SUMETI VIJ versus M/S PARAMOUNT TECH FAB INDUSTRIES
[2021] 2 S.C.R. 266, Supreme Court of India, 2021
Outcome: Leave Granted & Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
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   [2021] 2 S.C.R. 266
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SUMETI VIJ
v.
M/S PARAMOUNT TECH FAB INDUSTRIES
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 292 of 2021)
MARCH 09, 2021
[INDU MALHOTRA AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Order placed by
the accused-appellant – Delivered – Cheque issued by the appellant
in the name of complainant-respondent – Returned on presentation
with a note of “insufficient funds” in the account of appellant –
Notices sent by respondent – Neither responded to nor any payment
made within the statutory period – Complaints filed by the respondent
u/s.138 – Finding of acquittal returned by Trial Court – Reversed
by High Court – Held: Appellant has only recorded her statement
u/s.313, CrPC and has not adduced any evidence to rebut the
presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration – Facts
remained unrebutted and supported with the evidence on record –
Appellant rightly convicted by High Court – Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 – s.313.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Chapter XVII; s.138 –
Object of introduction – Discussed.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.139 – Scope of –
Discussed.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The object of introducing Section 138 and other
provisions of Chapter XVII in the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 appears to be to enhance the acceptability of cheques in
the settlement of liabilities. The drawer of the cheque be held
liable to prosecution on dishonour of
cheque with safeguards
provided to prevent harassment of honest drawers. Section 138
primarily relates to a civil wrong and the amendment made in the
year 2000 specifically made it compoundable. The burden of proof
was on the accused in view of presumption under Section 139 of
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the Act and the standard of proof was of “preponderance of
probabilities”. There is a mandate of presumption of
consideration in terms of the provisions of the Act and the onus
shifts to the accused on proof of issuance of cheque to rebut the
presumption that the cheque was issued not for discharge of any
debt or liability in terms of Section 138 of the Act. [Paras 13,
14][272-D-E; 237-A-B]
1.2 The scope of Section 139 of the Act is that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption, the standard of proof for
doing so is that of “preponderance or probabilities”. The
proceedings under Section 138 of the Act are quasi-criminal in
nature, and the principles which apply to acquittal in other criminal
cases are not applicable in the cases instituted under the Act.
Likewise, under Section 139 of the Act, a presumption is raised
that the holder of a cheque received the cheque for the discharge,
in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. To rebut this
presumption, facts must be adduced by the accused which on a
preponderance of probability (not beyond reasonable doubt as in
the case of criminal offences), must then be proved. [Paras 15-
17][274-A-B; G-H; 275-A-B]
1.3 In the case at hand, the complainant was able to prove
that the appellant placed the order for purchasing non-woven fabric
which was sold vide invoices amounting to Rs.5,07,062/- and
Rs.5,10,000/- which was delivered through public carrier trucks
and in lieu thereof, the cheques in favour of
the complainant were
issued by appellant in order to discharge her liability. On the
cheques being presented for encashment, the same were
dishonoured on the ground of “insufficient funds” in the account
of the appellant and the same were returned. That apart, when
the complainant exhibited documents in support of his complaints
and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof,
the appellant has recorded her statement under Section 313 of
the Code, but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the
presumption in support of her defence available under Section
139 of the Act. The appellant has not adduced any evidence to
rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for
consideration. The statement of the accused recorded under
Section 313 of the Code is not a substantive evidence of defence,
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but only an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating
circumstances appearing in the prosecution case of the accused.
The High Court has not committed any error in recording the
finding of guilt of the appellant and convicting her for an offence
being committed under Section 138 of the Act under its impugned
judgment which needs no further interference. [Paras 12, 18, 21
and 24][277-C-E; 278-A-B; 279-C-D]
K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan (2008) 1 SCC 258 :
[2007] 10 SCR 1010; Indus Airways Private Limited
and Others v. Magnum Aviation Private Limited and
Another (2014) 12 SCC 539 : [2014] 5 SCR 56 – held
inapplicable.
Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 : [2010]
6 SCR 507; Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat
and Another (2019) 18 SCC 106; Uttam Ram v. Devinder
Singh Hudan and Another (2019) 10 SCC 287 – relied
on.
Case Law Reference
[2007] 10 SCR 1010
held inapplicable
Para 8
[2014] 5 SCR 56
held inapplicable
Para 8
[2010] 6 SCR 507
relied on
Para 15
(2019) 18 SCC 106
relied on
Para 17
(2019) 10 SCC 287
relied on
Para 17
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 292 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2019 of the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Cr. Appeal No. 483 of 2012
With
Criminal Appeal No. 293 of 2021
Ritesh Khatri, Adv. for the Appellant.
Amit Gupta, Hari Shankar Mahapatra, M/s. Mitter & Mitter Co.,
Advs. for the Respondent.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RASTOGI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment dated 30th April,
2019 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh holding the appellant
guilty of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) after reversal of the finding
of acquittal returned by the learned trial Judge by its judgment dated 28th
September, 2012.
3. The brief facts of the case which emanates from the record
are that the appellant accused approached the complainant- respondent
in its factory at Moginand and expressed her desire to purchase non-
woven fabric from the complainant. On the basis of order placed by the
appellant, non-woven fabric was sold to the appellant vide invoice No.120
dated 01st October, 2010 and invoice No.135 dated 16th October, 2010
amounting to Rs.5,07,062/- and Rs.5,10,000/- which was delivered
through public carrier truck bearing Nos. HR-38G-5607 and HP-71-
0693 to the appellant accused and in lieu thereof, a cheque bearing
No.323930 dated 15th October, 2010 and No.323935 dated 01st November,
2010 were issued by the appellant in the name of the complainant from
her account of the Punjab National Bank, Karnal in order to meet the
legal existing and enforceable liabilities. The cheques on presentation
were returned vide memo dated 19th October, 2010 and 10th November,
2010 from Punjab National Bank, Karnal with a note of “insufficient
funds” in the account of the appellant. Two legal notices dated 29th
October, 2010 and 19th November, 2010 were sent by the complainant
to the appellant on two addresses. The notices were duly served but the
appellant neither responded to the notices nor made any payment in
furtherance thereto within the statutory period hence, two separate
complaints were filed by the complainant-respondent under Section 138
of the Act against the appellant-accused.
4. The complainant-respondent recorded the preliminary evidence
before the learned trial Judge and thereafter, the appellant-accused was
directed to be summoned for committing an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Act. After the presence of the appellant had been
secured, the learned trial Judge put notice of accusation, vis-a-viz the
accused, for an offence allegedly committed by her under Section 138
of the Act whereto she pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
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5. The complainant in order to prove its case against the appellant-
accused, has examined three witnesses and placed reliance on the
documentary evidence which were duly exhibited and referred to in
detail by the learned trial Judge in para 3 of its judgment. On conclusion
of recording of complainant’s evidence, the statement of the appellant-
accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”) by the learned trial
Judge wherein the appellant-accused claimed innocence and pleaded
false implication in the case however, did not lead any evidence in
defence.
6. On perusal of the evidence on record, the learned trial Judge
returned a finding that the complainant failed to establish that the material/
goods were delivered to the appellant in lieu of which, the cheques were
issued, and in the absence of burden being discharged by the complainant,
the onus to disprove or rebut the presumption could not be shifted to the
appellant as referred under Section 139 of the Act. Accordingly, the trial
court returned the finding of acquittal of the appellant, which was the
subject matter of challenge in appeal before the High Court at the instance
of the complainant.
7. The High Court on reappraisal of the evidence on record
affirmed that the primary burden was discharged by the complainant
that the cheques were issued by the appellant in lieu of the material
supplied, and
documentary evidence duly exhibited was placed on record
to substantiate the claim, and it was for the appellant-accused to discharge
her burden to rebut in defence as required under Section 139 of the Act.
In the instant case, the appellant only recorded her statement under
Section 313 of the Code. However, no evidence was recorded to disprove
or rebut the presumption in defence. Taking into consideration the overall
material on record while setting aside the finding of acquittal recorded
by the trial Judge, held that the appellant was guilty of committing an
offence under Section 138 of the Act and consequently, awarded
appropriate punishment of fine/sentence by the impugned judgment dated
30th April, 2019, which is the subject matter of challenge in appeals before
us.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the complainant
was not able to prove that the material/goods were ever sent or received
by the appellant and in terms of the complaint, the burden was on the
complainant to prove that the material/goods were received by the
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appellant, against which the cheques were received as security and even
though the appellant has not placed any evidence to disprove or rebut
the presumption in defence, still the complainant has to discharge its
burden and has to stand on his own legs. In the absence of the prima-
facie burden being discharged by the complainant, mere issuance of the
cheques by the appellant would not have been sufficient to justify that
the cheques were issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. In
support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court in K. Prakashan vs. P.K.
Surenderan1and Indus Airways Private Limited and Others Vs.
Magnum Aviation Private Limited and Another2.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the
appellant was able to succeed in creating a doubt in the mind of the
court below with regard to the non-existence of the debt or liability, and
the learned trial court had returned the finding based on the material
available on record. Unless it was found to be perverse or unsustainable,
or a case of non-consideration of any relevant material, the High Court
was not justified in reversing and setting aside the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court merely on the ground that the view expressed
by the High Court is more plausible with what being expressed by the
trial court in its judgment dated 28th September, 2012.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant
further submits that the
finding recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment is contrary
to the settled principles of law as considered by this Court in appreciating
the mandate of Sections 118(a), 138 and 139 of the Act. In consequence
thereof, the finding of guilt which has been recorded by the High Court
in the impugned judgment is unsustainable in law, and has to be set aside.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the complainant-respondent
while supporting the finding recorded by the High Court in the impugned
judgment submitted that there was sufficient material available on record
to justify that these cheques were issued with reference to the invoices
after delivery of goods, which were duly exhibited, and cheques were
issued in lieu thereof. In the sequence of facts, the cheques issued by
the appellant, on due presentation to the bank got dishonoured on the
ground of “insufficient funds”. The statutory notice was issued to the
appellant, who failed to respond. The complaints were filed by placing
1 (2008) 1 SCC 258
2 (2014) 12 SCC 539
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all documentary evidence in support of the complaint duly exhibited, and
three witnesses in support thereof were examined, and was able to
establish and discharge the burden of proof. It was for the appellant to
come forward with her defence, and prove to the contrary as envisaged
under Section 139 of the Act.
12. In the instant case, the appellant has only recorded her
statement under Section 313 of the Code, and has not adduced any
evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for
consideration. Once the facts came on record remained unrebutted and
supported with the evidence on record with no substantive evidence of
defence of the appellant to explain the incriminating circumstances
appearing in the complaint against her, no error has been committed by
the High Court in the impugned judgment, and the appellant has been
rightly convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Act and needs no interference of this Court.
13. The object of introducing Section 138 and other provisions of
Chapter XVII in the Act appears to be to enhance the acceptability of
cheques in the settlement of liabilities. The drawer of the cheque be held
liable to prosecution on dishonour of cheque with safeguards provided to
prevent harassment of honest drawers. Section 138 primarily relates to
a civil wrong and the amendment made in the year 2000 specifically
made it compoundable. The burden of proof was on the
accused in view
of presumption under Section 139 of the Act and the standard of proof
was of “preponderance of probabilities”. The N.I. Act including a cheque
carrying a presumption of consideration in terms of Sections 118(a) and
139 of the Act which is related to the purpose referred to and reads as
under:-
“118 Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. —Until the
contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:—
(a) of consideration —that every negotiable instrument was made
or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when
it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;
……..
139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed,
unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received
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the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge,
in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
14. There is a mandate of presumption of consideration in terms
of the provisions of the Act and the onus shifts to the accused on proof
of issuance of cheque to rebut the presumption that the cheque was
issued not for discharge of any debt or liability in terms of Section 138 of
the Act, which reads as under:-
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds
in the account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an
account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any
amount of money to another person from out of that account for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is
returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour
the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid
from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such
person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,
without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished
with imprisonment for 8 [a term which may be extended to two
years’], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the
cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a)
the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period
of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within
the period
of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b)
the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the
case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said
amount of money by giving a notice; in writing, to the drawer
of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding the return of
the cheque as unpaid; and
(c)
the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of
the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may
be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen
days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other
liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.”
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15. The scope of Section 139 of the Act is that when an accused
has to rebut the presumption, the standard of proof for doing so is that of
“preponderance or probabilities” which has been examined by a three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan3, which reads
as under:-
“26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the
respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by Section
139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned
observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [(2008) 4 SCC 54 :
(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 166] may not be correct. However, this does
not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in
that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances
therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of
a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a
defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that
there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.
27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause
that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective
of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section
138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the
dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under
Section
139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation.
However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable
by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence
since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil
wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test
of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation
of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be
expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof.”
16. It is well settled that the proceedings under Section 138 of the
Act are quasi-criminal in nature, and the principles which apply to acquittal
in other criminal cases are not applicable in the cases instituted under
the Act.
3 (2010) 11 SCC 441
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17. Likewise, under Section 139 of the Act, a presumption is raised
that the holder of a cheque received the cheque for the discharge, in
whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. To rebut this presumption,
facts must be adduced by the accused which on a preponderance of
probability (not beyond reasonable doubt as in the case of criminal
offences), must then be proved. In Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel vs. State
of Gujarat and Another4, this Court has examined the scope of Sections
138 and 139 of the Act, which reads as under:-
“15. So far the question of existence of basic ingredients for
drawing of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act
is concerned, apparent it is that the appellant-accused could not
deny his signatures on the cheques in question that had been drawn
in favour of the complainant on a bank account maintained by the
accused for a sum of Rs 3 lakhs each. The said cheques were
presented to the bank concerned within the period of their validity
and were returned unpaid for the reason of either the balance
being insufficient or the account being closed. All the basic
ingredients of Section 138 as also of Sections 118 and 139 are
apparent on the face of the record. The trial court had also
consciously taken note of these facts and had drawn the requisite
presumption. Therefore, it is required to be presumed that the
cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder
of the cheques i.e. the complainant received the
same in discharge
of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the appellant-
accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a
presumption.
…….
17. On the aspects relating to preponderance of probabilities, the
accused has to bring on record such facts and such circumstances
which may lead the Court to conclude either that the consideration
did not exist or that its non-existence was so probable that a prudent
man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the
plea that the consideration did not exist. This Court has, time and
again, emphasised that though there may not be sufficient negative
evidence which could be brought on record by the accused to
discharge his burden, yet mere denial would not fulfil the
4 (2019) 18 SCC 106
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requirements of rebuttal as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139
of the NI Act. This Court stated the principles in Kumar
Exports [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513]
“20. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two
options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not
exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the
non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a
prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt
existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not
expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is
expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may
adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not
supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability
to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in
every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of
consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the
existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated.
At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the
consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve
the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to
be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the
complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should
bring on record such facts and
circumstances, upon consideration
of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and
debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a
prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon
the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence
to prove that the note in question was not supported by
consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the
accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the
circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may
likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also
rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in
Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arising
under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.
21. The accused has also an option to prove the non-existence of
consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or in
some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the
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complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set
out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant
during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and
accepted by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of
the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential
burden shifts back to the complainant and, therefore, the
presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again
come to the complainant’s rescue.”
It was further considered by this Court in Uttam Ram vs.
Devinder Singh Hudan and Another5.
18. In the case at hand, elucidating from the principles, the
complainant was able to prove that the appellant placed the order for
purchasing non-woven fabric which was sold vide invoice No. 120 dated
01st October, 2010 and invoice No. 135 dated 16th October, 2010
amounting to Rs.5,07,062/- and Rs.5,10,000/- which was delivered
through public carrier truck bearing Nos. HR-38G-5607 and HP-71-
0693 and in lieu thereof, the cheques bearing No.323930 dated 15th
October, 2010 and No.323935 dated 01st November, 2010 in favour of
the complainant were issued by appellant in order to discharge her liability.
On the cheques being presented for encashment to the State Bank of
India, Branch Kala Amb, the same were dishonoured on the ground of
“insufficient funds” in the account of the appellant and the same were
returned vide memo dated 19th October and 10th November, 2010 by
Punjab National Bank,
Karnal.
19. Thereafter, two separate legal notices were served by the
complainant which were duly received by the appellant and even after
receiving the said notices, the appellant neither responded to the notices
nor made any payment within the statutory period of fifteen days and
only thereafter, two separate complaints were filed by the complainant
under Section 138 of the Act against the appellant-accused.
20. There was no response by the appellant at any stage either
when the cheques were issued, or after the presentation to its banker, or
when the same were dishonoured, or after the legal notices were served
informing the appellant that both the cheques on being presented to its
banker were returned with a note that it could not be honoured because
of “insufficient funds”.
5 (2019) 10 SCC 287
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21. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these documents
in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses
in support thereof, the appellant has recorded her statement under Section
313 of the Code, but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the
presumption in support of her defence available under Section 139 of
the Act. The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of
the Code is not a substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity
to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in
the prosecution case of the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to
rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration.
22. The judgment on which learned counsel for the appellant has
placed reliance i.e. K. Prakashan vs. P.K. Surenderan6 may not be of
any assistance for the reason that in the case dealing under Section 138
of the Act, the prosecution has to prove the case and these cases being
quasi-criminal in nature are to be proved on the basis of the principles of
“preponderance of probabilities”, and not on the principles as being
examined in the criminal case to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. So far as other case cited by the learned counsel for
the appellant i.e. Indus Airways Private Limited and Others Vs.
Magnum  Aviation Private Limited and Another7, there was
sufficiency of material on record to
justify that the cheques were issued
as advance payment for purchase of goods, and one of the terms and
conditions of the contract was that the entire payment would be made to
the supplier in advance. However, much within the time, the supplier-
complainant received the letter from the purchasers cancelling the
purchase orders and requested the supplier to return both the cheques.
The supplier pursuant thereto, sent response asking the purchasers as to
when the supplier could collect the payment, and only thereafter, the
suppler sent a legal notice to the purchasers and filed a complaint under
Section 138 of the Act. In the given circumstances, it was observed by
this Court that the complainant had failed even prima-facie that there
was a legally enforceable debt or other liability subsisting on the date of
drawal of the cheque as contemplated under Section 138 of the Act.
This judgment would not be of any help to the appellant in the instant
case.
6 (2008) 1 SCC 258
7 (2014) 12 SCC 539
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23. When the matter was earlier heard on 01st March, 2021, we
directed the learned counsel for the appellant to seek instructions whether
his client is ready to make payment of the stated cheque amount in both
the criminal appeals i.e. Rs.5,07,062/- and Rs.5,10,000/- and posted the
matter for further hearing on 05th March, 2021. Learned counsel for the
appellant on instructions, informed that his client is not willing to discharge
the stated amount, and wants to argue the case on merits. After hearing
the counsel for both the parties, we reserved the order on 05th March,
2021 and still afforded an opportunity that by 06th March, 2021 evening,
the appellant can still re-consider her instructions as noticed by us in the
order of 01st March, 2021. It has been informed to us that the appellant
is interested to get the outcome of the present appeals on merits.
24. In the given circumstances, the High Court, in our view, has
not committed any error in recording the finding of guilt of the appellant
and convicting her for an offence being committed under Section 138 of
the Act under its impugned judgment, which in our considered view,
needs no further interference. Consequently, the appeals are without
any substance, and are accordingly dismissed.
25. The bail bonds stand cancelled and the appellant shall either
pay the fine, or serve the sentence in compliance with the judgment
dated 30th April, 2019 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh.
26. Pending
application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Divya Pandey
Appeals dismissed
SUMETI VIJ v. M/S PARAMOUNT TECH FAB INDUSTRIES
[AJAY RASTOGI, J.]