G H BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
[2021] 1 S.C.R. 130, Supreme Court of India, 2021
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS.
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6209 of 2010)
JANUARY 19, 2021
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, DINESH MAHESHWARI AND
HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960
– s.11(3) and s.11(4) – Surplus land under the Act – Predecessor-
in-interest of appellant was bhumiswami of agricultural dry land –
He was stated to be holding land in excess of the prescribed ceiling
limit – Such excess land declared to be surplus land, whereafter,
respondents initiated proceedings for taking over possession and
eviction u/s.248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code –
Appellant filed suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction
contending that the land recovery proceedings were illegal since
he was actually left with land within the prescribed ceiling limit
since a part of the land had been decreed in favour of his mother-
in-law, ‘J’, after she filed a civil suit against him – Suit of appellant
dismissed by trial court – First Appellate Court however held that
the competent authority had failed to comply with the statutory
provisions u/s.11(3) and s.11(4) and restrained the respondents from
interfering with possession of such land – High Court set aside the
judgment of Appellate Court – On appeal, held: Right to property
is still a constitutional right under Art.300A of the Constitution
though not a fundamental right – Deprivation of the right can only
be in
accordance with the procedure established by law – On facts,
once a disclosure was made (that ‘J’ had filed a suit against
appellant), the matter had to be dealt with under sub-section (4) of
s.11 and in view of the pending suit proceedings between appellant
and ‘J’, the proviso to sub-section (4) of s.11 came into play which
required the respondent authorities to await the decision of the court
– However, the very scheme of the Act was breached by the
respondents in not complying with the statutory provisions – Even
notice was not issued to ‘J’ – She could have clarified the position
further – The effect of the decree in favour of ‘J’ is that the appellant
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loses the right to hold that land and his total land holding comes
within the ceiling limit – If there is no surplus land there can be no
question of any proceedings for takeover of the surplus land under
the Act – Judgment of first Appellate Court accordingly restored –
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 – s.248.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The factual matrix of the instant case is to be
examined in the context of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh
Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960. The preparation of
the statement of land held in excess of ceiling limit under Section
11 of the said Act has to be on the basis of information given in
the return under Section 9 of the said Act, or the information
obtained by the competent authority under Section 10 of the said
Act after making an enquiry. In terms of Section 11(3), the draft
statement is to be published and served on the holder, the creditor
and “all other persons interested in the land to which it relates.”
Once a disclosure is there that ‘J’ had filed a suit, there has to be
mandatorily a notice to her as otherwise any decision would be
behind her back and would, thus, violate the principles of natural
justice. [Para 22][141-B-D]
2. There is little ambiguity about the aforesaid position as
in Section 11(4) it has been stated that in case the competent
authority finds that any question has arisen regarding the title of
a particular holder, which has not been determined by the
competent court, the competent authority shall proceed to
enquire summarily into merits of such question and pass such
orders as it thinks fit. Thus, the power is vested with the
competent authority to determine such conflict of the land holding.
This is, however, subject to a proviso. The proviso clearly
stipulates that if such a question is already pending for decision
before the competent court, the competent authority shall await
the decision of the court. [Para 23][141-D-F]
3. The embargo came there and then as once the disclosure
was made the proceedings should have been kept in abeyance to
await the decision in those proceedings. The occasion to pass
orders under sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 11 of
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the said Act did not arise in the present case in view of the
disclosure of J’s suit. Further proceedings should have been kept
in abeyance to await the verdict in the suit as per proviso to sub-
section (4) and notice should have been issued to ‘J’. All this has
been observed to be in breach by the respondents. Thus, the
findings of the appellate court in constructions of these provisions
reflects the correct position of law in the given facts of the case.
[Para 24][141-F-H]
4. The legal position has to be appreciated in the factual
context. Thus, though there may be a process provided for
redressal under the scheme of the Act, it is this very scheme of
the Act which has been breached by the respondents in not
complying with the statutory provisions. It can be nobody’s say
that ‘J’ cannot file a title suit against the appellant. That suit being
maintainable and pending, and the factum of that suit being
disclosed in the return, the provisions of Section 11 had to be
strictly complied with. This is so as the right to property is still a
constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India
though not a fundamental right. The deprivation of the right can
only be in accordance with the procedure established by law. The
law in this case is the said Act. Thus, the provisions of the said
Act had to be complied with to deprive a person of the land being
surplus. [Para 28][142-F-H; 143-A-D]
5. The provisions
of the said Act are very clear as to what
has to be done at each stage. Once a disclosure was made, the
matter had to be dealt with under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of
the said Act and in view of the pending suit proceedings between
the appellant and ‘J’, the proviso came into play which required
the respondent authorities to await the decision of the court. Sub-
section 5 and thereafter sub-section 6 would kick in only after
the mandate of subsection 4 was fulfilled. In the present case it
was not so. Even notice was not issued to ‘J’. She could have
clarified the position further. The effect of the decree in favour of
‘J’ is that the appellant loses the right to hold that land and his
total land holding comes within the ceiling limit. If there is no
surplus land there can be no question of any proceedings for take
over of the surplus land under the said Act. Thus, the impugned
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order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the order of
the first appellate court is restored. [Paras 29, 30][143-B-E]
Competent Authority, Tarana District, Ujjain (M.P.) v.
Vijay Gupta & Ors., (1991) Supp 2 SCC 631 and State
of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Dungaji (Dead)
Represented by Legal Representatives & Anr., (2019) 7
SCC 465 : [2019] 9 SCR 979  – referred to.
Case Law Reference
(1991) Supp 2 SCC 631
referred to
Para 15
[2019] 9 SCR 979  
referred to
Para 17
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6209
of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.05.2008 and the decree
of the High Court for Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in Second Appeal
No. 644 of 1998.
Saurabh Moishra, AAG, Ms. Christi Jain, Harsh Jain, Harshit
Khanduja, Akshat Maheshwari, Harshvardhan Sharma, Ms. Pratibha
Jain, Sunny Choudhary, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The social objective of providing land to the tiller and the landless
post independence was sought to be subserved by bringing in ceiling in
agricultural holdings in different States.   It is towards this objective that
the   Madhya   Pradesh   Ceiling   on   Agricultural   Holdings   Act,   1960
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) was brought into force in
1960. The said Act,  inter alia, provided for acquisition  as well as
disposal of surplus land.
2. The  predecessor-in-interest  of  the  appellant  (now
represented by the LRs) was
the bhumiswami of agricultural dry land
measuring 64.438 acres   situated   in   Village   Bagadua,   Paragna
Sheopur   Kala,   District Morena,  Madhya  Pradesh.   He  was,  thus,
stated  to  be  holding  land  in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed as
per Section 7(b) of the said Act, whereby  a  holder  along  with  his
family  of  five  members  or  less  could hold a maximum amount of 54
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PRADESH & ORS.
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acres of land.   As a sequitur thereto the competent authority/competent
officer (respondent No.2 herein) initiated the  process  to  acquire  the
surplus  land  and  issued  a  draft  statement  in Land Ceiling Case
No.180/75-76/A-90(B) for acquisition of 10.436 acres of dry land from
Survey Nos.755, 756, 780 and 881/1 (for short ‘surplus land’). A final
order dated 30.3.1979 was published declaring such land as surplus.
In furtherance of the aforesaid, the respondents herein initiated the
process of taking over possession and eviction under Section 248 of  the
Madhya  Pradesh  Land  Revenue  Code,  1959  (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘said Code’) (the provision has since been deleted).
3. The appellant being aggrieved by the final order dated 30.3.1979
filed  a  suit  for  declaration of title and permanent injunction before  the
Court of Civil Judge Class-II, Sheopur Kala, District Morena. It is the
say of the appellant, as per averments in the plaint, that the proceedings
to recover land from him were illegal as he was actually left with only 54
acres of land which was within the prescribed ceiling limit in view of the
fact that the land measuring 17 bighas and 7 biswa in Survey No.77 had
been decreed in favour of one Jenobai, who was in kabza   kasht
(possession by cultivation) of the land for about 20 years.  She had filed
a civil  suit,  being  Civil  Suit  No.319/75A O.C.  on  15.10.1975  against
the
appellant  seeking  declaration  of  title  and  permanent  injunction
with respect to the aforementioned land.  There had been an admission
of the ground  position  by  the  appellant  and  thus,  the  suit  was
decreed on 5.3.1979 declaring Jenobai to be the owner in possession of
the said land. We may note that Jenobai is actually the mother-in-law of
the appellant and according to her, this land was being cultivated by her
on the basis of half and half of the land proceeds. However, subsequently
the appellant developed  improper intent and  taking advantage of her
being  a  widow and  an  old  woman,  had  colluded  with  the  Patwari
to  get  this  disputed land mutated in his name.
4. The suit filed by the appellant was contested by the respondents
herein and they took a defence in the written statement that the possession
of the surplus land had been taken over and allotted to other cultivators.
There was, however, an admission that the appellant in the return, filed
as per Section 9 of the said Act, mentioned the aspect of the pending
suit qua Survey No. 77. However, it was contended that  the appellant
had  neither  submitted  a  copy  of  the  suit  nor  any  proof  of pendency
of the suit. The suit was alleged to be collusive inasmuch as Jenobai, in
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fact, was the mother-in-law of the appellant and the endeavour was to
prevent the surplus land from being acquired. It was pleaded that Jenobai,
if she had title or possession of the land in survey No.77, would have
submitted a claim before the competent authority after the draft statement
was issued. The appellant was also alleged to not have submitted any
objection to the draft statement and the remedy of the appellant was
stated to be by way of an appeal before the competent court which was
not pursued.  The order of the competent authority was stated to have
become final and, thus, the action for taking over possession of surplus
land and allotment thereof was lawful.
5. The trial court decided the suit post trial vide judgment and
decree dated   7.10.1997.     The   trial   court   held   that   the   appellant
was   the bhumiswami in respect of the survey number in question and
the suit was collusive  with  Jenobai  having  knowledge  of  the  ceiling
proceedings. These findings resulted in a dismissal of the suit.
6. The appellant filed an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’) before the
Court of Additional   District   Judge,   Sheopur   Kala,   District   Morena.
The appellant’s  say  was  that  in  view  of  the  pendency  of  the  suit
filed  by Jenobai,  the  proceedings  under  the  said  Act  should  have
been  kept  in abeyance in view of the provisions of Section 11(4) of the
said Act.  The relevant provisions of Section 11 read as under:
“11.  Preparation  of  statement  of  land  held  in  excess  of
the ceiling area. - (1) On the basis of information given in the
return under  Section  9  or  the  information  obtained  by  the
competent authority  under  Section  10,  the  said  authority  shall
after  making such enquiry as it may deem fit, prepare a separate
draft statement in respect of each person holding land in excess
of the ceiling area, containing the following particulars:
(3) The draft statement shall be published at such place and in
such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof shall be
served on the holder or holders concerned, the creditors and all
other persons interested in the land to which it relates. Any
objection to the draft statement  received  within  thirty  days  of
the  publication  thereof shall  be  duly  considered  by  the
competent  authority  who  after giving the objector an opportunity
of being heard shall pass such order as it deems fit.
BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
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(4) If while considering the objections received under sub-section
(3)  or  otherwise,  the  competent  authority  finds  that  any
question has  arisen  regarding  the  title  of  a  particular  holder
and  such question has not already been determined by a Court of
competent jurisdiction,  the  competent  authority  shall  proceed
to  enquire summarily into the merits of such question and pass
such orders as it thinks fit.
Provided  that  if  such  question  is  already  pending  for  decision
before a competent court, the competent authority shall await the
decision of the court.
(5)  The  order  of  the  competent  authority  under  sub-section
(4) shall subject to appeal or revision, but any party may, within
three months from the date of such order, institute a suit in the
civil court to have the order set aside, and the decision of such
court shall be binding on the competent authority, but subject to
the result of such suit, if any, the order of the competent authority
shall be final and conclusive.]
[(6) After all such objections, have been disposed of, the competent
authority shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules
made thereunder, make necessary alterations in the draft statement
in  accordance  with  the  orders  passed  on  objections  and  shall
declare  the  surplus  land  held  by  each  holder.  The  competent
authority  shall,  thereafter,  publish  a  final  statement  specifying
therein the entire land held by the holder, the land to be retained
by him and the land declared to be surplus and send a copy thereof
the holder  concerned.  Such  a  statement  shall  be  published  in
such manner as may be prescribed and shall be conclusive
evidence of the facts stated therein.]”
7. The  information  about  the  pendency  of  the  suit  between
Jenobai and the appellant had been furnished to the competent authority,
and post decree of the suit the appellant had been left with only 54 acres
of land. Thus,  there  was  no  reason  to  initiate  proceedings  to  take
possession  of the disputed land.  The appellate court noted the admission
in the written statement filed by the respondents herein, that in the return
filed by the appellant   there   was   disclosure   of   the   factum   of
Jenobai   being   in possession  of  Survey  No.77  land  as  also  of  the
pendency  of  the  suit, being  Suit  No.319A/75  between  her  and  the
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appellant.   That  being  the factual position, Section 11(3) of the said Act
mandated that the copy of the draft statement ought to have been served
on Jenobai as she was an ‘interested  person’ in  the  land.   The
acquisition  proceedings  had  to  be kept in abeyance in view of the
proviso to Section 11(4) of the said Act till the disposal of the suit, and
that such a judgment of the civil court was binding  on  the  competent
authority.   The  suit  was  stated  to  have  been decreed for 3.306
hectares out of 17.715 hectares of land recorded in the name of the
appellant, resultantly leaving 14.399 hectares of land, which was within
the prescribed limited under Section 7 of the said Act.  On the basis of
these findings, the appeal was allowed and the judgment of the trial
court was set aside on the ground that the competent authority had failed
to  comply  with  the  statutory  provisions  under  Section  11(3)  and
11(4) of the said Act.  The appellant was declared as the bhumiswami
of the  surplus  land  and  the  respondents  were  restrained  from
interfering with his possession of the land.
8. It  is  now  the  turn  of  the  respondents  herein  to  prefer  an
appeal under Section 100 of the CPC before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Gwalior Bench in Second Appeal No.644 of 1998.  The High
Court vide order dated 8.5.2008 framed two substantive questions of
law, which read as under:
“i.  Whether  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Civil  Court
challenging  the
order of the Competent Officer is barred under Section 46 of the
said Act?
ii. Whether the judgment and decree of the first appellate court is
sustainable under the provisions of the said Act?”
9. On a conspectus of the matter, the High Court allowed the
appeal. The  rationale  for  the  same  was  that  after  the  publication  of
the  draft statement neither the appellant nor Jenobai had filed objections.
In the revenue records the appellant’s name was recorded as holder of
the entire agricultural  land  in  question.   No  information  was  stated
to  have  been provided  to  the  competent  authority  giving  particulars
of  the  suit  of Jenobai.   The competent authority was found not at fault
in the alleged breach  of  Sections  11(3)  and  11(4)  of  the  said  Act  as
the  information germane for the same had not been disclosed.
10. The  appellant  at  that  stage,  thus,  approached  this  Court
by  the present  Special  Leave  Petition  and  on  2.3.2009,  notice  was
BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
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issued  and status  quo  was  directed  to  be  maintained.    Subsequently,
leave  was granted  on  26.7.2010  and  ad  interim  order  was  made
absolute  till  the disposal of the appeal.
11. On  the  appeal  being  taken  up  for  hearing  on  16.1.2020
an  order was passed recording the factual controversy as to whether
the appellant had filed objections giving particulars of the pendency of
the civil suit. This  was  so  as  in  terms  of  Section  9(iv)  of  the  said
Act  that  such particulars   were   required   to   be   stated.     Even   on
the   question   of maintainability  of  the  suit,  it  was  mentioned  that  it
was  necessary  to peruse  the  objections  filed  by  the  appellant  to
determine whether the requirement of Section 9 of the said Act had
been fulfilled, Thus, records of the last ceiling case were directed to be
produced by the respondents herein. The records were, however, not
produced and, thus, on 9.9.2020, an  order  was  passed  giving  further
time  but  directing  that  failure  to produce  the  record  would  result  in
an  adverse  inference  being  drawn against the respondents herein.
12. The  respondents  filed  an  affidavit  on  26.9.2020  stating
that  the records were untraceable including the objections filed by the
appellant. It appears that due to carving out of some districts the records
could not be traced out.  The son of the appellant had stated that he did
not
have the record either.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, albeit in the
absence of  the  aforesaid  record,  which  was  not  produced  right  till
the  date  of hearing.
14. The appellant canvassed that the civil suit filed was
maintainable as  the  bar  of  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court  did  not
come  into  play  as specified  in  Section  46  of  the  said  Act  in  view
of  the  provisions  of Sections 11(4) and 11(5) of the said Act read
together. Section 46 of the said Act reads as under:
“46.  Bar  of  jurisdiction  of  Civil  Courts.  –  Save  as
expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have any
jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by
or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by
the competent authority.”
15. The  plea,  thus,  was  that  the  Section  begins  with  a  saving
clause qua the bar of civil court – “Save as expressly provided in this
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Act…..” The provisions of Section 46 were pleaded to be expressly
subject to the provisions  of  Section  11(5)  of  the  said  Act  and  the
observations  in Competent Authority,  Tarana  District, Ujjain  (M.P.)
v.  Vijay  Gupta & Ors.1 were relied upon, opining that a suit can be
filed in a civil court within  three  months  of  passing  of  an  order  by
the  competent  authority under Section 11(4) of the said Act in view of
the provisions of Section 11(5) of the said Act. There was pleaded to be
an admission about the disclosure  of  the appellant  regarding  the  factum
of  the  suit  filed  by Jenobai in the returns and, thus, the respondents
herein were required to wait for the outcome of the suit and should have
also invited objections from  Jenobai. The decree  in  the  civil  suit
between  the  appellant and Jenobai was, thus, submitted to be binding
on the competent authority.
16. On  the  other  hand,  the  respondents  herein  reiterated  that
the  suit filed by Jenobai was a collusive one and the object of the institution
was to  circumvent  the  provisions  of  the  said  Act.    In  this  behalf,
it  was submitted  that  the suit  under Section  11(5) of the  said Act  can
only be instituted within three months from the date of Section 11(4)
order, the date  of  which  is  not  mentioned.  However,  even  if  the
date  of  the subsequent order under Section 11(6) passed on 31.3.1979
is considered, the   period   of   three   months
elapsed   as   the   suit
was filed on 31.8.1979/3.9.1979 (there is some discrepancy qua the dates
as recorded in different proceedings). Further under Section 11(5) of
the said Act, a suit can only be filed for setting aside the order under
Section 11(4) of the said Act but no such prayer was made.
17. It was urged that after the order under Section 11(6) of the
said Act is passed, the land vests with the State under Section 12 of the
said Act and, thus, a suit for declaration of title was not maintainable.
There was no challenge to the order under Section 11(6) of the said Act
and, thus, the suit was not maintainable.   It was also urged that no suit
lies against an order under Section 11(6) of the said Act in view of the
judgment of this  Court  in  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  &  Anr.  v.
Dungaji (Dead) Represented by Legal Representatives & Anr.2
Learned counsel for the respondents  herein  pleaded  that  though  the
appellant  raised  the  issue about  the  pendency  of  the  suit  with
Jenobai  in  the  return  filed  under Section 9 of the said Act, the
1 1991 Supp (2) SCC 631.
2 (2019) 7 SCC 465.
BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
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documents were not produced and exhibited in this behalf even before
the trial court.   The possession of Jenobai as reflected in the revenue
records was not proved by any evidence led in that behalf. And, in fact,
no such objections were filed before the trial court.
18. On the aspect of this Court observing that an adverse inference
will be  drawn  as  per  the  orders  dated  16.1.2020  and  9.9.2020,  it
was submitted  that  the  copy  of  the  objections  were  never  placed
before  the trial  court,  the  first  appellate  court  and  the  High  Court
and,  thus,  the appellant  failed  to  discharge  the  burden  of  proving
the  case. There should,  thus,  be  no  occasion  to  draw  the  adverse
inference against the respondents herein.
19. We have given a thought to the matter in the conspectus of
what has been urged before us on the different dates and the proceedings
that had been recorded.  The matter was taken up on 16.1.2020 and in
view of the submissions advanced by the parties, the Court required
perusal of the record.  Thus, in the proceedings it was recorded that
there was a factual controversy   as   to   whether   the   appellant   in
pursuance   of   the   draft statement in the objections filed had given the
particulars of the pending civil suit filed by the mother-in-law of the
appellant claiming part of the land held by the appellant.  This was
considered to be relevant as in terms of Section
9(iv) of the said Act
such particulars are mandated to be given and,  thus,  the  respondents
herein  being  in  breach  or  not  of  the  other succeeding provisions of
the Act would depend on this important aspect. We  also  took  note  of
the  fact  that  as  per  the  respondents  herein  no particulars had been
given and the suit was alleged to be  collusive.   In order  to  determine
the  question  it  was  opined  that  this  Court  found  it necessary  to
peruse  the  objections  filed  by  the  appellant  to  come  to  a conclusion.
20. On the said date itself, this Court also required the pleadings
in the civil suit filed by the mother-in-law, Jenobai, to be placed on record
as also the judgment.
21. The  appellant  complied  with  the  order  dated  16.1.2020  by
filing these  additional  documents  but  the  respondents  herein  did  not
do  the needful. It is in these circumstances that on 9.9.2020 this Court
made it clear that  in  case  the  records  are  not  filed  adverse  inference
will  be drawn. The natural  sequitur  to  this  is  that  the  failure  to
place  the aforementioned documents  on  record  shows  that  there
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had  been  proper disclosure about  the  suit  in  the  return  filed  under
Section  9  of  the  said Act. The factum of disclosure of the suit could
not really be doubted by the  respondents  herein  in  view  of  their  own
pleadings  (admitted  in  the pleadings before the trial court, as perused
by us).  However, the records are alleged not to have been located.
22. The aforesaid factual matrix is, thus, to be examined in the
context of the provisions of the said Act. The preparation of the statement
of land held in excess of ceiling limit under Section 11 of the said Act has
to be on  the  basis  of  information  given  in  the  return  under  Section
9   of  the said Act,  or  the  information  obtained  by  the  competent
authority  under Section 10 of the said Act after making an enquiry. In
terms of Section 11(3), the draft statement is to be published and served
on the holder, the creditor and “all other persons interested in the land to
which it relates.” Once a disclosure is there that Jenobai had filed a  suit,
there has to be mandatorily a notice to her as otherwise any decision
would be behind her back and would, thus, violate the principles of natural
justice.
23. There is little ambiguity about the aforesaid position as in Section
11(4) it has been stated that in case the competent authority finds that
any question has arisen regarding the title of  a  particular  holder,  which
has not  been  determined  by  the  competent  court, the
competent
authority shall proceed to enquire summarily into merits of such question
and pass such orders as it thinks fit. Thus, the power is vested with the
competent authority  to  determine  such  conflict  of  the  land  holding.
This  is, however, subject to a proviso. The proviso clearly stipulates that
if such a question is already pending for decision before the competent
court, the competent authority shall await the decision of the court.
24. In our view, the embargo came there and then as once the
disclosure was made the proceedings should have been kept in abeyance
to await the decision in those proceedings. The occasion to pass orders
under sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the said Act
did not arise in the present case as in view of the disclosure of Jenobai’s
suit. Further  proceedings  should  have  been  kept  in  abeyance  to
await  the verdict in the suit as per proviso to sub-section (4) and notice
should have been issued to Jenobai.  All this has been observed to be in
breach by the respondents  herein. We  are,  thus,  of  the  view  that  the
findings  of  the appellate  court  in  constructions  of  these  provisions
reflects  the  correct position of law in the given facts of the case.
BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2021] 1 S.C.R.
25.     The  issue  of  jurisdiction  of  civil  court  is  no  more  res
integra  in view  of  the  judgment  in  Competent Authority,  Tarana
District,  Ujjain (M.P.).3 where it has been observed in para 4 as
under:
“4. So far as the other question regarding the maintainability of
the suit in a civil court is concerned, suffice to say that sub-section
(5) of Section 11 of the Act itself provides that any party may
within three months from the date of any order passed by the
Competent Authority under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the
Act institute a suit in the civil court to have the order set aside.
Thus the above provision itself permits the filing of a suit in a civil
court and any decision  of  such  court  has  been  made  binding
on  the  Competent Authority under the above provision of sub-
section (5) of Section 11 of the Act. It is not in dispute that the suit
in the present case was filed within three months as provided
under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act. In the result, we
do not find any force in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed
with no order as to costs.”
26. We have taken note of the latter proceedings of this Court in
State of  Madhya  Pradesh  &  Anr.  v.  Dungaji  (Dead)  Represented
by  Legal Representatives  &  Anr.4 discussing  the  scheme  of  the
Act  and  the requirement of taking recourse to the provisions of appeal
and revision under the said Act.
27. We have also
considered the plea of limitation advanced by
learned counsel for the respondents albeit no specific issue being framed
in respect of the same.
28. In our view the legal position has to be appreciated in the
factual context. Thus, though there may be a process provided for
redressal under the scheme of the Act, it is this very scheme of the Act
which has been  breached  by  the  respondents  herein  in  not  complying
with the statutory provisions. It can be nobody’s say that Jenobai cannot
file a title suit against the appellant. That suit being maintainable and
pending, and the factum of that suit being disclosed in the return (if the
nature of disclosure being the reason we wanted to peruse the record,
which were not  made  available),  the  provisions  of  Section  11  had  to
3 (supra).
4 (supra).
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be  strictly complied with. We say so as the right to property is still a
constitutional right  under  Article 300A  of  the  Constitution  of  India
though  not  a fundamental right. The deprivation of the right can only be
in accordance with the procedure established by law. The law in this
case is the said Act. Thus, the provisions of the said Act had to be
complied  with  to deprive a person of the land being surplus.
29. The provisions of the said Act are very clear as to what has to
be done at each stage. In our view once a disclosure was made, the
matter had to be dealt with under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the
said Act and  in  view  of  the  pending  suit  proceedings between  the
appellant  and Jenobai,  the  proviso  came  into  play  which  required
the  respondent authorities  to  await  the  decision  of  the  court. Sub-
section  5 and thereafter  sub-section  6  would  kick  in  only  after  the
mandate of  sub- section 4 was fulfilled. In the present case it was not
so. Even notice was not issued to Jenobai. She could have clarified the
position further. The effect of the decree in favour of Jenobai is that the
appellant loses the right to hold that land and his total land holding comes
within the ceiling limit. If  there  is  no  surplus  land  there  can  be  no
question  of  any proceedings for take over of the surplus land under the
said Act.
30. We are, thus, of the view that the impugned order is liable to
be set aside and the
order of the first appellate court is restored.
31. The appeal is accordingly allowed leaving the parties to bear
their own costs.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose
Appeal allowed.
BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]