PRABIR PURKAYASTHA versus STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 666, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
* Author
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 666 : 2024 INSC 414
Prabir Purkayastha 
v. 
State (NCT of Delhi)
(Criminal Appeal No. 2577 of 2024)
15 May 2024 
[B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the arrest and subsequent remand of the accused-
appellant was vitiated as the copy of the remand application 
was not provided to him or his counsel before passing of the 
order of remand thus, not informing him of the grounds of arrest 
in writing.
Headnotes
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Constitution 
of India – Articles 22(1) and 22(5) – FIR registered u/ss.13, 
16, 17, 18, 22C, UAPA r/w ss.153A, 120B, IPC – Appellant 
was arrested in connection therewith however, the arrest 
memo did not contain the ‘grounds of arrest’ – Appellant 
subsequently remanded to police custody by Remand 
Judge – Grounds of arrest were thus, not furnished to the 
appellant at the time of his arrest and before remanding him 
to police custody – Arrest and the police custody remand 
challenged by the appellant – Rejected by Single Judge of 
the High Court by impugned judgment – Validity:
Held: Requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or 
the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in 
connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive 
detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the 
Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached 
under any situation – Non-compliance of this constitutional 
requirement and statutory
mandate would lead to the custody 
or the detention being rendered illegal – Grounds of arrest 
must be communicated in writing to the person arrested of an 
offence at the earliest – Arrest memo nowhere conveyed the 
grounds on which the appellant was being arrested – It was 
simply a proforma indicating the formal ‘reasons’ for which
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
667
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
he was being arrested – Copy of the FIR was provided to 
the Advocate representing the accused for the first time on 
5.10.2023 – Appellant was arrested on 3.10.2023 at 5:45 p.m. 
as per the arrest memo – Investigating Officer (IO) had a clear 
window till 5:44 p.m. on 4.10.2023 for producing the appellant 
before the Magistrate concerned and to seek his police custody 
remand, if required – The advocate of the appellant presented 
himself at the police station on 3.10.2023 after the appellant 
was arrested and his mobile number was available with the IO 
however, the appellant was presented before the Remand Judge 
at his residence sometime before 6:00 a.m. on 3.10.2023 – A 
remand Advocate was kept present in the Court purportedly to 
provide legal assistance to the appellant – This entire exercise 
was done in a clandestine manner and was a blatant attempt 
to circumvent the due process of law; to confine the accused 
to police custody without informing him the grounds on which 
he was arrested; deprive him of the opportunity to avail the 
services of the legal practitioner of his choice so as to oppose 
the prayer for police custody remand, seek bail and also to 
mislead the Court – The accused having engaged an Advocate 
to defend himself, there was no reason as to why, information 
about the proposed remand application was not sent in advance 
to his Advocate – The remand application was transmitted to
the advocate of the appellant after the remand was granted by 
the Remand Judge which was at 6:00 a.m. as per the remand 
order dtd. 4.10.2023 – The remand order recorded that the copy 
of the remand application was sent to the Advocate engaged 
by the appellant through WhatsApp – These lines give a clear 
indication of subsequent insertion – The order of remand had 
already been passed at 6:00 a.m. and hence, the subsequent 
opportunity of hearing, if any, provided to the counsel was 
nothing but an exercise in futility – The copy of the remand 
application in the purported exercise of communication of the 
grounds of arrest in writing was not provided to the appellant or 
his counsel before passing of the order of remand dtd. 4.10.2023 
which vitiated his arrest and subsequent remand – Arrest of 
the appellant followed by remand order dtd. 4.10.2023 and the 
impugned order passed by the High Court are invalid and are 
quashed and set aside – Appellant entitled to be released from 
custody by applying the ratio in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India 
and Others [2023] 12 SCR 714. [Paras 30, 33, 34, 36, 39, 50, 51]
668
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.43B(1) – 
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – s.19(1) – 
Constitution of India – Article 22(1) – Appellant placed 
reliance on the judgment in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India 
and Others [2023] 12 SCR 714 to contend that in the said 
case s.19(1) of PMLA which is pari materia to s.43B(1) of the 
UAPA was interpreted and it was held that if the initial arrest 
is not in conformity with law, mere passing of successive 
remand orders would not be sufficient to validate the same:
Held: There is no significant difference in the language employed 
in Section 19(1) of the PMLA and Section 43B(1) of the UAPA 
– The provision regarding the communication of the grounds 
of arrest to a person arrested contained in Section 43B(1) of 
the UAPA is verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) of the 
PMLA – The contention advanced by the respondent that there 
are some variations in the overall provisions contained in Section 
19 of the PMLA and Section 43A and 43B of the UAPA would not 
have any impact on the statutory mandate requiring the arresting 
officer to inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested 
under Section 43B(1) of the UAPA at the earliest because, the 
requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is the same 
in both the statutes – Both the provisions find their source in 
the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(1) of the 
Constitution – Hence,
applying the golden rules of interpretation, 
the provisions which lay down a very important constitutional 
safeguard to a person arrested on charges of committing an 
offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be 
uniformly construed and applied – The interpretation of statutory 
mandate laid down in Pankaj Bansal on the aspect of informing 
the arrested person the grounds of arrest in writing has to be 
applied pari passu to a person arrested in a case registered 
under the provisions of the UAPA. [Paras 17, 19]
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Constitution of 
India – Articles 20, 21 and 22 – Right to be informed about 
grounds of arrest in writing – Purpose:
Held: Any person arrested for allegation of commission of 
offences under the provisions of UAPA or for that matter any 
other offence(s) has a fundamental and a statutory right to 
be informed about the grounds of arrest in writing and a copy 
of such written grounds of arrest have to be furnished to the
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
669
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
arrested person as a matter of course and without exception at 
the earliest – The purpose of informing to the arrested person the 
grounds of arrest is salutary and sacrosanct inasmuch as, this 
information would be the only effective means for the arrested 
person to consult his Advocate; oppose the police custody remand 
and to seek bail – Any other interpretation would tantamount 
to diluting the sanctity of the fundamental right guaranteed u/
Article 22(1) – The Right to Life and Personal Liberty is the most 
sacrosanct fundamental right guaranteed u/Articles 20, 21 and 
22 – Any attempt to violate such fundamental right, guaranteed 
by Articles, 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, would 
have to be dealt with strictly – The right to be informed about 
the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution 
of India and any infringement of this fundamental right would 
vitiate the process of arrest and remand – Mere fact that a 
charge sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate 
the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time 
of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody 
remand to the accused – The plea of the respondent that there 
was no requirement under law to communicate the grounds of 
arrest in writing to the appellant is rejected. [Paras 20-22]
Criminal Law – Arrest memo – ‘reasons for arrest’ vis-à-vis 
‘grounds of arrest’ –
‘grounds of arrest’ cannot be equated 
with the ‘reasons of arrest’:
Held: There is a significant difference in the phrase ‘reasons 
for arrest’ and ‘grounds of arrest’ – The ‘reasons for arrest’ as 
indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal parameters, 
viz., to prevent the accused person from committing any further 
offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent the 
accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to 
disappear or tempering with such evidence in any manner; to 
prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat or 
promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so 
as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or 
to the Investigating Officer – These reasons would commonly 
apply to any person arrested on charge of a crime whereas the 
‘grounds of arrest’ would be required to contain all such details 
in hand of the Investigating Officer which necessitated the arrest 
of the accused – Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed 
in writing must convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on
670
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
which he was being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity 
of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail 
– Thus, the ‘grounds of arrest’ would invariably be personal to 
the accused and cannot be equated with the ‘reasons of arrest’ 
which are general in nature. [Para 49]
Constitution of India – Article 141 – Plea of the respondent 
that the judgment in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and 
Others [2023] 12 SCR 714 relied upon by the accused-
appellant would not apply to the proceedings of remand 
made on 4.10.2023 as the appellant was remanded to police 
custody on 4.10.2023 whereas the judgment in Pankaj Bansal 
was uploaded on the website of Supreme Court in the late 
hours of 4.10.2023 and hence, the arresting officer could not 
be expected to ensure compliance of the directions given 
therein and thus, the alleged inaction of the IO in furnishing 
the grounds of arrest in writing to the appellant cannot be 
called into question as the judgment in Pankaj Bansal was 
uploaded and brought in public domain after the remand 
order had been passed:
Held: Said plea is misconceived – Indisputably, the appellant was 
remanded to police custody on 4.10.2023 whereas the judgment 
in the case of Pankaj Bansal was delivered on 3.10.2023 – Merely 
on a conjectural submission regarding the late uploading of the 
judgment, the respondent cannot be permitted to argue that 
the ratio of Pankaj Bansal would not
apply to the present case 
– Once this Court has interpreted the provisions of the statute 
in context to the constitutional scheme and has laid down that 
the grounds of arrest have to be conveyed to the accused in 
writing expeditiously, the said ratio becomes the law of the land 
binding on all the Courts in the country by virtue of Article 141 
of the Constitution of India. [Para 45]
Constitution of India – Article 22(5), 22(1) – Respondent 
referring to language of Article 22(5) contended that even 
in a case of preventive detention, the Constitutional scheme 
does not require that the grounds on which the order of 
detention has been passed should be communicated to the 
detenue in writing:
Held: Said submission is ex facie untenable in eyes of law – It 
has been the consistent view of this Court that the grounds on
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
671
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
which the liberty of a citizen is curtailed, must be communicated 
in writing so as to enable him to seek remedial measures 
against the deprivation of liberty – The language used in Article 
22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the 
communication of the grounds is exactly the identical – Neither of 
the constitutional provisions require that the ‘grounds’ of “arrest” 
or “detention”, as the case may be, must be communicated 
in writing – Thus, interpretation to this important facet of the 
fundamental right as made by the Constitution Bench in Harikisan 
v. State of Maharashtra and Others [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 918 
while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of 
India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution 
of India insofar the requirement to communicate the grounds of 
arrest is concerned. [Paras 27-29]
Case Law Cited
Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra and Others [1962] 
Supp. 2 SCR 918 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117 – 
followed.
Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Others [2023] 12 
SCR 714 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244; Roy V.D. v. 
State of Kerala [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 539 : (2000) 8 SCC 
590; Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India and Ors. 
[1981] 2 SCR 352 : (1981) 2 SCC 427 – relied on.
Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement [2023] 
16 SCR 743 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1682 – referred to.
List of Acts
Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967;
Constitution of India; 
Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Remand application; Order of remand; Arrest memo; Grounds 
of arrest; Grounds of detention; Informing grounds of arrest in 
writing; Communication of grounds of arrest to person arrested; 
Police custody remand; Custodial remand; Right to be informed 
about grounds of arrest; ‘Reasons for arrest’; ‘Grounds of arrest’; 
Preventive detention; Order of detention; Order of detention 
communicated to detenue in writing; Custody or detention illegal; 
Right to Life and Personal Liberty; Fundamental right.
672
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2577 
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.10.2023 of the High Court 
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC No. 7278 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Kapil Sibal, Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Advs., Arshdeep Singh Khurana, 
Nitin Saluja, Harsh Srivastava, Harshit Mahalwal, Sidak Singh Anand, 
Manan Khanna, Nikhil Pawar, Ms. Saujanya Shankar, Ms. Rupali 
Samual, Ms. Pinky Dubey, Ms. Simran Khurana, Ms. Ishita Soni, Ms. 
Pranya Madan, Saahil Mongia, Advs. for the Appellant.
Suryaprakash V Raju, A.S.G., Zoheb Hussain, Mukesh Kumar 
Maroria, Annam Venkatesh, Kanu Agrawal, Arkaj Kumar, Advs. for 
the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Mehta, J.
1.	
Leave granted.
2.	
The instant appeal by special leave is preferred on behalf of the 
appellant for assailing the order dated 13th October, 2023 passed by 
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi whereby the learned 
Single Judge dismissed the Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 7278 
of 2023 filed by the appellant seeking the following directions: -
“A. Declare the arrest of the Petitioner as illegal and in 
gross violation of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner 
guaranteed under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of 
India in relation to FIR No. 224/2023 dated 17.08.2023 
PS Special Cell, Lodhi Road, Delhi Police;
B. Declare and set aside the Remand Order dated 
04.10.2023 passed by
the Ld. Special Judge, Patiala 
House Court as null and void as the same being passed in 
complete violation of all constitutional mandates including 
failure to consult and to be defended by legal practitioner 
of his choice during the Remand Proceedings, being
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
673
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
violative of Petitioner’s right guaranteed under Article 22 
of the Constitution of India.
C. Direct immediate release of the Petitioner from custody 
in FIR No. 224/2023 dated 17.08.2023 PS Special Cell, 
Lodhi Road, Delhi Police.”
Brief Facts: -
3.	
The officers of the PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi carried 
out extensive raids at the residential and official premises of the 
appellant and the company, namely, M/s. PPK Newsclick Studio 
Pvt. Ltd. (“said company”) of which the appellant is the Director 
in connection with FIR No. 224 of 2023 dated 17th August, 2023 
registered at PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi for the 
offences punishable under Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 22C of the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short “UAPA”) read 
with Section 153A, 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter 
being referred to as the ‘IPC’). During the course of the search 
and seizure proceedings, numerous documents and digital devices 
belonging to the appellant, the company and other employees of the 
company were seized. The appellant was arrested in connection with 
the said FIR on 3rd October, 2023 vide arrest memo (Annexure P-7) 
prepared at PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi.
4.	
It is relevant to mention here that the said arrest memo is in a 
computerised format and does not contain any column regarding 
the ‘grounds of arrest’ of the appellant. This very issue is
primarily 
the bone of contention between the parties to the appeal.
5.	
The appellant was presented in the Court of Learned Additional 
Sessions Judge-02, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi (hereinafter 
being referred to as the ‘Remand Judge’) on 4th October, 2023, 
sometime before 6:00 a.m. which fact is manifested from the remand 
order (Annexure P-1) placed on record of appeal with I.A. No. 217857 
of 2023. The appellant was remanded to seven days police custody 
vide order dated 4th October, 2023.
6.	
The proceedings of remand have been seriously criticized as being 
manipulated by Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the 
appellant and aspersions of subsequent insertions in the remand 
order have been made. Hence, it would be apposite to reproduce 
the remand order dated 4th October, 2023 in pictorial form so as to 
form a part of this judgment.

674
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
675
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
7.	
The appellant promptly questioned his arrest and the police custody 
remand granted by the learned Remand Judge vide order dated 
4th October, 2023 by preferring Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 
7278 of 2023 in the High Court of Delhi which stands rejected by 
the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi vide judgment 
dated 13th October, 2023. The said order is subjected to challenge 
in this appeal by special leave.
Submissions on behalf of the appellant: -
8.	
Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel representing the appellant 
canvassed the following submissions in order to question the 
proceedings of arrest and remand of the appellant: -
(i)	
That the FIR No. 224 of 2023 (FIR in connection of which 
appellant was arrested) is virtually nothing but a second FIR 
on same facts because prior thereto, another FIR No. 116 
of 2020 dated 26th August, 2020 had been registered by PS 
EOW, Delhi Police (“EOW FIR”) alleging violation of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) regulations and other laws of the 
country by the appellant and the company, thereby causing 
loss to the exchequer. A copy of the said FIR was, however, 
not provided to the appellant. By treating the EOW FIR as 
disclosing predicate offences, the Directorate of Enforcement 
(for short “ED”) registered an Enforcement Case Information 
Report (for short ‘ECIR’) for the offences punishable under 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 
2002 (for short ‘PMLA’). The ED carried out extensive search 
and seizure operations at various places including the office 
of the company-M/s. PPK Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd., of which 
the appellant is the Director.
(ii)	
The company assailed the ECIR by filing Writ Petition (Crl.) 
Nos. 1129 of 2021 and 1130 of 2021 wherein interim protection 
against coercive steps was granted by High Court of Delhi 
on 21st June, 2021. The appellant was also provided interim 
protection in an application seeking anticipatory bail vide order 
dated 7th July, 2021.
(iii)	 The FIR No. 224 of 2023 has been registered purely on 
conjectures and surmises without there being any substance 
in the allegations set out in the report. The contents of the FIR 
which were provided to the appellant at a much later stage
676
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
discloses a purely fictional story without any fundamental facts 
or material warranting registration of the FIR.
(iv)	 Admittedly, the copy of FIR No. 224 of 2023 was neither made 
available in the public domain nor a copy thereof supplied to 
the appellant until his arrest and remand which is in complete 
violation of the fundamental Right to Life and Personal Liberty 
enshrined in Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India.
(v)	
Shri Sibal pointed out that the learned Remand Judge, vide 
order dated 5th October, 2023, allowed the application filed by the 
appellant seeking certified copy of the said FIR which was provided 
to the learned counsel for the appellant in the late evening on 5th 
October, 2023, i.e., well after the appellant had been remanded 
to police custody.
(vi)	 That the grounds of arrest were not informed to the appellant either 
orally or in writing and that such action is in gross violation of the 
constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of 
India and Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
(hereinafter being referred to as the ‘CrPC’).
(vii)	 Reliance was placed by the learned senior counsel on the 
judgment of this Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India 
and Others1 and it was contended that the mere passing of 
successive remand orders would not be sufficient to validate 
the initial arrest, if such arrest was not in conformity with law. 
Learned senior
counsel urged that this Court in the case of 
Pankaj Bansal (supra) interpreted the provision of Section 
19(1) of PMLA which is pari materia to the provisions contained 
in Section 43B(1) of the UAPA. Thus, the said judgment fully 
applies to the case of the appellant.
(viii)	 Shri Sibal referred to the observations made in the judgment of 
Pankaj Bansal (supra) and urged that since the grounds of arrest 
were not furnished to the appellant at the time of his arrest and 
before remanding him to police custody, the continued custody 
of the appellant is rendered grossly illegal and a nullity in the 
eyes of law because the same is hit by the mandate of Article 
22(1) of the Constitution of India.
1	
[2023] 12 SCR 714 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
677
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
(ix)	 Shri Sibal further urged that the view taken by a two-Judge 
Bench of this Court in Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of 
Enforcement2 holding the judgment in Pankaj Bansal (supra) 
to be prospective in operation would also not come in the way 
of the appellant in seeking the relief. He pointed out that the 
judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) was pronounced 
on 3rd October, 2023 whereas the illegal remand order of the 
appellant was passed on 4th October, 2023 and hence, the law 
laid down in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) is fully applicable 
to the case of the appellant despite the interpretation given in 
Ram Kishor Arora (supra).
(x)	
That the arrest of the appellant is in gross violation of the 
provisions contained in Article 22 of the Constitution of India, 
hence, the appellant is entitled to seek a direction for quashment 
of the remand order and release from custody forthwith.
(xi)	 That the action of the Investigating Officer in arresting and in 
seeking remand of the appellant is not only mala fide but also 
fraught with fraud of the highest order. 
(xii)	 Referring to the remand order dated 4th October, 2023, it was 
contended that the appellant was kept confined overnight by 
the Investigating Officer without conveying the grounds of 
arrest to him. He was presented in the Court of the learned 
Remand Judge on 4th October, 2023 in the early morning without 
informing Shri
Arshdeep Khurana, the Advocate engaged on 
behalf of the appellant who was admittedly in contact with the 
Investigating Officer because he had attended the proceedings 
at the Police Station Lodhi Colony, post the appellant’s arrest. 
In order to clandestinely procure police custody remand of the 
appellant, the Investigating Officer, presented the appellant at 
the residence of learned Remand Judge before 6:00 a.m. by 
informing a remand Advocate Shri Umakant Kataria who had 
never been engaged by the appellant to plead his cause.
(xiii)	 Learned Remand Judge remanded the accused to police custody 
at 6:00 a.m. sharp as is evident from the remand order (supra). 
Shri Arshdeep Khurana, the appellant’s Advocate was informed 
2	
[2023] 16 SCR 743 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1682
678
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
about the order granting remand by a WhatsApp message at 
7:07 a.m. but the same was an exercise in futility because 
there was no possibility that the learned Advocate could have 
reached the residence of the learned Remand Judge in time 
to oppose the prayer for remand.
(xiv)	That, as a matter of fact, the remand application had already 
been accepted at 6:00 a.m. which fact is manifested from the 
time appended at the end of the remand order (supra). The 
learned Remand Judge signed the proceedings by recording 
the time as 6:00 a.m. Hence, there is no escape from the 
conclusion that the remand order was passed without supplying 
copy of the grounds of arrest to the appellant or the Advocate 
engaged by him. The appellant was intentionally deprived from 
information about the grounds of his arrest and thereby he and 
his Advocate were prevented from opposing the prayer of police 
custody remand and from seeking bail.
(xv)	 He further urged that the stand taken by the respondent that the 
grounds of arrest were conveyed to the learned counsel for the 
appellant well before the learned Remand Judge passed the 
remand order is unacceptable on the face of the record because 
the time of passing the remand order is clearly recorded in 
the order dated 4th October, 2023 as 6:00 a.m. Admittedly, the 
grounds of arrest were conveyed to Shri Arshdeep Khurana, 
Advocate for the appellant well after 7:00 a.m. It was contended 
that
the noting made by the learned Remand Judge in the 
order dated 4th October, 2023 that the learned counsel for 
the appellant was heard on the application for remand is a 
subsequent insertion clearly visible from the remand order. The 
fact of subsequent insertion of these lines is fortified from the 
fact that the appellant had already been remanded to police 
custody by the time the Advocate was informed and the copy 
of the remand application containing the purported grounds of 
arrest was transmitted to him.
(xvi)	That the foundational facts in the FIR No. 224 of 2023 are 
almost identical to the allegations set out in the EOW FIR. The 
appellant had been granted protection against arrest by the 
High Court of Delhi in the EOW FIR. Owing to this protection, 
the mala fide objective of the authorities in putting the appellant
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
679
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
behind bars was not being served and, therefore, a new FIR 
No. 224 of 2023 with totally cooked up allegations came to 
be registered and the appellant was illegally deprived of his 
liberty without the copy of the FIR been provided and without 
the grounds of arrest being conveyed to the appellant.
9.	
On these grounds, Shri Sibal implored the Court to accept the appeal, 
set aside the impugned orders and direct the release of the appellant 
from custody in connection with the above FIR.
Submission on behalf of the respondent: -
10.	 Per contra, Shri Suryaprakash V. Raju, learned ASG, appearing for 
the respondent vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions 
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and made the 
following pertinent submissions:-
(i)	
He urged that the judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal 
(supra) has been held to be prospective in operation by this 
Court in the case of Ram Kishor Arora (supra).
(ii)	
The appellant was remanded to police custody on 4th October, 
2023 whereas the judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal 
(supra) was uploaded on the website of this Court in the late 
hours of 4th October, 2023 and hence, the arresting officer could 
not be expected to ensure compliance of the directions given 
in the said judgment. He thus urged that the alleged inaction 
of the Investigating Officer in furnishing the grounds of arrest 
in writing to the appellant cannot be called
into question as the 
judgment in Pankaj Bansal (supra) was uploaded and brought 
in public domain after the remand order had been passed.
(iii)	 Without prejudice to the above, learned ASG urged that as per 
the appellant’s version set out in the pleadings filed before the 
High Court of Delhi, he was actually remanded to the police 
custody after 7:00 a.m. With reference to these pleadings, Shri 
Raju contended that the appellant cannot be heard to urge that 
he was remanded to the police custody in an illegal manner 
and without the grounds of arrest having been conveyed to 
him in writing.
(iv)	 Learned ASG referred to the provisions contained in Articles 
22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India and urged that
680
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
there is no such mandate in either of the provisions that the 
grounds of arrest or detention should be conveyed in writing to 
the accused or the detenue, as the case may be.
(v)	
He urged that the right conferred upon the appellant by Article 
22(1) of the Constitution of India to consult and to be defended 
by a legal practitioner was complied with in letter and spirit 
because the relative of the appellant, namely, Shri Rishabh 
Bailey, was informed before producing the appellant before the 
learned Remand Judge. Admittedly, Shri Rishabh Bailey had 
intimated the appellant’s Advocate, Shri Arshdeep Khurana 
regarding the proposed proceedings of police custody remand 
of the appellant. 
(vi)	 He urged that the Advocate transmitted a written objection 
against the prayer for police custody remand over WhatsApp 
through the Head Constable Rajendra Singh and the learned 
Remand Judge has taken note of the said objection opposing 
remand in the remand order dated 4th October, 2023 and thus 
it would be futile to argue that the order granting remand is 
illegal in any manner.
(vii)	 Learned ASG further contended that now the investigation has 
been completed and charge sheet has also already been filed 
and, thus, the illegality/irregularity, if any, in the arrest of the 
appellant and the grant of initial police custody remand stands 
cured and hence, the appellant cannot claim to be prejudiced 
by the same.
(viii)	 He
vehemently urged that there are significant differences in 
the language employed in Section 19 of the PMLA and Section 
43A and 43B of the UAPA and, thus, the law as laid down by 
this Court in Pankaj Bansal (supra) does not come to the aid 
of the appellant in laying challenge to the remand order.
(ix)	 Learned ASG further urged that there is a presumption regarding 
the correctness of acts performed in discharge of judicial 
functions and hence, the noting recorded in the remand order 
dated 4th October, 2023 that the Advocate for the appellant had 
been heard on the remand application and that the grounds of 
arrest had been conveyed to the appellant cannot be questioned 
or doubted. He thus implored the Court to dismiss the appeal 
and affirm the order passed by the High Court of Delhi.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
681
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
Rejoinder on behalf of learned counsel for the appellant: -
11.	 Shri Sibal, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the 
argument advanced by learned ASG that the provisions contained 
in Section 19 of the PMLA and Section 43A and 43B of the UAPA 
operate in different spheres, is misconceived. He urged that language 
of both the provisions is pari materia and hence, the law laid down 
in Pankaj Bansal (supra) fully covers the controversy at hand.
12.	 Shri Sibal emphasised that on a plain viewing of the order dated 
4th October, 2023, it is clear that the lines indicating the sending of 
the copy of the remand application to the learned counsel for the 
appellant and the opportunity of hearing provided to the Advocate 
through telephone call have been subsequently inserted in the order. 
He thus urged that the plea advanced by Shri Raju, learned ASG 
that there is a presumption regarding the correctness of judicial 
proceedings cannot be accepted as a gospel truth in the peculiar 
facts of the case at hand. He contended that applying the same 
principle to the remand order dated 4th October, 2023 is counter 
productive to the stand taken by learned ASG inasmuch as, the order 
records the time of passing as 6:00 a.m. whereas the Advocate was 
admittedly informed after 7:00 a.m. Thus, there was no possibility 
of the remand application being sent to the Advocate or he being 
heard before passing
of the remand order. He, thus, reiterated his 
submissions and sought acceptance of the appeal.
Discussion and conclusion: -
13.	 We have given our thoughtful considerations to the submissions 
advanced at bar and have gone through the material placed on record.
14.	 Since, learned ASG has advanced a fervent contention regarding 
application of ratio of Pankaj Bansal (supra) urging that there is an 
inherent difference between the provisions contained in Section 19 
of the PMLA and Section 43A and 43B of the UAPA, it would first 
be apposite for us to address the said submission. 
15.	 In the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra), this Court after an elaborate 
consideration of the provisions contained in PMLA, CrPC and the 
constitutional mandate as provided under Article 22 held as below: -
“32. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of 
the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no person 
who is arrested shall be detained in custody without
682
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds 
for such arrest. This being the fundamental right 
guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of 
conveying information of the grounds of arrest must 
necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the intended 
purpose. It may be noted that Section 45 of the Act of 
2002 enables the person arrested under Section 19 thereof 
to seek release on bail but it postulates that unless the 
twin conditions prescribed thereunder are satisfied, such 
a person would not be entitled to grant of bail. The twin 
conditions set out in the provision are that, firstly, the Court 
must be satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the public 
prosecutor to oppose the application for release, that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested 
person is not guilty of the offence and, secondly, that he 
is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. To meet 
this requirement, it would be essential for the arrested 
person to be aware of the grounds on which the authorized 
officer arrested him/her under Section 19 and the basis 
for the officer’s ‘reason to believe’ that he/she is guilty of 
an offence punishable under the Act of 2002. It is only if 
the arrested person has knowledge of these facts that he/
she would be in a position to plead and prove before the 
Special Court that there are grounds to believe that he/she 
is not guilty of such offence, so as to avail the relief of
bail. 
Therefore, communication of the grounds of arrest, 
as mandated by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and 
Section 19 of the Act of 2002, is meant to serve this 
higher purpose and must be given due importance.
36. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why 
a copy of such written grounds of arrest should not 
be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of 
course and without exception. There are two primary 
reasons as to why this would be the advisable course 
of action to be followed as a matter of principle. Firstly, 
in the event such grounds of arrest are orally read out 
to the arrested person or read by such person with 
nothing further and this fact is disputed in a given 
case, it may boil down to the word of the arrested
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
683
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
person against the word of the authorized officer as 
to whether or not there is due and proper compliance 
in this regard. In the case on hand, that is the situation 
insofar as Basant Bansal is concerned. Though the ED 
claims that witnesses were present and certified that the 
grounds of arrest were read out and explained to him in 
Hindi, that is neither here nor there as he did not sign 
the document. Non-compliance in this regard would entail 
release of the arrested person straightaway, as held in V. 
Senthil Balaji (supra). Such a precarious situation is easily 
avoided and the consequence thereof can be obviated 
very simply by furnishing the written grounds of arrest, 
as recorded by the authorized officer in terms of Section 
19(1) of the Act of 2002, to the arrested person under due 
acknowledgment, instead of leaving it to the debatable 
ipse dixit of the authorized officer.
37. The second reason as to why this would be the 
proper course to adopt is the constitutional objective 
underlying such information being given to the 
arrested person. Conveyance of this information is not 
only to apprise the arrested person of why he/she is 
being arrested but also to enable such person to seek 
legal counsel and, thereafter, present a case before the 
Court under Section 45 to seek release on bail, if he/
she so chooses. In this regard, the grounds of arrest in 
V. Senthil Balaji (supra) are placed on
record and we find 
that the same run into as many as six pages. The grounds 
of arrest recorded in the case on hand in relation to Pankaj 
Bansal and Basant Bansal have not been produced before 
this Court, but it was contended that they were produced 
at the time of remand. However, as already noted earlier, 
this did not serve the intended purpose. Further, in the 
event their grounds of arrest were equally voluminous, it 
would be well-nigh impossible for either Pankaj Bansal or 
Basant Bansal to record and remember all that they had 
read or heard being read out for future recall so as to avail 
legal remedies. More so, as a person who has just been 
arrested would not be in a calm and collected frame of 
mind and may be utterly incapable of remembering the
684
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
contents of the grounds of arrest read by or read out to 
him/her. The very purpose of this constitutional and 
statutory protection would be rendered nugatory by 
permitting the authorities concerned to merely read out 
or permit reading of the grounds of arrest, irrespective 
of their length and detail, and claim due compliance 
with the constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) 
and the statutory mandate under Section 19(1) of the 
Act of 2002.
38. We may also note that the grounds of arrest recorded 
by the authorized officer, in terms of Section 19(1) of the Act 
of 2002, would be personal to the person who is arrested 
and there should, ordinarily, be no risk of sensitive material 
being divulged therefrom, compromising the sanctity and 
integrity of the investigation. In the event any such sensitive 
material finds mention in such grounds of arrest recorded 
by the authorized officer, it would always be open to him to 
redact such sensitive portions in the document and furnish 
the edited copy of the grounds of arrest to the arrested 
person, so as to safeguard the sanctity of the investigation.
39. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and 
purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate 
of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002 of informing the 
arrested person of the grounds of arrest, we hold that 
it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such 
written grounds of arrest is furnished to the
arrested 
person as a matter of course and without exception. 
The decisions of the Delhi High Court in Moin Akhtar 
Qureshi (supra) and the Bombay High Court in Chhagan 
Chandrakant Bhujbal (supra), which hold to the contrary, 
do not lay down the correct law. In the case on hand, 
the admitted position is that the ED’s Investigating 
Officer merely read out or permitted reading of the 
grounds of arrest of the appellants and left it at that, 
which is also disputed by the appellants. As this form 
of communication is not found to be adequate to fulfil 
compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the 
Constitution and Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, we 
have no hesitation in holding that their arrest was
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
685
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
not in keeping with the provisions of Section 19(1) 
of the Act of 2002. Further, as already noted supra, the 
clandestine conduct of the ED in proceeding against the 
appellants, by recording the second ECIR immediately after 
they secured interim protection in relation to the first ECIR, 
does not commend acceptance as it reeks of arbitrary 
exercise of power. In effect, the arrest of the appellants 
and, in consequence, their remand to the custody of the ED 
and, thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be sustained.”
(emphasis supplied)
16.	 Section 19 of the PMLA and Sections 43A, 43B and 43C of the 
UAPA are reproduced hereunder for the sake of ready reference: - 
Section 19 of the PMLA
“19. Power to arrest.—(1) If the Director, Deputy Director, 
Assistant Director or any other officer authorised in this 
behalf by the Central Government by general or special 
order, has on the basis of material in his possession, 
reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded 
in writing) that any person has been guilty of an offence 
punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and 
shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for 
such arrest. 
(2) The Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or 
any other officer shall, immediately after arrest of such 
person under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order 
along with the material in his possession, referred to in 
that
sub-section, to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed 
envelope, in the manner, as may be prescribed and such 
Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order and material 
for such period, as may be prescribed. 
(3) Every person arrested under sub-section (1) shall, 
within twenty-four hours, be taken to a [Special Court or] 
Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the 
case may be, having jurisdiction: 
Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude 
the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest 
to the [Special Court or] Magistrate’s Court.”
686
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Sections 43A, 43B and 43C of the UAPA 
“43A. Power to arrest, search, etc.—Any officer of the 
Designated Authority empowered in this behalf, by general 
or special order of the Central Government or the State 
Government, as the case may be, knowing of a design 
to commit any offence under this Act or has reason to 
believe from personal knowledge or information given 
by any person and taken in writing that any person has 
committed an offence punishable under this Act or from 
any document, article or any other thing which may furnish 
evidence of the commission of such offence or from any 
illegally acquired property or any document or other 
article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally 
acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or 
forfeiture under this Chapter is kept or concealed in any 
building, conveyance or place, may authorise any officer 
subordinate to him to arrest such a person or search such 
building, conveyance or place whether by day or by night 
or himself arrest such a person or search a such building, 
conveyance or place. 
43B. Procedure of arrest, seizure, etc.—(1) Any officer 
arresting a person under section 43A shall, as soon as 
may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. 
(2) Every person arrested and article seized under section 
43A shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay to the 
officer-in-charge of the nearest police station. 
(3) The authority or
officer to whom any person or article is 
forwarded under sub-section (2) shall, with all convenient 
dispatch, take such measures as may be necessary in 
accordance with the provisions of the Code. 
43C. Application of provisions of Code. —The provisions 
of the Code shall apply, insofar as they are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Act, to all arrests, searches and 
seizures made under this Act.”
17.	 Upon a careful perusal of the statutory provisions (reproduced 
supra), we find that there is no significant difference in the language 
employed in Section 19(1) of the PMLA and Section 43B(1) of the
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
687
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
UAPA which can persuade us to take a view that the interpretation of 
the phrase ‘inform him of the grounds for such arrest’ made by this 
Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) should not be applied 
to an accused arrested under the provisions of the UAPA. 
18.	 We find that the provision regarding the communication of the 
grounds of arrest to a person arrested contained in Section 43B(1) 
of the UAPA is verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) of the 
PMLA. The contention advanced by learned ASG that there are 
some variations in the overall provisions contained in Section 19 of 
the PMLA and Section 43A and 43B of the UAPA would not have 
any impact on the statutory mandate requiring the arresting officer 
to inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested under Section 
43B(1) of the UAPA at the earliest because as stated above, the 
requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is the same 
in both the statutes. As a matter of fact, both the provisions find 
their source in the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 
22(1) of the Constitution of India. Hence, applying the golden rules 
of interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very important 
constitutional safeguard to a person arrested on charges of committing 
an offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be 
uniformly construed and applied. 
19.	 We may note that the modified application of Section 167 CrPC
is 
also common to both the statutes. Thus, we have no hesitation in 
holding that the interpretation of statutory mandate laid down by 
this Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) on the aspect of 
informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest in writing has 
to be applied pari passu to a person arrested in a case registered 
under the provisions of the UAPA.
20.	 Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of the Court that any person 
arrested for allegation of commission of offences under the provisions 
of UAPA or for that matter any other offence(s) has a fundamental 
and a statutory right to be informed about the grounds of arrest 
in writing and a copy of such written grounds of arrest have to be 
furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without 
exception at the earliest. The purpose of informing to the arrested 
person the grounds of arrest is salutary and sacrosanct inasmuch as, 
this information would be the only effective means for the arrested 
person to consult his Advocate; oppose the police custody remand
688
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
and to seek bail. Any other interpretation would tantamount to diluting 
the sanctity of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1) 
of the Constitution of India.
21.	 The Right to Life and Personal Liberty is the most sacrosanct 
fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the 
Constitution of India. Any attempt to encroach upon this fundamental 
right has been frowned upon by this Court in a catena of decisions. 
In this regard, we may refer to following observations made by this 
Court in the case of Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala3:- 
“7. The life and liberty of an individual is so sacrosanct that 
it cannot be allowed to be interfered with except under the 
authority of law. It is a principle which has been recognised 
and applied in all civilised countries. In our Constitution 
Article 21 guarantees protection of life and personal liberty 
not only to citizens of India but also to aliens.”
Thus, any attempt to violate such fundamental right, guaranteed by 
Articles, 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, would have to 
be dealt with strictly.
22.	 The right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows from 
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and any infringement of this 
fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. 
Mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter, would 
not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the 
time
of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody 
remand to the accused.
23.	 Learned ASG referred to the language of Article 22(5) of the 
Constitution of India and urged that even in a case of preventive 
detention, the Constitutional scheme does not require that the 
grounds on which the order of detention has been passed should 
be communicated to the detenue in writing. Ex facie, we are not 
impressed with the said submission.
24.	 The contention advanced by learned ASG based on the language 
of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India persuaded us to delve 
deeper on the issue as to whether it is mandatory to communicate 
3	
[2000] Supp. 4 SCR 539 : (2000) 8 SCC 590
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
689
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
the grounds of arrest or detention in writing to the accused or the 
detenue, as the case may be, even though the constitutional mandate 
under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India does not 
explicitly require that the grounds should be communicated in writing.
25.	 A Constitution Bench of this Court examined in detail the scheme of 
Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India in the case of Harikisan v. 
State of Maharashtra and Others4 and held that the communication 
of the grounds of detention to the detenue in writing and in a language 
which he understands is imperative and essential to provide an 
opportunity to detenue of making an effective representation against 
the detention and in case, such communication is not made, the 
order of detention would stand vitiated as the guarantee under 
Article 22(5) of the Constitution was violated. The relevant para is 
extracted hereinbelow:
“ 7. ….. clause (5) of Article 22 requires that the grounds 
of his detention should be made available to the detenue 
as soon as may be, and that the earliest opportunity of 
making a representation against the Order should also be 
afforded to him. In order that the detenue should have 
that opportunity, it is not sufficient that he has been 
physically delivered the means of knowledge with 
which to make his representation. In order that the 
detenue should be in a position effectively to make 
his
representation against the Order, he should have 
knowledge of the grounds of detention, which are in the 
nature of the charge against him setting out the kinds 
of prejudicial acts which the authorities attribute to 
him. Communication, in this context, must, therefore, 
mean imparting to the detenue sufficient knowledge 
of all the grounds on which the Order of Detention is 
based. In this case the grounds are several, and are 
based on numerous speeches said to have been made 
by the appellant himself on different occasions and 
different dates. Naturally, therefore, any oral translation 
or explanation given by the police officer serving those 
on the detenue would not amount to communication, in 
4	
[1962] Supp. 2 SCR 918 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117
690
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
this context, must mean bringing home to the detenue 
effective knowledge of the facts and circumstances 
on which the Order of Detention is based.
(emphasis supplied)
26.	 Further, this Court in the case of Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union 
of India and Ors.5, laid down that the grounds of detention must 
be communicated to the detenue in writing in a language which 
he understands and if the grounds are only verbally explained, the 
constitutional mandate of Article 22(5) is infringed. The relevant para 
is extracted hereunder: -
“20. …. “Communicate” is a strong word. It means that 
sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the 
“grounds” should be imparted effectively and fully to the 
detenu in writing in a language which he understands. 
The whole purpose of communicating the “ground” to the 
detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective 
representation. If the “grounds” are only verbally 
explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left 
with him, in a language which he understands, then 
that purpose is not served, and the constitutional 
mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed…..”
(emphasis supplied)
27.	 From a holistic reading of various judgments pertaining to the law 
of preventive detention including the Constitution Bench decision of 
this Court in Harikisan (supra), wherein, the provisions of Article 
22(5) of the Constitution of India have been interpreted, we find that 
it has
been the consistent view of this Court that the grounds on 
which the liberty of a citizen is curtailed, must be communicated in 
writing so as to enable him to seek remedial measures against the 
deprivation of liberty.
28.	 Thus, there is no hesitation in the mind of this Court that the 
submission of learned ASG that in a case of preventive detention, 
the grounds of detention need not be provided to a detenue in writing 
is ex facie untenable in eyes of law. 
5	
[1981] 2 SCR 352 : (1981) 2 SCC 427
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
691
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
29.	 The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution 
of India regarding the communication of the grounds is exactly the 
identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the 
‘grounds’ of “arrest” or “detention”, as the case may be, must be 
communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet 
of the fundamental right as made by the Constitution Bench while 
examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would 
ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar 
the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned.
30.	 Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to 
communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in 
writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person 
placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) 
and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be 
breached under any situation. Non-compliance of this constitutional 
requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the 
detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be.
31.	 Furthermore, the provisions of Article 22(1) have already been 
interpreted by this Court in Pankaj Bansal (supra) laying down 
beyond the pale of doubt that the grounds of arrest must be 
communicated in writing to the person arrested of an offence at 
the
earliest. Hence, the fervent plea of learned ASG that there was 
no requirement under law to communicate the grounds of arrest in 
writing to the accused appellant is noted to be rejected.
32.	 Now, coming to the facts of the case at hand. Indisputably, FIR No. 
224 of 2023 came to be registered on 17th August, 2023. Copy of 
the FIR was never brought in public domain as the same was not 
uploaded on the website by the Investigating Agency. Admittedly, 
the copy of the FIR was not provided to the appellant despite an 
application having been made in this regard on his behalf till after 
the order of police custody remand was passed by the learned 
Remand Judge.
33.	 The copy of the FIR was provided to Shri Arshdeep Khurana, 
learned Advocate representing the accused for the first time on 5th 
October, 2023 and hence, till the time of being deprived of liberty, 
no communication had been made to the appellant regarding the 
grounds on which he had been arrested.
692
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
34.	 The accused was arrested on 3rd October, 2023 at 5:45 p.m. as per 
the arrest memo (Annexure P-7). As per Section 43C of the UAPA, 
the provisions of CrPC shall apply to all arrests, search and seizures 
made under the UAPA insofar as they are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Act. As per Section 57 CrPC read with Section 
167(1) CrPC, the appellant was required to be produced before the 
concerned Magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest. The 
Investigating Officer, therefore, had a clear window till 5:44 p.m. on 
4th October, 2023 for producing the appellant before the Magistrate 
concerned and to seek his police custody remand, if so required. 
There is no dispute that Shri Arshdeep Khurana, learned Advocate, 
engaged on behalf of the appellant had presented himself at the 
police station on 3rd October, 2023 after the appellant was arrested 
and the mobile number of the Advocate was available with the 
Investigating Officer. Inspite thereof, the appellant was presented 
before the learned Remand Judge at his residence sometime before 
6:00 a.m. on 4th October, 2023. A remand Advocate, namely, Shri 
Umakant Kataria was kept present in the Court purportedly to provide 
legal assistance to the appellant as required under Article 22(1) of 
the Constitution of India. Apparently, this entire exercise was done 
in a clandestine manner and was nothing but a blatant attempt to 
circumvent the due process
of law; to confine the accused to police 
custody without informing him the grounds on which he has been 
arrested; deprive the accused of the opportunity to avail the services 
of the legal practitioner of his choice so as to oppose the prayer 
for police custody remand, seek bail and also to mislead the Court. 
The accused having engaged an Advocate to defend himself, there 
was no rhyme or reason as to why, information about the proposed 
remand application was not sent in advance to the Advocate engaged 
by the appellant.
35.	 It is apparent that the appellant had objected to the appearance of 
the remand counsel before the learned Remand Judge and this is 
the reason, the Investigating Officer undertook a charade of informing 
of the Advocate engaged by the appellant on mobile. The learned 
Remand Judge recorded the presence of Shri Arshdeep Khurana, 
Advocate, mentioning that he had been informed and heard on the 
remand application through telephone call. The initial information 
about the accused appellant being presented before the learned 
Remand Judge was sent by the arresting officer to the appellant’s
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
693
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
relative Shri Rishab Bailey at around 6:46 a.m. and he, in turn, 
informed the Advocate Shri Arshdeep Khurana around 7:00 a.m. 
These facts are manifested from perusal of the call logs presented 
for the perusal of the Court. Thus, by the time, the Advocate engaged 
by the accused appellant had been informed, the order of remand 
had already been passed. Unquestionably, till that time, the grounds 
of arrest had not been conveyed to the appellant in writing.
36.	 The learned ASG had argued that the grounds of arrest were 
set out in the remand application which was transmitted through 
WhatsApp to Advocate Shri Arshdeep Khurana. However, the fact 
remains that the remand application was transmitted to the Advocate 
Shri Arshdeep Khurana after the remand had been granted by the 
learned Remand Judge which was at 6:00 a.m. as per the recording 
made in the remand order (reproduced supra). The contention of the 
learned ASG that there is variance in time of passing of the remand 
order as per the pleadings made on behalf of the accused appellant 
before the High Court of Delhi does not impress us in view of the 
time recorded in the remand order.
37.	 Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi held at para No. 
31 of the impugned order that the respondent had taken a categoric 
stand that the grounds of arrest were informed to the appellant orally 
and the same were also conveyed in writing as per the details
set out 
in the memo of arrest. However, learned ASG fairly did not advance 
any such argument based on the arrest memo.
38.	 The interpretation given by the learned Single Judge that the grounds 
of arrest were conveyed to the accused in writing vide the arrest 
memo is unacceptable on the face of the record because the arrest 
memo does not indicate the grounds of arrest being incorporated in 
the said document. Column No. 9 of the arrest memo (Annexure P-7) 
which is being reproduced hereinbelow simply sets out the ‘reasons 
for arrest’ which are formal in nature and can be generally attributed 
to any person arrested on accusation of an offence whereas the 
‘grounds of arrest’ would be personal in nature and specific to the 
person arrested.
“9. Reason for arrest
a.	
Prevent accused person from committing any further 
offence.
694
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
b.	
For proper investigation of the offence.
c.	
To prevent the accused person from causing the 
evidence of the offence to disappear or tempering 
with such evidence in any manner.
d.	
To prevent such person from making any inducement 
threat or promise to any person acquainted the facts 
of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing 
such facts to the Court or to the Police officer.
e.	
As unless such person is arrested, his presence in 
the Court whenever required cannot be ensured.”
39.	 The remand order dated 4th October, 2023(reproduced supra) records 
that the copy of the remand application had been sent to the learned 
Advocate engaged by the accused appellant through shriApp. A bare 
perusal of the remand order is enough to satisfy us that these two 
lines were subsequently inserted in the order because the script in 
which these two lines were written is much finer as compared to 
the remaining part of the order and moreover, these two lines give 
a clear indication of subsequent insertion. It is quite possible that 
the learned Remand Judge may have heard the learned counsel for 
the appellant after signing the remand order and thus, these lines 
were inserted later without intending any harm or malintention but 
the fact remains that the order of remand had already been passed 
at 6:00 a.m. and hence, the subsequent opportunity of hearing, if 
any, provided to the counsel was nothing but an exercise in
futility. 
40.	 Learned ASG had argued that the copy of the remand application 
forwarded over WhatsApp to the learned counsel for the accused 
appellant gives a complete picture about the grounds of arrest. We 
feel that any comment on the contents of the remand application and 
whether the same actually conveyed intelligible grounds of arrest 
to the accused or whether the same are so vague that it would be 
impossible to understand, may prejudice the trial of the case.
41.	 We may, however, briefly mention that the grounds of arrest as 
conveyed to the Advocate are more or less a narration of facts 
picked up from the FIR which in itself does not indicate any particular 
incident or event which gave rise to the alleged offences. However, 
the law is well settled that the FIR is not an encyclopaedia and is 
registered just to set the process of criminal justice in motion. The
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
695
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
Investigating Officer has the power to investigate the matter and 
collect all relevant material which would form the basis of filing of 
charge sheet in the Court concerned.
42.	 Extensive arguments were advanced by Shri Sibal, with reference to 
the stipulations made in Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 22C of the UAPA 
in order to contend that even if the FIR and the grounds set out 
in the remand application are taken to be true on the face of the 
record, apparently, the same convey just a fictional web spun around 
conjectures and surmises. It was contended that though a reference 
is made in the FIR that the appellant and one Neville Roy Singham, 
a foreign national were found to be discussing how to create a 
map of India without Kashmir and to show Arunachal Pradesh as a 
disputed area but the fact remains that no such map was prepared 
or published or was found in possession of the appellant or on his 
devices till the date of his arrest. 
43.	 Shri Sibal had also argued that the appellant was arrested without 
any indication as to how he was connected with the alleged incorrect 
map of India. He also urged that the FIR refers to farmers’ agitation 
without justifying as to how the appellant was connected with those 
incidents. He contended that not a single incident is mentioned in 
the FIR or the remand application which can give rise to the offences 
alleged and that the FIR was registered without any
plausible reason 
or basis just to victimise the appellant.
44.	 We do not feel persuaded to examine these aspects at this stage 
because the same would require entering into the merits of the case. 
This would be within the domain of the Court examining the matter 
after the filing of the charge sheet. The core issue in this appeal is 
regarding the illegality of the process whereby the appellant was 
arrested and remanded to police custody which does not require 
examining the merits of the case. 
45.	 It was the fervent contention of learned ASG that in the case of Ram 
Kishor Arora (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court interpreted 
the judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) to be having 
a prospective effect and thus the ratio of Pankaj Bansal (supra) 
cannot come to the appellant’s aid. Indisputably, the appellant herein 
was remanded to police custody on 4th October, 2023 whereas the 
judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) was delivered on 
3rd October, 2023. Merely on a conjectural submission regarding the
696
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
late uploading of the judgment, learned ASG cannot be permitted 
to argue that the ratio of Pankaj Bansal (supra) would not apply 
to the present case. Hence, the plea of Shri Raju, learned ASG 
that the judgment in Pankaj Bansal (supra) would not apply to the 
proceedings of remand made on 4th October, 2023 is misconceived.
46.	 We are of the firm opinion that once this Court has interpreted the 
provisions of the statute in context to the constitutional scheme and 
has laid down that the grounds of arrest have to be conveyed to the 
accused in writing expeditiously, the said ratio becomes the law of 
the land binding on all the Courts in the country by virtue of Article 
141 of the Constitution of India.
47.	 Now, coming to the aspect as to whether the grounds of arrest were 
actually conveyed to the appellant in writing before he was remanded 
to the custody of the Investigating Officer.
48.	 We have carefully perused the arrest memo (Annexure P-7) and find 
that the same nowhere conveys the grounds on which the accused 
was being arrested. The arrest memo is simply a proforma indicating 
the formal ‘reasons’ for which the accused was being arrested.
49.	 It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a significant 
difference in the phrase ‘reasons for arrest’ and ‘grounds of arrest’. The 
‘reasons for arrest’ as indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal 
parameters, viz., to prevent the accused person
from committing any 
further offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent 
the accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to 
disappear or tempering with such evidence in any manner; to prevent 
the arrested person for making inducement, threat or promise to any 
person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him 
from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the Investigating Officer. 
These reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on 
charge of a crime whereas the ‘grounds of arrest’ would be required 
to contain all such details in hand of the Investigating Officer which 
necessitated the arrest of the accused. Simultaneously, the grounds 
of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested accused 
all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him 
an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to 
seek bail. Thus, the ‘grounds of arrest’ would invariably be personal 
to the accused and cannot be equated with the ‘reasons of arrest’ 
which are general in nature.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
697
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
50.	 From the detailed analysis made above, there is no hesitation in 
the mind of the Court to reach to a conclusion that the copy of the 
remand application in the purported exercise of communication of 
the grounds of arrest in writing was not provided to the accused 
appellant or his counsel before passing of the order of remand dated 
4th October, 2023 which vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand 
of the appellant.
51.	 As a result, the appellant is entitled to a direction for release from 
custody by applying the ratio of the judgment rendered by this Court 
in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra).
52.	 Accordingly, the arrest of the appellant followed by remand order 
dated 4th October, 2023 and so also the impugned order passed by 
the High Court of Delhi dated 13th October, 2023 are hereby declared 
to be invalid in the eyes of law and are quashed and set aside. 
53.	 Though we would have been persuaded to direct the release of the 
appellant without requiring him to furnish bonds or security but since 
the charge sheet has been filed, we feel it appropriate to direct that 
the appellant shall be released from custody on furnishing bail and 
bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court.
54.	 We make it abundantly clear that none of the observations made 
above shall be treated as a comment on the merits of the case.
55.	 The appeal is allowed in these terms.
56.	 Pending application(s), if any, shall
stand disposed of.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
Result of the case: 
Appeal allowed.