M. VENKATESH AND ORS.  versus COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 454, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Issues
(2015] 11S.C.R.454 
A 
M. VENKATESH AND ORS. 
v. 
COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY 
B 
(Civil Appeal No. 7944 of 2015) 
SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 
[T.S. THAKUR, R.K. AGRAWAL AND 
R. BANUMATHI, JJ.) 
c 
Property laws: Vacant land -
Claim for settled 
possession - Entitlement for- Held: Not entitled - Question 
of establishing settled possession does not arise in relation 
to the properties that already stood cleared of any structures 
D by demolition of whatever stood on the same. 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Safe of property post issue 
of preliminary notification is void and non-est giving to the 
vendee the limited right to claim compensation and no more. 
E 
Adverse possession: Proof of - Held: Is proved only 
when possession is peaceful, open, continuous and hostile. 
Disposing of the appeals, the Court 
F 
HELD: 1. Once the High Court recorded a finding 
that the property was vacant as on the date of the filing 
of the suitthere was no question of the plaintiffs claiming 
settled possession of the said property assuming the 
view taken in John B. James case was otherwise legally 
G sound since the so called settled possession of the 
appellants in RFA No.911 of 2002 stood vacated from the 
suit schedule property, no prayer for injunction as set 
out in the petition filed by the appellants in those appeals 
could help them for an injunction issues only to protect 
~ 
H 
,_
454
M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV. 
455 
AUTHORITY 
what is in lawful possession of the plaintiffs. Injunction A 
could not be claimed when plaintiffs stand dispossessed 
from the suit property prior to the filing of the suit. The 
question of establishing settled possession did not, 
therefore, arise in relation to the properties that already 
stood cleared of any structures by demolition of B 
whatever stood on the same. The High Court was, in that 
view, justified in setting aside the decree passed by the 
Trial Court and dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs. 
[Para 12) [464-B-F] 
John B. James and Ors. v. Bangalore 
Development Authority (2001) 1 KarLJ 364 -
approved. 
c 
2. The respondents claim to have purchased the o 
suit property in terms of a sale deed dated 22nd August, 
1990, i.e. long after the issue of the preliminary 
notification published in July 1984. 
The sale in such 
cases is void and non-est in the eyes of law giving to the 
Vendee the limited right to claim compensation and no E 
more. [Para 13) [464-G-H; 465-A] 
U.P. Jal Nigam v. Katra Properties Pvt. Ltd. AIR 
1996 SC 1170: 1996 (1) SCR 683; Ajay Kishan 
Singhal v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2677: 1996 
F 
(4) Suppl. SCR 319; Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural 
Institute, Amravati and Anr. (1995) 5 SCC 
335:1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 421; Gian Chand v. 
Gopala and Ors. (1995) 5·scc 528; Meera Sahni 
v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. (2008) 9 
G 
SCC 177: 2008 (10) SCR 1012; Tika Ram v. State 
of
U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689; Tamil Nadu Housing 
Board v. A. Viswam (dead) by Lrs. AIR 1996 SC 
3377: 1996 (2) SCR 402; Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 
H
456 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
v. State of Gujarat and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1608: 
1998 (2) SCR 339 - relied on. 
3. The High Court has remained oblivious of the 
principle of adverse possession. All that the High Court 
8 has found in favour of the plaintiffs is that their 
possession is established. That, however, does not 
conclude the controversy. The question is not just 
whether the plaintiffs were in possession, but whether 
they had by being in adverse possession for the 
C statutory period of 12 years perfected their title. That 
question has neither been adverted to nor answered in 
the judgment impugned in this appeal. Such being the 
case the High Court erred in dismissing the appeal filed 
by the appellant-BOA. The fact that the plaintiffs had not 
D and could not possibly establish their adverse 
possession over the suit property should have resulted 
in dismissal of the suit for an unauthorised occupant had 
no right to claim relief that would perpetuate his illegal 
and unauthorised occupation of property that stood 
E vested in the BOA. (Para 19] (469-G-H; 470-A-C] 
Kamataka Board of Wakfv. Govt. of India (2004) 
10 SCC 779: 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 255; Saroop 
Singh v. Banta (2005) 8 SCC 330: 2005 (4) Suppl. 
F 
SCR 253; Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996) 
1 sec 639: 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 638; 
Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Ba/want (1995) 2 
SCC 543: 1995 (1) SCR 88- relied on. 
G 
Case Law Reference 
(2001) 1 KarLJ 364 
1996 (1) SCR 683 
H 1996
(4) Suppl. SCR 319 
approved 
relied on. 
relied on. 
Para 7 
Para 13 
Para 14

M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV. 
457 
AUTHORITY 
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 421 
relied on. 
Para 14 
A 
(1995) 5 sec 528 
relied on. 
Para 14 
2008 (10) SCR 1012 
relied on. 
Para 14 
(2009) 1 o sec 689 
relied on. 
Para 14 
B 
1996 (2) SCR 402 
relied on. 
Para 14 
1998 (2) SCR 339 
relied on. 
Para 14 
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 255 
relied on. 
Para 15 
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 253 
relied on. 
Para 16 
c 
1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 638 
relied on. 
Para 17 
1995 (1) SCR 88 
relied on. 
Para 18 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
D 
7944 of2015 
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.05.2012 of the 
High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RFA No. 912 of 2002 
• 
With 
E 
C.A. Nos. 7945-47, 7948 of 2015 
Rama Jois, Subramayam Jois, G.V. Chandrasekhar, N. 
K. Verma, Anjana Chandrashekar, S. K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh 
F 
Kumar, Ankur S. Kulkarni for the appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted. 
2. These appeals arise out of a common judgment and G 
order dated 301h May, 2012 passed by a Single Bench of the 
High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the High Court 
has allowed RFA Nos.912, 914, 915 and 916 of 2002, set 
aside the judgments and orders of the courts below and H
458 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A dismissed the suits relevant to those appeals. The High Court 
has, at the same time, affirmed the decree passed in OS 
No.6925 of2001 and dismissed RFANo.911 of2002 filed by 
the appellant against the same. The factual backdrop in which 
the suits and the appeals mentioned above came to be filed 
B may be summarised as under: 
3. M. Venkatesh-appellant in SLP (C) No.38601 of 2012 
claimed ownership over the suit schedule property by 
inheritance from his grandfather Munishamappa who is said 
C to have purchased the same under a registered sale-deed 
dated 7th July, 1954. In connected SLP (C) No.12016 of 2013 
Prabhaudas Patel also claimed to be the owner of suit schedule 
property relevant to his suit on the basis of purchase of the 
said property from its previous owner. The aforementioned two 
D parcels of land together with a larger extent in the vicinity were 
acquired by the Bangalore Development Authority ('BOA' For 
short) for the formation of Hosur Road, Sarjapur Layout in terms 
of a preliminary notification dated 17th July, 1984 and a final 
notification dated 28th November, 1986 published on 25th 
E December, 1986, after notices to the Khatedars and the 
persons interested, some of whom had filed their claims before 
the competent authority. Determination of amount of 
compensation payable. to the landowners having been 
F approved by the competent authority on 21st August, 1986, 
the BOA claimed that possession of
the land was taken over 
from the landowners and handed over to the engineering 
section of the authority by drawing a possession mahazar on 
6th November, 1987. A Notification under Section 16(2) of the 
G Act was also published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 4th 
July, 1991 which, according to the BOA, signified thatthe land 
in question stood vested with the BOA free from all 
encumbrances whatsoever. The further case of BOA is that 
long after the land had vested in the BOA, sites were carved 
H out and sold to different persons by the erstwhile owners, the
M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV. 
459 
AUTHORITY[T.S. THAKUR, J.] 
unauthorised act of the plaintiffs, however, got vacated and A 
the possession was taken over .. 
4. The case of the plaintiffs M. Venkatesh and 
Prabhaudas Patel on the other hand was that they were always 
in established possession of the suit schedule property owned 
B 
and that apprehending their dispossession from the same they 
had approached the High Court along with several others to 
restrain the BDA from interfering with their peaceful occupation 
of the suit property. Those petitions were disposed of by the 
High Court reserving liberty to the writ-petitioners to approach C 
the civil court for appropriate relief in a proper civil action. It 
was only after the disposal of the said petitions that OS 
Nos.3075 of2000, 6925 of2001, 5742 of2001, 7945 of2000 
and 5791 of 2001 came to be filed by the aggrieved parties in 
which the plaintiffs claimed to be the owners and occupants of D 
the suit property and prayed for an order restraining the BOA 
from interfering with their peaceful occupation. Plaintiffs also 
claimed that they had the title over the suit schedule property 
by prescription. 
E 
5. The suits aforementioned were contested by the 
defendant-BOA in which they, inter alia, claimed that the suit 
property stood duly acquired and its ownership vested in the 
BDA was free from all encumbrances whatsoever and that the 
plaintiffs had no right, title or interest in the same nor were
they F 
entitled to any declaration of title or injunction. According to 
the Trial Court the pleadings qf the parties gave rise to the 
following issues which were clubbed together for a common 
disposal: 
(1) Whether the Plaintiffs prove that, they have acquired 
and perfected their alleged title to the suit schedule 
properties by virtue of the alleged law on adverse 
possession, as claimed? 
G 
H
460 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
(2) Whether the Plaintiffs prove their alleged lawful 
possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule 
properties, as on the date of the suit? 
(3) Whether the Plaintiffs further prove the alleged illegal 
B 
interferences and obstructions by the defendant? 
(4) Whether the defendant proves that, the suit schedule 
properties is duly acquired by the defendant, in 
accordance with law and as such, the same have stood 
c 
vested with the defendant, free from all the 
encumbrances? 
(5) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the suit relief of 
declaration and injunction, against the defendant? 
D 
(6) What Order or Decree? 
E 
6. The Trial Court answered issue nos. 1 to 3 and 5 in 
the affirmative while issue no.4 was answered in the negative. 
The suits were on those findings decreed. 
7. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the 
Trial Court, BDAfiled RFANos.911, 912, 914, 915 and 916 of 
2002 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. A 
Single Judge of the High Court, as noticed earlier, has allowed 
F 
RFANos.912, 914, 915 and 916 of2002 but dismissed RAF 
No.911 of 2002. The High Court took the view that respondents 
in RFA No.911 of 2002 w~o happened to be respondents in 
SLP No.12016 of2013 were running a saw-mill which was in 
operation long prior to the filing of the suit and which continues 
G to be in existence even on the date of the suit and the judgment 
of the High Court. The High Court held that
the legal position 
stated by the Division Bench of that Court in John B. James 
and Ors. v. Bangalore Development Authority (2001) 1 
KarLJ 364 was clearly applicable to the said appeal entitling 
H
M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV. 
461 
AUTHORITY[T.S. THAKUR, J.] 
the owner in occupation to protection against attempted A 
eviction by the BOA The High Court, on that basis, dismissed 
RFA No.911 of 2012 filed by BOA upholding the judgment and 
decree passed by the Trial Court and restrai.ning the BOA from 
interfering with possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule 
property. As regards the remaining appeals, the High Court B 
held that the plaintiffs in those appeals were claiming settled 
possession of vacant pieces of land which even according to 
the pronouncement in John B. James case (supra) did not 
entitle them to any relief as no one could claim to be in 
established possession of a vacant piece of land. The High C 
Court found that there was no dispute that all the structures on 
the suit properties relevant to those suits had been demolished 
and that the land was a vacant piece of land all along and at all 
material times including the date of the judgment. The High 0 
Court accordingly non-suited all the plaintiffs except plaintiff in 
RFANo.911of2002. In SLP (C) No.12016 of 2013 the BOA 
has assailed the judgment of the High Court in so far as the 
same has dismissed RAF No.911of2002 filed by it. SLP (C) 
No.38601of2012 and SLP (C) Nos.12013-15 of2013 have E 
been on the other hand filed by the appellants to assail the 
orders passed by the High Court in so far as the same have 
dismissed RAF Nos.912, 914, 915 and 916 of2002. 
8. We have
heard Mr. Rama Jois, learned senior counsel, 
F 
appearing for the appellants and Mr. S. K. Kulkarni, counsel 
appearing for the BOA We may first deal with the question 
whether the plaintiffs in the suits relevantto RFANos.912, 914, 
915 and 916 of 2002 could claim to be the owners of the suit 
property on the basis of inheritance or sale instruments in their G 
favour and yet plead adverse possession over the very same 
property. The case set up by the plaintiffs in their suits was that 
they were the lawful owners of the suit schedule property and 
that they had been duly recognised as Khatedars by the village 
panchayat concerned. It was further alleged that property tax H
462 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
was also being assessed and levied by the competent authority 
from time to time and is being paid by them. It was alleged 
that the suit properties were being used for carrying on business 
in different names.and style. The local authorities had also 
issued no objection certificates for grant of electricity supply 
B 
connections in their favour and that they were paying electricity 
charges as and when demanded. The appellants claim to have 
set up their business which was their source of livelihood. 
Whatever may be the rights vested in the BOA pursuant to the 
notifications and the award, the BOA was not entitled to disturb 
C the peaceful occupation of the landowners according to the 
averments in the plaint. The plaintiffs, on that basis claimed 
the relief of permanent injunction restraining the BOA and its 
officials from disturbing their possession over the suit schedule 
0 
properties. The plaintiffs, it is noteworthy, claimed ignorance 
about the acquisition proceedings and alleged that they had 
not received any compensation and that they had continued to 
be in occupation as owners to the knowledge of the BOA and 
its officials. 
E 
9. In the written statement filed by the BOA it was 
asserted that the suit schedule properties stood acquired and 
vested in BOA as early as in the year 1986-87 and that the 
question of anyone developing or using any part of the same 
F 
did not arise. The documents relied upon by
the plaintiffs were, 
according to the BOA, of no value or relevance .. 
10. The High Court has, as noticed earlier, on an appraisal 
of the material on record, held that the suit schedule properties 
relevant to RFA No.911 of 2002 was a vacant piece of land 
G from which structures stood demolished and removed before 
the institution of the suits. The High Court in this regard 
observed: 
"But, insofar as the other respondents are concerned, 
H 
whether the appellant was justified in law or not in
M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV. 
463 
AUTHORITY [T.S. THAKUR, J.] 
carrying out the demolition, there is no dispute that all A 
structures in the respective suit properties have been 
razed to the ground and it was vacant land during the 
pendency of the suit and as on the date of the judgment. 
Therefore, the trial c.ourt was clearly in error in holding 
that the plaintiffs continued in settled possession of what B 
was vacant land. The law, as laid down in John B. 
James's case, supra clearly disentitled persons 
claiming to be in settled possession of vacant land. 
Therefore, the remedy of damages which was certainly 
available to the plaintiffs was unfortunately not claimed C 
and though the plaintiffs are said to have sought to 
reserve their right to claim such damages, it is not shown 
that the court below has expressly granted any such 
relief" 
D 
11. There is, in our opinion, no infirmity in the above 
reasoning. The decision in John B. James case (supra) upon 
which heavy reliance was placed by the plaintiffs before the · 
courts below itself did not permit anyone to claim that he is in 
settled possession of vacant land. The following passage from 
E 
the said decision in this regard is apposite: 
"If anyone, who has trespassed into BOA land or in 
unauthorised possession of BOA land, has put up a 
structure and completes and accomplishes the act of F 
possession and continues in such settled possession 
asserting possession and ownership in himself,
openly, 
peacefully and uninterruptedly to the knowledge of BOA 
for more than 12 years, then it is possible for him to 
contend that he has perfected his title to such property G 
by adverse possession and consequently, the title of 
BOA stood extinguished. It is needless to say that such 
adverse possession for 12 years should be subsequent 
to the date of vesting of land in BOA. 
The person H
464 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
claiming such title by adverse possession cannot call 
in aid any possession on his part or his predecessor 
for any period prior to date of vesting of land in BOA, to 
establish adverse possession, or possession during the 
tendency of any litigation regarding the property, cannot 
B 
be considered as possession adverse to BDA." 
12.0nce the High Court recorded a finding that the 
property was vacant as on the date of the filing of the suitthere 
was no question of the plaintiffs claiming settled possession 
C of the said property assuming the view taken in John B. James 
case (supra) was otherwise legally sound since the so called 
settled possession of the appellants in RFA No.911 of 2002 
stood vacated from the suit schedule property, no prayer for 
injunction as set out in the petition filed by the appellants in 
D those appeals could help them for an injunction issues only to 
protect what is in lawful possession of the plaintiffs. Injunction 
could not be claimed when plaintiffs stand dispossessed from 
the suit property prior to the filing of the suit. The question of 
establishing settled possession did not, therefore, arise in 
E relation to the properties that already stood cleared of any 
structures by demolition of whatever stood on the same. The 
High Court was, in that view, justified in setting aside the decree 
passed by the Trial Co1,1rt and dismissing the suit filed by the 
F 
plaintiffs. 
13. That brings us
to the question whether Prabhaudas 
Patel and other respondents in SLP (C) No.12016 of 2013 
were entitled to any relief from the Court. These respondents 
claim to have purchased the suit property in terms of a sale 
G deed dated 22"d August, 1990, i.e. long after the issue of the 
preliminary notification published in July 1984. The legal 
position about the validity of any such sale, post issue of a 
preliminary notification is fairly well settled by a long line of the 
decisions of this Court. The sale in $LlCh cases is void and 
H
M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV. 
465 
AUTHORITY [T.S. THAKUR, J.] 
non-est in the eyes of law giving to the Vendee the limited A 
right to claim compensation and no more. Reference may in 
this regard be made to the decision of this Court in U.P. Jal 
Nigam v. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 1170, 
where this Court said : 
B 
"3. It is settled law that after the notification under Section 
4(1) is published in the Gazette any encumbrance 
created by the owner does not bind the Government 
and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the 
property. In this case, notification under Section 4(1) C 
was published on 24-3-1973, possession of the land 
admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973 and pumping station 
house was constructed. No doubt, declaration under 
Section 6 was published later on 8-7-1973. Admittedly 
power under Section 17(4) was exercised dispensing D 
with the enquiry under Section 5-A and on service of 
the notice under Section 9 possession was taken, since 
urgency was acute, viz., pumping station house was to 
·be constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently, 
the land stood vested in the State under Section 17(2) E 
free from all encumbrances. It is further settled law that 
once possession is taken; by operation of Section 17(2), 
the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances 
unless a notification under Section 48(1) is published F 
in the Gazette withdrawing from the acquisition. Section 
11-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984,
therefore, does 
not apply and the acquisition does not lapse. The 
notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration 
under Section 6, therefore, remain valid. There is no G 
other provision under the Act to have the acquired land 
divested, unless, as stated .earlier, notification under 
Section 48(1) was published and the possession is 
surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart, since Mis 
Katra Properties, respondent had purchased the land H
466 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, 
its sale is void against the State and it acquired no right, 
title or interest in.the land. Consequently, it is settled 
law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification 
or the regularity in taking possession of the land before 
B 
publication of the declaration under Section 6 was 
published." 
14. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in 
Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2617; 
C Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati and Anr. 
(1995) 5 SCC 335; Gian Chand v. Gopala and Ors. (1995) 
5 SCC 528; Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi 
and Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 177 and Tika Ram v. State of U.P. 
(2009) 10 SCC 689. More importantly, as on the date of the 
D suit, the respondents had not completed 12 years in 
possession of the suit property so as to entitle them to claim 
adverse possession against BOA, the true owner. The 
argument that possession of the land was never t~ken also 
needs notice only to be rejected for it is settled that one of the 
E modes of taking possession is by drawing a Panchnama which 
part has been done to perfection according to the evidence 
led by the defendant- BOA. Decisions of this Court in Tamil 
Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (dead) by Lrs. AIR 
F 1996 SC 3377and Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat 
and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1608, sufficiently support the BOA 
that the mode of taking
possession adopted by it was a 
permissible mode. 
15. Coming then to the question whether the plaintiffs-
G respondents could claim adverse possession, we need to 
hardly mention the well known and oft quoted maxim nee vi, 
nee clam, nee precario meaning thereby that adverse 
possession is proved only when possession is peaceful, open, 
H continuous and hostile. The essentials of adverse possession
M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV. 
467 
. AUTHORITY[T.S. THAKUR, J.] 
were succinctly summed-up by this Court in Karnataka Board A 
of Wakfv. Govt. of/ndia (2004) 10 SCC 779 in the following 
words: 
"11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to 
be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. 
B 
Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time 
won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when 
another person takes possession of the property and asserts 
a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession 
by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the C 
true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming 
adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nee 
vi, nee clam, nee precario", that is, peaceful, open and 
continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, 
in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is D 
adverse to the true owner. It must ~tart with a wrongful 
disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, 
exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. 
(See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina (AIR 1964SC1254), Parsinni 
v. Sukhi (1993) 4 SCC 375 and D.N. Venkatarayappf3 v. State 
E 
of Kamataka (1997) 7 SCC 567). Physical fact of exclusive 
possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in 
exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors 
that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of F 
adverse
possession is not a pure question of law but a 
blended one offact and law. Therefore, a person who claims 
adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came 
into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, 
(c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other G 
party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his . 
possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading 
· adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he 
is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to 
clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish H 
. 
.
468 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
his adverse possession. [Mahesh Chand Sharma (Dr.) v. Raj 
Kumari Sharma (1996) 8 SCC 128)." 
16. Reference may also be made to the decision of thi~ 
Court in Saroop Singh v. Banta (2005) B SCC 330, where 
B this Court emphasised the importance of animus possidendi 
and observed: 
c 
D 
E 
"29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation 
does not commence from the date when the right of 
ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from 
the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. 
(See Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai 
Nayak (2004) 3 sec 376). 
30. "Animus possidendi" is one of the ingredients of 
adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the 
land has the requisite animus the period for prescription 
does not commence. As in the instant case, the 
appellant categorically stales that his possession is no"t 
adverse as that of true owner, the logical corollary is 
that he did not have the requisite animus. (See Mohd. 
Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita (2004) 1 SCC 371, SCC 
para 21.)" 
F 
17.Also noteworthy is the decision of this Court in Mohan 
Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996) 1 SCC 639, where this Court 
held that claim of title to the property and adverse possession 
are in terms contradictory. This Court observed: 
G 
H 
"4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the 
second plea. Having come into possession under the 
agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder
and 
plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile 
adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor 
or his successor in title or interest and that the latter
M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV. 
469 
AUTHORITY [T.S. THAKUR, J.] 
had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the A 
entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period 
of his title by prescription nee vi, nee clam, nee precario. 
Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-
A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication 
that he came into possession of the land lawfully under B 
the agreement and continued to remain in possession 
till date of the suit. Thereby the plea ·of adverse 
possession is not available to the appellant." 
18.To the same effect is the decision of this Court in 
C 
Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Ba/want (1995) 2 SCC 543, 
where this Court elaborated the significance of a claim to title 
viz.-a-viz. the claim to adverse possession over the same 
property. The Court said: 
D 
"15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, 
it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being 
that a person whose possession can be referred to a 
lawful title will not be permitted to show that his 
possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds E 
possession on behalf of another, does not by mere 
denial of that other's title make his possession adverse 
so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of 
/imitation. Therefore, a person who enters into 
possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another F 
of that title by pretending that he had no title at all." 
19. The Courts below have not seen the
plaintiff-
respondent's claim from the above perspectives. The High 
Court has, in particular, remained oblivious of the principle G 
enunciated in the decisions to which we have referred herein 
above. All thatthe High Court has found in favour of the plaintiffs 
is that their possession is established. That, however, does 
not conclude the controversy. The question is not just whether 
H
470 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
the plaintiffs were in possession, but whether they had by being 
in adverse possession for the statutory period of 12 years 
perfected their title. That question has neither been adverted 
to nor answered in the judgment impugned in this appeal. Such 
being the case the High Court, in our opinion, erred in 
B dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant-BOA. The fact that 
the plain!iffs had not and could not possibly establish their 
adverse possession over the suit property should have resulted 
in dismissal of the suit for an unauthorised occupant had no 
C right to claim relief that would perpetuate his illegal and 
unauthorised occupation of property that stood vested in the 
BOA. In the result: 
(i) Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.38601 of 2012 
and SLP (C) Nos. 12013-12015 of 2013 fail and are, 
0 
hereby, dismissed. 
(ii) Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.12016 of2013 
succeeds and is, hereby, allowed. The impugned 
judgment of the High Court is set aside insofar as the 
E 
same dismisses BDA's RFA No.911 of 2002. Resultantly 
RFA No.911 of 2002 shall stand allowed and the suit filed 
by the plaintiff dismissed but in the circumstances without 
any order as to costs. 
F 
Devika Gujral 
Appeals disposed of.