SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS. versus THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR.
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 594, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 594 : 2023 INSC 750
594
CASE DETAILS
SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS.
v.
THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 2857 of 2011)
AUGUST 22, 2023
[BELA M. TRIVEDI AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Award was passed by the Reference Court 
determining the amount of additional compensation to be paid to the 
appellant-trust. High Court whether justiﬁ ed in setting aside the award 
and remanding the matter to decide as to whether the Reference made was 
within the limitation as per s.18, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and decide 
the Reference afresh.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894—s.18–Application made by the 
appelant-trust seeking reference, if was beyond the period of limitation 
prescribed u/s. 18 or not in consonance with the consent terms arrived 
at between the parties:
Held: In view of the proviso to s.18, every application to the Collector 
seeking reference u/s.18 is required to be made within the time limit 
prescribed in the proviso thereto – However, in the instant case, the parties 
having entered into the consent terms on 20.10.1997 after the award u/s.11 
was made on 12.01.1996, and the respondent having speciﬁ cally agreed to 
pay the compensation awarded u/s.11 and take over the vacant and peaceful 
possession of the lands in question from the appellant as also having agreed 
to make reference to the District Court for the determination of market 
value of the said lands as on 17.12.1994, it did not lie in the
mouth of the 
respondent- Committee to say that the application made by the appellant-
trust seeking reference to the District Court was beyond the period of 
limitation prescribed u/s.18 or was not in consonance with the consent
595
terms arrived at between the parties – Since the consent terms as well as the 
directions contained in the order of High Court were silent as to within what 
period the appellant should make application to the respondent-Collector 
seeking Reference u/s.18, the respondent-Committee taking undue advantage 
of such ambiguity in the consent terms, raised the issue of limitation before 
the Reference Court – Reference Court rightly held that the Reference 
was ﬁ led with the Collector within the period of limitation as per the 
order passed by the High Court – High Court erred in interfering with 
the said well-reasoned ﬁ ndings and in setting aside the entire award and 
remanding the matter back to the Reference Court for deciding it afresh 
– Impugned judgments passed by the High Court ex facie erroneous, set 
aside.[Paras 7 and 9]
Interpretation of Statutes – Doctrine of Harmonious 
Construction:
Held: As per the rules of doctrine of harmonious construction, the 
document has to be read as a whole and in its totality – If there is any 
ambiguity either patent or latent, in any of the clauses of the document, 
the Courts should interpret such clause in such manner which is consistent 
with the other clauses and with the purpose and intent of the parties 
executing it.[Para 8]
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2857 of 
2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.09.2009 of the High Court 
of Bombay in
FA No. 1447 of 2006.
With
Civil Appeal No. 2858 of 2011.
Appearances:
B. H. Marlapalle, Sr. Adv., Anil Ahuja, Ajit Pravin Wagh, Avinish 
Saurabh, Saurabh Kumar, Preshit Vilas Surshe, Advs. for the Appellants.
SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS. v. 
THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR.
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Adv., M. Y. Deshmukh, Ms. Manjeet Kirpal, 
Ms. Adviteeya Sharma, Ms. Mishika Bajpai, Sachin Patil, Ms. Yugandhara 
Pawar Jha, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat 
Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. The Respondent no. 1- Market Committee had preferred two First 
Appeals being Nos. 1447 of 2006 and 1490 of 2006 before the High Court 
of Judicature at Bombay, challenging the award dated 07.03.2006 passed 
by the II Adhoc Additional District Judge, Nashik (hereinafter referred to as 
‘the Reference Court’) in Land Reference No. 525 of 1997. The High Court 
vide the impugned judgment and order dated 23.09.2009 allowed the First 
Appeal No. 1447 of 2006 and set aside the award dated 07.03.2006 passed 
by the Reference Court, and remanded the matter to the Reference Court 
to decide the question as to whether the Reference made to the Reference 
Court was within the limitation as per Section 18 of the Land Acquisition 
Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and decide the Reference 
afresh. The High Court vide the separate order of the even date, disposed 
of the First Appeal No. 1490 of 2006 observing that in view of the order 
passed in First Appeal No. 1447 of 2006, the appeal had become infructuous. 
The appellant- trust has preferred the instant appeals being aggrieved by the
judgments and orders passed in First Appeal Nos. 1447 of 2006 and 1490 
of 2006 by the High Court. 
2. Though the case has a chequered history, the bare facts necessary for 
the purpose of deciding the present appeals may be summarised as under:
(i) The lands bearing Survey Nos. 74, 75, 76 and 29 situated at 
Nashik, Makhamalabad belonging to the appellant- trust were 
sought to be acquired by the respondent no. 2 for the respondent 
no. 1– Agricultural Produce Market Committee under Section 6 of 
the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 126 of the Maharashtra 
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 vide the Notiﬁ cation dated 
17.06.1993.
597
(ii) In the said acquisition proceedings, an award was declared under 
Section 11 of the Act on 12.01.1996. The appellant- trust ﬁ led 
the Writ Petition being No. 607 of 1996 challenging the said 
proceedings on the ground that the award declared was beyond 
the statutory period of limitation. Initially the High Court granted 
an ad-interim injunction in favour of the appellant (the petitioner 
in the said petition) on 06.02.1996, against which the respondent 
had preferred a special leave petition before this Court. However, 
the SLP came to be dismissed by this Court. 
(iii) Since by virtue of the said interim order passed in the said writ 
petition, the possession of the lands in question continued with the 
appellant- trust, and though an award was declared under Section 
11 of the Act, the amount awarded remained with respondent 
no. 2, considering the hardship caused to both the parties, the 
appellant (the petitioner in the said petition) and the respondent 
no. 1- Agricultural Produce Market Committee (the respondent no. 
4 in the said writ petition) arrived at a Settlement on 20.10.1997 
and requested the High Court to dispose of the said writ petition 
in terms of the consent terms arrived at between the parties.
(iv) The High Court disposed of the said Writ Petition No. 607 of 1996 
by passing the following order on 20th October, 1997: -
“By consent of Parties Petition taken up for ﬁ nal hearing on 
board today. The consent terms between the petitioner and 4th 
Respondent taken on record.

Perused the Consent Terms. The same are just, fair, and equitable 
and hence are accepted.

In view of the above, this shall be an order in terms of Consent 
Terms and it is hereby directed as under:

(a) It is directed that the relevant date for determining market 
value of suit land would be 1 & 1/2 year after the publication 
of (illegible) Notiﬁ cation under Section 6 i.e., 17.06.1993 
and consequently both parties agree and admit that Market 
Value be determined as on 17.12.1994 date. 
SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS. v. 
THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

598
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.

(b) It is further directed that the petitioner shall hand over vacant 
and peaceful possession to the 4th Respondent through 2nd 
respondent within 4 weeks from the date of this order and 
that the petitioner Trust shall be paid the amount determined 
under the Award under section 11 by the 2nd respondent at the 
time of handing over possession.
(c) It is further directed that the Petitioner Trust shall within 4 weeks 
ﬁ le an Application to 2nd respondent under section 18 of the 
Land Acquisition Act and that the 2nd Respondent is directed to 
send the reference to District Court, Nasik within 4 weeks from 
the date of receipt. It is further directed that the District Court 
after hearing the reference shall determine the Market Value as 
on 17.12.1994 dated as agreed between the parties hereto.

(d) The parties are at liberty to challenge the decision regarding 
valuation given in Reference in the District Court, in accordance 
with law.

(e) The compromise & decision so arrived ﬁ nally, should not be 
treated as a precedent.
In view of the above, petition shall stand disposed of. No order 
as to cost.”
(v) Pursuant to the said order passed by the High Court, the payment 
was made to the appellant on 17.11.1997 and the possession of 
lands was handed over by the appellant. The appellant thereafter 
submitted an application on 03.12.1997 to respondent no. 2– 
Collector seeking reference to the District Court. The respondent 
No. 2– Collector accordingly referred the matter to the District 
Court on 18.12.1997.
(vi) The Reference Court after considering the issue of limitation raised 
on behalf of the respondents in the said Reference, held that the 
Reference ﬁ led with the Collector was within the period of limitation 
as per the order of the High Court. The Reference Court further 
determined the amount of additional compensation to be paid to the 
appellant-trust vide the award dated 07.03.2006.
599
(vii) The respondent no. 1- Committee, being aggrieved by the said award 
preferred the First Appeals being 1447 of 2006 and 1490 of 2006 
before the High Court, which came to be allowed vide the impugned 
orders as stated herein above.
3. The learned senior counsel Mr. B.H. Marlapalle appearing for the 
appellant- trust submitted that ﬁ ndings arrived at by the High Court with 
regard to the issue of limitation are ex facie erroneous. According to him, 
though the consent terms, more particularly, clause (c) thereof was not 
happily worded, the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition vide 
the order dated 20.10.1997 had speciﬁ cally directed the Reference Court 
to determine the market value of the lands in question as on 17.12.1994 as 
agreed between the parties, and therefore, the respondents could not have 
raised the issue of limitation contained in Section 18 of the Act. He further 
submitted that both the parties had to act in terms of the order passed by 
the High Court based on the consent terms, and therefore the respondent- 
Committee could not have raised the issue of limitation under Section 18.
4. Per Contra, the learned senior Counsel Mr. Parag Tripathi appearing 
for respondent no. 1- Committee pressing into service clause (c) of the 
consent terms vehemently submitted that there being no time limit mentioned 
in the said clause, it was required to be construed that the appellant- trust 
had to make an application to the second respondent under
Section 18 of the 
said Act within four weeks from the date of the order passed by the High 
Court i.e. from 20.10.1997 and the appellant having made the application 
seeking reference on 03.12.1997 i.e. after four weeks of the order dated 
20.10.1997, such an application was clearly barred by limitation in view of 
the consent terms as well as under Section 18 of the said Act.
5. Having carefully gone through the order dated 20.10.1997 passed by 
the High Court in Writ Petition No. 607 of 1996 based on the consent terms 
arrived at between the appellant- trust and the respondent no. 1- Committee, 
and the award passed by the Reference Court as also the impugned judgments 
and orders passed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the issue of 
limitation raised by respondent- Committee before the Reference Court and 
before the High Court was not only not tenable but was highly unreasonable 
and improper. As discernible from the consent terms, the very purpose of 
arriving at the said consent terms was to do away with the hardship caused 
SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS. v. 
THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
600
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
to both the parties because of the pendency of the Writ Petition. A monetary 
loss was being caused to the appellant- trust as it was losing the interest on the 
awarded amount under Section 11 of the said Act, and the respondent no. 1- 
Committee though was in dire need of the land, was deprived of the possession 
of the said lands under Acquisition. As per the said consent terms, both the 
parties had agreed that the relevant date for determining the market value of the 
lands in question would be 17.12.1994. It was further agreed that the appellant- 
trust would hand over the vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent- 
Committee and the appellant would be paid the amount determined under the 
Award under Section 11 of the Act by the respondent- Committee within four 
weeks from the date of the order passed by the Court. Lastly, it was agreed that 
the appellant- trust shall within a period of four weeks ﬁ le an application to 
the respondent no. 2 under Section 18 of the Act and the respondent no. 2 shall 
send the said reference for determination of value of the land as on 17.12.1994 
to the District Court, Nashik. The High Court disposed of the said Writ Petition 
giving directions in terms of the said consent terms.
6. Now, since the consent terms as well as the directions contained in 
the order of High Court were silent as to within what period the appellant 
should make application to the respondent- Collector
seeking Reference under 
Section 18 of the Act, the respondent- Committee taking undue advantage of 
such ambiguity in the consent terms, raised the issue of limitation before the 
Reference Court. Such a plea raised after taking over the possession of lands in 
question from the appellant was not only not in consonance with the tenor of the 
consent terms but it smacked of ulterior motive on the part of the respondent. 
The High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition No. 607 of 1996 had given 
directions in terms of the consent terms, and both the parties were expected to 
act accordingly. In view of said directions given by the High Court, the issue of 
limitation contained in Section 18 of the Act had clearly paled into insigniﬁ cance, 
and the respondent could not have raised such a plea before the Reference Court 
or before the High Court.
7. There cannot be any disagreement to the legal proposition that in view 
of the proviso to Section 18 of the said Act, every application to the Collector 
seeking reference under Section 18 is required to be made within the time limit 
prescribed in the proviso to Section 18. However, in the instant case, the parties 
having entered into the consent terms on 20.10.1997 after the award under
601
Section 11 was made on 12.01.1996, and the respondent having speciﬁ cally 
agreed to pay the compensation awarded under Section 11 and take over the 
vacant and peaceful possession of the lands in question from the appellant as 
also having agreed to make reference to the District Court, Nashik, for the 
determination of market value of the said lands as on 17.12.1994, it did not lie 
in the mouth of the respondent- Committee to say that the application made by 
the appellant- trust seeking reference to the District Court, Nashik was beyond 
the period of limitation prescribed under Section 18 or was not in consonance 
with the consent terms arrived at between the parties. Since the market value 
of the lands as on 17.12.1994 which was the reckonable date agreed by the 
parties, was required to be determined by the District Court, Nashik, making 
of an application to the Collector seeking a Reference under Section 18 was a 
sheer procedural formality required to be followed by the appellant. Though 
the consent terms and the directions of High Court were silent as to within 
what period the appellant had to make such an application, it was required 
to be construed that appellant had to make application after it received the 
compensation awarded under Section 11 and after it handed over possession 
of the lands, which it did.
8. It cannot be gainsaid that as per the rules of doctrine of harmonious 
construction, the document has to be read as a whole and in its
totality. If there 
is any ambiguity either patent or latent, in any of the clauses of the document, 
the courts should interpret such clause in such manner which is consistent with 
the other clauses and with the purpose and intent of the parties executing it.
9. The Reference Court after considering all the legal and factual aspects 
of the matter had rightly held that the Reference was ﬁ led with the Collector 
within the period of limitation as per the order passed by the High Court. In 
our opinion, the High Court had committed gross error in interfering with the 
said well-reasoned ﬁ ndings recorded by the Reference Court, and in setting 
aside the entire award and remanding the matter back to the Reference Court 
for deciding it afresh. The impugned judgments and orders passed by the High 
Court being ex facie erroneous, the same are set aside. 
10. In that view of the matter, both the appeals are allowed.
Headnotes prepared by: 
Appeals allowed.
Divya Pandey
SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL TRUST AND ORS. v. 
THE CHAIRMAN AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]