SRI PUBI LOMBI versus THE STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH & ORS.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 407, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
* Author
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 407 : 2024 INSC 200
Sri Pubi Lombi 
v. 
The State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 4129 of 2024)
13 March 2024
[J.K. Maheshwari* and Sanjay Karol, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
In absence of plea of malafide and no averment regarding violation 
of statutory provision taken by the private respondent before the 
High Court, whether the interference made by the Division Bench 
of the High Court in setting aside the judgment of the Single Judge 
was justified merely on the pretext that the proposed modification 
(in transfer order) is arbitrary or without application of mind for the 
sole reason that it was mooted by a MLA.
Headnotes
Service Law – Modified transfer order – Challenge to – The 
Single Judge of the High Court by upholding modified order 
of transfer dated 20.04.2023 observed that transfer made 
on the basis of UO Note dated 28.02.2023 put up by the 
MLA itself cannot be held to vitiate the transfer until there 
is an allegation of any malafide exercise of powers by the 
respondents-authorities in issuing the order – However, the 
Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order of the 
Single Judge – Propriety:
Held: It is settled that the person challenging the transfer ought to 
prove on facts that such transfer is prejudicial to public interest – 
The interference is only justified in a case of malafide or infraction 
of any professed norm or principle – In view of the judicial decisions 
of the Supreme Court, it is clear
that in absence of (i) pleadings 
regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom 
allegation are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) 
the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee 
who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not 
warranted – In the instant case, in absence of plea of malafide and 
no averment regarding violation of statutory provision taken by the 
private respondent before the High Court, interference as made by
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the Division Bench setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the 
Single Judge is not justified merely on the unsubstantiated pretext 
that the proposed modification is arbitrary or without application 
of mind for the sole reason that it was mooted by the MLA – The 
Division Bench has committed an error in setting aside the judgment 
of the Single Judge of the High Court. [Paras 9.2, 10, 14]
Judicial Review – Scope – Transfer orders – Discussed. [Paras 
9.2 - 9.5]
Case Law Cited
Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas, [1993] 3 SCR 
427 : (1993) 4 SCC 357; N.K. Singh v. Union of India 
and others, [1994] Suppl. 2 SCR 772 : (1994) 6 SCC 
98; Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others, 
[2007] 10 SCR 72 : (2007) 8 SCC 150; State of Punjab 
v. Joginder Singh Dhatt, AIR 1993 SC 2486; Ratnagiri 
Gas and Power Private Limited v. RDS Projects Limited 
and Ors., [2012] 9 SCR 690 : (2013) 1 SCC 524 – 
relied on.
Union of India and another v.  N.P. Thomas, 1993 Suppl. 
(1) SCC 704 – referred to.
List of Keywords
Service Law; Transfer order; Modified transfer order; Plea of 
malafide; Violation of statutory provision; Judicial interference; 
Judicial Review; Transfer prejudicial to public interest.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.4129 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.09.2023 of the Gauhati High 
Court in WA No. 266 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
B.K. Sharma, Sr. Adv., Kaushik
Choudhury, H.K. Das, S.P. Sharma, 
Saksham Garg, Jyotirmoy Chatterjee, Kasif Ahmed, Advs. for the 
Appellant.
Saurabh Mishra, Sr. Adv., Gagan Sanghi, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, 
Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
409
Sri Pubi Lombi v. The State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J. K. Maheshwari J.
1.	
Leave granted. 
2.	
The judgment dated 22.09.2023 passed by the Division Bench of 
the Gauhati High Court in Writ Appeal No. 266/2023 reversing the 
judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 11.07.2023 passed in 
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 199 (AP) 2023 has been assailed by the 
appellant (respondent No. 5 in Writ Court). The learned Single 
Judge by upholding order of transfer dated 20.04.2023 observed that 
transfer made on the basis of UO Note dated 28.02.2023 put up by 
the Member of the Legislative Assembly, 29-Basar (ST) Assembly 
Constituency (MLA) itself cannot be held to vitiate the transfer until 
there is an allegation of any malafide exercise of powers by the 
respondents-authorities in issuing the order.
3.	
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 199 (AP) 2023 was filed before the High 
Court by respondent No. 5 herein challenging the modified order 
of transfer dated 20.04.2023. Learned Single Judge dismissed the 
writ petition in absence of having any allegation of malafide, being 
transfer is one of the ingredients of the service. The relevant part 
of the said order is reproduced as thus: -
“17. Taking note of the law laid down by the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Masood Ahmad 
(supra); the U.O. Note, dated 28.02.2023, put up by the 
Member of Legislative Assembly, 29-Basar (ST) Assembly 
Constituency,
requesting the competent authority for 
transfer of the Respondent No. 5 as Deputy Director of 
School Education, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, 
Leparada, cannot be faulted with.
Accordingly, even if the respondent authorities had 
modified the earlier order of transfer, dated 15.11.2022, 
issued by the Commissioner (Education), Government 
of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, vide the impugned 
order, dated 20.04.2023, issued by the Commissioner 
(Education), Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, 
acting on the U.O. Note, dated 28.02.2023, put up by

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the Member of Legislative Assembly, 29- Basar(ST) 
Assembly Constituency; that itself, cannot be held to 
vitiate the impugned order, dated 20.04.2023, issued by 
the Commissioner (Education), Government of Arunachal 
Pradesh, Itanagar.

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19. Accordingly, in the absence of any mala fide exercise 
of power by the respondent authorities or violation of 
any statutory provision in issuing the impugned order, 
dated 20.04.2023, by the Commissioner (Education), 
Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar; I am, 
therefore, not inclined to interfere with the impugned 
order, dated 20.04.2023, issued by the Commissioner 
(Education), Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, 
in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, even 
if the aforesaid order, dated 20.04.2023, has been issued 
by the authority acting on the basis of the U.O. Note, 
dated 28.02.2023, put up by the Member of Legislative 
Assembly, 29-Basar(ST) Assembly Constituency, having 
regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court 
in Mohd. Masood Ahmad (supra).
20. In that view of the matter; I do not find any merit in 
this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed.”
4.	
On filing writ appeal by the Respondent No. 5 the Division Bench 
of the High Court while setting aside the order of learned Single 
Judge observed that the UO Note of the MLA was approved without 
application of mind and any remark of administrative exigencies by 
department to substantiate that it was in public interest or in exigency 
of the service. The relevant excerpt of the impugned judgment reads 
as:
“ 27. The appellant who was already under order of transfer 
is having a legitimate expectation to join and continue in 
the transferred place of
posting. However, his transfer 
order was suddenly modified without any proposal being 
mooted by his employer but acting on the proposal of the 
Local MLA and in favour of respondent No.5. In the above 
backdrop, this court is of the considered opinion that such 
order of transfer is neither issued in the exigencies of

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Sri Pubi Lombi v. The State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors.
service nor in public interest, rather the same is a result 
of arbitrary exercise of power.

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29. This Court cannot approve such kind of sheerly 
lackadaisical administrative procedure adopted in 
the decision-making process inasmuch as the proper 
administration under the Constitutional scheme of 
governance, every State action must be supported by 
reason. In the present case, the fact cannot be ignored 
that the appellant was already under order of transfer 
and he was released on 19.04.2023 and he joined at 
the place of transfer on 20.04.2023 and therefore, in the 
present case, it was further necessary to have the decision 
impugned supported by reason in cancelling the earlier 
transfer order that too when the proposal of transfer of 
respondent No. 5 was initiated not by the administrative 
department in public interest or in exigencies of services 
rather it was purely on the basis of U.O. Note given by 
local MLA. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this 
Court, the impugned order cannot be said to be an order 
of transfer in public interest or in exigencies of services.”
5.	
The judgment of the Division Bench has been questioned before 
us, inter-alia, contending that in the matter of transfer scope of 
judicial review is limited, only when such transfer is in violation of 
the statutory provisions or due to malafide reasons. As a corollary, 
it is not open to the Court to interfere with the orders of transfer on 
a post which is transferrable, in absence of any malafide alleged or 
infraction of any professed norms if such transfer is not
detrimental. 
Further, it was canvassed that transfer on the instance of MP/MLA 
always would not per se vitiate the order of transfer. 
6.	
Per contra learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 5 who was 
Writ Petitioner before the High Court submits that the malafide is of 
two kinds: - one malice in fact and the second malice in law, in the 
peculiar facts of this case the Division Bench has rightly set aside 
the order which do not warrant interference.
7.	
Conversely, learned counsel for the State has supported the 
contention of the appellant and urged that after consideration of the 
UO Note of the MLA, modified order of transfer has been passed in
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public interest after due application of mind, and the Division Bench 
has committed an error in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment 
of learned Single Judge. 
8.	
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and first we wish to 
appreciate the law and principles laid-down in the matter of transfer 
persuading judicial review. 
9.	
In the case of Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas; (1993) 4 
SCC 357, it is clearly observed by this Court that the scope of judicial 
review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory 
provision or the transfer is persuaded by malafide, non-observation 
of executive instructions does not confer a legally enforceable right 
to an employee holding a transferable post. The relevant paragraph 
reads as under: 
“7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for 
the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of 
transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation 
of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere 
with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the 
authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the 
Government on the subject……..”
9.1	 Further, following the footsteps of S.L. Abbas (supra) this Court 
in the case of Union of India and another v. N.P. Thomas; 
1993 Supp (1) SCC 704 held that the interference by the Court 
in an order of transfer on the instance of an employee holding 
a transferrable post without any
violation of statutory provision 
is not permissible.
9.2	 This Court further curtailed the scope of judicial review in the 
case of N.K. Singh v. Union of India and others; (1994) 6 
SCC 98 holding that the person challenging the transfer ought 
to prove on facts that such transfer is prejudicial to public 
interest. It was further reiterated that interference is only 
justified in a case of malafide or infraction of any professed 
norm or principle. Moreover, in the cases where the career 
prospects of a person challenging transfer remain unaffected 
and no detriment is caused, interference to the transfer must be 
eschewed. It is further held that the evidence requires to prove 
such transfer is prejudicial and in absence thereof interference
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Sri Pubi Lombi v. The State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors.
is not warranted. The law reiterated by this Court is reproduced, 
in following words: -
“9. Transfer of a public servant from a significant post 
can be prejudicial to public interest only if the transfer 
was avoidable and the successor is not suitable for the 
post. Suitability is a matter for objective assessment by 
the hierarchical superiors in administration. To introduce 
and rely on the element of prejudice to public interest as 
a vitiating factor of the transfer of a public servant, it must 
be first pleaded and proved that the replacement was by a 
person not suitable for the important post and the transfer 
was avoidable. Unless this is pleaded and proved at the 
threshold, no further inquiry into this aspect is necessary 
and its absence is sufficient to exclude this factor from 
consideration as a vitiating element in the impugned 
transfer. Accordingly, this aspect requires consideration 
at the outset.

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“23. …….Unless the decision is vitiated by mala 
fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle 
governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinised 
judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards 
for scrutinising all transfers and the courts lack the 
necessary expertise for personnel management of all 
government departments. This must be left, in public 
interest, to the departmental heads subject to the limited 
judicial scrutiny indicated.”
“24. …Challenge in courts of a transfer when the career 
prospects remain unaffected and there is no detriment 
to the government servant must be eschewed and 
interference by courts should be rare, only when a judicially 
manageable and permissible ground is made out. This 
litigation was ill-advised.”
9.3	 The issue involved in the present case is somewhat similar 
in the case of Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. and 
others; (2007) 8 SCC 150 wherein this Court in paragraph 8 
has observed as thus: -
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“8. ….. In our opinion, even if the allegation of the appellant 
is correct that he was transferred on the recommendation 
of an MLA, that by itself would not vitiate the transfer order. 
After all, it is the duty of the representatives of the people 
in the legislature to express the grievances of the people 
and if there is any complaint against an official the State 
Government is certainly within its jurisdiction to transfer 
such an employee……”
9.4	 It is not tangential to mention that this Court in the case of 
State of Punjab v.  Joginder Singh Dhatt; AIR 1993 SC 2486 
observed as thus: - 
“3……..It is entirely for the employer to decide when, where 
and at what point of time a public servant is transferred 
from his present posting………”
9.5	 It is also imperative to refer the judgement of this Court in the 
case of Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited v. RDS 
Projects Limited and Ors.; (2013) 1 SCC 524 where it reiterated 
one of the pertinent principles of administrative law is that when 
allegations of malafide are made, the persons against whom 
the same are levelled need to be impleaded as parties to the 
proceedings to enable them to answer. The relevant excerpt 
is reproduced as thus:
“27. There is yet another aspect which cannot be ignored. 
As and when allegations of mala fides are made, the 
persons against whom the same are levelled need to 
be impleaded as parties to the proceedings to enable 
them to
answer the charge. In the absence of the person 
concerned as a party in his/her individual capacity it will 
neither be fair nor proper to record a finding that malice 
in fact had vitiated the action taken by the authority 
concerned……..” 
10.	 In view of the foregoing enunciation of law by judicial decisions of this 
Court, it is clear that in absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, 
(ii) non-joining the person against whom allegation are made, (iii) 
violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer 
being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable 
post, judicial interference is not warranted. In the sequel of the said 
settled norms, the scope of judicial review is not permissible by
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Sri Pubi Lombi v. The State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors.
the Courts in exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the 
Constitution of India. 
11.	 On examining the facts of the present case, it is apparent that 
respondent No. 5 herein was transferred from the Government 
Higher Secondary School (GHSS) Kanubari, Longding district to 
Leparada as Deputy Director of School Education (DDSE) vide 
order dated 15.11.2022 and was directed to join in the last part of 
April, 2023. The UO Note dated 28.02.2023 has been written by 
the MLA specifying the administrative exigency and public interest 
in posting the appellant on the post of DDSE, Leparada. The said 
UO Note has been examined and competent authority has exercised 
its discretion in favour of the appellant, and the respondent No. 5 
herein has been retained on the same post in the same district in 
same status which he was holding prior to order of transfer dated 
15.11.2022 un-affecting his salary. Besides, it is also averred by the 
State that the modified order dated 20.04.2023 was passed prior to 
effective period during which respondent no. 5 was directed to join 
i.e., in the last part of April, 2023.
12.	 As per the counter affidavit filed by the State Government, even 
before us it is specifically averred that the order of transfer dated 
20.04.2023 modifying the previous order dated 15.11.2022 has been 
issued in public interest after due application of mind and without any
malafide intentions. As far as the stance of respondent no. 5 herein 
is concerned, the plea of malafide against transferring authority has 
not been agitated even before this Court or the High Court. Further, 
the impugned transfer order is also not alleged to be violative of any 
prescribed statutory provision.
13.	 In view of the stand taken by the Government and in absence of 
plea of malafide and no averment regarding violation of statutory 
provision taken by the private respondent before the High Court, 
interference as made by the Division Bench setting aside the well-
reasoned judgment of the Single Judge is not justified merely on the 
unsubstantiated pretext that the proposed modification is arbitrary or 
without application of mind for the sole reason that it was mooted 
by the MLA. In our view the Division Bench has committed an error 
in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 
14.	 Accordingly, the Civil Appeal is hereby allowed, the judgment and 
order dated 22.09.2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High

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Court is hereby set aside, restoring the order dated 11.07.2023 of 
the learned Single Judge. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand 
disposed of.
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
Result of the case: 
Appeal allowed.