MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA versus Q.C.R.G. MEMORIAL TRUST & ORS.
[2017] 11 S.C.R. 92, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
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(2017] ll S.C.R. 92 
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA 
v. 
Q.C.R.G. MEMORIAL TRUST & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 19662 of 2017) 
NOVEMBER 23, 2017 
(DIPAI<i MISRA, C.JI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND 
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.) 
Judicial Propriety/Judicial Discipline: 
Medical institution debarred from admitting students for 
academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19 by order dared 31.05.2017 
- Writ petition by respondent-instillllion - High Court directed Central 
Government to reconsider the issue of letter of permission granted 
to the institutir,m - Cemral Government by its order dated 19.08.2017 
confirmed its order dated 31.05.2017 - Writ petition 11/Art. 32 by 
the inslitutiof/ - Petition withdrawn with permission to approach 
High Court 11/Art. 226 - Supreme Court by its order dated 
28.08.2017. 1~hi/e permitting to withdraw the petition, made it clear 
that the High Court, while entertaining the writ petition shall not 
pass any interim order pertaining to the academic year 2UI 7-18 -
Writ petition .filed u!Art. 226 - High Court quashing the orders dated 
19.08.:!017 and 31.05.201 7, granted permission to the respundent-
institution to admit students for academic session 2017-18 - On 
appeal, held: Despite the order of Supreme Court dated 28.08.2017, 
the High Court permitted the institution to admit students for academic 
year 2017-18 that too without giving any opportunity to Central 
Government and Medical Council of India lo rep(v - The impugned 
judgment shows
unnecessary and uncalled for hun:v. unjustified 
haste and unreasonable sense of pron1ptitude ~ Judicial propriel)' 
requires judicial discipline - A Judge is expected tu abandon his 
personal notion or i111pression gathered from su~jective experience 
- The process of ac(judicalion lays emphasis on the wise scrutiny of 
materials sans emotions - The High Omrt had no reason to abandon 
the concept of judicial propriety and transgress the nil es - If the 
instit11tion has admitted students, they are debarred from continuing 
in the course - However, the institution is directed to compensate 
such students by paying Rs. 10,00,00VI- to each student apart from 
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MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. G.C.R.G. MEMORIAL TRUST 
& ORS. 
rejimding their fees - The prayer in respect of academic session 
2018-19, is also rejected - Ed11cation!Ed11cational Institutions. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The contmt of the order of Supreme Court dated 
28.08.2017 is graphically clear. The High Court was not allowed 
to pass any interim order pertaining to the Academic Session 
2017-2018, but the Division Bench of the High Court, for some 
unfathomable and inscrutable reason, allowed the prayer. Before 
the High Court, time was sought on behalf of the Central 
Government and the MCI to file counter affidavits. The same 
was denied and the contesting parties were deprived of the 
opportunity to contest. The judgment was delivered without 
waiting for the reply from the Central Government or MCI. The 
judgment of the High Court shows unnecessary and uncalled for 
hurry, unjustified haste and an unreasonable sense of promptitude 
possibly being oblivious of the fact that the stand of the Medical 
Council of India and the Central Government could not be given 
indecent burial when they were parties on record. Such a 
procedure cannot be countenanced in law. [Para 8][99-H; 100-A-
D] 
2. The judicial propriety requires judicial discipline. In the 
absence of a reply tiled by the Medical Council of India and the 
Central Government, it could not have been possible to answer 
the factual matrix of the case. What is not possible, is not possible. 
In
respect of the cases where renewal was granted. In any case, 
granting renewal for 2017-2018 and confirmation of letter of 
permission for 2016-2017 was totally unwarranted. [Para 91(100-
E-F] 
3. The adjudication by the Division Bench tantamounts to 
a state as if they dragged themselves to the realm of "willing 
suspension of disbelieP'. Possibly, they assumed that they could 
do what they intended to do. A Judge cannot think in terms of 
"what pleases the Prince has the force of law". The law docs not 
allow so, for law has to be observed by requisite respect for law. 
[Para 9][100-G-H] 
Shiv Moha11 Singh ~: The State (Delhi Administration) 
(1977) 2 SCC 238 : [1977] 3 SCR 172; Om Prakash 
Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan (2014) 5 SCC 417 : [201<1] 
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l SCR 939: Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem 
Heavy Engineering Works (P) ltd. and Am: ( 1997) 6 
SCC 450 : [ 1997) l Su pp!. SCR 184 - relied on. 
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Quillen v. Board of Education 115 NYS 2d 122, 126 
(1952) - referred to. 
"fl,!J: Justice Frankfurter : 'A Heritage for all Who Love 
the Law·· by Clark, Tom C.. 51A.B.A.J.330, 332 (1965): 
Foreword, to Memorial issue for Robert f-1. Jackson, 
55 Columbia Law Review (April, 1955) p. 436 -
referred to. 
4. A Judge is expected to abandon his 11ersonal notion or 
impression gathered from subjective experience. The process 
of adjudication lays emphasis on the wise scrutiny of materials 
sans emotions. A studied analysis of facts and evidence is a 
categorical imperative. Deviation from them is likely to increase 
the individual gravitational pull which has the potentiality to take 
justice to her coffin. )Para 15Jl102-F] 
5. The Division of High Court Bench had no reason to 
abandon the concept of judicial propriety and transgress the rules 
and further proceed on a path where it was not required to. Such 
things create ,institutional problems and the Judges shall be 
guided by it. (rara 18][103-C-DI 
6. As this Court had stayed the operation of the order at 
the interim stl)ge and further directed that if the Institution had 
admitted students they were debarred from continuing in the 
course. The same stands confirmed. The students who were 
given
admission by the institution that had taken recourse to 
unholy and uncalled for practice should not be allowed to suffer 
and arc to be compensated. Therefore, the respondent-institution 
is directed to pay Rs.10,00,000/- to each of the students who had 
taken admission apart from refunding their fees. Additionally, as 
the conduct of the l" respondent, is absolutely blameworthy, costs 
of Rs.25 lacs is imposed to be deposited before this Court. [Para 
17][102-G; 103-A-C] 
7. As far as the prayer of the institution as regards the 
Academic Session 2018-2019 is concerned, it docs not deserve 
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consideration and, accordingly, stands rejected. An unscrupulous
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. GC.R.G MEMORIAL TRUST 
& ORS. 
litigant who conceived tbe idea of paving the path of his own 
desire, moving according to his design, proceeding as per his 
whim and marching ahead with brazenness abandoning any sense 
of prudence cannot be leniently dealt with. It is the duty of the 
Court to take stringent action, for he bas polluted the purity 
attached to the justice dispensation system and sullied the majesty 
of law. [Para 1811103-D-E] 
Case Law Reference 
[1977] 3 SCR 172 
[2014] I SCR 939 
[1997] I Su11pl. SCR 184 
relied on 
relied on 
relied on 
Para 12 
Para 13 
Para 14 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 19662 
of2017. 
From the J udgmcnt and Order dated 01.09.2017 of the High Court 
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of Judicature at Allahabad, at Lucknow in Misc. Bench No. 20275 of D 
2017. 
Vikas Singh. Sr. Adv., Gaurav Sharma, Dhawal Mohan, Prutcck 
Bhatia, Abhishek, Ms. Mansi Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant. 
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Advs., Amit Kumar, 
Ms. Harshika Verma, D. N. Goburcihan, G. Govcradhan, Ms. Liz Mathew. 
M. F. Philip. Sarad Kr. Singhania. Gurmect Singh Makkcr, Puncet Jain, 
Mrs. Pratibha Jain. Somesh Chandra Jha. Ad vs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, CJ! I. Leave granted. 
2. The present appeal frescoes the scenario where one is tempted 
to quote a few lines from what has been stated in Quillen v. Bo11rd of 
Ed11clltio11 1• It reads thus:-
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"Thc distinction
between the gourmet and the gourmand is as 
neat and decisive in the prosaic realm of negotiation as in the 
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festive sphere of gastronomic enjoyment- attempting to satisfy 
an unrestrained or exaggerated appetite in either field may prove 
discomforting if not disastrous." 
'115NYS2dl22.126 (1952) 
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The purpose of referring to the same is to highlight the unrestrained 
and exaggerated appetite. When the factual matrix would be unrolled, 
the greed mall its colours shall come to the forefront. 
3. The present appeal by special leave calls in questwn the legal 
acceptability of the order dated 0 l" September 2017 passed by a Divis10n 
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Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench m Misc. Bench 
No.13530 of2017 whereby the High Court has quashed the order dated 
l ':I"' August 2017 as well as order dated 31" May 2017 passed by the 
Central Govunment and eventually granted permission to the l" 
respondent to admit students for the Academic Session 2017-201 8. 
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4. When the matter was listed on 06"' September 2017, this Court 
had passed the following order: 
"Issue notice fixing a returnable date within four weeks. 
As Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor Genernl 
for respondent No.3-Union oflndia and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, kamed 
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senior counsel has entered appearance on behalf of respondent 
N o.1 and 2, no fmiher notice need be issued. 
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As far as respondent No.5 and 6 arc concerned, let notice be 
issued. 
Dasti in addition is permitted. 
As an interim order, it is directed that there shall be stay of 
the operation of order dated l" September, 20 l 7 further corrected 
on 4'" $cptcmbcr 2017. 
If the Institution has admitted students they are debarred from 
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continuing in the course. We have
passed this order as we while 
disposing of the writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the 
Constitution had passed the following order:-
'Le;imed counsel for the petitioners seeks leave of this Court 
to withdraw the writ petition to approach the High Court under 
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A1ticle 226 of the Constitution of India. 
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The writ petition is permitted to be withdrawn. However, it is 
made clear that the High Comt, while entertaining the writ 
petition, shall not pass any interim order pertaining to the 
academic year 2017-2013.'
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. G.C.R.G. MEMORIAL TRUST 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!] 
We really fail to fathom the manner in which lhe High Court 
has misconstrued our order and passed the final order for 2017-
2018. We arc issuing notice only to test the propriety of the order 
and also ifthe Institution is eligible to get the renewal of letter of 
permission for 2018-20 19." 
The aforesaid order eloquently reflects the shock expressed by 
this Court. As is ret1ectible from the aforesaid, notice was issued only to 
test the propriety of the order and also if the institution is eligible to get 
the renewal for 20 l 8-2019. 
5. We shall initially address the first issue. To adjudge the issue of 
propriety of the order passed by the High Court, we arc compelled to 
travel in a time machine. The respondent-institution had filed a writ 
petition, i.e., Writ Petition (Civil) No.13530 of2017 before the High Court 
and was dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Court on 08 11' 
August 2017. On that day, the following order came to be passed: 
"In reference to order dated 4.8.2017, the Central Government, 
as per the instructions received by Mr. Asit Kumar Chaturvedi, 
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent no. l, has 
agreed to entertain the petitioners' matter along with other similar 
matters and consider it to revaluatc the recommendations/views 
of the MCI, Hearing Committee, DGHS and the Oversight 
Committee as available on record for grant of approval to the
petitioner-institution to admit the students in MBBS Course, after 
affording an opportunity ofhcaring to th~ petitioner-institution to 
the extent necessary. To facilitate the Central Government, the 
whole paragraph 25 of the judgment in which directive has been 
issued by the Supreme Court is reproduced below: 
'25. In the above persuasive premise, the Central Government 
is hereby ordered to consider afresh the materials on record 
pertaining to the issue of confirmation or otherwise of the letter 
of permission granted to the petitioner colleges/institutions. We 
make it clear that in undertaking this exercise, the Central 
Government would revaluate the recommendations/views of 
the MCI, Hearing Committee, DGHS and the Oversight 
Committee, as available on records. It would also afford an 
opportunity ofhearing to the petitioner colleges /institutions to 
the extent necessary. The process ofhearing and final reasoned 
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decision thereon, as ordered, would be completed peremptorily 
within a period of I 0 days from today. The parties would 
unfailing co-operate in compliance of this direction tu meet the 
time frame fixed.' 
Therefore, we also direct the Central Government lo consider 
the petitioners' matter accordingly within seven days as framed 
by Hon'blc the Supreme Court. 
The m~llter is listed before Hon 'ble the Supreme Comt on 
24.8.2017. 
We, therefore, also direct the regislly to list this matter on 
28.8.2017." 
6. In pursuance of the aforesaid order. taking note of the 
deficiencies, the Central Government passed the following order on 
19.8.2017: 
"17. Now, in compliance with the above direction of Court, the 
Ministry granted hearing to the college on 16.08.2017. The 
Hearing Committee after considering the records and oral & 
written submission of the college submitted its report to the 
Ministry. The findings of the Hearing Committee are as under-
The Committee notes that there was no deficiency of faculty 
and residents as per MCI assessment report. The findings of the 
assessor indicate some deficiency of clinical material and the 
observance of hospital protocols. 
During the course of hearing, the college produced certain 
documents contesting the findings of the assessors. The 
Committee perused the case sheet of single normal delivery on 
the day of inspection as shown by the college. The delivery
of 
Ms. Sameerun was performed without blood transfusion and the 
mother was discharged without treatment of anacmcia when she 
was severely anaemic at the time of admission with a haemoglobin 
level of 6.5 gm%. This is gross negligence. Further, the college 
could not produce any Government issued birth certificates in 
support of their claim of average number of deliveries. 
The inept handling of patients in the hospital is further confirmed 
during the perusal of cases pertaining to casualty and ICUs. The
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. G.C.R.G. MEMORIAL TRUST 
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& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!] 
college could not satisfy regarding the patients in casualty wards. 
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None of the 3 patients in !CCU seemed to have cardiac history. 
The pulse rate of one of the patient who was a PSVT (tachycardia) 
case was noted as 72/min at the time of admission. NO 
investigation was done. Other two patients with diagnosis of 
Kyphoscoliosis (spinal deformity) and vestibular neuritis (car 
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problem) were also admitted in the cardiac ICU. This confirms 
the finding of assessors and the college had no explanation. It is 
understood that as per MSR, the requirement is for requisite 
number of beds in ICUs, however, the college seem to be 
employing doubtful measures to show patients. 
It was also noted that the college was neither aware nor following 
the provisions qfbiomcdical waste (BMW) rules. 
The explanation offered by the college in obtaining 14 cadavers 
from 'Dcra Saccha Sauda' Sirsa, Haiyana without requisite 
permission and death certificates is a serious issue to be looked 
into by the concerned authorities. 
In view of the above, despite the fact that no deficiency of 
faculty and residents is noted, the functioning of the hospital as 
per norms is in serious doubt and the Committee agrees with the 
decision of the Ministry vidc letter dated 31.05.2017 to debar the 
college for two years and also permit MCI to encash bank 
guarantee. 
18. Accepting the recommendations of the Hearing
Committee, 
the Ministry reiterates its earlier decision dated 31.05.2017 to debar 
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the college from admitting students for a period of two years i.e. 
2017-18 and 2018-19 and also to authorize NCI to encash the 
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Bank Guarantee of Rs.2 Crore." 
7. As the facts would further uncurtain, the institution filed a petition 
under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court and chose to 
withdraw the same to approach the High Cou11 under Article 226 of the 
Constitution. The said order has already been quoted while reproducing 
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the order dated 06.09 .20 l 7. 
8. The content of the order dated 28.08.2017 is graphically clear. 
The High Court was not allowed to pass any interim order pertaining to 
the Academic Session 2017-2018 but the Division Bench of the High 
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Court, for some unfathomable and inscrmable reason. referred to certain 
judgments of this Court and allowed the prayer. It is beyond our 
comprehension as ro how the High Court could have even remotely 
thought of passing an order granting the Letter of Permission for the 
Academic Session 2016-2017 and renewal for 2017-2018. It is worthy 
to mention here that before the High Court, time was sought on behalf 
of the Central Government and the MCI to file counter affidavits. The 
same was denied and the contesting parties were deprived of the 
opportunity to contest. Be it noted, the writ petition that was filed before 
this Court was withdrawn on 28'h August, 2017 and a fresh writ was 
filed before the High Court on 29'" August 2017 and the judgment was 
delivered without waiting for the reply from the Central Gowrnment or 
MCI on OP' September 2017. ll is clear as the cloudless sky that the 
judgment of the High Court shows unnecessary and uncalled for hurry, 
unjustified haste and an unreasonable sense of promptitude possibly being 
oblivious of the fact that the stand of the Medical Council oflndia and 
the Central Government could not be given indecent burial when they 
were parties on record. Such a procedure cannot be countenanced in 
law. 
9. The wntroversy cannot be allowed to end with our aforesaid 
finding. The judicial propriety requires judicial discipline. In the absence 
of a reply filed by
the Medical Council of India and the Central 
Government. it could not have been possible to answer the factual matrix 
of the case. What is not possible, is not possible. We may hasten to add 
that in respect of the cases where renewal was granted, Mr. Vikas 
Singh would submit that the deficiency was within the permissible limit 
but in the present case, it was not so and in any case, granting renewal 
for 20 I 7-20 l 8 and confirmation of letter of permission for 2016-2017 
was totally unwarranted. In most of the cases. this Court has directed 
forre-inspection by the MCI which would then take a final decision for 
the academic year 20 l 8-20 I 9. It is a most w1fortunate situation that the 
Division Bench has paved such a path. One cannot but say that the 
adjudication by the Division Bench tantamounts to a state as if they 
dragged themselves to the realm of "willing suspension of disbelief'. 
Possibly. they assumed that they could do what they intended to do. A 
Judge cannot think in terms of"what pleases the Prince has the force of 
law". Frankly speaking, the law does not allow so, for law has to be 
observed by requisite respect for law.
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. GC.R.G MEMORIAL TRUST 
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& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJJ) 
IO. In this context. we may note the eloquent statement of Benjamin 
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Cardozo who said: 
"The judge is not a knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his 
own ideal of beauty and goodness." 
11. In this regard, the profound statement ofFclix Frankfurter' is 
apposite to reproduce: 
"For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to subordinate one's 
personal pulls and one's private views to the law of which we are 
all guardians -those impersonal convictions that make a society a 
civilized community, and not the victims of personal rule." 
The learned Judge has further stated': 
"What becomes decisive to a Justice's functioning on the Court in 
the large area within which his individuality moves is his general 
attitude toward law, the habits of the mind that he has formed or 
is capable of unforming, his capacity for detachment. his 
temperament or training for putting his passion behind his judgment 
instead of in front of it. The attitudes and qualities which I am 
groping to charncterize are ingredients of what compendiously 
might be called dominating humility." 
12. In Shiv Mohan Singh v. The State (Delhi Admi11istratio11)4, 
the Coui1 has observed: 
" ... a Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly free; he is not 
to innovate at pleasure; he is not a knight-errant roaming at will in 
pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness; he is to draw 
inspiration from
consecrated principles' ... " 
13. In this context, we may refer with profit the authority in Om 
Pr11kaslr Cl11111t11la v. K1111w11r B/11111' wherein it has been stated: 
"19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a Judge is not to be 
guided by any kind ofnotion. The decision-making process expects 
a Judge or an adjudicator to apply restraint, ostracise perceptual 
1 Clark, Ton1 C., •·Mr. Justice Frankfurter:' A Heritage for all Who Love the La,v", 51 
A.BAJ. 330. 332 (1965) 
'Foreword, lo Memorial issue for Robert H. Jackson, 55 Columbia Law Review (April, 
1955)p.436. 
'(1977)2 SCC238 
'(2014)5SCC417 
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subjectivity. make one ·s emotions subservient to one's reasoning 
and think dispassionately. He is expected to be guided by the 
established norms of judicial process and decorum." 
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And again: 
"20. A Judge should abandon his passion. He must constantly 
remind himself that he has a singular master "duty to truth" and 
such truth is to be arrived at within the legal parameters. No 
heroism, no rhetorics." 
14. In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Hea11y 
Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and anotlier'', the three-Judge Bench 
observed: 
"32. When a position in law is well settled as a result of judicial 
pronouncement of this Co wt, it would amow1t to judicial impropriety 
to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts 
to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order 
which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Suchjudieial 
adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the 
tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled 
principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has 
the cffoct of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of 
the panics. It is time that this tendency stops." 
15. The aforcstatcd thoughts arc not only meaningfully pregnant 
but also expressively penetrating. They clearly expound the role of a 
Judge, especially the effort ofundcrstanding and attitude of judging. A 
Judge is expected
to abandon his personal notion or impression gathered 
from subjective experience. The process of adjudication lays emphasis 
on the wise scrutiny of materials sans emotions. A studied analysis of 
facts and evidence is a categorical imperative. Deviation from them is 
likely to increase the individual gravitational pull which has the potentiality 
to take justice to her coflin. 
16. As is perceptible, we had stayed the operation of the order at 
the interim stage and further directed that if the Institution had admitted 
students they were debarred from continuing in the course. The same 
stands confirmed. 
"( 19971 6 sec 450
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. GC.R.G MEMORIAL TRUST 
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& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] 
17. Further, the question that remains to be adjudicated is whether 
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the students who were given admission by the institution that had taken 
recourse to unholy and uncalled for practice should be allowed to suffer. 
We think not. Students are to be compensated. They had paid the fees. 
Hopes were kindled in their hearts and aspirations in their mind. Their 
young minds_ were polluted by the institution and, therefore, we direct 
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the respondent-institution to pay Rs.10,00,000/- to each of the students 
who had taken admission apart from refunding their fees. Additionally, 
as the conduct of the I" respondent, namely, GC.R.G. Memorial Trust, 
is absolutely blameworthy, we impose costs ofRs.25 lacs to be deposited 
before this Court within eight weeks hence. 
18. Before parting, it is necessary to add and repeat that the 
Division Bench had no reason to abandon the concept of judicial propriety 
and transgress the rules and further proceed on a path where it was not 
required to. Such things create institutional problems and we are sure 
that the learnce! Judges shall be guided by it. As far as the prayer of the 
institution as regards the Academic Session 2018-2019 is concerned, it 
does nqt deserve consideration and, accordingly, stands rejected. We 
.say so as an unscrupulous litigant who conceived the idea of paving the 
path of his own desire, moving according to his design,
proceeding as 
per hi~ whim and marching ahead with brazenness abandoning any sense 
of prudence cannot be leniqntly dealt with. It is the duty of the Court to 
take stringent action, for he has polluted the purity attached to the justice 
dispensation system and sullied the majesty oflaw. 
19. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the appeal stands allowed. 
Costs. as already assessed. 
Kalpana K. Tripa1hy 
Appeal allowed. 
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