HARBEER SINGH versus SHEESHPAL & ORS.
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 380, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
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[2016) 8 S.C.R. 380 
HARBEER SINGH 
v. 
SHEESHPAL & ORS. 
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1624-1625of2013) 
OCTOBER 20, 2016 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3 - s. 161 and Explanation 
to s.162 - Murder - On accou/lf of previous enmity - Four accused 
- Chance Witnesses - Interested Witnesses - Prosecution case, that 
while driving Jeep, accused persons with intention to kill the victim 
hit him and dragged him from one place to another - Victim died on 
the spot - There was delay in recording the statement of witnesses -
Trial court convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to 
life imprisonment - High Court however, acquitted all the accused 
persons - On appeal, held: Prosecution was not able to prove its 
case beyond all reasonable doubt since the eye-witnesses were 
interested in the complainant and hence unreliable, while most other 
prosecution witnesses ll'ere chance witnesses - Evidence of the eye 
witnesses both as to fact of the alleged conspiracy and murder of 
the deceased, did not inspire confidence; there were inconsistencies 
and improvements in the deposition of the prosecution witnesses 
made over their statements recorded - Further, there was 
unexplained delay in recording the evidence of certain prosecution 
witnesses as well as many important and basic lapses in investigation 
that made the prosecution case suspicious - No ground to interfere 
with the judgment passed by High Court -
Penal Code, 1860 -
ss. 302, 149, I 20B. 
Constitution of India -Art.136 - Scope of - Interference in 
criminal appeal against acquittal - Supreme Court not to interfere 
with the judgment of the High Court unless High Court has acted 
perverse~y or improperly. 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. In an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution 
of India, Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of 
the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or 
31!0
HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS. 
381 
perverse or manifestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact 
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that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on 
record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal.[Para 
10][388-C-D) 
Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash 
(1972) 1 SCC 249 : 1972 (2) SCR 765; State of U.P. v. 
Harihar Bux Singh & Anr. (1975) 3 SCC 167; State of 
Uttar Pradesh v. Ashok Kumar & Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 1 
: 1979 (3) SCR 1; State of U.P. v. Gopi & Ors. (1980) 
Supp. SCC 160; State of Karnataka v. Amajappa & 
Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 468; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bmme 
@ Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271; State of U.P. v. 
Gurucharan & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 721 : 2010 (2) 
SCR 1110; State of Haryana v. Shakuntla & Ors. (2012) 
5 SCC 171 : 2012 (5) SCR 276; Hamza v. 
Muhammadkutty @ Mani & Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 150 : 
2013 (10) SCR 867 - referred to. 
2. PW3 and PW9 were not witnesses to the alleged 
conspiracy between the accused persons since not only the 
details of the conversation given by these two prosecution 
witnesses were different but also their presence at the alleged 
spot at the relevant time seems unnatural. Besides, it appears 
that there have been improvements in the statements of PW3. 
The Explanation to s.162 Cr.P.C. provides that an omission to 
state a fact or circumstance in the statement recorded by a 
police officer u/s.161 Cr.P.C., may amount to contradiction if 
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the same appears to be significant
and otherwise relevant 
having regard to the context in which such omission occurs 
and whether any omission amounts to a contradiction in the 
particular context shall be a question of fact. Thus, while it is 
true that every improvement is not fatal to the prosecution 
case, in cases where an improvement creates a serious doubt 
about the truthfulness or credibility of a witness, the defence may 
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take advantage of the same. The High Court had rightly 
considered these omissions 11rc material omissions amounting 
to contradictions covered by the Explanation to s.162 Cr.P,C. 
[Para 15][389-F-H; 390-A, B-C] 
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382 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
Ashok Vishnu Davare v. State Of Maharashtra (2004) 
9 SCC 431; Radha Kumar v. State of B ihar (no11' 
Jharkhand) (2005) 10 SCC 216; Sunil Kumar 
Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) & Ors. v. State of 
Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657 : 2010 (15) SCR 
452; Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 12 SCC 
473: 2013 (9) SCR 547 - referred to. 
3. In the present case, the date of occurrence was 
21.12.1993 but the statements of PWl and PW5 were recorded 
after two days of incident, i.e., on 23.12.1993. The evidence of 
PW6 was recorded on 26.12.1993 while the evidence of PWll 
was recorded after 10 days of incident, i.e., on 31.12.1993. There 
was a delay of 15-16 days from the date of the incident in recording 
the statements of PW3 and PW9. There is no reason to interfere 
with the observations of High Court on the point of delay and its 
corresponding impact on the prosecution case. Further, the High 
D Court has also concluded that these witnesses were interested 
witnesses and their testimony were not corroborated by 
independent witoesses.[Paras 15,16,17 and 18)(390-C, E; 391-
A-C] 
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Ganesh/al v. State of Mahrashtra (1992) 3 SCC 106: 
1992 (2) SCR 502; Mohd. Khalid 1~ State of W.B. (2002) 
7 SCC 334 : 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31; Prithvi (Minor) 
v. Mam Raj & Ors. (2004) 13 SCC 279 : 2004 (2) 
SCR 530; Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State 
(NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 sec 1: 2010 (4) SCR 103; 
Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State Of Maharashtra
(1978) 
4 SCC 371 : 1979 (2) SCR 94; Balakrushna S1Min v. 
State Of Orissa (1971) 3 SCC 192; Maruti Rama Naik 
v. State of Mahrashtra (2003) 10 SCC 670; Jagjit Singh 
v. State of Punjab (2005) 3 SCC 68; Darya Singh v. 
State of Punjab 1964 (7) SCR 397 - referred to. 
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4. Deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at 
the place of incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. 
Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the High Court that 
PW5 and PW6 were chance witnesses and their statements 
have been rightly discarded. The evidence of the eye witnesses 
H is not truthful, reliable and trustworthy and hence cannot
HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS. 
383 
form the 
basis 
of conviction. Their presence at the scene of A 
occurrence at the time of the incident is highly unnatural as also 
their ability to individually and correctly identify each of the 
accused from a considerable distance, especially when it was 
dark at the alleged place of occurrence, is itself suspect. 
[Paras 24, 25][392-G, H; 393-A] 
Puran v. The State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 459; Mousam 
Singha Roy and Ors. v. State of W.B. (2003) 12 SCC 
377; Shankarlal v. State of Rajastahan (2004) 10 SCC 
632; Jarnail Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab (2009) 9 
SCC 719 : 2009 (13) SCR 774 - relied on. 
6. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that 
the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable 
doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond all reasonable doubt 
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lies on the prosecution and it never shifts. Another golden thread 
which runs through the web of the administration of justice in 
criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence D 
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and 
the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the 
accused should be adopted. In the instant case, the prosecution 
has also been unable to convincingly connect the jeep of the 
accused Sheeshpal with the incident beyond reasonable doubt. 
Further, owing to other lapses in investigation, as recorded by 
the High Court, the prosecution has been unable to prove its
case beyond all reasonable doubt. The view taken by the High 
Court in the facts and circumstances of the case appears to be 
a reasonably plausible one. [Paras 11, 26][388-F-G; 393-B-C] 
Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 
808 : 1974 (1) SCR 722; State of Rajasthan v. Raja 
Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 : 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 445; 
Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 
415 : 2007 (2) SCR 630; Upendra Pradhan v. State of 
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Orissa (2015) 11 SCC 124 : 2015 (5) SCR 214; Go/bar 
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Hussain & Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr. (2015) 11 
SCC 242: 2015 (5) SCR 525 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
1972 (2) SCR 765 
referred to 
Para9 
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A 
(1975) 3 sec 167 
referred to 
Para 10 
1979 (3) SCR 1 
referred to 
Para 10 
(1980) Supp. sec 160 
referred to 
Para 10 
(200~) 9 sec 468 
referred to 
Para 10 
8 
(2009) 4 sec 211 
referred to 
Para 10 
2910 (2) SCR 1110 
referred to 
Para 10 
2012 (5) SCR 276 
referred to 
Para 10 
2013 (10) SCR 867 
referred to 
Para 10 
c 1974 (1) SCR 722 
referred to 
Para 11 
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 445 
referred to 
Para 11 
2007 (2) SCR 630 
referred to 
Para 11 
2015 (~) SCR 214 
referred to 
Para 11 
D 2015 (5) SCR 525 
referred to 
Para 11 
(2004) 9 sec 431 
referred to 
Para 15 
(2005) 10 sec 216 
referred to 
Para 15 
E 
~010 (15) SCR 452 
referred to 
Para 15 
2013 (9) SCR 547 
referred to 
Para 15 
1992 (2) SCR 502 
referred to 
Para 16 
2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31 
referred to 
Para 16 
F 2004 (~) SCR 530 
referred to 
Para 16 
2010 (4) SCR 103 
referred to 
Para 16 
1979 (2) SCR 94 
referred to 
Para 17 
(1971) 3 sec 192 
referred to 
Para 17 
G (2003) 10 sec 670 
referred to 
Para 17 
(2005) 3 sec 68 
referred to 
Para 17 
1964 (7) SCR 397 
referred to 
Para 19 
(1972) 3 sec 79 
referred to 
Para 21 
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HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS. 
AIR 1953 SC 459 
relied on 
Para 23 
(2003) 12 sec 377 
relied on 
Para 24 
(2004) 10 sec 632 
relied on 
Para 24 
2009 (13) SCR 774 
relied on 
Para 24 
CRJMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 
Nos. 1624-1625 of2013. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2011 of the High Court 
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in D. B. Criminal 
Appeal No. 290 of 1995 and D. B. Criminal Appeal No. 375of1995. 
WITH 
Crl.A. Nos. 217-218 of2013. 
K. K. Rai, Sr. Adv, Krishnanad Pandeya, Anshul Rai, Chandra 
Shekhar, Jayant Bhatt P. L, Hamid Khan, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, 
Ms. Madhurima Tatia, Advs. for the appearing patties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. I. These appeals, by special 
leave, are directed against the judgment and order dated 25th November, 
2011, passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, 
Jaipur, in D.S. Criminal Appeal No.290/1995 and D.S. Criminal Appeal 
No.375/1995, whereby the High Court has quashed and set aside the 
conviction of the accused respondents. Criminal Appeal Nos.1624-1625 
of2013 are filed by the son of the deceased and Criminal Appeal Nos.217-
218of2013 are filed by the State of Rajasthan challenging the acquittal 
order passed by the High Court. 
2. The brief facts of the case as unfolded by the prosecution are 
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as follows: On 21.12.1993, at 7.55 P.M., Bhagwara Ram (PW-8), the 
brother of the deceased Balbir Singh,
gave a written report at P.S. 
Kotwali Sikar, stating that on 21.12.1993 in the evening at about 6.00 
P.M., when his younger brother Balbir (deceased) was returning to.his 
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house, two men were standing near the Dhaba ofShankar and he started 
talking to them. In the meantime, Sheeshpal (son ofKhuba Ram) came 
from the side of Sikar driving his Jeep and with an intention to kill, hit 
Balbir and dragged him upto the Dhaba of Suresh as a result of which 
Balbir died on the spot. The owner of the Dhaba- Suresh Kumar chased 
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them on his motorcycle. It was further stated that the act was committed 
by Sheeshpal in furtherance of his old enmity with Balbirin connivance 
with Bhanwarlal, Dhanvir, Mangal (sons of Khuba Ram) and 
Bhanwarlal's brother-in-law Nemichand and Shiv Bhagwan of Village 
Gothura Tagalan. It is also mentioned in the written report that at the 
time of the incident, Sheeshpal was driving the jeep and Nemichand, 
Shiv Bhagwan, Rajendra and Prakash were with him in the Jeep and it 
is not mentioned that Bhanwarwal was present in the jeep or at the 
place of occurrence. The names of Dhanvir and Mangal were dropped 
later on. 
3. The Police registered a case under Section 302 of the Indian 
Penal Code and began investigation. Formal FIR was registered, place 
of occurrence was inspected, site plan was prepared, post-mortem of 
the dead body was done, Panchnama of the dead body was prepared 
and the vehicle used in the crime along with number plate of the vehicle 
and broken parts was seized. Statements of the witnesses were recorded 
and during investigation accused persons were taken into custody. After 
completion of the investigation, accused Bhanwar Lal was declared 
absconding. Charge sheet was filed against the accused persons before 
the learned Magistrate and the case was committed to the Sessions 
Court for trial. On Bhan war Lal's presence, his case was also committed 
as above and both the cases were
amalgamated and trial commenced. 
Charges under Sections 149, 302, 1208 of the !PC were framed against 
all the accused persons except Bhanwar Lal. Accused Bhanwar Lal 
was charged under Sections 302, 1208 of !PC. All the accused persons 
pleaded 'not guilty' and hence they were tried by the Court of Sessions. 
The Trial Court convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to 
life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the !PC. 
They were also sentenced severally under various sections. 
4. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 17.06.1995, passed 
by the Trial Comi, the accused persons filed appeals before the High 
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The High Court 
allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment and order passed by the 
Trial Court and acquitted all the accused persons. Hence, these appeals, 
by special leave, are filed before this Court. 
5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the Appellant 
as also the learned counsel appearing for the Respondents and perused 
the oral and documentary evidence on record.
HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS. 
387 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
6. The Trial Court convicted the accused relying upon the 
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successful establishment of the following facts by the prosecution: 
(a) Death of the deceased due to unnatural reasons vide the 
evidence of PW4 (medical jurist who conducted the post-mortem 
of the deceased), Ext. P-12 (post-mortem report), Ext. P-15 
(Panchnama), and the evidence of PW8 (complainant); 
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(b) Hatching of criminal conspiracy to commit the murder of the 
deceased by accused Bhanwar Lal along with Sheespal, Nemi 
Chand, Shiv Bhagwan and Rajendra Kumar vide the evidence of 
PW3 and PW9; 
(c) Existence of enmity between accused persons and the 
deceased; 
(d) Formation of an unlawful assembly by the accused Sheeshpal, 
Nemichand, Shiv Bhagwan, Rajendra Kumar and Prakash having 
the common object of committing the murder of the deceased 
vide the evidence of PW8, PW!, PWS, PW6 and PW! I; 
( e) Use of force and violence in furtherance of the common object 
by using vehicle RJ-23-C-0203 ofSheeshpal and commission of 
the offence defined under Section 300, fourthly, ofIPC. 
7. However, the High Court gave the benefit of doubt to the 
Respondents and acquitted them on the ground that the prosecution was 
not able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt since the eye-
witnesses were interested in the complainant and hence unreliable, while 
most other prosecution witnesses were chance witnesses. The evidence 
of the eye-witnesses
both as to the fact of the alleged conspiracy and 
the murder of the deceased, did not inspire confidence; there were 
inconsistencies and improvements in the deposition of the prosecution 
witnesses made over their statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. 
Further, there was unexplained delay in recording the evidence of certain 
prosecution witnesses as well as many important and basic lapses in 
investigation that made the prosecution case suspicious. 
8. Before proceeding with an analysis of various contentions raised 
by the parties or expressing opinion on the appreciation and findings of 
fact and law recorded by the Courts below, we wish to reiterate the 
scope of interference by this Court in a criminal appeal against acquittal 
under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia. 
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9. In Himachal Pradesh Administration Vs. Shri Om Prakash, 
(1972) I SCC 249, it was held by this Court: 
"In appeals against acquittal by special leave under Article 
136, this Court has undoubted power to interfere with the 
findings of fact, no distinction being made between 
judgments of acquittal and conviction, though in the case of 
acquittals it will not ordinarily interfere with the appreciation 
of evidence or on findings of fact unless the High Court 
'acts perversely or otherwise improperly'." 
I 0. The above principle has been reiterated by this Court in a 
number of judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a 
comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 
136 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere with the 
judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or 
perverse or manifestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another 
view could also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a 
ground for reversing an order of acquittal. [See State ofU .P. Vs. Harihar 
Bux Sin_gh & Anr., ( 1975) 3 SCC 167; State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. 
Ashok Kumar & Anr., (1979) 3 SCC I; State of U.P. Vs. Gopi & 
Ors., ( 1980) Supp. SCC 160; State of Karnataka Vs. Amajappa & 
Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 468; State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Banne @ 
Baijnath & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 271; State ofU.P. Vs. Gurucharan 
& Ors., (20 I 0) 3 SCC
721; State ofHaryana Vs. Shakuntla & Ors., 
(2012) 5 SCC 171 and Hamza Vs.Muhammadkutty@Mani & Ors., 
(2013) 11 sec I50J. 
11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt 
of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden 
of proving its case beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution 
and it never shifts. Another golden thread which runs through the web 
of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are 
possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of 
the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable 
to the accused should be adopted. [Vide Kali Ram Vs. State of 
Himachal Pradesh, ( 1973) 2 SCC 808; State ofRajasthan Vs. Raja 
Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180; Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State ofKarnataka, 
(2007) 4 SCC 415; U1>endra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 
SCC 124 and Golbar Hussain & Ors. Vs. State of Assam and Anr., 
c201 s) 11 sec 242).
HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS. 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
12. Keeping in mind the aforesaid position of law, we shall examine 
the arguments advanced by the parties as also the evidence and the 
materials on record and see whether in view of the nature of offence 
alleged to have been committed by the Respondents, the findings of fact 
by the High Court call for interference in the facts and circumstances of 
the case. 
I 3. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant 
that the High Court had erred in ignoring the prosecution evidence which 
conclusively proved the guilt of the accused persons who had conspired 
to kill the deceased in a garb of accident. Further, the High Court had 
also erred in reversing the conviction of the accused persons despite 
presence of sufficient evidence which indicated involvement of all the 
accused persons and a complete chain of incriminating circumstances 
proved by the prosecution. 
14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondents has 
primarily reiterated the reasons that found favour with the High Court in 
recording an order of acquittal in favour of the Respondents viz. failure 
of prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons 
Bhanwarlal, S, .eeshpal, Nemichand and Shiv Bhagwan hatched criminal 
conspiracy at the Dhani ofSheeshpal at around 7-8 p.m. on 19.12.1993 
and that the prosecution case suffered from contradictions, discrepancies 
and inconsistencies and, in particular,
that the testimony of eye witnesses 
did not inspire confidence due to the reasons recorded by the High Court. 
15. We have given careful consideration to the submissions made 
by the parties and we are inclined to agree with the observations of the 
High Cou11 that PW3 and PW9 were not witnesses to the alleged 
conspiracy between the accused persons since not only the details of 
the conversation given by these two prosecution witnesses were different 
but also their presence at the alleged spot at the relevant time seems 
unnatural in view of the physical condition of PW9 and the distance of 
Sheeshpal's Dhani from Sikar road. Besides, it appears that there have 
been improvements in the statements of PW3. The Explanation to Section 
162 Cr.P.C. provides that an omission to state a fact or circumstance in 
the statement recorded by a police officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C., 
may amount to contradiction ifthe same appears to be significant and 
otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which such omission 
occurs and whether any omission amounts to a contradiction in the 
particular context shall be a question of fact. Thus, while it is true that 
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every improvement is not fatal to the prosecution case, in cases where 
an improvement creates a serious doubt about the truthfulness or 
credibility of a witness, the defence may take advantage of the same. 
[See Ashok Vishnu Davare Vs. State Of Maharashtra, (2004) 9 
SCC 431; Rad ha Kumar Vs. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), (2005) 
IO SCC 216; Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) & Ors. Vs. 
State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 and Baldev Singh Vs. 
State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 473]. In our view, the High Court had 
rightly considered these omissions as material omissions amounting to 
contradictions covered by the Explanation to Section 162 Cr.P.C. 
Moreover, it has also come in evidence that there was a delay of 15-16 
days from the date of the incident in recording the statements of PW3 
and PW9 and the same was sought to be unconvincingly explained by 
reference to the fact that the family had to sit for shock meetings for 12 
to 13 days. Needless to say, we are not impressed by this explanation 
and feel that the High Court was right in entertaining doubt in this regard. 
16. As regards the incident of murder of the deceased, the 
prosecution has produced six eye-witnesses to the same. The argument 
raised against the reliance upon the testimony of these witnesses pertains 
to the delay in the recording of their statements by the police under 
Section 161 of Cr.P.C. In the present case, the date
of occurrence was 
21.12.1993 but the statements of PW I and PW 5 were recorded after 
two days of incident, i.e., on 23.12.1993. The evidence of PW6 was 
recorded on 26.12.1993 while the evidence of PW! I was recorded after 
I 0 days of incident, i.e., on 31.12.1993. Further, it is well-settled law that 
delay in recording the statement of the witnesses does not necessarily 
discredit their testimony. The Court may rely on such testimony if they 
are cogent and credible and the delay is explained to the satisfaction of 
the Court. [See Ganeshlal Vs. State of Mahrashtra, ( 1992) 3 SCC 
I 06; Mohd. Khalid Vs. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334; Prithvi 
(Minor) Vs. Mam Raj & Ors., (2004) 13 SCC 279 and Sidhartha 
Vashisht @ Manu Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 
I]. 
17. However, Ganesh Bhavan Patel Vs. State Of Maharashtra, 
(1978) 4 sec 371, is an authority for the proposition that delay in recording 
of statements of the prosecution witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., 
although those witnesses were or could be available for examination 
when the Investigating Officer visited the scene of occurrence or soon
HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS. 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
thereafter, would cast a doubt upon the prosecution case. [See also 
Balakrushna Swain Vs. State OfOrissa, (1971) 3 SCC 192; Maruti 
Rama Naik Vs. State of Mahrashtra, (2003) I 0 SCC 670 and Jagjit 
Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 SCC 68]. Thus, we see no reason 
to interfere with the observations of the High Court on the point of delay 
and its corresponding impact on the prosecution case. 
18. Further, the High Court has also concluded that these witnesses were 
interested witnesses and their testimony were not corroborated by 
independent witnesses. We are fully in agreement with the reasons 
recorded by the High Court in coming to this conclusion. 
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19. In Darya Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 328 = c 
1964 (7) SCR 397, this Court was of the opinion that a related or' 
interested witness may not be hostile to the assailant, but ifhe is, then his 
evidence must be examined very carefully and all the infirmities must be 
taken into account. This is what this Court said: 
"There can be no doubt that in a murder case when evidence 
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is given by near relatives of the victim and the murder is 
alleged to have been committed by the enemy of the family, 
criminal courts must examine the evidence of the interested 
witnesses, like the relatives of the victim, very 
carefully ........ But where the witness is a close relation of 
the victim and is shown to share the victim's hostility to his
assailant, that naturally makes it necessary for the criminal 
courts examine the evidence given by such witness very 
carefully and scrutinise all the infirmities in that evidence 
before deciding to act upon it. In dealing with such evidence, 
Courts naturally begin with the enquiry as to whether the 
said witnesses were chance witnesses or whether they 
were really present on the scene of the offence ...... If the 
-criminal Cow1 is satisfied that the witness who is related to 
the victim was not a chance-witness, then his evidence has 
to be examined from the point of view of probabilities and 
the account given by him as to the assault has to be carefully 
scrutinised." 
20. However, we do not wish to emphasise that the corroboration 
by independent witnesses is an indispensable rule in cases where the 
prosecution is primarily based on the evidence of seemingly interested 
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witnesses. It is well settled that it is the quality of the evidence and not 
the quantity of the evidence which is required to be judged by the Court 
to place credence on the statement. 
21. Further, in Raghubir Singh Vs. State ofU.P., ( 1972) 3 SCC 
79, it has been held that the prosecution is not bound to produce all the 
witnesses said to have seen the occurrence. Material witnesses 
considered necessary by the prosecution for unfolding the prosecution 
story alone need be produced without unnecessary and redundant 
multiplication of witnesses. In this connection general reluctance of an 
average villager to appear as a witness and get himself involved in cases 
ofrival village factions when spirits on both sides are running high has to 
be borne in mind. 
22. The High Court has further noted that there were chance 
witnesses whose statements should not have been relied upon. Learned 
counsel for the Respondents has specifically submitted that PW5 and 
PW6 are chance witnesses whose presence at the place of occurrence 
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was not natural. 
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23. The defining attributes ofa 'chance witness' were explained 
by Mahajan, J., in the case of Puran Vs. The State of Pun.jab, AIR 
1953 SC 459. It was held that such witnesses have the habit of appearing 
suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then disappearing 
after noticing the occurrence about which they are called later on to 
give evidence. 
24. ln Mousam
Singha Roy and Ors. Vs. State ofW.B., (2003) 
12 SCC 377, this Court discarded the evidence of chance witnesses 
while observing that certain glaring contradictions/omissions in the 
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evidence of PW2 and PW3 and the absence of their names in the FIR 
has been very lightly discarded by the Courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal 
Vs. State of Ra.iastahan, (2004) I 0 SCC 632, and Jarnail Singh & 
Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719, are authorities for the 
proposition that deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at the 
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place of incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. Therefore, for 
the reasons recorded by the High Court we hold that PW5 and PW6 
were chance witnesses and their statements have been rightly discarded. 
25. In the light of the above and other reasons recorded by the 
High Court, we hold that the evidence of the eye witnesses is not truthful, 
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reliable and trustworthy and hence cannot form the basis of conviction.
HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS. 
(PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
393 
Their presence at the scene of occurrence at the time of the incident is 
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highly unnatural as also their ability to individually and correctly identify 
each of the accused from a considerable distance, especially when it 
was dark at the alleged place of occurrence, is itself suspect. 
26. Besides these, the prosecution has also been unable to 
convincingly connect the jeep of the accused Sheeshpal with the incident 
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beyond reasonable doubt. Further, owing to other lapses in investigation, 
as recorded by the High Court, we are convinced that the prosecution 
has been unable to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The view 
taken by the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case 
• appears to be a reasonably plausible one. 
27. Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we are of the view 
that the present appeals are devoid of merits, and we find no ground to 
interfere with the judgment passed by the High Court. The appeals are, 
accordingly, dismissed. 
Ankit Gyan 
Appeals dismissed. 
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