BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus N. JAYAMMA
[2016] 4 S.C.R. 583, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2016] 4 S.C.R. 583 
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 
A 
v. 
N. JAYAMMA 
(Civil Appeal No. 2238 of2016) 
MARCH 10, 2016 
B 
[A.K. SIKRI AND R.K. AGRAWAL, JJ.] 
Adverse Possession ~Suit for declaration of title perfected 
by adverse possession - Filed by purchaser of the land which was 
already acquired under Land Acquisition Act - However, actual 
possession whereof remained with the original owner - Suit decreed 
C 
- Decree affirmed by High Court - On appeal, held: Plaintiff had 
herself admitted that the officials of the appellant-Authority 
(acquisition beneficiary) came to the suit property and demolished 
the structure - Thus the possession was not unhindered, peaceful 
and continuous - Plaintiff failed to prove title by adverse possession 
- Suit liable to be dismissed. 
D 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The respondent-plaintiff had herself admitted that 
the officials of the appellant-Authority bad come to the suit 
property and demolished the existing structure. This act of the 
Authority would amply demonstrate that there was no unhindered, 
peaceful and continuous possession of the suit land. [Para 22) 
[599-B-CJ 
2. The plea of equity that when the Authority itself is created 
for the purpose of formation of layouts and allotment of sites to 
the members of the public, the respondent should not be 
dispossessed when she is in continuous possession of the suit 
property, would not be the relevant considerations in the present 
case. The present appeal
arises out of civil proceedings filed in 
the form of a suit by the respondent and once it is found that the 
respondent has not been able to prove title by adverse possession, 
no such aspects, not coming within the scope of the suit 
proceedings, can be looked into. [Para 23) [599-D-E] 
M. Venkatesh & Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore 
Development Authority (2015) 10 Scale 27; P.T. 
Munichikkanna Reddy & Ors. v. Revamma & Ors. 2007 
(5) SCR 491: (2007) 6 sec 59 - relied on. 
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[2016] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
John B. James & Ors. v. Bangalore Development 
Authority & Anr. ILR 2000 KAR 4134 -
held 
inapplicable. 
UP. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd. 1996 (1) 
SCR 683 : (1996) 3 SCC 124; Ajay Kishan Singhal v. 
B 
Union of India 1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 319: (1996) 10 
sec 721; Mahavir & Am: V. Rural Institute, Amravati 
& Anr. 1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 421 : (1995) 5 SCC 335; 
Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 528; 
Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors. 
2008 (10) SCR 1012: (2008) 9 SCC 177; Tika Ram v. 
C 
State of Uttar Pradesh 2009 (14) SCR 905 : (2009) 10 
SCC 689; Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (D} 
by Lrs. 1996 (2) SCR 881: (1996) 2 SCC 634; Larsen 
& Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. 1998 (2) SCR 
339 : (1998) 4 SCC 387; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. 
D 
Government of India 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 255: (2004) 
10 SCC 779; Rama Shankar & Anr. v. Om Prakash 
Likhdhari & Ors. (2013) 6 ADJ 119; Ba/want Narayan 
Bhagde v. MD. Bhagwat 1975 (0) Suppl. SCR 250 : 
(1976) 1 SCC 700; NTPC Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta 2009 
(10) SCR 1084 : (2009) 8 SCC 339; Raghbir Singh 
E 
Sehrawat v. State of Haryana 2011 (14 ) SCR 1113 : 
(2012) 1 sec 792 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
(2015) 10 Scale 27 
relied on 
Para7 
F 
1975 (0) Suppl. SCR 250 
referred to 
Para 13 
2009 (10) SCR 1084 
referred to 
Para 13 
2011 (14) SCR 1113 
referred to 
Para 13 
1 ?96 (1) SCR 683 
referred to 
Para 18 
G 
1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 319 
referred to
Para 18 
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 421 
referred to 
Para 18 
(1995) 5 sec 528 
referred to 
Para 18 
2008 (10) SCR 1012 
referred to 
Para 18 
H 
2009 (14 ) SCR 905 
referred to 
Para 18
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. N. JAYAMMA 
585 
1996 ( 2) SCR 881 
referred to 
Para 18 
A 
1998 ( 2 ) SCR 339 
referred to 
Para 18 
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 255 
referred to 
Para 18 
2007 (5) SCR 491 
relied on 
Para 20 
(2013) 6 ADJ 119 
referred to 
Para 21 
B 
ILR 2000 KAR 4134 
held inapplicable Para 22 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2238 
of2016. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.08.2011 of the High Court c 
of Kamataka at Bangalore in Regular First Appeal No. 1279 of 2006. 
S. K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Advs. for 
the Appellant. 
P. Vishwanath Shetty, Sr. Adv., P. Venkat Reddy, Mahesh Thakur, 
Prashant Kr. Tyagi, Advs. for the Respondent. 
D 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. The instant appeal, which has travelled to 
this Court, had its origin in a suit filed by the respondent in the Court of 
City Civil Judge, Bangalore. The _said suit was filed by the respondent 
herein for declaration of title to the suit property situated in Sy. No. 76/ 
1. It was claimed by the respondent that she had purchased the property 
on June 22, 1994 ad-measuring East to West-60 ft. and North to South 
- 50 ft. (hereinafter referred to as the 'suit property') from its previous 
owner and had constructed a building thereupon. The aforesaid suit 
property, which was part of Sy. No. 76/I comprising 4 acres 31 guntas 
(hereinafter referred to as the 'scheduled property'), was acquired by 
the State Government for
Bangalore Development Authority-appellant 
herein (for short, 'the BDA'), for which Notification under Section 4 of 
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act') was is.sued on 
December 15, 1984 followed by a declaration under Section 6 of the Act 
on October 29, 1986. Purportedly, possession thereof was handed over 
to the BDA on August 30, 1988 vi de Mahazar (Exhibit D-4 ). However, 
it appears that the actual possession of the suit property remained with 
the original owner who then sold it to the respondent in the year 1994, as 
stated above. It is on this basis that the respondent filed the suit on the 
ground that she was in possession of the said property for more than 12 
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years even after the acquisition thereof by the State Government and, in· 
this manner, she had perfected her title by adverse possession. Thus, 
the relief claimed in the suit was for declaration that the respondent had 
become the owner thereof. 
2. The appellant contested the said suit by raising the plea that 
since the scheduled property had been acquired by the Government for 
formation of the layout and with effect from the date of final notification 
entire land vested with the Government, the respondent was precluded 
from claiming the possession thereof on the ground that it was already 
with her. It was also contended that the Government had handed over 
the possession of the land in question to the BDA on August 30, 1988 
and BOA was in legal possession thereof. It was also submitted that 
once Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on December 
15, 1984 and even declaration under Section 6 was issued on October 
29, 1986, it was not permissible forthe original owner to sell the acquired 
land to the respondent herein on June 22, 1994. It was also contended 
that as the land vested with the Government, in any case, the limitation 
under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was 30 years and not 12 
years and, therefore, the respondent could not claim adverse possession 
before the expiry of 30 years. 
issues: 
3. The trial court, on the basis of the pleadings, framed the following
"(I) Whether the plaintiff proves that she and her predecessors 
in title have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the 
suit schedule property since more than 12 years, adverse to the 
interest of the defendant as pleaded in the plaint? 
(2) Whether the plaintiff proves that she had perfected her title 
to the suit schedule property by way of adverse possession as 
pleaded in the plaint? 
(3) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant and his officials 
are unlawfully interfering with her possession of the suit schedule 
property as alleged in the plaint? 
( 4) Whether the plaintiff proves that she is entitled for the 
declaration of title to the suit schedule property as sought for in 
the suit? 
(5) Whether the plaintiff proves that she is also entitled for the 
grant of permanent injunction against the defendant as ought for 
in the suit?"
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. N. JAYAMMA 
[A. K. SIKRJ,, J.] 
4. Evidence was led and arguments heard, which resulted in 
passing of judgment and decree dated April 07, 2006 by the Additional 
City Civil Judge, Bangalore. All the issues were decided in favour of the 
respondent herein, on the basis of which suit was decreed in her favour 
declaring that she is the owner in possession of the suit property having 
perfected her title by ·way of adverse possession. As a consequence, 
decree of permanent injunction was also passed restraining the appellant 
- BDA, its officials and agents, etc. from alienating the suit property 
either by way oflease, public auction or by allotting the same in favour 
of any third party or from interfering with the peaceful possession and 
enjoyment of the said property by the respondent. This judgment and 
decree was appealed against by the appellant before the High Court by 
filing Regular First Appeal No. 1279 of2006. The High Court has, vide 
impugned judgment, affirmed the decree passed by the trial court thereby 
dismissing the appeal of the appellant. 
5. Attacking the judgment and decree passed by the trial court 
and affirmed by the High Court, learned counsel for the appellant 
submitted that even ifit is presumed that limitation period for claiming 
adverse possession is 12 years, in the instant case, that ingredient has 
not been satisfied by the respondent even on the basis of admitted facts. 
In this behalf, it was argued that
as per the respondent's own shoWing, 
she had purchased the area of 60 ft. x 50 ft. out of the acquired land on 
June 22, 1994. She1 thus, came into possession in the year 1994. He 
further pointed out that in the plaint itself, the respondent had averred 
that there was some existing construction and she had applied for 
regularisation of the said existing construction on July 25, 1994. Further, 
in para 10 of the plaint, the respondent admitted that the officials of the 
appellant had come to the suit, properly accompanied by Police force, 
and demolished the existing construction. He drew our attention to the 
following averments in the plaint to the aforesaid effect: 
"In spite of the above stated facts, the BDA andjts officials without 
any kind of notice and with the help of a large contingent of police 
force accompanied by the officials and workmen including the 
Commissioner, BOA and all of a sudden they have illegally 
trespassed over the suit schedule property on 24.04.2001 and 
interfered over the same and demo! ished the existing construction 
buildings as well as her business therein on 24.04.2001 with the 
aid of bulldozers and such other machinery, equipments .... " 
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6. It was, thus, argued that after purchase of the land on June 22, 
1994, the respondent remained in possession for barely 7 years when 
she was dispossessed, even as per the respondent's own showing and 
the suit filed on August 06, 2001 claiming adverse possession on the 
ground that she was in possession for 12 years, was incompetent. It 
was further submitted that as per the aforesaid pleadings in the plaint, it 
was clear that on the date of filing the suit, the respondent was not in 
possession nor was there any structure on the suit land and the question 
of claiming adverse possession, thus, did not arise. 
7. Learned counsel also argued that in order to lay claim of 
ownership on the basis of adverse possession, it has to be proved that 
such adverse possession is open and uninterrupted to the enjoyment of 
the defendant-Authority for more than 12 years, which essential 
requirement had not been satisfied. For this proposition, the learned 
counsel placed heavy reliance upon a recent judgment of this Court in 
M. Venkatesll & Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development 
Autllority. 1 
8. We may note at this stage that in arriving at a finding that the 
respondent was in possession of suit property for more than 12 years, 
the courts below have calculated the period from August 30, 1988, namely, 
the date on which possession was taken under a Mahazar (Exhibit 0-
4) by the State Government and
handed over to the BOA. Learned 
counsel for the BOA pleaded that the aforesaid approach of the courts 
below was wholly erroneous as the respondent, as per her own showing, 
came to possess the suit property only after the purchase thereof on 
· June 22, 1994. He also submitted that, in any case, sale in favour of the 
respondent in the year 1994 was void ab initio as the title had already 
been vested in the BOA and the original owner who had purportedly 
sold the property to the respondent was no longer owner thereof and 
had no right to sell the same. Learned counsel argued that even this 
aspect is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment in the case ofM. 
Venkatesh (supra). Learned counsel also pointed out that after the 
structure was demolished in the year 2001 by the BOA, as admitted by 
the respondent herself, the site in question was auctioned by the appellant 
on August 06, 2001 and sale deed was duly executed, which was proved 
before the trial court as Exhibit P-26. 
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that 
the respondent had led sufficient evidence to establish that she had been 
1(2015)10 Scale 27
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. N. JAYAMMA 
589 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
in continuous possession, which remained uninterrupted, and on the basis 
of this evidence a categorical finding was arrived at by the trial court to 
the effect that the respondent has perfected her title in respect of the 
suit property by way of adverse possession. This submission was 
elaborated by arguing that even when the schedule property was acquired 
by issuing requisite notifications and passing of the award, possession of 
the suit property was never taken by the BOA, which continued to be in 
possession of the vendor, from whom the respondent purchased the 
property vide sale deed dated June 22, 1994, and thereafter she had 
been in possession of this property. It was submitted that these were 
findings of facts arrived at on the basis of evidence produced on record 
which do not warrant any interference. It was also submitted that 
Mahazar (Exhibit D-4) dated October 13, 1988 was only a paper 
possession and no actual possession had been taken, which also stood 
proved not only by the evidence led by the respopdent, but even from 
the statements of DW-1 and DW-2, who were examined on behalf of 
the BOA. Learned counsel further pointed out that there was not even 
an iota of evidence adduced on behalf of the BOA that the possession of 
the suit property was taken on the date of Mahazar (Exhibit D-4) or 
subsequently thereafter. 
10. Insofar as claim of continuous, uninterrupted and peaceful
possession for a period of more than 12 years is concerned, it was the 
submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that possession of 
the respondent shall not be counted from the date of the sale deed, i.e. 
June 22, 1994, in her favour, but the earlier period during which the 
vendor was in possession also needs to be counted and the courts below 
were right in computing the period of 12 years from the date of Mahazar 
(Exhibit D-4) dated October 13, 1988. A fervent plea was made that if 
the impugned judgment is reversed, the respondent and the members of 
her family will be deprived of their only shelter, which would amount to 
taking away their right to property guaranteed h? them under Article 
300A of the Constitution of India. It is stated that there was a fully 
developed structure (house) (Exhibits P-22 to Pc25) on the suit property 
and the building was constructed after obtaining permission and licence 
from Agara Gram Panchayat and regularly taxes were paid with respect 
to the suit property and Khatha also stands in favour of the respondent. 
It was submitted that at no point of time the BOA took possession of the 
property in question from the vendor or the respondent. It was also 
argued that the BOA being a statutory authority created for the purpose 
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of formation of layouts and allotment of sites to the members of the 
pubic, even in equity it was not proper, just or fair to deprive the respondent 
of her only source of shelter. The very objective of the BOA is to 
provide shelter to the members of public. The counsel, thus, pleaded 
that this Court should not exercise its extraordinary power under Article 
136 of the Constitution even if the judgment impugned suffers from any 
error ifthe said judgment will not bring about any unjust result. 
11. Another submission of the learned counsel for the respondent 
was that the very purpose for which the land was acquired was to prepare 
a scheme for allotment of the houses to the members of the public. As 
per Section 27 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, such 
a scheme had to be prepared within five years from the passage of the 
award, but the BOA had failed to do so resulting in the lapsing of the 
scheme. This was yet another reason, according to the respondent, for 
not interfering with the decree passed in favour of the respondent. 
12. Tracing the history of the present litigation, learned counsel 
for the respondent referred to the judgment of the Karnataka High Court 
in John B. James & Ors. v. Bangalore Development Authority & 
Anr. ~ Delivering the judgment in that case, in a batch of writ petitions 
which were filed by the respondent and several others, the High Court, 
after
elaborately considering the rival contentions of the parties, had 
directed the writ petitioners, including the respondent herein to approach 
the civil court to establish their claim that they had perfected their title to 
. the suit property by adverse possession, as is clear from the following 
passage therefrom: 
"85. Where the petitioners claim that they are in settled possession 
for more than 12 years after the land had vested in BOA, it is 
open to them to approach the Civil Court for a declaration of title 
by establishing adverse possession for more than 12 years." 
13. Learned counsel for the respondent joined issue qua the 
arguments of the appellant predicated on the judgment of this Court in 
M. Venkatesh case with the submission that the said judgment had 
absolutely no application to the facts of the present case as the said case 
relates to the vacant house site and construction of building after 
dispossession, which was not the position in the instant case. On the 
other hand, he referred to the followingjudgments of this Court wherein 
symbolic/paper possession is held to be no possession in the eyes oflaw 
2 !LR 2000 KAR 4134
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. N. JAYAMMA 
591 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
and it is the actual possession under relevant rules which matters: 
A 
(i) Balwant Narayan Bltagde v. M.D. Bltagwaf 
(ii) NTPC Ltd. v. Ma/1es/1 Dutta• 
(iii) Ragltbir Singlt Seltrawat v. State of Hary<1na5 
14. Learned counsel for the respondent even referred to the 
provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and in particular 
sub-section (2) of Section 24 which lays down specific period within 
which the possession is to be taken of the property after acquisition and 
when no such possession was taken, the acquisition lapses. 
15. In the first blush, argument of the learned counsel for the 
respondent, viz., there is a finding of fact that respondent and her 
predecessors-in-title have been in continuous possession and enjoyment 
of the suit property for more than 12 years and, therefore, the respondent 
has perfected her title by adverse possession, appears to be attractive. 
It may appear to be a finding of fact simplicitor. However, an indepth 
analysis of the issue would manifest that the matter cannot be brushed 
aside with such a simplisitic overtone. In fact, the detailed discussion 
that follows would amply demonstrates that the manner in which the 
issue has been approached by the courts below is itself erroneous and 
legally unsustainable. For this, we are not even required to discuss various 
nuances of the
issue as the judgment of this Court in M. Venkates/1 has 
done this exercise whereby same issue has been directly and squarely 
dealt with which arose in almost similar circumstances. Therefore, it 
would be apt to discuss the facts of that case as well as law laid down 
therein which would provide answers to many arguments raised by the 
parties before us. 
16) In M. Venk<1teslt (supra) as well, land was acquired by the 
State Government ofKarnataka and given at the disposal of the BDA. 
Preliminary Notification was issued on July 17, 1984 and final Notification 
dated November 28, 1986 was published on December 25, 1986. 
Determination of amount of compensation payable to the landowners. 
having been approved by the competent authority on August 21, 1986, 
the BDA claimed that possession of the land was taken over from the 
'(1976) 1sec100 
'(2009) s sec 339 
'(2012) 1sec792 
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landowners and handed over to the engineering section of the BDA by 
drawing a possession Mahazar on November 06, 1987. A Notification 
under Section 16(2) of the Act was also published-in the Karnataka 
Gazette dated July 04, 1991 which, according to the BDA, signified that 
the land in question stood vested with the BDA free from all encumbrances 
whatsoever. Here also, after taking of the aforesaid steps by the BDA, 
the original land owners of the acquired land sold the said land to different 
persons after carving out the sites/plots. When the actual possession 
was sought to be taken, the said subsequent purchasers (like the 
respondent in the instant appeal) filed writ petitions in the High Court. 
Their writ petitions, along with the writ petition of the respondent herein 
and some others, were the subject matter of the judgment of the Division 
Bench of the High Court in John B. James's case (supra). Like the 
respondent herein, the individuals/subsequent purchasers in the case of 
M. Venkatesh (supra) were also relegated to the civil court giving them 
permission to file the suit if they were claiming adverse possession. Five 
such suits were the subject matter of the judgment in M. Venkates/1 
(supra). The trial court had, in fact, clubbed these suits which were 
decided together and decreed. The issues framed in those suits were 
almostthe same to the ones framed in the civil suit filed by the
respondent 
herein, as is clear from the issues which were settled by the trial court in 
those cases: 
"(!) Whether the Plaintiffs prove that, they have acquired and 
perfected their alleged title to the suit schedule properties by virtue 
of the alleged law on adverse possession, as claimed? 
(2) Whether the Plaintiffs prove their alleged lawful possession 
and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties, as on the date of 
the suit? 
(3) · Whether the Plaintiffs further prove the alleged illegal 
interferences and obstructions by the defendant? 
( 4) Whether the defendant proves that, the suit schedule properties 
is duly acquired by the defendant, in accordance with law and as 
such, the same have stood vested with the defendant, free from 
all the encumbrances? 
(5) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the suit relief of 
declaration and injunction, against the defendant? 
(6) What Order or Decree?"
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v: N. JAYAMMA 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
17. In that case also the trial court had recorded the findings that 
those plaintiffs were in lawful possession on the date of the suit, such 
possession was for more than 12 years and, thus, the plaintiffs had 
perfected their title to the schedule properties by way of adverse 
possession. The BDA filed appeals against the decree passed by the 
trial court. Four appeals were allowed wherein the High Court held that 
the trial court was wrong in recording the finding that those four plaintiffs 
had established their possession. It was noticed that the plaintiffs in 
those appeals were claiming settled possession of vacant piece of land, 
which was clearly impermissible. The High Court found that there was 
no dispute that all the structures on the suit properties, relevant to those 
suits, had been demolished and that the land was a vacant piece ofland 
all along and at all material times, including on the {!ate of filing the suit 
as well as on the date of judgment. These four plaintiffs had filed appeals 
which were dismissed by this Court in M. Ve11kates/z (supra) approving 
the view taken by the High Court in the said four appeals. Insofar as 
decision in those four cases is concerned, it may not be very relevant as 
inthe instant case it is not the vacant land with which we are concerned. 
However, what is relevant for us is the discussion in the fifth appeal 
which was filed by the BDA in the High Court
wherein the High Court 
had affirmed the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff. The High 
Court noticed that in the said case the plaintiffs were running a saw mill 
which was in operation long prior to the filing of the suit and which 
continued to be in existence even on the date of the suit as well as on the 
date of the judgment of the High Court. Keeping in view the aforesaid 
position, the High Court relied upon its Division Bench judgment in Jolin 
B. James's case (supra) and held that the plaintiff therein was entitled 
to protection against attempted eviction by the BDA. On this basis, 
decree passed by the trial court was affirmed. This judgment of the 
High Court was also appealed against, which also became the subject 
matter of discussion in M. Venkates/z (supra). Pertinently, this Court 
allowed the appeal of the BDA and set aside the aforesaid judgment of 
the High Court and reversed the decree passed by the trial court, thereby 
holding that even in this case the plaintiff was not entitled to any 
protection. 
18. Following reasons can be culled out in taking the aforesaid 
view by this Court: 
(a) The plaintiff therein had purchased the property from the 
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original owners in terms of sale deed dated August 22, 1980, which was 
long after the issuance of the preliminary notification published in July 
1984. Such a sale was clearly void and non est in the eyes of law, 
opined the Court. rn arriving at this conclusion, it referred to earlier 
decisions of this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Pvt. 
Ltd. 6; Ajay Kislian Singh al v. Union of India'; Maliavir & Am: v. 
Rural Institute; Amravati & Anr. 8; Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ors. 9; 
Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Del/ti & Ors. 10; and Tika 
Ram v. State of Uttar Pradeslt 11 • 
(b) As on the date of suit, the plaintiffs had not completed 12 
years in possession of the suit property so as to entitle them to claim 
adverse possession against the BDA, the true owner. This finding was 
given on the basis that the plaintiffs could count the period of the so-
called adverse possession only from the date they purchased the property 
and the period for which the original vendor held the property, or for that 
matter the date of Mahazar, could not be counted. 
( c) The Court also rejected the argument of the plaintiffs that 
possession of the land was never taken. In this behalf, the Court took 
the view that one of the settled mode of taking possession is by drawing 
a panchnama, which part had been done to perfection according to the 
evidence led by the BDA. For this, the Court referred to the
judgments 
in Taf!lil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (D) by Lrs. 11 and Larsen 
& Toubro Ltd. v. State of Guiarat & Ors. 13 
( d) Most pertinently, the Court also held that the plaintiffs could 
not claim adverse possession as, on the facts of that case, it could not 
be said that possession of the plaintiffs was peaceful, open, continuous 
and non-hostile. On this aspect, the Court took note of essentials of 
adverse possession, which are required to be proved, from the judgment 
in the case of If.arnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India 1• 
and some other judgments. Discussion in this behalf is contained in 
• (1996) 3 sec 124 
1 (1996) 10 sec n1 
• (1995) 5 sec 335 
' (1995) 5 sec 528 
'"(2008) 9 sec 177 
11 (2009) 1 o sec 689 
12 (I 996) 2 sec 634 
" ( 1998) 4 sec 387 
" (2004) 1 o sec 779
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. N. JAYAMMA 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
paras 15 to 18, which read as under: 
"15. Coming then to the question whether the plaintiffs-
respondents could claim adverse possession, we need to hardly 
mention the well known and oft quoted maxim nee vi, nee clam, 
nee preeario meaning thereby that adverse possession is proved 
only when possession is peaceful, open, continuous and hostile. 
The essentials of adverse possession were succinctly summed-
up by this Court in Karnataka Board of Wakfv. Govt. of India 
(2004) 10 sec 779 in the following words: 
"11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in 
possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-
use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't 
affect his title. But the position will be altered when another 
person takes possession of the property and asserts a right 
over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly 
asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is 
a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession 
must prove that his possession is "nee vi, nee clam, nee 
precario'', that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession 
must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to 
show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It 
.must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner 
and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the 
statutory period.
(See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina (AIR 1964 
SC 1254), Parsinni v. Sukhi (1993) 4 SCC 375 and D.N. 
Venkatarayappa v. State of Kamataka (1997) 7 SCC 567). 
Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi 
to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most 
important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this 
. nature, Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of 
law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person 
who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date 
he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his 
possession, ( c) whether the factum of possession was known 
to the other party, ( d) how long his possession has continued, 
and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person 
pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since 
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he is trying to defeatthe rights of the true owner, it is for him to 
clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his 
adverse possession. [Mahesh Chand Sharma (Dr.) v. Raj 
Kumari Sharma (1996) 8 SCC 128)." 
16. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in 
Saroop Singh v. Banta (2005) 8 SCC 330, where this Court 
emphasised the importance of animus possidendi and observed: 
"29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point.oflimitation does 
not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises 
to the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendant's 
possession becomes adverse. (See Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak 
v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak (2004) 3 SCC 376). 
30. "Animus possidendi" is one of the ingredients of adverse 
possession. Unless the person possessing the land has the 
requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. 
As in the instant case, the appellant categorically states that 
his possession is not adverse as that of true owner, the logical 
corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus. (See 
Mohd. Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita (2004) 1SCC371, SCC 
para 21.)" 
17. Also noteworthy is the decision of this Court in Mohan Lal v. 
Mirza Abdul Gaffar ( 1996) 1 SCC 639, where this Court held 
that claim of title to the property and adverse. possession are in 
terms contradictory. This Court observed: 
"4. As regards the first plea, it
is inconsistent with the second 
plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he 
must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion 
of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge 
of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that 
the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the 
entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period of 
his title by prescription nee vi, nee clam, nee precario. Since 
the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without 
saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession 
of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to 
remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of 
adverse possession is not available to the appellant."
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. N. JAYAMMA 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
18. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Annasaheb 
Bapusaheb Patil v. Ba/want ( 1995) 2 SCC 543, where this Court 
elaborated the significance of a claim to title viz.-a-viz. the claim 
to adverse possession over the same property. The Court said: 
"15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will 
not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person 
whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be 
permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's. 
title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not 
by mere denial of that other's title make his possession adverse 
so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. 
Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful 
title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he 
had no title at all." 
19. After taking note of the principle of law relating to adverse 
possession in the aforesaid manner, this Court commented about the 
erroneous approach of the High Court in the following manner: 
"19. The Courts below have not seen the plaintiff- respondent's 
claim from the above perspectives. The High Court has, in 
particular, remained oblivious of the principle enunciated in the 
decisions to which we have referred herein above. All that the 
High Court has found in favour of the plaintiffs is that their 
possession is established. "(hat, however,
does not conclude the 
controversy. The question is not just whether the plaintiffs were 
in possession, but whether they had by being in adverse possession 
for the statutory period of 12 years perfected their title. That 
question has neither been adverted to nor answered in the judgment 
impugned in this appeal. Such being the case the High Court, in 
our opinion, erred in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant-
BDA. The fact that the plaintiffs had not and could not possibly 
establish their adverse possession over the suit property should 
have resulted in dismissal of the suit for an unauthorised occupant 
had no right to claim relief that would perpetuate his illegal and 
unauthorised occupation of property that stood vested in the BDA." 
20. In addition to the discussion contained in M. Venkatesh case 
noted above, we may also add what was held in P.T. Municl1ikkanna 
Reddy & Ors. v. Revamnw & Ors.';: 
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"5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or 
presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the 
adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile 
acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound 
qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, 
continuous and hostile. (See Downing v. Bird; Arkansas 
Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock; Monnot v. 
Murphy; and City of Rock Springs v. Sturm)." 
21. In Rama Slzankar & Anr. v. Om Prak"s/1 Likltdlrari & 
. Ors. 16, the Allahabad High Court has observed as under: 
"21. The principle of adverse possession and its consequences 
wherever attracted has been recognized in the statute dealing 
with limitation. The first codified statute dealing with limitation 
came to be enacted in 1840. The Act 14 of 1840 in fact was an 
enactment applicable in England but it was extended to the territory 
of Indian continent which was under the reign of East India 
Company, by an authority of Privy Council in the East India 
Company v. Oditchurn Paul, 1849 (Cases in the Privy Council 
on Appeal from the East Indies) 43. 
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23. The law of Prescription prescribes the period at the expiry of 
which not only the judicial remedy is barred but a substantive 
right is acquired or extinguished. A prescription, by which a right 
is acquired, is called an 'acquisitive prescription'. A
prescription 
by which a right is extinguished is called 'extinctive prescription'. 
The distinction between the two is not of much practical importance 
or substance. The extinction of right of one party is often the 
mode of acquiring it by another. The right extinguished is virtually 
transferred to the person who claims it by prescription. 
Prescription implies with the thing prescribed for is the property 
of another and that it is enjoyed adversely to that other. In this 
respect it must be distinguished from acquisition by mere 
occupation as in the case of res nullius. The acquisition in such 
cases does not depend upon occupation for any particular length 
of time." 
16 (2013) 6 ADJ 119
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. N. JAYAMMA 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.) 
22. The aforesaid analysis of the judgment in M. Venkateslt (supra) 
amply shows that it is squarely and directly applicable to the facts and 
circumstances of the present case. In the first instance, it shows that 
reliance of the respondent herein on the judgment of Joltn B. James 
(supra) is of no avail. It would further demonstrate that the findings of 
the court below that only paper possession was taken and actual 
possession was not taken also becomes meaningless as the manner of 
taking possession in the instant case was also identical. In addition, it is 
pertinent that the respondent herein, in para 10 of the plaint, had herself 
admitted that the officials of the BDA had come to the suit property on 
April 24, 2001 and demolished the existing structure. This act of the 
BDA would amply demonstrate that there was no unhindered, peaceful 
and continuous possession of the suit land. 
23. Learned counsel for the respondent had raised the plea of 
equity. He has also submitted that when the BDA itself is created for 
the purpose of formation oflayouts and allotment of sites to the members 
of the public, the respondent should not be dispossessed when she is in 
continuous possession of the suit property. However, these would not 
be the relevant considerations in the present case as we cannot forget 
that the present appeal arises out of civil proceedings filed in the form of 
a suit by the respondent
and once it is found that the respondent has not 
been able to prove title by adverse possession, no such aspects, not 
coming within the scope of the suit proceedings, can be looked into. 
Insofar as the argument predicated on Section 27 of the Bangalore 
Development Authority Act or Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013 are concerned, again these issues were neither 
raised nor arise in the instant case. If the respondent, if at all, has any 
right to make claim on the aforesaid grounds, in any appropriate 
proceedings, she can do so, if permissible in law. We may clarify that 
this Court has not gone into these issues and, therefore, has not made 
any comments on the merits of such pleas raised by the respondent. 
24) As a result, the appeal stands allowed resulting in dismissal of 
the suit filed by the respondent in the trial court. In the facts and 
circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. 
Kljlpana K. T~ipat)ly 
Appeal allowed. 
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