FULESHWAR GOPE versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 315, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 315 : 2024 INSC 718
Fuleshwar Gope 
v. 
Union of India & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3923 of 2024)
23 September 2024
[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as to whether the validity of the Sanction Order can be 
challenged at any stage; whether violation of s.45(2) of the UAPA r/w 
rr.3 and 4 of the 2008 Rules, if any, vitiates the proceedings, whether 
violation of statutory timelines and the requirement of independent 
review which includes application of mind, are necessary aspects 
of procedure; whether the appellant’s involvement were actually 
independent of the ones in which A-6 and other members were 
arrayed as accused; and whether the statutory exemption u/s.22 
A of the UAPA applies to the appellant who claims to be unaware 
of the affairs of the company.
Headnotes†
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.45(2) – 
Cognizance of offences – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
(Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 – 
rr.3 and 4 – Time limit for making a recommendation by the 
Authority – Time limit for sanction of prosecution – Appellant’s 
case that he was made an accused and a member of the 
larger conspiracy – Allegations against him that on directions 
of A 6, a terrorist and chief of People’s Liberation Front of 
India-PLFI, the appellant formed a company, which used 
to directly/indirectly collect funds for the use of activities 
of PLFI; and that the appellant criminally conspired and
formed an unlawful association with members of PLFI-A 7 
and 14 – FIR against six persons alleging that Rs.25.83 lakhs 
of demonetized currency brought to the concerned Bank by 
A-6 – Appellant sought to quash suo motu letter in respect 
of the investigation; sanction letter granting sanction qua 
prosecution of the appellant as accused; and cognizance 
order under IPC and UAPA – Division Bench refused to quash 
the same – Challenge to:
* Author
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Held: No infirmity in the order granting sanction against the 
appellant  – It is not incumbent upon the authority to record 
detailed reasons to support its conclusion and, as such, the orders 
challenged, cannot be faulted with on that ground – Since trial 
is underway and numerous witnesses already stand examined, 
the challenge to the validity of the sanction qua the appellant 
left it to be raised before the trial judge – Whether or not both 
A-6 and the appellant are part of the same, continuing, ongoing  
transactions, is to be decided on the basis of evidence adduced 
at trial, and not at this stage, by this Court, thus, left to the 
appellants to raise this issue before the trial judge – Furthermore, 
as regards, application of exemption u/s.22A, this is a matter for the  
trial court to consider and not for this Court to decide at this 
stage, keeping in view that the trial is underway and proceeded 
substantially. [Paras 18, 41, 46, 50]
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.45(2) – Cognizance 
of offences – Validity of Sanction Order – Challenged to, at 
what stage:
Held: Validity of sanction should be challenged at the earliest 
instance available, before the Trial Court – If such a challenge is 
raised at an appellate stage it would be for the person raising the 
challenge to justify the reasons for bringing the same at a belated 
stage – Such reasons would have to be considered independently 
so as to
ensure that there is no misuse of the right of challenge 
with the aim to stall or delay proceedings – On facts, keeping in 
view the submission made that the trial is underway and numerous 
witnesses (113 out of 125) already stand examined, no finding given 
on the challenge to the validity of the sanction qua the appellant 
and leave it to be raised before the trial judge, who shall, if such 
a question is raised decide, it promptly. [Paras 18, 51.1]
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.45(2) – 
Cognizance of offences – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
(Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 – 
rr.3 and 4 – Time limit for making a recommendation by the 
Authority – Time limit for sanction of prosecution – Timelines 
in accordance with s.45(2) r/w rr.3 & 4 and the requirement of 
independent review, if necessary aspects of procedure, and 
non-adherence of which would vitiate proceedings under the 
UAPA:
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
Held: Timelines mentioned in rr.3 and 4 are couched in mandatory 
language and, thus, have to be strictly followed – This is keeping in 
view that UAPA being a penal legislation, strict construction must be 
accorded to it – Timelines imposed by way of statutory Rules are 
a way to keep a check on executive power which is a necessary 
position to protect the rights of accused persons – Independent 
review by both the authority recommending sanction and the 
authority granting sanction, are necessary aspects of compliance 
with s.45 of the UAPA – As regards appellant’s case that the 
timelines were not followed, the first sanction was granted more than 
a year after the recommendation was moved; and that there was 
no independent review on the part of both recommending authority 
and central government, as the sanction was merely granted within 
a day each, the gap between the first action against A-6 and the 
arrest of the appellant is a result of continuing investigation, as 
the appellant was made an accused in the second supplementary 
chargesheet, arising out of the same FIR; and since the investigation 
continued, the gap cannot be termed fatal so as to render the 
arrest of the appellant as unlawful or illegal – Grant of sanction 
is within the stipulated time – Furthermore, it cannot be said that 
there was non application of mind and lack of independent review. 
[Paras 20, 28.4, 41, 51.2]
Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 – ss.218-222 – Misjoinder 
of charges – Violation of CrPC – Plea of the appellant that the 
transactions in connection with which he has been brought 
to the book were actually independent of the ones in which 
A-6 and other members were arrayed as accused; and that 
that there has been gross misuse of powers by the NIA and 
a violation ss.218-224 CrPC:
Held: ss.218-222 not violated – Appellant falls under the latter 
category-multiple persons in the same trial (appellant is A-17 out 
of a total of 20 accused persons) – Joint or separate trial is a 
decision to be taken by the trial judge at the beginning of the trial 
considering the possibility of prejudice; and causing judicial delay, 
if any – Language of s.223 is directory in nature, signified by the 
use of word ‘may’ – Joint trial, if held, after having considered the 
two factors given, cannot be said to be ipso facto prejudicial to 
the parties – It is alleged that A-6 who is the Chief of PLFI, extorts 
money from various persons and that the company A-20 of which 
the appellant is a director, is used to legitimise the proceeds of
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such unlawful actions – However, appellant’s case that there is no 
connection between the charges levied on A-6 and the transactions 
because of which he has been made an accused, whereas the 
prosecution submits that both A-6 and A-17 are part of the same, 
continuing, ongoing transactions – Whether or not actually the case 
is a question to be decided on the basis of evidence adduced at 
trial, and not at this stage, by this Court – Thus, it is left to the 
appellants to raise this issue before the trial judge, who shall, if 
such a question is raised, decide it promptly at the appropriate 
stage. [Paras 44.3, 45, 46, 52.1]
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.22A – Offences 
by companies – Statutory exemption u/s.22 A – Applicability 
to the appellant who claims to be unaware of the affairs of 
the company:
Held: Whether or not the exemption u/s.22A applies is a matter to 
be established by the way of evidence for the person claiming such 
exemption has to demonstrate that either he was not in charge 
of the affairs of the company which has allegedly committed the 
offence, or that he had made reasonable efforts to prevent the 
commission of the offence – This is a matter for the trial court to 
consider and not for this Court to decide at this stage, keeping 
in view that the trial is underway and proceeded substantially. 
[Paras 50, 52.2]
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.22A – Offences 
by
companies – Applicability of s.22A:
Held: For application of s.22A, offence has to committed by a 
company; all persons who at the time of the offence were in control 
of, or responsible for, the company’s affairs shall be deemed 
guilty; such person would be saved from guilt as under if they can 
demonstrate that such act was not in their knowledge; they had 
taken reasonable care to prevent such offence from taking place – 
s.22A further provides that if it can be proved that the offence 
committed by the company was with consent; in connivance of; 
and attributable to neglect on the part of any promoter, director, 
manager, secretary or any other officer of the company, then they 
shall be held guilty. [Para 48]
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.45(2) – 
Cognizance of offences – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
(Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 –
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
rr.3 and 4 – Time limit for making a recommendation by the 
Authority – Time limit for sanction of prosecution – Timelines, 
whether directory or mandatory:
Held: Timelines, generally speaking, as part of statutory framework 
are extremely essential to an effective, efficient and focused 
machinery of criminal investigation, prosecution and trial – All 
stakeholders to the smooth functioning of these procedures of 
law must do their part in realising such timelines – They are 
the essential aspects of right to speedy trial, which is enshrined  
u/Art.21 of the Constitution of India. [Para 22]
‘Application of mind’ – Concept of:
Held: Application of mind must form part of any judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative order – To demonstrate the same, 
consideration of material placed before such authority must be 
reflected – It being a cerebral exercise, it is not within reason 
to set out any formula to explain what application of mind may 
actually mean or look like – It is to be ascertained in the facts 
and circumstances of each case – In the context of penal laws, 
authorities tasked with evaluating material prior to granting of 
sanction for prosecution, or the act of granting sanction itself 
must apply their mind to each and every facet of the material 
placed before it to arrive at the conclusion particularly so because 
the effect of the task at hand is immense – Grant/non-grant of  
sanction is what
sets in motion the machinery of strict laws such 
as UAPA or TADA. [Paras 25, 26]
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.45(2) – 
Cognizance of offences – Procedure for sanction provided 
under the UAPA:
Held: Court is enjoined from taking cognizance without previous 
sanction either by the Central Government or the State Government, 
as applicable, and such sanction shall only be given after the 
report of the authority appointed by the Central Government or the 
State Government, as the case may be, has been considered – 
This authority is to make an independent review of the evidence 
gathered and make a recommendation to the government within a 
time bound manner – If any Court takes cognizance without prior 
sanction of the Government, Centre or State, the same shall be 
in contravention of the Act and thus, bad in law – This sanction is 
not a function of the Government alone and it can only be granted
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after an independent body, albeit appointed by the Government, 
makes an independent review of the evidence. [Paras 28, 28.1]
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation & Sanction 
of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 – rr.3 and 4 – Time limit for 
making a recommendation by the Authority – Time limit for  
sanction of prosecution – Construction of:
Held: Penal statutes are statutes to be interpreted strictly – Rules 
flowing from statutory power, have the effect of a statute – s.52 of 
the UAPA grants power to the Central Government to make Rules 
for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act – s.52(2)(ee) 
enables the Government to prescribe the time for recommendation 
and grant of sanction u/s.45 – Rules are unequivocal in both, using 
the word ‘shall’ as also providing a specfic time period for both 
activities, i.e., making recommendation and granting sanction – In 
matters of strict construction, when a timeline is provided, along 
with the use of the word ‘shall’ and particularly when the same is 
in the context of a law such as the UAPA, it cannot be considered 
a mere technicality or formality – It demonstrates clear intention on 
the part of the Legislature – Compulsion has been imposed, and  
for compliance with that compulsion, a timeline has been provided – 
While the legislation is aimed at curbing unlawful activities and 
practices detrimental to national security and accordingly, provides 
the
authorities of the Government ample power to undertake and 
complete all procedures and processes permissible under law to 
that end, at the same time the interest of accused persons must 
also be safeguarded and protected – Time granted is only for  
consideration of the material collected by way of an independent 
review and then making a recommendation whereafter the 
sanctioning authority may then consider the materials as well as 
recommendation to finally, grant or deny the sanction – It is not for 
the purpose of the investigation itself, which understandably can be 
a time-consuming process, given the multiple variables involved – 
Timelines in such cases, serve as essential aspects of checks and 
balances and of course, are unquestionably important – Legislative 
intent is clear – Rules made by virtue of statutory powers prescribe 
both a mandate and a time limit – Same has to be followed – Strict 
adherence to the timeline mentioned in rr. 3 and 4 of the 2008, 
Rules to apply prospectively. [Paras 31, 32, 33]
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.45(2) –  
Cognizance of offences – Independent review – Meaning –
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
Plea that since both the recommending and the granting 
authorities took merely a day each in performing their 
respective functions, the requirement of an independent review 
which is to be undertaken by both authorities has been left 
unfulfilled thereby vitiating the sanction in question: 
Held: Independent review would mean a contemplation or study 
of the material gathered by the investigating officer to conclude 
as to whether or not a sanction to proceed under the provisions 
of the UAPA ought to be granted – Similarly, at the next stage, 
the sanctioning authority is to mull over and critically notice 
both the materials gathered as also the conclusion drawn by 
the recommending authority, in its act of granting sanction – 
Independence of this authority is sine qua non, without which it 
would have lost its entire purpose – Plea of the appellant that short 
amount of time taken in recommending and granting sanction, 
against him which is a sign of non-application of mind and lack of 
independent review, cannot be accepted – There is no question, 
as there rightly cannot be, on the competence of either of the 
authorities – Thus, solely on the ground that the time taken was 
comparatively short or even that other orders were similarly worded 
cannot call the credibility of the sanction into question – Thus, 
independent review as well as application of mind are questions to 
be determined by way of
evidence and as such should be raised 
at the stage of trial, so as to ensure that there is no undue delay 
in the proceedings reaching their logical and lawful conclusion on 
these grounds – If it is raised belatedly, however, the Court seized of 
the matter, must consider the reasons for the delay prior to delving 
into the merits of such objections – Belated challenges on these 
grounds cannot be allowed to act as roadblocks in trial or cannot 
be used as weapons in shirking away from convictions arising 
out of otherwise validly conducted prosecutions and trials – Order 
passed by an administrative authority is not to be tested by way 
of judicial review on the same anvil as a judicial or quasi-judicial 
order – While it is imperative for the latter to record reasons for 
arriving at a particular decision, for the former it is sufficient to 
show that the authority passing such order applied its mind to 
the relevant facts and materials – Thus, no infirmity in the order 
granting sanction against the appellant – It is not incumbent upon 
such authority to record detailed reasons to support its conclusion 
and, as such, the orders challenged, cannot be faulted with on 
that ground. [Paras 37, 40, 41]
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Words and phrases – Word independent – Meaning of:
Held: Act, or evaluation is made in a way which is lone standing 
or which does not rely on any other factor, such as previous 
consideration or evaluation by another authority, to arrive at its 
conclusion – Independence, which is the state of being independent 
would also be instructive in the understanding – Review, as a 
concept is to be understood for it is the coming together of these 
two aspects which would form the understanding of the term 
‘independent review’ – Import of the term independent review as 
can be understood, is a re-examination, scrutiny or critique of 
something which is not dependent or subject to control by any 
other factor or authority. [Paras 35-37]
Case Law Cited
A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [1984] 2 SCR 914 : (1984) 
2 SCC 500 – followed.
State of Karnataka v. S. Subbegowda [2023] 11 SCR 19 : 2023 
SCC OnLine SC 911; Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab [2021] 13 
SCR 566 : (2022) 2 SCC 89; State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh 
[2009] 8 SCR 85 : (2009) 6 SCC 372; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot 
Sandhu [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2005) 11 SCC 600; Union of 
India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1991] 3 SCR 873 : 1992 Supp 
(1) SCC 323; Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price 
Waterhouse [1997] Supp. 2 SCR 267 : (1997) 6 SCC 312; Shiv 
Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers [2003] 3 SCR 
762 : (2003) 6 SCC 659 – relied on.
Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. [2019] 8 SCR 824 : 
(2019) 17 SCC 326; Bhushan Kumar & Anr. v. State (NCT of 
Delhi) [2012] 2 SCR 696 : (2012) 5 SCC 424; State of Gujarat 
v. Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta [2019] 1 SCR 1104 : (2019) 20 
SCC 539; Ashraf Khan v. State of Gujarat (2012) 11 SCC 606; 
State of Gujarat v. Anwar Osman Sumbhaniya [2019] 2 SCR 
749  : (2019) 18 SCC 524; Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. 
State of Gujarat [1995] Supp. 2 SCR 637 : (1995) 5 SCC 302; 
Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat [1997] Supp. 3 
SCR 356 : (1997) 7 SCC 744; Seeni Nainar Mohammed v. State 
[2017] 3 SCR 312 : (2017) 13 SCC 685; Jamiruddin Ansari v. 
CBI [2009] 7 SCR 759 : (2009) 6 SCC 316; Peoples’ Union for 
Civil Liberties v. Union of India [2004] 1 SCR 232 : (2004) 9 
SCC 580; Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI [1994] Supp. 3 SCR
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
323
Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
263 : (1994) 5 SCC 410; Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam [2023] 
8 SCR 496 : (2023) 8 SCC 745; Central Bureau of Investigation 
v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (2014) 14 SCC 295; Parkash Singh 
Badal v. State of Punjab [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 197 : (2007) 
1 SCC 1; Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of India [2011] 13 
SCR 260 : (2012) 1 SCC 532 Central Bureau of Investigation 
& Ors. v. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal (2020) 17 SCC 664; 
P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim [2001] 3 SCR 1119 : (2001) 6 
SCC 704; Rangku Dutta v. State of Assam [2011] 8 SCR 639 : 
(2011) 6 SCC 358; Hussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat [2014] 
9 SCR 364 : (2014) 8 SCC 425; Mahesh Kariman Tirki v. State 
of Maharashtra, SLP (Crl.) Nos.11072-11073/2022; Binod Ganjhu 
v. Union of India, W.P(Crl) 308 of 2022; State of Rajasthan v. 
Mohinuddin Jamal Alvi (2016) 12 SCC 608; Roopesh v. State of 
Kerala, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 1372; Vijay Rajmohan v. Central 
Bureau of Investigation (Anti-Corruption Branch) [2022] 19 SCR 
563 : (2023) 1 SCC 329; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate 
of Enforcement [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 49 : (2005) 4 SCC 530; State 
of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 125 : (2005) 
1 SCC 368; Manjit Singh v. CBI [2011] 1 SCR 997 : (2011) 11 
SCC 578; State of T.N. v. Sivarasan [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 243 : 
(1997) 1 SCC 682; Priya Indoria v. State of Karnataka [2023] 
15 SCR 525 : (2024) 4 SCC 749; State of U.P. v. Manbodhan 
Lal Srivastava
[1958] 1 SCR 533 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4; 
State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [1961] 2 SCR 679 : 1960 
SCC OnLine SC 5; Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur 
[2008] 2 SCR 424 : (2008) 12 SCC 372; Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima 
Mamtaj [2014] 4 SCR 171 : (2014) 14 SCC 638; Union of India v. 
A.K. Pandey (2009) 10 SCC 552; C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of 
Karnataka [2005] 2 SCR 1163 : (2005) 4 SCC 81; State of M.P. 
v. Harishankar Bhagwan Prasad Tripathi [2010] 9 SCR 1148 : 
(2010) 8 SCC 655; State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain 
[2013] 3 SCR 850 : (2013) 8 SCC 119; Judgebir Singh v. National 
Investigation Agency [2023] 6 SCR 1 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 
543; State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti [2009] 11 SCR 790 : 
(2009) 17 SCC 92; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) 
SCC 222; Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary 
[1995] Supp. 2 SCR 818 : (1995) 6 SCC 225; Mohd. Iqbal M. 
Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [1998] 2 SCR 734 : (1998) 4 
SCC 494; Balbir v. State of Haryana [1999] Supp. 4 SCR 120 : 
(2000) 1 SCC 285; R. Dineshkumar v. State [2015] 5 SCR 605 :
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(2015) 7 SCC 497; S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla 
[2007] 2 SCR 862 : (2005) 8 SCC 89; Susela Padmavathy Amma 
v. Bharti Airtel Ltd [2024] 3 SCR 647 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 
311; N. Rangachari v. BSNL [2007] 5 SCR 329 : (2007) 5 SCC 
108; Central Bank of India v. Asian Global Ltd. [2010] 7 SCR 
694 : (2010) 11 SCC 203; Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta 
[2014] 10 SCR 1117 : (2015) 1 SCC 103; Rajesh Viren Shah v. 
Redington India Ltd. (2024) 4 SCC 305 – referred to.
Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin, LR (1917) AC 
170 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Maxwell in Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edn.); Cambridge 
dictionary; Merriam Webster dictionary; Black’s Law Dictionary; 
Burton’s Legal Thesaurus Third Edition Page 473. 
List of Acts
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) (Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 
2008; Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908; Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973; National Investigation Agency Act, 2008.
List of Keywords
Validity of Sanction Order; Violation of statutory timelines; 
Requirement of independent review; Application of mind; 
Statutory exemption u/s.22 A of the UAPA; Time limit for 
making recommendation by Authority; Time limit for sanction of 
prosecution; Terrorist and chief of People’s Liberation Front of 
India-PLFI; Activities of PLFI; Unlawful association; Demonetized 
currency; Quash suo motu letter;
Investigation; Sanction letter; 
Penal legislation; Strict construction; Grant of sanction; Non-
application of mind; Violation of CrPC; Timelines, whether directory 
or mandatory; Procedure for sanction under the UAPA; Strict 
adherence to timeline.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3923 
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.03.2023 of the High Court 
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in WPCR No. 443 of 2022
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
325
Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
Appearances for Parties
Balaji Srinivasan, Rohan Dewan, Vishwaditya Sharma, Ms. Harsha 
Tripathi, Advs. for the Appellant.
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Sr. Adv., 
Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Raghav Sharma, Madhav Singhal, Ms. Zeenat 
Malick, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
Leave granted.
2.	
Impugned in this appeal by special leave is a judgment of the High 
Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi dated 21st March, 2023 in W.P.(Crl.) 
No.443 of 2022, whereby the learned Division Bench refused to 
quash – 
(a)	 Suo motu letter No.F.No.11011/51/2017/IS-IV dated 16th January, 
2018 in respect of the investigation of Bero P.S. Case No. 
67/2016 dated 10th November, 2016;
(b)	 Sanction letter No.11011/51/2017/NIA dated 22nd July, 2020 
granting sanction qua prosecution of the present appellant as 
accused No.17 in R.C.-02/2018/NIA/DLI; and
(c)	
Cognizance order dated 25th July, 2020 u/s 120B of the Indian 
Penal Code r/w Section 17, 18, 21 & 22 of U.A. (P) Act, 1967, 
u/S 17(i) & (ii) of CLA Act, 1908 and charges framed on 16th 
March, 2021 pending trial before the Court of learned Special 
Judge, NIA, Ranchi;
It is to be noted that initially quashing was also sought in respect 
of sanction vide letter No.06/Avi-01/21/2017-2637 dated 12th May, 
2017 granted by the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, 
Prisons & Disaster
Management, Ranchi. However, paragraph 4 
of the impugned judgment records that this specific prayer was not 
pressed before it. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
3.	
The facts necessary for the disposal of the present appeal, shorn 
of unnecessary detail are :-
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3.1	 It is alleged that the appellant, Fuleshwar Gope1 is an associate 
of the People’s Liberation Front of India2 and is acquainted with 
the facts that Dinesh Gope @ Kuldeep Yadav @ Banku (A-6) 
is a terrorist and the chief of PLFI who collects money through 
extortion. He is further said to have criminally conspired and 
formed an unlawful association with members of PLFI, namely, 
Dinesh Gope, Sumant Kumar @ Pawan Kumar (A-7) and Hira 
Devi @ Anita Devi (A-14).
3.2	 On the direction of A-6, it is alleged that the appellant formed 
a company M/s. Shiv Shakti Samridhi Infra Pvt. Ltd. (A-20) 
along with A-14 which was more in the nature of a partnership. 
This company’s bank account was used to directly/indirectly 
collect funds from legitimate or illegitimate sources for the use 
of activities of PLFI on the directions of A-6. 
3.3	 On 10th November, 2016, FIR No.67 of 2016 at Bero, Jharkhand 
was registered against six persons under Section 212, 213/34, 
414 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 13, 17, 40 
of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 19673 and Section 
17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 on the allegation 
that Rs.25.83 lakhs of demonetized currency was brought to 
the concerned branch of the State Bank of India by A-6. 
3.4	 On 9th January, 2017, chargesheet No.01/2017 was filed and 
the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class took cognizance 
thereof. On 18th March, 2017, Deputy
Commissioner, Ranchi 
sought sanction to prosecute which was granted by the 
Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons & Disaster 
Management. However, subsequently, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs,4 Government of India issued a transfer order in respect 
thereto on 16th January, 2018 and as such the FIR was re-
registered as a case under the National Investigation Agency.5 
MHA further initiated suo-motu sanction on 16th October, 2019 
against twelve accused persons, A-1 to A-12. 
1	
Hereinafter referred to as A-17
2	
Abbreviated as ‘PLFI’
3	
Abbreviated as ‘UAPA’
4	
Abbreviated as ‘MHA’
5	
Abbreviated as “NIA”
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
3.5	 On 21st October, 2019, a supplementary chargesheet was filed 
by NIA wherein the Appellant was named as a witness for the 
Prosecution, as PW-65. On 5th November, 2019, Special Judge 
NIA took cognizance of the same. 
3.6	 The Appellant was subsequently arrested on 13th July, 2020. 
On 22nd July, 2020, suo-motu sanction was issued against an 
additional seven persons (A-13 to A-20), the Appellant is A-17. A 
second Supplementary Chargesheet was filed the next day i.e. 
23rd July, 2020 under Sections 17, 18, 21, and 22C of the UAPA. 
3.7	 On 14th November, 2022, the Appellant filed a Writ Petition 
before the High Court seeking for quashing of the Sanction 
Order dated 22nd July, 2020, taking of the cognizance of the 
second Supplementary Chargesheet vide an order 25th July, 
2020 and framing of charges by order dated 16th March, 2021. 
3.8	 It is in this backdrop, that the judgment impugned was passed.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
4.	
Before the High Court it was contended primarily that Sections 
6(2) & (3) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 20086 were not 
complied with and thereby the statutory timelines mentioned therein 
were completely ignored. Further, it was argued that Sections 45(1) 
& (2) of the UAPA were not adhered to. 
5.	
The High Court framed the following issues for its consideration:
“8. …
(i) Whether the Central Government has got suo-moto 
power to handover the investigation to the N.I.A.
once the 
investigation has been completed by the District Police.
(ii) Whether the Order of Sanction dated 22.07.2020 issued 
by the Under Secretary to the Government of India in 
exercise of power conferred under Section 45(2) of U.A.(P) 
Act, 1967 suffers from any illegality.
(iii) Whether the order taking cognizance against the 
petitioner under Section 120B I.P.C read with Sections 17, 
6	
Hereinafter ‘NIA, 2008’
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18, 21 & 22C of U.A.(P) Act, 1967 and Section 17(i) & (ii) 
of C.L.A Act, 1908 suffers from any infirmity.”
5.1	 The Court in deciding the first issue placed reliance on Pradeep 
Ram v. State of Jharkhand & Anr.,7 and more particularly 
paragraph 49 thereof, to hold that there is no lack of jurisdiction 
on the part of NIA to carry out further investigation and submit 
the supplementary report(s). 
5.2	 The second issue concerned the legality and propriety of 
sanction which was challenged on the ground that Rule 3 
of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation & 
Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 20088 was not followed. The 
Court referred to the contents of the sanction order dated 22nd 
July, 2020, impugned before it, and then concluded that the 
timeline stipulated in Rule 3 referred to supra, has been strictly 
adhered to.
5.3	 The third issue is as to whether the cognizance order is afflicted 
by non-application of mind. The Court considered the judgment 
in Bhushan Kumar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi)9 and State 
of Gujarat v. Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta10 to examine the 
power of the Magistrate at the stage of issuing process or 
summons. It was finally concluded that the approach of the 
learned Special Judge in dealing with the material placed before 
them by way of case diary, statements of various prosecution 
witnesses, other documents and material objects, requires no 
interference. 
6.	
Aggrieved by the
above findings of the High Court, the appellant is 
before this Court.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
7.	
We have heard Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned Advocate-on-Record for 
the appellant and Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor 
General of India and Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, learned Senior 
Counsel for the Union of India. 
7	
[2019] 8 SCR 824 : (2019) 17 SCC 326
8	
Hereinafter ‘2008 Rules’
9	
[2012] 2 SCR 696 : (2012) 5 SCC 424
10	
[2019] 1 SCR 1104 : (2019) 20 SCC 539
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
8.	
In assailing the impugned judgment, the appellants have advanced 
the following contentions. 
8.1	 Section 45 of UAPA read with Rules 3 and 4 of the 2008 
Rules provided for a detailed procedure with respect to grant 
of sanction along with a timeline within which the same is to 
be granted. The impugned sanction is not in consonance with 
the statutory mandate as the same was issued 2 years and 11 
months after the incident and 2 years and 6 months after the 
letter dated 12th May, 2017. 
8.2	 Clause (2) of Section 45 of the UAPA was violated as the 
requirement of ‘independent review’ while according sanction 
was not complied with. It is contended that the sanction order 
was passed mechanically without supplying any reasons or 
application of mind. The orders are stereotypical and standard. 
It is submitted that Section 45 requires independent scrutiny and 
application of mind at each stage – by requisitioning authority; 
by an independent agency and then by the sanctioning authority. 
Since, in the present facts the same was not complied with, 
sanction orders are liable to be quashed.
8.3	 Validity of sanction is a question that can be raised at any 
stage of proceedings. There are instances of this Court setting 
aside convictions after completion of trial and even quashing 
entire proceedings upon the filing of bail application, before trial 
on the ground of invalidity of sanction. In furtherance of
this 
submission, various judgments have been referred to. Ashraf 
Khan v. State of Gujarat;11 State of Gujarat v. Anwar Osman 
Sumbhaniya;12 Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of 
Gujarat;13 Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat;14 
Seeni Nainar Mohammed v. State;15 and Jamiruddin Ansari 
v. CBI.16 
11	
[2012] 12 SCR 1033 : (2012) 11 SCC 606
12	
[2019] 2 SCR 749 : (2019) 18 SCC 524
13	
[1995] Supp. 2 SCR 637 : (1995) 5 SCC 302
14	
[1997] Supp. 3 SCR 356 : (1997) 7 SCC 744
15	
[2017] 3 SCR 312 : (2017) 13 SCC 685
16	
[2009] 7 SCR 759 : (2009) 6 SCC 316
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8.4	 Both the requisitioning and sanctioning authorities have not 
considered that mens rea is absent which, as is well established, 
is a requisite to constitute a criminal offence unless explicitly 
excluded. Reference is made to Peoples’ Union for Civil 
Liberties v. Union of India17 and Sanjay Dutt v. State through 
CBI.18 In referring to latter judgment, reliance is placed on the 
holding that if a reasonable interpretation exists which permits 
the avoidance of penalty, Courts are bound to take that approach. 
8.5	 The appellant was not made an accused in the first module, 
i.e., FIR No.67/2016 nor in the second module (initiated by an 
alleged hawala transaction which took place on 22nd May 2018) 
and sanction in respect thereof was granted by the Central 
Government on 16th October, 2019. He was, in fact, made an 
accused in an independent transaction involving A-20 regarding 
which the sanction order (impugned herein) was issued on 22nd 
July, 2020. 
8.6	 The proviso to Section 22A exempts a person who is not in 
charge of and responsible for the affairs of the company, from 
prosecution. The appellant contends that he has wrongly been 
roped into the proceedings even when he is a Munshi working as 
a daily wager. He is illiterate and does not understand business 
transactions. A-6 took undue advantage of his situation, once 
A-7 and A-14 stole his identity. 
8.7	 No particular role has been ascribed to the
appellant. This case 
by the NIA has been thrust upon him given, (a) he is a director 
in the company which is A-20; (b) the said company allegedly 
received funds that were to be used by PLFI; (c) he hails from 
the same locality and is a distant acquaintance of Dinesh Gope 
who is the leader of the PLFI. 
9.	
The stand of the respondent - Union of India, as can be understood 
from the materials on record and the written submissions, is that -
9.1	 The sanction order that has led to the present proceedings 
has been granted after following due process. The NIA 
recommended prosecution of the accused persons including 
17	
[2004] 1 SCR 232 : (2004) 9 SCC 580
18	
[1994] Supp. 3 SCR 263 : (1994) 5 SCC 410
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
the present appellant vide its letter dated 14th July, 2020. The 
Central Government, in accordance with Section 45(2) of the 
UAPA referred the investigation report to the authority by letter 
dated 15th July, 2020, comprising two members for the purpose 
of independent review. The authority by its letter dated 16th July, 
2020 forwarded its report to the Ministry within the stipulated 
time period under Rule 3 of 2008 Rules. In other words, there 
is no violation of the Rules. 
9.2	 The impugned sanction order has been passed considering all 
the relevant materials on record, including the recommendation 
of the authority constituted under Section 45(2) of the UAPA. 
The authority consisted of a retired High Court Judge and the 
retired Law Secretary.
9.3	 Independent review took place at all relevant stages pursuant to 
which Central Government accorded sanction. Merely because 
the sanction was granted within one day of the recommendation, 
it cannot be said that there was non-application of mind. 
9.4	 Second and Third Module as explained in the supplementary 
chargesheets are not independent and separate transactions 
from that initiated in the FIR, but rather, are a part of the same 
continuing transaction undertaken by the accused persons to 
channel the Proceeds of Terrorism. The NIA on being entrusted 
with the investigation, had investigated the same and submitted 
the two supplementary chargesheets.
9.5	 The appellant is an active member of a terrorist gang and a close 
associate of Dinesh Gope (A-6) and was involved in collecting 
and channelizing funds by forming companies. A-20 of which 
the Appellant/A-17 was a director, served as a front to launder 
proceeds of terrorism. The claim of the appellant that A-7 & 
A-14 stole his identity is unsustainable and quashing cannot 
be placed on such a vague plea. 
9.6	 The trial is at a very advanced stage, and as such, no discretion 
be exercised in quashing the criminal proceedings. 
10.	 At the outset, we clarify that despite the last of the submissions 
made by the learned Additional Solicitor General, the Appellant 
invited findings on his submissions. Hence, we proceed to decide 
the issue on merits.
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QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BEFORE THIS COURT
11.	 Having considered the factual matrix and the submissions advanced 
by the learned counsel for the parties the following questions arise 
for our consideration:-
(i)	
Whether the Validity of the Sanction Order can be challenged 
at any stage?
(ii)	
Whether a violation of Section 45(2) of the UAPA r/w Rules 3 
& 4, if any, vitiates the proceedings? In other words, whether 
violation of - (a) statutory timelines and (b) the requirement of 
independent review which includes application of mind, are 
necessary aspects of procedure without which, any transaction 
under the UAPA shall be compromised to a point that its sanctity 
is rendered questionable?
(iii)	 Whether in the present facts, the argument of the appellant 
that the transactions in connection with which he has been 
brought to the book were actually independent of the ones in 
which Dinesh Gope (A-6) and other members were arrayed as 
accused, has any merit? 
(iv)	 Whether, in the facts, the statutory exemption under Section 
22 A of the UAPA applies to the appellant who claims to be 
unaware of the affairs of the company?
CONSIDERATION
(a)	 UAPA : An Introduction
12.	 The preamble of the Act reads as under:-
“An Act to provide for the more effective prevention of 
certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations 
[,and for dealing with terrorist activities,] and for matters 
connected therewith.”
13.	 A
Bench of Three Judges of this Court (of which both of us were 
members) considered the objective of the Act in the following terms 
in Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam19:-
19	
[2023] 8 SCR 496 : (2023) 8 SCC 745
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
“85. The main objective of the UAPA is to make powers 
available for dealing with activities directed against the 
integrity and sovereignty of India. It is also required to 
be noted that pursuant to the recommendation of the 
Committee on National Integration and Regionalisation 
appointed by the National Integration Council Act on whose 
recommendation the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) 
Act, 1963 was enacted, UAPA has been enacted. It appears 
that the National Integration Council appointed a Committee 
on National Integration and Regionalisation to look into, 
inter alia, the aspect of putting reasonable restrictions 
in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India and 
thereafter the UAPA has been enacted. Therefore, the 
UAPA has been enacted to make powers available for 
dealing with the activities directed against integrity and 
sovereignty of India.
86. Now let us consider the Preamble to the UAPA, 
1967. As per Preamble, the UAPA has been enacted 
to provide for the more effective prevention of certain 
unlawful activities of individuals and associations and 
dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected 
therewith. Therefore the aim and object of enactment of 
the UAPA is also to provide for more effective prevention 
of certain unlawful activities. That is why and to achieve 
the said object and purpose of effective prevention of 
certain unlawful activities Parliament in its
wisdom has 
provided that where an association is declared unlawful 
by a notification issued under Section 3, a person, who 
is and continues to be a member of such association 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to 2 years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
Therefore, Parliament in its wisdom had thought it fit that 
once an association is declared unlawful after following 
due procedure as required under Section 3 and subject 
to the approval by the Tribunal still a person continues to 
be a member of such association is liable to be punished/
penalised.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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(b)	 Relevant Statutory Provisions
14.	 At this juncture, we may refer to the applicable statute and rules.
14.1	 The requisite clauses of Section 2 (definitions clause of the 
Act) are as under:-
 “2. Definitions.-(1) In this Act, unless the context 
otherwise requires,-
…                                 …                                    …
(e) “Designated Authority” means such officer of 
the Central Government not below the rank of Joint 
Secretary to that Government, or such officer of the 
State Government not below the rank of Secretary 
to that Government, as the case may be, as may be 
specified by the Central Government or the State 
Government, by notification published in the Official 
Gazette;
…                                 …                                    …
(ec) “person” includes— (i) an individual, (ii) a 
company, (iii) a firm, (iv) an organisation or an 
association of persons or a body of individuals, 
whether incorporated or not, (v) every artificial juridical 
person, not falling within any of the preceding sub-
clauses, and (vi) any agency, office or branch owned 
or controlled by any person falling within any of 
the preceding sub-clauses;] (f) “prescribed” means 
prescribed by rules made under this Act;
…                                 …                                    …
(g) “proceeds of terrorism” means,— (i) all kinds of 
properties which have been derived or obtained from 
commission of
any terrorist act or have been acquired 
through funds traceable to a terrorist act, irrespective 
of person in whose name such proceeds are standing 
or in whose possession they are found; or 
(ii) any property which is being used, or is intended 
to be used, for a terrorist act or for the purpose of 
an individual terrorist or a terrorist gang or a terrorist
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
organisation. Explanation.—For the purposes of 
this Act, it is hereby declared that the expression 
“proceeds of terrorism” includes any property intended 
to be used for terrorism;”
14.2	 Section 45 of the Act is extracted below for ready reference.
“45. Cognizance of offences.— [(1)] No court shall 
take cognizance of any offence— 
(i) under Chapter III without the previous sanction of 
the Central Government or any officer authorised by 
the Central Government in this behalf; 
(ii) under Chapter IV and VI without the previous 
sanction of the Central Government or, as the case 
may be, the State Government, and where such 
offence is committed against the Government of a 
foreign country without the previous sanction of the 
Central Government. 
(2) Sanction for prosecution under sub-section (1) 
shall be given within such time as may be prescribed 
only after considering the report of such authority 
appointed by the Central Government or, as the case 
may be, the State Government which shall make an 
independent review of the evidence gathered in the 
course of investigation and make a recommendation, 
within such time as may be prescribed, to the Central 
Government or, as the case may be, the State 
Government.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14.3	 Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008 Rules read as follows:-
“3. Time limit for making a recommendation by the 
Authority. – The Authority shall, under sub-section 
(2) of Section 45
of the Act, make its report containing 
the recommendations to the Central Government [or, 
as the case may be, the State Government] within 
seven working days of the receipt of the evidence 
gathered by the investigating officer under the Code.
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4. Time limit for sanction of prosecution.-The 
Central Government [or, as the case may be, the State 
Government] shall, under sub-section (2) of Section 
45 of the Act, take a decision regarding sanction for 
prosecution within seven working days after receipt 
of the recommendations of the Authority.”
(Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE No. 1- Challenge to validity of sanction – at what stage?
15.	 Now, we proceed to examine the first question before this Court. 
In order to do so it is essential to extract the relevant portion of the 
sanction order:-
“5. And whereas, the Central Government in terms of 
the provisions of Section 45(2) of the Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act, 1967 (as amended) and the Unlawful 
Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of 
Prosecution) Rules, 2008 referred the above mentioned 
Investigation Report vide this Ministry’s letter of even no. 
dated 15th July, 2020 to the Authority comprising of two 
members namely Justice Dr. Satish Chandra (Retired) and 
Dr TK Vishwanathan, Law Secretary (Retired), constituted 
vide this Ministry’s order No. 11034/1/2009/IS-IV dated 
03.07.2015 for making an independent review of the 
evidence gathered in the course of investigation (term of 
the Authority extended till 31.07.2021 vide this Ministry’s 
order dated 12.06.2020);
6. And whereas, the Authority vide letter dated 16th July, 
2020 forwarded its report to this Ministry within the time 
limit
as prescribed in rule Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
(Recommendation and Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 
2008 and, after being satisfied with the material available on 
record and facts and circumstances therein, recommended 
for sanction for prosecution against the above mentioned 
accused persons/entities under the relevant sections of 
law including the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967;
7. And now, therefore, the Central Government, after 
carefully examining the material placed on record and 
the recommendations of the Authority, is satisfied that a
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
prima facie case is made out against the accused persons/
entities under the relevant sections of law and hereby 
accords sanction for prosecution under section 45(1) of 
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967…”
BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF  
THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA 
Sd/- 
(Dharmendar Kumar) 
Under Secretary to the Government of India”
(Emphasis supplied)
16.	 The question of validity of sanction being challenged, and at what 
stage it may be permissible, has engaged this Court on few previous 
occasions, albeit in context of different statutes. It shall be useful 
to refer to them.
16.1	 In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Kumar 
Aggarwal 20 this Court noted the importance of the process 
of grant of sanction. It has been termed “not an acrimonious 
exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act ” in the context of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.21 The Court summarised 
the essentials for validity of prosecution as under:-
“16. In view of the above, the legal propositions can 
be summarised as under:
16.1. The prosecution must send the entire relevant 
record to the sanctioning authority including the FIR, 
disclosure statements, statements of witnesses, 
recovery memos, draft charge-sheet and all other 
relevant material. The record so sent should also 
contain the material/document, if any, which may 
tilt the balance in favour of the accused and on the 
basis of which, the competent authority
may refuse 
sanction.
16.2. The authority itself has to do complete and 
conscious scrutiny of the whole record so produced 
20	
[2013] 14 SCR 983 : (2014) 14 SCC 295
21	
Hereinafter, ‘PC Act’
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by the prosecution independently applying its mind 
and taking into consideration all the relevant facts 
before grant of sanction while discharging its duty 
to give or withhold the sanction.
16.3. The power to grant sanction is to be exercised 
strictly keeping in mind the public interest and the 
protection available to the accused against whom 
the sanction is sought.
16.4. The order of sanction should make it evident 
that the authority had been aware of all relevant 
facts/materials and had applied its mind to all the 
relevant material.
16.5. In every individual case, the prosecution has to 
establish and satisfy the court by leading evidence 
that the entire relevant facts had been placed before 
the sanctioning authority and the authority had applied 
its mind on the same and that the sanction had been 
granted in accordance with law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16.2	 In Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab,22 this Court 
held that an authority, which is the sanctioning authority is not 
required to separately specify each of the offences against 
the accused public servant. This is to be done at the stage of 
framing of charge. What the law requires is that materials must 
be placed before the sanctioning authority so as to enable the 
application of mind in arriving at a decision. 
16.3	 In Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of India,23 Lodha, J. 
(as he then was) observed:
“10. In our view, invalidity of sanction
where sanction 
order exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like 
non-availability of material before the sanctioning 
authority or bias of the sanctioning authority or 
the order of sanction having been passed by an 
22	
[2006] Supp. 10 SCR 197 : (2007) 1 SCC 1
23	
[2011] 13 SCR 260 : (2012) 1 SCC 532
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
authority not authorised or competent to grant such 
sanction. The above grounds are only illustrative 
and not exhaustive. All such grounds of invalidity or 
illegality of sanction would fall in the same category 
like the ground of invalidity of sanction on account 
of non-application of mind—a category carved out 
by this Court in Parkash Singh Badal [(2007) 1 SCC 
1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] , the challenge to which 
can always be raised in the course of trial.”
16.4	 In Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors. v. Pramila 
Virendra Kumar Agarwal,24 while referring to Dinesh Kumar 
(supra), this Court reiterated the distinction between absence 
of sanction and the alleged invalidity of sanction on account of 
non-application of mind. It was held that absence as in issue 
can be raised at the threshold, however, invalidity, as in issue 
can only be raised at trial. 
16.5	 A Bench of three learned Judges in P.K. Pradhan v. State 
of Sikkim25 discussed the application of Section 197 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.26 Having referred to a host 
of precedents, it was concluded that: 
“15. …It is well settled that question of sanction under 
Section 197 of the Code can be raised any time after 
the cognizance; maybe immediately after cognizance 
or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion 
of trial and after conviction as well. But there may be 
certain cases where it may not be possible to decide
the question effectively without giving opportunity 
to the defence to establish that what he did was in 
discharge of official duty. In order to come to the 
conclusion whether claim of the accused that the act 
that he did was in course of the performance of his 
duty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor 
fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial 
by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In 
24	
(2020) 17 SCC 664
25	
[2001] 3 SCR 1119 : (2001) 6 SCC 704
26	
Hereinafter ‘CrPC’
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such an eventuality, the question of sanction should 
be left open to be decided in the main judgment 
which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16.6	 In recent past, this court, in State of Karnataka v. S. 
Subbegowda,27 while addressing the question of sanction and 
its validity in the context of PC Act underscored that challenge 
to sanction should be brought at the earliest stage possible 
and held that:
“10. … It is also well settled proposition of law that 
the question with regard to the validity of such 
sanction should be raised at the earliest stage of 
the proceedings, however could be raised at the 
subsequent stage of the trial also. In our opinion, the 
stages of proceedings at which an accused could raise 
the issue with regard to the validity of the sanction 
would be the stage when the Court takes cognizance 
of the offence, the stage when the charge is to be 
framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is 
complete i.e., at the stage of final arguments in the 
trial. Such issue of course, could be raised before the 
Court in appeal, revision or confirmation, however the 
powers of such court would be subject to sub-section 
(3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act. 
It is also significant to note that the competence of 
the court trying the accused also would be dependent 
upon the existence of the validity of sanction, and 
therefore it is always
desirable to raise the issue of 
validity of sanction at the earliest point of time. It cannot 
be gainsaid that in case the sanction is found to be 
invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and 
relegate the parties to a stage where the competent 
authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution 
in accordance with the law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27	
[2023] 11 SCR 19 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 911
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
17.	 The afore-cited authorities point to only one conclusion which is 
that sanction, though should be challenged at the earliest possible 
opportunity, it can be challenged at a later stage as well. These 
judgments, although not specifically in the context of laws such as 
UAPA, posit a generally acceptable rule that a right available to the 
accused, which may provide an opportunity to establish innocence, 
should not be foreclosed by operation of law, unless specifically 
provided within the statutory text. At the same time, challenging validity 
of sanction cannot and should not be a weapon to slow down or stall 
otherwise valid prosecution. Other legislations such as the CrPC 
provide mechanisms for the sanction and subsequent actions to be 
saved from being invalidated due to any irregularity etc. Section 465 
CrPC provides for the possibility that a sanction granted under Section 
197 CrPC can be saved by its operation. Similarly, a sanction under 
the PC Act, if found that there was any error, omission or irregularity 
would not be vitiated unless the same has resulted in failure of justice. 
18.	 The UAPA does not provide for any such saving of the sanction. This 
implies that, in the wisdom of the legislature, the inbuilt mechanism 
of the Act of having two authorities apply their mind to the grant of 
a sanction, is sufficient. This emphasizes the role and sanctity of 
the operation to be carried out
by both these authorities. In order to 
challenge the grant of sanction as invalid, the grounds that can be 
urged are that (1) all the relevant material was not placed before 
the authority; (2) the authority has not applied its mind to the said 
material; and (3) insufficiency of material. This list is only illustrative 
and not exhaustive. The common thread that runs through the 
three grounds of challenge above is that the party putting forward 
this challenge has to lead evidence to such effect. That, needless 
to say, can only be done before the Trial Court. In that view of the 
matter, we have no hesitation in holding that while we recognise the 
treasured right of an accused to avail all remedies available to him 
under law, in ordinary circumstances challenge to sanction under 
UAPA should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity so as to 
enable the Trial Court to determine the question, for its competence 
to proceed further and the basis on which any other proceeding on 
the appellate side would depend on the answer to this question. 
[See: S. Subbegowda (supra)]
In the attending facts and circumstances of the present case, keeping 
in view the submission made at the bar that the trial is underway
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and numerous witnesses (113 out of 125) already stand examined, 
we refrain from returning any finding on the challenge to the validity 
of the sanction qua the present appellant and leave it to be raised 
before the Trial Judge, who shall, if such a question is raised decide, 
it promptly. 
ISSUE No.2 :
19.	 The next issue that we must consider is whether the timelines in 
accordance with Section 45(2) of the UAPA r/w Rules 3 & 4 of 
the 2008 Rules and the requirement of independent review are 
necessary aspects of procedure, non-adherence of which would 
vitiate proceedings. As already reproduced above, the rules provide 
a seven day period within which the concerned authority is to 
make its recommendation on the basis of materials gathered by 
the investigating officer and a further seven days period for the 
government to grant sanction for prosecution, having considered 
the report of the authority. 
20.	 The ins and outs of the Appellant’s contention is that the said timelines 
were not followed and, in fact, the first sanction was granted more 
than a year after the recommendation was moved. This contention 
ties into another submission that there was no independent review 
on the part of both recommending authority and central government, 
as the sanction was merely granted within a day each. 
Timelines, whether directory or mandatory?
21.	 Let us now consider one of the primary arguments of the appellants, 
i.e.,
non-following of the statutory timelines. 
22.	 Timelines, generally speaking, as part of statutory framework are 
extremely essential to an effective, efficient and focused machinery 
of criminal investigation, prosecution and trial. It cannot be gainsaid 
that all stakeholders to the smooth functioning of these procedures 
of law must do their part in realising such timelines. They are the 
essential aspects of right to speedy trial, which is enshrined under 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 
23.	 The appellant’s objections regarding timelines is two-fold. One, that 
there is a large gap between the first sanction and his own arrest, given 
that he is allegedly part of the same continuing transaction according 
to the respondent union, and two, that since the authority despite
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having been granted a seven day period to consider the materials 
gathered by the investigating officers and make their recommendation, 
did so within barely a day, and that to in a manner which could be 
termed mechanical, thereby afflicting the recommendations from the 
vice of non-application of mind. 
24.	 The first objection appears to us, to be superficial at best. In order to 
understand this objection some important dates must be referred to:
S. No.
Details
Date
1.
First Information Report (F.I.R.)
10th November 2016
2.
Chargesheet 
(It is noted that investigation 
continues against A-6)
9th January 2017
3. 
Sanction against A-6
16th October 2019
4. 
First Supplementary Chargesheet
(A-6 is named herein; A-17 is 
brought in as a prosecution witness; 
Investigation continues still further)
21st October 2019
5.
Arrest of A-17
13th July 2020
6.
Sanction against A-17
22nd July 2020
7.
Second Supplementary Chargesheet
(A-17 is named herein)
23rd July 2020
The gap between the first action against A-6 and the arrest of the 
appellant is a result of continuing investigation, as evidenced by 
the fact that the appellant was made an accused in the second 
supplementary chargesheet, arising out of the same FIR under 
which A-6 was initially named an accused. Since the investigation 
continued, the gap cannot be termed fatal so as to render the arrest 
of the appellant as unlawful or illegal. It is also to be noted
that in 
the first supplementary chargesheet the appellant was initially a 
witness for the prosecution and with further investigation was made 
an accused thereafter. 
25.	 In order to consider the merits of the second objection, ‘application of 
mind’ as a concept must be understood. It is trite in law that application 
of mind must form part of any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative 
order. To demonstrate the same, consideration of material placed
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before such authority must be reflected. At the same time, it being 
a cerebral exercise, it is not within reason to set out any formula to 
explain what application of mind may actually mean or look like. It 
is to be ascertained in the facts and circumstances of each case. 
26.	 In the context of penal laws, authorities tasked with evaluating material 
prior to granting of sanction for prosecution, or the act of granting 
sanction itself must apply their mind to each and every facet of the 
material placed before it to arrive at the conclusion particularly so 
because the effect of the task at hand is immense. The grant/non-
grant of sanction is what sets in motion the machinery of strict laws 
such as UAPA or the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) 
Act, 1987.28 Given the severity of these laws and the nature of 
activities with which they are associated, the effect that they have 
on the person accused thereunder is not only within the realm of law 
but also drastically effects social and personal life. It is only after the 
authority having been handed this task, is of the considered view 
that sanction can be granted, should it be so done. 
27.	 The procedures qua sanctions provided in such legislations are meant 
to be followed strictly, to the letter more so to the spirit. Even the 
slightest of variation from the written word may render the proceedings 
arising therefrom to be cast in doubt. The
general principle, when 
the provision is couched negatively has been noticed by this court 
in Rangku Dutta v. State of Assam 29 in the following terms:
“18. It is obvious that Section 20-A(1) is a mandatory 
requirement of law. First, it starts with an overriding clause 
and, thereafter, to emphasise its mandatory nature, it uses 
the expression “No” after the overriding clause. Whenever 
the intent of a statute is mandatory, it is clothed with a 
negative command. Reference in this connection can be 
made to G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 
12th Edn., at pp. 404-05, the learned author has stated:
“… As stated by Crawford: ‘Prohibitive or 
negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. 
And this is so even though the statute provides 
28	
Hereinafter referred as ‘TADA’
29	
[2011] 8 SCR 639 : (2011) 6 SCC 358
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
no penalty for disobedience.’ As observed 
by Subbarao, J.: ‘Negative words are clearly 
prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a 
legislative device to make a statute imperative.’ 
Section 80 and Section 87-B of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908; Section 77 of the Railways 
Act, 1890; Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act, 
1947; Section 213 of the Succession Act, 1925; 
Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 
1947; Section 7 of the Stamp Act, 1899; Section 
108 of the Companies Act, 1956; Section 20(1) 
of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 
1954; Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) 
Act, 1972; the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended in 
1956); Section 10-A of the Medical Council Act, 
1956 (as amended in 1993), and similar other 
provisions have therefore, been construed as 
mandatory. A provision requiring ‘not less than 
three months’ notice’ is also for the same reason 
mandatory.”
We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid 
statement of law made by the learned author.”
For instance, under the TADA, it has been held that if the sanctioning 
authority as mentioned under Section 20-A is not the one who granted 
sanction and instead it was a higher authority, even then the said 
sanction would be illegal. Reference in this regard may be made to 
Hussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat 30 and State of Rajasthan 
v. Mohinuddin Jamal Alvi.31 
28.
Now turning to the procedure for sanction provided under the UAPA, 
we find that a Court is enjoined from taking cognizance without 
previous sanction either by the Central Government or the State 
Government, as applicable, and such sanction shall only be given 
after the report of the authority appointed by the Central Government 
or the State Government, as the case may be, has been considered. 
30	
[2014] 9 SCR 364 : (2014) 8 SCC 425
31	
(2016) 12 SCC 608
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This authority is to make an independent review of the evidence 
gathered and make a recommendation to the government within a 
time bound manner. 
28.1	 What flows from the above description of Section 45 is that 
if any Court takes cognizance without prior sanction of the 
Government, Centre or State, the same shall be in contravention 
of the Act and therefore bad in law. This sanction is not a 
function of the Government alone and it can only be granted 
after an independent body, albeit appointed by the Government, 
makes an independent review of the evidence. 
28.2	 The fact that sanction has been granted is not in dispute. What 
is disputed by the appellant is in which the manner the same 
has been granted. According to the case put up by him, the 
authority’s recommendation, and immediately thereafter the 
Government’s grant of sanction is evidence of non-application 
of mind and stereotypical or ‘cyclostyle’ orders. 
28.3	 Although we have taken note of the facts leading up the present 
appeal, for immediate reference we may recall here that the NIA 
vide its letter dated 14th July 2020 recommended prosecution 
for further seven persons (A-13 to A-20); the Ministry vide 
letter dated 15th July 2020 forwarded the investigation report 
to the authority; the authority, the next day, i.e., 16th July 2020, 
recommended sanction for prosecution against the seven 
persons. 
28.4	 Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008 Rules, reproduced
supra, grant 
the authority as also the Government a week’s time each 
to recommend and then grant sanction. On the face of it, 
the present grant of sanction is within the stipulated time. 
However, as is submitted by the appellant, is the fact that the 
recommendation, consideration and grant of sanction took 
place within three days enough to vitiate the prosecution to 
its entirety?
28.5	 One week’s time, given to both the authorities is to enable 
them to independently evaluate, first the materials placed on 
record then recommend the grant of sanction; and second, 
to evaluate the material and the recommendation so made 
above, to finally ink the order of sanction. If the time so granted
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
is thoroughly under-utilised or if either of the two authorities 
overshoot the time, as stipulated in the rules, what is the 
fate of the sanction which was underway? We find there to 
be divergent views taken on this issue by the High Courts. 
It is a recognised principle of law that the law should apply 
equally to all persons which then implies that there should be 
uniformity, despite various jurisdictions being at play, in how 
the law is applied. The Law Commission of India in its 136th 
Report recognised that “the want of uniformity” is “an evil”. The 
problem has been recognised stating thus :-
“1.2 Want of uniformity an evil.- It is needless 
to point out that want of uniformity in law not only 
impairs the quality or the substantive or procedural 
law but also causes serious inconvenience to citizens 
in general. Those whose business is to advise 
persons who consult them on questions of law, find 
it difficult to give such advice with confidence where 
the decisions are conflicting. Those who are entrusted 
with the functions of adjudicating on questions of 
law must spend considerable time in between two 
or more possible views on a subject which falls to 
be considered before them, In this process, there 
is bound to result considerable waste of time and 
energy. That apart, it is not a satisfactory situation 
that on a given topic, the rule of law prevailing in 
one part of the country should be
different from 
the rule prevailing in another part of the country 
when the disparity arises from conflicting judicial 
interpretations.”
28.5.1 The High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Nagpur Bench), in 
Criminal Appeal Nos.136 & 137 of 2017 titled as Mahesh Kariman 
Tirki v. State of Maharashtra’ on remand from this Court (by order 
dated 19th April 2023 passed in SLP (Crl.)Nos.11072-11073/2022 for 
decision on merits as also validity of sanction), regarding timelines 
mentioned in the 2008 Rules, held as under:
“153. Though the word “shall” no doubt connotes 
the sense of urgency, but the consequence of non-
compliance in strict sense which flows from the
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wordings in the rule, has not been spelt out under the 
statute. Neither at an initial stage of the prosecution 
nor even before us the defence has projected any 
prejudice from strict non-compliance of time frame. 
154. The very purport of the provision is to convey that 
the process has to be complied with and completed 
in an expeditious manner. Particularly, we have taken 
into account the contingency which may occur, if the 
word “shall” in the context is held mandatory. In that 
case, even if a single days delay would stifle the 
prosecution intending to curb the act of terrorism. 
Certainly, the legislative intent behind incorporating 
the term “shall” is not to stifle the prosecution on 
such insignificant technicality, but conveys that the 
process ought to be completed in an expeditious 
manner. We are unable to persuade ourselves to 
accept the contention that the term “shall” is to be 
strictly treated as a mandatory provision and failure to 
comply with the timeline strictly vitiates the process. 
Therefore, we respectfully defer with the view taken 
by the Kerala High Court in the case of Roopesh 
(supra) in that regard. 
155. We are of the view that and accordingly hold that 
to achieve legislative intent the dual mandate is to be 
complied with in its true spirit. Though a minuscule 
delay would not thwart the legislative intent, but delay 
if writ large from the record, which is unexplained, 
would
certainly have its own adverse impact on the 
process of sanction.”
The import of the above extract is that the timelines mentioned in 
Rules 3 and 4 of the 2008 Rules, despite having the word ‘shall’ in 
them, are to be taken as directory for, if the timeline is interpreted 
strictly, it may thwart the purpose of the legislation which is to curb 
unlawful activities of a specified nature.
We notice that an appeal from the judgement extracted above, is 
pending before this Court. In the course of the present judgement, 
we make no comments on the merits thereof and clarify, that the 
above extract is only for the purpose of determining the question of
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
law, in respect of the timelines mentioned in the 2008 Rules, being 
either mandatory or directory in nature.
28.5.2 The Jharkhand High Court, recently, in Binod Kumar Ganjhu 
@Vinod Kumar Ganjhu @Binod Ganjhu v. Union of India32 made 
similar observations and held that the timelines in the 2008 Rules 
are directory. It was observed-
“23. The decision in “Roopesh” is not a binding precedent 
and we do not find ourselves bound by the considerations 
of judicial comity and propriety. We are unable to record our 
agreement to the observations made by the Kerala High 
Court in “Roopesh” that the time-line provided under Rules 
3 and 4 of the Sanction Rules is mandatory. It is indeed 
not an issue for debate that the expression “shall” would 
not always convey mandatory compliance of the provision 
in law. In our opinion, the Sanction Rules lay down a time-
line which is in the nature of a guideline keeping in mind 
personal liberty of a person but such time-line cannot be 
held to be mandatory and, that too, in cases where serious 
allegations of commission of offence under UAP Act have 
been made and found prima-facie true by the NIA.
24. Long back, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme 
Court that the only principle which governs the criminal 
justice system is miscarriage of justice. This rule has its 
origin in the rules of principles of natural justice and that 
is why time and again the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has 
laid stress on fair trial. Even on conclusion of the trial, 
the judgment rendered by a competent Court was not 
held illegal where a charge was not framed by the Court 
[refer, “Begu v. King-Emperor” ILR (1925) 6 Lah 226]. In 
this context, we may also refer to the provisions under 
sections 468 to 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
which provide period of limitation for taking cognizance 
and exclusion as well as extension of period of limitation 
in certain cases. The scheme of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure thus indicates that it is not every irregularity 
which vitiates the trial and except in very exceptional kind of 
32	
W.P(Crl) 308 of 2022
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cases the Court would not step into and hold the judgment 
rendered illegal. The fundamental right of an accused is 
of fair trial in which he has sufficient opportunity to defend 
himself by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses 
to bring out falsity in the prosecution case. But beyond 
this, an accused has only a statutory right to establish 
that the procedure as prescribed under the law has not 
been followed and such non-adherence to the procedure 
prescribed has deprived him a fair opportunity to defend 
himself which occasioned in miscarriage of justice. As 
noticed above, the Court has taken cognizance of the 
offence under the UAP Act and charge has also been 
framed for committing such offence. In our considered 
opinion, the Sanction Rules would have no application in 
the cases of this nature because a criminal prosecution 
cannot be frustrated on mere technicalities.”
Though the Special Leave Petition against this Order was dismissed, 
however, it was clarified that the question of sanction under Section 
45 of the UAPA was not considered. 
28.5.3 Taking a diametrically opposite view, the Kerala High Court in 
Roopesh v. State of Kerala,33 held that the timeline stipulated cannot 
be taken to be directory, keeping in view the Legislature’s express 
inclusion of the same, departing from the practice adopted in other 
similarly placed laws such as TADA or Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
2002,34 it held as
under:
“12. The word ‘shall’ used in the Rules of 2008 has a 
well defined texture as available from the identical ‘shall’ 
employed in the text of sub-section (1) & (2) of S.45 of 
the UA(P)A; and the power conferred on the Central 
Government by S.52 to make rules for carrying out the 
provisions of the Act. The Rules of 2008 prescribed the time 
of seven days; as spoken of in the enactment. The Act itself 
is enacted, to prevent unlawful activities of individuals and 
associations as also dealing with terrorist activities, which 
terms are specifically defined under the enactment itself. 
33	
2022 SCC OnLine Ker 1372
34	
‘POTA’ for short.
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
The colour is perceivable from the context in which the 
enactment is saved from the challenge of having infringed 
the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, 
only on the ground of a reasonable restriction; which has 
to be construed very strictly. The Parliament, in bringing 
out the enactment and the Government, in promulgating 
the Rules had the prior experience of the TADA and POTA 
as also S.196 Cr.P.C; none of which had a time frame for 
issuance of sanction. UA(P)A as it was originally enacted, 
in its Statements of Objects and Reasons, declared it to 
be in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, 
intended to bring in reasonable restrictions to (i) freedom 
of speech and expression, (ii) right to assemble peaceably 
and without arms; and (iii) right to form associations or 
unions. The original enactment by S.17 required a sanction 
from the Central Government or the authorised officer to 
initiate prosecution.
…
14. The Parliament, in 2008, while enacting Amending Act 
35 of 2008 had consciously incorporated the provision 
requiring a recommendation from an Authority and 
retained the requirement of sanction from the appropriate 
Government, as provided in sub-section (1). It was by sub-
section (2) that an Authority was contemplated, to make 
recommendations after reviewing the evidence gathered 
and a specific time was permitted to be prescribed by rules. 
The Central
Government having brought out the Rules of 
2008 specifying the time, within which the recommendation 
and sanction has to be made, the time is sacrosanct and 
according to us, mandatory. It cannot at all be held that 
the stipulation of time is directory, nor can it be waived 
as a mere irregularity under S.460 (e) or under S.465 
Cr.P.C. S.460 saves any erroneous proceeding, inter-
alia of taking cognizance; if done in good faith. When 
sanction is statutorily mandated for taking cognizance 
and if cognizance is taken without a sanction or on the 
strength of an invalid one, it cannot be said to be an 
erroneous proceeding taken in good faith and the act of 
taking cognizance itself would stand vitiated.”
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The State of Kerala, being aggrieved by the final conclusion that the 
sanction was bad in law, carried in appeal to this Court. The Special 
Leave Petition bearing number SLP (Crl.) Nos.6981-6983 of 2022, 
was dismissed as withdrawn with the question of law left open. 
28.5.4 A similar view was taken by the High Court of Punjab and 
Haryana in Manjeet Singh v. State of Punjab.35 Although decided in 
the context of bail, it was held that if no decision is taken, in keeping 
with the timelines of the Rules 2008, the accused would be entitled 
to interim bail. It concurred with the view expressed by the Kerala 
High Court in Roopesh (supra). 
29.	 This Court has considered the issue of time-bound sanction. 
While dealing with sanctions under the PC Act, it was observed by 
Pamidighantam Sri Narsimha J. speaking for this Court, in Vijay 
Rajmohan v. Central Bureau of Investigation (Anti-Corruption 
Branch) 36 as under:
“23. Grant of sanction being an exercise of executive power, 
it is subject to the standard principles of judicial review such 
as application of independent mind; only by the competent 
authority, without bias, after consideration of relevant 
material and by eschewing irrelevant considerations. As 
the power to grant sanction for prosecution has legal 
consequences, it must naturally be exercised within a 
reasonable period. This principle is anyway inbuilt in our 
legal structure, and our constitutional
courts review the 
legality and proprietary of delayed exercise of power quite 
frequently…
…
29. The sanctioning authority must bear in mind that 
public confidence in the maintenance of the rule of law, 
which is fundamental in the administration of justice, is at 
stake here. By causing delay in considering the request 
for sanction, the sanctioning authority stultifies judicial 
scrutiny, thereby vitiating the process of determination of 
the allegations against the corrupt official Subramanian 
35	
[2022] 19 SCR 563 : CRA-D-5 of 2023 
36	
(2023) 1 SCC 329
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
Swamy [Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 
3 SCC 64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC 
(L&S) 666] . Delays in prosecuting the corrupt breeds a 
culture of impunity and leads to systemic resignation to 
the existence of corruption in public life. Such inaction is 
fraught with the risk of making future generations getting 
accustomed to corruption as a way of life. …
…
32. In the first place, non-compliance with a mandatory 
period cannot and should not automatically lead to the 
quashing of criminal proceedings because the prosecution 
of a public servant for corruption has an element of 
public interest having a direct bearing on the rule of law 
[Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 
64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666. 
Per A.K. Ganguly, J. : (SCC p. 102, paras 76-77)“76. The 
sanctioning authority must bear in mind that what is at 
stake is the public confidence in the maintenance of the 
rule of law which is fundamental in the administration of 
justice. Delay in granting such sanction has spoilt many 
valid prosecutions and is adversely viewed in public mind 
that in the name of considering a prayer for sanction, a 
protection is given to a corrupt public official as a quid 
pro quo for services rendered by the public official in the 
past or may be in the future and the sanctioning authority 
and the corrupt officials were or are partners in the same
misdeeds. …77. By causing delay in considering the 
request for sanction, the sanctioning authority stultifies 
judicial scrutiny and determination of the allegations 
against corrupt official and thus the legitimacy of the 
judicial institutions is eroded. It, thus, deprives a citizen 
of his legitimate and fundamental right to get justice by 
setting the criminal law in motion and thereby frustrates his 
right to access judicial remedy which is a constitutionally 
protected right.”]. This is also a non-sequitur. It must also 
be kept in mind that the complainant or victim has no 
other remedy available for judicial redressal if the criminal 
proceedings stand automatically quashed. At the same 
time, a decision to grant deemed sanction may cause
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prejudice to the rights of the accused as there would also 
be non-application of mind in such cases.”
(Emphasis supplied)
30.	 The observations in Vijay Rajmohan (supra) regarding the power of 
sanction being open to the standard principle of judicial review; the 
same being inbuilt in our legal structure; public confidence being at 
stake if a rule of law is violated, are principles that in our considered 
view it will apply equally to sanctions under UAPA. In context of the 
PC Act, it has been held that non-compliance of a mandatory period 
cannot ipso facto lead to quashing of criminal proceedings. This is 
where a difference emerges between the PC Act and the UAPA. The 
implication, social as well as legal of both these acts diverges, in 
as much as the latter entails far graver consequences. [See: State 
of T.N. v. Sivarasan; 37 Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi (supra); and 
Ashrafkhan (Supra)] The UAPA provides for a detailed procedure 
which is to be followed in granting of sanction and undoubtedly, the 
same must be followed in absolute letter and spirit. 
Construction of 2008 Rules
31.	 It is well understood that penal statutes are statutes to be interpreted 
strictly. This canon of construction has been reiterated time and 
again. It is apposite here to refer to certain authorities in this context. 
31.1	 Maxwell in The Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edn.) has 
observed:
“The effect of the rule of strict construction
might 
almost be summed up in the remark that, where 
an equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a 
reasonable doubt of its meaning which the cannons 
of interpretation failed to solve, the benefit of the 
doubt should be given to the subject and against 
the legislature which has failed to explain itself. But 
it yields to the paramount rule that every statute is to 
be expounded according to its expressed or manifest 
intention and that all cases within the mischief aimed 
at our, if the language permits, to be held to fall within 
its remedial influence”
37	
[1996] Supp. 8 SCR 243 : (1997) 1 SCC 682
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
Observations in the twelfth edition, in this context, are also 
educative:
“The strict construction of penal statutes seems to 
manifest itself in four ways : In the requirement of 
express language for the creation of an offence; in 
interpreting strictly words setting out the elements 
of an offence; in requiring the fulfillment to the letter 
of statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of 
punishment; and in insisting on the strict observance 
of technical provisions concerning criminal procedure 
and jurisdiction.”
31.2	 In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement,38 
a Constitution Bench while discussing the interpretation of 
penal statutes, held as under:
“36. The rule of interpretation requiring strict 
construction of penal statutes does not warrant a 
narrow and pedantic construction of a provision so 
as to leave loopholes for the offender to escape 
(see Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra 
[(1976) 3 SCC 684 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 493] ). A penal 
statute has to also be so construed as to avoid a lacuna 
and to suppress mischief and to advance a remedy 
in the light of the rule in Heydon’s case [(1584) 3 Co 
Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] . A common-sense approach for 
solving a question of applicability of a penal statute 
is not ruled out by the rule of strict construction. (See 
State of A.P. v. Bathu Prakasa Rao [(1976) 3 SCC 
301 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 395] and also G.P. Singh on
Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edn., 2004, 
Chapter 11, Synopsis 3 at pp. 754 to 756.)”
31.3	 In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements,39 a Bench of three 
judges, while dealing with an issue relating to Bihar Industrial 
Promotion Policy, 1995, discussed the construction of penal 
statutes. The Court observed that:
38	
[2005] Supp. 1 SCR 49 : (2005) 4 SCC 530
39	
[2004] Supp. 6 SCR 125 : (2005) 1 SCC 368
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“26. Whenever the statute prescribes that a particular 
act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays 
down that failure to comply with the said requirement 
leads to severe consequences, such requirement 
would be mandatory. It is the cardinal rule of 
interpretation that where a statute provides that a 
particular thing should be done, it should be done in 
the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is 
also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute 
is penal in character, it must be strictly construed 
and followed. Since the requirement, in the instant 
case, of obtaining prior permission is mandatory, 
therefore, non-compliance with the same must result 
in cancelling the concession made in favour of the 
grantee, the respondent herein.”
31.4	 The course of action to be adopted by Courts, in view of 
language used in the statutes has been noticed by this Court 
in Manjit Singh v. CBI,40 wherein it has been observed, 
referring to certain other authorities, that when the language of 
a provision is unambiguous it would not be open to Courts to 
adopt a hypothetical approach, leading to a different conclusion 
on the ground that such different conclusion would be more 
in sync with the objective of the statute. 
31.5	 In Priya Indoria v. State of Karnataka,41 the position of law 
was stated as under:
“84. Maxwell in his treatise on Interpretation of 
Statutes (10 Edn.), p. 284 states that “the
tendency 
of modern decisions on the whole is to narrow 
materially the difference between strict and beneficial 
construction”. It follows that criminal statutes such as 
the CrPC are interpreted with rational regard to the 
aim and intention of the legislature. What has to be 
borne in the judicial mind is that the interpretation of 
all statutes should be favourable to personal liberty 
40	
[2011] 1 SCR 997 : (2011) 11 SCC 578
41	
[2023] 15 SCR 525 : (2024) 4 SCC 749
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subject to fair and effective administration of criminal 
justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
32.	 Rules flowing from statutory power, have the effect of a statute. Section 
52 of the UAPA grants power to the Central Government to make Rules 
for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. Specifically, 
Section 52 (2)(ee) deals with the present situation, i.e., enables the 
Government to prescribe the time for recommendation and grant of 
sanction under Section 45. The 2008 Rules are unequivocal in both, 
using the word ‘shall’ as also providing a specific time period for both 
activities, i.e., making recommendation and granting sanction. In 
the views of the High Courts discussed above, two have taken the 
view that the timelines are directory, while the other two hold them 
to be mandatory. In the former view, the word ‘shall’ is interpreted 
as ‘may’. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to certain 
pronouncements. Prior to going into that question, we may also refer 
to the well-established principles qua criminal statutes. 
32.1	 In Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin,42 the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered the question 
of whether a certain provision in a statute imposing a duty on 
a public body or authority was mandatory or directory. The 
Court observed that:
“…The question whether provisions in a statute are 
directory or imperative has very frequently
arisen 
in this country, but it has been said that no general 
rule can be laid down, and that in every case the 
object of the statute must be looked at. The cases 
on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on 
Statutes, 5th ed., p. 596 and following pages. When 
the provisions of a statute relate to the performance 
of a public duty and the case is such that to hold 
null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would 
work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to 
persons who have no control over those entrusted 
with the duty, and at the same time would not promote 
42	
LR (1917) AC 170
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the main object of the Legislature, it has been the 
practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, 
the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting 
the validity of the acts done.”
32.2	 A Bench of five learned Judges in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan 
Lal Srivastava,43 while construing Article 320 of the Constitution 
of India, interpretated the words ‘shall’ and ‘may’ as under:
“11. …Hence, the use of the word “shall” in a statute, 
though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does 
not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have 
that effect, that is to say, that unless the words of the 
statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or 
the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. On 
the other hand, it is not always correct to say that 
where the word “may” has been used, the statute is 
only permissive or directory in the sense that non-
compliance with those provisions will not render the 
proceeding invalid. In that connection, the following 
quotation from Crawford on Statutory Construction  — 
Article 261 at p. 516, is pertinent:
“The question as to whether a statute 
is mandatory or directory depends upon 
the intent of the legislature and not 
upon the language in which the intent is 
clothed. The meaning and intention of 
the legislature must govern, and these 
are to be ascertained, not only from the 
phraseology of the provision, but also by 
considering its nature, its design, and
the 
consequences which would follow from 
construing it the one way or the other….”
32.3	 In State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya,44 a Constitution Bench 
considered the interpretation of the word ‘shall’ as mandatory 
and observed as under:
43	
[1958] 1 SCR 533 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4
44	
[1961] 2 SCR 679 : 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5
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“29. The relevant rules of interpretation may be 
briefly stated thus : When a statute uses the word 
“shall”, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court 
may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by 
carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. 
For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature 
the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the 
design of the statute, and the consequences which 
would follow from construing it the one way or the 
other, the impact of other provisions whereby the 
necessity of complying with the provisions in question 
is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute 
provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with 
the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with 
the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the 
serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, 
and, above all, whether the object of the legislation 
will be defeated or furthered.”
32.4	 In Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur,45 this Court 
considered at length this rule of interpretation. It was observed:
“21. The ultimate rule in construing auxiliary verbs 
like “may” and “shall” is to discover the legislative 
intent; and the use of the words “may” and “shall” is 
not decisive of its discretion or mandates. The use 
of the words “may” and “shall” may help the courts 
in ascertaining the legislative intent without giving 
to either a controlling or
a determinating effect. The 
courts have further to consider the subject-matter, the 
purpose of the provisions, the object intended to be 
secured by the statute which is of prime importance, 
as also the actual words employed.”
Although in this case the Court was concerned with a land dispute, 
the observation in respect of the use of the words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ 
are general principles of statutory construction and are therefore 
relevant to the present discussion. 
45	
[2008] 2 SCR 424 : (2008) 12 SCC 372
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32.5	 In Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj,46 this Court interpreted 
the words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the context of CrPC as under:
“12. …The use of the expression “shall” prima facie 
makes the inquiry or the investigation, as the case 
may be, by the Magistrate mandatory. The word 
“shall” is ordinarily mandatory but sometimes, taking 
into account the context or the intention, it can be 
held to be directory. The use of the word “shall” in 
all circumstances is not decisive. Bearing in mind 
the aforesaid principle, when we look to the intention 
of the legislature, we find that it is aimed to prevent 
innocent persons from harassment by unscrupulous 
persons from false complaints. Hence, in our opinion, 
the use of the expression “shall” and the background 
and the purpose for which the amendment has 
been brought, we have no doubt in our mind that 
inquiry or the investigation, as the case may be, is 
mandatory before summons are issued against the 
accused living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of 
the Magistrate.”
32.6	 Crawford’s Statutory Construction (1989 reprint),47 notes as 
follows in regard to ‘mandatory’ and ‘directory’ words:
“Ordinarily the words ‘shall’ and ‘must’ are mandatory, 
and the work ‘may’ is directory, although they are 
often used inter-changeably in legislation. This use 
without regard to their literal meaning generally makes 
it necessary for the courts to resort to construction in 
order to
discover the real intention of the legislature. 
Nevertheless, it will always be presumed by the court 
that the legislature intended to use the words in 
their usual and natural meaning. If such a meaning, 
however, leads to absurdity, or great inconvenience, 
or for some other reason is clearly contrary to the 
obvious intention of the legislature, then words 
which ordinarily are mandatory in their nature will 
46	
[2014] 4 SCR 171 : (2014) 14 SCC 638
47	
Cited in Union of India v. A.K. Pandey, (2009) 10 SCC 552
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
be construed as directory, or vice versa. In other 
words, if the language of the statute, considered as 
a whole and with due regard to its nature and object, 
reveals that the legislature intended the words ‘shall’ 
and ‘must’ to be directory, they should be given that 
meaning. Similarly, under the same circumstances, 
the word ‘may’ should be given a mandatory meaning, 
and especially where the statute concerns the rights 
and interests of the public, or where third persons 
have a claim de jure that a power shall be exercised, 
or whenever something is directed to be done for the 
sake of justice or the public good, or is necessary to 
sustain the statute's constitutionality.
Yet the construction of mandatory words as directory 
and directory words as mandatory should not be 
lightly adopted. The opposite meaning should be 
unequivocally evidenced before it is accepted as 
the true meaning; otherwise, there is considerable 
danger that the legislative intent will be wholly or 
partially defeated.”
(Emphasis supplied)
33.	 In matters of strict construction, when a timeline is provided, along 
with the use of the word ‘shall’ and particularly when the same is 
in the context of a law such as the UAPA, it cannot be considered 
a mere technicality or formality. It demonstrates clear intention on 
the part of the Legislature. A compulsion has been imposed, and 
for compliance with that compulsion, a timeline has
been provided. 
While the legislation is aimed at curbing unlawful activities and 
practices detrimental to national security and accordingly, provides 
the authorities of the Government ample power to undertake and 
complete all procedures and processes permissible under law to 
that end, at the same time the interest of accused persons must 
also be safeguarded and protected. It is expected of the Executive, 
in furtherance of the ideal of protection of national security, that it 
would work with speed and dispatch. The concern expressed by the 
Bombay High Court is that a strict interpretation of the timeline may 
defeat the objective of the legislation. While on first blush, such a 
statement is attractive, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the time
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granted is only for consideration of the material collected by way of an 
independent review and then making a recommendation whereafter 
the sanctioning authority may then consider the materials as well 
as recommendation to finally, grant or deny the sanction. It is not 
for the purpose of the investigation itself, which understandably can 
be a time-consuming process, given the multiple variables involved. 
There have to be certain limitations within which administrative 
authorities of the Government can exercise their powers. Without 
such limitations, power will enter the realm of the unbridled, which 
needless to state is, antithetical to a democratic society. Timelines 
in such cases, serve as essential aspects of checks and balances 
and of course, are unquestionably important. If the view of the 
Bombay and Jharkhand High Courts is allowed to stand it would be 
tantamount to the Judicial Wing supplanting its view in place of the 
legislature which is impermissible in view of the doctrine of separation 
of powers. We find support for our view in the Constitution Bench 
decision in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak,48 wherein 
D.A. Desai, J., held as under:
“18. It is a well-established cannon of construction that 
the court should read the section as it is and cannot 
rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any cannon of 
construction permit the court to read the section in such 
manner as to render it to
some extent otiose.”
[See also: Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal;49 Institute 
of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse;50* and 
Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers51] 
The legislative intent is clear. Rules made by virtue of statutory 
powers prescribe both a mandate and a time limit. The same has 
to be followed. Here itself we may clarify that the conclusion arrived 
at by us in respect of the strict adherence to the timeline mentioned 
in Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008, Rules shall not affect any decision of 
the authorities where the same may or may not have been followed 
48	
[1984] 2 SCR 914 : (1984) 2 SCC 500
49	
[1991] 3 SCR 873 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 
50	
[1997] Supp. 2 SCR 267 : (1997) 6 SCC 312
*dissenting opinion of Saghir Ahmad, J. 
51	
[2003] 3 SCR 762 : (2003) 6 SCC 659
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
as on date of this judgment. For ample clarity, it is stated that the 
observations made in this judgment shall apply prospectively. 
Independent Review
34.	 The bone of contention in this regard is that since both the 
recommending and the granting authorities took merely a day each 
in performing their respective functions, the requirement of an 
independent review which is to be undertaken by both authorities 
has been left unfulfilled thereby vitiating the sanction in question. 
35.	 The meaning of the word independent, as is well understood, is 
that the act, or as in this case, evaluation is made in a way which 
is lone standing or which does not rely on any other factor, such as 
previous consideration or evaluation by another authority, to arrive 
at its conclusion.
35.1	 The Cambridge dictionary defines the word independent to 
mean: –
“not influenced or controlled in any way by other 
people, events, or things” 
35.2	 The Merriam Webster dictionary defines the word independent 
as:-
“1: not dependent: such as
a (1): not subject to control by others ; (2): not affiliated 
with a larger controlling unit
b (1): not requiring or relying on something else : 
not contingent; (2): not looking to others for one’s 
opinions or for guidance in conduct; (3): not bound 
by or committed to a political party
c (1): not requiring or relying on others (as for care 
or livelihood); (2): being enough to free one from the
necessity of working for a living
d: showing a desire for freedom”
35.3	 The Black’s Law Dictionary defines:
“INDEPENDENT. Not dependent; not subject to 
control, restriction, modification, or limitation from a 
given outside source.”
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Independence, which is the state of being independent would also 
be instructive in our understanding. 
“INDEPENDENCE. The state or condition of being free 
from dependence, subjection, or control. A state of perfect 
irresponsibility. Political independence is the attribute of 
a nation or state which is entirely autonomous, and not 
subject to the government, control, or dictation of any 
exterior power.”
36.	 Review, as a concept is to be understood for it is the coming together 
of these two aspects which will form our understanding of the term 
‘independent review’. 
36.1	 The Cambridge dictionary defines the word review as:
“to think or talk about something again, in order to 
make changes to it or to make a decision about it”
36.2	 The Merriam Webster dictionary defines the word review to 
mean as:
“ …2: to examine or study again especially : to 
reexamine judicially
…
4 a: to go over or examine critically or deliberately; 
b: to give a critical evaluation of”
36.3	 The Burton’s Legal Thesaurus52 lists the following words as 
being similar to ‘review’ – analyse; comment upon; contemplari; 
criticize; critique; investigate; mull over; notice; critically; 
reconsider; reexamine; scrutinize; study and weigh.
37.	 The import of the term independent review as can be understood 
from the above is a re-examination, scrutiny or critique of something 
which is not dependent or subject to control by any other factor or
authority. In the present facts, independent review would mean a 
contemplation or study of the material gathered by the investigating 
officer to conclude as to whether or not a sanction to proceed under 
the provisions of the UAPA ought to be granted. Similarly, at the next 
52	
Third Edition; Page 473
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
stage, the sanctioning authority is to mull over and critically notice 
both the materials gathered as also the conclusion drawn by the 
recommending authority, in its act of granting sanction. 
38.	 The legislative intent in bringing about the aspect of independent 
review, by way of an amendment brought into effect from 31st 
December 2008, within Section 45 of the UAPA is required to be 
noticed. 
39.	 The Minister for Home Affairs in moving the draft Bills before the 
Council of States, highlighted the intent behind such introduction as 
herein below reproduced:
“Finally, Sir, we have incorporated a very salutary provision. 
To the best of our knowledge-I don’t know, I may be 
corrected by the Law Minister or the Law Secretary later - 
it is the first time we are introducing this. In a prosecution 
under the UAPA, now, it is the executive Government 
which registers the case through a police officer. It is the 
executive Government which investigates the case through 
an investigating agency, namely, the police department. It 
is the executive Govt. which sanctions u/s. 45. Therefore, 
there is a fear that a vindictive or a wrong executive Govt. 
could register a case, investigate and sanction prosecution. 
There is a fear. May be, it is not a fear that is entirely justified 
but you cannot say that it is entirely unjustified. So what 
are we doing? The executive Govt. can register the case 
because no one
else can register a case. The executive 
Govt., through its agency, can investigate the case. But, 
before sanction is granted under 45(1) we are interposing 
an independent authority which will review the entire 
evidence, gathered in the investigation, and then make a 
recommendation whether this is a fit case of prosecution. 
So, here, we are bringing a filter, a buffer, an independent 
authority who has to review the entire evidence that is 
gathered and, then, make a recommendation to the State 
Govt. or the Central Govt. as the case may be, a fit case 
for sanction. I think, this is a very salutary safeguard. All 
sections of the House should welcome it. This is a biggest 
buffer against arbitrariness which many Members spoke 
about. Sir, these are the features in the Bill.”
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In the statement extracted above, the idea, purpose and intent 
behind bringing in an independent authority to scrutinize the material 
gathered by the investigating agency prior to the government being 
able to issue or deny a sanction, has been clearly laid out. It was so 
done to have checks over the power of the executive in this regard. 
40.	 What flows from the above is that independence of this authority is 
sine qua non, without which it would have lost its entire purpose. The 
question, now to be considered is as to how it may be determined 
that a particular process shone with independence or was the same 
compromised by the clouds of influence, which may compromise its 
character.
40.1	 In C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka,53 the Court 
speaking in the context of a sanction order under PC Act held:
“9. Therefore, the ratio is sanction order should speak 
for itself and in case the facts do not so appear, 
it should be proved by leading evidence that all 
the particulars were placed before the sanctioning 
authority for due application of mind. In case the 
sanction speaks for itself then the satisfaction of 
the sanctioning authority is apparent by reading the 
order…”
This was also referred to in State of M.P. v. Harishankar Bhagwan 
Prasad Tripathi.54
40.2	 In State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain,55 after considering 
a host of authorities, including some that have been cited before 
in the present
case, the following factors were culled out:
“14.1. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that 
the valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning 
authority after being satisfied that a case for sanction 
has been made out.
14.2. The sanction order may expressly show that the 
sanctioning authority has perused the material placed 
53	
[2005] 2 SCR 1163 : (2005) 4 SCC 81
54	
[2010] 9 SCR 1148 : (2010) 8 SCC 655
55	
[2013] 3 SCR 850 : (2013) 8 SCC 119
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
before it and, after consideration of the circumstances, 
has granted sanction for prosecution.
14.3. The prosecution may prove by adducing the 
evidence that the material was placed before the 
sanctioning authority and its satisfaction was arrived 
at upon perusal of the material placed before it.
14.4. Grant of sanction is only an administrative 
function and the sanctioning authority is required to 
prima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts 
would constitute the offence.
14.5. The adequacy of material placed before the 
sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court 
as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order.
14.6. If the sanctioning authority has perused all the 
materials placed before it and some of them have 
not been proved that would not vitiate the order of 
sanction.
14.7. The order of sanction is a prerequisite as 
it is intended to provide a safeguard to a public 
servant against frivolous and vexatious litigants, but 
simultaneously an order of sanction should not be 
construed in a pedantic manner and there should 
not be a hypertechnical approach to test its validity.”
In the very same judgment, it was observed that “grant of sanction is 
a sacrosanct and sacred act” whose aim is to protect a public servant 
against vexatious litigation. However, when the order of sanction is 
(a) by a competent authority and (b) after due application of mind, it 
cannot be dealt
with lightly or, in other words, summarily discarded. 
40.3	 Recently, in Judgebir Singh v. National Investigation 
Agency,56 while examining the application of Rules 3 & 4 of 
2008 Rules, this court observed:
“50. …We place emphasis on the expression “within 
7 working days of the receipt of the evidence 
56	
[2023] 6 SCR 1 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 543
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gathered by the investigating officer under the 
CrPC”. This evidence which Rule 3 of the Rules, 
2008 contemplates is the final report i.e., filed by 
the investigating agency under Section 173 of the 
CrPC. How can one expect the authority under 
sub section (2) of Section 45 to make its report 
containing the recommendations without looking into 
the chargesheet thoroughly containing the evidence 
gathered by the investigating officer. On the contrary, 
Rule 3 of the Rules, 2008 makes it explicitly 
clear that the authority under sub section (2) of 
Section 45 of the UAPA is obliged in law to apply 
its mind thoroughly to the evidence gathered by 
the investigating officer and thereafter, prepare 
its report containing the recommendations to the 
Central Government or the State government for 
the grant of sanction. The grant of sanction is not 
an idle formality. The grant of sanction should 
reflect proper application of mind.
(Emphasis in original)
(Emphasis supplied)
40.4	 In State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti,57 the position of 
law was stated thus:
“7. Validity of an order of sanction would depend 
upon application of mind on the part of the authority 
concerned and the material placed before it. All 
such material facts and material evidence must be 
considered by it. The sanctioning authority must apply 
its mind on such material facts and evidence collected 
during the investigation. Even such application of
mind does not appear from the order of sanction, 
extrinsic evidence may be placed before the court 
in that behalf. While granting sanction, the authority 
cannot take into consideration an irrelevant fact nor 
can it pass an order on extraneous consideration 
57	
[2009] 11 SCR 790 : (2009) 17 SCC 92
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not germane for passing a statutory order. It is also 
well settled that the superior courts cannot direct 
the sanctioning authority either to grant sanction or 
not to do so…”
40.5	 In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu,58 this Court 
considered in extenso the provisions and scheme of the TADA 
in connection with the ‘2001 Parliament Attack’. For the present 
judgment certain observations made in regard to sanctions are 
relevant. They are summarised as follows:- 
40.5.1	
What is to be considered is whether the material 
which formed the raison d’être of the allegations was 
actually placed before the authority.
40.5.2	
A reiteration of the contents of the FIR or 
draft chargesheet does not constitute consideration or 
application of mind. It has to be something further than 
that. 
40.5.3	
The order of sanction or recommendation or 
grant of sanction, both should on their face indicate 
consideration of all relevant material. 
40.5.4	
The standard to be applied in ‘judging’ sanction 
orders is not the same as that applied to orders of quasi-
judicial bodies for it is a purely an administrative function. 
40.6	 The observations of this Court in State of Bihar v. P.P. 
Sharma,59 are instructive. Relevant extract is as under:
“27. The sanction under Section 197 CrPC is not 
an empty formality. It is essential that the provisions 
therein are to be observed with complete strictness. 
The object of obtaining
sanction is that the authority 
concerned should be able to consider for itself the 
material before the Investigating Officer, before it 
comes to the conclusion that the prosecution in 
the circumstances be sanctioned or forbidden. To 
comply with the provisions of Section 197 it must 
58	
[2005] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2005) 11 SCC 600
59	
1992 Supp (1) SCC 222
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be proved that the sanction was given in respect 
of the facts constituting the offence charged. It is 
desirable that the facts should be referred to on the 
face of the sanction. Section 197 does not require 
the sanction to be in any particular form. If the facts 
constituting the offence charged are not shown on 
the face of the sanction, it is open to the prosecution, 
if challenged, to prove before the court that those 
facts were placed before the sanctioning authority. 
It should be clear from the form of the sanction that 
the sanctioning authority considered the relevant 
material placed before it and after a consideration 
of all the circumstances of the case it sanctioned 
the prosecution.”
(Emphasis supplied)
41.	 Having given our attention to the position of law as above, let us now 
turn to the instant facts. Simply put, the objection of the appellant 
arises from the short amount of time taken in recommending and 
granting sanction, against him which he claims to be sign of non-
application of mind and lack of independent review. We are unable 
to accept such a contention. There is nothing on record to show 
that relevant material was not placed before the authorities. There 
is no question, as there rightly cannot be, on the competence of 
either of the authorities. Therefore, solely on the ground that the 
time taken was comparatively short or even that other orders were 
similarly worded cannot call the
credibility of the sanction into 
question. As has been noted in Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. 
Deepak Chowdhary,60 the authorities are required only to reach 
a prima facie satisfaction that the relevant facts, as gathered in 
the investigation would constitute the offence or not. In Mahesh 
G. Jain (supra) it has been held that the prosecution is to prove 
that a valid sanction has been granted. This needless to state, can 
only be done by adducing evidence at trial, where the defence in 
challenge thereto, will necessarily have to be given an opportunity 
to question the same and put forward its case that the two essential 
requirements detailed above, have not been met. Furthermore, 
60	
[1995] Supp. 2 SCR 818 : (1995) 6 SCC 225
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in Mohd. Iqbal M. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra,61 a case 
under the TADA, this Court was faced with a similar situation, the 
sanction wherein was granted by the competent authority, i.e., the 
Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay on the same day that he 
received the papers in that regard. The contention of non-application 
of mind was not accepted by the Court observing that so long as 
the sanction was by a competent authority and after applying its 
mind to all materials and the same being reflected in the order, the 
sanction would hold to be valid. It was further held that when an 
order does not so indicate, the prosecution is entitled to adduce 
evidence aliunde of the person who granted the sanction and that 
would be sufficient compliance. The Court would then, look into such 
evidence to arrive at a conclusion as to whether application of mind 
was present or absent. In conclusion, we hold that independent 
review as well as application of mind are questions to be determined 
by way of evidence and as such should be raised at the stage of 
trial, so as to ensure that there is no undue delay in the proceedings 
reaching their logical and lawful conclusion on these grounds. As 
a result of the conclusion drawn by this Court on the first issue, it 
is also to be said that if the sanction is taken exception to, on the 
above grounds, it has to be raised at the earliest instance and not 
belatedly,
however, law does not preclude the same from being 
challenged at a later stage. It is to be noted that the scheme of the 
UAPA does not house a provision such as Section 19 of the PC 
Act62 which protects proceedings having been initiated on the basis 
of sanctions which come to be questioned at a later point in time 
61	
[1998] 2 SCR 734 : (1998) 4 SCC 494
62	
19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.— 
…
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— 
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in 
appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, 
the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in 
fact been occasioned thereby; 
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity 
in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has 
resulted in a failure of justice; 
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise 
the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other 
proceedings. 
(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity 
in, such sanction has occasioned or
resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact 
whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.
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and, therefore, Courts ought to be careful in entertaining belated 
challenges. If it is raised belatedly, however, the Court seized of the 
matter, must consider the reasons for the delay prior to delving into 
the merits of such objections. This we may say so for the reason 
that belated challenges on these grounds cannot be allowed to act 
as roadblocks in trial or cannot be used as weapons in shirking 
away from convictions arising out of otherwise validly conducted 
prosecutions and trials.
An order passed by an administrative authority is not to be tested by 
way of judicial review on the same anvil as a judicial or quasi-judicial 
order. While it is imperative for the latter to record reasons for arriving 
at a particular decision, for the former it is sufficient to show that the 
authority passing such order applied its mind to the relevant facts 
and materials [See: P.P. Sharma (supra); Navjot Sandhu (supra) 
and Mahesh G. Jain (supra)] That being the accepted position we 
find no infirmity in the order granting sanction against A-17. It is not 
incumbent upon such authority to record detailed reasons to support 
its conclusion and, as such, the orders challenged herein, cannot 
be faulted with on that ground. 
ISSUE No.3 – Misjoinder of Charges and Violation of CrPC
42.	 The appellant contends that two disjointed transactions have been 
taken together, to make him an accused and a member of the larger 
conspiracy.
The respondent-Union on the other hand argues that 
all the transactions (First Module, Second Module, as also the one 
for which the Appellant was made an accused) are inter-connected 
and flow from the first sanction. Further, it has been alleged by the 
appellants that there is a gross misuse of powers by the NIA and a 
violation of Sections 218-224 of CrPC. 
43.	 Section 218 features in Chapter XVII of the CrPC titled ‘The Charge’ 
and more specifically Part B thereof, which is joinder of charges. In 
a sense, the appellant has alleged violation of an entire part of the 
chapter, which submission on the face of it is difficult to accept. It 
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— 
(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; 
(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall 
be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement 
of a similar nature.
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requires no reiteration that a person when alleging the contravention 
of a section or portion of statute, has to substantiate the same by 
demonstrating which aspect of the section stood not complied with 
and how such non-compliance has prejudicially affected him. In the 
present case, however, we are confronted with a sweeping statement 
of contravention of provisions of the CrPC with little to no explanation 
as to how that may be the case. 
43.1	 Section 218 provides, first, that there should be a separate 
charge for each distinct offence; and secondly, that there should 
be a separate trial for every such charge, except in the four 
cases mentioned in Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223. 
43.2	 Section 219 provides that the three charges of three offences 
of the same kind committed within one year be tried together. 
The section contemplates a joint trial for three separate 
offences only when the offences are essentially of a simple 
kind and do not require the framing of a multitude of different 
charges. 
43.3	 Section 220 relates to the joinder of charges of offences 
committed by the same person. It applies to a case, when 
different offences form part of the same transaction, and are 
committed by the same person, then he may be charged with 
and tried at one trial for, every such offence. 
43.4	 Section 221 provides for cases where it is doubtful what offence 
has been committed. If a single act or
series of acts is of such 
nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts, 
which can be proved will constitute, the charge can be framed 
for all offences or alternative charges can be framed. At the 
trial, if it is established that the accused has committed an 
offence, he may be convicted though he may not have been 
charged with the offence. 
43.5	 Section 222 applies to cases in which the charge is of an 
offence which consists of several particulars, a combination 
of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence. 
43.6	 Section 223 provides for joinder of charges against more than 
one accused person in the same trial. It deals with the plurality 
of persons, who can be tried together, in other words, the joint 
trial of more than one person.
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43.7	 Section 224 deals with withdrawal of remaining charges on 
conviction on one of several charges. 
44.	 Sections 218 to 222 pertain to the joinder of charges against the 
same person in the same trial. Section 223 deals with plurality of 
persons, i.e., more than one accused in the same trial. We may 
notice a few decisions of this Court, to put the application of these 
provisions, in context.
44.1	 In Balbir v. State of Haryana,63 a Bench of three learned 
Judges observed as under: 
“11. …In both the aforesaid clauses the primary 
condition is that persons should have been accused 
either of the same offence or of different offences 
“committed in the course of the same transaction”. 
The expression advisedly used is “in the course of 
the same transaction”. That expression is not akin 
to saying “in respect of the same subject-matter”. It 
is pertinent to point out that the same expression 
is employed in Section 220(1) of the Code also 
[corresponding to Section 235(1) of the old Code]. 
The meaning of the expression “in the course of the 
same transaction” used in Section 223 is not materially 
different from that expression used in Section 223(1) 
[sic 235(1)]. It is so understood by this Court in State 
of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao [AIR 1963 SC 
1850 : (1964) 3 SCR 297] . The following observation 
in the said judgment is contextually quotable:
“The series of acts which constitute a 
transaction must of
necessity be connected 
with one another and if some of them 
stand out independently, they would not 
form part of the same transaction but 
would constitute a different transaction 
or transactions. Therefore, even if the 
expression ‘same transaction’ alone had 
been used in Section 235(1) it would have 
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meant a transaction consisting either of 
a single act or of a series of connected 
acts. The expression ‘same transaction’ 
occurring in clauses (a), (c) and (d) of 
Section 239 as well as that occurring in 
Section 235(1) ought to be given the same 
meaning according to the normal rule of 
construction of statutes.”
12. For several offences to be part of the same 
transaction, the test which has to be applied is 
whether they are so related to one another in point 
of purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and 
subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. 
Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or 
design, where there is a continuity of action, then all 
those persons involved can be accused of the same 
or different offences “committed in the course of the 
same transaction”.”
44.2	 In R. Dineshkumar v. State,64 this Court considered the aspect 
of ‘transaction’ in the following terms:
“…19.3. This Court after taking note of the fact that 
the clause “same transaction” is not defined under the 
CrPC opined that the meaning of the clause should 
depend upon the facts of each case. However, this 
Court indicated that where there is a proximity of time 
or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity 
of action in respect of a series of acts, it is possible 
to infer that they form part of the same transaction. 
This Court also cautioned that every one of the 
abovementioned
elements need not co-exist for a 
transaction to be regarded as the “same transaction”.
20. According to us, the principle enunciated in 
Ganeswara Rao case [AIR 1963 SC 1850 : (1963) 2 
Cri LJ 671] is that where several persons are alleged 
to have committed several separate offences, which, 
64	
[2015] 5 SCR 605 : (2015) 7 SCC 497
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however, are not wholly unconnected, then there may 
be a joint trial unless such joint trial is likely to cause 
either embarrassment or difficulty to the accused in 
defending themselves.”
44.3	 In Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab,65 DY Chandrachud, J 
(as his Lordship then was) speaking for a three-judge Bench 
formulated the following principles in respect of joint or 
separate trials:
“51.1. Section 218 provides that separate trials shall 
be conducted for distinct offences alleged to be 
committed by a person. Sections 219-221 provide 
exceptions to this general rule. If a person falls under 
these exceptions, then a joint trial for the offences 
which a person is charged with may be conducted. 
Similarly, under Section 223, a joint trial may be held 
for persons charged with different offences if any of 
the clauses in the provision are separately or on a 
combination satisfied.
51.2. While applying the principles enunciated in 
Sections 218-223 on conducting joint and separate 
trials, the trial court should apply a two-pronged test, 
namely, (i) whether conducting a joint/separate trial 
will prejudice the defence of the accused; and/or (ii) 
whether conducting a joint/separate trial would cause 
judicial delay.
51.3. The possibility of conducting a joint trial will 
have to be determined at the beginning of the trial 
and not after the trial based on the result of the 
trial. The appellate court may determine the
validity 
of the argument that there ought to have been a 
separate/joint trial only based on whether the trial 
had prejudiced the right of accused or the prosecutrix.
51.4. Since the provisions which engraft an exception 
use the phrase “may” with reference to conducting 
a joint trial, a separate trial is usually not contrary to 
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[2021] 13 SCR 566 : (2022) 2 SCC 89
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Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.
law even if a joint trial could be conducted, unless 
proven to cause a miscarriage of justice.
51.5. A conviction or acquittal of the accused cannot 
be set aside on the mere ground that there was a 
possibility of a joint or a separate trial. To set aside 
the order of conviction or acquittal, it must be proved 
that the rights of the parties were prejudiced because 
of the joint or separate trial, as the case may be.”
The case of appellant, as is evident from the record, falls under the 
latter category, i.e., multiple persons in the same trial (appellant is 
A-17 out of a total of 20 accused persons). It has been held that 
joint or separate trial is a decision to be taken by the learned trial 
Judge at the beginning of the trial considering (a) the possibility of 
prejudice; and b) causing judicial delay, if any. Further, the language of 
Section 223 is directory in nature, signified by the use of word ‘may’. 
45.	 Naseeb Singh (supra) holds that a separate trial would not be 
contrary to law unless a miscarriage of justice can be demonstrated. 
Similarly, we are of the view that a joint trial, if held, after having 
considered the two factors given above, cannot be said to be ipso 
facto prejudicial to the parties. 
46.	 It is alleged that Dinesh Gope (A-6), who is the Chief of PLFI, 
extorts money from various persons and that this company (A-20) 
of which the present appellant is a director, is used to
legitimise the 
proceeds of such unlawful actions. The appellant, however, contends 
that there is no connection between the charges levied on A-6 and 
the transactions because of which he has been made an accused, 
whereas the Prosecution submits that both A-6 and A-17 are part of 
the same, continuing, ongoing transactions. Whether or not actually 
the case is a question to be decided on the basis of evidence adduced 
at trial, and not at this stage, by this Court. In State of U.P. v. Paras 
Nath Singh,66 the Court observed as under:
“8. …As the provision itself mandates that no finding, 
sanction or order by a court of competent jurisdiction 
becomes invalid unless it is so that a failure of justice has 
in fact been occasioned because of any error, omission or 
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[2009] 8 SCR 85 : (2009) 6 SCC 372
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irregularity in the charge including in misjoinder of charge, 
obviously, the burden is on the accused to show that in 
fact a failure of justice has been occasioned.”
Therefore, we leave it to the appellants to raise this issue before the 
Trial Judge, who shall, if such a question is raised, decide it promptly 
at the appropriate stage.
ISSUE No. 4 – Whether Section 22A applies to the Appellant?
47.	 Section 22A of the UAPA reads as under: 
“22A. Offences by companies.—
(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed 
by a company, every person (including promoters of the 
company) who, at the time the offence was committed, 
was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company 
for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as 
the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence 
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished 
accordingly: 
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall 
render any such person (including promoters) liable to 
any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the 
offence was committed without his knowledge or that he 
had exercised reasonable care to prevent the commission 
of such offence. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section 
(1), where an offence under this Act has been committed 
by a company and it is proved that the offence has 
been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is 
attributable to, any neglect on
the part of, any promoter, 
director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, 
such promoter, director, manager, secretary or other officer 
shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall 
be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (a) 
“company” means any body corporate and includes a firm 
or other association of individuals; and (b) “director”, in 
relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”
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48.	 For Section 22A to apply :- (a) offence has to committed by a company; 
(b) all persons who at the time of the offence were in control of, 
or responsible for, the company’s affairs shall be deemed guilty; 
(c) such person would be saved from guilt as under (b) if they can 
demonstrate that such act was (i) not in their knowledge; (ii) they 
had taken reasonable care to prevent such offence from taking place. 
The section further provides that if it can be proved that the offence 
committed by the company was (1) with consent; (2) in connivance 
of; (3) attributable to neglect on the part of any promoter, director, 
manager, secretary or any other officer of the company, then they 
shall be held guilty. 
49.	 The case put forward by the appellant is that he, who is allegedly a 
director of A-20 is saved by the statutory language which provides 
that if a person could demonstrate and prove that the offence 
was committed without his knowledge, he would be exempt from 
prosecution. This exemption is recognized in other statutes as well. 
We may take support of pronouncements of this Court with reference 
to Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 188167 
since the latter is similarly worded and phrased. 
“141. Offences by companies.—
(1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 
is a company, every person who, at the time the offence 
was committed, was in charge of, and was
responsible 
to, the company for the conduct of the business of the 
company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be 
guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded 
against and punished accordingly: 
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall 
render any person liable to punishment if he proves that 
the offence was committed without his knowledge, or 
that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the 
commission of such offence: 
Provided further that where a person is nominated as 
a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any 
office or employment in the Central Government or State 
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Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled 
by the Central Government or the State Government, as 
the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution 
under this Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), 
where any offence under this Act has been committed 
by a company and it is proved that the offence has 
been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is 
attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, 
manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such 
director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be 
deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to 
be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, — 
(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a 
firm or other association of individuals; and 
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the 
firm.”
49.1	 In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla,68 a Bench of 
three Judges held that only a person who is in charge of the 
affairs of the company, i.e., a director, manager or secretary 
and alongside that was connected to the criminal act being 
committed, would be liable under this section. Relevant portion 
thereof reads thus: 
“10. …What is required is that the persons who are 
sought to be made criminally liable under Section 141 
should be, at the time the offence was committed, 
in charge of and
responsible to the company for the 
conduct of the business of the company. Every person 
connected with the company shall not fall within the 
ambit of the provision. It is only those persons who 
were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of 
business of the company at the time of commission 
of an offence, who will be liable for criminal action. It 
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follows from this that if a director of a company who 
was not in charge of and was not responsible for the 
conduct of the business of the company at the relevant 
time, will not be liable under the provision. The liability 
arises from being in charge of and responsible for the 
conduct of business of the company at the relevant 
time when the offence was committed and not on 
the basis of merely holding a designation or office 
in a company. Conversely, a person not holding any 
office or designation in a company may be liable if 
he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge 
of and responsible for the conduct of business of a 
company at the relevant time. Liability depends on the 
role one plays in the affairs of a company and not on 
designation or status. If being a director or manager 
or secretary was enough to cast criminal liability, 
the section would have said so. Instead of “every 
person” the section would have said “every director, 
manager or secretary in a company is liable”…, etc. 
The legislature is aware that it is a case of criminal 
liability which means serious consequences so far as 
the person sought to be made liable is concerned. 
Therefore, only persons who can be said to be 
connected with the commission of a crime at the 
relevant time have been subjected to action.”
49.2	 This is the settled position of law which has been subsequently 
being reiterated in numerous judgments
of this Court. 
Illustratively, the recent judgment in Susela Padmavathy Amma 
v. Bharti Airtel Ltd.,69 referring to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals 
(supra) acquitted the appellant therein of the offences under 
Section 138 NI Act. Gavai, J., speaking for the Bench held 
as under:
“21. It was held that merely because a person is 
a director of a company, it is not necessary that 
he is aware about the day-today functioning of the 
company. This Court held that there is no universal 
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rule that a director of a company is in charge of its 
everyday affairs. It was, therefore, necessary, to aver 
as to how the director of the company was in charge 
of day-to-day affairs of the company or responsible 
to the affairs of the company. This Court, however, 
clarified that the position of a managing director or a 
joint managing director in a company may be different. 
This Court further held that these persons, as the 
designation of their office suggests, are in charge 
of a company and are responsible for the conduct 
of the business of the company. To escape liability, 
they will have to prove that when the offence was 
committed, they had no knowledge of the offence or 
that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the 
commission of the offence.”
[See also: N. Rangachari v. BSNL;70 Central Bank of India v. Asian 
Global Ltd.;71 Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta;72 and Rajesh 
Viren Shah v. Redington India Ltd.73]
50.	 Turning our attention to the facts of the present case once more, 
we find that in opposing the stand that he is a director, the appellant 
submits that he, in fact, is an uneducated person who is a munshi and 
whose identity has been stolen by A-7 & A-14. That being the case, 
this Court cannot, at this stage, decide whether Section 22A applies 
to the appellant or not. This is once again a matter for evidence. 
CONCLUSION
51.	 Consequent to the discussion made herein above, the
conclusions 
drawn by this Court in respect of the questions of law for our 
consideration, are as under:
51.1	 The validity of sanction should be challenged at the earliest 
instance available, before the Trial Court. If such a challenge is 
raised at an appellate stage it would be for the person raising 
the challenge to justify the reasons for bringing the same at 
70	
[2007] 5 SCR 329 : (2007) 5 SCC 108
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[2010] 7 SCR 694 : (2010) 11 SCC 203
72	
[2014] 10 SCR 1117 : (2015) 1 SCC 103
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(2024) 4 SCC 305
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a belated stage. Such reasons would have to be considered 
independently so as to ensure that there is no misuse of the 
right of challenge with the aim to stall or delay proceedings. 
51.2	 The timelines mentioned in Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008 Rules 
are couched in mandatory language and, therefore, have to 
be strictly followed. This is keeping in view that UAPA being 
a penal legislation, strict construction must be accorded to it. 
Timelines imposed by way of statutory Rules are a way to keep 
a check on executive power which is a necessary position to 
protect the rights of accused persons. Independent review by 
both the authority recommending sanction and the authority 
granting sanction, are necessary aspects of compliance with 
Section 45 of the UAPA.
52.	 For the next two questions, which depend on analysis of facts for 
their conclusions, their answers are as below :
52.1	 Sections 218-222, CrPC, are not violated. In respect of Section 
223, the position of law is the one taken in Paras Nath Singh 
(supra). Therefore, this Court prudently leaves it for the Trial 
Court to decide, if such an issue is raised before it. 
52.2	 Whether or not the exemption under Section 22A applies is a 
matter to be established by the way of evidence for the person 
claiming such exemption has to demonstrate that either he was 
not in charge of the affairs of the company which has allegedly 
committed the offence, or that he
had made reasonable efforts 
to prevent the commission of the offence. This, once again, is 
a matter for the Trial Court to consider and not for this Court to 
decide at this stage, keeping in view that the trial is underway 
and proceeded substantially. 
53.	 For the reasons afore-stated, the appeal lacks merit and, accordingly, 
is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. 
Result of the Case: Appeal dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain