SANTOSH S/O SHANKAR PAWAR versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 962, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
A 
B 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 962 
SANTOSH S/O SHANKAR PAWAR 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
(Criminal Appeal No.683 of 2015) 
APRIL 21, 2015 
[T.S. THAKUR, ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND 
R. BANUMATHI, JJ.] 
c 
Penal Code, 1860 -
s. 302 -
Murder - Husband 
suspected wife of infidelity, assaulted her and furlher set 
her on fire by pouring kerosene over her person - Wife 
suffered 60% burn injuries and later succumbed to her 
injuries - Her dying declaration was recorded - On the 
o basis of the dying declaration and the oral evidence of the 
prosecution witnesses, order of conviction and sentence 
of the husband uls. 302 by courls below - Interference with 
- Held: Not called for - Concurrent findings of facts 
recorded by the courls below based on evidence - There 
E being clear evidence as to the act of the accused to set 
the wife on fire, absence of pre-meditation would not reduce 
the offence of murder to culpable homicide not amounting 
to murder - Subsequent pouring of water by the husband 
would not mitigate the offence of murder - Act of pouring 
F kerosene though in a spur of moment, followed by lighting 
a match stick, throwing it and thereby setting her ablaze 
are intimately connected with each other and resulted in 
causing the death. 
G 
Crime against women - Bride burning cases - Duty 
of the courl - Held: Whenever the guilt of the accused is 
brought home beyond reasonable doubt, the Courl to deal 
with it sternly and award maximum penalty prescribed by 
H 
962
SANTOSH S/O SHANKAR PAWAR v. STATE OF 
963 
MAHARASHTRA 
law such that it may operate as deterrence to other persons A 
from committing such offence. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 Where the intention to kill is present, the 8 
act amounts to murder, where such an intention is 
absent, the act amounts to culpable homicide not 
amounting to murder. To determine whether the 
offender had the intention or not, each case must be 
decided on its facts and circumstances. From the facts c 
and circumstances of the instant case, it is evident that 
there was a homicide, namely the death of the wife; 
the deceased was set ablaze by the appellant and this 
act was not accidental or unintentional; and the post 
mortem certificate revealed that deceased died due to D 
shock and septicaemia caused by 60% burn injuries. 
When there is clear evidence as to the act of the 
accused to set the deceased on fire, absence of pre-
meditation would not reduce the offence of murder to 
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. [Para 10] E 
[969-H; 970-A-E] 
1.2 On facts, there was no provocation for the 
accused to pour kerosene and set her on fire. Act of 
pouring kerosene, though in a spur of moment, the F 
same was followed by lighting a match stick and 
throwing it on the deceased and thereby setting her 
ablaze. Both the acts are intimately connected with 
each other and resulted in causing the death of the 
deceased and the act of the accused is punishable for G 
murder. Even
assuming that the accused had no 
intention to cause the death of the deceased, act of the 
accused falls under clause (iv) of Section 300 IPC that 
is the act of causing injury so imminently dangerous 
where it will in all probability cause death. Any person H
964 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A of average intelligence would have the knowledge that 
pouring of kerosene and setting her on fire by throwing 
a lighted matchstick is so imminently dangerous that 
in all probability such an act would cause injuries 
causing death. [Paras 11, 12] [970-G-H; 971-A-B] 
B 
1.3 The accused was in his complete senses, 
knowing fully well the consequences of his act. The 
subsequent act of pouring water by the accused on the 
deceased also appears to be an attempt to cloak his 
C guilt since he did it only when the deceased screamed 
for help. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a 
mitigating factor. An act undertaken by a person in full 
awareness, knowing its consequences cannot be 
treated at par with an act committed by a person in a 
D highly inebriated condition where his faculty of reason 
becomes blurred. [Para 14] [972-A-C] 
1.4 Upon analysis of the evidence adduced by the 
prosecution, courts below recorded concurrent 
E findings that the accused caused the death of deceased 
and convicted the appellant. The concurrent findings 
of fact cannot be interfered with unless the findings 
are perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on 
record. In the totality of the facts and circumstances, 
F the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the courts 
below are based on evidence and there is no infirmity 
in the impugned judgment warranting interference. 
[Para 17] [973-E-G] 
G 
1.5 Within three months of her marriage, the
deceased died of burn injuries. In bride burning cases, 
whenever the guilt of the accused is brought home 
beyond reasonable doubt, it is the duty of the Court to 
deal with it sternly and award the maximum penalty 
H prescribed by the law in order that it may operate as
SANTOSH S/O SHANKAR PAWAR v. STATE OF 
965 
MAHARASHTRA 
deterrence to other persons from committing such A 
offence. [Para 15] [972-D] 
Ka/u Ram vs. State of Rajasthan (2000) 10 SCC 324 
- held inapplicable. 
Satya Narayan Tiwari & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 
2010 (12) SCR 1137 : (2010) 13 SCC 689; Dhananjay 
Shanker Shelly vs. State of Maharashtra 2002 (1) Suppl. 
SCR 352: (2002) 6 SCC 596 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
(2000) 10 sec 324 
2010 (12) SCR 1137 
2002 (1) Suppl. SCR 352 
held inapplicable. Para 14 
referred to. 
Para 16 
referred to. 
Para 17 
B 
c 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal D 
Appeal No. 683 of 2015. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.02.2012 of the 
High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, 
Nagpur in Criminal Appeal No. 343 of 2006. 
E 
Shahsi Bhushan Kumar for the Appellant. 
Sushil Kranjkar, Dharmendra Kishor, Aniruddha P. 
Mayee for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. Leave granted. 
F 
2. This appeal arises out of the judgment of the Nagpur G 
Bench of the Bombay High Court passed in Criminal Appeal 
No.343 of 2006 dated 2.2.2012 affirming the conviction of 
the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of 
life imprisonment imposed on him by the 5th AddJ.,Sessions 
H
966 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A Judge, Akola. 
3. Briefly stated, case of prosecution is that the 
marriage of the appellant Santosh Pawar and deceased 
Saraswatibai was solemnized on 17.6.2005. 
Due to 
B poverty, the deceased alongwith the accused was residing 
adjacent to her parental house situated at Ramji Nagar 
Boragonmanju in a rented house of one Kankale, since one 
month prior to the incident. The appellant and the deceased 
were earning their livelihood by doing daily wages work. 
C On 4.9.2005 at about 6.00 A.M., the deceased Saraswatibai 
went to answer nature's call and on her return, the 
deceased was questioned by the appellant as to why she 
returned late and the accused suspected her fidelity. lnspite 
of deceased trying to convince the appellant, the appellant 
D started assaulting her with fists and kicks. The appellant 
poured kerosene from a nearby lamp and set her ablaze. 
Saree of the deceased caught fire and the deceased ran 
towards the accused in an attempt to catch him, thereby 
burning the hands of the accused. When deceased started 
E screaming for help, the appellant, in order to save her, 
poured water on the deceased. In the meanwhile, the 
neighbours and the parents of the deceased gathered and 
the deceased was taken to the hospital. On the way to 
F the hospital, the deceased narrated the incident to her 
mother Gangabai-PW2 and sister-in-law-Sindhu Sunil 
Ingole (PW3) and also to neighbour Raju Janrao Gavai -
PW1. On
receipt of information about the occurrence, Sub 
Inspector of Police-Digmber Ramrao Ravrale (PW9) went 
G to the Government Hospital and he verified the condition 
of the deceased through the Medical Officer. PW9 then 
recorded the statement of deceased-Ex.24, on the basis 
of which FIR was registered for the offence under Section 
307 IPC. On requisition, PW7-the then Executive 
H Magistrate, went to the hospital and satisfied himself about
SANTOSH S/O SHANKAR PAWAR v. STATE OF 
967 
MAHARASHTRA [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
the fit mental condition of the deceased through Dr. Vijaya A 
Madhuarrao Pawanikar-PW6 and thereafter PW? recorded 
the dying declaration of deceased Saraswatibai. 
Saraswatibai succumbed to burn injuries on 12.09.2005. 
On the death of Saraswatibai, the FIR was altered to 
Section 302 IPC. Dr. Satish Udaybhanu Padhan-PW8 B 
conducted autopsy on the body of deceased Saraswatibai 
and issued Ex.22-Post Mortem certificate. PW8 opined that 
the deceased died due to shock and septicaemia caused 
by 60% burn injuries. Inquest was held and on completion 
and further investigation, chargesheet was filed against the C 
appellant under Section 302 IPC. 
4. To bring home the guilt of the accused, in the trial 
court prosecution examined ten witnesses and exhibited 
documents and material objects. The appellant was D 
questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. about the 
incriminating evidence and circumstances and the appellant 
denied all of them. The appellant pleaded that the fire was 
accidental and during his questioning under Section 313 
Cr.P.C., he filed Ex.34-his statement of defence. Upon E 
consideration of the evidence, trial court held that the guilt 
of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt and 
convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and 
sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and imposed 
F 
a fine of Rs.1000/- with default clause to suffer rigorous 
imprisonment for two months.
Aggrieved by the same, 
appellant preferred appeal before the High Court of 
Bombay and the said appeal was dismissed confirming the 
conviction and sentence. The present appeal assails the G 
correctness of the judgment passed by the High Court. 
5. In the SLP, notice was issued, only limited to the 
nature of offence. 
6. Drawing our attention to the supplementary H
968 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A statement-Ex.34 of the accused, learned counsel for the 
appellant contended that on the date of incident, the 
appellant went out to answer nature's call and when he 
returned, he saw his wife coming out of the house ablaze 
and the appellant immediately rushed and tried to 
B extinguish the fire due to which his hands also got burnt 
and the courts below did not properly appreciate the 
evidence and the statement of the accused. It was further 
submitted that in any event, there was no pre-meditation 
and there was no intention on the part of the appellant to 
C kill his wife and the facts and circumstances show that the 
appellant could not have intended to cause the death of 
deceased. 
7. Learned counsel for the respondent reiterated 
D findings of the courts below and submitted that the act of 
pouring kerosene and throwing the lighted matchstick on 
the deceased to set her ablaze would clearly prove that 
the accused intended to cause death and courts below 
rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC. 
E 
8. Insofar as the first contention that the appellant is 
not responsible for the death of deceased Saraswatibai, 
defence made an attempt to contend that the fire was 
accidental and that the appellant tried to extinguish the fire 
F in order to save her and in that process, he also suffered 
burn ihjuries. Prosecution has adduced cogent evidence 
to prove that the appellant has caused the death of 
deceased-
Saraswatibai. Accused suspected the deceased 
of infidelity and picking up a fight over it, he kicked her 
G and inflicted fist blows and further set her on fire by pouring 
kerosene over her person. PW-6 Doctor certified that the 
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make statement 
and PW7-Executive Magistrate recorded the dying 
H declaration-Ex.1. In the said dying declaration, the
SANTOSH S/O SHANKAR PAWAR v. STATE OF 
969 
MAHARASHTRA [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
deceased had categorically stated that on the date of A 
incident, the appellant poured. kerosene over her person 
and set her on fire. That accused poured kerosene on the 
deceased and set her on fire is corroborated by the oral 
testimony of PW3-Sindhu Sunil Ingole (sister-in-law) of the 
deceased. PW1-Raju Janrao Gavai, neighbour of the B 
deceased who accompanied the deceased to the hospital 
to whom the deceased is said to have made a statement 
about the overt act of the accused, had only stated that 
the deceased told him that the accused beat her and also 
kicked her. 
PW1 had not supported the statement of C 
deceased in the dying declaration that the accused poured 
kerosene on her and set her on fire. · However, the 
prosecution has established the guilt of the accused by 
Ex.1-dying declaration and the oral evidence of mother 0 
(PW2) and sister-in-law (PW3) and the ~ame cannot be 
doubted. 
9. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that 
there was no pre-meditation and the appellant had poured 
kerosene from the lamp nearby and thereafter the appellant E 
attempted to extinguish the fire by pouring water on her 
and himself getting burn injuries in the process. It was 
submitted that the conduct of the appellant in trying to 
extinguish the fire immediately after the incident would 
F 
clearly show that there was no intention on the part of the 
appellant to commit the murder. In
support of his 
contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court 
in Kalu Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 10 SCC 324. 
10. The question falling for consideration is whether G 
the act of the accused pouring water would mitigate the 
offence of murder. Where the intention to kill is present, 
the act amounts to murder, where such an intention is 
absent, the act amounts to culpable homicide not H
970 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A amounting to murder. To determine whether the offender 
had the intention or not, each case must be decided on its 
facts and circumstances. From the facts and circumstances 
of the instant case, it is evident that: (i) there was a 
homicide, namely the death of Saraswatibai; (ii) the 
B deceased was set ablaze by the appellant and this act 
was not accidental or unintentional; (iii) the post mortem 
certificate revealed that deceased died due to shock and 
septicaemia caused by 60% burn injuries. When the 
accused poured kerosene on the deceased from the 
C kerosene lamp and also threw the lighted matchstick on 
the deceased to set her on fire, he must have intended to 
cause the death of the deceased. As seen from the 
evidence of PWS:....Panch Witness, in the house of the 
0 
appellant kerosene lamp was prepared in an empty liquor 
bottle. Whether the kerosene is poured from the kerosene 
lamp or from the can is of no consequence. When there 
is clear evidence as to the act of the accused to set the 
deceased on fire, absence of pre-meditation will not reduce 
E the offence of murder to culpable homicide not amounting 
to murder. Likewise, pouring of water will not mitigate the 
gravity of the offence. 
11. After attending to nature's call, the deceased 
F returned to the house a little late. The accused questioned 
her as to why she was coming late and he also suspected 
her fidelity. There was no provocation for the accused
to 
pour kerosene and set her on fire. Act of pouring kerosene, 
though in a spur of moment, the same was followed by 
G lighting a match stick and throwing it on the deceased and 
thereby setting her ablaze. Both the acts are intimately 
connected with each other and resulted in causing the 
death of the deceased and the act of the accused is 
punishable for murder. 
H
SANTOSH S/O SHANKAR PAWAR v. STATE OF 
971 
MAHARASHTRA [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
12. Even assuming that the accused had no intention A 
·to cause the death of the deceased, act of the accused 
falls under clause (iv) of Section 300 IPC that is the act of 
causing injury so imminently dangerous where it will in all 
probability cause death. Any person of average intelligence 
would have the knowledge that pouring of kerosene and 
B 
setting her on fire by throwing a lighted matchstick is so 
imminently dangerous that in all probability such an act 
would cause injuries causing death. 
13. Insofar as 
the conduct of the accused in C 
attempting to extinguish fire, placing reliance upon the 
judgment of this Court in Ka/u Ram's case (supra), it was 
contended that such conduct of the accused would bring 
down the offence from murder to culpable homicide not 
amounting to murder. In Kalu Ram's case (supra), the D 
accused was having two wives. The accused in a highly 
inebriated condition asked his wife to part with her 
ornaments so that he could purchase more liquor, which 
led to an altercation when the wife refused to do as 
demanded. Infuriated by the fact that his wife had failed 
E 
to concede to his demands, the accused poured kerosene 
on her and gave her a matchbox to set herself on fire. On 
her failure to light the matchstick, the accused set her 
ablaze. But when he realized that the fire was flaring up, 
F 
he threw water on her person in a desperate bid to save 
her.
In such facts and circumstances, this Court held that 
the accused would not have intended to inflict the injuries 
which she sustained on account of act of the accused and 
the conviction was altered from Section 302 IPC to Section G 
304 Part II IPC. 
14. The decision in Ka/u Ram's case cannot be applied 
in the instant case. The element of inebriation ought to 
be taken into consideration as it considerably alters the H
972 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
power of thinking. In the instant case, the accused was in 
his complete senses, knowing fully well the consequences 
of his act. The subsequent act of pouring water by the 
accused on the deceased also appears to be an attempt 
to cloak his guilt since he did it only when the deceased 
B screamed for help. Therefore, it cannot be considered as 
a mitigating factor. An act undertaken by a person in full 
awareness, knowing its consequences cannot be treated 
at par with an act committed by a person in a highly 
inebriated condition where his faculty of reason becomes 
C blurred. 
15. Within three months of her marriage, the deceased 
died of burn injuries. In bride burning cases, whenever the 
guilt of the accused is brought home beyond reasonable 
D doubt, it is the duty of the Court to deal with it sternly and 
award the maximum penalty prescribed by the law in order 
that it may operate as a deterrence to other persons from 
committing such offence. 
E 
16. This Court on various occasions has stressed the 
need for vigilance in cases where a woman dies of burn 
injuries within a short span of her marriage and that stern 
view needs to be adopted in all such cases. In Satya 
Narayan Tiwari & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 
F (2010) 13 SCC 689, this Court in paragraphs (3) and (9) 
has held as under:-
"3. Indian society has become a sick society. This is 
evident from the large number of cases coming up in 
G 
this Court
(and also in almost all courts in the country) 
in which young women are being killed by their 
husbands or by their in-laws by pouring kerosene on 
them and setting them on fire or by hanging/ 
strangulating them. What is the level of civilisation of 
H 
a society in which a large number of women are
SANTOSH S/O SHANKAR PAWAR v. STATE OF 
973 
MAHARASHTRA [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
treated in this horrendous and barbaric manner? \Nhat A 
has our society become-this is illustrated by this 
case. 
9. Crimes against women are not ordinary crimes 
committed in a fit of anger or for property. They are B 
social crimes. They disrupt the entire social fabric. 
Hence, they call for harsh punishment. Unfortunately, 
what is happening in our society is that out of lust for 
money people are often demanding dowry and after 
extracting as much money as they can they kill the C 
wife and marry again and then again they commit the 
murder of their wife for the same purpose. This is 
because of total commercialisation of our society, and 
lust for money which induces people to commit 
murder of the wife. The time has come when we have D 
to stamp out this evil from our society, with an iron 
hand." 
17. Upon analysis of the evidence adduced by the 
prosecution, courts below recorded concurrent findings that E 
the accused caused the death of deceased Saraswatibai 
and convicted the appellant. 
It is well settled that 
concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with unless 
the findings are perverse and unsupportable from the 
evidence on record. This view has been reiterated in 
F 
Dhananjay Shanker Shetty vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 
6 SCC 596. In the totality of the facts and circumstances, 
in our view, the concurrent findings of facts recorded by 
the courts below are based on
evidence and we see no 
infirmity in the impugned judgment warranting interference. G 
18. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal dismissed. 
H