THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB,  MYSORE & ANR. versus ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRS. & ORS.
[2017] 4 S.C.R. 187, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2017] 4 S.C.R. 187 
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 
A 
MYSORE & ANR. 
v. 
ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 353 of2017) 
JANUARY 25, 2017 
[A. K. SIKRI AND R. K. AGRAWAL, JJ.) 
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 - ss. 28, 
29, 30 - Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
. Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - s.24 -
Applicability of - Respondents' land acquired by appellant under 
the 1966 Act after issuing preliminary notification u/s. 28 (1) and 
final notification u/s. 28(4) - Writ petition by respondents praying 
for quashing the notifications claiming that the proceedings had 
lapsed as no award was passed u/s.11-A of the 1894 Act which was 
applicable by virtue of s.30 of the 1966 Act - Single Judge of High 
Court rejected the plea of respondents and permitted the appellants 
to proceed with fixing the market value on the date of final 
notification - Writ appeal by respondents - Meanwhile, the 2013 
Act came into force repealing the 1894 Act - Respondents in view 
thereof pleaded that by virtue of s.24 of 2013 Act the acquisi~ion 
had lapsed since no award was passed under s.JJA of 1894 Act -
Appeal allowed by Division Bench quashing the acquisition 
proceedings - On appeal, held: The effect of non-applicability of 
s. JJA of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was not rightly understood 
by High Court - Once proceedings are initiated under the 1966 
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Act, s. JJA of the 1894 Act
would not be applicable - On .parity of 
reasoning, provision of s.24(2) of the 2013 Act not applicable -
Judgment of Division Bench set aside - Direction passed by Single 
Judge directing appellant authorities to fix compensation in 
accordance with provisions of s. 29 of 1966 Act, restored - Code of G 
Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. VI, r. 17 - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - . 
s.11-A -
Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 - r.JO(b). 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. The effect of non-applicability of Section UA 
of the Land Acquisition Act; 1894 (the Old LA Act) was not rightly 
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understood bythe High Court. 'fhe High Court was not oblivious 
of the judgment of this Court in M. }{agabllilsluma's case which 
is referred .by it in the impugned judgment itself, This judgment 
categorically holds that once the pr-0ccedings are Initiated· under 
·. the Karn.ataka Ind~strial Areas Development Act, 1966, Section 
HA of the Old LA Act would not be applicabie. [Para 25) 
[201-C·DJ 
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M. Nagabhushand v. State of Karnataka & Others 
· . [2011] 2 SCR 435 - relied on~ 
.. 1.2. Having regard to the aforesaid raiSO/l d'etre for non-
.· c. . . application of the Old LAAct, on th~ parity of reasoning, provision 
of Section 24(2) of }l.ight to:Fair Conlpensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisitipn Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 
· (the New LA Act) not applicable. [Para 26].{204-13] 
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State of MP. v. M V. Narasimhan [1976)1SCR6 : 1975 
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. (2) sec 377- reiied on. 
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. J2011J2SCR 435 
· . [1976] l SCR 6 
Case L:lw 'Referen~e 
relied on 
·.relied on · · 
Para25 
Para26 · 
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 353 of 
•.. a· 
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2017 .. 
From the fodglnent an<l Orderdated 14:01.2015 of the Higli Court 
of Karnataka, Bengaluruirt Writ Appeal No. 4/2013 (LA-1.<IADB). · · 
• ··Ms. Ki ran Suri, Sr'. Adv., S. J; Amith, Dr. (Mrs.) ~ipin Gupta, 
. Advs .. for theAppella11ts. · 
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· Manjunath Me'led, Joseph Aristotle S., Ms, Priya · Al'istotle, 
Ms. K. Priyadarshini, Anil Kulnar, Ms. Anitha Shenoy;Advs. for the 
Respondents. 
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. •. The Judg1nentof the C::()urt was delivered by 
A. K. SIKRI, J. I. Jhe questionoflaw that has been r~ised in · 
·.·· this'appeal by the appellants; for consideration by this Court, is: 
. Whether provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation iu)d 
Transparency in LandAcquisitionRehabilitation and Resettlement 
Act, 20l3(forshort, ''NewLAAct';), are applicable in the instant
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKlU, J.] 
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case when the land is acquired under the provisions of KIAD 
Act? 
2. Factual narration that is required to be noted, giving rise to the 
aforesaid question oflaw, is stated hereinbelow: 
Respondents is the ownerofland bearing Sy. No. 123/1 measuring 
4 acres 9 guntas and Sy. No. 123/2 measuring 1 acre situated at 
Anganahalli Village, Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk, Madhya 
District, Karnataka. 
3. The appellants issued a preliminary notification under Section 
28( 1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 
(hereinafter referred to as "KIAD Act") as it wanted to acquire certain 
lands, including that of the respondents for the purpose of developing the 
said lands as an Industrial Area and the same was published in the 
Karnataka Gazette on 15'h September, 2000. 
4. After issuing the necessary notices and following the procedure · 
prescribed under the KIAD Act, a final notification under Section 28( 4) 
was issued on I S'h June, 2005 in respect of total 153 acres I 0 guntas of 
'land. 
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5. Section 29 of the KIAD Act deals with compensation. Section 
29(2) provides that where the compensation has been determined by 
agreement between the State Government and the person to be 
compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such an agreement. In 
case, where no agreement is arrived at, the State Government is to refer 
the case to the Deputy
Commissioner for determination of the amount 
of compensation to be paid. This scheme of acquisition of land is 
contained in Sections 29 and 30 which are reproduced below: 
"28. Acquisition ofland.- (I) If at any time, in the opinion of the 
State Government, any land is required for the purpose of 
development by the Board, or for any other purpose in fu11herance 
of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by 
notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land. 
(2) On publication of a notification under sub-section (I), the State 
Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner 
is not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such 
persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, 
within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the 
land should not be acquired. 
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(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of 
the land and by any other person interested therein, and after 
giving such owner and person ari opportunity of being heard, the 
State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit. 
( 4) After orders are passed under sub-section (3), where the 
State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for 
the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section 
(I), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be 
made to that effect. 
(5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration 
under sub-section ( 4 ), the land shall vest absolutely in the State 
Government free from all encumbrances. 
(6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-
section (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order 
any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or 
deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person 
duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service 
of the notice. 
(7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made 
under sub-section (5), the State Government or any officer 
authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take 
possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as 
may be necessary. 
(8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State 
Government, after it has
taken possession of the land, may transfer 
the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been 
acquired. 
29. Compensation.-(!) Where any land is acquired by the State 
Government under this Chapter, the State Government shall pay 
for such acquisition compensation in accordance with the provisions 
of this Act. 
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(2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by 
agreement between the State Government and the person to be 
compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement.
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
(3) Where no suc.h agreement can be reached, the State 
Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for 
determination of the amount ofcompensation to be paid for such 
acquisition as also the person or persons to. whom such 
compensation shall be paid. 
( 4) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (3 ), tl1e Deputy 
Commissioner shall serve noti.ce on the owner ot occupier of such 
Jarid and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein 
to appear before him and state' their respective interests in the 
said land." 
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6. Section 30 of the KIAD Act deals with application of Land 
·Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Old LA Act') and 
same is reproduced below: 
"Section 30. application of Central Act I of 1894.-The provisions 
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894) shall 
mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by 
the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to court, the apportionment 
of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respect of 
lands acquired under this Chapter." 
7. In view of the statutory obligations to pay compensation in 
accordance with the provisions of the KIAD Act, the Deputy 
Commissioner, Madhya came to be constituted as an authority to assess 
and fix the market value prevailing as on the date of notification under 
Section 28( 1) of the KIAD Act in
consultation with land owners. The 
Advisory Committee consisting of eight persons was constituted. 
8. The appellants issued notice to all land owners for participating 
in the meeting of the Price Advisory Committee to fix the compensation 
with consent. The Advisory ·committee headed by the Deputy 
Commissioner held its meetings with the land owners. The proceedings 
of the Advisory Committee under the Chairmanship of Deputy 
Commissioner was held on 9m September, 2005. 
9. According to the appellants herein, the outcome of the meeting 
with the land owners was that the Advisory Committee could achieve a 
consensus and the market rate with consent was fixed at Rs. 6,50,000/-
per acre. It is also the case of the appellants that majority ofland owners 
have accepted the said compensation. However, respondents have taken 
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the position that they are not the parties to this agreement. This aspect 
shall be adverted to at a later stage with some more details. At this 
stage, it is suffice to mention that it has come on record that the 
· respondents had sent letter dated 30th October, 2006 to the appellants in 
reply to letter dated 16th August, 2006 of the appellants, thereby requesting 
the. appellants to provide reasonable and adequate compensation. 
However, before compensation could be disbursed to the respondents at 
the rates purportedly fixed, some disputes among family members of the 
respondents arose about the proportionment of the compensation amongst 
them. The children of respondent, namely, Parmesh, Lakshamma and 
Sunil appeared through their counsel and opposed payment of 
compensation to the respondents. In view of this dispute, the appellants 
deposited the entire compensation payable to the respondents, before 
the Civil Court, Srirangapatna, as perthe provisions of Section 30 of the 
Old LA Act. Precisely a sum of Rs. 30,15,871/- was deposited before 
the Civil Court vide cheque dated 8th March, 2007. On that basis LAC 
No. 13 of2007 was registered and the court sent notice dated 13th June, 
2008 to the respondents. At this stage, the writ petition was filed by the 
responden~s in the High Court of Karnataka prayi!Jg for quashing of 
preliminary notification dated ] 5th September, 2000 and final notification
dated ] 5th June, 2005, inter alia, on the following grounds: 
. (a) That provisions of Section 11, I IA of the Old LA Act are 
made applicable to the proceedings under KAID Act by vi11ue of Section 
30 of the KAID Act and the Deputy Commissioner has not passed any 
award as required under ~ection 11 of the Old LA Act; 
(b) The entfre proceedings initiated under Section 28 of the KAID 
Act have lapsed as no award has been .passed within two years from 
the date of publication of final declaration. 
(c) In the absence of consent award under Section 29(2) of the 
KIAD Act, the Deputy Commissioner is duty bound to pass regular 
award under Section 11 A of the Old LA Act within two years from the 
date of publication of final notification. 
( d) That the respondent herein had not given any consent for the 
. so-called consent award as she had not appeared before the Deputy 
Commissioner and did not pai1icipate in the said proceeding. 
I 0. The appellants contested the said writ petition by filing thtjir 
statement of objection. As per tl>e appellants, all the statutory notices
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
had been sent at the correct address of the respondent and necessary 
procedure for fixation of compensation had been followed by them. It 
was also submitted that provisions of Section 11 A of the Old LA Act 
were not applicable to the acquisition proceedings under KIAD Act. 
The Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment and order dated 91h 
November, 2012 allowed writ petition in part holding that the respondents 
were not the parties to the Consent Award. However, the Single Judge 
permitted the appellants to proceed with the fixing of the market value 
as on the date of final notification dated 151h June, 2005 after repelling 
the plea of the respondents that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed. 
Aggrieved by this judgment, the respondents preferred writ appeal before 
the Division Bench of the High Court wherein following stance was 
taken by them: 
(a) That mandatory notice required under Section 28(2) of the 
KIAD Act was not served upon the appellai1ts. 
(b) That Section 30 of the KIAD Act applies the provision of Old 
LA Act in respect of enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner 
and, therefore, Section I IA is applicable and in this case, the award is 
not passed under Section 11 A within two years, therefore, the acquisition 
has lapsed. 
( c) That proceeding of the Advisory Committee conducted on 91h 
September, 2005 is only a consultation with some of the
land owners and 
cannot be said to be a consent award, which is required to be passed in 
writing under Rule I O(b) of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 in form 
No. D. 
11. During the pendency of the matter, the New LA Act came 
into force on I~ January, 2014 whereby Old LA Act stood repealed. 
The respondents filed application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1908 alleging that since the New LA Act had come 
into force, as per Section 24 of the said Act, acquisition of the land had 
lapsed since no award has been passed under Section 11 of the Old LA 
Act. 
12. The Division Bench of the High Court ofKaranataka by its 
judgment and order dated 14'h January, 2015, allowed the writ appeal 
and quashed the proceeding initiated by the appellants by way of 
preliminary and final notification on the following grounds: 
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(~) Wh~n the award was required to be passed unde~ the Old LA 
Act, it cannot be said that provisions of the New LA Act would not 
apply to acquisition under KIAD Act and, therefore, Section 24 of the 
New LA Act will apply .. 
(b) Even though this Court has held that Section I IA of the Old 
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LA Act has no application in respect of the land acquired under.the 
provisions of KIAD Act, the New LA Act is appl.icable and that the 
acquisition proceedings would be deemed to have lapsed due to non-
payment, compensation and non-passing, of the a'Yard within a period of 
two years. 
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(c) That the New LA Act does not say whether it is applicable to 
the lands acquired under the provisions ofKarnataka Land Acquisition 
Act but what Section 24 says is that once the award is not passed under 
Section I IA of Old LA Act or the compensation is not paid within five 
years, such proceeding would be lapse. 
13. It cc;rnld be gathered from the above that the Division Ben'ch 
has held that the New LA Act would be applicable to the present 
proceedings though they were initiated under the provisions of the KIAD 
Act read with the Old LA Act.· It has further held tliat since there was 
no consent on:fixation of the compensation given by the respondents, 
the case would be governed by Section 24(1) of the New LA Act. 
However, since there is no provision for passing the award under the 
KIAD Act, which had to be passed only
under the Old LA Act, and 
since no award had been passed after the final declaration on l 51h June, 
2005, acquisition proceedings are deemed to have been lapsed. · 
14. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that after issuance 
of the pteliminary notification, requisite notices were issued and 
procedure prescribed under the KIAD Act was followed, which 
culminated in fixing the compensation at Rs.6,58,000/- per acre with 
consent of the land owners. Not only this, thereafter, even the 
compensation pertaining to the land of the respondents was deposited 
bytl1e appellants before. the City Civil Court, Srirangapatna. She stated 
that thi's comp~nsation. could nqt be disbursed or withdrawn by the 
respondents in v:iew of the dispute that had arisea between tI1e claimants 
&bout the apportionment of the said amount and for this reason, reference 
wa$ made under Section 30 of the Old LA Act. The Civil :Court had 
even issued notice to the parties for adjudication of the dispute. She, ..
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
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thus, submitted that once the Advisory Committee had taken a decision 
and fixed the compensation with the consent of the parties, no award 
under the provisions of the LA Act was required in the instant case. 
Proceeding further in this line of argument, she contended that in such 
circumstances, provisions of Section 24(2) of the New LA Act were not 
applicable and, ifat all, itis sub-section (1) of Section 24 which would be 
applicable in the given circumstances. Referring to sub-section (1) of 
Section 24, she argued that the situation would be akin to what has been 
contemplated under clause (b) thereof and, therefore, there w.as no 
question of deemed lapse ofa~quisition proceedings which situation is 
· pro:\tided under sub-section (2) of SectiOn 24 and is not attracted in the 
instant case. 
15. Learned counsel for the respondents countered the aforesaid 
submission by emphasising that the Single Bench as well as the Division 
Bench of the High Court rightly arrived at a finding of fact that the 
respondents had not given any consent for fixation of compensation at 
Rs.6,50,000/- and, therefore, the decision of the Advisory Committee 
dated 9th September, 2005 in this behalf was not binding on the 
.respondents. On this basis, it was submitted that as the exercise 
contemplated under Section 29 of the KIAD Act .was not fructified, it 
was like 'No Consent Award'
passed by the Advisory Committee and 
provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 24 ofNew LA Act shall squarely 
apply. 
16. From the narration of events described above as well as the 
arguments of both the sides, it becomes clear that the first question 
which needs determination is as to whether fixation of compensation at 
the rate ofRs.6,50,000/- per acre by the Advisory Committee is "".ith the 
consent of the respondents or not. 
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· 17. Before adverting to the aforesaid aspect, we may clarify certain 
legal aspects. In the State of Karnataka, land can be acquired under the 
KIAD Act as well, for the purpose of developing the acquired land as an 
industrial area. Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act provides for issuance of 
preliminary notification for the aforesaid purpose. Other sub-sections of 
Section 28 provide for a particular ,procedure-to be followed by issuing 
necessary notices and once that is undertaken; final notification for 
acquisition of the land can be issued under sub-section ( 4) of Section 28 
of the KIAD Act. Section 29 of the KIAD Act deals with the payment 
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of compensation. The provision which is made under this Section calls 
for determination of compensation by agreement between the State 
Government on the one hand and the land owner, who is to be 
compensated for the land acquired, on the other hand. In case, no such 
agreement is arrived at, the State Government is supposed to refer the 
case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of 
compensation, who is required to determine the compensation as per 
Section 30 of the KIAD Act. Section 30 of the KIAD Act provides that 
for fixing the compensation, the Deputy Commissioner is supposed to 
follow the same procedure as prescribed under the Old LA Act. 
Obviously, in that event, after following the procedure in the Old LA 
Act, the Deputy Commissioner is required to pass an award (which is 
contemplated under Section 9 of the Old LA Act). What follows from 
the above is that the first attempt is to arrive at a consensus between the 
State Government and the person who is the land loser. This task is to 
be undertaken by the Advisory Committee. )fit is accomplished then 
compensation is payable as per the said agreement. If such an agreement 
does not fructify, the Deputy Commissioner is to determine the 
compensation after following the procedure contained in the Old LA 
Act and pass necessary award in this behalf. Obviously, when there is 
an agreement no such award is required.
Conversely, when there is no 
agreement on compensation between the parties, passing of the award 
under Section 30 of the KIAD Act becomes imperative tc bring the 
acquisition proceedings to a logical conclusion. In the instant case, 
admittedly there is no award passed by the Deputy Commissioner. 
According to the appellants, it is because of the reason that, by consent, 
market rate of the land in question was fixed at Rs.6,58,000/- by the 
Advisory Committee under the Chainnanship of the Deputy Commissioner 
on 9th September, 2005. Respondents contend otherwise submitting 
that there is ho such consent and their plea is accepted by the Courts 
below. It becomes necessary to answer this question. 
18. The undisputed facts which emerge on record, are the 
following: 
On I Sth September; 2000, a preliminary notification under Section 
28(1) of the KIAD Act was published. It was followed by final 
notification dated 15th June, 2005 under Section 28( 4) of the KIAD Act. 
With the issuance of notification under Section 28( 4) of the KIAD Act, 
the land stood vested absolutely in the State Government, free from all
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
encumbrances (See Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act). Next step was to 
take the possession of the land as per the procedure stated in sub-sections 
(6) and (7) ofSection 28 of the KIAD Act and to pay the compensation 
as provided under Section 29 of the KlAD Act. The State Government 
had constituted the Advisory Committee consisting of8 persons which 
deliberated with the land owners in order to arrive at consensual figure 
of the compensation. Notice dated 23rd August, 2005 was issued in this 
behalf fixing the date of meeting as 9th September, 2005 with request to 
the land owners to attend the said meeting. Appellants have placed on 
record proceedings of the said meeting held on 9th September, 2005 as 
per which consent agreement was arrived at whereby compensation 
was fixed at Rs.6,50,000/- per acre. It appears that thereafter letter 
dated 16th August, 2006 was sent by the Office of the Special Land 
Acquisition Officer, KTADB, Mysore though it is not placed Oil record. 
However, respondent Anasuya Bai responded to that letter vide her 
communication dated 30th October, 2006 stating that she was ready to 
take reasonable and adequate compensation as per the. rate prevailing in 
the market. Thereafter, she wrote letter dated 7th February, 2008 
requesting the appellants to furnish copies of preliminary notification 
dated 13th May, 2005 and final notification issued under
Section 28(4) 
dated 15th June, 2005. Another letter dated 26th May, 2008 was written 
vide which she asked for the certified copies of the following documents: 
(i) Agreement, if any, reached between her and the Government 
as per the provisions of Section 29(2) of KIAD Act. 
(ii) Agreement, if any, entered into between her and KIAD Board 
as per the provisions of Section 11(2) ofKTAD Act. 
(iii) Award, if any, passed as per Section 11 (2) of Old LA Act 
based on principles of valuation of acquired land by adopting known 
metl10d of valuation. 
19. Aforesaid facts are not in dispute. However, it appears that 
tl1ereafter some litigation started in connection with the title of the property 
in question resulting into dispute as to who was fo receive the 
compensation and how it had to be apportioned. Respondent Anasuya 
Bai had filed soine petition in this behalf before the Principle Civil Judge 
(Sr. Division) and JMFC. Summons dated 13th June, 2008 were issued 
by the said Principal Civil Judge to the appellants to appear on 3rd May, 
2008. Having regard to this dispute, the appellants deposited the 
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A ·. compensation in the Civil Court at the rate of Rs.6,5~,000/: P,er acre as 
per the decision of the Advisory Committee. Wheri the 1Patter rested at 
that stage, the respondents filed writ petition in the High Court seeking 
.q1,u1shing.of preliminary n.ot.i.fication as well as final declaration .. Prayer 
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was also made to the effect that acquisiti011 oftheir land urider-Section 
28(1) of the KIAD Act be declared as lapsed. The aforesaid prayers 
were made on the ground that n~ award was passed by the Land 
Acquisition Collector within the time stipulated under Section 11 A of the 
Old LA Act. 
20. Appellants herein filed the statement of objections to the said 
writ petition contending that by agreement the compensation of 
Rs.6,50,000/- per acre was fixed and, therefore, there was no need to 
pass the award. It was also stated· that insofar as appellants are 
concerned, it had deposited the amount of compensation in the Civil 
Court in view of the dispute between the respondents inter se. 
21. From the issuance of notice alone to the respondents under 
Section 29 ofKIAD Act, it cannot be said that respondents had agreed 
to the compensation. It may be noted that large chunk of land was 
acquired and there were other land owners as well, despite· the 
respondents. No doubt, proceedings .dated 9th September, 2005 indicate 
that consent agreement is arrive.d at fixing the c.ompensation at
Rs.6,50,000/- per acre. However, the moot question is as to whether 
respondents are also consenting parties. The learned Single Judge of 
the High Court returned a categorical finding that respondents never 
gave any such consent. For this purpose, reference. was made to Rule 
JO(b) of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 which states the 
format in which the said mutual agreement is to be arrived at i.e. Form 
D. Rule 1 O(b) states the form of agreement to be executed under sub-
section (2) of Section 11 shall be in Form D. No such document is 
produced by the appellants. Moreover, the appellants also could not 
show that notice dated 23rd August, 2005 was, in fact, served on the 
respondents. Therefore, the respondents had not consented to the amount 
of compensation that was determined in the minutes dated 9th Septe!nber, 
2005. This finding is upheld by the Division Bench in the impugned 
judgment as well. There is no reason to disagree with this finding. 
22. Having said so, it also needs to be kept in: mii1d that a large 
chunk of land was acquired by the appellants and a miquscule part thereof 
belonged to the respondents herein. Further, insofar as respondents are
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 
199 
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
concerned, it even undertook the exercise of fixing the compensation 
for the acquired land, as per the provisions of the KIAD Act. Advisory 
Committee was constituted for this purpose. Notices were also sent to 
all concerned, including the respondents herein. It further transpired 
that the land owners ( exceptthe respondents)participated in the meeting 
and as per the minutes of the meeting dated 9th September, 2005, consent' 
agreement was arrived at whereby compensation at the rate of 
Rs.6,50,000/- per acre was fixed. With these minutes, the Advisory 
Committee remained under the impression that it had accomp,lished its 
task by reaching a consens~s on the qu.antum of ccimpensatioi1. Not. 
only this, further steps were taken to· pay the compensation at the 
aforesaid rate to the land owners, whose land was acquired. Insofar as 
respondents are concerned, due to the disputes inter se between them, 
the compensation as per the minutes dated 9th September, 2005 was 
even deposited with the Civil Court. The Civil Court issued notice and 
the respondents participated in the proceedings before the Civil Court. 
At that stage, respondents chose to file a writ petition for quashing of 
the acquisition proceedings coming out with the plea that they were not 
consenting parties and had not participated in the meeting dated 9th 
September, 2005 as even the notice was not
received by them. Aforesaid 
facts. disclose that the entire move on the part of the appellants wits 
bonafide one, though there was an accidental slip on their part that insofar 
as respondents are concerned, no consent to the amount of compensation 
fixed was giyen by them. It appears tJiat the appellantscautho~ities. did 
not proceed further to determine the .compensation .in respect of 
respondents' land as they nurtured a bonatide belief that with the fixation 
of compensation as per the Minutes dated 9th September, 2005 all the 
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land owners, including the respondents, had agreed with the same and, 
therefore, no further exercise was required. Had the appell~nts-authorities · f 
been more careful, they would have noticed thaf insofar as respondents 
herein are concerned, they are not the consenting parties. In that event, 
they could have brought them on board wHh other land owners by taking 
their specific consent as well or proceeded further under Section 29(3) 
of the KIAD Act. 
23. Taking these factors into consicleration, the learned Single Judge 
vide his judgment dated 9th November, 2012 permitted the appellants to 
proceed on the basis of the Gazette notification dated 15th J u!le, 2005 
·acquiring the la!1d and detenliine the compensation by making an award 
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in this behalf. By this process, appellants were allowed to proceed afresh 
to detem1ine the compensation under Section 29(2) of the KIAD Act by 
reaching an agreement with the respondents, and failing which to refer 
the case to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 29(2) for 
determination of the amount of compensation. The learned Single Judge, 
by adopting this course of action, specifically rejected the content~on of 
the respondents herein to quash the proceedings. 
24. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned 
judgment, however, has quashed the acquisition proceedings itselfholding 
that they have lapsed. For this purpose, the High Court has taken aid of 
Section 24 of the New LA Act in the following manner: 
"13. It is also noted that the acquisition proceedings including 
preliminary and final declaration have been passed under the 
provisions of the KIA DB Act. But there is no provisions under 
the KIADB Act to pass an award and award has to be passed 
only under the provisions of the LAAct, 1894. lfthe award has 
to be passed under LA Act, whether the new act can be pressed 
into service to hold the acquisition proceedings are lapsed on 
account of non-passing of award within a period of 5 years U/s 
11. If the award is passed under LA Act, the enquiry has to be 
conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before 
passing the award. Section 11 A contemplates ifthe award is not
passed within 2 years from the date of publication of the final 
declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall 
automatically stands lapsed. It is no doubt true the Hon 'ble 
Supreme Court in the case of M. Nagabhushana Vs. State of 
Karnataka and Others, (2011) 3 SCC 408 has held that Section 
11-A of the-Act is no applicatin in respect of the land acquired 
under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas 
Development Act. We have to consider in this appeal as to 
whether Section 24(2) of the New Act is applicable in order to 
hold that the acquisition proceedings deemed to be lapsed due to 
non-payment of compensation and non-passing of the award within 
a period of five years from the date of declaration and with effect 
from non-payment of compensation to the land owners. 
14. The New Act does not say whether the Act i£ applicable to 
the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Land
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KlADB, 
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
Acquisition Act 1894. What Section 24 says that ifthe award is 
not passed U/s 11 of the Act and the compensation is not paid 
within 5 years or more prior to new act, ifthe physical posGession 
of the land is taken or not especially the compensation is not paid 
or deposited in Court such proceedings deem to have been lapsed. 
In th instant case, it is not case of the respondent that award is not 
required to be passed under the provisions of LA Act. When the 
award is required to be passed under LA Act, the respondents 
cannot contend that the provisions of New Act cannot be made 
applicable on account of non payment of compensation within a 
·period of five years." 
25. This approach of the High Court, we find, to be totally 
erroneous. In the first instance, matter is not properly appreciated by 
ignoring the important aspects mentioned in para 24 above. Secondly, 
effect ofnon-applicability of Section I IA of the Old LA Act is not rightly 
understood. The High Court was not oblivious of the judgment of this 
Court in M. Nagabhuslumu's case which is referred by it in the aforesaid 
discussion itself. This judgment categorically holds that once the 
proceedings are initiated under the KIAD Act, Section 1 lA of the Old 
LA Act would not be applicable. Such an opinion of the Court is based 
on the following rationale: 
"29. The appellant has not challenged the validity of the
aforesaid 
provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the provisions of 
Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the 
publication of the Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD 
Act i.e. from 30-3-2004, the land jn question vested in the State 
free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5) of the 
KIAD Act, whereas·the land acquired under the said Act vests 
only under Section 16 thereof, which runs as under: 
"16.Power to take possessio11.-When the Collector has made 
an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the 
land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, 
free from all encumbrances." 
30. On a comparison of the aforesaid provisions, namely, 
Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 
of the said Act, it is clear that the land which is subject to 
acquisition proceeding under the said Act gets vested with 
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the Government only when tbe Collector makes an award 
under Section 11, and the Government takes possession. 
Under Se~tions 28(4) and 28(5)' of the KIAD Act, such 
".esting takes place by operation ()f law and it has nothing 
to do with the ma~ng of any award. This is where S~ctions 
28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act are vitally different from 
Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act. 
31. A somewhat similar question came up for consideration before 
a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan 
[(1996) 3 SCC 1] . In that case the acquisition proceedings 
commenc"ed under' Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban 
Improvement Act, 1959 and the same contentions were raised, 
namely, that the acquisition notification gets invalidated for not 
making an award within a period 'of two years from the .date of 
notification. Repelling the said contention, the learned Judges held 
that once the land is vested in the Government, the provisions of 
Section 11-A are not attracted and the acquisition proceedings 
will not lapse. (Pratap case [(1996) 3 SCC I] , SCC para 12 at 
p. 8 of the Report.) 
32. In Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 
326] this Court held that the provisions of Sections 6 and 11-A of 
the said Act do not apply to the provisions of the Bangalore 
Development Authority Act, 1976 (the BOA Act). Jn SCC para 
15 at p. 335 of the Report this Court made a distinction between 
the
purposes of the two enactments and held that all the provisions 
. of the said Act do not apply to the BOA Act. Subsequently, the 
Constitution Bench of this Court in Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. 
v. Bangalore Development Authority [(2011) 3 SCC 139 : (2011) 
1 SCC (Civ) 662: (2011) I Scale 533], held that Section 11-Aof 
the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the BOA Act. 
33, The same principle is attracted to the present case also. Here 
also on a comparison between the provisions of the said Act and 
the KIAO Act, we find that those two Acts were enacted to 
achieve substantially different purposes. Insofar as the KIAD 
Act is concerned, from its Statement of Objects and Reasons, it 
is clear that the same was enacted to achieve the following 
purposes:
THE SPECIAL LANI) ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
"It is. considereq necessary to make provision for the orderly 
· establishment and development of industries in suitable areas 
in the State. TO achieve this object, it is proposed to specify 
suitable areas for industrial development and establish a board 
to devefop such areas and make available lands therein for 
establishmenfof industries." 
34. The KIAD Act is of course a self-contained code. The said 
Act is .primarily ·a law regulating acquisition of land for public 
purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land 
under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of 
planne9 development of any city. It has to cater to ,different 
situations which come within the expanded horizon of public 
purpose. Recently the Constitution Bench of this Com1 in Girnar 
Traders (3) v. Staie of Maharashtra [(2011) 3 SCC 1: (2011) 1 
SCC (Civ) 578: (2.011) 1 Scale 223] held that Section U-A of the 
said Act does not apply to acquisition un4er the provisions of the 
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. 
3 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment 
of this Court in Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka [( 1998) 3 
SCC 276] . The said decision was cited for the purpose of 
contending that Section 11-A is applicable to an acquisition under 
the KIAD Act. In Mariyappa [( 1998) 3 SCC 276] before coming 
to hold that provision of Section
11-A o~the Central Act applies to. 
the Kamataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 
1972 (hereinafter "the 1972 Act"), this Court held that the 1972 
Act is not a self-contained code. The Court also held that the 
1972 Act and the Central Act are supplemental to each other to 
the extent that unless the Central Act supplements the Karnataka 
Act, the latter cannot function. The Court further held that both 
the Acts, namely, the 1972 Act and the Central Act deal with the 
same subject. But in the instant case the KIAD Act is a self-
contained code and the Central Act is not supplemental to it. 
Therefore, the ratio in Mariyappa [(1998) 3 SCC 276] is not 
attracted to the facts of the present case. 
36. Following the aforesaid well-settled principles, this 
Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the 
contention of the appellant that acquisition under the KIAD 
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Act lapsed for alleged non-compliance with the provisions 
of Section 11-A of the said Act. For the reasons aforesaid 
all the contentions of the appellant, being without any 
substance, fail and the appeal is dismissed." 
26. Having regard to the aforesaid raison d'etre for non-application 
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of~he Old LAAct, on the parity of reasoning, provision of Section 24(2) 
of the New LA Act making Section 11 A of the Old LA Act would, 
obviously, be not applicable. We would like to refer to the judgment in 
the case of State of M.P. v. M. V. Narasimlum
1 in this behalf where 
following proposition is laid down: 
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"Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous 
Act, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and 
independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected 
by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, 
however, will not apply in the following cases: 
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(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are 
supplemental to each other; 
(b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; 
(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, ifnot imported into 
the subsequent Act also, would renderthe subsequent Act wholly 
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unworkable and ineffectual; and 
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( d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or 
by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the 
subsequent Act." 
27. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the 
learned Single
Judge was correct in law which should not have been 
interfered with by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. It is 
significant to state that insofar as direction of the Single Judge is concerned 
that was accepted by the appellants herein, as the appellants did not 
challenge the same. It is the respondents which had filed the intra court 
appeal. Thus, appellants by their aforesaid conduct, are satisfied with 
the order of the learned Single Judge in directing them to determine the 
compensation. 
28. We, thus, allow this appeal by setting aside the judgment of 
the Division Bench and restore the direction passed by the Single Judge 
H 
1 ( t975l 2 sec 377

THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, 
205 
MYSORE v. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRs. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
with a direction to the appellants authorities to fix the compensation in ,, A 
accordance with the provisions of Section 29 of the KIAD Act. The 
said exercise shall be done as expeditiously as possible. 
No order as to cost. 
B 
Divya Pandey 
Appeal allowed. 
·"