GHUSABHAI RAISANGBHAI CHORASIYA & ORS. versus STATE OF GUJARAT
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 594, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 594 
GHUSABHAI RAISANGBHAI CHORASIYA & ORS. 
A 
v. 
STATE OF GUJARAT 
(Criminal Appeal No. 262 of2009) 
FEBRUARY 18, 2015 
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND 
B 
DIPAK MISRA, JJ.] 
C 
Pena/Code, 1860- 498A, 306, 201 and114-Dowrydeath 
-
The deceased committed suicide - Deceased-wife 
suspecting illicit relationship of her husband-accused -
Conviction by courts below of the husband and other three D 
accused - On appeal, held: Mere extra-marital relationship, 
even if proved, would be illegal and immoral unless proved 
that the accused had conducted in such a way which 
amounted to high degree of mental cruelty driving a woman 
to commit suicide - The facts of the present case did not E 
amount to cruelty under the first limb of s.498-A - The 
evidence against other appellants-accused also not sufficient 
to hold them guilty- All the accused acquitted. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The first limb of Section 498A IPC, which 
refers to cruelty, has nothing to do with demand of dowry. 
F 
In the present case, there is no demand of dJwry. The 
deceased was pained and disturbed as the husband was G 
having an illicit affair with appellant No.4. Such a 
situation would not amount to cruelty under the first limb 
of Section 498A IPC. Mere extra-marital relationship, even 
if proved, would be illegal and immoral. However, it 
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[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A would take a different character ifthe prosecution brings 
some evidence ~>n record to show that the accused had 
conducted in such a manner to drive the wife to commit 
suicide. In the instant case, the accused may have been 
involved in an illicit relationship with appellant No. 4, but 
B in the absence of some other acceptable evidence on 
record that can establish such high degree of mental 
cruelty, the Explanation to Section 498A which includes 
cruelty to drive a woman to commit suicide, would not 
C be attracted. [paras 18 and 20] [602-C-D; 604-G-H; 605-
A-B] 
Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat 2013 
(10) SCR 306 = 2013 (10) SCC 48 - relied on. 
D Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of Maharashtra 2002 
(3) SCR 376 =20.02 (5) SCC 177, Gurnaib Singh v. State of 
Punjab 2013 (3) SCR 563 = 2013 (7) SCC 108 - referred to. 
2. So far as the other accused persons, viz. appellant 
E Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are concerned, there is no allegation of 
any kind of physical torture. The evidence brought on 
record against them with regard to cruelty is absolutely 
sketchy and not convincing. 
On the basis of the 
evidence against them, it is difficult to sustain their 
F conviction under Sections 306 and 498A IPC. Since the 
offence under Section 306 and 498A IPC is not 
sustainable, the conviction under Section 201 IPC also 
cannot be sustained. [para 21] [605-C, D-E] 
G 
H 
Case Law Reference 
2002 (3) SCR ·376 
2013 (3) SCR 563
2013 (10) SCR 306 
referred to 
referred to 
relied on 
para 16 
para 17 
para 18
c 
GH!JSABHAI RAISANGBHAI CHORASIYA v. 
596 
STATE OF GUJARAT 
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
A 
262 of 2009 
From the Judgment·and Order dated 09.07.2008 of the High 
Court of Gujarat in Criminal Appeal No. 444 of 2005 
Haresh Raichura, Saroj Raichura, Kalp Raichura, RajatVats 
for the Appellants. 
B 
Anurag Ahluwalia, Hemantika Wahi, Puja Singh for the C 
Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. The present appeal, by special 
leave, is directed against the judgment of conviction and order D 
of sentence passed by the High Court of Gujarat atAhmedabad 
in Criminal Appeal No. 444/2005 whereby the Division Bench 
has affirmed the conviction recorded by the learned Additional 
Sessions Judge, Jamnagar, who had found the appellants guilty 
of the offences punishable under Section 498A, 306, 201 and 
E 
114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC' for short) and 
sentenced Ghusabhai Raisinghbhai Chorasia, appellant no.1 
to suffer five years imprisonment, Rakesh Ghusabhai 
Chorasia, appellant no.2 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for F 
seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-with a default clause 
and other accused persons, namely, Bakuben W/o Ghusabhai 
Chorasia and Jasuben @ Gaduben Rakeshbhai, appellant 
nos. 3 and 4 herein to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three 
years and to pay fine of Rs.250/-with a default clause under G 
Section 306 IPC. That apart, separate sentences were 
imposed under Section 498A and 201 with
the stipulation that 
all the sentences w.ould run concurrently. Be it noted, the 
appellants were tried along with two other accused persons, 
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A 
namely, Sangitaben w/o. Vijaybhai and Vijay Ghusabhai 
Chorasia who were acquitted by the learned trial Judge. It is 
also apt to note here that the State had also preferred two 
criminal appeals, one for enhancement of sentence and the 
other challenging the acquittal of the other two accused persons 
B 
and both the appeals were dismissed along with the appeal 
filed by the appellants in a common judgment. 
2. The prosecution case, bereft of unnecessary details, is that 
the marriage between the deceased Biniben and Rakesh was 
C solemnized approximately eight years before the date of 
occurrence, i.e. 4.3.2004. As put forth by the prosecution, 
Rakesh, husband of the deceased, had illicit relationship with 
Jasuben, a divorcee. Despite the said situation two children 
0 
were born in the wedlock but the compatibility between the 
husband and wife and the harmony of family life could not be 
sustained. When the first child was three months old, the 
deceased was driven out by her husband and she came to 
her parental home and stayed there for sometime. Afterthe 
E intervention of the-elders and relatives a settlement was arrived 
at and thereafter she came to stay in her in-laws house. It was 
the further case of the prosecution that the husband was keen 
in his extra-marital affair and that had led to more marital 
discord and bitterness. The in-laws, as alleged, used to take 
F away the income earned by her. A time came
when she was 
compelled to stay on the terrace of the house where she 
committed suicide on 4th of March, 2004. 
3. As the case of the prosecution further gets uncurtained, the 
G dead body was cremated without informing the parents of the 
deceased and the factum of the death was reported by the 
father-in-law of the deceased on 14th of March, 2004 and 
eventually the mother of the deceased came to know about 
the death on 17th of March, 2004 and thereafter reported at 
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GHUSABHAI RAISANGBHAI CHORASIYA v. 
598 
STATE OF GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.) 
the Police Station in Jamnagar. After the criminal law was set A 
in motion, the investigating agency proceeded with the 
· investigation and recorded the statements of 25 witnesses and 
eventually placed the charge-sheet under Sections 498A, 306 
and Section 201 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal 
Code, before the competent court. After the charge-sheet was 
B 
filed, the learned Magistrate committed the matter to the Court 
of Session. 
4. The accused persons abjured their guilt and wanted to be 
~~. 
c 
5. During the trial, the prosecution in order to establish the 
charges levelled against the accused persons, examined 25 
witnesses and exhibited certain documents. 
D 
6. The learned trial Judge placing reliance on the ocular as 
well as the documentary evidence came to hold that four 
accused persons, namely, father-in-law A-1, husband A-2, 
mother-in-law A-3 and the woman with whom the husband was 
having illicit relationship,A-4, guilty of the offences. However, 
E 
the trial Judge acquitted the elder brother of the husband and 
his wife for lack of evidence. 
7. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction 
and order of sentence, the accused filed Criminal Appeal No. 
F 
444 of 2005. As stated earlier, the State preferred Criminal 
Appeal No. 2408 of 2005 for enhancement of sentence and 
Criminal Appeal No. 2410 of 2005 assailing the judgment of 
the acquittal of two
accused persons. 
8. The High Court appreciating the evidence brought on record, 
declined to interfere in the appeals preferred by the State and 
resultantly all the appeals stood dismissed. 
G 
9. Be it noted, the principal witnesses on whom the prosecution 
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relied are Dakshaben Shantilal Shah, PW-9, a social worker 
at Vikas Vidhyalay (Vadhvan), Miraben Devsinhbhai, PW-21, 
sister of the deceased, Champaben Devsinhbhai, PW-18, 
mother of the deceased, Kanaiyabhai Devsinhbhai, PW-19, 
brother of the deceased and Natubhai Hirabhai, PW-17, 
B Sarpanch of village Rajsitapur. 
10. Accused persons in their statements recorded under 
Section 313 took'the plea that there was a divorce between 
the deceased and the accused No. 2, her husband; that she 
C was staying on the terrace of the house; that she committed 
suicide by consuming poison; and that the accused persons 
had no role in it. 
The defence, to substantiate its plea, 
examined one witness and got two documents exhibited. 
D 
11. We have heard Mr. Harish Raichura, learned counsel for 
the appellants and Mr. Anurag Ahluwalia, learned counsel for 
the State. 
12. On a careful scrutiny of the findings of the learned trial Judge 
E and that of the High Court, it is noticeable that both the Courts 
have found that cruelty, as alleged by the prosecution under 
Section 498A IPC was established as a result of which the 
deceased committed suicide. It is quite clear from the findings 
and evidence on record that there was no demand of dowry. 
F The learned trial Judge as well as the High Court has proceeded 
on the base that there was cruelty as per the first limb of Section 
498AIPC. 
13. The singular issue that requires to be
scrutinized is whether 
G there was such cruelty by the husband and his relations that 
could have driven the deceased to commit suicide. The stand 
of the accused persons, as has been indicated hereinabove, 
was that the husband had already divorced the deceased and 
H she was staying on the terrace. On a proper x-ray of the
GHUSABHAI RAISANGBHAI CHORASIYA v. 
600 
STATE OF GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.) 
material brought on record, it is manifest that the prosecution A 
has brought on evidence, three documents, exhibits 65 to 67, 
on record to show that there was divorce. The sister of the 
deceased, Miraben Devsinhbhai, PW-21, has categorically 
deposed that she had talked to the deceased on telephone 
before her death and the deceased had told her that there has B 
been a divorce between her husband and herself and she was 
staying on the terrace of the house and will leave for the parental 
home after the 'Hol.i: festival. 
14. The documents that have been produced by the C 
prosecution, namely, Exhibits 67 to 69 have not been believed 
by the learned trial Judge as well as the High Court on the 
ground that there is some unacceptable discrepancy. 
15. At this juncture, it is appropriate to mention that the Holi D 
festival in the said year fell on 6.3.2004 and the occurrence 
took place on March 4, 2004. It is also noticeable that the 
sister of the deceased had volunteered to speak about the 
conversation of divorce. The document shows that there was E 
a divorce as per the customs. There is material on record to 
show that she was staying on the terrace. In this factual 
backdrop what is to be seen is whether there has been a cruelty 
which compelled her to commit suicide. In this regard, we 
may fruitfully refer to· Section 498A of the IPC, which reads as 
F 
under: 
"498A. Husband or
relative of husband of a woman 
subjecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the husband 
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such 
woman to cruelty shall be pun-ished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to three years and shall 
also be liable to fine. 
Explanation.-Forthe purpose of this section, "cruelty" 
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means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely 
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave 
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or 
B 
physical) of the woman; or 
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is 
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her 
to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable 
c 
security or is on account of failure by her or any person 
related to her to meet such demand." 
16. This Court in Girdhar Shankar Tawade II. State of 
Maharashtra1, examining the scope of 498A, has observed 
D thus: 
'The basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid 
"cruelty" which stands defined by attributing a specific 
statutory meaning attached thereto as noticed 
E 
hereinbefore. Two specific instances have been taken 
note of in order to ascribe a meaning to the word "cruelty" 
as is expressed by the legislatures: whereas Explanation 
(a) involves three specific situations viz. (1) to drive the 
woman to commit suicide or (i1) to cause grave injury or 
F 
(iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical, 
and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity, in 
Explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury but 
the legislature thought it fit to include only coercive 
harassment which obviously as the legislative intent 
G 
expressed is equally heinous to match the physical injury: 
whereas one is patent, the
other one is latent but equally 
serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the 
same would also embrace the attributes of "cruelty" in 
H 
1 (2002) s sec 177
GHUSABHAI. RAISANGBHAI CHORASIYA v. 
602 
STATE OF GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
terms of Section 498-A." 
A 
17. In Gumaib Singh V. State of Punjab2, while analyzing 
the aforesaid provision, it has been opined that Clause (a) of 
the Explanation to Section 498A IPC defines cruelty to mean 
"any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive B 
the woman to commit suicide". Clause (b) of the Explanation 
pertains to unlawful demand and Clause (a) can take in its 
ambit mental cruelty. 
18. From the aforesaid authorities it is quite clear that the first c 
limb of Section 498A, which refers to cruelty, has nothing to do 
with demand of dOW(Y. In the present case, in fact, there is no 
demand of dowry. If the evidence is appropriately appreciated, 
the deceased was pained and disturbed as the husband was 
having an illicit affair with the appellant no.4. Whether such a D 
situation would amount to cruelty under the first limb of Section 
498A IPC is to be seen. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in 
Pinakin Mahipatray Rawa/ V. State of Gujarat', while 
dealing with extra marital relationship, has held thus: 
E 
"Marital relationship means the legally protected marital 
interest of one spouse to another which include marital 
obligation to another like companionship, living under the 
same roof, sexual relation and the exclusive enjoyment • · 
of them, to have children, their upbringing, services in 
F 
the home, support, affection, love, liking and so on.
Extramarital relationship as such is not defined in the 
Penal Code. Though, according to the prosecution in this 
case, it was that relationship which ultimately led to 
mental harassment and cruelty within the Explanation to 
Section 498-A and that A-1 had abetted the wife to 
2 (2013) 1sec108 
3 (2013) 10 sec 48 
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[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
commit suicide." 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
)()()()()( 
xxxxx 
xxxxx 
"We are of the view that the mere fact that the husband 
has developed some intimacy with another, during the 
subsistence of marriage and failed to discharge his 
marital obligations, as such would not amount to "cruelty'', 
but it must be of such a nature as is likely to drive the 
spouse to commit suicide to fall within the Explanation to 
Section 498-A IPC. Harassment, of course, need not be 
in the form of physical assault and even mental 
harassment also would come within the purview of 
Section 498-A IPC. Mental cruelty, of course, varies from 
person to person, depending upon the intensity and the 
degree of endurance, some may meet with courage and 
some others suffer in silence, to some it may be 
unbearable and a weak person may think of ending one's 
life. We, on facts, found that the alleged extramarital 
relationship was not of such a nature as to drive the wife 
to commit suicide orthatA-1 had ever intended or acted 
in such a manner which under normal circumstances, 
would drive the wife to commit suicide." 
The Court further proceeded to state: 
"Section 306 refers to abetment of suicide. It says that if 
any person commits suicide, whoever abets the 
commission of such suicide, shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years 
and shall also be liable to fine. The action for committing 
suicide is also on account of
mental disturbance caused 
by mental and physical cruelty. To constitute an offence 
under Section 306, the prosecution has to establish that 
a person has committed suicide and the suicide was
GHUSABHAI RAISANGBHAI CHORASIYA v. 
STATE OF GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
abetted by the aCC'.used. The prosecution has to establish 
beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed 
suicide and the accused abetted the commission of 
suicide. But for the alleged extramarital relationship, 
which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing 
has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the 
accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to 
commit suicide." 
604 
A 
. 
B 
19. After holding as aforesaid, the Court found on facts and 
especially referring to suicide note that one can infer that the C 
deceased was so possessive of her husband, and was always 
under an emotional stress that she might lose her husband 
and that apart she had exonerated the husband and accordingly 
it would not come within the scope and ambit of Section 306 0 
IPC. 
20. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is seen that the 
• factum of divorce has not been believed by the learned trial 
Judge and the High Court. But the fact remains is that the 
husband and the wife had started living separately in the same E 
house and the deceased had told her sister that there was 
severance of status and she would be going to her parental 
home after the 'Holi'festival. True it is, there is some evidence 
aboutthe illicit relationship and even ifthe same is proven, we F 
are of the considered opinion that cruelty, as envisaged under 
the first limb of Section 498A IPC would not get
attracted. It 
would be difficult to hold that the mental cruelty was of such a 
degree that it would drive the wife to commit suicide. Mere 
extra-marital relationship, even if proved, would be illegal and G 
immoral, as has been said in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal 
(supra), but it would take a different character if the prosecution 
brings some evidence on record to show that the accused had 
conducted in such a manner to drive the wife to commit suicide. 
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[2015) 2 S.C.R. 
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In the instant case, the accused may have been involved in an 
illicit relationship with the appellant no.4, but in the absence of 
some other acceptable evidence on record that can establish 
such high degree of mental cruelty, the Explanation to Section 
498A which includes cruelty to drive a woman to commit 
B suicide, would not be attracted. 
21. Presently, adverting to the involvement of the other accused 
persons, that is, appellant nos. 1, 3 and 4, we find that there is 
no allegation of any kind of physical torture. The evidence 
C brought on record against them with regard to cruelty is 
absolutely sketchy and not convincing. It has been alleged 
that the mother-in-law used to rob her money which she earned 
as wages. The said fact has really not been established. As 
far as appellant no. 4, Jesuben, is concerned, there is only 
D one singular allegation that at one public place, i.e. in a 'mela', 
she had threatened the deceased that she would be divorced 
by her husband. C>n the basis of the said evidence, it is difficult 
to sustain the conviction under Sections 306 and 498A IPC. 
E Once we are holding that the accused-appellants are not guilty 
of the offence under Section 306 and 498A IPC, the conviction 
under Section 201 IPC is also not sustainable. 
22. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the appeal is allowed, 
F 
the conviction and sentence of all the appellants are set aside. 
As they are on bail, they be
discharged of their bail bonds. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal allowed. 
G 
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