NIDHI versus RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS.
[2017] 1 S.C.R. 897, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2017) I S.C.R. 897 
NIDHI 
v. 
RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS. · 
(Civil Appeal No. 1008 of 20 I 7) 
FEBRUARY 07, 2017 
[DIPAK MISRA AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.) 
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent 
and Eviction) Act, 1972 - s.2J(J)(a) - Release of building under 
occupation of tenant - Release sought by landlady on the ground 
a/bona fide requirement for her grandparents -Prescribed Authority 
holding that balance of convenience was in favour of the landlady, 
found that she required the premises bona fide - Appellate court 
held that need for tenanted premises was not based on bona fide 
requirement - The High Court held that the alleged bona fide need 
extinguished in view of the subsequent circumstance viz. marriage 
of the landlady - On appeal, held: Though the court has the power 
to take note of the. subsequent events, court has to consider the 
effect of subsequent development on the bona fide need of the 
landlord - For the purpose of coming to the conclusion on bona 
fide need, comparative hardship of the parttes have to be taken into 
consideration - In the present case though the landlady, during 
pendency of the appeal, got married, but still her requirement to 
accommodate the grandparents continued - The subsequent event 
of marriage of landlady did not extinguish her c/qim for requirement 
considering the comparative hardship in the facts of the present 
case - The High Court, while taking note of subsequent events, 
failed to consider
comparative hardship to the landlady - Rent 
Control and Eviction. 
Rent Control and Eviction - Landlord-tenant dispute - The 
legislations made for dealing with !::::dlord-tenant disputes are pro-
tenant - The court tends to bend tu"'"'ds the tenant in order to do 
;ustice - But in the process of doing justice, the court cannot be 
over-zealous' and forget its duty towards !h" landlord. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The legislations made for dealing with such 
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landlord-tenant disputes were pro-tenant as the court tends to 
bend towards the tenant in order to do justice with the tenant; 
but in the process of doing justice, the Court cannot be over 
zealous and forget its duty towards the landlord also as ultimately, 
it is the landlord who owns the property and is entitled tO 
possession of the same when he proves his bona fide beyond 
reasonable doubt. [Para 13] (904-B-C] 
2. Section 2l(l)(a) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings 
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 shows that 
the landlord of rented property is entitled to the vacant possession 
of his rented premises in the event of his bona fide requirement 
of the said premises for his own residential or professional 
requirements or for any person related to him. [Para 11] [902-E; 
903-A-B] 
3. Ordinarily, rights of the parties stand crystallised on 
th_e date of institution of the suit. However, the court has power 
to take note of the subsequent events and mould the relief 
accordingly. Though the court has the power to take note of the 
subsequent events, court has to consider the effect of subsequent 
development on the bona fide need of the landlord. [Paras 15, 
16] [904-E; 905-E-FJ 
Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 : 
(1981) 3 SCR 605; Ramesh Kumar v. Kesha Ram 
(1992) Suppl. (2) SCC 623: Om Prakash Gupta v. 
Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256 : [2002] 1 SCR 
359: Ram Kumar
Barnwal v. Ram Lakhan (Dead) 
(2007) 5 SCC 660 : [2007] 6 SCR 576 - relied on. 
Kedar Nath Agrawal and Anr. v. Dhanraji Devi and 
Anr. 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC) - referred to. 
4. For the purpose of coming to the conclusion on bona 
fide need of the landlord, comparative hardship to the parties 
will have to be taken into consideration. In the present case, the 
appellant got married during the pendency of the appeal and 
settled with her husband; still her requirement to accommodate 
her parents and grandparents continued. Appellant has established 
her hmw fide requirement for accommodating her parents and 
grandparents in the suit premises merely because the appellant
NIDHI v. RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS. 
got married amidst the proceedings, does not extinguish her claim 
for the relief of possession of the suit premises. Therefore, the 
subsequent event, namely, marriage of appellant does not 
extinguish her requirement considering the comparative 
hardship. The respondents have another business of sweet shop 
and thus, is not going to suffer, if- ordered to vacate the suit 
premises as they can shift the place of business to some other 
place without suffering any loss of occupation, whereas the parents 
of the appellant would be subjected to hardship as she has no 
other premises to accommodate her grandparents as well as her 
parents. While taking note of the subsequent events, the High 
Court has not considered the comparative hardship to the 
appellant and erred in declining the relief to the appellant. [Para 
16] [905-F-H; 906-A-B] 
Case Law Reference 
[1'!81] 3 SCR 605 
relied on 
Para 14 
(1992) Suppl. (2) sec 623 
relied on 
Para 14 
(2Q02] 1 SCR 359 
relied on 
Para 15 
(2Q07] 6 SCR 576 
relied on 
Para 15 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1008 
of2017. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2013 of the High 
Cou11 of Judicature at Allahabad in WRIA No. 19835 of2003. 
Anup Bhambhani, Sr. Adv., Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Vyom 
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Raghuvanshi, Advs. for the Appellant. 
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Arpit Maheshwari, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, Advs. for the 
Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R.
BANUMATHI, J. 1. This appeal by way of special leave is 
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preferred against the order dated 23.01.2013 passed by the High Court 
of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003, wherein 
the High Court affirmed the order passed by Additional District Judge, 
Moradabad, thereby setting aside release order dated 29.10.1991 passed 
by the Prescribed Authority. 
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2. Brief facts of the present case are that the appellant is the 
owner and landlord of the premises in question, which is a non-residential 
accommodation. Allegedly, the premises was let out by ancestors of the 
appellant's family when they did not require the premises for personal 
use as the previous owner of the accommodation Smt. Krishna Devi 
'vife of Kunwar Mahendra Pratap Singh had adequate place to reside 
in. After the demise of Smt. Krishna Devi, appellant Nidhi became the 
owner of the premises in question and continued to receive rent from 
the respondent. The appellant filed a release application being PCS No.97 
of 1987, under Section 2 l(l)(a) of Uttar .Pradesh Urban Buildings 
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred 
to as U.P. Act XIII of 1972), seeking possession of the suit premises on 
the ground of her bona fide personal requirement. The appellant alleged 
that she is in need of the premises as the appellant wants to accommodate 
her grandparents in the demised house who live in village and are in 
need of care and medical treatment. Moreover, the appellant alleged 
that she and her younger sister required separate room for study. It was 
alleged that the respondent carries out the said hotel business for 
namesake only and is being carried out by the servant of the respondent. 
It was further alleged by the appellant that the respondent's main
business 
is that of a sweet shop and he has sufficient means to take some other 
place on rent to run his hotel business. 
3. Respondent-tenant admitted the tenancy in the property in 
dispute and resisted the application for release of accommodation, 
claiming that the appellant and her sister live in a big house called Kath 
Mahal which has sufficient space comprising of large rooms and large 
halls. It was averred that the grandparents of the appellant are big landlords 
in the village and live in a palatial house there and they are unable to 
climb stairs in the suit premises. Also, the alleged business of sweet 
shop is run by his son and the entire family is dependent upon the income 
from hotel business. 
4. Upon consideration of evidence and on hearing the parties, 
the Prescribed Authority held that the balance of convenience lies in 
favourofthe appellant and taking into consideration the social status of 
family and that the grandparents of the appellant want to live with her 
parents, found that the appellant bona fide requires the premises and 
vide order dated 29. I 0.1991 allowed the application for release of suit 
premises. The Prescribed Authority directed the appellant-landlord to
NIDHJ v. RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS. 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
compensate the respondent by giving him a sum equivalent to two years 
ofrent before taking possession. 
5. Respondent-tenant challenged the aforesaid order by way of 
Rent Control Appeal No.72of1991 under Section 22 ofU.P. Act Xlll 
of 1972, before the Additional District Judge at Morada bad, who vi de 
order dated 04.02.2003, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed 
by the Prescribed Authority holding that the appellant's need for the suit 
premises is not based on bona fide requirement and her need for 
accommodation is not immediate or pressing. 
6.Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate court, the appellant 
filed Writ Appeal No.19835 of2003 before the High Court of Judicature 
at Allahabad. The High Court upon consideration of the facts and 
materials placed on record before it and after hearing the contentions of 
the parties before it dismissed the writ appeal holding that the relief 
claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent development in 
circumstances, become inappropriate. The High Court found that when 
the statement of appellant was recorded, she was a student of B.Sc. 
and was of marriageable age and as the matter went before the appellate 
authority, the situation changed as the Court noticed that the appellant 
was married on 23.01 .1996 and her husband was a member oflndian 
Revenue Service who was, at that time, posted at Delhi and subsequently 
in Mumbai. The High Court
also observed that the sisters of the appellant 
also got married and were living with their husbands, elsewhere and that 
the alleged need had disappeared long back. The High Court relied on . 
the judgments of this Court in Hasmat Rai vs. Ragltunatft Prasad 
( 1981) 3 SCC 103 and Kedar Nat ft Agrawal and Anr. vs. Dftanraji 
Devi and Anr. 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC), to take the cognizance of 
subsequent events. 
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the first 
appellate court and the High Court have erroneously denied the relief 
sought by the appellant in the release application only because during 
the pendency of the appeal filed by the respondent, the appellant got 
married which is a subsequent development which would naturally take 
place and the appellant cannot be made to suffer on account of delay in 
adjudication. It was further contended that only because the husband of 
the appellant has been allotted a government accommodation, the need 
of the appellant did not disappear as the appellant required the scheduled 
premises for her own use and occupation as well as for the use and 
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[2017] I S.C.R. 
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occupation of her family and the appel I ant requires the scheduled premises 
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for herself as well as for her parents and grandparents and her bona 
fide requirement has not been properly considered by the High Court. 
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted 
that this Court has in numerous cases held that in case of eviction on the 
ground of bona fide need and comparative hardship, the court must 
consider the subsequent changes in events to decide the bona fide 
requirement of the landlord. It was further submitted that in her release 
application, the appellant had set up her bona fide need but failed to 
substantiate her stand and hence the first appellate court and the High 
Court rightly dismissed the release application. 
9. We have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel 
for the parties and pernsed the impugned order and other materials on 
record. 
10. The point falling for consideration is whether the marriage of 
the appellant/landlady as subsequent event can extinguish the bona fide 
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requirement of a landlady and disentitle her for the relief sought in the 
release application filed prior to her marriage. 
11. Before proceeding fu11her, it is apposite to have a look over 
the related provision under Section 21(1) of the U.P. Act which deals 
with proceedings for release of building underoccupation of tenant, clause 
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(a) of sub-Section (I) of Section 21 of the Act alone
is germane in the 
present proceedings and the said clause reads as under:-
"21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation 
of tenant.- (I) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application 
of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction ofa tenant from 
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the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is 
satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely-
( a) 
thatthe building is bona fide required either in its existing 
forn1 or after den1olition and ne'v construction by the 
landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his 
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family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, 
either for residential purposes or for purposes of any 
profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the 
trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the 
trust; 
" 
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NIDHI v. RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS. 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
An analysis of the above provision would show that the landlord of rented 
property is entitled to the vacant possession of his rented premises in the 
event of his bona fide requirement of the said premises for his own 
residential or professional requirements or for any person related to him. 
12. In the facts of present case, the appellant-landlady herein 
was living in a small house with her family comprising four members 
and was not able to accommodate her ailing grandparents who used to 
visit them frequently for medication purposes and were willing to reside 
with them permanently as they were living alone in their village where 
nobody was there to look after them. Appel I ant in order to accommodate 
her grandparents with them and in the light of growing needs of her and 
her younger sister (who were then studying) filed the release application 
before the prescribed authority and the release order was granted by 
the prescribed authority in favour of the appellant/landlady directing 
respondent-tenant to handover vacant possession of suit premises to the 
appellant. As noticed earlier, during the pendency of appeal, preferred 
by the respondent-tenant, the appellant got married and settled with her 
husband. The first appellate court as wel I as the High Court took note of 
this as subsequent development and held that the requirement no longer 
subsists and the claim of personal requirement has
disappeared. Of 
course, during the pendency of !is between the parties, situation 
underwent a change and the appellant got married to an Indian Revenue 
Service Officer and started residing with him in Delhi and Mumbai etc. 
Though the appellant is married and settled with her husband, her bona 
fide requirement cannot be said to have ended as she wanted the premises 
not just for herself but to accommodate her parents and grandparents in 
the suit premises so that they can live together. The family of the appellant 
is still said to be residing in rented premises in Moradabad, despite having 
their own suit premises to reside in. In the facts of present case, the 
change in subsequent events is not such that would deprive the appellant 
of her right to vacant possession of suit premises as it is a natural event 
that the daughter of the house would get married and settle with her 
husband. Though the appellant has got married and shifted to different 
accommodation with her husband, the actual bona fide requirement of 
premises is still the same, since her parents and grandparents are still 
residing separately from each other with no one to look after them. 
More so, the appellant got married but the family stays where it is and 
the bona fide requirement of pre1nises for accommodation of parents 
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remains the same. Being married and shifting to other place does not 
automatically result in extinguishing of bona fide requirement of the 
appellant as being the owner of property, she alone is to decide what she 
wants to do with her property. 
13. The legislations made for dealing with such landlord-tenant 
dispute 3 were pro-tenant as the court tends to bend towards the tenant 
in order to do justice with the tenant; but in the process of doing justice 
the Court cannot be over zealous and forget its duty towards the landlord 
also as ultimately, it is the landlord who owns the property and is entitled 
to possession of the same when he proves his bona fide beyond 
reasonable doubt as it is in the case before this Court. 
I 4. First appellate court as well as the High Court observed that 
during the pendency of the appeal, the appellant got married, her husband 
a member of Indian Revenue Service (IRS) posted at Delhi, Mumbai 
and other places and this subsequent event has extinguished the personal 
requirement of the appellant. In the impugned judgment, the High Court 
referred to number of judgments Has111at Rai and Another vs. 
Raglw11atft Prasad (I 981) 3 SCC I 03; Ra111esft Kumar vs. Keslw 
Ram (I 992) Suppl. (2) SCC 623 and other judgments. 
15. Ordinarily, rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date 
of institution of the suit. However, the court has power to take note of 
the
subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly. Power of the 
court to take note of subsequent events came up for consideration in a 
number of decisions. In 0111 Prakash Gupta vs. Ranhir B. Goval 
(2002) 2 SCC 256, this Court held as under:-
"11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties 
stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, 
therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of 
the parties as they stood at the commencement of the !is. 
However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events 
and mould the reliefaccordingly subject to the following conditions 
being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by 
reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot 
be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or 
changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable 
complete justice bein:; done to the parties: and (iii) that such 
subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly
NIDHI v. RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS. 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the 
opposite party is not taken by surprise. In Pasupuleti 
· Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 
770 this Court held that a fact arising after the !is, coming to the 
notice of the court and having a fundamental impact on the right 
to relieforthe mannerof moulding it and brought diligently to the 
notice of the court cannot be blinked at. The court may in such 
cases bend the rules of procedure if no specific provision oflaw 
or rule of fair play is violated for it would promote substantial 
justice provided that there is absence of other disentitling factors 
or just circumstances. The Court speaking through Krishna Iyer, 
J. affirmed the proposition that the court can, so long as the 
litigation pends, take note ofupdated facts to promote substantial 
justice. However, the Court cautioned: (i) the event should be 
one as would stultify or render inept the decretal remedy, (ii) 
rules of procedure may be bent if no specific provision or fair 
play is violated and there is no other special circumstance repelling 
resort to that course in law or justice, (iii) such cognizance of 
subsequent events and developments should be cautious, and 
(iv) the rules of fairness to both sides should be scrupulously 
obeyed. 
Om Prakaslt Gupta's case was referred with approval in Ram 
Kumar Barnwal vs. Ram Lakltan (Dead) (2007) 5 SCC 660. 
I 6.
Though the court has the power to take note of the subsequent 
events, court has to consider the effect of subsequent development on 
the bona fide need of the landlord. For the purpose of coming to the 
conclusion on bona fide need of the landlord, comparative hardship to 
the parties will have to be taken into consideration. As discussed above, 
in the present case, the appellant got married during the pendency of the 
appeal and settled with her husband; still her requirement to accommodate 
her parents and grandparents continued. Appellant has established her 
bona fide requirement for accommodating her parents and grandparents 
in the suit premises merely because the appellant got married amidst the 
proceedings does not extinguish her claim for the relief of possession of 
the suit premises. In our view, the subsequent event, namely, marriage 
of appellant does not extinguish her requirement considering the 
comparative hardship, it is to be pointed out that the respondents have 
another business of sweet shop and thus, is not going to suffer if ordered 
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to vacate the suit premises as they can shift the place of business to 
some other place without suffering any loss of occupation, whereas the 
parents of the appel.lant would be subjected to hardship as she has no 
other premises to accommodate her grand parents as well as her parents. 
While taking note of the subsequent events, the High Court has not 
considered the comparative hardship to the appellant and erred in 
declining the relief to the appellant. 
17. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the 
High Court is set aside and the order passed by the prescribed authority 
i.e. Court of Second Upper Civil Judge, Moradabad dated 29.l 0.1991 is 
restored. The appellant shall deposit the compensation before the 
prescribed authority payable to the respondent within four weeks from 
today. The respondent shall handover the possession of the suit premises 
within one month from the date of deposit of the amount, failing which 
the respondent-tenant shall be liable for committing contempt of this 
Court. No costs. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal allowed.