RAJA AND OTHERS versus STATE OF KARNATAKA
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 615, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2016) 9 S.C.R. 615 
RAJA AND OTHERS 
v. 
STATE OF KARNATAKA 
(Criminal Appeal No. 1767of2011) 
OCTOBER 04, 2016 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.376(g)/366/392 rlw. s.34 - Prosecutrix 
alleged gang rape by appellants - Inconsistencies in FIR and the 
deposition of prosecutrix - Appellants acquitted by trial court -
Acquittal reversed by High Court - Appellants pleaded false 
implication as they declined to oblige the prosecutrix qua her de111and 
for financial help - On appeal, held: View taken by the trial court 
is overwhelmingly possible - In contrast, findings of High Court 
are decipherably strained in favour of the prosecution by 
overlooking many irreconcilable inconsistencies, anomalies and 
omissions rendering the prosecution case unworthy of credit -
Prosecution failed to prove the charges - Appellants entitled to 
benefit of doubt. 
Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Interference by appellate 
court - Scope of - Discussed. 
Evidence - Evidence of prosecutrix in cases of rape, 
molestation and other physical outrages - Veracity of - Held: 
Generally, the testimony of a victim of rape or non-consensual 
physical assault ought to be accepted as true and unble111ished -
However, it would still be subject to judicial scrutiny lest a casual, 
routine acceptance thereof results in unwarranted conviction of the 
person charged - Svidence Act, 1872 - ss.113A, 113B ands. l J.IA -
Criminal Trial. 
Hostile witness - Extent of acceptability
- Discussed. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 From the nature of the exchanges between the 
Prosecutrix and the accused persons as narrated by her, the same 
are not at all consistent with those of an unwilling, terrified and 
anguished victim of forcible intercourse, if judged by the normal 
615 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
616 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016) 9 S.C.R. 
human conduct. Her post incident conduct and movements were 
also noticeably unusual. Instead of hurrying back home in a 
distressed, humiliated and a devastated state, she stayed back in 
and around the place of occurrence, enquired about the same 
from persons whom she claimed to have met in the late hours of 
night, returned to the spot to identify the garage and even looked 
at the broken glass bangles, discarded litter etc. According to 
her, she wandered around the place and as disclosed by her in 
evidence, to collect information so as to teach the accused 
persons a lesson. Her avengeful attitude in the facts and 
circumstances, as disclosed by her, if true, demonstrably evinces 
a conduct manifested by a feeling of frustration stoked by an 
intense feeling of deprivation of something expected, desired or 
promised. Her confident movements alone past midnight, in that 
state were also out of the ordinary. Her testimony that she met a 
cyclist to whom she narrated her tale of woe and that on his 
information, the police came to the spot and that thereafter she 
was taken to successive police stations before lodging the 
complaint at Sampangiramanagara police station as well has to 
be accepted with a grain of salt. Her conduct during the alleged 
ordeal was also unlike a victim of forcible rape and betrays 
somewhat submissive and consensual disposition. [Para 19][628-
E-H; 629-A-B) 
1.2 The medical
opinion of PW8 that she was accustomed 
to sexual intercourse when admittedly she was living separately 
from her husband for 1 and Y, years before the incident happened 
also has its own implication. The medical evidence as such in the 
attendant facts and circumstances in a way belies allegation of 
gang rape. [Para 20][629-C-D) 
1.3 Evidence of PW2 Geeta who admittedly offered shelter 
to the prosecutrix and her minor daughter, though had been 
declared hostile, her testimony as a whole could not be brushed 
aside. In her testimony, she indicated that the prosecutrix used 
to take financial help from the accused persons and that she used 
to indulge in dubious late night activities for which her husband 
deserted her. The defence plea of false implication as the accused 
persons had declined to oblige the prosecutrix qua her demand 
for financial help therefore cannot be lightly discarded in the overall
RAJA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
factual scenario. Her version therefore was a plausible one and 
thus fit in with the defence plea to demolish the prosecution case. 
The evidence of a hostile witness in all eventualities ought not 
stand effaced af together and the same can be accepted to the 
extent found dependable on a careful scrutiny. [Paras 21, 22)(629-
D-G) 
Himanshu alias Chintu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2011) 2 
SCC 36 : 2011 (1) SCR 48; Khujii v. State of MP. (1991) 
3 SCC 627 : 1991 (3) SCR 1; Kofi Lakhman Bhai 
Chanabhai v. State of Gujarat (1999) 8 sec 624 -
relied on. 
2. The seizures said to have been effected by the 
investigating agency also do not inspire confidence. The seized 
articles per se in absence of any evidence of corroboration of 
charge would not, irrefutably prove the involvement of the 
appellants in the offence alleged. [Para 23)(630-A-B) 
3. Though, generally the testimony of a victim of rape or 
non-consensual physical assault ought to be accepted as true and 
unblemished, it would still be subject to judicial scrutiny lest a 
casual, routine and automatic acceptance thereof results in 
unwarranted conviction of the person charged. [Para 24)(630-G) 
Raju and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 15 
SCC 133 : 2008 (16) SCR1078 - explained. 
4. Vis-a-vis the scope of interference with a judgment of 
acquittal, if two views are possible, the appellate court should 
not ordinarily interfere therewith though its view may appear to 
be
the more probable one. Only in exceptionable cases and under 
compelling circumstances, where the judgement of acquittal is 
found to be perverse i.e. if the findings have been arrived at by 
ignoring or excluding relevant materials or by taking. into 
consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material and are against the 
weight of evidence or are so outrageously in defiance of logic so 
as to suffer from the vice of irrationality, that interference by the 
appellate court would be called for. (Para 25](630-H;. 631-A-C] 
Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and Others. v. 
State of Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657 : 2010 (15) 
617 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
618 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
SCR 452; Shyamal Saha v. State of West Bengal (2014) 
12 SCC 321: 2014 (3) SCR 90 - explained. 
5. The prosecution case herein, when judged on the 
touchstone of totality of the facts and circumstances, does not 
generate the unqualified and unreserved satisfaction 
indispensably required to enter a finding of guilt against the 
appellants. The view taken by the Trial Court is overwhelmingly 
possible· one. In contrast, the findings of the High Court are 
decipherably strained in favour of the prosecution by overlooking 
many irreconcilable inconsistencies, anomalies and omissions 
rendering the prosecution case unworthy of credit. Noticeably, 
the High Court exonerated the appellants of the charge of 
abduction under Section 366 IPC, which is an inseverable 
component of the string of offences alleged against them. The 
view adopted by the High Court is not a plausible one when 
juxtaposed to that of the Trial Court. The prosecution failed to 
prove the charge against the appellants to the hilt as obligated in 
law and thus, they are entitled to the benefit of doubt. [Para 
27lf 631-E-H; 632-A] 
Case Law Reference 
2011 (1) SCR 48 
relied on 
Para 22 
1991 (3) SCR 1 
relied on 
Para 22 
(199~) 8 sec 624 
relied on 
Para 22 
2008 (16) SCR 1078 
explained 
Para 24 
~010 (15) SCR 452 
explained 
Para25 
2014 (3) SCR 90 
explained 
Para 26 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
I 767 of20 I I.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.09.2010 of the High Court 
ofKarnataka at Bangalore in Crl. A. No. 394 of2004. 
Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Sr. Adv., Anirudh Sanganeria, Chinmay 
Deshpande,Amjid Maqbool, R. D. Upadhyay,Advs. fortheAppellants. 
Joseph Aristotle S., Mrs. Priya Aristotle, Rajesh Kumar Singh, 
Ms. An itha Shenoy, Advs. for the Respondent.
RAJA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
The Judgment of the Coutt was delivered by 
AMITAVAROY,J. 1. Distressed by the reversal of their acquittal 
from the charge under Sections 366/376(g)/392 read with Section 34 
IPC, as recorded by the trial court, the appellants have impeached the 
impugned judgement and order of their conviction rendered by the High 
Court in the State appeal. 
2. We have heard Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior 
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Joseph Aristotle S, learned counsel 
for the respondent-State . 
. 3. The prosecution was set rolling by an oral report by the 
prosecutrix with the Sampa,ngiramanagara Police Station between 2.00 
A.M. and 3.00 A.M. of 11.10.1997, which was in Tamil language and 
was translated and recorded by S. Shiva Lingaia, ASI, whereafter a 
case was registered under Sections 366, 376(g), 392 r/w 34 IPC. 
4. The prosecutrix revealed that she was a resident of No.81, 
Jasari Kaleeli, Rustumji Compound, Richmond Road, Bangalore and 
was earning her livelihood by rendering services as a maid in the house 
of Shilpa Shetty at Shanti Nagar, Bangalore. According to her, because 
of the ilHreatment of her husband, she shifted to Bangalore about 8 
months prior to the incident by separating from him. 
She alleged that at about 7.30 P.M. in the previpus evening, while 
she was coming back from work and was at the Richmond Park, an 
auto rickshaw ,with two persons in it including the driver stopped by 
her side and she was
pulled inside. According to her, after travelling 
some distance, two other persons also got into the auto rickshaw. The 
miscreants then blindfolded her, by her chudidar cloth and took her to an 
auto garage where there was no light. The prosecutrix stated that the 
abductors lit a candle, spread 2 seats of the auto rickshaw on the ground, 
laid her forcibly thereon and in spite of her resistance and objections, 
forcibly undressed her and raped her by turn. She disclosed that 3 of 
the four persons ravished her. Out of them, two committed the act twice 
and the third only once. 
The prosecutrixfurther stated that one of the persons brought dosa 
and idli and also offered the same to her, 
whereafter they tried to 
repeat the same act, to which she protested for which she was kicked 
and fisted and further they snatched her Tali (mangalsootre) gold 
619 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F' 
G 
H
620 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
ear-studs. They then made her to wear her clothes, brought her in the 
auto rickshaw to a vacant place and discarded her. According to her, 
these violators were addressing each other as Raju, Venu, Parkash and 
Francis and claimed that she could identify them, if produced. 
Investigation followed and in the course thereof, the appellants were 
apprehended. The fourth person Francis could not be nabbed as he 
absconded. As a matter of fact, after the submission of the charge-
sheet against the appellants, the trial was conducted by segregating the 
absconding accused. They denied the charge under the above provisions 
of law. 
5. At the trial, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses and also 
marked several documents and exhibited material objects seized during 
the investigation. The appellants rendered their statements under Section 
313 Cr.P.C. reiterating their innocence and also examined one witness 
in defence. The trial court, to reiterate, acquitted the appellants of the 
charges levelled against them. The High Court by the impugned decision 
has reversed the acquittal and the appellants thus stand convicted under 
Sections 376(g) and 392 IPC r/w 34 IPC and have been sentenced to 
suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. 
6. The instant adjudication being one to examine the tenability of 
the conviction of the appellants on the reversal of their acquittal, an 
independent assessment of the evidence
on record is indispensable in 
the interest of justice, two courts of facts having arrived at irreconcilable 
conclusions on the same materials on records. It would thus be expedient, 
to analyse the evidence, oral and documentary before adverting to the 
rival arguments based thereon. 
7. PW I, the prosecutrix on oath stated that she has afemale child 
through her husband who lived separately with another lady and she and 
her daughter lived in the compound of PW2 Geeta. She deposed that 
she had been working in the house of Shilpa Shetty for the last three 
years and that even prior to the incident, the appellants used to tease her 
and pass remarks on the way. She stated that in the evening of the date 
of the incident along with the appellants, another person had boarded 
the auto and that the two persons sitting on her sides were app~llants 
Venu Gopal and Parkash. She testified that she also did peep out of the 
auto thinking that someone would save her, for which the person with 
the beard in the auto slapped her and therefore she felt frightened and 
sat behind. She stated that the abductors then blindfolded her with her
RAJA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
(AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
own dupatta, molested her inside the auto and ultimately took her to an 
auto garage and in spite of her objections, raped her one by one. 
According to her, she was raped by Venu Gopal, Parash and the bearded 
person in that order. 
In her deposition, however she stated that appellant Raja also 
assaulted her and had forcible intercourse with her. She reiterated that 
the violators then brought dosa and idlis and also offered some to her 
which she on being assaulted, did eat. In a depaiture from her FIR, the 
prosecutrix deposed that thereafter all the four performed one more 
round of intercourse by turn. Thereafter according to her, the bearded 
person snatched her Tali (mangalsootre) and the other, her ear studs. 
They did assault her by kicks and thereafter by making her wear her 
clothes, took her in the same auto and left her near a bridge. 
She 
complained of having sustained injuries on her thighs. 
She stated that thereafter she took water from a person near the 
garage road and ascertained from him the area where she was situated. 
According to her, from the location of the place, she could understand 
the site of the garage and on reaching there, she saw broken pieces of 
her glass bangles and also the litter and left overs of the food taken in 
the garage and could convincingly identify the place. She deposed further 
that at that time, a man came in a bicycle to whom she narrated the 
entire incident,
who asked her to wait and went to the Hoysala Police 
Station to report, whereafter the police did come, inspect the place as 
shown by her and took her to the Sampangiramanagara P.S. past midnight 
where she made her verbal complaint which was reduced into writing 
and she put her thumb impression thereon. 
The prosecutrix proved the complaint/FIR as Ex.PI. According 
to her, in the next morning at 6 A.M., the appellants were brought to the 
police station. She admitted to have been taken to the Vanivilas Hospital 
where she was medically examined. She also identified the ear studs, 
material Ex. I and also her inner-wear material Ex. 2 and broken pieces 
of glass bangles material Ex 3. She also stated to have identified the 
appellants in the test identification parade conducted in the central jail. 
She also identified the seats of the auto rickshaw as material Ex P4 and 
PS. 
In her cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted that she was 
not married and that she had come to Bangalore with Saravana whom 
621 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
622 
A 
8 
c 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
she had referred to in her examination-in-chief, as her husband. She 
stated that she lived with Saravana for three years in Bangalore and that 
they used to earn their living as labourers. She stated that Saravana 
deserted her, following frequent quarrels with her, whereafter PW2 Geeta 
gave her and her daughter, shelter. She testified that she used to earn 
Rs. 700 p.m. by working in the house of Shilpa Shetty and that there 
was none in the family or in her village to support her financially. She 
admitted that from one week prior to the incident, the appellants used to 
tease her and that from then she knew them. She admitted that the road 
from which she was abducted was a public thorough fare but asserted 
that she could not scream as she was gagged. She admittedthat though 
the auto travelled for I 0 minutes thereafter, she did not try to get down 
as she was scared of her abductors. She further disclosed that the 
appellants used to speak to her from 2/3 days prior to the incident. 
According to her, while she was near Fatima Bakery, which was 
opposite to Johnson market, she was taken inside the auto. She admitted 
D 
to have known the accused Francis then. She claimed to have identified 
two persons in the auto rickshaw when she was first picked up from 
the road as appellants Parkash and Francis. She admitted that none of 
the abductors did speak to her while in the auto rickshaw. She also 
conceded that she
did not scream for help from the passers-by on the 
E 
F 
road. She was confronted with her disclosure in the FIR that only three 
persons had committed rape on her though four had been named therein. 
She admitted that at the time when she was offered two idlis and a glass 
of water, she did not cry for help and instead had made up her mind to 
teach the miscreants a lesson by informing the pol ice. She also stated, 
by departing from the FIR that for the second time, three persons 
committed sexual intercourse with her. According to her, the ear studs 
had been given to her by her husband who got them- made at 
Kaveripattinam in Tamil Nadu. She claimed that her FIR was written 
by one Anthony in the police station whom she came to know at that 
point of time. 
G 
In her cross-examination, she further deviated by stating that apart 
from the 4th person referred to by her, there was yet another person of 
short stature and that she had forgotten to refer to him in her FIR. She 
admitted that her mouth was never shut but her abductors did threaten 
and scold her. She admitted that after she was abandoned by the 
II 
miscreants, she did alone return to the garage where the act was
RAJA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
committed. She also stated to have narrated her incident to five 
more persons at different places before the police had intervened, who 
according to her, were watchmen. She stated that she wanted to see 
the place before informing the police and, therefore she went in search 
thereof. 
She deposed that she saw the jeep of the Hoysala police 
and called for help whereafter she was taken in the jeep. She took the 
jeep near the garage and from there, she was taken to two more police 
stations before lodging the FIR at Sampangiramanagara Police Station. 
She contradicted herself by stating that the complaint was not 
written by Anthony. She also stated that her report was typed, read out 
to her whereupon she put her left thumb impression. When Ex. PI, FIR 
was shown to her, she admitted that it was not typed. She admitted as 
well that while narrating the incident and lodging the complaint, she 
did not disclose the names of the accused persons. She conceded as 
well that when she was taken to the hospital, there were no wounds. 
She admitted as well that PW 2 Geeta had advised her to take 
money and return to her native village and not to file a case as otherwise 
she would disclose that she was a prostitute. She denied the suggestion 
that she had requested for financial help from the appellants and when 
they expressed their inability, she lodged a false case against them to 
wreak vengeance. She also denied the
suggestion that the material 
exhibits, more particularity ear studs and tali (mangalsootre) were not 
hers and that the police had procured the same from elsewhere, to frame 
the accused persons. In the context of her identification of the appellants 
in the TIP, she admitted in her cross-examination that even prior to the 
incident, she had seen the accused persons and that not only they used 
to talk to her, she knew them as well. 
8. PW2 Geeta, on oath stated that she also did earn her living as a 
labourer .. She admitted that she knew the prosecutrix who was deserted 
by her husband and that she had accommodated her and her daughter 
and had provided shelter to them about 7 years prior to the incident. She 
stated that about four years back (coinciding approximately with the 
date of the incident), the prosecutrix had disclosed to her that on her 
way back home, she had been teased, on which she advised her to be 
careful. The witness stated that in the evening of the date of the incident, 
the prosecutirx did not return home and that at about mid-night, the police 
brought her back. She stated that she saw marks of assault on the body 
of prosecutrix and on being enquired, she stated that "they did not pay 
623 
A 
B 
C. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
624 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 .S.C.R. 
me any money but have snatched my ear studs. They have extracted 
all the work needed". The witness volunteered to explain "work" meant 
prostitution. 
At this stage, the witness was declared hostile and was 
cross-examined. Jn her cross-examination, she admitted that when the 
prosecutrix returned that night, she had suffered wounds and was 
limping. She denied to have stated before the police that the appellants 
had snatched her gold ornaments and had committed rape on her. She 
also denied to have identified the ear studs, as those of the prosecutrix 
and instead asserted that the same were not hers. She denied the 
suggestion that her retraction from the statement made before the 
police was with a view to help the accused persons. She volunteered to 
state that the reason for her husband to desert the prosecutrix was her 
activities of prostitution which had come to his knowledge. 
The witness further disclosed in her cross-examination by the 
defence that about a fortnight before the incident, the prosecutrix along 
with. her had approached the accused persons for an amount of Rs. 
10000 which she intended to invest for living in a separate house, which 
was however declined. PW2 testified that this was not to the liking of 
the prosecutrix, who was enraged by such refusal and left the place by 
intimidating them of adverse consequences. The witness on oath stated 
further that the prosecutrix after
returning home in the evenings and after 
completing the house hold work, used to go around in the night indulging 
in prostitution and when asked as to why she had lodged the complaint 
against the accused persons, she disclosed that this would compel them 
to part with the money that she wanted. 
9. PW3 Dr. B.R.S. Kashyap had examined the appellants and 
opined that there was nothing to suggest that they were incapable of 
performing sexual intercourse. He also was of the view that the injury 
on the body of the appellant Raju could have been sustained also in the 
course of attending his auto rickshaw or could be self- inflicted as well. 
10. PW4 Muthu produced as a seizure witness of the ear studs 
denied that same had been seized in his presence and instead testified 
that on the insistence of the police he put his signature on a paper. This 
witness was declared hostile but did not budge from his statement in his 
examination-in-chief. 
11. PW5 M.K. Srirangaiah was the Tehsildar, Bangalore North
RAJA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
625 
Taluk at the relevant time and he proved the conduct of TIP, in which 
the prosecutrix identified the appellants. 
12. PW8 K.M. Nandagopal was the Assistant Professor, OBG, 
Vanivilas Hospital on 11. I 0.1997 where at about 9 a.m. on that day, the 
prosecutrix was m~dically examined. He deposed that the prosecutrix 
was found to have sustained red colour injury on her left thigh. While 
stating that the vaginal swab of the prosecutrix was sealed and sent to 
the Forensic Science Laboratory, he was of the clear opinion that she 
was accustomed to the act of sexual intercourse. In his cross-
examination, the doctor admitted that the prosecutrix did not reveal any 
evidence or sign of having sexual intercourse at the time of her 
examination. Vis-a-vis the injuries on her thigh, the witness stated that 
this could happen due to reasons other than sexual intercourse. 
13. PWI 1 B.S. Mudumadeviah, the Investigating Officer affirmed 
that the FIR was lodged by the prosecutrix at 2 a.m. on 11. I 0.1997 at 
the police station. He deposed that after the medical examination of the 
prosecutrix, he accompanied her to the place of occurrence and seized 
therefrom a red colour drawer, one box ofNirodh (contraceptive), two 
auto rickshaw seats, two broken pieces of black bangles and three black 
bangles found strewn around. He identified the s.eized articles in court. 
He referred to the disclosure statement of the appellant
Parkash leading 
to the discovery of the ear studs of the prosecutrix from his house which 
he identified in the court as well. He also claimed to have seized the auto 
rickshaw identified by the same appellant used for abducting the 
prosecutrix. According to him, he had written down the complaint of 
the prosecutrix made verbally 
He conceded that the prosecutrix did not state that at that point of 
time, that she had been abducted by five persons and raped by four. She 
also did not disclose that there was another short person who had raped 
her as well. The witness admitted that she did not disclose that she was 
abducted while near the Fatima Bakery but referred to the spot as · 
Richmond Park. He denied the suggestion that the prosecutrix at the 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
time oflodging of the complaint did not name the miscreants. He denied 
G 
the suggestion as well that the ear studs were bought from Man Pasand 
Jewellers, Shanti Nagar by taking Rakesh, a friend of accused No. 3- . 
Parkash for the purpose. He denied the suggestion with regard to seizures 
from the spot and also the identification by the prosecutrix at the test 
identification parade. 
H
626 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
14. The defence witness Rakesh deposed on oath that after the 
incident, while one day he was in the house of Parkash, the pol ice visited 
the place and threatened the grand-fatherofthe appellant Parkash alleging 
that he (Parkash) had snatched a pair of ear studs from the prosecutrix, 
to which his grand-father objected. The witness stated that then the 
police took him and the grand-father of the appellant Parkash to Man 
Pasand Jewellers, a local jewellery shop, where the police threatened 
the old man to pay the amount to purchase a pair of ear studs for Rs. 
4000. The witness identified the ear studs through the emblem "M.P." 
thereon. He denied that the material Ex. I, the ear studs belonged to the 
prosecutrix and that the same had been seized from the appellant Parkash. 
15. Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel for the 
appellants has insistently argued that it being patent on a combined reading 
of the FIR and the testimony of the prosecutrix at the trial, that she is 
wholly untrustworthy and thatthe appellants have been falsely implicated, 
the impugned judge111..:nt and order is liable to be set aside lest it 
perpetuates gross injustice. The learned senior counsel has urged that 
not only the prosecutrix's version of the incident as a whole is inherently 
improbable, she has been wholly discredited as well by the medical 
evidence belying the accusation of forcible sexual intercourse
by the 
appellants in succession. Castigating the investigating agency for falsely 
foisting the articles claimed to have been seized on the appellants in its 
desperate attempt to establish their culpability, Mr. Patil has maintained 
that as th.e prosecutrix admittedly knew the appellants from before, their 
so called identification by her at the TIP is also of no consequence. The 
learned senior counsel asserted that PW2 Geeta, though having been 
declared hostile, her evidence at the trial otherwise consistent with the 
attendant facts and circumstances bearing on the conduct and activities 
of the prosecutrix ought not to have been discarded and this having 
vitiated the impugned decision as well, the conviction and sentence 
recorded against the appellants is liable to be interfered with. As the 
prosecution has failed to convincingly prove the charge levelled against 
the appellants, they are entitled to be acquitted, he urged. To buttress 
G 
these pleas, reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in 
Simi/ K11mar Samb/111dayal G11pta (Dr.) and otlters. Vs. State of 
Maltaraslttra (2010) 13 SCC 657, Sltyanutl Salta Vs. State of West 
Bengal (2014) 12 SCC 321. llinumslt11 alias Clti11t11 Vs. State (NCT 
of Delhi) (2011) 2 SCC 36 and Raj11 mu/ Otlters Vs. State of Madltya 
H 
Pradesh (2008) 15 SCC 133.
RAJA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
16. As against this, the learned state counsel wholly endorsed the 
impugned decision contending that not only the testimony of the 
prosecutrix is true, cogent and convincing, having regard to the charge 
levelled by her, the same is deserving offull credence to base the conviction 
of the appellants thereon. According to the learned counsel, the minor 
inconsistencies in the FIR and the deposition of the prosecutrix, on a 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, are acceptably 
reconcilable. As the identity of the appellants, as the perpetrators of the 
crime, is not in doubt, they having been identified by the.prosecutrix in no 
uncertain terms, the prosecution case ought not to be jettisoned by relying 
on the evidence of PW2, a hostile witness, he urged. While contending 
that the medical evidence is not mutilative of the charge and that the 
seizures made in course of the investigation do undeniably establish the 
complicity of the appellants, their conviction is legally valid and does not 
merit any interference in the instant appeal, he maintained. 
17. We have lent our anxious consideration to the materials on 
record as well as the competing arguments based thereon. Having regard 
to the charge levelled, the fulcrum of the prosecution case logically is 
the testimony of the prosecutrix. Undeniably therefore the credibility 
and trustworthiness of the victim's version is the decisive factor to
adjudge 
the culpability of the appellants. 
18. Filtering the unnecessary factual details, suffice it is to recount 
that the incident allegedly had occurred at 7.30 p.m. on a public road 
while the prosecutrix was returning home after the day's work. Her 
version is that while she was on the way, an auto rickshaw with two 
persons therein pulled up by her side and she was dragged in forcibly. 
After moving for about I 0 minutes, the abductors were joined by two 
more persons, whereafter she was taken to a garage and was molested 
against her will forcibly. 
19. To start with, the prosecutrix has contradicted herself qua the 
place of alleged kidnapping. In the complaint, she mentioned the spot to 
be near Richmond park, whereas in her evidence she referred to the 
same as opposite Johnson market. It is more or less authenticated by 
the evidence on record that after her abduction and on the way to the 
garage as narrated by her, she did not scream or cry for help. This is of 
utmost significance as it is not alleged by her that the abductors had put 
her under fear on the point of any weapon threatening physical injury 
thereby. This is more so, as admittedly the prosecutrix at the relevant 
627 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
628 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
time was a major and could very well foresee the disastrous consequences 
tof.ollow. She has admitted in her deposition as well that while she was 
ravished inside the garage and even during the intermittent breaks, she 
did not shout for any help. Her version in the complaint with regard to 
the offending act and the number of persons, who had· committed the 
same, is inconsistent with her testimony on oath at the trial. Notably in 
the complaint she mentioned about four persons of whom three raped 
and out of them, two committed the act twice. She did not disclose in 
her complaint that the accused persons were known: to her from before 
and disclosed that they during the time had been referring to themselves 
as Raju, Venu, Parkash and Francis. This, however has been denied by 
the investigation officer. On oath, she however introduced a fifth person 
as well. She accused all the four persons to have committed sexual 
intercourse with her for the second time. Though grudgingly, as admitted 
by her, she also consumed the food as offered to her by her molesters. 
In cross-examination, she admitted that she was not married to 
Sarv11na though she claimed him to be her husband in her examination-
in-chief. She disclosed more than once that the accused persons used 
to tease her for about 5-6 months prior to the incident and that she used 
to talk to them as well. In view of this admission of hers, the
identification 
by the prosecutrix of the accused persons in the TIP pales into 
insignificance. She contradicted herself in the cross-examination by 
stating that three of the four did rape her for the second time. She was 
also inconsistent with regard to the writer of her complaint. 
Her conduct during the alleged ordeal is also unlike a victim of 
forcible rape and betrays somewhat submissive and consensual 
disposition. From the nature of the exchanges between her and the 
accused persons as narrated by her, the same are not at all consistent 
with those of an unwilling, terrified and anguished victim of forcible 
intercourse, if judged by the normal human conduct. 
Her post incident conduct and movements are also noticeably 
unusual. Instead of hurrying back home in a distressed, humiliated and 
G 
a devastated state, she stayed back in and around the place of occurrence, 
enquired about the same from persons whom she claims to have met in 
the late hours of night, returned to the spot to identify the garage and 
even look at the broken glass bangles, discarded litter etc. According to 
her, she wandered around the place and as disclosed by her in her 
H 
evidence, to collect information so as to teach the accused persons a
RAJA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
lesson. Her avengeful attitude in the facts and circumstances, as disclosed 
by her, if true, demonstrably evinces a conduct manifested by a feeling 
of frustration stoked by an intense feeling of deprivation of something 
expected, desired or promised. Her confident movements alone past 
midnight, in that state are also out of the ordinary. Her testimony that 
she met a cyclist to whom she narrated her tale of woe and that on his 
information, the Hoysala police came to the spot and that thereafter she 
was taken to successive police stations before lodging the complaint at 
Sampangiramanagara police station as well 
has to be accepted with 
a grain of salt. 
20. PW8, who medically examined her, opined in clear terms that 
she was accustomed to sexual intercourse and that no sign of forcible 
intercourse was discernible. This assumes great significance in view of 
the allegation of forcible rape by 3 to 4 adult persons more than once. 
The medical opinion that she was accustomed to sexual inter course 
when admittedly she was living separately from her husband for 1 and 
Yi years before the incident also has its own implication. The medical 
evidence as such in the attendant facts and circumstances in a way 
belies the allegation of gang rape. 
21. The evidence of PW2 Geeta who admittedly had offered shelter 
to the prosecutrix and her minor daughter, though had been declared 
hostile, her testimony as a whole cannot
be brushed aside. In her 
testimony, this witness indicated that the prosecutrix used to take financial 
help from the accused persons and that she used to indulge in dubious 
late night activities for which her husband had deserted her. The defence 
plea of false implication as the accused persons had declined to oblige 
the prosecutrix qua her demand for financial help therefore cannot be 
lightly discarded in the overall factual scenario. Her version therefore is 
a plausible one and thus fit in with the defence plea to demolish the 
prosecution case. 
22. That the evidence ofa hostile witness in all eventualities ought 
not stand effaced altogether and that the same can be accepted to the 
extent found dependable on a carefiil scrutiny. was reiterated by this 
Court in Hinumsllu ® C/1intu (supra) by drawing sustenance of the 
proposition amongst others from Khuiii vs. State of MP. ( 1991) 3 SCC 
627 and Kofi Lakhman Bhai Chanabhai vs. State of Gujarat ( 1999) 
8 sec 624. It was enounced that the evidence of a hostile witness 
remains admissible and is open for a Court to rely on the dependable 
629 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
630 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] 9 S.C.R. 
part thereof as found acceptable and duly corroborated by other reliable 
evidence available on record. 
23. The seizures said to have been effected by the investigating 
agency also do not inspire confidence. Not only PW 4 Muthu denied 
that the seizure of ear studs had been made in his presence, DWI on 
oath had stated that this item of jewellery had in fact been purchased by 
the police from a local shop which he could identify on the basis of the 
symbol 'MP' inscribed thereon. In any view of the matter, the seized 
articles per se in absence of any evidence of corroboration of charge 
would not, irrefutably prove the involvement of the appellants in the 
offence all~ed. 
24. This Court in Raju (supra), while reiterating that the evidence 
of the prosecutrix in cases of rape, molestation and other physical outrages 
is to be construed to be that of an injured witness so much so that no 
corroboration is necessary, ruled that an accused must also be protected 
against the possibility of false implication. It was underlined that the 
testimony of the victim in such cases, though commands great weight 
but the same, cannot necessarily be universally and mechanically 
accepted to be free in all circumstances from embellishment and 
exaggeration. It was ruled that the presumption of absence of consent 
of the victim, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved as 
contemplated in Section l 14A of the
Evidence Act, was extremely 
restricted in its application compared to the sweep and ambit of the 
presumption under Sections I 13Aand l 13B of the Indian Evidence Act. 
It was exposited that insofar as the allegation of rape is concerned, the 
evidence of the prosecutrix must be examined as that of a injured witness 
whose presence at the spot is probable but it can never be presumed 
that her statement should always without exception, be taken as gospel 
truth. 
The essence of this verdict which has stood the test of time 
proclaims that though generally the testimony of a victim ofrape or non-
consensual physical assault ought to be accepted as true and unblemished, 
it would still be subject to judicial scrutiny lest a casual, routine and 
automatic acceptance thereof results in unwarranted conviction of the 
person charged. 
25. Vis-a-vis the scope of interference with a judgment ofacquittal, 
this Court in Sunil Kumar Slutbukunwr Gupta (Dr.) (supra) echoed
RAJA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
the hallowed proposition that if two views are possible, the appellate 
court should not ordinarily interfere therewith though its view may appear 
to be the more probable one. While emphasizing that the trial court has 
the benefit of watching the demeanour of the witnesses and is thus the 
best judge of their credibility, it was held that every accused is presumed 
to be innocent unless his guilt is proved and that his presumption of 
innocence gets reinforced with his acquittal by the trial court's verdict. 
It was reiterated that only in exceptionable cases and under compelling 
circumstances, where the judgement of acquittal is found to be perverse 
i.e. ifthe findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant 
materials or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material 
and are against the weight of evidence or are so outrageously in defiance 
oflogic so as to suffer from the vice ofirrationality, that interference' by 
the appellate court would be called for. 
26. That the appellate court is under an obligation to consider and 
identify the error in the decision of the trial court and then to decide 
whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference was underlined 
by this Court in S/1yanwl Salm (supra). It was emphasized that the 
appellate court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion for that 
of the trial court and that it has to exercise its discretion very
cautiously 
to correct an error oflaw or fact, ifany and significant enough to warrant 
reversal of the verdict of the trial cou11. 
27. The prosecution case, when judged on the touchstone of 
totality of the facts and circumstances, does not generate the unqualified 
and unreserved satisfaction indispensably required to enter a finding of 
guilt against the appellants. Having regard to the evidence on record as 
a whole, it is not possible for this Court to unhesitatingly hold that the 
charge levelled against the appellants has been proved beyond reasonable 
doubt. In our estimate, the view taken by the Trial Court is the 
overwhelmingly possible one. In contrast, the findings of the High Court 
are decipherably strained in favour of the prosecution by overlooking 
many irreconcilable inconsistencies, anomalies and omissions rendering 
the prosecution case unworthy of credit. Noticeably, the High Court 
has exonerated the appellants of the charge of abduction under Section 
366 IPC, which is an inseverable component of the string of offences 
alleged against them. Judged by the known parameters of law, the view 
adopted by the High Court is not a plausible one when juxtaposed to that 
of the Trial Court. We are of the unhesitant opinion that the prosecution 
631 
A 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
632 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
has failed to prove the charge against the appellants to the hilt as obligated 
in law and thus, they are entitled to the benefit of doubt. The appeal thus 
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgement and order is set-
aside. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds are discharged. 
Divya Pandey 
Appeal allowed.