SANJEEVKUMAR HARAKCHAND KANKARIYA versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 866, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 866 : 2024 INSC 1004
Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya
v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 14742 of 2024)
19 December 2024
[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether in view of the inconsistency between the 
Court Fees Act, 1870 and Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959, if 
any, would the appellant be entitled to a complete refund of court 
fees per the former, since it is a Central legislation.
Headnotes†
Court Fees Act, 1870 – Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959 – 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.89 – Settlement of disputes 
outside the Court – Court fees – Complete refund of – 
Entitlement – Civil dispute filed by the appellant which was 
resolved through mediation u/s.89 CPC – Trial court allowed 
refund of court fees only to the extent of 50% – Appellant 
filed writ petition seeking complete refund of court fees on 
the ground that the civil court erred by allowing refund only 
to the extent of 50% in view s.16 of the CFA, 1870; that as 
per s.21 of the LSA Act,1987 when a matter is referred to Lok 
Adalat u/s.20(1) of the said Act and a compromise or settlement 
is arrived, the court fee paid in such a matter shall also be 
refunded in accordance with CFA, 1870; that the said Act being 
a Central legislation, would override the State enactment – 
High Court rejected the petition – Correctness:
Held: Entry 11A List III cannot govern the refund of court fees when 
a matter is settled by methods of alternate
dispute resolution, in the 
face of Entry 3 List II simply by the use of the words “administration 
of justice” in the former – Reference to CFA, 1870 in respect of 
refund of court fees when the matter is settled by way of an award 
of Lok Adalat does not mean that the same shall be extended to 
the settlement of dispute by mediation for the simple reason that 
* Author
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Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
Lok Adalat and mediation are two distinct methods and cannot be 
equated – High Court made suggestion to the State legislature 
that the differences in the court fees in Lok Adalat, vis-à-vis, the 
forms of ADR should be done away to promote the adaptation 
of such methods of dispute resolution among the public – State 
legislature carried out such an amendment to the MCFA, 1959 and 
s.16A has been introduced therein – Effect would be that for the 
time when the amendment to the MCFA, 1959 granting partial or 
complete refund, as the case may be, in accordance with s.43 as 
amended, the persons whose matters were settled by way of ADR 
would not be entitled to 100% refund – Any matter settled under 
the processes mentioned in s.89 CPC after the coming into force 
of the said amendment, such parties to receive refund of court fees 
in its entirety – Total amount of court fees paid by the appellant, in 
respect of the refund of which the matter has travelled up to this 
Court was approximately Rs. 5 lakhs – Considering the fact that 
the original dispute was settled amicably and that the amount of 
court fees involved is not excessive, the same can be refunded 
to him. [Paras 20-24]
Case Law Cited
Pushpabai Shankerlal Sura v. The Official Liquidator, Sholapur Oil 
Mills Ltd. 1968 SCC OnLine Bom 62; Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (II) 
v. Union of India [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 929 : (2005) 6 SCC 344; High
Court of Madras v. MC Subramaniam [2021] 1 SCR 552 : (2021) 3 
SCC 560; Rangathan v. In the Court of District Judge, Trichirapalli; 
K.S Periyaswamy v. State of Karnataka 2019 SCC OnLine 
Kar 3032; Maharishi Shankarrao Mohite-Patil Sahakar Sakhar 
Karkhana Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 
628; Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra [2011] 3 SCR 1 : 
(2011) 3 SCC 1; Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore [1958] 
1 SCR 895 : AIR 1958 SC 255; Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) 
Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 1 : AIR 1962 
SC 1044; J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving v. State of U.P. [1961] 
3 SCR 185 : AIR 1961 SC 1170; British Airways PLC v. Union 
of India [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 152 : (2002) 2 SCC 96; Jamshed 
N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] 1 SCR 223 : (2005) 2 
SCC 591; In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979] 2 SCR 476 : 
(1979) 1 SCC 380; State of T.N. v. G.N. Venkataswamy [1994] 
Supp. 1 SCR 322 : (1994) 5 SCC 314; M. Karunanidhi v. Union
868
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of India [1979] 3 SCR 254 : (1979) 3 SCC 431; Ujagar Prints (II) 
v. Union of India [1989] 1 SCR 344 : (1989) 3 SCC 488; Afcons 
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd. 
[2010] 8 SCR 1053 : (2010) 8 SCC 24; State of Punjab v. Jalour 
Singh [2008] 1 SCR 922 : (2008) 2 SCC 660; Perry Kansagra 
v. Smriti Madan Kansagra [2019] 3 SCR 991 : (2019) 20 SCC 
753 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’, 14th Ed. by Justice G.P. 
Singh – referred to.
List of Acts
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987; Court Fees Act, 1870; Code 
of Civil Procedure 1908; Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959; Mediation 
Act, 2023; Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959; Constitution of India; 
Maharashtra Act No. X of 2018.
List of Keywords
Inconsistency between the Court Fees Act, 1870 and Maharashtra 
Court Fees Act, 1959; Complete refund of court fees; Central 
legislation; Maharashtra State Legislature; Refund; Court fees; Civil 
dispute; Mediation u/s.89 CPC; Refund of court fees only to the 
extent of 50%; Lok Adalat; Compromise or settlement; Alternate 
dispute resolution; Administration of justice; Award of Lok Adalat; 
Settlement of dispute by mediation; Lok Adalat and mediation, 
two distinct methods.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14742 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2014 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in WP No. 4919 of
2014
Appearances for Parties
Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, Nishant Sharma, Advs. for the 
Appellant.
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Akshay Nain, Akshit Pradhan, Bhuvan 
Mishra, Ms. Ruchi Gour Narula, Ms. Aarushi Singh, Arvind Kumar
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
869
Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
Sharma, Ms. Rukmini Bobde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya 
Aniruddha Pande, Ms. Soumya Priyadarshinee, Amit Srivastava, 
Amlaan Kumar, Vinayak Aren, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
Leave granted.
THE CHALLENGE 
2.	
This appeal questions the correctness of the judgment and order 
dated 1st October, 2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature at 
Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) between the self-same parties, whereby 
the High Court refused the prayer of the appellant herein seeking -
(a)	 a writ, order, order or direction to the State of Maharashtra to 
initiate a complete refund of court fees of all litigants including 
the appellant whose proceedings before the Civil Courts were 
disposed of in accordance with Section 89 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure 19081;
(b)	 quashing of notification dated 8th May, 2013 issued by the Law 
and Judiciary Department, Government of Maharashtra bearing 
No. HCA.2010/C.R 87/D192 as contrary to the provisions of the 
Court Fees Act, 18703 read with certain provisions of the Legal 
Services Authorities Act, 19874; 
(c)	
a declaration to the effect that Respondent No.2 i.e. State of 
Maharashtra had no authority in law to issue a notification 
contrary to the provisions of the CFA, 1870; and 
(d)	 that all such notifications and rules running contrary thereto be 
quashed and set aside.
1	
Hereinafter ‘CPC’
2
Hereafter, “the impugned notification”
3	
CFA, 1870
4	
LSA Act, 1987
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THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
3.	
The factual background which led the appellant to prefer the 
writ petition before the High Court was that he had entered into 
an agreement to sell a certain property located at Aurangabad. 
However, the said Agreement could not be performed and as such, 
he preferred Special Civil Suit No.274 of 2013 before the Court of 
the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Aurangabad, praying for a direction 
of specific performance of the contract. The dispute was referred to 
mediation under Section 89 CPC and, amicably resolved. The terms 
of settlement were presented to the Court and the Civil Suit was 
disposed of in terms of the said compromise. A request for refund 
of court fees was allowed only to the extent of 50%. 
3.1	 The appellant contended before the High Court that the learned 
Civil Court fell in error by allowing refund only to the extent of 50% 
in view Section 16 of the CFA, 1870. It was further contended 
that as per Section 21 of the LSA Act,1987 when a matter is 
referred to Lok Adalat under Section 20(1) of the said Act and 
a compromise or settlement is arrived at therein, the Court Fee 
paid in such a matter shall also be refunded in accordance with 
CFA, 1870. Still further it was argued that the said Act being a 
Central legislation, would override the State enactment. 
3.2	 The High Court’s observations can be summarized thus:-
(a)	 The CFA, 1870 is a pre-constitutional enactment
which 
no longer applies to the State of Maharashtra after 
the enactment of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 19595. 
In reaching this conclusion, reliance was placed on a 
judgment of a co-ordinate bench in Pushpabai Shankerlal 
Sura v. The Official Liquidator, Sholapur Oil Mills Ltd.6
(b)	 The use of CFA, 1870 in LSA, 1987 is a case of “legislation 
by incorporation”, the same analogy cannot be applied to 
the orders passed by courts on settlement of disputes. 
Decrees passed by courts on the basis of settlement cannot 
be equated to awards passed by Lok Adalat. Since the 
BCFA, 1959 would be applicable, no error can be found in 
the State issuing a notification under Section 43(2) thereof.
5	
Hereinafter, BCFA, 1959. 
6	
1968 SCC OnLine Bom 62
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Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
3.3	 Disposing of the writ petition, the Court made the following 
observations:
“16. While disposing of the writ petition, we deem it 
appropriate to recommend the State Government to issue 
necessary notification or to bring out necessary amendment 
incorporating provision in respect of refund of Court fees 
to the extent of 100% in respect of the matters which are 
disposed of by the Courts on adaptation of any of the 
modes prescribed under section 89 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908. Such a step would be in consonance 
with the directives issued by the Supreme Court in Salem 
Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India (supra), as 
well as it would bring parity with the provisions of section 
21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act and section 16 of 
the Court Fees Act, 1870. Thus, in order to bring uniformity 
in the matter of refund of Court fees and to eliminate 
discrepancies so far as matters disposed of in view of the 
award passed by Lok Adalat, and such of those matters 
which are disposed of in terms of the settlement arrived at 
on the basis of observance of any of the modes prescribed 
under section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a direction 
needs to be issued by the State of Maharashtra to take 
effective steps. Such a positive move will also give boost 
to the movement of Alternate Disputes Resolution, which, 
in fact, curtails precious time of the Court as well as
avoids 
unnecessary and prolonged indulgence in litigation before 
the Court. We hope and trust that respondent-State would 
consider this suggestion earnestly and take measures 
expeditiously.”
4.	
We have heard Mr. Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, learned Advocate-
on- Record for the Appellant, Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional 
Solicitor General, and Ms. Rukmini Bobde, Learned Counsel, for the 
Respondents. We have also perused the parties’ written submissions. 
4A.	 Submissions on behalf of Appellants
4A.1	Section 16 of the CFA, 1870 contemplates a refund of court 
fees in its entirety if the dispute inter se the parties is settled. 
The same is irrespective of the stage of the lis.
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4A.2	The Constitution of India in its Federal structure provides for 
the distribution of powers as enumerated in the lists under 
Schedule VII. Administration of justice is Entry No.11 – A in List 
III. The process of settlement of disputes through alternative 
dispute resolution7 mechanisms is a concept embedded in the 
effective administration of justice, and, therefore the CFA, 1870 
as also the legislations governing court fees in the States, are 
in concurrent operation. It, therefore, submitted that the State 
cannot be permitted to legislate to an extent such as it may 
repeal this Central Legislation.
4A.3	Section 21 of the LSA Act, 1987 specifically contemplates a 
reference to refund of court fees in terms of the provisions of 
CFA, 1870.
4A.4	It is submitted that Section 89 CPC was inserted into the 
statute book in 1999 empowered by the 129th Report of the Law 
Commission of India. The statement of objects and reasons 
thereof prescribes the intention of encouraging the settlement 
of disputes through ADR mechanisms. If the contention of the 
State is accepted that the CFA, 1870 is repealed in so far as 
the State of Maharashtra is concerned and the MCFA, 1959 
holds the field, it is submitted that the intention of the legislature 
in inserting Section 89 into the CPC, would be frustrated. 
4A.5	It is submitted that in order to protect the fulcrum of the insertion 
of Section 89 CPC, harmonious construction of all the
statutes 
is to be adopted. Without doing the same, the said section 
would be rendered otiose. 
4B.	 Submissions on behalf of Respondent(s)
4B.1	The CFA, 1870 was an ‘existing law’ within the meaning of 
Article 366 of the Constitution of India, and by virtue of Article 
372 of the Constitution, it continued to operate as law till such 
time ‘until altered or repealed or amended by a competent 
legislature.’
4B.2	The erstwhile State of Bombay, being the competent state 
legislature as described under Article 372 read with Article 246(2) 
7	
Hereinafter, ADR
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Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
superseded the CFA, 1870 with the BCFA, 1959, renamed 
the Maharashtra Court Fees Act,8 by an amendment in 2012. 
Section 49 of the MCFA, 1959 read with Schedule 4 thereof, 
explicitly repealed the CFA, 1870 in so far as Entries 3 and 66 
of the List II of the Constitution are concerned. As such, CFA, 
1870 has no application in the State of Maharashtra, which 
would, obviously, include Section 16 thereof, which provides 
for 100% refund of court fees if the case is settled through one 
of the modes mentioned in Section 89, CPC. 
4B.3	Section 43 of the MCFA,1959 governs the refund of court fees 
in the circumstances specified therein. The impugned notification 
dated 8th May, 2013 was passed under sub-section 2 of Section 
43, which specifies hundred percent repayment of court fees in 
certain specified circumstances- relating to social and welfare 
legislations, and for other matters it provides for fifty percent, 
and in yet other cases, the refund percentage is twenty-five. 
4B.4	Even if the impugned notification is found to be unconstitutional, 
the appellant would still be bound by Section 43(1) of the 
MCFA, 1959. The appellant has not challenged the vires of 
the said section. 
4B.5	This Court and various High Courts, it is submitted, have 
recognized court fees as a state subject. Reference is made 
to decisions of this Court in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (II) v. 
Union of India;9 High
Court of Madras v. MC Subramaniam10 
as being entirely distinguishable from the present facts. For 
High Courts, reliance is placed on Rangathan v. In the Court 
of District Judge, Trichirapalli; K.S Periyaswamy v. State 
of Karnataka;11 Maharishi Shankarrao Mohite-Patil Sahakar 
Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra.12 In these 
judgments, it is submitted that the respective High Courts 
permitted a hundred percent refund of court fees recognizing 
that the settlement arrived at was under the LSA Act, 1987. 
8	
Hereinafter, MCFA, 1959
9	
[2005] Supp. 1 SCR 929 : (2005) 6 SCC 344
10	
[2021] 1 SCR 552 : (2021) 3 SCC 560
11	
2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3032
12	
 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 628
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4B.6	It was also submitted that subsequently, in 2018, a provision, 
identical to Section 16 CFA, 1870 came to be inserted into the 
MCFA, 1959 by Maharashtra Act No. X of 2018. 
4B.7	In view of the above submissions, it is prayed that the High Court 
has rightly rejected the challenge to the impugned notification, 
on grounds of inconsistency with Section 16 of the CFA, 1870. 
QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION
5.	
The question presented for this Court’s adjudication was, considering 
the submissions as afore-stated is whether in view of the inconsistency 
between the CFA, 1870 and the MCFA, 1959, if any, would the 
appellant be entitled to a complete refund of court fees per the 
former, since it is a Central legislation? Allied thereto, would be the 
question of whether the Maharashtra State Legislature could have 
enacted the provision and brought out a notification giving refunds in 
ways contrary to and distinct from the manner and method provided 
in the Central Legislation?
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
6.	
As is clear from the above, the present case involves the interpretation 
of various legislative provisions falling within both Central and State 
Legislations. For reference, they are extracted hereinbelow :-
“CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
PART XI 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE 
STATES CHAPTER I.—LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS
Distribution of Legislative Powers
“246. (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, 
and, subject to clause
(1), the Legislature of any State 
also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the 
matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule 
(in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”).”
… … ……
“372. (1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution 
of the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
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Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law 
in force in the territory of India immediately before the 
commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force 
therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent 
Legislature or other competent authority. 
(2) For the purpose of brining the provisions of any law in 
force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions 
of this Constitution, the President may by order make 
such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether 
by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or 
expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such 
date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject 
to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any 
such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned 
in any court of law. 
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed— 
(a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or 
modification of any law after the expiration of three years 
from the commencement of this Constitution; or 
(b) to prevent any competent Legislature or other competent 
authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or 
modified by the President under the said clause. 
Explanation I.—The expression “law in force” in this article 
shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or 
other competent authority in the territory of India before 
the commencement of this Constitution
and not previously 
repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be 
then in operation either at all or in particular areas. 
Explanation II.—....
Explanation III.—.... 
Explanation IV.—....
List II—State List 1.
1. ...
2. ...
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3. ***Officers and servants of the High Court; procedure 
in rent and revenue courts; fees taken in all courts except 
the Supreme Court.
List III—Concurrent List
x                  x                    x                x
[11A. Administration of Justice; constitution and organisation 
of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts.]
PART XXI
[TEMPORARY, TRANSITIONAL AND SPECIAL 
PROVISIONS]
372. (1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of 
the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject to the 
other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in 
the territory of India immediately before the commencement 
of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until 
altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature 
or other competent authority.
(2) For the purpose of brining the provisions of any law in 
force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions 
of this Constitution, the President may by order1 make 
such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether 
by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or 
expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such 
date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject 
to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any 
such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned 
in any court of law.
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed— 
(a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or
modification of any law after the expiration of 2[three years] 
from the commencement of this Constitution; or 
(b) to prevent any competent Legislature or other competent 
authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or 
modified by the President under the said clause.
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Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
 Explanation I.—The expression “law in force” in this article 
shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or 
other competent authority in the territory of India before 
the commencement of this Constitution and not previously 
repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be 
then in operation either at all or in particular areas.”
COURT FEES ACT, 1870
16. [ Refund of fee [Section 16 repealed by Act 
5 of 1908 and again inserted by Act 46 of 1999, 
Section 34.]
Where the Court refers the parties to the suit to any one 
of the mode of settlement of dispute referred to in section 
89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the 
plaintiff shall be entitled to a certificate from the Court 
authorising him to receive back from the Collector, the full 
amount of the fee paid in respect of such plaint.]”
LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITIES ACT, 1987
“21. Award of Lok Adalat.—1 (1) Every award of the Lok 
Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court 
or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and 
where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, 
by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section 
(1) of section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be 
refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees 
Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).
(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and 
binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal
shall lie to any court against the award.”
MAHARASHTRA COURT FEES ACT, 1959
Section 43. Repayment of fee in certain circumstances.
(1) When any suit in a Court or any proceeding instituted 
by presenting a petition to a Court under the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 (XXV of 1955), is settled by agreement 
of parties before any evidence is recorded, or any appeal 
or cross objection is settled by agreement of parties
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before it is called on for effective hearing by the Court, 
half the amount of the fee paid by the plaintiff, petitioner, 
appellant, or respondent on the plaint, petition, appeal or 
cross objection, as the case may be, shall be repaid to 
him by the Court :
Provided that, no such fee shall be repaid if the amount of 
fee paid does not exceed twenty-five-rupees or the claim 
for repayment is not made within one year from the date 
on which the suit, proceeding, appeal or cross objection 
was settled by agreement.
(2) The State Government may, from time to time, by 
order, provide for repayment to the plaintiffs, petitioners, 
complaints under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments 
Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), appellants or respondents of any 
part of the fee paid by them on plaints, petitions, complaints 
under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 
1881 (26 of 1881), appeals or cross objections, in suits 
complaints under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments 
Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), proceedings or appeals disposed of 
under such circumstances and subject to such conditions 
as may be specified in the order.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, effective 
hearing shall exclude the dates when the appeal is merely 
adjourned without being heard or argued.”
ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATION
7.	
The sum and substance of the case put forward by the appellant is 
that this case pertains not merely to court fees as an
issue, but the 
larger issue of administration of justice, as that consequently, by virtue 
of Entry 11-A to the VII Schedule to the Constitution of India, the 
issue of refund of court fees, since it involves settlement of disputes 
by alternate mechanisms, which is an aspect of the administration 
of justice. Harmonious Construction needs to be adopted of all the 
provisions involved, i.e., CFA, 1870, MCFA 1959, LSA Act, 1987, and 
that the MCFA, 1959 being a State Legislation, cannot be allowed 
to override the Central Legislation(s). 
8.	
Keeping in view the contentions raised, adjudication of this dispute 
would involve the analysis of the provisions cited from the lens of the
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Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
doctrine of pith and substance and harmonious construction. Before 
proceeding to the merits of the instant case, it would be apposite to 
refer to certain pronouncements in this regard. 
8.1	 The Doctrine of Pith and Substance
The examination of the application of this doctrine has arisen before 
this Court on numerous occasions. For instance, a Bench of five 
Judges in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra,13 observed 
thus:
“173. The doctrine of pith and substance can be applied to 
examine the validity or otherwise of a legislation for want 
of legislative competence as well as where two legislations 
are embodied together for achieving the purpose of the 
principal Act. Keeping in view that we are construing a 
federal Constitution, distribution of legislative powers 
between the Centre and the State is of great significance. 
Serious attempt was made to convince the Court that 
the doctrine of pith and substance has a very restricted 
application and it applies only to the cases where the court 
is called upon to examine the enactment to be ultra vires 
on account of legislative incompetence.
174. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept this 
proposition. The doctrine of pith and substance finds its 
origin from the principle that it is necessary to examine 
the true nature and character of the legislation to know 
whether it falls in a forbidden sphere. This doctrine was
first applied in India in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank 
of Commerce Ltd. [(1946-47) 74 IA 23 : AIR 1947 PC 60] 
The principle has been applied to the cases of alleged 
repugnancy and we see no reason why its application 
cannot be extended even to the cases of present kind 
which ultimately relates to statutory interpretation founded 
on source of legislation.
175. In Union of India v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers’ 
College [(2002) 8 SCC 228] this Court held that in order 
13	
[2011] 3 SCR 1 : (2011) 3 SCC 1
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to examine the true character of the enactment, the entire 
Act, its object and scope is required to be gone into. The 
question of invasion into the territory of another legislation 
is to be determined not by degree but by substance. The 
doctrine of pith and substance has to be applied not only 
in cases of conflict between the powers of two legislatures 
but also in any case where the question arises whether 
a legislation is covered by a particular legislative field 
over which the power is purported to be exercised. In 
other words, what is of paramount consideration is that 
the substance of the legislation should be examined to 
arrive at a correct analysis or in examining the validity of 
law, where two legislations are in conflict or alleged to be 
repugnant.”
8.2	 Doctrine of Harmonious Construction
In the authoritative text ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’, 14th 
Ed. by Justice G.P. Singh, the Rule of Harmonious Construction has 
been captured in the following terms :
“As stated by VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J., “the Rule of 
Construction is well settled that when there are in an 
enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with 
each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, 
effect should be given to both. This is what is known as 
the rule of harmonious construction.” That, effect should 
be given to both, is the very essence of the rule. Thus a 
construction that reduces one of the provisions
to a “useless 
lumber” or “dead letter” is not harmonious construction. 
To harmonize is not to destroy.” 
The judgments referred to in the above paragraph are Venkataramana 
Devaru v. State of Mysore;14 Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. 
v. State of West Bengal;15 J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving v. 
State of U.P..16
14	
[1958] 1 SCR 895 : AIR 1958 SC 255
15	
[1962] Supp. 3 SCR 1 : AIR 1962 SC 1044
16	
[1961] 3 SCR 185 : AIR 1961 SC 1170
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881
Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
We may also refer to British Airways PLC v. Union of India17 
wherein this Court said as follows :
“8. While interpreting a statute the court should try to 
sustain its validity and give such meaning to the provisions 
which advance the object sought to be achieved by the 
enactment. The court cannot approach the enactment with 
a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting 
which make its working impossible. It is a cardinal principle 
of construction of a statute that effort should be made in 
construing the different provisions so that each provision will 
have its play and in the event of any conflict a harmonious 
construction should be given. The well-known principle of 
harmonious construction is that effect shall be given to 
all the provisions and for that any provision of the statute 
should be construed with reference to the other provisions 
so as to make it workable. A particular provision cannot 
be picked up and interpreted to defeat another provision 
made in that behalf under the statute. It is the duty of the 
court to make such construction of a statute which shall 
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. While 
interpreting a statute the courts are required to keep in 
mind the consequences which are likely to flow upon the 
intended interpretation.”
9.	
The primary argument, as recorded above is that the resolution of 
disputes by alternate mechanisms is
an aspect of the administration 
of justice and, therefore, anything connected thereto inclusive of 
refund of court fees as a result of out of Court settlement, would be 
governed by Entry 11A of List III.
Further, the inconsistency between the Central and State Act would 
have to be resolved, giving the Central Act primacy over the State 
Act. This argument is difficult to countenance. 
10.	 The scope of Entry 11A of List III has been discussed by a Constitution 
Bench of this Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra,18 
in the following terms : 
17	
[2001] Supp. 5 SCR 152 : (2002) 2 SCC 96
18	
[2005] 1 SCR 223 : (2005) 2 SCC 591
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“42. The general jurisdiction of the High Courts is dealt 
with in Entry 11-A under the caption “administration 
of justice”, which has a wide meaning and includes 
administration of civil as well as criminal justice. The 
expression “administration of justice” has been used 
without any qualification or limitation wide enough to 
include the “powers” and “jurisdiction” of all the courts 
except the Supreme Court. The semicolon (;) after 
the words “administration of justice” in Entry 11-A has 
significance and meaning. The other words in the same 
entry after “administration of justice” only speak in relation 
to “constitution” and “organisation” of all the courts except 
the Supreme Court and High Courts. It follows that under 
Entry 11-A the State Legislature has no power to constitute 
and organise the Supreme Court and High Courts. It is an 
accepted principle of construction of a Constitution that 
everything necessary for the exercise of powers is included 
in the grant of power. The State Legislature being an 
appropriate body to legislate in respect of “administration 
of justice” and to invest all courts within the State including 
the High Court with general jurisdiction and powers in all 
matters, civil and criminal, it must follow that it can invest 
the High Court with such general jurisdiction and powers 
including the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and also 
to take away such jurisdiction and powers from the
High 
Court except those, which are specifically conferred under 
the Constitution on the High Courts.”
(Emphasis Supplied) 
It is also important to note the discussion made by Y.V Chandrachud, 
CJI while writing for the majority of the seven Judges Bench in In 
Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978.19 The relevant extract thereof 
is as under:
“45. The field of legislation covered by Entry 11-A of List III 
was originally a part of Entry 3 of List II. By Section 57(b)
(iii) of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 which came into 
force on January 3, 1977 that part was omitted from Entry 
19	
[1979] 2 SCR 476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380
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883
Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
3, List II and by clause (c) of Section 57, it was inserted 
into List III as Item 11-A. This transposition has led to 
the argument that the particular amendment introduced 
by Section 57 (b)(iii) and (c), is invalid since it destroys 
a basic feature of the Constitution as originally enacted, 
namely, federalism. We are unable to appreciate how the 
conferment of concurrent power on the Parliament, in place 
of the exclusive power of the States, to the constitution 
and organisation of certain courts affects the principle 
of federalism in the form in which our Constitution has 
accepted and adopted it...”
(Emphasis supplied)
We must also take note of the observations in State of T.N. v. G.N. 
Venkataswamy.20 It was held:
“12. It is no doubt correct that with the coming into force 
of Entry 11-A List III it is no more the exclusive power of 
the State Legislature to legislate under the said entry but 
“administration of justice” and “constitution and organisation 
of all courts” are the subjects on which the State Legislature 
can legislate. These expressions have been authoritatively 
interpreted by this Court in Narothamdas case [1950 SCC 
905 : 1951 SCR 51 : AIR 1951 SC 69] . It is, therefore, 
settled that under Entry 11-A the State Legislature has 
the power to make laws thereby enlarging or reducing the 
powers of the courts. The State Legislature can create new 
courts, reorganise the
existing courts, provide jurisdiction to 
the said courts and also take away the existing jurisdiction 
if it so desires. We, therefore, see no reason why a State 
Legislature cannot confer additional jurisdiction on existing 
revenue courts to recover any public dues as arrears of 
land revenue.”
11.	 Administration of justice, as it flows from the above, pertains to 
investment in all Courts with general, territorial and pecuniary 
jurisdiction. All the powers necessary for constitution and organisation 
of Courts except this Court, and the High Courts, to some extent, 
20	
[1994] Supp. 1 SCR 322 : (1994) 5 SCC 314
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have been invested with the State as well as the Centre, under this 
Entry. Laws made by the Centre would necessarily prevail over the 
State made laws, should there be any inconsistency between the 
two, and the laws made by the latter shall be unconstitutional to 
the extent that they are inconsistent with the Central laws, by virtue 
of the Doctrine of Repugnancy, the contours of which can be well 
understood by a perusal of the judgment in M. Karunanidhi v. Union 
of India.21 The Constitution Bench held:
“8. It would be seen that so far as clause (1) of Article 254 
is concerned it clearly lays down that where there is a direct 
collision between a provision of a law made by the State 
and that made by Parliament with respect to one of the 
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject 
to the pro- visions of clause (2), the State law would be 
void to the extent of the repugnancy. This naturally means 
that where both the State and Parliament occupy the field 
contemplated by the Concurrent List then the Act passed 
by Parliament being prior in point of time will prevail and 
consequently the State Act will have to yield to the Central 
Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific 
and equitable distribution of legislative powers between 
Parliament and the State Legislatures. First, regarding the 
matters contained in List I, i.e. the Union List to the Seventh 
Schedule, Parliament alone is
empowered to legislate and 
the State Legislatures have no authority to make any law 
in respect of the Entries contained in List I. Secondly, so 
far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both Parliament 
and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in 
regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that 
is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254(1) 
discussed above. Thirdly, so far as the matters in List II, 
i.e. the State List are concerned, the State Legislatures 
alone are competent to legislate on them and only under 
certain conditions Parliament can do so. It is, therefore, 
obvious that in such matters repugnancy may result from 
the following circumstances:
21	
[1979] 3 SCR 254 : (1979) 3 SCC 431
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885
Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
1. Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State 
Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are 
absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and 
the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.
2. Where however a law passed by the State comes into 
collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry 
in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the 
extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central 
Act would become void provided the State Act has been 
passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254.
3. Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being 
substantially within the scope of the entries in the State 
List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List 
the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking 
the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the 
provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls 
within the four corners of the State List and entrenchment, 
if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential.
4. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature 
on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent 
with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, 
then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent 
of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. 
The result of obtaining the assent of the President would 
be that so far as
the State Act is concerned, it will prevail 
in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act 
in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs 
will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law 
adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made 
by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254.”
12.	 The argument of the appellant aside, court fees finds mention in the 
Seventh Schedule in Entry 3 of List II (reproduced supra). However, 
as is obvious, there is no inconsistency between Central and State 
legislation here. The reason why it is difficult to accept the argument 
of the appellant is because court fees are explicitly governed by 
Entry 3 List II, reproduced supra. When that is the case, no argument 
pertaining to inconsistency between the two entries and the respective 
laws made thereunder can be entertained in law. Still further, the
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law-making power given as delineated in the Seventh Schedule 
is not constricted, but wide. When the competence to legislate is 
called into question, it is permissible to demonstrate the same from 
a conjoint reading of multiple entries and it need not flow directly 
from one particular entry. M.N.Venkatachaliah J. (as his Lordship 
then was) writing for the majority in Ujagar Prints (II) v. Union of 
India22 held as under:
“53. If a legislation purporting to be under a particular 
legislative entry is assailed for lack of legislative competence, 
the State can seek to support it on the basis of any other 
entry within the legislative competence of the legislature. It 
is not necessary for the State to show that the legislature, in 
enacting the law, consciously applied its mind to the source 
of its own competence. Competence to legislate flows from 
Articles 245, 246, and the other articles following, in Part 
XI of the Constitution. In defending the validity of a law 
questioned on ground of legislative incompetence, the State 
can always show that the law was supportable under any 
other entry within the competence of the legislature. Indeed 
in supporting a legislation sustenance could be drawn and 
had from a number of entries. The legislation could be a 
composite legislation drawing upon several entries….”
13.	 A natural conclusion that can be drawn is that if legislative competence 
can be demonstrated, drawing on
multiple entries, the same can be 
taken to be beyond the pale of any doubt when there is a particular 
entry to that effect. Entry 3, List II specifically empowers the State to 
legislate in respect of fees taken in all courts, save this Court. Ergo, 
there is no reason to accept the appellant’s contention that simply 
because it involves settlement of the dispute per alternative dispute 
mechanisms, the matter pertaining to the court fee payable in such 
a case, would travel out of the purview of Entry 3, List II, and would 
instead fall within the amplitude of Entry 11-A, List III. 
14.	 At this juncture, let us address the argument of the appellant that 
differentiation in the refund of fees applicable between the Central 
and State legislation would defeat the overall, salutary purpose of 
Section 89 CPC.
22	
[1989] 1 SCR 344 : (1989) 3 SCC 488
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
887
Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
14.1	Reference may be made to the High Court of Judicature at 
Madras v. M.C. Subramaniam,23 wherein it has been held 
that the provision must be understood in the “backdrop of the 
long-standing proliferation of litigation in the civil court which 
has placed an undue burden on the judicial system, forcing 
speedy justice to become a casualty.” 
14.2	The observations in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian 
Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd.,24 are also noteworthy-
“26. Section 89 starts with the words “where it appears 
to the court that there exist elements of a settlement”. 
This clearly shows that cases which are not suited for 
ADR process should not be referred under Section 89 
of the Code. The court has to form an opinion that a 
case is one that is capable of being referred to and 
settled through ADR process. Having regard to the 
tenor of the provisions of Rule 1-A of Order 10 of the 
Code, the civil court should invariably refer cases to 
ADR process. Only in certain recognised excluded 
categories of cases, it may choose not to refer to an 
ADR process. Where the case is unsuited for reference 
to any of the ADR processes, the court will have to 
briefly record the reasons for not resorting to any of 
the settlement procedures prescribed under Section 
89 of the Code. Therefore, having a hearing after 
completion of pleadings, to consider recourse to ADR 
process under Section 89
of the Code, is mandatory. 
But actual reference to an ADR process in all cases is 
not mandatory. Where the case falls under an excluded 
category there need not be reference to ADR process. 
In all other cases reference to ADR process is a must.
Further ahead in this judgment, Raveendran J. writing for 
thisCourt, listed out the scenarios in which reference under 
Section 89 CPC should or should not be made. The same are 
not reproduced here but suffice it to say that the present dispute 
does not fall into any of the exceptions listed for the otherwise 
mandatory reference thereunder. 
23	
[2021] 1 SCR 552 : (2021) 3 SCC 560
24	
[2010] 8 SCR 1053 : (2010) 8 SCC 24
888
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
A perusal of the above as also other judgments on the application 
and scope of Section 89 CPC nowhere correlates the settlement 
of disputes by alternate mechanisms to the amount of money 
that may be saved by the parties in so far as the court fee is 
concerned.The only purpose is the resolution of the dispute by 
the means prescribed therein, aiding the reduction of pendency 
and backlog of cases. The refund of court fees, either partial 
or complete, as the case may be, is a benefit, incidental to the 
resolution of the dispute. Undoubtedly, the added pecuniary 
advantage may serve as a reason to galvanize and buoy the 
position of ADR, leading an increasing number of persons 
involved in disputes to opt therefor, however, that aspect, is 
not in the realm of primary considerations when examining the 
growth of ADR, or the object and purpose of the introduction 
of Section 89 into the CPC. 
14.3	It is difficult to accept this submission that Section 89, CPC will 
be negated if the scheme of refund as envisaged by the MCFA, 
1959 is given effect. It cannot be doubted that the settlement 
of a dispute outside court is a cause for celebration in as much 
as it translates to early resolution of the dispute inter se the 
parties and it means also, that there is one less file to add on to 
already overflowing record rooms of the concerned civil courts. 
It also cannot be gainsaid that all efforts should be made to 
encourage the
adoption of ADR mechanisms.
15.	 Let us now examine the submission regarding the reference in LSA 
Act, 1987 of the CFA, 1870 and its effect, if any, on MCFA, 1959. One 
is a Central legislation and the other is a State legislation. The LSA 
Act, 1987 was enacted by the legislature to give effect to Article 39A 
of the Constitution of India which places responsibility upon the State 
to secure the operation of a legal system which promotes justice and 
further casts a responsibility upon the State to provide free legal aid 
by way of suitable legislation or schemes so as to ensure that justice 
is not the province of only those who are unaffected by economic or 
other disabilities. The primary mode of dispute settlement prescribed 
in the Act is the ‘Lok Adalat’,the constitution and functioning of which 
are discussed in Chapters 6 and 6A of the Act. 
16.	 The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is to the 
effect that since a Central legislation, i.e., the LSA Act, 1987, in 
connection with an alternate method of dispute resolution makes
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889
Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
reference to CFA, 1870, the same should be extended to other similar 
modes of dispute resolution as well. In a sense, an effort has been 
made on part of the appellant to equate the Award of Lok Adalat to 
the resolution of his dispute by way of reference under Section 89 
CPC, i.e., mediation. This equivalence is misplaced. 
17.	 The scope of Lok Adalat has been discussed by a Bench of three 
learned Judges in State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh.25
“8. It is evident from the said provisions that the Lok Adalats 
have no adjudicatory or judicial functions. Their functions 
relate purely to conciliation. A Lok Adalat determines a 
reference on the basis of a compromise or settlement 
between the parties at its instance, and puts its seal of 
confirmation by making an award in terms of the compromise 
or settlement. When the Lok Adalat is not able to arrive at a 
settlement or compromise, no award is made and the case 
record is returned to the court from which the reference was 
received, for disposal in accordance with law. No Lok Adalat 
has the power to “hear” parties to adjudicate cases as a 
court does. It discusses the subject-matter with the parties 
and persuades them to arrive at a just settlement. In their 
conciliatory role, the Lok Adalats are guided by the principles 
of justice, equity and fair play. When the LSA Act refers to 
“determination” by the Lok Adalat and “award” by the Lok
Adalat, the said Act does not contemplate nor require an 
adjudicatory judicial determination, but a non-adjudicatory 
determination based on a compromise or settlement, arrived 
at by the parties, with guidance and assistance from the Lok 
Adalat. The “award” of the Lok Adalat does not mean any 
independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision-
making process. The making of the award is merely an 
administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement 
or compromise agreed by parties in the presence of the 
Lok Adalat, in the form of an executable order under the 
signature and seal of the Lok Adalat.”
18.	 The process of mediation has been described in Perry Kansagra v. 
Smriti Madan Kansagra.26 The following extract, although, in regard 
25	
[2008] 1 SCR 922 : (2008) 2 SCC 660
26	
[2019] 3 SCR 991 : (2019) 20 SCC 753
890
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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to the importance of confidentiality in such proceedings are none 
the less important for the instant case. 
“27. We, thus, have line of cases dealing with mediation/
conciliation and other proceedings in general and Rule 8 of 
the Rules dealing inter alia, with custody issues which is in 
the nature of an exception to the norms of confidentiality. 
It is true that the process of mediation is founded on 
the element of confidentiality. Qualitatively, mediation or 
conciliation stands on a completely different footing as 
against regular adjudicatory processes. Instead of an 
adversarial stand in adjudicatory proceedings, the idea 
of mediation is to resolve the dispute at a level which is 
amicable rather than adversarial. In the process, the parties 
may make statements which they otherwise would not have 
made while the matter was pending adjudication before a 
court of law. Such statements which are essentially made 
in order to see if there could be a settlement, ought not 
to be used against the maker of such statements in case 
at a later point the attempts at mediation completely fail. 
If the statements are allowed to be used at subsequent 
stages, the element of confidence which is essential for 
healthy mediation/conciliation would be completely lost. 
The element of confidentiality and the assurance that the 
statements would not be relied upon helps the parties 
bury the hatchet and move towards resolution of the
disputes. The confidentiality is, thus, an important element 
of mediation/ conciliation.”
19.	 As can be seen, there are certain similarities in the two processes, 
however, there are certain undeniable differences, foremost among 
them being that the former is governed by independent legislation and 
now, so are the certain aspects of the latter (Mediation Act, 2023).
20.	 It is inconceivable as to how a reference to mediation under the 
CPC can be read to be the same or equal to proceeding before a 
Lok Adalat for any reference thereto, to be helpful to the case put 
forward by the appellant. Simply because a refund under CFA, 1870 
is statutorily prescribed, to be given when a dispute is settled by 
way of a Lok Adalat, does by no stretch of the imagination mean 
by the exact situation be adopted to the settlement of a dispute by
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
891
Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya v. Union of India & Ors.
mediation. This argument has to be necessarily rejected. No error 
can be found, in this regard with the reasoning of the High Court. 
CONCLUSION 
21.	 The inescapable conclusion per the above discussion, holding that Entry 
11A List III cannot govern the refund of court fees when a matter is 
settled by methods of alternate dispute resolution, in the face of Entry 
3 List II simply by the use of the words “administration of justice” in the 
former and, that reference to CFA, 1870 in respect of refund of court 
fees when the matter is settled by way of an Award of Lok Adalat does 
not mean that the same shall be extended to the settlement of dispute 
by mediation for the simple reason that Lok Adalat and mediation are 
two distinct methods and cannot be equated, we hold that this appeal 
lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. 
22.	  As extracted supra, the High Court in the impugned judgment had 
made a suggestion to the State legislature that the differences in 
the court fees in Lok Adalat, vis-à-vis, the forms of ADR should be 
done away with the view to promote the adaptation of such methods 
of dispute resolution among the public. It has been brought to our 
attention that the State legislature has indeed carried out such an 
amendment to the MCFA, 1959 and Section 16A has been introduced 
therein by way of Maharashtra Act No.X of 2018, the relevant extract 
of
which reads under : 
MAHARASHTRA ACT No. X OF 2018.
(First published, after having received the assent of the 
Governor in the “Maharashtra Government Gazette”, on 
the 16th January 2018.)
An Act further to amend the Maharashtra Court-fees Act. 
WHEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Maharashtra 
Court-fees Act, for the purposes hereinafter appearing; it 
is hereby enacted in the Sixty-eighth Year of the Republic 
of India as follows :—
1….
2. After section 16 of the Maharashtra Court-fees Act 
(hereinafter referred to as “principal Act”), the following 
section shall be inserted, namely :—
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“16A. Where the court refers the parties to the suit to any 
one of the modes of settlement of dispute referred to in 
section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and suit 
is disposed of by the court by adaptation of any of the 
modes prescribed under the said section, the plaintiff shall 
be entitled to a certificate from the court authorising him 
to receive back from the collector, the full amount of the 
fee paid in respect of such plaint.’’.”
23.	 The effect of the above being that for the time when the amendment to 
the MCFA, 1959 granting partial or complete refund, as the case may 
be, in accordance with Section 43 as amended, the persons whose 
matters were settled by way of ADR would not be entitled to 100% 
refund. Any matter settled under the processes mentioned in Section 
89 CPC after the coming into force of the above-extracted amendment, 
such parties shall receive refund of court fees in its entirety.
24.	 The total amount of court fees paid by the appellant, in respect of 
the refund of which the matter has travelled up to this Court was 
approximately Rs. 5 lakhs. Should we, in the facts and circumstances 
of this case grant, in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under 
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, refund of the said amount is 
a question we have asked ourselves. Considering the fact that the 
original dispute was settled amicably and that the amount of court 
fees involved is not excessive,
in the peculiar facts of this case, for 
it not to be a binding precedent, we are of the view that the same 
can be refunded to him. Ordered accordingly.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. 
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain