LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST versus MAGNUM DEVELOPERS AND OTHERS
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 966, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
A 
B 
(2015] 10 S.C.R 966 
LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST 
v. 
MAGNUM DEVELOPERS AND OTHERS 
(CivilAppeal No. 14565 of2015) 
DECEMBER 15, 2015 
[M.Y. EQBALAND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.] 
Wakf Act, 1995 - s. 83(as amended by 2013 Act) -
c Constitution of tribunal -Amendment of s. 83(4) whereby 
three members tribunal to be constituted by the State 
Government by notification in the Official Gazette - Whether 
till a three member tribunal is constituted by the State 
Government by issuing notification one member tribunal as 
D constituted under 1995 Act would continue functioning or it 
ceases to have jurisdiction - Held: State has not done its 
mandatory duty of issuing fresh notification constituting three 
members tribunal as provided uls. 83 - It is common practice 
that the old institution/member continues to exercise duty till 
E the time any new institution/member takes charge of that duty 
-
One member tribunal would continue to exercise 
jurisdiction till the time the State constitutes three members 
tribunal by notification in the Official Gazette - High Court 
erred in holding that after the Amendment Act, 2013 came 
F into force, the one member tribunal exercising jurisdiction 
ceased to exist even though a fresh notification constituting 
three member tribunal has not been notified and that the civil 
court would exercise jurisdiction in such situation - States to 
take steps for constituting a three member tribunal as 
G mandated bys. 83(4) and issue notification to that
effect-
Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013. 
H 
Doctrine/Principle -
Doctrine of implied repeal -
Application of - Explained 
966
LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST v. MAGNUM 
967 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. 
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court 
A 
HELD: 1.1 From perusal of the statement of objects 
and reasons of the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013, it reveals 
· that the single member of the tribunal was working fine 
under the Waqf Act, 1995 (before 2013 amendment). The B 
idea of expanding the composition by the 2013 
Amendment seems to make improvement in the 
functioning of the tribunal with the help of two more 
members in the tribunal. Even by the 2013 amendment 
in Section 85 of the Act, they have also ousted the C 
jurisdiction of the reve~ue court or any other authorities 
along with the civil court. Meaning thereby the 
legislatures wanted to make sure that no authorities 
apart from the tribunal constituted under Section 83 of 
the Act shall determine any dispute, question or other D 
matter relating to a waqf property, eviction of a tenant or 
determination of rights and obligations of the lessor and 
the lessee of such property under this Act. [Paras 25 and 
26) [985-F-H; 986-A] 
1.2 As per the amendment, the three members 
tribunal is to be constituted by the State Government by 
notification in the Official Gazette. However, the State has 
not done its mandatory duty as provided under Section 
E 
83 of the Act (as the Section 83 uses the word "shall"). It F 
should be kept in mind that it is common practice that 
the old institution/member continues to exercise duty till 
the time any new
institution/member takes charge of that 
duty. The one member tribunal will continue to exercise· 
jurisdiction till the time the State constitutes three G 
members tribunal by notification in the Official Gazette. 
The High Court erred in holding that the civil court would 
exercise jurisdiction in such situation as it is manifest 
by the intention of the legislature that they do not want H
968 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A any other authorities to exercise over the Waqf property 
matter under the Act. [Para 27] [986-8-D] 
1.3 It was submitted that by 2013 Amendment Act, 
sub-section 83(4) has been substituted replacing the 
B earlier sub-section 83(4) as the intention of the 
Legislature is that One Member Tribunal is not enough 
and in its place a Three Member Tribunal should function; 
that the old Section 83(4) and the amended Section 83(4) 
is inconsistent with each other and, therefore, doctrine 
C of implied repeal would apply. The submission that 
section 83 (4) of 1995 has been implied repeal cannot be 
accepted. [Para 28] [986-E-G] 
1.4 In case where there is a repealing clause to a 
o particular Act, it is a case of express repeal, but in a case 
where doctrine of implied repeal is to be applied, the 
matter will have to be determined by taking into account 
the exact meaning and scope of the words used in the 
repealing clause. The implied repeal is not readily 
E inferred and the mere provision of an additional remedy 
by a new Act does not take away an existing remedy. 
While applying the principle of implied repeal, one has 
to see whether apparently inconsistent provisions have 
been repealed and re-enacted. The implied repeal of an 
F earlier law can be inferred only where there is enactment 
of a later law which had the power to override the earlier 
law and is totally inconsistent with the earlier law and 
the two laws cannot
stand together. If the later law is not 
c·apable of taking the place of the earlier law, and for 
G some reason cannot be implemented, the earlier law 
would continue to operate. To such a case, the rule of 
implied repeal may result in a vacuum which the law 
making authority may not have intended. [Para 30-31] 
H [987-8-F]
LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST v. MAGNUM 
969 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. 
1.5 There is a presumption against repeal by A 
implication. The reason for the presumption is that the. 
legislature while enacting a law has complete knowledge 
of the existing laws on the subject matter and, therefore, 
when it is not providing a repealing provision, it gives 
out an intention not to repeal the existing legislation. If B 
by any fair interpretation, both the statutes can stand 
together, there will be no implied repeal and the court 
should lean against the implied repeal. Hence, if the two 
statutes by any fair course of reason are capable of being 
reconciled, that may not be done and both the statutes C 
be allowed to stand. [Para 33] [988-G-GH; 989-A] 
· 1.6 The intention of the Parliament while substituting 
Section 83(4) is not that one member tribunal vanishes 
or ceases to exist till a three member tribunal is D 
constituted. Intention to bring new sub-section (4) in 
Section 83 is nothing but improvement in the 
constitution of th·e tribunal and both the earlier and the 
substituted sub-sections are not inconsistent with each 
other. [Para 39] 992-C-D] 
E 
1.8 The High Court erred in holding that after the 
Amendment Act, 2013 came into force, the one member 
tribunal exercising jurisdiction ceased to exist even 
though a fresh notification constituting three member F 
tribunal has not been notified. The States have not till 
date issued fresh notification constituting three 
members
tribunal as mandated by Section 83(4) of the 
Act. The States are directed to immediately take steps 
for constituting a three member tribunal and notification G 
to that effect must be issued. [Paras 40, 42] [992-E, F, H; 
993-A] 
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and 
Another vs. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2) (2009) 4 SCC 
H

970 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 10 S.C.R. 
A 
299: 2009 (2) SCR 161; Afcons Infrastructure 
Limited and Another vs. Cherian Varkey 
Construction Company Private Limited and Ors. 
(2010) 8 sec 24: 2010 (8) SCR 1053; M.P. Wakf 
Board vs. Subhan Shah (2006) 10 SCC 696: 2006 
B 
(8) Suppl. SCR 85; Municipal Council, Palai vs. 
T.J. Joseph AIR 1963 SC 1561:1964 SCR 87; 
Bhagat Ram Sharma vs. Union of India AIR 
(1988) SC 740: 1988 SCR 1034; Om Prakash 
Shukla v. Akhi/esh Kumar Shukla AIR 1986 SC 
c 
1043: 1986 SCR 855; Municipal Council, Palai 
vs. T.J. Joseph AIR 1963 SC 1561: 1964 SCR 
87; Harshad S. Mehta vs. State of Maharashtra 
(2001) 8 sec 257: 2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 577 -
D 
referred to. 
Mangin vs. /RC (1971) 1 All ER 179 (PC) -
Referred to. 
CASE LAW REFERENCE 
E 
2009 (2) SCR 161 
Referred to. 
Para 13 
2010 (8) SCR 105 
Referred to. 
Para 13 
2006 (8 ) Suppl. SCR 85 Referred to. 
Para 14 
F 
AIR 1963 SC 1561 
Referred to. 
Para 28 
1988 SCR 1034 
Referred to. 
Para 28 
1986 SCR 855 
Referred to. 
Para 32 
G 
1964 SCR 87 
Referred to. 
Para 34 
2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 577 Referred to. 
Para 36 
H
LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST v. MAGNUM 
971 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:Civil Appeal No. A 
14565 of2015 
From the Judgment and Orde'r dated 11.09.2015 of the 
High Court of Judicature at Bombay rendered in Civil Revision 
Application No. 395 of 2015 
B 
WITH 
C. A. NOS. 14566, 14567, 14569, 14570 & 14571 OF 
2015 
P. B. Gaikwad, Y. H. Muchhala, Saghar A. Khan, Ejaz 
Maqbool, C. George Thomas, Akriti Chaubey, G. D. Shaikh, 
Faraz Maqbool, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Samir Patel, Vatslya 
Vigya, Rajat Kapoor, Shakil Ahmed Syed, Mohd. Parvez 
c 
. Dabas, Uznii Jameel Husani, Shirish K. Deshpande; Ajay K. 
D 
J. Panicker, Shyam Moorjani, Sureshan P., Vaibhav S. 
Nagvekar, Ravindra KeshavraoAdsure, Nishant Ramakantrao 
Katneshwarkar for the appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
E 
M.Y. EQBAL, J.:ln the special leave petition being 
SLP(C)No.29234 of 2015, the petitioner (plaintiff) seeks to 
challenge the impugned judgment and order dated 11.9.2015 
passed by Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Civil 
F 
Revision No.395 of 2015, whereby waqf suit instituted by the 
petitioner before one memberWaqfTribunal has been held to 
be not maintainable and necessary directions have been 
issued by the said order for return of the plaint and for 
presentation before the appropriate civil court for adjudication G 
of disputes. 
2. The plaintiff, a trust called Lal Shah Baba Dargah Trust, 
instituted the suit before the one member Maharashtra
Waqf 
Tribunal, Aurangabad (in short, "the Tribunal") claiming the suit H
972 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 O S.C.R. 
A 
property as waqf property held by the trust, for perpetual 
injunction restraining defendants nos. 1 to 7 from illegally 
developing portion of the s.uit plot in City Survey No. 1 /50 to 
11/50 and part of C.S.No.50 situated at Tawripada, Lalbagh, 
Mumbai; from raising further construction; creating third party 
B interest; from changing the nature of the suit properties as also 
from handing over the possession of the flats constructed 
therein. A separate application for temporary injunction was 
also filed before the Tribunal, which was partly allowed and an 
ad-interim injunction. in those terms has been granted. 
c 
3. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal granting 
injunction, the defendant-respondents moved the High Court 
under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act, 1995 by way of civil 
revision, which was registered as C.R. No.395 of2015. The 
D defendant-respondents, besides other defence, challenged the 
jurisdiction of one man Tribunal on the ground inter alia that 
the functioning of single member Tribunal constituted under 
Section 83(4) of the 1995Act ceased to have jurisdiction after . 
the 1995 Act was amended by Wakf (Amendment) Act of 2013, 
E which came into force with effect from 1.11.2013 i.e. much 
before the commencement of the suit before one man Tribunal. 
4. The High Court after hearing the parties allowed the 
civil revision application and set aside the order of the Tribunal 
F holding that it
has no jurisdiction. However, the High Court in 
the impugned order did not interfere with the interim order. 
The High Court finally held:-
G 
H 
"74. Now it is also necessary to consider the fate of suits 
or other proceedings which are instituted prior to coming 
into force of the Amendment Act with effect from 
1.11.2013. The legislature has not made any transitory 
provision. The legislature has also not provided for 
transfer of suits/proceedings which are institut~d prior 
to 1.11.2013. In view of Section 6(e) of the General
LAL SHAH BABADARGAH TRUSTv. MAGNUM 
973 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
Clauses Act, 1897, suits/proceedings instituted before A 
a single member Tribunal prior to 1.11.2013 shall be 
continued as if Section 83(4) is not amended. In view 
thereof, it has to be held that the waqf suit instituted by 
the plaintiff after 1.11.2013 before a single member 
Tribunal is not maintainable and consequently Plaint is 
B 
liable to be returned along with Applications Exhibit 19 
and 30. Parties shall appear before the Tribunal when 
the Tribunal will pass further orders for return of Plaint 
along with Applications-Exhibit 19 and 30 for presentation 
before appropriate Civil Court in the light of observations C 
made herein. The impugned order will have to be 
quashed and set aside on the ground that it is without 
jurisdiction and Applications-Exhibit-19 and Exhibit-30 
· filed by the plaintiff are liable to be restored to the file. 0 
The said Applications will have to be decided by the Civil 
Court after return of Plaint along with Applications Exhibit 
19 and 30, on their own merits and in accordance with 
law uninfluenced by the observations made herein. 
75. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, Civil Revision 
E 
Application is allowed as under:-
1. The waqf suit instituted by the plaintiff before a single 
member Tribunal is not maintainable and consequently 
Plaint along with Applications-Exhibit 19 and 30 are 
F 
liable to be returned for presentation before
appropriate Civil Court. Parties shall appear before 
the Tribunal on 15.9.15 arid the Tribunal will pass 
necessary orders within two weeks from the date of 
appearance of the parties. 
G 
2. Impugned order passed by the Tribunal is quashed 
and set aside on the ground that the said order is 
without jurisdiction and Applications-Exhibit-19 and 30 
filed by the plaintiff are restored to the file. The said 
H
974 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A 
Applications shall be decided by the Civil Court after 
return of Plaint on their own merits on the basis of 
material on record and in accordance with law 
uninfluenced by the observations made herein. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
. G 
H 
3. Suits or any other proceedings instituted prior to 
1.11.2013 before a single member Tribunal will 
continue to be tried by the said Tribunal in view of 
Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 
4. On and after 1.11.2013, being the date when 
Amendment Act came into force, a single member 
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain and try disputes 
referred in Section 83(1) of the Act. Suits or any 
proceedings instituted on and after 1.11.2013 cannot 
be tried by a single member Tribunal. 
5. Civil Courts will have jurisdiction to entertain and try 
suits or any other proceedings instituted on and after 
1.11.2013 despite bar of Section 85 till such time the 
State Government issues notification appointing a 
three member Tribunal as per the amended Section 
83(4). 
6. As there is no provision for transfer of pending suits 
in the Amendment Act, suits or any other proceedings, 
so instituted on or after 1.11.2013, shall continue to 
be tried by Civil Courts even after the State 
Government issues notification constituting a three 
member Tribunal as per the Amended Section 83(4) 
unless the Central Government intervenes as per 
Section 113 or the Act is suitably amended . 
7. Notwithstanding
setting aside the impugned order, 
Clauses (2) and (3) of operative part of the impugned 
order shall remain in force for a period of six weeks 
from today so as to enable the plaintiff to obtain 
appropriate adinterim, interim order from Civil Court.
LAL SHAH BABADARGAHTRUSTv. MAGNUM 
975 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
Continuation of the ad-interim order shall not be A 
treated as expression of merits of the case either way. 
All the contentions in that regard are expressly kept 
open. 
8. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms with 8 
no orders as to costs." 
5. The defendant-respondent Maharashtra State Board 
of Wakfs, also aggrieved by the impugned order, has filed 
special leave petition being SLP(C) No. 31610 of2015. The 
petitioners in SLP(C) Nos.31605, 31606 and 31595 of2015 C 
are aggrieved by that part of the impugned order whereby the 
High Court divested jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal in respect 
of the waqf suit and conferred jurisdiction to the civil court to 
decide all those suits. 
6. In SLP(C) No.30725 of2015, the petitioner-defendants 
have assailed that part of the impugned order passed by the 
High Court whereby the High Court refused to interfere with 
D 
the interim order passed by the Tribunal and directed that the 
interim order passed by the Tribunal shall continue till the plaint E 
of the suit is presented to the civil court. 
7. Since all these special leave petitions arise out of the 
impugned judgment passed by the High Court and common 
questions of law are involved, these applications have been 
F 
heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 
8. Leave granted. · 
9. Mr. Saghar A. Khan, learned counsel appearing for the G 
appellant, assailed the impugned
judgment and order passed 
by the High Court as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction 
inasmuch as in exercise of revisional power under Section 
83(9) of the Waqf Act, 1995. The High Court ought notto have 
entered into the merits of the case and decide the jurisdiction 
H
976 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A of Single Member Tribunal before which the suit was pending 
for adjudication. According to the learned counsel, when the 
petition was filed by the respondent under Section 9(A) CPC 
· of the Maharasthra Amendment Act was pending before the 
Tribunal, the High Court ought not to have decided the 
B jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the revision petition which was 
filed by the defendant-respondent assailing the order of interim 
injunction. 
10. Learned counsel then submitted that in any case so 
C long as the State Government by notification in the official 
Gazette does not constitute a Tribunal as per amended Section 
83(4) of the Act, the Single Member Tribunal shall continue to 
determine and decide the matters referred to it under Section 
83( 1) of the Act. It was submitted that the Waqf Act, 1995 was 
D amended and the notification to that effect was issued on 
20.09.2013 amending certain provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995 
including Section 83(4) of the Act. By the said amendment 
the Tribunal which was already functioning under the principal 
Act was continued since no fresh notification constituting Three 
E Member Tribunal was issued. Learned counsel submits that 
in terms of amended Section 83(4) of the Act, the State 
Government shall have to issue a fresh notification in the official 
gazette constituting Three Members Tribunal. Till a fresh 
notification is issued, the One Member Tribunal shall continue 
F to
function. In t~is respect learned counsel submitted that the 
Andhra Pradesh High Court, Gujarat High Court and Kerala 
High Court have uniformly taken a view that so long as the 
State Government has not constituted a Three Member Tribunal 
G in terms of the amendment in Section 83(4) of the Act, a Single 
Member Tribunal is competent to decide the questions referred 
to it. 
11. Lastly, Mr. Khan, brought to our notice a notification 
H issued by the Central Government dated 14.05.2015 by which
LAL SHAH BABADARGAHTRUSTv. MAGNUM 
977 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
several amended acts sought to repeal including the Wakf A 
AmendmentAct, 2013 which came into force on 01.11.2013. 
According to the learned counsel, the said notification of the 
Central Government of 2015 repealing various amendment 
acts was not brought to the notice of the High Court. In the 
alternative, learned counsel submits that after the Amended 
B 
Act, 2015, repealing 2013 amendment, the One Member 
Tribunal is fully competent to entertain and decide the suit that 
has been filed by the appellant. 
12. Learned counsel further contended thatthe High Court C 
has totally ignored the mandate of Section 90( 1) and (3) of the 
Act allowing the prayer of the defendants to delete the name 
of Respondent No.2 - Waqf Board from the said Revision 
Application. The impugned order was passed without issuing 
notice to the Waqf Board and on this ground alone the impugned o· 
order is li<lble to be set aside. The High Court further failed to 
consider the provisions of Section 6, Section 7 and Section 
85 of the Waqf Act, 1995 which completely oust the jurisdiction 
of Civil Court to decide the nature of Auqaf and Waqf properties 
as the same requires adjudication by the WaqfTribunal alone. 
E 
13. Per contra, Mr. Y.H. Muchhala, learned senior counsel 
appearing for the defendant-respondents firstly contended that 
the plaintiff instituted the waqf suit after amendment to Section 
83(4) came into
force in 2013. On and from 01.01.2013, the F 
Single Member Tribunal cannot decide and determine the 
dispute referred to instituted before the Tribunal. According to 
the learned counsel while amending the Act of 1995 the 
Legislature has not made any transitory provision, hence bar 
under Section 85 cannot be invoked in the facts and G 
circumstances of the present case and particularly when the 
State Government has not issued a fresh notification appointing 
a Three Member Tribunal in terms of amended Section 83(4). 
So long as a Three Member Tribunal is not constituted by the H
978 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A 
State Government, the jurisdiction of Civil Court is not ousted. 
The High Court, therefore, rightly held that the plaintiff can 
approach the Civil Court and obtain appropriate relief so long 
as the Three Member Tribunal is not constituted in terms of 
Section 83(1)(4) of the Act. In support of the submission, 
B learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in the 
case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and 
Another vs. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2), (2009)4 SCC 299; and . 
Afcons Infrastructure Limited and Another vs. Cherian 
Varkey Construction Company Private Limited an_q 
C Others, (2010) 8 SCC 24. 
14. It has further been submitted on behalf of the defendants 
that the plaintiff has not prima facie established that the suit 
properties are the waqf properties belonging to the plaintiff, 
D and therefore, the Tribunal was r:iot justified in granting ad-
interim order. Whereas it has been pleaded on behalf of the 
plaintiff that coming into force of the Act is one thing and 
enforcement of the Act is another thing. Though the Principal 
Act came into force with effect from 1.1.1996 and the 
E Amendment Act came into force with effect from 1.11.2013, 
the scheme of the Act itself contemplates that in stage-wise 
the Act will be enforced. Till such time, the Tribunal is constituted 
in terms of the amended Section 83(4), single member Tribunal 
F can proceed to decide the disputes as contemplated under 
the
amended Section 83(1). Learned counsel submitted that 
the Principal Act as alsoAmendmentAct contemplate different 
statutory authorities. Each of such authorities must exercise 
the functions within the four corners of the Statute. In support of 
G this proposition, plaintiff relied upon the decision of the Apex 
Court in the case of M.P. Wakf Board vs. Subhan Shah, 
(2006) 1 o sec 696. 
15. As noticed above, the High Court in the concluding 
H para 74 of the impugned order, quoted hereinabove, held that
LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST v. MAGNUM 
979 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
the suit before the One Member Tribunal is not maintainable A 
and till a fresh notification is issued by the State Government 
constituting a Three Member Tribunal, the Civil Court has 
jurisdiction to entertain such suits and decide the dispute with 
regard to waqf properties. However, learned Single Judge 
refused to interfere with the interim order of injunction passed 
B 
by One Member Tribunal. The Court in paragraph 73 of the 
impugned order held:-
"73. The question whether the suit properties are wakf 
properties or not, is not a pure question of law. It is a C 
mixed question of law and fact. Parties will have to lead 
evidence in order to substantiate the respective case. 
For the reasons recorded in paragraphs 32 and 34 in 
the impugned order, the Tribunal has granted ad-interim 
order. I do not find that the Tribunal committed any error D 
in passing the ad-interim order. I, therefore, do not find 
that defendants no. 1 to 7 have made out any case for 
interfering with the impugned order in the exercise c,>f 
revisional jurisdiction." 
16. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and 
examined the relevant provisions of both the principal Act and 
the amendmentAct brought in 2013. 
E 
17. A cursory glance of the Waqf Act, 1995 would show F 
that the Waqf Act, (for short '1995 Act') came into force with 
effect from 1.1.1996. By Section 3(q), the Tribunal is defined 
as the
Tribunal constituted under sub-section 1 of the Section 
83 of the Act having jurisdiction in relation to that area. Section 
84 confers power to the Tribunat to decide and determine G 
dispute, questions or other matters relating to a waqf property 
and decide the proceeding as expeditiously as possible. 
18. The relevant provision i.e. Section 83 confers power 
to the State Government to constitute Tribunals. In the original 
H
980 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A Act, Section 83 provides for constitution of Tribunal consisting 
of only one person. Sub-section 4 of Section 83 as it stood 
under the original Act is quoted hereinbelow:-
"(4) Every Tribunal shall consist of one person, who shall 
B 
be a member of the State Judicial Service holding a rank, 
not below that of a District, Sessions or Civil Judge, Class 
I, and the appointment of every such person may be 
made either by name or by designation". 
C 
19. Certain amendments have been brought in the Act of 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
1995 in 2013 called the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013. By 
thisAmendmentAct, 2013, many sections have been amended 
including Section 83. After amendment, Section 83 reads as 
under:-
"83. Constitution of Tribunals, etc.-
(1) The State Government shall, by notification in the 
Official Gazette, constitute as many Tribunals as it may 
think fit, for the determination of any dispute, question or 
other matter relating to a waqf or waqf property, eviction 
of a tenant or determination of rights and obligations of 
the lessor and the lessee of such property, under this Act 
and define the local limits and jurisdiction of such 
Tribunals; 
· 
(2) Any mutawalli person interested in a Waqf or any 
other person aggrieved by an order made under this Act, 
or rules made thereunder, may make an application within 
the time specified in this Act or where no such time has 
been specified, within such time as may be presc~ibed,
to the Tribunal for the determination of any dispute, 
question or other matter relating to the Waqf. 
(3) Where any application made under sub-section (1) 
relates to any Waqf property which falls within the 
• territorial limits of the jurisdiction of two or more Tribunals,
LAL SHAH BAiJADARGAHTRUSTv. MAGNUM 
981 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
such application may be made to the Tribunal within the A 
iocal limits of whose jurisdiction the mutawalli or any one 
of the mutawallis of the Waqf actually and voluntarily 
resides, carries on business or personally works for gain, 
and where any such application is made to the Tribunal 
aforesaid, the other Tribunal or Tribunals having B 
jurisdiction shall not entertain any application for the 
determination of such dispute, question or other matter: 
Provided that the State Government may, if iI is of opinion 
that it is expedient in the interest of the Waqf or any other 
person interested in the Waqf or the Waqf property to C 
transfer such application to any other Tribunal having 
jurisdiction for the determination of the dispute, question 
or other matter relating to such Waqf or Waqfproperty, 
transfer such application to any other Tribunal having D 
jurisdiction , and, on such transfer, the Tribunal to which 
the application is so transferred shall deal with the 
application from the stage which was reached before 
the Tribunal from which the application has been so 
transferred, except where the tribunal is of opinion that it E 
is necessary in the interests of justice to deal with the 
application afresh. 
(4) Every Tribunal shall consist of-
( a) one person, who shall be a member of the State 
F 
Judicial Service holding a rank, not below that of a 
District, Sessions or Civil Judge,
Class I, who shall be 
the Chairman; 
(b) one person, who shall be an officer from the State 
Civil Services equivalent in rank to that of the Additional G 
District Magistrate, Member; 
(c) one person having knowledge of Musli.m law and 
jurisprud~nce, Member; and the appointment of every 
such person shall be made either by name or by · H 
designation.
982 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
(4A) The terms and conditions of appointment including 
the salaries and allowances payable to the Chairman 
and other members other than persons appointed as ex 
officio members shall be such as may be prescribed. 
(5) The Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court and 
shall have the same powers as may be exercised by a 
civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(5 of 
1908), while trying a suit, or executing a decree or order. 
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908(5of1908), the Tribunal shall follow such 
procedure as may be prescribed. 
(7) The decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding 
upon the parties to the application and it shall have the 
force of a decree made by a civil court. 
(8) The execution of any decision of the Tribunal shall be 
made by the civil court to which such decision is sent for 
execution in accordance with the provisions of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5of1908). 
(9) No appeal shall lie against any decision or order 
whether interim or otherwise, given or made by the 
Tribunal: Provided that a High court may, on its own motion 
or on the application of the Board or any person 
aggrieved, call for and examine the records relating to 
any dispute, question or other matter which has been 
determined by the Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying 
itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such
determination and may confirm, reverse or modify such 
determination or pass such order as it may think fit." 
20. Perusal of the amended sub-·section (4) of Section 83 
would show·that now the Tribunal shall consist of three members 
and the State Government shall by notification constitute a 
H Tribunal consisting of three members. Indisputably, till date,
LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST v. MAGNUM 
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DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
as per amended sub-section (4) of Section 83, the State A 
Governments of different States have not constituted Tribunal 
consisting of three persons by issuing notification. 
21. The only question, therefore, that arises for 
consideration is as to whether till a three member tribunal is B 
constituted by the State Government by issuing notification one 
member tribunal as constituted under 1995 Act shall continue 
functioning or it ceases to have any jurisdiction to entertain 
disputes and decide it in accordance with the provisions of 
Act. 
C 
22. The statement of objects and reasons for bringing Wakf 
(Amendment) Act, 2013 is quoted hereinbelow :-
'The Wakf Act, 1995, [which repealed and replaced the 0 
Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984] came into force on the 1st 
day of January, 1996. The Act provides for the better 
administration of auqaf and for matters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto. However, over the years 
of the working of the Act, there has been a widespread E 
feeling that the Act has not proved effective enough in 
improving the administration of auqaf. 
2.The Prime Minister's High Level Committee for 
Preparation of Report on Social, Economic and 
F 
Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India 
(also known as Sachar Committee) in its Report 
submitted to the Prime Minister on the 1 ?th November, 
2006 considered the aforementioned issue and 
suggested certain
amendments to the Act relating to G 
women's representation, review of the composition of 
the Central Wakf Council and the State Wakf Boards, a 
stringent and more effective approach to countering 
encroachments of Waqf properties and other matters. 
The Committee stressed the need for setting up of a H
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National Waqf Development Corporation and State Waqf 
Development Corporations so as to facilitate proper 
utilization of valuable waqf properties for the objectives 
intended. The Committee recommended that the Act 
should be amended so that the State Waqf Boards 
become effective and are empowered to properly deal 
with the removal of encroachments of waqf properties. It 
also recommended to amend the Act so that the Waqf 
Tribunal will be manned by a full time Presiding Officer 
appointed exclusively for waqf properties. The Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on Waqf in. its Third Report 
presented to the Rajya Sabha on the 4th March, 2008 
made re commendations for a wide range of 
amendments relating to time bound survey of waqf 
properties, prevention and removal of encroachments, 
making the Central Waqf Council a more effective and 
meaningful body, provisions for development of waqf 
properties, etc. In its Ninth Report presented to the Rajya 
Sabha on the 23'd October, 2008, the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee reconsidered certain issues. 
The 
recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Waqf were considered by the Central Waqf Council. 
The various issues and the need for amendments to the 
Act have also been considered in consultation with other 
stakeholders such as theAll India Muslim Personal Law 
Board, representatives of the State Governments and 
the Chairmen and the Chief Executive
Officers of State 
Waqf Boards." 
G 
23. With the aforesaid object, necessary provisions have 
been substituted in the original Act. Clause 40 of the Bill sought 
to amend Section 83 c,f the Act relating to constitution of the 
Tribunal with a view to expand the composition of a tribunal. 
Clause 41 of the Bill sought to amend Section 85 of the Act 
H dealing with bar of jurisdiction of civil courts so as to bar the
LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST v. MAGNUM 
985 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
jurisdiction of the revenue courts and any other authorities A 
besides civil courts in resp,ect of disputes, question or other 
matters relating to Waqf. Waqf properties or other matters 
required to be determined by the Tribunal. 
24. The aforementioned objectives nowhere stated that B 
there was any issue with regard to the functioning of the single 
member tribunal in the Waqf Act, 1995, which was functioning 
before the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013 (27 of 2013) came 
into force. They have come up with the idea of three members 
Tribunal only to expand the composition of the Tribunal as C 
mentioned in the Clause 40 of the Wakf (Amendment) Bill, 2010 
(Bill No.53 of 2010), which provides that it seeks to amend 
Section 83 of the Act relating to constitution of Tribunals, etc. 
Every Tribunal constituted by the State Government will have a 
Chairman who shall be a member of the State Judicial Service D 
holding a rank not below that of a District, Sessions or Civil 
Judge Class- I. There will be two other members, one of whom 
shall be an officer from the State Civil Services equivalent in 
rank to that of Additional District Magistrate and the other a 
person having knowledge of Muslim law and jurisprudence. 
E 
25. From perusal of the statement of objects and reasons, 
it reveals that the single member of the Tribunal wasiworking 
fine under the Waqf Act, 1995 (before 2013 amendment). The
idea of expanding the composition by the 2013 Amendment F 
seems to make improvement in the functioning of the Tribunal 
with the help of two more members in the Tribunal. 
26. Even by the 2013 amendment in Section 85 of the 
Act, they have also ousted the jurisdiction of the revenue court G 
or any other authorities along with the civil court. Meaning 
thereby the legislatures wanted to make sure that no authorities 
apart from the Tribunal constituted under Section 83 of the Act 
shall determine any dispute, question or other matter relating 
to a waqf property, eviction of a tenant or determination of rights H
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[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A and obligations of the lessor and the lessee of such property 
under this Act. 
27.As per the amendment, the three members Tribunal is 
to be constituted by the State Government by notification in 
B the Official Gazette. However, the State has not done its 
mandatory duty as provided under Section 83 of the Act (as 
the Section 83 uses the word "shall"). Then the question is 
should any party suffer due to the inaction of the State. We 
should keep in mind that it is common practice that the old 
C institution/member continues to exercise duty till the time any 
new institution/member takes charge of that duty. In the present 
case also, the one member tribunal will continue to exercise 
jurisdiction till the time the State constitutes three members 
tribunal by notification in the Official Gazette. The High Court 
D erred in holding that the civil court will exercise jurisdiction in 
such situation as it is manifest by the intention of the legislature 
that they do not want any other authorities to exercise over the 
Waqf property matter under the Act. 
E 
28. Mr. Muchhala, learned senior counsel appearing for 
the defendant/respondent, submitted that by 2013Amendment 
Act, sub-section 83(4) has been substituted replacing the 
earlier sub-section 83(4) of the Act as the intention of the 
Legislature is that One Member Tribunal is not enough and in 
F its place a Three Member Tribunal should function. According 
to the learned
counsel the old Section 83( 4) and the amended 
Section 83(4) is inconsistent with each other and, therefore, 
doctrine of i.mplied repeal will apply. In other words, the word 
substitution used in the Amended Act must be interpreted as 
G implied repeal. In this connection, learned counsel relied upon 
Afcons Infrastructure (supra), Municipal Council, Palai vs. 
T.J. Joseph, AIR 1963SC1561, and Bhagat Ram Sharma 
vs. Union of/ndia, AIR (1988) SC 740. 
H
LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST v. MAGNUM 
987 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
29. We are unable to accept the submission made by the A 
learned counsel that Section 83(4) of 1995 Act has been 
impliedly repealed. 
30. It is well settled that in case where there is a repealing 
clause to a particular Act, it is a case of express repeal, but in 
B 
a case where doctrine of implied repeal is to be appli,ed, the 
matter will have to be determined by taking into account the 
exact meaning and scope of the words used in the repealing 
clause. It is equally well settled that the implied repeal is not 
readily inferred and the mere provision of an additional remedy C 
by a new Act does not take away an existing remedy. While 
applying the principle of implied repeal, one has to see whether 
apparently inconsistent provisions have been repealed and 
reenacted. 
31.The implied repeal of an earlier law can be inferred 
only where there is enactment of a later law which had the power 
D 
to override the earlier law and is totally inconsistent with the 
earlier law and the two laws cannot stand together. If the later 
law is not capable of taking the place of the earlier law, and for E 
some reason cannot be implemented, the earlier law would 
continue to operate. To such a case, the rule of implied repeal 
may result in a vacuum which the law making authority may not 
have intended. 
32. The principle of implied repeal was considered by 
three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of
Om Prakash 
Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, AIR 1986 SC 1043, this 
Court held thus:-
F 
" ...... An implied repeal of an earlier law can be inferred G 
only where there is the enactment of a later law which 
had the power to override the earlier law and is totally 
inconsistent with the earlier law, that is, where the two 
laws -the earlier law and the later law- cannot stand H
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together. This is a logical necessity _because the two 
inconsistent laws cannot both be valid without 
contravening the principle of contradiction. The later laws 
abrogate earlier contrary laws. This principle is, however, 
subject to the condition that the later law must be effective. 
If the later law is not capable of taking the place of the 
earlier law and for some reason cannot be implemented, . 
the earlier law would continue to operate. To such a case 
the Rule of implied repeal is not attracted because the 
application of the Rule of impliep repeal may result in a 
vacuum which the law-making authority may not have 
intended. Now, what does Appendix II contain? It contains 
a list of subjects and marks assigned to each of them. 
But who tells us what that list of subject~ means? It is 
only in the presence of Rule 11 one can understand the 
meaning and purpo~e.of Appendix II. In the absence of 
an amendment reenacting Rule 11 in the 1947oRules, it 
is difficult to hold by the application of the doctrine of 
implied repeal that the 1950 Rules have ceased to be 
applicable to the ministerial establishments of the 
subordinate civil courts. The High Court overlooked this 
aspect of the case and proceeded to hold that on the 
mere rei_ntroduction of the new Appendix II into the 1947 
Rules, the examinations could be held in accordance with 
the said Appendix. We do not agree with this view of the 
High
Court." 
33. There is a presumption against repeal by implication. 
The reason for the presumption is that the legislature while 
G enacting a law has complete knowledge of the existing laws 
on the subject matter and, therefore, when it is not providing a 
repealing provision, it gives out an intention not to repeal the 
existing legislation. If by any fair interpretation, both the statutes 
can stand together, there will be no implied repeal and the 
H 
court should_ lean against the implied repeal. Hence, if the two 
~
LAL SHAH BABADARGAH TRUSTv. MAGNUM 
989 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
statutes by any fair course of reason are capable of being A 
reconciled, that may not be done and both the statutes be 
allowed to stand. 
34. The principle of implied repeal has been elaborately 
discussed in the case of Municipal Council, Palai vs. T.J. 
B 
.Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 1561, this Court held:-
"9. It is undoubtedly true that the legislature can exercise 
the power of repeal by implication. But it is an equally 
well-settled principle of law t.hat there is a presumption c 
against an implied repeal. Upon the assumption that the 
legislature enacts laws with a complete knowledge of all 
existing laws pertaining to the same subject the failure 
to add a repealing clause indicates that the intent was 
not to repeal existing legislation. Of course, this D 
presumption will be rebutted if the provisions of the new 
act are so inconsistent with the otd ones that the two 
cannot stand together. As has been- observed by 
Crawford on Statutory Construction, p. 631, para 311: 
E 
"There must be what is often called 'such a positive 
repugnancy between the two provisions of the old and 
the new statutes that they cannot be reconciled and made 
to stand together'. In other words they must be absolutely 
repugnant or irreconcilable. Otherwise, there can be no 
F 
implied repeal ... for the intent of the legislature to repeal 
the old enactment is utterly lacking." 
35. Their Lordships further observed
as under:-
"The reason for the rule that an implied repeal will take G 
place in the event of clear inconsistency or repugnancy, 
is pointed out in Crosbyv. Patch and is as follows: 
"As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, 
and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same 
subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the H
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Legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to 
interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the 
same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is 
irreconcilable. Bowen v. Lease (5 Hill 226). It is a rule, 
says Sedgwick, that a general statute without negative 
words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former 
one, unless the two acts are irreconcilably inconsistent. 
'The reason and philosophy of the rule,' says the author, 
'is, that when the mind of the legislator has been turned 
to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a 
subsequent statute in general terms, or treating the 
subject in a general manner, and not expressly 
contradicting the original act, shall not be considered as 
intended to effect the more particular or positive previous 
provisions, unless it is absolutely necessary to give the 
latter act such a construction, in order that its words shall 
have any meaning at all." 
36. In the case of Harshad S. Mehta vs. State of 
Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 257, a three Judges Bench of 
E this Court considered the principle of implied repeal and held:-
F 
G 
H 
"31. One of the. important tests to determine the issue of 
implied repeal would be whether the provisions of the 
Act are irreconcilably inconsistent with those of the Code 
that the two cannot stand together or the intention of the 
legislature was only to supplement the provisions of the 
I 
Code.
This intention is to' be ascertained from the 
provisions of the Act. Courts lean against implied repeal. 
If by any fair interpretation both the statutes can stand 
together, there will be no implied repeal. If possible, 
implied repeal shall be avoided. It is, however, correct 
that the presumption against the intent to repeal by 
implication is overthrown if the new law is inconsistent 
with or repugnant to the old law, for the inconsistency or
LAL SHAH BABA DARGAH TRUST v. MAGNUM 
991 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
repugnancy reveals an intent to repeal the existing laws. 
A 
Repugnancy must be such that the two statutes cannot 
be reconciled on reasonable construction or hypothesis. 
They ought to be clearly and manifestly irreconcilable. It 
is possible, as contended by Mr Jethmalani, that the 
inconsistency may operate on a part of a statute. Learned 
B 
counsel submits that in the present case the presumption 
against implied repeal stands rebutted as the provisions 
of the Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the 
provisions of the earlier Acts that the two cannot stand 
together. The contention is that the provisions of Sections C 
306 and 307 cannot be complied with by the Special 
Court and thus the legislature while enacting the Act 
clearly intended that the said existing provisions of the 
Code would not apply to the proceedings under the Act. 
0 
Learned counsel contends that this Court will not construe 
the Act in a manner which will make Sections 306 and 
307 or at least part of the said sections otiose and thereby 
defeat the legislative intendment whatever be the 
consequences of such an interpretation." 
E 
37. Learned counsel for the respondent put reliance on 
the decision of this Court in Afcons case (supra). In this case 
the question that came for consideration before the Court was 
whether Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers F 
the Court to refer the parties to
a suit to arbitration with the 
consent of both the parties. While considering the provisions 
of Section 89 and Order 10 Rule 1A of the Code, this Court 
held that consideration for reference under Section 89 is 
mandatory. While deciding the question various decisions G 
on the point of interpretation of statute are being considered 
and decide the issue holding that Court will have to follow the 
rule of literal construction which enjoins the Court to take words 
as used by the Legislature to give it the meaning which naturally 
implies. 
H
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A 
38. In Mangin vs. /RC, (1971) 1 All ER 179 (PC), the 
Privy Council held that the object of the construction of a statute 
being to ascertain the will of the legislature it may be presumed 
that neither injustice nor absurdity was intended. If therefore a 
literal interpretation would produce such a result, and the 
B language admits of an interpretation which would avoid it, then 
·such an interpretation may be adopted. 
39. Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned senior counsel 
appearing for the Wakf Board, has rightly contended that the 
C intention of the Parliament while substituting Section 83(4) is 
not that one member tribunal vanishes or ceases to exist till a 
three member tribunal is constituted. Intention to bring new 
sub-section (4) in Section 83 is nothing but improvement in 
the constitution of the Tribunal and both the earlier and the 
D substituted sub-sections are not inconsistent with each other. 
40. Having regard to the law discussed hereinbefore,and 
giving our anxious consideration in the matter, we are of the 
definite opinion that the High Court has committed serious error 
E of law in holding that after the Amendment Act, 2013 came 
into force, the one member Tribunal exercising jurisdiction 
ceased to exist even though a fresh notification constituting 
three member Tribunal has not been notified. The High Court 
further erred in law in directing the Civil Court to decide the 
F disputes in respect of waqf
property. 
41. We, therefore, allow all the appeals except the appeal 
arising out of SLP(C)No.30725/2015 and set aside the 
impugned judgment passed by the High Court. Consequently, 
G the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.30725/2015 is dismissed 
holding t~at the interim order passed by the Tribunal shall 
continue. 
42. Before parting with the order we record our serious 
H exception to the conduct of the States who have not till date

LAL SHAH BABADARGAHTRUSTv. MAGNUM 
993 
DEVELOPERS AND ORS. [M.Y.EQBAL, J.] 
issued fresh notification constituting three member Tribunal A 
as mandate by Section 83(4) of the Act. We, therefore, direct 
the States to immediately take steps for constituting a three 
member Tribunal and notification to that effect must be issued 
within four months from today. Let copy of this judgment be 
sent to the Chief Secretaries of all the States for compliance. 
B 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeals partly allowed.