STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS versus ANIL KUMAR SHARMA AND ANOTHER ,
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 166, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 166 
A 
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS 
B , 
v. 
ANIL KUMAR SHARMAAND ANOTHER 
(Criminal Appeal No. 789 of 2015) 
MAY 14, 2015 
[DIPAK MISRA, R. K. AGRAWAL AND 
PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.] 
c 
High Court-Power of- To issue directions on judicial 
side, relating to the procedure to be adopted in criminal trials 
- Scope of - Writ petition for quashing of FIR - During 
pendency thereof, High Court issued directions to trial courts 
not to accept the reports u/s. 173 Cr. P. C., unless accused 
D are produced, and to the police authorities to get installed 
photocopying machines at the police stations for preparing 
the copies required to be supplied u/s. 207 Cr.P. C. - It also 
provided feed back on the suggested amendments in Cr.PC., 
including one to get dispensed with the procedure as provided 
E uls. 209 Cr.PC. - Even after the petition got infructuous by 
virtue of closure of FIR, the High Court continued to monitor 
the process of expediting the original trials in the State - On 
appeal, Held: High Court erred in law treating the writ petition 
for quashing FIR as a PIL and passing sweeping directions 
F which are not in conformity with the provisions of Cr.PC. 
without there being sufficient data and material - No court 
can issue a mandate to legislature to enact a particular law-
Moreover, direction for getting Cr.PC. amendment was issued 
when Central Government was not even a party- However, 
G on the-basis of concession on behalf of the State, it is
directed 
to expedite the trials by making arrangements for preparing 
the copies of papers before filing of charge-sheet and make 
efforts to apprehend the accused - Judicial restraint- Code 
H of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 173, 207 and 209. 
166
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. ANIL KUMAR SHARMA 167 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
I It· 4 
A 
HELD: 1. No person, however high, is above the 
law. No institution is exempt from accountat?ility, 
including the judiciary. Accountability of the judiciary in · 
respect of its judicial functions and orders is vouchsafed B 
by provisions for appeal, reversion and review of orders. 
[Para 25] [180-G-H] 
2. The concern of the High Court regarding delay 
in criminal trials, expressed by it can be appreciated but c 
the manner in which sweeping directions were issued 
in the present case by the High Court, cannot be 
appreciated, particularly the directions, which are not in 
' 
conformity with the provisions of Cr.P.C. No court can 
issue a mandate to a legislature to enact a particular law. o 
[Paras 13 and 15] [173-B-C; 174-A] 
State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Mahindra and 
Mahindra Limited (2011) 13 SCC 77: 2011 (5) 
SCR 509; Pravasi Bha/ai Sangathan v. Union of India 
E 
and Ors. (2014) 11SCC477:2014(4) SCR 446-relied 
on. 
3. The High Court has clearly erred in law in 
treating the writ petition which was filed for quashing of F 
FIR, and had become infructuous, as Public lnterest 
Litigation, and issued sweeping directions, without there 
being sufficient data and material before if to pass 
directions. [Para 26) [181-A-B] 
· 4. There is no requirement u/s. 173 Cr.P.C. for the G 
Investigating Officer to produce the accused along with 
the charge-sheet. The High Court has not
cared to see 
that where there are several accused and only some of 
them could be arr.ested and remanded to judicial H
168 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A custody, and others are on bail, how all of them can be 
produced together by the police. The High Court should 
have realized that trial of under-trial prisoners cannot be 
allowed to be delayed, for want of presence of accused 
absconding in the case. [Para 26) [181-B-D) 
B 
5. There is no mandate in Section 207 Cr.P.C. 
which requires the police to prepare copies of all the 
papers before the chargesheet is filed. For example, the 
confessional statements recorded under Section 164 
C Cr.P.C. by the Magistrates cannot be supposed to be 
lying with the Investigating Officer. So far as requirement 
, of photocopying machine at the police station is 
concerned, similar machines could have been directed 
to be provided in the courts. [Para 27] [181-G-H; 182-A] 
D 
6. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in 
asking the State Authorities to file compliance report, in 
the matter of dispensing with requirement of committal 
of cases by the Magistrate to the Court of Sessions, as 
E provided in Section 209 Cr.P.C. The Central Government 
was not even party in the writ petition in which direction 
was issued to get amended the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. [Para 28) [182-B-C] 
F 
7. However, the Advocate General for the State 
conceded that all arrangements have been made for 
preparation of copies of the papers before the 
chargesheet is filed so that they can be served on the 
accused persons. It is also accepted by him that
all 
G efforts have to be made to apprehend the accused 
persons so that the trial can be expedited. Such 
concession is in consonance with the law and that the 
State shall comply with the same so that the delay does 
not occur on these grounds. The State is directed to 
H religiously follow these directions made on the basis of
STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH v. ANIL KUMAR SHARMA 169 
the concession [Paras 26 and 29] [181-D-F; 182-E] 
A 
Manoj Sharma v. State and Ors. (2008) 16 SCC 1: 
2008 (14) SCR 539; Census Commissioner and Ors. 
v. R. Krishnamurthy (2015) 2 SCC 796 Braj Kishore 
Thakur v. Union of India (1997) 4 SCC 65:1997 (2) 
B 
SCR 420; S. C. Chandra and Ors. v. State of Jharkhand 
and Ors. (2007) 8 SCC 279; State of U.P and Ors. v. 
Jeet S. Bisht and Anr. (2007~ 6 SCC 586: 2007 (7) 
SCR 705; A.M. Mathurv. Pramod Kumar Gupta (1990) 
2 SCC 533: 1990 (2) SCR 110- relied on. 
C 
Laker Airways vs. Department of Trade 1977 (2) WLR 
234 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
D 
2011 (5) SCR 509 
relied on 
Para 14 
2014 (4) SCR 446 
relied on 
Para 16 
2008 (14) SCR 539 
relied on 
Para 18 
1977 (2) WLR 234 
referred to 
Para 19 
E 
(2015) 2 sec 796 
relied on 
Para 20 
1997 (2) SCR 420 
relied on 
Para 21 
(2001) 8 sec 219 
relied on 
Para 22 
F 
2007 (7) SCR 705 
relied on 
Para 23 
1990 (2) SCR 110 
relied on 
''Para 24 
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 
No. 789 of 2015. 
G 
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.05.2013 of the 
Hi9h Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Writ 
Petition No. 62 of2013. 
Vijay Bahadur Singh, Adv. Gen., Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A Syed Ali Mortaza, Vibhu Tiwari, Ashutosh Kr. Sharma, Uday 
Pratap Singh, Ashok Kumar Lal for the Appellants. 
B 
Ashok K. Srivasatava, Rakesh K. Sharma, Surya Kant 
for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
PRAFULLAC. PANT, J.1. Leave granted. 
2. A substantial question of law has been raised in this 
C appeal, as to what extent a High Court can exercise its powers 
in issuing directions on judicial side, relating to the procedure 
to be adopted in criminal trials. 
3. This appeal is directed against the order dated 
o 24.5.2013 passed by High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in 
Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 62 of 2013 which has been 
kept alive even after it has become infructuous. 
4. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No. 1, Anil 
E Kumar Sharma (writ petitioner), was a clerk with ESI Hospital 
at Agra. He was transferred and posted on 23.5.2012 to KRB 
Hospital, Agra. A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged 
against him in respect of offence punishable under Section 
409 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Hari Parvat, 
F District Agra, which was registered as Crime Case No. 1044 
of 2012. Said respondent filed writ petition (Crl.) No. 62 of 
2013 before the High Court on 3.1.2013 with the following 
G 
,,, 
prayer:-
"issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, 
quashing the first information report dated 21.12.2012 
in Case Crime No. 1044 of 2012, under
Section 409 
IPC, P.S. Hari Parvat, DistrictAgra." 
5. It was pleaded by the writ petitioner that he was 
H assigned the job at the Enquiry and Registration counter, and
STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH v. ANIL KUMAR SHARMA 171 
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.] 
had nothing to do with the purchase of medicin~ or working A 
as a storekeeper, as such First Information Report in question, 
lodged against him was liable to be quashed. 
6. On 7.1.2013, the High Court granted interim stay of 
arrest of the writ petitioner, and strangely made certain B 
observations relating as to why the trials get prolonged due to 
various factors, including the non-arrest of accused by police 
while submitting the reports under Section 173 (2) of Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.). 
7. On the next date, i.e. 17.1.2013, the High Court 
directed the appellant authorities to file compliance reports 
with affidavits, to the above order, as also with regard to the 
supply of copies to the accused under Section 207 Cr.P.C. 
8. Thereafter, on 5.2.2013, though the FIR in question was 
c 
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still under investigation, but the High Court, on its own motion, 
referred to procedural issues relating to criminal trials which 
were never adverted to in the writ petition, and directed the 
police authorities to get installed photocopying machines at E 
the police stations for preparing the copies required to be 
supplied under Section 207 Cr.P.C. On this, on 8.3.2013, the 
Home Department of the State Government filed affidavit of 
compliance in response to order dated 5.2.2013 placing the 
minutes of the meeting held on 5.3.2013. 
F 
9. Next, on 24.5.2013, the High Court passed the
impugned order wherein even after noting that final closure 
report has been filed in respect of the Fl R in question (though 
the writ petition had become infructuous), it started monitoring G 
the process of expediting the criminal trials in the _State. 
10. It is pleaded by the appellants before us that due to 
the general directions issued by the High Court 'to the trial 
courts not to accept the reports under Section 173 Cr.P.C. 
H 
unless the accused are produced, thousands of cases got held
172 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A up in which reports could not be filed in the courts. It is further 
pleaded that the High Court insisted to provide feed back on 
the suggested amendments in the Criminal Procedure Code, 
including the one relating to enabling the police to file charge 
sheets in connection with Sessions case directly before the 
B Sessions Courts, and to get dispensed with the procedure of 
committal by the Magistrate (required under Section 209 
Cr. P. C., even though the Central Government was not a party 
to the writ petition). The High Court, vide its order dated 
C 24.5.2013, further directed the Principal Secretaries of 
Departments of Home, Finance and that of Law of the State 
Government, and the Director (Prosecution) of the State to file 
their personal affidavits regarding compliance of the directions 
issued by it. It is urged on behalf of the State Government that 
D on 19.7.2013 when the appellants soughtfurthertime, as the 
issues required wider consultation, with the Central 
Government, the High Court allowed time only up to 23.7.2012, 
i.e., three days, including the Sunday, to comply with the 
direction. 
E 
11. After Special Leave Petition is filed before this Court, 
the High Court has moved Criminal Misc. Petition No. 20573 
of 2013 before this Court as intervener, stating in paragraph 6 
that since respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (accused in Crime Case 
, 
F No. 1044 of 2012) might have lost their interest, as the final 
reports
have been submitted, certain facts relating to delay in 
trial and importance in dispensation of criminal justice are 
required to be placed on record. In paragraph 3 of the petition, 
the High Court has categorized four stages of delay in trials, 
G i.e., (i) delay in completion of investigation and filing of charge-
sheet, (ii) matters relating to stay of arrest even not only before 
filing of the charge-sheet but subsequent thereto; (iii) delay in 
preparation of copies of the prosecution papers to be provided 
to the accused and delay in procuring attendance of the 
H accused, and (iv) delay in procuring attendance of prosecution
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. ANIL KUMAR SHARMA. 173 
[PRAFULLAC. PANT, J.] 
witnesses and their cross-examination. 
12. We have heard learned Advocate General of State of 
Uttar Pradesh, and learned counsel for the intervener at lenglh. 
A 
13. We can appreciate the concern of the High Court 8 
regarding delay in criminal trials, expressed by it, but the 
manner in which sweeping directions issued in the present 
case by the High Court, cannot be appreciated, particularly 
the directions, which are not in conformity with the provisions 
ofCr.P.C. 
14. In State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Mahindra 
and Mahindra Limited1, this Court has made following 
observations, in paragraph 10, as to the power and scope of 
the High Court in issuance of directions to the legislature: -
"10. Within our Constitution, we have specifically demarcated 
c 
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the ambit of power and the boundaries of the three organs of 
the society by laying down the principles of separation of 
powers, which is being adhered to for carrying out democratic 
functioning of the country. So far as the legislation is concerned, 
E 
the exclusive domain is with the legislature. Subordinate 
legislations are framed by the executive by exercising the 
delegated power conferred by the statute, which is the rule-
making power. The judiciary has been vested with the power F 
to interpret the aforesaid legislations and to give effect to them 
since the parameters of the jurisdiction of both the organs are 
earmarked.
Therefore, it is always appropriate for each of the 
organs to function within its domain. It is inappropriate for the 
courts to issue a mandate to legislate an Act and also to make G 
a subordinate legislation in a particular manner. In this particular 
case, the High Court has directed the subordinate legislation 
to substitute wordings in a particular manner, thereby assuming 
to itself the role of a supervisory authority, which according to 
1 (2011)13 sec 77 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A us, is not a power vested in the High Court." 
15. This Court has time and again held that no court can 
issue a mandate to a legislature to enact a particular law. 
8 
16. In Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India and 
others2, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, in paragraph 20, 
has reminded the courts with regard to their limitations as 
follows: -
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F 
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" .... This Court has persistently held that our Constitution 
clearly provides for separation of powers and the court 
merely applies the law that it gets from the legislature. 
Consequently, the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition has 
insisted that the Judges should only reflect the law 
regardless of the anticipated consequences, 
considerations of fairness or public policy and the Judge 
is simply not authorised to legislate law. "If there is a law, 
Judges can certainly enforce it, but Judges cannot create 
a law and seek to enforce it." The court cannot rewrite, 
recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason 
that it has no power to legislate. The very power to 
legislate has not been conferred on the courts. However, 
of lately, judicial activism of the superior courts in India 
has raised public eyebrows time and again ..... " 
17. In Pravasi Bhala~ Sanghathan (supra), this Court 
has further observed in paragraphs 23 and 24 as under: -
"23. Further, the court should not grant a relief or pass 
order/direction which is not capable of
implementation. 
This Court in State of U.P v. U.P Rajya Khanij Vikas 
Nigam Sangharsh Samiti [(2008) 12 SCC 675] has held 
as under: (SCC pp. 690-91, para 48) 
"48. To us, one of the considerations in such matters is 
2 c2014} 11sec477
STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH v. ANIL KUMAR SHARMA 175 
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.] 
whether an order passed or direction issued is 
A 
susceptible of implementation and enforcement, and if 
it is not implemented whether appropriate proceedings 
including proceedings for wilful disobedience of the order 
of the Court can be initiated against the opposite party. 
The direction issued by the High Court falls short of this 
B 
test and on that ground also, the order is vulnerable." 
(emphasis supplied) 
24. Judicial review is subject to the principles of judicial 
c 
, restraint and must not become unmanageable in other 
aspects. (Vide King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 
[AIR 1945 PC 18], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 
Supp (1) SCC 335 and Akhilesh Yadav v. Vishwarath · 
Chaturvedi [(2013) 2 SCC 1].)" 
D 
18. In Manoj Sharma v .. State and others3, while 
discussing the scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court has 
held as under: -
"The doctrine of judicial restraint which has been 
emphasised repeatedly by this Court e.g. in Aravali Golf 
Club v. Chander Hass [(2008) 1 SCC 683] and Gov.t. of 
A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi [(2008) 4.SCC 720] restricts the 
power of the Court and does not permit the Court to 
ordinarily encroach into the legislative or executive 
domain. As observed by this Court in the above 
decisions, there is a broad separation of powers in the 
Constitution and it would not be proper for one organ of 
the State to encroach into the domain of another organ." 
19. Quoting
the observations in respect of policy making 
by Lord Justice Lawton in LakerAirways4, Chief Justice AS. 
Anand, as he then was, reiterated the principle that the 'role of 
3 (2ooai 1 a sec 1 
4 1977 (2) WLR 234 at 267 
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[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A the judge is that of a referee. I can blow my judicial whistle 
when the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts, I 
must neither take part in it nor tell the players how to play'. 
Justice Anand added: -
B 
"The judicial whistle needs to be blown for a purpose 
and with caution. It needs to be remembered that court 
cannot run the government. It has the duty of implementing 
the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights 
but they cannot push back the limits of the Constitution to 
c 
accommodate the challenged violation." 
D 
E 
F 
20. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Census 
Commissioner and others v. R. Krishnamurthy5, has 
observed as under: -
"25 ....... It is not within the domain of the court to legislate. 
The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation 
certain creative process is involved. The courts have the 
jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional. That 
too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the 
gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of 
constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are 
not to plunge into policy-making by adding something to 
the policy by way of issui'ng a writ of mandamus. There 
the judicial restraint is called for remembering what we 
have stated in the beginning ....... " 
21. In Braj Kishore Thakurv. Union oflndia6, this Court 
has made following observations: -
G 
"2. Judicial restraint is a virtue. A virtue
which shall be 
concomitant of every judicial disposition. It is an attribute 
of a Judge which he is obliged to keep refurbished from 
time to time, particularly while dealing .with matters before 
H 
5 (2015) 2 sec 796 
6 (1997) 4 sec 65
STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH v. ANIL KUMAR SHARMA 177 
[PRAFULLAC. PANT, J.] 
him whether in exercise of appellate or revisional or other 
A 
supervisory jurisdiction ...... " 
22. In S.C. Chandraandothersv. State of Jharkhand 
and others7, this Court observed: -
"34. There is broad separation of powers under the 
Constitution, and the judiciary should not ordinarily 
encroach into the executive or legislative domain. The 
theory of separation of powers, first propounded by the 
French philosopher Montesquieu in his book The Spirit 
of Laws still broadly holds the field in India today. Thus, in 
Asif Hameed v. State of J&K [1989 Supp (2) SCC 364] 
a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed (vide paras 
17 to 19): (SCC pp. 373-74) 
"17. Before adverting to the controversy directly involved 
in these appeals we may have a fresh look at the inter se 
functioning of the three organs of democracy under our 
Constitution. Although the doctrine of separation of 
powers has not been recognised under the Constitution 
in its absolute rigidity but the Constitution makers have 
meticulously defined the functions of various organs of 
the State. Legislature, executfVe and judiciary have to 
function within their own sphe(es demarcated under the 
Constitution. No organ can us1.1rp the functions assigned 
to another. The Constitution trusts to the judgment of these 
organs to function and exercise their discretion by strictly 
following the procedure prescribed therein. The 
functioning of
democracy depends upon the strength and 
independence of each of its organs. Legislature and 
executive, the two facets of people's will, they have all 
the powers including that of finance. Judiciary has no 
power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power 
to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State 
7 (2001) a sec 219 
B 
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178 
A 
B 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
function within the constitutional limits. It is the sentinel of 
democracy. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to 
restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the 
legislature and executive. The expanding horizon of 
judicial review has taken in its fold the concept of social 
and economic justice. While exercise of powers by the 
legislature and executive is subject to judicial restraint, 
the only check on our own exercise of power is the self-
imposed discipline of judicial restraint. 
18. Frankfurter, J. of the U.S. Supreme Court dissenting 
in the controversial expatriatior case of Trop v. Dulles [2 
L Ed 2d 630: 356 US 86 (1958)] observed as L·rider: 
(US pp. 119-20) 
'All power is, in Madison's phrase, "of an encroaching 
nature" . ... Judicial power is not immune against this 
human weakness. It also must be on guard against 
encroaching beyond its proper bounds, and not the less 
so since the only restraint upon it is self-restraint. ... 
Rigorous observance of the difference between limits of 
power and wise exercise of power-between questions 
of authority and questions of prudence-requires the 
most alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle 
F 
relationship of two concepts that too easily coalesce. No 
less does it ·require a disciplined will to adhere to the 
difference. It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of 
wisdom to prevail, to disregard one's own strongly held 
view of what is
wise in the conduct of affairs. But it is not 
G 
the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must 
observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own 
power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect to its 
own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint 
is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, 
H 
for the Constitution has not authorised the judges to sit in
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. ANIL KUMAR SHARMA 179 
[PRAFULLAC. PANT, J.] 
judgment on the wisdom of what Congress and the 
A 
Executive Branch do.' 
19. When a State action is challenged, the function of the 
court is to examine the action in accordance with law 
. and to determine whether the legislature or the executive 
B 
has acted within the powers and functions assigned under 
the Constitution and if not, the court must strike down the 
action. While doing so the court must remain within its 
self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on. the 
action of a coordinate branch of the Government. While 
C 
exercising power of judicial review of administrative 
action, the court is not an appellate authority. The 
Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise 
the executive in matters of policy or to sermonise qua 
any matter which under the Constitution lies within the 
D 
sphere of legislature or executive, provided these 
authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or 
statutory powers." 
(emphasis supplied)" 
E 
23. In State of U.P. and others v. Jeet S. Bisht and 
another8, this Court observed as under: -
r 
"49. Judicial restraint is consistent with and 
complementary to the balance of power among the three 
independent branches of the State. It accomplishes this 
in two ways. First, judicial restraint not only recognises 
the equality of the other two branches with the judiciary, it 
also fosters that equality by ·minimising inter-branch
interference by the judiciary. In this analysis, judicial 
restraint may also be called judicial respect, that is, 
respect by the judiciary for the other coequal branches. 
In contrast, judicial activism's unpredictable results make 
a c2001i s sec 586 
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[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
the judiciary a moving target and thus decreases the ability 
to maintain equality with the co-branches. Restraint 
stabilises the judiciary so that it may better function in a 
system of inter-branch equality." 
B 
24. In A.M. Mathurv. Pramod Kumar Gupta9 this Court 
observed that judicial restraint and discipline are necessary 
to the orderly administration of justice. The duty of restraint 
and the humility of function has to be the constant theme for a 
Judge, for the said quality in decision-making is as much 
C necessary for the Judges to command respect as to protect 
the independence of the judiciary. Para 13 of A.M. Mathurv. 
Pramod Kumar Gupta and others (supra) reads as under: -
"13. Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to 
D 
the orderly administration of justice as they are to the 
effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility 
of function should be constant theme of our judges. This 
quality in decision making is as much necessary for 
judges to command respect as to protect the 
E 
independence of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this 
regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, 
respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come 
before the court as well to other co-ordinate branches of 
the State, the executive and the legislature. There must 
F 
be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when 
litigants and public believe that the judge has failed in
these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor 
for the judicial process." 
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25. No person, however high, is above the law. No 
H 
institution is exempt from accountability, including the judiciary. 
Accountability of the judiciary in respect of its judicial functions 
and orders is vouchsafed by provisions for appeal, revision 
and review of orders. 
9 (1990) 2 sec 533
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. ANIL KUMAR SHARMA 181 
[PRAFULLAC. PANT, J.] 
26. In view of law laid down by this Court, as discussed A 
above, we are of the view that the High Court has clearly erred 
in law in treating the writ petition which was filed for quashing 
of FIR, and had become infructuous, as Public Interest 
Litigation, and issued sweeping directions, without there being 
sufficient data and material before it to pass directions. There B 
is no requirement under Section 173 Cr.P.C. for the 
Investigating Officer to produce the accused along with the 
charge-sheet. The High Court has not cared to see that where 
there are several accused and only some of them could be 
arrested and remanded to judicial custody, and others are on C 
bail, how all of them can be produced together by the police. 
The High Court should have realized that trial of under-trial 
prisoners cannot be allowed to be delayed, for want of 
presence of accused absconding in the case. Learned 0 
Advocate General has argued before us that several thousand 
charge-sheets got stuck up because of sweeping directions 
of the High Court from being filed in the courts. However, the 
learned Advocate General for the State submitted that all 
arrangements have been made for preparation of copies of E 
the papers before the charge sheet is filed so that they can be 
served on the accused persons. It is also accepted by him 
that all efforts have to be made to apprehend the accused 
persons so that the trial
can be expedited. As there is a 
concession by the learned Advocate General before us which 
F 
is in consonance with the law and that the State shall comply 
with the same so that the delay does not occur on these 
grounds. 
27. We also feel it pertinent to mention here that there is G 
no mandate in Section 207 Cr.P.C. which requires the police 
to prepare copies of all the papers before the chargesheet is 
filed. For example, the confessional statements recorded 
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrates cannot be 
supposed to be lying with the Investigating Officer. As far as H
182 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A requirement of photocopying machine at the police station is 
concerned, similar machines could have been directed to be 
provided in the courts. 
28: In our opinion, the High Court has exceeded its 
B jurisdiction in asking the State Authorities to file compliance 
report, in the matter of dispensing with requirement of 
committal of cases by the Magistrate to the Court of Sessions, 
as provided in Section 209 Cr.P.C. It is relevant to mention 
here that the Central Government was not even party in the 
C writ petition in which direction was issued to get amended the 
Code of Criminal Procedure. 
29. For the reasons, as discussed above, we are of the 
considered opinion that the impugned order dated 24.5.2013 
o passed in W.P.(Crl) No. 62 of 2013 by which sweeping 
directions are given by the High Court, is liable to be set aside. 
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is . 
set aside. However, the direction contained in paragraph 26 
above, to the State on the basis of the concession given by 
E the learned Advocate General shall be religiously followed. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal allowed.