SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR & ANR. versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
[2021] 6 S.C.R. 630, Supreme Court of India, 2021
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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[2021] 6 S.C.R. 630
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SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR & ANR.
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 526 of 2021)
MAY 25, 2021
[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Sentence/Sentencing: Sentences to run concurrently or
consecutively – Duty of Court of first instance to specify – Held: It
is legally obligatory upon the court of first instance while awarding
multiple punishments of imprisonment to specify in clear terms as to
whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively – If
the Court of first instance does not specify the concurrent running
of sentences, the inference, primarily, is that the Court intended
such sentences to run consecutively, though, the Court of first
instance ought not to leave this matter for deduction at the later
stage – Moreover, if the Court of first instance is intending
consecutive running of sentences, there is yet another obligation
on it to state the order (i.e., the sequence) in which they are to be
executed.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.31(1) – Held: s.31(1)
vests complete discretion with the Court to order the sentences for
two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently having regard
to the nature of offences and the surrounding factors – There cannot
be any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such
discretion by the Court; but this discretion has to be judiciously
exercised with reference to the nature of the offence/s committed
and the facts and circumstances of the case – However, if the
sentences (other than life imprisonment) are not provided to run
concurrently, one would run after the other, in such order as the
Court may direct.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.220 – The ‘single
transaction’ principle is essentially referable to s.220 which
provides that if more offences than one are committed in one series
of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, then
the accused may be charged with and tried at one trial for every
such offence – In a given case, after such trial for multiple offences,
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if the accused is convicted and awarded different punishments,
concurrent running thereof may be provided depending on the facts
and the relevant surrounding factors.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It is beyond a shadow of doubt that Section 31(1)
CrPC vests complete discretion with the Court to order the
sentences for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently
having regard to the nature of offences and the surrounding
factors. Even though it cannot be said that consecutive running
is the normal rule but, it is also not laid down that multiple
sentences must run concurrently. There cannot be any straitjacket
approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the Court;
but this discretion has to be judiciously exercised with reference
to the nature of the offence/s committed and the facts and
circumstances of the case. However, if the sentences (other than
life imprisonment) are not provided to run concurrently, one would
run after the other, in such order as the Court may direct.
[Para 10][639-B-D]
1.2 For what has been provided in Section 31(1) CrPC read
with the expositions of this Court, it follows that the Court of
first instance is under legal obligation while awarding multiple
sentences to specify in clear terms as to whether they would run
concurrently or consecutively. [Para 11][639-D-E]
Nagaraja Rao v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2015)
4 SCC 302 : [2015] 12 SCR 424 – relied on.
1.3
If the Court of first
instance does not specify the
concurrent running of sentences, the inference, primarily, is that
the Court intended such sentences to run consecutively, though,
as aforesaid, the Court of first instance ought not to leave this
matter for deduction at the later stage. Moreover, if the Court of
first instance is intending consecutive running of sentences, there
is yet another obligation on it to state the order (i.e., the sequence)
in which they are to be executed. The disturbing part of the matter
herein is that not only the Trial Court omitted to state the requisite
specifications, even the High Court missed out such flaws in the
order of the Trial Court. [Para 12][639-H; 640-A-B]
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2. The ‘single transaction’ principle is essentially referable
to Section 220 CrPC, which provides that if more offences than
one are committed in one series of acts so connected together
as to form the same transaction, then the accused may be charged
with and tried at one trial for every such offence. In a given case,
after such trial for multiple offences, if the accused is convicted
and awarded different punishments, concurrent running thereof
may be provided depending on the facts and the relevant
surrounding factors. The principle related with ‘single transaction’
cannot be imported for dealing with the question at hand.
[Para 14][640-E-F]
Manoj alias Panju v. State of Haryana (2014) 2 SCC
153 : [1996] 1 SCR 532; Nagaraja Rao v. Central
Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC 302 : [2015] 12
SCR 424; Gagan Kumar v. State of Punjab (2019) 5
SCC 154 : [2019] 3 SCR 367 – distinguished.
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors.(1996) 2 SCC
384; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Anoop Singh (2015)
7 SCC 773 : [2015] 6 SCR 960 – held inapplicable.
3. The offences in question were committed in the year
2008 i.e, before amendment of IPC by the Amending Act 13 of
2013; the appellants have continuously served about 13 years
and 2 months of imprisonment; and nothing adverse in regard to
their conduct while serving the sentences has been placed on
record. The requirements of complete justice to the cause could
adequately be met by
providing that the maximum period of
imprisonment to be served by the appellants shall be 14 years
and not beyond. [Para 17][642-D-E, F-G]
Muthuramalingam & Ors. v. State (2016) 8 SCC 313 :
[2016] 5 SCR 30 – followed.
O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala &
Ors. (2015) 2 SCC 501 : [2014] 11 SCR 140 – relied
on.
Mohan Baitha & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2001) 4
SCC 350; Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed
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Bhatti v. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention),
Ahmedabad & Anr. (1988) 4 SCC 183 : [1988] 2 Suppl.
SCR  747 – distinguished.
Case Law Reference
[2015] 12 SCR 424 
distinguished
Para 7.1
[2019] 3 SCR 367
distinguished
Para 7.1
[2014] 11 SCR 140  
relied on
Para 7.1
(2001) 4 SCC 350
distinguished
Para 7.2
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 747 
distinguished
Para 7.2
[1996] 1 SCR 532 
distinguished
Para 7.2
(1996) 2 SCC 384
held inapplicable
Para 7.3
[2015] 6 SCR 960  
held inapplicable
Para 7.3
[2016] 5 SCR 30
followed
Para 7.5
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 526 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.02.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal appeal No. 7399 of 2008.
Pai Amit, Deepak Raj Premi, Parashuram A.L., Manaswi Agrawal,
Rohit R. Saboo, Ms. Ranu Purohit, Ms. Pankhuri Bhardwaj, Ms. Bhavana
Duhoon, Satyam Tandon, Advs. for the appellants.
Vinod Diwakar, AAG, Sarvesh Singh Baghel, B.N. Dubey, Ms.
Shivranjani Ralawata, Advs.  for the respondent.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
JUDGMENT
Leave granted.
2. In view of the order dated 13.04.2018 passed by this Court
while granting permission to file Special Leave Petition and issuing notice,
the scope of this appeal is restricted to the question of sentence; and the
appellants herein, after their conviction of offences under Sections 363,
366 and 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), have already
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undergone 13 years and 2 months of imprisonment. In the given
circumstances, we have heard learned counsel for the parties finally at
this stage itself.
2.1. Even the short question involved in this matter carries the
peculiarities of its own, as noticed infra.
3. As regards relevant background aspects, suffice it to notice
that on 03.02.2008, Case Crime No. 44 of 2008 for offences under
Sections 363 and 366 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) came to be
registered at Police Station, T.P. Nagar, Meerut on the basis of a written
complaint that the complainant’s 13-year-old daughter, who had gone to
school on 15.01.2008, had not returned; and after a lot of efforts, the
complainant came to know that the accused-appellant No. 2 Faimuddin
@ Feru @ Sonu had enticed his daughter. In the course of investigation,
the victim girl was recovered and, ultimately, the charge-sheet was filed
against the appellants for offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376
IPC. They were tried in Sessions Trial No. 575 of 2008 wherein, the
Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5,
Meerut, in its judgement and order dated 12.09.2008, convicted them of
offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376(1) IPC.
4. After having recorded conviction as aforesaid, the Trial Court
sentenced the appellants to several punishments in the following manner:
rigorous imprisonment for a term of 5 years with fine of Rs. 2,000/- and
in default,
further imprisonment for 6 months for the offence under Section
363 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for a term of 7 years with fine of Rs.
3,000/- and in default, further imprisonment for 1 year for the offence
under Section 366 IPC; and rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10
years with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default, further imprisonment for
1½ years for the offence under Section 376(1) IPC. However, the Trial
Court did not specify as to whether the punishments of imprisonment
would run concurrently or consecutively; and if they were intended to
run consecutively, the Trial Court did not specify the order in which one
punishment of imprisonment was to commence after expiration of the
other.
5. As against the judgment and order of the Trial Court, only the
appellant No. 1 Sunil Kumar @ Sudhir Kumar preferred an appeal before
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, being Criminal Appeal No.
7399 of 2008. However, learned counsel for the appellant before the
High Court confined his arguments only on the point of sentence and did
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not press on the point of conviction. Thus, the conviction recorded by
the Trial Court attained finality, for the appellant No. 2 having not filed
the appeal and for the appellant No. 1, even after filing the appeal, having
not challenged the same. Accordingly, the High Court, examined only
the question of sentence qua the appellant No. 1 and, in its impugned
judgement and order dated 21.02.2018, while holding that the default
stipulations were rather disproportionate, proceeded to modify the order
of sentencing only to the extent that in the event of default in payment of
fine, the accused-appellant (i.e., the appellant No. 1) shall undergo
additional imprisonment for the terms of 5 months, 3 months and 1 month
for the offences under Sections 376(1), 366 and 363 IPC respectively.
However, the High Court, even after taking note of the fact that the
accused-appellant had already undergone 10 years of imprisonment, did
not consider that the Trial Court had neither provided for concurrent
running of sentences nor provided the order of running of sentences, if
they were to run consecutively. Interestingly, while the Trial Court
sentenced the appellants for offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376(1)
in that order, the High Court provided for modification of default
stipulations in converse order i.e., for offences under Sections 376(1),
366 and 363 IPC respectively.
6. For the reason that the decisions aforesaid were silent on the
point of concurrent or
consecutive running of sentences, the Jail
Superintendent, District Jail, Meerut, while issuing certificates of
confinement on 14.03.2018, stated that the accused-appellants had
undergone 10 years and 1 month of imprisonment but, there being no
mention in the sentencing order about concurrent running of sentences,
they were serving 22 years of imprisonment. Faced with such a
predicament, the accused-appellants have approached this Court.
7. While confining his arguments to the question of sentence,
learned counsel for the appellants Mr. Amit Pai has industriously put
forward the submissions with reference to Section 31 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) and a good number of the decisions
of this Court.
7.1. The learned counsel has contended, while relying on the
decisions in Nagaraja Rao v. Central Bureau of Investigation: (2015)
4 SCC 302 and Gagan Kumar v. State of Punjab: (2019) 5 SCC
154, that it is obligatory for the Court awarding punishments to specify
whether they shall be running concurrently or consecutively; and the
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omission on the part of the Trial Court and the High Court, to state the
requisite specifications, cannot be allowed to operate detrimental to the
interests of the accused-appellants. The learned counsel has contended
that though as per the mandate of Section 31 CrPC, unless specified to
run concurrently, the sentences do run consecutively but, for that purpose,
the Court is required to direct the order in which they would run; and no
such direction having been given by the Trial Court or by the High Court,
it cannot be said that the Courts were consciously providing for
consecutive running of sentences. Further, with reference to the decision
in O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala & Ors.: (2015)
2 SCC 501, the learned counsel would urge that it is not the normal rule
that multiple sentences are to run consecutively.
7.2. The learned counsel Mr. Pai has also attempted to adopt
another line of argument that concurrent or consecutive running of
sentences is also to be governed by ‘single transaction’ principle, as
discernible from a combined reading of Sections 31(1) and 220(1) CrPC.
In this regard, apart from the aforesaid decisions in Nagaraja Rao and
Gagan Kumar,the learned counsel has also relied upon the decisions in
Mohan Baitha & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr.: (2001) 4 SCC 350;
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti v. Assistant
Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad & Anr.: (1988) 4
SCC 183; and Manoj alias Panju v. State of Haryana: (2014) 2
SCC 153 and has submitted that looking to the nature of accusation,
there was no reason for the Courts to direct consecutive running of
sentences in the present case.
7.3. Further, the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to
the decisions in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors.: (1996) 2
SCC 384 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Anoop Singh: (2015) 7
SCC 773 to submit that those too were the cases involving offences
under Sections 363, 366 and 376 with victim being a minor; and therein,
this Court has awarded the sentences running concurrently.
7.4. The learned counsel has also argued that though the appellant
No. 2 did not prefer appeal against the judgment and order of the Trial
Court, this Court permitted him to file SLP by the order dated 13.04.2018;
and, therefore, benefit of reduction of default sentence, as ordered by
the High Court, deserves to be extended to the appellant No. 2 too.
7.5. The learned counsel Mr. Pai, even while frankly pointing out
the observations of the Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam &
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Ors. v. State: (2016) 8 SCC 313 (paragraph 28), to the effect that sub-
section (2) of Section 31 has no application to a case tried by the Court
of Sessions nor sub-section (2) forbids a direction for consecutive running
of sentences awardable by the Court of Sessions, has made a fervent
appeal that the appellants have already undergone over 13 years of
imprisonment; and if ordained to serve for a total term of 22 years by
consecutive running of sentences, it would be highly disproportionate to
the actual punishment they need to suffer in this case.
8. On the other hand, the learned AAG Mr. Vinod Diwakar has,
firmly as also fairly, put forward the views on behalf of the respondent-
State in opposition to the contentions aforesaid.
8.1. The learned AAG Mr. Diwakar would submit that Section 31
CrPC vests a discretion in the Trial Court to direct whether or not the
sentences would run concurrently when the accused is convicted at one
trial of two or more offences but, in the present case, after noticing the
gravity and nature of offences i.e., kidnapping and rape of a 13-year-old
girl, the Trial Court has exercised its discretion and did not mention that
the sentences would be running concurrently; and, therefore, ipso facto,
they are to run consecutively.
8.2. The learned AAG has also submitted that the principles related
with commission of offences in a single transaction do not lead to the
proposition that different sentences in relation to multiple
offences shall
invariably be running concurrently; and has referred to the enunciations
in O.M. Cherian (supra).The learned AAG has further referred to the
Constitution Bench decision in the case of Muthuramalingam (supra)
to submit that except life imprisonments, the other term sentences
awarded by the Court for several offences do run consecutively, unless
directed otherwise.
8.3. The learned AAG for the State would submit that concurrent
running of sentences, as provided in any particular case, relates to the
facts and circumstances pertaining to that case and the appellants cannot
claim any parity for concurrent running of sentences with reference to
any other decided case, even if relating to the offences of similar nature.
The learned AAG would argue that in the present case, looking to the
nature and gravity of offences, the Trial Court has exercised its discretion
in not directing concurrent running of sentences, which only means that
the sentences are to run consecutively; and that an omission on the part
of the Trial Court in not specifying the order of running cannot mean that
the sentences are to run concurrently.
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9. We have given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions
and have examined the record of the case with reference to the law
applicable.
10. The contentions urged in this matter essentially revolve around
the provisions contained in Section 31(1) CrPC. The contours of these
provisions have been succinctly delineated and explained by this Court
in the case of O.M. Cherian (supra) in the following terms: -
“20.  Under Section 31 CrPC it is left to the full discretion of the
court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of conviction
for two or more offences. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket
approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the courts.
By and large, trial courts and appellate courts have invoked and
exercised their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running
of sentences, favouring the benefit to be given to the accused.
Whether a direction for concurrent running of sentences ought to
be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the
offence or offences committed and the facts and circumstances
of the case. The discretion has to be exercised along the judicial
lines and not mechanically.
21. Accordingly, we answer the reference by holding that Section
31 CrPC leaves full discretion with the court to order sentences
for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently, having
regard to the nature of offences and attendant aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. We do not find any reason to hold that
normal rule is to order the sentence to be consecutive and exception
is to make the sentences concurrent. Of course, if the court does
not order the sentence to be concurrent, one sentence may run
after the other, in such order as the court may direct. We also do
not find any conflict in the earlier judgment in Mohd. Akhtar
Hussain and Section 31 CrPC.”
10.1. In Muthuramalingam (supra), the basic question before
the Constitution Bench was as to whether consecutive life sentences
could be awarded to a convict on being found guilty of a series of murders,
for which, he had been tried in a single trial. In the course of determination
of this question, the Constitution Bench dealt with several dimensions of
sentencing, particularly those relating to multiple sentences and observed,
inter alia, that,-
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“23……So interpreted Section 31(1) CrPC must mean that
sentences awarded by the court for several offences committed
by the prisoner shall run consecutively (unless the court directs
otherwise) except where such sentences include imprisonment
for life which can and must run concurrently….”
10.2. Thus, it is beyond a shadow of doubt that Section 31(1)
CrPC vests complete discretion with the Court to order the sentences
for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently having regard
to the nature of offences and the surrounding factors. Even though it
cannot be said that consecutive running is the normal rule but, it is also
not laid down that multiple sentences must run concurrently. There cannot
be any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion
by the Court; but this discretion has to be judiciously exercised with
reference to the nature of the offence/s committed and the facts and
circumstances of the case. However, if the sentences (other than life
imprisonment) are not provided to run concurrently, one would run after
the other, in such order as the Court may direct.
11. For what has been provided in Section 31(1) CrPC read with
the expositions of this Court, it follows that the Court of first instance is
under legal obligation while awarding multiple sentences to specify in
clear terms as to whether they would run concurrently or consecutively.
In the case of Nagaraja Rao (supra),this Court expounded on this legal
obligation upon the Court of first instance in the following terms:-
“11. The expressions “concurrently” and “consecutively”
mentioned in the Code are of immense significance while awarding
punishment to the accused once he is found guilty of any offence
punishable under IPC or/and of an offence punishable under any
other Special Act arising out of one trial or more. It is for the
reason that award of former enure to the benefit of the accused
whereas award of latter is detrimental to the accused’s interest.
It is therefore, legally obligatory upon the court of first instance
while awarding sentence to specify in clear terms in the order of
conviction as to whether sentences awarded to the accused would
run “concurrently” or they would run “consecutively”.”
12. As noticed, if the Court of first instance does not specify the
concurrent running of sentences, the inference, primarily, is that the Court
intended such sentences to run consecutively, though, as aforesaid, the
Court of first instance ought not to leave this matter for deduction at the
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later stage. Moreover, if the Court of first instance is intending consecutive
running of sentences, there is yet another obligation on it to state the
order (i.e., the sequence) in which they are to be executed. The disturbing
part of the matter herein is that not only the Trial Court omitted to state
the requisite specifications, even the High Court missed out such flaws
in the order of the Trial Court.
13. Even when we find the aforementioned shortcomings in the
orders passed by the Trial Court as also by the High Court, the question
is as to whether the sentences awarded to the appellants could be
considered as running concurrently? As noticed, the omission to state
whether the sentences awarded to the accused would run concurrently
or would run consecutively essentially operates against the accused
because, unless stated so by the Court, multiple sentences run
consecutively, as per the plain language of Section 31(1) CrPC read
with the expositions in Muthuramalingam and O.M. Cherian (supra).
The other omission to state the order of consecutive running cannot
ipso facto lead to concurrent running of sentences.
14. Faced with the position that the stated omissions will not, by
themselves, provide a room for concurrent running of sentences, learned
counsel for the appellants has endeavoured to invoke the ‘single
transaction’ principle. In our view, the said principle is essentially referable
to Section 220 CrPC,
which provides that if more offences than one are
committed in one series of acts so connected together as to form the
same transaction, then the accused may be charged with and tried at
one trial for every such offence. In a given case, after such trial for
multiple offences, if the accused is convicted and awarded different
punishments, concurrent running thereof may be provided depending on
the facts and the relevant surrounding factors. We are afraid, the principle
related with ‘single transaction’ cannot be imported for dealing with the
question at hand.
14.1. In the case of Mohan Baitha (supra),this Court observed
that the expression ‘same transaction’, from its very nature, is incapable
of an exact definition and it is not possible to enunciate any comprehensive
formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether
two or more acts constitute the same transaction. The question involved
in that case did not relate to sentence but to the inquiry and trial of
different offences pertaining to Sections 304-B, 498-A, 120-B and 406
IPC and territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate in Bihar when the alleged
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incident constituting one of the offences, i.e., under Section 304-B IPC,
had taken place in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Of course, in the case of
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra),this Court indicated that if a transaction
constitutes two offences under two enactments, generally it is wrong to
have consecutive sentences but this Court hastened to observe that such
a rule shall have no application if the transaction relating to the offences
is not the same or the facts concerning the two offences are quite
different. Significantly, in that case, consecutive running of sentences
awarded to accused-appellant, in two different cases pertaining to the
Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and the Customs Act, 1962, was upheld by this
Court with the finding that the two offences for which the appellant was
prosecuted were ‘quite distinct and different’. The only modification
ordered by this Court was concerning the term of imprisonment for the
latter conviction while disapproving its enhancement from 4 years to 7
years by the High Court after noticing that he was already sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of 7 years in the first offence. The trial and
conviction in the case of Manoj alias Panju(supra) had been for offence
under Section 307 IPC as also under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms
Act. In the case of Nagaraja Rao (supra), the trial and conviction had
been of offences under Section 381 IPC and Section 52 of the Post
Office Act, 1898. In the case of Gagan Kumar (supra),
offences were
under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC. These decisions, essentially
proceeding on their own facts, do not make out a case for interference
in favour of the appellants.
15. The punishments awarded by this Court in the cases of Gurmit
Singh and Anoop Singh (supra), relate to the individual facts and
circumstances and cannot be adopted as the precedents for the purpose
of particular quantum of sentences and their concurrent running.
Significantly, in both the said cases, the conviction was recorded by this
Court after setting aside the impugned orders of acquittal. The orders
passed by this Court, for striking a just balance in the matter of sentencing
after reversing the acquittal, cannot be applied to the present case where
conviction recorded by the Court of first instance was not even challenged,
and has attained finality.
16. For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are not inclined
to accept the principal part of the submissions of learned counsel for the
Appellants. However, the other part of his submissions, that requiring
the appellants to serve a total term of 22 years in prison would be highly
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disproportionate to the actual punishment they need to suffer in this case,
cannot be brushed aside as altogether unworthy of consideration.
17. We have taken note of the observations of the Constitution
Bench in Muthuramalingam (supra), which were made in the context
of a previous decision of this Court, where the eventuality of consecutive
running of life sentences was obviated with reference to the proviso to
sub-section (2) of Section 31. The Constitution Bench though endorsed
the view that consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded but observed
that the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 CrPC cannot be relied
upon to support this conclusion and also observed that sub-section (2) of
Section 31 CrPC has no application to a case tried by the Court of
Sessions nor sub-section (2) forbids a direction for consecutive running
of sentences awardable by the Court of Sessions.
17.1. Even when sub-section (2) of Section 31 CrPC is not directly
applicable, some of the relevant features of the present case are that the
offences in question were committed in the year 2008 i.e, before
amendment of IPC by the Amending Act 13 of 2013; the appellants
have continuously served about 13 years and 2 months of imprisonment;
and nothing adverse in regard to their conduct while serving the sentences
has been placed on record. In the given set of circumstances, we have
pondered over the question as to what ought to be the order
for a just
balance on the requirements of punishment on one hand and reasonable
release period for the appellants on the other, while keeping in view the
overall scheme of awarding of punishments and execution thereof,
including the ancillary aspects referable to Sections 433 and 433A CrPC
as also Section 55 IPC whereunder, serving of a term of 14 years even
in the sentence of imprisonment for life is the bottom line (subject to the
exercise of powers of commuting by the appropriate Government in
accordance with other applicable principles). After anxious consideration
of all the relevant factors, we are of the view that the requirements of
complete justice to the cause before us could adequately be met by
providing that the maximum period of imprisonment to be served by the
appellants shall be 14 years and not beyond.
18. However, the submission for extending the benefit of
modification of default stipulations qua the appellant no.2 carries the
shortcoming that the said appellant did not prefer appeal against the
judgment and order of the Trial Court. This is coupled with the fact that
in the root cause of this matter, the initial accusation of enticing the
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victim was made against the appellant No.2. In view of the overall
circumstances and the principal subject matter of this appeal, we find no
reason to re-open the issue which was not taken up by the appellant
No.2 at the relevant stage.
19. In view of the above, in exercise of powers under Article 142
of the Constitution of India, we provide for modification of the punishment
awarded to the appellants in the manner that the maximum period of
imprisonment to be served by them in relation to offences in question
shall be 14 years and not beyond. It goes without saying that this order
of modification is passed only in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
this case.
19.1. However, the requirement of payment of fine and the default
stipulations, as applicable to the appellant No.1 in terms of the order of
the High Court and to the appellant No.2 in terms of the order of the
Trial Court, shall remain intact. Learned counsel for the appellants submits
that as per his instructions, the appellant No.1 has deposited the fine
amount. The submission is taken on record. However, it is made clear
that in default in payment of fine, the defaulter-appellant shall undergo
respective default sentences consecutively and in the order they have
been imposed, for offences under Sections 363, 366, and 376(1) IPC.
20. The appeal is partly allowed, as aforesaid.
21. While closing on the matter, we deem it appropriate to reiterate
what was expounded in the case of Nagaraja Rao
(supra), that it is
legally obligatory upon the Court of first instance, while awarding multiple
punishments of imprisonment, to specify in clear terms as to whether
the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. It needs hardly
an emphasis that any omission to carry out this obligation by the Court of
first instance causes unnecessary and avoidable prejudice to the parties,
be it the accused or be it the prosecution.
Devika Gujral
Appeal partly allowed.
SUNIL KUMAR @ SUDHIR KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH