M/S. K. LAKSHMANYA AND COMPANY versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & ANR.
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 644, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 644 
MIS. K. LAKSHMANYA AND COMPANY 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & ANR. 
(Civil Appeal No.4335 of2012) 
NOVEMBER 01, 2017 
(R. .F. NARIMAN AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.] 
Income Tax Act, 1961- ss.244(A), .240 and s.245(D){4) -
Assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95 - Interest on refund -
C 
Entitlement of - High Court held that the assessee in the instant 
case was not entitled to interest uls.244(A) of the Act, when refui1d 
arose to it on account of partial waiver of interest chargeable uls. 
234(A) to (C) by an order of the Settlenlent Commission - Propriety 
of - Held: Settlement Commission referred to the CBDT circular 
D 
E 
F 
which enabled it to waive interest in favour of assessee - U/s. 244(A), 
it is enough that the refund become due under the Income-tax Act, 
in which case the assessee shall be entitled to receive simple interest 
- ExpressiOn "due" only means that a refimd becomes due if there 
is an order under the Act which either reduces or waives tax or 
interest - It is of no matter that the interest that is waived is 
discretionary in nature. for the moment that discretion is exercised, 
a concomitant right springs into being in favour of the assessee -
There/are, the High Court was incorrect in its vie1v that since a 
discretionary power has been exercised, no concomitant right was 
found for refund of interest to the assessee. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. The Settlement Commission, by its order 
referred to a circular
of the CBDT which gave it the power to 
waive interest; and by the aforesaid order, interest was partially 
waived for the assessment years 1993-94 and. 1994-95 in favour 
of assessee. Under Section 244(A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, 
G it is enough that the refund become due under the Income-tax 
Act, in which case the assessec shall, subject to the provisions 
of this Section, be entitled to receive simple interest. [Paras 2, 
10J[646-G-H; 650-E] 
H 
644
MIS. K. LAKSHMANYA AND COMPANY v. COMMISSIONER 
645 
OF INCOME TAX 
2. A corresponding right exists, to refund to individuals A 
any sum paid by them as taxes which are found to have been 
wrongfully existed or believed to be, for any reason, inequitable. 
The statutory obligation to refund, being non- discretionary, 
carries with it the right to interest, also making it clear that the 
right to interest is parasitical. The 'right to claim refund is 
automatic once the. statutory provisions have been complied with. 
[Para 171 (653-G-H] 
B 
3. The expression "due" only means that a refund becomes 
due if there is an order under the Act which either reduces or 
'vaives tax or interest. It is of no matter that the interest that is 
waived is discretionary in nature, for the moment that discretion 
is exercised, a concomitant right springs into being in favour of 
the assessee. The view of the C.I.T. (Appeals) and the ITAT 
was correct and that consequently, the High Court was incorrect 
in its view that since a discretionary power has been exercised, 
c 
no concomitant right was found for refund of interest to the D 
assessee.[Para 20] [654-E] 
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bhopal v. H.E.G Limited 
(2010) 15 SCC 349: Union of India v. Tata Chemicals 
Ltd. (2014) 6 SCC 335 : (2014] 3 SCR 298 - relied 
on. 
E 
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Needle Industries Pvt. 
Ltd. 233 ITR 370; Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. Commissioner 
of Income Tax I, Pune and Others (2006) 2 SCC 508 : 
[2006] 2 SCR
811; Commissioner of Income Tax, 
Mumbai v. Anjum MH. Ghaswala and Ors. (2002) 1 
F 
SCC 633 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 303 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
233 ITR 370 
referred to 
Para3 
[2006] 2 SCR 811 
referred to 
Para4 
G 
(2001) 4 Suppl. SCR 303 
referred to 
Para4 
(2010) 15 sec 349 
relied on 
Para .15 
(2014] 3 SCR 298 , 
relied on 
Para 16 
H
646 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 
A 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4335 
B 
of2012. 
· From the Judgment and Order dated 09.12.2009 of the High Court 
of Karnataka at Bangalore in ITA No. 486 of 2004. 
WITH 
Civil Appeal Nos. 4357, 4358, 4359, 4356, 4346, 4349, 4355, 
4353,4339, 4343, 4348, 4345, 43.50, 4351, 4347, 4336, 4340, 4338, 
4337, 4354, 4352, 4344, 4342, 4341, 4361, 4362, 4360, 4365, 4363, 
4366, 4364 of2012 
c 
Civil Appeal No. 5478 of2013. 
D· 
E 
F 
Preetesh Kapur, Mohit Chaudhary, AshokA. Kulkarni, Ms. Puja 
Shanna, Kuna! Sachdeva Balwinder Singh Suri, Ms. Garima Sharma, 
Rankit B. Raut, Mrs. Bina Gupta, Ms. Puja Sharma, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, 
Advs. for the Appellant. 
K. Radhakrishnan, M. S. Syali, Sr; Advs.,Arijit Prasad, Ms. Rashrni 
Malhotra, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, B. V. Balaram Das, Rustom B. 
Hathikhanawala, Mayank Nagi, Vikrant A. Maheshwari, Tarun Singh, 
Advs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R. F. NARIMAN, J. 1. The question which this appeal raises is 
whether the High Court ofKarnataka at Bangalore was correct in holding 
. that the assessee in the present case was not entitled to interest under 
Section 244 (A) of the Income-Tax, .1961 Act, when refund arose to it 
.on account of interest that was partially waived by an order of the 
Settlement Commission. We are concerned in the present case with the 
assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95. The asses see, being a 
. partnership firm, filed a
return for these years al1d once the order of 
assessment was completed, interest under Sections 234(A) to (C) was 
levied. 
· 
G 
2. Aggrieved by this levy of interest, the assessec filed an 
H 
application before tµe Settlement Commission, requesting the Commission · 
to waive the interest on the ground that it caused hardship to it. The 
Settlement Commission, by its order dated 22.03.2000, referred to a 
circular of the CBDT which gave it the power to waive such interest; 
and by the aforesaid order, interest was partially waived for the
MIS. K. LAKSHMANYA AND COMPANY v. COMMISSIONER 
647 
OF INCOME TAX [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] 
assessment years in question. On an application made by the assessee, 
A 
. the Assessing Officer, by his order dated 25.04.2000 refused to grant 
interest on the refund that was payable, and was not paid, within three 
months from the specified date. This was done on two grounds, namely, 
that the provisions· of Section 244(A) do not provide for payment of 
interest on refund due on account of waiver of interest that is charged 
B 
under Sections 234(A)-(C) of the Act and second, that the power assumed 
by the Settlement Commission for waiver of interest, by following the 
CBDT circular referred to, does not enable the Commission to provide 
for payment of interest under Section 244(A). 
3. An appeal that was filed before the C.l.T. (Appeals) was 
allowed. This was done by referring to a judgment of the Madras High 
C 
Court in Commissioner oflm:ome-Tax Vs. Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. 
233 ITR 370 and with reference to the CBDT circular which enabled 
the Settlement Commission to waive interest. An appeal by the Revenue 
to the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal (!TAT) was dismissed. However, 
in appeal to the High Court, by the impugnedj udgment dated 09 .12.2009, 
D 
the High Court of Karnataka held that, since waiver of interest was 
within the discretion of the Settlement Commission, no rightfiowed to 
the assessee to claim refund as a matter of right under law. In the 
aforesaid
circumstances, the judgments of the Tribunal and C.I.T. 
(Appeals) were set aside and the Assessing Officer's order was restored. 
4. Mr. Preetesh Kapur, learned cow1sel appearing on behalf of 
the appellant, has placed the relevant statutory provisions before us and 
has relied upon the Madras High Court judgment in Needle Industries 
(supra) and pointed out to us that this very judgment has been affirmed 
E 
by this Court in Sandvik Asia Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax I.· 
Pune and Others 2006 (2) SCC 508. According to hill\, since Section · F 
244(A) is wider than the pre-existing Section 241, it is clear that all the 
Judgments which deal with Section 241 apply with all force to the facts 
- of this case. He also relied upon the judgment of this Court in 
Commissioner oflncome Tax. Mumbai Vs. Anjum M.H.Ghaswala and 
Ors. 2002 (1) SCC 633 para 34 in particular, to show that when the 
G 
power to waive interest payable under a substantive provision of the 
Act was given by a circular of the Board to the Settlement Commission, 
interest' could be so waived and that a circular of the Board gave such 
power which was exercised by the Settlement Commission in the present 
case. According to him, the judgments of the C.I.T. (Appeals) and the 
H
648 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 
A 
Tribunal are, therefore, correct and ought not to have been set aside by 
the High Court. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
5. Mr. K.Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing for 
the respondent-Revenue, emphasised the expression "due to" which is 
present in Sections 240 and 244(A) and would, therefore, show that the 
refund must be "due" i.e. assessee should be entitled, as a matter oflaw 
to such refund or else interest would not become payable. He also 
refelTed to Sections 245(D)( 4)and(6) to buttress the aforesaid submission. 
According to him, the judgment in Ghaswala's case (supra) would show, 
paragraphs 23 and 30 in particular, that the Settlement Commission was 
given no power to waive interest, the idea of a Settlement Commission 
being that the asscssce pays tax promptly and that no concession can be 
given by the said Commission. He referred to the reasons given by the 
Assessing Officer in support of his order and stated that both reasons 
were correct in law. He also referred to paragraph 12 of the judgment 
under appeal and stated that the High Court was right, in that there was 
no entitlement to refund in the facts of the present case. 
6. Having heard learned counsel for both sides, it is necessary for 
us to extract the relevant statutory provisions. Section 240 occw-s in the 
Chapter which deals with refund, namely Chapter XIX of the Income-
Tax Act, 1961. Section 240 reads as follows: 
"240. Refund on appeal
etc.-Where, as a result of any order 
passed in appeal or other proceedings under this Act, refund of 
any amount becomes due to the assessee, the Assessing Officer 
shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act, refund the amount 
to the assessee without his having to make any claim in that behalf: 
Provided that where, by t~e order aforesaid,-
( a) an assessment is set aside or cancelled and an order of 
fresh assessment is directed to be made, the refund, if nay, shall 
become due only on the making of such fresh assessment; 
(b) the assessment is annulled, the refund shall become due 
. only of the amount, if any, of the tax paid in excess of the tax 
chargeable on the total income returned by the assessee." 
7. A cursory reading of the aforesaid section shows that refund 
may become due to the assessee, either as a result of an order passed in 
appeal or other proceedings under this Act. It is clear that refund that
MIS. K. LAKSHMANYA AND COMPANY v. COMMISSIONER 
649 
OF INCOME TAX [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] 
arises as a result ofan order passed under Section245(D)(4) is an order A 
passed in "other proceeding under this Act" 
Thus, it is clear that the assessee in the present' case is covered 
by Section 240 of the Act. 
8. When it comes to interest on refund, Section 244, which applied 
to assessment years up to and including assessment year 1989-90, made 
B 
it clear that it would apply where a refund is due to the assessee in 
pursuance of an order referred to in Section 240. It is only if the Assessing 
Officer does not grant the refund within three months from the end of 
the month in which such order is passed, that the Central Government 
shall pay to the assessee simple interest on the amount of refund due. 
c 
9. We are in this appeal directly concerned, howeve1; with Section 
244(A) of the Act which reads as follows: 
"Where refund of any amount becomes due to the assessee under 
this Act], he shall, 
subject to the provisions of this section, be entitled to receive, in 
addition to the said amount, simple interest 
thereon calculated in the following manner, namely :-
D 
(a) where the refund is out of any tax collected at source under 
Section 206C or paid by way of advance tax or treated as paid 
E 
under Secttion 199, during the financial year immedaitely preceding 
the assessment year, such interest shall be calculated at the rate 
of one-half percent for every month or part of
a month comprised 
in the pcriod;-
i) from the 
1st day of April of the assessment year to the date on which the 
refund is granted: 
if the return of income has been furnished on or before the due 
date specified under sub-section ( l) of Section 139; or 
(ii) from the date offumishing ofreturn of income to the date on 
which the refund is granted, in a case not covered under sub-
clause (I); 
F 
G 
(aa) where the refw1d is out of any tax paid under section 140A, 
such interest shall be calculated at the rate of one-half percent 
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650 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 
A 
for every month or part of a month comprised in the period, from 
the date of furnishing of return of income or payment of tax, 
whichever is later; to the date ori which the refund is granted. 
Provided that no interest under clause (a) or clause (aa) shall be 
payable, if the amount of refund is less than ten percent of the tax as 
B 
determined under sub-section (I) of section 143 or on regular assessment;) 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
(b) in any other case, such interest shall be calculated at the rate 
of (one half per cent) for every month or part of a month comprised in 
the period or periods from the date or, as the case may be, dates of 
payment of the tax or penalty to the date on which the refund is granted.'._'. 
Explanation:-F or the purpose of this clause," date of payment of 
tax or penalty" means the date on and from which the amount of tax or 
penalty specified in the notice of demand issued under section 156 is 
paid in excess of such demand. 
l 0. A cursory look at the aforesaid section shows that the aforesaid 
section is even wider than section 244 and is not restricted to refund 
being issued to the assessee in pursuance to an~ order referred to in 
Section 240. Under this Section, it is enough that the refund become 
due under the Income-tax Act, in which case the assessee shall, subject 
to the provisions of this Section, be entitled to receive simple interest. 
The objects and reasons for the aforesaid amendment
state: 
"11.2 Insertion of a new section 244A in lieu of sections 214, 243 
and 244,- Under the provisions of section 214, interest was payable 
to the assessee on any excess advance tax paid by him in a financial 
year from the Ist day of April next following the said financial 
year to the date of regular assessment. In case the refund was 
not granted within three months from the date of the month in 
which the regular assessment was completed, section 243 provided 
for further payment of interest. Under section 244, interest was · 
payable to the assessee for delay in payment ofrefund as a result 
of an order passed in appeal, etc., from the date following after 
the expiry of three months from the end of the month in which 
such order was passed to the date on which refund was granted. 
The rate of interest under all the three sections was 15 per cent 
annum. 
11.3. These provisions, apart from being complicated, left certain
MIS. K. LAKSHMANYAAND COMPANY v. COMMISSIONER 
651 
OF INCOME TAX [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] · 
gaps for which interest was not paid by the Department to the 
A 
assessee for money remaining with the Government. To remove 
this inequity, as also to simplify the provisions in this regard, the 
Amending Act, 1987, has inserted a new Section 244A' in the 
Income Tax Act, applicable from the assessment year 1989-90 
and onwards which contains all the provisions for payment of B 
interest by the Department for delay in the grant of refunds. The 
rate of interest has been increased from the earlier 15 per cent 
annum to l .5% per month or part .of a month, comprised in the 
period of delay in the grant of refund. The Amending Act, 1987, 
has also amended sections 214, 243 and 244 fo provide that the 
·provisions of these sections shall not apply to the assessment year 
C 
1989-90 or any subsequent assessment years." (emphasis 
supplied)" 
l I. The present case would fall outside sub-clauses a and aa of 
this provision and, therefore, fall within the residuary clause, namely 
sub-clause (b) of Section 244(A). 
D 
12. The Madras High Court in Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra) 
concerned itself with the position prior to the advent of Section 244A. It 
found that the expression "refund of any amount" used by Section 240 
and 244 would include not only tax and penalty but interest also. It was, 
therefore, held that the clear intention of Parliament is that the right to 
E 
interest will
compensate the assessee for the excess payment during the 
intervening period when the assessee did not have the benefit of use of 
such money paid in whatsoever character. 
The Court held that the result would be that the asssessee would 
be entitled to interest on refund also. 
13. This Court in Sandvik Asia Ltd. (supra) set out several questions 
of law which arose on the facts of that case. We are concerned with 
questions C and E which read as follows: 
"(C). Whether on a proper interpretation of the various provisions 
F 
of the Act an assessee was entitled to be compensated for the 
G 
delay in paying to it any 'amount' due to it even ifsueh 'amount' 
comprised of interest, as had been held by the Delhi and Madras 
High Courts and hence the impugned judgment was erroneous 
and ought to be reversed ? 
H
652 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 
E. Whether the High Court ought to have held that sections 240 
and 244 of the Act refer to 'refund of any amount', which phrase 
clearly includes any amount (including interest) due by the Income 
Tax department to the assessee, and hence the appellant was 
entitled to interest on the delay in the payment of amounts due 
from the Income-tax Depa11ment ?" 
14. After setting out the relevant statutory provisions, which at 
that time covered Section 244 and not Section 244(A), and after referring 
to a number of decisions, the Court ultimately referred to Needle 
Industries (supra) and expressly approved the same. It concluded the 
aforesaid questions in favour of the assessee as follows: 
"In the present appeal, the respondents have argued that the 
compensation claimed by the appellant is for delay by the Revenue 
in paying of interest, and this does fall within the meaning of refund 
as set out in Section 237 of the Act. The relevant provision is 
Seti on 240 of the Act which clearly lays down that what is relevant 
is whether any amount has become due to an assessee, and fw1her 
the phrase any amount will also encompass interest. This view 
has been accepted by various High Comts such as the Delhi, 
Madras, Kerala High Courts et.c. 
15. In Commissioner oflncome-Tax, Bhopal Vs. H.E.G.Limited 
2010 ( 15) SCC 349, this Court was squarely confrnnted with the meaning 
of the expression " where refund of any
amount become due to the 
assessee" in Section 244(A)(l ). This question was answered as follows: 
"5.In the present case, as stated above, there arc two components 
of the tax paid by the assessee for which the assessee was granted 
refund, namely TDS of Rs. 45,73,528 and tax paid after original 
assessment of Rs. 1,71,00,320. The Department contends that 
the words "any amount" will not include the interest which accrued 
to the respondent for not refunding Rs. 45,73,528 for 57 months. 
We see no merit in this argument. The interest component will 
partake of the character of the "amount due" under Section 244-
A. It becomes an integral part ofR. 45,73,528 which is not paid 
for 57 months after the said amount became due and payable. As 
can be seen from the facts narrated above, this is the case of 
short payment by the Department and it is in this way that the 
assesscc claims interest under Section 244-A of the Income Tax
MIS. K. LAKSHMANYA AND COMPANY v. COMMISSIONER 
653 
OF INCOME TAX [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] 
Act. Therefore, on both the aforestated grounds, we are of the 
A 
the view that the assessee was entitled to interest for 57 months 
on Rs. 45,73,5289. The principal amount of Rs. 45,73,528 has 
been paid on 31.12.1997 but not of interest which, as stated above, 
partook the character of 'amount due" under Section 244-A." 
16. In Union oflndia Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. 2014 (6) SCC 335, 
B 
this Court after going into the object for the enactment of Section 244(A), 
held: 
"Interest payment is a statutory obligation and non- discretionary 
in nature to the assessee. In tune with the aforesaid general 
principle, Section 244A is drafted and enacted. The language c 
employed in Section 244A of the Act is clear and plain. It grants 
substantive right of interest and is not procedw·al. The principles 
for grant ofinterest are the same as under the provisions of Section 
244 applicable to assessments before 01.04.1989, albeit with clarity 
of application as contained in Section 244A. 
31. The Department has also issued a Circular clarifying the 
purpose and object of introducing Section 244A of the Act to 
replace Sections 214, 243 and 244 of the Act. It is clarified therein, 
that, since there was some lacunae in the earlier provisions with 
regard to non-payment of interest by the Revenue to the assessee 
for the money remaining with the Government, the said section is 
introduced for payment
of interest by the Department for delay in 
grant of refunds. A general right exists in the State to refund any 
tax collected for its purpose, and a corresponding right exists to 
refund to individuals any sum paid by them as taxes which are 
found to have been wrongfully exacted or are believed to be, for 
any reason, inequitable. The statutory obligation to refund carried 
with it the right to interest also. This is true in the case of assessee 
under the Act." 
D 
E 
F 
17. The above extract would clearly show that a corresponding 
right exists, to refund to individuals any sum paid by them as taxes which 
G 
are found to have been wrongfully exasted or believed to be, for any 
reason, inequitable. The statutory obligation to refund, being non 
discretionary, carries with it the right to interest, also making it clear that 
the right to interest is parasitical. The right to claim refund is automatic 
once the statutory provisions have been complied with. 
H
654 
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B 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 12 S.C.R. 
18. However, Mr. K.Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel 
appearing for the respondent-Revenue, has strongly relied upon the 
decision of this Court in Ghaswala's case (supra). In this judgment, this 
Court held that the Settlement Commi.ssion was introduced into th<; 
Income-tax Act for the purpose of quick settlement of cases before it, 
so that the the tax due to the Revenue gets collected at the earliest. 
The object of this exercise is not to assist tax evaders. 
In so holding, 
this Court held that Section 245(D)( 6) being procedural in nature, cannot 
be used to locate any power to waive interest, if it is not otherwise 
waived under some other substantive provision in the Income-Tax Act. 
19. Ultimately, this Court arrived at the conclusion that the 
C ·Commission cannot either waive or reduce interest which is statutorily 
. payable unless there is express power to do so in that behalf. However, 
while so saying, the Court went on to clarify that the circulars issued 
pursuant to the powers under Section 119 of the Act, which empower 
the autJ10ritics under the Act to waive or reduce interest, may be availed 
D 
by the Settlement Commission to waive interest. 
20. We arc of the view thatthc expression "due" only means that 
a refund becomes due if there is an order under the Act whi~h either 
reduces or waives tax or interest. It is of no matter that the interest that 
is waived is discretionary in nature, for the
moment that discretion is 
E 
exercised, a concomitant right springs into being in favour of the asscsscc. · 
We are, therefore of view that the C.I.T. (Appeals) and the ITAT were 
correct in their view and that consequently, the High Court was incorrect 
i.n its view that since a discretionary power has been exercised, no 
concomitant right was found for refund of interest to the assesscc. 
F 
21. The appeals arc accordingly allowed and the impugned 
judgment is set aside. 
Ankit Gyan 
Appeals allowed.