NAGARAJA RAO versus CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 424, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 424 
NAGARAJA RAO 
V. 
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
· (Criminal Appeal No. 104 of 2015) 
.JANUARY 16, 2015 
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA AND 
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.] 
C 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.31 -Accused 
convicted of several offences at one trial - Power of the Court 
to award sentence - Sentence to run "concurrently" or 
"consecutively" -Appellant, a postal employee -Allegation 
that while on duty he committed theft of a registered insured 
D parcel containing Gold Chain - Conviction and sentencing 
of appellant uls.381 /PC and also uls.52 of the /PO Act-
Magistrate did not mention as to whether both the 
punishments will run "concurrently" or "consecutively" -
E Conviction not challenged before Supreme Court -
Challenge confined only to the sentences awarded- Whether 
the sentences awarded to appellant u/ /PC and the !PO Act 
should run "concurrently" or "consecutively" - Power available 
uls.31 CrPC invoked by Supreme Court- Held: Interest of 
F justice would be sub-served by directing both the sentences 
awarded to the appellant to run "concurrently as firstly, the 
case is pending for a long period of 21 years; secondly, the 
two sentences imposed on appellant, arose out of one offence 
of theft punishable uls.381 /PC tried in one trial; thirdly, 
G provisions of s.52 of the /PO Act were invoked against the 
appellant as he was a postal employee; fourthly, the Gold 
Chain was long recovered and also handed over to the
person 
concerned; fifthly, appellant was already dismissed from 
service due to impugned conviction; and lastly, appellant was 
H 
424

NAGARAJA RAO v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 
425 
INVESTIGATION 
suffering from heart ailment since long - Indian Post Office A 
Act, 1898 - s. 52 - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 381. 
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain @ Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti 
vs. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), 
Ahmedabad & Anr. (198&) 4 SCC 183; State of 
B 
Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali 
(2001) 6 SCC 311; Chatar Singh vs. State of M.P 
(2006) 12 SCC 37; State of Punjab vs. Madan 
Lal (2009) 5 SCC 238; Manoj@ Panu vs~ State 
of Haryana (2014) 2 SCC 153; Sawal Das vs. 
t.; 
State of Bihar (1975) 3 SCC 156 - relied on. 
Case Law Reference 
(1988) 4 sec 183 . 
relied on 
Para 17 
D 
(2001) 6 sec 311 
relied on 
Para 18 
(2006) 12 sec 37 
relied on 
Para 19 
(2009) 5 sec 238 
relied on 
Para 19 
E 
(2014) 2 sec 153 
relied on 
Para 19 
(1975) 3 sec 156 
relied on 
Para 22 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal F 
Appeal No(s). 104 of 2015 
Fram the Judgment and Order dated 25. 04.2014 of the 
High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Revision 
Petition No. 924 of 2009 
Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, Amit A. Pai for the appellant. 
T. A. Khan, Charul Sarin, B. V. Balaram Das for the 
Respondent. 
G 
H
426 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE J. 1. Leave granted. 
2. This appeal is filed by the accused against the 
judgment and final order dated 25.04.2014 passed by the High 
B Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Revision Petition· 
No. 924 of 2009 whereby the learned single Judge of the High 
Court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the order 
dated 23.09.2008/01.10.2008 passed by the XVII Additional 
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore in CC No. 2408 of 
C 1995 convicting and sentencing the appellant-accused for the 
offences punishable under Section 381 of the Indian Penal 
Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as "IPC") and Section 52 
of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as 
0 
"the I PO Act"), which was confirmed by order dated 08.10.2009 
passed by the XXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge 
and Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bangalore in Criminal 
Appeal No. 845 of 2008. 
E 
3. Facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. 
4. The appellant-accused, at the relevant time, (1.3.1992 
to 11.3.1993) was working as Sorting Assistant in Bangalore 
Packet Sorting Office, Head Record Office (Main Unit) at 
Bangalore. On the intervening night between 05.03.1993 and 
F 06.03.1993, the appellant-accused while on duty committed 
theft of a registered insured parcel bearing receipt No. 0127 
dated 03.03.1993 containing Gold Chain (V shape) weighing 
173.650 Grams
worth Rs. 70,41 Of-which was sent by its owner 
from Ramavadi Post Office, Bombay for being delivered to 
G the consignee - Guiab Jewellery Shop at K.H.B. Road Post 
Office, Bangalore. The parcel thus could not be delivered to 
the party concerned though reached to Bangalore post office. 
5. Mr. M.N.Narasimha Murthy-Assistant Superintendent · 
H of Bags (PW-1) in the office of Chief Post Master General of
NAGARAJA RAO v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 
427 
INVESTIGATION 
Karnataka, on coming to know of the missing of parcel and A 
commission of the theft of the parcel, immediately lodged a 
complaint (Ex-P-1) in the High Grounds Police Station. The 
complaint was accordingly investigated which revealed 
complicity of the appellant in commission of its theft which led 
to registration of Crime Case No. 115/1993 against the B 
appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 381 and 
419 of I PC read with Section 52 of the I PO Act. The case was 
then handed over to the CBI. The CBI registered the case being 
RC No. 14(S)/93-BLR, which eventually led to filing of the 
charge-sheet against the appellant in the Court of XVII C 
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore for 
appellant's prosecution for commission of aforementioned. 
offences. 
6. The appellant abjured the guilt and claimed the trial. 
D 
The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, by his order dated 
23.09.2008/01.10.2008 passed in CC No 2408 of 1995 
. convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under 
Section 381 IPC and Section 52 of the IPOAct and sentenced 
him to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months and to pay E 
a fine of Rs. 2000/- under Section 381 IPC and in default of 
payment of fine amount to undergo further simple imprisonment 
for 3 months. Similarly, the appellant was also sentenced to 
undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months and to pay a fine 
F 
of Rs. 2000/- for the offence punishable
under Section 52 of 
the IPO Act and in default of payment of fine amount, to undergo 
further simple imprisonment of 3 months. So far as the offence 
punishable under Section 419 IPC was concerned, the 
appellant was acquitted of the charge. 
G 
7. It may be pertinentto mention that the Chief Judicial 
Magistrate while awarding the punishment for commission of 
two offences as mentioned above did not mention as to 
whether both the punishments will run "concurrently" or H
428 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 12 S.C.R. 
A "consecutively''. In other words, the order of the Chief Judicial 
Magistrate in so far as it relates to the award of punishment 
was concerned it was silent, on this issue. 
· 8. Feeling aggrieved by the order of conviction and 
B sentence, the appellant filed an appeal being Criminal Appeal 
No. 845 of 2008 before the XXI Additional City Civil and 
Sessions Judge and Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bangalore. 
The appellate Judge, by his order dated 08.10.2009, confirmed 
the conviction and sentences awarded to the appellant and 
C dismissed his appeal. Against the said order, the appellant 
preferred a revision being Criminal Revision Petition No. 924 
of 2009 in the High Court. The High Court, by impugned order, 
dismissed the revision and in consequence upheld the 
conviction and sentences awarded to the appellant. It is against 
D this order, the appellant- accused has filed this appeal by way 
of special leave. 
9. While assailing the legality and correctness of the 
impugned order, learned Counsel for the appellant urged only 
E one point. Learned Counsel, however, did not question the 
legality and correctness of the conviction on its merit and 
confined his challenge only to the sentences awarded to the 
appellant. According to him, the Courts below erred in not 
directing both the sentences awarded to the appellant, i.e., 
F the one awarded under Section 381 IPC and the other awarded 
under Section 52 of the I PO Act to
run "concurrently". It was 
his submission that since both the offences which resulted in 
appellant's conviction under two different Acts (IPC and IPO 
Act) were tried in one trial and arose out of one act narnely-
G "theft", this was a fit case where the Courts below should have 
directed both the sentences to run "concurrently''. Learned 
Counsel pointed out that in every case of this nature, it is the 
duty of the Court to specifically mention in the order of 
H conviction as to whether the sentences awarded for the offences
NAGARAJA RAO v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 
429 
INVESTIGATION 
under the different sections would run "concurrently" or A 
"consecutively" by taking recourse to the provisions of 
Section 31 of the Code of Criminal ·Procedure, 1973 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). Learned Counsel 
contended that in any event, having regard to the nature of 
offence committed by the appellant, his advanced age (61 
B 
years), the serious heart ailment suffered by him while 
undergoing the sentence duly proved by documents and the 
fact that he has already been dismissed from service due to 
his conviction, this Court should invoke the power under Section 
31 of the Code and direct both the sentences, i.e:, the one C 
awarded under IPC and other awarded under IPO Act to run 
"concurrently" instead of to run "consecutively". 
10. In contra, learned counsel for the respondent- State 
supported the impugned judgment and submitted that no D 
interference is called for in the impugned judgment. 
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and 
on perusal of the record of the case,_ we find force in the 
submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. 
E 
12. The question, which arises for consideration in this 
appeal, is whether the sentences awarded to the appellant 
under IPC and the IPO Act should run "concurrently" or 
"consecutively"? 
F 
13.The 
expressions 
"concurrently" 
and 
"consecutively" mentioned in the Code are of immense 
significance while awarding punishment
to the accused once 
he is found guilty of any offence punishable under IPC or/and G 
of an offence punishable under any other Special Act arising 
out of one trial or more. It is for th~ reason that award of former 
enure to the benefit of accused whereas award of latter is 
detrimental to the accused's interest. It is, therefore, legally 
obligatory upon the Court of first instance while awarding H
430 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A sentence to specify in clear terms in the order of conviction as 
to whether sentence awarded to the accused would run 
"concurrently" or ttiey would run "consecutively" 
14. Section 31 of the Code deals with power of the Court 
s to award sentence in cases where the accused is convicted 
of several offences at one trial. It reads as under: 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
"31.Sentence in cases of conviction of several 
offences at one trial.-
( 1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or 
rl"ore offences, the Court may, subject to the 
provisions of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code 
(45of1860), sentence him for such offences, to the 
several punishments prescribed therefor which 
such Court. is competent to inflict; such 
punishments when consisting of imprisonment to 
commence the one after the expiration of the other 
in such order as the Court may direct, unless the 
Court directs that such punishments shall run 
concurrently. 
(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not 
be necessary for the Court by reason only of the 
aggregate punishment for the several offences 
being in excess of the punishment which it is 
competent to inflict on conviction of a single 
offence, to send the offender for trial before a higher 
Court: 
Provided that-
(a) in no ~ase shall such person be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a longer period than fourteen 
years;
NAGARAJARAO v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 
431 
INVESTIGATION 
(b) the aggr.egate punishment shall not exceed A · 
twice the amount of punishment which the Court 
is competent to inflict for a single offence. 
(3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted 
person, the aggregate of the consecutive B 
sentences passed against him under this section 
shall be deemed to be a single sentence." 
15. The issue as to in which circumstances the Court 
should direct the sentences to run "concurrently" or C 
"consecutively" after the accused is convicted of more than 
one offence in one trial or more has been the subject matter of 
several cases in this Court and thus remains no more res 
integra. This issue was considered by this Court while 
considering the scope of Sections 31, 427 and 428 of the o 
Code and Section 71 of IPC. 
16. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the 
decisions. 
17. In Mohd. Akhtar Hussain @ Ibrahim Ahmed E 
Bhatti vs. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), 
Ahmedabad & Anr., (1988) 4 sec 183, the accused was 
sentenced to undergo 7 years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 
10 lakhs was imposed for having found to be in possession of F 
primary gold worth Rs.1.4 crores which was in violation of the 
Gold (Control) Act. He was subsequently indicted for infringing 
the provisions of Customs Act by smuggling gold valued at 
Rs. 12.5 Crores and exporting silver worth Rs. 11.5 Crores. 
The accused pleading guilty in commission of the offences G 
was awarded 4 years
imp.risonment and also a fine. Both the 
sentences were directed to run "consecutively". However, 
the State contended that the offence under the Customs Act 
merited the maximum sentence, while the accused contended 
that sentences should run "concurrently". The High Court, 
H
432 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A 
however, enhanced the sentence as contended by the State 
and rejected the plea of the accused in regard to the award of 
sentences. This Court in an appeal filed by the accused 
accepted the plea raised by him and while allowing his appeal 
directed both the sentences to run "concurrently" by referring 
B to Se~tion 427 of the Code. The following observations made 
by this Court in paras 9 and 10 are apposite: 
"9. The section relates to administration of criminal 
justice and provides procedure for sentencing. The 
C 
sentencing court is, therefore, required to consider 
and make an appropriate order as to how the 
sentence passed in the subsequent case is to run. 
Whether it should be concurrent or consecutive ? 
o 
10. The basic rule of thumb over the years has been 
the so-called single transaction rule for concurrent 
sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two 
offences under two enactments generally, it is 
wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper 
E 
and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But 
this rule has no application ifthe transaction relating 
to offences is not the same or the facts constituting 
the two offences are quite different." 
F 
18. Likewise, a question arose before the three-judge 
Bench in State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Najakat Alia 
Mubarak Ali, (2001) 6 SCC 311, as to whether the accused 
convicted in two cases one after another was entitled to claim 
set off the period of
detention during investigation, inquiry or 
G trial from the sentence imposed on conviction in both the cases. 
H 
While interpreting Section 428 of the Code, the majority of the 
judges answered the question in affirmative. While answering 
the question, Justice Thomas, speaking for majority of the 
Judges, made the following observations, which are pertinent.
NAGARAJA RAO v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 
433 
INVESTIGATION 
"17. In the above context, it is apposite to point out · A 
that very often it happens, when an accused is 
convicted in one case under different counts of 
offences and sentenced to different terms of 
imprisonment under each such count, all such 
sentences are directed to run concurrently. The B 
idea behind it is that the imprisonment to be 
suffered by him for one count of offence will, in fact 
and in effect be imprisonment for other counts as 
well." 
19. The aforesaid principle of law was relied upon by 
this Court in Chatar Singh vs. State of M.P., (2006) 12 SCG 
c 
37 and State of Punjab vs. Madan Lal, (2009) 5 SCC 238, 
and lastly recently in Manoj @ Panu vs. State of Haryana, 
(2014) 2 sec 153, wherein this Court taking recourse to D 
Section 31 of the Code directed in somewhat similar facts 
that the sentences awarded to the accused to run 
"concurrently" in place of "consecutively". 
20. Keeping the aforesaid principle of law in mind and E 
applying the same to the facts of this case in the light of powers 
available under Section 31 of the Code, we are of the 
considered opinion that both the sentences awarded to the 
appellant in the case at hand should run "concurrently" and 
this we do by invoking Section 3~ which enables the Court to 
F 
so direct. 
21. In our considered opinion, this is a fit case where we 
can direct the sentences awarded to the appellant to run 
"concurrently" for the reasons that
firstly, the case out of which G 
this appeal arises relates to the year 1993 and is pending for 
a long period of 21 years; secondly, the two sentences, which 
were imposed on the appellant, arose out of one offence of 
theft punishable under Section 381 IPC tried in one trial; thirdly, 
H
434 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A the provisions of Section 52 of the IPO Act were required to 
be invoked against the appellant because he was the postal 
employee; fourthly, the Gold Chain was long recovered and 
·also handed over to the person concerned; fifthly, the appellant 
has already been dismissed from services due to impugned 
B conviction; and lastly, the appellant has been suffering from 
heart ailment since long, as is proved by documents filed along 
with the appellant's affidavit 03.11.2014. 
22. It is for all these reasons, in our considered opinion, 
C the interest of justice would be sub-served by directing both 
the sentences awarded to the appellant to run "concurrently". 
Since we have upheld the conviction, which was not challenged 
by the appellant in this appeal, the directions to run both the 
sentences "concurrently" can always be passed by the 
D appellate Court because such directions are in the nature of 
consequential on and incidental to the affirmance of the 
conviction as held by this Court in the case reported in Sawal 
Das vs. State of Bihar, (1975) 3 SCC 156. 
E 
23. In the light of foregoing discussion, the appeal 
succeeds and is allowed in part. The conviction and sentences 
awarded to the appellant by the courts below for the offences 
punishable under Section 381 of IPC and Section 52 of the 
IPO Act are upheld. However, it is directed that both the 
F sentences awarded to the appellant under IPC and IPO Act 
would run
"concurrently". 
24. As a consequence, if the appellant has already 
undergone the period of sentence imposed on him he shall be 
G released forthwith if not required in connection with any other 
case. 
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose· 
Appeal partly allowed.