ROHIT CHAUDHARY & ANR. versus M/S VIPUL LTD.
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 394, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 394 : 2023 INSC 807
394
CASE DETAILS
ROHIT CHAUDHARY & ANR.
v. 
M/S VIPUL LTD. 
(Civil Appeal No. 5858 of 2015)
SEPTEMBER 06, 2023 
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: The interpretation of the word and expression 
“Commercial Purpose” deﬁ ned u/s. 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection 
Act, 1986.
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – ‘Commercial purpose’ – Not 
deﬁ ned in the Act – The Explanation (added by Consumer Protection 
(Amendment) Act 50 of 1993:
Held: The expression ‘commercial purpose’ has not been deﬁ ned under 
the Act – In the absence thereof one have to go by its ordinary meaning 
– ‘Commercial’ denotes “pertaining to commerce”; it means ‘connected’ 
with or engaged in commerce; mercantile; “having proﬁ t as the main aim”; 
relate to or is connected with trade and traﬃ  c or commerce in general, 
is occupied with business and commerce – The Explanation (added by 
Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act 50 of 1993 (replacing Ordinance of 
24 of 1993 w.e.f. 18.06.1993) excludes certain purposes from the purview of 
the expression ‘commercial purpose’ – The Explanation clariﬁ es that even 
purchases in certain situations for ‘commercial purposes’ would not take 
within its sweep the purchaser out of the deﬁ nition of expression ‘consumer’ 
– In other words, if the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for 
the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, such 
purchaser of goods would continue
to be a ‘consumer’. [Para 12]
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – “Commercial purpose” – To 
ascertain purchase for “commercial purpose” or not – Assertion made 
in the complaint important – Evidence tendered had to be evaluated – 
No straight jacket formula can be adopted:
395
Held: If the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose 
of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, such purchaser of 
goods would continue to be a ‘consumer’ – When there is an assertion in the 
complaint ﬁ led before the Consumer Court or Commission that such goods 
are purchased for earning livelihood, such complaint cannot be nipped at the 
bud and dismissed – Evidence tendered by parties will have to be evaluated 
on the basis of pleadings and thereafter conclusion be arrived at – There 
cannot be any deﬁ ned formula with mathematical precision to examine the 
claims for non-suiting the complainant on account of such complaint not 
falling within the deﬁ nition of the expression ‘consumer’ as deﬁ ned u/s. 
2(1)(d). [Para 12] 
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – “Consumer” – Exclusion 
of persons buying goods either for resale or for use in large scale 
proﬁ t making activity from the deﬁ nition of consumer – Intention of 
Parliament:
Held: The Parliament has excluded from the scope of ‘Consumer’ 
for igniting proceedings under the Act, a person who obtains goods or 
services for re-sale or for any commercial purpose – Going by the plain 
dictionary meaning of the words used in the deﬁ nition section the intention 
of Parliament must be understood to be to exclude from the scope of the 
expression “consumer” any person who buys goods for the purpose of 
their being used in any activity engaged on a large scale for the purpose of 
making proﬁ t
– The words ‘for any commercial purpose’ must be understood 
as covering the cases other than those of resale of the goods – Thus, it is 
obvious, that Parliament intended to exclude from the scope of deﬁ nition 
not merely persons who obtain goods for resale but also those who purchase 
goods with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a 
large scale for the purpose of earning proﬁ t – Thus, persons buying goods 
either for resale or for use in large scale proﬁ t making activity will not be 
a consumer entitled to protection under the Act, which would be a plain 
interpretation of this deﬁ nition clause. [Para 11]
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – The NCDRC held that 
commercial space booked by the complainants cannot be said to be 
for the purposes of earning livelihood by self-employment or in other 
ROHIT CHAUDHARY & ANR. v. M/S VIPUL LTD.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
words the appellants are not consumers as deﬁ ned u/s. 2(1)(d) of the 
Act – Propriety:
Held: A perusal of the complaint ﬁ led before the Commission would 
indicate that appellants have speciﬁ cally pleaded that they were in search of 
oﬃ  ce space “for their self-employment and to run their business and earn 
their livelihood” – In the statement recorded on oath by the Commission, 
while hearing the maintainability of the complaint, the ﬁ rst appellant has 
stated that he was earlier engaged in the business of caustic soda as a dealer 
of M/s.‘R’ Industries and presently engaged in the business of investment/
dealing in property – He has nowhere stated that he had proposed to purchase 
the oﬃ  ce space from the respondent for the purpose of either selling the 
same for higher price or the said property was being purchased as an 
investment for being sold in future – The statement of the appellant was 
that he engaged in the business of investment/dealing in property would not 
ipso facto suggest or indicate the property proposed to be purchased from 
the respondent was for commercial purpose – It is not in dispute that in all 
the respondent has received a sum of Rs.51,10,117/- from appellants – To 
balance the equities, respondent directed to refund the amount it has received 
from appellants with interest calculated @ 12% per annum – Therefore, the 
order dated 11.05.2015 passed by the NCDRC in consumer complaint set 
aside.
[Paras 13, 16 and 17]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Synco Textiles Pvt. Ltd. vs. Greaves Cotton and Company Ltd., 1990 
SCC Online NCDRC 3 : (1991) 1 CPJ 499; Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical 
Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers and others, (2020) 2 SCC 265 : [2019] 
14 SCR 563; Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, (1995) 
3 SCC 583 : [1995] 3 SCR 174 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5858 of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.05.2015 of the National 
Consumer Redressal Commission at New Delhi in Consumer Complaint 
No.276 of 2015.
397
Appearances:
Digendra Sharma, Ajay Kumar Singh, Anubhav Bhandari, Niharika 
Dubey, Advs. for the Appellant.
M. R. Shamshad, Atul Sharma, Ankur Sharma, Alok Tripathi, Advs. 
for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1 The interpretation of the word and expression “Commercial Purpose” 
deﬁ ned under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for the sake of brevity) is the pivotal 
issue in this appeal.
FACTUAL MATRIX
2 The appellants intended to purchase a commercial space in the project 
called ‘Vipul World Commercial’ situated at Gurugram, Haryana, promoted 
by the respondent. After having come to know that Mrs. Bindu Rawlley and 
Mr. Talwinder Singh intended to sell their shares in oﬃ  ce unit No.306 on 
the third ﬂ oor in the aforesaid commercial complex allotted to them by the 
respondent, appellants agreed to purchase the same and accordingly made 
payment of entire agreed amount to their vendors. Recognizing the said 
transfer, the names of the appellants came to be recorded by the respondent 
in substitution to the names of the vendors of appellants. The customer code 
allotted to the original allotees was continued in the name of the appellants. 
It was agreed between the appellants and their vendors that appellants would 
pay a sum of Rs. 18,07,100 to the original allotees and the balance amount 
of Rs.34,27,050 to the respondent as and when demanded by the respondent.
In furtherance of the same and on payment to the original allotees, the fact 
of such sale of shares was intimated to the respondent.
3 Subsequent to the aforesaid circumstance, respondent raised a 
demand on the appellants and accordingly the amount was paid which was 
outstanding as on the date of demand. The respondent issued the receipt 
and also allotment letter allotting commercial space in “Vipul Business 
ROHIT CHAUDHARY & ANR. v. M/S VIPUL LTD.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
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Park” – 105 and thereafter re-allotted unit No.814 on 8th Floor for a sale 
consideration of Rs.51,51,415. This unilateral change was objected to by the 
appellants and in response to the same, the respondent threatened to forfeit 
the amount paid till date and also to cancel the allotment of the oﬃ  ce space.
4 Respondent forwarded a buyer’s agreement to the appellant and 
called upon them to return the same after signing and same was duly 
complied under the circumstances that prevailed. The respondent had agreed 
to deliver possession of the premises to the appellants within 24 months 
from the date of execution of such agreement and for reasons unknown, 
the same was not delivered. In the interregnum, appellants continued to 
pay instalments as and when demands were raised by the respondent (same 
has been denied by respondent). As per the statement of account issued by 
the respondent to the appellants, they have acknowledged total receipt of 
Rs. 50,28,122/- and payment of Rs.81,995/- made towards service tax was 
not reﬂ ected in the statement of accounts. As per the payment schedule 
forwarded by the respondent to the appellants, a sum of Rs.2,47,148/- was 
due and payable to the respondent by the appellants within 30 days from 
the date of possession notice, which was not issued.
5 On account of non-intimation about delivery of possession of 
the oﬃ  ce space unit allotted to the appellants and the inaction of the
respondent in not delivering possession of the oﬃ  ce space allotted, the 
appellants approached the National Consumer Redressal Commission at 
New Delhi by ﬁ ling a complaint, which was preceded by issuance of a 
legal notice whereunder the appellants demanded refund of Rs.51,10,117/- 
and interest @ of 18% P.A. amounting to Rs.42,52,143/- after terminating 
the buyer’s agreement dated 27.11.2009. A further sum of Rs.50 lakhs 
was also claimed towards mental agony. The Commission by impugned 
order dated 11.05.2015, dismissed the complaint in limine on the ground 
of maintainability holding that appellants are not ‘consumers’ as deﬁ ned 
under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act as appellants were already carrying on 
business for the purposes of their livelihood and therefore, it cannot be said 
that the property which was the subject matter of the complaint before the 
Commission was being purchased by them exclusively for the purposes of 
earning livelihood by way of self-employment. The Commission also opined 
that Commercial space booked by the appellants was for earning proﬁ t and
399
not for the purpose of earning livelihood by way of self-employment by 
relying upon the statement of ﬁ rst appellant recorded by the Commission. 
Hence the appeal.
6 We have heard the arguments of Shri Digendra Sharma, Mr. Ajay 
Kumar Singh, Mr. Anubhav Bhandari and Mr. Niharika Dubey, learned 
counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. M.R. Shamshad, Mr. Atul 
Sharma, Mr. Ankur Sharma and Mr. Alok Tripathi, learned counsel appearing 
for the respondent.
7 It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants 
that the Commission had erred in not appreciating the fact of appellants 
having booked the commercial space only for the purpose of earning 
livelihood by way of self-employment and not for the purposes of reselling 
or making proﬁ t due to escalation of price as pleaded in the complaint; in 
the statement that came to be recorded by the Commission, nowhere it has 
been stated by the appellants that commercial space booked by them was 
for the purpose of making proﬁ t and mere running of a dealership business 
of Reliance Industries and engaging themselves in business of investment 
in property, perse would not indicate or suggest that appellants intended 
to sell the same; the appellants though had approached the respondent for 
delivery of possession of the commercial space allotted to them, till date 
it was not delivered and silence on the part of the respondent had caused 
mental agony, frustration and depression to the appellants; the
unilateral 
change of the oﬃ  ce unit from Third ﬂ oor to Eighth ﬂ oor without consent 
of the appellants and forwarding a unilateral agreement and forcing the 
appellants to sign the same, by receiving all payments would tantamount to 
deceptive practice and falls within the meaning of ‘unfair trade practice’ as 
deﬁ ned under the Consumer Protection Act; inordinate delay on the part of 
the respondent in completing the project and handing over possession of the 
oﬃ  ce space allotted to the appellants has resulted in appellants undergoing 
serious mental agony and as such they should be compensated as prayed 
for in the complaint.
8 Rebutting the said contentions, learned counsel appearing for the 
respondent Mr. M.R. Shamshad, Mr. Atul Sharma, Mr. Ankur Sharma and 
Mr. Alok Tripathi, has supported the impugned order and has contended 
that appellants would not fall within the four corners of the deﬁ nition of 
ROHIT CHAUDHARY & ANR. v. M/S VIPUL LTD. 
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
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[2023] 14 S.C.R.
‘consumer’ as deﬁ ned under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act and the statement 
of the appellant No.1 recorded on oath by the commission while hearing 
the maintainability of the complaint, clearly shows that ﬁ rst appellant was 
earlier engaged in the business of caustic soda as a dealer of M/S Reliance 
Industries and presently engaged in the business of investments/dealing 
in property, and this would indicate that appellants were already engaged 
in the business and therefore, the property in question could not be said to 
be bought exclusively by the appellants for the purpose of earning their 
livelihood by self-employment and as such, the order of dismissal would not 
call for interference. He would elaborate his submissions by contending that 
appellants are already engaged in the business and the Act would exclude 
those persons who avail services for commercial purposes and the oﬃ  ce 
space was not purchased by the appellants exclusively for the purpose of 
earning livelihood; the complaint does not disclose any cause of action 
and it also ought to have been dismissed for suppression of fact namely the 
appellants having defaulted in the payments. Accordingly, he has sought 
for dismissal of the appeal. 
DISCUSSION AND OUR FINDINGS:
9 The National Commission at the outset considered the question as 
to whether the appellants are “Consumer” and answered in the negative. It 
has been held that appellants would not be entitled
to seek redressal of their 
grievance under the provisions of the Act. On the basis of the statement of 
the complainant made before it, the Commission has arrived at a conclusion 
that complainant No.1 was running a dealership business of M/s. Reliance 
Industries for their livelihood and they are also engaged in the business 
of investment in property. Hence, the commercial space booked by the 
complainants cannot be said to be for the purposes of earning livelihood 
by self-employment or in other words the appellants are not consumers as 
deﬁ ned under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. In this background it would be 
necessary to note Section 2(1)(d) of the Act and it reads as under:
“consumer” means any person who,—
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised 
or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred 
payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person 
who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly
401
paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, 
when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does 
not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any 
commercial purpose; or
(ii) 12 [hires or avails of] any services for a consideration which 
has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or 
under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneﬁ ciary 
of such services other than the person who 12 [hires or avails of] 
the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and 
partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such 
services are availed of with the approval of the ﬁ rst mentioned person 
13 [but does not include a person who avails of such services for any 
commercial purpose];
(Emphasis supplied by us)
10. The aforesaid deﬁ nition has received the attention of the National 
Commission in the case of Synco Textiles Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Greaves Cotton 
and Company Ltd. reported in 1990 SCC OnLine NCDRC 3 : (1991) 1 CPJ 
499 and approved by this Court in Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust 
v. Unique Shanti Developers and others (2020) 2 SCC 265. Whereunder 
this Court has followed the principles laid down in Laxmi Engineering 
Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583 whereunder it 
came to be held:
“10. A review of the provisions of the Act discloses that the quasi-
judicial bodies/authorities/agencies created by the Act known as 
District Forums, State
Commissions and the National Commission 
are not courts though invested with some of the powers of a civil 
court. They are quasi-judicial tribunals brought into existence to 
render inexpensive and speedy remedies to consumers. It is equally 
clear that these forums/commissions were not supposed to supplant 
but supplement the existing judicial system. The idea was to provide 
an additional forum providing inexpensive and speedy resolution 
of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods and 
services. The forum so created is uninhibited by the requirement of 
court fee or the formal procedures of a court. Any consumer can go 
and ﬁ le a complaint. Complaint need not necessarily be ﬁ led by the 
ROHIT CHAUDHARY & ANR. v. M/S VIPUL LTD. 
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
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complainant himself; any recognized consumers’ association can 
espouse his cause. Where a large number of consumers have a similar 
complaint, one or more can ﬁ le a complaint on behalf of all. Even the 
Central Government and State Governments can act on his/their behalf. 
The idea was to help the consumers get justice and fair treatment in 
the matter of goods and services purchased and availed by them in a 
market dominated by large trading and manufacturing bodies. Indeed, 
the entire Act revolves round the consumer and is designed to protect 
his interest. The Act provides for “business-to-consumer” disputes 
and not for “business-to-business” disputes. This scheme of the Act, 
in our opinion, is relevant to and helps in interpreting the words that 
fall for consideration in this appeal.
11. Now coming back to the deﬁ nition of the expression ‘consumer’ in 
Section 2(d), a consumer means insofar as is relevant for the purpose 
of this appeal, (i) a person who buys any goods for consideration; it 
is immaterial whether the consideration is paid or promised, or partly 
paid and partly promised, or whether the payment of consideration 
is deferred; (ii) a person who uses such goods with the approval of 
the person who buys such goods for consideration; (iii) but does not 
include a person who buys such goods for resale or for any commercial 
purpose. The expression ‘resale’ is clear enough. Controversy has, 
however, arisen
with respect to meaning of the expression “commercial 
purpose”. It is also not deﬁ ned in the Act. In the absence of a deﬁ nition, 
we have to go by its ordinary meaning. ‘Commercial’ denotes 
“pertaining to commerce” (Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary); 
it means “connected with, or engaged in commerce; mercantile; having 
proﬁ t as the main aim” (Collins English Dictionary) whereas the word 
‘commerce’ means “ﬁ nancial transactions especially buying and selling 
of merchandise, on a large scale” (Concise Oxford Dictionary). The 
National Commission appears to have been taking a consistent view 
that where a person purchases goods “with a view to using such goods 
for carrying on any activity on a large scale for the purpose of earning 
proﬁ t” he will not be a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of Section 2(d)
(i) of the Act. Broadly aﬃ  rming the said view and more particularly 
with a view to obviate any confusion — the expression “large scale” 
is not a very precise expression — Parliament stepped in and added
403
the explanation to Section 2(d)(i) by Ordinance/Amendment Act, 
1993. The explanation excludes certain purposes from the purview 
of the expression “commercial purpose” — a case of exception to an 
exception. Let us elaborate: a person who buys a typewriter or a car 
and uses them for his personal use is certainly a consumer but a person 
who buys a typewriter or a car for typing others’ work for consideration 
or for plying the car as a taxi can be said to be using the typewriter/
car for a commercial purpose. The explanation however clariﬁ es that 
in certain situations, purchase of goods for “commercial purpose” 
would not yet take the purchaser out of the deﬁ nition of expression 
‘consumer’. If the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the 
purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, such 
purchaser of goods is yet a ‘consumer’. In the illustration given above, 
if the purchaser himself works on typewriter or plies the car as a taxi 
himself, he does not cease to be a consumer. In other words, if the 
buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e., by self-employment, for earning 
his livelihood, it would not be treated as a “commercial purpose” and 
he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The 
explanation reduces the question, what is a “commercial purpose”, to 
a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. It is not the 
value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods 
bought are put to.
The several words employed in the explanation, viz., 
“uses them by himself”, “exclusively for the purpose of earning his 
livelihood” and “by means of self-employment” make the intention of 
Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by 
the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning his livelihood. 
A few more illustrations would serve to emphasise what we say. A 
person who purchases an auto-rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for 
earning his livelihood would be a consumer. Similarly, a purchaser 
of a truck who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier by himself 
would be a consumer. A person who purchases a lathe machine or 
other machine to operate it himself for earning his livelihood would 
be a consumer. (In the above illustrations, if such buyer takes the 
assistance of one or two persons to assist/help him in operating the 
vehicle or machinery, he does not cease to be a consumer.) As against 
this a person who purchases an auto-rickshaw, a car or a lathe machine 
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[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
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or other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another person 
would not be a consumer. This is the necessary limitation ﬂ owing from 
the expressions “used by him”, and “by means of self-employment” 
in the explanation. The ambiguity in the meaning of the words “for 
the purpose of earning his livelihood” is explained and clariﬁ ed by 
the other two sets of words.
15. In Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta [(1994) 1 
SCC 243] the question was whether a public authority engaged in 
constructing and selling houses can be said to be rendering a ‘service’ 
and whether the person purchasing such houses can be called a 
‘consumer’ within the meaning of the said deﬁ nition. While answering 
the question in the aﬃ  rmative, a Bench of this Court (Kuldip Singh 
and R.M. Sahai, JJ.) also examined the scheme and object of the Act 
and the ambit of the deﬁ nition of the expression ‘consumer’. The 
following observations are apposite: (SCC pp. 251-54, paras 2 and 3)
“To begin with the preamble of the Act, which can aﬀ ord useful 
assistance to ascertain the legislative intention, it was enacted, ‘to 
provide for the protection of the interest of consumers’. Use of the word 
‘protection’ furnishes key to the minds of makers of the Act. Various 
deﬁ nitions and provisions which elaborately attempt to achieve this 
objective have to be construed in this light without departing from the 
settled view that a preamble cannot
control otherwise plain meaning of 
a provision. In fact the law meets long-felt necessity of protecting the 
common man from such wrongs for which the remedy under ordinary 
law for various reasons has become illusory.
***
The word ‘consumer’ is a comprehensive expression. It extends 
from a person who buys any commodity to consume either as eatable 
or otherwise from a shop, business house, corporation, store, fair 
price shop to use of private or public services. In Oxford Dictionary 
a consumer is deﬁ ned as, ‘a purchaser of goods or services’. In 
Black’s Law Dictionary it is explained to mean, ‘one who consumes. 
Individuals who purchase, use, maintain, and dispose of products and 
services. A member of that broad class of people who are aﬀ ected by 
pricing policies, ﬁ nancing practices, quality of goods and services,
405
credit reporting, debt collection, and other trade practices for which 
State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws are enacted.’ The Act 
opts for no less wider deﬁ nition. It reads as under:
‘ “consumer” means any person who,—
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or 
promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system 
of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than 
the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised 
or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred 
payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but 
does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any 
commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has 
been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under 
any system of deferred payment and includes any beneﬁ ciary of such 
services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for 
consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or 
under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed 
of with the approval of the ﬁ rst mentioned person;
Explanation.— For the purposes of sub-clause (i), “commercial 
purpose” does not include use by a consumer of goods bought and 
used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by 
means of self-employment;’
It is in two parts. The ﬁ rst deals with goods and the other with
services. 
Both parts ﬁ rst declare the meaning of goods and services by use of 
wide expressions. Their ambit is further enlarged by use of inclusive 
clause. For instance, it is not only purchaser of goods or hirer of 
services but even those who use the goods or who are beneﬁ ciaries of 
services with approval of the person who purchased the goods or who 
hired services are included in it. The legislature has taken precaution 
not only to deﬁ ne ‘complaint’, ‘complainant’, ‘consumer’ but even to 
mention in detail what would amount to unfair trade practice by giving 
an elaborate deﬁ nition in clause (r) and even to deﬁ ne ‘defect’ and 
‘deﬁ ciency’ by clauses (f) and (g) for which a consumer can approach 
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[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
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[2023] 14 S.C.R.
the Commission. The Act thus aims to protect the economic interest 
of a consumer as understood in commercial sense as a purchaser of 
goods and in the larger sense of user of services.
21. We must, therefore, hold that:
(i) The explanation added by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) 
Act 50 of 1993 (replacing Ordinance 24 of 1993) with eﬀ ect from 18-
6-1993 is clariﬁ catory in nature and applies to all pending proceedings.
(ii) Whether the purpose for which a person has bought goods is 
a “commercial purpose” within the meaning of the deﬁ nition of 
expression ‘consumer’ in Section 2(d) of the Act is always a question 
of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.
(iii) A person who buys goods and uses them himself, exclusively for 
the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment 
is within the deﬁ nition of the expression ‘consumer’.”
11. A plain reading of the expression “consumer” indicates that any 
person who buys any goods for consideration which has been paid or 
promised or partly paid and partly promised under any system of deferred 
payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buy 
such goods. Such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or 
partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such use is 
made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who 
obtains such goods or services for resale or for
any commercial purpose. It is 
amply clear from the above deﬁ nition that the Parliament has excluded from 
the scope of ‘Consumer’ for igniting proceedings under the Act, a person 
who obtains goods or services for re-sale or for any commercial purpose. 
Going by the plain dictionary meaning of the words used in the deﬁ nition 
section the intention of Parliament must be understood to be to exclude from 
the scope of the expression “consumer” any person who buys goods for the 
purpose of their being used in any activity engaged on a large scale for the 
purpose of making proﬁ t. The words ‘for any commercial purpose’ must 
be understood as covering the cases other than those of resale of the goods. 
Thus, it is obvious, that Parliament intended to exclude from the scope of 
deﬁ nition not merely persons who obtain goods for resale but also those who 
purchase goods with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity
407
on a large scale for the purpose of earning proﬁ t. Thus, persons buying goods 
either for resale or for use in large scale proﬁ t making activity will not be 
a consumer entitled to protection under the Act, which would be a plain 
interpretation of this deﬁ nition clause. The intention of the Parliament as 
can be gathered from the deﬁ nition section is to deny the beneﬁ ts of the Act 
to persons purchasing goods either for purpose of resale or for the purpose 
of being used in proﬁ t making activity engaged on a large scale.
12. The expression ‘commercial purpose’ has not been deﬁ ned under 
the Act. In the absence thereof we have to go by its ordinary meaning. 
‘Commercial’ denotes “pertaining to commerce” (chambers 20th Century 
dictionary); it means ‘connected’ with or engaged in commerce; mercantile; 
“having proﬁ t as the main aim” (Collin’s English Dictionary); relate to or is 
connected with trade and traﬃ  c or commerce in general, is occupied with 
business and commerce. The Explanation (added by Consumer Protection 
(Amendment) Act 50 of 1993 (replacing Ordinance of 24 of 1993 w.e.f. 
18.06.1993) excludes certain purposes from the purview of the expression 
‘commercial purpose’- a case of explanation to an exception to amplify 
this deﬁ nition by way of an illustration would certainly clear the clouds 
surrounding such interpretation. For instance, a person who buys a car for 
his personal use would certainly be a consumer, but if purchased for plying 
the
car for commercial purposes namely as a taxi, it can be said that it is 
for a commercial purpose. However, the Explanation clariﬁ es that even 
purchases in certain situations for ‘commercial purposes’ would not take 
within its sweep the purchaser out of the deﬁ nition of expression ‘consumer’. 
In other words, if the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the 
purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, such 
purchaser of goods would continue to be a ‘consumer’. This court in the 
case of Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers 
(supra), has held that a straight jacket formula cannot be adopted in every 
case and the broad principles which can be curled out for determining 
whether an activity or transaction is for a commercial purpose would depend 
on facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, if the dominant purpose 
of purchasing the goods or services is for a proﬁ t motive and this fact is 
evident from record, such purchaser would not fall within the four corners 
of the deﬁ nition of ‘consumer’. On the other hand, if the answer is in the 
negative, namely if such person purchases the goods or services is not for 
ROHIT CHAUDHARY & ANR. v. M/S VIPUL LTD. 
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
408 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
any commercial purpose and for one’s own use, it cannot be gainsaid even 
in such circumstances the transaction would be for a commercial purpose 
attributing proﬁ t motive and thereby excluding such person from the 
deﬁ nition of ‘consumer’. When there is an assertion in the complaint ﬁ led 
before the Consumer Court or Commission that such goods are purchased 
for earning livelihood, such complaint cannot be nipped at the bud and 
dismissed. Evidence tendered by parties will have to be evaluated on the 
basis of pleadings and thereafter conclusion be arrived at. Primarily it 
has to be seen as to whether the averments made in the complaint would 
suﬃ  ce to examine the same on merits and in the event of answer being in 
the aﬃ  rmative, it ought to proceed further. On the contrary, if the answer 
is the negative, such complaint can be dismissed at the threshold. Thus, it 
would depend on facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be any 
deﬁ ned formula with mathematical precision to examine the claims for non-
suiting the complainant on account of such complaint not falling within the 
deﬁ nition of the expression ‘consumer’ as deﬁ ned under Section 2(1)(d). 
13. Now turning our attention to the facts on hand, namely, perusal of 
the complaint ﬁ led before the Commission would indicate that appellants 
have speciﬁ cally pleaded that they were in search of oﬃ  ce space “for their 
self-employment and to run their
business and earn their livelihood”. 
In the statement recorded on oath by the Commission, while hearing the 
maintainability of the complaint, the ﬁ rst appellant has stated that he was 
earlier engaged in the business of caustic soda as a dealer of M/S Reliance 
Industries and presently engaged in the business of investment/dealing in 
property. He has nowhere stated that he had proposed to purchase the oﬃ  ce 
space from the respondent for the purpose of either selling the same for 
higher price or the said property was being purchased as an investment for 
being sold in future. The statement of the appellant was that he engaged in 
the business of investment/dealing in property would not ipso facto suggest 
or indicate the property proposed to be purchased from the respondent 
was for commercial purpose. Even according to the statement of the ﬁ rst 
appellant, he was earlier engaged in the business of castic soda and now 
engaged in the business of investment/dealing in property. There will be 
varied eventualities. By way of illustration it can be noted that the appellants 
might have intended to take this property for running their business to eke
409
out their livelihood or open the oﬃ  ce for the purposes of dealing in the 
existing business or the possibility of the proposed oﬃ  ce being used as a 
corporate oﬃ  ce or head oﬃ  ce or branch oﬃ  ce of their existing business 
which cannot be ruled out. It is in this background the averment made in 
paragraph 6 of their complaint ﬁ led before the Commission would acquire 
signiﬁ cance and the relevant averment has been noticed hereinabove and 
at the cost of repetition when perused it would clearly indicate that when 
the appellants were in search of oﬃ  ce space “for their self-employment 
and to run their business and earn their livelihood” they had entered into 
an agreement to purchase the same from the original allotees. Neither this 
plea nor the statement made on oath recorded by the Commission would 
belie the stand of the appellants that they intended to purchase the oﬃ  ce 
space for their livelihood. In this scenario, the ﬁ nding recorded by the 
Commission in Paragraph 8 of impugned order is erroneous and contrary 
to the deﬁ nition clause of the expression “consumer” as deﬁ ned under 
section 2(1)(d).
14.  It is an undisputed fact that respondent has agreed to sell the 
oﬃ  ce space in the Vipul Business Park to the appellants. Record would 
also disclose that in all the appellants paid Rs.51,10,117/- or respondent 
had received the said amount from the appellants. Though, a faint attempt 
has been made by the appellants to contend that there was
unilateral change 
namely the respondent had agreed to sell the oﬃ  ce space 306 at third ﬂ oor 
to oﬃ  ce space No.814 in 8th ﬂ oor, we are not inclined to entertain the said 
plea in as much as the agreement has been duly signed by the appellants and 
in token of having accepted the same they have aﬃ  xed their signatures to 
the said agreement and it is too late in the day for the appellants to retrace 
their steps on this issue. The said contention stands rejected.
15. Clause 15 of the buyer’s agreement would clearly indicate that the 
possession of the premises was agreed to be delivered within 24 months 
from the date of agreement which undisputedly had not taken place, or in 
other words the allotted oﬃ  ce space was not delivered even after expiry 
of 24 months from the date of agreement. In fact, in the counter aﬃ  davit 
ﬁ led by the respondent an evasive denial has been made by contending 
that permissive possession of the commercial space had been oﬀ ered 
ROHIT CHAUDHARY & ANR. v. M/S VIPUL LTD. 
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
410 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
by the respondent to the appellants. However, it is not pleaded that the 
commercial space allotted to the appellants is ready for occupation. The 
statement of account dated 28.01.2014 forwarded to the appellants by the 
respondent would indicate the receipt of payment of Rs.51,10,117/- by the 
respondent. Though, respondent has received the payment towards service 
tax, same is not reﬂ ected in the statement of account. Be that as it may. On 
account of inaction of the respondent in not complying with their demand, 
appellants got issued a legal notice calling upon the respondent to refund 
Rs.93,62,025/- which is inclusive of the principal amount of Rs.51,10,117/- 
and Rs.42,52,143/- towards interests accrued thereon calculated @ 18% per 
annum and also demanded compensation of Rs.50,000,00/- towards mental 
agony by terminating the agreement.
16. In the normal course, we would have remitted the matter back to the 
Commission for adjudicating the complaint on merits in the light of ﬁ nding 
recorded hereinabove. However, we desist from this attractive proposition 
for reasons more than one. Firstly, the dispute relates back to the year 2006; 
secondly, the appellants have already repudiated the contract. Hence, in this 
background directing the respondent to execute the sale deed in respect of the 
oﬃ  ce premises would not arise, which is also not the claim of the claimant 
and only prayer which can be considered for being
examined would relate 
to refund of the amount. It is not in dispute that in all the respondent has 
received a sum of Rs.51,10,117/- which is also admitted by the respondent 
in its counter aﬃ  davit but contending that instalments which was due and 
payable had not been remitted on time and as such interest is payable on the 
delayed payments. However, the receipt of the amount of Rs. 51,10,117/- is 
not disputed by respondent. There being no plea with regard to the building 
or commercial complex being ready for being occupied, having been raised 
by the respondent in its counter aﬃ  davit and the communication dated 
25.01.2016 also not disclosing that the oﬃ  ce premises proposed to be sold in 
favour of the appellants being ready to be occupied but only evidencing the 
fact that the permissive possession of premises was being oﬀ ered, it cannot 
be presumed that possession of oﬃ  ce premises which is ready to oﬀ er was 
being delivered to the appellants. Hence, to balance the equities, it would 
be appropriate to direct the respondent to refund the amount it has received 
from appellants with interest calculated @ 12% per annum which would
411
not only meet the ends of justice but would also oﬀ set the interest loss if at 
all, if any caused to the respondent on account of delayed payments of the 
instalments by the appellants and keeping in mind the appreciated value 
of the asset namely oﬃ  ce premises which was proposed to be sold by the 
respondent to the appellant.
17. For the reasons afore-stated we allow this appeal, set aside the 
order dated 11.05.2015 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal 
Commission in consumer complaint No.276 of 2015 and allow the complaint 
in part by directing respondent to refund sum of Rs.51,10,117/- with interest 
@ 12% per annum from the date of complaint till date of payment with 
litigation cost of Rs. one lakh. 
Headnotes prepared by:  
Appeal allowed.
Ankit Gyan
ROHIT CHAUDHARY & ANR. v. M/S VIPUL LTD. 
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]