MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD versus MAHESHBHAI TINABHAI RATHOD & ORS.
[2021] 12 S.C.R. 94, Supreme Court of India, 2021
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD.
v.
MAHESHBHAI TINABHAI RATHOD & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 11477 of 2014)
DECEMBER 16, 2021
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI , A. S. BOPANNA AND
HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 – s.34 – Power of Court
to condone the delay for setting aside an Award – In the instant
case, Arbitral award passed on 28.02.2011 in favour of appellant
and copy of the award dispatched to both the parties – Thereafter
appellant filed execution petition on 27.06.2011 to recover amount
due from the respondent – Respondent on 04.01.2012 assailed the
arbitral award by filing the petition under s.34 of the Act 1996
along with the notice of motion under s.5 of Limitation Act seeking
condonation of delay of 185 days which is beyond the time limit
prescribed under s.34(3) of the Act 1996 – Single Judge while
considering the notice of motion noted that respondent refused to
accept the registered post containing the award and in that view,
declined to condone the delay – However, Division Bench of High
Court condoned the delay – On appeal, held: Limitation period to
set aside an award is prescribed under s.34 of the Act 1996 – Extent
to which the delay in setting aside an award can be condoned is
circumscribed under proviso s.34(3) of the Act 1996 – s.5 of
Limitation Act is not applicable to condone the delay beyond the
period prescribed under s.34 of the Act 1996 – Division Bench was
not justified
in condoning the delay in a casual manner – Order of
Single Judge restored.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. A perusal of the order passed by the Single Judge
indicates that as per the explanation put forth by the respondent,
it was their case that the Arbitration Petition under Section 34 of
Act 1996 filed on 04.01.2012 was on having knowledge of the
award, which according to the respondent was on 15.11.2011 when
notice in the execution petition was received. The affidavit in
[2021] 12 S.C.R. 94
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reply was noted by the Single Judge, as per which it was brought
on record that the Arbitrator had dispatched the award dated
28.02.2011 on 15.03.2011 by making an inscription, ‘AWARD’,
on the envelope, by Regd. Post Acknowledgment due. The refusal
to receive was endorsed by the postal authority on 23.03.2011.
In appropriate cases the delay is to be condoned so as not to
defeat the meritorious case. However, that would arise only when
the power under Section 5 of Limitation Act is available to be
exercised. The case of Katiji is one where such power was available
to be exercised as it was not excluded. In the instant case where
limitation is prescribed, the extent to which it can be condoned
is circumscribed and it has been held by this Court that Section 5
of Limitation Act is not applicable to condone the delay beyond
the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of Act 1996, the
Division Bench was not justified in condoning the delay in a casual
manner. [Paras 8, 10][101-A-C; 102-B-D]
Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8
SCC 470 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 619; State of Himachal
Pradesh & Anr. vs. Himachal Techno Engineers & Anr.
(2010) 12 SCC 210 : [2010] 8 SCR 1025; P. Radha
Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar (2019) 13 SCC 445 : [2018] 12
SCR 143; Chintels India Limited v. Bhayana Biuilders
Private Limited (2021) 4 SCC 602 – relied on.
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v.
Mst. Katiji and Others AIR 1987 SC 1353 : [1987] 2
SCR 387 – held
inapplicable.
Case Law Reference
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 619
relied on
Para 7
[2010] 8 SCR 1025
relied on
Para 7.1
[2018] 12 SCR 143
relied on
Para 7.2
(2021) 4 SCC 602
relied on
Para 7.3
[1987] 2 SCR 387
held inapplicable
Para 10
MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. v.
MAHESHBHAI TINABHAI RATHOD
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.11477
of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.09.2012 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No.526 of 2012 in Notice of Motion
No.925 of 2012 in Arbitration Petition No.209 of 2012.
With
Civil Appeal No.11478 of 2014.
Prashant Kumar, Amit Singh, Merusagar Samantaray, Advs. for
the Appellant.
V.  N. Raghupathy, Adv. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. S. BOPANNA, J.
1. The appellant in these appeals is assailing the order dated
24.09.2012 passed by the learned Division Bench of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Appeal Nos.526 and 525 of 2012 in NM No.925/
2012, NM No. 923/2012 in AP No.209/2012 and APNo.212 of 2012
respectively. By the said order the learned Division Bench has allowed
the appeals, condoned the delay and directed to place the Arbitration
Petition No.209 of 2012 and 212 of 2012 filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act 1996” for short) for admission
hearing before the learned Single Judge for consideration on merits.
2. The brief facts leading to the above appeals is that the
respondent availed loan facility for purchase of tractors and an agreement
No. 366533 dated 24.10.2005 was entered into between the parties in
respect of the transaction. The further details relating to the transaction
on merit is unnecessary to be adverted for the purpose of disposal of
these
appeals. However, it is noted that due to non-adherence to the
terms of contract, dispute arose between the parties and the same was
referred to arbitration by invoking the arbitration clause contained in the
agreement. The learned Arbitrator passed the award dated 28.02.2011
and allowed the claim made by the appellant. The learned Arbitrator is
stated to have dispatched the copy of the award to both the parties
through Registered Post acknowledgment due. The appellant herein
thereafter filed an execution petition on 27.06.2011 to execute the award
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and recover the amount due and payable by the respondent. The notice
of execution petition from the court of the Civil Judge, District Court,
Bhavnagar was issued to the respondent.
3. The respondent, at that stage, on 04.01.2012 assailed the arbitral
award dated 28.02.2011 by filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act
1996. By such time there was delay of 185 days beyond the time period
allowed under Section 34 (3) of the Act 1996. Hence along with the
petition, the respondent moved Notice of Motion No.925 of 2012 in
Arbitration Petition No.209 and Notice of Motion No.923 of 2012 in
Arbitration Petition No.212 of 2012 under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act seeking condonation of delay contending that the respondent had
knowledge of the proceedings only when summons was received from
the execution court on 15.11.2011. The appellant herein filed their objection
to the Notice of Motion. The learned Single Judge while considering the
Notice of Motion in the petition under Section 34 of Act 1996 noted that
the respondent refused to accept the registered post containing the award
and, in that view, declined to condone the delay. The respondent therefore
filed an appeal before the learned Division Bench, which has by a cryptic
order condoned the delay against the statutory provision and the law
enunciated by this Court. The appellant is therefore aggrieved and is
seeking that the order passed by the learned Division Bench be set aside,
consequently the
petition filed by the respondent under Section 34 of
Act 1996 be dismissed as barred by time.
4. We have heard Mr. Prashant Kumar, learned counsel for the
appellant, Mr. V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel for the respondents
and perused the material available on record.
5. Having noted the sequence, the only aspect which arises for
consideration in these appeals is as to whether the petition filed under
Section 34 of the Act 1996 was within the period of limitation provided
therein. If not, whether the delay is condonable by exercise of power
under Section 5 of Limitation Act? In that regard whether the action of
the learned Division Bench in condoning the delay by applying Section 5
of Limitation Act to a proceeding under Section 34(3) of Act 1996 in the
manner it has done in the instant case justified?
6. To appreciate the matter in its correct perspective it is necessary
at the threshold to take note of Section 34 (3) of Act 1996 providing for
the period of limitation, which is as hereunder: -
MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. v.
MAHESHBHAI TINABHAI RATHOD [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]
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“Section 34 (3):- An application for setting aside may not be made
after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party
making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a
request had been made under section 33, from the date on which
that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within
the said period of three months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”
7. The scope available for condonation of delay being self-
contained in the proviso to Section 34(3) and Section 5 of Limitation Act
not being applicable has been taken note by this Court in its earlier
decisions, which we may note. In Union of India vs. Popular
Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470 it has been held as hereunder: -
“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the
proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount
to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of
Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To
hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the
award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render
the phrase “but
not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of
interpretation would justify such a result.
14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the
conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to
challenge an award is absolute and unextendible by court under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation
Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main
objectives the need “to minimise the supervisory role of courts in
the arbitral process” This objective has found expression in Section
5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in
no uncertain terms:
“5. Extent of judicial intervention.—Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters
governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except
where so provided in this Part.”
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16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a
court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application
for setting aside such award “in accordance with” sub-section
(2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for
setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But
an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34,
sub-section (3) would not be an application “in accordance with”
that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse
to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the
period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section
34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide
that
“where the time for making an application to set aside the
arbitral award under Section 34 has expired … the award shall
be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the
same manner as if it were a decree of the court”.
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration
Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the
award expired, the court was required to “proceed to pronounce
judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so
pronounced a decree shall follow” (Section 17). Now the
consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996
Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without
any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on
the interpretation of the
language used in Section 34, the scheme
of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment
of the court’s powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section
5 of the Limitation Act.
7.1 Further, in State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. vs. Himachal
Techno Engineers & Anr. (2010) 12 SCC 210 it was noted and held as
hereunder: -
“2. A petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (“the Act”, for short) was filed by the appellant on 11-
3-2008, challenging the arbitral award. The petition was
accompanied by an application under sub-section (3) of Section
34 of the Act, for condonation of delay of 28 days in filing the
petition. The respondent resisted the application contending that
MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. v.
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the petition under Section 34 was filed beyond the period of 3
months plus 30 days and therefore, was liable to be rejected.
5. Having regard to the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act, the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will not apply
in regard to petitions under Section 34 of the Act. While Section 5
of the Limitation Act does not place any outer limit in regard to
the period of delay that could be condoned, the proviso to sub-
section (3) of Section 34 of the Act places a limit on the period of
condonable delay by using the words “may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter”. Therefore,
if a petition is filed beyond the prescribed period of three months,
the court has the discretion to condone the delay only to an extent
of thirty days, provided sufficient cause is shown. Where a petition
is filed beyond three months plus thirty days, even if sufficient
cause is made out, the delay cannot be condoned.”
7.2 The same view was taken by this Court in P. Radha Bai vs.
P. Ashok Kumar (2019) 13 SCC 445 wherein this Court held as follows-
“33.2. The proviso to Section 34 (3) enables a court to entertain
an application to challenge an award after the three months’ period
is expired, but only within an additional period of thirty dates, “but
not thereafter”. The use of the phrase “but not thereafter” shows
that the 120 days’ period is the outer boundary for
challenging an
award. If Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary for
challenging an award could go beyond 120 days. This Court has
consistently taken this view that the words “but not thereafter” in
the proviso of Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act are of a
mandatory nature, and couched in negative terms, which leaves
no room for doubt. [State of H.P. vs. Himachal Techno
Engineers (2010) 12 SCC 210], Assam Urban Water Water
Supply & Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd.
(2012) 2 SCC 624 and Anil Kumar Jinabhai Patel vs.
Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel (2018) 15 SCC 178]”
7.3 The observations of this Court in different decisions relating
to non-applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in condoning the
delay and extending the limitation prescribed under Section 34 (3) of Act
1996 was taken note of by a bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this
Court with approval, in Chintels India Limited vs. Bhayana Biuilders
Private Limited (2021) 4 SCC 602.
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8. In the above backdrop, a perusal of the order passed by the
learned Single Judge indicates that as per the explanation put-forth by
the respondent herein, it was their case that the Arbitration Petition under
Section 34 of Act 1996 filed on 04.01.2012 was on having knowledge of
the award, which according to the respondent was on 15.11.2011 when
notice in the execution petition was received. The affidavit in reply was
noted by the learned Single Judge, as per which it was brought on record
that the learned Arbitrator had dispatched the award dated 28.02.2011
on 15.03.2011 by making an inscription, ‘AWARD’, on the envelope, by
Regd. Post Acknowledgment due. The refusal to receive was endorsed
by the postal authority on 23.03.2011. The postal remark in Gujarati
“Lenavi Na Pade Che” (refused to accept) was noted by the learned
Single Judge. In para 9 and 10 of the order, the learned Single Judge has
ascertained the factual position of the refusal made by the respondent
and there being no denial on that front. In that light, the learned Single
Judge concluded as hereunder: -
“The envelopes forwarded by the learned Arbitrator to the
Petitioners, which are returned by the postal authorities to the
Arbitrator on the ground that the Petitioners have refused to accept
service of the same, are opened in Court and it is noted that the
learned Arbitrator had forwarded signed copies of the award to
the Petitioners. As stated hereinabove, the Petitioners have
admitted the fact that they have refused to accept service of the
envelopes containing copies of the Arbitral Award. Refusal of
service is good service in law. In view thereof, the Petitioners are
deemed to have been served with the signed copy of the award
on 23rd March, 2011. The Petitioners have filed the Petition only
on 02-04 January, 2012 i.e. after delay of about 197 days. The
issue as to whether the provision of Section 34(3) of the Act, has
the effect of excluding Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, came
up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Versus Principal
Secretary, Irrigation Department and Ors. wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has in paragraph 53 of its decision, categorically
held that the provisions of Section 34(3) of the Act, has the effect
of excluding Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.”
9. The learned Single Judge in that view took note of the legal
position and declined to condone the delay. The Notice of Motion was
accordingly dismissed.
MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. v.
MAHESHBHAI TINABHAI RATHOD [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]
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10. In contradistinction, a perusal of the order passed by the learned
Division Bench ex-facie indicates that it has proceeded at a tangent. On
referring to the contention that the respondent was a farmer and that no
amount is due, has relied on the decision of this Court in Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another vs. Mst. Katiji and Others
AIR 1987 SC 1353 out of context and has made the same as the basis to
allow the appeal. No-doubt the delay of 197 days may not seem too
inordinate. In appropriate cases the delay is to be condoned so as not to
defeat the meritorious case. However, that would arise only when the
power under Section 5 of Limitation Act is available to be exercised.
The case of Katiji (supra) is one where such power was available to be
exercised as it was not excluded. In the instant case where limitation is
prescribed, the extent to which it can be condoned is circumscribed and
it has been held by this Court that Section 5 of Limitation Act is not
applicable to condone the delay beyond the period prescribed under
Section 34(3) of Act 1996, the learned Division Bench was not justified
in condoning the delay in a casual manner. The order dated 24.09.2012
is not sustainable, the same is therefore set aside and the order of learned
Single Judge is restored.
11. The appeals are accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
12. All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
Devika
Gujral
Appeals allowed.