SURAIN SINGH versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 824, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Facts
.. 
. [2017] 2 S.C.R. 824 
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SURAIN SINGH 
v. 
THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
(Criminal Appeal No. 2284 of2009) 
B 
APRIL 10,2017 
[A. K. SIKRI AND R. K. AGRAWAL, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860: 
ss. 300 Exception 4, 30-1 Part JI, 302, 307, 32-1 - Sudden 
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fight - Murder - Bitler hostilfty between the warring factions to 
which accused and deceased belonged - Criminal litigation between 
these factions - Scuffle between the parties in the court when 
appellant-accused objected to the prese11ce of member of the 
opposite side -Appellant-accused at once.took out his Kirpa11 (used 
by 'Amritdhari Sikhs) a11d started giving blows to the opposite party. 
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resulting i11 deat/1 of two - Conviction 1tlss. 302, 307, 324 ·and 
sentenced to life imprisonment along with fine, by the courts below 
- On appeal, held: Where, 011 a".sudden quarrel, a perso11 in the 
heat of the mo111e11t picks up a weapo11 which is handy a11d causes 
injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit 
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of Exception -I provided he has not acted cruelly - On facts, attack 
was not premeditated a11d it was because of the spur of the moment 
and without any i11te11tio11 to cause death - Weapon used by the 
appellam-accused was a small Kirpa11 - It is clear from the materials 
011 record that the incident was in a sudden fight and the appella11r-
accused had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel 
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ma11ner - It can1101. be said that the appellant-accused had any 
imention of causing the
death of the deceased when he committed 
the act in question - lnfident took place out of grave and sudden 
. provocation - All requirements ttls.300 Exception 4 satisfied, thus, 
the accused entitled to the benefit of s. 300 Exception 4 - Accused 
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to be convicted ttls. 30-1 Part II and sentenced to imprisonment for 
10 years. 
· s. JOO Exception 4 - Invocation of - Necessary ingredients -
Explained. 
s. 304 Part I and Part II - Difference. between - Held: If 
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there is iment and knowledge then the same would be a case of s. 
824
. SURAIN SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
825 
304 Part I - If it is only a case of knowledge and not inteption to 
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· cause murder and bodily injury then the sa11ie would fall u/s,., 304 
Part IL 
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Disposing of the. app~al, the, Court · 
. HELD: 1.1 Exception 4 to Section 300 lPC applies in the 
absence of any premeditation. This is very clear from the wordings 
of the Exception itself. The exception contemplates that the 
sudden fight shall start upon the heat of passion on a .sudden 
·quarrel. The fourth exception to Section 300 IPC covers·acts 
done in a sudden fighL The .said Exception deals with a case of 
prov~cation not covered by the first exception, after which its 
place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is 
founded. upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of 
premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception lthere is total 
deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only 
that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges 
them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is 
provocation in Exception 4 as in E~ception 1, but the_injury done 
is not the direct consequence of t.!iat provocation •. In fact, 
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Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow 
' may,have·been struck, or some provocation given in the origin 
of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, 
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yet the subsequent 'coudui:t or both parties puts them in respect' 
ofguilt up'on an
equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual 
provocation and blows on .each side. ·The homicide committed is 
then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in 
. such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it.were 
so, the Exception niore appropriatety'applicable would be 
' Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination 
to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for 'which both parties are 
more or less ~to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, 
but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would 
not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual 
provocation and aggravation, and it is difficuit to apportion the 
share of blame which attaches to each fighter. [Para 7) (831-H; 
832-A-F) 
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1.2 The help or Exception 4 i:an be io"vok~d if death ,is 
c:aused (a) without premeditation, (b} in a sudden !ight, (c) without 
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the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel 
or unusual manner, and (tf) the fight must have been with the 
person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the 
ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that 
the ·"fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not 
defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion 
requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down 
and in this case, the parties bad worked themselves into a fury 
on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a 
combat between two and more persons whether with or without 
weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to 
what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of 
fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily 
depend upon the proved facts of each case. J<'or the application of 
Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden 
quar.rel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown 
that the offender bas not taken undue advantage or acted in a 
cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as 
used in the provision means "unfair advantage". [Para 7) [832-F-
H; 833-A-B) 
1.3 The appellant-accused, at the relevant time, was wearing 
Kirpan and he took out the same and gave 3 or 4 blows on the 
left side of the chest of BS. When the other side came io bis
rescue, the appellant-accused gave a blow on the back side of 
the waist of MS. The appellant-accused was further found to have 
given a blow on the backside of the left shoulder of the 
complainant and also two blows each using Kirpan on the right 
flank of SS and HS. [Para 121 [836-D-E) 
1.4 In the instant case, it is evident from the materials on 
record that there was bitter hostility between the warring factions 
to which the accused and the deceased belonged. Criminal 
litigation was going on between these factions. It is also proved 
from the material on record that the attack was not premeditated 
and preplanned. Both the parties were present in the Court of 
Executive Magistrate at the relevant time with regard to the 
proceedings under Section 107/151 of the Code. When the 
appellant-accused objected the presence of a member of the 
opposite side, the scuffle started between the parties which. 
resulted into death of two persons. The conduct of the ap1>ellant-
SURAIN SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
accused that he at ouce took out his Kirpan aud started giving 
blows to the opposite party proves that the attack was not 
premeditated and it was because of the spur of the moment and 
without any intention to cause death. The occasion for sudden 
fight must not only be sudden but the party assaulted must be on 
an equal footing in point of defence, at least at the onset. [Para 
14) [837-E-G) 
1.5 The weapon used in the fight between the parties is 
'Kirpan' which is used by 'Amritdbari Sikhs' as a spiritual tool. 
In .the instant case, the Kirpan used by the appellant-accused 
was a small Kirpan. In order to find out whether the instrument 
or manner of retaliation was cruel and dangerous in its nature, it 
is clear from the deposition of the Doctor who conducted autopsy 
on the body of the deceased that stab wounds were present on 
· the right side of the chest and of the back of abdomen which 
implies that in the spur of the moment, the appellant-accu~ed 
inflicted injuries using Kirpan though not on the vital -organs of 
the body of the deceased but be stabbed the deceased which 
proved fatal. The injury intended by the accused and actually 
inflicted by him is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to 
cause death or not, must be determined in each case on the basis 
of the facts and circumstances. In the instant case, the injuries 
caused were the result of blow with. a small Kirpan and it cannot 
be presumed that the accused
had intended to cause the inflicted 
injuries. The number of wounds caused d.uring the occurrence is 
not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence 
must have been sudden aud unpremeditated and the offender 
must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must 
not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. 
It is clear from the materials on record that the incident was in a 
sudden fight and the appellant-accused had not taken any undue 
advantage·or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, 
a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is 
handy ai!d causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be 
entitled to the benefit of this Exception provided he has not acted 
cruelly. [Para 15) [837-H; 838-A-E) 
1.6 If there is intent and knowledge then the same. would 
be a case of Section 304 Part I and if it is only a case of knowledge 
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and not intention to cause murder and bodily injury then the same 
would fall under Section 304 Part II. In the facts and circumstances 
of the instant case, it cannot be said that the appellant-accused 
had any intention of causing the death of the deceased when he 
committed the act in question. The incident took place out of 
grave and sudden provocation and hence, the accused is entitled 
to the benefit of Section 300 Exception 4 of the IPC. [Para 16) 
[838-E-F) 
. 
1.7 In entirety, considering the factual scenario of the case 
on hand, the legal evidence on record and in the background of 
legal pdnciples laid dowg by this Court, the inevitable conclusion 
is that the act ofthe appellant-accused was not a cruel act and the 
accused did not take undue advantage of the deceased. The scuffle 
took place in the heat of passion and all the req ulrements under 
Section 300 Exception 4 IPC have been satisfied. Therefore, the 
benefit of Exception 4 under Section 300 IPC is attracted to the 
fact situations and the appellant-accused is entitled to this benefit. 
Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction 
of the appellant-accused would be under Section 304 Part II IPC 
· instead of Section 302 IPC. Hence, the sentence of imprisonment 
for 10 years would meet the ends of justice. (Paras 17, 18) [838-
G-H; 839-A-B) 
State of A.P. v. Raya~arapu Punnayya and Another 
(1976) 4 SCC 382 :
[1977) 1 SCR 601; Budhi Singh v. 
State of Himachal Pradesh (2012) 13 SCC 663 : [2012) 
11 SCR 848; Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1993) 
4 SCC 238 : [1993) 3 SCR 696 - referred to. 
(1977) 1 SCR 601 
[2012) 11 SCR 848 
[1993) 3 SCR 696 
Case Law Reference 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
Para8 
Para 9 · ·· · 
Para 10 
. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:Triminal Appeal No. 
2284 of2009. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.09.2008 of the High Court 
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No. 209-DBA-
IWS. 
.
SURAIN SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
829 
Amipam Lal Das; Raktim Gogoi, Manuj Nagrath, Kartikeya 
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Singh,Anirudh Singh, Sahil Monga, Yadav Narender Singh, N. Gupta, 
Tarun Gupta, Ms. S. Janani, S. Thanwar, Kuldip Singh, V. Madhukar, 
0. K. Khullar, Rishi Malhotra, Advs. for the appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R. K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against the 
judgment and order dated 02.09 .2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab 
& Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 209-DB of 1998 
whereby the Division Bench of the High Court confirmed the order 
dated 26.03.1998 passed by the court of Additional Sessions Judge, 
Faridkot in Sessions Case No. 33of 1995 wherein the appellant herein 
was convicted under Sections 302, 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal 
Code, 1860 (in short 'the !PC') and sentenced to imprisonment for life 
along with fine. 
2. Brief facts: 
(a) Prosecution story, in brief, is that there was dispute between 
one Shri Amrik Singh-the complainant and his relatives on one side and 
accused persons on the other side regarding their turn of irrigating their 
fields. On account of this, earlier also there had been incidents of 
assau !ting each other. In the circumstances, both the parties were facing 
proceedings under Sections 107 /151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973 (in short 'the Code') before the Executive Magistrate, Faridkot. 
(b) On 17.02.1995, when both the parties had come to the court 
of
Executive Magistrate, Faridkot, the complainant (PW-I) along with 
his family members, viz., Raj Singh (PW-3), Harbans Singh (since 
deceased), Sukhchain Singh (PW-2), Mander Singh, Santa Singh (since 
deceased), Gursewak Singh, Banta Singh and others.was present in the 
court premises whereas from the side of accused Surain Singh (the 
appellant-accused) along with Jhanda Singh, Jasmail Singh, Darshan Singh, 
Pal Singh, Boota Singh had also come to the court in order to attend the 
proceedings. 
(c) At about 11 :00 a.ni., both the sides started quarrelling and had 
a heated exchange of words as Surain Singh (the appellant-accused) 
objected to the presence of Bhajan Singh, who was relative of Amrik 
Singh and not a party to the proceedings. Surain Singh-the appellant-
accused, took out his Kirpan and gave a blow to Bhajan Singh. When 
the complainant party tried to stop the appellant-accused, he gave a 
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Kirpan blow to Mander Singh. He also assaulted Harbans Singh (since 
deceased) with Kirpan. Darshan Singh also took out his Kirpan and 
started giving blows to Santa Singh (since deceased). The injured were 
taken to Guru Gobind Singh Medical Hospital Faridkot, where Santa 
Singh and Harbans Singh succumbed to their injuries. 
(d)AFirst Information Report(FIR) being No. 14 dated 17.02.1995 
was registered at Police Station, Faridkot by the complainant under 
Sections 302, 307, 324, 326, 148, 149 of the !PC and the case was 
committed to the Court of Sessions as Sessions Case No. 33 of J 995. 
( e) Learned Additional Sessions Judge, vide order dated 26.03 .1998, 
convicted the appellant-accused under Sections 302, 307 and 324 of the 
IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for life 
along with fine for the murder ofHarbans Singh and Santa Singh. The 
appellant herein was further sentenced to rigorous imprisonment (RI) 
for I (one) year for the offence under Section 324 of the IPC with the 
direction that all the sentences shall run concurrently. Since we are not 
concerned with the conviction and sentence passed against the other 
accused in the present case, we refrain from referring to the same. 
f) Being aggrieved by the order dated 26.03.1998, the appellant 
herein preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 209-DB of 1998 
before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court, vi de
order dated 02.09.2008, partly allowed the appeal of the appellant-accused 
while maintaining the conviction and sentence with regard to murder of 
Harbans Singh under Section 302 of the !PC, infliction of injury to 
Sukhchain Singh under Section 307 of the IPC and infliction of injuries 
on the personofBhajan Singh and Mander Singh under Section 324 of 
the !PC and acquitted him of the charge under Section 302 of the !PC 
forthe commission of murder of Santa Singh. 
g) Aggrieved by the order dated 02.09 .2008, the appellant-accused 
has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court. 
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material 
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on record. 
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4. The only point for consideration before this Court is whether 
the appellant-accused has made out a case for conviction under Section 
304 Part II instead of Section 302 of the IPC? 
5. Since the point for consideration is very limited in the instant
SURA!N SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
831 
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.] . 
case, there is no need to traverse all the factual details rather those 
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having· a bearing on the present appeal. 
6. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to produce Section 300 
which is as under:-
"300.Murder-.Except in the case hereinafter excepted, culpable 
homicide is murder, ifthe act by which the death is caused is done 
with the intention of causing death, or-
Secondly- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily 
injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the 
person to whom the harm is caused, or-
Thirdly-If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to 
any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient 
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-
Fourthly-lf the person committing the act knows that it is so 
imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death 
or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such 
act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or 
such injury as aforesaid. 
Exception !.-When culpable homicide is not murder.-
Culpable homicide is not murder ifthe offender, whilst deprived 
·of the power of self-control by grave .and sudden provocation, 
causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes 
the death of any other person by mistake or accident. 
...... x ..... xx ..... xx ..... x ......... . 
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Exception 4-Culpable homicide is not murder ifit is committed 
without premeditation in a -sudden fight in the heat of passion 
upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue 
advantage or acted in a cruet or unusual manner. 
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Explanation- It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the 
provocation or commits the first assault. 
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7. Exception 4 to Section 300 of the !PC atpplies in the absence of H
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any premeditation. This is very clear from the wordings of the Exception 
itself. The exception contemplates that the sudden fight shall start upon 
the heat of passion on a sudden quarrel. The fourth exception to Section 
300 !PC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals 
with a case of provocation not covered by the first exception, after which 
its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded 
upon the. same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. 
But, while in the case of Exception I there is total deprivation of self-
control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which 
clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would 
not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, 
but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In 
fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow 
may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the 
dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the 
subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon an 
equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on 
each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to 
unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed 
on one side. For ifit were so, the Exception
more appropriately applicable 
would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination 
to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or 
Jess to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but ifthe other 
had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the 
serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, 
and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each 
fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) 
without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders 
having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, 
and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case 
within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is 
to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 !PC 
is not defined in !PC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion 
requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in 
this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of 
the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two 
and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to 
enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden 
quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not
SURAIN SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.] 
must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the 
application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a · 
sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown 
that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or 
unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the 
provision means "unfair advantage" .. 
8. ln Slllte of A.P. vs. Rayavarapu Pu111wyya andAnotfter (1976) 
4 SCC 382, this Court while drawing a distinction between Section 302 
and Section 304 held as under:-
"12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, "culpable homicide" is 
genus and "murder" its specie. All "murder" is "culpable homicide" 
but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, "culpable homicide" sans 
"special characteristics of murder", is "culpable homicide not 
amounting to murder". For the purpose of fixing punishment, 
proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code 
practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The 
first is, what may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree". 
This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in 
Section 300. as "murder". The second may be termed as "culpable 
homicide of the second degree". This is punishable under the first 
part of Section 304. Then, there is "culpable homicide of the third 
degree". This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the 
punishment provided
for it is, also, the lowest among the 
punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of 
this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. 
21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court 
is confronted with the question whether the offence is "murder" 
or "culpabfe homicid~ not amounting to murder", on the facts of a 
case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three 
stages. The question .to be considered at the first stage would be, 
whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused 
the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between 
the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage 
for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to 
"culpable homicide" as defined in Section 299. If the answer to 
this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for 
considering the operation of Section 300 of the Penal Code, is 
reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine 
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whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within 
the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of"murder" 
contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the 
negative the offence would be "culpable homicide not amounting 
to murder", punishable under the first or the second part of Section 
304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third 
clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the 
positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions 
enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be "culpable 
homicide not amounting to murder", punishable under the first 
part of Section 304, of the Penal Code." 
· 9. In Bud/1i Singh vs. State of Hinutclutl Pradesh (2012) 13 
SCC 663 this Court has held as under:-
18. The doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is incapable of 
rigid construction leading to or stating any principle of universal 
application. This will always have to depend on the facts of a 
given case. While applying this principle, the primary obligation of 
the court is to examine from the point of view of a person of 
r.easonable prudence if there was such grave and sudden 
provocation so as to reasonably conclude that it was possible to 
commit the offence of culpable homicide, and as per the facts, 
was not a culpable homicide amounting to murder. An offence 
resulting from grave and sudden provocation
would normally mean 
that a person placed in such circumstances could lose self-control 
but only temporarily and that too, in proximity to the time of 
provocation. The provocation could be an act or series of acts 
done by the deceased to the accused resulting in inflicting of injury. 
19. Another test that is applied more often than not is that the 
behaviour of the assailant was that of a reasonable person. A fine 
distinction has to be kept in mind between sudden and grave 
provocation resulting in sudden and temporary loss of self-control 
and the one which inspires· an actual intention to kill. Such act 
should have been done during the continuation of the state of 
mind and the time for such person to kill and reasons to regain the 
dominion over the mind. Once there is premeditated act with the 
intention to kill, it will obviously fall beyond the scope ofculpable 
homicide not amounting to murder ..... "
SURAIN SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.] 
I 0. In Kikar Sill git vs. State of Rajastlwn ( 1993) 4 SCC 23 8, 
this Court held as under:-
"8. The counsel attempted to bring the case within Exception 4. 
For its application all the conditions enumerated therein must be 
satisfied. The act must be committed without premeditation in a 
sudden fight in the heat of passion; (2) upon a sudden quarrel; (3) 
without the offender's having taken undue advantage; ( 4) and the 
accused had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Therefore, 
there must be a mutual combat or exchanging blows on each 
other. And however slight the first blow, or provocation, every 
fresh blow becomes a fresh provocation. The blood is already 
heated or warms up at every subsequent stroke. The voice of 
reason is heard on neither side in the heat of passion. Therefore, 
it is difficult to apportion between them respective degrees of 
blame with reference to the state of things at the commencement 
of the fray but it must occur as a consequence of a sudden fight 
i.e. mutual combat and not one side track. It matters not what the 
cause of the quarrel is, whether real or imaginary, or who draws 
or strikes first. The strike of the blow must be without any intention 
to kill or seriously injure the other. If two men start fighting and 
one of them 'is unarmed while the other uses a deadly weapon, 
the one who uses such weapon must be held to have taken an 
undue advantage denying him the
entitlement to Exception 4. True 
the number of wounds is not the criterion, but the position of the 
accused and the deceased with regard to their arms used, the 
manner of combat must be kept in mind when applying Exception 
4. When the deceased was not armed but the accused was and 
caused it!juries to the deceased with fatal results, the Exception 4 
engrafted to Section 300 is excepted and the offences committed 
would be one of murder. 
9. The occasion for sudden quarrel must not only be sudden but 
the party assaulted must be on an equal footing in point of defence, 
at least at the onset. This is specially so where the attack is made 
with dangerous weapons. Where the deceased was unarmed and 
did not cause any i1tjury to the accused even following a sudden 
quarrel if the accused has inflicted fatal blows on the deceased, 
Exception 4 is not attracted and commission must be one of murder 
punishable under Section 302. Equally for attracting Exception 4 
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it is necessary that blows should be exchanged even if they do not 
all find their target Even if the fight is unpremeditated and sudden, 
yet if the instrument or manner of retaliation be greatly 
disproportionate to the offence given, and cruel and dangerous in 
its nature, the accused cannot be protected under Exception 4 .... " 
11. Now, we have to consider the facts of th is case on the 
touchstone of Section 300 Exception 4 in order to find out whether the 
case falls under the same or not. During the course of hearing, learned 
counsel for the appellant-accused strenuously contended before this Court 
that the High Court recorded a categorical finding that "an inescapable 
conclusion that can be drawn is that it was a case of sudden fight where 
the attack was without pre-meditation." He further contended that despite 
holding so, the High Court erroneously convicted the appellant-accused 
under Section 302 of the IPC instead of Section 304 Part II on the 
ground that the appellant-accused had acted in cruel manner and had 
caused injuries to six persons and a·death. 
12. The appellant-accused, at the relevant time, was wearing 
Kirpan and he took out the same and gave 3 or 4 blows on the left side 
of the chest ofBhajan Singh. When the other side came to his rescue,· 
the appellant-accused gave a blow on the back side of the waist of 
Mander Singh. The appellant-accused was further found to have given 
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a blow
on the backside of the left shoulder of Amrik Singh-the complainant 
and also two blows each using Kirpan on the right flank of Sukhchain 
Singh and Harbans Singh. 
13. ln view of the above, it is relevant to quote the statement of 
Dr. Sarabjit Singh Sandhu (PW-4), who conducted the autopsy on the 
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body ofHarbans Singh, which is as under:-
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"On the same day, at 4.50 p.m. I also conducted the post mortem 
examination on the dead bodyofHarbans Singh S/o Mandir Singh 
Rio Pakhi Khurd 27 years age, male brought by AS! Sukhdev 
Singh and HC Parson Singh No. 1432 of P.S. City Faridkot. Body 
was identified by Bohar Singh S/o Ajmer Singh and Tej Singh S/o 
Kartar Singh. Length of the body was 5'9". It was dead body of 
moderately built and moderately nourished young man wearing 
Sweater, Shirt, Jarsi, Paint, Kachha, Turban, Short Kirpan with 
black thread, White metallic kara in right forearm. P.M. staining 
as present series of marked patches at the back of trunk and
- SURAIN SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.] 
lower limbs. Rigor mortis was present in the neck.muscles and 
upper limbs. Absent in lower limbs (developing stage) clothes 
were blood stained and corresponding holes were present with 
clothes. I found the following injuries on his person:-
!. An onlique stab wound 3 x 0.5 cm was present on the lateral 
side of right side of chest in mid Axiliary line 22 cm below the 
Axillary apax. C.RP. it was bone deep. 
2. A transverse stab wound 2.0 x 5 cm was presentation the right · 
side back of abdomen, 8 ems below and lateral of injury no. 1 
on exploring, it was going medially and in words cutting 
subcutaneous tissue, muscles, right kidney. Peritoneum and 
large intestine. Peritoneum cavity contained above 1000 C.C. 
of fluid and clotted blood. Stomach contained about 150 C.C. 
of semi digested food. All other organs were healthy. 
All the injuries were anti mortem in nature. The cause of death in 
this case in my opinion was due to right kidney (hemorrhage and 
shock)-and large intestine, as a result of injury no. 2 which was 
sufficient to cause death in ordinary course.of nature." 
14. In the instant case, it is evident from the materials on record 
that there was bitter hostility between the warring factions to which the 
accused and the deceased belonged. Criminal litigation was going on 
between these factions. It is also proved from the material on record 
that the attack was not premeditated and preplanned.
Both the parties 
were present in the Court of Executive Magistrate, Faridkot atthe relevant 
time with regard to the proceedings unde~ Section I 07 /151 of the Code. 
When the appellant-accused objected the presence of a member of the 
opposite side, the scuffle started between the parties which resulted into 
death of two persons. The conduct of the appellant-accused that he at 
once took out his Kirpan and started giving blows to the opposite party 
proves that the attack was not premeditated and it was because of the 
spur of the moment and without any intention to cause death. The 
occasion for sudden fight must not only be sudden but the party assaulted 
must be on an equal footing in point of defence, at least at the onset. 
15. The weapon used in the fight between the parties is 'Kirpan' 
which is used by 'Amritdhari Sikhs' as a spiritual tool. In the present 
case, the Kirpan used by the appellant-accused was a small Kirpan. In 
order to find out whether the instrument or manner of retaliation was 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] 2 S.C.R. 
cruel and dangerous in its nature, it is clear from the deposition of the 
Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased that stab 
wounds were present on the right side of the chest and of the back of 
abdomen which implies that in the spur of the moment, the appellant-
accused inflicted injuries using Kirpan though not on the vital organs of 
~he body of the deceased but he stabbed the deceased which proved 
fatal. The injury intended by the accused and actually inflicted by him is 
sufficient in the ordinary course ofnature to cause death or not, must be 
detennined in each case on the basis of the facts and circumstances. In 
the instant case, the injuries caused were the result of blow with a small 
Kirpan and it cannot be presumed that the accused had intended to 
cause the inflicted injuries. The number of wounds caused during the 
·occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the 
occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender 
must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have 
taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. It is clear from 
the materials on record that the incident was in a sudden fight and we 
are of.the opinion that the appellant-accused had not taken any undue 
advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a 
person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy
and 
causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the 
benefit of this Exception provided he has not acted cruelly. 
16. Thus, if there is intent and knowledge then the same would be 
a case of Section 304 Part I and if it is only a case of knowledge and not 
intention to cause murder and bodily injury then the same would fall 
under Section 304 Part II. We are inclined to the view that in the facts 
and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the appellant-
accused had any intention of causing the death of the deceased when he 
committed the act in question. The incident took place out of grave and 
sudden provocation and hence the accused is entitled to the benefit of 
Section 300 Exception 4 of the !PC. 
· 
17. Thus, in entirety, considering the factual scenario of the case 
on hand, the legal evidence on record and in the background of legal 
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra, the 
inevitable conclusion is that the act of the appellant-accused was not a 
cruel act and the accused did not take undue advantage of the deceased. 
The scuffle took place in the heat of passion and all the requirements 
under Section 300 Exception 4 of the !PC have been satisfied. Therefore,
SURAIN SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 
839 
[R. K: AGRAWAL, J.] 
the benefit of Exception 4 under Section 300 IPC is attracted to the fact 
A 
situations and the appellant-accused is entitled to this benefit. 
18. Thus, considering the factual background and the legal position 
set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction 
of the appellant-accused would be under Section 304Part11 IPC instead 
of Section 302 IPC. Hence, the sentence of imprisonment for Hi years 
B 
would meet the ends of justice. 
19. The appeal is disposed of in the abovesaid terms. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal disposed of. 
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