JAGTAR SINGH versus STATE OF HARYANA
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 1013, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2015] 7 S.C.R.1013 
JAGTAR SINGH 
v. 
STATE OF HARYANA 
(Criminal Appeal No.86 of 201 ~, 
JUNE 19, 2015 
[R.K. AGRAWAL AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.] 
A 
8 
Penal Code, 1860- s. 304 Part II read with s. 34 - Land 
dispute between parties - On the fateful day, appellant and 
his brother caught hold of PW3 and when PW 3's uncle tried C 
to intervene, appellant inflicted injuries to uncle, who later 
succumbed to it- Conviction and sentence of both appellant 
and his brother u/s. 304 Part II rw s. 34 - However, High Court 
upheld conviction of the appellant, while acquitted his brother· 
- On appeal, held: Evidence proved the appellant guilty for D 
committing the offence - He was aggressor and had hit the 
deceased - Both ocular and documentary evidence proved 
that motive did exist prior to commission of the crime -
Material evidence duly proved by the eyewitnesses could E 
not be ignored - However, such was not the case of co-
accused and thus, he was given the benefit of doubt- Having 
regard to the nature of injury caused by the appellant to the 
deceased and the manner in which it was caused and taking 
into account the cause of death-shock and hemorrhage, the F 
courts below justified in bringing the case u/s. 304 Part II -
Also the punishment of five years appears to be just and 
proper - Thus, conviction and sentence awarded to the 
appellant by the courts below upheld. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The evidence proved that it was the 
appellant who took
the lead, caught hold of deceased 
1013 
G 
H
1014 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A by his hand, pulled him down to the ground and hit him 
on his head. Due to the head injury, the deceased first 
became unconscious and later succumbed to it. The 
ocular evidence on this issue was properly appreciated 
by the trial court and the High Court for holding the 
B appellant guilty for committing the offence. No 
inconsistency or exaggeration was noticed in the 
evidence adduced by the prosecution on the said issue 
so as to disbelieve the evidence of eyewitnesses account 
and thus, the finding of the High Court is accepted. [Paras 
C 17, 18] [1020-H; 1021-A-C] 
1.2 There was no case to differ with the finding of 
the two courts below on the issue of motive. There was 
enough evidence both ocular and documentary to prove 
D that the motive did exist prior to commission of the crime. 
E 
Thus, in the light of the facts, duly proved by the 
prosecution with the aid of their eyewitnesses, there was 
no good ground to differ with the finding of the High 
Court. [Paras 20, 21, 22] (1022-C-G] 
1.3 The evidence on record in no uncertain terms 
proved that it was the appellant who was the aggressor 
and hit the deceased. This evidence was rightly made 
basis by the two courts to hold the appellant guilty for 
F committing the offence. When the evidence directly 
attributes the appellant for commission of the act, it 
c~nnot be appreciated as to how and on what basis the 
material evidence duly proved by the eyewitnesses
could be ignored. Such was not the case so far as co-
G accused is concerned. The prosecution witnesses too 
did not speak against the co-accused and hence, was 
given the benefit of doubt. Also the State did not file any 
appeal against his acquittal and hence, that part of the 
H order has attained finality. [Para 24) [1023-B-D]
JAGTAR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1015 
1.4 The submission for conversion of the conviction A 
of the appellant to s.323/325 IPC or in the alternative to 
reduce the quantum of sentence to the extent of 
appellant already undergone i.e. three years, cannot be 
accepted. Having regard to the nature of injury caused 
by the appellant to the deceased and the manner in B 
which it was caused and taking into account the cause 
of death-shock and hemorrhage, the courts below were 
justified in bringing the case under Section 304 Part II 
instead of bringing the same either under Section 302 
or/and Section 304 Part I. It is apart from th~ fact that the C 
State has not filed any appeal against the impugned order 
seeking conviction of the appellant under Section 302 
or under Section 304 Part I or even for enhancement of 
punishment awarded to the appellant under Section 304 0 
Part II. [Paras 25, 26] [1023-E-H; 1024-A) 
1.5 The punishment of five years appears to be just 
and proper. It could have been even more because 
eventually the incident resulted in death of a person 
though the appellant did not intend to cause death of E 
deceased. In the absence of any cross appeal by the 
State on the issue of quantum of sentence, it is not 
proper to go into the question of adequacy of sentence. 
As a result, the conviction and sentence awarded to the 
appellant by the courts below is upheld. [Paras 27, 28] F 
[1024-B-D] 
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 
No. 86 of2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.2009 of the G 
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal 
Appeal Nos. 910-SB/1998. 
Akshat Goel, Shree Pal Singh for the Appellant. 
Devender Kr. Saini, AAG, Dr. Monika Gusain, Vikram Saini H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. This appeal is filed by 
B the accused against the final judgment and order dated 
22.12.2009 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana 
at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 910-SB of 1998 which 
arose from the order of conviction and sentence dated 
06.10.1998 and 07.10.1998 respectively passed by the 
C Sessions Judge, Karnal in Sessions Case No. 37 of 1996/ 
Session Trial No. 9of1997 convicting the accused persons 
under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 of the Indian 
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as "IPC") and 
sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for five years and 
0 to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- each. By impugned judgment, the 
High Court dismissed the appeal in respect of the present 
appellant-accused by upholding his conviction and sentence 
and allowed the appeal in respect of the co-accused by 
E 
acquitting him of the charge. 
2. Facts of the case need mention in bnef to appreciate 
the issue involved in this appeal. 
3. Harwant Singh/Harbans Singh, (PW-3)-first informant 
and the accused persons are related to each other Kapoor 
F Singh (since deceased), father of PW-3 was having three 
brothers, namely, Amar Singh, Gurnam Singh and Surinder 
Singh. The accused persons-Ajaib Singh and Jagtar Singh 
-the appellant herein are sons of Gurnam Singh. Amar Singh 
G and Gurnam Singh have expired. The
family of these persons 
owned extensive agricultural land. The forefathers of the parties 
had, therefore, partitioned the agricultural land verbally amongst 
the family members and accordingly all sharers were cultivating 
their respective share. 
H 
4. In the year 1991, the appellant-accused and his brother
JAGTAR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1017 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
raised a grievance to PW-3 that the land which was allotted to A 
them was not of good quality. PW-3, acceded to their request 
and exchanged ·his land with the accused persons. The parties 
accordingly executed the exchange deed on a written document 
before the Panchayat in relation to exchange of lands. However, 
the girdawari in respect of the exchanged land remained B 
unaltered and both the parties continued to cultivate their 
exchanged land. PW-3 then made improvements in the land 
which was in his possession by investing his money and labour. 
On finding that the land had been improved by PW-3, the 
appell.ant and his brother raised a demand to reverse the C 
exchange. On noticing that this might lead to a dispute, PW-3 
applied for correction of the girdawari entries in revenue 
records. The Tehsildar, Nilokheri on 31.07.1996, visited the 
spot to enable him to pass appropriate orders on adjudication 0 
of the application. 
5. On 20.09.1996, when PW-3 wentto the Court to attend 
the proceedings, his uncle Surinder Singh and Gurmeet Singh, 
son of Amar Singh also accompanied him. The Tehsildar 
passed the order in favour of PW-3. At about 5.15 p.m., when E 
they were coming out of the office of the Tehsildar, the appellant 
and his brother came there and caught hold of PW-3 and said 
that the verdict of the revenue officer is wrong and, therefore, 
they would not allow him to enter the land in
question. When 
F 
Surinder Singh tried to intervene, Jagtar Singh, the appellant-
accused herein caught hold of the beard of Surinder Singh 
and pulled him down on the ground and hit him on his head 2-
3 times by hand. Due to injuries received, Surinder Singh 
became unconscious. PW-3 and his cousin-Gurmeet Singh G 
then tried to catch hold of the accused persons but they 
managed to run away from the spot. Both of them then took 
Surinder Singh to the nearest hospital at Nilokheri but in 
midway, he died. Thereafter, PW-3 lodged an FIR bearing 
No.404 dated 20.09.1996 at P.S. Butana Dist. Kamal under H
1018 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A Section 302/341/34 IPC of the incident. 
6. After investigation, on 07 .10.1996, charge sheet 
against the accused persons, namely, Jagtar Singh-appellant 
(accused) herein and Ajaib Singh, was filed under Section 302/ 
B 341/34 IPC. 
7. Byorderdated 16.11.1996, the Judicial Magistrate-1 51 
Class, Kamal committed the case for trial to the Sessions 
Judge, Kamal which was numbered as Session Case No. 37 
c of 1996 (Session Trial No.9 of 1997). The prosecution 
examined six witnesses to prove their case whereas defence 
examined one witness and filed certain documents. 
8. By order dated 06.10.1998 in Sessions Case No. 37 
0 of 1996 and Sessions Trial No. 9of1997 convicted both the 
accused under Section 304 Part-II read with Section 34 of IPC 
and vide order dated 07.10.1998 sentenced them to undergo 
imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- each, 
in default of payment of fine to further undergo imprisonment 
E for six months under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 
oflPC. 
9. Aggrieved by the said order, the accused persons filed 
appeal bearing Appeal No. 910-SB of 1998 before the High 
F Court. The High Court, by judgment dated 22.12.2009 
dismissed the appeal of Jagtar Singh-the appellant (accused) 
herein and in consequence upheld his conviction whereas 
while allowing the appeal filed by Ajaib Singh, co-accused, 
set side his conviction and acquitted him of the charges. 
G 
10. Feeling aggrieved,
Jagtar Singh (accused) has filed 
this appeal by way of special leave. 
11. Heard Mr. Akshat Goel, learned counsel for the 
appellant-accused and Dr. Monika Gusain, learned counsel 
H for the State.
JAGTAR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1019 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
12. Challenging the conviction and sentence, learned A 
counsel for the appellant-accused has submitted that: 
(i) there was neither any motive on the part of accused to 
commit the offence in question and nor there was any incident 
of any type in the past during the course of proceedings. 
s 
(ii) in any case, since there was only one simple injury 
found on the body of the deceased and no weapon was used 
to inflict such injury, the courts below erred in convicting the 
appellant for an offences punishable under Section 304 Part 11 c 
oflPC. 
(iii) even if the case against the appellant-accused is held 
proved yet at best it is punishable under Section 323/325 of 
IPC. 
(iv) the statement of the eyewitnesses are not trustworthy 
and hence the Court below erred in placing reliance on their 
testimony. 
D 
(v) In any event, the High Court having rightly acquitted E 
the co-accused, the same benefit should have been extended 
to the appellant and he too should have been acquitted on the 
same reasoning 
(vi) and lastly since the appellant has already undergone F 
sentence for a period around 3 years or so out of total sentence 
awarded to him and hence the appellant be now left with the 
sentence already undergone by appropriately reducing the 
quantum of sentence. 
13. In contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State 
contended that no case is made out for any interference in the 
concurrent conviction
recorded by the two Courts below. He 
urged that none of the submissions of the appellant-accused 
G 
has any substance. 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on 
perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit in any of the 
submissions of the appellant-accused. 
15. The High Court dealt with the case of appellant herein 
s for holding him guilty as under: 
"The same is, however, not true in case of appellant 
Jagtar Singh. There is clear, clinching and 
unambiguous evidence on the record, in the 
c 
statements of PW-3-Harbans Singh and PW-4 
Gurmeet Singh to the effect that it was he who 
caught hold of Surinder Singh, deceased by latter's 
beard and hair, felled him upon ground and hit his 
head twice or thrice against ground. It was on 
o 
account of that hit that Surinder Singh became 
unconscious on the spot. Though appellant Jagtar 
Singh did make an attempt, abortive though, to raise 
above indicated plea (in the statement under Section 
313 Cr.P.C.) but that plea does not stand proved on 
E 
record. If there was an iota of truth in the above 
noticed pica of appellant Jagtar Singh (to the effect 
that matter was under discu:>sion in the presence of 
certain common relations), there is no reason why 
he could not have named them or examined at least 
F 
one or two out of them at the trial. Their testimony 
could be supportive of the plea raised by Jagtar 
Singh appellant at the trial." 
16. \Ne have also on our part perused the ocular evidence 
G and having so perused are inclined to concur with the 
aforementioned
view of the High Court calling no interference. 
17. The evidence, in our opinion, does prove that it was 
the appellant who took th'3 lead, caught hold of deceased by 
H his hand, pulled him down to the ground and hit him on his
JAGTAR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1021 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
head. The injury in the head resulted the deceased first A 
becoming unconscious and later succumbed to it. The ocular 
evidence on this issue was properly appreciated by the trial 
Court and the High Court for holding the appellant guilty for 
committing the offence in question and hence it deserves to 
be upheld. 
B 
18. We have not been able to notice any kind of 
inconsistency or exaggeration in : 1e evidence adduced by the 
prosecution on this material issue so as to disbelieve the 
evidence of eyewitnesses account and hence w&concur with C 
the finding of the High Court quoted above and reject the 
submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. 
19. Now so far as the issue relating to existence of motive 
is concerned, we consider it apposite to reproduce the finding D 
of the High Court on this issue. 
"There also, Jagtar Singh appellant is not on fir.mer 
footing. There is plethora of evidence available on 
record to prove that the first informant had filed an E 
application for correction of Girdawari entries and 
the adjudication announced on the relevant date by 
the revenue officer was favourable to him. There is 
also material available on record that first informant 
had improved the land which he exchanged with the F 
appellant to redress the grievance of the latter that 
the quality of the land which fell to their share in a 
partition was inferior. It was after the further 
exchange, as
between the appellants on the one 
hand and PW-3 Harbans Singh on the other hand, G 
that the latter had improved the quality of that land. 
It was obvious that the appellants entertained a 
feeling of envy towards the first informant and they 
had an eye upon the improved land under the 
cultivation of first informant. The favourable H
1022 
A 
B 
c 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
announcement of the Girdwari correction provided 
the proverbial combustible material to the appellants 
who have been proved on record to have announced 
thereafter that announcement of the verdict of the 
revenue officer notwithstanding, they would not 
allow the first informant to enter upon the land qua 
which Khasra girdwaries entries had been ordered 
to be corrected. It cannot, thus be said with any 
justification that the appellant had no motive to 
commit the impugned crime." 
20. We have on our part perused the evidence on this 
issue and find no case to differ with the finding of the two courts 
below. Learned counsel for the appellant was also not able to 
show as to why the aforementioned finding of the High Court 
D is rendered bad in law and legally unsustainable. 
21. In our considered view, there is enough evidence both 
ocular and documentary to prove that the motive did exist prior 
to commission of the crime in question. Firstly, it was not in 
E dispute that the parties were related to each other; secondly, 
everyone had a share in the lands which befong to their 
forefathers; thirdly, proceedings for mutation were going in 
revenue courts in relation to the lands belonging to them; 
fourthly, an order of mutation was passed by Tehsildar in PW-
F 3's favour which the accused did not like being adverse to 
them resulting in developing some grudge against PW-3 and 
his family members. 
22. In the light
of these facts, which are duly proved by the 
G prosecution with the aid of their eyewitnesses, we find no good 
ground to differ with the finding of the High Court and 
accordingly hold that there was a motive to commit the offence. 
We accordingly hold so. 
H 
23. We are not impressed by the submission of the
JAGTAR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 
1023 
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
learned counsel for the appellant when he· urged that since the A 
co-accused was acquitted of the charges, hence the benefit 
of the same be also extended to the appellant. 
24. As held above, the evidence on record in no uncertain 
terms proves that it was the appellant who was the aggressor 8 
and hit the deceased. This evidence was rightly made basis 
by the two courts to hold the appellant guilty for committing the 
· offence in question. When the evidence directly attributes the 
appellant for commission of the act then we fail to appreciate 
as to how and on what basis we can ignore this material C 
evidence duly proved by the eyewitnesses. Such was not the 
case so far as co-accused is concerned. The prosecution 
witnesses too did not speak against the co-accused and hence 
he was given the benefit of doubt. It is pertinent to mention that 
the State did not file an~' appeal against his acquittal and hence D 
that part of the order has attained finality. 
25. Now coming to the issue of conviction and sentence 
awarded under Section 304 Part II of IPC to the appellant, 
though arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for E 
the appellant for its conversion under Section 323/325 of IPC 
or in the alternative to reduce the quantum of sentence to the 
extent of appellant already undergone i.e. three years, we are 
not inclined to accept the submission of learned counsel even 
on this issue. 
F 
26.
In our considered opinion, having regard to the nature 
of injury caused by the appellant to the deceased and the 
manner in which it was caused and taking into account the 
cause of death - shock and hemorrhage, the Courts below G 
'were justified in bringing the case under Section 304 part II 
instead of bringing the same either under Section 302 or/and 
Section 304 Part I. It is apart from the fact that the State has 
not filed any appeal against the impugned order seeking 
conviction of the appellant under Section 302 or under Section H
1024 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 304 Part I or even for enhancement of punishment awarded to 
the appellant under Section 304 Part II. 
27. In any event, we find that punishment of five years 
appears to be just and proper. It could have been even more 
B because eventually the incident resulted in death of a person 
though the appellant did not intend to cause death of deceased. 
In the absence of any cross appeal by the State on the issue of 
quantum of sentence, we do not therefore consider it to be 
proper to go into the question of adequacy of sentence in this 
C appeal filed by the accused. 
28. In the light of foregoing discussion, we find no merit in 
this appeal which thus fails, and is accordingly dismissed. As 
a result, the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant 
D by the courts below is upheld. 
29. The appellant is accordingly directed to undergo 
remaining period of sentence. if the appellant is on bail, his 
bail bonds are cancelled to enable him to surrender and 
E undergo remaining period of sentence. 
30. A copy of the order be sent to concerned court for 
compliance. 
NidhiJain 
Appeal dismissed.