L. GOWRAMMA (D) BY LR. versus SUNANDA (D) BY LRS. & ANR.
[2016] 1 S.C.R. 256, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
A 
B 
[2016] l S.C.R. 256 
L. GOWRAMMA (D) BY LR. 
v. 
SUNANDA (D) BY LRS. & ANR. 
(Civil Appeal Nos. 174-175 of 2016) 
JANUARY 12, 2016 
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.] 
Hindu Law Women's Rights Act, 1933 (Mysore Act No. X of 
1933) - ss. 4, JO and 8 - Succession to Hindu male dying intestate 
- On facts, constitution of joint Hindu family between two brothers 
and wife of elder brother - Elder brother karta of the family -
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Partition of joint family property between two brothers - Death of 
younger brother leaving behind his widow and three daughters -
Execution of Will by widow-defendant no. 1 bequeathing her share 
in joint property in favour of only one of her daughters - Suit by 
other daughter against her mother-defendant no. 1, her sisters and 
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a purchaser who bought some property from her mother - Claim as 
regards her share in the property - Trial court applying s. 10(2)(g) 
held that the plaintiff entitled to w• share in the scheduled properties 
and decreed the suit - First appeal by defendant no. 1, dismissed -
Review petition also dismissed applying s. 8(1 )( d) - On appeal, 
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held: Succession to a Hindu male dying intestate would vest only in 
the widow u/s. 4( 1 )(ii) to the exclusion of the daughters - Judgments 
of the courts below set aside. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 A partition of joint family property among 
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brothers is expressly mentioned in Section S(l)(b) of the Hindu 
Law Women's Rights Act, 1933 (Mysore Act No. X
of 1933). 
Therefore, upon partition of joint family property between 'T' 
and his older brother, it is only their mother, their unmarried 
sisters and widows and unmarried daughters of their pre-
deceased undivided brothers who have left no male issue who 
G would get a share under the Section. Unlike sub-section (a), 
unmarried daughters of 'T' do not get any share at the partition 
between 'T' and his brother. [Para 18] [265-C-DJ 
1.2 Under Section lO(l)(g) it is only property taken by 
inheritance by a female from her husband that is included in 
H stridhana. This would not include the unmarried daughters as 
256
L. GOWRAMMA (D) BY LR. v. SUNANDA (D) BY LRS. 
257 
property taken by inheritance by a female from her father Is not A 
included. The succession to a Hindu male dying intestate would 
vest only in the widow under Section 4(1)(ii) to the exclusion of 
the daughters who are mentioned In a subsequent clause I.e. 
clause (iii) by virtue of the expression ''in the following order". 
The judgment of the courts below Is set aside and the suit would B 
be dismissed as a consequence. [Para 19, 20] (265-F-G] 
Byamma v. Ramdev ILR 1991 KAR 3245; Sathyaprema 
Manjunatha Gowda (Smt) v. Controller of Estate Duty, 
Karnataka (1997) 10 SCC 684: 1997 (3) SCR 86; 
Nagendra Prasad v. Kempananjamma 1968 1 SCR 124; 
Smt. Ramakka and others v. Smt. Thanamma since 
deceased by LR, P. Srinivas and Others ILR 2014 
Karnataka 1335 - Referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
I.L.R. 1991 KAR 3245 
Referred to. 
Para 11 
1997 (3) SCR 86 
Referred to. Para 12,13 
1968 1 SCR 124 
Referred to. 
Para 15 
ILR 2014 Karnataka 1335 
Referred to. Para 17 
c 
D 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 174-
E 
175 of2016 
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.08.2005 and 24.11.2007 of 
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 915 of 2005 
and in Review Petition No. 712 of 2005 in R.A.A. No. 915 of 2005. 
R. S. Hegde, Shanti Prakash, Rajeev Singh for the Appellants. 
S. N. Bhat for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R. F. NARIMAN, J. 1. Delay condoned in filing the special
leave 
petitions. 
2. Leave granted. 
3. These appeals raise an interesting question on the true 
construction of some of the provisions of the Hindu Law Women's Rights 
Act, 1933 (Mysore Act No.X of 1933). One Venkatsubbaiah had two 
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[2016] l S.C.R. 
sons Mahabalaiah and Thimmappa. After the death of Venkatsubbaiah, 
the two sons and the wife of Mahabalaiah constituted a joint Hindu 
family. Mahabalaiah being the elder brother was the Karta of the said 
family. In the year 1940-1941, Mahabalaiah and Thimmappa partitioned 
and divided their joint family properties and got possession of their 
respective shares. Tltimmappa died on 9.10.1952, leaving behind him 
his widow one Gowrarnma and three daughters. The widow has executed 
a will on 9.5.1990 bequeathing her share in the joint family property in 
favour of only one of the three daughters namely the third defendant. 
The 4th defendant has been joined in the suit inasmuch as the first 
defendant widow had sold one of the scheduled items of the suit property 
namely item No.3 to the said 4'h defendant during the pendency of the 
suit. 
4. One of the said daughters namely Sunanda filed a suit against 
defendant No. I - her mother, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 - her sisters, and 
defendant No.4-the purchaser, being O.S. No.46 of 1994. After setting 
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out the relevant facts, the Civil Judge, Senior Division hy judgment dated 
28.3.2005 framed as many as 12 issues and ultimately decided on 
application of Section I 0(2)(g) of the 1933 Act that the plaintiff would 
be entitled to a l/4'h share in the scheduled properties and the suit was 
decreed accordingly. 
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5. In a first appeal filed by defendant No.I, the first
Appellate 
Court agreed with the conclusions both on facts as well as law with the 
trial court. Accordingly, the first appeal was dismissed on 5.8.2005. 
6. Thereafter, a review petition was filed and by the judgment 
dated 24.11.2007, the review was dismissed but this time adverting to 
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Section 8( I)( d) of the 1933 Act and decreeing the suit with reference to 
the said Section. The review also was accordingly dismissed. 
7. Shri R.S. Hegde, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 
appellant has urged before us that the applicable Section of the 1933 Act 
is Section 4, and not Sections 8 and 10, and accordingly the succession 
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of a Hindu male dying intestate vests property only in the widow to the 
exclusion of the daughters and hence the plaintiff's suit should have 
been dismissed on this ground. 
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8. On the other hand, Shri S.N. Bhat, learned counsel, invited our 
attention to Section 8( l )( d) of the Act and according to him since joint 
family property passed to Thimmappa who was a single coparcener by
L. GOWRAMMA (D) BY LR. v. SUNANDA (D) BY LRS. 
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[R. F. NARIMAN, J.] 
survivorship, on partition in 1940-1941, all the classes of females 
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mentioned in Section 8 would be entitled to a share in the said property 
which would include not only his widow but also his unmarried daughters. 
9. For a proper appreciation of the controversy at hand, we set 
out the relevant Sections of the Hindu Law Women's Rights Act, 1933 
(Mysore Act No.X of 1933). 
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"Part I 
INHERITANCE 
4. Order of succession:-
( I) The succession to a Hindu male dying intestate shall, in the 
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first place, vest in the members of the family of the propositus 
mentioned below, and in the following order:-
i) the male issue to the third generation ; 
ii) the widow ; 
iii) daughters; 
iv) daughter's sons 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
8. Certain females entitled to shares at partition-
(!) (a) At a partition of joint family property between a person 
and his son or sons, his mother, his unmarried daughters and the 
widows and unmarried daughters of his predeceased undivided 
sons and brothers who have left no male issue shall be entitled to 
share with them. 
(b) At a partition of joint family property among brothers, their 
mother, their unmarried sisters and the widows and unmarried 
daughters of their predeceased undivided brothers who have left 
no male issue shall be entitled to share with them. 
(c) Sub-sections (a) and (b) shall also apply mutatis mutandis to 
a partition among other co-parceners in a joint
family. 
(d) Where joint family property passes to a single co-parcener by 
survivorship, it shall so pass subject to the right to shares of the 
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classes of females enumerated in the above sub-sections. 
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xxx 
.IO. 
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xxx 
What is "stridhana" -
[2016] 1 S.C.R. 
xxx 
(I) "Stridhana" means property of every description belonging to 
a Hindu female, otber than property in which she has, by law or 
under the terms of an instrument, only a limited estate. 
(2) "Stridhana" includes:-
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
(g) property taken by inheritance by a female from anotber female 
and property taken by inheritance by a female from her husband 
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or son, or from a male relative connected by blood except when 
tbere is a daughter or daughter's son of tbe propositus alive at tbe 
time tbe property is so inherited. 
(3) All gifts and payments otbertban or in addition to, or in excess 
of, tbe customary presents of vessels, apparel and other articles 
0 
of personal use made to a bride or bridegroom in connection witb 
their marriage or to their parents or guardians or other person on 
tbeir behalf, by tbe bridegroom, bride or tbeir relatives or friends, 
shall be the stridhana of tbe bride." 
10. A cursory reading of Section 8 would reveal that various females 
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mentioned in tbe Section would be entitled to a share of joint family 
property in the circumstances mentioned tberein. Under Sections 8(1)(a) 
to 8( I)( c) tbere has necessarily first to be a partition in tbe circumstances 
mentioned in each of the said sub-sections whereas under sub-section 
( d) what is required is tbat joint family properties should pass to a single 
coparcener by survivorship. If
tbis condition of sub-clause ( d) is met, 
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tben all tbe women mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (c) would be entitled 
to a share tberein. 
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11. Shri Bhat relied upon a judgment delivered by B.P. Singh,J. in 
Byamma v. Ramdev reported in I.L.R. 1991 KAR 3245. After setting 
out Section 8 oftbe 1933 Act, it was held:-
"It is well settled that devolution of joint family property, which 
come to tbe hands of a son from his fatber or grand-fatber or 
great-grand-father as unobstructed heritage is governed by the 
Rule of Survivorship. A male coparcener acquires right to such 
property by birth. This is different from property that may come 
to tbe hands of a coparcener in which he has no right by birth.
L. GOWRAMMA (D) BY LR. v. SUNANDA (D) BY LRS. 
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[R. F. NARIMAN, J.] 
This is what is known as obstructed heritage, and such property 
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devolve by succession and not by survivorship. Such a distinction 
is well known in Hindu Law. Therefore, when Section 8(l)(d) of 
the Mysore Act refers to the properties passing on to a single 
coparcener by survivorship, it has reference to the ancestral 
properties which come to his hands upon partition or otherwise. 
It is also well settled that if a coparcener dies, his interest devolves 
upon other coparceners by survivorship. As long as the joint family 
is in existence, all the coparceners jointly own all the properties. 
Each coparcener is a full owner of each property owned by the 
joint family. The effect of partition is severance of status and, as 
a consequence, each coparcener becomes entitled to separate 
possession and enjoyment of his share in the joint family properties. 
Partition by itself does not create a right because the right of a 
coparcener existed even before partition. It only brings about 
demarcation of his interest with a right to separate possession 
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and enjoyment. It is therefore, not correct to state that when a 
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coparcener, upon partition, gets his share in the joint family 
properties, it does not come to him by survivorship. The right which 
accrues to the coparcener is by operation of the Rule of 
Survivorship and the partition only demarcates his share in the 
joint family properties. As
observed earlier, unobstructed heritage 
always devolves by operation of the Rule of Survivorship and 
there is no exception to this Rule. It has therefore been held that 
where a father disposes of by a Will, his interest in the joint family 
properties in favour of his son, the properties in the hands of the 
E 
son still retain the character of coparcenary property, and not 
self-acquired property. 
I, therefore, hold that the properties to which Chowdappa became 
entitled, upon partition passed on to him by survivorship. I find no 
substance in the contention raised on behalf of the respondents 
that it passed on to him by reason of partition and not by 
survivorship. 
In view of Section 8(1) of the Act, there can be no doubt that a 
single coparcener such as Chowdappa took the ancestral property, 
subject to the right to shares of female members of the joint family 
enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 8(1) of the Mysore 
Act. The plaintiff, being a widow of a pre-deceased son, was 
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entitled to a share equal to one half of the share to which her 
husband would have been entitled if he were alive [ vide Section 
8(1) (a) of the Mysore Act]. I therefore hold that the plaintiff is 
entitled to claim one half of the share which her husband could 
have claimed if he was alive. In the instant case her husband 
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would have got half share in the properties in a partition between 
his father and himself in the year 1946 when Chowdappa became 
a single coparcener. Consequently, she is entitled to I/4th share in 
the suit schedule properties." (at para nos.JO, ll, 12 and 17) 
12. Unfortunately for Shri Bhat, this Court in Sathyaprema 
Manjunatha Gowda (Smt) v. Controller of Estate Duty, Karnataka, 
( 1997) 10 sec 684, has taken a view which is directly contrary to the 
view of the single Judge of the Kamataka High Court. 
13. In Sathyaprema's case (supra), the question posed was 
whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was 
correct in holding that neither the unmarried daughter nor the wife of the 
deceased had any interest in the joint family property of the deceased 
while he was alive. This Court stated that the only question for 
consideration is whether the estate left by the husband and father of the 
widow and unmarried daughter respectively on partition was obtained 
by survivorship applying Section 8( 1 )( d) of the Act. 
14. This Court exhaustively discussed the
meaning of the 
expressions "survivor" and "survivorship" and ultimately held:-
"Here, we are concerned with Manjunatha Gowda who had obtained 
property at a partition with coparceners. Survivorship, therefore, is the 
living of one of two or more persons after the death of the others having 
interest to succeed in the property by succession. The shares in the 
coparcenery property changes with death or birth of other coparceners. 
However, in the case of survivorship it is not of the same incidence. He 
received the property at the partition without there being any other 
coparcener. It is an individual property and, therefore, he did not receive 
it by survivorship but by virtue of his status being a coparcener of the 
Hindu Joint Family along with his father and brothers. 
Under these circumstances, the conclusion reached by the High 
Court that since it is by partition, not by survivorship, clause (d) of 
sub-section (1) of Section 8 does not get attracted, is not (sic) 
correct. No doubt, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment
L. GOWRAMMA (D) BY LR. v. SUNANDA (D) BY LRS. 
263 
[R. F. NARIMAN, J.] 
of this Court in Nagendra Prasad v. Kempananjamma [AIR 1968 
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SC 209] which was also considered by the High Court in the 
impugned judgment. This Court therein has explained that the object 
of Section 8(1)(d) is to give a right to claim a share in the joint 
family property to all females referred to in clauses (a) to (c) 
thereof. Merely because partition by one of the coparceners under 
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clauses (a) to (c) is a condition for a class of family members 
entitled to a share in the property, it does not apply to a case 
where class of family members entitled under clause 8( 1 )( d) since 
it stands altogether on a different footing and, therefore, partition 
is not a condition precedent for claiming a share by a class of 
family members enumerated in Section 8(1)(a) of the Act. But 
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that principle has no bearing to the facts in this case for the reason 
that the property held was not received by survivorship. 
Under these circumstances, family members enumerated under 
Section 8( 1 )( d) are not entitled to a share in the estate left by the 
deceased. Thus we do not find any illegality in the view taken by 
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the High Court warranting interference." (at paragraph nos.13-
15) 
15. In fact, this follows from a reading of Section 8. Whereas 
Sections 8(l)(a)(b) and (c) refers to a partition among coparceners in a 
joint family, sub-section ( d) refers to property passing to a single 
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coparcener
only by survivorship. In this behalf, in Nagendra Prasad v. 
Kempananjamma, [1968] 1 SCR 124, this Court by a majority judgment 
held:-
"This intention can only be given effect to on the basis that clause 
( d) does not restrict itself to finding out females on the basis of an 
p 
assumed partition between the last two male coparceners. It is 
significant that clause ( d) gives a right independently of a partition 
and we do not see why its scope should be restricted by assuming 
a partition." (at page No.128). 
16. 
In fact, even the dissenting Judge held:-
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"Clause ( d) applies to a case when the family property passes by 
survivorship to a sole surviving coparcener. In such a case there 
can be no partition, as is the case under clause (a) or (b) or ( c). 
Indeed, the property becomes incapable of partition and but for 
clause (d) no female relative would have any right to a share. To 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 1 S.C.R. 
save such a result clause ( d) provides that the rights of the female 
relatives should not be lost only by reason of the property passing 
to the sole surviving coparcener. Sub-section 5, furthermore, gives 
such female relatives as fall under sub-section 1 a right to have 
their shares separated and thus makes them co-sharers subject to 
whose rights the sole surviving coparcener takes the property. 
Therefore, whereas under clauses (a), (b) and (c) the rights 
fluctuate according to the position of the female relatives in the 
family when the partition takes place there is no such uncertainty 
in the case falling under clause (d) as the sole surviving coparcener 
takes the property subject to the right to shares of female relatives 
falling under the provisions of clause (a) or (b) or (c). Such is the 
scheme of Section 8(1)." 
17. The dissenting Judge basically dissented on the point that under 
sub-clause (d), a partition has to be assumed because it is only on such 
assumption that females on whom a right to share is conferred can be 
ascertained. It is clear, therefore, that Section 8( 1 )( d) can have no 
application to a case where joint family property passes to a single 
coparcener not by survivorship but by partition. 
A recent view of Section 8(l)(d) in Smt. Ramakka and others v. 
Smt. Thanamma since deceased by LR, P. Srinivas and Others, 
ILR 2014 Karnataka 1335, has been taken by a Division
Bench of the 
Karnataka High Court. While construing Section 8(l)(d), the Division 
Bench has held:-
"When the coparcenary property passes to a sole surviving 
coparcener, provision has been made in clause ( d) of Section 8(1 ). 
This clause, in protecting the rights of females, had necessarily to 
give females the right to share in the coparcenary property even 
if there be no partition at all, because, on passing of property to a 
sole surviving coparcener, there could not possibly be any partition 
sought by the male members of the coparcenary body. The right 
conferred by clause ( d) is, therefore, an independent right and not 
connected with the rights granted to the females under clauses 
(a), (b) and (c). The females who are to get benefit are all those 
to whom a right to a share in the joint family property would have 
accrued if there had been a partition either under clause (a), or 
clause (b) or clause (c). The language of clause (d) has to be 
.interpreted as laying down that right to shares will vest in all
L. GOWRAMMA (D) BY LR. v. SUNANDA (D) BY LRS. 
265 
[R. F. NARIMAN, J.] 
females of the joint Hindu family who would have possibly received 
A 
the right to a share if at any earlier time there had been partition in 
the family in any of the three manners laid down in clauses (a), 
(b) and (c). It is significant that clause (d) gives a right independent 
of a partition and its scope should not be restricted by assuming a 
partition." 
This is the correct view of the law on Section 8( 1 )( d), and we 
endorse it. 
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18. There is also another way of looking at the issue raised in the 
present appeals. A partition of joint family property among brothers is 
expressly mentioned in Section 8(1 )(b ). Therefore, upon partition of c 
joint family property between Thimmappa and his older brother, it is only 
their mother, their unmarried sisters and widows and unmarried daughters 
of their pre-deceased undivided brothers who have left no male issue 
who get a share under the Section. Unlike sub-section (a), unmarried 
daughters of Thimmappa do not get any share at the partition between 
Thimmappa and his brother. 
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19. The ground on which the judgments below rested, namely Section 
lO(l)(g), was not even sought to be supported by Shri Bhat. And for a 
very good reason. In order that Section IO(l)(g) apply, first and foremost 
the property referred to is "stridhana" which is defined as property of 
every description belonging to a Hindu female other than property in 
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which she
has by law or under the terms of an instrument only a limited 
estate. Under Section lO(l)(g) it is only property taken by inheritance 
by a female from her husband that is included in stridhana. This would 
not include the unmarried daughters as property taken by inheritance by 
a female from her father is not included. 
p 
20. In this view of the matter, Shri Hegde is right in saying that the 
succession to a Hindu male dying intestate will vest only in the widow 
under Section 4(1 )(ii) to the exclusion of the daughters who are mentioned 
in a subsequent clause i.e. clause (iii) by virtue of the expression "in the 
following order". This being the case, it is clear that the appeals will 
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have to be allowed and the judgments of the courts below set aside. 
The suit will stand dismissed as a consequence. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeals allowed.