DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR versus THE CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY & ORS.
[2023] 16 S.C.R. 377, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2023] 16 S.C.R. 377 : 2023 INSC 1032
377
CASE DETAILS
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR.
v.
THE CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7700 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 30, 2023
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, CJI, 
J.B. PARDIWALA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: The respondent No. 4 herein was appointed 
as the Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University, his tenure was for a 
period four years. As the tenure of the respondent No. 4 was coming to an 
end, the Chancellor initiated steps for selection and appointment of a new 
Vice-Chancellor. The Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education, State 
of Kerala issued notiﬁ cation inviting applications from eligible candidates. 
However, the respondent no. 4 herein was re-appointed as Vice-Chancellor 
of the Kannur University after the Minister for Higher Education and Social 
Justice addressed a letter to the Governor/Chancellor dated 22.11.2021 
recommending re-appointment of the respondent No. 4 herein for a second 
term. (i) Whether re-appointment is permissible in respect of a tenure 
post; (ii) Whether the outer age limit of sixty years for the appointment of 
Vice-Chancellor as stipulated under sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the 
Kannur University Act, 1996 is to be made applicable even in the case of 
re-appointment of the Vice-Chancellor for one more term of four years (iii) 
Whether the re-appointment of the Vice-Chancellor has to follow the same 
process as a fresh appointment by setting up
a selection committee under 
Section 10(1) of the Act 1996 (iv) Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender 
his statutory power of reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor.
Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Whether 
reappointment is permissible in respect of a tenure post:
Held: The ordinary meaning that can be ascribed to the term 
“reappointment” is the act or process of deciding essentially that someone 
should continue in a particular job – Ordinarily, the object behind providing
378 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
for reappointment is twofold – First is “retention” i.e., where the incumbent 
to the oﬃ  ce/post during his term is found to be extraordinary and has 
established himself or herself to be an asset to the institution, then in such 
circumstance, such person is retained with a view to allow him to continue 
on the same post for one more term – Secondly, having regard to the nature 
of the post the organization or institution may not be in a position to ﬁ ll up 
the post in a time bound manner and in such circumstances, the provision 
for reappointment may enable the organization or institution to relieve itself 
of the tedium of going through the entire selection process afresh every time 
the post becomes vacant – Therefore, the reappointment is permissible even 
in case of a tenure post. [Paras 46 and 47]
Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Whether the 
outer age limit of sixty years for the appointment of Vice-Chancellor 
as stipulated under sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act, 1996 is 
to be made applicable even in the case of reappointment of the Vice-
Chancellor for one more term of four years.
Held: On a plain reading of sub-section (9) of Section 10 of 
the Act 1996, it appears that the person sought to be appointed as a 
Vice-Chancellor must not be more than sixty-years of age at the time 
of appointment i.e., it provides the outer age limit for appointment – 
While sub-section (10) of Section 10 of
the Act 1996 provides that upon 
appointment, the term of the Vice-Chancellor would be for four years 
and that he shall be eligible for reappointment – The proviso attached 
to sub-section (10) stipulates that no person shall be appointed as Vice-
Chancellor for more than two terms – Sub-section (9) of Section 10 
of the Act 1996 will apply only at the stage of appointment of Vice-
Chancellor and would have no application whatsoever when it comes 
to reappointment of Vice-Chancellor under sub-section (10) – This is 
reinforced from the words “shall be eligible for reappointment” occurring 
in sub-section (10) which connotes that the same is an enabling provision 
whereby the Vice-Chancellor by virtue of holding his oﬃ  ce is deemed 
eligible for reappointment irrespective of the other provisions – If 
the outer age limit provided in sub-section (9) would apply even to 
reappointment, then the same would eﬀ ectively mean that only those 
persons who are appointed as Vice-Chancellor at the age of ﬁ fty-ﬁ ve or 
below could be considered for reappointment – Such an interpretation 
would result in conditions being read into sub-section (10) which have
379
not been prescribed by the legislature – Had the intent of legislature 
been otherwise, sub-section (10) or the words “shall be eligible for 
re-appointment” would have been speciﬁ cally qualiﬁ ed by or made 
subject to the words “sub-section (9)” or “provisions of this section” 
– If sub-section (9) is interpreted so as to be made applicable even to 
reappointment as provided in sub-section (10), then the result would be 
that any person who is appointed as Vice-Chancellor at the age of ﬁ fty-
six or more would not be eligible for reappointment, thereby rendering 
sub-section (10) and its proviso completely otiose and meaningless in 
such cases – A purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the 
purpose of giving full eﬀ ect to the statutory provisions – Thus, the outer 
age limit of sixty years provided in sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the 
Act 1996 will not apply, when it comes to reappointment under sub-
section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996. [Paras 48, 50, 52, 53, 56, 57]
Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Whether the 
reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor has to follow the same process as 
a fresh appointment by setting up a selection committee under Section 
10(1) of the Act 1996.
Held: Reappointment of Vice-Chancellor has been provided under sub-
section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 – The proviso to sub-section (10) 
of the Act 1996 further makes the intention of the legislature to provide for 
reappointment more clear –
The legislature has not thought ﬁ t to prescribe 
any particular procedure or any particular mode or manner of reappointment 
– The UGC Regulations are also silent as regards the reappointment of 
Vice-Chancellor – In the case at hand, sub-section (10) of Section 10 of 
the Act, 1996, provides for reappointment and does not even contain the 
words “subject to provisions of this section” – This is as good as to reﬂ ect 
the legislature’s intention of permitting reappointment without following 
the ordinary process of appointment of Vice-Chancellor – Thus, it is not 
necessary to follow the procedure of appointment as laid down in Section 
10 of the Act 1996 for the purpose of reappointment. [Paras 58, 65, 66]
Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Did the 
Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power of reappointment 
of the Vice-Chancellor.
Held: The facts make it abundantly clear that there was no independent 
application of mind or satisfaction or judgment on the part of the Chancellor 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY
380 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
and the respondent No. 4 came to be reappointed only at the behest of the 
State Government – Although the notiﬁ cation reappointing the respondent 
No. 4 to the post of Vice-Chancellor was issued by the Chancellor yet the 
decision stood vitiated by the inﬂ uence of extraneous considerations or to put 
it in other words by the unwarranted intervention of the State Government 
– It is the Chancellor who has been conferred with the competence under 
the Act 1996 to appoint or reappoint a Vice-Chancellor – No other person 
even the Pro-Chancellor or any superior authority can interfere with the 
functioning of the statutory authority and if any decision is taken by a 
statutory authority at the behest or on a suggestion of a person who has no 
statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal – Thus, it is the 
decision-making process, which vitiated the entire process of reappointment 
of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor – The decision making 
process because in such a case the exercise of power is amenable to judicial 
review – As a consequence, the notiﬁ cation dated 23.11.2021, reappointing 
the respondent no.4 as the Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University is 
quashed. [Paras 81,84, 85,86,87,90]
Words and Phrases – ‘Tenure’ and ‘Tenure post’ – Discussed.
Interpretation of Statutes – Doctrine/Principle – Doctrine of 
Purposive construction:
Held: The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse
to for the purpose of giving full eﬀ ect to the statutory provisions, and 
the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than 
rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not 
inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be unworkable – 
The rules of interpretation require that construction which carries forward 
the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the 
remedy alive, should be preferred looking into the text and context of the 
statute – Construction given by the court must promote the object of the 
statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not eﬀ ace 
its very purpose – The courts strongly lean against any construction which 
tends to reduce a statute to futility – The provision of the statute must be 
so construed as to make it eﬀ ective and operative – The court must take a 
pragmatic view and must keep in mind the purpose for which the statute 
was enacted as the purpose of law itself provides good guidance to courts 
as they interpret the true meaning of the Act and thus legislative futility 
must be ruled out. [Para 56]
381
Administrative Law – Principle:
Held: It is a well settled principle of administrative law that if a statute 
expressly confers a statutory power on a particular body or authority or 
imposes a statutory duty on the same, then such power must be exercised 
or duty performed (as the case may) by that very body or authority itself 
and none other – If the body or authority exercises the statutory power or 
performs the statutory duty acting at the behest, or on the dictate, of any 
other body or person, then this is regarded as an abdication of the statutory 
mandate and any decision taken on such basis is contrary to law and liable 
to be quashed – It is important to keep in mind that, in law, it matters not 
that the extraneous element is introduced (i.e., the advice, recommendation, 
approval, etc. of the person not empowered by the statute is obtained 
or given) in good faith or for the advancement of any goal or objection 
howsoever laudable or desirable – The rule of law requires that a statutory 
power vests in the body or authority where the statute so provides, and 
likewise, the discharge of the statutory duty is the responsibility of the 
body or authority to which it is entrusted – That body or authority cannot 
merely rubberstamp an action taken elsewhere or simply endorse or ratify 
the decision of someone else. [Para 71]
Writ – Writ of Quo Warranto:
Held: Quo warranto is a remedy or procedure whereby the State 
inquires into the legality of the claim which a
party asserts to an oﬃ  ce 
or franchise, and to oust him from its enjoyment if the claim be not well 
founded, or to have the same declared forfeited and recover it, if, having 
once been rightfully possessed and enjoyed; it has become forfeited for 
mis-user or non-user – It is now well settled that a writ of quo warranto 
lies if any appointment to a public oﬃ  ce is made in breach of the statute 
or the rules – In the case on hand, this Court is not concerned with the 
suitability of the respondent No. 4 – The “suitability” of a candidate for 
appointment to a post is to be judged by the appointing authority and not 
by the court unless the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules/
provisions. [Paras 30, 84]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
The University of Mysore and Anr. v. C.D. Govinda Rao and Anr, 
[1964] 4 SCR 575 – followed.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY
382 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
High Court of Gujarat and Another v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor 
Panchayat and Ors, [2003] 2 SCR 799: (2003) 4 SCC 712; B. 
Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage 
Board Employees’ Assn, [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 462:(2006) 11 SCC 
731; Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo 
and Ors., [2013] 14 SCR 621: (2014) 1 SCC 161; J.S. Yadav v. State 
of Uttar Pradesh and Another, [2011] 5 SCR 460: (2011) 6 SCC 570; 
Union of India v. Kuldeep Singh, (2004) 2 SCC 590: [2003] 6 Suppl. 
SCR 526; Clariant International Ltd. and Another v. Securities & 
Exchange Board of India, [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 843:(2004) 8 SCC 
524; Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots’ Association of India 
(ALPAI) and Others v. Director General of Civil Aviation and Others, 
[2011] 5 SCR 1019: (2011) 5 SCC 435 – relied on.
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, [1982] 2 SCR 365 :(1981) Supp SCC 
87:; State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 
1382; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, [1992] 1 
SCR 917 :(1992) Supp (2) SCC 351; Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of 
Gujarat, (2022) 5 SCC 179; Professor (Dr.) Sreejith P.S. v. Dr. Rajasree 
M.S., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1473; Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India 
and Others, [1992] 3 SCR 567: (1992) 3 SCC 526; Dept. of Commerce 
v. US House of Representatives, 1999 SCC OnLine US SC 10; State of 
U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2 SCR 679; Express Newspaper 
(P) Ltd. v.
Union of India, [1959] SCR 12; U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. 
NTPC Ltd., (2009) 6 SCC 235: [2009] 3 SCR 1060; Udai Singh Dagar 
v. Union of India, (2007) 10 SCC 306: [2007] 6 SCR 707; State of T.N. v. 
Hind Stone, [1981] 2 SCR 742: (1981) 2 SCC 205; Hotel Balaji v. State 
of A.P., [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 182: 1993 Supp (4) SCC 536; Yogendra 
Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, [2015] 14 SCR 1037:(2016) 3 SCC 183; 
State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah, [1967] 2 SCR 361; Municipal Corpn. 
of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101: [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 929; 
State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., [1991] 3 SCR 64; B.R. 
Kapur v. State of T.N. and Another (2001) 7 SCC 231: [2001] 3 Suppl. 
SCR 191; Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2018) 6 SCC 
162: [2018] 3 SCR 137; P. Venugopal v. Union of India,[2008] 8 SCR 
1; M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa [1961] 2 SCR 295; S.P. Jain 
v. Krishna Mohan Gupta [1987] 1 SCR 411; RBI v. Peerless General
383
Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., [1987] 2  SCR 1; Tinsukhia Electric 
Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, [1989] 2 SCR 544 :(1989) 3 SCC 709:; 
UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2008) 5 SCC 257: [2008] 5 SCR 
775; Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys, 
[2010] 10 SCR 779:(2011) 11 SCC 334; Bhuri Nath and Others v. State 
of J&K and Others, [1997] 1 SCR 138: (1997) 2 SCC 745 – referred to.
Hardwari Lal, Rohtak v. G.D. Tapase, Chandigarh and others, AIR 
1982 Punjab and Haryana 439 – referred to.
Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 1 WLR 
1155 : (1982) 3 All ER 141 (HL) - referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL APPEAL NO.7700 
OF 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2022 of the High Court of 
Kerala at Ernakulam in WA No.1698 of 2021.
Appearances:
Dama Seshadri Naidu, George Poonthottam, Sr. Advs., Atul Shankar 
Vinod, Hiresh Choudhary, Ms. Surbhi Sharma, Kannan Gopal Vinod, K. 
Sai Teja, M.P. Vinod, Advs. for the Appellants.
R. Venkataramani, AG, K. K. Venugopal, Basavaprabhu S. Patil, Sr. 
Advs., Venkita Subramoniam T.R., Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K. 
Joy, Alim Anvar, Shailesh Madiyal, Vaibhav Sabharwal, Akshay Kumar, 
Ms. Divija Mahajan, Anirudh Sanganeria, Samarth Kashyap, Advs. for the 
Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
For the convenience of the exposition, this judgement is divided in 
the
following parts: -
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY
384 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
INDEX*
A. 
Factual Matrix ...................................................................... 4
i) 
Notiﬁ cation dated 27.10.2021 constituting the Selection 
Committee ...................................................................... 5
ii) 
Notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 inviting applications for 
selection of Vice-Chancellor .......................................... 6
iii) Letter of the Minister for Higher Education / Pro-Chancellor 
dated 22.11.2021 recommending reappointment of the 
Respondent No. 4 ........................................................... 7
iv) 
Notiﬁ cation dated 22.11.2021 withdrawing the Notiﬁ cation 
dated 01.11.2021 inviting applications from the elligible 
candidates ...................................................................... 9
v) 
Letter of the Minister for Higher Education / Pro-Chancellor 
proposing reappointment of Vice-Chancellor ................ 9
vi) 
Reappointment Notiﬁ cation dated 23.11.2021 ............ 10
B. 
Relevant observations made by the Ld. Single Judge .....  11
C. 
Relevant observations made by the Division Bench in 
Appeal .................................................................................. 13
D. 
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant(s)........................ 15
E. 
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 2 - State of 
Kerala .................................................................................. 21
F. 
Submissions on behalf of
Respondent No. 3 - Kannur 
University............................................................................. 26
G. 
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 4 - Vice-
Chancellor ........................................................................... 28
H. 
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 1 - 
Chancellor………… ........................................................... 29
I. 
Relevant Provisions of the Kannur University Act, 1996 and 
the UGC Regulations, 2018 ................................................ 35
J. 
Writ of Quo Warran to ...................................................... 39
*Ed Note : Pagination is as per original judgment.
385
K. 
Questions of Law Formulated ........................................... 45
L. 
Analysis ................................................................................ 46
(i) 
Whether reappointment is permissible in respect of a Tenure 
Post? ............................................................................. 46
(ii) Whether the outer-age limit stipulated under sub-section 
(9) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 is applicable in the case 
of reappointment of Vice-Chancellor? ......................... 48
(iii) Whether the reappointment of Vice-Chancellor has to 
follow the same process as a fresh appointment under 
Section 10 of the Act 1996? ......................................... 54
(iv) Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power 
of reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor? ................... 58
M. Final Conclusion ................................................................. 70
“ ‘Intention of the Legislature’ is a common but very slippery phrase, 
which, popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied 
in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature 
probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact 
it. In a Court of Law or Equity, what the Legislature intended to be done or 
not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has 
chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary 
implication.” 
[Lord Watson in Salomon v. Saloman
& Co., (1897) AC 22, 38]
1. We are tempted to preface our judgment with the aforesaid 
observations of Lord Watson in Soloman (supra), as we need to keep in mind 
the principle of law as explained therein for the purpose of interpretation of 
Section 10(9) and Section 10(10) respectively of the Kannur University Act, 
1996 (for short, “the Act 1996”). In other words, the object or the intention 
behind enacting the two provisions referred to above. 
2. This appeal is at the instance of two unsuccessful original writ 
petitioners before the High Court. The appellant No. 1 herein in his capacity 
as the elected member of the Senate of Kannur University and the appellant 
No. 2 herein in his capacity as the member of the Academic Council of the 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
386 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
said University together questioned the legality and validity of reappointment 
of the respondent No. 4 herein, namely, Dr. Gopinath Ravindran as the 
Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University by ﬁ ling Writ Petition (C) No. 
26975 of 2021 in the High Court of Kerala, primarily on the ground that the 
respondent No. 4 was not eligible for reappointment as the Vice-Chancellor 
of the Kannur University. The writ application referred to above came to be 
rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the judgment 
and order dated 15.12.2021. The judgment rendered by the learned Single 
Judge of the High Court was challenged before a Division Bench of the 
High Court by ﬁ ling the Writ Appeal No. 1698 of 2021. The challenge in 
the appeal also failed. The Division bench dismissed the appeal vide the 
judgment and order dated 23.02.2022 thereby aﬃ  rming the judgment and 
order passed by the learned Single Judge declining to issue a writ of Quo 
Warranto. 
A. FACTUAL MATRIX 
3.  The facts are jejune. The respondent No. 4 herein was appointed as 
the Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University vide the Notiﬁ cation dated 
24.11.2017 duly issued by the Chancellor of the Kannur University. The 
tenure of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor was for a period of four 
years. As the tenure of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor of the 
University was coming to an end, the Chancellor initiated steps for selection 
and
appointment of a new Vice-Chancellor in the said University. The ﬁ rst 
step in the said process was the issue of a Notiﬁ cation dated 27.10.2021 
constituting a Selection Committee of three members. The Notiﬁ cation 
dated 27.10.2021 reads thus: 
“No.G53 1283/2021  
Governors Secretariat
Kerala Raj Bhavan
Thiruvananthapuram
27th October 2021
NOTIFICATION
In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 10, read 
with sub sections (1)(2) and (3) of the Kannur University Act, 
1996, the Chancellor of the University is pleased to constitute a 
Selection Committee comprising of the following members to make
387
recommendation (s) towards the selection and appointment of a new 
Vice Chancellor in the said University.
1. Dr. B. Ekbal - (Nominee of the University Senate) 
(Former Vice Chancellor, University of Kerala and former Member, 
State Planning Board)
2. Prof. B. Thimme Gowda - (Nominee of the University Grants 
Commission) 
Vice Chairman, Karnataka State Higher Education Council 
(Former Vice Chancellor, Bangalore University & Karnataka State 
Rural Development and Panchayat Raj University
3. Prof. VK Ramachandran (Nominee of the Chancellor)
Vice Chairperson, Kerala State Planning Board 
(Former HoD, Economic Analysis Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 
Bengaluru)
I, Prof. VK Ramachandran shall be the Convener of the Committee and 
the Committee shall tender its recommendation within three months 
from the date of this order as laid down in sub section (4), Section 10 
of the Kannur University Act, 1996.
By Order of the Governor/Chancellor
Sd/-
(Dr. Devendra Kumar Dhodawat, IAS)
Principal Secretary to Governor/Chancellor”
4. Thereafter, Notification dated 01.11.2021 was issued by the 
Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education, State of Kerala inviting 
applications from eligible candidates. The Notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 
reads thus: 
“B2/88/2021/H. EDN
Dated: 1.11.2021
NOTIFICATION
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19(1) (2) and (3) of 
the Kannur University Act,1996, the Chancellor, Kannur University 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
388 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
has constituted a Selection Committee to make recommendations for 
the appointment of a new Vice Chancellor, in the Kannur University.
Applications are invited by the Selection Committee for the selection 
of Vice Chancellor, Kannur University from eligible candidates. The 
qualiﬁ cation and experience are as prescribed in Clause 7.3(i) of 
the UGC notiﬁ cation dated 18.7.2018. Applicants should not have 
completed sixty years of age as on the date of notiﬁ cation, as provided 
in section 10 of Kannur University Act, 1996.
Applications in hard copy and soft copy (by e mail only) with bio data, 
proof of experience, qualiﬁ cations etc., in the attached format should 
reach the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Higher Education 
Department, Government Secretariat, Annexe II. Fourth Floor, 
Thiruvananthapuram - 695001 and highereducationbdepartment@
gmail.com on or before 5 PM on 30.11.2021.
Sd/-
Dr. Venu, IAS
Additional Chief Secretary
Higher Education, Environment
Archaeology, Archives & Museum Departments.”
5. It appears that in the meantime, the Minister for Higher Education 
and Social Justice in her capacity as the Pro-Chancellor addressed a letter 
to the Governor/Chancellor dated 22.11.2021 recommending reappointment 
of the respondent No. 4 herein for a second term as the Vice-Chancellor of 
the University. The letter dated 22.11.2021 reads thus:
“D.O. LETTER NO. 401/2021/M (H.Edn & SJ) DATED
22/11/2021
Honourable
Governor,
Kind attention of Honourable Governor is invited to the fact that the 
term of oﬃ  ce of Ex. Vice Chancellor of Kannur University is ending 
on November 23,2021 Notiﬁ cation for the selection of new Vice 
Chancellor was issued on November 1.2021.
389
Dr. Gopinath Raveendran is currently holding the post of Vice 
Chancellor. He is an eminent academician and able administrator. He 
has ushered the University to greater heights. A learned professor with 
an excellent academic record, he was Professor of History of Jamia 
Millia Islamia, Delhi. He has also been Academic Visitor, Dept. of 
Social Police, London School of Economics and Political Science and 
has administrative experience as Honorary Director, Nelson Mandela 
Centre for Peace and Conﬂ ict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia and 
as Member secretary, ICHR. He has indeed been an asset to Kannur 
University, an institution still in its infancy.
The remarkable achievements of the university in academic rating 
is the result of the hard work put in by the faculty and staﬀ  of the 
University under the able leadership of Dr. Gopinath Raveendran. 
The NAAC has upgraded the status of the University from B to B. He 
was instrumental in digitizing the University by introducing Digital 
Document Filling System (DDFS) and enthusiastically directed the 
University to amend its status in tune with UGC Regulations, 2018. 
He also initiated steps for starting a separate Research Directorate 
with the aim of improving research standards in the University. 
During his tenure, the University signed several MOUs with reputed 
national and international organization. Under his stewardship, the 
University also started a Business incubation Centre and established 
an Institution’s
Innovation Council to encourage the innovative 
potential of researchers and students. 
Kannur University under his able leadership, rose to eminence as one 
of the premier university in the country. It is therefore my considered 
opinion that Dr. Gopinath Raveendran may be allowed to continue 
for another term as Vice Chancellor. Its continuation will immensely 
beneﬁ t Kannur University Section 10 (10) of Kannur University Act 
provides for the reappointment of incumbent Vice Chancellor for a 
second term and· does not stipulate any restriction on age.
I request your Excellency to be pleased to cancel the notiﬁ cation dated 
27.10.20 appointing a Search-cum-Selection committee for identifying 
the person to be appointed as Vice Chancellor. I also request Your 
Excellency’s pleasure in cancelling the notiﬁ cation dated 1.11. 2021 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
390 
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[2023] 16 S.C.R.
and in re-appointing Dr. Gopinath Raveendran for a continuous second 
term as Vice Chancellor of Kannur University. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Dr. R. Bindu
Minister for Higher Education and
Social Justice and Pro-Chancellor
Sri Arif Mohammed Khan
Excellency The Governor of Kerala Bhavan”
6. It is pertinent to note that on the very same day and date i.e., 
22.11.2021, the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government, recalled 
the Notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 referred to above. The Notiﬁ cation dated 
22.11.2021 recalling the earlier Notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 inviting 
applications from the eligible candidates reads thus: 
“

NOTIFICATION

DATED: 22.11.2021
The notiﬁ cation no. B2/88/2021/H.EDN dated 01/11/2021 inviting 
application for the selection of Vice-Chancellor to Kannur University 
is withdrawn.
Dr. V. Venu, IAS
Additional Chief Secretary to Government.
Higher Education Department.”
7. On 22.11.2021, the Pro-Chancellor/Minister for Higher Education 
addressed one another letter to the Chancellor which reads thus: 
“D.O. LETTER NO. 406/2021/M (H.Edn & SJ) DATED
22/11/2021
Honourable Chancellor,
The term of Dr. Gopinath Raveendran, Vice Chancellor of Kannur 
University will cease on 23 November 2021.
As per D.O. No. GS3-1283/2021 dated 22.11.2021 from the oﬃ  ce of
391
your Excellency, steps have been taken to withdraw notiﬁ cation inviting 
applications to select a Vice Chancellor for Kannur University. As 
Pro Chancellor of Kannur University. I consider it my privilege to 
propose the name of Dr. Gopinath Raveendran, the present incumbent 
Vice Chancellor to be re-appointed as Vice Chancellor of Kannur 
University for a second continuous term beginning from 24.11.2021.

Thank you,
Sincerely,
Dr. R. Bindu
Pro-Chancellor, Kannur University
Minister for Higher Education
Sri Arif Mohammed Khan
His Excellency, The Governor of Kerala
Chancellor, Kannur University.”
8. Ultimately the ﬁ nal notiﬁ cation came to be issued dated 23.11.2021 
by order of the Governor/Chancellor reappointing the respondent No. 4 
herein as Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University for a period of four 
years w.e.f. 24.11.2021. The Notiﬁ cation dated 23.01.2021 reads thus:
“GOVERNMENT’S SECRETARIAT
KERALA RAJ BHAVAN
NOTIFICATION
No.GS3.1283/2021(3)
Dated: Thiruvananthapuram 23rd November, 2021
In exercise of the powers conferred under the Kannur University 
Act, 1996 and the UGC Regulations, 2018, the Chancellor of the 
University is pleased to re-appoint Dr. Gopinath Ravindran (Professor, 
Department of History, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi) as the Vice 
Chancellor of the Kannur University, for a period of four years, with 
eﬀ ect from 24th November, 2021. 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
392 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
By order of the Government/Chancellor
(Dr. Davendra Kumar Dhodawat, IAS)
Principal Secretary to Government/Chancellor.”
9. The above referred Notiﬁ cation dated 23.11.2021 was made the 
subject matter of challenge by the appellants herein before a learned Single 
Judge of the High Court. The challenge to the notiﬁ cation referred to above, 
reappointing the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor for a further term 
of four years was essentially on two grounds. First, in view of Section 
10(9) of the Act 1996, no person who is more than sixty years of age can be 
appointed as Vice-Chancellor. In other words, the outer age limit for being 
appointed as the Vice-Chancellor of the University being sixty years, the 
respondent No. 4 could not have been reappointed as the Vice-Chancellor 
having crossed the age of sixty years. Secondly, even for the purpose of 
reappointment, the entire procedure necessary for being appointed as the 
Vice-Chancellor for the ﬁ rst time should have been undertaken. In other 
words, the procedure prescribed in Section 10 of the Act 1996 ought to have 
been followed even at the time of reappointment. 
B. RELEVANT OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE LD. SINGLE 
JUDGE
10. As noted above, the challenge before the learned Single Judge 
failed. The writ petition came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge 
holding as under: 
“6. From the perusal of the provisions of Section 10, it is evident 
that Vice-Chancellor can
be appointed by Chancellor on the 
recommendation of the committee appointed by him which consists 
of three members with one elected by Senate, another by Chairman of 
the University Grants Commission and third by the Chancellor. The 
chancellor shall appoint one of the members of the committee to his 
convenience and committee shall make its recommendation within a 
period of three months of appointment. University is not precluded 
to unanimously recommend the name of only one person and in that 
process, Chancellor shall appoint that person to be Vice- Chancellor, 
but, it may submit a panel of three names within the period and the Vice-

393
Chancellor shall be appointed from among the persons in the panel. 
The aforementioned procedure at the time of the initial appointment, 
for a period of four years, in 2017 was followed. The ﬁ rst term was 
expiring after the completion of four years and it is in that background, 
notice Ext.P2 was published but the Secretary of Department of Higher 
Education notiﬁ ed of withdrawal with immediate eﬀ ect, for as per 
provisions of Sub section (10), Vice-Chancellor can be re-appointed, 
but the term is restricted to two (2).
It is now to be seen as to whether on the basis of statutory procedure 
provided in the Act ibid and on analysis of judgments cited, can this 
Court interfere in the process of appointment or not.
xxx

xxx
xxx
10. The expression ‘appointment’ and ‘re-appointment’ have 
different connotation; for undergoing the re-appointment the 
qualifications are prescribed under Clause 7.3 of the UGC 
regulations ibid and there is no age bar and for reappointment, 
criteria of age would not be applicable. No doubt, for 
appointment, the entire procedure prescribed under Section 10 
is to be followed. At the time of the initial appointment, in the 
year 2007, all the parameters were considered for appointment 
as per the procedure laid down therein but for re-appointment 
as per proviso to sub-Section (10) there is no requirement for 
undertaking the task of constitution of a Selection Committee as 
was done during the initial appointment. As per the pleading and 
submissions, there has not been any incident or lack of integrity, 
transparency as provided in the UGC regulations. Considering 
the provisions of applicable laws to my mind, notice Ext.P2 was 
withdrawn vide Ext.P3 on 22.11.2021 for the simple reason the 
party respondent i.e., the 4th respondent was not disqualified at 
the time of initial appointment. It cannot be said that there was 
any violation of the statutory provisions for reconsideration for 
the purpose of re-appointment, thus, in such circumstances, writ 
of quo-warranto cannot be issued.”
(Emphasis supplied)
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
394 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
C.  RELEVANT OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE DIVISION 
BENCH  IN APPEAL.
11. The writ appeal ﬁ led by the appellants herein before the Division 
Bench of the High Court also failed. The Division Bench in its impugned 
judgment held as under: 
“20. On an analysis of the said provision, it is clear that the Vice- 
Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor on the recommendation 
of a committee appointed by him for the purpose. In the case on hand, 
the appointment of the 4th respondent in the year 2017 for a period 
of 4 years in contemplation of sub-Section 10 of Section 10, and in 
contemplation of law is admitted. It is also an ·admitted fact that the 
eligibility and qualiﬁ cation of the 4th respondent at the initial stage of 
appointment is undoubted. It is also quite clear and evident from the 
provisions of Section 10 that a clear cut procedure and modalities are 
prescribed in the said provision to select the Vice Chancellor.
21. One of the important aspects that is to be noted is that as per sub-
Section 9 of Section 10, it is clearly speciﬁ ed that no person who is more 
than sixty years of age shall be appointed as Vice-Chancellor. But, when 
it comes to sub-Section 10 of Section 10, it is made explicit that the Vice-
Chancellor shall hold oﬃ  ce for a term of four years from the date on which 
he enters upon his oﬃ  ce and shall be eligible for re-appointment. However, 
interdiction is made as per the proviso thereto, by
making it clear that, a 
person shall not be appointed as Vice Chancellor for more than 2 terms. 
It is signiﬁ cant to note that sub-Section 10 of Section 10 of Act, 1996 is 
conjunctive in nature and not distinctive. Which thus means, the statute 
itself has made a clear cut procedure with respect to the re-appointment 
and has made it clear that the Vice Chancellor who holds the oﬃ  ce for 
a term of 4 years consequent to the initial appointment, shall be eligible 
for re-appointment.
22. No doubt, if there is any manner of shortcomings on the part of 
the Vice Chancellor initially appointed, so as to aﬀ ect the academic 
excellence, moral issues or otherwise to have any adverse consequence 
to hold the post of Vice Chancellor, it would be diﬀ erent. But, this 
is a case where the appellants have not raised any sort of such 
allegations against the 4th respondent. Merely because a notiﬁ cation

395
was issued to conduct a selection, that by itself will not dissuade the 
Government/Chancellor to recommend and re-appoint the existing 
Vice Chancellor.”
xxx

xxx
xxx
30. Therefore, after assimilating the factual and legal situations and 
understanding the issues, we are of the considered opinion that in the 
matter of re-appointment, the age bar prescribed under Section 10(9) 
for appointment of the Vice Chancellor would not come into play, 
because the Vice Chancellor who has appointed before attaining the 
age of 60 years, is entitled to continue for a term of four years and 
shall be eligible for re-appointment.
31. Taking into account all the above intrinsic aspects with regard to 
the appointment of the Vice Chancellor, eligibility, qualiﬁ cation etc., 
and also the relevant inputs of the UGC Regulations, 2018, we have no 
hesitation to hold that the learned single Judge was right in dismissing 
the writ petition. Even though various contentions were advanced 
and several judgments were cited by the respective Senior Counsel 
in regard to the intricacies of issuance of a writ of quo warranto, we 
are not inclined to go into that question, since we ﬁ nd that the re- 
appointment of the 4th respondent was made in accordance with law, 
and therefore he can never be said to be an usurper to the post. Having 
rendered the ﬁ ndings as above, the arguments advanced strenuously 
by the learned Senior Counsel Sri. George Poonthottam, relying upon 
the term ‘eligibility’, contained under Section 10(10) of the Act 1996 
in the matter of making reappointment by referring to various legal 
dictionaries, we do not ﬁ nd much force in the same.
32. Before we part with the judgment, it is only appropriate that the 
Press release issued by the oﬃ  ce of the Chancellor (Honourable 
Governor) of the University is discussed. On a perusal of Annexure 
A2 Press Release dated 03.02.2022, it is clear that right from the 
publication of selection notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 issued on behalf 
of the selection committee uptill the reappointment are narrated.
33. Be that as it may, it is clearly speciﬁ ed in the Press Release that 
on 23rd November, 2021, Kerala Raj Bhavan issued a notiﬁ cation re-
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
396 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
appointing the 4th respondent as the Vice Chancellor of the Kannur 
University. Other aspects are also dealt with in the Press Release, 
which we do not propose to traverse through, being unnecessary.
34. Taking into account the factual and legal circumstances deliberated 
above, we are of the clear and considered opinion that the appellants 
have not made out any case of jurisdictional error or other legal 
inﬁ rmities susceptible to be interfered with in the judgment of the 
learned single Judge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants (original 
writ petitioners) are here before this Court with the present appeal. 
D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT(S) 
13. Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu and Mr. George Poonthottam, the 
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants made the following 
submissions: -
a. 
The impugned judgment proceeds on an erroneous assumption 
that once an appointment to the post of Vice-Chancellor is 
made through proper channel, the reappointment of the same 
incumbent to such oﬃ  ce upon expiry of the ﬁ rst term can be 
made bypassing the original procedure prescribed, including the 
constitution of a Search-cum-Selection Committee as mandated 
by the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualiﬁ cations 
for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in 
Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of 
Standards in Higher Education)
Regulations, 2018 (for short, ‘the 
UGC Regulations’). While doing so the High Court has assumed 
that there is a distinction in procedure for ‘appointment’ and 
‘reappointment’, whereas there is no such distinction recognised 
under the service law jurisprudence. 
b. 
If the impugned judgment is to be upheld, then for reappointment 
as a Vice-Chancellor under the proviso to Section 10(10) of the 
Kannur University Act, there is no requirement for undertaking 
the exercise of forming and consulting the Selection Committee
397
as mandated under the UGC Regulations and as was done during 
the initial appointment. Going by this rationale, a person can be 
reappointed, even though there may be better qualiﬁ ed and more 
deserving candidates eligible and qualiﬁ ed to hold the oﬃ  ce. This 
obviously is not the letter and spirit of the Kannur University Act 
and the UGC Regulations, which aims at providing the highest 
standards of education. In such circumstances, it is essential to follow 
the entire selection process, even in cases of reappointment. 
c. 
On the date of reappointment i.e., 24.11.2021, the respondent 
No. 4 had crossed the age of 60 years which is the outer age 
limit for being appointed to the post of Vice-Chancellor under 
Section 10(9) of the Kannur University Act. Therefore, the 
respondent No. 4 was not eligible for being reappointed as the 
Vice-Chancellor in 2021.
d. 
The notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 was withdrawn only with a 
view to overcome the hurdle of the age limit, and thereby, bypass 
the prescribed procedure for appointment. 
e. 
Section 10(10) of the Kannur University Act is very speciﬁ c 
and clear. The language of the provision unequivocally 
spells out the legislative intent that if a person is once given 
an appointment, it would only enable him an opportunity to 
be considered for fresh appointment for one more term. The 
express language of the provision does not grant a candidate, 
who is already appointed as the Vice-Chancellor, to evade 
the mandatory
eligibility criteria and to be appointed as the 
Vice- Chancellor again. The distinction drawn by the High 
Court between the terms “appointment” and “reappointment” 
relying on Section 10(10) is totally perverse.
f. 
The High Court erred in proceeding on the premise that since 
the respondent No. 4 was eligible for appointment on the ﬁ rst 
occasion, he was also entitled for reappointment and thus 
the entire process for appointment need not be undertaken 
afresh. This appears to be the logic behind the withdrawal of 
Notiﬁ cations calling for fresh applications. 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
398 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
g. 
The High Court ought to have appreciated that the constitution of 
the Select Committee and preparation by the panel is prerequisite 
for the appointment of Vice-Chancellor of University. If the 
contention that the UGC Regulations do not impose any age 
restriction for appointment as the Vice-Chancellor is accepted, 
then the UGC Regulations do not provide for the reappointment 
of the Vice-Chancellor as well. 
h. 
Section 10(10) of the Kannur University Act contemplates 
reappointment and not an extension of the term of the Vice-
Chancellor. For this reason, the notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 
was issued calling for applications from eligible candidates for 
the post of Vice-Chancellor. The said notiﬁ cation stipulated that 
the candidate must satisfy the eligibility criteria mentioned in 
Clause 7.3(i) of the UGC Regulations, and should not be more 
than 60 years of age on the date of issuing the notiﬁ cation. When 
appointment is made by virtue of Section 10(10), the law does not 
provide an exemption to be followed in the case of an incumbent 
who is holding the post of Vice-Chancellor. 
i. 
The reliance placed by the High Court on the decisions of the 
Rajasthan High Court and Jammu & Kashmir High Court, in its 
impugned judgment is not correct as the two High Courts had 
failed to take into consideration the UGC Regulations which 
provides for the method and procedure for appointment of the 
Vice-Chancellor. The
appointment of the Vice-Chancellor can 
only be done in accordance with the procedure as laid therein 
and the central legislation fully occupies the issue. 
j. 
The reappointment was based on the request of the State 
Government and not on any independent evaluation. Such a 
request is wholly unwarranted as the State Government has no 
say in the appointment or reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor. 
k. 
The initial appointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-
Chancellor was also contrary to the provisions of the UGC 
Regulations 2010 more particularly Clause 7.3, which stipulates 
that the appointment shall be made after following the due process 
of identiﬁ cation of 3 to 5 names by the Search-cum-Selection
399
Committee. However, the minutes of the Search-cum-Selection 
Committee dated 20.11.2017 indicates that only one single name, 
i.e., the name of respondent No. 4, was recommended. Hence, the 
initial appointment itself being void ab initio, the reappointment 
is also void.
14. With a view to fortify the aforesaid submissions the learned Senior 
Counsel placed reliance on the following decisions: 
(i) 
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (First Judges Case), 1981 Supp 
SCC 87,
(ii) State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das, 2022 SCC OnLine 
SC 1382, 
(iii) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, 1992 
Supp (2) SCC 351,
(iv) Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, (2022) 5 SCC 179, 
(v) Professor (Dr.) Sreejith P.S. v. Dr. Rajasree M.S., 2022 SCC 
OnLine SC 1473, 
(vi)  Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 
526,
(vii) Dept. of Commerce v. US House of Representatives, 1999 SCC 
OnLine US SC 10,
15. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned Senior Counsel 
prayed that there being merit in the appeal, the same may be allowed and 
the Notiﬁ cation reappointing the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor 
of the Kannur University be set aside. 
E. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 2 - THE 
STATE OF KERALA
16. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 
State of Kerala made the following submissions: 
a. 
The seminal issue which arises in the present case is the conﬂ ict 
between the provisions of the UGC
Regulations, which is a 
subordinate legislation made under Section 26(1)(e) and (g) 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
400 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
respectively of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 
(‘UGC Act’), and the State laws made under Entry 25 of List 
III dealing with education.
b. 
The UGC Regulations make express provisions for the manner 
in which a selection has to be made for the appointment of a 
Vice-Chancellor through a Search-cum-Selection Committee 
consisting of persons of eminence in the sphere of higher 
education and who are not connected in any manner with the 
University concerned or its colleges. The Visitor/Chancellor 
shall appoint the Vice-Chancellor out of the Panel of three-ﬁ ve 
names recommended by the Search-cum-Selection Committee. 
c. 
The diﬀ erent state laws made under Entry 25 of List III dealing 
with the same subject have provisions which give a dominant 
status to the State Governments, and do not provide for the 
identical procedure provided for by the UGC Regulations. 
d. 
It has been held recently, in a judgment of this Court in 
Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) (2 Judges) which is followed 
in Anindya Sundar Das (supra) (2 Judges), that the UGC 
Regulations form a part of the UGC Act, 1956 for the reason 
that it requires that the regulations made under the Act shall be 
laid before the Parliament. Even though Section 26 of the UGC 
Act does not provide for these regulations being part of the Act, 
nevertheless the Court held that the mere fact of laying would 
result in the regulations being made part of the Act.
e. 
A catena
of judgments of this Court have held to the same eﬀ ect. 
What has been missed in holding so is that the subordinate 
legislation, whether of rules or regulations, could be read as 
part of the Act, but, for diﬀ erent purposes. The real eﬀ ect of 
this statement of the law is that Article 254 of the Constitution 
would have to be read as – where a law made by Parliament as 
well as the regulations or rules made under any Central Act is 
repugnant to the provisions of a law made by the legislature of 
a State, the law made by Parliament as well as the regulations or 
rules made under any Central Act will prevail. The provision will 
now mean that the law made by Parliament, or the regulations or
401
rules made under any Central Act, if repugnant to the law made 
by the legislature of a State, then the law made by the State, to 
the extent of the repugnancy, shall be void. 
f. 
By reading as aforesaid, the consequences would be far reaching. 
For this purpose, one should look at the very nature and source 
of making regulations or rules under the Central Act. The 
Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 
would allocate the particular subject of the Act to a particular 
minister, who would then have to decide on what the rule should 
be. It is possible, as in the case of the UGC Act, that many of the 
provisions made in the rules or regulations may not ﬁ nd a place 
in the body of the Act, and, the only provision, which could be 
possibly invoked would be the main provision of sub-section 
(1) of the rule making section, in which it would be stated that 
the regulations or rules may be made for the purposes of the 
Act. In the case of the UGC Act, the regulation making power 
is conferred upon the UGC, a statutory body acting under the 
Government, and not on the Government itself. 
g. 
The result is that a vast unbridled arbitrary power is vested in 
the executive where no deﬁ nite guidelines are provided for in 
any particular section of the Act, and where the Act is totally 
silent on the aspects that are covered by the legislations. Such 
an arbitrary unguided power by itself would violate Article 14 
of the Constitution of India, and the
regulation making power 
would have to be struck down. 
h. 
Additionally, the procedure and method of making regulations 
or rules which have to be laid before the House is contained in 
Rule 235 of “the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business 
in Lok Sabha”, which states: “The Speaker shall, in consultation 
with the Leader of the House, ﬁ x a day or days or part of a day 
as the Speaker may think ﬁ t for the consideration and passing of 
an amendment to such regulation, rule, sub-rule, bye-law etc., 
of which notice may be given by a member:” 
i. 
In ‘Parliamentary Procedure: Law Privileges Practice and 
Precedents’ by Subhash C. Kashyap, Third Edition Page 596, 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
402 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
it is stated that where a statute provides that rules shall be laid 
before Parliament and shall be subject to a modiﬁ cation made 
by Parliament, if a member gives a notice for modiﬁ cation of the 
Rules, the Government is bound to ﬁ nd time for discussion of the 
motion. The motion for modiﬁ cation contains a recommendation 
to the Rajya Sabha for concurrence, and the eﬀ ect of the passing 
of the motion by both the Houses is that the Government is bound 
to amend the rules accordingly.
j. 
It has been held in the judgment in Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) 
that the UGC regulations, though not so stated in the UGC Act, 
are part of the UGC Act, and hence, would prevail over the 
repugnant sections of the State Act, which would be rendered 
void to the extent of the repugnancy. 
k. 
A series of judgments of this Court state that subordinate 
legislation becomes a part of the Act, even though the section 
itself does not say so. These include State of U.P. v. Babu Ram 
Upadhya, (1961) 2 SCR 679, Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. 
Union of India, 1959 SCR 12, U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. NTPC 
Ltd., (2009) 6 SCC 235, Udai Singh Dagar v. Union of India, 
(2007) 10 SCC 306, and State of T.N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 
SCC 205. 
l. 
On the other hand, there is a line of judgments which states that 
unless the Act provides that the rules be deemed as enacted in 
the Act, a provision of the rule cannot be read as a part of the 
Act. This includes
Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P., 1993 Supp (4) 
SCC 536, Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, (2016) 3 
SCC 183, and State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah, (1967) 2 SCR 
361.
m. 
 None among these aspects which are crucial to the interpretation 
of Article 254 of the Constitution have been considered anywhere 
in the judgments on this issue, of whether the UGC Regulations 
are equivalent to the laws made by Parliament or not. This being 
so, the judgments being sub silentio, would not have any binding 
precedent.
403
n. 
The judgments of this Court relating to the UGC Act in 
Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) and Anindya Sundar Das (supra) 
are sub silentio and would not have any binding precedent, as 
great violence is being done to the Constitution, far beyond the 
intention of the founding fathers of the Constitution.
The reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Municipal 
Corpn. of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101, para 12 and State of 
U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, para 41.
F. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 
3 - KANNUR UNIVERSITY
17. Mr. Shailesh Madiyal, the learned counsel appearing for the Kannur 
University made the following submissions: 
a. 
The High Court has rightly observed that the age bar prescribed 
under Section 10(9) for appointment of the Vice-Chancellor 
would not be applicable at the time of reappointment as the 
Vice-Chancellor who was appointed before attaining the age of 
60 years, is entitled to continue for a term of four years and shall 
be eligible for reappointment under Section 10(10) of the Act 
1996. 
b. 
Section 10(9) of the Act 1996, clearly speciﬁ es that no person 
who is more than sixty years of age shall be appointed as Vice-
Chancellor. But, when it comes to Section 10(10) of the Act 1996, 
it states that the Vice-Chancellor shall hold oﬃ  ce for a term of 
four years from the date on which he enters upon his oﬃ  ce and 
shall be eligible for reappointment. However, the proviso makes 
it
clear that a person shall not be appointed as Vice-Chancellor 
for more than 2 terms. Section 10(10) of the Act should be read 
conjunctively and not distinctively. The statute itself has provided 
for the procedure with respect to the reappointment and has made 
it clear that the Vice-Chancellor holding oﬃ  ce shall be eligible 
for reappointment. The other eligibility criteria prescribed do not, 
therefore apply to ‘reappointment’ under Section 10(10). Hence, 
the reappointment is not to be considered as a fresh appointment 
upon completion of the ﬁ rst term.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
404 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
c. 
The age limit has been ﬁ xed even in the matter of reappointments 
in the Mahatma Gandhi University Act, 1985; Kerala Agricultural 
University Act, 1971; APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University 
Act, 2015; and the Thunchath Ezhuthachan Malayalam University 
Act, 2013. Therefore, the statute would explicitly specify the age 
limit in case of reappointments and when the statue does not 
provide for it, the age limit prescribed for appointment cannot 
be applied even in the case of reappointments.
G. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 
4 – VICE CHANCELLOR.
18. Mr. Basavaprabhu S. Patil, the learned Senior Counsel appearing 
for the respondent No. 4 made the following submissions: 
a. 
The questions of law, as formulated by the appellants are 
procedural in nature. 
b. 
This Court in Anindya Sundar Das (supra) on similar facts 
concerning reappointment of Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta 
University, clariﬁ ed that reappointment does not entail the 
same procedural formalities as appointment and there is a clear 
distinction in law between the two.
c. 
The High Court proceeded on the correct premise that Section 
10(10) read with Clause 7.3 of the UGC Regulations only 
prescribes the procedure for the initial appointment to the post 
of Vice-Chancellor. The respondent No. 4 at the time of initial 
appointment fulﬁ lled all the necessary qualiﬁ cations required to 
be appointed, and therefore, even at the time of reappointment
such eligibility conditions stood fulﬁ lled. Clause 7.3 does not 
talk of reappointment and thus would not be applicable to 
the respondent No. 4 since the reappointment was not a fresh 
appointment by any stretch of imagination. 
d. 
Section 10(9) and Section 10(10) respectively are two separate 
& distinct provisions and as such should be read conjunctively 
and not disjunctively. 
e. 
Neither Section 10(10) nor the UGC Regulation prescribe for 
any limitation on reappointment of a person as Vice-Chancellor.
405
Section 10 (9) only speciﬁ es that no person shall be ‘appointed’ 
as Vice- Chancellor above the age of 60. The term reappointment 
has, in the wisdom of the legislature, not been used in the Statute 
for the express purpose that Section 10(10) existed and to 
facilitate the continuation of eligible, qualiﬁ ed and experienced 
person on such post. 
H. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 
1- CHANCELLOR 
19. The learned Attorney General for India appearing for the Chancellor 
made the following submissions: 
a. 
The plain reading of regulation 7.3, indicates that the selection 
of Vice- Chancellor should be through proper scrutiny of merit 
by a panel of 3 to 5 persons (Search-cum-Selection Committee) 
through a public notification. The Search-cum-Selection 
Committee should be of persons of eminence in the sphere of 
Higher Education and the members should not be in any manner 
connected with the university concerned or its colleges. The 
Regulations further mandate that one of the members of the 
Search-cum-Selection Committee shall be nominated by the 
UGC for selection of Vice-Chancellor of State. In the present 
case, Regulation No. 7.3 of the UGC Regulations has not been 
complied with at all and therefore on this ground alone the 
reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor 
should be cancelled by a writ of quo-warranto. 
b. 
The State Government having adopted the UGC Regulations, the 
Regulations made by the Parliament under Entry 25 of
List III 
shall prevail over the State legislation. Once the UGC Regulations 
prescribe the procedure and method for appointment of Vice- 
Chancellor, the University has to comply with the Regulations, 
which has not been followed in the present case. Therefore, the 
High Court erred in not following the UGC Guidelines.
20. The learned Attorney General invited the attention of this Court 
to a press release issued by the Kerala Raj Bhavan dated 03.02.2022 which 
is at Annexure P-18 at page 136:
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
406 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
“03 February 2022
PRESS RELEASE
Kannur Varsity: Facts grossly distorted.
Kerala Raj Bhavan strongly refutes the claim in some news reports 
that it was on the direction of Hon’ble Governor that the name of 
Dr. Gopinath Ravindran was suggested for reappointment as Vice 
Chancellor, Kannur University. The truth is that the same was initiated 
by the Chief Minister and Higher Education Minister.
To set the record straight, Raj Bhavan would like to place the 
chronology of events on the 21st, 22nd and 23rd of November, 2021.
The tenure of the Vice Chancellor, Kannur University was to end 
on the 23rd of November. A selection committee had already been 
constituted vide notiﬁ cation dated 27.10.2021 to select and appoint 
a new Vice Chancellor.
The Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education Department, 
Government of Kerala had also issued a notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 
on behalf of the Selection Committee to invite the applications to the 
post of the Vice Chancellor.
While this process was on 21st November 2021, as deputed by Chief 
Minister, Shri K.K. Raveendranath, Legal Adviser to Chief Minister, 
met Hon’ble Governor at Kerala Raj Bhavan at 11.30 am. He conveyed 
to Hon’ble Governor, the Government’s desire to reappoint Dr. 
Gopinath Ravindran as Vice Chancellor and informed that a formal 
request to this eﬀ ect from the Minister for Higher Education was on 
the way to Raj Bhavan.
Hon’ble Governor, who had a diﬀ erent view
on the matter, informed 
him that the proposal appeared legally untenable since the due process 
of selection was already in motion. On this, the Legal Advisor informed 
that the Government has examined the matter in detail and that the 
request was legally sound to withstand any legal scrutiny. He informed 
that Government had the legal advice and produced some typed papers.
Hon’ble Governor inquired about its source, as it was unsigned.
407
The Legal Advisor to the Chief Minister said it was the opinion of the 
Advocate General of Kerala and repeated the plea to consider the 
request of the Government to reappoint Dr. Gopinath Ravindran as 
Vice Chancellor, Kannur University.
At this juncture, Hon’ble Governor said the instant opinion said to 
be from Advocate General but without his signature and seal, was of 
no signiﬁ cance.
To this, the Legal Advisor said that he will produce the legal opinion 
bearing the signature and seal of Advocate General without delay.
As submitted by Legal Advisor to the Chief Minister earlier, a letter 
written by Dr. R. Bindu, Minister for Higher Education reached Raj 
Bhavan at 01.30 pm on 22.11.2021. The letter had highlighted Dr. 
Gopinath Ravindran’s capabilities and desirability to be appointed 
for another term as Vice Chancellor.
In this letter, she had clearly requested Hon’ble Chancellor to “be 
pleased to cancel the notiﬁ cation dated 27.10.2021 appointing a 
Search-Cum-Selection Committee for identifying the person to be 
appointed as Vice Chancellor”.
She also requested Hon’ble Chancellor’s “pleasure in cancelling 
the notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 and in re-appointing Dr Gopinath 
Ravindran for a continuous second term as Vice Chancellor of Kannur 
University”.
On 22nd November by 12.10 pm, Shri R. Mohan, Oﬃ  cer on Special 
Duty to Chief Minister and the Legal Advisor to Chief Minister had met 
the Hon’ble Governor, repeated their request and in support,
submitted 
the signed legal opinion of the Advocate General which was addressed 
to the Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education Department.
This opinion of the Advocate General substantially endorsed the 
request made earlier by Legal Advisor to Chief Minister in the personal 
meeting with the Governor and the request of the Higher Education 
Minister in her letter.
The eight-page opinion of the Advocate General which is addressed 
to the Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education Department says 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
408 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
that there was no legal bar in reappointing Dr. Gopinath Ravindran as 
Vice Chancellor, Kannur University, and that the age bar of 60 years 
ﬁ xed in the Kannur University Act, in as much as the same is contrary 
to the UGC Regulations, is without the authority of law and as such, 
inapplicable. The Advocate General summed up his opinion as under:-
“1. If the Hon’ble Chancellor accepts this recommendation, the 
notiﬁ cation dated 27.10.2021, appointing a Search Committee for 
identifying the person to be appointed as Vice Chancellor of the Kannur 
University may be withdrawn.
2. Pro-Chancellor may be permitted to submit necessary proposal 
for the re-appointment of the present incumbent of the post of Vice-
Chancellor of the Kannur University as Vice Chancellor of the said 
University for a further continuous term of four years”.
This opinion of the Advocate General was also forwarded separately 
to Kerala Raj Bhavan by the Minister for Higher Education on 
22.11.2021 itself.
In the light of the legal opinion thus received from the Advocate 
General, the ﬁ le was processed and Hon’ble Governor agreed to 
accept the proposal of the Higher Education Minister.
At 04.30 pm, Principal Secretary to Governor wrote to Additional 
Chief Secretary, Higher Education, conveying the decision of 
the Hon’ble Chancellor “to withdraw the Notification dated 
27.10.2021 and subsequent Corrigendum dated 03.11.2021” and 
“to permit the State
Government to submit necessary proposal 
for the reappointment of the present incumbent in the post of Vice 
Chancellor Kannur University”.
At 10.10 pm on the same day Kerala Raj Bhavan received the next 
letter from the Minister for Higher Education, informing that “steps 
have been taken to withdraw notiﬁ cation inviting applications” and 
that as Pro Chancellor, she was proposing the name of Dr. Gopinath 
Ravindran, the present incumbent Vice Chancellor to be re-appointed 
as Vice Chancellor of Kannur University for a second continuous term 
beginning from 24.11.2021.
409
Accordingly, on 23rd November, 2021, Kerala Raj Bhavan issued 
notiﬁ cation reappointing Dr. Gopinath Ravindran as Vice Chancellor, 
Kannur University.
Thus, the argument in the news reports that the ‘Minister had only 
proposed a name in response to the Governor’s letter’, is far from the 
truth, which is clear from the chronology of events (which was also 
mentioned in Hon’ble Governor’s letter to Chief Minister on 08th 
December 2021).
In brief, the process of selection of Vice Chancellor, Kannur University 
which was set in motion vide Kerala Raj Bhavan notiﬁ cation dated 
27.10.2021 came to an end consequent to the request from the Minister 
Higher Education, OSD to Chief Minister and Legal Advisor to the 
Chief Minister duly supported by the legal opinion of the Advocate 
General, Kerala, culminated in the reappointment of Dr. Gopinath 
Ravindran as Vice Chancellor, Kannur University.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. In such circumstances, the learned Attorney General for India 
prayed that the reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor 
being contrary to the UGC guidelines, the same deserves to be set at naught 
by issue of writ of quo warranto. 
I. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE KANNUR UNIVERSITY 
ACT, 1996 & THE UGC REGULATIONS, 2018
22. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, 
we must look into the relevant provisions of the Kannur University Act as 
well as the relevant regulations of the UGC. 
23. Section 10 of the Kannur
University Act reads thus: 
“(1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor on 
the recommendation of a committee appointed by him for the purpose 
(hereinafter referred to as the committee).
(2) The committee shall consist of three members, one elected by the 
Senate, one nominated by the Chairman of the University Grants 
Commission and the third nominated by the Chancellor.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
410 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
(3) The Chancellor shall appoint one of the members of the committee 
to be its convener.
(4) The committee shall make its recommendation within a period 
of three months of its appointment or within such further period, not 
exceeding one month, as the Chancellor may specify in this behalf.
(5) In case the committee unanimously recommends the name of only 
one person, the Chancellor shall appoint that person to be the Vice-
Chancellor.
(6) In the case the committee is unable to recommend a name 
unanimously, it may submit a panel of three names to the Chancellor 
within the period specified in or under sub-section (4) and the 
Chancellor shall appoint one of the persons in the panel to be the 
Vice-Chancellor.
(7) In case the committee fails to make a unanimous recommendation 
as provided in sub-section (5) or to submit a panel as provided in sub-
section (6), each member of the committee may submit a panel of three 
names to the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed 
from among the persons mentioned in the panels.
(8) Non-submission of a panel under sub-section (7) by any member 
of the committee shall not invalidate the appointment of the Vice-
Chancellor.
(9) No person who is more than sixty years of age shall be appointed 
as Vice-Chancellor.
(10) The Vice-Chancellor shall, hold oﬃ  ce for a term of four years 
from the date on which he enters upon his oﬃ  ce and shall be eligible 
for re-appointment:
Provided
that a person shall not be appointed as Vice-Chancellor
for more than two terms.”
24. Section 10 of the Act 1996 referred to above, envisages distinct 
situations namely: 
(a)  Appointment of a Vice-Chancellor by the Chancellor out of a 
panel of three names recommended by the search committee 
constituted by the State Government;
411
(b)  No person above sixty years of age is eligible to be appointed as 
a Vice-Chancellor; 
(c)  Reappointment in respect of which, the power is vested in the 
Chancellor under Section 10(10); and 
(d)  The proviso attached to sub-section (10) of the Section 10 
stipulating that a person shall not be appointed as Vice-Chancellor 
for more than two terms. 
25. Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations deals with Vice-Chancellors 
and reads as follows: 
“7.3. VICE CHANCELLOR: 
A person possessing the highest level of competence, integrity, morals 
and institutional commitment is to be appointed as Vice-Chancellor. 
The person to be appointed as a Vice-Chancellor should be a 
distinguished academician, with a minimum of ten years’ of experience 
as Professor in a University or ten years’ of experience in a reputed 
research and / or academic administrative organisation with proof of 
having demonstrated academic leadership.
ii. The selection for the post of Vice-Chancellor should be through 
proper identiﬁ cation by a Panel of 3-5 persons by a Search-cum-
Selection-Committee, through a public notiﬁ cation or nomination 
or a talent search process or a combination thereof. The members of 
such Search-cum-Selection Committee shall be persons’ of eminence 
in the sphere of higher education and shall not be connected in 
any manner with the University concerned or its colleges. While 
preparing the panel, the Search cum-Selection Committee shall 
give proper weightage to the
academic excellence, exposure 
to the higher education system in the country and abroad, and 
adequate experience in academic and administrative governance, 
to be given in writing along with the panel to be submitted to 
the Visitor/Chancellor. One member of the Search cum Selection 
Committee shall be nominated by the Chairman, University Grants 
Commission, for selection of Vice Chancellors of State, Private and 
Deemed to be Universities. 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
412 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
iii. The Visitor/Chancellor shall appoint the Vice Chancellor out of the 
Panel of names recommended by the Search-cum-Selection Committee.
iv. The term of oﬃ  ce of the Vice-Chancellor shall form part of the 
service period of the incumbent making him/her eligible for all service 
related beneﬁ ts.” 
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Few salient features of the Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations 
referred to above are thus: 
(a) 
The selection of the Vice-Chancellor should be through proper 
identiﬁ cation by a panel of 3-5 persons by constituting a Search-
cum-Selection Committee through a public notification or 
nomination or a talent search process or a combination of all the 
four.
(b) The members of the Search-cum-Selection Committee should be 
persons of eminence in the ﬁ eld of higher education and they shall 
not be connected in any manner with the university concerned 
or its colleges. 
(c) 
The Selection Committee for the purpose of preparing the panel 
shall give proper weightage to the academic excellence, exposure 
to the higher education system in the country and abroad and 
adequate experience in academic and administrative governance. 
The panel shall place its recommendation before the Chancellor. 
(d) One member of the Selection Committee would be nominated 
by the Chairman, UGC.
J. WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO
27. Quo warranto is a judicial remedy against an intruder or usurper of 
an independent substantive public oﬃ  ce or
franchise or liberty. The usurper 
is asked ‘by what authority’ (quo warranto) he is in such oﬃ  ce, franchise, 
or liberty. A writ of quo warranto thus poses a question to the holder or 
occupier of a public oﬃ  ce, and that question is: “Where is your warrant 
of appointment by which you are holding this oﬃ  ce?” If the answer is not 
satisfactory, the usurper can be ousted by this writ.
413
28. The writ of quo warranto is an ancient Common Law remedy of a 
prerogative nature. It was a writ of right used by the Crown against a person 
claiming any oﬃ  ce, franchise, or liberty to inquire by what authority he was 
in the oﬃ  ce, franchise of liberty. In case his claim was not well founded or 
there was non-use, neglect, misuse, or abuse of the oﬃ  ce, he was to be ousted.
29. Quo warranto is a writ that lies against a person who usurps any 
franchise, liberty, or oﬃ  ce. 
In Corpus Juris Secundum, quo warranto is deﬁ ned thus;
“Quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right to the exercise 
of a franchise or oﬃ  ce and to oust the holder if his claim is not well 
founded, or if he has forfeited his right.”
Blackstone, states: “The ancient writ of quo warranto was in the 
nature of a writ of right for the King against any oﬃ  ce, franchise or liberty 
of the Crown to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order 
to determine the right.”
30. Quo warranto is a remedy or procedure whereby the State inquires 
into the legality of the claim which a party asserts to an oﬃ  ce or franchise, 
and to oust him from its enjoyment if the claim be not well founded, or 
to have the same declared forfeited and recover it, if, having once been 
rightfully possessed and enjoyed; it has become forfeited for mis-user or 
non-user.
31. In B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N. and Another reported in (2001) 
7 SCC 231, after referring to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Words
and 
Phrases and leading decisions on the point, it was observed that a writ of quo 
warranto is a writ which lies against the person who is not entitled to hold 
an oﬃ  ce of public nature and is only a usurper of the oﬃ  ce. Quo warranto 
is directed to such person who is required to show by what authority he is 
entitled to hold the oﬃ  ce. The challenge can be made on various grounds, 
including the ground that the possessor of the oﬃ  ce does not fulﬁ ll the 
required qualiﬁ cations or suﬀ ers from any disqualiﬁ cation, which debars 
him to hold such oﬃ  ce. It was further stated that on being called upon to 
establish valid authority to hold a public oﬃ  ce, if such person fails to do so, 
a writ of quo warranto shall be directed against him. It shall be no defence 
by the holder of the oﬃ  ce that the appointment was made by the competent 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
414 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
authority, who under the law is not answerable to any court for anything 
done in performance of duties of his oﬃ  ce. The question of fulﬁ lling legal 
requirements and qualiﬁ cations necessary to hold a public oﬃ  ce would be 
considered in the proceedings independent of the fact as to who made the 
appointment and the manner in which the appointment was made.
32. Any person may challenge the validity of an appointment of a 
public oﬃ  ce, whether any fundamental or other legal right of his has been 
infringed or not. But the court must be satisﬁ ed that the person so applying 
is bona ﬁ de and there is a necessity in public interest to declare judicially 
that there is a usurpation of public oﬃ  ce. If the application is not bona ﬁ de 
and the applicant is a mere pawn or a man of straw in the hands of others, 
he cannot claim the remedy. Though the applicant may not be an aspirant 
for the oﬃ  ce nor has any interest in appointment, he can apply as a private 
relator, or an ordinary citizen.
33. These rival submissions would need to be analyzed. However, 
before we enter into a substantive analysis of the submissions, it would be 
appropriate to deal with the procedural objection regarding the limits of the 
writ of quo warranto.
34. Through a line of cases, this Court has laid out the terms on which 
the writ of quo warranto may be exercised. In The University of Mysore and 
Anr. v. C.D. Govinda Rao and Anr., a Constitution
Bench of this Court, 
speaking through Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was), held that: (1964) 
4 SCR 575 
“Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding aﬀ ords a judicial remedy 
by which any person, who holds an independent substantive public 
oﬃ  ce or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he 
holds the said oﬃ  ce, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be 
duly determined, and in case the ﬁ nding is that the holder of the oﬃ  ce 
has no title, he would be ousted from that oﬃ  ce by judicial order. 
In other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the judiciary a 
weapon to control the Executive from making appointments to public 
oﬃ  ce against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public 
oﬃ  ce to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect 
the public from usurpers of public oﬃ  ce, who might be allowed to 
continue either with the connivance of the Executive or by reason of
415
its apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can eﬀ ectively 
claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy the Court that the oﬃ  ce 
in question is a public oﬃ  ce and is held by a usurper without legal 
authority, and that inevitably would lead to the enquiry as to whether 
the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance 
with law or not. 
(Emphasis supplied)
35. In High Court of Gujarat and Another v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor 
Panchayat and Ors. reported in (2003) 4 SCC 712, in his concurring opinion 
in a three-Judge Bench, Justice SB Sinha, held that:
“22. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of 
this nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case 
has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of quo 
warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo 
warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ, the Court merely 
makes a public declaration but will not consider the respective impact 
on the candidates or other factors which may be relevant for issuance 
of a writ of certiorari. (See R.K. Jain v. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 
119 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1128 : (1993) 25 ATC 464], SCC para 74.)
23. A writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the appointment 
is contrary to the statutory rules. (See Mor Modern Coop. Transport 
Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy. to Govt. of Haryana (2002) 
6 SCC 269.)”
36. In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban
Water Supply & 
Drainage Board Employees’ Assn. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 731, the 
limitations of the writ of quo warranto were elaborated upon by a two-Judge 
Bench of this Court. The court observed:
“49. … The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo 
warranto is a limited one which can only be issued when the 
appointment is contrary to the statutory rules.
xxx

xxx

xxx
51. It is settled law by a catena of decisions that the court cannot sit 
in judgment over the wisdom of the Government in the choice of the 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
416 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
person to be appointed so long as the person chosen possesses the 
prescribed qualiﬁ cation and is otherwise eligible for appointment. This 
Court in R.K. Jain v. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 119 : 1993 SCC 
(L&S) 1128 : (1993) 25 ATC 464] was pleased to hold that the 
evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates would not be 
gone into a public interest litigation and only in a proceeding initiated 
by an aggrieved person, may it be open to be considered. It was also 
held that in service jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the 
aggrieved person, that is, the non-appointee to assail the legality or 
correctness of the action and that a third party has no locus standi 
to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Further, it was 
declared that public law declaration would only be made at the behest 
of a public-spirited person coming before the court as a petitioner…”
(Emphasis supplied)
37. In Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo 
and Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 161, another two-Judge Bench of this 
Court reiterated that:
“21. …the jurisdiction of the High Court while issuing a writ of quo 
warranto is a limited one and can only be issued when the person 
holding the public oﬃ  ce lacks the eligibility criteria or when the 
appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. That apart, the concept 
of locus standi which is strictly applicable to service jurisprudence 
for the
purpose of canvassing the legality or correctness of the action 
should not be allowed to have any entry, for such allowance is likely 
to exceed the limits of quo warranto which is impermissible. The basic 
purpose of a writ of quo warranto is to confer jurisdiction on the 
constitutional courts to see that a public oﬃ  ce is not held by usurper 
without any legal authority.
(Emphasis supplied)
38. More recently, in Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka and Others 
reported in (2018) 6 SCC 162, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, of which 
one of us (Justice D.Y. Chandrachud) was a part, noted the line of precedent 
clarifying the remit of the writ of quo warranto.
417
39. Through these decisions, the Court has settled the position that 
the writ of quo warranto can be issued where an appointment has not been 
made in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the rival contentions must be 
analyzed by dealing with the scheme of the statutory provisions governing 
the appointment and reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor.
K. QUESTIONS OF LAW FORMULATED.
40. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and 
having gone through the materials on record the following questions of law 
fall for our consideration: 
(i) 
Whether reappointment is permissible in respect of a tenure post?
(ii) Whether the outer age limit of sixty years for the appointment of 
Vice-Chancellor as stipulated under sub-section (9) of Section 
10 of the Act 1996 is to be made applicable even in the case of 
reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor for one more term of four 
years?
(iii) Whether the reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor has to follow 
the same process as a fresh appointment by setting up a selection 
committee under Section 10(1) of the Act 1996?
(iv) Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power of 
reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor?
L. ANALYSIS
i) Whether reappointment is permissible in respect of a Tenure 
Post?
41. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that in the case of a tenure 
post such as the post of Vice-Chancellor, there can be no reappointment. In 
other words, at the end of the tenure the appointment
automatically comes 
to an end and there can only be a fresh appointment and not reappointment. 
42. In the aforesaid context, it is necessary to understand what is meant 
by a “tenure post”. The word “Tenure” is derived from the Latin word tenere 
which means “to hold”. The Black’s Law Dictionary deﬁ nes “tenure” in 
the context of a post or oﬃ  ce as follows [See: Henry Campbell Black on 
“Black’s Law Dictionary”, 1968, 4th Edition Pg. 1639]: - 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
418 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
“TENURE IN OFFICE. Right to perform duties and receive 
emoluments thereof.”
43. This Court in its decision in Dr. L.P. Agarwal (supra), while 
examining what is meant by a “tenure post” held that it is a post where the 
person appointed to it is entitled to continue in it till his term is complete 
unless it is curtailed for justiﬁ able reasons. The relevant observations read 
as under: -
“16. …Tenure means a term during which an oﬃ  ce is held. It is a 
condition of holding the oﬃ  ce. Once a person is appointed to a tenure 
post, his appointment to the said oﬃ  ce begins when he joins and it 
comes to an end on the completion of the tenure unless curtailed on 
justiﬁ able grounds. Such a person does not superannuate, he only goes 
out of the oﬃ  ce on completion of his tenure. …”
44. A similar view as aforesaid was taken by this Court in P. Venugopal 
v. Union of India reported in (2008) 5 SCC 1.
45. In another decision of this Court in J.S. Yadav v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh and Another reported in (2011) 6 SCC 570, it was held that a person 
appointed to a tenure post only goes out once the tenure is completed. The 
relevant observations are reproduced below: -
“17. An employee appointed for a ﬁ xed period under the statute is 
entitled to continue till the expiry of the tenure and in such a case there 
can be no occasion to pass the order of superannuation for the reason 
that the tenure comes to an end automatically by eﬄ  ux
of time….”
46. We are not impressed with the submission canvassed on behalf 
of the appellants that the post of the Vice-Chancellor being a “tenure 
post” reappointment is not permissible. The statute itself has provided for 
reappointment with some object in mind. The ordinary meaning that can 
be ascribed to the term “reappointment” is the act or process of deciding 
essentially that someone should continue in a particular job. Ordinarily, the 
object behind providing for reappointment is twofold. First is “retention” 
i.e., where the incumbent to the oﬃ  ce/post during his term is found to be 
extraordinary and has established himself or herself to be an asset to the 
institution, then in such circumstance, such person is retained with a view 
to allow him to continue on the same post for one more term. Secondly,
419
having regard to the nature of the post the organization or institution may 
not be in a position to ﬁ ll up the post in a time bound manner and in such 
circumstances, the provision for reappointment may enable the organization 
or institution to relieve itself of the tedium of going through the entire 
selection process afresh every time the post becomes vacant.
47. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that reappointment is permissible 
even in case of a tenure post. 
ii) Whether the outer-age limit stipulated under sub-section (9) of 
Section 10 of the Act 1996 is applicable in case of reappointment 
of the Vice-Chancellor?
48. On a plain reading of sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act 
1996, it appears that the person sought to be appointed as a Vice-Chancellor 
must not be more than sixty-years of age at the time of appointment i.e., 
it provides the outer age limit for appointment. While sub-section (10) of 
Section 10 of the Act 1996 provides that upon appointment, the term of 
the Vice-Chancellor would be for four years and that he shall be eligible 
for reappointment. The proviso attached to sub-section (10) stipulates that 
no person shall be appointed as Vice-Chancellor for more than two terms. 
49. A close reading of the statutory provisions of Section 10 of the 
Act 1996 would reveal that sub-section (9) deals with a situation prior to 
or leading upto the appointment of Vice-Chancellor whereas sub-section 
(10) contemplates a situation after the
appointment of Vice-Chancellor has 
been made. This is discernible from a very ﬁ ne but pertinent distinction 
between the language of the two provisions. Sub-section (9) which provides 
the outer age limit for appointment uses the word “person”. This connotes 
that the Vice-Chancellor is yet to be appointed whereas sub-section (10) 
uses the word “Vice-Chancellor” which connotes that it is applicable to the 
incumbent holding the oﬃ  ce of Vice-Chancellor or simpliciter the Vice-
Chancellor after having been appointed. 
50. Thus, in our view sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 will 
apply only at the stage of appointment of Vice-Chancellor and would have no 
application whatsoever when it comes to reappointment of Vice-Chancellor 
under sub-section (10). This is reinforced from the words “shall be eligible 
for re-appointment” occurring in sub-section (10) which connotes that the 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
420 
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[2023] 16 S.C.R.
same is an enabling provision whereby the Vice-Chancellor by virtue of 
holding his oﬃ  ce is deemed eligible for reappointment irrespective of the 
other provisions. 
51. We are conscious of the fact that, the proviso to sub-section (10) 
which provides that the Vice-Chancellor shall not be appointed for more than 
two terms also uses the word “person” which in our opinion is a deliberate 
choice. We say so because the proviso deals with a situation where the Vice-
Chancellor has demitted oﬃ  ce by virtue of lapse of his tenure. 
52. The aforesaid aspect may be looked at from one another angle. If 
we were to hold that the outer age limit provided in sub-section (9) would 
apply even to reappointment, then the same would eﬀ ectively mean that only 
those persons who are appointed as Vice-Chancellor at the age of ﬁ fty-ﬁ ve or 
below could be considered for reappointment. Such an interpretation would 
result in conditions being read into sub-section (10) which have not been 
prescribed by the legislature. Had the intent of legislature been otherwise, 
sub-section (10) or the words “shall be eligible for re-appointment” would 
have been speciﬁ cally qualiﬁ ed by or made subject to the words “sub-section 
(9)” or “provisions of this section”. 
53. If sub-section (9) is interpreted so as to be made applicable even 
to reappointment as provided in sub-section (10), then the result would be 
that any person who is appointed as
Vice-Chancellor at the age of ﬁ fty-six 
or more would not be eligible for reappointment, thereby rendering sub-
section (10) and its proviso completely otiose and meaningless in such cases. 
54. This would also severely curtail the scope of the selection 
committee while considering candidates for the post of Vice-Chancellor, 
as the selection committee in such case would be inclined to consider 
younger candidates over older and possibly more qualiﬁ ed and experienced 
ones who may be more suitable considering the coveted nature of the post 
and the duties expected to be discharged. Moreover, it would inhibit a 
Vice-Chancellor who has already held oﬃ  ce and proven himself to be a 
valuable asset during his tenure from being reappointed if he happens to be 
of more than sixty-years of age. This would frustrate the very purpose of 
‘reappointment’ which given the nature of the post of Vice-Chancellor is all 
the more important as it is the Vice-Chancellor who is responsible for the 
day-to-day functioning as well as the overall performance of the University, 
its faculty, students etc.
421
55. Even otherwise, the interpretation as sought to be placed by the 
appellants would lead to a very absurd situation, where a Vice-Chancellor 
of sixty-one years age cannot be reappointed to hold the oﬃ  ce of Vice-
Chancellor, however, at the same time another person would still be able to 
hold the oﬃ  ce of Vice-Chancellor at the very same age of sixty-one years 
only by reason of him being appointed at the age of ﬁ fty-nine years. This 
appears to be bereft of any logic, more particularly when sub-section (9) does 
not say that a person shall hold oﬃ  ce of Vice-Chancellor till he attains the 
age of sixty years and rather uses the expression “No Person who is more 
than sixty years of age shall be appointed as Vice-Chancellor”.
56. The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse 
to for the purpose of giving full eﬀ ect to the statutory provisions, and 
the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than 
rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative 
and not inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be 
unworkable. The rules of interpretation require that construction which 
carries forward the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the 
parties and keeps the remedy alive, should be preferred looking into 
the text and context of the statute. Construction given by the court must 
promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has 
been enacted and not eﬀ ace
its very purpose. The courts strongly lean 
against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The 
provision of the statute must be so construed as to make it eﬀ ective and 
operative. The court must take a pragmatic view and must keep in mind 
the purpose for which the statute was enacted as the purpose of law itself 
provides good guidance to courts as they interpret the true meaning of 
the Act and thus legislative futility must be ruled out. A statute must be 
construed in such a manner so as to ensure that the Act itself does not 
become a dead letter and the obvious intention of the legislature does 
not stand defeated unless it leads to a case of absolute intractability in 
use. The court must adopt a construction which suppresses the mischief 
and advances the remedy and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions 
for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add 
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the 
makers of the Act, pro bono publico. The court must give eﬀ ect to the 
purpose and object of the Act for the reason that legislature is presumed 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 16 S.C.R.
to have enacted a reasonable statute. (Vide M. Pentiah v. Muddala 
Veeramallappa [AIR 1961 SC 1107], S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan 
Gupta [(1987) 1 SCC 191], RBI v. Peerless General Finance and 
Investment Co. Ltd. [(1987) 1 SCC 424], Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. 
Ltd. v. State of Assam [(1989) 3 SCC 709], SCC p. 754, para 118, UCO 
Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2008) 5 SCC 257] and Grid Corpn. of 
Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys [(2011) 11 SCC 334].)
57. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, we hold that the outer age limit of 
sixty years provided in sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 will 
not apply, when it comes to reappointment under sub-section (10) of Section 
10 of the Act 1996.
iii) Whether the reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor has to 
follow the same process as a fresh appointment under Section 10 
of the Act 1996?
58. Reappointment of Vice-Chancellor has been provided under sub-
section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996. The proviso to sub-section (10) 
of the Act 1996 further makes the intention of the legislature to provide for 
reappointment more clear. The legislature has not thought ﬁ t to prescribe 
any particular procedure or any particular mode or manner of reappointment. 
The UGC Regulations are also silent as regards the reappointment of Vice-
Chancellor. 
59. The language of sub-section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 is 
plain and simple. The provision does not confer right to seek
reappointment. 
There is only one way of reading the provision, which is, that a Vice-
Chancellor once appointed, subject to the proviso to sub-section (10) 
of Section 10, is eligible to be considered for reappointment. What this 
implies is that an incumbent Vice-Chancellor may not have to reapply 
along with other candidates and compete for the same position once again. 
Reappointment essentially means the incumbent Vice-Chancellor would 
receive another term of four years if the Chancellor deems ﬁ t without 
reopening the position for new applications or without constituting a select 
committee. “Re” means again, and is freely used as preﬁ x. It gives colour 
of “again” to the verb with which it is placed. “Reappointment” is an act or 
process of being appointed again.
423
60. Where the appointment is to be made for the ﬁ rst time or where 
the same person is being appointed as a Vice-Chancellor for the second 
time, but not in continuation of the ﬁ rst term, the procedure provided under 
Section 10 of the Act 1996 must be gone through. However, in the case of 
reappointment immediately upon the tenure of the ﬁ rst term coming to an 
end, there is no requirement to initiate the entire process of appointment as 
provided under Section 10 of the Act 1996.
61. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court 
in the case of Anindya Sunder Das (supra), authored by one of us Dr. 
D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI. In the said case, the High Court at Calcutta had 
allowed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ 
of quo warranto against the Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University. The 
High Court held that the State Government had no authority to appoint or 
reappoint the Vice-Chancellor under Section 8 of the Calcutta University 
Act, 1979 (for short, “the Act 1979”) or by taking recourse to the 
residuary provisions of Section 60 of the Act 1979. As a consequence, the 
order issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of West Bengal 
reappointing the incumbent Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University was 
set aside. The High Court held that the Vice-Chancellor had no authority 
to hold that oﬃ  ce on the basis of the order of appointment. The judgment 
of the Calcutta High Court was challenged before this Court
in Civil 
Appeal No. 6706 of 2022. One of the issues that fell for consideration 
of this Court in the said case was, whether the same procedure which 
was provided for appointment of a Vice-Chancellor under Section 8(1) 
was required to be followed at the time of reappointment. 
62. It was argued that there is a distinction in law between appointment 
and reappointment because in the case of the latter the zone of consideration 
is restructured to persons already holding posts and in such case the 
suitability of the incumbent which was assessed at the time of initial 
appointment need not be reassessed. 
63. This Court in the aforesaid case took the view that reappointment 
of the Vice-Chancellor need not follow the same process as a fresh 
appointment by setting up a selection committee. We may reproduce the 
relevant observations made by this Court.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
424 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
“45. It would be appropriate to also analyze whether the re-
appointment of the VC has to follow the same process as a fresh 
appointment, by setting up a selection committee under Section 8(1) 
of the Act, as indicated by the Chancellor.
46. Section 8(6) stipulates the manner in which a vacancy in the oﬃ  ce 
of the VC which occurs by reason of death, resignation, expiration of 
the term of oﬃ  ce, removal or otherwise shall be ﬁ lled up. The provision 
indicates that such vacancy shall be ﬁ lled up in accordance with the 
provisions of sub-Section (1) of Section 8 of the Act. Section 8(6) has 
to be read in conjunction with Section 8(1) since the former expressly 
refers to the latter. The reference to the provisions of sub-Section (1) 
for ﬁ lling up a vacancy on the expiration of the term of oﬃ  ce will not 
obviously apply to a case of reappointment because the procedure 
contemplated by Section 8(1)(b) of a search committee would not 
attach to a reappointment. On this aspect, the High Court has correctly 
disagreed with the petitioner before it and noted that amended Section 
8(2)(a) which provides for the re-appointment of a VC for another term 
does not require that the procedure prescribed in Section 8(1) has to 
be followed for re-appointment”
(Emphasis supplied)
64. We are conscious of the fact, that in Anindya Sundar Das (supra) 
the afore-stated line of reasoning was adopted by this Court in view of the 
amendment
that was carried out whereby the original expression “subject to 
provisions of this section” in the provision dealing with reappointment was 
deleted, in other words, by virtue of such amendment the reappointment was 
no longer subject to the provision / section detailing the ordinary procedure 
for appointment of Vice-Chancellor, and thus, this Court had no hesitation 
in holding that the legislature’s intent was to allow reappointment by the 
Chancellor itself without following the ordinary process of appointment.
65. In the case at hand, sub-section (10) of Section 10 of the Act, 1996, 
provides for reappointment and does not even contain the words “subject 
to provisions of this section”. This in our opinion is as good as to reﬂ ect the 
legislature’s intention of permitting reappointment without following the 
ordinary process of appointment of Vice-Chancellor.
425
66. Thus, we hold that it is not necessary to follow the procedure of 
appointment as laid down in Section 10 of the Act 1996 for the purpose of 
reappointment. 
iv) Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power 
of reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor?
67. Before we proceed to answer the question whether the Chancellor 
abdicated or surrendered his statutory power of reappointment, we must 
try to understand the stance of the Chancellor in the present litigation as 
discernible from the counter-aﬃ  davit ﬁ led by him. We are quite perplexed 
with the stance of the Chancellor. The Chancellor wants this Court to allow 
the appeal and declare that the reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as 
Vice-Chancellor is not sustainable in law. The Chancellor says so because 
according to him the reappointment of the respondent No. 4 is in conﬂ ict 
with the UGC Regulations. 
68. The UGC Regulations are enacted by the UGC in exercise of powers 
under Sections 26(1)(e) and 26(1)(g) of the UGC Act 1956. The Regulations 
framed under the said Act, are laid before each House of the Parliament. 
Therefore, being a subordinate legislation, the UGC Regulations becomes 
a part of the Act. In case of any conﬂ ict between the State legislation and 
the Central Legislation, the Central Legislation shall prevail by applying the 
rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in Article 254 of the Constitution 
as the subject “Education” is in the Concurrent List (Entry No. 25 of List
III) of the VII Schedule of the Constitution. Therefore, any appointment or 
reappointment as a Vice-Chancellor contrary to the provisions of the UGC 
Regulations could be said to be in violation of the statutory provisions. 
However, the moot question is whether in the present case, there is any 
conﬂ ict between the State Legislation and the UGC Regulations? The UGC 
Regulations more particularly the Regulation 7.3 which, we have referred 
to in the earlier part of our judgment only talks about appointment of Vice-
Chancellor. The UGC Regulations provide for the procedure to be adopted 
for appointment of Vice-Chancellor. The UGC Regulations are silent in so 
far as reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor is concerned. There is no speciﬁ c 
procedure prescribed by the UGC under its regulations for the purpose of 
reappointment of Vice-Chancellor. The entire focus of the Chancellor is 
on the aforesaid. However, nothing has been said in the counter-aﬃ  davit 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
426 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
ﬁ led on behalf of the Chancellor as regards Chancellor’s own independent 
satisfaction or judgment for the purpose of reappointment of the respondent 
No. 4 as Vice-Chancellor. 
69. It is in such circumstances that we have thought ﬁ t to pose a 
question whether the Chancellor abdicated his statutory power? 
70. It has been stated by Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th 
Edn. at pp. 358-59 under the heading “Surrender, Abdication, Dictation” 
and sub-heading “Power in the wrong hands” as below:
“Closely akin to delegation, and scarcely distinguishable from it in 
some cases, is any arrangement by which a power conferred upon one 
authority is in substance exercised by another. The proper authority 
may share its power with someone else, or may allow someone else to 
dictate to it by declining to act without their consent or by submitting 
to their wishes or instructions. The eﬀ ect then is that the discretion 
conferred by Parliament is exercised, at least in part, by the wrong 
authority, and the resulting decision is ultra vires and void. So strict 
are the courts in applying this principle that they condemn some 
administrative arrangements which must seem quite natural and proper 
to those who make them….
Ministers and their departments have several times fallen foul of the 
same rule, no doubt equally to their surprise….”
(Emphasis supplied)
71. It is a well settled (and indeed, bedrock) principle of administrative 
law that if a statute expressly confers a statutory power on a particular 
body or authority or imposes a statutory duty on the same, then such power 
must be exercised or duty performed (as the case may) by that very body 
or authority itself and none other. If the body or authority exercises the 
statutory power or performs the statutory duty acting at the behest, or on the 
dictate, of any other body or person, then this is regarded as an abdication 
of the statutory mandate and any decision taken on such basis is contrary 
to law and liable to be quashed. It is important to keep in mind that, in law, 
it matters not that the extraneous element is introduced (i.e., the advice, 
recommendation, approval, etc. of the person not empowered by the statute 
is obtained or given) in good faith or for the advancement of any goal or
427
objection howsoever laudable or desirable. The rule of law requires that a 
statutory power vests in the body or authority where the statute so provides, 
and likewise, the discharge of the statutory duty is the responsibility of the 
body or authority to which it is entrusted. That body or authority cannot 
merely rubberstamp an action taken elsewhere or simply endorse or ratify 
the decision of someone else.
72. The concept of discretionary power and the mode of its exercise 
by statutory functionaries was an issue considered by this Court in Union of 
India v. Kuldeep Singh reported in (2004) 2 SCC 590, where in paragraphs 
20, 21 and 22, it was held thus;
“20. When anything is left to any person, judge or Magistrate to be 
done according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with 
sound discretion, and according to law. (See Tomlin’s Law Dictionary). 
In its ordinary meaning, the word “discretion” signiﬁ es unrestrained 
exercise of choice or will; freedom to act according to one’s own 
judgment; unrestrained exercise of will; the liberty or power of acting 
without control other than one’s own judgment. But, when applied to 
public functionaries, it means a power or right conferred upon them 
by law, of acting oﬃ  cially in certain circumstances according to the 
dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the 
judgment or conscience of others. Discretion is to discern between right 
and wrong; and therefore, whoever hath power to act
at discretion, is 
bound by the rule of reason and law. (See Tomlin’s Law Dictionary.) 
21. Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and 
proper. It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which 
enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper 
united with caution; nice discernment, and judgment directed by 
circumspection; deliberate judgment; soundness of judgment; a 
science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between 
wrong and right, between shadow and substance, between equity and 
colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to the will 
and private aﬀ ections of persons. When it is said that something is to 
be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to 
be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according 
to private opinion; according to law and not humour. It is to be not 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
428 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be 
exercised within the limit, to which an honest man, competent to the 
discharge of his oﬃ  ce ought to conﬁ ne himself (per Lord Halsbury, 
L.C., in Sharp v. Wakeﬁ eld [(1891 AC 173: (1886-90) All ER Rep 
651 (HL)]. (Also See S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India (AIR 1967 
SC 1427). 
22. The word “discretion” standing single and unsupported by 
circumstances signiﬁ es exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as 
distinguished from folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a 
discretion cannot be arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking. 
The word in it implies vigilant circumspection and care; therefore, 
where the legislature concedes discretion it also imposes a heavy 
responsibility….”
(Emphasis supplied)
73. Again, in Clariant International Ltd. and Another v. Securities 
& Exchange Board of India reported in (2004) 8 SCC 524, this Court 
reiterated these principles thus; 
“27. In Kruger v. Commonwealth of Australia [(1997) 146 Aus LR 
126] it is stated: 
“Moreover, when a discretionary power is statutorily conferred on a 
repository, the power must be exercised reasonably, for the legislature 
is taken to intend that the discretion be so exercised. Reasonableness 
can be determined only by reference to the community standards at 
the time of the exercise of the discretion and that must be taken to be 
the legislative intention.....” 
28. The
discretionary jurisdiction has to be exercised keeping in view 
the purpose for which it is conferred, the object sought to be achieved 
and the reasons for granting such wide discretion (See Narendra Singh 
v. Chhotey Singh [(1983) 4 SCC 131 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 788].

xxx

xxx

xxx
29. A discretionary jurisdiction, furthermore, must be exercised within 
the four corners of the statute. [See Akshaibar Lal (Dr.) v. Vice-
Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University [(1961) 3 SCR 386 : AIR 1961

429
SC 619] and also para 9-022 of de Smith, Woolf and Jowell: Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action, 5th Edn., p.445].”
74. Similar are the principles laid down in Joint Action Committee 
of Air Line Pilots’ Association of India (ALPAI) and Others v. Director 
General of Civil Aviation and Others reported in (2011) 5 SCC 435, where 
it has been held that:
“26. ... It is a settled legal proposition that the authority which 
has been conferred with the competence under the statute alone 
can pass the order. No other person, even a superior authority, 
can interfere with the functioning of the statutory authority. In 
a democratic set-up like ours, persons occupying key positions 
are not supposed to mortgage their discretion, volition and 
decision-making authority and be prepared to give way to carry 
out commands having no sanctity in law. Thus, if any decision is 
taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on suggestion of 
a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would be 
patently illegal. (Vide Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commr. of 
Bihar [(1969) 1 SCC 308 : AIR 1970 SC 1896], Chandrika Jha v. 
State of Bihar [(1984)2 SCC 41 : AIR 1984 SC 322], Tarlochan 
Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 
SC 2524] and Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen [(2010) 11SCC 557 : 
(2010) 4 SCC (Civ)524 : AIR 2010 SC 2210]. 
27. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Commr. of 
Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16), Bahadursinh 
Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia [(2004) 2 SCC 65 : 
AIR 2004 SC 1159] and Pancham Chand v. State of H.P. [(2008) 7 
SCC 117 : AIR
2008 SC 1888] observing that an authority vested 
with the power to act under the statute alone should exercise 
its discretion following the procedure prescribed therein and 
interference on the part of any authority upon whom the statute 
does not confer any jurisdiction, is wholly unwarranted in law. It 
violates the constitutional scheme. 
28. In view of the above, the legal position emerges that the authority 
who has been vested with the power to exercise its discretion alone 
can pass the order. Even a senior oﬃ  cial cannot provide for any 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
430 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
guideline or direction to the authority under the statute to act in a 
particular manner.”
(Emphasis supplied)
75. In Hardwari Lal, Rohtak v. G.D. Tapase, Chandigarh and 
others reported in AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 439 (Full Bench) the 
powers of the Governor with respect to the appointment/removal of the 
Vice-Chancellor of Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak under the 
Maharshi Dayanand University (Amendment) Act, 1980 were considered 
wherein a direction was sought with regard to the renewal of the term of 
the Vice-Chancellor of the said University. Certain promises had been 
made in connection with the same while making such appointment. 
The Court held that as the Governor was the ex oﬃ  cio Chancellor of 
the University, therefore, by virtue of his oﬃ  ce, he was not bound to 
act under the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Under Article 
154 of the Constitution, the executive powers of the State are vested in 
the Governor which may be exercised by him either directly, or through 
oﬃ  cers subordinate to him, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. Article 161 confers upon the Governor, a large number of 
powers including the grant of pardon, reprieves, respites or remissions of 
punishment, etc. Such executive power can be exercised by him only in 
accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Article 
162 states that the executive power of the State shall extend to all such
matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has the power 
to make laws. Therefore, the said provision widens the powers of the 
Governor. Article 166(3) of the Constitution further bestows upon the 
Governor the power to make rules for more convenient transactions 
of business of the Government of the State and also for the purpose of 
allocating among the Ministers of State such business. There are several 
ways by which, a power may be conferred upon the Governor, or qua the 
Governor, which will enable him to exercise the said power by virtue of 
his oﬃ  ce as Governor. Therefore, there can be no gainsaying that all the 
powers that are exercisable by the Governor by virtue of his oﬃ  ce can 
be exercised only in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council 
of Ministers except insofar as the Constitution expressly, or perhaps by 
necessary implication, provides otherwise.
431
76. Thus, in such a situation, the statute makes a clear-cut distinction 
between two distinct authorities, namely, the Chancellor and the State 
Government. When the legislature intentionally makes such a distinction, 
the same must also be interpreted distinctly, and while dealing with the 
case of the Vice-Chancellor, the Governor, being the Chancellor of the 
University, acts only in his personal capacity, and therefore, the powers 
and duties exercised and performed by him under a statute related to the 
University, as its Chancellor, have absolutely no relation to the exercise and 
performance of the powers and duties by him while he holds oﬃ  ce as the 
Governor of the State.
77. Hardwari Lal (supra) has been referred to and relied upon by this 
Court in Bhuri Nath and Others v. State of J&K and Others reported in 
(1997) 2 SCC 745. In the said case, the question that arose was in relation 
to whether the Governor was bound to act in accordance with the aid and 
advice of the Council of Ministers, or whether he could exercise his own 
discretion, independent of his status and position as the Governor, by virtue 
of him being the ex oﬃ  cio Chairman of the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine 
Board under the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988. The Shrine Board 
discharges functions and duties, as have been described under the Act in the 
manner prescribed therein, and thus, after examining the scheme of the Act, 
this Court held that, “In Hardwari Lal case [AIR 1982
P&H 439 : (1982) 
1 SLR 39] , a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was to 
consider whether the Governor in his capacity as the Chancellor of Maharshi 
Dayanand University was to act under Maharshi Dayanand University Act, 
1975 (Haryana Act No. 25 of 1975) in his oﬃ  cial capacity as Chancellor 
or with aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The Full Bench, after 
elaborate consideration of the provisions of the Act and the statutes, came 
to observe in para 121 at p. 476 that the Act and the statutes intended that 
the State Government would not interfere in the aﬀ airs of the University. 
The State Government is an authority quite distinct from the authority of 
the Chancellor. The State Government cannot advise the Chancellor to act 
in a particular manner. The University, as a statutory body, autonomous 
in character, has been given certain powers exercisable by the Chancellor 
in his absolute discretion without any interference from any quarter. In 
the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor or the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, the 
Chancellor is not required to consult the Council of Ministers. Though by 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
432 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
virtue of his oﬃ  ce as Governor, he becomes the Chancellor of the University, 
but while discharging the functions of his oﬃ  ce, he does not perform any duty 
or exercise any power of the oﬃ  ce of the Governor individually. However, 
while discharging the functions as a Chancellor, he does every act in his 
discretion as Chancellor and he does not act on the aid and advice of his 
Council of Ministers. The performance of the functions and duties under the 
Constitution with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers is distinct 
and diﬀ erent from his discharge of the powers and duties of his oﬃ  ce as 
Chancellor of the University. Under the Act and the statute, the Chancellor 
has independent existence and exercises his powers without any interference 
from any quarter. Therefore, the oﬃ  ce as a Chancellor held by the Governor 
is a statutory oﬃ  ce quite distinct from the oﬃ  ce of the Governor. Same view 
was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kiran Babu case [AIR 1986 
AP 275 : (1986) 1 An LT 36].”.
78. Bearing the aforesaid principles of law in mind, we proceed 
to consider whether there was any independent application of mind or 
satisfaction on the part of the Chancellor in reappointing the respondent 
No. 4 as Vice-Chancellor. The facts narrated by us in the earlier part of 
our judgment speak for themselves. The Chancellor had already initiated 
the steps for appointment of a new Vice-Chancellor and this
is evident by 
the fact that a selection committee was also constituted vide Notiﬁ cation 
dated 27.10.2021. It appears that at that point of time reappointment of the 
respondent No. 4 as Vice-Chancellor in accordance with sub-section (10) 
of Section 10 of the Act 1996 was not in the mind of the Chancellor. 
79. The State of Kerala issued Notiﬁ cation dated 01.11.2021 inviting 
applications from eligible candidates. All of a sudden, the Minister for Higher 
Education and Social Justice in his capacity as the Pro-Chancellor addressed 
a letter to the Chancellor dated 22.11.2021 recommending reappointment 
of the respondent No. 4 herein for a second term as Vice-Chancellor. It 
is also pertinent to note that on 22.11.2021 itself the notiﬁ cation inviting 
application from the eligible candidates was withdrawn. On the same date, 
the Minister addressed one another letter to the Chancellor stating that the 
respondent No. 4 be reappointed as Vice-Chancellor of Kannur University. 
On the very same day i.e., on 23.11.2021, the notiﬁ cation reappointing the 
respondent No. 4 as Vice-Chancellor was issued.
433
80. It appears from the press release issued by the Kerala Raj Bhavan 
dated 03.02.2022 that the opinion of the Advocate General was also sought 
for in connection with reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as Vice-
Chancellor. The very ﬁ rst para of the press release states that “Kerala Raj 
Bhavan strongly refutes the claim in some news reports that it was on the 
direction of Hon’ble Governor that the name of Dr. Gopinath Ravindran 
was suggested for reappointment as Vice Chancellor, Kannur University. 
The truth is that the same was initiated by the Chief Minister and Higher 
Education Minister.” The last part of the report is also relevant. It states 
that the process of selection of Vice-Chancellor which was set in motion 
vide Notiﬁ cation dated 27.10.2021 came to an end consequent to the request 
from the Minister of Higher Education and the opinion of the Advocate 
General, State of Kerala. 
81. The aforestated facts make it abundantly clear that there was no 
independent application of mind or satisfaction or judgment on the part of 
the Chancellor and the respondent No. 4 came to be reappointed only at the 
behest of the State Government. 
82. Under the scheme of the Act 1996 and the statutes, the Chancellor 
plays a very important role. He is not merely a titular head. In the selection 
of the Vice-Chancellor, he is the sole judge and his opinion is ﬁ nal in all 
respects. In reappointing the Vice-Chancellor, the main consideration to 
prevail upon the
Chancellor is the interest of the university. 
83. The Chancellor was required to discharge his statutory duties in 
accordance with law and guided by the dictates of his own judgment and 
not at the behest of anybody else. Law does not recognise any such extra 
constitutional interference in the exercise of statutory discretion. Any such 
interference amounts to dictation from political superior and has been 
condemned by courts on more than one occasions. 
M. FINAL CONCLUSION
84. It is now well settled that a writ of quo warranto lies if any 
appointment to a public oﬃ  ce is made in breach of the statute or the 
rules. In the case on hand, we are not concerned with the suitability of the 
respondent No. 4. The “suitability” of a candidate for appointment to a post 
is to be judged by the appointing authority and not by the court unless the 
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
434 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
appointment is contrary to the statutory rules/provisions. We have reached 
to the conclusion that although the notiﬁ cation reappointing the respondent 
No. 4 to the post of Vice-Chancellor was issued by the Chancellor yet the 
decision stood vitiated by the inﬂ uence of extraneous considerations or to put 
it in other words by the unwarranted intervention of the State Government. 
85. It is the Chancellor who has been conferred with the competence 
under the Act 1996 to appoint or reappoint a Vice-Chancellor. No other 
person even the Pro-Chancellor or any superior authority can interfere with 
the functioning of the statutory authority and if any decision is taken by a 
statutory authority at the behest or on a suggestion of a person who has no 
statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal. 
86. Thus, it is the decision-making process, which vitiated the entire 
process of reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor. 
The case on hand is not one of mere irregularity. 
87. We emphasise on the decision-making process because in such a 
case the exercise of power is amenable to judicial review. 
88. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans reported in 
(1982) 1 WLR 1155 : (1982) 3 All ER 141 (HL), Lord Brightman observed 
thus: (WLR p. 1174 G)
“… Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a 
decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made.”
89. In view
of the aforesaid, we allow this appeal. 
90. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court dated 
23.02.2022 is hereby set aside. As a consequence, the Notiﬁ cation dated 
23.11.2021, reappointing the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor of 
the Kannur University is hereby quashed. 
91. Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of. 
Headnotes prepared by: 
Appeal allowed.
Ankit Gyan