INDRA DALAL versus STATE OF HARYANA
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 1083, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 1083 
INDRADALAL 
v. 
STATE OF HARYANA 
(CriminalAppeal No.1261 of2009) 
MAY29, 2015 
[A.K. SIKRI AND UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860: s. 302 r/w. s. 1208 - Contract killing;.... 
A 
B 
Accused came on a scooter to victim-deceased's house and c 
fired at his chest and head- Thereafter he threw the pistol at 
the spot and ran away on the scooter- Previous grudge of 
appellants-accused alleged - Conviction recorded against 
appellants primarily on the basis of their confessional 
statements and recovery of scooter from the house of D 
appellant no. 1 - Held: The confessional statements were 
recorded when these accused were in police custody- Such 
statements were inadmissible having regard to ss. 25 and 26 
-
The information provided by all the accused/appellants in 
the form of confessional statements, had not led to any E 
discovery - Recovery of scooter was made in the absence 
of appellant - This recovery was pursuant to the statement 
made by PW-2, the brother of the deceased and not on the 
basis of any disclosure statements made by these appellants 
- Likewise, insofar as confessional statement allegedly given F 
by appellant-J was concerned, that was again in another FIR 
-
Therefore, the situation contemplated uls. 27 of the 
Evidence Act also did not get attracted - Even if the scooter 
was recovered pursuant to the disclosure statement, it would G 
have made the fact of recovery of scooter only, as admissible 
uls.27 of the Evidence Act,
and it would not have made the 
so-called confessional statements admissible which cannot 
be held as proved against them - Prosecution failed to prove 
1083 
H
1084 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A beyond reasonable doubt, the charge of conspiracy against 
appellants - Conviction set aside - Evidence Act, 1872 -
ss25 to 27. 
Evidence Act, 1872: ss.25 and 26- Philosophy behind 
B - Discussed. 
c 
Words and phrases: 'Confession' - Meaning of -
Discussed. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. The prosecution had produced one 
witness (PW-7), who was allegedly the witness of 
conspiracy. However, during trial, he was declared 
hostile. Therefore, there was no witness to this 
D conspiracy. No doubt, such conspiracies are normally 
hatched in dark and clandestinely and there may not be 
any eye witnesses. The conviction was recorded by the 
trial court and upheld by the High Court against these 
appellants primarily on the basis of their confessional 
E statements and recovery of the scooter from the house 
of appellant-I. The philosophy behind Sections 25 and 
26 of the Evidence Act is acceptance of a harsh reality 
that confessions are extorted by the police' officers by 
F practicing oppression and torture or even inducement 
and, therefore, they are unworthy of any crodence. The 
provision absolutely excludes from evidence against the 
accused a confession made by him to a pc>lice officer. 
The word 'confession' has no where been defined. 
G However, the courts have resorted to the dictionary 
meaning and explained that incriminating statements by 
the accused to the police suggesting the inference of 
the commission
of the crime would amount to confession 
and, therefore, inadmissible under this provision. It is also 
H defined to mean a direct acknowledgment of guilt and
INDRADALALv. STATE OF HARYANA 
1085 
not the admission of any incriminating fact, however A 
grave or conclusive. Section 26 of the Evidence Act 
makes all those confessions inadmissible when they are 
made by any person, whilst he is in the custody of a 
police officer, unless such a confession is made in the 
immediate presence of a Magistrate. Therefore, when a B 
person is in police custody, the confession made by him 
even to a third person, that is other than a police officer, 
shall also become inadmissible. In the present case, not 
only the confessions were made to a police officer, such 
confessional statements were made by the appellants C 
after their arrest while they were in police custody. The 
courts below had relied upon these confessions on the 
basis of these statements, coupled with 'other connected 
evidence available on the record', particularly the 0 
recovery of the scooter from the old house of appellant-
! and the disclosure/confessional statement made by 
· appellant-J in another case which was proved by 
Inspector PW-15. This approach of the High Court is 
contrary to law. [Para 14, 16 to 20] [1093-F-H; 1094-H; E 
1095-A, C-G; 1096-G-H; 1097-A-B] 
2. It is clear that Section 27 is in the form of proviso 
to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. It makes it 
clear that so much of such information which is received 
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of F 
a police officer, which has led to discovery of any fact, 
may be used
against the accused. Such information as 
given must relate distinctly to the fact discovered. In the 
present case, the information provided by all the G 
accused/ appellants in the form of confessional 
statements, has not led to any discovery. The recovery 
of scooter is not related to the confessional statements 
allegedly made by the appellants. This recovery was 
pursuant to the statement made by PW-2, the brother of H 
the deceased. It was not on the basis of any disclosure
1086 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A statements made by these appellants. Likewise, insofar 
as confessional statement allegedly given by appellant-
J is concerned, that is again in another FIR. Therefore, 
the situation contemplated under Section 27 of the 
Evidence Act also does not get attracted. Even if the 
B scooter was recovered pursuant to the disclosure 
statement, it would have made the fact of recovery of 
scooter only, as admissible under Section 27 of the 
Evidence Act, and it would not make the so-called 
confessional statements of the appellants admissible 
C which cannot be held as proved against them. [Para 23] 
[1097-F-H; 1098-A-D] 
3. PW-17, the Investigating Officer deposed in his 
statement that on July 13, 2001, the scooter allegedly 
D used in the offence was recovered from the, house of 
appellant-I. It was parked in verandah and the same was 
taken into possession. On July 13, 2001, appellant-I was 
in jail, as she was arrested on June 02, 2001, when the 
so-called recovery was made. Recovery was, thus, made 
· E in her absence. PW-17 had earlier gone to the house of 
appellant-I immediately after the incident, but did not find 
any scooter. If the registration number of the sc:ooterwas 
given by PW-2 during investigation and the Investigating 
Officer had visited the house of appellant-I, how he could 
F not find the scooter parked there with the same number 
on that date. All these facts cast a shadow of doubt on 
the alleged recovery of
scooter from the house of 
appellant-I. Appellant-J has denied that the scooter in 
question belonged to him. In order to prove his 
G ownership, the prosecution had produced PW-18, 
Registration Clerk with Regional Transport Office. No 
documents were produced to show the ownership of 
appellant-J. Only the report prepared by the clerk, 
H allegedly on the basis of the record, is produced. That 
cannot partake the character of primary evidence. There
INDRADALALv. STATE OF HARYANA 
1087 
is no sufficient evidence to prove the ownership of the A 
scooter in the name of appellant-J. The entire bucket of 
evidence is either inadmissible putting the roadblock 
creating by the Evidence Act or unbelievable/ 
untrustworthy. The prosecution has miserably failed to 
prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the charge of B 
conspiracy against these appellants with the aid of 
Section 120-B of IPC. [Paras 28 to 30] [1101-D, E-H; 1102-
A-H; 1103-A] 
Bul/u Das v. State of Bihar (1998) 8 SCC 130; Mohd. C 
Khalid v. State of West Bengal (2002) 7 SCC 334; Firozuddin 
Basheeruddin & Ors. v. State of Kera/a (2001) 7 SCC 596; 
State v. Nalini 1999 (3) SCR 1 : (1999) 5 SCC 253 - relied 
on. 
D 
Case Law Reference 
(1998) 8 sec 130 
relied on. 
Para 19 
(2002) 1 sec 334 
relied on. 
Para 24 
(2001) 1 sec 596 
relied on. 
Para25 
E 
1999 (3) SCR 1 
relied on. 
Para 20 
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 
No. 1261 of2009 etc. 
F 
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.03.2009 of the 
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal 
Appeal No. 311-DB of2008. 
WITH 
Crl. A. No. 1620 of 2009 
Crl.A. No. 1189 of2011 
G 
Sushil Kumar, Sanjay Jain, Sudarshan Singh Rawat, 
Harpuneet Singh Rai, Daya Krishan Sharma for the Appellant. 
H
1088 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
Deepak Thukral, Dr. Monika Gusain, Vishwa Pal Singh, 
Rajeev Kr. Singh for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
B 
A.K. SIKRI, J. 1) First Information Report (FIR) No. 99 
dated May 24, 2001 was registered at Police Station: City 
Dadri, Haryana. In this FIR, five persons were implicated and 
made accused for committing the murder of orn~ Nand Karan 
(hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'). Out of them, three 
c appellants are before us who were tried together and convicted 
for the said offence by the Sessions Court vide judgment dated 
April 11, 2008, followed by the order of sentenGe dated April 
12, 2008 sentencing them for life imprisonment and also to 
pay a fine of 10,000 each for commission of the offence 
D punishable under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the 
Indian Penal Code, 1860. In default of payment of fine, it was 
directed that they would undergo simple impri:sonment for a 
period of one year each. One more person was also made 
accused and tried with these appellants. However, he was 
E acquitted of the charges framed against him. Fifth person, 
Udeyveer@ Udey@ Sandeep, who was also an accused in 
the said charge-sheet, was convicted by a separate judgment 
pronounced on the same date, i.e. on April 11, 2008, and given 
the identical sentence. All the four convicted persons appealed 
F to the High Court. The High Court dismissed these appeals 
affirming the conviction and
sentence passed by the learned 
Additional Sessions Judge-II, Bhiwani. Udeiyveer has not 
preferred any further appeal. The three appellants before us 
in these three appeals, however, chose to challenge the 
G judgment of the High Court by filing special leave petitions, in 
which leave was granted earlier. 
2) Now, we take note of the case of the prosecution, in 
brief, which can be safely culled out from the impugned 
H judgment of the High Court as there is no dispute that the said
INDRA DALAL v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1089 
(A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
judgment correctly records the prosecution version: 
A 
3) The deceased Nand Karan, a retired Master, and his 
wife Suraj Kaur, were residing in the house known as 'Lal Kothi' 
situated on the Loharu Road, Dadri. On May 24, 2001, at 
about 8.00 p.m., the deceased, his wife and his brother Harish B 
Chander Godara were present in the house. While the 
deceased's wife was watering the plants in the lawn, the 
deceased inside the room and his brother on the roof, one 
young boy aged about 22-25 years, came on a scooter. He 
told Su raj Kaur that he had come from Rohtak and wanted to C 
meet Master Nand Karan. When she was talking with that 
' 
boy, the deceased came out of the house to the gate. Su raj 
Kaur told the deceased that a boy had come to meet him. 
Soon thereafter, the boy took out a pistol from his pant's pocket 
and fired at the deceased on his chest. Another shot was fired D 
at the head of the deceased. The deceased fell down crying. 
After hearing the sound of shots fired, Harish Chander Godara, 
brother of the deceased, immediately came down to the spot. 
After throwing the pistol at the spot, the boy ran away on the 
scooter on which he came. After the occurrence, many E 
persons, including Suresh Kumar, s/o. Hoshiar Singh, and 
Jaipal, s/o. Kamal Singh, reached the spot. After arranging 
vehicle, they took the deceased to the hospital, where he was 
declared dead. Dr. H.L. Beniwal (PW-3), who attended
the F 
deceased at the hospital, declared him dead and sent a ruqqa 
(Exhibit PE) to the Station House Officer, Dadri Police Station 
at 9.10 p.m., regarding the dead body being brought by Suresh 
Kumar and Jaipal. 
4) In the hospital, statement of Suraj Kaur (Exhibit PA) was G 
recorded by Sub-Inspector Ram Chander (PW-17) on May 24, 
2001 at 11.00 p.m. In her statement, she narrated the 
abovesaid occurrence and further stated that her husband was 
got murdered by Dr. Indra Dalal, her brother Bijender@ Vijay H 
. and Mahabir, through some unknown person, by hatching a
1090 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A conspiracy. The cause of grudge, as stated by her, was that 
an allegation of murder was levelled by them against her 
husband, her son Ravinder Kumar and one Sandeep, s/o. 
Mahabir Singh and in that regard a criminal trial under Section 
302 IPC was pending. Her son and Sandeep are in jail in 
B connection with the alleged murder. However, her husband was 
released on bail about three months back. Due to the said 
grudge, Indra Dalal, her brother Bijender@Vijay and Mahabir 
committed the murder of her husband by hiring a contract killer 
in a conspiracy. On the basis of the said statement, FIR 
C (Exhibit PA/1) was registered at Police Station Dadri on May 
24, 2001 at 11.10 p.m. Special report of the said FIR was 
received by the area Magistrate at 12.30 a.m. on May 25, 2001. 
5) On May 25, 2001, post mortem of the deceased was 
D conducted by Dr. Anil Chaudhary (PW-4 ), Dr. H. L. Beniwal and 
Dr. Giri Raj. They found two gun shot injuries on the body of the 
deceased, one on the chest and the other on the brain. One 
pallet each was got removed from those injuries. In the post 
mortem report (Exhibit PF), the cause of death ofthe deceased 
E was stated to be haemorrhage and shock due to gun shot injury 
on vital organs. 
6) The prosecution case, thus, in nutshell is this: One 
Dipender@ Banti, who was the son of the appellant Indra Dalal 
F and nephew of Bijender, was murdered, in which deceased 
Nand Karan was implicated
along with his sons, namely, 
Ravinder Kumar and Sandeep, who were even in jail in that 
connection. In order to take revenge, the appellants Indra Dalal 
and her brothers Bijender and Mahabir had hatched a 
G conspiracy to kill Nand Karan, for which they enticed Udeyveer 
and got him murdered through him. 
7) Investigation was conducted on the basis of the 
aforesaid FIR. During the investigation, statements of Suresh 
H and Harish Chander Godara were recorded. Harish Chander
INDRADALAL v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1091 
[AK. SIKRI, J.) 
Godara mentioned that the registration number of the scooter, A 
on which the assailant Udeyveer came, was HR 20G 1102. 
The clothes of the deceased, one fired bullet, one cartridge of 
fired bullet were seized along with certain other articles, on 
which CFL report was obtained. Post mortem was conducted 
on the body of the deceased. 
B 
8) On May 31, 2001, appellant Bijenderwas arrested. He 
allegedly made a disclosure/confessional statement (Exhibit 
PH) admitting the aforesaid conspiracy and motive for 
committing the murder of the deceased. On June 02, 2001, C 
appellant Indra Dalal was arrested and she also made a similar 
disclosure/confessional statement (Exhibit PT). On the same 
day, another confessional statement (Exhibit PK) was made 
by Bijender. 
9) As per the investigation, Police recorded the statement 
of one Pradeep Kumar, s/o. Daya Nand, on July 07, 2001, 
who was a resident of Charkhi Dadri. He stated that on May 
27, 2001, he had went to the clinic of the appellant Indra Dalal 
D. 
for medical checkup of his wife. At that time, Bijender came E 
there and both the appellants went inside. When she did not 
come out for some time, Pradeep Kumar went near the door, 
which was slightly open, and heard the talks of both the 
appellants, as per which Bijender·was telling Indra Dalal that 
he had engaged Udeyveer for killing Nand Karan. During F 
investigation, a cream colour LML scooter bearing registration
No. ~R 20G 1102 wa~ recovered on July 13, 2001 from the 
old house of Indra Dalal vide recovery Exhibit PD. 
10) Thereafter, the other appellant Jaibir was arrested on G 
December 10, 2001, who also gave his disclosure/ 
confessional statement (Exhibit PL) to the same effect as was 
given by the other two appellants Indra Dalal and Bijender. He 
further stated that he had given the scooter in question to 
Udeyveer and Ramesh for that purpose. On his naming H
1092 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A Ramesh, he was also arrested and his disclosure/ confessional 
statement (Exhibit PO) was recorded on December 23, 2001 
on the same lines. After investigation, challan was filed against 
these accused persons, except Udeyveer, who could not be 
arrested and was declared a proclaimed offender. However, 
B during the pendency of the trial, Udeyveer was also arrested 
on February 07, 2004. His disclosure/confessional statement 
(Exhibit PN) was recorded as well. 
11) During the trial, in the challan/case filed against these 
C appellants and also against Ramesh, the prosecution 
examined eighteen witnesses. These include Suraj Kaur/ 
complainant (PW-1 ), who supported the prosecution version, 
Harish ChanderGodara, brother of the deceased (PW-2), who 
had also supported the prosecution version, Dr. H.L. Beniwal 
D (PW-3), who had sent ruqqa (Exhibit PE) to the Station House 
Officer, Police Station Dadri, Dr. Anil Chaudhary (PW-4), who 
conducted the post mortem of the deceased, and Pradeep 
Kumar (PW-7), who was the alleged witness of conspiracy, 
but he did not support the prosecution version and was 
E declared hostile. Other witnesses were mostly police officials 
who proved one or the other disclosure/confessional 
statements of these accused persons as well as the 
Investigating Officer who conducted the investigation. Guiab 
F Singh (PW-18), Registration Clerk with the Regional Transport 
Office, was also produced, who
stated that as per the rec~rd, 
Jaibir s/o. Kanshi Ram, was the owner of the scooter which 
was seized by the Police. In the statements of the accused 
persons recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal 
G Procedure, 1973, all of them stated that they were innocent 
and were falsely implicated in the case. They also pleaded 
that their confessional statements were recorded by putting 
pressure upon them to compromise the matter of murder of 
son of Indra Dalal. 
H 
12) Supplementary charge-sheet was filed against
INDRA DALAL v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1093 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
accused Udeyveer, in which the prosecution examined A 
seventeen witnesses. However, since Udeyveer has not filed 
any appeal, we are eschewing the discussion pertaining to 
the evidence appearing against him. 
13) As mentioned above, the trial court acquitted only B 
Ramesh and convicted all other accused persons and the High 
Court has affirmed the same. The reading of the impugned 
judgment of the High Court would disclose that major portion 
of the judgment is devoted to the alleged role of accused 
Udeyveer and the Court came to the conclusion that there was C 
sufficient evidence against him proving his guilt, who had 
actually murdered the deceased. Insofar as the appellants are 
concerned, admittedly they have not taken active part in the 
commission of crime, namely, there is no actus reus. However, 
they have been implicated as the accused who actively hatched D 
conspiracy to murder the deceased and for this purpose hired 
the assassin Udeyveerfor a consideration of 3,00,000/-. Thus, 
the central issue in these appeals, qua these appellants, is as 
to whether the prosecution has been able to prove the 
involvement of the appellants with the aid of Section 120-B of E 
thelPC. 
14)As mentioned above, the prosecution had produced 
one witness, Pradeep Kumar (PW-7), who was allegedly the 
witness of conspiracy. However, during trial, he did not support F 
the prosecution version and was declared hostile.
Therefore, 
there is no witness -to this conspiracy. No doubt, such 
conspiracies are normally hatched in dark and clandestinely 
and there may not be any eye witnesses. We have to see from 
the circumstantial evidence or other evidence produced as to G 
whether such a charge is established or not. In the present 
case, the conviction is recorded by the trial court and upheld 
by the High Court against these appellants primarily on the 
basis of their confessional statements and recovery of the H 
scooter from the house of Indra Dalal. Therefore, it is to be
1094 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A examined as to whether conviction could be sustained on the 
basis of such statements. 
15) Mr. Sushi! Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing 
for the appellants Indra Dalal and Bijender, argued that these 
B confessional statements were admittedly recorded after the 
arrest of these accused and when these accused were in police 
custody. Therefore, such statements were inadmissible having 
regard to the provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872. Section 25 of the Evidence Act mandates 
C so, in certain and unequivocal terms, as is clear from the 
language thereof. It reads as follows: 
"25. Confession to police officer not to be proved. -
No confession made to a police officer shall be proved 
o 
as against a person accused of any offence." 
E 
F 
G 
Likewise, Section 26 makes any such statement 
inadmissible if given when in police custody. It reads: 
"26. Confession by accused while in custody of 
police not to be proved against him. - No confession 
made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-
officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a 
Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. 
Explanation. - In this section "Magistrate" does not 
include the head of a village discharging magisterial 
functions (in the Presidency of Fort St. George or 
elsewhere), unless such headman is a Magistrate 
exercising the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of 
Criminal
Procedure, 1882." 
16) The philosophy behind the aforesaid provision is 
acceptance of a harsh reality that confessions are extorted by 
the police officers by practicing oppression and torture or even 
H inducement and, therefore, they are unworthy of any credence.
INDRA DALAL v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1095 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
The provision absolutely excludes from evidence against the A 
accused a confession made by him to a police officer. This 
provision applies even to those confessions which are made 
to a police officer who may not oth.erwise be acting as such. If 
he is a police officer and confession was made in his 
presence, in whatever capacity, the same becomes B 
inadmissible in evidence. This is the substantive rule of law 
enshrined under this provision and this strict rule has been 
reiterated countlessly by this Court as well as the High Courts. 
17) The word 'confession' has no where been defined. C 
However, the courts have resorted to the dictionary meaning 
and explained that incriminating statements by the accused to 
the police suggesting the inference of the commission of the 
crime would amount to confession and, therefore, inadmissible 
under this provision. It is also defined to mean a direct D 
acknowledgment of guilt and not the admission of any 
incriminating fact, however grave or conclusive. Section 26 of 
the Evidence Act makes all those confessions inadmissible 
when they are made by any person, whilst he is in the custody 
of a police officer, unless such a confession is made in the E 
immediate presence of a Magistrate. Therefore, when a 
person is in police custody, the confession made by him even 
to a third person, that is other than a police officer, shall also 
become inadmissible. 
F 
18) In the
present case, as pointed out above, not only the 
confessions were made to a police officer, such confessional 
statements were made by the appellants after their arrest while 
they were in police custody. In Bullu Das v. State of Bihar1, 
while dealing with the confessional statements made by G 
accused before a police officer, this Court held as under: 
"7. The confessional statement, Ex.5, stated to have been 
1 (1998) s sec 130 
H
1096 
A 
8 
c 
D 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 7 S.C.R. 
made by the appellant was before the pollice officer in 
charge of the Godda Town Police Station where the 
offence was registered in respect of the murder of Kusum 
Devi. The FIR was registered at the police station on 8-8-
1995 at about 12.30 p.m. On 9-8-1995, it was after the 
appellant was arrested and brought before Rakesh Kumar 
that he recorded the confessional statement of the 
appellant. Surprisingly, no objection was taken by the 
defence for admitting it in evidence. The trial court also 
did not consider whether such a confessional statement 
is admissible in evidence or not. The High Court has also 
not considered this aspect. The confessional statement 
was clearly inadmissible as it was made by an accused 
before a police officer after the investigation had started." 
19) Notwithstanding the same, the trial court as well as 
the High Court had relied upon these confessions on the basis 
of these statements, coupled with 'other connected evidence 
available on the record', particularly the recovery of the scooter 
from the old house of accused Indra Dalal and the disclosure/ 
E confessional statement (Mark A) made by Jaibir in another 
case bearing FIR No. 718 dated November 30, 2001 
registered under Sections 420/407/463/471/120-B IPC and 
Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act, 1959 registered at Police 
F Station: Civil Lines, Hisar, which has been proved by Inspector 
RamAvatar(PW-15). 
20) What follows
from the above reasoning given by the 
High Court is that the confessional statements were supported 
with other evidence. Though the High Court has mentioned 
G 'other connected evidence', what is relied upon is the recovery 
of scooter and the disclosure/confessional statement made 
by Jaibir in some other case. No other evidence is pointed 
out by the High Court. On our specific query to the learned 
H counsel for the State during the arguments, he also conceded 
that the only 'connected evidence available on record' was
INDRA DALAL v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1097 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
the recovery of scooter and the confessional statement (Mark A 
A) made by Jaibir in FIR No. 718 dated November 30, 2001. 
This approach of the High Court relying upon the confessional 
statements, otherwise inadmissible, with the aid of 'other 
connected evidence' is contrary to law. We harbour serious 
doubts about basing criminal punishment on such an B 
, 
unapproach, not permissible in law. This conclusion gets 
strengthened as we proceed to discuss the nuances of legal 
principles and its application to the factual canvas herein. 
21) The question is as to whether these could be taken c 
into consideration to believe the confessional statements by 
the appellants, which were otherwise inadmissible in law. 
22) The only portion of the information contained in the 
conf~ssional statements that may be proved is provided under D 
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, which reads as under: 
"27. How.much of information received from accused 
may be proved. - Provided that, when any fact is deposed 
to as discovered in consequence of information received E 
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a 
police officer, so much of such information, whether it 
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the 
fact thereby discovered, may be proved." 
23) It is clear that Section 27 is in the form of proviso to F 
Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act . It makes it clear that 
so much of such
information which is received from a person 
accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, which 
has led to discovery of any fact, may be used against the G 
accused. Such information as given must relate distinctly to 
the fact discovered. In the present case, the information 
provided by all the accused/ appellants in the form of 
confessional statements, has not led to any discovery. More 
starkly put, the recovery of scooter is not related to the H
1098 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[20'15] 7 S.C.R. 
A confessional statements allegedly made by the appellants. This 
recovery was pursuant to the statement made by Harish 
Chander Godara. It was not on the basis of any disclosure 
statements made by these appellants. Likewise, insofar as 
confessional statement (Mark A) allegedly given by Jaibir is 
B concerned, that is again in another FIR. We shall come to its 
admissibility separately. Therefore, the situation contemplated 
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act also does not get 
attracted. Even if the scooter was recovered pursuant to the 
disclosure statement, it would have made the fact of recovery 
C of scooter only, as admissible under Section 27 of the 
Evidence Act, and it would not make the so-called confessional 
statements of the appellants admissible which cannot be held 
as proved against them. 
D 
24) At this juncture, let us discuss as to whether the 
disclosure/ confessional statement (Mark A) made by appellant 
Jaibir in another case would be relevant to prove the charge 
of conspiracy. It would be pertinent to point out that this 
statement is made by Jaibir much after the incident, when, 
E naturally, the common intention had ceased to exist. On this 
ground alone it would not be admissible. We would like to 
refer to the judgment of this Court in Mohd. Khalidv. State of 
West Sengaflwherein this Court held: 
F 
"33. In view of what we have said about the confessional 
statement it is not necessary to go into
the question as to 
whether the statement recorded under Section 164 of the 
Code has to be given credence even if the c:onfessional 
G 
statement has not been recorded under Section 15 of the 
TADA Act. However, we find substance in the stand of 
learned counsel for the accused- appellants that Section 
10 of the Evidence Act which is an exception to the general 
rule while permitting the statement made by one 
H 
2 (2002) 1 sec 334
INDRA DALAL v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1099 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
conspirator to be admissible as against other conspirator A 
restricts it to the statements made during the period when 
the agency subsisted. In State of Gujarat v. Mohd. Atik 
[(198) 4 sec 351] it was held thatthe principle is no longer 
res integra that any statement made by an accused after 
his arrest, whether as a confession or otherwise, cannot B 
fall within the ambit of Section 10 of the Evidence Act. 
Once the common intention ceased to exist, any statement 
made by a former conspirator thereafter cannot be 
regarded as one made in reference to their common 
intention. In other words, the post-arrest statement made C 
to a police officer, whether it is a confession or otherwise 
touching his involvement in the conspiracy, would not fall 
within the ambit of Section 10 of the Evidence Act." 
25) Likewise, in Firozuddin Basl1eeruddin & Ors. v. 
D 
State ofKera/a3·this Court discussed the law of conspiracy 
exhaustively and following passages therefrom would be 
sufficient to elucidate the legal position enshrined in Sections 
120-A and 120-B of the IPC: 
E 
"25. Conspiracy is not only a substantive crime, it also 
serves as a basis for holding one person liable for the 
crimes of others in cases where application of the usual 
doctrines of complicity would not render that person liable. 
Thus, one who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is F 
liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed 
by
every other member of the conspiracy in furtherance of 
its objectives, whether or not he knew of the crimes or 
aided in their commission. The rationale is that criminal 
acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy may be 
sufficiently dependent upon the encouragement and 
support of the group as a whole to warrant treating each 
member as a casual agent to each act. Under this view, 
' (2001 > 1 sec 596 
G 
H
1100 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
which of the conspirators committed the substantive 
offence would be less significant in determining the 
defendant's liability than the fact that th1~ crime was 
performed as a part of a larger division of labour to which 
the accused had also contributed his efforts. 
B 
26. Regarding admissibility of evidence, loosened 
,standards prevail in a conspiracy trial. Contrary to the 
usual rule; in conspiracy prosecutions, any declaration by 
one conspirator, made in furtherance of a conspiracy and 
C 
during its pendency, is admissible against each co-
conspirator. Despite the unreliability of hearsay evidence, 
it is admissible in conspiracy prosecutions. Explaining 
this rule, Judge Hand said: 
o 
"Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the 
law of evidence, but of the substantive law of crime. When 
men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they 
become ad hoc agents for one another, and have made 
'a partnership in crime'. What one does pursuant to their 
E 
common purpose, all do, and as declarations may be such 
acts, they are competent against all. (Van Riperv. United 
States, 13 F 2d 961, 967 (2d Cir 1926))." 
27. Thus conspirators are liable on an agemcy theory for 
F 
statements of co-conspirators, just as they are for the overt 
acts and crimes committed by their confreres." 
26) The Court also noted the earlier judgment in the case. 
of State v. Na/inf' wherein the principles governing the law of
G conspiracy had been summarized. Those principles are 
reproduced in para 32 of the judgment. For our purposes, 
principle No.2 is reproduced as under: 
"2. Acts subsequent to the achieving of the object of 
H • (1999) s sec 253
INDRA DALAL v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1101 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
conspiracy may tend to prove that a particular accused A 
was party to the conspiracy. Once the object of conspiracy 
has been achieved, any subsequent act, which may be 
unlawful, would not make the aecused a part of the 
conspiracy like giving shelter to an absconder." 
Thus, the alleged disclosure/confessional statement (Mark 
A) made by Jaibir in another case would be of no 
consequence. 
B 
27) With this, we now discuss the evidentiary value of the c 
recovery of scooter. 
28) Sub-Inspector Ram Chander, who was the 
Investigating Officer and who appeared as PW-17, deposed 
in his statement that on July 13, 2001, the scooter Jn question, D 
which was allegedly used in the offence, was recovered from . 
the house of Indra Dalal. It was parked in verandah and the 
same was taken into possession vide recovery memo Exhibit 
PD. It is important to n6te that on July 13, 2001, appellant 
Indra Dalal was in jail, as she was arrested on June 02, 2001, E 
when the so-called recovery was made. Recovery was, thus, 
made in her absence. Harish Chander Godara, brother of the 
deceased, appeared as PW-2. According to him, he was at 
the roof of the house at the time when a boy came and shot at 
his brother. He rushed from upstairs to the ground floor and F 
saw the boy leaving on scooter towards the town. He noted 
down the number of the scooter which was HR 20G 1102 and 
was of cream colour. He further stated that on July 13,
2001, 
on seeing the police vehicle near bus stand, he went to the 
Police to enquire about the case. During that time, one G 
informant informed the police that one scooter bearing No. 
HR 2-0G 1102 was standing in the store of the ol~ house of 
Indra Dalal. It would be of interest to point out that the 
Investigating Officer (PW-17) had earlier gone to the house of 
Indra Dalal immediately after the incident, but did not find any H
1102 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A scooter. If the registration number of the scooter was given by 
PW-2 during investigation and the Investigating Officer had 
visited the house of Indra Dalal, how he could not find the 
scooter parked there with the same number on that date. All 
these facts cast a shadow of doubt on the alleged recovery of 
B scooter from the house of appellant Indra Dalal. 
29) Appellant Jaibir has denied that the scooter in question 
belonged to him. In order to prove his ownership, the 
prosecution had produced Guiab Singh (PW-18), Registration 
C Clerk with Regional Transport Office. He produced on record 
application (Exhibit PZ) moved by the police officer and report 
(Exhibit PZ/1) made by Pavan Kumar, Clerk working in the 
Regional Transport Office. No documents have been produced 
to show the ownership of Jaibir. Only the report prepared by 
D Pavan Kumar, Clerk, allegedly on the basis of the record, is 
produced. That cannot partake the character of primary 
evidence. Moreover, in the cross- examination of PW-18, he 
has accepted that there is cutting in the relevant entry of 
ownership. He also admitted that he had not brought the forms/ 
E applications for change of ownership of the scooter in question. 
He further mentioned that as per the record, the original 
registration of the scooter was in the name of one Vipul 
Kaushal, s/o. Prithi Singh, resident of Hisar. In such a 
F circumstance, necessary evidence was required to
prove how 
the ownership changed hands and came to be recorded in 
the name of Jaibir. No such evidence has been produced. 
We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no sufficient 
evidence to prove the ownership of the scooter in the name of 
G Jaibir. 
30) Aforesaid discussion leads us to conclude that the 
entire bucket of evidence is either inadmissible putting the 
roadblock creating by the Evidence Act or unbelievable/ 
H untrustworthy. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view

INDRA DALAL v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1103 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove, beyond A 
reasonable doubt, the charge of conspiracy against these 
appellants with the aid of Section 120-B of IPC. As a result, 
the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment and 
sentence are, accordingly, set aside. During the pendency of 
these appeals, sentence of the appellant Indra Dalal had been B 
suspended. Her bail bonds shall, accordingly, stand 
discharged. The other two appellants, namely, Bijender@ 
Vijay and Jaibir, shall be released from jail forthwith, unless 
t~ey are required in any other case. 
c 
Devika Gujral 
Appeals allowed.