RAMAWATAR versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[2021] 10 S.C.R. 499, Supreme Court of India, 2021
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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RAMAWATAR
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 1393 of 2011)
OCTOBER 25, 2021
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI, SURYA KANT AND
HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
Constitution of India: Art.142 – Prosecution case was that
there was property dispute between the two neighbours appellant
and complainant – Complaint was filed under SC/ST Act against
the appellant that he abused complainant with repeated reference
to her caste – Courts below convicted the appellant under SC/ST
Act – In the instant appeal, complainant filed an application for
compromise – Held: The record manifests that there was an
undeniable pre-existing civil dispute between the parties – Thus,
the genesis of the deprecated incident was civil/property dispute –
Nothing on record indicated that either before or after the purported
compromise, any untoward incident had transpired between the
parties – Complainant, on her own free will, without any compulsion,
entered into a compromise and wished to drop the criminal
proceedings against the appellant – Appellant and the complainant
were residents of the same village and lived in very close proximity
to each other – They themselves had voluntarily settled their
differences – Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healed
wounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent to
effectuate the settlement – By invoking the powers under Art.142,
the instant criminal proceedings are quashed with the sole objective
of doing complete
justice between the parties – Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Compromise/Settlement.
Constitution of India: Art.142 – Invocation of, for quashing
of criminal proceedings involving non-heinous crime on the basis
of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the
accused – Held: When considering a prayer for quashing on the
basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the
underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or
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diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere
fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not
refrain Supreme Court or the High Court, from exercising their
respective powers under Art.142 of the Constitution or s.482 Cr.P.C.
– Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482.
Constitution of India: Art.142 – Powers to quash the
proceedings, scope of – Ordinarily, when dealing with offences
arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will
be extremely circumspect in its approach – The SC/ST Act has been
specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and
harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes – Where it appears to the Court that the offence although
covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature,
or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of
the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal
proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court
can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings – Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989: Object of the Act – Held: The SC/ST Act has
been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and
harassment
against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes – The Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that
despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/
Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at
the hands of upper-castes – The Act has been enacted keeping in
view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Arts.15,
17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of
protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as
to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based
atrocities – Constitution of India – Arts.15, 17 and 21.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. This Court or the High Court, as the case may
be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and
the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a
settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of
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their respective constitutional/inherent powers. However, the
powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are
exercisable in post-conviction matters only where an appeal is
pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the
premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the
accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is
sub-judice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal
proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine-qua-non
to involve the superior court’s plenary powers to do complete
justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the
attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings
on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an
embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an
indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always
be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. The purpose
of these extra-ordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow-
hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to
do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).
[Paras 10, 13][508-H; 509-A-D]
Ramgopal & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2021
(11) SCALE 555 – affirmed.
2.1 Even though the powers of this Court under Article
142 are wide and far-reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a
vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions
contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation
on the
Court’s power to do “complete justice”. However, this is not to
say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions
or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated
to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use
of its power and discretion accordingly. [Para 14][509-D-E]
Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr.
(1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795 – followed.
2.2 Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of
special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely
circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically
enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment
RAMAWATAR v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
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against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The
Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite
undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands
of upper-castes. The Act has been enacted keeping in view the
express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17
and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting
the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to
provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based
atrocities. [Para 15][510-C-E]
2.3 On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that
the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act,
is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence
has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or
where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse
of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash
the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for
quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court
is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be
contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes
unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a
‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court,
from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C. In cases such as the present,
the Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the
complainant-victim has entered into the compromise on the
volition of his/her free will and not on account of any duress. It
cannot be understated that since members of the Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribe belong to the weaker sections of our country,
they are more prone to acts of coercion, and therefore ought to
be accorded a higher level of protection. If the Courts find even
a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the accused
party. What factors the Courts should consider, would depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. [Paras 16, 18]
[510-F-H; 511-C-E]
2.4 By invoking the powers under Article 142, the instant
Criminal proceedings are quashed with the sole objective of doing
complete justice between the parties for the reasons that: Firstly,
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the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is to deter
caste-based insults and intimidations when they are used with
the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging
to the Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe community. In the
present case, the record manifests that there was an undeniable
pre-existing civil dispute between the parties. Considering this
aspect, it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence as
one being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtle
undertones of criminality, even though the provisions of a special
statute have been attracted in the present case. Secondly, the
offence in question, for which the Appellant has been convicted,
does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aim of the
SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classes
from atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. It appears
that although the Appellant may not belong to the same caste as
the Complainant, he too belongs to the relatively weaker/backward
section of the society and is certainly not in any better economic
or social position when compared to the victim. Despite the
rampant prevalence of segregation in Indian villages whereby
members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community
are forced to restrict their quartes only to certain areas, it is
seen that in the present case, the Appellant and the Complainant
lived in adjoining houses. Therefore, keeping in mind the socio-
economic
status of the Appellant, the overriding objective of the
SC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if the present proceedings
are quashed. Thirdly, the incident occurred way back in the year
1994. Nothing on record indicates that either before or after the
purported compromise, any untoward incident had transpired
between the parties. The State Counsel has also not brought any
other occurrence that would lead to believe that the Appellant is
either a repeat offender or is unremorseful about what transpired.
Fourthly, the Complainant has, on her own free will, without any
compulsion, entered into a compromise and wishes to drop the
present criminal proceedings against the accused. Fifthly, given
the nature of the offence, it is immaterial that the trial against the
Appellant had been concluded. Sixthly, the Appellant and the
Complainant parties are residents of the same village and live in
very close proximity to each other. There is no reason to doubt
RAMAWATAR v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
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that the parties themselves have voluntarily settled their
differences. Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healed
wounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent to
effectuate the settlement. [Para 19][511-E-H; 512-A-H]
Hitesh Verma v. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
(2020) 10 SCC 710; Ram Lal & Anr. v. State of J&K
(1999) 2 SCC 213: [1999] 1 SCR 230; Surendra Nath
Mohanty & Anr. v. State of Orissa (1999) 5 SCC 238 :
[1999] 2 SCR 1005; Bankat & Anr. v. State of
Maharastra (2005) 1 SCC 343 : [2004] 6 Suppl.
SCR 406 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2020) 10 SCC 710
referred to
para 7
[1999] 1 SCR 230
referred to
para 8
[1999] 2 SCR 1005
referred to
para 8
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 406
referred to
para 8
2021 (11)  SCALE 555
affirmed
para 10
[1998] 2 SCR  795
followed
para 14
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No.1393 of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2010 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No.1684 of 1995.
Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Adv. for the Appellant.
Praneet Pranav, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Advs. for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURYA KANT, J.
A civil dispute over the ownership and possessory rights of a piece
of land between the Appellant and his neighbour Prembai took an ugly
turn when the Appellant allegedly not only threw a brick on the
Complainant but also made filthy and slur remarks on her caste, which
prompted the Complainant to lodge FIR No. 18/94 at Police Station O.E.
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Panna under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 (in short ‘SC/ST Act’) read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘I.P.C.’). The
Appellant and his co-accused were subsequently tried, which led to the
Appellant’s conviction under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act and
consequential sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment and fine of
Rs. 1000/-. The Appellant challenged his conviction and sentence before
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench but his appeal was
dismissed vide the impugned judgment dated 02.08.2010.
BRIEF FACTS:
2. Ramawatar (Appellant) and Prembai (Complainant), who are
neighbours and live in adjoining houses, were entangled in a property
dispute with respect to a portion of land over which Prembai’s house
was built. On 25.06.1994, Ramawatar and his brother Katulal @ Kuddu
(Co-accused) broke down a wall to make a door that opened into the
house of Prembai. When this was resisted by her, a quarrel ensued
between the parties and the Appellant threw a brick at the Complainant.
Thereafter, this incident was reported and a complaint was lodged at
Police Station, Devendra Nagar on the same date itself, and an M.L.C
was also performed. Since the nature of the injury was simple, and the
offence was found non-cognizable, the Police took no further steps. On
the following day, i.e., 26.06.1994, when the Complainant was sitting in
front of her residence,
the Appellant and his brother appeared at the
scene. They were visibly enraged by the fact that Prembai had lodged
an F.I.R. against them. They started abusing her with repeated reference
to her caste whilst also threatening her of dire consequences. After that,
the Complainant and her husband Chotelal reported this incident before
the Harijan Welfare Police Station, and the subject-F.I.R. under the SC/
ST Act was lodged against the Accused.
3. The investigation commenced in light of the afore-stated facts.
Upon collection of substantial evidence, Appellant and co-accused were
committed to trial under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act read with
Section 34 of the I.P.C.
4. The Trial Court noted that the Complainant belonged to the
‘Prajapati’ community which is a Scheduled Caste. It was also observed
that the parties had candidly admitted to a pending property dispute
between them. The Trial Court further discerned that the prosecution
witnesses had, by and large, supported the version of the Complainant
RAMAWATAR v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[SURYA KANT, J.]
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and had indubitably substantiated that Ramawatar and Kuddu used
deprecatory language upon the Complainant. It was found that the
Appellant had made specific reference to the Complainant’s caste
escorted by the intent to insult her. The actions of the Appellant & co-
accused Kuddu were thus held to be in contravention of Section 3(1)(x)
of the SC/ST Act read with Section 34 I.P.C. The Trial Court, therefore,
convicted both the accused persons for the said offences and sentenced
each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months.
5. Discontented with their conviction, the accused preferred an
appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench.
However, during the pendency of the proceedings, co-accused Kuddu
passed away, and the appeal only survived qua the present Appellant.
His primary contention before the High Court was that the abuses, if
any, were not meant to demean the Complainant on account of her being
a member of the Scheduled Caste community. Instead, the incident
occurred on account of a property dispute between the parties. It was
thus submitted that the alleged incident could not attract the provisions
of the SC/ST Act. However, after re-appraising the evidence on record,
the High Court disagreed with the Appellant’s contention and held that
there was sufficient material to establish that the Complainant being a
member of the Scheduled Caste community was humiliated by the
Appellant.
Thus, concurring with the findings of the Trial Court, the High
Court maintained the order of conviction and sentence passed against
the Appellant.
6. Aggrieved, the Appellant has approached this Court.
CONTENTIONS:
7. When the instant appeal came up for hearing, what prompted
this Court to issue notice was that the matter had been settled between
the parties, and the Complainant had filed an application for compromise.
Reiterating the same plea, learned Counsel for the Appellant canvassed
before us that the parties are residents of the same village and there is
no existing enmity between them. It was submitted that the parties wished
to settle their dispute so that they may continue to have cordial relations.
He drew our attention to a decision of this Court in Hitesh Verma v.
The State of Uttarakhand & Anr1, wherein, it was held that a property
dispute between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of
1 (2020) 10 SCC 710, ¶ 22 & 24
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upper caste would not attract an offence under the SC/ST Act, unless
the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant thus prayed for invocation of this
Court’s powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to quash the instant
criminal proceedings. The Appellant’s stand and the application for
compromise were fully supported by the learned Counsel for the
Complainant.
8. Per Contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent State, without
controverting the factum of compromise, vehemently opposed such a
recourse. It was contended that there was a concurrent finding of
conviction, and no substantial question of law was involved in the present
appeal. Referring to the decisions of this Court in the case of Ram Lal
& Anr v. State of J&K2, Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr v. State of
Orissa3 and Bankat & Anr v. State of Maharastra4, learned State
Counsel submitted that the purported settlement between the parties is
inconsequential as the offence in question is not compoundable in terms
of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
‘Cr.P.C’). It was thus argued that the present case did not warrant any
interference by this Court.
ANALYSIS:
9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length,
we are of the opinion that two questions fall for our consideration in the
present appeal. First, whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Article
142 of the Constitution can be invoked for
quashing of criminal proceedings
arising out of a ‘non-compoundable offence? If yes, then whether the
power to quash proceedings can be extended to offences arising out of
special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?
10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to
outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of
Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh5, wherein, a two-
Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI &
Surya Kant, J) was confronted with an identical question. Answering in
the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court under
Section 320 Cr.P.C cannot be construed as a proscription against the
2 (1999) 2 SCC 213
3 (1999) 5 SCC 238
4 (2005) 1 SCC 343
5 Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012
RAMAWATAR v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[SURYA KANT, J.]
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invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of
the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482
Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extra-
ordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be to
do complete justice. Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case
may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and
the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a settlement/
compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respective
constitutional/inherent powers.
11. The Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further postulated that criminal
proceedings involving non-heinous offences or offences which are
predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage of the
proceedings, including at the appellate level. The Court, however, being
conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may attempt to escape
their criminal liabilities by securing a compromise through brute force,
threats, bribes, or other such unethical and illegal means, cautioned that
in cases where a settlement is struck post-conviction, the Courts should,
inter-alia, carefully examine the fashion in which the compromise has
been arrived at, as well as, the conduct of the accused before and after
the incident in question. While concluding, the Court also formulated
certain guidelines and held:
“19…
Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide
amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing
criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of
the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of
the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between
the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused
persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported
offence and/or other relevant considerations.”
[Emphasis Applied]
12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision
of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and re-iterate that the powers of
this Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding
on the basis of a voluntary co\\mpromise between the complainant/victim
and the accused.
13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under
Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post-
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conviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the
other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction
does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies
and the finality is sub-judice before an appellate court. The pendency of
legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine-qua-non
to involve the superior court’s plenary powers to do complete justice.
Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all
legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a
compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated
to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a
settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about
its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extra-
ordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow-hearted agreements
between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting
genuine settlement(s).
14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be
noted that even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are
wide and far-reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True
it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot
be constructed as a limitation on the Court’s power to do “complete
justice”. However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore
the statutory provisions or other
express prohibitions in law. In fact, the
Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to
regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly. The Constitution
Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of
India & Anr6 has eloquently clarified this point as follows:
“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing
complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter
pending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead the
Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers
and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing
a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the
conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the
creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not
a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It is well
recognised and established that this Court has always been a law-
6 (1998) 4 SCC 409, ¶ 48
RAMAWATAR v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[SURYA KANT, J.]
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maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a
“problem-solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami v.
Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the
substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject-matter
of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while
making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional
powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory
provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be
exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with
what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly
with the subject.”
15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special
statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect
in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter
acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition
of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various
atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful
of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express
constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the
Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of
these
vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation
to the victims of caste-based atrocities.
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the
offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily
private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been
committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation
of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the
Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines,
when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/
settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the
Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question
goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a
‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from
exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
or Section 482 Cr.P.C.
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17. Adverting to the case in hand, we note that the present Appellant
has been charged and convicted under the unamended Section 3(1)(x)
of the SC/ST Act7, which was as follows:
“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities- (1) Whoever, not
being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—
xxxx
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place
within public view;
xxxx”
18. We may hasten to add that in cases such as the present, the
Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainant-
victim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free
will and not on account of any duress. It cannot be understated that
since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to
the weaker sections of our country, they are more prone to acts of
coercion, and therefore ought to be accorded a higher level of protection.
If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be
given to the accused party. What factors the Courts should consider,
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
19. Having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the present case in light of the afore-stated principles, as well as having
meditated on the application for compromise, we are inclined to invoke
the powers under Article 142 and quash the instant Criminal proceedings
with the sole objective of doing complete justice between
the parties
before us. We say so for the reasons that:
Firstly, the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is
to deter caste-based insults and intimidations when they are used with
the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to
the Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe community. In the present case,
the record manifests that there was an undeniable pre-existing civil dispute
between the parties. The case of the Appellant, from the very beginning,
has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely on account of
frustration and anger over the pending dispute. Thus, the genesis of the
deprecated incident was the afore-stated civil/property dispute.
7 Section 3(1)(x) of the Act stands substituted by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.01.2016.
RAMAWATAR v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[SURYA KANT, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2021] 10 S.C.R.
Considering this aspect, we are of the opinion that it would not be incorrect
to categorise the occurrence as one being overarchingly private in nature,
having only subtle undertones of criminality, even though the provisions
of a special statute have been attracted in the present case.
Secondly, the offence in question, for which the Appellant has
been convicted, does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aim
of the SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classes
from atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. It appears to us
that although the Appellant may not belong to the same caste as the
Complainant, he too belongs to the relatively weaker/backward section
of the society and is certainly not in any better economic or social position
when compared to the victim. Despite the rampant prevalence of
segregation in Indian villages whereby members of the Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict their quartes only
to certain areas, it is seen that in the present case, the Appellant and the
Complainant lived in adjoining houses. Therefore, keeping in mind the
socio-economic status of the Appellant, we are of the opinion that the
overriding objective of the SC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if the
present proceedings are quashed.
Thirdly, the incident occurred way back in the year 1994. Nothing
on record indicates that either before or after the purported
compromise,
any untoward incident had transpired between the parties. The State
Counsel has also not brought to our attention any other occurrence that
would lead us to believe that the Appellant is either a repeat offender or
is unremorseful about what transpired.
Fourthly, the Complainant has, on her own free will, without any
compulsion, entered into a compromise and wishes to drop the present
criminal proceedings against the accused.
Fifthly, given the nature of the offence, it is immaterial that the
trial against the Appellant had been concluded.
Sixthly, the Appellant and the Complainant parties are residents
of the same village and live in very close proximity to each other. We
have no reason to doubt that the parties themselves have voluntarily
settled their differences. Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healed
wounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent to
effectuate the present settlement.

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CONCLUSION:
20. Consequently, and for the aforementioned reasons, we find it
appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
and quash the criminal proceedings to do complete justice between the
parties. As a sequel thereto, judgment and orders passed by the Trial
Court and the High Court are set aside. Bail bonds, if any, are discharged.
The appeal is allowed in above terms.
Devika Gujral
Appeal allowed.
RAMAWATAR v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[SURYA KANT, J.]