HDFC BANK LTD. versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1902, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1902 : 2024 INSC 807
HDFC Bank Ltd. 
v. 
The State of Bihar & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 4324 of 2024)
22 October 2024
[B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
What is the nature of enquiry while determining quashing of a First 
Information Report u/s.482 Cr.P.C., against a Bank and its Officials.
Headnotes†
Criminal law – Essential ingredients for offence under Section 
420 of IPC – Question of mens rea does not arise for a juristic 
person:
Held: The FIR must disclose the following ingredients to make out 
an offence u/s.420 : (i) That the Accused has induced anyone since 
inception; (ii) That the inducement was fraudulent or dishonest; 
(iii) That mens rea existed at the time of such inducement. The 
Accused/Bank is a jurisdiction person, and as such, the question of 
mens rea does not arise. However, on reading of the F.I.R., there 
is nothing to show that the Accused/Bank or its staff members had 
dishonestly induced someone to deceived to deliver any property 
to any person, and that the mens rea existed at the time of such 
inducement – Thus, the ingredients to attract the offence u/s.420 
I.P.C. would not be available. [Paras 20 and 21]
Criminal law – Section 482 CrPC – Quashing of FIR – Prima 
facie inquiry as to whether the ingredients of the offence in 
the FIR are made out or not.
Criminal law – Essential ingredients for offence under Section 
406, 409 and 462 of IPC:
Held: The following ingredients will have to be made out
for the 
offence u/s.409 I.P.C. – (a) That there has been any entrustment 
with the property, or with any dominion over property on a person 
in the capacity of a public servant or banker, etc.; (b) That the 
said person commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that 
property –  For bringing out the case under criminal breach of 
* Author
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HDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
trust, it will have to be pointed out that a person, with whom 
entrustment of a property is made, has dishonestly misappropriated 
it, or converted it to his own use, or dishonestly used it, or 
disposed of that property – In the present case, there is no 
allegation of entrustment of property which the Accused/Bank has 
misappropriated, and thus, the provisions of Section 406 and 409 
I.P.C. are not applicable – Since there was no entrustment of any 
property with the Accused/Bank, the ingredients of Section 462 
I.P.C. are also not applicable. [Paras 22 to 25]
Criminal Law – Quashing of F.I.R.:
Held: Relied upon the Judgment in State of Haryana and others 
v. Bhajan Lal and Others, [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : 1990 INSC 
363 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335, wherein it was held that an F.I.R. 
can be quashed where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not disclose 
a cognizable offence, or where the uncontroverted allegations made 
in the F.I.R. and the evidence collected in support of the same do 
not disclose the commission of any offence. [Paras 28 and 29]
Case Law Cited
Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 
[2020] 11 SCR 896 : 2020 INSC 665 : (2021) 2 SCC 427 – relied 
upon
State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others [1990] 
Supp. 3 SCR 259 : 1990 INSC 363 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335 – 
relied upon.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Quashing of
F.I.R.; Ingredients of offence u/s.420 IPC; Ingredients 
of offence u/ss.406 and 409 IPC.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
4324 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.06.2022 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Patna in CWJC No. 1375 of 2021
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Appearances for Parties
Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Adv., Vikram B. Trivedi, Faisal Sayyed, 
Nagarkatti Kartik Uday, Sanidhya Kumar, Ms. Pritha Suri,  
Advs. for the Appellant.
Manish Kumar, Divyansh Mishra, Venkatraman Chandrashekhara 
Bharathi, H R Rao, Ms. Priyanka Terdal, Udai Khanna, Shashank 
Bajpai, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, J.
1.	
Leave granted.
2.	
This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 8th June, 2022 
passed by the learned Single Bench of the High Court of Judicature 
at Patna in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1375 of 2021 wherein 
the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition preferred by 
the present appellant, HDFC Bank1, to quash the First Information 
Report2 being Case No. 549 of 2021 registered at Gandhi Maidan 
Police Station, Patna on 22nd November, 2021, against certain officials 
of the appellant-bank working at its Exhibition Road Branch, Patna 
for the offences punishable under Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 206, 
217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 of the Indian Penal Code, 18603. 
3.	
The facts which give rise to the present appeal are as under:-
3.1	 In October, 2021, Smt. Priyanka Sharma, Deputy Director of 
Income Tax (Investigation), Unit-2(2), Respondent No. 5 in the 
present proceedings, conducted a search and seizure operation 
in the case of several income-tax assessees including Shri Sunil 
Khemka (HUF), Smt. Sunita
Khemka and Smt. Shivani Khemka 
at the third floor of Khataruka Niwas, South Gandhi Maidan, 
Patna. The said search and seizure operation was conducted 
1	
Hereinafter referred to as the ‘appellant-bank’.
2	
‘FIR’ for short.
3	
‘IPC’ for short.
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HDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
on the basis of warrants of authorization issued under Section 
132(1) of the Income Tax Act, 19614. During the course of the 
search, it was found that Smt. Sunita Khemka held a bank 
locker bearing No. 462 in the appellant-bank at its Exhibition 
Road Branch, Patna. 
3.2	 On the basis of the said operation, on 5th October, 2021, an order 
under Section 132(3) of the IT Act was served upon the Branch 
Manager of the appellant-bank at its Exhibition Road Branch, 
Patna by the concerned Authorized Officer, thereby directing 
the said branch of the appellant-bank to stop the operation of 
any bank lockers, bank accounts and fixed deposits standing in 
the names of Shri Sunil Khemka (HUF), Smt. Sunita Khemka 
and Smt. Shivani Khemka, among several other individuals 
and entities, with immediate effect. It was further clarified that 
contravention of the order would render the Branch Manager 
liable under Section 275A of the IT Act and the same would 
result in penal action.
3.3	 In compliance of the aforesaid order, the appellant-bank 
stopped the operation of the bank accounts, bank lockers and 
fixed deposits of the individuals/entities mentioned in the order. 
Further, on 7th October, 2021, the appellant-bank blocked the 
bank accounts of the income-tax assesses named in the order 
and also sealed the bank locker bearing No. 462 belonging to 
Smt. Sunita Khemka.
3.4	 Subsequently, on 1st November, 2021,
Respondent No. 5 issued 
an order to the Branch Manager of the appellant-bank at its 
aforementioned branch thereby directing the appellant-bank to 
revoke the restraint put on the bank accounts of Smt. Sunita 
Khemka and three other persons, in view of the restraining 
order dated 5th October, 2021 passed under Section 132(3) of 
the IT Act. Accordingly, the said persons, including Smt. Sunita 
Khemka, were to be allowed to operate their bank accounts. The 
said order was received by the concerned Branch Manager of 
the appellant-bank of 8th November, 2021 at 4:00 p.m. However, 
4	
‘IT Act’ for short.
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on 2nd November, 2021 at 11:24 a.m., an email was sent to the 
Branch Manager which contained the same order. 
3.5	 Thereafter, on 9th November, 2021, the concerned branch of 
the appellant-bank allowed Smt. Sunita Khemka to operate her 
bank locker bearing No. 462 and proper entries recording the 
operation of the said locker were made in the bank’s records.
3.6	 Subsequently, on 20th November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 
conducted a search and seizure operation at the aforementioned 
bank locker in the concerned branch of the appellant-bank 
wherein it was found that Smt. Sunita Khemka had operated 
her bank locker with the assistance of the concerned officers of 
the appellant-bank. This was validated by the entry made in the 
bank’s records and the CCTV footage of the bank. Resultantly, 
the concerned officials of the aforementioned branch of the 
appellant-bank were found to have breached the restraining 
order dated 5th October, 2021.
3.7	 Accordingly, on 20th November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 issued 
summons under Section 131(1A) of the IT Act to Abha Sinha-
Branch Manager, Abhishek Kumar-Branch Operation Manager 
and Deepak Kumar-Teller Authoriser being the concerned 
officials of the appellant-bank at its aforementioned branch.
3.8	 The aforementioned officials attended the office of Respondent 
No. 5 and their statements were recorded wherein Abha Sinha 
and Abhishek Kumar stated that there had been an inadvertent
error on the part of the bank officials and they had misinterpreted 
the order dated 1st November, 2021. Since the said order 
pertained to the bank accounts of the concerned individuals 
including Smt. Sunita Khemka, the bank officials had misread the 
order to understand /assume that the revocation of the restraint 
extended to the bank lockers as well. Having misunderstood 
the order, the bank officials under a bona fide assumption that 
bank locker had been released as well, allowed Smt. Sunita 
Khemka to operate the same.
3.9	 The statement of Smt. Sunita Khemka had also been recorded 
wherein she stated that her accountant Surendra Prasad, after 
speaking with Deepak Kumar, had informed her that the restraint
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HDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
on the aforementioned bank locker had been revoked and she 
could operate the said locker. This was specifically denied by 
Deepak Kumar in his statement. 
3.10	Dissatisfied with the said explanations, Respondent No. 5 
submitted a written complaint to the SHO, Gandhi Maidan 
Police Station seeking to register an FIR against Smt. Sunita 
Khemka and the concerned bank officials on the ground that 
the order dated 5th October, 2021 had been violated owing to 
the unlawful operation of the aforementioned locker. 
3.11	On the basis of the said complaint, on 22nd November, 2021, 
an FIR being Case No. 549 of 2021 came to be registered 
against Smt. Sunita Khemka and the staff of the appellant-bank 
at its aforementioned branch for the offences punishable under 
Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 207, 217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 
of the IPC at the Gandhi Maidan Police Station, Patna.
3.12	Aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the appellant-bank 
preferred a Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case thereby invoking 
the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19735 for the quashing of the 
FIR. The High Court vide the impugned order dismissed the 
writ petition finding it to be devoid of merit.
3.13	Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
4.	
We have heard Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Counsel 
appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Manish Kumar, learned
Advocate-on-Record appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and 
Mr. Venkataraman Chandrashekhara Bharathi, learned counsel 
appearing on behalf of the respondent No.5.
5.	
Shri Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Counsel submits that 
taking the FIR at its face value, it does not disclose any mens rea 
of the officials of the appellant-bank and it also fails to disclose the 
commission of any offence. He further submits that the complaint 
also does not disclose any specific allegation with regard to collusion 
5	
Hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’
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between the unnamed staff of the appellant-bank with Ms. Sunita 
Khemka. The only allegation against the unnamed staff members 
of the appellant-bank is that while the Prohibitory Order dated 5th 
October 2021 was in force in relation to the bank locker No.462, 
Ms. Sunita Khema, customer of the appellant-bank, was permitted 
to operate the said bank locker. 
6.	
The learned Senior Counsel submits that taking the allegations at 
their face value, they do not disclose commission of the alleged 
offences of Sections 420, 409, 406, 462, 206, 217, 201, 34, 120B 
and 37 of the IPC. It is submitted that it is settled law that the High 
Court while considering a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 
for quashing the FIR must examine as to whether prima facie the 
ingredients of the offence have been made out in the FIR or not. In 
this regard, a reference is placed on the judgment of this Court in 
the case of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra 
and others6 and in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and 
others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another.7
7.	
Shri Kaul, relying on the judgments of this Court in the case of State 
of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others,8 submits that 
the continuation of the prosecution of the appellant-bank and/or its 
staff under IPC would amount to undue hardship and miscarriage 
of justice. 
8.	
Shri Manish Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents Nos. 1 to 4, on the contrary, submits that the High 
Court while exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot 
conduct a mini trial. It is submitted that this Court in the case of 
R. Venkatkrishnan v. Central Bureau of Investigation 9 has held 
that though a bank or a financial institution may not suffer ultimate 
loss but if the money has been allowed to be used by another 
person illegally for illegal purposes, the ingredients of Section 405 
IPC would be attracted. 
6	
[2020] 11 SCR 896 : (2021) 2 SCC 427
7	
[2024] 8 SCR 670 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2248
8	
[1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335
9	
[2009] 12 SCR 762 : (2009) 11 SCC 737
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
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HDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
9.	
It is submitted that access of the bank locker given to Ms. Sunita 
Khemka in violation of Section 132(2) of the IT Act would attract the 
offence under Section 409 read with Section 405 of the IPC.
10.	 It is submitted that the High Court has rightly, relying on various 
judgments of this Court including Neeharika Infrastructure Private 
Limited v. State of Maharashtra and others,10 held that the High 
Court cannot thwart any investigation into a cognizable offence, 
which is the statutory right and duty of the Police under the relevant 
provisions of the Cr.P.C. 
11.	 He further submits that it is equally settled that the Court cannot 
embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or 
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
12.	 With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have 
scrutinized the record. It will be relevant to refer to the Prohibitory 
Order issued by the Authorized Officer on 5th October 2021, which 
reads thus:
“Sub: Order under 132(3) of the Income- Tax Act, 1961 
in respect of bank Accounts, Lockers, Fixed Deposits 
etc.- regarding, 
Sir,
In connection with search operation conducted under 
sub-section (1) of section 132 of the Income-Tax Act, 
1961, in the office/residential/business premises of the 
under noted
person, you are directed to STOP OPERATION, 
immediately, of Bank Lockers, Bank Accounts and Fixed 
Deposits, if any,
standing in the below mentioned names(s) 
either singly or jointly, in terms of provisions of sub section 
(3) of section 132 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961.
10	
[2021] 4 SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401

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Sl. 
No.
Name & Address of the 
person
Detail 
of Bank 
Lockers/ 
Accounts/ 
Deposits
1.
Sunil Kumar Khemka
2.
Sunil Kumar Khemka (HUF)
3.
Sunita Khemka
4.
Saloni Khemka
5.
Shivani Khemka
6.
Sharda Devi Khemka
7.
Sharda Tradelinks Pvt. Ltd. 
8.
Gravity Sales Agency Pvt. Ltd.
9.
Sparsh Tie Up Pvt. Ltd.
10.
S.S. Biolife Pvt. Ltd. 
11.
NCL Synthetic Pvt. Ltd.
12.
Green Engicon Pvt. Ltd. 
13.
Gulmohar Vyapaar Pvt. Ltd.
14.
Lord Dealcom Pvt. Ltd.
15.
Paramount Financial Management
16.
Maa Jagdamba Seva Samiti Trust
2. The contravention of this order shall render you liable, 
under section 275A of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, to 
punishment of rigorous imprisonment which may extend 
to two years and also render you liable to fine.
3. You are requested to intimate the balance standing 
in these accounts IMMEDIATELY to the bearer of this 
letter and send a statement of the said accounts since 
the opening of the accounts along with copy of account 
opening form to this office within 7 (seven) days of receipt 
of this order.”
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HDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
13.	 It will also be relevant to refer to the Revocation Order dated 1st 
November 2021, issued by the Deputy Director of Income-Tax (Inv.) 
Unit-2(2), Guwahati, which reads thus:
“Sub: Revocation of order under section 132(3) of the 
Income Tax Act, 1961 in respect of Bank Accounts, Lockers, 
Fixed Deposits, etc.-reg.
Ref:- This office’s letter No.DIN/AC/DDIT/U 2(2)/GHY/2021-
22, dated 05.10.2021.
In this connection this is to state that, restrain order 
u/s.132(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were put on the 
following bank accounts of the persons as stated below. 
The restrain order put on the following bank accounts 
only may be revoked by your kind self and they may be 
allowed to operate these accounts.
Sl. 
No.
Name of Account Holder
Account No.
1.
Sunil Kumar Khemka (HUF)
01861000049315
2.
Sunil Kumar Khemka
01861530001080
3.
Sunita Khemka
01861530001097
4.
Shivani Khemka
01861460006152
14.	 It could thus be seen that though vide order dated 5th October 
2021, a restraint order was imposed in respect of Bank Lockers, 
Bank Accounts and Fixed Deposits, the Revocation Order dated 1st 
November 2021 only refers to the Bank Accounts. 
15.	 In the statements of the Officers of the appellant-bank, it is stated 
that the bank locker was inadvertently permitted to be operated, 
by misinterpreting the Revocation Order dated 1st November 2021. 
16.	 In the present case, we are only considering the FIR
registered for 
the offences punishable under the different provisions of the IPC. 
17.	 The FIR is registered on the basis of the complaint lodged by the 
Deputy Director of Income-Tax (Inv.) Unit-2(2), Guwahati, respondent 
No.5 herein. The only statement/allegation in the complaint with 
regard to the bank and its officers is thus:
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“However, it has come to the light, that the restraint order 
imposed under section 132(3) dated 05.10.21 has been 
breached and violated. During the course of execution of 
search & seizure operation on the Bank Locker no 462 
under warrant of authorization dated 20.11.21, it is found 
that Smt Sunita Khemka has operated the bank Locker 
no-462 on 09.11.21. The bank locker register maintained 
at the HDFC bank states that the Smt Sunita Khemka has 
operated the Bank Locker at 11.53 am. The CCTV footage 
was has validated the fact that Smt Sunita Khemka aided 
by the HDFC Bank Exhibition Branch, Patna has breached 
the order under section 132(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 
and has unlawfully operated her Bank locker no 462 in 
the HDFC Bank.”
18.	 It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court 
in the case of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami (supra):
“62. Now in this backdrop, it becomes necessary to advert 
briefly to the contents of the FIR in the present case. The 
FIR recites that the spouse of the informant had a company 
carrying on the business of architecture, interior design and 
engineering consultancy. According to the informant, her 
husband was over the previous two years “having pressure 
as he did not receive the money of work carried out by 
him”. The FIR recites that the deceased had called at the 
office of the appellant and spoken to his accountant for the 
payment of money. Apart from
the above statements, it has 
been stated that the deceased left behind a suicide note 
stating that his “money is stuck and following owners of 
respective companies are not paying our legitimate dues”. 
Prima facie, on the application of the test which has been 
laid down by this Court in a consistent line of authority 
which has been noted above, it cannot be said that the 
appellant was guilty of having abetted the suicide within 
the meaning of Section 306 IPC. These observations, we 
must note, are prima facie at this stage since the High 
Court is still to take up the petition for quashing. Clearly 
however, the High Court in failing to notice the contents 
of the FIR and to make a prima facie evaluation abdicated
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HDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
its role, functions and jurisdiction when seized of a petition 
under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court recited the legal 
position that the jurisdiction to quash under Section 482 
has to be exercised sparingly. These words, however, are 
not meaningless incantations, but have to be assessed 
with reference to the contents of the particular FIR before 
the High Court. If the High Court were to carry out a prima 
facie evaluation, it would have been impossible for it not to 
notice the disconnect between the FIR and the provisions 
of Section 306 IPC. The failure of the High Court to do so 
has led it to adopting a position where it left the appellant 
to pursue his remedies for regular bail under Section 439. 
The High Court was clearly in error in failing to perform 
a duty which is entrusted to it while evaluating a petition 
under Section 482 albeit at the interim stage.
63. The petition before the High Court was instituted under 
Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC. While 
dealing with the petition under Section 482 for quashing 
the FIR, the High Court has not considered whether prima 
facie the ingredients of the offence have been made out 
in the FIR. If the High Court were to have carried out this 
exercise, it would (as we have held in this judgment) have 
been apparent that the ingredients of the offence have not 
prima facie been established. As a consequence of its 
failure to
perform its function under Section 482, the High 
Court has disabled itself from exercising its jurisdiction 
under Article 226 to consider the appellant’s application 
for bail. In considering such an application under Article 
226, the High Court must be circumspect in exercising its 
powers on the basis of the facts of each case. However, 
the High Court should not foreclose itself from the exercise 
of the power when a citizen has been arbitrarily deprived 
of their personal liberty in an excess of State power.”
19.	 In the present case, the FIR does not show that the appellant-bank 
had induced anyone since inception.
20.	 For bringing out the offence under the ambit of Section 420 IPC, the 
FIR must disclose the following ingredients:
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(a)	 That the appellant-bank had induced anyone since inception;
(b)	 That the said inducement was fraudulent or dishonest; and 
(c)	
That mens rea existed at the time of such inducement.
21.	 The appellant-bank is a juristic person and as such, a question 
of mens rea does not arise. However, even reading the FIR and 
the complaint at their face value, there is nothing to show that the 
appellant-bank or its staff members had dishonestly induced someone 
deceived to deliver any property to any person, and that the mens 
rea existed at the time of such inducement. As such, the ingredients 
to attract the offence under Section 420 IPC would not be available.
22.	 Insofar as the provisions of Section 409 IPC is concerned, the 
following ingredients will have to be made out:
(a)	 That there has been any entrustment with the property, or with 
any dominion over property on a person in the capacity of a 
public servant or banker, etc.;
(b)	 That the said person commits criminal breach of trust in respect 
of that property.
23.	 For bringing out the case under criminal breach of trust, it will have 
to be pointed out that a person, with whom entrustment of a property 
is made, has dishonestly misappropriated it, or converted it to his 
own use, or dishonestly used it, or disposed of that property.
24.	 In the present case, there is not even an allegation of entrustment 
of the property which the appellant-bank has
misappropriated or 
converted for its own use to the detriment of the respondent No.5. 
As such, the provisions of Section 406 and 409 IPC would also not 
be applicable. 
25.	 As already discussed hereinabove, since there was no entrustment 
of any property with the appellant-bank, the ingredients of Section 
462 IPC are also not applicable. 
26.	 Likewise, since the offences under Section 206, 217 and 201 of the 
IPC requires mens rea, the ingredients of the said Sections also 
would not be available against the appellant-bank. 
27.	 The FIR/complaint also does not show that the appellant-bank and its 
officers acted with any common intention or intentionally cooperated
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HDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
in the commission of any alleged offences. As such, the provisions 
of section 34, 37 and 120B of the IPC would also not be applicable. 
28.	 It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court 
in the case of Bhajan Lal and others (supra):
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various 
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of 
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series 
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary 
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under 
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and 
reproduced above, we give the following categories of 
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could 
be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of 
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, 
though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, 
clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible 
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list 
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be 
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information 
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their 
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima 
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against 
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report 
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation 
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except 
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR 
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the 
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and 
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a 
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
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offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer 
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under 
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint 
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of 
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion 
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the 
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any 
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under 
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution 
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there 
is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, 
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the 
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended 
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously 
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance 
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private 
and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that 
the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be 
exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that 
too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be 
justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability 
or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the 
FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent 
powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the court 
to act according to its whim or caprice.”
29.	 We find that the present case would squarely fall within categories (2) 
and (3) of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal 
and others (supra).
30.	 We are of the considered view that the continuation of the criminal 
proceedings against the appellant-bank would cause undue hardship 
to the appellant-bank.

[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1917
HDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
31.	 In the result, we pass the following order.
(i)	
The appeal is allowed.
(ii)	
The impugned judgment and order dated 8th June 2022 passed 
by the learned Single Bench of the High Court of Judicature at 
Patna in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1375 of 2021 is 
quashed and set aside.
(iii)	 The First Information Report being Case No. 549 of 2021 
registered at Gandhi Maidan Police Station, Patna on 22nd 
November, 2021, against certain officials of the appellant-bank 
working at its Exhibition Road Branch, Patna for the offences 
punishable under Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 206, 217, 406, 
409, 420 and 462 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is also 
quashed and set aside qua the appellant-bank. 
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Vidhi Thaker, Hony. Associate Editor 
(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)