BINOY VISWAM versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
[2017] 7 S.C.R. 1, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Ratio
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
is impermissible in our constitutional democracy." 
A fortiorari, a law cannot be invalidated on the ground that the 
Legislature did not apply its mind or it was prompted by some improper 
motive. 
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80. It is, thus, clear that in exercise of power of judicial review, 
Indian Courts are invested with powers to strike down primary_ legislation 
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enacted by the Parliament or the State legislatures. However, while 
undertaking this exercise of judicial review, the same is to be done at 
three levels. In the first stage, the Court would examine as to whether 
impugned provision in a legislation is compatible with the fundamental 
rights or the Constitutional provisions (substantive judicial review) or it c 
falls foul of the federal distribution of powers (procedural judicial review). 
If it is not found to be so, no further exercise is needed as challenge 
would fail.· On the other hand, if it is found that Legislature lacks 
competence as the subject legislated was not within the powers assigned 
in the .list in VII Schedule, no further enquiry is needed and such a law is 
to be declared as ultravires the Constitution. However, while undertaking 
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substantive judicial review, if it is found that the impugned provision 
appears to be violative of fundamental rights or other Constitutional rights, 
the Court reaches the second stage of review. At this second phase of 
enquiry, the Court is supposed to undertake
the exercise as to whether 
the impugned provision can.still be saved by reading it down so as to 
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bring it in conformity with the Constitutional provisions. If that is not 
achievable then the enquiry enters the third stage. If the offending portion 
of the statute is severable,. it is severed and the Court strikes down the 
impugned provision declaring the same as unconstitutional. 
81. Keeping in view the aforesaid parameters we, at this stage, 
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we want to devote some time discussing the arguments of the petitioners 
based on the concept of 'limited government'. 
Concent of 'Limited Government' and its impact on powers 
of Judicial Review 
82. There cannot be any dispute about the manner in which Mr. 
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Shyam Divan explained the concept of 'limited Government' in his 
submissions. Undoubtedly, the Constitution oflndia, as an instrument of 
governance of the State, delineates the functions and powers of 'fach 
wing of the State, namely, the Legislature, the Judiciary and the Executive. 
It also enshrines the principle pf separation of powers which mandates 
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[2017] 7 S.C.R. 
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that each wing of the State has to function.within its own domain and no 
wing of the State is entitled to trample over the function assigned to the 
other wing of the State. This fundamental docum.ent of governance also 
contains principle offederalism wherein the Union is assigned certain 
powers and likewise powers of the State are also prescribed. In this· 
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.context, the Union Legislature, i.e. the Parliament, as well as the State 
Legislatures are given specific areas in respect of which they have power .. 
to legislate. That is so stipulated in Schedule VII of the Constitution 
wherein List I enumerates the subjects over which Parliament has the 
dominion, List II spells out those areas where the State Legislatures 
have the power to make laws while List III is the Concurrent List which 
is accessible both to the Union as well as the State Governments. The 
Scheme pertaining to making laws by the Parliament as well as by the 
Legislatures of the State is primarily contained in Articles 245 to 254 of · 
the Constitution.· Therefore, it cannot be disputed that each wing of the 
·State to act within the sphere delineated for it u~der the Constitution. It 
is correct that crossing these limits would render the action of the State 
ultra vires the Constitution~ When it comes to power of taxation; 
undoubtedly, power to tax is treated as sovereign power of any State. 
However, there are constitutional
limitations briefly described above. In 
a nine Judge Bench decision of this Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd. & 
Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.42 discussion on these constitutional 
limitations are as follows: 
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"20. Exercise of sovereign power is, however, subject to 
Constitutional limitations especially in a. federal system like ours 
where the States also to the extent permissible exercise the power 
to make laws includirig laws that levy taxes, duties and fees. That . 
the power to levy taxes is subject to constitutional limitations is no 
longer res-integra. A Constitution Bench of this Court has 
ii) Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of UP. ( 1990) 1 SCC 
I 09 recognised t.hat in India the Centre andthe States both enjoy 
the exercise of sovereign power, to the extent the Constitution 
confers upon them that power. This Court declared: . 
"56 ... We would not like, however, to embark upon any theory 
of police power because the Indian Constitution does not 
recognise police power as such. But we must recognise the 
exercise of Sovereign power which gives the State sufficient 
"(2016) 11 Scale I
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] . 
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authority to enact any law subject to the limitations of the 
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Constitution to discharge its functions. Hence, the Indian 
Constitution as a sovereign State has power to legislate on all 
branches except to the limitation as to the division of powers 
between the Centre and the States and also subject to the 
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The 
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Indian States, between the Centre.and the States, has sovereign 
power. The sovereign power is plenary and inherent in every 
sovereign State to do all things which promote the health, peace, 
morals, education and good order of the people. Sovereignty is 
difficult to define. This power of sovereignty is, however, 
subject to constitutional limitations. "This power, according to 
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some constitutional authorities, is to the public what necessity 
is to the individual. Right to tax or levy impost must be in . . 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." 
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. 21. What then are the Constitutional limitations on the power of 
· the State legislatures to levy taxes or for that matter enact D 
legislations in the field reser¥ed for them under the relevant entries 
of List II and III of the Seventh Schedule. The first and the · 
. . 
. 
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foremost of these limitations appears in Article 13 of the 
Constitution of India which declares that all laws in force in the 
territory oflndia immediately before the commencement of the "E
Constitution are void to the extent they are inconsistent with the 
provisions of Part m dealing with the fundamental rights guaranteed 
to the citizens. It forbids the States from making any law which 
takes away or abridges, any provision of Part UL Any law made 
in contravention of the said rights shall to the extent of contravention 
be void. There is no gain saying that the power to enact laws has 
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been conferred upon the Parliament subject to the above 
Constitutional limitation. So also in terms of Article 248, the 
residuary power to impose a tax not otherwise mentioned in the 
Co~current List or the State List has been vested In the Parliament 
to the exclusion of the State legislatures, and the States' power to 
levy taxes limited to what is specifically reserved in their favour 
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and no more. 
22. Article 249 similarly e!Tlpowers the Parliament to legislate with 
·respect to a matter in the State List for national interest provided 
the Council of States has declared by a resolution supported by 
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not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting that it 
is necessary or expedient in national interest to do so. The power 
is available till such time any resolution remains in force in terms 
of Article 249(2) and the proviso thereunder. 
23. Article 250 is yet another provision which empowers the 
Parliament to legislate with respect to any matter in the State List 
when there is a proclamation of emergency. In the event of an 
inconsistency between laws made by Parliament under Articles 
249 and 250, and laws made by legislature of the States, the law 
made by Parliament shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, prevail 
over the.law made by the State in terms of Article 251. 
24. The power of Parliament to .legislate for two or more States 
by consent, in regard to matters not otherwise within the power 
of the Parliament is regulated by Article 252, while Article 253 
starting with a non-obstante clause empowers Parliament to make 
any law for the whole country or l),ny part of the territory oflildia 
for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any 
other country or countries or any decision made at any international 
conference, association or other body." 
83. Mr. Divan, however, made an earnest endeavour to further. 
broaden this concept of 'limited Government' by giving an altogether 
different slant. He submitted that there are certain things that the States 
simply cannot
do because the action fundamentally alters the relationship 
between the citizens and the State. In this hue, he submitted that it was 
impermissible for the State to undertake the exercise of collection of 
bio-metric data, including fingerprints and storing at a central depository 
as it puts the State in an extremely dominant position in relation to the 
individual citizens. He also submitted that it will put the State in a position 
to target an individual and engage in surveillance thereby depriving or 
withholding the enjoyment of his rights and entitlements, which is totally 
impermissible in a country where governance of the State offounded on 
the concept of 'limited Government'. Again, this concept of limited 
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government is.woven around Article 21 of the Constitution. 
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84. Undoubtedly, we are in the era of liberalised democracy. In a 
democratic society governed by the Constitution, there is a strong trend 
towards the Constitutionalisation of democratic politics, wh\:fe the actions · 
of democratic elected GovernmenJ are judged in the light of the
BINOY ViSWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
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Constitution. In this context, judiciary assumes the role of protector of f 
the Constitution and democracy, being the ultimate arbi terin all matters 
involving the interpretation of the Constitution. 
85. Having said so, when it comes to exercising the power of 
judicial review of a legislation, the scope of such a power has to be kept 
in mind and the power is to be exercised within the limited sphere assigned 
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to the judiciary to undertake the judicial review. This has already been 
mentioned above. Therefore, unless the petitioner demonstrates that 
the Parliament, in enacting the impugned provision, has exceeded its 
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power prescribed in the Constitution or this provision violates any of the 
provision, the argument predicated on 'limited governance' will not c 
succeed. One of the aforesaid ingredients needs lo be established by 
the petitioners in order to succeed. 
86. Even in the case of Thakur Bharath Singh43 relied upon by . 
Mr. Divan, wherein executive order wa·s passed imposing certain 
restrictions requiring the respondent therein to reside at a particular place 
as specified in the order, which was passed in exercise of powers 
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contained under Section 3(l)(b) of the M.P. Public Security Act, 1959, 
the Court struck down and quashed the order only after it found that 
restrictions contained therein were unreasonable and violative of 
fundamental freedom guaranteed under Article 19(l)(d) and
(e) of the 
Constitution of India. 
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87. With this, we proceed to consider the arguments on which 
vires of the impugned provisions are questioned: 
Argument of Legislative Competence 
88. It is not denied by the petitioners that having regard to the 
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provisions of Article 246 of the Constitution and Entries 82 and 97 of 
List I, the Parliament has requisite competence to enact the impugned 
legislation. However, the submission of the petitioners was that the 
impugned legislative provision was made as per which enrolment under 
Aadhaar had become mandatory for the income tax assessees, whereas 
this Court has passed various orders repeatedly emphasising that 
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enrolment for Aadhaar card hag to be voluntary. On this basis, the· 
argument is that the Legislature lacked the authority to pass a law contrary 
to the judgments of this Court, without removing the basis of those 
judgments. It was also argued that evenAadhaar Act was voluntary in 
43 Footnote 9 above 
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nature and the basis of the judgments of this Court could be taken away 
only by making enrolment under the Aadhaar Act compulsory, which 
was not done. 
89. Before proceeding to discuss this argument, one aspect of the 
matter needs clarification. There was a debate as to whether Aadhaar 
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Act is voluntary or even that Act makes .:nrolment under Aadhaar 
mandatory. 
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90. First thing that is to be kept in mind is that the Aadhaar Act is 
enacted to enable the Government to identify individuals for delivery of 
benefits, subsidies and services unde~ various welfare schemes. This is 
so mentioned in Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act which states that proof of 
Aadhaar number is necessary for receipt of such subsidies, .benefits and 
services. At the same time, it cannot be disputed that once a person 
enrols himself and obtainsAadhaar number as mentioned in Section 3 of 
the Aadhaar Act,· such Aadhaar number. can be used for many other 
purposes. In fact, this Aadhaar nutnber becpmes the Unique Identity 
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(UID) of that person. Having said that, it is clear that there is no provision 
in Aadhaar Act which makes enrolment compulsory. May be for the 
purpose of obtaining benefits, proof of Aadhaar card is necessary as per 
Section 7 of the Act. Proviso to Section 7 stipulates that 'if an Aadhaar 
number is not assigned to enable an individual, he shall be offered 
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alternate and viable means ofidentification for delivery of the
subsidy, 
benefit 'or service. According to the petitioners, this proviso, with 
acknowledges alternate and viable means of identification, and therefore 
makes Aadhaar optional and voluntary and the enrolment is not necessary 
even for the purpose of receiving subsidies, benefits and services under 
various schemes of the Government. The respondents, however, interpret 
the proviso differently and there plea is that the words 'if an Aadhaar 
number is not assigned to an individual; deal with only that situation 
where application for Aadhaar has been made but for certain reasons _ 
Aadhaar number has not been assigned as it may take some time to give 
Aadhaar card. Therefore, this proviso is 011ly by way of an interim 
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measure till Aadhaar number is assigned; which is otherwise compulsory 
for obtaining certain benefits as stated in Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act. 
Fact remains that as per the Government and UIDAI itself, the 
requirement of obtaining Aadhaar number is voluntary. It has been so 
claimed by UIDAI on its website and clarification to this effect has also 
been issued by UIDAI. 
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BINOY VISWAM v. UNION o·F INpIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
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91. Thus, enrolment under Aadhaar is voluntary. However, it is a A 
moot question as to whether for obtaining benefits as prescribed under 
Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act, it i.s mandatory to give Aadhaar number or 
not is a debatable issue which we are not addressing as this very issue is 
squarely raised which is the subject matter of other writ petition filed 
and pending in this Court. 
92. On the one hand, enrollment under Aadhaar card is voluntary, 
however, for the purposes oflncorrie Tax Ad, Section l 39AA makes it 
compulsory for the assessees to give Aadhaar number which means 
insofar as income tax assessees are concerned, they have to necessarily 
entoll themselves under the Aadhaar Act and obtiiin Aadhaar number 
· which will be their- identification number as .that has become the 
requirement under the Income Tax Act:· .The contention that since 
enrollment under Aadhaar Act is voluntary, it cannot be compulsory under 
the Income Tax Act, cannot be countenanced. As already mentioned 
·above, purpose for enrollment under the Aadhaar Act is to avail benefits 
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of various welfare schemes etc. as stipulated in Section 7 oftheAadhaar D 
Act. Purpose behind Income Tax Act, on the other hand, is entirely 
different which has already been discussed in detail above. For achieving 
the said purpose, viz., to curb blackimongy, money laundering and tax 
evasion etc., ifthe Parliament chooses to make the
provision mandatory 
under the Income Tax Act, the competence of the Parliament cannot be 
questioned on the ground that it is impermissible only because under 
Aadhaar Act, the provision is directory in nature. It is the prerogative of 
the Parliament to make a particular provision directory in one statute 
and mandatory/compulsory in other. That by itself cannot be a ground 
to question the competence of the legislature. After all, Aadhaar Act is 
not a mother Act. Two laws, i.e., Aadhaar Act, on the one hand, and 
law in the form of Section 139AA of the Income Tax Act, on the other 
hand, are two different stand alone provisions{laws and validity of one 
cannot b.e examined in the light of provisions of other Acts. In Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shanket'14, if the objects of two statutory 
provisions are different and language of each statute is· restricted to its 
own objects or subject, then they are generally intended to run in parallel 
lines without meeting and there would be no real conflict though apparently 
it may appear to be so on the .surface. We reproduce hereunder the 
discussion to the aforesaid aspect contained in the said judgment: 
"(1971) 1 sec 442 
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"5 .... It is only when a consistent body oflaw cannot-be maintained 
without abrogation of the previous law that the plea of implied 
repeal should be sustained. To determine if a later statutory 
provision repeals by implication an earlier one it is accordingly 
necessary to closely scrutinise and consider the true meaning and 
effect both of the earlier and the later statute. Until this is done it 
cannot be satisfactorily ascertained if any fatal inconsistency exists 
between them. The meaning, scope and effect of the two statutes, 
as discovered on scrutiny, determirtes the legislative intent as to 
whether the earlier law shall cease or shall only be supplemented. 
If the objects of the two statutory provisions are different and the 
. language of each statute is restricted to its own objects or subject, 
then they are generally intended to run in parallel lines without 
meeting and there would be no real conflict though apparently it 
may appear to be so on the surface. Statutes in pari materia 
although in apparent conflict, should also, so far as reasonably 
possible, be construed to be in harmony with each other and it is 
only when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new 
provision and the prior statilte relating to the same subf ect-matter, 
that the former, being the later expression of the legislature, may 
be held to prevail, the prior~aw yielding to the extent of the conflict. 
The
same rule ofirreconcilable repugnancy controls implied repeal 
of a general by a special statute. The subsequent provision treating 
a phase of the same general subject-matter.in a more minute way 
may be intended to imply repeal protanto of the repugnant general 
provision with which it cannot reasonably co-exist. When there is 
no inconsistency between the general and the special statutethe 
later may well be construed as supplementary." 
93. In view or'the above, we are riot impressed by the contention 
6f the petitioners that the two enactments are contradictory with each 
other. A harmonious reading of the two enactments would clearly 
suggests that whereas enrollment of Aadhaaar is voluntary when it comes 
to taking benefits of various welfare schemes even if it is presumed that 
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requirement of Section 7 of Aadhaar Act that it is necessary to provide 
Aadhaar number to avail the benefits of schemes and services, it is upto 
a person to avail those benefits or not. On the other hand, purpose · 
behind enacting Section' I 39AA is to check a menace ofblack money as 
well as money laundering and also to widen the income tax net so as to 
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BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
{A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
cover those persons who are evading the payment of tax. 
94. Main emphasis, however, is on the plea that Parliament or any 
State legislature cannot pass a law that overrules a judgment thereby 
nullifying the said decision, that too without removing the basis of the 
decision. This argument appears to be attractive inasmuch as few orders 
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are passed by this Court in pending writ petitions which are.to the effect 
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that the enrollment of Aadhaar would be voluntary. However, it needs 
to be kept in mind that the orders have been passed in the petitions 
where Aadhaar scheme floated as an executive/administrative measure 
has been challenged. In those cases, the said orders are not passed in a 
case where the Court was dealing with a statute passed by the 
Parliament. Further, these an: interim orders as the Court was of the 
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opinion that till the matter is decided finally in the context of Right to 
Privacy issue, the implementation of the said Aadhaar scheme would 
remain voluntary. In fact, the main issue as to whether Aadhaar card 
scheme whereby biometrjc data of an individual is collected violates 
Right to Privacy and, therefore, is offensive of Article 21 of the 
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Constitution or not is yet to be decided. In the process; the Constitution 
Bench is also called upon to decide as to whether Right to Privacy is a 
· part of Article 21 of the Constitution at all. Therefore, no final decision 
has been
taken. In a situation like this, it cannot be said that Parliament 
is precluded from or it is rendered incompetent to pass such a law. That 
apart, the argumept of the petitioners is that the basis on which the 
aforesaid orders are passed has to be removed, which is not done. 
According to the petitioners, it could be done only by making Aadhaar 
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Act compulsory. It is difficult to accept this contention for two.reasons: 
first, when the orders passed by this Court which are relied upon by the 
petitioners were passed when· Aadhaar Act was not even enacted. . F 
Secondly, as already discussed in detail above, Aadhaar Act and the 1aw 
contained in Section l 39AA of the Income Tax Act deal with two different 
situations and operate in different fields. This argument oflegislature 
inc~mpetence also, therefore, has fails. 
Whether Section 139AA of the Act is discriminatory and G 
· offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India?. 
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Article 14, which enshrines the principle of equality as a 
fundamental right mandates that th.e State shall not deny to any person 
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the 
territory of India .. It, thus, gives the right to equal tre.atment in similar H
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A circumstances, both in privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. 
In Sri Srinavasa Theatre & Ors. v. Government of Tamil Nadu & 
Ors. 45, this Court explained that the two expressions. 'equality before 
law' and 'eqii!ll protection of law' do not mean the same thing even if 
there may be much in common between them. "Equality before law" is 
· a dynamic concept having many facets. One facet is that there shall be 
B no privileged person pr class and that one shall be above law. Another 
facet is "the obligation upon the State to bring about, through the machinery 
oflaw, a more eq\1al society ... For, equality before law can be predicated 
meaningfully only in an equal society ... ". The Court further observed 
that Article 14 prescribes equality before law. ·But the fact remains that 
C all persons are not equal by nature, attainment or circumstances, and, 
therefore, a mechanical equality before the law may result in injustice. 
Thus, the guarantee against the denial of equal protection of the law 
does not mean that identically the same mies of law should be made 
applicable to all persons in spite of difference in circumstances or 
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95. The ·varying needs of different classes or sections of people 
require differential and separate treatment. The Legislature is required 
to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infiniti: variety of
human 
relations. It must, therefore, necessarily have the power of making laws 
to attain particular objects and, for that purpose, of distinguishing, selecting 
E . and classifying persons. and things upon which its laws are to operate. 
The principle ofequality oflaw, thus, means not that the same law should 
apply to everyone but that a law should deal alike with all in one class; 
that there should be an equality of treatment under equal circumstances. 
It means "that equals should not be treated unlike and unlikes should not 
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be treated alike. Likes should be treated alike. 
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96. What follows is that Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does 
not forbid reasonable classification of persons, objects and transactions 
by the Legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. 
Classification to be reasonable should fulfil the following two tests: 
( 1) It should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be 
based on an intelligible differentia, some real and substantial 
distinction, which distinguishes persons or things grouped 
. together in the class from others left out of it. 
4' (1992) 2 $CC 643 
46 1950 SCR 869
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
(2) The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must 
have a rational or reasonable nexus with the object sought to 
be achieved by the statute in question. 
Thus, Article 14 in its ambit and sweep involves two facets, viz., it 
permits reasonable classification which is founded on intelligible differentia 
and accommodates the practical needs of the society and the differential 
must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved. Further, 
it does not allow any kind of arbitrariness and ensures fairness and 
equality of treatment. It is the fonjuris of our Constitution, the 
fountainhead of justice. Differential treatment does not per se amount 
to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and it violates Article 14 only 
when there is no reasonable basis and there are several tests to decide 
whether a classification is reasonable or not and one_ofthe tests will be 
as to whether it is conducive to the functioning of modern society. 
97. Insofar as the impugned provision is concerned, Mr. Datar 
had conceded that fi'rst_:test that of reasonable classification had been 
satisfied as he conceded that individual assesses form a separate class 
and the impugned provision which targeted only individual assesses would 
not be discriminatory on this ground. His whole emphasis was that 
Section 139AA did not satisfy the second limb of the twin tests of 
classification as, according to him, this
provision had no rational nexus 
with the object sought to be achieved. 
98. In this behalf, his submission was that if the purpose of the 
provision was to curb circulation of black money, such an object was not 
achievable by seeing PAN with Aadhaar inasmuch as Aadhaar is only 
for individuals. His submission was that it is only the individuals who are 
responsible for generating black money or money laundering. This was 
the basis for Mr. Datar's submission. We find it somewhat difficult to 
accept such a submission. 
99. Unearthing black money or checking money laundering is to 
be achieved to whatever extent possible. Various measures can be 
taken in this behalf. If one of the measures is introduction of Aadhaar 
into the tax regime, it cannot be denounced only because of the reason 
that the purpose would not be achieved fully. Such kind of menace, 
which is deep rooted, needs to be tackled by taking multiple actions and 
those actions may be initiated at the same time. It is 'the combined 
effect of these actions which may yield results and each individual action 
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considered in isolation may not be sufficient. Therefore, rationality of a 
particular measure cannot be challenged on the ground that it has no 
nexus with the objecti_\Te to be achieved. Of course, there is a definite 
objective. For this purpose alone, individual measure cannot be ridiculed. 
We have already taken note of the recommendations of SIT on black 
money headed by Justice M.B. Shah. We have also reproduced the 
measures suggested by the committee headed by Chairman, CBDT on 
'Measures to tackle black money in India and Abroad'. They have, in 
no uncertain terms, suggested that one singular proof of identity of a 
person for entering into finance/business transactions etc may go a long 
way in curbing this foul practice. That apart, even if solitary purpose of 
de-duplication of PAN cards is taken into consideration, that may be 
sufficient to meet the second test of Article 14. It has come on record 
that 11.3-5 lakhs cases of duplicate PAN or fraudulent PAN cards have 
already been detected and out of this 10,52 lakh cases pertain to individual 
assessees. Seeding of Aadhaar with PAN has certain benefits which 
have already been enumerated. Furthermore, even when we address 
the issue of shell companies, fact remains that companies are after all 
floated by individuals and these individuals have to produce documents 
to show their identity. It was sought to be argued that persons found 
with
duplicate/bogus PAN cards are hardly 0.4% and, therefore, there 
was no need to have such a provision. We cannot go by percentage 
figures. The absolute number of such cases is 10.52 lakh, which figure, 
by no means, can be termed as miniscule, to harm the economy and 
create adverse effect on the nation. Respondents have argued that 
Aadhaar will ensure that there is no duplication of identity as bio-metric 
will not allow that and, therefore, it may check the growth of shell 
companies as well. 
100. Having regard to the aforesaid factors, it cannot be said that 
there is no nexus with the objective. sought to be achieved. 
l 01. Another argument predicated on Article 14 advanced by Mr. 
Divan was that it was discriminatory in nature as i't created two classes; 
one class of those who volunteered to enrol themselves under Aadhaar 
scheme and other class of those who did not want it to be so. It was 
further submitted that in this manner this provision had the effect of 
creating an artificial class of those who object to Aadhaar scheme as 
selfconscious persons. This is a fallacious argument.
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
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102. Validity of a legislative act cannot be challenged by creating 
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artificial classes by those who are objecting to the said provision and 
predicating the argument of discrimination on that basis. When a law is 
made, all those who are covered by that law are supposed to follow the 
same. No doubt, it is the right of a citizen to approach the Court and 
question the constitutional validity of a particular law enacted by the 
Legislature. However, merely because a section of persons opposes 
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the law, would not mean that it has become a separate class by itself. 
Two classes, cannot be created on this basis, namely, one of those who 
want to be covered by the scheme, and others who do not want to be 
covered thereby. If such a proposition is accepted, every legislation 
would be prone to challenge on the ground of discrimination. As far as 
plea of discrimination is concerned, it has to be raised by showing that 
the impugned law creates two classes without any reasonable 
classification and treats them differently. 
103. The principle of equality does not mean that every law must 
have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, 
attainment or circumstances, in the same position, as the varying needs 
of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. It is 
permissible for the State to classify persons for legitimate purposes. 
The Legislature is also competent to exercise
its discretion and make 
classification. In the present scenario the impugned legislation has created 
two classes, i.e. one class of those persons who are assessees and other 
class of those persons who are income tax assessees. It is because of 
the reason that the impugned provision is applicable only to those who 
are filing income tax returns: Therefore, the only question would be as 
c 
D 
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to whether this classification is reasonable or not. There catmot be any 
dispute that there is a reasonable basis for differentiation and, therefore, · F 
equal protection clause enshrii:ied in Article 14 is not attracted: What 
Article 14 prohibits is class legislation and not reasonable classification 
for the purpose of legislation. All income tax asessees constitute one 
class and they are treated alike by the impugned provision. 
104. It may also be pointed out that the counsel for the respondents 
had argued that doctrine of proportionality cannot be read into Article 14 
of the Constitution and in support reliance has been placed on the 
judgment of this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & 
Anr. 47• This aspect need not be considered in detail inasmuch as 
"(1974) 4 sec 3 
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[2017] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
Mr. Datar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, had conceded at 
the Bar that he had invoked the doctrine of proportionality only in the 
context of Article 19( 1 )(g). 
B 
105. We, therefore, reject the argument founded on Article 14 of 
the Constitution. 
Whether impugned provision is violative of Article 19(1)(g) 
106. lnvocation of provisions of Article l 9(l)(g) of the Constitution 
. by the petitioners was in the context of proviso to sub-section (2) of 
Section J 39AA of the Act which contains the consequences of the failure 
to intimate theAadhaarnumber to such authority in such form and manner 
C 
as may be prescribed and reads as under: 
"(2) Every person who has been allotted permanent account 
number as on the l '' day of July, 2017, and who is eligible to 
obtain Aadhaar number, shall intimate his Aadhaar number to such 
authority in such form and manner as may be prescribed, on or 
D 
before a date to be notified by the Central Government in the 
Official Gazette: 
Provided that in case of failure to intimate the Aadhaar 
number, the permanent account number allotted to the 
person shall be deemed to be invalid and the other 
E 
provisions of this Act shall apply, as if the person had not 
applied for allotment of permanent account number." 
107. The submission was that the aforesaid penal consequence 
was draconian in nature and totally disproportionate to the non-compliance 
of provisions contained in
Section 139AA. It was pointed out that persons 
F 
effected by Section 139AA are only individuals, i.e. natural persons and 
not legal/artificial personalities like companies, trusts, partnership firms, 
etc. Thus, individuals who are professionals like lawyers, doctors, 
architects and lakhs of businessmen having small or micro enterprises 
are going to suffer such a serious consequence for failure to intimate 
G 
Aadhaar number to the designated authority. According to him, 
consequence of not having a PAN card results in a virtual 'civil death' 
as one example given was that under Rule 1148 of the Rules, it will not 
be possible to operate bank accounts with transaction above Rs.50,000/ 
- or to use credit/debit cards or purchase motor vehicles or property etc. 
H 
I 08. St:ction l 39A deals with PAN. Sub-section (I) thereof
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
99 
requires four classes of persons to have the PAN allotted. It reads as 
A 
under: 
"139A. Permanent account number. - (1) Every person, -
(i) if his total income or the total income of any other person in 
respect of which he is assessable under this Act during any previous 
year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to · 8 
income-tax; or 
(ii) carrying on any business or profession wh0se total sales, 
turnover or gross receipts are or is likely to exceed five lakh rupees 
in any previous year; or 
(iii) who is required to furnish a return ofincome under sub-section 
(4A) of section 139; or 
(iv) being an employer, who is required to furnish a return of fringe 
benefits under section l lSWD. 
c 
and who has not been allotted a permanent account number shall, 
D 
within such time, as may be prescribed, apply to the Assessing 
Officer for the allotment of a permanent account number." 
109 .. This PAN number has to be mentioned/quoted in number of 
eventualities specified under sub-section (S), (SA), (SB), (SC), S(D) and 
sub-section (6) of Section 139A. These provisions read as under: 
E 
"S. Every person shall -
(a) quote such number in all his returns to, or correspondence 
with, any income-tax authority; 
(b) quote such number in all challans for the payment ofany sum 
F 
due under this Act; 
( c) quote such number in all documents pertaining to such 
transactions as may be prescribed by the Board
in the interests 
of the revenue, and entered into by him: 
Provided that the Board may prescribe different dates for different 
G 
transactions or class of transactions or for different class of 
persons: 
Provided further that a person shall quote General Index Register 
Number till such time Permanent Account Number is allotted to 
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A 
such person; 
B 
c 
D 
E 
( d) intimate the Assessing Officer any change in his address or in 
the name and nature of his business on the basis of which the 
permanent account number was allotted to him. 
(SA) Every person receiving any sum or income or amount from 
which tax has been deducted under the provisions of Chapter 
XVIIB, shall intimate his permanent account number to the person 
responsible for deducting such tax under that Chapter: 
Provided further that a person referred to in this sub-section, shall 
intimate the General Index Register Number till such time 
permanent account number Is allotted to such person. 
(SB) Where any sum or income or amount has been paid after 
deducting tax under Chapter XVIIB, every person deducting tax 
under that Chapter shall quote the permanent account number of 
the person to whom such sum or income or amount has been paid 
by him-
( i) in the statement furnished in accordance with the provisions of 
sub-section (2C) of section 192; 
(ii) in all certificates furnished in accordance with the provisions 
of section 203; 
(iii) in all returns prepared and delivered or caused to be delivered 
in accordance with the provisions of section 206 to any income-
tax authority; 
(iv) in all statements prepared and delivered or caused to be 
F 
delivered in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) 
cf section 200: 
Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, specify different dates from which the provisions 
of this sub-section shall apply in respect of any class or classes of 
G 
persons: 
H 
Provided further that nothing contained in sub-sections (SA) and 
(SB) shall apply in case _of a person whose total income is not 
chargeable to income-tax or who is not required to obtain 
permanent account numberunder any provision of this Act if such
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
101 
person furnishes to the person responsible for deducting tax a 
A 
declaration referred to in section 197 A in the form and manner 
prescribed thereunder to the effect that the tax on his estimated 
total income of the previous year in which such income is to be 
included in computing his total income will be nil. 
(SC) Every buyer or licensee or lessee referred to in section 
B 
206C shall intimate his permanent account number to the person 
responsible for collecting tax referred to in that section. 
(SD) Every person collecting tax in accordance with the provisions 
of sectfon 206C shall quote the permanent account number of 
every buyer or licensee or lessee referred to in that section -
c 
(i) in all certificates furnished in accordance with the provisions 
of sub-section (S) of section 206C; 
(ii) in all n:turns prepared and delivered or caused to be delivered 
in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (SA) or sub-
section (SB) of section 206C to an income-tax authority; 
D 
(iii) in all statements prepared and delivered or caused to be 
delivered in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) 
of section 206C. 
(6) Every person receiving any document relating to a transaction 
E 
prescribed under clause (c) of sub-section (S) shall ensure that 
the Permanent Account Number ~r the General Index Register 
Number has been duly quoted in the document." 
110. Sub-section (8) empowers the Board to
make Rules, inter 
alia, prescribing the categories of transactions in relation to which PAN 
is to be quoted. Rule 114B of the Rules lists the nature of transaction in 
sub-rule (a) to (r) thereof where PAN number is to be given. 
F 
111. According to the petitioners, it amounts to violating their 
fundamental right to carry on.business/profession etc. as enshrined under 
Article 19( 1 )(g) of the Constitution which stands infringed and, therefore, 
it was for the State to show that the restriction is reasonable and in the 
G 
interest of pubic under Article 19( 6) of the Constitution. It is in this 
context, principle of proportionality has been invoked by the petitioners 
with their submission that restriction is unreasonable as it is utterly 
disproportionate for committing breach of Section 139AA of the Act. 
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112. As noted above, Mr. Datar had relied upon the judgment of 
this Court in Modern Dental College & Research Ce11tre48 and 
submitted that while applying the test of proportionality, the respondents 
were specifically required to demonstrate the that measures undertaken 
are necessary in that there are no alternative measures that may similarly 
achieve that same purpose with a lesser degree of limitation (narrow 
tailoring) and also that there was proper relation between the importance 
of achieving the proper purpose and the social importance of preventing 
the limitation on the constitutional right, (balancing two competing 
interests). 
113. In order to consider the aforesaid submissions we may 
bifurcate Section l39AA in two parts, as follows: 
(i) That portion of the provision which requires quoting of AaJhaar 
number ( sub:section(l)) and requirement of intimating Aadhaar 
number to the prescribed authorities by these who are PAN 
holders (sub-section (2)). 
(ii) Consequences of failure to intimate Aadhaar number to the 
prescribed authority by specified date. 
114. Insofar as first limb of Section I 39AA of the Act is concerned, 
we have already held that it was within the competence of the Parliament 
E 
to make a provision of this nature and further that it is not offensive of 
Article 14 of the Constitution. This requirement; per se, does not find 
foul with Article 19( I )(g) of the Constitution either,
inasmuch as, quoting 
the Aadhaar number for purposes mentioned in sub-section (I) or 
intimating the Aadhaar number to the prescribed authority as per the 
requirement of sub-section (2) does not, by itself, impinge upon the right 
F 
to carry. on profession or trade, e\c. Therefore, it is not violati~e of 
Article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution either. In fact, that is not even the 
argument of the petitioners. Entire emphasis of the petitioners 
submissions, while addressing "the arguments predicated on Article 
19(1 )(g) of the Constitution, is on the consequences that ensue in terms 
G 
of proviso to sub-section (2) inasmuch as.it is argued, as recorded above, 
that the consequences provided will have the effect of paralysing the 
right to carry on J?l\siness/profession. Therefore, thrust is on the second 
part of Section l 39AA of the Act, which we proceed to deal with, now. 
. 
. . 
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115. At the outset, it may be mentioned that though PAN is issued 
48 Footnote 7 above
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
103 
under the provisions of the Act (Section 139A), its function is not limited 
A 
to giving this number in the income-tax returns or for other acts to be 
performed under the Act, as mentioned in sub-sections (S), (SA), (SB), 
S(C), S(D) and 6 of Section 139A. Rule l 14B of the Rules mandates 
quoting of this PAN in val'ious other documents pertaining to different 
kinds of transactions listed therein. It is for sale and purchase of B 
immovable property valued at Rs.S lakhs or more; sale or purchase of 
motor vehicle etc., while opening deposit account with a sum exceeding 
Rs.S0,000/- with a banking company;. while making deposit of more than 
Rs.S0,000/- in any account with Post Office, savings bank; a contract of 
a value exceeding Rs. I lakh for sale or purchase of securities as defined 
under the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, l 9S6; while opening an 
C 
account with a banking company; making an application for installation 
of a telephone connection; making payment to hotels and restaurants 
when such payment exceeds Rs.2S,OOO/- at any one time; while 
purchasing bank drafts or pay orders for an amount aggregating 
Rs.S0,000/- or more during any one day, when payment in cash; payment 
D 
in cash in connection with travel to any foreign country of an amount 
exceeding Rs.2S,OOO/- at any one time; while making payment of an 
amount ofRs.S0,000/- or more to a mutual fund for purchase of its units 
or for
acquiring shares or debentures/bonds in a company or bonds issued 
by the Reserve Bank of India; or when the transaction of purchase of 
bullion or jewellery is made by making payment in cash to a dealer above 
a specified amount, etc. This shows that for doing many activities of 
day to day nature, including in the course of business, PAN is to be 
given. Pithily put, in the absence of PAN, it will not be possible to 
un.dertake any of the aforesaid activities though this requirement is aimed 
at curbing the tax evasion. Thus, ifthe PAN ofa person is withdrawn or 
is nullified, it definitely amounts to placing restrictions on the right to do 
business as a business under Article 19(l)(g) of the.Act. The question 
would be as to whether these restrictions are reasonable and, therefore, 
meet the requirement of clause ( 6) of Article 19. In this context, when 
'balancing' is to be done, doctrine of proportionality can be applied, which 
was explained in the case of Modern Dental College & Resea;ch 
Centre'9, in th~ following manner: 
"Doctrine of proportionality explained and applied 
S9. Undoubtedly, the right to establish and manage the educational 
49 Footnote 7 above 
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institutions is a-fundamental right recognised under Article 19(1 )(g) 
of the Act. It also cannot be denied that this right is not "absolute" 
and is subject to limitations i.e. "reasonable restrictions" that can 
be imposed by law on the exercise of the rights that are conferred 
under clause ( 1) of Article 19. Those restrictions, however, have 
to be reasonable. Further, such restrictions should be "in the interest 
of general public", which conditions are stipulated in clause ( 6) of 
Article 19, as under: 
"19. ( 6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect 
the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes, or prevent 
the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the 
general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the 
right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing 
in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing 
law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making 
any law relating to---
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessa&y for 
practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade 
or business, or 
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or 
controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or 
service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens 
or otherwise." 
60. Another significant feature which can be noticed from the
reading of the aforesaid clause is that the State is empowered to 
make any law relating to the professional or technical qualifications 
necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any 
occupation or trade or business. Thus, while examining as to 
whether the impugned provisions of the statute and rules amount 
to reasonable restrictions and are brought out in the interest of the 
general public, the exercise that is required to be undertaken is 
the balancing of fundamental right to carry on occupation on the 
one hand and the restrictions imposed on the other hand. This is 
what is known as "doctrine of proportionality". Jurisprudentially, 
"proportionality" can be defined as the set of rules determining 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for !,imitation of a 
constitutionally protected right by a, law to be constitutionally
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
permissible. According to Aharon Barak (former Chief Justice, 
Supreme Court of Israel), there are four sub-components of 
proportionality which need to be satisfied [ Aharon 
Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their 
Limitation( Cambridge University Press 2012).], a limitation ofa 
constitutional right will be constitutionally permissible if: 
(i) it is designated for a proper purpose; 
(ii) the measures undertaken to effectuate such a limitation are 
rationally connected to the fulfilment of that purpose;. 
(iii) the measures undertaken are necessary in that there are no 
alternative measures that may similarly achieve that same purpose 
with a lesser degree of limitation; and finally 
(iv) there needs to be a proper relation ("proportionality stricto 
sensu" or "balancing") between the importance of achieving 
the proper purpose and the social importance of preventing the 
limitation on the constitutional right. 
61. Modern theory of constitutional rights draws a fundamental 
distinction between the scope of the constitutional rights, and the 
extent of its protection. Insofar as the scope of constitutional rights 
is concerned, it marks the outer boundaries of the said rights and 
defines its contents. The extent of its protection prescribes the 
limitations on the exercises of the rights within its scope. In that 
sense, it defines the justification for limitations that can be imposed 
on such a
right. 
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62. It is now almost accepted that there are no absolute 
constitutional rights and all such rights are related. As per the 
F · 
analysis of Aharon Barak, two key elements in developing the 
modern constitutional theory of recognising positive constitutional 
rights along with its limitations are the notions of democracy and 
the rule oflaw. Thus, the requirement of proportional limitations 
of constitutional rights by a sub-constitutional law i.e. the statute, . G 
is derived from an interpretation of the notion of democracy itself. 
Insofar as the Indian Constitution is concerned, democracy is 
treated as the basic feature of the Constitution and is specifically 
accorded a constitutional status that is recognised in the Preamble 
of the Constitution itself. It is also unerringly accepted that this 
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notion of democracy includes human rights which is the 
cornerstone of Indian democracy~ Once we accept the aforesaid 
theory (and there cannot be any denial thereof), as a fortiori, it 
has also to be accepted that democracy is based on a balance 
between constitutional rights and the public interests. In fact, such 
a provision in Article 19 itself on the one hand guarantees some 
certain freedoms in clause (I) of Article 19 and at the same time 
empowers the State to impose reasonable restrictions on those 
freedoms in public interest. This notion accepts the modern 
constitutional theory that the constitutional rights are related. This 
relativity means that a constitutional licence to limit those rights is 
granted where such a limitation wil 1 be justified to protect public 
interest or the rights of others. This phenomenon-{Jf both the 
right and its limitation in the Constitution-exemplifies the inherent 
tension between democracy's two fundamental elements. On the 
one hand is the right's element, which constitutes a fundamental 
component of substantive democracy; on the other hand is the 
people element, limiting those very rights through their 
representatives. These two constitute a fundamental component 
of the notion of democracy, though this time in its formal aspect. 
f!ow can this tension be resolved? The answer is that this tension 
is not resolved by eliminating the "losing" facet from
the 
Constitution. Rather, the tension is resolved by way of a proper 
balancing of the competing principles. This is one of the expressions 
of the multi-faceted nature of democracy, Indeed, the inherent 
tension between democracy's different facets is a "constrnctive 
tension". It enables each facet to develop while harmoniously 
coexisting with the others. The best way to achieve this peaceful 
coexistence is through balancing between the competing interests. 
Such balancing enables each facet to develop alongside the other 
facets,.not in their place. This tension between the two 
fundamental aspects-rights on the one hand and its limitation oti 
the other hand~is to be resolved by balancing the two so that 
they harmoniously coexist with.each other. This balancing is to be 
. done keeping in mind the relative social values of each competitive 
asp~cts when considered in proper context. 
63. In this direction, the next question that arises is as to what 
criteria is to be adopted for a proper balance between the two
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
facets viz. the rights and limitations imposed upon it by a statute. 
Here comes the concept of "proportionality", which is a proper 
criterion. To put it pithily, when a law limits a constitutional right, 
such a limitation is constitutional if it is proportional. The law 
imposing restrictions will be treated as proportional if it is meant 
to achieve a proper purpose, and ifthe measures taken to achieve 
such a purpose are rationally connected to the purpose, and such 
measures are necessary. Thi~ essence of doctrine of proportionality 
is beautifully captured by Dickson, C.J. of Canada in R. v. Oakes, 
in the following words (at p. 138): 
"To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society, two central criteria must be 
satisfied. First, the objective, which the measures, responsible 
for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, 
must be "of' sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutional protected right or freedom ... Second ... the party 
invoking Section 1 must show that the means chosen are 
reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves "a form 
of proportionality test. .. " Although the nature of the 
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, 
in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of 
society with those of individuals and groups. There are, in my 
view, three important
components ofa proportionality test. First, 
the measures adopted must be ... rationally connected to the 
objective. Second, the means ... should impair "as little as 
possible" the right or freedom in question ... Third, there must 
be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which 
are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and 
the objective which has been identified as of "sufficient 
importance". The more severe the deleterious effects of a 
· measure, the more important the objective must be if the 
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society." 
64. The exercise which, therefore, is to be taken is to find out as 
to whether the limitation of constitutional rights is for a purpose 
that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society and such 
an exercise involves the weighing up of competitive values, and 
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality i.e. balancing 
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of different interests. 
65. We may unhesitatingly remark that this doctrine of 
proportionality, explained hereinabove in brief, is enshrined in Article 
19 itself when we read clause (I) along with clause ( 6) thereof. 
While defining as to what constitutes a reasonable restriction, this 
Court in a plethora of judgments has held that the expression 
"reasonable restriction" seeks to strike a balance between the 
freedom guaranteed by any of the sub-clauses of clause ( 1) of 
Article 19 and the social control permitted by any of the clauses 
(2) to (6). It is held that the expression "reasonable" connotes 
that the limitation imposed on a person in the enjoyment of the 
right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond 
what is required in the interests of public. Further, in order to be 
reasonable, the restriction must have a reasonable relation to the 
object which the legislation seeks to achieve, and must not go in 
excess of that object (see P.P. Enterprises v. Union ofindia [P.P. 
Enterprises v. Union of India, (1982) 2 SCC 33). At the same 
time, reasonableness of a restriction has to be determined in an 
objective manner and from the standpoint of the interests of the 
general public and not from the point of view of the persons upon 
whom the restrictions are imposed or upon abstract considerations 
(see Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State ofBihar AIR 1958 SC 731 ). 
In M.R.F. Ltd. v.
State ofKerala, (1998) 8 SCC 227, this Court 
held that in examining the reasonableness of a statutory provision 
one has to keep in mind the following factors: 
(1) The directive principles of State policy. 
(2) Restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so 
as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the general 
public. 
(3) In order to judge the reasonableness of the restrictions, no 
abstract or general pattern or a fixed principle can be laid down 
so as to be of universal application and the same will vary from 
case to case as also with regard to changing conditions, values of 
human life, social philosophy of the Constitution, prevailing 
conditions and the surrounding circumstances. 
( 4) A just balance has to be struck between the restrictions imposed 
and the social control envisaged by Article 19( 6).
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
109 
( 5) Prevailing social values as also social needs which are intended 
A 
to be satisfied by the restrictions. 
(6) There must be a direct and proximate nexus or reasonable 
connection between the resfyictions imposed and the object sought 
to be achieved. If there is a direct nexus between the restrictions, 
and the object of the Act, then a strong presumption in favour of B 
the constitutionality of the Act will naturally arise." 
116. Keeping in view the aforesaid parameters and principles in 
mind, we proceed to discuss as to whether the 'restrictions' which would 
result in terms of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 139AA of the Act 
are reasonable or not. 
C 
117. Let us revisit the objectives of Aadhaar, and in the process, 
that of Section 139AA in particular. 
118. By making use of the technology, a method is sought to be 
devised, in the form of Aadhaar, whereby identity of a person is 
ascertained in a flawless manner without giving any leeway to any 
D 
individual to resort to dubious practices of showing multiple identities or 
fictitious identities .. That is why it is given the nomenclature 'unique 
identity'. It is aimed at securing advantages on different levels some of 
which are described, in brief, below: 
(i) In the first instance, as a welfare and democratic State, it 
E 
becomes the duty cf any responsible Government to come out 
with welfare schemes for the upliftment of poverty
stricken and 
marginalised sections of the society. This is even the ethos of 
Indian Constitution which casts a duty on the State, in the form of 
· 'Directive Principles of State Policy', to take adequate and 
F 
effective steps for betterment of such underprivileged classes. 
State is bound to take adequate measures to provide education, 
health care, employment and even cultUral opportunities and social 
standing to these deprived and underprivileged classes. It is not 
that Government has not taken steps in this direction from time to 
time. At the same time, however, harsh reality is that benefits of G 
these schemes have not reached those persons for whom that 
are actually meant. 
India has achieved· significant economic growth since 
independence. In particular, rapid economic gro.wth has been achieved 
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in the last 25 years, after the country adopted the policy of liberalisation 
and entered the era of, what is known as, globalisation. Economic growth 
in the last decade has been phenomenal and for many years, the Indian 
economy grew at highest rate in the world. At the same time, it is also 
a fact that in spite of significant political and economic success which 
has proved to be sound and sustainable, the benefits thereof have not 
percolated down to the poor and the poorest. In fact, such benefits are 
reaped primarily by rich and upper middle classes, resulting into widening 
the gap between the rich and the poor. 
Jean Dreze & Amartya Sen 
eithly narrate the position as under50: 
"Since India's recent record of fast economic growth is often 
celebrated, with good reason, it is extremely important to point to 
the fact that the societal reach of economic progress in India has 
been remarkably limited. It is not only that the income distribution 
has been getting more unequal in recent years (a characteristic 
that India shares with China), but also that the rapid rise in real 
wages in China from which the working classes have benefited 
greatly is not matched at all by India's relatively stagnant real 
wages. No less importantly, the public revenue generated by rapid 
economic growth has not been used to expand the social and 
physical infrastructure in a determined and well-planned way (in 
this
India is left far behind by China). There is also a continued 
lack of essential social services (from schooling and health care 
to the provision of safe water and drainage) for a huge part of the 
population. As we will presently discuss, while India has been 
overtaking other countries in the progress of its real income, it has 
been overtaken in terms of social indicators by many of these 
countries, even within the region of South Asia itself(we go into 
this question more fully in Chapter 3, 'India in Comparative 
Perspective'). 
To point to just one contrast, even though India has significantly 
caught up with China in terms of GDP growth, its progress has 
been very much slower than China's in indicators such as longevity, 
literacy, child undernourishment and maternal mortality. In South 
Asia itself, the much poorer economy of Bangladesh has caught 
up with and overtaken India in terms of many social indicators 
(including life expectancy, immunization of children, infant mortality, 
'°An Uncertain Glory : India and its Contradictions
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
child undernourishment and girls' schooling). Even Nepal has 
been catching up, to the extent that it now has many social 
indicators similar to India's, in spite of its per capita GDP being 
just about one third. Whereas twenty years ago India generally 
had the second-best social indicators among the six South Asia 
countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and 
Bhutan), it now looks second worst (ahead only of problem-ridden 
Pakistan). India has been climbing up the ladder of per capita 
income while slipping down the slope of social indicators." 
It is in this context that not only sustainable development is needed 
which takes care ofintegrating growth and development, thereby ensuring 
that the benefit of economic growth is reaped by every citizen of this 
country, it also becomes the duty of the Government in a welfare State 
to come out with various welfare schemes which not only take care of 
immediate needs of the deprived class but also ensure that adequate 
opportunities are provided to such persons to enable them to make their 
lives better, economically as well as socially. As mentioned above, various 
welfare schemes are, in fact, devised and floated from time to time by 
the Government, keeping aside substantial amount of money earmarked 
for spending on socially and economically backward classes. However, 
for various reasons including corruption, actual benefit does not reach 
those
who are supposed to receive such benefits. One of the main 
reasons is failure to identify these persons for lack of means by which 
identity could be established of such genuine needy class. Resultantly, 
lots of ghosts and ·duplicate beneficiaries are able to take undue and 
impermissible benefits. A former Prime Minister of this country51 has 
gone to record fo say that out of one rupee spent by the Government for 
welfare of the downtrodden, only 15 paisa thereof actually reaches those 
persons for whom it is meant. It cannot be doubted that with UID/ 
Aadhaar much of the malaise in this field can be taken care of. 
(ii) Menace of com1ption and black money has reached alarming 
proportion in this country. It is eating into the economic progress 
which the country is otherwise achieving. It is not necessary to 
go into the various reasons for this menace. However, it would 
be pertinent to comment that even as per the observations of the 
Special Investigation Team (SIT) on black money headed by 
Justice M.B. Shah, one of the reasons is that persons have the 
' 1 Late Shri Raj iv Gandhi 
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option to quote their PAN or UID or passport number or driving 
licence or any other proof of identity while entering into financial/ 
business transactions. Because of this multiple methods of giving 
. proofs of identity, there is no mechanism/system at present to 
collect the data available with each of the independent proofs of 
ID. For this reason, even SIT suggested that these databases be 
interconnected. To the same effect is the recommendation of the 
Committee headed by Chairman, CBDT on measures to tackle 
black money in India and abroad which also discusses the problem 
of money-laundering being done to evade taxes under the garb of 
shell companies by the persons who hold multiple bogus PAN 
numbers under different names or variations of their names. That 
can be possible if one uniform proof of identity, namely, UID is 
adopted. It may go a long way to check and minimise the said 
malaise. 
(iii) Thirdly, Aadhaar or UID, which has come to be known as 
most advanced and sophisticated infrastructure, may facilitate law 
enforcement agencies to take care of problem -of terrorism to 
• 
some extent and may also be helpful in checking the crime and 
also help investigating agencies in cracking the crimes. No doubt, 
going by aforesaid, and may be some other similarly valid 
considerations, it is the intention of the Government to give phillip 
to Aadhaar movement and encourage the people of this
country 
to enroll themselves under the Aadhaar scheme. 
I 19. Wether such a scheme should remain voluntary or it can be 
made mandatory imposing compulsiveness on the people to be 
covered by Aadhaar is _a different question which shall be 
addressed at the appropriate stage. At this juncture, it is only 
emphasised that malafides cannot be attributed to this scheme. 
In any case, we are concerned with the vires of Section 139 AA 
of the Income Tax Act. 1961 which is a statutory provision. This 
Court is, thus, dealing with the aspect of judicial review of 
legislation. Insofar as this provision is concerned, the explanation 
of the respondents in the counter affidavit, which has already 
been reproduced above, is that the primary pm'pose of introducing 
this provision was to take care of the problem of multiple PAN 
cards obtained in fictitious names. Such multiple cards in fictitious 
names are obtained with the motive of indulging into money
... 
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
113 
laundering, tax evasion, creation and channelising of black money. 
A 
It is mentioned that in a de-duplication exercises, 11.35 lakhs cases 
of duplicate PANs/fr'audulent PANs have been detected. Out of 
these, around 10.52 lakhs pertain to individual assessees. 
Parliament in its wisdom thought that one PAN to one person can 
be ensured by adopting Aadhaar for allottment of PAN to 
B 
individuals. As of today, that is the only method available i.e. by 
seeding of existing PAN with Aadhaar. It is perceived as the best 
method, and the only robust method of de-duplication of PAN 
database. It is claimed by the respondents that the instance of 
duplicate Aadhaar is almost non-existent. It is also claimed that 
seeding of PAN with Aadhaar may contribute to widening of the c 
tax case as well, by checking the tax evasions and bringing in to 
tax hold those persons who are liable to pay tax but deliberately 
avoid doing so. It would be apposite to quote the following 
discussion by the Comptroller and Auditor General in its report 
for the year 2011 : 
"Widening of Tax Base 
The assessee base grew over the last five years from 297.9 lakh 
taxpayers in 2005-06 to 340.9 lakh taxpayers in 2009-10 at the 
rate .of 14.4 per cent. 
The Department has different mechanisms available to enhance 
the assessee base which include inspection and survey, information 
sharing with other tax departments and third party
information 
available in annual information returns. Automation also facilitates 
greater cross linking .. Most of these mechanisms are available at 
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the level of assessing officers. The Department needs to 
F 
holistically harness these mechanisms at macro level to analyse 
the gaps in the assessee base. Permanent Account Numbers 
(PANs) issued upto March 2009 and March 2010 were 807.9 · 
lakh and 958 lakh respectively. The returns filled in 2008-09 and 
2009-10 were 326.5 lakh and 340.9 lakh respectively. The gap 
between PANs and the number ofreturns filed was 617. l lakh in 
G 
2009-10. The Board needs to identify the reasons for the gap and 
use this information for appropriately enhancing the assessee base. 
The gap may be due to issuance of duplicate PAN cards 
and death of some PAN card holders. The Department 
needs to put in place appropriate controls to weed out the 
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A 
duplicate PANs and also update the position in respect of 
deceased assessee. It is significant to note that the number 
of PAN card holders has increased by 117.7 per cent 
between 2005-06 to 2009-10 whereas the number of returns 
filed in the same period has increased by 14.4 per cent only. 
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(emphasis supplied) 
The total direct tax collection has increased by 128.8 per cent 
during the period 2005-06 to 2009-10. The increase in the tax 
collection was around nine times.as compared to increase in the 
assessee base. It should be the constant endeavour of the 
Department to ensure that the entire assessee base, once correctly 
identified is duly meeting the entire tax iiability. However, ho 
assurance could be obtained that the tax liability on the assessee 
is being assessed and collected properly. This comment is 
corroborated in para 2.4.1 of Chapter 2 of this report where we 
have mentioned about our detection of under charge of tax 
amouting to Rs. 12,842.7 crore in 19,230 cases audited during 
2008-09. However, given the fact that ours is a test audit, 
Department needs to take firm steps towards strengthening the 
controls available on the existing statutes towards deriving an 
assurance on the tax collections." 
120. Likewise, the Finance Minister in his Budget speech in 
February, 2013 described the extent of.tax evasion and offering lesser 
income tax than what is actually due thereby labelling
India as tax known 
compliance, with the following figures: 
"India's tax to GDP ratio is very law, and the proportion of direct 
tax to indirect tax is not optional from the view point of social 
justice. I place before you certain data to indicate that our direct 
tax collection is not commensurate with the .income and 
consumption pattern of Indian economy. As against estimated 4.2 
crore persons engaged in organized sector employment, the number 
of individuals filing return for salary income are only 1. 74 crore. 
As against 5. 6 crore informal sector individual enterprises and 
firms doing small business in India, the number of returns filed by 
this category are only 1.81 crore. Out of the 13.94 lakh companies 
registered in India up to 31th March, 2014, 5.97 lakh companies 
have filed their returns for Assessment Year 2016-17. Of the 5.97
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
115 
lakh companies which have filed their returns for Assessment 
A 
Year 2016-17 so far, as many as 2.76 lakh companies have shown 
losses or zero income. 2.85 lakh companies have shown profit 
. before tax of less than Rs. I crore. 28,667 companies have shown 
profit between Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 10 crore, and only 7781 
companies have profit before tax of more than Rs. I 0 crores. 
Among the 3 .7 crore individuals who filed the tax returns in 2015-
16, 99 lakh show income below the exemption limit of Rs. 2.5 
Lakh p.a. 1.95 crore show income between Rs. 2.5 to Rs. 5 lakh, 
52 lakh show income between Rs. 5 to Rs. 10 lakhs and only 24 
Jakh people show income above Rs. I 0 lakhs. Of the 76 lakhs 
individual assesses who declare income above Rs. 5 lakhs, 56 
lakhs are in the salaried class. The number of people showing 
income more than 50 lakhs in the entire country is only 1.72 lakh. 
We can contrast this with the fact that in the last five years, more 
than 1.25 crore cars have been sold, and number oflndian citizens 
who flew abroad, either for business or tourism, is 2 crore in the 
year 2015. From all these figures we can conclude that we are 
largely a tax non-compliant society. The predominance of the cash 
in the economy makes it possible for the people to evade their 
taxes. When too many people evade the taxes, the burden of their 
share falls on those who are honest and complaint." 
121. The respondents
have also claimed that linking of Aadhaar 
· with PAN is consistent with India's international obligations and goals. 
In this behalf, it is pointed out that India has signed the Inter-Governmental 
Agreement (IGA) with the USA on July 9, 2015, for Improving 
International Tax Compliance and implementing the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). India has also signed a multilateral 
agreement on June 3, 2015, to automatically exchange information based 
on Article 6 of the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
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Tax Matters under the Common Reporting Scheme (CRS), formally 
referred to as the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account 
Information (AEoI). As part oflndia's commitment under FATCA and 
CRS, financial sector entities capture the. details about the customers 
G 
using the PAN. In case the PAN or submitted details are found to be 
incorrect or fictitious, it will create major embarrassment for the country. 
Under Non-filers Monitoring System (NMS), Income Tax Department 
identifies non-filers with potential tax liabilities. Data analysis is carried 
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out to identify non-filers about whom specific information was available 
in AIR, CIB data and TDS/TCS Returns. Email/SMS and letters are 
sent to the identified non-filers communicating the information summary 
and seeking to know the submission details of Income tax return. In a 
large number of cases (more than I 0 lac PAN every year) it is seen that 
the PAN holder neither submits the response and in many cases the 
letters are return unserved. Field verification by fields formations have 
found that in a large number of cases, the PAN holder is untraceable. In 
many cases, the PAN holder mentions that the transaction does not 
relate to them. There is a need to strengthen PAN by linking it with 
Aadhaar/biometric information to prevent use of wrong PAN for high 
value transactions. 
122. While considering the aforesaid submission of the petitioners, 
one has to keep in mind the aforesaid purpose of the impugned provision 
and what it seeks to achieve. The provision is aimed at seeding Aadhaar 
with PAN. We have already held, while considering the submission 
based on Article 14 of the Constitution, that the provision is based on 
reasonable classification and that has nexus with the objective sought to 
be achieved. One of the main objectives is to de-duplicate PAN cards 
and to bring a situation where one person is not having more than one 
PAN card or a person is not able to get PAN cards in
assumed/fictitious 
names. In such a scenario, if those persons who violate Section 139AA 
of the Act without any consequence, the provision shall be rendered 
toothless. It is the prerogative of the Legislature to make penal provisions 
for violation of any law made by it. In the instant case, requirement of 
giving Aadhaar enrolment number to the designated authority or stating 
this number in the income tax returns is directly connected with the 
issue of duplicate/fake PANs. 
123. At this juncture, we will also like to quote the following 
passages from the nine Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Jindal 
Stainless Ltd.51, which discussion though is in different context, will 
have some relevance to the issue at hand as well: 
"109. It was next argued on behalf of the dealers that an 
unreasonably high rate of tax could by itself constitute a restriction 
offensive to Article 301 of the Constitution. This was according 
to learned counsel for the dealers acknowledged even in the 
minority judgment delivered by Sinha, CJ in Atiabari 's 
" Footnote 40 above
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
117 
case (supra). If that be so, the only way such a. restriction could A 
meet the constitutional requirements would be through the medium 
of the proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution. There is, in 
our opinion, no merit in that contention either and we say so for 
two precise reasons. Firstly, because taxes whether high or low 
do not constitute restrictions on the freedom of trac;le and B 
commerce. We have held so in the previous paragraphs of the 
judgment based on our textual understanding of the provisions of 
Part XIII which is matched by the contextual interpretation. That 
being so the mere fact that a tax casts a heavy burden is no 
reason for holding that it is a restriction on the freedom of trade 
and commerce. Any such excessive tax burden may be opert to · C 
challenge under Part III of the Constitution but the extent of burden 
would not by itself justify the levy being struck down as a 
restriction contrary to Article 301 of the Constitution. 
110. Secondly because, levy of taxes is both an attribute of 
sovereignty and an unavoidable necessity. No responsible 
government can do without levying and collecting taxes for it is 
only through taxes that governments are run and objectives of 
general public good achieved. The conceptual or juristic basis 
underlying the need for taxation h~s not, therefore, been disputed 
by learned counsel for the dealers and, in our opinion, rightly so. 
That
taxation is essential for fulfilling the needs of the government 
is even otherwise well-settled. A reference to "A Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitatiops" (81h Edn. 1927 - Vol. ll Page 986) by 
Thomas M Cooley brings home the point with commendable 
clarity. Dealing with power of taxation Cooley says: 
"Taxes are defined to be burdens or charges imposed by the 
legislative power upon persons or property, to raise money for 
public purposes. The power to tax rests upon necessity, and is 
inherent in every .sovereignty. The legislature of every free 
State will possess it under the general grant oflegislative power, 
whether particularly specified in the. constitution among the 
powers to be exercised by it or not. No constitutional 
government can exist without it, and no arbitrary government 
without regular and steady taxation could be anything but an 
oppressive and vexatious despotism, since the only alternative 
to taxation would be a forced extortion for the needs of 
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government from such persons or objects as the men in power 
might select as victims." 
111. Reference may also be made to the following passage 
appearing in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US 316 ( 1819) where 
Chief Justice MarshaU recognized the power of taxation and 
pointed out that the only security against the abuse of such power 
lies in the structure of the government itself.The court said: 
"43. ..It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and 
their property is essential to the very existence of government, 
and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is 
applicable to the utmost extent to which the government may 
choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this 
power is found in the stmcture of the government itself. In 
imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This 
is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and 
oppressive taxation. 
· 
44. The people of a State, therefore, give to their government 
a right of taxing themselves and their property; and as the 
exigencies of the government cannot be limited, they prescribe . 
no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the 
interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents 
over their representative, to guard them against its abuse." 
112. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in State of 
Madras v. N.K. Nataraja Mudaliar (AIR
1969 SC 147) where 
this Court recognized that political and economic forces would 
operate against the levy of an unduly high rate of tax. The Court 
said: 
"16 .... Again, in a democratic constitution political forces would 
operate against the levy of an unduly high rate of tax. The rate 
. of tax on sales of a commodity may not ordinarily be based on 
arbitrary considerations, but in the light of the facility of trade 
in a particular commodity, the market conditions internal and 
external - and the likelihood of consumers not being scared 
away by the price which includes a high rate of tax. Attention 
must also be directed sub-Section (5) of Section 8 which 
authorizes the State Government, notwithstanding anything 
contained in Section 8, in the public interest to waive tax or
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
119 
impose tax on sales at a lower rate o'n inter-State trade or A 
commerce. It is clear that the legislature has contemplated 
that elasticity of rates consistent with economic forces is clearly 
intended to be maintained." 
124. Therefore, it cannot be denied that there has to be some 
provision stating the consequences for not complying with the 
B 
requirements of Section I 39AA of the Act, more particularly when these 
requirements are found as not violative of Articles 14 and 19 (of course, 
eschewing the discussion on Article 21 herein for the reasons already 
given). If Aadhar number is not given, the aforesaid exercise may not 
be possible. 
125. Having said so, it becomes clear from the aforesaid discussion 
that those who are not PAN holders, while applying for PAN, they are 
reqµired to give Aadhaar number. This is the stipulation of sub-section 
c 
(1) of Section 139AA, which we have already upheld. At the same 
time, as far as existing PAN holders are concerned, since the impugned 
provisions are yet to be considered on the touchstone of Article 21 of the 
D 
Constitution, including on the debate around Right to Privacy and human 
dignity, etc. as limbs of Article 21, we are of the opinion that till the 
aforesaid aspect of Art~cle 21 is decided by the Constitution Bench a 
partial stay of the aforesaid proviso is necessary. Those who have 
alr~ady enrolled themselves under Aadhaar scheme would comply
with 
E 
the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section I 39AA of the Act. Those 
who still want to enrol are free to do so. However, those assessees who 
are not Aadhaar card holders and do not comply with the provision of 
Section 139(2), their PAN cards be not treated as invalid for the time 
being. It is only to facilitate other transactions which are mentioned in 
Rule 114B of the Rules. We are adopting this course ofaction for more 
than one reason. We are saying so because of very severe consequences 
F 
that entail in not adhering to the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 
139AA of the Act. A person who is holder of PAN and if his PAN is 
invalidated, he is bound to suffer immensely in his day to day dealings, 
which situation should be avoided till the Constitution Bench authoritatively 
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determines the argument of Article 21 of the Constitution .. Since we are 
adopting this course of action, in the interregnum, it would be permissible 
for the Parliament to consider as· to whether there is a need to tone 
down the effect of the said proviso by limiting the consequences .. 
126. However, at the same time, we find that proviso to Section 
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139AA(2) cannot be read retrospectively. If failure to intimate the 
Aadhaar number renders PAN void ab initio with the deeming provision 
that the PAN allotted would be invalid as ifthe person had not applied 
for allotment of PAN would have rippling effect of unsettling settled 
rights of the parties. It has the effect of undoing all the acts done by a 
person on the basis of such a PAN. It may have even the effect of 
incurring other penal consequences under the Act for earlier period on 
the ground that there was no PAN registration by a particular assessee. 
The rights which are already accrued to a person in law cannot be taken 
away. Therefore, this provision needs to be read down by making it 
clear that it would operate prospectively. 
127. Before we part with, few comments are needed, as we feel 
that these are absolutely essential: 
(i) Validity of Aadhaar, whether it is under the Aadhaar scheme 
or the Aadhaar Act, is already under challenge on the touchstone 
of Article 21 of the Constitution. Various facets of Article 21 are 
pressed into service. First and foremost is that it violates Right to 
Privacy and Right to Privacy is part of Article 21 of the 
Constitution. Secondly, it is also argued that it violates human 
dignity which is another aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Since the said matter has already'been referred to the Constitution 
Bench, we have consciously avoided
discussion, though 
submissions in this behalf have been taken note of. We feel that 
all the aspect of Article 21 needs to be dealt with by the Constitution 
Bench. That is a reason we have deliberately refrained from 
entering into the said arena. 
(ii) It was submitted by the counsel for the petitioners themselves 
that they would be confining their challenge to the impugned 
provision on Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution as well as 
eompetence of the Legislature, while addressing the arguments, 
other facets of Article 21 of the Constitution were also touched 
upon. Since we are holding that Section 139AA of the Income 
Tax Act is not violative of Articles 14 and l 9(1)(g) of the 
Constitution and also that there was no impediment in the way of 
Parliament to insert such a statutory provision (subject to reading 
down the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 139AA of the Act 
as given above), we make it clear that the impugned provision has 
. passed the muster of Articles 14 and 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution.
BINOY VISWAM v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
[A. K. SIKRl, J.] 
121 
However, more stringent test as to whether this statutory provision A 
violates Article 21 or not is yet to be qualified. Therefore, we 
make it clear that Constitutional validity of this provision is upheld 
subject to the outcome of batch of petitions referred to the 
Constitution Bench where the said issue is to be examined. 
(iii) It is also necessary to highlight that a large section of citizens 
B 
feel concerned about possible data leak, even when many of those 
support linkage of PAN with Aadhaar. This is a concern which 
needs to be addressed by the Government. It is important that 
the aforesaid apprehensions are assuaged by taking proper 
measures so that confidence is instilled among the public at large 
that there is no chance of unauthorised leakage of data whether it 
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is done by tightening the operations of the contractors who are 
given the job of enrollment, they being private persons or by 
prescribing severe penalties to those who are found guilty of leaking 
the details, is the outlook of the Government. However, we 
emphasise that measures in this behalf are absolutely essential 
D 
and it would be in the fitness of.things that proper scheme in this 
behalf is devised at the earliest. 
128. Subject to the aforesaid, these writ petitions are disposed of 
in the following manner: 
(i) We hold that the Parliament was fully competent to enact Section 
E 
139AA of the Act and its authority to
make this law was not diluted by 
the orders of this Court. 
(ii) We do not find any conflict between the provisions of Aadhaar 
Act and Section 139AA of the Income Tax Act inasmuch as when 
interpreted harmoniously, they operate in distinct fields. 
F · 
(iii) $ection l 39AA of the Act is not discriminatory nor it offends 
equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 
(iv) Section 139AA is also not violative of Article 19(1 )(g) of the 
Constitution insofar as it mandates giving of Aadhaar enrollment number 
G 
for applying PAN cards in the income tax returns or notified Aadhaar 
enrollment number to the designated authorities. Further, proviso to sub-
section (2) thereof has to be read down to mean that it would operate 
only prospective. 
(v) The validity of the provision upheld in the aforesaid manner is 
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[2017] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
subject to passing the muster of Article 21 of the Constitution, which is 
the issue before the Constitution Bench in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 
of 2012 and other connected matters. Till then, there shall remain a 
partial stay on the operation of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 
139AA of the Act, as described above. 
B 
No costs. 
Devika Gujral 
Writ Petitions disposed of.