitation for decree of declaration of any other kind and therefore, 
the suit for declaration of title would essentially fall under Article 58 of 
the Schedule to the Limitation Act and the limitation would be three 
years from the date when the right to sue first accrues.
22.	 In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title 
rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be 
noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is 
claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would 
only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would 
be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The 
further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based 
upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of 
Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
23.	 In C. Mohammad Yunus vs. Syed Unnissa And Ors2 it has been 
laid down that in a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation 
would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further 
relief. In fact, a suit for a declaration of title to immovable property 
would not be barred so long as the right to such a property continues 
and
subsists. When such right continues to subsist, the relief for 
declaration would be a continuing right and there would be no limitation 
for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a declaration for a 
right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to Property subsist.
24.	 Even otherwise, though the limitation for filing a suit for declaration of 
title is three years as per Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation 
Act but for recovery of possession based upon title, the limitation is 
12 years from the date the possession of the defendant becomes 
adverse in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. 
Therefore, suit for the relief of possession was not actually barred 
and as such the court of first instance could not have dismissed the 
entire suit as barred by time.
25.	 No other point was raised and argued before us. 
2	
[1962] 1 SCR 67 : AIR 1961 SC 808

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26.	 Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we 
do not find any error or illegality on part of the first appellate court 
and the High Court in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent.
27.	 Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as devoid of merit. 
28.	 Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain