V.D. RAVEESHA versus THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2265, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2265 : 2024 INSC 1060
V.D. Raveesha 
v. 
The State of Karnataka
(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 980 of 2024)
22 October 2024
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the petitioner is guilty of committing offences u/ss.406, 
420, 468, 465 and 471 IPC, and if so, whether the sentences 
imposed on him by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate 
Court and High Court call for interference.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.406, 420, 468, 465, 471 – Petitioner failed 
to repay the loan obtained to purchase a vehicle – Allegation 
that petitioner forged documents and sold the vehicle to one  
S – FIR registered – Trial Court found petitioner guilty of offences 
u/ss.406, 468, 465, 420, and 471 of IPC – Criminal Appeal was 
dismissed by the Appellate Court – Criminal Revision filed by 
the petitioner was also dismissed – Correctness:
Held: The accused has not denied availment of the loan from the 
Company and the subsequent sale of the vehicle made in favour 
of S – The petitioner has taken the stand that the documents 
are genuine and not forged and/or fabricated, when the entire 
evidence, both oral as well as documentary, clearly reveal to the 
contrary – There is no record, whatsoever, forthcoming to show 
that the accused had repaid the loan – Had the petitioner actually 
paid back the loan, it could have been demonstrated by bringing 
before the Courts documents to indicate that money was transferred 
from
his account/source to the financier-Company – This has not 
been done – For the purposes of establishing the petitioner’s guilt, 
there was sufficient and reliable material, which rightly the Courts 
below have believed and relied upon – Thus, no infirmity in the 
same having been found, the conviction needs no interference – 
In the interest of justice, sentenced reduced to one year and six 
months’ simple imprisonment. [Paras 12, 18, 19]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.406 and s.420 – Difference between 
criminal breach of trust and cheating – Discussed.
* Author
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Penal Code, 1860 – s.406 and s.420 – Whether the petitioner, 
in the instant case, can be convicted both u/ss.406 and s.420 
of IPC:
Held: On an overall conspectus of the factual aspects juxtaposed 
with the evidence on record, as regards fulfilment of the ingredients 
of ss.406 and 420 of the IPC, at first sight, it may appear that the 
petitioner cannot be convicted both u/ss.406 and 420 of the IPC, 
but, in the present case, on a proper consideration of the issue in its 
entirety, there is a fine distinction inasmuch as, there are two different 
persons against whom the petitioner has committed the respective 
offences under the Sections supra – Evidently the petitioner is guilty 
of offence committed against the Company punishable u/s.406 of the 
IPC and also, of offence committed against M (PW4 and husband 
of purchaser S) punishable u/s.420 of the IPC. [Para 21]
Case Law Cited
Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2024] 
8 SCR 670 : (2024) 10 SCC 690 – relied on.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Criminal breach of trust; Cheating; Vehicle; Loan; Default in 
repayment of loan; Forgery; Fabrication of documents.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition 
(Criminal) No. 980 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.10.2023 of the High Court 
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLRP No. 653 of 2020
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Rahul
Kaushik, Sr. Adv., Anil C Nishani, Keshav Murthy, Jayram, 
Vishwesh R Murnal, M/s. Krishna & Nishani Law Chambers.
Advs. for the Respondent:
V. N. Raghupathy, Raghavendra M. Kulkarni.
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V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka
Judgment / Order of the S.upreme Court
Judgment
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
The present petition impugns the Final Judgment and Order dated 
11.10.2023 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) passed 
by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘High Court’) in Criminal Revision Petition No.653/2020, 
whereby the High Court confirmed the Judgment and Order dated 
25.08.2020 passed in Criminal Appeal No.29/2018 by the learned 
VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumakuru (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘Appellate Court’) which had affirmed the conviction 
recorded and sentence awarded to the petitioner, by the learned 
Additional Senior Civil Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tumakuru 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) vide Judgment and Order 
dated 26.04.2018 in C.C.No.1218/2012.
FACTUAL OVERVIEW:
2.	
The petitioner (hereinafter also referred to as the ‘accused’) had 
purchased a vehicle bearing Registration No.KA-41-2298 by 
obtaining financial assistance of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs) 
from M/s Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘Company’). A Loan-cum-Hypothecation Agreement 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Agreement’) was entered into between 
the accused and the Company whereby the above-mentioned 
vehicle was hypothecated in favour of the Company and the same 
was duly notified/marked in the
Registration Certificate of the said 
vehicle. Though the accused had paid one or two instalments, but 
thereafter, he defaulted and despite several requests, the accused 
did not make further payments. Accordingly, since as per the terms 
of the Agreement, the vehicle could be seized by the Company, 
on 18.02.2011, the concerned Branch Manager of the Company 
seized the vehicle and took it to the police station. At that time, 
it was revealed that the petitioner, without repaying the loan of 
Rs.2,95,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Ninety-Five Thousand) had forged 
and created (i) receipt no. AD 0873936 for having repaid the loan
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amount; (ii) No-Objection Certificate, and; (iii) Form No.35 purported 
to have been issued by the Company, by forging the signatures 
of the authorized signatories and had also sold the vehicle to one 
Savithramma. In short, it was alleged that the petitioner, without 
discharging the entire loan liability due towards the Company, sold 
off the vehicle by producing forged documents before the Regional 
Transport Office (hereinafter referred to as ‘RTO’) and getting the 
hypothecation cleared.
3.	
On the basis of these allegations, the Company’s Branch Manager 
lodged complaint leading to lodging of First Information Report 
bearing Crime No.34/2011 on 18.02.2011 under Sections 4061, 4202 
and 4683 read with 344 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘IPC’). On 16.11.2011, Chargesheet was filed 
against the petitioner under Sections 406, 468, 420, 465 and 471 
of IPC in the case registered as C.C. No.1218/2012 before the 
Trial Court.
4.	
Before the Trial Court, the prosecution examined PW1 to PW13 and 
got marked Ex. P1 to Ex. P32 and got exhibited one Compact Disc 
as M.O.1. The petitioner chose not to lead any defence evidence 
on his behalf, except producing a document marked as Ex. D1. 
On a consideration of the materials before it, the Trial Court found 
the petitioner guilty of offences under Sections 406, 468, 465, 420 
and 471 of the IPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment
(hereinafter abbreviated to ‘R.I.’), simple imprisonment (hereinafter 
abbreviated to ‘S.I.’) and fine(s), as under:
1	
‘406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.—Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, 
or with both.’
2	
‘420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.—Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly 
induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole 
or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being 
converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.’
3	
‘468. Forgery for purpose of cheating.—Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document  or 
electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment 
of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.’
4	
‘34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done by 
several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act 
in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.’
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V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka
IPC Section
Conviction and Sentence
406
Fine of Rs.5,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo three 
months’ S.I.
468
Two years’ R.I. along with fine of Rs.3,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo further 
three months’ S.I.
465
Fine of Rs. 5,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo three 
months’ S.I.
420
Two years’ R.I. along with fine of Rs.3,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo further 
three months’ S.I.
471
Fine of Rs.5,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo three 
months’ S.I.
5.	
Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded supra, the 
petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No.29/2018, which came to be 
dismissed by the Appellate Court. Thereafter, the petitioner filed 
Criminal Revision Petition No.653/2020 before the High Court which 
has also been dismissed vide the Impugned Order and the conviction 
and sentence, imposed and affirmed by the Courts below, has been 
confirmed.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE PETITIONER:
6.	
At the outset, learned senior counsel submitted that the High Court 
as well as the Appellate Court and the Trial Court committed error 
in convicting the petitioner without considering his case. It was 
argued that the Courts below failed to appreciate the fact that the 
petitioner had repaid the loan amount and received the receipt (Ex. 
P9), No-Objection Certificate (Ex. P8) and Form No.35 (Ex. P10) 
from the Company, after clearing the loan. It
was pointed out that the 
Company failed to produce any document/ledger/booklet to show that 
the loan was not repaid by the accused. Even the allegedly-forged 
Form No.35 was never produced before the Courts.
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7.	
It was argued that the prosecution failed to produce any evidence/
material to show how the disputed documents were fabricated and 
by using which computer/printer. There is also no material placed 
on record to connect the accused with the forged signatures. It was 
submitted that in the absence of such evidence, the petitioner cannot 
be convicted for the alleged offences in question.
8.	
It was submitted that Exs. P11 and P12 are said to be the formats 
of the receipt and No-Objection Certificate, which the Company 
issues to its customers. A customer entitled to receive Exs. P11 
and P12 was not examined before the Trial Court. When the loan 
pertaining to the said customer is cleared and Exs. P11 and P12 
were issued, there was no reason for the Company to retain those 
documents with it. Therefore, no importance could be attached to 
the said documents, and it was submitted that the said two exhibits 
were not produced from proper custody. 
9.	
It was further submitted that all the witnesses were employees of the 
Company and hence no reliance could be placed on their depositions. 
It was pointed out that PW4 was the only independent witness and 
PW13 did not support the case of the prosecution. It was put forth 
that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt 
and therefore, in the interest of justice, the Impugned Order be set 
aside by acquitting the petitioner.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE
RESPONDENT-STATE:
10.	 Per contra, learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted 
that Courts below have rightly convicted and sentenced the accused 
based on cogent grounds and the same does not call for any 
interference by this Court.  It was submitted that without repaying 
the loan, the accused has sold the vehicle to PW4 and forged Exs. 
P8 to P10. The disputed documents were forwarded to a handwriting 
expert along with the admitted signature and handwritings of the 
accused. The expert report (Ex. P28) fully supports the case of the 
prosecution. Further, PW5, the Divisional Manager of the Company, 
has specifically deposed that he never signed and issued Exs. P8, 
P9 and P10. It was submitted that the evidence on record sufficiently 
demonstrates that it is the accused alone who is the author of 
the forged and fabricated documents. In these circumstances, it 
was canvassed that the prosecution had proved the case beyond
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V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka
reasonable doubt. On these grounds, learned counsel prayed for 
dismissal of the instant petition. 
ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
11.	 We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the 
evidence on record as well as the orders of the Courts below. The 
issue before us is whether the petitioner is guilty of committing 
offences under Sections 406, 420, 468, 465 and 471 IPC, and if 
so, whether the sentences imposed on him by the Trial Court and 
confirmed by the Appellate Court and High Court call for interference.
12.	 The accused has not denied availment of the loan from the 
Company and the subsequent sale of the vehicle made in favour of 
Savithramma. However, he has taken the specific defence that he 
had cleared the loan and closed the account. PW1, the informant 
who was working as Manager in the Company, has specifically stated 
in his evidence that the accused had not cleared the loan and got 
the hypothecation cancelled on the basis of forged documents. He 
has stated that Exs. P8, P9 and P10 are not issued by the Company 
and has identified them as forged documents. PW1 has admitted the 
payment of 2-3 instalments made by the accused. As per the terms 
of the Agreement, if any customer commits default in payment of 5 
instalments, the Company is empowered to seize the vehicle. He 
has further stated that the Investigating Officer collected the sample 
writings and signatures of the
Divisional Manager of the Company 
as Exs. P13 and P14. Similarly, the writing of the accused was also 
collected as Exs. P15 and P16. These documents were sent to the 
handwriting expert for examination. This witness further stated that 
Exs. P11 and P12 are the standard sample receipt and No-Objection 
Certificate which the Company issues to its customers and these 
documents are prepared in duplicate and one copy is retained with 
the Company. It was further deposed that as per the Company’s 
rules, after clearance of the loan, the No-Objection Certificate is to 
be issued after one week. 
13.	 PW3-Nagabhushana is a Legal Executive in the Company and 
he has supported the statement of PW1. PW5-Nandakumar is the 
Divisional Manager of the Company. According to this witness, after 
the repayment of the entire loan by the customer the concerned 
branch forwards the file seeking No-Objection Certificate from him
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(PW5). He has specifically stated that the case-file pertaining to the 
accused’s loan has never come to his office and he had not issued 
Ex. P10 at any point of time. He has denied the signature on Ex. 
P10 as being his and deposed that the document is forged.
14.	 PW8-Venkataramaiah is a Junior Executive in the Company. He 
has deposed that during the relevant period when the accused is 
stated to have repaid the loan, he was working as a cashier in the 
relevant branch. He has specifically stated that being cashier of the 
Company’s branch, he has not issued Ex. P9 and has not received 
any payments from the accused. This witness has also deposed that 
the Investigating Officer had obtained the signatures and writings of 
the accused as also PW5. 
15.	 PW4-the husband of Savithramma has stated that he purchased the 
vehicle from the accused in the name of his wife. He also stated 
that the accused on his request brought the Clearance Certificate 
from the office of the RTO, Nelamangala. PW9-Dinesh Kumar is 
the Police Sub-Inspector who has deposed about receiving Exs. P9 
and 10 from RTO, Nelamangala. He further states that he forwarded 
the sample handwritings, signatures and Exs. P8 to P10 along with 
sample documents secured from PW1 being Exs. P11, P12 and P19 
to the handwriting expert.
16.	 PW11-Syed Asgar Imam is a retired Assistant Director of the Forensic 
Sciences Laboratory, Bangalore. This witness is an
expert witness 
in the case and had submitted an expert report being Ex. P28. This 
witness has specifically deposed that the signatures found on Exs. 
P8 and P9 were forged. This witness also specifically stated that it 
was the accused who had made the D5, D6 and D7 signatures on 
Ex. P10. It was stated that the signatures found on these documents 
were not the signatures of PW5, who is the competent person to 
issue these documents on behalf of the Company. 
17.	 It is undoubtedly true that some of the prosecution witnesses are 
officials working in the Company, but just for that reason they cannot be 
termed as interested witnesses. Except a bald allegation, no material 
has been placed on record by the accused to show any enmity or 
ill-will against him by these witnesses, to bolster the argument of false 
incrimination. As stated earlier, the accused took a specific defence 
that he had repaid the entire loan amount. However, nothing has 
been produced to show how the amount was repaid, when it was
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V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka
repaid, and by which mode it was repaid. Having taken a specific 
defence, it was for the accused to lead evidence and probabilize his 
defence. In our view, the accused has failed in this regard. 
18.	 In fact, the Court is a little surprised as to how the petitioner, even 
before this Court, has taken the stand that the documents are 
genuine and not forged and/or fabricated, when the entire evidence, 
both oral as well as documentary, clearly reveal to the contrary. 
Moreover, there is no record, whatsoever, forthcoming to show that 
the accused had repaid the loan. Obviously, the act of repayment 
of the loan, had the petitioner actually paid back the loan, could 
have been demonstrated by bringing before the Courts documents 
to indicate that money was transferred from his account/source to 
the financier-Company. This has not been done.
19.	 At this stage, and subject to what we have stated infra, it would 
suffice to say, that for the purposes of establishing the petitioner’s 
guilt, there was sufficient and reliable material, which rightly the Courts 
below have believed and relied upon.  Thus, no infirmity in the same 
having been found, the conviction needs no interference.  On the 
point of sentencing, we find that the Trial Court’s view, affirmed by 
the High Court, may need some tinkering, which we shall deal with 
in the penultimate paragraph.  Needless to state, the sentence(s) 
awarded to the
petitioner shall run concurrently.
20.	 In Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) 
10 SCC 690, a recent decision by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, 
it has been elucidated as under:
‘Difference between criminal breach of trust and 
cheating
35. This Court in its decision in S.W. Palanitkar v. State 
of Bihar [S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 
241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] expounded the difference in the 
ingredients required for constituting of an offence of criminal 
breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) vis-à-vis the offence of 
cheating (Section 420). The relevant observations read 
as under : (SCC p. 246, paras 9-10)
“9. The ingredients in order to constitute a criminal 
breach of trust are : (i) entrusting a person with 
property or with any dominion over property; (ii) that
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person entrusted : (a) dishonestly misappropriating 
or converting that property to his own use; or (b) 
dishonestly using or disposing of that property or 
wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation 
(i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in 
which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal 
contract made, touching the discharge of such trust.
10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are :  
(i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement 
of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so 
deceived should be induced to deliver any property 
to any person, or to consent that any person shall 
retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived 
should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do 
anything which he would not do or omit if he were 
not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), 
the act of omission should be one which causes or is 
likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced 
in body, mind, reputation or property.”
36. What can be discerned from the above is that the 
offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) 
and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients:
In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 
406 IPC)
(1) There must be entrustment with person for 
property or dominion over the property, and
(2) The person entrusted:
(a) Dishonestly misappropriated or converted 
property to his own use, or
(b)
Dishonestly used or disposed of the property 
or wilfully suffers any other person so to do in 
violation of:
(i) Any direction of law prescribing the method 
in which the trust is discharged; or
(ii) Legal contract touching the discharge of 
trust (see: S.W. Palanitkar [S.W. Palanitkar v.
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V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka
State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC 
(Cri) 129] ).
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420 
IPC, the essential ingredients are:
(1) Deception of any person, either by making a false 
or misleading representation or by other action or 
by omission;
(2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person 
to deliver any property, or
(3) The consent that any person shall retain any 
property and finally intentionally inducing that person 
to do or omit to do anything which he would not do 
or omit (see : Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State 
of Punjab [Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of 
Punjab (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 620]).
37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e. 
intention to defraud or the dishonest intention must be 
present, and in the case of cheating it must be there from 
the very beginning or inception.
xxx
40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating and 
dishonest intention starts with the very inception of the 
transaction. But in the case of criminal breach of trust, a 
person who comes into possession of the movable property 
and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts 
it to his own use against the terms of the contract, then 
the question is, in a case like this, whether the retention 
is with dishonest intention or not, whether the retention 
involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability 
would depend upon
the facts of each case.
41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and 
the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a 
fine one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused 
at the time of inducement should be looked into which 
may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, 
the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach
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of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for 
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown 
right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when 
the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it 
is this intention, which is the gist of the offence.
42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property 
must have been entrusted to the accused or he must have 
dominion over it. The property in respect of which the 
offence of breach of trust has been committed must be 
either the property of some person other than the accused 
or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be of 
some other person. The accused must hold that property 
on trust of such other person. Although the offence i.e. the 
offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest 
intention, yet they are mutually exclusive and different in 
basic concept.
43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust 
and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary 
at the time of making a false or misleading representation 
i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof 
of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal 
breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the 
property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same. 
Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or 
dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver 
any
property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot 
co-exist simultaneously.
xxx
55. It is high time that the police officers across the country 
are imparted proper training in law so as to understand the 
fine distinction between the offence of cheating vis-à-vis 
criminal breach of trust. Both offences are independent and 
distinct. The two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in 
the same set of facts. They are antithetical to each other. 
The two provisions of IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins 
that they cannot survive without each other.’
(emphasis supplied)
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21.	 Though, having regard to the afore-enumerated position of law, 
on an overall conspectus of the factual aspects juxtaposed with 
the evidence on record, as regards fulfilment of the ingredients of 
Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC, at first sight, it may appear that 
the petitioner cannot be convicted both under Sections 406 and 
420 of the IPC, but, in the present case, on a proper consideration 
of the issue in its entirety, there is a fine distinction inasmuch as, 
there are two different persons against whom the petitioner has 
committed the respective offences under the Sections supra: first, the 
Company and second, Mallikarjuna (PW4 and husband of purchaser 
Savithramma). Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present 
case, evidently the petitioner is guilty of offence committed against 
the Company punishable under Section 406 of the IPC and also, 
of offence committed against Mallikarjuna (PW4 and husband of 
purchaser Savithramma) punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
22.	 Accordingly, for reasons aforesaid, the criminal Special Leave 
Petition(s) stands dismissed, upholding the Impugned Order, with 
the distinguishment of the offences committed supra and by, in the 
interest of justice, reducing the sentence(s) awarded to one year 
and six months’ Simple Imprisonment. From the bail application it 
transpires that the petitioner has already surrendered and presently 
is lodged in Central
Prison, Parappana Agrahara, Electronic City 
Post, Bangalore. Thus, he is directed to serve the remaining period 
of the sentence as per this order.  This shall be notwithstanding 
that vide Record of Proceedings of even date, we had dismissed 
the matter(s) simpliciter.
23.	 Registry shall communicate the order to the Superintendent, Central 
Prison, Parappana Agrahara, Electronic City Post, Bangalore 
forthwith.
24.	 We do not propose to make an order as to costs. Pending I.A.s do 
not subsist for consideration and are closed.
Result of the case: SLP dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan