MULAKALA MALLESHWARA RAO & ANR. versus STATE OF TELANGANA & ANR.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 739, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 739 : 2024 INSC 639
Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. 
v. 
State of Telangana & Anr. 
Criminal Appeal No. 3599 of 2024 
29 August 2024
[J.K. Maheshwari and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The complaint, which set in motion the Criminal Law, was at the 
instance of Respondent No.2-complainant, who filed the same 
against the former in-laws of his elder daughter, for not returning 
the ornaments (gold) which he had given at the time of her marriage 
with their son. The sum and substance of the present dispute lie 
in the father’s right over the gifts, i.e.,‘stridhan’ given by him to his 
daughter at the time of marriage. 
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – s.406 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – 
s.6 – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Power of Attorney 
Act, 1882 – s.5 – The complainant lodged FIR under Section 
406 IPC pertaining to the return of the jewellery which he had 
given to his daughter at the time of her marriage as ‘stridhan’, 
but entrusted it to her-in laws (present-appellants) – Whether 
the father i.e., the complainant herein, had any locus to file 
the First Information Report which has led to the present 
proceedings keeping in view that the same was affected by 
delay and laches, thereby expressly being non-maintainable – 
Whether the High Court was correct in refusing to exercise its 
inherent power in quashing the proceedings under the CrPC:
Held: The jurisprudence as has been developed by Supreme 
Court is unequivocal with respect to
the singular right of the female 
(wife or former wife) as the case may be, being the sole owner 
of ‘stridhan’ – It has been held that a husband has no right, and 
it has to then be necessarily concluded that a father too, has no 
right when the daughter is alive, well, and entirely capable of 
making decisions such as pursuing the cause of the recovery of 
* Author
740
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
her ‘stridhan’ – As noted, the FIR was registered under Section 
406 IPC which prescribes a punishment for a criminal breach of 
trust – The very first ingredient itself is not made out, for there 
is no iota of proof on record to show that the complainant had 
entrusted the ‘stridhan’ of his daughter to the appellants which 
allegedly was illegally kept by them – That apart, the second 
ingredient, i.e., the dishonest misappropriation or conversion for 
own use, also stands unfulfilled, for there is nothing on record 
to substantiate that the complainant’s daughter’s former in-laws 
converted the ‘stridhan’ allegedly kept in their custody, for their 
own use, more so, when the parties in matrimony had never 
ever raised ‘stridhan’ as an issue either in the subsistence of the 
marriage or thereafter, especially during the time of settlement 
of all issues – Apart from a statement of the complainant that 
the ‘stridhan’ is with the former in-laws of his daughter, there 
is nothing on record to substantiate the factum of possession 
actually being with the appellants – Furthermore, the action being 
initiated more than 5 years after the divorce of the complainant’s 
daughter and also 3 years after her second marriage had taken 
place, demonstrates the same to be hopelessly belated in 
time – The FIR, which culminated in the present proceedings, 
was lodged in 2021, whereas the matrimonial relations between 
the complainant’s
daughter and her former husband ended in 
2015 – She subsequently got remarried in 2018 – Then, on 
what grounds does the complaint file the subject FIR in the year 
2021, is entirely unexplained – That apart, these proceedings 
have been initiated in the face of the Separation Agreement 
entered into by the parties to the marriage at the time of 
dissolution, that too, without any express authorization by the 
daughter of the complainant – Thus, the charge under Section 
6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is not made out and therefore,  
fails – Consequently, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that 
the proceedings initiated by the complainant (CC No.1369/2022) 
against the present appellants have to be quashed and set aside. 
[Paras 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20]
Case Law Cited
Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar [1985] 3 SCR 191 : (1985) 2 SCC 
370; Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [1996] Supp. 10 
SCR 347 : (1997) 2 SCC 397; Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy & Anr. v. 
Sudha Seetharam & Anr. [2019] 2 SCR 185 : (2019) 16 SCC 739;
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
741
Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr. 
Kishan Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Gurpal Singh & Ors. [2010] 
10 SCR 16 : (2010) 8 SCC 775 – relied on.
Maya Gopinathan v. Anoop S.B. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 609; 
Mala Kar v. State of Uttarakhand 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1049; 
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) 
Supp. 1 SCC 335; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao 
Chandrojirao Angre [1988] 2 SCR 930 : (1988) 1 SCC 692; 
Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra [2021] 4 SCR 
1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401; Peethambaran v. State of Kerala [2023] 
4 SCR 1144 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 553; Bobbili Ramakrishna 
Raja Yadad & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2016] 1 SCR 103 : 
(2016) 3 SCC 309; Rohtash & Anr. v. State of Haryana [2019] 16 
SCR 861 : (2019) 10 SCC 554 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Hindu Succession 
Act, 1956; Power of Attorney Act, 1882.
List of Keywords
Section 406 of Penal Code, 1860; Section 6 of Dowry Prohibition 
Act, 1961; Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Section 5 
of Power of Attorney Act, 1882; Father’s right over the gifts, i.e., 
‘stridhan’; Delay and laches; Entrustment of property; Dishonest 
misappropriation or conversion for own use; Divorce; Matrimonial 
relations; Re-marriage.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3599 
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.2022 of the High Court 
for the State
of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLP No. 11528 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
D. Mahesh Babu, Shishir Pinaki, Dhanaeswar Gudapalli, Ms. Mallika 
Das, Amber Jain, Devjee Mishra, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Devina Sehgal, Dhananjay Yadav, Vikas Mehta, Advs. for the 
Respondents.
742
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J. 
Leave Granted.
2.	
The present appeal is directed against an order of the High Court 
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad dated 22nd December, 2022 
passed in Criminal Petition No.11528 of 2022, whereby the High 
Court refused to quash proceedings arising out of C.C.No.1369 of 
2022 on the file of XXVIth Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at 
Hayathnagar, under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 
and Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 
3.	
Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows :
3.1	 The complaint, which set in motion the Criminal Law, was at 
the instance of one Padala Veerabhadra Rao (Respondent 
No.2 referred to as the complainant herein), who filed the same 
against the former in-laws of his elder daughter, namely, Padala 
Sujana Sheela Kumar (referred to as the daughter) for not 
returning the ornaments (gold) which he had given at the time 
of her marriage with their son. The marriage was solemnized 
on 22nd December, 1999. 
3.2	 Undisputably, the marriage was unsuccessful and after a period 
of approximately 16 years, the complainant’s daughter on 14th 
August, 2015 filed for divorce in the United States of America. 
The decree of divorce was granted by mutual consent by the 
Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, on 3rd February, 
2016. At that time, all possessions, material and financial, were
settled between the parties by way of the Separation Agreement. 
Hence, all issues arising out of matrimony stood closed as the 
daughter got remarried in the U.S.A. in May, 2018.
3.3	 Much thereafter, the complainant lodged FIR No.32 of 2021 
dated 15th January, 2021, under Section 406 IPC pertaining to 
the return of the jewellery which he had given to his daughter 
at the time of her marriage as ‘stridhan’, but entrusted it to 
her-in laws (present-appellants) 
1	
‘IPC’ for brevity
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
743
Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr. 
3.4	 It is necessary to record the complainant’s version of events. At 
the time of getting his daughter married in the year 1999, he had 
given 40 Kasula gold and other articles. Thereafter, the newly 
married couple migrated to the U.S.A where the complainant’s 
daughter was continually tortured, due to which the complainant’s 
wife was severely disturbed and eventually passed away on 6th 
June, 2008. His daughter and son-in-law got their divorce in 
the year 2016, after 16 years of marriage. Such articles given 
to his daughter during the marriage were entrusted at that time 
to the in-laws i.e., the appellant Nos.1 and 2. 
3.5	 Whereafter, the complainant’s daughter got remarried in the year 
2018 for which purpose the complainant had travelled to the 
U.S.A. Upon returning therefrom, allegedly he made requests 
to the former in-laws of his daughter (appellants herein) to 
return the articles entrusted to them. Such requests remained 
unheeded with the articles yet to be recovered. 
3.6	 In the course of investigation, notice dated 16th June, 2022, 
under Section 41(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732 
was sent to Mulakala Malleshwara Rao (Appellant No.1, the 
father-in-law of the complainant’s daughter). He denied all 
allegations and contended that the complaint has been filed 
with an intent to cause harassment.
3.7	 Upon completion of the investigation, the final report under
Section 173 Cr.P.C. was filed under the Sections noted above. 
3.8	 The appellant No.1, aggrieved thereby filed a petition for 
quashing of the charges, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 
4.	
The High Court found the allegations made in the charge-sheet, 
prima facie to be triable. As such, the prayer to exercise such powers 
was rejected. 
5.	
In the above context, the short point for consideration is whether 
the father i.e., the complainant herein, had any locus to file the First 
Information Report which has led to the present proceedings keeping 
in view that the same was affected by delay and laches, thereby 
expressly being non-maintainable? Contingent to the answer to this 
2	
‘Cr.P.C.’ for brevity
744
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
question would be, whether the High Court was correct in refusing 
to exercise its inherent power in quashing the proceedings under 
the Cr.P.C. 
6.	
The sum and substance of the present dispute lie in the father’s right 
over the gifts, i.e.,‘stridhan’ given by him to his daughter at the time 
of marriage. The generally accepted rule, which has been judicially 
recognized, is that the woman exercises an absolute right over the 
property. We may refer to Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar,3 wherein 
a Bench of three Judges observed : 
“6. To the same effect is Maine’s Treatise on Hindu Law 
at p.728. The characteristics of Saudayika have also been 
spelt out by Mulla’s Hindu Law at p. 168 (Section 113) 
which gives a complete list of the stridhan property of a 
woman both before and during coverture, which may be 
extracted thus:
“113. Manu enumerates six kinds of stridhana :
1. Gifs made before the nuptial fire, explained by Katyayana 
to mean gifts made at the time of marriage before the fire 
which is the witness of the nuptial (adhyagni).
2. Gifts made at the bridal procession, that is, says 
Katyayana, while the bride is being led from the residence 
of her parents to that of her husband (adhyavanhanika).
3. Gifts made in token of love, that is, says Katyayana, 
those made through affection by her father-in-law and 
mother-in-law (pritidatta), and those made at the time of her 
making obeisance at the feet of elders
(pada-vandanika).
4. Gifts made by father.
5. Gifts made by mother.
6. Gifts made by a brother.
7. It is, therefore, manifest that the position of stridhan 
of a Hindu married woman’s property during coverture is 
absolutely clear and unambiguous; she is the absolute 
3	
[1985] 3 SCR 191 : (1985) 2 SCC 370
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
745
Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr. 
owner of such property and can deal with it in any manner 
she likes — she may spend the whole of it or give it away 
at her own pleasure by gift or will without any reference 
to her husband. Ordinarily, the husband has no right or 
interest in it with the sole exception that in times of extreme 
distress, as in famine, illness or the like, the husband can 
utilise it but he is morally bound to restore it or its value 
when he is able to do so. It may be further noted that this 
right is purely personal to the husband and the property so 
received by him in marriage cannot be proceeded against 
even in execution of a decree for debt.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The position of the wife or woman being the sole authority in respect 
of ‘stridhan’ stands emphatically stated in Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh 
Kumar Bhada 4 in the following terms:
“9. A woman’s power of disposal, independent of her 
husband’s control, is not confined to saudayika but extends 
to other properties as well. Devala says: ‘A woman’s 
maintenance (vritti), ornaments, perquisites (sulka), gains 
(labha), are her stridhana. She herself has the exclusive 
right to enjoy it. Her husband has no right to use it except 
in distress….’ In N.R. Raghavachariar’s Hindu Law — 
Principles and Precedents (8th Edn.), edited by Prof. S. 
Venkataraman, one of the renowned Professors of Hindu 
Law, at para 468 deals with ‘Definition of Stridhana’. In
para 469 dealing with ‘Sources of acquisition’ it is stated 
that the sources of acquisition of property in a woman’s 
possession are: gifts before marriage, wedding gifts, gifts 
subsequent to marriage, etc. Para 470 deals with ‘Gifts to a 
maiden’. Para 471 deals with ‘Wedding gifts’ and it is stated 
therein that properties gifted at the time of marriage to the 
bride, whether by relations or strangers, either Adhiyagni 
or Adhyavahanika, are the bride’s stridhana. In para 481 
at p. 426, it is stated that ornaments presented to the 
bride by her husband or father constitute her stridhana 
property. In para 487 dealing with ‘powers during coverture’ 
4	
[1996] Supp. 10 SCR 347 : (1997) 2 SCC 397
746
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
it is stated that saudayika meaning the gift of affectionate 
kindred, includes both Yautaka or gifts received at the time 
of marriage as well as its negative Ayautaka. In respect 
of such property, whether given by gift or will she is the 
absolute owner and can deal with it in any way she likes. 
She may spend, sell or give it away at her own pleasure.
10. It is thus clear that the properties gifted to her before 
the marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of giving 
farewell or thereafter are her stridhana properties. It is 
her absolute property with all rights to dispose at her own 
pleasure. He has no control over her stridhana property. 
Husband may use it during the time of his distress but 
nonetheless he has a moral obligation to restore the same 
or its value to his wife. Therefore, stridhana property does 
not become a joint property of the wife and the husband 
and the husband has no title or independent dominion 
over the property as owner thereof.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Pratibha Rani (supra) stands followed recently in Maya Gopinathan 
v. Anoop S.B.5
Noticeably, the position of law has remained consistent throughout 
since 1985, till date, regarding the sole authority of the woman in 
respect of her ‘stridhan’ as has also been held recently in Mala Kar 
v. State of Uttarakhand ,6 wherein a decree of divorce stood passed 
inter se the parties on 18th October 2014, and FIR was filed on 6th 
April 2015,
the appellant’s request for the respondent to pay a sum 
of Rs.10 Lakhs in full and final settlement of all claims, including 
‘stridhan’ was accepted, and the former husband was directed to 
pay such amount.
7.	
As evidenced from the above, the jurisprudence as has been 
developed by this Court is unequivocal with respect to the singular 
right of the female (wife or former wife) as the case may be, being 
the sole owner of ‘stridhan’. It has been held that a husband has no 
right, and it has to then be necessarily concluded that a father too, 
5	
2024 SCC OnLine SC 609
6	
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1049
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
747
Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr. 
has no right when the daughter is alive, well, and entirely capable 
of making decisions such as pursuing the cause of the recovery of 
her ‘stridhan’. 
8.	
We also notice Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which 
talks about a Hindu female being the absolute owner of property. 
It reads:
“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute 
property.—(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, 
whether acquired before or after the commencement of 
this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not 
as a limited owner.
Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both 
movable and immovable property acquired by a female 
Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in 
lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift 
from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at 
or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or 
by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner 
whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as 
stridhana immediately before the commencement of this 
Act. …”
(Emphasis Supplied)
9.	
It is undisputed that action was initiated for securing possession of 
the articles and ornaments after a passage of more than 20 years 
since the date of marriage and five years after the settlement of all 
marital issues at the time of divorce and that too, not by the former 
wife, i.e., the complainant’s daughter, but by
the complainant himself. 
This coupled with the fact that there is no authorization on the part 
of the complainant’s daughter in his favour to initiate proceedings 
for recovery of ‘stridhan’ exclusively belonging to her, beckons the 
question on the basis of which the complainant has initiated the 
present proceedings. 
10.	 We find that the law provides for a situation where a woman may, 
in law, grant a person of her choosing the authority to do any act 
which she may herself execute. Section 5 of the Power of Attorney 
Act, 1882, provides as under:-
748
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
“5. Power-of-attorney of married women.—A married 
woman, of full age, shall, by virtue of this Act, have 
power, as if she were unmarried, by a non-testamentary 
instrument, to appoint an attorney on her behalf, for the 
purpose of executing any non testamentary instrument or 
doing any other act which she might herself execute or 
do; and the provisions of this Act, relating to instruments 
creating powers-of-attorney shall apply thereto.
This section applies only to instruments executed after 
this Act comes into force.”
It cannot be disputed that no such power of attorney, within the 
meaning of this Act, stood executed by the complainant’s daughter, 
in favour of her father, respondent No.2. 
11.	 At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the grounds under which 
the exercise of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been held 
to be justified. The locus classicus on this issue is State of Haryana 
v. Bhajan Lal 7 which considers Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. 
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre,8 and has been subsequently 
referred to and relied upon in Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of 
Maharashtra;9 and Peethambaran v. State of Kerala.10 The factors 
to be considered are well enumerated requiring no reiteration here. 
12.	 In particular, the second factor enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra) 
is that the FIR or any other document enclosed therewith does 
not disclose a cognizable offence; and the seventh factor,
which 
stipulates that where a criminal proceeding is initiated with manifest 
mala fides, ulterior motives or with a view to spite, are important in 
the present facts. 
13.	 As noted above, the FIR was registered under Section 406 IPC which 
prescribes a punishment for a criminal breach of trust. Section 405 
defines the said offence and provides for the ingredients that are 
required to be fulfilled for the offence to be made out. 
7	
[1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp. 1 335
8	
[1988] 2 SCR 930 : (1988) 1 SCC 692
9	
[2021] 4 SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401
10	
[2023] 4 SCR 1144 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 553
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
749
Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr. 
This Court in Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy & Anr. v. Sudha Seetharam 
& Anr.11 identified the ingredients required for a charge under Section 
406 to be justified:
“13. A careful reading of Section 405 shows that the 
ingredients of a criminal breach of trust are as follows:
13.1. A person should have been entrusted with property, 
or entrusted with dominion over property;
13.2. That person should dishonestly misappropriate or 
convert to their own use that property, or dishonestly use 
or dispose of that property or wilfully suffer any other 
person to do so; and
13.3. That such misappropriation, conversion, use 
or disposal should be in violation of any direction of 
law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be 
discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has 
made, touching the discharge of such trust.”
14.	 In view of the facts of this case, the very first ingredient itself is 
not made out, for there is no iota of proof on record to show that 
the complainant had entrusted the ‘stridhan’ of his daughter to the 
appellants which allegedly was illegally kept by them. 
That apart, the second ingredient, i.e., the dishonest misappropriation 
or conversion for own use, also stands unfulfilled, for there is nothing 
on record to substantiate that the complainant’s daughter’s former 
in-laws converted the ‘stridhan’ allegedly kept in their custody, for 
their own use, more so,
when the parties in matrimony had never 
ever raised ‘stridhan’ as an issue either in the subsistence of the 
marriage or thereafter, especially during the time of settlement of 
all issues.
15.	 Another ground on which the charge fails is that, apart from a 
statement of the complainant that the ‘stridhan’ is with the former 
in-laws of his daughter, there is nothing on record to substantiate the 
factum of possession actually being with the appellants. In Bobbili 
Ramakrishna Raja Yadad & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh,12 
11	
[2019] 2 SCR 185 : (2019) 16 SCC 739
12	
[2016] 1 SCR 103 : (2016) 3 SCC 309
750
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
this Court has held that giving dowry and traditional presents at the 
time of the wedding does not raise a presumption that such articles 
are thereby entrusted to the parents-in-law so as to attract the 
ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 
16.	 As such, insofar as Section 406 IPC is concerned, the instant case 
would fall under the second factor enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), 
where no cognizable offence is visible on the face of the record. 
Furthermore, the action being initiated more than 5 years after the 
divorce of the complainant’s daughter and also 3 years after her 
second marriage had taken place, demonstrates the same to be 
hopelessly belated in time. 
17.	 We may further observe that the object of criminal proceedings is to 
bring a wrongdoer to justice, and it is not a means to get revenge or 
seek a vendetta against persons with whom the complainant may 
have a grudge. The principle in law that delay in filing the FIR has 
to be satisfactorily explained and does not need any reiteration. In 
the present case, the record is entirely silent on that aspect. It is 
also to be noted, in the FIR the authorities are requested to take 
action against the appellant for not returning the gifts given by the 
complainant to his daughter at the time of the marriage, however, 
in the charge-sheet such a complaint turns into a demand of dowry 
and being pressured into incurring expenses for
marriage related 
functions. The question that is to be answered is that when the point 
of genesis is separate and distinct, how does the end result turn into 
something that is entirely foreign to the point of genesis? 
18.	 An additional aspect is to be taken note of. The FIR, which culminated 
in the present proceedings, was lodged in 2021, whereas the 
matrimonial relations between the complainant’s daughter and her 
former husband ended in 2015. She subsequently got remarried in 
2018. Then, on what grounds does the complaint file the subject FIR 
in the year 2021, is entirely unexplained. It has been observed in 
Kishan Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Gurpal Singh & Ors.13 that:
“…. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be 
permitted to give vent by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction 
of the criminal Court. The Court proceedings ought not to 
13	
[2010] 10 SCR 16 : (2010) 8 SCC 775
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
751
Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Anr. 
be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment 
or prosecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged 
clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a 
private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party 
in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may 
take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of 
law in the facts and circumstances of that case”.
Kishan Singh (supra) was recently referred to and followed in 
Rohtash & Anr. v. State of Haryana.14 
19.	 That apart, these proceedings have been initiated in the face of the 
Separation Agreement entered into by the parties to the marriage at 
the time of dissolution, that too, as already recorded supra without 
any express authorization by the daughter of the complainant. It 
categorically records as under:
“3. …
e. Personal Belongings, Furniture & Household Goods:
The parties have agreed upon a division of their furniture, 
furnishings, household goods, appliances, equipment, 
silverware, china, glassware, books, works of art and other 
household and personal property items presently held by 
one or both of the parties.
Each party hereby relinquishes all right, title and interest 
in and to all household goods, furniture and personal 
properties awarded to the other party.”
Clause 6 of the Separation Agreement is of import in the present 
controversy:
“6. RELEASES
Each of the parties hereto does
hereby release and 
discharge the other from any and all other claims, causes 
of action whether at law or in equity, dower, both in real and 
personal property, both under the statutes and common 
law, and all other charges of every kind, character or nature 
which either of the parties does now or might have against 
14	
[2019] 16 SCR 861 : (2019) 10 SCC 554
752
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
the other arising in any manner whatsoever, except as 
are herein specifically reserved to the parties, or as may 
be derived by either party to effectuate and maintain the 
terms of this Agreement.”
Further, clause 8 of the Separation Agreement records the full division 
of the property between the parties in the following terms:
“8. FULL DIVISION OF PROPERTY
The parties represent to the Court that this Agreement fully 
disposes and divides all the marital property of the parties 
and that there is no further property which this Court must 
divide. Further, the parties represent and warrant that they 
have each disclosed to the other all of their respective 
property interests in their respective Statement of Property 
filed in this cause.”
20.	 In view of the above, we also hold that the charge under Section 6 
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is not made out and therefore, fails. 
Consequently, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the 
proceedings initiated by the complainant (CC No.1369/2022) against 
the present appellants have to be quashed and set aside. Any action 
commenced as a result thereof is bad in law. The questions raised 
in this appeal are answered accordingly. 
21.	 The appeal is allowed in the above terms. The impugned judgment 
dated 22nd December 2022 in Criminal Petition No. 11528 of 2022 
between the self-same parties, the complaint stands quashed and 
set aside. Pending applications, if any,
are also disposed of. 
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan