THE STATE OF TELANGANA versus HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI & ORS.
[2017] 1 S.C.R. 141, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2017] l S.C.R. 141 
THE STATE OF TELANGANA 
v. 
HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANl & ORS. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 1144of2016) 
JANUARY 06, 2017 
(DIPAK MISRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal Procedure,· 197 3 - s. 482 - Inherent power 
of High Court - Interference in investigation - Scope of - High 
Court refused to quash the FIR and consequential investigation, 
but passed an order that if the accused person surrenders before 
the trial magistrate he shall be admitted to bail - Held: While 
declining to quash FIR and investigation, Court cannot extend the 
privilege to.accused person which is in nature of an anticipatory 
bail - High Court's direction amou/lfed to an order uls.438 CrPC, 
albeit ll'ithout satisfaction of the conditions of.the said provision -
This is legally unsustainable - Constitution of India - Art. 226 -
Bail. 
\ 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Exercise of 
power, scope - Held: The power u/s. 482 CrPC is very wide, but 
conferment of wide powers requires the court to be more cautious -
It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court - Courts · 
should oust and obstruct unscrupulous litigants from invoking the 
inherent jurisdiction of the Court for quashing of launching an 
FIR or investigation and then seek relief by an interim order - It is 
the obligation of the court t; keep such unprincipled and unethicai 
litigants at bay - Administration of Criminal Justice. 
Precedents: Binding effect of - Held: It is intellectual truancy 
to avoid
ihe precedents and issue directions which are not in 
consonance with /m1• - It is the duty of a Judge to sustain the judicial · 
balance and not to think of an order which can cause trauma to the 
process ·of adjudication - Culture of adjudication is stabilized when 
·intellectual discipline is maintained and further when such discipline 
constantly keeps guard on the mind. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
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HELD: In the instant case, the High Court did not refer to 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] l S.C.R. 
allegations made in the FIR or what has come out i·n the 
investigation. It correctly noted that the investigation is in 
progress and it is not appropriate to stay the investigation of the 
case. It disposed of the application under Section 482 CrPC, 
however while doing that it directed that the investigating agency 
shall not arrest the accused persons. This direction "amounts" 
to an order under Section 438 CrPC, albeit without satisfaction of 
the conditions of the said provision. This is legally unacceptable. 
Such directions would not commend acceptance, for they neither 
come within the sweep of Article 226 of the Constitution of India 
nor Section 482 CrPC nor Section 438 Cr PC. The types of orders 
like present one, are totally unsustainable. [Paras 15, 24, 25) 
(151-E-F; 157-A-B) 
Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad (1972) 1 SCC 
452 : (1972) 2 SCR 666; Jehan Singh v. Delhi 
Administration AIR 1974 SC 1146 : [1974) 3 SCR 
794; Amar Nath 1: State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 137: 
[1978) 1 SCR 222; Kurukshetra University v. State of 
Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 451; State of Bihar v. J.A.C. 
Sa/danha AIR 1980 SC 326 : (1980) 2 SCR 16; State 
of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha AIR 1982 SC 
949 : (1982) 3 SCR 121; Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna 
Shivalingappa Konjalgi AIR 1976 SC 1947 : (1976) 
Suppl. SCR 123; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. 
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692·: 
· [1988) 2 SCR 930;
State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan 
(1988) 4 SCC 655 ~ [1988) 3 Suppl. SCR 455 ; Rashmi 
Rekha Thatoi and Anr. 
v. State of Orissa and Ors. 
(2012) 5 SCC 690 : (2012] 5 SCR 674; Gurbaksh 
Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 
[1980) 3 SCR 383; Ranjit Singh v. State of Madhya 
Pradesh· and Ors. (2013) 16 SCC 797 : (2013) 11 
SCR 273 - relied on. 
King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 
~-18; Lolita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and 
Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013] 14 SCR 713; State of 
Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. AIR 1992 
SC 604 : (1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Jacob Mathew v.
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI 
143 
& ORS. 
State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1 : [2005] 2 Suppl. 
SCR 307; P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras (1970) 1 
SCC 595 : [1970] 3 SCR 931; CBI '" Tapan Kumar 
Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 : [2003] 3 SCR 485; Hema 
Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2014) 4 SCC 
453 : [2014] 1 SCR 465; Kartar Singh v. State of 
Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 : [1994] 2 SCR 375; Satya 
Pal v. State of UP. 2000 Cri LJ 569 (All); Ajeet Singh 
v. State of UP. 2007 Cri LJ 170 {All); Lalji Yadai; v. 
State of UP. 1998 Cri LJ 2366 {All); Kamlesh Singh v. · 
State of U.P. 1997 Cri LJ 2705 (All); Natho Mal v. 
State of U.P. 1994 Cri LJ 1919 (All); Amarawati v. State 
of U.P. 2005 Cri LJ 755 (All); Lal Kamlendra Pratap 
Singh V. State of U.P. (2009) 4 sec 437 : [2009] 4 
SCR 102 7 - referred to. 
AIR .1945 PC 18 
Case Law Reference 
referred to 
'[2013] 14 SCR 713 
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 307 
[1970] 3 SCR 931 
[2003] 3 SCR 485 
[1972] 2 SCR 666 
[1974] 3 SCR 794 
[1978] 1 SCR 222 
(1977) 4 sec 451 
[1980] 2 SCR 16 
[1982] 3 SCR 121 
[1976] Suppl. SCR 123 
[ 1988] 2 SCR 930 
[1988] 3 -suppl. SCR 455 
t2012] 5 SCR 674 
[1980] 3 SCR 383 
[2013] 11 SCR 273 
[2014] 1 SCR 465 
referred to 
referred to 
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relied on 
relied on 
relied on 
relied· on 
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referred to · 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[20 I 7] I S.C.R. 
[1994] 2 SCR .375 
referred to 
Para 18 
2000 Cri LJ 569 (All) 
referred to 
Para 19 
2007 Cri LJ 170 (All) 
referred to 
Para 19 
1998 Cri LJ 2366 (All) 
referred to 
Para 19 
1997 Cri LJ 2705 (All) 
referred to 
Para 19 
1994 Cri LJ 1919 (All) 
referred to 
Para 19 
2005 Cri LJ 755 (All) 
referred to 
Para 20 
[2009] 4 SCR 1027 
referred to 
Para 20 
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
I 144of20I6. 
. 
From the Order dated 18.10.2014 by the High Court of Judicature 
at Hyderabad for the State ofTelangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh 
in Criminal Petition No. I 0012of2014. 
Harin P. Raval, Sr. Adv., S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Baskula Athik, 
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Ad vs. for the Appellant. 
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Ms. Nilofar Khan, Adv. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment ofihe Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. The seminal issue that arises for 
consideration in this appeal, by special leave, is whether the High Court 
while refusing to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to interfere In an application for 
quashment of the investigation, can restrain the investigating agency not 
to arrest the accused persons during the course of investigation. 
2. The facts lie in a narrow compass. On the basis of a report 
by the informant under Section 154 CrPC, FIR No. 205/2014 dated 
26.07.2014 was registered at Chandrayanagutta Police Station, 
Hyderabad for the offences punishable under
Sections 147, 148 149 
and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Challenging the initiation of 
criminal action, the three, accused persons, namely, accused Nos. I, 2 
and 5, (respondent Nos. I, 2 and 3 herein) invoked inherent jurisdiction 
of the High Court in Criminal Petition No. I 0012 of2014 forquashingof 
the FIR and consequential investigation. As the impugned order would 
show, the lean_1ed single Judge referred to the FIR and took note of the 
submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners therein that all the 
allegations that had been raised in the FIR were false and they had been
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
falsely implicated and thereafter expressed his disinclination to interfere 
on the ground that it was not appropriate to stay the investigation of the 
case. However, as a submission had been raised that the accused persons 
were innocent and there had been allegation of false implication, it would 
be appropriate to direct the police not to arrest the petitioners during the 
pendency of the investigation and, accordingly, it was so directed. 
3. It is submitted by Mr. Harin P. Raval, lea111ed senior counsel 
appearing for the State that the informant had sustained grievous injuries 
and was attacked by dangerous weapons and custodial interrogation of 
the accused persons is absolutely essential. According to him, the High 
Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can quash 
an FIR on certain well known parameters but while declining to quash 
the same, it cannot extend the privilege to the accused persons which is 
in the nature ofan anticipatory bail. Learned senior counsel would submit 
that the nature of the order passed by the High Court is absolutely 
. unknown to the exercise ofinherentjurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC 
and, therefore, it deserves to be axed. 
4. Ms. Nilofar Khan, learned counsel appearing for the 
respondent Nos. I to 3 in support of the order passed by the High Court 
submitted tha(the custodial interrogation is not necessary in the facts of 
the case.
She would further submit that the plentitude of power conferred 
on the High Court under Section 482 CrPC empowers it to pass such an 
order and there being no infirmity in the order, no interference is warranted 
. by this Court. 
5. The controversy compels one to visit the earlier decisions. In 
Kin1: Emperor v. Klmf!ia Nazir Ahmad 1 while deliberating on the 
scope of right conferred on the police under Section 154 CrPC, Privy 
Council observed:-
" ... so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not 
interfere with the police in matters which are within their province 
and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In 
India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the ·pa11 of 
the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable 
crime without .requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, 
and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it 
should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by 
'AIR 1945 PC 18 
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an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions 
of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, 
and the combination ofindividual liberty with a due observance of 
law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise 
its own function, always of course subject to the right of the Court 
to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 
491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature 
of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the 
Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and 
not until then." 
Having stated what lies within the domain of the investigating 
agency, it is essential to refer to the Constitution Bench decision in Lalita 
Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh am/ Ors'. The question that 
arose for consideration before the Constitution Bench was whether "a 
police officer is bound to register a first information report upon receiving 
apy information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under 
Section 154 CrPC or the police officer has the power to conduct a 
'preliminary inquiry' in order to test the veracity of such information 
before registering the same"? While interpreting Section 154 CrPC, the 
Court addressing itselfto various facets opined that Section 154(1) CrPC 
admits of no other construction but the literal construction. Thereafter it 
referred to the
legislative intent of Section 154 which has been elaborated 
in State of Horyam1 am/ Ors. v. Blwja11 Lal wul Ors.·' and various 
other authorities. Eventually the larger Bench opined that reasonableness 
or credibility of the informatio1i is not a condition precedent for the 
registration of a case. Thereafter there was advertence to the concept 
of preliminary inquiry. In that context, the Court opined thus:-
" I OJ. It means that the number of FIRs not registered is 
approximately equivalenttothe numberofFIRs actually registered. 
Keeping in view the NCRB figures that show that about 60 lakh 
cognizable offences were registered in India during the year 2012, 
the burking of crime may itself be in the range of about 60 lakhs 
every year. Thus, it is seen that such a large number of Fl Rs are 
not registered every year, which is a clear violation of the rights 
of the victims of such a large number of crimes. 
I 04. Burking of crime leads to dilution of the rule of law in the 
short run; and also has a very11egative impact on the rule of law 
2 (2014) 2 sec 1 
'AIR 1992 SC 604
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI 
147 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
in the long run since people stop having respe~t for the rule of 
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law. Thus, non-registration of such a large number of Fl Rs leads 
to a definite lawlessness in the society. 
105. Therefore, reading Section 154 in any other form would not 
only be detrimental to the scheme of the Code but also to the 
society as a whole. It is thus seen that this Court has repeatedly 
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· held in various decided cases that registration of FIR is mandatory 
if the information given to the police under Section 154 of the 
Code discloses the commission of a cognizable offence." 
7. While dealing with the likelihood of misuse of the provision, 
the Court ruled thus:-
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''114. lt is true that a delicate balance has to be maintained between 
the interest of the society and protecting the liberty of an individual. 
As already discussed above, there ·are already sufficient 
safeguards provided in the Code which duly protect the liberty of 
an individual in case of registration of false FIR. At the same 
time, Section 154 was drafted keeping in mind the interest of the 
victim and the society. Therefore, we are of the cogent view that 
mandatory registration of FIRs under Section 154 of the Code 
will not be in contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution as 
purported by various counsel." 
8. The exceptions that were carved out pertain to medical 
negligence cases as has been stated in Jacob Matltew v. State of
Punjab'. The Court also referred to the authorities in P. Sirajuddin v. 
State of Madras-'·and CBI v. Tap<m Kumar Si11f(lt' and finally held 
that what is necessary is only that the information given to the police 
must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, 
registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence 
is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered 
immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary 
verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether 
a cognizable offence has been committed. But, ifthe information given 
clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no 
other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are 
not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the 
• (2005) 6 sec 1 
'\1970) 1sec595 
'\2003) 6 sec 11s 
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[2017] 1 S.C.R. 
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information is falsely given, whether the infonnation is genuine, whether 
the information is credible, etc. At the stage of registration of FIR, what 
is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses 
the commission of a cognizable offence. 
9. Be it noted, certain directions were issued by the Constitution 
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"' 120.5_. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the 
veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to 
ascertain whether the information reveals ar•) vognizable offence. 
120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is 
to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of 
each case. The category of cases in whicl] preliminary inquiry 
may be made are as under: 
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes 
(b) Commercial offences 
(c) Medical negligence cases 
(d) Corruption cases 
( e) Cases where there is abnonnal delay/laches in initiating criminal 
prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the 
matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. 
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all 
conditions which may wa1rnnt preliminary inquiry. 
120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused 
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and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-
bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of 
such
delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General 
Diary entry. 
120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the 
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record of all information received in a police station, we direct 
that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether 
resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be 
mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the 
decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, 
as mentioned above." 
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THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
10. We have copiously referred to the aforesaid decision for the 
simon pure reason that at the instance of the informant the FIR was 
lodged and it was registered which is in accord with the decision of the 
Constitution Bench. 
11. Once an FIR is registered, the accused persons can always 
approach the High Court under Section 482 Cr PC or under Article 226 
of the Constitution for quashing of the FIR.· In Blwjm1 Lal (supra) the 
two-Judge Bench after referring to Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameslrwar 
Prasatf, Je/um Singlr v. De/Iii Administration', Amar Natlr v. State 
of Haryuna', Kurukslretra University v. State of Haryana", State of 
Biflar v. J.A.C. Sa/dm11ra 11 , State o_f West Benf(al v. Swapan Kumar 
Gulla 11, Smt. Naf(awwa v. Veert1111w Shivalinf(appa Konjalf(V', 
Mad/ravrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Samblwjirao Clumdrojirao Angre", 
State of Bilutr v. Murad Ali Klla11 15 and some other authorities that 
had dealt with the contours of exercise of inherent powers of the High 
Court, thought it appropriate to mention certain category of cases by 
way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 of 
the Constitution or inherent power under Section 482 CrPC could be 
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court orotherwise 
to secure the ends of justice. The Court also observed that it may not be 
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an 
. exhaustive list of myriad cases wherein such power should be exercised. 
The illustrations given by the Court need to be recapitulated:-
"( I) Where the allegations made in the first information report or 
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and 
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence 
or make out a case against the accused. 
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other 
materials, ifany, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable 
'(1972) 1sec452 
'AIR 1974SC1146 
9 ( 1977) 4 sec 137: AIR 1977 SC 2185 
IO ( 1977) 4 sec 451 : AIR 1977 SC 2229 
11 AIR 1980 SC 326 
"AIR 1982 SC 949 
13 AIR 1976SC1947 
"(1988) 1SCC692:AIR1988SC709 
"(1988) 4 sec 655 :AIR 1989 SC I 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] l S.C.R. 
offence,justifyingan investigation by police officers under Section 
156(1) of the Code except under an order ofa Magistrate within 
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do 
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case 
against the accused. 
( 4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable 
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no 
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a 
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so 
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent 
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient 
ground for proceeding against the accused. 
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the 
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a 
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance 
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in 
the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for 
the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala 
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an 
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with 
a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 
It is worthy to note that the Court has clarified that the said 
parameters or guidelines are not exhaustive but only illustrative. 
Nevertheless, it throws light on the circumstances and situations where 
court's inherent power can be exercised. 
12. There can be no dispute over the proposition that inherent 
power in a matter of quashment of FIR has to be exercised sparingly 
and with caution and when and only when such exercise is justified by 
the test specifically laid down in the provision itself. There is no denial of 
the fact that the power under Section 482 CrPC is very wide but it 
needs no special emphasis to state that conferment of wide power requires 
the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty 
on the Court.
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANl 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
13. In this regard, it would be seemly to reproduce a passage 
from Kurukshetra University (supra) wherein Chandrachud, J. (as 
His Lordship then was) opined thus:-
"2. lt surprises us in the extreme that the High Court thought that 
in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a first information 
report. The police had not even commenced investigation into the 
complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding 
at all was pending in any court in pursuance of the FIR. It ought 
to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary 
jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. 
That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with 
circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases." 
14. We have referred to the said decisions only to stress upon the 
issue, how the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in a proceeding 
relating to quashment of FIR can be justified. We repeat even at the 
cost of repetition that the said power has to be exercised in a very sparing 
manner and is not to be used to choke or smother the prosecution that is 
legitimate. The surprise that was expressed almost four decades ago in 
Kurukslzetra University's case compels us to observe that we are also 
surprised by the impugned order. 
15. In the instant case\.the High Court has not referred to 
allegations made
in the FIR or what has come out in the investigation. It 
has noted and correctly that the investigation is in progress and it is not 
appropriate to stay the investigation of the case. It has disposed of the 
application under Section 482 CrPC and while doing that it has directed 
that the investigating agency shall not arrest the accused persons. Th is 
direction "amounts" to an order under Section 438 CrPC, albeit without 
satisfaction of the conditions of the said provision. This is legally 
unacceptable. 
I 6. To appreciate the nature of the order passed, it is necessary 
to have a survey of the authorities that deal with grant of anticipatory 
bail. In R(ls/imi Rek/w Tlwtoi (Ind Anr. v. State of Orissa <md Ors." 
the High Court while rejecting the application for anticipatory bail had 
directed that ifthe accused persons surrender, the trial magistrate shall 
release them on bail on such terms and conditions as he may deem fit 
and proper. Analysing the scope of Section 438 CrPC as expressed by 
"(2012) s sec 690 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017) I S.C.R. 
the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksli Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab" 
and other decisions, the Court held thus:-
"33. We have referred to the aforesaid pronouncements to highlight 
how the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra) 
had analysed and explained the intrinsic underlying concepts under 
Section 438 of the Code, the nature of orders to be passed while 
conferring the said privilege, the conditions that are imposable 
and the discretions to be used by the courts. On a reading of the 
said authoritative pronouncement and the principles that have been 
culled out in Savitri Agarwal'" there is remotely no indicat.ion 
that the Court of Session or the High Court can pass an order that 
on surrendering of the accused before the Magistrate he shall be 
released on bail on such terms and conditions as the learned 
Magistrate may deem fit and proper or the superior court would 
impose conditions for grant of bail on such surrender. When the 
High Court in categorical terms has expressed the view that it is 
not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner-accused it 
could not have issued such a direction which would tantamount to 
confennent of benefit by which the accused would be in a position 
to avoid arrest. It is in clear violation of the language employed in 
the statutory provision and in flagrant violation of the dictum laid 
dow1Yin Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra) and the
principles culled 
out in Savitri Agamal (mpra). It is clear as crystal the court 
cannot issue a blanket order restraining arrest and it can only 
issue an interim order and the interim order must also conform to 
the requirement of the section and suitable conditions should be · 
imposed." 
Elaborating further, the Court held:-
"36. In the case at hand the direction to admit the accused persons 
to bail on their surrendering has no sanction in .law an<), in fact, 
creates a dent in the sacrosanctity of law. It is contradictory in 
terms and law does not countenance paradoxes. It gains 
respectability and acceptability when its solemnity is maintained. 
Passing such kind of orders the interest of the collective af large 
and that of the individual victims is jeopardised. That apart, it curtails 
the power of the regular court dealing with the bail applications. 
17 ( 1980) 2 sec 565 : Al R 1980 SC 1632 
'"(2009) s sec 325
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
37. In this regard it is to be borne in mind that a court of law has 
to act within the statutory command and not deviate from it. It is 
a well-settled proposition of law what cannot be done directly, 
cannot be done indirectly. While exercising a statutory power a 
court is bound to act within the four corners thereof. The statutory 
exercise of power stands on a different footing than exercise of 
power of judicial review. This has been so stated in Bay Berry 
Apartments (P) Ltd. v. Shobha 1' and UP. State Brassware 
Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey''1." 
17. In Ranjit Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. 21 the 
High Court had directed that considering the nature of the allegation and 
the evidence collected in the case-diary, the petitioner shall surrender 
before the competent court and shall apply for regular bail and the same 
shall be considered upon furnishingnecessary bail bond. The said order 
was challenged before this Court. The two-Judge Bench was constrained 
to observe:-
"lt is the duty of the superior courts to follow the command of the 
statutory provisions and be guided by the precedents and issue 
directions which are permissible in law. We are of the convinced 
opinion that the observations made by the learned Single Judge 
while dealing with second application under Section 438 CrPC 
were not at all warranted under any circumstance as it was neither 
in consonance with
the language employed in Section 438 CrPC 
nor in accord with the established principles of law relating to 
grant of anticipatory bail. We may reiterate that the said order 
has been interpreted by this Comt as an order only issuing a 
direction to the accused to surrender, but as we find, it has really 
created colossal dilemma in the mind of the learned Additional 
Sessions Judge. We are pained to say that passing of these kind 
of orders has become quite frequent and the sagacious saying, "a 
stitch in time saves nine" may be an apposite reminder now. We 
painfully part with the case by saying so." 
18. At this juncture, \\le are obliged to refer to the decision in 
Heilia Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 22 • In the said 
"(2006) 13 sec 737 
'"(2006) 1 sec 479 
21 (2013) 16 sec 191 
22 (2014) 4 sec 453 
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judgment, the Court was dealing with the power of the High Court of 
Allahabad pertaining to grant of pre-arrest bail in exercise of extraordinary 
or inherent jurisdiction and it is significant, for in the State ofUttar Pradesh 
Section 438 CrPC has been deleted by the State Legislature. Be it noted 
that constitutional validity of the said deletion was challenged before the 
Constitution Bench in Kartar Singft v. State of Punjab'-' wherein it has 
been held that deletion of the application of Section 438 CrPC in the 
State of Uttar Pradesh is constitutional. The Constitution Bench has 
ruled held that claim for pre-arrest protection is neither a statutory nor a 
right guaranteed under Article 14, Article 19 or Article 21 of the 
Constitution oflndia. The larger Bench has further observed thus:-
"368. (17)-Though it cannot be said that the High Court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under Article 226 of 
the Constitution and pass orders either way, relating to the cases 
under the 1987 Act, that power should be exercised sparingly, 
that too only in rare and appropriate cases in extreme 
circumstances. But the judicial discipline and comity of courts 
require that the High Courts should refrain from exercising the 
extraordinary jurisdiction in such matters." 
19. The Allahabad High Court has taken similar view in several 
judgments, namely, Satya Pal v. State of U.P. 14, Ajeet
Singh v. State of 
U.P. 15, Lalji Ytulav v. State of U.P. 16, Kamlesh Singh v. State of U.P. 17 
and Natho Mal v. State of U.P.". 
.,. 
20. In Hema Misl1ra (supra) the Court referred to the decision in 
Amarawati v. State of U.P. 19 which has been affirmed by this Court in 
Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P.·'". In Lal Kamlemlra 
Pratap Singh (supra) it has been held thus:-
"6. The learned counsel for the appellant apprehends that the 
appellant will be arrested as there is no provision for anticipatory 
bail in the State of U .P. He placed reliance on a decision of the 
"(1994) 3 sec 569 
"2000 Cri .LJ 569 (All) 
"2007 ~riLJ 170 (All) 
"' 1998 Cri LJ 2366 (All) 
27 1997 Cri LJ 2705 (All) 
'"1994CriLJ 1919(All) 
"2005 Cri LJ 755 (All) 
'" r2009) 4 sec 431
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
Allahabad High Court in Amarawati v. State of U.P. (supra) in 
which a seven-Judge Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court 
held that the court, if it deems fit in the facts and circumstances 
of the case, may grant interim bail pending final disposal of the 
bail application. The Full Bench also observed that arrest is not a 
must whenever an FIR of a "c'6gnizable offence is lodged. The 
Full Beµch placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Joginder 
Kumar v. State of U.P. 31 ., 
21. After referring to the same, Radhakrishnan, J. opined thus:-
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"! may, however, point out that there is unanimity in the view that · · 
in spite of the fact that Section 438 has been specifically omitted 
and made inapplicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, still a party 
aggrieved can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under 
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being extraordinary 
jurisdiction and the vastness of the powers naturally impose 
considerable responsibility in its application.All the same, the High 
Co1,1rt has got the power and sometimes c!uty in appropriate cases 
to grant reliefs, though it is not possible to pinpoint what are the 
appropriate cases, which have to be left to the wisdom of the 
Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of 
India." 
22. Sikri,J. in his concurring opinion stated thatthough the High 
Courts have very wide powers under Article
226, the very vastness of 
the powers imposes on it the responsibility to use them with circumspection 
and in accordance with the judicial consideration and well~established 
principles, so much so that while entertaining writ petitions for granting 
interim protection from arrest, the Court would not go on to the extent of 
including the provision of anticipatory bail as a blanket provision. It has 
been further observed that such a power has to be exercised very 
·cautiously keeping in view, at the same time, that the provisions of Article 
226 are a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The powers 
are, therefore, to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and to 
prevent abuse of process oflaw by the authorities indiscriminately making 
pre-airest of the accused persons. In entertaining such a petition under 
Artie.le 226, the High Court is supposed to balance the two interests. On 
the one hand, the .Court is to ensure that such a power under Article 226 
is not to be exercised liberally so as to convert it into Section 438 CrPC 
"(1994) 4 sec 260 
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proceedings, keeping in mind that when this provision is specifically omitted 
in the State ofUttar Pradesh, it cannot be resorted to_ as back door entry 
via Article 226. On the other hand, wherever the High Court finds that in 
a given case ifthe protection against pre-arrest is not given, it would 
amount to gross miscarriage of justice and no case, at all, is made for 
arrest pending trial, the High Court would be free to grant the relief in 
the nature of anticipatory bail in exercise of its power under Article 226 
of the Constitution. Keeping in mind that this power has to be exercised 
sparingly in those cases where it is absolutely warranted and justified. 
23. We have referred to the authority in Hema Mishra (supra) 
as that specifically deals with the case that came from the State ofUttar 
Pradesh where Section 438 CrPC has been deleted. It has concurred 
with the view expressed in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Sinf(lt (supra). The 
said decision, needless to say, has to be read in the context of State of 
Uttar Pradesh. We do not intend to elaborate the said principle as that is 
not necessary in this case. What needs to be stated here is that the 
States where Section 438 CrPC has not been deleted and kept on the 
statute book, the High Court should be well advised that while entertaining 
petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC, 
exercise judicial restraint. We may hasten to
clarify that the Court, if it 
thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-
restraint imposed by law, has the jurisdiction to quash the investigation 
and may pass appropriate interim orders as thought apposite in law, but 
it is absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable to pass an order of the 
present nature while declining to interfere or expressing opinion that it is 
not appropriate to stay the investigation. This kind of order is really 
inappropriate and unseemly. It has no sanction in law. The Courts should 
oust and obstruct unscrupulous .litigants from invokin_g the inherent 
jurisdiction of the Court on the drop of a hat to file an application for 
quashing oflaunching an FIR or investigation and then seek relief by an 
interim order. It is the obligation of the court to keep such unprincipled 
and unethical litigants at bay. 
24. It has come to the notice of the Court that- in certain cases, 
the High Coutts, while dismissing the application under Section 482 CrPC 
are passing orders that if the accused-petitioner surrenders before the 
trial magistrate, he shall be admitted to bail on such terms and conditions 
as deemed fit and appropriate to be imposed by the concerned Magistrate. 
Sometimes it is noticed that in a case where sessions trial is warranted,
THE STATE OF TELANGANA v. HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI 
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
directions are issued that on surrendering before the concerned trial 
judge, the accused shall be enlarged on bail. Such directions would not 
commend acceptance in light of the ratio in Rashmi Reklw Tlwtoi 
(supra), Gurbakslt Singh Sibbkt"(supra), etc., for they neither come 
within the sweep of Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia nor Section· 
482 CrPC nor Section 438 CrPC. This Court in Ranjit Singh (supra) 
had observed that the sagacious saying "a stitch in time saves nine" may 
be an apposite reminder and this Court also painfully so stated. 
25. Having reminded the same, presently we can only say that 
the types of orders like the present one, are totally unsustainable, for it is 
contrary to the aforesaid settled principles and judicial precedents. It is 
intellectual truancy to avoid the precedents and issue directions which 
are not in consonance with law. It is the duty of a Judge to sustain the 
judicial balance and not to think of an order which can cause trauma to 
the process of adjudication. It should be borne in mind that the culture 
ofadjudication is stabilized when intellectual discipline is maintained and 
further when such discipline constantly keeps guard on the mind. 
26. In view of the aforesaid premises, we allow the appeal, set 
aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct that the 
investigation shall proceed in accordance with law. Be it clarified that 
we
have not expressed anything on any of the aspects alieged in the 
· First Information Report. 
Ankit Gyan 
Appeal allowed. 
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