RAMANLAL AND ANR. versus STATE OF HARYANA
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 147, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 147 
RAMANLAL ANDANR. 
v. 
STATE OF HARYANA 
(Criminal Appeal No. 2279 of 2009) 
MAY 15, 2015 
[T. S. THAKUR AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 148, 323, 325 and 304 (Part I) 
A 
B 
- Prosecution ulss. 148, 323, 325 and 302 rlw s. 149- Of ten c 
accused - Trial court convicted all the accused - High Court 
confirmed the conviction of 4 of the accused while acquitted 
rest of them - On appeal, held: Prosecution proved its case 
qua the appellants-accused - However, since the incident 
was without premeditation and a sudden fight upon a sudden D 
... , ,.. 
quarrel and since the injuries were inflicted in the heat of 
passion without taking any undue advantage or acting in a 
cruel and unusual manner -
Therefore, by invoking 
Exception 4 to s. 300 the offence will not'fall uls. 302 but uls. 
304 (Part I) - Since the number of accused was reduced to E 
only 4 due to acquittal of 6 of the accused, the appellants 
also cannot be convicted with the aid of s. 149 -
The 
conviction of appellant-accused 'H' is converted from s. 3021 
149 to s. 304 (Part I) - Other appellants-accused are acquitted 
u/s. 3021149 while their conviction ulss. 325 and 323 F 
confirmed. 
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. There is nothing in the evidence to G 
probablise the defence version that the incident in 
question had taken place on account of an attempt on 
the part of the deceased to sodomise 'J'. There are no 
tell tale signs of any such attempt having
been made. 
Not only that, the defence has not taken care to examine H 
147
148 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 'J', the alleged victim of the attempted act as a witness 
to prove that any such attempt was at all made by the 
deceased. [Para 6) [153-H; 154-A-B] 
2. The provisions of Section 149 IPC are no longer 
B available to the prosecution for convicting the appellants 
whose number is reduced to 4 consequent upon the 
acquittal of the remaining accused persons. In the 
present case, the prosecution had named all those 
constituting the unlawful assembly, but, only four of 
C those named were eventually convicted, thereby 
reducing the number to less than five. There is no 
evidence to suggest that any one, apart from the persons 
named in the charge-sheet were members of the unlawful 
assembly, but, were either not available or remained 
D unidentified. Such being the position, the conviction of 
the appellants with the help of Section 149 IPC does not 
appear to be legally sustainable. [Para 12) [161-~·E] 
. . .· 
.. 
Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 174: 
E 
1962 Suppl. SCR 848; Nagamalleswara Rao (K) and 
Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1991) 2 SCC 532: 1991 
(1) SCR 875 - relied on. 
3.1 The fact that accused 'H' had inflicted a single 
F injury on the head of the deceased, showed that there 
was no intention to kill the deceased, other injuries 
inflicted by the remaining accused being only simple in 
nature. The offence could not, therefore, be graver than 
culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable 
G u/s.
304 (Part-I) IPC. [Para 13) [161-H; 162-A-B] 
H 
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465:1958 
SCR 1495- relied on. 
3.2 Even when the act may not have been committed
RAMANLAL ANDANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA 
149 
with the intention of causing death, the same was A 
intended to cause such bodily injury as was likely to 
cause death, within the meaning of Section 304 Part I. 
However, the circumstances of the present case leave 
no manner of doubt that the incident was without any 
pre-meditation and a sudden fight upon a sudden B 
quarrel. The injuries upon the deceased were inflicted 
in the heat of passion and without the appellant taking 
any undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual 
manner. The fact situation of the case, therefore, attracts 
Exception 4 to s. 300 especially when in terms of C 
explanation to Exception 4, it is immaterial in such cases 
which party offers the provocation or commits the first 
assault. That being so, the offence committed by the 
author of the injury is not murder but culpable homicide 0 
not amounting to murder punishable u/s. 304 IPC. 
Therefore, the conviction of the appellants u/s. 302 r/w. 
Section 149 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for 
life awarded to them is set aside. Appellant 'H' is, instead, 
convicted u/s. 304 Part-I. [Paras 16, 17 and 18] [164-B-H] E 
4. The conviction of other three appellants-accused 
for offences punishable under Sections 325 and 323 of 
the IPC and the sentence awarded to them shall stand 
affirmed. [Para 18] [165-B-G] 
Case Law Reference 
1962 Suppl. SCR 848 
1991 (1) SCR 875 
1958 SCR 1495 
relied on. 
relied on. 
relied on. 
Para 10 
Para 11 
Para 14
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal 
Appeal No. 2279 of 2009. 
F 
G 
H
150 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A 
From the Judgment and Order dated 07. 05.2009 of the 
B 
c 
D 
High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal 
Appeal No. 631-DB of 2000. 
WITH 
Criminal Appeal No. 1351of2010 
Bhagwati Prasad, Fakhruddin, Sanjeev Bhatnagar, 
Pushpinder Singh, Manju Jaitley, Ram Niwas Buri, Divya 
Mishra, N. Annapoorani for the Appellants. 
Arun Kumar, AAG, Kamal Mohan Gupta, Sanjay Kumar 
Visen, M. Qamaruddin for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
T. 5. THAKUR, J. 1. These two appeals by special 
leave assail a common judgment and order dated 7th May, 
2009 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab 
and Haryana at Chandigarh whereby Criminal Appeal No.631 
E of 2000 filed by the appellants challenging their conviction for 
offencespunishable under Sections 323, 325, 302 read with 
Section 149 of the IPC has been dismissed and the sentence 
of lite imprisonment awarded to each one of them by the trial 
Court affirmed. 
-
F 
2. The prosecution case in a nutshell is that on 2"d July, 
1998 at about 10 O' clock in the morning Ved Pal and his 
brother Gopal, now deceased, were watering their fields in 
village Doongriwala, district Faridabad in the State of Haryana. 
G At about 12.00 noon Jai Pal, son of Nihar Singh entered their 
field in which the two brothers had grown their paddy crop. 
Deceased-Gopal appears to have objected to Jai Pal's 
trespass into the paddy crop to which objection Jai Pal
gave 
an abusive reply insisting that he would pass through the paddy 
H crop regardless of Gopal's objection. While this altercation
RAMANLAL ANDANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA 
151 
[T. S. THAKUR, J.] 
was going on between deceased-Gopal and Jai Pal, 10 to 12 A 
persons appeared on the spot armed with lathis, pharsas and 
ballams. They included Har Chand, Digamber and Bhagat 
Singh sons of Jairam; Rajbir, Lal and Bhola sons of Har Chand; 
Jagdish son of Girraj; Rattan Lal son of Jagdish; Naresh and 
Rajkumar sons of Ramesh all Jats by caste and residents of B 
village Doongriwala. They are alleged to have given a lalkara 
to eliminate Ved Pal and deceased Gopal and assaulted both 
of them causing several injuries including an injury on the head 
of the deceased-Gopal that felled him to the ground. The injured 
were removed to the hospital at Hodal for treatment where C 
Ved Pal made a statement which was made before ASI Narain 
Singh that led to the registration of a case against the persons 
aforementioned for offences punishable under Sections 148, 
149, 323 and 307 of the IPC. With Gopal succumbing to the 0 
injuries in the Escorts Hospital at Faridabad, the offence under 
Section 307 of the IPC was converted into one of murder 
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. Investigation by the 
police led to the arrest of accused Har Chand, Digambar and 
Jagdish on 3rd July, 1998. Several recoveries from the accused E 
persons are said to have been made in the -course of 
investigation which culminated in filing of a charge-sheet 
against ten persons in all excluding Bhagat Singh son of Jai 
Ram who even though
named in the FIR, was foun"tl innocent 
while Jai Pal being a juvenile was referred to the Juvenile Court F 
at Faridabad. The net result was that nine out of those named 
in the FIR only were eventually committed to face the trial before 
the Additional Sessions Judge at Faridabad for offences under 
Sections 148, 323, 325 and 302 read with Section 149 of the 
IPC. At the trial, Bhagat Singh son of Jai Ram was also added G 
as an accused under Section 319 of the Cr. P. C, taking the 
number of those accused to face the trial to ten in all. 
3. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as 
many as ten witnesses. These included the first informant Ved H
152 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A Pal examined as PW-1; Prakash examined as PW-2; Kishan 
Singh examined as PW-3; Satbir Singh examined as PW-4 
and Ors. HK Mishra, VR Gupta and SP Jayant examined as 
PWs 5, 6 and 10 respectively. The remaining witnesses 
happened to be police officials including the investigating 
B officer. The accused did not lead any evidence in defence. In 
their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., 
they alleged false implication. It was further alleged that Jai 
Prakash and Har Chand alone were present on the spot at the 
time of the incident and that the remaining nine accused 
C persons had been falsely implicated. Their further case was 
that on the fateful day Jai Pal was watering his fields when 
deceased Gopal tried to commit sodomy upon him. Har Chand 
noticed this attempt of the deceased and objected to it, 
0 whereupon deceased Gopal inflicted a lathi blow upon the 
person of Har Chand. Har Chand, in exercise of the right of 
private defence and with a view to rescuing Jai Pal, inflicted a 
lathi blow on de9eased Gopal, while Jai Pal caused injuries to 
Ved Pal in the incident. 
E 
4. The Trial Court appraised the evidence adduced by 
the prose·cution and came to the conclusion that the 
depositions of PW1-Ved Pal and PW2-Prakash were 
completely reliable. The Trial Court rejected the contention 
F urged on behalf of the accused persons that the delay in the 
lodging of the Fl R was not satisfactorily explained
or that the 
prosecution ought to suffer on account of its failure to explain 
the injuries sustained by the accused persons. The Trial Court 
also rejected the contention that there was no motive for the 
G commission of the offence or that there was any contradiction 
between the medical and ocular evidence led in the case. The 
Trial Court on that reasoning sentenced all the ten accused 
persons arraigned before it to undergo imprisonment for life 
under Section 302 of the IPC and a fine of Rs.5,000/-each. In 
H default of payment of fine, they were directed to undergo further
RAMANLAL ANDANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA 
153 
[T. S. THAKUR, J.] 
rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each. They A 
were also sentenced to under rigorous imprisonment for a 
period of one year and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with a default 
sentence of three months each under Section 325 of the IPC. 
For the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 148 of 
the IPC the accused were sentenced to pay a fine of B 
Rs.1,000/- each. No default sentence in regard to those 
offences was, however, awarded. 
5. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded to 
them, the appellants filed Criminal Appeal No.631 of 2000 C 
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, 
which was disposed of along with Criminal Revision No.345 
of 2001 filed by Ved Pal-the first informant by a common 
judgment and order impugned in these appeals. The High 
Court upon a reappraisal of the evidence adduced at the trial D 
came to the conclusion that the appeal filed by Digamber, 
Rajbir, Lala, Bhola, Jagdish and Raj Kapoor deserved to be 
allowed, while the same deserved dismissal qu~rti~r Chand, 
Raman Lal, Naresh and Bhagat Singh. That is precisely the 
backdrop in which Har Chand, Raman Lal, Naresh and Bhagat E 
Singh are before us in these appeals by special leave assailing 
their conviction and the sentence awarded to them. 
6. On behalf of the appellants it was argued tfi
1aYlhe courts 
below had fallen in error in convicting the appellants l;>y placing F 
an implicit reliance upon
the depositions of PW1 ~Ved Pal and 
PW2-Prakash and in the process, ignoring the defence version 
about the genesis of the incident. It was contended that the 
incident had occurred on account of an attempjed act of 
sodomy by the deceased upon Jaipal to which the appellant-
G 
Har Chand had objected resulting in lathi blows being inflicted 
•V • 
by the two sides rivals to each other. The argument needs 
notice only to be rejected. We say so because th~~e is nothing 
in the evidence to probablise the defence vers!On that the H
154 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A incident in question had taken place on account of an attempt 
on the part of Gopal to sodomise Jaipal. There are no tell tale 
signs of any such attempt having been made. Not only that, 
the defence has not taken care to examine Jaipal the alleged 
victim of the attempted act as a witness to prove that any such 
B attempt was at all made by the deceased-Gopal. We have, 
therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the argument that the 
defence version was a probable version which could not be 
given credence. The courts below have, in our opinion, rightly 
rejected the defence version for which there was no factual 
C foundation whatsoever in the evidence. 
7. It was next argued by learned counsel for the appellants 
that with the acquittal of 6 out of 10 accused persons, the charge 
that the appellants constituted an unlawful assembly ought to 
D fail and as an inevitable consequence thereof, the conviction 
of the appellants for murder with the help of Section .149 of the 
IPC rendered unsustainable. It was contended that acquittal 
of other accused persons alleged to be members of the 
unlawful assembly, implied that the said accused had been 
E falsely implicated in the case or that they, even if physically 
present on the spot as alleged, did not share the common 
object of the convicted accused. 
8. Section 141 of the IPC defines unlawful assembly as 
F under: 
"141. Unlawful assembly.-An assembly of five or 
more persons is
designated an "unlawful assembly", if 
the common object of the persons composing that 
G 
assembly is-
(First) -
To overawe by criminal force, or show of 
criminal force, 1 [the Central or any State Government 
or Parliament or the Legis-lature of any State], or any 
H 
public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such
RAMANLAL ANDANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA 
155 
[T. S. THAKUR, J.] 
public servant; or 
A 
(Second) -
To resist the execution of any law, or of any 
legal process; or 
(Third, -
To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, 
or other offence; or 
(Fourth) -
By means of criminal force, or show of 
criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain 
possession of any property, or to deprive any person of 
the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or 
other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or 
enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or 
(Fifth) -
By means of criminal force, or show of criminal 
force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally 
bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled 
to do. 
Explanation.-An assembly which was not ·unlawful 
when it assem-bled, may subsequently become an 
unlawful assembly." 
B 
c 
D 
E 
9. In terms of Section 149 of the IPC every member of an 
unlawful assembly is guilty of the offence committed by any 
other member of the assembly in prosecution of the common 
F 
object. Section 149 of the IPC reads: 
"149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of 
offence commit-ted in prosecution of common 
object.-lf an offence is committed by any member of 
G 
an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common 
object of that assembly, or such as the members of that 
assembly knew to be likely to be committed in 
prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time 
of the committing of
that offence, is a member of the 
H
156 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
same assembly, is guilty of that offence." 
10. The question is whether acquittal of some of the 
accused persons reducing the number of those convicted to 
less than 5 has the effect of taking the case out of the purview 
B of Section 149 (supra). A Constitution Bench of this Court has 
in Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab1 examined that question 
and authoritatively answered the same. The prosecution story 
in that case also was that on the date of the incident 5 accused · 
persons composed an unlawful assembly and that in 
C prosecution of the common object of the said assembly, they 
committed rioting while armed with deadly weapons. The 
prosecution alleged that in pursuance of the common object 
of the assembly Gurdip Singh was murdered and injuries 
caused to Harnam Singh. The prosecution alleged that 
D although the fatal injury was inflicted by only one of the accused 
persons on Gurudip Singh's head since the same was in 
prosecution of the common object of unlawful assembly, all 
those who were members of the assembly were guilty under 
Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC. On behalf of the 
E defence it was argued that the constructive criminal liability 
under Section 149 did not arise once two of the accused who 
were alleged to be members of that assembly were acquitted 
thereby reducing the number comprising the assembly to three 
F persons only. This Court while dealing with that contention 
conceived of
three possible situations and the legal position 
applicable to each one of such situations. This Court observed: 
G 
"8. The true legal position in regard to the essential 
ingredients of an offence specified bys. 149 are not in 
doubt. Section 149 prescribes for vicarious or 
constructive criminal liability for all members of an 
unlawful assembly where an offence is committed by 
any member of such an unlawful assembly in 
H 
1 AIR 1963 SC 174
RAMANLAL ANDANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA 
[T. S. THAKUR, J.] 
prosecution of the common object of that assembly or 
such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely 
to be committed in prosecution of that object. It would 
thus be noticed that one of the essential ingredients of 
section 149 is that the offence must have been 
committed by any member of an unlawful assembly, 
and S.141 makes it clear that it is only where five or 
more persons constituted an assembly that an unlawful 
assembly is born. provided. of course: the other 
requirements of the said section as to the common 
object of the persons composing that assembly are 
satisfied. In other words, it is an essential condition of 
an unlawful assembly that its membership must be five 
or more. The argument, therefore, is that as soon as 
the two Piara Singhs were acquitted, the 
membership of the assembly was reduced from five 
to three and that made s. 141 inapplicable which 
inevitably leads to the result that S. 149 cannot be 
invoked against the appellants. In our opinion, on 
the facts of this case, this argument has to be 
upheld. We have already observed that the point raised 
by the appellants has to be dealt with on the assumption 
that only five persons were named in the charge as 
persons composing the unlawful assembly and 
evidence led in the course of the trial is confined only 
to the said five persons. If that be so, as soon as two 
of the five named persons are acquitted, the 
assembly must be
deemed to have been composed 
of only three persons and that clearly cannot be 
regarded as an unlawful assembly." 
9. In dealing with the question as to the applicability of 
S. 149 in such cases it is necessary to bear in mind the 
several categories of cases which come before the 
Criminal Courts for their decision. If five or more persons 
157 
A 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
158 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R.. 
are named in the charge as composing an unlawful 
assembly and evidence adduced by the prosecution 
proves that charge against all of them, that is a very 
clear case where S. 149 can be invoked. It is, however, 
not necessary that five or more persons must be 
convicted before a charge under S. 149 can be 
successfully brought ,home to any members of the 
unlawful assembly It may be that less than five persons 
may be charged and convicted under S.3021149 ifthe 
charge is that the persons before the Court, along with 
others named constituted an unlawful assembly; the 
other persons so named may not be available for trial 
along with their companions for the reason, for instance, 
that they have absconded. In such a case, the fact that 
less than five persons are before the Court does not 
make section 149 inapplicable for the simple reason 
that both the charge and the evidence seek to prove 
that the persons before the court and others number 
more than five in all, and as Such, they together 
constitute an unlawful assembly Therefore, in order to 
bring home a charge under S. 149 it is not necessary 
that five or more persons must necessarily be brought 
before the court and convicted. Similarly, less than five 
persons may be charged under s. 149 if the prosecution 
case is that the persons before the Court and others 
numbering in all more than five composed an unlawful 
assembly, these others being
persons not identified and 
so not named. In such a case, if evidence shows that 
the persons before the c;ourt along with unidentified and 
. 
un-named assailants or members composed an 
unlawful assembly, tryqse before the Court, can be 
convicted under section 149 though the unnamed. and 
unidentified persons ar~ not traced and charged. Cases 
may also arise where in the charge, the prosecution 
names five or more -persons and alleges that they
RAMAN LAL ANDANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA 
[T. S. THAKUR, J.] 
constituted an unlawful assembly. In such cases, if both 
the charge and the evidence are confined to the persons 
named in the charge and out of the persons so named 
two or more are acquitted leaving, before the court less 
than five persons to be tried, then s. 149 cannot be 
invoked. Even in such cases, it is possible that though 
the charge names five or more 'persons is composing 
an unlawful assembly, evidence may nevertheless 
show that the unlawful assefnbiy consisted of some 
other persons as well who were not identified and so not 
named. In such cases, either the trial court or even the 
High Court in appeal may be able to come to the 
conclusion that the acquittal of some of the persons 
named in the charge and tried will not necessarily 
displace the charge under section 149 because along 
with the two or three persons convicted were others who 
composed the unlawful assembly but who have not been 
identified and so have not been named. In such cases 
the acquittal of one or more persons named in the 
charge does not affect the validity of the charge under 
section 149 because-on the evidence the court offacts 
is able to reach the conclusion that the persons 
composing the unlawful assembly nevertheless wer:e 
five or more than five. It is true that in the last category 
of cases, the court will have to be very careful in reaching 
the said conclusion. But there is no legal bar which 
prevents the
court from reaching such a conclusion. 
The failure to refer in the charge to other members of 
the unlawful assembly un-named and unidentified may 
conceivably raise the point as to whether prejudice 
would be caused to the persons before the Court by 
reason of the fact that the charge did not indicate that 
un-named persons also were members of the unlawful 
assembly. But apart from the question of such prejudice 
which may have to be careful/f'Considered, there is no 
159 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
160 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
legal bar preventing the court of facts from holding that 
though the charge specified only five or more persons, 
the unlawful assembly in fact consisted of other persons 
who were not named and identified. That appears to be 
the true legal position in respect of the several 
B 
categories of cases which may fall to be tried when a 
charge under section 149 is framed." 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
(emphasis supplied) 
11. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in 
Nagamalleswara Rao (K) and Ors. v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh2 where this Court observed: 
"However, the learned Judges over-looked that since 
the accused who are convicted were only four in number 
and the prosecution has not proved the involvement of 
other persons and the courts below have acquitted all 
the other accused of all the offences, section 149 cannot 
be invoked for convicting the four appellants herein. 
The learned Judges were not correct in stating that A 1, 
A2, AS and A 11 "can be held to be the members of the 
unlawful assembly along with some others unidentified 
persons' on the facts and circumstances of this case. 
The charge was not that accused 1, 2, 5 and 11 "and 
others' or "and other unidentified persons" formed into 
an unlawful assembly but it is that ''you accused 1 to 
15" who formed into an unlawful assembly. It is not the 
prosecution case that apart from the said 15 persons 
there were other persons who were involved in the crime.
When the 11 other accused were acquitted it means 
that their involvement in the offence had not been 
proved. It would not also be permissible to assume or 
conclude that others named or unnamed acted 
conjointly with the charged accused in the case unless 
H 
2 (1991)2 SCC532
RAMANLAL ANDANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA 
161 
[T. S. THAKUR, J.] 
the charge itself specifically said so and there was 
A 
evidence to conclude that some others also were 
involved in the commission of the offence conjointly 
with the charged accused in furtherance of a common 
object." 
12. Applying the above principles to the case at hand, 
we are of the view that the provisions of Section 149 of the 
IPC are no longer available to the prosecution for convicting 
8 
the appellants whose number is reduced to 4 consequent upon 
the acquittal of the remaining accused persons. The facts of C 
the case at hand are not covered by situations one and two 
referred to in Mohan Singh's case (supra). It is a case which, 
in our opinion, falls more appropriately in situation three where 
the prosecution had named all those constituting the unlawful 
assembly, but, only four of those named were eventually D 
convicted, thereby reducing the number to less than five. There 
is no evidence to suggest that any one, apart from the persons 
named in the charge-sheet were members of the unlawful 
assembly, but, were either not available or remained 
unidentified. Such being the position, the conviction of the E 
appellants with the help of Section 149 of the IPC does not 
appear to be legally sustainable. 
13. The third and the only other submission made by 
learned counsel for the appellants related to the nature of the F 
offence committed by Har Chand, the author of the fatal injury. 
It was
urged that the incident in question had taken place 
without any pre-meditation in a sudden fight because of a 
sudden quarrel following Jai Pal's insistence to enter the crop 
growing field of the complainant. Injuries were caused by those G 
involved in the fight to each other. Appellant-Har Chand had 
not taken any undue advantage nor.had he acted in a cruel or 
unusual manner. The case, therefore, fell within Exception 4 
to Section 300 of the IPC. The fact that Har Chand had inflicted H
162 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A a single injury on the head of the deceased-Gopal showed 
that there was no intention to kill deceased-Gopal, other 
injuries inflicted by the remaining accused being only simple 
in nature. The offence, according to the learned counsel, could 
not, therefore, be graver than culpable homicide not amounting 
B to murder punishable under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 
14. The locus classicus on the interpretation of Sections 
299 and 300 of the IPC is the often quoted decision of this 
Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab3 where Vivian Bose, 
C J. speaking for the Court, explained the ingredients that must 
be satisfied for a culpable homicide to amount to murder. 
Dealing with clause 'Thirdly' under Section 300 of the IPC, the 
Court explained the essentials of that clause in the following 
words: 
D 
E 
"12. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the 
following facts before it can bring a case under Section 
300 'thirdly'; 
First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily 
injury is present. 
"~ 
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These 
are purely objective investigations. 
F 
Thirdly, it must be proved that ther.e was an intention to 
inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it 
was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other 
kind of injury was intended. 
G 
Once these three elements are proved to be present, 
the enquiry proceeds further and, 
Fourthly, it must
be proved that the injury of the type 
lh-
just described made up of the three elements set out 
H 
3 AIR 1958 SC 465 
.,.,..,.
RAMANLAL ANDANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA 
163 
[T. S. THAKUR, J.] 
above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course 
A 
of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective 
and inferential and has nothing 0to do with the intention 
of the offender." 
15. The Court then goes on to explain the third ingredient B 
referred to the above passage and makes the following 
observations which bring home the essence of the third 
ingredient in simple words: 
J 21 
''The question is not whether the prisoner intended to 
c 
inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he 
intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. 
If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the 
circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, 
the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if 
D 
there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the 
appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that 
he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its 
seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is 
neither here nor there. The question, so far as the 
E 
intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to 
kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of 
seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury 
in question; and once the existence of the injury is 
proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless 
F 
the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite 
conclusion." 
16.Applying the above to the case at
hand, we have no 
difficulty in holding that keeping in view the nature of the injury, 
G 
the vital part of the body on which the same was inflicted and 
the weapon used by the accused appellant-Har Chand, and 
the medical evidence, that the saicfinjury was sufficient in the 
ordinary course to cause death, culpable homicide would, in 
the case at hand, tantamount to murder but for the application 
H
164 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A of Exception 4 to Section 300. The question, however, is 
whether Exception 4 really applies and, if so, whether the injury 
was inflicted with the intention of causing death or of causing 
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The circumstances 
of the case to which we have referred in the earlier part of this 
B judgment, however, leave no manner of doubt that the incident 
was without any pre-meditation and a sudden fight upon a 
sudden quarrel. The injuries upon the deceased were inflicted 
in the heat of passion and without the appellant taking any 
undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner. The 
C fact situation of the case, therefore, attracts Exception 4 
especially when in terms of explanation to Exception 4, it is 
immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or 
commits, the first assault. That being so, the offence committed 
0 by the author of the injury is not murder but culpable homicide 
not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 of the 
IPC. 
17. Coming then to the question whether the act 
committed by Har Chand-appellant was with intention to cause 
E death or of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause 
death, we are of the opinion that even when the act may not 
have been committed with the intention of causing death, the 
same was intended to cause such bodily injury as was likely to 
F cause death, within the meaning of Section 304 Part I. 
18. In
the result, we allow these appeals in part and to 
the following extent: 
1. 
The conviction of the appellants under Section 302 
G 
read with Section 149 IPC and the sentence of 
imprisonment for life awarded to them is set aside. 
2. 
Appellant Har Chand is, instead, convicted under 
Section 304 Part-I and sentenced to undergo rigorous 
H 
imprisonment for a period of eight years and a fine of

RAMANLAL ANDANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA 
165 
[T. S. THAKUR, J.] 
Rs.5000/-. In default payment offine he shall undergo A 
further imprisonment for a period of six months. His 
conviction and sentence for offences punishable under 
Section 325 shall remain unaffected and so also the 
fine and default sentence awarded to him. 
B 
3. 
The conviction of Appellants-Raman Lal, Naresh and 
Bhagat Singh for offences punishable under Sections 
325 and 323 of the IPC and the sentence awarded to 
them shall stand affirmed. They shall be set free ,unless 
required in connection of any other case, as they have C 
already undergone the imprisonment awarded to 
them. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeals partly allowed. 
D