NIDHI KAIM versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & OTHERS ETC.
[2016] 7 S.C.R. 822, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Directions issued
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[2016] 7 S.C.R. 822 
NIDHI KA!M 
v. 
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & OTHERS ETC. 
(CivilAppealNo. 1727 of2016) 
MAY 12, 2016 
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.) 
Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board Act, 2007: 
s.3 - Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board 
popularly known as Vyavsayik Pariksha Manda! (Vyapam) -
Constitution of Board/Vyapam - Notification uls.3 for constituting 
the Board not been issued - But Board brought i11to existence for 
conducting the examination for admission in the medical, 
engineering and agricultural universities and for ad111ission in the 
polytechnics - The Board constituted is a non-stalutmy body -
It 
has no existence apart from the government - Appel !ants contention 
that the Board constituted has no authority in law is not tenable for 
the reason that if the Board is without any authority of law for 
cancelling the examination conducted by it, it is equally without 
any authority of law to conduct the common entrance examination 
(PMT) - Any admission based on the marks obtained at such 
common entrance exa111inatio11 would be equally without any 
authority of law in the sense of legislative sanction - Whatever be 
the legal implications of the exercise of such power vis-a-vis others, 
the appellants cannot be heard saying that the Board has no 
authority of law to take action against them because they had 
appeared for the said examination and taken the benefit of securing 
admissions into the
various medical colleges on the basis of the 
marks obtained by them in the examination - Even otherwise, under 
the scheme of our Constitution, the executive power of the State is 
co-extensive with its legislative power - If it is established that the 
adoption of unfair means on large scale resulted in the contamination 
of the entrance examination (PMT) process of successive years, the 
State undoubtedly would have the power to take appropriate action 
to protect the public interest - Education/Educational Institutions. 
Examination process - Tampering of - Entrance examination 
for admissions into medical colleges - Allegation of conspiracy in 
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NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
the context of the examination - Cancellation of results of so111e 
candidates resulting in cancellation of their admissions - Criminal 
cases - Based on enquiry reports, Board concluded that there was 
tampering with the examination p;·ocess and the appellants as well 
as some other students resorted to unfair means at the said 
examination - Cuncellafion of admissions of appellants and others -
Challenge against -
Per C/1e/ameswar, J: 
The case on hand can 
fall within the category of exceptions to the rule of audi alteram 
partem if there is reliable material to hold that the examination 
process is vitiated - There was tampering with the examination 
process insofar as the appellants and a few others are concerned -
There is no reason to interfere with cancellation of admission on 
the count that the rule of audi alteram partem was not complied 
with by the re:;pondents before cancelling the admissions of the 
appellants - However, question is whether these appellants deserve 
sympathy and whether society can afford to waste such technically 
trained and qualified human resources which require enormous 
amounts of energy, time and other material resources to generate -
Appellants whatever by their role in tampering of the examination 
process must have been juveniles and cannot be subjected to 
punishment under criminal law - For the said reasons they should 
be permitted to complete their study of medicine and become trained
doctors to serve the nation - It would serve the larger public 
interests, by 111aking the appellants serve the nation for a period of 
five years as and when they become qualified doctors, without any 
regular salary and attendant benefits of service under the State 
and certificates of their medical degrees be handed over only after 
completion of five years - Per St1pre, J: The case at hand established 
a case of 111ass copying attributable to appellants who resorted to 
unfair means in a planned way in the PMT examination - It was 
neither necessary to give any show cause notice to the appellants 
nor necessary to supply the material to appellants - Procedure 
adopted by State!Vyapam cannot be said to be unfair or arbitrary -
Action impugned is not in breach of rules of natural justice -
Appellants are not entitled to claim equitable relief on the ground 
that they have al111ost completed their course during interregnum 
period - No case 111ade out under Art.142 of the Constitution -
State may consider per111itting the appellants and other candidates 
alike the appellants to appear in the co111petitive examination 
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[2016] 7 S.C.R. 
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whenever it is held and consider granting age relaxation to those 
candidates who crossed the age limit, if prescribed - Held: In view 
of difference of opinion, matter to be placed before the Chief Justice 
of India for appropriate orders - Constitution of India - Art.142 -
Equity. 
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Directing to place matter before Chief Justice of India in 
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view of difference of opinion, the Court 
HELD: PER CHELAMESWAR, J. 1.1. Section 3 of the 
Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board Act, 2007 
contemplates establishment of a Board (a body corporate) by a 
notification of the State Government. Admittedly, the notification 
constituting the Board has not been issued, but a body constituted 
earlier under various executive orders of the State of Madhya 
Pradesh continues to be in existence. The composition and legal 
structure of the third respondent (BOARD) was discussed 
elaboratetv in * Pratiblta Si11gll 's case and upheld by Supreme 
Court in **Pooja Yadav case. It appears from the said judgment 
that the third respondent (BOARD) was brought into existence 
"for conducting the examination for admission in the medical, 
engineering and agricultural universities and for admission in the 
polytechnics and initiate the necessary proceedings in this 
regard" by a notification dated 17.4.1982 issued in the name of 
the Governor. The said notification was published in the official 
gazette on 19.4.1982. Therefore, the
BOARD is a non-statutory 
'body'. It is not a corporate entity. It has no existence apart from 
the government. Barring the vague statement regarding the 
purpose for which the BOARD is created, the Notification dated 
17.4.1982 does not contain any details regarding either the powers 
or the functions of the BOARD. The net result is that the entire 
exercise of holding the PMT and regulating the admissions of 
students into the various medical colleges would be only an 
exercise of the executive powers of the _State of Madhya Pradesh. 
If the third respondent BOARD is without any authority of law 
for cancelling the examination conducted by it, it is equally without 
any authority of law to conduct the common entrance examination 
(PMT). Any admission based on the marks obtained at such 
common entrance examination would be equally without any 
authority of law in the sense of legislative sanction. Even
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
otherwise, the argument of the appellants is required to be 
rejected for the reasons that under the scheme of our 
Constitution, the executive power of the State is co-extensive 
with its legislative power. In the absence of any operative 
legislation, the executive power could certainly be exercised to 
protect the public interest. The right of each one of the appellants 
for admission to the medical colleges in the State of Madhya 
Pradesh is itself an emanation of the State's executive action. 
No doubt, even executive action of the State can create rights. 
Unless there is something either in the Constitution or law which 
prohibits the abrogation or abridgment of rights, it is permissible 
for the State to do so by executive action in accordance with some 
specified procedure of law. No doubt, that the overarching 
requirement of Constitution is that every action of the State must 
be informed with reason and must be in public interest. If it is 
established that the adoption of unfair means on large scale 
resulted in the contamination of the entrance examination (PMT) 
process of successive years, the State undoubtedly would have 
the power to take appropriate action to protect the public interest. 
[Paras 1, 21, 22) [836-H; 837-A-B; 846-B-F; 847-A-B; 848-A-C) 
**Pooja Yadav &Anr. v. State of M.P. decided by 
Supreme Court on 19.5.2014 in SLP(C) 13629-630 of 
2014 - relied on. 
*Ku. Praiibha Singh (Minor) v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors. 2014 (III) MPJR 178 - referred to. 
2. This Court in **"Sinha case laid down the principle that 
the rule of "udi (l/ter"m partem need not be complied with in 
connection with the cancellation of examinations where it would 
be impracticable to apply the said principle. Adoption of unfair 
means on a large scale is one of them. The Court did not go by 
the percentage of the students who were alleged to have had 
resorted to the practice of unfair means. When the Court 
characterized the situation as practice of unfair means on a 'large 
scale', it used the expression only to distinguish the situation 
from cases of practice of unfair means by one or two students. 
The Court has also held that there are other circumstances 
justifying the departure from complying with the audi a/teram 
partem rule. They are - leakage of question papers and 
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destruction of a large number of answer papers. The examples 
given therein are not exhaustive of all the categories constituting 
exceptions to the application of the rule of "udi "lter"m p"rtem. 
Therefore, the percentage of the students who are alleged to 
have resorted to unfair means is irrelevant. Similarly, resorting 
to unfair means by a 'large number of students' is not the only 
circumstance which justifies the non-compliance with the rule of 
"udi (l/fer"m p(lrfem. Cases such as the one on hand where there 
are allegations of criminal conspiracies resulting in the tampering 
with the examination process for the benefit of a large number of 
students would be certainly one of the exceptional circumstances 
indicated in Sinha's case provided there is some justifiable 
material to support the conclusion that the examination process 
had been tampered with. The case on hand can fall within the 
category of exceptions to the rule of "udi (l/fer"m p"rtem if there 
is reliable material to come to the conclusion that the examination 
process is vitiated. [Paras 23, 34] [858-B, C; 857-D-E; 849-A-D] 
* * * The Bihar School Examination Board v. Sub has 
Chandra Sinha & Others (1970) 1 SCC 648: 1970 (3) 
SCR 968 - relied on. 
Onkar Lal Bajaj & Others v. Union of India & Another 
(2003) 2 SCC 673: 2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 605 - relied 
on. 
3. There is nothing inherently irrational or perverse in the 
BOARD's
conclusions (i) that the examination process was 
tampered with; and (ii) that all the appellants who are identified 
to be members of the 'pairs' are beneficiaries of such manipulated 
examination process, relying upon the circumstances if they are 
unimpeachable. Each one of the circumstances is an inference 
which flows from certain basic facts which either individually or 
in combination with some other facts constituted the 
circumstance. The fact that the entire process of the generation 
of roll numbers to the students and allotment of the students to 
various examination centres is done by a computerised process 
is not in dispute. The assertion of the BOARD that technically 
such a process requires SOME LOGIC to be followed is not 
disputed by the appellants. The expert committee (on an analysis 
of the data) (i) identified the logic followed for generating the roll 
numbers and allotting the examination centres and also (ii)
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
reaching a conclusion that in the case of the appellants and a few 
others the allotment was not in accordance with the logic initially 
adopted. The same are not normally amenable to judicial review 
because Courts would lack the necessary technical expertise to 
sit in judgment over such matters. There is no reason to doubt 
either the factual or legal correctness of the first two 
circumstances. [Paras 36, 37) [858-H; 859-A-B, C-F] 
4. The appellant contended that ifthere is a deviation from 
the general pattern with regard to the allotment of Roll numbers 
and the examination centres, the appellants could not be blamed 
or 'penalised' because the entire process of the allotment was 
done by the Board and its officials. The question of either 'blame' 
or 'penalty' does not arise in the context. If tampering with the 
examination process took place, whether all or some of the 
appellants are culpable is a matter for a criminal court to examine 
as and when any of the appellants is sought to be prosecuted. 
But the fact that the examination process was tampered with is 
relevant for administrative action such as the one impugned 
herein. The said fact formed the foundation for the further enquiry 
for identifying the beneficiaries of such contaminated process. 
Having regard to the circumstances relied upon, there is no illogic 
in the conclusions drawn by the expert committee which formed 
the basis for the impugned action of the
BOARD. There is no 
irrationality either in the formula or the decision of the BOARD 
to assign greater weightage to the incorrect matching answers. 
There is nothing inherently suspicious about two candidates sitting 
in close proximity in an examination and giving the same correct 
answer to a question because there can only one correct answer 
to a question. On the other hand, if they give the same wrong 
answer to a given question and if the number of such wrong 
answers is high, it can certainly generate a doubt and is a strong 
circumstance indicating the occurrence of some malpractice. Such 
a test was approved by this Court in Bagles/1w"r Prasad's case. 
Even otherwise, it would be futile to pursue the inquiry in this 
regard. There is no r~ason to interfere with the impugned 
judgment on the count that the rule of audi alteram partem was 
not complied with by the respondents before cancelling the 
admissions of the appellants. [Para 38) [859-G; 860-A-F; 861-A, 
C-D) 
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Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., 
Allahabad & Another v. Bagleshwar Prasad & Another 
(1963) 3 SCR 767 - relied on. 
5.1. The next question that requires examination is the 
legality of the action of the respondents after a lapse of 
considerable time. It varies between one to five years with 
reference to each of the appellants. The decision of the 
respondents necessarily led to litigation which consumed another 
three years. The net result is that appellants, who belong to 
2012 batch, spent four years undergoing the training in medical 
course; others progressively longer periods extending up to eight 
years but could not acquire their degrees because of the impugned 
action and the pendency of this litigation. Most of the appellants 
would have acquired their degree in medicine by now if they had 
been successful at the examinations. In the case in hand, the 
number of students involved is relatively huge. In view of the 
conclusion that neither the procedure adopted by the respondents 
nor the evidence relied upon by the respondents for taking 
impugned action against the appellants could be characterized as 
illegal, is it permissible for this Court to interfere with the 
impugned action of the respondents either on the ground that 
there is a considerable time lapse or that such action would have 
ruinous effect on the lives and careers of the appellants? and 
therefore
inequitable is a troubling question. [Paras 39, 46) [861-
D-F; 864-E-F) 
5.2. The public policy of the country and the larger public 
interests would be more appropriate guides than the 
considerations of equity to decide the questions in the absence 
of any statutory prescription applicable to the controversy on 
hand. Public policy of this country regarding the retention of the 
benefit obtained by perpetrator of crime is that normally the 
benefit cannot be permitted to be retained by the perpetrator of 
crime. But the principle is applied only on adjudication that the 
benefit was obtained by perpetration of crime. Situ Sa/iu's case is 
also a case establishing the principle that the law permits the 
retention of property acquired pursuant to fraudulent means 
(allegedly) because law does not permit an enquiry into the 
allegation beyond the reasonable period. However, when it comes 
to other civil rights, the public policy, as can be discerned from
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
various enactments, seems to be not to deprive those who are 
found to have been guilty of offences of all their civil rights. It is 
required to be examined whether it would be consistent with the 
public policy to deprive the appellants of the benefits of their 
education on the ground that they secured certain benefits by 
adopting fraudulent means. [Paras 47, 50, 51) [864-G; 867-D-E; 
869-B-E] 
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & 
Another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Another (1986) 3 SCC 
156: 1986 (2) SCR 278 - relied on. 
Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others (2012) 
7 SCC 433: 2012 (5) SCR 768; Ram Preeti Yadav " 
U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education 
& Others (2003) 8 SCC 311: 2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 352 
- Explained. 
6.1. All the appellants are also being investigated for the 
commission of various offences which if proved would render them 
liable for imprisonment for periods extending beyond three years, 
and therefore, there is no period oflimitation for taking cognizance 
of them. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned action 
against the appellants would be inconsistent with the public policy 
on the ground of the .time gap. While it is a salutary principle 
based on public policy not to permit the retention of 'property' 
obtained by fraudulent means, the application of the said principle 
becomes a matter of doubtful utility to, the society in the context 
of the acquisition of
knowledge by adopting fraudulent means 
examined from the point of view of the public interest. In the 
context of property (economic gains), the application of the 
principle works to the benefit of the rightful owner. But in the 
context of acquisition of knowledge, nobody would benefit by the 
application of the rule and would therefore serve only a limited 
public purpose. [Paras 52, 53) [870-A-D] 
6.2. Some 634 youngsters, who have already completed 
their training in medicine (or about to complete) and whose 
knowledge could have otherwise been utilized for the benefit of 
the society, would be simply rendered useless for the society in 
the sense their knowledge cannot be utilized for the welfare of 
the society. The question is not whether these appellants deserve 
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any sympathy. A larger question- whether this society can afford 
to waste such technically trained and qualified human resources 
which require enormous amounts of energy, time and other 
material resources to generate. Obviously, it takes another five 
years of time and expenditure of considerable material resources 
to produce another set of 634 qualified medical graduates. It is 
in the background of this consideration, this issue is required to 
be decided. Another important consideration in the context is 
that most of the appellants, whatever be their respective role, if 
any, in the tampering of the examination process, must have been 
'juveniles' as defined under the Juvenile Justice Act. They cannot 
be subjected to any 'punishment' prescribed under the criminal 
law even if they are not only the beneficiaries of the tampered 
examination process but also the perpetrators of the various acts 
which constitute offences contaminating the examination process. 
For the said reasons, the appellants should be permitted to 
complete their study of medicine and become trained doctors to 
serve the nation. But at the same time there is a compelling 
national interest that dishonest people cannot be made to believe 
that "time heals everything' and the society would condone every 
misdeed if only they can manage to get away with their wrong 
doing for a considerably long period. Society must receive some
compensation from the wrongdoers. Compensation need not be 
monetary and in the instant case it should not be. It would serve 
the larger public interests, by making the appellants serve the 
nation for a period of five years as and when they become qualified 
doctors, without any regular salary and attendant benefits of 
service under the State, nor any claim for absorption into the 
service of the State subject of course to the payment of some 
allowance (either in cash or kind) for their survival. The appellants 
be handed over the certificates of their medical degrees only 
after they complete the five years. [Para 54, 55, 56] (870-D-G; 
871-A-E] 
Situ Sahu & Others v. State of Jharkhand & Others 
(2004) 8 SCC 340: 2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 258- relied 
on. 
B. Ramanjini & Others v. State of A.P. & Others (2002) 
5 SCC 533 : 2002 (3) SCR 506; S.P. Chengalvaraya 
H 
Naidu (Dead) by LRs v. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs &
NlDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
Others, (1994) 1 SCC 1: 1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 422; 
Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. 
v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta & Others 1962 Supp (3) SCR 
36 - referred to. 
Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley (1956) 1 All ER 341 -
referred to. 
PER SAPRE, J. (Partly dissenting) 1. The facts of the case 
at hand are identical partly to the facts of the case of Bi/iar School 
Examination Board and partly to the facts of Bagleshwar Prasad 
and Prem Prakash. This I say for the following reasons. First, 
this is a case where large number of candidates (more than two 
hundred) in the examinations held from 2008 to 2012 were found 
involved in copying like what was noticed in the case of Biliar 
School Examination where 36 candidates were found involved in 
copying. Second, there was uniform pattern adopted by the 
candidates for doing copy in the examinations. This circumstance 
lends support to the fact that "mass copying" was done by the 
candidates in a planned manner; Third, candidates who managed 
to sit in pair in close proximity (described as "scorer" and 
"beneficiary"), their wrong answers consistently matched with 
each other. This circumstance was relied on in the cases of 
Bagleshwar Prasad and Prem Prakash Kalunia for forming an 
opinion that both the candidates copied from each other; Fourth, 
the material seized in investigation prinw facie established that 
"mass copying" was done in a planned manner by the several 
candidates
(appellants) to enable them to answer the questions; 
Fifth, interpolations were found in sitting plan originally made by 
Vyapam for some years to accommodate the candidates 
(appellants) and others like the appellants to sit in a particular 
examination center in close proximity with each other so that 
they are able to copy from each other; Sixth, many candidates 
despite clearing the examination did not take admission in any 
medical college. There was no satisfactory answer given by them 
barring very few; Seventh, material seized in investigation was 
found sufficient by the Expert Committee to form an opinion that 
it was a case of "mass copying". In addition it was also established 
on probabilities and circumstantial evidence that the candidates 
in large scale which included the appellants did mass copying; 
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Eighth, the Expert Committee examined the issues from all angles 
and analyzed the material seized for coming to a conclusion that 
it was a case of "mass copying" done by the candidates in large 
scale as a part of a planned strategy and that they used unfair 
means; Ninth, allegations of ma/a fides were not alleged in the 
writ petitions by any candi~ate against any member of Expert 
Committee or/and officials of the StateNyapam; Tenth, the writ 
court rightly did not act as an appellate court to reverse the 
decision of Expert Committee; Eleventh, the formula evolved 
by the Expert Committee was usually applied in such type of cases 
by various institutions and no perversity or/and arbitrariness was 
shown by the appellants in the formula except to contend that it 
was not a proper formula; and lastly, the expression "mass 
copying" not being defined in any Act/Regulation/Rules, its 
meaning in ordinary parlance can be summed up as "sizable or 
large number of candidates found copying or discovered to ltave 
copied wltile answering their question paper by using unfair means 
in examination". This fully applies to the facts of the case at hand. 
[Paras 45, 46) [889-A-H; 890-A-C] 
The Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas 
Chandra Sinha & Others (1970) 1 SCC 648: 1970 (3) 
SCR 968; Board of High School and Intermediate 
Education, U.P., Allahabad & Another v. Bagleshwar 
Prasad & Another (1963) 3 SCR
767 - relied on. 
2. Neither the writ court and nor this Court could sit as an 
appellate Court over the decision of the Expert Committee and 
find fault in the material relied on by the Committee; Secondly, 
the method evolved by the experts was usually applied to find 
out as to whether two candidates had copied from each other and 
hence no fault could be noticed in it; Thirdly, the decision to cancel 
the results was based on other contemporaneous material seized 
during the investigation by STF; Fourthly, the decision to cancel 
the results was not taken in post-haste but was taken with full 
application of mind by the Expert Committee which consists of 
experts in subjects and lastly, this being a case of "mass copying", 
it was neither necessary to give any show cause notice to the 
appellants and nor necessary to supply the material to the 
appellants. [Para 48) (890-E-F]
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
3. It is a clear case of what is called in ordinary parlance a 
"mass copying". The procedure adopted by the StateNyapam 
cannot be said to be unfair or arbitrary. The action impugned is 
not in breach of rules of natural justice which has no application 
to the facts of this case. It is a settled principle that rules of 
natural justice are not embodied rules and hence such rules cannot 
be put in a strait-jacket. The object of tke rules of natural justice, 
is only to ensure that order causing civil consequences should 
not be passed arbitrarily. It is not that in every case, there must 
be an opportunity of oral hearing to person concerned. This 
principle applies to the case at hand. [Para 50] [891-A-C] 
4. This takes to the next submission namely, that since 
there was inordinate delay in taking the decision to cancel the 
examination and in the meantime the appellants have altered their 
position by completing their degree course, or are about to 
complete the Course in near future and hence this Court should 
protect the appellants' interest on equitable considerations. The 
appellants are not entitled to claim any equitable relief on the 
ground that they have almost completed their course during the 
interregnum period and hence no action on the basis of their 
PMT Examination results is called for. The case at hand prima 
f acie established a case of "mass copying" attributable to the 
appellants who resorted to unfair means
in a planned way in the 
PMT examination and lastly, when any action is done discretely, 
it takes times to discover. In these circumstances, the State may 
consider permitting the appellants and other candidates alike the 
appellants to appear in the competitive examination whenever it 
is held and consider granting age relaxation to those candidates 
who crossed the age limit, if prescribed. Such liberty, if granted, 
would not cause any prejudice to any one and at the same time 
would do substantial justice to all such candidates. Beyond this, 
the appellants are not entitled to claim any indulgence. [Paras 
51, 57, 58, 61) [891-D; 894-A-B, C-D; 895-H; 896-A-B] 
5. It is well known that the Examination is always considered 
as one of the major means to assess and evaluate candidate's 
skills and knowledge be it a school test, university examination, 
professional entrance examination or any other examination. 
Candidate's fitness for his further assignment whether in studies 
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or employment is, therefore, judged on the basis of his 
performance in the examination. It is for this reason, the 
examination is considered as a common tool around which the 
entire education system revolves. Examination malpractices, 
academic fraud or cheating in the examination is as old as the 
examination itself. Study made by the educationist ·has revealed 
that these malpractices are gradually on the rise across the world 
and has caused a threat to public trust in reliability and credibility 
to the system as a whole. These malpractices occur within and 
outside the examination halls and are perpetrated by the 
candidates, staff and other external agencies before, during and 
after the examination. Various kinds of strategies are innovated 
and then applied to enable the candidate to clear the examination 
any how. It has, therefore, destroyed the piousness of the 
examination. With a view to prohibit such activities, State of A.P. 
had enacted a legislation but it was found inadequate to control 
such activities. It is, therefore, the collective responsibility of 
the Government (Central/States), educational bodies/Institutions 
to ponder over and evolve a uniform policy in a comprehensive 
manner to firmly deal with such activities in the larger public 
good. It is hoped that effective remedial steps would be taken in 
that regard. (Paras 68 to 70) (897-G-H; 898-A-D) 
Board of High School and
Intermediate Education, U.P., 
Allahabad and Anr. v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta and Ors. 
AIR 1962 SC 1110: 1962 Supp (3) SCR 36; Prem 
Parkash Kaluniya v .. Punjab University and Ors. 
(1973) 3 SCC 424; B. Ramanjini & Ors. v. State of A.P. 
& Ors. (2002) 5 SCC 533: 2002 (3) SCR 506; Chief 
General Manager, Calcutta Telephones District, Bharat 
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Surendra Nath Pandey & Ors., 
2011 (15) SCC 81: 2011 (14) SCR 840; Ram Preeti 
Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate 
Education and Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 311:2003 (3) Suppl. 
SCR 352; Madhyamic Shiksha Manda! MP. 1( Abhi/ash 
Shiksha Prasar Samiti & Ors., (1998) 9 SCC 236 -
relied on. 
Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. (2012) 7 
SCC 433: 2012 (5) SCR 768; Union qf India & Anr. v. 
Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398: 1985 (2) Suppl.
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
835 
SCR 131; Dr. Dinesh Kumar & Ors. v. Motilal Nehru 
A 
Medical College, Allahabad & Ors., (1985) 3 SCC 
542:1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 1; State of Maharashtra & 
Ors. v. Jalgaon Municipal Council & Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 
731:2003 (1) SCR 1112; Situ Sahu & Ors. v. State of 
Jharkhand & Ors. (2004) 8 SCC 340:2004 (4) Suppl. 
B 
SCR 258 - Distinguished. 
Case Law Reference 
In the Jude;ment of Chelameswar, J. 
19(~ (3) SCR 968 
relied on 
Para 26 
20Q~ (3) SCR 506 
referred to 
Para 26 
c 
(1963) 3 SCR 767 
relied on 
Para26 
1962 Supp (3) SCR 36 
referred to 
Para27 
2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 605 
relied on 
Para 27 
20~2. (5) SCR 768 
Explained 
Para 40 
2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 352 
Explained 
Para 41 
D 
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 422 
referred to 
Para 43 
19~~ (2) SCR 278 
relied on 
Para 48 
2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 258 
relied on 
Para 49 
E 
In the Judi:;ment of Aba:r Manohar Sal.!re, J. 
1962 Supp (3) SCR 36 
relied on 
Para24 
0?63) 3 SCR 767 
relied on 
Para 45 
19(~ (3) SCR 968 
relied on 
Para 45 
20Q~ (3) SCR 506 
relied on 
Para36 
F 
(1973) 3 sec 424 
relied on 
Para 45 
2011 (14) SCR 840 
relied on 
Para38 
2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 352 
relied on 
Para 41 
0?98) 9 sec 236 
relied on 
Para 54 
G 
20p (5) SCR 768 
Distinguished 
Para 59 
1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 131 
Distinguished 
Para 62 
1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 1 
Distinguished 
Para 62 
2003 (1) SCR 1112 
Distinguished 
Para62 
2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 258 
Distinguished 
Para 62 
H
836 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 7 S.C.R. 
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1727 
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of2016. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.10.2014 of the High Court 
of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 7676 of 
2014 
WITH 
C.A.NOS.1720-1724, 1726, 1728, 1729, 1733, 1734-1741, 1742-
1749, 1750-1751, 1752, 1753-1758, 1759-1764, 1765, 1766, 1767-1768, 
1769-1774, 1776-1787, 1788, 1789-1791, 1792-1794, 1795-1798, 1799-
1805, 1806-1808, 1809, 1810-1811, 1812, 1813-1814, 1815, 1816-1817, 
1818-1819, 1820, 1821, 1822-1824, 1825, 1826, 1827, 1828, 1830, 1831-
1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836-1837, 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, 1843, 
1844, 1845, 1846and 1847-1852of2016. 
Dr. Raj iv Dhavan, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Sr. Advs., Vijay Kumar, 
Thomas Oommen, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Sunny Choudhary, Nikhil Jain, Gagan 
Deep Sharma, Ms. Preeti Singh, Ms. Vikram Mehta, Varun Kumar 
Tikmani, Varun Singh, Vikas Mehta, Nar Hari Singh, Aniruddha P. Mayee, 
Varinder Kumar Sharma, Bharat Singh, Ashish Kr. Upadhyay, Amit 
Pawan, Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Suryanarayana Singh, Karamveer Jindal, 
Divyakant Lahoti, Anish Gupta, Shashank Garg, Pulkit Tare, Rameshwar 
Prasad Goyal, Rajender Prasad, Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Navin Prakash 
Ms. Meetu Singh, Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, T. Mahipal, Mithilesh 
Kumar Singh, Mrs. Manju Singh,Akshay Ringe, E. C. Agrawala, Atishi 
Dipankar, Advs. for the Appellant. 
Ranjit Kumar, SG, Maninder Singh, ASG, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, 
Sr. Adv.,
R. Balasubramanian, Raj iv Nanda, Santosh Kumar, B. V. Bairam 
Das,Rajul Shrivastava, K. Krishna Kumar, Purushaindra Kaurav, Mishra 
Saurabh,Ankit Kr. Lal, Sanjeev Bansal, Akshay K. Ghai, Rajeev Kumar 
Bansal, C. D. Singh, Amithesh Kumar, Shashank Shekhar, (For M. K. 
Sinha), Gaurav Sharma, Prateek Bhatia, Dhawal Mohan, Arjun Garg, 
Mani sh Yadav, Pramod Sharma,Abhinav Gupta, Ms. PratibhaJain, Advs. 
for the Respondents. 
The following Judgments and Order of the Court were delivered 
by 
CHELAMESWAR, J. I. The Madhya Pradesh Vyavsayik 
Pariksha Manda! Adhiniyam, 2007 [The Madhya Pradesh Professional
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
Examination Board Act, 2007] (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 
came into force on 15°' October 2007. Section 3 1 of the said Act 
contemplates establishment of a Board (a body corporate) by a 
notification of the State Government. Admittedly, as on today, the 
notification constituting the Board has not been issued, but a body 
constituted earlier under various executive orders' of the State of Madhya 
Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as "the BOARD") continues to be in 
existence. It carries on various activities. 
2. One of the objectives of the statutory Board specified under 
Section I 0 is as follows: 
"(a) to conduct entrance examinations for admission to various 
professional and other educational institutions on the request of 
the State Government, other State Governments, Central 
Government, Universities and national or state level institutions." 
3. It appears that admissions to various medical colleges either 
privately managed or managed by the government in the State of Madhya 
Pradesh are regulated by a common entrance examination [called as 
"Pre-Medical Entrance Test (PMT)]. such an examination was 
conducted annually by the BOARD. The Act came to be passed with a 
view to create a statutory basis for the BOARD which, inter alia, is 
required_ to conduct entrance examinations for admissions into various 
educational institutions including medical colleges. Unfortunately, the 
notification
contemplated under Section 3 never came to be issued but 
everybody in the administration of the State of Madhya Pradesh 
proceeded all these years on an assumption that the BOARD (a mythical 
beast) would somehow became the body contemplated under Section 3 
of the Act. This aspect of the matter is one of the issues in the case; 
and, therefore, I shall deal with it later in this judgment. 
1 Section 3. Incorporation of the Board. - (I) The State Government shall establish by 
a notification, a Board to be called the Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination 
Board with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification. 
(2) The Board shall be a body corporate by the name of the Madhya Pradesh 
Professional Examination Board and shall have perpetual succession and a common 
seal with power to acquire and hold property, both movable and immovable and shall 
have power to transfer any property held by it and to contract and do all other things 
necessary for the purposes of its constitution and may sue or be sued in its corporate 
name. 
2 For the details of the executive orders, See Ku. Pratibha Singh (Minor) v. The State of 
Madhya Pradesh & Others. 2014 (Ill) MPJR 178 
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4. Entrance examination for admissions into medical colleges for 
the year 2013 was conducted by the abovementioned BOARD on 
7.7.2013. On the same day, a crime came to be registered in FIR No.539 
of 2013 alleging commission of various offences pursuant to a large 
scale conspiracy in the context of the examination. The FIR came to be 
registered against several persons including students and some employees 
of the State of Madhya Pradesh who were working in the administration 
of the BOARD. 
5. The Chairman of the BOARD also caused some enquiry3 into 
the allegations. By two orders, dated 9.10.2013 and 6.12.2013, the 
BOARD cancelled the results of 345 and 70 candidates respectively. 
As a consequence, admissions granted to the abovementioned students 
in various medical colleges stood cancelled. Challenging those orders, a 
batch of writ petitions came to be filed before the Madhya Pradesh 
High Court. All the said writ petitions were dismissed by an order dated 
11.4.2014 of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in 
Ku. Pratiblta Singh v. Tile State of Madhya Pradesh & Others. The 
correctness of the said judgment was questioned in SLP (C) Nos.13629-
630 of2014 (Pooja Yadav & Another v. State of M.R & Others) and 
16257 of 2014 (Sumit Sinha v. State of M.P. & Others), which were 
dismissed by orders dated 19.5.2014 and 08.08.2014 respectively 
confirming the judgment of the High Court. 
6.
Parallelly, the police investigated the crime (FIR No. 539/2013) 
mentioned supra. Some officers of the BOARD and others were 
arrested. Pursuant to information gathered during the course of the 
investigation of the abovementioned crime, the investigating agency sent 
two letters dated 23. I 0.2013 and 31.12.20134 to the BOARD. It is 
' The nature of the enquiry "·as discussed by Madhya Pradesh High Court in great detail in 
the judgment of Ku. Pratibha Singh (Minor) v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, 
2014 (Ill) MPJR 178 
• (a) In reference to above subject. it is submitted that on conducting inquiry from the 
accused arrested in the cases registered in connection with referenced examination and 
other examinations in S.T.F.. M.P. Bhopal and even in so far as the accused arrested by 
your office have stated regarding forgery in these examination. Accused Jagdish Sagar and 
Sanjiv Shilpkar arrested in the S.T.F. Crime No.12/2013. under Section 420, 467. 468, 
471. 120 B l.P.C .. 3(0)1. 2/4 M.P. Recogniltion Examination Act. 1937 have stated 
regarding forgery for setting of equal roll number in P.M.T. Examination 2012 and 2013 
and for setting of equal roll numbers in the P.M. T. Examination 2013 in collusion with 
Officers of Vyapam namely Nitin Mahindra and Others. 
Therefore, it is requested to provide report after conducting investigation in accordance 
with law as conducted in connection P.M.T. Examination 2013. P.M.T. Examination 
2012. in the referenced P.M.T.
Examination 2009. 2010. 2011. so that. action would be 
taken in accordance with law in connection with above: - relevant portion of the letter 
dated 31.12.2013 
(b) We understand that the original letter is in vernacular and the above is a Translation 
placed on record before us."
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
informed at the bar that the first of the abovementioned letters informed 
the BOARD about some irregularities in the conduct of the PMT of 
20 I 2, and the second called upon the BOARD to cause an inquiry into 
and provide certain information with regard to the PMTs of the years 
2009 to 2011. On receipt of the said letters, the BOARD decided to 
enquire into the PMT process ofnot only the years 2009 to 2012 but also 
the year 2008. 
7. The enquiry was conducted. The pattern of the enquiry is 
similar to the one conducted concerning PMT 2013. Based on the enquiry 
reports, the Soard came to two conclusions: (i) there was a tampering 
with the examination process in each one of the abovementioned five 
years; and (ii) the appellants as well as some others students5 resorted 
to unfair means at the said examinations. They were beneficiaries of 
such tampered examination process. The BOARD, therefore, cancelled 
the admissions of the appellants and some others. Aggrieved, a large 
number of students, whose admissions were cancel led, approached the 
Madhya Pradesh High Court by filing writ petitions. Majority of the writ 
petitions came to be dismissed by a common judgment dated 24.09.2014. 
The remaining writ petitions came to be dismissed by another common 
judgment dated 7.10.2014 in the light of the judgment dated 24.09.2014. 
The instant appeals arise out of the said judgments preferred by some of 
the unsuccessful
petitioners therein (students). 
8. Before I proceed to examine the correctness of the impugned 
judgments, I think it would be profitable to describe broadly the 
examination process (with respect to which there is no dispute) conducted 
by the BOARD and also the nature of the allegations which formed the 
basis for the cancellation of the admissions of the various students. 
THE PROCESS: 
9. Each year the BOARD conducted a common entrance 
examination (for example PMT 2013) for all students aspiring to secure 
admission to various medical colleges in the State of Madhya Pradesh. 
Year 
Number of Students 
2012 
319 
2011 
98 
2010 
90 
2009 
85 
2008 
42 
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Each year a large number of students (in tens ofthousands)6 not only 
from various parts of the State of Madhya Pradesh but also from other 
States appear for such examination. The examination is conducted in 
different cities/towns of Madhya Pradesh and in each city/town there is 
one or more identified examination centres depending upon the number 
of students choosing to appear for the PMT from that city/town. These 
examination centres are usually located in existing educational institutions 
ii! the city/town. 
l 0. Each of the students applying is initially given a registration 
number and is subsequently al lotted a Roll number. It is the agreed case 
of all the parties that each of the students is entitled to choose a city/ 
town where the student would like to take the examination. Depending 
on the choice of the city/town in which the student wishes to take the 
examination, students are allotted a specified examination centre or 
centres (depending upon the number of students) in the city/town, as the 
case may be. The process of generating roll numbers and allotment of 
the centre of examination to each one of the students is done by ll 
computerised process. Such a process is designed and applied by an in-
house computer expert body of the BOARD. 
11. According to the BOARD, such a computerised process of 
generating roll numbers and allotting the students to various examination 
centres in the
State is by following some logical pattern. The pattern 
may vary from year to year and need not be the same for all the years. 
For example, in a particular year, the allotment of roll numbers could be 
in the alphabetical order of the names of the students, whereas in another 
the same could be on the basis of the date of the application of the 
student. (I make it clear that I am not examining the exact logic applied 
in each of these years. It was only meant to illustrate the possibilities of 
the variations in the pattern.) What is important is the existence of a 
pattern and logic underlying the generation and allotment ofroll numbers 
and examination centres to the students. The existence of such pattern 
is of great significance and relevance in the instant case. 
- --- ·-
--· 
'Year 
Total number of students 
i 2008 - - .. who appe.ared in tlie !'MT .. 
38,37~ ·-
- ----· 
--
I 2009 
29,162 
i 2010 
26 711 
: 2011 
26,116 
: 2012 
38.671
NIDHI KAIM' v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
12. Admittedly, there was no show cause notice to any one of the 
students before cancelling their admissions. No speaking order indicating 
the reasons which formed the basis forthe cancellation of the admissions 
was either passed or served on any one of the appellants. Reasons were 
spelt out for the first time in the High Court. It appears from the impugned 
judgment and the submissions made before us that respondents relied 
upon circumstantial evidence7 to reach the two conclusions referred to 
in para 7 (supra). 
13. The case of the appellants before the High Court was that: 
(i) the impugned orders cancelling admission of the appellants 
were passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural 
justice. None of the appellants had been given either -
a show cause notice indicating the allegations on the basis of 
which their admissions were proposed to be cancelled; 
7 The Circumstances are:-
(i) with respect to each of the five years in question, a definite pattern was followed by 
the BOARD in allotment of Roll numbers as well as examination centres. But, it is 
detected on enquiry that allotment of both the Roll number and the examination centre 
with respect to some of the students was in deviation from the pattern adopted for the 
year; 
(ii) Such deviations with reference to several centres occurred in pairs. The logica! 
pattern employed for the generation of Roll numbers was broken with respect
to some 
pairs of students. They were allotted sequential Roll numbers, though they could not 
have been allotted those numbers if the logical pattern were followed. Further, such 
pairs of students were allotted examination Centres which they could not have been 
allotted having regard to Roll numbers allotted to them, and the pattern of the Roll 
numbers allotted to th.: particular examination Centre. 
(iii) in such pairs, once again there is a pattern i.e. the more accomplished student is 
made to sit in front of the other of the pair (referred to in the impugned judgment as 
"Scorer" and "beneficiary" respectively). Such an arrangement was made in order to 
enable the ''beneficiary·· to copy from the '"scorer"; 
(iv) with reference to most of the identified pairs, the candidates not only got 
substantially similar (if not identical) marks, but also their answers, both correct and 
incorrect, with reference to each one of the questions answered by them matched to a 
substantial extent. 
(v) in most of the cases of the identified pairs, the 'scorer' did not belong to Madhya 
Pradesh. 
(vi) Such ·scorers' in most of the cases though secured sufficiently high marks in the 
PMT, did not take admission in any one of the medical colleges of Madhya Pradesh. 
The respondents, therefore. believe that the 'scorers' were not genuinely interested in 
securing admission in any medical college of MP and they appeared in the examination 
only to facilitate the 'beneficiary' to obtain
good marks to enable the beneficiary to 
secure admission. 
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or 
any order in writing containing the reasons which formed the 
basis for the orders cancelling the admissions. 
Therefore, the appellants are unaware of the reasons which 
prompted respondents to cancel the admission of the appellants. 
Consequently, appellants had no opportunity to defend 
themselves against the impugned action of cancellation of their 
admissions. The entire exercise was undertaken behind the 
back of the appellants. Therefore the action of the respondents 
is illegal and void ab initio on the ground of non-compliance 
with the requirement of the principles ofnaturaljustice, more 
particularly the rule of audi alteram partem. 
(ii) that the circumstances (mentioned in the Footnote No.7) which 
formed the basis for the twin conclusions of the respondents, 
that there was a tampering with the examination process (in 
each of the years in question) and that the appellants and others 
are beneficiaries of such tampered examination process are 
without any proven factual basis and are pure conjunctures. 
(Certain ancillary submissions made in this regard will be 
considered later in this judgment). 
(iii)The appellants also argued very forcefully that the impugned 
action against the appellants who belong to different batches 
(commencing from 2008) is unsustainable in view of the long 
lapse of time between the date of the alleged malpractice 
committed by the appellants and the date of
the action by the 
respondents. It is submitted that the impugned action is arbitrary 
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because the 
penalty is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct of the 
appellants. 
14. On the other hand, the defence of the respondent authorities 
has been: 
(i) it is a case of"mass copying" similar to a situation obtaining in 
Tlte Bihar School Exami11atio11 Board v. Sublias C/uuu/ra 
Si11lta & Others, ( 1970) 1 SCC 648 (hereinafter referred to 
as Silrlw'.~ case) wherein this Court held that in such a situation, 
there is no requirement of holding a "detailed inquiry into the 
matter and examine each individual case to satisfy ... which
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
rcHELAMESWAR, J.l 
one of the candidates had not adopted unfair means". 
Therefore, there is no violation of principles ofnaturaljustice 
as contended by the appellants; 
(ii) since the appellants secured admission through fraudulent 
means, they cannot be permitted to retain the benefits accruing 
out of such a fraud, merely on the ground that there was some 
delay in detection of the fraud. 
15. The High Court agreed with the respondents and held that it is 
a case of "mass copying" and there was no need to comply with the 
requirement of the audi alteram partem rule. In coming to the conclusion, 
the High Court relied upon its earlier decision in Pratiblta Singll 's case 
rendered in connection with PMT 20138• The High Court also agreed 
with the conclusion of the respondents that there was a logical pattern in 
the allotment of Roll numbers and the examination centres to the students 
(with respect to each of the years in question) and the said logical pattern 
was breached with respect to the appellants. The High Court took note 
of the fact that the conclusions of the BOARD are based on the opinion 
of an expert committee (essentially consisting of people qualified in 
computer science) and the same cannot be interfered with in judicial 
review. 
16. The 2"d submission is also rejected by the High Court on the 
ground that all the appellants resorted to unfair means in an organized 
manner (in collusion with officials of the BOARD
and certain other 
criminal elements who played a major role in perpetrating such a large 
scale illegal activity) and played fraud on the examination system. The 
High Court, therefore, opined that appellants cannot be permitted to retain 
the benefit obtained through fraud merely because there was some time 
gap in detecting the fraud. 
17. Hence, the instant appeals. 
•'"Para 72. We have already held that the candidates had indulg~d in mass copying in 
Pre-Medical Tests, 2008 to 2012 therefore, for the reasons assign~d by Division Bench 
in paras 91 to 106 of the decision in the case of Pratibha Singh (supra) the principles of 
natural justice would have no application in the peculiar fact situation of these cases .. 
" 
[The judgment in Pratibha Singh 's case (supra) dated 11.4.2014 is a common judgment 
delivered in a batch of writ petitions filed by number of students who had appeared in 
the PMT 2013, but whose admissions were also cancelled on the allegation of large 
scale malpractices in the said examination.] 
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A 
18. On behalf of the appellants, it is argued before us: 
(i) 
that the cases on hand are not cases of 'mass copying'. 
Having regard to the small numberofthe students whose 
admissions have been cancelled and having regard to 
the large number of students who appeared for the 
B 
examination in each of the years in question (the details 
of which are already noted in para 7 supra), the number 
of students who were alleged to have copied constitute 
a small fraction, therefore, it cannot be said that these 
are cases of "mass copying". 
c 
(ii) 
Apa1t from the objection based on the statistical data, it 
is also the case of the appellants that even conceptually 
the case on hand cannot be a case falling under the 
category of"mass copying". According to the appellants, 
the expression "mass copying" has a definite legal 
connotation as discussed in Bilt"r School Ex"mi11atio11 
D 
Bo{lrd C{ISe (supra) and the case on hand does not 
answer the description of"mass copying" as understood 
in the said case. 
(iii) 
Cancellation of the examination and the admissions of 
the appellants without complying with the rule of audi 
E 
alteram partem is illegal and assuming for the sake of 
arguments that there was some basis (the expert 
committee opinion) for the respondents to draw ce1tain 
inferences which formed the basis for the allegations 
constituting the circumstances leading to the twin 
conclusions impugned by the appellants,
there are 
F 
considerable number of exceptions to each one of the 
circumstances [mentioned in para (iii) to (vi) of the 
Footnote No.7] asserted by respondents. 
Therefore, 
the decision ofrespondents that the result of examination 
of all these appellants required to be cancelled on the 
G 
ground that they resorted to "mass copying" without even 
giving a reasonable opportunity to the appellants to defend 
is flawed and legally untenable. In view of such 
exceptions, it is imperative in law that the decision to 
cancel admissions of the appellants must be preceded 
by an appropriate enquiry compliant with the principles 
H 
of natural justice.
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
845 
fCHELAMESWAR, J.l 
(iv) 
The appellants also made some ancillary submissions 
to demonstrate that the evidence relied upon by the 
respondents is based on facts (the details will be 
considered at the appropriate place) which render the 
evidence unreliable and unscientific. 
(v) 
Even otherwise, cancellation ofresult of the appellants 
after a long lapse of time from the date of the commission 
of the alleged malpractice (ranging from 1 to 5 years) is 
an irrational exercise of the power by the BOARD. It 
is argued that apart from the irrationality, such a course 
of action would simply ruin the I iv es of these candidates 
as they would lose precious number of years in the prime 
of their youth and they would be ban-ed by age to pursue 
any other course at this stage. 
I make it clear that it is not the argument of any of the 
appellants herein that the allegations [mentioned in the 
Footnote 7], even if proved to be unexceptionable, would 
not be sufficient in law to justify the impugned action of 
the respondents. 
(vi) 
In the absence of a notification contemplated under 
Section 3 of the Act, there is no validly constituted 
BOARD under the Act and, therefore, the BOARD is 
without any authority of law to cancel the examinations 
so far as they pertain to the appellants and also the 
admissions of the appellants. 
DISCUSSIONS: 
I 9. l shall first deal with the submission No.( vi) of the appellants 
i.e. in the absence of the
notification contemplated under Section 3 of 
the Act, the third respondent - a non- statutory Board - has no legal 
authority to cancel either the examination conducted by it or the 
admissions of the appellants to the various medical colleges. 
20. The learned counsel for the appellants pointed out to Section 
24(2)( e) of the Act which authorises the Board constituted under Section 
3 of the Act to make regulations providing for "imposition of penalties on 
candidates using unfair means or interfering in the examinations 
conducted by the Board" and argued that such power would be available 
only for the statutory Board, if ever constituted and the third respondent 
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herein has no authority in law - in the sense of legislative sanction to 
take the impugned action. 
21. Admittedly the notification contemplated under Section 3 of 
the Act has not been issued so far. The composition and legal structure 
of the third respondent (BOARD) was discussed elaborately in Pratib/1a 
Singh 's case. It appears from the said judgment that the third respondent 
(BOARD) was brought into existence "for conducting the examination 
for admission in the medical, engineering and agricultural universities 
and for admission in the polytechnics and initiate the necessary 
proceedings in this regard" by a notification dated 17.4.1982 issued in 
the name of the Governor. The said notification was published in the 
official gazette on 19.4.1982. Such a BOARD was initially constituted 
with 13 members and reconstituted from time to time. Therefore, the 
BOARD is a non-statutory 'body'. It is not a corporate entity. It has no 
existence apart from the government. Barring the vague statement 
(extracted above) regarding the purpose for which the BOARD is 
created, the Notification dated 17.4.1982 does not contain any details 
regarding either the powers or the functions of the BOARD9• 
22. The net result is that the entire exercise of holding the PMT 
and regulating the admissions of students into the various medical colleges 
would be only an exercise of the executive powers of the State of Madhya
Pradesh. 
If the third respondent BOARD is without any authority of law 
for taking the impugned action, it is equally without any authority oflaw 
to conduct the common entrance examination (PMT). 
Any admission based on the marks obtained at such common 
F 
entrance examination would be equally without any authority of law in 
the sense oflegislative sanction. Whatever be the legal implications of 
the exercise of such power vis-a-vis others (which we are not called 
upon to examine in these appeals), the appellants cannot be heard saying 
that the BOARD has no authority of law to take action against them 
G 
because they had appeared for the said examination and taken the benefit 
of securing admissions into the various medical colleges on the basis of 
the marks obtained by them in the examination. 
9 An unfortunate state of affairs in public administration of a country where people 
associated with the different branches of governance under the Constitution make tall 
H 
claims about the constitutional commitment to the rule of law in the country.
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
847 
fCHELAMESWAR, J.l 
Even otherwise, the argument of the appellants is required to be 
A 
rejected for the following reasons: 
Under the scheme ofour Constitution, the executive power of the 
State is co-extensive with its legislative power 10 • In the absence of any 
operative legislation, the executive power could certainly be exercised 
10 Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Others v. The State of Punjab. AIR 1955 SC 549 
Para 7. Article 73 of the Constitution relates to the executive powers of the Union, 
while the corresponding provision in regard to the executive powers of a State is 
contained in Article 162. The provisions of these articles are analogous to those of 
section 8 and 49(2) respectively of the Government of India Act, 1935 and lay down 
the rule of distribution of executive powers between the Union and the States, 
following the same analogy as is provided in regard to the distribution oflegislative 
powers between them. Article 162, with which we are directly concerned in this 
case, lays down: 
'·Subject to the provisions of this Constitution. the executive power of a 
State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the 
State has power to make laws: 
Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State 
and Parliament have power to make laws. the executive power of the State 
shall be subject to. and limited by. the executive p0\1er expressly conferred 
by this
Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or 
authorities thereof." 
Thus under this article the executive authority of the State is exclusive in respect to 
matters enumerated in List I! of Seventh Schedule. The authority also extends to the 
Concurrent List except as provided in the Constitution itself or in any law passed by 
the Parliament. Similarly, Article 73 provides that the executive powers of the Union 
shall extend to matters with respect to which the Parliament has power to make laws 
and to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the 
Government oflndia by virtue of any treaty or any agreement. The proviso engrafted 
on clause (I) further lays down that although with regard to the matters in the Concurrent 
List the executive authority shall be ordinarily left to be State it would be open to the 
Parliament to provide that in exceptional cases the executive power of the Union shall 
extend to these matters also. 
Neither of these articles contain any definition as to what the executive 
function is and what activities would legitimately come within its scope. They are 
concerned primarily with the distribution of the executive power between the Union on 
the one hand and the States on the other. They do not mean, as Mr. Pathak seems to 
suggest, that it is only when the Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on 
certain items appertaining to their respective lists, that the Union or the State
executive, 
as the case may be. can proceed to !unction in respect to them. 
On the other hand, the language of Article 162 clearly indicates that the 
powers of the State executive do extend to matters upon which the state Legislature is 
competent to legislate and are not confined to matters over which legislation has been 
passed already. The same principle underlies Article 73 of the Constitution. These 
provisions of the Constitution therefore do not lend any support to Mr. Pathak's 
contention. 
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to protect the public interest' 1• The right of each one of the appellants 
herein for admission to the medical colleges in the State of Madhya 
Pradesh is itself an emanation of the State's executive action. No doubt, 
even executive action of the State can create rights. Unless there is 
something either in the Constitution or law which prohibits the abrogation 
or abridgment ofrights, it is permissible for the State to do so by executive 
action in accordance with some specified procedure of law. No doubt, 
that the overarching requirement of Constitution is that every action of 
the State must be informed with reason and must be in public interest. 
Nothing has been brought to our notice which prohibits the impugned 
executive action. !fit is established that the adoption of unfair means on 
large scale resulted in the contamination of the entrance examination 
(PMT) process of successive years, the State undoubtedly would have 
the power to take appropriate action to protect the public interest. 
I, therefore, reject the submission of the appellants. 
23. I shall now deal with the submissions No. (i) and (ii) of the 
appellants. 
Before we deal with the submission, it would be profitable to 
examine the relevant aspect of the judgment of this Court in Sbtlw's 
case (supra), because the High Court placed a heavy reliance on the 
said judgment for rejecting the submissions of the writ petitioners/
appellants herein. 
Though Sinlw's case acquired the notoriety as a case of "mass 
copying'', the total number of students whose examination was cancelled 
was 36 out of thousands of people, who appeared forthe examination in 
the State ofBihar. Interestingly, the said judgment nowhere employed 
the phrase "mass copying". This Court was dealing with a question of 
the legality of the action of the appellants in cancelling"the examinations 
of all subjects held at the secondary school examination of 1969 at 
Hanswadih centre" for the reason "that unfair means were practiced on 
a large scale". 
11 Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others. ( 1982) I 
SCC39 
"Para 20 .... In other words, the State in exercise of its executive power is charged with 
the duty and the responsibility of carrying on the general administration of the State. 
So long as the State Government docs not go against the provisions of the Constitution 
or any law, the width and amplitude of its executive power cannot be circumscribed. If 
there is no enactment covering a particular aspect, certainly the Government can carry 
on the administration by issuing administrative directions or instructions, until the 
legislature makes a law in that behalf. Otherwise, the administration would come to a 
standstill."
NIDHI KAlM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.) 
This Court laid down the principle that the rule of audi alteram 
partem need not be comp I ied with in connection with the cancellation of 
examinations where it would be impracticable to apply the said principle. 
Adoption of unfair means on a large scale is one of them. This Court did 
not go by the percentage of the students who were alleged to have had 
resorted to the practice ofunfair means. When this Court characterized 
the situation as practice of unfair means on a 'large scale', it used the 
expression only to distinguish the situation from cases of practice of 
unfair means by one or two students. This Court has also held that there 
are other circumstances justifying the departure from complying with 
the audi alterG111 partem rule. They are - leakage of question papers 
and destruction of a large number of answer papers'~. In my opinion, 
the examples given therein are not exhaustive of all the categories 
constituting exceptions to the application of the rule of audi alteram 
partem. 
Therefore, the percentage of the students who are alleged to have 
resorted to unfair means is irrelevant. Similarly, resorting to unfair means 
by a' large number of students' is not the only circumstance which justifies 
the non-compliance with the rule of audi a/teram partem. 
24. That leads me to the next question, whether the situation 
prescribed in the case on hand falls within the exceptional circumstances
con.templatc:d by Sinlza's case? 
.25. A large number of judgments are cited before us to emphasise 
the importance of the requirement to comply with the rule of audi alteram 
partem as an aspect of the guarantee contained in Article 14 of the 
Constitution. On the other hand, the respondents have relied upon an 
equally good number of judgments to demonstrate that there are well 
known exceptions to the application of the principles of natural justice. 
I do not think it necessary to examine all those judgments because as a 
general proposition of law, there cannot be any dispute about the 
importance of the above-mentioned rule. 
However, the applicability of the said rule in the context of various 
situations which vitiate an examination process fell for the consideration 
of this Court on more than one occasion. A law in this regard is fairly 
well settled. 
" The Court was thon not considering the rigl1t of an examining body to cancel its own 
examination when it was satisfied that the examination was not properly conducted or 
ihat in die conduct of the examination the majority of the examinees had not conducted 
themselves as they should have. 
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26. The case of the BOARD is that for taking the impugned action, 
they need not have proof of the guilt or complicity of the individual students 
in contaminating the examination process. It is argued that if there is 
some reasonably reliable material to establish the fact that the examination 
process insofar as it concerns the appellants was contaminated, the 
BOARD would be justified in law to take the impugned action. The 
moment contamination of the examination process is established, the 
BOARD is relieved of the legal obligation to comply with the rule of 
audi alteram partem concerning the students who are the members of 
the pairs identified by the BOARD (on the basis of the expert committee 
report) to be the beneficiaries of the contaminated examination process. 
According to the BOARD, tampering with the examination process took 
place on a large scale in each of the years in question, and it took place 
pursuant to a deep conspiracy involving several people. Following the 
rule of audi alteram partem in such circumstances would be an 
impracticable exercise and the same is not required to be undertaken in 
view of the judgments of this Court in Bilwr Sc/100/ Exuminfltion Bollrd 
v. Sublws Clwndrll Sinlla & Others, ( 1970) 1 SCC 648 and B. 
Rflmm1jini & Otllers v. St"te of A.P. & Otllers, (2002) 5 SCC 533 to 
emphasise on the need to comply with the rule of audi alteram partem. 
The
respondents also relied upon Board of Higlt Sclloo/ "ml 
Intermediate Education, U.P., Allt1/utbtul & Anotlter le Baglesluvar 
Prasad & Anotller, ( 1963) 3 SCR 767 in support of their submission 
that the scope of judicial reliance is very limited in the cases of 
malpractices at examinations. 
27. On the other hand, appellants placed heavy reliance on the 
decision of this Court reported in Board of High School "nd 
Intermediate Educfltion, U.P. 1'. G/u111shyt1111 Dlls Guptll & Ot/lers, 
1962 Supp (3) SCR 36 and Onkar L"I Bt{it1.i & Otllers le Union of 
India &Anotller, (2003) 2 SCC 673 to emphasise on the need to comply 
with the applicability of the rule of audi alteram part em. 
28. Glianshyam Das Gupta and Sublws Clumdr" Sin/I" directly 
deal with the applicability of the rule of audi alteram par/em in the 
context of allegation of copying in an examination. Rt111u111ji11i's C(ISe 
deals with cancellation of the examination (conducted for the purpose of 
some recruitment process) on the ground of leakage of question papers 
and .O!'k"r.La/ Bt{i"i (supra) deals with cancellation of allotment of 
petrol pumps made to a large numberof people, on the basis of allegations 
that such allotment was vitiated as a consequence of a corrupt process 
of selection.
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.) 
29. B"f(lesh w"r Pr"md's c"se (supra) was a case of cancellation 
of examination results of only two students (the respondent before this 
Court and another) on the ground that they had adopted unfair means. It 
was not a case of non-compliance with the rule of audi alteram part em. 
An inquiry was conducted by a Sub-Committee constituted for the said 
purpose, and it found that both the students were guilty of adopting unfair 
means. Both the students challenged the decision to cancel their 
examination. The High Court set aside the impugned order on the ground 
that there was no direct evidence on the basis of which a Committee 
could have come to the conclusion that the students had adopted unfair 
means. 
This Cou1t reversed the High Cowt decision and held that the 
very fact that both the candidates gave identical answers was sufficient 
evidence of adoption ofunfair means in the examination. While coming 
to the conclusion, this Court observed that it would be "inappropriate in 
such cases to require direct evidence 13" and in cases where direct 
13 Para 12. Jn dealing with petitions of this type, it is necessary to bear in mind that educational institutions 
like the Uni\'ersities or Appellant I set up Enquiry Committees to deal with the problem posed by the 
adoption of unfair means by candidates, and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic Tribunals 
to decide all relevant questions in the
light of the evidence adduced before them. 
In the matter of the 
ado11tion of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available, but cases may arise where direct 
evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of probabilities and 
circumstantial evidence. This problem which educational institutions han! to face from time to time is a 
serious problem and unless there is justification to do so, courts should be slow to interfore with the decisions 
of domestic Tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. 
In dealing with the validity 
of the impugned orders passed by Uni\'crsities under A11icle 226, the High Com1 is not sitting in appeal over 
the decision in question; its jurisdiction is limited and though it is true that if the impug11ed order is not 
supported by any evidence at all, the High Court would be justified. to quash that order. 
But the conclusion 
that the impugned order is not supported by any evidence must be reached nncr considering the question as 
to whether probabili1ies and circumslantial evidence do not justify the said co11clusion. Enquiries held by 
domestic Tribunals in such cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom charges are famed must 
be given adequate opportunities to defond themselves, and in holding such enqui1ies, the Tribunals must 
scrupulously follow rules of natural justice; but it" ould, we thin kt not be rcasonnble to import into these 
enquiries all
considerations which go\'ern criminal trials in ordinary courts or law." 
See also: ~laharashtra State Board of Seconllary and Higher Set.·ondary Education,., K.S. 
Gandhi & Others, (1991) l SCC 716 
"Para 37. It is thus well settled lnw that strict rules of the Evidence Act, and the standard of proof 
envisaged therein do not apply to depa11mental proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities 
to receive and place on record all the nccessal)', relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts though not 
proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the facts 
in issue. In grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropria1i_o11, etc. sddom direct evidence would 
be available. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. In our consiJered view inference from 
the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The mind is 
prone to take pleasure to adapt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them 
to fonn parts of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstantial to deduce necessary 
inferences in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there arc objective facts, direct or 
circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts 
can be inferred, as much as is praclical, as if they had been actually observed. In
other cases the inferences do 
not go beyond reasonable probability. Jflhere are no positive proved facts, oral, llocumentmy or circumstantial 
from which the inferences can be made the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or 
conjecture. Therefore, when an inference of proof that a fact in dispute has been held established there must be 
some material facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could he drawn. The standard of 
proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt "but" the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an 
inference that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof cannot be put in a strait-jacket fommla. No 
mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof. The probative value could be gauged from facts and 
circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic enquiries." 
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evidence is not available "the questions will have to be considered in the 
light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence". This case also laid 
down the principles governing the judicial review of the decisions of 
educational institutions (examining bodies) in the context of the adoption 
of unfair means in examinations by the students. Though this Court held 
that the educational institution must "scrupulously fol low the principles 
ofnaturaljustice" the scope of judicial review was held to be very limited 
and "it would ...... not be reasonable to import into these enquiries all 
considerations which govern criminal trials". 
30. It is not necessary to make any analysis of the judgment of 
this Court in Glumsliy"m D"s Gupt" (supr") as the same was 
considered by this Court in Si11/w's C(lse, analysed and distinguished. 
31. I shall now analyse Si11/w's case (supra). 
In the month of March, 1969, the Bihar School Examination Board 
conducted the examination forthe secondary school students. The results 
of the examination were published. However, the result of all the 36 
students who appeared for the examination at Hanswadih was not 
announced. The Examination Board cancelled the examination insofar 
as the abovementioned students are concerned on the ground that they 
had reso11ed to 'unfair means on a large scale'. However, the students 
were allowed to appear at a supplementary examination to
be held in 
September 1969. 
The students challenged the said decision of the Board before the 
Patna High Cow1 successfully. 
This Court reversed the decision of the Patna High Court. 
Principally, two contentions raised on behalf of the students (which found 
favour with the High Court): 
i) 
That, nobody complained aboutthe commission ofany malpractice; 
therefore, the Board was not justified in cancelling the result." 
ii) 
That there was a failure to comply with the requirement of 
" Para 9- The argument that no one had complained about the examination need not 
detain us. The Tabulators sent their remarks on which investigation was made. The 
Unfair Means Committee and the Moderators gave their opinion. These were sutftcient 
for taking action. There was no need to wait for a complaint, nor was a complaint really 
necessary. The results were withheld so that inquiries could be completed. In the 
meantime the results of the other centres which were not under suspicion could be 
declared because in their case there was no reason to withhold publication.
NIDHI KAlM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
fCHELAMESWAR, J.l 
principles of naturaljustice. 1; 
were considered and rejected. 
For reaching such conclusions, this couii took note of the fact 
that the examination centre registered an unusually high rate of success 
compared to the other examination centres 16 - a case of relying upon 
circumstantial evidence. This Court further undertook a random inspection 
of the answer papers of the students and recorded a finding that "a 
comparison of the answer books showed such a remarkable agreement 
in the answers that no doubt was left in our minds that the students had 
assistance from an outside source. Therefore, the conclusion that unfair 
means were adopted stands completely vindicated." 
" Paral3. This is not a case of any particular individual who is being charged with 
adoption of unfair means but of the conduct of all the examinees or at least a vast 
mf(jority of them at a particular centre. If it is not a question of charging any one 
individually with unfair means but to condemn the examination as ineffective for the 
purpose it was held. Must the Board give an opportunity to all the candidates to 
represent their cases? We think not. It was not necessary for the Board to give an 
opportunity to the candidates if the examinations as a whole were being cancelled. The 
Board had not charged any one with unfair means so that he could claim to defend 
himself. The examination was vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a mass
scale. In 
these circumstances it would be wrong to insist that the Board must hold a detailed 
inquiry into the matter and examine each individual case to satisfy itself which of the 
candidates had not adopted unfair means. The examination as a whole had to go. 
"' Para 11. This brings us to the crux of the problem. The High Court interfered on 
the ground that natural justice and fair-play were not observed in this case. This was 
repeated to us by the respondents in the appeal. A mention of fair-play does not 
come veriwell from the respondents who were grossly guilty of breach of fair-play 
themselves at the examinations. Apart from the reports of the experts, the results 
speak for themselves. At the other centres the average of successtUI candidates was 
50%. At this centre the examinations had the following percentage: 
I. 
Mother Indian Language 
2. 
English 
3. 
Social Studies 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
JO. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
E\'eryday Science 
Elementary Mathematics 
Economics and Civics 
Elementary Physiology and Hygiene 
Geography 
History 
Physics 
Chemistry 
AdYance Mathematics 
Sanskrit 
94% 
70% 
95% 
90% 
100% 
92% 
96% 
99% 
88% 
70% 
100% 
99% 
100% 
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The students relied upon an earlier judgment of this court in 
Ghanshyam Das Gupta's Case. It was held therein that the students 
(only 3 in number) whose examination was cancelled on the ground that 
they had resorted to copying ~ught to have been given an opportunity to 
defend themselves. 
This court distinguished Ghanshyam Das Gupta's case holding 
that the said judgment did not imply that the rule of audi alteram part em 
must be followed in cases " ... where the examination as a whole was 
vitiated, say by leakage of papers or by destruction of some of the answer 
books or by discovery of unfair means practised on a vast scale ... ". 
This Court further held that in G/w1tshyam D"s Gupta '"the Court was 
then not considering the right of an examining body to cancel its own 
examination when it was satisfied that the examination was not properly 
conducted or that in the conduct of the examination the majority of the 
examinees had not conducted themselves as they should have" and after 
so distinguishing Glumshy"m D"s Gupta. this Cow1 held as follows: 
"14 .... To make such decisions depend upon a full-fledged judicial 
inquiry would hold up the functioning of such autonomous bodies 
as Universities and School Board. While we do not wish to whittle 
down the requirements of natural justice and fair-play in cases 
where such requirement may be said to arise, we do not want 
that this Court should be
understood as having stated that an inquiry 
with a right to representation must always precede in every case, 
however different. The universities are responsible for their 
standards and the conduct of examinations. The essence of the 
examinations is that the worth of every person is appraised without 
any assistance from an outside source. If at a centre the whole 
body of students receive assistance and are managed to secure 
success in the neighbourhood of I 00% when others at other centres 
are successful only at an average of 50%, it is obvious that the 
University or the Board must do something in the matter. It cannot 
hold a detailed quasi-judicial inquiry with a right to its alumni to 
plead and lead evidence etc., before the results are withheld or 
the examinations cancelled. If there is sufficient material on which 
it can be demonstrated that the university was right in its 
conclusion that the examinations ought to be cancelled then 
academic standards require that the university's appreciation of 
the problem must be respected. It would not do for the Court to 
say that you should have examined all the candidates or even
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
855 
~[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
their represe~tatives with a view to ascertaining whether they 
A 
had received assistance or not. To do this would encourage 
indiscipline if not also perjury." 
Sinlia's case.judgment, in my view, yie!ds the following principles: 
(1) 
Where there are allegations that students resorted to "unfair 
means on a large scale" at an examination, this court would 
B 
not insist upon registration of a formal complaint. Any reliable 
information suggesting the occurrence of such malpractice in 
the examination is sufficient to authorize the examining body 
_ to take action because examining bodies are "responsible for 
their standards and the conduct of examinations" and ''the 
e.sseoce of the examination is that the worth of every person is 
appraised without any assistance from an outside source". 
(2) 
A lone circumstance could itself be sufficient in a g~ven Cl!Se 
for the examining body to record a conclusion that tlie students 
resorted to "unfair means on a '/arge-scal.e" in an 
examination. This Court approv~d the conclusion of the Bihar 
.School Examination Board that the students had resorted to 
unfair means .on a large scale in one examination centre17 and 
also approved the decision making process of the Board ·on 
the basis of circumstantial evidence. The lone circumstance 
that the success rate of the students who appeared for the 
examination from the centre in question· is to'o high in 
comparison to
other centres. 
· 
· (3) 
In such cases, the examining body need not hold "a. detailed 
quasi-judicial inquiry with a right to its alumni to plead and lead 
evidence etc." and the examining body's "appreciation of the 
problem must be respected." 
(4) To insist on the observance of the principles ofnaturaljustic'e, 
i.e. giving notice to each student and holding enquiry before 
cancelling the examination in such'-eases would 'hold up the 
functioning' of the educational institutions which are responsible 
for maintenance of the standards of educ11tion, and "encourage 
indiscipline,-if not, also perjury". 
17 To assure itsdfregarding the correctness of the said inference, this Court undertook 
comparison of the answer papers of some of the students and recorded satisfaction that 
such answer papers "showed such a remarkable agreement in the answ~rs that no do.ubt 
was left in the minds of this Court that the students had assistance from an outside 
source". 
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(5) 
Compliance with the rule of audi a/teram partem is not 
necessary not only in the cases of employment of 'unfair means 
on large scale' but also situations where there is a 'leakage of 
papers' or 'destruction of some of the answer books' etc. 
(6) 
This Court drew a distinction between action against 
B 
an individual student on the ground that the student had resorted 
to unfair means in the examination and the cancellation of the 
examination on the whole (or with reference to a group of 
students) because the process itself is vitiated. 
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32. B. Ranumjitti's case was a case where the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh had cancelled the examinations conducted by the District 
Selection Committee in Anantapur district on the basis ofa report of the 
Superintendent of Police that there was mass copying and leakage of 
question papers. The said order was set aside by the High Court. It was 
a case where no oppo1tunity was given to the candidates before 
cancelling the examination. The challenge was not on the ground that 
there was a failure ofnaturaljustice but on the ground that there was no 
material before the State justifying the conclusion that the examination 
process was vitiated. On appeal, this Court reversed the said order 
holding that: 
"8. Further, even if it was not a case of mass copying or leakage 
of question papers or such other circumstance, it is clear that in 
the conduct of the examination,
a fair procedure has to be adopted. 
Fair procedure would mean that the candidates taking part in the 
examination must be capable of competing with each other by 
fair means. One cannot have an advantage either by copying or 
by having a foreknowledge of the question paper of otherw_ise. 
In such matters wide latitude should be shown to the Government 
and the courts should not unduly interfere with the action taken 
by the Government which is in possession of the necessary 
information and takes action upon the same. The comts ought 
not to take the action I ightly and interfere with the same particularly 
when there was some material for the Government to act one 
way or the other .... " 
33. Coming to the case of 011kar Lal Bajaj (supra), Government 
of India decided to cancel the allotment of all retail outlets, LPG 
distributorship etc. which had been made on the basis of the 
H 
recommendations of a 'Dealer Selection Board'. Such a decision was
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
taken in view of serious allegations ofillegality and impropriety in making 
such allotments. Approximately some 6000 allotments were cancelled 
without any further enquiry and opportunity to any one of the allottees. 
This Court set aside the Government's order of cancelling all allotments 
with certain further directions that the cases of 413 dealers (who were 
identified !:>y the court on the basis of the material placed before this 
Court) be examined by a Committee consisting of a retired Judge of this 
Court and another of the Delhi High Court. For reaching such a 
conclusion, this Court rejected the submission of the Union oflndia that 
in a given situation, it may be "legally permissible" to resort to such mass 
cancellation where it is found that large number of selections were tainted 
and segregation of good. and bad would be time consuming. This Court 
opined "the solution by resorting to cancellation of all was worse than 
the problem. Cure was worse than the disease. Equal treatment to 
unequals is nothing but inequality. To put both the categories - tainted 
and the rest - on a par is wholly unjustified, arbitrary, unconstitutional 
being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." 
34. From an analysis of the above decisions, the following principles 
emerge:-
1. 
Nonnally, the rule of audi alteram partem must be scrupulously 
followed in the cases of the cancellation of the examinations 
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of students on the ground that they had resorted to unfair means 
E 
(copying) at the examinations. 
2. 
But the abovementioned principle is not applicable to the cases 
where unfair means were adopted by a relatively large number 
of students and also to certain other situations where either 
the examination process is vitiated or for reasons beyond the 
control of both students and the examining body, it would be 
unfair or impracticable to continue the examination process to 
insist upon the compliance with audi alteram partem rule. 
3 
4 
The fact that unfair means were adopted by students at an 
examination could be established by circumstantial evidence. 
The scope of judicial review of the decision of an examining 
body is very limited. If there is some reasonable material before 
the body to come to the conclusion that unfair means were 
adopted by the students on a large scale, neither such conclusion 
nor the evidence forming the basis thereof could be subjected 
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A 
to scrutiny on the principles governing the assessment of 
evidence in a criminal court. 
· 
Cases such as the one on hand where there are allegations of criminal 
conspir~cies resulting in the tampering with the examination process for 
the benefit of a large number of students would be certainly one of the 
B 
exceptional circumstances indicated in Sinlw's C(ISe provided there is 
some justifiable material to support the conclusion that the examination 
process had been tampered with. 
Jn the light of the principles oflaw emerging from scrutiny of the 
abovementionedjudgments, we are of the opinion that case on hand can 
c 
fall within the category of exceptions to the rule of audi alteram partem 
if there is reliable material to come to the conclusion that the examination 
process is vitiated. 
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That leads me to the next question - whether the material relied 
upon by the BOARD for reaching the conclusion that the examination 
process was contaminated insofar as the appellants (and also some more 
students) are concerned and the appellants are the beneficiaries of such 
confaminated process, is tenable? 
35. A great deal of effort was made by the appellants to 
demonstrate to us that the various circumstances - relied upon by the 
respondents to reach the conclusion that each one of the appellants herein 
is the beneficiary of a conspiracy by which the purity of examination 
process undertaken by the Board is
contaminated - are impeachable. 
The learned counsel demonstrated before us that at least in some.cases, 
one or more of the circumstances relied upon by the Board [indicated in 
sub-paragraphs (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of Footnote 7 (supra)] are 
inapplicable. For example, the assumption that the "scorer" is a more 
accomplished student than the "beneficiary" and that the "scorer" always 
sat in front of the "beneficiary" at the time of the examination to enable 
the "beneficiary" to copy from the "scorer" are demonstrated to be 
wr,ong at least in some cases. There are cases where the "scorer" 
secured less marks than the "beneficiary". Similarly, the allegation that 
"'scorers" did not take admission in any of the medical colleges of Madhya 
Pradesh despite securing sufficiently high marks entitling them to obtain 
admissions, is demonstrated to be wrong. At least in some cases "scorers" 
have in fact joined some medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh. 
36. There is nothing inherently irrational or perverse in the
NIDHI KAIM v, STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
859 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
BOARD's conclusions (i) that the examination process was tampered 
with; and (ii) that all the appellants herein who are identified to be members 
of the 'pairs' (referred to earlier) are beneficiaries of such manipulated 
examination process18, relying upon the circumstances (mentioned in 
Footnote 7 supra) if they are unimpeachable. Each one of the 
circumstances is an inference which flows from certain basic facts which 
either individually or in combination with some other facts constituted 
the circumstance. One or more of such facts (constituting circumstances 
mentioned in (iii) to (vi) of Footnote 7 s~).are demonstrated to be not--
true (with reference to some of the appellants). 
37. The proofofthe first two circumstances (mentioned in Footnote 
7) depends upon the analysis of the data which is available on the 
-c<;>mputers. The fact that the entire process of the generation of roll 
numbers to the students and allotment of the students to various 
examination centres is done by a computerised process is not in dispute. 
The assertion of the BOARD that technically such a process requires 
SOME LOGIC to be followed is not disputed by the appellants. The 
expert committee (on an analysis of the data) (i) identified the logic 
followed for generating the roll numbers and allotting the examination 
centres and also (ii) reaching a conclusion that in the case of the appellants 
and a few others the allotment
was not in accordance with the logic 
initially adopted. The same are not normallyamenable to judicial review. 
because Courts would lack the necessary technical expertise to sit in 
judgment over such matters. Apart from that, there is no specific challenge 
to those conclusions, except that the matter should have been examined 
by an independent expert committee. I do not find any legal basis for 
such a submission. I, therefore, see no reason to doubt either the factual 
or legal correctness of the first two circumstances. 
'It, therefore, logically follows that there was a tampering with the 
examination process insofar as the appellants and a few others are 
concerned. 
38. The other submission of the appellants in this regard is that if 
there is a deviation from the general pattern with regard to the allotment 
of Roll Numbers and the examination Centres, the appellants could not 
" Whether the said circumstances would be sufficient to connect any one of the 
students on a criminal charge is a different question and we express no opinion on the 
same as we understand that criminal cases are registered and are being investigated 
against some of the appellants (ifnot all) in connection with the same transaction which 
is the subject maiter of debate in these appeals. 
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be blamed or 'penalised' because the entire process of the allotment 
was done by the BOARD and its officials. 
In my opinion, the question of either 'blame' or 'penalty' does not 
arise in the context. If tampering with the examination process took 
place, whether all or some of the appellants are culpable is a matter for 
a criminal court to examine as and when any of the appellants is sought 
to be prosecuted. 
But the fact that the examination process was tampered with is 
relevant for administrative action such as the one impugned herein. The 
said fact formed the foundation for the further enquiry for identifying 
the beneficiaries of such contaminated process. Having regard to the 
circumstances relied upon, I do not see anything illogical or untenable in 
the conclusions drawn by the expert committee which formed the basis 
for the impugned action of the BOARD. It is argued that the formula 19 
adopted by the BOARD to record the conclusion that the members of 
the identified pairs resorted to unfair means at the examination is without 
any scientific basis. I do not see any irrationality either in the formula or 
the decision of the BOARD to assign greater weightage to the incorrect 
matching answers. There is nothing inherently suspicious about two 
candidates sitting in close proximity in an examination and giving the 
same correct answer to a question because there can only one correct 
answer to
a question. On the other hand, if they give the same wrong 
answer to a given question and ifthe number of such wrong answers is 
high, it can certainly generate a doubt and is a strong circumstance 
·indicating the occurrence of some malpractice. Such a test was approved 
by this Court in Bag/es/1war Prasad's case10 
19 The Expert Committee evolved a formula to examine whether a conclusion could be 
reached with respect to the identified pairs that they had resorted to the unfair means. 
The facts relevant for the said formula are: 
( 1) the total number of questions answered by each number of the pair: 
(2) the number of correct answers given by each number of the pair and how many of 
the said correct answers matched; 
(3) the number of wrong answers matched. 
After determining the above mentioned numbers with respect to each of the identified 
pairs, greater weightage is given to the incorrect matching answers to arrive at a conclusion 
that the number of the identified pair resorted to unfair means at the examination. 
20 Para 6. " ... He admitted that the mistaken answers in the two papers were identical 
and he pleaded that he could not say anything as to why this happened .... " 
Para II. •· ... We have looked at the incorrect answers ourselves and we are not 
prepared to hold that the identical incorrect answers were given by the two candidates 
either by accident or by coincidence. Some of the incorrect answers, and, particularly, 
the manner in which they have
been given, clearly suggest that they were the result of 
either one candidate copying from the other, or both candidates copying from a common 
source . ... "
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
rcHELAMESWAR, J.l 
Even otherwise, in my opinion, it would be futile to pursue the 
inquiry in this regard. Assuming for the sake of argument that the 
submission of the appellants is right and there are some cases (of 
appellants) where the appellants can demonstrate (if an opportunity is 
given to them) that the circumstantial evidence is not foolproof and 
therefore the impugned order must be set aside on the ground of failure 
ofnaturaljustice, the BOARD wpuld still be entitled (in fact it would be 
obliged in view of the allegation of systematic tampering with the 
examination process year after year) in law to conduct afresh enquiry 
after giving notice to each of the appellants. That would mean spending 
enormous time both by the BOARD and by the appellants for the enquiry 
and the consequential (inevitable) litigation regarding the correctness of 
the eventual decision of the BOARD. 
For the abovementioned reasons, I do not propose to interfere 
with the impugned judgment on the count that the rule of audi alteram 
partem was not complied with by the respondents before cancelling the 
admissions of the appellants herein. 
39. The next question that requires examination is the legality of 
the action of the respondents after a lapse of considerable time. It varies 
between one to five years with reference to each of the appellants. The 
decision of the respondents necessarily led to litigation which consumed 
another three years.
The net result is that appellants, who belong to 
2012 batch, spent four years undergoing the training in medical course; 
others progressively longer periods extending up to eight years but could 
not acq.uire their degrees because of the impugned action and the 
pendency of this litigation. Most of the appellants would have acquired 
their degree in medicine by now if they had been successful at the 
examinations. 
40. Learned counsel for the appellants made a fervent appeal 
that this Court in exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 permit the 
appellants to complete their education subject to such conditions as this 
Court deems fit, to satisfy the demand of justice. A very emotional appeal 
was made during the course of hearing that the lives of 634 youngsters 
would be ruined if the impugned action of the respondents remains 
unaltered. They would lose a decade of precious time of their youth and 
they would become practically useless for themselves and for their 
families-even forthe society. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court 
may modify the impugned orders in the light of twin principles that (1) 
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the public policy of this country even with regard to the crimes is that. 
they cannot be taken cognizance of beyond the period of limitation 
stipulated under various Jaws. It is submitted that as of now the appellants 
are alleged to be only beneficiaries of a fraud but not yet proved to be 
criminals; (2) the appellants are youngsters who were of adolescent age 
at the time of the commission of the alleged fraud. Even ifit is proved 
that each of the appellants is directly a participant in the 'crime', which 
Jed to the tampering with the examination process (year to year), they 
cannot be subjected to the punishment under the criminal law in view of 
the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act. Therefore, it is submitted that 
thi$ Court may pass such orders, as it deems fit in the circumstances of 
the ca.se, short of depriving the appellants of their entire future. In this 
regard, the learned counsel relied upon Priya Gupta v. State of 
C/1/iattisxar/1 & Others, (2012) 7 SCC 433. 
41. On the other hand, it is argued on behalf of the respondents 
that having regard to the nature of deep rooted conspiracy behind the 
illegal admissions of the appellants, showing of any compassion in dealing 
with the cases of the appellants would have adverse impact on the 
enforcement of law in'this country. It is argued that having regard to the 
well known maxim that "fraud vitiates everything" and the settled
principle oflaw that the benefits secured out ofa fraudulent action cannot 
be permitted to be retained, the appellants cannot be permitted to claim 
any sympathetic consideration from this Court. In support of the said 
submission, the learned counsel relied upon Ram Preeti Yadav i: U.P. 
Board of Hig/1 Sc/ioo/ and Intermediate Education & Otllers, (2003) 
s sec J 11. 
·--
· 
42. Before I discuss the rival submissions mentioned above, I deem 
it appropriate to examine the two judgments relied upon hy the contending 
parties. 
43. Ram .Preeti Yadav's case was a case where intermediate 
result of the third respondent before this Court was withheld on a suspicion 
of his having employed unfair means in the examination. However, he 
was issued a provisional marksheet which did not indicate that the result 
of his intermediate examination has been withheld. ! On the basis of the 
said provisional marksheet, he pursued higher studies and became a 
post graduate and secured employment as a teacher in one of the colleges 
in Uttar Pradesh. Some twelve years after intermediate examination, 
he was informed that his intermediate examination was cancelled.
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
Invariably litigation ensued. On examination of the factual background, 
.. this Court recorded a conclusion that "thus, it is evident that a fraud was·· 
committed. Respondent No.3 is the sole beneficiary to the said fraud 
and it, as such, must be presumed that he was a party thereto". Invoking 
the principle that "fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" 
and relying upon two earlier judgments in S.P. Clie~1f("lv"r"y" N"idu 
(Dead) by LRs v. Jag"nn(lt/t (Dead) by LRs & Others, ( 1994) 1 SCC 1 
and Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341, this Court. 
reversed the High Court judgment granting relief to the third respondent. 
44 . .In Pri}'" Gupta's case (supra), Priya Gupta's admission to 
the MBBS course granted in the academic year 2006-07 was cancelled 
by the State of Chhattisgarh in 2010 on the ground that such admission 
was not in accordance with the relevant Rules"1• This Court didn't find 
any illegality in the cancellation of the admission of Priya Gupta."" 
. However, taking into consideration the fact that Priya Gupta had 
already completed her course study, this Court held as follows: 
"74. On the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, though 
we find no legal or other infirmity in the judgment under appeal, 
but to do complete justice between the parties within the ambit of 
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we would permit the 
appellants to complete
their professional courses, subject to the 
·condition that each one of them pay a sum of Rs 5 lakhs to 
Jagdalpur College, which amount shall be utilised for developing 
the infrastrµcture in Jagdalpur College. 
75. We have not and should not be even understood to have stated 
any precedent for the cases like grant of admission and leave to 
complete the cou-rs.e like the appellants in the present case." 
21 It was found that "the admission ... had been on the basis of fake letters purported 
to be issued from the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) ... ". 
22 ''Para 73 .... By their admissions, firstly, other candidates of higher merit have been 
denied admission in the MBBS course. Secondly, they'have taken advantage ofa very 
low professional college fee, as in private or colleges other than the government colleges, 
the fee payable would be Rs.1,95,000 per year for general admission and for management 
quota, the fee payable would be Rs.4,00,000 per year, but in government colleges, it is 
Rs.4000 per year. So, they have taken a double advantage. As per their merit, they· 
. obviously would not have got admission into Jagdalpur College and woiilifliave been 
given admission in private colleges. The ranks that they obtained in the competitive 
examination clearly depict this possibility because there were only 50 seats in Jagdalpur 
College and there are hundreds of candidates above the appellants in the order of merit. 
They have also, arbitrarily and
unfairly, benefited from lower fees charged in Jagdalpur 
College." 
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Both Ram Preeti Ytuktv and Priyll Gupta's cases (supra) are cases 
where opportunities secured by individuals by some fraudulent means 
were subject matter of litigation. While in the earlier case, this Court 
declined to take into account the time gap between fraudulent act and 
the detection of the fraud, for deciding the legality of the action against 
Ram Preeti Yadav, in the latter case this Court thought it fit to permit the 
benefits secured to be retained through fraudulent means on payment of 
certain amount to be utilized "for developing the infrastructure" in the 
college where Priya Gupta had studied. One of the many judgments of 
this Court falling under the ''.jurisprudence of peculiar facts" with a caveat 
that it does not constitute a precedent. !! 
45. Be that as it may, both the above-discussed cases deal with 
the question oflegality of the action taken against individuals (small in 
number - one in the first of the abovementioned cases and two in the 
second of the cases) in the context of their fraudulent conduct in securing 
the benefits of higher education. They pleaded that it would be inequitable 
to deprive them of the benefits of their education after considerable 
lapse of time. This Court rejected the plea of Ram Preeti Y{l(ktv both 
.in law and fact, but in Priy" Gupt"'s Clise it was rejected in law? but 
accepted in fact! 
46. Coming to th~ case in hand, the number of students
involved 
is relatively huge~,. In view of the conclusion recorded by me earlier 
that neither the procedure adopted by the respondents nor the evidence 
relied upon by the respondents for taking impugned action against the 
appellants could be characterized as illegal, is it permissible for this Court 
to interfere with the impugned action of the respondents either on the 
ground that there is a considerable time lapse or that such action would 
have ruinous effect on the lives and careers of the appellants? and 
therefore inequitable is a troubling question. 
47. The public policy of the country and the larger public interests, 
in our opinion, would be more appropriate guides than the considerations 
of equity to decide the questions in the absence of any statutory 
prescription applicable to the controversy on hand. 
" They are the beneficiaries of a tampered examination process. The tampering took 
place systematically and repeatedly for a number of years virtually destroying the 
credibility of the examination process. It deprived a number of other more deserving 
students from securing admissions to the medical colleges.
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
fCHELAMESWAR, J.l 
48. This court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation 
Limited & Another v. Brojo Nath Ga11f(uly & A11otller, ( 1986) 3 SCC 
156 explained the concept of public policy and its role in the judicial 
decision making process in the following words: 
"92. The Indian Contract Act does not define the expression "public 
policy" or "opposed to public policy''. From the very nature of 
things, the expressions "public policy", "opposed to public policy", 
or "contrary to public policy" are incapable of precise definition. 
Public policy, however, is not the policy of a pa1ticular government. 
It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the 
public interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in 
the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the 
public good or the public interest has varied from time to time. As 
new concepts take the place of old, transactions which were once 
considered against public policy are now being upheld by the courts 
and similarly where there has been a well recognized head of 
public policy, the courts have not shirked from extending it to new 
transactions and changed circumstances and have at times not 
even flinched from inventing a new head of public policy. There 
are two schools of thought- "the narrow view" school and "the 
broad view" school. According to the former, courts cannot create 
new heads of public policy whereas the latter
countenances judicial 
law-making in this area. The adherents of"the narrow view" 
school would not invalidate a contract on the ground of public 
policy unless that particular ground had been well-established by 
authorities. Hardly ever has the voice of the timorous spoken more 
clearly and loudly than in these words of Lord Davey 
in Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Ltd [(1902) 
AC 484, 500): "Public policy is always an unsafe and treacherous 
ground for legal decision". That was in the year 1902. Seventy-
eight years earlier, Burrough, J., in Richardson v. Mellish [( 1824) 
2 Bing 229, 252: 130 ER294, 303 and (l 824-34)All ER 258, 266) 
described public policy as "a very unruly horse, and when once 
you get astride it you never know where it will carry you". The 
Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, however, was not a man to 
shy away from unmanageable horses and in words which conjure 
up before our eyes the picture of the young Alexander the Great 
taming Bucephalus, he said in Enderby Town Football Club 
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Ltd. v. Football Assn. Ltd. ((1971) Ch 591, 606]: "With a good 
man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can 
jump over obstacles." Had the timorous always held the field, not 
only the doctrine of public policy but even the common law or the 
principles of Equity would never have evolved. Sir William 
. .}Joldsworth in his History of English Law Vol. III, p. 55, has 
said: 
"In fact, a body oflaw like the common law, which has grown 
up gradually with the growth of the nation, necessarily acquires 
some fixed principles, and ifit is to maintain these principles it 
must be able, on the ground of public policy or some other like 
ground, to suppress practices which, under ever new disguises, 
seek to weaken or negative them." 
It is thus clear thatthe principles governing public policy must be 
andare capable, on properoccasion, ofexpansion or modification. 
Practices which were considered perfectly normal at one time 
have today become obnoxious and oppressive to public 
conscience. If there is no head of public policy which covers a 
case, then the court must in consonance with public conscience 
and in keeping with public good and public interest declare such 
practice to be opposed to public policy. Above all, in deciding any 
case which may not be covered by authority our courts have before 
them the beacon light of the Preamble to the Constitution. Lacking 
precedent, the court
can always be guided by that light and the 
principles underlying the Fundamental Rights and the Directive 
Principles enshrined in our Constitution." 
49. One of the indicators of public policy on a given topic is the 
legislation dealing with the topic. The questions on which the public policy 
is required to be ascertained·in the context of the present case are: 
I. 
2. 
Whether administrative action to nullify any benefit acquired by a 
person through fraudulent means could be taken without reference 
to any limitation of time? 
Whether a benefit obtained through the perpefration offraud could 
be permitted to be retained? 
The law of limitation is relevant and indicates to policy in the
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
fCHELAMESWAR, J.l 
context of the first question. Various periods of limitation are prescribed 
for initiation of legal proceedings under the Limitation Act, 1963 and 
various other laws. This Court in Situ Sahu & Others v. State of 
Jharklland & Others, (2004) 8 SCC 340 held that the statutory power 
of suo moto revision could be exercised to deprive a person of the property 
acquired bi him even in the cases where such acquisition is through 
fraudulent means only within a reasonable period. It was a case of the 
claim of a member of a scheduled tribe that their ancestors were tenants 
of a piece of land whose landlord obtained a deed of surrender by fraud. 
The question before this Court was whether the Dy. Commissioner could 
exercise the statutory authority under Section 71-A of the Chota Nagpur 
Tenancy Act, I 908 at any point of time without any limitation and restore 
the land to the.claimant. This Court held that such power must be 
exercised within a reasonable time. 
Criminal law also prescribes time limits for taking cognizance of 
· offences. But in cases of offences where the prescribed punishment is 
more than 3 years, no period of limitation is provided under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, I 973.0• 
50. Public policy of this country regarding the retention of the 
benefit obtained by perpetrator of crime is that normally the benefit cannot 
be permitted to be retained by the perpetrator of crime. But the principle 
is
applied only on adjudication that the benefit was obtained by 
perpetration of crime. 
5 l. A person adjudged to be guilty of an offence is not permitted 
"See Sections 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 
468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.· 
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(I) Except as otherwise provided els~where in this Code, no Court shall take 
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cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry 
of the period of limitation. 
. 
· 
(2) The period oflimitation shall 'be -
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only: 
(b) one year. if the oftence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not 
excee_ding 9ne year; 
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term 
G 
exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences 
which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is 
punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe 
punishment. 
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to retain the financial gains arising out of such crime. :5 Ttransfer of 
property for the purpose of concealing the fact that it is the benefit 
arising out of or statutorily presumed to be arising out of crime is not 
" See Sections 452. 453 and 456 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 
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"Section 452. Order for disposal of property at conclusion of trial.- (I) When an 
inquiry or trial in any Criminal Court is concluded, the Court may make such order as it 
thinks fit for the disposal, by destruction, confiscation or delivery to any person claiming 
to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise, of any property or document produced 
before it or in its custody, or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, 
or which has been used for the commission of any offence. 
(2) An order may be made under sub-section (1) for the delivery of any property to 
any person claiming to be entitled to the possession thereof, without any condition or on 
condition that he executes a bond, with or without sureties, to the satisfaction of the 
Court, engaging to restore such property to the Court if the order made under sub-section 
(I) is modi tied or set aside on appeal or revision. 
(3) A Court of Session may, instead of itscl f making an order under sub-section (I), 
direct the property to be delivered to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who shall thereupon 
deal with it in the manner provided in
sections 457, 458 and 459. 
(4) Except where the property is livestock or is subject to speedy and natural decay, 
or where a bond has been executed in pursuance of sub-section (2), an order made under sub-
section (I) shall not be carried out for two months, or when an appeal is presented, until 
such appeal has been disposed of. 
(5) In this section, the term '·property" includes. in the case of property regarding 
which an offence appears to have been committed, not only such property as has been 
originally in the possession or under the control of any party, but also any property into 
or for which the same may have been converted or exchanged, and anything acquired by 
such conversion or exchange. whether immediately or otherwise. 
Section 453. Payment to innocent purchaser of money found on accused.· When 
any person is convicted of any offonce which includes, or amounts to. theft or receiving 
stolen properly. and it is proved that any other person bought the stolen property from 
him without knowing or having reason to believe that the same was stolen, and that any 
money has on his arrest been taken out of the possession of the convicted person, the 
Court may, on the application of such purchaser and on the restitution of the stolen 
property to the person entitled to the possession thereof. order that out of such money a 
sum not exceeding the price paid by such purchaser be delivered to him. 
Section 456. Power to restore 1>osscssion of immovable property.- (I)
When a 
person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by 
criminal intimidation, and it appears to the Court that, by such force or show of force or 
intimidation. any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the Court 
may, if it thinks fit, order that possession of the same be restored to that person after 
evicting by force, if necessary, any other person who may be in possession of the property: 
Provided that no such order shall be made by the Court more than one month after 
the date of the conviction. 
(2) Where the Court trying the offence has not made an order under sub-section (I), 
the Court of appeal, conlimialion or revision may, if it thinks fit, make such order while 
disposing of the appeal. reference or revision. as the case may be. 
(3) Where an order has been made under sub-section ( I). the provisions of section 454 
shall apply in relation thereto as they apply in relation to an order under section 453. 
(4) No order made under this section shall prejudice any right or interest to or in such 
immovable property which any person may be able lo establish in a civil suit.'"
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
869 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
countenanced.26 Similarly, it is the law of this country that a person found 
guilty of murder is not entitled to succeed (even ifhe is otherwise eligible 
for succession in accordance with the relevant principles of succession) 
to the estate of the victim27 • 
Situ Saltu's case (supra) is also a case establishing the principle 
that the Jaw permits the retention of property acquired pursuant to 
fraudulent means (allegedly) because law does not permit an enquiry 
into the allegation beyond the reasonable period. 
However, when it comes to other civil rights, the public policy, as 
can be discerned from various enactments, seems to be not to deprive 
those who are found to have been guilty of offences of all their civil 
rights. For example, the right to contest an election for the various 
constitutional bodies is denied to a person convicted of various offences 
enumerated under Section 8 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 
but only for a certain specified period. Similarly, the right to vote is 
denied to persons convicted of offences specified under Section 11 A of 
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for a period specified therein. 
It is also worthwhile noticing that even such disqualifications could be 
removed by the Election Commission for reasons to be recorded.28 
It is required to be examined whether it would be consistent with 
the public policy to deprive the appellants of the
benefits of their education 
on the ground that they secured certain benefits by adopting fraudulent 
means. 
26 See Section 4 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of 
Prope11y) Act, 1976 
"Section 4. Prohibition of holding illegally acquired property.- ( 1) As from the 
commencement of this Act, it shall not be lawful for any person to whom this Act 
applies to hold any illegally acquired property either by himself or through any other 
person on his behalf. 
(2) Where any person holds any illegally acquired property in contravention of the 
provision of sub- section (I), such property shall be liable to be forfeited to the Central 
Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 
27 See Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 
"Section 25. Murderer disqualified.-A person who com1nits murd.er or abets the 
commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person 
murdered, or any other ·property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she 
committed or abetted the commission of the murder." 
'" See Section 11 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 
"Section 11. Removal or reduction of period of disqualilication.-The Election 
Commission may. for reasons to be recorded, remove any disqualification under this 
Chapter (except under section 8A) or reduce the period of any such disqualification. 
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52. We are informed that all the appellants are also being 
investigated for the commission of various offences which if proved 
would render them liable for imprisonment for-periods extending beyond 
three years, and therefore, there is no period of limitation for taking 
cognizance of them. Therefore, it cannot be said thatthe impugned action 
against the appellants would be inconsistent with the public policy on the 
ground of the time gap. 
53. While it is a salutary principle based on public policy not to 
permit the retention of 'property' obtained by fraudulent means, the 
application of the said principle becomes a matter of doubtful utility to 
the society in the contextofthe acquisition of knowledge by adopting 
fraudulent means examined from the point of view of the public interest. 
In the context of property (economic gains), the application of the principle 
works to the benefit of the rightful owner. But in the context ofacquisition 
of knowledge, nobody would benefit by the application of the rule and 
would therefore serve only a limited public purpose. 
· ' 
54. Some 634 youngsters, who have already completed their 
training in medicine (or about to complete) and whose knowledge could 
have otherwise been utilized for-the benefit of the society, would be 
simply rendered useless for the society in the sense their knowledge 
cannot be utilized for the welfare of the society. The
question is not 
whether these appellants deserve any sympathy. In my view, a larger 
question- whether this society can afford to waste such technically trained 
and qualified human resources which require enormous amounts of energy, 
time and other material resources to generate. Obviously, it takes another 
five years of time and expenditure of considerable material resources to 
produce another set of 634 qualified medical graduates. It is in the 
background of this consideration, this issue is required to be decided. 
55. Another important consideration in the context is that most of 
(ifnot all) the appellants, whatever be their respective role, if any, in the 
tampering of.the examination process, must have been 'juveniles'c9 as 
defined under the Juvenile Justice Act. They cannot be subjected to any 
'punishment' prescribed under the criminal law even if they are not only 
the beneficiaries of the tampered examination process but also the 
29 Section 2(k) -'juvenile" or "child" means a person who has not completed eighteenth 
yearofage; 3[(1) ''.juvenile in conflict with law" means ajuvenile who is alleged to ha.ve 
committed an offence and has not completed eighteenth year of age as on the date of 
commission of such offence
NIDHf KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
perpetrators of the various acts which constitute offences contaminating 
the examination process. 
56. For the abovementioned reasons, I would prefer to permit the 
appellants to complete their study of medicine and become trained doctors 
to serve tb nation. But at the same time there is a compelling national 
interest that dishonest people cannot be made to believe that "time heals 
everything' and the society would condone every misdeed if only they 
can manage to get away with their wrong doing for a considerably long 
period. 
Society must receive some compensation from the wrongdoers. 
Compensation need not be monetary and in the instant case it should not 
be. In my view, it would serve the larger public interests, by making the 
appel la11ts serve the nation for a period of five years as and when they 
become qualified doctors30, without any regular salary and attendant 
benefits of service under the State, nor any claim for absorption into the 
service of the State subject of course to the payment of some allowance 
(either in cash or kind) for their survival. I would prefer them serving 
the Indian Armed Forces subject to such conditions and disciplines to 
which the armed forces normally subject their regular medical corps. r 
would prefer that the appellants be handed over the certificates of their 
medical degrees only after they complete the abovementioned five years. 
The abovementioned exercise would require the
ascertainment of the 
views ofMinistry of Defence, Government oflndia, and passing of further 
appropriate orders by this Court thereafter. In view of the disagreement 
of views in this regard, I am not proposing such an exercise. 
Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon'ble the Chief 
Justice oflndia for appropriate orders. 
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. I. I have had the advantage 
of going through the elaborate and well considered draft judgment 
proposed to be pronounced by my learned Brother. 
2. Having gone through the draft judgment, I agree with the 
reasoning given by my learned Brother on all the issues except on one 
issue dealt with in paragraphs 39 to 55 relating to issuance of directions 
to the respondents. 
'" Community sen·ice as an alternative to the traditional punishment of imprisonment 
for those found guilty of crime is gaining currency in some countries. It appears to me 
to be more useful to the society. I do not sec any reason why such a concept cannot be 
adopted in the context of situations like the one on hand. 
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A 
3. In my view, keeping in view the nature of controversy and the 
findings recorded by us on the main controversy which has resulted in 
upholding of the impugned judgment, no case is made out for passing 
any directions under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and hence 
these appeals deserve to be dismissed. 
B 
4. However, having regard to the issues which were ably argued 
by the learned counsel and in the light of my disagreement on one issue, 
as mentioned above, with my learned Brother, I propose to write few 
paragraphs of my own in support of my reasoning and the conclusion. 
5. I need not set out the facts in detail since my learned Brother 
c 
has succinctly mentioned them in his draft judgment. 
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6. Suffice it to say, the controversy involved in these appeals 
centers around broadly to the following facts. 
7. The appellants along with several other candidates appeared in 
the PMT examinations held in the years 2008 to 2012 and 2013. So far 
as these appeals are concerned, they relate to examinations held in the 
years 2008 to 2012. The State ofM.P. through Professional Examination 
Board hereinafter called "Vyapam" had conducted these examinations 
for getting admission in MBBS Degree Course in various Government/ 
Private Medical Colleges in State ofM.P. 
8. The appellants cleared the PMT examination and got admissions 
in MBBS Degree Course in various Government/Private Medical 
Colleges in the
State ofM.P. Some are prosecuting their studies in MBBS 
Course and some claims to have completed their studies. 
9. The Vyapam, however, cancelled the appellants' PMT 
Examination results by order dated 09. I 0.2013 and various orders. The 
reason for cancellation was that the detailed investigations were made 
in conducting of the PMT examinations held in the years 2008 to 2013. 
The outcome of the investigations, however, revealed that the appellants 
and several other candidates resorted to unfair means in large scale by 
adopting planned strategy in answering their question papers. It was 
revealed that the appellants and other candidates in connivance with 
Vyapam 's officials and some outsiders entered into a conspiracy and 
conceived a plan as to how the appellants and their associates should sit 
in the examination centre and accordingly sitting arrangements in 
particu Jar examination centers with another candid ate (described in scam 
as "scorer") were made which facilitated the candidate (described in
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
scam as "beneficiary") to copy from the candidate (scorer) sitting in 
frontofhim from his answer sheet. It was also revealed thatthe appellants 
and conspirators were successful in their plan and the appellants secured 
the requisite marks in the PMT examination which enabled them to get 
admission in MBBS course at the cost of deserving candidates who 
despite clearing the examination could not secure admissions in MBBS 
Course in the respective years. 
10. In support of their decision, the StateNyapam filed material 
which was seized by the Special Task Force (STF) sleuths in the ongoing 
investigati0n. The material seized consisted of(I) relevant files relating 
to conduct of these examinations from Vyapam's office (2) statement of 
persons recorded by STF sleuths involved in the scam such as Vyapam's 
officials, candidates, their parents, outsiders who hatched the conspiracy 
on receiving money consideration etc. (3) computers, hardware and 
software used in programing the examinations- (4) benefits (cash or 
otherwise) alleged to have been received by the persons involved in 
the scam (5) copies of FIR and Charge sheets filed against several 
accused for commission of offences of fraud, cheating, conspiracy etc. 
(6) Copies of bail orders (granting or/and refusing bail) passed in several 
cases by various courts including the orders of the High Court passed 
from time to time in PIL dealing with the scam
(7) order of this Court 
directing the CBI to take over the ongoing investigation of the Scam 
from STF (8) Expe11 Committee's repo11s on scam etc. 
11. The appellants, felt aggrieved by the decision of cancellation 
of their results, filed several writ petitions before the High Court ofM.P. 
out of which these appeals arise. The challenge to the cancellation of 
their result was on several factual and legal grounds as detailed infra. 
12. The State and Vyapam supported the decision of cancellation 
of the results and inter alia contended that it is based on Expert 
Committee's reports, which has taken into account the aforementioned 
material for coming to a conclusion that it was a case of "mass 
copying". 
13. The High Court upheld the stand taken by the State/Vyapam 
and dismissed the writ petitions. The High Court by its reasoned judgment 
held inter alia that Firstly, it was a case of "mass copying"; Secondly, 
the material seized was sufficient for the Expert Committee for coming 
to a conclusion that it was a case of "mass copying" found to have 
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been done at a large scale by the appellants and other candidates by 
resorting to unfair means; Thirdly, the decision to cancel the appellants' 
result is based on Expert Committee's report which has applied their 
mind to all aspects of the case after taking into account all material 
seized in investigation and, therefore, no fault could be found in such 
decision of the Expert Committee; Fourthly, the decision has been taken 
in larger public interest; and lastly, this being a case of "mass copying", 
it was not necessary for the State/Vyapam to give any opportunity of 
hearing to any candidate individually to show cause before cancellation 
of their results as has been laid down by this Court consistently in several 
decided cases referred to hereinbelow. 
14. It is this issue, which is now carried by the unsuccessful 
candidates (appellants) to this Court in these appeals. 
15. The controversy in these appeals mainly centered around to 
the following legal issues. 
16. In the first place, submission of learned counsel for the 
appellants was that the perusal of the materials relied on by the State/ 
Vyapam against the appellants (though disputed by the appellants) would 
go to show that it does not make out a case of "mass copying" but at 
best may make out a case of unfair means resorted to by few individual 
candidates in answering their questions papers. It was, therefore, their 
submission that
since these candidates, who resorted to unfair means, 
were later identified, the State/Vyapam should have given show cause 
notices to these candidates individually setting out therein the nature of 
unfair means committed by each such candidate by following the rule of 
natural justice, i.e., rule of (111</i (l/fer"m partem and after affording 
the erring candidates (appellants) an opportunity of hearing by supplying 
the alleged material, an appropriate order should have been passed. 
17. Second submission of learned counsel forthe appellants was 
that there was no material on the basis of which the decision to cancel 
the appellants' results could have been taken by the State/Vyapam. It 
was urged that in any event such material was neither sufficient and nor 
relevant for cancellation of the results and, more so, since it was not 
supplied to the appellants, the same was of no consequence. 
18. Third submission of learned counsel for the appellants was 
that the decision to cancel the results was not taken immediately after 
the examinations were over but was taken after a considerable delay
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
and since in the meantime, the appellants on the basis of the results 
altered their position and successfully completed their MBBS degree 
course or are about to complete in near future, the cancellation of the 
results done at such belated stage is not justified being inequitable and 
unreasonable and hence deserve to be set aside. In the alternative, it 
was urged that the appellants be allowed to prosecute their studies on 
suitable terms as this Court may deem fit and proper to impose on the 
appellants. 
19. Fom1h submission of learned counsel for the appellants was 
that since the constitution of Vyapam (Board) was not done in 
accordance with the requirements of the M.P. Professional Examination 
Board Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") inasmuch as no 
notification under Section 3 of the Act was issued till date, all actions so 
far taken including cancellation of the resu Its by the Board are rendered 
illegal because these actions/decisions were taken by the Board which 
was not validly constituted. 
20. The aforementioned submissions were elaborated by the 
learned counsel for the appellants with reference to the record of the 
case and by placing reliance on various decisions of this Court. 
21. In reply, learned counsel for the respondtlnts (State/Vyapam) 
supported the reasoning and the conclusion of the High Court and prayed 
for its upholding calling no interference therein. 
22.
The questions, which arise for consideration in these appeals, 
are, Firstly, whether it is a case of "mass copying"; Secondly, whether 
the appellants were entitled to a show cause notice before cancellation 
of their results; Thirdly, whether the appellants are entitled to claim any 
equity in their favour on account of delay occurred on the part of the 
State/Vyapam in cancelling their result and, if so, what relief are they 
entitled to claim; and lastly, whether the Vyapam Board was legally 
constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and if not then 
its effect on the controversy involved in these cases. 
23. Before we examine the aforementioned questions, it is 
necessary to take note of the law laid down by this Court especially the 
law dealing with the cases of"copying" and "mass copying". 
24. The first leading case of this Court (Five- Judge Bench) on 
the question of"copying" is Board of High School and Intermediate 
Education U.P.,Allahabad Vs. Ghanshyam Das Gupta and Others, 
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AIR 1962 SC 1110 = 1962 Supp (3) SCR 36. The facts of this case were 
that 3 students of G.S. Hindu Intermediate College of Sikandrarao 
appeared in Intermediate (Commerce) Examination in 1954. These 3 
students passed the examination. In December 1954, their fathers/ 
guardians received information that the Examinations Committee had 
cancelled their results and debarred them from appearing in examination 
to be held in 1955. 
25. These 3 students thereupon filed writ petition in the High Court 
contending that the Examinations Committee had never afforded any 
opportunity to them to rebut the allegations made against them and that 
they were never informed about the nature of unfair means used by 
them in the examination. 
26. The majority of Judges of the High Court, who heard the writ 
petition, accepted the writ petitioners' contention and allowed the writ 
petition. The Board, therefore, filed an appeal to this Court. This Court 
affirmed the view taken by the High Court. Construing powers of the 
Examination Committee, in Rule I (I) of the Regulations, this Court held 
that the Examination Committee was acting as quasi-judicially body while 
exercising powers under Rule I (I) and, therefore, principles of natural 
justice should have been observed. Justice Wanchoo speaking for the 
Bench held as follows: 
"11. .... We are therefore of opinion that the Committee 
when it exercises its powers under
Rule 1(1) is acting quasi-
judicially and the principles of natural justice which require 
that the other party, (namely, the examinee in this case) 
must be heard, will apply to the proceedings before the 
Committee. This view was taken by the Calcutta High Court 
in Dipa Pal v. University of Calcutta, AIR 1952 Cal 594 and 
B.C. Das Gupta V. Bijoyranjan Rakshit, AIR 1953 Cal 212 
in similar circumstances and is in our opinion correct." 
27. The second leading case where this Court (Three-Judge 
Bench) examined the case of "copying" and how it should be dealt 
with by the concerned authorities and the Court is Board of High Sclloo/ 
and Intermediate Education, U.P., Alla/wb"d and Anr. vs 
Bagles/1war Prasad and Anr., AIR 1966 SC 875=(]963) 3 SCR 767. 
28. The facts of this case were that two candidates were found 
copying in the examination. The charge of copying was based on the
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
fact that one candidate had given wrong answer to one question precisely 
in the same form in which the said answers had been given by another 
candidate. Both the candidates were accordingly given show cause notice 
to explain the charge. Both denied the charge. The enquiry committee 
was then constituted to probe the issue and the committee came to a 
conclusion, after examining the whole issue, that it was a case of copying 
and accordingly cancelled their results. 
29. Both the candidates filed writ petition in Allahabad High Court. 
The High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the cancellation 
order. It was held that the decision to cancel the result is not supported 
by any evidence. The Board appealed to this Court. This Court allowed 
the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and while upholding the 
cancellation of the result dismissed the writ petition filed by the two 
candidates. 
30. Justice Gajendragadkar (as His Lordship then was) speaking 
for the Three-Judge Bench in his distinctive style of writing held in Paras 
11 and 12 as under:-
"11. Before the High Court, a statement was flied showing 
the seating arrangement in Room No. Hf wli.ere the 
respondent was sitting for writing his answers. It appears 
that he was No. 3 in the 3rd row, whereas the other candidate 
with Roll No. 94733 was No. 4 in the second row. The High 
Court was very much impressed by the fact that the
respondent could not have looked back and copied from 
the answer-book of the other candidate, and the High Court 
did not think that there was any evidence to show that the 
other candidate could have copied from the respondent's 
paper with his connivance. We have looked at the incorrect 
answers ourselves and we are not prepared to hold that 
the identical incorrect answers were given by the two 
candidates either by accident or by coincidence. Some of 
the incorrect answers, and, particularly, the manner in which 
they have been given, clearly suggest that they were the 
result of either one candidate copying from the other, or 
both candidates copying from a common source. The 
significance of this fact has been completely missed by the 
High Court. The question before the Enquiry Committee 
had to be decided by it in the light of the nature of the 
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incorrect answers themselves, and that is what the Enquiry 
Committee has done. It would, we think, be inappropriate 
in such a case to require direct evidence to show that the 
respondent could have looked back and copied from the 
answer written by the other candidate who was sitting 
behind him. There was still the alternative possibility that 
the candidate sitting behind may have copied from the 
respondent with his connivance. It is also not unlikely that 
the two candidates may have talked to each other. The 
atmosphere prevailing in the Examination Hall does not 
rule out this possibility. These are all matters which the 
Enquiry Committee had to consider,.and the fact that the 
Enquiry Committee did not write an elaborate report, does 
not mean that it did not consider all the relevant facts before 
it came to the conclusion that the respondent had used 
unfair means. 
12. In dealing with petitions of this type, it is necessary to 
bear in mind that educational institutions like the 
Universities or Appellant 1 set up Enquiry Committees to 
deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means 
by candidates, and normally it is within the jurisdiction of 
such domestic Tribunals to decide all relevant questions in 
the light of the evidence adduced before them. In the matter 
of the adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may 
sometimes be available, but cases may arise where direct
evidence is not available and the question will have to be 
considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial 
evidence. This problem which educational institutions have 
to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless 
there is justification to do so, courts should be slow to 
interfere with the decisions of domestic Tribunals appointed 
by educational bodies like the Universities. In dealing with 
the validity of the impugned orders passed by Universities 
under Article 226, the High Court is not sitting in appeal 
over the decision in question; its jurisdiction is limited and 
though it is true that if the impugned order is not supported 
by any evidence at all, the High Court would be justified to 
quash that order. But the conclusion that the impugned 
order is not supported by any evidence must be reached
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
after considering the question as to whether probabilities 
and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said 
conclusion. Enquiries held by domestic Tribunals in such 
cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom 
charges are framed must be given adequate opportunities 
to defend themselves, and in holding such enquiries, the 
Tribunals must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice; 
but it would, we think, not be reasonable to import into 
these enquiries all considerations which govern criminal 
trials in ordinary courts oflaw. In the present case, no animus 
is suggested and no nw/a fides have been pleaded. The 
enquiry has been fair and the respondent has had an 
opportunity of making his defence. That being so, we think 
the High Court was not justified interfering with the order 
passed against the respondent." 
31. In the third leading case of Bilwr School Ex(/mi11(lfio11 Bo(lrd 
vs Subltas Clwmlra Sinha & Ors. (1970) (}) SCC 648, this Court 
(Three-Judge Bench) examined the question of "mass copying" or 1 
may say "unfair means practiced on a large scale in examination" and 
how the concerned authorities and the courts qua the candidates should 
deal with such case. 
32. The facts of this case were that the Bihar School Examination 
Board (for short "Board") conducted annual Secondary School 
Examination in the State ofBihar. Several candidates appeared at various 
centres all over
the State. 36 students of two schools namely, S.S.H.E 
School Jagdishpur and H.E. School Malaur of District Shahbad (Bihar) 
appeared in the examination at Hanswadih Centre. The results of all the 
candidates were declared in papers except the results of the 36 candidates 
of the two schools who had appeared in the examination from Hanswadih 
Centre. After sometime, news was published in the paper that the 
examinations of all subjects held at Hanswadih Centre were cancelled 
and the reason given for cancellation was that the candidates at this 
Centre practiced unfair means on a large scale. However, the candidates 
of this Centre were allowed to appear in the supplementary Secondary 
School Examination. 
33. The candidates challenged the order of cancellation of their 
results in writ petition in the High Court of Patna on the ground that 
before cancelling the result, the rules of natural justice and fair-play 
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were not observed because the candidates were not afforded any 
opportunity of hearing before cancellation of their results. 
34. The High Court accepted the submission and allowed the writ 
petition by quashing the order of cancellation of their results. Against the 
decision of the High Court of Patna, the Board appealed to this Court. 
This Court ordered production of answer books for their inspection and 
compared them. The comparison showed remarkable agreement in the 
answers that students had assistance from an outside source. Th is Court 
allowed the Board's appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and 
dismissed the writ petition filed by the candidates and upheld the 
cancellation of the results. 
35. Justice Hidayatulla-the learned Chief Justice speaking for the 
Three-Judge Bench in his inimitable style of writing distinguished the 
case of Ghanshyamdas Gupta (supra) and held in paras 13 and 14 as 
under:-
"13. This is not a case of any particular individual who is 
being charged with adoption of unfair means but of the 
conduct of all the examinees or at least a vast majority of 
them at a particular centre. Ifit is not a question of charging 
any one individually with unfair means but to condemn the 
examination as ineffective for the purpose it was held. Must 
the Board give an opportunity to all the candidates to 
represent their cases? We think not. It was not necessary 
for the Board
to give an opportunity to the candidates if 
the examinations as a whole were being cancelled. The 
Board had not charged any one with unfair means so that 
he could claim to defend himself. The examination was 
vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a mass scale. In 
these circumstances it would be wrong to insist that the 
Board must hold a detailed inquiry into the matter and 
examine each individual case to satisfy itself which of the 
candidates had not adopted unfair means. The examination 
as a whole had to go. 
14. Reliance was placed upon G/umsltyam Das Gupta case 
to which we referred earlier. There the examination results 
of three candidates were cancelled, and this Court held that 
they should have received an opportunity of explaining their 
conduct. It was said that even if the inquiry involved a large
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
number of persons, the Committee should frame proper 
regulations for the conduct of such inquiries but not deny 
the opportunity. We do not think that that case has any 
application. Surely it was not intended that where the 
examination as a whole was vitiated, say by leakage of 
papers or by destruction of some of the answer books or 
by discovery of unfair means practised on a vast scale that 
an inquiry would be made giving a chance to every one 
appearing at that examination to have his say? What the 
Court intended to lay down was that if any particular person 
was to be proceeded against, he must have a proper chance 
to defend himself and this did not obviate the necessity of 
giving an opportunity even though the number of persons 
proceeded against was large. The Court was then not 
considering the right of an examining body to cancel its 
own examination when it was satisfied that the examination 
was not properly conducted or that in the conduct of the 
examination the majority of the examinees had not 
conducted themselves as they should have. To make such 
decisions depend upon a full-fledged judicial inquiry would 
hold up the functioning of such autonomous bodies as 
Universities and School Board. While we do not wish to 
whittle down the requirements of natural justice and fair-
play in cases where such requirement may be said to arise, 
we do not want that this Court should be understood as
having stated that an inquiry with a right to representation 
must always precede in every case, however different. The 
universities are responsible for their standards and the 
conduct of examinations. The essence of the examinations 
is that the worth of every person is appraised without any 
assistance from an outside source. If at a centre the whole 
body of students receive assistance and are managed to 
secure success in the neighbourhood of 100% when others 
at other centres are successful only at an average of 50%, 
it is obvious that the University or the Board must do 
something in the matter. It cannot hold a detailed quasi-
judicial inquiry with a right to its alumni to plead and lead 
evidence etc., before the results are withheld or the 
examinations cancelled. If there is sufficient material on 
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which it can be demonstrated that the university was right 
in its conclusion that the examinations ought to be cancelled 
then academic standards require that the university's 
appreciation of the problem must be respected. It would 
not do for the Court to say that you should have examined' 
all the candidates or even their representatives with a view 
to ascertaining whether they had received assistance or 
not. To do this would encourage indiscipline if not also 
perjury." 
36. In the fourth leading case of Prem Parkash Kaluniya Vs. 
Punjab University and Ors., (1973) 3 SCC ./2./, which involved 
identical facts alike the facts ofthe case ofBagleshwar Prasad (supra) 
involving two students whose results were cancelled on the ground of 
using unfair means of copying in the examination, this Court (Three-
Judge Bench) relied on facts and law laid down in Bagleshwar Prasad 
(supra) and upheld the cancellation of the results. 
3 7. Justice Grover speaking for the Bench held in paras 11 and 12 
as under:-
"11. A good deal of emphasis had been laid on the answers 
which were given by the two candidates and our attention 
had been invited to the discrepancies between the details 
of the answers contained in the two answer books. It was 
further pointed out that the appellant had made rough 
calculations at the back of the answer book which showed 
that he had worked out the answer on his own without the 
aid
of any other source which could be regarded as common 
from which the other candidate was alleged to have copied. 
These, however, are matters on which the court cannot 
entertain a petition under Article 226. It was for the Standing 
Committee to al'l'ive at its own conclusion 011 the evidence 
before it and the same cannot be re-examined except on 
very limited grounds which have not been established. We 
are also unable to see how the finding of the Standing 
Committee could be regarded as vague or as having been 
based on no evidence. 
12. In Board of Higlt Sc/tool and Intermediate Education, 
U.P. v. Baglesltwar Prasad in which the facts were very 
similar, it was held that the identity of the wrong answers
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
given by the respondent in that case with that of the other 
candidate bearing the consecutive Roll Number rendered 
the charge of the respondent having employed unfair means 
highly probable and that the findings of the enquiry 
committee based upon such probabilities and circumstantial 
evidence could not be said to be based on no evidence as 
in r-uch matters direct evidence quite often cannot be 
available. It was further pointed out that in dealing with 
these cases the problem faced by such institutions should 
be appreciated by the High Court and so long as the enquiry 
held was fair and afforded the candidate an opportunity to 
defend himself, the matter should not be examined with 
the same strictness as applicable to criminal charges in the 
ordinary courts of law. There is hardly any justification for 
saying in the present case that the finding of the Standing 
Committee was based on no evidence." 
38. In the fifth case of B. Ramanjini & Ors. vs. State of A.P. 
& Ors. (2002) 5 SCC 533, the facts of the case were that the State 
authorities had cancelled the examination held for selecting secondary 
school teachers after noticing certain complaints of "mass copying" 
found to have been done by the candidates in the examination in respect 
of Anantapur District. 
39. Justice Rajendra Babu (as His Lordship then was) speaking 
for the Bench took note of the law laid down in the case of Bi/tar 
Sc/tool
Exami11ati<>11 (supra) and while upholding the decision of 
cancellation of the result of the candidates held as under: 
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"8. Further, even if it was not a case of mass copying or 
F 
leakage of question papers or such other circumstance, it 
is clear that in the conduct of the examination, a fair 
procedure has to be adopted. Fair procedure would mean 
that the candidates taking part in the examination must be 
capable of competing with each other by fair means. One 
cannot have an advantage either by copying or by having a 
G 
foreknowledge of the question paper or otherwise. In such 
matters wide latitude should be shown to the Government 
and the courts should not unduly interfere with the action 
taken by the Government which is in possession of the 
necessary information and takes action upon the same. The 
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courts ought not to take the action lightly and interfere 
with the same particularly when there was some material 
for the Government to act one way or the othet~ Further, in 
this case, the first examinations were held on 19-4-1998. 
The same stood cancelled by the order made on 15-5-1998 • 
. Fresh examinations were held on 11-7-1998 and results have 
been published on 29-7-1998. Interviews were however 
held on 29-7-1998 (sic 27-8-1998) in such cases. The events 
have taken place in quick succession. The parties have 
a1>proached the court after further examinations were held 
and after having participated in the second examination. It 
is clear that such persons would not be entitled to get relief 
at the hands of the court. Even if they had not participated 
in the second examination, they need not have waited till 
the results had been announced and then approached the 
Tribunal or the High Court. In such cases, it would lead to 
very serious anomalous results involving great public 
inconvenience in holding fresh examinations for a large 
number of candidates and in Anantapur district alone nearly 
1800 candidates were selected as a result of the 
examinations held for the second time. Therefore, we think, 
the High Court ought not to have interfered with the order 
made by the Government on 15-5-1998 in cancelling the 
examinations and holding fresh examination." 
40. Jn the sixth case of Union
Public Service Commission vs. 
Ja_gannath Mishra, (2003) 9 SCC 237, the facts were identical to the 
facts of the cases ofBagleshwar Prasad and Prem Prakash Kalunia 
(supra). In this case also two candidates sitting in close proximity in 
examination centre copied from each other. The committee examined 
their answer papers and found that answers were matching with each 
other. Their results were accordingly cancelled which led to filing of 
petition first before the Tribunal and then to the High Couit successfully. 
However, when the matter came to this Cou1t at the instance of UPSC, 
this Comt placed reliance on the law laid down in Ba2leshwar Prasad 
and Prem Prakash Kalunia (supra) and while allowing the UPSC's 
appeal, set aside the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court and 
upheld the decision of cancellation of the result. It is apposite to reproduce 
what is held by this Court in para 4 as under:
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
"4. Before we answer the questions posed, to have our 
conscience clear, we had called upon UPSC to produce the 
answer papers of both the candidates. We have carefully 
scrutinised the answer papers of both the candidates and 
on a thorough scrutiny of the same, we have no doubt in 
our mind that but for assistance and/or connivance of the 
respondent it would not have been possible for the other 
candidate to answer in the manner in which he has 
answered. As has been stated by this Court in the case of 
Prem Parkasli Kaluniya v. Punj"b University in a matter like 
this it would be difficult to get direct evidence and so long 
as an inquiry is held to be fair and it affords the candidate 
adequate opportunity to defend himself, the matter should 
not ordinarily be examined by courts with the same 
strictness as applicable to criminal charges. The Court had 
further held that where findings are based on probabilities 
and circumstantial evidence, such findings cannot be said 
to have been based on no evidence. From the facts alleged, 
it is crystal clear that the respondent was a brilliant student. 
But, if a brilliant student is found to have adopted any unfair 
means in a competitive examination, he will have to bear 
the consequences of the same. Since we ourselves have 
examined the two answer papers in question and have come 
to the conclusion that but for the assistance or connivance 
of the respondent
in some way or the other, it would not 
have been possible for the other candidate to answer his 
question paper in the manner in which he has answered, 
who was sitting just behind the respondent, we see no 
justification for the Tribunal to interfere with the conclusion 
of UPSC. The judgment of this Court on which the Tribunal 
as well as the High Court has placed reliance will have no 
application to the case in hand. In that view of the matter, 
we are of the considered opinion that the Tribunal 
committed serious error in interfering with the conclusion 
of UPSC and in interfering with the punishment awarded 
by it. The High Court also committed error in affirming the 
said decision of the Tribunal. It is true that there has been 
no report from the invigilator indicating any malpractice by 
the respondent or the person who was sitting behind him. 
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But, mere absence of such report would not be sufficient 
to exonerate the delinquency, if otherwise a conclusion 
could be arrived at that but for the assistance of the 
respondent the candidate sitting behind him could not have 
copied in tile manner he has done. The Tribunal as well as 
the High Court committed serious error by giving extra 
weightage for the absence of any report from the invigilator. 
It cannot be held as a principle that wherever there is no 
report from the invigilator indicating adoption of malpractice 
in any examination the appropriate authority cannot come 
to the conclusion about the adoption of malpractice. It would 
always be a case depending upon the materials produced 
and there would be no bar for an expert body to come to a 
definite conclusion about adoption of malpractice in an 
examination even in the absence ofa report of the invigilator 
to that effect. It would always be a question of fact to be 
decided on the basis of materials produced before the expert 
body." 
41. In the seventh leading case decided by (Three-Judge Bench) 
in Chief General Manager, Calcutta Telephones District, Bharat 
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Surendra Nath Pandey & Ors., 
2011 (15) SCC 81, the facts of the case were that B.S.N.L. a Government 
Company conducted departmental examination for granting promotion 
to the post of Junior Accounts Officers to their employees. The results 
were
displayed containing the names of successful and unsuccessful 
candidates. Some unsuccessful candidates then made a representation 
as required under Rule 13 ofTelegraph Manual requesting for disclosure 
of their marks obtained by them in the examination. This request was 
not acceded to and hence these candidates filed 0.A. before CAT. The 
CAT directed BSNL to publish the results, allow the candidates to appear 
in the examination next year and pass appropriate orders on their 
representation. The authorities concerned disposed of the representation 
stating that some irregular practices were noticed in the examination 
attributable to the candidates who resorted to unfair means and hence 
their results were cancelled. 
42. The candidates filed writ petitions against this order in Calcutta 
High Court. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and held 
that B.S.N.L could not prove that it was a case of "mass copying" 
H 
attributable to candidates. The appeal filed by B.S.N.L having been
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOl-IAR SAPRE, J.) 
dismissed by the Division Bench, the matter came to this Court at the 
instance ofB.S.N.L. This Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders 
of High Court and dismissed the candidates' writ petition. 
43. Referring to and placing reliance on all the aforementioned 
cases referred to above, Jµstice Nijjar speaking for the Bench held in 
paras 28 ancl 33 as under:-
"28. We are of the considered opinion that the procedure 
adopted by the appellants cannot be said to be unfair or 
arbitrary. It was a reasonable and fair procedure adopted in 
the peculiar circumstances of the case. It cannot be said to 
be in breach of rules of natural justice. It must be 
remembered that rules of natural justice are not embodied 
rules. They cannot be put in a straitjacket. The purpose of 
rules of natural justice is to ensure that the order causing 
civil consequences is not passed arbitrarily. It is not that in 
every case there must be an opportunity of oral hearing. 
33. As noticed earlier, in the pa·esent case, the appellants 
had adopted a very reasonable and a fair approach. A bona 
fide enquiry into the fact situation was conducted by a 
committee of high-ranking officers of the Department. In 
our opinion, the High Court was wholly unjustified in 
interfering with the decision taken by the appellants in the 
peculiar circumstances of the case. It is settled beyond cavil 
that the decisions taken by the competent
authority could 
be corrected provided it is established that the decision is 
so perverse that no sensible person, who had applied his 
mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. 
The aforesaid principle is based on the ground of irrationality 
and is known as the Wednesbury principle. The court can 
interfere with a decision, if it is so absurd that no reasonable 
authority could have taken such a decision. In our opinion, 
the procedure adopted by the appellants cannot be said to 
be 
suffering 
from 
any 
such 
irrationality or 
unreasonableness, which would have enabled the High 
Court to interfere with the decision." 
44. After examining the facts and the law laid down in 
abovementioned seven cases, in my opinion, the ratio laid down in these 
cases can be summarized thus: First, in a case where several candidates 
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are found involved in "mass copying" or in other words, where vast 
majority of candidates were found to have resorted to use of unfair 
means in any examination then it is not necessary for the concerned 
Institute to give any show cause notice to any individual candidate before 
cancellation of his result; Second, when it is difficult to prove by direct 
evidence that the "copying" was done by the candidates then the same 
can be proved by drawing inference based on probabilities and 
circumstantial evidence; Third, there are several ways in which unfair 
means can be reso1ted to by the candidates for doing copying individually 
or in the large scale by vast majority of candidates; Fourth, where few 
candidates are found involved in doing copying then it is necessary to 
give to individual candidate a show cause notice by following rules of 
naturaljustice before taking any action against him; Fifth, there must be 
some material (whether direct or based on probabilities and 
circumstances) to prove that a candidate resorted to unfair means for 
doing copying in answering his question paper; Sixth, if there is adequate 
material to prove that the copying was done by individual candidate or 
by the candidates on a large scale then even if no report was submitted 
by any invigilator of any such incident yet it would be of no significance; 
Seventh, the Court should not act as an appellate Court over the
decision 
of Expe1t Committee to examine the issue of "copying" or/and "mass 
copying", i.e., copying done on a large scale by vast majority of candidates 
and more so when the Expe1t Committee has found the candidate guilty 
of resorting to unfair means; Eighth, the Co Ult should be slow to interfere 
in the decision taken by the Expert Committee in such cases; Ninth, if 
wrong answers of two candidates sitting in close proximity tallies with 
each other then it would be a strong circumstance of copying done by 
these two candidates; Tenth, this Court has consistently maintained a 
distinction between a case of "copying" and "mass copyini;.:'', i.e. 
copying done on a large scale by vast majority of candidates for applying 
the rules of natural justice to the case. In the case of former, rules of 
natural justice would be applicable and hence show cause notice to 
individual candidate who is accused of doing copying will have to be 
given to such candidate whereas in the case of later, the rules of natural 
justice are not applicable and hence it is not necessary to give any show 
cause notice to any candidate involved in mass copying; and Eleventh, 
the use of unfair means by any candidate is a serious matter because it 
affects the credibility of the examination and, therefore, once such charge 
is held proved against any such candidate, the matter needs to be dealt
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
with sternly in relation to erring candidates. 
45. When I examine the facts of the case at hand in the light of 
ratio laid down in the aforementioned cases, then 1 find that the facts of 
the case at hand are identical partly to the facts of the case of Billllr 
Sclloo/ Examination Board (supra) and partly to the facts of 
Bagleshwar Pras(lc/ am/ Prem Pr"kash (supra). This I say for the 
following reasons. 
46. First, this is a case where large number of candidates (more 
than two hundred) in the examinations held from 2008 to 2012 were 
found involved in copying like what was noticed in the case of Billllr 
School Examin"tion (supra) where 36 candidates were found involved 
in copying. Second, there was uniform pattern adopted by the candidates 
for doing copy in the examinations. This circumstance lends support to 
the fact that "mass copying" was done by the candidates in a planned 
manner; Third, candidates who managed to sit in pair in close proximity 
(described as "scorer" and "beneficiary"), their wrong answers 
consistently matched with each other. This circumstance was relied on 
in the cases of Bagleshwar Prasad and Prem Prakash Kalunia 
(supra) for forming an opinion that both the candidates copied from each 
other; Fourth, the material seized in investigation primafacie established 
that "mass copying" was done in a planned manner by the several 
candidates (appellants herein) to enable them to
answer the questions; 
Fifth, interpolations were found in sitting plan originally made by Vyapam 
for some years to accommodate the candidates (appellants) and others 
like the appellants to sit in a particular examination center in close 
proximity with each other so that they are able to copy from each other; 
Sixth, many candidates despite clearing the examination did not take 
admission in any medical college. There was no satisfactory answer 
given by them barring very few; Seventh, material seized in investigation 
was found sufficient by the Expert Committee to form an opinion that it 
was a case of "mass copying". In addition it was also established on 
probabilities and circumstantial evidence that the candidates in large scale 
which included the appellants did mass copying; Eighth, the Expert 
Committee examined the issues from all angles and analyzed the material 
seized for coming to a conclusion that it was a case of"mass copying" 
done by the candidates in large scale as a part of a planned strategy and 
that they used unfair means; Ninth, allegations of malafides were not 
alleged in the writ petitions by any candidate against any member of 
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Expert Committee or/and officials of the State/Vyapam; Tenth, the writ 
court rightly did not act as an appellate court to reverse the decision of 
Expert Committee; Eleventh, the formula evolved by the Expert 
Committee was usually applied in such type of cases by various 
institutions and no perversity or/and arbitrariness was shown by the 
appellants in the formula except to contend that it was not a proper 
formula; and lastly, the expression "mass copying" not being defined 
in any Act/Regulation/Rules, its meaning in ordinary parlance can be 
summed up as "sizable or large number of candidates found copying 
or discovered to have copied while answering their question paper 
by using unfair means in examination". In my view, this fully applies 
to the facts of the case at hand. 
4 7. I am not impressed by the submissions of learned counsel for 
the appellants when they made attempt to find fault in the material relied 
on by the State/Vypaym against the appellants and contended that it is 
not a material at all, and in any event, it is irrelevant and hence can not 
be looked into for any purpose. It was also urged that since it was not 
supplied to the appellants and hence it is of no use. 
48. As held above, Firstly, neither the writ court and nor this Court 
could sit as an appellate Court over the decision of the Expert Committee 
and find fault in the material relied on by the Committee; Secondly,
the 
method evolved by the experts was usually applied to find out as to 
whether two candidates had copied from each other and hence no fault 
could be noticed in it; Thirdly, the decision to cancel the results was 
based on other contemporaneous material seized during the investigation 
by STF; Fourthly, the decision to cancel the results was not taken in 
post-haste but was taken with full application of mind by the Expert 
Committee which consists of experts in subjects and lastly, this being a 
case of "mass copying", it was neither necessary to give any show 
cause notice to the appellants and nor necessary to supply the material 
to the appellants. It is for these reasons, I find no merit in this submission. 
49. Though an attempt was made by learned counsel for the 
appellants to distinguish the cases cited above but I am unable to notice 
any significant distinction. This Court, therefore, has to apply the law 
laid down in these cases for deciding the case at hand. It is all the more 
because the learned counsel for the appellants did not challenge and in 
my view rightly, the correctness of the view taken in any of these 
decisions.
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
891 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
50. ln the light of detailed discussion and the reasoning given supra, 
lam of the considered opinion that it is a clear case of what is called in 
ordinary parlance a "mass copying" and I have no hesitation in holding 
so. l am also of the opinion that the procedure adopted by the State/ 
Vyapam cannot be said to be unfair or arbitrary. 1 am also of the view 
that the action impugned is not in breach ofrules ofnaturaljustice which 
has no application to the facts of this case as held in the cases ofBihar 
School Examination and BSNL (supra). It is a settled principle that 
rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and hence such rules 
cannot be put in a strait-jacket. The object of the rules of natural justice, 
is only to ensure that order causing civil consequences should not be 
passed arbitrarily. It is not that in every case, there must be an opportunity 
of oral hearing to person concerned. This principle, in my view, applies 
to the case at hand. 
51. This takes me to the next submission of learned counsel for 
the appellants, namely, that since there was inordinate delay in taking 
the decision to cancel the examination and in the meantime the appellants 
·have altered their position by completing their degree course, or are 
about to complete the Course in near future and hence this Court should 
protect the appellants' interest on equitable considerations. I do not agree. 
52. The issue
of somewhat similar nature was examined by this 
Court in the case of Ram Preeti Yadav vs. U.P. Board of High 
School and Intermediate Education and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 311. 
In th is case, the facts were that in the year 1984, Mr. Mahendra Pratap 
Yadav (respondent No.3 therein) appeared as private candidate in 
intermediate examination conducted by U .P.Board of High School and 
Intermediate Education. Mr. Yadav's result was withheld as a suspected 
case of using unfair means in the examination. He was, however, issued 
two provisional mark sheets. In one mark sheet, it was mentioned that 
his result is withheld (WB) whereas in other it was not. Mr. Yadav on 
the basis of provisional marks-sheet which did not mention withholding 
of his result took admission in B.A. and cleared the examination. He 
also thereafter cleared M.A. examination. He was then selected as a 
teacher. In the year 1993, an inquiry was made pursuant to which he 
was informed in 1996 that his intermediate examination result, which 
was held in the year 1984, is cancelled. 
53. Challenging the cancellation of his result, Mr. Yadav filed writ 
petition in the High Court at Allahabad on three grounds: Firstly, he was 
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not afforded any opportunity ofhearing before his result was cancelled; 
Secondly, the cancellation of the result was done after almost 10 years 
and hence it is wholly arbitrary; and Thirdly, since in the meantime, he 
cleared BA 'and MA Examinations with good percentage and secured 
employment as a teacher, the cancellation of his intermediate examination 
result is bad in law. 
54. A learned Single Judge of the High Comi was of the view that 
since Mr. Yadav has successfully cleared BA and MA Examinations 
and has also secure(! employment due to his brilliant performance in BA 
and MA Examinations, why should his career be ruined. It was on these 
grounds, his writ petition was allowed and cancellation of his result was 
set aside. The appeal filed by the Board and the institute against the 
order of Single Judge was dismissed and hence the Board carried the 
matter in appeal to this Court. 
55. This Court allowed the appeal and while rejecting the 
aforementioned three grounds of challenge, set aside the order of the 
High Collli and dismissed the writ petition. This Court while rejecting 
the submissions placed reliance on earlier decision of this Court rendered 
in Madhyamic Shiksha Manda! M.P. vs. Abhilash Shiksha Prasar 
Samiti & Ors., ( 1998) 9 SCC 236 and quoted para 2 of Madhyamic 
Shiksha Mondal's case (supra) in suppo11 of their reasoning which 
reads as under:-
"2. We feel a little distressed that in
matter like this the 
High Court should have interfered with the decision taken 
by the Board ........................... In the face of this material, 
we do not sec any justification in the High Court having 
F 
interfered with the decision taken by the Board to treat 
the examination as cancelled. It is unfortunate that the 
student community resorts to such methods to succeed in 
examinations and then some of them come forward to 
contend that innocent students become victims of such 
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misbehaviour of their companions. That cannot be helped. 
In such a situation the Board is left with no alternative but 
to cancel the examination. It is extremely difficult for the 
Board to identify the innocent students from those indulging 
in malpractices. One may feel sorry for the innocent 
students but one has to appreciate the situation in which 
the Board was placed and the alternatives that were available
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
to it so far as this examination was concerned. It had no 
alternative but to cancel the results and we think, in the 
circumstances, they were justified in doing so. This should 
serve as a lesson to the students that such malpractices 
will not help them succeed in the examination and they may 
have to go through the drill once again. We also think that 
those in charge of the examinations should also take action 
against their Supervisors/Invigilators, etc., who either 
permit such activity or become silent spectators thereto. 
If they feel insecure because of the strong-arm tactics of 
those who indulge in malpractices, the remedy is to secure 
the services of the Uniformed Personnel, if need be, and 
ensure that students do not indulge in such malpractices." 
56. This Court then equated the incident of this nature with fraud 
played by the candidate and held in Paras 13, 14 and 26 of Ram Preeti 
Yadav's case which read as under: 
"13. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which 
induces the other person or authority to take a definite 
determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the 
former either by words or letter. Although negligence is 
not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. (See Derry v. 
Peek, (1889) 14 AC 337) 
14. In Luwr11s Estates Ltd. v. Beal'fey, (1956) 1 All ER 341, 
the Court of Appeal stated the law thus: (All ER p. 345 
C-D) 
"I cannot accede to this argument for a
moment. No court 
in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage 
which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, 
no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has 
been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The 
court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly 
pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates 
judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever;" 
26. Further, we find that there is no equity in favour of 
Respondent 3, inasmuch as he knew that his result had 
been withheld because of the allegation of having used unfair 
means in the examination. Suppressing this fact, he took 
admission in BA and studied further." 
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57. Applying the aforesaid law to the facts of the case at hand, I 
find that the appellants are not entitled to claim any equitable relief on 
the ground that they have almost completed their course during the 
interregnum period and hence no action on the basis of their PMT 
Examination results is called for. 
58. In my view, when in the case of Ram Preeti Yaclav (supra}, 
the decision to cancel the result was taken after 10 years of the 
examination in which he had appeared and in the meantime, he had also 
completed his higher studies and secured an employment yet this Court 
was not impressed by such submission and rejected it in express terms. 
So is the case here where delay in cancellation of the result is less as 
compared to the case of Mr. Yadav. That apart, the case at hand prima 
facie established a case of"mass copying" attributable to the appellants 
who resorted to unfair means in a planned way in the PMT examination 
and lastly, when any action is done discretely, it takes times to discover. 
59. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance upon the 
decision in Priya Gupta Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and ors., (2012) 7 
SCC 433 and contended that this Court should invoke its extra- ordinary 
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution as was exercised in the 
case of Priya Gupta for granting relief to the appellants on equitable 
terms and conditions and allow the appellants to
continue their study in 
MBBS Degree course. 1 cannot accept this submission for more than 
one reason. 
60. First, the facts of the case at hand and the facts of the case of 
Priya Gupta (supra) are not similar because in the case of Priya Gupta, 
the right of only one candidate was involved whereas in the case at hand 
large number of candidates are involved. Second, when this Court invokes 
its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution which 
is indeed rare and should indeed be rare for its invocation, it is always 
confined to the particular facts of that case and cannot be cited as a law 
laid down by this Court. Third, when in similar type of cases, this Court 
did not grant any equitable relief to the erring candidates except pen11itted 
the candidates to appear in the supplementary examination (see Para 2 
of Bi/wr Sc/tool Examination case (supra) at page 649 of the report 
where this Court upheld such direction while allowing the appeal 
filed by Board), then in my view, the same principle should apply to this 
case also. Fou11h, once the cancellation of the Examination results is 
upheld as beingjust, legal and proper, then its natural consequence must
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
ensue. In other words, once the examination is cancelled irrespective of 
ground on which it is cancelled then candidates whose results are 
cancelled have to repeat the examination whenever it is held. They can 
not take any benefit of such examination like those candidates who 
successfully passed the examination with their merit. Fifth, having regard 
to the nature of the controversy involved in the case coupled with the 
complicity of several persons in the Scam and the manner in which the 
appellants cleared the examination which gave rise to initiation of criminal 
proceedings (though pending) against the appellants and several others, 
the exercise of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction under A11icle 226 for 
grant of equitable relief of any nature to the appellants is not called for 
and if granted, it will be against the settled legal position laid down by 
this Court. Since no equitable relief under Article 226 is called for, as a 
corollary, the question of invoking our extraordinary powers under Article 
142 does not appear to be proper. In any case, in the 1 ight of the finding 
recorded by this Court against the appellants which has resulted in 
upholding of the impugned order of the High Cowi, this is not a fit case 
for invocation of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction available under Article 
142. Sixth, grant of any equitable relief may be construed as awarding 
premium to the appellants of
what they did. It would demoralize the 
meritorious students who could not secure the admission on their merit 
due to the appellants' entry in the Colleges by illegal means. Seventh, 
this is not a case where the appellants' results were cancelled on some 
technical ground and that too attributable to the State. In other words, if 
the cancellation had been done on a cause not attributable to the appellants 
then perhaps this Court would have considered grant of appropriate prayer 
to the appellants. However, such is not the case here. Eighth, grant of 
any equitable relief, as prayed by the appellants, once they are held 
responsible for cancellation of their results would affect the creditability 
in conducting the examination and cause more harm to the candidates 
as a whole and especially those who prepare for their examination 
sincerely and on their merit. In my view it will not be, therefore, in 
larger public good in long run to entertain any such prayer. Ninth, since 
the appellants, are in their youth, they can still appear in the examination 
and clear it with distinction by proving their merit. And lastly, grant of 
any such relief to the appellants may amount to some extent travelling 
beyond the real controversy and may be considered inconsistent with 
the main findings rendered by this Court. 
61. In these circumstances, the State may consider permitting the 
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appellants and other candidates alike the appellants to appear in the 
competitive examination whenever it is held and consider granting age 
relaxation to those candidates who crossed the age limit, if prescribed. 
Such liberty, if granted, would not cause any prejudice to any one and at 
the same time would do substantial justice to all such candidates as was 
done in the case ofllihar School Examination (supra). Beyond this, in 
my view, the appellants are not entitled to claim any indulgence. 
62. Learned counsel for the appellants cited several cases, such 
as Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tulsiram Patel, ( 1985) 3 SCC 398, Dr. 
Dinesh Knmar & Ors. vs. Motilal Nehrn Medical College, 
Allahabad & Ors., ( 1985) 3 SCC 542, State of Maharashtra & Ors. 
vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council & Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 731 and Situ 
Sahu & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 340 etc. 
in support of their submissions. Perusal of these decisions would show 
that this Court in these decisions has explained the general principle of 
rules of natural justice and how this principle is applicable to a particular 
case. 
63. This Court has laid down in these cases that the applicability 
of rules of natural justice is not static but it has different facets and, 
therefore, its applicability vary from case to case. I find that none of 
these cases has dealt with the cases of "copying" or "mass copying". 
In my view, when
the question as regard the applicability of rules of 
natural justice has already been decided by this Court in several cases 
relating to "copying" and "mass copying" then the law laid down in 
such cases must be applied to the cases at hand and not the one which 
lays down the law which explains the principle in general. Similarly, the 
last case cited has no application to the facts of this case because it 
deals with the applicability of rule to the case relating to the land. It is 
for these reasons, the submissirn based on the case law cited has no 
merit. It is accordingly rejected. 
64. This takes me to the issue regarding constitution ofVyapam 
under the Act and its effect on the controversy in question. Since this 
issue has been elaborately dealt with by my esteemed Brother, I 
respectfully agree with His Lordship's reasoning and the conclusion and 
hence do not wish to add anything. 
65. It is pe11inent to mention that this Court by order dated 
08.08.2014 has dismissed one S.L.P. (c) No. 16257 of2014 in limine 
arising out of the order of the High Court dated 11.04.2014 in W.P. No.
NIDHI KAIM v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.l 
20342 of2013 entitled Km. Pratibha Singh & Ors. vs. State & Ors. 
and other connected matters. This writ petition was filed by the 
candidates who had appeared in the PMT examination held in the year 
2013. The results of these candidates were also cancelled on the same 
grounds on which it was cancelled in the cases at hand. i.e., in relation to 
candidates of the years 2008 to 20 I 2. The High Court by order dated 
11.04.2014 dismissed the writ petitions and upheld the cancellation of 
the resu Its. In fact, the impugned judgment in th is case has followed in 
extenso the main decision rendered in Prntibha Siugh's case (supra). 
Since it was a dismissal of SLP in limine and as rightly argued by the 
learned counsel for the appellants that there was no merger of the decision 
of the High Court and nor it could be considered that this Court affirmed 
the view taken by the High Court in Pratibha Singh's case (supra), we 
considered in the interest of justice to hear these matters in detail and 
record our reasons. 
66. It was then brought to our notice by the learned counsel 
appearing for the State/Vyapam that pursuant to FIR registered in these 
cases, the investigation is still going on by the CBI as directed by this 
Court vide an order passed in pending special leave petition. It is stated 
that in several cases, charge sheets have been filed against several 
accused in Courts. 
67. It is accordingly made
clear that any observation made by this 
Court in this judgment would not, in any way, influence the ongoing 
investigation and any pending criminal case. It is also made clear that 
this Court has examined the issue relating to cancellation of results in 
the light of grounds raised by the appellants in the writ petitions and the 
special leave petitions. In this view of the matter, ongoing investigation 
and pending criminal cases will be dealt with and decided strictly in 
accordance with law uninfluenced by any observation made hereinabove. 
68. Before parting, it is considered apposite to observe that it is 
well know11 that the Examination is always considered as one of the 
major means to assess and evaluate candidate's skills and knowledge be 
1ta school test, university examination, professional entrance examination 
or any other examination. Candidate's fitness for his further assignment 
whether in studies or employment is, therefore, judged on the basis of 
his performance in the examination. It is for this reason, the examination 
is considered as a common tool around which the entire education system 
revolves. 
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69. Examination malpractices, academic fraud or cheating in the 
examination is as old as the examination itself. Study made by the 
educationist has revealed that these malpractices are gradually on the 
rise across the world and has caused a threat to public trust in reliability 
and credibility to the system as a whole. These malpractices occur within 
and outside the examination halls and are perpetrated by the candidates, 
staff and other external agencies before, during and after the examination. 
Various kinds of strategies are innovated and then applied to enable the 
candidate to clear the examination any how. It has, therefore, destroyed 
the piousness of the examination. With a view to prohibit such activities, 
State of A.P. had enacted a legislation but it was found inadequate to 
control such activities. 
70. It is, therefore, the collective responsibility of the Government 
(Central/States), educational bodies/Institutions to ponderover and evolve 
a uniform policy in a comprehensive manner to firmly deal with such 
activities in the larger public good. It is hoped that effective remedial 
steps would be taken in that regard. 
71. In view of foregoing discussion, I find no merit in these appeals. 
All the appeals thus fail and are accordingly dismissed. No Costs. 
ORDER 
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Jn view of the divergence of opinion in terms of separate judgments 
F 
pronounced by us in these appeals today, the Registry is
directed to 
place the papers before Hon' ble the Chief Justice oflndia for appropriate 
further orders. 
Devika Gujral 
Matter referred to CJ I.