BABLU KUMARAND ORS. versus STATE OF BIHAIR AND ANR.
[2015] 8 S.C.R. 512, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
A 
8 
[2015] 8 S.C.R. 512 
BABLU KUMARAND ORS. 
v. 
STATE OF BIHAIRANDANR. 
(Criminal Appeal No.914 of2015) 
JULY20, 2015 
(DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.] 
c 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.401 - Revisional 
jurisdiction - Power of High Court to set aside order of 
acquittal - Informant alleged that appellants killed the 
victim-deceased - Trial court ordered issue of summons to 
the witnesses and warrants against the informant- Trial court 
o after numerous dates ultimately recorded that witnesses 
were not present and ordered acquittal - High Court held 
that there was no service report or execution of warrant 
against the informant and there was no service report to show 
that either summons were served on other witnesses or 
E warrants issued against witnesses were executed and it 
remanded the matter to trial court for retrial - On appeal, 
held: The Court is under legal obligation to see that the 
witnesses who have been cited by prosecution are produced 
by it or.if summons are issued, they are actually served on 
F the witnesses - If the Court is of opinion that the material 
witnesses have not been examined, it should not allow the 
prosecution to close the evidence - In the instant case, High 
Court upon perusal of record held that notices were not 
served on the witnesses -
High Court would be justified to 
G interfere with an order of acquittal if the trial court has wrongly 
shut out the evidence which the prosecution wishes to 
produce - The order
of High Court cannot be regarded as 
faulty. 
H 
512
BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 
513 
Criminal trial: Concept of fair trial - Obligation of courts A 
- Held: It is the duty of the court to see that neither the 
prosecution nor the accused play truancy with the criminal 
trial or corrode the sanctity of the proceeding - The court is 
duty bound to see that neither the prosecution nor the 
defence take unnecessary adjournments and take the trial B 
under their control and to see that the witnesses who.have 
been cited by the prosecution are produced by it or if 
summons are issued, they are actually served on the 
witnesses - Public Prosecutor who conducts the trial, has a C 
statutory duty to perform - The Court also is not expected 
to accept the version of the prosecution as if it is sacred -
Non-application of mind by the trial court has the potentiality 
to lead to the paralysis of the conception of fair trial. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
D 
HELD: 1. A scrutiny of the orders passed by the trial 
Judge from time to time showed that the trial Judge has 
really not taken pains to verify whether the summons 
were actually served on the witnesses or not. The High E 
Court rightly observed that the trial court did not also 
try to verify from the record whether the warrants had 
been executed or not. He had directed the prosecution 
to prod.uce the witnesses and mechanically recorded 
that the witnesses were not present and proceeded to F 
direct the prosecution to keep them present. 
Eventually, the trial Judge passed
an a,cquittal order 
under Section 232 CrPC. [Para 6) [520-E-G] 
K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR G 
1962 SC 1788: 1963 SCR 412- relied on 
Abinash Chandra Bose v. Bimal Krishna Sen (1963) 3 
SCR 564: AIR 1963 SC 316 - distinguished. 
Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh 1981 Supp. SCC H
514 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 8 S.C.R. 
A 83; Sunil Kumar Pal v. Phota Sheikh (1984) 4 SCC 533; 
Bansi Lalv. Laxman Singh 1986 (3) SCR 191: (1986) 3 SCC 
444; Satyajit Baneljee & Ors. v. State ofWB. & Ors. 2004 (6) 
Suppl. SCR 294: (2005) 1 SCC 115; Mary Pappa Jebamani 
v. Ganesan & Ors. 2013 (11) SCR1042: 2013 (15) SCALE 
B 154; Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B. P. Singh and others 
v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another2002 (1) Suppl. 
SCR 495: (2002) 6 SCC 650; Manu Sharma v. State (NCT 
of Delhi) 2010 (4) SCR 103: (2010) 6 SCC 1; Rattiram v. 
C State of M.P. 2012 (3) SCR496: (2012) 4 SCC 516; Natasha 
Singh v. CBI 2013 (5) SCR 539 : (2013) 5 sec 741; J. 
Jayalalithaa v. State of Kamataka (2014) 2 SCC 401; NHRC 
v. State of.Gujarat 2009 (7) SCR 236 : (2009) 6 $CC 767; 
State of Kamataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 
D 359: (1999) 8 SCC 715; Ram Bali v. State of U.P. 2004 (1) 
Suppl. SCR 195: (2004) 10 sec 598; Kamel Singh v. State 
of M.P. 1995 (2) Suppl. seR 629: (1995) 5 sec 518; Dayal 
Singh v. State of Uttaranchal 2012 (10) SCR 157: (2012) 8 
SCC 263; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another v. St'3te 
E of Gujarat and others 2004 (3) SCR 1050: (2004) 4 SCC 
158 - referred to. 
2. Keeping in view the concept of fair trial, the 
obligation of the prosecution, the interes_t of the 
F community and the duty of the Court, it can irrefragably 
be stated that the Court cannot be a sile.nt spectator or a 
mute observer when it presides over a trial. It
is the duty 
of the court to see that neither the prosecution nor the 
·accused play truancy with the criminal trial or corrode 
G the sanctity of the pr.oceeding. They cannot expropriate 
or hijack the community interest by conducting 
themselves in such a manner as a consequence of which 
the trial becomes a farcical one. Law does not 
countenance a 'mock trial'. It is a ~erious concern of the 
H society. Every member of the collective has an inherent
BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 
515 
interest in such a trial. No one can be allowed to create A 
a dent in the same. The court is duty bound to see that 
neither the prosecution nor the defence takes 
unnecessary adjournments and take the trial under their 
control. The court is under the legal obligation to see 
that the witnesses who have been cited by the B 
prosecution are produced by it or if summons are issued, 
they are actually served on the witnesses. If the court is 
of the opinion that the material witnesses have not been 
examined, it should not allow the prosecution to close C 
the evidence. There can be no doubt that the prosecution 
may not examine all the material witnesses but that does 
not necessarily mean that the prosecution can choose 
not to examine any witness and convey to the court that 
it does not intend to cite the witnesses. In the case at 0 
hand, it is luculent that the High Court upon perusal of 
the record came to hold that notices were not served on 
the witnesses. The agonised widow of deceased was 
compelled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the 
High Court against the judgment of acquittal as the trial E 
was closed after examining a formal witness. The whole 
trial was nothing, but comparable to an experimentation 
conducted by a child in a laboratory. It is neither 
permissible nor allowable. [Paras 18, 19] [527-F; 528-A-
H; 529-A-B] 
F 
Case Law Reference 
2004 (3) SCR 1050 
referred to 
Para 3 
(1963) 3 SCR 564 
distinguished
Para4 
G 
1963 SCR 412 
referred to 
Para 6 
1981 Supp. sec 83 
referred to 
Para 8 
(1984) 4 sec 533 
referred to 
Para 9 
H

516 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
1986 (3) SCR 191 
referred to 
Para 10 
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 294 referred to 
Para 11 
2013 (11) SCR 1042 
referred to 
Para 11 
B 
2002 (1) Suppl. SCR 495 referred to 
Para 12 
2010 (4) SCR 103 
referred to 
Para 13 
2012 (3) SCR 496 
referred to 
Para 14 
c 
2013 (5) SCR 539 
referred to 
Para 15 
(2014) 2 sec 401 
referred to 
.Para 16 
2009 (7) SCR 236 
referred to 
Para 17 
D 
1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 359 referred to 
Para 17 
2004 (1) Suppl.SCR 195 referred to 
Para 17 
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 629 referred to 
Para 17 
E 
2012 (10) SCR 157 
referred to 
Para 17 
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: CriminalAppeal 
No. 914 of 2015 
F 
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.2011 in 
G 
H 
Criminal Revision No. 919 of 2008 of the High Court of 
Judicature at Patna, Bihar 
K.C. Dua fortheAppellants. 
Devendra Kumar Singh, Prem Sunder Jha, Puja Singh, 
Shishir Pinaki, Aditya Narayan Singh and Samir Ali Khan for 
the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 
517 
DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The pivotal issues, quite disturbing A 
and disquieting, that emanate in this appeal by special leave 
fbr scrutiny, deliberation and apposite delineation, 
fundamentally pertain to the role of the prosecution and the 
duty of the court within the requisite paradigm of fair trial which 
in the ultimate conceptual eventuality results in appropriate B 
stability of criminal justice dispensation system. The attitude 
of callousness and non-chalance portrayed by the prosecution 
and the total indifferent disposition exhibited by the learned 
trial Judge in shutting out the evidence and closing the trial 
after examining a singular formal witness, PW 1, in a trial where C 
the accused persons were facing accusations for the offences 
punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342 and 302 
of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which entailed an acquittal 
under Section 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 0 
(CrPC), are really disconcerting; and indubitably cause 
discomfort to the judicial conscience. It seems that everyone 
concerned with the trial has treated it as a farce where the 
principal protagonists compete with each other for gaining 
supremacy in the race of closing the case unceren:ioniously, 
E 
burying the basic tenets offairtrial, and abandoning one's duty 
to serve the cause of justice devoutly. It is a case where the 
prosecution has played truant and the learned trial Judge, with 
apathy, has exhibited
impatience. Fortunately, the damage 
done by the trial court has been rectified by the High Court in 
F 
exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC; 
but what is redemption for the conception of the fair trial has 
caused dissatisfaction to the accused persons, for they do 
not intend to face the retrial. It is because at one point of time, 
the High Court had directed for finalization of trial within a fixed G 
duration and the learned trial Judge, in all possibility, harboured 
the impression that even if the prosecution witnesses had not 
been served the notice to depose in court, and the prosecution 
had not taken any affirmative steps to make them available for 
adducing evidence in court, yet he must conclude the trial by H
• 
518 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 8 S.C.R. 
A the target date as if it is a mechanical and routine act. The 
learned.trial Judge, as it appears to us, has totally forgotten 
that he could have asked for extension of time from the High· 
Court, for the High Court, and we are totally convinced, could 
never have meant to conclude the trial either at the pleasure of 
B the prosecution or desire of the accused. 
2. The sad scenario has to have a narration. The informant 
lodged an FIR on 29.11.2004 at Tikari Police Station about 
8.00 p.m. thatthe accused persons came armed with various 
C weapons, took away her husband Brahamdeo Yadav, the 
deceased, and threatened the family members not to come 
out from their house. The deceased was taken towards the 
house of Krishna Yadav and next morning he was found dead 
having several wounds. It was mentioned in the FIR that the 
D occurrence had taken place as the family of the informant and 
the accused persons were in litigating terms. On the basis of 
the FIR, criminal law was set in motion and eventually, the 
investigating agency submitted the charge-sheet for the 
offences which we have already mentioned hereinbefore. After 
E the accused persons were sent up for trial, charges were 
framed on 10.8.2007. Be it noted, the appellants in this case 
were tried as accused in Session Trial No. 350/2006 and trial 
of different accused-persons had been split up. It is apt to 
F mention here that applications for grant of bail were
preferred 
by certain accused persons before the High Court and the High 
Court by order dated 17.07.2007, while declining to admitthe 
accused persons to bail, directed that the trial should be 
concluded as early as possible and in any case within nine 
G months from the date of receipUproduction of the copy of the 
order passed by the High Court. After the charges were 
framed, the learned trial Judge, that is, Additional Session 
Judge, FTC-II Gaya, passed orders to issue summons to the 
witnesses and they were issued on 17.8.2007. Thereafterthe 
H learned trial Judge issued bailable as well as non-bailable
BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 
[DIPAKMISRA, J.] 
519 
warrants againstthe informant on 5.12.2007. The learned trial A 
Judge on various occasions recorded that witnesses were not 
present and ultimately vide order dated 17.5.2008 directed 
the matter to be posted on 23.5.2008 for orders under Section 
232 CrPC and on the dated fixed recorded the judgment of 
acquittal. 
B 
3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the 
informant preferred criminal revision no. 919 of 2008. The 
learned Single Judge upon perusal of the record found that 
there was no service report/execution of warrant of arrest C 
against the informant and there was also no service report on 
record to show that either summons were served on other 
witnesses or bailable or non-bailable warrants issued against 
the witnesses were executed. The High Court also took note 
of the fact that after the accused persons were examined under D 
Section 313 CrPC, case was adjourned to 17.5.2008 for 
evidenee of the defence and hearing and finally the matter was 
taken up for consideration under Section 232 CrPC and 
judgment was passed acquitting the accused persons. It has 
been clearly stated by the High Court that the Superintendent E 
of Police, Gaya had not taken steps to produce the evidence 
and the learned trial Judge had not taken effective steps for 
production of witnesses and tried to conclude the trial without 
being alive to the duties of the trial court. The learned Single F 
Judge has placed reliance
on the decision rendered in Zahira 
Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another v. State of Gujarat and 
·others' and opined there has been no fair trial and accordingly . 
remanded the matter for retrial by the trial court. 
4. Calling in question the propriety and justification of the G 
order passed by the High Court, it is submitted by Mr. Tanmaya 
Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellants that 
adequate opportunities were afforded to the prosecution 
1 (2004) 4 sec 1 sa 
H
520 
· SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 8 S.C.R. 
A witnesses and when summons were issued, a presumption 
has to be drawn thatthey had been served and, therefore, there 
was no error on the part of the learned trial Judge in passing 
the order under Section 232 CrPC and the High Court in 
exercise of revision al jurisdiction could not have directed for 
B retrial of the case because such a direction can only be issued 
in very rare and exceptional circumstances. It is urged by him 
that the accused persons in the split up trial have been 
acquitted and, therefore, no fruitful purpose would be served 
for holding a retrial. In support of his submissions, he has 
C commended us to the authority in Abinash Chandra Bose v. 
Bimal Krishna Sen2. 
5. Mr. Shishir Pinaki, learned counsel for the State and 
Mr. Devendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the informant-
D respondent no.2 have supported the order passed by the High 
Court on the ground that the order in the obtaining facts and 
circumstances does not warrant any interference. They have 
emphasised on the concept offair trial and how the trial in the 
instant case defeats the very essence of the said concept. 
E 
6. On a scrutiny of the orders passed by the learned trial 
Judge from time to time, we find that the learned trial Judge 
has really not taken pains to verify whether the summons had 
really been served on the witnesses or not. The High Court 
F 
has rightly observed that the trial court has also not tried to
verify from the record whether the warrants had been executed 
or not. As is manifest, he had directed the prosecution to 
produce the witnesses and mechanica.lly recorded that the 
. witnesses were not present and proceeded to direct the 
G prosecution to keep them present. Eventually, as we have 
stated earlier, the trial Judge posted the matter to 23.5.2008 
and passed an order under Section 232 CrPC. The question 
that arises for consideration is whether under these 
H 
2 (1963) 3 SCR 564 =AIR 1963 SC 316
BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
521 
circumstances the High Court while dealing with the revision A 
under Section 401 CrPC should have interfered and directed 
for retrial of the case. In this regard, we may refer with profit to 
the decision in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh3 and Anr., wherein a three-Judge Bench while dealing 
with the power of the High Court for directing retrial has ruled B 
thus: 
"It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set 
aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private 
parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; C 
but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by 
the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is 
· some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest 
error on a point of law and consequently there has been a 
flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of Section D 
439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of 
acquittal -into one of conviction and that makes it ail the 
more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not 
convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by 
the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself E 
directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of 
conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High 
Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is 
only in exceptional cases that this power should be F 
exercised. It is not
possible to lay down the criteria for 
determining such exceptional cases which would cover 
all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases 
of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court 
in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These G 
cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to 
try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where 
the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the 
prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court 
' AIR 1962 SC 1766 
H
522 
A 
B 
c 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 8 S.C.R. 
has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial 
court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has 
been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal 
court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding 
of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and 
other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be 
cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can 
. justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such a 
case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court 
was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of 
the provisions of Section 439( 4 ). " 
From the aforesaid decision, it is apparent that the High 
Court would be justified to interfere with an order of acquittal if 
the trial court has wrongly shut out the evidence which the 
D prosecution wishes to produce. It is one of the instances given 
by the court in the aforesaid verdict. 
7. In Abinash Chandra Bose (supra), the Court though 
dealing with a different fact situation observed that when the 
E prosecution had the full opportunity to produce the evidence 
and the trial court had unreasonably not refused any opportunity 
to the prosecution to adduce all the evidence that it was ready 
and willing to produce; the High Court should not have directed 
for retrial as that would put the·accused to botheration and 
F expense of a second trial. While saying so, the three-Judge 
Bench
also observed that same could not be done simply 
because the prosecution did not adduce all the evidence that 
shculd and could have been brought before the court of first 
instance. 
G 
8. In this context, it is seemly to refer to the authority in 
Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singfrl wherein a three-
Judge Bench explaining the decision in Chinnaswamy 
H • 1981 Supp. sec 83
BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 
523 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
(supra) observed that:-
A 
" .... we only wish to say that the criminal justice system 
does not admit of 'piegon-holing'. Life and the Law do 
not fall neatly into slots. When a court starts laying down 
rules enumerated (1), (2), (3), (4) or (a), (b), (c), (d), it is B 
arranging for itself traps and pitfalls. Categories, 
classifications and compartments, which statute does not 
mention, all tend to make law 'less flexible, less sensible 
and less just.'" 
Be it noted, in the said case this Court had affirmed the 
order of retrial directed by the High Court in a revision petition 
. preferred under Section 401 CrPC on the ground that judgment 
c 
of acquittal consisted of faulty reasoning and lack of judicial 
approach, and accepted canons for appreciating evidence had o 
been thrown to the wind as a consequence of which grave 
miscarriage of justice had occurred. 
9. In Sunil Kumar Pal v. Phota Sheikh5, the Court while 
commenting on the unusual procedure adopted by trial court, E 
opined that:-
" ....... We have no doubtthat under these circumstances 
the trial could not be regarded as fair and just so far as 
the prosecution was concerned. The entire course of F 
events shows that the conduct of the trial was heavily 
loaded in favour of Respondents 1to9. The trial must in 
the circumstances be held to be vitiated and the acquittal 
of Respondents 1 to 9 as a result of such trial must be set 
aside. It is
imperative that in order that people may not G 
lose faith in the administration of criminal justice, no one 
should be allowed to subvert the legal process. No citizen . 
should go away with the feeling that he could not get justice 
• (1984) 4 sec 533 
H
524 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
from the court because the other side was socially, 
economically or politically powerful and could manipulate 
the legal process. That would be subversive of the rule of 
law." 
B 
10. In Bansi Lal v. Laxman Singh'>, on the question of 
limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC and the 
duty of the court, a two-Judge Bench opined that such a power 
has to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a 
glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on 
C point of law and there has consequently been flagrant 
miscarriage of justice. A mere circumstance that finding of 
fact recorded by the trial court which may be in the opinion of 
the High Court is erroneous or incorrect, would not justify setting 
aside the order of acquittal and directing a retrial of the 
P accused. 
11. In Satyajit Banerjee & Ors. v. State ofW.B. & Ors.7, 
it has been opined that direction for retrial should not be made 
in all or every case where acquittal of accused is for want of 
E adequate or reliable evidence. It is only when an extraordinary 
situation with regard to first trial is found so as to treat it as a 
farce or a 'mock trial', direction for retrial would be justified. 
The same principle has been reiterated in Mary Pappa 
Jebamani v. Ganesan & Ors. 8 
F 
12. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.P. Singh and 
others v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and anothe~. 
while dealing with the power under Section
401 CrPC, the 
Court while not agreeing with the High Court interfering with 
G the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at 
• (1986) 3 sec 444 
1 c2005) 1 sec 115 
' 2013 (15) SCALE 154 
· H • c2002i 6 sec 550
BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] . 
the instance of the informant observed thus:-
"It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the 
evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from 
that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification 
525 
A 
for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 
B 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment 
of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial 
court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of 
procedure has been pointed out. There was also no 
improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was C 
there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct 
of the trial vitiating the trial itself." 
13. In the present context, it is also necessary to 
tlppreciate the basic concept behind a fair trial. In Manu D 
Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)1°, it has been stated that:-
"197. In the Indian criminal jurisprudence, the accused 
is placed in a somewhat advantageous position than 
under different jurisprudence of some of the countries in 
E 
.. __ 
the world. The criminal justice administration system in 
-...india places human rights and dignity for human ltfe at 
a much- higher pedestal. In our jurisprudence an 
accused is presumed-to.be innocent till proved guilty, 
the alleged accused is entitled to fa!rness and true F 
investigation and fair trial and the prosecuJion is 
, --
expected to play balanced role in the trial of a crime. 
The investigation should
be judicious, fair, transparent 
and expeditious to ensure compliance with the basic rule 
of law. These are the fundamental canons of our criminal G 
jurisprudence and they are quite in conformity with the 
constitutional mandate contained in Articles 20 and 21 
10 (201oi s sec 1 
H
526 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 8 S.C.R. 
A 
of the Constitution of India." 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
14. In Rattiram v. State ofM.P. 11 , a three-Judge Bench 
has ruled thus:-
"Fundamentally, a fair and impartial trial has a sacrosanct 
purpose. It has a demonstrable object that the accused 
should not be prejudiced. A fair trial is required to be 
conducted in such a manner which would totally ostracise 
injustice, prejudice, dishonesty and favouritism." 
And again:-
"Decidedly, there has to be a fair trial and no miscarriage 
of justice and under no circumstances, prejudice should 
be caused to the accused but, a pregnant one, every 
procedural lapse or every interdict that has been acceded 
to and not objected at the appropriate stage would not 
getthe trial dented or make it unfair. Treating it to be unfair 
would amount to an undesirable state of pink of perfection 
in procedure. An absolute apple-pie order in carrying out 
the adjective law, would only be sound and fury signifying 
nothing." 
15. In this regard, it is apt to rep.reduce a passage from 
Natasha Singh v. CB/12, wherein it has been laid down:-
"Fair t;iai is the main object of criminal procedure, and it 
is the duty of the court to ensure.that such fairness is not 
hampered or threatened in any manner. Fair trial entails 
the interests of the accused, the victim and of the society, 
G 
and therefore, fair trial includes the grant of fair and proper 
opportunities to the person concerned, and the same must 
be
ensured as this is a constitutional, as well as a human 
" (2012) 4 sec s1 s 
H 
12 (2013) s sec 741
BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
527 
right. Thus, under no circumstances can a person's right A 
to fair trial be jeopardised. 
16. In J. Jaya/a/ithaa v. State ofKarnataka13, the Court 
dealing with the concept of fair trial has opined that:-
8 
"Denial of a fair trial is as much injustice to the accused 
as is to the victim and the society. It necessarily requires 
a trial before an impartial Judge, a fair prosecutor and an 
· atmosphere of judicial calm. Since the object of the trial is 
to mete out justice and to convict the guilty and protect the c 
innocent, the trial should be a search for the truth and not 
a bout over technicalities and must be conducted under 
such rules as will protect the innocent and punish the guilty. 
Justice should not only be done but should be seem to 
have been done. Therefore, free and fair trial is a sine o 
qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution." 
17. The same principle has also been stated in NHRC v. 
State of Gujarat14, State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa 
Reddy15, Ram Bali v. State of U.P. 16, Karne/ Singh v. State E 
of M.P. 17 and Dayal Singh v. State of Uttarancha/18• 
18. Keeping in view the concept of fair trial, the obligation 
of the prosecution, the interestofthe community and the duty 
of the Court, it can irrefragably be stated that the Court cannot 
be a silent spectator or a mute observer when it presides over F · 
a trial. It is the duty of the court to see that neither the 
" (2014) 2 sec 401 
" (2009)
e sec 767 
" (1999) 8 sec 715 
10 (2004) 10 sec 598 
11 (1995) s sec 518 
" (2012) 8 sec 2s3 
G 
H
528 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 8 S.C.R. 
A prosecution nor the accused play truancy with the criminal trial 
or corrode the sanctity of the proceeding. They cannot 
expropriate or hijack the community interest by conducting 
themselves in such a manner as a consequence of which the 
trial becomes a farcical one. Law does not countenance a 
B 'mock trial'. It is a serious concern of the society. Every 
member of the collective has an inherent interest in such a 
trial. No one can be allowed to create a dent in the same. The 
court is duty bound to see that neither the prosecution nor the 
defence takes unnecessary adjournments and take the trial 
C under their control. The court is under the legal obligation to 
see that the witnesses who have been cited by the prosecution 
are produced by it or if summons are issued, they are actually 
served on the witnesses. If the court is of the opinion that the 
0 
material witnesses have not been examined, it should not allow 
the prosecution to close the evidence. There can be no doubt 
that the prosecution may not examine all the material witnesses 
but that does not necessarily mean that the prosecution can 
choose not to examine any witness and convey to the court 
E that it does not intend to cite the witnesses. The Public 
Prosecutor who conducts the trial, has a statutory duty to 
perform. He cannot afford to take things in a light manner. 
The Court also is not expected to accept the version of the 
prosecution as if it is
sacred. It has to apply its mind on every 
F occasion. Non-application of mind by the trial court has the 
potentiality to lead to the paralysis of the conception of fair 
trial. 
· 
19. In the case at hand, it is luculent that the High Court 
G upon perusal of the record has come to hold that notices were · 
not served on the witnesses. The agonised widow of deceased 
was compelled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High 
Court against the judgment of acquittal as the trial was closed 
after examining a formal witness. The order passed by the 
H

BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
529 
High Court by no stretch of imagination can be regarded as A 
faulty. That being the position, we have no spec of doubt in 
our mind that the whole trial is nothing, but comparable to an 
experimentation conducted by a child in a laboratory. It is 
neither permissible nor allowable. Therefore, we unhesitatingly 
affirm the order passed by the High Court as we treat the view B 
expressed by it as unexceptionable, for by its order 1t has 
annulled an order which was replete with glaring defects that 
had led to miscarriage of justice. 
20. Consequently, the appeal, being sans merit, stands C 
dismissed. The order be communicated to the Registrar 
General of the High Court to communicate to the concerned 
learned trial Judge to proceed with the trial in accordance with 
law.-
Devika Gujral 
Appeal dismissed.