ASHOK VERMA versus THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 743, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 743 : 2024 INSC 1011
Ashok Verma
v.
The State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 815 of 2022)
19 December 2024
[C.T. Ravikumar* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether concurrent conviction of the appellant u/ss.302, 201 and 
498A of the IPC for the murder of his wife is justified.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201 and 498A – Concurrent 
conviction – Death of the wife of the appellant-convict, occurred 
in her matrimonial home – Plea of the appellant-convict that 
her death was suicidal and not homicidal:
Held: Trial Court and High Court concurrently weighed the 
circumstances and gave sturdy reasons to conclude that death of 
the deceased was homicidal in nature and not suicidal – Even after 
seeing his wife hanged using her dupatta, the appellant did not 
care to cut the noose then and there and he chose to do so, only 
after witness(es) were brought to the scene of occurrence – Had 
it been a bona fide, genuine attempt on his part to save her life, 
he would have cut the noose of the ligature then and there itself 
upon seeing her hanged, before going to inform the witness(es) 
that she had hanged herself – Further, the appellant took up the 
plea of alibi on the ground that he was in a nearby garden to the 
place of occurrence at the relevant point of time – DW-1 deposed 
that the appellant was with him during that period in the nearby 
garden however, there is no evidence establishing that DW-1 
was there in the garden
during the said period – Strict proof is 
required to establish the plea of alibi – It can be applied only if 
the ‘elsewhere place’ is far away from the place of occurrence 
so that it was extremely improbable or impossible for the person 
concerned to reach the place of occurrence and to participate 
in the crime on the relevant date and time of occurrence – Plea 
of alibi was rightly rejected by the Courts below – Furthermore, 
* Author
744
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
non-rupture of hyoid bone of the deceased would not and should 
not be taken as the sole reason to upturn the concurrent finding 
that it is a case of strangulation – Therefore, plea of appellant 
that the death of victim was not homicidal is rejected. [Paras 7, 
9, 10, 11, 17]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Whether the appellant who was 
bound to offer his version as to how the occurrence had 
taken place in the circumstances obtained in this case, had 
discharged his onus by virtue of s.106:
Held: s.106 is an exception to the general rule laid down in s.101, 
that the burden of proving a fact rest on the party who substantially 
asserts the affirmative of the issues and that this Section is not 
intended to relieve any person of that duty or burden – If some 
occurrence happened inside a residence where the accused is 
supposed to be, he is bound to offer his version as to how the 
occurrence had taken place – The prosecution succeeded in 
establishing, rather it is an attempt and undisputed fact that the 
deceased and the appellant-convict were residing in the place of 
occurrence, which is the house of the accused – On the death of 
the wife, the appellant alone could offer an explanation, though 
this Section could not be used so as to shift the onus of proving 
the offence from the prosecution to the accused – In the absence 
of explanation when other circumstances fasten the culpability on 
the appellant’s failure to offer
satisfactory explanation as to the 
occurrence, the only possible inference could be that the accused 
had participated in the crime. [Paras 18, 19]
Case Law Cited
Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 225 : 
AIR 1997 SC 322; Babudas v. State of M.P. (2003) 9 SCC 86; 
G. Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka, 2010 INSC 525 : [2010] 
10 SCR 377 : (2010) 8 SCC 593; Paramjeet Singh v. State of 
Uttarakhand, 2010 INSC 647 : [2010] 11 SCR 1064 : (2010) 10 
SCC 439; Satish Nirankari v. State of Rajasthan, 2017 INSC 479 : 
[2017] 4 SCR 298 : (2017) 8 SCC 497 – relied on.
Dnyaneshwar v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 INSC 323 : [2007] 
4 SCR 248 : (2007) 10 SCC 445; Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. 
State of Bihar and Anr., 2007 INSC 3 : [2007] 1 SCR 13 : (2007) 
10 SCC 433 – referred to.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
745
Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh
Books and Periodicals Cited
Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology; Taylor’s Principles 
and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 13th Edn., Pp 307- 08.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872.
List of Keywords
Concurrent conviction; Concurrent finding; Murder; Matrimonial 
home; Death suicidal and not homicidal; Hanged; Dupatta; Noose; 
Ligature; False plea of alibi; Garden; ‘elsewhere place’; Far 
away from the place of occurrence; Non-rupture of hyoid bone; 
Strangulation; Satisfactory explanation.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
815 of 2022
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.02.2019 of the High Court 
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 845 of 2013
Appearances for Parties
A Sirajudeen, Sr. Adv., Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Mrs. Usha Pant 
Kukreti, Advs. for the Appellant.
Prashant Singh, Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Piyush Yadav, Alok Sahay, 
Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
C.T. Ravikumar, J.
1.	
This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court 
of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No.845 of 2013 whereby and 
whereunder it confirmed the conviction of the appellant under Sections 
300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the “IPC”) punishable 
under Section 302, IPC, 201 and 498A of the IPC, in Sessions Trial 
No. 147 of 2012 and the sentences imposed therefor.
746
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
2.	
Shortly stated, the prosecution case is as hereunder: -
The marriage between the appellant-convict and the deceased 
Smt. Pushpa was solemnised in the year 2006. The incident which 
led to the conviction of the appellant in connection with the death 
of Smt. Pushpa occurred on 26.01.2012 at his house, which is 
the matrimonial home of the deceased. The paternal home of the 
deceased is also proximately situated viz., around 50 meters from 
her matrimonial home. The appellant is addicted to gambling and 
to lash out money therefor, he used to torture her physically and 
mentally. He had even mortgaged the jewellery of the deceased 
for the said purpose. The deceased used to share such sorrowful 
incidents with PW-8 Aarti, who is her own sister. On 26.01.2012, 
also when PW-8 went to the house of the deceased she told that 
she was thrashed by the appellant-husband. At about quarter to 
7 pm on 26.01.2012, the appellant went to his in-laws’ house and 
informed them that Pushpa hanged herself and thereupon, he along 
with her parents gone back home where Pushpa was seen on bed 
on her knees and still knotted by dupatta around the neck, which in 
turn, was tied to a piece of wood near the ceiling fan. Despite the 
opposition, the appellant cut the noose and took her in a vehicle to 
Sector-9 Hospital, where the doctor checked and declared her as 
dead. Autopsy on her body was conducted by PW-11, Dr. P. Akhtar. 
In fact, initially a
case was registered only under Section 174 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the “Cr.P.C.”) but, later 
FIR No.269/12 was registered on 07.04.2012 under Sections 302, 
201 and 498A, IPC against the appellant. On being tried, the trial 
Court convicted him as noted above and for the conviction under 
Section 300, IPC, he was sentenced under Section 302, IPC, to 
undergo life imprisonment and also with a fine of Rs.1000/-, for the 
conviction under Section 201, IPC, he was sentenced to undergo 
rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.500/- and for the 
conviction under Section 498A, IPC, he was sentenced to undergo 
rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs.500/-. Default 
sentences were also passed in case of payment of fine imposed 
for the conviction under the aforesaid sections. The corporeal 
sentences were ordered to be run concurrently. In the appeal viz., 
in Criminal Appeal No.845 of 2013, the High Court confirmed the 
conviction under the aforesaid sections and also the sentences 
imposed therefor.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
747
Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh
3.	
Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and 
the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State.
4.	
The facts expatiated earlier would reveal that the appellant was 
convicted concurrently for the aforesaid offences and there is 
concurrency even with respect to the sentences imposed therefor. In 
such circumstances, there is, in fact, very little scope for interference 
in an appeal by Special Leave. In such cases, overlooking of a 
vital piece of evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the 
convict-appellant or that the finding is based and built on inadmissible 
evidence, which if eschewed from evidence, the prosecution case 
would be substantially discredited or it would impair the prosecution 
case, are some such situations where this Court may interfere with. 
When the contentions raised are pitted against the evidence on record, 
they would reveal no such circumstances. Still, we will proceed to 
consider the contentions raised to find out any other tenable grounds 
are raised by the appellant which may persuade us to entertain this 
appeal against the concurrent conviction.
5.	
The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the plea of 
‘alibi’ was not properly appreciated and considered, especially with 
reference to the oral testimony of DW-1. Despite the non-rupture 
of the hyoid bone the Courts wrongly concluded that the nature of 
the death was
homicide. It is also contended that no circumstances 
which irresistibly pointing to the guilt of the appellant-convict were 
established by the prosecution though the conviction was based on 
circumstantial evidence. 
6.	
Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State 
would submit that the circumstances that led to the finding of guilt 
against the appellant were discussed in detail by the trial Court and 
the High Court as the Appellate Court reappreciated and concurred 
with them besides adding additional reasons for confirming the 
conviction as also the sentence. In short, it is submitted that the 
cumulative effect of such circumstances relied on by the Courts do 
not brook any hypothesis other than the one irresistibly leading to 
the guilt of the appellant-convict, no interference with the concurrent 
conviction as also sentence, is invited in this case. 
7.	
In view of the rival contentions, we have bestowed careful 
consideration of the said contentions with reference to the materials 
on record. As noted earlier, the incident which led to the death of Smt.
748
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Pushpa, the wife of the appellant-convict, had occurred admittedly 
in her matrimonial home. The case of the appellant-convict is that 
a careful scanning of the evidence on record would reveal that the 
prosecution had failed to establish that it is a case of homicide and 
in fact, it is a case of suicide. Adding to the above contentions, the 
learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant was 
implicated in this case and was convicted without any satisfactory 
evidence much less any clinching evidence and also disregarding the 
fact that it was he who attempted to save her life and in that regard 
after cutting the noose of the ligature he took her to the hospital. 
While considering the contention, we shall not lose sight of the fact 
that more often criminals would try to dub a murder as suicidal or 
accidental death. The identification of the nature of the death is, 
therefore, always an important medico-legal problem. In that regard, 
the Courts concerned have to study the total evidence to discern 
whether death is a case of homicide or suicide or accidental. The 
concurrent finding in the case on hand with reference to the evidence 
on record is that it is a case of homicide. Presumption is only a rule 
in the realm of burden of proof and the trial Court and the High Court 
concurrently weighed the circumstances and gave sturdy reasons 
to conclude that death of Pushpa is homicidal in nature and not
suicidal. In such circumstances, we are not persuaded to entertain 
the concurrently repelled contention of the appellant that the death 
of Pushpa was not homicidal. 
8.	
Now, the question is about the sustainability of the concurrent finding 
on the culpability of the appellant. Of course, various contentions 
have been raised by the appellant to assail the finding of guilt against 
him concurrently referred to in the judgments of the trial Court and 
the High Court. There can be no doubt that while dealing with the 
such a question creation of fake scene by the appellant, absence of 
explanation by the accused despite being bound by virtue of Section 
106 of the Evidence Act are also to be taken into consideration. In 
the context of the case on hand, the case established by the oral 
testimony of PW-8, Arti who is the own sister of the deceased would 
show that at about 7 pm on the fateful day the appellant came to 
the paternal home of the deceased and informed that Smt. Pushpa 
hanged herself and immediately thereupon, herself, her mother and 
sister went along with him to his house viz., matrimonial home of 
the deceased. The further fact established through the mouth of
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
749
Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh
the said prosecution witness is that upon reaching there Pushpa 
was seen on her knees on bed and still knotted by dupatta around 
the neck which, in turn, tied to a wood near the ceiling fan. As per 
PW-8, despite the opposition of their mother when he attempted to 
cut the noose of the ligature and request to wait for the arrival of their 
relatives, he cut it immediately and took her to a nearby hospital at 
Sector 9. Soon on check-up, the doctor declared that she was dead. 
In this context, it is also worthy to note the oral evidence of DW-1, 
Subhash Rao. DW-1 had deposed that on that day, he along with 
the appellant went to Maitri Garden and from there returned home 
between 6 pm and 7 pm and he got down near the lane leading 
to his house. Thereafter, the appellant came to him and informed 
that Pushpa had hanged herself. According to him, thereupon, he 
along with the appellant went to the latter’s house and thereafter, 
he cut the noose of the ligature and took Pushpa to the hospital 
where she was checked and declared as dead. In this context it is 
also relevant to note that there is no scintilla of evidence suggesting 
that she was alive when the noose was cut or that she breathed 
her last enroute to the hospital. We have referred to the evidence 
of DW-1 to show that the cutting of the noose of the ligature, as 
per the version of prosecution witness as also that of DW-1 was 
done only after the
appellant went to the witness(es) and informed 
of seeing Pushpa hanged herself. In short, going by the case of 
the prosecution or that of the defence even after seeing Pushpa 
hanged using her dupatta, he did not care to cut the noose then 
and there and had chosen to do so, only after witness(es) were 
brought to the scene of occurrence. 
9.	
In the above context, it is also relevant to note the absence of self-
inflicted injuries like scratches on the body of the deceased, going 
by the necroscopical evidence consisting of the oral evidence of 
PW-11, Dr. P. Akhtar with his report. When this be the evidence 
on record how can the appellant contend that he made a bid to 
save the life of the deceased wife Pushpa and in that regard cut 
the noose of the ligature and took her to the hospital. Had it been 
a bona fide, genuine attempt on his part to save her life, he would 
have cut the noose of the ligature then and there itself upon seeing 
her hanged, before going to inform the aforesaid witness(es) that 
she had hanged herself. We are of the considered opinion that the 
contention of the counsel for the appellant as aforesaid regarding the
750
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
lifesaving attempt, will be of no assistance in the face of evidence 
of the facts established. 
10.	 We will now consider the question whether the contention of the 
appellant that the plea of alibi was considered perversely, especially 
without properly appreciating the evidence of DW-1. In the decision 
in Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar,1 this Court took note of the 
meaning of the Latin word ‘alibi’ as ‘elsewhere’ and observed and 
held that the said plea would be available only if that ‘elsewhere’ is 
a place which is that much far off making it extremely impossible or 
improbable for the person concerned to reach the place of occurrence 
and participate in the offence concerned on the relevant date and 
time. Paragraph 22 and 23 of the said decision which is relevant for 
the purpose reads thus: - 
“22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an exception 
(special or general) envisaged in the Penal Code, 1860 
or any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised 
in Section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are 
inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant. Illustration 
(a) given under the provision is worth reproducing in this 
context:
“The question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta 
on a certain date; the fact that on that date, A was at 
Lahore is relevant.”
23. The Latin word alibi means “elsewhere” and that word 
is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse 
to a defence line
that when the occurrence took place 
he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it 
is extremely improbable that he would have participated 
in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal case, in 
which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical 
injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution 
to prove that the accused was present at the scene and 
has participated in the crime. The burden would not be 
lessened by the mere fact that the accused has adopted 
the defence of alibi. The plea of the accused in such 
1	
1996 INSC 1260 : [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 225 : AIR 1997 SC 322
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
751
Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh
cases need be considered only when the burden has 
been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once 
the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is 
incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, 
to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the 
possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When 
the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence 
has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution 
through reliable evidence, normally the court would be 
slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect that 
he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if 
the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality 
and of such a standard that the court may entertain some 
reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene 
when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no 
doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. 
For that purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be 
laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on the 
accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict 
proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi. This 
Court has observed so on earlier occasions (vide Dudh 
Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 166; State 
of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple [(1984) 1 
SCC 446.”
11.	 In the context of the afore-extracted paragraphs, it is relevant to 
note that in the case on hand, the
appellant was bound to explain 
what happened on that day at his house by virtue of Section 106 of 
the Evidence Act since the appellant and the deceased were man 
and wife and the incident had occurred in the house where they 
were residing. Therefore, he was bound to explain and establish the 
same as it is a fact, exclusively within his knowledge, by concrete 
evidence, if he fails to establish the plea of ‘alibi’. 
12.	 In the case on hand, the appellant convict took up the plea of alibi on 
the ground that he was in a nearby garden to the place of occurrence 
at the relevant point of time. DW-1 deposed that the appellant was 
with him during that period in the nearby Maitri Garden and returned 
from there between 6 pm and 7 pm and he got down near the lane 
of his house. Furthermore, he would depose that thereafter, the 
appellant came back and told him that Pushpa hanged herself and
752
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
then he proceeded to the house of the appellant and the noose was 
cut and she was taken to hospital. 
13.	 As held in Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra), strict proof is 
required to establish the plea of alibi. There is absolutely no evidence 
establishing that DW-1 was there in the garden during the said period. 
Then, how his version could be relied on by the appellant to establish 
the plea of alibi. That apart, the very fact is that the appellant took up 
the plea of alibi on the ground that he was in a nearby garden itself 
would be sufficient to throw the case put forth by him as defence, in 
the light of Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra). The plea of alibi, in 
the light of the decision in Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra) can 
be applied only if the ‘elsewhere place’ is far away from the place 
of occurrence so that it was extremely improbable or impossible 
for the person concerned to reach the place of occurrence and to 
participate in the crime on the relevant date and time of occurrence. 
In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the said 
contention was rightly rejected by the Courts below. 
14.	 The effect of false plea of alibi was considered by this Court in 
Babudas v. State of M.P.2 and in G. Parshwanath v. State of 
Karnataka.3 In G. Parshwanath’s case, this Court held that when 
the accused gave a false plea that he was not present on the spot, 
his statement would be regarded as additional
circumstance against 
him strengthening the chain of circumstances already found firm. 
15.	 In the decision in Babudas’s case (supra), this Court held that in a 
case of circumstantial evidence, a false plea of alibi set up by the 
accused would be a link in the chain of circumstances but then it 
could not be the sole link or sole circumstances based on which a 
conviction could be passed. 
16.	 In the decision in Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand,4 this 
Court held that the aid of false defence led on behalf of accused 
could be used to lend assurance to the Court when the case of the 
prosecution is established on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 
17.	 Now, we will deal with the contention made as a last-ditch effort against 
the finding of the Courts below that Pushpa’s death is homicidal, 
2	
(2003) 9 SCC 86
3	
2010 INSC 525 : [2010] 10 SCR 377 : (2010) 8 SCC 593
4	
2010 INSC 647 : [2010] 11 SCR 1064 : (2010) 10 SCC 439
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
753
Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh
based on the non-rupture of hyoid bone. Based on the decision in 
Satish Nirankari v. State of Rajasthan,5 and the relevant text at 
page 454 and 456 of Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 
the contention(s) unsuccessfully raised before the High Court were 
reiterated before us and in other words, contended that non-rupture 
of hyoid bone would indicate that death of Pushpa is suicidal and 
not homicidal in nature. We have already held that sturdy and sound 
reasons have been given by two Courts to conclude that it is a case of 
homicide. Non-rupture of hyoid bone of Pushpa would not and should 
not be taken as the sole reason to upturn the said concurrent finding 
that it is a case of strangulation. In this context, it is to be noted that 
in Satish Nirankari’s case, this Court held even in the absence of 
non-rupture of hyoid bone cause of death can be of strangulation. The 
position and posture of the body of Pushpa when PW-8 and others 
came to the house of the appellant-convict, as deposed by PW-8, 
were not challenged in cross-examination. This was duly taken note 
of by the Courts. In view of the said decision and what is stated sin 
Taylor’s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 13th Edn., 
Pp 307-08, which were extracted in paragraph 14 of the impugned 
judgment and in view of the position obtained from the evidence of 
PW-8, we do not find any reason to proceed further with the
said 
contention that owing to the non-rupture of hyoid bone the finding 
of homicidal death invites interference. 
18.	 Now, we will consider whether the appellant who was bound to 
offer his version as to how the occurrence had taken place in the 
circumstances obtained in this case, had discharged his onus by virtue 
of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 is an exception to 
the general rule laid down in Section 101, that the burden of proving 
a fact rest on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of 
the issues and that this Section is not intended to relieve any person 
of that duty or burden. 
19.	 If some occurrence happened inside a residence where the accused 
is supposed to be, he is bound to offer his version as to how the 
occurrence had taken place. In the case on hand, the prosecution 
had succeeded in establishing, rather it is an attempt and undisputed 
fact that the deceased and the appellant-convict were residing in the 
place of occurrence, which is the house of the accused. On the death 
5	
2017 INSC 479 : [2017] 4 SCR 298 : (2017) 8 SCC 497
754
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the wife, the appellant alone could offer an explanation, though 
this Section could not be used so as to shift the onus of proving 
the offence from the prosecution to the accused. In the absence 
of explanation when other circumstances fasten the culpability on 
the appellant’s failure to offer satisfactory explanation as to the 
occurrence, the only possible inference could be that the accused 
had participated in the crime. (See the decisions in Dnyaneshwar 
v. State of Maharashtra,6 and Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. 
State of Bihar and Anr.7).
20.	 As established by the prosecution, the place of occurrence is the 
matrimonial home of the deceased where the deceased and appellant 
were living. The evidence of PW-8, Aarti that the deceased was 
being tortured, physically and mentally was also not controverted 
while being cross-examined, as held by the two Courts. The Courts 
have taken note of the fact that though PW-8 gave evidence to such 
effect while being examined in chief, there was no cross-examination 
on such points to make her untrustworthy. 
21.	 The cumulative effect and impact of all such circumstances explained 
together with the sturdy reasons assigned by the trial Court which 
got confirmation from the impugned judgment, constrain us to hold 
that this appeal is devoid of merits. Consequently, the captioned 
appeal stands dismissed. 
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
6
2007 INSC 323 : [2007] 4 SCR 248 : (2007) 10 SCC 445
7	
2007 INSC 3 : [2007] 1 SCR 13 : (2007) 10 SCC 433