STATE OF UTTARAKHAND versus SUDHIR BUDAKOTI
[2022] 16 S.C.R. 913, Supreme Court of India, 2022
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
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STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
v.
SUDHIR BUDAKOTI
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2661 of 2015)
APRIL 07, 2022
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M.M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
Constitution of India: Art.14: Classification test – The
Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development
published communications on revision of pay scale of the Lecturers
on one side and the Administrative Staff starting from the Registrar
on the other – The State of Uttarakhand applied the directions issued
by the Central Government  on revised salary to its teaching faculty
alone, and not to the registrar – Allegation of discrimination – High
Court held that the pay scale was meant to be applied to registrar
and the faculty both – On appeal, held: Appellant is not bound by
any direction issued by the Central Government which would at
worst be mandatory to the Central Universities and the Central
Government Colleges receiving funds – Thus, any such decision
would obviously be directory to State Government Colleges and
Universities, being in the nature of a mere recommendation – High
Court misconstrued the facts – Appellant nowhere made a decision
to accept and adopt the circular of the Central Government
pertaining to the Registrars working in the Universities coming under
its purview – In absence of any legal right with the corresponding
duty, such a relief can never be asked for, particularly when there
are clear and specific rules provided for the pay scale of Registrars
by the appellant – When the
classification is distinct and clear having
adequate rationale with due relation to the objective, there is no
reason to hold otherwise by treating a Registrar at par with the
Lecturers – One is meant for administration and the other teaching
– Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 – Universities.
Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973: s.17(1) –
Appointment – Whether State Universities bound by directions issued
by Central Government – Held: Appellant not bound by any direction
issued by the Central Government which would at worst be
mandatory to the Central Universities, and Colleges receiving funds
   [2022] 16 S.C.R. 913
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by the Central Government. Such directions would be directory to
State Government Colleges and Universities, being in the nature of
a mere recommendation.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 A mere differential treatment on its own cannot
be termed as an “anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution”.
When there is a reasonable basis for a classification adopted by
taking note of the exigencies and diverse situations, the Court is
not expected to insist on absolute equality by taking a rigid and
pedantic view as against a pragmatic one. [Para 14][920-A-B]
1.2 When the differentiation is clearly distinguishable with
adequate demarcation duly identified, the object of Article 14 gets
satisfied. Social, revenue and economic considerations are
certainly permissible parameters in classifying a particular group.
Thus, a valid classification is nothing but a valid discrimination.
That being the position, there can never be an injury to the concept
of equality enshrined under the Constitution, not being an
inflexible doctrine. [Para 15][920-B-D]
1.3 The question as to whether a classification is reasonable
or not is to be answered on the touchstone of a reasonable,
common man’s approach, keeping in mind the avowed object
behind it. If the right to equality is to be termed as a genus, a
right to non-discrimination becomes a specie. When two identified
groups are not equal, certainly they cannot be treated as a
homogeneous
group. A reasonable classification thus certainly
would not injure the equality enshrined under Article 14 when
there exists an intelligible differentia between two groups having
a rational relation to the object. Therefore, an interference would
only be called for on the court being convinced that the
classification causes inequality among similarly placed persons.
The role of the court being restrictive, generally, the task is best
left to the concerned authorities. When a classification is made
on the recommendation made by a body of experts constituted
for the purpose, courts will have to be more wary of entering into
the said arena as its interference would amount to substituting
its views, a process which is best avoided. [Para 17][920-E-H;
921-A]
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1.4  As long as the classification does not smack of inherent
arbitrariness and conforms to justice and fair play, there may not
be any reason to interfere with it. It is the wisdom of the other
wings which is required to be respected except when a
classification is bordering on arbitrariness, artificial difference
and itself being discriminatory. A decision made sans the aforesaid
situation cannot be tested with either a suspicious or a microscopic
eye. Good-faith and intention are to be presumed unless the
contrary exists. [Para 18][921-A-C]
2.1  The appellant is not bound by any direction issued by
the Central Government which would at worst be mandatory to
the Central Universities and the Central Government Colleges
receiving funds. Thus, any such decision would obviously be
directory to State Government Colleges and Universities, being
in the nature of a mere recommendation. [Para 20][930-D-E]
2.2 The High Court of Uttarakhand has misconstrued the
facts. The Appellant nowhere has made a decision to accept and
adopt the circular of the Central Government pertaining to the
Registrars working in the Universities coming under its purview.
In the absence of any legal right with the corresponding duty,
such a relief can never be asked for, particularly when there are
clear and specific rules provided for the pay scale of Registrars
by the Appellant. When the classification is distinct and clear
having adequate rationale with due relation to the objective,
there
is no reason to hold otherwise by treating a Registrar at par with
the Lecturers. One is meant for administration and the other
teaching. [Para 21][930-H; 931-A-D]
Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust
(2011) 2 SCC 575: [2010] 14 SCR 873; Shamasundar
v. University of Mysore 1996 SCC OnLine Kar 430;
Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India (1994) 2 SCC
521: [1994] 1 SCR 700; Union of India v. International
Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437; Hotel & Bar (FL.3)
Association of Tamil Nadu (HOBAT) v. The Secretary to
Government, Commercial Taxes Department 2015 SCC
OnLine Mad 7092; Narmada Bachao Andolan v.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND  v. SUDHIR BUDAKOTI
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Union of India (2000) 10 SCC 664: [2000] 4 Suppl.
SCR  94; State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan,
(2011) 7 SCC 639: [2011] 6 SCR 443; Indian Drugs
& Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen, (2007) 1 SCC 408:
[2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 73; Union of India v. International
Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437: [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR
55; Kalyani Mathivanan v. K.V. Jeyaraj, (2015) 6 SCC
363: [2015] 3 SCR 467 – relied on.
Case Law Reference
[2010] 14 SCR 873
relied on
Para 19
[1994] 1 SCR 700
relied on
Para 19
(2003) 5 SCC 437
relied on
Para 19
[2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 94
relied on
Para 19
[2011] 6 SCR 443
relied on
Para 19
[2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 73
relied on
Para 19
[2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 55
relied on
Para 19
[2015] 3 SCR 46
relied on
Para 20
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2661
of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2012 of the High Court
of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition (S/B) No.51 of 2011.
Jatinder Kumar Sethi, Dy. AG, Ashutosh Kumar Sharma, Sunny
Sachin Rawat, Sudarshan Singh Rawat, Ayush Negi, Ms. Vishakha
Upadhyaya, Ms. Himanshi Tyagi, Aakarshan Aditya, Advs. for the
appearing parties.
Respondent-in-person
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. M. SUNDRESH, J.
1. Aggrieved over the judgment rendered by the High Court of
Uttarakhand in allowing the Writ Petition (S/B) No.51/2011 filed by the
Respondents before us, the present appeal by special leave has been
filed.
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NECESSARY FACTS
2. The statute by the name, “State Universities Act, 1973” enacted
by the State of Uttar Pradesh was adopted by the State of Uttarakhand
through a modification order of the year 2001.
3. Section 16 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) deals with the post of Registrar,
who shall be a whole-time officer of the University. He shall not be
offered nor be entitled to accept any remuneration for any other work in
the University, save as provided under the governing rules. His
appointment has to be in terms of Section 17 of the Act and the rule
making power provided thereunder.
4. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 17(1) of the
Act, the State of Uttarakhand brought into the statute book, “The
Uttarakhand State University (Centralized Services) Rules, 2006”
(hereinafter referred to as, “2006 Rules”), prescribing essential
qualifications, procedure for recruitment and pay scale etc. for the post
of Registrars in the State Universities. The 2006 Rules also provide the
qualification for a Lecturer, which is obviously different to that of a
Registrar.  To be noted, the pay scale at the relevant point of time was
3200-100-3500-125-4875, with effect from 01.01.1986.
5. The State of Uttarakhand, on 16.06.2008, sent a requisition to
the State Public Service Commission for the appointment of Registrars
in the State Universities, clearly indicating the essential qualifications
along with the
pay scale, as aforesaid. On 31.12.2008, the Government
of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of
Higher Education, New Delhi published two separate communications
addressed to the Secretary, University Grant Commission (hereinafter
referred to as “the UGC”) on the revision of the pay scale of the Lecturers
on one side and the Administrative Staff starting from the Registrar on
the other. Both these circulars issued separately were obviously meant
to be implemented by the Central Government Universities and the
Central Government Colleges duly funded by it. In other words, they
became mere recommendations qua the State Government Universities.
We may hasten to add the qualification prescribed for the post of Registrar
by the UGC being higher, stands different to that of the Uttarakhand
State Universities as mandated under the 2006 Rules.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND  v. SUDHIR BUDAKOTI
[M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]
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6. The State of Uttarakhand thought it fit to accept the
recommended revised pay scale of the Government of India dated
31.12.2008, meant to be applied for the Central Universities and Central
Government Colleges, to its teaching faculties alone, except sub-clause
(f) in clause 8, which speaks of age of superannuation, an issue with
which we are not concerned in the present lis.
7. Respondent No. 1 was selected and given the appointment to
the post of Registrar on 23.11.2009 with the appropriate pay scale in
terms of the 2006 Rules, which was also notified in the advertisement
itself.
8. After taking charge as an Assistant Registrar in Kumaon
University, Respondent No. 1 filed Writ Petition (S/B) No.51/2011 before
the High Court of Uttarakhand seeking the pay scale meant to be applied
for his counterparts in the Central Universities. While entertaining the
writ petition, the High Court in and by its order dated 11.03.2011 directed
the Principal Secretary, Higher Education of the State of Uttarakhand to
take a call on the letter dated 01.01.2010 sent by the Kumaon University,
which order is appositely placed hereunder:
“ ............. List after service is affected. It appears that
Kumaon University has written a letter dated 08.01.2010
to the Principal Secretary, Higher Education
Department seeking fixation of the pay scale of the
petitioner. We are requesting the Principal Secretary,
Higher Education Department to
take a decision thereon
and informed us in regard to that decision.
Sd/-
Chief justice, Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
11.03.2011"
9. The pay scale of Respondent No. 1 was also revised by the
State of Uttarakhand on the recommendation of the Sixth Pay
Commission through a Government Order in G.O. No. 124/XXVIV(6)/
2011 dated 05.04.2011. On receipt of the Government Order, Respondent
No. 1 got his prayer duly amended seeking to question it as unconstitutional.
10.  By the order dated 27.02.2012, the High Court of Uttarakhand
issued a direction to the Pay Anomaly Committee to look into the matter
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afresh, which was accordingly complied with, by not accepting the case
of Respondent No. 1, finding no justification particularly when there is a
distinct difference in the qualification as prescribed by the UGC and the
State Government for the aforesaid post. A supplementary counter-
affidavit was also filed bringing this to the notice of the Court.
11. The High Court allowed the writ petition on a factual error by
misconstruing the decision made in favour of the teaching faculty to that
of the Registrar and other administrative staff. The Appellant seeks to
set aside the said decision before us.
RESPECTIVE SUBMISSIONS:
Submissions of the Appellant:
12. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the High
Court has completely misunderstood the admitted facts. There are two
circulars dealing with the Lecturers and the Registrars. A decision was
made to revise the pay scales of the UGC for the Lecturers and not for
the Registrars. One has to see the economic implication. Respondent
No. 1 has got neither any accrued nor vested right to seek pay parity.
Such a parity cannot be sought by comparing the Lecturers and the
other Registrars working in the Central Universities. There is no
mandatory compliance of the Central Government’s revised pay scale
implementation for the State Universities. The matter involved partakes
the character of a policy decision made upon considering the available
material, including the economic fallout and therefore, no
judicial review
is available. Mainly because Respondent No. 1 was made to undertake
the work assigned to a Lecturer and vice versa, the aforesaid arrangement
being temporary will not create a right. The classification being just and
fair and Respondent No. 1 being aware of the pay scale fixed in tune
with the rules governing, the order passed by the High Court having
huge financial ramifications, has to be set aside.
Submissions of the respondents:
13. Respondent No. 1, who appears as a party-in-person, made a
primary contention before us that he did function as a Lecturer albeit for
a limited period, the pay scale fixed was very low.  Having revised the
pay scale for the Lecturers, nothing prevented the Appellant from
undertaking the said exercise for the Registrars as well. Thus, the benefit
conferred need not be disturbed.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND  v. SUDHIR BUDAKOTI
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Classification Test & Policy Decisions of the State:
14.  A mere differential treatment on its own cannot be termed as
an “anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution”. When there is a
reasonable basis for a classification adopted by taking note of the
exigencies and diverse situations, the Court is not expected to insist on
absolute equality by taking a rigid and pedantic view as against a pragmatic
one.
15.  Such a discrimination would not be termed as arbitrary as the
object of the classification itself is meant for providing benefits to an
identified group of persons who form a class of their own. When the
differentiation is clearly distinguishable with adequate demarcation duly
identified, the object of Article 14 gets satisfied. Social, revenue and
economic considerations are certainly permissible parameters in
classifying a particular group. Thus, a valid classification is nothing but a
valid discrimination. That being the position, there can never be an injury
to the concept of equality enshrined under the Constitution, not being an
inflexible doctrine.
16.  A larger latitude in dealing with a challenge to the classification
is mandated on the part of the Court when introduced either by the
Legislature or the Executive as the case may be. There is no way, courts
could act like appellate authorities especially when a classification is
introduced by way of a policy decision clearly identifying the group of
beneficiaries by analysing the relevant materials.
17. The question as to whether a classification is reasonable or
not is to be answered on the touchstone of a reasonable, common man’s
approach, keeping in mind the avowed object behind it. If the right to
equality is to be termed as a genus, a right to non-discrimination becomes
a specie. When two identified groups are not equal, certainly they cannot
be treated as a homogeneous group. A reasonable classification thus
certainly would not injure the equality enshrined under Article 14 when
there exists an intelligible differentia between two groups having a rational
relation to the object. Therefore, an interference would only be called
for on the court being convinced that the classification causes inequality
among similarly placed persons. The role of the court being restrictive,
generally, the task is best left to the concerned authorities. When a
classification is made on the recommendation made by a body of experts
constituted for the purpose, courts will have to be more wary of entering
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into the said arena as its interference would amount to substituting its
views, a process which is best avoided.
18. As long as the classification does not smack of inherent
arbitrariness and conforms to justice and fair play, there may not be any
reason to interfere with it. It is the wisdom of the other wings which is
required to be respected except when a classification is bordering on
arbitrariness, artificial difference and itself being discriminatory. A decision
made sans the aforesaid situation cannot be tested with either a suspicious
or a microscopic eye. Good-faith and intention are to be presumed unless
the contrary exists. One has to keep in mind that the role of the court is
on the illegality involved as against the governance.
19. For the aforesaid principle of law, we would like to quote the
elucidations of this Court in the following judgments:
Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust,
(2011) 2 SCC 575:
“36. Differential treatment in our opinion does not per se amount
to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It violates Article 14
only when there is no conceivable reasonable basis for the
differentiation. In the present case, as pointed out above, there is
a reasonable basis and hence in our opinion there is no violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
37. In our opinion it is not prudent or pragmatic for the Court to
insist on absolute equality when there are diverse situations and
contingencies, as in the present
case. In view of the inherent
complexities involved in modern society, some free play must be
given to the executive authorities in this connection.
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39. In our opinion, there is often a misunderstanding about Article
14 of the Constitution, and often lawyers and Judges tend to
construe it in a doctrinaire and absolute sense, which may be
totally impractical and make the working of the executive
authorities extremely difficult if not impossible.
40. As Lord Denning observed:
“This power to overturn executive decision must be exercised
very carefully, because you have got to remember that the
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND  v. SUDHIR BUDAKOTI
[M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]
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executive and the local authorities have their very own
responsibilities and they have the right to make decisions. The
courts should be very wary about interfering and only interfere
in extreme cases, that is, cases where the court is sure they
have gone wrong in law or they have been utterly unreasonable.
Otherwise you would get a conflict between the courts and
the Government and the authorities, which would be most
undesirable. The courts must act very warily in this matter.”
(See Judging the World by Garry Sturgess Philip Chubb.)”
41. In our opinion Judges must maintain judicial self-restraint while
exercising the powers of judicial review of administrative or
legislative decisions. “In view of the complexities of modern
society”, wrote Justice Frankfurter, while Professor of Law at
Harvard University, “and the restricted scope of any man’s
experience, tolerance and humility in passing judgment on the
worth of the experience and beliefs of others become crucial
faculties in the disposition of cases. The successful exercise of
such judicial power calls for rare intellectual disinterestedness and
penetration, lest limitation in personal experience and imagination
operate as limitations of the Constitution. These insights Mr Justice
Holmes applied in hundreds of cases and expressed in memorable
language: It is misfortune if a Judge reads his conscious or
unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely
into
the law, and forgets that what seem to him to be first principles
are believed by half his fellow men to be wrong.
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43. In our opinion adjudication must be done within the system of
historically validated restraints and conscious minimisation of the
Judges’ preferences. The Court must not embarrass the
administrative authorities and must realise that administrative
authorities have expertise in the field of administration while the
Court does not. In the words of Chief Justice Neely, former Chief
Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals:
“I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a Judge.
I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, financer, banker,
stockbroker or system management analyst. It is the height of
folly to expect Judges intelligently to review a 5000 page record
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addressing the intricacies of a public utility operation. It is not
the function of a Judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal
of a pedantic school master substituting its judgment for that
of the administrator.”
44. In administrative matters the Court should, therefore, ordinarily
defer to the judgment of the administrators unless the decision is
clearly violative of some statute or is shockingly arbitrary. In this
connection, Justice Frankfurter while Professor of Law at Harvard
University wrote in The Public and its Government:
“With the great men of the Supreme Court constitutional
adjudication has always been statecraft. As a mere Judge,
Marshall had his superiors among his colleagues. His
supremacy lay in his recognition of the practical needs of
the Government. The great Judges are those to whom the
Constitution is not primarily a text for interpretation but the
means of ordering the life of a progressive people.”
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48. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC
225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461 (vide AIR para 1547) Khanna, J.
observed: (SCC p. 821, para 1535)
“1535. In exercising the power of judicial review, the courts
cannot be oblivious of the practical needs of the Government.
The door has to be left open for trial and error.”
B. Shamasundar v. University of Mysore, 1996 SCC OnLine
Kar 430:
“6. Equality before law and equal protection of laws is the heart
and soul of the Constitutional system adopted by this country. The
right to equality and equal protection of laws under Article 14 are
genus and the right to non-discrimination are the species. Equality
as contemplated under the Constitutional scheme means equality
among equals. The doctrine of equality is considered to be a
corollary to the concept of Rule of Law which postulates that
every executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any
person must be fair and referable to legal authority. What Article
14 prohibits is the class legislation and not reasonable classification.
If classification is based upon reasonable criteria and the persons
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[M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]
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belonging to well-defined class are treated equally, the vice of
discrimination would not be attracted. In order to pass the test of
reasonable classification the impugned Statute, order or notification
is required to pass the twin tests of permissible classification viz.,
(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from others left out of the group and;
(ii) that, that differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the impugned statute or order.
7. It is not conceived that the classification should be scientifically
perfect or logically complete. The Court would not interfere unless
it is shown that the classification resulted in inequality amongst
the persons similarly situated. The reasonable classification
expected to stand the test of the Constitutional guarantees requires
that such classification was real and substantial which contemplated
some just reasonable relation to the job of the legislation. The
Courts have not to determine as to whether the impugned action
has resulted in inequality but have to decide whether there was
some differentia which had an object to be achieved by the
impugned action. Mere differentiation per se does not amount to
discrimination attracting the operation of the guarantee of equality.
The purpose and object of the impugned action has to be
ascertained
from the attending circumstances in each case.
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11. Applying the tests noted herein above it is apparent that the
appellants did not discharge the initial onus of proof of prima facie
satisfying the Court that the impugned statute was violative of
Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. The mere fact that
the statute provided a different age of retirement for the teachers
of the University was by itself not sufficient to conclude that the
same was discriminatory or that the classification contemplated
was not reasonable. It has been conceded before us that
classification was made in favour of a specified class i.e., the
teachers as defined under Section 2(7) and 2(8) of the Karnataka
State Universities Act 1976 (hereinafter called the ‘Act’). The
classification thus made in favour of teachers cannot be held to
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be discriminatory. Such classification was held permissible in State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Hari Datt Sharma [AIR 1993 SC 1312]. In
Life Insurance Corporation of India etc. v. S. Srivastava [AIR
1987 SC 1527.], it was held that while determining the question
regarding the fixation of age for retirement the Court can take
judicial notice of different age of retirement prevailing in several
services in the Country. The discrimination as regards the age of
retirement between Employees belonging to different classes
though in the same service could not be termed to be discriminatory.
The teachers within the meaning of the Act include Professors,
Readers, Lecturers and other persons imparting instructions in
any affiliated college. Even though the definition is inclusive, yet it
is only for the University to consider and decide as to who were
the persons appointed for the purpose of imparting instructions in
the University or in the colleges maintained by the University.
This Court cannot embark upon the task of deciding as to who
was a teacher within the meaning of the Act. The Division Bench
of this Court in University of Mysore v. Maribasavaradya’s case,
[ILR 1990 Kar 3671.] supra considered this aspect of the matter
as well and rightly came to the conclusion that the appellants
therein who were the Research Assistants could not be held to be
teachers on the basis of the performance of their duties. Clause
(d) of statute 2 of the impugned statutes defined the
teacher of
the University to mean such persons who were appointed for the
purposes of imparting instructions in University or in any college
maintained by the Universities. It is admitted that none of the
appellants before us was appointed as teacher of the University
for being entitled to the benefit of the Statute 3 which is impugned
before us. Whether all the appellants or any one of them was
imparting instructions is a question which can properly be
appreciated and adjudicated by the University, the employer of
the appellants. This Court cannot embark upon deciding the
academic question on the basis of assumptions and presumptions.
The appellants have not been in a position to persuade us to disagree
with the earlier judgment of this Court in the University of Mysore
v. P. Maribasavaradya’s case [ILR 1990 Kar 3671]. We are also
of the opinion that the classification contemplated by the impugned
statute is neither unreasonable nor without any basis.”
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Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521:
“9. It was then urged on behalf of the petitioners that on principle
of ‘equal pay for equal work’ they were entitled to pay scale of
Rs 330-560. It was pointed out that they have been performing
the same nature of work, which was being performed by other
Pharmacists Grade-B who have been given the scale of Rs 330-
560. The nature of work may be more or less the same but scale
of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience
which justifies classification. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal
work’ should not be applied in a mechanical or casual manner.
Classification made by a body of experts after full study and
analysis of the work should not be disturbed except for strong
reasons which indicate the classification made to be unreasonable.
Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of
the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them. The principle
of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has been examined in State of M.P.
v. Pramod Bhartiya, (1993) 1 SCC 539 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 221 :
(1993) 23 ATC 657 by this Court. Before any direction is issued
by the Court, the claimants have to establish that there was no
reasonable basis to treat them separately in matters of payment
of wages or salary. Then only it can be held that there has been a
discrimination, within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution.”
Union of India v.
International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC
437:
“15. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the
executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is
wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article
14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not
give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior
criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of
every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone
irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted
tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by
the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the
heartbeat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of
judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly
for a discernible reason, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose.
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The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more
easily visualized than precisely defined. A question whether the
impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on
the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious
test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible
principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it
really satisfy the test of reasonableness.
16. Where a particular mode is prescribed for doing an act and
there is no impediment in adopting the procedure, the deviation to
act in a different manner which does not disclose any discernible
principle which is reasonable itself shall be labelled as arbitrary.
Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that
an act uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary.”
Hotel & Bar (FL.3) Association of Tamil Nadu (HOBAT) v
The Secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes Department
2015 SCC OnLine Mad 7092:
“17. The power of judicial review over a policy decision in the
field of revenue is quite settled. Such a decision is not required to
be tested by a Court of law with suspicious and microscopic eye.
The parameters for decision are good faith and intention. A
Constitutional Court will have to look at the decision made by the
Executive or a Legislature by taking a practical view and it should
rather avoid an absolute and inflexible concept. An interpretation,
which serves the legislative object and intent leading to
a purposive
construction, is required to be made by the Court…”
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC
664:
“229. It is now well-settled that the courts, in the exercise of their
jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision.
Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the
type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed,
are part of policy-making process and the Courts are ill-equipped
to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The Court, no
doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no
law is violated and people’s fundamental rights are not transgressed
upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution….”
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND  v. SUDHIR BUDAKOTI
[M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]
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[2022] 16 S.C.R.
State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC
639:
“36. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the
Government merely because it feels that another decision would
have been fairer or more scientific or logical or wiser. The wisdom
and advisability of the policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial
review unless the policies are contrary to statutory or constitutional
provision or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power….”
Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen, (2007)
1 SCC 408:
“29. In para 19 of the aforesaid judgment of the Constitution Bench,
an important observation has been made about whether the court
can impose financial burden on the State in this manner. Para 19
states as under: (Umadevi (3) case, Secy., State of Karnataka
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1: 2006 SCC (L& S) 753, SCC pp.25-26)
“19. One aspect arises. Obviously, the State is also controlled
by economic considerations and financial implications of any
public employment. The viability of the department or the
instrumentality of the project is also of equal concern for the
State. The State works out the scheme taking into consideration
the financial implications and economic aspects. Can the court
impose on the State a financial burden of this nature by insisting
on regularisation or permanence in employment, when those
employed temporarily are not needed permanently or regularly?
As an example, we can envisage a
direction to give permanent
employment to all those who are being temporarily or casually
employed in a public sector undertaking. The burden may
become so heavy by such a direction that the undertaking itself
may collapse under its own weight. It is not as if this had not
happened. So, the court ought not to impose a financial burden
on the State by such directions, as such directions may turn
counterproductive.”
Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC
437:
“17. The courts as observed in G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon
Municipal Council, (1991) 3 SCC 91:AIR 1991 SC 1153 are
kept out of the lush field of administrative policy except where a
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policy is inconsistent with the express or implied provision of a
statute which creates the power to which the policy relates or
where a decision made in purported exercise of power is such
that a repository of the power acting reasonably and in good faith
could not have made it. But there has to be a word of caution.
Something overwhelming must appear before the court will
intervene. That is and ought to be a difficult onus for an applicant
to discharge. The courts are not very good at formulating or
evaluating policy. Sometimes when the courts have intervened on
policy grounds the courts’ view of the range of policies open under
the statute or of what is unreasonable policy has not got public
acceptance. On the contrary, curial views of policy have been
subjected to stringent criticism.
18. As Professor Wade points out (in Administrative Law by
H.W.R. Wade, 6th Edn.), there is ample room within the legal
boundaries for radical differences of opinion in which neither side
is unreasonable. The reasonableness in administrative law must,
therefore, distinguish between proper course and improper abuse
of power. Nor is the test court’s own standard of reasonableness
as it might conceive it in a given situation. The point to note is that
the thing is not unreasonable in the legal sense merely because
the court thinks it to be unwise.
19. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993)
3 SCC 499 : AIR 1994 SC 988 it was observed that decision
taken by
the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable
and not taken in public interest where the doctrine of legitimate
expectation can be applied. If it is a question of policy, even by
ways of change of old policy, the courts cannot intervene with the
decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and
circumstances giving rise to legitimate expectation, would primarily
be a question of fact.
20. As was observed in Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union
of India, (1999) 4 SCC 727 : AIR 1999 SC 1801 the change in
policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be
justified on “Wednesbury reasonableness”. The decision-maker
has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to
the change in policy. It is, therefore, clear that the choice of policy
is for the decision-maker and not the court. The legitimate
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND  v. SUDHIR BUDAKOTI
[M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]
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[2022] 16 S.C.R.
substantive expectation merely permits the court to find out if the
change of policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate
expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable
person could have made. A claim based on merely legitimate
expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right.
Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it covers the entire span of time:
present, past and future. How significant is the statement that
today is tomorrow’s yesterday. The present is as we experience
it, the past is a present memory and future is a present expectation.
For legal purposes, expectation is not same anticipation. Legitimacy
of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the
sanction of law.”
ON FACTS
20. We have recorded the facts in the preceding paragraphs. Law
has become quite settled that the Appellant is not bound by any direction
issued by the Central Government which would at worst be mandatory
to the Central Universities and the Central Government Colleges receiving
funds. Thus, any such decision would obviously be directory to State
Government Colleges and Universities, being in the nature of a mere
recommendation. The aforesaid position has been clarified by the decision
of this Court in Kalyani Mathivanan v. K.V. Jeyaraj, (2015) 6 SCC
363:
“62.2. The UGC Regulations being passed by both the Houses of
Parliament, though a subordinate legislation has binding effect on
the universities to which it applies.
62.3. The UGC Regulations, 2010 are mandatory to teachers and
other academic staff in all the Central universities and colleges
thereunder and the institutions deemed to be universities whose
maintenance expenditure is met by UGC.
62.4. The UGC Regulations, 2010 are directory for the universities,
colleges and other higher educational institutions under the purview
of the State legislation as the matter has been left to the State
Government to adopt and implement the Scheme. Thus, the UGC
Regulations, 2010 are partly mandatory and is partly directory.”
21. The High Court of Uttarakhand in our opinion has completely
misconstrued the facts. The Appellant nowhere has made a decision to
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accept and adopt the circular of the Central Government pertaining to
the Registrars working in the Universities coming under its purview. In
the absence of any legal right with the corresponding duty, such a relief
can never be asked for, particularly when there are clear and specific
rules provided for the pay scale of Registrars by the Appellant itself.
The decision of the Appellant qua the Lecturers who form a distinct
group as against the Respondent No. 1 who holds a higher position in the
administration has been lost sight of. Merely because Respondent No. 1
was made to fill the gap by temporarily taking up the job of a Lecturer,
he would never become one and so also a Lecturer, who might undertake
the job of a Registrar. This is nothing but an administrative convenience
borne out of a contingency. When the classification is distinct and clear
having adequate rationale with due relation to the objective, there is no
reason to hold otherwise by treating a Registrar at par with the Lecturers.
One is meant for administration and the other teaching. The High Court
has also not considered the financial implications as any decision would
not rest with Respondent No. 1 alone, but the entirety of the administrative
staff.
22. Having pointed out the aforesaid wrong understanding of facts
culminating in the decision impugned before us, we accordingly set aside
the same by allowing the Civil Appeal No.2661 of 2015 and, as a
consequence, the writ petition
filed, stands dismissed.  No costs.
Devika Gujral and Amarendra Kumar
Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Vrinda Singh, LCRA)
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND  v. SUDHIR BUDAKOTI
[M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]