CHHANGA @ MANOJ versus STATE OF M. P.
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 27, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2017]2 S.C.R. 27 
CHHANGA @ MANOJ 
v. 
STATE OF M. P. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 898 of 2005) 
FEBRUARY 28, 2017 
[R. F. NARIMAN AND 
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860 : 
s. 307 r!w. s. 34 - Prosecution under - For attempt to 
murder - By appellant-accused alongwith three other accused -
Allegation that one of the co-accused hurled two bombs at the 
exhortation of the appellant-accused - Courts below convicted all 
the accused - On appeal by appellant-accused plea that in view of 
simple nature of injuries and in view of his role, offence u!s. 307 
not made out - Held: In order to make out charge uls. 307 an 
intention coupled with some common act in execution thereof is 
enough - It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing 
death should have been inflicted - In the present case, in view of 
nature of weapons, it can be inferred that the intention was to cause 
death - Exhortation by the appellant-accused attracted the charge 
uls. 307 rlw. s. 34 - Conviction affirmed. 
Sentence/Sentencing: 
Conviction uls. 307 rlw s. 34 !PC - Sentenced to three years 
imprisonment - Plea to reduce the sentence to the period already 
undergone i.e. about 2 years - Held: The accused got away very 
lightly - Undue sympathy leading to inadequate sentence would do 
more harm to the justice system and would undermine public 
confidence in the efficacy of law - Sentence upheld. 
Dismissing the appeal, the· Court 
HELD: 1.1 It is not essential that bodily injury capable of
causing death shonld have been inflicted in order that the charge 
under Section 307 IPC be made out. It is enough if there is an 
intention coupled with some common act in execution thereof. 
[Para 7] (30-E] 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] 2 S.C.R. 
1.2 In the present case, the nature of the weapon used pre-
dominates. Two bombs were hurled, which are lethal weapons, 
from which it can safely be inferred that the intention was to cause 
death. Also, the words uttered by appellant-accused, namely, that 
the complainant ought to be killed, lend further credence to this 
view. The motive of the accused has also been made out, namely, 
that the intention was to kill the person in the shop as he was an 
informer. True, the nature of the injuries in the present case was 
stated to be simple, but this is only because of the fortuitous 
circumstance that the bomb exploded at a distance far from PW 
1. Therefore, it is clear that Accused No.4 (appellant) in coming 
together with the other three accused and going together with 
them, and in shouting the words "kill him" certainly attracted 
the charge under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC. The 
concurrent judgments of the Courts below do not need to be 
disturbed. [Para 8] [31-B-E] 
State of MP. v. Kashiram and Others (2009) 4 SCC 
26 : [2009] 1 SCR 806; Jage Ram and Others v. State 
of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 366 : [2015] 11 SCR 1004; 
Sevaka Perumal and Anr. " State of Tamil Nadu (1991) 
3 SCC 471 : [1991] 2 SCR 711 - relied on. 
2. Undue sympathy leading to imposition of inadequate 
sentence would do more harm to the justice system and would 
undermine public confidence in the efficacy of law. The appellant
appears to have got away lightly. Therefore, there is no reason to 
interfere, in the concurrent Judgments, under Article 136 of the 
Constitution of India. [Paras 10, 11, 12] [31-G-H; 32-A] 
f2009J 1 SCR 806 
[2015] 11 SCR 1004 
f1991J 2 SCR 711 
Case Law Reference 
relied on 
relied on 
relied on 
Para 7 
Para 7 
Para 11 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal A.ppeal 
No. 898 of2005. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.2004/29.04.2005 of 
the High Court ofM. P. at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No. 37of1990 
H 
and MCR. Case No. 3142 of2005.
CHHANGA@ MANOJ v. STATE OF M.P. 
29 
Dinesh Kumar Garg, Abhishek Garg, Dhananjay Garg, Deepak 
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Mishra, Advs. for the Appellant. 
Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, Ms. Shreya Bhatnagar, C. D. Singh, Advs. 
for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R. F. NARIMAN, J. I. This is an appeal filed by Accused 
No.4- appellant herein who was convicted under Section 307 read with 
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code along with the other accused and 
sentenced to imprisonment for a period of three years by the learned 
Additional Sessions Judge vide Judgment dated 8'h January, 1990. In an 
appeal preferred to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, the 
said Court concurred with the findings of the learned Additional Sessions 
Judge and dismissed the appeal of the appellant - herein. 
2. Apparently, the accused were inimical to one Gyan Singh, who 
was the younger brother of the informant. PW I, the informant, Man 
Singh was sitting in a Bettle Shop, and the app~llant came there with 
three other persons, one of whom, Rakesh, threw a bomb at him with 
intent to kill him. The bomb exploded dashing the back portion of the 
bettle shop, which caused injury to PW I's left thigh, after which the 
said Rakesh also threw another bomb which dashed against the window 
of the said shop and exploded. The role of the present appellant before 
us is succinctly stated by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who 
said that the accused - Chhanga @ Manoj - the present appellant
specifically stated "kill him, he should not be spared, he habitually reports". 
All four accused persons came together and ran away together from 
the spot of the incident. 
3. The deposition of injured eye-witness PW I was believed by 
both the Courts below. He was fully corroborated by PW 6, who was 
the father of the injured eye-witness, and PW 7, who was a third 
independent eye-witness. PW s 4, 5 and 9 were declared hostile, and in 
paragraph 11 of the Judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 
the statements of these witnesses were taken into account and were 
condemned. 
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4. The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the common 
intention under Section 34 was proved not only by the fact that the four 
accused came together and left together but that the present accused 
shouted the words that have been stated hereinbefore. From this, it was 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 
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held that the charge under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. 
was made out against all the accused, and they were sentenced to three 
years imprisonment. 
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5. Shri Dinesh Kumar Garg, learned counsel appearing for the 
appellant, has raised two points in appeal before us. First ofall, according 
to him, the injuries were simple in nature and, therefore, it should be 
inferred that the idea was not to kill, and the charge therefor of Section 
307 has no( been made out on facts. Further, since the role of the present 
accused was not an active one, inasmuch as he only shouted what he 
has supposed to have said, he should)n any case, even if conviction be 
sustained, be sentenced to the period already undergone, which we are 
informed is roughly almost two years in jail. 
6. Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of 
the respondent - State of M.P. has, on the other hand, stated that the 
concurrent findings on common intention as well as the evidence, 
particularly of the injured eye-witness, as corroborated by the other 
witnesses, has made it clear that both the Judgments are correct. Indeed, 
the appellant appears to have got away lightly. 
}. Neither of the points raised by Shri Garg appeal to us. First 
and foremost, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing 
death should have been inflicted in order that the charge under Section 
307 be made out. It is enough
if there is an intention coupled with some 
common act in execution thereof. This position has been repeatedly laid 
down by this Court in "State of M.P. vs. Kashiram and Others" (2009) 
4 SCC 26 at paragraphs 12 to 16. In addition, in a recent Judgment in 
'Jage Ram and Others vs. State of Haryana' (2015) 11 SCC 366, the 
law has been laid down as follows :-
"For the purpose .of conviction under Section 307 !PC, the 
prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; 
and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the 
prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder 
of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended 
to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under 
Section 307 !PC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of 
causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of 
injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding 
as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be
CHHANGA@ MANOJ v. STATE OF M.P. [R. F. NARlMAN, J.] 
adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused 
is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the 
weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the 
· incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the 
injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the 
blows given, etc." 
8. On the facts, in the present case, the nature of the weapon 
used pre-dominates. Two bombs were hurled, which are lethal weapons, 
from which it can safely be inferred that the intention was to cause 
death. Also, the words uttered by Accused No.4, namely, that the 
complainant ought to be killed, also lend further credence to this view. 
The motive of the accused has also been made out, namely, that the 
intention was to kill the person in the shop as he was an informer. True, 
the nature of the injuries in the present case was stated to be simple, but 
,this is only because of the fortuitous circumstance that the bomb exploded 
at a distance far from PW I. In our opinion, therefore, it is clear that 
Accused No.4 in coming together with the other three accused and 
going together with them, and in shouting the words "kill him" certainly 
attracted the charge under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Code. 
The concurrent Judgments of the Courts below do not need to be 
disturbed. 
9. Shri Garg also exhorted us to allow the present appeal to 
conclude with the sentence already
undergone. According to him, the 
appellant is on bail since 2006, and at this distance of time, there is no 
point in sending him back for incarceration for a period of one year and 
a little over. 
I 0. We are unable to agree with this argument. The crime 
committed is heinous in nature, and we agree with the learned counsel 
for the respondent - State that the appellant - herein appears to have 
got ~way lightly. 
11. We also advert to a Judgment in 'Sevaka Perumal and Anr. 
vs. State of Tamil Nadu' (1991) 3 SCC 471, in paragraph I 0 of which it 
has been high lighted that undue sympathy leading to imposition of 
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system and would 
undermine public confidence in the efficacy of law. 
12. Having regard to the above, and further taking into 
consideration the fact that the appellant appears to have got off lightly, 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 
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we see no reason to interfere in the concurrent Judgments under Article 
136 of the Constitution oflndia. 
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13. The appeal stands dismissed. 
14. Needless to say the appellant who was granted bail pursuant 
to Order dated 20-3-2006 of this Court, stands cancelled and he is directed 
to surrender within a period of two weeks from today to serve out the 
remaining period of sentence. 
· 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal dismissed.