M.NARAYAN versus STATE OF KARNATAKA
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 226, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
c 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 226 
M.NARAYAN 
v. 
STATE OF KARNATAKA 
(Criminal Appeal No.1207 of 2012) 
APRIL 17, 2015 
[T.S. THAKUR AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 498A, 304 8 - Dowry Prohibition 
Act, 1961 - ss. 3, 4, 6 - Death of wife by hanging from the 
roof - Occurrence of incident barely two years after her 
marriage with the appellant-husband - Death in suspicious 
o circumstances re/atable to the constant demand for dowry 
and harassment and ill-treatment unleashed on her -
Acquittal by trial court- However, reversal of order of acquittal 
by High Court - Conviction and sentence of appellant-
husband for commission of offences u!ss. 498A and 3048 
E and ss. 3, 4, 6 of the 1961 Act- On appeal, held: Prosecution 
had been able to prove the culpability of the appellant vis-a-
vis the charges beyond any reasonable doubt- Progression 
of events from before the marriage till the unnatural death of 
the hapless victim, provides an inseverable link inter se as 
F a/so clearly demonstrates the buildup of the intolerable 
mental and physical torture on her, driving her to take refuge 
of such a drastic step - Evidence of the prosecution 
witnesses in this regard is coherent, consistent and compact 
G - Thus, the order passed by the High Court is upheld -
Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 113A and 1138. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The material witnesses PWs-2, 3, 4 and 
H 
226
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
227 
10 do prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased A 
had been subjected to continuous harassment, assaults 
and intimidation from a few months after the marriage, 
so much so that being unable to bear the unbearable 
cruelty, she did take the extreme step of eliminating 
herself to seek alleviation from such physical and mental B 
torture. PWs-2, 3 and 10, in particular, are the relations 
of both sides and, therefore, in the absence of any 
overwhelming material on records to the contrary, there 
is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve their versions c 
encompassing the progression of events from before 
the marriage till the unfortunate end of the deceased. The 
demand for dowry originated from before the marriage 
and against a 'claim' of Rs.40,000/- and j3wellery, the 
family of the deceased could garner Rs.25,000/- by way o 
of cash. Jewellery to the extent possible was also given. 
This demand for dowry having its roots from before the 
marriage, as the incidents thereafter as narrated by PWs-
2, 3 and 10 as disclosed to them by the deceased and 
also witnesses to some of those demonstrate, assumed E 
virulent proportions culminating in the pathetic death of 
the deceased. The gravamen of the testimony of PWs-2, 
3 and 10 bearing on the essential facts constituting the 
ingredients of the offences with which the appellant had 
been charged has remained unshaken in their cross-
F 
examination. Minor and stray inconsistencies in
their 
narration, does not destroy the substratum of their 
version which otherwise do wholly furnish the required 
materials to constitute the pre-requisites for the offences G 
under Sections 3048, 498A and Sections 3 and 4 of the 
Act. The view the trial court, having regard to the gamut 
of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, is not a 
possible one. On the other hand, the conclusion reached 
by the appellate court is the only possible deduction in H
228 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A the attendant facts and circumstances. [Para 19) [239-
8-H; 240-A-8) 
1.2 Having regard to avowed objective of the Act 
along with the purpose of incorporation of Section 498A 
B and 3048, IPC, along with Sections 113A and 1138 of 
the Evidence Act, the view so expressed is concurred 
with. [Para 28) [244-8) 
1.3 On a cumulative consideration of the relevant 
c aspects, factual and legal, the unhesitant opinion is that 
the prosecution had been able to prove the culpability 
of the appellant vis-a-vis the charges beyond any 
reasonable doubt. The progression of events from before 
the marriage till the unnatural death of the hapless 
D deceased, not only provides an inseverable link inter se 
but also unambiguously demonstrates the buildup of the 
intolerable mental and physical torture on her, driving 
her to take refuge of such a drastic step. The evidence 
of the prosecution witnesses in this regard is evidently 
E coherent, consistent and compact. There is nothing 
supervening to suggest that she did suffer from any 
mental imbalance or eccentricity so as to probabilise any 
-act of self-elimination without any compelling reason. On 
F the other hand, the evidence on record demonstrates in 
emphatic terms that she had been complaining of the 
appellant's persistent and hurtful demand for dowry and 
her pitiable condition, being subjected to continuous and 
ruthless harassment and ill-treatment resulting in severe 
G physical
and mental torture. Thus, the conviction and 
sentence as recorded by the High Court is upheld. [Paras 
30, 31, 32) [244-G-H; 245-A-F] 
SurinderSingh v. State ofHaryana (2014) 4 SCC 129; 
H 
Kans Rajv. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207; Rajinder
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
Singh v. State of Punjab 2015(3) SCALE 174; Sher 
Singh v. State of Haryana (2015 (1) SCALE 250; 
Dinesh v. State of Haryana 2014 (5) SCALE 641 -
referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
2015(3) SCALE 17 4 
Referred to. 
Para 10 
(2014) 4 SCC 129 
Referred to 
Para 29 
(2000) 5 SCC 207 
Referred to 
Para 29 
(2015 (1) SCALE 250 
Referred to. 
Para 29 
2014 (5) SCALE 641 
Referred to. 
Para 29 
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal 
Appeal No. 1207 of2012 
229 
A 
B 
c 
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.02.2007 of the 
High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Crl. Appeal No. 1076 D 
of2000 
Rajesh Mahale, Krutin R. Joshi, fortheAppellant. 
Anitha Shenoy for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
AMIT AVA ROY, J. 1. Aggrieved by the reversal of the 
verdict of his acquittal from the charge of having committed 
E 
the offences under Section 498A and Section 304B of the 
F 
Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') and 
Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the appellant has mounted 
this challenge against the judgment and order dated G 
15.02.2007 rendered by the High Court of Karnataka at 
Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.1076 of 2000. 
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 
3. The prosecution is traceable to an oral information 
H
230 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
lodged by Smt. Shivamma, the neighbour of the deceased 
Gangalaks~mamma (for short 'Ganga'}, to the effect that on 
her return to her house at about 5.30 p.m. on 08.09.1993, she 
found Ganga hanging by the neck by a rope from the roof. She 
also mentioned that a folding chair was found on the cot. 
B According to the informant on this sight, she lost her 
consciousness and when she regained the same, she found 
that the body of Ganga had been meanwhile removed from 
the hook of the roof and had been laid in the house. She, 
C however, expressed ignorance about the person or the agency, 
who/which had brought down the body. 
4. On receipt of this information, the Hebbal Police 
Station, Bangalore City, registered the same as UDR No.34/ 
D 
1993 under Section 174 Cr.P.C. Autopsy on the dead body 
was conducted on 09.09.1993 at M.S. Ramaiah Medical 
College, Bangalore, which confirmed that the death was due 
to asphyxia as a result of hanging. The post mortem report 
also disclosed a ligature mark on the front, sides and back of 
E neck of the deceased. The ligature material was identified to 
be a light green nylon rope measuring 286 ems in length and 4 
ems in diameter. Dr. J. Kiran, who performed the post mortem 
examination, mentioned in the report that the rope did fit into 
the ligature mark and was capable of bearing the weight of 
F thebody. 
5. Be that as it may, on 10.09.1993 Shri Siddagangaiah, 
the maternal uncle of
the deceased, lodged a complaint about 
the death of her niece Ganga on 08.09.1993 with the same 
G Police Station. The information revealed that the deceased 
had been given in marriage to the appellant on 20.06.1991 
and that on that occasion, gold ornaments and cash of Rs.20, 
000/- had been given by way of dowry. It was alleged that for 
about six months after the marriage, the couple lived happily 
H
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
231 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
and thereafter the husband of the deceased (the appellant A 
herein) developed some illicit relationship with another girl of 
Nayak community and as a consequence, started to despise 
the deceased and often assaulted her in an inebriated 
condition besides intimidating and harassing her by 
demanding Rs.50, 000/- as dowry. It was mentioned as well 
B 
that about two months prior to the demise of the deceased, 
she had come to the village of the informant and had stayed 
there for a month for being unable to bear the harassment 
meted out to her by her husband. The informant asserted that C 
during that time, the deceased had disclosed to him and his 
wife about the persistent demand of the appellant-husband 
for Rs.50,000/- by way of dowry. The informant mentioned as 
well about an incident of about the same time, i.e. two months 
before the incident, when the appellant-husband had visited o 
their house at Dasanapura village in the midnight in an 
intoxicated state, holding a knife in hand. According to the 
informant, the appellant threatened to kill her (deceased) and 
the family members if the deceased was not able to arrange 
for Rs.50,000/-. The informant mentioned as well of another E 
incident thereafter, when the deceased had come to their house 
stating that her husband had tried to murder her and also 
showed to them the marks of assault on her body. The informant 
stated too that the deceased had
disclosed to them that unless 
Rs.50,000/- as demanded by her husband was paid, he would 
F 
kill her. According to the informant, he thereafter did visit the 
house of the appellant whereupon the deceased had repeated 
her apprehension that ifthe amount of Rs.50,000/-was not 
paid, she would be continuously harassed and intimidated. G 
The informant also mentioned that on 09.09.1993 at about 5.00 
p.m., one of his relatives, Seenappa, having conveyed to them, 
the news of the death of his niece (Ganga) by hanging, he with 
his parents went to the house of the deceased at about 12.30 
p.m. and saw the dead body lying there. Contending that all of H
232 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
them had noticed a ligature mark around the neck of the 
deceased and that she had died in suspicious circumstances 
relatable to the constant demand for dowry and the harassment 
and ill-treatment unleashed on her, suitable legal action was 
sought for. The police on this information registered CR. 
B 
No.318/93 under Section 304(8), IPC. 
6. Investigation followed and after completion thereof, 
charge sheet was filed against the appellant under Sections 
3048 and 498A, IPC as well as 3, 4 and 6 of the Act. The 
C 
appellant, on being confronted with the charge, denied the 
same for which he was made to stand trial. The prosecution 
examined several witnesses, including Dr. J. Kiran who had 
performed the post mortem examination, as PW-1, the 
0 
informant Siddagangappa as PW-2, Govindaiah, grandfathe~ 
of the deceased as PW-3, Govindappa, nephew of PW-3, as 
PW-4, Yeshodha, niece of the deceased as PW-10, as well 
as the Investigating Officer. Amongst others, the post mortem 
report (Ext. P-1) and the information/complaint referred to 
E 
hereinabove were proved at the trial. The appellant abided by 
his denial in course of his examination under Section 313, 
Cr.P.C., but did not adduce any evidence in defence. 
7. The learned trial court, on an appraisal of the 
F 
evidence on record, disbelieved the case of the prosecution 
and consequently recorded the finding of acquittal of the 
appellant qua all the charges. It was of
the view that the 
contradictions in the testimony of PWs-3, 4 and 10 did render 
the prosecution case wholly untrustworthy. It rejected the case 
G of the prosecution also on the ground that the allegations for 
demand of dowry had been leveled only after the incident and 
not prior thereto. That the prosecution had failed to adduce 
any evidence pertaining to the accusation that the appellant 
had developed illicit relationship with another girl, was also 
H
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
233 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
noted in support of his exoneration from the charges. 
A 
8. In the appeal against such acquittal preferred by the 
State of Karnataka, to reiterate, the High Court of Karnataka 
has returned a finding of guilt against the. appellant, thus, 
convicting him under 7 Sections 498A and 3048 of the IPC as 
B 
well as under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Act. By the decision 
assailed, the appellant has been awarded sentence of 
imprisonment: (a) for seven years with a fine of Rs.5,000/- for 
the offence under Section 3048, lPC,; (b) three years with a 
-fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under Section 498A, IPC,; 
C 
(c) five years and a fine of Rs.25,000/- for the offence under 
Section 3 of the Act; and ( d) six months with a fine of Rs.1, 000/ 
- for the offence under Section 4 of the Act. Provision to undergo 
further imprisonment in case of default in payment of fine was 0 
also made. All the sentences, however, were ordered to run 
concurrently. Relief by way of set-off against the sentence 
awarded for the period of custody suffered by him at the time 
of trial was, however, extended to the appellant. 
9. It has been assiduously urged by the learned counsel 
E 
for the appellant that the order of acquittal having been 
recorded by the learned trial court on an appropriate evaluation 
of the evidence on record, the High Court had fallen in gross 
error in reversing the same. According to the learned counsel, 
F 
though
death was as a result of suicide committed by the 
deceased and that too after little over two years of marriage, 
as the other essential ingredients of the offences with which 
the appellant had been charged were not proved, the learned 
trial court had rightly acquitted him. Referring to the testimony G 
of PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10, in particular, the learned counsel 
insisted that in the face of the contradictions on material terms, 
the prosecution version had b.een rendered wholly untrustworthy 
and that the High Court had erred in law and on facts in 
H
234 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
reversing the acquittal of the appellant. The learned counsel 
has argued that in the absence of any reliable and convincing 
evidence pertaining to demand for dowry and harassment or 
cruelty meted out to the deceased, the view entertained by the 
, High Court to the contrary is patently erroneous and if the 
B impugned judgment and order is allowed to stand it will result 
in travesty of justice. Without prejudice to the above, learned 
counsel has maintained that the view expressed by the learned 
trial court, in the conspectus of the evidence on record, being 
C assuredly a plausible one, it is not a case of reversal of acquittal 
as has been decisively enunciated by a plethora of judicial 
pronouncements and, thus, on this count as well the impugned 
judgment and order is liable to be interfered with. 
0 
10. In reply, learned counsel forthe State while Rndorsing 
the sustainability of the impugned decision has emphatically 
argued that the prosecution had amply established the charges 
against the appellant. Dismissing the minor inconsistencies 
in the testimony of PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10 to be wholly 
E inconsequential, the learned counsel has asserted that the view 
entertained by the learned trial court was 11ot a possible one 
and, thus, was rightly overturned in appeal in the interest of 
justice. According to the learned counsel for the State, the 
evidence on record unmistakably established all the ingredients 
F of the
offences with which the appellant had been charged 
rendering the conclusion of guilt arrived at by the High Court to 
be the yield of the only view possible. Adverting to the facts 
bearing on the persistent demand for dowry, harassment and 
ill-treatment qua the deceased as authenticated by the 
G testimony of the prosecution witnesses, learned counsel has 
insisted that the appellant had been rightly convicted on the 
charges leveled against him. It being not a case where the 
view entertained by the learned trial court was one of the two 
H permitted by the materials on record, the plea against
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
235 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
interference therewith based on the precedential dicta outlining A 
the parameters of scrutiny in an appeal against 10 acquittal, 
is wholly misplaced and, thus, untenable, she urged. Reliance, 
to reinforce the above submissions, was placed on the 
decision of this Court in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab 
[2015(3) SCALE 174]. 
B 
11. The materials on record as laid before this Court 
and the rival assertions have been duly analysed. Following 
the sequence of events as stand admitted, there is no room 
fordoubtthatthe unfortunate incident in which death had visited, 
C 
· Ganga, was barely over two years of her marriage with the 
appellant. That the death had been otherwise than under normal 
circumstances is also indubitable. 
12. In the instant appeal, it is not incumbent though for D 
this Court to re-scrutinize the evidence, the present being a 
case of reversal of acquittal, we have construed it to be 
expedient to undertake that exercise albeit to the extent 
essential. This is more so having regard to the inalienable E 
ingredients of the offences with which the appellant had been 
charged and eventually convicted by the High Court. 
13. The testimony of PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10 in particular 
having a vital bearing on the accusations constituting the 
offences would, therefore, be revisited. The narration on oath 
F 
by PW-2, Siddagangappa, is in substantial reiteration of his 
version in the complaint
pertaining to the facts relatable to 
• marriage, dowry demand of the appellant, harassment, assault 
and intimidation to the deceased by him and eventual G 
commission of suicide by her. The witness had introduced 
himself to be the uncle of the appellant, the latter being the son 
of his cousin brother. He is the maternal uncle too of th>---· 
deceased. He claimed to have reared the deceased after she 
had lost her mother. /\ccording to this witness, the appellant H
236 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
about 3 or 4 months prior to the marriage had demanded 
Rs.40,000/- in cash and also jewelleries by way of dowry, to 
which he had agreed to give Rs.25,000/- in cash accompanied 
by jewelleries. The witness deposed that about twenty days 
before the celebration of the marriage, he gave cash of 
B Rs.25,000/- to the appellant. He testified that after six months 
of the marriage, the appellant started assaulting the deceased, 
coercing her to bring Rs.50,000/- from him (witness) to 
purchase cows for his dairy. Thewitness stated that the 
C appellant thereafter repeated this conduct for about 10/12 
times and also sent the deceased to fetch this amount from 
him. The witness has expressly stated on oath that these facts 
have been revealed to him by the deceased. The witness 
stated that this harassment and assaults did continue thereafter 
o for about 1to1-1/2 years till Ganga had committed suicide, 
the situation having become intolerable for her. The witness 
also deposed to have accompanied his parents to the 
matrimonial house of ~he deceased after receiving the 
information of her death. That he also on the same date lodged 
E a complaint with the Hebbal Police Station was stated by him. 
14. In cross-examination, the witness deposed to have 
sold away their land for a sum of Rs.80,000/- out of which 
Rs.40,000/- had been spent for making gold ornaments. That 
F 
in order to meet the expenses of marriage the family had sold
away standing trees for about Rs.15,000/-, was stated as well. 
He, however, indicated that the deceased though had 
discontinued her studies at an early age and was a little • 
sensitive by nature, had acquaintantes in the neigbourhood. 
G That she was a little upset for being unable to bear a child was 
also stated by this witness. 
H 
15. PW-3, Govindaiah, is by relation a distant- cousin 
of the accused. He too is the grandfather of the deceased. He
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
237 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
reiterated on oath that the appellant before the marriage had 
A 
been demanded Rs.40,000/- byway of dowry and that against 
the same, a sum of Rs.25,000/-was paid. The witness stated 
further that in additionthereto, jewelleries had been given at 
the marriage. According to this witness, before the expiry of 
about one year from the date of marriage, the deceased had 
B 
visited his house and had told him that she was being harassed 
by her husband, who was demanding from her an additional 
amount of Rs.50,000/- by way of dowry for developing his dairy 
business. The witness, in reply, expressed his financial C 
incapability. He, however, stated that during the stay of the 
deceased with him for a period of about one week, the appellant 
had come to the house and had created a pandemonium under 
the influence of liquor and had threatened to assault him and 
the deceased, reiterating his demand for Rs.50,000/-. This D 
happened, according to the witness, also in the presence of 
Gangappa, Govindappa and Seenappa. This witness further 
stated that eight days after the said incident, the appellant 
came to his house and took the deceased with him whereafter 
within one week Ganga committed suicide. This witness 
E 
deposed to have seen the dead body of the deceased in the 
house of the appellant. He affirmed that PW-2 had lodged a 
complaint in connection with the incident. He opined as well 
that Ganga had committed
suicide because of the intolerable 
harassment and ill-treatment meted out to her by the appellant 
F 
for failing to meet his illegal demand of additional dowry. 
16. PW-4, Govindappa, is the nephew of PW-3 
Govindaiah. His evidence-in-chief is limited to the extent of 
his visit to the matrimonial home of the deceased after receiving 
G 
the information of her death. This witness was declared hostile 
and was cross-examined in course of which he generally 
denied the statements made by him during the investigation 
inculpating the appellant. 
H
238 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
17. PW-10, Yeshodha, is the aunt of the deceased, 
besides being the wife of Siddagangappa (PW-2). She 
reaffirmed the testimony of PWs-2 and 3 about the demand of 
a sum of Rs.40,000/- by the appellant and his parents as dowry 
before the marriage, together with jewellery. She stated as well 
B that as finally settled, an amount of Rs.25,000/- by cash and 
jewelleries handed over to the appellant and his father about a 
week prior to the marriage. This witness stated that after four 
months after the marriage when Ganga visited her house, she 
C had revealed that she was being subjected to harassment and 
assaults by the appellant in connection with demand for an 
additional amount of Rs.50,000/- in cash for the improvement 
of his dairy business. This witness deposed as well that about 
7-8 months thereafter Ganga had visited them again and had 
D reiterated her complaint of harassment, abuse and assault by 
the appellant for the same reason. According to this witness, 
on the same day the appellant visited their house late in the 
night and had taken Ganga from there. She stated that about 
two months prior to the incident, Ganga had again come to 
E their house and had confided in her that the same cruel 
treatment had been continuing. This witness deposed that a 
little more than a month thereafter, the appellant came to their 
house and created a furore in connection with his demand for 
Rs.50,000/- and also threatened to
kill Govindaiah (PW-3) if 
F the amount was not paid. This witness stated that this happened 
also in the presence of Gangappa (PW-3), Govindappa (PW-
4) and one Srinivas. According to this witness, Ganga met an 
unnatural death about a month thereafter. She stated as well 
G that on their visit to the matrimonial house of the deceased 
they saw a ligature mark around her neck. 
18. As adverted to hereinabove, the medical opinion in 
clear terms evinced that the deceased had died due to 
H asphyxia as a result of hanging. The ligature marks were also
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
239 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
seen on the front, sides and back of neck of the deceased. 
A 
19. The material witnesses whose testimony has been 
synopsized above, i.e. PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10, in our estimate, 
do prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased had 
been subjected to continuous harassment, assaults and 
B 
intimidation from a few months after the marriage, so much so 
that being unable to bear the unbearable cruelty, she did take 
the extreme step of eliminating herself to seek alleviation from 
such physical and mental torture. PWs-2, 3 and 10, in particular, 
are the relations of both sides and, therefore, in the absence C 
of any overwhelming material on records to the contrary, there 
is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve their versions 
encompassing the progression of events from before the 
marriage till the unfortunate end of the deceased. Noticeably, 0 
the demand for dowry originated from before the marriage and 
against a 'claim' of Rs.40,000/- and jewelleries, the family of 
the deceased could garner Rs.25,000/- by way of cash. 
Jewelleries to the extent possible were also given. This demand 
for dowry having its roots from before the marriage, as the E 
incidents thereafter as narrated by PWs-2, 3 and 10, as being 
disclosed to them by the deceased and also being witnesses 
to some of those demonstrate, assumed virulent proportions 
culminating in the pathetic death of the deceased. The 
gravamen of the testimony of PWs-2,
3 and 10 bearing on the 
F 
essential facts constituting the ingredients of the offences with 
which the appellant had been charged has remained unshaken 
in their cross-examination. Minor and stray inconsistencies in 
their narration, in our opinion, does not destroy the substratum 
of their version which otherwise do wholly furnish the required G 
materials to constitute the pre-requisites for the offences under 
Sections 3048, 498A and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The 
view adopted by the learned trial court, in our opinion, having 
regard to the gamut of the evidence adduced by the H
240 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
prosecution, is not a possible one. On the other hand, we are 
of the view that the conclusion reached by the learned trial court 
is the only possible deduction in the attendant facts and 
circumstances. 
B 
20. Sections 3048 and 498A of the IPC are set out 
hereunder at this juncture for ready reference:-
"304B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman 
is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs 
c 
otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven 
years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before 
her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by 
her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in 
connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall 
D 
be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative 
shall be deemed to have caused her death. 
Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, 
"dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of 
E 
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28of1961 ). 
F 
G 
H 
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which shall 
not be less than seven years but which may extend to 
imprisonment for life. 
498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman 
subjecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the 
husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, 
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years 
and shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation.-For the
purpose of this section, "cruelty"
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
241 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
means-
A 
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely 
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave 
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or 
physical) of the woman; or 
B 
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is 
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her 
to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable 
security or is on account of failure by her or any person 
c 
related to her to meet such demand." 
21. Whereas under Section 304B defining 'dowry 
death', there will be a statutory presumption against the 
husband for having caused the death of a woman resulting 
D 
from burns or bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under 
normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage 
accompanied by the proof that soon before her death she had 
been subjected to cruelty or harassment by him or any of his 
relatives for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, 
E 
Section 498A provides for punishment to the husband or his 
relative, if the woman has been subjected to cruelty. As per the 
Explanation attached to Section 498A, IPC, 'cruelty' has been 
defined to mean any willful conduct which is of such a nature 
as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause 
F 
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or 
physical) to her or harassment of the woman with a view to 
coercing her or any person
related to her to meet such demand. 
22. 'Dowry' as used in Section 304B, IPC, has been G 
assigned the meaning as, according to it, in Section 2 of the 
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Section 2 of the Act defining 
'dowry' is quoted hereinbelow:-
H
242 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
"2 Definition of 'dowry'. -In this Act, "dowry" means 
any property or valuable security given or agreed to be 
given either directly or indirectly-~ 
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the 
B 
marriage; or 
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any 
other person, to either party to the marriage or to any 
other person, at or before 1 [or any time after the marriage 
c 
in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but 
does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons 
to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. 
D 
4[***] 
Explanation //.-The expression "valuable security" has 
the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal 
Code (45of1860)." 
23. As is evident from the definition so provided, 'dowry' 
E shorn of all details, in the plainest form, signifies any property 
or valuable security having an inextricable nexus with the 
marriage. 
24. Section 3 of the Act prescribes penalty for any 
F person who gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry 
after the enforcement thereof. This section excludes its 
application vis-a-vis the presents given at the time of marriage 
to the bride/bridegroom without any demand having been 
G made in that regard and if such presents are entered in a list . 
maintained in accordance with the rules framed under the Act. 
The penalty for demand, directly or indirectly, of any dowry from 
the parents or other relatives or
guardian of a bride/bridegroom 
has been enjoined by Section 4 of the Act. 
H
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
243 
[AMITAVA ROY, J .. ] 
25. A combined reading of the above provisions attests A 
the salutary legislative intendment of not only discouraging any 
demand for dowry either directly or indirectly but also penalizing 
any such act. The obvious concern of the legislature on this 
growing social menace based on demand for dowry, and the 
resultant macabre fall outs eventuated in the incorporation of B 
Sections 498A and 304B by successive amendments of the 
Indian Penal Code by Act of 46 of 1983 and Act 43 of 1986 
respectively. Not only Section 304B enjoins a statutory 
presumption of the guilt of the husband on the proof of the C 
eventualities as mentioned therein, Section 113B of the Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872 fortifies such presumption in the probative 
perspedives. Section 304B, IPC, and Section 113B of the 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, do supplement each other to 
effectuate the legislative mandate of statutory presumption of o 
guilt, the contingencies warranted being present. 
26. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 
permits a court to presume that the husband of a woman or 
any of his relative had abetted her to commit suicide if it is 
E 
shown that she had resorted to the such act within a period of 
seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband 
or such relative of his had subjected her to cruelty. 
27. This Court, amongst others, in Rajinder Singh 
F 
(supra) after an exhaustive survey of the judicial
pronouncements on the purport of the expression 'dowry' as 
noticed hereinabove, has enunciated that any money or 
property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons 
mentioned in Section 2 of the Act, at or before or at any time G 
after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death 
of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with 
or in relation to the marriage unless the facts of a given case 
clearly and unequivocally point otherwise, thus defining the 
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244 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 
A 
content of the word for its application. 
28. Having regard to avowed objective of the Act along 
with the purpose of incorporation of Section 498A and 3048, 
IPC, along with Sections 113Aand 1138 of the Indian Evidence 
8 
Act, 1872, we are in respectful agreement with the view so 
expressed. 
29. Qua the words 'soon before' appearing in Section 
1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 3048 of 
c the IPC, it is no longer res integra that the same is laden with 
the notion of proximity test, but not synonymous with the term 
'immediately before'. It has been inter alia stated also in 
Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana [(2014) 4 SCC 129) that 
though the applicability of this expression would obviously 
D depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, it ought 
to mean that the time interval cannot be stretched to any period. 
This Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207], 
while dwelling upon the import of the words 'soon before death' 
observed that there ought to be a proximate and live link 
E between the impact of cruelty based on dowry demand and 
the consequential death. That these words, however, should 
receive a fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the 
great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 3048 
F was highlighted by this Court in Sher Singh v. State of Haryana 
[(2015 (1) SCALE 250]. In Dinesh v. State of Haryana [2014 
(5) SCALE 641 ], it was underscored
that the expression 'soon 
before' cannot be lodged in a straitjacket formula so as to fix 
any time for its relevance and applicability . 
G 
30. On a cumulative consideration of the relevant 
aspects, factual and legal, as addressed to hereinabove, we 
are, thus, of the unhesitant opinion that the prosecution had 
been able to prove the culpability of the appellant vis-a-vis the 
H charges beyond any reasonable doubt.
M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 
245 
[AMITAVA ROY, J.] 
31. To reiterate, the progression of events from before A 
the marriage till the unnatural death of the hapless deceased, 
not only provides an inseverable link inter se but also 
unambiguously demonstrates the buildup of the intolerable 
mental and physical torture on her, driving her to take refuge of 
such a drastic step. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses 
B 
in this regard is evidently coherent, consistent and compact. 
The materials on record though indicate that the deceased 
had lost her mother at a young age and was denied the love 
and affection of her father who married for the second time C 
and was also a little sensitive and self-centered, there is nothing 
supervening to suggest that she did suffer from any mental 
imbalance or eccentricity so as to probabilise any act of self-
elimination without any compelling reason. On the other hand, 
the evidence on record demonstrates in emphatic terms that o 
she had been complaining of the appellant's persistent and 
hurtful demand for dowry by way of an additional amount of 
Rs.50,000/- and her pitiable condition, being subjected to 
continuous and ruthless harassment and ill-treatment resulting 
in severe physical and mental torture. 
E 
32. In view of the above, we hereby affirm the conviction 
and sentence as recorded by the High Court in toto. In the 
result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant's bail 
bond stands discharged and he is
hereby ordered to surrender 
F 
before the learned trial court to serve out the sentence awarded. 
All follow up steps be taken forthwith. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal dismissed. 
G