AJAY KUMAR SINGH versus THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF & ORS.
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 957, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 957 
AJAY KUMAR SINGH 
v. 
THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING-JN-CHIEF & ORS. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 325of2012) 
JULYl3,2016 
[T.S. THAKUR, CJI AND R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
Penal Code, 1860: 
ss. 342 and 392 rlw. s.25(1-A) of Arms Act ands. 77(2) of 
Navy Act, 1957 - Bunk robbery by 3 Navy officials - Court Martial 
trial - Conviction on the basis of the witnesses PWs 14 and 18 
(Bank Manager and Clerk) - Their dismissal with disgrace 
alongwith other consequential penalties - In statutory appeal 
conviction confirmed - Armed Forces Tribunal disbelieved the 
identification of the three accused persons by PWs 14 and 18 -
Convicted the accused 'AK' and 'UK' on the basis of evidence of 
Fingerprint Expert proving the chance fingerprint to be that of 
appellants 'AK' and 'UK' - Appellant 'DK' was acquitted giving 
him benefit of doubt -Appeals by accused 'AK' and 'UK' assailing 
their conviction and by accused 'DK' seeking his reinstatement in 
service in view of his acquittal - Held: Evidence of PWs 14 and 18 
as regards the identification of the accused persons could not have 
been disbelieved - The lapses in the evidence of the fingerprint 
expert cannot result in acquittal of the two appellants 'AK' and 
'UK' - So far as the third appellant 'DK' is concerned though his 
identification as accused in confirmed as evidence of PWs J.I and 
18 are reliable, but in absence of States appeal against his acquiual, 
his acquittal cannot be interfered with - He cannot claim
reinstatement as he has been acquitted giving benefit of doubt - An 
employee can claim reinstatement only when he has been honourably 
acquitted - Even in view that he was identified by PWs 14 and 18, 
he cannot be reinstated -Arms Act, 1959 - s. 25 {1-A) - Navy Act, 
1957 - s. 77(2) - Service Law - Reinstatement. 
Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 - s.30 - Power under - Scope 
of - Held: In exercise ofp01rer u/s.30,Supreme Court normally does 
not reappreciate the evidence and is slow in inte1:fering with the 
findings of the Armed Forces Tribunal, unless there is substantial 
question of public importance. 
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[2016] 5 S.C.R. 
Service Law - Reinstatement - Acquittal in criminal case does 
not entitle a person to automatic reinstatement - Only if the employee 
is acquitted honourably (not on benefit of doubt), he can claim 
reinstatement. 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 In exercise of power under Section 30 of the 
Armed Forces Tribunal Act, this Court normally does not re-
appreciate the evidence and is slow to interfere with the findings 
of the tribunal unless there is substantial question of public 
importance. But when it is found that appreciation of evidence in 
a given case is vitiated by serious error, this Court can re-
appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings. [Para 
17] [968-G] 
1.2 The tribunal was not right in disbelieving the evidence 
of PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) as to the identification 
of the appellants as the culprits who committed robbery in the 
bank. They have clearly spoken about the occurrence that on 
the date of incident, three persons entered into the bank and 
threatened PW-14 and PW-18 by showing gun and committed 
robbery in the bank. Since they were still at work in the bank at 
the time of the incirlent, it is reasonable to assume that there was 
enough light to do so inside the bank. From the evidence of PW-
14 and PW-18, it is clear that the incident lasted for a brief period 
during which the appellants were talking to each other. As per 
the evidence of
PW-14 and PW-18, while the culprits were so 
conversing lifting their visors, they were able to see the culprits. 
It is obvious that the extraordinary situation, in which the 
incidence occurred must have left an indelible impression in the 
mind of the witnesses about the identity of the culprits. 
Immediately after the incident, PW-14 (Manager) lodged the 
complaint before Police Station wherein he gave the descriptive 
particulars of the three culprits namely their age, height, colour 
complexion etc. and also given the details of the weapons. Identity 
of the appellants by PW-14 and PW-18 in the court is also 
corroborated by identification of the appellants by PW-14 and PW-
18 in the test identification parade. [Paras 12 and 14] [965-D-G] 
1.3 Evidence of PW-15-Fingerprint Expert incriminates the 
appellants AK and UK. However, in proving this incriminating 
evidence, there seems to be lapses on the part of the prosecution.
AJAY KUMAR SINGH v. THE FLAG OFFICER 
COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF & ORS. 
The nature of lapse in the prosecution, in the present case, cannot 
result in acquittal of the appellants. The evidence adduced by 
the prosecution must be scrutinized independently of such lapses 
either in the investigation or by the prosecution or otherwise, 
the result of the criminal trial would depend upon the level of 
investigation or the conduct of the prosecution. Criminal trials 
should not be made casualty for such lapses in the investigation 
or prosecution. The conviction of the accused AK and UK is to 
be affirmed on the evidence of PW-14 and PW-18, if not on the 
evidence of fingerprint expert and the appeals are liable to be 
dismissed;[Para 17) [967-G-H; 968-A, DJ 
1.4 In so far as appellant-UK is concerned, prosecution 
has adduced evidence to show that after the incident, he has 
deposited huge amount in his bank account. He has not explained 
the source of such huge amount deposited in the bank which is a 
strong incriminating circumstance against the appellant. (Para 
18) [968-E-G) 
. 
2.1 Tribunal disbelieved the identification of appellant-DK 
by PWs 14 and 18. Though the evidence of PW-14 and PW-18 is 
reliable in identifying the appellants, since Union of India has not 
filed any appeal challenging acquittal of appellant-DK, the Court 
cannot go into these aspects. [Para 20) (969-D-E] 
2.2 Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer 
from exercising power in accordance
with the Rules and 
Regulations in force. Acquittal in a criminal case does not entitle 
a person to automatic reinstatement. Only if the employee had 
been honourably acquitted, could he make a claim for 
reinstatement. In the present case, the tribunal came to the 
conclusion that no satisfactory evidence had been adduced by · 
the prosecution to sustain the conviction of appellant-DK and 
therefore the tribunal set aside the conviction giving him the 
benefit of doubt. The appellant-DK was not honourably acquitted. 
[Paras 21, 22 and 23) [969-F-H; 970-E-F; 971-A-B] 
2.3 Moreover, as the identity of the appellants by PW-14 
(Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) is credible and acceptable, 
evidence of PW-14 and PW-18 identifying appellant-DK as one of 
the culprits is a factor to be reckoned with while considering his 
plea for reinstatement. Additionally, appellant- DK had deposited 
Rs.90,000/- in his bank account and the explanation of the appellant 
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[2016] 5 S.C.R. 
A 
for this deposit is not convincing. [Para 24) [971-D-E] 
Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil 
Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Ors. 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 
314 : (2005) 7 SCC 764; T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. 
v. K Meerabai 2006 (1) SCR 540 : (2006) 2 SCC 255; 
B 
Union of India and Am: v. Bihari Lal Sidhana 1997 (3) 
SCR 364 : (1997) 4 SCC 385 - relied on. 
c 
D 
Case Law Reference 
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 314 
2006 (1) SCR 540 
1997 (3) SCR 364 
relied on 
relied on 
relied on 
Para 21 
Para 21 
Para 22 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
325 of2012. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.11.2010 of the Armed 
Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Chennai in T. A. No. 139 of2010 (W. 
P. No. 21811 of 2000 High Court of Andhra Pradesh) 
WITH 
E 
Crl.A.No.471-472of2013 
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Crl.A. No. 626-627 of2016. 
K. Parameshwar, Vishal Gupta, Kumar Mihir, Advs. for the 
Appellant. 
K. Radhakrishnan, Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Advs., Ms. Rashmi 
Malhotra, Atulesh Kumar, S. N. Terdal, B. V. Balaram Das, Advs. for 
the Re~pondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. Delay condoned and leave granted in 
SLP (Crl.) No.8037-8038 of2012. 
2. Appellant-Ajay Kumar Singh (AK Singh), Ex-Seaman, First 
Class (appellant in Criminal Appeal No.325of2012) and Umesh Kumar 
Singh (UK Singh), Ex-Radio Operator (Special), First Class (appellant 
in Criminal Appeals No.4 71-4 72 of 2013) have assailed the judgments
AJAY KUMAR SINGH v. THE FLAG OFFICER 
COMMANDING-JN-CHIEF & ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
of Armed Forces Tribunal, Chennai°lri T.A. No.139 of 2010 dated 
11.11 .20 I 0 and T.A. No. I I of 2011 dated 05.01.2012 and order dated 
17.02.2012 passed in Review Petition No.2 of2012 in and by which the 
tribunal affirmed the conviction of the appellants under Sections 342 and 
392 !PC read with Section 77(2) of the Navy Act, 1957 and modified the 
sentence of imprisonment to that of the period already undergone by 
them. Appellant Dhirendra Kumar Singh (DK Singh), Ex-Leading 
Seaman, Physical Trainer, Second Class who was acquitted by the tribunal 
with pensionary benefits, has preferred separate appeals seeking direction 
for reinstatement and other monetary benefits. These criminal appeals 
though assail separate judgments of Armed Forces Tribunal, Chennai, 
as the appeals arise out of the same bank robbery incident, all the appeals 
were heard tpgether and ar_e disposed of by this common judgment. 
3. Brief facts which led to filing of these appeals are as follows: 
Mr. N .K. Marwaha, Branch Manager of Andhra Bank, Extension 
Counter, situated at Utility Complex, INS Virbahu filed a complaint on 
04.06.1998 at Malkapuram Police Station alleging that at about 7.20 
p.m. while settling the accounts forthe day along with Nallamuthu Dass, 
the cashier, noticed two persons entered the bank stating that they wanted 
to open a bank account and the third person entered after them. Of 
three
persons, two were armed with two countrymade pistols, a khukri 
and an iron rod and they together threatened the manager and cashier 
to open iron safe. Manager-Marwaha and cashier opened the iron chest 
and the culprits removed Rs.2,54,376/- from the cash tray of the iron 
safe and kept the same in the blue colour rexin bag which they were 
carrying. They removed the money, the three persons locked the manager 
and the cashier inside the strong room of the bank before escaping in a 
metallic blue Bajaj Chetak scooter alongwith the blue colour cash bag. 
During the commission of the offence, the culprits were concealing their 
identity by wearing helmets with visors and masks. After forcing open 
strong room where they had been locked, the manager filed a complaint 
on 04.06.1998 before Malkapuram Police Station based on which first 
information report was registered in Crime No.34of1998 under Sections 
392 and 342 IPC read with Section 25 (I-A) of the Arms Act. The 
Naval Police had taken over the investigation; but they were unable to 
make headway into identity of the accused persons despite recovery of 
the scooter and other articles on 23.07.1998. The investigation. was 
then handed over to the civil police. After further investigation, civil police 
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[2016] 5 S.C.R. 
arrested appellants AK Singh and UK Singh on 30.07.1998. Appellant 
DK Singh was arrested at Howrah Railway Station on 24.07 .1998 and 
thereafter brought to Visakhapatnam on 28.07.1998. On 30.07.1998 all 
three persons were remanded to custody in central jail, Visakhapatnam. 
Based on the statement of the accused persons, certain recoveries were 
made. On 17 .08.1998, identification parade was conducted and PW s 14 
and 18 identified the appellants. 
4. The Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatnam vide letter dated 
28.10.1998 advised the Flag Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern 
Naval Command, Visakhapatnam to try the accused persons by Court 
Martial. Therefore, the appellants were transferred to naval custody 
under the provisions of Section 475 Cr.P.C. read with Criminal Courts 
and Court Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978 and the matter 
was investigated afresh by the Commanding Officer, INS Circars. After 
completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed against the appellants 
on 26.06.1999 under Sections 392 and 342 !PC read with Section 77 (2) 
of the Naval Act and Section 25(1-A) of the Arms Act read with Section 
77(2) of the Navy Act:-(i) for committing a robbery of Rs.2,54,3 71/- at 
the Andhra Bank Extension Counter at INS Virbahu; (ii) for wrongful 
confinement of the bank manager and cashier; (iii) for possession of 
country made pistol and three rounds of ammunition whilst
committing 
the offence; and (iv) that accused had remained absent without leave. 
The Court Martial was convened on 16.07 .1999 and the appellants were 
tried before the Court Martial. 
5. Before the Court Martial, twenty nine prosecution witnesses 
were examined. Upon consideration of evidence, the Court Martial found 
the appellants guilty of various charges and sentenced them to undergo 
various imprisonments. Additionally, all three appellants were imposed 
punishment of dismissal with disgrace and to suffer such other 
consequential penalties involved. The appellants preferred statutory 
appeals before the Chief of the Naval Staff in accordance with Section 
162 of Navy Act 1957. The Chief of Naval Staff confirmed the 
conviction of the appellants and reduced the imprisonment and maintained 
dismissal of the appellants with disgrace from the naval service. 
6. The details of charges framed against the appellants, findings 
of the court martial, punishment and findings of the appellate authority/ 
Chief of the Naval Staff are as under:-
AJAY KUMAR SINGH v. THE FLAG OFFICER 
963 
COMMANDING-JN-CHIEF & ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
Name of 
the 
Appellant 
AK Singh 
UK Singh 
DK Singh 
Charges Framed 
I. Under Section 
392 IPC read with 
Section 
77 
(2) 
Navy Act. 
2. 
Under Section 
342 IPC read with 
Section 
77 
(2) 
Navy Act. 
3. 
Under Section 
25 (I-A) Arms Act 
read with Section 
77 12) Navv Act. 
I. Under Section 
392 IPC read with 
Section 
77 
(2) 
Navy Act. 
2. 
Under Section 
342 !PC read with 
Section 
77 
(2) 
Navy Act. 
3. Under Section 
25 (1-AJ Arms Act 
read with Section 
77 (2) Navy Act. 
4. 
Under Section 
51 Navy Act. 
I. Under Section 
392 !PC read with 
Section 77 (2) of 
Navy Act. 
2. 
Under Section 
342 IPC read with 
Section 77 (2) of 
Navy Act. 
3. 
Under Section 
60(a) Navy Act. 
4. Under Section 
25 (I-A) Arms Act 
read with Section 
77 (2) Navy Act. 
5. 
Under Section 
49 (2) (b) of Navy 
Act. Alternatively, 
under Section 
51 
Navy Act. 
Findings of the 
Court Martial and 
PuniShment 
Found 
guilty 
of 
charges I and 2 under 
Sections 392 and 342 
!PC read with Section 
77(2) Navy Act and 
sentenced to undergo 
RI for sixty months; 
dismissal 
from 
service with disgrace 
and 
to 
suffer 
consequential 
nenalties involved. 
Found 
guilty 
of 
charges I, 2 and 4 
under Sections 392, 
342 IPC read with 
Sections 77(2) and 51 
of Navy 
Act 
and 
sentenced to undergo 
RI 
for 
ninety 
six 
months; 
dismissal 
from 
service 
with 
disgrace and to forfeit 
fourteen days mullets 
'of pay
and allowance 
and 
suffer 
consequential 
penalties involved. 
Found 
guilty 
of 
charges I, 2,3 and 5 
under Sections 392, 
342 !PC read with 
Sections 77 (2), 60 
(a) and 49 (2)(b) of 
the 
Navy 
Act. 
Sentenced to undergo 
RI 
fur 120 months 
dismissal 
from 
service with disgrace 
and 
consequential 
penalties involved. 
Charge No. 4 -
Not 
guilty. 
Findings of the 
Appellate 
Authority/Chief 
of the Naval 
Staff 
Maintained 
conviction 
reduced 
sentence 
twenty 
months; 
Confirmed 
dismissal 
service 
disgrace. 
the 
and 
the 
to 
four 
from 
with 
Maintained 
the 
conviction 
reduced 
sentence 
ninety 
months 
seventy 
tnonths; 
confirmed 
dismissal 
service 
disgrace; 
forfeiture 
and 
the 
from 
six 
to 
two 
from 
with 
mullets of pay 
and 
allowances 
for fourteen days 
and to suffer the 
consequential 
penalties. 
Maintained 
finding of Court 
Martial 
except 
on charge No.5 
under 
Section 
49(2)(b) who is 
found guilty of 
alternate charge 
under Section 5 I 
of the Navy Act 
and 
reduced 
sentence 
from 
120 months 
to 
96 
months. 
Reduced 
the 
rank to Sea I. 
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7. Challenging the conviction and the punishment of dismissal 
with disgrace, the appellants have filed writ petitions before the Andhra 
Pradesh High Court which upon constitution of the Armed Forces 
Tribunal were transferred to Armed Forces Tribunal, Chennai and the 
tribunal disposed of the appeals confirming the conviction of the appellants 
AK Singh and UK Singh. The tribunal disbelieved the versions of PW-
14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) and held that PWs 14 and 18 could 
not have seen the faces of the culprits at the time of committing the 
crime since even according to the prosecution the accused covered their 
faces with masks and helmets and were conversing only by lifting the 
visors of the helmets. PW-15 fingerprint expert opined '"that fingerprints 
marked as 'A' and 'B' tallied with the specimen fingerprints of 
appellants AK Singh and UK Singh" (Exs.P46 and P4 7). Based on 
the evidence of PW-15 V. Hanumantha Rao, Fingerprint Expert, the 
. tribunal confirmed the conviction of the appellants-AK Singh and UK 
Singh and reduced the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the 
appellants AK Singh and UK Singh to the period already undergone by 
them and maintained their dismissal. 
8. In so far as DK Singh is concerned, the tribunal held that there 
is no satisfactory evidence to establish his guilt and acquitted him giving 
him benefit of doubt. The tribunal directed that DK Singh 's period of
arrest till the date of sentence by the Court Martial shall be counted for 
the qualifying service to enable DK Singh to get his pension. The tribunal 
however held that DK Singh shall not be entitled to any monetary benefit 
like backwages etc. for the interregnum period except that the same is 
counted for qualifying service for getting pension. Being aggrieved by 
declining the relief of reinstatement and other monetary benefits, DK 
Singh has preferred Criminal Appeals arising out ofSLP(Crl.) No. 8037-
8038 of2012. 
9. Learned counsel for the appellants and appellant DK Singh 
who appeared in person reiterated the pleas urged before the court martial 
and the tribunal and submitted that great injustice has been done to the 
appellants in not following the procedure established by law inasmuch 
as there was non-compliance of the provisions of Section 5 of the 
Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 in taking the fingerprints of the 
appellants. It was submitted that the photographs of the appellants were 
taken and were shown to the PW-14 (manager) and PW-18 (cashier) to 
enable them to identify the appellants-accused without which, it would 
not have been possible for PW-14 and PW-18 to identify them since
AJAY KUMAR SINGH v. THE FLAG OFFICER 
COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF & ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
even according to the prosecution version when they entered the bank 
in order to conceal their identity, they were wearing helmets and visors. 
It was submitted that the Court Martial and the Tribunal committed serious 
error in appreciating the evidence and material on record. 
I 0. Per contra, learned couns~l for the respondents submitted that 
the case of the appellants have been extensively dealt with by the tribunal 
and all the questions oflaw and fact have been considered at length and 
the tribunal has passed a reasoned order wherein all the issues raised by 
the parties have been considered and the impugned order warrants no 
interference. In so far as appellant-DK Singh it was submitted that 
acquittal in the criminal case does not entitle him for reinstatement as he 
was not honourably acquitted but was given benefit of doubt and cannot 
claim reinstatement as of right. 
11. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and perused 
the impugned judgments and ~aterial on record. 
12. PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) have clearly spoken 
about the occurrence that on the date of incident on 04.06.1998, three 
persons entered into the bank and threatened PW-14 and PW-18 by 
showing gun and committed robbery in the bank. Before the Court 
Martial, PW-14 and PW-18 have identified the three appellants as the 
culprits who committed robbery in the bank. PW-14 and PW-18 have
also spoken about the identification parade held in the prison and that 
they have identified the appellants in the test identification parade. 
13. The tribunal disbelieved the evidence of PW-14 and PW-l8c-
and their identification of the appellants on the ground that they could 
not have seen the faces of the culprits at the time of commission of 
offence, since even according to the prosecution, the appellants were 
covering their faces with masks and helmets with visors and they lifted 
the visors only while conversing with the bank personnel and tribunal 
held that there was no possibility of PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 
(Cashier) seeing the faces of the accused. The tribunal further relied 
upon the representation made by the appellants to the Metropolitan 
Magistrate that they had been photographed by the police to enable the 
eye-witnesses (PW s 14 and 18) to identify them in the test identification 
parade and on those findings, the tribunal disbelieved the evidence of 
PW-14 and PW-18 insofar as the identification of the appellants. 
14. The tribunal, in our view, was not right in disbelieving the 
evidence of PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) as to the 
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identification of the appellants as the culprits who committed robbery in 
the bank. The occurrence was at 7 .20 p.m. on 04.06.1998. At the time 
of occurrence, the bank personnel including PW-14 and PW-18 were 
working and settling the accounts and were about to close the bank. 
Since the bank personnel were still at work in the bank, it is reasonable 
to assume that there was enough light to do so inside the bank. The 
appellants who entered the bank initially asked PW-14 to open the bank 
account. Before however PW-14 could refuse, the appellants took out 
a revolver and other weapons. From the evidence of PW-14 and PW-
18, it is clear that the incident lasted for a brief period during which the 
appellants were talking to each other. As per the evidence of PW-14 
and PW-18, while the culprits were so conversing lifting their visors, 
they were able to see the culprits. It is obvious that the extraordinary 
situation, in which the incidence occurred must have left an indelible 
impression in the mind of the witnesses about the identity of the culprits. 
Be it noted that immediately afterthe incident, PW-14 (Manager) lodged 
the complaint before Malkapuram Police Station wherein he gave the 
descriptive particulars of the three culprits namely their age, height, colour 
complexion etc. and also given the details of the weapons. As noted 
earlier, identity of the appellants by PW-14 and PW-18 in the court
is 
also corroborated by identification of the appellants by PW-14 and PW-
18 in the test identification parade. In that view, the tribunal was not 
right in disbelieving the evidence of PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 
(Cashier). It is also pertinent to note that PW-14 and PW-18 had no 
reason to falsely implicate the appellants which aspect was not kept in 
view by the tribunal. To that extent, we differ from the findings of the 
tribunal and accepting the evidence of PW-14 and PW-18 and maintain 
the conviction of appellants-AK Singh and UK Singh. 
15. Yet another piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution 
is the recovery of weapons from AK Singh. As per the prosecution, 
appellant-AK Singh was arrested on 30.07 .1998 and based on his 
confession, the weapons used in the commission of offence were 
recovered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Photographs of the 
weapons/material objects recovered were produced before the court 
martial and the tribunal has noted that the photograph of the weapon 
was taken on 29.07.1998 itself, as seen from the requi.sition for taking 
photo of the weapons. The tribunal therefore disbelieved the prosecution 
case in so far as the recovery of the weapon used at the time of 
committing the offence. Since we did not have the benefit of perusing
AJAY KUMAR SINGH v. THE FLAG OFFICER 
COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF & ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
the photographs, so produced, we are not expressing any view about the 
findings of the tribunal on this aspect. 
16. To sustain the conviction of AK Singh and UK Singh, court 
martial as well as the tribunal relied upon the evidence of Fingerprint 
Expert-V. Hanumantha Rao (PW-15) who had stated that upon 
information to the control room on 04.06.1998, he reached the scene of 
occurrence at Naval Base, Andhra Bank Extension Counter, INS Virbahu 
at 9.00 p.m. While examining the scene ofoccurrence, PW-15 observed 
two chance fingerprints on the glass entrance door of the bank. PW-15 
developed the same with his universal or white powder and marked 
them as "A" and "B" for the purpose of lifting them by taking photos. 
As the photographer was not available, PW-15 left the scene of 
occurrence and on the next day morning i.e. 05.06.1998 at about 0800 
hrs., PW-15 took the police constable Trimul Kumar-photographer of 
MFSL Unit, Visakhapatnam and photographed the preserved chance 
fingerprints. The chance fingerprints so lifted were kept in the office of · 
PW-15 for comparison. The police supplied the specimen fingerprints 
of bank officials for comparison and as per the evidence of PW-15, 
fingerprints of the bank employees did not tally with the chance 
fingerprints lifted from the entrance door of the bank. Two months later 
after the arrest of the appellants, specimen fingerprints of AK
Singh, 
UK Singh and also DK Singh were sent to PW-15 for comparison. On 
comparison, PW-15 noted that the chance fingerprint marked "A" was 
identical to the specimen right middle finger impression marked as "SI" 
which is the specimen fingerprint of appellant-AK Singh and the said 
report was marked as Ex.P-46. In Ex.P-47-report, PW-15 opined that 
chance fingerprint marked "B" was identical to the specimen right index 
finger impression as "S(a)" which is the specimen finger impression of 
appellant-UK Singh. 
17. Contention of respondents is that evidence of PW-15-Fingerprint 
Expert incriminates the appellants AK Singh and UK Singh. However, 
in proving this incriminating evidence, there seems to be lapses on the 
part of the prosecution. As noticed earlier, police constable Tirumal 
Kumar-photographer of MFSL Unit had taken the photographs of the 
preserved chance fingerprints. To prove the chance fingerprints lifted 
from the entrance glass doors of the bank, the prosecution should have 
proved the photographs by examining constable-Trimul Kumar and should 
have produced the negatives of the photographs of the chance 
fingerprints. This lapse in the prosecution, in our view, cannot result in 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
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acquittal of the appellants. The evidence adduced by the prosecution 
must be scrutinized independently of such lapses either in the investigation 
or by the prosecution or otherwise, the result of the criminal trial would 
depend upon the level of investigation or the conduct of the prosecution. 
Criminal trials should not be made casualty for such lapses in the 
investigation or prosecution. Evidence of PW-I 4 (Manager) and PW-I 8 
(Cashier) identifying the appellants and their evidence as to identity of 
the appellants in the test identification parade ought not to have been 
disbelieved by the tribunal. In exercise of power under Section 30 of the 
Armed Forces Tribunal Act, this Court normally does not re-appreciate 
the evidence and slow to interfere with the findings of the tribunal unless 
there is substantial question of public importance. But when it i~ found 
that appreciation of evidence in a given case is vitiated by serious error, 
this Court can re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings. 
In our view, the tribunal was not right in disbelieving the evidence of 
PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) in identifying the appellants 
AK Singh, UK Singh and DK Singh as culprits and their identity in test 
identification parade and their conviction is to be affirmed on the evidence 
of PW-I 4 and PW-I 8, if not on the evidence of fingerprint expert and 
the appeals are liable to be
dismissed. 
I 8. In so far as appellant-UK Singh, prosecution has adduced 
evidence to show that after the incident, he has deposited huge amount 
in his bank account. PW-29-Gopal Priyadarshi, Assistant, Central Bank 
of India stated that appellant-UK Singh is having account No.8206 in 
Central Bank of India, Azamgarh Branch, Uttar Pradesh and that he 
had deposited Rs.81,600/- on 11.06.1998. Ex. P76 is the certificate issued 
by the Central Bank, Azamgarh dated 07 .10.1998 as per which the last 
balance in the account of UK Singh is Rs.1,32,670/- including an interest 
of Rs.570/-. PW-29 deposed that as per Ex.C-11, pay in slip, the 
denomination of the cash of Rs.81,600/- deposited by the accused was, 
one bundle of Rs.500/-(Rs.500xl 00=50,000/-), 316 notes of Rs. IOO/-
(Rs.100x316= 31,600/-) total Rs.81,600/-.Appellant-UK Singh has not 
explained the source of such huge amount deposited in the· bank on 
11.06.1998 which is a strong incriminating circumstance against the 
appellant. 
19. Facts leading to DK Singh's arrest are slightly different from 
those of AK Singh and UK Singh. DK Singh was serving on Board 
alongwith other sailors in INS Anjadip, Visilkhapatnam on 04.06.1998. 
He collected his Genform No.358/S dated 03.07.1998 from ship INS
AJAY KUMAR SINGH v. THE FLAG OFFICER 
COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF & ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
Anjadip at Visakhapatnam and proceeded to his next duty station for 
POPTI 'Q' course at INS, Venduruthy, Cochin. DK Singh alongwith his 
wife, children and brother-in-law proceeded towards his native place by 
Corromandal express. On the basis of information, DK Singh was 
arrested at Howrah Railway Station on 24.07 .1998, was kept under 
custody till 28.07 .1998 at Calcutta and thereafter he was brought to 
Visakhapatnam on 28.07 .1998. In Court Martial inquiry, DK Singh was 
found guilty and sentenced to undergo ten years rigorous imprisonment 
and dismissal with disgrace from navy with consequential penalties. Upon 
appeal, his conviction was confirmed and sentence was reduced to eight 
years. The tribunal acquitted appellant-DK Singh by giving him benefit 
of doubt. While acquitting DK Singh, tribunal directed that the appellant-
DK Singh is deemed to have been retired from service with effect from 
03.05.2004 on completion of qualifying service required for pension. 
Assailing the same, appellant-DK Singh has filed the appeal seeking for 
reinstatement and other consequential benefits. 
20. As in the case of other appellants, tribunal disbelieved the 
identification of DK Singh by PWs 14 and 18. The tribunal accepted 
DK Singh's plea that his photograph was taken on the same date when 
he was placed under custody i.e. on 29 .07 .1998 and identification parade 
was conducted on
17.08.1998. The tribunal was of the opinion that 
there was probability for the investigating agency to have shown his 
photo to PWs 14 and 18. As discussed earlier, we have differed from 
the approach and finding of the tribunal in appreciation of evidence of 
PW-14 and PW-18 in identifying the appellants. However, since Union 
oflndia has not filed any appeal challenging acquittal of appellant DK 
Singh, we do not propose to go into these aspects. 
21. It is fairly well settled that acquittal by a criminal court would 
not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance .with the 
Rules and Regulations in force. [vide Ajit Kumar Nag v. General 
Manager (P J), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Ors. (2005) 
7 SCC 764, T.NC.S. Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. v. K. Meerabai (2006) 2 
sec 255] 
22. Acquittal in a criminal case does not entitle a person to 
automatic reinstatement. In Union of India and Am: v. Bihari Lal 
Sidhana (1997) 4 SCC 385, it was held as under:-
"5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal 
court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 
reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent 
authority to take decision whether the delinquent government 
servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be 
taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and 
Appeal) Rules or underthe Temporary Service Rules. Admittedly, 
the respondent had been working as a temporary government 
servant before he was kept under suspension. The termination 
order indicated the factum that he, by then, was under suspension. 
It is only a way of describing him as being under suspension when 
the order came to be passed but that does not constitute any stigma. 
Mere acquittal of government employee does not automatically 
entitle the government servant to reinstatement. As stated earlier, 
it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a 
decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be 
done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should 
be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent 
is only a temporary government servant, the power being available 
under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent 
authority to invoke the said power and terminate the services of 
the employee instead of conducting the enquiry or to continue in 
service a government servant accused of defalcation of public 
money. Reinstatement would be a charter for
him to indulge with 
impunity in misappropriation of public money." 
23. Only ifthe employee had been honourably acquitted, could he 
make a claim for reinstatement. In the case in hand, the tribunal acquitted 
the appellant-DK Singh:-(i) as in the case of AK Singh and UK Singh, 
tribunal disbelieved the identification of appellant-DK Singh by PW-14 
(Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) and (ii) the weapons that were alleged 
to have been recovered on the basis of confession of DK Singh on 
12.08.1998 appears to have been photographed on 29.07.1998 by the 
prosecution, the tribunal thus rejected the prosecution case that weapons, 
bag and suitcase were recovered on the basis of confession given by 
DK Singh. Unlike AK Singh and UK Singh's case, DK Singh did not 
have incriminating fingerprint evidence at the scene of occurrence and 
DK Singh raised defence plea of alibi. According to DK Singh he was 
on duty along with four others on aboard Indian Naval Ship, Anjadip on 
04.06.1998 from 0900 hours to 1300 hours and then again from 1525 
hours to 0740 hours on 05.06.1998. To examine this plea of alibi, the 
tribunal called for the Duty Ashore Book maintained at INS Anjadip
AJAY KUMAR SINGH v. THE FLAG OFFICER 
COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF & ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
(Original of Ex. P.32). DK Singh claimed that the document entry at SI. 
No.53 was tampered with and consequently, tribunal noted that there 
indeed was some overwriting in SI. No.53 besides the column for the 
name of the individual. The tribunal concluded that prosecution had not 
placed any material on record to show that after finishing his duty at 
1300 hours, appellant-DK Singh was allowed to avail off and thus the 
tribunal concluded that in the absence of evidence that DK Singh was 
allowed to go off after 1300 hours on 04.06.1998, the benefit of doubt 
must be afforded to him. 
24. The tribunal came to the collective conclusion that no 
satisfactory evidence had been adduced by the prosecution to sustain 
the conviction of DK Singh and therefore the tribunal set aside the 
conviction giving him the benefit of doubt. From a perusal of the impugned 
judgment, it is clear that the tribunal has acquitted the appellant-DK 
Singh on the ground that the prosecution has not established the guilt of 
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not as if; the appellant-DK 
Singh was honourably acquitted. It is also to be pointed out that as 
discussed above, that we have taken the view that the identity of the 
appellants by PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) is credible and 
acceptable. Evidence of PW-14 and PW-18 identifying DK Singh as 
one of the culprits is a factor to be reckoned with
while considering the 
plea of the appellant-DK Singh for reinstatement. Additionally, it is to be 
pointed out that as seen from the evidence of K. Rama Krishna Rao-
Inspector of Police (PW-17) on 10.06.1998, DK Singh deposited 
Rs.90,000/- in his bank account No.3395 of SBI BR Township Branch 
and the explanation of the appellant for this deposit is not convincing. 
Having regard to our findings on the evidence of PW s 14 and 18, the 
acquittal of appellant-DK Singh itself becomes a debatable point. 
However, we do not propose to go into this aspect since the Union of 
lndi 0 has not filed any appeal challenging acquittal of DK Singh. 
Appellant-DK Singh who was only granted benefit of doubt cannot seek 
for reinstatement and the consequential benefits and his appeal is also 
liable to be dismissed. 
25. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed. 
K~Jpana K. T~ipat)1y 
Appeals dismissed. 
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