LILAWATI AGARWAL ETC. versus THE STATE OF JHARKHAND ETC.
[2016] 2 S.C.R. 292, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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[2016] 2 S.C.R. 292 
LILAWATI AGARWAL ETC. 
v. 
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND ETC. 
(Civil Appeal No. 1363 of2007) 
APRILOl,2016 
[DIPAK MISRA, V. GOPALA GOWDA AND KURIAN 
JOSEPH, JJ.] 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. 23 (2) [as amended by Land 
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1894} -Land Acquisition (Amendment) 
Act, 1984 - s. 30(2) - Enhanced solatium - Benefit of-- As extended 
by s. 30(2) of Amendment Act - Interpretation of s. 30(2) of 
Amendment Act given by Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh case 
- Clarification in K.S. Paripoornan (II) case by Three Judge Bench 
- Jn the present case Division Bench expressed doubt with regard 
to correctness of decision in Paripoornan (II) case in view of the 
;udgment in Raghubir Singh 's case and hence referred the 111a1ter to 
Larger Bench - Held: The decision in Raghubir Singh 's case was 
confined only to grant of solatium in re~pect of award passed 
between the two dates i.e. 30.04.1982 and 24.09.1984 and it was 
1101 relatable to any award as such passed after the amended date -
Par.ipoornan (I.I) case postulates about the awards passed after the 
Amendment Act came into force - The decision is in consonance 
with Raghub!r Singh 's case - Decision in Paripooranan (II) case does 
not run counter to the authority in Constitution Bench - The award 
in the present case was passed after e1iforcement of Amendment Act 
- Therefore principles stated in Paripoornan (II) cuse would be 
squarely applicable - Amount of
solatium directed to be computed 
qfier taking into consideration Sunder's case passed by Constitution 
Bench of Supreme Court. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The decision in * Raghubir Singh 's case was only 
concerned with the grant of solatium in respect of the award 
passed between two dates, namely, April 30, 1982 and September 
24, 1984. The issue before the Constitution Bench was not 
relatable to any award as such passed after the amended date. In 
view of the principle stated in Constitution Bench judgment in 
292
LILAWATI AGARWAL ETC. v. THE STATE OF Jl-IARKHAND 
ETC. 
*R"gh"bir Singh case and what has been clarified in three Judge 
Bench judgment in **K.S. Paripoortum (II) C(lse, it cannot be said 
that the three-Judge Bench decision runs counter to the authority 
in the Constitution Bench. It also does not give a different 
interpretation to Section 30(2) that what has been st~ted by the 
Constitution Bench. In fact, ** K.S. Paripoortutn (JI) clearly 
postulates about the awards that have been passed by the court 
after the Amendement Act has come into force which is in 
consonance with the ratio laid down in * R"gh ubir Singh 's case. 
The three-Judge Bench has only observed that the restricted 
interpretation placed by the Constitution Bench in * R"ghubir 
Singh case should not convey that Section 23(2) would not apply 
to the awards of the civil court pending at the time when the Act 
came into force or thereafter. Thus, the controversy with which 
the three-Judge Bench was dealing with was absolutely different 
and the view expressed by it is absolutely in accord with the 
principles laid down in *R"g/111bir Sing/i's case. Additionally, it 
is also in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 
23(2) of the Act. Therefore, there is no reason to disagree with 
the view expressed in ** K.S. P"ripoomt111 (II) case, as it has 
appositely understood the rule exposited in *R"ghubir Sillgfl's 
case. [Paras_8 and 10] [301-E-F; 302-D-G] 
*Union of India and Another vs. Raghubir
Singh (Dead) 
By Lrs. Etc. (1989) 2 SCC 754:1989 (3) SCR 316; 
** K.S. Paripoornan (II} vs. State of 
Kera/a 
and 
Others (1995) 1 SCC 367: 1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 696 -
explained. 
Lilawati Aganva/ (Dead) By Lrs. and Others vs. State 
of Jharkhand (2008) 15 SCC 464: 2008 (5) SCR 1160; 
K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition 
Officer (1985) 1 SCC 582:1985 (2) SCR 914; Bhag 
Singh V, Union Territory of Chandigarh (1985) 3 sec 
737: 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 949; State of Punjab v. 
Mohinder Singh 2008 (15) SCC 464: 2008 (5) SCR 
1160 - referred to. 
2. The award in the present case had been passed by the 
reference court on 30th September, 1985. Therefore, there cannot 
be any trace of donbt that principle stated in **K.S. Paripoornan 
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(II) case would squarely be applicable. The High Court by the 
impugned judgment has wrongly opined that the principle stated 
in the ** K.S. Paripoormm (fl) case would not be applicable. The 
appellant shall be entitled to the benefits as per the law laid down 
in ** K.S. Paripoornrm (II) case. It is not disputed that the 
appellants are not entitled to the benefits under Section 23(1A) 
in view of the decision in ***K.S. Paripoornmt (/) vs. State of 
Kera/a. The respondent while computing the amount shall take 
judgment in 'S111lller's case into consideration. In case the 
respondent do not comply with the judgment, execution can be 
levied and at that juncture this aspect can also be taken note of 
as it forms a part of the decree. The respondents are directed to 
deposit the amount before the executing court within six weeks 
hence. If any amount has already been deposited, that shall be 
taken into consideration while computing the amount. [Paras 12, 
14 and lS] [302-H; 303-A-D; 304-B-C] 
**K.S. Paripoornan (II) 1·s. Stale of Kera/a and Others 
(199S) l SCC 367:1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 696 - relied 
on. 
'Sunder vs. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 211: 2001 
(3) Suppl. SCR 176 - followed. 
***K.S. Paripoornan (/) vs. Stale of Kera/a (1994) S 
SCC S93: 1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 40S - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
2008 (S) SCR 1160 
referred to 
Para I 
1989 (3) SCR 316 
explained 
Para l 
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 696
explained 
Para 1 
relied on. 
Para 12 
198S (2) SCR 914 
refereed to. 
Paras 
198S (2) Suppl. SCR 949 
referred to. 
Paras 
2008 (S) SCR 1160 
referred to. 
Para6 
1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 405 
referred to. 
Para 12 
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 176 
followed. 
Para 13
LILAWATI AGARWAL ETC. v. THE STATE OF .IHARKHAND 
295 
ETC. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1363 
A 
of2007 
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.02.2003 of the High Court 
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Appeal from Original Decree No. 32 and 33 
of1986 
1-limanshu Munshi, Dr. Gajendra Prasad Singh, Durga Dutta, 
Mani sh Garani, Advs., for the Appellants. 
Ajit Kumar Sinha, Sr. Adv, Gopal Prasad, Shashank Singh, Anip 
Sachthey, Ms. Anjali Chauhan, Himanshu Munshi, Advs., with him for 
the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Cou1t was delivered by 
DIP AK MISRA, J. A two-Judge Bench of this Cou1t in Lilmvati 
Agarwal (Dead) By Lrs. <t11d Others vs. State of J/wrklwnd', after 
refe11"ing to the paragraphs 31 and 34 of the pronouncement in Union of 
illdia and Another vs. Raghuhir Singh (Dead) By Lrs. Etc.'. 
expressed doubt with regard to the correctness of the decision in K.S. 
Paripoonum (JI) vs. State {)(Kera/a am/ Others' and eventually 
expressed thus:-
"In Raghubir Singh case two terminus points were fixed i.e. 
award by the Collector or decision of the Reference Court must 
have been taken between 3-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. It has been 
clearly stated in the last line of para 34 that every case "must" 
have been decided between the aforesaid terminus. In 
Paripoornan JI case at para 4 it was observed that restrictive 
interpretation should not be given. With great respect we are 
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unable to subscribe to the view. As a matter of fact a three-
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Judge
Bench was trying to give an interpretation different from 
what was specifically given by the Constitution Bench. 
Therefore, we think it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger 
Bench to consider correctness of the view expressed in para 4 in 
Paripoornan II case holding that a restricted interpretation should 
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not be given, on the face of what has been stated in para 34 of 
Raghubir Singh case. Records may be placed before the 1-lon'ble 
Chief Justice of India for necessary details." 
1 \2008 15 sec 464 
\1989) 2 sec 754 
\1995) 1sec367 
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On the basis of the aforesaid order, the matter has been placed 
before us. 
2. As we perceive, it is necessary to express an opinion whether 
the correctness of the decision in KS. P"ripoormm (II) deserves to be 
considered by a Constitution Bench as the pronouncement in the said 
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3. To appreciate the controversy, we think it appropriate to 
reproduce paragraphs 30, 31 and 34 from R"gftubir Si11gft (supra):-
'·30. We now come to the merits of the reference. The reference 
is limited to the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Land 
Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984. Before the enactment of 
the Amendment Act, solatium was provided under Section 23(2) 
of the Land Acquisition Act (shortly, "the parent Act") at 15% on 
the market value of the Land computed in accordance with Section 
23( I) of the Act, the solatium being provided in consideration of 
the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The Land Acquisition 
Amendment Bill, 1982 was introduced in the House of the People 
on 30 April, 1982 and upon enactment the Land Acquisition 
Amendment Act 1984 commenced operation with effect from 24 
September. 1984. Section 15 of the Amendment Act amended 
Section 23(2) of the parent Act and substituted the words '30 per 
centum' in place of the words' 15 percentum'. Parliament intended 
that the benefit of the enhanced solatium should be made available 
albeit to a limited degree, even
in respect ofacquisition proceedings 
taken before that date. It sought to effectuate that intention by 
enacting Section 30(2) in the Amendment Act. Section 30(2) of 
the Amendment Act provides: 
"(2) the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 23 ...... of the 
principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 ........ ofthis 
Act ....... shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, 
and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to 
any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal 
against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act 
after the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the 
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the 
People] and before the commencement of this Act." 
31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that 
the award made by the Collector referred to here is the award
LILAWATI AGARWAL ETC. v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND 
ETC. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
made by the Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act, and the 
award made by the Court is the award made by the Principal 
Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent 
Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 
of the parent Act. There can be no doubt that the benefit of the 
enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an 
award made by the Collector between 30 April 1982 and 24 
September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium 
is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an award made by the 
Court between 30 April 1982 and .24 September 1984, even though 
it be upon reference from an award made before 30 April, 1982. 
xxxxx 
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34. Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab 
v. Mohinder Singh', but in the absence of a statement of the 
reasons which persuaded the learned Judges to take the view 
they did we find it difficult to endorse that decision. It received 
the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh', 
but the judgment in Bhag Singh, (supra) as we have said earlier, 
has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions 
of Section 30(2), and consequently we find ourselves at variance 
with it. The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that 
an appeal is a continuation.ofthe proceeding initiated before the 
Court by way of reference under-Section 18 but,
in our opinion, 
the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting 
terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the 
respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that 
the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter, but we are not 
satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. 
Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the word 'or' 
has been used in Section 30(2), as a disjunctive between the 
reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and an 
order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal 
and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period 30 
April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984 is as much applicable to the 
appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is 
to the award made by the Collector or the Court. We think that 
what Parliament intends ~o say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) 
' (1986) 1 sec 365 
' ( 1985) 3 sec 73 7 
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will be available to an award by the Collector orthe Court made 
between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate.order of the 
High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award 
of the Collector or the Cou11 made between the said two dates. 
The word ·or· is used with reference to the stage at which the 
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proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under-Section 30(2) 
is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with 
the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the 
aforesaid two dates. the benefit of Section 30(2) wil I be applied to 
such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the 
proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High 
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Colll1 or the Supreme Cou11. it is at that stage when the benefit of 
Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the 
Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April. 
1982 and 24 September. 1984.'" 
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[Emphasis supplied] 
4. In Ragl111bir Singh (supra). the question of law referred to the 
Constitution Bench was:-
.. Whether under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by 
the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the claimants are 
entitled to solatium at 30 per cent of the market value irrespective 
of the dates on which the acquisition proceedings were initiated 
or the dates on which the award had been passed?" 
5. In the said case. the award with regard to compensation was
passed by the Collector in March, 1963 and the reference under Section 
18 of the Act was disposed of by the Additional District Judge on June 
I 0, 1968. The reference cou11 had enhanced the compensation granted 
by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, •the 
Act'). The claimant had preferred an appeal to the High Cou11 claiming 
fu11her compensation. During the pendency of the appeal, the Land 
Acquisition (Amendment) Bill. 1982 was introduced in the Parliament 
on April 30. 1982 and became law as the Land Acquisition (Amendment) 
Act, 1984 when it received the assent of the President on September 24. 
1984. The High Court disposed of the appeal by its judgment and order 
dated December 6, 1984. While it raised the rate of compensation it 
also raised the rate of interest payable on the compensation and taking 
into account the amendment Act. awarded solatium at 30%. The 
judgment and order of the High Court was under assail before this Court
LILAWATI AGARWAL ETC. v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND 
ETC. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
and a two-Judge Bench keeping in view the decisions in K. 
Kanwlaja111111a1111it1var11 v. Special Land Acquisition Officer'. and 
Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of C/iall{/igarh 7 thought it apt to refer 
the matter to a larger Bench which ultimately resulted in the verdict in 
Rag/111bir Si11glr (supra). 
6. To understand the dictum in Raghubir Singh (supra), it is 
necessary to understand what was stated in Bhag Singh (supra) and 
what has been overruled in Rag/111bir Singh (supra). In Blwg Singh 
(supra) a three-Judge Bench was dealing with the question of\ aw relating 
to interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. In the said 
case, the award was passed by the land acquisition collector on October 
9, 1975 and the reference court had passed the award on July 31, 1979. 
The award passed by the reference court was assailed in appeal before 
the High Court. The three-Judge Bench considered the decisions in 
State of P1111jab v. Mohi11tler Si11glt' and K. Ka111a/aja11111um11iavar11 
(supra) and agreed with the view expressed in Mohi11tler Si11g/1is case 
and recorded therein disagreement with the view taken in K. 
Kamalaja111111a1111iavam (supra). Be it stated, the three-Judge Bench 
in Blwg Si11gft (supra) while agreeing with the earlier three-Judge Bench 
decision has opined thus:-
"We may first consider what would be the position if Section 30 
sub-section (2) were not enacted and the
amendments in Section 
23 subsection (2) and Section 28 were effective only from the 
date on which they were made, namely, September 24. 1984 when 
the Amending Act received the assent of the President and was 
brought into force. If at the date of the commencement of the 
Amending Act, any proceedings for determination of compensation 
were pending before the Collector under Section 11 of the Act or 
before the court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the 
·amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would 
admittedly be applicable to such proceedings. This much indeed 
was conceded by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 
respondents and even in Kamalaja111111C11111iamru case (supra) it 
was accepted to be the con-ect position. Chinnappa Reddy, J. 
speaking on behalf of the Court in Ka111a/ajam111a1111iamn1 case 
(supra) observed (SCC p. 584): "The new Section 23(2), of course, 
'· ( t 985) 1 sec 5s2 
1 t t985J 3 sec 737 
" Civil Appeal· No. 3267of1979 decided on May I. 1985 
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necessarily applies to awards made by the Collector or court after 
the commencement" of the Amending Act .... " 
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7. Regard being had to the both the aspects, it is imperative to 
understand the issue that was referred to the Constitution Bench. As is 
noticeable, the larger Bench observed that the reference was limited to 
the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. The 
Constitution Bench noted the intention of the Parliament, referred to 
Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act and in that context opined that:-
"32. The question is: What is the meaning of the words "or to any 
order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal 
against any such award?" Are they limited, as contended by the 
appellants, to appeals against an award of the Collector or the 
Court made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, or do they include 
also, as contended by the respondents, appeals disposed of between 
30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 even though arising out of awards of 
the Collector or the Court made before 30-4-1982. We are of 
opinion that the interpretation placed by the appellants should be 
preferred over that suggested by the respondents. Parliament has 
identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before 
the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against "any 
such award". The submission on behalfofthe respondents is that 
the words "any such award" mean the award made by the Collector
or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this context, 
upon the language of Section 30(2), the order in appeal is an 
appellate order made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 -
in 
which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court 
may have been made before 30-4-1982. To our mind, the words 
"any such award" cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by 
learned counsel for the respondents. No such words of description 
by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of 
the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the 
existing hierarchical structure of fora contemplated in the parent 
Act those appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal 
against the award of the Collector or of the Court. The words 
"any such award" are intended to have deeper significance, and 
in the context in which those words appear in Section 30(2) it is 
clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the 
Collector or Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. In other
LILAWATI AGARWAL ETC. v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND 
ETC. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit 
of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the 
Collector or by the Court is made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-
1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Cowt 
and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Cowt 
or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24-9-1984 or after 
that date. All that is niaterial is that the award by the Collector or 
by the Comt should have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-
9-1984. We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion 
reached by this Court in K. Ka111alaja111111a1111iavaru v. Special 
Land Acquisition Officer l, and find ourselves unable to agree 
with the view taken in Bhag Singh v. Union Territo1y of 
Chandigarh-;,_, The expanded meaning given to Section 30(2) in 
the latter case does not, in our opinion, flow reasonably from the 
language of that sub-section. It seems to us that the learned Judges 
in that case missed the significance of the word "such" in the 
collocation "any such award" in Section 30(2). Due significance 
must be attached to that word, and to our mind it must necessarily 
intend that the appeal to the High Comt or the Supreme Court, in 
which the b".nefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given, must be 
confined to an appeal agaii1st an award of the Collector or of the 
Cou1t rendered between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984". 
8. The aforesaid larger
Bench decision. as we find, was only 
. concerned with the grant of solatium in respect of the award passed 
between two dates, namely, April 30, 1982 and !')eptember 24, 1984. 
The issue before the Constitution Bench was not relatable to any award 
as such passed after the amended date. 
9. In K.S. Paripooma11 (II) (supra), the three-Judge Bench 
appreciated the law laid down in Raglmbir Singlt 's case and referred 
to Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 
1984) which was a transitory provision and reproduced paragraph 31 of 
the Constitution Bench judgment and then proceeded to state thus:-
"This Court thereby clearly held that even in the pending reference 
made before 30-4-1982, if the civil court makes an award between 
30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, Section 30(2) gets attracted and thereby 
the enhanced solatium was available to the claimants. Since Section 
30(2) deals with both the amendments to Section 23(2) and Section 
28 of the Principal Act by Section I 5(b) and Section 18, 
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respectively, of the Amendment Act by parity of the reasoning 
the same ratio applies to the awards made by the civil court between 
those dates. The conflict of decisions as to whether Section 23(2) 
as amended by Section I 5(b) of the Amendment Act through 
Section 30(2) of the transitory provisions would be applicable to 
the pending appeals in the High Court and the Supreme Court 
was resolved in Raghubir Singh case I by the Constitution Bench 
holding that the award of the Collector or the court made between 
13-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 would alone get attracted to Section 
30(2) of the transitory provision. The restricted interpretation should 
not be understood to mean that Section 23(2) would not apply to 
the award of the civil court pending at the time when the Act 
came into force or thereafter. In this case, admittedly the award 
of the civil court was made after the Act had come Into force, 
namely, 28-2-1985." 
I 0. On a perusal of the principle stated in Raghubir Si11gh case 
and what has been clarified in K.S. Paripoorna11 (II) case, we do not 
find that the three-Judge Bench decision runs counter to the authority in 
the Constitution Bench. It also does not give a different interpretation to 
Section 30(2) that wnat has been stated by the Constitution Bench. In 
fact, K.S. Paripoorna11 (II) clearly postulates about the awards that 
have been passed by the court after' the Act has come into force which 
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is in consonance with the ratio laid down in Raghubir Si11gh 's case. 
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The three-Judge Bench has only observed that the restricted 
interpretation placed by the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh 
(supra) should not convey that Section 23(2) would not apply to the 
awards of the civil court pending at the time when the Act came into 
force or thereafter: Thus, the cont;pversy with which the three-Judge 
Bench was dealing with was absolutely different and the view expressed 
by it is absolutely in accord with the principles laid down in Raghubir 
Singh's case. Additionally, it is also in consonance with the provisions 
contained in Section 23(2) of the Act. Therefore, we do not see any 
reason to disagree with the view expressed in K.S. Paripoornan (II) as 
we are of the convinced opinion that it has appositely understood the 
rule exposited in Raghubir Singh 's case. 
11. Having so stated, ordinarily we would have directed the matter 
to be placed before a two-Judge Bench, but it is not necessary to do so. 
We have been apprised at the Bar that the award in this case had been 
passed by the reference court on 30'h September, 19.85. Therefore,
LILAWATI AGARWAL ETC. v. THE STATE OF JHARKHA \:rJ 
303 
ETC. (DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
there cannot be any trace of doubt that principle stated in K.S. 
A 
Paripooma11 (II) would squarely be applicable. 
12. The High Comt by the impugned judgment has opined that 
the principle stated in the K.S. Paripoorna11 (II) (supra) would not be 
applicable. The said view is perceptibly erroneous. We are of the 
considered opinion that the appellant shall be entitled to the benefits as 
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per the law laid down in K.S. Paripoorna11 (II). It is not disputed at the 
Bar that the appellants are not entitled t-0 the benefits under Section 
23( I A) in view of the decision in K.S. Paripoonw11 (I} vs. State of 
Kera/a'. 
I 3. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note ofanother c 
aspect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in St111(/er vs. U11io11 of 
India'° has opined that:-
"24. The proviso to Section 34 of the Act makes the position 
further clear. The proviso says that "if such compensation" is not 
paid within one year from the date of taking possession of the 
o 
land, interest shall stand escalated to I 5% per annum from the 
date of expiry of the said period of one year "on the amount of 
compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited 
before the date of such expiry". !tis inconceivable that the solatium 
amount would attract only the escalated rate of interest from the 
expiry of one year.and that there w_ould be no interest on solatium 
E 
during the
precedin.g period. What tlie legislature intended was to 
make the aggregate amount under Section 23 of the Act to reach 
the hands of the person as and when the award is passed, at any 
rate as soon as he is deprived of the possession of his land. Any 
delay in making payment of the said sum should enable the party 
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to have interest on the said sum until he receives the payment. 
Splitting up the compensation into different components for the 
purpose of payment of interest under Section 34 was not in the 
contemplation of the legis'lature when that section was fra1ned or 
enacted. 
xxx 
xxx 
27. In our view the aforesaid statement of law·-is in accord with -
the sound principle of interpretation. Hence the person emit led to 
the compensation awarded is also entitled to get interest on the 
' (1994) s sec 593 
G 
'°(2001)7SCC211 
H
304 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
aggregate amount including solatium. The reference is answered 
accordingly." 
14. We have referred to the aforesaid authority by abundant caution 
so that the respondent while computing the amount shall take the same 
into consideration. Needless to say, in case the respondent do not comply 
B 
with the judgment, execution can be levied and at that juncture this aspect 
can also be taken note of as it forms a part of the decree. 
15. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and it is directed that the 
appellants shall be entitled to the benefits as stated herein-above. The 
judgment and the decree passed by the High Court stands modified. The 
c respondents are directed to deposit the amount before the executing 
court within six weeks hence. If any amount has already been deposited, 
that shall be taken into consideration while computing the amount. In 
the fact and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to 
costs. 
D 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal allowed.