UNION OF INDIA & ORS. versus DILER SINGH
[2016] 4 S.C.R. 473, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2016] 4 S.C.R. 473 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
v. 
OILER SINGH 
(Civil Appeal No.1133 of2016) 
JUNE 30, 2016 
[DIPAK MISRA AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.] 
Service Law: 
Central Reserve Police Force Act, J949- s.J J (1) - Punishment 
of dismissal from service under - Proportionality of - On facts, 
CRPF constable went outside the campus-Naxalwadi Area without 
the permission of the competent authority - Went to the market, 
consumed liquor and quarrelled with civilians - Punishment of 
dismissal from service by disciplinary authority in exercise of power 
conferred u/s.11 - Jn suit, the trial court set aside the dismissal 
order holding that the disciplinary authority not entitled to convert 
charge uls.JJ(J), a minor penalty to major pe1ialty and that it had 
;urisdiction to try the suit - Jn appeal, appellate court held that the . 
trial court had no jurisdiction to try the suit - In second appeal, the 
High Court held that the allegations levelled against the constable 
were not of serious nature and did not attract the penalty of dismissal 
- On appeal held: In exercise of power u/s. J J (]), punishment of 
dismissal can be imposed - When member of the disciplined force 
deviates from the discipline and behaves in an untoward manner 
which is not conceived of. it cannot be said that the punishment of 
dismissal is disproportionate and shocking to the judicial conscience 
- Thus, the punishment is absolutely proportionate - Further, the 
High Court did not frame any substantial
question of law as required 
u/s. J 00 CPC - High Court while admitting the second appeal should 
have framed the substantial question of law - Thus, the order passed 
by the High Court set aside and that of the appellate court restored 
and the sui( is dismissed - Code of Civil Procedure, J 908 - s. J 00 -
Central Reserve Police Force Rules, J955 - r.27-A(l). 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 On a perusal of the judgment of the High Court, 
it is evident that it has not framed any substantial question of law. 
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The High Court while admitting the second appeal should have 
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[2016] 4 S.C.R. 
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framed the substantial question(s) of law which would have been 
adverted to at the time of final hearing. [Paras 17, 18) 
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1.2 The said view that s. 11 of the Central Rescue Police 
Force Act, 1949 deals with only those minor punishments which 
may be awarded in a departmental inquiry and a plain reading 
thereof makes it quite clear that a punishment of dismissal can 
certainly be awarded thereunder even if the delinquent is not 
prosecuted for an offence u/s. 9 or Section 10, is concurred with. 
It is opined that under the scheme of the Act, in exercise of power 
under Section 11(1) of the Act punishment of dismissal can be 
imposed. [Para 20) [482-F-G; 483-B) 
1.3 The High Court to reverse the conclusion of the first 
appellate Court extensively quoted from the decision of the High 
Court rendered in Akhilesfl Kumar. The Division Bench in Akfli/esh 
Kumar's case has clearly held that the delinquent employee, being 
a member of the Force, could not have left the camp without 
prior permission. It has also opined when a personnel is posted 
in a camp, he is not free to move as per his choice even during 
the period when he is not on duty. However, as· is manifest, the 
Division Bench opined that the imposition of dismissal as a 
punishment, which is a major one, could not have been imposed 
E . by the disciplinary authority. The said opinion was expressed 
without referring to the position of law that has been clearly
laid 
down in the case of Ghu/am Mohd. Bhat case .. Thus, the basic 
premise is erroneous. In the impugned order, the writ court has, 
after reproducing the passage from Akhi/esh Kumar's, opined that 
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the controversy is covered by the judgment rendered by the High 
Court of Calcutta. It is extremely significant to note that the Single 
Judge has not even made an effort to appreciate the decision in 
Gllltlam Mohd. Bhat case though the same was relied upon by 
the first appellate Judge. Thrust of reasoning of the first appellate 
court was that a major punishment of dismissal could be imposed 
in law. It is quite unfortunate that the High Court has dislodged 
the finding without any analysis but reproducing a passage from 
the Calcutta High Court which had not referred. to the ratio laid 
down by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ghulam Mohd. Blmt's 
case. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is wholly 
unsustainable. [Paras 20, 21) [484-C-D; 485-E-H; 486-A]
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. OILER SINGH 
1.4 The respondent was a part of the disciplined force. He 
has left the campus without prior permission, proceeded to the 
market, consumed liquor and quarrelled with the civilians. It has 
been established that he had consumed liquor at the market place, 
and it has been also proven that he has picked up quarrel with 
the civilians. It is not expected of a member of the disciplined 
force to behave in this manner. When a member of the disciplined 
force deviates to such an extent from the discipline and behaves 
in an untoward manner which is not conceived of, it is difficult to 
hold that the punishment of dismissal as has been imposed is 
disproportionate and shocking to the judicial conscience. As a 
member of the disciplined force, the respondent was expected 
to follow the rules, have control over his mind and passion, guard 
his instincts and feelings and not allow his feelings to fly in fancy. 
It is not a mild deviation which human nature would grant some 
kind of lenience. It is a conduct in public which has compelled 
the authority to think and, rightly so, that the behaviour is totally 
indisciplined. The respondent has given indecent burial to self-
control, diligence and strength of will-power. Thus, the judgment 
and decree passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the 
first appellate court is restored and the suit instituted by the 
respondent/plaintiff stands dismissed. (Paras 22, 23, 24] [486-C, 
E-G; 487-C]
Union of India & others " Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (2005) 
13 SCC 228: 2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 367 - relied on. 
Ram Singh Rai v. Union of India 2003 (1) SCT 523; 
Rattan Singh v. Union of India & Others 2003 (1) SCT 
59; Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF and 
another v. Akhilesh Kumar 2007 (6) SLR 438; Santosh 
Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179:2001 
(1) SCR 948; Govindaraju v. Mariamman (2005) 2 SCC 
500:2005 (1) SCR 1100; Om Kumar and Others v. 
Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386: 2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 
693; Union of India and Another v. G Ganayutham 
(1997) 7 SCC 463:1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 549; Union of 
India v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari (2006) 10 SCC 388: 
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 217 - referred to •. 
Case Law Reference 
2003 (1) SCT 523 
referred to 
Para6 
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[2016] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
2003 (1) SCT 59 
referred to 
Para6 
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 367 
relied on 
Para7 
2001 (1) SCR 948 
referred to 
Para 17 
2005 (1) SCR 1100 
referred to 
Para 17 
B 
2007 (6) SLR 438 
referred to . 
Paras 20,21 
2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 693 
referred to 
Para 22 
1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 549 
referred to 
Para22 
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 217 
referred to 
Para22 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1133 
C 
of2016. 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 04.10.2012 of the High Court 
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 4578 of 201 O. 
Maninder Singh, ASG, Nalin Kohli, Ms. Asha G. Nair, Prabhas 
Bajaj, Amarjeet Singh, Ms. Nivedita Nair, B. Krishna Prasad, Advs. for 
the Appellants. 
Jasbir Singh Malik, Ms. Usha Nandini. V, Advs. for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. I. The respondent, a constable in Central 
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Reserve Police Force (CRPF), was enrolled as such on 1.4.1990. He 
was posted in the 23 Battalion where he served continuously 
approximately for fourteen years. Subsequently, he was transferred to 
61 Battalion where he served for two years. During the second posting 
a charge-sheet was served on him alleging that on 22.06.2001 about 
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11.30 hrs. he left the campus without permission of the competent 
authority and went to the bazaar and consumed liquor and quarrelled 
with some civilians. On being informed, S.l. Sheoji Ram, HC Mahabir 
Singh and Captain FiyazAhmed brought
him from bazaar to the campus. 
On the advice of the competent authority, a medical examination was 
conducted on the respondent and as per the medical report given by the 
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assistant surgeon, District Hospital, Medak at Sangareddy, it was found 
that the respondent had consumed liquor. 
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2. On the basis of the aforesaid report, a depa1tmental enquiry 
was ordered by Commandant 61-Bn. vide Memo No. P-Vlll-8/01-61-
EC-II dated 6. 7 .200 I and the respondent was also placed under
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. OILER SINGH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
suspension with effect from 6.7.2001. The enquiry officer conducted 
an enquiry and on the base of the material and testimony of the witnesses 
came to hold that the charges had been proved. 
3. The disciplinary authority concurred with the findings recorded 
by the enquiry officer and came to hold that the charges levelled against · 
the respondent had been proved beyond doubt. Recording concurrence 
with the findings returned by the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority 
opined that the respondent was not fit to continue any more in the Force 
and accordingly in exercise of power conferred under Section 11 (I) of 
the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (for brevity, 'the Act') read 
with Rule 27-A(I) of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (in 
short 'the Rules') ordered the respondent to be removed from the service. 
It was further stipulated in the order that except the pay and allowances 
given to the respondent during suspension period from 7.7.2001 to 
12.9.2001, he would not be entitled to any pay or allowances and the 
period of suspension shall be treated as such. That apart, it was directed 
that medals and awards, if any, that had been received by the de! inquent 
employee during service period shall be forfeited under the provision of 
Section 12( I) of the Act. 
4. The respondent initiated a civil action by tiling Civil SuitNo.253/ 
2002/05 in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Narnaul seeking a 
declaration that the orders passed against him by the authorities were 
illegal. The appellants contested the suit by putting forth a stand that 
due enquiry was held by the authorities and the charges levelled against 
the respondent were duly proved and there was no procedural error in 
the enquiry. 
5. Learned Civil Judge framed the following issues: 
"1. Whether the impugned order No. P-IIl-8/2001-61 Stha II dated 
12-September, 2001 are wrong, illegal, against facts, arbitrary 
malatide; against principles of natural justice, null and void and 
ineffective against the rights of plaintiff? 
2. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to tile the suit? 
3. Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain 
the present suit? 
. 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form?" 
6. While dealing with the issue number I, the trial Court took note of 
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the fact that the charges were issued against the delinquent officer under 
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Section 11 ( 1) of the Act, relied on the decision rendered in Ram Singh 
Rai v. Union of India 1 and Rattan Singh v. Union of India & Others2 
and came to hold that the disciplinary authority was not entitled in law to 
convert the charge under Section 11 (I), a min or penalty to a major penalty 
and accordingly opined that the impugned order of dismissal was illegal, 
null and void. The trial Court further held that it had jurisdiction to try 
the suit and eventually decreed the suit with costs. It directed for 
reinstatement of the respondent plaintiff in service with effect from 
12.09.2001 along with arrears of pay and allowances and other 
consequential benefits. 
7. Being aggrieved, the aforesaid judgment and decree was called 
in question by the department in Civil Appeal No. I I of2009 before the 
Additional District Judge, Narnaul who by judgment dated 27.03.2010 
reversed the judgment of the trial Court and held that the trial Court had 
no jurisdiction to try the suit, and further the judgment and decree passed 
by it were not sustainable in view of the decision in Union of India & 
others v. Glmlam Mohd. BJ"'t3. 
8. The respondent assailed the defensibility of the judgment of the 
first appellate Court in Regular Second Appeal No.4578/2010. Learned 
single Judge noted the grounds of challenge, referred to the decision in 
Ram Singh Rai (supra) and reproduced a passage from the decision in 
Deputy
Inspector General of Police, CRPF and another v. Akhilesli 
Kumar and came to hold that the controversy is covered by the judgment 
of the Calcutta High Cou11 rendered in Ak/1i/es'1 Kumar (supra) and 
accordingly opined that the allegations levelled against the respondent 
plaintiff were not of serious nature which would have attracted penalty 
of dismissal from the services. The aforesaid perception led to 
acceptance of the appeal and dislodgment of the judgment and decree 
of the first appellate Court and restoration that of the trial Court. 
9. We have heard Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor 
General for Union of India and Mr. J.S. Naik, learned counsel for the 
respondent. 
10. To appreciate the controversy, it is relevant to refer to the 
relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2(c) defines "the Force" to mean 
'2003 (I) SCT 523 
2 2003 (I) SCT 59 
' (2005) 13 sec 228 
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'2007 (6) SLR 438
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. DILER SINGH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
the Central Reserve Police Force. Section 2(d) defines "member of the 
Force" to mean a person who has been appointed to Force by the 
Commandant, whether before or after the commencement of the Act 
and in Section 1,3,6,7,16, I 7, 18 and 19, includes also a person appointed 
to the Force by the Central Government, whether before or after such 
commencement. Section 7 specifies in general duties of members of the 
Force. Section 8 provides for superintendence, control and administration 
of the Force. Section 9 stipulates about more heinous offences. It provides 
that a member who commits heinous offences shall be punishable with 
transportation for life for a term of not less than seven years or with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years or with 
fine which may be extended to three months' pay or with fine to that 
extent in addition to such sentence of transportation or imprisonment. 
Section 10 provides for less heinous offences. It states that a member 
of the Force who commits such offence shall be punishable within 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine 
which may extend to three months' pay, or with both. Thus, the aforesaid 
provision defines the offences and provides punishment for the same. 
11. In the case at hand, we are concerned with the concept of 
minor punishments as postulated under Section 11 of the Act. Section 
11 of the Act reads as follows:-
"11.
Minor punishments. - (I) The Commandant or any other 
authority or officer as may be prescribed, may, subject to any 
rules made under this Act, award in lieu of, or in addition to, 
suspension or dismissal any one or more of the following 
punishments to any member of the Force whom he considers to 
be guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or remissness in the 
discharge of any duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a 
member of the Force, that is to say, -
· 
(a) reduction in rank; 
(b) fine of any amount not exceeding one month's pay and 
allowances; 
(c) confinement to quarters, lines or camp for a term not exceeding 
one month; 
(d) confinement in the quarter-guard for not more than twenty-
eight days; with or without punishment drill or extra guard, fatigue 
or other duty, and 
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( e) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in 
the Force. 
(2) Any punishment specified in clause ( c) or clause ( d) of sub-
section (I) may be awarded by any gazetted officer when in 
command ofany detachment of the Force away from headquarters, 
provided he is specially authorised in this behalf by the 
Commandant. 
(3) The assistant commandant, a company officer or a subordinate 
officer, not being below the rank of subedar or inspector, 
commanding a separate detachment or an output or in temporary 
command at the headquarters of the Force, may, without, a moral 
trial, award to any member of the Force who is ·for the time being 
subject to his authority any one or more of the following 
punishments for the commission of any petty offence against 
discipline which is not otherwise provided for in this Act, or which 
is not a sufficiently serious nature to require prosecution before a 
Criminal Court, that is to say, -
(a) confinement for not more than seven days in the quarter-
guard or such other place as may be considered suitable, with 
forfeiture ofall pay and allowances during its continuance; 
(b) punishment drill, or extra-guard, fatigue or other duty, for not 
more than thirty days, with or without confinement to quarters, 
lines or camp; 
(c) censure or severe censure: provided that this punishment may 
be awarded to a subordinate officer only by the Commandant. 
( 4)
Ajamadar or sub-inspector who is temporarily in command of 
a detachment or an outpost may, in like manner and for the 
commission of any like offence, award to any member of the 
·Force for the time being subject to his authority any of the 
punishments specified in clause (b) or sub-section (3) for not more 
than fifteen days." 
12. At a subsequent stage, we shall advert to the interpretation 
placed by th is Court on the aforementioned provision. Prior to that, it is 
necessary to state in detail the misconduct or misbehaviour in support of 
charges framed against the respondent. The same is as under: 
"A11icle- I 
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That, on transfer of Force No.901342841 Constable Di I er Singh,
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. OILER SINGH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
from 23 Battalion C.R.P.F. to 61 Battalion C.R.P.F., he reported 
on 28.09.2000 and was posted in C/61. Presently, Force No. 
901342841 Constable Oiler Singh is posted at Platoon No.7, Police 
Station Jinnaram, C.R.P.F. Narsapur, Medhak, Andhra Pradesh, 
which is a Naxalwadi Area. Therefore, keeping in view the 
sensitivity of the area, it was necessary for each personnel to 
take permission for leaving the camp. Despite applicability 
(implementation) of these orders, Force No.901342841 Constable 
Oiler Singh, on 22.06.200 I at about 1330 hours, went outside the 
Camp without permission of any competent officer, which is against 
the discipline of force and good orders. 
Article-2 
That, Force No. 901342841 Constable Oiler Singh, on 22.06.200 I 
at about 1330 hours left out from platoon No.7, Police Station 
Jinna Ram, C/61, C.R.P.F. Narsapur, Medhak, Andhra Pradesh, 
which is Naxalwadi Area, without permission of any competent 
officer and after going to the market, he consumed very much 
I iquor (wine) and quarrelled there with many civilians. On receiving 
information about this at Platoon, witness No.2,5 and Constable 
Nawaj Ahmad brought him from the market under influence of 
liquor at about 1500 hours. At about 1800 hours, witness No.4 
with one Section handed over it to C.H.M. in Company 
Headquarters. Thereafter at about 2030 hours, he was taken to 
.... Singa Reddy's Civil Hospital, where his medical
examination 
was got conducted. According to the medical certificate, he h11d 
consumed liquor(wine). Therefore, the act on his part is against 
the worthy orders and discipline of the Force." 
13. The enquiry officer, as is vivid from the \:nquiry report, found 
that all the witnesses had supported the fact that on 22.06.2001 the 
respondent had gone out of the camp and in the market he had consumed 
liquor and quarrelled with the local persons, and accordingly has 
proceeded to hold as under:-
"Thus, it is also proved that on 22.06.200 I, constable Oiler Singh 
came out of his platoon post without obtaining permission from 
any one and consumed liquor, thereafter, he quarrelled with the 
local persons in the market and besides above, he by using indecent 
language hurled abuses to the personnel present in the camp and 
on reaching at company headquarters Narsapur against CRPF 
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personnel and officers, which is totally against the conduct and 
behaviour of a civilized and good constable." 
14. In this backdrop, the judgments of the Courts below and that 
of the High Court are to be scrutinised. The trial Court by placing reliance 
on the decisions in Ram Singh Rai (supra) and Rattan Singh (supra) 
has opined that the punishment of dismissal could not have been imposed 
on the delinquent employee under Section 11(1) of the Act. The first 
appellate Court while holding that the trial Court has no territorial 
jurisdiction also reversed the finding which was rendered in the context 
of Section 11 (I) of the Act. In this context, learned appellate Judge 
relied on the decision in Glut/am Moltd. Bltat (supra). The High Court, 
as is evident, has not referred to the decision in Glwlam Mohd. Bltat 
(supra) but has adverted to a different aspect which is in the relam of 
proportionality. 
15. It is submitted by Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional 
Solicitor General for the appellants that the High Court has not framed 
any substantial question of law under Section JOO of the Code of Civil 
Procedure which is absolutely mandatory. It has further been submitted 
that the High Court should have applied the ratio laid down by this Court 
in Gltulam Mo ltd. Bil at (supra) which defines the operational spectrum 
of Section 11 (I) of the Act and also not followed the decision in Akltileslt
Kumar (supra) to dislodge the judgment of the appellate Court. 
16. Learned counsel for the respondent, per contra, wou Id support 
the judgment passed by the High Court on the foundation that this High 
Court has ascribed adequate reasons to come to the conclusion and, in 
any case, the punishment of dismissal in the facts and circumstances is 
too harsh and shocks the conscience. 
17. First, we shall deal with the submission with regard to framing 
of substantial question(s) of law. On a perusal of the judgment of the 
High Court, it is evident that it has not framed any substantial question of 
law. The Court in Santos It llazari v. Purusltottam TiwarP, has held 
that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without 
formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if 
it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast 
on Court. The existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua 
non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section I 00 
of the Code. The said principle has been reiterated in many a decision 
'(2oo 1) J sec 119
UNibN OF INDIA & ORS. v. OILER SINGH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J .] 
including the one in the Govindara;u v. Mariam11utn6 which has been 
placed reliance upon by Mr. Maninder Singh: In the said case it has 
been laid down, the substantial question of law has to be framed for 
such a formulation is the sine qua 11011 for exercise of power under 
Section I 00 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
18. It is necessary to state here that the High Court while admitting 
the second appeal should have framed the substantial question(s) oflaw 
which would have been adverted to at the time of final hearing. That is 
the comn:Jand of the provision and has been clearly stated by this Court 
in number of occasions. We may unhesitatingly state that we do not 
remotely get a sprinkle of bliss by ingeminating or repeating the same. It 
has been done following the rigoristic concept of 'duty for duty sake' 
with the great expectation that this would be the last one. , 
19. The core issue that emerges for consideration is whether under 
Section 11(1) of the Act, punishment of dismissal can be imposed. The 
controversy is no more res integra. In Glwlam Mohd. Bhat {supra) 
while interpreting Section 11 of the Act, it has been held thus:-
"5. A bare perusal of Section 11 shows that it deals with minor 
punishment as compared to the major punishments prescribed in 
the preceding section. It lays down that the Commandant or any 
other authority or officer, as may be prescribed, may subject to 
any rules made under
the Act, award any one or more of the 
punishments to any member of the Fore who is found guilty of 
disobedience, neglect of duty or remissness in the discharge of 
his duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the 
Force. According to the High Court the only punishments which 
can be awarded under this Section are reduction in rank, fine, 
confinement to quarters and removal from any office of distinction 
or special emolument in the Force. In our opinion, the interpretation 
is not correct, because the section says that these punishments 
may be awarded in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal. 
6. The use of the words "in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or 
dismissal", appearing in sub-section( I) of Section 11 before clauses 
(a) to (e) shows that the authorities mentioned therein are 
empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to 
the member of the Force who is found guilty and in addition to, or 
in lieu thereof, the punishment mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) 
'(2005) 2 sec 500 
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[2016] 4 S.C.R. 
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may also be awarded." 
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Andagain:-
"7 .... It is, therefore, clear that section 11 deals with only those 
minor punishments which may be awarded in a departmental 
inquiry and a plain reading thereof makes it quite clear that a 
punishment of dismissal can certainly be awarded thereunder even 
if the delinquent is not prosecuted for an offence under Section 9 
or Section IO." 
20. We respectfully agree with the said view and opine that under 
the scheme of the Act, in exercise of power under Section 11 (I) of the 
Act punishment of dismissal can be imposed. As is seen from the 
impugned order, the High Court, to reverse the conclusion of the first 
appellate Court, has extensively quoted from the decision of the Calcutta 
High Court rendered in Akhilesh K1111uir (supra). Be it stated that the 
charges levelled against the delinquent officer therein was the same. 
The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, analysing the Act, 
especially Section 1 O(m) and various clauses ofthe CRPF Manual, came 
to hold thus:-
"It is an admitted position from the factual matrix of the 
departmental proceedings that the writ petitioner/delinquent was 
posted in a camp. As per rule of such positing in a camp/lines the 
concerned personnel is not free to move as per his choice even 
during the period when he is not on actual duty. The discipline of 
a camp is completely different in comparison with the posting of 
an
individual in an office and or in other places outside of the 
camp. It is true, by rotation of 8 hours duty is allotted to the 
respective personnel who are attached to the camp and staying in 
the camp but that does not mean that when he wil I not be in active 
duty, he would be allowed to go outside of the camp without prior 
permission. From the relevant provision of Clauses 7.2 and 6.23 
as already quoted it appears that absence without leave or 
permission from the camp would invite initiation of judicial trial of 
the delinquent ifthere is a serious and grave situation or otherwise 
a departmental enquiry. Hence, finding of the learned trial judge 
that as the delinquent/writ petitioner was not on active duty, the 
aforesaid clauses got no effect, is not appealing us for its 
applicability to quash the order of dismissal. However, from the 
aforesaid provision of maintaining discipline while a personnel is
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. OILER SINGH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
posted in a camp which requires a prior permission to leave the 
camp even for a short period from the Company Commander, we 
. are of the view that the charge· under Article no. l was proved. 
Now, on the question of quantum of punishment, namely, dismissal 
from service as imposed on such charge, we are of the view that 
as under clause 6.23 there is a provision for initiation of the 
departmental eriquiry and as per decision only a minor punishment 
could be imposed and as Section 1 O(m) of CRPF Act provides 
the minor punishment issue in that field, we are of the view that 
dismissal being a major punishment should not have been passed 
by the Disciplinary Authority. 
8. Considering all the issues, we are quashing the order of dismissal 
as well as the order of confirmation of such by the Appellate 
Authority and remanding the matter back to the Disciplinary 
Authority under the service regulation· of the delinquent to decide 
the quantum of punishment as would be commensurating with the 
charge of misconduct as admitted, which invites only minor 
punishment." 
21. The aforesaid analysis reveals that the Division Bench has 
clearly held that the delinquent employee, being a member of the Force, 
could not have left the camp without prior permission. It has also opined 
when a personnel is posted in a camp, he is not free to move as per his 
choice even during the period when he is not on duty. However, as is
manifest, the Division Bench has opined that the imposition of dismissal 
as a punishment, which is a major one, could not have been imposed by 
the disciplinary authority. The said opinion has been expressed without 
referring to the position of law that has been clearly laid down in the 
case of Gltu/am Moltd. Bltat (supra). Thus, the basic premise is 
erroneous. In the impugned order, the writ court has, after reproducing 
the passage from Akltileslt Kumar (supra), opined that the controversy 
is covered by the judgment rendered by the High Court of Calcutta. It is 
extremely significant to note that the learned Single Judge has not even 
made an effort to appreciate the decision in G/111/am Mohd. Bit at (supra) 
though the same was relied upon by the learned first appellate Judge. 
Thrust of reasoning of the first appellate court was that a major 
punishment of dismissal could be imposed in law. It is quite unfortunate 
that the High Court has dislodged the finding without any analysis but 
reproducing a passage from the Calcutta High Court which had not 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] 4 S.C.R. 
referred to the ratio laid down by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in 
Gltulam Moltd. Bltat's case. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the 
High Court is wholly unsustainable. 
22. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that 
even ifthe charges have been proven, the punishment of dismissal in the 
obtaining factual matrix is absolutely harsh and shocking to the 
conscience. It is his submission that the punishment is disproportionate. 
The resporrdent was a part of the disciplined force. He has left the 
campus without prior permission, proceeded to the market, consumed 
liquor and quarrelled with the civilians. It has been established that he 
had consumed liquor at the market place, and it has been also proven 
that he has picked up quarrel with t.~e civilians. It is not expected of a 
memberofthe disciplinedforce to behave in this manner. The submission, 
as has been noted earlier, is that the punishment is absolutely 
disproportionate. The test of proportionality has been explained by this 
Court in Om Kumar and others v. Union of India1, Union of India 
and another v. G Ganayutltam8 and Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad 
Tiwari.,. In Dwarka Prasad Tiwari (supra), it has been held that unless 
the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate 
authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal; there is no scope 
for interference. When a member of the disciplined force
deviates to 
such an extent from the discipline and behaves in an untoward manner 
which is not conceived of, it is difficult to hold that the punishment of 
dismissal as has been imposed is disproportionate and shocking to the 
judicial conscience. 
23. We are inclined to think so as a member of the disciplined 
force, the respondent was expected to follow the rules, have control 
over his mind and passion, guard his instincts and feelings and not allow 
his feelings to fly in fancy. It is not a mild deviation which human nature 
would grant some kind of lenience. It is a conduct in public which has 
compelled the authority to think and, rightly so, that the behaviour is 
totally indisciplined. The respondent, if we allow ourselves to say so, 
has given indecent burial to self-control, diligence and strength of will-
power. A disciplined man is expected, to quote a few lines from Mathew 
Arnold:-
1 (2001) 2 sec 386 
• (1997) 1sec463 
• (2006) 10 sec 388
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. OILER SINGH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
"We cannot kindle when we will 
The fire which in the heart resides, 
The spirit bloweth and is still, 
Jn mystery our soul abides: 
Buttasks in hours of insight will'd 
Can be through hours of gloom fulfill'd. 
Though the context is slightly different, yet we have felt, it is worth 
reproducing. 
24. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree 
passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the first appellate court 
is restpred and the suit instituted by the respondent/plaintiff stands 
dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no 
..-. order as to costs. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal allowed. 
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