VIJAY SINGH @ VIJAY KR. SHARMA versus THE STATE OF BIHAR
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 108, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Facts
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 108 : 2024 INSC 735
Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma 
v. 
The State of Bihar
(Criminal Appeal No. 1031 of 2015)
25 September 2024
[Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards sustainablility of the findings of the High 
Court holding the appellants guilty of commission of offences u/ss. 
302/34 and 364/34 IPC; as also the approach of the High Court, if 
in line with the settled law for reversing an acquittal into conviction.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 302/34 and 364/34 – Kidnapping or 
abducting in order to murder – Abduction and murder of woman 
over a property dispute – Factum of her death discovered in 
furtherance of written report lodged by informant and brother-
in-law of the victim – Conviction and sentence of accused nos. 
1-5 of the commission of offences u/ss. 302/34 and 364/34, 
however acquittal of accused nos. 6 and 7 of all the charges – 
High Court upheld the conviction of accused nos. 1-5, as also 
convicted accused nos. 6 and 7 of the commission of offences 
u/ss. 364/34 and 302/34 – Sustainability:
Held: Offence of murder is entirely dependent on circumstantial 
evidence and in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain 
of evidence must be complete and must give out an inescapable 
conclusion of guilt – Prosecution case is far from meeting that 
standard – Mere presence of certain make-up articles cannot 
be a conclusive proof of the fact that the victim was residing in 
the
said house, especially when another woman was admittedly 
residing there – No material whatsoever could be found at the 
house to directly indicate that the deceased as also the informant 
were residing there – Prosecution failed to examine even one 
cohabitant to prove the said fact – Evidence of the eye witnesses 
declared as wholly unreliable including on the aspect of time of 
death – Thus, no reason to doubt the post mortem report and 
the findings therein – Prosecution case full of glaring doubts as 
* Author
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Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar
regards abduction – Although, the post mortem report indicates 
that the death of the deceased was unnatural and the commission 
of murder cannot be ruled out, however no direct evidence to 
prove the commission of murder by the accused persons – Link of 
causation between the accused persons and the alleged offence 
conspicuously missing – Circumstantial evidence emanating 
from the facts surrounding the offence of abduction, such as the 
testimonies of eye witnesses, failed to meet the test of proof and 
cannot be termed as proved in the eyes of law – No inference could 
be drawn from it to infer the commission of the offence u/s. 302 
by the accused persons – Also motive has a bearing only when 
the evidence on record is sufficient to prove the ingredients of the 
offences under consideration – Without the proof of foundational 
facts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of 
motive alone – Thus, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden 
to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt – Reasonable doubts 
are irreconcilable and strike at the foundation of the prosecution’s 
case – Furthermore, approach of the High Court in reversing the 
acquittal of A-6 and A-7 not in line with the settled law pertaining 
to reversal of acquittals – High Court took a cursory view of the 
matter and reversed the acquittal without arriving at any finding 
of illegality or perversity or
impossibility of the trial court’s view or 
non-appreciation of evidence by the trial tourt – Thus, the appellants 
to be acquitted of all the charges – Findings of conviction arrived 
at by the courts below not sustainable and set aside. [Paras 28-
32, 34-37]
Judicial deprecation – High Court’s observation that the make-
up articles found in the house could not have belonged to the 
widow lady as there was no need for her to put on make-up 
being a widow:
Held: Said observation not only legally untenable but also 
highly objectionable – Sweeping observation of this nature not 
commensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality expected from a 
court of law, specifically when the same is not made out from any 
evidence on record. [Para 27]
Case Law Cited
State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran [2007] 3 SCR 507 : (2007) 3 SCC 
755; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [2007] 2 SCR 630 : (2007) 
4 SCC 415; Nepal Singh v. State of Haryana [2009] 6 SCR 982 : 
(2009) 12 SCC 351; Kashiram v. State of M.P. [2001] 4 Supp. SCR
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263 : (2002) 1 SCC 71; Labh Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 1 
SCC 181; Suratlal v. State of M.P (1982) 1 SCC 488; Rai Saheb 
& Ors. v. State of Haryana (1994) Supp.1 SCC 74; Sanjeev v. 
State of H.P (2022) 6 SCC 294 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Abduction; Murder; Abduction and murder of woman; Circumstantial 
evidence; Chain of evidence; Reversal of acquittal; Motive; Burden 
to prove case beyond reasonable doubt; Judicial deprecation; 
Observation of High Court highly objectionable; Observation of High 
Court not commensurate with sensitivity and neutrality expected 
from court of law.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1031 
of 2015
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.03.2015 of the High Court of 
Judicature at Patna in Govt. Appeal (DB) No. 16 of 1992
With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1578, 765, 1579 of 2017 
Appearances for Parties
R. K. Dash, Sr. Adv., Ms. Fauzia Shakil, Amit Sharma, Dipesh Sinha, 
Ms. Pallavi Barua, Ms. Aparna Singh, Ajay Kumar Singh, Advs. for 
the Appellant.
Shivam Singh, Kartikay Aggarwal, Manish Kumar, Shantanu Sagar, 
Anil Kumar, Prabhat Ranjan Raj, Gunjesh Ranjan, Shashank Kumar 
Saurav, Vaibhav Jain, Manoneet Dwivedi, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Satish Chandra Sharma, J.
1.	
On 30.08.1985, Neelam breathed her last in Simaltalla, PS Sikandra, 
District Munger, Bihar. The factum of her
death was discovered in
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Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar
furtherance of the written report lodged by the informant and brother-
in-law of the deceased, namely, Ramanand Singh (examined as 
PW18 before the Trial Court1) wherein he alleged that Neelam was 
abducted by seven persons from their house in an incident which 
occurred at around 10:00 PM on the said day. On the basis of this 
information, an FIR bearing no. 127 of 1985 was lodged at PS 
Sikandra and investigation was commenced which led to the filing of 
a chargesheet against the seven accused persons, namely – Krishna 
Nandan Singh (Accused No.1), Ram Nandan Singh (Accused No.2), 
Raj Nandan Singh (Accused No.3), Shyam Nandan Singh (Accused 
No.4), Bhagwan Singh (Accused No. 5), Vijay Singh (Accused No. 
6) and Tanik Singh (Accused No.7). 
2.	
The Trial Court charged all seven accused persons for the commission 
of offences punishable under Sections 323, 302, 364, 449, 450, 
380/34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.2 Later, accused 
nos. 6 and 7 were distinctly charged for the commission of offences 
punishable under Sections 342, 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. 
After trial, the Trial Court, vide order dated 05.06.1992, convicted 
the accused persons listed as accused nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for the 
commission of offences under Section 302/34 and 364/34 of IPC. 
They were acquitted of all other charges, and accused nos. 6 and 
7 were acquitted of all the charges. 
3.	
The convicts
preferred an appeal before the Patna High Court against 
the order of conviction and the State preferred an appeal before the 
High Court against the order of acquittal of the two accused persons. 
The Patna High Court, vide a common judgment dated 26.03.2015,3 
upheld the conviction of the five convicts and set aside the acquittal 
of accused nos. 6 and 7 by finding them guilty of the commission 
of offences under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of IPC. Accordingly, 
accused nos. 6 and 7 were also convicted and were sentenced 
to undergo rigorous life imprisonment on each count. The present 
batch of appeals assail the order/judgment dated 26.03.2015 of the 
Patna High Court. 
1	
Prosecution witness or PW
2	
Hereinafter referred as “IPC”
3	
Passed in Govt. Appeal (DB) No. 16/1992, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 219/1992 and Criminal Appeal (DB) 
No. 271/1992
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BRIEF FACTS
4.	
Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts reveal that deceased Neelam 
was the wife of one Ashok Kumar who happened to be the son of 
PW3/Ganesh Prasad Singh, and the informant PW18/Ramanand 
Singh was the brother of Ashok Kumar. The informant’s case was 
that at the relevant point of time, the deceased was residing with her 
husband and the informant in the house belonging to her late father 
Jang Bahadur Singh, who belonged to Simaltalla. The house was 
partially occupied by the deceased, her husband and her brother-
in-law and the remaining portion was rented out and tenants were 
residing in those portions. 
5.	
As per the prosecution case, on 30.08.1985 at about 10:00 PM, 
PW18 was sitting outside the house on a rickshaw along with one 
Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Soordas, and Neelam was sleeping 
inside the house. Her husband, Ashok Kumar, had gone to his native 
place Ghogsha. Suddenly, the seven accused persons, including 
the appellants before us, came from north direction along with 15 
other unknown assailants. Accused Vijay Singh/A-6 caught hold of 
the informant/PW18 and as soon as he raised alarm and started 
shouting, two unknown persons pointed out pistols towards him and 
directed him to maintain silence. Thereafter, the accused persons 
who had caught the informant, assaulted him with fists and slaps, and 
confined him near the well situated on the north side of the house. 
Meanwhile, A-1
entered the house with 5-7 other accused persons 
by getting the house unlatched through a resident namely Kumud 
Ranjan Singh and dragged Neelam out of the house. As soon as 
they dragged her out, four persons caught hold of Neelam by her 
arms and legs, lifted her and started moving towards Lohanda. As 
per the informant, the accused persons also picked up two sarees, 
two blouses, two petticoats and a pair of slippers from Neelam’s 
room while going out. 
6.	
As the informant raised alarm, other people of the mohalla also 
gathered around including PW2 Vinay Kumar Singh, PW4 Chandra 
Shekhar Prasad Singh and PW5 Ram Naresh Singh. The said three 
witnesses witnessed the accused persons taking away Neelam but 
could not stop them. The informant explained that no one dared to 
follow the accused persons as they had pointed pistols and had 
threatened of dire consequences. The informant also explained the
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Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar
motive behind the commission of the crime. It transpires from his 
statement that Neelam’s late father Jang Bahadur Singh had no 
son and his house was in possession of his daughter Neelam. She 
was abducted in order to forcefully obtain the possession of the 
house belonging to her father. The second limb of motive stems 
from the pending litigation between A-1 to A-5 (appellants) on one 
side and deceased Neelam, her maternal grandfather and her 
two sisters on the other side. The accused persons had obtained 
letters of administration and probate of the Will left by late Jang 
Bahadur Singh from the competent court and the said order came 
to be challenged before the Patna High Court by the deceased, 
her maternal grandfather and younger sisters. In the said appeal, 
the Patna High Court had injuncted the accused persons from 
alienating any part of the property. The High Court also restrained 
the execution of the probate of the Will by restraining the delivery of 
possession of the property to the accused persons. Thus, deceased 
Neelam was residing in her father’s house along with her husband 
and brother-in-law in order to retain the possession of the property. 
In this backdrop, the matter went for trial. 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
7.	
The Trial Court, while acquitting A-6 and A-7, observed that the 
motive attributed for the commission of the crime was not attributable 
to the said two accused
persons as no interest of theirs could be 
disclosed in the pending litigation. Further, it also found that A-6 
was not named in the FIR registered upon the information supplied 
by PW18 and in his oral testimony, no statement of assault by A-6 
and A-7 was given by him. It further held that no evidence surfaced 
during the trial to indicate the participation of A-6 and A-7 in the acts 
of abduction and commission of murder. 
8.	
While convicting A-1 to A-5 on the charges under Sections 302/34 
and 364/34 of IPC, the Trial Court primarily relied upon the oral 
testimonies of PW18/informant, PW2, PW4 and PW5. The motive 
for the commission of the offence was supplied by the pending legal 
dispute relating to the property belonging to late Jang Bahadur Singh. 
The Court also replied upon circumstantial evidence borne out from 
the testimonies of PW7 (maternal uncle of the de-ceased), PW3 
(father-in-law of the deceased), PW23 (sister of the deceased) and 
PW13 (doctor) to arrive at the finding of guilt.
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BEFORE THE HIGH COURT
9.	
A reading of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court 
suggests that the High Court carried out a fresh appreciation of 
evidence. The High Court firstly examined the question whether 
Neelam was actually residing in the house from which she was 
abducted. Relying upon the testimonies of PW7 (maternal uncle of 
deceased), PW18 (brother-in-law of deceased and informant) and 
PW21 (Investigating Officer), the Court concluded that Neelam was 
indeed residing in the said house. In doing so, the Court discarded 
the fact that the other independent occupants of the house such as 
Ram Chabila Singh, his son, Kumud Ranjan Singh etc. did not come 
in support of the said fact. To overcome this deficiency, the Court 
relied upon the statements of PW21 and PW23 (sister of deceased) 
that some make-up articles were found in a bag lying in the room, 
which was suggestive of the fact that a woman was residing in the 
said room. 
10.	 In further consideration, the High Court excluded the evidence 
of PW5 for the reason that his presence at the place of incident 
was doubtful. For, PW5 deposed that he was heading towards his 
home from Deoghar and on the way from Lakhisarai to Simaltalla, 
he stopped at Sikandra Chowk along with PW2 and PW4. It was 
at this point that they heard the hulla and ended up witnessing the 
commission of offence. The High Court took note of the fact that 
while going from Deoghar to
Simaltalla, Lakhisarai and Ghogsha 
would come first and thus, there was no reason for PW5 to come all 
the way to Sikandra Chowk if he was going to his home in Ghogsha 
as he could have directly proceeded from Lakhisarai to Ghogsha. 
Nevertheless, the High Court duly relied upon the evidence of PW2, 
PW4 and PW18 as well as on circumstantial evidence comprising 
of the testimonies of PW23, PW13 (doctor) and absence of suitable 
explanation in the statements of accused persons under Section 
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734 as regards the fatal 
injuries suffered by the deceased. Thus, the High Court upheld the 
finding of guilt of A-1 to A-5. 
11.	 As regards A-6 and A-7, the High Court reversed the finding of 
acquittal of the Trial Court into that of conviction. Primarily, the High 
4	
Hereinafter referred as “CrPC”
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Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar
Court observed that the said two accused persons were acquitted on 
the basis of the exonerating testimony of PW5 and the same cannot 
be sustained as the testimony of PW5 has been excluded by the 
High Court in appeal. Further, the Court held that the testimonies of 
PW2, PW4 and PW18 were consistent regarding the participation 
of A-6 and A-7 and thus, they were convicted for the commission of 
the offences under Sections 364 and 302 of IPC read with Section 
34 of IPC. The applicability of Section 34 IPC was based on the 
fact that A-6 and A-7 had confined PW18 near the well in order to 
eliminate any chances of resistance in the acts committed by the 
other five accused persons. 
SUBMISSIONS
12.	 On behalf of A-6 and A-7, it is submitted that there was no motive 
for the said accused persons to have indulged in the commission 
of the offence in question. The motive, if any, existed only for the 
remaining five accused persons who were interested in the outcome 
of the pending litigation between the parties. It is further contended 
that the High Court ought not to have entered into the exercise of 
re-appreciation of the entire evidence without finding any infirmity in 
the view taken by the Trial Court. To buttress this submission, it is 
submitted that since the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible 
view, it could not have been disturbed by the High Court in appeal. 
In this regard,
reliance has been placed upon the decisions of this 
Court in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran,5 Chandrappa v. State of 
Karnataka,6 Nepal Singh v. State of Haryana,7 Kashiram v. State of 
M.P.,8 Labh Singh v. State of Punjab9 and Suratlal v. State of M.P.10 
13.	 It is further submitted that no reliance could be placed upon the 
testimonies of PW2 and PW4 as their presence at the spot was 
doubtful. Further, if they were 400 yards away when hue and cry was 
raised, they could not have seen A-6 taking away PW18 towards the 
well as the said fact took place prior to the hue and cry. It is further 
5	
[2007] 3 SCR 507 : (2007) 3 SCC 755
6	
[2007] 2 SCR 630 : (2007) 4 SCC 415
7	
[2009] 6 SCR 982 : (2009) 12 SCC 351
8	
[2001] 4 Supp. SCR 263 : (2002) 1 SCC 71
9	
(1976) 1 SCC 181
10	
(1982) 1 SCC 488
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submitted that in the FIR, no pistol was assigned to A-6, whereas, the 
said fact was brought forward at the time of evidence. The appellants 
have also raised a question regarding the time of incident on the 
basis of medical evidence. It is stated that the post-mortem report 
indicated that half-digested food was found in the stomach of the 
deceased, whereas, the informant PW18 deposed that the incident 
took place immediately after dinner. If such was the case, the death 
ought to have occurred around 1-2 AM in the intervening night of 
30.08.1985-31.08.1985, but the post-mortem report, based on the 
post-mortem conducted at around 05:30 PM on 31.08.1985, indicated 
that death took place about 24 hours ago and thus, the time of death 
was around 05:00 PM on 30.08.1985 and not 10:00 PM, as alleged. 
14.	 The appellants have also submitted that the prosecution has not 
proved that the deceased was actually residing in the concerned 
house at Simaltalla. 
15.	 Per contra, it is submitted on behalf of the State that mere non-
examination of some independent witnesses shall not be fatal to 
the case of the prosecution. Reliance has been placed upon the 
decision of this Court in Rai Saheb & ors. v. State of Haryana11 to 
contend that at times, independent witnesses may not come forward 
due to fear. It is further submitted that the High Court has correctly 
appreciated the evidence in order to arrive at the finding of guilt
of 
the accused persons. It is further submitted that the testimonies of 
PW2, PW4 and PW18 are consistent and the High Court has correctly 
placed reliance upon their testimonies. As regards motive as well, it 
is submitted that the evidence is sufficient to reveal motive for the 
commission of the crime. 
16.	 We have heard learned counsels for the appellants as well as for 
the State. We have also carefully examined the record.
DISCUSSION
17.	 In light of the rival contentions raised by the parties, the principal 
issue that arises before the Court is whether the finding of guilt of 
the appellants arrived at by the High Court is sustainable in light of 
the evidence on record. As a corollary of this issue, it also needs 
11	
(1994) Supp.1 SCC 74
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Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar
to be examined whether the approach of the High Court was in line 
with the settled law for reversing an acquittal into conviction in a 
criminal appeal. 
18.	 After two rounds of litigation before the Trial Court and the High Court, 
it is fairly certain the case is to be examined only with respect to the 
offences under Sections 364 and 302 of IPC read with Section 34 
IPC. With respect to the offence under Section 364 IPC, the case of 
the prosecution is based on direct oral evidence, and with respect 
to the offence under Section 302 IPC, the case of the prosecution is 
essentially based on circumstantial evidence as no direct evidence 
of the commission of murder could be collected. However, it is 
quite evident that the offence of murder was committed after the 
commission of the offence of abduction. There is a sequential 
relationship between the two offences and thus, in order to set up 
a case for the commission of the offence of murder, it is necessary 
to prove the commission of the offence of abduction by the accused 
persons/appellants. For, the chain, in a case based on circumstantial 
evidence, must be complete and consistent. 
19.	 In order to prove the offence under Section 364 IPC, the prosecution 
has relied upon the oral testimonies of four eye witnesses – PW-
2, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-18. Their testimonies have been assailed 
on various counts. The appellants have termed the said
witnesses 
as interested and chance witnesses. The former charge originates 
from the fact that the witnesses were related to the deceased, and 
the latter charge originates from the fact that the witnesses had no 
rea-son to be present at the place of offence and they just appeared 
unexpectedly as a matter of chance. Let us examine both the aspects. 
We may first examine the testimonies of the witnesses independently, 
without going into their relationship with the deceased. 
20.	 The informant PW18 has deposed that he was standing near a 
rickshaw outside his house and the deceased was sleeping inside 
the house. PW18 was standing along with three independent 
persons namely, Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Soordas. The seven 
accused persons came along with 15 other persons. A-6 and A-7, 
along with unknown persons, first came to PW18 and took him away 
towards the well and confined him there. Thereafter, the remaining 
accused persons, along with other unknown assailants, entered 
the house wherein the deceased was sleeping. Interestingly, as
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per the version of the informant, the house was bolted from inside 
and was opened by a tenant namely Kumud Ranjan Singh. The 
problem with the informant’s version begins from this point itself. 
As per his version, the first eye witnesses of the incident ought to 
have been Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry, Soordas and Kumud Ranjan 
Singh. One person, namely Soordas, was stated to be blind and 
thus, he may be excluded. Nevertheless, the prosecution ought to 
have examined the three natural witnesses of the incident namely, 
Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Kumud Ranjan Singh. There is no 
explanation for non-examination of the natural eye witnesses. The 
version becomes more doubtful when it is examined in light of his 
statement that he could not prevent the accused persons as A-6 
had threatened him with a pistol. In the FIR, no pistol has been 
attributed to A-6, whereas in the statement recorded before the Trial 
Court, this fact was introduced for the first time, which is indicative of 
improvement. Furthermore, PW18 got it recorded in the FIR that A-6 
and others had assaulted him with fists and slaps, but the said fact 
was not deposed before the Trial Court in his examination in chief. 
The discrepancy assumes greater seriousness in light of the fact that 
no pistol has been recovered from any of the accused persons and 
if the factum of branding of pistol is un-der the cloud of doubt, the 
entire conduct of PW18 becomes
doubtful and unnatural, as he did 
not try to prevent the accused persons from entering the premises 
or from abducting the deceased or from taking away the deceased 
on their shoulders in front of his eyes as he was the brother-in-law 
of the deceased. 
21.	 The other eye witnesses, PW2, PW4 and PW5, de-posed collectively 
in favour of the prosecution as they had arrived at the scene of 
crime together. At around 10:00 PM on the fateful night, the said 
eye witnesses happened to be present at Sikandra Chowk and 
they heard some hue and cry at the house of the deceased. The 
witnesses were coming together in a jeep from Lakhisarai and were 
going towards their home in Ghogsha village, the village wherein the 
deceased was married and also the native village of PW18/informant. 
PW2 was the driver of PW4. The testimo-nies of the said PWs have 
made it clear that while coming from Lakhisarai to Sikandra Chowk, 
Ghogsha came first, followed by Lohanda and Simaltalla. In such 
circumstances, their presence at Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM must 
be explained to the satisfaction of the Court. For, if they were going
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to their village, there was no occasion for them to come to Simaltalla 
as it did not fall on their way. But no such ex-planation is forthcoming 
from the material on record. 
22.	 Interestingly, this lacuna was duly noted by the High Court with 
respect to PW5 as there was no reason for him to be present at 
Sikandra Chowk at the time of incident and his testimony was 
excluded. However, the same logic was not extended to the testimony 
of PW4 as well, as it was equally improbable for him to be present 
at Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM on the date of incident. His visit to 
Sikandra Chowk was not necessitated for going to his village. Even 
otherwise, since the three eye witnesses were similarly placed as 
per their own version, the rejection of testimony of one witness 
ought to have raised a natural doubt on the testimonies of the other 
two witnesses unless they had a better explanation. However, no 
such doubt was entertained by the High Court and the impugned 
judgment offers no explanation for the same. In light of their own 
testimonies, none of the three eye witnesses were required to visit 
Sikandra Chowk or Simaltalla for going to their village. 
23.	 The testimonies of the eye witnesses are also impeachable in light of 
the other evidence on record. PW21 was the investigating officer in 
the case and he had examined the aforesaid PWs as eye witnesses 
of the incident. The version put forth
by the eye witnesses meets a 
serious doubt when examined in light of the evidence of DW3 and 
DW4, the concerned Deputy Superintendent and Superintendent of 
Police respectively who had supervised the investigation of the present 
case. Both these officers were examined as defence witnesses on 
behalf of the appellants. As per the supervision notes prepared by 
DW3 during the course of investigation, PW2 and PW4 got to know 
about the incident only when PW18 came running to them after the 
incident. PW2, at that time, was sitting in a hotel with Umesh Singh 
to have ‘prasad’. Similarly, the evidence of DW4 indicates that on 
the date of incident, at around 10:00 PM, PW4 was coming from 
Lakhisarai in his jeep and he saw six-seven persons fleeing away in 
a jeep and he identified them as the accused persons. Thus, PW4 
entered the scene after the commission of offence and he did not 
witness the act of abduction. The testimony of PW2 strengthens 
the doubt as he deposed that when they reached the police station 
after the incident with PW18, neither him nor PW4 in-formed the 
IO that they had directly seen the incident. The stark difference
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between the versions put forth by the PW21 and DW3/DW4 raises 
serious concerns regarding the fairness of investigation conducted 
by PW21 and it is a reasonable possibility that the eye witnesses 
were brought in to create a fool proof case. The evidence of DW3 
and DW4, both senior officers who had exercised supervision over 
the investigation conducted by PW21, indicates that the so-called 
eye witnesses of the incident were actually accessories after the 
fact and not accessories to the fact. 
24.	 The second limb of the objection against the testimonies of the eye 
witnesses is that none of the eye witnesses is an independent witness 
of fact. Ordinarily, there is no rule of law to discard the testimonies 
of the witnesses merely because they were known to the victim 
or belonged to her family. For, an offence may be committed in 
circumstances that only the family members are present at the place 
of occurrence in natural course. However, the present case does 
not fall in such category. In the facts of the present case, the natural 
presence of the eye witnesses at the place of occurrence is under 
serious doubt, as discussed above, and for unexplained reasons, the 
naturally present public persons were not examined as witnesses in 
the matter. The non-examination of natural witnesses such as Doman 
Tenti, Daso Mistry, Soordas, Kumud Ranjan Singh and many other 
neighbours who admittedly came out of their houses to
witness the 
offence, coupled with the fact that the projected eye witnesses failed 
to explain their presence at the place of occurrence, renders the 
entire version of the prosecution as improbable and unreliable. The 
eye witnesses, being family members, were apparently approached 
by PW18 who in-formed them about the incident and later, their 
versions were fabricated to make the case credible. Notably, when 
the version put forth by the interested witnesses comes under a 
shadow of doubt, the rule of prudence demands that the independent 
public witnesses must be examined and corroborating material must 
be gathered. More so, when public witnesses were readily available 
and the offence has not taken place in the bounds of closed walls. 
25.	 Pertinently, the conduct of the eye witnesses also ap-pears to be 
unnatural considering that they were all relatives of the deceased. 
Firstly, PW18 did not try to prevent the ab-duction. Even if it is believed 
that he was held against a pistol, the statement regarding the existence 
of pistol comes as an improvement from his first information given 
to the police, as already noted above. Nonetheless, it is admitted
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that PW2, PW4 and PW5 came in a jeep and they saw the accused 
persons leaving with Neelam after abducting her. It is also admitted 
that they had identified the accused persons, who were essentially 
the relatives of the eye witnesses. In such circumstances, as per 
natural human conduct, the least that they could have done was 
to follow the accused persons in their jeep. They admittedly had a 
ready vehicle with them. Despite so, there was no such attempt on 
their part, so much so that the dead body of Neelam was not even 
discovered until the following morning as none of the eye witnesses 
had any clue as to where the accused persons had taken away the 
deceased after abducting her. 
26.	 One crucial foundational fact in the present case is that the deceased 
was residing in her father’s house at Simaltalla. Although, the Trial 
Court and High Court have not doubted the said fact, we have our 
reservations regarding the same. In addition to the statements of 
PW18 (informant), PW23 (sister of deceased) and PW7 (maternal 
uncle of deceased), no other witness has deposed to prove the factum 
of residence. The admitted evidence on record sufficiently indicates 
that various other tenants were residing in the same house, including 
Kumud Ranjan Singh, Education Officer Ram Chabila Singh along 
with his daughter and son. 
27.	 The investigating officer PW21 had inspected the house and no direct
material, except some make-up articles, could be gathered so as to 
indicate that Neelam was actually residing there. Admittedly, another 
woman namely, Chando Devi (sister of Ram Chabila Singh) was 
also residing in the same portion of the house. The High Court did 
take note of this fact but explained it away by observing that since 
Chando Devi was a widow, the make-up articles could not have 
belonged to her as there was no need for her to put on make-up 
being a widow. In our opinion, the observation of the High Court is 
not only legally untenable but also highly objectionable. A sweeping 
observation of this nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity 
and neutrality expected from a court of law, specifically when the 
same is not made out from any evidence on record. 
28.	 Be that as it may, mere presence of certain make-up articles cannot 
be a conclusive proof of the fact that the deceased was residing in 
the said house, especially when another woman was admittedly 
residing there. Furthermore, if Neelam was indeed residing there, 
her other belongings such as clothes etc. ought to have been found
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in the house and even if not so, the other residents of the same 
house could have come forward to depose in support of the said fact. 
29.	 Notably, certain clothes such as two sarees, two blouses and two 
petticoats were recovered along with the dead body of the deceased. 
The prosecution version is that the accused persons had taken away 
the said clothes from the house of the deceased while abducting her. 
There is absolutely no explanation for the said conduct on the part 
of the accused persons. It is difficult to understand as to why the 
accused persons would take her clothes along while abducting her. 
On the contrary, this fact actually serves the case of the prosecution 
in proving that the de-ceased was actually residing at the house in 
Simaltalla. The clothes appear to have been planted along with the 
dead body in order to support the fact of actual residence of the 
deceased at her father’s house in Simaltalla. In light of the material 
on record, it could be concluded that no material whatsoever could 
be found at the house of Jang Bahadur Singh to directly indicate 
that the deceased was residing there. The make-up articles were 
linked with the deceased on the basis of a completely unacceptable 
reasoning and without any corroborative material. The prosecution 
has failed to examine even one cohabitant to prove the said fact. 
Furthermore, no personal belongings of the deceased, such as 
clothes,
footwear, utensils etc., could be found in the entire house. 
Therefore, we are not inclined to believe that the deceased was 
actually residing in the house at Simaltalla. In the same breath, we 
may also note that even for PW18, no material was found in the 
said house to indicate that he was in fact residing there. Apart from 
his own statement, no witness has come forward to depose that the 
informant was a resident of the said house. The prosecution has not 
spotted any room in the entire house wherein PW18 was residing 
and thus, his own presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful. 
30.	 The appellants have also raised certain objections with respect to the 
time of death. The discrepancy has been flagged in light of the post 
mortem report, based on the post-mortem conducted at around 5:30 
PM on 31.08.1985, which indicates that death took place around 24 
hours ago. It indicates that the time of death must have been around 
5:00 PM on 30.08.1985, which is contrary to the evidence of PW18 
that the incident took place around 10:00 PM on 30.08.1985. A post 
mortem report is generally not considered as conclusive evidence 
of the facts mentioned in the re-port regarding the cause of death,
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time of death etc. It could always be corroborated with other direct 
evidence on record such as ocular evidence of the eye witnesses. 
However, when there is no other credible evidence on record to 
contradict the report, the facts stated in the post mortem report are 
generally taken as true. In the present matter, the evidence of the 
eye witnesses has been declared as wholly unreliable including on 
the aspect of time of death. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the 
post mortem report and the findings therein. 
31.	 At this stage, we may also note that the approach of the High Court 
in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 was not in line with the 
settled law pertaining to reversal of acquittals. The Trial Court had 
acquitted the said two accused persons on the basis of a thorough 
appreciation of evidence and the High Court merely observed that 
their acquittal was based on the improbable statement of PW5 and 
since the evidence of PW5 stood excluded from the record, there 
was no reason left for the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Pertinently, the 
High Court did not arrive at any finding of illegality or perversity in 
the opinion of the Trial Court on that count. Furthermore, it did not 
arrive at any positive finding of involvement of the said two accused 
persons within the sphere of common intention with the remaining 
accused persons. Equally, the exclusion of the evidence of PW5, 
without
explaining as to how the evidence of PW2 and PW4 was 
not liable to be excluded in the same manner, was in-correct and 
erroneous. 
32.	 We do not intend to say that the High Court could not have 
appreciated the evidence on record in its exercise of appellate 
powers. No doubt, the High Court was well within its powers to 
do so. However, in order to reverse a finding of acquittal, a higher 
threshold is required. For, the presumption of innocence operating 
in favour of an accused through-out the trial gets concretized with a 
finding of acquittal by the Trial Court. Thus, such a finding could not 
be reversed merely because the possibility of an alternate view was 
alive. Rather, the view taken by the Trial Court must be held to be 
completely unsustainable and not a probable view. The High Court, 
in the impugned judgment, took a cursory view of the matter and 
reversed the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 without arriving at any finding 
of illegality or perversity or impossibility of the Trial Court’s view or 
non-appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court.
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33.	 We may usefully refer to the exposition of law in Sanjeev v. State 
of H.P.,12 wherein this Court summarized the position in this regard 
and observed as follows:
“7. It is well settled that:
7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the 
reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting 
the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate court 
is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court 
deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State 
of Karnataka13, Anwar Ali v. State of H.P.14)
7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the 
normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets 
reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P.15)
7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, 
the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering 
with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. 
State of Kerala16)”
34.	 Having observed that the case of the prosecution is full of glaring 
doubts as regards the offence of abduction, we may briefly note 
and reiterate that the offence of murder is entirely dependent on 
circumstantial evidence. Although, the post mortem report indicates 
that the death of the deceased was unnatural and the commission 
of murder cannot be ruled out. But there is no direct evidence on 
record to prove the commission of murder by the accused persons. 
The link of causation between the accused persons and the alleged 
offence is
conspicuously missing. The circumstantial evidence 
emanating from the facts surrounding the offence of abduction, 
such as the testimonies of eye witnesses, has failed to meet the 
test of proof and cannot be termed as proved in the eyes of law. 
Therefore, the foundation of circumstantial evidence having fallen 
down, no inference could be drawn from it to infer the commission 
12	
(2022) 6 SCC 294
13	
(2019) 5 SCC 436
14	
(2020) 10 SCC 166
15	
AIR 1955 SC 807
16	
[1998] 3 SCR 280 : (1998) 5 SCC 412
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Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar
of the offence under Section 302 IPC by the accused persons. It is 
trite law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain 
of evidence must be complete and must give out an inescapable 
conclusion of guilt. In the pre-sent case, the prosecution case is far 
from meeting that standard. 
35.	 As regards motive, we may suffice to say that motive has a bearing 
only when the evidence on record is sufficient to prove the ingredients 
of the offences under consideration. Without the proof of foundational 
facts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of 
motive alone. Moreover, the motive in the present matter could operate 
both ways. The accused persons and the eyewitnesses belong to 
the same family and the presence of a property related dispute is 
evident. In a hypothetical sense, both the sides could benefit from 
implicating the other. In such circumstances, placing reliance upon 
motive alone could be a double-edged sword. We say no more. 
36.	 The above analysis indicates that the prosecution has failed to 
discharge its burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 
The reasonable doubts, indicated above, are irreconcilable and strike 
at the foundation of the prosecution’s case. Thus, the appellants are 
liable to be acquitted of all the charges. 
37.	 In light of the foregoing discussion, we hereby conclude that the 
findings of conviction arrived at by
the Trial Court and the High Court 
are not sustainable. Moreover, the High Court erred in reversing 
the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Accordingly, the impugned judgment 
as well as the judgment rendered by the Trial Court (to the extent 
of conviction of A-1 to A-5) are set aside, and all seven accused 
persons (appellants) are hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled 
upon them. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if 
lying in custody. 
38.	 The captioned appeals stand disposed of in terms of this judgment. 
Interim application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. No costs. 
Result of the Case: Appeals disposed of.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain