V. PRAKASH @ G.N.V. PRAKASH versus M/S. P.S. GOVINDASWAMY NAIDU & SONS’ CHARITIES REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING TRUSTEE & ORS.
[2022] 18 S.C.R. 948, Supreme Court of India, 2022
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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   [2022] 18 S.C.R. 948
948
V. PRAKASH @ G.N.V. PRAKASH
v.
M/s. P.S. GOVINDASWAMY NAIDU & SONS’ CHARITIES
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING TRUSTEE & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3791 of 2022)
MAY 09, 2022
[VINEET SARAN AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Trusts Act, 1882– Validity of Appellant’s claim to the office of
founder trustee in the respondent-Trust– Held: The overwhelming
evidence produced by the appellant in the form of Aadhaar Card
issued by the Government of India as also his Income Tax
assessments in India based on the certification of Chartered
Accountant of his fulfilling the requirement of ‘resident’ in terms of
s.6 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has been taken to be of little value
by the High Court after counting the number of days of the
appellant’s stay in India and then questioning that the certificates
were not showing as to for how many days he was in Madras
Presidency–Also, appellant’s ownership and possession of property
in India, including residential property; having bank accounts in
India; being assessed as resident for the purpose of Income Tax
Act, 1961 have all been brushed aside by the High Court by mere
count of number of days of stay in India– Mere holding of Green
Card of the United States of America cannot be treated as decisive
of the matter in the present case–When examining the matter from
the point of view of spirit of Scheme of Administrationgoverning
the Trust, the concept of representation of the
branch of founder
trustee needs to be respected and, in that regard, claim of the
descendant like the appellant cannot be lightly brushed aside by a
mere count of number of days of stay in India while ignoring all
other features and factors showing his choice of staying in India–
Trial Court rightly analysed the evidence on record and arrived at
a just conclusion in upholding the claim of the appellant to the
office of founder trustee in the respondent-Trust as the representative
of the branch of ‘PSGNN’– Impugned judgment set aside – Judgment
and decree of the Trial Court restored – Thus, the appointment of
respondent no.10 in the Trust stands annulled – Appellant entitled
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to hold the office of founder trustee representing ‘PSGNN’ branch–
Income Tax Act, 1961– s.6 – Estoppel – Principle of res judicata.
Deeds and Documents– Rules of construction – Construction
of terms of Scheme of Administration (SOA) governing the
respondent-Trust and their application to the facts of present case
(more particularly regarding abode/residence of plaintiff-appellant)–
Discussed – Interpretation of Statutes.
Words and Phrases – ‘resides’ – Discussed.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
1.1 The High Court seems to have approached the case
from an altogether wrong angle and has proceeded on irrelevant
considerations while ignoring the relevant factors and material
considerations. The High Court seems to have picked up the
residential requirement in the qualification for trusteeship in the
Scheme of Administration as being of strict physical presence,
de hors the context and de hors the purpose.The overwhelming
evidence produced by the plaintiff-appellant in the form of Aadhaar
Card issued by the Government of India as also his Income Tax
assessments in India based on the certification of Chartered
Accountant of his fulfilling the requirement of ‘resident’ in terms
of Section 6 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has been taken to be of
little value by the High Court after counting the number of days
of the appellant’s stay in India and then questioning that the
certificates were not showing as to for how many days he was in
Madras Presidency. Even in that
regard, the High Court, though
referred to the decision in Mst Jagir Kaur but failed to take note
of the ratio therein. The appellant’s ownership and possession of
property in India, including residential property; having bank
accounts in India; being assessed as resident forthe purpose of
Income Tax Act, 1961 have all been brushed aside by the High
Court by mere count of number of days of stay in India. This
Court is unable to endorse this approach.[Paras 23 and 24][980-
A-E]
Mst Jagir Kaur &Anr. v. Jaswant Singh [1964] 2 SCR
73– referred to.
1.2 In paragraph 21 of the impugned judgment, the High
Court has observed that the spirit of the provisions prescribing
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qualification ought to be respected. With respect, it appears that
the High Court in the first place seems to have missed out the
fundamentals on the spirit of formation of trust and its Scheme of
Administration. As noticed, the trust was established in the year
1926 by the sons of Shri P.S. Govindaswamy Naidu and the trust
was actually named as “M/s. P.S. Govindaswamy and Sons’
Charity”. The Scheme of Administration, while envisaging nine
trustees, specifically provided for the four sons of Shri P.S.
Govindaswamy as the founder trustees. Office of founder trustee
has been made a heritable one with the concept of having the
hereditary trustee in the line of each of the founder trustee. Until
01.01.1994, the appellant’s father Shri G.N. Venkatapathy
remained a founder trustee after the demise of his father Shri
P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu, one of the original founder trustees,
who died in the year 1938. The hereditary trusteeship, in the
spirit of Scheme of Administration, has continued in relation to
the lines of other original founder trustees too as the respondent
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are respectively representing the branches of
Shri P.S. Venkatapathy, Shri P. Rangaswami Naidu and Shri P.S.
Ganga Naidu. Reverting to the branch of Shri P.S.G.
Narayanaswami Naidu who died in the year 1938 and was
substituted by his son Shri G.N. Venkatapathy, it is noticed that
after the death of Shri G.N. Venkatapathy, his brother Shri
V. Rajan
was taken as the founder trustee to represent this branch. As
noticed above, there had been internal disputes, which cropped
up after resignation of Shri V. Rajan and which led to litigations
and appointment of Shri Naren Rajan and later appointment of
Shri V. Rajan again as founder trustee. As already noticed, with
the demise of Shri Naren Rajan on 21.05.2015 and of Shri V. Rajan
on 21.06.2017, it is the appellant alone who remains to be the
male descendant to represent the branch of Shri P.S.G.
Narayanaswami Naidu.When looking at the spirit of the Scheme
of Administration of Trust, it would be a travesty of the Scheme
itself if in the presence of the appellant, the representation of
this branch of the founder trustee is annulled or the position is
shifted to someone else. Of course, this could happen if it is
established beyond doubt that the appellant has incurred one or
more of the disqualifications. In this suit, no other disqualification
has been alleged by the respondents against the appellant except
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his want of residence in Madras Presidency. This suggestion has
been effectively repelled by the appellant by production of cogent
evidence and with specific assertion that he was residing in India
since 2010. When examining the matter from the point of view of
spirit of Scheme of Administration, the concept of representation
of the branch of founder trustee needs to be respected and, in
that regard, claim of the descendant like the appellant cannot be
lightly brushed aside by a mere count ofnumber of days of stay in
India while ignoring all other features and factors showing his
choice of staying in India.[Paras 25 and 25.1][980-E-H; 981-A-F]
1.3 As observed by this Court in Mst Jagir Kaur, ultimately,
the question of residence in every case depends on the facts, but
the word ‘reside’ usually means something more than a flying
visit or a casual stay. The appellant who has continuously been in
India, apart from holding property and bank accounts in India
and also holding an Aadhaar Card, could least be said to be a
person visiting India casually or as a transit tourist.The High
Court has posed a question that certificates do not disclose that
out of 979 days in seven years, how many days the appellant was
in Madras Presidency? Again, the approach of the High Court
does not commend to us. It has not been shown if the appellant
had not been available in the area in question so as to effectively
participate in the administration and management of the Trust.
Mere holding of Green Card of the United States of America
cannot be treated as decisive of the matter in the present case.The
High Court has made adverse comments on the justified
observations of the Trial Court that in view of the scientific
advancements, the word ‘reside’ should not be given that meaning
as was understood a century back. With respect, such
observations of the High Court are again, not in conformity with
the principles of construction of a document.[Paras 25.2-27][981-
F-H; 982-A-C]
1.4 If at all the rule of literal construction is applied literally,
the term in question about residing within “Madras Presidency”
would itself be treated as redundant for the simple reason that
geographically or demographically, there does not exist any
location as of today which could be termed as “Madras
Presidency”. Obviously, such an approach would be incorrect and
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the area that was known as “Madras Presidency” at the time of
drafting of the document in the year 1926 and framing of the
Scheme of Administration in the year 1936 would be taken note
of and whatever area is now referable to the said erstwhile
“Madras Presidency” area would be relevant; and the residence
has to be with reference to the said area. The point relevant for
the present purpose is that the expression “Madras Presidency”
is not being construed in its literal sense and is construed with
reference to its present meaning.Taking cue from the aforesaid,
when the verb “reside” is taken up to understand its meaning
and purport with reference to the object of the document, its
present day meaning and connotation cannot be lost sight of. Of
course, if a person has given up his residence and has
permanently settled at some other place, the question may arise
about his fulfilment of the condition but, at the same time, the
expression “resides” cannot be given a literal meaning as if a
person like the plaintiff-appellant having multiple places of
residence would incur disqualification for the purpose of the deed
in question if not permanently located at a particular place.While
not approving the approach of the High Court in this matter,
particularly in relation to the construction of the terms of SOA, a
little furthermay be observed. The words and expressions in the
deeds or statutes are preferably provided their
contextual and
contemporary meaning. In this process of construction, the words
and expressions are not viewed as fossil remains; rather they
retain the organic character and do take their meaning from all
the surroundings. For that matter, a particular word like “resides”
could carry multiple different connotations with reference to the
time or period of its interpretation; and connotations may be
different than those understood about 100 years back. When a
particular word or expression in any document is to be operated
and applied, all the relevant characteristics available in praesenti
have to be kept in view for a meaningful and purposeful
construction. Of course, that meaning should not do violence to
the real intent and purpose.The question at hand is of assigning
a logical, contextual and contemporary meaning to a particular
expression. It is one thing to alter the term of a document and
cannot be equated with the process of assigning a purposeful
meaning to a particular expression. In the true rules of
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construction, the words are always assigned the meaning which
stand in tandem with their context, while assuring that the
assigned meaning serves the purpose.The requirements of
physical residence, with the rapid advancement of the means of
communication and transport cannot be ignored particularly when
the purpose of the term ‘residence’ in document in question is to
ensure participation in the affairs of the trust effectively, as and
when required. The intent of the Trial Court in its observations
had been only this much that in view of the present-day
advancement, literal meaning of residence, by requiring actual
physical presence every day and every moment is not correct.
There is no hesitation in endorsing the views and findings of the
Trial Court. [Paras 27.1-29.1][982-C-H; 983-A-F; 984-A-B]
Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan (1994)
3 SCC 440 : [1994] 1 SCR 445 – referred to.
1.5 Prima facie, the principle of estoppel may not operate
against the contesting respondents. The plaintiff-appellant seeks
to invoke the principle of estoppel essentially with reference to
the fact that after the judgment dated 16.04.2013 in O.S. No. 631
of 2012, he was unanimously chosen as the founder trustee on
18.04.2013. The said decision of the continuing founder trustees
to induct the appellant to represent his branch was essentially
pursuant to the order of the Trial Court but, ultimately the decision
of the Trial Court did not sustain itself and was
reversed by the
High Court in its judgment dated 30.06.2014 in A.S. No. 178 of
2013. In that position, the said decision of thefounder trustees to
induct the appellant on 18.04.2013 could not have operated as
estoppel against them.However, prima facie, what is applicable
to the question of estoppel would not directly apply to the question
of res judicata. The entitlement of the rival claimants to the office
of founder trustee representing Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu
branch was a matter innate and interwoven with the question as
raised before the High Court in A.S. No. 178 of 2013. The High
Court distinctly recorded in its judgment dated 30.06.2014 that
there was no dispute about qualification of the rival claimants
which included the present appellant in his capacity as 10th
defendant in the said matter. The present contesting respondents
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were indeed parties to the said proceedings and particularly the
Trust was a party thereto and was duly represented by the
Managing Trustee. When the question of qualification or
disqualification could have been raised and was not raised by the
present contesting respondents, it is difficult to say that the
principles of res judicata and at any rate, those of constructive res
judicata in terms of Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 would not apply.However, these aspectsare
not being elaboratedfor the reason that in the present suit, the
plaintiff-appellant has categorically established the fact that he
was indeed eligible and was not suffering from the alleged
disqualification.Viewed from any angle, the judgment of the High
Court remains unsustainable. The Trial Court had rightly analysed
the evidence on record and arrived at a just conclusion in
upholding the claim of the appellant to the office of founder trustee
in the respondent-Trust as the representative of the branch of
Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu. Impugned judgment and order
dated 04.03.2021 is set aside; and the judgment and decree of
the Trial Court dated 12.10.2020 are restored. Consequently,
the appointment of respondent No. 10 in the Trust shall stand
annulled and the appellant shall be entitled to hold the office of
founder trustee representing P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu branch.
As a necessary consequence of findings
and conclusions, the claim
of the applicant of I.A. No. 80383 of 2021 is rendered redundant.
That application also stands rejected.[Paras 32.1-34][984-E-H;
985-A-F]
Yogesh Bhardwaj v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC
355 : [1990] 2 SCR 666, Inder Singh Ahluwalia v. Prem
Chand Jain & Ors. 1993 SCC OnLine Del 12; Makhija
Construction & Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Indore Development
Authority & Ors.: (2005) 6 SCC 304–referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1990] 2 SCR 666
referred to
Para 18.3
[1964] 2 SCR 73
referred to
Para 24
[1994] 1 SCR 445
referred to
Para 28
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3791 of
2022.
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From the Judgment and Order dated 04.03.2021 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in A.S. No.978 of 2020.
Mrs. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., Vidyashankar, B. Raghunath, Mrs. N.
C. Kavitha, Mrs. Ayushma Awasthi, Sriram P., Advs. for the Appellant.
V. Giri, M. N. Rao, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Sr. Advs., Ms.
Suveni, S. Thananjayan, Ms. Promila, Ms. Jaswanthi Anbuselvan, Ms.
Aaina Verma, Anoop Prakash Awasthi, P. R. Ramakrishnan, M. S. Vishnu
Sankar, Biju Raman, I. Abrar Md. Abdulla, B. Karunakaran, Advs. for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
Table of Contents*
Preliminary .........................................................................2
Relevant factual matrix and background ........................3
The respondent-Trust and its constituents ..........3
First round of litigation and relevant events ........7
Second round of litigation and relevant events ..11
Third round of litigation & subject-matter before this
Court ................................................................................. 14
Findings of the Trial Court ................................... 19
Findings of the High Court ................................... 22
Other claimants .............................................................. 27
Rival Submissions ............................................................ 28
The appellant’s claim rightly accepted by the Trial
Court
................................................................................. 32
The questions of res judicata and estoppel ................... 38
Conclusion ........................................................................ 41
Preliminary
Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by the plaintiff of a suit for declaration and
injunction, is directed against the judgment and order dated 04.03.2021,
as passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras1 in Appeal Suit
No. 978 of 2020 whereby, the High Court has allowed the appeal filed
by the contesting defendants (respondent Nos. 1 to 8 herein) and has set
1 For short, ‘the High Court’.
* Ed. Note : Pagination in the Table of Contents is as per the original judgment.
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aside the judgment and decree dated 12.10.2020, as passed by the
Principal District Judge, Coimbatore2, in Original Suit No. 160 of 2018.
2.1 In the suit aforesaid, the plaintiff-appellant sought the relief of
declaration that he was entitled to be appointed as the founder trustee of
the public trust M/s. P.S. Govindaswamy Naidu & Sons’ Charities
(respondent No. 1 herein)3 as per its Scheme of Administration4, for
being the surviving male descendant of the branch represented by his
late father. The claim of plaintiff-appellant was resisted by the contesting
respondents with reference to the fact that he was a Green Card Holder
of the United States of America and was not fulfilling the requirements
of ‘residing within the area of Madras Presidency’, as envisaged by the
Scheme of Administration. The Trial Court held that the plaintiff-appellant
was indeed a resident of the area in question and was duly qualified to
hold the position of founder trustee of the respondent-Trust. The High
Court, however, took the view opposite with reference to the fact that
the plaintiff-appellant was continuously holding a Green Card and had
stayed in India less than half of the time in the past; and the assertion of
his intent of permanently residing in India was contradicted by the
evidence on record. Therefore, the High Court set aside the judgment
and decree of the Trial Court.
3. Though a seemingly straightforward question as
regards
construction of the relevant terms of SOA governing the respondent-
Trust and their application to the facts of present case (more particularly
regarding abode/residence of plaintiff-appellant) is involved in the matter
but, the position of founder trusteeship in the respondent-Trust has
undergone various rounds of litigation and disputes, some of which have
their own bearing in the present matter. Thus, a somewhat lengthy
reference to the background aspects would be necessary.
Relevant factual matrix and background
The respondent-Trust and its constituents
4. In the first place, worthwhile it would be to take into
comprehension the salient features related with the respondent-Trust
and its constituents.
2 For short, ‘the Trial Court’.
3 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Trust’ / ‘the respondent-Trust’.
4 For short, ‘SOA’.
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4.1. The respondent No. 1 - M/s P.S. Govindaswamy Naidu &
Sons’ Charities - is the Trust wherein the appellant has staked the claim
to be recognised as one of the founder trustees.
4.2. The respondent-Trust was initially administered as per the
trust deed registered on 25.01.1926, which was executed by four persons
namely, (1) Shri P.S.G. Venkataswami Naidu, (2) Shri P.S.G. Rangaswami
Naidu, (3) Shri P.S.G. Ganga Naidu, and (4) Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami
Naidu. For the better and efficient administration, the general body of
the Trust passed a resolution on 26.11.1934 to take legal opinion and
followed it up with a request to the Principal Subordinate Judge,
Coimbatore in Original Suit No. 145 of 1935 to frame a Scheme of
Administration. The Principal Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, by his order
dated 29.02.1936, in supersession of the earlier Scheme, provided for a
comprehensive Scheme of Administration of the respondent-Trust. This
Scheme, in its Chapter IV under the title “THE BOARD OF
TRUSTEES”, provided that there shall be a Board of Trustees consisting
of 9 members out of which, the above-mentioned four persons were
recognised as ‘Founder Trustees’ while the rest were referred to as
‘Elected Trustees’. It was also provided that one of the founder trustees
shall be the ‘Managing Trustee’. It was further provided that a founder
trustee shall be entitled to hold office for life. The other provisions as
regards term of office of elected trustees are not
relevant for the present
purpose.
4.3. The relevant provision in SOA, which forms the subject-matter
of debate in the present case, is contained in the opening part of Clause
(B) of Chapter IV, as regards qualification for trusteeship, and reads as
under: -
“QUALIFICATION AND DISQUALIFICATION FOR
TRUSTEESHIP (A) QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE
TRUSTEESHIP
No person shall be elected or hold office as trustee unless,
(i) he is a Hindu
(ii) he resides in the Madras Presidency and
(iii) he is not less than 21 years age”
4.4. The provisions relating to vacancies and filling up of vacancies,
particularly as regards founder trustees, could be noticed in Clause (C)
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and Clause (D) (1) of SOA, which may also be reproduced for ready
reference as under: -
“(C)VACANCIES:
1) Whenever a vacancy arises, the managing Trustee or any other
Trustee on becoming aware of the fact of such vacancy shall
bring it to the notice of the Board at the next monthly meeting of
the board. The vacancy shall be filled up within two months
thereafter.
2. Whenever a Trustee shall during the continuance of his office
cease to possess the qualifications necessary for holding the office
of Trustee or becomes disqualified to hold the office of Trustee,
the managing trustee or any other Trustee on becoming aware of
the fact shall bring it to the notice of the Board and the Board
after notice to the Trustee concerned and after such enquiry as
may be necessary declare that a vacancy has occurred stating
the grounds of such declaration and thereupon elect a Trustee in
his place under the provisions herein contained.
3. Whenever a Trustee is guilty of breach of trust of gross neglect
and breach of duty, the Board shall have power after due and
proper notice of the charge to the Trustee concerned and after
giving him an opportunity to answer the charges against him
investigate in to the matter and after enquiry record its findings on
the said charges giving reasons for its conclusions. If it finds that
by a resolution passed by a majority of not less than six of whom
two will be Founder trustees, he has been guilty
of breach of trust
or gross neglect and breach of duty involving loss or damage to
the charges, then on such a finding being recorded, the Trustee
concerned shall vacate and shall be deemed to have vacated his
office as trustee. The Trustee to be removed will leave at once.
Neither the Trust nor the Board nor any of the Trustees shall be
liable to any trustee or trustees so in respect of acts done bonafide
in pursuance of these provisions and any person elected to the
office of the Trustee shall be deemed to contract with the trust
and with each of his Co-trustees to waive all rights of action in
respect of acts done bonafide by the Board or any trustee in this
behalf.
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4. The office of a Trustee shall become vacant by resignation on
the part of Trustee and notification of the same to the Board or to
the Managing Trustee.
5. Any member of the board who fails to attend five consecutive
meetings shall cease to be a member of it but maybe reappointed
to the office in accordance with provisions herein contained.
(D) FILLING UP OF VACANCIES:
(1) FOUNDER TRUSTEES
(a) Whenever any vacancy arises in the office of a Founder
Trustee, an adult male descendant in the male line of the original
founder Trustee if existing and competent according to the rules
herein contained, shall be eligible for appointment to that office.
(b) If there be only one in such line and he is willing to act he shall
be appointed as Trustee by the Board of Trustees. If such person,
however, could not be appointed thereto by reason of his not having
the necessary qualifications for Trustee or by reason of his being
disqualified for Trusteeship then the remaining Founder. Trustees
shall proceed to fill up the vacancy in the same manner as if such
person did not exist; but the person so appointed to the office shall
hold office only till the disability ceases and on such disability
ceasing the person entitled to succeed as herein before mentioned
shall be appointed to the place of trustee.
(c) If there are more than one in such line competent to hold
office, according to the provisions herein contained, then they shall
choose from among themselves and the
person so selected shall
be appointed to the place. If there is disagreement among them
then the opinion of the majority shall prevail. If there is no such
majority concurring in such selection of one among them or if
they do not select one from among themselves within six weeks
of such vacancy then the remaining Founder trustees shall either
unanimously or by a majority select one from such competitors
and the person so selected shall be appointed to fill the vacancy.
A person who is competent to hold office of a Founder Trustee
who has however expressed his unwillingness to accept the office
shall be precluded from putting forward his rights again but his
right to exercise his vote in the selection of a founder Trustee in
his line shall remain unaffected.
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NAIDU & SONS’ CHARITIES [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
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(d) If there be no competent person in such line or if the only
person eligible for appointment expresses his unwillingness to
accept the office the office shall be filled up by the remaining
founder Trustees by selecting one competent and willing from the
other lines. The person so selected shall be appointed as Trustee
and he shall be subject to the provisions herein contained hold
office for life.
(e) If at any time there shall be a person in the line of any of the
Founder Trustees competent to hold office under these rules his
rights of succession shall belong to him and he shall be eligible for
appointment to the office of a Founder Trustee notwithstanding
that by reason of the absence of a person competent and willing
in that line the remaining Founder Trustee selected a person from
the other lines.”
5. Pursuant to the aforesaid Scheme of Administration, the Trust
was conducting its affairs but, in the year 1938, one of the founder trustees
Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu expired, leaving behind two sons,
namely, Shri G. N. Venkatapathy and Shri V. Rajan.
5.1. After the demise of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu, his
son Shri G. N. Venkatapathy (father of the appellant) held the position of
founder trustee in the respondent-Trust until his demise on 01.01.1994.
Thereafter, his brother Shri V. Rajan became the founder trustee,
representing the branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu and held
the position as
such until 25.04.2012 when he submitted a letter of
resignation and nominated his son Shri Naren Rajan to be appointed as a
founder trustee. This act of Shri V. Rajan triggered the dispute and it
was alleged that as a consequence of resignation, he had lost his right to
nominate or vote in the selection process of the hereditary trustee of the
branch represented by him. This had been the genesis of three rounds of
litigation revolving around the office of founder trustee representing the
branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu.
First round of litigation and relevant events
6.  The dispute as to the rights of Shri V. Rajan to nominate or
vote after his resignation from the office of founder trustee became the
subject matter in O.S. No. 631 of 2012 filed by him and his son Shri
Naren Rajan against the Trust, the trustees and the present appellant
Shri V. Prakash @ G.N.V. Prakash, who was also a probable candidate
to represent the family of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu as founder
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trustee, being the son of the said Shri G.N. Venkatapathy. In the plaint,
an assertion was made that the present appellant (10th defendant in that
suit) was not qualified to hold the office of founder trustee but this assertion
was not taken forward by the plaintiffs. Hence, the Trial Court went on
to decide the other issues involved in the matter, particularly as regards
the voting right of Shri V. Rajan after his resignation.
6.1.  The Trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated 16.04.2013,
held that Shri V. Rajan had lost his right to vote and remaining founder
trustees should make the selection between Shri Naren Rajan and the
appellant Shri V. Prakash @ G.N.V. Prakash. Thereafter, on 18.04.2013,
the founder trustees unanimously chose the appellant for the said office
of founder trustee representing the branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami
Naidu. Accordingly, the appellant continued to hold the office of founder
trustee and attended the meetings of the Trust.
6.2. However, in appeal, being A.S. No. 178 of 2013, the High
Court, by its judgment and order dated 30.06.2014, held that though Shri
V. Rajan had lost his right to contest for the office of founder trustee, but
his right to vote remained intact and once he had such right to vote,
appointment of Shri Naren Rajan with his vote cannot be denied. During
the course of consideration of the appeal, the High Court also took note
of the fact that there was no dispute on point that both Shri Naren Rajan
and Shri V. Prakash (present appellant) were qualified to be considered
for the post of founder trustee and it was also admitted that they did not
incur any disqualification in that regard. In view of its findings, the High
Court issued mandatory injunction to the defendants 1 to 9 of that suit to
appoint 2nd plaintiff, Shri Naren Rajan, as one of the founder trustees.
6.2.1. A few aspects related with the stand of parties qua the
present appellant (10th defendant in the suit in question) could be noticed
in necessary details. The High Court formulated the points for
determination in the following terms: -
“23. On the basis of the above submissions, the following points
for consideration arise in this appeal suit:-
1. Whether the first plaintiff lost his competency and became
ineligible to elect his successor by reason of his resignation as
held by the trial court?
2. Whether the declaratory relief sought for by the plaintiffs
that the Board Meeting of the Trust held on 25.04.2012 and
30.07.2012 are illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs?
V. PRAKASH @ G.N.V. PRAKASH v. M/s. P.S. GOVINDASWAMY
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3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of mandatory
injunction directing the defendants 1 to 9 to appoint the 2nd plaintiff
as one of the trustees representing the branch of PSG
Narayanasamy Naidu?
4. Whether the defendants 1 to 9 are to be restrained from
appointing the 10th defendant as representing the branch of PSG
Narayanasamy Naidu?
5. Whether the defendants 1 to 9 are injected from taking policy
decision in the ensuing board meeting?”
6.2.2. The aforesaid point No. 4, as regards restraining the other
defendants from appointing the present appellant to represent the branch
of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu, had its co-relation with the basic
questions involved in point Nos. 1 and 3 i.e., right of the 1st plaintiff Shri
V. Rajan to vote for selection of founder trustee after resigning and the
mandate for the other defendants to appoint the 2nd plaintiff Shri Naren
Rajan as the founder trustee. In that context, the fundamental requirement
was of the competence and qualification of the two rival claimants to
the said office of founder trustee i.e., the 2nd plaintiff Shri Naren Rajan
and the present appellant Shri V. Prakash; and in that regard, it had been
the specific case of all the parties that both of them were qualified to be
considered for the said office. This aspect of the matter was repeatedly
taken note of by the High Court, as could be noticed from paragraphs 30
and 32 of the said
judgment, which read as under: -
“30. As regard the qualification of the plaintiffs and the 10th
defendant are concerned, it is admitted that both the plaintiffs and
the 10th defendant are qualified to be considered for the post of
founder Trustees. It is also admitted that they did not incur any
disqualification from holding that post. According to the learned
Senior counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 3 and 10 and as
per the findings of the learned trial Judge, though the first plaintiff
was qualified, after having submitted his resignation, he suffered
disqualification and therefore, he was not competent to contest to
the office of the founder Trustee or in other-words, he lost his
competency by reason of his resignation to elect the founder
Trustee and only those persons, who are competent to hold the
post are entitled to choose one from among themselves to elect or
select a founder Trustee as per Clause [c] of Chapter IV(D) (1)
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and therefore, excluding the first plaintiff, who lost competency,
the persons who are eligible to be considered to the office of the
founder Trustee representing PSG Narayanasamy Naidu are the
2nd plaintiff and the 10th defendant and therefore, the trial court
was right in directing the other Trustees, namely the plaintiffs 2 to
4 to select one among them and as there was consensus among
them.
***
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***
32. According to me, the learned trial Judge as well as the learned
Senior counsels appearing for the respondents 1 to 3 and 10 have
not properly understood the difference between the qualifications
prescribed as per Chapter IV(B) and the process of filling up the
vacancy as stated in Chapter IV(D). As stated supra, there is no
dispute that the plaintiffs and the 10th defendant are qualified to
be considered for the post of founder Trustees and the question to
be considered is whether the first plaintiff incurred disqualification
by reason of the resignation and thereby, lost his competency to
hold the office in future.”
6.2.3. In regard to the core question as to the competence of Shri
V. Rajan to be a member of electoral college, the High Court, of course,
returned the finding that he was competent and his only disqualification
was of contesting for the office of founder trustee after having
relinquished the same. Thus, the High Court put its seal of approval on
the selection of 2nd plaintiff Shri Naren Rajan by the majority comprising
of the vote of
1st plaintiff and consequently, injuncted the other defendants
from appointing the present appellant (10th defendant in said suit) to
represent the branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu.
6.3. The appellant attempted to question the judgment of the High
Court before this Court but, the petition seeking special leave to appeal,
being SLP(C) No. 26503 of 2014, was dismissed by this Court on
26.09.2014.
6.4. Thus, the said Shri Naren Rajan came to be appointed as
founder trustee, representing P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu branch of
the family.
6.5. Unfortunately, on 21.05.2015, the said Shri Naren Rajan met
with his untimely death due to a road accident.
V. PRAKASH @ G.N.V. PRAKASH v. M/s. P.S. GOVINDASWAMY
NAIDU & SONS’ CHARITIES [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
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Second round of litigation and relevant events
7. After the death of Naren Rajan on 21.05.2015, vacancy again
arose and the appellant V. Prakash filed a suit, being O.S. No. 1225 of
2015 before the District Munsif Court, Coimbatore, for recognizing him
as a founder trustee for the reason that the other surviving male member
Shri V. Rajan was prohibited to hold the office of founder trustee, as
held in the earlier round of litigation.
8. While the said suit filed by the appellant was pending, a separate
suit in O.S. No. 1952 of 2015, filed by Shri G. Rangaswamy (respondent
No. 9 herein) seeking injunction against the Trust in the matter of filling
up of vacancies. An order granting injunction therein and very
maintainability of this suit were questioned by the contesting trustees
before the High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 665 of 2010 and
they sought rejection of the plaint of O.S. No. 1952 of 2015. Therein,
appellant filed M.P. No. 3 of 2015 and the said Shri V. Rajan filed M.P.
No. 4 of 2015 to get themselves impleaded.
8.1. The said revision petition and the interlocutory applications
filed therein were considered together by the High Court in its order
dated 26.06.2015. This order carries several interesting features, as
noticed infra.
8.2. The said revision petition was filed by the present respondent-
Trust through its managing trustee Shri L. Gopalakrishnan, who himself
joined as petitioner No. 2 and
was also joined by another founder trustee
Shri G.R. Karthikeyan and by one elected trustee Shri D.
Lakshminarayanasamy5.
8.3. At the outset, it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff-Shri
G. Rangaswamy (respondent No. 9 herein) before the High Court that
he wanted to withdraw the suit as filed and, therefore, the civil revision
petition was unnecessary. However, these submissions were opposed
by the learned counsel appearing for the revisionists (contesting
respondents herein) as also by learned counsel appearing for the said
Shri V. Rajan. The High Court, looking to the circumstances of the case,
even while recording the statement made on behalf of the plaintiff that
he would withdraw the suit, proceeded to examine the other contentions
of the parties wherein the respective claims were asserted on behalf of
the present appellant and the said Shri V. Rajan, for being appointed as
5 The said revisionists are respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein.
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founder trustee to represent P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu branch. It
was asserted on behalf of the appellant that he alone was competent for
the vacancy in question for Shri V. Rajan having sustained disqualification
by resignation. While refuting these submissions, it was asserted by the
learned counsel appearing for Shri V. Rajan that the appellant was a
Green Card Holder of U.S.A. and was visiting India rarely and he was
disqualified for having converted into Christianity. The stand taken on
behalf of the revisionists was that they would select a person based on
the qualification of two rival claimants i.e., the appellant and Shri V.
Rajan.
8.4. The High Court proceeded to observe that the issue regarding
the appointment of the trustee representing the line of Shri P.S.G.
Narayanaswami Naidu was the basic issue which the Court would be
deciding so that final decision could be taken by the existing founder
trustees. Thereafter, the High Court referred to various aspects of the
matter, including the reason of Shri V. Rajan’s earlier resignation that it
was to facilitate the transition of trusteeship to his son (Shri Naren Rajan)
but his son having expired, he was entitled to the vacancy so caused.
8.5. Having examined the matter in its totality, the High Court
held that Shri V. Rajan was not suffering from any disqualification and
at the same time, directed the Board of Trustees to consider the claims
of Shri V. Rajan and the appellant V. Prakash and then
to take appropriate
decision regarding the appointment of founder trustee from Shri P.S.G.
Narayanaswami Naidu family.
8.6. The appellant challenged this decision of the High Court in
SLP(C) Nos. 23316-23318 of 2015, which was dismissed by this Court
by the order dated 04.01.2016 as the main suit itself was withdrawn.
8.7. Subsequently, the said Shri V. Rajan was appointed against
the vacancy of founder trustee and continued to function as such.
However, as the providence would have it, the said Shri V. Rajan also
expired on 21.06.2017.
Third round of litigation & subject-matter before this Court
9.  With the death of Shri V. Rajan on 21.06.2017, the appellant
remained the sole surviving male member from the branch of P.S.G
Narayanaswami Naidu’s family and by the letter dated 30.06.2017, he
intimated his willingness to serve as founder trustee. Thereafter, on
01.08.2017, clarifications were sought from the appellant by the Board
V. PRAKASH @ G.N.V. PRAKASH v. M/s. P.S. GOVINDASWAMY
NAIDU & SONS’ CHARITIES [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
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of Trustees in reference to his qualifications to hold the office as founder
trustee. In the detailed letter dated 10.08.2017, appellant brought the
judgment and decree in O.S. No. 631 of 2012 and A.S. No. 178 of 2013
to the notice of the Trust.
9.1. Thereafter, on 07.11.2017, the Board replied by stating that in
A.S. No. 178 of 2013, the High Court had not given any categorical
finding regarding the qualification of the founder trustee. The appellant
was further called upon to furnish proof of his permanent residence in
India because the Board was of the view that SOA mandated that for a
person to be qualified for the post of founder trustee, he must be
“permanently” residing in Madras.
9.2. Subsequently, the appellant sent another detailed letter dated
22.11.2017, stating that the finding of the High Court regarding his
qualification was categorical and he was duly qualified even in terms of
the requirement of residence in the light of his Indian Passport, Aadhaar
Card, property documents, bank accounts and previous appointment by
the Board itself.
9.3. Again, the appellant received a communication dated
16.02.2018 that the Board had taken note of the pending suit in O.S. No.
1221 of 2015, where the matter was sub judice. However, on 22.02.2018,
the appellant informed the Board that he had already filed an application
for withdrawing the suit on 02.02.2018, being I.A. No. 264 of 2018, with
liberty to institute
fresh proceedings.
10. Even when all the aforementioned correspondence did not
yield the desired result, the appellant filed the present suit in O.S. No.
160 of 2018 before the Principal District Judge, Coimbatore for the relief
of declaration that he was entitled to be recognized as the founder trustee
as per the SOA and also for perpetual injunction.
10.1.While deciding I.A. No. 272 of 2018, filed by the contesting
respondents for rejection of the plaint in O.S. No. 160 of 2018, the Trial
Court, by its order dated 27.04.2018, directed the respondent-Trust to
decide the eligibility of the appellant with already furnished documents.
This decision however was made subject to the result of the suit. The
relevant part of the said order dated 27.04.2018 reads as under: -
“....Already the issue between the parties was with regard to the
citizenship of the plaintiff in USA. The document that was sought
by the petitioner was explained by the plaintiff herein. so this Court
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directs the petitioner in I.A.272/2018 to decide the eligibility of
the plaintiff with the already furnished document and with the
explanation given by the plaintiff dated 22.11.2017 in respect of
the citizenship of USA within two weeks from the date of this
order and report to this Court on 04.06.2018. Until such time, any
decision taken by the petitioner is subject to the result of this suit.
Further the plaintiff is agreed to produce the 1st document
tomorrow (28.04.2018).”
10.2. Accordingly, the Board of Trustees, in its meeting held on
27.07.2018, considered the claim of the appellant and, after scrutinising
the documents, rejected his claim to the office of founder trustee on its
view that the founder trustee must be permanently residing in Madras
Presidency as per SOA; and the appellant, being a Green Card Holder
of U.S.A., was not qualified for the office of hereditary trustee as per
Chapter IV Clause (B)(a)(ii) of the SOA. On 21.08.2018, the decision
of Board of Trustees was placed before the Trial Court by filing a memo
along with minutes of the meeting.
10.3.Thus, after going full circle of communications and
proceedings, the matter was before the Trial Court for adjudication.
11. The plaintiff-appellant submitted before the Court that the
conduct of the trustees has been mala fide and unconscionable in not
considering him qualified to be a founder trustee and adding the
requirement of “permanent” residence. It was further submitted that
the
Board of Trustees had violated the mandate of SOA which provided
the outer limit of 60 days to fill the vacancy in the office of founder
trustee. The appellant further submitted that in the light of previous
litigation whereby respective Courts had declared him duly qualified and
also his previous appointment as a founder trustee, the Board of Trustees
was not justified in denying his candidature. The appellant also stated
that ‘Green Card’ was a mere privilege granted to him by virtue of his
marriage to a US citizen and was not an evidence of citizenship. He
further contended to be a resident and citizen of India and submitted his
Indian Passport, Aadhaar card, Bank accounts and other documents to
support his claim.
11.1. On the other hand, respondent Nos. 1-8 submitted that the
suit was not maintainable and denied the claim of appellant by contending
that the judgment dated 16.04.2013 in O.S. No. 631 of 2012 was on
recast issues, without any decision on the issue of qualifications of the
V. PRAKASH @ G.N.V. PRAKASH v. M/s. P.S. GOVINDASWAMY
NAIDU & SONS’ CHARITIES [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
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appellant. Reference was made to page 10 of the said judgment that had
been as under: -
“Both sides chose to leave those issues (issues on disqualification
of Mr. Naren Rajan and Mr. Prakash) open as could be gathered
during the course of the arguments.Accordingly, the issues are
recast as below”.
11.1.1. It was further submitted that in A.S. No. 178 of 2013, the
High Court did not give any specific finding on the issue of qualification
and merely observed by way of obiter dicta that Shri Naren Rajan and
the appellant were qualified to be considered for the post of founder
trustee. As regards the previous appointment of the appellant on
18.04.2013, it was submitted that the appointment was conditional upon
the proof of permanent residence of the appellant in Coimbatore, Tamil
Nadu; and the appellant being a Green Card holder of U.S.A. was not
qualified to be appointed as a founder trustee as per Chapter IV Clause
(B) of SOA.
11.2. After considering the respective pleadings of the parties,
Trial Court framed twelve issues. The relevant issues for the present
purpose could be noticed as under: -
“1. Whether the plaintiff is having necessary qualification for the
post of founder trustee of the 1st defendant, in terms of the scheme
of administer of the 1st defendants?
2. Whether the averments of the defendants is that the plaintiff is
disqualified from being appointed as a Founder Trustee of the 1st
defendant as he is a
Green Card Holder of the United States of
America I a permanent Resident of USA?
3. Whether the contentions of the defendants that the suit is laid
on non existent provision in the scheme of administration dated
29-02-1936 in O.S.No.145/1935 framed by the Court of Principal
Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, is correct or not?
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8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to be recognized as the founder
trustee of the 1st defendant trust in the vacancy caused by the
demise of Mr.V.Rajan?
9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction as prayed
for?
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10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled the relief of declaration,
declaring that the meetings of the Board of Trustees of the 1st
defendant, held after 60 days from the date of demise of Mr.
V.Rajan, without notice, without participation of the plaintiff are
null and void?”
11.3. After taking the evidence and having heard the parties, the
Trial Court proceeded to decide the relevant issues in its judgment dated
12.10.2020.
Findings of the Trial Court
12. After a detailed analysis of the material placed on record as
also the previous litigations, the Trial Court decided the question of
qualification to be appointed as founder trustee in favour of the appellant.
A few of the relevant observations and findings of the Trial Court as
occurring in paragraphs 40 and 44 of its judgment could be profitably
reproduced as under: -
“40. Ex.A.2 is the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.631/
2012. In the said suit, the plaintiff’s uncle V.Rajan and his son are
the plaintiffs. The said suit was filed seeking for the relief of
declaration challenging the validity of the meeting of Board of
Trustees of the 1st defendant trust and other reliefs. In the said
suit the plaintiff herein has been arrayed as 10th defendant and
the defendants herein were also arrayed as defendants. The said
suit was ultimately dismissed with the direction to the Board of
Trustees that it shall choose one from among the 2nd plaintiff (Naren
Rajan) and the 10th defendant (V.Prakash @
G.N.V.Prakash, the
plaintiff herein) to represent the branch of late.PSG Narayanasamy
Naidu in the Board consistent with the spirit of SOA. In the said
suit though the Rajan and Naren Rajan pleaded about the alleged
disqualifications of the plaintiff herein, later on, they did not press
the said plea. In fact, both sides choose to leave those issues
open. The 1st defendant trust or any other defendants did not raise
any plea about the alleged disqualifications of the plaintiff. Even
though the issues were recasted, the learned Additional District
Judge, after satisfying the qualification of the plaintiff herein, arrived
the said decision.
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V. PRAKASH @ G.N.V. PRAKASH v. M/s. P.S. GOVINDASWAMY
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44. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiff’s
qualification, to be appointed as a founder trustee has been affirmed
by the Judicial proceedings. The said judicial proceedings reached
its finality. In the earlier proceedings, the defendants did never
raise any objections with regard to the qualification of the plaintiff.
Moreover, in view of the judgment passed in Ex.A.2, the plaintiff
was selected as Board of Trustee and the plaintiff had effectively
served as a Board of Trustees from 8-04-2013 to 26-06-2015. He
had participated in the Board meetings and has contributed his
knowledge to the benefit and development of the 1st defendant
trust. The said factum has been proved vide the documents
Ex.A.37 to Ex.A.47. Further, this Court has perused the Ex.A.9
and Ex.A.10, wherein the 1st defendant trust did not say anything
about the alleged disqualification of the plaintiff. Further, the
Plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and deposed before the Court
that he is an Indian citizen and resident of Coimbatore.”
12.1. On the issue of ‘Green Card’, the Trial Court perused the
concerned legislation and literature of the U.S.A., wherein the permanent
resident card has been described as a document issued to immigrants
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as evidence that the
holder has been granted the privilege of residing permanently in the United
States. The holders of the Green Card are known as
Lawful Permanent
Residents (LPR). They are the citizen of another country but are entitled
to apply for U.S. citizenship. The Court came to the conclusion that
‘Green Card’ was a mere privilege and did not terminate the Indian
citizenship automatically. Relevant extracts of the findings of the Trial
Court would read as under: -
“46. It is apposite to mention here that PW.1, in his evidence has
deposed that, in the year 2010 itself, he shifted from USA to India
permanently. Further he retired in the year 2009 in USA. He denied
the suggestion that he cannot stay more than six months at a time
in India. He has deposed that he is holding Indian Passport and he
has not applied or obtained USA Passport. Further, he deposed
that the even though plaintiff could apply for USA citizenship, he
did not apply for the same. Hence, as rightly pointed out by the
learned counsel, ‘green card’ is a privilege. It is one of the way to
attain US citizenship. It alone does not confer citizen of US states.
If the card holder violates, he will lose the green card holder status.
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One can voluntarily give up the card. Hence, merely because, the
plaintiff is a green card holder, his Indian citizenship will not be
declined automatically.
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48. Hence, this Court holds that holding green card is a privilege.
Green card holder does not automatically lose his citizenship of
his mother country. Hence, this Court decides that plaintiff’s having
green card, would not be a bar to be a founder trustee.”
12.2. The Trial Court accepted the appellant’s right to be
recognised as the founder trustee pursuant to Chapter VI Clause (4)(c)(1)
of the SOA, as being the sole surviving adult male member of the P.S.G.
Narayanaswami Naidu branch of the family and granted injunction
restraining the defendants from interfering with the right of the appellant
as a founder trustee. The Trial Court held and directed as under: -
“53. In view of the above, this Court hold that the plaintiff is entitled
to be recognized as the founder trustee of the 1st defendant trust
in the vacancy caused by the demise of Mr.V.Rajan. Since, the
1st defendant trust has not acted as per the SOA, the plaintiff is
entitled the relief of declaration that is to be recognized the founder
trustee of the 1st defendant trust in the vacancy caused by the
demise of Mr.V.Rajan, consequently, the plaintiff is entitled the
permanent injunction restraining the defendants from any manner
interfering with the right of the plaintiff as a founder trustee of the
1st defendant trust and in
his role, responsibilities and duties as a
founder trustee of the 1st defendant trust.
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56. Admittedly, the scheme framed in the year 1936, at that time
there were very limited transport facilities. Nowadays due to
advancement of scientific technology and development of human
resources, the world has shrunk into a Global Village. Admittedly,
the plaintiff’s wife is a citizen of USA. The plaintiff served in
USA. Now he has retired from service, he has winded up his
businesses at USA. Due to the developments in the Air transport
he can travel from USA to India within a day or two. Due to
Covid-19 pandemic, international conferences, seminar, Board
Meetings etc., all are being conducted through video conference.
In fact, in this case also, both side counsels had argued through
V. PRAKASH @ G.N.V. PRAKASH v. M/s. P.S. GOVINDASWAMY
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video conference. From the above imply that even if the plaintiff
resides in USA, he could effectively discharge his function as
Founder Trustee and even he can very well participate in the
Board Meetings and other meetings through means of technology.
Hence, this Court is of the considered view that Chapter IV clause
(B) (ii) that one has to reside in the Madras presidency is otiose
for the present days and the said provision requires suitable
amendment. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that
Ex.A.1. Scheme of Administration is to be amended suitably. The
plaintiff counsel has submitted that the 1st defendant trust alone is
entitled to take steps to amend the SOA. Till the plaintiff is
appointed as a Board of Trustee, he has no power to take steps to
amend the Scheme of Administration. The power or authority to
amend the scheme of administration lies only with the 1st defendant
trust.”
Findings of the High Court
13. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree so passed by the
Trial Court, the contesting respondents approached the High Court by
way of First Appeal in A.S. No. 978 of 2020.
13.1.  Learned counsel for the contesting respondents extensively
assailed the judgment of the Trial Court in declaring the appellant qualified
for trusteeship on the basis of non-existing provision of the SOA. It was
submitted that as per Chapter IV Clause (B)(a)(ii) of SOA, one of the
qualifications for the post of
founder trustee was that the person
concerned ought to be a resident within the area of Madras Presidency;
and the expressions “he resides in the Madras Presidency” had specific
connotations and reasoning in reference to the extensive supervision
work required to be carried out by the Trustee.
13.2. Per contra, learned counsel for the present appellant
submitted that doctrine of res judicata was applicable even against the
co-defendants. It was further emphasised that the earlier appointment
of the appellant, when the Board of Trustee was called upon to elect
amongst the descendants of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu during
the earlier rounds of litigation, was a sufficient instance for the operation
of estoppel by conduct and to forbid the respondents to change their
stand.
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13.3. After considering the respective submissions of the parties,
High Court observed that qualification of the founder trustee with
reference to residence in Madras Presidency was the bone of contention;
and held that the Trial Court erred in applying the principles of res judicata
and estoppel in the present suit. The High Court observed thus: -
“12. The point for consideration in the appeal is whether the plaintiff
proved before the Trial Court he resides within the Madras
Presidency, to be qualified for the post of Trusteeship in the
Appellant Trust?
13.”Madras Presidency” when the scheme framed in the year
1936, during the British India period included most of the present
South India states and part of Orissa. After Independence and
the limitation of states on linguistic lines City of Coimbatore where
the appellant trust Iocated fall under the “State of Tamil Nadu”
formerly known as “Madras State”.
14. Be that as it may, the issue is narrowed down whether a
green card holder of USA will fall under the meaning of a person
resides in Madras Presidency. Though this issue was framed in
the earlier round of litigation (i.e) O.S.No.631 of 2012, the said
issue was deleted and not adverted leaving the issue open,
therefore any observation and finding in the earlier litigation made,
it was not on a issue framed. The Trial Court in O.S.No.631 of
2012 expressly made clear it will not advert to this issue. So,
whether the plaintiff resides in Madras Presidency
in the present
suit will not be hit by Section 11 of C.P.C This Court is of the view
that the earlier appointment of the plaintiff as Founder Trustee
was also done in the midst of litigation and there was no opportunity
for the parties to prove either way whether holding the green
card will disqualify a person therefore, the principle of estoppel
also cannot be applied in this case. This Court wants to make
clear that the suit ought not to have been decided on the point res
judicata or estoppel. Settling the legal objections regarding the
maintainability of the suit as above, the point of qualification as
per scheme now tested in the right of evidence placed.”
13.4. Thereafter, the High Court observed that the appellant was
a permanent resident of the U.S.A., as reflected from his Green Card.
He was holding Aadhaar Card to raise the presumption of his residence
at the address mentioned therein and he was an income tax assessee in
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India as well as in the U.S.A. However, as per Ex.A24 and Ex.A25, the
letters given by Chartered Accountant on 12.02.2018 and 07.01.2019
respectively, for the period 2014 to 2019, the appellant had been out of
India for more than half of the period even though he alleged to have
shifted permanently to India in the year 2010. After taking note of these
facts, High Court observed that as per the spirit of SOA, the plaintiff-
appellant has failed to prove his animus to reside in Madras Presidency
and could not be termed as a resident. The High Court observed and
held as under: -
“21. Going by his own admission in the cross examination, he has
deposed that in the year 2010 itself he shifted to India permanently.
Whereas, Ex.A.24 and Ex.A.25 for the period 2014 to 2019, he
had not been in India for more than half the period. It is notthat he
should not go abroad and he should always stay within the
Presidency of Madras, when the qualification had been prescribed
though a century old unless until it is amended, the spirit the of
provision should be respected. The plaintiff who claims Trusteeship
have miserable failed to place evidence that he live in Madras
Presidencyand he continue to have the animus to reside in Madras
Presidency.
22. The plaintiff still holds his green card, most of the time he was
not staying in India even according to his own evidence. Based
on his conduct of attending the board meeting earlier, when
he
was holding the Trusteeship will though give an impression that
he will be physically available when the meeting is conducted, but
as said in the Supreme Court judgment and relied by the plaintiff
counsel, the animus of the person to reside in India is important
and only the animus has to be looked into. Here is the case where
the plaintiff say he has shifted to India from U.S.A permanently
and reside in India since 2010, but his own evidence indicates that
only less than 50% of the period he was in India and he holds
green card, which show he is a permanent resident of USA. He
has not given up his green card. His animus to be a resident of
U.S.A is made explicit. In the cross examination, he has asserted
that he has no intention to give up his green card. His admission
on oath as well as his conduct does not show that he neither on
fact resides within Madras Presidency nor have any animus to
live within Madras Presidency. Animus of a person can be inferred
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only by the conduct. Nobody can say the plaintiff should not have
the green card or have a business in foreign country and account
in a foreign country, but when he wish to hold the Trusteeship of
a Trust, which mandates that the trustee must reside within Madras
Presidency and if he is not able to satisfactorily prove that he
resides within Madras Presidency, it is not obligatory on the part
of the other Trustees to induct him to the Trust, contrary to the
provision of the scheme of administration.
***
***
***
26. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff
would seriously contend that the respondent/plaintiff is a resident
of India as defined under income tax Act and he has all animus to
stay in India permanently. Though such statement is made in the
course of arguments, evidence placed by respondent/plaintiff does
not support the said statement. As pointed out earlier, the
respondent/plaintiff had stayed in India less than 50 % and his
intention to live in Madras Presidency permanently is not fortified
by his conduct. His statement on oath that from 2010 he is
permanently residing in India is also falsified by its own document
Ex.A.24 and Ex.A.25.”
13.5. The High Court further observed that Trial Court had given
a wide interpretation to the word “resides” in the light of scientific
advancements but, such a change or amendment was not permissible in
collateral proceedings and that could only be done via appropriate
amendment to the clause
in the SOA. The High Court said, -
“24. Any terms found in the written document not in contrary to
law to be understood the way it is stated and not to be supplemented
unless there is ambiguity. Here is a clause which says the Founder
Trustee must reside within Madras Presidency. The word -resides-
as per Oxford dictionary, means -live in a particular place-. The
word to be understood as it is defined and cannot be substituted
with the word -stay- or -animus to reside- or domicile or citizenship.
25. The Trial Court Judge has thought that in view of scientific
advancement the word reside should not be given the meaning
how it was understood 100 years ago. I fear, few years later,
some other Judges may think the restricting the post of Trusteeship
to male member is against gender Justice so it should be read as
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female also since in general clauses Act he includes she, men
includes women so male includes female. This may be the opinion
of the Judges, but the persons who manage the Trust should come
forward to amend the clause, if they feel it is out dated or not
convenient. Without appropriate amendment to the clause in the
scheme of administration which is the out come of the scheme
framed under a Court decree, the terms to the scheme cannot be
manipulated.”
13.6. In view of above, the High Court set aside the judgment
and decree of the Trial Court and held that the appellant was not residing
within the area of Madras Presidency as per the qualifications prescribed
under the SOA and hence, was not eligible for the office of the founder
trustee. The High Court held and concluded as under: -
“28. Going by the literal meaning of the word -resides- as of now,
the records produced and relied by the respondent/plaintiff is
inadequate to qualify him as a person who resides in Madras
Presidency. However, not a disqualification it is always open to
the respondent/plaintiff to place before the Board of Trustees,
records to show he resides within Madras Presidency and qualified
to hold the trusteeship.
29. For the said reasons, this Court finds that the trial Court
judgment holding that the plaintiff/respondent resides within Madras
Presidency and qualified to hold the post of Trustee is contrary to
hisown admission and other
evidence, hence liable to be set aside.
Accordingly, this Appeal Suit is Allowed. The trial Court judgment
is set aside. Consequently, connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition
is also closed. No costs.”
14. The plaintiff-appellant has approached this Court being
aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 04.03.2021 so passed by the
High Court and that is how the matter is before us for determination of
the basic question relating to the validity of the appellant’s claim to the
office of founder trustee.
Other claimants
15. Before adverting to the rival submission of the main contesting
parties, appropriate it would be to take note of a few facts related with
two other claimants to the said office of founder trustee in the respondent-
Trust.
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15.1. The petition seeking leave to appeal was taken up for
consideration on 01.07.2021 when it was informed on behalf of the
contesting respondents that Shri Narayan Karthikeyan had been
appointed as founder trustee on 14.05.2021 on the vacancy in question.
In the given set of circumstances, the plaintiff-appellant was permitted
to join the said newly appointed trustee as respondent No. 10 and while
issuing notice, status quo with regard to composition of the trustees was
directed to be maintained.
15.2. The said respondent No. 10 is none other but son of Shri
G.R. Karthikeyan, respondent No. 3. His father-in-law and brother-in-
law are also holding the office of trustee in the respondent-Trust and are
on record as respondent Nos. 7 and 8 respectively. It has been submitted
by the respondent No. 10 that he came to be nominated after the appellant
was found ineligible because the three founder trustees decided to
nominate one of the eligible members from the remaining three family
branches of founder trustees; and accordingly, a decision was arrived at
to appoint him as one of the trustees.
16. During the pendency of SLP, on 14.07.2021, an application
for intervention (I.A. No. 80383 of 2021) also came to be filed on behalf
of one Dr. D. Padmanabhan, who would assert his own right to be
appointed as a trustee. The applicant has pointed out the relationship of
respondent No. 10 with the other existing trustees and has submitted
that the appointment of
respondent No. 10 was against the spirit of SOA.
The applicant has further submitted that his late father Prof. G.R.
Damodaran was the founder principal of the two colleges and contributed
towards development of the activities of the Trust, particularly related
with empowerment of education; and his late father held the status of
Managing Trustee from 1972-1978. The applicant submits that he wishes
to be a part of the Trust for the purpose of contributing towards its
growth so that the institutions pioneered by his father scale greater heights.
17. As regards the above-mentioned two claimants, suffice it to
observe that their respective claims to the office in question could be
taken up for consideration only if the claim of the appellant is negatived
and he is held ineligible to hold this office. Having said so, we may revert
to the core of the matter with reference to the rival submissions.
Rival Submissions
18. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that
the High Court has wrongly reversed the judgement of the Trial Court
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whereby the appellant was considered fulfilling the requirement of
‘residence’ as per the SOA. The Trial Court was justified in taking note
of previous conduct of the respondent Trust as well as previous judicial
proceedings. The Trial Court was also justified in considering the Green
Card as a mere privilege and not a bar operating against the appellant,
so as to prevent him from being appointed as a founder trustee.
18.1. It has been contended by the learned senior counsel for the
appellant that the principles of res judicata and estoppel are of great
importance in the matter at hand, and the contentions on these principles
should not have been cursorily rejected by the High Court. In support,
reliance is placed on several decisions of this Court.
18.2. The learned counsel would further submit that it was
independently proved by the appellant before the Trial Court that he was
a resident of the area in question and also had the required animus to
reside thereat. His Aadhaar Card, Indian Passport, bank certificates,
certificates issued by Chartered Accountants are sufficient to prove his
residence and animus, and also to qualify him to hold the office of the
founder trustee.
18.3. The learned counsel has argued that any period of physical
presence, however short, may constitute residence provided that it is not
transitory, fleeting or casual, as was observed by this Court in Yogesh
Bhardwaj v. State of U.P. & Ors.:
(1990) 3 SCC 355. The very fact
that appellant retired in 2009, shifted to India in 2010, and has not applied
for citizenship of the U.S.A. till date, duly proves his animus. In support
of these contentions, reliance is placed on several decisions, including
those in Inder Singh Ahluwalia v. Prem Chand Jain & Ors.: 1993
SCC OnLine Del 12, and Mst Jagir Kaur & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh:
(1964) 2 SCR 73.
19. Learned counsel for the proforma respondent No. 9 has
supported the claim of the appellant and has submitted that the Trial
Court, after considering all the aspects, had rightly held the appellant
qualified for the office of founder trustee, being the only male descendant
available in the family branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu.
Thus, he ought to be appointed the founder trustee as per the SOA. The
learned counsel has further submitted that the qualification of the
appellant was never disputed by the Board in earlier proceedings. There
was a sudden change of stand by the Board, which is mala fide and
unjustified.
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20. Per contra, learned senior counsel for respondent Nos. 1-4
and 10 has submitted that the High Court has rightly set aside the judgment
of the Trial Court. The bar of res judicata has no application in the
present matter because the appellant’s qualification had never been a
matter directly in issue and was never decided on merits in previous
rounds of litigation. Furthermore, the bar of estoppel cannot operate
against the respondent-Trust because the previous appointment of the
appellant was on the condition of submission of proof of permanent shifting
to Coimbatore. The learned senior counsel would further submit that the
issue of Green Card qua the residence in India is a pure question of law
and hence, principle of estoppel cannot be invoked in the present matter.
20.1. Learned senior counsel has contended that the appellant is
not qualified to be a founder trustee as per Chapter IV Clause (B) of the
SOA. A Green Card is officially known as a Permanent Resident Card
and the holder of this card cannot stay outside U.S.A. beyond one year
without re-entry permit. The appellant has himself deposed in his cross-
examination about his intention of not giving up his Green Card. He is a
pensioner in U.S.A.; has a driving licence; and is an income tax assessee
in U.S.A. Thereby, appellant has completely failed to establish his animus
to be a resident of India.
21. Learned senior counsel for respondent Nos. 6-8 has also made
the submissions in parallel lines
and has contended that the principle of
res judicata cannot be applied as the issue of qualification was not
decided on merits and in earlier litigation, there was no conflict of interest
between the respondent-Trust (defendant No. 1 in O.S. No. 631 of 2012)
and the appellant (defendant No. 10). Thereby, essential conditions for
the application of res judicata between the co-defendants as laid down
by this Court in Makhija Construction & Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Indore
Development Authority & Ors.: (2005) 6 SCC 304 are not fulfilled
and present suit is liable to be dismissed.
22. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions
and having examined the material placed on record, we are clearly of
the view that this appeal deserves to succeed and the decree of the Trial
Court deserves to be restored.
The appellant’s claim rightly accepted by the Trial Court
23. A comprehensive look at the logic and reasoning of the High
Court in the impugned judgment impels us to observe that the High Court
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seems to have approached the case from an altogether wrong angle and
has proceeded on irrelevant considerations while ignoring the relevant
factors and material considerations. The High Court seems to have picked
up the residential requirement in the qualification for trusteeship in the
Scheme of Administration as being of strict physical presence, de hors
thecontext and de hors thepurpose.
24. The overwhelming evidence produced by the plaintiff-appellant
in the form of Aadhaar Card issued by the Government of India as also
his Income Tax assessments in India based on the certification of
Chartered Accountant of his fulfilling the requirement of ‘resident’ in
terms of Section 6 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has been taken to be of
little value by the High Court after counting the number of days of the
appellant’s stay in India and then questioning that the certificates were
not showing as to for how many days he was in Madras Presidency.
Even in that regard, the High Court, though referred to the decision in
Mst Jagir Kaur (supra) but failed to take note of the ratio therein. The
appellant’s ownership and possession of property in India, including
residential property; having bank accounts in India; being assessed as
resident for the purpose of Income Tax Act, 1961 have all been brushed
aside by the High Court by mere count of number of days of stay in
India. With respect, we are unable to endorse this approach.
25. In
paragraph 21 of the impugned judgment, the High Court
has observed that the spirit of the provisions prescribing qualification
ought to be respected. With respect, it appears that the High Court in the
first place seems to have missed out the fundamentals on the spirit of
formation of trust and its Scheme of Administration. As noticed, the
trust was established in the year 1926 by the sons of Shri P.S.
Govindaswamy Naidu and the trust was actually named as “M/s. P.S.
Govindaswamy and Sons’ Charity”. The Scheme of Administration, while
envisaging nine trustees, specifically provided for the four sons of Shri
P.S. Govindaswamy as the founder trustees. Office of founder trustee
has been made a heritable one with the concept of having the hereditary
trustee in the line of each of the founder trustee. Until 01.01.1994, the
appellant’s father Shri G.N. Venkatapathy remained a founder trustee
after the demise of his father Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu, one of
the original founder trustees, who died in the year 1938. The hereditary
trusteeship, in the spirit of Scheme of Administration, has continued in
relation to the lines of other original founder trustees too as the respondent
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Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are respectively representing the branches of Shri P.S.
Venkatapathy, Shri P. Rangaswami Naidu and Shri P.S. Ganga Naidu.
Reverting to the branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu who died
in the year 1938 and was substituted by his son Shri G.N. Venkatapathy,
it is noticed that after the death of Shri G.N. Venkatapathy, his brother
Shri V. Rajan was taken as the founder trustee to represent this branch.
As noticed above, there had been internal disputes, which cropped up
after resignation of Shri V. Rajan and which led to litigations and
appointment of Shri Naren Rajan and later appointment of Shri V. Rajan
again as founder trustee. As already noticed, with the demise of Shri
Naren Rajan on 21.05.2015 and of Shri V. Rajan on 21.06.2017, it is the
appellant alone who remains to be the male descendant to represent the
branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu.
25.1. When looking at the spirit of the Scheme of Administration
of Trust, in our view, it would be a travesty of the Scheme itself if in the
presence of the appellant, the representation of this branch of the founder
trustee is annulled or the position is shifted to someone else. Of course,
this could happen if it is established beyond doubt that the appellant has
incurred one or more of the disqualifications. In this suit, no other
disqualification has been alleged by the respondents against the appellant
except his want of residence in Madras Presidency. This suggestion has
been
effectively repelled by the appellant by production of cogent
evidence and with specific assertion that he was residing in India since
2010. In our view, when examining the matter from the point of view of
spirit of Scheme of Administration, the concept of representation of the
branch of founder trustee needs to be respected and, in that regard,
claim of the descendant like the appellant cannot be lightly brushed aside
by a mere count of number of days of stay in India while ignoring all
other features and factors showing his choice of staying in India.
25.2. As observed by this Court in Mst Jagir Kaur (supra),
ultimately, the question of residence in every case depends on the facts,
but the word ‘reside’ usually means something more than a flying visit or
a casual stay. The appellant who has continuously been in India, apart
from holding property and bank accounts in India and also holding an
Aadhaar Card, could least be said to be a person visiting India casually
or as a transit tourist.
26. The High Court has posed a question that certificates do not
disclose that out of 979 days in seven years, how many days the appellant
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was in Madras Presidency? Again, the approach of the High Court does
not commend to us. It has not been shown if the appellant had not been
available in the area in question so as to effectively participate in the
administration and management of the Trust. Mere holding of Green
Card of the United States of America cannot be treated as decisive of
the matter in the present case.
27. The High Court has made adverse comments on the justified
observations of the Trial Court that in view of the scientific advancements,
the word ‘reside’ should not be given that meaning as was understood a
century back. With respect, such observations of the High Court are
again, not in conformity with the principles of construction of a document.
27.1. If at all the rule of literal construction is applied literally, the
term in question about residing within “Madras Presidency” would itself
be treated as redundant for the simple reason that geographically or
demographically, there does not exist any location as of today which
could be termed as “Madras Presidency”. Obviously, such an approach
would be incorrect and the area that was known as “Madras Presidency”
at the time of drafting of the document in the year 1926 and framing of
the Scheme of Administration in the year 1936 would be taken note of
and whatever area is now referable to the said erstwhile “Madras
Presidency” area would be relevant; and the residence has to be with
reference to the said area. The point relevant for the present purpose is
that the expression “Madras Presidency” is not being construed in its
literal sense and is construed with reference to its present meaning.
27.2. Taking cue from the aforesaid, when we take up the verb
“reside” to understand its meaning and purport with reference to the
object of the document, its present day meaning and connotation cannot
be lost sight of. Of course, if a person has given up his residence and has
permanently settled at some other place, the question may arise about
his fulfilment of the condition but, at the same time, the expression
“resides” cannot be given a literal meaning as if a person like the plaintiff-
appellant having multiple places of residence would incur disqualification
for the purpose of the deed in question if not permanently located at a
particular place.
28. While not approving the approach of the High Court in this
matter, particularly in relation to the construction of the terms of SOA,
we may observe a little further. The words and expressions in the deeds
or statutes are preferably provided their contextual and contemporary
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meaning. In this process of construction, the words and expressions are
not viewed as fossil remains; rather they retain the organic character
and do take their meaning from all the surroundings. For that matter, a
particular word like “resides” could carry multiple different connotations
with reference to the time or period of its interpretation; and connotations
may be different than those understood about 100 years back. When a
particular word or expression in any document is to be operated and
applied, all the relevant characteristics available in praesenti have to be
kept in view for a meaningful and purposeful construction.Of course,
that meaning should not do violence to the real intent and purpose.6
29. In order to buttress its reasoning, the High Court has even
gone to the extent of suggesting a proposition in paragraph 25 of the
impugned judgment which, to say the least, does not stand to logic. The
High Court has observed that if the construction of sentence or words
was to be made with reference to the present-day scenario, sometime
later some Judge might think that restricting the trusteeship to male
member was against gender justice and it should be read to include
female too. With respect, we are unable to endorse this approach. The
hypothesis as suggested by the High Court is of the process of altering
the term of a document. The question at hand is of assigning a logical,
contextual and contemporary meaning to a particular expression. It
is
one thing to alter the term of a document and cannot be equated with the
process of assigning a purposeful meaning to a particular expression. In
the true rules of construction, the words are always assigned the meaning
which stand in tandem with their context, while assuring that the assigned
meaning serves the purpose.
29.1. The requirements of physical residence, with the rapid
advancement of the means of communication and transport cannot be
6 In the case of Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan: (1994) 3 SCC 440
this Court has pointed out that the words are not passive agents or mathematical
symbols so as to carry the same value and meaning the same thing at all times. This
Court has said,
 “93. It is apposite, in this context, to refer to the following passage found in
Chapter 4 in the book titled The Loom of Language:
 “Words are not passive agents meaning the same thing and carrying the same
value at all times and in all contexts. They do not come in standard shapes and
sizes like coins from the mint, nor do they go forth with a decree to all the world
that they shall mean only so much, no more and no less. Through its own
particular personality, each word has a penumbra of meaning which no draftsman
can entirely cut away. It refuses to be used as a mathematical symbol.””
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ignored particularly when the purpose of the term ‘residence’ in document
in question is to ensure participation in the affairs of the trust effectively,
as and when required. The intent of the Trial Court in its observations
had been only this much that in view of the present-day advancement,
literal meaning of residence, by requiring actual physical presence every
day and every moment is not correct. We have no hesitation in endorsing
the views and findings of the Trial Court.
The questions of res judicata and estoppel
32. After the discussion and analysis foregoing, we have arrived
at a clear conclusion that the contesting respondents had been unjustified
in questioning of the eligibility of plaintiff-appellant to hold the office of
founder trustee with reference to his Green Card and want of permanent
residence in the area in question. This had been the finding of the Trial
Court which we have no hesitation in restoring, while setting aside the
contra conclusion of the High Court on the merits of the principal issue
involved in the matter. That being the position, the other arguments of
the parties in regard to res judicata and estoppel need not even be gone
into because, in our view, the result which the appellant seeks to derive
from the operation of these principles has nevertheless been reached in
the present case with reference to the evidence led herein. Thus, we do
not propose to elaborate on the issues of
estoppel and res judicata as
raised by the plaintiff-appellant.
32.1. We may, however, indicate that in our prima facie opinion,
the principle of estoppel may not operate against the contesting
respondents. The plaintiff-appellant seeks to invoke the principle of
estoppel essentially with reference to the fact that after the judgment
dated 16.04.2013 in O.S. No. 631 of 2012, he was unanimously chosen
as the founder trustee on 18.04.2013. The said decision of the continuing
founder trustees to induct the appellant to represent his branch was
essentially pursuant to the order of the Trial Court but, ultimately the
decision of the Trial Court did not sustain itself and was reversed by the
High Court in its judgment dated 30.06.2014 in A.S. No. 178 of 2013. In
that position, the said decision of the founder trustees to induct the
appellant on 18.04.2013 could not have operated as estoppel against
them.
32.2. However, in our prima facie opinion, what is applicable to
the question of estoppel would not directly apply to the question of res
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judicata. The entitlement of the rival claimants to the office of founder
trustee representing Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu branch was a
matter innate and interwoven with the question as raised before the
High Court in A.S. No. 178 of 2013. The High Court distinctly recorded
in its judgment dated 30.06.2014 that there was no dispute about
qualification of the rival claimants which included the present appellant
in his capacity as 10th defendant in the said matter. The present contesting
respondents were indeed parties to the said proceedings and particularly
the Trust was a party thereto and was duly represented by the Managing
Trustee. When the question of qualification or disqualification could have
been raised and was not raised by the present contesting respondents, it
is difficult to say that the principles of res judicata and at any rate,
those of constructive res judicata in terms of Explanation IV to Section
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would not apply.7 However, we
are not elaborating on these aspects for the reason that in the present
suit, the plaintiff-appellant has, in our view, categorically established the
fact that he was indeed eligible and was not suffering from the alleged
disqualification.
Conclusion
33. Viewed from any angle, we are satisfied that the judgment of
the High Court remains unsustainable. In our view, the Trial Court had
rightly analysed the evidence on record and arrived at a just conclusion
in upholding the
claim of the appellant to the office of founder trustee in
the respondent-Trust as the representative of the branch of Shri P.S.G.
Narayanaswami Naidu.
34. Accordingly, and in view of above, this appeal succeeds and is
allowed; impugned judgment and order dated 04.03.2021 is set aside;
and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 12.10.2020 are
7 The said Section 11 and its Explanation IV read as under:
“11.Res judicata. – No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter
directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in
a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or
any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try
such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently
raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
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Explanation IV.- Any matter which might an and ought to have been made
ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a
matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.”
V. PRAKASH @ G.N.V. PRAKASH v. M/s. P.S. GOVINDASWAMY
NAIDU & SONS’ CHARITIES [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 18 S.C.R.
restored. Consequently, the appointment of respondent No. 10 in the
Trust shall stand annulled and the appellant shall be entitled to hold the
office of founder trustee representing P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu
branch. As a necessary consequence of our findings and conclusions,
the claim of the applicant of I.A. No. 80383 of 2021 is rendered redundant.
That application also stands rejected.
The parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
Divya Pandey and Amarendra Kumar
Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Pragya Samal, LCRA)