BIRBAL CHOUDHARY@ MUKHIYA JEE versus STATE OF BIHAR
[2017] 13 S.C.R. 48, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
[2017) 13 S.C.R. 48 
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY@ MUKHIYA JEE 
v. 
STATE OF BIHAR 
(Criminal Appeal No. 701 of2012) 
OCTOBER 06, 2017 
(A. K. SIKRI AND R. K. AGRAWAL, JJ.] 
Pena.I code. 1860: 
ss. 364Al34, 395 and 412 - Prosecution under - Of 
appellants-accused - Conviction by trial court based on the 
testimonies of witnesses, Tl Parade and recoveries from the accused 
- Two appellants-accused in view of their criminal antecedents 
sentenced to deqth and remaining appellants-accused sentenced to 
life imprisonment - High Court confirmed the conviction - However. 
death sentence as well as life sentence were reduced to 20 years RI 
- On appeal,hel/:/: Prosecution has duly proved its case against the 
appel/ants-accu$ed - Conviction and sentence justified. 
ss. 364A and 368 - Offence under - Nature of - Held: s. 368 
puts the offence prescribed therein at par with s. 364A by raising a 
statutory presuff/ption based on a legal fiction of the former being 
a deemed offence under the latter. if evidence be there. 
Sentence/Sentencing: 
Life sentence - Life sentence means imprisonment of full life 
and not sentence for 14 years. 
F 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
s. 401 - Notice under - Requirement of - Before enhancing 
the sentence - Held: Modification of life sentence to 20 years 
imprisonment dbes not require notice under s. 401 - Modification 
of life sentence to 20 years imprisonment is in fact reduction of 
G sentence and not enhancement as life sentence means
sentence for 
full life. 
H 
s. 464 - E.ffect of omission to frame, irregularity in the charge 
or misjoinder of the charges - Held: No sentence by a court of 
competent jurisdiction would be deemed invalid on the ground that 
48
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
49 
no charge was framed or any irregularity in the charge or misjoinder 
A 
of the charges, unless the court comes to the conclusion that a failure 
of justice had occasioned thereby. 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 Involvement of A-13 in the abduction and 
confinement of the victims stands fully established. Evidence B 
against him is that the victims found that A-13 was referred to by 
others as Mukhiya Jee. Other evidence which is produced is his 
identification by PW-17 and that the abductees were kept, for 
few days, in his house. PW-17, though did not participate in TIP 
but in the Court, he made a categorical statement that though c 
other accused persons were present in the Court he did not find 
A-13 in the Court. This shows that PW-17 could identify him and 
when he found that he was not present in the Court on that day, 
he specifically stated to this effect. PW-17 again when appeared 
in the Court, duly identified A-13 and mentioned that he was kept 
in the house of A-13 who was Mukhiya of Ganj Bharsara. Taking D 
note of this, the High Court has made categorical remarks that 
A-13 neither disputed the said identification nor put any question 
in cross-examination on this aspect. PW-18 had identified A-13 
in TIP, but in the Court, he did not identify him. Much credence 
cannot be given to the conduct of PW-18 refusing to identify E 
A-13 in the Court, in view of the fact that PW-18 had turned
hostile. 
During TIP, he had identified A-13 and this TIP was conducted in 
the presence of Metropolitan Magistrate (PW-9) who categorically 
deposed to the aforesaid effect. That apart, sufficient evidence 
is produced in the form of statement of PW-17 (who is held to be 
trust-worthy by both the courts below) that he was kept in the 
house of A-13. (Paras 26-29] (67-F-H; 68-A-B, E; 70-A] 
1.2 So far as demand for ransom is concerned, on the very 
first day, when informant submitted his written report on the basis 
of which FIR was registered, he had categorically mentioned that 
F 
he was convinced that the abduction was for ransom. Another G 
aspect is that out of three persons abducted, the Driver (PW-18) 
was released on the very next day whereas others were kept in 
the captivity for 52 days. It has also come on record that 
Exhibit-8 (the letter written by PW-17 during confinement signed 
H
50 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 13 S.C.R. 
by PW-20) is also asking PW-5 to pay the ransom amount and 
secure their release. The demand for ransom stands established 
from the col)versation between PW-5, when two of the accused 
identified themselves calling from a mobile phone number, sent 
to establish contact with the abductors and made the demand for 
a ransom of Rs. 50 lakhs and further stated that they were sending 
the ring of PW-17 and a letter from them (Exhibit-8) in proof of 
their confin~ment to claim ransom. Exhibit-8 stated that PW-5 
should at the earliest arrange to have them released. The mobile 
forensic evill.encc brought on record during investigation by 
necessary r~ports from the telephone authorities in the manner 
provided for in Section 63(b) of the Evidence Act, 1872, clearly 
proves that a demand for ransom was in fact made. Even 
otherwise, i~ is not the defence of the. appellants that there existed 
any enmity between the victims and the appellants for false 
implication. An act of abduction in the present manner is the 
result of meticulous planning of the logistics with separate roles 
assigned to the individual players. The demand for ransom, 
therefore, clearly stands established. That it was actually paid or 
not, is irrelevant. The demand for ransom has been duly proved 
by the prosecution. [Paras 30, 31 and 35] [70-B-C, E-H; 71-A-B; 
72-A] 
Malle~hi v. State of Karnataka (2004) 8 SCC 95 : 
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 441 -
relied on. 
l.3 R¢-examination of PW-1 to PW-6 after consolidation of 
chargesheet was taken in the interest of the appellant. Appellant 
was not named in the first chargcsheet and at the time when PW-
1 to PW-6 were examined in the first chargesheet, obviously, the 
appellant "1as not present. It is for this reason that these witnesses 
were examined again and the appellant was given full opportunity 
to cross-examine them. No prejudice is caused to the appellant 
by referring to the deposition of these witnesses when examined 
G in the first instance inasmuch as their deposition on both the 
occasions have remained the same. [Para 37] [72-G; 73-A] 
H 
1.4 The trial court had sentenced the appellant for life for 
conviction under Sections 364A/34 IPC. Imprisonment for life 
would mean full life and not sentence of 14 years which may be 
grossly disproportionate or inadequate and cannot be called as
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY@ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
51 
sentence of life. The High Court while modifying the sentence A 
qua the appellant A-13, in fact, reduced the same from life 
imprisonment to 20 years RI. Therefore, the question of giving 
any notice under Section 401 Cr.P.C. did not arise. [Para 36) [72-
B-D) 
Swamy Shraddananda (2) @ Murali Manohar Mishra 
B 
v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 : [2008) 11 
SCR 93 - relied on. 
Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2016) 9 
SCC 541 : [2016) 8 SCR 872 - distinguished. 
Muthuramalingam & Ors. v. State represented by 
Inspector of Police (2016) 8 SCC 313 : [2016) 5 SCR 
30 - followed. 
c 
2. A-6 has also been convicted under Section 364A read 
with Section 34 IPC as well as Section 395 IPC. PW-17 has 
specifically identified A-6 in the TIP. The High Court has D 
considered this TIP to be without blemish. Section 395 IPC 
pertains to punishment for dacoity. This provision was invoked 
as the abductors who were more than five in numbers had robbed 
the abductees of the money in their possession. This itself is 
sufficient to confirm the abduction of PWs-17, 18 and 20. It is 
also important that 
PW-19, who was Investigating Officer (IO) 
in this case, has narrated in detail the manner in which he 
conducted the investigation which shows that it is during the 
course of investigation, names of accused persons kept surfacing 
and investigation proceeded accordingly. Insofar as deposition 
of PW-18 is concerned, he
had turned hostile fearing his own 
safety. Though PW-18 had deposed to the contrary to what 
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded, within three 
days of his deposition in the court, he mustered courage when he 
was assured of his safety and filed a fresh application and identified 
the accused persons. [Paras 39, 40 and 41) [73-C, E; 74-D-F) 
Suman Sood @ Kawaljeet Kaur v. State of Rajasthan 
AIR 2007 SC 2774 : [2007) 6 SCR 499 ; Mahabir v. 
State of Delhi AIR 2008 SC 2343 : (2008) 6 SCR 361 
- relied on. 
E 
F 
G 
H
52 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017) 13 S.C.R. 
A 
Motila/ ¥adav v. State of Bihar (2015) 2 SCC 647 ; 
Ronny alias Ronald James Alwaris & Ors. v. State of 
Maharashtra (1998) 3 SCC 625 : (1998] 2 SCR 162 ; 
Suresh Chandra Bahri & Ors. v. State of Bihar 
(1995) t Suppl. sec. 80 : [1994] t Suppl. SCR 483 -
B 
referred to. 
3. Plea was taken that A-14, A-10, A-ll and A-12 were not 
named by eith~r PW-17 or PW-18 or PW-20 and in their cases, no 
TIP was conducted and they were not identified in the Court as 
well by the witnesses. The only allegation against them was that 
they had fed the victim at the time of arrest. These persons are 
C 
convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC. It was sought to argue 
that aid of Section 34 was wrongly taken in the instant case. It 
would depend on the facts of each case as to whether Section 34 
or Section 149 of IPC or both the provi,sions are attracted. Non-
applicability of Section 149 11,'C is no bar in convicting the accused 
D persons unden Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 of IPC, if 
the evidence discloses commission of offence in furtherance of 
common intention of them all. The courts below have rightly 
concluded tha~ there was a common intention in commi.tting the 
offence of kidnapping for ransom, by all the convicted persons. 
E 
Qua A-14, it was additionally submitted that PW-17 did not identify 
any particulan house. However, it has come on record th.at one of 
the accused in his confessional statement had stated that
victims 
were kept in their house which is given credence by the High 
Court for the reason that it is corroborated by evidence of PW-
17 who had identified the house of A-14. Therefore, the argument 
F 
that no particular house was identified is not correct. [Paras 45, 
46, 47, 49 an<j 50] (76-F-G; 77-A; 78-A; 80-A-D) 
Mohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 
174 : [1962) Suppl. SCR 848 ; Chittarmal & Anr. v. 
State of Rajasthan (2003) 2 SCC 266 : [ 2003] 1 SCR 
G 
49 - referred to. 
H 
4. Allegation against A-9 is that he was part of the team 
which had kidnapped the victims. He was identified in TIP as 
well as in Court. His only contention was that there was no reason 
to convict hi111 under Section 364A IPC and his conviction should
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
53 
have been under Section 364 IPC as after kidnapping, no role is 
A 
assigned to him and, therefore, the allegations of ransom cannot 
be attributed to him. Once role of A-9 in kidnapping the three 
persons stands established beyond any doubt and it also stands 
established that kidnapping was for the ransom which was 
actually demanded and there was a common intention behind the B 
aforesaid acts, A-9 is rightly convicted under Section 364A 
IPC. [Paras 52 and 53] [80-F-G] 
5. A-1 is also one of those who was a part of team which 
abducted PWs-17, 18 and 20. Qua him, the High Court, rightly 
had held that the identification and involvements of the appellant 
in the abduction and confinement clearly stands proved. The C 
recovery of the items by the Police on information furnished to it 
during investigation, identified in the T.I.P. was evidence 
admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. [Para 54] 
[81-A; 83-A] 
6.1 A-8 is convicted under Section 364A/34 IPC and was D 
acquitted of the charge under Section 412 IPC. As regards the 
plea that his name was not mentioned in the chargesheet, the IO 
(PW-19) has explained in detail that during the course of 
investigation, names of these accused persons kept surfacing 
and investigation has been proceeded accordingly. It is, for this 
reason, that second chargesheet was filed implicating other 
persons including A-8. Such plea was not advanced in the High 
CouFt. Insofar
as absence of charge under Section 364A against 
him is concerned, that may not make the things better for this 
appellant in view of the fact that he was specifically charged under 
Section 368 IPC. This provision makes it clear that even a 
person who wrongfully conceals or confines a kidnapped person 
knowing that he has been kidnapped, suffers the same 
consequences at par with the person who had kidnapped or 
abducted the person with the same intention or knowledge or for 
E 
F 
the same purpose. In the statement of accusations under G 
Section 313 Cr.P.C., it was categorically put to him that 
allegation against him was of having kept the kidnapped persons 
in confinement knowing that they had been kidnapped. Thus, 
specific case set up by the prosecution against A-8 was that he 
had kept the victims in confinement with the knowledge that they 
H
54 
SUPRJEME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
were kidnapped. Thus, ingredient of Section 368 IPC has been 
established against him. 
Once that has been proved, 
consequences 11f Section 364A IPC, for which other co-accused 
persons were found convicted, shall stand attracted. Section 368 
IPC puts the offence prescribed therein at par with Section 364A 
B 
by raising a statutory presumption based on a legal fiction of the 
former being a deemed offence under the latter, if evidence be 
there. [Paras 56, 57, 58 and 591 (83-C-E, G-H; 84-A-B) 
Suman Sood @ Kawaljeet Kaur v. State of Rajasthan 
AIR 2007 SC 2774 : (20071 6 SCR 499 - relied on. 
c 
6.2 Section 464 of the Cr.P.C. provides that no sentence by 
a Court of competent jurisdiction would be deemed invalid on 
the ground th11t no charge was framed or any irregularity in the 
charge or misjoinder of the charges, unless the Court comes to 
the conclusion that a failure of justice had occasioned thereby. 
In the present case, no such prejudice has been caused to A-8 
D who knew th\! ingredients of charge that were levelled against 
him. [Para 60) (84-EI 
E 
F 
G 
H 
7. There is also no error in the judgment of the Courts 
below convicting the appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos. 703-704 
of 2012. [Para 62) [84-GJ 
Case Law Reference 
(20161 8 SCR 872 
distinguished 
Para 23 
[20041 4 SuPJ>I. SCR 441 
relied on 
Para 33 
(20081 11 SCR 93 
relied on 
Para 36 
[20161 5 SCl.t 30 
followed 
Para 36 
[20071 6 SCl.t 499 
relied
on 
Para 41 
120081 6 sen. 361 
relied on 
Para 42 
(2015) 2 sec 647 
referred to 
Para 43 
[19981 2 SCR 162 
referred to 
Para43 
(19941 1 Suppl. SCR 483 
referred to 
Para 43 
(1962) Suppl, SCR 848 
referred to 
Para 47 
[20031 1 SC~ 49 
referred to 
Para 48
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
55 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
A 
No. 701 of2012. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.03.2010 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 648 of 2008 
WITH 
Criminal Appeal Nos. 702, 705-706, 708, 707 and 703-704 of2012 
B 
AND 
Criminal Appeal No.1858 of2013. 
R. Basant, S. B. Upadhyay, Sr. Advs, Abbay Kumar, Himanshu, 
Vineet Kr. Singh, Bilal Khan, Santosh Mishra, Sujit Kumar Singh, Param c 
Kumar Mishra, Ms. Anisha Upadhyay, Nishant Kumar, Ms. Sharmila 
Upadhyay, Abhijat P. Medh, Nakul Dewan, C. George Thomas, 
Ms. Tanya Shree, Zain Maqbool, Ejaz Maqbool, Kumar Rajesh Singh, 
Ms. Punam Singh, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Gaurav Agrawal, Abhikalp 
Pratap Singh, T. Mahi pal, Advs.for the Appellants. 
D 
Ratnakar Dash, Sr. Adv., Akhilesh Kumar Pandey, Gopal Singh, 
Kumar Milind,.Abhinav Mukherji, Siddharth Garg, Ms. Bihu Sharma, 
Ms. Purnima Krishna, Advs. for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
A.K. SIKRI, J. l. The eleven appellants herein, out of the fifteen 
E 
persons who faced trial, are variously convicted under the provisions of 
the Indian Penal Code (!PC) for committing offences punishable under 
Sections 364A, 34, 395 and412 of the !PC, hereby call into question the 
confirmation of their conviction by the High Court by the common 
impugned judgment and order dated March 30, 2010, which was rendered 
·in a batch of appeals. Ensuing from their
conviction on the above-
F 
mentioned charges, the appellants and others similarly situated have been 
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for 20 years. 
2. The Sessions Court, finding them guilty of aforesaid offences, 
had sentenced two appellants, Krishna Bihari Singh @ Krishna Singh 
and Jawahar Koiry @ Jawahar Singh @ Neta Jee, to suffer death 
G 
penalty. However, the sentence has been truncated by the High Court 
on appeal/reference, awarding them the punishment of imprisonment 
for 20 years. The High Court, having opined that the actions of all the 
appellants were driven by common intention, the conviction of life 
imprisonment of the other remaining appellants is also fixed at 20 years. 
H
56 
A 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 13 S.C.R. 
3. The case pertains to the abduction of Ajay Shanker Mishra 
(PW-17), Martoj Singh (PW-18) and Raju Mishra (PW-20) which the 
prosecution claims, was committed for extracting ransom. The written 
report of Arnn Kumar Mishra (the informant, examined as PW-5 during 
trial) and subsequent FIR divulge that the victim PW-17 and the informant 
(PW-5) were doing the business together, wherein PW-17 was mainly 
responsible f<~r collecting money dues from their business associates. 
On November 20, 2006, PW-17 along with informant's cousin PW-20 
and the driver PW-18, left Buxar in a White Maruti Gypsy bearing No. 
BR IP 2619, with the purpose of collecting the dues. Having collected a 
total of Rs. 4 lakhs from their business associates i.e. Sanjay Jaiswal 
C 
(PW-!), Rajesh Kumar Jaiswal (PW-2), Sandeep Kumar Jaiswal (PW-
3), Parwez Hassan Ansari (PW-4) and others, they were proceeding to 
head back. While they telephonically informed twice, last being at 4:30 
PM, they did not return home and the next day was spent searching for 
the missing victims. The records further disclose that around 6 pm on 
D 
the next day, the said white Gypsy escorted by a motorcycle and a silver 
Bolero was seen going towards Jamauli on the Rampur Jamauli Canal 
road. Additionally, it was also recorded that on the same day i.e November 
21, 2006, at &round 8:45 pm, the driver PW-18 contacted the informant 
PW-5 from Sonbarsa informing him that seven
unknown persons had 
abducted the victims Ajay Shanker Mishra and Raju Mishra, at gunpoint, 
E 
the previous evening at around 5 pm by overtaking the vehicle with two 
motorcycles and the driver PW-18 was left at Sonbarsa by the abductors. 
It was further mentioned in the FIR that the abductors had committed 
the said crime for the purpose of extracting ransom. 
F 
4. Aft'r the investigation, a chargesheet under Section 173 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) was filed before the ChiefJudicial 
Magistrate, )3uxar, alleging the commission of offences, inter alia by 
the appellants herein under Sections 364A, 395, 412 and 120B of the 
!PC. The prosecution led 22 witnesses as part ofits evidence to establish 
its case. As per the statement put forth by the informant PW-5, the day 
following the release of the Driver PW-18, they went to the place of 
G 
occurrence mid confinement with the police. A mobile sim card belonging 
to PW-5's servant Rinku was sent to the abductors for establishing 
contact and through which the demand for Rs. 50 lakhs was made. On 
demanding lhe proof whether the victims were alive, the accused persons 
informed him that they were sending the victim's watch and ring and 
H 
further permitted the victim Ajay Shanker Mishra to speak on the mobile.
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
57 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
It was also stated that the accused persons disclosed their names as 
A 
Jawahar Koiry and Suresh Koiry. PWs-17 and 20 were released from 
the captivity after 52 days on January 11, 2007 even though the driver, 
PW-18 was released on the day following the abduction. It is further 
revealed that upon the release of the victims, the police took them to the 
place where they had been kept during the abduction for identification 
B 
and _the Police subsequently drew up a location map based on their 
information. 
5. The trial court vide its order convicted all the accused 
(appellants) persons under Sections 364A/34, 395 and412 IPC. However, 
the appellants were acquitted of the charge framed under Section 120B 
C 
IPC. The Court convicted the appellants based on the testimonies of the 
22 witnesses led by the prosecution, the Test Identification Parade (TIP) 
charts wherein the victims identified the appellants, the recovery of 
Rs.1,50,000/- from the Almirah kept in the house of accused Krishna 
Singh which was not challenged by the said accused having also failed 
to establish how it came to be in his possession. On the other hand, the 
D 
prosecution clearly proved that the victims had realized due amounts 
from their business associates which was taken away by the accused 
persons at the time of their kidnapping out of which two bundles ofnotes 
were handed over to one "Babusaheb" who had a rifle with
him and 
was driving the silver Bolero. The victim identified "Babusaheb", as 
Krishna Singh, the accused- appellant. Additionally, the demand for 
E 
ransom was proved by the evidence of the informant (PW-5) along with 
the victim's (PW-17) letter, the seizure list as well as the TIP Chart. 
F 
6. Although, four accused persons, namely, Lal Mohar Singh, 
Prabhawati Devi, Rajbahadur Singh@Chunnu Singh and Krishna Singh 
were charged for the offence under Section 412 of the IPC due to the 
recovery of Rs. 1,50,000/- from the Almirah of the house of Krishna 
Singh, the trial court held that the prosecution had failed to prove and 
establish the fact that these four accused persons had knowledge or 
reason to believe that the recovered money from the Almirah was the 
looted money. In such a circumstance, the court further held that the 
G 
offence under Section 412 IPC is proved against the appellant Krishna 
Singh only. The prosecution, however, established that 12 accused persons 
including appellants Krishna Singh, Birbal Choudhary, Shyam Bihari 
Paswan, Angad Koiry, Jawahar Koiry, Ramashraya Koiry and other 
accused persons, namely, Rambriksha Koiry, Hridayanand Koiry, 
H
SUPRIEME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
Mangala Singh, Ramdarash Koiry, Saroj Singh and Harbanse Ram, 
kidnapped and ll:ept the victims in their custody as well as tortured the 
victims to pay a ransom in furtherance of their common intention. This 
led the court to l\old that the offence under Section 364/34 of the !PC is 
well proved and established against the 12 persons. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
7. Appelhmt Jawahar Koiry was charged for the offence under 
Section 412 of the !PC as well. The trial court took into account the 
allegation made against him on the reasoning that the golden ring of the 
victim Ajay Shanker Mishra which was taken by the accused person in 
the course of t~e kidnapping was recovered from his possession. In 
such circumstances, the allegation was held proved and established by 
the evidence of the witnesses, the seizure list as well as the TIP Chart. 
The court furti)er held that out of 11 accused persons including the 
appellants, originally charged under Section 397 !PC for committing the 
dacoity of cash of about Rs.4 lakhs with one White Maruti Gypsy bearing 
registration no BR 1 P 2619 from the possession of the victims stood 
established ag11inst the accused appellants having been well proven by 
the prosecution. The court absolved other accused persons including the 
appellant Ramashraya Koiry of the charge under Section 395 of the 
!PC holding that the prosecution had failed to establish and proved its 
case against the remaining accused.
However, it went on to hold that in 
the given circumstances, the offence under Section 395 !PC was well 
proved and established against the remaining appellants. The court further 
absolved the aqcused persons including the appellants of the charge for 
the offence under Section l 20B of the !PC with the findings that even 
though it came in the evidence of PW-19, the Investigating Officer in 
the case, that ~he accused persons had planned to kidnap the victims, 
this fact was not proved and established by the evidence led by any of 
the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution having failed to prove any 
prior agreeme11t of the accused person to kidnap the victim, the court 
held that the offence under Section I 20B stood devoid of any proof. 
8. The t~ial court keeping in mind the criminal antecedents of the 
G 
appellants Krishna Singh and Jawahar Koiry, considered it justified to 
sentence them'to death holding that the punishment oflife imprisonment 
would be inadequate for the offence under Section 364A/34 !PC 
committed by them. However, noting that the remaining accused did not 
have any criminal history, the court sentenced them to undergo 
imprisonmentlfor life forthe offence punishable under Section 364A/34 
H 
IPC. The appellants were further sentenced to undergo Rigorous
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
59 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
Imprisonment (RI) for 10 years for the offence under Section 395 IPC 
A 
and since the accused appellants Krishna Singh and Jawahar Koiry were 
already sentenced for the offence under Section 395 of the IPC, the 
court found it fit not to pass any separate sentence against them for the 
offence under Section 412 of the IPC. 
9. Before the High Court, the common submission on behalf of B 
the prosecution was that the sentence of death was to commensurate 
with the offence and in the interest of the society warranting no 
interference. It was also submitted that even if the court were not to 
uphold the death sentence of the appellant, surely the same was not a fit 
case for the sentence of life imprisonment commonly understood for a 
term of 14 years. 
c 
10. The High Court in its impugned judgrnent opined that the 
abduction of the victims by certain unknown persons stood fully 
established. The first description of the alleged abductors figured in the 
deposition ofPW-17. Photographically reliving the abduction, he recounted 
that the person sitting pillion on one of the motorcycles was referred to 
as 'Neta Jee' by his accomplices. The pillion rider on the second 
motorcycle had a mole on his left cheek. Both these persons pull out 
PW-17 and PW-18 respectively from the Gypsy. The latter snatched the 
money bag. Another person who got down from the Bolero, pulled out 
PW-20 and pushed him into the
Bolero, had a rifle in his hand. He 
further described that one of them was of stout built with a receding hair 
line with strands of white hair and was wearing Kurta Pajama. The 
person possessed with the rifle was of fair complexion and average 
height referred to as 'Babu Saheb' by his accomplices. PW-17 further 
stated that the accomplice referred to as 'Verma Jee' took out two packets 
of the money wrapped in newspaper bundles from the bag and handed it 
over to the person driving the Bolero addressed as 'Babu Saheb' and 
told him to return, which he did, along with the Gypsy driven by another. 
The abductor identified as 'Neta Jee' while travelling in the Bolero when 
the mobile phone of PW-17 rang, as PW-5 had called, the said abductor 
stated that he was the father of all and disconnected the number. 
11. The High Court has also held that the abductees having 
remained closeted with the abductors for approximately five hours in 
the vehicle the victims had ample opportunity to identify the features 
D 
E 
F 
G 
and faces of the accused persons. This, the court added, was a perfectly 
natural conduct and lent great credibility to their evidence and 
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60 
SUPlllEME COURT lllEPORTS 
[2017] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
identification. The trauma and agony of the victims surely led to the 
identification $1ld features of the abductors being etched in the minds of 
the victims in the form of an imprint when they stated they could clearly 
identify them., The court further held that driver (PW-18), who was 
released on the day following the abduction near Sonbarsa Petrol pump 
B 
as an affirming witness, fully corroborated PW-17 in material particulars 
for the mode, the manner and stay in confinement at Village Simri on the 
first night. On, his release, he stated to have gone along with the Police 
and showed them the place of abduction and the place where he was 
kept in confinement and was finally released. This found corroboration 
in the evidence of PW-8, the first Investigating Officer. PW-17 had given 
C 
a graphic des~ription of the places where he and PW-20 were kept 
during their confinement for approximately 52 days including identifying 
landmarks cci>rroborated and confirmed by PW-19 during police 
investigation. 
12. Tht High Court further discussed the demand for ransom 
D 
made on the basis of Exhibit 8 which is the letter written by PW-17 
during confinement and signed by PW-20 askingPW-5 to pay the ransom 
amount and ~ecure their release. The demand for ransom also stood 
established from the conversation between PW-5 when the accused 
appellants Jawahar Koiry and Suresh Koiry identified themselves calling 
from the phone
number 9430029994 which was sent to establish contact 
E 
with the abd~ctors. The demand for ransom of Rs. 50 lakhs was made 
and they further stated that they were sending the ring of PW-17 and a 
letter (Exhibit 8) from them as proof of their confinement to claim ransom. 
The mobile forensic evidence, which was brought on record during the 
investigation, also showed that a call was made which proves that a 
F 
demand for ransom was in fact made. The court further pointed out that 
the act of ab<!uction as was carried out in the present case was a result 
of meticulous planning of the logistics with separate roles assigned to 
the individu~l players. Once the demand for ransom stood established, 
whether it was actually paid for or not, was irrelevant. 
G 
13. The High court in its decision regarding the sentence awarded 
H 
· to each of the accused appellants, discussed the insertion of Section 
364A which was a result of the changing scenario of crime in the country. 
The court pointed out the smooth and flawless nature of the crime, which 
leads to the conclusion that the accused persons were not novices. With 
the sole lust ci>f gaining quick access to money, the accused persons who
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY@ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
61 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
were otherwise not paupers or beggars committed a crime that was an 
A 
organised criminal antisocial activity, where such people could not be 
held amenable to reaffirmation as they constitute a danger to society. To 
be able to cope with the changing times, the law needs to evolve and 
with this intention, the court discussed the provision oflife imprisonment 
for this crime. The section provides for the said punishment for threat to 
B 
cause hurt and apprehension of hurt from real hurt. Holding that the 
said section should be read in isolation without being confined to Section 
319, justice would prevail if RI of 20 years was awarded to all the accused 
appellants. Regarding the two accused appellants i.e. Krishna Singh and 
Jawahar Koiry, who were awarded the death sentence, the court reasoned 
that the only justification provided for the enhanced sentence for these 
C 
two appellants was due to their criminal antecedents, for no evidence 
transpired with regard to any act on part of the two appellants ofhaving 
threatened to cause death or hurt to the victims or conduct of a nature 
giving rise to reasonable apprehension in the mind of the victims of death 
or hurt much less having caused death or hurt. Holding that there was 
D 
no justification to distinguish their case from that of the other appellants 
for award of a different sentence, and holding that classification could 
not be done based
solely on criminal antecedents, the High Court 
sentenced them along with the other appellants to 20 years of RI. 
14. For the sake of clarity, we may sum up the position regarding 
the outcome of trial by the Court of Sessions as well as that of the High 
E 
Court: 
Two chargesheets were filed pertaining to the episode in question, 
which have been narrated in brief above, whereby three persons (PW-
F 
17, PW-18 and PW-20) were kidnapped. Both the cases were 
amalgamated in which trial took place against 15 persons. The trial 
court acquitted three persons, namely, Prabhawati Devi (A-2), Lal Mohar 
Singh (A-3) and Rajbahadur Singh @ Chunnu Singh (A-4) of all the 
charges. Remaining 12 persons were acquitted of charge of conspiracy 
levelled under Section 120-B ofIPC. However, for various other charges, 
they were convicted and given different sentences which were to run 
G 
concurrently. Krishna Singh (A-1) and Jawahar Koiry (A-5) were given 
death sentence for commission of offences under Sections 364A/34 and 
Section 395 IPC. In appeal, the High Court has maintained the conviction 
of these accused persons as recorded by the trial court. However, death 
sentence of A-I and A-5 is commuted and is substituted by RI of 20 
H
62 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017) 13 S.C.R. 
A 
years. In the cases of other convicts also, life sentence is modified to 20 
years R1. Thi~ position is reflected hereunder in a tabular form: 
Accused 
Name 
Charged 
Conviction 
Conviction 
Conviction 
by 
Trial & 
by 
High; 
Court 
Sentence 
Court 
by 
Trial 
B 
. 
. .. 
Court 
l 
Krishna 
364A/34, 
364N34, 
Death & 10 
Not 
Bihari 
l20B, 
395,412 
1
, years Rl 
confinned. 
~h @ 395, 
Raised to 20 
shna 
. 412/34 
years R1 
Sinoh 
2 
Pn1bhawati 
412/34 
Acquitted 
x 
x 
DF!Vi 
3 
Lal Mohar 412/34 
AcquittOO ,x 
x 
: 
.~i.ngh 
' 
- ....... .... 
------·· 
-- ·-
. . 
c 
4 
Rajbahadur 412/34 
Acquitted 
:X 
x 
Si.gh 
@ 
Ctiunnu 
I 
Singh 
5 
Jawahar 
364A/34, 
364N34, 
: Death & 10 'Not 
' 
' 
Kniry 
@ l20B, 
395, 412 
I years RI 
confinned. 
Jawahar 
395, 412 
Raised to 20 
i 
Singh 
@ 
I years RI 
D 
Neta Jee 
s:am 
____ ,_ 
364A/34, 
364N34, 
Life & l 0 ] 20 years 
I 
6 
B' ari 
l20B, 395 
395 
yeara RI 
Paswan 
I 
7 
Rambriksh 
364N34, 
364N34 
Life 
20 years 
E 
a Koirv 
l20B, 395 
8 
Harbanse 
368,412 
364N34 
Life 
20 years 
Ram 
364A.;34, 
.. -·- -
: 
9 
Angad 
364N34, 
Life & 10 20 years 
-~f!Zyanan_'._~~~il:,S.-
395 
. yeara RI 
I 
---- .. 
-- -· 
lO 
364N34 
: Life 
20 years 
dKoirv 
l20B 395 
F 
ll 
Man gala 
'364A/34, 
364A/34 
i Life 
! 20 years 
' 
Sinuh 
l20B, 395 
I 
12 
Saroj Singh 364N34, 
364A/34 
; Life 
: 20 years 
l20B, 395 
13 
Birbal 
364N34, 
364A/34, I Life & 10 20 years 
Choudhary 
l20B, 395 
395 
;
yeara 
@ 
I 
Mlikhiya 
G 
Jee 
-------·--------1··-· 
- ----- ------- · Rimiisllray 
364A.i34, 
14 
364A/34 
I Life 
20 years 
a j(oiiy 
l20B, 395 
' 
--- -I -- --- ... 
15 
Ramdaiash 
364N34, 
364N34 
I Life 
20 years 
Koi'"'' 
120B 395 
; 
H
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
63 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
15. Out of the aforesaid 12 persons whose conviction is maintained 
A 
by the High Court, 11 persons have approached this Court. Ramdarash 
Koiry (A-15) has not challenged the verdict of the High Court. Particulars 
of the criminal appeals of these 11 convicted persons are the following: 
1·1 ... [ cril1liill11AjlpealNo.101/2012 ........ r 8irbi.1 C:liouCihary·········· 
I 
I 
I, 2 
:, Criminal AppealNo. 702/2012 
I Shyam Bihari Paswan 
r 3 I 
Criminal AppealNo-:-7o3:7o4/26 iz 
rJawaharkoiry - - -
~ 4 
: Criminal Appeal No. 705/2012 
: RamashrayaKoiry 
! · 5 · · · ·\· e:r;ffi iillii.:Aiiii eai-N 0: 7o6izo i2 ------· ---j (i) · -R.~ffitiriliS ha K:oiry 
: 
' 
I 
I 
1 (ii) Hirdayanand Koiry 
: (iii) Mangala Singh 
! (iv) Saroj Singh 
i 6 
i Criminal Appeal No. 707/2012 
I Krishna Bihari Singh 
I-
I 
' 
: 1·-rc:r1;n;ru,_rA.weafN'o.7os72M2-----r·/\fi!iil<fK.0liy ________ ------
: 
i 
I i Harbanse Ram 
16. Mr. Basant, learned senior counsel argued Criminal Appeal 
B 
c 
D 
No. 701 of2012,Mr. Upadhyay, learned senior counsel argued Criminal 
Appeal Nos. 702 of2012, 705 of2012, 706 of2012 and 708 of2012 
E 
whereas Ms. Niranjana Singh and Mr. T. Mahipal, advocates argued 
Criminal Appeal Nos. 707 of2012 and 1858 of20!3. Mr. Gopal Singh, 
advocate appearing for the State responded to the arguments advanced 
by the counsel for the various appellants. Mr. R. Dash, learned senior 
counsel, who appeared on behalf
of the informant, supported the case of F 
the prosecution. 
17. As pointed out above, though charge of conspiracy under 
Section 120-B IPC was also framed against these appellants, the-Court 
of Sessions acquitted them of this charge. Thus, conspiracy has not 
been established. However, common intention behind the aforesaid 
G 
criminal acts in held proved. In this background, we proceed to examine 
the plea of defence put up by each of the appellant, to find out as to 
whether their conviction is appropriate or not. 
18. Mr. Basant arguing for the appellant Birbal Choudhary (A-
13) made his submission on three fronts, namely: 
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64 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017) 13 S.C.R. 
A 
(i) There is no legal evidence to implicateA-13. 
B 
(ii) Allegations and charge under Section 364AoflPC was utterly 
baseless. 
(iii) Enha11.cement of sentence to 20 years RI was legally 
impermissible. 
19. On the first aspect, Mr. Basant submitted that the allegations 
pertained to abduction of three persons who had deposed in the Court as 
PWs-17, 18 and 20 but none of them had identifiedA-13 in the Court. 
Not only this, PW-17 and PW-20 did not identify him even earlier and 
did not participate in the TIP. As far as PW-18 is concerned, though he 
C 
was taken to TIP dn December 11, 2006, he identified some other person 
as 'Mukhiya Jee'. His submission was that Birbal Choudhary was 
implicated only on the basis of statement of these kidnapped persons 
that when they were detained in captivity, after kidnapping, one person 
was addressed as; 'Mukhiya' and A-13 is known as 'Mukhiya'. Apart 
D 
from that, there was not even iota of evidence against his client and 
even PW-18 identified somebody else as 'Mukhiya' in TIP held on 
December 11, 2006 and this piece of evidence could not be used against 
Birbal Choudharr- Referring to another TIP which was conducted on 
December 14, 2006, Mr. Basant submitted that though in the said TIP, 
he identified Birbal Choudhary, but in the Court he did not identify him. 
E 
Further, no recoveries were made fromA-13. On the aforesaid basis, 
his submission was that there was no legal
evidence to implicate this 
appellant. 
20. Another submission of Mr. Basant in this context was that 
before the two chllrgesheets were consolidated, in the first chargesheet, 
F 
13 persons were committed to trial on April 16, 2007 and other iwo 
persons from the second chargesheet were committed to trial on 
September 15, 2007. However, before September 15, 2007, six witnesses, 
namely, PW-I to PW-6 had already been examined in the trial pertaining 
to first chargesheet. After the two chargesheets were consolidated, 
G 
PW-I to PW-6 were examined again. However, deposition of these 
witnesses when examined again was used against the appellant Birbal 
Choudhary as well by the trial court in its judgment which has prejudiced 
the case ofBirbal Choudhary. 
21. Mr. B._sant also found fault with the reasoning of the High 
H 
Court wherein A-13 is covered by the TIP, by inference.
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
22. Adverting to the argument predicated on Section 364A IPC, 
submission ofMr. Basant was that ingredients of this Section could not 
be established during the trial inasmuch as there was no demand for 
ransom as neither PW-5 nor PW-17 deposed to this effect. For this 
purpose, he read out the accusations made in the FIR which, according 
to him, did not contain any reference to either 'Mukhiya Jee' or 'ransom'. 
Only a belief was expressed to that effect which could not take the 
place of evidence, submitted the learned senior counsel. He also read 
out relevant portions of depositions of PW-18, PW-9 (Metropolitan 
Magistrate who conducted TIP) and PW-20 who did not support the 
prosecution case. He further submitted that though it is alleged by the 
prosecution that the kidnapped persons were kept in the house of A-13, 
there was no reliable evidence to this effect inasmuch as no Mahazir of 
the house was prepared and no evidence was led to the effect that 
where the kidnapped persons were kept, that house belongs to A-13. In 
65 
A 
B 
c 
this behalf, he also laboured to submit that the witnesses, particularly, 
PW-8, PW-18 and PW-19 had given varying versions. He, thus, argued D 
that no demand for ransom was proved. 
23. Insofar as purported enhancement of sentence is concerned, 
the learned senior counsel referred to the provisions of Section 386 as 
well as Section 401 of Cr.P.C. and submitted that,
before enhancing the 
sentence, a notice is required to be given which was not done in this 
case and, therefore, the order of modifying the sentence thereby giving 
RI of20 years was not in accordance with law. For this submission, he 
rested his case on the judgment of this Court in Vikas Yadav v. State of 
Uttar Pradesh &' Ors. 1 wherein it is held as under: 
"39. To elaborate, though the power exercised under Article 71 
andArticle 161 of the Constitution is amenable to judicial review 
in a limited sense, yet the Court cannot exercise such power. As 
far as the statutory power under Section 43 3-A Cr PC is concerned, 
it can be curtailed when the Court is of the considered opinion 
that the fact situation deserves a sentence of incarceration which 
be for a fixed term so that power of remission is not exercised. 
There are many an authority to support that there is imposition of 
fixed term sentence to curtail the power of remission and scuttle 
the application for consideration of remission by the convict. It is 
because in a particular fact situation, it becomes a penological 
1(2016) 9 sec 541 
E 
F 
G 
H
66 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
SUPR,EME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 13 S.C.R. 
necessity' which is permissible within the concept of maximum 
and the minimum. There is no dispute over the maximum, that is, 
death sentence. However, as far as minimum is concerned the 
submissi~n of the learned counsel for the appellants is that courts 
can say "imprisonment for life" and nothing else. It cannot be 
kept in such a straitjacket formula. The court, as in the case at 
hand, when dealing with an appeal for enhancement of sentence 
from imprisonment of life to death, can definitely say that the 
convict shall suffer actual incarceration for a specific period. It is 
within tile domain of judiciary and such an interpretation is 
permissible. Be it noted, the Court cannot grant a lesser punishment 
than the minimum but can impose a punishment which is lesser 
than the maximum. It is within the domain of sentencing and 
constitutipnallypermissible." 
24. Mr. Gppal Singh, learned counsel appearing for the State argued, 
per contra, that there was sufficient evidence to implicate and convict 
A-13 which was duly taken note of by the trial court as well as by the 
High Court. He1referred to those portions of the judgments of the Courts 
below wherein involvement·ofA-13 as well as the evidence which was 
produced to substantiate the allegations against him has been discussed. 
He also submitted that there was sufficient evidence to prove the 
accusation of demanding ransom by the accused persons
includingA-13 
on the basis of which charge under Section 364A !PC was duly proved. 
Insofar as argument of the appellant that no notice under Section 401 
Cr.P.C. was served before modifying the sentence, his submission was 
that it was not a case of enhancement of sentence. On the contrary, the 
High Court had converted the sentence oflife imprisonment to that of 
20 years RI and this has to be taken as reduction in the sentence inasmuch 
as 'life imprisonment' has to be treated as imprisonment for whole life, 
as per the decisions of this Court. 
25. As already noted during narration of facts and events, the 
three persons were abducted on November 20, 2006. Whereas the 
G 
Driver (PW-18) was released on November 21, 2006, other two abductees 
were kept in confinement for a period of 52 days and were released 
only on Januazy 11, 2007. Informant in this case was Arun Kumar 
Mishra (PW-5) who had lodged written report on November 21, 2006 at 
10 pm on the basis of which formal FIR was registered which was sent 
to the Magistrate on November 22, 2006. PW-5 and his cousin Raju 
H
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
67 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
Mishra (PW-20) were the partners in the business of cement, iron and A 
were also having dealership of Hindustan Lever. PW-17 was their 
employee who was responsible for collection of money, dues from business 
associates in Ramgarh area and used to travel frequently for this purpose. 
On.the fateful day, PW-17 along with informant's cousin Raju Mishra 
(PW-20) had left Buxar at 10 am on white Gypsy which was driven by 
B 
PW-18. On that day, they had collected about Rs.4 lakhs from various 
persons and proceeded for Buxar at about 3:30 pm which fact was 
informed to the informant telephonically. They had reached Rampur at 
4:30 pm about which they had told informant telephonically but there 
was no contact thereafter. The manner in which PW-5/informant came 
to know about their abduction as staied by him in his complaint is already 
C 
mentioned above. In his written report lodged on the same day at 10 
pm, the informant had stated that he was convinced that abduction was 
for ransom. As many as 22 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. 
The accused persons, in a:ll, examined 9 witnesses. As per the prosecution 
story, the victims, after their kidnapping, were kept in the house ofJawahar D 
Koiry@Neta Jee (A-5) at Village Simri and thereafter they were shifted 
to Village Bhanpur and then to Ganj Bharsara where they were kept in 
the house of Birbal Choudhary@ Mukhiya Jee (A-13). From there, 
they
were moved to Village Dilhua,Bhabhni and Baradih. This movement 
from village to village where they have kept from time to time is sought 
to be established from the mobile versions of accused as reported by 
E 
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) that all these villages fell within 
the location of one mobile tower identified by Kochas A. 
26. In this hue, we examine the role ofBirbal Choudhary. Evidence 
against him is that the victims found thatA-13 was referred to by others 
as Mukhiya Jee. Other evidence which is produced is his identification 
F 
by PW-17 and that the abductees were kept, for few days, in his house. 
The question is whether there was clinching evidence on the aforesaid 
aspects. 
27. PW-17, though did not participate in TIP, came to the Court 
for his deposition. On that day, he made a categorical statement in the 
G 
Court that though other accused persons were present in the Court he 
did not find Birbal Choudhary in the Court. This shows that PW-17 
could identify Birbal Choudhary and when he found that he was not 
present in the Court on that day, he specifically stated to this effect. 
PW-17 again appeared in the Court on November 28, 2007. On that 
H
68 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
day, Birbal Choudhary was present in the Court. PW-17 duly identified 
him and mentioned that he was kept in the house of A-13 who was 
Mukhiya of Ganj Bharsara. Taking note of this, the High Court has 
made categorical remarks thatA-13 neither disputed the said identification 
nor put any question in cross-examination on this aspect. Learned senior 
B 
counsel for the ~ppellant has sought to take some mileage by raising the 
plea that though PW-18 had identified A-13 in TIP conducted on 
December 14, 2006 but in the Court, he did not identify him. However, 
what is ignored ,in the process that he had turned hostile during tbe trial 
and this fact is discussed by the High Court in the following manner: 
c 
D 
"35. P.W. 18, likewise deposing one year later was consistent 
with P. W. 17 on the narration of abduction and mobile conversation 
at 9 P.M. He confirmed showing the Police the place of abduction 
and the place of confinement before release. The witness identified 
the rifle used during abduction and identified the Bolero by its 
velvet coloured seat as also one of the accused Birbal Chaudhary 
in T.l.P. but went hostile during the identification of the appellant 
in trial cbncemed of his own safety as very apparent from his 
statement at paragraph 13 of his crossexamination.'' 
28. In th11: aforesaid circumstance, much credence cannot be given 
to the conduct of PW-18 refusing to identify A-13 in the Court. During 
E
TIP, he had identified and this TIP was conducted in the presence of 
Metropolitan Magistrate (PW-9) who categorically deposed to the 
aforesaid effect. That apart, sufficient evidence is produced in the form 
of statement of PW-17 (who is held to be trust-worthy by both the courts 
below) that he was kept in the house of A-13. Specific discussion qua 
F 
G 
H 
this appellant in the judgment of the High Court runs as under: 
"58. The appellant Birbal Chaudhary has been convicted under 
Section 364A/ 34 and 395 ofl.P.C. and sentenced to R.I. For life 
and ten years under the latter. He has been identified in the T.I.P. 
by P.W. 18. It has to be remembered that the witness was a 
driver earning his livelihood in the employment of P. W. 5, 17 & 
20. His interest in identification of the accused was obviously 
limited ~d he was clearly worried of his own safety when he 
may not remain in the employment of aforesaid witnesses. The 
appellant was identified as the Mukhiya of village Ganjbharsara, 
where t~ victims had been kept on the night of22.11.2006 before
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
69 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
they were moved to village Dilhua. P.W. 17 on 22.11.2007 stated 
A 
in Court while recognizing other accused present in the dock that 
Mukhiya Ji was not present in Court. This is nothing but a positive 
identification of the accused by affirmance of the witness that he 
recognizes the physical features of the accused. He clearly states 
that they were kept in the house of Mukhiya of village 
B 
Ganjbharsara. From the deposition of P.W. 18, it is apparent that 
despite having recognized the appellant during T.I.P. he prefers to 
play safe in Court by again stating that he never recognized any 
body and that he does not do so today also. The house of the 
appellant was one of the places of confinement shown by P. W. 
18 to P.W. 8, the first investigating officer, as one of the places of C 
confinement where the victims were moved in the evening on the 
second day before he was released at night. The witness had 
stated during T.I.P. that the appellant was the person who had 
pulled him from the Gypsy and pushed him into the Bolero. This 
clearly tallies with the evidence of P.W. 17, who stated that P.W. 
D 
18 was pulled out from the Gypsy and pushed into the Bolero. 
Clearly worried for his own safety, the witness did not identify the 
appellant on 11.12.2006 in T.I.P. P.W.17 has stated in his deposition 
of the nocturnal knocks on his door after the trail started. But only 
after P.W.18 appears to have
been assured of his own safety that 
he mustered courage again, filed a fresh application and identified 
E 
the appellant barely three days later on 14.12.2006. It is not the 
case of the appellant that the witness had the opportunity to see 
him between 11.12.2006 to 14.12.2006. The appellant preferred 
Cr. Revision no.2 of 2007 against the same before the Sessions 
Judge, Buxar and which was dismissed on 16.1.2008. The 
appellant did not question the dismissal bringing the matter to a 
finality. The emphasis of the appellant on the dispute in his identity 
when P. W. 18 describes him of wheatish complexion and P. W. 17 
describes him as fair cannot be given much credence. There is 
F 
not much difference between fair and wheatish Indian skin as 
distinct from European skin. P.Ws. 8, 17, 18 & 19 had consistently 
G 
stated that the victims having been kept in the house of the appellant, 
not disputed by the appellant in his cross-examination, when in his 
petitions under section 317 of the Criminal Procedure Code on 
several dates describes himselfas 'Mukhiya'. His involvement in 
the abduction and confinement, therefore, stands established." 
H
70 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] l3 S.C.R. 
29. After going through the records and depositions of material 
witnesses, specifically keeping in mind the arguments of Mr. Basant, we 
do not find any reason to deviate from the aforesaid conclusion arrived 
at by the High Cburt. We agree that involvement of Birbal Choudhary 
in the abduction and confinement of the victims stands fully established. 
30. As far as demand for ransom is concerned, it has to be kept in 
mind that on the very first day, when informant submitted his written 
report on the basis of which FIR was registered, he had categorically 
mentioned that he was convinced that the abduction was for ransom. 
Another aspect which is highlighted by the High Court is that out of 
three persons abducted, the Driver (PW-18) was released on the very 
next day whereiis others were kept in the captivity for 52 days. This 
different treatment accorded to these victims is captured and highlighted 
by the High Court in the following manner: 
"30. P.W. 17, 18 & 20 were the victims of abduction. P.W. 17 
and20, businessmen and relatives of the informant, were released 
from captivity after 52 days on 1 l.1.2007., while P.W. 18, the 
driver was released on the next day of abduction at night. The 
distinction is too apparent. P. W. 18 was not worth the abduction 
for ransom." 
31. lt has also come on record that Exhibit-8 dated November 27, 
2007 is the letter written by PW-17 during confinement signed by
PW-
20 also asking PW-5 to pay the ransom amount and secure their release. 
The demand for ~ansom stands established from the conversation between 
PW-5, when the accused Jawahar Koiry and Suresh Koiry identified 
themselves calling from the mobile phone number 9430029994, sent to 
establish contact with the abductors and made the demand for a ransom 
of Rs. 50 lakhs and further stated that they were sending the ring of 
PW-17 and a letter from them (Exhibit-8) in proof of their confinement 
to claim ransom. Exhibit-8 stated that PW-5 should at the earliest arrange 
to have them rel¢ased. The mobile forensic evidence brought on record 
during investigation by necessary reports from the telephone authorities 
in the manner prpvided for in Section 63(b) of the Indian Evidence Act, 
1872 of the conversation on November 28, 2006 of a call made from the 
aforesaid numb¢r shows that a call was made from it on mobile no. 
9934848065 of PW-21, clearly proves that a demand for ransom was in 
fact made. Even otherwise, it is not the defence of the appellants that 
there existed any enmity between the victims and the appellants for
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY@ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
71 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.) 
false implication. Once the abduction has been established, surely the 
A 
abductors did not do so in such planned organized manner with smooth 
flawlessness discussed, to play hide and seek games or only to scare the 
victims out of a business dispute or for any other reason to force them to 
desist from a particular course of action. An act of abduction in the 
present manner is the result of meticulous planning of the logistics with 
B 
separate roles assigned to the individual players. The demand for ransom, 
therefore, clearly stands established. That it was actually paid or not is 
irrelevant. 
32. Section 364A reads as under: 
"Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in c 
detention after such kidnapping or abduction and threatens to cause 
death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a 
reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or 
hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the 
Government or (any foreign State or international inter-
governmental organization or any other person) to do or abstain 
D 
from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with 
death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine." 
33. In Ma/leshi v. State of Karnataka2, this Court has laid down 
the ingredients which need to be satisfied for establishing commission of E 
crime under Section 364A. It is held that: 
"To
attract the provisions of Section 364-A what is required to be 
proved is: 
(I) that the accused kidnapped or abducted the person; 
(2) kept him under detention after such kidnapping and abduction; 
and 
(3) that the kidnapping or abduction was for ransom." 
34. Insofar as ingredient of kidnapping for ransom is concerned, 
F 
the Court provided the following guidelines: 
G 
"Ultimately the question to be decided is "what was the intention? 
Was it demand of ransom?" There can be no definite manner in 
which demand is to be made. Who pays the ransom is not the 
determinative fact." 
2(2004) s sec 95 
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[2017] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
35. Insofar as kidnapping is concerned, there is no serious dispute 
B 
about the same. We find that the demand for ransom has been duly 
proved by the prosecution. 
36. Evenithe last argument of Mr. Basant lacks merit. It is to be 
kept in mind that the Sessions Court had sentenced the appellant for life 
for conviction under Sections 364N34 !PC. It has been held by this 
Court in Swa~ Shraddananda (2) @ Murali Manohar Mishra v. 
State of Karnati,ka' that imprisonment for life would mean full life and 
not sentence of 14 years which may be grossly disproportionate or 
inadequate and cannot be called as sentence of life. After specifically 
C 
taking note of this judgment, the High Court felt it appropriate to award 
the punishment of imprisonment for 20 years. It was done not only in 
the case of the appellant or others who were awarded life imprisonment 
by the trial court but even two other convicts who were given death 
sentence, their sentence is also reduced to 20 years RI. It is, therefore, 
clear that the High Court while modifying the sentence qua the appellant 
D 
Birbal, in fact, reduced the same from life imprisonment to 20 years RI. 
Therefore, the question of giving any notice under Section 401 Cr.P.C. 
did not arise. The judgment of this Court in Vikas Yadav's case is of no 
help to the app~lant. In that case, the main issue was of remission of 
life sentence a~ observations in para 39 were made in that context.
E 
Otherwise, facts of that case would reveal that life imprisonment by the 
trial court converted to minimum non-remittable fixed term of25 years 
by the High Coim was held to be appropriate in the facts of that case. 
We may mentim" that the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in 
Muthuramalingam & Ors. v. State represented by Inspector of 
Police' has approved the view taken in Swami Shraddananda 's case 
F 
that life imprisonment would be treated as imprisonment for full life. 
The issue which fell for consideration was altogether different. 
37. Insofar as the argument of Mr. Basant, learned senior counsel 
for the appellant predicated on re-examination of PW-1 to PW-6 after 
consolidation of chargesheet is concerned, we find that this step was 
G 
rather taken in the interest of the appellant. Appellant was not named in 
the first chargesheet and at the time when PW-I to PW-6 were examined 
in the first chargesheet, obviously, the appellant was not present. It is for 
this reason that these witnesses were examined again and the appellant 
'(2008) 13 sec 767 
H 
4(2016) s sec 313
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
73 
(A. K. SIKRI, J.) 
was given full opportunity to cross-examine them. We do not find that 
A 
any prejudice is caused to the appellant by referring to the deposition of 
these witnesses when examined in the first instance inasmuch as their 
deposition on both the occasions have remained the same. Therefore, 
we do not find any merit in this argument also. 
38. As a consequence, we dismiss the Criminal Appeal No. 701 
B 
of2012. 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2012 
39. This appeal is filed by Shyam Bihari Paswan (A-6) who has 
also been convicted under Section 364A read with Section 34 !PC as 
well as Section 395 !PC. Mr. Upadhyay arguing for A-6 submitted that 
C 
he has been convicted relying upon the testimony of PW-17 whereas 
the Driver (PW-18) had deposed to the contrary. He also submitted that 
insofaras PW-20 is concerned, he did not name A-6. He also questioned 
as to why only PW-17 called for TIP, excluding PW-18 and PW-20. He 
also submitted that PW-17 cannot be relied upon. Much mileage were 
D 
sought to be drawn by the learned counsel on the basis of letter dated 
December 29, 2006 which was written by A-6 addressed to the Chief 
Judicial Magistrate wherein he had alleged unlawful torture committed 
on him while under judicial custody. 
40. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of PW-17 and 
we do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel as far as this 
aspect is concerned. Having said so, it
may be pointed out that PW-17 
has specifically identifiedA-6 in the TIP. The High Court has considered 
this TIP to be without blemish and role of A-6 has been considered in 
the following manner: 
"56. The Appellant has been convicted under Section 364 Al 34 
and 395 I.P.C and sentenced to R.I. for life and ten years under 
the latter. P.W. 17 in his evidence has stated that when their vehicle 
was intercepted one of the abductors who got off the motorcycle 
and pushed P.W. 18 from the Gypsy into the Bolero had a mole on 
E 
F 
his cheek. In like manner, as the appellants Krishna Bihari Singh 
G 
and Jawahar Koery, P.W. 17 identified this appellant in the test 
identification parade held on 5 .2.2007. The appellant surrendered 
on 1·8.12.2006 and was in Police custody on remand from 
19.12.2006 to 26.12.2006. P.W. 17 and 20 were released on 
H
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11.1.2007. The arguments that the witness therefore, had 
opportunity to see the accused, whose photograph was taken and 
he was moved around for which he wrote to the Human Rights 
Commission etc. is of no relevance as on facts, this Court is 
satisfied that there has been no delay in the T.l.P. So as to vitiate 
the same. The argument of alleged illegality in the T.I.P. is of no 
avail and <1>nly an ingenuity in this appeal as no such questions 
were put i'1 cross-examination to P.W. 9, the Magistrate, who 
conducted the T.l.P. The witness named the appellant as one of 
the four accused present in the dock on 27.11.2007, when he 
stated that he did not identify other persons present, making a 
clear distinction." 
41. It would be interesting to mention at this stage, that insofar as 
conviction under Section 395 !PC is concerned, no counsel had even 
questioned the same as no argument is advanced in that behalf. Section 
395 !PC pertains to punishment for dacoity. This provision was invoked 
as the abductors who were more than five in numbers had robbed the 
abductees of the money in their possession. This itself is sufficient to 
confirm the abduction ofPWs-17, 18 and20. It is also important to note 
that PW-19, who was Investigating Officer (IO) in this case, has narrated 
in detail the manner in which he conducted the investigation which shows 
that it is during the course of investigation, names of accused
persons 
kept surfacing al).d investigation proceeded accordingly. Insofar as 
deposition of PW" 18 is concerned, we have already dealt with the same 
while considerin$ Criminal Appeal No. 701 of 2012 who had turned 
hostile fearing his own safety. At the cost ofrepetition, we may point 
out that though PW-18 had deposed to the contrary to what statement 
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded. Further, within three days of 
his deposition in the court, he mustered courage when he was assured 
of his safety ans! has filed a fresh application and identified the accused 
persons. This aspect is highlighted by the High Court while dealing with 
the case of Birbid Choudhary and the said portion has already been 
extracted. above. In Suman Sood@ Kawaljeet Kaur v. State of 
G Rajasthan', importance of identification parade, as a substantive piece 
of evidence, was accorded in the following manner: 
"59. In A.LR. 2007 Supreme Court 2774 (Suman Sood @ 
Kawaljeet Kaur versus State of Rajasthan) the conviction was 
H 
'AIR 2007 SC 2774
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
75 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
under Seetion 364 A of the Penal Code. It was held in paragraph 
A 
41 as follows : "41. Regarding identification of accused, both the 
courts have considered the evidence of prosecution witnesses 
and recorded a finding that identity of the accused was established 
beyond doubt. We are also satisfied that evidence of PW 9, victim 
Rajendra Mirdha was natural and inspired confidence. His 
B 
evidence established that he was kidnapped in the morning of 
February 17, 1995 and he remained with the kidnappers up to the 
date of encounter on February 25, 1995, i.e. for eight-nine days. 
Obviously, therefore, his evidence was of extreme importance. It 
was believed by both the courts and we see nothing wrong in the 
approach of the courts below. It is true and admitted by the 
C 
prosecution witnesses that the photographs of the accused were 
shown on television as also were published in newspapers. That, 
however, does not in any way adversely affect the prosecution, if 
otherwise the evidence of prosecution witnesses is reliable and 
the Court is satisfied as to identity of the accused. Even that ground, 
D 
therefore, cannot take the case of the appellants further. It is thus 
proved beyond doubt that the accused had committed offences 
punishable under Section 343 read with 120B, IPC as also under 
Section 346 read with 120B, IPC." 
42. This legal position was reiterated inMahabirv. State of Delhi" 
in
the following words: 
"12. It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence 
ofidentification in Court.Apart from the clear provisions of Section 
E 
9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a 
catena of decisions of this Court. The facts, which establish the 
identity of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of F 
the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of 
a witness is the statement made in Court. The evidence of mere 
identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is 
from its very nature ii\herently of a weak character. The purpose 
of prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the 
G 
trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a 
safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the 
sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to the identity of the 
accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier 
'AIR 2008 SC 2343 
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identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is 
subject to exceptions, when, for example, the Court is impressed 
by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, 
without s11ch or other corroboration. The identification parades 
belong to 'the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in 
the Code which obliges the investigating agency to hold or confers 
a right upon the accused to claim, a test identification parade. 
They do not constitute substantive evidence and these parades 
are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to 
hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the 
evidence <1>f identification in Court. The weight to be attached to 
such identification should be a matter for the Courts of fact. In 
appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification even 
without insisting on corroboration. (See Kanta Prashad v. Delhi 
Administration (AIR 1958 SC 350), Vaikuntam Chandrappa and 
others v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1960 SC 1340), Budhsen 
and another V. State ofU.P. (AIR 1970 SC 1321) and Rarneshwar 
Singh v. siate of Jammu and Kashmir (AIR 1972 SC 102)." 
43. We may point out that Mr. Dash, learned senior counsel for 
the informant had argued to the effect that TIP was not necessary in 
this case by ref¢rring to the judgments in Motilal Yadav v. State of 
Bihar', Ronny alias Ronald James Alwaris & Ors. v. State of 
E
Maharashtra' and Suresh Chandra Bahri & Ors. v. State of Bihar'. 
F 
G 
H 
However, it is not necessary to deal with this aspect once we find that 
TIP conducted il\l the present case has been correctly relied upon. 
44. Thus, this appeal also stands dismissed. 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 705-706 OF 2012 
45. Criminal Appeal No. 705 of2012 is filed by Ramashraya Koiry 
(A-14) and Criminal Appeal No. 706 of2012 is filed by four convicted 
persons, namely, Rambriksha Koiry (A-7), Hirdayanand Koiry (A-I 0), 
Mangala Singh GA-11) and Saroj Singh (A-12). It was submitted that 
insofar as these persons are concerned, they were not named by either 
PW-17 or PW-18 or PW-20 and in their cases, no TIP was conducted 
and they were not identified in the Court as well by the witnesses. The 
only allegation against them was that they had fed the victim at the time 
of arrest. 
'(2015) 2 sec 647 
"< 1998) 3 sec 625 
'1995 Supp (I) sea 80
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
77 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.) 
46. However, what is to be kept in mind is that these persons are 
A 
convicted with the aid of Section 34 !PC as well. With regard to these 
appellants, the High Court has affirmed their sentence in the following 
manner: 
"67. The appellants Ram Briksh Koery, Hirday Koery Mangla 
Singh and Saroj Singh have been acquitted of the charge under 
B 
395 l.P.C. but convicted under section 364 A I 34 l.P.C. And 
sentenced to R.I. For life. The appellants have been arrested on 
10.12.2006 from the house of appellant Jawahar Koery. P.W. 19, 
who carried out the raid stated that the appellants attempted ·to 
flee on seeing the Police. They are stated to have been providing 
logistic support to the accused. That they may not have been put 
C 
on T.l.P. Or identified in the dock is not relevant as they were 
taken into custody contiguous with the continued confinement of 
the victims from the house of an accused positively involved proved 
by cogent and convincing evidence, when their conviction is with 
the aid of section 34 l.P.C. of aiding the aforesaid accused, and D 
mere presence shall suffice without need for proof of any positive 
overt act in furtherance. Clearly they were persons looking after 
the appellants and the victims by preparing food and otherwise 
looking after their well being. In a operation of the present natµre 
it needs no discussion that several players are involved with their
respective roles assigned to them as it is not possible for an 
E 
individual to commit the acts in question singlehandedly with the 
smoothness of execution presently noticed. 
68. The appellants Ramashraya Koery and Ram Darash Koery 
of village Dilhua have been convicted under section 364 A I 34 
l.P.C. and sentenced to R.I. for life. They have neither been put 
on T.I.P. nor identified by P.W. 17, 18 or 20. The evidence against 
them in the confession of accused Shyam Bihari Paswan is that 
tl;ie victims were kept in their house at village Dilhua. This part of 
the confession by itself shall not be sufficient for the conviction of 
F 
the appellants. But when it is corroborated by the evidence of G 
P.W.17 identifying to P.W.19 the house of the appellants as the 
place where they were kept in confinement at village Dilhua after 
being moved from Ganjbharsara on the night of 22.11.2006. the 
weak evidence against them gets fortified fully to justify their 
conviction.'' 
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47. It was sought to argue that aid of Section 34 was wrongly 
taken in the instimt case and in support, learned counsel refers to the 
case of ]lfohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab10, wherein it was 
held: 
"13. That inevitably takes us to the question as to whether the 
appellants can be convicted under Section 302/34. Like Section 
149, Section 34 also deals with cases of constructive criminal 
liability. It1 provides that where a criminal act is done by several 
persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of 
such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were 
done by him alone. The essential constituent of the vicarious 
criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is the existence of 
common intention. If the common intention in question animates 
the' accused persons and ifthe said common intention leads to the 
commission of the criminal offence charged, each of the persons 
sharing the common intention is constructively liable for the criminal 
act done by,one of them Just as the combination of persons sharing 
the same common object is one of the features of an unlawful 
assembly, &o the existence of a combination of persons sharing 
the same c<1>mmon intention is one of the features of Section 34. 
In some ways the two sections are similar and in some cases they 
may overlap. But, nevertheless, the common intention which is 
the basis of'Section 34 is different
from the common object which 
is the basis of the composition of an unlawful assembly. Common 
intention d~notes action-in-concert and necessarily postulates the 
existence of a prearranged plan and that must mean a prior meeting 
of minds. It would be noticed that cases to which Section 34 can 
be applied 'llisclose an element of participation in action on the 
part of all the accused persons. The acts may be different; may 
vary in their character, but they are all actuated by the same 
common int~ntion. It is now well-settled that the common intention 
required by Section 34 is different from the same intention or 
similar intention. As has been observed by the Privy Council in 
Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor [72 IA 148] common intention 
within the meaning of Section 34 implies a pre-arranged plan, and 
to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should 
be proved tll.at the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to 
"AIR !963 SC 174
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY@ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
79 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
the pre-arranged plan and that the inference of common intention 
A 
should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible 
from the circumstances of the case." 
48. He also took support of Chittarmal & Anr. v. State of 
Rajasthan11 and relied upon para 14 thereof, which is as under: 
"14. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that Section 34 as 
well as Section 149 deal with liability for constructive criminality 
i.e. vicarious liability of a person for acts of others. Both the 
sections deal with combinations of persons who become punishable 
as sharers in an offence. Thus they have a certain resemblance 
B 
and may to some extent overlap. But a clear distinction is made 
C 
out between common intention and common object in that common 
intention denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates the 
existence of a prearranged plan implying a prior meeting of the 
minds, while common object does not necessarily require proof of 
prior meeting of minds or preconcert. Though there is a substantial 
D 
difference between the two sections, they also to some extent 
overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each 
case whether the charge under Section 149 overlaps the ground 
covered by Section 34. Thus, if several persons numbering five or 
more, do an act and intend to do it, both Section 34 and Section 
149 may apply. If the common object cloes not necessarily
involve 
E 
a common intention, then the substitution of Section 34 for Section 
149 might result in prejudice to the accused and ought not, therefore, 
to be permitted. But if it does involve a common intention then the 
substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 must be held to be a 
formal matter. Whether such recourse can be had or not must 
depend on the facts of each case. The non-applicability of Section 
149 is, therefore, no bar in convicting the appellants under Section 
302 read with Section 34 IPC, if the evidence discloses commission 
of an offence in furtherance of the common intention of them all. 
(See Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor [AIR 1925 PC 
F 
1 : 26 Cri LJ 431] , Mannam Venkatadari v. State of A.P. [( 1971) 
G 
3 sec 254: 1971 sec (Cri) 479: AIR 1971 sc 1467], Nethata 
Pothuraju v. State of A.P. [(1992) 1 SCC 49 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 20 
: AIR 1991 SC 2214] and Ram Taha/ v. State of U.P. [(1972) 1 
sec 136: 1972 sec (Cri) 80: AIR 1972 sc 254] )" 
11(2003 l 2 sec 266 
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49. There cannot be any quarrel about the law laid down in the 
aforesaid judgmpnts where subtle distinction is drawn between Section 
34 and Section 149, !PC which deal with 'common intention' and 
'common object' respectively. At the same time, it is also clarified that 
it would depend on the facts of each case as to whether Section 34 or 
Section 149 of !PC or both the provisions are attracted. It is also held 
that non-applicability of Section 149 !PC is no bar in convicting the 
accused persons under Section 302 !PC read with Section 34 of!PC, if 
the evidence disqloses commission of offence in furtherance of common 
intention of them all. From the facts of the present case, we are satisfied 
that the courts below have rightly concluded that there was a common 
intention in committing the offence of kidnapping for ransom, by all the 
convicted persons. 
50. Qua A-14, it was additionally submitted that PW-17 did not 
identify any par\icular house. However, it has come on record that 
accused Shyam Bihari Paswan in his confessional statement had stated 
that victims were kept in their house at Village Dilhua which is given 
credence by the High Court for the reason that it is corroborated by 
evidence of PW-17 who had identified the house of A-14. Therefore, 
the argument that no particular house was identified is not correct. 
51. As a consequence, these appeals are also dismissed. 
CRIMIN.$L APPEAL
NO. 708 OF 2012 
52. This appeal is filed by Angad Koiry (A-9). Allegation against 
him is that he was part of the team which had kidnapped the victims. 
He was identified in TIP as well as in Court. These aspects were fairly 
admitted by the learned counsel. However, his only contention was that 
there was no reason to convict him under Section 364A !PC and his 
conviction shoul~ have been under Section 364 !PC. In this behalf, 
submission was that after kidnapping, no role is assigned to him and, 
therefore, the allegations ofransom cannot be attributed to A-9. 
53. Once we find that role of A-9 in kidnapping the three persons 
stands established beyond any doubt and it also stands established that 
kidnapping was for the ransom which was actually demanded and there 
was a common int~ntion behind the aforesaid acts, A-9 is rightly convicted 
under Section 364A !PC. Resultantly, Criminal Appeal No. 708 of2012 
is dismissed as well.
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
81 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.) 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 707 OF 2012 
A 
54. This appeal is filed by A-I Krishna Bihari Singh @Krishna 
Singh. As far as A-I is concerned, he is also one of those who was a 
part of team which abducted PWs-17, 18 and 20. Our purpose would 
be served by reproducing the discussion qua him in the impugned judgment 
of the High Court, as during arguments, learned counsel appearing for 
B 
this appellant could not make any single argument worthy of any 
consideration: 
. "52. The Appellant stands convicted under Section 364 Al 34,395 
and 412 l.P.C. and sentenced to death. P.W. 17 states, after the 
abductors intercepted the Gypsy, the person driving the Bolero 
stepped out carrying a rifle and who was addressed by his 
accomplices as "Babu Saheb." The accused referred to as "Verma 
ji" by his accomplices took out two packets of money wrapped in 
a 27 news paper and handed it to the person driving the Bolero 
who then drove away at about 9 P.M. On the 7th day of the 
abduction, the person driving the Bolero possessed with a rifle 
had come on a motorcycle along with accused who had a mole on 
his face ( accused Shyam Bihari Paswan ) that his house had 
been raided, family members arrested, and the Bolero vehicle, 
money and his rifle seized. The victims were abducted at 4 P.M. 
and remained with him in the Bolero till 9 P.M. They therefore 
had adequate opportunity to see the accused and it can safely be 
said
that their picture got etched or imprinted in the minds of the 
victim in the confines of the car during this five hours. The witness 
further stated that the accused did not have their faces covered 
during the incident. P.W. 17 identified this appellant in the dock by 
his identification of"Babu Saheb", referred during abduction by 
c 
D 
E 
F 
his accomplices. The accused then disclosed his name as Krishna 
Bihari Singh.This was a perfectly natural and reliable identification 
being made by P. W. 17 when he was vividly reliving the abduction 
drama in his mind by a photographic regeneration. That the 
appellant was not put on T.l.P. but was identified in the dock for 
G 
the first time 10 months after release from abduction is of no 
relevance in the facts of the present case. Likewise, the absence 
of his identification by P.W. 18 or 20 is also not material to the 
prosecution case as it is not the number of witnesses but the issue 
of the credibility of the sole witness, in which lies the test. T.l.P., 
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is more appropriate where the victim may have had only a glimpse 
of the un)mown accused and there may be no particular reasons 
to remember him. The T.I.P. of such an accused has been 
considered proper only as an aid that the investigation was 
proceeding in the 28 right direction. Such identification is not 
substantive evidence in itself but is only corroborative. In the facts 
of the case as discussed above, this Court finds no infirmity in the 
first ident,fication of the appellant in the dock. The Bolero vehicle 
used in the abduction was recovered from the house of the 
appellant. Whether it was recovered from the boundaries of his 
premises or parked on the road in front of his house with houses 
on both sides of the road is hardly relevant and does not make out 
a defence of lack of his ownership of the same. Both P.W. 17 & 
18 in thelr evidence have clearly identified the silver coloured 
Bolero by its red colour velvet seat cover in the Court and test 
identification parade respectively. The two packets of cash 
wrapped in the news paper given to the appellant by his 
accomplices while parting ways containing a total of one lac fifty 
thousand with the words 'Ansari Nuao' written on it, was the 
money given by P. W. 4 to P. W. 17 kept in the black bag by P. W. 
18. It has been stated by P. W. 17, that the money was wrapped in 
news paper before handing it over to P. W. 18 who then kept it in
the black bag. The appellant in his statements under section 313 
Cr.P.C. first stated that it was money withdrawn on the credit 
card in the name of his wife, and later stated that it was his income 
from his dhimni business. His bank pass book produced in defence 
did not show withdrawals of the nature claimed during the period 
in question to justify his claim for source of the money. The 
vacillating stand of the appellant hirnselfleaves this Court satisfied 
that he was nottelling the truth. Both P. W. 17 & 18 also recognized 
the rifle ciµ-ried by the appellant based on the features of the rifle 
narrated by them in the T.l.P. and in the Court respectively. This 
seizure was affected from the house 29 of the appellant and turned 
out to be a licensed weapon in his name. Last but not the least, 
the Bolero turned out to be a stolen vehicle from Uttar Pradesh 
bearing a fake registration number originally allotted to a two 
wheeler. Ervents that speak for themselves about the dispensation 
of the appellant. This Court, therefore, holds in light of the aforesaid 
discussion that the identification and involvements of the appellant
BIRBAL CHOUDHARY @ MUKHIYA JEE v. STATE OF BIHAR 
83 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
in the abduction and confinement clearly stands proved. The 
A 
recovery of the aforesaid items by the Police on information 
furnished to it during investigation, identified in the T.1.P. was 
evidence admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act." 
55. As a consequence, this appeal stands dismissed. 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1858 OF 2013 
56. Harbanse Ram {A-8) is the appellant in this appeal. He is 
convicted under Section 364A/34 !PC ;md was acquitted of the charge 
under Section 412 IPC. His lawyer argued that his name was not 
mentioned in the first chargesheet. Further, as far as A-8 is concerned, 
charges were framed only under Section 368 and 412 !PC and, therefore, 
his conviction under Section 364A/34 was legally not tenable. 
57. As far as argument of the counsel that the name of A-8 was 
B 
c 
not mentioned in the chargesheet, as already pointed out above, the IO 
(PW-19) has explained in detail that during the course of investigation, 
names of these accused persons kept surfacing and investigation has 
D 
been proceeded accordingly. It is, for this reason, that second 
chargesheet was filed implicating other persons including A-8. 
Interestingly, no such argument was advanced in the High Court. 
58. Insofar as absence of charge under Section 364A is concerned, 
that may not make the things better for this appellant in view of the fact 
E 
that he was specifically charged under Section 368
!PC which is to the 
following effect: 
"Whoever, knowing that any person has been kidnapped or has 
been abducted, wrongfully conceals or confines such person, shall 
be punished in the same manner as ifhe had kidnapped or abducted 
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such person with the same intention or knowledge, or for the same 
purpose as that with or for which he conceals or detains such 
person in confinement." 
59. This provision makes it clear that even a person who wrongfully 
conceals or confines a kidnapped person knowing that he has been 
G 
kidnapped suffers the same consequences at par with the person who 
had kidnapped or abducted the person with the same intention or 
knowledge or for the same purpose. In the statement of accusations 
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., it was categorically put to him that allegation 
against him was of having kept the kidnapped persons in confinement 
H
84 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
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SUPRIEME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] 13 S.C.R. 
knowing that they had been kidnapped. Thus, specific case set up by 
the prosecution against A-8 was that he had kept the victims in 
confinement with the knowledge that they were kidnapped. Thus, 
ingredient of Section 368 IPC has been established against him. Once 
that has been proved, consequences of Section 364A !PC, for which 
other co-accused persons were found convicted, shall stand attracted. 
Section 368 !PC puts the offence prescribed therein at par with Section 
364A by raising a statutory presumption based on a legal fiction of the 
former being a deemed offence under the latter, if evidence be there. In 
Suman Sood's case, this legal principle is laid down in the following 
manner: 
"60. Kidnapping for ransom is an offence of unlawfully seizing a 
person and then confining the person usually in a secret place, 
while attempting to extort ransom. This grave crime is sometimes 
made a capital offence. In addition to the abductor a person who 
acts as a gp between to collect the ransom is generally considered 
guilty of the crime." 
60. That apart, learned counsel for the respondent rightly contended 
that Section 464 of the Cr.P.C. provides that no sentence by a Court of 
competent jurisc)iction would be deemed invalid on the ground that no 
charge was fram~d or any irregularity in the charge or misjoinder of the 
charges, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that a failure of justice 
had
occasioned thereby. In the present case, no such prejudice has 
been caused to A-8 who knew the ingredients of charge that were levelled 
against him. 
61. Thus, finding no merit in this appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 
1858 of2013 is also dismissed. 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 703-704 OF 2012 
62. Nobocjy argued these appeals. In any case, we have examined 
the matter in the context of these appeals as well and do not find any 
error in the judgment of the Courts below convicting these appellants. 
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Therefore, we dismiss these appeals as well. 
63. In fine, all the appeals are dismissed thereby confirming the 
conviction and sentence passed hy the High Court. 
Kalpana K_ Tripathy 
Appeals distnisscd.