STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE versus S. SUBBEGOWDA
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 19, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 19 : 2023 INSC 669 
CASE DETAILS
STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE
v.
S. SUBBEGOWDA
(Criminal Appeal No. 1598 of 2023)
AUGUST 03, 2023
[ANIRUDDHA BOSE AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issues for consideration: 
(i) Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers u/s. 482 of CrPC 
could have discharged the respondent-accused from the charges levelled 
against him for the oﬀ ences u/s. 13(1)(e) punishable u/s. 13(2) of the said Act, 
despite the fact that the accused had not pressed for his second application 
for discharge by submitting the Memo dated 02.12.2014 and despite the 
fact that after framing of the charge by the Special Court on 23.12.2014, the 
trial had proceeded further and the prosecution had examined 17 witnesses 
in support of its case? 
(ii) Whether the High Court in the criminal petition ﬁ led u/s. 482 
of the CrPC could reverse the ﬁ ndings recorded by the Special Court with 
regard to the validity of sanction, ignoring the bar contained in sub-section 
(3) read with sub-section (4) of s.19 of the said Act?
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.13(1)(e) and s.13(2) 
– Charges framed – Trial Court examined witnesses – High Court 
discharged the accused – Propriety of:
Held : Admittedly, the second application was not pressed for by 
the respondent by submitting the Memo on 02.12.2014, wherein it was 
stated that the Court may proceed to frame charge against him – Thus, by 
the said Memo, the respondent-accused had speciﬁ cally not
pressed for 
his contention with regard to the validity of sanction or error in granting 
the sanction by the Government, and he speciﬁ cally requested the Court 
to proceed further with the framing of charge – Considering the said 
memo, the trial court framed the charge, and the prosecution examined
20
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
as many as 17 witnesses in support of its case – At that stage, the 
respondent submitted the third application which was in the nature of 
interlocutory application again seeking the discharge u/s. 227 of CrPC on 
the ground that there was an error in the sanction order, the Government 
being not competent to grant the sanction u/s. 19(1) of the said Act – 
The said application having been dismissed by the trial court, the High 
Court could not and should not have entertained the petition u/s. 482 of 
CrPC, which was in the nature of revision application, and reversed the 
ﬁ ndings recorded by the trial court, in view of sub-section (3) read with 
sub-section (4) of s.19 of the said Act. [Para 7]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s. 19(3) – Special Judge 
recorded ﬁ ndings – Findings reversed by the High Court – Propriety 
of:
Held : While dismissing the third application filed by the 
respondent seeking discharge after examination of 17 witnesses by 
the prosecution, it was speciﬁ cally held by the Special Judge that the 
sanction accorded by the Government which was a superior authority 
was proper and valid – Such ﬁ ndings recorded by the Special Judge 
could not have been and should not have been reversed or altered by 
the High Court, in view of the speciﬁ c bar contained in sub-section (3) 
of s.19 and that too without recording any opinion as to how a failure 
of justice occasioned. [Para 14]
Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 – Interlocutory application 
seeking discharge midst of trial – Maintainablity of:
Held : Such an interlocutory application seeking discharge in the 
midst of trial would not be maintainable – Once the cognizance was taken 
by the Special Judge and the charge was framed against the accused, the 
trial could neither have been stayed nor scuttled in the midst of it in view 
of Section 19(3) of the said Act – In the instant case, though the issue 
of validity of sanction was raised at the earlier point of time, the same 
was not pressed for – The only stage open to the respondent-accused 
in that situation was to raise the said issue at the ﬁ nal arguments in the 
trial. [Para 15] 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.19(1) – Stages of raising 
issue with regard to validity of sanction u/s. 19(1):
21
Held : The stages of proceedings at which an accused could raise the issue 
with regard to the validity of the sanction would be the stage when the Court takes 
cognizance of the oﬀ ence, the stage when the charge is to be framed by the Court 
or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e., at the stage of ﬁ nal arguments in the 
trial – Such issue of course, could be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or 
conﬁ rmation, however the powers of such court would be subject to sub-section 
(3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act. [Para 10]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.19(3) and (4) – Combined 
reading of:
Held : The combined reading of sub-section (3) and (4) of Section 19 
makes it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no ﬁ nding, 
sentence or order passed by the Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a 
Court in appeal, conﬁ rmation or revision on the ground of, the absence of, or 
any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), 
unless in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned 
thereby. [Para 11]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka (2015) 14 SCC 186 : [2015] 8 SCR 
685; State of M.P. vs. Bhooraji and Others (2001) 7 SCC 679 : [2001] 2 
Suppl. SCR 128 – relied on.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
1598 of 2023.
From the Judgment
and Order dated 16.08.2018 of the High Court 
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP No. 4463 of 2018.
Appearances:
Shubhranshu Padhi, Ms. Rajeshwar Shankar, Niroop Sukriti, Jay 
Nirupama, Advs. for the Appellant.
H. N. Shashidhara, Sr. Adv., Devamshu Behl, Balaji Srinivasan, Advs. 
for the Respondent.
STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v. 
S. SUBBEGOWDA
22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
JUDGMENT/ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. The appellant – State of Karnataka Lokayukta Police by way of 
instant appeal has assailed the judgment and order dated 16.08.2018 passed 
by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Petition No. 4463 
of 2018 whereby the High Court has allowed the said petition by discharging 
the respondent (original petitioner-accused) from the oﬀ ences charged under 
Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 
1988 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), on the ground that the sanction 
accorded to prosecute the respondent-accused by the Government was illegal 
and without jurisdiction.
2. The respondent was working as an Executive Engineer in the 
Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board, Mandya Division, 
Mandya during the period 1983 to 2007. On the basis of the Source Report 
dated 17.12.2007 submitted by the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, 
Bengaluru Rural Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru, a case being 
Crime No. 22 of 2007 (later numbered as Crime No. 62 of 2008) came to be 
registered against the respondent for the oﬀ ence under Section 13(1)(e) read 
with Section 13(2) of the said Act. It was alleged, inter alia, that the respondent-
accused during his tenure in the oﬃ  ce as an Executive Engineer had amassed 
the wealth disproportionate to his known sources of income. On the completion 
of the
investigation, the Investigating Oﬃ  cer had sent the papers to the State 
Government seeking sanction to prosecute the respondent as required in 
Section 19(1) of the said Act. The Government of Karnataka on the basis of 
the material placed before it, had accorded the requisite sanction by issuing 
the Government order dated 13.09.2010. Thereafter the chargesheet came 
to be ﬁ led in the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru 
Rural District at Bengaluru wherein it was alleged that respondent had abused 
his position as a public servant, had indulged into corrupt practices and had 
amassed wealth disproportionate to his known sources of income. The said 
case was registered as Special Case No. 488 of 2011 before the said Court.
3. The respondent-accused ﬁ led an application under Section 227 
read with 239 of CrPC on 12.10.2011, seeking his discharge from the
23
case contending, inter alia, that neither the contents of the Source 
Report nor the other documents constituted any oﬀ ence as alleged, 
and that the sanction under Section 19(1) of the said Act was issued by 
the Government without any application of mind. The said application 
came to be dismissed by the trial court by passing a detailed order on 
01.02.2013. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondent preferred a 
Criminal Revision Petition being no. 287 of 2013 before the High Court. 
The said petition came to be disposed of by the High Court vide the order 
dated 05.07.2013 directing the trial court to consider the documents made 
available by the respondent during the investigation and produced by 
the prosecution with the chargesheet, while framing the charge without 
being inﬂ uenced by the order dated 01.12.2013.
4. It appears that in view of the said order passed by the High 
Court, the respondent-accused again ﬁ led an application under Sections 
227 and 239 of CrPC before the trial court seeking his discharge from 
the case by contending, inter alia, that the sanction order passed by the 
Government lacked application of mind and was given mechanically and 
that the Investigating Oﬃ  cer had suppressed the material produced by 
the respondent oﬀ ering satisfactory explanations to the assets acquired, 
income derived and expenditure incurred by the respondent during 
period in question. Pertinently, the respondent did not press for the said 
application
by submitting a memo on 02.12.2014 and stating therein 
that the Court may proceed to frame charge against him. The said memo 
reads as under- 
“IN THE COURT OF THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE BANGALORE RURAL AT BANGALORE
Spl.C.C. No.488 of 11
BETWEEN:
State by Lokayktha Police,

Bangalore Rural.

... Complainant
AND:
Subbegowda.

… Accused
STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v. 
S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

24
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
 MEMO FILED ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
The above named Accused humbly submits that he will not press the 
application ﬁ led under Sections 227 and 239 of Cr.P.C., 1973 seeking discharge 
in the case. It is further submitted that the Hon’ble Court may proceed to frame 
charges against the Accused.
02.12.2014
Bangalore.

Sd/-
Advocate for Accused.”
5.The trial court thereafter framed the charge against the respondent-
accused on 23.12.2014 for the oﬀ ence of criminal misconduct under Section 
13(1)(e) punishable under Section 13(2) of the said Act in Special Case No. 488 
of 2011. The prosecution thereafter examined as many as 17 witnesses in support 
of its case, and in the midst of the trial the respondent-accused again ﬁ led third 
application under Section 227 of CrPC seeking his discharge from the case on 
the ground that the respondent was an employee of the Karnataka Urban Water 
Supply and Drainage Board and could be removed only by the said Board in 
view of Rule 10 of Karnataka Civil Services (Classiﬁ cation, Control and Appeal) 
Rules, 1957. The State Government therefore had no jurisdiction to accord the 
sanction to prosecute the respondent under Section 19(1) of the said Act. The trial 
court vide the order dated 05.06.2018 dismissed the said application by passing 
a detailed order holding, inter alia, that the third successive application ﬁ led by 
the respondent-accused for the discharge from the case, when the evidence of 17 
witnesses had been recorded and when the contention based on the sanction was 
already rejected by the Court earlier, was liable to be dismissed. The aggrieved 
respondent ﬁ led the Criminal Petition being no. 4463 of 2018 under Section 482 
of CrPC before the High Court, which came to be allowed by the High Court 
vide the impugned order.
6.In view of the
afore-stated undisputed facts the following questions arise 
for consideration before this Court:
(i) 
Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 
of CrPC could have discharged the respondent-accused from the 
charges levelled against him for the oﬀ ences under Section 13(1)(e) 
punishable under Section 13(2) of the said Act, despite the fact that the 
accused had not pressed for his second application for discharge by
25
submitting the Memo dated 02.12.2014 and despite the fact that 
after framing of the charge by the Special Court on 23.12.2014, 
the trial had proceeded further and the prosecution had examined 
17 witnesses in support of its case?
(ii) Whether the High Court in the criminal petition ﬁ led under 
Section 482 of the CrPC could reverse the ﬁ ndings recorded by 
the Special Court with regard to the validity of sanction, ignoring 
the bar contained in sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of 
Section 19 of the said Act?
7. As stated earlier, after having not succeeded in the ﬁ rst application 
seeking discharge under Section 227 of CrPC, in which the petitioner had 
raised the issue of sanction by contending that the sanction was accorded by 
the Government under Section 19(1) of the said Act without any application 
of mind, the respondent-accused had ﬁ led the second application again 
seeking his discharge under Section 227 of CrPC by raising the issue of 
sanction by contending, inter alia, that the sanction order was passed 
mechanically by the Government and that the Investigating Oﬃ  cer had 
suppressed the material produced by the respondent oﬀ ering satisfactory 
explanations to the assets acquired by him. Admittedly, the second 
application was not pressed for by the respondent by submitting the Memo 
on 02.12.2014, wherein it was stated that the Court may proceed to frame 
charge against him. Thus, by submitting the said Memo, the respondent-
accused had speciﬁ
cally not pressed for his contention with regard to the 
validity of sanction or error in granting the sanction by the Government, 
and he speciﬁ cally requested the Court to proceed further with the framing 
of charge. Considering the said memo, the trial court framed the charge, 
and the prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses in support of its 
case. At that stage, the respondent submitted the third application which 
was in the nature of interlocutory application again seeking the discharge 
under Section 227 of CrPC on the ground that there was an error in the 
sanction order, the Government being not competent to grant the sanction 
under Section 19(1) of the said Act. The said application having been 
dismissed by the trial court, the High Court could not and should not 
have entertained the petition under Section 482 of CrPC, which was in 
the nature of revision application, and reversed the ﬁ ndings recorded by 
STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v. 
S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
the trial court, in view of sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of Section 
19 of the said Act.
8. For the ready reference, the relevant part of sub-section (1), (3) and 
(4) of Section 19 are reproduced herein below: 
“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution. —
(1) No court shall take cognizance of an oﬀ ence punishable under 
sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a 
public servant, except with the previous sanction save as otherwise 
provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)—

(a)  in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, 
was at the time of commission of the alleged oﬀ ence employed in 
connection with the aﬀ airs of the Union and is not removable from 
his oﬃ  ce save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, 
of that Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may 
be, was at the time of commission of the alleged oﬀ ence employed 
in connection with the aﬀ airs of a State and is not removable from 
his oﬃ  ce save by or with the sanction of the State Government, 
of that Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to 
remove him from his oﬃ  ce.
(2) —————
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), —
(a) no ﬁ nding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge 
shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, conﬁ rmation or 
revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission 
or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), 
unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact 
been occasioned thereby;

(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the 
ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction

27
granted by the authority, unless it is satisﬁ ed that such error, 
omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any 
other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision 
in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, 
trial, appeal or other proceedings.
(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, 
or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has 
occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall 
have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should 
have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—

(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction;
(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to 
any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of 
a speciﬁ ed authority or with the sanction of a speciﬁ ed person 
or any requirement of a similar nature.”
9. Similar provision is contained in Section 465 of CrPC on whether 
ﬁ nding or sentence is reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity. 
It reads as under: -
“465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, 
omission or irregularity. -
1. Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no ﬁ nding 
sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction 
shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, conﬁ rmation of 
revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the 
complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or 
other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other 
proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any 
sanction for the prosecution unless in the opinion of that Court, a 
failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. 
2. In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in 
any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any 
STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v. 
S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court 
shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have 
been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.”
10. Having regard to the afore-stated provisions contained in Section 19 
of the said Act, there remains no shadow of doubt that the statute forbids taking 
of cognizance by the Court against a public servant except with the previous 
sanction of the Government/authority competent to grant such sanction in terms 
of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). It is also well settled proposition 
of law that the question with regard to the validity of such sanction should be 
raised at the earliest stage of the proceedings, however could be raised at the 
subsequent stage of the trial also. In our opinion, the stages of proceedings at 
which an accused could raise the issue with regard to the validity of the sanction 
would be the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the oﬀ ence, the stage 
when the charge is to be framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is 
complete i.e., at the stage of ﬁ nal arguments in the trial. Such issue of course, 
could be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or conﬁ rmation, however 
the powers of such court would be subject to sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) 
of Section 19 of the said Act. It is also signiﬁ cant to note that the competence 
of the court trying the accused also
would be dependent upon the existence of 
the validity of sanction, and therefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of 
validity of sanction at the earliest point of time. It cannot be gainsaid that in case 
the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and 
relegate the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh 
sanction for the prosecution in accordance with the law. 
11. The combined reading of sub-section (3) and (4) of Section 19 makes 
it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no ﬁ nding, sentence 
or order passed by the Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in 
appeal, conﬁ rmation or revision on the ground of, the absence of, or any error, 
omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in 
the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. 
sub-section (4) further postulates that in determining under sub-section (3) 
whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction has 
occasioned, or resulted in failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the 
fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage 
in the proceedings. The explanation to sub-section (4) further provides that for
29
the purpose of Section 19, error includes “competency of the authority to grant 
sanction”. Thus, it is clear from the language employed in sub-section (3) of 
Section 19 that the said sub-section has application to the proceedings before 
the Court in appeal, conﬁ rmation or revision, and not to the proceedings before 
the Special Judge. The said sub-section (3) clearly forbids the court in appeal, 
conﬁ rmation or revision, the interference with the order passed by the Special 
Judge on the ground that the sanction was bad, save and except in cases where 
the appellate or revisional court ﬁ nds that the failure of justice had occurred 
by such invalidity.
12. This Court in case of Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka1 has very 
aptly dealt with the intricacies of Section 19(1) as also Section 19(3) and 
19(4) of the said Act as to at what stage the question of validity of sanction 
accorded under Section 19(1) of the said Act could be raised, and what are 
the powers of the court in appeal, conﬁ rmation or revision under sub-section 
(3) of Section 19 of the said Act.
“22. The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under 
Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus much too clear 
to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by the 
court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of an 
authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of clauses (a), 
(b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question regarding validity
of such 
sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The competence 
of the court trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of 
a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be invalid the court 
can discharge the accused relegating the parties to a stage where the 
competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in 
accordance with law. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity 
attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non 
est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same 
oﬀ ences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution.
23. Having said that there are two aspects which we must immediately 
advert to. The ﬁ rst relates to the eﬀ ect of sub-section (3) to Section 
19, which starts with a non obstante clause. Also relevant to the same 
aspect would be Section 465 CrPC which we have extracted earlier.
1 
(2015) 14 SCC 186
STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v. 
S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
23.1. It was argued on behalf of the State with considerable tenacity 
worthy of a better cause, that in terms of Section 19(3), any error, 
omission or irregularity in the order sanctioning prosecution of an 
accused was of no consequence so long as there was no failure of justice 
resulting from such error, omission or irregularity. It was contended that 
in terms of Explanation to Section 4, “error includes competence of the 
authority to grant sanction”. The argument is on the face of it attractive 
but does not, in our opinion, stand closer scrutiny.
23.2. A careful reading of sub-section (3) to Section 19 would show 
that the same interdicts reversal or alteration of any ﬁ nding, sentence or 
order passed by a Special Judge, on the ground that the sanction order 
suﬀ ers from an error, omission or irregularity, unless of course the court 
before whom such ﬁ nding, sentence or order is challenged in appeal or 
revision is of the opinion that a failure of justice has occurred by reason 
of such error, omission or irregularity. Sub-section (3), in other words, 
simply forbids interference with an order passed by the Special Judge 
in appeal, conﬁ rmation or revisional proceedings on the ground that the 
sanction is bad save and except, in cases where the appellate or revisional 
court ﬁ nds that failure of justice has occurred by such invalidity. What 
is noteworthy is that sub-section (3) has no application to proceedings
before the Special Judge, who is free to pass an order discharging the 
accused, if he is of the opinion that a valid order sanctioning prosecution 
of the accused had not been produced as required under Section 19(1).
23.3. Sub-section (3), in our opinion, postulates a prohibition against 
a higher court reversing an order passed by the Special Judge on the 
ground of any defect, omission or irregularity in the order of sanction. It 
does not forbid a Special Judge from passing an order at whatever stage 
of the proceedings holding that the prosecution is not maintainable for 
want of a valid order sanctioning the same.
23.4. The language employed in sub-section (3) is, in our opinion, clear 
and unambiguous. This is, in our opinion, suﬃ  ciently evident even 
from the language employed in sub-section (4) according to which the 
appellate or the revisional court shall, while examining whether the error, 
omission or irregularity in the sanction had occasioned in any failure of 
justice, have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should
31
have been raised at an early stage. Suﬃ  ce it to say, that a conjoint reading 
of sub-sections 19(3) and (4) leaves no manner of doubt that the said 
provisions envisage a challenge to the validity of the order of sanction 
or the validity of the proceedings including ﬁ nding, sentence or order 
passed by the Special Judge in appeal or revision before a higher court 
and not before the Special Judge trying the accused.
23.5. The rationale underlying the provision obviously is that if the 
trial has proceeded to conclusion and resulted in a ﬁ nding or sentence, 
the same should not be lightly interfered with by the appellate or the 
revisional court simply because there was some omission, error or 
irregularity in the order sanctioning the prosecution under Section 19(1). 
Failure of justice is, what the appellate or revisional court would in such 
cases look for. And while examining whether any such failure had indeed 
taken place, the Court concerned would also keep in mind whether the 
objection touching the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction 
could or should have been raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings 
meaning thereby whether the same could and should have been raised 
at the trial stage instead of being urged in appeal or revision.”
13. In State of M.P. vs. Bhooraji and Others2, this Court had an 
occasion to deal with the various aspects contained in Section 465 of CrPC 
more particularly to deal with the expression “A failure of justice has
in fact 
been occasioned” as contained therein. Since, the provisions contained in 
Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and in Section 465(1) of 
CrPC are pari materia, the observations made in the said decision would 
be relevant. 
“14. We have to examine Section 465(1) of the Code in the above 
context. It is extracted below:
“465. (1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, 
no ﬁ nding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent 
jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal, 
conﬁ rmation or revision on account of any error, omission or 
irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, 
order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in 
any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or 
2 
(2001) 7 SCC 679
STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v. 
S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion 
of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.”
15. A reading of the section makes it clear that the error, omission or 
irregularity in the proceedings held before or during the trial or in any 
enquiry were reckoned by the legislature as possible occurrences in 
criminal courts. Yet the legislature disfavoured axing down the proceedings 
or to direct repetition of the whole proceedings afresh. Hence, the 
legislature imposed a prohibition that unless such error, omission or 
irregularity has occasioned “a failure of justice” the superior court shall 
not quash the proceedings merely on the ground of such error, omission 
or irregularity.
16. What is meant by “a failure of justice” occasioned on account of such 
error, omission or irregularity? This Court has observed in Shamnsaheb 
M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka [(2001) 2 SCC 577: 2001 SCC (Cri) 
358] thus: (SCC p. 585, para 23)
“23. We often hear about ‘failure of justice’ and quite often the submission 
in a criminal court is accentuated with the said expression. Perhaps it is 
too pliable or facile an expression which could be ﬁ tted in any situation 
of a case. The expression ‘failure of justice’ would appear, sometimes, as 
an etymological chameleon (the simile is borrowed from Lord Diplock 
in Town Investments Ltd. v. Deptt. of the Environment [(1977) 1 All ER 813 
: 1978 AC
359 : (1977) 2 WLR 450 (HL)] ). The criminal court, particularly 
the superior court should make a close examination to ascertain whether 
there was really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouﬂ age.”
14. In the instant case, the Special Judge proceeded with the trial, on 
the second application for discharge ﬁ led by the respondent having not been 
pressed for by him. The Special Judge, while dismissing the third application 
ﬁ led by the respondent seeking discharge after examination of 17 witnesses by 
the prosecution, speciﬁ cally held that the sanction accorded by the government 
which was a superior authority to the Karnataka Water Supply Board, of which 
the respondent was an employee, was proper and valid. Such ﬁ ndings recorded 
by the Special Judge could not have been and should not have been reversed 
or altered by the High Court in the petition ﬁ led by the respondent challenging 
the said order of the Special Judge, in view of the speciﬁ c bar contained in sub-
section (3) of Section 19, and that too without recording any opinion as to how
33
a failure of justice had in fact been occasioned to the respondent-accused 
as contemplated in the said sub-section (3). As a matter of fact, neither the 
respondent had pleaded nor the High Court opined whether any failure of 
justice had occasioned to the respondent, on account of error if any, occurred 
in granting the sanction by the authority. 
15. As a matter of fact, such an interlocutory application seeking 
discharge in the midst of trial would also not be maintainable. Once the 
cognizance was taken by the Special Judge and the charge was framed 
against the accused, the trial could neither have been stayed nor scuttled in 
the midst of it in view of Section 19(3) of the said Act. In the instant case, 
though the issue of validity of sanction was raised at the earlier point of 
time, the same was not pressed for. The only stage open to the respondent-
accused in that situation was to raise the said issue at the ﬁ nal arguments in 
the trial in accordance with law. 
16. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the 
High Court is set aside. It will be open for the respondent to raise the issue 
of validity of sanction if he desires to do so, in accordance with law at the 
ﬁ nal stage of arguments in the trial. Special Judge is directed to proceed 
with the trial from the stage it had stopped, in accordance with the law and 
as expeditiously as possible. 
17. Appeal stands allowed accordingly.
Headnotes prepared by:
Appeal allowed.
Ankit Gyan
STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v. 
S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]