SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. versus SUBHASIS MITRA
[2023] 2 S.C.R. 297, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Ratio
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SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS.
v.
SUBHASIS MITRA
(Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 352 of 2022)
FEBRUARY 02, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
Contempt of Court – Certain provisions of the West Bengal
Madrasa Service Commission Act, 2008 regulating the process of
appointment of teachers in aided Madrasas recognized as minority
institutions, were declared unconstitutional by High Court –
However, Supreme Court declared the provisions of the Act to be
valid and binding – During the pendency of the appeals, some
appointments were made by the madrasas – Contempt proceedings
filed seeking release of salaries of teachers appointed after the
provisions of the Act were declared unconstitutional by the High
Court – Held: Given the nature of the interim orders made during
the pendency of the appeal, there is no doubt that the court declared
the appointments to be valid to the extent, they conformed to the
concerned rules and norms – However, there was no discussion
w.r.t whether the Court had applied its mind as to how the madrasas
had proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff
– Also, there was no discussion regarding rules/regulations,
applicable circulars and guidelines in terms of which aided and
unaided recognized institutions could make appointments – In
contempt proceeding, court cannot enlarge its scope and examine
matters which are not part of the directions/orders contained in the
judgement of which contempt
is alleged – Argument of the
respondent-alleged contemnors that there ought to be an exercise
of verification, is merited – Further proceedings cannot be
continued as no determination can be made unless there is a due
verification in regard to the employment of each of the petitioners –
Committee constituted to consider the claims of the petitioners –
West Bengal Madrasa Service Commission Act, 2008 – Constitution
of India – Art.142.
Disposing of the petitions, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The judgement of the High Court in the appeal
had declared unconstitutional certain provisions of the Act. This
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court, in its judgement set aside those findings of the High Court
regarding validity of the Act. Consequently, the provisions of the
Act were held to be valid and binding. In Para 58, the court
declared the nominations by the Commission in pursuance of the
provisions of the Act as valid, and the appointments made, after
disposal of the matters by the High Court as deemed to be valid
for all purpose. However, there is no discussion with respect to
whether the court had applied its mind as to how the madrasas
had proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff.
Also there is no discussion regarding rules/regulations, applicable
circulars and guidelines in terms of which aided and unaided
recognized institutions could make appointments, having regard
to the standard of education required and the requisite
experience; whether a transparent method was followed; whether
the madrasa concerned was recognized one or not; whether the
committee or body selecting the individual was constituted in
accordance with the rules and regulations, etc. The argument of
the respondent/alleged contemnors that there ought to be an
exercise of verification, therefore, appears to be merited and
substantial. Thus, given the nature of the interim orders made
during the pendency of the appeal, there can be no doubt that the
court declared the appointments to be valid to the extent, they
conformed to the concerned rules and binding
norms. The court,
in contempt proceeding cannot enlarge its scope and examine
matters which are not part of its remit, i.e. extent of the direction
or orders contained in the judgement of which contempt being
alleged. [Paras 6-9][302-F; 304-D-H; 305-B]
Sudhir Vasudeva v. M. George Ravishekaran (2014) 3
SCC 373 : [2014] 4 SCR 27 – relied on.
1.2 Further proceedings cannot be continued as no
determination can be made unless there is a due verification in
regard to the employment of each of the petitioners. Furthermore,
this court, in lawful exercise of contempt jurisdiction, cannot
examine the merits of a decision, whether the state or the
madrasa’s stand that any of the petitioners is entitled to the
benefits of being treated as an employee, having regard to the
concerned rules and regulations. [Paras 10 and 11][306-E-G]
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J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar (1996) 6 SCC 291 :
[1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 110; Midnapore Peoples’ Coop.
Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 39 – relied
on.
1.3 A Committee headed by retired Judge, Calcutta High
Court is constituted exercising powers under Article 142 of the
constitution. Further directions issued. The Committee is
requested to consider the claims of the petitioner, keeping in
mind the issues enumerated. [Para 17][309-G-H; 310-A]
Shaikh Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Conti
Rahamania High Madrasah & Ors 2020 (6) SCC 689 :
[2020] 1 SCR 185 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2020] 1 SCR 185
 referred to
 Para 2
[2014] 4 SCR 27
 relied on
 Para 5
[1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 110
 relied on
 Para 11
CIVIL  APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION : Contempt
Petition (Civil) No.352 of 2022. In Civil Appeal No.5808 of 2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.12.2015 of the High Court
of Calcutta in AST No.192 of 2014.
With
Conmt. Pet. (C) Nos.513/2022, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571,
572, 573, 574, 575/2023, 514, 515, 498, 516, 517/2022, 576, 577, 578, 579,
580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594/
2023, 353, 354, 355, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374,
494, 512/2022, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601/2023, 360, 361, 362, 363,
375, 376, 377, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 378, 379, 380, 495, 496,
497, 499, 500, 501, 502, 510, 511/2022, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608,
609, 610, 611/2023 and Civil
Appeal No.768 of 2023
Vijay Hansaria, Partha Sarathi Bhattacharya, C. U. Singh,  Huzefa
A. Ahmedi, Sr. Advs., Abu Sahel, Rajeev Kumar Gupta,  Parminder
Singh Bhullar, Pijush K. Roy, Mrs. Kakali Roy, Nayeemul Haq, Rajan
K. Chourasia, Gaurav Choudhary, Chand Qureshi, Sanjay Saini, Rahul
Mohod, Pradeep Mohod, Shiv Kumar Vats, Rama Kant Sharma, Dr.
SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. v. SUBHASIS MITRA
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Ram Kishor Choudhary, Pulkit Agarwal, Atarup Banerjee, Sunando Raha,
Abu Sohel, Nishant Kumar, Biswroop Bhattacharya, Golam Mohinddin,
Anindo Mukherjee, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Madhumita
Bhattacharjee, Ms. Arushi Mishra, Shamshad, Aditya Samaddar, M R
Shamshad, Shashank Singh, Arijit Sarkar, Ms. Nabeela Jamil, Advs. for
the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Leave granted in SLP(C) No. 3352 of 2021. Permission to file
Contempt Petitions in Civil Appeal No. 5808/ 2017 is granted. These are
taken along with the remaining above-mentioned Contempt Petitions.
2. This order will dispose of several contempt petitions which
complained of willful and deliberate violation of judgment of this Court in
Shaikh Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Conti Rahamania High
Madrasah & Ors1. This court had to consider the correctness of the
view expressed by the Calcutta High Court which held that some
provisions of the West Bengal Madrasa Service Commission Act, 2008
(hereafter, “the Act”) was unconstitutional. Those provisions regulated
the process of appointment of teachers in aided Madrasas which were
recognized as minority institutions. This court recorded its finding that
the provisions in question, i.e., Sections 8, 10, 11 & 12 of the Act were
valid and constitutional. At the same time the court was conscious that
some appointments were made by the madrasas during the pendency
of
the appeals and held as follows:
“58. In the end, we declare all nominations made by the
Commission in pursuance of the provisions of the Commission
Act to be valid and operative. However, if after the disposal
of the matters by the High Court any appointments are made
by the concerned Madarshas, such appointments of teachers
shall be deemed to be valid for all purposes. But the
Commission shall hereafter be competent to select and
nominate teachers to various Madarshas in accordance with
the provisions of the Commission Act and the Rules framed
thereunder.”
1 2020 (6) SCC 689
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3. All the petitioners argued that even during the pendency of the
proceedings in appeal, contempt proceedings had been drawn seeking
release of salaries of teachers who were appointed after the provisions
of the Act were declared unconstitutional by the High Court. The
petitioners advert to interim orders dated 10.05.2016, 01.08.2016,
17.05.2018, directing that those recruited or working during the pendency
of the proceedings ought to be paid salary. It is argued that the effect of
the judgement is that even while upholding the provisions of the Act, the
court at the same time protected the recruitment of the petitioners. In
these circumstances, denial of the benefit of regular service to them on
one pretext or the other by the respondent contemnors amounts to
deliberate and willful disregard of the Act, and calls for appropriate
stringent action.
4. After notice was issued in this contempt proceedings and
considering the submissions of the parties, this Court had on 12.07.2022
directed the respondents (alleged contemnors) to consider and verify
the claims of the petitioners to examine whether they were legal and
valid and release appropriate amounts. The subsequent order of
23.02.2022 had observed that the terms of the final judgement of this
court, especially para 58 disclosed that benefits were not confined and
relief not granted only to the parties to the litigation but that the directions
had the effect of in rem adjudication. The court therefore
directed the
respondent contemnors to verify from the record with respect to
entitlement of all petitioners. The contempt petitioners in their response
urged that there are express directions of this court to release salaries of
the contempt petitioners without insisting on verifying genuineness of
their claims of being teaching/non-teaching staff or having requisite
qualifications as required by law. It is also pointed out that this Court
was conscious that several appointments had been made which were
either irregular or unsustainable having regard to the norms applicable.
In this regard the respondent/alleged contemnors relied upon the order
dated 07.05.2018 to submit that in that order, the court had unequivocally
recorded that no equity would be created on the arrangements made in
the stop gap arrangement which would be subject to the final orders in
the civil appeals.
5. The respondents also argued that the judgement of this court –
i.e. in the directions contained in paragraph 58 - nowhere contained an
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express direction to release salary in favour of anyone including the
contempt petitioners without insisting upon verification of their claims of
their being teaching/non- teaching staff or their having requisite
qualification as prescribed by law. It is further submitted that even if the
petitioners rely upon earlier interim orders, those were only for release
of salary subject to eligibility and verification as per law. The respondents
have relied upon the judgement of this court in Sudhir Vasudeva v. M.
George Ravishekaran2 , to submit that the court exercising contempt
jurisdiction cannot traverse beyond the four corners of the judgement or
order alleged to have been flouted or examine questions which have not
been dealt with or decided in the judgement of which violation is alleged.
It is argued that all that this court did in the final judgement was to hold
appointments of individuals made during the pendency of the appeals
and the High Court judgement valid. The context of the judgement was
the applicability of provisions of the Act. However, that did not mean
that other statutory conditions such as qualifications, recognition or
otherwise of the madrasa concerned; its eligibility for grant-in-aid; the
qualifications held by the candidate at the time of appointment; existence
of vacancies and the manner in which the selection took place, etc.
could not be considered. The alleged contemnors relied upon the
recruitment rules in this regard which prescribed the manner of
recruitment such as publication of employment notification; the roster of
vacancies; staffing pattern; whether the institution is eligible and admitted
to aid or not.
6. As noted earlier, the judgement of the High Court in the appeal
had declared unconstitutional certain provisions of the Act. This court, in
its judgement set aside those findings of the High Court regarding validity
of the Act. Consequently, the provisions of the Act were held to be valid
and binding. The Act sought to regulate appointments to various
institutions covered by it, including the madrasas in West Bengal. This
court upheld the provisions of the Act after examining the relevant details
and inter alia held as follows:
“54. The regime put in place by the State legislature thus
ensures that the Commission comprising of experts in the field
would screen the talent all across the State; will adopt a fair
selection procedure and select the best available talent purely
2(2014) 3 SCC 373
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on merit basis; and even while nominating, the interest of the
minority institution will also be given due weightage and taken
care of. The statutory provisions thus seek to achieve
‘excellence’ in education and also seek to promote the interest
of the minority institutions. The provisions satisfy the test as
culled out in the decision of this Court in TMA Pai Foundation
case.
55. In our considered view going by the principles laid down
in the decision in TMA Pai Foundation case, the concerned
provisions cannot, therefore, be said to be transgressing the
rights of the minority institutions. The selection of the teachers
and their nomination by the Commission constituted under
the provisions of the Commission Act would satisfy the national
interest as well as the interest of the minority educational
institutions and said provisions are not violative of the rights
of the minority educational institutions.
56. The aforesaid conclusions have been arrived at by us in
keeping with the principles laid down by this Court in TMA
Pai Foundation case.
We are aware that in Brahmo Samaj Education Society,
Sindhi Education Society and Chandana Das (Malakar),
decided after TMA Pai Foundation, this Court had also dealt
with the question whether the concerned authorities could
validly nominate teachers to be appointed in minority
educational institutions. Brahmo Samaj Education Society did
not specifically deal with the question whether rules were valid
or not and left it
to the authorities to bring the rules and
regulations in conformity with the principles in TMA Pai
Foundation case. Sindhi Education Society dealt with the issue
in the context of reservation. It also found that the teachers
nominated by the concerned authorities would not be
compatible to teach in educational institutions run by linguistic
minorities. In Chandana Das (Malakar) the basic issue was
whether the concerned institution was a minority institution
or not. Sindhi Education Society and Chandana Das
(Malakar) dealt with statutory regimes which did not have
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any special features or matters concerning compatibility of
teachers which could be required going by the special
characteristics of the minority educational institutions.
However, the additional feature in the present matter shows
that the composition of the Commission with special emphasis
on persons having profound knowledge in Islamic Culture
and Theology, would ensure that the special needs and
requirements of minority educational institutions will always
be taken care of and thus the present case stands on a different
footing.
We, therefore, have no hesitation in going by the test culled
out in the TMA Pai Foundation and hold that the provisions
of the Commission Act are not violative of the rights of the
minority educational institutions on any count.”
7. In Para 58, the court declared the nominations by the
Commission in pursuance of the provisions of the Act as valid, and the
appointments made, after disposal of the matters by the High Court as
deemed to be valid for all purpose. However, there is no discussion with
respect to whether the court had applied its mind as to how the madrasas
had proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff. Also
there is no discussion regarding rules/regulations, applicable circulars
and guidelines in terms of which aided and unaided recognized institutions
could make appointments, having regard to the standard of education
required and the requisite experience;
whether a transparent method
was followed; whether the madrasa concerned was recognized one or
not; whether the committee or body selecting the individual was
constituted in accordance with the rules and regulations, etc. The
argument of the respondent/alleged contemnors that there ought to be
an exercise of verification, therefore, appears to be merited and
substantial.
8. In these circumstances, given the nature of the interim orders
made during the pendency of the appeal, there can be no doubt that the
court declared the appointments to be valid to the extent, they conformed
to the concerned rules and binding norms. To hold otherwise would be to
disregard the provisions, norms and guidelines constituting the essential
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and basic standards which every educational institution is expected to
conform to.
9. Furthermore, there is merit in the respondents’ submission that
the court, in contempt proceeding cannot enlarge its scope and examine
matters which are not part of its remit, i.e. extent of the direction or
orders contained in the judgement of which contempt being alleged. In
fact, in the decision in Sudhir Vasudeva (supra), it was held as follows:
“19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court
to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available
both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could
even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission
of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty
in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care
and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not,
adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-
determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order
in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must
not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order
which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions
that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or
the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions
which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-
evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of
consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience
or wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be
reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The
Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt
plea the power available to the Court in other corrective
jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No
order or direction supplemental to what has been already
expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising
jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an
exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in
the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would
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appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited
at the Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath
Ganguly [(2002) 5 SCC 352 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 703] , V.M.
Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju [(2004) 13 SCC 610 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 907] , Bihar Finance Service House
ConstructionCoop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami [(2008)
5 SCC 339] and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV
[(2006) 1 SCC 613].”
10. In the present case too, this court is of the opinion that the
respondents’ stand that without verification of the petitioners’ appointment
and whether the procedures prescribed were duly followed in respect of
matters such as fulfilling eligibility conditions (essential qualifications and
relevant experience); availability of vacancy; staff pattern in respect of
madrasas where recognition was granted and if so for what period;
whether the institution was aided and recognized or not or recognized
and non-aided, and if so for what duration; whether a duly empowered
selection body or bodies considered the candidature of the claimant before
he/she was appointed and whether the committee or body selecting the
individual/claimant was constituted in accordance with the rules or
guidelines, etc is justified. In these circumstances, this court is of the
opinion that further proceedings cannot be continued as no determination
can be made unless there is a due verification in regard to the employment
of each of the
petitioners.
11. Furthermore, this court, in lawful exercise of contempt
jurisdiction, cannot examine the merits of a decision, whether the state
or the madrasa’s stand that any of the petitioners is entitled to the benefits
of being treated as an employee, having regard to the concerned rules
and regulations. In J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar3 this court explained
the limited scope of contempt proceedings, as follows, in the facts of the
case:
“6. The question then is whether the Division Bench was right
in setting aside the direction issued by the learned Single
Judge to redraw the seniority list. It is contended by Mr S.K.
Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that
unless the learned Judge goes into the correctness of the
3 (1996) 6 SCC 291
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decision taken by the Government in preparation of the
seniority list in the light of the law laid down by three Benches,
the learned Judge cannot come to a conclusion whether or
not the respondent had wilfully or deliberately disobeyed the
orders of the Court as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act.
Therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court
necessarily has to go into the merits of that question. We do
not find that the contention is well founded. It is seen that,
admittedly, the respondents had prepared the seniority list on
2-7-1991. Subsequently promotions came to be made. The
question is whether seniority list is open to review in the
contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformity
with the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is seen
that once there is an order passed by the Government on the
basis of the directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh
cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum.
The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be
right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions.
But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved
party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that
cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order.
After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt
proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single Judge
cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words,
the learned Judge was
exercising the jurisdiction to consider
the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would
not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the
Division Bench has exercised the power under Section 18 of
the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance being a judgment or
order of the Single Judge; the Division Bench corrected the
mistake committed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, it
may not be necessary for the State to file an appeal in this
Court against the judgment of the learned Single Judge when
the matter was already seized of the Division Bench.”
12. In a later decision, Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. v.
Chunilal Nanda4 this court explained the limitations of a court exercising
contempt jurisdiction:
4 (2006) 5 SCC 399
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“11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to
appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be
summarised thus:
I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against
an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of
its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order
imposing punishment for contempt.
II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for
contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt
nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an
order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable
under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances,
they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide
whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so,
what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto.
In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or
decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between
the parties.
IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court
on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in
the exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and,
therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act.
The only exception is where such direction or decision is
incidental to or inextricably connected with the order
punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under
Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or
inextricably connected directions.
V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an
issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the
dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the
aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open
to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a
learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-
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court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).”
13. It is thus, apparent, that if this court were to pronounce upon
the merits of the respondents’ position, it would necessarily have to
consider the facts of each case, and decide whether the stand of the
alleged contemnors – wherever a decision adverse to the petitioners is
taken, is correct on its merits. That exercise, plainly is not admissible in
proper exercise of contempt jurisdiction.
14. The above observations would have ordinarily been conclusive
and dispositive of the present petitions. However, this court is conscious
of the fact that the process of verification undertaken by the state would
result in further delay and may lead to multifarious litigation, spelling
uncertainty to individuals and members of staff of madrasas who were
appointed after following all norms and procedures.
15. During the hearing this court had suggested constitution of a
committee which would examine all relevant factors and verify the claims
of the petitioners which could then be considered and acted upon by the
same. This suggestion was acceptable to the state, the commission and
concerned madrasas who are represented by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr.
C.U. Singh, Sr. Advocates and other counsel.
16. During the hearing, the court had suggested constitution of a
committee which would go into all relevant factors and verify the claims
of the petitioners
which would then be considered and acted upon by the
same. This suggestion was acceptable to the state, the concerned
madrasas and the petitioners, represented by M/s. Rakesh Dwivedi,
C.U. Singh, and Huzeffa Ahmadi, Sr. Advocates, Ms. Madhumita
Bhattacharjee, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, and other counsel.
17. Accordingly, this Court exercising its powers under Article
142 hereby constitutes a Committee headed by Justice Debi Prasad
Dey, retired Judge, Calcutta High Court. The Committee shall also consist
of a Principal Secretary ranking officer of the IAS, who had served in
the West Bengal cadre and stationed in Kolkata with experience in the
Higher Education Department as well as a retired Registrar of one of
the State Universities in West Bengal, residing in Kolkata. The State
Government shall nominate the members other than the Chairman. The
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Committee is requested to consider the claims of the petitioner, keeping
in mind the following:
(a) Whether the madrasa or its managing committee was
recognized by the state government on the date on which the
appointment was made?
(b) Whether such appointments were made, of candidates who
possessed the requisite prescribed qualifications and fulfilled the
experience and other eligible conditions stipulated for the post
concerned?
(c) Whether such an appointment was made by following the
recruitment procedure indicated in the Kolkata Gazette Notification
dated 11-03- 2015 (No. 93-SE/S/10R-14/2013-9th February, 2015)
and in Kolkata Gazette Notification dated 04-03-2016 (No. 486-
MD/O/2M-11/2016)?
(d) Whether the appointments were made against vacancies that
existed and whether the vacancies conformed to the staffing
pattern for the concerned institution/madrasas
(e) Whether after the appointments were made, the persons
appointed actually worked on their respective posts?
(f) Whether the appointments were actually made on the date of
the appointment letter, or were backdated?
18. The remuneration of the Chairperson of the Committee shall
be ` 10,00,000/- and that of each member shall be ` 5,00,000/-. The
committee shall complete its task expeditiously; and, within four months
from today, submit a report to the State Government, which shall then
pass appropriate orders in respect of the petitioners within two months
thereafter.
19. Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee submitted that all necessary
co-operation would be extended by the State Government, which is
directed to provide infrastructure, and the necessary staff to the committee
to complete its task. The State Government is directed to notify the
committee, within four weeks from today, and give appropriate publicity
to those interested to seek verification of their claim. Such publicity shall

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be through appropriate advertisement in newspapers, both in English
and in Bengali. In addition, the notification shall also be placed on the
website of the State Government’s Minority Affairs & Madrasah
Education Department, Nabanna, Howrah. The notification shall indicate
the time within which representations can be made. It is open to those
claiming benefit, as well as those likely to be affected by the report, to
represent to the committee, within the time stipulated. The committee
shall also consider a suitable and practicable method of giving hearing to
those interested.
20. These petitions and pending applications/appeal(s) are disposed
of in the above terms.
Divya Pandey
Petitions disposed of.
(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)
SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. v. SUBHASIS MITRA
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]