KALI CHARAN AND OTHERS versus STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1064, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1064 : 2024 INSC 898
Kali Charan and Others 
v. 
State of U.P. and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 13119 of 2024)
26 November 2024
[B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the present acquisition is a part of the integrated 
development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway” undertaken by 
respondent No.3-Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development 
Authority (YEIDA); Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and 
17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was legal and justified 
in the instant case, thereby justifying the decision of the State 
Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of 
the Act; Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the 
Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the questioned 
acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore lays down the correct 
proposition of law or whether the Division Bench in the case of 
Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles laid down 
in Radhy Shyam case and quashing the acquisition proceedings 
in question.
Headnotes†
Land acquisition – Present acquisition if a part of the integrated 
development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway” undertaken by 
respondent No.3-YEIDA:
Held: Yes – Development of land parcels for industrial, residential, 
and recreational purposes is complementary to the construction 
of the Yamuna Expressway – The objective of the acquisition is 
to integrate land development with the Yamuna Expressway’s 
construction, thereby promoting overall growth
serving the public 
interest – Thus, the Expressway and the development of adjoining 
lands are considered to be inseparable components of the overall 
project – Appeals filed by the landowners dismissed, while that of 
the YEIDA are allowed. [Para 38]
* Author
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Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.17 (1), (4) – Application of 
ss.17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, if was 
legal and justified in the instant case, justifying the decision 
of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under 
s.5-A of the Act:
Held: Yes – The invocation of ss.17(1) and 17(4) was legal and 
justified in this case – The urgency clause was applied in accordance 
with the planned development of the Yamuna Expressway, as held 
in the decision of this Court in Nand Kishore. [Para 38]
Land acquisition – View taken by the Division Bench of 
the Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the 
questioned acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore, if lays 
down the correct proposition of law or whether the Division 
Bench in the case of Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying 
the principles laid down in Radhy Shyam case and quashing 
the acquisition proceedings in question:
Held: Kamal Sharma extensively considered the factual matrix 
and also examined the original records of the State Government 
to arrive at the satisfaction that the invocation of the urgency 
clause was absolutely justified with regard to the acquisition in 
question – High Court also exhaustively considered the entire 
sequence of judicial pronouncements in respect of the acquisition 
in question before arriving at the aforesaid conclusion and acted 
in an equitable manner while affirming the
acquisition proceedings 
and directing the grant of additional compensation – The view of 
the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma, which relied upon Nand 
Kishore is the correct proposition of law – Judgment of the High 
Court in Shyoraj Singh, which relied on Radhy Shyam is not a 
correct legal interpretation – Shyoraj Singh set aside as it does 
not lay down good law and is per incuriam as it was passed 
overlooking the earlier precedents – Kamal Sharma has already 
granted additional compensation of 64.7% to the landowners, 
to be offered as ‘No Litigation Bonus’ in consonance with the 
Government order dated 04.11.15, thus there is no scope for 
further enhancement in compensation – 64.7% enhancement 
in compensation to apply in rem, ensuring uniform benefits 
to all affected landowners under the present land acquisition.  
[Paras 38, 43, 44]
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Case Law Cited
Shyoraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. Writ-C No. 30747 of 
2010 – held not good law; per incuriam.
Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial 
Development and Ors Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 – held good law.
Kalicharan v. State of U.P. and others SLP(C) No. 15782 of 
2023; Nand Kishore Gupta and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh 
and Others [2010] 11 SCR 356 : (2010) 10 SCC 282; Radhy 
Shyam (dead) through LRs. and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh 
and Others [2011] 8 SCR 359 : (2011) 5 SCC 553; Dev Sharan 
and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2011] 3 SCR 
728 : (2011) 4 SCC 769; Devender Kumar Tyagi and Others v. 
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2011] 15 SCR 641 : (2011) 9 
SCC 164; Darshan Lal Nagpal (Dead) by LRs. v. Government of 
NCT of Delhi and Others [2012] 2 SCR 595 : (2012) 2 SCC 327; 
Anand Singh and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 
[2010] 9 SCR 133 : (2010) 11 SCC 242; Narendra Road Lines 
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP and Others SLP(C) No. 17808 of 2010 : 
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29682 of 2009; Yogesh Kumar v. 
State of U.P. CMWP No.10782/2013; Natthi v. State of U.P. Thru. 
Secr. Industrial Devp. & Ors. Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010 : SLP(C) 
No. 014705-014710 of 2011; Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana 
[2009] 11 SCR 470 : (2009) 8 SCC 539; Savitri Devi v. State of 
Uttar Pradesh and Others [2015] 7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21; 
Sahara India Commercial
Corporation Limited and Others v. State 
of Uttar Pradesh (2017) 11 SCC 339; Noida Industrial Development 
Authority v. Ravindra Kumar and Others [2022] 1 SCR 1113 : 
(2022) 13 SCC 468; Yamuna Expressway Industrial Authority v. 
Shakuntla Education and Welfare Society [2022] 5 SCR 1034 : 
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 655 – referred to.
List of Acts
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 
1976.
List of Keywords
Land acquisition; Acquisition proceedings; Integrated development 
of lands abutting the Yamuna Expressway; Acquisition of 
the abutting lands; Integrated development plan of ‘Yamuna 
Expressway”; Development of adjoining lands; Integrated project;
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
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Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA); 
Urgency clause; Jewar Airport; Master Plan; Industrial, residential, 
and recreational purposes; Objective of the acquisition; Integrate 
land development with the Yamuna Expressway construction; Public 
interest; Land parcels; Enquiry; ‘in rem’; Additional compensation; 
Enhancement in compensation; Landowners; Policy for Planned 
Development along the Taj Expressway.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13119 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.05.2023 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Allahabad in WC No. 56629 of 2011
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 13120, 13121-13122, 13123-13124, 13125, 
13126, 13127, 13128, 13129, 13130, 13131, 13132, 13133, 13134, 
13135, 13136, 13137, 13138-13139, 13140-13141, 13142-13143,  
13144-13157, 13158-13162, 13163, 13164, 131165, 13166, 
13167, 13168, 13169, 13170, 13171, 13172, 13173, 13174  
and 13175 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Sharan Dev Singh Thakur, AAG, 
Jayant Bhushan, Niranjan Reddy, V.K. Shukla, Chinmoy Pradip 
Sharma, Ranjit Kumar, Gopal Jain, Rajive Bhalla, Mohd Shoeb Alam, 
Sr. Advs., Anand Mishra-1, Ms. Vandita Nain, Ms. Ayushi Rajput, 
Amar Gupta, Divyam Agarwal, Pranav Tanwar, Mohit Sharma, 
Ms. Parul Shukla, Ms. Shubhangi Pandey, Ms. Divya Jyoti Singh, 
Vineet Nagar, Kshitiz Ahuja, Shekhar Bhatia, Kapil Chaudhary, 
Samyak
Jain, Rajat Sehgal, Ms. Vandana Anand, Anurag Rawal, 
Amit Singh, Akash Nagar, Jaibir Singh Nagar, Suresh Chand Nagar, 
Ms. Ruchi B Nagar, Kuldeep Nagar, Nafees Chaudhary, Surender 
Kumar, Yashpal Bbhati, Vijender Kumar, Ankit Bhati, Arvind 
Tanwar, Siddhartha Jha, Rakesh Mishra, Pankaj Dubey, Ms. Rishu 
Mishra, D.N. Dubey, Ambuj Sharma, Sanjay Sarin, Tarun Rana, 
Ms. Gagan Deep Kaur, Ms. Lavanya Paul, Dinkar Kalra, Susheel 
Tomar, Sanjeev Malhotra, Nischal Kumar Neeraj, Yogesh Tiwari, 
Sarthak Nema, Abhinav Singh Parihar, Sanjay K. Agrawal, Syed 
Imtiyaz Ali, Aftab Ali Khan, Moazzam Khan, Ms. Sheetal Rawat, 
Mumtaz Alam Siddiqui, Ali Safeer Farooqi, Ms. Phaguni Bajpayi,
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Mansur Ali Khan, Rahat Ali Chaudhary, Ms. Ruchira Goel, Siddharth 
Thakur, Adit Jayeshbhai Shah, Sharanya Singh, Mustafa Sajad, 
Abhinav Parihar, Ms. Neema, Vikrant Singh Bais, Vikas Upadhyay,  
Mrs. Ankita Kashyap, Ms. Nimisha Swarup, Nitin Gaur, Arjun 
Singh Tomar, Alok Shankar, Vivek Sharma, Deepesh Srivastava,  
Ms. Rachana Sharma, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Mehta, J.
Table of Contents*
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................
4
BATCH NO. 1 – LANDOWNERS’ APPEALS @ SPECIAL 
LEAVE PETITIONS .....................................................................
5
BATCH NO. 2 – YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE 
PETITIONS ................................................................................
6
BRIEF FACTS .............................................................................
6
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LANDOWNERS 
(APPELLANTS IN BATCH NO. 1) ..............................................
15
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF YEIDA (RESPONDENT NO. 
3 IN BATCH NO. 1) ....................................................................
26
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS .................................................
38
CONCLUSION ............................................................................
44
1.	
Delay in filing application(s) for setting aside of abatement is 
condoned.
2.	
Abatement is set aside.
3.	
Delay in filing
the application(s) for substitution is condoned.
4.	
Application(s) for substitution is allowed.
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
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Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
5.	
Application(s) for transposition is allowed.
6.	
Application(s) for intervention/impleadment is allowed.
7.	
Leave granted.
INTRODUCTION
8.	
The present batch of civil appeals @ special leave petitions arise out 
of the land acquisition proceedings initiated by respondent No.1-State 
of Uttar Pradesh1 for planned development in the District Gautam 
Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, through respondent No.3-Yamuna 
Expressway Industrial Development Authority2 by invoking ‘urgency 
provisions’ incorporated in Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land 
Acquisition Act, 18943.
9.	
Arguments on all the appeals @ special leave petitions have been 
heard analogously and are being disposed of vide this common 
judgment. 
10.	 In total, 35 civil appeals @ special leave petitions are preferred 
both by landowners and YEIDA which can be categorized into two 
batches as mentioned below:
BATCH NO. 1 - LANDOWNERS’ APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE 
PETITIONS
11.	 A total of 29 civil appeals @ special leave petitions have been filed 
by the landowners challenging the decision of the Division Bench 
of the Allahabad High Court in “Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P. 
thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors4”. The 
appeal @ special leave petition titled “Kalicharan v. State of U.P. 
and others5” is being treated as the lead matter in this batch.
BATCH NO. 2 - YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS
12.	 The YEIDA has filed 6
appeals @ special leave petitions challenging 
various decisions of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court 
1	
hereinafter being referred to as ‘State’
2	
hereinafter being referred to as ‘YEIDA’
3	
hereinafter being referred to as “the Act”
4	
Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as ‘Kamal Sharma’
5	
SLP(C) No. 15782 of 2023
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invalidating the self-same land acquisition proceedings for integrated 
development of notified areas including the decision in “Shyoraj 
Singh and Others v. State of U.P.6”. The appeal @ special leave 
petition titled “YEIDA v. Shyoraj Singh and Ors.7” is being treated 
as the lead matter in this batch. 
BRIEF FACTS
13.	 The chronology of events leading to the filing of these civil appeals 
are as follows. 
14.	 For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the factual context as 
noticed in Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled as “Kamal Sharma v. State 
of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors.8 
(lead matter in Batch No.1)filed before the Allahabad High Court. 
15.	 Upon receipt of a proposal from the Director, Land Acquisition 
Directorate, Rajswa, Uttar Pradesh, with prior approval of the State 
Government, a notification dated 26th February, 2009 was issued 
under Section 4(1)9 read with Sections 17(1)10 and 17(4)11 of the 
Act for the acquisition of the tracts of lands in question for planned 
development in the District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The 
relevant portion of the aforesaid notification is extracted below: -
“Under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition 
Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894), the Governor hereby 
6	
Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as ‘Shyoraj Singh’
7	
SLP(C) Nos. 19512-19513 of 2023 
8	
Supra, Note 4
9	
4. Publication of preliminary
notification and power of officers thereupon. –
(1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] the land in any locality [is needed or] is likely to 
be needed for any public purpose [or for a company], a notification to that effect shall be published in the 
Official Gazette [and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in 
the regional language], and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to 
be given at convenient places in the said locality [(the last of the dates of such publication and the giving 
of such public notice , being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification)].
10	
17. Special powers in case of urgency. –
(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the [appropriate Government], so directs, the Collector, though no 
such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice 
mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1). [take possession of any land needed for a public purpose]. Such 
land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all encumbrances.
11	
17. Special powers in case of urgency. –
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions 
of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the [appropriate Government] may direct that the 
provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under
section 
6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of the publication of the notification] under section 4, 
sub-section (1).
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1071
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
notifies for the information of the general public that the 
land mentioned in the Schedule below shall be earmarked 
for public purposes, namely, the Yamuna Expressway 
Industrial Development Authority in District Gautam Budh 
Nagar for Planned Development.
Because the Governor is of the opinion that the 
provisions or sub-section (1) of section 17 of the said 
Act apply to the said land, because the said land is 
urgently needed for planned development in district 
Gautam Buddha Nagar through Yamuna Expressway 
Industrial Development Authority and in view of this 
urgency, it is also necessary that the possible delay in 
conducting the Investigation under Section 5-A of the 
said Act should be avoided. Therefore, the Governor 
also directs under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the 
said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said 
Act shall not apply.”
(emphasis supplied) 
16.	 Since the land was sought to be acquired by invoking urgency 
provisions under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, the landowners 
made representations to the Chief Executive Officer(‘CEO’) of 
YEIDA requesting that their land may not be acquired because the 
status of the land was ‘Abadi Bhoomi’ which was being used by 
the landowners as dwelling units and for rearing their cattle. The 
functionaries/authorities concerned did not accede to the request 
of the landowners and the State Government issued the
notification 
dated 19th February, 2010 under Section 6 of the Act.
17.	 The landowners challenged the acquisition of their lands by filing 
numerous writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court, primarily 
seeking the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings undertaken 
by invoking Sections 4 and 6 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of 
the Act on several grounds which may be broadly categorized as 
below:-
(i)	
That the State Government arbitrarily invoked Section 17(1) and 
Section 17(4) of the Act and deprived the landowners of their 
valuable right to raise objections under Section 5-A of the Act.
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(ii)	
That a bare reading of the notification issued under Section 
4 would reflect that there was no material with the State 
Government for invoking the urgency clause in the matter of 
acquisition of land for planned development.
(iii)	 That there was no genuine public purpose behind the acquisition 
and thus, the impugned action was illegal, arbitrary and 
unjustified. 
18.	 These writ petitions were decided by the Allahabad High Court 
taking divergent views which are assailed in these appeals by 
special leave. 
19.	 The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court vide judgment dated 
24th April, 2017 allowed the Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010 titled Shyoraj 
Singh and quashed the land acquisition notifications in question 
holding that the grounds being taken in the impugned notifications 
for invocation of the urgency clause were arbitrary and bad in law. 
The learned Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh summoned the original 
records from the State Government and perused the same to arrive 
at the following conclusions: - 
(i)	
The Division Bench referred to two letters issued by the 
authorities of the District Gautam Budh Nagar, the details of 
which are as follows: 
(a)	 A letter justifying the invocation of the urgency clause 
signed by the Additional Chief Executive Officer of Yamuna 
Expressway, Tehsildar, Naib Tehsildar, and Lekhpal. The 
relevant extract from the said letter is as below: - 
“Yamuna expressway urgently
needs the 
proposed land for planned industrial development. 
In the event of delay in the acquisition, there is a 
strong possibility of increasing encroachment on 
the proposed land, due to which public interest 
project of planned industrial development will 
adversely be affected.” 
“Hearing and disposal of written/oral objections 
will definitely take years and there will be 
unexpected delays which will stall the planned 
development.”
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Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
(b)	 A letter issued in 2010 by the District Magistrate, recording 
a satisfaction that the prevailing facts and circumstances 
justified the invocation of the powers under Section 17 of 
the Act for dispensing with the hearing of objections under 
Section 5-A of the Act. The relevant extract from the said 
letter is as below:
“Due to the need to complete the project without 
delay in the acquisition of the said land, it is 
necessary to take possession of the proposed 
land with immediate effect. In the case of using 
Section 17 of LAA, the provisions of Section 
5-A of the Act become extinct and I fully agree 
with the justification of ending the opportunity 
of hearing to the land owners.”
With reference to the aforesaid letters, the Division Bench 
observed that the two grounds mentioned for invoking urgency 
clause were: (1) That there are chances of unauthorized 
construction/encroachment on the said land. (2) Large number 
of landowners would be affected by the acquisition and hearing 
such large number of landowners would delay the project.
The Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh held that the above-noted 
factors did not furnish legally acceptable justification for the 
exercise of power under Section 17(1) of the Act by the State 
Government because the acquisition was primarily meant to 
cater to private interests in the name of industrial development 
of the District and no material was
produced on record to show 
that the State Government and/or agencies/instrumentalities 
of the State were intending to establish industrial units on the 
acquired tracts of land. Further, the justification for invoking 
urgency provisions, that the land will be encroached on, had 
no substance as the land was already in possession of the 
recorded tenure holders.
(ii)	
The Division Bench also observed that the notification under 
Section 4 of the Act was published on 26th February, 2009 
but thereafter, the State Government took nearly one year to 
publish the notification under Section 612 of the Act. The time 
12	
Published on 19th Feb, 2010.
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of one year consumed by the State Government in publishing 
the notification under Section 6 of the Act was by itself sufficient 
to infer that there was absolutely no urgency that could have 
justified the invocation of the urgency clause, thereby depriving 
the landowners of an opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A 
of the Act. 
20.	 However, another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while 
dealing with a batch of 73 writ petitions challenging the very same 
land acquisition proceedings took a different view from Shyoraj 
Singh and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the landowners, the 
lead matter being Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled “Kamal Sharma 
v. State of U.P.”. The Division Bench while upholding the acquisition 
proceedings held that it could not be accepted that the entire exercise 
for invocation of urgency clause was mechanical or there was no 
material with the State for recording the subjective satisfaction to 
this effect. The reasons assigned by the Division Bench in Kamal 
Sharma were as follows: -
(i)	
A perusal of the Master plan and the facts established that 
the land required for development of Yamuna Expressway 
[‘Planned development through Yamuna Expressway’] was 
for an integrated project. The land was initially acquired for 
the Yamuna Expressway and, thereafter, for developing land 
parcels alongside the Expressway as townships.
(ii)	
The original record of the State contains a
categorical statement 
that the State Government, after scrutinizing the record had 
accepted the proposal applying mind to the fact that, in case 
the objections under Section 5-A of the Act were invited, it would 
adversely affect and cause delay in execution of the project 
of public importance. The said decision was made looking at 
the enormity of the project which required the acquisition of 
the lands spread over a large area of 18,000 hundred acres 
(approx.) comprising 16 villages. The development of the village 
‘Abadi Bhoomi’s by YEIDA was also linked to the development 
of the land alongside the Expressway. It was not the case of 
non-application of mind and no fault in the decision-making 
process could be demonstrated.
(iii)	 There was no post-notification delay, inasmuch as, in two or 
three acquisition notifications, which were the subject matter of
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Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
challenge in the present writ petitions, wherein one year time 
has been consumed in the issuance of the Section 6 notification, 
the delay has beenduly explained by the State. 
21.	 In Kamal Sharma, the Division Bench distinguished Shyoraj Singh 
noting that the said judgment failed to consider the fact that the 
acquisition was proposed for an integrated project and that the 
Division Bench did not deal with the argument that looking at the 
large number of tenure holders, the hearings would have resulted 
into the project of tremendous importance being delayed. Further, 
it was noted that the reasons given for justifying the invocation of 
the urgency clause had not been examined in the context in which 
they were made, and also the decision of this Court in the case of 
Nand Kishore Gupta and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and 
Others.13 was not considered. 
22.	 The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while delivering the 
judgment in Kamal Sharma, validated the acquisition proceeding in 
question and granted an enhanced compensation of 64.7% to the 
landowners. 
23.	 During the course of arguments, this Court was apprised of the fact 
that out of total 410 writ petitioners(landowners) before the High 
Court, only 96 have challenged the judgment in Kamal Sharma by 
filing civil appeals @ special leave petitions in Batch No. 1.
24.	 It is in this backdrop of the conflicting decisions
rendered by the 
Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court, that the two batches 
of civil appeals @ special leave petitions i.e. Batch No.1 and Batch 
No.2, have been preferred by the landowners and YEIDA before 
this Court.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LANDOWNERS (APPELLANTS 
IN BATCH NO. 1): -
25.	 Learned counsel representing the landowners implored the Court to 
grant relief in favour of the appellants as prayed for in Batch No.1 
wherein lead matter is “Kalicharan and others v. The State of Uttar 
Pradesh and others14” and negate the challenge to the judgment in 
13	
[2010] 11 SCR 356 : (2010) 10 SCC 282; hereinafter referred to as ‘Nand Kishore’
14	
supra
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Shyoraj Singh. They advanced the following pertinent submissions 
for assailing the questioned land acquisition proceedings:-
(i)	
That the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, while 
rendering the judgment dated 26th May, 2023 in Kamal Sharma, 
in effect sat in appeal over the judgment dated 24th April, 2017 
in Shyoraj Singh rendered by a coordinate bench of the same 
High Court which dealt with an identical controversy both in 
facts and law. It was fervently contended that the Division Bench 
of Allahabad High Court, while dealing with the subsequent 
batch of writ petitions in Kamal Sharma should have followed 
the judgment passed in Shyoraj Singh as a matter of judicial 
discipline.
(ii)	
That if at all the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma was of a 
view that Shyoraj Singh did not lay down the correct position 
of law, then the question of law should have been referred to 
a larger Bench rather than taking a divergent view in a Bench 
with a composition of same number of Judges. 
(iii)	 That the land acquisition notifications under Sections 4 
and 6 of the Act were dated 26th February, 2009 and 19th 
February 2010, respectively. The above-mentioned dates 
demonstrate that about one years’ time was taken by the State 
Government for issuance of the final declaration notification 
under Section 6 after the proposal under Section 4 of the 
Act was issued and thus, there was pre and post notification 
delay which could
not have been ignored and had to be taken 
into account. In this background there could not have been 
any justification for the dispensation of few weeks’ time to the 
landowners to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act, on 
the ground of urgency. On this aspect, reliance was placed upon 
Radhy Shyam (dead) through LRs. and Others v. State of 
Uttar Pradesh and Others,15 wherein this Court observed as 
follows: -
“82. In this case, the Development Authority sent the 
proposal sometime in 2006. The authorities up to the 
level of the Commissioner completed the exercise of 
15	
[2011] 8 SCR 359 : (2011) 5 SCC 553; hereinafter referred to as ‘Radhy Shyam’
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Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
survey and preparation of documents by the end of 
December 2006 but it took one year and almost three 
months for the State Government to issue notification 
under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4). 
If this much time was consumed between the receipt 
of proposal for the acquisition of land and issue of 
notification, it is not possible to accept the argument 
that four to five weeks within which the objections 
could be filed under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A 
and the time spent by the Collector in making enquiry 
under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A would have 
defeated the object of the acquisition.”
Reliance in this regard was also placed on Dev Sharan and 
Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,16 wherein this 
Court observed as below: - 
“37[Ed.: Para 37 corrected vide Official Corrigendum 
No. F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2011 dated 16-3-2011.]. Thus 
the time which elapsed between publication of 
Section 4(1) and Section 17 notifications, and Section 
6 declaration in the local newspapers is 11 months 
and 23 days i.e. almost one year. This slow pace at 
which the government machinery had functioned in 
processing the acquisition, clearly evinces that there 
was no urgency for acquiring the land so as to warrant 
invoking Section 17(4) of the Act.
38. In Para 15 of the writ petition, it has been clearly 
stated that there was a time gap of more than 11 
months between Section 4 and
Section 6 notifications, 
which demonstrates that there was no urgency in the 
State action which could deny the petitioners their right 
under Section 5-A. In the counter which was filed in 
this case by the State before the High Court, it was 
not disputed that the time gap between Section 4 
notification read with Section 17, and Section 6 
notification was about 11 months.”
16	
[2011] 3 SCR 728 : (2011) 4 SCC 769
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Learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance 
on Devender Kumar Tyagi and Others v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh and Others,17 wherein, this Court, while dealing with a 
post-notification delay of almost two years, held as follows: 
“28. In the facts and circumstances of the present 
case, it is clear that this Court, vide its order dated 
17-8-2004 [(2011) 12 SCC 572], has issued a direction 
to the respondents to relocate the bone mills and 
allied industries causing environment pollution and 
health hazards as per the recommendations of CPCB 
and, inter alia, the respondents were also directed 
to identify the area for relocation. Pursuant to this, 
the respondents have filed an affidavit in the month 
of December 2004 specifying the construction of 
the Leather City Project at Hapur in Ghaziabad. 
Subsequently, it was only after the lapse of two years, 
the State Government had issued a Notification under 
Section 4 on 3-7-2006 and the same was published 
on 4-7-2006. Thereafter, the State Government took 
more than 17 months in order to make a declaration 
of the notification under Section 6 from the date of 
publication of the notification under Section 4 of the LA 
Act. In view of the above circumstances, it is crystal 
clear that the government functionary has proceeded 
at very slow pace at two levels, that is, prior to the 
issuance of the notification under Section 4 and post 
the issuance of the
notification under Section 4, for 
acquisition of the land for construction of the Leather 
City Project, which undoubtedly is a public purpose. 
Therefore, the above series of the events amply 
exhibit the lethargical and lackadaisical attitude of 
the State Government. In the light of the above 
circumstances, the respondents are not justified in 
invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17 of 
the LA Act, thereby, depriving the appellants of their 
valuable right to raise objections and opportunity of 
17	
[2011] 15 SCR 641 : (2011) 9 SCC 164
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1079
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
hearing before the authorities in order to persuade 
them that their property may not be acquired.
Further reliance was placed on the case of Darshan Lal Nagpal 
(Dead) by LRs. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others,18 
wherein,this Court observed as below: 
“36. It needs no emphasis that majority of the 
projects undertaken by the State and its agencies/
instrumentalities, the implementation of which 
requires public money, are meant to benefit the 
people at large or substantially a large segment of 
the society. If what the High Court has observed 
is treated as a correct statement of law, then in all 
such cases the acquiring authority will be justified 
in invoking Section 17 of the Act and dispense with 
the inquiry contemplated under Section 5-A, which 
would necessarily result in depriving the owner of his 
property without any opportunity to raise legitimate 
objection. However, as has been repeatedly held by 
this Court, the invoking of the urgency provisions can 
be justified only if there exists real emergency which 
cannot brook delay of even few weeks or months. In 
other words, the urgency provisions can be invoked 
only if even small delay of few weeks or months 
may frustrate the public purpose for which the land 
is sought to be acquired. Nobody can contest that 
the purpose for which the appellants’ land and land 
belonging to others was sought to be acquired was a 
public purpose
but it is one thing to say that the State 
and its instrumentality wants to execute a project of 
public importance without loss of time and it is an 
altogether different thing to say that for execution of 
such project, private individuals should be deprived 
of their property without even being heard.”
(iv)	 That one of the grounds taken by the State for invoking the 
urgency clause was that there were chances of unauthorized 
18	
[2012] 2 SCR 595 : (2012) 2 SCC 327
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construction/encroachments on the land subject to acquisition. 
This stand was questioned by placing reliance on Radhy 
Shyam, wherein this Court observed that it is highly unlikely 
that the recorded tenure holders would encroach or allow 
encroachments on their own land when they are admittedly 
in the possession of the same. The relevant extract as relied 
upon is quoted hereinbelow: - 
“83.  The apprehension of the respondents that 
delay in the acquisition of land will lead to enormous 
encroachment is totally unfounded. It is beyond the 
comprehension of any person of ordinary prudence to 
think that the landowners would encroach their own 
land with a view to frustrate the concept of planned 
industrial development of the district.” 
(v)	
That there was no material before the State Government to 
show the existence of any unforeseeable emergency warranting 
invocation of the urgency clause under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) 
of the Act, thereby denying the landowners of their right to file 
objections against acquisition of their lands. 
(vi)	 That the lands under acquisition were to be utilized for 
commercial and residential purposes and such development 
work, would take ample time in planning and execution, thus 
there could have been no justification for the invocation of 
urgency clause. Reliance in this regard was placed on the 
following observations in Radhy Shyam:-
“80......Even if planned industrial
development of the 
district is treated as public purpose within the meaning 
of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify 
the exercise of power by the State Government under 
Section 17(1) and 17(4). The objective of industrial 
development of an area cannot be achieved by 
pressing some buttons on the computer screen. It 
needs a lot of deliberations and planning keeping in 
view various scientific and technical parameters and 
environmental concerns. The private entrepreneurs, 
who are desirous of making investments in the State, 
take their own time in setting up the industrial units. 
Usually, the State Government and its agencies/
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1081
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
instrumentalities would give them two to three years to 
put up their factories, establishments, etc. Therefore, 
time required to ensure compliance with the provisions 
contained in Section 5A cannot, by any stretch of 
imagination, be portrayed as delay that will frustrate 
the purpose of acquisition.”
Reliance was also placed upon the decision of Anand Singh 
and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,19 wherein 
this Court observed as follows: - 
“46. As to in what circumstances the power of 
emergency can be invoked are specified in Section 
17(2) but circumstances necessitating invocation of 
urgency under Section 17(1) are not stated in the 
provision itself. Generally speaking, the development 
of an area (for residential purposes) or a planned 
development of city, takes many years if not decades 
and, therefore, there is no reason why summary 
enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A may 
not be held and objections of landowners/persons 
interested may not be considered. In many cases, 
on general assumption likely delay in completion 
of enquiry under Section 5-A is set up as a reason 
for invocation of extraordinary power in dispensing 
with the enquiry little realising that an important and 
valuable right of the person interested in the land is 
being taken away and with some effort enquiry could 
always be completed expeditiously.”
(vii)	 That the judgment of this Court in Radhy
Shyam holds the 
field on the issue of invocation of urgency clause in acquisition 
proceedings for planned development for commercial, residential, 
industrial purposes and the decision in Kamal Sharma has been 
rendered while glossing over the law settled in Radhy Shyam. 
(viii)	 That the right to be heard as provided under Section 5-A of the 
Act is in the nature of a fundamental right and the same cannot 
be dispensed with, so as to justify the lackadaisical approach 
of the State Government. It was also contended that Section 
19	
[2010] 9 SCR 133 : (2010) 11 SCC 242
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5-A is not to be superseded ipso facto even if the provisions of 
Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the Act are being invoked. Reliance 
in support of this contention was placed upon the decision 
of this Court in the case of Dev Sharan v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh and Others,20 wherein it was held that even in cases 
of ‘urgency’ or ‘unforeseen emergency’, enquiry contemplated 
by Section 5-A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with and even 
if the case is covered under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 
17, sub-Section (4) of Section 17 would not necessarily apply. 
The relevant extracts relied upon are as below:- 
“32. In a recent judgment of this Court in Essco Fabs, 
(2009) 2 SCC 377, this Court, after considering previous 
judgments as also the provisions of Section 17 of the 
Act held: (SCC P. 839, para 41)
“41. Whereas sub-section (1) of Section 17 
deals with cases of ‘urgency’, sub-section (2) 
of the said section covers cases of ‘sudden 
change in the channel of any navigable river 
or other unforeseen emergency’. But even in 
such cases i.e. cases of ‘urgency’ or ‘unforeseen 
emergency’, enquiry contemplated by Section 
5-A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with which 
is clear from sub-section (4) of Section 17 of 
the Act.”
This Court, therefore, held that once a case is covered 
under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17, sub-
section (4) of Section 17 would not necessarily apply: 
(SCC P. 395, para 54) 
“54. In our
opinion, therefore, the contention 
of the learned counsel for the respondent 
authorities is not well founded and cannot be 
upheld that once a case is covered by sub-
sections (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act, 
sub-section (4) of Section 17 would necessarily 
apply and there is no question of holding inquiry 
20	
(2011) 4 SCC 769
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1083
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
or hearing objections under Section 5-A of the 
Act. Acceptance of such contention or upholding 
of this argument will make sub-section (4) 
of Section 17 totally otiose, redundant and 
nugatory.”
(ix)	 That the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court committed 
grave error in law while placing reliance upon the judgment of 
Nand Kishore, for denying relief to the landowners. That on a 
conjoint reading of paras 3 and 96 of Nand Kishore, it would 
become evident that the land in question therein admeasured 
1604 Hectares, which was to be acquired for the construction 
of the Yamuna Expressway itself and it is in that background 
that the invocation of the urgency clause was upheld, whereas 
the question as to the invocation of urgency clause to acquire 
land for commercial, residential or industrial purpose was not 
posed for adjudication in Nand Kishore,although it held the 
acquisition to be for public purpose. Paras 3 and 96 of Nand 
Kishore read as follows: - 
“3. The High Court, in the judgment dated 30-11-2009 
passed in Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P. [ CMWP 
No. 31314 of 2009 decided on 30-11-2009 (All)] , 
basically pointed out that out of 12,282 landowners, 
11,397 had already received their compensation under 
the agreement and the challenge related only to 21.03 
ha out of 1604 ha of land. The High Court also took 
the view that the scales of justice must tilt towards 
the right to
development of the millions who will be 
benefited from the road and the development of the 
area, as against the human rights of 35 petitioners 
therein, whose main complaint was that they were 
not heard before the declaration under Section 6 of 
the Act. The High Court also declined to give any 
direction to the State Government to consider to 
exempt 21.03 ha of land relating to the 35 petitioners 
therein on account of the fact that the construction 
of the road had to be made in an alignment and 
that alignment could not be changed. Identical view 
was taken in another writ petition filed by one Balbir
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Singh. The High Court also expressed its concern 
that any direction to exempt the land covered by the 
construction might seriously jeopardise the Project. 
The High Court also reiterated that the acquisition of 
the land for interchange of the road was the essential 
part of the Project, as also the construction of bridges, 
culverts and interchanges, which were essential for 
the fast-moving six-lane Expressway.
96. We are not impressed by the argument that the 
encroachment issue was not a relevant factor. This 
argument was based on the reported decision in Om 
Prakash v. State of U.P. [(1998) 6 SCC 1] It must 
be said that the actual scenario in that case was 
different. In that case, the Court was considering the 
acquisition of area of about 500 acres comprising 
of 437 plots, whereas, in the present case, the area 
to be acquired for the Expressway alone was more 
than 1600 ha. This is apart from the 25 million sq 
m of land which was liable to be acquired for the 
purposes of development of five land parcels. There 
was interlinking between the acquisition of land for the 
highway and the acquisition of land for establishing 
the five townships.”
(x)	
That the judgment in Radhy Shyam carves out a clear distinction 
by observing that the judgment in Nand Kishore related to the 
lands proposed to be acquired for construction of the expressway 
itself and not to the lands acquired for commercial, residential, 
and
industrial purposes, for which the invocation of urgency 
clause was held to be untenable and bad in law. 
(xi)	 That neither the appellants have received any amount towards 
compensation for acquisition of the lands nor have they parted 
with the possession of the subject lands, and thus, quashing of the 
land acquisition notification would not have any adverse impact 
as no development has taken place on the lands in question.
(xii)	 That the mere ploy of the grant of adequate compensation to 
the landowners with an escalation of 64.7% could not justify 
the grave illegalities committed by the authorities under the
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1085
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
garb of urgent acquisition because the same cannot obviate or 
supersede the substantive fundamental right of the landowners 
to file objections against the acquisition of the privately owned 
lands. 
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF YEIDA (RESPONDENT NO.3 IN 
BATCH NO. 1):-
26.	 Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, Shri Ranjit 
Kumar, Shri Gopal Jain, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf 
of YEIDA implored the Court to uphold the judgment passed in Kamal 
Sharma and to reverse the judgment passed in Shyoraj Singh as 
being unsustainable in the eyes of law. They advanced the following 
pertinent submissions seeking the above relief:-
(i)	
YEIDA is a statutory authority formed under Section 3 of the 
U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, which has been 
established to ensure planned development of the ‘industrial 
development area’. In furtherance of this objective, YEIDA 
prepared the Master Plan of 2021 and the Master Plan of 2031 
with the intent to develop the eastern side of river Yamuna 
by construction of a six-lane Expressway joining Noida to 
Agra and also for integrated development of five distinct 
regions along the said Expressway for residential, industrial, 
institutional and recreational purposes. The construction of 
the Jewar Airport is also a part and parcel of the very same 
integrated project.
(ii)	
That a bare perusal of the Master Plan(Phase-1-2031) clearly
establishes that the land acquired for development across 
Yamuna Expressway, is an integrated project. The land was 
initially acquired for the Yamuna Expressway and thereafter, 
for developing land parcels alongside the Yamuna Expressway 
as residential townships, industrial areas, amusement zones, 
etc. The development is strictly being carried out in accordance 
with the Master Plan prepared by YEIDA. 
(iii)	 The Yamuna Expressway is a vital project of seminal importance 
providing access to millions of commuters by connecting 
the National Capital to Agra and nearby areas. The Yamuna 
Expressway is poised to become even more important with 
the upcoming Jewar Airport. A project of this magnitude would
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require the involvement of the adjoining areas which would lead 
to an overall development of the State. 
(iv)	 That the legality of the acquisition of the lands in question by 
YEIDA for integrated and complementary planned development 
is no longer res integra as the same has been consistently 
upheld by this Court vide various judicial pronouncements over 
time, the landmark case being Nand Kishore.
(v)	
That the judgment in Nand Kishore squarely covers the 
controversy at hand, wherein it was observed that the planned 
development of 25 million square meter of land (2500 Hectares) 
being acquired for creation of the five zones for industry, 
residence, amusement zones, etc. would be complementary to 
the creation of the Expressway and is a part of an integrated 
project and it was urged that similarly in the present case, land 
has been acquired for the planned development of the region.
(vi)	 That it is settled law that the decision on invocation of urgency 
clause is an administrative decision requiring subjective 
satisfaction of the State Government and scope of judicial 
review in the matters of invocation of the urgency clause under 
Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act is limited to the decision-
making procedure and not to the decision itself. The Court is 
required to examine the record just to arrive at a satisfaction 
regarding existence of material to form an opinion about invoking 
the urgency clause.
(vii)	 That the controversy involved in the present case is adidem 
to the facts of the case in Nand Kishore and the factors that 
weighed with this Court in upholding the invocation of the urgency 
clause in Nand Kishore, also exist in the present case, and 
therefore, the invocation of the urgency clause in the present 
case was fully justified. The Court’s attention was drawn to the 
following factors:-
(a)	 Enormity of the project: The acquisition therein in ‘Nand 
Kishore’ case, involved 1604 Hectares of land affecting 
12,283 farmers. Similarly, in the present case, the 
acquisition involves approximately 2,979 Hectares of land 
affecting 12,868 farmers/landowners. Thus, the present 
acquisition is of greater magnitude than the one considered 
in Nand Kishore.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
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Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
(b)	 Likelihood of encroachments: The area for the expressway 
alone exceeded 1600 Hectares, not including the 25 million 
square meter parcel of land required for developing the 
five additional zones. In the present case, out of the 
2,979 Hectares of land acquired, only 456.74 Hectares 
of land is under litigation. Therefore, there is an imminent 
likelihood of encroachment on 2,522.26 Hectares of land 
where landowners have already received compensation 
and YEIDA has taken the possession.
(c)	
Number of Landowners to be heard: The total number of 
landowners to be heard could delay the project further. 
In the present case, 12,868 landowners would need to 
be heard, significantly delaying the project. Only 140 
landowners are before this Court (inclusive of both batches 
of civil appeals @ special leave petitions), claiming they 
were not heard before the issuance of notification under 
Section 6 of the Act, whereas, the others have accepted 
the escalated compensation of 64.7% directed to be paid 
by the High Court in Kamal Sharma. Thus, hearing all 
the landowners was bound to unnecessarily delay the 
developmental works of great importance without causing 
any real prejudice to the large number of landowners and 
would also lead to escalation of cost of development.
(viii)	 That there was sufficient material before the State Government 
to justify the invocation of urgency clause, and there
was no 
malice on part of the State Government in invoking the same. 
Stress was laid upon the observations made in Nand Kishore, 
wherein it was held that the executive’s subjective satisfaction in 
dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A can be subjected 
to judicial review only on the grounds of insufficient material to 
justify dispensing with the enquiry or malice in the impugned 
action, neither of these elements exist in the present case.
(ix)	 That the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case 
of Shyoraj Singh clearly erred while relying upon the case 
of Radhy Shyam to hold that the acquisition notifications are 
bad in law and that the urgency clause was wrongly invoked. 
That Radhy Shyam is not applicable to the lands acquired for 
integrated planned development project at hand and is clearly 
distinguishable on facts as the said judgment was passed in the
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context of an acquisition for private purposes, serving private 
interests and the chunk of land was acquired in a standalone 
exercise for development of residential, commercial and 
industrial projects, unlike the present case where the acquisition 
is being done in the national interest for a project meant to 
create public infrastructure of huge magnitude. In this regard, it 
was submitted that Nand Kishore was distinguished in Radhy 
Shyam in the following terms: -
“76. In Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P. [(2010) 
10 SCC 282] the acquisition was upheld because the 
land was urgently needed for construction of Yamuna 
Expressway and by the time the matter was decided 
by this Court, huge amount had been spent on the 
project. As against this, the exercise of power under 
Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4) for the acquisition of land 
for residential, industrial and commercial purposes, 
construction of sewage treatment plant and district 
jails was held to be legally impermissible in Raja 
Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. [AIR 1967 SC 
1081 : (1967) 1 SCR 373], Narayan Govind Gavate 
v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 1 SCC 133 : 1977 
SCC (Cri) 49], Om Prakash v. State of U.P. [(1998) 6 
SCC 1], Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja [(2004) 8 
SCC 453] , Essco Fabs (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana 
[(2009) 2 SCC 377 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 537], Babu 
Ram v. State of Haryana [(2009) 10 SCC 115 : (2009) 
4 SCC (Civ) 69] and Anand
Singh v. State of U.P. 
[(2010) 11 SCC 242 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 423].”
(x)	
That this Court in Natthi v. State of U.P. & Ors.21 and Narendra 
Road Lines Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP and Others,22 has 
dismissed the SLPs preferred against the judgments passed 
by the Allahabad High Court in the self-same acquisition while 
relying on the law laid down in Nand Kishore, wherein it was 
held that the acquisition in question in District Gautam Budh 
Nagar through YEIDA is for planned development and the 
21	
SLP(C) No. 014705-014710 of 2011
22	
SLP(C) No. 17808 of 2010
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1089
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
subject lands are contiguous to the land parcels, which were 
acquired for the purpose of residential, industrial, amusement, 
etc. along with Yamuna Expressway. 
(xi)	 The attention of the Court was also drawn to the fact that the 
SLP in Natthi v. State of U.P. & Ors.23 was dismissed on 9th 
May, 2011, just a month after the decision of Radhy Shyam 
which was delivered on 15th April, 2011. 
(xii)	 That another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in 
the case of Yogesh Kumar v. State of U.P.24 considered the 
applicability of Radhy Shyam on invocation of urgency clause 
for planned development through YEIDA, and vide judgment 
dated 1st March, 2013,it was held that in view of judgment in 
Natthi v. State of U.P. Thru. Secr. Industrial Devp. & Ors.,25 
the decision in Radhy Shyam will have no application on the 
present acquisition. The decision of Allahabad High Court in 
Yogesh Kumar was also affirmed by this Court while dismissing 
the SLP26 by a Bench presided over by Hon’ble Mr. Justice 
G.S. Singhvi (who authored Radhy Shyam) vide order dated 
23rd September, 2013. 
(xiii)	 That it was correctly held by the Division Bench of Allahabad 
High Court in Kamal Sharma that the right of the tenure holders 
to object against the acquisition provided under Section 5-A 
of the Act cannot be said to be a fundamental right or a right 
akin to fundamental right protected by the Constitution of India.
(xiv)	That the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Kamal 
Sharma has meticulously reviewed the material on record, 
and held that the same justified the invocation of the urgency 
clause, recording its conclusions as follows: 
(a)	 The lands of nine villages were acquired through different 
notifications issued over a span of two years between 26th 
February, 2009 to 22nd March, 2011. 
23	
(Supra, Note 22)
24	
CMWP No.10782/2013, hereinafter referred to as ‘Yogesh Kumar’
25	
Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010, hereinafter referred to as ‘Natthi’
26	
Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. CC 16505/2013
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(b)	 Majority of the declaration notifications were issued in a 
gap of 3 to 4 months.
(c)	
It was specifically mentioned in the Certificate of the 
Collector that the acquisition of different parcels of land 
was being proposed as contiguous part of the project. 
If an opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A of the 
Act was granted, the same would have resulted in legal 
proceedings and eventual non-availability of contiguous 
land which would have hampered the execution of the 
integrated project in a time bound manner. The original 
record of the State provides categorical statements to 
this effect. 
(d)	 The aforesaid decision was taken on account of the 
enormousness of the project in question and the area of 
the land sought to be acquired.
He thus urged that the Division Bench of the Allahabad High 
Court, therefore, rightly held that the invocation of the urgency 
clause was not a mechanical exercise and was undertaken 
pursuant to the subjective satisfaction of the State Government 
being arrived at after due application of mind to material available 
on record. 
(xv)	 That the judgment in Shyoraj Singh does not lay down good 
law and is liable to be set aside, since it failed to take note 
of the earlier Division Bench decisions of the Allahabad High 
Court in the cases of Natthi,27 Narendra Road Lines Pvt. Ltd. 
v. State of U.P. & Others28 and Yogesh Kumar,29 wherein the 
validity of self-same land acquisition
for integrated planned 
development by YEIDA was upheld. Ignoring an earlier judicial 
precedent rendered by a Bench presided by co-equal number 
of judges and taking a totally contrary view itself amounts to a 
fundamental error rendering the subsequent view per incuriam 
as held in case of Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana.30
27	
Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010
28	
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29682 of 2009, hereinafter referred to as ‘Narendra Road Lines’
29	
supra
30	
[2009] 11 SCR 470 : (2009) 8 SCC 539
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1091
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
(xvi)	That there is no pre or post notification delay in the present 
acquisition inasmuch as there are only three notifications, where 
a period of nearly one year has been consumed in issuing the 
Section 6 notification. For other seven notifications, Section 6 
notification was issued within two to four months.
Learned Solicitor General concluded his submissions urging that it 
is now futile to oppose the acquisition, particularly when the same is 
unequivocally accepted by all except a few, inasmuch as the majority 
of the landowners have accepted the enhanced compensation without 
raising any further challenge to the acquisition. Learned Solicitor 
General urged that the entire process was wholly transparent and 
that there was pressing necessity for acquisition of lands, considering 
the public purpose involved. He thus implored the Court to accept 
the appeals filed by the YEIDA and dismiss the appeals filed by the 
landowners. 
27.	 We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions 
advanced at bar and have gone through the impugned judgments 
and the material placed on record.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS: -
28.	 The issues which arises for our consideration in the present batches 
of appeal are as follows: -
(i)	
Whether the present acquisition is a part of the integrated 
development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway” undertaken by 
respondent No.3-YEIDA? 
(ii)	
Whether the application of
Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act 
was legal and justified in the instant case, thereby justifying the 
decision of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry 
under Section 5-A of the Act?
(iii)	 Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad 
High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the questioned 
acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore lays down the 
correct proposition of law or whether the Division Bench in the 
case of Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles 
laid down in Radhy Shyam and quashing the acquisition 
proceedings in question?
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29.	 Before adverting to the above issues, we may take note of the fact 
that the State Government had formulated a “Policy for Planned 
Development along the Taj Expressway31” and the notification to 
this effect was issued by the Infrastructure & Industrial Development 
Commissioner, Government of Uttar Pradesh on 29th December, 2007. 
The Policy dealt with the formation of Special Development Zone32 
and the development thereof. As per clause 3.2 of the said Policy, 
the land use of SDZ is divided in the following terms: -
“3.2. Land use of SDZ (special development zone)
The permissible break-up of the total land area under SDZ 
for different activities shall be as under:
%age of total area of SDZ
A.
Core Activity Sports
Not less than 35%
(including road & open spaces)
B.
Other activities
(i)
Commercial
Not more than 20%
(ii)
Institutional & amenities
Not less than 5%
(iii)
Roads, open and  
Circulation areas
Not less than 25%
(iv)
Residential including  
Group Housing and  
Plotted Development
Not less than 15%
Area
”
30.	 A bare perusal of the aforesaid clause makes it clear that while 
the development of roads and open spaces which was to constitute 
35% of the land area was considered to be the core activity, the 
allied activities such as commercial, institutional & amenities, roads, 
open and circulation areas, residential including group housing and 
plotted development areas were to constitute the remaining 65%
of the land under the SDZ. Hence, undeniably, the authorities were 
31	
In short, ‘Policy’
32	
In short ‘SDZ’.
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Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
required to develop the entire SDZ in an integrated manner. This 
aspect was precisely taken note of by this Court in the case of Nand 
Kishore. The relevant extracts from the judgment of Nand Kishore 
are reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference: -
“57. The Expressway is a work of immense public 
importance. The State gains advantages from the 
construction of an expressway and so does the general 
public. Creation of a corridor for fast-moving traffic resulting 
into curtailing the travelling time, as also the transport of 
the goods, would be some factors which speak in favour of 
the Project being for the public purpose. Much was stated 
about the 25 million sq m of land being acquired for the 
five parcels of land. In fact, in our opinion, as has rightly 
been commented upon by the High Court, the creation of 
the five zones for industry, residence, amusement, etc. 
would be complementary to the creation of the Expressway.
58. It cannot be forgotten that the creation of land parcels 
would give impetus to the industrial development of the 
State creating more jobs and helping the economy and 
thereby helping the general public. There can be no doubt 
that the implementation of the Project would result in 
coming into existence of five developed parcels/centres 
in the State for the use of the citizens. There shall, thus, 
be the planned development of this otherwise industrially
backward area. The creation of these five parcels will 
certainly help the maximum utilisation of the Expressway 
and the existence of an Expressway for the fast-moving 
traffic would help the industrial culture created in the five 
parcels. Thus, both will be complimentary to each other and 
can be viewed as parts of an integral scheme. Therefore, 
it cannot be said that it is not a public purpose.”
31.	 Learned counsel for the landowners sought to draw a distinction, 
urging that Nand Kishore only dealt with the issue as to whether 
the acquisition was for public purpose and not with the issue as 
to whether the invocation of the urgency clause for commercial, 
residential, industrial purpose was justified. However, we are of the 
view that this contention is bereft of merit as no such distinction is 
permissible.
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32.	 The core question which requires this Court’s consideration is whether 
the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shyoraj 
Singh was justified in relying upon Radhy Shyam, so as to quash 
the acquisition notification pertaining to the development of the land 
adjoining the Yamuna Expressway. The relevant extracts from Radhy 
Shyam which are reproduced supra would make it clear that in the 
said case, this Court was considering a controversy relating to the 
land acquisition for the purpose of planned industrial development 
in District Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida Industrial 
Development Authority. Hence, the project did not contemplate 
a planned and integrated development of an Expressway and 
the adjoining areas. It was a standalone project pertaining to the 
development in industrial Gautam Budh Nagar. However, it cannot 
be gainsaid that Yamuna Expressway is a vital heartline providing 
access to millions of commuters from National Capital Delhi to Agra. 
The Expressway also connects the prestigious upcoming Jewar 
Airport to adjoining areas. To assume that the Yamuna Expressway 
is a simple highway without any scope for simultaneous development 
of the adjoining lands for commercial, residential and other such 
activities would be unconceivable. A project of such magnitude and 
enormity would definitely require the involvement of the adjoining 
areas which would lead to an overall
development of the State of 
Uttar Pradesh at large.
33.	 As observed above, the purpose behind the acquisition was 
unquestionably the integrated development of lands abutting the 
Yamuna Expressway. The acquisition of the lands for the Expressway 
could not be isolated or separated from the acquisition of the abutting 
lands. This was precisely held in the case of Nand Kishore.
34.	 It may be noted that the entire edifice of Shyoraj Singh is based on 
Radhy Shyam, wherein a two-Judge Bench of this Court decided the 
controversy arising from land acquisition pertaining to the planned 
industrial development in the District Gautam Budh Nagar. Another 
Division Bench of this Court considered the acquisition pertaining 
to the Yamuna Expressway in the case of Natthi. Placing reliance 
on Nand Kishore,the Division Bench of the same composition as in 
Radhy Shyam vide order dated 9th May, 2011 rejected the special 
leave petition(s) laying challenge to the invocation of the urgency 
clause in the self-same acquisition proceedings.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1095
Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
35.	 Much stress was laid by the learned counsel for the landowners 
on the issue that the Division Bench while deciding the impugned 
judgment in the case of Kamal Sharma could not have taken a 
different view from Shyoraj Singh and if at all, there was any doubt 
on the correctness of the view taken in Shyoraj Singh, then, the 
question of law was mandatorily required to be referred to a larger 
Bench. We feel that the said argument is fallacious on the fact of 
it. Much prior to Shyoraj Singh’s decision, three different Division 
Benches of the Allahabad High Court by detailed judgments in the 
cases of Natthi, Narendra Road Lines and Yogesh Kumar had 
already affirmed the validity of invocation of the urgency clause in 
the land acquisition notifications for the integrated development plan 
of ‘Yamuna Expressway’ by respondent No.3-YEIDA. It is trite to 
mention that in Shyoraj Singh, the Division Bench failed to consider 
the earlier Division Bench judgments in the cases of Natthi, Narendra 
Road Lines and Yogesh Kumar. In thisbackground, the view taken 
by the Division Bench in the case of Shyoraj Singh is per incuriam, 
rather than that in Kamal Sharma.
36.	 At the cost of repetition, it may be mentioned that the Division 
Bench judgments rendered by the Allahabad High Court in the 
cases of Natthi, Narendra Road Lines and Yogesh Kumar have 
been affirmed by this Court with the dismissal of
SLPs assailing the 
impugned judgments in those cases.
CONCLUSION
37.	 In the wake of the above discussion, we have no hesitation in 
holding that the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court correctly 
interpreted the legal position while deciding the batch of writ petitions 
in the case of Kamal Sharma and the judgment in the case of 
Shyoraj Singh does not lay down the correct proposition of law.
38.	 The issues framed above are answered in the following terms: 
(i)	
Whether the present acquisition is part of the integrated 
development plan of the ‘Yamuna Expressway’ undertaken by 
respondent No. 3-YEIDA?

y
Yes, the present acquisition forms part of the integrated 
development plan for the Yamuna Expressway initiated 
by YEIDA. As observed in the case of Nand Kishore, 
the development of land parcels for industrial, residential,
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and recreational purposes is complementary to the 
construction of the Yamuna Expressway. The objective of 
the acquisition is to integrate land development with the 
Yamuna Expressway’s construction, thereby promoting 
overall growth serving the public interest. Consequently, 
the Expressway and the development of adjoining lands 
are considered to be inseparable components of the overall 
project.
(ii)	
Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act 
was legal and warranted in the instant case, thereby justifying 
the Government’s decision to dispense with the inquiry under 
Section 5-A of the Act?

y
Yes, the invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was legal and justified in this 
case. The urgency clause was applied in accordance with 
the planned development of the Yamuna Expressway, as 
held in Nand Kishore.
(iii)	 Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad 
High Court in Kamal Sharma while relying on Nand Kishore 
lays down the correct proposition of law, or whether the Division 
Bench in Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles 
laid down in Radhy Shyam and quashing the acquisition 
proceedings in question?
y
The view expounded by the Division Bench in Kamal 
Sharma, which relied upon Nand Kishore, sets forth the 
correct proposition of law, and the judgment of the High 
Court in Shyoraj Singh, which relied on Radhy Shyam, 
did not present a correct legal interpretation. The judgment 
in Shyoraj Singh is set aside as it does not lay down 
good law and was passed while overlooking at the earlier 
precedents, rendering it per incuriam.
39.	 The High Court while deciding Kamal Sharma extensively considered 
the factual matrix and also examined the original records of the State 
Government to arrive at the satisfaction that the invocation of the 
urgency clause was absolutely justified with regard to the acquisition 
in question. The High Court also exhaustively considered the entire
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Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
sequence of judicial pronouncements in respect of the acquisition 
in question before arriving at the aforesaid conclusion and acted 
in an equitable manner while affirming the acquisition proceedings 
and directing the grant of additional compensation. We appreciate 
the endeavour made by the High Court to resolve the controversy 
objectively and equitably and grant our full imprimatur to the judgment 
in Kamal Sharma. 
40.	 Now, we are called upon to consider as to whether the escalated 
compensation formula as arrived at by the Division Bench of the 
High Court in the case of Kamal Sharma would subserve the ends 
of justice or the landowners whose lands have been acquired would 
be entitled to better compensation.
41.	 It is pertinent to note that the overwhelming majority of landowners 
have refrained from seeking judicial intervention in this matter, as 
manifested by the fact that only 140 out of 12,868 landowners(covered 
in both batches of civil appeals @ special leave petitions) have opted 
to challenge the acquisition by approaching this Court. This indicates 
that the majority of the landowners have accepted the escalated 
compensation granted by the High Court in Kamal Sharma. 
42.	 This Court, in the cases of Savitri Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh 
and Others,33 Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited 
and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh,34 and Noida Industrial 
Development Authority
v. Ravindra Kumar and Others,35 despite 
holding the invocation of the urgency clause under Sections 17(1) 
and 17(4) of the Act to be illegal, nonetheless upheld the acquisition 
proceedings and directed enhancement of compensation so as to 
compensate the land owners. However, in the present case, we have 
concluded that the action of the State in invocation of the urgency 
clause is in consonance with the law. 
43.	 The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, while delivering 
its decision in Kamal Sharma has already granted additional 
compensation of 64.7% to the landowners, to be offered as ‘No 
Litigation Bonus’ in consonance with the Government order dated 4th 
33	
[2015] 7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21
34	
(2017) 11 SCC 339
35	
[2022] 1 SCR 1113 : (2022) 13 SCC 468
1098
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November, 2015, thus there is no scope to direct further enhancement 
in compensation.
44.	 In light of the Government order dated 4th November, 2015 and 
the precedents set in Savitri Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh36 and 
Yamuna Expressway Industrial Authority v. Shakuntla Education 
and Welfare Society,37 it is directed that 64.7% enhancement in 
compensation shall apply in rem, ensuring uniform benefits to all 
affected landowners under the present land acquisition.
45.	 The question of non-issuance of the final award and its effect on the 
acquisition is left open ensuring that any affected party would retain 
the right to challenge or seek appropriate remedy on this specific 
issue independently, in accordance with law.
46.	 As a result of the above discussion, the appeals filed by the 
landowners i.e. Batch No. 1, are dismissed, and the appeals filed 
by YEIDA i.e. Batch No. 2, are hereby allowed.
47.	 No order as to costs.
48.	 Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals filed by the landowners are dismissed. 
Appeals filed by YEIDA are allowed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
36	
supra
37	
[2022] 5 SCR 1034 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 655