THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA, UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND REGULATION) ACT, 1976 AND ANR. versus DAVID MANTOSH & ORS.
[2019] 4 S.C.R. 331, Supreme Court of India, 2019
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
331
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA, UNDER THE
LAND (CEILING AND REGULATION) ACT, 1976 AND ANR.
v.
DAVID MANTOSH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 10629-10631 of  2014 etc.)
FEBRUARY 26, 2019
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976:
ss. 12(4), 13, 30, 33(1), 33(3), 33(4) and 40 – Land in question
subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act – Thereafter allotted
to respondent-hospital on a long term lease of 30 years – The
Notification issued u/s. 10(3) of the Act was challenged by
respondent No. 1 – The notification was upheld by High Court and
Supreme Court – However, Supreme Court observed that it was open
to the respondent to avail any appropriate remedy – Thereupon
respondents 1 to 7 filed the present suit seeking declaration that
the proceedings under the Act which culminated in issuance of
notification u/s. 10(1) of the Act be declared  null and void and the
respondents be declared owners of the suit property – Trial court
dismissed the suit interalia holding that the suit was not maintainable
and was also barred by limitation – In appeal, High Court interalia
held that the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit on merits
and hence the suit was maintainable and that the plaintiffs
(respondent Nos. 1 to 7) were the owners of the suit property – On
appeal, held: The Act is a self-contained code in itself providing
complete machinery while dealing with the land-owners right in
relation to the excess
land prescribed under the Act – The Act gives
finality to the orders passed by the appellate authority u/s. 33 and
also provides bar to file civil suits in relation to cases falling u/s.
30(5) and s. 40 of the Act – Therefore, jurisdiction of civil courts to
try the civil suits with respect to land which were subjected to ceiling
proceedings under the Act, are impliedly barred – The civil court
had no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs as sought in the present case
– Belated challenge to the ceiling proceedings is meritless –
Furthermore, the State after acquiring ownership of the suit property
[2019] 4  S.C.R. 331
   331
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
has allotted it to the hospital on 30 years lease and hence the situation
has become irreversible – Jurisdiction.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The entire scheme of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 makes two things clear. First, the Act
is a self-contained code in itself, which provides complete
machinery while dealing with the rights of the land-owners in
relation to their lands, which are in excess of the ceiling limits
prescribed under the Act. It also provides adequate remedies to
correct all kinds of errors committed by the competent authority
under the Act; and Second, the Act gives finality to the orders
passed by the appellate authority under Section 33, and also
provides a bar to file the civil suits in relation to cases falling
under Section 30 (5) and Section 40 of the Act. [Para 50]
[348-B, C]
2. The jurisdiction of the civil court is held to be exclused
by implication to try the civil suit in question. This is for the
following reasons: First, the Act in question gives finality to the
orders passed by the appellate authority [refer to Section 33(3)].
Second, the Act provides adequate remedies in the nature of
appeals, such as first appeal to the Tribunal and second appeal to
the High Court. [refer to Sections 12 (4),  13 and 33 (1)]. Third
the Act is a complete code in itself and gives overriding powers
on other laws (refer to Section 42). Fourth, the Act expressly
excludes
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to the cases
falling under Sections 30 and 40 (refer to Section 30(5) and Section
40). Fifth, as a result of dismissal of writ petition and SLP in the
first round of litigation it was held therein that the proceedings
under the Act in question were done in conformity with the Act in
question. In the light of the aforesaid five reasons - a fortiori, the
jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to all the issues arising
under the Act is held impliedly excluded thereby satisfying all
the conditions set out in clause (1) of *Dhula Bai case. Therefore,
the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try the civil suits with respect
to the lands, which were subjected to ceiling proceedings under
the Act, are held to be impliedly barred, since the Act excludes
the jurisdiction of the civil court. [Paras 54, 55 and 56] [350-A-F]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
333
3. It is evident from the relief prayed for in the plaint that
the plaintiffs have sought a declaration that the notification dated
12.02.1990 issued under Section 10 of the Act be declared null
and void; that a statement filed by defendant No. 2 under Section
6 of the Act before the Competent Authority be declared null and
void; and that the statement filed by defendant No. 3 under Section
8 of the Act be declared null and void. The Civil Court had no
jurisdiction to grant the afore-mentioned reliefs inasmuch as its
jurisdiction to grant such reliefs is impliedly barred under the
Act. [Paras 57, 58][350-G, H; 351-A, B]
4. If Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 - Plaintiffs claimed themselves
to be the lawful owners and holders of the suit property to the
exclusion of others, there were three remedies available in law
which they could have availed of: (i) First, a remedy accrued to
them when defendant No. 2 claimed to have purchased the suit
property from the alleged vendors on 30.11.1962. The
Respondents should have filed a Civil Suit against the vendors
(ii) The second remedy arose under Section 6 of the Act, for filing
a statement as owners and holders of the suit property before
the Competent Authority, after the Act came into force in 1976.
This was also not availed of by the plaintiffs. (iii) The third remedy
was in filing objections under Section 10(1) of the Act before the
Competent Authority when the Competent Authority invited
objections on 12.02.1990 from
public and pursuant to it, the notice
was issued in that behalf. The respondents again did not avail of
this remedy, and failed to file any objections. [Para 59][351-B-F]
5. The Respondents-Plaintiffs having failed to avail any of
the three remedies at appropriate time, resorted to fourth remedy
of filing a Writ Petition to challenge the notifications dated
11.05.1990. This Writ Petition was, however, dismissed. The
order of dismissal was affirmed by this Court in SLP. The dismissal
of the SLP by this Court had a three-fold effect on the rights of
the parties to the lis in relation to the suit property: First, the
entire action taken by the competent authority initiated from
Section 6 of the Act till issuance of notifications under Section
10(1) and (3) of the Act issued on 12.02.1990 and 11.05.1990 in
relation to the suit property were held to be in conformity with
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
334
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
the provisions of the Act. This satisfied the last condition of clause
(1) of *Dhula Bai case. Second, the suit property stood vested in
the State free from all encumbrances under Section 10(3) of the
Act. Third, the State Government was held to be in legal
possession of the suit property as the owner on and after
11.05.1990, to the exclusion of all, by following the due procedure
of law. In such a situation, the Respondent Nos.1 to 7 could not
take recourse to filing of the civil suit on the basis of the
observation made by this Court. [Paras 60-62][351-F-H;
352-A-C]
6. If there were any remedy available to the respondents in
relation to the suit property, then any such remedy was under
the Act but not by filing a civil suit in a civil court and start a fresh
round of litigation with respect to the suit property.  Such a suit
was impliedly barred in the light of exclusion of jurisdiction of
the civil court under the Act.  [Para 63][352-D, E]
7. The intention of the Legislature is more explicit in
excluding the jurisdiction of the civil court under the Act in
question. It is clear from a reading of Sections 12(4), 13, 30, 33(1),
33(3), 33(5) and 40 of the Act in question. [Paras 70 and 71]
[355-C, D]
8. Thus,  the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the civil
suit in relation to the land which is subject to ceiling proceedings
under the Act in question; nor did the civil court have the
jurisdiction to declare the
proceedings held under the Act, as
void or illegal or non est, since it was impliedly excluded and
barred under the Act. [Para 72][355-F]
9. It cannot be said that prejudice was caused to respondent
Nos. 1 to 7 by the ceiling proceedings which proceeded against
them behind their back as it has been held that the civil court
had no jurisdiction to entertain a civil suit with respect to
proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, being a special
and self-contained enactment.  Furthermore,  respondent Nos. 1
to 7/ Plaintiffs having failed to raise objections to the ceiling
proceedings at any stage, the suit property stood vested in the
State, free from all encumbrances. The belated challenge to the
same is meritless. Having failed to avail of the remedies under
the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the one resorted to resulted in
rejection of the claim made therein upto this Court, Respondent
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
335
Nos. 1 to 7/ Plaintiffs sought to start a fresh round of litigation by
filing a civil suit, which was barred under the Act. Furthermore,
the State after acquiring ownership over the suit land has allotted
the suit land to the  Hospitals on a 30 years lease. Hence, the
situation has now become irreversible. [Paras 73-75][355-H;
356-A-D]
10. Therefore, the Division Bench of High Court was not
justified in allowing the Respondents’ appeal, and decreeing the
civil suit whereas the trial court was right in dismissing the civil
suit. [Para 76][356-D]
Dhula Bai v. State of MP (AIR 1969 SC 78) : [1968]
SCR 662 – followed.
State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC 229 :
[1995] 3 SCR 857; Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat
Kararia (1996) 7 SCC 218 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 774;
Bangalore Development Authority v. K. S Narayan
(2006) 8 SCC 336 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 186; State of
Punjab v. Amarjit Singh (2011) 14 SCC 713 – relied
on.
Case Law Reference
[1968] SCR 662
followed
Para 51
[1995] 3 SCR 857
relied on
Para 65
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 774
relied on
Para 67
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 186
relied on
Para 69
(2011) 14 SCC 713
relied on
Para 69
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 10629-
10631 of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2013 of the  High
Court at Calcutta in F.A. No. 202 of 2008 and Order dated 24.07.2014
in RVW 36 of 2014 with CAN 1450 of 2014 in F.A. No. 202 of 2008.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 9829-9830, 9900 of 2016.
Kalyan Bandopadhya, C. U. Singh,
Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Advs.,
Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee, Pratap Venugopal, Ms. Surekha Raman,
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
Anuj Sarma, Ms. Remya Raj (for M/S. K J John And Co), Anubhav
Ray, Krishna Parkhani, Ankolekar Gurudatta, Chandan Shreekant
Malapur, Debarshi Bhuyan, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Charles Mantosh, In-Person.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. C.A. Nos.10629-10631
of 2014 are filed by the Competent Authority against the Judgment and
Order dated 27.09.2013 in F.A. No. 202/2008, Judgment and Order dated
24.07.2014 in the Review Petition being RVW No. 36/2014 with CAN
No.1450/2014 in F.A. No.202/2008 passed by the High Court at Calcutta.
2. C.A. Nos.9829-9830 of 2016 are filed by M/s Apollo Gleneagles
Hospitals Ltd. against the judgment and order dated 27.09.2013 in F.A.
No.202/2008 with CAN No.1054/2014 and C.A. No. 9900/2016 against
the judgment and order dated 24.07.2014 in RVW No.117/2014 in F.A.
No.202/2008 passed by the High Court at Calcutta.
3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in these appeals,
it is necessary to set out the facts in detail, which led to filing of these
appeals. The facts set out hereinbelow are taken from the list of dates
filed by the parties.
4. Appellant No.1 herein is the Competent Authority, Calcutta-
Defendant No. 3, Appellant No.2 is the State of West Bengal-Defendant
No. 2, whereas Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 herein are Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 7,
Respondent No. 8 is Defendant No.1 and Respondent No. 9 is Defendant
No. 2 in the Civil Suit out
of which these appeals arise.
5. The dispute pertains to land bearing No.73, holding No.42, Canal
Circular Road, Calcutta - 700 054 measuring around 2 bighas, 2 katas, 4
chataks and 25 sq. ft. (which is a part of and adjacent to a bigger chunk
of land measuring around 29 bighas) (hereinafter referred to as “suit
property”).
6. One Abdul Jabbar claimed to have purchased the suit property
on 29.07.1919 in an auction sale. He, in turn, claimed to have sold it to
one Maula Ataul Haq on 29.09.1927 who, in turn, is alleged to have sold
it to one Poonam Chand Sethia on 15.08.1933.
7. Mr. Poonam Chand Sethia, in turn, on 17.08.1933 claimed to
have transferred the suit property to one Moti Chand Nakhat, Amrito
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
337
Lal Shah, Thakur Lal Mehta and Champa Lal Daphtary, being the trustees
of a Trust who, in turn, claimed to have transferred it to one Mr. P.S.
Mantosh - the predecessor-in-interest of the original Plaintiff, who is
now represented by his legal representatives (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7).
8. It may be mentioned here that after 1933 till 30.11.1962, the
suit property went through several transfers between various parties. It
was also the subject matter of civil and criminal proceedings between
the parties, who claimed to have possessed the suit property. We,
however, do not consider it necessary to set out these details here.
9. Suffice it to say, that eventually the suit property along with its
adjacent land bearing Nos.73, 60, 72, etc. came into the hands of Mr.
Monilal Goyee and Mr. Bijay Kumar Goyee who, in turn, claimed to
have sold it to M/s Hindustan Housing on 15.06.1957. M/s Hindustan
Housing, in turn, transferred the suit property along with adjacent land to
M/s Orient Beverage Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “M/s OBL”) vide
registered sale deed dated 30.11.1962.
10. On 17.02.1976, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) came into force. It was
extended to the State of West Bengal on the same day. The suit property
along-with the adjacent land was an “urban land” under Section 2(o) of
this Act, and was falling under urban agglomeration as defined by Section
2(n) of the Act.
11. M/s OBL claiming to be
a “person” under Section 2(i) of the
Act, and claiming “to hold” the suit property under Section 2(l) of the
Act in excess of the ceiling limits specified under Section 4 of the Act
filed a statement on 15.09.1976 under Section 6(1) of the Act before the
Competent Authority.
12. It may be mentioned here that in the statement M/s OBL
showed the suit property as a vacant land, and prayed that they be allowed
to hold the excess vacant land for constructing the dwelling houses
thereon under Section 21 of the Act.
13. The Competent Authority by order dated 27.09.1988, however,
rejected the prayer made by M/s OBL. The rejection resulted in M/s
OBL agreeing to surrender the possession of the entire excess land held
by them beyond the prescribed ceiling limit. On 04.01.1990, M/s OBL
accordingly surrendered their possession on the land bearing Nos. 58,
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
338
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
60, 72, 73, 79, & 81 situated at Canal Circular Road, Calcutta in favour
of the State. The said surrender included the suit property also. The
Deputy Secretary, Land & Land Reforms Department then directed M/
s OBL to file the statement as required under Sections 8 to 10 of the
Act.
14. On 22.01.1990, M/s OBL informed the Competent Authority
that they are prepared to surrender the possession of the suit property
subject to awarding them compensation as provided under the Act. On
08.02.1990, the Competent Authority served final statement under Section
9 of the Act on M/s OBL. This led to the issuance of a notification by
the State under Section 10(1) of the Act which was duly published in the
Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary on 15.02.1990 inviting objections from
the general public. The Competent Authority, however, did not receive
any objection from any person pursuant to the notice published. This
was followed by issuance of the final notification under Section 10(3) on
11.05.1990 which resulted in vesting of the suit property in the State of
West Bengal free from all encumbrances.
15. The Competent Authority, on 23.05.1990, served notice to M/
s OBL calling upon them to physically surrender the possession of the
suit property to the State, which was done on 28.05.1990.
16. The State of West Bengal (Appellant No.2 herein) on
04.04.1991 allotted the suit property (No.73) along with adjacent land
measuring around
34,147 sq. meters bearing premises Nos. 58, 59, 60,
61, 62, 72, 73, 79, & 81 at Canal Circular Road to Respondent No. 8
(Defendant No. 1-M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals) on a long term lease
of 30 years. The Respondent No. 8 (Defendant No. 1) then was given
possession of the land from the State. The State executed a lease deed
dated 02.12.1994 in favour of M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals.
Thereafter, M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals set up a hospital at a huge
cost, and is running their hospital since the last two decades.
17. In the year 1992, Respondent No.1 (Plaintiff No. 1) woke up
from her slumber, and claimed to be the owner and holder of the suit
property and part of the adjacent land. The Plaintiff felt aggrieved by
the notification issued under Section 10(3) on 11.05.1990 and filed a
Writ Petition (WP No.1382/1992) to challenge the same before the
Calcutta High Court.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
339
18. The Single Judge vide Order dated 26.08.1992 allowed the
Writ Petition and quashed the notification dated 11.05.1990.
19. The Respondent No.8 (Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals Ltd.) felt
aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge dated 26.08.1992 and filed
Writ Appeal No.324/1993 before the Division Bench of the High Court.
20. The Division Bench vide order 03.04.1997 allowed the appeal
and set aside the order of the Single Judge, and dismissed the Writ Petition.
As a consequence, thereof, the notification dated 11.05.1990 issued by
the State was held to be legal and valid and was accordingly restored.
21. The Respondent No.1 felt aggrieved by the Judgment of the
Division Bench and filed S.L.P.(C) No.12726 of 1997 in this Court. By
Order dated 28.07.1997, this Court dismissed the said petition. This Court,
however, observed that if the Petitioner (Respondent No.1 herein) has
any appropriate remedy under the Act or any other law, it would be open
to her to avail the same in accordance with law.
22. It is in this background, that Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 filed Civil
Suit (TS No. 101/1998) out of which the present appeals arise. The suit
was filed against the present Appellants, i.e., the Competent Authority
under the Act, the State of West Bengal, and Respondent Nos. 8 and 9
in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sealdah.
23. The Civil Suit was filed for declaration and possession of the
suit property.  The Plaintiffs claimed a declaration that the entire
proceedings which culminated in the issuance of the notification dated
12.02.1990 under Section 10 (1) under the Act in relation to the suit
property be declared null and void and the plaintiffs be declared owners
of the suit property. The reliefs claimed in the suit read as under:
“(a) A declaration that the Notification No.53-X-U.L.(Cal)
dated February 12, 1990 is null and void.
  a)   A declaration the statement filed by the defendant No.2
under sub-Section 1 of Section 6 of Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 is null and void so far as it
relates to premises No.73, Canal Circular Road,
Calcutta being the suit premises;
  b)  A declaration that the draft statement prepared by the
defendant No.3 under Section 8 of the Urban Land
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, on the basis of the
statement filed by the defendant No.2 is null and void
and not binding upon the plaintiffs so far as it relates to
the suit property;
c)   A declaration that letter No.1500-UL/AV-11/19 dated
April 4, 1991 and/or the purported allotment of the suit
premises to the defendant No.1 by the defendant No.3
is inoperative, collusive, fraudulent and void;
d)   A declaration that the plaintiffs are the owners of the
premises No.73, Canal Circular Road, Calcutta and the
plaintiffs is entitled to possession of the suit property
as owner;
e)  A decree for recovery of possession evicting the
defendant No.1 from suit property;
f)   A decree for a sum of Rs.1 crore from the defendant
No.1 as mesne profit and/or damages for illegal use and
occupation of the suit premises;
g)   Costs of the suit;
h)   Such other or further relief or reliefs that the plaintiffs
      may be entitled to in law or equity.”
24. The Appellants-State of West Bengal, the Competent Authority,
and Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 herein filed their respective Written
Statements.
25. The Trial Court on the basis of pleadings framed the following
11 issues:
“1.  Is there any cause of action for the suit?
2.    Is the suit maintainable?
3.    Is the suit barred by limitation?
4.    Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
5.   Has the plaintiff any right title and interest over the
land in suit?
6.
Has the suit property vested to the State?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
341
7.    Is the Plaintiff entitled to get a decree for declaration
that Notification No.53-X-UL(Cal) dated 12.02.1990 is
null and void, or a declaration that the statement filed
by the Defendant No.2 under provisions of Urban Land
(Ceiling & Regulation) Act is null and void or declaration
that the statement prepared by Defendant No.3 is null
and void or a declaration that letter No.1500-UL/AV/
II/19 dated 04.04.1981 and the purported allotment of
the suit premises to the Defendant No.1 is inoperative,
collusive, fraudulent and void?
8.    Is the Plaintiff entitled to a decree for declaration that
the Plaintiff is entitled to a possession of the suit
property as a co-owner?
9.    Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree for recovery of
possession of the suit property by evicting the
Defendant No.1 therefrom?
10.  Is the Plaintiff entitled to a decree of Rs.1 crore against
the Defendant and mesne profit?
11.  To what other relief, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled to?”
26. The parties then adduced their evidence. The Trial Court vide
judgment and decree dated 24.04.2008 answered all the 11 issues against
the Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 herein) and dismissed the Suit
which gave rise to filing of First Appeal (No.202/2008) before the Calcutta
High Court by the Plaintiffs - Respondent Nos. 1 to 7.
27. The Division Bench vide the impugned Judgment allowed the
plaintiffs’ appeal, and set aside the Judgment and Decree of the Trial
Court, and decreed the suit
filed by the Plaintiffs’. The High Court held
that the suit is maintainable; that it is not barred; that the Civil Court has
the jurisdiction to try the civil suit on merits; that the Plaintiffs are the
owners of the suit property; that the competent authorities did not follow
the mandatory procedure laid down under the Act; that the proceedings
under the Act are not binding on the Plaintiffs; that the Appellant–Apollo
Gleneagles Hospitals was in unauthorized possession of the suit property
and were directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit property to
the Plaintiffs, or in the alternative, to pay  its value  within 3 months to
the Plaintiffs.
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
28. The Competent Authority - Defendant No. 3, the State of
West Bengal - Defendant No. 4 and Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals -
Defendant No.1 being aggrieved by the Judgment of the High Court
filed the present Special Leave Petitions in this Court, which have been
renumbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 10629-10631/2014.
29. The question, which arises for consideration in these appeals,
is whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in allowing
the appeal filed by the Plaintiffs’ (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7) and decreeing
the suit.
30. We have heard Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhya, learned senior
counsel appearing for the Appellant - State of West Bengal and
Competent Authority, Mr. C.U Singh learned Senior counsel appearing
for Appellant - M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals and Mr. Dhruv Mehta,
learned senior counsel for the Respondent – Plaintiffs.
31. The counsel for the Competent Authority inter alia submitted
that:
(i) the reliefs prayed for by the Plaintiffs could not be granted by
the Civil Court, as the Civil Suit was barred under the Act. Having
regard to the scheme of the Act, the Act is a self-contained Act
which provided adequate remedies to the land holders to challenge
any action taken, and orders passed by the competent authorities
in revision/appeals, as the case may be, in ceiling proceedings
under the Act itself.
(ii) It was further contended that Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 having
lost their legal battle, which
had attained finality up to this Court in
the first round of litigation, all issues pertaining to the suit property
had already come to an end. According to the learned counsel, no
issue in relation to the suit property survived for adjudication by
any Court, much less the Civil Court.
(iii) It was further contended that the legal effect of issuance of
the notification under Section 10 (1) of the Act on 12.02.1990,
followed by issuance of the consequential final notification under
Section 10(3) on 11.05.1990, was that the suit property stood vested
in the State free from all encumbrances. Therefore, no person
has any right to claim a right, title and interest over the suit property
on and after the suit property stood vested in the State on
11.05.1990.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
343
(iv) Learned counsel for the Appellants then contended that the
Civil Suit filed by the Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7) was
barred by limitation, because the Plaintiffs had slept over their
alleged right of ownership over the suit property by not availing of
remedies under the Act.
(v) According to learned counsel for the Appellants, when M/s
OBL claimed to have purchased the suit property in 1962, the
Plaintiffs ought to have filed a Suit for Declaration of their title,
which they failed to do so. In any case, the Plaintiffs had a remedy
to file their statement under Section 6 of the Act on 15.09.1976,
or raised an objection on the issue of ownership qua M/s OBL at
that time under Section 10(4) of the Act.
(vi) It was contended that the Respondent- Plaintiffs, at no stage
of the pendency of the ceiling proceedings, raised any objection
under Section 10 (1). Hence, their right, if any, to claim any right,
title and interest in the suit property got extinguished consequent
upon vesting of the suit property in the State under Section 10(3)
of the Act on and after 11.05.1990.
32. The learned Senior Counsel for Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals
inter alia while elaborating the submission of learned senior counsel
Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhya submitted that:
(i) The suit property is governed by the Act, which continues to
be in operation in the State of West Bengal. As a consequence,
according to the learned counsel, a Civil Suit would impliedly be
barred and hence
the Respondents had a remedy which is available
under the Act. It was urged that the Act being a complete Code
creates rights, remedies and fora for adjudication of disputes and
hence the Civil Suit filed by Respondents No.1 to 7 would not be
maintainable.
(ii) That in any event Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 had failed to establish
their claim of ownership and possession over the suit property.
The suit instituted by Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 was also barred by
limitation because the Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 were not
in possession of the suit property since 1962. The notification under
the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 was published
on 17.02.1976 and as per scheme of the Act, the owner of the suit
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
property was obligated to file a return, since the suit property was
beyond the ceiling limit.
(iii) Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 claimed that their
predecessor-in-interest viz. namely Ms. Daisy Mantosh was the
owner of premises No. 71/1, 60,72 and 73 Canal Circular Road
and since the extent of land held was in excess of the ceiling limit,
yet she did not file any return in respect of the suit properties.
(iv) On the other hand, M/s Orient Properties Pvt. Ltd. (renamed
as M/s Orient Beverages Ltd. “OBL”) submitted a return under
Section 6 of the Act, and also made an application under Section
21 for retaining the excess land, which was refused on 27.09.1986.
(v) The Land and Reforms Department on 04.04.1991 decided to
allot the suit property to M/s Janapriya Hospital Corporation Ltd.,
later renamed as Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals for setting up a
hospital. This was done by executing a lease for 30 years, for
which a premium of Rs. 98, 41,300 was paid to the State. A large
hospital with all amenities has since been set up.
33. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel, appeared on behalf
of Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs and supported the reasoning and
conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned
Order. It was inter alia contended that no case for interference was
made out with the impugned Order.
34. The Counsel submitted that there was a non-compliance with
the provisions of the Act and
the Rules framed thereunder while dealing
with the suit property. A mere notification in the Official Gazette was
not sufficient for vesting to take place under the Act. The notification,
according to learned counsel was issued without ensuring proper
compliance of the Act read with Rules and therefore the entire process
of vesting of the suit property in the Appellants was vitiated and bad in
law.
35. It was then contended that the Civil Suit was maintainable
and the civil court’s jurisdiction was not impliedly excluded as the Civil
Suit was filed pursuant to the directions of the Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court and this Court in SLP (C) No. 12726 of 2007. This
Court had dismissed the said SLP vide Order dated 28.07.1998 with the
liberty to pursue the remedy available under the Act or any other law. It
was submitted that since the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs were
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
345
illegally dispossessed from the suit property (as they were not given a
proper and valid notice in terms of the provisions of the Act and the
Rules framed thereunder), there was a violation of the principles of natural
justice.
36. Thus, according to learned counsel, even where a statute gives
finality to a decision, such a provision does not exclude cases where the
provisions of the particular statute have not been complied with, or the
tribunal has not acted in conformity with the statute or fundamental
principles of judicial procedure. Hence, the Civil Suit filed by Respondent
Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs was maintainable and not barred by law.
37. It was sought to be contended that the rights, title and interest
of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs in the suit property are common
law rights and do not emanate from the Act and therefore, must be
adjudicated only by a civil court.
38. The learned counsel further contended that there was no
occasion for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs to file a Return or
declaration in respect of the suit property since the suit property was not
a “vacant land” in terms of the Act. The Act only contemplates filing of
Returns with respect to “vacant lands”.  Hence, the provisions of the
Act were not applicable to the present case.
39. The learned Counsel further argued that the civil court was
therefore the proper forum for adjudication of the disputes between the
parties as the Appellants/Defendants had colluded
amongst themselves
with respect to the suit property and had committed a fraud on the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs. Hence, the dispute could not have
been decided by a tribunal by ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court.
40. Lastly, the Senior Counsel contended that the Civil Suit filed
on 29.06.1998 was well within limitation since the cause of action of the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs to file the suit ripened only after this
Court vide Order dated 28.07.1997 had disposed of the SLP (C) No.
12726/1997 granting liberty to the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs to
pursue any appropriate remedy under the Act or any other law.
41. We have heard the learned Senior Counsels appearing for the
parties and perused the record of the case including the written
submissions. We find force in the submissions advanced on behalf of the
Appellants - Defendants.
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
42. The three principal issues, which arise for consideration in
these appeals, are:
First, whether the High Court was justified in holding that the
Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try the civil suit in relation to the
suit property which was subjected to ceiling proceedings under
the Act.
Second, whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to declare the
ceiling proceedings under the Act as void and not binding on the
Plaintiffs even though the same had attained finality in the first
round of litigation upto this Court.
Third, whether the High Court was justified in holding that the
Plaintiffs are the owners of the suit property and entitled to claim
possession of the suit property or its value from the Appellant -
M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals.
43. Before we examine the afore-mentioned three issues, it is
necessary to first examine the scheme of the Act in question and the
law governing the issues raised in the present appeals.
44. The Act in question was enacted to provide for the imposition
of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of
such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of
building on such land, and for matters connected therewith. It was enacted
with the object of preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands
of a few persons, and speculation and profiteering with a view to bringing
about the equitable distribution of land in urban
areas to sub- serve the
common good.
45. The Act has 47 Sections. Section 2(a) to (q) defines the various
expressions used in the Act. Section 3 prohibits the person from holding
the land in excess of the ceiling limits after coming into the force of the
Act. Section 4 specifies the ceiling limit for holding the land by any
person. Section 5 deals with the transfer of vacant land by its holder.
Section 6 provides for filing of Statement by the persons holding vacant
land in excess of ceiling limits. Section 7 also deals with filing of Statement
in case if the land is situated within the jurisdiction of two or more
competent authorities. Section 8 deals with preparation of draft statement
as regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limits. Section 9 deals
with the preparation of final statement. Section 10 deals with acquisition
of vacant land in excess of ceiling limits.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
347
46. Section 11 provides for payment of amount for vacant land
acquired. Section 12 provides for constitution of Tribunal and appeal to
the Tribunal. Section 13 provides for filing second appeal to the High
Court against the order of Tribunal. Section 14 provides for mode of
payment. Section 15 provides for ceiling limits on future acquisition by
inheritance, bequest or by sale in execution of decree etc. Section 16
deals with filing of Statement when the Act is adopted by the State
subsequently. Section 17 deals with power to enter upon any vacant
land. Section 18 provides for imposition of penalties for concealment of
particulars of vacant land. Section 19 provides exclusion clause from
applicability of certain provisions of the Act to some specified landowners.
Section 20 deals with power to exempt any land.
47. Section 21 provides that excess land not to be treated excess
land in certain cases. Section 22 deals with retention of vacant land
under certain circumstances. Sections 23 and 24 deal with disposal of
vacant land acquired under the Act. Section 25 defines certain
expressions. Section 26 enjoins notice to be given before transfer of
vacant land. Section 27 provides for prohibition on transfer of urban
property. Section 28 deals with regulation of registration of documents
in certain cases. Section 29 deals with regulation of construction of building
with dwelling units. Section 30 gives power of demolition and stoppage
of building. It also
provides a right of appeal and bar of filing suits in civil
court in relation to matters falling under Section 30.
48. Section 31 deals with powers of competent authority. Section
32 deals with jurisdiction of competent authorities and the Tribunal in
special cases. Section 33 provides a right of appeal to the appellate
authority whose order shall be final whereas Section 34 provides for
filing revision to State. Section 35 empowers the State to issue orders
and directions to competent authority. Section 36 gives power to central
government to give directions to the State Government. Section 37 deals
with filing of returns and report by the competent authority. Section 38
deals with offences and punishment. Section 39 deals with offences by
companies.
49. Section 40 again provides for a bar from filing of the suit or
other legal proceedings against the Government and officers in respect
of anything, which is done in good faith or intended to be done by or
under the Act. Section 41 deals with cognizance of offences. Section 42
gives overriding effect of the Act on other laws. Section 43 specifies the
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
348
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
court fees payable on the applications, appeals or other proceedings
under the Act. Section 44 specifies certain officers to be public servant.
Section 45 empowers the authorities to correct the clerical errors. Section
46 is a rule making power and lastly Section 47 gives power to remove
difficulties.
50. The entire scheme of the Act set out above would make two
things clear. First, the Act is a self-contained code in itself, which provides
complete machinery while dealing with the rights of the land-owners in
relation to their lands, which are in excess of the ceiling limits prescribed
under the Act. It also provides adequate remedies to correct all kinds of
errors committed by the competent authority under the Act; and Second,
the Act gives finality to the orders passed by the appellate authority
under Section 33, and also provides a bar to file the civil suits in relation
to cases falling under Section 30 (5) and Section 40 of the Act.
51. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Dhula
Bai vs. State of MP (AIR 1969 SC 78) examined the question as to
when the jurisdiction of the Civil Court can be held to have been expressly
or impliedly excluded in trying a civil suit in the context of Section 9 of
Code of Civil procedure, 1908.
52. Justice Hidayatullah, the then learned Chief Justice, speaking
for the Bench in his inimitable style, laid down 7 tests for examining the
afore-mentioned question. These
tests read as under:
“(1)  Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the
special tribunals the civil courts’ jurisdiction must be held
to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the
civil court would normally do in a suit.  Such provision,
however, does not exclude those cases where the
provisions of the particular Act have not been complied
with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity
with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the
court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act
to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies
provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the
jurisdiction of the civil court.  Where there is no express
exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme
of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
349
necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive.  In
the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a
special right or a liability and provides for the determination
of the right or liability and further lays down that all
questions about the said right and liability shall be
determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether
remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts
are prescribed by the said statute or not.
(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra
vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under
that Act.  Even the High Court cannot go into that question
on a revision or reference from the decision of the
Tribunals.
(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional
or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged,
a suit is open.  A writ of certiorari may include a direction
for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed
by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to
replace a suit.
(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for
refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or
illegally collected, a suit lies.
(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart
from its constitutionality are for the decision of the
authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the
authorities are declared to be final or there is an express
prohibition in the particular Act.  In either case, the scheme
of the
particular Act must be examined because it is a
relevant enquiry.
(7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not
readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down
apply.”
53. In the light of the tests laid down in Dhula Bai (supra) and
further keeping in view the scheme of the Act, we have to examine the
issue as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly or
impliedly excluded in trying the civil suit in relation to matters arising out
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
of the Act in question and second, whether the Civil Court has the
jurisdiction to declare the proceedings held under the Act, as being void.
54. Having examined the issue, we are clearly of the opinion that
the present case falls under clause(1) of Dhula Bai (supra) and satisfies
the test laid down therein. Hence, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is
held to be excluded by implication to try the civil suit in question. This we
say for the following reasons: -
First, the Act in question gives finality to the orders passed by the
appellate authority [refer to Section 33(3)].
Second, the Act provides adequate remedies in the nature of
appeals, such as first appeal to the Tribunal and second appeal to
the High Court. [refer to Sections 12 (4),  13 and 33 (1)].
Third, the Act is a complete code in itself and gives overriding
powers on other laws (refer to Section 42).
Fourth, the Act expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court in relation to the cases falling under Sections 30 and 40
(refer to Section 30(5) and Section 40).
Fifth, as a result of dismissal of writ petition and SLP, it is held
therein that the proceedings under the Act in question were done
in conformity with the Act in question.
55. In light of the aforesaid five reasons - a fortiori, the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court in relation to all the issues arising under the Act is held
impliedly excluded thereby satisfying all the conditions set
out in clause
(1) of Dhula Bai (supra).
56. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the jurisdiction
of the Civil Courts to try the civil Suits with respect to the lands, which
were subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act, are held to be
impliedly barred, since the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
57. Now coming to the facts of the case, we find from the relief
prayed for in the plaint  (see  prayers (a) to (d) quoted supra) that the
plaintiffs have sought a declaration, that the notification dated 12.02.1990
issued under Section 10 of the Act be declared null and void; Second, a
statement filed by M/s OBL - defendant No. 2 under Section 6 of the
Act before the Competent Authority be declared null and void; Third,
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
351
the statement filed by defendant No. 3 under Section 8 of the Act be
declared null and void.
58. In our opinion, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant the
afore-mentioned reliefs inasmuch as its jurisdiction to grant such reliefs
is impliedly barred under the Act.
59. In our view, if Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 - Plaintiffs claimed
themselves to be the lawful owners and holders of the suit property to
the exclusion of others, there were three remedies available in law which
they could have availed of:
(i) First, a remedy accrued in favour of Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 if
not earlier when M/s OBL claimed to have purchased the suit
property from the alleged vendors on 30.11.1962. It was at that
point of time, a cloud was cast on their alleged title in relation to
the suit property. Since registration of the sale deed amounts to a
public notice, the Respondents should have filed a Civil Suit against
the vendors of M/s OBL, and M/s OBL, for a declaration of their
ownership and cancellation of their sale deed in relation to the suit
property. It was not availed of.
(ii) The second remedy arose under Section 6 of the Act, for
filing a statement as owners and holders of the suit property before
the Competent Authority, after the Act came into force in 1976.
This was also not availed of by the plaintiffs.
(iii) The third remedy was in filing objections under Section 10 (1)
of the Act before the Competent Authority when the Competent
Authority invited objections on
12.02.1990 from public and pursuant
to it, the notice was issued in that behalf. The respondents again
did not avail of this remedy, and failed to file any objections.
60. The Respondents-Plaintiffs having failed to avail any of the
three remedies at appropriate time, resorted to fourth remedy of filing a
Writ Petition to challenge the notifications dated 11.05.1990 in the High
Court of Calcutta.  This Writ Petition was, however, dismissed by a
Division Bench of the High Court vide dated 03.04.1997. The order of
dismissal was affirmed vide order dated 28.07.1997 passed by this Court
in SLP (C) No.12726 of 1997.
61. In our considered opinion, the dismissal of the SLP by this
Court vide Order 28.07.1997 had a three-fold effect on the rights of the
parties to the Lis in relation to the suit property:
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
First, the entire action taken by the competent authority initiated
from Section 6 of the Act till issuance of notifications under Section
10(1) and (3) of the Act issued on 12.02.1990 and 11.05.1990 in
relation to the suit property were held to be in conformity with the
provisions of the Act. This satisfied the last condition of clause
(1) of Dhula Bai (supra) also.
Second, the suit property stood vested in the State free from all
encumbrances under Section 10 (3) of the Act.
Third, the State Government was held to be in legal possession of
the suit property as the owner on and after 11.05.1990, to the
exclusion of all, by following the due procedure of law.
62. In such a situation, the Respondent Nos.1 to 7 could not take
recourse to filing of the Civil Suit on the basis of the observation made
by this Court.
63. As observed supra, if there were any remedy available to the
Respondents in relation to the suit property, then any such remedy was
under the Act but not by filing a civil suit in a Civil Court and start a fresh
round of litigation with respect to the suit property.  Such a suit was, in
our view, impliedly barred in the light of exclusion of jurisdiction of the
Civil Court under the Act.
64. Indeed, we find support for our reasoning by the decisions of
this Court rendered in several decided cases as mentioned below.
65. In State of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC 229,
a question arose as to whether
a civil suit is maintainable, and if so,
whether ad-interim injunction could be issued by the Civil Court in such
suit against the State where the proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act were taken pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the
Land Acquisition Act, and delivered to its beneficiary.
66. This Court examined the issue in the context of the scheme of
the Land Acquisition Act in juxtaposition with Section 9 of the CPC
and held that having regard to the object and scheme of the Act, the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the matters falling under the
Act stands impliedly excluded, and is barred. Para 3 of the decision is
apposite and reads as under:
“3. The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and
whether ad interim injunction could be issued where
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
353
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken
pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the Act
and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act
are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising
the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose.
The State is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements
contained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act by proper
publication of notification and declaration within limitation
and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local
publications envisaged under the Act as amended by Act
68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration
under Section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and
becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to
authorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the
acquisition of the land and to make the award. Section 11-A
now prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 years
from the last date of publication envisaged under Section 6
of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Government
needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise
the power under Section 17(4) of the Act and dispense with
the enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled
to issue notice to the parties under Section 9 and on expiry
of 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediate
possession even before the award could be made.
Otherwise, it would take possession after the award under
Section 12. Thus, it could be
seen that the Act is a complete
code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are,
therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by
necessary implication the power of the civil court to take
cognizance of the case under Section 9 of CPC stands
excluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the
question of the validity or legality of the notification under
Section 4 and declaration under Section 6, except by the High
Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.
So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable.”
                                                          (Emphasis supplied)
67. This very issue then came up for consideration in another
decision of this Court in Laxmi Chand vs. Gram Panchayat Kararia
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
(1996) 7 SCC 218. In that case, the question arose as to whether the
civil suit filed to challenge the award passed under the Land Acquisition
Act is maintainable and, if so, whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to
entertain such suit for deciding the issue raised therein on its merits.
68. This Court held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain and try such civil suit on its merits. Its jurisdiction is impliedly
barred having regard to the object and the scheme of the Act. Paras 2
and 3 of the decision are apposite and read as under:
“2………..It is seen that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 gives jurisdiction to the civil court to try all
civil suits, unless barred. The cognizance of a suit of civil
nature may either expressly or impliedly be barred. The
procedure contemplated under the Act is a special
procedure envisaged to effectuate public purpose,
compulsorily acquiring the land for use of public purpose.
The notification under Section 4 and declaration under
Section 6 of the Act are required to be published in the
manner contemplated thereunder. The inference gives
conclusiveness to the public purpose and the extent of the
land mentioned therein. The award should be made under
Section 11 as envisaged thereunder. The dissatisfied
claimant is provided with the remedy of reference under
Section 18 and a further appeal under Section 54 of the
Act. If the Government intends to withdraw
from the
acquisition before taking possession of the land, procedure
contemplated under Section 48 requires to be adhered to.
If possession is taken, it stands vested under Section 16 in
the State with absolute title free from all encumbrances and
the Government has no power to withdraw from acquisition.
3. It would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is complete
in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court to take
cognizance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary
implication, stood barred. The civil court thereby is devoid of
jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the
procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right an
aggrieved person has is to approach the constitutional courts,
viz., the High Court and the Supreme Court under their
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
355
plenary power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively with
self-imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary
power. Barring thereof, there is no power to the civil court.”
                     (Emphasis supplied)
69. This view was reiterated by this Court in two later decisions
(refer - Bangalore Development Authority vs. K.S Narayan (2006)
8 SCC 336 and State of Punjab vs. Amarjit Singh (2011) 14 SCC
713).
70. On comparing the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act with
the scheme of the present Act in question, we find that the intention of
the Legislature is more explicit in excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court under the Act in question.
71. Indeed, it is clear from a reading of Sections 12(4), 13, 30,
33(1), 33(3), 33(5) and 40 of the Act in question.  We also find that some
sections of the Act in question which has bearing on the question of
exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court are in pari materia with
the Sections in the Land Acquisition Act whereas some Sections of the
Act which also have bearing on this question are not to be found in the
Land Acquisition Act. Yet, this Court on examining the scheme of the
Land Acquisition Act and the remedies provided therein has held that
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly excluded and barred to try
the civil suit. The scheme of this Act, therefore, clearly indicates that
exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction is provided therein impliedly.
72. It is for all these
reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that
the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the civil suit in relation to the
land which is subject to ceiling proceedings under the Act in question;
nor did the Civil Court have the jurisdiction to declare the proceedings
held under the Act, as void or illegal or non est, since it was impliedly
excluded and barred under the Act.
73. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel for the Respondents
- Plaintiffs vehemently argued on the facts of the case, which are set
out in detail above, that a perusal of the facts would go to show as to
how the plaintiffs derived their title over the suit property from their
predecessor-in-title, and the prejudice which was caused to them by the
ceiling proceedings which proceeded against them behind their back.
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND
REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
356
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019]  4  S.C.R.
74. We reject the contentions and submissions made on behalf of
Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/ Plaintiffs since we have inter alia held that the
Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a Civil Suit with respect to
proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, being a special and self-
contained enactment.
75. Furthermore, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/ Plaintiffs having
failed to raise objections to the ceiling proceedings at any stage, the suit
property stood vested in the State, free from all encumbrances. The
belated challenge to the same is meritless. Having failed to avail of the
remedies under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the one resorted to
resulted in rejection of the claim made therein upto this Court, Respondent
Nos.1 to 7/ Plaintiffs sought to start a fresh round of litigation by filing a
Civil Suit, which was barred under the Act. Furthermore, the State after
acquiring ownership over the suit land has allotted the suit land to the M/
s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals on a 30 years lease. Hence, the situation,
in our view, has now become irreversible.
76. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that
the Division Bench was not justified in allowing the Respondents’ appeal,
and decreeing the Civil Suit whereas the Trial Court was right in dismissing
the Civil Suit.
77. As a consequence, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The
impugned judgments are set aside and the judgment of the Trial Court is
restored.  As a result thereof, the suit filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 7
out of which these appeals arise is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy
               Appeals allowed.