NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH THROUGH SECRETARY & ORS
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 1073, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2017) 12 S.C.R. 1073 
NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH THROUGH SECRETARY 
& ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 3695 of2009) 
DECEMBER 06, 2017 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.] 
A 
B 
Stamp Act, 1899 - ss. 2(12). 2(14), 2(16) and Art.35 of 
Schedule I - Respondent No.3-Corporation and appellants entered 
into a formal contract - Each appellant was to carry out the work c 
of collection of "Tehbazari" and "Parking Fees" in terms of contract 
- Dispute arose as to the true nature of the contract and stamp duty 
payable by the appellants - Corporation demanded requisite stamp 
duty payable under the Stamp Act whereas as per Collector of Stamps 
the appellants were liable to pay stamp duty@ Rs. 701- per thousand 
on the contract amount treating the co/lfract as Lease - High Court 
D 
upheld the demand raised by the Collector of Stamps - Held: The 
terms of the contract would show that it was meant to collect tolls 
(fees) called "Tehbazari" in local parlance from squatters, vendors, 
kiosks etc. and was for collecting parking fees - By awarding such 
contract to the appellants. the Corporation had let their right to the 
appellants to collect the fees from a class of persons and for carrying 
E 
on particular activity in the city- The contract satisfied the definition 
of the expression "instrument" as defined in s.2(14) of the Act 
because it created a right and liabili(v and lastly, it also satisfied 
the definition of expression "executed" and
"execution" as defined 
in s.2(12) of the Act because it contained the signature of F 
contracting parties - Further, it related to the right to collect the 
tolls let by the Corporation to the person concerned. which square~v 
attrncts s.2(16)(c) of the Act and partakes the character of a 
"Lease" - Therefore, the contract in question is a "Lease" as de.fined 
in s.2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and is accordingly chargeable to 
payment of stamp duly as per the rates prescribed in Art.35 of G 
Schedule 1 of the Stamp Act as "Lease". 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: l.l The contract in question show that it was meant 
to collect tolls (fees) called "Tehbazari" in local parlance from 
1073 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 
A squatters, vendors, kiosks etc. and was for collecting parking 
fees. Such contract is regarded as an instrument by which tolls 
of any description are let. The contract was, therefore, for 
recovery of tolls and created rights and liabilities in favour of 
contracting parties qua each other. It cannot be disputed that 
B 
c 
D 
E 
the expression "tolls of any description" in clause (c) would 
include all kinds of levy, charges, fees etc. which the Corporation 
is entitled to charge under its Bye-laws (41). A/ortiori, the fees in 
question would also fall under Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act. 
(Paras 16 and 211 [1080-B; 1081-EJ 
1.2 The contract in question also satisfied the definition of 
the expression "Instrument" as defined in Section 2(14) of the 
Stamp Act because it created a right and liability and lastly, it also 
satisfied the definition of expressi!Jn "executed" and "execution" 
as defined in Section 2 (12) of the Stamp Act· because it contained 
the signature of contracting parties. The case at hand relates to 
the right to collect the tolls let by the Corporation to the person 
concerned. It squarely attracts Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act 
and partakes the character of a "Lease". Accordingly stamp duty 
is chargeable as per the rates prescribed in Article 35 of Schedule 
l of the Stamp Act as "Lease". [Paras 22, 26 and 27] (1081-F-G; 
1082-D-E) 
Mohammad Ali v. Board of Revenue, U.P. AIR 1987 
Allahabad
348 - approved. 
New Bus-Stand Shop Owners Association v. Corporation 
of Kozhikode & Anr. (2009) (10) SCC 455 : (2009) 14 
F 
SCR 793 - distinguished. 
Munindra Nath Upadhaya v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1995) 
2 UPLBEC 1789 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
G (1995) 2 UPLBEC 1789 
AIR 1987 Allahabad 348 
(2009) 14 SCR 793 
referred to 
approved 
distinguished 
Para 10 
Par:a 10 
Para 24 
H 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3695 
of2009
NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
1075 
PRADESH THR. SEC. & ORS. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.05.2006 of the High Court 
A 
of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9661 of2005 
WITH 
C. A. Nos. 3714, 3709, 3705, 3699, 37! i and 3702 of2009. 
J itendra Mohan Sharma, Sr. Adv., Anupam Lal Das, Anirudh Singh, 
B 
Ashok Kumar Sharma, Ms. Bandana Singh, Deepak Jyoti Ghildiyal, Vikal 
Mudgal, Pravcen Chaturvedi, Advs. for the Appellants. 
M. R. Shamshad, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Aviral Saxena, Dhawal 
Uniyal Vinay Garg, Kamlendra Mishra, Vishwa Pal Singh, Ravi Prakash 
Mehrotra, K. L. Janjani, Adarsh Upadhyay, P. K. Chakravarty, Gunnam c 
Venkateswara Rao, Advs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. I. These appeals arc filed 
against the judgment and order dated 22.05.2006 passed by the High 
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 9661/ D 
2005, 21327 /2006, 13249/2003, 12958/2004, 26755/2004, 31238/2005, 
44533/2005, 31058/2003, 22817/2006, 12957/2004 and 44532/2005 
whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants 
herein. 
2. In order to appreciate the short issue arising in this bunch of E 
appeals, it is necessary to set out few relevant facts hereinbclow. 
3. Respondent No.3 is a "Nagar Nigam Mccrut" also called 
"Municipal Corporation Meerut" in the State ofU.P. (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Corporation"). The Corporation is
constituted and governed 
by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 . F 
(for short "the Act"). Its area of operation is in the city of Meerut. 
4. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 541 ( 4 I) of the 
Act, the Corporation has framed Bye-laws for implementing the 
provisions of the Act and for regulating various activities meant essentially 
for the benefit of the residents/public ofMeerut city. Clause 41 of the 
G 
Bye-laws empowers the Corporation to fix any fees for grant of any 
license, sanction or permission to person(s) by and under the Act. 
5. In March 2004, the Corporation issued an advertisement inviting 
bids from public at large for letting out the right of collection of ( 1) 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 
A 
realization ofTehbazari Fee from squatters, vendors, kiosks and (2) for 
· collecting parking fees. 
6. So far as the connecting appeals are concerned, they pertain to 
other cities of U.P. but relate to the same aforementioned activities. 
The appellants participated in the public auction held by the Corporation. 
B 
Their bids were finally accepted. 
7. The Corporation accordingly informed to the appellants 
individually about acceptance of their bids and entered into a formal 
contract with each appellant to enable them to carry out the work of 
collection of what is called as "Tehbazari" and "Parking Fees" in terms 
c of the contract. One such contract is (Annexure P-10). The period of 
contract was up to 31.03 .2005. 
8. The execution of contract led to the disputes among the 
appellants, Corporation and the Collector of Stamps, namely, what is the 
true nature of the contract and how much stamp duty is payable by the 
D 
appellants on the contract under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short 
· "the Stamp Act"). 
E 
F 
G 
H 
9. The Corporation, vidc their letter (Annexure P-8), requested 
the appellants to deposit the requisite stamp duty payable under the Stamp 
Act whereas the Collector of Stamps requested the appellants to pay 
stamp duty@ Rs.70/- per thousand on the contract amount treating the 
contract as Lease. 
I 0. The appellants felt aggrieved of the demand raised by the 
Collector of Stamps and filed writ
petitions in the Allahabad High Court. 
The Allahabad High Court placing reliance on its previous decisions in 
Munindra Nath Upadhaya vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (W.P. No.4978 
of 1994) (1995) 2 UPLBEC 1789 and Mohammad Ali vs. Board of 
Rc\'cnuc, U.P. (AIR 1987 Allahabad 348) upheld the demands raised 
by the Collector of Stamps and finding no fault therein dismissed the 
writ petitions which has given rise to filing of these appeals by special 
leave by the unsuccessful writ petitioners in this Court. 
l l. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal 
of the record of the case, we find no merit in these appeals. In our 
opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the High Com1 in the case of 
Mohammad Ali vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. (supra) is just and proper 
calling for no interference for the reasons given by us hereinbelow.
NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
1077 
PRADESH THR. SEC. & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
12. Sections 2(12), 2(14), 2(16) and Article 35 of Schedule I to 
A 
the Stamp Act arc relevant for deciding the question arising in the case. 
They read as under: 
"2(12) "Executed" and "execution", used with reference 
to instruments, mean "signed" and "signature". 
2(14) "Instrument" includes every document by which any 
B 
right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, 
limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. 
2(16) "Lease" means a lease of immovable property, and 
includes also -
(a) a pattu; 
(b) a Ka/J11liyat or other undertaking in writing, not being a 
counterpart of a lease, to cultivate, occupy, or pay or deliver 
rent for, immovable property; 
c 
(c) any instrument by which tolls of any description arc let; 
D 
(d) any writing on an application for a lease intended to 
signify that the application is granted; 
Article 35 of Schedule 1. 
Description of Instrument 
Proper Stamp-duty 
E 
LEASE, 
including 
an 
under-lease 
or sub-lease 
and any agreement to let or 
sub-let 
F 
(a) where by such lease the 
rent 
is 
fixed 
and 
110 
premium 
is 
paid 
or 
delivered-
The same duty as a Bond 
(i) 
where the lease 
(No.IS) for the whole 
purports to be 
amount 
payable 
or 
G 
for a term of 
deliverable under such 
less than one 
lease. 
year; 
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1078 
A 
B. 
c 
D 
E. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] 12 S.C.R. 
(ii) 
where the lease purports 
to be for a term of not 
less than one year but 
not more than three 
years; 
(iii) where the lease purports 
to be for a term in 
excess of three years; 
(iv) where the lease does not 
purport to be for any 
definite term; 
(v) 
where the lease purports 
to be in perpetuity. 
(b) where the lease is granted 
for a fine or premium or for 
money advanced and where no 
rent is reserved. 
( c) where the lease is granted 
for a fine or premium or for 
money advanced in addition to 
rent reserved. 
The same duty as Bond (No. 
15) for the amount or value of 
the 
average 
annual 
rent 
reserved. 
The 
same 
duty 
as 
a 
Conveyance (No. 23) for a 
consideration equal 
to 
the 
amount or value of the average 
annual rent reserved. 
The 
same 
duty 
as 
a 
Conveyance (No.23) for a 
consideration equal 
to 
the 
amount or value of the average 
annual rent which would be 
paid or delivered for the first 
ten years if the lease continued 
so long. 
The 
same 
duty 
as 
a 
Conveyance (No. 23) for a 
consideration equal to one-fifth 
of the whole amount of rents 
which would 
be 
paid or 
deli vcrcd in respect of the first 
fifty years of the lease. 
The 
same 
duty 
as 
a 
Conveyance (No. 23) for a 
consideration equal 
to the 
amount or value of such fine or 
premium or advance as set 
forth in the lease. 
The 
same 
duty 
as 
a 
Conveyance (No. 23) for a 
consideration 
equal 
to 
the
amount or value of such fine or 
premium or advance as set 
forth in the lease, in addition to

NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH THR. SEC. & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
Exemptions 
(a) Lease, executed in the 
case of a cultivator and for 
the purposes of cultivation 
(including a lease of trees for 
the production of food or 
drink) without the payment 
or delivery of any fine or 
premium, when. a definite 
term is expressed and such 
term does not exceed one 
year, or when the average 
annual rent reserved does not 
exceed one hundred rupees. 
the duty which would have 
been payable on such lease 
if no fine or premium or 
advance had been paid or 
delivered: 
Provided that, in any case 
when 
an agreement to 
lease is stamped with the 
ad valorem stamp required 
for a lease, and a lease in 
pursuance 
of 
such 
agreement is subsequently 
executed, the duty on such 
lease shall not exceed eight 
annas. 
13. The expression "Lease" defined in Section 2(16) clause (c) 
shows that it also includes therein "any instrument by which tolls of 
any description are let". 
1079 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
14. Similarly the expression "executed" and "execution" with 
reference to any instrument, as defined in Section 2( 12) of the Stamp 
Act, means "signecf' and "signature". 
15. Likewise the expression "Instrument" defined in Section 
2( 14) shows that it includes therein every document by which any right 
H
1080 
A 
B 
c· 
D 
E 
F 
G 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 
or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, 
extinguished or recorded. 
16. In our considered opinion, reading of the contract in question 
would show that it was meant to collect tolls (fees) called "Tehbazari" 
in local parlance from squatters, venders, kiosks etc. and was for 
collecting parking fees. Such contract, in our view, is regarded as an 
instrument by which tolls of any description are let. In other words, by 
awarding such contract to the appellants, the Corporation had let their 
right to the appellants to collect the fees from a class of persons and for 
carrying on particular activity in the city. . 
17. The expression "Lease" under the Stamp Act has a wider 
meaning as compared to its original meaning contained in Section 105 of 
Transfer of Property Act (for short "the T.P. Act"). If "Lease" under 
Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act includes therein four specified category 
of documents set out in clauses (a) to (d), we do not find any such 
inclusion in Section l 05 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is for this 
reason, we are of the view that the definition of"Lease" for the purpose 
of Stamp Act is extensive in nature. It is also clear from the use of the 
expression "and includes also" in Section 2 (16) of the Stamp Act. 
18. So by fiction, "any instrument by which tolfs of any 
description are let" is considered as "Lease" for the purpose of payment
of stamp duty under the Stamp Act. 
I 9. Justice G.P. Singh, the learned author in his book "Principles 
of Statutory Interpretation" in 13th edition - at pages 179 and 180 has 
dealt with this subject under the heading "Definition sections or 
interpretation clause". 
In its sub-heading (a) "Restrictive and 
extensive definition", the author has explained as to where the words 
"mean", "include", "includes", and "means and includes" arc used in 
any definition clause in the Act then how such definition should be 
interpreted. The following passage is apposite to quote. 
"(a) Restrictive and extensive definitions 
The Legislature has power to define a word even artificially. 
So the definition of a word in the definition section may 
either l>e restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may l>e 
extensive of the same. When a word is defined to 'mean' 
such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and
NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
1081 
PRADESH THR. SEC. & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
exhaustive; whereas, where the word defined is declared 
A 
to 'include' such and such, the definition is prima facie 
extensive. When by an amending Act,_ the word 'includes' 
was substituted for the word 'means' in a definition section, 
it was held that the intention was to make it more 
extensive. Further, a definition may be in the form of 'means 
B 
and includes', where again the definition is exhaustive, on · 
the other hand, if a word is defined 'to apply to and include', 
the definition is understood as extensive. These meanings 
of the expressions 'means', 'includes' and 'means and 
includes' have been reiterated in Delhi Development 
Authority vs. Bhola Nath Sharma, (2011) 2 SCC 54. The 
C 
use of word 'any' e.g. any building also connotes extension 
for 'any' is a word of very wide meaning and prima facie the 
use of it excludes limitation." 
20. In our opinion, the aforesaid rule of interpretation applies while 
interpreting the definition of Lease under Section 2( 16) of the Stamp 
D 
Act. 
21. As mentioned above, the Corporation in these cases awarded 
the contract to the appellants to recover the tolls (fees) from squatters, 
vendors, kiosks etc. and for parking the vehicles in specified places. 
The contract was, therefore, for recovery of tolls and created rights and 
E 
liabilities in favour of contracting parties qua each other. It cannot be 
disputed
that the expression "tolls of any description" in clause ( e) would 
include all kinds of levy, charges, fees etc. which the Corporation is 
entitled to charge under its Bye-laws ( 41 ). A fortiori, the fees in question 
would also fall under Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act. 
22. In our opinion, the contract in question also satisfied the 
definition of the expression "Instrument" as defined in Section 2(14) of 
the Stamp Act because it created a right and liability and lastly, it also 
satisfied the definition of expression "executed" and "execution" as 
defined in Section 2 (12) of the Stamp Act because it contained the 
F 
signature of contracting parties. 
G 
23. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, placed reliance 
on the decision of this Court 
in New Bus-Stand Shop Owners 
Association vs. Corooraton of Kozhikode & Anr. [2009 (10) SCC 
455] and contended that in the light of the law laid down in the case of 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017) 12 S.C.R. 
A 
New Bus-stand Shop Owners Association (supra), the contract in 
question has characteristics of a "license" but not of a "lease" and, 
therefore, the contract would attract a stamp duty payable on a License 
Deed under the Stamp Act. 
24. In our view, the law laid down in the case of New Bus-stand 
B 
Shop Owners Association (supra) is not applicable to the case at hand 
and is distinguishable on facts. 
25. In the case of New Bus-stand Shop Owners Association 
(supra), the Corporation ofKozhikode had let out their shops to several 
persons and executed agreement in their favour. The question, however, 
c arose as to the true nature of the agreement, whether it is a "license 
agreement" or a "lease agreement". Their Lordships on construction 
of the terms of agreement held that the agreement was a license and 
accordingly chargeable to stamp duty as "License" under the Kerala 
Stamp Act. 
D 
26. Such is not the case here. The case at hand relates to the 
E 
F 
right to collect the tolls let by the Corporation to the person concerned. 
It squarely attracts Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and partakes the 
character of a "Lease". 
27. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered 
opinion that the contract in question is a "Lease" as defined in Section 
2( 16)( c) of the Stamp Act and is accordingly chargeable to payment of 
stamp duty as per the rates prescribed in Article 35 of Schedule I of the 
Stamp Act
as "Lease". The conclusion arrived at by the Single Judge 
in Mohammad Ali vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. (supra) is, therefore, 
correct which we support with our reasoning given supra. 
28. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals arc found to be 
devoid of any merit. They are accordingly dismissed. 
. Ankit Gyan 
Appeals dismissed .