P. KISHORE KUMAR versus VITTAL K. PATKAR
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 796, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 796 : 2023 INSC 1009
796
CASE DETAILS
P. KISHORE KUMAR
v.
VITTAL K. PATKAR
(Civil Appeal No. 7210 of 2011)
NOVEMBER 20, 2023
[BELA M. TRIVEDI AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: The plaintiﬀ ’s vendor applied u/s. 9A of the 
Mysore (Personal & Miscellaneous) Inam Abolition Act, 1954 and sought 
occupancy rights in respect of 15 acres of Sy. No. 3. According to the 
plaintiﬀ , the claim of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor succeeded before the Special 
Deputy Commissioner of Inams. However, the appellant-defendant 
alleged that the Commissioner’s order granted occupancy rights u/s. 9 in 
favour of his predecessor-in-interest. Trial Court after examining revenue 
records adduced by the plaintiﬀ  and the Commissioner’s order, held that 
the ownership of the suit property vested in the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor. Whether 
the High Court was justiﬁ ed in upholding the decision of the Trial Court.
Mysore (Personal & Miscellaneous) Inam Abolition Act, 1954 – 
Portions of Sy. No.3 was sold to two diﬀ erent parties, a dispute between 
the two parties arose and, in fact, triggered the suit instituted by the 
plaintiﬀ , inter alia, praying for declaration of title and permanent 
injunction with respect to Schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’ property, against the 
defendant – The Trial Court held that the ownership of the suit property 
vested in the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor – However, the ﬁ rst Appellate Court 
overturned the ﬁ ndings of the Trial Court – The High Court upheld 
the
order of the Trial Court – Propriety:
Held: A bare perusal of the s.9 and s.9A reveals that while s.9 
allows an Inamdar to make an application for occupancy rights, a tenant 
is aﬀ orded an opportunity for the same u/s. 9A of the Act subject to the
797
condition that he was a tenant in respect of the subject land immediately 
prior to the date of vesting – Therefore, it is only a tenant or an Inamdar, 
who could have made such an application – In the instant case, before the 
Commissioner, the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor was one of the applicants while the 
defendant’s predecessor-in-interest was one of the respondent Inamdars 
– The Commissioner lucidly stated that the claimants were not tenants at 
the time of vesting and, therefore, the claims of, inter alia, the plaintiﬀ ’s 
vendor, were ordered to be rejected – It was further said that their respective 
survey numbers were to be registered in favour of the Inamdars u/s. 9 – This 
can have only one possible meaning, that the claim of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor 
for occupancy right as a tenant was rejected, and that of the defendant’s 
predecessor-in-interest was acknowledged – The Commissioner’s order 
distinctly denying the rights of occupancy to the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor is 
evidence that renders the revenue entries unworthy of acceptance – Also, 
an examination of the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiﬀ , also tilts 
the balance against him – The deed simply states that the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor 
traces her title not to a grant in her favour by the government, but through 
a sale deed executed in her favour – Further, there is a categorical recital in 
the deed that the property is neither Inam land nor tenanted land, and that 
there is no legal impediment to the sale of
such property – Some element of 
mischief being present is clear inasmuch as a relevant fact was concealed, 
i.e., the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor had indeed applied for occupancy rights under 
the Act but had failed to secure them – Such an application would never 
have been necessary, had the property not been Inam or tenanted land, thus 
laying bare the deﬁ ciency in the plaintiﬀ ’s title – The High Court, while 
observing that there existed a lawfully registered sale deed in favour of 
the plaintiﬀ , failed to identify this inherent defect in the title claimed by 
the plaintiﬀ  – The ﬁ rst Appellate Court rightly overturned the ﬁ ndings of 
the Trial Court and dismissed the suit – The Commissioner’s order was 
correctly interpreted to determine as to in whom occupancy rights vested 
in respect of the ‘B’ schedule property – As a result, the plaintiﬀ ’s suit 
shall stand dismissed. [Paras 8, 9, 16, 17, 31]
Maxim – Nemo dat quod non habet – Whether plaintiﬀ ’s vendor 
having been denied the right of title in the land by the Commissioner’s 
order, could have conveyed the same to her vendee:
P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR
798 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
Held: It is settled law that a vendor cannot transfer a title to the vendee 
better than he himself possesses, the principle arising from the maxim nemo 
dat quod non habet, i.e., “no one can confer a better title than what he himself 
has” – In the instant case, the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor having been denied the right 
of title in the land by the Commissioner’s order, could not have conveyed 
the same to her vendee. [Para 18]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – Mysore (Personal & 
Miscellaneous) Inam Abolition Act, 1954 – The High Court framed the 
following question of law for decision “Whether the lower appellate 
court had erred in law in not considering Ex P-1 to Ex P-29 and the 
admissions made by defendant (DW-1)?” – The High Court interpreted 
the Commissioner’s order to be in favour of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor – 
Propriety: 
Held: The question framed by the High Court did not merit the label 
of a substantial question of law so as to warrant interference with the ﬁ rst 
appellate decree u/s. 100 of the CPC – That apart, the High Court was remiss 
in reversing the ﬁ ndings of facts rightly arrived at by the ﬁ rst Appellate 
Court – The ﬁ rst Appellate Court had overturned the ﬁ ndings of the Trial 
Court, on the premise that revenue records alone could not aid the plaintiﬀ  
in establishing his title, especially in the glaring absence of any Inam grant 
in favour of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor – The decision to adopt the Trial
Court’s 
approach of interpreting the Commissioner’s order within the framework of 
the revenue records that were exhibited was yet another aspect in which the 
High Court fell in error – An attempt ought to have been made by the High 
Court to harmoniously read the Commissioner’s order with the provisions 
of the Act and to interpret the same so as to render it in consonance with 
the law, the failure of which leads to the inescapable conclusion that the 
same is indefensible – The High Court while rendering the judgment and 
order under challenge proceeded on an erroneous approach and contrary to 
settled law – The plaintiﬀ  having failed to meet the burden of proof imposed 
on him by law, his suit against the defendant must fail. [Paras 28, 29,30]
Title – Documents of title – Revenue records:
Held: It is trite law that revenue records are not documents of title. 
[Para 11]
799
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Nazir Mohamed vs. J. Kamala (2020) 19 SCC 57; Jitendra Singh vs. State 
of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802; Union of India and 
Ors. vs. Vasavi Co-operative Housing Society Limited and Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 
269: [2014] 1 SCR 180; Jagdish Prasad Patel (Dead) thr. LRs. and Ors. vs. 
Shivnath and Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 82: [2019] 6 SCR 518 – relied on.
Sawarni vs. Inder Kaur and Ors (1996) 6 SCC 223: [1996] 5 Suppl. 
SCR 165; Balwant Singh & Ors vs. Daulat Singh (Dead) by LRs and Ors. 
(1997) 7 SCC 137; Sita Ram Bhau Patil vs. Ramchandra Nago Patil (Dead) 
by LRs. and Ors (1977) 2 SCC 49: [1977] 2 SCR 671; R.V.E. Venkatachala 
Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple (2003) 8 SCC 752: 
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 450; Somnath Burman vs. S.P. Raju and Ors. (1969) 
3 SCC 129: [1970] 2 SCR 869; Gurdev Kaur vs. Kaki (2007) 1 SCC 546: 
[2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 27 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.7210 of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2010 of the High Court of 
Karnataka at Bangalore in RSA No.1333 of 2009.
Appearances:
A. Diwakara, Sr. Adv., Kashi Vishweshwar, Ms. A. Sumathi, Advs. for 
the Appellant.
S. N. Bhat, Sr. Adv., Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Ms. Akhila Wali, Shiva 
Swaroop, Nanda Kumar K. B. for M/s Nuli & Nuli, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 
THE APPEAL
1. This civil
appeal arises from the judgment and decree dated 29th 
November, 2010 rendered by the Karnataka High Court, whereby an appeal 
P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR
800 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”, hereafter) 
was allowed, resulting in restoration of the decree passed by the Trial Court 
and setting aside of the ﬁ rst appellate decree dismissing the suit of the 
plaintiﬀ  – respondent (“plaintiﬀ ”, hereafter).
BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS 
2. The factual matrix of the case, insofar as is relevant for the purpose 
of a decision on this appeal, is set out hereinbelow:
i) 
The pleaded case in the plaint is that land comprised in Sy. No. 
3, measuring 187 acres 38 guntas, in Navarathna Agrahara, 
Hobli, Devanhalli Taluk, Bangalore, devolved upon the plaintiﬀ ’s 
predecessor-in-interest, K. Muniyappa @ K. Shamaiah vide a 
Family Settlement Deed dated 30th July, 1953. 
ii) 
15 acres out of the said land was sold by K. Shamaiah to the 
vendor of the plaintiﬀ , i.e., Smt. Akula Yogamba (“plaintiﬀ ’s 
vendor” hereafter) vide registered sale deed dated 14th February, 
1958. 
iii)  The Mysore (Personal & Miscellaneous) Inam Abolition Act, 
1954 (“the Act” hereafter), enacted for abolition of Inams in the 
State of Mysore, came into force on 15th March, 1955. By virtue 
of the Act, all rights, title and interests in the land, hitherto vested 
in the Inamdars, ceased and came to be vested absolutely in the 
State of Mysore. However, the Act provided for an opportunity 
to the Inamdars to make an application under section 9 thereof 
to register as an occupant of the land. 
iv) The
plaintiﬀ ’s vendor applied under section 9A of the Act and 
sought occupancy rights in respect of 15 acres of Sy. No. 3. 
According to the plaintiﬀ , the claim of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor 
succeeded before the Special Deputy Commissioner of Inams 
(“Commissioner”, hereafter). The Commissioner passed an order 
dated 25th November, 1958 (“Commissioner’s order”, hereafter) 
while deciding this application, which reads as follows: 
“Order sheet
In the Order of Special 
Case No. 51/1958-59
801
Sl. No. Order of proceedings with signature of 
Presiding Oﬃ  cer
Signature of parties or 
pleaders when necessary
The persons noted below have purchased 
the lands noted against them after the date 
of vesting from jodidars
1
Sri. Keralavarma S.No. 13_33-00
2
Sri. Lokaranjan, S. No. 13_20-00
3
Smt. Akula Yogama S. No. 3_15_00
4
Sri Venkata Rao S.No. 3_1-4
5
Sri M. Raja Rao S. No. _ Dry 3-26, 6-00
6
S. No. 3 ____ 12-00
7
Hence, the claim of the applicants may 
be rejected and Khata u/s 9 of the Act in 
the name of the jodidar may be made.
Sd/-
Special Deputy Commissioner for 
Abolition of Inams Kolar District, 
Kolar 
25th November, 1958
Order
Order
The claimants were not tenants at the time of vesting. Therefore, claims 
of Sri Keralvarma, Yogamba, Bheemavarapu Venkata Rau, Sri Ranga 
Rao are ordered to be rejected. These numbers are separately registered 
in favour of the Inamdars under Section 9.
13/33, 13/20 are registered in favour of the Inamdar Sri K. 
Srinivasamurthy u/s 9 and 3/15, 3/1-2, 2/3-36, 16/2-6, 3/12 are ordered 
to be registered as occupant.
Dictated, transcript edited by me and then pronounced in open court. 
(sign)
Special Deputy Commissioner 
for Abolition of Inams, Bangalore”
P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR
[DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
802 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
It is the interpretation of the Commissioner’s order which forms the 
fulcrum of the present dispute. 
v) 
 While the plaintiﬀ  alleged that the claim of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor 
was accepted, thus making the plaintiﬀ  the lawful owner with 
the better title, the appellant – defendant (“defendant” hereafter) 
in his written statement alleged that the Commissioner’s order 
granted occupancy rights under section 9 in favour of his 
predecessor-in-interest, i.e., K. Srinivasa Murty, the Inamdar, 
from whom the defendant purchased 5 acres and 28 guntas, thus 
vesting him with the better title.
vi) 
Amendments made to the Act in 1979 vested the powers of the 
Special Deputy Commissioner with the Land Tribunal. Upon 
applications being made by other tenants for occupancy rights 
in Sy. No. 3, the Land Tribunal, vide order dated 20th September, 
1982, conferred occupancy rights on the defendant’s predecessor-
in-interest, with respect to an extent of 21 acres in Sy. No. 3. An 
endorsement to the same eﬀ ect was also led in evidence by the 
defendant.
vii) Sale deeds were thereafter executed for the same parcel of land by 
both sides. While the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor sold an extent of 15 acres 
to the plaintiﬀ  vide registered sale deed dated 12th November, 
1987, the defendant purchased 5 acres and 28 guntas comprised 
in Sy. No.3 vide registered sale deeds dated 20th June, 1984 from 
his respective vendors. 
viii) Portions of Sy. No.3 being
sold to two different parties, a 
dispute between the two parties became imminent and, in fact, 
triggered O.S. 506/1995 (“the suit” hereafter) instituted by the 
plaintiﬀ , inter alia, praying for declaration of title and permanent 
injunction with respect to Schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’ property, 
against the defendant. The prayers in the plaint are reproduced 
hereinbelow for the sake of clarity:
“a) declaring that the plaintiﬀ  is the absolute owner of the 
schedule property? (sic)
803
b) for permanent injunction restraining the defendant or 
his henchmen, person from in any way interfering with 
the plaintiﬀ ’s lawful peaceful possession in both A and B 
schedule property.
c) and for the costs and such other reliefs as this Hon’ble 
Court deems ﬁ t to grant in the circumstances of the case, 
in the interest of justice and equity.”
The property schedules are extracted hereinbelow:
“Schedule – A
15 Acres of land situated in Sy No. 93, Old No. 3 in 
Navarathna Agrahara, Jala Hobli Devanahalli Taluk, 
Bangalore District**
Schedule – B
All the piece and parcel of the 5.28 guntas of land in Re. 
S. No. 93, Old No. 3, situated at Eastern side of by passing 
mud road situated in Navarathna Agrahara, Jala Hobli 
Devanahalli Taluk, Bangalore**”
ix)  The learned Civil Judge (“Trial Court”, hereafter) after extensive 
examination of revenue records adduced by the plaintiﬀ , and 
the Commissioner’s order, held that the ownership of the suit 
property vested in the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor. In arriving at such a 
conclusion, the court was predominantly persuaded by Ext. P8 
(Record of Rights), which recorded that vide order dated 24th 
March 1959 passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner, Inam 
Abolition, occupancy rights had been conferred on the plaintiﬀ ’s 
vendor. However, no order or endorsement of the said date was 
actually exhibited before the Trial Court. The decree passed by 
the Trial Court is quoted below for facility of understanding:
“After contest, it is
ordered and decreed that the suit of the 
plaintiﬀ  is hereby decreed. It is declared that the plaintiﬀ  
is the absolute owner of the B Schedule property and the 
defendant or any persons claiming through him are hereby 
permanently restrained from interfering with the peaceful 
P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR
[DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
804 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
possession and enjoyment of the plaintiﬀ  over the suit 
schedule A and B properties.”
x) 
Aggrieved by the decree, the defendant carried it in an appeal 
under section 96 of the CPC before the learned District Judge. The 
ﬁ rst appellate court overturned the ﬁ ndings of the Trial Court, on 
the premise that revenue records alone could not aid the plaintiﬀ  
in establishing his title, especially in the glaring absence of any 
Inam grant in favour of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor. It was noted by 
the appellate court that though the plaintiﬀ  referred to the order 
dated 24th March, 1959, the same was not led in evidence. 
xi) 
A second appeal carried by the plaintiﬀ  before the High Court 
succeeded vide the judgment and order impugned herein. The 
High Court framed the following question of law for decision 
which, according to it, was a substantial question of law:
“Whether the lower appellate court had erred in law in not 
considering Ex P-1 to Ex P-29 and the admissions made 
by defendant (DW-1)?”
The High Court interpreted the Commissioner’s order to be in favour 
of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor, such interpretation being bolstered solely by the 
revenue records exhibited by the plaintiﬀ . Though it was noted that the grant 
of occupancy rights in favour of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor under section 9A was 
contrary to the provisions of the Act, it was observed that the decision having 
attained ﬁ nality could not be challenged after such
extensive passage of time 
before a civil court. The plaintiﬀ  was, therefore, held to have established the 
better title, resulting in upholding of the decree passed by the Trial Court. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
3. Learned senior counsel for the defendant, Mr. A Diwakara, 
highlighted the dissatisfaction recorded by the High Court with the 
evidence adduced by the plaintiﬀ , and stressed that in view of the same, 
the Court could not have held the plaintiﬀ  to establish a better title than the 
defendant, more so when the Court itself recorded the fact that the grant 
of occupancy rights in favour of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor under section 9A of 
the Act was contrary to its import. It was argued by him that the plaintiﬀ ’s
805
vendor being a purchaser, could not have applied as an “occupant” under 
the provisions of the Act, such application being restricted only to tenants. 
The Commissioner’s order categorically recorded that the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor 
was not a tenant at the time of vesting of the land; therefore, the order could 
not, by any stretch of imagination, be interpreted to vest occupancy rights 
in the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor. 
4. Per contra, Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned senior counsel for the plaintiﬀ , 
argued that the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor had made an application for occupancy 
rights in 15 acres of Sy No. 3, and the Commissioner, while noting that 
the vendor was not a tenant at the time of vesting, went on to record that 
occupancy registration under section 9A be done. He strenuously advanced 
the record of rights for the year 1983 in the name of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor, 
along with subsequent revenue entries in the name of the plaintiﬀ , to argue 
that it was the plaintiﬀ , and his vendor before him, who were being treated 
as the rightful owners by the revenue authorities, such authorities having 
rightly interpreted the Commissioner’s order to mean that ownership vested 
in the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor. 
ANALYSIS
5. This Court in Nazir Mohamed vs. J. Kamala1 has crisply analysed 
numerous decisions rendered by this Court on section 100 of the CPC and 
summarised the law as follows:
“30. Where no such question of law, nor even a mixed question of law 
and fact was urged before the trial court or
the ﬁ rst appellate court, as 
in this case, a second appeal cannot be entertained. ***
33.2.  The High Court should be satisﬁ ed that the case involves a 
substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question 
of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a 
question, answer to which aﬀ ects the rights of parties to the suit) will 
be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any speciﬁ c 
provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding 
precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. 
1 
(2020) 19 SCC 57
P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR
[DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
806 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
33.3. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, 
where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions 
of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the 
matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In 
the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not 
because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered 
on a material question, violates the settled position of law.”
6. Although it is true that Nazir Mohamed (supra) is a decision of 
recent origin and the High Court cannot be said to have the beneﬁ t of perusal 
thereof, there can be little doubt that the law on what would constitute a 
‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of section 100, CPC has 
not changed over the years and the jurisdiction continues to be limited in 
the sense that interference ought not to be made unless the appeal involves 
a substantial question of law as distinguished from a mere question of law. 
7. We have held earlier that much would depend on the Commissioner’s 
order, the true interpretation of which was ﬁ ercely contested by senior 
counsel on either side. However, before embarking on the process of 
determining if the question of ownership of the suit property was rightly 
decided by the High Court, an examination of sections 9 and 9A of the Act 
is considered imperative.
“9. Lands and buildings to vest in the
Inamdar :-
(1) Every Inamdar shall, with eﬀ ect on and from the date of vesting, 
be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands other than:-
(i) communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, 
mines, quarries rivers, streams, tanks and irrigation works;
(ii) lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered 
under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8; and (iii) lands upon which have been 
erected buildings owned by any person other than the Inamdar.
(2) Every building situated within the limits of the inam which was 
owned immediately before the date of vesting by the Inamdar shall, 
with eﬀ ect on and from such date, vest in the Inamdar. 
Explanation: In this section ‘inamdar’ means an Inamdar other than a 
holder of a minor inam referred to in Section 7.
807
9A. Other Tenants of Inamdar: Every tenant of the Inamdar, other 
than the tenants entitled to be registered as occupants under Sections 4, 
5 and 6, shall, with eﬀ ect on and from the date of vesting and subject 
to the provisions of Chapter III-A, be entitled to continue as a tenant 
of the land in respect of which he was a tenant immediately before 
the date of vesting.”
(emphasis supplied by us)
8. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions reveals that while section 
9 allows an Inamdar to make an application for occupancy rights, a tenant is 
aﬀ orded an opportunity for the same under section 9A of the Act subject to 
the condition that he was a tenant in respect of the subject land immediately 
prior to the date of vesting. Therefore, it is only a tenant or an Inamdar, who 
could have made such an application. 
9. Let us now examine the Commissioner’s order. In the case before 
the Commissioner, the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor was one of the applicants while 
the defendant’s predecessor-in-interest was one of the respondent Inamdars. 
The Commissioner lucidly stated that the claimants were not tenants at 
the time of vesting and, therefore, the claims of, inter alia, the plaintiﬀ ’s 
vendor, were ordered to be rejected. It was further said that their respective 
survey numbers were to be registered in favour of the Inamdars under 
section 9. This, in our view, can have only one possible meaning, that the 
claim of the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor for occupancy right as a tenant was
rejected, 
and that of the defendant’s predecessor-in-interest was acknowledged. The 
plaintiﬀ ’s vendor having failed to satisfy the condition of being vested 
with tenancy rights as on the date stipulated by section 9A and such order 
having remained unchallenged for all times, we are unable to agree with 
the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiﬀ . 
10. Mr. S.N. Bhat for the plaintiﬀ  sought to rely on Ext. P8 and the 
other revenue entries containing the name of the plaintiﬀ  and the plaintiﬀ ’s 
vendor to argue that the Commissioner’s order vested the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor 
with occupancy rights, and it is only in accordance with such order did 
the revenue authorities enter the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor’s name in the records. 
However, we are also unable to agree with such an argument. 
11. It is trite law that revenue records are not documents of title. 
P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR
[DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
808 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
12. This Court in Sawarni vs. Inder Kaur and Ors.2 held that mutation 
in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any 
presumptive value on title. All it does is entitle the person in whose favour 
mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question. 
13. This was further aﬃ  rmed in Balwant Singh & Ors vs. Daulat 
Singh (Dead) by LRs and Ors.3 wherein this Court held that mere mutation 
of records would not divest the owners of a land of their right, title and 
interest in the land. 
14. In Jitendra Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.4, this 
Court after considering a catena of judgments, reiterated the principle of 
law as follows:
“6. ***mutation entry does not confer any right, title or interest in 
favour of the person and the mutation entry in the revenue record is 
only for the ﬁ scal purpose.”
15. We may also proﬁ tably refer to the decision of this Court in Sita 
Ram Bhau Patil vs. Ramchandra Nago Patil (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.5 
wherein it was held that there exists no universal principle that whatever 
will appear in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct, when there 
exists evidence to the contrary. 
16. In the present case, the Commissioner’s order distinctly denying 
the rights of occupancy to the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor is evidence that renders 
these revenue entries unworthy of acceptance. 
17. An examination of the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiﬀ , 
also
tilts the balance against him. The deed simply states that the plaintiﬀ ’s 
vendor traces her title not to a grant in her favour by the government, but 
through a sale deed executed in her favour. Further, there is a categorical 
recital in the deed that the property is neither Inam land nor tenanted land, and 
that there is no legal impediment to the sale of such property. Some element 
of mischief being present is clear inasmuch as a relevant fact was concealed, 
2 
(1996) 6 SCC 223
3 
(1997) 7 SCC 137
4 
2021 SCC OnLine SC 802
5 
(1977) 2 SCC 49
809
i.e., the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor had indeed applied for occupancy rights under the 
Act but had failed to secure them. Such an application would never have 
been necessary, had the property not been Inam or tenanted land, thus laying 
bare the deﬁ ciency in the plaintiﬀ ’s title. The High Court, while observing 
that there existed a lawfully registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiﬀ , 
failed to identify this inherent defect in the title claimed by the plaintiﬀ .
18. It is settled law that a vendor cannot transfer a title to the vendee 
better than he himself possesses, the principle arising from the maxim nemo 
dat quod non habet, i.e., “no one can confer a better title than what he himself 
has”. In the present case, the plaintiﬀ ’s vendor having been denied the right 
of title in the land by the Commissioner’s order, could not have conveyed 
the same to her vendee. 
19. In contrast, when the sale deed dated 20th June, 1984 executed in 
favour of the defendant is examined, there is an unequivocal and categorical 
recital that the vendor purchased the land from Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy, 
in whose favour occupancy rights were granted vide the Commissioner’s 
order. A comparative study of the two sale deeds leaves none in doubt that 
the defendant’s sale deeds, supported by the Commissioner’s order, weigh 
heavier in the scales of justice as compared to the plaintiﬀ ’s sale deed, which 
is only supported by revenue documents. 
20. The deﬁ ciencies in the plaintiﬀ ’s case
are further revealed by the 
deposition of the plaintiﬀ , wherein he has admitted that he had not seen the 
Commissioner’s order, and that he “was not told that Smt. Akula Yogamba 
is merely a tenant and that, she had no right over the land”. The doctrine of 
caveat emptor tasks a vendee with the duty to diligently investigate the title 
he is purchasing, but the plaintiﬀ  in the present case has evidently shirked 
such duty for which the law cannot come to his rescue. 
21. It is also curious to note that the plaintiﬀ  has placed on record 
endorsements issued by the Commissioner in favour of four other tenants, 
but has failed to produce one in his own vendor’s name. We cannot help 
but take an adverse view of the same against the plaintiﬀ , since it only goes 
towards making denser the cloud which has been cast on the plaintiﬀ ’s title.
22. Contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiﬀ  that through the 
record of rights the plaintiﬀ  has established his title by a preponderance 
P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR
[DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
810 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
of probabilities is not sustainable. As noted above, the plaintiﬀ  failed to 
produce a single document of title in respect of the suit property. In a dispute 
with respect to determination of title, merely pointing out the lacunae in the 
defendant’s title would not suﬃ  ce. Having instituted the suit for declaration, 
the burden of proof rested on the shoulders of the plaintiﬀ  to reasonably 
establish the probability of better title, which the plaintiﬀ  in the present 
case, has manifestly failed to do. 
23. This Court, in Union of India and Ors. vs. Vasavi Co-operative 
Housing Society Limited and Ors.6, held as under:
“15. It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden 
always lies on the Plaintiﬀ  to make out and establish a clear case for 
granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up 
by the Defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the Plaintiﬀ .”
24. This decision was aﬃ  rmed, and further elaborated upon, in Jagdish 
Prasad Patel (Dead) thr. LRs. and Ors. vs. Shivnath and Ors.7, wherein 
this Court has succinctly summarized the law on burden of proof in suits 
for declaration of title as follows:
“44. In the suit for declaration for title and possession, the Plaintiﬀ s-
Respondents could succeed only on the strength of their own title 
and not on the weakness of the case of the Defendants-Appellants. 
The burden is on the Plaintiﬀ s-Respondents to establish
their title 
to the suit properties to show that they are entitled for a decree for 
declaration. The Plaintiﬀ s-Respondents have neither produced the 
title document i.e. patta-lease which the Plaintiﬀ s-Respondents are 
relying upon nor proved their right by adducing any other evidence. 
As noted above, the revenue entries relied on by them are also held 
to be not genuine. In any event, revenue entries for few Khataunis 
are not proof of title; but are mere statements for revenue purpose. 
They cannot confer any right or title on the party relying on them 
for proving their title.”
6 
(2014) 2 SCC 269
7 
(2019) 6 SCC 82
811
25. Mr. S.N. Bhat placed reliance on the decision of this Court in 
R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. 
Temple8 to contend that the plaintiﬀ  was only expected to prove his title to 
a high degree of probability and not beyond reasonable doubt. The principle 
of law argued by the learned senior counsel is not one we wish to dispute, 
the same having been well settled through numerous decisions of this 
Court. However, having led in evidence only revenue documents which 
are essentially ﬁ scal in nature, we have no hesitation in holding that in the 
present case, the plaintiﬀ  has been unable to assert his case to a high degree 
of probability. It is, therefore, not enough that the plaintiﬀ  led in evidence 
records of rights for a number of years in an attempt to establish his title; 
such records would not counter the proof of occupancy rights furnished by 
the defendant, in a test of probative value. 
26. This Court, in Somnath Burman vs. S.P. Raju and Ors.9 held that 
possession can be regarded as a better title against all, except the true and 
lawful owner. Therefore, the multitude of revenue documents put to use to 
argue that the plaintiﬀ  was cultivating the suit property would not adequately 
meet the demands of proof made by law. The only credible document of 
title led as evidence in the present case was in favour of the defendant’s 
predecessor-in-interest; hence, it must follow that it is only the defendant 
who can be declared
the lawful owner of the ‘B’ schedule property. 
27. In the light of the discussions made above, we hold that the Trial 
Court erred in decreeing the suit by placing on a higher probative pedestal 
the revenue entries. In our considered opinion, the ﬁ rst appellate court 
rightly overturned the ﬁ ndings of the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. The 
Commissioner’s order was correctly interpreted to determine as to in whom 
occupancy rights vested in respect of the ‘B’ schedule property. 
28. The ﬁ rst appellate court having examined the facts in extenso, the 
High Court ought not to have interfered with the ﬁ ndings rendered therein 
by virtue of being, in second appeal, a court of law. As was astutely said by 
this Court in Gurdev Kaur vs. Kaki10, a second appellate court is not expected 
8 
(2003) 8 SCC 752
9 
(1969) 3 SCC 129
10 (2007) 1 SCC 546
P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR
[DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
812 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
to conduct a “third trial on facts” or be “one more dice in the gamble.” The 
decision rendered by the ﬁ rst appellate court, not being in violation of the 
settled position of law, ought not to have been interfered with. With utmost 
respect to the High Court, we are constrained to observe that the question 
framed by it could be regarded as one of law, if it all, but did not merit the 
label of a substantial question of law so as to warrant interference with the 
ﬁ rst appellate decree under section 100 of the CPC.
29. That apart, the High Court was remiss in reversing the ﬁ ndings 
of facts rightly arrived at by the ﬁ rst appellate court. The decision to adopt 
the Trial Court’s approach of interpreting the Commissioner’s order within 
the framework of the revenue records that were exhibited was yet another 
aspect in which the High Court fell in error. An attempt ought to have been 
made by the High Court to harmoniously read the Commissioner’s order 
with the provisions of the Act and to interpret the same so as to render it 
in consonance with the law, the failure of which leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that the same is indefensible. 
30. The sequitur of this discussion, with respect, is that the High Court 
while rendering the judgment and order under challenge proceeded on an 
erroneous approach and contrary to settled law. The plaintiﬀ  having failed 
to meet the burden of proof imposed on him by law, his suit
against the 
defendant must fail.
31.The impugned judgment and decree are, accordingly, set aside. 
The civil appeal stands allowed and the decree passed by the Trial Court, 
extracted hereinabove, is set aside with the result that the plaintiﬀ ’s suit 
shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
32. We, however, make it clear that any observation made in this 
judgment may not prejudice the plaintiﬀ ’s right, if any, in respect of ‘A’ 
schedule property; if in future his right is put to jeopardy and the appropriate 
forum is approached to protect such right, such forum shall proceed to decide 
the lis on its own merits.
Headnotes prepared by:  
Appeal allowed.
Ankit Gyan