JOINT SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT,  GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETARIAT,  SHILLONG versus HIGH COURT OF MEGAHALAYA THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR,  SHILLONG
[2016] 2 S.C.R. 376, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2016] 2 S.C.R. 376 
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JOINT SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, 
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GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETARIAT, 
SHILLONG 
v. 
HIGH COURT OF MEGAHALAYA THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR, 
SHILLONG 
(Civil Appeal No.2987 of2016) 
MARCH 18,2016 
[DIPAK MISRA AND SffiVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.] 
Constitution of India, 1950-Art.226- Suo motu petition under 
- For giving effect to Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014 by bringing 
the institution into existence - The Court also scanned the anatomy 
of the provisions u!s. 3 (2j{a) of 2014 Act and granted stay of 
operation of a portion of s.3 (2){a) - On appeal, held: The court 
can initiate suo motu proceedings in very rare circumstances 
depending of the nature of legislation and collective benefit - But 
in such case also the Court cannot raise the issue relating to any 
particular provision and seek explanation in exercise of jurisdiction 
u!Art.226 - The High Court has wrongly scanned the anatomy of 
the provision and passed an order in reltition to it as if the provision 
is obnoxious or falls foul of any constitutional provision - High 
Court also could not have granted stay - Therefore, the part of the 
impugned order which deals with the provision of the Act is set 
aside - The direction pertaining to stay is also set aside - The 
executive is required to see that the institution of Lokayukta is in 
place - Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014 - s.3(2){a). 
Public Interest Litigation - Suo motu initiation of PIL - When 
- Held: Court can
initiate suo motu proceedings in respect pf certain 
issues which come within domain of public interest - But it depends 
upon the nature of the issue involved - There cannot be uncontrolled 
or unguided exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. 
Judiciary - Limitations of adjudication - Discussed. 
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. There can be no doubt, the court can initiate suo 
H motu proceedings in respect of certain issues which come within 
376
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OFMEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETARIAT, 
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SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR 
the domain of public interest. Suo motu public interest litigation 
can be initiated to ameliorate the conditions of a class of persons 
whose constitutional or otherwise lawful rights are affected or 
not adequately looked into. The Court has adopted the said tool 
so that persons in disadvantaged situation because of certain 
reasons - social, economic or socio-economic - are in a position 
to have access to the Court. The constitutional courts can also 
entertain letter petitions and deal with them as writ petitions. 
But it will depend upon the nature of the issue sought to be 
advanced. There cannot be uncontrolled- or unguided exercise 
of epistolary jurisdiction. [Paras 11, 12 and 15) [384-B; 385-G-H; 
384~G-H] 
Nirmal Singh Kah/on v. State of Punjab & others 2008 
(14) SCR 1049 : (2009) 1 SCC 441; Raju Ramsing 
Vasave v Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar 2008 (12) SCR 
992 : (2008) 9 sec 54 - relied on. 
Budhadev Karmaskar (1) v. State of WB. 2011 (2) SCR 
925 : (2011) 11 SCC 538; Ram/i/a Maidan Incident, In 
Re 2012 (4) SCR 971 : (2012) 5 SCC 1 - referred to. 
2. In the instant case, the legislature has passed the 
·legislation in its wisdom. There was no challenge to the 
constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act. The suo motu 
petition was registered for giving effect to the Act by bringing 
the. institutions into existence. This may be thought
of in very 
rare circumstances depending on the nature-Of legislation and 
. the collective benefit but in that arena also the Court .cannot raise 
the issue relating to any particular provision and seek explanation 
in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 
In the case at hand, the High Court has, with an erroneous 
understanding offlindamental principle oflaw, scanned the anatomy 
of the provision and passed an order in relation to it as if it is 
obnoxious or falls foul of any constitutional provision. ··The same 
is clearly impermissib.le. A person aggrieved o.r with expanded 
concept of locus st(lndi could have assailed the provisions. But 
hi that event there are cert.ain requirements and need for certain 
compliances. The High Court could not have proceeded as if"it 
was testing the validity of the provision and granted stay. The 
approach is totally fallacious. The part of the order which deals 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 2 S.C.R. 
A with the provisions of the Act is set aside. The direction pertaining 
to the stay of the provisions of the Meghalaya Lokaynkta Act, 
2014 is also set aside. When the State Legislature has introduced 
. the legislation to take steps as regards the institution, it shall be 
the endeavour of the executive to see that the office of the 
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Lokayukta is in place. As this Court has completely dealt with 
the matter, the writ petition initiated by the High Court shall be 
deemed to have been disposed of. [Paras 16, 2hrnd 22) (386-A-
D; 387-F-G; 388-A-C) 
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"a 
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kartar Singh AIR 1964 SC 
1135 : 1964 SCR 679; State of Andhra Pradesh and 
another v. K. Jayaraman and others (1974) 2 SCC 738 
: AIR 1975 SC 633; Union of India v. E.I.D. Parry 
(India) Ltd. AIR 2000 SC 831 : 2000 (l) SCR 537 : 
(2000) 2 SCC 223; State of Haryana v. State of Punjab 
& another 2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 849 : (2004) 12 SCC 
673 - relied on. 
Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 (2). Suppl. SCR 
122 : (1994) 6 SCC 651; Census Co111111issio11er and 
others v. R. Krishnamurthy (2015) 2 SCC 796 - relied 
on. 
Case Law Reference 
1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 122 
relied on. 
Para2 --· 
(201~) 2 sec 796 
relied on. 
Para3 
2011 (2) SCR 925 
referred to. 
Para 11 
2012 (4) SCR 971 
referred to. 
Para 13 
2008 (14) SCR 1049 
relied on. 
Para 13 
20!)8 (12) SCR 992 
relied on. 
Par!l 14 
1964 SCR 679 
relied on. 
Para 17 
(1974) 2 sec 738 
relied on.
Para 18. 
2000 (0 SCR 537 
relied on. 
Para 19 
2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 849 
relied on. 
Para20 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Ch<il Appeal No. 2987 
of2016 
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2015 in Writ Petition 
H Civil No. 319 of 2015 passed by the High ~ourt ofMeghalya at Shillong.
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETAl{JAT, 
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SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR 
Ranjan Mukherjee, Subhro Sanyal, Advs., for the appearing 
-earties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. L New York Times, in the Editorial, "The 
Frankfurter Legacy," on September 2, 1962, while stating about the 
greatness of Felix Frankfurter, chose the following expression:-
"History will find greatness in Felix Frankfurter as a justice, not 
because of the results he reached but because of his attitude 
toward the process of decision. His guilding lights were detachment, 
rigorous integrity in dealing with the facts of a case, refusal to 
resort to unworthy means, no matter how noble the end, arid 
dedication to the Court as an institution. Because he was human, 
Justice Frankfurter did notjllways live up to his own ideal. But he 
taught us the lesson that there is importance in the process." 
2. Almost two decades and two years back, the Court in Tata 
Cellular v; Ul!ion of India' referred, with approval, the following 
passage from Neely, C.J .' :--
"82 .... '-I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a 
Judge and from those limitations I generalise to the inherent 
limitations of all appellate courts reviewing rate cases. It must be 
remembered that this Court sees approximately 1262 cases a year 
with five Judges. I am -not an accountant, electrical engineer, 
financier, banker, stock broker, or systems
management analyst. 
It is the height of folly to expect Judges intelligently to review a 
5000 page record addressing the intricacies of public utility 
operation.' " 
3. Regard being had to the directions issued by the High Court, 
. this Court in Census Commissioner and otllers v. R. Krisllnamurtlly' 
commenced_ the judgment in the following manner:-
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"The present appeal depicts and, in a way, sculpts the non-
acceptance of conceptual limitation in every human sphere 
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. including that of adjudication. No adjudicator or a Judge can 
conceive the idea that the sky is the limit or for that matter there 
'(1994)6SCC651 
2 Bernard Schwartz in A.dministr'atire La1r. 200 Edn .• p. 584 
'(2015) 2 sec 796 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] 2 S.C.R. 
is no barrier or fetters in one's individual.perception, for judicial 
vision should not be allowed to be imprisoned and have the 
potentiality to cover celestial zones. Be it ingeminated, refrain 
and restrain are the essential virtues in the arena of adjudication 
because they guard as sentinel so that virtuousness is constantly 
sustained. Not for nothing, centuries back Francis Bacon4 had to 
say thus: 
"Judges ought to be more learned· than witty, more reverend than 
plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things, 
integrity is their portion and proper virtue .... Let. the Judges also 
remember that Solomon's throne was supported by lions on both 
sides: let them be lions, but yet lions under tlie throne." 
4. The necessity has arisen again for reiteration of the fundamental 
principle to be adhered to by a Judge. It is because tiie order impugned 
herein presents a sad sad scenario, definitely and absolutely an 
impertnissible and unacceptable one. 
· 
5. Presently, to the facts of the case. A writ petition forming the 
subject matter of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 319 of 2015 was registered 
under the caption "Suo 1110111 cognizance of appointment of Lokayukta 
and failure to constitute Meghalaya State Human Rights Commission". 
By the impugned order dated 14.12.2015, the High Court referred to 
clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Meghalaya Lokayukta 
Act, 2014 (for brevity,
"the Act") and proceeded to deal with the same. 
In that context, it has passed the following order:-
"The provision providing such eligibility criterion requires judicial 
scrutiny; for: the same eligibility cannot be provided for the 
Chairperson and for a Member other than the Judicial Member of 
the Lokayukta. Besides, the Central Lokpal and Lokayukta Act 
of2013 does not prescribe any eligibility criteria for Lokayukta 
and Up-Lokayukta. That apart, <lther States including State of 
Karnataka and State of Madhya Pradesh, looking to adj udicarory 
nature of work, has provided the eligibility criteria like a former · 
Judge of Supreme Court; a Chief Justice of High Court or a Judge 
of High Court, whereas, the eligibility criteria provided in the 
Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014, inter alia includes a criterion 
-iBacon, '"Essays: Of Judicature in I The Works of Francis Bacon" (Montague, Basil, 
Esq ed .. Philadelphia: A Hart, late Carey & Hart. I 852). pp. 58-59.
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETARIAT, 
381 
SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. IT~ REGISTRAR [DIPAK 
M!SRA,J.] 
whereby an eligible non-Judicial person can also be appointed as 
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the Chairperson. Hence, issue notice. 
During the pendency of this writ petition, the portion of clause (a) 
of sub-section (2) of Section 3, which reads as " ... or an eminent 
person who fulfills the eligibility specified in clause (b) of sub-
section (3)"; and consequently, "Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section 
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(3) of Section 3" insofar as it provides for the offending criterion 
for the appointment of the Chairperson is hereby stayed." 
6. After passing the said order, the High Court has proceeded to 
deal with the appointment of the Chairperson and Members of the 
Meghalaya State Human Rights Commission. Dealing with the said c 
facet, it had directed as follows:-
"Now, coming to the appointment of the Chairperson and Members 
of the Meghalaya State Human Rights Commission, Hon 'ble the 
Apex Court has, vide order dated 24.7.2015 in Crl.M.P. No. 16086 
ofl 997 in Crl.M.P. No. 420 I of 1997 (Shri Di lip K. Basu v. State 
of West Bengal and Ors) has directed various States including 
the State of Meghalaya to set up the State Human Rights 
Commission within six months and to fill up the vacancy of 
Chairperson and Members of State Human Rights Commission 
within 3 (three) months from the date of order. As towards 
conlpliance of the aforesaid directions ofHon'ble the Apex
Court, 
the State ofMeghalaya has not initiated the process of appointment 
of the Chairperson and Members of the State Human Rights 
Commission, we direct the Chief Secretary, State of Meghalaya, 
to file affidavit showing the status of processing of the file for the 
appointment of the Chairperson and other Members of the State 
Human Rights Commission on the next date of hearing. Besides, 
we also make it clear, that the State shall specify the name of 
Hon 'ble former Judge of Supreme Court and Hon 'ble former Chief 
Justice of High Court, who have been offered the appointment as 
Chairperson. The State shall also clearly indicate as to who are 
the Judges of High Court and other non-Judicial persons who 
have been offered the appoint111ent as the Chairperson/Members 
of the Commission. This information is required to maintain 
transparen~y in the process of appointment on the posts as 
aforesaid." . 
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7. Be it noted, the Division Bench has appointed two counsel as 
Amicus Curiae and directed the Registrar General to settle their 
professional fee to be paid by the Department of Law, Government of 
Meghalaya. 
8. Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee learned counsel appearing for the 
appellant has submitted that the State has no cavil over the directions 
relating to constitution of the State Human Rights Commission by 
appointment of Chairperson and Members. Jn course of hearing, the 
learned counsel has submitted that the State shall appoint the Chairperson 
and Members of the State Human Rights Commission as per law by end 
of June, 2016. That being the concession by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf 
of the State which, we think, is absolutely fair, there is no need to advert 
to the said aspect. It is also urged by Mr. Mukherjee that the State 
would not have challenged the said part of the order as it understands its 
responsibility and further when the High Court has issued the direction, 
the State is obliged to respect the same as it is in consonance with the 
legal position. The cavil, Mr. Mukherjee would put it, pertains to the 
observations made by the High Court and the stay order passed in respect 
of the provision relating to eligibility prescribed under the Act. It is urged 
by him that there had been no assail to the constitutional validity of the 
said provision and, therefore, the High Court could not have suo motu
taken up the same, especially when the language employed is also similar 
to the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 passed by the Parliament. 
9. To appreciate the submission, it is necessary to note that 
Chapter II of the Act deals with Establishment of Lokayukta. Sections 
3 reads as follows:-
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"Section 3. Establishment of Lokayukta.-(1) As soon as 
after the commencement of this Act, there shall be established, 
by notification in the Official Gazette, a body to be called the 
"Lokayukta". 
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(2) The Lokayukta shall consist of-
( a) a Chairperson, who is or has been a Chief Justice of the 
High Court or a Judge of the High Court or an eminent person 
who fulfils the eligibility specified in clause (b) of sub-section 
(3); and 
(b) such number of members, not exceeding fourout of whom 
fifty percent shall be Judicial Members.
J. S .• POLITJCAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA, MAJN SECRETARIAT, 
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SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR [DIPAK 
MISRA,J.] 
(3)Aperson shall be eligible to be appointed,-
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(a) as a Judicial Member ifhe is or has been a Judge of the 
High Court or is eligible to be a Judge of the High Court; 
(b) as aMemberotherthan a Judicial Member, ifhe is a person 
of impeccable integrity, outstanding ability having special 
knowledge and expertise of not less than twenty-five years in 
the matters relating to anti-corruption policy, public 
administration, vigilance, finance including insurance and 
banking, law, and management. 
(4) The Chairperson or a Member shall not be -
(i) a member of Parliament or a member of the Legislature of 
any State or Union territory; 
(ii) a person convicted of any offence involving moral turpitude; 
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(iii) a person ofless than forty-five years of age, on the date of 
assuming office as Chairperson or Member, as the case may 
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be; 
(iv) a member of any Panchayat or Municipality or District 
Council; 
(v) a person who has been removed or dismissed from service 
of the Union or a State, and shall not hold any office of trust or 
profit (other than his office as the Chairperson or a Member) 
or be connected with any political party or carry on any business 
or practice any profession and accordingly, before he enters 
upon his office, a person appointed as the Chairperson or a 
Member, as the case may be, shall, if -
(a) he holds any
office of trust or profit, resign from such office; 
or 
(b) he is carrying on any business, sever his connection with 
the conduct and management of such business; or 
(c) he is practicing any profession, cease to practice such 
profession." 
I 0. Section 4 deals with appointment of Chairperson or Members 
on recommendation of Selection Committee; and other provjsions of the 
Act dwell upon various other facets which we need not refer to. 
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Submission of Mr. Mukherjee is that the High Court could not have suo 
motu proceeded to deal with the appointment ofLokayukta and, in any 
case, could not have directed stay of the provision. 
l I. There can be no doubt, the court can initiate s11<J 1110/u 
proceedings in respect of certain issues which come within the domain 
of public interest. In Budlutdev Karmaskur (1) v. State of W.B.-' the 
Court, while dismissing an appeal, observed thus:-
"' 14. Although we have dismissed this appeal, we strongly feel 
that the Central and the State Governments through Social Welfare 
Boards should prepare schemes for rehabilitation all over the 
country for physically and sexually abused women commonly 
known as the 'prostitutes' as we are of the view that the prostitutes 
also have a right to live with dignity under Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India since they are also human beings and their 
problems also need to be addressed. 
15. As already observed by us, a woman is compelled to indulge 
in prostitution not for pleasure but because of abject poverty. If 
such a woman is granted opportunity to avail some technical or 
vocational training, she would be able to earn her livelihood by 
such vocational training and skill instead of by selling her body. 
l 6. Hence, we direct the Central and the State Governments to 
prepare schemes for giving technical/vocational training to sex 
workers and sexually abused women
in all cities in India. The 
schemes should mention in detail who will give the technical/ 
vocational training and in what manner they can be rehabilitated 
and settled by offering them employment. For instance, if a 
technical training is for some craft like sewing garments, etc. then 
some arrangements should also be made for providing a market 
for such garments, otherwise they will remain unsold and unused, 
and consequently the woman will not be able to feed herself." 
The purpose of the initiation in the aforesaid case is self-evident. 
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12. Suo 111otu public interest litigation can be initiated to ameliorate · 
the conditions of a class of persons whose constitutional or otherwise 
lawful rights are affected or not adequately looked into. The Court has 
adopted the said tool so that persons in disadvantaged situation because 
of certain reasons - social, economic or socio-economic -are in a position 
to have access to the Court. The Court appoints A111icus Curiae to 
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'(2011) 11 SCC538
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA. MAIN SECRETARIAT. 
SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR [DIPAK 
MISRA,J.] 
assist the Court and also expects the executive to respond keeping in 
view the laudable exercise. 
13. In Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re', suo 1110111 probe of 
incident was ordered by the Court against imposition of prohibitory order 
at night and hasty and forcible evacuation of public on the basis of media 
reports and CCTV camera footage. In Nirnwl Singlt Kali/on v. State 
of Panjab & otlters', the Court ~as held:-
"The High Court while entertaining the writ petition formed a prima 
facie opinion as regards the systematic commission of fraud. While 
dismissing the writ petition filed by the selected candidates, it initiated a 
suo motu public interest litigation. It was entitled to do so. The nature of 
jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, as is well known, in a private 
interest litigation and in a public interest litigation is different. Whereas 
in the latter it is inquisitorial in nature, in the former it is adversarial. In a 
public interest litigation, the court need not strictly follow the ordinary 
procedure. It may not only appoint committees but also issue directions 
upon the State from time to time:{See Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik 
Coop. Credit Society Ltd.& another' and Raju Rainsing Vasave v. 
Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar9.)" 
14. In Raju Ramsing Vasave (supra), the Court has observed 
that when a question is raised, this
Court can take cognizance of a matter 
of such grave .importance suo 1110111. It may not treat the special leave 
petition as a public interest litigation, but, as a public law litigation. It is, in 
a proceeding of that nature, permissible for the Court to make a detailed 
enquiry with regard to the broader aspects of the matter although it was 
initiated at the instance of a person having a private interest. A deeper 
scrutiny can be made so as to enable the Court to find out as to whether 
a party to a !is is guilty of commission of fraud on the Constitution. If 
such an enquiry subserves the greater public interest and has a far-
reaching effect on the society the Court will not shirk its responsibilities 
from doing so. 
,., .. 
15. Be it noted, the constitutional courts can entertain4etter petitions 
and deal with them as writ petitions. But it will depend upon the nature 
of the issue sought to be advanced. There cannot be uncontrolled or 
unguided exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. 
'<2012) 5 sec 1 
'(2009) 1 sec 441 
'<2008) 12 sec 541 
'<2008) 9 sec 54 
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[2016] 2 S.C.R. 
16. In the instant case, as is evident, the High Court has compared 
the provisions pertaining to appointment of Chairperson and Members 
under the Act with the provisions of other Acts enacted by different 
legislatures. The legislature has passed the legislation in its wisdom. 
There was no challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions of 
the Act. The suo motu petition was registered for giving effect to the 
Act by bringing the institutions into existence. This may be thought of in 
very rare circumstances depending on the nature of legislation and the 
collective benefit but in that arena also the Court cannot raise the issue 
relating to any particular provision and seek explanation in exercise of 
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the case at hand, as 
is manifest, the Division Bench of the High Court has, with an erroneous 
understanding offundamental principle oflaw, scanned the anatomy of 
the provision and passed an order in relation to it as if it is obnoxious or 
falls foul ofany constitutional provision. The same is clearly impermissible. 
A person aggrieved or with expanded concept of locus standi some 
one could have assailed the provisions. But in that event there are certain 
requirements and need for certain compliances. 
17. In State of Uttar Prac/esll v. Kartar Singh 10, while dealing 
with the constitutional validity of Rule 5 of the Food Adulteration Rules,
1955, it has been opined as follows:-
" ..... if the rule has to be struck down as imposing unreasonable 
or discriminatory standards, it could not be done merely on any a 
priori reasoning but only as a result of materials placed before the 
Court by way of scientific analysis. It is obvious that this can be 
done only when the party invoking the protection of Art. 14 makes 
averments with details to sustain such a plea and leads evidence 
to establish his allegations. That where a party seeks to impeach 
the validity of a rule made by a competent authority on the ground 
that the rules offend Art. 14 the burden is on him to plead and 
prove the infirmity is too well established to need elaboration." 
18. In State of Am/lira Praclesll mu/ mwtlier v. K. Jayaramm1 
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and others' 1, it has been ruled thus:-
"It is clear that, if there had been an averment, on behalf of the 
petitioners, that the rule was invalid for violating Articles 14 and 
16 of the Constitution, relevant facts showing how it was 
discriminatory ought to have been set out." 
'" AIR 1964 SC 1135 
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11 (1974)2 sec 738: AIR 1975 sc 633
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETARIAT, 
SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR [DIPAK 
MISRA,J.] 
I 9. In Union of India v. E.LD. P(lrry (India) Ltd.", a two-
Judge Bench of this Court has expressed thus:-
" ... There was no pleading that the Rule upon which the reliance 
was placed by the respondent was ultra vires the Railways Act, 
I 890. In the absence of the pleading to that effect, the trial Court 
did not frame any issue on that question. The High Court of its 
own proceeded to consider the validity of the Rule and ultimately 
held that it was not in consonance with the relevant provisions of 
the Railways Act, 1890 and consequently held that it was ultra 
vires. This view is contrary to the settled law ... " 
20. In St(lfe of H(lryrtn(I v. Stme of P111~iab & (lllOt/ier 13, the 
Court emphasizing on the facet of pleading, has opined that:-
" ..... It is well established that constitutional invalidity (presumably 
that is what Punjab means when it uses the word "unsustainable") 
of a statutory provision can be made either on the basis oflegislative 
incompetence or because the statute is otherwise violative of the 
provisions of the Constitution. Neitherthe reason forthe particular 
enactment nor the fact that the reason for the legislation has 
become redundant, would justify the striking down of the legislation 
or for holding that a statute or statutory provision is ultra vires. 
Yet these are the grounds pleaded in subparagraphs
(i), (iv), (v), 
(vi) and (vii) to declare Section 14 invalid. Furthermore, merely 
saying that a particular provision is legislatively incompetent [ground 
(ii)] or discriminatory [ground (iii)] will not do. At least prima facie 
acceptable grounds in support have to be pleaded to sustain the 
challenge. In the absence of any such pleading the challenge to 
the constitutional validity ofa statute or statutory provision is liable 
to be rejected in limine." 
2 I. This being the position in law, the High Court could not have 
proceeded as if it was testing the validity of the provision and granted 
stay. The approach is totalty fallacious. Having opined aforesaid, we 
have no option but to set aside that part of the order which deal.s with the 
provisions of the Act. We do not intend to express any opinion with 
regard to validity of any provision contained in the Act. We also do not 
think it condign to direct thatthe establishment under the said Act should 
become operational within any fixed time. Suffice to say at present that 
12 (2000) 2 sec 223 : AIR 2000 SC 831 
'' (2004) 12 sec 673 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
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wl:>en the State Legislature has introduced the legislation to take steps 
as regards the institution, it shall be the endeavour of the executive to 
see that the office of the Lokayukta is in place. We say no more for the 
present. 
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22. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the appeal is partly allowed 
and the direction pertaining to the stay of the provisions of the Meghalaya 
Lokayukta Act, 2014 is set aside. It is directed that State Human Rights 
Commission shall become functional by end of June, 2016. As we have 
completely dealt with the matter, the writ petition initiated by the High 
.Court shall be deemed to have been disposed of. There shall be no order 
as to costs. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal partly allowed.