JAYANTILAL VERMA versus STATE OF M.P. (NOW CHHATTISGARH)
[2020] 12 S.C.R. 411, Supreme Court of India, 2020
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
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JAYANTILAL VERMA
v.
STATE OF M.P. (NOW CHHATTISGARH)
(Criminal Appeal No. 590 of 2015)
NOVEMBER 19, 2020
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
s. 302 – Death caused by strangulation – In matrimonial house
of the deceased – Chargesheet against the husband (appellant-
accused) and father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased –
Trial Court relying on evidence of PW-1 and medical evidence
convicted all the accused u/s. 302 – During appeal to High Court
prosecution against father-in-law of the deceased abated due to
his death – High Court acquitted the mother-in-law while convicting
the appellant-accused – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: Evidence
of PW-1 was consistent and cogent – In view of the facts that family
members were present in the house, some time before the incident
and there was no possibility of outsider coming and strangulating
the deceased, it was for the accused to explain how the deceased
could have received the injuries – There was no explanation given
by the accused – Therefore there is no reason to interfere with the
impugned judgment – Conviction of appellant-accused upheld –
However, State is directed to consider the release of the accused on
completion of 14 years of actual sentence.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1.1 It is no doubt true that a large number of
witnesses turned hostile and the Trial Court was also not happy
with the manner, the prosecution conducted this case.  But that
is not an
unusual event in the long drawn out trials and in the
absence of any witness protection regime of substance, one has
to examine whatever is the evidence which is capable of being
considered, and then come to a finding whether it would suffice
to convict the accused. [Para 20][420-D-E]
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1.2 The rationale adopted for coming to the conclusion
behind the reason for the real brother of the deceased turning
hostile while step brother stood his ground is also obvious and
correctly appreciated, i.e., to preserve the close family ties which
continued to exist by marriage in the instant case, in view of the
siblings of the deceased and appellant herein being married. In
the Indian context, there exists a continued relationship between
two families wherein the daughter-in-law comes from another
house. [Para 21][420-E-G]
1.3 The case of the prosecution rests only on the testimony
of PW-1 and the medical evidence.  The statement of PW-1 was
consistent and cogent except to the extent that in the earlier
statement he had not mentioned the factum of the death being
attributed to snakebite. However, that itself would not nullify the
remaining part of his testimony.  In fact, the said witness did not
back out from the statement, but could not state the reason why
the police did not record it in the FIR though it was mentioned.
[Para 22][420-G-H; 421-A]
Yanob Sheikh Alias Gagu v. State of West Bengal (2013)
6 SCC 428 : [2012] 13  SCR 1150 ; Gulam Sarbar v.
State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) (2014) 3 SCC 401 :
[2013] 12 SCR 1 – referred to.
1.4 The doctor opined the cause of death to be asphyxia
due to strangulation.  Thereafter, he has stated that nature may
be homicidal.  This was so stated because asphyxia being the
cause of death, the doctor himself could not have conclusively
said whether it was homicidal or suicidal. It was also voluntarily
opined, that there had to be a minimum of five minutes of forceful
pulling to cause the death. [Para 23][421-A-C]
1.5 The death was caused and the body was found in the
precincts of the house of the appellant, where there were only
family members staying.  The High Court also found that the
location of the house and the surrounding buildings was such
that there was no possibility of somebody from outside coming
and strangulating the deceased and that too without any
commotion being caused or any valuable/jewellery missing.  [Para
24][421-B-D]
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1.6 In the present case, the Court is confronted with a
situation where the appellant, as a husband, is alleged to have
caused the death of his wife by strangulation. The fact that the
family members were in the home some time before the incident
is also quite obvious.  No explanation has been given as to how
the wife could have received the injuries. This is a strong
circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of
the crime. The appellant was under an obligation to give a plausible
explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement
recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could
not be the answer in such a situation.  [Para 25][421-D-F]
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006)
10 SCC 681 : [2006] 7 Supp. SCR 156  - relied on.
Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi v. State of
Maharashtra (2007) 15 SCC 455 : [2007] 11 SCR 1 ;
Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. State of Bihar & Anr.
(2007) 10 SCC 433 : [2007] 1 SCR 13 – referred to.
2. However,  the respondent-State is directed to examine
whether the appellant has completed 14 years of actual sentence
or not and if it is so, his case should be examined within a
maximum period of two months for release in accordance with
norms. If not, the exercise be undertaken within the same time
on completion of 14 years of actual sentence. [Para 27][421-F-H]
Case Law Reference
[2007] 11 SCR 1
referred to
Para 15
[2007] 1 SCR 13
referred to
Para 15
[2006] 7 Supp. SCR 156
relied on
Para 15
[2012] 13 SCR 1150 
referred to
Para 18
[2013] 12 SCR 1
referred to
Para 18
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 590 of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.09.2014 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 1930 of 2000.
JAYANTILAL VERMA v. STATE OF M.P. (NOW
CHHATTISGARH)
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Satish Pandey, Salim Ansari, Umang Tripathi, Ms. Geeta Verma,
Manmohan Sharma, Raghvendra Kumar and Nishanth Patil, Advs. for
the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. On the fateful day of 24.8.1999, one Sahodara Bai was found
dead on a cot in her matrimonial home located in village Uslapur, District
Rajanandgaon, M.P. (now Chhattisgarh).  A marg intimation was lodged
with the police at the behest of her brother, one Kishore Kumar, who
alleged that he had returned to village Uslapur to see his sister, where he
was informed by her in-laws that she had died.  He related a prior incident
from a few days ago alleging that on 19.8.1999, the deceased had returned
to her maternal home to village Baiharsari stating that she had been
harassed at the hands of her in-laws for the last 6-7 months. The cause
for harassment was stated to be that the appellant herein (her husband)
had a brother who lived separately and the in-laws would beat and harass
her if she attempted to speak to the wife of the brother of the appellant
herein.  The endeavour of reconciliation took place when Kishore Kumar
along with another brother, Lochan, had brought the deceased back to
her matrimonial home. Even at that stage, on being asked whether they
wanted her to live with them, the in-laws responded that they will see
for a few days and then decide. The deceased thereafter stayed back at
her
matrimonial home.
2. A postmortem was conducted on the body and FIR No.72/99
came to be registered at P.S. Bodla, District Kawargha on 29.8.1999
arraying the appellant herein, his father, one Lalchand and mother, one
Ahiman Bai as accused for offences punishable under Sections 302
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘IPC’).  The FIR is stated to have been registered at the behest
of one K.P.S. Paikara, the SHO of P.S. Bodla, who relayed the
abovementioned information from the marg intimation and also elaborated
on the relationship of the deceased and the appellant herein along with
the findings of the postmortem report.  The marriage between the
appellant herein and the deceased had taken place about 8 years prior to
the incident and there was a son born, who was only a few months old.
The appellant herein, along with the deceased was staying with his
parents.  The post mortem report stated that the cause of death was
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asphyxia due to strangulation, and the nature of death was possibly
homicidal.  On completion of investigation, Chargesheet No. 64/99 was
filed and charges were framed by the Sessions Court in Sessions Trial
No.165/1999, arraying the appellant herein and his parents as accused.
The version given by the accused in their statements under Section 313
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Cr.P.C.’) was that on the morning of the incident all the three accused
had gone to the fields, while only the deceased remained at home.
Lalchand stated that after taking a bath in the pond, when he returned,
he discovered the deceased lying dead in her cot. Thereafter he called
the appellant herein and his wife, Ahiman Bai, who were still in the
fields. No evidence was led in this regard.
3. The prosecution led evidence of 9 witnesses to establish their
case.  Five of these witnesses turned hostile – PW-2 (Lochan), brother
of the deceased, PW-3 (Mukund), PW-4 (Jagdev), PW-5 (Pitambar
Verma) and PW-6 (Ghasiya).  The case of the prosecution was, thus,
based on the testimonies of the remaining witnesses, i.e., PW-1, Kishore
Kumar, the brother of the deceased and PW-7, Rajendra Chauhan, who
prepared the site plan, PW-8, K.P.S. Paikara, Investigating Officer and
PW-9, Dr. M.S. Bachkar, who conducted the postmortem.  Thus,
effectively the case was based on the testimony of PW-1, apart from
the testimony of the doctor who conducted the postmortem.
4.
The Sessions Court held all the three accused persons guilty of
offences punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, in terms of the judgment
dated 21.7.2000.
5. The finding of the Sessions Court was based on the cause of
death being asphyxia due to strangulation.  The testimony of the doctor,
PW-9, was relied upon to come to the conclusion that the death was
homicidal as it was a result of strangulation.  The possibility of any other
manner of death was explored by the court, i.e., thieves killing the
deceased in order to snatch a chain from her neck.  This was ruled out
as the incident took place in the house, which in turn was surrounded by
other houses on three sides and no commotion was heard.  Further, no
crime of theft had been reported in the recent past.  Next, the possibility
of death caused by a snakebite was explored. This was owing to the
testimony of PW-1, who had stated, that upon finding his sister dead and
enquiring as to what had happened, Lalchand, father of appellant herein
JAYANTILAL VERMA v. STATE OF M.P. (NOW
CHHATTISGARH) [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
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had stated that she had died of a snakebite.  Court noted that the
postmortem did not indicate any symptom of a snake bite as there was
no mark or any poisoning detected in the body.  The suicide theory was
also ruled out as there were scratch marks found on her neck.  The
conclusion was, thus, based on circumstantial evidence to convict the
accused.  All the three accused preferred an appeal before the High
Court, being Criminal Appeal No.1930/2000.  In the course of the
pendency of the appeal, Lalchand, the father-in-law of the deceased
passed away.  The High Court concluded that there was no legally
admissible evidence to convict the mother-in-law of the deceased, and
hence she was acquitted.  However, the conviction of the appellant herein
was upheld by the High Court.
6. The appellant herein filed the present appeal in which leave
was granted on 30.3.2015.
7. It would be appropriate to note that there was some
improvement in the statement of PW-1 to the extent that he had never
mentioned Lalchand’s explanation of the death of the deceased by snake
bite in the earlier statement.  While this was noted by the Trial Court, all
other aspects were found to be consistent with his earlier statements.
The testimony of PW-1 as a whole was found to be natural.  It was also
noted that there was an absence of any prior animosity between PW-1
and the family of the appellant herein.  PW-1, incidentally, was the
stepbrother of
the deceased, while PW-2, who turned hostile was her
real brother.  The cause of witnesses turning hostile, as per the Trial
Court, was that PW-2 was influenced on account of subsisting family
relationship, as the daughter of Lalchand (sister of the appellant herein)
was married to the brother of PW-2.
8. The circumstantial evidence was examined closely as that could
be the only basis of conviction, and it was found that there was a complete
chain to prove the guilt of the accused.  The visit of the deceased to her
maternal home, her statement regarding the ill-treatment by her in-laws
to her brother, PW-1, her being taken to the matrimonial home by PW-1
along with another brother, Lochan, the discussion between PW-1 and
Lalchand and finally the cause of death being homicidal were all
circumstances examined to establish guilt of the accused.  The Trial
Court held that after the murder, Lalchand sent his wife and the appellant
herein to the fields, while he himself went to the pond to bathe and when
he returned to his house, he raised a hue and cry, pretending to be shocked
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by the sudden death of the deceased.  There was a possibility of death
being caused by strangulation by an article made of a chain-like material
but the same had likely been destroyed.  The Trial Court did castigate
the manner of prosecution.
9. The High Court in the given situation, apart from relying on the
testimony of PW-1, turned its attention to the postmortem report.  In this
context, it was noted that there was blood oozing from both nostrils and
mouth of the deceased, there was swelling over the right cheek, marks
of ecchymosis at epiglottis region and back of the neck, bruise present
at left axillary of cheek and there was depression mark of a mala on the
left side of the neck. It went on to state that since the incident had taken
place inside the privacy of the house, the onus was on the persons residing
in the house, to give an explanation.  In such situations, it was noted that
it is difficult for the prosecution to lead any direct evidence to establish
the guilt of the accused.  In this regard, the High Court referred to
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Evidence Act’), which reads as under:
“106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person,
the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
It, thus, opined that in such cases, while the initial burden to establish
the case would be upon the prosecution, it would be of a relatively
light
character. There would be a corresponding a burden on the inmates of
the house to give cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed.
They could not get away by keeping quiet and offering no explanation.
10. In the aforesaid contours of the factual situation we have
examined the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties.
11. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant herein
was that the circumstantial evidence was not of such a nature that it
could be said to be conclusive, and the chain of evidence was not complete
to pronounce the appellant herein guilty.  The previous allegations of
cruelty had not been proved as there was no prior complaint of
harassment lodged by the deceased or her relatives and that the testimony
of PW-1 is further discredited, as he is the stepbrother and not the real
brother of the deceased.  It was further argued that the statements of
the witnesses were not recorded prior to 29.8.1999 i.e., for five days
from the date of incident, and even the site plan prepared by PW-7 was
JAYANTILAL VERMA v. STATE OF M.P. (NOW
CHHATTISGARH) [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
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not proved.  There was stated to be no intention or motive attributable to
the appellant herein to kill the deceased and the prosecution could not
absolve itself of the burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
12. The testimony of PW-9, Dr. Bachkar was assailed as there
was no formation of a firm opinion regarding the nature of death as it
was mentioned that it “may” have been homicidal. There was stated to
be a mark on the left side of the neck and but no such mark existed
around the neck.  He had stated that the mark could have been caused
by pressing the necklace on the neck, but asphyxia was not possible due
to the same.  No recovery of necklace had taken place from the appellant
herein and the weapon of crime was never recovered.  Lastly, it was
contended that on the same evidence, the mother of the appellant herein
had been acquitted.
13. The appellant herein is stated to have served 16 years and 9
months of his sentence but some dispute was raised about the actual
time he had spent in jail by learned counsel for the respondent State,
though it was conceded that cases for release were considered after 14
years of serving the actual sentence.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent State relied upon the
absence of any explanation by the accused regarding the cause of death,
even though the death had occurred in the privacy of the matrimonial
home.  The appellant herein and his family are stated to be the
only
residents, where the body of the deceased was found and that itself cast
a burden on them within the meaning of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act.
15. In order to support the aforesaid proposition, reliance was
placed on the following judgments:
a. Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi v. State of
Maharashtra1: In this case, the death had occurred in the
matrimonial home but the conviction was supported by a dying
declaration.
b. Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. State of Bihar & Anr.2:
Here, the weapon of offence, a gun, was recovered from the
room of the accused and the dead body was found on the terrace
attached to the private room of the accused.
1 (2007) 15 SCC 455
2 (2007) 10 SCC 433
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c. Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra3: In this
case, the body of the deceased was found in the matrimonial home
and the cause of death was strangulation, though the defence
pleaded it to be a case of a snakebite.
16. The aforesaid, would thus, show that the third case best fits
the factual scenario in the present case.
17. Learned counsel for the State emphasised that the other
witnesses turning hostile cannot be a ground itself to acquit the accused
and the testimony of PW-1 was consistent and sufficient to convict the
appellant herein.  In this behalf, a reference was made to Section 134 of
the Evidence Act, which reads as under:
“134. Number of witnesses. – No particular number of witnesses
shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact.”
18. It was, thus, contended that mere presence or absence of a
large number of witnesses cannot be the basis of conviction. It is the
quality of evidence and not the number of witnesses, which is relevant.
In this behalf, a reference was made to the following cases:
a. Yanob Sheikh Alias Gagu v. State of West Bengal4, where it
was observed as under:
“20. We must notice at this stage that it is not always the quantity
but the quality of the prosecution evidence that weighs with the
Court in determining the guilt of the accused or otherwise. The
prosecution is under the responsibility of bringing its case beyond
reasonable doubt and cannot escape that responsibility. In order
to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt, the evidence produced
by the prosecution has to be qualitative and may not be quantitative
in nature. In the case of Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [(2007)
14 SCC 150], the Court held as under:
“28. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that Indian legal
system does not insist on plurality of witnesses. Neither the
legislature (Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872) nor the
judiciary mandates that there must be particular number of
witnesses to record an order of conviction against the accused.
Our legal system has always laid emphasis on value, weight
3 (2006) 10 SCC 681
4 (2013) 6 SCC 428
JAYANTILAL VERMA v. STATE OF M.P. (NOW
CHHATTISGARH) [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
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and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity
or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent
court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and
record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in
spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about
the quality of evidence. The bald contention that no conviction
can be recorded in case of a solitary eyewitness, therefore,
has no force and must be negatived.”
b. Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand)5 wherein
the Court relied on the same aforementioned principle.
19. On consideration of the evidence led by the prosecution and
considering the concurrent findings by the two courts qua the appellant
herein we are unable to find any reason to interfere with the judgment of
the courts below.
20. It is no doubt true that a large number of witnesses turned
hostile and the Trial Court was also not happy with the manner of
prosecution conducted this case.  But that is not an unusual event in the
long drawn out trials in our country and in the absence of any witness
protection regime of substance, one has to examine whatever is the
evidence which is capable of being considered, and then come to a finding
whether it would suffice to convict the accused.
21. The rationale adopted for coming to the conclusion behind the
reason for the real brother of the deceased turning hostile while step
brother stood his
ground is also obvious and correctly appreciated, i.e.,
to preserve the close family ties which continued to exist by marriage in
the instant case, in view of the siblings of the deceased and appellant
herein being married. In the Indian context, there exists a continued
relationship between two   families wherein the daughter-in-law comes
from another house.
22. We are conscious that the case of the prosecution rests only
on the testimony of PW-1 and the medical evidence.  The statement of
PW-1 was consistent and cogent except to the extent that in the earlier
statement he had not mentioned the factum of the death being attributed
to snakebite. However, that itself would not nullify the remaining part of
his testimony.  In fact, the said witness did not back out from the statement,
5 (2014) 3 SCC 401
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but could not state the reason why the police did not record it in the FIR
though it was mentioned.
23. The doctor opined the cause of death to be asphyxia due to
strangulation.  Thereafter, he has stated that nature may be homicidal.
This was so stated because asphyxia being the cause of death, the doctor
himself could not have conclusively said whether it was homicidal or
suicidal. It was also voluntarily opined, that there had to be a minimum
of five minutes of forceful pulling to cause the death.
24. In our view, the most important aspect is where the death was
caused and the body found.  It was in the precincts of the house of the
appellant herein where there were only family members staying.  The
High Court also found that the location of the house and the surrounding
buildings was such that there was no possibility of somebody from outside
coming and strangulating the deceased and that too without any
commotion being caused or any valuable/jewellery missing.
25. We are confronted with a factual situation where the appellant
herein, as a husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by
strangulation.  The fact that the family members were in the home some
time before is also quite obvious.  No explanation has been given as to
how the wife could have received the injuries.  This is a strong
circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the
crime.6  The appellant herein was under an obligation to give a plausible
explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded
under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the answer
in such a situation.
26. We, thus, find no reason to interfere with the impugned
judgment.  The appeal is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to
bear their own costs.
27. We, however, direct the respondent State to examine whether
the appellant herein has completed 14 years of actual sentence or not
and if it is so, his case should be examined within a maximum period of
two months for release in accordance with norms.  If not, the exercise
be undertaken within the same time on completion of 14 years of actual
sentence.
6 Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (supra).
Kalpana K. Tripathy
Appeal dismissed.
JAYANTILAL VERMA v. STATE OF M.P. (NOW
CHHATTISGARH) [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]