STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. versus DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS.
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 1057, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Issues
[2015) 13 S.C.R. 1057 
STATE OF HARYANA&ANR. 
v. 
DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal Ne. 318 of2011 etc.) 
SEPTEMBER 07, 2015 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE,JJ.) 
A 
B 
. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4, 6, SA, 11 A and 17 -
s.4 notification dated 18.01.2001 -
Invoking urgency c 
provision u/s.17(1) and 17(4)-Declaration u/s. 6 issued the 
next ciay - The notification and the declaration challenged 
in the court by land-owners - Court passed interim order on 
07.02.2002 -
The State on 08.02.2002 passed award, 
oblivious to the interim orders and took possession of certain o 
parts of Schedule iand - The High Court by order dated 
12.1.2004 further quashed the declaration on the grounds 
that the State failed to adhere to mandatory requirement of 
payment of 80% compensation; and that it did not qualify as 
a case of urgency as the State failed to pass the award within 
E 
one year from the date of the declaration- However, the High 
Court permitted the land-owners to file objections u/s. SA 
within· 30 days and also permitted the State to issue fresh 
declaration u/s. 6, if it found substance in those objections -
Objections filed on 11.02.2004 were dismissed - Fresh F 
declaration u/s. 6 was issued on 30.12.2004 - The land-
owners again challenged the s.4 notifjcation dated 
18.01.2002 as well as declaration dated 30.12.2004-High 
Court quashed the acquisition proceedings holding that 
declaration dated 30.12.2004 was issued beyond the G 
statutory period
from the date of s. 4 notification and that award 
was also not passed within two years, thus falling foul of s. 
11A- On appeal, held: The entire exercise of/and acquisition 
proceedings has to be completed within three years - There 
H 
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1058 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 13 S.C.R. 
...-
A are lapses on the part of the State in the manner in which it 
conducted the acquisition - No compensation was paid at 
the time of invocation of urgency provision - Once the State 
invoked s. 17, it was necessary for it to tend the payment of 
80% of the compensation- Section 17(3A) and 17(38) cannot 
B be rendered nugatory- The Declaration dated 30.12.2004 
cannot be upheld and the same cannot be considered as 
continuation of initial Declaration - the order dated 12. 1. 2004 
was erroneous and prejudicial to the landowners and hence 
the State cannot be permitted to rely on that- No party should 
C suffer for the mistake of the Court - Order of High Court 
upheld. 
s. 17 - Invocation of- By State - Without paying 80% 
of the compensation - Held: The State cannot be permitted 
D to invoke one part of s. 17 while discarding another - If the 
manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under a statute, 
the act must be done in that manner or not at all. 
ss. 4 and 6 -
Land acquisition -
Payment of 
E compensation to land-owners- Possession of the land taken 
by the beneficiary -
Thereafter acquisition proceedings 
challenged - Held: As per s. 24 of 2013 Act, the requirements 
for an acquisition to attain finality are passing of award, 
payment of compensation and taking of possession - In the 
F present case, since the land-owners allowed the acquisition 
to become final, they cannot challenge it thereafter- In the
facts of the case, challenge to acquisition proceedings was 
also belated - Hence, acquisition proceedings upheld -
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
G Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 -
s.24. 
Interpretation of Statutes - Expropriatory legislation -
Interpretation of - Held: Expropriatory legislation such as 
H Land Acquisition Act, must be construed strictly- Legislation.
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1059 
Decree - Challenge to- When - Held: A decree without A 
jurisdiction is a nullity - Its invalidity could be a subject at 
any stage in any proceedings, even at the stage of execution. 
Dismissing C.A.Nos. 318 of 2011 and 459-460 of 
2011 and allowing C.A. Nos. 461-462, the Court 
8 
HELD: 
C.A. Nos. 318 of2011and495-460 of2011: 
1. The entire exercise in the land acquisition 
P(Oceedings has to be completed within three years. C 
This time prescription is intended to ensure that the 
landowners whose lands have been expropriated on the 
State's continuing powers of eminent domain, receive 
the market price for their property in close proximity of 
_the time of acquisition. These persons would thus be in D 
a position to purchase alternate property, which 
indubitably would not be possible if the compensation 
award is implemented after delay. ·courts must be ever 
vigilant and _resolute in protecting these persons from E 
unfair treatment by the State. Parliament was alive to 
the injury that would inexorably visit the landowners if 
acquisition proceedings were not circumscribed by time, 
as compensi)tion is pegged to the date of the 
Notification. Parliament has, in terms of the Right to Fair F 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, provided 
amelioration against Governmental apathy. [Para 3] 
[1068-C-E] 
Greater Naida Industrial Development Authority 
G 
vs.
Devendra Kumar (2011) 12 SCC 375; Kiran 
Singh vs. Chaman Paswan (1955) 1 SCR 117; 
Dr. Jogmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Dir. Health Services, 
Haryana 2013 (8) SCR 77: (2013) 10 SCC 136 
- relied on. 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu 
2002.(2) SCR 383: (2002) 3 SCC 533-referred to. 
2. Even though the holding of property is no longer 
a fundamental right guaranteed under Part Ill of the 
8 Constitution of India, it has been given constitutional 
protection under Article 300A. The Constitution now 
guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his 
property save by authority of law. That authority, inter 
alia, is the necessity to tend the payment of 80 per cent 
c of the compensation estimated by the Collector in the 
event that Section 17 is to be pressed into service, with 
the objective of denying the landowners remonstration 
rights by filing Objections in consonance with Section 
5A of the L.A. Act. Expropriatory legislation, such as the 
D L.A. Act, must compulsorily be construed strictly. The 
appellant State cannot be permitted to invoke one part 
of Section 17 while discarding another. Sections 17(3A) 
and 17(38), cannot be.rendered nugatory. "It is the basic 
principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a 
E particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act 
must be done in that manner or not at all." [Para 6] [1071-
G; 1072-A-D, E] 
3. There are lapses on the part of the Appellant State 
F in the manner in which it conducted the acquisition. No 
compensation whatsoever, leave alone the 80 per cent 
postulated by the Statute under Section 17(3), was given 
at the time that the urgency
provisions were invoked. 
This exercise ought to have been carried out by passing 
G a provisional or ad hoc Award containing the Collector's 
estimation of the compensation to be paid to the 
landowners. [Para 5] [1070-B-C] 
Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kera/a (1999) 3 
H 
SCC 422: 1999 (1) SCR 1121; Nazir Ahmad v.
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1061 
King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253; Rao Shiv 
A 
Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 
1954 SC 322: 1954 SCR 1038; State of U.P. v. 
Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358; Hussein 
Ghadial/y v. State of Gujarat (2014) 8 SCC 425 -
relied on. 
B 
Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426 - referred to. 
4. Prima facie, time for filing of s. 5A Objections 
would have to be computed to have commenced on the 
date of the Order, i.e. 12.1.2004, and further there seems c 
to be no alternative but to deem the issuance of the 
Section 4 Notification forthe same date. The High Court 
in the previous litigation ought to have simply quashed 
the Section 4 Notification in personam, or if 
circumstances so commanded, in rem. By enjoining the D 
petitioners to file Objections, the High Court has causad 
a piquant position to come into place .. But, no party can 
be made to suffer any disadvantage due to an act of the 
Court. [Para 7] [1072-G; 1073-A·B] 
E 
5. According to Section 11A of the L.A. Act, the 
award has to be made within two years of the date of the 
Declaration, which requirement was met in this case. 
There was no basis on which to calculate this period 
from the date of the previous Order, as the Division Bench F 
has done. [Para 8] [1073-G-H] 
6.1 The Division Bench Order dated 12.1.2004, 
which allowed for filing of a fresh Section 6 Declaration, 
ought to have be.en assailed by the State since its G 
conclusions were contrary to
the ratio of the Constitution 
Bench of this Court in *Padma Sundara Rao c~se. The 
landowners could equally have challenged this Order. 
However, given the resources available virtually at the 
beck and call of the State, it cannot be excused for its H ·
1062 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 
A neglect or jural folly and must be held responsible for its 
failures. This is especially so since the concerned 
citizens face the draconian consequences of 
expropriation of their land with its attendant loss of 
income. (Para 10] (1074-F-H; 1075-A-B] 
B 
6.2 The Division Bench has predicated its decision 
to set aside the Notification as well as the Declaration 
which ironically the previous Division Bench had failed 
to follow. The decision of the Constitutional Bench in 
C *Padma Sundara Rao held that the language in Section 
6(1) is clear and unambiguous, and the time period 
cannot be stretched as this would not be in keeping with 
the legislative intent. The contention of the appellant 
State that the Declaration dated 30.12.2004 is a 
D continuation of the initial Declaration is thus clearly 
erroneous, as such a finding would be in the face of the 
strict interpretation of time prescribed by *Padma 
Sundara Rao and the unambiguous language of Section 
6. Had the Legislature intended to allow for such a 
E 
continuation, it would have done so by specifically 
providing for it, as it has done for periods covered by 
orders of stay and injunction. Furthermore, the appellant 
State cannot place reliance on an erroneous Order which 
F caused grave prejudice to the rights of the Respondents. 
No party should suffer for the mistake of the Court. (Para 
11] (1077-E-H; 4178-A] 
6.3 Since compensation is calculated based on
the 
value of the land on the date of Section 4 Notification, 
G the Order of the Division Bench dated 12.1.2004 resulted 
in the landowners getting compensation at 2001·- rates 
even thqugh the Award was finally passed in 2006 and 
the compensation is yet to be paid to the Respondents. 
H Had the Division Bench Order struck down only the
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1063 
Declaration, which. in turn would have resulted in the A 
entire acquisition lapsing, the Appellant State would have 
had to reinitiate acquisition proceedings, resulting in the 
Respondents receiving compensation at the market 
rates current at the time of the fresh Notification. 
Therefore, the Declaration dated 30.12.2004 cannot be B 
upheld merely by virtue of the previous Division Bench's 
erroneous and prejudicial Order. [Para 11] [1078-A-D] 
*Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu 
2002 (2) SCR 383 : (2002) 3 SCC 533 - relied 
C 
on. 
7. The quashing of the entire acquisition 
proceeding has to be explicitly expressed. Quashing of 
acquisition proceedings at the instance of one or two 0 
landowners does not have the effect of nullifying the 
entire acquisition. Landowners who are aggrieved by the 
acquisition proceedings would have to lay a challenge 
to them at least before an Award is pronounced and 
possession of the land is taken over by the Government. E 
However, generally speaking, Courts come to the 
succour of those, who approach it. In some instances 
equities are equalized by allowing subsequentslothful 
petitioners, belatedly and conveniently jumping on the 
bandwagons, to receive, at the highest, compensation F 
granted to others sans interest. [Para 9] [1074-B-F] 
Sh yam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4 
sec 255 : 1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 533; Abhey 
Ram, Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh
Uban 
(1999) 7 sec 44 : 1999 (1) Suppl. scR 650; 
Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban (2000) 
7 sec 296 : 2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 496; The 
Chairman and M.D., TNHB v. S. Saraswathy2015 
AIR2315;A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation· 
G 
H 
•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
Limited v. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao (2012) 
12 sec 797 - relied on. 
C.A. Nos. 461-462 of2011: 
8.1 In the appeals compensation has been paid to 
B the contesting respondents, whose land is now in the 
possession of Haryana Urban Development Authority. 
Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
C Resettlement Act, 2013 makes it clear that the three 
requirements for an acquisition to attain finality are the 
passing of an award, payment of compensation and 
taking of possession, all of which are met here. [Para 
13] [1078-G-H; 1079-A] 
D 
8.2 The Contesting Respondents in these Appeals 
also had not been parties before the Division Bench in 
its Judgment dated 12.3.2008. As that Judgment did not 
explicitly state that it would apply to all the landowners 
E affected by the impugned acquisition process, it was 
limited in scope to the parties before it. The Contesting 
Respondents in these Appeals only filed writ petitions 
challenging the acquisition after the Judgment dated 
12.3.2008 was passed. Till the date of the 12.3.2008 
F Judgment, these Respondents had acquiesced to the 
acquisition and had allowed it to become final, and 
therefore they could not seek to challenge it by placing 
reliance on a Judgment that did not enure to their benefit. 
[Para 13] [1079-B-D] 
G 
8.3 A number of Proforma Respondents were 
impleaded in Civil Appeal No. 462 vide order
dated 
12.4.2013, who first challenged the acquisition by filing 
a writ petition in 2010, well after the Judgment dated 
H 
12.3.2008~ It is thus clear that these Respondents, too,

STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1065 
initially consented to the acquisition process and only A 
challenged it belatedly by seeking to rely upon a 
favourable Judgment that did not relate or pertain to 
them. [Para 14) [1079-F] 
Case Law Reference 
B 
2002 (2) SCR 383 
referred to 
Para4 
c2011) 12 sec 375 
relied on 
Para4 
(1955) 1 SCR 117 
relied on 
Para4 
c 
2013 (8) SCR 77 
relied on 
Para 4 · 
1999 (1) SCR 1121 
relied on 
Para6 
(1875) 1 Ch D 426 
referred to 
Para 6 
AIR 1936 PC 253 
relied on 
Para 6 
D 
1954 SCR 1038 
relied on 
Para 6 
1964 SC 358 
relied on 
Para 6 
(2014) 8 sec 425 
relied on 
Para 6 · 
· 1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 533 
relied on 
Para9 
E 
1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 650 
relied on 
Para 9 
2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 496 
relied on 
Para 9 
2015AIR 2315 
relied on 
Para 9 
F 
(2012) 12sec191 
relied on 
Para 9 
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
318 of2011. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2008 of G 
Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at 
Chandigarh in CWP No. 1123 of 2006. 
WITH 
C;A. No. 459-462 of 2011. 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
Amrender Sharan, Sr. Adv, Ajay Bansal, AAG, Govind 
' 
Goel, SanjaY. Kumar, Yadav, Ankit Goel, Dr. Kailash Chand, 
C.D. Singh, GauravYadava, Sachin Jain, Ms. Kumud Lata Das, 
Sanjai Kumar Pathak, Ms. Madhu Moolchandani, S.N. Gupta, 
Surya Kant, Advs., for the appearing parties. 
B 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 
c 
Civil Appeal No. 318 OF 2011 
1. This Appeal questions the correctness of the Judgment 
dated 12.3.2008 delivered by the Division Bench of the High 
Court of Punjab and Haryana in C.W.P. No. 1123 of 2006, on 
the basis of which the High Court had also allowed C. W. P. No. 
D 
1465 of 2006, C.W.P. No. 2166 of 2007, C.W.P. No. 7066 of 
2008 and C.W.P. No~ 7353 of 2008. Civil Appeal No. 318 of 
2011 and Civil Appeal Nos. 459-462 of 2011 respectively 
assail these Judgments. It merits to mention that the connected 
E 
Civil Appeal No. 535 of2011 was, on the unrefuted submission 
made by the learned counsel for the Respondents/Landowners. 
in that Appeal, dismissed as infructuous by an Order dated 
11.3.2015 of this Court; the submission was that the Public 
Notice dated 8.4.2010 had released the subject land from 
F 
acquisition. 
2. The State of Haryana had issued a Notification under 
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 ('L.A. Act' for 
brevity) on 18.1.2001 to acquire 12.18 acres of land falling in 
G 
Village Khera Markanda and 11.64 acres of land falling in 
Village
Ratgal as mentioned in the Schedule thereto for the 
construction of a fell-storm sewer, a sewage-treatment plant 
and a crematorium (Shamshan Ghat) at Kurukshetra. 
/' 
Simultaneous with the issuance of this Notification, the 
H 
Appellant State had also invoked the urgency provisions
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1067 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 
contained in Sections 17(1) and 17(4 ), thereby denying to the A 
landowners (some of whom are the Respondents before us) 
the opportunity to file Objections under Section SA of the L.A. 
Act. A Declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was issued 
the very next day, i.e. 19.1.2001. It was at this juncture that the 
Respondents/Landowners filed C.W.P. No. 2503 of 2002 and 
B 
C.W.P. No. 8696 of 2002, (along with a third party namely 
Neelam Ram, the petitioner in C.W.P. Ne. 4887 of 2002) 
challenging the Section 4 Notification dated 18.1.2001 and 
the Section 6 Declaration dated 19.1.2001. 
c 
3. It will be pertinent to point out that by the time interim 
orders came to be passed in the Writ Petitions by the Division 
Bench on 7.2.2002, the one year period prescribed in the 
statute to advance from Notification to Declaration stage had 
already elapsed. It is also relevant to record that D 
notwithstanding the interim order dated 7 .2.2002, the Appellant 
State passed an Award on the next day, namely 8.2.2002, 
obviously oblivious of those interim orders. It also took 
possession of certain parts of the Scheduled lands. The one 
year prescription having been transgressed, the subject E 
acquisition would have met its statutory death but for the feature 
that the urgency provisions had been invoked by the State in 
the event without legal propriety. The time table established 
under the L.A. Act
requires to be recalled. Upon the publication 
of a Notification, affected landowners are required to file 
F 
Objections within thirty days. Although no period has been 
prescribed for disposal of Objections by the Collector, this 
exercise must reach its culmination within one year of the 
Notification's issuance. If these actions are SD done, the G 
Government must direct the Collector to "take order for the 
acquisition of the land" which·is a statutory provision which 
smacks superficiality. The Collector must also mark and 
measure the land in question, cause public notice to be given 
of the Government's intention to take possession of the land 
H 
'
1068 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 
A and invite claims for compensation etc. After deciding any 
objection or representation received from the interested 
parties, an Award has to be made within two years of the 
Declaration, failing which the entire acquisition proceedings 
would lapse. Of course the period covered by stay orders 
B granted by a Court would be excluded. Parliament was, as is 
manifestly evident, alive to the injury that would inexorably visit 
the landowners if acquisition proceedings were not 
circumscribed by time, as compensation is pegged to the date 
of the Notification. The entire exercise has to be completed 
C within three years. This time prescription is thus obviously 
intended to ensure that the landowners whose lands have been 
expropriated on the State's continuing powers of eminent 
domain receive the market price for their property in close 
D proximity of the time of acquisition. These persons would thus 
be in a position to purchase alternate property, which 
indubitably would not be possible if the compensation award 
is implemented after delay. Courts must be ever vigilant and 
resolute in protecting these persons from unfair treatment by 
E the State. Thankfully, Parliament has, in terms of the Right to 
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, provided 
amelioration against Governmental apathy. 
F 
4. By a brief Order delivered on 12.1.2004, that is in the 
era of
Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) 3 
SCC533, the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High 
Court, noting the contentions that the Appellant State had not 
adhered to the mandatory ·requirement of payment of 80 per 
G cent comper;isation to the landowners and that it did not qualify 
as a case of urgency since the Appellant State passed had 
failed to publish an Award within one year after the Section 6 
Declaration, quashed the latter. However, for reasons 
recondite, the Division Bench simultaneously permitted the 
H petitioners before it to file Section SA Objections within thirty
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1069 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 
days and permitted the Appellant State to issue a fresh Section A 
6 Declaration in the event that it found no substance in those 
Objections. The directions could not have been given by the 
Division Bench. Instead, the Division Bench should have simply 
quashed the Section 6 Declaration, at which point the Section 
4 Notification would have lapsed, due to the fact that the one B 
year period for filing a Declaration had already elapsed. In 
Greater Naida Industrial Development Authority vs. Devendra 
Kumar (2011) 12 SCC 375 it has been clarified that it is 
impermissible for the Government to proceed with the 
acquisition from the stage of Section 4. Applying the ratio of C 
Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan (1955) 1 SCR 117 which 
has been followed in Dr. Jogmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Dir. Health 
Services, Haryana (2013) 10 SCC 136 to the effect that a 
decree without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could be D 
a subject at any stage in any proceedings and even at the 
stage of execution, the said Order of the Division Bench can 
be ignored. We think it appropriate to reproduce the operative 
part of this Order for reasons that will become apparent later:-
"l n the facts and circumstances of the case, as E 
mentioned above, in our view, interest of justice would . 
be served, if we quash declaration under Section 6 of 
the Act dated 19.1.2001, and all subsequent 
proceedings that might have
been taken thereafter with F 
liberty to the petitioners to file objections under 
Section 5-A of the Act within 30 days from the date of 
receipt of a certified copy of the order, which, naturally 
shall be heard by the State or the authority constituted 
by the State for that purpose, in accordance with law G 
and after giving an appropriate hearing to the petitioners 
if the objections are rejected, naturally, the Government 
will be in its power to issue declaration under Section 6 
of the Act. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
Petition is disposed of accordingly. However, parties 
are left to bear their own costs." (emphasis supplied) 
5. We must highlight the lapses by the Appellant State 
in the manner in which it conducted the acquisition. 
B Significantly, no compensation whatsoever, leave alone the 80 
per cent postulated by the Statute under Section 17(3), was 
given at the time that the urgency provisions were invoked. 
This exercise ought to have been carried out by passing a 
provisional or ad hoc Award containing the Collector's 
C estimation of the compensation to be paid to the landowners. 
The State seems to be oblivious of the law and impervious to 
the plight of the landowners whose livelihood is virtually 
deracinated. Section 6 requires particular perusal and we are 
extracting its relevant portions for convenience. Also, for facility 
D of reference, Sections 17(3A) is reproduced in order to 
emphasize that those provisions could be correctly and 
properly resorted to only if the State Government, through its 
Collector, had tendered 80 per cent of the compensation 
estimated by him. 
E 
Section 6 - Declaration that land is required for 
a public purpose - (1) Subject to the provisions of 
Part VII of th is Act, when the appropriate Government is 
satisfied, after considering the report, it any, made under 
F 
section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is 
needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a 
declaration
shall be made to that effect under the 
signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some 
officer duly authorized to certify its orders, and different 
G 
declarations may be made from time to time in respect 
of different parcels of any land covered by the same 
notification under section 4, sub-section (1) irrespective 
of whether one report or different reports has or have 
been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-
H 
section (2):
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1071 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 
Provided that no declaration in respect of any A 
particular land covered by a notification under section 
4, sub-!ection (1 ),_ 
(i) xxx 
xxx 
,• 
xxx 
(ii) Published after the commencement of the Land 
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made 
after the expiry of one year from the date of the 
publication of the notification: 
17. Special powers in cases of urgency -
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
B 
c 
(3A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-
section ( 1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without o 
prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), -
(a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the 
compensation for such land as estimated by him 
to the persons interested entitled thereto, and 
(b·) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or 
more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31, 
sub-section (2), 
E 
and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions 
F 
of section 31, sub-section (2) (except the second 
provision thereto), shall apply as they apply to the 
payment of compensation under that section. 
6. Even though the holding of property is no longer a G 
fundamental right guaranteed under Part Ill of the Constitution 
of India, it has been given constitutional protection under Artiele 
300A which came to be inserted into the Constitution by the 
Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment)Act, 1978 which omitted 
Article 19( 1 )(f), viz., "to acquire, hold and dispose
of propertY'. 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[201S] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
The Constitution now guarantees that no person shall be 
deprived of his property save by authority of law. We have 
mentioned this for the reason that if the UnioA or the State 
Government is desirous of depriving any person of his property 
it can only do so by authority of law. That authority, as is facially 
B evident, inter alia, is the necessity to tend the payment of 80 
per cent of the compensation estimated by the Collector in the 
event that Section 17 is to be pressed into service, with the 
objective of denying the landowners remonstration rights by 
filing Objections in consonance with Section SA of the L.A. 
C Act. Expropriatory legislation, such as the L.A. Act, must 
compulsorily be construed strictly. The Appellant.State cannot 
be permitted to invoke one part of Section 17 while discarding 
another. Sections 17(3A) and 17(3B), which were inserted by 
0 
the Act 68 of 1964 with effect from 24.9.1994, cannot be 
rendere~ nugatory. In this regard, we are reminded of the 
Judgment of this Court in Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of 
Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 422 which held that: "It is the basic 
principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a 
E particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be 
done in that manner or not at all.• The origin of this rule is 
traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor (187S) 1 Ch D 426 
which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King 
Emperor AIR 1936
PC 2S3, and has been upheld in Rao Shiv 
F 
Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322, 
State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 3S8 and Hussein 
Ghadiallyv. State of Gujarat (2014) 8 SCC 425. 
7. Prima facie, time for filing of SA Objections would 
G have to be computed to have commenced on the date of the 
Order, i.e. 12.1.2004, and further there seems to be no 
alternative but to deem the issuance of the Section 4 
Notification for the same date. Hence the Section 6 Declaration 
would have to be made at the latest by 11.1.200S. However, 
H we reiterate that the High Court ought to have simply quashed
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1073 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 
the Section 4 Declaration in personam, or if circumstances so A 
commanded, in rem. By permitting nay enjoining the petitioners 
to file Objections, the High Court has caused a piquant position · 
to come into place. But, as is trite, no party can be made to 
suffer any disadvantage due to an act of the Court. The 
Respondents filed Objections on 11.2 .2004 which were 
B 
dismissed in September 2004 paving the way for the passing 
of a fresh Section 6 Declaration on 30.12.2004. The 
Respondents thereupon challenged the Section 4 Notification 
dated 18.1.2002 and the Section 6 Declaration dated 
30.12.2004 in terms of C.W.P. No.1123 of2006, C.W.P. No. C 
1465 of 2006 and C.W.P. No. 2166 of 2007. 
8. In the second salvo of writ petitions, the Division 
Bench has found in the impugned Judgment dated 12.3.2008 
that the second Section 6 Declaration had been made after D 
the passing of the period prescribed in the L.A. Act, as the 
Section 4 Notification was issued on 18.1.2001. It noted that 
this Court had held in Padma Sundara Rao that the subject 
statutory period has to be imparted a strict construction; the 
period could be increased only in the circumstances postulated 
E 
and provided for in the Act itself. The Division Bench also 
observed that even if the second Section 6 Declaration were 
to be accepted as valid by construing the one year period from 
the date of the Order of the previous
Division Bench dated 
12.1.2004, the Appellant State had failed to pass an Award 
F 
within two years, thus falling foul of Section 11 A of the L.A. Act. 
The Section 4 Notification, the Section 6 Declaration and all 
proceedings pursuant thereto were therefore quashed. We find 
it apposite to note the error in the latter observation. According G 
to Section 11 A of the L.A. Act, the award hbs to be made within 
two years of the date of the Declaration, which requirement 
was met in this case. There was no basis on which to calculate 
this period from the date of the previous Order, as the Division 
Bench has done. 
H
1074 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
9. It would be pertinentto clarify thatthe quashing of the 
entire acquisition proceeding has to be explicitly expressed. 
This Court has in Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar 
(1993) 4 SCC 255, Abhey Ram, Delhi Administration v. Gurdip 
Singh Uban (1999) 7 SCC44, Delhi Administration v. Gurdip 
B Singh Uban (2000) 7 SCC 296 and The Chairman and M.D., 
TNHB v. S. Saraswathy (Judgment delivered on 11.5.2015 in 
Civil Appeal Nos. 736-737 of 2008) reiterated and restated 
the established and consistent view that quashing of acquisition 
proceedings at the instance of one or two landowners does 
C not have the effect of nullifying the entire acquisition. In A.P. 
Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited v. Chinthamaneni 
Narasimha Rao (2012) 12 SCC 797, this Court has reiterated 
the established proposition that landowners who are aggrieved 
D by the acquisition proceedings would have to lay a challenge 
to them at least before an Award is pronounced and 
possession of the land is taken over by the Government. 
Numerous decisions of this Court have been discussed 
obviating the need to analyze all of them once again. However, 
E generally speaking, Courts come to the succour of those who 
approach it. In some instances equities are equalized by 
allowing subsequent slothful petitioners, belatedly and 
conveniently jumping on the bandwagons, to receive, at the 
highest, compensation granted to others sans interest. 
F 
10.
The Appellant State has filed thisAppeal contending 
that the parties are bound by the Division Bench Order dated 
12.1.2004, which allowed for filing of a fresh Section 6 
Declaration. This is a specious submission because the State 
G ought to have assailed that Order since its conclusions were 
contrary to the ratio of the Constitution Bench of this Court in 
Padma Sundara Rao. It may be contended that the 
landowners could equally have challenged this Order. 
However, given the resources available virtually at the beck 
H and call of the State, it cannot be excused for its neglect or
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1075 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 
jural folly and must be held responsible for its failures. This is A 
especially so since the concerned citizens face the draconian 
consequences of expropriation of their land with its attendant 
loss of income. The Appellant State further contended that the 
initial Section 6 Declaration was within the statutory time period 
and upon the curing of technical defects, the original Section 
B 
6 Declaration continued. The Appellant State also argued that 
the possession of certain lands has already been taken by the 
Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) and therefore 
those matters have acquired finality in accordance with the 
ratio of Padma Sundara Rao, which is available in these C 
extracted paragraphs: 
11. It may be pointed out that the stipulation regarding 
the urgency in terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no 
role to play when the period of limitation under Section D 
6 is reckoned. The purpose for providing the period of 
limitation seems-to be the avoidance of inconvenience 
to a person whose land is sought to be acquired. 
Compensation gets pegged from the date of notification 
under Section 4( 1 ). Section 11 provides that the E 
valuation of the land has to be done on the date of 
publication of notification under Section 4(1 ). Section 
23 deals with matters to be considered in determining 
the compensation. It provides that the market value of F 
the land is to be fixed with
reference to the date of 
publication of the notification under Section 4( 1) of the 
Act. The prescription of time-limit in that background is, 
therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chandv. Union 
of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 it was held by this Court that G 
though no period was prescribed, action within a 
reasonable time was warranted. The said case related 
to a dispute which arose before prescription of specific 
periods. After the quashing of declaration, the same 
became non est and was effaced. It is fairly conceded 
H
1076 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 
by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no 
bar on issuing a fresh declaration after following the due 
procedure. It is, however, contended that in case a fresh 
notification is to be issued, the market value has to be 
determined on the basis of the fresh notification under 
Section 4( 1) of the Act and it may be a costly affair for 
the State. Even if it is so, the interest of the person whose 
land is sought to be acquired, cannot be lost sight of. 
He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If 
the acquisition soughtto be made is done in an illogical, 
illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer 
on that count. 
****** 
14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets 
the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is 
misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, 
it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if 
deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. 
v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd.) The legislative casus 
omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative 
process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and 
unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something 
into it, as was done in Narsimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah 
case the period was further stretched to have the time 
period run from date of service of the High Court's order. 
Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of 
Section 6( 1 ). If the view
is accepted it would mean that 
a case can be covered by not only clause (1) and/or 
clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1 ), but also by a 
non-prescribed period. Same can never be the 
legislative intent. 
*****
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1077 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 
16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis A 
principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. 
. Chinnathambi Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu 
AIR 1980 Mad 251 : (1980) 2 MLJ 269 (FB)was 
rendered on 22-6-1979 i.e. much prior to the 
amendment by the 1984Act. lfthe legislature intended 
B 
to give a new lease of life in those cases where the 
declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no 
reason why it could not have done so by specifically 
providing for it. The fact that the legislature specifically 
provided for periods covered by orders of stay or C 
injunction clearly shows that no other period was 
intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for 
providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus 
curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench 0 
of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact 
situation of this case. 
11. The Division Bench has predicated its decision to 
set aside the Notification as well as the Declaration on P ... dma 
Sundara Rao, which ironically the previous Division Bench 
E 
had failed to follow. The decision of the Constitutional Bench 
in Padma Sundara Rao held that the language in Section 
6(1) is clear and unambiguous, and the time period cannot be 
stretched as this would not be in keeping with the legislative 
intent. The contention of the Appellant State that the Declaration 
F 
dated 30.12.2004 is a
continuation of the initial Declaration is 
thus clearly erroneous, as such a finding would be in the face 
of the strict interpretation of time prescribed by Padma 
Sundara Rao and the unambiguous language of Section 6. 
G 
Had the Legislature intended to allow for such a continuation, 
it would have done so by specifically providing for it, as it has 
done for periods covered by orders of stay and injunction. 
Furthermore, the Appellant State cannot place reliance on an 
erroneous Order which caused grave prejudice to the rights of H
1078 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 13 S.C.R. 
A 
the Respondents. It would be apt to mention the legal principle 
that no party should suffer for the mistake of the Court. Since 
compensation is calculated based on the value of the land on 
the date of the Section 4 Notification, the Order of the Division 
Bench dated 12.1.2004 resulted in the landowners getting 
B compensation at 2001 rates even though the Award was finally 
passed in 2006 and the compensation is yet to be paid to the 
Respondents. Had the Division Bench Order struck down only 
the Declaration, which in turn would have resulted in the entire 
acquisition lapsing, the Appellant State would have had to 
C 
reinitiate acquisition proceedings, resulting in the Respondents 
receiving compensation at the market rates current at the time 
of the fresh Notification. We therefore find that the Declaration 
dated 30.12.2004 cannot be upheld merely by virtue of the 
D 
previous Division Bench's erroneous and prejudicial Order. 
We are in agreement with the decision of the High Court in the 
impugned Judgment and consequently dismiss the Appeal. 
C.A. Nos. 459-460 of 2011 
E 
12. We are of the opinion thatthe substance of the issues 
in question in this batch of petitions are analogous to those in 
Civil Writ Petition No. 1123 of 2006 which has been assailed 
in Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, save for the difference that it 
is the Haryana Urban Development Authority which has filed 
F 
the Appeal. In that light, the
findings made in the preceding 
Appeal apply squarely to this batch of Appeals as well, and 
are decided in the same terms. 
C.A. Nos. 461-462 of2011 
G 
13. The factual scenario in these Appeals is different 
from Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, in that compensation has 
been paid to the Contesting Respondents, whose land is now 
in the possession of Haryana Urban Development Authority. 
Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and 
H Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1079 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.) 
Resettlement Act, 2013 makes it clear that the three A 
requirements for an acquisition to attain finality are the passing 
of an award, payment of compensation and taking of 
possession, all of which are met here. Furthermore, the 
Contesting Respondents in these Appeals had not been 
parties before the Division Bench in its Judgment dated B 
12.3.2008. As that Judgment di<;I not explicitly state that it would 
apply to all the landowners affected by the impugned 
acquisition process, it was limited in scope to the parties 
before it, for reasons that we have already discussed herein. 
It would also be pertinent to note that the Contesting C 
Respondents in these Appeals only filed writ petitions 
challenging the acquisition after the Judgment dated 
12.3.2008 was passed. We find that till the date of the 
12.3.2008 Judgment, these Respondents had acquiesced to 0 
the acquisition and had allowed it to become final, and therefore 
they could not seek to challenge it by placing reliance .,;n a 
Judgment that did not enure to their benefit. 
14. A number of Proforma Respondent& were 
impleaded in Civil Appeal No. 462 vide order dated 12.4.2013, E 
and we are not aware of whether the acquisitions with regard 
to their land has become final. However, these Proforma 
Respondents first challenged the acquisition by filing a writ 
petition in 2010, well after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008. It 
is thus clear
that these Respondents, too, initially consented 
F 
to the acquisition process and only challenged it belatedly by 
seeking to rely upon a favourable Judgment that did not relate 
or pertain to them. The impugned Orders dated 12.5.2008 in 
C.W.P. No 7066 of 2008 and 13.5.2008 in C.W.P. No. 7353 of G 
2008 as well as Order dated 19.1.2010 in C.W.P. No. 163 of 
2010 are therefore set aside, and these Appeals are 
accordingly allowed. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeals disposed of. 
H