HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. versus KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS HARSORA AND ORS.
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 515, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Ratio
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 515 
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. 
v. 
KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS HARSORA AND ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. I 0084 of2016) 
OCTOBER 06, 2016 
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.) 
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - s. 
2(q) and its proviso - Constitutional validity of s. 2(q) - Held; The 
object of the Act is to provide various remedies to women who suffer 
from domestic violence - Preamble of the Act also makes it clear 
that the Act is to redress violence, whether physical, sexual, verbal, 
emotional or economic - The definition of 'respondent' in s.2(q) is 
not based on any intelligible dijferentia having any rational relation 
to the object sought to be achieved by the Act - The microscopic 
difference between male and female, adult and non adult, regard 
being had to the object sought to be achieved by the Act, ·is neither 
real nor substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the 
object of the legislation - Rather the words 'adult male person' are 
contrary to the object - Therefore, the words, 'adult male' before 
the word 'person' in s., 2 (q) are struck down as these words 
discriminate between persons similarly situated and being contrary 
to the object to be achieved by the Act ...:. Applying the principle of 
severability, on striking down the expression 'adult male', the rest 
of the Section is left intact and can be enforced to achieve the object 
of the legislation without the offending words - The proviso to s.2(q) . 
has been
provided only to carve out an exception to a situation .of 
'respondent' not being an 'adult male',... Once 'adult male' is struck 
down, the proviso has no independent existence, having been 
rendered otiose - Constitution of India - Art. · 14 - Doctrine of 
severability. 
Disposing of the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. A cursory reading of the statement of objects 
and rea-sons makes it clear that the phenomenon of domestic 
violence against women is widely prevalent and needs redressal. 
Whereas crimhJal law does offer sQme redressal, civil law does 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
not address this phenomenon in its entirety. The idea therefore 
is to provide various innovative remedies in favour of women 
who suffer from domestic vio-lence, against the perpetrators of 
such violence. (Para 14][532-E-F] 
Re: Special Courts Bill (1979) 2 SCR 476 - followed. 
Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India (1990) 2 
SCR 441; Harbilas Rai Bansal '" State of Punjab 1995 
(6) Suppl. SCR 178 : (1996) 1 SCC 1 - relied on. 
2. The preamble of the statute is again significant. The 2005 
Act is to provide for effective protection of the rights of women 
C who are victims of violence of anv kind occurring within the family. 
The preamble also makes it clear that the reach of the Act is that 
violence, whether physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic, 
are all to be redressed by the statute. That the perpetrators and 
abettors of such violence can, in given situations, be women 
D themselves, is obvious. (Para 16)(532,-H; 533-A] 
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3. The definition of "domestic relationship" contained in 
Section 2(f) is a very wide one. It is a relationship between 
persons who live or have lived together in a shared household 
and are related in any one of four ways - blood, marriage or a 
relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or family 
members of a joint family. A reading of these definitions makes it 
clear that domestic relationships involve persons belonging to 
both sexes and includes persons related
by blood or marriage. 
This necessarily brings within such domestic relationships male 
as well as female in-laws, quite apart from male and female 
members of a family related by blood. [Para 18][540-D-F] 
4. Equally, a shared household includes a household which 
belongs to a joint family of which the respondent is a member. 
Even before the 2005 Act was brought into force on 26.10.2006, 
Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was amended, with effect 
from 9.9.2005, to make females coparceners of a joint Hindu 
family and so have a right by bil·th in the property of such joint 
family. This being the case, whe1; a member of a joint Hindu 
family will now include a female co1larcener as well, the restricted 
definition contained in Section '.t(q) has necessarily to be given a 
relook, given that the definition of 'shared household' in Section
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. 
2(s) of the Act would include a household which may belong to a 
joint family of which the respondent is a member. The aggrieved 
person can therefore make, after 2006, her sister, for example, a 
respondent, if the Hindu Succession Act amendment is to be 
looked at. But such is not the case under Section 2(q) of the 
2005 Act, as the main part of Section 2(q) continues to read "adult 
male person", while Section 2(s) would include such female 
coparcener as a respondent, being a meinber of a joint family. 
This is one glaring anomaly. [Para 18][540-F-H; 541-A-B] 
5, When Section 3 of the Act defines domestic violence, it 
is clear that such violence is gender neutral. It is also clear that 
physical abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse and economic abuse 
can all be by women against other women. Even sexual abuse 
may, in a given fact circumstance, be by one woman on another. 
Sectio~ 3, therefore, in tune with the general object of the Act, 
seeks to outlaw domestic violence of any kind against a woman, 
and is gender neutral. [Para 19][541-B-C] 
- 6. Section 17(2) makes it clear that the aggrieved person 
cannot be evicted or excluded from a shared household or any 
part of it by the "respondent" save in accordance with the 
procedure established by law. If "respondent" is to be read as 
only an adult male person, it is clear that women who evict or 
exclude the aggrieved person are not within its coverage,
and if 
that is so, the object of the Act can very easily be defeated by an 
adult male person not standing in the forefront, but putting forward 
female persons who can therefore evict or exclude the aggrieved 
person from the shared ho~sehold. This again is an important 
indicator that the object of the Act will not be sub-served by 
reading "adult male person" as "respondent". [Para 19][541-D-
E] 
7. Under Section 18(b), for example, when a protection order 
is given to the aggrieved person, the "respondent" is prohibited 
from aiding or abetting the commission of acts of domestic 
violence. This again would not take within its ken females who 
may be aiding or abetting the commission of domestic violence, 
such as daughters-in-law and sisters-in-law, and would again 
stultify the reach of such protection orders. [Para 20][541-F-G] 
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8. Section 19(l)(c) makes it clear that the Magistrate may 
pass a residence order, on being satisfied that domestic violence 
has taken place, and may restrain the respondent or any of his 
relatives from entering any portion of the shared·household in 
which the aggrieved person resides. This again is a pointer to 
the fact that a residence order will be toothless unless the 
relatives, which include female relatives of the respondent, are 
also bound by it. [Para 21)[541-G, H; 542-A] 
9. Under Section 20, a Magistrate may directthe respondent 
to pay monetary relief to the aggrieved person, of various kinds, 
mentioned in the Section. If the respondent is only to be an 
"adult male person", and the money payable has to be as a result 
of domestic violence, compensation due from a daughter-in-law 
to a mother-in-law for domestic violence inflicted would not be 
available, whereas in a converse case, the daughter-in-law, being 
a wife, would be covered by the proviso to Section 2(q) and would 
consequently be entitled to monetary relief against her husband 
and his female relatives, which includes the mother-in-law. [Para 
22][542-D-E] 
10. The sweep of the Act is such that all the innovative 
reliefs available under Sections 18 to 22 may also be sought in 
any legal proceeding before a civil court, family court or criminal 
court affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent. The 
proceeding in the
civil court, family court or criminal court inay 
well include female members of a family, and reliefs sought in 
those legal proceedings would not be restricted by the definition 
of "respondent" in the 2005 ~ct. Tims, an invidious discrimination 
will result, depending upon whether the aggrieved person 
chooses to institute proceedings under the 2005 Act or chooses 
to add to the reliefs available in either a pending proceeding or a 
later proceeding in a civil court, family court or criminal court. It 
is clear that there is no intelligible differentia between a 
proceeding initiated under the 2005 Act and proceeding initiated 
in other fora under other Acts, in which the self-same reliefs 
grantable under this Act, which are restricted to an adult male 
person, are grantable by the other fora also against female 
members of a family. This anomaly again makes it clear that the 
definition of "respondent" in Section 2(q) is not based on any
HIRAL P, HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS, 
519 
intelligible differentia having any rational relation to the object 
sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act. The restriction of such 
person to being an adult male alone is obviously not a differentia 
which would be in sync with the object sought to be achieved 
under the 2005 Act, but would in fact be contrary to it.[Para 
23][542-F-H; 543-A-B] 
11. Even the expression ''adult" in the main part is Section 
2( q) is restrictive of the object sought to be achieved by the kinds 
of orders that can be passed under the Act and must also be, 
therefore, struck down, as this word contains the same 
discriminatory vice that is found with its companion expression 
"male".[Para 24][543-D-E] 
12. The Protection from Domestic Violence Bill, 200~ was 
first introduced in the Lok Sabha in 2002 which had lapsed also 
defined "respondent" as meaning "any person who is ..... " without 
the addition of the words "adult ~ale", being in consonance with 
the object sought to .be achieved by the Bill, which was pari 
materia with the object sought to be achieved by the present 
Act.· In the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace 
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, "resp_ondent" 
is defined in Section 2(111) thereof as meaning a person against 
whom the aggrieved woman has made a complaint under Section 
9. Here again the prefix "adult male" is conspicuous by its 
absence. The 2002 Bill and the 2013 Act are in
tune with the 
object sought to be achieved by statutes which are meant to 
protect women in various spheres of life. Thus, Parliament itself 
has thought it reasonable to widen the scope of the expression 
"respondent" in the Act of 2013 so as to be in tune with the 
object sought to be achieved by such legislations. [Paras 41, 
42)(554-E; 555-B-E) 
13. Over emphasis on the doctrine of classification or an 
anuous_and sustained attempt to discover some basis for 
classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive Article 14 
of its glorious content. That process would inevitably end in · 
substituting the doctrine of classification for the doctrine of 
equality. This admonition seems _to have come true in the present 
case, as the classification of "adult male person" clearly subverts 
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[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
A the doctrine of equality, by restricting -the reach of a social 
beneficial statute meant to protect women against all form~ of 
domestic violence. [Para 31)(546-G-H; 547-A] 
State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (i961) 1 SCR 14; 
Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab (1963) 2 SCR 353 -
D 
relied on. 
14. The microscopic difference between male and female, 
adult and non adult, regard being had to the object sought to be 
achieved by the 2005 Act, is neither real nor substantial nor does 
it have any rational relation to the object of the legislation. In 
c fact, the words "adult male person" are contrary to the object of 
affording protection to women who have suffered from domestic 
violence "of any kind". Therefore, the words "adult male" before 
the word "person" in Section 2( q) are struck down, as these words 
discriminate between persons similarly situate, and far from being 
in tune with, are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by 
D 
the 2005 Act. [Para 36)[551-D-F) 
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D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305: 1983 
(2) SCR 165; Re: Special Courts Bill (1979) 2 SCR 476; 
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCR 621; 
Subra111anian Swamy v. CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682 : 2014 
(6) SCR 873 - followed. 
Rattan Arya and Ors. v. State. of Tamil Nadu and Am: 
(1986) 3 SCC 385 : 1986 (2) SCR 596; Union of India 
v. N.S. Ratnam (2015) 10 SCC 681 : 2015 (8) SCR 751; 
Cellular Operators Association of India v. TRAI
(2016) 
7 sec 703 - relied on. 
B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N. (2001) 7 SCC 231: 2001 (3) 
Suppl. SCR 191 - referred to. 
15. An application of the severability principle would make 
it clear that having struck down the expression "iidult male" in 
Section 2( q) of the 2005 Act, the rest of the Section is left intact 
and can be enforced to achieve the object of the legislation without 
the offending words. Under Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, while 
defining 'respondent', a proviso is provided only to carve out an 
exception to a situation of "respondent" not being an ad nit male.
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
521 
HARSORA AND ORS. 
Once the expression 'adult male' is struck down, the proviso 
A 
has no independent existence, having been rendered otiose and 
hence stands deleted. [Paras 40, 46)(554-D-E; 558-G] 
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305: 1983 
(2) SCR 165; R.MD. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of 
India 1957 SCR 930 - followed. 
B 
Corporation of Calcutta v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. 
(1964) 5 SCR 25; Motor General Traders '~ State of 
A.P. (1984) 1 SCC 222 : 1984 (1) SCR 594; Satyawati 
S~arma v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 287 : 2008 (6) 
SCR 566 - relied on. 
c 
Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao 
Wankhade 2011 (2) SCR 261 : (2011) 3 SCC 650 -
relied on. 
Indra Sanna v. V.K. V. Sanna 2013 (14) SCR 1019 : 
(2013) 15 SCC 755; Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse 
D 
& Anr. 2013 (10) SCR 259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188 -
referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
(11)90) 2 SCR 441 
followed 
Para 11 
E 
1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 178 
relied on 
Para 12 
2011. (2) SCR 261 
relied on 
Para 26 
2013 (14) SCR 1019 
referred to 
Para 27 
2013 (10) SCR 259 
referred to 
Para28 
F 
(1961) 1 SCR 14 
relied on 
Para30 
(11)63) 2 SCR 353 
relied on 
Para 31 
1983 (2) SCR 165 
followed 
Para32 
(11)79) 2 SCR 476 
followed 
Para32 
G 
(11)78) 2 SCR 621 
followed 
Para32 
1986 (2) SCR 596 
relied on 
Para33 
2014 (6) SCR 873 
followed 
Para34 
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(2016] 9 S.C.R. 
2015 (8) SCR 751 
relied on 
Para35 
1957 SCR 930 
followed 
Para36 
(1964) 5 SCR 25 
relied on 
Para37 
1984 (1) SCR 594 
relied on 
Para38 
2008 (6) SCR 566 
relied on 
Para 39 
(2016) 7 sec 703 
relied on 
Para 44 
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 191 
referred to 
Para 45 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10084 
of2016. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.09.2014 of the High Court 
of Bombay in WP(C) No 300 of2013. 
Haren P. Raval, Sr. Adv., Naren Thakore, Bhargava V. Desai, 
Ms. Akriti Dewan, Ms. DivyaAnand, Anando Mukherjee, Nipun Saxena, 
Advs. for the Appellants. 
· Ms. Pinki Anand, ASG, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Ajay 
Sharma, Shailendra Saini, Karan Seth, Ansh Luthra, Shashank Dewan, 
Gurmeet Singh Makker, Ms. Manisha T. Karia, Annanya Ghosh, Mud it 
Sood, Ms. Nidhi Nagpal, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Arpit 
Rai, Advs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R.F. NARIMAN, J. I. Leave granted. 
2. The present appeal arises out of a judgment dated 25.9.2014 of 
a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. It raises an important 
question as to the constitutional validity of Section 2( q) of the Protection 
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of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, (hereinafter referred to 
as "the 2005 Act"). 
3. On 3.4.2007, Kus um Narottam Harsora and her mother Pushpa 
Narottam Harsora filed a complaint under the 2005 Act against Pradeep, 
the brother/son, and his wife, and two
sisters/daughters, alleging various 
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acts of violence against them. The said complaint was withdrawn on 
27.6.2007 with liberty to file a fresh complaint. 
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4. Nothing happened for over three years till the same duo of 
mother and daughter filed two separate complaints against the same 
respondents in October, 2010. An application was moved before the
HJRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
learned Metropolitan Magistrate for a discharge ofrespondent Nos. 2 to 
4 stating that as the complaint was made under Section 2(a) read with 
Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, it can only be made against an adult male 
person and the three respondents not being adult male persons were, 
therefore, required to be discharged. The Metropolitan Magistrate passed 
an order dated 5.1.2012 in which such discharge was refused. In a writ 
petition filed againstthe said order, on 15.2.2012, the Bombay High Court, 
on a literal construction of the 2005 Act, discharged the aforesaid three 
respondents from the complaint. We have been informed that this order 
has since attained finality. 
5. The present proceedings arise because mother and daughter 
have now filed a writ petition, being writ petition No.300/2013, in which 
the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) has been challenged. Though 
the writ petition was amended, there was no prayer seeking any 
interference with the order dated 15.2.2012, which, as has already been 
stated hereinabove, has attained finality. 
6. The Bombay High Court by the impugned judgment dated 
25.9.2014 has held that Section 2( q) needs to be read down in the following 
manner:-· 
"In view of the above discussion and in view of the fact 
that the decision of the Delhi High Court in Kusum Lata 
Sharma's case has not been disturbed by the Supreme Court, 
we are inclined to
read down the provisions of section 2(q) of 
the DY Act and to hold that the provisions of"respondent" 
in section 2(q) of the DY Act is not to be read in isolation 
but has to be read as a pmt of the scheme of the DY Act, 
and particularly along with the definitions of "aggrieved 
person", "domestic relationship" and "shared household" · 
in clauses (a), (f) and (s) of section 2 of the DY Act. If so 
read, the complaint alleging acts of domestic violence is 
maintainable not only against an adult male person who is 
son or brother, who is or has been in a domestic relationship 
with the aggrieved complainant- mother or sister, but the 
complaint can also be filed against a relative of the son or 
brother including wife of the son I wife of the brother and 
sisters of the male respondent. In other words, in our view, 
the complaint against the daughter-in-law, daughters or 
sisters would be maintainable under the provisions of the 
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DV Act, where they are co- respondent/s in a complaint 
against an adult male person, who is or has been in a domestic 
relationship with the complainant and such co- respondent/ 
s. It must, of course, be held that a complaint under the DV 
Act would not be maintainable against daughter-in-law, 
sister-in- law or sister of the complainant, ifno complaint is 
filed against an adult male person of the family." 
7. The present appeal has been filed against this judgment. Shri 
Harin P. Raval, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the 
appellants, assailed the judgment, and has argued before us that it is 
clear that the "respondent" as defined in Section 2( q) of the said Act 
can only mean an adult male person. He has further argued that the 
proviso to Section 2( q) extends "respondent" only in the case of an 
aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage, 
in which case even a female relative of the husband or male partner 
may be arraigned as a respondent. He sought to assail the judgment on 
the ground that the Court has not read down the provision of Section 
2(q), but has in fact read the proviso into the main enacting part of the 
said definition, something that was impermissible in law. He has argued 
before us that the 2005 Act is a penal statute and should be strictly 
construed in the event of any ambiguity. He further argued that in fact 
there was no
ambiguity because the expression "adult male person" 
cannot be diluted in the manner done by the High Court in the impugned 
judgment. He cited a large number of judgments on the golden rule of 
literal construction, on how reading down cannot be equated to re-reading 
in constitutional law, and on how a proviso cannot be introduced into the 
main part of a provision so as to distort its language. He also cited before 
us judgments which stated that even though a statute may lead to some 
hardship, that would not necessarily render the provision unconstitutional 
nor, in the process of interpretation, can a Court mend or bend the 
provision in the face of the plain language used. He also cited judgments 
before us stating that given the plain language, it is clear that it is only for 
the legislature to make the changes suggested by the High Court. 
8. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel appearing on 
behalf of the respondents, countered each of these submissions. First 
and foremost, she argued that the 2005 Act is a piece of social beneficial 
legislation enacted to protect women from domestic violence of all kinds. 
This being the case, it is clear that any definition which seeks to restrict
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
the reach of the Act would have to be either struck down as being 
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution or read down. According to 
her, given the object of the statute, which is discernible clearly from the 
statement of objects and reasons, the preamble, and various provisions 
of the 2005 Act which she took us through, it is clear that the expression 
"adult male person" is a classification not based on any intelligible 
differentia, and not having any rational relationship with the object sought 
to be achieved by the Act. In fact, in her submission, the said expression 
goes contrary to the object of the Act, which is to afford the largest 
possible protection to women from domestic violence by any person, 
male or female, who happens to share either a domestic relationship or 
shared household with the said woman. In the alternative, she argued 
that the High Court judgment was right, and that ifthe said expression is 
not struck down, it ought to be read down in the manner suggested to 
make it constitutional. She also added that the doctrine of severability 
would come to her rescue, and that ifthe said expression were deleted 
from Section 2(q), the Act as a whole would stand and the object sought 
to be achieved would only then be fulfilled. She referred to a large 
number of judgments on Article 14 and the doctrine of severability 
generally. She also argued that within the
definition of"shared household" 
in Section 2(s) of the Act, the "respondent" may be a member of a joint 
family. She has adverted to the amendment made to the Hindu Succession 
Act in 2005, by which amendment females have also become coparceners 
in a joint Hindu family, and she argued that therefore the 2005 Act is not 
in tune with the march of statutory law in other areas. She also countered 
the submission ofShri Raval stating that the 2005 Act is in fact a piece 
of beneficial legislation which is not penal in nature but which affords 
various remedies which are innovative in nature and which cannot be 
availed of in the ordinary civil courts. She added that Section 31 alone 
was a penal provision for not complying with a protection order, and 
·went on to state that the modern rule as to penal provisions is different 
from that sought to be contended by Shri Raval, and that such rule 
requires the court to give a fair interpretation to the provisions of these 
statutes, neither leaning in favour of the accuser or the accused. She 
also added that given the beneficial statute that we have to strike down/ 
interpret, a purposive construction alone should be given, and as the 
offending expression "adult male per:son" is contrary to such purpose 
and would lead to absurdities and anomalies, it ought to be construed in 
tune with the Act as a whole, which therefore would include females, as 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
well, as respondents. She also pointed out that, at present, the sweep of 
the Act was such that if a mother-in-law or sister-in-law were to be an 
aggrieved person, they could only be aggrieved against adult male 
members and not against any opposing female member ofajoint family 
- for example, a daughter-in-law or a sister-in-law. This will unnecessary 
B 
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stultify what was sought to be achieved by the Act, and would make the 
Act a dead letter insofar as these persons are concerned. She also argued 
that the Act would become unworkable in that the reliefs that were to be 
given would only be reliefs against adult male members and not their 
abettors who may be females. 
9. Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General for India, 
more or less adopted the arguments of the counsel who appeared for 
the Union oflndia in the Bombay High Court. It was her submission 
that in view of the judgment in Kusum Lata Sharma v. State (Crl. 
M.C. No.75 of2011dated2.9.2011) of the Delhi High Court, laying 
down that the mother-in-I~~ is also entitled to file a complaint against 
D 
the daughter-in-law under the provisions of the 2005 Act, and the SLP 
against the said judgment having been dismissed by the Supreme Court, 
her stand was that it would be open to a mother-in-law to file a complaint 
against her son as well as her daughter-in-law and other female relatives 
of the son. In short, she submitted that the impugned
judgment does not 
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require interference at our end. 
l 0. This appeal therefore raises a very important question in the 
area of protection of the female sex generally. The Court has first to 
ascertain what exactly is the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 
Act. In doing so, this Court has to see the statement of objects and 
reasons, the preamble and the provisions of the 2005 Act as a whole. In 
so doing, this Court is only following the law already laid down in the 
followingjudgments. 
11. In Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India, { 1990) 2 
SCR 441, this Court was faced with the constitutional validity of an 
exemption section contained in the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961. After 
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referring in detail to Re: Special Courts Bill, 1979 2 SCR 4 76 and the 
propositions laid down therein on Article 14 generally and a few other 
judgments, this Court held:-
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"It is first necessary to discern the true purpose or object 
of the impugned enactment because it is only with reference
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J:] 
to the true object of the enactment that the existence of a 
rational nexus of the differentia on which the classification 
is based, with the object sought to be achieved by the 
enactment, can be examined to test the validity of the 
classification. 
In Francis 
Be1111io11 's 
Statutory 
Interpretation, ( 1984 edn.), the distinction between the 
legislative intention and the purpose or object of the 
legislation has been succinctly summarised at p. 237 as 
under: 
"The distinction between the purpose or object of an 
enactment and the legislative intention governing it is that 
the former relates to the mischief to which the enactment 
is directed and its remedy, while the latter relates to the 
legal meaning of the enactment." 
There is thus a clear distinction between the two. While 
the purpose or object of the legislation is to provide a remedy 
for the malady, the legislative intention relates to the meaning . 
or exposition of the remedy as enacted. While dealing with 
the validity of a classification, the rational nexus of the 
differentia on which the classification is based has to exist 
with the purpose or object of the legislation, so determined. 
The question next is of the manner in which the purpose or 
object of the enactment has to be determined and the 
material which can be used for this exercise. For determining 
the purpose or object of the legislation, it is
permissible to 
look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when 
the law was passed 11nd which necessitated the passing of 
that law. For the limited purpose of appreciating the 
background and the antecedent factual matrix leading to 
the legislation, it is permissible to look into the Statement of 
Objects and Reasons of the Bill which actuated the step to 
provide a remedy for the then existing malady. In A. 
Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M'" Venkitachalam 
Potti [(1955) 2 SCR 1196 : AIR 1956 SC -246 : ( 1956) 29 
ITR 349], the Statement of Objects and Reasons was used 
for judging the reasonableness of a classification made in 
an enactment to see if it infringed or was contrary to the 
Constitution. In that decision for determining the question, 
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even affidavit on behalf of the State of"the circumstances 
which prevailed at the time when the law there under 
consideration had been passed and which necessitated the 
passing of that law" was relied on. It was reiterated in State 
of West Bengal v. Union of India [(1964) I SCR 371 : 
AIR 1963 SC 1241] that the Statement of Objects and 
Reasons accompanying a Bill, whc': introduced in 
Parliament, can be used for 'the limited purpose of 
understanding the background and the antecedent state of 
affairs leading up to the legislation'. Similarly, in Pannalal 
Binjraj v. Union of India [ 1957 SCR 233 : AIR 1957 SC 
397 : (1957) 31 ITR 565] a challenge to the validity of 
classification was repelled placing reliance on an affidavit 
filed on behalfofthe Central Board of Revenue disclosing 
the true object of enacting the impugned provision in the 
Income Tax Act." 
12. To similar effect, this Court held in Harbilas Rai Bansal v. 
State of Punjab, (1996) I SCC I, as follows: 
"The scope of Article 14 has been authoritatively laid down 
by this Comi in innumerable decisions including Budhan 
Chaudhry v. State of Bihar [(1955) 1 SCR 1045 : AIR 
1955 SC 191] , Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. 
Tendolkar [ 1959 SCR 2 79 : AIR 195 8 SC 53 8] , Western 
U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of 
U.P. [(1969) 
1 
SCC 
817] 
and Mohd. 
Hanif 
Quareshi v. State of Bihar [ 1959 SCR 629 : AIR 195 8 SC
731]. To be permissible under Article 14 of the Constitution 
a classification must satisfy two conditions. namely (i) that 
the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia 
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped 
together from others left out of the group and (ii) that 
differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought 
to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification 
may be founded on different basis, but what is necessary is 
that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification 
and the object of the Act under consideration. 
The statement of objects and reasons of the Act is as under: 
"Statement of Objects and Reasons of the East
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (Act 3 of 
1949).- Under Article 6 of the India (Provisional 
Constitution) Order, 194 7, any law made by the Governor 
of the Punjab by virtue of Section 93 cifthe Government of 
India Act, 1935, which was in force immediately before 
15-8-1947, is to remain in force for two years from the 
date on which the Proclamation ceased to have effect, viz., 
14-8-194 7. A Governor's Act will, therefore, cease to have 
effect on 14-8-1949. It is desired that the Punjab Urban 
Rent Restriction Act, 194 7 (Punjab Act No. VI of 194 7), 
being a Governor's Act, be re-enacted as a permanent 
measure, as the need for restricting the increase of rents of 
certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas 
and the protection of tenants.against mala fide attempts by 
their landlords to procure theif eviction would be there even 
after 14-8-1949. 
In order to achieve the above object, a new Act 
incorporating the provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent 
Restriction Act, 194 7 with necessary modification is being 
enacted." 
It is obvious from the objects and reasons quoted above 
that the primary purpose for legislating the Act was to protect 
the tenants against the ma la fide attempts by their landlords 
to procure their eviction. Bona fide requirement of a landlord 
was, therefore, provided in the Act- as originally enacted 
-
a ground to evict the tenant from
the premises whether 
residential or non-residential: 
The provisions of the Act, prior to the amendment, were 
uniformly applicable to the residential and non-residential 
buildings. The amendment, in the year 1956, created the 
impugned classification. The objects and reasons of the Act 
indicate that it was enacted with a view to restrict the 
increase of rents and to safeguard against the mala fide 
eviction of tenants. The Act, therefore, initially provided-
conforming to its objects and reasons -
bona fide 
requirement of the premises by the landlord, whether . 
residential or non-residential, as a ground of eviction of the 
tenant. The classification created by the amendment has 
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no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. 
To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the 
landlord would not cause any hardship to the tenant. 
Statutory protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such 
an extent that the landlord is precluded from evicting the 
tenant for the rest of his life even when he bona fide requires 
the premises for his personal use and occupation. It is not 
the tenants but the landlords who are suffering great 
hardships because of the amendment. A landlord may 
genuinely like to let out a shop till the time he bona fide 
needs the same. Visualise a case of a shopkeeper (owner) 
dying young. There may not be a member in the family to 
continue the business and the widow may not need the shop 
for quite some time. She may like to let out the shop till the 
time her children grow up and need the premises for their 
personal use. It would be wholly arbitrary- in a situation 
like this -
to deny her the right to evict the tenant. The 
amendment has created a situation where a tenant can 
continue in possession of a non-residential premises for life 
and even after the tenant's death his heirs may continue 
the tenancy. We have no doubt in our mind that the objects, 
reasons and the scheme of the Act could not have envisaged 
the type of situation created by the amendment which is 
patently harsh and grossly unjust for the landlord of a non-
residential
premises." [paras 8, 9 & 13) 
13. In accordance with the law laid down in these judgments it is 
important first to discern the object of the 2005 Act from the statement 
of objects and reasons:-
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS 
1. Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human rights issue 
and serious deterrent to development. The Vienna Accord 
of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for 
G 
Action ( 1995) have acknowledged this. The United Nations 
Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) in its General 
Recommendation No. XII (1989) has recommended that 
State parties should act to protect women against violence 
H 
of any kind especially that occurring within the family.
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
2. The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely prevalent 
but has remained largely invisible in the public domain. 
Presently, where a woman is subjected to cruelty by her 
husband or his relatives, it is an offence under section498A 
of the Indian Penal Code. The civil law does not however 
address this phenomenon in its entirety. 
3. It is. therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view 
the rights guaranteed under articles 14, 15 and 21 of the 
Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil law 
which is intended to protect the woman from being victims 
of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of 
domestic violence in the society. 
4. The Bill, inter alia, seeks to provide for the following:-
(i) It covers those women who are or have been in a 
relationship with the abuser where both parties have 
lived together in a shared household and are related by 
consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the 
nature of marriage or adoption. In addition, relationships 
with family members living together as a joint family 
are also included. Even those women who are sisters, 
widows, mothers, single women, or living with the abuser 
are entitled to legal protection under the proposed 
legislation. However, whereas the Bill enables the wife 
or the female living in a relationship in the nature of 
marriage to file a complaint under the proposed 
enactment against any
female relative of husband or 
the male partner, it does not enable any female relative 
of the husband or the male partner to file a complaint 
against the wife or the female partner. 
(ii) It defines the expression "domestic violence" to include 
actual abuse or threat or abuse that is physical, sexual, 
verbal, emotional or economic. Harassment by way of 
unlawful dowry demands to the woman or her relatives 
would also be covered under this definition. 
(iii) It provides for the rights of women to secure housing. 
It also provides household, whether or not she has any 
title or rights in such· home or household. This right is 
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secured by a residence order, which is passed by the 
Magistrate. 
iv) It empowers the Magistrate to pass protection orders in 
fa:vour of the aggrieved person to prevent the respondent 
from aiding or committing an act of domestic violence 
or any other specified act, entering a workplace or any 
other place frequented by the aggrieved person, 
attempting to communicate with her, isolating any assets 
used by both the parties and causing violence to the 
aggrieved person, her relatives or others who provide 
her assistance from the domestic violence. 
(v)It provides for appointment of Protection Officers and 
registration of non-governmental organizations as 
service providers for providing assistance to the 
aggrieved person with respect to her medical 
examination, obtaining legal aid, safe shelter, etc. 
5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. The notes 
on clauses explain the various provisions contained in the 
Bill." 
14. A cursory reading of the statement of objects and reasons 
makes it clear that the phenomenon of domestic violence against women 
is widely prevalent and needs redressal. Whereas criminal law does 
offer some redressal, civil law does not address this phenomenon in its 
entirety. The idea therefore is to provide various innovative remedies in 
favour of women who suffer from domestic violence, against the 
perpetrators of such violence. 
15. The preamble of the statute is again
significant. It states: 
Preamble 
"An Act to provide for more effective protection of the 
rights of women guaranteed under the constitution who are 
G 
victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family 
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." 
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16. What is of great significance is that the 2005 Act is to provide 
for effective protection of the rights of women who are victims of vi.olence 
of any kind occurring within the family. The preamble also makes it
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
533 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
clear that the reach of the Act is that violence, whether physical, sexual, 
A 
verbal, emotional or economic, arc all to be redressed by the statute. 
That the perpetrators and abettors of such violence can, in given situations, 
be women themselves, is obvious. With this object in mind, let us now 
examine the provisions of the statute itsel~. 
17. The relevant provisions of the statute are contained in the 
B 
following Sections: 
"2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise 
requires,-
( a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has 
been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and 
who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic 
violence by the respondent; 
(t) "domestic relationship" means a relationshrp between. 
two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived 
together in a shared household, when they are related by 
consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the 
nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living 
together as a joint family; 
(q) "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or 
has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved 
person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought 
any reliefunder this Act: 
Provided that an aggrieved' wife or female living in a 
relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a 
complaint against a relative of the husband or the male
partner. 
(s) "shared household" means a household where the 
person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic 
relationship either singly or along with the respondent and 
includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either 
jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned 
or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the 
aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly 
have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a 
household which may belong to the joint family of which 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016) 9 S.C.R. 
A 
the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the 
respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or 
interest in the shared household. 
3. Definition of domestic violence.-For the purposes 
of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of 
B 
the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case 
it-
( a) banns or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, 
limb or well being, whether mental or physical, of the 
aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing 
c 
physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse 
and economic abuse; or 
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved 
person with a view .to coerce her or any other person related 
to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other 
D 
property or valuable security; or 
( c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or 
any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause 
(a) or clause (b); or 
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or 
E 
mental, to the aggrieved person. Explanation 1.-For the 
purposes of this section,-
(i) "physical abuse" means any act or conduct which is of 
such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to 
life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of 
F 
the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal 
intimidation and criminal force; 
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(ii) "sexual abuse" includes any conduct of a sexual nature 
that abuses,
humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the 
dignity of woman; 
(iii) "verbal and emotional abuse" includes-
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or 
ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male 
child; and
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
535 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.r. NARIMAN, J.] 
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in 
A 
whom the aggrieved person is interested. 
(iv) "economic abuse" includes-
( a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources 
to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or 
custom whether payable under an order of a court or 
otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of 
necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities 
for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, 
property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved 
person, payment of rental related to the shared household 
and maintenance; 
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets 
whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, 
bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved 
person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the 
domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required 
by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or 
any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved 
person; and 
( c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources 
or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or 
enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access 
to the shared household. Explanation IL-for the purpose 
of determining whether any act, omission, commission or 
conduct of the respondent
constitutes "domestic violence" 
under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of 
the case shall be taken into consideration. 
I 7. Right to reside in a shared household.-
( I) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law 
for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic 
relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared 
household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial 
interest in the same. 
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded 
from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent 
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save in accordance with the procedure established by law. 
18. Protection orders.-The Magistrate may, after giving 
the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of 
being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic 
violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a 
B 
protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and 
prohibit the respondent from-
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( a) committing any act of domestic violence; 
'(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic 
violence; 
(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved 
person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or 
any other place frequented by the aggrieved person; 
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, 
with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written 
or electronic or telephonic contact; 
( e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank 
accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties,jointly 
by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by 
the respondent,, inc 1 ud ing her stridhan or any other property 
held either jointly by the parties or separately by them 
without the leave of the Magistrate; 
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or 
any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from 
domestic violence; 
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection 
order. 
19. Residence orders.-
( 1) While disposing of an
application under sub section (I) 
of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that 
domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order-
( a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any 
other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved 
person from the shared household, whether or not the
.. 
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
537 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared 
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household; 
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the 
shared household; 
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from 
B 
entering any portion of the shared household in which the 
......... 
aggrieved person resides; 
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing 
of the shared household or encumbering the same; 
( e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in 
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the shared household except with the leave of the 
Magistrate; or 
( t) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate 
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her 
in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the 
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circumstances so require: Provided that no order under 
clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a 
woman. 
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions 
or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably 
E 
necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the 
aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person. 
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to 
execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the 
commission of domestic violence. 
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(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be 
an order under Chapter Vlll of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be
dealt with 
accordingly. 
( 5) While passing an order under sub-section (I), sub- . 
G 
section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an 
order directing the officer-in-charge of the nearest police 
station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist 
her or the person making an application on her behalf in the 
implementation of the order. 
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(6) While making an order under sub-section (I), the 
Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations relating 
to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard 
to the financial needs and resources of the parties. 
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer-in-charge of the 
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police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been 
approached to assist in the implementation of the protection 
order. 
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to 
the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any 
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other property or valuable security to which she is entitled 
to. 
20. Monetary reliefs.-
( I) While disposing ofan application under sub-section (I) 
of section 12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to 
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pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and 
losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of 
the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence 
and such relief may include but is not limited to-
E 
(a) the loss of earnings; 
(b) the medical expenses; 
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or 
removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved 
person; and 
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(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as 
her children, if any, including an order under or in addition 
to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of I 974) or any other law 
for the time being in force. 
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(2) The
monetary relief granted under this section shall be 
adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the 
standard of living to which the aggrieved person is 
accustomed. 
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an 
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HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
539 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.) 
appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of 
A 
maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case 
may require. 
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for 
monetary relief made under sub-section (I) to the pa11ies 
to the application and to the in-charge of the police station 
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within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent 
resides. 
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to 
the aggrieved person within the period specified in the order 
under sub section (I). 
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(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make 
payment in terms of the order under sub section (I), the 
Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the 
respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to 
,deposit with the com1 a portion of the wages or salaries or 
D 
debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which 
amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable 
by the respondent. 
26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.-
I. Any reliefavailable under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 
E 
may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil 
court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved 
person and the respondent whether such proceeding was 
initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. 
2. Any relief referred to in sub section (I) may be sought 
F 
for in addition to and
along with any other relief that the 
aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding 
before a civil or criminal court. 
3. In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved 
person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under 
G 
th is Act, she shall be bound to infonn the Magistrate of the 
grant of such relief. 
3 l. Penalty for breach of protection order by 
respondent.-
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(I) A breach of protection order, or of an interim protection 
order, by the respondent shall be an offence under this Act 
and shall be punishable with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to one year, or 
with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or 
with both. 
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(2) The offence under sub-section (I) shall as far as 
practicable be tried by the Magistrate who had passed the 
order, the breach of which has been alleged to have been 
caused by the accused. 
(3) While framing charges under sub-section (!), the 
Magistrates may also frame charges under section 498A 
of the Indian Penal Code ( 45 of 1860) or any other provision 
of that Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 
1961 ), as the case may be, if the facts disclose the 
commission of an offence under those provisions." 
18. It will be noticed that the definition of"domestic relationship" 
contained in Section 2(t) is a very wide one. It is a relationship between 
persons who live or have lived together in a shared household and are 
related in any one of four ways - blood, marriage or a relationship in the 
nature of marriage, adoption, or family members of a joint family. A 
reading of these definitions makes it clear that domestic relationships 
involve persons belonging to both sexes and includes persons related by 
blood or marriage. This necessarily brings within such domestic 
relationships male
as well as female in-laws, quite apart from male and 
female members of a family related by blood. Equally, a shared household 
includes a household which belongs to a joint family of which the 
respondent is a member. As has been rightly pointed out by Ms. Arora, 
even before the 2005 Act was brought into force on 26. l 0.2006, the 
Hindu Succession Act,1956 was amended, by which Section 6 was 
amended, with effect from 9 .9 .2005, to make females coparceners of a 
joint Hindu family and so have a right by birth in the property of such 
joint family. This being the case, when a member ofajoint Hindu family 
will now include a female coparcener as well, the restricted definition 
contained in Section 2( q) has necessarily to be given a relook, given that 
the definition of 'shared household' in Section 2(s) of the Act would 
include a household which may belong to a joint family of which the 
respondent is a member. The aggrieved person can therefore make,
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
after 2006, her sister, for example, a respondent, if the Hindu Succession 
Act amendment is to be looked at. But such is not the case under 
Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, as the main parrofSection 2(q) continues 
to read "adult male person", while Section 2(s) would include such female 
coparcener as a respondent, being a member of a joint family. This is 
one glaring anomaly which we have to address in the course of our 
judgment. 
19. When Section 3 of the Act defines domestic violence, it is 
clear that such violence is gender neutral. lt is also clear that physical 
abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse and economic abuse can all be by 
women against other women. Even sexual abuse may, in a given fact 
/ circumstance, be by one woman on another. Section 3, therefore, in 
tune with the general object of the Act, seeks to outlaw domestic violence 
of any kind agai.@.t a woman, and is gender neutral. When one goes to 
the remedies that the Act provides, things become even clearer. Section 
17(2) makes it clear that the aggrieved person cannot be evicted or 
excluded from a shared household or any part of it by the "respondent" 
save in accordance with the procedure established by law. If 
"respondent" is to be read as only an adult male person, it is clear that 
women who evict or exclude the aggrieved person are not within its 
coverage, and if that is so, the object of the Act can very
easily be 
defeated by an adult male person not standing in the forefront, but putting 
forward female persons who can therefore evict or exclude the aggrieved 
person from the shared household. This again is an important indicator 
that the object of the Act will not be sub-served by reading "adult male 
person" as "respondent". 
20. This becomes even clearer from certain other provisions of 
the Act. Under Section l S(b), for example, when a protection order is 
given to the aggrieved person, the "respondent" is prohibited from aiding 
or abetting the commission of acts of domestic violence. This again 
would not take within its ken females who may be aiding or abetting the 
commission of domestic violence, such as daughters-in-law and sisters-
in-law, and would again stultify the reach of such protection orders. 
21. When we come to Section 19 and residence orders that can 
be passed by the Magistrate, Section 19(1)(c) makes it clear that the 
Magistrate may pass a residence order, on being satisfied that domestic 
violence has taken place, and may restrain the respondent or any of his 
relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the 
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aggrieved person resides. This again is a pointer to the fact that a 
residence order will be toothless unless the relatives, which include female 
relatives of the respondent, are also bound by it. And we have seen 
from the definition of"respondent" that this can only be the case when 
a wife or a common law wife is an aggrieved person, and not if any 
other woman belonging to a family is an aggrieved person. Therefore, in 
the case of a wife or a common law wife complaining of domestic violence, 
the husband's relatives including mother-in-law and sister-in-law can be 
arrayed as respondents and effective orders passed against them. But 
in the case of a mother-in-law or sister-in-law who is an aggrieved person, 
the respondent can only be an "adult male person" and since his relatives 
are not within the main part of the definition of respondent in Section 
2( q), residence orders passed by the Magistrate under Section 19( I)( c) 
against female relatives of such person would be unenforceable as they 
cannot be made parties to petitions under the Act. 
22. When we come to Section 20, it is clear that a Magistrate 
may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to the aggrieved person, 
of various kinds, mentioned in the Section. If the respondent is only to 
be an "adult male person", and the money payable has to be as a result 
of domestic violence, compensation due from a daughter-in-law to a 
mother-in-law for
domestic violence inflicted would not be available, 
whereas in a converse case, the daughter-in-law, being a wife, would be 
E 
covered by the proviso to Section 2( q) and would consequently be entitled 
to monetary relief against her husband and his female relatives, which 
includes the mother-in-law. 
F 
. . 
23. When we come to Section 26 of the Act, the sweep of the Act 
is such that all the innovative reliefs available under Sections 18 to 22 
may also be sought in any legal proceeding before a civil court, family 
court or criminal court affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent. 
The proceeding in the civil court, family court or criminal court may well 
include female members of a family, and reliefs sought in those legal 
proceedings would not be restricted by the definition of"respondent" in 
G 
the 2005 Act. Thus, an invidious discrimination will result, depending 
upon whether the aggrieved person chooses to institute proceedings under 
the 2005Act or chooses to add to the reliefs available in either a pending 
proceeding or a later proceeding in a civil court, family court or criminal 
court. It is clear that there is no intelligible differentia between a 
proceeding initiated under the 2005 Act and proceeding initiated in other 
H
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
fora under other Acts, in which the self-same .reliefs grantable under 
this Act, which are restricted to an adult male person, are grantable by 
the other fora also against female members of a family.· This anomaly 
again makes it clear that the definition of"respondent" in Section 2(q) is 
not based on any intelligible differentia having any rational relation to the 
object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act. The restriction of such 
person to being an adult male alone is obviously not a differentia which 
would be in sync with the object sought to be achieved under the 2005 ' 
Act, but wou Id i1.1 fact be contrary to it. 
24. Also, the expression "adult" would have the same effect of 
stultifying orders that can be passed under the aforesaid sections. It is 
not difficult to conceive of a non-adult 16 or 17 year old member of a 
household who can aid or abet the commission of acts of domestic 
violence, or who can evict or help in evicting or excluding from a shared 
household an aggrieyed person. Also, a residence order which may be 
passed under Section 19(1 )( c) can get stultified if a 16 or 17 year old 
relative enters the portion of the shared household in which the 
aggrieved person resides after a restraint order is passed against 
the respondent and any ofhis adult relatives. Examples can be multiplied, 
all of which would only lead to the conclusion that even the expression
"adult" in the main part is Section 2( q) is restrictive of the object sought 
to be achieved by the kinds of orders that can be passed under the Act 
and must also be, therefore, struck down, as this word contains the same 
discriminatory vice that is found with its companion expression "male". 
25. Shri Raval has cited a couple of judgments dealing with the 
provisions of the 2005 Act. For the sake of completeness, we may refer 
to two of them. 
26. In Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao 
Wankhade, (2011) 3 SCC 650, this Court, in a petition by a married 
woman against her husband and his relatives, construed the proviso to 
Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act. This Court held: 
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"No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression 
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"relative", nor has the said expression been specifically 
defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it 
specific to males only. In such circumstances, it is clear 
that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives 
of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint 
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that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic 
Violence Act, 2005." [Para 16] 
27. In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, the 
appellant entered into a live-in relationship with the respondent knowing 
that he was a married person. A question arose before this Court as to 
whether the appellant could be said to be in a relationship in the nature 
of marriage. Negativing this contention, this Court held: 
"The appellant, admittedly, entered into a live-in relationship 
with the respondent knowing that he was a married person, 
with wife and two children, hence, the generic proposition 
laid down by the Privy Council in Andrahennedige 
Dinohamy v. 
Wijetunge 
Liyanapatabendige 
Balahamy [(1928) 27 LW 678: AIR 1927 PC 185], that 
where a man and a woman are proved to have lived 
together as husband and wife, the law presumes that they 
are living together in consequence of a valid marriage will 
not apply and, hence, the relationship between the appellant 
and the respondent was not a relationship in the nature of a 
marriage, and the status of the appellant was that of a 
concubine. A concubine cannot maintain a relationship in 
the nature of marriage because such a relationship will not 
have exclusivity and will not be monogamous in character. 
Reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court 
in Badri Prasadv. Director of Consolidation [( 1978) 3 
SCC 527] and Tulsa v.
Durghatiya [(2008) 4 SCC ~20] . 
We may note that, in the instant case, there is no 
necessity to rebut the presumption, since the appellant was 
aware that the respondent was a married person even before 
the commencement of their relationship, hence the status 
of the appellant is that of a concubine or a mistress, who 
cannot enter into relationship in the nature of a marriage. 
The long-standing relationship as a concubine, though not a 
relationship in the nature of a marriage, of course, may at 
times, deserves protection because that woman might not 
be financially independent, but we are afraid that the DV 
Act does not take care of such relationships which may 
perhaps call for an amendment of the definition of Section 
2(1) of the DV Act, which is restrictive and exhaustive.
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
Parliament has to ponder over these issues, bring inproper 
legislation or make a proper amendment of the Act, so that 
women and the children, born out of such kinds of 
relationships be protected, though those types ofrelationship 
might not be a relationship in the nature of a marriage." 
[Paras 57, 59 & 64] 
28. It may be noted that in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse 
& Anr., (2014) 1 SCC 188, this Court held that the expression "wife" in 
Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, includes a woman who 
had been duped into marrying a man who was already married. In so 
holding, this Court held: 
"Thus, while interpreting 'a statute the court may not only 
take into consideratio.n the purpose for which the statute 
was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It 
is this mischief rule, first propounded in Heydon 
case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637] which became the 
historical source of purposive interpretation. The court 
would also invoke the legal maxim construction of ut res 
magis valeat quam pereatin such cases i.e. where 
alternative constructions are possible the court must give 
effect to that which 'Ym be responsible for the smooth 
working of the system for which the statute has been 
enacted rather than one which will put a road block in its 
way. If the choice is between two interpretations, the 
narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest puri}ose 
of
the legislation should be avoided. We should avoid a 
construction which would reduce the legislation to futility 
and should accept the bolder construction based on the view 
that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of 
bringing about an effective result. If this interpretation is 
not accepted, it would amount to giving a premium to the 
husband for defrauding the wife. Therefore, at least for the 
purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C, 
such a woman is to be treated as the legally wedded 
wife;"[Para 20] 
29. We will now deal with some of the cases cited before us by 
both the learned senior advocates on Article 14, reading down, and the 
severability principle in constitutional law. 
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30. Article 14 is in two parts. The expression "equality before 
law" is borrowed from the Irish Constitution, which in turn is borrowed 
from English law, and has been described in State ofU.P. v. Deoman 
Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14, as the negative aspect of equality. The 
"equal protection of the laws" in Article 14 has been borrowed from the 
141h Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and has been described in the 
same judgment as the positive aspect of equality namely the protection 
of equal laws. Subba Rao, J. stated: 
"This subject has been so frequently and recently before 
this court as not to require an extensive consideration. The 
doctrine of equality may be briefly stated as follows: All 
persons are equal before the law is fundamental of every 
civilised constitution. Equality before law is a negative 
concept; equal protection of laws is a positive one. The 
former declares that every one is equal before law, that no 
one can claim special privileges and that all classes are 
equally subjected to the ordinary law of the land; the latter 
postulates an equal protection ofall alike in the same situation 
and under like circumstances. No discrimination can be 
made either in the privileges conferred or in the liabilities 
imposed. But these propositions conceived in the interests 
of the public, iflogically stretched too far, may not achieve 
the high purpose behind them. In a society of
unequal basic 
structure, it is well nigh impossible to make laws suitable in 
their application to all the persons alike. So, a reasonable 
classification is not only pennitted but is necessary if society 
should progress. But such a classification cannot be 
arbitrary but must be based upon differences pertinent to 
the subject in respect of and the purpose for which it is 
made." [at page 34] 
31. In Lachhman Dass v. State of Pun.jab, (1963) 2 SCR 353, 
Subba Rao, J. warned that over emphasis on the doctrine of classification 
or an anxious and sustained attempt to discover some basis for 
classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive Article 14 of its 
glorious content. That process would inevitably end in substituting the 
doctrine of classification for the doctrine of equality. This admonition 
seems to have come true in the present case, as the classification of 
i'adult male person" clearly subverts the doctrine of equality, by restricting
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
the reach of a social beneficial statute meant to protect women against 
all forms of domestic violence. 
32. We have also been referred to D.S. Nakara v. Union of 
India, (1983) I SCC 305. This judgment concerned itself with pension 
payable to Government servants. An office Memorandum of the 
Government of India dated 25.5.1979 restricted such pension payable 
only to persons who had retired prior to a specific date. In holding the 
date discriminatory and arbitrary and striking it down, this Court went 
into the doctrine of classification, and cited from Re: Special Courts 
Bill, ( 1979) 2 SCR476 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union ~flndia, (1978) 
2 SCR 621, and went on to hold that the burden to affirmatively satisfy 
the court that the twin tests of intelligible differentia having a rational 
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act would lie on the 
State, once it has been established that a particular piece of legislation is 
on its face unequal. The Court further went on to hold that the petitioners 
challenged only that part of the scheme by which benefits were admissible 
to those who retired from service after a certain date. The challenge, it 
was made clear by the Court, was not to the validity of the Scheme, 
which was wholly acceptable to the petitioners, but only to that part of it 
which restricted the number of persons from availing of its benefit. The 
Court went on
to hold: 
"If it appears to be undisputable, as it does to us that the 
pensioners for the purpose of pension benefits form a class, 
would its upward revision permit a homogeneous class to 
be divided by arbitrarily fixing an eligibility criteria unrelated 
to purpose of revision, and would such classification be 
founded on some rational principle? The classification has 
to be based, as is well settled, on some· rational principle 
and the rational principle must have nexus to the objects 
sought to be achieved. We have set out the objects 
underlying the payment of pension. If the State considered 
it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme, we find no 
rational principle behind it for granting these benefits only 
to those who retired subsequent to that date simultaneously 
denying the same to those who retired prior to that date. If 
the liberalisation was considered necessary for augmenting 
social security in old age to government servants then those 
who, retired earlier cannot be worst off than those who 
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retire later. Therefore, this division which classified 
pensioners into two classes is not based on any rational 
principle and ifthe rational principle is the one of dividing 
pensioners with a view to giving something more to persons 
otherwise equally placed, it would be discriminatory. To 
illustrate, take two persons, one retired just a day prior and 
another a day just succeeding the .specified date. Both were 
in the same pay bracket, the average emolument was the 
same and both had put in equal number of years of service. 
How does a fortuitous circumstance of retiring a day earlier 
or a day later will permit totally unequal treatment in the 
matter of pension? One retiring a day earlier will have to 
be subject to ceiling of Rs 8100 p.a. and average emolument 
to be worked out on 36 months' salary while the other will 
have a ceiling of Rs 12,000 p.a. and average emolument 
will be computed on the basis of last lO months' average. 
The artificial division stares into face and is unrelated to 
any principle and whatever principle, if there be any, has 
absolutely no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by 
liberalising the pension scheme. In fact this arbitrary division 
has not only no nexus to the liberalised pension scheme but 
it is counter-productive and runs counter to the whole.gamut 
of pension scheme. The equal treatment guaranteed in 
Article 14 is wholly violated inasmuch as the pension
rules 
being statutory in character, since the specified date, the 
rules accord differential and discriminatory treatment to 
equals in the matter of commutation of pension. A 48 hours' 
difference in matter of retirement would have a traumatic 
effect. Division is thus both arbitrary and unprincipled. 
Therefore, the classification does not stand the test of Article 
14." [para 42] 
33. We were also referred to Rattan Arya and others v. State 
ofTamil Nadu and another, (1986) 3 SCC 385, and in particular, to the 
G 
passage reading thus:-
"We may now turn to S.30(ii) which reads as follows: 
"Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to any residential 
building or part thereof occupied by anyone tenant ifthe 
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HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
exceeds four hundred rupees." 
By one stroke, this provision denies the benefits conferred 
by the Act generally on all tenants to tenants ofresidential 
buildings fetching a rent in excess of four hundred rupees. 
As a result of this provision, while the tenant of a non-
residential building is protected, whether the rent is Rs. 50, 
Rs. 500 or Rs. 5000 per month, a tenant of a residential 
building is protected ifthe rent is Rs. 50, but not ifit is Rs. 
500 or Rs. 5000 per month. Does it mean that the tenant of 
a residential building paying a rent of Rs. 500 is better able 
to protect himself than the tenant ofa non-residential building 
paying a rent of Rs. 5000 per month? Does it mean that the 
tenant ofa residential building who pays a rent of Rs. 500 · 
per month is not in need of any statutory protection? Is 
there any basis for the distinction between the tenant of a 
residential building and the tenant of a non-residential building 
and that based on the rent paid by the respective tenants? 
Is there any justification at all for picking out the class of 
tenants ofresidential buildings paying a rent of more than 
four hundred rupees per month to deny them the !rights 
conferred generally on all tenants of buildings residential or 
non-residential by the Act? Neither from the Preamble of 
the Act nor from the provisions of the Act has it been possible 
for us even to discern any
basis for the classification made 
by S.30(ii) of the Act."(Para 3) 
34. In Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682, a 
Constitution Bench of this Court struck down Section 6A of the Delhi 
Police Special Establishment Act on tqe ground that it made an invidious 
distinction between employees of the Central Government of the level 
of Joint Secretary and above as against other Government servants. 
This Court, after discussing various judgments dealing with the principle 
of discrimination (when a classification does not disclose an intelligible 
. differentia in relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act) 
from para 38 onwards, ultimately held that the aforesaid classification 
defeats the purpose of finding prima facie truth in the allegations of graft 
and corruption against public servants generally, which is the object for 
which the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was enacted. In paras 59 
and 60 this Court held as follows: 
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"It seems to us that classification which is made in Section 
6-A on the basis of status in government service is not 
permissible under Article 14 as it defeats the purpose of 
finding prima facie truth into the allegations of graft, which 
amount to an offence under the PC Act, 1988. Can there 
B 
be sound differentiation between corrupt public servants 
based on their status? Surely not, because irrespective of 
their status or position, corrupt public servants are corrupters 
of public power. The corrupt public servants, whether high 
or low, are birds of the same feather and must be confronted 
with the process ofinvestigation and inquiry equally. Based 
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on the position or status in service, no distinction can be 
made between public servants against whom there are 
allegations amounting to an offence under the PC Act, 1988. 
Corruption is an enemy of the nation and tracking down 
corrupt public servants and punishing such persons is a 
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necessary mandate of the PC Act, 1988. It is difficult to 
justify the classification which has been made in Section 6-
A because the goal of law in the PC Act, 1988 is to meet 
corruption cases with a very strong hand and all public 
servants are warned through such a legislative measure 
E 
that corrupt public servants have to face very serious 
consequences. In the words of Mathew, J. in Shri Ambica 
Mills Ltd. [State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., 
(1974) 4 sec 656 :
I 974 sec (L&S) 381 : (1974) 3 scR 
760) : (SCC p. 675, paras 53-54) 
F 
"53. The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the 
protection of equal laws. But laws may classify .... 
54. A reasonable classification is one which includes all 
. who are similarly situated and none who are not." 
Mathew, J., while explaining the meaning of the words, 
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"similarly situated" stated that we must look beyond the 
classification to the purpose of the law. The purpose of a 
law may be either the elimination of a public mischief or 
the achievement of some positive public good. The 
classification made in Section 6-A neither eliminates public 
mischief nor achieves some positive public good. On the 
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HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
other hand, it advances public mischief and protects the 
crimedoer. The provision thwarts an independent, 
unhampered, unbiased, efficient and fearless inquiry/ 
investigation to track down the corrupt public servants." 
[paras 59 and 601 . 
35. In a recent judgment, reported as Union of India v. N.S. 
Ratnam, (2015) 10 SCC 681, this Court while dealing with an exemption 
notification under the Central Excise Act stated the law thus:-
"We are conscious of the principle that the difference which 
will warrant a reasonable classification need not be great. 
However, it has to be shown that the difference is reaJ and 
substantial and there must be some just and reasonable 
relation to the object of legislation or notification. 
Classification having regard to microscopic differences is 
not good. To borrow the phrase from the judgment in Roop 
Chand Adlakha v. DDA [ 1989 Supp (I) SCC 116 : · 1989 
SCC (L&S) 235 : (1989) 9 ATC 639] : "To overdo 
classification is to undo equality." [para 18] 
36. A conspectus of these judgm~ents also leads to the result that 
the microscopic difference between male and female, adult and non 
adult, regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 
Act, is neither real or substantial nor does it have any rational relation to 
the object of the legislation. In fact, as per the principle settled in the 
Subramanian Swamy judgment, the words "adult
male person" are 
contrary to the object of affording protection to women who have suffered 
from domestic violence "of any kind". We, therefore, strike down the 
words "adult male" before the word "person" in Section 2(q), as these 
words discriminate between persons similarly situate, and far from being 
in tune with, are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 
Act. 
Having struck down these two words from the definition of 
"respondent" in Section 2( q), the next question that arises is whether the 
rest of the Act can be implemented without the aforesaid two words. 
This brings us to the doctrine of severability- a doctrine well-known in 
constitutional law and propounded for the first time in the celebrated 
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union oflndia, 1957 SCR 930. This 
judgment has been applied in many cases. It is not necessary to refer to 
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the plethora of case law on the application of this judgment, except to 
refer to one or two judgments directly on point. 
37. An early application of the aforesaid principle is contained in 
Corporation of Calcutta v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd., [ 1964] 5 
S.C.R. 25, in which a portion ofSection437(iXb) oftheCalcutta Municipal 
B 
Act, 1951 was struck down as being a procedural provision which was 
an unreasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the 
Constitution. Chamarbaugwalla's case was applied, and it was 
ultimately held that only the portion in parenthesis could be struck down 
with the rest of the Act continuing to apply. 
c 
38. Similarly, in Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., (1984) 
I SCC 222, Section 32(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent 
& Eviction) Control Act, 1960 which exempted all buildings constructed 
on and after 26.8.1957, was struck down as being violative of Article 14 
of the Constitution. This judgment, after applying Chamarbaugwalla 's 
case in para 27, and D.S. Nakara's case in para 28, stated the law 
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thus:-
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"On a careful consideration of the above question in the 
light of the above principles we are of the view that the 
striking down of clause (b) of Section 32 of the Act does 
not in any way affect the rest of the provisions of the Act. 
The said clause is not so inextricably bound up with the rest 
of the Act as to make the rest of the Act
unworkable after 
the said clause is struck down. We are also of the view that 
the Legislature would have still enacted the Act in the place 
of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 
and the Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Act, 
1954 which were in force in the two areas comprised in the 
State of Andhra Pradesh and it could not have been its 
intention to deny the beneficial effect of those laws to the 
people residing inAndhra Pradesh on its formation. After 
the Second World War owing to acute shortage of urban 
housing accommodation, rent control laws which were 
brought into force in different parts of India as pieces of 
temporary legislation gradually became almost pennanent 
statutes. Having regard to the history of the legislation under 
review, we are of the view that the Act has to be sustained
HTRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
even after striking down clause (b) of Section 32 of the 
Act. The effect of striking down the impugned provision 
would be that all buildings exceptthose falling under clause 
(a) of Section 32 or exempted under Section 26 of the Act 
in the areas where the Act is in force will be governed by 
the Act irrespective of the date of their construction." [para 
29] 
39. In Satyawati Sharma v. Union oflndia, (2008) 5 SCC 287, 
Section 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was struck down in part, 
inasmuch as it made an invidious distinction between bonafide 
requirement of two kinds of landlords, the said ground being available 
for residential premises only and not non residential premises. An 
argument was made that ifthe Section was struck down only in part, 
nothing more would survive thereafter. This was negatived by this Court 
in the following words: 
"In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 
14(1)(e)oftheI958Act is violative of the doctrine of equality 
embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution oflndia insofar 
as it discriminates between the premises let for residential 
and non-residential purposes when the same are required 
bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for 
any member of his family dependent on him and restricts 
the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the 
premises let for residential purposes only. 
However, the aforesaid
declaration should not be 
misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1 )( e) of 
the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the 
parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14( 1 )( e) 
is unconstitutional in its entirety and we feel that ends of 
justice will be met by striking down the discriminatory 
portion of Section 14(1 )( e) so that the remaini11g part thereof 
may read as under: 
"14. (I )(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are 
required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a 
residence for himself or for any member of his family 
dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any 
person for whose benefit the premises are held and that 
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A 
the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable 
accommodation; 
B 
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E 
***" 
While adopting this course, we have kept in view well-
recognised rule that ifthe offending portion ofa statute can 
be severed without doing violence to the remaining part 
thereof, then such a course is permissible-R.M.D. 
Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India [AIR 1957 SC 628] 
and Lt. Col. Sawai Bhawani Singh v. State of 
Rajasthan[(l996) 3 SCC 105] . 
As a sequel to the above, the Explanation appearing below 
Section l 4(l)(e) of the 1958-Act will have to be treated as 
redundant." [paras 41 - 43] 
40. An application of the aforesaid severability principle would 
make it clear that having struck down the expression "adult male" in 
Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, the rest of the Section is left intact and can 
be enforced to achieve the object of the legislation without the offending 
words. Under Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, while defining 'respondent', 
a proviso is provided only to carve out an exception to a situation of 
"respondent" not being an adult male. Once we strike down 'adult 
male', the proviso has no independent existence, having been rendered 
otiose. 
41. Interestingly the Protection from Domestic Violence Bill, 2002 
was first introduced in the Lok Sabha in 2002. This Bill contained the 
definition of"aggrieved person", "relative", and "respondent" as follows: 
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"2. Definitions. 
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In this Act, unless the
context otherwise requires,-
a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is or has 
been a relative of the respondent and who alleges to have 
been subjected to acts of domestic violence by the 
respondent;" 
xxxx 
i) "relative" includes any person related by blood, marriage 
or adoption and living with the respondent;
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.) 
j) "respondent' means any person who is or has been a 
relative of the aggrieved person and against whom the 
aggrieved person has sought monetary relief or has made 
an application for protection order to the Magistrate or to 
the Protection Officer, as the case may be; and" 
42. We were given to understand that the aforesaid Bill lapsed, 
after which the present Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 
22.8.2005, and was then passed by both Houses. It is interesting to note 
that the earlier 2002 Bill defined "respondent" as meaning "any person 
who is ..... " without the addition of the words "adult male'', being in 
consonance with the object sought to be achieved by the Bill, which was 
pari materia with the object sought to be achieved by the present Act. 
We also find that, in another Act which seeks to protect women in_ another 
sphere, namely, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace 
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal)Act, 2013, "respondent" is defined 
in Section 2(m) thereofas meaning a person against whom the aggrieved 
woman has made a complaint under Section 9. Here again it will be 
noticed that the prefix "adult male" is conspicuous by its absence. The 
2002 Bill and the 2013 Act are in tune with the object sought to be 
achieved by statutes which are meant to protect women in various spheres 
oflife. We have adverted to the aforesaid legislation only to show that
Parliament itself has thought it reasonable to widen the scope of the 
expression "respondent" in the Act of2013 so as to be in tune with the 
object sought to be achieved by such legislations. 
43. Having struck down a portion of Section 2( q) on the ground 
that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, we do not 
think it is necessary to go into the case law cited by both sides on literal 
versus purposive construction, construction of penal statutes, and the 
correct construction of a proviso to a Section. None of this becomes 
necessary in view of our finding above. 
44. However, it still remains to deal with the impugned judgment. 
We have set out the manner in which the impugned judgment has 
purported to read down Section 2( q) of the impugned Act. The doctrine 
of reading down in constitutional adjudication is well settled and has 
been reiterated from time to time in several judgments, the.most recent 
of which is contained in Cellular Operators Association of India v. 
TRAI, (2016) 7 SCC 703. Dealing with the doctrine of reading down, 
this Court held:-
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"But it was said that the aforesaid Regulation should be 
read down to mean that it would apply only when the fault 
is that of the service provider. We are afraid that such a 
course is not open to us in law, for it is well settled that the 
doctrine of reading down would apply only when general 
words used in a statute or regulation can be confined in a 
particular manner so as not to infringe a constitutional right. 
This was best exemplified in one of the earliest judgments 
dealing with the doctrine of reading down, namely, the 
judgment of the Federal Court in Hindu Womens Rights 
to Property Act, 1937, In re [Hindu Womens Rights to 
Property Act, 1937, In re, 1941 SCC OnLine FC 3: AIR 
1941 FC 72] . In that judgment, the word "property" in 
Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 
was read down so as not to include agricultural land, which 
would be outside the Central Legislature's powers under 
the Government oflndiaAct, 1935. This is done because it 
is prbumed that the legislature did not intend to transgress 
constitutional limitations. While so reading down the word 
"property", the Federal Court held: (SCC OnLine FC) 
" ... If the restriction of the general words to purposes within 
the power of the legislature would be to leave an Act with 
nothing or next to nothing in it, or an Act different in kind, 
and not merely in degree, from an Act in which the general 
words were given
the wider meaning, then it is plain that 
· the Act as a whole must be held invalid, because· in such 
circumstances it is impossible to assert with any confidence 
that the legislature intended the general words which it has 
used to.be construed only in the narrower sense: Owners 
of SS Kalibia v.Wilson [Ow1iers of SS Kalibia v. Wilson, 
(1910) 11 CLR 689 (Aust)] , Vacuum Oil Co. Pty. 
Ltd. v. Queensland [Vacuum 
Oil 
Co. 
Pty. 
Ltd. v. Queensland, (1934) 51 CLR 677 (Aust)] 
, R. v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration, exp Whybrow & Co. IR. v. Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, ex p Whybrow 
& Co., (1910) 11 CLR 1 (Aust)] and British Imperial Oil 
Co. Ltd. v.Federal Commr. of Taxation [British Imperial
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] 
Oil Co. Ltd. v. Federal Commr. of Taxation, (1925) 35 
CLR 422 (Aust)] ." 
(emphasis supplied) 
This judgment was followed by a Constitution Bench of 
this Court in DTC v.Mazdoor Congress [DTC v. Mazdoor 
Congress, 1991 Supp (I) SCC 600: 1991 SCC (L&S) 1213] 
. In that case, a question arose as to whether a particular 
regulation which conferred power on an authority to 
terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed 
employee by issuing a notice terminating his services, or by 
making payment in lieu of such notice without assigning 
any reasons and without any opportunity of hearing to the 
employee, could be said to be violative of the appellants' 
fundamental rights. Four of the learned Judges who heard 
the case, the Chief Justice alone dissenting on this aspect, 
decided that the regulation cannot be read down, and must, 
therefore, be held to be unconstitutional. In the lead judgment 
on this aspect by Sawant, J., this Court stated: (SCC pp. 
728-29, para 255) 
"255. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or 
ofrecasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. 
It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being 
struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an 
extension of the principle that when two interpretations are 
possible--one rendering it constitutional and the other 
making it unconstitutional, the former should ~e
preferred. 
The unconstitutionality may spring from either the 
incompeten~e of the legislature to enact the statute or from 
its violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. 
The second situation which summons its aid is where the 
·provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is 
possible to gather the intention of the legislature from the 
object of the statute, the context in which the provision 
occurs and the purpose for which it is made. However, 
when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous 
language and its intention is clear, it is not permissible 
either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in 
accord with good reason and conscience. In such 
circumstances, it is not possible for the court to remake the 
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statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the 
legislature if it so desires, to amend it. What is further, if the 
remaking of the statute by the courts is to lead to its distortion 
that course is to be scrupulously avoided. One of the 
situations further where the d6Ctrine can never be called 
into play is where the statute requires extensive additions 
and deletions. Not only it is no part of the court's duty to 
undertake such exercise, but it is beyond its jurisdiction to 
do so. (emphasis supplied)" [paras 50 and 51] 
45. We may add that apart from not being able to mend or bend a 
provision, this Court has earlier held that"reading up" a statutory provision 
is equally not permissible. In B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N., (2001) 7 
SCC 231, this Court held: 
"Section 8(4) opens with the words "notwithstanding 
anything in sub-section (I), sub-section (2) or sub-section 
(3)", and it applies only to sitting members of Legislatures. 
There is no challenge to it on the basis that it violates Article 
14. If there were, it might be tenable to contend that 
legislators stand in a class apart from non-legislators, but 
we need to express no final opinion. In any case, ifit were 
found to be violative of Article 14, it would be struck down 
in its entirety. There would be, and is no question of so 
reading it that its provisions apply to all, legislators and non-
legislators, and that, therefore, in
all cases the di,squalification 
must await affirmation of the conviction and sentence by a 
final court. That would be "reading up" the provision, not 
"reading down", and that is not known to the law." [para 
39] 
46. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the Bombay 
High Court and declare that the words "adult male" in Section 2( q) of 
the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these words do not square with 
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the proviso to 
G 
Section 2(q), being rendered otiose, also stands deleted. We may only 
add that the impugned judgment has ultimately held, in paragraph 27, 
that the two complaints of 2010, in which the three female respondents 
were discharged finally, were purported to be revived, despite there being 
no prayer in Writ Petition No.300/2013 for the same. When this was 
H 
pointed out, Ms. Meenakshi Arora very fairly stated that she would not

HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HARSORA AND ORS. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.) 
be pursuing those complaints, and would be content to have a declaration 
from this Court as to the constitutional validity of Section 2( q) of the 
2005 Act. We, therefore, record the statement of the learned counsel, in 
which case it becomes clear that nothing survives in the aforesaid 
complaints of October, 20 I 0. With this additional observation, this appeal 
stands disposed of. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal disposed of. 
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