DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. versus TARUN PAL SINGH & ORS.
[2017] 14 S.C.R. 202, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
[2017) 14 S.C.R. 202 
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. 
v. 
TARUN PAL SINGH & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 19356 of 2017) 
NOVEMBER 15,2017 
(ARUN MISHRA AND 
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.) 
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
C Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: 
ss. 24(J)(b) and proviso to s.24(2) - Whether Proviso to 
sub- section (2) of s. 24 governs sub-section (l)(b) of s. 24 or is 
confined to sub-section 24(2) alone - Held: ss.24(1) and 24(2) 
operate in two different fields - The proviso is only an exception to 
D the main provision - For applicability of the proviso, the case has 
to be covered by s.24(2)- The object of the proviso is to give benefit 
of computation of compensation to all landholders and to save land 
acquisition proceedings - The legislative intention is clear that it is 
enacted as proviso to s.24(2) - If it is read as proviso to s. 24(J)(b), 
it would create repugnancy with said provision and provisions of 
E s.24(J)(b) and 24(2) would become wholly inconsistent with each 
other -
The interpretation which creates inconsistency or 
repugnancy has to be avoided - No contrary intention is available 
in the provisions so as not to read the proviso as part of s.24(2) -
Interpretation of Statutes. 
F 
Interpretation of Statutes: 
Proviso to a provision - Construction of - Discussed. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. Effect of a proviso is to except all preceding 
G portion of the enactment. It is only
occasionally that proviso is 
unrelated to subject matter of preceding section, it may have to 
be interpreted as a substantive provision. Ordinarily, a proviso 
is not interpreted as stating a general rule. Provisos are often 
added as saving clauses. A proviso must be construed with 
reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is 
H 
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DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN.PAL 
203 
SINGH & ORS. 
appended. The proviso is ordinarily subordinate to the main A 
Section. A construction placed on proviso which brings general 
harmony to the terms of the Section should prevail. A proviso 
may sometime contain substantive provision. Ordinarily, proviso 
to a section is intended to take out a part of the main section for 
special treatment. Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond 
B 
the main provision to which it is a proviso. A proviso is not 
interpreted as stating a general rule, it is an exception to main 
provision to which it is carved out as a proviso. Proviso can not 
be construed as enlarging the scope of enactment when it can be 
fairly and properly constructed without attributing that effect. It 
is not open to read in, the words of enactment which are not to be 
C 
found there and which would alter its operative effect. [Para 9] 
(225-D-G] 
H Nizam s Religious Endowment Trust, Hyderabad v. 
Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra. Pradesh, 
Hyderabad AIR 1966 SC 1007: (1966] SCR 384; 
Kederanath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The 
Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. AIR 1966 SC 12 : (1965] 
SCR 626 ; lshverlal Thakorelal Almaula (Deceased) 
after him his heirs and Legal Representatives v. Motibhai 
Nagjibhai AIR 1966 SC 459 : (1966] SCR 367 ; Shah 
Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subhash 
Chandra Yograj Sinha AIR 1961 SC 1596 ; S.Sundaram 
Pillai & Ors. v. V.R. P~ttabiraman & Ors. (1985) 1
SCC 
591: [1985] 2 SCR 643; Haryana State Cooperative 
Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State 
Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees Union 
& Anr. (2004) 1 SCC 574 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 
1039 ; Ramesh Kumar Sharma v. Union of India & Ors. 
(2006) 6 SCC 510: (2006) 4 Suppl. SCR 227 ; Nagar 
Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors. AIR 
2009 SC 187 : (2008] 14 SCR 419 ; Shimbhu & Anr. v. 
State of Haryana (2014) 13 SCC 318 : (2013] 14 SCR 
136 - relied on. 
Statute Law by Craies, Seventh Edition - referred to. · 
D 
E 
F 
G 
2.1 Section 24(1) of Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and H
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[2017] 14 S.C.R. 
A Resettlement Act, 2013 begins with non-obstante clause. The 
Parliament has given overriding effect to this provision over all 
other provisions of 2013 Act. Section 24(2) also begins with non-
obstante clause. This provision has overriding effect over Section 
24(1). It is apparent that Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 deals with 
B the lapse of acquisition in case the award had been made five 
years or more prior to commencement of the Act but the physical 
possession of the land had not been taken or the compensation 
had not been paid. The provision of Section 24(2) and its proviso 
together further clarify that, in case the award has been made 
and compensation in respect of majority of land holdings has not 
C been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all the 
beneficiaries specified in the notification for Acquisition shall be 
entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of 
2013 Act. Even if, minority of the claimants are disbursed with 
the compensation, such claimants also would get benefit of 
D compensation under 2013 Act. Thus it is clear that even if the 
acquisition does not lapse, all the beneficiaries to whom the 
compensation is payable would be entitled to compensation under 
2013 Act. [Para 12) [227-A-D) 
2.2 Reading of Sections 24(1) and 24(2) conjointly & 
homogenously makes it abundantly clear that they operate in two 
E different fields. Section 24(l)(b) unequivocally
indicates that in 
case the award has been passed under the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894, all the proceedings shall continue as if 1894 Act has not 
been repealed. Section 24(1)(a) makes the provision of 2013 
Act applicable only in case where the award has not been passed. 
F !n other words, it gives a clue that when an award has been 
passed, obviously further proceedings have to be undertaken 
under the 1894 Act, to that extent proceedings under the said 
,. 
Act is saved, and the Act of 2013 will not apply. In such cases, 
there is no necessity of initiation of acquisition proceedings afresh 
except in cases as provided under Section 24(2). Whereas Section 
G 24(2) would be applicable, if the Award under Section 11 of the 
old Act has been made five years or more prior to commencement 
of 1894 but physical possession of the Janel has not been taken or 
the compensation has not been paid. Proviso to Section 24(2) 
further makes it clear that in case the compensation in respect of 
H majority of lancl holdings has not been deposited in the account
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
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SINGH & ORS. 
of the beneficiaries, then, all the beneficiaries, specified in the A 
notification for Acquisition shall be entitled to compensation in 
· accordance with the provisions of Act of 2013. The legislature 
has provided different consequences in the provisions keeping 
in mind the time gap as enumerated in Sections 24(1) and 24(2). 
The legislature has visualized and expected that the things would 
B 
not happen overnight on passing of an award. [Para 12) (228-B-
F] 
2.3 Three contingencies are provided under Sub-Section 
(2) of Section 24 i.e. (i) in case if award was passed five years or 
more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and (ii) if C 
compensation has not been paid, or (iii) possession has not been 
taken. Exception is carved out by adding the proviso to Section 
24(2) - wherein the land acquisition would not lapse, in case some 
of the land losers are paid compensation but land owners of 
majority of holding are not paid. Thus the proviso to Section 24(2) 
cannot be lifted and made part of Section 24(1)(b). [Para 12) (227-
D 
G-H; 228-A) 
2.4 The proviso to Sub~Section (2) makes it clear that when 
the Award has been made and, compensation in respect of majority 
of holdings has not been deposited in the account of beneficiaries,. 
the acquisition would not lapse. However, all the beneficiaries E 
shall be entitled to enhanced compensation under 2013 Act. This 
proviso is to be necessarily part of
Sub-Section (2)-of Section 24 
only. The legislative intention is clear that it is enacted as proviso 
to Section 24(2), and otherwise also if read as if it were a proviso 
to Section 24(1)(b ), it would create repugnancy with said provision 
and the provisions of section 24(l)(b) and proviso to 24(2) would 
F 
become wholly inconsistent with each other. This is a trite law 
that the interpretation which creates inconsistency or repugnancy 
has to be avoided and proviso has to be part of Section 24(2) as 
enacted. As per fundamental rule of its construction, no contrary 
intention is available in the provisions so as not to read it as part G 
of Section 24(2). As Section 24(1)(b) provides, in case award has 
been passed under 1894 Act, the proceedings shall continue of 
the said Act as if it has not been replaced whereas Section 24(2) 
provides deemed lapse in case award is passed 5 years or more 
before commencement of 2013 Act and possession has not been 
H
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[2017] 14 S.C.R. 
A taken or compensation has not been paid and as per the proviso 
with respect to majority of holding compensation has not been 
deposited in account of land owners. In case award has been 
passed few days before commencement of the 2013 Act, then 
deposit of compensation with respect to majority of holding is 
B 
bound to take time, that is why legislature has made difference of 
consequences based upon time gap in passing of award as 
requisite steps to be taken are bound to consume some time by 
providing proceedings to continue under 1894 Act. [Para 11) (226-
C-H] 
2.5 A proviso appended to a provision has to be specifically 
C interpreted in the manner so as to enable the field which is covered 
by the main provision. The proviso is only an exception to main 
provision to which it has been enacted and no other. The proviso 
deals with a situation which takes something out of the main 
enactment to provide a particular course of action, which course 
D of action could not have been adopted in the absence of the 
proviso. The proviso appended to Section 24(2) indicates that it 
carves out an exception for a situation where the land acquisition 
proceedings shall not be deemed to lapse. Thus, for the 
applicability of the proviso, a case has to be covered by Section 
24(2) i.e. (1) award has been made five years or more prior to the 
E enforcement of 2013 Act. [Para 13) (228-F-H; 229-A) 
2.6 The purpose and object of the
proviso is to give benefit 
of computation of compensation to all landholders and to save 
land acquisition proceedings. Hence, it is evident that the proviso 
is appropriately be treated as a proviso to Sub- Section (2) of 
F Section 24 and cannot be read as proviso to Section 24(1)(b) of 
Act of 21113. [Para 13) (229-Cj 
Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. 
(2016) 16 SCC 258 : (2016) 5 SCR 227 - distinguished. 
G 
Case Law Reference 
[2016) 5 SCR 227 
distinguished 
Para6 
[1966) SCR 384 
relied on 
Para 8 (b) 
[1965) SCR 626 
relied on 
Para 8 (c) 
(1966) SCR 367 
relied on 
Para 8 (d) 
H AIR 1961 SC 1596 
relied on 
Para 8 (e)
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
207 
SINGH& ORS. 
[1985) 2 SCR 643 
relied on 
Para 8 (t) 
[2003) 6 Suppl. SCR 1039 
relied on 
Para 8 (i) 
[2006) 4 Suppl. SCR 227 
relied on 
Para 8 (j) 
[2008) 14 SCR 419 
relied on 
Para 8 (k) 
[2013) 14 SCR 136 
relied on 
Para 8 (I) 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 19356 
of2017. 
From the Judgment and Orderdated21.05.2015 of the High Court 
of Delhi at New Delhi in C. W. Petition No. 8596 of2014 
WITH 
Civil Appeal Nos. 19362, 19361, 19358, 19357, 19360, 19359, 
19363, 19364and 19412of2017 
A 
B 
c 
Sanjay R. Hegde, Sr. Adv., Ms. Shashi Kiran, Satish Chandra, 
Sujit Kumar Jha, Ms. Priya Sharma, Manoj Jain, Hara Prasad Sahu, 
Kamlesh Kumar Mishra, Shiv Kant Mishra, Pranaya Kumar Mohapatra, 
D 
Parveen Swarup, Manish Kaushik, Ms. Aradhana Sharma, Anil Goel, 
Sachin Gupta, Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Ms. Monika, Sukrit R. Kapoor, 
Ms. Nitya Madhusoodhanan, Muhammad Khan, R.V. Prabhat, Umar 
Hoda, Gaurav Goel, Siddhartha Chowdhury, Vishaal Maan, Satyawan 
Rathee, Abhishek Gupta, Keshav Ranjan, B.V. Balaram Das, Advs. for 
E 
the appearing parties. 
The following Qr.der of the Court was passed: 
ORDER 
I. Leave granted. 
F 
2. The only issue involved in the present case is whether the 
provision or'Section 24(l)(b) of the Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 
2013 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 2013 ') is governed by the 
proviso to
Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the said Act or it has to be 
G 
read as part of section 24(2). 
-
3. For the purpose of Delhi Metro Railways, land acquisition was 
initiated by issuing a Notification on 04.06.2009 under Section 4 read 
with Section 17(1) and ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter 
referred to as 'the Act of 1894'). 
I 
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[2017] 14 S.C.R. 
A 
4. As per letter dated 16.6.2009, written by the appellant-Delhi 
Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. ('DMRC', for short) to the Land & Building 
Department of the Delhi Government, 80% of the land compensation 
amounting to Rs.3,28,56,687.49p. (Rupees Three Crores, Twenty Eight 
Lakhs, Fifty-Six Thousand, Six Hundred Eighty-Seven and Forty Nine 
Paise only) was deposited by the appellant vide cheque dated 15.6.2009. 
B The matter travelled to this Court; and this Court dismissed the Special 
Leave Petition. Thereafter, declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 
1894 had been issued on 9.10.2009, and possession of the land was 
taken by the DMRC. Award was pronounced on 14.9.20 I I by the Land 
Acquisition Collector ('the LAC', for short). On 16.9.2009, the DMRC 
C deposited the amount of compensation determined by the LAC. The 
balance amount i.e. Rs.60,81,04,200/- (Rupees Sixty Crores, Eighty One 
Lakhs, Four Thousand, Two Hundred only) was demanded by the Land 
& Building Department by writing a letter dated 15. I 0.2011; and, that 
amount was also paid, vide cheque dated 02.11.2011. It was deposited 
D on 3.11.2011. Thus, the DMRC has deposited the total assessed 
compensation. The DMRC was in possession of the land and after 
development, it has been handed over for the public purpose, i.e., MRTS 
project, for construction ofChattarpur Metro Station and Electrical Relay 
Sub-Station to cater to the Metro Line from Mehrauli to
Gurgaon and 
Chattarpur Metro Station. The claimants have already sought reference 
E under Section 18 of the Act of 1894, for enhancement of the 
compensation, which is stated to be pending. In the High Court, certain 
writ petitions were filed by the claimants in which, vide its judgment and 
order dated 21.5.2015, it was directed that the acquisition would stand, 
but the compensation would be paid to the writ petitioners under the Act 
F of 2013. Hence, the appeals have been preferred by DMRC in this 
Court. 
5. It was urged by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 
appellant that Award has been passed within 5 years prior to the 
commencement of the Act of2013; the Act came into force on 1.1.2014; 
the Award was passed on 14.04.2011. Thus, the provisions of Section 
G 24(l)(b) of the Act of2013 would be applicable and such, proceedings 
would not lapse and compensation would not be payable as per proviso 
to Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the Act of2013. The view taken by 
the High Court, that the proviso to section 24(2) is applicable, is not 
correct. The amount has already been deposited before the Land 
H Acquisition Collector. Rs.21 Crores is said to have been paid towards
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
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SINGH & ORS. 
.. 
compensation. The High Court has, thus, erred. in holding that the 
A 
compensation is required to be paid under the Act of 2013. 
6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 
landowners contended that the proviso to Section 24(2) has to be read 
as part of Section 24(1 )(b) of the Act of 2013, and it cannot be read as 
part of Sub-Section (2) of Section 24, as legislature have carved out a B 
different independent provision which would be applicable to an Award · 
passed, as contemplated under Section 24( I )(b ), and since in the instant 
case, the amount has not been deposited with respect to the majority of 
the land holdings in the account of the beneficiaries, the compensation 
becomes payable to all the beneficiaries under the Act of2013. Reliance 
C 
has been placed on the decision of this Court in Delhi Development 
Authority Vs. Sukhbir Singh & Ors., (2016) 16 SCC 258. 
7. Section 24 of the Act of 20 I J is extracted hereunder: 
"24.( I) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any 
case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land 
D 
Acquisition Act, 1894, -
(a) Where no award under section 11 of the said Land 
Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act 
relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or ·' · 
b) Where an award under said section 11 has been made, then 
E 
such proceedings shall continue under the
provisions of the 
said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been 
repealed. 
(2) Notwiths~nding anything contained in sub-section (I), in case 
.. of land a~quisition proceedings initiated under the Land 
F 
Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 
has been made five years or .more prior to the commencement -· 
- ~of this Act buttlrephysical-possession of tile land 11!1.S ilot been 
··taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings 
-slntH-oo-deemed to have lapsed anmhe appropriate Government, 
G 
if it so chooses, shaU-initiate -tfie proceedings of such land 
acquisitioo..afresh in 11ccordance with the provisions of this Act: 
-
" 
. Provided that whe;e an.award has been made and 
c.Qmpensiltion in respect of a majorityof landholding has riot 
been deposited in the account ·of the ben~liClaries; then, all 
H 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 14 S.C.R. 
beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under 
section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to 
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 
8. Before coming to the construction of the proviso to section 24, 
we deem it appropriate to consider rules regardin~ construction of proviso. 
(a) Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition referring to various 
decisions for construction of provisos has observed : 
"The effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso, according 
to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except out of the 
preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something 
enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it; 
and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope 
of an enactment when it can be fairly and properly construed 
without attributing to it that effect." 
"When one finds a proviso to a section," said Lush J. in 
Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 170, 173, "the 
natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part 
of the section would have included the subject-matter of the 
proviso." 
In West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. 
[1897] A.C. 647, 652 Lord Watson said: "I am perfectly clear 
that if the language of the enacting part of the statute does not 
contain the provisions which are said to occur in it, you cannot 
derive these provisions by implication
from a proviso. When one 
regards the natural history and object of provisos, and the manner 
in which they find their way into Acts of Parliament, I think your 
Lordships would be adopting a very dangerous and certainly 
unusual course if you were to import legislation from a proviso 
wholesale into the body of the statute, although I perfectly admit 
that there may be and are many cases in which the terms of an 
intelligible proviso may throw considerable light on the ambiguous 
import of the statutory words." 
And Lord Herschell in the same case said : "I decline to 
read into any enactment words which are not to be found there 
and which would alter its operative effect because of provisions 
to be found in any proviso," though he admitted that a proviso 
H 
may be a useful guide in the selection of one or other of two
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
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SINGH & ORS. 
possible constructions of words in the enactment or to show the A 
scope of the latter in a doubtful case. 
InR. v. Dibdin [1910] P.57, 125 Moulton L.J. said: "The fallacy 
of the proposed method of interpretation is not far to seek. It. 
sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso 
must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which 
B 
it stands as a proviso. It treats it as if it were an independent 
enacting clause instead of being dependent on the main 
enactment. The courts, as, for instance, in Exp. Partington, ( 1844) 
6 Q.B. 649, 653,ReBrocklebank(l889)23 Q.B.D461, and Hill 
v. East and West India Dock Co. (1884) 9 App.Cas.448 have 
frequently pointed out this fallacy, and have refused to be led 
C 
astray by arguments such as these which have been addressed 
to us, which depend solely on taking words absolutely in their 
strict literal sense, disregarding the fundamental consideration 
-that they appearing in the proviso." 
So where section 65 in a group of sections from section 62 
D 
onwards in a private Act at the side of which was a note 
"Sewers- Sanitary arrangements," provided that "nothing in the 
Act shall authorise the Corporation of Newcastle-on-Tyne to 
. commit a nuisance," and the Improvement Act of 1885 by section 
22 authorised the corporation to erect posts, rails, and fences for 
E 
the protection of passengers and traffic, it was argued that this
authority must be read subject to the proviso as to nuisance; but 
the court held that the proviso affected only the group of sections 
to which it was attached and was not a proviso to section 22. 
But sections, thoµgh framed as provisos upon preceding sections, 
may exceptionally contain matter which is in substance a fresh 
enactment, adding to and not merely qualifying what goes before." 
(b) In H.E. H.Nizam's Religious Endowment Trust, Hyderabad 
v. Commissioner of Income-tax, {1.ndhra Pradesh, Hyderabad AIR 
1966 SC l 007, this Court has observed : 
"7. As has been pointed out by Craies in his book on Statute 
Law,6th Edn. at p. 217, "The effect ofan excepting or qualifying 
proviso, according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except 
F 
G 
out the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something 
enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it." 
The proviso to clause (i) excepts the .two classes of income H
212 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] l4S.C.R. 
subject to the condition mentioned therein from the operation of 
the substantive clause. It comes into operation only when the 
said income is applied to religious or charitable purposes without 
the taxable territories. In that event, the Central Board of 
Revenue, by general or speci.r • "rder, may direct that it shall not 
be included in the total income. , hi: . wiso also throws light on 
the construction of the substantive pan of clause (i) as the 
exception can be invoked only upon the applicatiun of the income 
to the said purposes outside the taxable territories. The application 
of the income in praesenti or in futuro for purposes in or outside 
the taxable territories, as the case may be, is the necessary 
condition for invoking either the substantive part of the clause or 
the proviso thereto." 
( c) In Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The 
Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., AIR 1966 SC 12, this C'otJrt has 
discussed the purpose of the proviso thus: 
"8. Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act in effect exempts a specified 
turnover of a dealer from sales tax. The provision prescribing 
the exemption shall, therefore, be strictly construed. The 
substantive clause gives the exemptiorl and the proviso qualifies 
the substantive clause. In effect, the proviso says that part of 
the turnover of the selling dealer covered by the terms of sub-cl. 
(ii) will be exempted provided a declaration in the form
prescribed 
is furnished. To put it in other words, a dealer cannot get the 
exemption unless he furnishes the declaration in the prescribed 
form. It is well settled that "the effect of an excepting or qualifying 
proviso, according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except 
out of the preceuing portion of the enactment, or to qualify 
something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be 
within it": see "Craies on Statute Law", 6th Edn., p. 217. If the 
intention of the Legislature was to give exemption ifthe terms of 
the substantive part of sub-cl. (ii) alone are complied with, the 
proviso becomes redundant and otiose. To accept the argument 
of the learned counsel for the appellant is to ignore the proviso 
altogether, for if his contention be correct it will lead to the position 
that ifthe declaration form is furnished, well and good; but, ifnot 
furnished, other evidence can be produced. That is to rewrite 
the clause and to omit the proviso. That will defeat the express
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
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SINGH & ORS. 
intention of the Legislature. Nor does R. 27 A support the contrary A 
construction. The expression "on demand" only fixes the point 
of time when the declaration forms are to be produced; otherwise, 
the rule would be inconsistent with the section. Section 5(2)(a)(ii) 
says that the declaration form is to be furnished by the dealer 
and r. 27 A says that it shall be furnished on demand, that is to 
8 
say, it fixes the time when the form is to be furnished. This 
reconciles the provisions of r. 27 A with those of s. 5(2)(a)(ii) of 
the Act, whereas the construction suggested by the learned counsel 
introduces an incongruity which shall be avoided. Section 21 A 
on which reliance is placed has no bearing on the question to be 
decided. It only empowers the Commissioner or any person 
C 
appointed to assist him under sub.section ( 1) of s. 3 to take 
evidence on oath etc. It can be invoked only in a case where the 
authority concerned is empowered to take evidence in respect 
of any particular matter, but that does not enable him to ignore a 
statutory condition to claim exemption." 
(d) In Jshverlal Thakorelal Almaula (Deceased) after him his 
heirs and Legal Representatives v. Motibhai Nagjibhai, AIR 1966 
SC 459, the intendment of the proviso has been discussed thus: 
D 
"8. The proper function of a proviso is to except or qualify 
something enacted in the substantive clause, which but for the 
E 
proviso
should be within that' clause. It may ordinarily be 
presumed in construing a proviso that it was intended that the 
enacting part of the section would have included the subject-
matter of the proviso. But the question is one of interpretation of 
the proviso and there is no rule that the proviso must always be 
restricted to the ambit of the main enactment. Occasionally itrn . F 
statute, a proviso is unrelated to the subject-matter of the preceding 
section, of contains matters extraneous to that section, 'and it 
may have then to be interpreted as a substantive provision, dealing 
independently with the matter specified therein, and not as 
qualifying the main or the preceding section." 
G 
(e) In Shah Bhojraj kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. 
Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596, this Court has 
discussed the object of the proviso and how it is to be interpreted thus: 
"9. The law with regard to provisos is well-settled and well-
understood. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment 
H
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[2017] 14S.C.R. 
to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and 
ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. 
But, provisos are often.added not as exceptions or qualifications 
to the main enactment but as savings clauses, in which cases 
they will not be construed as controlled by the section. The proviso 
which has been added to s. 50 of the Act deals with the effect of 
repeal. The substantive part of the section repealed two Acts 
which were in force in the State of Bombay. If nothing more had 
been said, s. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act would have 
applied, and all pending suits and proceedings would have 
continued under the old law as if the repealing Act had not been 
passed. The effect of the proviso was to take the matter out of 
s. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act and to provide for a 
special saving. It cannot be used to decide whether s. 12 of the 
Act is retrospective. It was observed by Wood, V.C., in Fitzgerald 
v. Champneys (1861) 70 E.R. 958 that saving clauses are seldom 
used to construe Acts. These clauses are introduced into Acts 
which repeal others, to safeguard rights which, but for the savings, 
would be lost. The proviso here saves pending suits and 
proceedings, and further enacts that suits and proceedings then 
pending are to be transferred to the courts designated in the Act 
and are to continue under the Act and any or all the provisions of
the Act are to apply to them. The learned Solicitor-General 
contends that the savings clause enacted by the proviso, even if 
treated as substantive law, must be taken to apply only to suits 
and proceedings pending at the time of the repeal which, but for 
the proviso, would be governed by the Act repealed. According 
to the learned Attorney-General, the effect of the savings is much 
wider, and it applies to such cases as come within the words of 
the proviso, whenever the Act is extended to new areas." 
(f) In S.Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. V.R. Pattabiraman & Ors., 
(1985) I SCC 591, thisCourthaselaboratelyconsidered various decisions 
with respect to the proviso and has discussed the matter thus : 
29. Odgers in Construction of Deeds and Statutes (5th Edn.) 
while referring to the scope of a pmviso mentioned the following 
ingredients: 
"P. 317. Provisos -These am clauses of exception or 
qualification in an Act, excepting s1Jmething out of, or qualifying
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
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something in, the enactment which, but for the proviso, would be 
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within it. 
P. 318. Though framed as a proviso, such a clause may 
exceptionally have the effect of a substantive enactment." 
30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at pages 294-295 has 
collected the following principles in regard to a proviso: 
B 
(a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption 
is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would 
have included the subject-matter of the proviso. 
(b) A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding 
C 
parts of the clause to which it is appended. 
( c) Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso 
shall stand and be held a repeal of the section as the proviso 
·speaks the latter intention of the makers. 
( d) Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a D 
guide to its interpretation: but when it is clear, a proviso cannot 
imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the 
section. 
( e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section. 
(f)A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling E 
reasons. 
. ) 
(g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of 
abundant caution. 
(h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into 
general harmony with the terms of section should prevail. 
F 
( i) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso 
will not
prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed to 
be read as supplemental to the earlier one. 
U) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision. 
31. In the case of Local Government Board v. South Stoneham 
Union, 1909 AC 57, Lord Macnaghten made the following 
observation: 
"I think the proviso is a qualification of the preceding enactment 
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which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate." 
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32. In Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai AIR 
1966 SC 459, it was held that the main object of a proviso is 
merely to qualify the main enactment. In Madras and Southern 
Mahrata Railway Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality AIR 1944 
PC 71, Lord Macmillan observed thus: 
"The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a 
case which would otherwise fall within the general language of 
the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case." 
33. The above case was approved by this Court in CIT v. Indo 
Mercantile Bank Ltd. AIR 1959 SC 713, where Kapur, J. held 
that the proper function of a proviso was merely to qualify the 
generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and 
taking out, as it were, from the main enactment a portion which, 
but for the proviso, would fall within the main enactment. In 
Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subbash 
Chandra Yograj Sinha AIR 1961 SC 1596, Hidayatullah, J., as he 
then was, v~ry aptly and succinctly indicated the parameters of 
a proviso thus: 
· 
"As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify 
or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, 
a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule." 
34. In West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society 
1897 AC 647, while guarding against the danger of interpretation 
of a proviso, Lord Watson observed thus: 
"a
very dangerous and certainly unusual course to import 
F 
legislation from a proviso wholesale into the body of }he statute." 
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35. A very apt description and extent ofa proviso was given by 
Lord Oreburn in Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff Vale 
Railway Co. 1909 AC 253, where it was pointed out that insertion 
of a proviso by the draftsman is not always strictly adhered to its 
legitimate use and at times a section worded as a proviso may 
wholly or partly be in substance a fresh enactment adding to and 
not merely excepting something out of or qualifying what goes 
before. To the same effect is a later decision of the same Court 
in Jennings v. Kelly I 940 AC 206, where it was observed thus:
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
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"We must now come to the proviso, for there is, I think, no doubt 
A 
that, in the construction of the section, the whole of it must be 
read, and a consistent meaning, if possible, given to every part of 
it. The words are: ... 'provided that such licence shall be granted 
only for premises situate in the ward or district electoral division 
in which such increase in population has taken place .. .' There 
seems to be no doubt that the words "such increase in population" 
refer to the increase of not less than 25 percent of the population. 
mentioned in the opening words of the section." 
36. While interpreting a proviso care must be taken that it is 
used to remove special cases from the general enactment and 
provide for them separately. 
37. In short, generally speaking, a proviso is intended to limit the 
enacted provision so as to except something which would have 
otherwise been within it or in some measure to modify the 
eirncting clause. Sometimes a proviso may be embedded in the 
main provision and becomes an integral part of it so as to amount 
to a substantive provision itself. 
38. Apart from the authorities referred to above, this Court has 
in a long course of decisions explained and adumbrated the various 
shades, aspects, and elements of a proviso. In State of Rajasthan 
v. Leela Jain AIR 1965 SC 1296, the following observations were 
made: 
"So far as a general principle of construction of a
proviso is 
concerned, it has been broadly stated that the function of a proviso 
is to limit the main part of the section and carve out something 
which but for the proviso would have been within the operative 
part." 
39. In the case of STO, Circle-I, Jabalpur v. Hanuma11 Prasad 
AIR 1967 SC 565, Bhargava, J. observed thus: 
"It is well-recognized that a proviso is added to a principal clause 
primarily with the object of taking out of the scope of that principal 
clause what is included in it and what the legislature desires 
should be excluded." 
40. In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. R.S. Jhaver AIR 
1968 SC 59, this Court made the following observations: 
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"Generally speaking, it is true that the proviso is an exception to 
the main part of the section; but it is recognised that in exceptional 
cases a proviso may be a substantive provision itself." 
41. In Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf ( 197 6) l SCC 128, 
Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 
B 
136-37, paras 16, 18): 
"There is some validity in this submission but if on a fair 
construction, the principal provision is clean a proviso cannot 
expand or limit it. Sometimes a proviso is engrafted by an 
apprehensive draftsman to remove possible doubts, to make 
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matters plain, to light up ambiguous edges. Here, such is the 
case. 
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If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be 
limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, 
the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, 
inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of 
construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the 
principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily --
is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the who.le 
section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually 
throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction." 
42. In Hiralal Rattanlal v. State ofU.P. (1973) l SCC 216, this 
Court made the following observations: [SCC para 22, p. 224: 
SCC (Tax) p.
315] 
"Ordinarily a proviso to a section is intended to take out a part of 
the main section for special treatment. It is not expected to enlarge 
the scope of the main section. But cases have arisen in which 
this Court has held that despite the fact that a provision is called 
proviso, it is really a separate provision and the so-called proviso 
has substantially altered the main section." 
· 43. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point 
because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly 
well established. To sum up, a proviso may serve four different 
purposes:
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
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SINGH & ORS. 
_ ( 1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main 
A_ 
enactment: 
(2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of 
the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be 
fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable: 
(3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an 
B 
integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and 
colour of the substantive enactment itself; and 
4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the 
enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment 
of the statutory provision. 
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44. These seem to be by and large the main purport and 
parameters of a proviso." 
(g) In Dibyasingh Malana v. State of Orissa & Ors. AIR 1989 
SC 1737, this Court considered effect of proviso and observed: 
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"7. On a plain reading of the definition of the term "family" in 
Section 37(b) of the Act we are of the view that the said definition 
as it stands is neither meaningless nor of doubtful meaning. In 
this connection, it may be pointed out that keeping in view the 
agrarian reform which was contemplated by the Act and 
E 
particularly the provisions of Chapter IV relating to ceiling and 
disposal of surplus land which were calculated to distribute the 
surplus land of big tenure holders among the overwhelming have-
nots of the State the Legislature in its wisdom gave an artificial 
meaning to the term "family".
The main provision containing the 
definition of the term is to be found in the first part of Section 
F 
37(b) namely "family in relating to an individual means the 
individual, the husband or wife as the case may be of such 
individual and their children whether major or minor", The later 
part of Section 37(b) namely "but does not include a major married .-
son who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before 
G 
the 26th day of September 1970" does not on the face of it 
contain a matter which may in substance be treated as a fresh 
enactment adding something to the main provision but is apparently 
and unequivocally a proviso containing an exception. This admits 
of no doubt in view of the words "but does not include". In the 
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Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore v. The Indo Mercantile 
Bank Limited ( 1959) Supp. (2) S.C.R. 256 it was held: 
"Ordinarily the effect of an excepting or a qualifying proviso is 
to carve something out of the preceding enactment or to qualify 
something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be in 
it and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope 
of an enactment when it can be fairly and properly construed 
without attributing to it that effect." 
(Emphasis supplied)" 
(h) In Kush Sahgal & Ors. v. M.C. Mitter & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 
l 390, this Court has observed thus : 
"32. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 21, a landlord can apply 
for eviction of a tenant on the ground that the building was bona 
fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and 
new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or 
any member of his family either for residential purposes or for 
purposes of any profession, trade or calling or on the ground that 
the building which was in a dilapidated condition was required 
for purposes of demolition and new construction. The second 
Proviso to Sub-section (2) however provides that "AN 
APPLICATION UNDER CLAUSE (a) SHALL NOT BE 
ENTERTAINED IN THE CASE OF ANY RESIDENTIAL 
BUILDING FOR OCCUPATION 
FOR BUSINESS 
PURPOSES." Thus, if an application is made by the landlord 
for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the building in
occupation of that tenant which was used exclusively for 
residential purposes was required for business purposes or for 
any other commercial activity, it would not be a ground within 
the meaning of Section 2 l ( l) of the new Act for the eviction of 
the tenant and the application will not be entertained. This we 
~ay because the normal function of a PROVISO is to except 
something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted 
therein which but for the PROVISO would be within the purview 
of the enactment. (See; Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 
v. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 12). Since the natural 
presumption is that but for the PROVISO, the enacting part of 
the section would have included the subject-matter of the 
PROVISO, the enacting part has to be given such a construction
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
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SINGH & ORS. 
which would make the exceptions carved out by the PROVISO 
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necessary and a construction which would make the exceptions 
unnecessary and redundant should be avoided (See: Justice G. 
P. Singh's "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" Seventh Edition 
1999, p-163). This principle has been deduced from the decision 
of the Privy Council in Govt. of the Province of Bombay v. 
Hormusji Manekji, AIR 1947 PC 200 as also the decision of this 
Court in Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980." 
(emphasis supplied) 
B 
(i) In Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. c 
v. Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees 
Union & Anr., (2004) 1 SCC 574, this Court has considered normal 
function of proviso and observed thus : 
"9. The normal function ofa proviso is to except something out 
of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which 
but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. 
As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey (1880) 5QBD 
170 (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills andGinning 
Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 
1596 and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta, 
AIR 1965 SC 1728), when one finds a proviso to a section the 
natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part 
of the section would have included the subject-matter of the 
proviso. The
proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal 
with a case which would otherwise fall within the general 
language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that 
case. It is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is -
expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate. As a general 
rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an 
exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is 
not interpreted as stating a general rule. "If the language of the 
enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which 
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are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by 
implication from a proviso," said Lord Watson in West Derby 
Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co., 1.987 AC 
647.Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to 
which it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main 
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provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no 
other. [See A.N Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran, 1992 SUPP I 
SCC 304, Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue 
Tribunal (1991) 3 SCC 442 and Kera/a State Housing Board 
v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 672] 
"This word (proviso) hath diverse operations. Sometime it worketh 
a qualification or limitation; sometime a condition; and sometime 
a covenant." (Coke upon Littleton, 18th Edn., p. 146.) 
"If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later clause which 
destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, 
the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant, and the earlier 
clause prevails .... But if the later clause does not destroy but 
only qualifies the earlier, then the two are to be read together 
and effect is to be given to the intention of the parties as disclosed 
by the deed as a whole" (per Lord Wrenbury in Forbes v. Git, 
( 1922) AC 256). 
A statutory proviso "is something engrafted on a preceding 
enactment" (R. v. Taunton, St. James, (1829) 9 B & C 831 ER 
p. 311). 
"The ordinary and proper function of a proviso coming after a 
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general enactment is to limit that general enactment in certain 
instances" (per Lord Esher in Barker, Re, (1890) 25 QBD 285). 
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10 ........... . 
11. The above position was noted in Ali M.K. v. State ofKerala, 
(2003) 11 sec 632." 
(emphasis supplied) 
(j) In Romesh Kumar
Sharma v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 
6 SCC 510, this Court has observed that normally proviso does not travel 
beyond the provisions to which it is proviso. This court held: 
12. "JO. The normal function ofa proviso is to except something 
out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein 
. which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the 
enactment. As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey 
(1880) 5 QBD 170 (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil 
Mills andGinning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, 
AIR 1961 SC 1596 and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corpn.
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
SINGH & ORS. 
223 
of Calcutta, AIR 1965 SC 1728), when one finds a proviso to a A 
section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the 
enacting part of the section would have included the subject-
matter of the proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to 
except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within 
the general language of the main enactment and its effect is 
B . 
confined to that case. It is a qualification of the preceding 
enactment which is expressed in terms too generar to be quite 
accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment 
to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and 
ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. 
"If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not 
C 
contain the provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot 
derive these provisions by implication from a proviso ..... " said 
Lord Watson in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life 
Assurance Society, 1987 AC 647. Normally, a proviso does 
not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves D 
out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted 
as a proviso and to no other. [See A.N Sehgal v. Raje Ram 
Sheoran, 1992 SUPP 1 SCC 304, Tribhovandas Haribhai 
Tambo/i v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (1991) 3 SCC 442 and 
Kera/a State Housing Board v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd., 
(1994) 5 sec 672]. 
E 
"This word
(proviso) hath diverse operations. Sometime it 
worketh a qualification or /imitation; sometime a condition; 
and sometime a covenant. " (Coke upon Littleton, 18th Edn., 
p. 146.)" 
. 
"If in a deed an earlier· clause is followed by a later clause 
F 
which destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier 
clause, the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant, and 
the earlier clause prevails .... But if the later clause does not 
destroy but only qualifies the earlier, then the two are to be 
read together and effect is to be given to the intention of the 
G 
parties as disclosed by the deed as a whole. " (per Lord 
Wrenbury in Forbes v. Git, (1922) 1 AC 256). 
11. A statutory proviso 'is something engrafted· on a 
preceding enactment' (R v. Taunton St James, (1829) 9 E&C 
831 ER p. 311). 
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'The ordinary and proper function of a proviso coming after 
a general enactment is to limit that general enactment in 
certain instances. ' (Per Lord Esher in Barker, Re .. , (1890) 
25 QBD 285). 
12. A proviso to a section cannot be used to import into the 
enacting part something which is not there, but where the 
enacting part is susceptible to several possible meanings it 
may be controlled by the proviso (see Jennings v. Kelly, 1940 
AC 206)." 
(k) In Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & 
Ors., AIR 2009 SC 187, this Court has observed thus: 
"8. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out 
of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which 
but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. 
As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey 1880 (5) QBD 
170, (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning 
Factory v. Sub hash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC I 596 
and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta, 
AIR (1965) SC 1728; when one finds a proviso to a section the 
natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part 
of the section would have included the subject matter of the 
proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal 
with a case which would otherwise fall within the general 
language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that 
case. It is a qualification of
the preceding enactment which is 
expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate. As a general 
rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an 
exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is 
not interpreted as stating a general rule. ''If the language of the 
enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which 
are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by 
implication from a proviso." Said Lord Watson in West Derby 
Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. 1897 AC 647) (HL). 
Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which 
it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main provisi9n to 
which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. (See 
· A.N. Sehga1 and-Ors. v. Raje Ram Sheoram and Ors., AIR 1991 
SC 1406), Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue
\ . 
. ,. 
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
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Tribunal and Ors. (AIR 1991 SC 1538) andKerala State Housing 
A 
Board and Ors. v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. and Ors. 1994 ( 5) 
sec 672." 
(I) In Shimbhu & Anr. v. State ofHaryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318, 
this Court has observed that fundamental rule of construction is that a 
proviso must be considered part of the main proviso to which it stands as 
B 
a proviso. This Court held: 
"13. It is a fundamental rule ofconstruction that a proviso must 
be considered in relation to the main provision. to which it stands 
as a proviso, particularly, in such penal provisi_ons. Whether there 
exist any "special and adequate reason" would depend upon a.~ c 
variety of factors and the peculiar facts and circumstances of 
ea_9h case. This Court, in various judgments, has reacht<d the 
consensus that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in .that 
behalf for universal application." 
9. What follows from aforesaid enunciation that effect of a proviso ··· D 
is to except all preceding portion of the enactment. It is only occasionally 
that proviso is unrelated to subject matter of preceding section, it may 
have to be interpreted as a substantive provision. Ordinarily, a proviso is 
not interpreted as stating a~ general rule. Provisos are often added as 
saving clauses. A proviso must be construed with.-re·terence to the 
preceding parts of the clause to ·which it is appended. The proviso is 
ordinarily subordinate
to the'main section. A construction placed on 
proviso which brings general harmony to the terms of the secti~;m:should 
prevail. A proviso may sometime contain: substantive provision .. Ordinarily, 
proviso to a section is intended to take out a part of the main section for 
special t~eatment. Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the main 
provision to which it is a proviso. A proviso is nqt interpreted as stating 
a general rule, it is an exception to main provision to which it is carved 
out as a proviso. Proviso can not be construed as enlarging the scope of 
enactment when it can be fairly and properly constructed without 
attributing that effect. It is not open to read in the words of enactment 
which are not to be found there and which would ~lter its op_erative 
effect. 
.. 
· 
10. It is apparent from the provisi~ns ofSecti~n 24( I), that it contains 
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a non-obstante clause with respect to any provision rriade in the Act·of 
2013. It is also provided in Section 24( I )(b) that in case any land acquisition 
proceedings had been initiated under the Act of 1894 and; an Award H
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[2017)14 S.C.R. 
1 A under Section 11 has been made, such proceedings.shall continue under 
the provisions of the Act of 1894, as if the said Act had not been repealed. 
· 11. An exception is also carved out by a non-obstante clause 
contained in Sub-Section (2) of Section 24; it begins with "notwithstanding 
anything contained in Sub-~ection ( 1 )".Thus, it would supersede provisions 
B of section 24(1) also. In case of land acquisition proceedings, initiated 
under the Act of 1894, wherein an Award has been made within 5 years 
·or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, if physical 
possession has not b~en taken or compensation has not been paid, then 
the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. The proviso to 
Sub-Section (2) makes it clear that when the Award has been made and, 
C compensation in respect of majority of ho-fd!ngs has not been deposited 
in the account ofberieficiaries the acquisition wouldnot lapse. However, 
all the beneficiaries shall be entitle<lo to enhanced compensation under 
the Act of 2013. This proviso is to be necessarily part of Sub-Section 
·(2) of section 24 only. The.' legislative intention is clear that it is enacted 
D 
a~ P!'..OYlso to j;ection 24(2), and otherwise also. if read as if it were a 
proviso to Section 24(1 )(b ), it would create repugnancy with said provision 
and the pr9vjsions of section 24( I )(b) and proviso to 24(2) would become 
· wholly inconsistent with each other. This
is a trite law that the 
illterpretation which creates inconsistency or repugnancy has to be 
avoided and proviso has to be part of Section 24(2) ~§ enacted. As per 
E fundamental rule of its construction, no contrary intention is available in 
the provisions so as not to read it as part of Section 24(2). As section. 
24(l)(b) provide_s, in case award has been passed under Act of 1894, 
the proceedings shall continue of the said Act as ifit has not been replaced 
whereas Section 24 (2) provides deemed lapse in case award is passed 
F 5 years or more: before commencement of Act of 2013 and possession 
_has not been taken or compensation has not beeri paid and as per the 
· proviso with respect to majority of holding compensation has not been 
deposited in accoµnt of land owners. In case award has been passed 
few days before commencement of the Act of 2013, then deposit ef • 
G" compensation with respect to majority of holding is bound to take time, 
that is why legisiature has made-difference of consequences based upon 
time gap in passing of award-as requisite steps to be taken are bound to 
consume some time by providing proceedings to continue under the Act 
of 1894. 
H
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
227 
SINGH& ORS.· 
12. Section 24( 1) begins with non-obstante clause. The Parliament'- A 
. -has given overriding effect to this provisiOn over all other provisions of 
. Act-~f2013. Section 24(2) also begins with non-obstante clause: This -· 
- provision has overriding effect over Section 24(1). It is'apparent that 
Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 deals with the lapse of acquisition in case_ 
the award had been m~de ~ve yea~s or more prior to commencement of-';-B 
2013 Act but the physical possesston of the land had not been taken or. -
· the compensation had not !Jeen paid. The provision of Section 24(2) and 
it_s proviso together furtherC!arifytha!, in case the award has been made 
and compensation in respect of majority of land holdings has notbeen. 
·deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then; all the. b~neficiades 
specified in the notification for Acquisition shall beentitled to compensation C 
- ~ in accordance with the provisions of Act of 2013. Even if, minority of -
the claimants are disbursed with the compensation such Claimants also · 
would get benefit of compensation under the Act of 2013 .-'I)us it is 
clear that even if the acquisition does not lapse, all the beneficiaries to 
whom the compensation is p~yable would be entitled to compen5atio~ ~ D 
·undertheActof2013. 
·. 
-
-
-
If the proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 is .read as part 9f 
Sub-Section. ( 1} of Section 24, the same _makes the said
provision 
completelycfifferent and inconsistenLWhenwe coriside_dhe expression 
"where an Award under_Section 11 has been made" provided under·· 
Section 24( 1 )(b ), the proceedings have to continue under the provisions 
E 
of Act of 1894. If the proviso:to Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 readas 
proviso to Section 24( 1 ), then Section 24( 1 )(b) will be rendered nugatory 
. and/or becomes otiose. True effect has to be given to the provision 
contained in Section 24( I )(b) which says that when award under Section 
11 has been made, then such· proceedings shall continue under the 
F 
provisions of Land Acquisition Acfl 894, as if the said Act has not been 
repealed. 
~ 
The three contingencies are provided under S~b-Section (2) of 
Section 24 i.e. (i) in case if award was passed five years or more prior 
- to the commencement of Act of2013 and (ii) if compensation has not 
G 
been paid, or (iii) possession has not been taken. Exception is carved--
out hy adding the proviso to.Section 24(2)- wherein the land acquisitiori-
woU:ld riot lapse, in case some of the land losers are paid compensation 
but land owners of majority of holding are not paid. Thus "'.e are of the_-. 
>-
H 
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228 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 14 S.C.R. 
A considered opinion that the proviso to Section 24(2) cannot be lifted and 
made part of Section 24(l)(b). 
At the cost of repetition, we observe that reading of Sections 
24( 1) and 24(2) conjointly & homogenously makes it abundantly clear 
that they operate in two different fields. Section 24( I )(b) unequivocally 
B indicates that in case the award has been passed under the Act of 1894, 
all the proceedings shall continue as if the Act of 1894 has not been 
repealed. Section 24( 1 )(a) makes the provision of Act of2013 applicable 
only in case where the award has not been passed. In other words, it 
gives a clue that when an award has been passed, obviously further 
proceedings have to be undertaken under the Act of 1894, to that extent 
C proceedings under the said Act is saved, and the Act of 2013 will not 
apply. In such cases, there is no necessity of initiation of acquisition 
proceedings afresh except in cases as provided under Section 24(2). 
Whereas Section 24(2) would be applicable ifthe Award under Section 
11 of the old Act has been made five years or more prior. to 
D commencement of 1894 but physical possession of the land has not been 
taken or the compensation has not been paid. Proviso to Section 24(2) 
further makes it clear that in case the compensation in respect of majority 
of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, 
then, all the beneficiaries, specified in the
notification for Acquisition 
shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of 
E Act of2013. The legislature has provided different consequences in the 
provisions keeping in mind the time gap as enumerated in Sections 24(1) 
and 24(2). The legislature has visualized and expected that the things 
would not happen overnight on passing of an award. 
13. We have already clarified supra based on catena of judgments, 
F that a proviso appended to a provision has to be specifically interpreted 
in the manner so as to enable the field which is covered by the main 
provision. The proviso is only an exception to main provision to which it 
has been enacted and no other. The proviso deals with a situation which 
takes something out of the main emwtment to provide a particular course 
G of action, which course of action could not have been adopted in the 
absence of the proviso. 
H 
The proviso appended to Section 24(2) indicates that it carves out 
an exception for a situation where the land acquisition proceedings shall 
not be deemed to lapse. Thus, for the applicability of the proviso, a case
DELI-IT METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
229 
SINGH & ORS. 
has to be covered by Section 24(2) i.e. (I) award has been made five 
A 
years or more prior to the enforcement of the 2013 Act. 
The proviso to Section 24(2) contemplates a situation where with 
respect to majority of the holding compensation not deposited event of 
minority of holding the landowners are paid, meaning thereby that for 
majority of the landholding in case amount is deposited acquisition is 
B 
saved by the proviso. The proviso in fact extends the benefit even to 
those land holders who have received compensation as per the 1894 
Act. Thus all land holders are to receive benefit of higher and liberal 
compensation under 2013 Act. This situation is one where land acquisition 
proceedings shall not lapse and are saved. The purpose and object of 
the proviso is to give benefit of computation of compensation to all 
C 
landholders and to save land acquisition proceedings. Hence, it is evident 
that the proviso is appropriately be treated as a proviso to Sub-Section 
(2) of Section 24 and cannot be read as proviso to Section 24(1)(b) of 
Actof2013. 
14. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Delhi D 
Development Authority Vs. Sukhbir Singh (supra). The facts of the 
said case reflect that Notification under Section 4 was issued on 
24.10.1961; Award was passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, New 
Delhi, on 12.12.1997; and possession was taken on 27.1.2000. It was 
not a case
under Section 24( I )(b ). It was clearly a case covered by 
E . 
provisions contained in Section 24(2) of the Act of2013, as Award had 
been passed 5 years before'the commencement of the Act of2013. In 
that context, this Court has discussed the matter and observed as follows: 
"11. Section 24( I) begins with a non-obstante clause and covers 
situations where either no award has been made under the Land 
F 
Acquisition Act, in which case the more beneficial provisions of 
the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply, 
or where an award has been made under Section 11, land 
acquisition proceedings shall continue under the provisions of 
the Land Acquisition Act as if the said Act had not been repealed. 
G 
12: To Section 24(1)(b) an important exception is carved out by 
Section 24(2). The necessary ingredients of Section 24(2) are 
as follows: 
(a) Section 24(2) begins with a non-obstante clause keeping sub-
section (1) out of harm's way; 
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230 
B 
c. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 14 S,C.R. 
(b) For it to apply, land acquisition proceedings should have been 
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act; 
-, 
( c) Also, an award under Section 11 should have been made 5 
years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act; 
(d) Physical possession of the land, if not taken, or compensation, 
if not paid, are fatal to the land acquisition proceeding that had 
been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act; 
( e) The fatality is pronounced by stating that the said proceedings 
shall be deemed to have lapsed, and the appropriate Government, 
. if it so chooses, shall, in this game of snakes and ladders, start all 
over again." 
In Sukhbir Singh (supra), this Court has observed that Section 
24( I) begins with a non-obstante clause, and thereafter, in the aforesaid 
paragraph 12, it has been observed that in respect of Section 24(l)(b), 
an important exception is carved out by Section 24(2): This Court 
D nowhere held in said decision that the proviso to Section 24(2) is to be 
read as part of Section 24( l )(b ), as was tried to be suggested. Through 
the non obstante clause in the opening part, exception has been carved 
out in Section 24(2) to section 24( I), proviso remains part of section 
24(2)_only. There is no dispute with proposition that exception had been 
E · carved out in section 24(2) of the Act oO_Q 13. Whereas, the issue involved 
in the present case is different. The issue involved in the instant
case is, 
whether the proviso is to be read as a part of Section 24( I )(b) or as a 
part of Section 24(2) as per settled principles of construction a proviso 
except out preceding portion of enactment to which it is appended. The 
same is-appended to section 24(2) not to section 24(l)(b) under the Act 
F of 2013. _In ouropinion, it was neither question raised in Sukhbir Singh 
(supra), nor has it been answered. Thus, that decision, in our view, is of 
no value, to assist the cause of the respondents. 
· 15; This Court specifically held in the case of Delhi Development 
Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh (supra), the objective of Section 24(2) is 
G to punish the State if it has been "tardy in tendering or paying 
compensation" even after five years have elapsed after passing of the 
award, specifically this Court held that Section24(2) is an exception to 
Section 24( I )(b) and for Section 24(2) to apply the award under Section 
11 should have been made-five years or more prior to commencement 
H of Act of20l3.
' 
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. v. TARUN PAL 
·231 
SINGH & ORS. 
16. It was urged at the erid by Mr. Anil Goel, learned counsel A 
appearing on behalf of some of the landowners that, since the amount 
has not been deposited with respect to majority of holding in the account 
of the beneficiaries, the acquisition stands lapsed. We have held that the 
proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable in the instant case, same is · 
applicable where the Award had been passed·S years before. lffa case 
where Award has been passed within 5 years, the said proviso of section · B 
24(2) cannot be said to be applicable. The submission made on the basis 
of the proviso cannot be said to be sustainable. 
17. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the decision of the 
High Court carmot be said to be sustainable, and the same is hereby set 
aside. The appeals are atrowed. Pending applications stand disposed 
C 
of. The respondents cannot be said to be en~itled to payment of 
compensation under theAct of2-013. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy_ 
Appeals allowed. 
,_ 
·I·