STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. versus PRASAR BHARTI & ORS.
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 118, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
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[2016) 3 S.C.R. 118 
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. 
v. 
PRASAR BHARTI & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 5252 of2016) 
MAY27,2016 
[A.K. SIKRI AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.] 
Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar 
Bharati) Act, 2007 - ss. 3, 2 (b), 2(h) - Sports Broadcast Signals 
(Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharti) Rules, 2007 - rr. 5, 2(b), 
3 - Mandatory sharing of certain sports broadcasting signals -
Obligations of a Television Broadcasting Organisation - Scope of 
- Appellant shared live broadcast signal of a sporting event-world 
feed with Prasar Bharati - Inclusion of certain enhancing 
"features" such Hawk-eye, ball delivery speed reference, umpire 
naming graphics, player statistics, score cards, match summary 
graphics, replay graphics etc - Such features contained logos of 
the event sponsors known as "On-Screen Credits" - Logos of 
advertisers contained in the 'world feed' shared by appellant with 
Prasar Bharti, if amounts to advertisement - Held: Logos are 
commercials of the ~ponsors which would be treated as not on~v 
advertisements but commercial advertisements - Word 'its' in s. 3 
cannot be given limited meaning by confining it to advertisements 
only of broadcasting service provider - Signals to be shared with 
Prasar Bharati by content rights owner or holder are to be the best 
feed that is provided to broadcast service provider in India and has 
to be 'free from commercial advertisements - ICC which included 
those
advertisements/logos, the feeds have to be without those logos/ 
advertisements - If advertisements are also to be included in the 
signals, there has to be sharing of the revenue - When live 
broadcasting signal is shared containing advertisements, those 
advertisements have much larger viewership because of its telecast/ 
broadcast on Prasar Bharati, rei·enue thereof is to be shared between 
the Broadcaster and Prasar Bharti. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 It is not denied by the appellant that the logos 
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STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
are of the event sponsors, known as 'On-Screen Credits' in 
industry parlance. The appellant has it'ielf shown the photographs. 
No doubt, such logos or On-Screen Credits may appear at the 
time of featuring replays like ball delivery speed and when a player 
gets out either when he is bowled, run out or caught or they are 
shown while depicting player statistics, scoreboard, match 
summary, graphs, etc. Nonetheless, these are the advertisements 
of the sponsors like Pepsi, LG, Fly Emirates, Reli.ance, etc. These 
sponsors have entered into arrangement for showing their logo 
on the occasions referred. It is also not in dispute that these 
sponsors pay for such On-Screen Credits. Insofar as such 
sponsors are concerned, their motive in giving these logos to be 
shown on Television is crystal clear, viz. it is intended to advertise 
their company names for commercial motives in mind. These arc, 
thus, commercials of the sponsors which would clearly be treated 
as not only advertisements but commercial advertisements. Once 
it is held that what is shown are advertisements, the question as 
to whether these advertisements are shown because of some 
arrangement between the organisers of the tournament and the 
sponsors or as a result of arrangement between the broadcasters, 
i.e. the appellant, and the sponsors is immaterial. Section 3 of 
the Sports Act does not make any distinction between the 
aforesaid two kinds of
advertisements. What is prescribed, in no 
nncertain terms, is that sharing of the live broadcasting signal 
has to be without advertisements. [Para 27] [140-H; 141-A-D] 
1.2 On a plain reading of Section 3 of the Sports Act, it is 
accepted that the obligation to share such sports broadcasting 
signals is upon the following persons: (i) content rights owner; 
(ii) content holder; and (iii) television or radio broadcasting 
service provider. Any of these categories of persons arc not 
allowed to carry a live television broadcast on: (i)' any cable or 
direct-to-home network; (ii) radio commentary broadcast in India, 
if such television broadcast or radio commentary broadcast 
happens to be of sporting events which is of national importance 
unless such content rights owner or content holder or 
broadcasting service provider simultaneously shares the live 
broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati to enable Prnsar Bharati 
to re-transmit the same on its terrestrial networks and DTH 
networks in such manner and on such terms and conditions as 
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may be specified. [Para 28) [141-E-H; 142-A-B) 
1.3 It becomes apparent from the reading of the Preamble 
of the Act that purpose is to provide access to the largest number 
of listeners and viewers, on a free to air basis, of sporting events 
of national importance. This task is given to Prasar Bharati. 
Notwithstanding more popularity which the private channels have 
gained over a period of time, coverage of Prasar Bharati is far 
more reaching insofar as Indian population is concerned as it 
reaches almost every nook and corner of the country. Further 
the radio as well as television broadcasting of Prasar Bharat is 
free of cost. It is for this reason that the law in the form of Sports 
Act is enacted in order to ensure that such sporting events of 
national importance are made available to every citizen of this 
country, irrespective of his/her financial conditions. Section 3, 
thus, aims to achieve two purposes; to provide access to largest 
number of listeners and viewers on a free to air basis. The principle 
of purposive interpretation, in this context, meant that Prasar 
Bharati was supposed to telecast these matches for the benefit 
of general masses spread through out India, who otherwise do 
not receive signals of private channels like the appellant or are 
not having financial capacity to pay for these channels. Thus, it 
was a larger public interest which was sought to be served and 
noble
objective was kept in mind while enacting the statute; 
insofar as income that is generated from advertisements is 
concerned, which are shown on television or broadcasted on radio, 
the revenue thereof is to be shared between the Broadcaster 
and Prasar llharati. The purpose is obvious. It is the broadcasting 
service provider who is supposed to share the live broadcasting 
signal with Prasar Bharati, which has the arrangements with the 
advertisers and, thus, takes money from those who book their 
advertisements to be broadcasted on television or radio. 
However, when the signals are shared with Prasar Bharati enabling 
it to simultaneously retransmit the same on its terrestrial 
networks or DTH networks, the vicwership/audienee gets 
multiplied as the reach is to much larger section of citizenry 
through Prasar Bharati. Therefore, Section 3(1), in the first 
instance, mandates that the sharing of live broadcasting signals 
with Prasar Bharati has to be 'without its advertisements'. 
Exception is, however, made in sub-section (2) of Section 3 which
STAR SPORTS !NOIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
enables the broadcasting service provider to even share the 
contents along with advertisements, but subject to the condition 
that there has to be a sharing of revenue in the proportion 
prescribed in sub-section (2) of Section 3. Thus, when live 
broadcasting signal is shared containing advertisements, those 
advertisements have much larger viewership because of its 
telecast/broadcast on Prasar Bharati. The benefit of 
advertisement in such a case would accrue to those who have 
booked the advertisements and the service provider, in such an 
eventuality would definitely be in a position to charge much more 
from the advertisers. It is a matter of common knowledge that 
rates of advertisement go up when circulation thereof is enhanced. 
The application of rule of purposive interpretation would go against 
the appellant and in favour of the respondent. [Paras 31, 32) [142-
F-H; 143-A-H) 
1.4 It becomes clear that the sharing of the signals has to be 
without any advertisements and if the advertisements are also to 
be included in the signals, there has to be sharing of the revenue. 
The Attorney General rightly argued that the word 'its' cannot 
be given limited meaning by confining it to advertisements only 
of broadcasting service provider. Section 3 which starts with 
negative covenant very expressly puts an embargo to all the three 
categories mentioned therein, viz., content rights owner, (ii) 
contents holder as well as
(iii) television or radio broadcasting 
service provider not to have television broadcast either through 
cable or DTH and not to have any radio commentary broadcast 
unless live broadcasting signal is shared simultaneously with 
Prasar Bharnti. Examined in this hue, it becomes clear that the 
words 'without its advertisements' which follow immediately after 
the words 'unless it simultaneously shares the live broadcasting 
signal' has to be given a meaning that such broadcasting signals 
arc to be without advertisements, whether it is of the content 
rights owner, content holder or that of television or radio 
broadcasting service provider. It is made crystal clear by providing 
the definition of 'content rights owner' or 'holder' in Ruic 2(b) of 
the Rules, 2007. Ruic 3(3) takes the issue beyond any pale of 
doubt when it mentions that the signals to be shared with Prasar 
Bharati by the content rights owner or holder arc to be the best 
feed that is provided to broadcast service provider in India and 
has to be 'free from commercial advertisements'. Tims, even if 
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it is ICC which has included those advertisements/logos, the feeds 
have to be without those logos/advertisements inasmuch as 
nobody can dispute that the content rights owner are content 
holder, i.e, ICC in the instant case has included those logos/ 
advertisements from purely commercial angle. Thus, the 
arrangement between the ICC and the appellant, is totally 
inconsequential. [Para 33] (144-B-GJ 
Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply 
Company of Orissa Limited (Southco) and Another 
vs. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill (2012) 2 SCC 108:2011 
(15) SCR 211; Davis vs. Sebastian (1999) 6 SCC 
604: 1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 612; V.B.Raju vs. Union 
of India and Others 1980 (Supp) SCC 513: 1981 
SCR 599; Secretary, Ministry of Information & 
Broadcasting, Govt. of India and Others vs. Cricket 
Association of Bengal and Other(l995) 2 SCC 161: 
1995 (1) SCR 1036 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
2011 (15) SCR 211 
referred to 
1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 612 referred to 
1981 SCR 599 
1995 (1) SCR 1036 
referred to 
referred to 
Para 12 
Para 13 
Para 14 
Para 21 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CIVIL APPEAL No. 5252 
of2016. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 03. I 0.2013 in WPC No. 3611 
of 2013 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. 
Mukul Rohatgi, AG, A.M., Singhvi, Sudhir Chandra, Arv ind Datar, 
Abhinav Vasisht, Sr. Advs., Sai Krishna Rajagopal, Sidharth Chopra, 
Ms. Sneha Jain, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Mani sh
Kumar, Shiv am Singh, 
L. Ahmed, Ms. Sarni Dutt, Ms. Akanksha Munjal, Gopal Singh, Nikhil 
Nayyar, Rajeev Sharma, Ms. Radhalakshmi, Harshvardhan Jha, Adarsh 
Upadhyay, Radha Rangaswamy, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Abhinav Mukerji, 
Gopal Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
A.K. SJKRI, J. I. Leave granted. 
2. The instant appeal is filed against the impugned judgment dated 
October 3, 2013 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of 
Delhi in W.P.(C) No. 3611 of 2013 which was filed by the appellant 
herein. The appeal raises the issue regarding the scope of obligations of 
a Television Broadcasting Organisation under the Sports Broadcasting 
Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act, 2007 (hereinafter 
referred to as "Sports Act"). We may mention at the outset that under 
Section 3 of the Sports Act, a Television Broadcasting Organisation is 
prohibited from carrying the live television broadcast of a sporting event 
of national importance on cable or Direct-to-Home (DTH) networks in 
India, unless it simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signals, without 
its advertisements, with the Prasar Bharati (respondent No. I) to enable 
it to retransmit the same on its terrestrial and DTH network. 
3. In view of the above statutory obligation, the appellant herein 
sharing the live broadcast signals with respodnent No. I Prasar Bharati 
and there is no dispute about the same. The appellant, as a television 
broadcaster, is allowed to insert advertisements on its avenue and recoup 
its advertisements during a break in live play at various poi11ts during 
broadcast, such as, during breaks between overs in a cricket match, at
the fall of a wicket, during drink breaks etc. These advertisements are 
not included while sharing the live broadcasting signals with Prasar 
Bharati. No dispute about this as well. 
4. The problem has, however, arisen in respect of the contents 
shared. with Prasar Bharati which, at times, include some kind of 
advertisements. According to the appellant, the broadcast signal of a 
spo11ing event provided by an event organiser, known as the "world 
feed" (as the same feed is provided to all broadcasters the world over), 
includes the broadcast of the live play of the event as it happens on the 
field as also certain "features" which enhance a view's experience, such 
a Hawk-eye, ball delivery speed reference, umpire naming graphics, 
player statistics, score cards, match summary graphics, replay graphics 
etc. These features are inse11ed at the site by or at the instance of the 
event organiser. Such features invariably contain logos of the event 
sponsors known as "On-Screen Credits" in industry parlance. These 
"On-Screen Credits" are, however, included while sharing the live 
broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati. Prasar Bharati has taken 
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exception to the aforesaid inclusion treating the same as "advertisements" 
and, thus, turning it as violative of Section 3(1) of the Sports Act. The 
appellant, on the other hand, has taken the position that in terms of 
Section 3( 1) of the Sports Act, the obligation of a television Broadcaster, 
i.e., the appellant, is limited to sharing of the world feed which it receives 
from the event organizer/owner on as as-is-where-is basis without 
advertisements of the television broadcaster, and that the appellant is 
not obliged to remove any On-Screen Credits inserted by the event 
organizer. The appellant contested the stand of Prasar Bharati 
(respondent No. 1) that it is the duty of the appellant to ensure that the 
sponsor logos/On-Screen Credits present ion the world feed, which ios 
created by or at the instance of the organizer of the event, have to also 
be removed by the appellant. 
5. By the impugned judgment, the High Comi has found favour 
with the contention raised by Prasar Bharati and this view of the High 
Court is the subject matter of challenge in the instant appeal. The !is 
has travelled to this Court in following factual background. 
6. The appellant (formerly ESPN Software India Private Limited) 
is the sole and exclusive distributor of some sports channels in India. 
These include ESPN, Star Sports, Star Sports 2 and Star Cricket. These 
channels telecast various sporting events such as
ICC Cricket, BCCI 
Cricket, Formula 1, Barclays Premier League Football, ICC Cricket World 
Cup and Wimbledon etc. for telecasting these events, the appellant enters 
into a contract with the sporting events organizers. These broadcasting 
rights have also been acquired from International Cricket Council (ICC) 
to broadcast cricket events organised by ICC for the Indian territory. 
7. Keeping in mind the mandate of Section 3 of the Sports Act. the 
appellant informed respondent no. I, i.e., Prasar Bharati on March 07, 
2013 that it would be sharing the live signals with Prasar Bharati of 
cricket matches organised by the ICC. It was followed by another 
letter dated March 14, 2013 wherein the appellant stated that such live 
signals, which the appellant would be sharing with Prasar Bharati, shall 
contain certain added features comprising of commercial elements. 
Prasar Bharati replied vide letter dated April 06, 2013 informing the 
appellant that under the law, appellant's obligations is to share the signals 
without any commercials. The appellant responded by stating that under 
the contract with the sporting event organizers, the appellant was 
receiving the feed containing certain advertisements by the organizer of
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
[A.K. oIKRI, J.] 
the sporting events and, therefore, the signals were transmitted as it is, 
including those advertisements which were not the advertisements booked 
by the appellant. It was also stated that as per Section 3 of the Sports 
Act, appellant was to share the live broadcast signal as it is, i.e., the 
manner in which it was received by it from the copyright owner of the 
broadcast (the sporting event organizer) and, therefore, it did not amount 
to any violation of Section 3 of the Sports Act. It was also contended 
that the appellant had no control over the live signals so received. Since 
both the parties remain adamant about their respective position, the 
appellant approached the High Court of Delhi by way of writ petition 
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking following declarations 
and reliefs: 
"(a) a declaration that under the provisions of the Act and the 
Rules framed thereunder, the appellant shall offer to simultaneously 
share with the respondent no. I the same live broadcasting signals 
of sporting events of national importance as provided by the 
appellant to other broadcast network service providers in India, 
without insertion of the appellant's commercial advertisements; 
(b) a declaration that the live broadcasting signals of sporting 
events of national importance shared by the appellant with the 
respondent no. I under Section 3 of the Act shall be the best feed 
as received from
site with all features inclusive ofany commercials 
of the event owner and without insertion of any commercial 
advertisements by the appellant. 
(c) a writ of certiorari to quash and set-aside the communication 
dated 06111 April, 2013 issued by the respondent no. 1; 
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(d) hold and declare Rule 5 of the Sports Rules in violative of 
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Section 3 of the Act and ultra-vires Article 14 of the Constitution; 
( e) Hold and declare that upon the appellant offering to share t he 
world feed of the relevant matches of the Champions Trophy 
2013 without its commercial advertisement with the respondent, 
it has discharged its obligation under Section 3 of the Act; and 
o 
(f) Such other writ, order or direction as the court may deem fit in 
the interest of justice." 
8. Insofar as vi res of Rule 5 of the Rules, 2007 is concerned, the 
High Court repelled the contention of the said Rule being ultra vires the 
provisions of Section 3 of the Sports Act with the reason that this Rule 
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simply obliges the content right owner or the holder or a broadcast service 
provider to comply with the statutory provisions of the Act, which in any 
case was the obligation of the broadcaster even if Rule 5 was not to 
exist. Thereafter, the High Court came to the fulcrum of the dispute 
and noted that insofar as plain language of Section 3 of the Sports Act is 
concerned, it categorically casts an obligation on the broadcaster to share 
the life broadcasting signals without its advertisements, with Prasar 
Bharati. We would produce the text of Section 3 at this juncture: 
"3. Mandatory sharing of ce1iain sports broadcasting signals -
(I) No content rights owner or holder and no television or radio 
broadcasting service provider shall carry a live television broadcast 
on any cable or Direct-top-Home network or radio commentary 
broadcast in India of sporting events ofnational importance, unless 
it simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signal, without its 
adve1iisements, with the Prasar Bharati to enable them to re-
transmit the same on its terrestrial networks and Direct-to-Home 
networks in such manner and on such terms and conditions as 
may be specified. 
(2) The terms and conditions under sub-section (I) shall also 
provide that the advertisement revenue sharing between the 
content rights owner or holder and the Prasar Bharati shall be in 
the ratio of not Jess than 75:25 in case of
television coverage and 
50:50 in case of radio coverage. 
(3) The Central Government may specify a percentag_e of the 
revenue received by the Prasar Bharati under sub-section (2), 
which shall be utilised by the Prasar Bharati for broadcasting other 
sporting events." 
The High Court noted that the arguments of the appel !ant was that 
the contents were to be shared 'without its_ advertisements' which meant 
no advertisements of the Broadcaster and, therefore, this expression did 
not include advertisements inserted in the feed by the event organizer. 
This argument is, however, rejected in the following manner: 
"The expression 'unless it simultaneously shares the live 
broadcasting signal, without its advertisements, with the Prasar 
Bharati .... ' with reference to the two words 'its advertisements' 
in the phrase, admits of the phrase having only one meaning and 
not admitting two. The only one meaning that the live broadcast 
signals have to be without any advertisements for the reason the
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
rules of English grammar guide us that the subject of (the single 
sentence) sub-section (1) of Section 3, is 'the content right owner 
or holder or radio broadcasting service provider' and the three 
words 'without its advertisements' are a sub-clause constituting a 
condition and since the three words immediately follow the words 
'live broadcasting signal' they have to be, plainly read, as a condition 
concerning the live broadcast service provider; meaning thereby, 
whosoever airs a live television broadcast of sporting events of 
national importance must share the same without any 
advertisements insetied with Prasar Bharati." 
9. The submission of the appellants that it had no control over the 
live signals which included the advertisements of the event organizer 
was also dismissed with following observations: 
"We need not discuss the effect of the petitioner having no control 
over the live signals and the effect of the. legislative provision i.e. 
Section 3( 1 ), casting an obligation upon the petitioner which is 
impossible of being performed by the petitioner or obliges the 
petitioner to violate its contractual obligations with the copyright 
owner of the broadcast, for the reason the same would relate to 
the vi res of Section 3(1) of the Act; and we highlight once again 
. that the vires of Section 3( 1) of the Act has not been cha I lenged." 
The aforesaid is the central theme of the impugned
judgment of the 
High Court. Though, in addition, the High Court has touched upon certain 
other peripheral aspects as well, but that need not be mentioned at this 
stage. 
10. The arguments which were advanced by Dr. A.M. Singhvi, 
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant are stated in 
summarised form hereinbelow: 
(I) In the first instance, it was argued that 'On-Screen Credits' 
put in by the event organizers themselves cannot be treated as 
advertisements at all. As these features were the integral part of the 
feeds that the appellant was receiving from the organizers for the purpose 
of broadcasting. These credits were logos of the event sponsors whic;h 
were appearing on the screen as per the agreement between the event 
sponsors and the event organizers. Following examples are given by tbe 
appellants: 
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STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
129 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
WEST IMOlES 11 NEW lE.A.lANO 
-·-----
MATCH SUMMARY 
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A 
In the aforesaid photographs LG, Fly Emirates, Reliance and Pepsi 
are the logos of the event sponsors which are embedded in the feeds 
that are received. 
(ll) Taking the aforesaid argument further, it was submitted that in 
any case the appellant gets those logos embedded as it is and has not 
B 
control over the same. It was argued that while sharing the signals with 
Prasar Bharati, there was no mechanism or methodology to remove 
these logos. 
(Ill) It was submitted that in the aforesaid context, the said logos 
could not be treated as commercial advertisements and the purpose of 
c 
Section 3 of the Sports Act was not to share only those kinds of 
advertisements which were commercial in nature, i.e., book by the 
Broadcaster/appellant from which the appellant had received the revenue 
and generated income. In other words, it was argued that having regard 
to purposive interpretation which was to be given to the expression 
'without its advertisements' the aforesaid logos would not come within 
D · the mischief of the aforesaid expression. It is in the same hue, the 
argument of Dr. Singhvi was that not only those advertisements which 
were inserted at the instance of the broadcasting organisation carrying 
live signal in India, were required to be removed as per Section 3 of the 
Sports Act, it was emphatically emphasised that broadcasting 
E 
organizations, like appellants, are only authorised by respective event
owners, as also under law, to insert advertisements during normal and 
routine breaks in the live play of an event/match, such as end of overs, 
fall ofwicket(s), lunch break, drinks break, injury, rain etc. 
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11. It was also argued that there is a distinction between the event/ 
match as played and the event/match as broadcast. The broadcast of 
an event/match contains not on'ly the live event/match as played on the 
field but also certain enhancement in the form of features. These features 
aid the viewer in better understanding and appreciating the game and as 
such enhance the viewership experience. These features/On-Screen 
Credits are as much a part of the broadcast of an event as the play of 
the event itself. As per the appellant, the obligation under Section 3 is to 
simultaneously share the live 'broadcasting signals' which are received 
by an entity carrying the television broadcast in India and not just the live 
'event' itself. However, as a result of the impugned judgment, the 
appellant will be·wmpelled to share the live 'event' and not the live 
'broadcast signal' of the event. The appellant submits that it is not
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
practically feasible for a broadcaster to remove the on-screen credits 
inserted by the event organizer in the live signals and simultaneously 
share the same signals (as provided to other service providers such as 
cable and private DTH networks) with Prasar Bharati. In the past 
when the appellant was compelled to provide a clean feed, the appellant 
was constrained to procure a separate feed at a considerable cost as it 
was not practically feasible for the appellant to remove the insertions of 
the event organizer while simultaneously sharing the same feed with 
Prasar Bharati. The appellant submits that the mandate of the Act is 
simultaneous sharing and not procuring and providing a separate live 
feed to Prasar Bharati. 
12. Dr. Singhvi laid emphasis on the words 'simultaneously shares 
the live broadcasting signals' and submitted that since the obligation was 
to share it 'simultaneously' i.e., 'as it is' the sharing of the signals with 
logos coming from the organizers were not supposed to be removed. 
Another submission of Dr. Singhvi was that Section 3 was expropriate 
in nature, i.e. contra proferantem. ln order to buttress this argument, 
the learned senior counsel argued that the purport of sharing the signals 
without advertisement was that ifthe advertisements are also included 
along with the other contents, the Broadcaster becomes the beneficiary 
of having much larger audience and viewers and,
therefore, in such 
cases Prasar Bharati wanted its share in such advertisement. In the 
instant case when the appellant had not earned any income from these 
advertisements as these were not booked by the appellant, there was no 
question of sharing alleged income. Reference was made to the judgment 
of this Court in Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply 
Company of Orissa Limited (Southco) and Another vs. Sri Seetaram 
Rice Mi/11 wherein rule of purposive interpretation was explained in the 
following manner: 
"46. "Purposive construction" is certainly a cardinal principle of 
interpretation. Equally true is that no rule of interpretation should 
either be overstated or overextended. Without being overextended 
or overstated, this rule of interpretation can be applied to the 
present case. It points to the conclusion that an interpretation which 
would attain the object and purpose of the Act has to be given 
precedence over any other interpretation which may not further 
the cause of the statute. The development of law is particularly 
1 (2012i 2 sec 10s 
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liberated both from literal and blinkered interpretation, though to a 
limited extent. 
4 7. The precepts of interpretation of contractual documents have 
also undergone a wide-ranged variation in the recent times. The 
result has been subject to one important exception to assimilate 
the way in which such documents are interpreted by Judges on 
the common sense principle by which any serious utterance would 
be interpreted by ordinary life. In other words, the common sense 
view relating to the implication and impact of provisions is the 
relevant consideration for interpreting a term of document so as 
to achieve temporal proximity of the end result. 
48. Another similar rule is the rule of practical interpretation. This 
test can be effectually applied to the provisions of a statute of the 
present kind. It must be understood that an interpretation which 
upon application of the provisions at the ground reality, would 
frustrate the very law should not be accepted against the common 
sense view which will fu11her such application. 
49. Once the court decides that it has to take a purposive 
construction as opposed to textual construction, then the legislative 
purpose sought to be achieved by such an interpretation has to be 
kept in mind. We have already indicated that keeping in view the 
legislative scheme and the provisions of the 2003 Act, it will be 
appropriate to adopt the approach of purposive
construction on 
the facts of this case. We have also indicated above that the 
provisions of Section 126 of the 2003 Act are intended to cover 
the cases over and above the cases which would be specifically 
covered under the provisions of Section 135 of the 2003 Act." 
13. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on the 
judgment of this case in Davis vs. Sebastim11, wherein it was held as 
under: 
"8. Now, what is the meaning of the expression "personal use" in 
G 
sub-section (8) It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that 
words in a statute shall be given their natural, ordinary meaning; 
nothing should be added to them nor should any word be treated 
as otiose. Two comprehensive expressions "additional 
accommodation" and "personal use" are employed in sub-section 
----
H 
'(1999) 6 sec 604
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
[A.K. S!KRI, J.] 
(8). The expression "additional accommodation" takes in both 
residential as well as non-residential buildings. "Personal use" is 
also an expression of wide amplitude. There is nothing in the sub-
section which restricts the import of that expression. The said 
requirement of sub-section (8) will be complied with on the 
satisfaction of the Controller about bona fide need of the additional 
accommodation for personal use of the landlord. To what use the 
additional accommodation should be put, is the choice of the 
landlord. In the case ofa non-residential building whether a new 
business should be set up in the additional accommodation or 
whether it should be used for expansion of the existing business, 
is left entirely to the option of the landlord. This, being the 
intendment of the legislature, the court cannot impose any 
restriction with regard to the use of the additional accommodation 
from which the eviction of the tenant is sought." 
14. It was next contended that the word 'its' occurring in the 
expression 'without its advertisements' was referable to the Broadcaster 
and, therefore, on the application of the rule ofliteral construction, those 
logos which were embedded by the event organizers could not be treated 
as the advertisements of the appellant. Dr. Singhvi also endeavored to 
take solace from V.B. Raju Vs. Union of India mu/ Otllers3 in support 
of his contention that otherwise the word
'its' would be rendered otiose, 
ifthe aforesaid interpretation as suggested by the appellant is not made 
applicable. 
15. The aforesaid submissions of the learned senior counsel for the 
appellant were countered by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney 
General for India. At the outset, he drew our attention to the prayers 
made in the writ petition and, in particular, prayers (a) and (b) and 
submitted that these involve disputed question of facts, viz., whether the 
appellant, by sharing the signals/world feed was simultaneously passing 
advertisements therein as well? And whether under the given 
circumstances, such advertisements were of commercial nature and were 
offensive of Section 3 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder? He 
submitted that the appellant was trivializing the issue by giving it the 
nomenclature of' logo' but the fact remains that those logos were of the 
advertisers/sponsors who had given it purely for commercial purposes. 
The learned Attorney General referred to the counter affidavit which 
'wso (Suppl sec 513 
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was filed in the High Court wherein a specific stand was taken by Prasar 
Bharati that it is the appellant who is inserting commercials in the feed 
and not ICC, as is clear from the following averments made in the counter 
affidavit: 
"Without prejudice to what has been stated above, it is submitted 
that ion fact it is the appellant who is inserting commercials in the 
feed and not ICC. The answering respondent understands that it 
is the appellant who is producing the feed for and on behalf of 
ICC from the ground. The feed as is generated from the ground 
is free of all commercials. It is thereafter that the commercials 
are inserted. It is another matter that the insertion of commercials 
. takes hardly a second but the assertion of the appellant that it has 
not control over the insertion is clearly incorrect." 
He then referred to para 26 of the rejoinder affidavit wherein the 
aforesaid assertion of the respondent was denied by the appellant. He, 
thus, argued that these are the disputed questions of facts which could 
not be gone in a writ petition, and as a consequence in the present appeal, 
his submission was that ifthe appellant wanted to raise pure legal question 
it had to be decided on the premise that the appellant had inserted those 
advertisements and insofar as Prasar Bharati is concerned, it had received 
the feeds with the said advertisements and that was the only basis on 
which the
issue at hand could be decided by applying the legal provisions. 
16. Mr. Rohtagi then referred to the preamble to the Sports Act, 
2007 highlighting the object with which the said Act was enacted and 
submitted that it is that spirit and objective which has to be kept in mind 
while construing the provisions of Section 3 of the Sports Act. 
17. Insofar as interpretation that is to be given to the word 'its' 
occurring in the expression 'without its advertisements', he submitted 
that Section 3 mentions three categories, namely, (a) content right owner; 
(b) holder; and (c) service provider. According to him, the word 'its' 
was relatable to any of the aforesaid three categories and, therefore, 
even if it is presumed that the logos/advertisements in the world feed 
are inserted by the event organizers, that also falls within the mischief of 
the aforesaid provision. Basic idea, according to him, was that the feed 
generated has to be free of ads. 
18. Mr. Rohtagi also referred to the provisions of sub-section (2) 
of Section 3 of the Act to highlight the purpose of sharing the revenue
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
[A.K. SlKRJ, J.] 
which was in the ratio of75:25, i.e., 75% for the Broadcaster and 25% 
revenue was to be given to Prasar Bharati. His submission that the 
statutory provision was enacted to compensate Prasar Bharati for 
showing the advertisements which were booked by the Broadcaster or 
even event sponsors who had earned money therefrom. 
19. Mr. Rohtagi also took aid of Rule 2(b) of the Rules for 
interpreting Section 3 appropriately and submitted that the words 'content 
rights owner or holder' clearly meant all the three aforesaid categories. 
In view of Rule 5 of the Rules, he argued that it was the responsibility of 
the appellant to take care of ICC even if it is presumed that ICC as 
event organizer had given world feed in that manner. 
20. Proceeding therefrom, the next argument of the learned Attorney 
General was that such a provision cannot be treated as expropriately, as 
the revenue was shared between the parties. 
21. Concluding his submissions, Mr. Rohtagi referred to the judgment 
of this Court in Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcastinf:, 
Govt. of India and Others Vs. Cricket Association of Bengal and 
Otlter' wherein it was held that airwaves are public property. He 
submitted that paragraph 78 which was reliedupon by the appellant had 
to be read in conjunction with paragraph 79. Both these paras read as 
under: 
"78. There is no doubt that since the airwaves/frequencies are a 
public property and
are also limited, they have to be used in the 
best interest of the society and this can be done either by a central 
authority by establishing its own broadcasting network or regulating 
the grant of licences to other agencies, including the private 
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agencies. What is further, the electronic media is the most powerful 
F 
media both because of its audio-visual impact and its widest reach 
covering the section of the society where the print media does not 
reach. The right to use the airwaves and the content of the 
programmes, therefore, needs regulation for balancing it and as 
well as to prevent monopoly of information and views relayed, 
G 
which is a potential danger flowing from the concentration of the 
right to broadcast/telecast in the hands either of a central agency 
or of few private affluent broadcasters. That is why the need to 
have a central agency representative of all sections of the society 
'(1995J 2 sec 161 
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free from control both of the Government and the dominant 
influential sections of the society. This is not disputed. But to 
contend that on that account the restrictions to be imposed on the 
right under Article 19(1 )(a) should be in addition to those 
permissible under Article 19(2) and dictated by the use of public 
resources in the best interests of the society at large, is to 
misconceive both the content of the freedom of speech and 
expression and the problems posed by the element of public 
property in, and the alleged scarcity of, the frequencies as well as 
by the wider reach of the media. If the right to freedom of speech 
and expression includes the right to disseminate information to as 
wide a section of the population as is possible, the access which 
enables the right to be so exercised is also an integral part of the 
said right. The wider range of circulation of information or its 
greater impact cannot restrict the content of the right nor can it 
justify its denial. The virtues of the electronic media cannot become 
its enemies. It may warrant a greater regulation over licensing 
and control and vigilance on the content of the programme telecast. 
However, this control can only be exercised within the framework 
of Article 19(2) and the dictates of public interests. To plead for 
other grounds is to plead for unconstitutional measures. It is further 
difficult to appreciate such
contention on the part of the 
Government in this country when they have a complete control 
over the frequencies and the content of the programme to be 
telecast. They control the sole agency of telecasting. They are 
also armed with the provisions of Article 19(2) and the powers of 
pre-censorship under the Cinematograph Act and Rules. The only 
limitation on the said right is, therefore, the limitation ofresources 
and the need to use them for the benefit of al I. When, however, 
there are surplus or unlimited resources and the public interests 
so demand or in any case do not prevent telecasting, the validity 
of the argument based on limitation of resources disappears. It is 
true that to own a frequency for the purposes of broadcasting is a 
costly affair and even when there are surplus or unlimited 
frequencies, only the affluent few will own them and will be in a 
position to use it to subserve their own interest by manipulating 
news and views. That also poses a danger to the freedom of 
speech and expression of the have-nots by denying them the truthful 
information on all sides of an issue which is so necessary to form
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
a sound view on any subject. That is why the doctrine of fairness 
has been evolved in the US in the context of the private broadcasters 
licensed to share the limited frequencies with the central agency 
like the FCC to regulate the programming. But this·phenomenon 
occurs even in the case of the print media of all the countries. 
Hence the body like the Press Council of India which is 
empowered to enforce, however imperfectly, the right to reply. 
The print media further enjoys as in our country, freedom from 
pre-censorship unlike the electronic media. 
79. As stated earlier, we are not concerned in the present case 
with the right of the private broadcasters, but only with the limited 
right for telecasting particular cricket matches for particular hours 
of the day and for a particular period. It is not suggested that the 
said right is objectionable on any of the grounds mentioned in 
Article 19(2) or is against the proper use of the public resources. 
The only objection taken against the refusal to grant the said right 
is that of the limited resources. That objection is completely 
misplaced in the present case since the claim is not made on any 
of the frequencies owned, controlled and utilised by Doordarshan. 
The right claimed is for uplinking the signal generated by the BCCI/ 
CAB to a satellite owned by another agency. The objection, 
therefore, is devoid of any merit and untenable in law. It also
displays a deliberate obdurate approach." 
22. We have given our due, deep and pervasive consideration to 
the submissions of counsel for both the parties, which they deserve. It is 
clear from the contents of the arguments that the contentions are virtually 
the same which were projected before the High Court; the only difference 
could be that the arguing counsel have projected a melange of much 
more clarity, deftness and dexterity in their pellucid arguments. 
23. At the outset it needs to be remarked that vires of the provisions 
of Section 3 of the Sports Act are not questioned. It is only interpretation 
that has to be placed on the said provision, on which the parties have 
joined issue. Therefore, we have to ascertain the true meaning and 
scope of Section 3 of the Act and on attaining this task, answer to the 
issue would become available. 
24. We may also mention that though the provisions of Rule 5 of 
the Rules were challenged on the ground that these are ultra vi res Section 
3 of the Act, after the High Court has negatived this challenge, this 
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argument was not persisted in this Court. Therefore, we have also to 
proceed in the matter, keeping in view the provisions of Rule 5 of the 
Rules. We may, however, hasten to add the reason given by the High 
Court in repelling the argument that Rule 5 of the Rules is ultra vires 
Section 3 is well founded even otherwise. With the aforesaid preliminary 
remarks, we proceed to analyse the arguments and discuss the issue 
involved. 
25. Provisions of Section 3 of the Act have already been taken 
note of. We would like to quote hereunder, the text of Section 2(b) which 
defines 'broadcasting' along with Section 2(d) and Section 2(h) which 
provide definitions of' broadcasting networks service' 'content' as wel 1 
as Rules 2(b), 3 and 5. 
"(b) "broadcasting" means assembling and programming any form 
of communication content, like signs, signals, writing, pictures, 
images and sounds, and either placing it in the electronic form on 
electro-magnetic waves on specifie frequencies and transmitting 
it through space or cables to make it continuously available on the 
carrier waves, or continuously streaming it in digital data form on 
the computer networks, so as to be accessible to single or multiple 
users through receiving devices either directly or indirectly; and 
all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions; 
(d) "broadcasting networks service" means a service, which 
provides a network of
infrastructure of cables or transmitting 
devices for carrying broadcasting content in electronic form on 
specified frequencies by means of guided or unguided electro-
magnetic waves to multiple users, and includes the management 
and operation of any of the following: 
(i) Teleport/Hub/Earth Station, 
(ii) Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Network, 
(iii) Multisystem Cable Television Network, 
G 
(iv) Local Cable Television Network, 
(v) Satellite Radio Broadcasting Network, 
(vi) any other network service as may be prescribed by the Central 
Government; 
H 
(h) "content" means any sound, text, data, picture (still or moving),
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
139 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
other audio-visual representation, signal or intelligence of any 
A 
nature or any combination thereof which is capable of being 
created, processed, stored, retrieved or communicated 
electronically; 
5. The Central Government shall take all sµch measures, as it 
deems fit or expedient, by way ofissuing Guidelines for mandatory 
B 
sharing of broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati relating to 
sporting events of national importance: 
Provided that the Guidelines issued before the promulgation of 
the Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar 
Bharati) Ordinance, 2007( Order 4 of2007), shall be deemed to 
C 
have been issued validly under the provisions of this section. 
Rule 2(b) 'content rights owner or holder' ·shall mean a person 
for the time being having or holding the broadcasting rights in 
respect of a sporting event of national importance within the 
territory oflndia; 
o 
Rule 3 3 Sharing of Sports Broadcasting Signals with Prasar 
Bharati. (1) Every content rights owner or holder and television 
or radio broadcasting service provider intending to carry a live 
television broadcast on any cable television network or Direct-to-
Home network or intending to make a radio commentary broadcast 
E 
in India, of a sporting event of national importance shall at least 
forty- five days prior to the proposed date of telecast or broadcast, 
inform the Prasar Bharati about the same and
offer to share the 
live signals in the manner and on such terms and conditions as are 
hereunder specified. 
(2) The content rights owner or holder and television or radio 
broadcasting service provider shall provide the live signals to the 
Prasar Bharati at the Master Control Room of Doordarshan or as 
the case may be, the Master Control Room of All India Radio, at 
its own cost. 
(3) The signals to be shared with the Prasar Bharati by the content 
rights owner or holder, shall be the best feed with all features as 
that of provided to a broadcast service provider in India, free 
from commercial advertisements. 
(4) The signals referred to in sub-rules (2) and (3) shall include 
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[2016] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
signals of the pre-live event and the post-live event coverage. 
(5) The Prasar Bharati shall not be under any obligation to carry 
the logo of any channel available in India. 
B 
(6) The Prasar Bharati shall have all the rights to generate, pre, 
post and intermission progra.-iiming. 
(7) The Prasar Bharati shall have the right to retransmit the signals 
on its terrestrial and Direct-to-Home networks including the AM 
and FM Channels of the All India Radio. 
Rule. 5 - Responsibility of a television or radio channel broadcasting 
c 
the sporting event. If the television or radio broadcasting service 
provider is different from the content rights owner or holder, it 
shall be its duty to ensure that adequate arrangements for 
compliance with the provisions of the Act and the rules are made, 
at the time of acquisition of the rights from the content rights 
owner or holder." 
D 
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26. It is a common case of the parties that the "world feeds" which 
the appellant shares with Prasar Bharati is covered by the definition of 
'broadcasting' under Section 2(b) of the Act and in that sense the appellant 
provides broadcasting network service as defined in Section 2(d) of the 
Act. Further, the 'world feed' would amount to 'content' under Section 
2(h) of the Act. It is these contents which are to be mandatorily shared 
by the appellant with Prasar Bharati. However, at the same time such 
contents have to be 'without its
advertisements'. 
27. First thing which we need to deliberate upon is as to whether 
the logos of the advertisers contained in the 'world feed' shared by the 
appellant with Prasar Bharati amounts to 'advertisement'. As noted 
above, the plea of the appellant in this behalf is that since the broadcast 
signal of the sporting event provided by the event organiser (ICC in the 
instant case) includes these logos and the appellant is supposed to share 
the same as it is with Prasar Bharati, it would not be treated as 
advertisements. It is also argued that these are not commercial 
advertisements as the appellant is not getting any revenue from the 
sponsors. To our mind, this is a specious argument to ward off the situation 
with which the appellant is confronted with. It is not denied by the 
appellant that these logos are of the event sponsors, known as 'On-
Screen Credits' in industry parlance. The appellant has itself shown the 
photographs thereof which have been reproduced by us above. No
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.) 
doubt, such logos or On-Screen Credits may appear at the time of 
featuring replays like ball delivery speed and when a player gets out 
either when he is bowled, run out or caught or they are shown while 
depicting player statistics, scoreboard, match summary, graphs, etc. 
Nonetheless, these are the advertisements the sponsors like Pepsi, LG, 
Fly Emirates, Reliance, etc. These sponsors have entered into arrangement 
for showing their logo on the occasions referred to above. It is also not 
in dispute that these sponsors pay for such On-Screen Credits. Insofar 
as such sponsors are concerned, their motive in giving these logos to be 
shown on Television is crystal clear, viz. it is intended to advertise their 
company names for commercial motives in mind. These are, thus, 
commercials of the sponsors which would clearly be treated as not only 
advertisements but commercial advertisements. Once we hold that what 
is shown are advertisements, the question as to whether these 
advertisements are shown because of some arrangement between the 
organisers of the tournament and the sponsors or as a result of 
arrangement between the broadcasters, i.e. the appellant, and the 
sponsors is immaterial. Section 3 of the Sports Act does not make any 
distinction between the aforesaid two kinds of advertisements. What is 
prescribed, in no uncertain terms, is that sharing of the live broadcasting 
signal has to be without
advertisements. 
28. On a plain reading of Section 3 of the Sports Act, we are inclined 
to agree with the submission of Mr. Rohatgi that the obligation to share 
such sports broadcasting signals is upon the following persons: (i) content 
rights owner; (ii) content holder; and (iii) television or radio broadcasting 
service provider. Any of these above categories of persons are not 
allowed to carry a live television broadcast on: 
(i) any cable or direct-to-home network; 
(ii) radio commentary broadcast in India, 
if 
such television broadcast 
or 
radio commentary broadcast 
happens to be of sporting events which is of national importance 
unless 
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A 
such content rights owner or content holder or broadcasting service 
provider simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signals with Prasar 
Bharati 
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to enable Prasar Bharati to re-transmit the same on its terrestrial networks 
and DTH networks 
in such manner and on such terms and conditions as may be specified. 
29. The guidance for laying down the terms and conditions that can 
be specified on which sharing of the broadcasting signals has to take 
place with Prasar Bharati, is mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 3, 
which specifically mentions that such terms and conditions shall also 
provide that advertisement revenue sharing between the content rights 
owner or holder and Prasar Bharati shall be in the ratio of 75:25 in the 
case of television coverage; and 50:50 in the case of radio coverage. 
Section 4 of the Sports Act, 2007 provides for penalties in case of any 
violations of the terms and conditions as may be specified under Section 
3 subject to the condition that amount of a pecuniary penalty shall not 
exceed I crore. 
30. The preamble of the Act which gives an idea of the purpose 
behind enacting this statute reads as under: 
"An Act to provide access to the largest number of listeners and 
viewers, on a free to air basis, of sporting events of national 
impo11ance through mandatory sharing of sports broadcasting 
signals with Prasar Bharati and for matters connected therewith 
or
incidental thereto. " 
31. ft becomes apparent from the aforesaid reading of the Preamble 
that purpose is to provide access to the largest number of listeners and 
viewers, on a free to air basis, of sporting events of national importance. 
This task is given to Prasar Bharati. Notwithstanding more popularity 
which the private channels have gained over a period of time, coverage 
of Prasar Bharati is far more reaching insofar as Indian population is 
concerned as it reaches almost every nook and corner of the country. 
Further the radio as well as television broadcasting of Prasar Bharat is 
free of cost. ft is for this reason that the law in the form of Sports Act is 
enacted in order to ensure that such sporting events ofnational importance 
are made available to every citizen of this country, irrespective of his/ 
her financial conditions.
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI 
143 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
32. Section 3, thus, aims to achieve two purposes: 
A 
(a)to provide access to largest number of listeners and viewers on 
a free to air basis. The principle of purposive interpretation, in this context, 
meant that Prasar Bharati was supposed to telecast these matches for 
the benefit of general masses spread through out India, who otherwise 
do not receive signals of private channels like the appellant or are not 
B 
having financial capacity to pay for these channels. Thus, it was a 
larger public interest which was sought to be served and noble objective 
was kept in mind while enacting the statute; 
(b)insofar as income that is generated from advertisements is 
concerned, which are shown on television or broadcasted on radio, the 
C 
revenue thereof is to be shared between the Broadcaster and Prasar 
Bharati. The purpose is obvious. It is the broadcasting service provider 
who is supposed to share the live broadcasting signal with Prasar Bharati, 
which has the arrangements with the advertisers and, thus, takes money 
from those who book their advertisements to be broadcasted on television 
or radio. However, when the signals are shared with Prasar Bharati 
enabling it to simultaneously retransmit the same on its terrestrial networks 
or DTH networks, the viewership/ audience gets multiplied as the reach 
is to much larger section of citizenry through Prasar Bharati. Therefore, 
Section 3( I), in the
first instance, mandates that the sharing of live 
broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati has to be 'without its 
advertisements'. Exception is, however, made in sub-section (2) of 
Section 3 which enables the broadcasting service provider to even share 
the contents along with advertisements, but subject to the condition that 
there has to be a sharing ofrevenue in the proportion prescribed in sub-
section (2) ofSection 3. As aforesaid, when live broadcasting signal is 
shared containing advertisements, those advertisements have much larger 
viewership because of its telecast/broadcast on Prasar Bharati. The 
benefit of advertisement in such a case would accrue to those who 
have booked the advertisements and the service provider, in such an 
eventuality would definitely be in a position to charge much more from 
the advertisers. It is a matter of common knowledge that rates of 
advertisement go up when circulation thereof is enhanced. When we 
keep in mind the aforesaid twin objectives of the Act, the answer to the 
issue raised becomes obvious. The application of rule of purposive 
interpretation would go against the appellant and in favour of the 
respondent. 
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33. With this, we advert to the next question, namely, whether the 
word 'its' refers to the advertisements that are booked only by the 
broadcasters, namely, the appellant in the instant case? Let us now 
understand the meaning of the word 'its' occurring in the obligation cast 
upon the broadcasting service provider to share the I ive broadcasting 
signals 'without its advertisements'. From our aforesaid discussion, it 
becomes clear that the sharing of the signals has to be without any 
advertisements and ifthe advertisements are also to be included in the 
signals, there has to be sharing of the revenue. The learned Attorney 
General has rightly argued that the word 'its' cannot be given limited 
meaning by confining it to advertisements only of broadcasting service 
provider. Section 3 which starts with negative covenant very expressly • 
puts an embargo to al I the three categories mentioned therein, viz., content 
rights owner, (ii) contents holder as well as (iii) television or radio 
broadcasting service provider not to have television broadcast either 
through cable or DTH and not to have any radio commentary broadcast 
unless live broadcasting signal is shared simultaneously with Prasar 
Bharati. Examined in this hue, it becomes clear that the words 'without 
its advertisements' which follow immediately after the words 'unless it 
simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signal' has to be given a
meaning that such broadcasting signals are to be without advertisements, 
whether it is of the content rights owner, content holder or that of television 
or radio broadcasting service provider. It is made crystal clear by providing 
the definition of 'content rights owner' or 'holder' in Rule 2(b) of the 
Rules, 2007. Rule 3(3) takes the issue beyond any pale of doubt when it 
mentions that the signals to be shared with Prasar Bharati by the content 
rights owner or holder are to be the best feed that is provided to broadcast 
service provider in India and has to be 'free from commercial 
advertisements'. Thus, even if it is ICC which has included those 
advertisements/logos, the feeds have to be without those logos/ 
advertisements inasmuch as nobody can dispute that the content rights 
owner are content holder, i.e, ICC in the instant case has included those 
logos/advertisements from purely commercial angle. Thus, the 
arrangement between the ICC and the appellant, is totally 
inconse_q uential. 
34. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion would be to conclude 
thatthere is no merit in the instant appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed 
with costs. 
H 
NidhiJain 
Appeal dismissed.