T. VALSAN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. versus K. KANAGARAJ & ORS.
[2023] 6 S.C.R. 456, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
456
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
T. VALSAN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.
v.
K. KANAGARAJ & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3466-3468 of 2023)
MAY 08, 2023
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, ABHAY S. OKA AND
MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
Electricity Department, Group B (Technical) Assistant Engineer
(Electrical) Recruitment Rules, 1979 – Promotion to the post of
Assistant Engineer (Electrical) – Under the Rules, 80% of the
vacancies for the post of Assistant Engineer were to be filled up by
promotion and 20% by direct recruitment – Out of this 80%, 50%
were earmarked for those Junior Engineers who possessed Degree
in Engineering with regular service of 3 years and the other 50%
for those possessing Diploma with regular service of 7 years – Junior
Engineers-private respondents, who were originally Diploma holders
and had acquired degree during service, were promoted as Assistant
Engineers immediately after acquiring their degree without insistence
on 3 years of continuous service from the date of acquisition of the
degree – Challenged by appellants who had joined the service as
Junior Engineers, having already acquired an Engineering Degree
prior to the said appointment – CAT held partly in favour of the
appellants relying on Shailendra Dania case – High Court held in
favour of the Respondents relying on D. Stephen Joseph case – Issue
referred by two-Judges Bench opining that D. Stephen Joseph case
did not reflect the correct opinion as while construing almost
identical Rules, the three-Judges
Bench in Shailendra Dania case
had opined to the contrary – Answering the reference, held: View
taken in D. Stephen Joseph case is the applicable law – Under the
Rules, the distinction is between the diploma holder and the degree
holder and the period of service rendered as a Junior Engineer
without any distinction between the years served prior to or after
having obtained the degree – View taken by High Court upheld –
Service Law.
Service Law – Seniority – Held: In the absence of any statutory
provision or rule made thereunder or under the proviso appended
[2023] 6 S.C.R. 456
456
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
457
to Article 309, once an incumbent is appointed to the post according
to rules, their seniority has to be counted from the date of
appointment – Constitution of India – Article 309.
Service Law – Promotion – Two channels for promotion –
Incentive to acquire the higher degree – Discussed.
D. Stephen Joseph v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 4
SCC 753 : [1997] 3 SCR 1040 – held applicable.
C. Chakkaravarthy & Ors. v. M. Satyavathy, IAS & Ors.
(2015) 16 SCC 652 – relied on.
Shailendra Dania & Ors. v. S.P. Dubey & Ors. (2007)
5 SCC 535 : [2007] 5 SCR 190; M. B. Joshi v. Satish
Kumar Pandey (1993) 2 Supp. SCC 419 : [1992] 2
Suppl. SCR 1; K. K. Dixit & Ors. v. Rajasthan Housing
Board & Anr. (2015) 1 SCC 474 : [2014] 10 SCR 397;
Anil Kumar Gupta v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
(2000) 1 SCC 128 : [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 553;
Chandravathi P. K. & Ors. v. C. K. Saji & Ors. (2004)
3 SCC 734 : [2004] 2 SCR 330; Satpal Antil v. Union
of India (1995) 4 SCC 419 : [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 1;
A. K. Raghumani Singh v. Gopal Chandra Nath (2000)
4 SCC 30 : [2000] 2 SCR 943; Pramod K. Pankaj v.
State of Bihar (2004) 3 SCC 723 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR
916 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2007] 5 SCR 190
referred to
Para 7
[1997] 3 SCR 1040
held applicable
Para 7
[1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 10
[2014] 10 SCR 397
referred to
Para 12
[1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 553
referred to
Para 17
[2004] 2 SCR 330
referred to
Para 17
(2015) 16 SCC 652
relied on
Para 19
[1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 22
[2000] 2 SCR 943
referred to
Para 22
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 916
referred to
 Para 22
T. VALSAN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. v. K. KANAGARAJ & ORS.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
458
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3466-
3468 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.11.2010 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in WP Nos. 26525 of 2009, 221 and 7165 of
2010.
Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, Venkita Subramoniam T. R., Likhi Chand
Bonsle, Rahat Bansal, Ms. Komal Mundhra, Advs. for the Appellants.
Anurag Dubey, Bhupendra Kumar Bhardwaj, Ms. Anjali Tiwari,
Ms. Geetanjali Setia, Ms. Divya Bhardwaj, S. R. Setia, Aravindh S.,
Ms. Uma Bhuvaneswari C., Abbas B., Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The Appellants herein joined the service as Junior Engineers in
the Electricity Department of the Government of Puducherry, having
already acquired an Engineering Degree prior to the appointment to the
post of Junior Engineer. On the other hand, the private Respondents
joined the service as Junior Engineers with a Diploma and, in the course
of service, obtained an Engineering Degree.
Factual Background:
3. As per the Government of Pondicherry, Electricity Department,
Group B (Technical) Assistant Engineer (Electrical) Recruitment Rules,
1979 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) for the post of Junior
Engineer, 50% of the vacancies are to be filled by promotion, and the
remaining 50% are to be filled by direct recruitment. The next avenue
of promotion is to the post of Assistant Engineer (Electrical).
4. Under the
said Rules, 80% of the vacancies for the post of
Assistant Engineer are to be filled up by ‘promotion’ and 20% by
‘direct recruitment’. The promotion is made among Junior Engineers
with three years of regular service for those with a Degree in
electrical engineering and seven years of regular service for those
with only a Diploma in electrical engineering. A subsequent
amendment dated 07.10.1982 was made to Rule 4 read with
Paragraph 11 of the Recruitment Rules on the subject of
‘promotion’. Thereafter, the amended Rules earmarked 50% for

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
459
those Junior Engineers who possess Degree in Engineering with
regular service of 3 years. The other 50% was earmarked for those
Junior Engineers who possess Diploma with regular service of 7
years.
5. Significance of the aforesaid is that in order to earn their
promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer, a Junior Engineer, possessing
an Engineering Degree, has to have fewer years of service while in the
case of a Diploma holder, the requisite period for service, to be eligible
for promotion, was more. We may notice that while working as a Junior
Engineer, there is no difference between a Degree holder and a Diploma
holder. The moot point, thus, which arises, is whether, for a Diploma
holder, who acquires a degree during the course of employment, the
period of service as a Junior Engineer prior to acquiring the degree is to
T. VALSAN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. v. K. KANAGARAJ & ORS.
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
460
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
be excluded for computing the eligible period of service for promotion to
the post of an Assistant Engineer.
6. The Puducherry administration construed the Rules to mean
that as long as the Diploma holder acquires a degree, the period spent in
service as a Junior Engineer, before the acquisition of an engineering
degree, would be counted. The Appellants, thus, approached the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
CAT’) in O.A. No. 355/2008, challenging the decision of the Puducherry
administration to promote the Junior Engineers, who were originally
Diploma holders and acquired degree during service, as Assistant
Engineers under the Degree quota, immediately after they acquired their
degree without insisting on a three-years of continuous service from the
date of acquisition of the degree. This was alleged to have resulted in
denying promotion to the Junior Engineers, who joined the service as
Degree holders.
Procedural History:
Before the Central Administrative Tribunal
7. The CAT, vide an order dated 20.11.2009, partly found in favour
of the Appellants and opined that the qualifying service for Junior
Engineers, who obtained their degree during their service for the purposes
of promotion to Assistant Engineer under the Degree quota, would have
to be considered from the date when they obtained the degree. This
view of the CAT was based on Shailendra Dania & Ors. v. S.P. Dubey
&
Ors.1. The CAT opined that the Rule in question in the present case is
almost identical to the Rule in the aforesaid case and, thus, concluded
that the Degree and Diploma holders are distinct, and both are entitled
to promotion in their respective quota. The CAT, in its wisdom, did not
consider the case of D. Stephen Joseph v. Union of India & Ors.2 on
the ground that the issue requires fresh consideration in view of the
subsequent judgment of this Court in Shailendra Dania & Ors.3
8. The aforesaid view resulted in multiple writ petitions4 being
filed before the High Court by several employees of the Puducherry
1 (2007) 5 SCC 535
2 (1997) 4 SCC 753
3 (supra)
4 W.P. No. 26525 of 2009 and W.P. Nos. 221 & 7165 of 2010
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
461
Electricity Department, who were affected by the order but were not
impleaded as a party before the CAT.
Arguments Before the High Court
9. In the proceedings before the High Court, the two parties relied
upon the aforesaid two judgments – the Appellants on Shailendra Dania
& Ors.5 case while the Respondents on D. Stephen Joseph6 case.
Shailendra Dania & Ors.7 case is undisputedly a latter judgment and
pertains to a different Rule, albeit it is stated to be almost similar, while
D. Stephen Joseph8 case deals with the very same Rules, in question,
as in the present case. The submission of the Respondents was that in
the Rules in question, there is nothing stipulated that the experience gained
after the acquisition of the Degree in Electricity Engineering was alone
to be considered.
10. The High Court held in favour of the Respondents by allowing
the writ petition while relying on the judgment in D. Stephen Joseph9
case. In this behalf, the judgment in M.B. Joshi v. Satish Kumar
Pandey10 was also relied upon by the High Court, which had been cited
in D. Stephen Joseph11 case qua the aspect of interpretation of service
rules. The said case opined that when a Rule is quite specific, it would
not be proper to count the experience only from the date of acquisition
of the superior educational qualification because such an interpretation
will violate the purpose to incentivise the employee to acquire higher
education. The relevant past practice followed by the
Department being
to the same effect, the practice of considering the tenure of a Junior
Engineer as a whole was said to have acquired the status of a Rule of
the department. Simultaneously, it was also observed that since the very
Rule, in question, had been interpreted by this Court, it was not open for
the CAT to have relied upon the decision qua some other Rules. In the
context of the two judgments of the Supreme Court so discussed, it was
observed that Shailendra Dania & Ors.12 case, being the latter judgment
5 (supra)
6 (supra)
7 (supra)
8 (supra)
9 (supra)
10 (1993) Supp. (2) SCC 419
11 (supra)
12 (supra)
T. VALSAN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. v. K. KANAGARAJ & ORS.
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
462
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
of three-Judges, had distinguished itself from the earlier judgment in D.
Stephen Joseph13 case, being the judgment of two-judges, on the true
interpretation of that Rule, in question.
11. The aforesaid resulted in the Special Leave Petition being
filed before this Court.
Initial Proceedings Before this Court
12. The two-Judges Bench of this Court, in terms of the order
dated 30.01.2018, referred the issue to be considered by a larger Bench.
While making the reference, the two-Judges Bench opined that D.
Stephen Joseph14 case apparently was not reflecting the correct opinion
as while construing almost identical Rules, a larger Bench of three-Judges
had opined to the contrary in Shailendra Dania & Ors.15 case as also
in K.K. Dixit & Ors. vs. Rajasthan Housing Board & Anr.16, wherein
this Court had opined that the period of experience must be reckoned
from the date of acquisition of the Degree. This is how the matter came
up before the three-Judges Bench, as now constituted for our
consideration in the reference.
The debate before us
13. On behalf of the Appellants, it was sought to be canvassed
that the interpretation of the Rule ought to be governed by the two
principles:
i.
The prescription of an educational qualification and a certain
number of years of experience in the designated post is a
cumulative requirement. A higher educational qualification
makes a qualitative difference in the service rendered by the
incumbent. Therefore, such prescription of a lesser number
of years of experience for promotion has a rational nexus to
the object sought to be achieved, namely, achieving efficiency
at work.
ii.
Watertight compartments are created for the two classes of
employees - the ones with the higher educational qualification
requiring lesser number of years of service, and the ones
13 (supra)
14 (supra)
15 (supra)
16 (2015) 1 SCC 474
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
463
with lesser educational qualification requiring higher number
of years of service. This demarcation has a direct nexus with
the object stated above, and any breach of such demarcation
will amount to treating unequal’s as equals, thereby defeating
the purpose of the Rule.
14. It was submitted that the three-Judges Bench in Shailendra
Dania & Ors.17 case had taken into account the aforementioned
principles and had interpreted an almost identical Rule. That judgment
had been further followed and relied upon by this Court in K.K. Dixit &
Ors.18 case. It was further submitted that the two-Judges Bench judgment
in D. Stephen Joseph19 case had no precedential value, and it is sub
silentio as to the actual text of the Rule and the difference in the quality
of service rendered by a Degree holder Junior Engineer vis-à-vis a
Diploma holder Junior Engineer was neither placed nor covered by this
Court. That judgment was stated to be completely based only on the
arguments of a past practice and not as to the actual meaning and
interpretation of the relevant Rule.
15. While referring to the Rule, it was submitted that the plain and
dictionary meaning of the word “with” is “accompanied by”. The
synonyms in the dictionary are “accompanied by, escorted by,
alongside, in addition to, as well as”. Thus, the submission of the
Appellants was that irrespective of the use of the word “with” or “and”,
it is a conjunctive phrase and in the light of settled principles, the
requirement of educational qualification and service experience is a
cumulative requirement.
16. The Appellants contended that they had qualified as Junior
Engineers holding Degrees for a much longer period of time than the
private Respondents, who had entered the service only as Junior Engineers
holding Diplomas and actually earned their promotions almost immediately
once they acquired their Degrees by coming into the Degree quota. This
was stated to permit the private Respondents to infiltrate into the quota
meant for the Degree holders based on a wrong interpretation of the
Rule and relying on the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of D.
Stephen Joseph20.
17 (supra)
18 (supra)
19 (supra)
20 (supra)
T. VALSAN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. v. K. KANAGARAJ & ORS.
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
17. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the Respondents
while commending the view taken in D. Stephen Joseph’s21 case that
the view in that case and Shailendra Dania & Ors.22 case is really not
in variance. The Rule was stated to be different. Apart from that,
observations made in Shailendra Dania & Ors.23 case, which would
show that the view taken in D. Stephen Joseph24 case has not been
faulted. A reference was also made to two other judicial pronouncements
of this Court in Anil Kumar Gupta v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi25
and Chandravathi P.K. & Ors. v. C.K. Saji & Ors.26, which had also
endorsed the view taken in D. Stephen Joseph27case and, thus, that
case cannot be said to be a sub silentio. These two judgments are once
again of a three-Judges Bench, and the latter judgment had set down the
principles to be followed as regards the counting of the service period of
Diploma holders.
18. The effect of the aforesaid pronouncements was stated to be
that in case of the Electricity Department of the Union Territory of
Puducherry, the principle that has emerged in respect of the Rules is
that for the purpose of the eligibility for promotion as Assistant Engineer,
Diploma holders can count their service prior to the acquisition of their
degree.
Analysis of the aforesaid judgments and our view:
19. On examining the controversy in the context of the arguments
urged and the judicial precedents, we can say that
actually, the issue is
no more res integra in view of the judgment of this Court in C.
Chakkaravarthy & Ors. v. M. Satyavathy, IAS & Ors.28 Though it is
a two-Judges Bench view, the very issue has been examined, which is
really sought to be debated before us. It was observed in para 10 as
under:
“There is, in our opinion, considerable merit in that submission of
the petitioners. There is no gainsaying that this Court has
21 (supra)
22 (supra)
23 (supra)
24 (supra)
25 (2000) 1 SCC 128
26 (2004) 3 SCC 734
27 (supra)
28 (2015) 16 SCC 652
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
465
unequivocally declared that promotion to the post of Assistant
Engineers in the service shall be on the basis of merit and merit
alone and that seniority of the candidates cannot be taken as an
input for determining such merit. This Court has also very clearly
rejected the procedure followed by the Government whereby the
date on which the candidate had acquired his degree qualification
was taken as a determining factor. That being so, and given the
large number of candidates eligible for consideration the
Government was entitled to adopt the method of restricting the
zone of consideration based on the number of vacancies. Inasmuch
as the Government relied upon the DoPT guidelines for achieving
that objective it committed no fault. The question, however, is
whether the Government could draw-up a list of eligible candidates
not by reference to the length of service in the cadre but by
reference to the date on which the candidates acquired the eligibility
which, as noticed earlier, was itself dependent upon the date on
which the candidate acquired the degree qualification. Since,
however, the acquisition of a degree qualification itself was not
based on any consistently uniform criterion, test or procedure, the
date on which such a qualification was acquired and resultantly
the date on which the candidate attained their eligibility was also
bound to be anything but uniform and non-discriminatory. As
between the date of acquiring eligibility and the date of
entering
service as a Section Officer/Junior Engineer the latter was, in our
opinion, a more intelligible, fair and reasonable yardstick to be
applied for drawing-up the list of eligible candidates by the review
DPC. Inasmuch as the review DPC relied upon the date of
acquiring eligibility as the basis for preparation of the list of eligible
candidates, it committed a mistake which needs to be corrected.”
20. A reading of the aforesaid paragraph shows that the promotion
to the post of Assistant Engineer was to be based on merit and merit
alone. The seniority of candidates could not be taken into account for
determining such merit. In this merit-based selection, there was a
qualifying prescription to be so considered on merits. The time period
spent in the service as Junior Engineer was at variance dependent on
whether the person had a qualifying Degree or a qualifying Diploma.
There was no necessity for a Degree to perform the job of a Junior
Engineer, and all persons were alike. The distinction only came into play
when the merit-based promotion had to take effect. Thus, as to when
T. VALSAN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. v. K. KANAGARAJ & ORS.
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
the person obtained the degree as a method of advancement of his
knowledge and entitling him to an earlier consideration in the time period
would not be relevant.
21. The Department of Personnel and Training, “Instructions and
Guidelines on Seniority”, have been placed before us. As far as the
seniority of promotees is concerned, the relevant portion is as under:
“2.2. SENIORITY OF PROMOTEES
.........
2.2.1 Where promotions to a grade are made from more than one
grade and quotas have been laid down for each feeder grade, the
eligible persons shall be arranged in separate lists in the order of
their relative seniority in their respective grades. The officers in
each grade, assessed as fit by the Departmental Promotion
Committee shall be interpolated in the ratio prescribed for each
grade in the recruitment rules for the post.”
22. A three Judges Bench of this Court in Chandravathi P.K. &
Ors.29 referred to a number of earlier judgments on the issue, including
D. Stephen Joseph30, Satpal Antil v. Union of India31, Anil Kumar
Gupta32, A.K. Raghumani Singh v. Gopal Chandra Nath33 and
Pramod K. Pankaj v. State of Bihar34 and quoted with approval of the
last of these judgments. The principle laid down is that in the absence of
any statutory provision or rule made thereunder or under the proviso
appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, once an incumbent
is appointed to the post according to rules, their
seniority has to be counted
from the date of appointment.
23. In Shailendra Dania & Ors.35 case, it was noticed in para
36 that the past practice would be a relevant aspect while construing the
service rule. The aforementioned judgment distinguished itself from D.
Stephen Joseph36 case on the ground that the interpretation of the rules
29 (supra)
30 (supra)
31 (1995) 4 SCC 419
32 (supra)
33 (2000) 4 SCC 30
34 (2004) 3 SCC 723
35 (supra)
36 (supra)
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
467
would be determined on a case-to-case basis, and the wordings of the
rules as well as past practices are important criteria. Similarly, in the
present case, the Electricity Department has a past practice of considering
the years of service prior to the acquisition of the degree.
24. The principle of past practice being of significance has also
been noticed in M.B. Joshi37 case. This judgment also discusses the
aspect where there are two channels for promotion (as in the present
case) and illustrates that if the total time period of service was not to be
counted, then there could not be said to be any incentive to acquire the
higher degree except as an academic pursuit. The incentive is that if you
acquire a higher degree as compared to a diploma, you come into a
channel which entitles consideration, albeit on merit, in a fast lane with
less number of years of service required in the cadre.
25. In our view, one of the important aspects is the wording of the
Rule itself. According to the Rules, 50 percent of the promotion quota is
from Junior Engineers with three years of regular service in the grade
“and” possessing a degree in Electrical Engineering. The Rule does not
say from which date the time period of regular service has to be counted,
but there is a twin requirement of three years of regular service as also
a degree. As against this, the second scheme of 50 percent promotion
from Junior Engineers uses the word “with” seven years of regular
service
in the grade and possessing a diploma in Electrical Engineering.
Thus, the distinction is between the diploma holder and the degree holder
and the period of service rendered as a Junior Engineer without any
distinction between the years served prior to or after having obtained
the degree. Accepting the plea of the Appellant would amount to insertion
into the requirement of the Rules, which is not stipulated. Further, this is
how the Rule has been understood by the Department, the framers of
the Rules, and accordingly, the Rules have been uniformly implemented
in the Electricity Department over a period of time. In view of the above,
due weightage must be given to the view of the framers of the Rules.
Conclusion:
26. In view of the aforesaid, we uphold the view taken by the
High Court opining that there is no distinction between the time period
served before or after the acquisition of the degree so long as the degree
is acquired and is the basis for consideration of the promotion. We are,
37 (supra)
T. VALSAN (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. v. K. KANAGARAJ & ORS.
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
468
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
thus, of the view that for all the aforesaid reasons for the Department in
question, the view taken in D. Stephen Joseph38 is held to be applicable
law, and we answer the reference accordingly.
27. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
Divya Pandey
Appeals dismissed.
(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)
38 (supra)