VIJAYA SINGH & ANR. versus STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 906, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 906 : 2024 INSC 905
Vijaya Singh & Anr. 
v.  
State of Uttarakhand
(Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 2013)
25 November 2024
[Bela Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the Criminal Appeal filed by the Appellants challenging 
the conviction under Section 302/201 IPC can be entertained in 
the facts and circumstances of the case.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Criminal Procedure Code, 
1973 – Section 164 – Principles governing circumstantial 
evidence reiterated – On facts and circumstances, held that 
the Trial Court and the High Court have correctly appreciated 
the evidence, and the conviction of the Appellant upheld:
Held: It is a well settled principle of law that when a case is 
based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved 
must point unequivocally to the guilt of the accused and must 
be incompatible with any theory of being innocent – There are 
no material contradictions in the versions of the witnesses – The 
evidence of every witness cannot be subject to the same level 
of scrutiny and the Court must be alive to the social position of 
the witness – Further, it is trite law that mere presence of minor 
variations is not fatal to the case of the prosecution – It is so 
because natural testimony is bound to have variations – The 
question is whether the variations or contradictions could be 
termed as fatal to the case of the prosecution – The evidence 
adduced before the Court is to be examined
as a whole and not 
in isolation – This principle assumes greater importance in cases 
which are based on circumstantial evidence as in the absence of 
direct evidence of the offence, the Court is required to analyze the 
proved circumstances in a collective sense to arrive at a reasonable 
finding – In such cases, the finding of the Court is essentially an 
irresistible inference which is drawn from the proved material on 
record. [Paras 11, 25, 39]
*Author
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Vijaya Singh & Anr. v.  State of Uttarakhand
Jurisprudence concerning statements under Section 164 
CrPC – Discussed:
Held: Statement under Section 164 CrPC is not considered as 
a substantive piece of evidence, as substantive oral evidence 
is one which is deposed before the Court and is subjected to 
cross- examination – However, Section 157 of Indian Evidence 
Act, 1872 makes it clear that a statement under Section 164 CrPC 
could be used for both corroboration and contradiction – It could 
be used to corroborate the testimonies of other witnesses – The 
need for recording the statement of a witness under Section 164 
CrPC arises when the witness appears to be connected to the 
accused and is prone to changing his version at a later stage 
due to influence – Considering the conceptual requirement of 
recording a statement before a Judicial Magistrate during the 
course of investigation and the utility thereof, as prescribed 
in Section 157 of Evidence Act, it could be observed that a 
statement under Section 164, although not a substantive piece 
of evidence, not only meets the test of relevancy but could also 
be used for the purposes of contradiction and corroboration –  
A statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC serves a special 
purpose in a criminal investigation as a greater amount of credibility 
is attached to it for being recorded by a Judicial Magistrate and 
not by the Investigating Officer – A statement under Section 
164 CrPC is not
subjected to the constraints attached with a 
statement under Section 161 CrPC and the vigour of Section 162 
CrPC does not apply to a statement under Section 164 CrPC – 
Therefore, it must be considered on a better footing – However, 
relevancy, admissibility and reliability are distinct concepts in 
the realm of the law of evidence – The weight to be attached 
to such a statement (reliability thereof) is to be determined 
by the Court on a case-to-case basis and the same would  
depend to some extent upon whether the witness has remained 
true to the statement or has resiled from it, but it would not be a 
conclusive factor. [Paras 27, 28]
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
List of Keywords
Circumstantial evidence; 164 statement.
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Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  
122 of 2013
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.08.2012 of the High Court 
of Uttarakhand at Nainital in CRLA No. 148 of 2004
Appearances for Parties
Sachin Patil, Satyajit A Desai, Siddharth Gautam, Abhinav  
K. Mutyalwar, Sachin Singh, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Advs. for the 
Appellants.
Sudarshan Singh Rawat, Ms. Saakshi Singh Rawat, Ms. Rachna 
Gandhi, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Satish Chandra Sharma, J.
1.	
In April, 2002, Devaki got married to Vijaya Singh. More than an 
year after the wedding, on the fateful day of 14.09.2023, Devaki 
died an unnatural death at the house of her in-laws. Vijaya Singh, 
appellant no. 1 herein, was accused of murdering her along with his 
mother, namely Basanti Devi, appellant no. 2 herein. The case was 
registered as FIR No. 04/2003 at PS R.P. Jakholi, Rudraprayag, 
District Garhwal, Uttarakhand. After the conclusion of investigation 
and trial, the Trial Court found the appellants guilty. In appeal, the 
High Court of Uttarakhand also found them guilty and upheld the 
decision of the Trial Court. The appellants, by way of instant appeal, 
have assailed the Judgment and Order dated 29.08.2012 passed 
by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No. 
148 of 2004, whereby the said appeal preferred by the appellants 
was dismissed. 
2.	
The appellant No.1
happened to be the husband and the appellant 
No.2 happened to be the mother-in-law of the deceased Devaki. After 
the incident, the FIR was registered at the instance of the complainant 
Shankar Singh (brother of the deceased Devaki), against the present 
appellants and Shri. Matbar Singh (father-in-law of the deceased).
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Vijaya Singh & Anr. v.  State of Uttarakhand
It was alleged inter alia in the said complaint that on 14.09.2003 at 
about 9 P.M., he had received one phone call from the in-laws of 
his sister at Gram Sabha Dangi (Village Hariyali) informing him that 
his sister had poured kerosene oil over her person at about 6 P.M. 
and had set herself ablaze. According to the complainant, he along 
with his two brothers went to the place of occurrence, where they 
saw that their sister was lying in almost naked condition with green 
grass having been put over her body and they suspected that their 
sister was murdered and she had not committed suicide.
3.	
The Investigating Officer, after completing the investigation, filed the 
chargesheet against the appellants for the offences under Sections 
302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.1 The case was committed 
for trial to the Sessions Court and the District & Sessions Judge, 
Rudraprayag, vide the Judgment and Order dated 14.05.2004, 
convicted both the appellants for the commission of offence under 
Section 302 of IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment and 
fine of Rs.5,000/- each, and in default thereof, to further undergo 
imprisonment for a period of 6 months. The said Court also convicted 
them for the offence under Section 201 of IPC and sentenced them 
to undergo imprisonment for a period of 2 years with payment of 
fine of Rs. 2000/- each, and in default thereof to further undergo 
imprisonment for a
period of 3 months. Being aggrieved by the said 
Judgment and Order passed by the Trial Court, the appellants had 
preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No.148 of 2004 before 
the High Court, which came to be dismissed by the High Court vide 
the impugned Judgment and Order dated 29.08.2012.
4.	
The Trial Court acknowledged that the entire case of the prosecution 
was based on circumstantial evidence and further, that the entire 
chain of evidence consistently pointed in the direction of guilt of the 
appellants. It found that the testimonies of the witnesses were credible 
and the retraction of their statements by PW-3 and PW-4, sisters of 
appellant no. 1, was a result of tutoring. Thus, the statements of the 
said witnesses recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 19732 were found to be truthful and natural. 
5.	
The decision of the Trial Court was assailed before the High Court 
and the High Court, in the impugned order/judgment, found that the 
1	
Hereinafter referred as “IPC”
2	
Hereinafter referred as “CrPC”
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Trial Court had correctly analyzed the evidence on record and no 
infirmity was found in the findings of the Trial Court. 
6.	
While assailing the judgement of the High Court, learned counsel for 
the appellants submitted that there was a delay in the registration 
of FIR as the same was registered after 24 hours from the incident 
and the said period led to the fabrication of the entire story by the 
complainant. It is further submitted that there was no allegation of 
harassment at the time of registration of FIR and the versions put 
forth by PW-1, PW-2, PW-5 and PW-6 are inherently contradictory 
and there is no corroboration between the same. It is further submitted 
that PW-1 was not the real nephew of the deceased but was a 
distant relative belonging to the same community and therefore, 
he could not have possessed any direct knowledge of cruelty or 
harassment. It is further submitted that the statements of PW-1 
and PW-5 appeared to be contrary to each other as PW-5 has not 
deposed regarding any bodily injury to the deceased at any point of 
time and has deposed that the relationship between the appellants 
and the deceased was cordial. 
7.	
It is further submitted that the statements of PW-3 and PW-4 
recorded under Section 164 CrPC are liable to be rejected as the 
said statements were recorded in the presence of the Investigating 
Officer under threat, and could not be considered as voluntary 
statements. It
is further submitted that the said statements could 
not be termed as substantive evidence and could only be used to 
corroborate or contradict the testimony of a witness in the Court. It 
is further submitted that the primary witness of the prosecution is 
PW-7/doctor and his testimony is fundamentally flawed. It is submitted 
that the concerned doctor initially deposed that he could not definitively 
state whether the death of the deceased was homicidal or suicidal, 
however, the witness later opined that 100% percent burn injuries 
were uncommon in suicide cases. It is submitted that in case of 
suicide, the act of burning is a voluntary act and therefore, 100% 
burn injuries are completely possible. To buttress, it is contended 
that the evidence of an expert is not the evidence of fact and is only 
advisory in nature. It is added that medical jurisprudence is not an 
exact science and in the expert testimony cannot be considered as 
a conclusive proof of the fact.
8.	
Learned counsel has also submitted that the trial court and the High 
Court have failed to analyze the circumstances of the case in an
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objective manner and the findings of the said courts are based more 
on conjectures and less on evidence.
9.	
Per contra, it has been contended on behalf of the respondent State 
that the circumstances of the present case have proved the guilt of the 
appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It has been submitted that the 
chain of circumstances is complete and falls within the parameters laid 
down by this Court with respect to circumstantial evidence. Learned 
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has placed reliance 
upon the decision of this Court in Prabhudayal and Ors. v. State of 
Maharashtra3 to contend that in bride burning cases, the absence 
of cries or shouts from the victim is suggestive of the fact that it was 
not a case of suicide. Learned counsel has also laid emphasis on the 
false plea of alibi taken by appellant no. 2, and has submitted that if 
a false plea is taken by the accused in the course of a trial, it could 
be considered as an additional circumstance against the accused. 
10.	 We have heard the respective parties and we may now proceed 
to answer the seminal issue whether the findings arrived at by the 
High Court are based on a correct appreciation of the evidence on 
record and are sustainable in the eyes of law. 
DISCUSSION
11.	 At the outset, it may be noted that the entire case of prosecution 
hinges on the circumstantial evidence, in as much as there was no 
eye witness
to the incident in question. It is a well settled principle 
of law that when a case is based on circumstantial evidence, the 
circumstances proved must point unequivocally to the guilt of the 
accused and must be incompatible with any theory of his being 
innocent. The principles governing the appreciation of circumstantial 
have been laid down by this Court in unequivocal terms in Sharad 
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra.4 The principles, termed 
as the Panchsheel or five principles of circumstantial evidence, are 
traceable in the following para:
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that 
the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case 
against an accused can be said to be fully established:
3	
[1993] 3 SCR 878 : (1993) 3 SCC 573
4	
[1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116
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(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt 
is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the 
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may 
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a 
legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be 
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji 
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 
793] where the observations were made: 
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must 
be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict 
and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is 
long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with 
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, 
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis 
except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature 
and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except 
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as 
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion 
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must 
show that in all human probability the act must have been 
done by the accused.”
12.	 So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is not 
disputed that deceased Devaki and the
Appellant No.1 got married 
in April, 2002 and the Appellant No.2 happened to be the mother-in-
law of the deceased. It is also not disputed that the tragic incident 
occurred on 14.09.2003 i.e. within 17 months of the marriage, when 
deceased Devaki succumbed to the burn injuries at her matrimonial 
home i.e. at the home of the appellants. 
13.	 The Prosecution had examined as many as 8 witnesses to prove 
the charges levelled against the appellants, out of whom PW-1 
Vinod Singh happened to be the nephew of the deceased who had
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inter alia stated that he used to go to leave his aunt Devaki at her 
matrimonial home and used to feel that the behaviour of appellant 
no. 2 was not good with her. He also stated that in the month of 
August, 2002 when he had visited the matrimonial home of his aunt 
to bring her back home, her mother-in-law (appellant no.2) had 
indulged into a quarrel with him saying that if he wanted to take his 
aunt with him, then he should keep her permanently with him. He 
also deposed that the appellant no. 2 had threatened him by saying 
that he had not seen her anger till that point of time. On that day, 
PW-1 came back home with his aunt/deceased. He also stated 
that in the year 2003, when his aunt i.e. the deceased Devaki had 
visited her parental home, she was found to have an injury on her 
eye and on his asking about the injury, she had confidentially told 
him that the said injury was caused by her husband - Vijaya Singh 
(appellant no.1), however he had not disclosed the same to anyone 
so that the matter may not aggravate further. 
14.	 In cross-examination, PW-1 deposed that he used to go to his aunt’s 
matrimonial house frequently as her brothers were not residing in the 
maternal village. He also deposed that appellant no. 1 was working 
in Chandigarh and used to come home in 3-4 months. He further 
deposed that the deceased used to insist for going to Chandigarh 
and the appellant had promised her
that he would take her soon. 
He further deposed that appellant no. 2 used to quarrel with the 
deceased regarding household work and about her desire of going 
to Chandigarh. 
15.	 PW-2 (Shankar Singh), brother of the deceased Devaki had stated 
before the Court that on 14.09.2003, a call was received at about 
12.00 - 1.00 o’clock in the midnight from the village of his sister that 
his sister had poured kerosene oil on her person and put herself 
ablaze. He, therefore, managed to go to the village of his sister along 
with 5-6 people and when he reached the matrimonial home of his 
sister, the appellants were sitting outside the verandah and he was 
told that his sister had committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil 
on herself. He further stated that when he went inside the room, he 
saw that the dead body of his sister was lying on the floor between 
two coats in naked condition and green grass was put over her dead 
body. A quilt was lying there in burnt condition along with water. He 
further stated that at the time of incident, his sister was pregnant 
and he had felt that his sister had not committed suicide but she was
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murdered by her in-laws. He deposed that his sister used to tell them 
about the harassment of her in-laws regarding non-performance of 
household work. In the cross-examination, he admitted that his sister 
wanted to accompany her husband Vijaya and stay at Chandigarh 
instead of staying at village and that prior to the death of his sister, 
the relationship between his sister and the accused Vijaya Singh 
was quite cordial.
16.	 PW-3 Saroj happened to be the sister of the appellant no.1 and 
daughter of appellant no.2, whose statement was recorded under 
Section 164 of Cr.P.C. during the course of investigation. She admitted 
about the recording of her statement before the Magistrate under 
Section 164 of Cr.P.C and admitted her signatures on the statement. 
In cross- examination, she stated that she was not present at home at 
the time of incident and that the relationship between her sister-in-law 
Devaki and her mother and brother was cordial. She further admitted 
that when the Patwari brought her to the Magistrate for recording her 
statement, he had threatened her, and had also remained present 
before the Magistrate when her statement was being recorded. PW-3 
denied any statement regarding quarrel between the deceased and 
appellant no. 2. PW-4 Preeti is also the sister of appellant no.1 and 
daughter of appellant no.2, and she also deposed to the same effect 
as her sister Kumari Saroj/PW-3. 
17.	 PW-5 examined
by the prosecution was Kamal Singh, who happened 
to be the cousin brother of the deceased Devaki. He stated that on 
receiving the telephone call on 14.09.2003 at 8:00 PM about the 
incident, he had gone to the house of the deceased and saw that 
the dead body of his sister Devaki was lying on the floor in naked 
condition and some green grass was put over her body. One bedding 
was also lying in the room and water was put all over it. He also 
stated that on inspection of the room, he felt that Devaki had not 
committed suicide but her mother-in-law and husband had murdered 
her by setting her ablaze. He further deposed that quarrels used to 
take place between the deceased and the appellants over her desire 
of going to Chandigarh with her husband. 
18.	 During cross-examination, PW-5 deposed that the deceased had told 
him that her mother-in-law was not allowing her to visit Chandigarh. 
19.	 PW-6 Sunita Devi, was the sister-in-law of the deceased Devaki. 
She stated that as and when Devaki used to visit her parental
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home, she used to tell her about the harassment caused by her 
mother-in-law and husband. She used to tell her that she (Devaki) 
was kept terrorized and threatened, and was not given proper food 
at her matrimonial home and that her in-laws would go out locking 
her in the house.
20.	 The expert witnesses regarding the cause of death, examined by the 
prosecution, was PW-7 Dr. Shailendra Kumar, who had carried out 
post-mortem of the deceased Devaki. He stated that the deceased 
had sustained 100% burn injuries and the whole body was burnt 
from top to bottom. The cause of death was ‘Death due to shock’ 
and semi digested food was found in her stomach. No smell of any 
kind was felt from her person. He further stated that a male womb 
measuring 10 cm having weight 200 gm was found in the uterus of 
the deceased. In the cross-examination, he had stated that it was not 
possible to give opinion whether the deceased had got herself burnt 
or somebody had burnt her after pouring kerosene. However, in his 
opinion, sustaining 100% burn injuries was not possible in case of 
self-inflicting burns and that some percentage would have been left. 
In the cross-examination, he had explained that 100% burns would 
mean the body was lying burnt from top to bottom. He also admitted 
that if the size of the room was very small, then entering the room 
from outside would not be probable due to smoke.
21.	 The Investigating
Officer, Shyam Lal Patwari examined as PW-8 had 
deposed about the investigation carried out by him after receiving the 
complaint from PW-2 on 15.09.2003. He deposed that he had seized 
the articles from the place of occurrence, which included semi burnt 
bedding, two cans of kerosene measuring 5 litre each, having half 
litre of kerosene available in each can at that time, one burnt wood 
etc. and had prepared a seizure memo. He further stated that when 
the accused Vijaya Singh was arrested, he had found fresh abrasion 
injury marks on his face and Vijaya Singh had told him that he had 
sustained those injuries due to scorching. Similarly, accused Basanti 
Devi at the time of her arrest was found to have fresh abrasion 
mark on her forehead and she also stated that the said marks were 
due to scorching. He also stated that he had made arrangement 
for recording of statements of witnesses Kumari Saroj and Kumari 
Preeti under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Judicial Magistrate. In 
the cross-examination, he had admitted that he had not made any
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arrangement for the medical examination of the injuries sustained 
by the accused Vijaya Singh and Basanti Devi.
22.	 The statements of the appellants were recorded under Section 313 
of Cr.P.C. Both of them denied the allegations made against them by 
the witnesses examined by the prosecution. The appellant no.1-Vijaya 
Singh further stated that the deceased was adamant to accompany 
him at Chandigarh, however, he had said that it would take one to 
two months and therefore, she committed suicide. The appellant 
no.2-Basanti Devi stated in her further statement that at the time 
of incident, she had gone to a flour mill which was located at the 
distance of 5 kms from her village along with her sister Pitambari 
Devi, and when they came back, the incident had already taken place.
23.	 The appellants had examined a defence witness Pitambari Devi. She 
had stated that on the date of incident in the morning, she along 
with Basanti Devi had gone to Dharat (Flour Mill) situated in Bajaira 
which was 5 kms away and had come back home together in the 
evening at about 5.00 PM by bus. She further stated that people 
told her that the incident of fire had taken place in the house of the 
accused, however, she had not seen the dead body of the deceased.
24.	 On a careful appreciation of the evidence on record, it could be seen 
that the appellant no. 1 was working in Chandigarh and used to visit 
his village once in 3-4 months.
During these intervals, the deceased 
used to live alone with her in-laws in the village. The witnesses 
have invariably deposed that the deceased was desirous of going 
to Chandigarh along with her husband and appellant no. 2 had an 
objection regarding the same. The basis of that objection becomes 
clear from the testimony of PWs as the appellant no. 2 wanted the 
deceased to help with the domestic chores at home. 
25.	 The story of the prosecution begins much before the commission of 
the alleged offence. PW-1 and PW-6 have deposed in no uncertain 
terms that the deceased used to share with them her agony at her 
matrimonial home. They have deposed regarding the desire of the 
deceased to go to Chandigarh as well as regarding the harassment 
caused by appellant no. 2 for that reason. PW-1 has also deposed 
regarding the presence of an injury on the body of the deceased 
when she once visited her parental house soon after her wedding. 
Their versions have largely remained unrebutted despite elaborate 
cross-examination. The appellants have raised questions regarding
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their versions stating that they are contradictory. We are unable to 
find any material contradiction in their versions and the Trial Court 
and the High Court have correctly appreciated their evidence in light 
of their background. For, the witnesses were essentially villagers 
and their testimonies cannot be subjected to mathematical precision. 
The evidence of every witness cannot be subject to the same level 
of scrutiny and the Court must be alive to the social position of the 
witness. Further, it is trite law that mere presence of minor variations 
is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. It is so because a natural 
testimony is bound to have variations. The question is whether the 
variations or contradictions could be termed as fatal to the case of 
the prosecution. The said question needs to be answered in light 
of the other evidence on record by examining whether the oral 
testimonies have found corroboration from other evidence or have 
remained isolated testimonies. 
26.	 In the present case, the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-6 are supported 
by the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-4, who are the sisters of appellant 
no. 1 and daughters of appellant no. 2. They are not interested 
witnesses and their testimonies must be given due credence. The 
statements of PW-3 and PW-4 were recorded before the Judicial 
Magistrate under Section 164 of CrPC in the aftermath of the incident. 
However, the issue
with respect to their evidence is that they have 
sought to retract from their statements recorded under Section 164 
CrPC and have denied a material part of their statements before the 
Sessions Court. The reason for retraction is that the statements were 
recorded under threat of the concerned Patwari who was present 
before the Judicial Magistrate along with the witnesses. The weight 
to be attached to such a statement during appreciation of evidence 
is the question that arises before us at this juncture.
27.	 The jurisprudence concerning a statement under Section 164 CrPC 
is fairly clear. Such a statement is not considered as a substantive 
piece of evidence, as substantive oral evidence is one which is 
deposed before the Court and is subjected to cross-examination. 
However, Section 157 of Indian Evidence Act, 18725 makes it clear 
that a statement under Section 164 CrPC could be used for both 
corroboration and contradiction. It could be used to corroborate the 
5	
Hereinafter referred as “Evidence Act”
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testimonies of other witnesses. In R. Shaji v. State of Kerala,6 this 
Court discussed the two-fold objective of a statement under Section 
164 CrPC as:
“15. So far as the statement of witnesses recorded under 
Section 164 is concerned, the object is two fold; in the 
first place, to deter the witness from changing his stand by 
denying the contents of his previously recorded statement, 
and secondly, to tide over immunity from prosecution by 
the witness under Section 164. A proposition to the effect 
that if a statement of a witness is recorded under Section 
164, his evidence in Court should be discarded, is not at 
all warranted …”
The Court also recognized that the need for recording the statement 
of a witness under Section 164 CrPC arises when the witness appears 
to be connected to the accused and is prone to changing his version 
at a later stage due to influence. The relevant para reads thus:
“16. … During the investigation, the Police Officer may 
sometimes feel that it is expedient to record the statement 
of a witness under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure. 
This usually happens when the witnesses to a crime are 
clearly connected to the accused, or where the accused 
is very influential, owing to which the witnesses may be 
influenced …”
28.	 Considering the conceptual requirement of recording a statement 
before a Judicial Magistrate during the course of investigation and 
the utility thereof, as
prescribed in Section 157 of Evidence Act, it 
could be observed that a statement under Section 164, although 
not a substantive piece of evidence, not only meets the test of 
relevancy but could also be used for the purposes of contradiction and 
corroboration. A statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC serves 
a special purpose in a criminal investigation as a greater amount of 
credibility is attached to it for being recorded by a Judicial Magistrate 
and not by the Investigating Officer. A statement under Section 164 
CrPC is not subjected to the constraints attached with a statement 
under Section 161 CrPC and the vigour of Section 162 CrPC does 
6	
MANU/SC/0087/2013
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not apply to a statement under Section 164 CrPC. Therefore, it must 
be considered on a better footing. However, relevancy, admissibility 
and reliability are distinct concepts in the realm of the law of evidence. 
Thus, the weight to be attached to such a statement (reliability thereof) 
is to be determined by the Court on a case-to-case basis and the 
same would depend to some extent upon whether the witness has 
remained true to the statement or has resiled from it, but it would not 
be a conclusive factor. For, even if a witness has retracted from a 
statement, such retraction could be a result of manipulation and the 
Court has to examine the circumstances in which the statement was 
recorded, the reasons stated by the witness for retracting from the 
statement etc. Ultimately, what counts is whether the Court believes 
a statement to be true, and the ultimate test of reliability happens 
during the trial upon a calculated balancing of conflicting versions 
in light of the other evidence on record. 
29.	 In the present case, the statements of PW-3 and PW-4 were recorded 
by the Judicial Magistrate on 09.10.2003 i.e. almost 25 days after the 
incident. Thus, their statements were recorded after the passage of 
a considerable time and could not be termed as hasty statements 
as there was sufficient cooling period for the witnesses to think over 
and contemplate the consequences of their statements. During
this 
entire period, both PW-3 and PW-4 remained with their family and it 
is not their case that they were kept under influence or were tutored 
during this period. Pertinently, PW-1 has also deposed that on certain 
occasions, PW-3 had accompanied the deceased Devaki to her 
maternal home, which indicates that PW-3 had a sense of attachment 
with the deceased and the same could have been the reason for giving 
a statement against her own brother and mother. In fact, the retraction 
of these statements by PW-3 and PW-4 before the Court appears to be 
a result of tutoring and manipulation as the said witnesses could have 
easily been won over by their family members during the intervening 
period. Furthermore, the witnesses have admitted that the statements 
were signed by them and there is no suggestion to the effect that the 
witnesses could not have understood the statements. The statements 
have been certified by the concerned Magistrate to the effect that they 
have been read by the witnesses and their consequences have been 
explained to the witnesses. 
30.	 PW-3 and PW-4 have deposed that they were under threat from 
the concerned Investigating Officer who was present along with
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them before the Magistrate. The concerned Investigating Officer 
has been examined as PW-8 in the present case and during his 
examination, there is not even a suggestion from the appellants to 
the effect that he was present along with PW-3 and PW-4 at the time 
of recording their statement under Section 164 or to the effect that 
he had threatened them to give incriminating statements against the 
appellants. Furthermore, the concerned Magistrate could have been 
examined as a witness in the present matter to clear the controversy 
on this aspect and for unexplained reasons, he was never called 
for examination especially when a completely hostile version was 
being provided by the witnesses qua the proceedings which were 
conducted before him. The appellants failed to place any material 
on record to justify the allegation of threat and as discussed above, 
the statements of PW-3 and PW-4 recorded under Section 164 
CrPC reflected the correct version of the events that transpired on 
the fateful day. 
31.	 Having said so, we deem it fit to observe that a statement under 
Section 164 CrPC cannot be discarded at the drop of a hat and on 
a mere statement of the witness that it was not recorded correctly. 
For, a judicial satisfaction of the Magistrate, to the effect that the 
statement being recorded is the correct version of the facts stated 
by the witness, forms part of every such statement and a higher 
burden must be
placed upon the witness to retract from the same. 
To permit retraction by a witness from a signed statement recorded 
before the Magistrate on flimsy grounds or on mere assertions would 
effectively negate the difference between a statement recorded by 
the police officer and that recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. In the 
present matter, there is no reasonable ground to reject the statements 
recorded under Section 164 CrPC and reliance has correctly been 
placed upon the said statements by the courts below. 
32.	 Thus, it stands proved from the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-4 that 
on the fateful day, the deceased and appellant no. 1 had proceeded 
to the bus stand to leave for Chandigarh but they returned back as 
they could not find any bus. Naturally, despite the disappointment of 
not finding a bus, the deceased must have been happy to have finally 
found a way to go to Chandigarh along with her husband. However, 
after she came back, a quarrel took place between the appellant 
no. 2 and the deceased. This was at around 4 PM, after the return 
of appellant no. 2 from Dharat. Thereafter, PW-3 and PW-4 left for
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Vijaya Singh & Anr. v.  State of Uttarakhand
picking grass and when they returned around 6 PM, the deceased was 
found dead due to burning. During this interval, only the appellants 
were at home along with the deceased. The presence of appellant 
no. 2 at the place of occurrence is duly established and the testimony 
of DW-1 stands falsified in light of the versions put forth by PW-3 and 
PW-4. Even otherwise, as per DW-1, appellant no. 2 came back at 
5 PM and incident is stated to be of 6 PM. The courts below have 
correctly analyzed this aspect and no case for alibi is made out. 
33.	 The appellants have urged that the death of the deceased was suicidal 
and not homicidal. The reason given for suicide is that the deceased 
was frustrated as she could not go to Chandigarh along with her 
husband. The reason does not inspire confidence at all. For, there 
is no proportionality of this reason with the drastic act of suicide and 
even otherwise, on the date of incident, the deceased and appellant 
no. 1 had left for Chandigarh and had to return due to non-availability 
of bus. Thus, the deceased had no reason to be frustrated about it 
as things were finally moving as per her desire. Furthermore, the 
deceased was pregnant at the time of incident and she could not 
have taken a drastic step of suicide with a womb in her stomach. 
On the contrary, it is not difficult to accept that appellant no. 2 must 
have been angry with the deceased for going to
Chandigarh and the 
quarrel which took place between the deceased and appellant no. 2, 
as per PW-3 and PW-4, was consistent with the natural course of 
events on the fateful day. 
34.	 So far as the possibility of suicide is concerned, it is difficult to believe 
that the deceased managed to procure two cans of kerosene (5 
litres each) on her own for committing suicide within a time bracket 
of two hours, that too in the presence of the appellants in the house. 
It is equally difficult to believe that the deceased poured almost 9 
litres of kerosene on herself, put herself on fire and kept on burning 
till her body suffered 100% burns, without the appellants getting a 
whisper about the same despite being present in the same house. 
If it was indeed a case of self-immolation, the appellants must have 
done something to save her and her body would not have suffered 
100% burns. This fact assumes greater gravity when it is seen that 
the room was not bolted from inside and was open for access. Thus, 
the conduct of the appellants, previous to and at the time of the 
incident, pointed in an incriminating direction. Furthermore, as per 
the testimonies of PWs, no smell of kerosene could be detected at
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the place of occurrence or in the body of the deceased which is not 
consistent with the allegation of self-immolation using an enormous 
quantity of kerosene. 
35.	 Yet another circumstance which merited an explanation, and could 
not be explained by the appellants, was the presence of fresh injury 
and abrasion marks on the faces of the appellants at the time of 
their arrest. Both the appellants tried to explain away the presence 
of injuries/marks by stating that they occurred due to scorching. 
Although, the investigating officer ought to have ensured the 
conduct of medical examination of the fresh injuries/marks, however, 
the reason stated by the appellants is completely incredible. The 
appellants were residing in the same area and if at all the marks 
were due to scorching, they could not have been fresh marks. The 
only inference which could be drawn from the presence of fresh 
injuries is that there was physical resistance from the deceased 
when she was being set ablaze. It could not have been explained 
away in this manner. 
36.	 Equally questionable was the subsequent conduct of the appellants. 
The conduct of the appellants in the aftermath of the incident 
was unnatural and does not exonerate them in any manner. The 
deceased, as per the versions of PW-3 and PW-4, was dead by the 
time they returned i.e. around 6 PM. As per DW-1, the deceased 
had put herself on fire when she returned with appellant no. 2
from Dharat at around 5 PM. Irrespective of whether the time of 
death is taken as 5 PM or 6 PM, the fact remains that intimation 
of death was not given to the family members of the deceased 
before 8 PM (as per PW-5 and 9 PM as per the FIR), and in the 
interim, no complaint whatsoever was given by the appellants to 
the local police. Moreover, no effort was made by the appellants 
to provide medical attention to the deceased or to take her to any 
nearby hospital. The appellants were found to be sitting outside 
the house when PW-2 and PW-5 reached. That the appellants 
chose to remain silent in their house for over two hours, despite 
witnessing that the deceased had completely succumbed to burn 
injuries, goes on to show a completely unnatural conduct and 
points in the direction of their guilt. Moreover, instead of taking 
measures to take legal or medical assistance without loss of time, 
the appellants were actually tampering with the scene of crime, as 
discussed in the following para.
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Vijaya Singh & Anr. v.  State of Uttarakhand
37.	 The evidence has revealed that the scene of crime was actually 
found to be altered by the time the Investigating Officer and the 
PWs reached the spot. The presence of two kerosene jars of 5 litres 
each, presence of grass on the body of the deceased, sprinkling of 
water on the quilt, placement of body between two unburnt coats 
etc. are the circumstances which indicate the alteration of the crime 
scene by the appellants in order to shield themselves from suspicion. 
Since the deceased had suffered 100% burns, the water could not 
have been poured to save the deceased from burns and must have 
been poured afterwards to demonstrate that they had made efforts 
to save her. If water was indeed poured at the time of burning, the 
deceased ought not have suffered 100% burns from top to bottom 
and the act of pouring the water later on the quilt clearly amounts 
to manipulation of evidence. The findings on this count also remain 
unchallenged and are not open to any doubt. 
38.	 Thus, we may observe that the circumstantial evidence available on 
record appears to be consistent and does not leave much scope for 
the innocence of the appellants. The circumstances overwhelmingly 
point in the direction of guilt of the appellants and the cumulative 
effect of the circumstances has been analyzed correctly by the 
courts below. An alternate possibility is not in sight. To add to it, the 
evidence of PW-7 also
states that it was not possible for the body 
to sustain 100% burns in the case of suicide or self-immolation and 
this opinion finds support from other evidence on record. Therefore, 
this opinion has been appreciated by the High Court and Trial Court 
in correct context. 
39.	 Once the entire evidence led by the prosecution is examined 
collectively and comprehensively, the only possibility that emerges 
is of the guilt of the appellants. The appellants have attempted to 
raise questions regarding the evidence of PW-7 and PW-3/PW-4 
for various other isolated reasons. However, as discussed above, 
in order to arrive at the true picture, the evidence adduced before 
the Court is to be examined as a whole and not in isolation. This 
principle assumes greater importance in cases which are based on 
circumstantial evidence as in the absence of direct evidence of the 
offence, the Court is required to analyze the proved circumstances 
in a collective sense so as to arrive at a reasonable finding. In such 
cases, the finding of the Court is essentially an irresistible inference 
which is drawn from the proved material on record.
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40.	 We have also examined other grounds such as the delay in 
registration of FIR, however, we are unable to find any merit in the 
same. PW-2 was informed about the incident at night on 14.09.2003 
and as soon as he received the information, he travelled to the 
appellants’ village. Thereafter, he went to lodge a complaint, but the 
Patwari was not available at night, which is quite understandable 
as it was late. The complaint was lodged the very next day. Even 
otherwise, it could take a reasonable time for a family member to 
process the news of a tragic death and as long as the delay is not 
unreasonable or suspicious, any delay in the lodging of complaint 
would not be of much consequence, especially when other evidence 
is of incriminating value. 
41.	 In light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view 
that the Trial Court and High Court have correctly appreciated the 
evidence on record. We are unable to find any infirmity in the findings 
of the courts below and the impugned order is sustainable in the 
eyes of law. In the absence of a finding of illegality or perversity or 
impossibility of the impugned findings, consistent views taken by 
two courts cannot be disturbed on mere conjectures or surmises. 
Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. 
42.	 The appellants, if enlarged on bail, shall surrender before the 
concerned Jail Superintendent within two weeks from the date of 
this judgment
for serving their sentence. Registry to communicate 
the order forthwith. 
43.	 The present appeal stands disposed of in terms of this judgment. 
Interim application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. No costs.
Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Mukund P Unny, Hony. Associate Editor 
(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)