U. SUBHADRAMMA & ORS. versus STATE OF A.P. REP. BY PUB. PROSECUTOR & ANR.
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 469, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 469 
U. SUBHADRAMMA & ORS. 
v. 
STATE OF A.P. REP. BY PUB. PROSECUTOR & ANR. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 1596of201 I) 
JULY 04, 2016 
[S.A. BOBDE AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 -: Clause 3 -
Application for attachment of property - Misappropriation of fimds 
by accused - Death of accused during the pendency of criminal 
trial - Attachment of property of dead accused by District Judge -
Permissibility of- Held: Prosecution cannot cominue against a dead 
person - Such proceedings and findings are contrary to the very 
foundation of criminal jurisprudence - 111 such a case the accused 
does not exist and cannot be convicted - District Judge committed 
a gross error of law in acting upon such a finding and treating 
accused as guilty of such offences while making the order of 
attachment and confirming the said order of attachment - Orders 
of the criminal court vis-a-vis the said accused illegal and set aside. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 If the law requires that the orders of attachment 
should be withdrawn upon acquittal it stands to reason that such 
orders must be withdrawn when the prosecution abates or cannot 
result in a conviction due to the death of the accused, whose 
property is attached. Concept of abatement of a trial could be 
subsumed in the clause where the final judgment and order of 
the Criminal Court is one of acquittal. The presumption of 
innocence of an accused till he is convicted must be borne in
mind and there is no reason to consider this presumption to have 
vaporized upon the death of an accused. [Para 6] (475-D-F] 
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1.2 A prosecution cannot continue against a dead person. A 
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fortiori a criminal court cannot continue proceedings against a 
dead person and find him guilty. Such proceedings and the findings 
are contrary to the very foundation of criminal jurisprudence. In 
such a case the accused docs not exist and cannot be convicted. 
Consequently, the District Judge committed a gross error of law 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] 3 S.C.R. 
in acting upon such a finding and treating R as guilty of such 
offences while making the order of attachment and while 
confirming the said order of attachment of properties. In such 
circumstance, the courts below erred in recording the finding 
that appellant No.1 had committed the offence as alleged by the 
prosecution. Further, finding recorded by the Single Judge of 
the High Court that appellant No.1 alone had committed the 
offence and nor appellant No. 2, must be taken to have 
misappropriated the said amount is perverse. The facts involved 
did not warrant presumption of commission of offence by appellant 
No.1 and thus, the findings recorded by the courts below are not 
tenable. [Paras 7, 8, 9) [476-A-C; E-F] 
1.3 The District Judge could not have proceeded with the 
attachment proceedings at all since the attachment proceedings 
were initiated by the State against R under clause 3 of the Criminal 
Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944, who was actually dead. Clause 
3 contemplates that such an application must be made to the 
District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the 
said person ordinarily resides or carries on business, in respect 
of property which the State Government believes the said person 
to have procured by means of the offences. It is incomprehensible, 
therefore, that such an application could have been made in regard 
to a dead person who obviously cannot be said to
be ordinarily 
resident or carrying on business anywhere. There is no legal 
provision which enables continuance of prosecution upon death 
of the accused. The proceedings and the decisions of the courts 
below are disturbing, in the first place, though the accused had 
died, the trial court proceeded with the trial and recorded a 
conviction two years after his death, then, this null and void 
conviction was used as a basis for making an attachment of his 
properties before the Sessions Court. Astonishingly, all 
applications succeeded, the attachment was made absolute and 
over and above all, the High Court upheld the attachment. The 
orders of the Criminal Court vis-a-vis R are illegal and is set 
aside. The impugned judgment is unsustainable and is set aside. 
[Paras 10, 11) [476-1!'-H; 477-A-C) 
Willie (WILIAM) Slaney v. State of M.P. 1956 AIR 116 : 
1955 SCR 1140; Babu Singh v. State ()f Punjab (1963) 
3 SCR 749; Ashish Batham v. State of M.P. 2002 (2)
U. SUBHADRAMMA & ORS. v. STATE OF A.P. REP. BY PUB. 
PROSECUTOR & ANR. 
Suppl. SCR 146 : 2002 (7) SCC 317; Ranjitsing 
Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr. 
2005 (3) SCR 345 : 2005 (5) SCC 294; Sher Singh @ 
Partapa v. State of Haryana 2015 (1) SCR 29 : 2015 
(3) SCC 724; State of Punjab v . .!agbir Singh. Baljit 
Singh and Karan Singh AIR 1973 SC 2407 - referred 
to. 
Case Law Reference 
1955 SCR 1140 
referred to 
Para6 
(1963) 3 SCR 749 
referred to 
Para6 
2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 146 
referred to 
Para6 
2005 (3) SCR 345 
referred to 
Para6 
2015 (1) SCR 29 
referred to 
Para6 
AIR 1973 SC 2407 
referred to 
Para8 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
No. 1596 of201 l. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.06.2006 of the High Court 
of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No. 
5922 of2002. 
J.M. Sharma, Sr.Adv .. R. S. Krishnan, Ms. Suruchi, Syed Ahmad 
Naqvi, Ms. Sweta Jain, D. Mahesh Babu, Advs. for the Appellants. 
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Guntur Prabhakar, Ms. Prerna Singh, G. N. Reddy, Advs. for the 
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Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Com1 was delivered by 
S. A, BOBDE, J. 1. The appellants being legal representatives 
of one Ramachandraiah who was accused of offences under Sections 
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409, 468 read with Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code, have filed this 
appeal against the Judgment and order dated 28-6-2006 of the High 
Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad dismissing their petition under 
Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. Ramachandraiah, since 
deceased, who was the husband of Appellant No.1 and father of 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] 3 S.C.R. 
Appellant Nos. 2 and 3, was prosecuted under the aforesaid sections in 
respect of misappropriation of funds. He was charged with 
misappropriation ofan amount of Rs. 6,57,355.90 during the period 31-
7-1987 to 29-6-1988 along with him one Subbarayudu was charged as 
Accused No.2. In October, 1991, U. Ramachandraiah expired during 
the trial. The trial court acquitted the Accused No.2 Subbarayudu by 
Judgment dated 25.10.1993. However, the trial court observed on the 
basis of oral and documenta1·y evidence that Ramachandraiah alone 
committed the offence as alleged by the prosecution. Further, that there 
was no oral or documentary evidence placed before the Court to show 
that Subbarayudu the surviving accused assisted Ramachandraiah in 
committing the alleged offence. In effect, the trial court found 
Ramachandraiah responsible for the offences though he could not be 
adjudged guilty since he had expired. 
Proceedings under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance 
against the property of the deceased 
2. In 1997, the State moved an application under the Criminal 
Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 (Ordinance No. XXXVlll of 1944) 
for attachment of property of the appellant under the criminal law. 
Thereon, the DistrictJudge passed an orderofinterim attachment under 
Clause 4 of the ordinance on the basis that Ramachandraiah has 
committed the scheduled offences or that he has procured money or the 
property in
question from the proceeds of such offence. The District 
Judge issued notice calling upon the appellants to show cause why the 
orderofattachment should not be made absolute. In this order, the District 
Judge observed that according to the state as many as 30 items mentioned 
in the schedule were acquired by the said Ramachandraiah either in his 
own name or his wife's name or in the names of his sons due to illegal 
amounts drawn by him and a case was filed against Ramachandraiah as 
accused No. I and Subbarayudu as accused no.2. The District Judge 
further observed that the trial court i.e. first Additional District Munsif, 
Cuddapah found Ramachandraiah had committed the offence as alleged 
by the prosecution and, therefore, the said Ramachandraiah committed 
the offence. It was observed by the learned District Judge that 
Ramachandraiah had been found to have prepared bills in the fictitious 
names of2 I lecturers during the relevant period and had drawn cash on 
the basis of the pay bills including the bogus bills since May 1991 and 
drawn about Rs.38,00,000/- to Rs.40,00,000/-.
U. SUBHADRAMMA & ORS. v. STATE OF A.P. REP. BY PUB. 
PROSECUTOR & ANR. [S. A. BOBDE, J.] 
3. Thereafter on 1-10-2002", the learned District Judge heard 
both sides and made the order of interim conditional attachment absolute. 
He observed that the High Court has refused to interfere with the order 
of interim conditional attachment and though no counter affidavit had 
been filed by the appellants, the learned District Judge observed that the 
appellants have failed to prove that the prope1iies as mentioned in the 
schedule are the selt~acquired properties of U. Ramachandraiah and, 
therefore, the order is being made absolute. 
4. The appellants then challenged the order of the learned District 
Judge making an interim attachment absolute by way of a petition under 
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Single Judge 
held that the amount misappropriated is 6,57,355.90; strangely, on the 
basis of the charge sheet. The learned Single Judge also observed that 
Ramachandraiah who alone had committed the offence and not 
Subbarayudu, must be taken to have misappropriated the said amount 
since the Trial Court held the latter to !Je innocent. Against the aforesaid 
order, the appellants have preferred this appeal. 
5. Learned Senior counsel for the appellants submitted that the 
scheme of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 ·does not 
permit the District Judge to confirm any attachment of the property 
though the criminal court has not validly convicted
and found the accused 
or the person whose property is sought to be attached as guilty. Learned 
counsel submitted that in this case, it was not possible for the criminal 
court to have convicted or found Ramachandraiah guilty since he expired 
in 1991 during the trial. In fact, according to the appellants, no application 
for attachment could have been made under these circumstances. 
Learned counsel for the respondents strongly opposed the prayer and 
submitted that the appellants may not to be allowed to retain property 
obtained by ill-gotten means and it was legal for the learned District 
Judge to have passed the order ofattachment in respect of such property 
which was admittedly the subject matter of the charge-sheet. It has, 
therefore, become necessary for us to examine whether the property of 
a person which was merely case of an offence of misappropriation but 
who died during the pendency of the criminal trial can be attached in the 
hands of his legal representatives under the provisions of Criminal Law 
Amendment Ordinance, 1944. 
6. As far as making the application for attachment, we find that 
the law authorises the State Government to make such an application 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
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even though proceedings against the person may not yet have resulted 
in a conviction. This is by virtue of clause 3 1 which empowers the 
Government to authorise making of such an application to the District 
Judge where it has reason to believe that any person has committed any 
scheduled offence. But however clause 3 requires the Government to 
make such an application to the District Judge within the local limits of 
whose jurisdiction the said person ordinarily resides or carries on business; 
thus clearly requiring the existence of such a person. It excludes the 
possibility of proceedings against a dead person. Clause 4 of the act 
empowers the District Judge to pass an order of ad i1iterim attachment 
on prima facie grounds for believing that the person in respect of whom 
the application is made has committed any scheduled offence or has 
procured any money or prope1iy thereby. Sub-clause 2 requires the 
District Judge to issue a notice, presumably at the address where the 
person ordinarily resides or carries on business (vide clause 3) along 
with copies of the order and the application etc. Clause 5 provides for an 
3. Application for attachment of property:-
( I) Where the [State Government or as the case may be. the Central Government] 
has reason to believe that any person has committed (whether alter the commencement 
of this Ordinance or not) any scheduled offence the [State Government may.
whether 
or not any Court has taken cognizance of the offence. authorise the making of an 
application to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the said 
person ordinarily resides or carries on business. for attachment, under this Ordinance, 
of the money or other property which the [State Government. or as the case may be, 
the Central Government] believes the said person to have procured by means of the 
offence, or if such money or property cannot for any reason be attached, of other 
property of the said person of value as nearly as may be equivalent to that of the 
aforesaid money or other property. 
[Amended by A.O. 1950 & again by Prevention of Corruption Act. 1988] 
(2) The provisions of Order XXYll of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908. shall apply to proceedings for an order of attachment under this 
Ordinance as they apply to suits by the [Government]. 
(3) An application under sub-section (I) shall be accompanied by one or more 
aftidavits, stating the grounds on which the belief that the said person has committed 
any scheduled offence is founded. and the amount of money or value ofother property 
believed to have been procured by means of the offence. The application shall also 
furnish-
[ Added by Prevention of Corruption Act. 1988] 
(a) any information available as to the location for the time being of any such money or 
other property and shall, if necessary, give particulars, including the estimated value, of
other property of the said person: 
(b) the names and addresses of any other person believed to have or to be likely to 
claim. any interest or title in the property of the said person. 
·
U. SUBHADRAMMA & ORS. v. STATE OF A.P. REP. BY PUB. 
475 
PROSECUTOR & ANR. [S. A. BOBDE, J.] 
investigation of objections to the attachment who have been served with 
notices under clause 4. Sub-clause 3 empowers the District Judge to 
pass an order making the ad interim order of attachment absolute or 
varying it by releasing a portion of the property or withdrawing the order. 
Clause 13 requires the Government to inform the District Judge about 
the status of the criminal proceedings. It requires the Government to 
furnish the District Judge with a copy of the judgment or order of the 
trial court and with copies of the judgment or orders, ifany of the appellate 
or revisional court thereon. Sub-clause 2 mandates that the District Judge 
shall forthwith withdraw any orders of attachment of property made in 
connection with the offence if(a) cognizance ofalleged scheduled offence 
has not been taken or (b) where the final judgment and orders of the 
criminal court is one of acquittal. While, this clause is clear that the 
orders of attachment must be withdrawn if cognizance of the offence 
has not been taken or there has been an acquittal; the clause is silent as 
to the effect of abatement of prosecution. It is due to this silence that it 
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is contended by the State Government in this case that the orders of . D 
attachment could not only have been continued but could also have been 
confirmed. It is not possible for us to accept the submission. If the law
requires that the orders of attachment should be withdrawn upon acquittal 
it stands to reason that such orders must be withdrawn when the 
prosecution abates or cannot result in a conviction due to the death of 
the accused, whose property is attached. Concept of abatement of a 
trial could be subsumed in the clause where the final judgment and order 
of the Criminal Court is one of acquittal. In this context, the presumption 
of innocence of an accused till he is convicted must be borne in mind 
and there is no reason to consider this presumption to have vaporized 
upon the death of an accused. It may be noted that this Court has time 
and again reiterated the presumption of innocence of an accused till he 
is convicted.' 
7. As far as the circumstances of this case are concerned, we 
find that there has been a gross mis-carriage of justice at several steps. 
In the first place, the finding of the trial court that Ramachandraiah was 
alone responsible for the offences is completely vitiated as null and void 
since Ramachandraiah had admittedly died on the date this finding was 
2 (1955)2SCR 1140atpage 1195 
(1963) 3 SCR 749 at page 766 
(2002) 7 sec 317 at para 8 
(2005) 5 sec 294 at para 35 
(2015) 3 sec 724 at paras 12 and 17 
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rendered. It is too well settled that a prosecution cannot continue against 
a dead person. A fortiori a criminal court cannot continue proceedi11gs 
against a dead person and find him guilty. Such proceedings and the 
findings are contrary to the very foundation of criminal jurisprudence. In 
such a case the accused does not exist and cannot be convicted. 
Consequently, the learned District Judge committed a gross error oflaw 
in acting upon such a finding and treating Ramachandraiah as guilty of 
such offences while makingthe order ofattachment and while confirming 
the said order of attachment of properties. 
8. In such circumstance, the courts below erred in recording the 
finding that Appellant No. I had committed the offence as alleged by the 
prosecution. Further, finding recorded by the learned Single Judge of the 
High Court that Appellant No.1 alone had committed the offence and 
nor Appellant No.2, must be taken to have misappropriated the said 
amount is perverse. 
"A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give 
flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with 
the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is 
guilty of the crime with which he is charged ................. In 
arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged 
with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence 
by the yardstick of
probabilities, its intrinsic worthy and the animus 
of witness3• 
9. The facts involved herein did not warrant presumption of 
commission of offence by Appellant No. I and thus the findings recorded 
by the courts below are not tenable. 
I 0. In fact, we find that the learned District Judge could not have 
proceeded with the attachment proceedings at all since the attachment 
proceedings were initiated by the State against Ramachandraiah under 
clause 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944, who was 
actually dead. Clause 3 contemplates that such an application must be 
made to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction 
the said person ordinarily resides or carries on business, in respect of 
property which the State Government believes the said person to have 
procured by means of the offences. It is incomprehensible, therefore, 
that such an application could have been made in regard to a dead person 
who obviously cannot be said to be ordinarily resident or carrying on 
3 State of Punjab v.Jagbir Singh,Baljit Singh and Karan Singh.AIR 1973 SC 2407
U. SUBHADRAMMA & ORS. v. STATE OF A.P. REP. BY PUB. 
PROSECUTOR & ANR. [S. A. BOBDE, J.] 
business anywhere. There is no legal provision which enables continuance 
of prosecution upon death of the accused. We must record that the 
proceedings and the decisions of the courts below are disturbing, to say 
the least. In the first place, though the accused had died, the trial court 
proceeded with the trial and recorded a conviction two years after his 
death. Then, this null and void conviction was used as a basis for making 
an attachment of his properties before the Sessions Court. Astonishingly, 
all applications succeeded, the attachment was made absolute and over 
and above all, the High Court upheld the attachment. 
11. The orders of the Criminal Com1 vis-a-vis Ramachandraiah 
are illegal and liable to be set aside. We also find that the impugned 
judgment in appeal is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. The 
orders of the Courts below are accordingly set aside. The appeal 
succeeds. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal allowed. 
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