MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION versus DILIP UTTAM JAYABHAY
[2022] 1 S.C.R. 148, Supreme Court of India, 2022
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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[2022] 1 S.C.R. 148
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MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
v.
DILIP UTTAM JAYABHAY
(Civil Appeal No. 7403 of 2021)
JANUARY 03, 2022
[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
Maharashtra Recognition of trade unions and prevention of
unfair labour practices Act 1971: Departmental proceedings –
Misconduct proved against respondent-driver of driving the vehicle
rashly and negligently due to which the accident occurred in which
four persons died – Disciplinary authority passed order of dismissal
from service – Labour Court did not interfere with the order of
dismissal by giving cogent reasons and after re-appreciating entire
evidence on record including the order of acquittal passed by the
criminal court – However, the Industrial Court though did not
interfere with the findings recorded by disciplinary authority on
misconduct proved, interfered with order of dismissal solely on the
ground that punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to
misconduct proved and the same was unfair labour practice as per
item No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act of 1971 – The same was not
interfered with by the High Court – On appeal, held: The findings
of enquiry officer and order passed by Labour Court and Industrial
Court showed that respondent-workman was driving the vehicle in
such a great speed and rashly due to which the accident had
occurred in which four persons died – Even while acquitting
respondent-driver who was facing the
trial under ss.279 and 304(a)
of IPC, Criminal Court observed that prosecution had failed to prove
that the incident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the
respondent only and none else – Therefore, even if it is assumed
that driver of the jeep was also negligent, it can be said to be a
case of contributory negligence – That does not mean that the
respondent-workman was not at all negligent – Hence, it did not
absolve him of the misconduct – As per the cardinal principle of
law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on
the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both the
cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields
and with different objectives – Therefore, the Industrial Court erred
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in giving much stress on the acquittal of the respondent by the
criminal court – Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act,
1971, to instant case, it cannot be said that the dismissal of the
respondent was for misconduct of a minor or technical character,
without having any regard to the nature of the misconduct – Even
the past record of service of the respondent was not considered by
the Industrial Court – As per case of the appellant, respondent-
workman was in service for three years and during three years’
service tenure he was punished four times – Therefore, it cannot be
said that the order of dismissal was without having any regard to
the past record of the service of the respondent – Therefore, in facts
and circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court wrongly invoked
clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act, 1971, and wrongly
interfered with the order of dismissal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer in
the departmental enquiry and the judgment and order passed by
the labour court as well as the Industrial Court and even the
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the criminal court show
that when the respondent was driving the vehicle it met with an
accident with the jeep coming from the opposite side and in the
said accident four persons died. From the material on record it
emerges that the impact of the accident with the jeep coming
from the opposite side was such that the jeep was
pushed back
25 feet. From the aforesaid facts it can be said that the respondent
– workman was driving the vehicle in such a great speed and
rashly due to which the accident had occurred in which four
persons died. Even while acquitting the respondent-driver who
was facing the trial under Sections 279 and 304(a) of IPC, Criminal
Court observed that the prosecution failed to prove that the
incident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the accused
– respondent herein only and none else. Therefore, at the best
even if it is assumed that even driver of the jeep was also
negligent, it can be said to be a case of contributory negligence.
That does not mean that the respondent-workman was not at all
negligent. Hence, it does not absolve him of the misconduct.
[Para 10.2][156-E-H; 157-A]
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2.1 The Labour Court had in extenso considered the order
of acquittal passed by the criminal court and did not agree with
the submissions made on behalf of the respondent-workman that
as he was acquitted by the criminal court he cannot be held guilty
in the disciplinary proceedings. Even from the judgment and
order passed by the criminal court, it appears that the criminal
court acquitted the respondent based on the hostility of the
witnesses; the evidence led by the interested witnesses; lacuna
in examination of the investigating officer; panch for the spot
panchnama of the incident, etc. Therefore, criminal court held
that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the
respondent beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary in the
departmental proceedings the misconduct of driving the vehicle
rashly and negligently which caused accident and due to which
four persons died has been established and proved. As per the
cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing
or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of
proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate
in different fields and with different objectives. Therefore, the
Industrial Court has erred in giving much stress on the acquittal
of the respondent by the criminal court. Even otherwise it is
required to be noted that the Industrial Court has not interfered
with the findings recorded by the
disciplinary authority holding
charge and misconduct proved in the departmental enquiry, and
has interfered with the punishment of dismissal solely on the
ground that same is shockingly disproportionate and therefore
can be said to be an unfair labour practice as per clause No.1(g)
of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. [Paras 10.3
10.4][157-B-G]
2.2 Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU
& PULP Act, 1971, to the present case it cannot be said that the
dismissal of the respondent was for misconduct of a minor or
technical character, without having any regard to the nature of
the misconduct. The respondent – workman has been held to be
guilty for a particular charge and particular misconduct. Even the
past record of service of the respondent has not been considered
by the Industrial Court. As per case of the appellant – MSRTC
the respondent – workman was in service for three years and
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during three years’ service tenure he was punished four times.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the order of dismissal was without
having any regard to the past record of the service of the
respondent. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the Industrial Court wrongly invoked clause No.1(g) of Schedule-
IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. [Para 10.5][158-E-H]
3. Even otherwise in the facts of the case when in the
departmental enquiry, it has been specifically found that due to
rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver – respondent,
the accident took place in which four persons died, when the
punishment of dismissal is imposed it cannot be said to be
shockingly disproportionate punishment. In the departmental
proceedings every aspect has been considered. Even the
Industrial Court has not interfered with the findings recorded by
the enquiry officer in the departmental proceedings. Therefore,
in the facts and circumstance of the case, the Industrial Court
committed a grave error and has exceeded in its jurisdiction while
interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary
authority, which was not interfered by the Labour Court.
[Para 11][159-A-C]
4. It is also required to be noted that before the Industrial
Court the respondent-workman-driver admitted that after the
order of dismissal he has been gainfully employed. Therefore
also the reinstatement in service with continuity of service was
not warranted. Even the
directions issued by the High Court
directing the appellant to pay wages to the respondent-workman
for the period from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018 also could not have
been passed by the High Court in a writ petition filed by the
appellant. It was not the petition filed by the workman-respondent.
Therefore, even otherwise the directions issued in para 8 of the
impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained as the same
is beyond the scope and ambit of the controversy before the High
Court. [Paras 12, 13][159-C-E]
Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2011) 9
SCC 94 : [2011] 11 SCR 136; Union of India & Ors. v.
Sitaram Mishra & Anr. (2019) 20 SCC 588 – referred
to.
MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v.
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Case Law Reference
[2011] 11 SCR 136
referred to
Para 5.2
(2019) 20 SCC 588
referred to
Para 5.2
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.7403 of
2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2020 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.8401 of 2003.
Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Vyom Raghuvanshi, Ms. Purvat Wali,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Nishanth Patil, Ms. Malvika Kala, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 23.01.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Writ Petition No.8401 of 2003, by which the High Court has
dismissed the said writ petition preferred by the appellant – Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “MSRTC”)
in which it challenged the order passed by the Industrial Court in Revision
Application (ULP) No.13 of 2002, directing reinstatement of respondent
without back wages but with the continuity of service, original writ
petitioner – MSRTC has preferred the present appeal.
2. The respondent herein was serving as a driver and plying
passenger buses. That on 23.10.1992 when he was driving the bus, it
met with an accident with a jeep coming from the opposite direction. It
appears that instead of taking the bus to the left side, he took the bus to
the extreme right which was the wrong side and as a result, the jeep
and
the bus collided. The accident resulted in death of four passengers on
the spot and six passengers were seriously injured. The jeep was
completely damaged with its radiator and engine board broken and
damaged and the inside of the jeep was completely crushed. The impact
of the collision was so high that the jeep was pushed back by about 25
feet. The bumper of the bus was also crushed. The driver of the jeep
also sustained injuries. The respondent was subjected to disciplinary
enquiry. On conclusion of enquiry he was dismissed from service. He
was also prosecuted for the offence under Section 279 of IPC. However,
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he came to be acquitted. (his acquittal shall be dealt with herein below).
The respondent challenged the order of dismissal before the Labour
Court. The Labour Court upheld the order of dismissal. In a revision
application the Industrial Tribunal considering the acquittal of the
respondent in criminal proceedings and observing that the drivers of
both the vehicles were negligent (contributory negligence), the Industrial
Tribunal exercised powers under item No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971. (“MRTU” and “PULP Act, 1971” for short),
and held that the order of dismissal is disproportionate to the misconduct
proved. Before the Industrial Tribunal the respondent/workman did not
press for the back wages. The Industrial Tribunal directed his
reinstatement without back wages but with continuity of service.
3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated
31.07.2003 passed by the Industrial Tribunal ordering reinstatement
without back wages but with continuity of service, the appellant preferred
writ petition before the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order
the High Court has not only dismissed the writ petition preferred by the
appellant, but has also directed appellant to pay to the respondent back
wages with effect from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018 i.e. which is the date
of his superannuation. The High Court has also directed that the
respondent shall also be
entitled to retiral benefits on the basis of continuity
of service with effect from date of his dismissal and till his superannuation.
4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court, dismissing the writ petition and
confirming the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal setting aside the
order of dismissal and ordering reinstatement with continuity of service
and back wages, the MSRTC has preferred the present appeal.
5. Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant – MSRTC has vehemently submitted that in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court committed a grave
error in interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary
authority on the ground that the same is shockingly disproportionate to
the misconduct proved.
5.1 It is submitted that both, the High Court as well as the Industrial
Court have not at all considered and/or appreciated the difference
between the disciplinary enquiry and the criminal proceedings.
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5.2 It is submitted that the High Court as well as the Industrial
Court had erred in relying upon the acquittal of respondent in criminal
case. It is submitted that the Industrial Court and the High Court have
failed to appreciate that the acquittal has no bearing or relevance on the
disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are
different and the proceedings operate in different fields and have different
objectives. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in cases of
Samar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 94
and Union of India & Ors. Vs. Sitaram Mishra & Anr., (2019) 20
SCC 588.
5.3 It is further submitted that in fact the Labour Court rightly
held that acquittal in the criminal case would not come to the rescue of
the respondent as the acquittal in the criminal case is on the failure of
the prosecution to examine investigating officer, panch for spot
panchnama, etc., and to prove their case beyond doubt. It is submitted
that on the other hand in the departmental proceedings misconduct has
been proved. It is therefore submitted that the Industrial Court and the
High Court ought not to have given undue importance to the acquittal of
the respondent in the criminal case.
5.4 It is further submitted that even otherwise in the facts and
circumstances of the case when in the vehicle accident four persons
died due to the negligence on the part of the respondent in
driving the
vehicle carelessly and negligently and during his three years’ tenure he
was punished four times earlier, it cannot be said that the punishment of
dismissal was shockingly disproportionate. It is submitted that in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the case would not fall under item No.1(g)
of Schedule-IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.
5.5 It is further submitted that even the Industrial Court specifically
observed in the order that the misconduct is not of a minor or technical
character. It is further submitted that the Industrial Court also observed
that there is no victimization and the action of the MSRTC cannot be
said to be not in good faith. The Industrial Court also observed that the
MSRTC has neither falsely implicated the complainant – respondent nor
has it dismissed the respondent for patently false reasons and therefore
respondent failed to prove the alleged unfair labour practice as per the
MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. It is submitted that however the Industrial
Court has interfered with the order of punishment/dismissal imposed by
the disciplinary authority invoking clause 1(g) of Schedule-IV of MRTU
and PULP Act, 1971.
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5.6 It is further submitted that even the respondent admitted that
he was gainfully employed after his dismissal. Therefore, the order of
reinstatement was not warranted at all.
5.7 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that even otherwise the directions issued by the
High Court in the impugned judgment and order in para 8 directing the
appellant – MSRTC to pay to the respondent back wages with effect
from 1st November, 2003 to 31st May, 2018, could not have been passed
in a petition filed by the appellant – MSRTC. It is submitted therefore
that such an order is as such beyond the scope of the writ petition before
the High Court.
6. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the present
appeal.
7. Shri Nishanth Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent has supported the judgment and order passed by the Industrial
Court and confirmed by the High Court.
7.1 It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case
when the Industrial Court found the order of dismissal disproportionate
to the misconduct proved, the same can be said to be an unfair labour
practice as per item No. 1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP
Act, 1971. Thus the Industrial Court rightly interfered with the order of
dismissal and the same is rightly confirmed by the High Court.
7.2 It is contended that in the present case as such it was not the
fault on the part of the respondent – driver. That the jeep
driver coming
from the opposite side was on the wrong side of the road and the
respondent tried to avoid the accident. It is submitted that the criminal
court found that even the jeep driver was also negligent and considering
the fact the criminal court acquitted the respondent – driver, the judgment
and order passed by the Industrial Court, ordering reinstatement without
back wages but with continuity of service does not warrant any
interference. It is submitted therefore that the High Court rightly did not
interfere with the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court
ordering reinstatement without back wages.
8. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present
appeal.
9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length.
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10. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the departmental
proceedings the misconduct alleged against the respondent – driver of
driving the vehicle rashly and negligently due to which the accident
occurred in which four persons died has been proved. Thereafter, the
disciplinary authority passed an order of dismissal, dismissing the
respondent – workman from service. The Labour Court did not interfere
with the order of dismissal by giving cogent reasons and after re-
appreciating the entire evidence on record including the order of acquittal
passed by the criminal court. However, the Industrial Court though did
not interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority on
the misconduct proved, interfered with the order of dismissal solely on
the ground that punishment of dismissal is disproportionate to the
misconduct proved and the same can be said to be to be unfair labour
practice as per item No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP
Act, 1971. The same is not interfered with by the High Court.
10.1 Therefore, the short question which is posed for the
consideration of this Court is whether in the facts and circumstances of
the case the punishment of dismissal can be said to be an unfair labour
practice on the ground that the same was disproportionate to the
misconduct proved and therefore the Industrial Court was justified in
interfering with the order of dismissal and ordering
reinstatement with
continuity of service.
10.2 Having gone through the findings recorded by the enquiry
officer in the departmental enquiry and the judgment and order passed
by the labour court as well as the Industrial Court and even the judgment
and order of acquittal passed by the criminal court, it emerges that when
the respondent was driving the vehicle it met with an accident with the
jeep coming from the opposite side and in the said accident four persons
died. From the material on record it emerges that the impact of the
accident with the jeep coming from the opposite side was such that the
jeep was pushed back 25 feet. From the aforesaid facts it can be said
that the respondent – workman was driving the vehicle in such a great
speed and rashly due to which the accident had occurred in which four
persons died. Even while acquitting the accused – respondent – driver
who was facing the trial under Sections 279 and 304(a) of IPC Criminal
Court observed that the prosecution failed to prove that the incident
occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the accused – respondent
herein only and none else. Therefore, at the best even if it is assumed
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that even driver of the jeep was also negligent, it can be said to be a case
of contributory negligence. That does not mean that the respondent –
workman was not at all negligent. Hence, it does not absolve him of the
misconduct.
10.3 Much stress has been given by the Industrial Court on the
acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court. However, as such the
Labour Court had in extenso considered the order of acquittal passed by
the criminal court and did not agree with the submissions made on behalf
of the respondent – workman that as he was acquitted by the criminal
court he cannot be held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings.
10.4 Even from the judgment and order passed by the criminal
court it appears that the criminal court acquitted the respondent based
on the hostility of the witnesses; the evidence led by the interested
witnesses; lacuna in examination of the investigating officer; panch for
the spot panchnama of the incident, etc. Therefore, criminal court held
that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondent
beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary in the departmental
proceedings the misconduct of driving the vehicle rashly and negligently
which caused accident and due to which four persons died has been
established and proved. As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal
in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary
proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are different and
the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives.
Therefore, the Industrial Court has erred in giving much stress on the
acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court. Even otherwise it is
required to be noted that the Industrial Court has not interfered with the
findings recorded by the disciplinary authority holding charge and
misconduct proved in the departmental enquiry, and has interfered with
the punishment of dismissal solely on the ground that same is shockingly
disproportionate and therefore can be said to be an unfair labour practice
as per clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.
10.5 Now so far as the order passed by the Industrial Court ordering
reinstatement with continuity of service by invoking clause No.1(g) of
Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 is concerned, as per
clause No. 1(g) only in a case where it is found that dismissal of an
employee is for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without
having any regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or the past
record of service of the employee, so as to amount to a shockingly
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disproportionate punishment. Clause No.1 of Schedule-IV of the MRTU
& PULP Act, 1971 reads as under:-
“Schedule IV
1.
To discharge or dismiss employees-
(a)
by way of victimisation;
(b)
not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise of the
employer’s rights;
(c)
by falsely implicating an employee in a criminal case
on false evidence or on concocted evidence;
(d)
for patently false reasons;
(e)
on untrue or trumped up allegations of absence
without leave;
(f)
in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice
in the conduct of domestic enquiry or with undue
haste;
(g)
for misconduct of a minor or technical character,
without having any regard to the nature of the
particular misconduct or the past record of service
of the employee, so as to amount to a shockingly
disproportionate punishment.”
Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP
Act, 1971, to the present case it cannot be said that the dismissal of the
respondent was for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without
having any regard to the nature of the misconduct. The respondent –
workman has been held to be guilty for a particular charge and particular
misconduct. Even the past record of service of the respondent has not
been considered by the Industrial Court. As per case of the appellant –
MSRTC the respondent – workman was in service for three years and
during three years’ service tenure he was punished four times. Therefore,
it cannot be said that the order of dismissal was without having any
regard to the past record of the service of the respondent. Therefore, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court wrongly
invoked clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act,
1971.
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11. Even otherwise in the facts of the case when in the departmental
enquiry, it has been specifically found that due to rash and negligent
driving on the part of the driver – respondent, the accident took place in
which four persons died, when the punishment of dismissal is imposed it
cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate punishment. In the
departmental proceedings every aspect has been considered. At the cost
of repetition, it is observed that even the Industrial Court has not interfered
with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in the departmental
proceedings. Therefore, in the facts and circumstance of the case, the
Industrial Court committed a grave error and has exceeded in its
jurisdiction while interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the
disciplinary authority, which was not interfered by the Labour Court.
12. It is also required to be noted that before the Industrial Court
the respondent – workman – driver admitted that after the order of
dismissal he has been gainfully employed. Therefore also the
reinstatement in service with continuity of service was not warranted.
13. Even the directions issued by the High Court in para 8 in the
impugned judgment and order directing the appellant to pay wages to
the respondent – workman for the period from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018
also could not have been passed by the High Court in a writ petition filed
by the appellant. It was not the petition filed by the workman –
respondent.
Therefore, even otherwise the directions issued in para 8 of
the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained as the same is
beyond the scope and ambit of the controversy before the High Court.
14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present Appeal Succeeds. The judgment and order passed by the
Industrial Court in Revision Application (ULP) No.13 of 2002 and the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition
No.8401 of 2003 are hereby quashed and set aside and the judgment
and Award passed by the Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No.96 of
1993 is hereby ordered to be restored. Consequently, the order of
dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent
– workman from service is hereby upheld. The present appeal is allowed
to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no order as to costs.
Devika Gujral
Appeal allowed.
MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v.
DILIP UTTAM JAYABHAY [M. R. SHAH, J.]