M. HARIHARASUDHAN versus R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
[2019] 13 S.C.R. 442, Supreme Court of India, 2019
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
442
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
M. HARIHARASUDHAN
v.
R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 8069 of 2019)
OCTOBER 17, 2019
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss)
Act, 1992:
ss. 7, 10 and 14  – Whether the Act excludes the jurisdiction
of civil court – High Court by impugned order held that though
there is no express bar on civil jurisdiction, but since the Act and
the Rules framed thereunder provide a particular method of claiming
compensation for damages to the property, all other methods for
claiming compensation were excluded by implication – Appeal to
Supreme Court – Held: A claim for compensation under the Act is
only in the nature of an additional remedy – It is evident from the
provisions of the Act that it does not oust the jurisdiction of civil
court either expressly or by necessary implication – s.14 recognizes
the concurrent jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for
damages – Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss)
Act, 1992 – Jurisdiction.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The question of ouster of the jurisdiction of the
civil court by specially constituted tribunals, not to be readily
inferred unless the conditions as under are satisfied.  Where the
statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the
civil courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is
adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do
in
a suit. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of
the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the
intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may
be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute
creates a special right or a liability and provides for the
   [2019] 13 S.C.R. 442
442
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
443
determination of the right or liability and further lays down that
all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined
by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally
associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said
statute or not. [Para 6] [448-E-G; 449-B-C]
Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1968] 3 SCR
662 – followed.
2. Additionally, it is important to note that the Tamil Nadu
Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, which was enacted
in 1992, initially only pertained to damage and loss caused to
public property. The Act was amended vide the Tamil Nadu Public
Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1994, which was
published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary
on 09.08.1994, to provide compensation in respect of property
other than public property as well. The Rules framed under the
Act came into force on 09.04.1994, that is to say, prior to the
amendment of the Act. Though certain amendments were
subsequently made to the Rules, vide G.O. Ms. No. 1285, Home
(Court IV) dated 24.10.1994, it appears that the State Government
has committed an oversight in amending the Rules, and has failed
to provide any procedure for the claiming and assessment of
damages with respect to property other than public property. A
bare reading of the Rules in their entirety thus makes it clear
that the State Government has committed an oversight in
amending the Rules appropriately to bring them in
consonance
with the amended enactment, and to facilitate the appropriate
enforcement of the same. [Para 9] [453-B-D, G]
3. Even if it is assumed that the Rules broadly provide a
procedure to claim compensation for damage or loss to public as
well as private property, the scheme of the Act does not envisage
ouster of jurisdiction of the civil court. [Para 10] [453-H; 454-A]
4. Reading the Rules expansively, not literally, it is evident
that the Act, along with the Rules, provides for the award of
compensation in two ways. Firstly, it may be awarded at the end
of the trial for any offence punishable under the Act, or may be
ordered to be paid out of the fine imposed upon the accused.
M. HARIHARASUDHAN v. R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
444
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
This is similar to the power of the criminal court to award
compensation under Section 357 of the Cr.P.C. Secondly,
compensation may be awarded upon an application as envisaged
under Section 10, after a summary inquiry as envisaged under
the Rules. This is somewhat similar to the summary procedure
envisaged under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for claiming
compensation thereunder. This would indicate that the Act and
Rules provide a specific remedy to claim compensation for loss
and damage to property. [Para 11]
5. It is evident that s.7 clearly recognises the possibility of
a civil suit instituted subsequent to the criminal proceedings
under the Act, relating to the same matter, where if the Court
trying the civil suit is awarding compensation, it is required to
take into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation
under Section 7 of the Act. It does not stand to reason that the
Act would permit the subsequent filing of a civil suit while
excluding the concurrent jurisdiction of the civil court. Moreover,
even the summary remedy of claiming compensation envisaged
under Section 10 of the Act, read with the Rules, does not preclude
the filing of a suit for damages. Section 14 clearly provides that
the Act is in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law in
force for the time being. It further mandates that nothing contained
in the Act shall exempt any person from any proceeding by way
of
investigation or otherwise which might be instituted against
him apart from under the Act. “Law” in force would include the
common law, under which the tortious remedy of damages may
be claimed, which remedy can only be pursued in a civil court.
Thus, it is evident that the Act, by way of Section 14, clearly
recognises the concurrent jurisdiction of the civil court to
entertain a suit for damages. Section 3 of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 is similar to Section 14 of the Act, which
provides that the 1986 Act is in addition to and not in derogation
of other laws in force. [Paras 13 and 14]
Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union
of India [2019] 8 SCC 416 ; State of Karnataka v.
Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society (2003)
2 SCC 412 : [2003] 1 SCR 397 ; Indian Medical
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
445
Association v. V. P. Shantha (1995) 6 SCC 651 : [1995]
5 Suppl. SCR 110  – relied on.
6. Section 14 of the Act, being in addition to and not in
derogation of the provisions of other laws in force, permits an
aggrieved person to approach the civil court for relief if he so
desires, instead of availing of the remedy envisaged under Section
10 of the Act. Clearly, a claim for compensation under the Act is
only in the nature of an additional remedy which may be pursued
in place of filing a civil suit for the same relief. [Para 14]
7. Moreover, it is clear that since a claim for compensation
under Section 10 may only be determined by way of summary
proceedings, it does not stand as a complete substitute to the
remedies that may be pursued in a civil court and determined
through a full-fledged trial, even though certain powers of the
civil court are conferred upon the prescribed authority
determining a claim for compensation under the Act. Thus, the
Act does not stand in place of and preclude a claim for damages
under the common law as may fall for determination before a civil
court in a civil suit. The Act does not oust the jurisdiction of the
civil court either expressly or by necessary implication.
[Paras 15 and 16]
Case Law Reference
1968 (3) SCR 662
followed
Para 4.2
[2019] 8 SCC 416
relied on
Para 14.1
[2003] 1 SCR 397
relied on
Para 14.1
[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 110
relied on
Para 14.2
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 8069
of 2019.
From the
Judgment and Order 29.03.2019 of the Madurai Bench
of Madras High Court  in A.S. (MD) No. 143 of 2018.
V. Giri, Veera Kathirawan, Sr. Advs., Muthu Saran, M. P.
Parthiban, A. S. Vairawan, Hardik Gautam, Advs. for the Appellant.
G. Sivabalamurugan, Adv. for the Respondents.
M. HARIHARASUDHAN v. R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The instant appeal arises from the final judgment and order
dated 29.03.2019 passed by the Madurai Bench of the High Court of
Madras in A.S. (M.D.) No. 143 of 2018 allowing the appeal filed by the
unsuccessful defendants in O.S. No. 186 of 2016 (the Respondents
herein), wherein the suit for damages filed by the Appellant herein had
been decreed by the First Additional District Judge, Madurai, vide order
dated 03.04.2018.
3. The short question in this appeal is whether the suit for damages
filed by the Appellant is maintainable in light of the Tamil Nadu Property
(Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992 (in short “the Act”), which
depends on whether the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court.
In this respect, the brief facts of the case as alleged by the Appellant are
as follows:
3.1 The Appellant runs a hotel at Madurai. He had purchased a
plot of land adjacent to a plot owned by his father, where he started
construction in 2014. The Appellant’s father filed O.S. No. 783 of 2014
against Respondent No. 1 for the relief of injunction, since Respondent
No. 1 had started putting up a construction in front of the Appellant’s
property obstructing free access to the property of the Appellant’s father.
Though an order for maintaining the status quo was passed in the said
suit, Respondent No. 1 completed his construction
regardless. Later,
aggrieved by the filing of the suit, Respondent No. 1, along with some
henchmen, damaged certain construction materials on the Appellant’s
property, causing damage to the tune of Rs. 2.27 lacs. The Appellant
resultantly lodged the first information before the police and a crime
came to be registered against Respondent No. 1, who later further
damaged the show-case glass at the Appellant’s hotel by pelting stones
at it and damaged its automatic glass door by driving a car into the hotel.
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 trespassed into the hotel and took away cash
of more than Rs. 1 lac. The Appellant spent Rs. 73,000/- on medical
expenses for his injured employees, and subsequently filed O.S. No. 186
of 2016.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
447
3.2 The Trial Court decreed the suit, i.e. O.S. No. 186 of 2016,
holding that the Appellant was entitled to damages of Rs. 18,28,941/-
with interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the suit till
the date of realization, with proportionate costs. The maintainability of
the suit was not an issue before the Trial Court.
3.3 The High Court, in appeal, framed points for consideration
with respect to the maintainability of the suit, non-joinder of necessary
parties, and the accrual of the cause of action. Though it was held that
the suit was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and was not
prematurely filed, the decree was set aside solely based on the finding
that the suit was not maintainable. The High Court found that there was
no express bar on civil jurisdiction in the Act. However, it held that since
the Act specified a particular method for claiming compensation for
damage to property in Sections 10 and 11 of the Act, as well as Rule 4 of
the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Rules, 1994
(in short “the Rules”), all other methods for claiming compensation were
excluded by implication, and thus the jurisdiction of the civil court was
impliedly barred. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed the instant appeal.
4. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. V. Giri, appearing for the Appellant,
argued that though the High Court had correctly held that there was no
express bar on the jurisdiction of the civil court, it erred in holding that
the Act impliedly ousted the jurisdiction of the civil court—in fact, the
provisions thereof indicate that such jurisdiction exists concurrently with
the remedies provided under the Act.
4.1 Learned Senior Counsel first referred to Section 7(4) of the
Act, which provides that compensation ordered by the Court to be paid
under Section 7 shall be accounted for at the time of awarding
compensation in a subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter. He
contended that Section 7(4) thus recognizes the possibility of a civil suit
being filed, and thus impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the civil court
to award compensation. He also submitted that the scheme of Section 7
was a near verbatim reproduction of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short the “Cr.P.C.”), which pertains to the power of
a criminal court to order the payment of compensation, but also accounts
for the filing of a subsequent civil suit for compensation.
4.2 Secondly, our attention was drawn to Section 14 of the Act,
which saves proceedings instituted outside of the Act, to argue that the
M. HARIHARASUDHAN v. R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
448
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
jurisdiction of the civil court was also saved under Section 14. Learned
Senior Counsel stressed that ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court is
not to be readily inferred, referring to the decision of the Constitutional
Bench of this Court in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1968
(3) SCR 662.
5. Learned Counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, argued
that the Act and Rules constituted a self-contained code and ousted the
jurisdiction of the civil court by necessary implication. He submitted that
the Rules create a specific authority for the determination and payment
of compensation, and thus the decision in Dhulabhai (supra) would
squarely apply, where it was also held that the jurisdiction of the civil
court must be held to excluded when there is an adequate and sufficient
remedy specifically provided in a statute which would normally be
associated with actions in a civil court. He further argued that the scheme
of the Act and Rules would be rendered redundant if the jurisdiction of
the civil court to award compensation were to be recognized.
6. It has not been disputed that there is no express bar under the
Act on the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for damages.
As set out above, all we need to determine is whether the jurisdiction of
the civil court is barred by necessary implication. The principles laid
down in Dhulabhai (supra) are pertinent in this regard. While dealing
with the question of ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court by specially
constituted tribunals, this Court concluded that such ouster was not to be
readily inferred unless the conditions set out by the Court were satisfied.
For the purposes of determining the question before us, we need only
refer to the following conditions laid down by this Court in Dhulabhai
(supra):
“… (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the
special Tribunals the civil courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be
excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts
would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not
exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act
have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not
acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court,
an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
449
adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be
relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil
court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the
remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the
intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may
be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute
creates a special right or a liability and provides for the
determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all
questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by
the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally
associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said
statute or not.
        x
x
x
(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily
to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.”
(emphasis added)
6.1 Thus, essentially, we must determine whether the Act provides
an adequate final remedy to what the civil court would normally do in a
suit, such that the jurisdiction of the civil court must necessarily be inferred
to have been ousted. The scheme of the Act and Rules must be examined
in this light.
7. Section 1 of the Act deals with the short title and commencement,
and Section 2 deals with definitions. Importantly, sub-section (4) defines
“property” as any movable or immovable property or machinery owned
by, or in possession of, or under the control of any person,
including the
entities listed under clauses (a) to (j) of the sub-section, for instance, the
Central and State Government, any local authority, and any institution,
concern, or undertaking. Sections 3, 4 and 5 lay out offences punishable
under the Act, while Section 6 pertains to the grant of bail.
7.1  Section 7, which is central to our controversy, merits
reproduction:
“7. Order to Pay Compensation.—(1) When imposing a
sentence of fine for an offence under this Act, the Court may
when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine
recovered to be applied—
M. HARIHARASUDHAN v. R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
(a) in defraying expenses properly incurred in the prosecution;
(b) in the payment, to any person, of compensation for any loss or
injury caused by the offence;
(c) in replacing or as the case may be, restoring to the previous
state, the property including any road, bridge, navigable channel,
natural or artificial.
(2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to appeal, no
such payment shall be made before the period allowed for
presenting the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be presented,
before the decision of the appeal.
(3) An order under this section may also be made by an Appellate
Court or by the High Court when exercising its powers of revision.
(4) At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent civil
suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take into account
any sum paid or recovered as compensation under this section.
(5) Save as otherwise provided, when a Court imposes a sentence,
of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing
judgment, order the accused person to pay, by way of
compensation, such amount as may be specified in the order to
the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the
act for which the accused person has been so sentenced.”
(emphasis added)
7.2 Evidently, Section 7(1) provides that where the Court trying
any offence punishable under the Act imposes a sentence of fine after
conviction, it may order such fine to be partly or
wholly applied, inter
alia, for the payment of compensation for any loss or injury caused by
the offence, as mentioned in clause (b). Sub-section (5), at the same
time, provides that if a Court is imposing a sentence under the Act
comprising only imprisonment, the Court may order the accused to
separately pay compensation to the aggrieved party.
7.2.1 It is relevant to note at this stage itself that Section 8 specifies
that offences under the Act cannot be tried by any Court inferior to that
of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or a Sessions Court.
7.2.2 As per Section 7(3), an order under Section 7, which would
include orders both under sub-sections (1) and (5), may also be made by
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
451
an Appellate Court or the High Court in the exercise of the power of
revision. Most crucial, however, is sub-section (4), which specifically
provides that in a subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter, if the
civil court is awarding compensation, it shall take into account any sum
paid or recovered as compensation under Section 7 of the Act.
7.3  Moving on, Section 9 provides that notwithstanding anything
contained in the Act, where an offence punishable under this Act has
been committed during any procession, assembly, meeting, agitation,
demonstration or any other activity organised by a political party or
communal, language or ethnic group, the Court shall presume that the
offence has also been committed by such party or group, which shall be
liable to pay compensation for damage or loss caused to any property, in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
7.4 Section 10(1) pertains to claims for compensation for damage
and loss, which can be made by the person affected by the damage or
loss, or by an officer empowered by any authority specified in clauses
(a) to (j) of Section 2(4). Sub-section (2) provides that every application
for claiming compensation shall be in such format as may be prescribed.
7.5 Section 11(1) provides that every claim for compensation for
damage or loss caused to property shall be made to the authority as may
be prescribed. Sub-section (2) provides the factors to be considered by
the
prescribed authority while determining the quantum of compensation,
and sub-section (3) provides that such authority shall have to follow
prescribed procedure while deciding the application. Sub-section (4) gives
the prescribed authority the powers of a civil court as provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “the CPC”) for the purpose of
taking evidence on oath, enforcing the attendance of witnesses, discovery
and production of documents and material objects, and for such other
purposes as may be prescribed.
7.6 Section 12 of the Act provides that the prescribed authority
under Section 11 may, after determining the compensation to be awarded,
issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector, who shall recover the
same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. Section 12-A
deals with the manner of appeal against an order under Section 11,
providing that an appeal may be made to such authority as may be
prescribed. Sub-section (2) specifically provides that the decision of the
appellate authority shall be final and shall not be called into question in
M. HARIHARASUDHAN v. R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
any Court of law. Section 13 confers power on the State Government to
make rules under the Act.
7.7 Section 14 is the savings provision. Since much revolves around
this provision as well, we reproduce it below:
“14. Saving.—The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to,
and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force
and nothing contained herein shall exempt any person from any
proceeding by way of investigation or otherwise which might, apart
from this Act, be instituted against him.”
7.8 Section 15, the last provision of the Act, repeals the Tamil
Nadu Public Property (Prevention of Destruction and Loss) Act, 1982.
8. The Rules have been framed by the State Government in the
exercise of powers under Section 13 of the Act. Rule 3 lays down who
may claim compensation for damage or loss to property owned by, or in
the possession or under the control of, an authority specified in clauses
(a) to (j) of Section 2(4), and in what manner. Importantly, Rule 4 sets
out the Commissioner for Revenue Administration, or any authority
authorised by him, as competent to decide compensation claims made
under Rule 3. Sub-rule (2) provides that the decision of the competent
authority as to the quantum of compensation for damage or loss caused
to public property shall be final and not be questioned in any Court of
law. Sub-rule (3) lays down certain additional factors to be considered
while determining
compensation for damage or loss caused to public
property.
8.1 Rules 5 to 10 deal with various aspects of the procedure of
inquiry, including rectification of defects, filing of the written statement,
notice to parties, issue of summons, and the appearance of legal
practitioners if required. Rule 11 gives the power to the inquiring authority
to inspect the damaged property, while Rule 12 allows the production of
damaged movable property before the authority. Rule 13 deals with travel
expenses of the inquiring authority. Rule 14 provides for the summary
examination of any person required. Rule 15 states that the inquiring
authority has to get recorded a memorandum of the substance of the
evidence of each witness. Rule 16 provides that the inquiring authority
may take assistance from persons having special knowledge with respect
to any matter relevant to the inquiry. Rules 17 to 19 require the inquiring
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
453
authority to frame a record of points to be decided, maintain a brief diary
of the proceedings of the inquiry, and record his findings concisely on
each point and record reasons for such findings. Rule 20, pertaining to
the application of the CPC, was omitted by G.O. Ms. No. 1285, Home
(Court IV), dated 24.10.1994. Rule 21, the last rule, deals with the manner
of recovery of compensation.
9. Additionally, it is important to note that the Act, which was
enacted in 1992, initially only pertained to damage and loss caused to
public property. The Act was amended vide the Tamil Nadu Public
Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1994, which was
published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary on
09.08.1994, to provide compensation in respect of property other than
public property as well. The Rules framed under the Act came into
force on 09.04.1994, that is to say, prior to the amendment of the Act.
Though certain amendments were subsequently made to the Rules, vide
G.O. Ms. No. 1285, Home (Court IV) dated 24.10.1994, it appears that
the State Government has committed an oversight in amending the Rules,
and has failed to provide any procedure for the claiming and assessment
of damages with respect to property other than public property. For
instance, as already discussed, Rule 3, which prescribes the authority to
claim compensation, continues to deal only with applications for
compensation with respect to public property. Similarly, Rule
4(1), which
prescribes the authority before whom compensation is to be claimed,
does not clarify as to before whom an application should be made to
claim damages for loss caused to private property. At the same time,
Rule 4(2) states that the assessment of compensation for damage or
loss caused to public property shall be final, without any mention of the
fate of damages with respect to private property. So also, Rule 4(3)
takes care of the assessment of compensation for damage or loss caused
to public property, and does not deal with how damages are to be assessed
in case of private property. A bare reading of the Rules in their entirety
thus makes it clear that the State Government has committed an oversight
in amending the Rules appropriately to bring them in consonance with
the amended enactment, and to facilitate the appropriate enforcement
of the same.
10. However, even if we assume that the Rules broadly provide a
procedure to claim compensation for damage or loss to public as well as
M. HARIHARASUDHAN v. R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
private property, we find force in the contention of learned Senior Counsel
for the Appellant that the scheme of the Act does not envisage ouster of
jurisdiction of the civil court.
11.  As mentioned supra, reading the Rules expansively, not literally,
it is evident that the Act, along with the Rules, provides for the award of
compensation in two ways. Firstly, it may be awarded at the end of the
trial for any offence punishable under the Act, or may be ordered to be
paid out of the fine imposed upon the accused. This is similar to the
power of the criminal court to award compensation under Section 357
of the Cr.P.C. Secondly, compensation may be awarded upon an
application as envisaged under Section 10, after a summary inquiry as
envisaged under the Rules. This is somewhat similar to the summary
procedure envisaged under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short
“the 1986 Act”), for claiming compensation thereunder. This would
indicate that the Act and Rules provide a specific remedy to claim
compensation for loss and damage to property. It was on this basis that
learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the civil court could
not be said to have concurrent jurisdiction to decide a suit for damages.
12. Such an argument, however, deserves to be rejected. We first
turn our attention to the aspect of award or provision of compensation
by the criminal court under Section 7 after trial for any offence under
the Act. It is evident that the provision clearly recognises the possibility
of a civil suit instituted subsequent to the criminal proceedings under the
Act, relating to the same matter, where if the Court trying the civil suit is
awarding compensation, it is required to take into account any sum paid
or recovered as compensation under Section 7 of the Act. It does not
stand to reason that the Act would permit the subsequent filing of a civil
suit while excluding the concurrent jurisdiction of the civil court.
13. Moreover, even the summary remedy of claiming compensation
envisaged under Section 10 of the Act, read with the Rules, does not
preclude the filing of a suit for damages. Section 14 of the Act is important
in this regard, which clearly provides that the Act is in addition to, and
not in derogation of, any other law in force for the time being. It further
mandates that nothing contained in the Act shall exempt any person
from any proceeding by way of investigation or otherwise which might
be instituted against him apart from under the Act. “Law” in force would
include the common law, under which the tortious remedy of damages
may be claimed, which remedy can only be pursued in a civil court.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
455
Thus, it is evident that the Act, by way of Section 14, clearly recognises
the concurrent jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for damages.
14. In this regard, it would be useful to refer to Section 3 of the
1986 Act, similar to Section 14 of the Act, which provides that the 1986
Act is in addition to and not in derogation of other laws in force:
“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—The provisions of
this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions
of any other law for the time being in force.”
14.1 This provision has been considered on a multitude of occasions
by this Court to affirm that the remedy available before consumer fora
may only be one of several concurrent remedies available to an aggrieved
person. For instance, even recently, this Court in Pioneer Urban Land
and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 43/2019,
decided on 09.08.2019) observed that remedies to flat allottees under
various statutes such as the 1986 Act, the Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Act, 2016, and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
are concurrent. However, for our purposes, we may limit ourselves to
examine the effect of Section 3 of the 1986 Act on the jurisdiction of the
civil court. The following discussion in State of Karnataka v.
Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society, (2003) 2 SCC 412,
serves us adequately, where this Court explained that the 1986 Act does
not supplant the jurisdiction of
the civil court:
“46. By reason of the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, it is
evident that remedies provided thereunder are not in derogation
of those provided under other laws. The said Act supplements
and not supplants the jurisdiction of the civil courts or other
statutory authorities.
x
x
 x
53. … Furthermore, primarily the jurisdiction of the forums/
Commissions is to grant damages. In the event, a complainant
feels that he will have a better and effective remedy in a civil
court as he may have to seek for an order of injunction, he
indisputably may file a suit in an appropriate civil court or may
take recourse to some other remedies as provided for in other
statutes.”
(emphasis added)
M. HARIHARASUDHAN v. R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
456
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
14.2 We may also refer to the following observations made by
this Court in its earlier decision in Indian Medical Association v. V.P.
Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC 651, where, while concluding that consumer
fora were competent to deal with complaints regarding deficiency in
service by way of medical negligence, it was observed as follows:
“37. … In complaints involving complicated issues requiring
recording of evidence of experts, the complainant can be asked
to approach the civil court for appropriate relief. Section 3 of the
Act which prescribes that the provisions of the Act shall be in
addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law
for the time being in force, preserves the right of the consumer to
approach the civil court for necessary relief…”
(emphasis added)
14.3 There is no doubt in our minds that a similar proposition holds
the field even with respect to the Act at hand. Section 14 of the Act,
being in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of other laws
in force, permits an aggrieved person to approach the civil court for
relief if he so desires, instead of availing of the remedy envisaged under
Section 10 of the Act. Clearly, a claim for compensation under the Act is
only in the nature of an additional remedy which may be pursued in
place of filing a civil suit for the same relief.
15. Moreover, it is clear that since a claim for compensation under
Section 10 may only be
determined by way of summary proceedings, it
does not stand as a complete substitute to the remedies that may be
pursued in a civil court and determined through a full-fledged trial, even
though certain powers of the civil court are conferred upon the prescribed
authority determining a claim for compensation under the Act.
16. Upon an evaluation of the entire scheme of the Act and Rules,
and looking to the tests laid down by Dhulabhai (supra), we are thus of
the considered opinion that the Act does not stand in place of and preclude
a claim for damages under the common law as may fall for determination
before a civil court in a civil suit. In this view of the matter, we find
ourselves drawn to the irresistible conclusion that the Act does not oust
the jurisdiction of the civil court either expressly or by necessary
implication, and that the High Court has erred in allowing the appeal
filed by the Respondents herein by holding that the suit filed by the
Appellant was not maintainable.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
457
17. As mentioned supra, the Trial Court, upon holding that the suit
is maintainable, proceeded to decree the suit on merits.  The appeal
before the High Court, filed under Section 96 of the CPC, was decided
only on the preliminary point pertaining to the maintainability of the suit.
In view of our finding that the suit is maintainable, the matter has to be
remitted to the High Court for hearing the first appeal on merits.
18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and consequently, the
judgment of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the
High Court for deciding the first appeal being A.S. (MD) No. 143 of
2018 on merits.
Kalpana K. Tripathy
Appeal allowed.
M. HARIHARASUDHAN v. R. KARMEGAM AND ORS.
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. ]