BRIJENDRA SINGH & ORS. versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN
[2017] 3 S.C.R. 374, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
A 
B 
[2017] 3 S.C.R. 374 
BRIJENDRA SINGH & ORS .. 
v. 
STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
(Criminal Appeal No. 763 of2017) 
APRIL 27, 2017 
[A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.) 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.319 - Power of court 
(o summon accused not arraigned as accused- Exercise of - When 
C - Held: Prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger 
and cogent evidence than mere probability of his complicity - Degree 
of satisfaction is to be more than the degree which is warranted at 
the time of framing of the charges against others in respect of whom 
chargesheet was filed - Power is not to be exercised in a casual or -. 
a cavalier manner - On facts, trial court acted in a casual and 
D cavalier manner in passing the summoning order against the 
appellants - Documentary and other evidence collected during the 
investigation, showed that appellants plea of alibi was correct -
Evidence recorded during trial was nothing more than the statements 
which was already there uls. 161 Cr.P.C. recorded at the time of 
E investigation of the case - Trial court was duty bound to see while 
· forming prima facie opinion and to see as to whether 'much stronger 
evidence than mere possibility of the appellants' complicity came 
on record - There was no satisfaction of this nature - High Court 
too ignored the said material- Thus, the order of summoning the . 
appellants u/s. 319 set aside. 
F 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The powers of the court to proceed und-er
Section 319 Cr.P.C. even against those persons who are not 
~rraigned as accused, cannot be disputed. This provision is meant 
to achieve the objective that real culprit should not get away - ' 
G _unpunished. Section 3.19 Cr.P.C., which is an enabling provision 
empowering the Court to take· appropriate steps for proceeding 
against any perso.n, not being an accused, can be exercised at 
any time after the charge-sheet is filed and before the 
pronouncement.of the judgment, except during (he stage of. 
H 
374.
• 
BRJJENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
375 
Section 207/208 Cr.P.C., the committal etc., which is only a pre-
A 
trial stage intended to put the process into motion. [Paras 9,. 
10)(381-H; 383-B-C] 
1.2 The principles enunciated in Hardeep Singh 's case are 
recapitulated. The power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be 
exercised by the trial court, once it finds that there is some B 
'evidence' against such a person on the basis of which evidence it 
can be gathered that he appears to be guilty of offence. The 
'evidence' means the material that is brought before the court 
during trial. Insofar as the material/evidence collected by the IO 
at the stage of inquiry is concerned, it can be utilised for 
corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the court C 
to invoke the power under Section 319. No doubt, such eVidence 
that has surfaced in examination-in-chief, without cross-
examination of witnesses, can also be taken into consideration. 
However, since it is a discretionary power given to the court 
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and is also an extram;dinary one, same D 
has to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the 
circumstances of the case so warrants. The degree 'Of satisfaction 
is more than the degree which is warranted at the time of framing 
of the charges against others in respect of whom chargesheet 
was filed. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against 
a person from the evidence led before the court that such power E 
·
should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a 
cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed 
requires stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. 
[Para 13)(385-B-G] 
· 
1.3 When the said principles with their application are 
translated to the facts of this case, an impression is gathered that 
the trial court acted in a casual and cavalier manner in passing 
F 
the summoning order against the appeUaitts: The police 
investigation revealed that the statements of these persons 
regarding the presence of the' appellants at the place of occurrence·· G : 
was doubtful and did not inspire confidence, in view· of the 
documentary and other evidence collected during the 
investigation, which depicted another story and clinchingly 
showed that appellants plea ·of alibi was correct. This record was -
. before the trial court. Notwithstanding the same, the trial court · 
· 
· 
If
376 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 3 S.C.R. 
A went by the deposition of complainant and some other persons in 
their examination-in-chief, with no other material to support their 
so-called verbal/ocular version. Thus, the 'evidence' recorded 
during trial was nothing more than the statements which was 
already there u/s.161 Cr.P._C. recorded at the time of investigation 
of the case. No doubt, the trial court would be competent io 
B 
exercise its power even on the basis, of such statements recorded 
before it in examination-in-chief. However, in a case like the 
instant where plethora of evidence was collected by the IO during 
investigation which suggested otherwise, the trial court was at 
least duty bound to look into the same while forming prima facie 
C opinion and to see as to whether 'much stronger evidence than 
mere possibility of their (i.e. appellants) complicity has come on 
record. There is no satisfaction of this nature. Even it is presumed 
that the trial court was not apprised of the same at the time when 
it passed the order, the High Court too blissfully ignored the 
D said material. Except reproducing the discussion contained in 
the order of the trial court and expressing agreement therewith, 
nothing more was done. Such orders cannot stand judicial 
scrutiny. The order of summoning the appellants under Section 
319 Cr.P.C. is set aside. [Paras 14, 15 and 16](385-F; 386-A-Fl 
E 
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2014) 2 SCR 
1 : (2014) 3 sec 92
- relied on. 
Case Law Reference 
[2014) 2 SCR 1 
relied on 
Paras 14, 15 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
F No. 763 of2017. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2016 by the High Court 
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in S. B. Criminal 
RevisionPetitionNo.1355/2015. 
Sushi! Kumar Jain, Sr. Adv., Abhinav Gupta, Ms. Priyal Jain, 
ff- Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advs. for the Appellants. 
H 
Ram Naresh Yadav, Milind Kumar, Advs. for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
A. K. SIKRI, J. 1. The appellants herein, three in number, have 
been summoned by the Court of Special Judge, SC/ST Act, which is in
BRIJENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
377 
[A. K. SlKRI, J.] 
seisin of the trial in respect of FIR No. 53 of2000, wherein charges for A 
offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323,448, 302/149 of Indian Penal 
Code (IPC) as well as under Sections 3 and 3(2)(V) of the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 
(SC/ST Act) have been framed. The appellants were not arraigned as 
accused in the chargesheet. The charges were framed against those 
B 
who were accused in the chargesheet and prosecution evidence is being 
recorded. The appellants are summoned as additional accused persons 
under Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) to 
face the trial along with other accused persons. The trial court has 
passed the Order dated 06.10.2015 on an application filed by the 
complajnant Harkesh Meena under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. This order C 
was challenged by the appellants before the High Court. However, the 
High Court has dismissed the revision petition preferred by the appellants 
on 11.01.2016. 
2. Factual details pertaining to the FIR and registration of case 
against other persons as well as filing of the application by the complainant D 
under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. and the orders therein are as under: 
On the basis of a written complaint, FIR No. 53 of 2000 was 
registeredat 10:30pmon29.04.2000underSections 147, 148, 149,323, 
448, 302/149 IPC as well as under Sections 3 and 3(2)(V) of SC/ST 
Act. In this
complaint, the complainant had stated that at about 3:00 pm 
E 
on 29.04.2000 when he was at his Khejra well, making his cattle drink 
water, certain persons including appellants who belong to his village came 
there armed with axe, lathi sabbal (iron rod) and knives in their hands, 
with intention to kill the complainant. On seeing them, the complainant 
ran from that place and came to his uncle's (Nathu) house and cried 
loudly. His uncle was sleeping in front of the house and Lakhpat was 
F 
sleeping under Neem tree. As soon as he came into the thatch, Pratap 
Singh inflicted lathi blow on him from behind which hit on his back. The 
complainant ran into the house of Bharatlal. Brijendra Singh inflicted 
sabbal at the head of his uncle Nathu who was sleeping at that time and , 
Pratap hit his uncle with axe above the ear. Thereafter, all these accused 
G 
persons started inflicting lathi sticks. Lakhpat tried to run in order to 
rescue himself. These persons gave beating to him as well, with lathi 
sticks. When the complainant's elder brother went to rescue them, these 
accused persons gave lathi sticks blow to him as well. In the meantime, 
their wives, wives of their sons had also come. Rishi, son of Ramu 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 3 S.C.R. 
A Brahmin ofTalabka and Bhanu, nephew of Jagdish Singh of Jaipur were 
also along with them. Because of the beating by the accused persons, 
complainant's uncle Nathu died on the spot. Thereafter, accused persons 
fled away. The incident was witnessed by a number of villagers. In the 
FIR, the appellants were also named as accused persons. 
B 
3. FIR was registered and the matter was investigated by the 
Investigating Officer (IO)." During the investigation, the appellants were 
also interrogated. They had stated that they are residing at Jaipur and at 
the time of incident, they were in Jaipur. Thus, plea of alibi was taken 
by these persons. Appellant No.1 and 2 are in police service and at 
C relevant time they were posted at Jaipur. Appellant No.2 Jagdish has 
lost his leg while on traffic police duty. Appellant No.3 Bhanu is the 
appellant's sister's son and claimed that he was also at Jaipur. The 
police after investigation and considering the evidence with regard to 
the alibi of the appellants Brijendra, Jagdish (who lost his leg while 
discharging traffic police duty) and Bhanu, did not find any sufficient 
D and reliable evidence against the appellants and, therefore, did not file 
any challan against them and kept the investigation pending under Section 
178(3) Cr.P.C. When the trial court by its Order dated 06.09.2000, 
without any challan being submitted by the police, directed cognizance 
\ 
of the matter, the
appellants filed the S.B. Cri1,11inal Revision No. 505/ 
2000 before the High Court and the High Court vide its Order dated 
E 16.04.2009 allowed the Revision and set aside the Order dated 06.09.2000 
of the trial court. The High Court, however, made it clear that the said 
.J Order dated 16.04.2009 shall be without prejudice to the powers of the 
Sessions Court to add any person in the array of accused under Section 
319 Cr.P.C. 
F 
4. During the period when S.B. Criminal Revision No. 505 of 
· 2000 was pending before the High Court, the police came to the conclusion 
that the appellants were not involved in the incident. The police after 
investigation, prepared the Final Report of closure of the case against 
the appellants which was approved by the SP. In this manner, after 
G completing the investigation, the police filed the Challan only against 
other accused persons, namely, Bhanwar Singh, Pratap Singh and 
Shambhu Singh. 
5. Though, at the time of filing of the Challan, the police kept 
investigation pending, subsequently it came to the conclusion that the 
H appellants were not involved and the final report of closure of the case
BRIJENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
379 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
against the appellants was filed. The trial court framed charges against A 
the aforesaid three accused persons and the trial proceeded, though it 
has been delayed abnormally as more than 15 years have been passed. 
Be that as it may, the prosecution examined 23 witnesses including PW-
1 Bharat Lal, PW"2 Kamla, PW-3 Lakhpat, PW-4 Harkesh and PW-5 
Amritlal sometime in.the year 2009. On 26.03.2014 i.e. after five years 
B 
of examination of the aforesaid witnesses, complainant filed application 
under Section 319 ofCr.P.C. Itis this application which has been allowed 
by the Special Judge and the said order has been affirmed by the High 
Court. 
6. Mr. Sushi! Kumar Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for 
the appellant, submitted that the appellant had obtained information from C 
the authorities under the Right to Information Act about the status of the 
investigation that was carried out by the Investigating Officet culminating 
into filing of the final report. He drew our attention to the letter dated 
19.02.2016 that was received by the appellant in response to his query 
underthe Right to Information Act wherein the information was supplied D 
to the appellant along with requisite documents that were collected during 
the investigation. The details of these documents are as under: 
{i) Duty Certificate No. 2407 dated 04.05.2000 signed by the 
Assistant Inspector General of Police (Training),
Jaipur, 
Rajasthan, certifying that Brijendra Singh, Junior Driver, was 
E 
present on duty on 29.04.2000. 
(ii) Medical Certificate No. 13365 dated 28.04.2000 issued by the 
Medical Officer, Primary Medical Centre, Moti Kotla, Jaipur, 
certifying that Jagdish Singh was suffering from ..... (illegible) 
disease on 24.04.2000 and was advised five days rest. 
F 
(iii) Letter dated 17.02.2002 signed by the Police Superintendent, 
District Karauli, addressed to the Circle Officer, Circle -
Kailadevi, giving the sanction under Section 173(9) of the Cr.P.C. 
to end investigation in Cr.No. 53/2K, Police Station, Sapotra, 
and submit the report in the Court. 
G 
(iv) Statement of Rajendra Prasad, Deputy Inspector General of 
Police, Police Head Office, Jaipur, recorded under Section 161 
Cr.P.C. on 07.12.2000, wherein he stated that on 29.04.2000, 
he was working on the post of Assistant Inspector General of · 
Police (Training), Jaipur, Rajasthan and Brijendfa S.ingh; 
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380 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 3 S.C.R. 
Constable, was his driver who was present on duty on that day. 
Log book of the vehicle was also produced to show the presence 
ofBrijendra Singh. 
(v)Statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. ofSmt. Shashi 
Rajawat, Medical Officer Jn-charge, Government Ayurvedic 
Hospital, Nahati Ka Naka, wherein she had stated that as per 
the record one Bhanu Pratap Singh had come to the hospital on 
26.4.2000, suffering from sickness as he was having loose 
motions and was vomiting as well. He was treated by the said 
Medical Officer and was also prescribed medicines on a slip 
written by her. She verified the prescription. 
(vi)Statement of Mr. Naveel Kasliwal of Jain Medical Store, 
Opposite Government Hospital, Moti Katia, Jaipur, recorded 
under Section 161 Cr.P.C., wherein stated that the said Medical 
Store was owned by him. He verified that the medical slip of 
the Government Hospital had been written by Sudhir Sharma 
on 29.04.2000 and based thereupon he had given the medicines. 
(vii) Statement ofSudhir Sharma, Medical Officer, Government 
Hospital, Moti Katia, Jaipur, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., 
wherein he stated that from 22.02.2000 to 04.05.2000, his duty 
was at Vidhan Sabha from 3.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. and in the 
morning from 8.00 a.m. till 12.00 noon at the Government 
Hospital. He further stated that on 29.04.2000, a patient named 
Jagdish Singh, who was suffering from malaria fever, had
come 
and was prescribed medicines by him on the slip, which are 
medicines of the Government Hospital. He verified that the 
slip was written by him, containing the prescription. Three 
days medicines were given to the patient. On 02.05.2000, again 
two days medicines for the patient were prescribed on the said 
slip. 
(viii)Statement ofShri Mahendra Singh Tanwar, who was working 
as a driver at the Government District Mahila Hospital, 
Sanganeri Gate, Jaipur, r_ecorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. 
He stated that son of his elder brother, Bhanu Pratap Singh, 
who was a student, was unwell fo; 15 to 20 days in the month 
of April, 2000. For this purpose, he was given treatment in 
private hospital but no improvement was found and, therefore,
BRIJENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
381 
[A. K. SIKRJ, J.] 
he was taken to Ayurvedic Hospital on 26.04.2000 for A 
treatment. He was suffering from loose motions and cough 
for which he was prescribed three days medicines and the 
medicines were repeated again on 29.04.2000 for further three 
days. 
7. Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel, submitted that it is on the basis 
B 
of the aforesaid documents and statements of various persons, recorded 
during investigation, the Investigating Officer was convinced that these 
three appellants were in Jaipur at the time of the incident and, therefore, 
could not have been present at the place of incident, i.e. Karauli, which 
is at a distance of 176 kms. approximately, from Jaipur. Submission of 
Mr. Jain was that merely on the basis of the statement of the complainant, 
C 
which was there before the Investigating Officer as well at the time of 
investigation, the Special Judge could not have allowed the application 
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. as no further or new material was produced 
before the Court which could indicate the involvement of the appellants. 
Learned counsel submitted that for exercising the powers under Section D 
319 Cr.P.C., which was discretionary and extraordinary in nature, the 
trial court should have convinced itself that there is strong and cogent 
evidence indicating that the appellants may be guilty of committing the 
offence. This condition, according to him, was not satisfied. He further
submitted that the High Court also did not examine the matter from the 
aforesaid perspective and merely went by the fact that the witnesses 
E 
have deposed about the involvement of the appellants in their deposition 
before the Court. 
8. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argued 
that the trial court has rightly exercised its power on the basis of 
depositions of the witnesses before it, which were in the form of F 
'evidence' to the effect that the appellants may have committed the 
offence in question. It was argued that provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. 
were not meant for this purpose only and the exercise of power by the 
trial court cannot be treated as unwarranted. It was so observed by the 
High Court also while dismissing the revision petition and observing that 
G 
no illegality or perversity was found in the orders of the trial court. 
9. Powers of the Court to proceed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 
even against those persons who are not arraigned as accused, cannot be 
disputed. This provision is meant to achieve the objective that real culprit 
should not get away unpunished. A Constitution Bench of this Court in H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 3 S.C.R. 
A Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 92, explained 
the aforesaid purpose behind this provision in the following manner: 
B 
c 
"8. The· constitutional mandate under Articles 20 and 21 of the 
· Constitution oflndia provides a protective umbrella for the smooth. 
administration of justice making adequate provisions to ensure a 
fair and efficacious trial so that the accused does not get prejudiced 
after the law has been put into motion to try him for the offence 
but at the same time also gives equal protection to victims and to 
society at large to ensure that the guilty does not get away from 
the clutches of law. For the empowerment of the courts to ensure 
that the criminal administration of justice works properly, the law 
was appropriately codified and modified by the legislature under 
CrPC indicating as to how the courts should proceed in order to 
ultimately find out the truth so that an innocent does not get 
punished but at the same time, the guilty are brought to book under 
the law. It is these ideals as enshrined under the Constitution and 
D 
our laws that have led to several decisions, whereby inncvating 
methods and progressive tools have been forged to find C'Ut the 
real truth and to ensure that the guilty does not go unpuni&hed. 
E 
F 
G 
H 
xx 
xx 
xx 
12. Section 319 Cr PC springs out of the doctrine judex damnatur 
cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned when guilty is 
acquitted) and
this doctrine must be used as a beacon light while 
explaining the ambit and the spirit underlying the enactment of 
Section 319 CrPC. 
13. It is the duty of the court to do justice by punishing the real 
c.ulprit. Where the investigating agency for any reason does not 
array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not 
powerless in calling the said accused to face trial. The question 
remains under what circumstances and at what stage should the 
court exercise its power as contemplated in Section 319 CrPC? 
xx 
xx 
xx 
19. The court is the sole repository of justice and a duty is cast 
upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it will be 
inappropriate to deny the existence of such powers with the courts 
in our criminal justice system where it is not uncommon that the
BRIJENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
383 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
real accused, at times, get away by manipulating the investigating A 
and/or the prosecuting agency. The desire to avoid trial is so strong 
that an accused makes efforts at times to get himself absolved 
even at the stage of investigation or .inquiry even though he may .. 
be connected with the commission of the offence." 
10. It also goes without saying that Section 319 Cr.P.C., which is 
B 
an enabling provision empowering the Court to take appropriate steps 
for proceeding against any person, not being an accused, can be exercised 
at any time after the charge-sheet is filed and before the pronouncement 
of the judgment, except during the stage of Section 207 /208 Cr.P.C., the 
committal etc., which is only a pre-trial stage intended to put the process 
into motion. 
C 
11. In Hardeep Singh 's case, the Constitution Bench has also 
settled the controversy on the issue as to whether the word 'ev~dence' 
used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense 
and indicates the evidence collected during investigation or the word 
'evidence' is limited to the evidence recorded during trial. It is held that D 
it is that material, after cognizance is taken by the Court, that is available 
to it while making an inquiry into or trying an offence, which the court 
can utilise or take into consideration for supporting reasons to summon 
any person on the basis of evidence adduced before the
Court. The 
word 'evidence ' has to be understood in its wider sense, both at the 
E 
stage of trial and even at the stage of inquiry. It means that the power to 
proceed against any person after summoning him can be exercised on 
the basis of any such material as brought forth before it. At the same 
time, this Court cautioned that the duty and obligation of the Court 
becomes more onerous to invoke such powers consciously on such 
material after evidence has been led during trial. The Court also clarified 
F 
that 'evidence' under Section 319 Cr.P.C. could even be examination-
in-chief and the Court is not required to wait till such evidence is tested 
on cross-examination, as it is the satisfaction of the Court which can be 
gathered from the reasons recorded by the Court in respect of complicity 
of some other person( s) not facing trial in the offence. 
G 
12. The moot question, however, is the degree of satisfaction that 
is required for invoking the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and the 
related question is as to in what situationsthis power should be exercised 
in respect of a person named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted._ These 
two aspects were also specifically dealt with by the Constitution Bench H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 3 S.C.R. 
A in Hardeep Singh~ case and answered in the following manner: 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
"95. At the time of taking cognizance, the court has to see whether 
a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused. 
Under Section 319 CrPC. though the test of prima facie case is 
the same. the degree of satisfaction that is re~uired is much stricter. 
· A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Vikas v. State of 
Rajastltan [(2014) 3 SCC 321] , held that on the objective 
satisfaction of the court a person may be "arrested" or. 
"summoned", as the circumstances of the case may require, if it 
appears from the evidence that any such person not being the 
accused has committed an offence for which such person could 
be tried together with the already arraigned accused persons. 
xx 
xx 
xx 
105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary and an 
extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in 
those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is 
not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the SessionL Judge 
is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of 
committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence 
occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court 
that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier 
manner. 
I 06. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be 
established from the evidence led before the court, not
necessarily 
tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it reguires much stronger 
evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has 
to be aruilied is one which is more than prima facie case as 
exercised at the time of framing of charge. but short of satisfaction 
to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to 
conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should 
refrain from exercising power under Section 3 I 9 Cr PC. In Section 
3 I 9 CrPC the purpose of providing if"it appears from the evidence 
that any person not being the accused has committed any offence" 
is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried 
together with the accuser!'. The words used are not "for which 
such person could be convicted". There is, therefore, no scope 
for the comi acting under Section 3 I 9 CrPC to form any opinion
BRIJENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
385 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
as to the guilt of the accused. 
A 
(emphasis supplied)" 
13. In order to answer the question, some of the principles 
enunciated in H4rdeep Singh 's case m11y be recapitulated: 
Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the trial 
B 
court at any stage during the trial, i.e., before the conclusion of trial, to 
summon any person as an accused and face the trial in the ongoing 
case, once the trial court finds that there is some 'evidence' against 
such a person on the basis of which evidence it can be gathered that he 
appears to be guilty of offence. The' evidence' herein means the material 
that is brought before the Court during trial. Insofar as the material/ 
evidence collected by the IO at the stage of inquiry is concerned, it can 
c 
be utilised for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the 
Court to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. No doubt, such 
evidence that has surfaced in examination-in-chief, without cross-
examination of witnesses, can also be taken into consideration. However, 
D 
since it is a discretionary power given to the Court under Section 319 
Cr.P.C. and is also an extraordinary one, same has to be exercised 
sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case 
so warrants. The degree of satisfaction is more than the degree which 
is warranted at the time of framing of the charges against others in 
respect of whom chargesheet
was filed. Only where strong and cogent 
evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the Court 
that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a 
casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be 
formed requires stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. 
E 
14. When we translate the aforesaid principles with their application 
F 
to the facts of this case, we gather an impression that the trial court 
. acted in a casual and cavalier manner in passing the summoning order 
against the appellants. The appellants were named in the FIR. 
Investigation was carried out by the police. On the basis of material 
collected during investigation, which has been referred to by us above, 
G 
the IO found that these appellants were in Jaipur city when the incident 
took place in Kanaur, at a distance of 175 kms. The complainant and 
others who supported the version in the FIR regarding alleged presence 
of the appellants at the place ofincident natl also made statements under 
Section 161 Cr.P.C. to the same effect. Notwithstanding the same, the 
H
386 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] 3 S.C.R. 
A police investigation revealed that the statements of these persons 
regarding the presence of the appellants at the place of occurrence was 
doubtful and did not inspire confidence, in view of the documentary and 
other evidence collected during the investigation, which depicted another 
story and clinchingly showed that appellants plea of alibi was correct. 
B 
15. This record was before the trial court. Notwithstanding the 
same, the trial court went by the deposition of complainant and some 
other persons in their examination-in-chief, with no other material to 
support their so-called verbal/ocular version. Thus, the 'evidence' 
recorded during trial was nothing more than the statements which was 
already there under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded at the time of 
C investigation of the case. No doubt, the trial court would be competent 
to exercise its power even on the basis of such statements recorded 
before it in examination-in-chief. However, in a case like the present 
where plethora of evidence was collected by the IO during investigation 
which suggested otherwise, the trial court was at least duty bound to 
D look into the same while forming prima facie opinion and to see as to 
whether 'much stronger evidence than mere possibility of their (i.e. 
appellants) complicity has come on record. There is no satisfaction of 
this nature. Even if we presume that the trial court was not apprised of 
the same at the time when
it passed the order (as the appellants were 
not on the scene at that time), what is more troubling is that even when 
E this material on record was specifically brought to the notice of the High 
Court in the Revision Petition filed by the appellants, the High Court too 
blissfully ignored the said material. Except reproducing the discussion 
contained in the order of the trial court and expressing agreement 
therewith, nothing more has been done. Such orders cannot stand judicial 
F 
scrutiny. 
16. As a consequence, this appeal is allowed setting aside the 
order of summoning the appellants under Section 319 Cr.P. C. 
-
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal allowed.