M/S BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED versus A.S. RAGHAVENDRA
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 100, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 100 : 2024 INSC 265
M/S Bharti Airtel Limited 
v. 
A.S. Raghavendra
(Civil Appeal No.5187 of 2023)
02 April 2024
[Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the respondent would or would not come within the 
definitional stipulation of a “workman” as laid out under Section 
2(s), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Headnotes
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – s.2(s) – “workman” – When 
not – Respondent appointed in the appellant-Company as 
Regional Business Head (South) in the grade of Senior 
Manager (B2)-Sales performed managerial and supervisory 
work, if a “workman”:
Held: No – Respondent himself described his position as a Member 
of the senior management cadre, in-charge of supervising the 
Account Managers in the four Southern States – He performed a 
supervisory role over the managers and was the Assessing Manager 
of his team, which consisted of Managers in the B-1 & B-2 Levels 
– Respondent had perks such as Special Allowance, Car Hiring 
Charges, Petrol and Maintenance, Driver’s Salary etc. – Labour 
Court vide a detailed order and discussion held the respondent 
not to be covered under “workman” as per s.2(s) – However, the 
Single Judge did not appreciate the discussion by the Labour 
Court and the available evidence in their true perspective, relying 
mainly upon the judgment in Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable 
India (P.) Ltd. [1984] 3 SCR 169 – Absence of power to appoint, 
dismiss or conduct disciplinary
enquiries against other employees 
was not the only reason for the Court to conclude in Ved Prakash 
Gupta that the appellant therein was a “workman” – Mere absence 
of power to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary inquiries against 
other employees, would not and could not be the sole criterion 
to determine such an issue – Nature of duties performed by the 
respondent do not place him under the cover of s.2(s) – Impugned 
judgment passed by Division Bench of the High Court as well
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M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra
as the judgment of the Single Judge holding respondent to be a 
“workman”, set aside – Judgment of the Labour Court holding that 
respondent was performing the role of a Manager and thus was not 
a “workman” within the meaning of s.2(s), restored – Respondent 
not a “workman” and thus, reference to the Labour Court under 
the ID Act against the appellant would not be maintainable. [Paras 
5, 21, 22-25 and 29]
Constitution of India – Articles 226, 227 – Re-appraisal of 
facts – Respondent working as Regional Business Head 
(South)- Government Enterprise Services in the grade of 
Senior Manager (B2)-Sales resigned from the appellant-
Company however, later filed petition before the Deputy 
Labour Commissioner alleging that his resignation was 
forceful – Dispute referred to the Labour Court by appropriate 
Government – Labour Court rejected the reference holding 
that respondent was performing the role of a Manager and 
thus was not a “workman” within the meaning of s.2(s), ID 
Act – Writ Petition filed by respondent challenging the said 
award – Award set aside by Single Judge – Appellant filed 
appeal, dismissed by Division Bench – Appellant contended 
that the approach of the Single Judge of re-appreciating the 
entire evidence and coming to a fresh conclusion was not 
proper while exercising jurisdiction u/Articles 226 and 227:
Held: As regards the power of the High Court to re-appraise the 
facts, it
cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible 
u/Articles 226 and 227 – However, there must be a level of infirmity 
greater than ordinary in a Tribunal’s order, which is facing judicial 
scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference – Such a 
situation did not prevail in the present facts. [Para 26]
Case Law Cited
Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur [2011] 
4 SCR 867 : (2011) 6 SCC 584; Suo-Motu Contempt 
Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2021 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 
858; Shankarbhai Nathalal Prajapati v. Maize Products 
(2002) SCC OnLine Guj 143; Suzuki Parasrampuria 
Suitings Private Limited v. Official Liquidator of 
Mahendra Petrochemicals Limited (in Liquidation) 
[2018] 12 SCR 906 : (2018) 10 SCC 707; Muthu 
Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai v. Parithi 
Ilamvazhuthi [2011] 5 SCR 329 : (2011) 5 SCC 496;
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K D Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited [2008] 
10 SCR 454 : (2008) 12 SCC 481; Tularam Manikrao 
Hadge v. Sudarshan Paper Converting Works, Nagpur 
2020 SCC OnLine Bom 965; Bombay Mothers and 
Children’s Society v. General Labour Union (Red Flag) 
1991 SCC OnLine Bom 88; Deepali Gundu Surwase v. 
Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) [2013] 
9 SCR 1 : (2013) 10 SCC 324; Ishwarlal Mali Rathod 
v Gopal (2021) SCC OnLine SC 921; Anvar P V v. P K 
Basheer [2014] 11 SCR 399 : (2014) 10 SCC 473; Sri 
Shivadarshan Balse v. The State of Karnataka, rep. by 
its Secretary, Revenue Department (2017) SCC OnLine 
Kar 2317; Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Limited v. Kitab Singh 
[2013] 1 SCR 611 : (2013) 12 SCC 573; National Kamgar 
Union v. Kran Rader Private Limited [2018] 1 SCR 74 : 
(2018) 1 SCC 784; Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. 
The Workmen (1970) 3 SCC 248; Arkal Govind Raj 
Rao v. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. Bombay [1985] Suppl. 
1 SCR 282 : (1985) 3 SCC 371 – held inapplicable.
Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P.) Ltd. (1984) 
2 SCC 569 : [1984] 3 SCR 169; Indian Overseas Bank 
v. IOB Staff Canteen Workers Union [2000] 2 SCR 1212 
: (2000) 4 SCC 245; Anoop Sharma v. Public Health 
Division, Haryana (2010) 5 SCC 497; Pepsico India 
Holding (P) Ltd. v. Krishna Kant Pandey [2015] 1 SCR 288 
: (2015) 4 SCC 270; Heavy Engineering Corporation v. 
Presiding Officer, Labour Court [1996] Suppl. 8 SCR 92 : 
(1996) 11 SCC 236;
Muir Mills Unit of NTC Ltd. v. Swayam 
Prakash Srivastava [2006] Suppl. 9 SCR 1028 : (2007) 
1 SCC 491; C Gupta v. Glaxo Smithkline Ltd. [2007] 
7 SCR 800 : (2007) 7 SCC 171; E.S.I. Corporation’s 
Medical Officers’ Association v. ESI Corporation [2013] 
12 SCR 907 : (2014) 16 SCC 182; Sonepat Cooperative 
Sugar Mills v. Ajit Singh [2005] 2 SCR 105 : (2005) 3 
SCC 232; H R Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. [1994] 
3 SCALE 816 : (1994) 5 SCC 737; Management of M/s 
May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Workmen AIR (1967) SC 
678; Chauharya Tripathi v. Life Insurance Corporation of 
India [2015] 4 SCR 186 : (2015) 7 SCC 263; S K Maini 
v. M/s Carona Sahu Company Limited [1994] 2 SCR 
333 : (1994) 3 SCC 510 – referred to.
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M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra
List of Acts
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Workman; Reference to Labour Court; Managerial and supervisory 
work; Supervisory role; Managerial capacity; Nature of duties; 
Re-appraisal of facts.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5187 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.03.2022 of the High Court 
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 4067 of 2019
Appearances for Parties
C U Singh, Sr. Adv., Vatsalya Vigya, Advs. for the Appellant.
Respondent-in-person.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
1.	
Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent-in-person.
2.	
The present appeal arises out of the final judgment and order dated 
31.03.2022 (hereinafter referred to as the “impugned judgment”), 
passed by a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka 
at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in Writ 
Appeal No.4067 of 2019 (L-TER) arising from Writ Petition No.13842 
of 2018 (L-TER) by which the High Court dismissed the appeal filed 
by the appellant (hereinafter also referred to as the “Company”), 
which was occasioned on account of the learned Single Judge partly 
allowing the respondent’s writ petition.
THE FACTUAL COMPASS:
3.	
The respondent, upon being interviewed by the appellant’s concerned 
officials was appointed as the Regional Business Head (South) –
Government Enterprise Services on 22.06.2009, in the grade of 
Senior Manager (B2)-Sales. The same carried an annual benefits 
package of Rs.22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Two lakhs) with fixed pay
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of Rs.13,20,000/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs Twenty Thousand) and 
variable pay under the Sales Incentive Plan (hereinafter referred to as 
“SIP”) of Rs.8,80,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs and Eighty Thousand). 
The respondent worked as Team Leader and Regional Business 
Head (South) - Government Enterprise Services, heading a team 
comprising four Account Managers (Sales), one each for the States 
of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, respectively. 
The said Managers were working under the supervision and control 
of the respondent and were in the B1 and B2 salary levels. On 
24.03.2011, the respondent made an initial resignation request on the 
internal system, which was accepted by the appellant on 09.05.2011. 
In terms thereof, the respondent was paid Rs.5,92,538/- (Rupees 
Five Lakhs Ninety-Two Thousand Five Hundred and Thirty-Eight) by 
the appellant in full and final settlement of all his claims.
4.	
After about 19 months, the respondent filed a petition before the 
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Region-2, Bengaluru, alleging his 
resignation to be a forceful resignation, which resulted in initiation of 
conciliation proceedings but ended in failure. However, on 27.06.2013, 
brushing aside the appellant’s objections that the Industrial Disputes 
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the “ID Act”) was not applicable 
in the case of the respondent as he performed managerial and 
supervisory work at an annual package
totalling Rs.22,00,000/- 
(Rupees Twenty-Two Lakhs) and thus, was not a “workman”, within 
the meaning of Section 2(s)1, ID Act, the “appropriate Government”2 
1	
 Extracted hereinafter.
2	
‘(a) “appropriate Government” means,—
(i)	
in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the 
authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such 
controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government or in relation 
to an Industrial Dispute concerning a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A 
of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or the Industrial 
Finance Corporation of India Limited formed and registered under the Companies Act, 
1956], or the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation established under Section 3 of the 
Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of Trustees constituted 
under Section 3-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 
(46 of 1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State Boards of Trustees constituted 
under Section 5-A and Section 5-B, respectively, of the Employees’ Provident Fund and 
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or the Life Insurance Corporation of India 
established under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or 
the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited registered under the Companies Act, 1956 
(1 of 1956) or
the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established under 
Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), 
or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under Section 3 of the Warehousing 
Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of
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M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra
[herein, the Government of Karnataka] referred the dispute to the 
Labour Court under Section 10(1)(c)3, ID Act on 27.06.2013. Pleadings 
were completed and witnesses were examined by both sides.
5.	
On 05.09.2017, the Labour Court made its Award recording findings 
of fact and held that the respondent had failed to plead or prove that 
he was a “workman” and that on an assessment of the evidence on 
record, he was performing the role of a Manager and thus was not a 
“workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s), ID Act, and accordingly 
rejected the reference. Aggrieved, the respondent filed Writ Petition 
No.13842 of 2018 (L-TER) before the High Court challenging the 
Labour Court’s Award and the learned Single Judge by judgment and 
order dated 29.11.2019, partly allowed the writ petition, relying upon 
the judgment of this Court in Ved Prakash Gupta v Delton Cable 
India (P.) Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 569. The learned Single Judge held 
that since there was an absence of power in the respondent, whilst 
the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established 
under Section 3, or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States 
under Section 16 of the Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or the Airports Authority 
of India constituted under Section 3 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994), 
or a Regional Rural Bank established under
Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 
1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or the Industrial 
Reconstruction Corporation of India Limited, or the Banking Service Commission established, 
under Section 3 of the Banking Service Commission Act, 1975, or an air transport service, 
or a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an oilfield, a Cantonment Board, or a major 
port, any company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is 
held by the Central Government, or any corporation, not being a corporation referred to in 
this clause, established by or under any law made by Parliament, or the Central public sector 
undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous 
bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Central Government, and
(ii)	
in relation to any other industrial dispute, including the State public sector undertaking, 
subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or 
controlled by the State Government, the State Government:
Provided that in case of a dispute between a contractor and the contract labour employed 
through the contractor in any industrial establishment where such dispute first arose, the 
appropriate Government shall be the Central Government or the State Government, as the 
case may be, which has control over such industrial establishment.’
3	
‘10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or
Tribunals.—(1) Where the appropriate Government is of 
opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing,—
(a) xxx; or
(b) xxx; or
(c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it 
relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or
(d) xxx:
Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely 
to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the 
reference to a Labour Court under clause (c) :’
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in service of the appellant, to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary 
enquiries against other employees, the same indicated that the 
respondent did not belong to the managerial category and held him 
to be a “workman”. The learned Single Judge, thus, set aside the 
award and remanded the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication 
on merits within 3 months therefrom. Aggrieved by the learned Single 
Judge’s judgment, the appellant filed Writ Appeal No.4067 of 2019 
(L-TER) before the learned Division Bench, which was dismissed 
vide the impugned judgment.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:
6.	
Mr C U Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that 
the Labour Court’s order covered in detail all the factual and legal 
aspects based on the evidence produced before it by both sides and 
needed no interference. It was urged that the learned Single Judge 
as also the learned Division Bench of the High Court erroneously 
interfered in the matter. It was submitted that the respondent was a 
Regional Business Head, whose nature of duties clearly established 
that he was a senior manager in the managerial cadre, earning an 
annual package of Rs.22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Two Lakhs) 
and thus, was not covered by the definition of “workman” as per 
Section 2(s), ID Act. He contended that even the approach adopted 
by the learned Single Judge of re-appreciating the entire evidence 
and coming to a fresh conclusion was not
proper while exercising 
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 
1950 (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) as it was not a 
Court of first instance.
7.	
Mr Singh submitted that even without examining the Award and 
findings of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge concluded 
that the same were perverse. It was advanced that the learned 
Division Bench, on the assumption that the learned Single Judge 
had examined the materials on record, concurred with the judgment 
of the learned Single Judge, ignoring the admitted fact that the 
respondent had worked in progressively more senior managerial 
positions before joining the appellant as Senior Manager (Sales) in 
Band-2 which was equivalent to Deputy General Manager as also 
that his previous employment was as Regional Manager (South) 
in Kodak India Private Limited and he had joined the appellant as 
Head of Sales Operations for four Southern States (Karnataka, Tamil
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M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala) and was also the Team Leader 
of a managerial team which comprised an Account Manager (Sales) 
each for the four States. It was canvassed that the respondent was 
also writing the half-yearly and annual performance assessments 
and appraisals of the Account Managers referred supra as also 
liaising, negotiating and representing the appellant/Company with 
senior government officials of the Indian Administrative Service and 
the General Managers of various Public Sector Undertakings. 
8.	
Further, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the burden of proving 
that the respondent was a “workman” under the ID Act, was not 
discharged and he had neither pleaded nor proved the nature of 
duties and functions performed by him. It was his stand that once 
the respondent tendered his resignation on 24.03.2011, which was 
accepted and he was relieved from service on 09.05.2011, pursuant 
whereto he accepted the full and final settlement on 23.06.2011 
along with receipt of SIP on 26.08.2011, he had clearly accepted 
what had transpired. It was advanced that, therefore, after a period 
of over 1½ years raising an industrial dispute before the Deputy 
Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer, Bengaluru, on the 
ground that his resignation was obtained under coercion and duress, 
was not tenable and was rightly rejected by the Labour Court. It was 
submitted that ironically the
documents relied upon by the respondent 
himself clearly demonstrated that he was a member of the senior 
management cadre, being in-charge of and supervising the Accounts 
Managers in the four Southern States as noted hereinbefore, which, 
by no stretch of imagination can lead to the conclusion that he was 
a “workman”. Learned Senior counsel submitted that in the written 
statement filed by the Company in reply to the Statement of Claim 
of the respondent, it was specifically pleaded that the respondent 
was not a “workman” and the nature of his duties were described in 
detail. However, the learned Single Judge grossly erred and misread 
the documentary and oral evidence while reaching the incorrect 
conclusion that the respondent was a “workman” within the meaning 
of Section 2(s), ID Act.
9.	
On the legal aspect, it was contended that the High Court had 
exceeded its jurisdiction in such matters, as the law was that a writ 
of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution can be issued only 
to correct errors of jurisdiction where a Court or Tribunal acts with 
material irregularity or in violation of natural justice but not for the
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purpose of re-appreciation of evidence or acting as a Court of appeal. 
For such proposition, reliance was placed on the judgment in Syed 
Yakub v K S Radha Krishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, the relevant being 
Paragraph 74. Similarly, it was contended that in matters pertaining 
to industrial law, it has been held that unless the High Court first 
concludes that the Award or Order of a Labour Court or Industrial 
Tribunal is based on no evidence or is perverse, the High Court 
cannot proceed to reappreciate the evidence under Articles 226 or 
227 of the Constitution. In this regard, following judgments were 
relied on - Indian Overseas Bank v IOB Staff Canteen Workers 
Union, (2000) 4 SCC 245; Anoop Sharma v Public Health Division, 
Haryana, (2010) 5 SCC 497, relevant being Paragraphs 12-145, and; 
4	
‘7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 
226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer 
in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts 
or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, 
or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where 
in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally
or properly, as for instance, 
it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where 
the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, 
however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the 
Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that 
findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot 
be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the 
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard 
to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording 
the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or 
had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, 
if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be 
corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear 
in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ 
of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal was 
insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led 
on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the 
jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately 
exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath Bora v. 
Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam [(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar 
Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168].’
5	
‘12. A reading of the impugned order shows that the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the award 
of the Labour Court without even adverting to the fact that challenge to similar award passed in the cases 
of other employees was negatived by the High Court and this Court. We have no doubt that if the Division 
Bench had taken the trouble of ascertaining the status of the disputes raised by other employees, then 
it would have discovered that the award of reinstatement of similarly situated employees has been 
upheld by the High Court and this Court and in that event, it may not have passed the impugned order. 
That apart, we find that even though the Division Bench did not come to the conclusion that the finding 
recorded by the Labour Court on the issue of non-compliance with Section 25-F of the
Act is vitiated 
by an error of law apparent on the face of the record, it allowed the writ petition by assuming that the 
appellant’s initial engagement/employment was not legal and the respondent had complied with the 
conditions of a valid retrenchment.
13. In our view, the approach adopted by the Division Bench is contrary to the judicially recognised 
limitations of the High Court’s power to issue writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution—Syed
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M/S Bharti Airtel Limited v. A.S. Raghavendra
Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. v Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 
4 SCC 270.
10.	 Further, it was submitted that unless a person proves that he is 
employed to perform any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, 
operational, clerical, or supervisory work, such person does not 
fall within the definition of “workman” under Section 2(s), ID Act 
and that it has been held that a teacher, an advertising manager, a 
chemist employed in a sugar mill, gate sergeant in a tannery, and a 
welfare officer in an educational institution are not “workman”, and 
that a legal assistant, whose job is not stereotyped and involves 
creativity can never be a “workman”. It was submitted that the High 
Court has, thus, clearly fallen in error in not appreciating the ratios 
of judgments of this Court in Heavy Engineering Corporation v 
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1996) 11 SCC 236; Muir Mills 
Yakoobv. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477 : (1964) 5 SCR 64] , Municipal Board, Saharanpur 
v. Imperial Tobacco of India Ltd. [(1999) 1 SCC 566] , Lakshmi Precision Screws Ltd. v. Ram Bahagat 
[(2002) 6 SCC 552 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 926] , Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar v. ADJ, Varanasi [(2010) 5 SCC 
510 : JT (2002) 8 SC 69] , Mukand Ltd. v. Staff and Officers’ Assn. [(2004) 10 SCC 460 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 
798] , Dharamraj v. Chhitan [(2006) 12 SCC 349 : (2006) 11 Scale 292] and CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch 
Stock Exchange Ltd. [(2008) 14 SCC 171 : (2008)
12 Scale 582]
14. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR 64] the Constitution Bench 
of this Court considered the scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases 
involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functions under 
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench, Gajendragadkar, J. 
observed as under: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7)
“7. … A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior 
courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without 
jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly 
be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or 
improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to 
the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is 
opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a 
writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an 
appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court 
or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ
proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, 
but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded 
by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the 
Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously 
admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding 
of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected 
by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind 
that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of 
certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was 
insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence 
led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within 
these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of 
certiorari can be legitimately exercised.”’
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Unit of NTC Ltd. v Swayam Prakash Srivastava, (2007) 1 SCC 
491; C Gupta v Glaxo Smithkline Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 171; E.S.I. 
Corporation’s Medical Officers’ Association v ESI Corporation, 
(2014) 16 SCC 182; Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills v Ajit Singh, 
(2005) 3 SCC 232; H R Adyanthaya v Sandoz (India) Ltd., (1994) 
5 SCC 737; Management of M/s May and Baker (India) Ltd. v 
Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 678, and; Pepsico India Holding (supra).
11.	 Even with regard to Chauharya Tripathi v Life Insurance Corporation 
of India, (2015) 7 SCC 263, the relevant being Paragraphs 9-166, 
6	
‘9. We have quoted in extenso as the Constitution Bench has declared the pronouncement in S.K. Verma 
case [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510] as per incuriam.
10. At this juncture, it is condign to note the position in Mukesh K. Tripathi [(2004) 8 SCC 387 : 2004 SCC 
(L&S) 1128] which has been rendered by the three-Judge Bench that has been placed reliance upon by 
the High Court while deciding the writ petition. In Mukesh K. Tripathi case [(2004) 8 SCC 387 : 2004 SCC 
(L&S) 1128] , the question arose whether the appellant, who was appointed as Apprentice Development 
Officer, could be treated as a workman. While dealing with the said question, the three-Judge Bench 
referred to earlier decisions and the Constitution Bench decision in H.R. Adyanthaya [(1994) 5 SCC 737 : 
1994 SCC (L&S) 1283] and opined that : (Mukesh K. Tripathi case [(2004) 8 SCC
387 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 
1128] , SCC p. 396, paras 21-23)
“21. Once the ratio of May and Baker [AIR 1967 SC 678] and other decisions following the same 
had been reiterated despite observations made to the effect that S.K. Verma [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 
1983 SCC (L&S) 510] and other decisions following the same were rendered on the facts of that 
case, we are of the opinion that this Court had approved the reasonings of May and Baker [AIR 
1967 SC 678] and subsequent decisions in preference to S.K. Verma [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 
SCC (L&S) 510] .
22. The Constitution Bench further took notice of the subsequent amendment in the definition 
of ‘workman’ and held that even the legislature impliedly did not accept the said interpretation 
of this Court in S.K. Verma [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510] and other decisions. 
23. It may be true, as has been submitted by Ms Jaising, that S.K. Verma [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 
1983 SCC (L&S) 510] has not been expressly overruled in H.R. Adyanthaya [(1994) 5 SCC 
737 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1283] but once the said decision has been held to have been rendered 
perincuriam it cannot be said to have laid down a good law. This Court is bound by the decision of 
the Constitution Bench.”
We respectfully agree with the aforesaid exposition of law. There can be no cavil over the proposition 
that once a judgment has been declared per incuriam, it does not have the precedential value. After so 
stating, the three-Judge Bench did not accept the stand of the
appellant therein that he was a workman 
and accordingly declined to interfere.
11. As has been stated earlier, the decision that was pressed into service in the application filed for 
review is the judgment in R. Suresh [(2008) 11 SCC 319 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1083] . In the said case, 
the question that was posed in the beginning of the judgment reads thus : (SCC p. 321, para 2)
“2. Whether jurisdiction of the Industrial Courts is ousted in regard to an order of dismissal passed 
by Life Insurance Corporation of India, a corporation constituted and incorporated under the Life 
Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, is the question involved in this appeal which arises out of a 
judgment and order dated 3-2-2006 [LIC v. Industrial Tribunal, Writ Appeal No. 3360 of 2001, 
decided on 3-2-2006 (Ker)] passed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam.”
12. The facts of R. Suresh case [(2008) 11 SCC 319 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1083] that were the subject-
matter of the lis in the said case were that the respondent was appointed as a Development Officer 
of LIC and a departmental proceeding was initiated against him and eventually he was found guilty in 
respect of certain charges and was dismissed from service by the disciplinary authority. As an industrial 
dispute was raised by him, the appropriate Government referred the dispute for adjudication by the 
Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal passed an award on 6-2-1993 and reduced the punishment imposed
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the appellant contends the said decision squarely covers the case, 
but has not been accepted by the learned Single Judge.
by the employer. The said order was assailed before the High Court in the writ petition. Before the High 
Court, the decision in M. Venugopal v. LIC [(1994) 2 SCC 323 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 664 : (1994) 27 ATC 84] 
was cited. The High Court opined that the said decision was not applicable and placed reliance on the 
authority in S.K. Verma [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510] . Thereafter, the Court referred to the 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment and after referring to 
various provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, opined that it is “State” and on that basis 
ruled thus : (R. Suresh case [(2008) 11 SCC 319 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1083] , SCC p. 328, paras 35-36)
“35. The jurisdiction of the Industrial Court being wide and it having been conferred with the power 
to interfere with the quantum of punishment, it could go into the nature of charges, so as to arrive 
at a conclusion as to whether the respondent had misused his position or his acts are in breach of 
trust conferred upon him by his employer.
36. It may be true that quantum of loss may not be of much relevance as has been held in Suresh 
Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce [(2006) 10 SCC 572 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 612 : (2007) 1 
SCC (L&S) 224] , but there again
a question arose as to whether he was in the position of trust 
or not.”
13. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that the two-Judge Bench in R. Suresh case [(2008) 11 SCC 
319 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1083] referred to the decision in S.K. Verma [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC 
(L&S) 510] and also stated that they were not unmindful of the principle stated in Mukesh K. Tripathi 
[(2004) 8 SCC 387 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1128] . Dealing with the decision in Mukesh K. Tripathi [(2004) 8 
SCC 387 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1128] , the Court said that there the question was whether the Apprentice 
Development Officer would be a “workman” within the meaning of the provisions of Section 2(s) of the 
Act and observed that it was not dealing with the case that pertains to an apprentice.
14. Mr Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant built the plinth of his argument on 
the basis of the aforesaid authority with the hope that an enormous structure would come into existence 
but as we find on a studied and anxious reading of the judgment, we notice that there is no reference 
to the Constitution Bench decision in H.R. Adyanthaya [(1994) 5 SCC 737 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1283] and 
the two-Judge Bench, though has referred to S.K. Verma [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510] 
and Mukesh K. Tripathi [(2004) 8 SCC 387 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1128] but has not taken note of what the 
three-Judge Bench has said in Mukesh K. Tripathi [(2004) 8 SCC 387 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1128] with 
regard to the
precedent and how S.K. Verma case [(1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510] is no more 
a binding precedent.
15. In our considered opinion, the decision in R. Suresh [(2008) 11 SCC 319 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 
1083] cannot be regarded as the precedent for the proposition that a Development Officer in LIC is a 
“workman”. In fact, the judgment does not say so but Mr Vasdev, the learned Senior Counsel would 
submit that inferring such a ratio, cases are being decided by the High Courts and other authorities. 
Though such an apprehension should not be there, yet to clarify the position, we may quote a few lines 
from Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213 : AIR 1987 SC 1073] : (SCC p. 221, 
para 18)
“18. … It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, 
and not what logically follows from it. (See Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495 : 
(1900-03) All ER Rep 1 (HL)] .)”
In view of the aforesaid, any kind of interference is not permissible but, a pregnant one, it has dealt with 
the cases of Development Officers of LIC.
16. As we find, the said judgment R. Suresh [(2008) 11 SCC 319 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1083] has been 
rendered in ignorance of the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench in H.R. Adyanthaya [(1994) 5 
SCC 737 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1283] and also the principle stated by the three-Judge Bench in Mukesh K. 
Tripathi [(2004) 8 SCC 387 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1128] that the decision in S.K. Verma [(1983) 4 SCC
214 : 
1983 SCC (L&S) 510] is not a precedent, and hence, we are compelled to hold that the pronouncement 
in R. Suresh [(2008) 11 SCC 319 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1083] is per incuriam. We say so on the basis of 
the decisions rendered in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372] , Punjab 
Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Labour Court [(1990) 3 SCC 682 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 
71] , State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [(1991) 4 SCC 139] and Siddharam Satlingappa 
Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra [(2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] .’
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12.	 Learned counsel summed up his arguments by pointing out that 
the Labour Court had rightly noticed Clause 5.5 of the respondent’s 
Appointment Letter which starts with “being a managerial cadre 
employee you will be………”, which should leave no manner of doubt 
that the respondent cannot come within the definition under Section 
2(s), ID Act and his post/position was a pure managerial position.
13.	 Learned counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge has 
erroneously relied on Ved Prakash Gupta (supra) to hold that 
since there was an absence of power to appoint, dismiss or hold 
disciplinary enquiry against other employees, the same indicated 
that the respondent did not belong to the managerial capacity as the 
observation therein was not a water-proof compartment to hold that 
the respondent was a “workman”. Mr Singh urged that the impugned 
judgment deserved to be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT-IN-PERSON
14.	 The respondent, who appeared in person, vehemently opposed the 
instant appeal. He submitted that the arguments advanced on behalf 
of the appellant are without any basis. He submitted that before the 
learned Single Judge and the learned Division Bench of the High 
Court, he had succeeded in establishing that he was a “workman” 
based on the nature of duties performed by him. Further, he contended 
that the Labour Court had ignored the fact that there was enough oral 
and documentary evidence
showing the nature of duties performed 
by him, which was ignored in a hyper-technical manner on the 
ground that specific pleading that he was a “workman” was missing 
in his Statement of Claim. It was his stand that only because of his 
designation and salary, it was held that he was not a “workman” 
which was an incorrect approach by the Labour Court. He submitted 
that the proceedings before the Labour Court do not require strict 
compliance of Rules of Evidence, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He canvassed that basically it is 
the rules of natural justice which have to prevail. It was further argued 
that in the Statement of Claim, the expression “workman” was not 
expressly used as he had engaged the services of an advocate to 
draft such claim and was also because of inadvertence and sheer 
oversight. The respondent urged that the same cannot be held to 
be against him as he has mentioned in sufficient detail, the duties 
performed by him and nature thereof, which are neither managerial
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nor supervisory but, as per him, purely clerical. He reiterated that 
the appellant had obtained his resignation under coercion, and he 
was removed from his services wrongfully/unlawfully and virtually 
at gunpoint. He submitted that the resignation was not out of his 
free will as he had pleaded for alternative job/employment with the 
appellant and had stated the reason for resignation.
15.	 It was submitted that the appellant is a telecommunications enterprise 
and offers telecom-related products and services to individuals and 
entities as also to Government Departments and participates in 
government tenders. The respondent stated that the appellant has a 
separate division called “Government Vertical Division/Department” 
which has to liaison with Government Departments by collecting 
information and passing it on to the superior officers/management in 
the Company. The Respondent states that he was working in such 
vertical division and thus his duties were clerical in nature.
16.	 Continuing, the respondent stated that he had no decision-making 
knowledge, and/or qualification, and/or powers and nobody reported 
to him. The stand taken was that to facilitate its employees for having 
ease of access to Government Departments, the appellant like many 
other private organisations, tactfully gave fanciful and impressive 
designations like “Regional Business Head”, “Team Leader”, etc. 
without any real
power or authority. It was submitted that subsequently, 
the appellant did not issue any further Memo or Letter designating 
him as “Regional Business Head” or “Team Leader”. He reiterated 
that he was not writing any appraisals of any employee and was also 
not an “Assessing Manager”. The respondent also tried to indicate 
discrepancies in the stand of the appellant before different fora.
17.	 The respondent, in support of his contentions above, has placed 
reliance upon the following pronouncements:
Devinder Singh v Municipal Counicl, Sanaur, (2011) 6 SCC 
584; Suo-Motu Contempt Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2021 [2022 
SCC OnLine SC 858]; Shankarbhai Nathalal Prajapati v Maize 
Products, 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 143; Suzuki Parasrampuria 
Suitings Private Limited v Official Liquidator of Mahendra 
Petrochemicals Limited (in Liquidation), (2018) 10 SCC 707; 
Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai v Parithi 
Ilamvazhuthi, (2011) 5 SCC 496; K D Sharma v Steel Authority 
of India Limited, (2008) 12 SCC 481; Tularam Manikrao Hadge v
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Sudarshan Paper Converting Works, Nagpur, 2020 SCC OnLine 
Bom 965; Bombay Mothers and Children’s Society v General 
Labour Union (Red Flag), 1991 SCC OnLine Bom 88; Deepali 
Gundu Surwase v Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.), 
(2013) 10 SCC 324; Ishwarlal Mali Rathod v Gopal, 2021 SCC 
OnLine SC 921; Anvar P V v P K Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473; 
Sri Shivadarshan Balse v The State of Karnataka, rep. by its 
Secretary, Revenue Department, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 2317; 
Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Limited v Kitab Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 573; 
National Kamgar Union v Kran Rader Private Limited, (2018) 1 
SCC 784; Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v The Workmen, (1970) 
3 SCC 248; Ved Prakash Gupta (supra), and; Arkal Govind Raj 
Rao v Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. Bombay, (1985) 3 SCC 371.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
18.	 Having carefully considered the facts and circumstances and 
submissions of the parties, the Court finds that the Impugned 
Judgment as also the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge 
cannot be sustained. The moot issue is whether the respondent would 
or would not come within the definitional stipulation of a “workman” 
as laid out under Section 2(s), ID Act. The same reads as under:
“2(s) “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) 
employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, 
skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work 
for hire or reward, whether the terms of
employment be 
express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding 
under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes 
any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or 
retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that 
dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has 
led to that dispute, but does not include any such person—
(i)	
who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), 
or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 
1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii)	
who is employed in the police service or as an officer 
or other employee of a prison; or
(iii)	 who is employed mainly in a managerial or 
administrative capacity; or
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(iv)	 who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws 
wages exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem or 
exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached 
to the office or by reason of the powers vested in 
him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.”
19.	 The story begins with induction of the respondent into the appellant-
Company on 22.06.2009. Perusal of the Appointment Letter of even 
date, which has also been taken note of by the Labour Court, reveals 
at the very beginning that the respondent’s appointment was as 
“Senior Manager(B2) - Sales” in the Company.
20.	 Clause 5.5 of the Appointment Letter provides as under:
“Being a managerial cadre employee you will be 
responsible for the overall smooth and effective functioning 
of the department/ establishment/ office/ staff/ employees 
under you charge and will be directly responsible for the 
successful and timely completion of any job / work assigned 
to you or any person working under your control and 
supervision and/ or within the department/ establishment/ 
office of which you are for the tire being holding the charge 
You would adhere to the norms of office discipline. You 
would also be responsible to ensure proper and effective 
adherence to the norms of office discipline including 
working hours, systems and procedures by the staff/ 
employees working under your supervision and/or In the 
department/ office/ establishment under
your charge.” [sic]
21.	 Coupled with the above, Annexure ‘A’ to the Appointment Letter 
discloses that the respondent had perks such as Special Allowance, 
Car Hiring Charges, Petrol and Maintenance, Driver’s Salary, 
Professional Body Membership(s) and Credit Card Reimbursement 
etcetera.
22.	 The fixed pay of the respondent was Rs.13,20,000/- (Rupees Thirteen 
Lakhs and Twenty Thousand), whereas the SIP was Rs.8,80,000/- 
(Rupees Eight Lakhs and Eighty Thousand), with the total coming 
to Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Two Lakhs) per annum. In the 
orders of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge and the learned 
Division Bench as also the material placed before us in the present 
proceedings, it is clear that even prior to joining the appellant-
Company, the respondent, had worked in a managerial capacity
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in another organisation7. The respondent himself described his 
position as a Member of the senior management cadre, in-charge of 
supervising the Account Managers in the four Southern States. Even 
the application made by the respondent seeking employment in the 
appellant-Company shows that it was for the position of “Head Sales 
Operations”. Further, in the said application, relating to professional 
experience, he disclosed that he was Regional Manager South – 
Graphic Communication Group in Kodak India Private Limited from 
June, 2007 till the date of making the application; in Xerox India as 
“Corporate Account Relationship Manager”(2005-2007), “Manager 
Graphic Arts” (2002-2005) and “Account Manager – Government” 
(2000-2002); in Food World Supermarkets Limited as “Assistant 
Manager-Operations” (April, 2000-October, 2000) and in STM & 
Sterling Resort (I) Limited as “Assistant Manager Sales” (July, 
1992–March, 2000).
23.	 The records also show that the respondent, in fact, performed a 
supervisory role over the managers and was the Assessing Manager 
of his team, which consisted of Managers in the B-1 & B-2 Levels. 
Moreover, after adducing the evidence led by both sides, the Labour 
Court vide a detailed order and discussion, has held the respondent 
not to be covered under “workman” as per Section 2(s), ID Act. The 
learned Single Judge has not appreciated the discussion by the 
Labour Court and the available
evidence in their true perspective, 
relying mainly upon the judgment in Ved Prakash Gupta (supra). 
In Paragraph 12 of Ved Prakash Gupta (supra), it was held “…It 
must also be remembered that the evidence of both WW1 and MW1 
shows that the appellant could never appoint or dismiss any workman 
or order any enquiry against any workman. In these circumstances 
we hold that the substantial duty of the appellant was only that of 
a Security Inspector at the gate of the factory premises and that it 
was neither managerial nor supervisory in nature in the sense in 
which those terms are understood in industrial law. In the light of 
the evidence and the legal position referred to above we are of the 
opinion that the finding of the Labour Court that the appellant is not 
a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act is perverse 
and could not be supported.”
7 
 Kodak India Private Limited.
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24.	 A bare perusal of the above makes it crystal clear that absence of 
power to appoint, dismiss or conduct disciplinary enquiries against 
other employees was not the only reason for the Court to conclude 
in Ved Prakash Gupta (supra) that the appellant therein was a 
“workman”. At this juncture, we may note that although Ved Prakash 
Gupta (supra) was decided by a 3-Judge Bench, in a later judgment 
by a 2-Judge Bench of this Court in S K Maini v M/s Carona Sahu 
Company Limited, (1994) 3 SCC 510, it was held that “…It should 
be borne in mind that an employee discharging managerial duties 
and functions may not, as a matter of course, be invested with the 
power of appointment and discharge of other employees. It is not 
unlikely that in a big set-up such power is not invested to a local 
manager but such power is given to some superior officers also 
in the management cadre at divisional or regional level. …” The 
judgment in S K Maini (supra) is innocent of Ved Prakash Gupta 
(supra), but we do not find any inconsistency in the statement of law 
laid down in S K Maini (supra), given our reading of Ved Prakash 
Gupta (supra) as enunciated hereinabove.
25.	 That being said, in our considered view, mere absence of power to 
appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary inquiries against other employees, 
would not and could not be the sole criterion to determine such an 
issue. Holding otherwise would lead to
incongruous consequences, as 
the same would, illustratively, mean that, employees in high-ranking 
positions but without powers to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary 
enquiry would be included under the umbrella of “workman” under 
Section 2(s), ID Act. We cannot be oblivious of the impact of our 
decisions. In this context, reference to the decision in Shivashakti 
Sugars Limited v Shree Renuka Sugar Limited, (2017) 7 SCC 
729 is apposite:
“43. It has been recognised for quite some time now that 
law is an interdisciplinary subject where interface between 
law and other sciences (social sciences as well as natural/
physical sciences) come into play and the impact of other 
disciplines on Law is to be necessarily kept in mind while 
taking a decision (of course, within the parameters of 
legal provisions). Interface between Law and Economics 
is much more relevant in today’s time when the country 
has ushered into the era of economic liberalisation, which 
is also termed as “globalisation” of economy. India is on
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the road of economic growth. It has been a developing 
economy for number of decades and all efforts are made, 
at all levels, to ensure that it becomes a fully developed 
economy. Various measures are taken in this behalf by the 
policy-makers. The judicial wing, while undertaking the task 
of performing its judicial function, is also required to perform 
its role in this direction. It calls for an economic analysis 
of law approach, most commonly referred to as “Law and 
Economics”. In fact, in certain branches of Law there is a 
direct impact of Economics and economic considerations 
play predominant role, which are even recognised as legal 
principles. Monopoly laws (popularly known as “Antitrust 
Laws” in USA) have been transformed by Economics. The 
issues arising in competition laws (which has replaced 
monopoly laws) are decided primarily on economic analysis 
of various provisions of the Competition Commission 
Act. Similar approach is to be necessarily adopted while 
interpreting bankruptcy laws or even matters relating to 
corporate finance, etc. The impress of Economics is strong 
while examining various facets of the issues arising under 
the aforesaid laws. In fact, economic evidence plays a 
big role even while deciding environmental issues. There 
is a growing role of Economics in contract, labour, tax, 
corporate and other laws. Courts are increasingly receptive 
to economic arguments while deciding these
issues. In 
such an environment it becomes the bounden duty of 
the Court to have the economic analysis and economic 
impact of its decisions.
44.We may hasten to add that it is by no means suggested 
that while taking into account these considerations, specific 
provisions of law are to be ignored. First duty of the Court 
is to decide the case by applying the statutory provisions. 
However, on the application of law and while interpreting a 
particular provision, economic impact/effect of a decision, 
wherever warranted, has to be kept in mind. Likewise, in a 
situation where two views are possible or wherever there 
is a discretion given to the Court by law, the Court needs 
to lean in favour of a particular view which subserves the 
economic interest of the nation. Conversely, the Court
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needs to avoid that particular outcome which has a potential 
to create an adverse effect on employment, growth of 
infrastructure or economy or the revenue of the State. It 
is in this context that economic analysis of the impact of 
the decision becomes imperative.”
(emphasis supplied)
26.	 As regards the power of the High Court to re-appraise the facts, 
it cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible under 
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, there must be a 
level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a Tribunal’s order, which is 
facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference. 
We do not think such a situation prevailed in the present facts. 
Further, the ratio of the judgments relied upon by the respondent 
in support of his contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand.
27.	 Though much emphasis was laid by the respondent on his claim 
that his resignation was forced, this Court is not persuaded to 
accept such a contention, basically on the ground that the language 
employed by the respondent in his resignation letter is to the effect 
that he was submitting his resignation, which may be approved, 
keeping the interest of his family and career and also that with 
utmost feeling of humiliation and insult he was submitting such 
resignation. It further indicates that over the six months preceding 
his resignation, he felt that he had been
subjected to unfair rating, 
which indicates his disillusionment and dissatisfaction, while working 
for the Company. Pausing here, the Court would indicate that a 
person, in the employment of any company, cannot dictate terms of 
his employment to his employer. He has channels of venting her/his 
grievances but ultimately, it is the view of the competent authority 
within the organisation that will prevail with regard to his appraisal/
rating. In his resignation letter dated 24.03.2011, the respondent has 
further stated that because of being subjected to unfair rating without 
any feedback or review, he faced personal and professional insult, 
harassment and was left with no option but to submit his resignation, 
which was not out of his free will. Again, the Court would indicate 
that the phraseology, “not of his free will” would not mean that it was 
forced upon him by the Company. Rather, what can be gathered 
from the materials on record and the orders of the fora below, is 
that the resignation was more out of a sense of being unfairly rated 
by the appellant. From the material available, it also transpires that
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the respondent had made a complaint to the Ombudsman pertaining 
to his unfair rating. Needless to point out, it would be far-fetched for 
the Court to assume that the entire organisation i.e., the Company 
would be against one individual (the respondent) and that a person 
of such high calibre and quality, who could deliver so much to the 
Company, would be forced to put in his papers.
28.	 The respondent asserts that he was one of the best performers and 
an asset to the Company. Such being the situation, it is hard to fathom 
why all his superiors would have turned against him. On the record, 
there is no direct allegation of any bias against or victimisation of 
the respondent as he himself has stated as also written to various 
persons venting his grievances. Only because things did not turn out 
the way the respondent wanted them to, or for that his grievances 
were not adequately or appropriately addressed, cannot lead to 
the presumption that the resignation was forced upon him by the 
Company. One way to label the respondent’s resignation as “forced” 
would be to attribute the compulsion to the respondent, rather than 
factors relating to the Company and/or its management. In other 
words, it can be termed a result of feeling suffocated due to lack of 
proper appreciation and not being given his rightful due that led to 
the chain of events supra, rather than by way of any arbitrariness or 
high-handedness on the
part of the appellant. Bearing due regard to 
the nature of duties performed by the respondent, we are satisfied 
that the same do not entail him being placed under the cover of 
Section 2(s), ID Act.
29.	 For reasons aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is, accordingly, 
allowed. The impugned judgment as well as the judgment rendered 
by the learned Single Judge are set aside. The judgment of the 
Labour Court is revived and restored. Ex consequenti, it is held and 
declared that the respondent is not a “workman” and thus, reference 
to the Labour Court under the ID Act against the appellant would 
not be maintainable. We commend the respondent for his spirited 
resistance to the appeal.
30.	 Parties to bear their own costs.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
Result of the case: 
Appeal allowed.