MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD. versus STATE OF M.P. & ORS.
[2016] 11 S.C.R. 780, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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[2016] l 1 S.C.R. 780 
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD. 
v. 
STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 2464 of 2016) 
NOVEMBER 10,2016 
[DIPAK MISRA AND SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.] 
Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949 - Explanation 
(b) of Part B of Table of Rates of Duty to s. 3(1) -Interpretation of 
term "processing" under the definition of "mine" - Grievance of 
appellant pertains to definition of "mine" the effect of which is to 
make processing a part of mining and prescription of higher rate of 
duty for "mines" (i.e. a composite activity of mining and 
processing) - Propriety of- Held: The word "processing" herein 
would mean those processes with help of hands or machineries 
connected and linked to mining activity- It would not include process 
by which a new or differe.nt article other than one which has been 
mined, is produced-The intent and purpose is certainly not to compel 
and force a manufacturing unit set up at an acceptable distance 
fi·om mine to pay electricity tariff at a higher rate - Pertinently, a 
mamifacturing unit whether adjacent to the mine or not, would pay 
a lower tariff - Thus, tariff has to be levied as meant for 
mamifacturing unit- Electricity Tariff- Interpretation of statutes -
Maxim - Noscitur a sociis - Mines and Minerals. 
Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949 - Explanation 
(b) of Part B of Table of Rates of Duty to s. 3(1) - Interpretation of 
term "mineral" under the definition of "mine" - Plea of appellant
that manganese ore is a mineral but ferro manganese is not a mineral 
because the said mineral is converted into "alloy" and ceases to be 
mineral - However, the State contended that definition is an inclusive 
one - Held: Appellant was using manganese ore as one of the raw 
materials and consuming the same while manufacturing ferro 
manganese alloy - The stage of crushing, treating, processing, etc. 
of manganese ore was in Integrated Manganese Beneficiation Plant 
(!MB Plant) stage, same cannot be applied in Ferro Manganese 
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MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
Plant Stage - Thus, Ferro Manganese Plant, being a unit involved 
in manufacturing o,f ferro manganese alloy as opposed to a unit 
involved in crushing, treating, processing, etc. of manganese ore, 
cannot be treated within the extended definition of 'mine' - Mines 
and Minerals. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. The words 'crushing', 'treating' and 'transporting' 
are words of narrower significance and the word 'processing' used 
between these words should not be given a very wide meaning, 
for the legislative intent is narrower. The word 'processing' would 
take its meaning in the cognate sense. In other words, the general 
word 'processing' will be restricted to the sense conveyed by the 
words 'crushing', 'treating' and 'transporting'. The intent being 
that electricity tariff payable in respect of mining activities would 
include the mine itself, all machinery situated or located in the 
mine or in a premises adjacent to the mine wherein crushing, 
processing, treatment or transportation of the minerals as mined 
is undertaken. The word 'processing' herein would mean those 
processes with the help of hands or machineries connected and 
linked to mining activity. It would not include process by which a 
new or different article other than the one which has been mined, 
is produced. It relates and signifies the composite activity of 
mining and processing. The intent is not to include processes 
which would lead to
creation of a different commodity as known 
in the commercial world for otherwise even manufacturing activity 
would get covered, whereas manufacturing unit is liable to pay 
electricity tariff at a lower rate. The intent and purpose is certainly 
not to compel and force a manufacturing unit being set up at an 
acceptable distance from the mine, for the manufacturing unit 
adjacent to the mine would have to pay electricity tariff at a higher 
rate. Pertinently, a manufacturing unit set up by another entity, 
whether adjacent to the mine or not, would pay a lower tariff. 
Such absurdity and irrationality has to be avoided. In the present 
context, therefore, 'processing' would mean activities in order 
to make the mineral mined marketable, saleable and 
transportable, without substantially changing the identity of the 
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(2016] 11 S.C.R. 
mineral, as mined. When there is a substantial change at the 
mineral mined and the process results in a different commodity 
being produced or transforming and completely changing the 
mineral, it would fall outside the scope of the word 'processing'. 
The restricted construction will also be acceptable in view of the 
use of the word 'mineral' in the end of the Explanation. The word 
'mineral' in the Explanation is the product which was mined and 
is put to 'crushing', 'processing', 'treatment' and 'transporting' 
the mineral. In other words, mineral means mineral which was 
mined and not a new product created by using or processing the 
mineral mined. [Para 20] [796-G; 797-A-G] 
Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central 
Excise 1990 (2) SCR 797 : 1990 (3) SCC 447; 
Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers' Association v. 
Administrative Officer & Ors.2004 (1) SCR 470 : 2004 
(1) SCC 755; CIT v. Tara Agency 2007 (8) SCR 136 : 
2007 (6) SCC 429; Orient Paper and Industries v. 
State Qf MP. and Anr. 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 790 : 2006 
(12) SCC 468; and Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. 
v. 
Commissioner of Income Tax, Ernakulam 2001 (2) 
Suppl. SCR 559 : 2001 (7) SCC 525- relied on. 
2.1 Following is the seriatim in which the mining/ 
processing/manufacturing takes place: (a) First Stage : The 
appellant mines manganese ore from its mines. There is a levy 
of electricity duty on the appellant's consumption of electricity 
F
during mining at 40%, which the appellant is not disputing; (b) 
Second Stage: Such mines manganese ore is processed by 
removal of impurities in the appellant's Integrated Manganese 
Beneficiation Plant (IMB Plant). During this process the cleaning 
of mineral takes place by various methods to remove impurities 
G and foreign contents for the enrichment of the manganese content 
and during this process, the manganese mineral remains a mineral. 
There is a levy of electricity duty on the appellant's consumption 
of electricity of IMB Plant at 40%, which the appellant is not 
disputing; (c) Third Stage: At the Ferro Manganese Plant, raw 
materials like, processed manganese ore (for which 40% 
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MANGANESE ORE INDJA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
electricity duty is already paid by IMB Plant), iron ore, coke, 
dolomite, coal, carbon, etc., are by way of a manufacturing process. 
A completely new product commercially known and sold in the 
market as ferro manganese alloy which is a different product with 
different chemistry and, through smelting in furnace. [Para 23] 
[799-C-G] 
2.2 To bring the Ferro Manganese Plant of the appellant 
within the meaning of' mine', the State has argued that the Ferro 
Manganese Plant is being "used for crushing, processing, treating 
or transporting" the mineral, that is, manganese ore. This is 
clearly unsustainable as the appellant is neither crushing or 
processing or treating or transporting manganese ore but rather 
using it as one of the raw materials and consuming the same while 
manufacturing ferromanganese alloy. The state of crushing, 
treating, processing, etc. of the manganese ore (mineral) was in 
the IMB Plant (second stage), where the appellant is paying 
electricity duty at 40%. The same rate cannot be applied in the 
Ferro Manganese Plant (the third stage) as it cannot be taken to 
be within the meaning of 'mine' for the aforesaid reason. [Para 
24] [799-H; 800-A-C] 
2.3 If a new substance is brought into existence or if a new 
or different article having a distinctive name, character or use 
results from particular processes, such process or processes 
would amount to manufacture. [Para 25) [800-C-D] 
Gramophone Co. of
India Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, 
Calcutta 2000 (1) SCC 549; Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. v. 
Commissioner of Income Tax, Ernakulam 2001 (2) 
Suppl. SCR 559 : 2001 (7) SCC 525; Servo-Med 
Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise 
2015 (6) SCALE 137 - relied on. 
2.4 The Ferromanganese Alloy so manufactured by the 
appellant using the mineral Manganese at its Ferromanganese 
plant is an entirely different product from its mineral raw material 
both physically and even chemically. Moreover, unlike Manganese 
ore a ferromanganese alloy can never be found in the natural state 
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A and it has to be manufactured from the manganese ore and other 
minerals only. The same logic applies to copper concentrate as a 
different and distinct product comes into existence. Thus 
analyzed, in both the cases, the different products in commercial 
parlance have emerged. Hence, the principle of 11oscitur a sociis 
B has to be applied. As a logical corollary, tariff has to be levied as 
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meant for manufacturing unit. [Paras 30, 31] [804-A-C] 
State of MP v. Bir/a Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. 199S (1) 
Suppl. SCR 271: 199S ( 4) SCC 603; Hindustan Copper 
Ltd. v. State of MP and others 2004 (12) SCC 408; 
State of WB. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. And others 
2004 (1) SCR S64 : 2004 (10) SCC 201; Uranium 
Corporation of India Ltd., Bihar v. Collector of 
Central Excise, Patna 198S (19) ELT 609; V. P. 
Pithupitchai and another v. Special Secretary to the 
Govt. of TN. 2003 (3) SCR 104S : 2003 (9) SCC S34; 
Stone Crusher Owners Association and other v. MP 
Electricity Board and others MP No. 673/1993; 
Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd. 
v. Union of India and others 1973 (1) SCR 997: 1972 
(2) SCC 620; East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh 1962AIR1733 :1963 SCR 404; Elel Hotels 
and Investments 
Ltd. 
v. 
Union of India 
1990 AIR 1664 : 1989 (2) SCR 880 : 1989 (3) sec 
698 and Govt. of A.P v. P. Laxmi Devi 2008 (3) 
SCR 330: 2008 (4) SCC 720;Tarlochan Dev Sharma 
v. State of Punjab & Ors. 2001
(3) SCR 1146 : 2001 
(6) SCC 260; Union of India v. Harjeet Singh 
Sandhu 2001 (2) SCR 1127 : 2001 (5) SCC S93 -
referred to. 
Principles of Statutory Interpretation - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
199S (1) Suppl. SCR 271 
2004 (12) sec 408 
H 2004 (1) SCR S64 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
Paras 
Paras 
Para 10
MANGANESE ORE JNDIALTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
785 
1985 (19) ELT 609 
referred to 
Para 10 
A 
2003 (3) SCR 1045 
referred to 
ParalO 
1973 (1) SCR 997 
referred to 
Para 10 
1963 SCR 404 
referred to 
Para 11 
1989 (2) SCR 880 
referred to 
Para 11 
B 
2008 (3) SCR 330 
referred to 
Para 11 
2001 (3) SCR 1146 
referred to 
Parall 
2001 (2) SCR 1127 
referred to 
Para 11 
1990 (2) SCR 797 
relied on 
Para 18 
c 
2004 (1) SCR 470 
relied on 
Para18 
2007 (8) SCR 136 
relied on 
Para 19 
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 790 
relied on 
Para 19 
2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 559 
relied on 
Para 19, 26 
D 
2000 (1) sec 549 
relied on 
Para24 
2015 (6) SCALE 137 
relied on 
Para27 
CJVJLAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2464 
of2016. 
E 
From the Judgment and OrderdatedOl .12.2011 of the High Coutt 
ofMadhya Pradesh Principal Seat atJabalpur in Writ Petition No. 9017 
of2010 
WITH 
C.A. Nos. 2465-2467 of 2016. 
F 
Mukul Rohatgi,AG, P. P. Rao, Sr.Adv., T. G Narayanan Nair, 
Devashish Bharuka, K. N. Madhusoodhanan, Ravi Bharuka, R. K. Sanghi, 
Ms. Nandini Sen, Deba Prasad Mukherjee, Advs. for the Appellant. 
Amalpushp Shroti, B. S. Banthia, Mishra Saurabh,Amit Kumar 
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Lal, Advs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. l. In this batch ofappeals, by special leave, 
the appellants have assailed the legal tenability of separate orders dated 
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[2016] II S.C.R. 
A 01.12.2011 passed in Writ Petition No. 9017 of20 I 0 which relates to the 
writ petition filed by Manganese Ore India Ltd. and M.P. No. 2821 of 
1988, M.P. No. 3827of1993 and W.P. No. 3103of1994 preferred by 
Hindustan Copper Limited. 
B 
2. 
As the commonality of controversy centres around 
interpretation of the terms "mineral" and "processing" under the definition 
of"mine" as defined under Explanation (b) of Part-B of Madhya Pradesh 
Electricity Duty Act, 1949 (for brevity, "the Act"), we shall enumerate 
the scheme of the Act and the various litigations that have taken place 
and thereafter advert to the facts in each case. For brevity and to avoid 
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repetition, we have initially referred to the litigation and different orders 
passed in the case of Hindustan Copper Limited. 
3. 
The erstwhile Central Provinces and Berar Legislative 
Assembly had enacted the CP and Berar Electricity Duty Act, 1949 
which was adopted in the State of Madhya Pradesh and has come to be 
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known as the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949. The Preamble 
to the Act as amended by the State Legislature provides that it is an Act 
for the levy of duty on sale or consumption of electrical energy. Section 
3(1) of the Act accordingly provides for levy of duty on sale or 
consumption of electrical energy. It stipulates that subject to the exceptions 
E specified in Section 3-A, every distributor of electrical energy and every 
producer shall
pay every month to the State Government at the prescribed 
time and in the prescribed manner a duty calculated at the rates specified 
in the table below on the units of electrical energy sold or supplied to a 
consumer or consumed by himself for his own purposes or for purposes 
F of his township or colony, during the preceding month. The table to 
Section 3(1) prescribes different rates of duty depending for the purpose 
for which the electrical energy is sold. Part-B of the table provides for 
different rates of duty forthe electrical energy-sold, supplied or consumed 
for the purposes therein. Item 3 to the said table reads as follows:-
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"3. Mines (other than captive 
mines of cement industry)" 
40 
4. The numeral 40 comes under the heading 'rate of duty as 
percentage of the electricity tariff per unit'. The Explanation (b) to 
Section 3(1) defines "mine" as under:-
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
"Explanation .-(b) "Mine" means a mine to which the Mines 
Act, 1952 (No. 35of1952) applies and includes the premises or 
machinery situated in or adjacent to mine and used for crushing, 
processing, treating or transporting the mineral." 
5. 
It is necessary to state here that Hindustan Copper Limited 
had filed a Writ Petition to strike down the provision of Section 3 and the 
Table Part-B Item 4 (which is now Item No. 3 after 1995 amendment) 
and Explanation (b) which contains extended definition of mines as ultra 
vires the Constitution. As the factual matrix would reveal, the High 
Court dismissed the Writ Petition by placing reliance on State of M.P. v. 
Bir/a Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. 1• The matter travelled to this Court which 
eventually formed the subject matter of Civil Appeal Nos. 3248-50 of 
1998. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Hi11dusta11 Copper Ltd. v. 
State of M.P. and others1 taking note of certain facts opined that the 
main controversy that was required to be examined by the High Court 
was as to how the word "mines" is to be understood as contained in 
clause (b) of the Explanation under Item 4 of the Table contained in 
Section 3 of the Act. This Court took note of the contentions of the 
appellant therein that the activities carried on by it do not fall within the 
meaning of the word "adjacent" area and further the approach of the 
respondents was selective and discriminatory. As the
submissions raised 
were not dealt with by the High Court but it proceeded to dispose of the 
case without examining the facts in greater details in regard to either the 
activities carried on at different places by the appellant or as to how in 
the context of the facts of the case and having due regard to the provisions, 
the word "adjacent" should be construed, the Court remitted the Writ 
Petition to the High Court by stating so:-
"Under the circumstances, we consider it just and appropriate 
that the High Court should examine afresh the contentions 
advanced on behalf of the parties, having due regard to the materials 
placed on record and in the context of the provisions of the Act 
touching the controversy. Since we are taking a view to remit the 
case to the High Court, we do not wish to express one way or the 
other on the merits of the respective contentions urged by the 
parties .... " 
1 (1995)4 sec 603 
2 (2004) 12 sec 4os 
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6. After the remit, the High Court heard the Writ Petition and 
dismissed the same. The order passed by the High Court was assailed in 
appeal, !Jy special leave, in Civil Appeal No. 6725 of2008. In the second 
round, the two-Judge Bench stated the facts in detail which are to the 
effect that the appellant therein is engaged in extraction of copper ore, 
by open cast mining process involving drilling and blasting the ore in the 
open pit mine, the.ore in the form of boulders are transported to the 
primary crusher (situated at a distance of2.53 km from the mine), where 
it is crushed into pebbles/pieces and such crushed ore is then carried on 
a conveyor to a secondary crusher (situated at about 5 km from the 
mine) for further crushing into smaller pebbles. After the said stage, 
small pieces/pebbks are then carried by a conveyor to the Concentrator 
Plant (situated at 5.5 km from the mine). 
7. 
This Court further proceeded to state the facts adumbrated 
as projected by the appellant before the High Court. It was asserted 
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that:-
"4. In the Concentrator Plant, the ore is milled into powder in the 
ball mills. Such powder mixed with water is carried in the form 
of slurry to floatation cells. In the floatation cells, the slurry is 
subjected to froth floatation process and the copper concentrate 
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is removed and dried in vacuum driers and stored in concentrate 
storage sheds. The tailing pumps are at a distance
of8 km. A 
large quantity of water is required for the Concentrator Plant for 
being used in milling. Water is also required for the factory 
township. The required water is pumped from the mines through 
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pumps located at an intake well (situated at a distance of l 0 km 
from the mine). From the intake well, water is pumped to water 
treatment plant (situated at a distance of6 km from the mine). 
5. According to the appellant, its activities consist of two distinct 
parts. First is mining, that is, drilling, blasting and collecting of ore 
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which is carried on at mine pit. This activity is carried on in the 
mine area registered under the Mines Act, I 952. The second is 
processing, which is carried on at the primary crusher, the 
secondary crusher and the Concentrator Plant. The processing 
(manufacturing) part of the activities are carried on in the factory 
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area. The primary crusher, the secondary crusher, the ball mill,
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
the Concentrator Plant, the tailing pumps, the intake well and the 
water treatment plant are situated away from the mine, at 
distances varying from 2.5 km to I 0 km and are registered 
separately as a "factory" under the provisions of the Factories 
Act, 1948. The open pit mine (mining area) and the processing 
plants/machineries (factmy area) are all situated in a large tract 
ofland taken on mining lease from the State Government." 
8. 
The two-Judge Bench adverted to the chronology of the case 
and noted that the principal grievance of the appellant therein pertains to 
the definition of"mine" the effect of which is to make processing a part 
of mining and the prescription ofa higher rate of duty for "mines" (that 
is composite activity of mining and processing), while prescribing a lesser 
rate for other categories of industries. That apart, the Court taking note 
of the fact that classification of factories into two categories: (a) those 
which are adjacent to a mine and used for crushing, processing, treating 
and transporting the mineral; and (b) other factories is permissible. It 
was urged on behalf of the appellant that the expression "adjacent to the 
mines" is vague and ambiguous that leads to discriminatory treatment by , 
the authorities. Further, its processing plant, that is, the primary crusher, 
the secondary crusher, the ball mill, the Concentrator Plant, the tailing 
pumps, the intake
well and the water treatment plant are not situated 
"adjacent" to its mine and therefore could not be treated as "mine" for 
the purpose oflevy of electricity duty. The Court also took note of the 
issues framed by the High Court after the order ofremit on the earlier 
occasion. The said issues read as follows:-
"(i) Whether prescribing different rates of tax for processing 
plant and machinery adjacent to a mine ('factory' falling within 
the extended definition of 'mine'), and other factories is 
discriminatory and arbitrary and therefore violative of Articles 
14 and 19 of the Constitution oflndia? 
(ii) Whether definition of the word 'mine' in Explanation (b) in 
the Table under Section 3 of the Act, gives unguided discretion to 
authority under the Act to decide what is 'adjacent to a mine' 
and therefore invalid.? 
(iii) Whether use of the words 'adjacent to a mine' would mean 
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[2016] 11 S.C.R. 
only the premises or machinery abutting to or adjacent to the 
mine, and not premises or the plant/machinery situated at a 
distance of about 2.5 to 6 km? 
(iv) Whether the State had applied different yardsticks in charging 
duty to petitioner and in charging duty to Bhilai Steel, Balco, 
Manganese Ore India Ltd. and thereby practised discrimination?" 
9. 
It is imperative to state here that a contention was advanced 
by the appellant therein that the High Court had not considered the real 
issues and the questions formulated for determination did not cover the 
actual issues and disputes involved. The Cou11 proceeded to state the 
controversy in followingterms:-
"21. The Act was amended by the M.P. Electricity Duty 
(Amendment) Act, 1986 (in short "the Amendment Act"). 
Different rates of duty are provided in Pa11 B. In the said Part, 
clause ( 4) relates to the mines other than the captive mines of 
cement factory and the rate is 50 paise per unit of energy. 
Explanation (b) defines ;;mine" as follows: 
"(b) ;mine' means amine to which the Mines Act, 1952 ( 
35of1952) applies and includes the premises or machinery 
situated in or adjacent to a mine and used for crushing, 
processing, treating or transporting the mineral." 
22. It was submitted that the entry relating to mines refers to 
processing, treating or transporting the mineral. According to the 
learned Solicitor General the stress is on the
expression "mineral". 
It was pointed out that the appellant is manufacturing "copper 
concentrate" which is not a mineral and it is not doing "mining" 
so far as it is covered by clause (7) forother industries not covered 
under the above categories where the rate is 5 paise per unit of 
energy. Essentially the submission is that the Explanation only 
relates to mining or minerals. What is excisable is "copper 
concentrate" because there is a process of manufacturing 
involved. It is seen that Points (iii) and (iv) formulated by the 
High Court for determination are really relevant. But the points 
have not been correctly formulated to cover the actual essence 
of the dispute. The correct question would be as follows:
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
"Whether copper concentrate is a mineral and whether 
Explanation to Part B of the Act applies even though 
manufacturing process is involved to bring it into existence?"" 
In view of the aforesaid, this Court set aside the impugned judgment 
and remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of 
the question framed permitting the parties to place material in support of 
their respective stands. 
I 0. After the remand, before the High Court it was contended 
that mineral is something which grows in the mine and is capable of 
being won or extracted so as to be subjected to the better or precious 
use. It was further contended that copper ore is extracted at the mine 
pit and then it is subjected to processing whereafter copper ore becomes 
copper concentrate which is a different commodity which is an excisable 
product. On that basis, it was urged that copper concentrate is not a 
"mineral" and consequently, Explanation (b) to Part-B of Section 3 of 
the Act will notapply. Reliance was placed on State ofW.B. y. Kesoram 
Industries Ltd. and others3 and Uranium Corporation of India Ltd., 
Bihar v. Collector of Central Excise, Patna4• On behalf of the State, 
it was urged that copper concentrate is a "mineral" regard being had to 
the definition contained in Section 2(jj) of the Mines Act, 1952 (for short, 
"the 1952 Act") as well as Schedules I and II appended to the Mines and 
Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. The Division Bench 
was commended to the authority in V.P. Pithupitchai and another v. 
Special Secretary to the Govt. of T.N. 5 and the decision of the Division 
Bench of the High Court in Stone Crusher Owners Association and 
other v. M.P. Electricity Board and others6• On behalf of the 
respondents, the competent authority of the M.P. Electricity Board 
contended that the copper ore does not cease to be a "mineral" merely 
because it is subjected to the stated processing and therefore the copper 
concentrate does not lose its identity as a mineral. It was further submitted 
that even though the copper ore is subjected to processing yet its chemical 
structure does not change by placing reliance on the decision in Minerals 
'(2004) 10 SCC201 
' 1985 (19) ELT 609 
'(2003) 9 sec 534 
6 MP No. 673/1993 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] II S.C.R. 
A 
and Metals Trading C01poratio11 of India Ltd. v. Union ofI11dia and 
others7• 
B 
c 
11. The High Cou1t considering the rivalised submissions at the 
Bar, came to hold that the State has the authority to pick and choose 
districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates for taxation ifit does 
so reasonably and for the said purpose placed reliance on East India 
Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 8• It further opined that while 
latitude is available to the legislature in the matters of classification of 
objects, persons and things for purposes of taxation and it has to be so 
havingregard to the complexities involved in the formulation of taxation 
policy. To express the said opinion, the High Court placed reliance on 
El el Hotels am! Investments Ltd. 11. Union of lndia9 and Govt. of A.P. 
v. P. Laxmi Devi 10 • Thereafter it referred to subject-and-object rule 
and in that regard reproduced a passage from Principles of Statutory 
Interpretation 11 and commended itself to the authorities in Tarloclum 
D Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab & Ors. 11 and Union of India v. llarjeet 
Singh Sandhu 13 • After stating the legal proposition in the aforesaid 
manner, the High Court ruled that the 1949 Act is an enactment meant to 
provide for levy of duty on sale or consumption of electrical energy and 
the Act has been enacted in exercise of power under item 48 (b) List II 
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of the Government oflndiaAct, 1953 which
corresponds to Entry 53 of 
List II of the Vllth Schedule of the Constitution oflndia, namely, tax on 
consumption or sale of electricity. It referred to Section 3 of the Act and 
the definition of the term 'mine' and deduced that electricity duty under 
the Act is a tax which is levied on sale of consumption of electricity and 
fu1ther proceeded to state that if the table appended to Section 3 of the 
Act is seen, the classification for the purpose oflevy of electricity duty is 
based on the purpose for which the electrical energy is sold or consumed 
and the classification table for the purpose oflevy of duty. Dealing with 
the facet of classification, the High Court observed that:-
"The classification made under Section 3 of the Act has a clear 
1 (1972) 2 sec 620 
8 AIR 1962 SC 1733 
9 (1989) 3 sec 698 =AIR 1990 SC 1664 
10 (2008) 4 sec 120 
11 Justice GP. Singh, 12th Edn .. Page 349-350 
12 (2001 l 6 sec 260 
" (2001) 5 sec 593
MANGANESE ORE.INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, raising 
revenue by grouping different types ofindustries and prescribing 
different rates of duty depending upon the nature of the industry. 
The highest rate of electricity duty is prescribed by the legislature 
in its wisdom for the mining industry. The object of prescribing 
the highest rate of electricity duty appears to tax the person/ 
industry exploiting the nature wealth which is non-renewable. 
The exploiter has been required to contribute more, so that such 
contribution is, hopefully, utilized forthe welfare of the people to 
whim such natural wealth belongs". 
12. After so stating, it adverted to the anatomy of the definition 
of the term 'mine' and observed that the expression creates a legal fiction 
and, therefore, the definition will embrace only what is comprised within 
the ordinary meaning of'mine' part, together with what is mentioned in 
the inclusive part of the definition and, therefore, as per well settled rules 
of statutory interpretation has to be read with regard to subject and object 
of the Act. The Court proceeded to state that the object of the Act is to 
raise revenue by prescribing rate of duty and the highest rate of duty is 
prescribed for mining industries as it is exploiting the natural wealth which 
is non-renewable, therefore, it must pay higher rate of duty which can be 
utilized for meeting the essential
expenditures by the State Government. 
Thereafter, the High Court held:-
"Taking into account the fact that the expression 'mine' creates 
a legal fiction and ifthe word 'mineral' is read subject to the 
context and object of the Act, it is graphically clear that wide 
meaning has to be given to expression 'mineral'. If the copper 
ore is converted to copper concentrate by processing, it only 
enriches content of copper in the copper concentrate and it does 
not cease to be 'mineral' merely on its conversion from copper 
to copper concentrate. 
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In view of the preceding analysis, in our considered opinion 
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copper concentrate is a mineral as defined in explanation (b) to 
Part B of Section 3 of the Act and, therefore, the explanation (b) 
to Part B of Section 3 of the Act applies to it. 
Besides "copper concentrate: is the end product. What is 
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'crushed, processed, treated or transported' is not copper 
concentrate' but the ore. The electricity in question is being 
consumed for such "crushing, processing, treating or 
transportation"." 
13. Dwelling upon the word "adjacent" and the argument raised 
pertaining to discrimination between industries located in close proximity 
of the mine and other industries carrying on the same activity, namely, 
'crushing, processing, treating or transportation', which are not located 
in such close proximity of the mine, the Division Bench opined that:-
"The word 'adjacent' does not mean 'adjoining' or 'abutting', 
but has a wider connotation, and would include close proximity 
such being in the same locality. This proposition is not disputed, 
and therefore, it is not necessary to refer to the case law cited 
for the meaning of the word 'adjacent'. fn reply the learned 
Additional Advocate General submits that this differentiation is 
justified because the increased overheads such as transportation 
costs have been considered for not subjecting the far away 
industries to higher tax". 
14. When the matter was listed for hearing, Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, 
learned Attorney General appearing for the Manganese Ore India Ltd. 
and Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for Hindustan Copper 
Ltd. urged that the High Court has fallen into grave error by imposing 
the electricity duty on the basis of the definition
engrafted under 
Explanation (b) to Section 3(1) of the 1949 Act. It was contended by 
Mr. Rohtagi that manganese ore is a mineral under the Mines Act, 1952 
but ferro manganese is not a mineral because the said mineral is converted 
into "alloy" and ceases to be a mineral. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior 
counsel submitted that copper is a mineral but copper concentrate does 
not contain any character of a mineral and, therefore, the duty has to be 
charged at the rate of 8% and not at the rate of 40%. 
15. Mr. Saurabh, learned counsel for the State, per contra, 
contended that the definition is an inclusive one and hence, when the 
mineral is processed for the purpose of conversion to alloy, duty at the 
rate of 40% is leviable. Learned counsel for the State would submitthat 
the view expressed by the High Court is absolutely defensible.
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
795 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
16. The thrust of the matter is whether the aforesaid activity 
A 
after the mineral i.e. ore has been mined would be covered by the word 
'processing' used in the Explanation B to Item 3( I) which defines the 
term 'mine'. Mine as per the said explanation means a mine as to which 
the Mines Act, 1952 applies. The word "mine" as defined in the Mines 
Act, 1952 reads as follows:-
B 
"U) "mine" means any excavation where any operation for the 
purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been carried 
on, and includes 
(i-iv) ..... 
(v) 
all conveyors or aerial ropeways provided for the bringing 
into or removal from a mine of minerals or other articles or for 
the removal of refuse therefrom; 
(vi) all adits, levels, machinery, railways, tramways and sidings 
in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine; 
(vii) 
all protective works being carried on in or adjacent to 
the mine;" 
17. The word 'minerals' as defined in the Mines Act, 1952 reads 
as follows: 
"(ii)"minerals" mean all substances which can be obtained from 
the earth by mining, digging, drilling, dredging, hydraulicking, 
quarrying or by any other operation and includes mineral oils 
(which in tum include natural gas and petroleum)". 
18. Mining would comprehend every activity by which the mineral 
is extracted or obtained from earth irrespective of whether such activity 
is carried on at the surface or in the bowel, but it must be an
activity for 
winning a mineral. For the purpose ofltem 3 'mine' to which electrical 
energy is sold, supplied or consumed, it would include machinery or 
premises situated in the adjacent to the mine, provided the electricity is 
used for crushing, processing, treating or transporting the minerals. The 
word 'mineral' used in the aforesaid Explanation under the Act would 
have reference to the mineral which is mined and is then crushed, 
processed, treated or transported. The word 'processing' used in the 
Explanation has to be interpreted in the context and for the purpose of 
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the said item. Process can be given either a wide or a narrow meaning. 
In the context in which it is used in the Explanation, we are disposed to 
think that it must be given a meaning which emerges when we apply the 
rule of noscitur a sociis which means that the meaning of the word is to 
be judged by the company it keeps. [See: Ro/tit Pulp alld Paper Mills 
Ltd. v. Collector of Celltral Excise'•]. The rule of noscitur a sociis 
has been applied and accepted in Altmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers' 
Associatio11 v. Admillistrative O.ffecer & Ors. 15 We would prefer to 
construe the said word in the Explanation with reference to the words 
before and after for the word 'processing' used therein. The word 
'processing' herein, we think, should be interpreted and understood with 
the associated words 'crushing' and 'treating'. The word 'processing' 
is susceptible of the meaning keeping in view the word 'crushing' and 
'treatment' used before and afterwards. 
19. We are absolutely conscious that noscitur a sociis rule is 
not applied when the language is clear and there is no ambiguity, which 
according to us does exist and perceptible in the Explanation in question. 
A very broad and a wide definition of the term 'processing' ifapplied, 
would include manufacture ofa new or distinct product. Manufacture 
normally involves a series of processes either by hand or machine. [fa 
restricted construction is not applied
it would create and give rise to 
unacceptable consequences. It is not the intent to treat and regard 
manufacturing activities as processing. Manufacturing, as is understood, 
means a series of processes through different stages in which the raw 
material is subjected to change by different operations. [For different 
between process and manufacturing see C/Tv. TaraAgellcy 16, Oriellt 
Paper alld Industries v. State of M.P. a11d Anr. 17 and Aspinwall & 
Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Emakulam 18.] 
20. The words' crushing', 'treating' and 'transporting' are words 
of narrower significance and the word' processing' used between these 
G 
words should not be given a very wide meaning, for the legislative intent, 
according to us, is narrower. The word. 'processing' would take its 
"(1990) 3 sec 447 
"(2004) 1 sec 755 
" (2007) 6 sec 429 
11 (2006) 12 sec 468 
H 
"(2001) 1sec525
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
meaning in the cognate sense. In other words, the general word 
'processing' will be restricted to the sense conveyed by the words 
'crushing', 'treating' and 'transporting'. The intent being that electricity 
tariff payable in respect of mining activities would include the mine itself, 
all machinery situated or located in the mine or in a premises adjacent to 
the mine wherein crushing, processing, treatment or transportation of 
the minerals as mined is undertaken. The word 'processing' herein would 
mean those processes with the help of hands or machineries connected 
and linked to mining activity. It would not include process by which a 
new or different article other than the one which has been mined, is 
produced. It relates and signifies the composite activity of mining and 
processing. The intent is not to include processes which would lead to 
creation of a different commodity as known in the commercial world for 
otherwise even manufacturing activity would get covered, whereas 
manufacturing unit is liable to pay electricity tariff at a lower rate. The 
intent and purpose is certainly not to compel and force a manufacturing 
unit being set up at an acceptable distance from the mine, for the 
manufacturing unit adjacent to the mine would have to pay electricity 
tariff at a higher rate. Pertinently, a manufacturing unit set up by another 
entity, whether adjacent to the mine or not, would pay a
lower tariff. 
Such absurdity and irrationality has to be avoided. In the present context, 
we would, therefore, hold 'processing' would mean activities in order to 
make the mineral mined marketable, saleable and transportable, without 
substantially changing the identity of the mineral, as mined. When there 
is a substantial change at the mineral mined and the process results in a 
different commodity being produced or transforming and completely 
changing the mineral, it would fall outside the scope of the word 
'processing'. The restricted construction will also be acceptable in view 
of the use of the word 'mineral' in the end of the Explanation. The word 
'mineral' in the Explanation is the product which was mined and is put to 
'crushing', 'processing', 'treatment' and 'transporting' the mineral. In 
other words, mineral means mineral which was mined and not a new 
product created by using or processing the mineral mined. 
2 I. Be it noted, learned counsel forthe appellants would submit 
that the metals and minerals available in the earth are rarely found in the 
pure forms and degree of purity that the ultimate users demand. They 
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are intimately mixed, physically or chemically and often both, with other 
substances. For use, the good must be separated from the worthless 
substances. The sum total of the treatments to which the ores are 
subjected to in orderto separate and discard their worthless fractions by 
essentially physical means is called "Ore Dressing''. The various modes 
of Ore Dressing include handpicking, smting, screening, washing, jigging, 
magnetic separation, crushing, grinding, etc. In this process, there is no 
change in the chemical composition and properties of mined mineral, 
before and after processing/dressing to make it saleable. It is important 
to point out that mineral/dressing is a subject matter of Mineral 
processing. 
22. As distinguished from the above, manufacturing of an alloy, 
etc. is a subject matter of Metallurgy and is a part of Metallurgical branch 
ofengineering. Ore Dressing is defined as the processing of raw mineral 
to yield a marketable mineral by such means that do not destroy the 
chemical identity of the minerals. On the other hand, an alloy like the 
Ferro Manganese Alloy is a result of a manufacturing method which 
involves Electro thermic smelting in case of the appellant which ultimately 
changes the chemical identity of manganese ore resulting into 
ferromanganese alloy. This method requires manganese ore as one of 
the raw materials for the manufacture of Ferro Manganese Alloy. Ferro
Alloy is defined as an alloy of iron with a sufficient amount of some 
element or element such as manganese, silicon, chromium or vanadium 
as a means ofintroducing these elements into iron and steel. Customarily, 
Ferro alloys are identified or designated by the principal base metals 
present in them. The names of Ferro alloys are abbreviated by using 
chemical symbols, e.g., FeMn, FeSi and FeCr standing for Ferro 
Manganese, Ferro Silicon and Ferro Chromium, respectively. 
Manufacturing of Ferro manganese alloy involves the use of manganese 
ore as a raw material which is subjected along with other raw material 
(Dolomite, Iron Ore, Coke, Coal and Carbon Paste), to Electro thermic 
G smelting. The manufacturing of Ferro Manganese by Electro thermic 
smelting is a continuous smelting with the electrodes submerged deep 
into the charge. The smelting includes the stages as follows: pre-heating 
of the materials, drying and removal of volatiles, reduction ofoxides, and 
smelting of the metal and slag. The same reasoning and manufacturing 
H
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
[DIPAK MlSRA, J .) 
processing is required to create copper concentrate, a new and different 
commercial product. lt is not the mineral as mined. 
23. It is urged that Ferromanganese is an alloy and is not a 
mineral. The same is an alloy of manganese and iron and is not available 
in natural form. It is manufactured in the ferromanganese plant of the 
appellant- Manganese Ore India Ltd. by using raw materials LIKE 
manganese ore, iron, coal, coke, dolomite, etc. It is further contended 
that the appellant, Manganese Ore India Ltd. has, within its manganese 
ore mine area, an Integrated Manganese Beneficiation Plant (IMB Plant) 
as also a Ferro Manganese Plant (FMP). Following is the seriatim in 
which the mining/processing/manufacturing takes place:-
a. First Stage : The appellant mines manganese ore from its mines. There 
is a levy of electricity duty on the appellant's consumption of electricity 
during mining at 40%, which the appellant is not disputing. 
b. Second State: Such mines manganese ore is processed by removal of 
impurities in the appellant's Integrated Manganese Beneficiation Plant 
(IMB Plant). During this process the cleaning of mineral takes place by 
various methods to remove impurities and foreign contents for the 
enrichment of the manganese content and during this process, the 
manganese mineral remains a mineral. There is a levy of electricity duty 
on the appellant's consumption of electricity ofIMB
Plant at 40%, which 
the appellant is not disputing. It is relevant to note that 95% to 98% of 
such processed manganese ore is sold in open market. Remaining is 
then sent as a raw material to the appellant's Ferro Manganese Plant 
(FMP). 
c. Third State: At the Ferro Manganese Plant, raw materials like, 
processed manganese ore (for which 40% electricity duty is already 
paid by IMB Plant), iron ore, coke, dolomite, coal, carbon, etc., are by 
way of a manufacturing process through a furnace, blended into a 
completely new product commercially known and sold in the market as 
ferromanganese alloy which is a different product with different chemistry 
and, through smelting in furnace. This is nothing but a manufacturing 
activity, where raw materials like manganese ore, iron ore, coke, dolomite, 
coal, carbon, etc are completely consumed/exhausted. 
24. To bring to the Ferro Manganese Plant of the appellant within 
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the meaning of'mine', the State has argued before this Court that the 
Ferro Manganese Plant is being "used for crushing, processing, treating 
or transporting" the mineral, that is, manganese ore. This is clearly 
unsustainable as the appellant is neither crushing or processing or treating 
or transporting manganese ore but rather using it as one of the raw 
materials and consuming the same while manufacturing fetrnmanganese 
alloy. The state of crushing, treating, processing, etc. of the manganese 
ore (mineral) was in the !MB Plant (second stage), where the appellant 
is paying electricity duty at 40%. The same rate cannot be applied in the 
Ferro Manganese Plant (the third stage) as it cannot be taken to be 
within the meaning of'mine' forthe aforesaid reason. 
25. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that in 
numerous decisions, this Cout1 has reiterated that if a new substance is 
brought into existence or ifa new or different article having a distinctive 
name, character or use results from particular processes, such process 
or processes would amount to manufacture. In the case of Gramopl1011e 
Co. of India Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Ca/cutta 19, this Court held:-
" 11. The term "manufacture" is not defined in the Customs Act. 
In the allied Act, namely the Central Excise Act, 1944 also, the 
term "manufacture" is not to be found defined though vide clause 
(f) of Section 2 an
inclusive definition is given of the term 
"manufacture" so as to include certain processes also therein. 
12. "Manufacture" came up for the consideration of the 
Constitution Bench in Ujagar Prints v. Union of India (J 989) 
3 sec 488. lt was held that if there should come into existence 
a new article with a distinctive character and use, as a result of 
the processing, the essential condition justifying manufacture of 
goods is satisfied. The following passage in the Permanent Edition 
of Words and Phrases was referred to with approval in Delhi 
Cloth and General Mills, AIR 1963 SC 791 at p. 795: 
"'Manufacture' implies a change, but every change is not 
manufacture and yet every change of an article is the result of 
treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is 
necessary and there must be transformation; a new and different 
•• (2000) i sec 549
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
801 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or 
A 
use." 
13. In a series of decisions [to wit, Decorative Laminates (India) 
(P) Ltd v. CCE, (!996) JO SCC 46, Union of India v. Parle 
Products (P) Ltd. 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 662, Laminated 
Packings (P) Ltd v. CCE, (!990) 4 SCC 51 and Empire 
Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (!985) 3 SCC 314] the view taken 
consistently by this Court is that the moment there is 
transformation into a new commodity commercially known as a 
distinct and separate commodity having its own character, use 
and name whether it be the result of one process or several 
processes, manufacture takes place; the transformation of the 
goods into a new and different article should be such that in the 
commercial world it is known as another and different article. 
Pre-recorded audio cassettes are certainly goods known in the 
market as distinct and different from blank audio cassettes. The 
two have different uses. A pre-recorded audio cassette is generally 
sold by reference to its name or title which is suggestive of the 
contents of the audio recording on the cassette. The appellant is 
indulging in a mass production of such pre-recorded audio 
cassettes. It is a manufacturing activity. The appellant's activity 
cannot be compared with a person sitting in the market extending 
the facility of recording any demanded music or sounds on a 
blank audio cassette brought by or made
available to the customer, 
which activity may be called a service. The Tribunal was not 
right in equating the appellant's activity with photoprocessing and 
holding the appellant a service industry." 
26. In Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. (supra) this Court has held as 
follows:-
" 13. The word "manufacture" has not been defined in the Act. 
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In the absence ofa definition of the word "manufacture" it has 
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to be given a meaning as is understood in common parlance. It is 
to be understood as meaning the production ofarticles for use 
from raw or prepared materials by giving such materials new 
forms, qualities or combinations whether by hand labour or 
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machines. If the change made in the article results in a new and 
different article then it would amount to a manufacturing activity. 
14. This Court while determining as to what would amount to a 
manufacturing activity, held in CSTv. Pio Food Packers, 1980 
Supp. SCC 174 : that the test for determination. whether 
manufacture can be said to have taken place is whether the 
commodity which is subjected to the process of manufacture 
can no longer be regarded as the original commodity, but is 
recognized in the trade as a new and distinct commodity. It was 
observed: (SCC p. 176, para 5) 
"Commonly manufacture is the end result of one or more 
processes through which the original commodity is made to 
pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one 
case to another, and indeed there may be several stages of 
processing and perhaps a different kind of processing at each 
stage. With each process suffered, the original commodity 
experiences a change. But it is only when the change, or a 
series of changes, take the commodity to the point where 
commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original 
commodity but instead is recognized as a new and distinct article 
that a manufacture can be said to take place." 
15. Adverting to facts of the present case, the assessee after 
plucking or receiving the raw coffee berries makes it undergo 
nine processes to give it the shape of coffee beans. The
net 
product is absolutely different and separate from the input. The 
change made in the article results in a new and different article 
which is recognized in the trade as a new and distinct commodity. 
The coffee beans have an independent identity distinct from the 
raw material from which it was manufactured. A distinct change 
comes about in the finished product. 
16. Submission of the learned counsel for the Revenue that the 
assessee was doing only the processing work and was not involved 
in the manufacture and production of a new article cannot be 
accepted. The process is a manufacturing process when it brings 
out a complete transformation in the original article so as to
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
803 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
produce a commercially different article or commodity. That 
A 
process itself may consist of several processes. The different 
processes are integrally connected which results in the production 
of a commercially different article. !fa commercially different 
article or commodity results afl:er processing then it would be a 
manufacturing activity. The assessee after processing the raw 
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betTies conve1is them into coffee beans which is a commercially 
different commodity. Conversion of the raw berry into coffee 
beans would be a manufacturing activity." 
27. This Court in Servo-Med Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. 
Commissioner of Central 1:..xcise
111 has held as under:-
"27 .(J) Where the goods remain exactly the same even after a 
particular process, there is obviously no manufacture involved. 
Processes which remove foreign matter from goods complete in 
themselves and/or processes which clean goods that are complete 
in themselves fall within this category." 
"27 .( ./) Where the goods are transfonned into goods which are 
different and/or new after a particular process, such goods being 
marketable as such. It is in this category that manufacture of 
goods can be said to take place." 
28. Thus, the Ferro Manganese Plant, being a unit involved in 
manufacturing offerromanganese alloy as opposed to a unit involved in 
crushing, treating, processing, etc. of manganese ore, cannot be treated 
within the
extended definition of'mine' within the Explanation (b) of 
Part B ofTable of Rates of Duty to Section 3(1) of the Act. 
29. The Executive Engineer and Chief Electrical Inspector, 
Government of Madhya Pradesh, vide its letter dated 06.02.2005 to the 
Superintendent Engineer and Deputy Electrical Inspector, Government 
of Madhya Pradesh, had confirmed as under:-
"On spot inspection it is confirmed that, Ferro Manganese Plant 
does not come in the Mining Area and Electricity Duty@ 8% 
being charged at present by the M.P. State Electricity Board is 
proper." 
20 2015 (6) SCALE 137 
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A 
30. The Ferromanganese Alloy so manufactured by the appellant 
using the mineral Manganese at its Ferromanganese plant is an entirely 
different product from its mineral raw material both physically and even 
chemically. Moreover, unlike Manganese ore a ferromanganese alloy 
can never be found in the natural state and it has to be manufactured 
B 
from the manganese ore and other minerals only. The same logic applies 
to copper concentrate as a different and distinct product comes into 
existence. 
31. Thus analyzed, we find that in both the cases, the different 
products in commercial parlance have emerged. Hence, we are inclined 
C 
to think that the principle of noscitur a sociis has to be applied. As a 
logical corollary, tariff has to be levied as meant for manufacturing unit. 
Therefore, the analysis made by the High Court is not correct and, 
accordingly, the judgments rendered by it deserve to be set aside and we 
so direct. However, during this period if any amount has been paid by 
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the appellants to the revenue, the same shall be adjusted towards future 
demands. 
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32. Consequently, appeals are allowed. In the facts and 
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 
Ankit Gyan 
Appeals allowed.