MOHIDEEN ABDUL KHADAR (DEAD)THROUGH LRS. versus RAHMATH BEEVI (D) THR. HER LRS. AND ORS.
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 164, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 164 : 2023 INSC 969
164
CASE DETAILS
MOHIDEEN ABDUL KHADAR (DEAD)THROUGH LRS.
v.
RAHMATH BEEVI (D) THR. HER LRS. AND ORS.
(Petition For Special Leave To Appeal (Civil) Nos 24748-24749 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 01, 2023
[ANIRUDDHA BOSE AND SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Dispute inter alia over retention of possession 
and tenancy right of predecessor of the petitioners in respect of second 
scheduled property (measurement of which was disputed in the suit ﬁ led 
by the predecessor of the respondents), as described in his plaint.
Suit – As regards the second scheduled property, the case of the 
petitioners is that it was rented out to their predecessor by its owner ‘AB’ 
– ‘AB’ had conveyed this property to the predecessor of the respondents 
through another deed – Predecessor of the petitioners sought declaration 
of title to the ﬁ rst scheduled land and permanent injunction restraining 
the defendants from disturbing his peaceful possession over the second 
scheduled property – In the suit instituted by the predecessor of the 
respondents, mandatory injunction was sought seeking removal of 
petitioner’s predecessor along with another person from the properties 
speciﬁ ed – Dispute over dimension of the second scheduled property 
– Validity of notice u/s.106, Transfer of Property Act – Petitioners if 
entitled to protection of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act:
Held: The second scheduled property in the plaint filed by the
predecessor of the respondents showing measurement of 15 feet (east-west) 
and 18 feet (north-south) is the correct measurement thereof– No reason not 
to accept this measurement – Further, on the question of validity of notice 
u/s.106, 1882 Act and whether the petitioners were entitled to protection of 
the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act or not, the High Court found 
both the points in favour of the predecessor of the respondents – No reason
165
to interfere with the ﬁ nding returned by the High Court – In substance, it 
retained the decision of the Trial Court in the suit ﬁ led by the predecessor 
of the petitioners in relation to second scheduled property – Transfer of 
Property Act, 1882 – s.106 – Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. 
[Paras 7 and 8]
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) 
Nos.24748-24749 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.09.2018 of the High Court of 
Judicature at Madras at Madurai in SAMD Nos.576 of 2002 and 02 of 2005.
Appearances:
Varinder Kumar Sharma, Yugal Kishor Prasad, Ms. Parul Sharma, 
Shantanu Sharma, Bishan Dass, Ms. Deeksha Gaur, R. S. Mishra, Mahendra 
Singh, Advs. for the Petitioners.
Ms. Shalini Kaul, Adv. for the respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
Delay condoned.
2. The present petitions have been ﬁ led by two nephews of one 
Mohideen Abdul Khadar, who died on 14.06.2019. He had interest in 
two blocks of lands, adjacent to each other located in Thenkasi Taluk, 
Kadayanallurpet within the Kadayanallur municipal limits in the State of 
Tamil Nadu. The petitioners bring this action in the capacity of legatees of 
said Mohideen. The dispute relates to title of Mohideen in respect of one 
block out of the two, described as ﬁ rst scheduled property in his plaint 
which triggered oﬀ  the suit giving rise to this proceeding. The other
part of 
the dispute is over retention of his possession and tenancy right in respect 
of second scheduled property, as described in his plaint. The ﬁ rst scheduled 
property measures approximately 15x15 sq. feet over which Mohideen 
MOHIDEEN ABDUL KHADAR (DEAD)THROUGH LRS. v. 
RAHMATH BEEVI (D) THR. HER LRS.
166 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
claimed title whereas the second scheduled property measures approximately 
15x18 sq. feet. There is some dispute on its measurement, which we shall 
deal with later in this judgment. In respect of the latter block of land, one 
Rahmath Beevi sued for delivery of vacant possession whereas Mohideen 
asked for protection of his possession in his suit. The original owner of 
both these properties was one Ameenal Beevi (since deceased) and she had 
conveyed the ﬁ rst scheduled property to Mohideen on 16.08.1989 through a 
deed of sale. So far as the second scheduled property is concerned, the case 
of the petitioners is that it was rented out to their predecessor by Ameenal 
Beevi only. Said Ameenal Beevi had conveyed this property to Rahmath 
Beevi (since deceased) on 30.05.1995 through another deed. 
3. Original Suit No. 172 of 1995 was instituted by Mohideen in the 
Court of Principal District Munsif Judge, Thenkasi. In this suit Mohideen 
claimed beneﬁ t of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. This 
Statute gives certain additional protection to a class of tenants beyond what 
is contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter ‘1882 Act’). 
Mohideen along with one Sahul Hameed, who also appears to have had been 
in occupation of part of the land conveyed to Rahmath Beevi by Ameenal 
Beevi had been served with notices to quit by Rahmath Beevi in terms 
of Section 106 of the 1882 Act both dated 11.08.1995.
Mohideen wanted 
declaration of title to the ﬁ rst scheduled land and permanent injunction 
restraining the defendants from disturbing his peaceful possession over 
the second scheduled property. So far as status of ﬁ rst scheduled property 
is concerned, Mohideen’s title is not in much dispute. In their counter-
aﬃ  davit, petitioners claiming to be the legal representatives of Rahmath 
Beevi (henceforth referred to as the respondents) have taken a plea that 
Mohideen himself had sold the ﬁ rst scheduled property on 06.12.2017 to 
his two nephews. They appear to be the petitioners before us. 
4. Rahmath Beevi’s (second defendant in O.S. No.172 of 1995, 
represented by her legal representatives before us) stand has been that she 
had become owner of the second scheduled property on the basis of the 
aforesaid registered sale deed. Rahmath Beevi, in the suit instituted by 
her (O.S. No.464 of 1995) in the same Court claimed relief of mandatory 
injunction seeking removal of Mohideen and Sahul Hameed from the 
properties speciﬁ ed by her. They were the ﬁ rst and the second defendants
167
respectively in Rahmat Beevi’s suit. In this suit, she also claimed ground rent 
from the defendants in that suit. In her suit, she referred to four schedules to 
describe the suit property representing diﬀ erent interests. The ﬁ rst schedule 
in O.S. No.464 of 1995 matches with the ﬁ rst schedule of O.S. No.172 of 
1995. As regards the second scheduled property, it was Rahmath Beevi’s case 
that it involved an area of 15x18 sq. feet. The third scheduled property in 
her plaint comprised of an area of 6.2x6.9 sq. feet within second scheduled 
land. As recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court in respect of the third 
scheduled property, Sahul Hameed was the tenant thereof, but he did not 
contest the suit. It was held by the Trial Court that three-fourth portion of 
the third scheduled property was within the second scheduled land and the 
rest of the third scheduled property fell in the ﬁ rst scheduled land. Said 
Sahul Hameed, as it appears from the cause title of this petition, is the son of 
Rahmath Beevi. The fourth scheduled property in the plaint in O.S. No.464 
of 1995 has been described as:-
“4th Schedule
In the said number said street, bounded on the east of the road and the 
3rd schedule, south of Ameenal Beevi shop, north of the 3rd schedule 
and the 1st schedule of properties. West of Ameenal Beevi land. Within 
these east to west on the northern side 15 feet, southern side 8 feet, 
10 inches, South to north on the western side 11 feet 3 inches, easter
side 18 feet.”
5. It was the case of Rahmath Beevi that Mohideen had taken on rent 
the fourth scheduled land from Ameenal Beevi and put up a “temporary 
shop” there. The pleading in the plaint gives an impression that it was a 
temporary structure. In her suit, Rahmath Beevi wanted vacant possession of 
the fourth scheduled property and removal of the construction set up thereon. 
The Trial Court granted declaration in favour of Mohideen in respect of ﬁ rst 
scheduled property. His claim on second scheduled property was dismissed. 
The suit instituted by Rahmath Beevi was decreed in the following terms:-
“O.S.No.464/95 is allowed with costs, it is held that the plaintiﬀ  is 
entitled to get the delivery of vacant possession of the 4th suit schedule 
property from the 1st defendant and that the plaintiﬀ  is entitled to get 
the delivery of vacant possession of the 3rd suit schedule property from 
the 2nd defendant and that in default of delivery of possession by the 
MOHIDEEN ABDUL KHADAR (DEAD)THROUGH LRS. v. 
RAHMATH BEEVI (D) THR. HER LRS. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
168 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
two persons, the plaintiﬀ  shall get the delivery of possession through 
court, and the 1st defendant has to pay the sum of Rs.216/- towards 
the damages for use and occupation of the 4th suit schedule property 
till the date of suit, from the date of suit till the date of payment along 
with 6% further interest and that the 2nd defendant has to pay the sum 
of Rs.216/- towards damages for the use and occupation of the 2nd 
schedule of property till the date of suit, from the date of suit till the 
delivery of possession with further interest of 6% and from the date 
of ﬁ ling of suit till the date of delivery of the 2nd schedule of property, 
by the defendants, the interim income of Rs.100/- to be paid by the 1st 
defendant to the plaintiﬀ  and Rs.50/- to be paid by the 2nd defendant 
to the plaintiﬀ  and the suit is decreed.”
6. Mohideen appealed against the judgment and decree in both the 
suits. The First Appellate Court  sustained the Trial Court’s ﬁ nding in O.S. 
No.172 of 1995 as regards ﬁ rst scheduled property, but the Trial Court’s 
judgment on second scheduled property was set aside. The judgment and 
decree of the Trial Court in O.S. No.464 of 1995 was set aside. Both the 
Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had dealt with the matters by a 
common judgment (of each Court). Rahmath Beevi had ﬁ led two appeals 
before the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908 and the High Court also
disposed of both the appeals by a common 
judgment delivered on 25.09.2018. It is this judgment which is assailed 
before us by the petitioners. 
7. Disputes had arisen over dimension of the second scheduled 
property. The High Court, on this count, has recorded in the judgment 
assailed before us:-
“17. It is pertinent to observe that the major portion of the third 
schedule property lies in the second schedule and the lesser area 
alone lies in the ﬁ rst schedule property, hence, the 3/4th portion of 
the third schedule property lies in the second schedule property. It 
is the evidence of the ﬁ rst defendant that he only constructed the 
permanent structure and the second defendant is paying rent to him. 
Further, it is also the evidence of the ﬁ rst defendant that the second 
schedule property was purchased by the plaintiﬀ  and the North South 
measurement is 18 feet and there were road lines on the Southern side
169
of the ﬁ rst schedule property and the ﬁ rst schedule property is also 
a vacant site and it has been shown as a area with bushes. The ﬁ rst 
defendant has also deposed that he has omitted to state that the 6 feet 
on North South property given to Sahul Ahmeed (second defendant) 
for rent. It is also the clear evidence of the ﬁ rst defendant that there 
is no written document for giving rent to Sahul Hameed. Further, the 
said Sahul Hameed who was the tenant under ﬁ rst defendant, was not 
examined by the ﬁ rst defendant. Further, it is also observed that for the 
legal notice issued by the plaintiﬀ , the second defendant who claimed 
to be his tenant has not made any reply. Hence, it has to be presumed 
that the second defendant Sahul Hameed was originally a tenant under 
the Ameenal Beevi and was never a tenant of the second defendant.”
In his cross-examination (at page 42 of the photocopy of the counter-
aﬃ  davit of respondent nos.3 to 9), Mohideen had speciﬁ cally stated:-
“I bought the 1st schedule property as 15 feet South - North. I don’t 
have more than that South - North 15 feet. It is correct to be said that 
I don’t have more than 15 feet in South - North as per Sale Agreement. 
It is correct to be said that the 2nd schedule property is bought by 
Rahmath Beevi. It is correct to be said that she bought 18 feet South - 
North. It is correct to be said that the East - West road is on the South 
of the South Mall to the 1st schedule property.”
The deed of
conveyance executed by Ameenal Beevi in favour of 
Rahmath Beevi, the copy of which has been annexed at page 38 of the 
same counter-aﬃ  davit also describes the schedule of the property sold to 
the latter as:-
“1st Schedule Sale Property
Tenkasi Reg. Dist, Kadayanallur Sub Regr., Kadayanallur village, 
23rd Ward, Town Municipality, in the 1st, 11th No. Road Street, New 
Ward No. 11, Street No.1, the plot on the east side, the boundaries are:
East of 11th No. Main Road; West of my own plot; north of Abdul 
Khader Muhaideen’s plot; South of my own site; within these 15 feet 
on the East-West side, 18 feet on the South- North, the plot of 270 sq.ft, 
in S.No. 59 to 61. The value is Rs.14,850/-”
MOHIDEEN ABDUL KHADAR (DEAD)THROUGH LRS. v. 
RAHMATH BEEVI (D) THR. HER LRS. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
170 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
Thus, we are of the opinion that the second scheduled property in 
Rahmath Beevi’s plaint showing measurement of 15 feet (east-west) and 
18 feet (north-south) is the correct measurement thereof. Therefore, we do 
not ﬁ nd any reason not to accept this measurement. 
8. The other points of law that we shall address now is on the question 
of validity of notice under Section 106 of the 1882 Act and whether the 
petitioners were entitled to protection of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants 
Protection Act or not. The High Court found both the points in favour of 
the predecessor of the respondents. It has been held by the High Court:-
“14….It is not in dispute that the ﬁ rst schedule property in both the 
suits are one and the same. The second schedule property is shown 
with the measurements 15x15 ft. in O.S.No.172 of 1995, whereas, 
according to the plaintiﬀ  in O.S.464 of 1995, it is 15x18. The ﬁ rst 
defendant claimed that he entered into a lease deed with Ameenal Beevi 
as regards second schedule property vide Ex.A2 on 20.03.1985 and 
he made permanent construction over it and that he has been paying 
rent to the in respect of the said property to the sons of Ameenal Beevi 
and therefore, according to him, he is entitled to the protection under 
City Tenants Protection Act. While so, it is pertinent to note that the 
plaintiﬀ  purchased the second schedule property from the original 
owner Ameenal Beevi by way of sale deed dated
30.05.1995 under 
Ex.A1 and after purchase, she issued quit notice dated 1.10.1995 under 
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the defendants 1 and 2. It 
is also pertinent to note that the ﬁ rst defendant has purchased the ﬁ rst 
schedule property from Ameenal Beevi, in respect of which, he claimed 
declaration of title, which was rightly granted by the trial Court. The 
ﬁ rst defendant only claims tenancy rights over the second schedule 
property and sought for protection under City Tenants Protection Act. 
According to the ﬁ rst defendant, the sale deed executed by the Ameenal 
Beevi in favour of the plaintiﬀ  under Ex.A1 dated 30.05.1995 in respect 
of second schedule property, is not legally valid and it is not binding 
upon him. However, in order to prove the same, the ﬁ rst defendant has 
not produced any documents nor he proved that the original owner 
Ameenal Beevi had not sold the property to the plaintiﬀ . Therefore, 
after purchase the second schedule property from Ameenal Beevi,
171
the plaintiﬀ  has rightly issued the quit notice under Section 106 of 
the Transfer of Property Act to the defendants 1 and 2 which, in the 
opinion of this Court, is valid since the plaintiﬀ  stepped into the shoes 
of Ameenal Beevi after having purchased the second schedule property 
and after issuing quit notice, she also terminated the tenancy. Hence, 
the ﬁ rst defendants is not entitled to the beneﬁ ts under City Tenants 
Protection Act. Accordingly, these issues are answered in favour of 
the plaintiﬀ  and against the defendants.”
We do not ﬁ nd any reason to interfere with the said ﬁ nding returned 
by the High Court. The High Court, in substance, retained the decision of 
the Trial Court in Mohideen’s Suit (O.S. No.172 of 1995) in relation to 
second scheduled property. As regards Rahmath Beevi’s suit (O.S. No.464 
of 1995), the High Court held:-
“19. In view of the above discussion, the plaintiﬀ  in O.S.No. 464 of 1995 
is entitled for recovery of possession of fourth schedule of property 
which is also the second schedule property in O.S.No. 172 of 1995. 
Accordingly, the ﬁ rst defendant in O.S.No.464 of 1995 has to pay 
the rent at Rs.100/- towards fourth schedule property and the second 
defendant has to pay Rs.50/- and the plaintiﬀ  in O.S.No.464 of 1995 
is entitled to mesne proﬁ ts at Rs.150/- from the date of the suit till the 
date of judgment payable by the defendants 1 and 2.”
9. Before us, arguments were also advanced as regards locus of the
petitioners to maintain these petitions. The second appeal by the High Court 
was decided on 25.09.2018 and the present petitions have been ﬁ led on 
03.03.2020. The petitioners are staking their claim as legatees of deceased 
Mohideen, who passed away on 14.06.2019. The petitioners claim that the 
will had been executed on 18.04.2018 bequeathing the testator’s possession 
and enjoyment over the second scheduled property. On behalf of the 
respondents, it has been argued that without proving the said testamentary 
instrument, the petitioners could not challenge the judgment of the High 
Court in the capacity of legatees. It was further argued that tenancy could 
not be a subject of disposition under any testamentary instrument. So far 
as locus of the petitioners is concerned, this Court had allowed their plea 
for substitution by an order passed on 31.08.2021. Now by proceeding on 
the basis that the petitioners were substituted would not determine ﬁ nally 
MOHIDEEN ABDUL KHADAR (DEAD)THROUGH LRS. v. 
RAHMATH BEEVI (D) THR. HER LRS. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
172 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
their locus to maintain the present petitions deriving their right from the 
said testamentary instrument. But as we have held against the petitioners 
on merit, we do not need to examine these two issues. The present petitions 
accordingly stand dismissed. 
10. Interim order, if any, shall stand vacated in the above terms.
11. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
12. There shall be no order as to costs. 
Headnotes prepared by:  
Petitions dismissed.
Divya Pandey