UNION OF INDIA & ANR. versus JAHANGIR BYRAMJI JEEJEEBHOY (D) THROUGH HIS LR
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 76, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 76 : 2024 INSC 262
Union of India & Anr. 
v. 
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
(Civil Appeal No. 4672 of 2024)
03 April 2024
[Aniruddha Bose and J.B. Pardiwala,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court committed any error in passing the 
impugned order by which it declined to condone the delay of 12 
years and 158 days in filing the restoration application by appellants-
Union of India for restoration of the Writ Petition.
Headnotes
Delay – Non-condonation of – Length of the delay, relevant 
– Decree for possession of the suit premises was passed in 
favour of respondent in 1987 – Appeal thereagainst filed by 
appellants-Union of India, dismissed in 1992 – Said order of 
the appellate court was challenged by the appellants by filing 
Writ Petition in 1993 which was dismissed for non-prosecution 
in 2006 – Respondent filed Execution Petition in 2013 – Later, 
appellants filed application seeking restoration of the Writ 
Petition filed in 1993 and for condonation of delay of 12 years 
and 158 days in preferring such restoration application – 
Impugned order passed by High Court declining to condone 
the said delay – Correctness:
Held: Length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court 
must take into consideration while considering whether the delay 
should be condoned or not – Once it is held that a party has lost his 
right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own 
inaction for long, delay cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate 
and thus, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice 
deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations 
– Further, while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the 
court must not start with the merits of the main matter – Court 
owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation 
offered by the party seeking condonation – It is only if the sufficient 
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side 
is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits
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of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay – Question 
of limitation is not merely a technical consideration – Rules of 
limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and 
principles of equity – It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private 
party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the 
gross delay of more than 12 years – In the present case, litigation 
between the parties started sometime in 1981 – Almost 43 years 
have elapsed however, till date the respondent has not been able 
to reap the fruits of his decree – Appellants failed to prove that 
they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this 
vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case – No 
error committed by High Court in passing the impugned order. 
[Paras 26, 27, 25, 34]
Case Law Cited
Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat 
Industrial Development Corporation [2010] 2 SCR 1172 : 
(2010) 5 SCC 459; Postmaster General and others v. 
Living Media India Limited [2012] 1 SCR 1045 : (2012) 
3 SCC 563; Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs v. State of 
Andhra Pradesh & others [2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 
SCC 363; Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs. v. Executive 
Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project & others [2008] 15 
SCR 135 : (2008) 17 SCC 448; Esha Bhattacharjee v. 
Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy 
& Others [2013] 9 SCR 782
: (2013) 12 SCC 649 – 
relied on.
List of Keywords
Limitation; Gross delay; Delay condonation; Sufficient cause; Length 
of the delay; Principles of equity.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.4672 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.07.2019 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Bombay in CA No. 1494 of 2019
Appearances for Parties
R.Venkataramani, AG, Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, Col. R. 
Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Chinmayee Chandra, Chitvan Singhal,
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Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the 
Appellants.
Sudhanshu Chaudhari, Sr. Adv., Ms. Supreeta Sharanagouda, 
Sharanagouda Patil, Mahesh P Shindhe, Ms. Rucha A Pande, 
Veeraragavan M, C Sawant, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.
Leave granted.
2.	
This appeal arises from an order passed by a learned single Judge 
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 09.07.2019 in Civil 
Application No. 1494 of 2019 filed in Writ Petition No. 2307 of 1993 
by which the High Court declined to condone the delay of 12 years 
and 158 days in filing the application for restoration of the Writ Petition 
No. 2307 of 1993 referred to above which came to be dismissed for 
non-prosecution vide order dated 10.10.2006.
3.	
The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under.
4.	
The suit property bearing S. No. 402, Bungalow No. 15A, situated 
at Staveley Road, Pune Cantonment, Pune–1 was leased by the 
respondent in favour of the appellants on 09.03.1951.
5.	
As the appellants committed breach of the terms of the lease deed, 
the respondent herein instituted civil suit bearing No. 2599 of 1981 
before the Court of the 4th Additional Small Causes Judge, Pune 
for the recovery of the possession of the suit property & arrears 
towards the rent.
6.	
On 02.05.1987, the suit came to be allowed and the final decree 
came to be passed in the following terms:
“ORDER
1)	
The plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the suit 
premises.
2)	
The defendant shall deliver vacant and peaceful 
possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs or 
before 30.6.1987.
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3)	
The defendants do pay by way of damages and 
mesne profits and notice charges Rs. 17,383/- to 
the plaintiffs.
4)	
The defendant shall also pay future mesne profits 
at the rate of Rs. 316/- per month from the date of 
filing of the suit till recovery of possession of the suit 
premises under order 20 rule 12(1) of CPC.
5)	
The defendant shall pay costs of this suit to the 
plaintiffs and shall bear their own.”
7.	
The appellants herein challenged the judgment and decree referred 
to above by preferring Civil Appeal bearing No. 850 of 1987 in the 
Court of the District Judge, Pune. The appeal filed by the appellants 
herein came to be dismissed vide the judgment and order dated 
29.08.1992 passed by the 8th Additional District Judge, Pune.
8.	
The judgment and order passed by the first appellate court dismissing 
the appeal referred to above came to be challenged by the appellants 
herein by filing the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 before the High Court 
of Bombay invoking its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of 
the Constitution of India.
9.	
On 10.10.2006, the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 referred to above 
came to be dismissed for non-prosecution. The order reads thus:
“Coram : D.G. Deshpande – J.) on 10.10.06
AND UPON hearing Shri. D.S. Mhaispurkar for Respondent 
Nos. 1A to 1C and 2 this Court has passed the following 
order:-
“None for the Petitioners. Mr. D.S.
Mhaispurkar for the 
Respondents 1A to C and 2.
Petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim order is 
vacated.
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ordered that this writ petition is 
disposed of as per the accompanying court’s order. The 
directions given in the court’s order hereinabove shall be 
carried out and complied with scrupulously. 
It is accordingly ordered that this order be punctually 
observed and carried into execution by concerned.”
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10.	 On 26.11.2013 the respondent herein filed Execution Petition bearing 
No. 16 of 2014. The appellants herein were served with the notice 
in the execution proceedings on 18.03.2016 by the Executing Court.
11.	 On 20.08.2018, the appellants herein filed an application seeking to 
set aside the order passed by the Executing Court. On 30.10.2018 
the Executing Court set aside the said order referred to above.
12.	 On 12.04.2019, the appellants herein filed Civil Application No. 1294 
of 2019 seeking restoration of the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 referred 
to above and for condonation of delay of 12 years and 158 days in 
preferring such restoration application.
13.	 On 09.07.2019, a learned single Judge of the High Court vide the 
impugned order declined to condone the delay of 12 years and 158 
days in filing the restoration application. 
14.	 In view of the aforesaid, the appellants are here before this Court 
with the present appeal.
Submissions on behalf of the appellants
15.	 Mr. R. Venkataramani, the learned Attorney General for India 
appearing for the appellants vehemently submitted that he has a 
very good case on merits and considering the merits alone, the 
delay of 12 years and 158 days deserves to be condoned. The 
learned Attorney General laid much emphasis on the fact that the 
suit property is situated within the Pune cantonment which is under 
the ownership of the Union of India and the same was held by the
respondent herein on old grant lease and in such circumstances, 
according to the learned Attorney General, the respondent in his 
capacity as a private party should not be permitted to deprive 
the Government of its land after having admitted that the super 
structure alone belongs to him and that the land belongs to the 
Government.
16.	 On the aspect of delay of 12 years and 158 days in filing the restoration 
application before the High Court, the learned Attorney General has 
no explanation worth to offer.
Submissions on behalf of the respondent
17.	 Mr. Sudhanshu Chaudhari, the learned senior counsel appearing for 
the respondent, on the other hand, vehemently opposed the present 
appeal and submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law
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could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing 
the impugned order.
18.	 He submitted that no sufficient case worth the name has been 
assigned by the appellants for the purpose of getting such a long 
and inordinate delay of more than 12 years condoned for filing the 
restoration application.
19.	 In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed 
that there being no merit worth the name in the present appeal, the 
same may be dismissed.
Analysis
20.	 Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and 
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that 
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any 
error in passing the impugned order?
21.	 When this matter was heard for the first time by this Bench, we 
brought to the notice of the learned Attorney General something very 
relevant as observed by the High Court in para 18 of its impugned 
order. Para 18 of the impugned order reads thus:
“18. During the course of hearing, I suggested Mr. Singh that 
in case the defendants are ready and willing to handover 
possession of the suit property to the respondents, the 
Court will consider restoring the Petition to its original 
position. The respondents in turn will give undertaking to the 
effect that in case the defendants succeed in the Petition, 
before approaching the Apex Court, they will
handover 
possession of the suit property to the defendants. Upon 
taking instructions, Mr. Singh submitted that defendants 
are not ready and willing to handover possession of the 
suit property. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no case 
is made out for condoning the delay.” 
22.	 Thus, it appears that the High Court made a reasonable suggestion 
to the appellants that if the possession of the suit property is handed 
over to the respondent, then probably the Court may consider 
restoring the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 which came to be dismissed 
for default on 10.10.2006. The High Court noted as above that the 
learned counsel appearing for the appellants declined to hand over 
the possession of the suit property to the respondent herein. We
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reiterated the very same suggestion before the learned Attorney 
General that if the appellants are ready and willing to hand over the 
suit property to the respondent, then, despite there being a long and 
inordinate delay, we may consider condoning the same and remanding 
the matter back to the High Court so that the High Court may be in 
a position to hear the matter on its own merits. However, the learned 
Attorney General, after taking instructions from his clients, regretted 
his inability to persuade the appellants to hand over the possession 
of the suit property to the respondent.
23.	 In such circumstances referred to above, we were left with no 
other option but to call upon the learned Attorney General to make 
submissions as to why we should look into only the merits of the 
matter and condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days.
24.	 In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are 
not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not 
convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation 
of such a long and inordinate delay.
25.	 It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or 
Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more 
than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after 
the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the 
law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice
would be 
caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation 
between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. 
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent 
has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a 
mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 
days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole 
of the legal proceedings.
26.	 The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must 
take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be 
condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, 
it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for 
instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period 
of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have 
the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a 
long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such 
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the
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substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical 
considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, 
the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The 
court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation 
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient 
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side 
is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of 
the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27.	 We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a 
technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the 
principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should 
not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the 
respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the 
whims and fancies of the appellants.
28.	 At this stage, we would like to quote few observations made by the 
High Court in its impugned order pointing towards lack of bona fides 
on the part of the appellants. The observations are as under:-
“9. A perusal of paragraph 4 extracted hereinabove shows 
that on oath, solemn statement is made that notice of 
Darkhast No.16 of 2014 for execution of the decree issued 
by the executing Court was received by the Department 
on 25.02.2019. As against this, in paragraph 3 of the
additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra 
Rajaram Pawar, it is stated that the averments made in 
paragraph 4 as regards service of Darkhast on 25.02.2019 
is factually incorrect. Notice of Darkhast No. 16 of 2014 
was received by the defendants on 18.03.2016. The error 
in the application is out of inadvertence for which he 
tendered unconditional apology. It is further stated that 
inadvertent mistake on facts as to knowledge of execution 
proceedings was purely because of oversight in the light 
of possibilities of issuance of possession warrant by the 
executing court and requirement of expeditious urgency 
of moving before this Court to save the proceeding in 
litigation since 1981 which otherwise would have got 
frustrated. He stated that the same is nothing beyond 
human error.

x

x

x

x
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12. The assertions made in paragraph 4 are bereft of 
any particulars and are totally vague. In fact the solemn 
statement made in paragraph 4 that notice of Darkhast 
for execution of the decree issued by the executing Court 
was received by the Department on 25.02.2019, to put it 
mildly, is incorrect statement. In view of paragraph 3 of the 
additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra 
Rajaram Pawar, it is evident that notice of Darkhast 
was received by the defendants on 18.03.2016. It is 
material to note that no particulars are given as to when 
the Department sought legal opinion. There is also no 
explanation as to why Department did not instruct lawyer 
in the High Court to apply for restoration of the Petition 
and why the Department defended execution proceedings. 
It is worthwhile to note that execution proceedings were 
filed by the respondents only because Writ Petition was 
dismissed. If the Writ Petition was restored, automatically 
the execution proceedings would have been stayed by 
the executing Court. Instead of adopting appropriate 
proceedings, the defendants unnecessarily went on 
defending the execution proceedings. In paragraph 4(b) 
though it is stated that Department was regularly following 
up with its panel lawyer till 2003, this statement is also 
not substantiated by producing any document. Even if I 
accept that the Department was regularly following up 
with its panel lawyer till
2003, there is no explanation 
worth the name as to why the Department did not follow 
up the matter between 2003 and 2006 when the Petition 
was dismissed in default. That apart, equally, there is no 
explanation as to why no follow up action was taken by 
the officers between 2006 and 2016 when Department 
acquired knowledge about dismissal of Writ Petition on 
18.03.2016.
13. It is no doubt true that while considering the application 
for condonation of delay, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ 
has to be liberally construed. It, however, does not mean 
that without making any sufficient cause, the Court will 
condone the delay regardless of the length of the delay. In 
the present case, the delay is of 12 years and 158 days.
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A perusal of the application as also the additional affidavit 
hardly indicates any sufficient cause for condoning the 
unpardonable delay of 12 years and 158 days.”
29.	 In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat 
Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459, this 
Court rejected the application for condonation of delay of 4 years in 
filing an application to set aside an exparte decree on the ground 
that the explanation offered for condonation of delay is found to be 
not satisfied.
30.	 In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India 
Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the 
application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the 
Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an 
exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for 
the government departments. In that case, this Court held that 
unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason 
for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to 
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for 
several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural 
red tape in the process cannot be accepted. In Para Nos. 25, 
26, 27, 28, and 29 respectively, this Court dealt with the scope 
of ‘sufficient cause’ and held as follows:
“25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned 
in the “better affidavit”
sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, 
SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant 
to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself 
mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of 
the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief 
Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. [(2009) 8 AD 201 
(Del)] as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, 
their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said 
judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received 
by the Department on the very same day. There is no 
explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the 
impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a 
reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy 
was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of 
nearly four months.
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26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file 
better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither 
the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any 
explanation for not applying the certified copy within 
the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the 
affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that 
there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the 
dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there 
is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. 
Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was 
due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, 
the fact remains that from day one the Department or the 
person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in 
prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate 
steps. 
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned 
were well aware or conversant with the issues involved 
including the prescribed period of limitation for taking 
up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition 
in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a 
separate period of limitation when the Department was 
possessed with competent persons familiar with court 
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable 
explanation, we are posing a question why the delay 
is to be condoned mechanically merely because the 
Government or a wing of the Government is a party 
before us. 
28. Though we are
conscious of the fact that in a 
matter of condonation of delay when there was no 
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of 
bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to 
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in 
the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot 
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim 
on account of impersonal machinery and inherited 
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot 
be accepted in view of the modern technologies being 
used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly 
binds everybody, including the Government.
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29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government 
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless 
they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the 
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to 
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending 
for several months/years due to considerable degree 
of procedural red tape in the process. The government 
departments are under a special obligation to ensure that 
they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. 
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not 
be used as an anticipated benefit for the government 
departments. The law shelters everyone under the same 
light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
31.	 In the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh & others, (2011) 4 SCC 363, this Court made the following 
observations:
“20. In N. Balakrishnan, [(1998) 7 SCC 123] this Court 
again reiterated the principle that: (SCC p. 127, para 11)
“11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy 
the rights of parties. They are meant to see that 
[the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but 
seek their remedy promptly.”
21 to 27.........
28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which 
could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay 
after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts 
such as
“liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, 
“substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the 
substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where 
the court concludes that there is no justification for the 
delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High 
Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and 
restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst 
adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather 
pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with 
the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court 
resorted to blatant sarcasms.
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29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant 
language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved 
by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering 
applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of 
the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and 
unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, 
especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within 
reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to 
be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. 
Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and 
should not form the basis of exercising discretionary 
powers.” 
32.	 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs. v. Executive 
Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project & others, (2008) 17 SCC 448, 
this Court held as follows:
“19. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat [(1981) 
1 SCC 495 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 184] this Court observed: 
(SCC p. 497, para 6)
“6. … it is true that a party is entitled to wait until 
the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But 
when it allows limitation to expire and pleads 
sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, 
the sufficient cause must establish that because 
of some event or circumstance arising before 
limitation expired it was not possible to file the 
appeal within time. No event or circumstance 
arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute 
sufficient cause.” 
(emphasis supplied) 
This
judgment squarely applies to the facts in hand.

x

x

x

x
21. Shri Mohta, learned Senior Counsel relying on 
the decision of this Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. 
Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123] submitted that length 
of delay is no matter and acceptability of explanation is 
the only criterion. It was submitted that if the explanation 
offered does not smack of mala fides or it is not put
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forth as a part of dilatory tactics, the court must show 
utmost consideration to the suitor. The very said 
decision upon which reliance has been placed holds 
that the law of limitation fixes a lifespan for every legal 
remedy for the redress of the legal injury suffered. 
Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to 
unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The 
law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. The 
decision does not lay down that a lethargic litigant can 
leisurely choose his own time in preferring appeal or 
application as the case may be. On the other hand, 
in the said judgment it is said that court should not 
forget the opposite party altogether. It was observed: 
(SCC p. 128, para 11)
“11. … It is enshrined in the maxim interest 
reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general 
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules 
of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights 
of the parties. They are meant to see that parties 
do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their 
remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal 
remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively 
fixed period of time.”
22. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361] 
this Court held that: (AIR pp. 363-65)
“In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 
it is relevant to bear in mind two important 
considerations. The first consideration is that
the expiration of period of limitation prescribed 
for making an appeal gives rise to right in 
favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree 
as binding between the parties and this legal 
right which has accrued to the decree-holder 
by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly 
disturbed. The other consideration which 
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause 
of excusing delay is shown discretion is 
given to the court to condone the delay and 
admit the appeal. It is further necessary to
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emphasise that even if the sufficient cause 
has been shown a party is not entitled to the 
condonation of delay in question as a matter 
of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a 
condition precedent for the exercise of the 
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by 
Section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally 
introduces the consideration of all relevant 
facts and it is at this stage the diligence 
of the party or its bona fides may fall for 
consideration.” 
(emphasis supplied)
23. On the facts and in the circumstances, we are of 
the opinion that the respondent beneficiary was not 
diligent in availing the remedy of appeal. The averments 
made in the application seeking condonation of delay in 
filing appeals do not show any acceptable cause much 
less sufficient cause to exercise courts’ discretion in its 
favour.”
33.	 In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of 
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, 
this Court made the following observations:
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can 
broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an 
application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not 
supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove 
injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood 
in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being 
had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and 
are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining 
fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal 
the technical considerations should not be given undue 
and uncalled for emphasis.
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Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate 
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of 
the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking 
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict 
proof should not affect public justice and cause public 
mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant 
so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure 
of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to 
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it 
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay 
and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former 
doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it 
may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants 
strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal 
delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party 
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors 
to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental 
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale 
of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the 
said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name 
of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation
offered is concocted or 
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the 
courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side 
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away 
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking 
recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully 
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the 
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective
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reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity 
representing a collective cause should be given some 
acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more 
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They 
are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should 
be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard 
manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required 
to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that 
adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice 
dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not 
be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual 
philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down 
regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet 
a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality 
of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the 
ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a 
non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity 
can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be 
curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”
34.	 In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that 
the High Court committed no error much less any error of law 
in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court 
was
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the 
Constitution of India. 
35.	 In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay 
should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial 
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants 
have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting 
the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied 
in this case.

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Union of India & Anr. v.  
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
36.	 For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 
There shall be no order as to costs. 
37.	 Pending application, if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
Result of the case: 

Appeal dismissed.