STATE OF U.P. & ORS versus M/S LALTA PRASAD VAISH AND SONS
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1931, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Unknown
Segment: Issues
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1931 : 2024 INSC 812
State of U.P. & Ors.  
v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
(Civil Appeal No. 151 of 2007)
23 October 2024
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, Hrishikesh Roy, 
Abhay S Oka, B.V. Nagarathna,* J B Pardiwala, 
Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, 
Augustine George Masih, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The issues which arise for adjudication in this reference pertain 
to the scope of the power of the State Legislatures under Entry 8 
and the meaning of the phrase “intoxicating liquor”. The question 
is whether “intoxicating liquor” in Entry 8 only includes potable 
alcohol, such as alcoholic beverages or also includes alcohol which 
is used in the production of other products; whether Entry 52 of 
List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution overrides Entry 8 
of List II; whether the expression ‘intoxicating liquors’ in Entry 8 of 
List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution includes alcohol 
other than potable alcohol; and whether a notified order under 
Section 18G of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 
is necessary for Parliament to occupy the field under Entry 33 of 
List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh 
Schedule  – Whether Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh 
Schedule to the Constitution is an industry-based entry or a  
product-based entry:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh
Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the 
Constitution is both an industry-based entry and a product-based 
entry – The words that follow the expression “that is to say” in the 
* Author
1932
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Entry are not exhaustive of its contents – It includes the regulation of 
everything from the raw materials to the consumption of ‘intoxicating 
liquor”. [Para 140(a)] – [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. (dissenting)] 
Entry  8-List II deals with “intoxicating liquors” – The misuse, 
diversion or abuse of “industrial alcohol” as “intoxicating liquors” can 
also be controlled and prevented under Entry 8-List II by the State 
Legislatures having regard to Article 47 of the Constitution – It is 
also made clear that the Industries (Development and Regulation) 
Act 1951 which has been enacted by the Parliament by virtue of 
Entry 52-List I has taken control of “Fermentation Industries” as a 
scheduled industry – Such “Fermentation Industries” would exclude 
“intoxicating liquors”. [Para 33(a)]
Constitution of India – Entry 52 of List I, Entry 24 of List II – 
Whether Parliament can occupy the field of the entire industry 
merely by issuing a declaration under Entry 52 of List I:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine 
George Masih, JJ.] Parliament cannot occupy the field of the 
entire industry merely by issuing a declaration under Entry 52 
of List I – The State Legislature’s competence under Entry 24 of 
List II is denuded only to the extent of the field covered by the law 
of Parliament under Entry 52
of List I. [Para 140(b)] – [Per B.V. 
Nagarathna, J. (dissenting)] Parliament can occupy the field of 
the entire industry by merely issuing a declaration under Entry 
52-List I and the State Legislature’s competence under Entry 24-
List II is denuded to the field of the entire industry and specifically 
to the extent of the field covered by the law of Parliament under 
Entry 52-List I. [Para 33(b)]
Constitution of India – Whether Parliament have the legislative 
competence to enact a law taking control of the industry of 
intoxicating liquor covered by Entry 8 of List II in exercise of 
the power under Article 246 read with Entry 52 of List I:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] Parliament does not have the legislative competence
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1933
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
to enact a law taking control of the industry of intoxicating liquor 
covered by Entry 8 of List II in exercise of the power under 
Article 246 read with Entry 52 of List I. [Para 140(c)] – [Per B.V. 
Nagarathna, J. (concurring)]. [Para 33(c)]
Constitution of India – Meaning of the expression ‘intoxicating 
liquor’ by judgments of the Bombay High Court in FN Balsara v. 
State of Bombay, this Court in FN Balsara and Southern 
Pharmaceuticals:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself and 
for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, 
Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George Masih, 
JJ.] The judgments of the Bombay High Court in FN Balsara v. State 
of Bombay, this Court in FN Balsara and Southern Pharmaceuticals 
did not limit the meaning of the expression ‘intoxicating liquor’ to 
its popular meaning, that is, alcoholic beverages that produce 
intoxication – All the three judgments interpreted the expression 
to cover alcohol that could be noxiously used to the detriment of 
health. [Para 140(d)] – [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. (dissenting)] 
The context of the controversy must be borne in mind in the said 
cases – The aforesaid decisions in substance limited the meaning 
of the expression “intoxicating liquors” to its popular meaning i.e. 
“alcoholic beverages” that produce intoxication – Therefore, in the 
context of prohibition of “intoxicating liquor”
as a beverage, there 
could not have been prohibition of production of alcohol used for 
medicinal and toilet preparation as well as “industrial alcohol” or 
non-potable alcohol. [Para 33(d)]
Constitution of India – Expression ‘intoxicating liquor’ in 
Entry 8 – Legislative meaning and judicial meaning:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] The expression ‘intoxicating liquor’ in Entry 8 has not 
acquired a legislative meaning on an application of the test laid 
down in Ganon Dunkerley. [Para 140(e)] – [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. 
(dissenting)] The expression “intoxicating liquor” in Entry 8 has 
acquired a legislative and judicial meaning over the decades as 
discussed. [Para 33(e)]
1934
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Constitution of India – Evolution of Legislative Entries on 
Alcohol – Use of expression “intoxicating liquor”:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] The study of the evolution of the legislative entries 
on alcohol indicates that the use of the expressions “intoxicating 
liquor” and “alcoholic liquor for human consumption” in the Seventh 
Schedule was a matter well-thought of – It also indicates that the 
members of the Constituent Assembly were aware of use of the 
variants of alcohol as a raw material in the production of multiple 
products. [Para 140(f)] – [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. (dissenting)] 
The members of the Constituent Assembly were clear in what 
they envisaged within the scope and ambit of the expression 
“intoxicating liquors” in Entry 8-List II – This is also evident from 
Item 26 of the First Schedule of the IDRA – “Intoxicating liquors” is 
only a segment of the “Fermentation Industries”, namely, potable 
alcohol – There was no intention on the part of the members of the 
Constituent Assembly to read within the expression “intoxicating 
liquors” non-potable or “industrial alcohol” – Further, in order to 
have a consistency between what was envisaged under Entry 84-
List I and Entry 51-List II in the context of alcoholic liquors for 
human consumption, the
taxing Entry in List II which is within the 
legislative competence of the States follows the regulatory Entry 
in Entry 8-List II – Therefore, the use of the expression “industrial 
alcohol” or non-potable alcohol in Synthetics and Chemicals (7J) 
was only to crystallise all variants of alcohol which were non-potable 
and to distinguish the same from potable alcohol meant only for 
human consumption as a beverage. [Para 33(f)]
Constitution of India – Entry 8 of List II – Scope and ambit:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine 
George Masih, JJ.] Entry 8 of List II is based on public interest – It 
seeks to enhance the scope of the entry beyond potable alcohol – 
This is inferable from the use of the phrase ‘intoxicating’ and 
other accompanying words in the Entry – Alcohol is inherently a 
noxious substance that is prone to misuse affecting public health 
at large – Entry 8 covers alcohol that could be used noxiously
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1935
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
to the detriment of public health – This includes alcohol such as 
rectified spirit, ENA and denatured spirit which are used as raw 
materials in the production of potable alcohol and other products – 
However, it does not include the final product (such as a hand 
sanitiser) that contains alcohol since such an interpretation will 
substantially diminish the scope of multiple other legislative 
entries. [Para 140(g)] – [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. (dissenting)] 
The entire controversy cannot be viewed from the point of view 
of alcohol being used as a raw material and final product such 
as hand sanitizer containing alcohol – The potential misuse of 
alcohol cannot be the basis for interpreting an Entry such as 
Entry 8-List II – Ultimately, the “Fermentation Industries” have 
to be borne in mind which takes within its canvas only non-
potable /“industrial alcohol” – The aspect of public health having 
a corelation to Entry 8-List II dealing with “intoxicating liquor” and 
the misuse of alcohol cannot be a guide while interpreting the 
content of the said Entry and therefore, its scope and ambit being 
amplified beyond what it really envisages as a field of legislation 
for the States to legislate upon. [Para 33(g)]
Constitution of India – The judgment in Synthetics (7J) – 
Overruled:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine 
George Masih, JJ.] The judgment in Synthetics (7J) is overruled 
in terms of this judgment. [Para 140(h)] – [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. 
(dissenting)] The judgment in Synthetics and Chemicals (7J) 
need not be overruled in relation to Section 18G of the IDRA and 
it continues to be good law in the context of what is comprised in 
the expression “industrial alcohol” and “intoxicating liquors” except 
what has been clarified above in Entry 8-List II.[Para 33(h)]
Constitution of India – Entry 8 of List II – Industries (Development 
and Regulation) Act 1951 – Item 26:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine 
George Masih, JJ.] Item 26 of the First Schedule to the IDRA 
must be read as excluding the industry “intoxicating liquor”. 
[Para 140(i)] – [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. (dissenting)] Item 26 of
1936
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
the First Schedule of the IDRA must be read excluding only what 
is contained in the expression “intoxicating liquors” as interpreted 
above in Entry 8-List II. [Para 33(i)]
Constitution of India – Correctness of the judgment in Tika 
Ramji on the interpretation of word ‘industry’:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine 
George Masih, JJ.] The correctness of the judgment in Tika 
Ramji on the interpretation of word ‘industry’ as it occurs in the 
Legislative entries does not fall for determination in this reference.
[Para 140(j)] – [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.] Tika Ramji is held to be 
not good law insofar as the requirement of issuance of a notified 
order as a condition precedent for the field to be occupied, has 
been mandated therein.[Para 33(j)]
Constitution of India – Entry 8 of List II and Entry 33(a) of List III – 
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 – s.18G:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] The issue of whether Section 18G of the IDRA covers 
the field under Entry 33(a) of List III does not arise for adjudication 
in view of the finding that denatured alcohol is covered by Entry 8 
of List II”. [Para 140(k)] – [Per B.V.
Nagarathna, J. (dissenting)] 
Denatured alcohol belongs to the family of “industrial alcohol” 
and therefore, Section 18G of the IDRA has a bearing on the 
said product – Section 18G occupies the field under Entry 33(a)-
List III and, thereby, only Parliament is competent to legislate on 
all articles or class of articles related to a scheduled industry i.e. 
“Fermentation Industries”. [Para 33(k)]
Constitution of India – Article 246 – Federal balance of the 
distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the 
States:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine 
George Masih, JJ.] The federal balance of the distribution of
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1937
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
legislative powers between the Union and the States rests on 
the interpretation of the phrase “notwithstanding” in Clause (1) of 
Article 246 and “subject to” in Clause (3) of Article 246 – It is more 
than clear that the phrases provide predominance to Parliament 
over State Legislatures – The federal balance lies not on the 
recognition that the Constitution grants Parliament predominant 
legislative power but on the identification of the scope of such 
predominance – The scope of the non-obstante clause in Article 
246(1) and the subjugation clause in Article 246(3) must not be 
interpreted in isolation but along with the substantive provisions 
of the clauses – Clause (1) of Article 246 grants Parliament the 
“exclusive power” to enact laws with respect to matters in List I – 
Similarly, Clause (3) of Article 246 grants the Legislature of States, 
the “exclusive power” to enact laws with respect to matters in 
List II – On a holistic interpretation of the provisions, it is clear 
that the non-obstante clause in Article 246(1) and the subjugation 
clause in Article 246(3) do not permit Parliament to enact laws with 
respect to the entries in List II – Each of the legislative bodies are 
sovereign and supreme within the sphere that is allocated to them 
in the Seventh Schedule – It is crucial to note that Clause (1) of 
Article 246 stipulates that the power of Parliament to make laws with
respect to entries in List I is ‘notwithstanding’ not just the power to 
make laws with respect to matters in the Concurrent list but also 
the power to make laws with respect to matters in the State List – A 
combined reading of the non-obstante clause and the subjugation 
clause along with the use of the phrase “exclusive power” means 
only one thing, that when there is a conflict between the entries 
in List I and List II, the power of Parliament supersedes. [Para 44]
Constitution of India – Legislative entries – Interpretation – 
Overlap between two entries:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine 
George Masih, JJ.] The legislative entries must be given a wide 
meaning – All incidental and ancillary matters which can be fairly 
and reasonably comprehended must be brought within them – 
However, if there is an overlap between two entries the Court 
must endeavour to interpret the entries harmoniously – While 
interpreting the entries harmoniously, it must be ensured that no 
entry is rendered redundant – This principle of construction applies
1938
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
equally to entries within the same List and entries within different 
lists – The principle of parliamentary supremacy must be applied 
only when the attempted reconciliation by the above methods of 
interpretation fails. [Para 51] 
Constitution of India – Entry 8 of List II – Usage of phrase 
“that is to say”:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] The expression ‘that is to say’ in Entry 8 of List II 
cannot be interpreted to circumscribe the scope of the entry – The 
words that follow ‘that is to say’ are illustrative and explanatory 
of the scope of the provision – The expression does not limit the 
scope of the entry – Thus, the scope of Entry 8 of List II cannot 
be limited to the ‘production, manufacture, possession, transport, 
purchase and sale’ of Intoxicating Liquor. [Para 55] 
Constitution of India – Entry 52 of List I – Whether an implied 
limitation can be read into Entry 52 of List I in the absence of 
the expression “to the extent to which”:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] If an implied limitation is not read into the Entry, 
Parliament by a simple declaration may take over the complete 
industry and
subject the power of the State Legislature to make any 
provision with respect to that industry to the power of Parliament – 
This interpretation diminishes the scope of competence of the 
State Legislature under Entry 24 of List II – Such an interpretation 
completely tilts the federal balance that entries 52 of List I and 24 
of List II seek to maintain – The power of Parliament in Entry 52 of 
List I is defined by the phrase ‘control’ – The Entry does not read 
as “industries, declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the 
public interest” – The Entry states “Industries, the control of which 
by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in 
the public interest” – The law enacted by Parliament must not be 
an abstract declaration but must specify the extent of control that 
is necessary to be taken in public interest – The State Legislature 
will have the competence to legislate with respect to the field which 
is not the subject matter of control – The legislative competence of
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1939
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
the State Legislature is only denuded to the extent of the ‘control’ 
by the Union declared by the law of Parliament to be expedient 
in the public interest. [Para 65] 
Constitution of India – Whether Parliament under Entry 52 of 
List I takes over the industry of intoxicating liquor covered 
by Entry 8 of List II:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] No – Entry 52 of List I is a general entry dealing with 
industry – Entry 8 of List II is a special entry dealing with one 
particular industry – The consequence of interpreting Entry 52 
to cover the industry of ‘intoxicating liquor’ is two-fold: first, it 
would amount to deleting the words ‘production, manufacture’ in 
Entry 8; and second, the State Legislature also loses its exclusive 
competence to legislate upon the product of the industry, rendering 
Entry 8 fully redundant – This is because the legislative competence 
on products of industries covered by Entry 52 of List I is placed 
in Entry 33 of List III – As a consequence, Parliament does not 
have the legislative competence to enact a law taking control 
of the industry of intoxicating liquor under Entry 52 of List I.  
[Paras 71(e), 72] 
Constitution of India – Entry 8 of List II – Intoxicating Liquor:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y
Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] It is clear from the analysis of various judgments that 
the meaning of the phrase ‘intoxicating liquor’ in Entry 8 of List II 
has been expanded beyond the narrow definition of alcoholic 
beverages that produce an ‘intoxicating effect’ upon consumption – 
Liquids which contain alcohol and which can possibly be used 
(or misused) as intoxicating liquor have been included within the 
meaning of the phrase. [Para 82] 
Words and Phrases – Intoxicating Liquor – Interpretation:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine
1940
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
George Masih, JJ.] The expression ‘intoxicating liquor’ can 
possibly be interpreted to mean the following: (a) Alcohol which 
is used as a beverage for human consumption such as beer or 
gin, that is, potable liquor; (b) If liquor means liquid, then Entry 8 
of List II includes all liquids which contain alcohol; and (c) Alcohol 
which is used as a raw material to prepare other products such as 
pharmaceutical products and cosmetic drugs – This could include 
denatured alcohol but also other types of alcohol that are used in 
the production of products without denaturing it. [Para 107] 
Words and Phrases – Alcoholic Liquor – Meaning:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] ‘Alcoholic liquor’ defines the scope of the provision 
based on the ingredient, that is, ‘alcohol’ – In contrast, ‘intoxicating 
liquor’ defines the scope of the provision based on the effect, that 
is, intoxication – Thus, even liquor which colloquially or traditionally 
is not considered as alcoholic liquor may be covered by the 
phrase ‘intoxicating liquor’ if it produces the effect of intoxication. 
[Para 112(a)]
Words and Phrases – Intoxicate – Meaning:
Held: [Per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, for himself 
and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J B Pardiwala, Manoj 
Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish
Chandra Sharma, Augustine George 
Masih, JJ.] “Intoxicate” means the ability of someone to lose 
control of their behaviour – It could also mean poison – Thus, the 
purpose of substituting the adjective which indicates the ingredient 
(alcohol) with the impact (intoxication) seems to be enhance the 
scope of the Entry to cover liquor which has an impact on health. 
[Para 112(b)] 
Constitution of India – Entry 8-List II and Art.47 – Industrial 
alcohol – Intoxicating liquor:
Held: [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.] Merely because “industrial alcohol” 
or non-potable alcohol such as rectified spirit can be converted 
into “intoxicating liquors” or alcohol fit for human consumption as 
a beverage (potable alcohol), that would not empower the State 
Legislature to tax or impose any levy on such “industrial alcohol” –
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1941
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
However, since the expression “intoxicating liquors” in Entry 8-List II 
deals specifically with alcohol used as a beverage and meant for 
human consumption, it would be within the scope and ambit of 
the said Entry for the State Legislature to regulate any abuse or 
conversion of “industrial alcohol” as a beverage, which is, in fact, 
harmful when consumed – Therefore, having regard to Article 47 of 
the Constitution, a State Legislature can even prohibit manufacture 
of “intoxicating liquors” in a State as one of the objects of which 
would be to negate the conversion or abuse of “industrial alcohol” 
as alcohol fit for human consumption. [Para 11.2]
Constitution of India – Entry 8-List II – Intoxicating liquor – 
Intoxicating effect – Direct and indirect human consumption:
Held: [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.] What prima facie appears is 
that the “intoxication” effect is a sine qua non for the legislative 
competence of States on any liquors potentially coming within 
the scope of Entry 8-List II – In the absence of an “intoxicating” 
effect from liquors, a State Legislature cannot legislate on the 
subject – However, what is required to be seen is the nature of 
the product which leads to such an intoxicating effect upon human 
consumption of the same – Here, the expression consumption 
must be explained – It is not all kinds of human consumption, 
direct or indirect, which is the determining
factor – It is only direct 
consumption i.e. as an ingestion by the act of drinking as a beverage 
or a drink – An indirect consumption by use of alcoholic liquors as 
a raw material for any other product, industrial, medicinal or a toilet 
item cannot be included as part of Entry 8-List II – Secondly, merely 
because there can be a potential misuse of “industrial alcohol”, 
for example, by converting rectified spirit (“industrial alcohol”) as 
a beverage which has an intoxicating effect, Entry 8-List II cannot 
be stretched to include such “industrial alcohol” – The prevention 
of abuse of “industrial alcohol” as a beverage is also covered 
under Entry 8-List II – Thus, what is carved out of “Fermentation 
Industries” in Entry 24-List II is only “intoxicating liquors” used 
as beverage and thus, for direct human consumption the said 
subject is placed in Entry 8-List II – This would imply that the 
rest of “Fermentation Industries” would be within the scope and 
ambit of Entry 24-List II which is subject to Entry 52-List I and is 
a scheduled industry as per Section 2 read with Item 26 of First 
Schedule of IDRA. [Para 12.14]
1942
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Constitution of India – Entry 8-List II – Intoxicating liquor – 
Contours of interpretation:
Held: [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.] In deciding on “intoxicating liquors”, 
the contours of interpretation must be concerned only with the very 
nature of the product of “intoxicating liquors” rather than the entire 
industry concerning alcohol – Entry 8-List II provides the legislative 
competence to States to regulate production, manufacture, 
possession, transport, purchase and sale of only “intoxicating 
liquors” – It must follow from this that what is being produced or 
manufactured or possessed or transported or purchased or sold 
must actually be “intoxicating liquors” and not any other alcoholic 
product. [Para 12.16]
Constitution of India – Entry 52-List I – Industries (Development 
and Regulation) Act – Item 26 of the First Schedule – s.18G:
Held: [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.] The IDRA is enacted by 
Parliament under Entry 52-List I taking control of, inter alia, 
“Fermentation Industries” as noted in Item 26 of the First Schedule 
to the said Act – Section 18G deals with any article or class of 
articles relatable to any scheduled industry i.e. “Fermentation 
Industries” in the instant cases – The Explanation to Section 18G 
states that the expression “article or class of articles” relatable 
to any scheduled industry i.e. “Fermentation Industries” herein 
includes any article or class of articles imported into India which 
is
of the same nature or description as the article or class of 
articles, manufactured or produced in the scheduled industry – 
The explanation is inclusive and not an exhaustive one – For 
immediate reference Item 26 of the First Schedule of the IDRA 
pursuant to the 2016 amendment is “The fermentation industries 
(other than potable alcohol): (i)  Alcohol; (ii) other products of 
fermentation industries” – The Item 26 w.e.f. 14.05.2016, has 
been amended to clarify that “Fermentation Industries” refers to 
industries others than potable alcohol – This is for the reason 
that “intoxicating liquors” in Entry 8-List II is equated to only 
potable alcohol and rest of the industry of the “Fermentation 
Industries” other than potable alcohol is a scheduled industry – 
Once an industry is a scheduled industry under the provisions 
of IDRA, in the context of Section 18G the Central Government 
may notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1943
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
of IDRA by a notified order provide for regulating the supply and 
distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein of a product 
of scheduled industry. [Paras 15.7, 15.8] 
Constitution of India – Art.254 – Doctrine of repugnancy in 
the context of the legislative subjects which are enumerated 
in List III or the Concurrent List:
Held: [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.] Article 254 of the Constitution 
applies the doctrine of repugnancy in the context of the legislative 
subjects which are enumerated in List III or the Concurrent List – 
While applying the principles of repugnancy under Article 254, a 
sine qua non is to identify the conflict between the laws made by 
the Parliament and the laws made by the State Legislature – The 
conflict between the said laws is the basis for the application of 
Article 254 – The conflict could be direct when both the laws 
cannot operate together or it could be indirect when the State 
law entrenches upon a Parliamentary or Central law – But when 
laws made by the Parliament or the State Legislature can be 
implemented without there being any conflict, the principle of 
repugnancy would not apply inasmuch as there would be no 
contrary results owing to the applicability of both sets of laws – In 
other words, there cannot be a situation where obeying the State 
laws would result in disobeying the Parliamentary laws – Thus, 
when laws are made under an Entry in
List III or the Concurrent 
List by both the Parliament as well as by the State Legislature, 
the Court must first ascertain whether the two sets of laws can 
operate harmoniously, if not, whether harmonious interpretation 
could be given to the said laws so as to avoid a conflict between 
the two – It is only when there is a conflict between the two 
sets of laws inasmuch as the State laws would be abridging the 
Parliamentary law, in such a case, the doctrine of Parliamentary 
supremacy would apply i.e. when a harmonious interpretation is not 
possible – Even if the two laws overlap, if they are complimentary 
to each other, in such a case, there would be no application of 
the principle of Parliamentary supremacy – Thus, when there is 
absolute inconsistency between the two sets of laws, and they are 
not reconcilable then, the principle of Parliamentary supremacy 
would apply in the context of repugnancy. [Para 16.2]
1944
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Principles/Doctrines – Doctrine of occupied field:
Held: [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.] The application of the doctrine of 
occupied field is a technique adopted by the constitutional courts 
in order to ensure that there is no potential conflict that could arise 
between the State laws and the existing Parliamentary law having 
regard to the nature of the legislative powers, their importance in 
the socio-economic sphere of governance in the country and such 
other considerations. [Para 16.6]
Constitution of India – Entry 8-List II and Art.254 – Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act – s.18G, Item 26 of First 
Schedule – Whether Item 26 which speaks of “Fermentation 
Industries” to include “industrial alcohol” or non-potable 
alcohol as a product of such industry which has been taken 
control of by the Union under the provisions of IDRA (and 
which is excluded from the scope and ambit of Entry 8-List II), 
falls within the scope and ambit of a scheduled industry, and 
thereby Section 18G would apply on the said aspects:
Held: [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.] The answer is in the affirmative for 
the following reasons: firstly, insofar as the potable or “intoxicating 
liquors” is concerned, the legislative field is exclusively with the 
State Legislature – However, in respect of the scheduled industry 
which is “Fermentation Industries” (which does not take within 
its scope and ambit potable alcohol) vide Item 26 of the First
Schedule, all other types of alcohol including “industrial alcohol” 
can be regulated only by the Parliamentary law and the Central 
Government – Any other interpretation would imply that even in the 
face of Section 18G being incorporated into the IDRA and in the 
absence of any notified order being issued, the States Legislatures 
and the State Governments would have the legislative competence 
to make laws on what is the subject matter of Section 18G of IDRA 
under Entry 33(a)-List III – Then, each State could make its own 
law on the said subject matter covered under Section 18G of IDRA 
pertaining to a scheduled industry – If in respect of the products 
of a scheduled industry, the States make laws and there are a 
variety of laws made by the individual States which are in force 
in respect of the subject under Section 18G of IDRA then when a 
notified order is issued, the Central Government’s notified order 
would apply if there is a direct conflict between the State laws or
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1945
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
legal regime in place and the notified order that is issued – This 
would result in a legal quagmire vis-à-vis a scheduled industry – 
It cannot then be said that it is necessary to ascertain whether 
there is a direct conflict between the State law and the notified 
order made by the Central Government at every instance such 
an order is issued and if there is such a direct conflict then, the 
Parliamentary law would apply on the strength of Article 254 of 
the Constitution. [Paras 16.7 and 16.8]
Constitution of India – Entry 33(a)-List III – Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act – s.18G, Item 26 of First 
Schedule – Whether, under Entry 33(a)-List III, the States 
have been denuded of their powers by virtue of insertion of 
Section 18G to the IDRA, i.e., Section 18G having occupied 
the field to the extent of control as mentioned and the States 
would not have the competence to pass any law relating to 
Entry 33(a)-List III:
Held: [Per B.V. Nagarathna, J.] Answer is in affirmative – This is 
because Section 18G has been inserted by Parliament to the IDRA 
which is an enactment made pursuant to Entry 52-List I – Entry 52-
List I speaks of the Union by declaration made by Parliament 
by law taking control of such scheduled industry (Section 2 of 
the IDRA) such as the “Fermentation Industries” herein – The 
industries which are controlled of by the Union are specified in 
the First
Schedule to the IDRA – “Fermentation Industries” is 
a scheduled industry – Therefore, the Union has taken control 
of “Fermentation Industries”  – For the sake of clarification, in 
the year 2016 an amendment was made to expressly exclude 
potable alcohol from “Fermentation Industries” and it includes 
only non-potable alcohol such as “industrial alcohol” – The 
detailed discussion made is in regard to only “industrial alcohol” 
being non-potable alcohol – “Intoxicating liquors” being potable 
alcohol is not within the scheduled industry – Therefore, the said 
products of “Fermentation Industries” which have been taken 
control of by the Union by virtue of insertion of the Section 18G 
of the IDRA would come within the scope and ambit of the said 
Section. [Para 16.10] 
Constitution of India – Importance of “Industrial Alcohol” to 
the Indian Economy – Discussed. [B.V. Nagarathna, J.]
1946
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.
Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of UP [1989] Supp. 1 SCR 
623 : (1990) 1 SCC 109 – overruled.
State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley [1959] 1 SCR 379 : 1959 
SCR 379 – followed.
Tika Ramji v. State of UP [1956] 1 SCR 393 : AIR 1956 SC 676 – 
held inapplicable.
Nashirwar v. State of MP [1975] 2 SCR 861 : 1975 AIR 360; Har 
Shanker v. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commissioner, AIR 1957 SC 
414; Synthetics & Chemicals v. State of UP [1980] 2 SCR 531 : 
(1980) 2 SCC 441; State of Bombay v. FN Balsara [1951] 1 SCR 
682 : (1951) SCC 860; Indian Mica and Micancite Industries v. 
State of Bihar [1971] Supp. 1 SCR 319 : (1971) 2 SCC 236; Shri 
Bileshwar Khand Udyog Khedut Sahakari Mandali v. State of Gujarat 
[1992] 1 SCR 391 : (1992) 2 SCC 42; Gujchem Distillers India v. 
State of Gujarat [1992] 1 SCR 675 : (1992) 2 SCC 399; State of 
AP v. McDowell [1996] 3 SCR 721 : (1996) 3 SCC 709; Vam Organic 
Chemicals v. State of UP [1997] 1 SCR 403 : (1997) 2 SCC 715; 
Bihar Distillery v. Union of India [1997] 1 SCR 680 : (1997) 2 SCC 
727; Government of Haryana v. Haryana Brewery (1997) 5 SCC 
758; State of UP v. Modi Distillery [1995] Supp. 3 SCR 119 : (1995) 
5 SCC 753; Deccan Sugar & Abkari v. Commissioner of Excise, 
AP (2004) 1 SCC 243; State of UP v. Vam Organic [2003] Supp. 
4 SCR 957 : (2004) 1 SCC 225; RP Sharma v. State of UP 2004 
SCC OnLine All 159; State of
UP v. Lalta Prasad [2007] 11 SCR 
670 : (2007) 13 SCC 463; SIEL Ltd v. Union of India [1998] Supp. 
1 SCR 560 : (1998) 7 SCC 26; ITC Ltd v. Agricultural Produce 
Market Committee [2002] 1 SCR 441 : (2002) 9 SCC 232; Jindal 
Stainless Steel v. State of Haryana [2016] 10 SCR 1 : (2017) 12 
SCC 1 [617]; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State of Bihar [1983] 
3 SCR 130 : (1983) 4 SCC 45; State of WB v. Committee for 
Protection of Democratic Rights [2010] 2 SCR 979 : (2010) 3 SCC 
571; Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [1962] 
Supp. 3 SCR 1 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 60 : AIR 1962 SC 1044; 
Union of India v. HS Dhillon [1972] 2 SCR 33 : (1971) 2 SCC 779; 
TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [1993] Supp. 3 SCR
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1947
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
117 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; State of Karnataka v. State of Meghalaya 
[2022] 18 SCR 516 : (2023) 4 SCC 416; MPV Sundararamier 
& Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1958] 1 SCR 1422 : (1958) 
9 STC 298; R Abdul Quader & Co. v. STO [1964] 6 SCR 867; 
United Province v. Atiqa Begum (1940) FCR 110; Godfrey Phillips 
India Ltd. v. State of UP [2005] 1 SCR 732 : (2005) 2 SCC 515; 
Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India [1970] 1 SCR 
479 : (1969) 2 SCC 166; Bhola Prasad v. The King Emperor (1942) 
4 FCR 17; Bansal Wire Industries v. State of UP [2011] 7 SCR 
416 : (2011) 6 SCC 545; Sait Rikaji Furtarnal v. State of AP (1991) 
Supp (1) SCC 202; CST v. Popular Trading Company [2000] 2 
SCR 983 : (2000) 5 SCC 511; State of Punjab v. Devans Modern 
Brewaries [2003] Supp. 5 SCR 930 : (2004) 11 SCC 26; State of 
Bombay v. Bombay Education Society [1955] 1 SCR 568 : (1954) 
2 SCC 152; Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner 
of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) [2001] 1 SCR 407 : (2001) 2 SCC 
201; State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society [1955] 1 SCR 
568 : (1954) 2 SCC 152; Mineral Area Development Authority v. 
M/s Steel Authority of India [2024] 8 SCR 540 : 2024 INSC 554; 
Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of UP [1980] 3 SCR 331 : (1980) 
4 SCC 136; Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar [1970] 2 SCR 100; 
State of Haryana v. Chanan Mal [1976] 3 SCR 688; Hingir-Rampur 
Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of
Orissa [1961] 2 SCR 537 : AIR 1961 SC 
459; State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co. [1964] 4 SCR 461 : 
AIR 1964 SC 1284; Baijnath Kadio v. State of Bihar [1970] 2 SCR 
100 : (1969) 3 SCC 838, 847-848 : AIR 1970 SC 1436; State of 
Haryana v. Chanan Mal [1976] 3 SCR 688 : (1977) 1 SCC 340, 
351 : AIR 1976 SC 1654; Wavery Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & 
Co (2018) 4 SCC 743; FN Balsara v. State of Bombay 1950 SCC 
OnLine Bom 57; Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemical v. State 
of Kerala [1982] 1 SCR 519 : (1981) 4 SCC 391; Kone Elevator 
India (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N. [2014] 5 SCR 912 : (2014) 7 SCC 1; 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. GTL Infrastructure Limited 
[2016] 11 SCR 172 : (2017) 3 SCC 545; Rainbow Steels v. Sales 
Tax Commissioner, UP [1981] 2 SCR 727 : AIR 1981 SC 2010; 
State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1960 SC 610; 
Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise [1990] 
2 SCR 797 : AIR 1991 SC 754; Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. 
State of Kerala [1973] 1 SCR 356 : (1972) 2 SCC 218; Ganga 
Sugar Corporation v. State of UP [1980] 1 SCR 769 : (1980) 1
1948
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
SCC 223; Viswanathiah & Co. v. State of Karnataka [1991] 1 SCR 
305 : (1991) 3 SCC 258 – referred to.
In the Judgment of B.V. Nagarathna, J.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [1995] Supp. 6 SCR 
759 : (1995) 1 SCC 574 – followed.
State of Assam  v. Sristikar Dowerah AIR 1957 SC 414; 
Nashirwar v. State of MP [1975] 2 SCR 861 : 1975 AIR 360; 
Deep Chand v. State of UP [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 8 : AIR 1959 
SC 648 – relied on.
Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1956] 1 SCR 393 : AIR 1956 
SC 676 – held not good law (insofar as the requirement of 
issuance of a notified order as a condition precedent).
Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1989] 
Supp. 1 SCR 623 : AIR 1990 SC 1927 – need not be overruled.
State of Bombay v. FN Balsara [1951] 1 SCR 682 : 1951 SCC 860 : 
AIR 1951 SC 318; Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of 
W.B. [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 1 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 60 : AIR 1962 
SC 1044; Indian Mica and Micancite Industries v. State of Bihar 
[1971] Supp. 1 SCR 319 : (1971) 2 SCC 236; Ishwari Khetan Sugar 
Mills v. State of UP [1980] 3 SCR 331 : AIR 1980 SC 1955 : (1980) 
4 SCC 136; State of AP v. McDowell [1996] 3 SCR 721 : (1996) 
3 SCC 709; Bihar Distillery v. Union of India [1997] 1 SCR 680 : 
(1997) 2 SCC 727; Vam Organic Chemicals v. State of UP [1997] 1 
SCR 403 : (1997) 2 SCC 715; State of UP v. Vam Organic [2003] 
Supp. 4 SCR 957 : (2004) 1 SCC 225; State of Karnataka v.
State 
of Meghalaya [2022] 18 SCR 516 : (2023) 4 SCC 416; RMDC v. 
Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628; MPV Sundararamier & Co. v. 
State of Andhra Pradesh [1958] 1 SCR 1422 : (1958) 9 STC 298 : 
AIR 1958 SC 468; Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner 
and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer [1954] 1 SCR 873 : AIR 1954 
SC 220; Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division [1958] 
1 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398; Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. 
Collector of Excise, Government of Tripura [1973] 1 SCR 533 : 
AIR 1972 SC 1863; State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal [1972] 
3 SCR 784 : AIR 1972 SC 1816; Har Shanker v. Dy. Excise and 
Taxation Commissioner [1975] 3 SCR 254 : AIR 1975 SC 1121;
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1949
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [1991] 3 SCR 64 : 
(1991) 4 SCC 139; Shri Bileshwar Khand Udyog Khedut Sahakari 
Mandali v. State of Gujarat [1992] 1 SCR 391 : (1992) 2 SCC 42; 
Gujchem Distillers India v. State of Gujarat [1992] 1 SCR 675 : 
(1992) 2 SCC 399; State of UP v. Modi Distillery [1995] Supp. 3 
SCR 119 : (1995) 5 SCC 753; Shree Krishna Gyanoday Sugar 
Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1996] Supp. 4 SCR 680 : (1996) 10 SCC 
11; Deccan Sugar and Abkari Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Excise 
(1998) 3 SCC 272; Government of Haryana v. Haryana Brewery 
Ltd [2002] 1 SCR 942  : (2002) 4 SCC 547; State of Bihar  v. 
Industrial Corporation (P) Ltd [2003] Supp. 3 SCR 362 : (2003) 
11 SCC 465; ITC Ltd. v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee 
[2002] 1 SCR 441 : (2002) 9 SCC 232; Southern Pharmaceuticals 
and Chemicals v. State of Kerala [1982] 1 SCR 519 : AIR 1981 
SC 1863; Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar [1970] 2 SCR 100 : 
AIR 1970 SC 1436; Hingir-Rampur Coal Co., Ltd. v. The State of 
Orissa [1961] 2 SCR 537 : AIR 1961 SC 459; State of Orissa v. 
M.A. Tulloch and Co. [1964] 7 SCR 816 : AIR 1964 SC 1284; 
State of Haryana. v. Chanan Mal [1976] 3 SCR 688 : AIR 1976 
SC 1654; Gujarat University v. Shri Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar 
[1963] Supp. 1 SCR 112 : AIR 1963 SC 703; Baharul Islam v. The 
Indian Medical Association [2023] 9 SCR 917 : 2023 SCC OnLine 
SC 79; Modern Dental College &
Research Centre v. State of 
Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353; The South India Corporation 
(P) Ltd. v. The Secretary, Board of Revenue Trivandrum [1964] 
4 SCR 280 : AIR 1964 SC 207; Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of 
Tamil Nadu [2004] 1 SCR 306 : (2004) 3 SCC 1; M/s. Hoechst 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1983] 3 SCR 130 : AIR 
1983 SC 1019; Mineral Area Development Authority Etc. v. M/s. 
Steel Authority of India & Others (Civil Appeal Nos. 4056-4064 of 
1999); Indian Aluminium company Limited v. Karnataka Electricity 
Board [1992] 3 SCR 213 : (1992) 3 SCC 580; Shree Krishna 
Gyanoday Sugar Ltd.; Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar 
[1999] Supp. 1 SCR 146 : (1999) 9 SCC 620; SIEL Ltd. v. Union 
of India [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 560 : (1998) 7 SCC 26; State of 
Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Limited [2012] 4 SCR 448 : 
(2012) 7 SCC 106; Deep Chand v. State of UP [1959] Supp. 2 
SCR 8 : AIR 1959 SC 648; State of W.B. v. Union of India [1964] 
1 SCR 371 : AIR 1963 SC 1241 – referred to.
1950
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Crowley v. Christensen (1890) 34 Law Ed. 620; South Carolina v. 
United States (1905) 199 US 437; Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank 
of Commerce Limited, Khulna AIR 1947 P.C. 60; United Province v. 
Atiqa Begum (1940) FCR 110: AIR 1941 FC 16 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.:
F.B. Wright, Distillation of Alcohol and De-Naturing (2nd ed. 
1907); Stuart Walton, Norma Miller, An Encyclopedia of Spirits 
& Liqueurs and How to Cook with Them (2000); KA Jacques, 
TP Lyons, DR Kelsall (ed), The Alcohol Textbook: A reference 
for the beverage, fuel and industrial alcohol industries (4th ed. 
Nottingham University Press); Alcohol Denaturants-Specification 
(Second Revision), ICS 71.100.80; Constitutional Law of India, 
Volume 3 (4th edn.) [25.57] 2340-2341; Constitution of India, 
Article 13; Shiva Rao (Vol II) pg. 666; Committee on Indian 
Constitutional Reform (Volume  1 Part I) 369; Joint Committee 
on Indian Constitutional Reform (Volume 1 Part I) 148-149; 18th 
Amendment of US Constitution; Report of the Joint Committee 
on Indian Constitutional Reform; Constituent Assembly Debates 
(2 September 1949) Volume IX.
In the Judgment of B.V. Nagarathna, J.:
Cooley’s “Constitutional Limitations” [2nd ed. Boston : Little, Brown 
& Company, p.58]; Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth Edition), 
Volume 26; Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, Pg.1278; Nicholas 
in his Australian
Constitution, 2nd Edition, page 303; Sugarcane 
(Control) Order, 1955; XIIth five-year plan (2012-2017) of the 
Planning Commission.
List of Acts
In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.:
Constitution of India; Constitution (One Hundred and First 
Amendment) Act 2016; Industries (Development and Regulation) 
Act, 1951; Industries (Development and Regulation) Amendment 
Act 2016; U.P Excise (Amendment) (Re-enactment and Validation) 
Act 1976; Bombay Abkari Act 1878; Madras Abkari Act 1886; 
Bengal Excise Act 1909; Bihar Excise Act 1915; MP Excise Act
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1951
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
1915; Punjab Excise Act 1914; Chhattisgarh Excise Act 1915; UP 
Excise Act 1910; Government of India Act 1919; Central Provinces 
and Berar Act 14 of 1938, AIR 1939 FC 1; C.P & Berar Taxation 
Act, AIR 1939 FC 1; Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949; Abkari Act 
1077; Bengal Excise Act 1909; MP Excise Act 1916; Punjab 
Excise Act 1914; Chhattisgarh Excise Act 1915; United Province 
Excise Act 1910; Licensing (Consolidating Act) 1872; Spirits Act 
1880; Government of India Act 1935; UP Sugarcane Act; U.P 
Excise (Amendment) (Re-enactment and Validation) Act 1976; 
License Consolidation Act 1910; Indian Power Alcohol Act 1948; 
Ethyl Alcohol (Price Control) Order 1966; Mines and Minerals 
(Development and Regulation) Act 1957; UP Sugar Undertakings 
(Acquisition) Act 1971; Oriental Gas Company Act 1960; Andhra 
Pradesh Prohibition Act 1995; Bombay Prohibition Act 1949; 
National Prohibition Act 1919.
In the Judgment of B.V. Nagarathna, J.:
Constitution of India; Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 
1951; Punjab Brewery Rules, 1956; Specially Denatured Spirit 
Rules, 1976; Kerala Rectified Spirit Rules, 1972; Government of 
India Act, 1919; Government of India Act, 1935; Bombay Abkari 
Act, 1878; Punjab Excise Act, 1914; UP Excise Act, 1910; Madras 
Abkari Act, 1886; Bengal Excise Act, 1909; Bihar & Orissa Excise 
Rules, 1990; Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915; Andhra Pradesh 
Prohibition Act,
1995; Bihar Molasses (Control) Act, 1947; Customs 
and Excise Act, 1952; Licensing Act, 1964; U.P. Sugar Undertaking 
(Acquisition) Ordinance, 1971; Companies Act, 1956; Uttar Pradesh 
Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953; 
Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955); Sugarcane 
(Control) Order, 1955; Kerala Chitties Act 23 of 1975; (Central) 
Chit Funds Act, 1982; Kerala Finance Act 7 of 2002; Food Safety 
and Standards Act, 2006.
List of Keywords
In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.
Entry 8 of List II; Industry based entry; Product based entry; 
Expression “that is to say”; Intoxicating liquor; Entry 52 of List I; 
Entry 24 of List II; Article 246 of Constitution; Alcoholic liquor; 
Potable alcohol; Non-potable alcohol; Rectified spirit; Denatured
1952
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
spirit; Judgment in Synthetics (7J); Item 26 of First Schedule 
to IDRA; Industry; Section 18G of IDRA; Entry 33(a) of List III; 
Distribution of Legislative Power; Scheme of Legislative Entries; 
Harmonious interpretation; Federal Balance; Overlap of two 
Entries; Expression “to the extent to which”; Intoxicate; State 
Legislature.
In the Judgment of B.V. Nagarathna, J.:
Entry 8-List II; Intoxicating liquor; Industrial alcohol; State 
Legislature; Article 47 of Constitution; Fermentation Industries; 
Alcoholic beverages; Item 26 of First Schedule of IDRA; Potable 
alcohol; Non-Potable alcohol; Judgment in Synthetics and 
Chemical (7J); Human consumption; Misuse of alcohol; Public 
health; Section 18G of IDRA; Entry 33(a)-List III; Intoxicating 
effect; Direct and indirect human consumption; Article 254 of the 
Constitution; Doctrine of repugnancy; Doctrine of Parliamentary 
supremacy; Harmonious interpretation; Doctrine of occupied field; 
Scheduled industries.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 151 of 2007
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.2004 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No. 421 of 1997
With
Special Leave Petition (C)….(Cc) No. 7999 of 2017, Special 
Leave Petition (C) No. 27241 of 2019, Special Leave Petition 
(C) No. 18582 of 2023, Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 19275, 
16505, 26110 and 26111 of 2004, Civil Appeal No. 580 of 2008, 
Civil Appeal Nos. 152
and 153 of 2007, Civil Appeal No. 610 of 
2008, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 20204 of 2012, Civil Appeal 
Nos. 6768 of 2014, Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 20519 and 
25447 of 2014, Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 3160 and 4057 
of 2015, Civil Appeal No. 2084 of 2020, Civil Appeal No. 4987 of 
2021, Diary No. 41507 of 2019, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 
18686 of 2022, Diary No. 7447 of 2023, Civil Appeal No. 154 of 
2007, Civil Appeal Nos. 671, 672, 688 and 750 of 2008 and Civil 
Appeal No. 5093 of 2011
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1953
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
Appearances for Parties
R. Venkataramani, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, Nalin Kohli, Lokesh 
Sinhal, Sr. A.A.Gs., Shadan Farasat, Saurabh Mishra, AAGs, 
K.N. Balgopal, Adv.Gen., Amit Kumar, Adv. Gen./Sr. Adv., Kuldeep 
Parihar, DAG, Dinesh Dwivedi, Arvind P Datar, V. Giri, Dhruv 
Agarwal, Dhruv Agrawal, Rajiv Dutta, J.S. Attri, S. Nandakumar, 
Balbir Singh, Jaideep Gupta, Arvind Datar, Sr. Advs., Samar 
Vijay Singh, Bhakti Vardhan Singh, Rahul Unnikrishnan, Prateek 
Dwivedi, Vikas Singh Jangra, Manish Kumar, Amit Kumar Pathak, 
Patiraj Yadav, Krishnam Mishra, Pawan Kishore Singh, Nishant 
Singh, Keshav Mittal, Amit Ojha, Azeem A Dost, Ms. Sabarni Som, 
Prashant Sharma, Akshat Kumar, Pankaj Bhagat, C.K. Sasi, Meena 
K Poulose, Harsher Sunder, Nihar Dharmadhikari, Rao Vishwaja, 
Rahul Narang, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Ms. Sonali Jain, Mukesh Kumar 
Singh, Raman Yadav, Kartikay Aggarwal, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, 
Chitvan Singhal, Mrs. Ameyvikrama Thanvi, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, 
Pratyush Shrivastava, Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Navanjay Mahapatra, 
Ms. Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Vatsal Joshi, Bhuvan Kapoor, Varun 
Chugh, Mrinal Elkar Mazumdar, Ms. Indira Bhakar, Mukesh Kumar 
Verma, Shashwat Parihar, Harish Pandey, Rajesh Singh Chauhan, 
Apoorv Kurup, Piyush Beriwal, Mukul Singh, Omar Ahmad, Ms. 
Tahira Karanjawala, Ishan Gaur, Ms. Simran Jeet, Vikram Shah, 
Pratibhanu Kharola, Tuhin Dey, Shreyas Maheswari, Ms. Astha 
Singh,
Aditya Shankar Dixit, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Ejaz Maqbool, 
Raghavendra M. Bajaj, Mrs. Garima Bajaj, Ms. Akriti Chaubey, S. 
Mahesh Sahasranaman, Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, Saif Zia, Harshit 
Khanduja, Sahib Kochar, Ms. Ritika Kohli, Md Faisal Masood, 
Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, Praveen Kumar, Ms. Sunaina Kumar, 
Pradeep Kumar Dubey, Abhigya Kushwah, Mrs. Sunita Yadav, 
Vineeth S., Ravindra Kumar Gupta, Siddharth Rajkumar Murarka, 
Rohan Rohatgi, Akhilesh Kumar Shrivastava, Mrs. Shubhangini 
Rohatgi, Anirudh Bakhru, Harshit Anand, Harshit Khaduja, Ankit 
Khera, Ms. Hrishika Jain, M.P. Vinod, Sanjeev Kumar Singh, Kumar 
Dushyant Singh, Shighra Kumar, Bhishm Pratap Singh, Devansh 
Shekhar, Ms. Pooja Singh, Ms. Subasri Jaganathan, Ms. Neha 
Singh, Mrs. Vanita Bhargava, Sanjeev Kumar Kapoor, Aakash 
Bajaj, Ajay Bhargava, Ms. Prerona Banerjee, Ms. Nandita Chauhan, 
Ms. Tijil Thakur, Ms. Aarushi Yadav, Narinder Kumar Verma, M/s. 
Khaitan & Co., Ajit Sharma, Krishnamohan K., Ms. Dania Nayyar, 
Yamini Sharma, Praveen Chaturvedi, Vikas Kumar Singh, D.S. 
Mishra, Pradeep Kumar Mathur, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms.
1954
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Deepika Nandakumar, Niraj Gupta, Naresh Kumar, Mrs. Nanita 
Sharma, Vivek Sharma, Shailendra Singh, Mahesh Tiwari, Nishit 
Agrawal, Ms. Kanishka Mittal, Ms. Vanya Agrawal, Ms. Upasna 
Agrawal, Shrey Kapoor, Vikash Kumar Jha, Vinay Garg, Upendra 
Mishra, Ms. Neetu Rawat, Ankit Shah, Manan Verma, Milind Kumar, 
B.S. Rajesh Agrajit, Vishal Meghwal, Ms. Priya Nagar, Aravindh 
S., Akshay Gupta, Ms. Devina Sehgal, D.L. Chidananda, Ms. 
Pallavi Langar, Shivam Singh, Ms. Bahuli Sharma, Sahil Bhatiya, 
Ishwar Singh, Ms. Shaswati Parhi, Suyash Vyas, Divyansh Mishra, 
Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Mirza Kayesh Begg, Ms. Maitreyee 
Jagat Joshi, Astik Gupta, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, Argha Roy, Ms. 
Ojaswini Gupta, Ms. Ruby, Ms. Mamta Bharwaj, Dhananjaya 
Mishra, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, 
Bharat Bagla, Naman Tandon, Ms. Monica Benjamin, Karan 
Sachdev, Shyam Gopal, Ranjeev Khatana, Rajnjeev Khatana, 
Sourav Singh, Adarsh Dubey, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Ankit Roy, 
Anshul Malik, Sarthak Sharma, Ms. Shruti Agrawal, Ms. Nimisha 
Menon, Ayushman Arora, Sravan Kumar Karanam, Ms. Shireesh 
Tyagi, Ms. Tayade Pranali Gowardhan, Ms. Jayashree PK, Aniket 
Singh, Mrs. B. Renuka Devi, Ms. Mamatha Ralla, P. Santhosh 
Kumar, Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, 
Pawanshree Agrawal, Ms. Astha Sharma, Srisatya Mohanty, Ms. 
Anju Thomas, Sanjeev Kaushik, Ms. Mantika Haryani, Shreyas 
Awasthi, Himanshu Chakravarty, Ridhi
Bose, Ms. Ripul Swati 
Kumari, Bhanu Mishra, Ms. Muskan Surana, Ms. Lihzu Shiney 
Konyak, Ms. Anvita Dwivedi, Divyanshu Srivastava, Ms. Himanshi 
Shakya, Nikunj Gupta, Dr. Monika Gusain, Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, 
Sahil Bhalaik, Polanki Gowtham, KV Girish Chowdary, T Vijaya 
Bhaskar Reddy, Ms. Rajeswari Mukherjee, Meeran Maqbool, 
Ms. Archita Nigam, Tushar Giri, Siddharth Khanna, Rajiv Kumar 
Choudhry, Ajay K. Jain, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Ms. Devyani Bhatt, 
Ms. Srujana Suman Mund, Sabarish Subramanian, C. Kranthi 
Kumar, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Naman Dwivedi, B. Sarathraj, Danish 
Saifi, Raghvendra Kumar, Anand Kumar Dubey, Devvrat Singh, 
Varun Singh, Nishant Verma, Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Karun 
Sharma, Ms. Anupama Ngangom, Ms. Rajkumari Divyasana, Tushar 
Jarwal, Ms. Anuradha Dutt, Rahul Sateeja, Pranav Bansal, Sanyam 
Agarwal, B.R. Menon, Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, Ms. Mrinal 
Gopal Elker, Saurabh Singh, Ms. K. Enatoli Sema, Ms. Limayinla 
Jamir, Amit Kumar Singh, Ms. Chubalemla Chang, Prang Newmai, 
Avijit Mani Tripathi, Advs. for the appearing parties.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1955
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
Table of Contents*
A.	 Background .............................................................................
5
i.	
Relevant constitutional provisions ................................
5
ii.	
The judgment in Synthetics (7J) ....................................
8
iii.	 The aftermath of Synthetics (7J) ....................................
16
iv.	 The Reference Order(s) ...................................................
22
B.	 Submissions ............................................................................
26
i.	
Appellants’ submissions .................................................
26
ii.	
Respondent’s submissions .............................................
35
C.	 The distinction between potable and non-potable 
alcohol .....................................................................................
42
D.	 Issues ......................................................................................
45
E.	 Analysis ....................................................................................
45
i.	
The constitutional distribution of legislative power ....
45
ii.	
Scheme of legislative entries .........................................
48
iii.	 The field covered by Entry 52 of List I and Entry 8 of 
List II ..................................................................................
51
a.
The scope of Entry 8 ................................................
52
I.	
The meaning of ‘that is to say’ ........................
52
II.	 Product or industry based entry .......................
55
b.	 Scope of Entry 52 of List I: the absence of “to the 
extent to which” .........................................................
57
c.	 Reconciling the potential overlap between Entry 52 
of List I and Entry 8 of List II .....................................
63
iv.	 Scope of Entry 8: Meaning of ‘intoxicating liquor’ ......
70
a.	 Precedent on the interpretation of ‘intoxicating 
liquor’: exploring FN Balsara and Southern 
Pharmaceuticals ......................................................
71
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1956
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
b.	 The legal import of ‘intoxicating liquor’ .....................
79
c.	 Evolution of the legislative lists on ‘intoxicating 
liquor’ .........................................................................
85
d.	 The harmonious interpretation ..................................
96
v.	
The correctness of the decision in Synthetics 
(7J) ..................................................................................... 102
vi.	 The impact of the decision on Item 26 of the First 
Schedule of IDRA ............................................................. 113
vii.	 The (ir)relevance of the decision in Tika Ramji to the 
dispute .............................................................................. 115
viii.	Section 18G of IDRA and Entry 33 of List III ................ 119
F.	 Conclusion .............................................................................. 120
A.	
Background
1.	
“Intoxicating liquor” falls within the legislative domain of the State 
Legislatures under Entry 8 of the State list, List II, of the Seventh 
Schedule to the Constitution. The issues which arise for adjudication 
in this reference pertain to the scope of the power of the State 
Legislatures under Entry 8 and the meaning of the phrase “intoxicating 
liquor”. The question is whether “intoxicating liquor” in Entry 8 only 
includes potable alcohol, such as alcoholic beverages or also 
includes alcohol which is used in the
production of other products. 
In Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of UP,1 (“Synthetics 
[7J]), a seven-Judge Bench delineated the scope of the regulatory 
powers of State Legislatures on “intoxicating liquor”. The correctness 
of Synthetics [7J] (supra) has been referred to a larger bench. We 
answer the reference in this judgment. 
i.	
Constitutional provisions
2.	
The State has the legislative competence under Entry 24 of List II 
over ‘industries’ but this is subject to entries 7 and 52 of List I.2 
Under Entry 52 of List I, Parliament has legislative competence over 
such industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by 
1	
[1989] Supp. 1 SCR 623 : (1990) 1 SCC 109
2	
“24. Industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I”
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1957
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.3 Entry 7 of 
List I deals with industries which are declared by Parliament by law 
to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of 
war.4 Under Entry 33 of List III, the State Legislatures and Parliament 
can legislate on trade and commerce in, and the production, 
supply and distribution of the products of industries controlled by 
Parliament under Entry 52 of List I.5 Entry 8 of List II deals with 
‘intoxicating liquors’.6 These words are followed by the expression 
“that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, 
purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors”. The Seventh Schedule 
also demarcates taxing powers related to alcohol separately. 
Entry 84 of List I (before it was amended by the Constitution (One 
Hundred and First Amendment) Act 2016) enabled Parliament to 
levy duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or 
produced in India except alcoholic liquors for human consumption 
but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol.7 
Entry 51 of List II confers the State Legislature the competence 
to levy duties of excise, inter alia, on alcoholic liquors for human 
consumption but not including medicinal and toilet preparations 
containing alcohol.8
3	
“52. Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the
public interest.”
4	
“7. Industries declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the 
prosecution of war.”
5	
“33. Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of –
(a) The products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament 
by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products;
(b) Foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;
(c) Cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates;
(d) Raw cotton, whether grinned or ungrinned, and cotton seed; and
(e) Raw jute.”
6	
“8. Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and 
sale of intoxicating liquors” 
7	
“84. Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except- 
(a) Alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) Opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics,
But including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in 
sub-paragraph (b) of this entry. 
But including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in 
sub-paragraph (b) of this entry.”
8	
“51. Duties of excise on the following goods manufactured or produced in the State and counterveiling 
duties at the same or lower rates on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India:-
(a) Alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) Opium, Indian
hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics,
But not including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in 
sub-paragraph (b) of this entry.
1958
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
3.	
In exercise of the power under Article 2469 read with Entry 52 of List I, 
Parliament enacted the Industries (Development and Regulation) 
Act 1951.10 Section 2 of IDRA stipulates that it is expedient in public 
interest that the Union should take control of the industries specified 
in the First Schedule to the enactment. Item 26 of the First Schedule 
read as follows: 
“26. Fermentation industries: 
(1)	 Alcohol 
(2)	 Other products of fermentation industries”
4.	
In 2016, Item 26 of the First Schedule to the IDRA was amended to 
exclude potable alcohol from the ambit of the Item.11 Item 26 reads 
as follows after the amendment:
“26. Fermentation industries (other than potable alcohol):
(1)	 Alcohol 
(2)	 Other products of fermentation industries”
5.	
Section 18-G of IDRA12 grants the Central Government the power to 
regulate the supply and distribution “of any article or class of articles 
relatable to a scheduled industry” for securing equitable distribution 
and availability at fair prices.
9	
“246. Subject matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.”
10	
“IDRA”
11	
The Industries (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act 2016
12	
“18G. Power to control supply, distribution, price, etc., of certain articles.—
(1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the 
equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any article or class
of articles relatable to any 
scheduled industry, may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, by notified 
order, provide for regulating the supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), a notified order made 
thereunder may provide—
(a) for controlling the prices at which any such article or class thereof may be bought or sold;
(b) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the distribution, transport, disposal, acquisition, 
possession, use or consumption of any such article or class thereof;
(c) for prohibiting the withholding from sale of any such article or class thereof ordinarily kept for 
sale;
(d) for requiring any person manufacturing, producing or holding in stock such article or class 
thereof to sell the whole or the part of the articles so manufactured or produced during a specified 
period or to sell the whole or a part of the article so held in stock to such person or class of persons 
and in such circumstances as may be specified in the order;
(e) for regulating or prohibiting any class of commercial or financial transactions relating to such 
article or class thereof which in the opinion of the authority making the order are, or if unregulated 
are likely to be, detrimental to public interest;
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1959
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
ii.	
The judgment in Synthetics (7J)
6.	
The United Provinces Excise Act 191013 was enacted to “consolidate 
and amend the law in force in the United Provinces relating to 
the import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and possession 
of intoxicating liquor and of intoxicating drugs”. In exercise of the 
powers under the UP Excise Act, the Government of the United 
Provinces levied vend fee14 on ‘denatured spirit’ from the wholesale 
dealer of denatured spirit. The UP Excise Act was amended 
to include Section 24-A. Section 24-A provided that the Excise 
Commissioner may grant licence for the manufacture or sale of 
any ‘foreign liquor’. ‘Foreign Liquor’ was defined in the subordinate 
Rules to include “all rectified, perfumed, medicated and denatured 
spirit.”15 The constitutional validity of the amendment including 
Section 24-A was challenged before the Allahabad High Court. The 
High Court upheld the challenge. The UP State Legislature enacted 
the U.P Excise (Amendment) (Re-enactment and Validation) Act 
1976 including Section 24-A relying on the decisions of this Court 
(f) for requiring persons engaged in the distribution and trade and commerce in any such article 
or class thereof to mark the articles exposed or intended for sale with the sale price or to exhibit 
at some easily accessible place on the premises the price-lists of articles held for sale and also 
to similarly exhibit
on the first day of every month, at such other time as may be prescribed, a 
statement of the total quantities of any such articles in stock;
(g) for collecting any information or statistics with a view to regulating or prohibiting any of the 
aforesaid matters; and
(h) for any incidental or supplementary matters, including, in particular, the grant of issue of 
licences, permits, or other documents and charging of fees therefor.
(3) Where in pursuance of any order made with reference to clause (d) of sub-section (2), any person 
sells any article, there shall be paid to him the price therefor—
(a) where the price can consistently with the controlled price, if any, be fixed by agreement, the 
price so agreed upon;
(b) where no such agreement can be reached, the price calculated with reference to the controlled 
price, if any, fixed under this section;
(c) where neither clause (a) nor clause (b) applies, the price calculated at the market-rate prevailing 
in the locality at the date of sale.
(4) No order made in exercise of any power conferred by this section shall be called in question in any 
Court.
(5) Where an order purports to have been made and signed by an authority in exercise of any power 
conferred by this section, a Court shall, within the meaning of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), 
presume that such order was so made by that authority.
Explanation.—In this section, the expression “article or class of articles” relatable to any scheduled 
industry
includes any article or class of articles imported into India which is of the same nature or 
description as the article or class of articles manufactured or produced in the scheduled industry.”
13	
“UP Excise Act”
14	
Vend fee means the fee that is paid by a licenses dealer to sell the products in retain.
15	
Section 4(2) of the UP Act provides that the State may declare what shall be deemed to be foreign liquor 
or country liquor
1960
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
in Nashirwar v. State of MP16 and Har Shanker v. Dy. Excise 
and Taxation Commissioner.17 The Allahabad High Court upheld 
the validity of the U.P Excise (Amendment) (Re-enactment and 
Validation) Act 1976.18 
7.	
The appellants in Synthetics & Chemicals v. State of UP19 
(“Synthetics [2J]”), held licenses for wholesale vend of ‘denatured 
spirit’. They instituted proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution 
before the Allahabad High Court for seeking a direction to quash the 
notification by which vend fee was levied from a wholesale licence 
dealer of ‘denatured spirit’. The High Court dismissed the petitions. 
It held that the phrase ‘intoxicating liquors’ in Entry 8 of List II of 
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution includes denatured spirit 
and that the State was, therefore, competent to levy the vend fee 
on denatured spirit.
8.	
Proceedings under Article 136 were instituted for challenging the 
decision of the High Court. Proceedings were also initiated under 
Article 32 challenging the constitutional validity of the levy of vend 
fee. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Synthetics (2J) (supra) 
heard the writ petition and the appeals against the judgments of 
the Allahabad High Court together. Three issues arose before the 
Bench. On the issue of the meaning of the phrase ‘intoxicating 
liquor’ in Entry 8, the two-Judge Bench referred to the decisions of 
this Court in State of Bombay v. FN Balsara,20
Nashirwar (supra) 
and Har Shanker (supra) and held that the decisions indicate that 
the phrase ‘intoxicating liquor’ in Entry 8 of List II comprises of 
liquor which contains alcohol, both potable and non-potable.21 The 
second issue was whether in view of IDRA, the power of the State 
to regulate alcohol (both potable and non-potable) was denuded. 
In particular, reference was made to the notification issued by the 
Union under Section 18-G of the IDRA prescribing the price of 
various types of alcohol and rectified spirit. The two-Judge Bench 
referred to the decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Tika 
16	
[1975] 2 SCR 861 : 1975 AIR 360
17	
AIR 1957 SC 414
18	
1976 ALJ 436 (FB)
19	
[1980] 2 SCR 531 : (1980) 2 SCC 441
20	
[1951] 1 SCR 682 : (1951) SCC 860
21	
(1980) 2 SCC 441 [18]
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1961
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
Ramji v. State of UP22 and entry 33 of List III to hold that the State 
Legislature had the power to legislate regarding the production, 
supply and distribution of the products of the industries notified by 
Parliament under Entry 52 of List I.23 The two-Judge Bench further 
held that the Ethyl Alcohol (Price Control) Order issued by the Central 
Government in exercise of the power under Section 18G of IDRA did 
not take away the exclusive rights of the State Government relating to 
intoxicating liquor.24 The third issue was whether the phrase ‘foreign 
liquor’ in Section 24-A includes denatured spirit or only alcohol for 
human consumption. The Bench held that the meaning of the phrase 
cannot be restricted to alcohol for human consumption since “when 
liquor is put to any use such as manufacture of other articles, the 
liquor is all the same consumed.”25 
9.	
Review petitions were filed against the decision of this Court in 
Synthetics (2J) (supra). Writ petitions were also filed for challenging the 
rules by which vend fees were levied in Uttar Pradesh, and provisions 
of various laws enacted by the then State of Bombay, and the States 
of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh by which exclusive privilege of 
dealing with any intoxicant was vested in the State. The matters were 
heard by a seven-Judge Bench in Synthetics (7J) (supra). 
10.	 Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji, writing for himself and five
other judges 
framed the following issues for consideration: 
“2. The main question that falls for consideration in these 
matters is whether the vend fee in respect of the industrial 
alcohol under different legislations and rules in different 
States is valid. […] The questions with which we are mainly 
concerned are the following: 
Whether the power to levy excise duty in case of industrial 
alcohol was with the State legislature or the Central 
legislature;
What is the scope and ambit of Entry 8 of List II of the 
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution?
22	
[1956] 1 SCR 393 : AIR 1956 SC 676
23	
(1980) 2 SCC 441 [25-28]
24	
(1980) 2 SCC 441 [28]
25	
(1980) 2 SCC 441 [34]
1962
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Whether, the State Government has exclusive right or 
privilege of manufacturing, selling, distributing etc. of 
alcohols including industrial alcohol. In this connection, 
the extent, scope and ambit of such right or privilege has 
also to be examined.”
11.	 The decision, first, laid down the meaning of the terms, ‘rectified 
spirit’, ‘industrial alcohol’, and ‘ethyl alcohol’. The decision noted 
that the petitioners and appellants were manufacturers of ‘ethyl 
alcohol’ and that ‘ethyl alcohol’, which is also known as rectified 
spirit is an industrial alcohol. The judgement, used the three phases 
interchangeably:
“74. It has to be borne in mind that by common standards 
ethyl alcohol (which has 95 per cent) is an industrial alcohol 
and is not fit for human consumption. The petitioners and 
the appellants were manufacturing ethyl alcohol(95 per 
cent) (also known as rectified spirit) which is an industrial 
alcohol. ISI specification has divided ethyl alcohol (as 
known in the trade) into several kinds of alcohol. Beverage 
and industrial alcohols are clearly and differently treated. 
Rectified spirit for industrial purposes is defined as “spirit 
purified by distillation having a strength not less than 95 per 
cent of volume by ethyl alcohol”. Dictionaries and technical 
books would show that rectified spirit (95 per cent) is an 
industrial alcohol and is not potable as such. It appears, 
therefore, that industrial
alcohol which is ethyl alcohol (95 
per cent) by itself is not only non-potable but is highly toxic. 
The range of spirits of potable alcohol is from country spirit 
to whisky and the ethyl alcohol content varies between 
19 to about 43 per cent. These standards are according 
to the ISI specifications. In other words ethyl alcohol (95 
per cent) is not alcoholic liquor for human consumption 
but can be used as a raw material input after processing 
and substantial dilution in the production of whisky, gin, 
country liquor, etc.”
12.	 This Court allowed the challenge on the following grounds:
a.	
The phrase ‘intoxicating liquor’ in Entry 8 means ‘liquor which 
is consumable by human being as it is” for the following 
reasons: (i) In FN Balsara (supra), this Court was not aware
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1963
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
of the full use of alcohol as industrial alcohol;26 and (ii) Only 
two decisions of this Court have dealt with industrial alcohol. 
One was the decision in Synthetics (2J) (supra) and the other 
was the decision in Indian Mica and Micancite Industries v. 
State of Bihar27 in which this Court held that Parliament had 
the legislative competence to levy tax on alcoholic liquor not 
fit for human consumption;28
b.	
The provisions that are challenged are not regulatory but seek 
to levy a tax.29 List II does not confer the State Legislature the 
power to levy of tax on industrial alcohol;30
c.	
In view of Item 26 of the First Schedule to IDRA, the control 
of alcohol industries vests exclusively in the Union. Thus, the 
power to issue licenses to manufacture both potable and non-
potable alcohol vests in the Central Government;31
d.	
The State can also not regulate industrial alcohol as a ‘product’ 
of the controlled industry in terms of Entry 33 of List III because 
the Union occupies the whole field on industrial alcohol as 
evinced by Section 18G of the IDRA;32
e.	
Even otherwise, the impugned provisions do not regulate a 
product of the scheduled industry. Rather, they deal with the 
manufacture and sale of industrial alcohol;33
f.	
The power of the States to legislate on the subject of alcohol 
is restricted to laws which (paragraph 86 of Synthetics (7J) 
(supra)):
i.	
Prohibit potable alcohol
in terms of Entry 6 of List II which 
concerns public health; 
ii.	
Lay down regulations to ensure that non-potable alcohol is 
not diverted and misused as a substitute for potable alcohol; 
26	
(1990) 1 SCC 109 [74]
27	
[1971] Supp. 1 SCR 319 : (1971) 2 SCC 236
28	
(1990) 1 SCC 109 [75]
29	
On the distinction between tax and fee (see (1990) 1 SCC 109 [69-73]
30	
(1990) 1 SCC 109 [83]
31	
(1990) 1 SCC 109 [85]
32	
(1990) 1 SCC 109 [85]
33	
(1990) 1 SCC 109 [85]
1964
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
iii.	
Charge excise duty on potable alcohol and sales tax under 
Entry 52 of List II. However, sales tax cannot be charged 
on industrial alcohol; and
iv.	
Charge fees on a quid pro quo basis, in return for some 
service rendered by the state, as distinct from fees for 
grant of a privilege in terms of Indian Mica (supra).
13.	 However, the judgment in paragraph 88 makes the following 
observations: 
“On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions and practice, 
we are clearly of the opinion that in respect of industrial 
alcohol the States are not authorised to impose the impost 
they have purported to do. In that view of the matter, the 
contentions of the petitioners must succeed and such 
impositions and imposts must go as being invalid in law 
so far as industrial alcohol is concerned. We make it 
clear that this will not affect any impost so far as potable 
alcohol as commonly understood is concerned. It will also 
not affect any imposition of levy on industrial alcohol fee 
where there are circumstances to establish that there was 
quid pro quo for the fee sought to be imposed. This will 
not affect any regulating measure as such.”
14.	 Paragraph 88 lays down the following three principles: 
a.	
States do not have the competence to levy tax on industrial 
alcohol;
b.	
States have the competence to levy tax on potable alcohol; and
c.	
States have the competence to levy fee on industrial alcohol. 
15.	 Justice Oza in his
concurring opinion held: 
a.	
The legislative entries in List I and List II clearly demarcate the 
taxing powers of Parliament and State Legislature. Entry 84 of 
List I covers levy of excise duty on alcoholic liquor for other 
than human consumption and Entry 51 of List II covers levy of 
excise duty on alcoholic liquor for human consumption;34
34	
(1990) 1 SCC 109 [97]
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1965
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
b.	
Parliament controls the alcohol industry since Item 26 of IDRA 
deals with industry based on fermentation and alcohol. The 
competence of the State Legislature under Entry 8 can only 
be subject to IDRA;35 and
c.	
The regulation of the State under Entry 8 of List II can only be 
limited to prevent the conversion of alcoholic liquors for industrial 
use for human consumption. Regulatory fee can be levied by 
the State for this limited purpose.
iii.	
The aftermath of Synthetics (7J)
16.	 Subsequently, the interpretation of the decision in Synthetics (7J) 
(supra) came up before this Court in numerous occasions. In Shri 
Bileshwar Khand Udyog Khedut Sahakari Mandali v. State of 
Gujarat,36 the constitutional validity of Section 58-A of the Bombay 
Prohibition Act 1949 was challenged. Section 58-A enabled the 
State Government to direct that “the manufacture, import, export, 
transport, storage, sale, purchase, use, collection or cultivation of any 
intoxicant, denatured spiritous preparations, hemp, mhowra flowers 
or molasses” would be in the supervision of persons appointed by 
them and the costs of such staff were required to be borne by the 
person engaged in the activity. This Court rejected the challenge. 
Relying on Synthetics (7J) (supra), the two-Judge Bench observed 
that though industrial alcohol is not covered by the regulatory powers 
under Entry 8 or the taxing power under Entry
51 of List II, the State 
has powers to ensure that industrial alcohol is not diverted to be 
used as potable alcohol and this is covered by Entry 33 of List III.37 
35	
(1990) 1 SCC 109 [100]
36	
[1992] 1 SCR 391 : (1992) 2 SCC 42
37	
“4. […] Levy as a fee under Entry 8 of List II of Seventh Schedule or excise duty under Entry 51 are 
different than cost of supervision charged under Section 58-A. The former has to stand the test of a levy 
being in accordance with law on power derived from one of the constitutional entries. Since Synthetics 
and Chemicals case [Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1990) 1 SCC 109] finally brought 
down the curtain in respect of industrial alcohol by taking it out of the purview of either Entry 8 or 51 
of List II of Seventh Schedule the competency of the State to frame any legislation to levy any tax or 
duty is excluded. But by that a provision enacted by the State for supervision which is squarely covered 
under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List which deals with production, supply and distribution which includes 
regulation cannot be assailed. The bench in Synthetics and Chemicals case [Synthetics and Chemicals 
Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1990) 1 SCC 109] made it clear that even though the power to levy tax or duty 
on industrial alcohol vested in the Central Government the State was still left with power to lay down 
regulations to ensure that non-potable alcohol, that is, industrial alcohol, was not diverted and misused 
as
substitute for potable alcohol. This is enough to justify a provision like Section 58-A.”
1966
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
This decision was followed by another two-Judge Bench in Gujchem 
Distillers India v. State of Gujarat.38
17.	 In State of AP v. McDowell,39 the prohibition of sale and consumption 
of intoxicating liquor in the State of Andhra Pradesh was challenged. 
The petitioners submitted that the State did not have the competence 
to prohibit consumption. For this purpose, reference was made to the 
observations in paragraph 85 of Synthetics (7J) (supra), where the 
Court had observed that after the enactment of IDRA, the power to 
issue licenses to manufacture both potable and non-potable liquor 
vested in Parliament. The three-Judge Bench rejected the argument 
by referring to observations in paragraph 86(a) Synthetics (7J) 
(supra) that States have the power to enact legislation in the nature 
of prohibiting potable liquor.40 In Vam Organic Chemicals v. State 
of UP41 [“Vam Organic I”], the rules issued under the UP Excise 
Act providing for power to issue licenses for denaturation of spirit 
and levy of denaturing fee was challenged. Justice A M Ahmadi 
(as the learned Chief Justice then was) writing for the two-Judge 
Bench noted that Synthetics (7J) (supra) did not hold that the State 
will not have any power over ‘industrial alcohol’.42 Specifically, the 
two-Judge Bench referred to the observations in paragraph 86(b) 
that the State may lay down regulations to ensure that non-potable 
alcohol is not misused as a substitute
for potable alcohol. Justice 
Ahmadi observed that the process of denaturing was to ensure it 
was not misused as potable alcohol which would be covered by the 
observations in Synthetics (7J) (supra).43 
18.	 In Bihar Distillery v. Union of India,44 the petitioner challenged 
the State’s cancellation of their license for preparing “rectified 
spirit” on the ground that the State lacked competence in view of 
38	
[1992] 1 SCR 675 : (1992) 2 SCC 399
39	
[1996] 3 SCR 721 : (1996) 3 SCC 709
40	
(1996) 3 SCC 709 [33]
41	
[1997] 1 SCR 403 : (1997) 2 SCC 715
42	
[1997] 1 SCR 403 : (1997) 2 SCC 715 [13]
43	
(1997) 2 SCC 715 [13,14] “14. It is to be noticed that the States under Entries 8 and 51 of List II read with 
Entry 84 of List I have exclusive privilege to legislate on intoxicating liquor or alcoholic liquor for human 
consumption. Hence, so long as any alcoholic preparation can be diverted to human consumption, 
the States shall have the power to legislate as also to impose taxed etc. In this view, denaturation of spirit 
is not only an obligation on the States but also within the competence of the States to enforce. [ emphasis 
supplied] 
44	
[1997] 1 SCR 680 : (1997) 2 SCC 727
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1967
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
Synthetics (7J) (supra). Justice B P Jeevan Reddy, writing for the 
two-Judge Bench held that the observations in paragraph 85 that 
Parliament has legislative competence over both potable and non-
potable alcohol in view of the enactment of IDRA was a typographical 
error.45 The Bench further observed that Synthetics (7J) (supra) 
was mainly concerned with legislative competence over “denatured 
rectified spirit” (which was exclusively and wholly industrial alcohol) 
and not “rectified spirit” (which could be used directly for industrial 
purposes or denatured for industrial purposes or used to prepare 
liquor for human consumption.)46 This Court held that the line of 
demarcation must be drawn at the stage of clearance of the rectified 
spirit since it was used for the preparation of both potable alcohol 
(over which the State had competence under Entry 8 of List II) and 
non-potable alcohol (over which the State did not have competence 
under Entry 8 of List II):
“23. The line of demarcation can and should be drawn at 
the stage of clearance/removal of the rectified spirit. Where 
the removal/clearance is for industrial purposes (other than 
the manufacture of potable liquor), the levy of duties of 
excise and all other control shall be of the Union but where 
the removal/clearance is for obtaining or manufacturing 
potable liquors, the levy of duties of excise and all other 
control shall be
that of the States. This calls for a joint 
control and supervision of the process of manufacture of 
rectified spirit and its use and disposal.”
19.	 The decision further elucidated the realm of competence of the State 
and the Union with respect to (a) industries engaged in manufacturing 
rectified spirit meant exclusively for supply to industries; (b) industries 
engaged exclusively in manufacturing rectified spirit for production of 
potable alcohol; and (c) industries engaged in both of the above. This 
demarcation will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections of 
the judgment. To understand the manner in which Bihar Distillery 
(supra) interpreted the judgment in Synthetics (7J) (supra), it is 
sufficient at this stage to know that the demarcation of the competence 
was based on the purpose for which the rectified spirit was used. 
45	
(1997) 2 SCC 727 [12]
46	
(1997) 2 SCC 727 [23]
1968
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
20.	 In Government of Haryana v. Haryana Brewery,47 a two-Judge 
Bench noted the dissonance in multiple decisions interpreting the 
judgment in Synthetics (7J) (supra) and directed that the papers may 
be placed before the Chief Justice for listing the matters before the 
Constitution Bench. In particular, the Bench noted the observations in 
(i) McDowell (supra) that the State has competence over production 
to sale of “intoxicating liquor”; (ii) Vam Organic I (supra), that State 
has competence over “denatured spirit”; and (iii) Bihar Distillery 
(supra) that the State’s competence over “rectified spirit” depended 
on the purpose for which spirit was going to be used. The Bench 
also noted the observations of a three-Judge Bench in State of 
UP v. Modi Distillery48 that the State does not have the legislative 
competence to levy excise duty on the material or input that is used 
in the process of producing alcoholic liquor for human consumption 
by relying on Synthetics (7J) (supra).49 However, it must be noted 
that the Bench in Modi Distillery (supra), specifically recorded 
that it does not “express any opinion in regard to the power of the 
State to regulate the manufacture of alcoholic liquors for human 
consumption.”50 
21.	 Meanwhile, another two-Judge Bench51 referred the decision in 
Bihar Distillery (supra) to a larger Bench on the ground that it 
was prima facie contrary to the scheme of legislative competence
as examined by the Constitution Bench of this Court and the three-
Judge Bench decision of this Court in Modi Distillery (supra). The 
three-Judge Bench in Deccan Sugar & Abkari v. Commissioner 
of Excise, AP,52 without overruling the decision in Bihar Distillery 
(supra) observed that this Court in Synthetics (7J) held that the 
State Legislature does not have the competence to levy any excise 
47	
(1997) 5 SCC 758
48	
[1995] Supp. 3 SCR 119 : (1995) 5 SCC 753
49	
In this case, the challenge was to the levy of excise duty on wastage in the preparation of Indian Made 
Foreign Liquor (IMFL), pipeline wastage and obscuration (which is the process of adding caramel to 
spirit for the preparation of rum. The Bench relied on the observations in Synthetics (7J) that the 
phrase ‘alcoholic liquor for human consumption’ means the liquor that is consumable “as it is” to hold 
that the State does not have the power to levy excise duty on the stages of manufacture or preparation 
of the liquor. 
50	
(1995) 5 SCC 753 [14]
51	
Deccan Sugar and Abkari Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Excise, AP (1998) 3 SCC 272
52	
(2004) 1 SCC 243
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1969
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
duty on “rectified spirit”.53 Subsequently, another two-Judge in 
State of UP v. Vam Organic54 [“Vam Organic (II)”], dealt with the 
challenge to the levy of license fee on ‘denatured industrial alcohol’, 
a raw material used in the preparation of Organic compounds. In 
that case, the State had submitted that it had the power to levy 
the fee because denatured alcohol could be renatured to produce 
potable alcohol which is covered by paragraph 86(b) of the decision 
in Synthetics (7J). The Bench rejected the submission holding 
that the State Government is competent to levy fee to ensure that 
industrial alcohol (which the judgment used alternatively for ethyl 
alcohol) is not “surreptitiously converted into potable alcohol so that 
… the public is protected from consuming illicit liquor”. However, 
the Bench relying on Vam Organic I (supra) noted that the power 
stops with denaturing and that even if denatured alcohol can be 
re-natured, the States would not have the power to regulate it. The 
relevant observations are extracted below:
“43. […] We are of the view that the State Government 
is competent to levy fee for the purpose of ensuring that 
industrial alcohol is not surreptitiously converted into potable 
alcohol so that the State is deprived of revenue on the sale 
of such potable alcohol and the public is protected from 
consuming such illicit liquor. But this power stops with 
the
denaturation of the industrial alcohol. Denatured 
spirit has been held in Vam Organics-I to be outside the 
seism of the State Legislature. Assuming that denatured 
spirit may by whatever process be renatured (a proposition 
which is seriously disputed by the respondents) and then 
converted into potable liquor, this would not give the State 
the power to regulate it. Even according to the demarcation 
of the fields of legislative competence as envisaged in 
Bihar Distillery industrial alcohol for industrial purposes 
falls within the exclusive control of the Union and according 
to Bihar Distillery “denatured rectified spirit, of course, is 
wholly and exclusively industrial alcohol.”
(emphasis supplied)
53	
(2004) 1 SCC 243 [2] 
54	
(2004) 1 SCC 225
1970
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
iv.	
The Reference Order(s)
22.	 Separately, the State of UP levied an ad valorem licence fee on the 
sale of specially denatured alcohol by a wholesale vendor to those 
holding a licence under Form FL 4155 of the UP Excise Act. The fee 
was levied under the provisions of the UP Spirit Rules. The petitioner 
in RP Sharma v. State of UP56 instituted a writ petition before the 
Allahabad High Court, inter alia, for challenging the relevant rule 
and for a refund of the fee collected by the state. 
23.	 A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowed the petition, 
relying on the decision in Vam Organic-II (supra) since the fee was 
levied on the sale of denatured spirit and not to ensure that rectified 
spirit was not diverted for human consumption. The State of UP 
preferred an appeal against the decision before this Court, resulting 
in the present proceedings. The Court issued notice on the matter 
and granted an interim stay of the judgment of the High Court on 
27 August 2004. By its order dated 25 October 2007, a three-Judge 
Bench of this Court in State of UP v. Lalta Prasad57 agreed with the 
submissions advanced by counsel for the appellants on the need for 
reconsideration by a larger bench. Numerous decisions were relied 
on to argue that Section 18G of the IDRA would not deprive the 
States of the power to enact laws with respect to Entry 33 of List III. 
The appellants argued that a notification ought to be
issued under 
Section 18G for the field under Entry 33 to be occupied. Justice 
Altmas Kabir, writing for the three-Judge Bench observed that that 
the question of whether Section 18G occupies the field of Entry 33 
on the alcohol industry needs to be referred to a Constitution Bench:
“26. … The 7 Judge Bench did not also have the benefit 
of the reasoning in Ch. Tikaramji’s case (supra) which had 
held that in the absence of any notified order under Section 
18-G of the 1951 Act no question of repugnancy could 
arise, which Mr. Dwivedi urged, recognised the State’s 
power to legislate with regard to matters under Entry 33 
of List III notwithstanding the provisions and existence of 
Section 18-G in the 1951 Act.
55	
Form FL 41 is meant for those industries where alcohol is used as a solvent but some alcohol continues 
to remain in final products such as lacquers, varnish, polishes, adhesives, anti-freezers and brake fluids.
56	
2004 SCC OnLine All 159.
57	
[2007] 11 SCR 670 : (2007) 13 SCC 463
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1971
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
27. Mr. Dwivedi then went on to refer to the judgment 
of this Court in SIEL Limited v. Union of India (1998) 
7 SCC 26 wherein the learned Judges relying on the 
policy decision in Ch. Tikaramji’s case (supra) explained 
and distinguished the decision of the 7 Judge Bench in 
Synthetics and Chemicals case (supra). […]
28. Yet another case referred to by Mr. Dwivedi was the 
decision of a Constitution Bench of 5 Judges of this Court 
in Belsund Sugar v. State of Bihar (1999) 9 SCC 620 […]. 
In the said case also it was observed by the Constitution 
Bench that in the absence of promulgation of any statutory 
order covering the filed under Section 18-G it could not 
be said that mere existence of a statutory provision for 
entrustment of such power would result in regulation of 
purchase and sale of flour even if it is a scheduled industry. 
It may be noted that even while noting the decision of the 
7 Judge Bench in Synthetics and Chemicals case (supra) 
the Court placed reliance on the decision rendered in the 
SIEL Ltd. Case (supra). 
…
35. On consideration of the aforesaid submissions made 
on behalf of the respective parties, we are of the view 
that Mr. Dwivedi’s submissions have a good deal of force, 
since by virtue of the interpretation of Section 18-G in 
the Synthetics and Chemicals case (supra) the power 
of the State to legislate with matters relating to Entry 
33 of List III have
been ousted, except to the extent 
as explained in the Synthetics and Chemicals case in 
paragraphs 63-64 of the judgment, where the State’s power 
to regulate, as far as regulating the use of alcohol, which 
would include the power to make provisions to prevent and/
or check industrial alcohol being used as intoxicant liquor, 
had been accepted. … As submitted by Mr. Dwivedi, the 
7 Judge Bench did not have the benefit of the views 
expressed by this Court earlier in Ch. Tikaramji case 
(supra) where the State’s power to legislate under the 
Concurrent List stood ousted by legislation by the 
Central Government under Entry 52 of List I and also
1972
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
in view of Section 18-G of the Industries (Development 
and Regulation) Act, 1951.
36. In our view, if the decision in the Synthetics and 
Chemicals case (supra) with regard to the interpretation of 
Section 18-G of the 1951 Act is allowed to stand, it would 
render the provisions of Entry 33 (a) of List III nugatory 
or otiose. 
37. We are, therefore, also of the view that this aspect of 
the matter requires reconsideration by a larger Bench of this 
Court, particularly, when the views expressed by 7 Judge 
Bench on the aforesaid question have been distinguished 
in several subsequent decisions of this Court, including 
the two decisions rendered by Constitution Benches of 
five Judges.”
(emphasis supplied)
24.	 This Court formulated six questions for adjudication by a larger 
Bench. They are reproduced below:
a.	
Does Section 2 of the IDRA have any impact on the field 
covered by Section 18G of the same or Entry 33 of List III of 
the Seventh Schedule?
b.	
Does Section 18G of the aforesaid Act fall under Entry 52 of List 
I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, or is it covered 
by Entry 33 of List III thereof? 
c.	
In the absence of any notified order by the Central government 
under Section 18G of the above Act, is the power of the State 
to legislate in respect of matters enumerated in Entry 33 of 
List III ousted? 
d.	
Does the mere enactment of Section 18G of the IDRA, give 
rise to a presumption that it was
the intention of the Central 
government to cover the entire field in respect of Entry 33 of List 
III so as to oust the States’ competence to legislate in respect 
of matters relating thereto? 
e.	
Does the mere presence of Section 18G of the IDRA, oust 
the State’s power to legislate in regard to matters falling under 
Entry 33(a) of List III?
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1973
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
f.	
Does the interpretation given in Synthetics (supra), in respect 
of Section 18G of the IDRA correctly state the law regarding 
the States’ power to regulate industrial alcohol as a product 
of the Scheduled industry under Entry 33 of List III in view of 
clause (a) thereof?
25.	 The batch was placed before a Constitution Bench pursuant to the 
above order. By an order dated 8 December 2010, the Constitution 
Bench observed that the decision in Synthetics (7J) (supra) requires 
to be considered by a Bench of nine Judges and directed the matter 
be placed before a larger Bench:
“Having meticulously examined the judgment of the 
Constitution Bench of seven learned Judges in the case 
of Synthetics and Chemical Limited & Ors. vs. State of 
Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in 1990 (1) SCC 109, we 
are of the view that the matter requires consideration by 
a Bench of nine Judges.” 
26.	 Though the three-Judge Bench by an order 25 October 2007 only 
referred the issue of the interplay between Section 18-G of the 
IDRA and Entry 33 of List III to the Constitution Bench, the order 
of the Constitution Bench categorically noted that the correctness 
of the decision in Synthetics (7J) ought to be reconsidered by a 
nine Judge Bench. Thus, this Bench is not limited to the questions 
framed by the three-Judge Bench. 
B.	
Submissions
i.	
Appellants’ submissions
27.	 This Court held in Synthetics (7J)
(supra) that denatured spirit is 
industrial alcohol and is outside the jurisdiction of States under Entry 
8, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It held that 
Entry 8, List II deals only with potable alcohol. Mr Dinesh Dwivedi, 
learned senior counsel representing the State of UP assailed the 
reasoning in Synthetics (7J) (supra) and argued that the States 
have jurisdiction over industrial alcohol. He submitted that:
a.	
Legislative entries are fields of legislation and must be read 
widely and construed liberally to maintain the federal balance. 
The exclusive jurisdiction of the States cannot be ousted by 
a Parliamentary enactment. Article 245 of the Constitution is
1974
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
subject to Article 246 and therefore the division of legislative 
powers must be given their full effect;
b.	
The term ‘intoxicating liquors’ appearing in Entry 8 of List II of 
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution has a rich history and 
legislative practice accompanying it; 
c.	
The term ‘intoxicating liquors’ in Entry 8 of List II is borrowed 
from Entry 31, List II of the 1935 Act. The 1935 Act was enacted 
by the British Parliament when the term ‘intoxicating liquors’ had 
attained a specific meaning. This meaning can be discerned 
from Section 110 of the License Consolidation Act 1910 and 
Sections 3, 4, 5, 116 of the Spirit Act 1880; 
d.	
In British legislations, the words ‘intoxicating liquors’ were defined 
to include spirit of all kinds including fermented and distilled 
spirits. The terms ‘intoxicating liquors’ and ‘spirit’ or ‘liquor of all 
kinds’ were used interchangeably in laws in England; 
e.	
Various provincial statutes defined the words ‘liquor’ and ‘sprit’ 
to include all liquids containing alcohol.58 These legislations were 
enacted with the knowledge that alcohol is used for industrial 
purposes. ‘Intoxicating liquors’ in Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh 
Schedule to the Constitution is a comprehensive phrase which 
connotes all liquids containing alcohol. Therefore, liquor and 
spirit including industrial alcohol have always been under the 
jurisdiction of States;
f.	
The 1935 Act used different
phrases in Entries 31 and 40 of 
List II of its Seventh Schedule. These entries are relatable 
to Entries 8 and 51 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the 
Constitution respectively. Whereas the phrase ‘alcoholic liquor 
for human consumption’ is used in Entry 51 List II for taxation 
purposes, Entry 8 of List II uses the word ‘intoxicating liquors’. 
Similarly, Entry 84 of List I uses the phrase ‘alcoholic liquor 
not for human consumption’ and Article 47 uses the phrase 
‘intoxicating drinks’. It would be irrational to presume that the 
framers of the Constitution used different phrases to mean the 
same thing;
58	
Bombay Abkari Act 1878, Madras Abkari Act 1886, Bengal Excise Act 1909, Bihar Excise Act 1915, MP 
Excise Act 1915, Punjab Excise Act 1914, Chhattisgarh Excise Act 1915 and UP Excise Act 1910.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1975
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
g.	
The term ‘liquors’ used in a legislation under Entry 31 of List II 
of the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act was accepted to mean 
all alcoholic liquids by this Court in FN Balsara (supra). The 
language of Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the 
Constitution is borrowed from Entry 31 of List II of the Seventh 
Schedule to the 1935 Act and must be deemed to have the 
same meaning; 
h.	
Entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution 
uses the phrase ‘alcoholic liquor not for human consumption’. 
Usage of widely different terms in the Constitution would appear 
irrational if ‘intoxicating liquors’ was understood to exclude 
alcohols used in industries;
i.	
Entry 8 of List II includes alcohols used in industries. Since it 
is a specific entry in List II, alcohols used in industries will be 
excluded from the general entry on industries in Entry 24 of 
List II. The Union cannot take over any industry in pursuance 
of Entry 52 of List I unless the industry falls under Entry 24 of 
List II. Therefore Parliament cannot takeover industrial alcohol 
by making a declaration under the IDRA, which relates to Entry 
52 of List I;
j.	
Entry 8 of List II is not subject to any other entry in the Seventh 
Schedule. The Constitution makes specific mention where it 
intends a legislative field to be subject to other entries in the 
Seventh Schedule; and
k.	
 Synthetics (7J) (supra)
fell into error by not considering the 
traditional meaning of ‘intoxicating liquors’. It also failed to 
notice all previous decisions, like Ch Tika Ramji v. State of 
UP,59 which defined ‘industry’ for the purpose of Entry 24 of 
List II and Entry of 52 List I and delineated its scope. It held 
that the product of an industry notified under the IDRA falls 
under Entry 33 of List III. 
28.	 Mr Dwivedi submitted that Entry 8 of List II governs the production, 
manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating 
liquors. Since alcohols used in industries fall within the remit of 
‘intoxicating liquors’ the State legislature has exclusive and inalienable 
59	
[1956] 1 SCR 393 : 1956 SCC OnLine SC 9
1976
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
jurisdiction in this field. However, in the alternative, the industry i.e. 
the production and manufacture of alcohols used in industries, would 
be governed by the general entry, Entry 24 of List II, which can be 
taken over by the Union upon a declaration under Entry 52, List I. 
The product of the industry would be governed by Entries 26 and 
27 of List II and would require a declaration under Entry 33 of List III 
for the Union to occupy the field. He argued that only the production 
and manufacture of industrial alcohol would be governed by the 
Union List even if the requirement of a declaration under Entry 52 
of List I is met by Section 2 of the IDRA read with Entry 26 of the 
First Schedule to the IDRA. However, no corresponding declaration 
is made under Section 18G of the IDRA to satisfy the requirements 
of Entry 33, List III. The Central government would be required to 
issue a notified order under Section 18G of the IDRA to claim control 
over the product. No such order has been issued and therefore the 
product remains in the exclusive domain of the State. Therefore, the 
Union has not occupied the field under Entry 33, List III.
29.	 Mr Arvind Datar, learned senior counsel took us through the process 
of making denatured alcohol and potable liquor from molasses 
or grains. He argued that a license is required to make ENA and 
another license is required to make denatured spirit out of ENA. The 
process of
denaturation is done before a State Excise Officer and the 
excise or duty payable against ENA and denatured spirit changes 
drastically. He argued that States can regulate potable alcohol as 
well as denatured spirits because the process of denaturing takes 
place within the same premises. 
30.	 Mr Datar argued that the Synthetics (7J) (supra) must be overruled 
because:
a.	
In para 74 of the judgment, this Court erred in assuming that 
industrial alcohol and rectified spirit are the same substance. 
Rectified spirit or ethyl alcohol, which is per se for human 
consumption, cannot be used interchangeably with industrial 
alcohol which has undergone denaturation. Ethyl alcohol or 
rectified spirit usually undergoes denaturation for the purpose 
of their use in industries. This would involve payment of fees 
and obtaining of licenses for the process;
b.	
The expression ‘alcoholic liquor for human consumption’ in 
Entry 51 of List II was mistakenly read as ‘alcoholic liquor
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1977
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
fit for human consumption’ which has a widely different 
meaning.60 For example, molasses despite not being capable 
of final consumption, as it is, would be alcohol for human 
consumption. It would undergo a process for making it fit for 
human consumption. However, that does not take away from 
the fact that molasses is intended for human consumption and 
is susceptible to excise. Alcoholic liquor for human consumption 
means that the alcoholic liquor is capable of being consumed 
by humans. It would fall under Entry 51, List II while denatured 
alcohol would fall under Entry 84, List I;
c.	
Everything except denatured spirit is alcohol for human 
consumption because it has the potential to be consumed by 
humans. The process of denaturation is carried out only to make 
the alcohol sufficiently disagreeable for human consumption to 
avoid its misuse. ENA and rectified spirit may therefore be for 
human consumption and cease to be such upon undergoing 
denaturation. Mr Datar emphasized that the State does not have 
the power to levy tax on ENA in terms of Synthetics (7J) (supra) 
despite being for human consumption. Such an interpretation 
has drastically reduced the ability of States to levy tax under 
Entry 51 of List II;
d.	
Unlike what was held in Synthetics (7J) (supra), there are 
no licenses to manufacture industrial alcohol because what is 
manufactured is only the ENA. ENA can be
denatured for the 
purpose of alcohol used in industries. However, it does not 
require separate manufacturing units; 
e.	
The 158th Report of the Law Commission of India sought to 
address the practical problems which arose from the judgment 
of this Court in Synthetics (7J) (supra). It noted that the excise 
laws in force across different States in the country made no 
distinction between liquors used for human consumption or for 
other purposes. These pre-Constitution laws closely regulated 
and controlled the manufacture, possession, sale and transport 
of all alcohol and the Union government had no say in the matter. 
The Report clarified that there is no such thing as ‘industrial 
alcohol’ and that rectified spirit which has 95% alcohol may be 
60	
Paras 52, 54, Synthetics (supra).
1978
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
used for industrial and non-industrial purposes. Accordingly, 
the report opined that litigation on the issue be avoided by 
bringing an amendment to the IDRA, namely, the substitution 
of item 26 in the First Schedule to the IDRA with the phrase 
“Fermentation Industries but not including alcohol.” This was to 
enable the States to levy excise duties on alcohol which had 
been the case for over a century prior to the judgment of this 
Court in Synthetics (supra). Parliament did not amend the 
IDRA as suggested by the Law Commission but instead only 
excluded potable alcohol from the purview of the Union with 
retrospective effect from the commencement of the IDRA; and
f.	
 Synthetics (7J) (supra) must be overruled because it suffers 
from inconsistency in holding that the States have nothing to do 
with alcohol as well as holding that they can levy a regulatory 
fee.61
31.	 Mr Datar submitted that the phrase ‘that is to say’ featuring in 
Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule connotes that the entry 
is exhaustive. Such a reading would mean that the entire journey 
of intoxicating liquor – from production to purchase and sale will 
fall within the remit of Entry 8 of List II. Since Entry 8 of List II is 
exhaustive and is not subject to any other entry in List I or List III, it 
cannot be transgressed by a law made by Parliament. 
32.	 Relying on the State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley,62 Mr Datar 
argued that to
understand the meaning of ‘intoxicating liquors’, which 
has not been defined in the Constitution, the Court may identify if the 
expression is nomen juris and adopt the meaning which the word 
has obtained over a passage of time. The British law i.e. the Spirits 
Act 1880 includes denatured alcohol. Similarly, this Court in India 
Mica (supra) and FN Balsara (supra) held that intoxicating liquor 
includes denatured spirits. Mr Datar also presented a list of legislation 
enacted at around the same time which included denatured alcohol 
in the same category as liquor. Mr Datar relied on the judgment of 
this Court in SIEL Ltd v. Union of India63 to argue that the subjects 
enumerated in Entry 33, List III are excluded from Entry 52, List I. 
61	
Para 86. Synthetics (supra)
62	
[1959] SCR 379
63	
[1998] Supp. 1 SCR 560 : (1998) 7 SCC 26
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1979
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
Lastly, he urged that since Section 18G of the IDRA does not specify 
that it extends to ‘production’, even the issuance of a notified order 
would not result in the occupation of the field by the Union with 
respect to production. 
33.	 Mr Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel, supplemented the case 
of the appellants. He submitted that if this Court were not inclined 
to hold that all alcohol falls under Entry 8 of List II then, in the 
alternative, the judgment of this Court in Synthetics (7J) (supra) 
must be overruled on the ground that the three-fold classification 
of Tika Ramji (supra) has not been followed. This Court in Tika 
Ramji (supra) devised a threefold classification as pre-production, 
production and post-production. It held that only the second 
category i.e. production would be covered by the word ‘industry’. 
He submitted that the State therefore has the power to regulate 
the manufacture of ENA which would fall under the pre-production 
category. The State would also have the power to regulate the 
distribution of denatured alcohol. Buttressing this point, Mr Jaideep 
Gupta argued that it becomes imperative for the State to regulate 
the distribution of denatured alcohol because it may be renatured 
and distributed as potable alcohol which will lead to tragedies. He 
argued that it becomes imperative for the State to regulate such 
instances under Entry 8 of List II as well
as Entry 6 of List II which 
deals with public health. 
34.	 Mr V Giri, learned senior counsel, differed from other counsel for the 
appellants and submitted that denatured alcohol would be excluded 
from the ambit of the term ‘intoxicating liquors’ and would therefore 
fall under Entry 24 of List II. However, he supported the arguments 
of the other counsel on a notified order under Section 18G of the 
IDRA being a prerequisite for Parliament to occupy the field under 
Entry 33 of List III. 
35.	 Mr Balbir Singh, learned senior counsel, and Mr Shadan Farasat 
and Dr. Vivek Sharma, learned counsel, have supported the above 
arguments on behalf of the appellants.
ii.	
Respondent’s submissions
36.	 Mr R Venkataramani, learned Attorney General for India appearing 
for the Union of India submitted that:
1980
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
a.	
The production, manufacture, trade and commerce, supply 
and distribution constitute a chain of economic activity and 
may not be looked at separately. Therefore, the process of 
production necessarily includes the series of actions of trade, 
commerce, supply and distribution. This implies that there is a 
symbiotic relationship between Entry 52 of List I and Entry of 
33 List III and they may not be looked at separately. Entry 52 
of List I and Entry 33 of List III are a family of entries which are 
interconnected. Entry 52 of List I can also include and touch 
upon all matters relating to an industry that is brought under the 
control of the Union. These matters can be production, trade, 
commerce, supply and distribution, etc.;
b.	
Entry 52 of List I is a special entry uncontrolled by any other 
entry including Entry 8 of List II. It envisages the possibility of 
uniform control at the federal level of any declared industry by 
removing it from the individual jurisdiction of the States. Such 
uniform control serves the purpose of subserving the common 
good, equitable distribution, fair prices, utility of the products 
of an industry for serving the interests of all the States, etc.;
c.	
To the extent that Parliament legislates with respect to an 
industry, the powers of the States under Entries 26 and 27 of List 
II are denuded. Similarly, the powers of the States under Entry 
33 of List III are denuded if
Parliament has occupied the field. 
Merely because a notified order is not issued would not leave 
the subject to be legislated upon by the States. This is because 
the lack of regulation or notification may be to serve the interest 
of the industry. The principle elucidated in Tika Ramji (supra) 
is not a principle of universal application i.e., in the absence 
of a notified order under Section 18G, the IDRA will not be a 
dormant law and the States will not derive their competence to 
deal with all or any matters otherwise exhaustively dealt with 
by Section 18G;
d.	
The observations in SIEL (supra) and Tika Ramji (supra) are 
incorrect in completely separating Entry 52 of List I from Entry 
33 of List III. It is open to Parliament to enact laws in respect 
of trade and commerce, production, supply, distribution. The 
fact that the IDRA touches upon a certain field is enough to 
oust the jurisdiction of the State completely;
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1981
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
e.	
All uses of liquids containing alcohol, other than those meant 
for human consumption, would fall under one category which 
is non-potable alcohol. Non-potable alcohol must fall outside 
Entry 8 of List II. Accordingly, the 2016 amendment to Entry 26 
of Schedule I of the IDRA must be taken to have validly taken 
over non-potable alcohol;
f.	
The focus of the framers while drafting the provisions concerning 
alcohol in the Constitution was temperance, regulation of trade 
and commerce in consumable alcohol preparations and to 
raise revenue;
g.	
Entry 8 of List II cannot be interpreted to carve anything out 
of Entry 52, List I and Entry 33, List III. The judgment of this 
Court in ITC Ltd v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee,64 
is inapplicable to the present case because ITC (supra) 
was determined in the context of overlapping entries. The 
‘fermentation industry’ has been dealt with under the IDRA, 
which is a self-contained legislation;
h.	
The term ‘intoxicating liquors’ in Entry 8 of List II does not 
include all classes of alcoholic liquids. The use of the phrase 
‘that is to say’ occurring in Entry 8 of List II only refers to the 
range of activities concerning one class of alcohol, namely 
potable alcohol, and is not referable to other classes of liquor;
i.	
The framers of the Constitution may not have been aware of 
many industrial uses of alcohol and that all alcohol is
neither 
consumable by humans nor intoxicating in nature; and
j.	
The Report of the Industrial Alcohol Committee in 1920 observed 
that it was difficult to define ‘intoxicating liquors’ since there was 
no intrinsic difference between alcohol intended for potable and 
non-potable purposes.
37.	 Mr Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, argued that 
the adjudication on the interplay of Sections 2 and 18G of the IDRA 
with Entry 52 of List I and Entry 33 of List III will have a bearing 
on other legislation and therefore the ruling in this case may not 
be restricted to the industry of alcohol. The division of legislative 
64	
[2002] 1 SCR 441 : (2002) 9 SCC 232
1982
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
powers has undergone four stages: (a) the devolution of powers 
to the Federal legislature and the Provincial legislatures under the 
Devolution Rules, Government of India Act 1919;65 (b) the division of 
subjects between the Centre and the Provinces under the 1935 Act; 
(c) the draft Constitution which was placed before the Constituent 
Assembly; and (d) the entries as they were finally adopted in the 
Constitution. The Solicitor General submitted that:
a.	
Some industries have always been considered as necessarily 
under Union control. This may be because it is in national 
interest, requires uniform regulation throughout the country, or 
when the industry or its products are sought to be equitably 
distributed. Entry 52 of List I is in furtherance of the federal 
principle;
b.	
Entry 20 of the Central Subject List in the Devolution Rules 
framed under the 1919 Act which corresponds to Entry 52 of 
List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution used the term 
‘development’. A similar provision was inserted as Entry 34, List I 
of the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act which also used the 
term ‘development’. This entry was further retained as Entry 64 of 
List I of the Seventh Schedule to the draft Constitution. However, 
after debates in the Constituent Assembly the entry gained the 
form in which it appears today in Entry 52 of List I. The word 
‘development’ was dropped from the entry but the word ‘control’ 
was
retained. Therefore, the term ‘control’ must have been 
intended to connote a wider meaning than its earlier versions;
c.	
This is borne out by the Constituent Assembly debates where 
Dr BR Ambedkar responded to amendments which sought to 
introduce the term ‘development and control’ in draft Entry 64, 
List I. He stated that the intention of the Drafting Committee 
was not merely to allow the Union to take over the development 
of an industry but also other aspects; 
d.	
 Tika Ramji (supra) must be overruled because:
i.	
It did not consider the Constituent Assembly debates and 
wrongly restricted the meaning of industry to manufacturing 
and production only;
65	
“1919 Act”
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1983
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
ii.	
All aspects from the sourcing of raw materials to the 
distribution of products must fall within the powers of the 
Union to take control of an industry under Entry 52 of List I;
iii.	
Article 366(12) did not define the term ‘goods’ to include 
raw materials in particular;
iv.	
Entry 27 of List II is subject to Entry 33 of List III. The 
implication of this aspect was not sufficiently dealt with by 
the Court in Tika Ramji (supra); and
v.	
It is expedient in public interest that alcohol is regulated 
by a Central legislation. Currently, the IDRA occupies the 
field, and any State law on alcohol, other than potable 
alcohol, will be repugnant to the IDRA. The holding in 
Tika Ramji (supra), that there must be a notified order in 
force pursuant to Section 18G for there to be repugnancy 
is not correct. Further, it was obiter dicta;
e.	
 Synthetics (7J) (supra) rightly did not consider the observations 
in Tika Ramji (supra) regarding the absence of a notified order 
by the Union government;
f.	
The debates in the Constituent Assembly would show that the 
framers of the Constitution intended the Union to have some 
control over the trade and commerce, production, supply and 
distribution which led to the introduction of a concurrent list 
entry which is identifiable as Entry 33 of List III;
g.	
The power of taxation over potable alcohol has always been 
with the States and the power of
taxation over non-potable 
alcohol has always been with the Union. This is borne out by 
the evolution of Entry 84 of List I and Entry 52 of List II of the 
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The control and the 
taxing power were cumulatively given to the provinces under 
Entry 16 of the provincial subject list of the Devolution Rules 
under the 1919 Act. Under the 1935 Act, Entry 45 of List I 
specifically excluded ‘alcoholic liquor for human consumption’ 
from the domain of the Union and correspondingly included it 
under the State list as Entry 40 of List II;
h.	
The term ‘intoxicating liquors’ in Entry 8 of List II means a 
beverage which has the effect of intoxication upon consumption.
1984
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
The term is not used elsewhere in the Seventh Schedule and 
instead the term ‘alcoholic liquor for human consumption’ is 
used in taxing entries. The terminological variation is because 
the incidence of tax is relevant in a taxing entry. Accordingly, 
since intoxication is not the incidence of taxation but the effect 
of consuming alcoholic liquor, it is not used in the taxing entries;
i.	
Similarly, in Article 47, the term ‘intoxicating drinks’ is used to 
connote all drinks which have the effect of intoxication regardless 
of its alcoholic content, for example, Indian hemp;
j.	
This Court, in Synthetics (7J) (supra), held that ‘intoxicating 
liquors’ is limited to ‘alcoholic liquor fit for human consumption’. 
FN Balsara (supra) defined liquor in a different context and did 
not deal with legislative competence; and
k.	
Industrial alcohol is a subject which affects the entire nation 
and requires a uniform approach. This is evidenced by national 
laws and policies such as the Indian Power Alcohol Act 1948, 
Ethyl Alcohol (Price Control) Order 1966 and the National 
Biofuel Policy 2018.
38.	 Mr Dhruv Agrawal, learned senior counsel; Mr Abhimanyu Bhandari; 
Mr Omar Ahmad; Ms Tahira Karanjawala; Ms Sansriti Pathak; Mr 
Pawan Shree Agarwal; Mr S Nandakumar; and Mr Akash Bajaj, 
learned counsel, have supported the above arguments on behalf 
of the respondent.
C.	
The distinction between potable and non-potable alcohol
39.
Before delineating the issues that fall for the consideration of this 
Court, certain preliminary remarks on the process of preparation of 
potable alcohol, that is, alcohol that is used as a beverage must be 
made. The raw material for potable alcohol is generally molasses 
and grain,66 which is fermented and distilled to produce rectified 
spirit. Rectified spirit, also known as ethyl alcohol, contains about 
95% alcohol and some impurities which can affect flavour and 
aroma. Rectified spirit is used as a solvent in pharmaceutical and 
cosmetic products. Though rectified spirit is not generally used in 
66	
See FB Wright, Distillation of Alcohol and De-Naturing (2nd ed. 1907)
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1985
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
the preparation of alcoholic beverages, it may be used to produce 
home-made liqueurs.67 Extra Neutral Alcohol is a highly purified form 
of ethanol which contains more than 96% alcohol. ENA has a neutral 
taste and smell and is mostly used as a base for the preparation of 
premium beverages. Additionally, it is also used in the production of 
products like perfumes and mouthwashes. Absolute alcohol is ethanol 
that contains less than 1% water and more than 99% alcohol.68 
The high purity of the alcohol makes it ideal for the preparation of 
pharmaceutical products, cosmetics and chemical manufacturing 
that require a water-free solvent.69
40.	 ‘Industrial alcohol’ is a common term that is used to denote the 
alcohol that is used in industries. As indicated above, all the above 
three variants of ethanol are used in various industrial preparations. 
While ENA is usually used for the preparation of alcoholic beverages, 
rectified spirit is also used to prepare certain alcoholic beverages. 
Denaturation is a process by which ethanol is deliberately made 
undrinkable by adding chemicals known as ‘denaturants’ to make 
it poisonous or foul smelling and unsuited for ingestion by humans. 
Denaturants can be added to any of the three forms of ethanol 
(ENA, rectified spirit and absolute alcohol). Denatured alcohol is also 
further classified into ‘Completely Denatured Alcohol’ and ‘Specially 
Denatured
Alcohol’. Both these formulations contain denaturants 
making it unconsumable. However, in completely denatured alcohol, 
the denaturants cannot be easily removed while in ‘specially denatured 
alcohol’, they can be easily removed.70 In view of this complexity, 
where the materials for the preparation of potable alcohol are also 
used for the preparation of other products, a simplistic classification of 
‘potable’ and ‘non-potable’ alcohol cannot be made for the purposes 
of this judgment. 
41.	 This is also evident from the submissions by counsel on the scope 
of Entry 8 of List II. The counsel made the following submissions:
67	
Stuart Walton, Norma Miller, An Encyclopedia of Spirits & Liqueurs and How to Cook with Them (2000)
68	
See FB Wright, Distillation of Alcohol and De-Naturing (2nd ed. 1907)
69	
See KA Jacques, TP Lyons, DR Kelsall (ed), The Alcohol Textbook: A reference for the beverage, fuel 
and industrial alcohol industries (4th ed. Nottingham University Press)
70	
See Alcohol Denaturants-Specification (Second Revision), ICS 71.100.80
1986
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
a.	
Entry 8 only includes the final product of potable alcohol, that 
is alcoholic beverages for human consumption. Entry 8 does 
not include ENA which is a raw material for the preparation of 
beverage;71
b.	
Entry 8 includes ENA and potable alcohol;72
c.	
Entry 8 includes ENA, potable alcohol and the process of 
‘denaturing’ ENA;73 and
d.	
Entry 8 includes ENA, potable alcohol and denatured alcohol.74 
D.	
Issues 
42.	 With the above preliminary observations, we have formulated the 
following issues: 
a.	
Whether Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the 
Constitution overrides Entry 8 of List II;
b.	
Whether the expression ‘intoxicating liquors’ in Entry 8 of List II 
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution includes alcohol 
other than potable alcohol; and 
c.	
Whether a notified order under Section 18G of the IDRA is 
necessary for Parliament to occupy the field under Entry 33 of 
List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
E.	
Analysis 
i.	
The constitutional distribution of legislative power
43.	 One of the prominent features of a federal Constitution is the 
distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States. 
Article 246 provides for the distribution of legislative powers between 
Parliament and the State Legislatures. Clause (1) of Article 246 
stipulates that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with 
respect to any matter enumerated in the Union List (List I to the
Seventh Schedule) notwithstanding anything in the State or the 
71	
See submissions of Mr Tushar Mehta, learned SG.
72	
See submissions of V Giri, counsel for petitioner
73	
See Vam Organic (II) 
74	
See submissions of Mr Dwivedi and Mr Datar senior counsel
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1987
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
Concurrent Lists. Clause (2) stipulates that Parliament and the State 
Legislatures have the power to legislate on any matter enumerated 
in the Concurrent List (List III of the Seventh Schedule) subject to 
the power of Parliament under Clause (1) but notwithstanding the 
power of the State Legislatures under Clause (3). Clause (3) provides 
that subject to clauses (1) and (2), the State Legislatures have 
the power to legislate on any matter enumerated in the State List 
(List II of the Seventh Schedule) of the Seventh Schedule. Further, 
Clause (4) provides for the power of Parliament to enact laws for 
Union Territories. It states that Parliament may enact laws for any 
part of the territory of India which is not included in a State. This 
power includes the power of Parliament to make laws with respect 
to entries enumerated in the State list, for Union Territories. 
44.	 The federal balance of the distribution of legislative powers between 
the Union and the States rests on the interpretation of the phrase 
“notwithstanding” in Clause (1) of Article 246 and “subject to” in 
Clause (3) of Article 246. It is more than clear that the phrases 
provide predominance to Parliament over State Legislatures. The 
federal balance lies not on the recognition that the Constitution grants 
Parliament predominant legislative power but on the identification 
of the scope of such predominance. The scope of
the non-obstante 
clause in Article 246(1) and the subjugation clause in Article 246(3) 
must not be interpreted in isolation but along with the substantive 
provisions of the clauses. Clause (1) of Article 246 grants Parliament 
the “exclusive power” to enact laws with respect to matters in List I. 
Similarly, Clause (3) of Article 246 grants the Legislature of States, 
the “exclusive power” to enact laws with respect to matters in List II. 
On a holistic interpretation of the provisions, it is clear that the non-
obstante clause in Article 246(1) and the subjugation clause in Article 
246(3) do not permit Parliament to enact laws with respect to the 
entries in List II. Each of the legislative bodies are sovereign and 
supreme within the sphere that is allocated to them in the Seventh 
Schedule.75 What then is the purpose of the non-obstante and 
subjugation clause? It is crucial to note that Clause (1) of Article 246 
stipulates that the power of Parliament to make laws with respect to 
entries in List I is ‘notwithstanding’ not just the power to make laws 
with respect to matters in the Concurrent list but also the power to 
75	
Jindal Stainless Steel v. State of Haryana (2017) 12 SCC 1 [617]
1988
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
make laws with respect to matters in the State List. A combined 
reading of the non-obstante clause and the subjugation clause along 
with the use of the phrase “exclusive power” means only one thing, 
that when there is a conflict between the entries in List I and List II, 
the power of Parliament supersedes. 
45.	 The judgment of this Court in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State 
of Bihar76 is the locus classicus on the constitutional scheme of 
legislative distribution. The decision holds that when there is a conflict 
between an entry in List I and entry in List II which is not ‘capable 
of reconciliation’,77 the power of Parliament to legislate with respect 
to a field covered by List I must supersede the exercise of power by 
the State legislature to that extent.78 The judgment also proceeded 
to lay down the manner in which the entries in List I and List II must 
be reconciled79: 
a.	
In case of a seeming conflict between the entries in the two 
lists, the entries must be read together without giving a narrow 
and restricted meaning to either of the entries in the Lists; and 
b.	
If the entries cannot be reconciled by giving a wide meaning, 
it must be determined if they can be reconciled by giving the 
entries a narrower meaning. 
46.	 In State of WB v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights,80 
a Constitution Bench held that the principle of federal supremacy in 
Article 246 can be resorted to only when there
is an ‘irreconcilable 
direct conflict’ between the entries in List I and List II.81 
ii.	
Scheme of legislative entries
47.	 The lists in the Seventh Schedule demarcate the legislative fields 
between Parliament and the State Legislatures. They do not 
confer power but stipulate broad fields of legislation.82 The source 
76	
[1983] 3 SCR 130 : (1983) 4 SCC 45
77	
Also see In re Central Provinces and Berar Act 14 of 1938, AIR 1939 FC 1
78	
(1983) 4 SCC 45 [38] 
79	
AIR 1939 FC 1 [41]
80	
[2010] 2 SCR 979 : (2010) 3 SCC 571
81	
(2010) 3 SCC 571 [27]; Also see In re C.P & Berar Taxation Act, AIR 1939 FC 1
82	
See Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W.B., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 60; Union of India v. HS 
Dhillon (1971) 2 SCC 779; TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1989
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
of the power of Parliament and State Legislatures emanates from 
Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution. These provisions in the 
Constitution have been borrowed from Sections 99 and 100 of 
the Government of India Act 193583 with necessary modifications. 
The demarcation of legislative fields is based on a deliberate 
design as well as on the principles of federalism. Matters requiring 
coordination between different regions of the country or of national 
importance have been placed in the field of Parliament. Matters 
requiring localized focus and limited or no coordination between 
States have been placed in the State List. Fields of legislation 
which may require either uniform legislation for the entire nation 
or context and region-specific accommodation, depending on the 
circumstance, are placed in the Concurrent List. Moreover, the 
three lists make a clear distinction between general entries and 
taxation entries. The power of taxation cannot be derived from a 
general entry.84 The entries in the legislative lists do not cast an 
obligation to legislate or to legislate in a particular manner. Within 
the confines of an entry, the legislature exercises plenary power 
subject to the provisions of the Constitution.85 
48.	 Numerous language devices are used in the Seventh Schedule to 
prevent the conflict of entries and ensure a clear demarcation of 
the fields of entry. The entries in
List II use the following language 
devices: 
a.	
‘Subject to’ a specific provision of List I or List III: Entries 2,17,22, 
24,26,27,33 and 57;
b.	
‘Subject to’ provisions of an entire list with regard to the subject 
matter: Entry 13;
c.	
‘Not specified in’ or ‘other than those specified in’ List I: Entries 
13, 32 and 63; and
d.	
‘Subject to’ law made by Parliament or ‘subject to’ any limitations 
imposed by Parliament by law: Entries 37 and 50.
83	
“1935 Act”
84	
State of Karnataka v. State of Meghalaya (2023) 4 SCC 416; Union of India v. HS Dhillon (1971) 2 SCC 
779; MPV Sundararamier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1958) 9 STC 298; R Abdul Quader & Co. v. 
STO (1964) 6 SCR 867; HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Volume 3 (4th edn.) [25.57] 2340-2341.
85	
United Province v. Atiqa Begum (1940) FCR 110; Constitution of India, Article 13
1990
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
49.	 With respect to category (a) above, where an Entry in List II is subject 
to an entry or entries in List I or List III, the extent of the legislative 
field covered by the entry in List II is circumscribed by the domain 
covered by the entries in Lists I or III to which the entry in List II is 
subject. For example, Entry 22 of the State List deals with “courts 
of wards subject to the provisions of Entry 34 of List I”. Entry 34 
of List I provides for “Courts of wards for the estates of Rulers of 
Indian States”. The legislative field in Entry 22 of List II is wider 
than the field of Entry 34 of List I. Hence the subjection of Entry 22 
of List II to Entry 34 of List I indicates that that the field assigned 
to the States is circumscribed to the extent of the field assigned 
to Parliament in Entry 34 of List I. Barring the express legislative 
device of subordination, the States have complete power to enact 
laws over the fields specified in List II of the Seventh Schedule to 
the Constitution. The authority of the State Legislature to enact laws 
on those entries of List II which are not expressly made subject to 
other entries has maintained the federal balance of legislatures 
under the Constitution.86 
50.	 The devices of language used in the Seventh Schedule prevent the 
overlap between entries in various Lists. Now, what of the instances 
where there is an overlap between provisions in different entries 
but
the Constitution does not use a device to resolve it? It must 
be recalled that the federal supremacy of Parliament on legislative 
competence can only be resorted to when there is an ‘irreconcilable 
direct conflict’ between entries in different lists. It is crucial to note 
the difference between ‘overlap’ and ‘conflict’. An overlap occurs 
when two or more things or fields partially intersect. However, a 
conflict occurs when two or more entries operate in the exactly same 
field. Courts while dealing with an overlap of legislative entries must 
endeavour to diminish the overlap and not enhance it by including it 
in the field of conflict. The federal supremacy accorded to Parliament 
ticks in at the stage of ‘conflict’. 
51.	 The legislative entries must be given a wide meaning. All incidental and 
ancillary matters which can be fairly and reasonably comprehended 
must be brought within them.87 However, if there is an overlap 
86	
ibid
87	
United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (1940) FCR 110; Western India Theatres Ltd. V. Cantonment Board, Elel 
Hotels & Investments Ltd. V. Union of India; Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. V. State of UP (2005) 2 SCC 515
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1991
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
between two entries the Court must endeavour to interpret the 
entries harmoniously. While interpreting the entries harmoniously, it 
must be ensured that no entry is rendered redundant. This principle 
of construction applies equally to entries within the same List and 
entries within different lists.88 The principle of parliamentary supremacy 
must be applied only when the attempted reconciliation by the above 
methods of interpretation fails. 
iii.	
The field covered by Entry 52 of List I and Entry 8 of List II
52.	 Entry 8 of List II reads as follows: 
“Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, 
manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale 
of intoxicating liquors”.
(emphasis supplied)
a.	
The scope of Entry 8
I.	
The meaning of ‘that is to say’
53.	 Entry 8 of List II deals with ‘intoxicating liquor’. The Entry specifies 
the scope of the provision by the usage of the phrase ‘that is to say’. 
The Entry stipulates that it includes everything from the production 
to the sale of intoxicating liquor, with the use of the expressions 
‘production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale’. 
The Entry specifies the breadth of the provision by couching it in 
over broad terms. There are a few entries which provide such a 
specification, by the use of the words “that is to say”.89 Otherwise, the 
general language of the Seventh Schedule is to merely mention the
field such as ‘gas and gas-works’,90 or ‘fisheries’,91 or ‘census’,92 or 
‘public health and sanitation; hospitals and dispensaries’.93 Entry 25 
of List II specifies ‘gas and gas-works’ without clarifying the scope of 
the provision. Similarly, Entry 21 of List II specifies ‘fisheries’. Even 
88	
See Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 166
89	
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India; Entry 71 to List I, Entry 5 to List II, Entry 13 of List II, Entry 
17 of List II, Entry 18 of List II, Entry 42 of List II
90	
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India; Entry 25 of List II
91	
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India; Entry 21 of List II
92	
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India; Entry 69 of List I
93	
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India; Entry 6 of List II
1992
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
within the entries that provide some specification, there are two 
kinds. First, entries where the meaning of the field is clarified. For 
example, Entry 71 of List I deals with the field of ‘Union Pensions’. 
The phrase ‘that is to say’ is then used to specify the meaning of the 
phrase ‘Union Pensions’ as pensions payable by the Government of 
India or out of the Consolidated Fund of India.94 This specification 
operates more or less as a definition clause. Second, the phrase is 
used to specify the scope of the provision. For example, Entry 5 of 
List II reads as “local government, that is to say, the constitution and 
powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts…”95 Entry 8 
falls in the latter category.
54.	 The next question is whether the phrase ‘that is to say’ used in 
Entry 8 limits or explains the scope of the entry. The interpretation 
of the phrase ‘that is to say’ has fallen for the consideration of this 
Court earlier in numerous cases.96 This Court has adopted both 
views. Benches have interpreted the expression as a limiting as well 
as an explanatory device. In Bhola Prasad v. The King Emperor,97 
the Federal Court dealt with the meaning of the phrase ‘that is to 
say’ in Entry 31 of the Provincial List in the 1935 Act. Entry 31 of 
the Provincial List read as “Intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, 
that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, 
purchase and sale of
intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic 
drugs.” The issue was whether the Provincial Government had 
the competence to issue a notification prohibiting the possession 
of intoxicating liquor. The Federal Court held that the Provincial 
Government had the competence to prohibit though Entry 31 does 
not expressly grant the power to ‘prohibit’. The Court noted that 
the words that follow the phrase ‘that is to say’ were explanatory 
94	
Other examples include Entry 13 of List II which specifies the meaning of ‘communications’ to mean 
roads, bridges, ferries and Entry 42 of List II which specifies State pensions to mean pensions payable 
by the State or out of the Consolidated Fund of the State. 
95	
Other examples include Entry 17 of List II which reads as “water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation 
and canals, drainage and embankments, water storage and water power subject to the provisions of 
entry 56 of List I” and Entry 18 of List II which reads as ‘Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land 
tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation 
of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; and colonization. 
96	
State of Karnataka v. Balaji Computers; Bansal Wire Industries v. State of UP (2011) 6 SCC 545; Sait 
Rikaji Furtarnal v. State of AP (1991) Supp (1) SCC 202; CST v. Popular Trading Company (2000) 5 
SCC 511; State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Brewaries (2004) 11 SCC
26; State of Bombay v. Bombay 
Education Society (1954) 2 SCC 152
97	
(1942) 4 FCR 17
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1993
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
or illustrative and not words of either amplification or limitation. 
However, in other judgments dealing with taxing provisions, this 
Court has held that the expression ‘that is to say’ is employed to 
exhaustively enumerate.98 While interpreting the expression ‘that is 
to say’, it must not be lost that it features in the legislative list which 
must be interpreted widely and to include all ancillary items. The 
interpretation of taxing statutes (which must be construed strictly) 
and legislative entries in the Seventh Schedule(which are required 
to be construed widely and liberally) cannot be the same. This was 
noticed by the Constitution Bench in State of Bombay v. Bombay 
Education Society.99
55.	 In State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries,100 the levy of tax 
on the import of potable liquor manufactured in other States was 
challenged. Justice SB Sinha in his dissenting opinion, considered the 
scope of the words ‘that is to say’ in Entry 8 of List II. Relying on the 
decisions in CST v. Popular Trading101 and Indian Aluminium Co. 
Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals),102 
the learned Judge held that the expression ‘that is to say’ in Entry 8 
of List II is descriptive, enumerative and exhaustive and circumscribes 
the scope of the said entry to a great extent.”103 However, the opinion 
did not consider the decisions in Bhola Prasad (supra) and State 
98
State of Karnataka v. Balaji Computers; Bansal Wire Industries v. State of UP (2011) 6 SCC 545 [20]; Sait 
Rikhaji Furtarnal v. State of AP (1991) Supp (1) SCC 202 [4]; CST v. Popular Trading Company (2005) 5 
SCC 511
99	
(1954) 2 SCC 152; “12. […] He points out that one of the meanings of the word “namely” as given in 
Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VII, p. 16 is “that is to say” and he then refers us to the decision of the 
Federal Court in Bhola Prasad v. King Emperor [Bhola Prasad v. King Emperor, 1942 SCC OnLine 
FC 3 : (1942) 4 FCR 17 at p. 25] where it was stated that the words “that is to say” were explanatory or 
illustrative words and not words either of amplification or limitation. It should, however, be remembered 
that those observations were made in connection with one of the legislative heads, namely, Entry 31 
of the Provincial Legislative List. The fundamental proposition enunciated in R. v. Burah [R. v. Burah 
(1878) LR 3 AC 889 (PC)] was that Indian Legislatures within their own sphere had plenary powers of 
legislation as large and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself. In that view of the matter every 
entry in the legislative list had to be given the widest connotation and it was in that context that the words 
“that is to say”, relied upon by the learned Attorney General, were interpreted in that way by the Federal 
Court. To do otherwise would have been to cut down the generality of the legislative head itself. 
The same reason cannot
apply to the construction of the Government Order in the present case for the 
considerations that applied in the case before the Federal Court have no application here.” [emphasis 
supplied]
100	 (2004) 11 SCC 26
101	 [2000] 2 SCR 983 : (2000) 5 SCC 511
102	 [2001] 1 SCR 407 : (2001) 2 SCC 201
103	 (2001) 2 SCC 201 [158]
1994
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society104 and instead referred 
to the interpretation of the expression in taxing statutes. For the 
above reasons, the expression ‘that is to say’ in Entry 8 of List II 
cannot be interpreted to circumscribe the scope of the entry. The 
words that follow ‘that is to say’ are illustrative and explanatory of 
the scope of the provision. The expression does not limit the scope 
of the entry. Thus, the scope of Entry 8 of List II cannot be limited to 
the ‘production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and 
sale’ of Intoxicating Liquor. 
II.	
Product or industry based entry
56.	 The Seventh Schedule differentiates between an industry and the 
product of the industry. Entry 24 of List II deals with industries. 
Entries 26 and 27 of List II deal with products of industries. Entry 
26 deals with “Trade and commerce within the State subject to the 
provisions of Entry 33 of List III”. Entry 27 provides for “Production, 
supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of Entry 
33 of List III”. Entry 33 of List III enables both Parliament and the 
State Legislature to enact laws with respect to trade and commerce 
in, and the production, supply and distribution of, inter alia, the 
products of the industry where control by the Union is declared by 
Parliament by law to be in the public interest. Thus, if the Union has 
control over an industry under Entry 52 of List I, both
Parliament and 
the State Legislature will have the competence with respect to the 
products in terms of Entry 33 of List III. Under Entries 26 and 27 of 
List II, the State Legislature has the exclusive power to enact laws 
with respect to the products of the industries covered by Entry 24 of 
List II. Parliament has the competence to legislate on any ‘industry’ 
provided that it satisfies the condition stipulated in Entry 52 of List I 
(control by the Union being declared by a law of Parliament to be in 
the public interest). The necessary corollary of the enactment of the 
law under Entry 52 is that the products of the industry are shifted to 
the Concurrent list from the State List. 
57.	 The scope of Entry 8 must be interpreted in this background. If 
Entry 8 is a product-based Entry, it will only cover the consumable 
end-product. However, if it is an industry-based Entry, it would cover 
104	 [1955] 1 SCR 568 : (1954) 2 SCC 152
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1995
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
the production of the product as well.105 Entries 24, 26 and 27 of 
List II are general entries relating to industry and the products of the 
industries. A distinction between industry and product is made in List II 
to give effect to the legislative scheme by which certain industries 
may be controlled by the Union under Entry 52 of List I but products 
of those industries which are placed in the Concurrent list under 
Entry 33. To give effect to this unique demarcation, it was necessary 
to separate the entries relating to industries and products in List II. 
However, Entry 8 is a specific entry dealing only with ‘intoxicating 
liquor’. The distinction made between industry and products in the 
general entries to give effect to the scheme of legislative distribution 
on industries is not adopted in Entry 8. We have in the preceding 
sections emphasised that the primary principle of interpreting entries 
in the legislative lists is to provide a wide meaning to them. A narrow 
interpretation must only be adopted when either (a) the scope of 
the Entry is limited by the use of language devices; or (b) a wide 
interpretation creates an overlap between entries within the same 
list or different lists. For example, Entry 25 of List II provides States 
the competence over “gas and gas-works”. This Court in Calcutta 
Gas Company (supra) did not interpret the Entry to only include the 
product of ‘gas
and gas works’ but rather interpreted it to include the 
industry. This is the construction which is in consonance with settled 
principles of interpretation. 
58.	 Entry 8 in itself indicates that the intent is to ensure that it is read 
as broadly as possible. The Entry itself covers the ‘production, 
manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale’ of intoxicating 
liquors. Thus, it is clear that the Entry seeks to regulate everything 
from the stage of the raw materials to the consumption of ‘intoxicating 
liquor’. Entry 8 of List II includes both the industry and the product 
of ‘intoxicating liquor’.
b.	
Scope of Entry 52 of List I: the absence of “to the extent to which”
59.	 Entry 24 of List II deals with ‘Industries’. The entry is subject to 
entries 7 and 52 of List I. Entry 7 of List I deals with industries 
which are declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the 
purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war. Entry 52 of List I 
105	 See Tika Ramji v. State of UP, AIR 1956 SC 676
1996
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
deals with industries, the control of which by the Union is declared 
by Parliament to be expedient in the public interest. The State 
Legislature will have the competence to enact laws with respect to 
‘industries’. However, Parliament has the power to deal with such 
industries which are necessary to be in the control of the Union for: 
(a) public interest; (b) defence; and (c) prosecution of war. Thus, 
the State Legislature will have the competence to enact laws with 
respect to all industries, unless Parliament has taken control of the 
industry under Entries 52 or 7 of List I. 
60.	 A comparison may be drawn to Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of 
List II to cull out the scope of Entry 52 of List I. Entry 23 of List II 
deals with the “regulation of mines and mineral development subject 
to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development 
under the control of the Union.” Entry 54 of List I deals with the 
“regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to 
which such regulation and development under the control of Union 
is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in public interest.” 
The expression ‘to the extent to which’ is absent in Entry 52 of List I. 
In Mineral Area Development Authority v. M/s Steel Authority 
of India,106 a nine-Judge Bench of this Court dealt with the scope 
of Entry 52 of List I and in particular, the purport of the expression 
“to the extent to which”.
One of the contentions before the nine-
Judge Bench was that the State Legislature does not have any 
power under Entry 23 of List II because the Mines and Minerals 
(Development and Regulation) Act 1957107 is a complete code that 
occupies the entire field relating to regulation of mines and mineral 
development. Rejecting the argument, the majority held that the 
words “to the extent to which” indicates that “besides declaring that 
it is taking under its control any subject relating to the regulation 
of mines and mineral development, Parliament has to specify the 
extent to which the Parliamentary regulation is deemed expedient 
in the public interest.”108 
61.	 As opposed to Entry 54, Entry 52 does not use the words “to the 
extent to which”. The question is whether the State Legislature is 
106	 2024 INSC 554
107	 “MMDRA”
108	 2024 INSC 554 [158-161]
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1997
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
denuded from legislating on an industry which is controlled under 
the IDRA or any other similar legislation enacted under Article 246 
read with Entry 52. Section 2 of IDRA provides that the Union 
takes control over the industries specified in the First Schedule. In 
Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of UP,109 a Constitution Bench 
of this Court dealt with the constitutional validity of the UP Sugar 
Undertakings (Acquisition) Act 1971 which was challenged on the 
ground that the State Legislature lacked the legislative competence. 
While demarcating the scope of Entry 52 of List I and Entry 24 of 
list II, Justice D A Desai (writing for himself and two other Judges), 
observed that the degree and extent of control acquired by Parliament 
upon a declaration under Entry 52 would depend on the legislation 
enacted “spelling out the degree of control assumed”. The relevant 
observations are extracted below: 
“7. […] Entry 52 List I on its own language does not 
contemplate a bald declaration for assuming control over 
specified industries, but the declaration has to be by law 
to assume control of specified industries in public interest. 
The legislation enacted pursuant to the power to legislate 
acquired by declaration must be for assuming control over 
the industry and the declaration has to be made by law 
enacted, of which declaration would be an integral part. 
Legislation for assuming
control containing the declaration 
will spell out the limit of control so assumed by the 
declaration. Therefore, the degree and extent of control 
that would be acquired by Parliament pursuant to the 
declaration would necessarily depend upon the legislation 
enacted spelling out the degree of control assumed. A 
mere declaration unaccompanied by law is incompatible 
with Entry 52 List I. A declaration for assuming control of 
specified industries coupled with law assuming control 
is a prerequisite for taking legislative action under Entry 
52 List I. The declaration and the legislation pursuant 
to declaration to that extent denude the power of State 
Legislature to legislate under Entry 24 List II.” 
109	 [1980] 3 SCR 331 : (1980) 4 SCC 136
1998
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
62.	 The opinion of Justice D A Desai referred to the judgments of this 
Court in Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar110 and State of Haryana v. 
Chanan Mal111 “on an identical Entry 54, List I.”112 It was also argued 
that Section 2 of IDRA,113 unlike Section 2 of MMDRA114 does not 
provide that the Union shall take control “to the extent herewith 
provided”, and thus, IDRA takes full control over the scheduled 
industries. Rejecting the argument, Justice D A Desai noted that the 
“words of limitation on the power to make declaration are ‘by law’”.115 
Justice R S Pathak, as the learned Chief Justice then was, (writing 
for himself and Justice Koshal) observed that he would refrain from 
expressing any opinion on this issue and that the challenge to the 
validity of the impugned enactment could be disposed of without a 
reference to Entries 52 of List I and 24 of List II.116 
63.	 In ITC (supra), another Constitution Bench briefly dealt with this issue. 
It was argued that this Court in Ishwari Khetan (supra) equated Entry 
52 of List I with Entry 54 of List II. Justice Y K Sabharwal, as the 
learned Chief Justice then was, writing for the majority specifically 
rejected the argument that Entry 54 was equated with Entry 52 and 
observed that the “decision does not adopt the mines and minerals 
cases for the purposes of considering the scope of Entry 52 of List I.”117 
64.	 We agree with the opinion of Justice Desai in
Ishwari Khetan 
(supra). Entries 52 and 54 of List I (and entries 23 and 24 of List II) 
are unique. Though entries 23 and 24 stipulate that they are subject 
110	 [1970] 2 SCR 100
111	 [1976] 3 SCR 688
112	 (1980) 4 SCC 136 [8]
113	 “2. Declaration as to expediency of control by Union: It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public 
interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule.”
114	 “2. Declaration as to expediency of Union Control.- It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public 
interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of 
minerals to the extent hereinafter provided.” [emphasis supplied]
115	 (1980) 4 SCC 136 [11]
116	 “44.[…] It seems to us that the observations made by this Court in Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of 
Orissa [AIR 1961 SC 459 : (1961) 2 SCR 537] , State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co. [AIR 1964 SC 1284 : 
(1964) 4 SCR 461] , Baijnath Kadio v. State of Bihar [(1969) 3 SCC 838, 847-848 : AIR 1970 SC 1436 : 
(1970) 2 SCR 100, 113] and State of Haryana v. Chanan Mal [(1977) 1 SCC 340, 351 : AIR 1976 SC 1654 : 
(1976) 3 SCR 688, 700] cannot be of assistance in this behalf. In each of those cases, the declaration 
made by Parliament in the concerned enactment limited the control of the mines and the development of 
minerals to the extent provided in the enactment. Whether the terms in which the declaration has been
framed in Section 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act — a declaration not expressly 
limiting control of the specific industries to the extent provided by the Act — can be construed as being so 
limited is a matter which, we think, we should deal with in some more appropriate case.” 
117	 (2002) 9 SCC 232 [31]
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
1999
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
to specific entries in List I, they are actually subject to the law made 
by Parliament under the entries. The entries are unique in the sense 
that the scope of an entry in the State List is not subjected to another 
entry in the Union List but rather by the law made by Parliament. The 
consequence of this is that when stretched to the extreme, Parliament 
may by law declare that all industries must be in the control of the 
Union. This would enable Parliament to render an entry in the State List 
otiose. As held in the preceding section of this judgment, the entries 
must be interpreted to maintain the federal balance. When there are 
two possible interpretations of the entries, the Court must choose the 
one that maintains the federal balance. Entries 24 of List I and 52 of 
List II maintain the federal balance in a unique way. The members 
of the Constituent Assembly thought it fit to include ‘industries’ as a 
legislative field in the State List because it requires localized focus. 
If the draftspersons thought otherwise, they could have included 
the Entry in the Union List or even the Concurrent List. The unique 
placement of these entries must be considered and given due effect. 
The entries must not be interpreted in a manner that would, in effect 
for all purposes, place the entry in the Concurrent List. 
65.	 The question is whether an implied limitation can be read into Entry 
52 of
List I in the absence of the expression “to the extent to which”. If 
an implied limitation is not read into the Entry, Parliament by a simple 
declaration may take over the complete industry and subject the power 
of the State Legislature to make any provision with respect to that 
industry to the power of Parliament. This interpretation diminishes 
the scope of competence of the State Legislature under Entry 24 of 
List II. Such an interpretation completely tilts the federal balance that 
entries 52 of List I and 24 of List II seek to maintain. The power of 
Parliament in Entry 52 of List I is defined by the phrase ‘control’. The 
Entry does not read as “industries, declared by Parliament by law to 
be expedient in the public interest.” The Entry states “Industries, the 
control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to 
be expedient in the public interest.” The law enacted by Parliament 
must not be an abstract declaration but must specify the extent of 
control that is necessary to be taken in public interest. The State 
Legislature will have the competence to legislate with respect to 
the field which is not the subject matter of control. The legislative 
competence of the State Legislature is only denuded to the extent 
of the ‘control’ by the Union declared by the law of Parliament to be 
expedient in the public interest.
2000
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
c.	
Reconciling the potential overlap between Entry 52 of List I 
and Entry 8 of List II
66.	 Having discerned the scope of Entry 52 of List I, it next needs to be 
considered if Entry 52 of List I and Entry 8 of List II overlap, and if 
they overlap, whether they can be reconciled. 
67.	 At this juncture, the decisions of this Court that have dealt with the 
interplay of Entry 52 of List I and entries of List II need to be referred to. 
In Calcutta Gas Company v. State of West Bengal,118 a Constitution 
Bench dealt with the overlap between Entry 52 of List I and Entry 25 
of List II. Entry 25 of List II provides for ‘gas and gas works’. The 
Legislature of West Bengal enacted the Oriental Gas Company Act 
1960. The constitutional validity of the enactment was challenged on 
the ground that Entry 24 of List II which deals with industries is subject 
to Entry 52 of List I and thus, Entry 25 of List II must be confined to 
matters which are not covered by Entry 24. In short, the submission 
was that the ‘industry’ of gas and gas works will be covered by Entry 
24 of List II and the other matters relating to gas and gas works will 
be covered by Entry 25 of List II. Justice Subba Rao writing for the 
Constitution Bench held that the ‘industry’ of gas and gas works will 
be covered by Entry 25 for the following reasons119: 
a.	
Entry 25 of List II will become redundant if Entry 24 of List II 
(read along with Entries 25 and 26
which deal with trade, 
commerce, production, supply and distribution of products) 
covers the industry of ‘gas and gas works’;
b.	
The alternative, allows Entries 24 and 25 to operate fully in 
their respective fields. Entry 24 must be interpreted to cover 
the entire field of industry while Entry 25, the specific industry 
of gas and gas works;120 and
118	 [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 1 : AIR 1962 SC 1044
119	 AIR 1962 SC 1044 [9]
120	 “9. […] If industry in Entry 24 is interpreted to include gas and gas works, Entry 25 may become 
redundant, and in the context of the succeeding entries, namely Entry 26, dealing with trade and 
commerce, and Entry 27, dealing with production, supply and distribution of goods it will be 
deprived of all its contents and reduced to “useless lumber”. If industrial, trade, production and supply 
aspect are taken out of Entry 25, the substratum of the said entry would disappear: in that event we 
would be attributing to the authors of the Constitution ineptitude, want of precision and tautology. On 
the other hand, the alternative contention enables Entries 24 and 25 to operate fully in their respective 
fields: while Entry 24 covers a very wide field, that is, the field of the entire industry in the State, Entry 
25, dealing with gas and gas-works, can be confined wo a specific industry, that is, the gas industry.” 
[emphasis supplied]
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
2001
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
c.	
Parliament cannot enact laws on the gas industry under Entry 
52 because the meaning of ‘industry’ in Entry 24 of List II and 
Entry 52 of List I is the same. Since Entry 24 does not cover 
the gas industry, it cannot be included in Entry 52 as well.121 
68.	 In McDowell (supra), the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh 
Prohibition Act 1995 was under challenge. The enactment prohibited 
the selling, buying, consumption and manufacture of liquor. It was 
submitted that the State did not have the competence to enact the 
statute because the manufacture and production of intoxicating liquors 
is an industrial activity covered by Item 26 of the Schedule to IDRA. 
It may be recalled that Item 26 before the 2016 amendment included 
alcohol and other products of fermentation industry. The three-Judge 
Bench of this Court rejected the submission. Justice Jeevan Reddy, 
writing for the Bench, observed that:
a.	
Entry 8 expressly refers to ‘production and manufacture’ of 
intoxicating liquor. Including the production and manufacture 
of liquor in Entry 24 of List II (and as a consequence in Entry 
52 of List I), would amount deleting the words “production and 
manufacture” in Entry 8;
b.	
Entry 24 is a general entry and Entry 8 is a specific entry. On 
the application of the principle of generalia specialibus non 
derogant (general things do not derogate from specific things), 
the industry
of intoxicating liquor will not fall under the general 
entry (Entry 24) but the special entry (Entry 8); and
c.	
Entry 52 only governs Entry 24 and not Entry 8. Thus, the 
industry of intoxicating liquor cannot be taking over by Parliament 
under Entry 52.122
121	 “11. […] As we have indicated earlier, the expression “industry” in Entry 52 of List I bears the same 
meaning as that in Entry 24 of List II, with the result that the said expression in Entry 52 of List I also does 
not take in a gas industry.”
122	 “26. […] Entry 24 is a general entry relating to industries whereas Entry 8 is a specific and special entry 
relating inter alia to industries engaged in production and manufacture of intoxicating liquors. Applying 
the well-known rule of interpretation applicable to such a situation (special excludes the general), we 
must hold that the industries engaged in production and manufacture of intoxicating liquors do not have 
within Entry 24 but do fall within Entry 8. This was the position at the commencement of the Constitution 
and this is the position today as well. Once this is so, the making of a declaration by Parliament as 
contemplated by Entry 52 of List I does not have the effect of transferring or transplanting, as it may be 
called, the industries engaged in production and manufacture of intoxicating liquors from the State list 
to Union List. As a matter of fact, Parliament cannot take over the control of industries engaged in the 
production and manufacture
of intoxicating liquors by making a declaration under Entry 52 of List I, since 
the said entry governs only Entry 24 in List II but not Entry 9 in List II.”
2002
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Referring to the decision in Calcutta Gas Company (supra), the 
three-Judge Bench observed that Entry 8 is more specific as compared 
to Entry 24 because the former expressly refers to ‘production and 
manufacture’, and thus, it is all the more clear that the production 
of liquor cannot be covered by Entry 52.123 
69.	 In Calcutta Gas Company (supra) and McDowell (supra), this Court 
adopted the following established principles of interpretation to resolve 
the overlap between legislative entries: (a) generalia specialibus 
non derogant; (b) an interpretation which does not render an entry 
redundant must be adopted; and (c) parliamentary supremacy in 
Article 246 will only operate if the entries in the State List and the 
Union List cannot be reconciled. The approach in Calcutta Gas 
Company (supra) and McDowell (supra) on the issue of reconciling 
the conflict between the entries varies on one aspect. In Calcutta 
Gas Company (supra), the Constitution Bench adopted a three-
step analysis: 
a.	
On an application of the principle of generalia specialibus non 
derogant, the industry of the specific entry (in this case, the 
gas industry) was traced to Entry 25 and not Entry 24 (which 
is a general entry); 
b.	
Entry 52 is co-extensive with Entry 24. Thus, the scope of Entry 
54 is circumscribed by the scope of Entry 24; and 
c.	
The gas industry is included in Entry 25 (and not Entry 24) 
which is not subject to Entry 52.
Thus, Entry 52 cannot cover 
the gas industry. 
70.	 In McDowell (supra), the three-Judge Bench applied the principle 
that the State Legislature has full competence to enact laws with 
respect to those entries which are not expressly subject to an entry 
in List I or List III. 
71.	 The question is whether Parliament under Entry 52 of List I takes over 
the industry of intoxicating liquor covered by Entry 8. The answer is in 
the negative. Irrespective of whether the term ‘industry’ is interpreted 
123	 “28. […] Article 246 cannot be invoked to deprive the State Legislatures of the powers inhering in them 
by virtue of entries in List II. To wit, once an enactment, in pith and substance, is relatable to Entry 8 in 
List II or for that matter any other entry in List II, Article 246 cannot be brought into yet hold that State 
Legislature is not competent to enact that law.”
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
2003
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
in a narrow or a wide manner (a point that is vehemently contested 
by both sides), the industry of intoxicating liquor cannot be taken 
over by Parliament under Entry 52 of List I for the following reasons: 
a.	
The general principle is that legislative lists must be interpreted 
widely. The question that the Court must pose is whether the two 
entries would overlap when interpreted widely. If they overlap, 
the Court must reconcile them. But the method of reconciliation 
must maintain the federal balance. The courts must not apply 
the principle of legislative supremacy of Parliament at the stage 
of reconciliation. As explained above, such an exercise would 
tilt the federal balance towards the Union;
b.	
The only limitation in Entry 52 is that the control of the industry 
by the Union must be necessary for public interest. Parliament 
can legislate on any industry, provided that it satisfies the 
condition prescribed in the Entry. Thus, Entry 52 when read 
independent of any other entry of List I, List II and List III does 
not preclude the inclusion of the industry of intoxicating liquor 
(provided that the Union is able to prove that its control is 
necessary in public interest). Similarly, Entry 8 of List II, when 
read independently also includes, inter alia, the production and 
manufacture of intoxicating liquor which is included within the 
meaning of industry. Thus, Entry 52 of List I
and Entry 8 of 
List II overlap on the aspect of ‘industry’ of intoxicating liquor; 
c.	
Entry 8 of List II is not subject to Entry 52 of List I. Thus, the 
State Legislature has the exclusive competence to enact a law 
on the field in Entry 8. The Court must distinguish between 
entries that are expressly subject to entries in the Union List 
and entries that are not. When one entry is not subject to the 
other, the Court must harmonise the overlap of the entries;
d.	
The only way to reconcile the entries is either to exclude the 
industry of intoxicating entry from Entry 52 of List I or Entry 8 of 
List II. The Court while reconciling the provisions, must ensure 
that neither of the entries is rendered redundant. The principle of 
generalia specialibus non derogant is used by courts to ensure 
that the harmonisation of the entries does not render an entry 
redundant. In Wavery Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co,124 
124	 [1963] 3 SCR 209
2004
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
the issue was whether Parliament or the State Legislature 
had the competence to enact laws with respect to ‘forward 
markets’. Applying the principles of generalia specialibus non 
derogant, this Court held that the Union will have competence 
over ‘forward contracts’ in terms of Entry 48 of List I (stock 
exchanges and future markets) and that if it is brought within 
Entry 26 of List II (trade and commerce), Entry 48 will become 
redundant. Similarly, in Jayant Verma v. Union of India,125 
this Court applied the principle to resolve the overlap between 
Entry 30 of List II and Entry 45 of List I. A special entry must 
prevail over a general entry, otherwise, the special entry may 
become redundant; and
e.	
Entry 52 of List I is a general entry dealing with industry. Entry 8 
of List II is a special entry dealing with one particular industry.126 
The consequence of interpreting Entry 52 to cover the industry 
of ‘intoxicating liquor’ is two-fold: first, it would amount to deleting 
the words ‘production, manufacture’ in Entry 8; and second, 
the State Legislature also loses its exclusive competence to 
legislate upon the product of the industry, rendering Entry 8 
fully redundant. This is because the legislative competence on 
products of industries covered by Entry 52 of List I is placed 
in Entry 33 of List III.
72.	 As a consequence, Parliament does not have the legislative 
competence to enact a law taking control of
the industry of intoxicating 
liquor under Entry 52 of List I. 
iv.	
Scope of Entry 8: Meaning of ‘intoxicating liquor’
73.	 Entry 8 of List II is a general entry and not a taxing entry. However, 
it is a special entry in the sense that it specifically enumerates 
‘intoxicating liquors’ as a legislative field to the exclusion of all other 
general entries under which it may have otherwise been subsumed. 
The Entry stipulates that intoxicating liquors would fall within the 
legislative domain of States. The arguments of the counsel on either 
side on the scope of Entry 8 of List II rest on the interpretation of 
the expression “intoxicating liquor”.
125	 (2018) 4 SCC 743
126	 Calcutta Gas company (supra) and McDowell (supra)
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
2005
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
74.	 The appellants rely on the meaning of ‘liquor’ in statutes which predate 
the Constitution to argue that the framers of the Constitution were 
aware of the sense in which the phrase was used at the time and, 
that it included denatured alcohol. In response, the Union argues 
that the word ‘intoxicating’ occurring in the expression ‘intoxicating 
liquors’ must not be rendered redundant by adopting the interpretation 
accorded to Entry 8 of List II by the appellants. It argues that 
‘intoxicating liquors’ means beverages which are per se meant for 
human consumption for the purpose of intoxication without dilution 
or modification by any process. The Union also relies on the legal 
history of the division of legislative fields between the Union and the 
States in support of its argument that only Parliament is competent 
to legislate with regard to denatured alcohol.
a.	
Precedent on the interpretation of ‘intoxicating liquor’: exploring 
FN Balsara and Southern Pharmaceuticals
75.	 The respondents have relied on the interpretation of the phrase 
‘intoxicating liquor’ in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in FN 
Balsara v. State of Bombay.127 The petitioners have strongly relied 
on the decision of this Court in FN Balsara (supra) which overturned 
the judgment of the Bombay High Court. 
76.	 The petitioner in Balsara (supra) had one bottle of whisky, one 
bottle of brandy, one bottle of
wine, two bottles of beer, one bottle of 
medicated wine, one bottle of eau-de-cologne, one bottle of lavender 
water and some bottles of medicinal preparations. The petitioner 
invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge the validity 
of the Bombay Prohibition Act 1949.128 As the name suggests, the 
statute sought to put in place and enforce the policy of prohibition 
of alcohol. It was enacted with reference to Entry 31 of List II of 
the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act, which was similar to Entry 
8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, in respect 
of intoxicating liquors. The Act defined ‘intoxicant’ as “any liquor, 
intoxicating drug, opium or any other substance which the Provincial 
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette declare to 
be an intoxicant…”129 ‘Liquor’ was defined to include “all liquids 
127	 1950 SCC OnLine Bom 57
128	 “Bombay Prohibition Act” 
129	 Bombay Prohibition Act 1949; Section 2(22)
2006
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
containing alcohol”.130 The definition clause was challenged on the 
ground that it was beyond the competence of the State Legislature 
under the entries in List II and List III of the 1935 Act. Chief Justice 
M C Chagla, writing for the Bench, held that the State Legislature 
did not have the competence to enact laws with respect to the 
“legitimate use of alcoholic preparations which are not beverages” 
and “the use of medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol”.131 
In short, the High Court held that ‘intoxicating liquor’ in Entry 31 of 
List II of the 1935 Act did not include all liquids with alcohol, and 
thus, the definition was beyond the scope of the State Legislature. 
The reasons for the interpretation were thus: 
a.	
Liquor ordinarily means a strong drink as opposed to a soft drink. 
In any event, it must be a beverage which is ordinarily drunk;
b.	
The difference in the words qualifying ‘liquor’ in entries 31132 and 
40(a)133 of List II in the 1935 Act (the Entry corresponding to 
Entry 51 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution) 
is very significant. In Entry 31, the word used is ‘intoxicating’. In 
Entry 40(a), the word used is ‘alcoholic’. In the Whitepaper of 
1933, the entry dealt with ‘alcoholic liquor’ which was substituted 
with the expression intoxicating liquor. With the substitution, 
non-intoxicating liquor was excluded from the scope of the 
Entry; and
c.	
Medicinal and
toilet preparations containing alcohol are neither 
liquor nor intoxicating. Thus, they are excluded from the scope 
of the Entry.
The 18th amendment to the US Constitution prohibits the sale, 
manufacture and transportation of ‘intoxicating liquor’.134 The 
130	 Bombay Prohibition Act 1949; Section 2(24)
131	 1950 SCC OnLine Bom 57 [36]
132	 “31. Intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, 
transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs, but subject, 
as respects opium, to the provisions of List I and, as respects poisons and dangerous drugs, to the 
provisions of List III.”
133	 “40. Duties of excise on the following goods manufactures or produced in the Province and countervailing 
duties at the same or lower rates on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India- (a) 
alcoholic liquors for human consumption…”
134	 18th Amendment to the US Constitution; Section 1: “After one year from the ratification of this article 
the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the 
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage 
purposes is hereby prohibited.”
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
2007
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
petitioners relied on judgments of the US Supreme Court to 
substantiate the submission that the State Legislature can legislate 
on all liquids containing alcohol. The High Court, upon an analysis 
of judgments noted that they only hold that ‘intoxicating liquor’ could 
cover drinks that contain a small percentage of alcohol, even if it 
does not produce an intoxicating effect. The Court further noted 
that the judgments of the US Courts hold that the State cannot 
regulate the legitimate use of non-beverage, and medicinal and 
toilet preparations containing alcohol, but only regulate their use 
for noxious purposes. Upon the analysis of the decisions, the High 
Court held that the State: (a) has the competence to legislate on 
alcoholic liquids which are not normally consumed as drinks; (b) 
cannot legislate on the “legitimate” use of alcoholic preparations 
which are not beverages; and (c) cannot legislate on the use of 
medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. 
77.	 The appeals against the judgment of the High Court were allowed 
by a Constitution Bench of this Court in FN Balsara (supra). This 
Court noticed the meaning of the word ‘liquor’ by referring to its 
dictionary meaning and also assessed the meaning assigned to it 
in various enactments including the National Prohibition Act 1919 in 
the USA, the Licensing (Consolidating) Act 1910 and the Spirits Act 
1880 in England.
It also referred to the Indian enactments, namely, 
the Bombay Abkari Act 1878, the Bengal Excise Act 1909, the 
Punjab Excise Act 1914 and the UP Excise Act 1910. The judgment, 
authored by Justice Fazl Ali, was careful to clarify that the Court was 
not suggesting that the definition of ‘liquor’ in the Bombay Prohibition 
Act was borrowed from the statutes in the USA or England but that 
they were referred to show that the term was “capable of being used 
in a wide sense”.135 Based on its analysis, this Court observed that:
a.	
While ‘liquor’ was commonly understood to mean a drink or 
beverage produced by fermentation or distillation, the various 
enactments referred to indicated that the phrase extended to 
liquids which were not, strictly speaking, beverages;136 
b.	
The definitions of ‘liquor’ and ‘intoxicating liquor’ in the provincial 
statutes consistently included liquids containing alcohol. The 
135	 (1951) SCC 860 [43] 
136	 (1951) SCC 860 [41]
2008
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
framers of the 1935 Act were aware of the ‘accepted sense’ 
of the meaning assigned to the term in the various provincial 
laws;137 and
c.	
Therefore, the term ‘intoxicating liquors’ in Entry 31 of List II 
of the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act included not only 
beverages which intoxicate but also all liquids containing 
alcohol. While this may not have been the meaning attributed 
to ‘intoxicating liquors’ in common parlance, the numerous 
statutory definitions made it clear that the expression in Entry 31 
of List II of the 1935 Act was broad and included all liquids 
containing alcohol.138 
78.	 The Constitution Bench also approached the question from the 
perspective of the entries on ‘public health’ and ‘public order’, and 
Article 47139 of the Constitution. The Bench noted that the word ‘liquor’ 
must be given a wide meaning to include “all alcoholic liquids which 
may be used as substitutes for intoxicating drinks, to the detriment of 
health.”140 On the consideration of the meaning of the phrase, both 
from the perspective of legislative meaning and the constitutional 
directive of prohibiting intoxicating drinks which are injurious to health, 
this Court reversed the finding of the High Court.141
79.	 Though the High Court held that the definition of ‘liquor’ in the Bombay 
Prohibition Act is ultra vires and this Court reversed the finding, 
there is one commonality between both the decisions. Neither of the
decisions limited the scope of the phrase to the common parlance 
meaning of ‘intoxicating beverages’. Both the decisions held that 
the entry covered liquor which may not produce ‘intoxication’ but 
which may be used for noxious purposes. The difference is one of 
137	 (1951) SCC 860 [44]
138	 (1951) SCC 860 [44]
139	 “47. Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve 
public health.- The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living 
of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the 
State shall endeavor to being about prohibition of the consumption, except for medicinal purposes of 
intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.”
140	 (1951) SCC 860 [45]
141	 See Paragraph 48: “… the idea of prohibition is connected with public health, and to enforce prohibition 
effectively the wider definition of the word “liquor” would have to be adopted so as to include all alcoholic 
liquids which may be substitutes for intoxicating drinks, to the detriment of health. On the whole, I 
am unable to agree with the High Court’s finding, and hold that the definition of ‘liquor’ in the Bombay 
prohibition Act is not ultra vires.” [emphasis supplied]
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
2009
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
degree. While the High Court held that all liquids containing alcohol 
will not be covered by Entry 31 of List II, this Court held otherwise. 
However, the conclusion of this Court on the scope of the phrase 
cannot be read detached from observations that a wider definition of 
intoxicating liquor is necessary to cover other products which ‘may 
be used as substitutes for intoxicating drinks’. 
80.	 In Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemical v. State of Kerala,142 
the appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the provisions 
of the Abkari Act, as amended by the Abkari (Amendment) Act 1967 
and Kerala Rectified Spirit Rules 1972 which regulated the use of 
alcohol for the preparation of medicines. Item 22 of the Schedule 
to IDRA specifies the “drugs and pharmaceuticals” industry. The 
contention was that the State Legislature did not have the competence 
to enact laws because the field was covered by Parliament through 
IDRA. The issue before the three-Judge Bench of this Court was 
whether the State Legislature had the competence to enact a law 
related to medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol under 
Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This 
Court held that the State had the competence to enact the impugned 
laws under Entry 8 of List II because the legislations are confined to 
ensuring the proper utilisation of rectified spirit in the
manufacture of 
medicinal and toilet preparations.143 After referring to the decision of 
this Court in FN Balsara (supra), the Bench held that only medicinal 
preparations which are capable of being misused for “noxious” 
purpose can be considered ‘intoxicating liquor’.144 This Court held 
that the test to determine if it can be misused is whether the article 
in question can be used as a beverage: 
“19. The general test for determining what medicinal 
preparations containing alcohol are capable of 
being misused and, therefore, must be considered 
intoxicating within the meaning of the term “intoxicating 
142	 (1981) 4 SCC 391
143	 (1981) 4 SCC 391 [14]
144	 “18. … The power to legislate with regard to intoxicating liquor carries with it the power to regulate 
the manufacture, sale and possession of medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol, not for 
the purpose of interfering with the right of citizens in the matter of consumption or use for bona fide 
medicinal and toilet preparations, but for preventing intoxicating liquors from being passed on 
under the guise of medicinal and toilet preparations. It was within the competence of the State 
legislature to prevent the noxious use of such preparations, i.e. their use as a substitute for 
alcoholic beverages.” [emphasis supplied]
2010
[2024] 10 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
liquor”, is the capability of the article in question for 
use as a beverage. The impugned provisions have been 
enacted to ensure that rectified spirit is not misused 
under the pretext of being used for medicinal and 
toilet preparations containing alcohol. It was argued 
that this definition was therefore ultra vires the powers of 
the State legislature, which could only make laws related 
to alcoholic beverages.”
(emphasis supplied)
81.	 The observations of this Court in Southern Pharmaceuticals (supra) 
follow the precedent in FN Balsara (supra) that preparations which 
contain alcohol will be covered by the phrase ‘intoxicating liquor’ 
in Entry 8 to prevent its ‘noxious use’. In Indian Mica (supra), the 
appellant challenged the vires of the rule levying licence fee to possess 
denatured spirit. The Rules were framed under the Bihar and Orissa 
Excise Act 1915. The State would have the competence to enact 
a law levying fee on denatured spirit under Entry 66 of List II145 if 
the spirit was covered by the phrase ‘intoxicating liquor’ in Entry 8 
of List II. Denatured spirit in this case was used as a raw material 
for the preparation of another product (micanite). In this case, the 
Constitution Bench held that denatured spirit is ‘intoxicating liquor’ 
and thus, covered by Entry 8 of List II.146 Further it was held that the 
fee charged will be valid if the levy has a reasonable relationship 
with the services
rendered by the Government.147
82.	 It is clear from the analysis of the above judgments that the meaning of 
the phrase ‘intoxicating liquor’ in Entry 8 of List II has been expanded 
beyond the narrow definition of alcoholic beverages that produce an 
‘intoxicating effect’ upon consumption. Liquids which contain alcohol 
and which can possibly be used (or misused) as intoxicating liquor 
have been included within the meaning of the phrase. 
83.	 We will test this proposition in the subsequent sections. In our 
opinion, there are four possible approaches that we can adopt to 
determine the meaning of the expression ‘intoxicating liquor’. The 
first is through the identification of the ‘legislative meaning’ of the 
145	 “66. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not including fees taken in any Court.”
146	 (1971) 2 SCC 236 [3]
147	 (1971) 2 SCC 236 [11]
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
2011
State of U.P. & Ors. v. 
M/s Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons
phrase intoxicating liquor; the second is through legislative history; 
the third, is the common parlance test, and the fourth is the principle 
of workability. We will discuss the merits and demerits of each of 
the above approaches in turn. 
b.	
The legal import of ‘intoxicating liquor’
84.	 The petitioners submit that the expression ‘intoxicating liquor’ is a term 
of recognised legal import because it has been used in numerous 
statutes that pre-date the 1935 Act, where the phrase was first 
used in Entry 31 of List II. The principle of ‘legal import’ has been 
used by this Court to interpret entries in the Seventh Schedule. In 
Gannon Dunkerley (supra), a Constitution Bench dealt with the 
interpretation of Entry 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the 
1935 Act which specified the field of ‘taxes on the sale of goods’. 
This Court was required to interpret the phrase ‘sale of goods’. On 
one side it was contended that the term must be given the ‘popular 
meaning’ and on the other side, it was contended that it must be 
given the ‘legal meaning’. This Court chose the latter. The Bench 
laid down the standard to determine when a phrase has obtained 
a legal meaning. This Court laid down a two-prong test: first, the 
phrase should have acquired a well-recognised, definite and precise 
meaning in law;148 and second, the legal import of the word must be 
practically unanimous.149 It is
also crucial to note that in this case, 
the popular meaning of the phrase was not widely different from the 
legal meaning150.151
148	 “The ratio of the rule of interpretation that words of legal import occurring in a statute should be construed 
in their legal sense is that those words have, in law acquired a definite and precise sense, and that, 
accordingly, the legislature must be taken to have intended that they should be understood in that sense. 
In interpreting an expression used in a legal sense, therefore, we have only to ascertain the precise 
connotation which it possesses in law.” [emphasis supplied] 
149	 “It will be seen from the foregoing that there is practical unanimity of opinion as to the import of the word 
“sale” in its legal sense
150	 “Now, in its popular sense, a sale is said to take place when the bargain is settled between the parties, 
though property in the goods may not pass at that stage, as where the contract relates to future or 
unascertained goods, and it is that sense that the learned Judge would appear to have had in his mind 
when he spoke of a commercial or business sense. But apart from the fact that these observations were 
obiter, this Court has consistently held that though the word “sale” in its popular sense is not 
restricted to passing of title, and has a wider connotation as meaning the transaction of sale, and that 
in that sense an agreement to sell would, as one of the essential ingredients of sale, furnish sufficient
nexus for a State to impose a tax..” [emphasis supplied] 
151	 The judgement in Gannon Dunkerley’s case (supra) was held to be constitutionally superseded on other 
aspects by subsequent cases including Kone Elevator India (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N. (2014) 7 SCC 1. 
However, the principle of interpretation referred to in this judgment continues to be good law.