MAHILA RAMKALI DEVI AND OTHERS versus NANDRAM (D) THR. LRS. AND OTHERS
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 974, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2015) 4 S.C.R. 974 
A 
MAHILA RAMKALI DEVI AND OTHERS 
B 
v. 
NANDRAM (D) THR. LRS. AND OTHERS 
Civil Appeal No. 2366 of 2010 
MAY 14, 2015 
[M.Y. EQBAL AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order 6 r. 17 -
C Amendment of plaint - Appellant no. 1-plaintiff filed a suit 
for declaration of title and possession of suit properly on 
the basis of Will - Application for amendment of plaint filed 
by appellant no.1 to make appellant no.2 to 5 entitled to 
D suit properly on the basis of inheritance - High Courl held 
that it was not in the interest of justice to allow the 
application for amendment as it would totally change the 
character of the plaint after lapse of more than 40 years -
Held: The Courl always gives relief to amend the pleading 
E of the parly, unless it is satisfied that the parly applying 
was acting malafide -
High Courl ought not to have 
rejected the amendment application - Matter remitted back 
to High Courl for consideration afresh -
Pleadings -
Amendment of. 
F 
Partly allowing the appeal and remitting the matter 
to the High Court, the Court 
HELD: 1. It is well settled that rules of procedure 
are intended to be a handmaid to the administration 
G of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely 
because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or 
even infraction of rules of procedure. The Court always 
gives relief to amend the pleading of the party, unless 
H 
974
MAHILA RAMKALI DEVI v. NANDRAM (D) THR. LRS. 975 
it is satisfied that the party applying was acting A 
malafide or that by his blunder he had caused injury 
to his opponent which cannot be compensated for by 
an order of cost. The High Court ought not to have 
rejected the application. [paras 20, 21) [984-f-h; 985-a] 
Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal vs. National Building Material 
Supply, Gurgaon AIR 1969 SC 1267: 1970 (1) SCR 22; 
Pandit lshwardas vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. 
AIR 1979 SC 551: 1979 (2) SCR 424 - relied on. 
Nahar Hirasingh and Ors. vs. Dukalhin and Ors. AIR 
1974 MP 141 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
AIR 1974 MP 141 
1970 (1) SCR 22 
1979 (2) SCR 424 
referred to. 
relied on. 
relied on. 
Para 16 
Para 22 
Para 23 
B 
c 
D 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
E 
2366 of 2010. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2005 of the 
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in S.A. 
No. 310 of 1997. 
F 
Sushi! Kumar Jain, Dileep Tandon, Puneet Jain, 
Abhinav Gupta, Monu Maheshwari (For Pratibha Jain) for 
the Appellants. 
Niraj Sharma, Sumit Kumar Sharma for the G 
Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
M. Y. EQBAL, J. 1. This appeal by special leave is 
directed against the judgment dated 01.03.2005 of the High H
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[2015) 4 S.C.R. 
A Court of Madhya Pradesh, which allowed the respondents' 
appeal and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff-
Appellants for declaration of title and possession of the suit 
property. 
B 
2. The factual matrix of the case is that the suit 
property was originally owned by Hardayal who had two 
sons Raghuvardayal and Mahadev Prasad. When Hardayal 
died, the suit property fell to the share of Raghuvardayal 
and on his death it passed on to his wife Sumitra and then 
C his son Radhakishan and then Radhakishan's wife 
Ajuddhibai. 
3. The plaintiff/appellant no.1 filed a suit for declaration 
of title and possession of the suit property in Gwalior 
o against the deceased Nandram and deceased Kashiram, 
who were original defendant nos.1 and 2 respectively and 
are now being represented through legal representatives 
and also against defendant no.3 Rukmani Bai. The case 
of the Appellants was that before Ajuddhibai died issueless 
E in 22.6.1961, she had executed a Will dated 21.1.1961 in 
favour of plaintiff/appellant no.1 who was the wife of 
Baijnath, son of Mahadev Prasad. The probate of the Will 
was also stated to have been obtained. The Appellants 
challenged the validity of the sale deed dated 19.12.1950 
F purported to have been executed by Ajuddhibai in favour 
of defendant no.3-Rukmani Bai and sale deed dated 
1.2.1962 executed by Rukmani Bai in favour of deceased 
Nandram-defendant no.1 and deceased Kashiram-
defendant
no.2 and alleged that defendant nos.1 and 2 
G were thus in illegal possession of the suit property. The 
defendants Nandram and Kashiram denied the averments 
made in the plaint and contended that they had legally 
obtained the title of the suit property vide sale deed dated 
H 1.2.1962 though one Ram Singh who was the sub-tenant
MAHILA RAMKALI DEVI v. NANDRAM (D) THR. LRS. 977 
[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
of Ajuddhibai. 
A 
4. The trial court held that the Will in favour of plaintiff/ 
appellant no. 1 was proved and that she had become 
successor of Ajuddhibai through probate. The sale deeds 
dated 19.12.1950 in favour of Rukmani Bai were held to 
B 
be not proved in view of the contradictory statements made 
by the defendants' witnesses, the failure of the defendant 
no.3 to attend court and prove the sale deeds, the absence 
of the signatures of Ajuddhibai on the sale deeds, the 
failure to mutate the suit property in their names and as C 
Ajuddhibai was in Vrindavan and not in Gwalior as alleged 
at the time of execution of the sale deeds. Ram Singh was 
noted to have been in possession of the suit property till 
his death in 1956 and the defendants were held to have 
not acquired title by adverse possession as the suit was D 
filed in 1964. The defendants Nandram and Kashiram were 
held to have not acquired any title over the suit property. 
Hence, the suit was allowed and the defendants were 
directed to hand over possession of the suit property to 
the plaintiff-appellant. 
E 
5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, the 
defendant nos.1 and 2 preferred an appeal before the. 
District Court, which upheld the findings of the trial court 
and dismissed their appeal. 
F 
6. The defendants then assailed the judgment of the 
District Court by preferring second appeal in the High Court, 
which was
eventually allowed. However, in the challenge 
made before the Supreme Court by way of appeal by G 
special leave, the Apex Court set aside the order of the 
High Court and remitted the matter back with directions to 
the High Court to first frame questions of law, if any, and 
then proceed with the matter and decide the same in 
accordance with law. 
H
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(2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
7. On remand, the High Court formulated substantial 
questions of law and then heard the learned counsel 
appearing for both the parties and passed the impugned 
judgment. The High Court held that the suit was within the 
period of limitation as the lower courts have recorded 
B concurrent findings as to the exclusive possession of one 
Ram Singh till his death in 1956. On the third issue, the 
High Court held that there is a concurrent finding of both 
the trial court and appellate court that the documents were 
forged, based on the evidence of the handwriting expert 
C and the depositions of the witnesses who had stated that 
Ajuddhibai was residing at Vrindavan and not at Gwalior 
when the document was executed. The genuineness of the 
Will was also upheld as concurrent factual findings to the 
0 
effect were not liable to be interfered with. 
8. On the second issue as to whether appellant no.1 
would be a successor to Ajuddhibai, learned Single Judge 
of the High Court observed that Sections 164 and 165 of 
the M.P. Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as 
E the 'Code'), which dealt with devolution of interest of a 
bhumiswamy and transfer of rights respectively were 
amended on 8.12.1961. Since Ajuddhibai had died before 
the amendment, the unamended sections were held to be 
F applicable. The unamended Section 165 was noted to be 
barring a bhumiswamy from transferring her interest 
through a Will and Ajuddhibai was
thus held to have had 
no right to execute a Will. Learned Single Judge also 
rejected the contention that defendant no.3 was a 
G successor under section 164(2)(b) as Ajuddhibai had not 
inherited the suit property from her husband or father-in-
law rather from Sumitra i.e. her mother-in-law. The 
defendant no.3 was further held to have not· been the 
nearest surviving heir of the husband of Ajuddhibai 
H especially when Baijnath, son of Mahadev Prasad and the
MAHILA RAMKALI DEVI v. NANDRAM (D) THR. LRS. 979 
[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
husband of the Appellant no.1, was alive. 
A 
9. As noticed above the second appeal was remanded 
to the High Court with a direction to formulate substantial 
question of law and then decide the appeal afresh. 
Pursuant to the aforesaid order the High Court formulated s 
the following substantial questions of law:-
"(1) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff on 29.4.64 
challenging the registered as to deeds executed on 
19.12.1950 can be said to be within limitation in c 
view of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act? 
(2) Whether Ramkali is entitled to succeed the suit 
property left behind by Ayodhyabai under Section 
164 of the M.P. Revenue Code? 
(3) Whether the findings arrived at by the two courts 
below that the documents Exs. D/2 and D2A are 
forged, is only based on the expert opinion and not 
supported by any legal evidence on record?" 
D 
E 
10. Answering the first question, the High Court held 
that the suit cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation. 
Answering question no.3, the High Court further came to 
the conclusion that the two courts below have concurrently 
found that the Will Ex. P.1 is a genuine document which is F 
a finding of fact and cannot be interfered with. 
11. On the question as to whether Ramkali is entitled 
to succeed the suit property left behind by Ajuddhibai, the 
High Court, after referring Section 164 of the M.P. Land G 
Revenue Code, came to the conclusion
that Ajuddhibai had 
no right to execute the will in respect of agricultural land 
prior to amendment of Section 164 of the Code. The High 
Court further rejected the contention made by the 
defendant-respondent that Rukmani Bai was the nearest H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 4 S.C.R. 
A surviving heir of the husband of Ajuddhibai and that she 
would be entitled to succeed to her property. The Court 
held:-
"The argument is without any force because the 
s 
plaintiff can succeed only if Ajudhibai had inherited 
the property from her husband or her father-in- law. 
In the present case Ajudhibai has not inherited 
property from her husband or father-in-law. In fact, she 
has inherited the property from Sumitra, her mother-
C 
in-law. Moreover, from the record it appears that on 
the date of filing of the suit Baijnath, husband of 
Ramkalidevi was alive. Baijnath was the son of 
Mahadev Prasad who is the son of Hardayal. In such 
circumstances Ramkalidevi cannot succeed the 
D 
property left behind of Ajudhibai in view of section 164 
of the M.P. Land Revenue Code as she was not the 
nearest surviving heir of the husband of Ajudhibai." 
12. The second substantial question of law is as to 
E whether or not Ramkali is entitled to succeed to the suit 
property left behind by Ajuddhibai (Ayodyabai) under 
section 164 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. Ajuddhibai 
executed the Will dated 21.01.1961 in respect of an 
agricultural land, i.e., suit property in favour of Ramkali 
F Devi. The suit property was then governed by the Madhya 
Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The devolution 
of interest of a Bhumidar and transfer of rights by Bhumidar 
was governed by Section 164 and 165 of the Code 
respectively. Amendment was
incorporated in these 
G provisions on 8.12.1961, whereas Ajuddhibai died prior to 
the amendment. Therefore, the legality of the Will shall be 
governed by unamended Section 164 of the Code. Section 
164 of the Code, as it stood before its amendment in 1961, 
H provided for the order in which the devolution of the rights
MAHILA RAMKALI DEVI v. NANDRAM (D) THR. LRS. 981 
[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
of a Bhumiswami would take place after his death. The A 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 had already come into force 
when Section 164 was enacted. 
13. However, this Section was amended by the M.P. 
Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act No.38 of 1961 
B 
which came into force with effect from 8.12.1961 and the 
personal law was made applicable to devolution of 
Bhumiswami 'rights and property of the Bhumiswami after 
his death was to pass by inheritance, survivorship or 
bequest, as the case may be. 
C 
14. Transfer of interest of Bhumiswami in his land 
otherwise than by Will subject to Section 164 was dealt 
with by the unamended Section 165 of the Code. However, 
the words "otherwise than by will" was deleted by the o 
amendment dated 8.12.1961 and the words "bequest" was 
added in Section 164. Therefore, the right of Bhumiswami 
to transfer his land by way of a Will was not recognized 
by law when Ajuddhibai executed the Will dated 21.1.1961. 
She had no right to execute the same prior to amendment E 
of Section 164 of the Code. Property could only be 
devolved in the order of succession as mentioned in 
Section 164. Thus, the question of proving genuineness 
of the Will need not be considered. 
15. However, the claim of Ramkali Devi does not stand 
valid in view of the unamended Section 164 of the Code 
as she was not the nearest surviving heir of the husband 
of Ajuddhibai since her husband (son of the
brother-in- law 
F 
of Ajuddhibai's father-in-law) was alive on the date of filing G 
the suit by Ramkali. 
16. The question referred for consideration to the Full 
Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of 
Nahar Hirasingh and Ors. vs. Dukalhin and Ors., AIR 1974 H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A MP 141, was whether the provision for succession of 
Bhumiswami rights under Section 164 of the Madhya 
Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 as it stood before its 
amendment in 1961, was a valid provision or it was ultra 
vires in view of Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 
B 1956. The Court held it to be a valid provision. It was also 
observed that the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954, as also 
the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, had received the 
assent of the President, and therefore, by virtue of Sub-
clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution, that law would 
C prevail in the State of Madhya Pradesh as against any 
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. However, 
the matter would be different when the M.P. Land Revenue 
Code, 1959, after amendment of Section 164 by the M.P. 
0 
Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1961, made the 
personal law of the parties applicable to devolution to 
agricultural properties. Upon such amendment, the personal 
law as amended from time to time would be applicable. 
17. The application for amendment of plaint filed by 
E appellant no.1 to make appellant nos. 2 to 5 fall under 
Class XVII of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 
was rejected by learned Single Judge of the High Court 
on the ground that the same would change the nature of 
F the suit which was filed 40 years ago, as the claim was 
made solely on the basis of Will and not on the basis of 
inheritance. The High Court allowed
the appeal vide the 
impugned judgment as the appellants had no locus standi 
to file the suit as Ajuddhibai could not have transferred her 
G interest through a Will. Hence, present appeal by special 
leave by the plaintiffs. 
18. While rejecting the amendment petition, the High 
Court observed as under: 
H 
"16. During the course of hearing an application is
MAHILA RAMKALI DEVI v. NANDRAM (D) THR. LRS. 983 
[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
filed by the respondents under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC A 
for amendment to the effect that the respondents 
Dinesh, Satish, Sanjay and Rajendra fails under Class 
XVII of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. 
This amendment, at this stage, in fact cannot be 
allowed because the same is going to totally change B 
the nature of the suit. The suit is filed in the year 1964 
the suit was filed on the premises that Ramkali Devi 
has inherited the property from Ajudhibai on the basis 
of will. By the amendment in the pleadings Dinesh, 
Satish, Sanjay and Rajendra have joined as party. C 
That amendment was incorporated on 18. 7.1994 and 
their names were added as plaintiffs in the suit. In 
the cause title also the word 'plaintiff' is substituted 
by the word 'plaintiff'. However, there is no D 
amendment in the averments made in the rest of the 
pleadings in the plaint. In such circumstances, now, 
it will not be in the interest of justice to allow the 
application for amendment which totally goes to 
change the premises of the suit after a lapse of more E 
than 40 years. In the present case the plaintiffs have 
based their title solely on the basis of a will executed 
by Ajudhibai and, therefore, allowing an application 
for amendment making claim on the basis of 
inheritance that too through Hardayal cannot be F 
permitted at this stage. Hence, the amendment 
application is rejected." 
19. It appears thus while
disposing of the appeal, the High 
Court has not gone into the amended plaint. 
By G 
amendment, the plaintiff-appellant not only sought to add 
the names of Dinesh, Satish, Sanjay and Rajendra sons 
of Baijnath Prasad Saxena in the category of plaintiffs, but 
also sought to make necessary amendment in paragraph 
3 of the plaint. The averment sought to be incorporated in H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A paragraph 3 of the plaint by amendment is reproduced 
hereunder: 
"Vikalp me yadi vasiyatnama vaidya na mana jave to 
be Ajudhibai ke karibtar varies vadini ke ladke 
B 
Rajendra, Dinesh, Satish aur Sanjay hi hai jo abhi 
nabalig hai aur yeha dava unke hito ko represent 
karte huai unki maliki ke adhar par bhi prastut hai. 
Vadini ke dekh-rekh me ladke rahte hai. Garj yahe 
hai ki har halat me prativadigan ki koi swatva v 
C 
mukable vadini avam uske ladke nahi hai. Aur vadini 
vivadagrast aaraji ka kabja apne tatha ladkon ko aur 
se pane ki patra hai." 
D 
E 
F 
As translated in English 
"In alternative, if the will is not held valid, yet the 
plaintiff's sons Rajendra, Dinesh, Satish, Sanjay, who 
at present are minors are near relations of Ajudhibai 
and this suit is submitted to represent their interests 
on basis of their ownership. The sons live in care of 
plaintiff meaning thereby in every condition there is 
no right of defendants competing plaintiff. And the 
plaintiff herself and on behalf of her sons is entitled 
to get possession of the suit land." 
20. 
It is well settled that rules of procedure are 
intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. 
A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of 
some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction 
G of rules of procedure. The Court always gives relief to 
amend the pleading of the party, unless it is satisfied that 
the party applying was
acting malafide or that by his 
blunder he had caused injury to his opponent which cannot 
be compensated for by an order of cost. 
H
MAHILA RAMKALI DEVI v. NANDRAM (D) THR. LRS. 985 
[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
21. In our view, since the appellant sought amendment A 
in paragraph 3 of the original plaint, the High Court ought 
not to have rejected the application. 
22. In the case of Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal vs. 
National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 
B 
1267, this Court held that the power to grant amendment 
to pleadings is intended to serve the needs of justice and 
is not governed by any such narrow or technical limitations. 
23. In Pandit lshwardas vs. State of Madhya Pradesh c 
and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 551, this Court observed:-
"We are unable to see any substance in any of the 
submissions. The learned counsel appeared to argue 
on the assumption that a new plea could not be 0 
permitted at the appellate stage unless all the material 
necessary to decide the plea was already before the 
Court. There is no legal basis for this assumption. 
There is no impediment or bar against an appellate 
Court permitting amendment of the pleadings so as 
E 
to enable a party to raise a new plea. All that is 
necessary is that the Appellate Court should observe 
the well-known principles subject to which 
amendments of pleadings are usually granted. 
Naturally, one of the circumstances which will be taken 
F 
into consideration before an amendment is granted 
is the delay in making the application seeking such 
amendment and, if made at the Appellate stage the 
reason why it was not sought in the trial court.
If the 
necessary material on which the plea arising from the G 
amendment may be decided is already there, the 
amendment may be more readily granted than 
otherwise. But, there is no prohibition against an 
Appellate Court permitting an amendment at the 
appel:'.1te stage merely because the necessary H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
material is not already before the Court." 
24. In the light of the discussion made hereinabove 
and also having regard to the fact that the amendment 
sought for by the plaintiff-appellant ought to have been 
B allowed by the High Court, 
in our considered opinion 
substantial issue no.2, as formulated by the High Court, 
needs to be decided by the High Court afresh. 
25. We, therefore, allow the appeal in part, affirm the 
c finding recorded by the High Court on substantial question 
no. 1 and 3. However, the finding recorded by the High 
Court in the impugned judgment on substantial question 
no.2 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the 
High Court to decide the aforementioned substantial 
o question no.2 afresh, taking into consideration the relief 
sought for by the plaintiff-appellant by amending the plaint. 
Devika Gujral 
Appeal partly allowed & remited back to High Court. 
E