GURMEET KAUR versus DEVENDER GUPTA & ANOTHER
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1602, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1602 : 2024 INSC 967
Gurmeet Kaur 
v. 
Devender Gupta & Another
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 4825-4826 of 2024)
26 November 2024
[B.V. Nagarathna* and  
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh JJ.] 
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the appellant while discharging her duty as a 
public servant on the relevant date, there was any excess in the 
discharge of the said duty which did not require the first respondent 
to take a prior sanction for prosecuting the appellant.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Prosecution of 
Judges and public servants – Appellant-District Town Planner 
(Enforcement) and 12 others forcibly entered the college of 
the respondent-chairman, created chaos and took away the 
college telephone forcibly – Complaint filed but no action 
taken – Thereafter, the appellant asked for the building map/
plan and other documents, and one of the accused demanded 
illegal gratification but the respondent refused – Consequently, 
the appellant forcibly entered the college premises along with 
police personnel with heavy machinery and equipment for 
demolition and after vacating the campus, the demolition took 
place – In a writ petition, the Local Commissioner appointed by 
the High Court submitted his report that the existing building 
was constructed prior to 2004 much before the notification 
whereby respondent’s college area was declared controlled 
area – Private complaint filed – All accused discharged except 
the appellant-and
accused nos.2 and 4 – Summoning order 
passed against them u/ss. 452, 506, 427, 384, 440, 166 read 
with s.120-B IPC – Thereafter, petition u/s. 482 CrPC by the 
appellant seeking quashing of the complaint, all consequential 
proceedings, and the summoning order – High Court dismissed 
the petition – Correctness:
*Author
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Held: Appellant who is accused of carrying out the demolition was 
doing so within the scope and ambit of her authority – Not a case 
where appellant carried out the demolition dehors any legal backing 
or basis; neither was the said act of carrying out of the demolition 
outside the scope of her authority as the District Town Planner in 
the Enforcement Division – Appellant was carrying out the orders 
of the superior officers – There is a correlation between the act 
of demolition and the discharge of official duty – Demolition was 
carried out during the course of performance of appellant’s official 
duties – Fact that an application was filed seeking regularisation 
of the construction put up by the first respondent would indicate 
that even according to the first respondent, there was a digression 
and other irregularities in the construction put up which required 
regularisation – It cannot be said that when such an application 
was pending, the appellant had no authority to demolish the 
construction – Impugned demolition cannot also be termed as 
an “excess” – First respondent ought to have sought sanction for 
prosecution u/s.197 – Same, not having been done vitiated the 
initiation of the criminal proceeding against the appellant – Thus, 
the summoning order and the consequent steps taken by the trial 
court pursuant to the said summoning order quashed – Since there 
was no prior order of sanction
passed u/s.197 of the CrPC, the 
initiation of the complaint itself, is non est. [Paras 32, 33]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Prosecution of 
Judges and public servants – Object and purpose of s.197:
Held: Is to protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified 
criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties within the 
scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to them – Reading of 
s.197 indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take cognizance 
of such offences mentioned in the said provision except with 
the previous sanction of the appropriate government when the 
allegations are made against, inter alia, a public servant – Salient 
words relevant under sub-section (1) of s.197 are “is accused of 
any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting 
or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court 
shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous 
sanction” – Thus, for the purpose of application of s.197, a sine 
qua non is that the public servant is accused of any offence 
which had been committed by him in “discharge of his official
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duty” – Said expression clearly indicate that s.197 would not 
apply to a case if a public servant is accused of any offence 
which is de hors or not connected to the discharge of his or her 
official duty. [Para 22]
Case Law Cited
State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew [2004] 3 SCR 504 : (2004) 
8 SCC 40; Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand [2012] 9 SCR 125 : 
(2012) 12 SCC 72 – relied on.
Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh [2013] 16 SCR 542 : (2013) 15 SCC 
624; Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu [1955] 1 SCR 1302 : (1955) 
1 SCR 1302 at 1307 – distinguished.
D.T. Virupakshappa v. C. Subhash [2015] 5 SCR 534 : (2015) 
12 SCC 231; Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar [2000] Supp. 
3 SCR 747 : (2000) 8 SCC 500; D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer 
Hussain [2020] 6 SCR 453 : (2020) 7 SCC 695; Bhagwan Prasad 
Srivastava v. N.P. Mishra [1971] 1 SCR 317 : (1970) 2 SCC 56; 
Punjab State Warehousing Corporation v. Bhushan Chander [2016] 
4 SCR 537 : (2016) 13 SCC 44; Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Gurmej 
Kaur [1988] 1 SCR 450 : (1987) 4 SCC 663; Amod Kumar Kanth 
v. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy [2023] 6 SCR 669 : 
Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2017; Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bihari 
[1955] 2 SCR 925 : AIR 1956 SC 44 – referred to.
List of Acts
Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of 
Unregulated Development Act, 1963; Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Discharging duty as public servant; Excess in
discharge; Prior 
sanction; District Town Planner (Enforcement); Illegal gratification; 
Demolition; Local Commissioner; Controlled area; Summoning 
order; Orders of superior officers; Correlation between act of 
demolition and discharge of official duty; Regularisation of 
construction; Authority to demolish construction; Sanction for 
prosecution u/s. 197 CrPC; Previous sanction of appropriate 
government; Public servant; Acting or purporting to act in discharge 
of his official duty.
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Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s). 
4825-4826 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.09.2017 and 01.11.2017 of 
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No. 
4549 of 2015 and CRM No. 33535 of 2017 respectively
Appearances for Parties
Alok Sangwan, Sr. A.A.G., Mukul Rohtagi, Sr. Adv., Sameer Rohtagi, 
Sumit Kumar Sharma, Samar Vijay Singh, Rajat Sangwan, Ms. 
Sabarni Som, Fateh Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Aseem Mehrotra, Ms. Deeksha Mehrotra, Rajeev Singh, Akshay 
Amritanshu, Ms. Drishti Saraf, Ms. Pragya Upadhyay, Ms. Swati 
Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nagarathna, J. 
Leave granted.
2.	
Being aggrieved by the order dated 18.09.2017 passed in 
CRM-M-4549-2015 by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at 
Chandigarh in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 dismissing the petition as not maintainable; 
and order dated 01.11.2017 passed in application bearing CRM 
No.33535 of 2017 declining to recall the order dated 18.09.2017, 
the appellant is before this Court.
3.	
The relevant facts of the case are that the appellant herein filed a 
petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
(for short “CrPC”) seeking quashing of complaint No.1383 dated 
13.03.2010/11.11.2011 titled “Devender Gupta vs. Director, Town and 
Country Planning and
others” along with the proceedings thereof. 
The said complaint was filed by Devender Gupta under Sections 323, 
452, 506, 427, 384, 440, 166, 148, 149 read with Section 34 of the 
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) along with all consequential 
proceedings and the impugned order dated 20.11.2014 passed by
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the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gurgaon summoning 
the appellant herein and two others for the aforesaid offences were 
assailed before the High Court.
4.	
The original complaint filed by Devender Gupta-first respondent herein 
under various provisions of the IPC referred to above against the 
present appellant, who was at the relevant time, the District Town 
Planner (Enforcement) and twelve others was that on 24.09.2006, the 
appellant had forcibly entered Anupama College of Engineering and 
Anupama Institute of Management, both situated at Gurgaon District 
of which the first respondent was the Chairman, in her official jeep 
along with some other officials and created chaos and had taken 
away the college telephone No.2241615 forcibly. That the college 
had resisted initially but the appellant refused to oblige them; a 
complaint was lodged before the Bilaspur Police Post regarding the 
said incident but no action was taken. Thereafter, the complainant 
met the appellant herein on 10.11.2006 along with his advocate 
but the appellant had asked for the building map/plan and other 
documents and the first respondent-complainant had produced the 
said documents. However, one of the accused, Manipal demanded 
Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty lakhs Only) as an illegal gratification 
but the first respondent-complainant refused to oblige the same. 
Consequently, on 05.02.2007 at about 9.45 A.M., the appellant
forcibly entered the college premises along with sufficient number 
of police personnel with heavy machinery and equipment for the 
purpose of demolition and after vacating the campus of the staff and 
students, the demolition took place. The said action of the appellant 
was with a mala fide intention owing to non-payment of the bribe 
made previously; that an FIR was registered on the instructions of 
accused No.5 and the same was found to be false. 
Further, Writ Petition (C) No.16184/2001 had also been filed in which 
the High Court had appointed a Local Commissioner to inspect the 
college campus and he had submitted his report on 18.10.2007 stating 
that there was an existing building which was constructed prior to 
the year 2004 which was much before the notification being issued 
under the provisions of The Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled 
Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 (“the Act” 
for the sake of brevity). Therefore, the Notification issued under the 
said Act was not applicable to the subject building inasmuch as its 
construction was prior to 05.08.2005.
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5.	
The aforesaid complaint was filed under Section 200 of the CrPC as 
a private complaint and on preliminary evidence and recording the 
statement of the complainant and witnesses namely CW-1 and CW-2 
and documentary evidence at Ex.PA to PZ, Ex. PAA to Ex.PDD., 
the Trial Court issued a summoning order on 20.11.2014 against the 
present appellant and two others only under Sections 323, 452, 506, 
427, 384, 440, 166 read with Section 120-B of the IPC.
6.	
Being aggrieved by the summoning order and also the very filing 
of the complaint against the appellant herein, the aforesaid petition 
was filed before the High Court. On considering the pleadings on 
record as well as the contentions, the High Court dismissed the 
said writ petition. Although there were two main facets of the said 
writ petition: one with regard to the quashing of the complaint itself 
on merits on the premise that no offence whatsoever was made 
out; the second aspect of the said case assumes significance 
inasmuch as the contention of the appellant before the High Court 
was that there was no sanction order passed under Section 197 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and therefore, 
the very initiation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant 
herein were vitiated.
7.	
The High Court dismissed the said writ petition by stating that at 
that stage it could not categorically be opined whether there was an 
illegal act
as such which was committed by the public servant namely 
the appellant herein which required sanction, or the requirement of 
sanction was unnecessary having regard to the nature of the acts 
complained against; that it required a detailed inquiry inasmuch 
as the Trial Court had held that there was a prima facie evidence 
against the appellant herein. In the above premise, the Writ Petition 
was dismissed.
8.	
Learned senior counsel Sri Mukul Rohatgi assisted by Sri Sameer 
Rohatgi, learned counsel submitted that taking into consideration the 
allegations against the appellant herein, it is a clear case where the 
appellant, during the course of the discharge of her official duties 
had carried out the demolition on the basis of the instructions of her 
superior officers and therefore, there was no malicious act, malice 
or any illegal act which could have been attributed to the appellant 
herein let alone any criminal act which could have been alleged 
against the appellant herein.
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9.	
It was submitted that the High Court ought to have gone into the 
aspect as to whether any offence at all was made out and quashed 
the criminal complaint. It was further submitted that given the nature of 
allegations against the appellant herein, it can be noted that the said 
allegations emanate from the nature of the duties that the appellant 
carried out on 05.02.2007 inasmuch as the demolition of the illegal 
construction was carried out on the said date which neither can be 
termed to be an instance of “excess” in the discharge of her duties 
nor can it be said that there was a criminal intent on the part of the 
appellant herein. The appellant had simply performed her duties as 
per the instructions of her superior officers. 
10.	 It was therefore submitted that the sanction for prosecution within the 
scope and ambit of Section 197 of the CrPC, which is a mandatory 
requirement, had to be taken from the State Government before the 
initiation of criminal proceedings even though the criminal proceedings 
in the instant case is under Section 200 of the CrPC by way of a 
private complaint. In this regard our attention was also drawn to 
Sections 20 and 21 of the Act to contend that no suit, prosecution 
and other legal proceedings would lie against any person in respect 
of anything which has been done in good faith or intended to be done 
in pursuance of the Act or the rules made thereunder. Further, no Civil
Court would have any jurisdiction to entertain or decide any question 
relating to matters under the Act or the rules made thereunder. It was 
submitted that the object and purpose of obtaining sanction under 
Section 197 of the CrPC is in order to protect the bona fide acts of 
officers and officials done during the discharge of their official duties 
and that the salutary intent of the said provision must be realised 
and hence, before initiation of any criminal proceeding, the condition 
precedent of obtaining a sanction is a mandatory requirement and 
hence, in the instant case the absence of any sanction order being 
issued by the State Government has vitiated the very initiation of 
the criminal complaint against the appellant herein. In support of 
this submission, reliance was placed on the following decisions of 
this Court:
(1)	  D.T. Virupakshappa vs. C. Subhash (2015) 12 SCC 231 
(“D.T. Virupakshappa”);
(2)	  Abdul Wahab Ansari vs. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 500 
(“Abdul Wahab Ansari”)
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(3)	  D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020) 7 SCC 695 
(“D. Devaraja”)
(4)	  Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of Victim of Uphaar 
Tragedy and Anr., Crl. Appeal No.1359/2017 disposed of 
on 20.04.2023.
11.	 It was submitted that having regard to the position of law which 
squarely apply to the facts of the present case, the impugned order 
may be set aside and the initiation of the criminal proceedings against 
the appellant may be quashed and all consequential orders thereby 
may be quashed.
12.	 Per contra, learned counsel for the first respondent Sri Aseem 
Mehrotra, at the outset submitted that the impugned order would not 
call for any interference; that the appellant would now have to face the 
criminal trial; and that the appellant has had the benefit of the interim 
order of stay of proceedings at the hands of this Court. Therefore, 
the appeal may simply be dismissed in limine, so that the appellant 
would stand the test of criminality which has been alleged against 
her. It was contended that the first respondent was constrained to 
file the complaint owing to the fact that the Notification issued under 
the Act was not at all applicable and that the demolition carried out 
by the appellant herein was with vengeance and malice; that she 
had no authority to carry out the demolition of the building which 
was constructed prior to 05.08.2005 inasmuch as the notification did 
not apply to the
period prior to 05.08.2005.
13.	 Further, the first respondent herein had made an application for 
regularization of the alleged illegal construction, the same was 
pending consideration and instead of considering the application for 
regularization made by the first respondent herein, the Department 
kept the same pending and went ahead with the demolition. This has 
caused not only monetary loss but also has prejudiced the institutions 
of which the first respondent is the Chairman. 
14.	 In this regard, learned counsel for the first respondent drew our 
attention to the following judgments of this Court:
(1)	  Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava vs. N.P. Mishra (1970) 2 SCC 
56 (“Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava”)
(2)	  Urmila Devi vs. Yudhvir Singh (2013) 15 SCC 624, (“Urmila 
Devi”)
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(3)	  Punjab State Warehousing Corporation vs. Bhushan 
Chander (2016) 13 SCC 44 (“Bhushan Chander”)
(4)	  Bakhshish Singh Brar vs. Gurmej Kaur (1987) 4 SCC 663 
(“Bakhshish Singh Brar”)
15.	 Learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that there is 
sufficient material against the appellant herein who cannot be 
given the benefit of the legal position that the absence of sanction 
prior to the initiation of criminal proceeding would vitiate the entire 
proceeding. He submitted that in the event this Court was to hold 
that the sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC was a necessary 
condition to be complied with by the first respondent herein in the 
context of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC, 
then, in the absence of such sanction being taken till date, liberty may 
be reserved to the first respondent herein to make a representation 
for seeking such a sanction.
16.	 Learned counsel for the second respondent-State, Sri Akshay 
Amritanshu with reference to his counter affidavit and other pleadings 
submitted that having regard to the fact that appellant herein was on 
the relevant day discharging her duties as a District Town Planner and 
it was in accordance with the scope and ambit of her authority that 
the demolition was carried out, the first respondent herein could not 
have initiated the criminal proceeding as against her in the absence 
of an order of sanction for doing so under the
provisions of Section 
197 of the CrPC. 
17.	 Learned counsel for the second respondent-State also submitted that 
there is no merit in the arguments of the first respondent’s counsel 
that the appellant herein ought to have been slow in carrying out 
the demolition inasmuch as the application for regularisation was 
pending before the Department and therefore the act of demolition 
of the illegal structure was an instance of excess as demonstrated 
by the various dicta of this Court. He submitted that in view of the 
conspectus of facts in the instant case, it was not at all a case of excess 
inasmuch as the Department which had to consider the application for 
regularisation was a different wing and the representation made for 
regularisation was not an impediment for carrying out the demolition. 
It was therefore submitted that appropriate orders may be made in 
this appeal.
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18.	 It was also submitted that this Court may be mindful of the fact that 
when an officer or an official of the State is carrying out the duty 
entrusted, the object and purpose of passing an order of sanction for 
prosecution under Section 197 of the CrPC must be borne in mind 
that a public servant ought not to be exposed to criminal prosecution 
or other kinds of litigation which would be wholly unjustified. 
19.	 In the circumstances, learned counsel for the second respondent 
submitted that the impugned order may be set aside and appropriate 
relief may be granted to the appellant herein.
20.	 We have considered the arguments advanced at the bar in light of 
the facts which emanate in this case. At this stage itself, we may 
opine that we would confine the scope of this appeal to the question 
whether it was necessary for the first respondent herein to have made 
an application seeking sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and 
thereafter proceeded to file the complaint under Section 200 of the 
CrPC. We also state that having regard to our reasoning and our 
decisions, it may not be necessary to go into the merits whether the 
appellant herein had indeed committed the offences alleged against 
her and therefore, the same ought to be quashed also. 
21.	 For ease of reference, Section 197 of the CrPC is extracted as under:
“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.
(1) When any person who is or was
a Judge or Magistrate 
or a public servant not removable from his office save by 
or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any 
offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting 
or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no 
Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with 
the previous sanction-
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the 
case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged 
offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the 
Union, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the 
case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged 
offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State 
of the State Government :[Provided that where the alleged
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offence was committed by a person referred to in clause 
(b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under 
clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force 
in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression 
“State Government” occurring therein, the expression 
“Central Government” were substituted.] [Added by Act 
43 of 1991, Section 2 (w.e.f. 2-5-1991).]
22.	 As already noted, the object and purpose of the said provision is 
to protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified criminal 
prosecution while they discharge their duties within the scope and 
ambit of their powers entrusted to them. A reading of Section 197 
of the CrPC would indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take 
cognizance of such offences which are mentioned in the said provision 
except with the previous sanction of the appropriate government 
when the allegations are made against, inter alia, a public servant. 
There is no doubt that in the instant case the appellant herein was 
a public servant but the question is, whether, while discharging 
her duty as a public servant on the relevant date, there was any 
excess in the discharge of the said duty which did not require the 
first respondent herein to take a prior sanction for prosecuting the 
appellant herein. In this regard, the salient words which are relevant 
under sub-section (1) of Section 197 are “is accused of any offence 
alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to 
act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance 
of such offence except with the previous sanction”. Therefore, for 
the purpose of application of Section 197, a sine qua non is that the 
public servant is accused of any offence which had been committed 
by him in “discharge of his official duty”. The said expression would 
clearly indicate that Section 197 of the CrPC would not apply to a 
case if a public servant is accused of any offence which is de hors 
or not connected to the discharge of his or her official duty. However, 
there are a line of judgments which have considered this expression 
in two different ways which we shall now advert to.
23.	 Learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the appellant have 
submitted the following judgments which indicate that Section 197(1) 
would apply prior to the initiation of a criminal proceeding under 
Section 197 of the CrPC. On the basis of the said judgments they 
have contended that it is during the discharge of her official duty that 
the demolition had taken place in the instant case and therefore, the
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necessity of an order of sanction being passed by the Government 
was a sine qua non prior to initiation of the criminal proceeding. The 
judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellant 
herein could be adverted to at this stage.
a)	
In D.T. Virupakshappa vs. C. Subhash (2015) 12 SCC 231 
(“D.T. Virupakshappa”), the appellant therein was accused 
in a private complaint before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) 
and JMFC, on which the learned Magistrate took cognizance, 
registered Criminal Case No.74 of 2009 and issued summons to 
the appellant therein. The offences alleged were under Sections 
323, 324, 326, 341, 120, 114, 506 read with Section 149 of 
the IPC. The appellant therein moved the High Court under 
Section 482 of the CrPC which was declined by the impugned 
order therein. The main contention of the appellant therein was 
that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance 
of the alleged offences and issued process to the appellant 
without sanction from the State Government under Section 197 
of CrPC, and on that sole ground, the High Court should have 
quashed the proceedings. It was alleged that the appellant 
therein exceeded in exercising his power during investigation of 
a criminal case and assaulted the respondent therein in order to 
extract some information with regard to the death of a person, 
and in that connection, the respondent therein was detained 
in
the police station for some time. Therefore, the allegation 
of the appellant therein had an essential connection with the 
discharge of the official duty and therefore, the previous sanction 
was necessary. The issue of “police excess” during investigation 
and requirement of sanction for prosecution in that regard, was 
also a subject-matter in State of Orissa vs. Ganesh Chandra 
Jew (2004) 8 SCC 40 (“Ganesh Chandra Jew”) which was 
relied upon. There was also reliance on Om Prakash vs. State 
of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 72 (“Om Prakash”). The Court 
held that the ratio of the aforesaid two judgments squarely apply 
to the case of the appellant therein and having regard to the 
factual matrix of that case, it was observed that the offensive 
conduct was reasonably connected with the performance of 
the official duty of the appellant therein. Therefore, the learned 
Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the case without 
the previous sanction of the State Government and the High
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Court had missed this crucial point in the impugned order. This 
Court observed that in case such sanction is obtained and the 
same is produced before the learned Magistrate, the matter 
could be proceeded further before the learned Magistrate in 
accordance with law.
b)	
In Abdul Wahab Ansari vs. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 
500 (“Abdul Wahab Ansari”), the facts were that the son of 
the deceased, who was respondent No.2 therein, had filed 
a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, alleging 
commission of offences by the appellant therein under Sections 
302, 307, 380, 427, 504, 147, 148 and 149 of the IPC as well as 
Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Chief Judicial Magistrate was 
of the opinion that the provisions of Section 197 of the CrPC 
would have no application to the facts of the case. Further, there 
was sufficient evidence available to establish a prima facie case 
and therefore had directed issuance of non-bailable warrants 
against the appellant therein and other accused persons. The 
appellant therein moved the High Court under Section 482 of 
the CrPC praying, inter alia, that no cognizance could be taken 
without a sanction of the appropriate Government, as required 
under Section 197 of the CrPC as the appellant was discharging 
his official duty pursuant to an order of the competent authority. 
The High Court opined that all the questions could be raised 
at the time of framing of charge and
disposed the application 
filed by the appellant therein. Before this Court, two questions 
were raised and it was observed that previous sanction of the 
competent authority being a precondition for the Court taking 
cognizance of the offences if the offences alleged had been 
committed by the accused was in discharge of his official duty, 
the question touched upon the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in 
the matter of taking cognizance and therefore, there was no 
requirement that an accused should wait for taking such plea till 
the charges were framed. Placing reliance on certain decisions 
of this Court, it was observed in this case that the appellant 
therein had been directed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to 
be present with police force and remove the encroachment in 
question and in the course of discharge of his duty to control the 
mob, he had directed for opening of fire, which was in exercise 
of the power conferred upon him and the duty imposed upon
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him under the orders of the Magistrate. Hence, Section 197(1) 
of the CrPC applied to the facts of the case. Since no sanction 
had been taken, the cognizance by the Magistrate was bad in 
law and therefore, the same was quashed qua the appellant 
therein and the appeal was allowed.
c)	
In D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020) 7 SCC 
695 (“D. Devaraja”), the facts were that the High Court had 
disposed of the application under Section 482 of the CrPC which 
was filed for quashing the order passed by the Additional Chief 
Metropolitan Magistrate III, Bengaluru City in taking cognizance 
of a private complaint, inter alia, against the appellant-accused 
therein, for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 220, 
323, 330, 348 and 506-B read with Section 34 of the IPC. The 
High Court did not quash the impugned order of the Additional 
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dated 27.12.2006, but remitted 
the complaint back to the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan 
Magistrate instead, with, inter alia, liberty to the appellant-
accused therein to apply for discharge. The question considered 
by this Court was whether the learned Magistrate could, at all, 
have taken cognizance against the appellant therein, in the 
private complaint, in the absence of a sanction under Section 
197 of the CrPC read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police 
Act, 1963, as amended by the Karnataka Police (Amendment) 
Act, 2013, and
if not, whether the High Court should have 
quashed the impugned order of the Magistrate concerned, 
instead of remitting the complaint to the Magistrate concerned 
and requiring the appellant-accused therein to appear before 
him and file an application for discharge. Referring to several 
judgments of this Court, Indira Banerjee, J. speaking for the 
Bench observed in paragraph 66 to paragraph 71 as under:
“66. Sanction of the Government, to prosecute a police 
officer, for any act related to the discharge of an official 
duty, is imperative to protect the police officer from 
facing harassive, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous 
proceedings. The requirement of sanction from the 
Government, to prosecute would give an upright 
police officer the confidence to discharge his official 
duties efficiently, without fear of vindictive retaliation 
by initiation of criminal action, from which he would be
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protected under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, read with Section 170 of the Karnataka 
Police Act. At the same time, if the policeman has 
committed a wrong, which constitutes a criminal 
offence and renders him liable for prosecution, he 
can be prosecuted with sanction from the appropriate 
Government.
67. Every offence committed by a police officer 
does not attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure read with Section 170 of the Karnataka 
Police Act. The protection given under Section 197 
of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 
170 of the Karnataka Police Act has its limitations. 
The protection is available only when the alleged act 
done by the public servant is reasonably connected 
with the discharge of his official duty and official duty 
is not merely a cloak for the objectionable act. An 
offence committed entirely outside the scope of the 
duty of the police officer, would certainly not require 
sanction. To cite an example, a policeman assaulting a 
domestic help or indulging in domestic violence would 
certainly not be entitled to protection. However, if an 
act is connected to the discharge of official duty of 
investigation of a recorded criminal case, the act is 
certainly under colour of duty, no matter how illegal 
the act may be.
68. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted 
in excess of duty, but there is a reasonable connection 
between the act and the
performance of the official 
duty, the fact that the act alleged is in excess of duty 
will not be ground enough to deprive the policeman of 
the protection of the government sanction for initiation 
of criminal action against him.
69. The language and tenor of Section 197 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of 
the Karnataka Police Act makes it absolutely clear 
that sanction is required not only for acts done in 
discharge of official duty, it is also required for an
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act purported to be done in discharge of official duty 
and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such 
duty or authority.
70. To decide whether sanction is necessary, the test 
is whether the act is totally unconnected with official 
duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with 
the official duty. In the case of an act of a policeman 
or any other public servant unconnected with the 
official duty there can be no question of sanction. 
However, if the act alleged against a policeman is 
reasonably connected with discharge of his official 
duty, it does not matter if the policeman has exceeded 
the scope of his powers and/or acted beyond the 
four corners of law.
71. If the act alleged in a complaint purported to be 
filed against the policeman is reasonably connected 
to discharge of some official duty, cognizance thereof 
cannot be taken unless requisite sanction of the 
appropriate Government is obtained under Section 
197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or Section 
170 of the Karnataka Police Act.”
It was concluded that the High Court had erred in law refusing 
to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to 
set aside the impugned order of the learned Magistrate taking 
cognizance of the complaint, after having held that it was a 
recognized principle of law that sanction was a legal requirement 
which empowers the court to take cognizance. This Court 
allowed the appeal
and set aside the judgment and order under 
appeal and the complaint was quashed for want of sanction.
d)	
In Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of Victim of Uphaar 
Tragedy, Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2017 disposed of by 
three-Judge Bench of this Court on 20.04.2023 of which one 
of us (Nagarathna, J.) was a member, it was observed that the 
question of cognizance being taken in the absence of sanction 
and thereby Section 197 of the CrPC being flouted is not to be 
conflated and thereby confused with the question as to whether 
an offence has been committed. The salutary purpose behind
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Section 197 of the CrPC is protection being accorded to public 
servants. In paragraphs 28, 29 and 31, it was observed as under:
“(28) The State functions through its officers. 
Functions of the State may be sovereign or not 
sovereign. But each of the functions performed by 
every public servant is intended to achieve public 
good. It may come with discretion. The exercise of 
the power cannot be divorced from the context in 
which and the time at which the power is exercised 
or if it is a case of an omission, when the omission 
takes place. 
(29) The most important question which must be 
posed and answered by the Court when dealing 
with the argument that sanction is not forthcoming is 
whether the officer was acting in the exercise of his 
official duties. It goes further. Even an officer who acts 
in the purported exercise of his official power is given 
the protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. This is 
for good reason that the officer when he exercises the 
power can go about exercising the same fearlessly no 
doubt with bona fides as public functionaries can act 
only bona fide. In fact, the requirement of the action 
being bona fide is not expressly stated in Section 
197 of the Cr.P.C., though it is found in many other 
statutes protecting public servants from action, civil 
and criminal against them.
x x x x
(31) One ground which has found favour with the 
High Court against the appellant is that the
appellant, 
according to the High Court, could raise the issue 
before the Magistrate. 
Here we may notice one aspect. When the question 
arises as to whether an act or omission which 
constitutes an offence in law has been done in the 
discharge of official functions by a public servant 
and the matter is under a mist and it is not clear 
whether the act is traceable to the discharge of his
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official functions, the Court may in a given case tarry 
and allow the proceedings to go on. Materials will be 
placed before the Court which will make the position 
clear and a delayed decision on the question may 
be justified. However, in a case where the act or the 
omission is indisputably traceable to the discharge 
of the official duty by the public servant, then for the 
Court to not accept the objection against cognizance 
being taken would clearly defeat the salutary purpose 
which underlies Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It all 
depends on the facts and therefore, would have to 
be decided on a case-to-case basis.”
It was concluded that learned Magistrate had erred in the facts of the 
said case in taking cognizance against the appellant therein contrary 
to the mandate of Section 197 of the CrPC and on that short ground 
alone, the appeal was allowed and the proceedings challenged 
in Section 482 were quashed. However, it was observed that the 
same would not stand in the way of the competent authority taking 
a decision in the matter and/or granting sanction for prosecuting the 
appellant therein in accordance with law.
24.	 Learned counsel for the first respondent tried to distinguish the said 
judgments by another set of judgments of this Court wherein the 
question, whether the officer or official in discharge of the official duties 
had exceeded limits of the official authority or capacity and
therefore, 
there was no necessity for seeking a sanction for prosecution for 
the excess committed by an officer or official during the course of 
discharge of duty. In this regard, the following judgments have been 
relied upon by the learned counsel for the first respondent.
a)	
In Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava vs. N.P. Mishra (1970) 2 SCC 
56 (“Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava”), the facts were that the 
appellant therein had used defamatory language towards the 
complainant and the two accused persons had insulted and 
humiliated him in the eyes of the public. The question before this 
Court was whether complainant’s case was covered by Section 
197 of the CrPC and previous sanction of the superior authority 
was necessary before the trial court could take cognizance of 
the complaint. It was held that the alleged offence consisted 
of the use of defamatory and abusive words and of getting the
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complainant forcibly turned out of the operation theatre by the 
cook. This was not a part of the official duty of the appellant 
therein as a Civil Surgeon or that it was directly connected with 
the performance of his official duty that without so acting he could 
not have properly discharged it. Consequently, it was observed 
that it was not necessary to seek sanction under Section 197 
of the CrPC. It was observed that the object and purpose 
underlying Section 197 of the CrPC is to afford protection to 
public servants against frivolous, vexatious or false prosecution 
for offences alleged to have been committed by them while acting 
or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. This 
Section is designed to facilitate an effective and unhampered 
performance of their official duty by public servants by providing 
for scrutiny into the allegations of commission of offences by 
them by their superior authorities and prior sanction for their 
prosecution as a condition precedent to the cognizance of the 
cases against them by the courts. The said provision therefore 
cannot be construed too narrowly or too widely. A too narrow 
and pedantic construction may render it otiose for it is no part 
of an official duty to commit an offence. This Court was of the 
view that it is not the “duty” which requires examination so much 
as the “act” because the official act can be performed both in 
the discharge of the
official duty as well as in, dereliction of it. 
One must also guard against too wide a construction. Therefore, 
a line has to be drawn between the narrow inner circle of strict 
official duties and acts outside the scope of official duties. Thus, 
there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the 
discharge of the official duty; the act must bear such relation 
to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but 
not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of 
the performance of his duty. 
Referring to Amrik Singh vs. State of Pepsu (1955) 1 SCR 
1302 at 1307 (“Amrik Singh”), the test to be adopted was, 
if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official 
duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been 
done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; 
and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a 
proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be 
a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be
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investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the 
grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the 
prosecution. It was further observed that the quality of the act 
that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of 
the official duties of the public servant concerned the protection 
contemplated by Section 197 of the CrPC will be attracted. On 
the facts of the aforesaid case, it was observed that sanction 
was unnecessary and therefore, the appeal was dismissed. 
We feel that the aforesaid case would not apply to the present 
case having regard to the facts that have been elucidated above.
b)	
Sanction for prosecution of a police officer accused of causing 
grievous injuries and death in conducting raid and search and 
whether the police officer concerned while acting in purported 
discharge of official duty exceeded limits of his official capacity, 
were issues which were determined in Bakhshish Singh Brar 
vs. Gurmej Kaur (1987) 4 SCC 663 (“Bakhshish Singh Brar”). 
The matter arose before this Court because the petitioner 
therein being a government servant was being proceeded 
against in the absence of a sanction under Section 197 of the 
CrPC for the offences under Sections 148, 302, 325, 323, 149 
and 120-B of the IPC. The contention of the petitioner therein 
was that cognizance of the offence under Section 197 of the 
CrPC could not have been taken nor the
trial proceeded with 
without the sanction of the appropriate authorities. The question 
was, whether, while investigating and performing his duties as 
a police officer, was it necessary for the petitioner therein to 
conduct himself in such a manner which would result in such 
consequences such as injuries of one of the alleged accused 
and consequent death. Dwelling on the said issue, this Court 
observed that in the facts and circumstances of each case, 
protection of public officers and public servants functioning in 
discharge of official duties and protection of private citizens have 
to be balanced by finding out as to what extent and how far is 
a public servant working in discharge of his duties or purported 
discharge of his duties and whether the public servant has 
exceeded his limits. Taking note of Section 197 of the CrPC 
which is at the stage of taking cognizance, this Court observed 
that the criminal trial should not be stayed in all cases at the 
preliminary stage and it was observed on the facts of the case
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that the trial should proceed and the question of sanction under 
Section 197 of the CrPC may be agitated after some evidences 
have been noted by the trial court.
c)	
In Urmila Devi vs. Yudhvir Singh (2013) 15 SCC 624, (“Urmila 
Devi”) there are two concurring judgments by this Court. In the 
said case, the facts were that the appellant therein had filed a 
complaint against the respondent alleging that the respondent 
therein had threatened the appellant and another person that 
if they did not withdraw the complaint filed by them earlier as 
against a third person under Section 500 of the IPC both of 
them will not remain in service. The learned Chief Judicial 
Magistrate, Panchkula had summoned the accused Nos.1 to 
10 and 12 to face the trial for the offences under Sections 
323, 354, 389, 452, 458, 500 and 506 read with Sections 34 
and 120-B of the IPC. It was contended that none of the acts 
complained of against the respondent therein would amount 
to exercise of any powers in his official capacity as the SDM 
and, therefore, he could not have taken umbrage under Section 
197 of the CrPC. On considering the allegations against the 
respondent therein, this Court observed that the behaviour 
of the respondent therein as written in the complaint of the 
appellant, if found to be true, could only be held to be a high-
handed one bordering on indecency of the highest order, 
wholly abusing his status as the SDM and
can never be held 
to have acted within the statutory framework of law. That none 
of the actions alleged against the respondent therein by the 
appellant therein could be held to be one in which he acted 
in his capacity as the Executive Magistrate. This is because 
the respondent therein could not have barged into the house 
of a lady, that too at odd hours of 10.00 pm accompanied by 
a posse of police officers under the guise of ascertaining the 
truthfulness or otherwise of a complaint and for that purpose 
engage the services of two cameraman also with video cameras. 
It was observed that having regard to the aforesaid allegations 
against the respondent therein, the invocation of Section 197 
of the CrPC was wholly uncalled for and consequently the 
impugned orders of the learned Additional Sessions Judge as 
well as the High Court was set aside and the appeal filed by 
the appellant complainant was allowed.
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T.S. Thakur, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in his 
concurring judgment discussed the term “official” in its various 
connotations. For the purpose of understanding the expression 
“acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties” 
in Section 197 of the CrPC which provides for obtaining a 
sanction of a public servant before he could be proceeded 
against for offences alleged to have been committed by him. It 
was observed that the test of direct and reasonable connection 
between the official duty of the accused and the acts allegedly 
committed by them is, therefore, the true test to be applied while 
deciding whether the protection of Section 197 of the CrPC is 
available to a public servant accused of the commission of an 
offence. It was further observed that public functionaries cannot 
under the cloak of purported discharge of official duties resort 
to harassment and humiliation of the citizens on the pretext of 
a complaint having been received by them, especially when 
the same does not disclose the commission of any offence 
triable by the Executive Magistrate or cognizable by the police. 
Therefore, the allegations made against the respondent therein 
in the said case were held to be outside the scope of discharge 
of official duties and hence, the plea that Section 197 of the 
CrPC had to be applied, was rejected.
It is necessary to appreciate the backdrop of the
facts in the 
aforesaid case in which the complaints were made by the 
appellant therein against the respondent therein which we have 
epitomized above. It appears that the SDM in the aforesaid case 
was inquisitive about the adulterous relationship between the 
appellant therein and another person and a complaint having 
been received in that regard, had entered the house of the 
appellant (a woman) after sunset with a posse of police force, 
carrying video cameras for conducting an unwarranted search of 
the house, humiliating and invading the privacy of the appellant 
therein, insulting and humiliating another person by asking him 
to undress and dragging both of them to the police station for 
medical examination against their wishes, especially when 
male doctors were asked to examine the appellant therein (a 
woman) without any lawful justification for doing so. Therefore, 
the said judgment squarely turns on the glaring facts of the 
said case and cannot at all be applied to the facts which arise 
in the present case.
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d)	
In Punjab State Warehousing Corporation vs. Bhushan 
Chander (2016) 13 SCC 44 (“Bhushan Chander”), the 
allegations against the respondent accused who was working 
as a Godown Assistant in State Corporation was that he 
misappropriated 11 gunny bales valuing Rs.38,841 and tampered 
with the record of the department concerned. Prosecution under 
Sections 409, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC was initiated without 
obtaining any sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. Inter 
alia, it was contended that the question of invoking Section 197 
of the CrPC would not arise in the case of employees of Public 
Sector Undertakings (PSU). Allowing the appeal, it was held that 
there has to be reasonable connection between the omission 
or commission and the discharge of official duty or the act 
committed was under the office held by the official concerned. 
If the acts, omission or commission of which are totally alien to 
the discharge of the official duty, question of invoking Section 
197 of the CrPC would not arise. In the said case, this Court 
observed that on the factual matrix as it obtained sanction 
under Section 197 of the CrPC was unnecessary. Reliance was 
placed on the judgment of this Court in Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. 
Bihari, AIR 1956 SC 44 (“Matajog Dobey”) wherein it was 
opined that there must be a reasonable connection between the 
act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such 
relation to the duty
that the accused could lay a reasonable but 
not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course 
of the performance of his duty. In such an event, the need for 
obtaining a sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC would 
arise. Ultimately, in order to answer this query, the facts of each 
case would have to be considered and whether an offence has 
been committed in the course of official duty or not, or under 
colour of office cannot be answered hypothetically. In the said 
case, it was held the High Court was not right in setting aside 
the conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial is 
vitiated in the absence of sanction. Consequently, the appeal 
was allowed and the judgment and order passed by the High 
Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to decide 
the revision petition in accordance with law.
25.	 We have considered the facts of the present case in light of the 
aforesaid rulings and the observations made by this Court. The
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relevant facts of the case are that on 05.08.2005, a notification was 
issued under the provisions of the Act. The said notification declared 
the area around the Government Primary School at village Bilaspur 
as a Controlled Area under the provisions of the said Act. The area 
of the respondent College (Anupama College) was also declared 
as a Controlled Area. Thereafter, on 06.03.2006, First Show-Cause 
Notice was issued by the predecessor of the appellant herein to 
the respondent regarding additional construction raised in Anupama 
College. The representatives of the first respondent sought time to 
file a reply. When the matter stood thus on 19.06.2006, the appellant 
was appointed as District Town Planner (Enforcement), Gurgaon. 
26.	 As there was no reply to the show-cause notice and the construction 
continued, the appellant herein issued restoration order under Section 
12(2) of the Act on 09.10.2006. The appellant also lodged FIR No.364 
dated 13.10.2006 with Police Station Bilaspur. Subsequently, on the 
request made by the appellant, the District Magistrate deputed two 
Duty Magistrates for overlooking the demolition. On 04.02.2007 and 
05.02.2007, the demolition operation of the additional unauthorized 
construction was carried out. The respondent made a complaint 
against the appellant to the Senior Town Planner, Town and Country 
Planning Department stating that the appellant had demanded illegal
gratification of Rs.20 lakhs and when that was not paid, the appellant 
had carried the demolition of the main building without serving any 
notice and thereby causing loss to the College. The appellant informed 
the Director, Town and Country Planning that all the construction 
raised after the date of notification had been demolished.
27.	 Subsequently, a second show-cause notice under Section 12(2) was 
issued owing to re-erection of the demolished portion. On 12.03.2007, 
the appellant relinquished her charge of DTP (E), Gurgaon owing 
to her transfer. Subsequently, on 05.04.2007, a preliminary report 
was submitted by the ADC Gurgaon to the effect that the demolition 
was unlawful. 
28.	 CWP No.6425 of 2017 was filed by the first respondent before the 
High Court seeking quashing of second show-cause notice dated 
12.03.2007. The appellant herein was arraigned as respondent no.4 
in the said writ petition. In response to the said writ petition, the ADC 
Gurgaon submitted modified and amended report specifically holding 
that the demolition was as per law. Another restoration order was
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passed on 21.08.2007 due to continued unauthorized construction 
by the respondent. However, later on, accepting the report of the 
Local Commissioner, the High Court vacated the stay granted to the 
first respondent, while observing that the ADC Report had been filed 
by the Government and the first respondent herein had threatened 
the Local Commissioner and deserves no relief.
29.	 That, it is only after lapse of three years from the date of demolition, 
first respondent herein filed a Criminal Complaint No.1383 of 2010 
under Sections 34, 148, 149, 166, 323, 384, 427, 440, 452 and 506 
IPC in the Court of Additional CJM, Gurgaon against 13 accused. The 
JMFC discharged all other accused except the appellant and accused 
nos.2 and 4 in Complaint No.1383 of 2010 and the summoning 
order was passed against the appellant and accused nos.2 and 4, 
namely, Senior Town Planner and Junior Engineer, Town & Country 
Planning (E). 
30.	 It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the appellant filed the petition 
under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court seeking for quashing 
of the summoning order dated 20.11.2014, in which initially a stay 
was granted and thereafter the said CRM-M was dismissed as not 
maintainable.
31.	 We have perused the impugned order of the High Court in light of 
the aforesaid facts and submissions and the judicial dicta on the 
position of law applicable in the instant case.
32.	 We find that the facts
of the present case would clearly indicate that 
the appellant herein who is accused of carrying out the demolition 
was doing so within the scope and ambit of her authority. We find 
that this is not a case where the appellant herein carried out the 
demolition dehors any legal backing or basis; neither was the 
said act of carrying out of the demolition outside the scope of her 
authority as the District Town Planner in the Enforcement Division. 
The appellant was carrying out the orders of the superior officers. 
There is a correlation between the act of demolition and the 
discharge of official duty. The demolition was carried out during the 
course of performance of appellant’s official duties. The fact that an 
application was filed seeking regularisation of the construction put 
up by the first respondent would indicate that even according to the 
first respondent, there was a digression and other irregularities in 
the construction put up which required regularisation. However, the
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contention of learned counsel for the first respondent is that when 
such an application was pending, the appellant had no authority to 
demolish the construction. We do not think that such an argument 
would impress us for the reason that the mere pendency of the 
application seeking regularisation before another department would 
have been an impediment for carrying out the demolition inasmuch 
as there was sufficient basis for doing so and was done under the 
orders of the superior authority and not independently as such. The 
fact that an application for regularization of the construction put 
up was filed implied that there was a deficiency/irregularity in the 
construction put up by the respondent No.1 herein. The impugned 
demolition cannot also be termed as an “excess”.
33.	 In the circumstances, we observe that the first respondent herein 
ought to have sought sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of 
the CrPC in the instant case. The same, not having been done vitiated 
the initiation of the criminal proceeding against the appellant herein. 
Consequently, the summoning order and the consequent steps taken 
by the Trial Court pursuant to the said summoning order are liable 
to be quashed and are thus quashed. Insofar as the very initiation 
of the complaint is concerned, we observe that since there was no 
prior order of sanction passed under Section 197 of the CrPC, the 
initiation of the
complaint itself, is non est. 
However, we reserve liberty to the first respondent herein to take 
steps in accordance with law and seek an order of sanction. 
The appeals are allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain