PRIYANKA MISHRA & ORS versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.
[2023] 5 S.C.R. 1152, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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   [2023] 5 S.C.R. 1152
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PRIYANKA MISHRA & ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No.1545 of 2023)
MAY 8, 2023
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND AHSANUDDIN
AMANULLAH, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing of
FIR – Complaint filed by Respondent no.2-wife against appellants
(sister-in-law, mother-in-law and father-in-law) and her husband
for offences punishable u/s.498-A and s.34, IPC and s.4, Dowry
Prohibition Act – Petition filed by appellants u/s.482 for quashing,
dismissed – On appeal, held: FIR in question as far as appellants
are concerned, is an abuse of the process of the Court – Respondent
No.2 resided for less than three weeks in the matrimonial home from
the date the marriage was solemnised – She then lived with her
husband at Hyderabad for some time and, finally moved to London
and then Sweden – Subsequently, upon returning to India, she filed
the criminal case in question – While living with her husband in
Sweden, respondent no. 2 had filed a divorce petition, hence, there
was no occasion per se for her after coming from Sweden to visit
the matrimonial home, much less reside there – Moreover, the husband
of Respondent No.2 having emailed a complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, 3 days prior to the wife lodging her
complaint, with regard to threat received from Respondent No.2 to
implicate him and his family members, is clearly indicative that the
charges, against the
appellants were an afterthought – Impugned
judgment set aside – FIR quashed qua the appellants – Penal Code,
1860 – ss.498-A, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act – s.4.
Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v State of Bihar (2022)
6 SCC 599 – relied on.
Rajesh Sharma v State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 10 SCC
472 : [2017] 9 SCR 529; State of Haryana v Bhajan
Lal 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR
259; Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC
309 : [1998] 1 SCR 746; Mahendra K C v State of
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Karnataka (2022) 2 SCC 129; Central Bureau of
Investigation v A Ravishankar Prasad (2009) 6 SCC
351 : [2009] 9 SCR 1025; S Mahaboob Basha v State
of Karnataka (2014) 10 SCC 244 : [2014] 13 SCR
1266; Rupali Devi v State of Uttar Pradesh (2019) 5
SCC 384 : [2019] 6 SCR 577 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2017] 9 SCR 529
referred to                   Para 14
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259
referred to                   Para 16
[1998] 1 SCR 746
referred to                   Para 17
[2009] 9 SCR 1025
referred to                   Para 18
[2014] 13 SCR 1266
referred to                   Para 19
[2019] 6 SCR 577
referred to                   Para 20
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal
No.1545 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2019 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in MCRC No.6054 of 2019.
Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Sr. Adv., Karan Mamgain, Praveen
Gaur, Ms. Banni Khanna, Vikrant Singh Bais, Yogesh Tiwari, Ms. Neema,
Advs. for the Appellants.
Gopal Jha, Akshay Sahay, Rohil Bansal, Lzafeer Ahmad B. F.,
Advs. for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was passed by
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. The present Appeal is directed against the Final Judgment and
Order dated 30.04.2019 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned
Judgment”) passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at
Gwalior (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in Miscellaneous
Criminal
Case No. 6054 of 2019 by which the petition filed by the
appellants under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
PRIYANKA MISHRA & ORS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & ANR.
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(hereinafter referred to as the “Code”) praying to quash First Information
Report viz. Crime No. 139 of 2018 registered at P.S. Mahila Thana,
District Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh has been dismissed.
THE FACTUAL PRISM:
4. The Appellants before us, respectively, are the sister-in-law,
mother-in-law and father-in-law of the Respondent No.2. As per the
complaint filed by Respondent no.2 before the police, the Appellants and
the husband of the Respondent No.2 were made accused for offences
punishable under Section 498-A and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”) and Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). As per the
allegations, the accused including the appellants and other family members
demanded INR 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) cash and fifteen tolas
gold ornaments. As per the complaint, the Respondent No.2 was married
to the son of the Appellants No.2 & 3 on 03.02.2014 at Gwalior, Madhya
Pradesh. As per the demands of the Accused-Appellants, Respondent
No.2’s father gave about INR 5,00,000/-(Rupees Five Lakhs) cash, fifteen
tolas gold jewellery, a diamond ring worth INR 50,000/-, clothes worth
INR 60,000/- for the husband, apart from household articles and overall
INR 30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs) was spent in the marriage
functions.
5. It is alleged that after marriage, the Appellants started physically
and mentally harassing
Respondent No.2 demanding dowry and started
taunting her that her husband would have fetched INR 1,00,00,000/-
(Rupees One Crore) as dowry. It is stated that in April, 2014 the
Respondent No.2 got a job in Hyderabad, Telangana, where her husband
was employed and she became pregnant there. It is further stated that
the Appellants and husband of Respondent No.2 started abusing her
that if a child was born, expenses would increase and the father of
Respondent No.2 had already cheated them. It is also alleged that the
accused, inter alios, forcibly got an abortion performed on Respondent
No.2 at Hyderabad. And when the Appellant No.1 was to be engaged,
the Appellants again started harassing her and in March, 2016 she was
taken by her father to her parental home.
6. After moving to Hyderabad in April, 2014, Respondent No.2
and her husband worked and lived at Hyderabad between April-
September, 2014 and after that her husband left for London for an
assignment, and she followed suit to London, but in December, 2014
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only. Thereafter, the husband of Respondent No.2 got a job in Sweden
in March, 2015 and the wife/Respondent No.2 joined him in May, 2015.
7. The Respondent No.2 later filed a criminal case against her
husband and the appellants. This prompted the Appellants to move before
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh through Miscellaneous Criminal Case
No. 6054 of 2019 for quashing the same under Section 482 of the Code.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that already a
divorce case has been instituted in Sweden. It was submitted that
Respondent No.2 hardly lived at the matrimonial home as she was married
on 03.02.2014 and in April, 2014 moved to Hyderabad and lived with her
husband and also worked there. In March, 2015 Respondent No.2’s
husband moved to Sweden and in May, 2015, she too joined him in
Sweden.
9. It was submitted that the Appellants No.2 & 3 hardly stayed at
the matrimonial home at Rewa, Madhya Pradesh, as Appellant No. 3
was working at Raigarh and living in company accommodation there
with his wife (Appellant No. 2) and that the Appellant No.1 was working
in Pune being employed with Wipro Infotech Limited.
10. Learned counsel contended that there is no specific allegation
against any of the appellants. Furthermore, it was canvassed that the
Respondent No.2, having lived with her husband at Hyderabad and
becoming pregnant, shows cordial relations between husband and wife.
It was submitted that the allegation
of forced abortion at Hyderabad is a
complete falsehood for the reason that if such a serious incident had
actually occurred, the Respondent No.2/her family members would
definitely have a complaint lodged before some authority. It was also
urged that moving of Respondent No.2 alongwith her husband to Sweden
after receiving employment, and; living there also indicates that she had
no grievance against her husband and against the appellants. It was
submitted that the Appellants have, at no point of time, tried to interfere
in the personal lives of the couple.
11. Learned counsel submitted that Respondent No.2 and her
husband had, in fact, filed an application seeking divorce in Stockholm,
Sweden on 09.07.2018. Respondent No.2, upon her return to India from
Sweden, started threatening her husband and the Appellants to withdraw
the divorce case afore-noted, else a criminal case would be lodged against
PRIYANKA MISHRA & ORS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & ANR.[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
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all the family members. It was submitted that the same is borne out from
the fact that the husband of Respondent No.2 made a complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Gwalior on 18.09.2018, and only thereafter did
the Respondent No.2 submitted her complaint, 3 days later, on 22.09.2018.
12. Learned counsel drew the attention of the Court to the
discrepancy(ies) in the statements of Respondent No.2, under Section
161 of the Code before the police and under Section 164 of the Code
before the learned Magistrate inasmuch as in the complaint, she has
stated that her father brought her to the parental home, whereas in the
statement before the learned Magistrate, she has stated that she was
forcibly sent to her parental home by the accused persons.
13. Learned counsel also drew the Court’s attention to the order
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gwalior dated 26.11.2018, by
which anticipatory bail was granted to the appellants in which it has
been noted that no documents had been appended with the case-diary
with regard to any injury(ies) suffered by the complainant/Respondent
No.2, and also that she was living in Sweden.
14. Reliance was placed on Rajesh Sharma v State of Uttar
Pradesh, (2018) 10 SCC 472, in which taking into consideration the
misuse of Section 498-A of the IPC, the Court had issued certain
directions. The submissions urged was that the same were not followed
in the present case.
15. It was submitted
that a perusal of the FIR and the charge
sheet along with the documents appended thereto, revealed that no
evidence/material was made out on its face value and that the present
criminal prosecution was an abuse of the process of law.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2
16. Learned counsel for Respondent No.2, who has also filed a
counter-affidavit, submitted that the allegations have been duly proved
during investigation and cognizance has been taken by the learned
Magistrate against all the accused, including the Appellants. Reliance
was placed on the decision by this Court in State of Haryana v Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335, wherein, submitted learned counsel, it
has been held that if looking at the FIR, it cannot be said that prima
facie no case is made out against the applicants, and that veracity of the
allegations cannot be gone into at the stage of investigation, which is to
be established by evidence to be produced before the learned trial court.
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17. The decision in Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, (1998)
3 SCC 309  was also relied upon, where at Paragraph 18 the Court
noticed that on account of not satisfying the demand of goods, right from
the next date of marriage, the wife was repeatedly taunted, maltreated
and mentally tortured by being called ugly and thus, there cannot be
greater mental torture and harassment of any bride. Similar reliance
was placed on Mahendra K C v State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC
129, where it was stated that under Section 482 of the Code, the test to
be applied by the High Court is as to whether the allegation(s) in the
complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting thereto, prima
facie establish the ingredients of the offence(s) alleged.
18. It was canvassed that the High Court neither tests the veracity
of the allegations nor proceeds as a judge conducting a trial. Likewise,
reference was made to the judgment in Central Bureau of Investigation
v A Ravishankar Prasad, (2009) 6 SCC 351, where though the trial
of the case was at an advanced stage, the High Court had quashed the
charges. This Court reversed the decision of the High Court therein
holding the same to be an abuse of the process of court.
19. Learned counsel submitted that in S Mahaboob Basha v State
of Karnataka, (2014) 10 SCC 244, where at Paragraph 8 it had been
held that in a case concerning cruelty meted out to the wife, to bring
home the guilt of the accused, it was not essential to examine the
independent witnesses, as such ill-treatment and cruelty are committed
in closed doors, where hardly any witness can be expected, much less
an independent witness.
20. Turning to Rupali Devi v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 5
SCC 384 [a 3-Judge Bench decision, where one of us, Sanjay Kishan
Kaul, J. also constituted the coram], reliance was placed on Paragraph
16, where this Court was pleased to hold:
“16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the
wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the
matrimonial home on ac- count of acts of cruelty committed
by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the
factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a
complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-
A of the Penal Code.”
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
PRIYANKA MISHRA & ORS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & ANR.[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
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21. Having considered the matter in detail, this Court finds that
the FIR in question, as far as the Appellants are concerned, is an abuse
of the process of the court. From a plain but careful reading of the
material brought on record, including the statements of Respondent No.2
under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code and also of other witnesses, the
allegations insofar as they relate to the Appellants seem far-fetched and
do not inspire confidence. The facts in totality evince that Respondent
No.2 resided for less than three weeks in the matrimonial home from
the date the marriage was solemnised, then lived with her husband at
Hyderabad for quite some time and, finally moved to London and then
Sweden. Subsequently, Respondent No.2 upon returning to India, filed
the criminal case in question. We think the same is a retaliatory tactic,
inasmuch as the Appellants herein are concerned.
22. At this juncture, it would be relevant to note that once in Sweden,
where the Respondent No.2 was living with her husband, a divorce petition
had been filed, there was no occasion per se, for Respondent No.2 after
coming from Sweden to visit the matrimonial home, much less reside
there.
23. Moreover, the husband of Respondent No.2 having e- mailed
a complaint, 3 days prior to the wife lodging her complaint, to the
Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, with regard to threat having been
received from Respondent No.2 to implicate the husband
and his family
members, is clearly indicative that the charges, at least, as against the
instant appellants are an afterthought. While the principles in the
precedents cited by the Respondent No.2 hold the field, what is relevant
is to see whether they come to her aid in the present factual scenario.
The answer is in the negative.
24. In a decision of recent vintage, this Court in Kahkashan
Kausar alias Sonam v State of Bihar, (2022) 6 SCC 599, after
considering various precedents, held that the rejection of the prayer for
quashing the criminal case against the in-laws of the complainant- wife
therein was unjustified. The appeal was allowed by quashing the FIR
against those appellants in the said case. The Court, while granting relief,
observed as under:
“21. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant
circumstances and in the absence of any specific role
attributed to the appellant- accused, it would be unjust if the
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appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial
i.e. general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a
situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband
are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this
Court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an
eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused,
and such an exercise must, therefore, be discouraged.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. We are in agreement with the view aforesaid. In the present
case, the facts are akin to the position that obtained in Kahkashan
Kausar (supra). In light of the discussions made hereinabove, this Court
is of the firm opinion that the Appellants are to be protected against
vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, and from unnecessarily
being put through the rigours of an eventual trial.
26. The appeal stands allowed. We nip this prosecution in the
bud. Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment deserves to be, and hereby is,
set aside. FIR Crime No. 139 of 2018 registered at Police Station Mahila
Thana, District Gwalior, stands quashed qua the Appellants. Any
consequential proceedings thereto pertaining to the Appellants shall melt
into oblivion in the eye of law.
27. Pending applications, ergo, do not subsist for consideration
and are consigned to records. Costs made easy.
28. Respondent No.2, by way of a subsequent affidavit, sought to
bring to our notice the later developments in the Swedish proceedings.
Without
expressing any view thereupon, we clarify that this judgment
shall not preclude Respondent No.2 from pursuing other lawful remedies,
if so available, against the husband in India or Sweden, as the case may
be.
Divya Pandey
Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)
PRIYANKA MISHRA & ORS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & ANR.[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]