STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS versus DEV BRAT SHARMA
[2022] 2 S.C.R. 528, Supreme Court of India, 2022
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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[2022] 2 S.C.R. 528
528
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS
v.
DEV BRAT SHARMA
(Civil Appeal No. 2064 of 2022)
MARCH 16, 2022
[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
Court Fees Act, 1870: s.7 – Computation of Fees – Money
suit – Respondent filed a suit for recovery of Rs.20 Lakhs as damages
on account of denying the status of freedom fighter and affixed
court fees of Rs.50 – Appellant sought rejection of plaint on the
ground of non payment of requisite court fee – Trial Court directed
the respondent to make good the court-fees on the amount of Rs.20
lakhs claimed as damages – However, High Court set aside the
order of trial court – On appeal, held: s.7 of the Act 1870 provides
for computation of fees in certain suits – s.7(i) refers to Money
Suits which includes suits for damages, compensation, arrears of
maintenance, annuities or other sums payable periodically where
the fee payable would be according to the amount claimed – s.7(iv)
which has six categories where the fees would be payable according
to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or
memorandum of appeal – For s.7(iv), liberty has been given to
plaintiff to value his claim for the payment of Court fee – Present
case is of money suit for compensation/damages and would fall u/
s.7(i) of the Act – Valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction and
relief has to be same in the money suit falling u/s.7(i) – Court fees
shall be payable by the respondent
on the valuation, i.e., on Rs. 20
lakhs – Hence, ad valorem Court-fees would have to be paid as per
schedule 1 entry 1 – Order of the High Court set aside – Order of
Trial court restored.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Chapter III of the Act deals with ‘Fees in Other
Courts and in Public Offices.’ Section 6 thereof provides that no
document of any kind specified as chargeable in the First or
Second Schedule of this Act would be filed, exhibited or recorded
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in any Court of Justice or would be received or furnished by any
public officer, unless in respect of such document, fee of an amount
not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the
proper fee for such document is paid. First Schedule lays down
the computation of ad valorem Court fees whereas Second
Schedule gives the table of fixed Court fees payable on different
categories of plaints, documents and pleadings. [Para 18]
[537-F-G; 538-A-B]
2. Section 7 thereof provides for computation of fees payable
in certain suits. Sub-clause (i) refers to Money Suits which
includes suits for damages, compensation, arrears of maintenance,
annuities or other sums payable periodically where the fee payable
would be according to the amount claimed. Then, there are other
sub-clauses which are not relevant for the case in hand. However,
sub-clause (iv) which has further six categories, namely, suits (a)
for movable property of no market value; (b) to enforce a right to
share in joint family property; (c) for a declaratory decree and
consequential relief; (d) for an injunction; (e) for easements; and
(f) for accounts. The fees on a suit falling in these categories
would be payable according to the amount at which the relief sought
is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. It also states
that in all such suits the plaintiff would state the amount at which
he values the relief sought. [Para 19][538-B-E]
3. A reading of the relief clause in the plaint
would make it
abundantly clear that this was a money suit for compensation/
damages and not falling under any of the categories mentioned in
clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, there would be no
question at all for the applicability of Section 7(iv) of the Act. It
would be a simple case of applicability of Section 7(i) of the Act
and ad valorem Court-fees would have to be paid as per Schedule
1 entry 1. It is only with respect to the category of suits specified
in clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act that the plaintiff has the
liberty of stating in the plaint the amount at which relief is valued
and Court-fees would be payable on the said amount. Liberty
given under clause (iv) to the specific suits of six categories is
not available to the suits falling under any other clause, be it (i),
(ii), (iii) etc. Once the suit in question was a money suit for
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compensation and damages falling under clause (i) of Section 7 of
the Act, ad valorem Court-fees would be payable on the amount
claimed. [Paras 20, 21][539-F-H; 540-A-B]
4. In the present case, the respondent has not given a
separate valuation for relief sought and rightly so, as it had no
liberty and right to give different valuation than what was being
actually claimed. As a matter of fact, in Para 11 of the plaint it is
clearly stated that the valuation is the same for Court-fees and
jurisdiction. The valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and
relief has to be the same in the money suits falling under category
7(i). It was only in category of suits covered by Clause (iv) of
Section 7 that there could be two different valuations for the
purposes of jurisdiction and for relief sought. [Paras 28, 29]
[543-B-D]
M/s Commercial Aviation & Travel Company v. Vimla
Pannalal (1988) 3 SCC 423 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR
431; M.P. Shreevastava v. Mrs. Veena[1967] 1 SCR 147;
Shanbhagakannu Bhattar v. Muthu Bhattar AIR 1971
SC 2468 : [1971] 2 SCR 711; S.RM. AR. S. SP.
Sathappa Chettiar v. S. RM. AR. RM. Ramanathan
Chettiar 1958 AIR 245 : 1958 (0) SCR 1024– Held
Inapplicable.
Manpreet Singh v. Gurmail Singh and others (2016) 4
Civil Court Cases 503 (PLH); State of Punjab v. Jagdip
Singh Chowhan (2005) 1 RCR (Civil) 54; Ranjit Kaur
v. PSEB6 (2006) SCC Online P&H 1095; Manjeet
Singh v. Beant Sharma 16(c) (2012) SCC Online P&H
13081;
Hem Raj v. Harchet Singh (1993) Civil Court
Cases 48 (P&H); Subhash Chander Goel v. Harvind
Sagar (2003) AIR (Punjab) 248; State of Punjab v.
Jagdip Singh Chowhan (2005) 1 RCR (Civil) 54;
Manpreet Singh v. Gurmail Singh (2016) 3 PLR 751;
Dr. B.L. Kapoor Memorial Hospital v. Balbir Aggarwal
(2015) SCC Online P&H 1790; Bharpoor Singh and
another v. Lachhman Singh 2017(1) Law Herald 609 –
referred to.
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Case Law Reference
[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 431
referred to
Para 17 (i)
[1967] 1 SCR 147
held inapplicable
Para 17(e) (i)
[1971] 2 SCR 711 
held inapplicable
Para 17 (e) (ii)
AIR (1988) 3 SC423
held inapplicable
Para 22 (1)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2064
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.08.2017 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CR No.291 of 2017.
Ms. Uttara Babbar, Manan Bansal, Advs. for the Appellants.
Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Ms. Filza Moonis, Advs. for
the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The State of Punjab and its officers have assailed the
correctness of the judgment and order dated 11.08.2017 passed by the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana, whereby the High Court allowed
the revision petition filed by the respondent Dev Brat Sharma and further
proceeded to reject the application of the appellant under Order VII
Rule 11 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure1 after setting
aside the order dated 10.11.2016 passed by the Trial Court holding that
the respondent (plaintiff before the Trial Court) was required to make
good deficiency in the Court fees on the amount of Rs. 20 Lakhs claimed
by him as compensation.
FACTS:
3. The respondent instituted a suit for recovery of Rs.20 Lakhs as
damages allegedly suffered by him on account of denying the status of
freedom fighter by the defendants and also for the loss of reputation on
account of non-issuance of certificate of freedom fighter along with
interest @9% per annum from the date of institution of the suit till
realization of the amount. The State of Punjab and five others (officers
1 Code of Civil Procedure - CPC
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS v. DEV BRAT SHARMA
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of the State Government) were impleaded as defendants. This suit was
registered as Case No.1661 of 2015 in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Jalandhar.
4. Briefly the facts as set out in the plaint were:
(i) that the respondent belongs to a renowned family of Jalandhar.
He had retired as DDPO and was the youngest freedom fighter in the
Quit India Movement. After retirement, he was practicing as an Advocate
and commanded great respect among the residents of Jalandhar. Further
details regarding his family background are also stated.
(ii) that the respondent was duly recognized by the Government
of Punjab as a ‘freedom fighter’ but the defendant No.3, the Director,
Lotteries, who was posted as Deputy Commissioner, Jalandhar at the
relevant time, denied the said status.
(iii) that the respondent had filed two writ petitions before the
High Court at Chandigarh bearing CWP No.15316 of 2013 and CWP
No.18535 of 2013 against the rejection of his request for issuing the
certificate of ‘freedom fighter’. The High Court disposed of Writ Petition
No.15316/2013 on 19.07.2013 and allowed Writ Petition No.18535/2013
on 14.11.2014.
(iv) that the respondent had to travel to Chandigarh several times,
engage lawyers, pay fees and expenses for the said litigation at an old
age, he had suffered great mental tension and torture on account of
illegal acts of the defendant Nos.3 to 6 (officers of State of Punjab).
(v) that the
grandson of the respondent could not get admission
because of non-issuance of the said certificate and so he had to be
admitted in a college in the State of Tamil Nadu.
(vi) that the respondent spent approximately Rs.2 Lakhs on
litigation. He had to make several trips to Tamil Nadu for the education
of his grandson, who otherwise could have been admitted in Punjab. As
such, he suffered damages of approximately Rs.20 Lakhs, which included
Rs.2 Lakhs for the litigation expenses, mental tension, harassment and
further incidental damages.
5. Accordingly, a legal notice dated 16.03.2015 was given under
Section 80 CPC calling upon the defendants to pay a sum of Rs.20
Lakhs as damages suffered by him. When despite notice, the said amount
was not paid, a suit was instituted praying for the following reliefs:
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“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the suit of the
plaintiff for recovery of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lacs only)
as damages suffered by the plaintiff on account of denying the
status of Freedom Fighter to the plaintiff by the defendant No.3
who was posted as Deputy Commissioner, Jalandhar at the relevant
time and loss of reputation on account of non-issuance of
Certificate of Freedom Fighter for the use of his grandson, may
kindly be decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendant with costs, in the interest of justice and equity.
It is further prayed that the decretal amount may be allowed
to be recovered along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum
from the date of institution of the suit till the realization of the
amount.
It is further prayed that any other relief, which this Hon’ble
Court may deem fit and proper may also be granted in favour of
the plaintiff and against the defendant, in the interest of justice
and equity.”
6. According to the contents of paragraph 11 of the plaint, the
valuation of the suit both for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction
was fixed at more than Rs.20 lakhs but court fees of Rs.50/- was affixed
relying upon judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court. An
undertaking to pay the court fees on the sum to be adjudicated as damages
by the Court in due course of time was also stated. Paragraph 11 of the
plaint is reproduced below:
“11. That the value of the suit for the purpose of court fee
and jurisdiction is fixed at more than Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty
lacs only) but in view of the latest law, laid down by the Hon’ble
Punjab & Haryana High Court in case titled “Ajit Singh Kohar
Vs. Shashi Kant” (CR No.5638 of 2014, decided on August
25th, 2014) that the suit for defamation for maligning reputation,
the affixation of court fee of Rs.50/- is acceptable as exact value
of the relief to be granted, cannot be ascertained at initial stage
and accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court left the petitioner in that
case to pay the court fee on the sum to be adjudicated as damages
by the lower court in due course of time. The relevant portion of
the order of the Hon’ble High Court is reproduced as under: -
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS v. DEV BRAT SHARMA
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
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“6. Sequelly, the impugned order is set aside
leaving the petitioner to pay the court fee on the sum
to be adjudicated as damages by the lower court in
due course of time, but not at this initial stage,
notwithstanding that the petitioner though, leaving
the entire matter to the court for adjudication of the
quantum of damages, he himself has given the
quantum of damages to be Rs.2.00 Crores”
Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Punjab
& Haryana High Court, though the plaintiff himself has given the
quantum of damages to be Rs.20,00,000/- but at this initial stage,
notwithstanding that the plaintiff though, leaving the entire matter
to this Hon’ble Court for adjudication of the quantum of damages,
is affixing the tentative court fee of Rs.50/-. However, the plaintiff
undertakes to pay the court fee on the sum to be adjudicated as
damages by this Hon’ble court in due course of time.”
7. The appellants filed written statement wherein preliminary
objections were raised, one of them being that the suit had not been
properly stamped for the purposes of Court- fees. A replication was
filed by the respondent reiterating the contents of the plaint and also
refuting the preliminary objection.
8. The appellants thereafter preferred an application under Order
VII Rule 11 (c) read with Section 151 CPC on the ground of non-payment
of requisite Court-fees, which was registered as IA No.00001 of 2016.
9. The Trial
Court, vide order dated 10.11.2016, disposed of the
said application with the direction to the respondent to file the Court-
fees on the amount of Rs.20 Lakhs as claimed by him and granted about
10 weeks’ time to make good the deficiency.
10. The Trial Court first considered the judgment in the case of
Manpreet Singh vs. Gurmail Singh and others2, relied upon by the
respondent in support of his submissions and distinguished the same as
being neither applicable nor helpful for the respondent on the facts of
the said case. It further took into consideration the provisions contained
in Section 7(i) of the Court Fees Act, 18703 as being applicable and,
2 (2016) 4 Civil Court Cases 503 (PLH)
3 The Act
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accordingly, directed the respondent to make good the Court- fees on
the amount of Rs.20 lakhs claimed as damages.
11. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent preferred a
revision petition under Section 115 CPC before the High Court which
was registered as CR No.291 of 2017. The High Court, vide judgment
and order dated 11.08.2017, referred to a number of judgments to hold
that as the actual and specified amount of damages was still to be
assessed and determined by the Trial Court, as such, the direction of the
Trial Court to pay ad valorem Court fees on the amount of Rs.20 lakhs
was not sustainable in law.
12. The High Court was further influenced by the pleadings in the
plaint and replication to the effect that the respondent undertakes to
make good the court fees on the amount adjudicated as damages by the
Court in due course of time.
13. The High Court, accordingly, set aside the order of the Trial
Court dated 10.11.2016 and rejected the application of the appellant under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC with a further direction to the Trial Court to
proceed with the suit.
14. The above judgment of the High Court is under challenge.
During the pendency of the Special Leave Petition, the suit was dismissed
by the Trial Court on 28.02.2020. Aggrieved, the respondent has preferred
an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, which is pending.
ARGUMENTS:
15. We have heard on behalf of the appellant- Ms. Uttara Babbar,
Advocate and on behalf of the respondent-
Shri Abhimanyu Tiwari,
Advocate.
16. Broadly, the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants
are:
(a) that the High Court fell in error in relying upon several judgments
which had no application to the facts of the present case;
(b) that the judgment in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Jagdip
Singh Chowhan4 relied upon by the High Court was carried in appeal5
4 (2005) 1 RCR (Civil) 54.
5 Civil Appeal No.3987 of 2006
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS v. DEV BRAT SHARMA
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
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before this Court and this Court has held that ad valorem court fees
would be payable in a suit for malicious prosecution for a claim of Rs. 2
Crores;
(c) that the Court-fees was payable under Section 7(i) of the Act
and that Section 7(iv) of the Act would have no application. Reliance is
placed upon two judgments i.e. Ranjit Kaur vs. PSEB6, and Manjeet
Singh vs. Beant Sharma7;
(d) that the respondent in writ petitions filed before the High Court
had also claimed damages and compensation and once such relief has
not been granted by the High Court, the suit itself, for the same relief
was not maintainable and ought not to have been entertained. It was a
clear abuse of process of law and such frivolous litigations ought to have
been nipped in the bud.
17. On behalf of plaintiff-respondent, the learned counsel Shri
Abhimanyu Tiwari has sought to justify the order of the High Court as
just, valid and in accordance with law. According to learned counsel:
(a) the High Court rightly rejected the application under Order
VII Rule 11 in view of the several judgments referred to in the order;
(b) as proper valuation could not be ascertained at the time of
institution of the suit, there would not be any justification for charging ad
valorem court fees on a tentative amount mentioned in the plaint;
(c) the High Court had left it open for the Trial Court to determine
the actual valuation after trial whereupon the court fees would
be
recovered from the plaintiff for which he had given an undertaking also,
and hence, no error could be said to have been committed by the High
Court;
(d) reliance has been placed upon the following judgments in
support of the above propositions:
i) M/s Commercial Aviation & Travel Company vs. Vimla
Pannalal8.
ii) Hem Raj vs. Harchet Singh9;
6 (2006) SCC Online P&H 1095
7 (2012) SCC Online P&H 13081
8 (1988) 3 SCC 423,
9 (1993) Civil Court Cases 48 (P&H),
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iii) Subhash Chander Goel vs. Harvind Sagar10;
(iv) State of Punjab vs. Jagdip Singh Chowhan11 (reversed
by this Court);
(v) Manpreet Singh vs. Gurmail Singh12;
(vi) Dr. B.L. Kapoor Memorial Hospital vs. Balbir
Aggarwal13
(e) before Trial Court issue no.3 was framed relating to proper
valuation of the suit for the purposes of the Court- fees. Trial Court vide
judgment and order dated 28.02.2020 although had dismissed the suit
but held that the onus to prove the said issue was placed upon the
defendants and as no evidence was led nor any argument advanced in
support of the said issue, decided the same against the defendants-
appellants. The judgment dated 28.02.2020 having not been carried further
by the appellants, it would suggest that they had abandoned the said
issue. In support of the said submission that an abandoned issue could
not be resurrected in higher forum, reliance was placed upon following
two judgments: -
i) M.P. Shreevastava vs. Mrs. Veena14;
ii) Shanbhagakannu Bhattar vs. Muthu Bhattar15.
(f) in the event this Court was of the view that the plaintiff was
liable to pay ad valorem court fees on the amount mentioned in the
plaint, then, the same would be of academic interest only as the appellants
had abandoned their plea regarding valuation by not filing any cross
objection or appeal against the judgment dated 28.02.2020.
ANALYSIS:
18. Chapter III of the Act deals with ‘Fees In Other Courts And
In Public Offices.’ Section 6 thereof provides
that no document of any
kind specified as chargeable in the First or Second Schedule of this Act
would be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of Justice or would be
10 (2003) AIR (Punjab) 248,
11 (2005) 1 RCR (Civil) 54,
12 (2016) 3 PLR 751,
13 (2015) SCC Online P&H 1790.
14 (1967) 1 SCR 147,
15 (AIR 1971 SC 2468.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS v. DEV BRAT SHARMA
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
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received or furnished by any public officer, unless in respect of such
document, fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the
said Schedules as the proper fee for such document is paid. First Schedule
lays down the computation of ad valorem Court fees whereas Second
Schedule gives the table of fixed Court fees payable on different
categories of plaints, documents and pleadings.
19. Section 7 thereof provides for computation of fees payable in
certain suits. Sub-clause (i) refers to Money Suits which includes suits
for damages, compensation, arrears of maintenance, annuities or other
sums payable periodically where the fee payable would be according to
the amount claimed. Then, there are other sub-clauses which are not
relevant for the case in hand. However, sub-clause (iv) which has further
six categories, namely, suits (a) for movable property of no market value;
(b) to enforce a right to share in joint family property; (c) for a declaratory
decree and consequential relief; (d) for an injunction; (e) for easements;
and (f) for accounts. The fees on a suit falling in these categories would
be payable according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued
in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. It also states that in all such suits
the plaintiff would state the amount at which he values the relief sought.
Section 6 and relevant part of Section 7 of the Act are reproduced
hereunder: -
“6. Fees on
documents filed, etc., in Mofussil Courts or in
public offices. –
Except in the Courts hereinbefore mentioned, no document of
any of the kinds specified as chargeable in the First or Second
Schedule to this act annexed shall be filed, exhibited or recorded
in any Court of Justice, or shall be received or furnished by any
public officer, unless in respect of such document there be paid a
fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said
Schedules as the proper fee for such document.
7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits. – The amount
of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter
mentioned shall be computed as follows: -
for money.- (i) In suits for money (including suits for damages or
compensation, or arrears of maintenance, of annuities, or of other
sums payable periodically) – according to the amount claimed.
………………
……………………
……………….
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(iv) In suits –
for movable property of no market-value.
-(a) for moveable property where the subject- matter has no
market-value, as, for instance, in the case of documents relating
to title,
to enforce a right to share in joint family property. – (b) to
enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is
joint family property,
for a declaratory decree and consequential relief. - (c) to
obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief
is prayed,
for an injunction. – (d) to obtain an injunction,
for easements. – (e) for a right to some benefit (not herein
otherwise provided for) to arise out of land, and
for accounts. - (f) for accounts-
according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the
plaint or memorandum of appeal;
In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he
values the relief sought;
………………
…………………
……………”
20. The moot question for consideration is whether the suit in
question as framed was a money suit for compensation/damages falling
under Clause (i) of Section 7 or was a suit falling in any of the categories
specified in clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. A reading of the relief
clause would make it abundantly clear that this was a money suit for
compensation/damages and not falling under any of the categories
mentioned in clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, there would
be no question at all for the applicability of Section 7(iv) of the Act. It
would be a simple
case of applicability of Section 7(i) of the Act and ad
valorem Court-fees would have to be paid as per Schedule 1 entry 1.
21. It is only with respect to the category of suits specified in
clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act that the plaintiff has the liberty of
stating in the plaint the amount at which relief is valued and Court-fees
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS v. DEV BRAT SHARMA
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
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would be payable on the said amount. Liberty given under clause (iv) to
the specific suits of six categories is not available to the suits falling
under any other clause, be it (i), (ii), (iii) etc. Once the suit in question
was a money suit for compensation and damages falling under clause (i)
of Section 7 of the Act, ad valorem Court-fees would be payable on the
amount claimed.
22. The High Court, in the impugned judgement, has referred to
the following authorities in order to support the conclusion arrived at by
it:
1)
M/s Commercial Aviation and Travel Company vs.
Vimla Pannala16;
2)
Hem Raj vs. Harchet Singh17;
3)
Subhash Chander Goel vs. Harvind Sagar (supra);
4)
State of Punjab vs. Jagdip Singh Chowhan (supra);
5)
Manpreet Singh vs. Gurmail Singh (supra);
6)
Dr. B.L.Kapoor Memorial Hospital vs. Balbir
Aggarwal (supra);
7)
S.Ajit Singh Kohar vs. Sashi Kant (supra); and,
8)
Bharpoor Singh and another vs. Lachhman Singh,
2017(1) Law Herald 609.
23. The judgment in the case of Ms. Commercial Aviation and
Travel Company (supra) is of this Court and rest of the judgments are
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The judgment in the case of M/
s Commercial Aviation and Travel Company (supra) has been relied
upon by the High Court in the case of Hemraj (supra) which in turn has
been followed in other cases. In the case of Commercial Aviation and
Travel Company (supra), the suit was filed for relief of dissolution of
partnership and for accounts. For the purposes of jurisdiction, it was
valued at Rs. 25 lacs whereas for the purposes of court fees the relief
was valued at Rs. 500/-. In those circumstances, an application was
moved by the defendant under Order VII Rule 11(b) CPC for rejection
of the plaint on the ground that the suit has been grossly undervalued.
16 AIR (1988)3 SC 423
17 (1993) Civil Court Cases 48 (P&H)
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24. This Court considered the provisions under Section 7(iv) of
the Act and was of the view that suits covered by Section 7(iv) were of
such nature that it is difficult to lay down any standard of valuation and
it was, therefore, that liberty was given to the plaintiff to give a separate
valuation of the relief sought for the purposes of payment of court fees.
This Court also observed that in a suit for accounts, it is almost impossible
for the plaintiff to value the relief correctly. As such the judgement in the
case of M/s Commercial Aviation (supra) has no application. The suit
for accounts and dissolution of partnership would fall in one of the six
categories as specified in Section 7(iv) of the Act.
25. This Court further relied upon a Constitution Bench decision
of this Court in the case of S.RM.AR.RM. Ramanathan Chettiar
(supra)reported in AIR 1958 SC 245 equivalent of 1958 SCR 1024
and quoted a paragraph from the said judgment which explains why the
legislature left it open for the plaintiff to value his claim for the six
categories of the suit falling under Section 7(iv) of the Act. The basic
reason was that as it was almost difficult to value the claim for any of
the suits covered under Section 7(iv), therefore, for the purposes of
payment of court fees, a different valuation for the relief sought could
be given. All such suits were thus placed in Clause (iv) giving liberty to
the plaintiff to give a separate valuation for relief sought.
However,
ultimately it would be the actual relief granted which would determine
the court fees to be paid and the same may be made good by the plaintiff
in case lesser court fees was paid.
26. In the case of Chettiar (supra), the relief claimed was for
partition of the joint family properties and also for accounts in respect
of the joint family assets managed by the respondent. The plaintiff
further valued the claim for accounts at Rs. 1,000/- and paid a court
fees of Rs. 100/- on the said amount. However, for the purposes of
jurisdiction, the appellant gave a valuation of Rs. 15 lacs as the value
of his share. The registry took objection with regard to the payment of
the court fees and valuation, and therefore, the matter was referred to
various authorities, officers and Court under the provisions of the Act.
Ultimately after a series of innings, the matter was settled by the
aforesaid judgment and while dealing with the said issue regarding
different valuations and payment of court fees at the time of institution
of the suit, this Court discussed the scheme of Section 7 and in that
context, explained it as follows:
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS v. DEV BRAT SHARMA
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
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“If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable
in suits covered by the several sub- sections of s. 7 is
considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling
under sub-s. (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has
been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes
of court fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears
to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to
value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any
precision or definiteness. Take for instance the claim for
partition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to share
in any property on the ground that it is joint family property.
The basis of the claim is that the property in respect of which
a share is claimed is joint family property. In other words, it is
property in which the plaintiff has an undivided share. What
the plaintiff purports to do by making a claim for partition is
to ask the court to give him certain specified properties
separately and absolutely on his own account for his share
in lieu of his undivided share in the whole property. Now it
would be clear that the conversion of the plaintiff’s alleged
undivided share in the joint family property into his separate
share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any
precision or definiteness. That is why legislature has left it to
the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the payment
of
court fees. It really means that in suits falling under s. 7
(iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his
claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the court
in computing the court fees payable in respect of the said
relief. In the circumstances of this case it is unnecessary to
consider whether, under the provisions of this section, the
plaintiff has been given an absolute right or option to place
any valuation whatever on his relief.”
27. In the case of Hem Raj (supra) and all other judgments
referred to in the impugned judgment, reliance is placed upon the
observations from the judgments of Commercial Aviation(supra) and
Chettiar (supra) explaining the departure of difference carved out for
the categories and suits covered by Section 7(iv) of the Act. They have
erroneously proceeded to apply the same to the category of money suits
mentioned in Section 7(i) of the Act. Neither in the case of M/s
Commercial Aviation (supra) nor in the case of Chettiar (supra), this
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Court ever laid down that for the purposes of suits covered by clauses
other than Section 7(iv), there could be separate valuation for the purposes
of court fees and jurisdiction. On a completely erroneous approach, an
erroneous interpretation of the judgments in the case of M/s.
Commercial Aviation (supra) and Chettiar (supra), several orders
were passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which have been
relied upon in the impugned judgment. What is important to note here is
that this case related to the valuation for the purposes of relief sought.
28. In the present case, the respondent has not given a separate
valuation for relief sought and rightly so, as it had no liberty and right to
give different valuation than what was being actually claimed. As a matter
of fact, in para 11 of the plaint it is clearly stated that the valuation is the
same for Court-fees and jurisdiction.
29. The valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and relief has to
be the same in the money suits falling under category 7(i). It was only in
category of suits covered by Clause (iv) of Section 7 that there could be
two different valuations for the purposes of jurisdiction and for relief
sought.
30. Ms Babbar referred to two judgments of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in support of her submissions, namely, Ranjit Kaur
(supra) (2006) and Manjeet Singh (supra) (2012). Manjeet Singh
(supra) had relied upon Ranjit Kaur (supra) which had clearly held that
in a suit for damages,
ad valorem Court-fees would be payable on the
amount of the damages claimed.
31. Ms. Babbar also pointed out that the judgment in the case of
Ranjit Kaur (supra) dealt with the case laws on the point not only of
this Court but also of different High Courts. It specifically noted that the
judgments in the case of Subhash Chander Goel (supra), Jagdip Singh
Chowhan (supra) and Hemraj (supra) did not notice the statutory
provisions and other binding precedents.
32. The High Court in the impugned judgment had also placed
reliance upon a judgment in the case of Jagdip Singh Chowhan (supra)
which again was a case for damages. This was carried to this Court by
the State. The said judgment has since been set aside by this Court vide
order dated 29.05.2012 passed in Civil Appeal No.3987 of 2006,
State of Punjab vs. Jagdip Singh Chowhan. A copy of the said order
has been provided by Ms.Babbar, learned counsel for the appellants.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS v. DEV BRAT SHARMA
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This Court observed that there can be no dispute that in a suit for malicious
prosecution, ad valorem Court-fees is payable. The Court proceeded to
grant liberty to the counsel for the plaintiff- respondent to take appropriate
steps for amendment of the plaint or to make good the Court-fees. The
said order is reproduced hereunder:
“The present appeal is directed against the order dated 14.10.2004
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana in C.R.No.2933/2004 whereby the High Court has
permitted the plaintiffs- (respondent herein) to pay the court fee
on the tentative valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fees.
It is worth noting, for the said purpose the suit was valued at
Rs.1,43,000/- though a decree was sought for Rs.two crores
approximately. There can be no dispute that in a suit for malicious
prosecution, ad valorem court fee is payable. Faced with this
situation, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 could only
state that he will file an application for amendment before the trial
Court either restricting his claim to the amount on which the court
fee has been paid or may enhance the claim beyond the said
amount and will pay the ad valorem court fee on the same.
Recording such statement of respondent No.1, we set aside the
order passed by the learned Single Judge and grant him liberty to
file the requisite amendment to bring the plaint in order.
The appeal is
accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.”
33. On behalf of the respondent, a submission was raised relating
to the final determination of issue No.3 by the Trial Court vide judgment
and order dated 28.02.2020 where the Trial Court decided the issue
against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiff.
34. The said submission has no legs to stand for two reasons:
firstly, the said judgment had come subsequent to the filing of the present
appeal @ Special Leave Petition as the judgment of the High Court is
dated 11.08.2017 and secondly, the Trial Court had dismissed the suit
vide judgment dated 28.02.2020 as such the State was not required to
challenge the finding on issue No.3. At the time when Trial Court took
the suit for final determination, the subject-matter of issue No.3 was
covered by the impugned order of the High Court. As such, no other
decision could have been taken by the Trial Court. Moreover, for the
reason that the issue was already pending before this Court since 2018,
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much before the dismissal of the suit as such it was not necessary for
the State to challenge the said finding. Any decision taken by the Trial
Court would always remain subject to final outcome of the appeal@ Special
Leave Petition which was pending since prior in point of time. To say that
the decision of present appeal would be purely academic is therefore not
acceptable. As such we find no applicability of the two judgments in the
case of M.P. Shreevastava (supra) and Shanbhagakannu Bhattar
(supra) relied upon by the respondent. Apart from the above, the finding
on issue No.3 could also be questioned by the State in its capacity as
respondent during the hearing of the appeal.
35. We are not going into the other questions raised by Ms. Babbar
regarding the institution of suit being abuse of the process of law and we
leave it open for the Appellate Court to decide the said issue, if raised by
the State.
36. The High Court, therefore, fell in error in setting aside the
order passed by Trial Court whereby it had granted time to the plaintiff-
respondent to make good the Court-fees within a particular period failing
which the plaint would stand rejected.
37. For all the reasons recorded above, the appeal is allowed. The
judgment and order of the High Court dated 11.08.2017 is set aside and
that of the Trial Court dated 10.11.2016 is restored. Since the suit itself
had been finally dismissed on 28.02.2020, (i) but, court fees was
nevertheless payable by the
plaintiff-respondent on the valuation, i.e., on
Rs. 20 lakhs. Hence, it is directed that the plaintiff-respondent shall make
payment of such court fees within four weeks from today; (ii) Moreover,
the plaintiff- respondent shall further be required to make payment of
court fees in the appeal on the value he shall put on the relief sought to
be claimed in appeal. The Appellate Court shall allow the plaintiff (who
is appellant therein) to state the valuation and grant him reasonable time
to make payment of court fees before proceeding further in appeal.
38. There shall be no order as to costs.
39. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Devika Gujral
Appeal allowed.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS v. DEV BRAT SHARMA
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]