STATE OF KARNATAKA versus STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 499, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Hearing Adjourned
Segment: Ratio
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 499 
STATE OF KARNATAKA 
v. 
STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 2453 of2007) 
DECEMBER 09, 201_6 
[DIPAK MISRA, AMITAVA ROY AND 
A.M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.] 
A 
B 
Constitution of India - Arts. 262(2), 131, 136 - Inter-State 
River Water Dispute - Adjudication of - Jurisdiction of Supreme 
Court - Order passed by the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal on 
C 
sharing of river water - Challenge to -Appeals by special leave u/ 
Art. 136 filed by the States of Karnataka, Kerela and Tamil Nadu 
before this Court - Plea that Art. 262(2) read with s. 11 ands. 6 of 
the 1956 Act bars the jurisdiction of this Courtto adjudicate upon 
any water dispute - Held: Appeals by States of Karnataka, Kerela 
and Tamil Nadu are maintainable - Supreme Court has jurisdiction D 
to hear the appeals - Once a water dispute, as defined u!Art. 262(1) 
read with provisions of the 1956 Act is adjudicated by the tribunal, 
it loses the nature of dispute - Person aggrieved can always have 
his remedy invoking the jurisdiction u/Art. 136 - Founding fathers 
did not want the award or the final order passed by the tribunal to 
remain immune from challenge - That is neither the express language 
E 
of Art. 262(1) nor it is impliedly stated - Also, the legislative 
intendment of s. 6(2) is clear that the Parliament did not intend to 
create any kind of embargo on the jurisdiction of this Court - Section 
6 cannot be interpreted in an absolute mechanical manner and the 
words "same force as on
order or decision" cannot be treated as a 
F 
decree for the purpose for excluding the jurisdiction of this 
Court - Thus, on basis of the exposition of the principles of law 
relating to fiction, the intendment of th{! legislature and the ultimate 
purpose and effect of the provision, s. 6(2) does not bar the 
iurisdiction conferred on this Court u!Art. 136 - Inter-State River 
Water Disputes Act, 1956 - ss. 2(c), 6(2), 11. 
~ 
G 
Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 - ss. 11, 2(c), 
6(2) - Inter-State River Water Dispute - Issuance of interim order 
whereby the State of Karnataka directed to release 2000 cusecs of 
water to State of Tamil Nadu, to continue. 
499 
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500 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
Ad.iourning the matter, the Court 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
HELD: 1.1 Various Articles occurring in Part III of the 
Constitution of India have been bestowed the extended meaning 
through iµterpretative process to fructify the constitutional 
obligations because the provisions in the Constitution have to 
be understood and interpreted keeping in view the social 
progress, economic growth of environment of law and the global 
development oflaw. Protection offundamental rights as a concept 
cannot remain .static. They grow by encompassing a rainbow of 
views that advocate new rights that the globe perceives. But the 
authority conferred under Article 32 has its limitations when the 
lis under Article 262 emerges. It is interesting to note that the 
Constitution has not provided machinery for resolution of the 
disputes in the Constitution but has empowered the Parliament 
to make laws to provide to exclude the power of the Supreme 
Court or any other court with regard to jurisdiction in respect of 
complaints or disputes that find mention in Article 262(1). The 
Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 bars the exercise of 
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. In spite of the 
same, there is certain scope for exercise of jurisdiction. Article 
262 is a ·part of the original Constitution and, therefore, the 
question posed is whether the framers of the Constitution have 
used the express vehicle of language in this Article
so as not to 
. bestow any power on the courts including the Supreme Court. · 
[Paras 25, 34) [523-C-F; 531-C] 
· 
1.2 Section 5 provides for adjudication of water disputes. 
Section 11 stipulates that neither the Supreme Court nor any 
other Court shall have or exercise jurisdiction in respect of any 
water dispute which may be referred to a tribunal under the 1956 
Act. The tribunal is constituted when a request is made under 
Section 3 from any State Government in respect of any water 
dispute. Section 4 of the 1956 Act provides that the Central 
G Government shall constitute a Water Disputes Tl"ibunal if it is of 
the opinion that the water dispute cannot be settled by 
negotiations. The 1956 Act is in consonance with Article 262 which 
empowers the Parliament to provide that neither the Supreme 
Court nor any other court shall exercise jul"isdiction in respect 
of any such dispute or complaint but the same has to pertain to 
H
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
501 
Article 262(1). Thus, the bar on the jurisdiction of this Court has A 
to be in accord with the language employed in Article 262(1). 
Section 11 bars the jurisdiction of this Court pertaining to original 
dispute or complaint. It was submitted by the appellant that dispute 
or complaint as mentioned in Article 262 and Section 11 of the 
--
" 
1956 Act not only covers the dispute before the tribunal but also 
B 
encompasses any appeal by special leave because it still has the 
characteristics of a dispute. On a first blush, the said submission 
may look attractive but on a keener scrutiny, it does not deserve 
acceptance. The language used in Article 262(1) and Section 11 
relate to a water dispute or complaint. It pertains to a dispute or 
a complaint at the pre-adjudicatory stage. A complaint by the State C 
Government is in a different realm altogether. It is meant to invite 
the attention of the Central Government pertaining to the fact 
that a water dispute had arisen or is likely to arise and it needs to 
be addressed by constituting a tribunal. Once a water dispute is 
adjudicated, it is extremely difficult to put it in the compartment D 
of "any water dispute". After the adjudication, one of the States 
or both the States may have a grievance but a contention cannot 
be advanced by them or by the Union oflndia that the controversy 
is still at the stage of dispute that has been intended to be covered 
either under
Article 262(1) of the Constitution or under the 
scheme of the 1956 Act and, therefore, the jurisdiction of this 
E 
Court stands excluded. It has to pertain to the original dispute 
or original complaint. [Para 52, 53) [544-G-H; 545-A-F] 
1.3 The purpose of referring to the definition of term 
'adjudication' is to arrive at the conclusion that once a water 
dispute, as defined under Article 262(1) read with provisions of F 
the 1956 Act is adjudicated by the tribunal, it loses the nature of 
dispute. A person aggrieved can always have his remedy invoking 
the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 
There is no scintilla of doubt that the founding fathers did not 
want the award or the final order passed by the tribunal to remain 
immune from challenge. That is neither the express language of G 
Article 262(1) nor it impliedly so states. Thus, the submission 
with regard to maintainability of the appeal by special leave under 
Article 136 of the Constitution of India on this score stands 
repelled. [Para 66) [551-D-F] 
H
502 
A 
B 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
1.4 Relying on Section 6(2), which was introduced by way 
of Amendment Act 2002 (Act No. 14 of 2002) that came into force 
from 6.8.2002, it is submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court is 
ousted as it cannot sit over in appeal on its own decree. The said 
submission was resisted by the respondent contending that the 
said provision, if it is to be interpreted to exclude the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court of India, it has to be supported by a 
constitutional amendment adding at the end of Article 136(2) the 
words "or to any determination of any tribunal constituted under 
the law made by Parliament under Article 262(2)" and, in such a 
situation, in all possibility such an amendment to the Constitution 
may be ultra vires affecting the power of judicial review which is 
a part of basic feature of the Constitution. Section 6(2) has been 
inserted to provide teeth to the decision of the tribunal after its 
publication in the official gazette by the Central Government and 
this has been done keeping in view the Sarkaria Commission's 
D Report on Centre-State relations (1980). [Para 68) (552-A-E) 
E 
1.5 The Report of the Commission as the language would 
suggest, was to make the final decision of the tribunal binding on 
both the States and once it is treated as a decree of this Court, 
then it has the binding effect. It was suggested to make the award 
effectively enforceable. The language employed in Section 6(2)
suggests that the decision of the tribunal shall have the same 
force as the order or decree of this Court. There is a distinction 
between having the same force as an order or decree of this Court 
and passing of a decree by this Court after due adjudication. The 
Parliament has intentionally used the words from which it can be 
F 
construed that a legal fiction is meant to serve the purpose for 
which the fiction has been created and not intended to travel 
beyond it. The purpose is to have the binding effe~ of the 
tribunal's award and the effectiveness of enforceability. Thus, it 
has to be narrowly construed regard being had to the purpose it 
is meant to serve. [Para 69) [553-A-C) 
G 
H 
1.6 The fundamental rule of interpretation. is the same 
whether one construes the provisions of the Constitution or an 
Act of Parliament, namely, that the court will have to find out the 
expressed intention from the words of the Constitution or the 
Act, as the case may be." When the said principles of statutory
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
503 
interpretation are applied to understand the legislative A 
intenclment of Section 6(2) it is clear as crystal that the Parliament 
dl' not intend to create any kind of embargo on the jurisdiction 
of this Court. The said provision was inserted to give the binding 
effect to the award passed by the tribunal. The fiction has been 
created for that limited purpose. Section 11 of the 1956 Act, bars 
B 
the jurisdiction of the courts and needless to say, that is in 
consonance with the language employed in Article 262 of the 
Constitution. The Founding Fathers had not conferred the power 
on this Court to entertain an original suit or complaint and that is 
luminescent from the language employed in Article 131 of the 
Constitution and from the series of pronouncements of this Court. 
C 
Be it clearly stated that Section 6 cannot be interpreted in an 
absolute mechanical manner and the words "same force as on 
order or decision" cannot_ be treated as a decree for the purpose 
for excluding the jurisdiction of this Court. It cannot be a decree 
as if this Court has adjudicated the matter and decree is passed. 
0 
The Parliament has intepded that the same shall be executed or 
abided as if it is a decree of this Court. It is to be borne in mind 
that a provision should not be interpreted to give a different 
colour which has a technical design rather than serving the object 
of the legislation. The exposition of the principles
of law relating 
tfi fiction, the iutendment of the legislature and the ultimate 
purpose and effect of the provision compel this court to repel the 
submissions raised on behalf of the Union of India that Section 
6(2) bars the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Artie.le 
136. Thus, the Civil Appeals are maintainable. [Paras 75, 76, 78) 
[555-B-G; 556-CJ 
In Re: Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal 1993 Supp (1) 
SCC 96: 1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497; State of Karnataka 
v. State of A.P. and Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 572: 2000 (3) 
SCR 301; State of Haryana v. State of Punjab and Am: 
(2002) 2 SCC 507: 2002 (1) SCR 227; State of 
Himachal Pradesh v. Union of India and Ors. (2011) 
13 SCC 344; Tamil Nadu Cauvery Neerppasana 
Vilaiporulgal Vivasayigal Na/a Urimai Padhugappu 
Sangam v. Union of India and Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 
440:1990 (3) SCR 83; Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. 
Union of India and Ors. (2000) 10 SCC 664: 2000 (4) 
E 
F 
G 
H
504 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
Suppl. SCR 94; Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection 
Forum v. Union of India and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 643: 
2006 (2) SCR 740; Atma Linga Reddy & Ors. v. Union 
of India and Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 788: 2008 (10) SCR 
741; Networking of Rivers, In Re (2012) 4 SCC 51: 
2012 (1) SCR 1118; State of Tamil Nadu v. State of 
Karnataka and Ors. with Union Territory of Pondicherry 
v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (1991) Supp (1) SCC 
240: 1991 (2) SCR 501; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok 
Hurra & Am: (2002) 4 SCC 388: 2002 (2) SCR 1006; 
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and 
Ors. 1_955 (1) SCR 267; Associated Cement Companies 
Ltd v. P.N. Sharma (1965) 2 SCR 366; Jose Da Costa 
and Am: v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim and Ors. 
(1976) 2 SCC · 917; Arunachalam 
v. 
P.S.R. 
Sadhanantham and Anr: (1979) (2) SCC 297: 1979 (3) 
SCR 482; P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and 
Am: (1980) 3 SCC 141; Union Carbide Corpqration 
and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 
584:1991 (1) Suppl. SCR 251; Prashant Ramachandra 
Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti (1995) Supp (2) 
SCC 539: 1995 (1) SCR 871; Mahendra Saree 
Emporium (JI) v. G. V. Srinivasa Murthy (2005) 1 SCC 
481: 2004 (3) Suppl. SCR 931; U. Sree 1~ U. Srinivas 
(2013) 2 sec 114: 2012 (11) SCR 256; Mathai v. 
George and Anr. (2010) 4 SCC 358:2010 (3) SCR 533; 
Aneeta Hada v._ Godfather Travels and Tours Private 
Limited (2012) 5 sec 661: 2012 (5) SCR 503; L.
Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. (1997) 3 
SCC 261: 1997 (2) SCR 1186; Minerva Mills Ltd. and 
Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 625: 
1981 (1) SCR 206; Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachilhu and 
Ors. (1992) 1 SCC 309; M Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union 
of India and Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 212: 2006 (7) Suppl. 
SCR 336; Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Dy. 
Speaker, Arunaclial Pradesh .Legislative Assembly and 
Ors. (2016) 8 SCC 1; P. Sambamurthy and Ors. v. State 
Qf A1}_dhra Pradesh and Anr. (1987) 1 SCC 362: 1987 
(1) SCR 879; /.R. Coelho (dead) by LRS. v. State of
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
SOS 
T.N. (2007) 2 SCC 1: 2007 (1) SCR 706; State of Orissa 
v. Government of India and Anr. (2009) 5 SCC 492: 
2009 (1) SCR 992; Mathai v. George (2016) 7 SCC 
700; Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 
6 SCC 211; Gujarat State Cooperative Land 
Development Bank Ltd. v. P.R. Mankad and Ors.; (1979) 
3 SCC 123; Canara Bank and Ors. v. National Thermal 
Power Corporation and Anr. (2001) 1 SCC 43: 2000 
(5) Suppl. SCR 387; Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels 
and Tours (2012) 5 SCC 661:2012 (5) SCR 503; 
Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi v. Commissioner, Municipal 
Corporation of Kalyan and Dombivali and Ors. (2014) 
11 SCC 417; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v.. 
State of Rajtisthan (1996) 2 SCC 449: 1996 (1) SCR 
518; Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and 
Ors. AIR 1966 SC 1987; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari 
Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280: 2013 (2) SCR 301 - referred 
to. 
R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal ex parte Gilmore (1957) 
1 QB 574; Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation 
Commission (1969) 2 AC 147 - .referred to. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singlt 141h 
E 
Edn; Principles of Statutory Interpretation by GP. Singh 
l21h Eiln p 381; Administrative law by Sir William Wafle 
91h Edn; Blacks Law Dictionary 6'h Edn. p 42 - referred 
to. 
Case Law Reference 
F 
2000 (3) SCR 301 
referred to 
Para4 
2002 (1) SCR 227 
referred to 
Para4 
(2011) 13 sec 344 
referred to 
Para4 
1990 (3) SCR 83
referred to 
Para4 
G 
2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 94 
referred to 
Para4 
2006 (2) SCR 740 
referred to 
Para4 
2008 (10) SCR 741 
referred to 
Para4 
2012 (1) SCR 1118 
referred to 
Para4 
H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
1991 (2) SCR 501 
referred to 
Para4 
2002 (2) SCR 1006 
referred to 
Para5 
1955 (1) SCR 267 
referred to 
Para6 
(1965) 2 SCR 366 
referred to 
Para6 
B 
(1976) 2 sec 911 
referred to 
Para6 
1979 (3) SCR 482 
referred to 
Para6 
(1980) 3 sec 141 
referred to 
Para6 
1991 (1) Suppl. SCR 251 
referred to 
Para6 
c 
1995 (1) SCR 871 
referred to 
Para6 
. 
2004 (3) Suppl. SCR 931 
referred to 
Para6 
2012 (11) SCR 256 
referred to 
Para6 
2010 (3) SCR 533 
referred to 
Para6 
D 2012 (5) SCR 503 
referred to 
Para 7 
2013 (2) SCR 301 
referred to 
Para 7 
1997 (2) SCR 1186 
referred to 
Para8 
E 
1981 (1) SCR 206 
referred to 
Para8 
(1992) 1 sec 309 
referred to 
Para8 
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 
referred to 
Para8 
(2016) 8 sec 1 
referred to 
Para8 
F 
1987 (1) SCR 879 
referred to 
Para9 
2007 (1) SCR 706 
referred to 
Para24 
2009 (1) SCR 992 
referred to 
Para26 
1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497 
referred to 
Para 43 
G (2016) 1 sec 100 
referred to 
Para 62 
(2005) 6 sec 211 
referred to 
Para 63 
(1979) 3 sec 123 
referred to 
Para 64 
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 387 
referred to 
Para 64 
H 2012 (5) SCR 503 
' . 
' 
referred to 
Para 71
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
507 
(2014) 11 sec 417 
1996 (1) SCR 518 
AIR 1966 SC 1987 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
Para 73 
Para 74 
Para 75 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2453 
A 
of2007. 
B 
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.02.2007 of the Cauvery 
Water Disputes Tribunal at New Delhi, of the Inter State River Water 
Disputes Act of 1956. 
Mukul Rohatgi, AG., Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG., F. S. Nariman, Anil 
B. Divan, S. S. Javali, Jaideep Gupta, A. S. Nambiar, Shekhar Naphade, 
C 
Rakesh Dwivedi, Subramonium Prasad, Sr. Advs., M. R. Naik, Mohan 
V. Katarki, S. C. Sharma, V. N. Raghupathy, R. S. Ravi, J. M.Aangadhar, 
Ranvir Singh, G. Prakash, J ishnu M.L., Ms.Priyanka Prakash, Ms. Beena 
Prakash, Manu Srinath, Ms. Anindita Mitra, B. Balaji, Rajesh Mahale, 
V. G. Pragasam, Prabu Ramasubramanian, P. K. Manohar, Shanta D 
Vashdhuan, S. Wasim A. Qadri, Ms. Madhvi Diwan, Ajay Sharma, Zaid 
Ali,Ansh Singh Luthra, Ms. Snidha Mehra, Ms. Kiran Seth, Ms. Somya 
Rathore, D. S. Mahra, G. Umapathy, C. Pararpasivam, Pankaj Kumar 
Mishra, A. S. Bhasme, Ramesh Babu M. R., Ms. Aparna Bhat, Joshita 
Pai, P. Raman, Advs. for the appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
E 
DIPAK MISRA, J. I. In these Civil Appeals the assail by the 
States of Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu is to the final order dated 
05.02.2007 passed by the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (for short, 
"the tribunal") constituted under the Inter-State
River Water Disputes 
F 
Act, 1956 (for short, "the 1956 Act"). It is apt to note here that certain 
interlocutory applications were filed by the State ofTamil Nadu for release 
of water highlighting the scarcity of water faced by it and further laying 
stress on the predicament of the farmers. This Court had passed certain 
interim directions on 27•h of September, 2016 while dealing with I.A. 
Nos. 15 and 16 of 2016. The Court sought the assistance of the learned 
G 
Attorney General for India to find out the view of the Union of India, 
whether it would facilitate a discussion so that the impasse between the 
two States would appositely melt. The matter was adjourned to 30'h of 
September, 2016 and on that day, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney 
General for India apprised this Court that the meeting had been held H
508 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
under the Chairmanship of Union Minister of Water Resources, River 
Development and Ganga Rejuvenation and the Minutes of the said 
meeting were produced before the Court. The Minutes indicated that 
despite best efforts to make both the States to arrive at a consensus on 
release of Cauvery water, they took such divergent stands as a 
consequence of which nothing could be resolved. After noting various 
aspects, the Court enquired from the learned Attorney General with 
regard to constitution of the Cauvery Management Board to which he 
responded thatthe Board would be constituted on or before 4m of October, 
2016. Keeping in view the submissions, the Court directed the States, 
namely, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala and Union Territory of 
Puducherry to nominate their respective representatives as per the final 
order passed by the tribunal. The earlier order to release 6000 cusecs of 
water was reiterated. The matter was adjourned to 61h of October, 2016. 
2. Before the matter could be listed on the date fixed, the learned 
Attorney General for India mentioned the matter on 03.10.2016 that 
D 
Union of India had sought for some modification of the earlier order. 
E 
F 
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H 
The matter was taken up on 4'h of October, 2016. On that day, the 
Court noted that the order passed by it relating to release of water had 
been complied with. Thereafter, it adverted to the I.A. 18 of2016 which 
had been filed on behalf of the.
Union oflndia seeking modification of 
the orders dated 20'h of September, 2016 and 30'h of September, 2016. 
After reproducing the prayer, the Court dwelled upon the submissions of 
Mr. Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India, Mr. F.S. Nariman and 
Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing for the States 
of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu respectively and thereafter passed the 
following order:-
"It is the submission of Mr. Rohtagi that as it is a debateable 
issue; -the Court may not advert to the issue ofreview or recall but 
defer it to be considered at the time of the final disposal of the 
appeal. As advised, at present, we think it appropriate to defer the 
same. 
At this stage, we are obliged to state that in course ofhearing, 
we asked Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel that the note he 
has filed (which we have reproduced hereinabove) covers the 
time till 6.10.2016 and the appeals can be heard as directed earlier 
on 18.10.2016 and, therefor1:, what should be the arrangement 
for the said pe~iod. Mr. Nariman submitted that he has no
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
509 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
instructions in the matter and he does not intend to make any 
A 
statement in that regard. Thereafter, we enquired who would be 
in a position to obtain instructions from the State of Karnataka 
and Mr. Mohan and Mr. Raghupathy, appearing for the State sought 
some time to obtain instructions. As suggested by us, the matter 
was adjourned by half an hour and we took up the matter at 3 .20 
p.m. 
At 3.20 p.m., Mr. M.R. Naik, learned Advocate General 
forthe State ofKarnataka has filed a note which reads as follows: 
"In response to the Hon'ble Court's query and in view of the 
Hon'ble Court suggesting that the pending !As and objections 
to the Supervisory Committee's recommendations cannot be 
heard before 18th October, 2016 and taking into account the · 
drinking water requirement in the State, it wil 1 not be possible 
to release water at the inter state border Biligundlu, of a quantity 
not more than 1500 cusecs per day on an average limited for a 
period of 10 days from 7th October, to 16th October, 2016." 
Mr. Naik and Mr. Mohan submitted that from 5.09.2016 to 
30.09.2016, State ofKarnataka has released 17.5 TMC of water. 
B 
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The said aspect has been disputed by Mr. Naphade after obtaining 
instructions. According to him, the State ofKarnataka has released 
16.9 TMC of water. Learned senior counsel for the State of Tamil 
Nadu would submit that the State ofKarnataka is in deficit of 4.6
TMC of water forthe month of September and State ofKarnataka 
under the final order of the Tribunal is required·to give 22 TMC of 
water for the month of October. If the note of the State of 
Karnataka is taken into consideration, 3 .1 TMC of water will be 
F 
released between 1.10.2016 to 6.10.2016. The learned Advocate 
General submitted that he has filed the note after obtaining 
instructions. Mr. Nariman would contend that this Court should 
confine the release to the instructions obtained by the learned 
Advocate General as a real plight faced by the inhabitants of 
State of Karnataka. 
G 
Before we enter into the said arena, we think it appropriate 
to dwell upon the facet relating to have a report pertaining to the 
ground reality in both the States relating to the Cauvery basin. 
Mr. Rohtagi, learned Attorney General submitted that in paragraph 
15 of the IA No.18 of 2016, he has given certain suggestions. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016) 8 S.C.R. 
Paragraph 15 reads as follows : 
"(15) it is submitted that it would be in the fitness of things that a 
High Powered Technical Team is appointed by the Chairman of 
the Supervisory Committee who is the Secretary of the Ministry 
of Water Resources. The composition of the Technical Team 
would Shri G.S. Jha, Chairman/Member, Central Water 
Commission (CWC), Government of India (who would be the 
Chairman of the said Team), Shri Syed Masood Hussain, Member 
(CWC), Shri R.K. Gupta, Chief Engineer (CWC) and such other 
experts as decided by Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources in 
consultation with Chairman, CWC to proceed immediately to the 
site so that an inspection of the entire Basin is done for assessing 
the ground realities and prepare a report forthwith for being placed 
before this Hon'ble Court. 
This Technical Team will inspect the entire Basin, make an 
assessment of the entire issue, prepare a report forthwith within 
30 days thereof. 
lt is found that Karnataka has the following reservoirs: 
(i) 
Hemavathi 
(ii) 
Harangi 
(iii) 
Krishan Raj Sagar 
(iv) 
Kabini 
The State of Tamil nadu has the following two reservoirs: 
(i) 
Mettur 
(ii) 
Lower Bhavani Dam 
(iii) 
Amaravati" 
Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing for the State 
of Tamil Nadu submitted that he has no objection for the same but 
it should include a technical person from each of the State and the 
Chief Secretary of the
States. Mr. Naik, learned Advocate General 
for the State of l):arnataka also acceded to the same. In view of 
the aforesaid, we direct the.technical team headed by Mr. GS. 
Jha, Chairman, Central Water Commission (CWC), Government 
of India shall be constituted. It shall have, Shri Syed Masood 
Hussin, Member, CWC, Shri R.K. Gupta, Chief Engineer, CWC 
and a Chief Engineer or any competent authority nomim1ted by
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
511 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
the State of Karnataka and State of Tamil Nadu and the Chief A 
Secretaries or their nominee of both the States. Mr. G. Prakash, 
learned standing counsel for the State of Kerala submitted that a 
Chief Engineer shall also be included in the team. Mr. Nambiar, 
learned senior counsel appearing for the Union Territory of 
Puducherry also submitted that a Chief Engineer-from Puducherryc B 
shall also be included in the team. It is so directed. _They shall also 
be included in the team. 
The said team shall go to the area in question and submit a 
report relating to the ground reality before this Court on 17. I 0.2016. 
Needless to say, the report shall be served on the learned counsel 
C 
for the parties prior to that. 
Let the I.As. and appeals be listed on 18. l 0.2016. Needless 
to say, the I.As., objections thereto ari'd the report shall be 
considered on 18.10.2016. Registry is also directed to list the 
appeals on that day. 
As far as the interim arrangement is concerned till 
18.10.2016, we direct that the State ofKarnataka shall release 
2000 cusecs of water from 7.10.2016 till 18.10.2016." 
D 
3. On J 81h of October, 2016, the learned Attorney General being 
assisted by learned Additional Solicitor General filed the report of the 
E 
Committee which pertained to social aspects and technical aspects. It is 
worthy to note that the Committee had not suggested anything with regard 
to quantity of
water that could be released by the State ofKamataka. At 
that point of time, learned Attorney General submitteQ that the appeals, 
by special leave, preferred by the States, namely, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka 
and Kerala are not maintainable. The submission of Mr. Rohatgi was 
F 
echoed by Mr. A.S. Nambiar, learned senior counsel appearing for the 
Union Territory of Puducherry. In view of the aforc~aid submission, it 
was decided to hear the maintainability of the appeals and the interim 
order passed on earlier occasion was directed to be continued until further 
orders. The issue of maintainability ofappeals was heard and ultimately 
G 
the order was reserved. 
4. Mr. Rohatgi, while questioning the maintainability of the appeals 
by special leave, submitted thatArticle 262(2) of the Constitution read 
with Section 11 of the 1956 Act bars the jurisdiction of this Court to 
adjudicate upon any water dispute as defined under Section 2(c) of the H
512 
A 
B 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
1956 Act. Expatiating the said proponment, it is urged by him that Article 
262 begins with a non-obstante clause :md authorizes the Parliament to 
provide by law to exclude the jurisdiction of this Court or any other court 
in respect of a dispute or complaint that has been referred to in clause 
( l) of Article 262 and hence, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to 
decide anything that pertains to or emerges from water dispute. It is 
canvassed by him that the Court does not have power to deal with the 
!is either under Article 131 or Article 32 of the Constitution and, therefore, 
it cannot entertain an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the 
Constitution oflndia that assails the final order of the tribunal. To bolster 
the aforesaid proposition, he has commended us to th.e authorities in In 
C 
Re: Cauvery Water Dispute Tribuna/1, State of Karnataka v. State 
of A.P. and Ors.=, State of Haryana v. State of Punjab and Anr. 3, 
State of Himaclial Pradesh v. Union of India and Ors.•, Tamil Nadu 
Cau·very Neerppasana Vilaiporulgal Vivasayigal Na/a Urinlai 
Padliugappu Sangam v. Union of India and Ors. 5, Narmada 
D 
Baclwo Andolan v. Union of India and Ors. 6, M ul/aperiyar 
Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India and Ors. 7, Atma 
Linga Reddy & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.8, Networking of 
Rivers, In Re9, State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka and Ors. 
witlt Union Territory of Pondicl1erry v.
State of Karnataka and Ors. JO. 
5. It is further propounded by Mr. Rohatgi that the 1956 Act framed 
E 
by Parliament is a complete code in itself and ifthe scheme of the said 
Act is scrutinized and appreciated in proper perspective, it is clear as 
crystal that this Court has no jurisdiction to exercise the appellate power 
by granting leave. The said submission is sought to be pyramided by 
placing reliance on Section 6(2) of the 1956 Act which provides that 
F 
decision of the tribunal after its publication in the Official Gazette by the 
Central Government shall have the force of an order or decree of the 
Supreme Court. Elucidating the said aspect, it is contended by him that 
1 1993 supp (I) sec 96 (2) 
2 (2000) 9 sec 572 
G , (2002) 2 sec 501 
• (20ll) n sec 344 
' (1990) 3 sec 440 
• (2000) 1 o sec 664 
1 (2006) 3 sec 643 
• (2008) 1 sec 788 
• (2012) 4 sec $1 
H 
''' ( 1991) Supp (I) sec 240 
~
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
513 
rDIPAK MISRA, J.] 
once the statutory provision postulates that the award has the same 
A 
force as that of the decree of this Court, there cannot be an appeal 
assailing the same, for the simon pure reason that the concept of intra-
court appeal is alien to the adjudicatory process of this Comt and remotely 
not conceived of under the constitutional scheme or by any precedent. 
For the said purpose, he has drawn inspiration from the authority in 
Rupa As/wk H urra v. As/wk H wra & Anr. 11 • 
6. Mr. Nari man, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of 
Karnataka resisting the submissions of the learned Attorney General 
has referred us to the Draft Constitution dated 21.02.1948 prepar~d by 
the Drafting Committee which contained the progenitor of Article 136 
of the Constitution; the Constituent Assembly debates pertaining to Article 
112( l) and (2); history of Article 262 and submitted that the protective, 
preclusive or ouster clauses are not unknown to the legislature and the 
legislature has frequently used the provisions for restricting or eliminating 
power of judicial review, but the judicial pronouncements in this country 
B 
c 
are consistent that the jurisdiction of the courts of superior jurisdiction 
D 
are unaffected by such provisions. The learned senior counsel has referred 
to many authors and tests to highlight the principle that the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court is guaranteed by the
constitutional provisions, and 
the exclusion ofitsjurisdiction is notto be easily infen-ed. It is propounded 
by Mr. Nariman that the decisions upon which reliance has been placed 
by the learned Attorney General lead to the indubitable conclusion that 
E 
only in respect of the original dispute or complaint, the jurisdiction of the 
courts including the Supreme Court under Article 131 stands excluded, 
but do not in any manner affect the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court 
under Article 136 of the Constitution. He has placed heavy reliance on 
the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of F 
Karnataka and Ors. with Union Territory of P01u/ic/1erry v. State of 
Karnataka and Ors. (supra) to strengthen uie stance that the Comt 
has clearly expressed the opinion that an appeal by special leave under 
Article 136 of the Constitution is available to the party aggrieved by an 
order of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal and hence, the plea of 
maintainability has no space for any kind of debate. According to the 
G 
learned seni~r counsel, plentitude of power under Article 136 of the 
- Constitution has been authoritatively stated by the Constitution Bench in 
Durga S/tankar Mehta v. Thakur Raglturaj Singlt and Ors. 12 and 
11 (2002) 4 sec 388 
12 1955 (I) SCR 267: AIR 1954 SC 520 
H
514 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016) 8 S.C.R. 
A further in Assoc;iated Cement Companies Ltd v. P.N. Sllarma 13, Jose 
Da Costa and Anr. v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcomim and Ors.
1 ~. 
Arunacllalam v. P.S.R. Sadllanantllam and Anr. i;, P.S.R. 
Sadlianantliam v. Arunacflalam and 
Anr. 16, Union Carbide 
Corporation and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.11, Praslwnt 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
Ramacliandra Deshpande v. Maruti Ba/aram Haibatti 18, Malzendra 
Saree Emporium (II) v. G V. Srinivasa Murtlzy 19, U. Sree v. U. 
Srinivas~
0 and Mathai v. George and Anr. ~
1 and the exercise of the 
said power by the Court has not been curtailed by the original 
constitutional provision, that is, Article 262 and could not have been 
crippled by any statutory provision and, in fact, has not been taken away 
by the 1956 Act, for it has its source in Article 262 which does not so 
envisage. 
7. In reply to the submission pertaining to Section 6(2) of the 1956 
Act that the final order by the tribunal once published in the Gazette has 
the force of an order or decree of this Court, it is argued by him that the 
said provision, by no means, deprives this Court to interfere with such 
decision by way of appeal by special leave because it is a decision rendered . 
by the tribunal and a tribunal always remains a tribunal, for all purposes, 
and it is impossible to draw the inference that it ousts the jurisdiction of 
this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. According to him, 
acceptance of such a
stand would tantamount to rewriting Article 136 
itself. Elucidating further, Mr. Nariman contends that Section 6(2) has 
been inserted by the Amending Act 14 of2002 with effect from 06.08.2002 
to give teeth to the final order of the tribunal in accordance with the 
~arkaria Commission's recommendations given in its report on Center-
State Relations, 1980. That apart, submits learned senior counsel that it 
is the settled principle oflaw that even when there is a legal fiction, like 
a deeming provision, the interpretation of the said provision should not 
go beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created or expand the 
horizon which it was never meant to reach. For reinforcing the contention, 
" (1965) 2 SCR 366 
G 
1'(1976)2SCC917 
" ( 1979) (2) sec 297 
1' (1980) 3 sec 141 
11 (1991) 4 sec 584 
1• ( 1995) Supp (2) sec 539 
1' (2005) 1 sec 481 
20 (2013)2 sec 114 
H 
11 (2010) 4 sec 358
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
515 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
reliance has been placed on Aneeta Hada v. God/allier Travels and A 
Tours Private Limited'-" and State of Uttar Pradesli v. Hari-Ram"3• 
8. Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of 
Tamil Nadu has submitted that in Article 262(2) of the Constitution as 
well as in Section 11 of the 1956 Act, the words used are "in respect of 
any dispute" and the ouster clause is to the effect that "no court including 
B 
the Supreme Court shall exercise the jurisdiction in respect of such dispute 
or complaint" and the ouster of jurisdiction of this Court is limited and by 
no stretch of imagination it allows any room for expansion. It is put forth 
by him that under Article 136 power of judicial review is conferred on 
this Court by the Constitution oflegislative action, judicial decision and 
administrative action and the said power of judicial review is the basic 
feature of the Constitution which cannot be curtailed by a statutory 
provision as enshrined under Sections 6(2) and 11 of the 1956 Act. For 
c 
the aforesaid purpose, learned senior counsel has commended us to the 
authorities in L. Chandra- Kumar v. Union of India and Ors."\ 
Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.=;, Kiiloto 
D 
Hollo/ion v. Zac/1illm and Ors."6, M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of 
India and Ors."7 and Nabam Rebia am/ Bamang Felix v. Dy. 
Speaker, Arunacllal Prades/i Legislative Assembly and Ors."8•
E 
9. It is further contended by Mr. Naphade that the tribunal is 
bound by the Constitution and rule oflaw and denial of powerof judicial 
review to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution would be an 
obstruction in the process ofadjudication and justifiable decision making 
process, for it is the duty of the tribunal to render a decision which 
should be made by application of established principles oflaw, namely, 
adherence to principles of natural justice, good conscience, absence of 
arbitrariness, just and appropriate appreciation of evidence on record, 
F 
showing respect for precedents, demonstrable ratiocination that would 
show application of mind and in such an adjudicatory process, it is 
inconceivable that the founding fathers of the Constitution had 
contemplated creation of a tribunal with unguided, uncontrolled or 
22 (2012) s sec 661 
" (2013) 4 sec 280 
"(1997) 3 sec 261 
" ( 1980) 3 sec 625 
· "(1992) 1sec309 
21 (2006) 8 sec 212 
"(2016) 8 sec 1 
G 
H
516 
A 
B 
c 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
uncanalised judicial powers. He has anchored on the authority P. 
Sambamurtlly and Ors. v. State of Andllra Prmle~·fl and Anr. "9 to 
bolster the proposition that it is a basic principle of rule of law that exercise 
of power by any authority must not only be conditioned by the Constitution 
but must also be in accordance with law and that power of judicial review 
is conferred by the Constitution with a view to ensure that the supremacy 
oflaw is sustained. It is further put forth by him that the tribunal which 
is constituted under Section 4 of the 1956 Act is not a constitutional 
functionary as contemplated by th~ Constitution and, therefore, the 
argument on behalf of the Union oflndia that Article 262 being a part of 
the original Constitution, any law made under Article 262 can oust the 
jurisdiction of this Court including the power of judicial review ur.der 
A1iicle 136 is wholly untenable. It is additionally expounded in this regard 
that "there is a qualitative difference between the provisions of the 
Constitution and the law made under the Constitution. For the aforesaid 
purpose, he has drawn inspiration from c_ertain passages from Nabam 
0 
Rebia (supra). 
E 
F 
IO. Mr. Naphade has scanned the anatomy of the 1956 Act to 
substantiate that the legal fiction contemplated under Section 6(2) of the 
1956 Act operates only with regard to the execution of the decision of 
the tribunal which has the same force as
an order or decree of this 
Court and cannot be allowed to travel beyond the same. Developing the . 
said argument, it is astutely urged by him that the provision under Section 
6(2) has to be understood in the limited sense, that is, the decision has to 
be enforced as a decree of this Court as per the rules framed by this 
Court, but that does not create an impediment to entertain an appeal by 
special leave and further such kind of curtailment of power of judicial 
review is not provided for under Article 262 of the Constitution. Learned 
senior counsel would contend that a procedural power for implementation 
cannot be equated with the substantive exercise of power or 
reexamination or review of the correctness of the decision of the tribunal, 
and if such an interpretation is placed, the said provision of the 1956 Act 
would become unconstitutional. He has referred us to a passage from 
G Interpretation of Statutes by G.P. Singh (12'h Edition, Pg 381) and relied 
upon Kilwta Hol/ollon (supra). 
11. Keeping in view the aforesaid submissions raised at the Bar, it 
is necessary to have a keen scrutiny of the Articles of the Constitution 
H 
"'(1987) 1sec362
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
517 
roIPAK MISRA, J.l 
that have been referred to by the learned Attorney General for Union of A 
India and the learned senior counsel for the Union Territory of Puducherry 
to support the stand that an appeal by special leave is not maintainable 
or this Court has no jurisdiction under any Article of the Constitution to 
entertain any proceeding pertaining to a dispute or complaint as regards 
the use, distribution or control of the waters or in any inter-State river or 
B 
river valley, and the arguments advanced in oppugnation by the learned 
senior counsel for the States involved. 
12. Article 131 defines the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court which reads as follows:-
" 131 . Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Subject to the' c 
provisions of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall, to the 
exclusion ofany other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute 
(a)between the Government oflndia and one or more States; or 
(b) between the Government oflndia and any State or States on 
one side and one or more other States on the other; or ( c) between 
D 
two or more States, if and in so far as the dispute involves any 
question (whether oflaw or fact) on which the existence or extent 
of a legal right depends: Provided that the said jurisdiction shall 
not extend to a dispute arising out of any treaty, agreement, 
covenant, engagements, and or other similar instrument_ which, 
E 
having been entered
into or executed before the commencement 
of this Constitution, continues in operation after such 
commencement, or which provides that the saidjurisdiction shall 
not extend to such a dispute." 
[Emphasis supplied] 
13. At a later part ofour decision, we shall delve into the authorities 
that have dealt with the said provision to appreciate the purpose, impact 
and the ambit of the same, but it is suffice to say at this stage that the 
power under Article 131 of the Constitution, subject to the other provisions 
of the Constitution, can be exercised in respect of any original dispute. 
14. At this stage, it is essential to understand the constitutional 
scheme as regards the conferment of power on the judiciary. Art1cles 
F 
G 
132 to 134(2) deal with appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeal 
from High Courts in certain cases, appellate jurisdiction of Supreme 
Court in appeal from High Courts in case of civil matters and appellate 
' 
H
518 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
jurisdiction of Supreme Court with regard fo criminal matters. To have 
a complete picture, the aforesaid three Articles are reproduced below:-
. 
, 
"132. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from 
High Courts in certain cases ( 1 )An appeal shall lie to the Supreme 
Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in 
B 
the territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, 
if the High Court certifies under Article 134-A that the case 
involves a substantial question oflaw as to the interpretation of 
this Constitution. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
(2) Omitted 
(3) Where such a certificate is given, any party in the case may 
appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that any such question 
as aforesaid has been wrongly decided. 
Explanation- For the purposes of this article, the expression "final 
order" includes an order declaring an issue which, if decided in 
favour of the appellant, would be sufficient for the final disposal 
of the case 
133. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High 
Courts in regard to civil matters 
(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, 
decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a J:Iigh Court in the 
territory oflndia ifthe High Court certifies under Article 134-A 
(a) that the case involves a substantial question oflaw of general 
importance; and 
(b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question
needs to 
-be decided by the Supreme Court 
(2)Notwithstanding anything in Article 132, any party appealing 
to the Supreme Court under clause (1) may urge as one of the 
grounds in such appeal that a substantial question oflaw as to the 
interpretation of this Constitution has been wrongly decided 
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, no appeal shall, unless 
Parliament by law otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court 
from the judgment, decree or final order of one Judge of a High 
Court. 
134. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal 
matters 
( 1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
519 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of A 
a High Court in the territory of India ifthe High Court-
(a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused 
person and sentenced him to death; or 
· 
(b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court 
subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the 
B 
accused person and sentenced him to deat.1,1; or 
( c) certifies under Article 134-A that the case is a fit one for 
appeal to the Supreme Court: 
Provided that an appeal under sub clause (c) shall lie subject to 
such provisions as may be made in that behalfunder clause ( 1) of c 
Article 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish 
or require 
(2) Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court any 
further powers to entertain and hear appeals from any judgment, 
final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in D 
the territory oflndia subject to such conditions and limitations as 
may be specified in such law. 
15. Article 134-A provides for Certificate for appeal to the Supreme 
Court by every High Court passing or making a judgment, decree, final 
order, or sentence, referred to in clause (1) of Article 132 or clause (1) 
of Article 133, or clause (1) of Article 134 either on its own motion, if it - E 
deems fit so and upon oral application made by or on behalf of the party 
aggrieved, immediately
after the passing or making of such judgment, 
decree, final order or sentence, after determination whether a certificate 
of the nature referred to in clause (I) of Article 132, or clause (1) of 
Article 133 or, as the case may be, sub-clause (c) ofclause (1) of Article 
F 
134, may be given in respect of that case. Article 135 states about 
jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court under any existing law to 
be exercisable by the Supreme Court. In the instant case, thi: controversy 
centres around Article 136. The said Article reads as follows:-
" 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court 
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court 
may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any 
judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause 
- ~or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory 
oflndia. 
G 
H
520 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
(2) Nothing in clause (l) shall apply to any judgment, determination, 
sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal 
constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces." 
16. The Draft Constitution of2 I .02. I 948 prepared by the Drafting 
Committee had the draft of Article I 09 and draft of Article 112. Draft 
B 
Article 109 after deliberation came in the shape of Article 131 and 
similarly, the draft Article 112 took the shape of Article 136. DraftAi:ticle 
109 read as follows:-
" 109. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Supreme 
Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have original 
c 
jurisdiction in any dispute:-
( a) 
between the Government of India and one or more States, 
or 
(b) 
between the Government oflndia and any State or States 
on one side and one or more other States on the other, or 
D 
(c) 
between two or more States. 
E 
F 
G 
H 
If in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law 
or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends: 
Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to-
(i) a dispute to which a State for the time being specified in Part 
III of the First Schedule is a party, ifthe dispute arises out of any 
provision of a treaty, agreement, engagement, sanad or other similar 
instrument which was entered into or executed before the date of 
commencement of this Constitution and has; or has been; 
continued in
operation after that date; 
(ii) a dispute to which any State is a party, ifthe dispute arises out 
of any provision of a treaty, agreement, engagement, sanad or 
other similar instrument which provides that the said jurisdiction 
shall not extend to such a dispute." 
17. The draft Article 112 was couched in the following language:-
~ 
. 
"112. The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave 
to appeal frpm any judgment, decree or final order in any cause 
or matter, passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory 
oflndia except the States for the time being specified in Part III 
of the First Schedule in cases where the provisions of article 110 
or article 111 of this Constitution do not apply."
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
521 
rDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
18. On 16.10.1949 draft Article 112 was substituted by a new 
A 
draft Article 112(1) and (2). Articles 112(1) and (2)which were adopted 
and added to the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly, read .as 
follows:-
"112(1) The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special 
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination sentence 
B 
or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or 
tribunal in the territory oflnd ia. 
(2) Nothing in Clause (1) of this article shall apply to any judgment, 
determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court of 
tribunal co'nstituted by or under any law relating to the Armed 
C 
Forces." 
19. Be it noted, on 16.10.1949 Clause (2) of Draft Article 112 
(Corresponding to Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950) was 
added to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court any 
determination, sentence ororder passed or made by any Court or tribunal 
D 
constituted under any law related to the armed forces. 
20. While moving the alteration, Mr. T.K. Krishnamachari spoke:-
"'The reason for introducing these two new amendments is the 
view expressed by the Defence Ministry that such protection is 
necessary in respect of the decisions of courts-martial which deal 
E 
with the Armed Forces and the analogy of what obtains in other 
countries was brought before us. We therefore felt there was a 
case for putting in a, provision of
this nature in articl.es 112 and 
203." 
21. In his speech to Constituent Assembly Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 
F 
(on 16.10.1949) explained why Clause 2 was added in Draft Article 
112:-
"This question is not merely a theoretical question but is a question 
of great practical moment because it involves the discipline of the 
Armed Forces. If there is anything with regard to the armed forces, 
G 
it is the necessity of maintaining discipline. The Defence Ministry 
feel that if a member of the armed forces can look up either to the 
Supreme Court or to the High Co mt for redress against any decision 
which has been taken by a Court or tribunal constituted for the 
purpose of maintaining discipline in the armed forces, discipline 
H
522 
A 
B 
c 
D 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016) 8 S.C.R. 
would vanish. I must say that that is an argument against which 
there is no reply. That is why clause (2) has been added in article 
112 by this particular amendment and a similar provision is made 
in the provisions relating to the powers of superintendence of the 
High Courts. That is my justification why it is now proposed to 
put in clause (2) of article 112." 
22. With this background, Article 136 has been given the shape as 
it is found in the Constitution today. Article 32 of the Constitution, which 
occurs in Part III, deals with fundamental rights. It provides for remedies 
for enforcement of the rights conferred by the said Part of the 
Constitution. The said Article reads as follows:-
"32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part 
(I) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate 
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this 
Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or 
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever 
may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights 
conferred by this Part. 
(3) Without prejudice to tht: powers conferred on the Supreme 
Court by clauses (I) and (2), Parliament may by law empower 
any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction 
all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme
Court under 
clause (2). 
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended 
F 
except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution." 
23. This Court, interpreting the broad canvas of Article 32 of the 
Constitution, has ruled that it is the duty of the Supreme Court to provide 
a protective umbrella for the sustenance of the fundamental rights of the 
citizens oflndia. It is the sacred duty of the Court to see thatthe citizens 
G 
who follow the path of law are protected from those who engage 
themselves in such activities by which other's fundamental rights are 
jeopardized. 
24. In LR. Coelho (dead) by LRS. v. State of T.N. 30 the larger 
Bench has held that the judiciary is the best institution to protect 
H '" (2007) 2 sec 1
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
523 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
fondamental rights, given its independent nature and also because it 
A 
involves interpretation based on the assessment of values besides textual 
interpretation. It enables application of the principles of justice and law. 
It has also been laid down therein that the role of the judiciary is to 
protect fundamental rights. A modern democracy is based on the twin 
principles of majority rule and the need to protect fundamental rights. 
B 
The Court has referred to the statem'ent of principle that lays down that 
it is the job of the judiciary to balance the principles ensuring that the 
Government on the basis of number does not override fundamental rights. 
25. We have referred to the aforesaid authority to show how the 
Constitution has conferred the power on this Court under Article 32 to 
protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It would not be out of C 
place to mention here that various Articles occurring in Part III of the 
Constitution have been bestowed the extended meaning through 
interpretative process to fructify the constitutional obligations because 
the provisions in the Constitution have to be understood and interpreted 
keeping in view the social progress, economic growth of environment of D 
law and the global development oflaw. Protection offundamental rights 
as a concept cannot remain static. They grow by encompassing a rainbow 
of views that advocate new rights that the
globe perceives. But the 
authority conferred under Article 32 has its limitations when the !is under 
Article 262 emerges. It is interesting to note that the Constitution has not 
provided machinery for resolution of the disputes in the Constitution but 
E 
has empowered the Parliament to make laws to provide to exclude the 
power of the Supreme Court or any other court with regard to jurisdiction 
in respect of complaints or disputes that find mention in Article 262( 1 ). 
The 1956 Act bars the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 of the 
Constitution. In spite of the same, there is certain scope for exercise of F 
jurisdiction. In this context, we may refer to certain authorities. 
26. In State of Orissa v. Government of India andAnr. 31 Kabir, J. 
(as His Lordship then was) taking note of the fact that though a complaint 
had been made by the State of Orissa, yet the Central Government had 
not taken any action in the matter and further considering the facts in 
G 
issue, opined that the controversy that had arisen between the States of 
Orissa and Andhra Pradesh must be held to be a "water dispute" within 
the meaning of Section 2( c )(i) of the 1956 Act which refers to any dispute 
between two or more State Government!> with regard to use, distribution 
" t2009) s sec 492 · 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
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-- ·' 
A 
or control of the waters of, or in, any inter-State river or river valley. 
B 
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E 
F 
G 
H 
The issue arose relating to the power of the Court to pass interim order 
inasmuch the tribunal had not yet been constituted. Analyzing the law, 
the learned Judge opined thus:-
"49. Coming to the question of grant of interim order during the 
interregnum, I am satisfied that unless some interim protection is 
given till the constitution of the Water Disputes Tribunal by the 
Central Government, the objection raised by the State of Orissa 
will be rendered infructuous, which certainly is not the intention 
of the 1956 Act. 
50. Notwithstanding the powers vested by Section 9 oftheAct in · 
the Water Disputes Tribunal to be constituted by the Central 
Government under Section 4, which includes the power to grant 
the interim order, this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution 
has ample jurisdiction to pass interim orders preserving the status 
quo till a Tribunal is constituted which can then exercise its powers 
under Section 9. 
51. The bar under Section 11 of the Act will come into play once 
the Tribunal is constituted and the water dispute is referred to the 
said Tribunal. Ti II then, the bar of Section 11 cannot operate, as 
that would leave a party without any remedy till such time as the 
Tribunal is formed, which may be delayed." 
Katju, J. concurred with the opinion given by Kabir, J. though he 
added
certain other aspects. 
27. The purpose of referring to the said decision is that this Court 
has exercised the power under Article 32 to issue certain interim directions 
as the tribunal was not constituted. The said directions are as under:-
"52. I, accordingly, allow the writ petition and direct the Central 
Government to constitute a Water Disputes Tribunal with in a period 
of six months from the date and to refer to it the dispute relating 
to the construction of the Side Channel Weir and Flood Flow Canal 
Project at Katragada on River Vansadhara by the State of Andhra 
Pradesh for diversion of the waters of the said river which could 
adversely affect the supply of water from the said river to the 
State of Orissa. 
53. I also direct that pending constitution of the Water Disputes
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
525 
rmPAK MISRA? J.l 
Tribunal and reference of the above dispute. to it, the State of A 
Andhra Pradesh will maintain status quo as of date with regard to 
the construction of the side channel weir and the flood flow canal 
at Katragada. Once the Tribunal is constituted the patties wi II be 
free to apply for further interim orders before the Tribunal." 
28. At this juncture, we may hasten to add that we have referred 
to the aforesaid authority only for the sake of stating how and under 
what circumstances the Court had exercised jurisdiction under Article 
32 of the Constitution. And nothing more. 
29. In this context, it is seemly to refer to the authority Networking 
of Rivers; In Re (supra) wherein a three-Judge Bench was dealing 
with a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking the 
relief for issue of an appropriate writ, order or direction, more particularly 
a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 therein 
to take appropriate steps/action to nationalize all the rivers in the country. 
That apart, further directions were also sought. Interpreting Article 262 
of the Constitution, the Court held:-
"66 .... Under the constitutional scheme, there is a clear 
demarcation of fields of operation and jurisdiction between the 
legislature, judiciary and the executive. The legislature may save 
unto itself the power to make certain specific legislations not only 
governing a
field of its legislative competence as provided in the 
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, but also regarding a particular 
dispute referable to one of the articles itself. Article 262 of the 
Constitution is one of such powers .... " 
Further elaborating the said Article, the three-Judge Bench 
observed:-
"67 .... Parliament can reserve to itself, the power to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts, including the highest Court of the land, in 
·relation to a water dispute as stated under this article. The 
jurisdiction of the Court will be ousted only with regard to the 
adjudication of the dispute and not all matters incidental thereto. 
For example, the Supreme Court can certainly direct the Central 
Government to fulfil its statutory obligation under Section 4 of the 
Act, which is mandatory, without deciding any water dispute 
between the States .... " 
And again:-
B 
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"68. One of the possible views taken with regard to Article 262 is 
that the use of expression "may" in the Constitution does not 
indicate a clear legislative intent, thus, it may be possible that 
Section 11 of the Act could refer only to such disputes as are 
already referred to a Tribunal and which are outside the purview 
of the courts. Once a specific adjudicatory mechanism is created, 
that machinery comes into operation with the creation of the 
Tribunal and probably, then alone will the Court's jurisdiction be 
ousted. 
· 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
71. The River Boards Act, 1956 was enacted by Parliament under 
List I Entry 56. The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act was 
also enacted with reference to the same entry. Whereas the 
mandate of the latter is to provide a machinery for the settlement 
of disputes, the former is an Act to establish boards for the 
regulation and development of inter-State river basins, through 
advice and coordination, and thereby to reduce the friction amongst 
the States concerned. It is this kind of coordination which is 
required to be generated at all levels to implement the Interlinking 
of Rivers Programme; as proposed. Huge amounts of public money 
have been spent at the planning stage itselfand it will be a travesty 
of good governance and the epitome of harm to public interest, if 
these projects are not carried forward with a sense of sincerity 
and a desire for its
completion. 
72. In a more recent judgment of this Court in State of Karnataka 
v. State of A.P. (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court took 
the view that in Section 11 of the Act, the expression "use, 
distribution and control of water in any river" are the keywords in 
determination of the scope of power conferred on a Tribunal 
constituted under Section 3 of the Act. If a matter fell outside the 
scope of these three crucial words, the power of Section 11 in 
ousting the jurisdiction of the courts in respect ofany water dispute, 
which is otherwise to be referred to the Tribunal, would not have 
any manner of application. The test of maintainability of a legal 
action initiated by a State in a court would thus be, whether the 
issues raised therein are referable to a Tribunal for adjudication 
of the manner of use, distribution anri ..,.:;;itrol ofwater." 
[Emphasis supplied]
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
527 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
30. This is how this Court has perceived the test of maintainability A 
of an action initiated by a State in the context of Article 32 of the 
Constitution to sustain a legal action before this Court, that is, the tis 
must fall outside the scope of Section 11 of the 1956 Act. 
31. Presently, let us proceed to analyse what has been precisely 
conveyed under A1ticle 262 of the Constitution. Article 262 comes under 
B 
Part XI of the Constitution that deals with relations between the Union 
and the States. Chapter I of Part XI provides for legislative relations and 
Chapter II deals with administrative relations. Article 262 comes under 
Chapter II and it comes under the heading "Dispute relating to waters". 
The said Article reads as follows:-
"262. Adjudication of disputes relating to waters of inter-State 
rivers or river valleys.-
( I) Parliament may by law provide for the adjudication of any 
dispute or complaint with respect to the use, distribution or control 
c 
of the waters of, or in, any inter-State river or river valley 
D 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may 
by law provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court 
shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint 
as is referred to in clause ( 1 )." 
32. The said Article, as the written submissions of Mr. Nariman 
would reflect, has a history. Draft Articles 239 to 242
(Interference 
with Water Supplies) of the Draft Constitution prepared by the Draft 
Committee on 21.02.1948 were somewhat similar to the provisions of 
Sections 130 to 133 (with some alterations) of the Government oflildia 
Act, 1935. They provided for: 
"(a) Complaints as to Interference with Water supplies by the 
Government of any State specified in Part I or Part III of the First 
Schedule regarding Executive action or legislation taken or passed 
or proposed to be taken or passed with respect to use, distribution 
or control of water; 
(b) Such complaints were to be lodged with the President oflndia; 
(c) If the President received such complaints he was· authorized 
to appoint a Commission consisting of persons having special 
knowledge and experience in irrigation, engineering, etc., to 
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investigate the complaint; 
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( d) The Commission would investigate the matter referred to them 
and present to the President a Report setting out the facts as 
found by them and making recommendations as they think proper; 
(e) "If upon consideration of the Commission's Report the 
President was of the opinion that anything therein contained 
involved a substantial question oflaw, he was obliged to refer the 
question to the Supreme Court, ("shall refer") under Draft Article 
119 (now Article 143 of the Constitution), and on receipt of the 
Opinion of the Supreme Court thereon, the President would return 
the Report to the Commission together with the opinion on the 
substantial question of law by the Supreme Court and the 
Commission had to thereupoh make ("shall make") such 
modifications in the Report as were necessary to bring it in accord 
with the opinion of the Supreme Court and present the Report so 
modified to the President; 
(t) Effects had to be given in any State to any order made by the 
President and any act of the Legislature of a State repugnant to 
the Presidential order would be, to the extent of repugnancy, void; 
and 
(g) "Notwithstanding anything in the Constitution neither the 
Supreme Court nor any other Court would have jurisdiction to 
entertain any action or suit in respect of any matter if action in 
respect of that matter might have been taken under any of the 
preceding Articles by the Government ofa State
or the President." 
33. The actual Articles in the Draft Constitution prepared by the 
Drafting Committee on 21.02.1948 read as follows:-
"239. If it appears to the Government of any State for the time 
being specified in Part I or Part III of the First Schedule that the 
Interests of that State, or of any of the inhabitants thereof, in the 
water from any natural source of supply in any State have been 
or are likely to be affected prejudicially by-
( a) any executive action or legislation taken or passed, or proposed 
to be taken or passed; or 
\b) the failure of any authority to exercise any of their powers; 
With respect to the use, distribution or control of water from that
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
529 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
source, the Government of the State may complain to the 
A 
President. 
240. (I) If the President receives such a complaint as aforesaid, 
he shall, unless he is of opinion that the issues involved are not of 
sufficient importance to warrant such action, appoint a Commission 
consisting of such persons having special knowledge and B 
experience in irrigation, engineering, administration, finance or law 
as he thinks fit, and request that Commission to investigate in 
accordance with such instructions as he may give to them, and to 
report to him on the matters to which_ the complaint relates, or 
such of those matters as he may refer to thein. 
(2) A Commission so appointed shall investigate the matters 
referred to them and present t.o the President a report setting out 
the facts as found by them and making such recommendations as 
they think proper. 
· 
c 
(3) If it appears to the President upon consideration of the 
D 
Commission's report that anything therein contained requires 
explanation, or that he needs guidance upon any point not originally 
referred by him to the Commission, he may again refer the matter 
to the Commission for further investigation and a further report. 
(4) For the purposes of assisting a Commission appointed under 
E 
this Article in investigating any matters referred to them, the 
Supreme Court, of requested by the Commission so to do, shall 
make such orders for the
purposes of the proceedings of the 
Commission as they may make in the exercise of the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
( 5) The report of the Commission shall include a recommendation 
as to the Government or persons by whom the expenses of the 
Commission and ariy costs incurred by any State or persons in 
appearing before the Commission are to be paid and as to the 
amount of ariy expenses or costs to be paid; and an order made 
F 
by the President under this article, in so far as it relates to expensed 
G 
or costs, may be enforced as if it were· an order made by the 
Supreme Court. 
( 6) After considering any report made to him by the Comm.is.sion 
the President shall, subject as hereinafter provided, make orders 
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in accordance with the report. 
(7) "If upon consideration of the Commission's report the President 
is of the opinion that anything therein contained involves a 
substantial question of law he shall refer the question to the 
Supreme Court under Article 119 of this Constitution and on receipt 
of the opinion of the Supreme Court thereon shall, unless the 
Supreme Court has agreed with the Commission's report, return 
the report to the Commission together with the opinion and the 
Commission shall thereupon make such modifications in the report 
as may be necessary to bring it in accord with such opinion and 
present the report as so modified to the President." 
(8) Effect shall be given, if any State affected, to any order made 
under this article by the President, and any Act of the Legislature 
of a State which is repugnant to the order shall, to the extent of 
the repugnancy, be void. 
(9) The President, on application made to him by the Government 
of any State affected, may at any time, if a Commission appointed 
as aforesaid so recommend, vary any order made under this 
article. 
241. If it appears to the President that the interests of any State 
for the time being specified in Part II of the First Schedule, or of 
any of the inhabitants of such a State, in the water from any 
natural source of supply in any State for the time being specified 
in Part I or III of the First Schedule have been or are likely
to be 
affected prejudicially by-
(a) any executive action or legislation taken or passed, or proposed 
to be taken or passed; or 
(b) the failure of any authority to exercise any of their powers; 
With respect to the use, distribution or control of water from that 
source, he may, ifhe thinks fit, refer the matter to a Commission 
G 
appointed in accordance with the provisions of the last preceding 
article and thereupon those provisions shall apply as ifthe State 
for the time being specified in Part II of the First.Schedule were 
a State for the time being specified in Part I of that Schedule and 
as if a complaint with respect to the matter had been made by the 
Government of that State to the President. 
H
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
531 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
242. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, neither the 
A 
Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction to 
entertain any action or suit in respect of any matter, if action in 
respect of that matter might have been taken under any of the 
three last proceedings articles by the Government of a State or 
the President." 
34. This is how Article 262 took the present shape and was 
incorporated in the Constitution. The question that emanates for 
consideration is whether the language employed under Article 262 intends 
to oust the jurisdiction of this Court on all scores and counts. At the 
outset, it has to be kept in mind that the said Article is a part of the 
original Constitution and, therefore, the question which requires to be 
posed is whether the framers of the Constitution have used the express 
vehicle oflanguage in this Article so as not to bestow any power on the 
courts including the Supreme Court. The submission of the learned 
Attorney General is that it being a part of the original Constitution and 
B 
c 
the founding fathers having thought it apposite not to confer such power 
D 
on the Supreme Court, the law relating to basic structure or judicial 
review would not apply as jurisdiction or authority has not been conferred 
at the commencement of the Constitution. As indicated earlier, Mr. 
Nariman and Mr. Naphade appearing for the States of Karnataka and 
Tamil
Nadu respectively would contend that it is neither the intention of 
the founding fathers of the Constitution nor the language employed in 
E 
the said Article even remotely so suggest that the architects of the 
Constitution had ever intended that a final order passed by a tribunal 
created by the Parliament for adjudication would be free from challenge 
and remain absolutely immune from assail. 
35. In this backdrop, it is necessary to peruse and analyse the 
F 
authorities cited by the learned counsel for the parties. The Constitution 
Bench in In Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (supra) was dealing 
with the reference made by the President under Article 143 of the 
Constitution wherein three questions were referred for the opinion of 
this Court. As the factual matrix would show, in pursuance of direction 
G 
given by this Court in Tamil Nmlu Cauvery Neerppasmw Vilaiporulgal 
Vivasayigal Nafa Urimai Padliugappu Sangam (supra) the Union 
Government by its notification dated 02.06.1990 constituted the Cauvery 
Water Dispute Tribunal and by notification of even date referred to it the 
water dispute emerging from Tamil Nadu's LetterofRequest dated July 
6, 1986. The State of Tamil Nadu sought interim relief from the tribunal 
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[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
and the interim relief claimed was that the State ofKarnataka be directed 
not to impound or utilize water of Cauvery river beyond the extent 
impounded or utilised by them as on May 31, 1972. An application was 
filed by the Union Territory of Pondicherry (as it was then) seeking a 
direction from the tribunal to direct both the Kamataka and Tamil Nadu 
B 
to release the water already agreed to during the months of September 
· to March. The tribunal considered simultaneously both the applications 
for interim relief and directed the States to file their respective counter 
statements and replies to the statements of case filed in the main dispute. 
Before the disputant States could submit their statements in the case, 
c 
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the tribunal heard the application for interim reliefs since Tamil Nadu 
had filed an application to direct Karnataka as an emergent measure to 
release at least 20 TMC of water as the first instalment, pending final 
orders on their interimapplication. Besides contesting the application on 
merits, both Karnataka and Kerala raised a preliminary objection as 
regards the jurisdiction of the tribunal to entertirn the said application 
and to grant any interim relief. Preliminary objection was that the tribunal 
constituted under the 1956 Act had a limited jurisdiction and it had no 
inherent powers as an ordinary civil court has and there was no provision 
of law which authorized or conferred
jurisdiction on the tribunal to grant 
any interim relief. The tribunal heard the parties both on the preliminary 
objection and on merits and eventually came to hold that it could not 
entertain the said applications for grant of interim relief as they were not 
maintainable in law and resultantly, dismissed the same. 
Being 
dissatisfied, the State of Tamil Nadu approached this Court by means of 
special leave petitions which were later on converted i1ito Civil Appeals. 
The Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kammaka and Ors. 
with U11io11 Territor31 of Pondicllerry v. State of Kamataka and Ors. 
(supra) referred to Article 262 of the Constitution and Section 11 of the 
1956 Act and in that context, ruled that:-
"12. A perusal of the above provisions leaves no manner of doubt 
that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, Parliament is 
authorised by law to provide that neither the Supreme Court nor 
any other court shall exercise jurisdiction in respect ofany dispute 
or complaint relating to the use, distribution or control of the waters 
of, or in, any interstate river or river valley. The dispute referred 
by the Central Government to the Tribunal under the Act relates 
to the above controversy and as such this Court has no jurisdiction 
to decide the merits of the dispute raised by the appellants and
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
533 
rmPAK MISRA, J.] 
pending before the Tribunal. The controversy, however raised by 
A 
the appellants in these appeals is that they had submitted the 
applications before the Tribunal for granting interim relief on the 
ground of emergency till the final disposal of the dispute and the 
Tribunal wrongly held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the 
same. The Tribunal is a statutory authority constituted under an 
B 
Act made by the Parliament and this Court has jurisdiction to 
decide the parameters, scope, authority and jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal. It is the judiciary i.e. the courts alone that have the 
function of determining authoritatively the meaning of a statutory 
enactment and to lay down the frontiers of jurisdiction of any 
body or Tribunal constituted under the statute." 
C 
And again:-
"14. In the dispute relating to river Cauvery itself an application 
under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed by the Tamil Nadu 
Cauvery Neerppasana Vilaiporulgal Vivasayigal Nala Urimal 
Padhugappu Sangam which was said to be a society registered 
D 
under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act asking this Court 
for direction to the Union oflndia to refer the dispute under Section 
4 of the Act and this Court in Tamil Nadu Cauvery Neerppasana 
Vilaiporulgal Vivasayigal Na/a Urimai Padhugappu Sangam 
v. Union of India (supra) allowed the petition and directed the 
Central Government to fulfil its statutory
obligation and notify in 
the official gazette the constitution of an appropriate tribunal for 
the adjudication of the water dispute. 
15. Thus, we hold that this Court is the ultimate interpreter of the 
provisions of the Interstate Water Disputes Act, 1956 and has an 
authority to decide the limits, powers and the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal constituted under the Act. This Court has not only the 
po;wer but obligation to decide as to whether the Tribunal has any 
jurisdiction ornot under the Act, to entertain any interim application 
till it finally decides the dispute referred to it. There is thus no 
force in the above argument raised by Dr Y.S. Chitale. 
16. We would now examine the controversies raised on merits in 
these appeals. It was contended on behalf of the appellants before 
E 
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the Tribunal that it had jurisdiction to entertain these miscellaneous 
petitions for interim relief. Firstly, for the reason that when the 
Tribunal while exercising powers of granting interim relief it will 
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be only exercising 'incidental and ancillary powers', as the interim 
reliefs prayed for arise out of the water dispute which has been 
referred to the Tribunal. Secondly, under Article 262 of the 
Constitution of India, once the Parliament has enacted the Act 
providing foradj udication ofa dispute in regard to sharing of water 
ofCauvery Basin, no other court in the country has the jurisdiction 
to grant an interim relief and, as such, the Tribunal has the inherent 
powers to grant the interim relief, otherwise petitioners shall be 
left with no remedy for the enforcement of their rights. 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
22. The above passage clearly goes to show that the State of 
Tamil Nadu was claiming for an immediate relief as year after 
year, the realisation at Mettur was falling fast and thousands of 
acres in their ayacut in the basin were forced to remain fallow. It 
was specifically mentioned thatthe inordinate delay in solving the 
dispute is taken advantage of by the Government of Karnataka in 
extending their canal systems and their ayacut in the new projects 
and every day of delay is adding to the injury caused to their 
existing irrigation. The Tribunal was thus clearly wrong in holding 
that the Central Government had not made any reference for 
granting any interim relief. We are not concerned, whether the 
appellants are entitled or not, for any interim relief on merits, but 
we are clearly of the view
that the reliefs prayed by the appellants 
in their C.M.P. Nos. 4, 5 and 9 of 1990 clearly come within the 
purview of the dispute referred by the Central Goyernment under 
Section 5 of the Act. The Tribunal has not held that it had no 
incidental and ancillary powers for granting an interim relief, but it 
has refused to entertain the C.M.P. Nos. 4, 5 and 9 on the ground 
that the reliefs prayed in these applications had not been referred 
by the Central Government. In view of the above circumstances 
we think it is not necessary for us to decide in this case, the larger 
question whether a Tribunal constituted under the Interstate Water 
Disputes Act has any power or not to grant any interim relief. In 
the present case the appellants become entitled to succeed on the 
basis of the finding recorded by us in their favour that the reliefs 
prayed by them in their C.M.P. Nos. 4, 5 and 9 ofl990 are covered 
in the reference made by the Central Government." 
36. We have referred to the aforesaid decision in extenso as this 
H 
Court had allowed the appeals by holding that it had the authority to
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
535 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.l 
decide the limits, powers and the jurisdiction of the tribunal constituted A 
under the 1956 Act and further it held that not only this Court had the 
power but also obligation to decide as to whether the tribunal has any 
jurisdiction under the 1956 Act to entertain any interim relief till it finally 
decides the dispute referred to it. 
37. Be it noted, in pursuance of the judgment passed by this 
B 
Court, certain applications were filed before the tribunal and before it 
objections were again raised with regard to maintainability of the 
applications filed by Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry for interim relief which 
were rejected on the ground that the direction given by this Court was 
binding on it. Thereafter, the tribunal decided the applications on merits 
and issued certain directions. Thereafter, the Governor of Karnataka 
C 
issued an Ordinance namely "the Karnataka Cauvery Basic Irrigation 
Protection Ordinance, 1991 ". After the Ordinance was issued, the State 
of Karnataka instituted a suit under Article 131 against the State of 
Tamil Nadu and others for declaration that the tribunal's order granting 
interim relief was without jurisdiction and, therefore, null and void. The o 
Ordinance that was issued was replaced by Act 27 ofl 991. The provisions 
of the said Act were a verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the 
Ordinance except that in Section 4 of the said Act the words "any court
or" were omitted. The omission of the above words excluded this Court's 
order dated April 26, 1991 from the overriding effect of the said provision. 
lt is in this context that the President made the Reference under Article 
143 of the Constitution. 
E 
38. While dealing with question No. I, that is, whether the 
Ordinance and the provisions thereof are in accordance with the provisions' 
of the Constitution, the Court referred to Article 131 and thereafter opined 
thus:-
F 
"56. It is clear from the article thatthis Court has uriginaljurisdiction, 
among other things, in any dispute between two or more States 
where the dispute involves any question whether of law or fact 
on which the existence and extent of a legal right depends except 
those matters which are specifically excluded from the said 
G 
jurisdiction by the proviso. However, the Parliament has also been 
given power by Article 262 of the Constitution to provide by law 
that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall exercise 
jurisdiction in respect of any dispute or complaint with respect to 
the use, distribution or control of the water of, or in, any inter-
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(2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
Stateriverorrivervalley. Section 11 oftheAct,namely, theinter-
State Water Disputes Act, 1956 has in terms provided for such 
exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts. It reads as follows:-
"11. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, 
neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have or 
B 
exercise jurisdiction in respect ofany water dispute which may 
be referred to a Tribunal under this Act." 
57. This provision of the Act read with Article 262 thus excludes 
original cognizance or jurisdiction of the inter-State water dispute 
which may be referred to the Tribunal established under the Act, 
c 
from the purview of any court including the Supreme Court under 
Article 131." 
D 
F 
Proceeding further, it stated:-
"77. The effect of the provisions of Section 11 of the present Act, 
viz., the Inter-State Water Disputes Act read with Article 262 of 
the Constitution is that the entire judicial power of the State and, 
therefore, of the courts including that of the Supreme Court to 
adjudicate upon original dispute or complaint with respect to the 
use, distribution or control of the water of, or in any inter-State 
river or river valleys has been vested in the Tribunal appointed 
under Section 4 of the said Act. It is, therefore, "not possible to 
accept the submission that the question of grant of interim relief 
falls outside the purview of the said provisions and can be agitated 
under Article 131 of
the Constitution.Hence any executive order 
or a legislative enactment of a State which interferes with the 
adjudicatory process and adjudication by such Tribunal is an 
interference with the judicial power of the State. In view of the 
fact that the Ordinance in question seeks directly to nullify the 
order of the Tribunal passed on June 25, 1991 it impinges upon the 
judicial power of the State and is, therefore, ultra vires the 
Constitution." 
G 
39. Relying on the aforequoted passages, it is contended by Mr. 
H 
Rohatgi that it has been clearly spelt out by the Constitution Bench that 
the power of the Supreme Court to adjudicate is ousted under Article 
262(2) read with Section 11 of the 1956 Act. Mr. Nariman and Mr. 
Naphade appearing for the States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu 
respectively w~uld contendethat the opinion of the Constitution Bench
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
537 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
has to be appositely understood since it clearly lays down that ouster of A 
the judicial power of the Supreme Court to adjudicate upon original dispute 
or complaint with regard to use, distribution or control of the waters or 
in any inter-State river or river valley which has been vested in the 
tribunal. It is highlighted by them that as per the dictum of the Constitution 
· Bench, this Court cannot take cognizance of an original dispute or 
B 
complaint, but within that purview the assail to final order of the tribunal 
does not come and hence, the power of the Court in that regard remains 
unaffected. 
40. In State of Karnataka v. State of A.P. (supra), another 
Constitution Bench was dealing with a suit filed under Article 131 of the 
Constitution. While expressing the opinion, Pattanaik, J. (as His Lordship 
C 
then was) has held:-
"24. Article 131 being subject to the other provisions of the 
Constitution including Article 262, if Parliament has made any 
law for adjudication of any water dispute or a dispute relating to 
distribution or control of water in any inter-State river or river D 
valley, then such a dispute cannot be raised before the Supreme 
Court under Article 131, even if the dispute be one between the 
Centre or the State or between two States. In exercise of 
constitutional powerunder Article 262( 1 ), Parliament, in fact has 
enacted the law called the Inter-State Water
Disputes Act, 1956 
E 
and Section 1-1 of the said Act provides that neither the Supreme 
Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any 
water dispute which could be referred to a tribunal under the Act. 
This being the position, what is necessary to be found out is whether 
the assertions made in the plaint filed by the State of Karnataka · 
and the relief sought for, by any stretch of imagination can be held 
F 
to be a water dispute, which could be referred to the Tribunal, so · 
as to oust the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 
131." 
41. Majmudar, J. concurring with the view of Pattanaik, J. has 
opined that:-
G 
"It is not in dispute between the parties that the Inter-State Water 
Disputes Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Disputes Act") 
is a legislation passed under Artie.le 262 of the Constitution. It is 
equally not in dispute that Section 11 thereof excludes the 
jurisdiction of this Court in respect of water disputes referred to 
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the Tribunal. It will, therefore, have to be seen whether the State 
of Andhra Pradesh, as plaintiff, having invoked the jurisdiction of 
this Court under Article 131 has, in substance, raised "water 
dispute" which will exclude the jurisdiction of this Court as per 
Section 11 of the Disputes Act read with Article 262 clause (2). 
In other words, ifin substance, the plaintiff wants adjudication of 
any "water dispute" between it and the other contesting States, 
namely, the State ofKarnataka or the State of Maharashtra which 
are upper riparian States located in the Krishna basin through 
which River Krishna, which is admittedly an inter-State river, 
flows." 
42. Bane1jee, J. supplementing the view has opined:-
"123. Incidentally, whereas Article 262 pertains to legislative 
enactments containing an ouster of jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, Article 131 relates to conferment of the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court in the event of there being any dispute between 
two States or between one or more States on the one hand and 
another on the other hand or between the Union of India and 
other States. Let us, however, analyse the issue of ouster of 
jurisdiction under Article 262 as contended by Mr Salve, the learned 
Solicitor General of India. The heading of Article 262 is rather 
significant since it reads as "Disputes relating to waters" and in 
the body of the article it is provided that in the event
of there 
being any dispute, Parliament may by law provide for adjudication 
ofany dispute in regard to use, distribution or control of the waters 
of, or in, any inter-State river or river valley. Article 262 is specific 
as regards adjudication of disputes pertaining to water whereas 
Article 131 provides for a general power and conferment of 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the event of there being any 
dispute between two States etc. etc. There is neither any conflict 
between Article 262 and Article 131 nor, thus, the fields covered 
therein overlap each 'other, a specific exclusion has been thought 
of by our Constitution-framers and been provided for in the 
Constitution." 
The learned Judge referred to authority in the earlier Constitution 
Bench decision rendered in In Re: Cauvery Water Dilpute Tribunal 
(supra) to express the aforesaid view.
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
539 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
43. The said pronouncement has to be appreciated in a seemly A 
perspective. The issue arose whether the suit filed under Article 131 of 
the Constitution pertained to water dispute which required to be referred 
to the tribunal under the 1956 Act. In that context, the Court opined that 
if it is a water dispute, jurisdiction of this Court is excluded but Court has 
to see the averments in the plaint. It has also been opined that there is 
B 
no conflict between Article 131 and Article 262 of the Constitution. As 
regards entertaining a water dispute, it is to be scrutinized whether the 
controversy that is the subject matter of the suit invites the bar of 
jurisdiction of this Court, for it depends upon the nature of dispute. Thus, 
the view has been expressed in the context of Article 131 of the 
Constitution: 
C 
44. In State of Haryana (supra) the Court was dealing with a suit 
filed under Article 131 of the Constitution for seeking certain reliefs 
impleading State of Punjab as defendant No. 1 and Union of India as 
defendant No. 2. The issue of maintainability of the suit arose for 
consideration. Dealing with the said issue, the two-Judge Bench referred 
D 
to Article 262 of the Constitution and Section 11 and Section 2(c) of the 
1956 Act that defines water dispute and in that context ruled thus:-
"7. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition that in the 
event the present dispute
between the two States would come 
within the definition of"water dispute" in Section 2{c) of the Act 
E 
and as such is referable to a Tribunal under Section 11 of the Act, 
then certainly the jurisdiction of this Court would be barred, in 
view of Article 262 of the Constitution read with Section 11 of the. 
Act." 
45. In Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum (supra) 
a three-Judge Bench was dealing with safety of the Mullaperiyar reservoir. 
In that context, the Court posed the question whether the jurisdiction of 
this Court is barred in view of Article 262 read with Section 11 of the 
1956 Act. Analysing the provisions of the Constitution and scrutinizing 
the import of the statutory provisions, it was ruled that:-
"22. Article 262 provides that Parliament may by law provide for 
the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect to the 
use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter-State 
river or river valley. The jurisdiction of the courts 'iri respect of 
any dispute or complaint referred to in Article 262(1) can be barred 
F 
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[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
by Parliament by making law. The Inter-State Water Disputes 
Act, 1956 was enacted by Parliament in exercise of power under 
Article 262 of the Constitution. Section 11 of the said Act excludes 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in respect of a water dispute 
referred to the Tribunal. Section 2(c) of this Act defines "water 
dispute". It, inter alia, means a dispute as to the use; distribution 
or control of the waters of, or as to the interpretation or 
implementation of the agreement of such waters." 
After so observing, the Court held that the dispute in the said case 
was not one contemplated by Section 2(c) of the 1956 Act. The Court 
C so held as the main issue was about the safety of the dam on increase of 
the water level and for determining the said issue, neither Article 262 of 
the Constitution nor the provisions of the 1956 Act had any applicability. 
Being of this view, it repelled the contention that the jurisdiction of the 
Court in regard to the controversy raised was barred under Article 262 
read with Section 11 of the 1956Act. 
D 
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G 
H 
46. In Atma Linga Reddy (supra), a writ petition was filed by 
the petitioners as pro bono publico praying for issue of an appropriate 
writ, direction or order restraining the State of Karnatakil and Sree 
Swarna Energy Limited from constructing a mini hydro power project at 
Rajolibanda Diversion Scheme (RDS), Raichur District,Karnataka by 
quashing and
cancelling the power project. A prayer was also made to 
direct the State of Karnataka to regulate water at RDS anicut and to 
ensure smooth flow of water in RDS canal to the extent of full allocated 
water of 15.9 TMC to the State of Andhra Pradesh. Addressing the 
issue with regard to maintainability, the Court opined that:-
"33. In the light of the scheme as envisaged by the makers of the 
Constitution as also by Parliament under Act 33 of 1956 in 
connection with water disputes between States, it is .clear_ to us 
that such disputes cannot be made subject-matter of petition either 
in a High Court under Article 226 or in this Court under Article 32 
of the Constitution. Probably, Article 262 is the only provision 
which enables Parliament to oust and .exclude jurisdiction of all 
courts including the Supreme Court (this Court). 
34. It is also pertinent to note that clause (2) of Article 262 contain's 
a non obstante clause (Notwithstanding anything in this 
Constitution). It is no doubt true that Article 262 of the Constitution· 
is not self-exe·cutory inasmuch as it does not, by itself, take away
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
541 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of disputes relating to waters 
A 
of inter-State rivers or river valleys. It is an enabling provision 
and empowers Parliament to enact a law providing for adjudication 
of such disputes or complaints, excluding the jurisdiction of all 
courts including this Court (Supreme Court). 
3 5. Article 131 of the Constitution which enables the Central 
B 
Government or a State Government to institute a suit in this Court 
on its Original Side in certain cases also cannot be invoked in 
inter-State water disputes in view of Section 11 of the Act (vide 
T.N. Cauvery Etc. Sangam v. Union of India (supra). In other 
words, the provisions of Article 131 of the Constitution have to be 
C 
construed harmoniously subject to the provisions of Article 262 of 
the Constitution. A petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, 
hence, cannot be entertained by this Court." 
4 7. After so stating, the Court adverted to the stand of the 
petitioners therein that if this Court holds that a petition is not maintainable 
in this Court, they have no remedy for the enforcement of their right D 
recognised by the Constitution and guaranteed by Article 32 enshrined 
in Part III of the Constitution and also it would violate basic philosophy 
of the rule oflaw reflected in the well-known maxim ubijus ibi remediitm 
(wherever there is right, there is remedy). Dealing with the said stand, 
the
Court held as follows:-
E 
"38. In our considered opinion, however, preliminary objections 
raised on behalf of the contesting respondents are well founded 
and are required to be upheld. We have already extracted the 
relevant provisions of the Constitution as also of Act 33 of 1956. 
The Founding Fathers of the Constitution were aware and 
F 
conscious of sensitive nature of inter-State disputes relating to 
waters. They, therefore, provided machinery for adjudication of 
such disputes relating to waters of inter-State rivers or river 
valleys. By enacting Article 262, they empowered Parliament to 
enact a law providing for adjudication of any dispute or complaint 
with respect to the use, distribution or control of waters of any 
G 
inter-State river or river valley. They, however, did not stop there. 
They went ahead and empowered Parliament to exclude the 
jurisdiction ofall courts including the final court of the country in 
such disputes. The intention of framers of the Constitution, in our 
opinion, was clear, obvious and apparent. It was thought proper 
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[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
and appropriate to deal with and decide such sensitive issues once 
and fo~ all by a Jaw made by Parliament." 
48. Thereafter, the Court referred to clause (c) of Section 2 of the 
1956 Act that defines "water dispute" and Section 3 which provides for 
complaints by the State Governments as to water dispute. Commenting 
on the same, the Court expressed:-
, 
"41. Bare reading of the above provisions leaves no room for 
doubt that they are very wide. Section 3 deals with situations not 
only where a water dispute has actually arisen between one State 
and another State, but also where such dispute is "likely to arise". 
Moreover, it applies not only to those cases in which interest of 
the State has been prejudicially affected, but also embraces within 
its sweep interest of any of the inhabitants thereof which has 
been affected or is likely to be affected. To us, therefore, it is 
abundantly clear that such a dispute is covered by Article 262 of 
the Constitution and should be dealt with in accordance with the 
provisions of Act 33 of 1956 and it cannot be challenged in any 
court including this Court. 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
46. Ultimately, what is contemplated by the Act is to look into, to 
protect and to safeguard interests of tl'e State as also of its subjects 
and citizens. Precisely for that reason, Section 3 has been worded 
widely. It provides for constitution of a tribunal for adjudication by 
the Central
,Government on a dispute raised or complaint made by 
any State that interest of the State or any of the inhabitants thereof 
has been prejudicially affected or is likely to be affected. In our 
considered opinion, therefore; the present petition under Article 
32 is not maintainable. 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
52. From the relevant provisions of the Constitution, Act 33 of 
1956 and the decisions referred to hereinabove, there is no doubt 
in our mind that the present writ petition under Article 32 of the 
Constitution is not maintainable." 
The aforesaid decision, as is limpid, has been delivered in the context 
of a writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution, by way 
of publi9 interest litigation and the !is as the court perceived was squarely 
H covered by the connotative expanse of"water dispute".
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
543 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
49, In the State of Himachal Pradesh (supra) the Court was A 
dealing with the maintainability of a suit under Article 131 of the 
Constitution. One of the issue that was framed by the Court was whether 
the suit was maintainable under Article 131. Dealing with the said issue, 
the Court referred to the authority in State of Karnataka v. State of 
A.P. (supra) and State of Haryana (supra) and opined that when a 
contention is raised that a suit filed under Article 131 of the Constitution B 
is barred under Article 262(2) of the Constitution read with Section 11 of 
the 1956 Act, what is necessary to be found out is whether the assertions 
made in the plaint and the relief sought for, by any stretch of imagination, 
can be held to constitute a water dispute so as to oust the jurisdiction of 
this Court under Article 131 of the Constitution. Thereafter the Court C 
proceeded to hold that from the assertions made in the entire plaint as 
well as the reliefs claimed therein by the plaintiff, the dispute did not 
relate to inter-State river water issue or the use thereof, and actually 
relate to sharing of power generated in the Bhakra-Nangal and the Beas 
Projects and such a dispute did not attract the law was not barred under D 
clause (2) of Article 262 of the Constitution read with Section 11 of the 
1956 Act. Thus~ the emphasis was.laid on the nature of the dispute in 
. the context of exercise of
original jurisdiction. 
50. The crux of the matter is whether the interpretation placed by 
this Court on the aforesaid decisions lays down the ratio that Article 262 
read with Section 11 of the 1956Actousts the jurisdiction.. of Article 136 
E 
of the Constitution. On an anxious perusal and studied scrutiny of the 
aforesaid authorities, we find that what has been ousted is the jurisdiction 
of this Court to take cognizance of any dispute or complaint with respect 
to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter State 
river or river valley. The. Constitution Bench in bi Re: Cauvery Water 
F 
Dispute Tribunal (supra) has opined that this Court cannot take 
cognizance of the original complaint or dispute relating to what has been 
mentioned in Article 262. Article 262(2) empowers the Parliament, by 
law, to provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall 
exercisejurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint as is 
referred to in clause (I). Thus, the legislation is relatable to the disputes G 
which have been referred to in Article 262(1 ).'In this. regard, we may 
refer to Section 2( c) of the 1956 Act that defines "water dispute". It 
reads as follows:-
"2.(c) 'water dispute' to mean any dispute or difference between 
two or more State Governments with respect to-
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[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
(i) the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter-
State river or river valley; or 
B 
c 
D 
E 
(ii) the interpretation of the terms of any agreement relating to 
the use, distribution or control of such waters or the implementation 
of such agreement; or 
(iii) the levy ofany water rate in contravention of the prohibition 
contained in Section 7." 
51. Se«:tion 3 deals with complaints by State Governments as to 
water disputes. Jt provides that:-
"3. Complaints by State Governments as to water disputes.-
If it appears to the Government of any State that a water dispute 
with the Goverg,ment of another State has arisen or is likely to 
arise by reasonofthe fact that the interests of the State, or of any 
of the inhabitants thereof, in the waters of an inter-State river or 
river valley have been, or are likely to be, affected prejudicially 
by-
( a) any executive action or legislation taken or passed, or proposed 
to be taken or passed, by the other State; or 
(b) the failure of the other State or any authority therein to exercise 
any of their powers with respect to the use, distribution or control 
of such waters; or 
(c) the failure of the other State to implement the terms of any 
agreement relating to the use, distribution or control of such waters, 
the State Government may, in such form and manner as may be 
F 
prescribed, request the Central Government to refer the water 
dispute to a Tribunal for
adjudication." 
52. Section 5 provides for adjudication of water disputes. Section 
11 stipulates that neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall 
have or exercise jurisdiction in respect of any water dispute which may 
G be referred to a tribunal under the 1956 Act. The tribunal is constituted 
H 
· when a request is made under Section 3 from any State Government in 
respect ofany water dispute. Section 4 of the 1956 Act provides thatthe 
Central Government shall constitute a Water Disputes Tribunal if it is of 
the opinion that the water dispute cannot be settled by negotiations. The 
1956 Act, as we perceive, is in consonance with Article 262 which
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. . 545 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
empowers the Parliament to provide that neither the Supreme Court nor 
A 
any other court shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute 
or complaint but the same has to pertain to Article 262( I). 
53. Thus, the bar on the jurisdiction of this Court has to be in 
accord with the language employed in Article 262( I). Section 11 bars 
the jurisdiction of this Court pertaining to original dispute or complaint. 
B 
The submission of Mr. Rohatgi is that dispute or complaint as mentioned 
in Article 262 and Section 11 of the 1956Act not only covers the dispute 
before the tribunal but also encompasses any appeal by special leave 
because it still has the characteristics of a dispute. On a first blush, the 
aforesaid submission may look attractive but on a keener scrutiny, we 
are disposed to think, it does not deserve acceptance. The language 
C 
used in Article 262(1) and Section 1
11 relate to a water dispute or 
complaint. It pert.ains to a dispute or a complaint at the pre-adjudicatory 
stage. A complaint by the State Government is in a different realm 
altogether. It is meant to invite the attention of the Central Governmen( 
pertaining to the fact that a water dispute had arisen or is likely to arise 
D 
and it needs to be addressed by constituting a tribunal. Once a water 
dispute is adjudicated, it is extremely difficult to put it in the compartment 
of" any water dispute". After the
adjudication, one of the States or both 
the States may have a grievance bot a contention cannot be advanced 
by them or by the Union oflndia that the controversy is still at the stage 
of dispute that has been intended to be covered either under Article 
E 
262(1) of the Constitution or under the scheme of the 1956 Act and, 
therefore, the ju'risdiction of this Court stands excluded. Needless to 
emphasise, it has to pertain to the original dispute or original complaint 
and that is why, the Constitution bench in In Re: Cauvery Water Dispute 
Tribunal (supra) had held that this Court cannot take cognizance ofan 
F 
original dispute or complaint. The Constitution Bench analyzing the 
scheme of the 1956 Act has opined that the tribunal had the jurisdiction 
to grant interim relief.It has also been categorically ruled that thJs Court 
cannot take cognizance of original dispute. The majority in State 'of 
Tamil Nadu v. Staie of Karnataka and Ors. witli p-tiion Territory of 
Pondicherry v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (supra) has opined that 
G 
this Court has jurisdiction to decide the parameters, scope, authority and 
jurisdiction of the tribunal. It has been further held that it is the judiciary 
i.e. the courts alone that have the function of determining authoritatively 
the meaning of a statutory enactment and to lay down the frontiers of 
. jurisdiction ofany body br tribunal constituted under tM statute. 
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54. At this stage, we may also refer to the scope of certain aspects 
which have been highlighted by Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel 
appearing for the State ofKarnataka. According to him, the protective, 
preclusive or ouster clauses are to be construed strictly. He has relied 
on the classic text of Administrative Law by Sir William Wade (9'h Edn.) 
wherein it has been said that " ... first it must be stressed that there is a 
presumption against any restriction of the supervisory powers of the 
court". He has also relied upon case of R. v. Medic"{ Appe"l Tribun"l 
ex p"rte Gilmore3c wherein Denning LJ said that "l find it very well 
settled that the remedy by certiorari is never to be taken away by any 
statute except by the most clear and explicit words." Lord Reid in the 
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compens"tion Commission33 has recalled 
that:-
"It is a well established principle thata provision ousting the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the court must be construed strictly - meaning, I 
think that, if such a provision is reasonably capable of having two 
meanings, that meaning shall be taken which preserves the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the court". 
55, Having stated about the aspect pertaining to the approach of 
the Court with regard to interpret the ouster provisions, we may profitably 
refer, being commended, to certain authorities as to how the Court has 
perceived its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution. 
~6. In Durg" Slwnkar Me/tf(l (supra), it has been held thus:-
"It is now well settled by the majority decision of this Court in the 
case Of Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank 
Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.34that the expression 
F 
"Tribunal" as used in article 136 does not mean the same thing as 
"Court" but includes, within its ambit, all adjudicating bodies, 
provided they are constituted by the State and are invested with 
judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive 
functions. The only Courts or Tribunals, which are expressly 
G 
exempted from the purview of article 136, are those which are 
est!lblished by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces as 
laid down in clause (2) of the article. It is well known that an 
appeal is a creature of statute and there can be no inherent right 
32 ( 1957) 1 QB 574 [at 583] 
33 (1969) 2 AC 147 [at 170C-D] 
H " 1950 SCR 459
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
547 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
of appeal from any judgment or determination unless an appeal is 
A 
expressly provided for by the law itself. The powers given by 
article 13 6 of the Constitution however are in the nature of special 
or residuary powers which are exercisable outside the purview of 
ordinary law, in cases where the needs of justice demand 
interference by the Supreme Court of the land. The article itself B 
is worded in the widest terms possible. It vests in the Supreme 
Court a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing 
appeals, by granting of special leave, against any kind of judgment 
or order made by a Court or Tribunal in any cause or matter and 
the powers could be exercised in spite of the specific provisions 
for appeal contained in the Constitution or other laws. The 
C 
Constitution for the best of reasons did not choose to fetter or 
circumscribe the powers exercisable under this article in any 
way." 
fEmphasis addedl 
And again:-
"In the first place article 136 is a constitutional provision which 
no Parliamentary legislation can limit or take away. In the second 
place the provision being one, which overrides ordinary laws, no 
presumption can arise from words and expressions declaring an 
adjudication of a particular Tribunal to be final and conclusive, 
that there was an intention to exclude the exercise of the special 
powers. As has been said already, the non obstante clause in
article 
329 prohibits challenge to an election either to Parliament or any 
State Legislature, eltcept in the manner laid down in clause (2) of 
the article. But there is no prohibition of the exercise of its powers 
by the Supreme Court in proper cases under article 136 of the 
Constitution against the decision or determination of an Election 
Tribunal which like all other judicial, tribunals comes within the 
purview of the article. It is certainly desirable that the decisions 
D 
E 
F 
on matters of disputed election should, as soon as possible, become 
final and conclusive so that the constitution of the Legislature o 
may be distinctly and speedily known. But the powers under article 
136 are exercisable only under exceptional circumstances. The 
article does not create any general right of appeal from decisions 
ofall Tribunals." 
Though the context is different, we have referred to the said 
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[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
authority to appreciate the width and plentitude of power under Article 
136 of the Constitution. That apart, the said authority supports the view 
that framers of the Constitution have not chosen to circumscribe the 
powers exercisable under this Article. We are conscious of the fact that 
the context was different, but it is obligatory on the part of this Court to 
B 
see whether any bar is created under the original Constitution and if so, 
to what extent. 
c 
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G 
H 
57. In this regard, Mr. Nariman ha's also referred to Associated 
Cement Companies Ltd. (supra), especially, the concurring opinion of 
Bachawat, J., who has articulated thus:-
"The great purpose of Art. 136 is the recognition of the basic 
principle that one Court having supreme judicial power in the 
Republic will have appellate power over all Courts and adjudicating 
authorities vested with the judicial powers of the State throughol\t 
the territory of India barring those constituted by or under any 
law relating to the Armed Forces. In this background, the basic 
test of a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 is that it is an 
adjudicating authority (other than a Court) vested with the judicial 
powers of the State." 
58. In Jose Da Costa (supra), it has been opined that Article 136 
vests in this Court plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and 
hearing appeals by granting special leave against any kind of judgment 
or order made by a
court or tribunal in any case or matter and the power 
cannot be taken away expressly or impliedly by any ordinary legislation. 
59. In Arunacltalam v. P.S.R. Sadltanantliam (supra), it has 
been ruled that Art. 136 of the Constitution invests the Supreme Court 
with a plentitude of plenary, appellate power over all Courts and tribunals 
in India. Thereafter, the Court has stated that:-
" Appellate power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 136 
of the Constitution is not to be confused with ordinary appellate 
power exercised by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals under 
specific statutes. As we said earlier, it is a plenary power, 
'exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law' to meet the 
pressing demands of justice (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. 
Thakur Raghuraj Singh). Article 136 of the Constitution neither 
confers on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the Court's
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
549 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
jurisdiction. The power is vested in the Supreme Court but the A 
right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction is vested in no one. The 
exercise of the power of the Supreme Court is not circumscribed 
by any limitation as to who may invoke it." 
60. In P.S.R. Sadhanantlwm v. Arunaclta/am (supra) this Court 
(speaking through Justice Krishna Iyer) held that:-
B 
" .... Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary power; it is 
extraordinary in its amplitude, its limit, when it chases injustice, is 
the sky itself. This Court functionally fulfils itself by reaching out 
to injustice wherever it is and this power is largely derived in the 
common run of cases from Article 136. Is if merely a power in c 
the court to be exercised in any manner it fancies? Is there no 
procedural limitation in the manner of exercise and the occasion 
for exercise? Is there no duty to act fairly while hearing a case 
under Article 136, either in the matter of grant of leave or, after 
such grant, in the final disposal of the appeal? We have hardly 
any doubt that here is a procedure necessarily implicit in the power D 
vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Article 
136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding fathers 
unarguably intended in the very terms of Article 136 that it shall 
be exercised by the highest judges of the land with scrupulous 
adherence to judicial principles well
established by precedents in 
our jurisprudence." 
61. In Pras/1ant Ramacltandra Desltpantk(supra), Sahai, J. 
speaking for the Court has observed that remedy under Article 136 is a 
constitutional right and it cannot be taken away by legislation much less 
by invoking the principle of election or estoppels, because the jurisdiction 
exercised by this Court under Article 136 is an extraordinary jurisdiction 
which empowers this Court to grant leave to appeal from any judgment, 
decree or determination in any cause or matter passed or made by any 
court or tribunal and the scope of this Article has been settled in numerous 
decisions. It is not hedged with any restriction or any exception as is 
normally found in the provisions conferringjurisdiction. 
62. Learned senior counsel has also commended us to Maltendra 
Saree Emporium (II) '(supra) and U. Sree (supra) and to a recent 
Constitution Bench decision in Matltai v. George35, wherein the Court 
has opined that no effort should be made to restrict the powers of this 
"(2016) 1sec100 
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A Court under Article 136 because while exercising its power under Art. 
136 of the Constitution oflndia, this Court can, after considering facts of 
the case to be decided, very well use its discretion. 
63. In this context, we may profitably refer to Ganga Kumar 
Srivastava v. State of Biliar36• After referring to the earlier authorities, 
B the Court culled out certain principles which would invite exercise of 
power of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia. They 
are as follows:-
"(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution 
are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere 
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with the concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional 
circumstances. 
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(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact 
given by the High Court, ifthe High Court has acted perversely 
or otherwise improperly. 
(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136 
only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of 
law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the 
conscience of the Court. 
(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of 
the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe 
to act upon it. 
(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by 
any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles 
ofnatural justice, errors ofrecord and
misreading of the evidence, 
or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly 
perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record." 
We have referred to the aforesaid authorities solely for the purpose 
of accentuating the nature of jurisdiction exercised by this Court under 
Article 136. 
64. Having stated about the extent of jurisdiction of this Court 
under Article 136 of the Constitution and upon taking note of the 
precedents pertaining to sphere of Article 262 read with Section 11 of 
the 1956 Act, we may state that what is excluded under the Constitution 
is the dispute or complaint. The term 'dispute', as has been held in 
H 
"(2005) 6 sec 211
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
551 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
Gujarat State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. P.R. 
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Mankad and Ors.37, means a controversy having both positive and 
negative aspects. In Canara Bank and Ors. v. National Thermal 
Power Corporation andAnr. 38, the term 'dispute' has been interpreted 
to mean that there is a postulation of an assertion of a claim by one party 
and denial by the other. The term 'dispute' maybe given a broad meaning 
B 
or a narrow meaning and the 1956 Act gives it a broad meaning, as has 
been held by this Court. 
65. In this context, the term 'adjudication' becomes extremely 
significant. In Black' Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 42 "adjudication" 
is defined as:-
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"Adjudication.- The legal process of resolving a dispute. The 
formal giving or pronouncing a judgment or decree in a court 
proceeding; also the judgment or decision given. The entry of a 
decree by a court in respect to the parties in a case. lt impTies a 
hearing by a court, after notice, of legal evidence on the factual 
issue(s) involved." 
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66. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid definition is to arrive 
at the conclusion that once a water dispute, as defined under Article 
262(1) read with provisions of the 1956 Act is adjudicated by the tribunal, 
it loses the nature of dispute. A person aggrieved can always have his 
remedy invoking the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of E 
India. We have no a: scintilla of
doubt in our mind that the founding 
fathers did not want the award or the final order passed by the tribunal 
to remain immune from challenge. That is neither the express language 
of Article 262(1) nor it impliedly so states. Thus, the contention of the 
Union oflndia with regard to maintainability of the appeal by special 
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leave under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia on this score stands 
repelled. 
67. The second limb of submission of Mr. Rohatgi as regards the 
maintainability pertains to the language employed under Section 6(2) of 
the 1956 Act, which reads as follows:-
"6(2) The decision of the Tribunal, after its publication in the Official 
Gazette by the Central Government under sub-section (1), shall 
have the same force. as an order or decree of the Supreme Court." 
" l 1979) 3 sec 123 
,. (2001) 1sec43 . 
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68. Relying 'on Section 6(2), which was introduced by way of 
Amendment Act 2002 (Act No. 14 of 2002) that came into force from 
6.8.2002, it is submitted by Mr. Rohatgi thatthe jurisdiction of this Court 
is ousted as it cannot sit over in appeal on its own decree. The said 
submission is seriously resisted by Mr. Nariman and Mr. Naphade, learned 
senior counsel contending that the said provision, if it is to be interpreted 
to exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, it has to be 
supported by a constitutional amendment adding at the end of Article 
136(2) the words "or to any determination of any tribunal constituted 
under the law made by Parliament under Article 262(2)" and, in such a 
situation, in all possibility such an amendment to the Constitution may be 
ultra vires affecting the power of judicial review which is a part of basic 
feature of the Constitution. Learned senior counsel for the respondent 
has drawn a distinction between the confennent and the exclusion of 
the power of the Supreme Court oflndiaby the original Constitution and 
any exclusion by the constitutional amendment. Be that as it may, the 
D said aspect need not be adverted to, as we are only required to interpret 
Section 6(2) as it exists today on the statute book. The said provision 
has been inserted to provide teeth to the decision of the tribunal after its 
publication in the official gazette by the Central Government and
this 
has been done keeping in view the Sarkaria Commission's Report on 
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Centre-State relations (1980). The relevant extract of the Sarkaria 
Commission's Report reads as follows:-
, 
"17.4.19 The Act was amended in 1980 and Se·ction 6A was 
inserted. This section provides for framing a scheme for giving 
effect to a Tribunal's award. The scheme, inter alia provides for 
the establishment of the authority, its term of office and other 
condition of service, etc. but the mere creation of such an agency 
will not be able to ensure implementation of a Tribunal's award. 
Any agency set up under Section 6A cannot really function without 
the cooperation of the States concerned. Further, to make a 
Tribunal's award binding and effectively enforceable, it should 
have the same force and sanction behind it as n order or decree 
of the Supreme Court. We recommend that the Act should be 
suitably amended forth is purpose. 
17.6.05 - The Inter- State Water Disputes Act, 1956 should be 
amended so that a Tribunal's Award has the same force and 
sanction behind it as an order or decree of the Supreme Court to 
make a Tribunal's a~rd really binding."
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
553 
rDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
69. The Report of the Commission as the language would suggest, 
A 
was to make the final decision of the tribunal binding on both the States 
and once it is treated as a decree of this Court, then it has the binding 
effect. It was suggested to make the award effectively enforceable. 
The language employed in Section 6(2) suggests thatthe decision of the 
tribunal shall have the same force as the order or decree of this Court. 
There is a distinction between having the same force as an order or 
decree of this Court and passing of a decree by this Court after due 
adjudication. The Parliament has intentionally used the words from which 
it can be construed that a legal fiction is meant to serve the purpose for 
which the fiction has been created and not intended to travel beyond it. 
The purpose is to have the binding effect of the tribunal's award and the 
effectiveness of enforceability. Thus, it has to be narrowly construed 
regard being had to the purpose it is meant to serve. 
70. In this context, we may usefully refer to the Principles of 
Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edition by G.P. Singh. The learned author 
has expressed thus:-
"In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to 
ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created39, and after 
ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and 
consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the
giving effect to the fiction40• But in so construing the fiction it is 
not be extended beyond the purpose for which is created41 , or 
beyond the language of the section by which it is created•~. It 
cannot also be extended by importing another fiction43• The 
principles stated above are 'well-settled:.44 A legal fiction may 
also be interpreted narrowly to make the statute workable.45 
· 
71. In Aneeta Hada v. God/allier Travels and Tours46, a three-
Judge Bench has ruled thus:-
"37. In State of T.N. v. Arooran Sugars Ltd. 4- the Constitution 
39 AIR I 953 SC 333, AIR I 953 SC 244 
•0 (1951) 2 All ER 587,AIR 1959 SC 352 
41 AIR 1955 SC 661, AIR 1963 SC 1448 
42 AIR 966 SC 719, AIR 1997 SC 208 
43 AIR 1966 SC 870 
" AIR 2004 SC 3666 
"AIR 2005 SC 34 
"(2012) 5 sec 661 
"(1997) 1 sec 326 
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Bench, while dealing with the deeming provision in a statute, ruled 
that the role of a provision in a statute creating legal fiction is well 
settled. Reference was made to Chief Inspector of Mines v. 
Karam Chand Thapar'8, J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd. 
v. Union of India'9, M Venugopal v. LIC50 and Harish Tandon 
v. ADM, Allahabad51 and eventually, it was held that when a 
statute creates a legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed 
to have been done which in fact and truth has not been done, the 
Court has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose and 
between which persons such a statutory fiction is to be resorted 
to and thereafter, the courts have to give full effect to such a 
statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical conclusion. 
38. From the aforesaid pronouncements, the principle that can be 
culled out is that it is the bounden duty of the court to ascertain for 
what purpose the lega'I fiction has been created. It is also the duty 
of the court to imagine the fiction with all real consequences and 
instances unless prohibited from doing so. That apart, the use of 
the term "deemed" has to be read in its context and further, the 
fullest logical purpose and import are to be understood. It is because 
in modern legislation, the term "deemed" has been used for 
manifold purposes. The object of the legislature has to be kept in 
mind." 
72. In Hari Ram (supra),
the Court has held that in interpreting 
the provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what 
purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining the same, the court 
is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or 
inevitable corollaries for giving effect to the fiction. 
73. In this regard, reference to the authority in Nandkislwre 
Ganesh Joshi v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Kalyan 
and Dombivali and Ors. 52 would be apposite. It has been held that a 
legal fiction has to be applied having regard to the legislative intent and a 
restrictive meaning can be attributed to make the statute workable. 
74. This Court in De/Iii Ciolli and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. 
48 AIR 1961 SC 838 
"I 987 Supp. sec 350 
'" (I 994 )2 sec 323 
"(1995) 1sec537 
H 
"(2014) 11 SC'-'417
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 
555 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
State of Rajasthan;3 held that what can be deemed to exist under a 
A 
legal fiction are facts and not legal consequences which do not flow 
from the law as it stands. 
75. In this context, fruitful advertence may be made to a passage 
from Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. ;.i wherein 
Subba Rao, CJ speaking for the Bench has opined:-
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" ... the fundamental rule of interpretation is the same whether 
one construes the provisions of the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament, namely, that the court will have to find out the 
expressed intention from the words of the Constitution or the Act, 
as the case may be." 
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76. When we apply the aforesaid principles of statutory 
interpretation to understand the legislative intendment of Section 6(2) it 
·is clear as crystal that the Parliament did not intend to create any kind of 
embargo on the jurisdiction of this Court. The said provision was inserted 
to give the binding effect .to the award passed by ~he tribunal. The fiction 
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has been created for that limited purpose. Section 11 of the 1956 Act, as 
stated earlier, bars the jurisdiction of the courts and needless to say, that 
is in consonance with tlie language employed in Article 262 of the 
Constitution. The Founding Fathers had not conferred the power on this 
Court to entertain an original suit or complaint and that is luminescent 
from the language employed in Article 131 of the
Constitution and from 
the series of pronouncements of this Court. Be it clearly stated that 
Section 6 cannot be interpreted in an absolute mechanical manner and 
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the words "same force as on order or decision" cannot be treated as a 
decree for the purpose for excluding the jurisdiction of this Court. To 
elaborate, it cannot be a decree as if this Court has adjudicated the 
matter and decree is passed. The Parliament has intended that the Same 
shall be executed or abided as if it is a decree of this Court. It is to be 
borne in mind that a provision should not be interpreted to give a different 
colour which has a technical design rather than serving the object of the 
legislation. The exposition of the principles oflaw relating to fiction, the 
intendment Of the legislature and the ultimate purpose and effect of the 
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provision compel us to repel the submissions raised on behalf of the 
Union of India that Section 6(2) bars the jurisdiction conferred on this 
Court under Article 136. 
" l 1996) 2 sec 449 
"AIR 1966 SC 1987 
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77. We would like .to clarify one aspect. Learned senior counsel 
appearing for the State ofKamataka as well as the State of Tamil Nadu 
have commended us to various authorities which we have already 
referred to in the context of Article 136 of the Constitution, but the purpose 
behind the said delineation is to show the broad canvas of the· aforesaid 
constitutional provision in the context of maintainability of the civil appeals. 
How the final order passed By the tribunal would be adjudged within the 
parameters of the said constitutional provision has to be debated when 
we finally address the controversy pertaining to the subject matter of 
the Civil Appeals. 
78. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we express the opinion that 
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the Civil Appeals are maintainable. Let the Appeals be listed at 3 p.m. 
on I5.12.2016forfurtherorders. 
79. Interim order passed on 18.10.2016 to ~ontinue. 
Nidhi Jain 
Matter adjourned.