HARPAL SINGH versus ASHOK KUMAR & ANR.
[2017] 14 S.C.R. 107, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2017] 14 S.C.R. 107 
HARPAL SINGH 
v. 
ASHOK KUMAR & ANR. 
(Civil Appeal No. 22967of2017) 
DECEMBER 15,2017 
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND · 
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.) 
A 
B 
Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 - s.185 - Bar under - When 
attracted- Held: To be 'land' for the purpose of ibe 1954 Act, the 
C 
land must be held or occupied for purposes contemplated under 
the Act - Where the land is not used for any such purpose and has 
been built upon, it would cease to be agricultural land - And once 
the agricultural land loses its basic character and is converted into 
authorized/unauthorized colonies, disputes of plot holders cannot 
be decided by the revenue authorities and would have to be resolved D 
by the civil court - Thus, the bar uls.185 would not be attracted -
In the instant case, respondents had filed suit for possession uls.6 
of the Specific Relief Act - However, the land in question had ceased 
to be agricultural in nature and thus, was not governed by the 1954 
Act - Resultantly, the bar uls.185 was not attracted - Objection 
E 
raised by appellant to execution of the decree was without 
foundation - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.6. 
Decree - Challenge to, before executing court - Ground for -
Held: Validity of a decree can be challenged before an executing 
court only on the ground of inherent lack of jurisdiction which 
renders the decree a nullity. 
Respondents-plaintiffs filed suit for possession against the 
appellant under Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963. The 
F 
suit was decreed ex-parte by trial court. Respondents initiated 
proceedings for execution of the decree. The appellant filed 
objection on the ground that since the suit land was agricultural G 
land, hence a civil suit was barred under Section 185 ofthe Delhi 
Land Reforms Act, 1954. The objection was dismissed by the 
executing court. The appellant challenged the said order of the 
executing court before High Court by filing petition under Article 
227, which was dismissed. Hence, the present appeal. 
H 
107
108 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 14 S.C.R. 
A 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD:l.1 The position of law is that where the land has 
not been used for any purpose contemplated under the Land 
Reforms Act, 1954 and has been built upon, it would cease to be 
agricultural land. Once agricultural land loses its basic character 
B and has been converted into authorized/u·nauthorized colonies 
by dividing it into plots, disputes of plot holders cannot be decided 
by the revenue authorities and would have to be resolved by the 
civil court. The bar under Section 185 of the Act would not be 
attracted. (Para 6) [112-B-C) 
c 
1.2 In the present case, the finding of fact which was arrived 
at by the executing Court in the course of its decision on the 
objection to execution is that the land had ceased to be agricultural 
land and was not being used for purposes contemplated under 
the 1954 Act. The said findings have not been squarely challenged 
in these proceedings. Hence, it cannot be held that the decree of 
D the trial court was a nullity. The land was not governed, as a result, 
by the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 since it was not agricultural 
and thus, the bar under Section 185 was not attracted. 
[Paras 8, 9) (113-F-G; 114-E, F) 
1.3 The validity of a decree can be challenged before an 
E executing court only on the gorund of an inherent lack of 
jurisdiction which renders the decree a nullity. In the present 
case, there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction and the
objection 
to the execution of the decree was without foundation. [Paras 7, 
9) [112-C; 114-F] 
F 
G 
H 
Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath [1962) 2 SCR 747 -
relied on. 
Ram Lubbaya Kapoor v. JR Chawla and others 1986 
RLR 432; Narain Singh and Anr v. Financial 
Commissioner (2008) 105 DRJ 122; Neelima Gupta and 
Ors i~ Yogesh Saroha and Ors. 156 (2009) DLT 129 ; 
Anand J Datwani v. Ms Geeti Bhagat Datwani and Ors. 
(2013 (137) DRJ 146 ; Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash 
(1977) 2 SCC 662 : (1977) 3 SCR 60 ; Gaon Sabha v 
Nathi (2004) 12 sec. 555 : (20041 3 SCR 354 -
referred to.
. HARPAL SINGH v. ASHOKKUMAR &ANR.. 
109 
Case Law Reference 
1986 RLR 432 
referred to 
Paras 
(2008) lOS DRJ 122 
referred to 
Paras 
1S6 (2009) DLT 129 
referred to 
Para5 
(2013 (137) DRJ 146 
referred to 
Paras 
[1962] 2 S~R 747 
r:elied on 
Para7 
[1977] 3 SCR 60 
referred to 
Para7 
[2004] 3 SCR 3S4 
referred to 
Para7 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 22967 
of2017. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 19 .09.2014 of the High Court 
of Delhi at New Delhi in C. M. (Main) 1368 of 2010. 
Raj iv Dewan, Balraj Dewan, Advs. for the Appellant. 
Kavin Gulati, Sr. Adv., Avi Tandon, Avinash Sharma, Advs. for 
. the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. 1. Leave granted. 
2. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, by a judgment 
dated 19 September 2014 rejected a petition under Article 227 of the 
Constitution. The petition sought to challenge an order dated 21 August 
2010 of the Additional District Judge (North) rejecting the objections of 
the appellant in the course of the execution of a decree. 
A 
B 
c 
D, 
E 
F 
3. Sometime in 2002 a suit was instituted by the respondents for a 
permanent injunction, alleging that the defendants to the suit were 
threatening to interfere with the possession of their lands situated at 
Nilothi, Delhi. The suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge on 14 F ebmary 
2005, holding it to be barred by the provisions of Section 185 (1) of the ·G 
Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. The
Trial court held that the plaintiff had 
failed to place any registered document on record to establish his 
· -. ownership in respect of the land. Moreover, in the view of the trial Court, 
it was necessary for the plaintiffs to first seek a declaration from the 
revenue court as bhoomidars upon which alone an injunction could be 
H
110 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 14 S.C.R. 
A sought. Subsequently, on 31 December 2005 the respondents instituted 
a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act against the appellant, 
alleging that the appellant had forcibly taken possession of the land. In 
response it was the case of the appellant that he was neither in possession 
of the land nor had he dispossessed the respondents. The suit was 
B decreed by the trial court ex-parte on 30 May 2009, upon which execution 
was initiated by the respondents as decree-holders. In the course of the 
execution, the appellant filed objections on the ground that he was not 
concerned with the suit property and was not in possession and on the 
ground that the ex-parte decree was obtained by misrepresentation and 
fraud. The objections were dismissed in default on 16 April 2010 and a 
C warrant of possession was directed to be issued by the ADJ (North)-04, 
Delhi. The appellant appears to have filed objections to the execution of 
the decree on 12 July 2010 on the ground that Section 185 of the Delhi 
Land Reforms Actbars a civil suit for the recovery of possession. The 
objections were dismissed by the executing Court on 21August2010 
D with the following observations: 
E 
F 
G 
H 
"The Delhi Land Reforms Act is applicable with regard to the 
agricultural land only but the land in question is not agriculture 
land which has been vehemently argued by the counsel for the 
DH and in support of her contention placed on record
the copies 
of the electricity bills pertaining to the same khasra number which 
is subject matter of the instant execution proceedings. Even 
otherwise, it is a matter of common knowledge that most of the 
rural land in Delhi has become urbanized and private colonies, 
may be unauthorized, have mushroomed on such agricultural land. 
This fact has since been substantiated with the help of electricity 
bills which takes out the sting from the contentions raised by the 
counsel for the objector and in the process strengthens the case 
of the DH, the arguments is thus, brushed aside that the court 
lack of inherent jurisdiction on account of the fact that land in 
question is governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act being 
agriculture land." 
The order of the executing court was challenged by the appellant under 
Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petition by 
its judgment dated 19 September 2014. The High Court rejected the 
submission that the decree obtained under Section 6 of the &pecific Relief
HARPAL SINGH v. ASHOK KUMAR & ANR. 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
ll l .. 
Act was a nullity on the ground that the suit was barred by Section 185 A 
of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. 
4. On behalf of the appellant it has been submitted that since an 
earlier suit seeking a permanent injunction was dismissed by a competent 
civil court in view of the provisions of Section 185(1) of the Delhi Land 
Reforms Act 1954, and since the land is 'agricultural' in nature, the civil B 
court did not have jurisdiction in the matter.The decree was a nullity and 
this defence, it was submitted, could be raised in execution. 
5. The High Court has relied upon the earlier decisions of the 
court following Ram Lubbaya Kapoor v JR Chawla and others•, in 
. which it has been held that to be 'land' forthepurposeofthe Delhi Land c 
Reforms Act,1954, the land must be held or occupied for purposes 
connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry and if it is 
not used for such purposes, it ceases to be land for the purposes of the 
Act. The same view has been taken by the Delhi High Court in Narain 
Singh and Anr v Financial Commissioner2, Neelima Gupta and 
Ors v Yogesh Saroha and Ors3, and Anand J Datwani v Ms Geeti 
Bhagat Datwani and Ors4• 
6. Section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act defines the 
expression 'land' as follows: 
"(13) "land" except in sections 23 and 24, means land held or E 
occupied for purpose connected with agriculture, horticulture or 
animal husbandry
including pisciculture and poultry farming and 
includes-
· 
(a) Buildings appurtenant thereto, 
(b) Village abadis, 
(c) Grovelands, 
( d) Lands for village pasture or land covered by water and used 
for gt'owing singharas and other produce or land in the bed of 
a river and used for casual or occasional cultivation,. 
But does not include-
'1986RLR432 
2 (2008) 105 DRJ 122 
3 156 (2009) DLT 129 
4 (2013 (137) DRJ 146 
F 
G 
H
112 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 14 S.C.R. 
A 
land occupied by building in belts or areas adjacent to Delhi town, 
which the Chief Commissioner may be a notification in the 
Official Gazette declare as an acquisition thereto;" 
The position oflaw which has been consistently followed is that where 
. the land has not been used for any purpose contemplated under the 
B Land Reforms Act and has been built upon, it would cease to be 
agricultural land. Once agricultural land loses its basic character and 
has been converted into authorized/unauthorized colonies by dividing it 
into plots, disputes of plot holders cannot be decided by the revenue 
authorities and would have to be resolved by the civil court. The bar 
under Section 185 would not be attracted5• This position oflaw has not 
C been controverted in the present proceedings. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
7. The validity ofa decree can be challenged before an executing 
court only on the ground of an inherent lack of jurisdiction which renders 
the decree a nullity. In Hira Lal Patni v Sri Kali Nath6, this Court held 
thus: 
" ... The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution 
proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the 
decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it 
could not have seisin of the case because the subject-matter 
was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was 
dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or 
some such other ground
which could have the effect of rendering 
the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject-
matter of the suit or over the parties to it..." 
' Section 185 provides thus: 
"185. Cognizance of suits, etc., under this Act- (l) Except as provided by or under 
this Act no court other than a court mentioned in column 7 of Schedule I shall, 
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Proced8re, 1908 (5 of 
1908), take cognizance ofany suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in column 
3 thereot: 
(2) Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order passed under 
any of the proceedings mentioned in column 3 of the Schedule 3 aforesaid. 
(3)An appeal shall lie from the final order passed by a court mentioned in column 
3 to the court or authority mentioned in column 8 thereof. 
(4) A second appeal shall lie from the final order passed in an appeal under sub-
section (3) to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in column 9 of the Schedule 
aforesaid. 
6 (1962) 2 SCR 747
HARPAL SINGH v. ASHOK KUMAR & ANR. 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
In Sunder Dass v Ram Prakash', this court held that: 
"Now, the law is well settled that an executing court cannot go 
behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. 
113 
A 
But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that 
where the de~ree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of 
inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be 
B 
set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent 
jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the court to 
.. try the case and a decree which, is a nullity is void and can be 
declared to be void by any court in which it is presented. Its 
nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be 
enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or C 
even in collateral proceedings. The executing court can, therefore, 
entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse 
to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing court would 
not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because 
the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree 
D 
at all. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340 
: (1955) 1SCR117] and Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath [AIR 
1962 SC 199: (1962) 2 SCR 747]. It is, therefore, obvious that 
·in the present case, it was competent to the executing court to 
examine whether the decree for eviction was a
nullity ori the 
ground that the civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain 
E 
the suit in which the decree for eviction was passed. If the decree 
for eviction was a nullity, the executing court could declare it to 
·be such and decline to execute it against the respondent." 
[See also Gaon Sabha v Nathi8] 
. 8. In the present case, the finding of fact which was arrived at by 
the executing Court in the course of its decision on the objection to 
execution is that the land had ceased to be agricultural land and was not 
being used for purposes contemplated under the Delhi Land Reforms 
F 
Act 1954. The High Court while affirming the view of the executing 
court made the following observations: 
G 
" ... But in the present case, the Decree Holder had shown 
electricity bills pertaining to the same Khasra number and the 
1 (1977)2 sec 662 
• (2004) 12 sec 555 
H
114 
A 
B 
c 
D 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 14 S.C.R. 
Court also considered that most rural lands in Delhi have become 
urbanized and private unauthorized colonies have mushroomed 
on agricultural lands. Therefore, in fact, the said land had lost its 
character of agricultural land. Besides, the suit was filed under 
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for declaration and 
possession along with injunction and other consequential reliefs. 
The executing Court found that the objector had not shown as to 
how the said suit was not maintainable. It relied upon the dicta 
of the Supreme Court in Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 
1962 SC 199 which held that "the validity of a decree can be 
challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the 
court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction 
in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case because the 
subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the 
defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or 
decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the 
effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in 
respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it. 
But in the instant case there was no such inherent lack of 
j t.:isdiction." 
9. The above findings have not been squarely challenged in these 
proceedings. The suit which was decreed on 30 May 2009 was a suit 
E under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act which in
any event, did not 
require a determination of the question of title. The earlier suit was a suit 
for injunction. The finding of fact which has been1arrived at is to the 
effect that the land in question had ceased to be agricultural in nature on 
the date of the institution of the suit. Hence, it cannot be held that the 
F decree of the trial court was a nullity. The land was not governed, as a 
result, by the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 since it was not agricultural 
and the bar under Section 185 was not attracted. There was no inherent 
lack of jurisdiction and the objection to the execution of the decree was 
without foundation. 
G 
l 0. For the above reasons, we find no merit in the civil appeal, 
which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 
Divya Pandey 
Appeal dismissed.