ASHOK KUMAR & ANR versus STATE OF BIHAR & ORS
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 815, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Arguments
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 815 
ASHOK KUMAR & ANR 
v. 
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 
(Civil Appeal No. 9092 of2012) 
. OCTOBER 21, 2016 
[T. S. THAKUR, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND 
DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.] 
Service Law: Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class III and Class IV) 
(Amendment) Rules, 2001 - rr.5,6, 7, 10 - Promotion through selection 
- Selection Criteria - Eighty five marks a/located for written 
examination and fifteen for interview - Select list not approved -
Fresh selection process with a/location of marks for written exam 
and interview in the ratio of 90:10 - Appellants participated in the 
fresh process of selection but were unsuccessful and subsequently, 
they challenged the selection process - Propriety - Held : Appellants 
appeared in an examination without any objection to process of 
selection - They cannot subsequently turn around and contend that 
the selection process was unfair or that there was a lacuna therein, 
merely because result is not palatable - Principle of estoppel would 
operate - Constitution of India - Art. 309 - Principle of estoppel. 
Applications were invited for promotion to Class III posts from 
amongst Class IV employees of the Civil Court. Eighty five marks were 
fixed for the written examination and fifteen for the interview. 
Appointment committee submitted list of selected candidates to High 
Court. High Court declined to approve the select list and issued a 
communication requiring holding of fresh written examination carrying 
ninety marks and
interview often marks. Appellants participated in the 
fresh process of selection but were unsuccessful and subsequently, they 
challenged the selection process. 
Disposing of the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The appellants participated in the fresh process 
of selection. If the appellants were aggrieved by the decision to 
hold a fresh process, they did not espouse their remedy. Instead, 
they participated in the fresh process of selection and it was only 
upon being unsuccessful that they challenged the result in the 
writ petition. This was clearly not open to the appellants. The 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016) 8 S.C.R. 
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principle of estoppel would operate. In the present case, the fact 
that the appellants were clearly on notice, when the fresh selection 
process took place that written examination would carry ninety 
marks and the interview, ten marks. The appellants participated 
in the selection process. Moreover, two other considerations 
B weigh in balance. There was an element of vagueness about 
whether Rule 6 which dealt with promotion merely incorporated 
the requirement of an examination provided in Rule 5 for direct 
recruitment to Class III posts or whether the marks and qualifying 
marks were also incorporated. Moreover, no prejudice was 
established to have been caused to the appellants by the 90:10 
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allocation. [Paras 11, 13][822-H; 823-A; 825-E-G] 
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2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, to meet the 
ends of justice, it was directed that in the event that there is any 
existing vacancy, appellant may be allowed to work on Class III 
post in which he is currently working on the provisional basis 
until the next round of selection process takes place. The appellant 
would be at liberty to participate in the selection process that 
may be held in future and in the event he is declared successful, 
he would be at liberty to make a representation to the competent 
authority for consideration of the period spent by him on the Class 
III post for the purpose of fixation of seniority. [Para 16][826-C-
E] 
Raj
Kumar v. Shakti R,a} (1997) 9 SCC 527-
distinguished. 
Marripati Nagaraja v. The Govern111ent of Andhra 
Pradesh (2007) 11 SCC 522 : 2007 (11) SCR 506; 
Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal (2008) 3 
PLJR (SC) 271; A111lan Jyoti Borrooah v State of Assa111 
(2009) 3 SCC 227 : 2009 (1) SCR 593; Chandra 
Prakash Trwari v Shakuntala Shukla (2002) 6 SCC 127 
: 2002 (3) SCR 948; Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar 
(2007) 8 SCC 100 : 2007 (10) SCR 41; Munindra 
Kumar v. Rajiv Govil (1991) 3 SCC 368 : 1991 (2) SCR 
812; Rasl1111i Mishra li MP. Public Service Commission 
(2006) 12 sec 724 : 2006 (7) Suppl. scR 708; 
Manish Kumar Shah v. State of Bihar (2010) 12 SCC 
576; Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service
ASHOK KUMAR & ANR v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 
Commission (2011) 1 SCC 150: 2010 (12) SCR 944; 
Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi (2013) 11 SCC 
309 : 2013 (5) SCR 687; Chandigarh Administration 
v. Jasmine Kaur (2014) 10 SCC 521 : 
2014 (9) 
SCR 1122; Pradeep Kumar Raiv. Dinesh Kumar 
Pandey (2015) 11 SCC 493: 2015 (6) SCR 825; 
Madras Institute of Development v. S.K. Shiva 
Subaramanyam (2016) 1 SCC 454 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
2007 (11) SCR 506 
referred to 
(2008) 3 PLJR (SC) 271 
referred to 
2009 (1) SCR 593 
2002 (3) SCR 948 
2007 (10) SCR 41 
1991 (2) SCR 812 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 708 referred to 
(2010) 12 sec 576 
referred to 
2010 (12) SCR 944 
2013 (5) SCR 687 
2014 (9) SCR 1122 
2015 (6) SCR 825 
(2016) 1 sec 454 
(1997) 9 sec s21 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
distinguished 
Para7 
Para7 
Para 7 
Para 12 
Para 12 
Para 12 
Para 12 
Para 12 
Para 12 
Para 12 
Para 12 
Para 12 
Para 12 
Para 14 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9092 
of2012. 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.2011 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Patna in LPA No. 1991 of 2010. 
G 
Amit Pawan, Akshat Shrivastava, Suryodaya Prakash Tiwari, 
Gaurav Singh, Ad vs. for the Appellant. 
Nagendra Rai, Sr. Adv., Ms. Prema Singh, Shashank Saurav, T. 
Mahipal, Gopal Singh, Shlok Chandra, Advs. for the Respondents. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J, I. This appeal arises from a 
judgment and order ofa Division Bench of the High Court ofJudicature 
at Patna dated 16 December 2011 which allowed a Letters Patent Appeal 
instituted by the ninth to fourteenth respondents. The Division Bench set 
aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 9 
November 2010 by which selections made by promotion from Class IV 
posts to Class III posts in the District Court ofMuzaffarpur were quashed. 
The Division Bench has held that the original petitioners who succeeded 
before the learned Single Judge in challenging the process of promotion 
were estopped from doing so, having unsuccessfully participated in the 
selection process. 
2. On 2 December 2003, the office of the District and Sessions 
Judge, Muzaffarpur issued General order No. 204 of 2003 inviting 
applications for promotion to six Class III posts from amongst Class IV 
employees of the Civil Court at Muzaffarpur. The selection was to be 
D made on the basis of a fresh written test and interview. Twenty seven 
candidates appeared in the written examination which was conducted 
on 20 April 2004 of whom fourteen qualified. These candidates were 
interviewed on 7 July 2004. Eighty five marks were fixed for the written 
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examination and fifteen marks for the interview. The appointment 
committee selected six candidates on the basis of
merit for appointment 
to the six Class III posts by promotion. The select list was submitted to 
the High Court on 26 July 2004. The High Court declined to approve the 
select list on the ground that the marks allotted for the written examination 
were not in accordance with the Court's General letter No. I of 1995 
and the Rules of 1992, 1998 and 200 I covering Bihar Civil Court Staff. 
By a letter dated 19 August 2004, the Registrar (Administration) directed 
the District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur to hold a fresh examination 
fixing ninety marks for the written examination by treating the qualifying 
marks as forty five. 
3. Accordingly, a fresh General order (171 of2004) was issued 
G by the District and Sessions Judge on 8 October 2004. The General 
order specifically adverted to the communication dated 9 August 2004 
of the High Court and stipulated that a fresh written examination 
comprising ninety marks would be held (with qualifying marks of forty 
five) which would be followed by an interview carrying ten marks. 
H Pursuant to this, a written test was held on 7 November 2004 followed
ASHOK KUMAR & ANR v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
by an interview on 12 December 2004. Results were declared on 31 
December 2004 and the ninth to fourteenth respondents were appointed 
on Class III posts. All the appellants participated in the process of 
selection. 
4. The two appellants and four other unsuccessful candidates then 
filed a Writ Petition before the High Court in order to challenge the 
General order dated 8 October 2004 and the order of appointment dated 
31 December 2004. The primary ground was that the appointment 
process was vitiated, since under the relevant rules, the written test was 
required to carry eighty five marks and the interview, fifteen marks. 
Counter affidavits were filed in response to the Writ Petition by the 
Registrar of the Civil Court at Muzaffarpur, the Registrar General of the 
High Court and by the selected candidates. The High Court on the 
administrative side defended its action by placing reliance on its General 
letter bearing No. I of 1995 (Civil) dated 22 November 1995 which 
stipulated a written examination comprising of ninety marks (with 
qualifying marks of forty five) followed by an interview carrying ten 
marks for promotion from Class IV to Class III posts. The High Court 
submitted in its counter affidavit that this General letter continued to 
hold the field. Moreover, it was urged that Rule 6 of the Bihar Civil 
Court Staff(Class III and Class IV) (Amendment) Rules, 2001 stipulates 
that
promotion from Class IV to Class III posts shall be made by an 
appointment committee on the basis of merit cum seniority. While the 
Rules of 200 I also stipulated the mode of appointment by promotion, the 
procedure for promotion was governed by General LetterNo. l of 1995. 
This, it was urged, has been reiterated in the administrative instructions 
issued by the High Court on 20 December 2007. 
5. The learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ 
petition and quashed the appointment made by the District and Sessions 
Judge, Muzaffarpur. The learned Single Judge held that under Rule 6 of 
the Bihar Civil Court Staff(Class III and Class IV)( Amendment) Rules, 
2001,the written examination was to carry eighty five marks and the 
interview fifteen marks (instead and in place of the earlier requirement 
of ninety marks and ten marks respectively). In the view of the learned 
Single Judge, once the rules, which have been made under Article 309, 
were amended in 200 I, the earlier rules would stand superseded and the 
General letter of the High Court would not have the effect of overriding 
the statutory rules. The examination, it was i10ticed was held after the 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A new rules had come into force in July 2001. In consequence, the learned 
Single Judge held that the notification fixing eighty five marks for the 
written examination and fifteen marks for the interview had been correctly 
issued by the District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur who as a result, 
was directed to declare the results of all those who had participated in 
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the first selection examination. 
6. After the order of the learned Single Judge, a direction was 
issued by which six persons who had been appointed to Class III posts 
were reverted to their original Class IV posts on 30 November 2010. 
They filed a Letters Patent Appeal in order to challenge the judgment 
and order of the learned Single Judge. In the meantime, an order was 
issued by the District and Sessions Judge by which six persons who 
were successful in the first selection process were promoted to Class 
III posts. The candidates included both the appellants and four other 
candidates. These four candidates were also successful in the previous 
result. As a consequence, two persons were excluded. 
7. The Division Bench of the High Court by a judgment and order 
dated 16 December 2011 allowed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the 
ninth to fourteenth respondents and, while setting aside the judgment 
and order of the learned Single Judge, restored the original order of 
appointment dated 31 December 2004. The Division Bench agreed with 
the
construction placed by the learned Single Judge on the Rules of 
200 I. However, while interfering with the judgment of the learned Single 
Judge, the Division Bench took the view that the appellants had in 
pursuance of the notification issued by the District and Sessions Judge 
participated in the selection process without any protest. Having failed 
to raise any objection to the selection process, it was held that the 
appellants were estopped from turning around and challenging the 
selection once they were declared unsuccessful. In taking this view, the 
""''·1ision Bench has relied upon the judgments of this Court in: (i) 
"··' · ·' oati Nagaraja v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh'; (ii) 
Dhar.;: ·; · y Malik v. State of UttaranchaF; and (iii) Amlan Jyoti 
G Borrooahv. State of Assam3• 
H 
8. Now at the outset, it would be necessary to advert to the 
1 (2007) 11 sec s22 
2 (2008) 3 PLJR (SC) 271 
' (2009) 3 sec 227 
,
ASHOK KUMAR & ANR v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
provisions of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class III and Class IV) 
(Amendment) Rules, 1998. Rule 6 provides for the mode of recruitment 
of Class ll1 employees through a centralized written examination and 
oral interview. Rule 6(ii) earlier provided that the written test shall consist 
of ninety marks while ten marks shall be allotted to the interview. Rule 7 
deals with appointment by promotion. Rule 7(i) stipulates that 
appointments from Class III to Class IV posts on promotion shall be 
made by the appointment committee on the basis of merit cum seniority. 
Rule ?(iii) is in the following terms: 
"for promotion in terms of the preceding rule, the 
Appointment Committee shall hold a separate examination 
of the eligible candidates and call for interview only such 
candidates who obtain the qualifying marks in the written 
examination." 
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9. The Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class III and Class IV) 
(Amendment) Rules, 2001 were notified with effect from 1 I July 2001. 
Rules 5to12 were substituted. Rule S(iv) governs the mode of recruitment · D 
ofClassIII employees. Rule S(iv)(d) provides for a written test of eighty 
five marks and an interview consisting of fifteen marks, totally aggregating 
to one hundred marks. The qualifying marks for the written examination 
are to be forty five. Rule 6 provides for appointment by promotion in the 
following terms: 
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"Appointment by Promotion-(i)
The appointments to Class 
III posts by promotion from Class IV posts shall also be 
made by the Appointment Committee on merit-cum-seniority 
basis; 
(ii) Twenty percent of vacant Class III posts shall be made 
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reserved for promotion from Class IV employees who 
possess the minimum educational qualification and have 
three year experience in the post held by them; 
(iii) For promotion in terms of the preceding rule, the 
Appointment Committee shall hold a separate examination 
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of the eligible candidates and call for interview only such 
candidates who obtain the qualifying marks in the written 
examination." 
Under Rule 7(iv),all appointments are subject to such directions 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
as may be issued by the High Court from time to time. Rule I 0 enables 
the High Court to qualify or supplement the rules by issuing a general or 
special direction from time to time. The amended Rules of 2001, as 
noted above provide for the recruitment of Class III employees in Rule 
S(iv) and for appointment by promotion from Class IV to Class III posts 
in Rule 6.Rule6 (iii) stipulates that for promotion in terms of the preceding 
rule, the appointment committee shall hold a separate examination of the 
eligible candidates and call for interview only such candidates who obtain 
the qualifying marks in the written examination. The learned Single Judge 
held that in consequence, Rule 6 incorporates the requirement which is 
provided in Rule 5 of a written examination consisting of eighty five 
marks, an interview of fifteen marks and qualifying marks of forty five 
in the written test. The Division Bench on adverting to the provisions of 
Rules 5 and 6 of the Rules, 2001 noticed that there was some scope for 
interpretation on account of vagueness of the rules. However, on the 
balance, the Division Bench was not inclined to differ with the view of 
D the learned Single Judge on the interpretation of the rules. 
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10. The basic issue that was addressed by the Division Bench 
was thatthe appellants having participated in the fresh round of selection 
could not be permitted to assail the process once they were
declared 
unsuccessful. On this aspect, a briefrecapitulation of the facts would be 
in order. In the original process of selection, following the issuance of 
General order No. 204 of 2003 by the District and Sessions Judge, 
Muzaffarpuron 2 December2003, a written examination was held on 20 
April 2004 consisting of eighty five marks followed by an interview on 7 
July 2004 consisting of fifteen marks. The High Court declined to approve 
of the selection list and issued through its Registrar (Administration), a 
communication dated 19 August 2004 requiring the holding of a fresh 
written examination carrying ninety marks in which the qualifying marks 
would be regarded as forty five in terms of its General letter No. I of 
I ':'95. Pursuant thereto, a circular was issued in the form of a new General 
ord::r ~earing No.171 of2004 on 8 October 2004wh ich stipulated that in 
terms of the directions issued by the High Court on 19 August 2004, a 
G fresh written examination would be held carrying ninety marks (with 
qualifying marks as forty five) followed by an interview often marks. 
Candidates who had applied earlier were not required to apply afresh. 
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11. The appellants participated in the fresh process of selection. 
lfthe appellants were aggrieved by the decision to hold a fresh process,
ASHOK KUMAR & ANR v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
they did not espouse their remedy. Instead, they participated in the fresh 
process of selection and it was only upon being unsuccessful that they 
challenged the result in the writ petition. This was clearly not open to the 
appellants. The principle of estoppel would operate. 
12. The law on the subject has been crystalized in several decisions 
of this Court. In Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla4, 
this Court laid down the principle that when a candidate appears at an 
examination without objection and is subsequently found to be not 
successful, a challenge to the process is precluded. The question of 
entertaining a petition challenging an examination would not arise where 
a candidate has appeared and participated. He or she cannot subsequently 
turn around and contend that the process was unfair or that there was a 
lacuna therein, merely because the result is not palatable. In Union of 
India v. S. Vinodh Kumar\ this Court held that: 
"18. It is also well settled that those candidates who had 
taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the 
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procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question 
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the same ... 
(See also Munindra Kumar v. Raj iv Govil6 and Rashmi 
Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission7)." 
The same view was reiterated in Amlan Jyoti Borroah 
(supra)where it was held to bewell settledthat candidates who have taken 
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part in a selection
process knowing fully well the procedure laid down 
therein are not entitled to question it upon being declared to be 
unsuccessful. 
In Manish Kumar Shah v. State of Bihar8, the same principle 
was reiterated in the following observations: 
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"16. We also agree with the High Court that after having 
taken part in the process of selection knowing fully well 
that more than 19% marks have been earmarked for viva 
voce test, the Petitioner is not entitled to challenge the criteria 
or process of selection. Surely, if the Petitioner's name had 
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appeared in the merit list, he would not have even dreamed 
'(2002) 6 sec 121 
'(2007) s sec 100 
'(1991) 3 sec 368 
1 (2006) 12 sec 724 
• (2010) 12 sec 576 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
of challenging the selection. The Petitioner invoked 
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the 
Constitution of India only after he found that his name does 
not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission. 
This conduct of the Petitioner clearly disentitles him from 
questioning the selection and the High Court did not commit 
any error by refusing to entertain the writ petition. Reference 
in this connection may be made to the Judgments in 
MadanLal v. State of J. and K. MANU/SC/0208/1995 : 
(1995) 3 SCC 486, Marripati Nagaraja v. Government of 
Andhra Pradesh and Ors. MANU/SC/8040/2007: (2007) 
11 SCC 522, Dhananjay Malik and Ors. v. State of 
Uttaranchal and Ors. MANU/SC/7287/2008: (2008) 4 SCC 
171, AmlanJyotiBorooah v. State of Assam MANU/SC/ 
0077/2009: (2009)3 SCC227 and K.A. Nagamani v. Indian 
Airlines and Ors. (supra)." 
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In Vijendra Kumar Vermav. Public Service Commission9, 
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candidates who had participated in the selection process were aware 
'that they were required to possess certain specific qualifications in 
computer operations. The appellants had appeared in the selection process 
and after participating in the interview sought to challenge the selection 
process as being without jurisdiction. This was held to be impermissible. 
In Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi10, candidates who were 
competing for the post of Physiotherapist in the State of Uttrakhand
participated in a written examination held in pursuance of an 
advertisement. This Court held that if they had cleared the test, the 
respondents would not have raised any objection to the selection process 
or to the methodology adopted. Having taken a chance of selection, it 
was held that the respondents were disentitled to seek reliefunder Article 
226 and would be deemed to have waived their right to challenge the 
advertisement or the procedure of selection. This Court held that: 
"18. It is settled law that a person who consciously takes 
partin the process of selection cannot, thereafter, tum around 
and question the method of selection and its outcome." 
In Chandigarh Administration v. Jasmine Kaur11, it was held 
'(2011) 1 sec 150 
'°(2013) 11 sec 309 
11 (2014) 10 sec 521
ASHOK KUMAR & ANR v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
that a candidate who takes a calculated risk or chance by subjecting 
himself or herself to the selection process cannot tum around and complain 
that the process of selection was unfair after knowing of his or her non-
selection. In Pradeep Kumar Raiv.Dinesh Kumar Pandey12, this 
Court held that: 
"Moreover, we would concur with the Division Bench on 
one more point that the appellants had participated in the 
process of interview and not challenged it till the results 
were declared. There was a gap of almost four months 
between the interview and declaration of result. However, 
the appellants did not challenge it at that time. This, it appears 
that only when the appellants found themselves to be 
unsuccessful, they challenged the interview. This cannot 
be allowed. The candidates cannot approbate and reprobate 
at the same time. Either the candidates should not have 
participated in the interview and challenged the procedure 
or they should have challenged immediately after the 
interviews were conducted." 
This principle has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Madras 
Institute of Development v. S.K. Shiva Subaramanyam 13• 
13. In the present case, regard must be had to the fact that the 
appellants were clearly on notice, when the fresh selection process took 
place that written examination would carry ninety marks and the interview, 
ten marks. The appellants participated in the selection
process. Moreover, 
two other considerations weigh in balance. The High Court noted in the 
impugned judgment that the interpretation of Rule 6 was not free from 
vagueness. There was in other words no glaring or patent illegality in the 
process adopted by the High Court. There was an element of vagueness 
about whether Rule 6 which dealt with promotion merely incorporated 
the requirement of an examination provided in Rule 5 for direct recruitment 
to Class III posts or whether the marks and qualifying marks were also 
incorporated. Moreover, no prejudice was established to have been caused 
to the appellants by the 90: 10 allocation. 
14. The decision in Raj Kumarv. Shakti Raj
1 ~(which was relied 
12 (2015) 11 sec 493 
"(2016) 1 sec 454 
" (1997) 9 sec 527 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
upon by the appellants) involved a case where government was found to 
have committed glaring illegalities in the procedure. Hence, it was held 
that the principle of estoppel by conduct or acquiescence had no 
application. The decision is distinguishable. 
15. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench cannot held to 
be in error in coming to the conclusion that it was not open to the appellants 
after participating in the selection process to question the result, once 
they were declared to be unsuccessful. During the course of the hearing, 
this Court is informed that four out of six candidates, who were ultimately 
selected figured both in the first process of selection as well as in the 
subsequent selection. One candidate is stated to have retired. 
16. The apprehension now is of the remaining candidate being 
reverted as a result of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High 
Court. In our view, it would be appropriate ifthe equities are duly adjusted 
by a suitable direction. We are of the view that the ends of the justice 
would be met by a direction that in the event that there is any existing 
D 
vacancy, appellant who has still continued in service, may be allowed to 
continue to work on the Class III post in which he is currently working 
on a provisional basis until the next round of selection process takes 
place. The appellant would be at liberty to participate in the selection 
process that may be
held in future and in the event he is declared 
. E 
successful, he would be at liberty to make a representation to the 
competent authority for consideration of the period spent by him on the 
Class Ill post for the purpose of fixation of seniority. 
17. Subject to the above direction, the judgment of the Division 
Bench and the High Court is affirmed. The appeal shall accordingly 
F 
stand disposed of in the above tenns. There shall be no order as to 
costs. 
Ankit Gyan 
Appeal disposed of.