CHANDER BHAN (D) THROUGH LR SHER SINGH versus MUKHTIAR SINGH & ORS.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1148, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
* Author
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1148 : 2024 INSC 377
Chander Bhan (D) Through LR Sher Singh 
v.  
Mukhtiar Singh & Ors.
Civil Appeal No. 2991 of 2024
03 May 2024 
[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
(1) Whether respondent-purchasers were unaware of lis-pendens 
and could claim to be bona-fide purchasers and be entitled to 
protection u/s.41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; (2) Whether 
the principle of lis-pendens as enshrined u/s.52 would apply in the 
State of Punjab; and (3) When would the doctrine of lis-pendens 
take effect.
Headnotes†
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – ss.52 and 41 – Transaction 
hit by lis pendens – Agreement to sell property between 
Appellant and Respondent No.3-owner – Appellant paid  
earnest money – Later, filed suit for injunction – Injunction 
order in favour of Appellant – Same day, Respondent No.3 
executed release deed in favour of Respondent no.4 who 
executed sale deed in favour of Respondent Nos.1 & 2 – 
Suit for specific performance by Appellant – Erroneously 
dismissed by High Court – Order of temporary injunction 
was operating when transactions qua the suit property were 
executed by respondents – Respondents 1-2 (subsequent 
purchasers) bound by lis pendens and cannot claim to be 
bonafide purchasers, in peculiar facts of the case – Not entitled 
to protection u/s.52.
Held: 1. Explanation to s.52 clarifies that pendency of a suit 
shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which the 
plaintiff
presents the plaint – Further, that such pendency would 
extend till a final decree is passed and such decree is realised – 
In the present case, the release deed was executed after the suit 
for temporary injunction was filed by the appellant, hence, the
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Chander Bhan (D) Through LR Sher Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh & Ors.
release made by respondent no.3 in favour of respondent no.4 
would be covered by the doctrine of lis pendens – Respondent 
no. 4 executed the registered sale deed in favour of respondents 
1-2 during the operation of the temporary injunction order – Thus, 
the alienation made by respondents, cannot operate against the 
interests of the appellant considering he had obtained an order 
of temporary injunction in his favour – Subsequent purchasers 
will be bound by doctrine of lis pendens and cannot claim  
they are bonafide purchasers because they were not aware  
of the injunction order, looking at the peculiar facts of the present 
case. [Paras 19, 20, 22]
2. Release Deed executed by respondent no. 3 in favour of 
respondent no. 4 and the Sale Deed executed by respondent no. 4 
in favour of respondents 1-2 is without any legal sanctity – Alienation 
made by respondents cannot operate to the disadvantage of the 
appellant – Respondent no.3 directed to accept the balance sale 
consideration from the appellant and execute the agreement to 
sell in favour of the appellant. [Paras 24, 25]
Doctrines/ Principles – Principle of lis pendens as enshrined 
u/s.52 – Applicability – In the State of Punjab – Transfer of 
Property Act, 1882 – ss.52 and 1. 
Held: By virtue of s.1 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 
the provisions of the said Act are not applicable in the States 
of Punjab, Delhi or
Bombay; subject, of course to certain  
exceptions – However, even if s.52 is not applicable in its strict 
sense in the present case (where subject land situated in Punjab) 
then too the principles of lis-pendens, which are based on justice, 
equity and good conscience, would certainly be applicable. [Para 17]
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.52, Explanation to – 
Pendency of suit commences from date on which the plaintiff 
presents the suit.
Held: Explanation to s.52 clarifies that pendency of a suit shall be 
deemed to have commenced from the date on which the plaintiff 
presents the suit i.e. the date of presentation of plaint or institution 
of proceedings in court of competent jurisdiction.– Further, such 
pendency would extend till a final decree is passed and such 
decree is realised. [Para 18]
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Case Law Cited
Shivshankara and Another v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char [2023] 6 
SCR 359 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 358 – relied on.
Rajendra Singh v. Santa Singh [1974] 1 SCR 381 : AIR 1973 SC 
2537; Dev Raj Dogra v. Gyan Chand Jain [1981] 3 SCR 174 : 
(1981) 2 SCC 675; Sunita Jugalkishore Gilda v. Ramanlal Udhoji 
Tanna [2013] 8 SCR 215 : (2013) 10 SCC 258; Kanshi Ram v. 
Kesho Ram, AIR 1961 P&H 299; Sardar Kar Bachan Singh v. 
Major S Kar Bhajan Singh, AIR 1975 P&H 205 – referred to.
List of Acts
Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Evidence Act, 1872.
List of Keywords
Doctrine of Lis pendens; Bona-fide purchaser; Equity; Injunction; 
Agreement for Sale; Release Deed.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2991 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.10.2019 of the High Court of 
Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 2746 of 2012
Appearances for Parties
Rameshwar Singh Malik, Sr. Adv., Jitesh Malik, Abhay Singh, Mrs. 
Leelawati Suman, B C Bhatt, Satish Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.
Narender Hooda, Sr. Adv., Rahul Rathore, Shaurya Lamba, 
Ms. Sukhmani Bajwa, Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, Advs. for the 
Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
1.	
The appeal filed by the appellant presently before us challenges the 
Judgement and order dated 03.10.2019, passed in a second appeal 
by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The impugned Judgement of 
the High Court has
reversed the concurrent findings of the trial court
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Chander Bhan (D) Through LR Sher Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh & Ors.
and the first appellate court and has consequently dismissed the 
suit of specific performance filed by the appellant-plaintiff, although 
a partial relief was granted to the appellant by return of the earnest 
money to the appellant, with interest.
2.	
The facts leading to this appeal are that on 10.11.2002 appellant 
and respondent no. 3 entered an agreement to sell relating to 16 
“Kanals” of land for a total consideration of Rs. 8 lakhs, where Rs. 
2.50 lakhs was paid at the time of agreement and remaining Rs. 5.50 
lakhs was to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed, which 
was to be executed on or before 10.11.2004.
3.	
After the agreement to sell but before the date of the execution of 
the sale deed the present appellant having received the knowledge 
that respondent no. 3 was likely to alienate the suit property, files a 
suit for permanent injunction on 21.07.2003 against respondent no. 3 
where an order of temporary injunction was passed in his favour on 
28.07.2003. On the very same day, i.e., 28.07.2003 respondent no. 
3 though executes a “release deed” in favour of his son, Harvinder 
Singh (respondent no. 4), for which mutation was also sanctioned. 
4.	
Subsequent to the Release Deed, respondent no. 4, son of respondent 
no.3, executed a registered sale deed dated 16.06.2004 in favour 
of Mukhitar Singh and Baljeet Singh (respondent nos. 1-2) for the 
suit land.
5.
The appellant then files a suit for specific performance before the 
Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jind, as the defendant i.e. 
present respondent No.3 did not come forward even on the last day 
i.e. 10.11.2004 to execute the sale deed. In his Written Statement, 
respondent no. 3, takes the defence that the agreement for sale 
was signed by him, but under a “misconception”. It is contended 
that the appellant/plaintiff had taken the defendant to a shop for 
being a witness and had fraudulently obtained his signatures on 
the agreement to sell. Respondents 1 and 2, on the other hand, 
claimed to be bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration and 
sought protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 
1882 (hereafter “Act of 1882”).
6.	
The Trial Court, nevertheless decreed the suit of the appellant 
with costs and directed respondent no. 3 to accept balance sale 
consideration and execute the agreement to sell. It was held that
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respondent no. 3 had admitted about the execution of the agreement 
to sell in the earlier suit for injunction filed by the appellant, and further 
Vijay Singh (PW-5) had verified the execution of the agreement. 
The Trial Court did not give any credence to the objections of the 
defendants (present respondents No. 3 and 4). Both these defendants, 
father and son respectively, had refused to depose in the witness 
box. An adverse inference was drawn against them by the Court, 
on this aspect as well.
7.	
An interesting development, meanwhile took place before the Trial 
Court. PW-7 who was the lawyer of the appellant in the injunction 
suit, had become an attesting witness of the “sale deed” executed by 
respondent no. 4 in favour of respondent nos. 1-2. The Trial Court, thus 
observed that from the deposition of PW-7 during cross-examination, 
PW-7 had committed a breach of privileged communication and 
violated Section 126 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
8.	
No appeal against this Judgement was filed by respondents 3 and 4. 
All the same, an Appeal was filed by respondents 1 and 2 before the 
Additional District Judge, Jind which was dismissed on 06.03.2012. 
While reiterating the findings of the Trial Court, the First Appellant 
Court had observed that since PW-7 was the attesting witness of the 
sale deed in favour of respondent 1-2 and also the advocate of the 
appellant in the injunction suit, therefore, it can be safely
presumed 
that respondents 1-2 would have been aware of the injunction, and 
consequently their defence of bonafide purchaser can never be 
accepted. While dismissing the appeal, the Appellate Court observed 
that the respondents had colluded together to defeat the just claim 
of the plaintiff, i.e., the appellant before this Court. 
9.	
Respondents 1-2 then filed their Second Appeal before the Punjab 
and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, which was allowed vide order 
dated 03.10.2019, which is presently under challenge before us. The 
High Court in the impugned order has reversed the judgements of 
the trial court and the First Appellate Court, though it held that the 
plaintiff, i.e., the present appellant was entitled to the relief of refund 
of earnest money along with 8% interest per annum from date of 
agreement till date of judgement and 6% interest per annum from 
date of the date of judgement till realization of the amount.
10.	 Primarily three factors weighed with the High Court. Firstly, the 
Release Deed and order of temporary injunction were executed
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Chander Bhan (D) Through LR Sher Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh & Ors.
and passed on the same day i.e. 28.07.2003 and it was, therefore, 
not possible to determine that the Release Deed was in violation 
of the injunction order. Secondly, the suit for permanent injunction 
was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn so the protection afforded by 
the order of temporary injunction would subsume with the dismissal 
of the main suit. Thirdly, in the deposition and cross-examination of 
PW-7, there was no admission that he had informed respondents 
1-2 about the order of temporary injunction in favour of the appellant. 
Although respondents 3 and 4 refused to depose in the witness 
box, yet respondents 1-2 had both appeared as a witness and from 
their deposition, it cannot be inferred that they were aware of the 
injunction order. Thus, the High Court concluded that respondents 
1-2 were bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration and 
deserved protection under Section 41 of the Act of 1882. The relevant 
observations of the High Court are reproduced below:
“In the suit for permanent injunction, land measuring 
16 kanals out of khewat No. 322 khata No. 435 total 
measuring 86 kanal 14 marlas was the subject matter. 
Neither Harvinder Singh nor the present appellants were 
party to the said litigation. The interim injunction against 
alienation was allowed vide order dated 28.7.2003, the 
date a lawyer appeared on behalf of Iqbal Singh @ 
Pala Singh and filed memo
of appearance. The release 
deed in favour of defendant No. 2 Harvinder Singh was 
executed by Iqbal Singh @ Pala Singh defendant No. 1 
on 28.7.2003. There is no evidence on record as to the 
time when injunction order was passed by the trial court 
and the time when the release deed was executed and 
registered in favour of Harvinder Singh. This apart, sale 
in violation of an injunction order passed by the courts 
would not render the transaction void ab initio and, at 
best, proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code 
can be initiated by the aggrieved party. There is nothing 
on record suggestive of the fact that respondent-plaintiff 
initiated any such proceedings against Iqbal Singh or 
Harvinder Singh. Moreover, the injunction order dated 
28.7.2003 also lost its life the moment suit for permanent 
injunction was later dismissed in the year 2004. Counsel 
for the respondent-plaintiff has failed to cite any provision
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in law or a precedent that if suit property is transferred 
in favour of the vendor of a litigant claiming bona fide 
purchaser during pendency of earlier litigation, he is 
not entitle to protection under Section 41 of the TP Act 
irrespective of whether he was aware of pendency of 
that litigation or otherwise. The release deed in favour of 
defendant No. 2 and sale deed in favour of the appellants 
were subject to outcome of suit for injunction that was 
eventually dismissed by the Court. In this view of the 
matter, findings of the courts to reject plea of bona fide 
purchaser of the appellants on account of pendency of 
suit for permanent injunction are not based upon any 
legal ground, thus, unjustified.”
11.	 While allowing the second appeal, the High Court though has upheld 
the concurrent findings as to the execution of the agreement to sell, 
and that the appellant had paid Rs. 2.50 lakhs as earnest money to 
respondent no. 3. Consequently, the High Court gave the alternate 
relief to the appellant, as indicated above.
12.	 On behalf of the appellant, we have heard learned counsel Mr. 
Rameshwar Singh Malik, Sr. Advocate and Mr. Narender Hooda, 
Sr. Advocate on behalf of respondents 1-2. Though service by way 
of publication was done for respondents 3 and 4, they have not 
entered appearance. 
13.	 Mr. Narender Hooda, Sr. Adv for the respondents/defendants has 
relied on the findings of the High Court to submit
that respondents 
1-2 made due enquiries about the suit property, however, the 
revenue records did not indicate that another agreement to sell 
was executed in favour of the appellant. Further, it is argued that 
PW-7 had never informed them about the injunction order passed 
in favour of the appellant. Thus, they are the bonafide purchasers 
for valuable consideration and possession has been taken over by 
the respondents 1-2 since 2004 subsequent to which, they have 
renovated the land and installed a pump there as well. 
14.	 Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik, Sr. Adv on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff 
would on the other hand submit that the High Court committed a grave 
error in reversing the concurrent findings of the Courts below. The 
transaction qua the suit property was executed by the respondents
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Chander Bhan (D) Through LR Sher Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh & Ors.
after the appellant obtained an order of temporary injunction from the 
Trial Court, hence the entire transactions would be hit by lis pendens 
given under Section 52 of the Act of 1882. Even otherwise, the High 
Court has upheld the findings of the Courts below that the agreement 
to sell in favour of the appellant as well as the acceptance of earnest 
money was duly proved. Lastly, the respondent nos. 3 and 4 never 
preferred any appeal against the judgements passed by the lower 
courts so they have attained finality qua them, which is indicative 
of the collusion between the respondents.
15.	 In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it will be 
appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Transfer of 
Property Act, 1882, the benefit of which is being claimed by both 
parties. Section 41 of the Act of 1882 which governs the principle of 
bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration is reproduced below:
“41. Transfer by ostensible owner.— Where, with the 
consent, express or implied, of the persons interested in 
immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of 
such property and transfers the same for consideration, 
the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the 
transferor was not authorised to make it:
Provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care 
to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the 
transfer, has acted
in good faith.”
Similarly, Section 52 of the Act of 1882 governs the principle of lis 
pendens and is reproduced below:
“52. Transfer of property pending suit relating 
thereto.—During the [pendency] in any Court having 
authority [within the limits of India excluding the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir] or established beyond such limits] 
by [the Central Government, of [any] suit or proceeding 
[which is not collusive and] in which any right to immovable 
property is directly and specifically in question, the property 
cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party 
to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any 
other party thereto under any decree or order which may 
be made therein, except under the authority of the Court 
and on such terms as it may impose.
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[Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, the 
pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to 
commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint 
or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent 
jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has 
been disposed of by a final decree or order, and complete 
satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been 
obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the 
expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the 
execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.]”
16.	 The object underlying the doctrine of lis pendens is for maintaining 
status quo that cannot be affected by an act of any party in a pending 
litigation. The objective is also to prevent multiple proceedings by 
parties in different forums. The principle is based on equity and good 
conscience. This Court has clarified this position in a catena of cases. 
Reference may be made here of some, such as: Rajendra Singh v. 
Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537; Dev Raj Dogra v. Gyan Chand 
Jain (1981) 2 SCC 675; Sunita Jugalkishore Gilda v. Ramanlal 
Udhoji Tanna (2013) 10 SCC 258.
17.	 It must be stated here though that by virtue of Section 1 of the 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 the provisions of the said Act are 
not applicable in the States of Punjab, Delhi or Bombay; subject, 
of course to certain exceptions. Yet, in the case of Kanshi Ram v. 
Kesho Ram,
AIR 1961 P&H 299 the Punjab and Haryana High Court 
has held that since the explanation to Section 52 is based on equity 
and good conscience this principle can be applicable. Recently, this 
Court in Shivshankara and Another v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char, 2023 
SCC OnLine SC 358 held as follows:
“….Even if it is taken for granted that the provisions under 
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable 
as such in the case on hand it cannot be disputed that 
the principle contained in the provision is applicable in 
the case on hand. It is a well-nigh settled position that 
wherever TP Act is not applicable, such principle in the 
said provision of the said Act, which is based on justice, 
equity and good conscience is applicable in a given similar 
circumstance, like Court sale etc…..”
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In short, there can be no doubt that even if Section 52 of T.P Act 
is not applicable in its strict sense in the present case then too the 
principles of lis-pendens, which are based on justice, equity and 
good conscience, would certainly be applicable.
18.	 Keeping this in mind, the explanation to Section 52 which was 
inserted by the Act No. XX of 1929, clarifies that pendency of a suit 
shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which the 
plaintiff presents the suit. Further, that such pendency would extend 
till a final decree is passed and such decree is realised. 
19.	 In the facts of the present case, the suit for permanent injunction 
was filed on 21.07.2003 which is prior to the execution of release 
deed, i.e., 28.07.2003. Thus, since the release deed is executed 
after the suit for temporary injunction was filed by the appellant, the 
alienation made by respondent no. 3 in favour of respondent no. 4 
would be covered by the doctrine of lis pendens. 
20.	 In other words, the appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction 
on 21.07.2003 and obtained an order of temporary injunction on 
28.07.2003. As on 21.07.2003 the doctrine of lis pendens would take 
its effect. The release deed executed by respondent no. 3 in favour 
of respondent no. 4 was of 28.07.2003, which is subsequent to the 
filing of the suit. Respondent no. 4 executed the registered sale 
deed in favour of
respondents 1-2 on 16.06.2004 which is during the 
operation of the temporary injunction order. Thus, the alienation made 
by respondents, cannot operate against the interests of the appellant 
considering he had obtained an order of temporary injunction in his 
favour. The same position has been held by this Court in a recent 
decision of Shivshankara and Another v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char 
(Supra), which has similar facts in the context of an injunction order.
21.	 Once it has been held that the transactions executed by the 
respondents are illegal due to the doctrine of lis pendens the defence 
of the respondents 1-2 that they are bonafide purchasers for valuable 
consideration and thus, entitled to protection under Section 41 of 
the Act of 1882 is liable to be rejected. 
22.	 We are presently not getting into the deposition of PW-7 though it 
is unusual and also whether respondents 1-2 had knowledge of the 
injunction, even though we find no substantial reasons for the High 
Court to base its entire decision on the deposition of this witness 
(PW-7). We are going by the settled position that subsequent
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purchasers will be bound by lis pendens and cannot claim they are 
bonafide purchasers because they were not aware of the injunction 
order, looking at the peculiar facts of the present case. 
23.	 Respondents 1-2 have also claimed they have made substantial 
alterations to the property by investing money and they have also 
installed a submersible pump. However, this cannot be the basis 
for the respondents to claim any sort of compensation or stake any 
sort of claim against the property. (See: Sardar Kar Bachan Singh 
v. Major S Kar Bhajan Singh, AIR 1975 P&H 205)
24.	 Consequently, the Release Deed dated 28.07.2003 executed 
by respondent no. 3 in favour of respondent no. 4 and the Sale 
Deed dated 16.06.2004 executed by respondent no. 4 in favour of 
respondents 1-2 is held to be without any legal sanctity. There was 
an order of temporary injunction operating at the time when these 
transactions were made and the alienation made by the respondents 
cannot operate to the disadvantage of the appellant. Since the parties 
to these proceedings are bound by the doctrine of lis pendens the 
respondents 1-2 cannot take the protection of bonafide purchasers 
for valuable consideration. 
25.	 Consequently, this appeal is allowed, the Judgement dated 
03.10.2019 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in RSA 
No. 2746 of 2012 is set aside. The decree in favour of the appellant 
is upheld. The respondent no. 3 is directed to
accept the balance 
sale consideration of Rs.5,50,000 from the appellant and execute 
the agreement to sell dated 10.11.2002 in favour of the appellant, 
within 3 months from today.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Harshit Anand, Hony. Associate Editor  
(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)