THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. versus DAVINDER SINGH & ORS.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1321, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Reference answered
Segment: Issues
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1321 : 2024 INSC 562
The State of Punjab & Ors. 
v. 
Davinder Singh & Ors. 
Civil Appeal No. 2317 of 2011
01 August 2024
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, B.R. Gavai,*  
Vikram Nath,* Bela M. Trivedi,* Pankaj Mithal,*  
Manoj Misra and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The Supreme Court was required to adjudicate upon whether the 
sub-classification of Scheduled Castes for the purpose of providing 
affirmative action, including reservation is valid. In this context, the 
following issues arose for consideration: Whether sub-classification 
of a reserved class is permissible under Articles 14, 15 and 16 
of the Constitution; Whether the Scheduled Castes constitute a 
homogenous or a heterogenous grouping; Whether Article 341 of 
the Constitution creates a homogenous class through the operation 
of the deeming fiction; and Whether there any limits on the scope 
of sub-classification.
Headnotes†
Reservation – Whether sub-classification of Scheduled Castes 
for purposes of reservation is constitutionally permissible – 
Held (per majority), Yes. 
Held (per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and  
Manoj Misra, J.): 1. Article 14 of the Constitution permits  
sub-classification of a class which is not similarly situated for the 
purpose of the law – The Court while testing the validity of sub-
classification must determine if the class is a homogenous integrated 
class for fulfilling the objective of the sub-classification – If the class 
is
not integrated for the purpose, the class can be further classified 
upon the fulfillment of the two-prong intelligible differentia standard.  
[Para 205(a)]
2. The holding in Chinnaiah that sub-classification of the Scheduled 
Castes is impermissible is overruled. [Para 205(f)]
Held (per B.R. Gavai, J.) (Concurring): 1. E.V. Chinnaiah, which 
held that sub-classification amongst the Scheduled Castes for the 
* Author
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purpose of giving more beneficial treatment to a group in the larger 
group of the Scheduled Castes is not permissible, does not lay 
down a good law. [Para 296 (i)]
2. Sub-classification amongst the Scheduled Castes for giving more 
beneficial treatment is permissible in law. [Para 296 (ii)]
Held (per Vikram Nath, J.) (Concurring): I am generally in 
agreement with the reasons and conclusions arrived at in the 
opinions of Hon’ble the Chief Justice and Brother Justice Gavai in 
particular that the holding in E.V. Chinnaiah, that sub-classification 
within Scheduled Castes was impermissible, does not lay down 
good law and stands over-ruled. [Para 1]
Held (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Concurring): 1. The issue of sub-
classification of scheduled castes has been appropriately answered 
by the Chief Justice and my esteemed brother Justice Gavai by 
their separate opinions with which I respectfully agree. [Para 9]
2. The policy of reservation as enshrined under the Constitution 
and by its various amendments requires a fresh re-look and 
evolvement of other methods for helping and uplifting the depressed 
class or the downtrodden or the persons belonging to SC/ST/OBC 
communities – So long no new method is evolved or adopted, the 
system of reservation as prevailing may continue to occupy the 
field with power to permit sub-classification of a class particularly 
scheduled caste as I would not be suggesting dismantling of an
existing building without erecting a new one in its place which may 
prove to be more useful. [Para 84(i)] 
3. Sub-classification of Scheduled Castes is permissible in law for 
the purposes of reservation. [Para 85]
Held (per Satish Chandra Sharma, J.) (Concurring): I have had 
the privilege of reading the lucid and detailed opinion(s) authored 
by Hon’ble Dr. Justice D.Y.Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India 
and Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai, respectively – I am fully in 
agreement with both opinions to the extent that the validity of 
sub-classification within Scheduled Castes has been held to be 
constitutionally permissible. [Para 1]
Held (per Bela M. Trivedi, J.) (Dissenting): 1. When the law 
was settled by the Constitution Bench in E.V. Chinnaiah after 
considering all the previous judgments including Indra Sawhney 
and after investing substantial judicial time and resources, the
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same should not have been doubted and referred to the larger 
bench by the Three-Judge Bench in Davinder Singh, and that too 
without assigning any reason much less cogent reason for their 
disagreement disregarding the well settled doctrines of Precedents 
and Stare decisis. [Para 79(i)]
2. The Nine-Judge Bench in Indra Sawhney and the Five-Judge 
Bench in Jarnail Singh had not dealt with the issue of sub-
classification of the “Scheduled Castes” in the context of Article 
341, much less had dealt with the State’s powers to sub-classify or 
sub-divide or regroup the castes specified as “Scheduled Castes” 
under Article 341 of the Constitution, and therefore, it could not be 
held that the law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah was not in consonance 
with Indra Sawhney or Jarnail Singh. [Para 79(viii)]
3. The power conferred upon the Supreme Court under Article 142 
cannot be used to supplant the substantive law applicable to the 
case under consideration – Even with the width of its amplitude, 
Article 142 cannot be used to build a new edifice where none 
existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing 
with the subject, and thereby to achieve something indirectly which 
cannot be achieved directly – The action of the State, though 
well intentioned and affirmative in nature, if violates the specific 
provision of the Constitution, cannot be validated by the Supreme 
Court in exercise of
its jurisdiction under Article 142. [Para 79(ix)]
4. The affirmative action and legal frameworks, though both do 
aim at more equitable society, they must navigate complex legal 
principles to ensure fairness and constitutionality. [Para 79(x)]
5. The law laid down by the Five-Judge Bench in E.V. Chinnaiah 
is the correct law and deserves to be confirmed. [Para 80]
Reservation – Whether sub-classification of Scheduled Castes 
for reservation was excluded or barred by the Nine Judge 
Bench decision in Indra Sawhney case – Held, No.
Held (per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and  
Manoj Misra, J.): In Indra Sawhney, this Court did not limit the 
application of sub-classification only to the Other Backward Class – 
This Court upheld the application of the principle to beneficiary 
classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). [Para 205(b)]
Held (per B.R. Gavai, J.) (Concurring): In Indra Sawhney,  
7 Learned Judges affirmed the position as laid down in N.M. Thomas
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that clause (4) of Article 16 is not by way of an exception to 
clause (1) of Article 16, but it is an emphatic way of stating a principle 
implicit in Article 16(1) – It has been held that further classification 
of backward classes into backward and more backward classes 
is permissible under the Constitution – It has been held in Indra 
Sawhney that under Article 16(4) the Scheduled Castes are also 
included in the term ‘backward class of citizens’. [Paras 247, 248]
Held (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Concurring): The Chief Justice in 
his opinion has clearly opined that this Court in Indra Sawhney 
never intended to limit the application of sub-classification to the 
other backward classes only – If any class is not integrated it can 
be further classified and such sub-classification of a class would 
not be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, so long persons 
in a class are not similarly situated. [Para 79]
Held (per Bela M. Trivedi, J.): Though Indra Sawhney had sought 
to define “backward class” in terms of social backwardness, 
while considering the ambit of “backward class” for the purpose 
of Article 16(4), it did not deal with the issue qua the Scheduled 
Castes/ Scheduled Tribes particularly in the light of Article 341/342, 
rather it categorically kept the Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes 
outside the purview of consideration – The Scheduled Castes 
being the most backward class amongst the backward
classes, 
and having acquired a special status by virtue of Article 341, the 
question of defining “backward class” qua the “Scheduled Castes” 
did not arise, and rightly not dealt with in Indra Sawhney for the 
purposes of Article 16(4) of the Constitution. [Para 70]
Reservation – Whether Scheduled Castes under Article 341, 
constitute a homogeneous class – Held (per majority), No – 
Constitution of India – Art. 341.
Held (per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and  
Manoj Misra, J.): 1. In Chinnaiah, Justice Santosh Hegde observed 
that the Castes notified by the President in the exercise of power 
under Article 341 form a class in themselves – For this purpose, 
the learned Judge relied on certain observations of the Constitution 
Bench in NM Thomas case – In NM Thomas however, rules 
providing concessions to the members of the Scheduled Castes 
for qualifying at the entrance examination were challenged – One 
of the issues before the Court was whether the concession to the 
members of the Scheduled Castes violated Article 16(2) since it 
discriminates solely on the ground of “caste” – To overcome the
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embargo placed by Article 16(2), the learned Judges observed that 
provision for affirmative action is made in favour of the Scheduled 
Castes, which once notified by the President in exercise of the 
power under Article 341 are not a “caste” but a class – The 
class that is constituted by the Presidential notification as the 
Scheduled Castes consists of numerous castes, thereby forming 
a class – The observations in NM Thomas do not go further to 
state that it is a homogenous class that cannot be classified 
further – Additionally, the approach adopted in NM Thomas by 
this Court that the Scheduled Castes are a class because they 
comprise of a collection of castes must be read in the context 
of the nine-Judge Bench decision in Indra Sawhney, where this 
Court held that caste is itself a class – Therefore, the inference 
drawn by Justice Hegde in Chinnaiah that the Scheduled Castes 
are a homogenous class based on the above observations in  
NM Thomas is erroneous. [Paras 113, 114]
2. Article 341(1) does not create a deeming fiction – The phrase 
“deemed” is used in the provision to mean that the castes or groups 
notified by the President shall be “regarded as” the Scheduled 
Castes – Even if it is accepted that the deeming fiction is used for 
the creation of a constitutional identity, the only logical consequence 
that flows from it is that castes included in the list will receive the
benefits that the Constitution provides to the Scheduled Castes – 
The operation of the provision does not create an integrated 
homogenous class. [Para 205(c)]
3. Sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes does not 
violate Article 341(2) because the castes are not per se included 
in or excluded from the List – Sub-classification would violate 
the provision only when either preference or exclusive benefit is 
provided to certain castes or groups of the Scheduled Castes over 
all the seats reserved for the class. [Para 205(d)]
Held (per B.R. Gavai, J.) (Concurring): The ground realities 
cannot be denied – Even among the Scheduled Castes, 
there are some categories who have received more inhuman 
treatment for centuries and generations as compared to the other  
categories – The hardships and the backwardness which these 
categories have suffered historically would differ from category to 
category – Therefore, merely because they are part of a single or 
a combined Presidential List, it cannot be said that they form part 
of a homogeneous group. [Para 261]
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Held (per Bela M. Trivedi, J.) (Dissenting): 1. While giving a 
broad and generous construction to the Constitutional provisions, 
the rule of “plain meaning”, or “literal” interpretation, which is the 
“primary rule” has to be kept in mind. [Para 79(ii)]
2. The Presidential List specifying “Scheduled Castes” under 
Article 341 assumes finality on the publication of the notification, 
and the castes, races or tribes, or groups within castes, races or 
tribes specified in the notification are deemed to be the “Scheduled 
Castes” in relation to that State or Union Territory as the case 
may be, for the purposes of the Constitution and as such assume 
special status of “Scheduled Castes”. [Para 79(iii)]
3. It is only the Parliament by law which can include in or exclude 
from the list of the “Scheduled Castes” specified in the notification 
notified under Clause (1), any caste, race or tribe or part of or group 
within any caste, race or tribe – Such notification notified under 
Clause (1) cannot be varied even by the President by issuing any 
subsequent notification. [Para 79(iv)]
4. It is by virtue of the notification of the President under Article 341 
that the “Scheduled Castes” come into being – Though the members 
of Scheduled Castes are drawn from different castes, races or 
tribes, they attain special status of “Scheduled Castes” by virtue of 
Presidential Notification – The etymological and evolutionary history 
and
the background of the nomenclature “Scheduled Castes”, 
coupled with the Presidential orders published under Article 341 
of the Constitution, make the “Scheduled Castes”, a homogenous 
class, which cannot be tinkered with by the States. [Para 79(v)]
Reservation – Whether State legislature has the power of sub-
classification of Scheduled Castes under Arts. 15 and 16 – Held 
(per majority), Yes – Constitution of India – Arts. 15 and 16.
Held (per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and  
Manoj Misra, J.): Historical and empirical evidence demonstrates 
that the Scheduled Castes are a socially heterogenous class – 
Thus, the State in exercise of the power under Articles 15(4) and 
16(4) can further classify the Scheduled Castes if (a) there is a 
rational principle for differentiation; and (b) the rational principle 
has a nexus with the purpose of sub-classification. [Para 205(e)]
Held (per B.R. Gavai, J.) (Concurring): 
1. It is the duty of the State to give preferential treatment to the 
backward class of citizens who are not adequately represented – If
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
the State while discharging that duty finds that certain categories 
within the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are not 
adequately represented and only the people belonging to few of the 
categories are enjoying the entire benefit reserved for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, can the State be denied its right to 
give more preferential treatment for such categories? The answer 
would be in the negative, since the same would not amount to 
tinkering with the Presidential List. [Para 258]
2. No doubt that if the State decides to provide 100% of the 
reservation for Scheduled Castes to one or more categories 
enlisted in the Presidential List in that State to the exclusion of 
some categories, it may amount to tinkering with that list because, 
in effect, it would amount to denial of benefit of reservation to those 
Scheduled Caste categories which have been excluded – That 
would, in effect, amount to deletion of the said categories from 
the Presidential List notified under Article 341 of the Constitution, 
which power is exclusively reserved with Parliament; such an 
exercise would not be permissible. [Para 259]
3. However, merely because more preferential treatment is provided 
to the more backward or more inadequately represented among 
the Scheduled Castes, it would not amount to tinkering with the 
Presidential List – The same would be permissible in view of the 
law laid down by
the 9-Judge Bench in the case of Indra Sawhney. 
[Para 260]
Held (per Bela M. Trivedi, J.) (Dissenting): 1. The States have 
no legislative competence to enact the law for providing reservation 
or giving preferential treatment to a particular caste/castes by 
dividing/sub-dividing/sub-classifying or regrouping the castes, races 
or tribes enumerated as the “Scheduled Castes” in the notification 
under Article 341. [Para 79(vi)]
2. Under the guise of providing reservation or under the pretext 
of taking affirmative action for the weaker of the weakest sections 
of the society, the State cannot vary the Presidential List, nor can 
tinker with Article 341 of the Constitution. [Para 79(vii)]
Reservation – Criteria and scope for sub-classification of 
Scheduled Castes – Discussed.
Held (per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and  
Manoj Misra, J.): 1. The purpose of the reservation clause is 
to remedy the inadequate representation in public services of
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certain “classes” – The intent of Article 16(4) is to cover those 
classes which have been inadequately represented because of 
their backwardness. [Paras 165, 166]
2. However, adequacy of representation when determined purely 
from a numerical perspective without accounting for factors such 
as representation vis-à-vis posts would dilute the purpose of the 
provision – The objective of Article 16(4) is to ensure effective 
representation of the class in the services of the State across posts 
and grades – The objective of the provision is not to emulate the 
existing social hierarchy where the low-grade posts are occupied 
by the socially backward while supervisory and managerial posts 
continue to be occupied by the advanced classes – If the objective 
of Article 16(4) is to be achieved in the truest sense, the inadequacy 
of representation must not be determined only on the basis of the 
total number of members of the backward class in the services of 
the State but by assessing the representation of the class across 
various posts. [Paras 167, 168]
3. Since the purpose of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is to ensure equality 
of opportunity of the socially backward classes, the criterion for 
sub-classification within a class (be it the Other Backward Classes 
or the Scheduled Castes or Tribes) must be an indicator of social 
backwardness – The yardstick for classification must differentiate 
the class based on inter-se social
backwardness – The inter-se 
backwardness could be identified based on the same or different 
identity. [Para 174]
4. Since the State can use any yardstick to determine inter-se 
backwardness, it is not necessary that the criteria for sub-
classification and the criteria used to distinguish the class from 
the other classes must be the same – How does the State identify 
inter-se social backwardness within the Scheduled Castes? The 
inter-se backwardness can, inter alia, be identified based on 
inadequacy of effective representation – However, it must be 
proved that inadequacy of effective representation of a caste is 
because of its social backwardness – The State must prove that 
the group/caste carved out from the larger group of Scheduled 
Castes is more disadvantaged and inadequately represented. 
[Paras 175, 177]
5. While the State may embark on an exercise of sub-classification, 
it must do so on the basis of quantifiable and demonstrable data 
bearing on levels of backwardness and representation in the
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
services of the State – It cannot merely act on its whims or as 
a matter of political expediency – The decision of the State is 
amenable to judicial review – When its action is challenged under 
Article 226 or before this Court under Article 32, the State must 
provide justification and the rationale for its determination – No 
State action can be manifestly arbitrary – It must be based on 
intelligible differentia which underlie the sub-classification – The 
basis of the sub-classification must bear a reasonable nexus to 
the object sought to be achieved. [Para 190]
6. Though sub-categorization based on each caste is permissible, 
there can never be a situation where seats are allocated for every 
caste separately – Though each caste is a separate unit, the 
social backwardness suffered by each of them is not substantially 
distinguishable to warrant the State to reserve seats for each 
caste – If the social backwardness of two or more classes is 
comparable, they must be grouped together for the purposes of 
reservation. [Para 195]
7. The scope of sub-classification of the Scheduled Castes is 
summarized as follows: (i) The objective of any form of affirmative 
action including sub-classification is to provide substantive equality 
of opportunity for the backward classes – The State can sub-
classify, inter alia, based on inadequate representation of certain 
castes – However, the State must
establish that the inadequacy of 
representation of a caste/group is because of its backwardness; (ii) 
The State must collect data on the inadequacy of representation 
in the “services of the State” because it is used as an indicator 
of backwardness; and (iii) Article 335 of the Constitution is not 
a limitation on the exercise of power under Articles 16(1) and 
16(4) – Rather, it is a restatement of the necessity of considering 
the claims of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in 
public services – Efficiency of administration must be viewed in 
a manner which promotes inclusion and equality as required by 
Article 16(1). [Para 205(f)]
Held (per B.R. Gavai, J.) (Concurring): 1. For sub-classification 
amongst the Scheduled Castes, the State will have to justify 
that the group for which more beneficial treatment is provided is 
inadequately represented as compared to the other castes in the 
said List. [Para 296 (iii)]
2. While doing so, the State will have to justify the same on the 
basis of empirical data that a sub-class in whose favour such more
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beneficial treatment is provided is not adequately represented. 
[Para 296 (iv)]
3. However, while providing for sub-classification, the State would 
not be entitled to reserve 100% seats available for Scheduled 
Castes in favour of a sub-class to the exclusion of other castes 
in the List. [Para 296 (v)]
4. Such a sub-classification would be permissible only if there is a 
reservation for a sub-class as well as the larger class. [Para 296 (vi)]
Held (per Vikram Nath, J.) (Concurring): Any exercise involving 
sub-classification by the State must be supported by empirical 
data. [Para 1]
Held (per Satish Chandra Sharma, J.) (Concurring): I am 
fully in agreement with the opinion(s) authored by Hon’ble  
Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India and Hon’ble 
Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai, respectively to the extent that any exercise 
involving sub-classification by the State, must be supported by 
empirical data that ought to underscore the more ‘disadvantaged’ 
status of the sub-group to which such preferential treatment is 
sought to be provided vis-à-vis the Constitutional Class as a 
whole. [Para 1]
Reservation – Applicability of creamy layer principle to the 
Scheduled Castes – Discussed.
Held (per B.R. Gavai, J.): 1. Taking into consideration that 
the Constitution itself recognizes the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes to be the most backward section of the society, 
the parameters for exclusion from
affirmative action of the person 
belonging to this category may not be the same that is applicable 
to the other classes – If a person from such a category, by bagging 
the benefit of reservation achieved a position of a peon or maybe a 
sweeper, he would continue to belong to a socially, economically and 
educationally backward class – At the same time, the people from 
this category, who after having availed the benefits of reservation 
have reached the high echelons in life cannot be considered to 
be socially, economically and educationally backward so as to 
continue availing the benefit of affirmative action – They have 
already reached a stage where on their own accord they should 
walk out of the special provisions and give way to the deserving 
and needy. [Para 294]
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2. The State must evolve a policy for identifying the creamy layer 
even from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes so as 
exclude them from the benefit of affirmative action – Only this and 
this alone can achieve the real equality as enshrined under the 
Constitution. [Para 295]
3. The finding of M. Nagaraj, Jarnail Singh and Davinder Singh 
to the effect that creamy layer principle is also applicable to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes lays down the correct 
position of law. [Para 296 (vii)]
4. The criteria for exclusion of the creamy layer from the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of affirmative action 
could be different from the criteria as applicable to the Other 
Backward Classes. [Para 296 (viii)]
Held (per Vikram Nath, J.) (Concurring): I am in agreement with 
the opinion of Brother Justice Gavai that ‘creamy layer’ principle is 
also applicable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and 
that the criteria for exclusion of creamy layer for the purpose of 
affirmative action could be different from the criteria as applicable 
to the Other Backward Classes. [Para 2]
Held (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Concurring): 1. Justice Gavai has 
rightly concluded that the State must evolve a policy of identifying 
the creamy layer even from the scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes so as to exclude them from the benefit of reservation. [Para 83]
2. In the Constitutional
regime, there is no caste system and the 
country has moved into a casteless society except for the deeming 
provision under the Constitution for the limited purposes of affording 
reservation to the depressed class of persons, downtrodden or 
belonging to SC/ST/OBC – Therefore, any facility or privilege for 
the promotion of the above categories of persons has to be on a 
totally different criteria other than the caste may be on economic 
or financial factors, status of living, vocation and the facilities 
available to each one of them based upon their place of living 
(urban or rural). [Para 84(ii)]
3. The reservation, if any, has to be limited only for the first 
generation or one generation and if any generation in the family 
has taken advantage of the reservation and have achieved higher 
status, the benefit of reservation would not be logically available 
to the second generation. [Para 84(iii)]
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4. Periodical exercise has to be undertaken to exclude the class 
of person who after taking advantage of reservation has come to 
march, shoulder to shoulder with the general category. [Para 84(iv)]
Held (per Satish Chandra Sharma, J.) (Concurring): On the 
question of applicability of the ‘creamy layer principle’ to Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, I find myself in agreement with 
the view expressed by Justice Gavai i.e., for the full realisation of 
substantive equality inter se the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes, the identification of the ‘creamy layer’ qua Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes ought to become a constitutional imperative 
for the State. [Para 2]
Held (per Bela M. Trivedi, J.) (Dissenting): In so far as 
Article 15(4) and 15(5) are concerned, the use of the word “any” 
before the words “socially and educationally backward classes” 
and the use of the word “the” before “Scheduled Castes/Scheduled 
Tribes” clearly indicate that the said provisions pertain to the “Other 
Backward Classes” which are socially and educationally backward, 
and that the said provisions also pertain to the “Scheduled Castes” 
and “Scheduled Tribes”, however the “Scheduled Castes” do not 
require any further identification once they are notified under 
Article 341 – As rightly held in Ashok Kumar Thakur, the “creamy 
layer” principle is one of the parameters to identify backward  
classes – The “Scheduled Castes”
having already been specified 
in the Presidential List under Article 341, the said creamy layer 
principle cannot be applied to the “Scheduled Castes” for their 
identification as backward class. [Para 71]
Case Law Cited
In the judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
EV Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2004] Supp. 5  
SCR 972 : (2005) 1 SCC 394 – overruled.
State of Kerala v. NM Thomas [1976] 1 SCR 906 : (1976) 2 SCC 
310; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 454 : 
(1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 – explained.
Triloki Nath v. State of J&K [1969] 1 SCR 103; State of UP v. Pradip 
Tandon [1975] 2 SCR 761 : 1975 1 SCC 267; Akhil Bhartiya Soshit 
Karamchari Sangh (Rly) v. Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 185 : (1981)
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
1 SCC 246; State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh [2020] 10 SCR 857: 
(2020) 8 SCC 1; Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta [2018] 10 
SCR 663 : (2018) 10 SCC 396; Bhaiyalal v. Harikishan Singh [1965] 
2 SCR 877; State of Maharashtra v. Milind [2000] Supp. 5 SCR 
65 : (2001) 1 SCC 4; Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board [2018] 10 SCR 
513 : (2018) 10 SCC 312; B. Basavalingappa v. D. Munichinnapa 
[1965] 1 SCR 316; Srish Kumar Chodhury v. State of Tripura 
[1990] 1 SCR 576 : 1990 Supp SCC 220; State of West Bengal v. 
Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) AIR 75; Chiranjit Lal 
Chowdhury v. Union of India [1950] 1 SCR 869 : 1950 SCC 833; 
General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari [1962] 2 SCR 
586 : AIR 1962 SC 36; CA Rajendra v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 
507; State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan [1951] 1 SCR 525; 
B Venkataramana v. The State of Madras AIR 1951 SC 229; Balaji 
v. State of Mysore [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439 : AIR 1963 SC 649; 
Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 158 : 
(1995) 6 SCC 684; Ajit Singh (II) v. State of Punjab (1999) INSC 
407; Ajit Singh (I) v. State of Punjab [1996] 3 SCR 125 : (1996) 2 
SCC 715; S Vinod Kumar v. Union of India [1996] Supp. 7 SCR 
142 : (1996) 6 SCC 580; T Devadasan v. Union of India [1964] 4 
SCR 680; M Nagaraj v. Union of India [2006] Supp. 7 SCR 336 : 
(2006) 8 SCC 212; Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India [2022] 1 
SCR 970 : (2022)
4 SCC 1; BK Pavitra (II) v. State of Karnataka 
[2019] 7 SCR 1086 : (2019) 16 SCC 129; Janki Prasad Parimoo 
v. State of J&K [1973] 3 SCR 236 : (1973) 1 SCC 420; Shri Ram 
Krishna Dalmia v. Shri SR Tandolkar [1959] 1 SCR 279 : 1958 
SCC OnLine SC 6; Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re [1979] 2 SCR 
476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380; Moorthy Match Works v. CCE [1974] 3 
SCR 121 : (1974) 4 SCC 428; Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University 
[1989] 1 SCR 689 : (1989) 2 SCC 145; Budhan Choudhry v. State 
of Bihar [1955] 1 SCR 1045; All India Station Masters & Assistant 
Station Master’s Association v. General Manager, Central Railways 
[1960] 2 SCR 311 : AIR 1960 SC 384; Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union 
of India [1975] 1 SCR 449 : 1975 3 SCC 76; State of Jammu and 
Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa [1974] 1 SCR 771 : 1974 1 SCC 19; 
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India [1968] 1 SCR 185; Katyani 
Sayal v. Union of India [1980] 3 SCR 139 : (1980) 3 SCC 245;  
Col AS Iyer v. V Balasubramanyam [1980] 1 SCR 1036 : 1980 
1 SCC 634; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India [2018] 7 SCR 
379 : (2019) 3 SCC 345; Consolidated Coffee Ltd v. Coffee Board,
1334
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Bangalore [1980] 3 SCR 625 : 1980 3 SCC 358; Bhuwalka Steel 
Industries Limited v. Union of India [2017] 2 SCR 993 : (2017) 5 
SCC 598; St. Aubyn v. Attorney General 1952 AC 15; Industrial 
Supplies Private Limited v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 375 : 
(1980) 4 SCC 341; K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan [2005] 1 SCR 
296 : (2005) 1 SCC 754; Bengal Immunity Company Ltd v. State 
of Bihar [1955] 2 SCR 603 : (1955) SCC OnLine SC 2; Delhi 
Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd v. State of Rajasthan [1980] 3 SCR 
1109 : 1976 3 SCC 443; Punit Rai v. Dinesh Chaudhary [2003] 
Supp. 2 SCR 743 : 2003 8 SCC 204; Marri Chandra Shekar Rao 
v. Dean, Seth GS Medical College [1990] 2 SCR 843: (1990) 3 
SCC 130; Palghat Jilla Thandan Samudhaya Samrakshna Samithi 
v. State of Kerala [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 872 : (1994) 1 SCC 359; 
Janki Prasad Parimoo v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [1973] 3 
SCR 236 : (1973) 1 SCC 420; RK Sabharwal v. State of Punjab 
[1995] 2 SCR 35 : (1995) 2 SCC 745; Triloki Nath v. State of 
Jammu and Kashmir (I) [1967] 2 SCR 265; Chitralekha v. State 
of Mysore. AIR 1964 SC 1823; P Rajendran v. State of Madras 
[1968] 2 SCR 786; Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board  
(1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 – referred to.
East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council LR 1952 
AC 109 – referred to.
In the judgment of B.R. Gavai, J.
E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. [2004] Supp. 
5 SCR 972 : (2005) 1 SCC 394; – held, not good
law.
State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and others [1976] 1 
SCR 906 : (1976) 2 SCC 310; Indra Sawhney and others v. Union 
of India and others [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 454 : (1992) Supp 3 
SCC 217 – explained.
M. Nagaraj and others v. Union of India and others [2006] Supp. 
7 SCR 336 : (2006) 8 SCC 212; The State of Punjab & Ors. v. 
Davinder Singh & Ors. [2020] 10 SCR 857 : (2020) 8 SCC 1; 
Jarnail Singh and others v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta and others 
[2018] 10 SCR 663 : (2018) 10 SCC 396 – affirmed.
The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. (2020) 8 
SCC 65; State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan [1951] 
1 SCR 525; M.R. Balaji and others v. State of Mysore [1963]
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
1335
The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
Supp. 1 SCR 439 : 1962 SCC OnLine 147; State of Gujarat v. 
Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad [1974] 3 SCR 760 : (1974) 
4 SCC 656; His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru 
v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225; T. 
Devadasan v. Union of India [1964] 4 SCR 680 : AIR 1964 SC 55; 
Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) represented 
by its Assistant General Secretary on behalf of the Association v. 
Union of India and others [1981] 2 SCR 185 : (1981) 1 SCC 246; 
K.C. Vasanth Kumar and another v. State of Karnataka [1985] 
Supp. 1 SCR 352 : 1985 Supp SCC 714; Marri Chandra Shekhar 
Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College and others [1990] 2 SCR 
843 : (1990) 3 SCC 130 – referred to.
In the judgment of Pankaj Mithal, J.
E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. [2004] Supp. 
5 SCR 972 : (2005) 1 SCC 394; Indra Sawhney and Ors. v. Union 
of India and Ors. [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 454 : (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 
217; State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan [1951] 1 SCR 
525 : AIR (1951) SC 226; B. Venkataramana v. State of Madras 
and Ors. AIR (1951) SC 229; S. Vinod Kumar and Anr. v. Union 
of India and Ors. [1996] Supp. 7 SCR 142 : (1996) 6 SCC 580; 
Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 158 : 
(1995) 6 SCC 684; Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab [1996] 3 
SCR 125 : (1996) 2 SCC 715; Ajit Singh (II) v. State of Punjab 
(1999) INSC 546; Ashoka
Kumar Thakur v. State of Bihar [1995] 
Supp. 3 SCR 269 : (1995) 5 SCC 403; Indra Sawhney (II) v. Union 
of India [1999] Supp. 5 SCR 229 : (2000) 1 SCC 168; M. Nagaraj 
v. Union of India [2006] Supp. 7 SCR 336 : (2006) 8 SCC 212; 
TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 
587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; Islamic Academia Education v. State 
of Karnataka [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 474 : (2003) 6 SCC 697; P.A. 
Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 603 : (2005) 
6 SCC 537; Ashok Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union 
of India [2014] 11 SCR 712 : (2014) 8 SCC 1; Ram Singh v. Union 
of India [2015] 5 SCR 670 : (2015) 4 SCC 697; Janhit Abhiyan 
v. Union of India (EWS Reservation) [2022] 14 SCR 1 : (2023) 
5 SCC 1; M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 
439 : AIR 1963 SC 649; K C Vasantha Kumar & Anr. v. State of 
Karnataka (1985) SCC Suppl. 714; State of Kerala v. N M Thomas 
[1976] 1 SCR 906 : (1976) 2 SCC 310; Akhil Bharatiya Soshit
1336
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India & Ors. [1981] 2 SCR 185 : 
(1981) 1 SCC 246; Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra  
(2021) 8 SCC 1 – referred to.
In the judgment of Bela M. Trivedi, J.
Pradip Chandra Parija and Others v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik 
and Others [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 460 : 2002 (1) SCC 1; Maganlal 
ChhaganLal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & 
Others [1975] 1 SCR 1 : (1974) 2 SCC 402; Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh 
v. Union of India & Another [1961] 2 SCR 828 : AIR 1961 SC 532; 
Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay 
North, Ahmedabad [1965] 2 SCR 908 : AIR 1965 SC 1636; Dr. 
Shah Faesal and Others v. Union of India and Another [2020] 3 
SCR 1115 : (2020) 4 SCC 1; GVK Industries Limited and Another 
v. Income Tax Officer and Another [2011] 3 SCR 366 : (2011) 4 
SCC 36; Dr. JaiShri Laxman Rao Patil v. Chief Minister and Others 
[2021] 15 SCR 715 : (2021) 8 SCC 1; B. Basavalingappa v. D. 
Munichinnappa & others [1965] 1 SCR 316 : AIR (1965) SC 1269; 
Bhaiya Lal v. Harikishan Singh [1965] 2 SCR 877 : AIR (1965) SC 
1557; State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and Others [2000] Supp. 
5 SCR 65 : (2001) 1 SCC 4; Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board and 
Others [2018] 10 SCR 513 : (2018) 10 SCC 312; State of Kerala 
& Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors. [1976] 1 SCR 906 : (1976) 2 SCC 
310; Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Others [2007] 7 
SCR 63 : (2008) 6 SCC 1; and Supreme Court Bar
Association 
v. Union of India and Another [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 
409 – followed.
State of Haryana vs. Ranbir alias Rana [2006] 3 SCR 864 : (2006) 
5 SCC 167; ADM Jabalpur vs. Shivakant Shukla (1976) 8 SCC 
521; and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Others 
[1990] 3 SCR 744 : (1990) 4 SCC 557– relied on.
E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others [2004] 
Supp. 5 SCR 972 : (2005) 1 SCC 394 – affirmed.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Others [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 
454 : (1992) Suppl. 3 SCC 217; and Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain 
Gupta [2018] 10 SCR 663 : (2018) 10 SCC 396 – distinguished.
K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa [1954] 1 SCR 1 : 
(1953) 2 SCC 178; M. Nagaraj and Others v. Union of India and 
Others [2006] Supp. 7 SCR 336 : (2006) 8 SCC 212; State of 
Punjab and Others v. Davinder Singh and Others (2020) 8 SCC 65;
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
1337
The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
State of Punjab and Others v. Davinder Singh and Others [2020] 
10 SCR 857 : (2020) 8 SCC 1 – referred to.
Northern Securities Company v. The United States (1903) 193 
U.S. 197 (1903) – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
In the judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
3rd meeting of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes 
held on 13.12.2010 under the Chairmanship of Dr PL Punia; 
Ashwini Deshpande, Double Jeopardy? Stigma of Identity and 
Affirmative Action, The Review of Black Political Economy 2019, 
Vol. 46(I) 38-64; Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and 
the Backward Classes in India, [Oxford University Press (1984)] 
130; Report of the Indian Franchise Committee (1932) Vol I, 
112; Hutton Census Report (1931) 471; Minute of dissent by 
Mr SB Rambe, Mr CY Chintamani, Mr RR Bakhale, Report of the 
Franchise Committee, 231; Dr Ambedkar, Note on the Depressed 
Classes, Report of the Franchise Committee, 211; AM Shah, The 
‘Dalit” category and its Differentiation; AM Shah, Untouchability, 
the Untouchables and Social Change in Gujarat in Dimensions of 
Social Life, Essays in Honor of David G Mandelbaum (edited by 
Paul Hockings); Robert F Kennedy, Center for Justice and Human 
Rights, Understanding Untouchability: A comprehensive Study of 
Practices and Conditions in 1589 Villages, 22-33; Ravinchandran 
Bathran, The many omissions of a concept: Discrimination amongst 
Scheduled
Castes, Economic & Political Weekly, (Vol L1 No. 47, 
November 19, 2016) 1342-1346; Uma Ramaswamy, Protection 
and Inequality among Backward Groups, Economic & Political 
Weekly (Vol. 21 No. 9, 9 March 1986); B Shiva Rao, The Framing 
of India’s Constitution: Select Documents [Vol II, The Indian 
Institute of Public Administration] 221; Justice Usha Mishra Report 
on National Commission to Examine Issue of Sub-Categorisation 
[327] – referred to.
In the judgment of B.R. Gavai, J.
Abhinav Chandrachud, These Seats are Reserved: Caste, Quotas 
and the Constitution of India (Viking by Penguin Random House 
India 2023); B.R. Ambedkar, ‘Evidence before the Southborough 
Committee on Franchise’ in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings 
and Speeches, ed. Vasant Moon, Ministry of Social Justice
1338
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
and Empowerment 2019, Vol.I, p. 255; Anurag Bhaskar, The  
Foresighted Ambedkar: Ideas that shaped Indian constitutional 
Discourse (Viking by Penguin Random House 2024); Narendra 
Jadhav, Ambedkar: Awakening India’s Social Conscience. (Konark 
Publishers Pvt. Ltd. 2014) – referred to.
In the judgment of Bela M. Trivedi, J.
Bernard Schwartz, A Book of Legal Lists: The Best and Worst in 
American Law P.283 and Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial 
Process, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 13th Edition 1946) 
141 – referred to.
In the judgment of Pankaj Mithal, J.
Nani Palkiwala, We, The Nation: The Lost Decades 179 (Mehta 
Publishing House 1995) and Skanda Purana Vol.18 Book VI, Nagar 
Kanda, Chapter 239, Verse 31-34 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward 
Classes (Reservation in Services) Act 2006; Tamil Nadu 
Arunthathiyars (Special Reservation of seats in educational 
institutions including private educational Institutions and of 
appointments or posts in services under State within the Reservation 
for the Scheduled Castes) Act 2009; Andhra Pradesh Scheduled 
Castes (Rationalisation of Reservations) Act 2000; Constitution 
(One Hundred and Second Amendment) Act,  2018; Constitution 
(Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act 1995; Constitution (Eighty-first) 
Amendment Act 2000; Constitution (Eighty-second) Amendment 
Act 2000; Constitution (One Hundred and Fifth) Amendment
Act, 
2021; First Amendment to the Constitution.
List of Keywords
Articles 14, 15, 16 and 341 of Constitution; Reservation; Scheduled 
Castes; Sub-classification; Affirmative action; Homogenous or 
heterogenous grouping; Operation of deeming fiction; Limits 
on scope of sub-classification; Intelligible differentia; Beneficial 
treatment; Doctrine of Precedent; Stare decisis; Substantive 
law; Backward class; Integrated homogenous class; Presidential 
List; Historical and empirical evidence; Socially heterogenous 
class; Rational principle for differentiation; Preferential treatment;
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
1339
The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
Inadequate representation; Criteria and scope for sub-classification; 
Inter-se backwardness; Judicial review; Reasonable nexus; Sub-
categorization based on caste; Social backwardness; Empirical 
data; more ‘disadvantaged’ status; Creamy layer principle.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
2317 of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.03.2010 of the High Court 
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No.18290 of 2009
With
C.A. No. 6936 of 2015, C.A. No. 5597 of 2010, W.P.(C) No. 21 of 
2023, C.A. No. 5593 of 2010, S.L.P.(C) No. 30766 of 2010, S.L.P.(C) 
Nos. 8701, 36500-36501 of 2011, T.C.(C) No. 38 of 2011, T.P.(C) No. 
464 of 2015, W.P.(C) No.1477 of 2019, C.A. Nos. 5586, 5598 and 
5595-5596 of 2010, C.A. No. 2324 of 2011, T.C.(C) No. 37 of 2011, 
C.A. Nos. 5589, 5600 And 5587 of 2010, S.L.P.(C) Nos. 5454-5459 
of 2011, C.A. No. 2318 of 2011, C.A. No. 289 of 2014 And W.P.(C) 
No. 562 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
R. Venkataramani, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, K.M. Nataraj, ASG, 
Saurabh Mishra, Shadan Farasat, AAGs, Vivek Jain, DAG, 
Gurminder Singh, Adv.Gen./Sr. Adv., Kapil Sibal, Vijay Hansaria, 
M.S. Ganesh, Salman Khurshid, Rakesh Khanna, Arun Bhardwaj, 
Manoj Swarup, Dr. K.S. Chauhan, Salil Sagar, Shekhar Naphade, 
P.S. Teji, Saket Singh, Dama Seshadri Naidu, Nidhesh Gupta, 
Dr. Manish Singhvi, Siddharth Luthra, Sanjay Hegde, Colin Gonsalves, 
Dr. S.
Muralidhar, A.D.N. Rao, Sr. Advs., Karan Sharma, Karmanbir 
Singh, Harshit Anand, Abhishek Babbar, Mohit Siwach, Rishabh 
Sharma, Ms. Hrishika Jain, Ms. Princy Sharma, Ms. Mreganka 
Kukreja, Ms. Natasha Maheshwari, Ms. Devyani Gupta, Ms. 
Aparajita Jamwal, Gautam Bhatia, Nizam Pasha, Rishabh Parikh, 
Rahul Narayan, Ms. Arjoo Rawat, Ms. Saushriya Havelia, Ms. Tanvi 
Anand, Ms. Rupali Samuel, Thomas Franklin Caesar, S. Gowthaman, 
V. Puneedhan, Dhuli Venkata Krishna, Selvam P, Sameer Aslam, 
Samar Vijay Singh, Resham Singh, Ms. Roopa Paul, H.L. Chumber, 
Ms. Sunita Bhardwaj, Parveen Paul, Ms. Vasundhara Rana, Rahul 
Kumar, Satyendra Kumar, Anandh Kannan N., Ms. Kavya Jhawar,
1340
[2024] 8 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Ms. Nandini Rai, R.K. Singh, Mrs. Neeraj Singh, Kumar Gaurav, P.S. 
Bhagat Singh, V. Subramanian, Ajay Chaudhary, Praveen Pathak, 
Ram Bhadauria, Robin Khokhar, Devendra Singh, K. Seshachary, 
Sanchar Anand, Anant Kumar Vatsya, Ms. Poonam Datta, Ms. 
Yashswini, Nikhil Hooda, Gajinder Chauhan, Kaushal Yadav, Ms. 
Lubna Naaz, Nandlal Kumar Mishra, Aditya Pushkal Khanna, Ms. 
Arushi Jain, Ram Kishor Singh Yadav, Ms. Ramya Khanna, Ms. 
Vidhi Jain, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Dr. Rashmi Khanna, Dr. Ajay Kumar, 
Dr. Vikas Pahal, Ms. Shilpita, Mrs. Anila Bharti, Arjun Raghuvanshi, 
Arpit Kumar, Ritul Tandon, Dr. Monika Gusain, Gauraan, Abhishek 
Sharma, Shrutanjaya Bhardwaj, Hariom Yaduvanshi, Ms. S. Harini, 
Ankit Swarup, Rohit Kumar Singh, Neelmani Pant, Ms. Apoorva Singh, 
Rishi Bhargava, Ms. Yashvi Aswani, Ms. Rajlakshmi, Ms. Supriya 
Juneja, Apoorv Kurup, Shailesh Madiyal, Kanu Agrawal, Mrs. Sonali 
Jain, Raman Yadav, Chitvan Singhal, Kartikay Aggarwal, Abhishek 
Kumar Pandey, Amrish Kumar, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Ms. Sonali 
Jain, Chitvan Sinhal, Anmol Chandan, Saurabh Mishra, Mukesh 
Kumar Maroria, Rajat Nair, Tadimalla Bhaskar Gowtham, Vatsal Joshi, 
Bhuvan Kapoor, Krishna Kant Dubey, Ms. Indira Bhakar, Shashwat 
Parihar, Rajesh Singh Chauhan, Vinayak Sharma, Karanbir Singh, Ms. 
Nupur Kumar, Aman Naqvi, Shadab Azhar, Ajit Kumar Ekka, Pratik 
R. Bombarde, R.S.M. Kalky, S.P. Singh, Sunil Kumar, Murari Lal, 
Dr. K. Elumalai, Ramesh
Kumar, Sumit Kishore, Abhishek Chauhan, 
Bhim Kishore, Sandeep Malik, Ajit Kumar, Samarth Sagar, Sankalp 
Sagar, Mithu Jain, Sanchit Garga, Birendra Kumar Mishra, Ms. 
Poonam Atey, Hemendra, Sirajuddin, Balbir Singh Sewak, Ripudaman 
Singh Sidhu, M.F. Philip, Ms. Purnima Krishna, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, 
Ms. Farah Hashmi, Karamveer Singh Yadav, Prashant, Sanjay 
Kumar Visen, Kuldeep Singh Kuchaliya, Neelesh Singh Rao, Prativa 
Prakash Janapriya Nayak, Mrs. Sangeeta Singh, Ms. Sarvshree, 
Mrs. Niranjana Singh, Ms. Japneet Kaur, G. Balaji, Ms. Shivali 
Chaudhary, Ms. Vriti Gujral, Ananvay, Poorna Chandan, Sandeep 
Kumar Jha, Kumar Vaibhaw, Ms. Devina Sehgal, Seehzan Hashmi, 
Vineet George, Anas Tanwir, Shahrukh Ali, Ebad Ur Rahman, Ms. 
Stuti Shrivastav, Ms. Riyal Suryawanshi, Ankit Tiwari, Tanay Hegde, 
Satya Mitra, Ms. Hetvi Patel, P. Venkateshan, Bankey Bihari Sharma, 
Ms. S. Janani, Rahul Gupta, R.V. Kameshwaran, Ravi Prakash, 
Tushar Bakshi, Shakti Kanta Pattanaik, Mrs. Naresh Bakshi, Raj 
Kumar Gupta, Shekhar Kumar, Santosh Krishnan, MA Karthik, 
Maitreya Subramaniam, Ms. Pallak Bhagat, Girish Chowdhary,
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 
1341
The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
Ms. Deepshikha Sansanwal, Ms. Vasundhra Rana, Rakesh Dahiya, 
Brij Bhushan, Vishal Prasad, Abhay Anil Anturkar, Dhruv Tank, 
Aniruddha Awalgaonkar, Ms. Surbhi Kapoor, Ms. Deepanwita 
Priyanka, B.K. Satija, Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Vishwanathan 
Iyer, Aman Roop Sharma, Ms. Shymphy Sharma, Pramod Tiwari, 
Vivek Tiwari, Ms. Jyoti Mehra, Ms. Madhusmita Bora, Nishe Rajen 
Shonker, Sunny Choudhary, Prateek Bhatia, Aaditya Aniruddha 
Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, 
Aditya Krishna, Ms. Raavi Sharma, Ajay Pal, D. Kumanan, Sheikh 
F Kalia, Mrs. Deepa. S, Veshal Tyagi, Vishwa Pal Singh, Dhawal 
Uniyal, Ashish Pandey, Mukesh Kumar, Srikant Singh, Ashutosh 
Bhardwaj, Prateek Rai, Shubham Saxena, Sanjeev Kaushik, 
Ms. Anvita Dwivedi, Ms. Astha Sharma, Shreekant Neelappa 
Terdal, Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Pukhrambam Ramesh 
Kumar, Karun Sharma, Ms. Anupama Ngangom, Ms. Rajkumari 
Divyasana, Avijit Mani Tripathi, Ms. K. Enatoli Sema, Ms. Limayinla 
Jamir, Amit Kumar Singh, Ms. Chubalemla Chang, Prang Newmai, 
Sameer Abhyankar, Ms. Vani Vandana Chhetri, Ms. Nishi Sangtani, 
Ms. Zinnea Mehta, Aakash Thakur, Vatsalya Vigya, Dr. Ashok 
Siddhartha Priya Ram Singh, Dharma Dutt Verma, Rohit Verma, 
Vivek C. Solshe, Varun V. Solshe, Anjani Kumar Jha, P. Venkatesan, 
Ronak Karanpuria, Parteek Kumar, Jai Wadhwa, Akarsh Jain, Ankit 
Swarup, Annam Venkatesh, P. Soma Sundaram, Krishan Kumar,
Vipin Kumar Jai, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, 
Ms. Charanya Lakshmikumaran, Rahul Jajoo, Veeradasu Vankata 
Rathnam, Y.K. Viswanath, A. Veeresh Kumar, Kashapogu Suresh, 
Dr. Manoj Gorkela, Ms. Sitwat Nabi, Ms. Raina Anand, Varun 
Kumar, M/s. Gorkela Law Office, S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, 
A Manoj Kumar, K. Paari Vendhan, M/s. Nuli & Nuli, Vivek Sharma, 
Sanjay Jain, Raghunatha Sethupathy B, Vikalp Mudgal, Ms. Jyoti 
Mendiratta, M/s. Mukesh Kumar Singh & Co., Sravan Kumar Karanam, 
Potturi Suresh Kumar, Pusa Mallesh, Ms. Pranali Tayade, Mrs. Medha 
Singh, P. Santhosh Kumar, Ms. Shireesh Tyagi, Mrs. B. Renuka 
Devi, Mrs. Mamatha Ralla, V.K. Biju, Anirudha Purushotham, Abhay 
Pratap Singh, Mrs. Ria Sachthey, Chetanya Singh, Shaji George, 
Dr. Ranjeet Bharti, Mayank Pandey, Ms. Viajy Lakshmi, Mrs. Rubina 
Jawed, Amlendu Kumar Akhilesh Kumar Jha, Mrs. Rekha Pandey, 
Nitin Meshram, Ashutosh Dubey, Advs. for theappearing parties.
Applicant-in-person.
1342
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Digital Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
INDEX*
A.
Background.....................................................................
5
i.
Relevant constitutional provisions......................
5
ii.
The genesis of the reference to the Constitution 
Bench .....................................................................
7
iii.
The judgment in Chinnaiah ..................................
11
iv.
The reference ........................................................
16
B.
Submissions ...................................................................
18
i.
Submissions of Petitioners .................................
18
ii.
Submissions of Respondents ..............................
25
C.
Issues .............................................................................
31
D.
Analysis .........................................................................
32
i.
The jurisprudence on reservation...........................
32
a.
Reservation as an exposition of substantive 
equality .............................................................
32
I.
The competing visions of equality .............
32
II.
The “efficiency” of reservation ..................
38
III. The interplay of Article 16 and Article 335
44
ii.
Permissibility of sub-classification under 
Article 14 .............................................................
52
a.
The contours of Article 14 ..............................
53
b.
Sub-classification as a facet of equality .........
55
c.
Micro-classification: the limits of sub-
classification ....................................................
61
iii.
Sub-classification in reservations: tracing the 
journey through Balaji, Vasanth Kumar and Indra 
Sawhney .................................................................
63
a.
Indra Sawhney did not exclude sub-classification 
within the Scheduled Castes ..........................
69
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
iv.
The import of the deeming fiction in Article 341... 72
a. Chinnaiah on the deeming fiction in Article 341 ... 72
b. Scope of deeming fiction ................................. 74
c. 
Article 341 does not create a deeming fiction.. 76
d. Article 341(1) read with Article 341(2) only 
proscribes exclusion from and inclusion in the 
Scheduled Castes List...................................... 81
v.
Historical and empirical evidence of inter-se 
backwardness within the Scheduled Castes...... 88
a.
Identification of the depressed classes ............. 89
b.
Empirical evidence of heterogeneity ................ 96
vi.
The power of the State to sub-classify under 
Articles 15 and 16 ................................................. 100
vii.
Criteria for sub-classification ................................ 103
a.
The meaning of “Backward Class” .................. 104
b.
Inadequacy of representation in services of the 
State .................................................................. 110
c.
The requirement of “effective” representation.. 115
d.
Yardstick for sub-classification.......................... 120
viii. The limits of sub-classification ........................... 122
a.
Model of special provisions ............................... 122
b.
The caste-class conundrum ............................. 128
ix.
Scope for judicial review ...................................... 131
a.
Inter-se backwardness
...................................... 131
b.
Adequacy of representation .............................. 133
E.
Conclusion ...................................................................... 138
1.	
The reference to this Constitution Bench raises significant questions 
relating to the right to equal opportunity guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The principal issue is whether sub-classification of the Scheduled 
Castes for reservation is constitutionally permissible.
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A.	
Background 
i.	
Relevant constitutional provisions 
2.	
Article 14 of the Constitution stipulates that the State shall not deny 
to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws 
within the territory of India. Article 15(1) states that the State should 
not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(4) stipulates that 
nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special 
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes.1
3.	
Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public 
employment. Clause (1) of Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity 
for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to 
any office under the State. Clause (2) stipulates that no citizen shall 
be discriminated in or be ineligible for any employment or office under 
the State on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, 
place of birth, residence or any of them. Clause (4) of the provision 
states that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making 
any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour 
of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, 
is not adequately represented in the services under the State.2
4.	
Article 366(24)
of the Constitution defines the term ‘Scheduled Castes’ 
to mean such castes, tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, 
races or tribes as are deemed under Article 341 to be Scheduled 
Castes for the purposes of the Constitution. Article 341(1) grants the 
President the power to notify the castes, races or tribes (or parts 
of or groups within castes, races or tribes) which shall be deemed 
to be Scheduled Castes for a State or a Union Territory for the 
purposes of the Constitution. The President has been empowered 
to issue the notification with respect to a State in consultation with 
the Governor of the State. Article 341(2) stipulates that Parliament 
may by law include or exclude any caste, race, or tribe (or part of 
1	
Article 15 (4) “Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State form making any 
special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or 
for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.”
2	
Article 16 (4) “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation of 
appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State is not 
adequately represented in the services under the State.”
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
or group within any caste, race, or tribe) from the list of Scheduled 
Castes specified in the notification and that a notification issued 
under clause (1) shall not be varied by any subsequent notification. 
Article 341 is extracted below for reference: 
“Article 341. Scheduled Castes.- (1) The President may 
with respect to any State or Union Territory, and where 
it is a State after consultation with the Governor thereof, 
by public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes, 
or parts of or groups within castes, races, tribes which 
shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to 
be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union 
Territory, as the case may be. 
(2) Parliament may by law include or exclude from the 
list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued 
under clause (1) any caste, race, or tribe or part of or 
group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid 
a notification issued under the said clause shall not be 
varied by any subsequent notification.” 
5.	
Articles 3423 and 342-A4 relate to notification of Scheduled Tribes 
and socially and educationally backward classes respectively and 
contain provisions pari materia to Article 341. 
ii.	
The genesis of the reference to the Constitution Bench
6.	
The State Legislature of Punjab enacted the Punjab Scheduled 
Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act 2006.5 
3	
Article
342. Scheduled Tribes.-(1) The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and 
where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the tribes 
or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purposes 
of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the 
case may be.
(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in a 
notification issued under clause (1) any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or 
tribal community, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by 
any subsequent notification.
4	
Article 342A. Socially and educationally backward classes.—(1) The President may with respect to any 
State or Union territory, and where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public 
notification, specify 6 [the socially and educationally backward classes in the Central List which shall for 
the purposes of the Central Government] be deemed to be socially and educationally backward classes 
in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be. 
(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the Central List of socially and educationally 
backward classes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any socially and educationally 
backward class, but save
as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by 
any subsequent notification.
5	
“Punjab Act”
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The long title stipulates that it is a statute to provide for reservation 
in services for the members of the Scheduled Castes and Backward 
Classes and for matters incidental thereto. Section 2(f) defines 
“Scheduled Castes” as Scheduled Castes notified by the President 
under Article 341 of the Constitution by the Constitution (Scheduled 
Castes) Order 1950, as amended from time to time. Section 4(2) 
provides that reservation of twenty-five percent shall be made for the 
members of the Scheduled Castes and twelve percent for Backward 
Classes while filing up vacancies by direct recruitment in services. 
Section 4(5) stipulates that fifty percent of the vacancies of the 
quota reserved for the Scheduled Castes in direct recruitment shall 
be offered to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, if available, as a first 
preference from amongst the Scheduled Castes. 
7.	
Proceedings were instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution 
for challenging the validity of Section 4(5) of the Punjab Act. 
By a judgment dated 29 March 2010, the High Court of Punjab 
and Haryana declared Section 4(5) unconstitutional, relying on the 
judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in EV Chinniah v. 
State of Andhra Pradesh.6 
8.	
Opposing the State’s appeal against the order of the High Court, 
the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench 
in Chinnaiah (supra). The State submitted that Chinnaiah (supra) 
does not apply to
the controversy in hand and that the decision is 
in any event, not consistent with the judgment of the nine-Judge 
Bench in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India.7 On 20 August 2014, a 
three-Judge Bench referred the correctness of Chinnaiah (supra) for 
consideration by a larger Bench. The three-Judge Bench observed 
that the judgment needs to be revisited, considering Article 338, the 
judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney (supra) and the interplay 
between Article 16 and Articles 338 and 341 of the Constitution. 
9.	
On 9 November 1994, the Government of Haryana issued a 
notification8 by which the Scheduled Castes in the State were 
classified into two categories - Blocks A and B - for the purposes 
of reservation. Block B consisted of Chamars, Jatia Chamars, 
Rahgars, Raigars, Ramdasias or Ravidasias. Block A consisted of 
6	
[2004] Supp. 5 SCR 972 : (2005) 1 SCC 394
7	
(1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 
8	
Notification No.22/5590-3-GS/111
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
the remaining thirty-six castes in the list of Scheduled Castes for 
the State. Within the quota reserved for Scheduled Castes in direct 
recruitment for Government jobs, fifty percent of the vacancies were 
to be offered to candidates from Block A and the other fifty percent 
were to be offered to candidates from Block B. The notification 
further stipulated that in case suitable candidates from Block A were 
unavailable, candidates from Block B should be recruited against 
those vacancies. Similarly, in the event that suitable candidates 
from Block B were unavailable, candidates from Block A should 
be recruited against those vacancies. Thus, preference would be 
given to castes belonging to Block A and Block B in the fifty per cent 
earmarked for them. Proceedings were initiated under Article 226 
for challenging the constitutional validity of the notification. By a 
judgment dated 6 July 2006, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana 
quashed the notification on the ground that the sub-classification 
of castes placed in the list of Scheduled Castes is unconstitutional 
in view of the judgment of this Court in Chinnaiah (supra). The 
Special Leave Petitions challenging the judgment of the High Court 
of Punjab and Haryana were tagged with the appeals involving the 
challenge to the Punjab Act. 
10.	 The State Legislature of Tamil Nadu enacted the Tamil Nadu 
Arunthathiyars (Special Reservation of
seats in educational institutions 
including private educational Institutions and of appointments or posts 
in services under State within the Reservation for the Scheduled 
Castes) Act 2009.9 The long title to the legislation states that it 
is an Act to provide for reservation of seats to Arunthathiyars in 
educational institutions, including private educational institutions in 
the State and for appointment in services under the State. The Tamil 
Nadu Act defines Arunthathiyars to mean the castes of Arunthathiyar, 
Chakkiliyan, Madari, Madiga, Pagadi, Thoti and Adi Andhra from the 
list of seventy-six Scheduled Castes notified by the President under 
Article 341, as amended from time to time.10 Section 3 stipulates 
that sixteen per cent of the seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes 
in educational institutions shall be offered to the Arunthathiyars, if 
available, having regard to the social aand educational backwardness 
of the community. Section 4 makes a similar provision for the 
9	
“Tamil Nadu Act”
10	
Tamil Nadu Act; Section 2(a)
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Arunthathiyars in recruitment to Government posts.11 Proceedings 
under Article 32 of the Constitution were instituted before this Court 
for challenging the constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Act on the 
ground that it contravenes the judgment of this Court in Chinnaiah 
(supra). The batch of matters challenging the Tamil Nadu Act was 
tagged with the batch of matters challenging the Punjab Act. 
iii.	
The judgment in Chinnaiah
11.	 A three - judge Bench of this Court was called upon to adjudicate on 
the validity of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation 
of Reservations) Act 2000. The Act was enacted following the 
recommendations of the Ramachandran Raju Commission constituted 
by the State Government. The Commission was tasked with 
ascertaining the groups among the Scheduled Castes in the State 
who had failed to avail of the benefits of reservations in college 
admissions and state public services. The Commission found inter-se 
backwardness among the Scheduled Castes in the state in matters 
of reservation in education and appointment. Accepting its findings- 
that there were inequalities among the Scheduled Castes as far as 
the distribution of the benefits of reservation was concerned - the 
State Government promulgated the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled 
Castes (Rationalisation of Reservations) Ordinance 1999. While 
proceedings challenging the Ordinance were pending, the State 
enacted a law to
replace Ordinance. Section 3, which provided 
for ‘Rationalisation of Reservations,’ apportioned the benefits of 
reservation among Scheduled Castes into four groups – Groups A, 
B, C and D - in varying percentages : 1% for Group A, 7% for Group 
B, 6% for Group C and 1% for Group D respectively, subject to the 
availability of eligible candidates. The Andhra Pradesh High Court 
rejected challenges to the Act, leading to appeals which came to be 
decided by this Court in Chinnaiah (supra). 
11	
4. Notwithstanding anything contained in the 1994 Act or the 2006 Act or in any other law for the time 
being in force or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority, having regard to the 
social and educational backwardness of Arunthathiyars included in the Scheduled Castes, sixteen per 
cent of the appointments or posts reserved for the Scheduled Castes shall be offered to Arunthathiyars, 
if available, in appointments or posts in the services under the State, on preferential basis amongst the 
Scheduled Castes, in such manner as may be prescribed. 
Explanation.- For the purposes of this Act, “services under the State” includes the services under- 
(i)	 The Government 
(ii)	 He legislature of the State
(iii)	Any local authority 
(iv)	Any Corporation or Company owned or controlled by the Government; or 
(v)	 Any other authority in respect of which the State Legislature has power to make laws
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
12.	 The appellants argued that the State legislature lacked legislative 
competence to enact the law. They argued that once enumerated 
in the Presidential List under Article 341 of the Constitution, the 
Scheduled Castes constitute a homogenous class, which is incapable 
of further subdivision/sub-classification. Such a classification, they 
argued, amounted to tinkering with the Presidential List, in violation 
of Article 341(2) and Article 14 of the Constitution. 
13.	 The respondent-State on the other hand, argued that Article 341 
allows the President to identify certain castes as Scheduled Castes 
and only Parliament can include or exclude entries from the List so 
created. The State argued that it could, in exercise of powers under 
Articles 15(4) and 16(4) decide the scope and extent of reservations. 
This power, they argued, was not limited by Article 341 which operates 
in an entirely different field. The State urged that the Act of 2000 was a 
form of affirmative action and it did not exclude or include anyone from 
the Presidential List under Article 341. Such a sub-classification of the 
Scheduled Castes was claimed to be permissible under Article 16(4) 
for the same reason that this Court had held in Indra Sawhney (supra) 
that the backward classes could be divided into the ‘more backward’ 
and ‘backward’, depending on inter-se backwardness. 
14.	 A Constitution Bench of this Court,
speaking through Justice Santosh 
Hegde (for himself, Justice SN Variava and Justice BP Singh), Justice 
HK Sema and Justice SB Sinha unanimously held that the Andhra 
Pradesh Act was unconstitutional. 
15.	 Justice Hegde examined whether the Andhra Pradesh Act tinkered 
with the Presidential List notified under Article 341 and held that the 
States have no power to deal with the Scheduled Castes except the 
maintenance of efficiency of administration. Justice Hegde observed 
that certain members of the Constituent Assembly sought to give 
power to the States to interfere with the list but the amendments 
to that effect were unsuccessful. Analysing the opinion of Justice 
Hegde, the following formulations emerge:12
a.	
The Scheduled Castes form a class by themselves13 as 
elucidated in the opinions of Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice 
Fazl Ali in State of Kerala v. NM Thomas;14
12	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde, 13-19]. 
13	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde, 20-26].
14	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde, 82, 135 and 169].
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b.	
The purpose of the Act was to divide the castes in the 
Presidential List and then to distribute the 15% reservations for 
the Scheduled Castes in the state among four groups. The Act 
did not provide reservations for the first time but redistributed 
them by sub-classifying the Scheduled Castes. Reservations 
are not a constitutional mandate and once the state has fulfilled 
the obligation to reserve certain seats under Articles 15(4) and 
16(4), it cannot apportion reservations among sub-classes. 
Notwithstanding the purpose of such sub-classification, the State 
cannot claim legislative competence under Entry 41, List II and 
Entry 25, List III of the Seventh Schedule in order to divide the 
Scheduled Castes’ List. The pith and substance of the law in 
question was not traceable to these entries;15
c.	
The Scheduled Castes constitute a class, and a classification 
already exists. The issue was whether a further classification 
is permissible within this class with the objective of providing 
reservations.16 The rationale of Indra Sawhney (supra), to 
the extent that it permitted sub-classification of the Other 
Backward Classes,17 did not apply to the Scheduled Castes.18 
Sub-classification was akin to giving preference to a ‘miniscule 
proportion’ of the Scheduled Castes, over other groups and 
would be impermissible in view of Article 14;19 and
d.	
The Constitution creates a legal fiction in terms of which the
Scheduled Castes constitute a “class as a whole”. The States 
cannot sub-divide them. Such a sub-classification would tinker 
with the Presidential list and violate Article 14. If the benefits 
of reservation are not being distributed equitably, they can be 
supplemented by additional measures such as training, which 
would not be contrary to Articles 14 and 15.20 A further sub-
classification amongst the Scheduled Castes would not be 
reasonable and a uniform yardstick must be adopted to give 
benefits to the Scheduled Castes.21
15	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde, 30-31]
16	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde, 38]
17	
“OBCs”
18	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde, 38]
19	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde, 39,40] 
20	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde, 43] 
21	
ibid.
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
16.	 In his concurring opinion, Justice HK Sema held that the purpose 
of reservations is to afford special protection to the members of the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as a homogenous class of 
persons. Further classification of this class of people would amount to 
tinkering with the Presidential List. This regrouping of a homogenous 
group would, also amount to reverse discrimination and be violative 
of Article 14.22
17.	 In his concurring opinion, Justice SB Sinha held that Indra Sawhney 
(supra), while determining whether backward classes could be divided 
into more backward and backward classes, was not dealing with 
Scheduled Castes.23 
In that context, Justice Sinha observed:
a.	
Unlike the Other Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes are treated as a separate class by the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes Orders;24 
b.	
The State had failed to establish the reasonableness of its 
classification among the Scheduled Castes;25 
c.	
The Relli Community was the most backward community and 
hardly received any benefits of reservations. On the other 
hand, the Adi Andhra community was numerically larger and 
educationally better off compared to the Rellis. Both these groups 
were placed in Group A and Group D respectively and each 
was given the same 1% share in total reservations. The Act 
thus wrongly treated them alike despite apparent differences, 
without any basis;26
d.	
Micro-classification was impermissible under Article 14;27
22	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sema, 49, 50] 
23	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 75] 
24	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 77] 
25	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 81] 
26	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 97]
27	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 98]. Relied on Triloki Nath v. State of J&K [1969] 1 SCR 103; State of 
UP v. Pradip Tandon 1975 1 SCC 267; Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Rly) v. Union of India 
(1981) 1 SCC 246.
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e.	
Backwardness of the class was the link holding this class together 
and a classification that is justifiable based on backwardness 
of the class cannot be based on backwardness of the caste;28
f.	
Article 16(4) must be read with Article 335 and efficiency of 
administration cannot be sacrificed to benefit some castes out 
of the homogenous Scheduled Castes;29 and
g.	
The validity of the sub-classification and not the extent of the 
reservation was in question. Therefore, the argument that the 
States have the prerogative to decide the extent of reservations 
was inapplicable.30 The State could certainly stipulate the 
legislative policy about the extent of reservations but it could 
not take away the benefit of reservations on the ground that 
certain groups among the Scheduled Castes have advanced 
in the hierarchy.31
iv.	
The reference
18.	 On 27 August 2020, in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh,32 a 
Constitution Bench held that the judgment in Chinnaiah (supra) 
requires to be revisited by a larger Bench of seven Judges because 
it failed to consider significant aspects bearing on the issue. These 
aspects have been formulated thus: 
a.	
In Indra Sawhney (supra),33 this Court held that it is constitutional 
to classify the backward class into the ‘backward’ and the ‘more 
backward’ class of citizens. The provisions of Articles 341, 342, 
and 342A are pari materia. That being the case, this Court has 
to analyse how
a contrary conclusion to the effect that sub-
classification is permissible within the Backward Class but not 
within the Scheduled Castes, could be reached. In Indra Sawhney 
(supra) the phrase “Backward Classes” in Article 16(4) was 
interpreted to include both socially and educationally backward 
classes and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes;34
28	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 104]
29	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 105]
30	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 112,113]
31	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 114]
32	
[2020] 10 SCR 857 : (2020) 8 SCC 1
33	
(1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [Justice Reddy,803];[Justice Sawant, 524 and 525]
34	
(2020) 8 SCC 1 [42]
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b.	
The Scheduled Castes are not a homogenous class.35 
Preferential treatment can be given to the most downtrodden 
of the class who are not adequately represented. Such a sub-
classification is made to provide equality of opportunity, so as 
to achieve the purpose of reservation;36
c.	
It would be open to the State, under Article 16(4), to grant the 
benefits of reservation on a rational basis to certain castes 
within the Scheduled Castes by fixing a reasonable quota of the 
reserved seats for them if they are inadequately represented;37 
and 
d.	
Preferential treatment to certain castes would not lead to 
the exclusion of other castes from the list prepared under 
Article 341.38 In Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta,39 this 
Court observed that the exclusion of the “creamy layer” from 
the Scheduled Castes for securing the benefit of reservation 
does not tinker with the Presidential List under Article 341. All 
the castes included in the list of Scheduled Castes are given 
the benefit of reservation even if they are sub-classified. 
B.	
Submissions 
19.	 The submissions of the counsel were restricted to the issue of 
whether the judgment of this Court in Chinnaiah (supra) requires 
to be reconsidered since the High Court had held that the Punjab 
Act and the Haryana Notification were unconstitutional solely for the 
reason that they are contrary to the above judgment. 
i.	
Submissions of
Petitioners
20.	 Mr Gurminder Singh, Advocate General for the State of Punjab and 
Mr Shadan Farasat, Additional Advocate General made the following 
submissions: 
a.	
The judgment in Chinnaiah (supra) erroneously treats the 
Scheduled Castes as an indivisible monolith/block; 
35	
Relied on the observation of Justice Reddy in Indra Sawhney (supra) 
36	
(2020) 8 SCC 1 [50]
37	
(2020) 8 SCC 1 [52, 56]
38	
(2020) 8 SCC 1 [35]
39	
[2018] 10 SCR 663 : (2018) 10 SCC 396
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b.	
Preferential treatment promotes substantive equality. 
Chinnaiah (supra) is against the very idea of reservations 
which mandates protective discrimination based on relative 
backwardness; 
c.	
Justice SB Sinha’s judgment in Chinnaiah (supra) is self-
contradictory. While it recognizes inter-se disparity among the 
Scheduled Castes, it holds the remedy to address this disparity 
to be unconstitutional. Once inter-se disparity is acknowledged, 
sub-classification of the class would be in pursuance of 
substantive equality; 
d.	
The State has the power to sub-classify because the enabling 
power to reserve seats includes ancillary and supplemental 
provisions such as preferences, concessions and exemptions; 
e.	
In Indra Sawhney (supra) this court has recognised internal 
differences between castes.40 Sub-classification within a class 
aligns with the opinion of Justice Mathew in NM Thomas (supra) 
holding that further classification within the class was possible;41 
f.	
The Scheduled Castes are not a homogenous group but 
face varying degrees of discrimination. The first part of the 
obligation under Article 16(4) to ascertain backwardness has 
been accomplished by the President and subsequently, by the 
Parliament under Article 341. The second part of the enquiry 
about ‘inadequate representation’ is a mandate for the States. 
If the Scheduled Castes list were to be treated as a monolith, it 
would render the second
part of Article 16(4) otiose and make 
the role of the States redundant; 
g.	
Sub-classification varies from the creamy layer principle since 
(i) economic advancement does not offset social discrimination 
faced by the Scheduled Castes; (ii) while the creamy layer 
excludes the socially advanced, sub-classification aims to identify 
within the Scheduled Castes, those who face the maximum 
social discrimination; (iii) sub-classification mainstreams certain 
castes and creates a preference based on qualitative inclusion, 
contradistinguished from exclusion of the creamy layer; and 
40	
Relied on Indra Sawhney (supra) [Justice Reddy, 802]
41	
Relied on NM Thomas (supra) [Justice Mathew, 43]
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(iv) preferential treatment identifies certain castes within the 
Scheduled Castes’ list, while the creamy layer exclusion applies 
to individuals; 
h.	
Scheduled Castes do not lose their identity once enumerated 
because caste is a sociological reality while the enumeration 
in the list is through the operation of a legal fiction. The limited 
preference to some groups by sub-classification because of 
their relative disadvantage will not exclude the other Scheduled 
Castes in the List notified under Article 341; 
i.	
The State Legislatures have the legislative competence to make 
preferences for the purposes of laws in relation to Entry 41 of 
List II and Entry 25 of List III of the Seventh Schedule; and 
j.	
Article16(4) is not subject to Article 335. ‘Efficiency’ under 
Article 335 must be defined in an inclusive sense.
21.	 Mr Kapil Sibal, senior counsel made the following submissions: 
a.	
The Constitution permits sub-classification. Article 366(34) which 
defines the Scheduled Castes envisages that even a part of a 
caste or a group may be included; 
b.	
While Justice Mathew in NM Thomas (supra) noted that 
“they are no castes in the Hindu fold but an amalgam of 
castes …”, in Chinnaiah (supra), Justice Hegde replaced “they” 
with “there” in the above paragraph and noted instead, “there are 
no castes…”. This replacement completely alters the meaning 
of the quotation in NM Thomas (supra)
which was that the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are a conglomeration 
of groups placed outside of the caste hierarchy, and not that 
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes are homogenous;42
c.	
When Dr. B R Ambedkar stated in the Constituent Assembly that 
Article 341 is meant to “eliminate any kind of political factors” in 
“disturbing” the List, he was referring to inclusion and exclusion 
from the List. Sub-classification has no bearing on the power 
of inclusion and exclusion. Potential political tinkering cannot 
obviate the present constitutional need for acknowledging and 
remedying inter-se inequality among the Scheduled Castes; 
42	
Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde, 22] relying on NM Thomas (supra) [Justice Iyer, 135]
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d.	
Article 342A of the Constitution inserted by the Constitution 
(One Hundred and Second Amendment) Act 2018 empowers 
the President to notify socially and educationally backward 
classes. This Article is pari materia to Article 341 and Article 342. 
Sub-classification is permissible for Schedule Castes because 
Indra Sawhney (supra) permits sub-classification for the Socially 
and Educationally Backward Classes and after the inclusion of 
Article 342A, they are at par with the Scheduled Castes; and
e.	
Chinnaiah (supra) is not in line with empirical data collected 
by the State. According to the view of Justice Reddy in Indra 
Sawhney (supra),43 several castes or tribes within the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes are not similarly situated. 
22.	 Mr Shekhar Naphade, senior counsel appearing on behalf of the 
State of Tamil Nadu submitted that: 
a.	
Chinnaiah (supra) does not provide connecting links between 
Article 341 and subclassification. The plain meaning of 
Article 341 does not limit the power of the State legislature to 
classify the listed Scheduled Castes; and
b.	
Classification based on inter-se backwardness is in pursuance of 
Article 14. This inter-se backwardness is not among individuals 
but among groups in the Scheduled Castes. Indra Sawhney 
(supra) is applicable to sub-classification of the Scheduled 
Castes.
23.	 Mr Gopal Sankaranarayanan, senior counsel submitted on behalf 
of Intervenor Madiga
Jana Seva Samiti that Scheduled Castes 
or Tribes are not castes because Article 366(24) uses “deemed”. 
Article 16(2) uses “only”; thus, a Scheduled Caste, identified due to 
historic untouchability, is not “caste” under Articles 15(1) and16(2).
24.	 Mr KK Venugopal, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner Madiga 
Reservation Porata Samithi submitted that Article 14 does not only 
mandate equal treatment to all but also bars discrimination by equal 
treatment of unequals. He submitted that Article 38(2) entitles those 
who are unequal in status to special treatment to bring them on the 
same plane. Article 341 has to be read along with Article 38(2).
43	
Relied on Indra Sawhney (supra) [Justice Reddy, 795].
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
25.	 Mr R Venkataramani, Attorney General of India submitted that 
Articles 14 to 16 and Articles 341 and 342 operate in different fields. 
Mere designation under Article 341 does not entail homogeneity.
26.	 Mr Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India submitted that equality is 
not a static concept. It has evolved from the judgment of this Court 
in Champakam Dorairajan (supra), to Indra Sawhney (supra). Sub-
classification is an issue of rationalising the affirmative action regime. 
27.	 Mr Nidhesh Gupta, Senior Counsel submitted that adequate 
representation is a matter within the subjective satisfaction of the 
state, subject to backwardness and inadequacy of representation. 
Courts cannot scrutinize underlying data to reach that satisfaction of 
the state. Since Article 16(4) refers to “backward classes of citizens” 
collectively, Scheduled Castes are at par with the Backward Classes. 
Article 16(4) is a broader provision that Articles 15 (4) and 15(5). 
While Articles 15(4), 15(5) refer to “any special provisions for the 
Scheduled Castes..”, Article 16(4) uses “..any backward class of 
citizens”. The use of “any” in Article 16(4), as opposed to the use 
of the word “the” to qualify the beneficiary classes in Articles 15(4) 
and 15(5), indicates that there is a greater discretionary power under 
Article 16(4).
28.	 Mr Vijay Hansaria, Senior Counsel submitted that the List under 
Article 341 is
not a constitutional provision in itself, but an executive 
order passed by the President that can be modified by Parliament.
29.	 Dr S Muralidhar, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State 
of Andhra Pradesh submitted that the State has not enacted a new 
law consequent to the decision in Chinnaiah (supra). 
30.	 Mr Arun Bhardwaj, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State 
of Haryana submitted that there are disadvantaged groups within 
the Scheduled Castes and the State should be allowed to alleviate 
their concerns.
31.	 Mr Kanu Agarwal, standing counsel for Chandigarh submitted that 
affirmative action can be summarized as a two- step process including 
identification (Articles 341 and 342) and extension (i.e. how affirmative 
action can be undertaken). 
32.	 Ms Shraddha Deshmukh, counsel submitted that rights cannot be 
bundled up for the unequal members of the Scheduled Castes,
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without ensuring that the rights accrue to them in proportion to their 
lack of representation. Sub-classification is therefore, essential for 
better representation of the weaker among the Scheduled Castes.
33.	 Mr Dama Sheshadri Naidu, Mr Rajesh Kumar Khanna, Mr Sidharth 
Luthra, senior counsel, and Dr Vivek Sharma, Mr Shivam Singh and 
Mr Sanjay Jain, counsel appearing on behalf of other Petitioners and 
Intervenors have adopted the above submissions. 
ii.	
Submissions of Respondents
34.	 Mr Manoj Swarup, senior counsel made the following submissions: 
a.	
The Scheduled Castes constituted by a notification issued by 
the President under Article 341(1) are a class in themselves. 
The latter part of Article 341(2) stipulates that no variation to 
the List is permitted except by a law enacted by Parliament. 
The class constituted by the Presidential notification can 
be interfered with only by Parliament under Article 341(2). 
As is evident from the Constituent Assembly debates on 
Article 341, Parliament is solely vested with the power to alter 
the Presidential list otherwise, the executive would tinker with 
the list to achieve political ends;
b.	
Upon the issuance of a notification by the President under 
Article 341, the castes notified are deemed to be Scheduled 
Castes for the purposes of the Constitution. The castes which 
are included in the Presidential list under Article 341 are 
heterogenous. However, once
notified, the castes are put in an 
artificial mould of homogeneity by the deeming fiction;
c.	
The necessary effect of the preferential treatment to Balmiki 
Sikhs and Mazhabis in the fifty percent seats reserved for 
Scheduled Castes in Punjab is that the persons belonging to 
other Scheduled Castes are excluded from those seats;
d.	
None of the entries in the Seventh Schedule deal with Scheduled 
Castes. The only entry under which a law on reservation for the 
Scheduled Castes can be enacted is Entry 97 of List I. Thus, 
even if sub-classification of the Scheduled Castes is permissible, 
only Parliament and not the Legislature of the State has the 
power to enact such a law;
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
e.	
The National Commission for Scheduled Castes constituted 
under Article 338 can consider any new data sets or experiences 
of the Scheduled Castes and make recommendations. However, 
the power to alter the list solely vests with Parliament;
f.	
Courts through a judicial exercise cannot include or exclude any 
caste from the list of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes 
notified by the President;44
g.	
Classification within the Scheduled Castes is based on caste 
which is impermissible by virtue of Article 16(2); and
h.	
Contrary to the submissions of the petitioners, Chinnaiah 
(supra) discusses the interplay between Articles 16(4) and 341 
of the Constitution.
35.	 Mr Salil Sagar, senior counsel made the following submissions:
a.	
The direct impact and effects standard45 must be used to decide 
the issue of whether granting preference to certain castes 
amounts to tinkering the Presidential List. Sub-classification, 
in effect, restricts the scope and operation of the Presidential 
list in the following manner: 
i.	
It has an exclusionary effect, disturbing the scheme of 
reservation sought to be implemented; 
ii.	
It disproportionately increases the share of reservation 
available to certain communities and decreases the share 
available to the rest of the communities; and
iii.	
The sub-grouping of castes violates the legal fiction in 
Article 341 by which a homogenous group is created for 
the
purposes of the Constitution.
b.	
In Indra Sawhney (supra), this Court held that sub-classification 
of other backward classes is constitutionally valid. This Court 
cautioned against the application of the same principles to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; and
44	
Bhaiyalal v. Harikishan Singh (1965) 2 SCR 877; State of Maharashtra v. Milind (2001) 1 SCC 4; 
Bir Singh v. Dekhi Jal Board (2018) 10 SCC 312
45	
Relied on IR Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1
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c.	
Sub-classification of the Scheduled Castes cannot be held 
constitutional merely because Articles 341, 342 and 342-A are 
pari materia. The classes represented by the Scheduled Castes 
and the Other Backward Classes are distinct. Castes which are 
notified as Scheduled Castes have a feature of commonality; 
they all suffer from the historical injustice of untouchability.
36.	 Dr KS Chauhan, senior counsel made the following submissions: 
a.	
In Indra Sawhney (supra), this Court held that a caste can be 
a class for the purposes of reservation under Article 16 if the 
caste is socially and educationally backward;46 and
b.	
In Indra Sawhney (supra), Justice Jeevan Reddy observed 
that Article 16(4) of the Constitution mainly contemplates that 
reservation must be on the grounds of social backwardness. 
There cannot be any further classification of the Scheduled 
Castes since all the castes which are notified as Scheduled 
Castes by the President share the commonality of social 
backwardness in the form of untouchability.
37.	 Mr Sanjay Hegde, senior counsel made the following submissions: 
a.	
This Court in the judgments delivered after Indra Sawhney 
(supra) has observed that it was limited in its application to 
Other Backward Classes;47
b.	
In State of Kerala v. NM Thomas,48 this Court held that the 
Scheduled Castes constitute a class in themselves. Similar 
observations were made in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari
Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India;49
c.	
The notification issued by the President under Article 341 can 
be altered only by law made by Parliament;50 
46	
(1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [Justice Pandian, 57,60,67,82,95]; [Justice Jeevan Reddy, 782,784]
47	
Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 [293, 393, 633]; Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain 
Gupta (2018) 10 SCC 396 [16, 24, 34]
48	
[1976] 1 SCR 906 : (1976) 2 SCC 310
49	
[1981] 2 SCR 185 : (1981) 1 SCC 246 
50	
Relied on B. Basavalingappa v. D. Munichinnapa (1965) 1 SCR 316; Bhaiya Lal v. Harikrishnan Singh 
(1965) 2 SCR 877; Srish Kumar Chodhury v. State of Tripura, (1990) Supp. SCC 220; Palghat Jilla Than 
dan Samudhya Samrakshna Samiti v. State of Kerala (1994) 1 SCC 359; State of Maharashtra v. Milind 
(2001) 1 SCC 4 [15]; Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board (2018) 10 SCC 312
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
d.	
States must confer the benefits to members of all the castes 
notified by the President under Article 341. If the State 
Government is of the opinion that benefits are not required to 
be conferred to the caste, then it can make a recommendation 
for its exclusion from the list of Scheduled Castes; and
e.	
The purpose of conferring Parliament with the power to alter 
the list issued by the President under Article 321 is to prevent 
the tinkering of the list for political purposes. 
38.	 Mr Mallela Venkata Rao, counsel submitted that the opinion of 
Justice SB Sinha in Chinnaiah (supra) that other forms of affirmative 
action must be employed to remedy inter-se backwardness 
within the Scheduled Castes is the appropriate and constitutional 
approach.
39.	 Mahendra Kumar Mitra, Petitioner-in-person appearing on behalf of 
Dr. Ambedkar Scheduled Castes Federation, Karnataka submitted 
that the recommendation of the Justice Usha Mehra Committee to 
include Clause (3) to Article 341 providing Parliament the power to 
sub-categorize castes upon a resolution received from the State was 
not accepted by the National Commission for Scheduled Castes.51
40.	 Anusuchit Jaati-Janjati Adhikari Evam Karamchari Sangh, a social 
welfare association submitted that sub-classification of the Scheduled 
Castes defeats the purpose of providing special reservation to 
Scheduled Castes.
41.	 Mr Saket Singh, appearing
for the Haryana Pradesh Chamar 
Mahasabha, submitted that the deeming fiction in Article 341 creates 
a common identity of Scheduled Castes even though each caste 
within the list possesses a unique identity. Counsel further submitted 
that the Constitution would expressly provide a provision for the 
special treatment of certain castes where necessary. 
42.	 Mr Vembadi Subramanian and Mr VK Biju, counsel, made submissions 
on the same lines.
51	
3rd meeting of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes held on 13.12.2010 under the Chairmanship 
of Dr PL Punia.
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C.	
Issues 
43.	 The Constitution Bench has to adjudicate upon whether the sub-
classification of Scheduled Castes for the purpose of providing 
affirmative action, including reservation is valid. In this context, the 
following issues arise for consideration: 
a.	
Whether sub-classification of a reserved class is permissible 
under Articles 14, 15 and 16; 
b.	
Whether the Scheduled Castes constitute a homogenous or a 
heterogenous grouping; 
c.	
Whether Article 341 creates a homogenous class through the 
operation of the deeming fiction; and
d.	
Whether there any limits on the scope of sub-classification.
D.	
Analysis 
i.	
The jurisprudence on reservation 
44.	 The jurisprudence surrounding reservations has undergone 
turbulations, both inside and outside the courts. Two crucial issues 
have dominated the jurisprudential debate – identifying the model of 
equality espoused by the Constitution and the interplay of equality with 
‘efficiency’ or ‘merit’. It is important that we trace the core principles 
governing reservations in India before we proceed to answer the issue 
of whether sub-classification of the Scheduled Castes is violative 
of Articles 14,15 and 16. This would enable us to analyze whether 
sub-classification furthers the constitutional promise of equality.
a.	
Reservation as an exposition of substantive equality 
45.	 The purpose of the equal opportunity principle in Article 16(1) and 
the reservation
provision in Article 16(4) has emerged as a focal 
point of the jurisprudence on reservations in this Court. A discussion 
of the journey of the competing models of equality that the Court 
has espoused and their evolution over the course of the years is 
necessary to understand the constitutional vision on equality. 
I.	
The competing visions of equality
46.	 Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution encompass an equality 
code in pursuance of the preambular values of equality of status and 
opportunity and social justice. Article 14 lays down general principles
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
governing equality by postulating that there must be “equality before 
the law” and “equal protection of law”. In its formative years, this 
Court interpreted Article 14 through the lens of the classification 
doctrine52 which is premised on the recognition that formal equality 
in law, by which every person irrespective of their circumstances is 
treated alike, does not translate to factual equality. The underlying 
foundation of this doctrine is that two persons who are not similarly 
situated cannot be treated alike.53 
47.	 Articles 15(1) and 16(1) were viewed as an elucidation of the 
equality principle housed in Article 14.54 However, the Courts were 
reticent in applying the doctrine of reasonable classification and its 
underlying assumption that ‘not all persons (and not all situations) 
are alike’ to the realm of reservation. The reason for the hesitation 
was that the means adopted (that is, reservation) were understood 
to not have relevance to securing equality of opportunity which was 
defined in terms of formal equality and efficiency.55 In the State 
of Madras (now Tamil Nadu), seats in Medical and Engineering 
colleges were apportioned among different groups in the proportion 
set forth in a Government Order called the “Communal GO”. Seats 
were apportioned in specific proportions for Non-Brahmins (Hindus), 
Backward Hindus, Brahmins, Harijans, Anglo-Indians, Christians 
and
Muslims.56 In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan,57 
a Constitution Bench of this Court held the reservation of seats 
in educational institutions on that basis to be unconstitutional and 
violative Article 29(2) which stipulates that no citizen shall be denied 
admission in any educational institution maintained by the State or 
receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, language, or any of them. The Court observed that Article 29 
does not contain an exception clause such as Article 16(4) which 
would permit reservation of seats in educational institutions. 
52	
See State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 AIR 75
53	
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India (1950) SCC 833 [38,39]
54	
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India (1950) SCC 833 [38,39]
55	
General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36; CA Rajendra v. Union of India, 
AIR 1968 SC 507
56	
Non-Brahmin (Hindus): 6; Backward Hindus: 2; Brahmins: 2; Harijan: 2, Anglo-Indians and Indian 
Christians (1); Muslims: 1.
57	
[1951] SCR 525
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48.	 The State of Madras also notified that vacancies to the post of 
District Munsif would be filed on the basis of the Communal GO. In 
B Venkataramana v. The State of Madras,58 reservation of seats 
in services based on the Communal GO was challenged. The 
Constitution Bench observed that Article 16(4) permits the State to 
make provisions for ‘backward classes’ in the services if they are 
not adequately represented in the opinion of the State and that only 
Harijans and the backward Hindus can be considered as ‘backward 
classes’. The denial of admission to seats other than those reserved 
for Harijans and Backward Hindus, it was observed, would be a 
discrimination based on “caste,” violating Articles 16(1) and 16(2). 
49.	 The above judgments adopted a formalistic and reservation-limiting 
approach in the reading of the constitutional provisions. In this 
approach, reservation was viewed as an exception to the principle 
of equal opportunity in Articles 15(1) and 16(1). This Court had 
recognized the principle of reasonable classification in Article 14 
before the decision in Champakam Dorairajan (supra). However, it 
did not transpose the principle to the realm of reservation.59 Even in 
Venkataramana (supra), this Court held that reservation in services 
is permissible only because the Constitution expressly provides for 
it. Reservation or any other form of affirmative action was regarded 
as antithetical to the
equality principle and not a re-statement of it. 
50.	 The Constitution was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) 
Act 1951 to include Clause (4) in Article 15 to overcome the 
judgment in Champakam Dorairajan (supra). Despite the inclusion 
of Article 15(4), a formalistic reading of the equality code continued. 
In Balaji v. State of Mysore,60 this Court observed that Articles 15(4) 
and 16(4) are special provisions (or in other words, an exception 
to the principle of equality) while prescribing a cap of fifty per cent 
on the total seats to be reserved. It was in NM Thomas v. State of 
Kerala,61 that this Court undertook an expansive and substantive 
reading of the equality code. In that case, proceedings were instituted 
for challenging the constitutional validity of Rule 13AA of the Kerala 
58	
AIR 1951 SC 229
59	
Article 15(4) was included in the Constitution by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 to 
overcome the judgment in Champakam Dorairajan. 
60	
[1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439 : AIR 1963 SC 649
61	
(1976) 2 SCC 310; the seeds of the expansive approach were sowed by Justice Subba Rao in 
T Devadasan.
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
State and Subordinate Services Rules 1958 by which the qualifying 
criteria was relaxed for candidates belonging to the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The majority constituting the seven-
Judge Bench interposed the principle of reasonable classification 
in Article 14 to Article 16(1)62 and observed that Article 16(4) is not 
an exception to the principle of equality of opportunity. Article 16(4), 
in the opinion of the Court, clarifies and explains the principle in 
Article 16(1).63 Chief Justice Ray observed that Article 16(1) will not 
be violated when the rule ensures “equality of representation in the 
services for unrepresented classes after satisfying the basic needs 
of efficiency of administration”.64 Chief Justice Ray’s opinion rests on 
two conceptual foundations. First, the goal of Article 16(1) is to ensure 
equality of representation while maintaining efficiency of service; and 
second, the beneficiaries must be the unrepresented class. Equality 
of opportunity was framed in the language of equal representation 
subject to these two caveats. Justice K K Mathew adopted a different 
approach. The learned Judge broke down the conceptual foundation 
of the equality provision in the following manner: 
a.	
A criterion which is relevant to the apportionment of the good 
(that is, services) must be adopted;65 
b.	
It must be determined if the relevant criterion leads to an a priori
exclusion of a certain class. The State is required to identify if 
persons of all classes have an equal chance of satisfying the 
chosen criteria;66 and
c.	
There is a violation of the right to equal opportunity if the relevant 
criterion leads to a priori exclusion. In that case, a compensatory 
provision must be made to offset the disadvantage.67 
51.	 In his concurring opinion, Justice Krishna Iyer observed that when 
two interpretations of Article 16(1) are available, that which ensures 
equal participation and fair representation in administration must be 
chosen.68
62	
(1976) 2 SCC 310 [Ray CJI, 21]
63	
(1976) 2 SCC 310 [Ray CJI, 37]
64	
(1976) 2 SCC 310 [Ray CJI, 45]
65	
(1976) 2 SCC 310 [Justice Mathew, 55]
66	
(1976) 2 SCC 310 [ Justice Mathew, 58-59]
67	
(1976) 2 SCC 310 [ Justice Mathew, 74]
68	
(1976) 2 SCC 310 [Justice Krishna Iyer, 120]
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52.	 Thus, at the end of the first phase, it was clarified that the Constitution 
espouses a substantive vision of equality where reservation is not 
an exception but, as Justice Krishna Iyer observed in NM Thomas 
(supra), an “illustration of constitutionally sanctified” classification.69 
However, the Judges varied on the purpose of Article 16(1). While 
Chief Justice Ray defined equality in opportunity in terms of equality 
in representation and efficiency of service, Justice Mathew defined 
it in terms of equality in representation of the backward class. 
Additionally, Chief Justice Ray identified the beneficiary class as the 
‘unrepresented’ class without laying down the basis of the under-
representation. Justice Mathew on the other hand, identified the 
beneficiary class not merely on the basis of under-representation 
but on the cause for under-representation. It was this difference 
in the opinions that brooded over the post-NM Thomas era. In the 
subsequent section, we will discuss the impact of Chief Justice Ray’s 
reading of the principle of efficiency into Article 16 on the scope of 
reservation policies. 
II.	
The “efficiency” of reservation
53.	 The expansive reading of the constitutional ideal of equality, noticed 
above, was not sufficient to realize the full potential of affirmative 
action. A barrier was raised through Article 335. Article 335 
emphasizes that the State shall maintain efficiency of
administration 
while deciding the claims of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes in appointments to services.70 This Court, while deciding the 
following four important questions relating to reservations, placed 
considerable emphasis on the efficiency of service to limit the scope 
of reservation:
a.	
Whether reservation is limited to initial appointment; 
b.	
If reservation is extendable to promotions, the method to be 
employed to ascertain seniority; 
69	
(1976) 2 SCC 310 [Justice Krishna Iyer, 136]
70	
335. The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into 
consideration consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of service, in the making of appointments 
to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. Provided that nothing in 
this article shall prevent in making of any provision in favour of the members of the Scheduled Castes 
and the Scheduled Tribes for relaxation in qualifying marks in any examination or lowering the standards 
of evaluation, for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of services or posts in 
connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State.
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
c.	
Whether lowering the standard of evaluation for backward 
classes violates the equal opportunity principle in Article 16; and
d.	
The permissible method for calculating vacancies to be filled 
through reservation.
The central theme that governed these four issues was whether 
the expansion of the scope of reservations would dilute the overall 
efficiency of the service. 
54.	 In General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari,71 the issue 
was whether Article 16(4) permits reservations in promotions. Writing 
for the majority of the Constitution Bench, Justice Gajendragadkar 
observed that though reservations in promotions are detrimental 
to “efficiency”, a reading of Article 16(4) to include reservations in 
promotions would further substantive equality72: 
“27. It is true that in providing for the reservation of 
appointments or posts under Article 16(4) the State has 
to take into consideration the claims of the members of 
the backward classes consistently with the maintenance 
of the efficiency of administration. It must not be forgotten 
that the efficiency of administration is of such paramount 
importance that it would be unwise and impermissible 
to make any reservation at the cost of efficiency of 
administration. That undoubtedly is the effect of Article 
335. Reservation of appointments or posts may 
theoretically and conceivably mean some impairment 
of efficiency; but the risk
involved in sacrificing efficiency 
of administration must always be borne in mind when any 
State sets about making a provision for reservation of 
appointments or posts.” 
(emphasis supplied)
71	
[1962] 2 SCR 586
72	
[1962] 2 SCR 586 [27]; See Article 335 which provides that that the claims of the members of the 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the 
maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in 
connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. The majority in Rangachari (supra), interpreted the 
phrase “matters relating to employment” as it occurs in Article 16(1) to also include promotion. The next 
issue which fell for the consideration of the Court was whether Article 16(4) covers promotion because 
the provision only uses the phrases “appointments or posts”. This Court held that the phrase “posts” 
would - as held by the High Court - not mean ex-cadre posts but posts in the services under the State 
because any other interpretation would be contradictory to the purpose of Article 16(4) which is to ensure 
adequate representation.
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55.	 Both the majority and the minority (consisting of Justice Wanchoo 
and Justice Ayyangar) agreed that reservations impair the efficiency 
of administration. The learned Judges belonging to the minority only 
disagreed on the balance which must be drawn between reservation 
and efficiency of service. Justice Gajendragadkar observed that though 
reservations in promotion will impair efficiency of administration, the 
social benefit of reservation will trump the cost of the impairment. 
Justice Wanchoo and Justice Ayyangar disagreed. According to the 
minority, an interpretation of Article 16(4) to include reservation in 
promotion would be contrary to the principles set out in Article 335.73 
Similarly, in CA Rajendran v. Union of India,74 this Court observed 
that restricting reservations only to Class III and Class IV posts was 
justified because Class I and Class II posts require candidates with 
higher efficiency which would not be achieved if promotional posts 
are reserved.75
56.	 The judgment in Rangachari (supra) was overruled in Indra Sawhney 
(supra). In Indra Sawhney (supra), this Court adopted the approach 
of the minority in Rangachari (supra), holding that reservations 
in promotions would dilute efficiency in administration.76 By the 
Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act 1995, Parliament 
amended the Constitution to include Clause (4-A) into Article 16 
permitting reservation for the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes in promotion. 
57.	 The issue whether members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes should be considered senior to candidates of the general 
category (who were senior to the candidates of the reserved 
category in the feeder category)77 when they are being considered 
for subsequent promotion arose before this Court. In Union of India 
v. Virpal Singh Chauhan,78 this Court held that though the catch-up 
rule is not implicit in Article 16, it is a constitutionally valid practice 
73	
[1962] 2 SCR 586 [Justice Wanchoo, 35]; [Justice Ayyangar, 41] 
74	
AIR 1968 SC 507
75	
AIR 1968 SC 507 [9]
76	
(1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [Justice Reddy, 827, 828]; [Justice Thommen,302]; [Justice Sawant,552]
77	
The service rule by which the general category retains their seniority is called the catch-up rule. 
The service rule by the seniority is measured based on the feeder pool is called consequential seniority.
78	
[1995] Supp. 4 SCR 158 : (1995) 6 SCC 684
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to maintain “efficiency”.79 This was reiterated in Ajit Singh (I) v. 
State of Punjab.80 Justice NP Singh, writing for the three-Judge 
Bench observed that the process of appointments must balance 
both Article 16(4) and Article 335 and that the “principal object of a 
promotion system is to secure the best possible incumbents for the 
higher position”.81 Subsequently, Parliament amended Article 16(4-A) 
by the Constitution (Eighty-fifth Amendment) Act 2001 to overcome 
a series of judgments of this Court where the rule of consequential 
seniority in reservation was held to result in reverse-discrimination. 
Article 16(4-A), as amended by the Constitution (Eighty-fifth 
Amendment) Act 2001, enables the State to provide reservation in 
promotion with consequential seniority. 
58.	 In Indra Sawhney (supra), Justice Jeevan Reddy writing for four 
Judges observed that relaxation of qualifying marks in promotion 
would result in inefficiency of administration. This position was 
reiterated by a two-Judge Bench in S Vinod Kumar v. Union of 
India.82 A proviso was included in Article 335 by the Constitution 
(Eighty-second) Amendment Act 2000 to overcome this aspect of 
the ruling in Indra Sawhney (supra) and Vinod Kumar (supra). The 
proviso provides that Article 335 does not prevent the State from 
relaxing the qualifying marks in any examination for reservation in 
promotion.
59.	 The method for
calculating the permissible total percentage of 
reservation was another issue in which the “efficiency of administration” 
was used to limit the scope of reservation. This Court had held in 
Balaji (supra) and Indra Sawhney (supra) that reservation must not 
exceed 50 per cent. The State was faced with a peculiar situation 
where a sufficient number of persons from the reserved category 
was not available to fill the seats reserved for them. The issue was 
whether the unfilled seats of the reserved category could be carried 
over to the next year, and whether the carried forward vacancies 
could be counted while calculating the total percentage of reserved 
seats in that year. 
79	
Also see Ajit Singh (II) v. State of Punjab (1999) 7 SCC 209
80	
(1996) 2 SCC 715; “it cannot be overlooked that at the first promotion from the basic grade, there was no 
occasion to examine their merit and suitability for the purpose of promotion.”
81	
(1996) 2 SCC 715 [15]
82	
[1996] Supp. 7 SCR 142 : (1996) 6 SCC 580
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60.	 In T Devadasan v. Union of India,83 the majority held that a carry 
forward of the unfilled vacancies of the reserved category to the next 
year will abrogate the equal opportunity principle and impair efficiency. 
Justice Subba Rao while dissenting, advocated for a harmonious 
reading of Articles 16, 46 and 335. Laying the groundwork for the 
jurisprudential development in NM Thomas (supra), the learned 
Judge observed that the phrase “any provision” in Article 16(4) is 
wide enough to include the carry forward rule. The observation of 
the majority that carrying forward the vacancies to the subsequent 
year is contrary to the equal opportunity principle was line with the 
judgment in Balaji (supra) because the judgment was delivered 
in the pre-NM Thomas (supra) era. However, besides the narrow 
interpretation of the equal opportunity principle, the concept of 
“efficiency” also weighed with the Court. 
61.	 By the Constitution (Eighty-first) Amendment Act 2000, the Constitution 
was amended to include Article 16(5) by which the States are permitted 
to carry forward the unfilled seats of the reserved category to be 
filled up in the succeeding years. The challenge to the constitutional 
validity of Article 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) was rejected by the Constitution 
Bench in M Nagaraj v. Union of India84 where it was held that the 
efficiency of administration is only relaxed and not “obliterated” by 
the inclusion of
Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B).85 
62.	 As is evident from the discussion above, the jurisprudence in the 
second phase on questions involving the scope of reservation, 
evolved around the idea that reservation dilutes the efficiency in 
administration or to put it otherwise, reservation is anti-merit. The 
Constitution was amended to overcome this Court’s holding on 
each of the above issues, thereby overhauling the premise that 
reservation does not ensure efficiency in service. The Constitution, 
after the numerous turbulations within each of the issues traced, 
today advances a more substantive reading of the equality provision, 
expanding the sphere and the scope of reservation to ensure that 
the benefits trickle down to those who need it the most. However, 
traces of the friction between merit and reservation continue to persist 
83	
[1964] 4 SCR 680 : (1964) 4 SCR 680
84	
[2006] Supp. 7 SCR 336 : (2006) 8 SCC 212
85	
(2006) 8 SCC 212 [108]
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even after the amendments to Articles 16 and 335.86 This Court has, 
with a few divergences,87 continued to uphold the binary of merit 
and reservations. The understanding of the Courts at the end of this 
phase was that the scope of reservation must be expanded to ensure 
substantive equality in spite of its dilution of efficiency,88 thereby 
continuing to read the requirement of efficiency into Article 16(4). 
III.	
The interplay of Article 16 and Article 335
63.	 In this section, we will discuss whether the principle in Article 335 
must be read as a limitation on the power of the State to provide 
reservations under Article 16. Article 335 provides that the claims 
of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes 
shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of 
efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services. 
The proviso to the Article states that the provision shall not prevent 
the “relaxation of qualifying marks in any examination or lowering 
the standards of evaluation”, for reservation of the Scheduled Castes 
and the Scheduled Tribes in matters of promotion. 
64.	 Reservations under Article 16(4) are not restricted to the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The provision provides the State 
with the enabling power to provide reservations for the “backward 
classes” which are not adequately represented in the services of
the 
State. The “backward class” encompasses more than the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. It encompasses all classes whose 
backwardness is attributable to social reasons.89 This includes other 
socially and educationally backward classes such as the Other 
Backward Class category, women and the disabled. 
65.	 Applying the additional requirement of “efficiency of administration” only 
with respect to the exercise of power under Article 16(4) vis-à-vis the 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes would be discriminatory. 
Reading this requirement into Article 16(4) assumes that a dilution 
of the principle of efficiency in administration is the necessary effect 
86	
Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212
87	
Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India (2022) 4 SCC 1; BK Pavitra (II) v. State of Karnataka (2019) 16 
SCC 129
88	
See General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36; T Devadasan v. Union of India 
[1964] 4 SCR 680 [Justice Subba Rao, 32]
89	
See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [116,117,492,788, 859(3)(e)]
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of reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes while 
the same standard is not applied to reservations for Other Backward 
Classes. Though this Court has not expressly stated so in as many 
words, efficiency of administration was added as a requirement for 
the exercise of power under Article 16(4) to prevent discrimination 
between the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and other Socially 
and Educationally Backward Classes. If the requirement of efficiency 
of administration in Article 335 was not read into Article 16, then 
the requirement would only apply to reservations for the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes but not for the reservation of other 
socially backward beneficiary classes.90 
66.	 However, such an interpretative exercise (that is, applying the 
principle of efficiency of service to restrict the power of the State to 
provide affirmative action policies) is contrary to the express language 
of Article 335 which is confined to the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes. The preliminary error is that the requirement of 
efficiency of administration was viewed as an additional requirement 
and a roadblock to reservation provisions. Efficiency was not 
understood as a facet of the principle of equal opportunity. 
67.	 The meaning of the phrase “efficiency” as it occurs in Article 335 
must be determined to take this argument to its logical conclusion. 
Though the Constitution does not
define the phrase, the proviso to 
the Article offers interpretative guidance. The proviso states that 
“relaxation in qualifying marks in any examination or lowering the 
standards of evaluation” does not amount to a reduction in the 
efficiency of administration. There can be two possible deductions 
about the scope of the provision, based on a reading of the proviso. 
One possible meaning that can be deduced is that marks in the 
qualifying examination are not a marker of efficiency of administration 
because if they were, then a reduction of the qualifying standards/
marks would also lead to a reduction in efficiency. Another possible 
interpretation could be that the premise of the proviso is that 
while reduction or dilution of the evaluating standards or the 
qualifying marks is not inconsistent with maintenance of efficiency, 
90	
The opinion of Justice Sawant in Indra Sawhney (supra), highlights this aspect:” 434: […] It cannot, 
however, be doubted that the same considerations will have to prevail while making provisions for 
reservation in favour of all backward classes under Article 16(4). To hold otherwise would not only be 
irrational but discriminatory between two classes of backward classes.”
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a complete removal of the qualifying marks would be.91 Even if 
the latter interpretation is accepted, it only goes to establish that 
securing higher marks in an examination does not contribute to 
higher efficiency and that securing a minimum mark (and not the 
highest) in the examination is sufficient to maintain efficiency of 
administration. Thus, a policy which allows for lower qualifying 
marks or standards of evaluation is by the proviso to Article 335 
not contrary to efficiency. 
68.	 The only constitutional provision which refers to an examination for 
appointments to posts in services is Article 320 which stipulates 
that the Union and State Public Service Commissions must conduct 
examinations for appointments to the services of the Union and the 
State. An examination is an assessment to determine the proficiency 
of candidates and their suitability for the post. The Constitution 
does not prescribe the exact method of assessment which must 
be adopted for the examination. The Constitution also does not 
prescribe that the examination must be framed in a manner which 
would only assess skill sets accessible to certain classes of people. 
The principle of equality in opportunity in Article 16(1) is therefore the 
guide for the State while it is determining the method of examination. 
The examination or any method of distribution of posts must ensure 
factual equality. An examination
leads to a priori exclusion if it only 
assesses the skill set that is accessible to specific classes. It is to 
offset this disadvantage that affirmative action policies are introduced 
for the distribution of posts. 
69.	 The underlying premise of the decision in NM Thomas (supra) is 
that the distribution of public resources including seats in educational 
institutions and public services must be based on considerations of 
equality and justice. Thus, Article 335 is not a limitation on the exercise 
of power under Articles 16(1) and 16(4). Rather, it is a restatement of 
the necessity of considering the claims of the Scheduled Castes and 
the Scheduled Tribes in public services. Efficiency of administration 
must not be viewed in terms of the narrow lense of scores in an 
examination which a priori excludes certain classes but in terms of 
inclusivity and equality as required by Article 16(1). 
91	
See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [835]; M Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 
8 SCC 212 [108]
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70.	 This Court has previously challenged the binary of reservation and 
merit. In Devadasan (supra), Justice Subba Rao observed that there 
is no conflict between the provisions of Articles 16(4) and 335 and 
that the latter has no bearing on the interpretation of the former. 
Justice Rao observed that the former provision, is directory while 
the latter is a mandatory provision by which the State is required 
to consider the “claims”92 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes.93 Subsequently, in Vasanth Kumar (supra) Justice Chinnappa 
Reddy echoed this view. The learned Judge observed that reservation 
cannot be viewed as a conflict between the principles of merit and 
distributive justice. It is rather, the conflict between the haves and 
the have-nots.94 
71.	 This line of reasoning was furthered in BK Pavitra (II) v. State of 
Karnataka,95 where this Court observed that the assumption of the 
critiques of reservation is that awarding opportunities in government 
services based on “merit” results in an increase in administrative 
efficiency.96 In BK Pavitra (II) (supra) and Neil Aurelio Nunes v. 
Union of India,97 this Court highlighted the folly of measuring “merit” 
based on the performance of candidates in a seemingly “neutral” 
selection process which is factually not neutral since the process 
does not provide equal opportunity to candidates belonging to classes 
which face widespread inequalities in
accessing facilities required 
to ace the examinations.98 In Neil Aurelio Nunes (supra), a two-
Judge Bench of this Court discussed the privileges that accrue to 
the advanced classes in the form of cultural capital which ensures 
that a child is unconsciously trained by the familial environment and 
the economic capital:
“24. […] the privileges that accrue to forward classes 
are not limited to having access to quality schooling and 
access to tutorials and coaching centres to prepare for 
92	
Justice Krishna Iyer in NM Thomas (supra) observed that the usage of the phrase ‘claims’ in Article 335 
indicates that reservation is a right and not the provision of charity or benevolence. [paragraph 128]
93	
[1964] 4 SCR 680 [25]
94	
(1985) Supp. SCC 714 [35, 36]
95	
[2019] 7 SCR 1086 : (2019) 16 SCC 129
96	
(2019) 16 SCC 129 [129]
97	
[2022] 1 SCR 970 : (2022) 4 SCC 1
98	
Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India (2022) 4 SCC 1
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a competitive examination but also includes their social 
networks and cultural capital) communication skills, 
accent, books or academic accomplishments) that they 
inherit from their family. […] Social networks based on 
community linkages) become useful when individuals seek 
guidance and advice on how to prepare for examination 
and advance in their career.” 
72.	 One of us (DY Chandrachud J) writing for the Bench, observed that 
while examinations are a convenient method to allocate educational 
resources, they are not effective markers of merit, and that merit 
should be understood in terms of the social good of equality and 
inclusivity.99
73.	 Before concluding the discussion in this section, we deem it necessary 
to discuss the opinion of the nine-Judge Bench in Indra Sawhney 
(supra) on the binary of merit and reservation because this Bench 
sitting in a composition of seven is bound by the opinion of the larger 
Bench. The petitioners in that case argued that the necessary effect 
of reservation is the appointment of less meritorious persons while 
the respondents argued that marks obtained in an examination do 
not represent the inherent merit of the candidate. Justice B P Jeevan 
Reddy, authoring the plurality opinion, observed that it is not necessary 
to express their view on the competing visions of reservation and 
merit. However, the learned Judge observed that reservation is not
anti-merit. The learned Judge made two conceptual observations: 
first, even if merit is not synonymous with efficiency in administration, 
its relevance and significance cannot be ignored. Reservations imply 
the selection of a less meritorious person;100 and second, members 
of disadvantaged sections, given the opportunity, would overcome 
the barriers and prove their merit. 
74.	 Applying these two principles, Justice Jeevan Reddy held that: 
(a) the removal of minimum marks in qualifying examinations for 
the backward class is invalid; (b) there cannot be reservations in 
99	
Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India (2022) 4 SCC 1 [28]; BK Pavitra (II) v. State of Karnataka (2019) 16 
SCC 129 [131]
100	 Also see, Janki Prasad Parimoo v. State of J&K (1973) 1 SCC 420, Justice Khanna in NM Thomas v. 
State of Kerala (1976) 2 SCC 310; Justice Subba Rao in Devadasan v. Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680
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promotions;101 and (c) there cannot be any reservation in certain 
positions of services “where either on account of the nature of duties 
attached to them or the level (in the hierarchy)”, merit alone counts. 
The learned Judge also proceeded to give a non-exhaustive list of 
such positions. The list included technical posts in research and 
development organizations/departments/institutions; specialties and 
super-specialties in medicine, engineering and other such courses 
in physical sciences and mathematics; defense services; posts of 
professors; airline pilots; and scientists and technicians in nuclear 
and space application. Justice Pandian also agreed with this view,102 
making it the view of the majority.
75.	 Justice Jeevan Reddy recognized that reservation is not anti-merit. 
Two constitutional amendments overruled the above aspects of the 
holding in Indra Sawhney (supra). These amendments altered the 
intersection between the exercise of power under Article 16(4) and 
Article 335. The Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act 1995 
included Article 16(4-A) enabling the State to provide reservations 
for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in promotions. 
The Constitution (Eighty-second) Amendment Act 2000 added the 
proviso to Article 335 stipulating that lowering the standards of 
evaluation will not be inconsistent with the maintenance of efficiency. 
The amendments recognize the difficulties
and struggles faced 
by members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes 
during promotions. In a formal sense, the criteria of selection for 
promotions a priori excludes the members of the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes because the criteria which are considered 
to be appropriate are not accessible to them. In a more informal 
but substantive manner, the members of the Scheduled Castes 
and the Scheduled Tribes are often unable to climb up the ladder 
because of the stigma of incompetence held against candidates 
who are selected through reservation. The stereotype operates 
against them because they are externalized as “affirmative action 
beneficiaries” or “quota candidates”.103 The amendments recognize 
101	 The holding that there shall not be reservations in promotions was based on the link between Article 
16(4) and Article 335. See, Justice Reddy [827] and Justice Sawant [552-224]
102	 Justice Pandian in Indra Sawhney (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [243(11)]
103	 See Ashwini Deshpande, Double Jeopardy? Stigma of Identity and Affirmative Action, The Review of 
Black Political Economy 2019, Vol. 46(I) 38-64
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the discrimination through the operation of both human conduct 
and recruitment processes. They are an emphatic repudiation of 
the binary of reservation and merit. 
ii.	
Permissibility of sub-classification under Article 14
76.	 In Chinnaiah (supra), one of the issues was “whether the impugned 
enactment creates sub-classification or micro-classification of 
Scheduled Castes”.104 Justice Santosh Hegde, writing for himself 
and two other Judges noted that according to the decision in 
NM Thomas (supra), all the castes in the list acquired a special status 
as a ‘class’ and that a classification for the purpose of reservation 
already existed. The learned Judge observed that the Scheduled 
Castes form a class by themselves and any further classification 
would violate the doctrine of reasonableness.105 Justice Hegde 
observed that a class cannot be sub-divided to give more preference 
to a “miniscule proportion of the Scheduled Castes in preference to 
the other members of the same class”.106 In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Sema observed that further classification of the Scheduled 
Castes, who constitute a homogenous group would amount to 
“discrimination in reverse” and would run contrary to Article 14.107 
Justice Sinha observed that the Constitution permitted additional 
measures in respect of disadvantaged groups to bring them at 
par with the advantaged groups, but the class which requires
the 
benefits of additional protection, cannot be discriminated inter se 
when both satisfy the test of abysmal backwardness and inadequate 
representation in public service.108 Justice Sinha further noted that 
the state had not discharged the burden of proving reasonable 
classification and the nexus of the classification with the purpose 
of the enactment.109 
77.	 In Chinnaiah (supra), this Court held that the Scheduled Castes 
cannot be further classified for the purpose of reservation because 
they constitute an internally homogenous class by virtue of their 
104	 Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde J,32] 
105	 Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde,37,43]
106	 Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Hegde,36]
107	 Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sema, 46-50]
108	 Chinnaiah (supra) [Justice Sinha, 81] 
109	 ibid.
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inclusion in the Presidential list and thus, as a class, groups within 
the Scheduled Castes cannot be treated differently. In view of the 
already existing classification of the Scheduled Castes under the 
Constitution, further classification and consequent preferential 
treatment were held to violate Article 14, as it would amount to a 
constitutionally proscribed ‘micro-classification’. To appreciate the 
correctness of this view of Article 14 and micro-classification, we must 
analyze the contours of the equality guarantee and permissibility of 
sub-classification under Article 14.
a.	
The contours of Article 14
78.	 Article 14 employs two expressions – equality before the law and 
equal protection of the laws. Both different in content and sweep.110 
“Equality before the law”-, an expression derived from the English 
Common law, entails absence of special privileges for any individual 
within the territory. It does not mean that the same law should apply 
to everyone, but that the same law should apply to those who are 
similarly situated.111 The expression “equal protection of the laws” 
means that among equals, laws must be equally administered. 
It enjoins the State with the power to reasonably classify those who 
are differently placed. The mandate of “equal protection of laws” 
casts a positive obligation on the state to ensure that everyone may 
enjoy equal protection of the laws, and no one is unfairly denied
this protection. In essence, the guarantee of equality entails that all 
persons in like circumstances must be treated alike. That there must 
be a parity of treatment under parity of conditions.112 Equality does not 
entail sameness. The State is allowed to classify in a manner that is 
not discriminatory. The doctrine of classification gives content to the 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.113 Under this approach, 
the focus is on the equality of results or opportunities over equality 
of treatment.114
110	 Indra Sawhney (supra) [Justice Reddy,643]
111	 Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 55
112	 Indra Sawhney (supra), [Thommen J, 260]
113	 HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, 4th Edition, Volume I, page 439. 
114	 Sandra Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 14, 
Issue 3, 2016, 712-738.
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79.	 The Constitution permits valid classification if two conditions 
are fulfilled. First, there must be an intelligible differentia which 
distinguishes persons grouped together from others left out of the 
group. The phrase “intelligible differentia” means difference capable 
of being understood.115 The difference is capable of being understood 
when there is a yardstick to differentiate the class included and 
others excluded from the group.116 In the absence of the yardstick, 
the differentiation would be without a basis and hence, unreasonable. 
The basis of classification must be deducible from the provisions 
of the statute; surrounding circumstances or matters of common 
knowledge.117 In making the classification, the State is free to 
recognize degrees of harm.118 Though the classification need not be 
mathematical in precision, there must be some difference between 
the persons grouped and the persons left out, and the difference 
must be real and pertinent.119 The classification is unreasonable if 
there is “little or no difference”.120 Second, the differentia must have 
a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law, 
that is, the basis of classification must have a nexus with the object 
of the classification.121 
b.	
Sub-classification as a facet of equality
80.	 The first issue that arises for the consideration of this Court is 
whether the principle of
sub-classification per se violates Article 14. 
It is established precept that Article 14 guarantees factual and not 
formal equality. Thus, if persons are not similarly situated in reference 
to the purpose of the law, classification is permissible. The same 
logic of classification equally applies to sub-classification. The law 
can further classify a class that is already created by law for a limited 
purpose if it is heterogeneous for another purpose. This Court has 
in multiple judgments held that such classification within a class is 
valid under Article 14.122 
115	 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1
116	 Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) (1952) 1 SCC 1, [Das J, 66]
117	 Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri SR Tandolkar 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6, [12]
118	 Ibid; Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re (1979) 1 SCC 380
119	 Moorthy Match Works v. CCE (1974) 4 SCC 428
120	 Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University (1989) 2 SCC 145
121	 Indra Sawhney (supra) [Reddy J, 643]; State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310; Ram Krishna 
Dalmia  v.  Justice S.R. Tendolkar, [1959] 1 SCR 279; Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar [1955] 1 
SCR 1045
122	 State of Kerala v. NM Thomas [Justice Mathew J, 83]; DS Nakara v, Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305 
[Justice Desai, 48]
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81.	 To lay down the contours of the scope of sub-classification, it 
needs to be determined if the class is an integrated homogenous 
class. In All India Station Masters & Assistant Station Master’s 
Association v. General Manager, Central Railways,123 the issue 
before a Constitution Bench of this Court was whether ‘road-side 
Station Masters’ could be differentiated from Guards for the purpose 
of promotion to the higher post of Station Masters. Answering the 
issue in the affirmative, this Court held that the Station Masters and 
Guards did not form an integrated class since they were recruited 
and trained separately. Thus, a distinction between the two classes 
was held not to be violative of the equality code which only requires 
the State to treat equals equally. Similarly, in Mohd. Shujat Ali v. 
Union of India,124 another Constitution bench of this Court held that 
the distinction between graduate and non-graduate Supervisors for 
the purpose of promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer was valid 
because there was no integration between the two categories. The pay 
scale and even the nomenclature for the two classes were different.
82.	 In All India Station Masters (supra) and Mohd. Shujat Ali (supra), 
this Court did not specifically answer the question of whether there 
could be sub-classification within an integrated class. That issue 
arose for adjudication before this Court in State of Jammu and 
Kashmir
v. Triloki Nath Khosa.125 The rules provided that only 
Assistant Engineers who possessed a degree or certain other 
qualifications were entitled to promotion to the post of Divisional 
Engineer. However, the pool of Assistant Engineers consisted of both 
degree and diploma holding graduates. The diploma holders among 
them challenged the constitutionality of the rule on the ground that 
it classified within the class of “Assistant Engineers” based on their 
educational qualification, and such a classification within a class 
was violative of Article 14. It was argued that if persons recruited 
from different sources are integrated into one class, they cannot 
thereafter be classified to permit preferential treatment in favour of 
some of them. This Court upheld the validity of the rule holding that 
the classification based on educational qualifications, for the purpose 
of promotions is not unreasonable. Justice YV Chandrachud (as he 
123	 [1960] 2 SCR 311 : AIR 1960 SC 384
124	 [1975] 1 SCR 449 : (1975) 3 SCC 76
125	 [1974] 1 SCR 771 : (1974) 1 SCC 19
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then was), writing for the bench held that the classification had a 
reasonable nexus with the objective of promotions, which was to 
achieve administrative efficiency in engineering services. 
83.	 It was also submitted that if persons recruited from different 
sources are integrated into one class, no further classification can 
be made within that class. In this case, the direct recruits to the 
post of Assistant Engineer were required to hold a degree in civil 
engineering. However, the promotees were drawn from the service 
which was open to both degree and diploma holders (the latter did 
not require a civil engineering degree). Thus, it was argued that a 
classification based on educational qualifications is a classification 
which is based on the source of service. This Court held that though 
persons were appointed from various sources such as promotion and 
direct recruitment, they came to be integrated into a common class of 
Assistant Engineers.126 However, despite this integration into a class, 
they could be validly classified based on educational qualifications 
because it was not a classification based on the source of service. 
84.	 In this context, this Court cautioned that the judgment ought not to be 
interpreted as a justification for minute and microcosmic classifications 
and that the theory of classification could not be evolved through 
“imperceptible extensions”, diluting
the very substance of the equality 
guarantee.127 Distinguishing the judgment in Roshan Lal Tandon v. 
Union of India,128 this Court observed in Triloki Nath (supra) that 
the issue in the former was whether the yardstick for integration (that 
is, the source of recruitment) could be used as a yardstick for further 
integration, which was not the issue in Triloki Nath (supra). Thus, 
Triloki Nath (supra) is the leading judgment for the proposition that 
126	 ibid, [YV Chandrachud J, 50]. “50. We are therefore of the opinion that though persons appointed directly 
and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for purposes 
of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. 
The Rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma-
holders does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and must be upheld.” 
127	 ibid, [YV Chandrachud J, 51]. “51. But we hope that this judgment will not be construed as a charter 
for making minute and microcosmic classifications. Excellence is, or ought to be, the goal of all good 
governments and excellence and equality are not friendly bed-fellows. A pragmatic approach has 
therefore to be adopted in order to harmonize the requirements of public services with the aspirations 
of public servants. But let us not evolve, through imperceptible extensions, a theory of classification 
which may
subvert, perhaps submerge, the precious guarantee of equality. The eminent spirit of an ideal 
society is equality and so we must not be left to ask in wonderment: What after all is the operational 
residue of equality and equal opportunity?”
128	 [1968] 1 SCR 185
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an integrated class can be further classified if there is intelligible 
differentia and if the yardstick used has a nexus to the object of the 
provision.129 
85.	 It is not a given that appointees of different sources form an 
integrated class merely upon their appointment to one post. Even 
upon integration, the groups retain their separate identity for other 
purposes. In Katyani Sayal v. Union of India,130 this Court held 
that the Assistant Officers of the Railways recruited through a 
competitive examination and those recruited on the recommendation 
of the Union Public Service Commission do not form an integrated 
homogenous class because the objects of recruitment, the tenure 
and even the appointing authority are different. In Col AS Iyer v. 
V Balasubramanyam,131 a Constitution Bench of this Court upheld 
Survey of India promotion rules that reserved 50% more posts 
for engineers drawn from the military than for civilian engineers. 
Justice Krishna Iyer, writing for the Bench, observed that the army 
engineers never merged into the Survey of India service, along with 
their civilian counterparts. 
86.	 The judgment of this Court in DS Nakara v. Union of India132 has 
dwelt on the issue of sub-classification. In Nakara,133 a scheme which 
divided pensioners into two groups based on the date of retirement, 
to provide pension was challenged. A Constitution Bench held that 
pensioners formed a class. Notably, this
Court, similar to Triloki 
Nath (supra), did not hold that sub-classification is impermissible 
merely because the pensioners constitute a class in themselves. 
As opposed to the inherent impermissibility of sub-classification, 
the particular basis of classification in that case namely, the date 
of retirement, was found to be arbitrary considering the objective of 
granting pensions. It was held that if this basis of classification was 
accepted as valid, it would create an artificial distinction between two 
persons who retired within forty-eight hours of each other. Writing 
129	 See NM Thomas [Justice Mathew, 83]
130	 [1980] 3 SCR 139 : (1980) 3 SCC 245
131	 [1980] 1 SCR 1036 : (1980) 1 SCC 634
132	 (1983) 1 SCC 305
133	 ibid [48]
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
for the Bench, Justice D A Desai held that this Court while deciding 
if sub-classification is permissible must determine if the class is 
homogenous for the purpose of the law.134
87.	 Nakara (supra) goes a step further than Triloki Nath (supra) to state 
that the scope of sub-classification does not hinge on the yardstick 
which is used to integrate groups into a class but on the issue of 
whether the class is homogenous or integrated for the specific 
objective of the law. When a law integrates a class, such as diploma 
and degree holders, it integrates the class for the purpose of that 
specific law and not for all purposes. Thus, a class which is not 
similarly situated for the purpose of the law can be further classified. 
The test that the Court must follow to determine the validity of the 
sub-classification of a class is as follows: 
a.	
Whether the class is “homogenous” or “similarly situated” for 
the purpose of the specific law; 
b.	
If the answer to ‘a’ above is in the affirmative, the class cannot 
be sub-classified;
c.	
If the answer to ‘a’ above is in the negative, the class can be 
sub-classified upon the fulfilment of the following standard: 
i.	
There must be a yardstick (or intelligible differentia) further 
classifying the class; and
ii.	
The yardstick must have a rational nexus with the object 
of the statute. 
c.	
Micro-classification: the limits of sub-classification 
88.	 The
next issue which arises is whether there are any limits to sub-
classification. In numerous judgments, this Court has held that 
the State must not micro-classify since such classifications would 
denude (rather than promote) the guarantee of equality, replacing 
the doctrine of equality with the doctrine of classification.135 When 
does sub-classification take the properties of micro-classification? 
134	 DS Nakara (supra) [Desai J,42] : “If it appears to be undisputable, as it does to us that the pensioners 
for the purpose of pension benefits form a class, would its upward revision permit a homogenous class 
to be divided by arbitrarily fixing an eligibility criteria unrelated to purpose of revision and would such 
classification be founded on some rational principle?”
135	 Mohammad Shujat Ali and Others v. Union of India (1975) 3 SCC 76 [Justice Bhagwati, 24-26]
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89.	 In Nakara (supra), this Court incidentally illustrated what could be 
termed as a microscopic classification. This Court observed that 
if each pensioner were to be classified based on their individual 
dates of retirement or the month of their retirement, it would be too 
microscopic a classification. Notably, it was not the State’s argument 
that every individual pensioner retiring on a particular date was a 
class unto themselves or that the date of retirement was the basis 
of classification. Rather, the argument was that those retiring before 
the designated date were a class, distinct from those retiring after 
that date:
“9.  Is this class of pensioners further divisible for the 
purpose of “entitlement” and “payment” of pension into 
those who retired by certain date and those who retired after 
that date? If date of retirement can be accepted as a valid 
criterion for classification, on retirement each individual 
government servant would form a class by himself because 
the date of retirement of each is correlated to his birth 
date and on attaining a certain age he had to retire. It is 
only after the recommendations of the Third Central Pay 
Commission were accepted by the Government of India 
that the retirement dates have been specified to be 12 in 
number being last day of each month in which the birth 
date of the individual government servant happens to fall. In 
other words, all government servants
who retire correlated 
to birth date on attaining the age of superannuation in a 
given month shall not retire on that date but shall retire 
on the last day of the month. Now, if date of retirement 
is a valid criterion for classification, those who retire 
at the end of every month shall form a class by 
themselves. This is too microscopic a classification to 
be upheld for any valid purpose. Is it permissible or is it 
violative of Article 14?”
(emphasis supplied)
90.	 All persons are unequal in one or the other aspect. In a given 
situation, even a single individual may be treated as a class by 
themselves.136 In that case, it is particularly important that laws do 
136	 Charanjit Chowdhury (supra) 833 [58]; Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) [11]
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not micro-classify. The question of whether the classification amounts 
to a micro-classification which is impermissible under Article 14 
would depend on the facts of each case. However, the two crucial 
components of the standard of intelligible differentia prescribe the 
limits of sub-classification. The two components are (a) the purpose; 
and (b) the rational basis (or principle) for the differentiation. This 
Court has previously held that the purpose must be independent of 
the differentiation.137 The Court grants the State sufficient latitude 
in identifying the purpose, including the degrees of harm.138 The 
same degree of latitude is not accorded to the principle underlying 
the differentiation. It is not sufficient if the principle underlying the 
classification is relevant or shares a nexus to the purpose. The 
principle underlying the classification must be reasonable and 
rational.139 In Nakara (supra), this Court questioned the rationale 
of classifying the beneficiary class based on the date of retirement. 
In a concurring opinion in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India,140 
Justice Indu Malhotra held that a principle of differentiation based on 
“core and immutable” characteristics is not rational. For example, if 
the law stipulates that the loan of farmers from one specific village 
in a State will be fully waived, it must prove through the submission 
of cogent material that there
is a rational principle distinguishing 
one village from other villages in the State. In this context, the State 
will for example have to prove that location of the land is a rational 
principle of categorization and then subsequently prove that the 
village is not similarly situated for the purpose of the law. With this 
background, we proceed to analyze the specific issue of whether 
the sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes is constitutionally 
permissible. 
iii.	
Sub-classification in reservations: tracing the journey through 
Balaji, Vasanth Kumar and Indra Sawhney
91.	 The issue of whether the State can further sub-classify within a class 
for the purpose of reservation first arose in MR Balaji (supra). The 
State of Mysore appointed the Mysore Backward Class Committee 
137	 Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University (1989) 2 SCC 145 
138	 See Anwar Ali Sarkar (Supra) [7]; Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) [11]; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills 
(1974) 4 SCC 656 [61]
139	 See DS Nakara (supra) [43]
140	 [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2019) 3 SCC 345
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to advise it on the adoption of criteria for the determination of the 
socially and educationally backward class. Based on the report of 
the Committee, the State recommended the sub-classification of the 
Backward Class into the Backward Class and More Backward Class 
based on educational backwardness.141 In MR Balaji (supra) the 
Constitution Bench held the sub-classification of the backward class 
to be unconstitutional because it: (a) was solely based on caste;142 
and (b) devised measures for the benefit of “all” classes of citizens 
who are less advanced when compared to the most advanced class 
in the State which is not the scope of Article 15(4)143:
“29. In this connection, it is necessary to add that the 
sub-classification made by the order between Backward 
Classes and More Backward Classes does not appear to 
the justified under Article 15(4). Article 15(4) authorises 
special provision being made for the really backward 
classes. In introducing two categories of Backward Classes 
what the impugned order, in substance purports to do is 
to devise measures for the benefit of all the classes of 
citizens who are less advanced, compared to the most 
advanced classes in the State, and that, in our opinion, 
is not the scope of Article 15(4). The result of the method 
adopted by the impugned order is that nearly 90% of the 
population of the State is treated as backward, and that 
illustrates how the order in fact
divides the population of 
the State into most advanced and the rest, and puts the 
latter into two categories of Backward and More Backward. 
The classification of the two categories, therefore, is not 
warranted by Article 15(4).”
141	 The criterion for the sub-classification was whether the standard of education in the community is less 
than 50% of the State Average. If it is, the community must be regarded as a more backward community. 
If it is not, then the community must be regarded as the backward community.
142	 AIR 1963 SC 649 [25]
143	 AIR 1963 SC 649 [29] This observation must be read along with the observation in Paragraph 21 
where this Court held that the test of relativity must not be used to determine the backward class: 
“21. In considering the scope and extent of the expression “Backward Classes” under Article 15(4), it is 
necessary to remember that the concept of backwardness is not intended to be relative in the sense that 
any classes who are backward in relation to the most advanced classes of the society should be included 
in it. If such relative tests were to be applied by reason of the most advanced classes, there would be 
several layers or strata of backward classes and each one of them may claim to be included under Article 
15(4).”
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
92.	 This view was critiqued by Justice O Chinnappa Reddy in Vasanth 
Kumar (supra). In Vasanth Kumar (supra), this Court was invited 
to deliver its opinion on reservations which may serve as a guideline 
to the Commission that the Government of Karnataka proposed to 
appoint for examining the question of reservation in education and 
employment sectors. In his concurring opinion, Justice Chinnappa 
Reddy observed that as a matter of principle, sub-classification 
within a reserved class is valid provided that both the classes are 
far behind the advanced class and that one of the classes is ahead 
of the most backward class.144 The learned Judge observed that the 
validity of the classification of the Backward Class into Backward 
and More Backward Classes may be open to adjudication on the 
facts of each case. 
93.	 In Indra Sawhney (supra), an Office Memorandum which introduced 
a criterion giving preference for the poorer of the Socially and 
Educationally Backward Class was under challenge. The learned 
Judges diverged on the interpretation of the phrase “poorer”. Justice 
Pandian construed the phrase “poorer” in the Memorandum to 
mean economically weaker sections. Justice B P Jeevan Reddy, 
authoring the plurality opinion, construed the phrase “poorer” not in 
the economic sense but in the socio-economic sense. The learned 
Judges adopted a different approach while dealing with the issue of
sub-classification owing to this divergence. Justice Pandian observed 
that preference for a section of the socially and educationally backward 
section would eliminate or exclude the other section of the class.145 
This observation of the learned Judge must be read along with a 
previous observation that the socially and educationally backward 
class shares a common characteristic of social backwardness which 
cannot then be further divided solely based on economic criteria. 
Thus, the learned Judge did not find the sub-classification of the 
socially and educationally backward classes unconstitutional per se 
but the sub-classification of the class based on economic criteria 
which is alien to the determination of the beneficiary class. Another 
reason for the decision of the learned Judge was the model of sub-
classification which was prescribed by the Office Memorandum. 
144	 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [55]
145	 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [207(5)]
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The Office Memorandum provided that the poorer section would 
have preference over all the seats reserved for a class, leaving the 
possibility of excluding the rest open. 
94.	 Justice Jeevan Reddy observed that there is no constitutional or 
legal bar in classifying the backward class into backward and most 
backward class.146 The learned Judge held that sub-classification is 
valid for two reasons. First, there may be inter-se backwardness within 
same class and in such a situation, sub-classification ensures that 
the more backward of the class can secure the benefit.147 Second, 
the constitutional scheme expressly provides for sub-classification. 
Article 16(4) only identifies the beneficiary class as the “backward 
class” unlike Article 15(4) which expressly identifies the socially 
and educationally backward class, the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes. The relevant observation is extracted below:
“803. There is another way of looking at this issue. Article 
16(4) recognises only one class viz., “backward class of 
citizens”. It does not speak separately of Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes, as does Article 15(4). Even so, it is 
beyond controversy that Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes are also included in the expression “backward 
class of citizens” and that separate reservations can be 
provided in their favour. It is a well-accepted phenomenon 
throughout the country. What is the logic behind
it? It is 
that if Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other 
Backward Classes are lumped together, OBCs will take 
away all the vacancies leaving Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes high and dry. The same logic also 
warrants categorisation as between more backward and 
backward. We do not mean to say — we may reiterate — 
that this should be done. We are only saying that if a State 
chooses to do it, it is not impermissible in law.” 
146	 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [802]
147	 “802. We are of the opinion that there is no constitutional or legal bar to a State categorising the backward 
classes as backward and more backward. We are not saying that it ought to be done. We are concerned 
with the question if a State makes such a categorisation, whether it would be invalid? We think not. Let us 
take the criteria evolved by Mandal Commission. Any caste, group or class which scored eleven or more 
points was treated as a backward class. Now, it is not as if all the several thousands of castes/groups/
classes scored identical points. There may be some castes/groups/classes which have scored points 
between 20 to 22 and there may be some who have scored points between eleven and thirteen. It cannot 
reasonably be denied that there is no difference between these two sets of castes/groups/classes.”
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
95.	 The learned Judge also construed the phrase “preference” in the 
Office Memorandum to mean “equitable apportionment” such that 
preference does not exclude the benefit to the less backward of the 
socially and educationally backward class.
96.	 With respect to the sub-classification of the backward classes, Justice 
Sawant observed that both the sub-categories must be substantially 
(and not comparatively) backward when compared to the forward 
class and there must be a substantial difference in backwardness 
between the sub-categories themselves. The learned Judge notes 
that if these two criteria are fulfilled, then it is not only advisable but 
imperative to sub-classify. Echoing the opinion of Justice Jeevan 
Reddy, Justice Sawant observed that sub-classification would lead to 
the exclusion of classes if the preference model is followed instead 
of the model whereby a percentage of seats are allotted to the most 
backward.148 
97.	 The observations in Indra Sawhney (supra), elucidate the following 
three principles with respect to sub-classification:
a.	
Sub-categorization within a class is a constitutional requirement 
to secure substantive equality in the event that there is a 
distinction between two sections of a class;
b.	
Sub-classification must not lead to the exclusion of one of 
the categories in the class. A model that provides sufficient 
opportunities to all categories of the
class must be adopted; and
c.	
Sub-classification among a class must be on a reasonable 
basis. Justice Sawant held that the distinction between the 
148	 “524.[…] To give an instance, the Mandal Commission has, on the basis of social, educational and 
economic indicators evolved 22 points by giving different values to each of the three factors, viz., social, 
educational and economic. Those social groups which secured 22 points or above have been listed there 
as “socially and educationally backward” and the rest as “advanced”. Now, between 11 and 22 points 
some may secure, say, 11 to 15 points while others may secure all 22 points. The difference in their 
backwardness is, therefore, substantial. Yet another illustration which may be given is from Karnataka 
State Government order dated October 13, 1986 on reservations issued after the decision in Vasanth 
Kumar [(1985) Supp. SCC 714 : [1985] Supp 1 SCR 352] where the backward classes are grouped into 
five categories, viz., A, B, C, D and E. In category A, fall such castes or communities as that of Bairagi, 
Banjari and Lambadi which are nomadic tribes, and Bedaru, Ramoshi which were formerly stigmatised 
as criminal tribes whereas in category D fall such castes as Kshatriya and Rajput. To lump both together 
would be to deny totally the benefit of special provisions to the former, the latter taking away the entire 
benefits. On the other hand, to deny the status of backwardness to the latter and ask them to compete
with the advanced classes, would leave the latter without any seat or post. In such circumstances, 
the sub-classification of the backward classes into backward and more or most backward is not only 
desirable but essential.”
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categories must be substantial. Justice Jeevan Reddy held 
that the sub-categorization must be reasonable. 
a.	 Indra Sawhney did not exclude sub-classification within the 
Scheduled Castes 
98.	
In Chinnaiah (supra), this Court observed that the principles in 
Indra Sawhney (supra) on sub-classification of the Other Backward 
Class will not apply to the Scheduled Castes because the judgment 
specifically observed that it is only ruling on the sub-classification 
of the Other Backward Class and not the Scheduled Castes and 
the Scheduled Tribes.149 At two places in Indra Sawhney (supra), 
Justice Jeevan Reddy limited the observations to the Other Backward 
Classes and did not extend them to the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes. While dealing with the identification of the 
backward class of citizens under Article 16(4), the learned judge 
made the following observations:150 
“781. At the outset, we may state that for the purpose of 
this discussion, we keep aside the Scheduled Tribes and 
Scheduled Castes (since they are admittedly included within 
the backward classes), except to remark that backward 
classes contemplated by Article 16(4) do comprise some 
castes – for it cannot be denied that Scheduled Castes 
include quite a few castes.”
99.	
These observations were made in the specific context of the 
recognition of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as a 
separate class of beneficiaries under Article
15(5) and their absence 
in Article 16(4). Justice Jeevan Reddy noted that it is admitted 
that the Backward Class in Article 16(4) includes the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes even though the provision does not 
expressly state so.
100.	 While discussing the issue of the exclusion of the creamy layer 
in the identification of the beneficiary class under Article 16(4), 
Justice Jeevan Reddy noted that the discussion is confined to the 
Other Backward Class and does not have any relevance to the 
149	 Chinnaiah v. State of AP (2005) 1 SCC 394 [Justice Santhosh Hegde, 38]; [Justice Sinha, 76]
150	 (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [781]
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Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.151 This observation 
must also be understood in the context in which it was made. While 
discussing the necessity of the exclusion of the creamy layer of 
the Other Backward Class for the purposes of reservation, Justice 
Reddy observed that social backwardness is the connecting link in 
a class identified under Article 16(4). The learned Judge remarked 
that the class does not remain a homogenous class if some of the 
members of the class are socially forward. This Court noted that 
economic advancement can be a relevant criterion to exclude the 
creamy layer provided that the economic advancement is so high 
as to cause social advancement. The observation that this does 
not apply to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was 
made because they suffer from a more egregious form of social 
backwardness when compared to the Other Backward Class. The 
Court did not deem it necessary to decide the issue of whether the 
financial advancement of the members of the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes would cause social advancement since the issue 
in Indra Sawhney (supra) was only with respect to reservation for 
the Other Backward Class. 
101.	 The question then is whether there is any reason to not extend the 
principle of sub-classification to the Scheduled Castes when a nine-
Judge Bench of this Court has already extended the principle to the
beneficiary classes under Articles 15 and 16. It is true that the social 
backwardness of the Other Backward Class is not comparable to 
that of the Scheduled Castes since they are more socially advanced 
than the Scheduled Castes. That is precisely why the Constitution 
groups them into two separate classes in Article 15(4). It is also 
true that the castes included within the class of Other Backward 
Class do not suffer from a single form of social backwardness. The 
castes which are included within the Other Backward Class suffer 
from a certain degree of comparable backwardness but the form 
of social backwardness amongst them may vary. As opposed to 
this position, the Scheduled Castes suffer from a common form of 
social backwardness through untouchability. 
102.	 It is one thing to argue that the Scheduled Castes cannot be sub-
categorized on account of their limited heterogeneity and common 
151	 (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 [792]
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identity as opposed to the Other Backward Class. But it is another 
issue to completely disregard the application of the principle of 
sub-classification to the Scheduled Castes on the ground that Indra 
Sawhney (supra) limited its application to the Other Backward 
Class. We do not find that the purport of the observations in Indra 
Sawhney (supra) on sub-classification was to limit it to the Other 
Backward Classes, to the exclusion of the Scheduled Castes. The 
principle of sub-classification was given judicial assent in Indra 
Sawhney (supra) to ensure that the principle of substantive equality 
is fulfilled. The principle of sub-classification will be applicable to the 
Scheduled Castes if the social positions of the constituents among 
the castes/groups is not comparable. In the subsequent section, 
we will analyze if Article 341 through the operation of the deeming 
fiction creates an integrated homogenous class that cannot be 
further classified. 
iv.	
The import of the deeming fiction in Article 341
103.	 Article 366(24) defines the Scheduled Castes as the castes, groups, 
races or tribes which are deemed to be Scheduled Castes under 
Article 341(1). The provision does not offer any assistance on the 
criteria which must be satisfied by the castes, groups, races or tribes 
for them to be notified as a Scheduled Caste under Article 341. The 
definition clause only refers to the deeming fiction created by Article
341. Article 341(1) also does not lay down the criteria for inclusion of 
a caste as a Scheduled Caste. Sub-clause (1) of Article 341 refers 
to the power of the President to specify the castes, races, tribes 
or parts of or groups within these three groups. Specified as such, 
they shall be deemed to be Scheduled Castes for the purpose of 
the Constitution in relation to the state. The respondents submitted 
that the “deeming fiction” creates a homogenous integrated class 
that cannot be further classified. The tenability of the submission 
needs to be analyzed.
a.	
Chinnaiah on the deeming fiction in Article 341
104.	 In his opinion in Chinnaiah (supra), Justice Santosh Hegde relied 
on NM Thomas (supra) to hold that the Scheduled Castes, though 
drawn from various castes, races and tribes, attain a new status by 
the Presidential notification. Justice Sema noted that once notified 
through a Presidential Notification under Article 341 (1), Scheduled
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Castes attain a homogenous status. The learned Judge then held 
that the objective of the notification was to afford special protection 
to the Scheduled Castes as a homogenous group, which cannot 
be regrouped in the manner in which it was done by the Andhra 
Pradesh Act. Justice Sinha noted that Scheduled Castes constitute 
a class of persons entitled to special protection and could not be 
discriminated inter se, as all of them satisfied the test of abysmal 
backwardness and inadequate representation. He specifically 
observed that the Scheduled Castes are a “single integrated class 
of most backward citizens”. 
105.	 One of the issues in Jarnail Singh (supra) was whether the 
judgment in Nagaraj (supra) was correct to apply the principle of 
the exclusion of the creamy layer to the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes. It was argued before the Court in Jarnail Singh 
(supra) that the application of the creamy layer principle to the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes would have the effect of 
amending the List, which is not permissible under Articles 341(2) 
and 342(2). The Constitution Bench held that the exclusion of 
the creamy layer from the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes is justified under the equality code because the members 
of the creamy layer no longer require reservation since they have 
moved “forward so that they may march hand in hand with other 
citizens of India
on an equal basis.”152 Writing for the Bench, Justice 
Nariman observed that the application of the principle of creamy 
layer to reservations for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes per se will not have the effect of tinkering with the Lists 
notified under Articles 341 and 342 because a caste as a whole is 
not excluded from the List but only persons who have overcome 
backwardness are excluded.153 
106.	 Thus, it needs to be determined if the interpretation of the scope of 
Article 341 in Chinnaiah (supra) is correct. We must decide, first, 
whether Article 341 creates a deeming fiction. Second, if it does, 
the purpose and effect of the legal fiction created under Article 341 
must be analyzed. That is, we must decide whether the legal fiction 
creates a homogenous class which cannot be further classified. 
152	 (2018) 10 SCC 396 [26, 34]
153	 ibid [26]
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Third, the scope of the prohibition under Article 341 (2) must be 
determined in relation to the effect of the legal fiction created by 
Article 341(1).
b.	
Scope of deeming fiction 
107.	 The use of the phrase “deemed to be” is not conclusive of a legal 
fiction.154 The word deemed is used for many purposes, such as 
for the artificial construction of a word and to clarify uncertain 
constructions, or plainly just to mean “regarded as being”.155 A legal 
fiction is essentially a presumption that certain facts which do not 
exist in fact, will be treated as real and existing for the purpose of 
law. Courts have evolved two principles on the operation of legal 
fictions. The first principle is that a legal fiction must be confined 
to its ‘legitimate field’, for the specific purpose for which it was 
created.156 In Bengal Immunity Company Ltd v. State of Bihar,157 
a seven-Judge Bench of this Court held that legal fictions are 
created only for a certain purpose and they must be confined only 
to that “legitimate field”. In its decision in that case, this Court held 
that the deeming fiction in the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a), 
before the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act 1956, (by which 
a sale was deemed to have taken place in the State where the 
goods were delivered because of the direct sale) only applied to 
Article  286(1)(a) and not to Article 286(2). This Court held that 
the scope of Article 286(1)(a) which
barred a State from imposing 
tax on sales outside the State, was different from the scope of 
Article 286 (2) which stated that unless otherwise provided by law, 
State laws could not tax a sale or purchase which took place in the 
course of inter-state trade or commerce.158 
154	 See Consolidated Coffee Ltd v. Coffee Board, Bangalore (1980) 3 SCC 358 [11,12]; Bhuwalka Steel 
Industries Limited v. Union of India (2017) 5 SCC 598 [36,37,43,44]
155	 St. Aubyn v. Attorney General, 1952 AC 15, 53 [Lord Radcliffe]
156	 Industrial Supplies Private Limited v. Union of India (1980) 4 SCC 341 [25]; K. Prabhakaran v. P. 
Jayarajan (2005) 1 SCC 754 [39]; See Bengal Immunity Company Ltd v. State of Bihar (1955) SCC 
OnLine SC 2
157	 Bengal Immunity Company Ltd v. State of Bihar (1955) SCC OnLine SC 2 [Justice Das, 32]
158	 52. A legal fiction pre-supposes the correctness of the state of facts on which it is based and all the 
consequences which flow from that state of facts have got to be worked out to their logical extent. But 
due regard must be had in this behalf to the purpose for which the legal fiction has been created. If 
the purpose of this legal fiction contained in the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) is solely for the purpose 
of sub-clause (a) as expressly stated it would not be legitimate to travel beyond the scope of that purpose 
and read into the provision any other purpose howsoever attractive it may be. The legal fiction which
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108.	 The second principle is that the scope of the legal fiction must 
be extended to the consequences which “logically” flow from its 
creation. The opinion of Lord Asquith in East End Dwelling Co. 
Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council159 is the leading case for this 
proposition. The Law Lord observed that the effect of a legal fiction 
must not be limited to treating facts that do not exist as real but 
must be expanded to understand the effects and consequences 
that flow from the legal fiction.160 However, a law creating a 
deeming fiction cannot create presumptions in favor of a legal 
consequence but only presumptions about facts from which certain 
legal consequences may follow. In Delhi Cloth & General Mills 
Co. Ltd v. State of Rajasthan,161 the constitutional validity of the 
Kota Municipal Limits (Continued Existence) Validating Act of 1975 
was challenged. The Municipalities Act prescribed a mandatory 
procedure for delimitation of municipalities including a public 
notice inviting objections. This mandatory procedure was flouted 
in the inclusion and exclusion of certain villages to and from the 
Kota municipality in the State. The Validating Act provided that 
notwithstanding the mandatory provisions of the Municipalities 
Act, those villages would be deemed to have always continued 
to exist as they do within the limits of Kota municipality. The 
Court held that the Validating Act
required the deeming of a legal 
position rather than the deeming of a fact from which such legal 
consequence would follow. The Bench found that this was not a 
permissible creation of a fiction. Article 341 must be interpreted 
based on the above principles. 
was created here was only for the purpose of determining whether a particular sale was an 
outside sale or one which could be deemed to have taken place inside the State and that was 
the only scope of the provision. It would be an illegitimate extension of the purpose of the legal 
fiction to say that it was also created for the purpose of converting the inter-State character of the 
transaction into an intra-State one. This type of conversion could not have been in the contemplation 
of the Constitution-makers and is contrary to the express purpose for which the legal fiction was created 
as set out in the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a). [emphasis supplied] 
159	 LR 1952 AC 109
160	 ibid at page 132. “If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless 
prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequence and incidents which, if the putative state 
of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.... The statute says that 
you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit 
your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.” 
161
[1980] 3 SCR 1109 : (1976) 3 SCC 443.
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c.	
Article 341 does not create a deeming fiction
109.	 In Punit Rai v. Dinesh Chaudhary,162 the issue before a three-
Judge Bench of this Court was whether the Respondent, who 
contested an election for a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes 
in the Legislative Assembly, belonged to the Scheduled Caste 
community. Justice Sinha, writing the concurring opinion made a 
passing observation that Article 341(1) creates a deeming fiction.163 
However, this observation does not form the ratio decidendi of the 
judgment. Thus, it needs to be analyzed if Article 341(1) creates a 
deeming fiction. 
110.	 Article 341(1) consists of three parts. The first part lays down the 
procedure for notifying a caste as a Scheduled Caste. The President, 
in consultation with the Governor (if the notification is with respect to 
a State) is empowered to specify castes which shall be Scheduled 
Castes. In the second part, a provision similar to Article 366(26), 
provides some clarity on who could be notified as a Scheduled Caste: 
a caste, race, or tribe or parts of or groups within the caste, race 
or tribe. The third part, with the use of the words “for the purposes 
of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes” includes 
a substantive provision. In the absence of the word “deemed”, the 
provision would have solely been a procedural clause, empowering 
the President to notify the Scheduled Castes. The use of the word 
“deemed” ensures
that the castes or groups of castes shall be 
regarded as Scheduled Castes by the very act of notifying them. 
Thus, the inclusion of the word ‘deemed’ in Articles 341(2) and 
342(2) does not create a legal fiction since it does not provide any 
artificial construction. To that extent, the observations of the three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Punit Rai (supra) that Article 341(2) 
creates a deeming fiction are erroneous. 
111.	 In Milind (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court observed 
that the purpose of Article 341(1) is to recognize and identify 
the Scheduled Castes for the purpose of the Constitution and to 
prevent disputes as to who would constitute a Scheduled Caste for 
the purpose of the benefits under the Constitution.164 The Indian 
162	 [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 743 : (2003) 8 SCC 204
163	 ibid [Justice Sinha, 25]
164	 ibid, [35]
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
social order consists of castes or groups which suffer from varying 
degrees of social backwardness, ranging from untouchability to 
occupational segregation. These castes are grouped into different 
classes by the Constitution, such as the Scheduled Castes or 
the Scheduled Tribes, based on the degree of marginalization 
for the purpose of conferring benefits through affirmative action. 
A caste only becomes a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or 
a socially and educationally backward caste when the President 
issues a notification to that effect in the exercise of the power 
under Articles 341, 342 and 342A respectively. Thus, it could be 
argued that the word “deemed” in the provision creates a legal 
fiction for creating a constitutional identity for the castes which 
are included in the lists. 
112.	 Even if it is accepted that the deeming fiction is used for the creation 
of a constitutional identity, the fiction can neither be extended to other 
purposes nor can it create legal consequences that do not logically 
flow from the fiction. Accepting the respondents’ argument that once 
included in the List, communities specified in the List of Scheduled 
Castes assume homogeneity would be akin to extending the legal 
fiction to a purpose that was not envisaged. The purpose of the 
deeming fiction is ‘identification’ of castes which are the Scheduled 
Castes. The logical corollary of the
identification of castes or groups 
as Scheduled Castes is not that this creates a homogenous unit. 
The inclusion of certain castes within the Scheduled Caste category 
is only to demarcate them from other castes which are not included 
in the category. The inclusion does not automatically lead to the 
formation of a uniform and internally homogenous class which cannot 
be further classified. Article 341 creates a legal fiction for the limited 
purpose of identification of Scheduled Castes by distinguishing them 
from other groups. It offers no guidance on how the Scheduled 
Castes fare among themselves or on heterogeneity among the 
Scheduled Castes for the purpose of the Constitution. The legal 
fiction which assigns an identity to the Scheduled Castes, separate 
from other categories cannot be stretched to draw inferences about 
the existence or non-existence of internal differences among the 
Scheduled Castes. The only logical consequence is that each of 
the groups that is included in the list will receive the benefits that 
the Constitution provides to the Scheduled Castes as a class.
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113.	 In Chinnaiah (supra), Justice Santosh Hegde observed that the 
Castes notified by the President in the exercise of power under 
Article 341 form a class in themselves. For this purpose, the learned 
Judge relied on the following observations of the Constitution Bench 
in NM Thomas (supra): 
a.	
Justice Mathew observed that the members of the Scheduled 
Castes attain a new status by the Presidential Notification;165 
b.	
Justice Krishna Iyer observed that the Scheduled Castes are 
not castes within the Hindu fold but an amalgam of castes, 
races, groups, tribes, communities or parts thereof found on 
investigation to be the lowliest and in need of massive State 
aid and notified as such by the President;166 and
c.	
Justice Fazal Ali observed that the Scheduled Castes and 
the Scheduled Tribes have been given a special status in 
the Constitution and they constitute a class by themselves.167
114.	 It is necessary to understand the context of the case to understand 
the import of the above observations. In NM Thomas (supra), rules 
providing concessions to the members of the Scheduled Castes 
for qualifying at the entrance examination were challenged. One 
of the issues before the Court was whether the concession to the 
members of the Scheduled Castes violated Article 16(2) since it 
discriminates solely on the ground of “caste”. To overcome the 
embargo placed by Article 16(2), the learned Judges observed that
provision for affirmative action is made in favour of the Scheduled 
Castes, which once notified by the President in exercise of the 
power under Article 341 are not a “caste” but a class. The class 
that is constituted by the Presidential notification as the Scheduled 
Castes consists of numerous castes, thereby forming a class. The 
observations in NM Thomas (supra) do not go further to state that 
it is a homogenous class that cannot be classified further. In fact, 
Justice Mathew observed in the very next paragraph that there 
can be further classification within a class if there is an intelligible 
165	 NM Thomas (supra) [Justice Mathew, 82]
166	 NM Thomas (supra) [Justice Iyer, 135]
167	 NM Thomas (supra) [Justice Fazal Ali, 169] : “If, therefore, the members of the scheduled castes and the 
scheduled tribes are not castes, then it is open to the State to make reasonable classification in order to 
advance or lift these classes so that they may be properly represented in the services under the State.”
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The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 
differentia separating a group within a class from another group.168 
Additionally, the approach adopted in NM Thomas (supra) by this 
Court that the Scheduled Castes are a class because they comprise 
of a collection of castes must be read in the context of the nine-
Judge Bench decision in Indra Sawhney (supra), where this Court 
held that caste is itself a class. Therefore, we are of the view that 
the inference drawn by Justice Hegde in Chinnaiah (supra) that the 
Scheduled Castes are a homogenous class based on the above 
observations in NM Thomas (supra) is erroneous. 
d.	
Article 341(1) read with Article 341(2) only proscribes exclusion 
from and inclusion in the Scheduled Castes List. 
115.	 In Chinnaiah (supra), this Court held that sub-classification amounted 
to tinkering with the Presidential list by the State legislature, and 
was therefore, violative of Article 341(2) which exclusively vests 
power in Parliament. Article 341(2) prescribes the only manner 
in which the Presidential Notification under Article 341(1) may be 
altered. The provision stipulates that castes, races or tribes, or 
parts of or groups within them once notified by the President under 
Article 341(1) may be included in or excluded from the List only by 
Parliament. The latter half of the clause states by way of abundant 
caution that ‘save as aforesaid’, the notification shall not be varied. 
The provision reads as
follows: 
“(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from 
the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification 
issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part 
of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as 
aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall 
not be varied by any subsequent notification.” 
(emphasis supplied)
116.	 Dr B R Ambedkar, while proposing the inclusion of Articles 300A 
and 300B of the Draft Constitution (which correspond to Articles 341 
and 342 of the Constitution), indicated that once notified, any 
elimination from the list or an addition to the list was to be made 
by Parliament and not by the President. This limitation, he noted 
was to eliminate “political factors” from disturbing the list: 
168	 NM Thomas (supra) [Justice Mathew, 83].
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“..The only limitation that has been imposed is this: that 
once a notification has been issued by the President, 
which, undoubtedly, he will be issuing in consultation 
with and on the advice of the government of each State, 
thereafter, if any elimination was to be made from the list 
so notified or any addition was to be made, that must be 
made by Parliament and not by the President. The object 
is to eliminate any kind of political factors having a play in 
the matter of the disturbance in the Schedule so published 
by the President.”169
117.	 Unless amended in the manner prescribed under Article 341(2), 
the Presidential List notified under Article 341(1) is conclusive of 
which community is a Scheduled Caste and must be taken as it is. 
Article 341(2) prescribes the scope of permissible changes to the 
List published under Article 341(1) and exclusively vests the power 
to vary these lists in Parliament.
118.	 The prohibitions in Articles 341 (1) and 342 (2) are two-fold : first, 
specification as a Scheduled Caste is circumscribed by the territorial 
limits of the State or the region, specific to which a particular group 
has been notified.170 For instance, Entry 23 of Part I of the Scheduled 
Castes Order for the State of Andhra Pradesh enumerates: 
“Godagalli, Godagula (in the districts of Srikakulam, Vizianagaram 
and Vishakhapatanam)”. Hence, the enlisted communities (Godagalli 
and Godagula) are treated as a
Scheduled Caste for the districts 
named in the entry and not for the entire State. In Marri Chandra 
Shekar Rao v. Dean, Seth GS Medical College,171 a Constitution 
Bench of this Court considered whether a member of the Gouda 
community, recognized as a Scheduled Tribe in Andhra Pradesh, 
could seek admission to a seat reserved for the Scheduled Tribes 
in Maharashtra. Answering it in the negative, this Court observed 
that since the social conditions of caste groups vary across the 
country, a caste or tribe could not be generalized as a Scheduled 
Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the whole country. It held that the 
expression “in relation to that State” in Articles 341 (1) and 342(1) 
169	 Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, page 1636 (17 September 1949)
170	 See Constitutional (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 [2,4]
171	 [1990] 2 SCR 843 : (1990) 3 SCC 130
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could not be rendered redundant by treating a caste specified as 
a Scheduled Caste in one State to be entitled to the benefits for 
Scheduled Castes in another State, where it was not so specified.172 
In Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board,173 one of the issues before this 
Court was whether the power of the State to make provisions for 
affirmative action for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
under Article 16(4) is impacted by the power of the President under 
Articles 341(1) and 342(1) of the Constitution. The Constitution 
Bench held that a State in exercise of its power under Article 16(4), 
cannot extend the benefits accorded to the Scheduled Castes to 
a caste which is not enumerated in the Presidential list notified 
under Article 341(1). The Court held that the enabling provision 
under Article 16(4) must be harmoniously read with Articles 341 and 
342. Therefore, if a statute extends the policy of affirmative action 
to groups not enumerated specifically with respect to that State/
Union Territory, it would circumvent the mandate of Article 341(2) 
and would be an impermissible expansion of the List, contrary to the 
mandate of Article 341(1).174 Thus, this Court held that the benefit of 
reservation cannot be extended to a caste which is not enumerated 
as a Scheduled Caste in that State, though it finds a place in the 
Presidential List with respect to another State.
119.	 Second,
Article 341(2) provides that only Parliament can include 
in or exclude from the List any caste, tribe, race or their parts 
or groups. The Presidential notification cannot be varied by any 
subsequent notification, other than by an inclusion or exclusion by 
Parliament. By completely vesting in Parliament the power to include 
or exclude from the Presidential List, Article 341(2) correspondingly 
limits the power of the President (acting on the aid and advice of 
the Council of Ministers at the Centre) and the Governor (acting 
on the aid and advice of the State Government when consulted) to 
include or exclude castes or sub-castes from the List. 
120.	 In Chinnaiah (supra), this Court interpreted Article 341(2) as a 
limit on the power of the President to “tinker” with the list.175 Article 
172	 Marri (supra) [9]
173	 [2018] 10 SCR 513 : (2018) 10 SCC 312. 
174	 ibid, [Justice Gogoi, 34]; [Justice Banumathi, 79, 81]
175	 Chinnaiah (supra), [Justice Hegde, 43]