NAVIN CHANDRA DHOUNDIYAL versus STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ORS.
[2020] 7 S.C.R. 572, Supreme Court of India, 2020
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
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NAVIN CHANDRA DHOUNDIYAL
v.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3493 of 2020)
OCTOBER 16, 2020
[UDAY UMESH LALIT AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Service Law: Appellants were working as Professors in various
disciplines in the respondent Kumaun University – They were
aggrieved by office order dated 21.12.2019 which set out their
respective dates of retirement (which were the last dates in the months
they attained the age of superannuation) – Appellants placed
reliance on Statute no.16.24 of the University, applicable to them
contending that they were entitled to continue beyond the last date
of month in which each of them attained the age of superannuation
till the “30th of June following” in terms of that provision – Held:
On a plain interpretation of Statute No. 16.24, including the proviso,
it is clearly apparent that firstly each teacher attains the age of
superannuation on completing 65 years {Statute No. 16.24 (1)} –
Secondly, no teacher who attains the age of superannuation has a
right or entitlement to re-employment; in fact, the opening expression
“No teacher” appears to rule out re-employment of superannuated
teachers {Statute No. 16.24 (2)} – Thirdly, and importantly the
proviso {to Statute 16.24 (2)} carves out an exception to the main
provision, inasmuch as it provides that a teacher whose “date of
superannuation does not fall on June 30, shall continue in service
till the end of the academic
session, that is June 30, following and
will be treated as on re-employment from the date immediately
following his superannuation till June, 30, following.” – The very
object and intent of the proviso to Statute No.16.24 is to avoid the
disruption caused by discontinuity of service of a teaching staff
employee or official mid-session – Therefore, the view in *Indu Singh
case, dealing with an identical statute, was correctly interpreted –
Appellants are entitled, consequently, to continue till the end of the
following June on re-employment – If any of them has been
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superannuated, he or she shall be reinstated, with full salary for
the period they were out of employment, and allowed to continue
till the following June, on re-employment basis.
*Dr. Indu Singh v State of Uttarakhand.(2017) SCC
Online 1527; S.K. Rathi v Prem Hari Sharma (2001) 9
SCC 377; Raj Narain Pandey v Sant Prasad Tewari &
Ors [1973] 2 SCR 835 – relied on.
S. Kasi v State through Inspector of Police (2020) SCC
Online 529; Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd v
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009)
8 SCC 646 : [2009] 12 SCR 54; Central Board of
Dawoodi Bohra Community v State of Maharastra
(2005) 2 SCC 673 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 1054 –
referred to.
State Of U.P. v Ramesh Chandra Tiwari (2015) 6 ADJ
579 – approved.
Case Law Reference
[2009] 12 SCR 54
referred to
Para 6
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 1054
referred to
Para 6
(2001) 9 SCC 377
relied on
Para 6
[1973] 2 SCR 835
relied on
Para 13
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3493
of 2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.08.2020 of the High Court
of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition(S/B) No. 211 of 2020.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 3494, 3495, 3496 and 3497 of 2020
Gaurav Gupta, Vikas Bahuguna, Ms. Swastik Dalai, Robin Singh
Rathore, Rajesh Kumar, Gaurav Goel, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Ms. Anuja
Pethia, Advs. for the appearing parties.
NAVIN CHANDRA DHOUNDIYAL v. STATE OF
UTTARAKHAND AND ORS.
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The Order of the Court was passed by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Leave granted. The parties were heard finally in these appeals.
The common question which arises for decision is as to the correct
interpretation of a condition in the respondent-University’s statutes
regarding the date of superannuation of its teachers.
2. All the appellants are working as Professors in various
disciplines, in the respondent Kumaun University (hereafter “the
University”). They are aggrieved by an office order dated 21.12.2019
which set out their respective dates of retirement (which were the last
dates in the months they attained the age of superannuation, i.e. 65 years).
The appellants relied on Statute No. 16.24 of the University, applicable
to them, contending that they were entitled to continue beyond the last
date of the month in which each of them attained the age of
superannuation, till the “30th of June following” in terms of that
provision. That statute reads as follows:
“16.24 (1) The age of superannuation of a teacher of the
University, whether governed by the new scale of pay or not
shall be sixty-five years.
(2) No extension in service beyond the age of superannuation
shall be granted to any teacher after the date of
commencement of these statutes.
provided that a teacher whose date of superannuation does
not fall on June 30, shall continue on service till the end of
the academic session, that is June 30, following and will be
treated as on re-employment from the date immediately
following his superannuation till June, 30, following.
(Provided further that such physically and mentally fit
teachers shall be reappointed for a further period of two years,
after June, 30, following the date of their superannuation as
were imprisoned for taking part in freedom struggle of 1942
and are getting freedom fighters pension)
Provided also that the teachers who were re-appointed in
accordance with the second proviso as it existed prior to the
commencement to the Kumaun University (Twenty-third
amendment) First Statute, 1988 and a period of one year has
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not elapsed after the expiry of the period of their
reemployment, may be considered for re-appointment for a
further period of one year.”
3. The appellants were aggrieved by the office order dated
21.12.2019 and approached the Uttarakhand High Court in writ
proceedings. They argued that they were entitled to continue in service,
on extension up to the end of June, 2021. They had relied on a previous
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court - Dr. Indu Singh v
State of Uttarakhand1. In that judgment, the Division Bench had, on an
interpretation of the relevant provisions (which were worded identically
to Statute No. 16.24 as in this case) held that those who retire after 30th
June are “entitled to continue till the end of the academic year”.
The Division Bench placed emphasis and importance on the legislative
intent “to cater to the supreme need to not adversely affect the
academic activities of the institution and to safeguard the interest
of the students.”
4. The impugned judgment rejected the appellants’ writ petition,
holding that Indu Singh2 could not be considered as a binding authority.
It was also held that Statute No. 16.24 applies to the teachers of the
university. The Division Bench said that Statute No. 16.24 (2) specifically
places an embargo on extension in service beyond the age of
superannuation. Statute No. 16.24 (2.1) – according to the Division Bench,
merely provided that if the superannuation were not to fall on June, 30th,
the
teacher shall continue in the service till end of the academic session
i.e. June, 30th and the same will be treated as re-employment. The
Division Bench was of the opinion that whenever the superannuation of
an employee falls within the month of June, in that event, his or her
retirement would stand extended till the end of June of that particular
month. The words used “of the end of the academic session”, was held
to be “misleading”. Further, according to the Division Bench, the end
of an academic session was not “fixated as on June, even though,
most of the universities end their academic session in June, 30th. It
is not a matter of rule that the same happens everywhere. Therefore,
the said concession has been granted only for the month of June.”
In other words, the impugned judgment considered Indu Singh3to be
limited to holding that the service of an employee or teacher retiring in a
1 2017 SCC Online 1527
2 Supra n.1
3 Supra n.1
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given month; would be “extendable only till the end of the month and
not more.” The impugned judgment stated that if the appellants were
right, every officer would get an extension for a year or so, which could
never be the intention of the university or of the government.
5. It is argued by Mr. Gaurav Gupta, learned counsel for the
appellants, that the impugned judgment erred in holding that the proviso
to Statute No. 16.24 only enables teachers to continue till the end of the
month and that to understand it to say that it assures re-employment to a
superannuated teacher till the end of June of the academic session is
misleading. It is submitted that the purport of the proviso has to be
gathered from the circumstance - that it caters to a specific eventuality,
where the teacher/official superannuates on a particular day of any month,
after June 30th, of an academic year. Superannuation would normally
mean that the retirement date would be in accordance with the rules. In
this particular case, since the provision applied only to teachers, the
intention of the statute clearly was the continuance of status quo, to
avoid disturbance, caused by the retirement, and the likely time to be
taken by the University to make alternative arrangements to fill the
vacancy. This was conceived in the larger interest for the students, who
would have faced difficulties in completing their syllabi in the absence of
the teacher, and
likely time taken for the new teacher to adjust to the
subject and the students.
6. It was next submitted that the High Court should not, having
regard to the precedential value of Indu Singh4, held that it was
incorrectly reasoned, or that its facts were different, because the provision
dealing with retirement was in pari materia with Statute No. 16.24. He
relied on the provision which was considered in Indu Singh5 in support
of this contention6. Further, Mr. Gupta submitted that a bench of co-
equal strength could not have refused to follow an earlier decision; if it
doubted it or wished to depart from it, the proper course would have
4 Supra n.1
5 Supra n.1
6 Para 17.15 of the First Statutes of the University of Hemavati Nandan Bahuguna,
Garhwal, 1978, which read as follows:
“17.15 No extension in service beyond the age of superannuation shall be
granted to any teacher after the date of commencement of these Statutes:
Provided that a teacher whose date of superannuation does not fall on June 30, shall
continue in service till the end of the academic session, that is, June 30 following, and
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been to refer the issue to a larger, or full bench. Counsel relied on certain
decisions of this court, in this regard.7 Counsel also relied on the decision
of this court in S.K. Rathi v Prem Hari Sharma8 and submitted that the
impugned judgment was again in error in holding that the decision of this
court was not binding, as the observations were obiter. It was lastly
urged that the consistent view of the High Court, expressed by two
other Benches [in Professor Sri Krishna Khandelwal v State of
Uttarakhand {WP (S/B) No. 601/2017}, decided on 10.01.2018 and
Binod Kumar Singh v State of Uttarakhand {WP (S/B) No. 328/
2019, decided on 25.07.2019}] in relation to the concerned statute, i.e.
proviso to Statute No. 16.24, that the teacher whose age of
superannuation was after the 30th of June of any given year, was to be
continued as a re-employed officer, till the end of the academic session,
i.e. 30th June of the following year.
7. Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, learned counsel for the University and
the State, urged this court not to interfere with the impugned judgment.
She argued that the Division Bench had good reasons to differ from the
reasoning in Indu Singh9. She emphasized that the impugned judgment
took note of the submissions on behalf of the state that according to a
general order, whenever an employee attained the age of superannuation
(regardless of the date), he/she was entitled to continue till the end of
that particular month. It was submitted that the
Division Bench took
note of this argument, and correctly surmised that the proviso to Statute
No. 16.24 merely embodied the principle underlying that government
will be treated as on re-employment from the date immediately following his
superannuation till June 30, following:
Provided further that such physically and mentally fit teachers shall be re-appointed for
a further period of two years, after June 30, following the date of their superannuation,
as were imprisoned for taking part in freedom struggle of 1942 and are getting freedom
fighters pension.
Provided also that the teachers who were re-appointed in accordance with the second
proviso as it existed prior to the commencement of the Garhwal University (Twenty-
second Amendment) First Stututes, 1988 and a period of one year has not elapsed after
the expiry of the period of their re-employment, may be considered for re-appointment
for a further period of one year.”
7 S. Kasi v State through Inspector of Police 2020 SCCOnline 529; Nahar Industrial
Enterprises Ltd v Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009) 8 SCC 646;
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v State of Maharastra (2005) 2 673;
8 (2001) 9 SCC 377
9 Supra n.1
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order, ensuring that teachers retired only at the end of the month during
which they attained the age of superannuation.
8. Ms. Shukla submitted that one could not read too much into the
expression “the 30th June following” beyond the fact that it was meant
to illustrate that if a teacher were to attain the age of superannuation
during June of any year, she or he could be re-employed till the end of
that month. Ms. Shukla submitted that surely that did not imply that the
teacher, a superannuated employee had a right to insist that he should
be re-employed till the end of June of the next year. Learned counsel
underlined the intent of the main provision, which enacts the essential
principle, which is that every teacher attains the age of superannuation
when she turns 65; in these circumstances, he/she cannot claim
entitlement to re-employment.
9. This court is of the opinion that on a plain interpretation of
Statute No. 16.24, including the proviso in question, it is clearly apparent
that firstly each teacher attains the age of superannuation on
completing 65 years {Statute No. 16.24 (1)}. Secondly, no teacher who
attains the age of superannuation has a right or entitlement to re-
employment; in fact, the opening expression “No teacher” appears to
rule out re-employment of superannuated teachers {Statute No. 16.24
(2)}. Thirdly, and importantly the proviso {to Statute 16.24 (2)} carves
out an exception to the main
provision, inasmuch as it provides that a
teacher whose “date of superannuation does not fall on June 30,
shall continue in service till the end of the academic session, that is
June 30, following and will be treated as on re-employment from
the date immediately following his superannuation till June, 30,
following.”
10. It appears that in S.K. Rathi10, a resolution, perhaps a
forerunner to Statute No. 16.24 was in issue. No doubt, the petitioner
there was officiating as principal. His contention was that by virtue of
the resolution, he was entitled to continue beyond the age of
superannuation, as acting principal. This court negatived his claim
to continue as principal. However, crucially, the court underlined that a
teacher had a right to continue till the 30th June following:
“3. It is not in dispute that respondent No. 1, who was a
teacher, had been appointed as an acting Principal. He
attained the age of 60 years sometime in December, 1999.
10 Supra n. 8
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With an effort to continue in office, he filed a writ petition
(CM. Writ Petition No. 54640 of 1999) and in the impugned
order dated 5th January, 2000, the Division Bench of the
High Court observed that in view of the decision of another
Division Bench in Udai Narain Pandey’s case, respondent
No. 1 could continue to function as Principal of the Institution
till 30th June 2000. Hence this appeal.
4. On a query raised by us, learned Counsel for the
respondent drew our attention to a decision of the Government
contained in document dated 16th February, 1999, in which
it was, inter alia, stated that for teachers like respondent No.
1 the age of superannuation was 60 years. The said decision
further states that no extension in service shall be granted
but “if the date of superannuation of a teacher does not fall
on June 30, the teacher shall continue in service till the end
of the academic session i.e. June 30, following”. This is the
clause on which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel in
support of the decision of the High Court.
5. There is no doubt that the said decision would enable
respondent No. 1 to continue as a teacher, which is his
substantive appointment, up to 30th June, following the day
when he attained the age of 60 years, but this clause cannot
allow him to continue as an acting Principal which is a
different post altogether. It cannot be disputed that the post
of Principal and of the teacher is not the same. It is a teacher
on promotion
who is appointed as a Principal and there is no
decision of the Government giving extension beyond the age
of 60 years to a Principal. This being so, the appeal is allowed
and the decision of the High Court permitting respondent No.
1 to function as Principal of the Institution till 30th June,
2000 is set aside.”
11. This court no doubt held that a teacher could not continue as
principal; yet, it decisively ruled that “There is no doubt that the said
decision would enable respondent No. 1 to continue as a teacher,
which is his substantive appointment, up to 30th June, following
the day when he attained the age of 60 years.” In this court’s opinion,
such a categorical expression about a pari materia norm was decisive
enough for the court to have found itself compelled to follow. Yet, the
NAVIN CHANDRA DHOUNDIYAL v. STATE OF
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impugned judgment- with respect, characterized the expression in
S.K.Rath11 as obiter. The Division Bench, in this court’s view, erred on
this score.
12. The issue appears to have lingered and different benches of
the Allahabad High Court, in view of the differences in phraseology of
rules and statutes of various institutions, seem to have expressed divergent
views in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Ultimately, this led to a reference
which was answered by a Full Bench, authored by Justice D.Y.
Chandrachud12 by the judgment reported as State Of U.P. v Ramesh
Chandra Tiwari13.
“Primary schools are governed by the provisions of the Uttar
Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972 and the service conditions
of the teachers are governed by the Rules framed under the
Act. Rule 29 lays down (i) the age of superannuation which
is 62 years; (ii) the principle that a teacher who attains the
age of 62 years will retire from service on the last day of the
month in which the age of superannuation is attained; and
(iii) the principle that a teacher who has retired during an
academic session, shall continue to work till the end of the
academic session and that such period of service will be
deemed to be an extended period of employment. The proviso
to Rule 29 enacts a legal fiction through the subordinate
legislation, the effect of which is that though a teacher has
attained the age of superannuation, the teacher,
notwithstanding the fact that
he or she had retired during the
academic session, will continue to work until the end of the
academic session and that such period of service will be
deemed to be an extended period of employment. Rule 29
refers to the academic session as being 1 July to 30 June,
since this was the academic session which prevailed right until
academic session 2013-14. The reason why a special provision
is made in the proviso to Rule 29 is to ensure that the
educational needs of students are not disrupted by the
retirement of a teacher in the midst of an academic session.
In other words, the benefit is extended not so much for teachers
11 Supra n.8
12 At that time, the Chief Justice of the court
13 (2015 (6) ADJ 579)
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(though the teachers would obviously also receive the benefit
of an extended period of employment) but primarily to protect
the students whose education would be disturbed by the
absence of a teacher for the academic session.”
13. The above analysis would show that the view of the
Uttarakhand High Court, as also the Allahabad High Court (now settled
by the full bench decision) consistently have been that teachers
superannuating are to be treated as re-employed or allowed to continue,
in the larger interest of the pupils, has prevailed. If the view that found
acceptance with the impugned judgment were to prevail, there would be
avoidable disruption in teaching; the likely delay in filling vacancies caused
mid-session cannot but be to the detriment of the students. That apart,
this court is also of the opinion that if the state or the university wished
to depart from the prevailing understanding, appropriate measures could
have been taken, putting all the concerned parties to notice, through
amendments. In the absence of any such move, the departure from the
prevailing understanding through a discordant judgment, as the impugned
judgment is, injects uncertainty. Long ago, this court had underlined this
aspect while ruling that long standing or established status quo brought
about by judgments interpreting local or state laws, should not be lightly
departed from, even by this Court, in Raj Narain Pandey v Sant Prasad
Tewari & Ors14 in the following words:
“In the matter of the interpretation of a local statute, the view
taken by the High Court over a number of years should
normally be adhered to and not disturbed. A different view
would not only introduce an element of uncertainty and
confusion, it would also have the effect of unsettling
transactions which might have been entered into on the faith
of those decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis can be aptly
invoked in such a situation. As observed by Lord Evershed
M.R. in the case of Brownsea Haven Properties v. Poole
Corpn.(1958 [Ch] 574), there is well-established authority
for the view that a decision of long standing on the basis of
which many persons will in the course of time have arranged
their affairs should not lightly be disturbed by a superior
court not strictly bound itself by the decision.”
14 1973 (2) SCR 835
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14. This court is consequently of the opinion that the impugned
judgment is in error. The very object and intent of the proviso to Statute
No.16.24 is to avoid the disruption caused by discontinuity of service of
a teaching staff employee or official mid-session. Therefore, the view in
Indu Singh15, dealing with an identical statute, was correctly interpreted;
the other decisions which dealt with Statute No.16.24 [Professor Sri
Krishna Khandelwal and Binod Kumar Singh (supra)] too were
correctly decided.
15. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and orders
of the High Court are set aside. The appellants are entitled, consequently,
to continue till the end of the following June on re-employment. If any of
them has been superannuated, he or she shall be issued with orders of
reinstatement, with full salary for the period they were out of employment,
and allowed to continue till the following June, on re-employment basis.
The appeals are allowed without any order as to costs.
Devika Gujral
Appeals allowed.
15 Supra n. 1