CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI AND ORS. versus JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA AND ORS.
[2017] 11 S.C.R. 271, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Ratio
(2017] 11S.C.R,271 
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI AND ORS. 
A 
v. 
JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA AND ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 8928 of2015) 
JULY06,2017 
B 
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, (:j1, N. v. RAMANA AND 
DR. D. Y. CHANDRA CI-IUD, JJ.] 
... 
Constitution of India - Art. 142 - Public employment -
Reservation for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe - Individuals 
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seeking benefit of public employment on the basis of scheduled 
caste/scheduled tribe claim - Verification by scrutiny committee -
Invalidation of their caste or tribe claim - Protection by the 
constitutional court - Entitlement to - Held: Where benefit is see11red 
by an individual such as an appointment to a post or admission to 
an educational institution 'on the basis that the candidate belongs 
D 
to a reserved category for which the benefit is reserved. invalidation 
of the caste or tribe claim upon verification would result in 'the 
appointment or admission being rendered void or non est -
Withdrawal 0{ benefits secured on the basis of the false caste claim 
is a necessary consequence - Exception to the above is in those 
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cases where this Court exercises its power u!Art. 142 to render 
complete justice - Though the pqwer of the Supreme Court u/Art. 
142 is a constitutional power vested in the court for rendering 
complete justice and is couched in wide terms, the exercise of the 
jurisdiction must have due regard to legislative mandate, where a 
law such as Maharashtra Act XXlll of 2001 holds the field - Power
u!Art. 142 should not be exercised to defeat the legislative 
prescription - Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, 
De-Notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward 
Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance 
and Verification) Caste Certificate Act, 2000. 
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Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, 
De-Notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward 
Classes and Special Backward Categ01:v (Regulation of Issuance 
and Verification) Caste Certificate .tjct, 2000 - Object and purpose 
of the enactment -Held: By Maharashtra Act XXlll of 2001 there is 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017) l l S.C.R. 
a legislative codiflcarion of the hroad principles enunciated in 
**Madhuri Patil - Legislation provides a stall/tat:v .framework tu 
regulate issuance of casre certijicaie and to deal i.vith instances 
where persons did nut belong to schedule caste or tribes ur reserved 
categories lvere .v.eeking apfJointnzent or adn1issio11.5 to the detrilnent 
of genuine candidates - Basic purpose and rationale for 1he 
legislation is to secure the just entitlements of legitimate claimants. 
ss. I 0 and 11 -
Individuals seeking benefit of public 
employment on the ba:>is of" scheduled caste/scheduled tribe claim -
Invalidation of caste or lribe claim - Withdrmval of /Jene(t1 obtained 
- Requirement of dishonest in1ent for the application s. JO - Held: 
There is no requirement of" dishonest intent- Mens rea is an ingrediell/ 
of the penal provisions contained in s.ll ll'hich is prospective and 
would apply in those silllotions where the act constituting the offence 
has token place a/ter the date of its enforcement. 
Operation of the Act - Prospective or retrospective 
Application to admissions or appointments made prior to the date 
on which the Act came inlO fol"ce - Elucidated. 
Circulars/Government Orders/Notifications - Administrative 
circulars and government resolutions - Effect of -
Held: 
Administrative circ11/ars and government resolutions are s11bservient 
to legislative mandate and cannot be contrwy eirher
to constitutional 
norms or statutory principles - Where ca11didate has obtai11ed an 
appointment to a post 011 the basis of a caste certificate and ii is 
fo1111d 11po11 verification by the Scr111i11y Committee that rhe claim is 
false. the services of such an individual cannot be proiected hy 
taking recourse to adn1i11istrative circulars or resolutions -Protection 
uj· clai111s uj· a usurper is an ctct <~f deviance to the conslitutiunal 
schen1e as J-vell cfs to statuto1:v n1andate. 
In the batch of cases, Individuals sought the benefit of public 
employment on the basis of a claim to belong to a beneficiary 
group. On investigation it was found to be invalid. Notwithstanding 
the invalidation of the claim to belong to a Scheduled Caste/ 
Scheduled Tribe or backward community, this Court's jurisdiction 
is invoked. 
Issue which arises as to whether such equities are 
sustainable at law and, if so, the limits that define the jurisdiction
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGD!SH 
273 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
of the court to protect individuals who have secured access to 
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the benefit of reservation inspite of the fact that they do not belong 
to the caste, tribe or class for whom reservation is intended. 
Disposing of the appeals, the Court 
HELD: l. It is declared that 
(i) The directions which were issued by the Constitution 
Bench of this Court in *Mi/ind case were in pursuance of the 
powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution; 
(ii) Since the decision of this Court in ** Madlzuri Patil which 
was rendered on 2.09.1994, the regime which held the field in 
pursuance of those directions envisaged a detailed procedure 
for issuance of caste certificates, scrutiny and verification of caste 
and tribe claims by Scrutiny Committees to be constituted by the 
State Government, the procedure for the conduct of investigation 
into the authenticity of the claim, cancellation and confiscation of 
the caste certificate where the claim is found to be false or not 
genuine, withdrawal of benefits in terms of the termination of an 
appointment, cancellation of an admission to an educational 
institution or disqualification from an electoral office obtained on 
the basis that the candidate belongs to a reserved category; and 
prosecution for a criminal offence; 
(iii) The decisions of this Court in ***R. Vishwanat/za Pillai 
and in ****Datt(l/ray rendered by benches of three Judges laid 
down the
principle of law that where a benefit is secured by an 
individual-such as an appointment to a post or admission to an 
educational institution-on the basis that the candidate belongs to 
a reserved category for which the benefit is reserved, the 
invalidation of the caste or tribe claim upon verification would 
result in the appointment or, as the case may be, the admission 
being rendered void or 11011 est; 
(iv) The exception to the above doctrine was in those cases 
where this Court exercised its powe'r under Article 142 of the 
Constitution to render complete justice; 
(v) By Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 there is a legislative 
codification of the broad principles enunciated in** Madl111ri Patil, 
the legislation provides a statutory framework for regulating the 
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issuance of cast11 certificates (Section 4); constitution of Scrutiny 
Committees for verification of claims (Section 6); submission of 
applications for :verification of caste certificates (Section 6(2) and 
6(3); canceJlatiou o.f .;a,te certifi~ates. (Section 7); burden of proof 
{Scftio~ 8); ~thdraw~f.oftibticftts:o& .. incd upon the invalidation 
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of the claim (Section lO); and initiation of prosecution (Section 
11), amongst other things; 
(vi) The power conferred by Section 7 upon the Scrutiny 
Committee to verify a claim is both in respect of caste certificates 
issued prior to and subsequent to the enforcement of the Act on 
18.10.2001, finality does not attach to a caste certificate (or to 
the claim to receive benefits) where the claim of the individual to 
belong to a reserved caste, tribe or class is yet to be verified by 
the Scrutiny Committee; 
(vii) Withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a caste 
claim which has been fouud to be false and is invalidated is a 
necessary consequence which flows from the invalidation of the 
caste claim and uo issue of retrospcctivity would arise; 
(viii) The decisions in Kavita Solu11ke a11d Sliali11i of two 
Judges arc overruled, Sliali11i in so far as it stipulates a 
requirement of a dishonest intent for the application of the 
provision of Scction 10 is, with respect, erroneous and does not 
reflect the correct position in law; 
(ix) Me11s rea is an
ingredient of the penal provisions 
contained in Sqction 11 which is prospective and would apply in 
those situations where the act constituting the offence has taken 
place after the date of its enforcement; 
(x) The judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High 
Court in Aru11 So11011e is manifestly erroneous and is overruled; 
and 
(xi) Though the power of the Supreme Court under Article 
142 of the Constitution is a constitutional power vested in the 
court for rendering complete justice and is a power which is 
couched in wide terms, the exercise of the jurisdiction must have 
due regard to legislative mandate, where a law such as 
Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 holds the field. [Para 57][346-B-
H; 347-A-.FJ
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
275 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
*State af Maharashtra v. Mi/ind (2001) I SCC 4 : 
A 
[2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 65 - explained and followed. 
**Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner, 
Tribal Development (1994) 6 SCC 241; R. Vishwanatha 
Pillai v. State of Kera/a (2004) 2 SCC 105 : [2004] l 
SCR 360; Union of India v. Dattatray S/o. Namdeo 
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Mendhekar (2008) 4 SCC 612 : [2008] 2 SCR 1096 -
relied on. 
Kavita Vasant Solunke v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 
8 SCC 430 : [2012] 7 SCR 251; Shalini Gajananrao 
Dalal v. New English High School Association (2013) 
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16 SCC 526 : [2013] 12 SCR 807 - overruled. 
Arun Vishwanath Sonone v. State of Maharashtra 
(2015) l Mb L.J. 457 - disapproved. 
2.1 The Constitution Bench of this Court which decided 
*Mi/ind case was. on a reference whether it is permissible to hold D 
an enquiry and let in evidence to decide or declare that any tribe 
or tribal community. or. a part or group within the tribe or 
community is included in t.he general name, even though it is not 
so specifically mentioned in the entry contained in the Constitution 
(Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. The Constitution Bench held E 
that it was not permissible either to hold an enquiry or to allow 
evidence to decide that though a tribe (or its sub group) is not 
specifically included in the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 it must, 
nonetheless, be treated or deemed to be included in the general 
name. The view of this Court is that an
entry in the Order has to 
be read as .it stands. However, the Constitution Bench, having 
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due regard to the circumstances of the individual cases before ' 
the Court, protected the degree obtained by the candidate 
concerned. This Court also provided that having regard to the 
passage of time including interim orders which were passed, the 
admissions and appointments that have become final would 
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remain unaffected by the judgment. [Para 40][332-D-G] 
*State of Maharashtra .v. Mi/ind (2001) 1 SCC 4 : 
[2000) 5 Suppl. SCR 65 - explained and followed. 
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2.2 The object and purpose underlying the enactment of 
the state legislation is to regulate the issuance of caste certificates 
and to deal with instances which had come to light where persons 
who did not belong to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes or reserved 
categories were seeking appointments or admissions to the 
detriment of genuine candidates. The basic purpose and rationale 
for the legislation is to secure the just entitlements of legitimate 
claimants. The judgment in Slia/i11i case is with respect to error 
in imputing the requirement of a dishonest intent into the 
provisions of Section I 0 of the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, De-Notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic 
Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category 
(Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 
2000. Sections 7 and 10 have to be construed in harmony. Section 
7 provides for the cancellation of a caste certificate where before 
or after commencement of the Act, a person who docs not belong 
to a reserved calegory has obtained a false caste certificate and 
the Scrutiny Committee, after enquiry, is of the opinion that the 
certificate was obtained fraudulently. These requirements have 
to be fulfilled before the certificate is cancelled. The falsity of the 
caste certificate and the opinion of the Scrutiny Committee of its 
being fraudulently obtained form the basis of a
cancellation under 
Section 7. Section 10 prescribes that a person who docs not 
belong to a reserved category and secures admission or obtains 
appointment against a reserved post by producing a false caste 
certificate shall upon its cancellation by the Scrutiny Committee 
be debarred from the institution or as the case may be discharged 
from employment and the benefits derived shall be withdrawn. 
Sub-section (2) provided for the recovery of all financial benetits 
while sub-section (3) provides for the cancellation of a degree, 
diploma or educational qualification. Sub-section (4) provides for 
disqualification from electoral office. The falsity of the certificate 
is the basis of an order under Section 7. Section IO provides the 
consequence. The challenge to an order of the Scrutiny 
Committee (invalidating a caste or tribe certificate) may fail or 
succeeds. If the challenge before the High Court succeeds, no 
question of the consequence under Section 10 arises. If the 
challenge fails, the consequence under Section 10 follows the 
finding in the order under Section 7 that the certificate is false.
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
Similarly, if the order under Section 7 is not challenged. or if the 
challenge is given up, there is no occasion to protect the benefits 
secured on the basis of a certificate which is invalidated. The 
expression "false" must be construed in contra-distinction to that 
which is true, genuine or authentic. Falsity in this sense means 
the setting up of a claim to belong to a reserved category. (Para 
44)(335-G-H; 336-A-F] 
2.3 Section 10 provides for the withdrawal of civil benefits 
which have accrued to an individual on the strength of a claim to 
belong to a reserved category, when the claim upon due enquiry 
and verification is invalidated. Section 10, as its marginal note 
indicates, provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the 
basis of a false caste certificate. Section 11 provides for offences 
and penalties. The invalidation of a caste certificate may result in 
two consequences : (i) immediate cancellation or withdrawal of 
the benefits received by the candidate on the hasis of a false 
caste certificate; (ii) prosecution of a claimant who procures a 
certificate which is found to be false· by the Scrutiny Committee. 
The intent of a candidate may be of relevance only if there is a 
prosecution for a criminal offence. However, where a civil 
consequence of withdrawing the benefits which have accrued on 
the basis of a false caste claim is in issue, it would be contrary to 
the legislative
intent to import the requirement of a dishonest 
intent. In importing such a requirement, the bench of two Judges 
in Sllali11i's case has fallen into error. In the very nature of things 
it would be casting an impossible burden to deh·e into the mental 
processes of an applicant for a caste certificate. As the provisions 
of the Act indicate, a person, who claims to belong to a reserved 
category and who seeks the benefit of an appointment to a 
reserved post or of admission to an educational institution against 
a reserved scat or any other benefit provided by the provisions 
of Article 15(4), has ,to apply for the grant of a caste certificate. 
The burden of proof that he or she belongs to such a caste, tribe 
or class lies with the claimant. The legislature has legitimately 
assumed that a person who seeks a caste certificate must surely 
be aware of the caste, tribe or class to which he or she belongs 
and must establish the claim. If the claim to belong to the reserved 
category is found to be untrue, the caste certificate has to be 
cancelled on the ground that it has been obtained falsely. The 
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grant of the benefit to the candidate is fraudulent because the 
candidate has obtained a benefit reserved exclusively for a 
specified caste, tribe or class to which he or she is not entitled. 
The decision in Shalini's case would result in serious 
consequences and would eviscerate the statutory provision. The 
interpretation placed on the provisions of Section 10 by the 
judgment in Shalini's case is evidently incorrect. (Para 45)(336-
G-H; 337-A-B] 
2.4 Service under the Union and the States, or for that 
matter under the instrumentalities of the State subscrvcs a public 
purpose. These services arc instruments of governance. Where 
the State embarks upon public employment, it is under the 
mandate of Articles 14 and 16 to follow the principle of equal 
opportunity. Affirmative action in the Constitution is part of the 
quest for substantive equality. Available resources and the 
opportunities provided in the form of public employment are in 
contemporary times short of demands and needs. Hence, the 
procedure for selection, and the prescription of eligibility criteria 
has a significant public clement in enabling the State to make a 
choice amongst competing claims. The selection of ineligible 
persons is a manifestation of a. systemic failure and has a 
deleterious effect on good governance. Selection of a person who 
is not eligible allows someone who is ineligible to gain access to 
scarce public
resources. The rights of eligible persons arc viola led 
since a person who is not eligible for the post is selected. An 
illegality is perpetrated by bestowing benefits upon an imposter 
undcservingly. These effects upon good governance find a similar 
echo when a person who docs not belong to a reserved category 
passes of as a member of that category and obtains admission to 
an educational institution. Those for whom the Constitution has 
made special provisions arc as a result ousted when an imposter 
who docs not belong to a reserved category is selected. The 
fraud on the Constitution precisely lies in this. Such a consequence 
must be avoided and stringent steps be taken by the Court to 
ensure that unjust claims of imposters are not protected in the 
exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The nation cannot 
live on a lie. Courts play a vital institutional role in preserving 
the rule of law. The judicial process should not be allowed to be 
I• • ••. 
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CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
utilised to protect the unscrupulous and to preserve the benefits 
which have accrued to an imposter on the specious pica of equity. 
Once the legislature has stepped in, by enacting Maharashtra 
Act XXIII of 2001, the power under Article 142 should not be 
exercised to defeat legislative prescription. The Constitution 
Bench in Mili11d's case spoke on 28 November 2000. The state 
law has been enforced from 18 October 2001. Judicial directions 
must be consistent with law. Several decisions failed to take note 
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of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. The directions which were 
issued under Article 142 were on the erroneous inarticulate 
premise that the area was unregulated by statute. Shali11i case 
noted the statute but misconstrued it. [Para 46][337-F-H; 338-
C 
A-E] 
2.5 It cannot be said that Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 
cannot apply to admissions or appointments which were made 
prior to the date on which the Act came into force. The submission 
based on retrospectivity overlooks certain crucial links in the D 
analysis. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute 
is prinra facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary 
implication made to have a retrospective operation. However, 
the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is 
to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair 
existing obligations. Equally the rule against retrospective
construction is not applicable to a statute merely because a part 
of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to 
its passing. Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 provides in Section 1 
(2) that it shall come into force on such dates as the State 
Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint 
upon receiving assent of the President. The Act was notified to 
come into force by a government notification dated 17 October 
2001 with effect from 18 October 2001. Prior to the enforcement 
'-Of the Act, the regime which held the field was in terms of the 
directions _that were issued by this Court in its judgment dated 2 
September 1994 in Madlrm·i Patil's case. The directions which 
' were issued by this Court comprehended: passing of an order of 
' cailc'ellation' and confrsc~tion ~ .. th\! caste certificate if the' claim 
W:JS found to be_false; and,cancellation of the admission g~antcd' 
or the appointment made where the caste certiticate is invalidated 
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and debarment of the candidate from further studies or to continue 
in a post. [Para 501[340-E-H; 341-E-F) 
2.6 The regime which obtained since 2',. September I 994 
under the directions in Mudhuri Patil was granted a statutory 
status by the enactment of Maharashtra Act XXIII of2001. Section 
7 provides for the cancellation and confiscation of a false caste 
certificate whether it was issued before or after the 
commencement of the Act. The expression "before or after the 
commencement of this Act'' indicates that the Scrutiny Committee 
constituted under Section 6 is empowered to cancel a caste 
certificate whether it was issued prior to 18 October 2001 or 
thereafter. SectiQn 10 which provides for the withdrawal of benefits 
secured on the basis of a false caste certificate which is withdrawn 
is essentially a con seq nence of the cancellation of the caste 
certificate. Where a candidatr has secured admission to an 
educational institution on the basis that he or she belongs to a 
designated reserved category and it is found upon investigation 
that the daim to belong to that category is false, admission to the 
institution necessarily falls with the invalidation of the caste 
certificate. Admission being founded on a claim to belong to a 
specified caste, tribe or class, it is rendered void upon the claim 
being found to he untrue. The same must hold in the case of an 
appointment to a post. Therefore,
the absence of the words 
"before or after the commencement of this Act" in Section 10 
makes no substantive difference because a withdrawal of benefit 
is an event which flows naturally and as a plain consequence of 
the invalidation of the claim. Moreover, even prior to the 
enactment of the state legislation, the benefit which was secured 
on the basis of a caste claim was liable to be withdrawn upon its 
invalidation. The Act has hence, neither affected vested rights 
nor has it imposed new burdens. The Act does not impair existing 
obligations in Sections 7 and IO. An analysis of the provisions of 
Section 11 demonstrates that the provision creates offences and 
provides for penalties. Under Section ll (l) (a) the offence 
consists of obtaining a false caste certificate (by furnishing false 
information), filing a false statement or document or by any 
fraudulent means. Under Section II (1)(b) the offence consists in 
securing a benefit exclusively reserved for designated castes,
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCl v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
tribes or classes by a person who docs not belong to that category 
in terms of appointment; admission in an educational institution 
against a reserved scat; or election to a local authority or 
cooperative society against an office which is reserved for that 
category. The provisions of Section 11 (I) must be read and 
construed in a prospective sense having regard to the guarantee 
contained in Article 20 (I) of the Constitution. The offence having 
been created by Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001, the Act which 
constitutes the offence must relate to a period aner the date of 
the enforcement of the Act. In terms of the penal provisions of 
Section 11, the statute in so far as it creates offences and provides 
for penalties must hence be construed prospecth'cly. [Paras 51, 
52][341-.F-H; 342-A-H] 
2. 7 Administrative circulars and government resolutions 
arc subservient to legislative mandate and cannot be contrary 
either to constitutional norms or statutory principles. Where a 
candidate has obtained an appointment to a post on the solemn 
basis that he or she belongs to a designated caste, tribe or class 
for whom the post is meant and it is found upon verification by 
the Scrutiny Committee that the claim is false, the services of 
such an individual cannot be protected by taking recourse to 
administrative circulars or resolutions. Protection of claims of a 
usurper is an act of deviance to the
constitutional scheme as well 
as to statutory mandate. No government resolution or circular 
can override constitutional or statutory norms. The principle that 
government is bound by its own circulars is well-settled but it 
cannot apply in a situation such as present. Protecting the 
services of a candidate who is found not to belong to the community 
or tribe for whom the reservation is intended substantially 
encroaches upon legal rights of genuine members of the reserved 
communities whose just entitlements arc negated by the grant of 
a scat to an ineligible person. In such a situation where the rights 
of genuine members of reserved groups or communities arc liable 
to be affected detrimentally, government circulars or resolutions 
cannot operate to their detriment. [Para 53][343-A-D] 
2.8 When an admission to an educational institution is 
sought to be cancelled upon the invalidation of a caste or tribe 
claim is that the student has substantially progressed in the course 
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of studies and a cancellation of admission would result in prejudice 
not only to the student but to the system as well. When the student 
has completed the degree or diploma, a submission against its 
withdrawal is urged a fortiorari. The state legislature has made a 
statutory decisi<m amongst competing claims, based on a public 
policy perspective which the court must respect. The submission 
that there is a loss of productive societal resources when an 
educational qualification is withdrawn or a student is compelled 
to leave the course of studies (when he or she is found not to 
belong to the caste or tribe on the basis of which admission to a 
reserved seat was obtained) cannot possibly outweigh or nullify 
the legislative mandate contained in Section 10 of the state 
legislation. When a candidate is found to have put forth a false 
claim of belonging to a designated caste, tribe or class for whom 
a benefit is reserved, it would be a negation of the rule of law to 
exercise the jurisdiction under Article 142 to protect that 
individual. Societal good lies in ensuring probity. That is the only 
manner in which the sanctity of the system can be preserved. 
The legal system cannot be seen as an avenue to support those 
who make untrue claims to belong to a caste or tribe or socially 
and educ.ational)y backward class. These benefits are provided 
only to designa~ed castes, tribes or classes in
accordance with 
the constitutional scheme and cannot be usurped by those who 
do not belong to them. The credibility not merely of the legal 
system but also of the judicial process will be eroded if such claims 
are protected in exercise of the constitutional power conferred 
by Article 142 despite the stale law. [Para 5411343-E-H; 344-A-
B] 
2.9 Medical education is what middle-class parents across 
the length and breadth of the county aspire for their children. 
There is intense competition for a limited number of under-
graduate, post-graduate and super-speciality scats. This can 
furnish no justification for recourse to unfair means including 
adopting a false rlaim to belong to the reserved category. The 
fault-lines of the system, be it in education, health or law, are that 
its lethargy and indolence furnish incentives for the few who 
choose to break the rules to gain an unfair advantage. In such a
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CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
situation, the court as a vital institution of democratic governance 
must be firm in sending out a principled message that there is no 
incentive other than for behaviour compliant with rules and 
deviance will meet severe reprimands of law. [Para 56)(345-G-
H; 346-A[ 
3.1 Jn Cltair1111111 a11d Managing Director FCI v. Jagdislt 
Ba/arum Baltiru C.A. 8928/2015, during the pcndcncy of the 
litigation, the respondent retired from service and was even paid 
his terminal dues. Hence, at this stage, no claim by a· member of 
Mahdco Koli, Scheduled Caste could be made or entertained on 
behalf of respondent or any member of his family on the strength 
orthc caste certificate which has been invalidated by the Scrutiny 
Committee. No further benefits of any nature whatsoever would 
be admissible to the respondent on the basis of his claim which 
has been invalidated. [Para 58] [347-H; 348-G-H; 349-A] 
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3.2 In Sltri Shivaji Shikshan Sanstlta & Anr. v. Raju Lax111011 
Gadekar & Ors. (CA No. 9155 of 2015) and State of Malwruslttra 
D 
1'. Raju Laxma11. Gadekar & Ors. (CA No. 9157 of 2015), the writ 
petition filed by the employee challenging the order of the Scrutiny 
Committee was dismissed holding that he docs not belong to the 
Halba Scheduled Tribe. The caste certificate which was obtained 
by the .respondent has been demonstrated to be a false caste 
certificate. The challenge to the order of
termination also attained 
finality. The High Court clearly erred in allowing protection of 
service to the employee. Such a direction is also contrary to the 
provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. The appointment 
secured by the respondent on the basis of a false caste claim was 
required to be withdrawn in terms of provisions of Section 10. 
There has been a complete misuse of the process by the 
respondent. (Para 58] (349-B, G-H; 350-A-B] 
3.3 In State of Mal1aruslttra v. Ku. Ch/1uyu D/o.Hemraj Nimje 
& Ors. (Civil Appeal No.9160 of 2015) it is held that the 
respondent has no right to claim prokction of her services. The 
respondent has misused the process of law by filing successive 
writ petitions to pre-empt an adjudication by the Scrutiny 
Committee and then confining the claim only to the protection of 
her services. For the reasons, indicated the order of the High 
Court is set aside.(Para 58][350-C, F-G] 
E 
F 
G 
]-[
284 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 1 ; S. C.R. 
3.4 In St11te ofM11haras/1tru & Anr. Vs. Mr.~.Arundhati Suresh 
Ni11awe & Anr. {C.A. Nos. 9203-04 of 2015) and in M11hat111a Fule 
Kris/ii Vidyapeetll v. Nag11at/1 Bah1m10 M1111grule & Ors. (C.A. 
No.8926 of 2015) for the reasons indicated in the body of the 
judgment and those indicated hy this Court while disposing of 
Civil Appeal NQs.9155 and 9157 of 2015, the impugned judgments 
and orders of the High Court arc set aside. [Para 58] [351-A, CJ 
3.5 In S11resh S/o.Dewaji Vairag11de v. The Comroller G'eneral, 
l11dia11 Bt11'ea11 of A-lines, Indira Bhavan, Civil Lines, Nagp11r & 
Am: (Civil Appeal No.1918 of 2010) having due regard for the 
reasons contained in the body of this judgment, there is no error 
in the judgment of the High Court. (Para 58]352-A, DJ 
3.6 In Rajendra Slo. Ramaji Mahishudwe v.~. The Joint 
Commissioner am/ Vice-Clrnirmun Sched11/ed Tribe, Caste 
Certificate Scrutiny Co111111i1tee & Anr (Civil Appeal No. 9154 of 
2015) the High Court by its judgment declined to grant protection 
to the services uf the appellant upon the invalidation of his claim 
to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe by the Scrutiny 
Committee. There is a clear and patent misuse of process by the 
appellant. In tl;le absence of the caste validity certificate, the 
appointment of the appellant cannot be held to have attained 
lhality. Having due regard to the reasons contained therein, there 
is no error in the judgment
of the High Court. [Para 58J(352-E; 
353-A-BI 
3. 7 In C/1/wya tllo. Yt1d1wrao Barapatre@ Chhaya W/o. Rajee" 
Dlwkate v. The State of Malwrashtra & Ors. (C.A. Nos. 9158-59 
F 
of 2015) and in Ravimlra G'ovi11drao Nagp11rkt1r Vs. Secretlll)', 
Raj11stha11 Ed11c11tio11 Socie~1· Washim & Ors. (C.A. Nos.8604-05/ 
17 @ SLP (C) Nos. 33864-65 of 2015) for the reasons contained 
in the body of the judgment and having due regard to the 
invalidation of the claim of the respondent by the Scrutiny 
Committee, there is no error in the judgment of the High Court. 
G 
[Para 58[353-C, EJ 
H 
3.8 In Sh i Sllh>uji Ed11calion Socie(1• & Anr. v. Slt1te of 
M11/wras/1trt1 & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.8601/17 @ SLP (C) No. 
289 of 2016) the High Court by its order has none the less directed 
reinstatement of the third respondent subjl•ct to an undertaking
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
285 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
that he would not claim the benefit of belonging to the Scheduled A 
Tribe in future. Once the tribe claim of the respondent has been 
held to be false, the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable 
for the reasons indicated in the body of this judgment. The 
judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. (Para 58)354-
D, F-G] 
3.9 In Hi11dusta11 Aero11autics Limited v. Murlidltar Arju11 
Neware t111dA11r. (C.A. Nos. 8602-03/17 @ SLP (C) Nos.529-30 
of 2016) for the reasons contained in the body of the judgment· 
and having due regard to the fact that the claim of the respondent 
B 
has been found to be false, there is merit in the appeals by the 
appellant. The impugned judgments of the High Court arc set 
C 
aside. [Para 58](355-A, D] 
3.10 In India Trade Promotio11 Organisation v. Vivekkumar 
Lajjaslta11kar Cltaurasiya (C.A.No.8607/17 @ SLP ©No.14830 of 
2015) and in Mumbai Metropolitan Regio11 Develop111e11t Authority 
v. Raje11dra Ramc/1a11dra Dltakale & A11r. (C.A. 8609/17 @ SLP D 
(C) No.13409 of 2015) for the reasons contained in the body of 
the judgment, the impugned judgment of the High Court granting 
reinstatement to the respondent, is set aside. [Para 58][355-F-
G; 356-A) 
3.11 In State of Maharashtra v. Vasant, s/o.Gyandeo Gonnade 
E 
(C.A. 8606/17 @ S.L.P.(C)No. 19992 of 2015) in view of the 
reasons contained in the body of this judgment, the basis of the 
impugned decision of the
High Court-.Full Bench decision in Arun 
Sonone, is erroneous. The respondent docs not belong to the 
Halba Scheduled Tribe. It is also clear that the benefits obtained 
F 
by the respondent were subject to the decision in Milind, wherein 
this Court has held that Halba-Koshti is not a Scheduled Tribe, 
the relevant entry in the Scheduled Tribes Order 1950 being 
'Halba, Halbi'. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set 
aside. (Para 58][356-E; 358-B-CJ 
3.12 In State ofMaharasltlra v. Ku. Vijaya Deorao Nandunwar 
& A11r. (C.A.No.9107 of 2015), in Prttdip Gajam111 Koli Vs.State of 
Maltarttslttra & Ors.(Civil Appeal No.8598/17 @ SLP (C) 18925 
of 2014 for the reasons contained in the body of the judgment, 
the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable and is set 
G 
H
286 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] l l S.C.R. 
A 
aside. [Para 5811358-D, FJ 
3.13 In /Shll!ar Shrawan Nikhare Vs.Stale of Maharashtra & 
Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 7187 of 2013) having regard to the fact 
that the claim of the appellant to belong to a Scheduled Tribe was 
invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee, the School Tribunal cannot 
B 
be faulted in declining to entertain the appeal against the 
consequential order of termination of service. Moreover, for the 
reasons containe<I in the body of the present judgment, there is 
no merit in the Civil Appeal. [Para 58][358-G; 359-D] 
3.14 In Eknath Barikrao Dhamvade v. Divisional Controller, 
c State Transport Corporation & Anr. (Civil Appeal 8608/17 @ SLP 
(C) ... CC No. 10889 of 2015, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Saryakaltt 
& Ors. (CA No.8597/17@ SLP (C) No. 16852 of 2016), Executive 
Director (Lubes), lhdia11 Oil Corporation Ltd. v.~. Aslzok Mahadeoruo 
Pathrabe & Ors. (CA Nos.8599-8600/17), and State of Maharashtra 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
& Ors. Vs. Rupesh slo. Teksingh Shinde (Civil Appeal Nos.8610/ 
17@ SLP (C) No.2299 of 2017) for the reasons contained in the 
body of the judgment and in view of the complete abuse of process 
by the appellant/respondent, the order of the High Court is 
unsustainable and set aside.[Para 58J[359-E; 361-CI 
Mi/ind Sharad Katware v. State of Maharashtra (1986) 
I Born CR 403; Bank of India v. Avinash D. Mandivikar 
(2005) 7 sec 690 : 12005] 3 Suppl. SCR 170; 
Additional General Alanager!Hwnan
Resources, Bharat 
Heavy Elecrricals Ltd. v. Suresh Ramakrishna Burde 
(2007) 5 SCC 336 : [20071 6 SCR 388; State of 
Maharashtra v. Sanjay K. Nimje (2007) 14 SCC 481 : 
[20071 1 SCR 960; Yogesh Ramchandra Naikwadi v. 
The State of.Maharashtra (2008) 5 SCC 652 : [2008] 5 
SCR 456; Anjan Kumar v. Union of India & Ors (2006) 
3 SC 257 : [2006] 2 SCR 212; State of Maharashtra & 
Ors. v. Ravi Prakash Bahu/alsing Parmar & Anr (2007) 
I SCC 80 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 105: Regional 
Manager, Central Bank v. Madh11/ika Guru Prasad 
Dahir AIR 2008 SC 3266 : [2008] 11 SCR 319; Sandip 
Subhash Parate v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 7 SCC 
501 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 282; Central Warehousing 
Corporation v. Jagdishkumar Vithalrao Panjankar
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
C. A .No. 233 of 2007; State of Maharashtra v. Om Raj 
(2007) 14 SCC 488; Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh 
Deorao Bhivapurkar (2008) 9 SCC 54 : (2008] 12 SCR 
992; Punjab National Bank v. Vilas Govindrao Bokade 
(2008) 14 SCC 545; Vijaykumar v. State of Maharashtra 
(2010) 14 SCC 489; Damodhar v. Secretary, Industrial, 
Energy & Labour Department (2010) 15 SCC 537; 
Raiwad Manojkumar Nivrultirao 
v. 
State of 
Maharashtra (2011) 9 SCC 798 : (2011] 12 SCR 986; 
Dattu Namdev Thakur v. Stale of Maharashtra (2012) 
1 SCC 549 : (2011] 13 SCR 475; R. Unnikrishnan v. V. 
K. Mahanudevan (2014) 4 SCC 434 : (2014) 1 SCR 
350; Pa/ghat Ji/la Thandan Samudhaya Samrakshna 
Smithi v. State of Kera/a (1994) 1 SCC 359 : (1993) 3 
Suppl. SCR 872; B. H. Khawas v. Union of India (2016) 
8 SCC 715 : (2016] 3 SCR 773; Ramesh Suresh Kamble 
v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 1 Mh. L.J 423; Sujit 
Vasant Patil v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 3 Mh. L J 
1109: Ganesh Rambhau Kha/ale v. 
State of 
Maharashtra (2009) 2 Mh. L.J. 788; Priyanka 
Omprakash Panwar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 4 
Mh L.J. 847; Apurva Ashok Gokha/e v. State of 
Maharashtra (2013) 1 Mh. LJ 139; Bank of India v. 
Avinash D.Mandivikar (2005) 7 SCC 690 : (2005) 3 
Suppl. SCR 170; Yogesh Ramchandra Naikwadi v. State 
of Maharashtra (2008) 5 SCC 652 : (2008] 5 SCR 
456; Anurag Kumar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 
(2016) 9 SCC 426; Nidhi Kaim and Another v. State of 
Madhya
Pradesh And Others (2017) 4 SCC 1; Chairman 
and Managing Director FCJ v. Jagdish Balaram Bahira 
2017 (7) JT 125; Shri Shivaji Shikshan Sanstha & Am: 
v. Raju Laxman Gadekar & Ors. (CA No. 9155 of 
2015); State of Maharashtra v. Raju Laxman Gadekar 
& Ors (CA No. 9157 of 2015); State of Maharashtra v. 
Ku. Chhaya D/o.Hemraj Ninye & Ors. (CA No.9160 of 
2015); State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Mrs. Arundhati 
Suresh Ninawe & Anr. (CA Nos. 9203-04 of 2015); 
Mahatma Fule Krishi Vidyapeeth v. Nagnath Baburao 
Mangrule & Ors. (CA No.8926 of 2015); Suresh SI 
287 
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B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
288 
A 
B 
c 
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E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] l l S.C.R. 
o.Dewaji Vairagade v. The Co11troller General, Indian 
Bureau of Mines. Indira Bhavan. Civil lines. Nagpur 
& Anr. (CA No.1918 of 2010); Rajendra S/o. Ramaji 
Mahisbadwe v. The Joint Commissioner and Vice-
Chairman Scheduled Tribe, Caste Certificate Scrutiny 
Committee & Anr (CA No. 9154 of 2015); Chhava 
dlo. Yadaorao Barapatre @ Chhaya W!o. Rajeev 
Dhakate )J. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (CA Nos. 
9158-59 of 2015); Ravindra Govindrao Nagpurkar v. 
Secretary, Rajasthan Education Society Washim & Ors. 
(CA Nos.8604-05/17 @ SLP (C) Nos. 33864-65 of 
2015; Shri Shivaji Education Sociezv & Anr. v. State of 
Maharashtra & Ors. (CA No.8601117 @ SLP (C) No. 
289 of 2016); Hindustan Aeronaulics Limited v. 
Murlidhar A1jun Neware and Anr. (C.A. Nos. 8602-
03/17@ SLP (C) Nos.529-30 of 2016; India Trade 
Promotion Organisation v. Vivekkumar Lajjashankar 
Chaurasiya (C.A. No. 8607/17@ SLP ©No.14830 of 
2015); Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development 
Authorit_~ v. Rajendra Ramchandra Dhakate & Anr. (CA 
8609/17 @ SLP (C) No. 13409 of 2015); State of 
lifahara~htra >'. Vas ant, s/o. Gyandeo Gonnade (CA 
8606/17 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 19992 of 2015); State of 
Maharashtra v. Ku. Vijaya Deorao Nandanwar & Anr. 
(CA No. 9107 of 2015); Ishwar Shrawan Nikhare v. 
State of Maharashtra & Ors. (CA No. 7187 of 2013; 
Eknath Barikrao Dhanwade v. Divisional Controller, 
Stale Transport Corporation & Am: (CA 8608/17 @ 
SLP (C) ...
CC No. 10889 of 2015); Pradip Gajanan 
Koli v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (CA No.8598/17 
@ SLP (C) 18925 of 2014); Union of India & Ors. v. 
Suryakant & Ors (CA No. 8597/17 @ SLP (C) No. 
16852 of 2016); Executive Director (Lubes), Indian Oil 
Corporation ltd. v. Ashok Mahadeorao Pathrabe & 
Ors. (CA Nos. 8599-8600/17@ SLP (C) Nos. 29388-
89 of 2016); The State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Rupesh 
slo.Teksingh Shinde (CA Nos.8610/17@ SLP (C) 
No.2299 of 2017) - referred to.
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
289 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
Case Law Reference 
A 
(1986) 1 Born CR 403 
referred to 
Para 10 
[2005) 3 Suppl SCR 170 
referred to 
Para 21 
[2007) 6 SCR 388 
referred to 
Para 22 
[2007) 1 SCR 960 
referred to 
Para 23 
[2008) 5 SCR 456 
referred to 
Para 25 
B 
[2006) 2 SCR 212 
referred to 
Para 25 
[2006) 8 Suppl. SCR 105 
referred to 
Para 25 
[2008) 11 SCR 319 
referred to 
Para 25 
[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 282 
referred to 
Para 26 
c 
c2001) t 4 sec 488 
referred to 
Para 27 
[2008) 12 SCR 992 
referred to 
Para 28 
(2008) 14 sec 545 
referred to 
Para 28 
c2010) 14 sec 489 
referred to 
Para 28 
c2010) 15 sec 537 
referred to 
Para 28 
D 
[2011] 12 SCR 986 
referred to 
Para 28 
(2011) 13 SCR 475 
referred to 
Para 28 
[2014] 1 SCR 350 
referred to 
Para 31 
[1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 872 
referred to 
Para 31 
E 
[2016) 3 SCR 773 
referred to 
Para 32 
(2007) 1 Mb. L.J 423 
referred to 
Para 33 
(2004) 3 Mb. L J 1109 
referred to 
Para 33 
(2009) 2 Mb. L.J. 788 
referred to 
Para 33 
(2009) 4 Mb L.J. 847 
referred to 
Para 34 
F 
(2013) l Mb. LJ 139 
referred to 
Para 34 
(2005) 3 Suppl. SCR 170 
referred to 
Para 40 
[2007] 6 SCR 388 
referred to 
Para 40 
[2008) 2 SCR 1096 
referred to 
Para 40 
G 
[2008) 5 SCR 456 
referred to 
Para 40 
(2016) 9 sec 426 
referred to 
Para 47 
c2011) 4 sec 1 
referred to 
Para 55 
[19941 6 sec 241 
relied on · 
Para 57 
H
290 
A 
B 
c 
D 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] ll S.C.R. 
[2000) 5 Suppl. SCR 65 
explained and followed 
Para 40, 57 
[2004) 1 SCR 360 
relied on 
Para 57 
[2008) 2 SCR 1096 
relied on 
Para 57 
[2012) 7 SCR 251 
overruled 
Para 57 
[2013) 12 SCR 807 
overruled 
Para 57 
(2015) 1 Mh L.J. 457 
disapproved 
Para 57 
2017 (7) JT 1!5 
referred to 
Pua 58 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8928 
of2015. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2014 of the High Court 
of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 10088 of2013 
C. A. No. 1918 of2010 
C.A. No. 7187/2013 
WITH 
C. A. Nos. 9155, 9157, 9160, 9203-9204, 8926, 9154, 9158-9159 
and 9107 of2015 
C.A. No~. 8604-05, 8601, 8602-03, 8607, 8609, 8606, 8598, 8597, 
E 
8599-8600, 8610 and 8608 of2017. 
Manindcr Singh, P. S. NarshimaASGs., Colin Gonsalves, Huzcfa 
Ahmadi, B. H. Marlapalle, Sr. Advs., Ali Qambar Zaidi, Satya Mitra, 
Satyajit A. Desai, Ms. A. S. Desai, Ms. Indra Sawhncy, Raj iv Shukla, 
Shubham Saxena, Debesh Panda, Aniruddh A. Joshi, Rajeev M. Roy, 
F 
Gopal Balwant Sathe, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Kishor 
Lambat, Ms. Aditi Deshpande, Rabin Majumder, Sanjay Kharde, Sunil 
Kumar Verma, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Akash Kakade, Somanath Padhan, 
Mani sh Pi tale, Ms. D. S. Matwankar, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Ravindra 
Keshavrao Adsure, Anand Landge, Siddheshwar N. Biradar, 
G 
Ms. N. Shoba, Sri Ram J. Thalapathy, V. Adhimoolam, Shilp Vinod, 
Anirudha A. Joshi, Rajeev Maheshwaranand Roy, Uday B. Dube, 
M. Y. Deshmukh,
Sushi! Karanjkar, K. N. Rai, B. Krishna Prasad, Ms. 
Shrcya Bhatnagar, Siddhcsh Kolwal, Nalin Kohli, P. K. Mullick, 
R. B. Yadav, Piyush Sharma, Prabhas Bajaj, Akshay Amrirtanshu, 
. Praveen Jain, Mrs. Gunjan Sinha Jain, T. S. Sidhu, Mukesh Kumar, 
H
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA 
Sirnranjeet Singh, Vikas Soni, (For Mis. M. V. Kini & Associates), 
Ms. Shubhangi Tuli, Rohan Sharma,Ajit Wagh, Kishor Lambat, (For Mis. 
Lambat &Associates), Manish Pitale, Ms. D.S. Matwankar. C. S. Ashri, 
Ms. Shikha Sarin, Rajesh Kumar, E. C. Agrawala, Ms. Aditi Deshpande, 
(For Mis. Lambat and Associates), Gagan Sanghi,'Ramcshwar Prasad 
Goyal, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Nirnimesh Dube, Ms. Manju Jetley, 
D. S. Mahra, Vivck C. Solshe, C. G. Solshe, Ms. Astha Deep, 
S. M. Jadhav, (For Mis. S. M. Jadhav and Company), Kunda! Kumar 
Lal, Yash Pal Dhingra, Suhas Kadam, (For Mis. Lemax Lawyers & 
Co.), Advs., for the appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. I. Delay condoned in SLP 
(C) ...... CC No.1088912015. 
2. Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions. 
A The perspective 
3. The framers of the Constitution conceived of a policy of 
affirmative action to redress the social exclusion, economic deprivation 
and political alienation suffered by historically disadvantaged classes of 
Indian society. Reservation of posts in public employment and seats for 
admission in educational institutions and the setting apart of seats in 
electoral bodies was envisaged by the Constitution for the fulfilment of a 
constitutional aspiration of social justice to the Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes and to socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. Jn 
pursuit of the
constitutional goal of substantive equality, reservations have 
been envisaged as a means of enabling members of beneficiary groups 
to realise, in a true sense, dignity, freedom and liberty which the 
Constitution guarantees as its basic philosophy. But the problem which 
has confronted legislatures, policy makers as well as courts (as enforcers 
of the rule of law) is a capture of the benefits of affirmative action 
programmes by persons who do not genuinely belong to the beneficiary 
groups. This kind of capture poses a serious dimension. When a person 
who docs not belong to a caste, tribe or class for whom reservation is 
meant, seeks to pass off as its member, such a stratagem constitutes a 
fraud on the Constitution. For one thing a person who is disentitled to the 
benefit of a welfare measure obtains the benefit. For another.this deprives 
a beneficiary who is genuinely entitled to receive those benefits of a 
291 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[20 l 7] 11 S.C.R. 
legitimate entitlement. This constitutes an egregious constitutional fraud. 
It is a fraud on the statutes which implement the provisions of the 
Constitution. It is a fraud on state policy. Confronted with this problem. 
the legislatures have intervened with statutory instruments while the 
executive has, in implementation of law, set down administrative 
parameters and guidelines to prevent the usurpation of benefits. 
4. The batch of cases with which the court is confronted involves 
individuals who soµght the benefit of public employment on the basis of 
a claim to belong to a beneficiary group which has, upon investigation 
been fow1d to be invalid. Despite the invalidation of the claim to belong 
to a Scheduled Caste or, as the case may be, a Scheduled Tribe or 
backward community, the intervention of the Court is invoked in the 
exercise of the power of judicial review. The basis for the invocation of 
jurisdiction lies in an assertion that equities arise upon a lapse of time 
and tllese equities arc capable of being protected citllcr by the High 
Court (in the exer¢ise of its jurisdiction under Article 226) or by this 
Court (when it discharges the constitutional function of doing complete 
justice under Article 142). The present batch of cases then raises the 
fundamental issue as to whether such equities are sustainable at law 
and, if so, the limils that define the jurisdiction of the court to
protect 
individuals who have secured access to the benefit of reservation inspite 
of the fact that they do not belong to the caste, tribe or class for whom 
reservation is intended. 
5. A large body of precedent has evolved both in the High Courts 
as well as in this Court in seeking to find answers to pleas raised by 
individuals that they are entitled to protection by a constitutional court, 
even after the invalidation of their caste or tribe claims. The decided 
cases reflect a profound awareness on the part of courts of the human 
element involved. Assessment of human consequences case by case 
has resulted in a conflicting line of approach, in the effort of the court to 
balance the letter Of law with a sense of compassion. Since this Bench 
of three Judges is called upon to seek a median, through the body of 
G judicial precedent, it is, at the outset, necessary to set out the fundamental 
values and vision which the cou11 must pw·sue. Those values as well as 
the vision is charted out to the court by the Constitution and it is the 
Constitution which the court expowids. The constitutional policy of 
creating reservations subserves a high constitutional value of providing 
H
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
293 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
social redress and a life of dignity to castes, tribes and classes which 
were in a historical sense oppressed by a systemic pattern of social 
exclusion and human deprivation. The benefits which the Constitution 
A 
has conferred on beneficiary groups cannot be dissipated by allowing 
others who do not belong to the designated castes or tribes to secure the 
benefit. Public employment is a significant source of social mobility. 
B 
Access to education opens the doors to secure futures. As a matter of 
principle, in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, the court must 
weigh against an interpretation which will protect unjust claims over the 
just, fraud over legality and expediency over principle. As the nation 
evolves, the role of the court must be as an institution which abides by 
constitutional principle, enforces the rule oflaw and reaffirms the belief C 
that claims based upon fraud, expediency and subterfuge will not be 
recognised. Once these parameters are established with a clear judicial 
formulation individual cases should pose no problem. Usurpation of 
constitutional benefits by persons who are not entitled to them must be 
answered by the court in the only way permissible for an institution 
which has to uphold the rule of law. Unless the courts were to do so, it 
would leave open a path of incentives for claims based on fraud to survive 
legal gambits
and the creativity of the disingenuous. 
D 
B The regulatory regime : Madhuri Patil 
6. On 24 February 1981, the Government of Maharashtra issued 
E 
a G.R. which prescribed the procedure for obtaining (i)castc certificates 
from the Sub-divisional Officers; and (ii) validity certificates from a 
Scrutiny Committee. 
7. In 1994, the systemic usurpation of benefits by persons who 
did not belong to the beneficia1y groups came to the fore before this 
F 
Court. There was before this Court, an urgent need expressed to set 
down a framework to regulate the grant of caste certificates and to 
scrutinise claims. The need for scrutiny and verification of caste claims 
was addressed in a judgment of this Court, speaking through a bench of 
two judges, in Kumari Madhurl Patil Vs. Additional Commissioner, 
Tribal Development1• The judgment was delivered on 2 September 
G 
1994. While emphasizing the need to ensure that claims to belong to a 
beneficiary group must be carefully scrutinized, this Court observed thus: 
" ... 13. The admission wrongly gained or appointment wrongly 
'(1994) 6 sec z41 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] ll S.C.R. 
obtained on the basis of false social status certificate necessarily 
have the effect of depriving the genuine Scheduled Castes or 
Scheduled Tribes or OBC candidates as enjoined in the Constitution 
of the benefits conferred on them by the constitution. The genuine 
candidate~ are also denied admission to educational institutions or 
appointments to office or posts under a State for want of social 
status certificate. The ineligible or spurious persons who falsely 
gained entry resort to dilatory tactics and create hurdles in 
completion of the inquires by the Scrutiny Committee .... " (Id. at 
p. 254) 
8. Detailed guidelines were formulated in the judgment of this 
Court for the constitution of committees by the State Governments for 
scrutinizing claims of candidates to belong to a Scheduled caste or tribe 
or, as the case may be, to a backward community designated for 
reservations. The directions issued by this Court envisaged the constitution 
ofVigilance Cells which would conduct local enquiries to determine the 
authenticity of a claim to belong to a designated caste or tribe. The 
court, among other things, issued the following directions: 
"13 ...... (14). In case, the certificate obtained or social status 
claimed is found to be false, the parent/guardian/the candidate 
should be' prosecuted for making false claim. If the prosecution 
ends in a conviction and sentence of the accused, it could be
regarded as an offence involving moral turpitude, disqualification 
for elective posts or offices under the State or the Union or elections 
to any local body, legislature or Parliament; 
( 15). As soon as the finding is recorded by the Scrutiny Committee 
F 
holding that the certificate obtained was false, on its cancellation 
and confiscation simultaneously, it should be communicated to the 
educational institution concerned or the appointing authority by 
rcgistcrcd,post with acknowledgement due with a request to cancel 
the admission or the appointment. The Principal etc. of the 
educational institution responsible for making the admission or the 
G 
appointing authority, should cancel the admission/appointment 
without any further notice to the candidate and debar the candidate 
from further study or continue in office in a post." (Id. at p. 256-
257) 
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CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
295 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
C The Halba I Halbi controversy 
A 
9. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 and the 
Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order 1950 provide in relation to each 
State a list of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of 
constitutional reservations. In the list of Scheduled Tribes for the State 
of Maharashtra, Entry 19 is: 
"Haiba, Halbi" 
B 
10. In the State of Maharashtra, the ambit of Entry 19 became a 
bone of contention particularly with persons belonging to the Halba-
Koshti community claiming to be a sub-tribe of the designated tribe. A 
Division Bench of the High Court spoke on the issue on 4 September 
C 
1985 in Milind Sharad Katwarc Vs. State of Maharashtra'. The 
Division Bench held that Halba-Koshti constituted a sub-division of the 
tribe "Halba-Halbi" under Entry 19 of the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950. 
Halba-Koshtis were, in the view of the Division Bench, entitled to the 
status of a Scheduled Tribe on the ground that they were comprehended 
within a designated tribe namely, Halba-Halbi. In coming to this conclusion, 
D 
the Di vision Bench opined that it is permissible to enquire whether a 
sub-division of a tribe which is not mentioned in the Scheduled Tribes 
Order, 1950 is nevertheless a part and parcel of a tribe which is 
designated. 
11. Upon a challenge by the State of Maharashtra before this 
Court, the issue wa~ referred to a
Constitution Bench and eventually 
resulted in the judgment in State of Maharashtra Vs. Milind3• The 
Constitution Bench held that the Scheduled Tribes Order had to be read 
as it is; and no evidence could be let in to urge that a tribe or tribal 
community or its part constituted a part of a tribe which was specifically 
designated. In other words : 
"36 ... ( 1 ). It is not at all permissible to hold any inquiry or let in 
any evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community 
or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community is included 
in the general name even though it is not specifically mentioned in 
the entry concerned in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 
1950. 
(2). The Scheduled Tribes Order must be read as it is. It is not 
even permissible Iv say that a tribe, sub-tribe, part of or group of 
'(1986) t Born CR 403 
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any tribe or tribal community is synonymous to the one mentioned 
m the Scheduled Tribes Order if they are not so specifically 
mentioned in it. 
(3).A notification issued under clause (I) of Article 342, specifying 
Scheduled Tribes, can be amended only by law to be made by 
Parliament. In other words, any tribe or tribal community or part 
of or group within any tribe can be included or excluded from the 
list of Scheduled Tribes issued under clause ( 1) of Article 342 
only by Parliament by law and by no other authority. 
(4). It is not open to State Governments or courts or tribunals or 
any other authority to modify, amend or alter the list of Scheduled 
Tribes specified i.n the notification issued under clause (I) of Article 
342." (Id at p. 30-31) 
The judgment of the Bombay High Court holding that Halba-Koshti 
formed a part of the designated scheduled tribe, Halba-Halbi was 
reversed. The declaration oflaw by this Court under Article 141, negated 
the position oflaw enunciated by the Bombay High Court. This was, it 
must be emphasised, not a case of prospective over-ruling. 
12. The Constitution Bench in Milind dwelt on the dangers in 
allowing benefits which are reserved to designated castes and tribes 
being usurped by individuals who do not belong to them. Allowing the 
benefits which are reserved by Presidential orders issued under Articles 
341 and 342 to be usurped by an imposter would
negate the purpose of 
the reservation. This was succinctly emphasized in the following 
observations of the Constitution Bench: 
"35 .... The Presidential Orders are issued under Articles 341 and 
342 of the Constitution recognizing and identifying the needy and 
deserving people belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes mentioned therein for the constitutional purpose of availing 
benefits of reservation in the matters of admissions and 
employment. If these benefits arc taken away by those for whom 
they are not meant, the people for whom they are really meant or 
intended will be deprived of the same and their sufferings will 
continue. Allowing the candidates not belonging to Scheduled tribes 
to have the benefits or advantage of reservation either in admissions 
or appointments leads to making mockery of the very reservation 
against the mandate and the scheme of the Constitution." 
(id. alp. 30)
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
297 
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13. Milind Sharad Katwarc whose cause had travelled from 
A 
the Bombay High Court in 1985 to this Court had, by the time that the 
Constitution Bench resolved the issue on 28 November 2000 qualified 
as a doctor. He claimed the benefit of equities which had intervened in 
the meantime. They were recognized in the ultimate directions which 
were issued by this Court in the following observations: 
"38. Respondent 1 joined the medical course for the year 1985-
86. Almost 15 years have passed by now. We are told he has 
already completed the course and may be he is practicing as a 
doctor. In this view and at this length of time it is for nobody's 
benefit to annul his admission. Huge amount is spent on each 
candidate for completion of medical course. No doubt, one 
Scheduled Tribe candidate was deprived ofjoining medical course 
by the admission given to Respondent 1. If any action is taken 
against Respondent I, it may lead to depriving the service of a 
doctor to the society on whom public money has already been 
spent. In these circumstances, this judgment shall not affect the 
degree obtained by him and his practicing as a doctor. But we 
make it clear that he cannot claim to belong to the Scheduled 
Tribe covered by the Scheduled Tribes Order. In other words, he 
cannot take advantage of the Scheduled Tribes Order any further 
or for any other constitutional purpose. Having
regard to the 
passage of time, in the given circumstances, including interim 
orders passed by this Cowt in SLP (C) No. 16372of1985 and 
other related matters, we make it clear that the admissions and 
appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by 
this judgment." (Id. at p. 31) 
The latter part of the above extract covered other cases before the 
court. 
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Reading these observations there can be no manner of doubt that this 
Court took recourse to its constitutional power under Article 142 to protect 
benefits which had accrued to a candidate who had qualified as a doctor 
though with the caveat that he would not be entitled to claim the status 
G 
of belonging to a Scheduled tribe in the futw·c. The latter part protected, 
having regard to the passage of time and interim orders passed in the 
batch of cases, appointments and admissions which had become final. 
These directions were evidently under Article 142 of the Constitution. 
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D The legislation in Maharashtra 
14. The legislature in the State of Maharashtra enacted the 
Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-Notified Tribes 
(VimuktaJatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special 
Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste 
Certificate Act, 2000. The legislation essentially takes care, for that state 
of the concerns that were expressed in the decision of this Court in 
Madhuri Patil by providing a statutory framework to regulate the 
issuance of caste certificates, scrutiny and verification of claims and the 
consequences to ensue upon the invalidation of a claim. The legislation 
received the assent of the President and was published in the gazette on 
23 May 200 l. By a. notification dated 17 October 200 I, the Act came 
into force from 18 October 2001, in terms of Section I (2). Section 3 
requires every person claiming to belong to a Scheduled caste or tribe, 
other backward class or a.ny other designated tribe or community seeking 
to obtain public employment or an admission to an educational institution 
or contesting an electoral scat in a local authority or a co-operative society 
to apply for tho issuance ofa caste certificate to a competent authority 
named by the State Government. Section 4 empowers the competent 
authority to issue a ca~tc certificate upon being satisfied of the genuineness 
of the claim. Section 6
requires the State Government to constitute 
Scrntiny Committees for the verification of caste certificates issued by 
the competent authorities constituted under Section 4(1 ). Sub-Section 
(2) of Section 6 reqlllircs the beneficiary ofa caste certificate to submit 
an application to a Scrutiny Committee for the verification of the caste 
certificate and for issuance of a validity certificate. The appointing 
author~ty is similarly required by sub-Section (3) to make an application 
to the Scrutiny Committee to verify the caste certificate. Section 6 
provides thus: 
"6. (I) The Government shall constitute by notification in the official 
Gazette, one or more Scrutiny Committee(s) for verification of 
Caste Certificates issued by the Competent Authorities under sub-
section ( 1) of section 4 specifying in the said notification the 
functions a.nd the area of jurisdiction of each of such Scrutiny 
Committee or Committees. 
(2) After obtaining the Caste Certificate from the Competent 
Authority, any person desirous of availing of the benefits or
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
concessions provided to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, 
De-notified Tribe (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other 
Backward Classes or Special Backward Category for the purposes 
mentioned in section 3 may make an application, well in time, in 
such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, to the 
concerned Scrutiny Committee for the verification of such Caste 
Certificate and issue of a validity certificate. 
(3) The appointing authority of the Central or State Government, 
local authority, public sector undertakings, educational institutions, 
Co-operative Societies or any other Government aided institutions 
shall, make an application in such form and in such manner as 
may be prescribed by the Scrutiny Committees for the verification 
of the Caste Certificate and issue of a validity certificate, in case 
a person selected for an appointment with the Government, local 
authority, public sector undertakings, educational institutions, Co-
operative societies or any other Government aided institutions who 
has not obtain such certificate. 
( 4) The Scrutiny Committee shall follow such procedure for 
verification of the Caste Certificate and adhere to the time limit 
for verification and grant of validity certificate, as prescribed.'" 
Section 7 provides for the confiscation and cancellation of "false 
certificates". Section 7 is in the following terms : 
"7. ( 1) Where,
before or after the commencement of this Act, a 
person not belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled 
Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other 
Backward Classes or Special Backward Category has obtained 
a false Caste Certificate to the effect that either himself or his 
children belong to such Castes, Tribes or Classes, the Scrutiny 
Committee may, suo motu, or otherwise call for the record and 
enquire into the correctness of such certificate and if it is of the 
opinion that the certificate was obtained fraudulently, it shall, by 
an order cancel and confiscate the certificate by following such 
procedure as prescribed, after giving the person concerned an 
opportunity of being heard, and communicate the same to the 
concerned person and the concerned authority, if any 
(2) The order passed by the Scrutiny Committee under this Act 
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shall be final and shall not be challenged before any authority or 
cowt except the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution 
of India." 
Section 8 relates to the burden of proof and envisages that in any 
application for the issuance of a caste certificate by the competent 
authority; in any enquiry conducted by the competent authority or Scrutiny 
Committee or appellate authority; and in the trial of any offence under 
the Act, the buO}en of proving that the person belongs to such caste, 
tribe or class shaill be on the claimant - applicant. Section 10 provides for 
the consequence of the invalidation of a caste certificate and reads thus: 
"'10. (!)Whoever not being a person belonging to any of the 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta 
Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other backward Classes or Special 
Backward Category secures admission in any educational 
institution against a seat reserved for such Castes, Tribes or 
Classes, or secures any appointment in the Government, local 
authority or in any other Company or Corporation, owned or 
controlled by the Government or in any Government aided institution 
or Co-opcrati ve Society against a post reserved for such Castes, 
Tribes or Classes by producing a false Caste Certificate shall, on 
cancellation of the Caste Certificate by the Scrutiny Committee, 
be liable to be debarred from the concerned educational institution, 
or
as the case may be, discharged from the said employment 
forthwith and any other benefits enjoyed or derived by virtue of 
such admission or appointment by such person as aforesaid shall 
be withdrawn forthwith. 
(2) Any amount paid to such person by the Government or any 
other agency by way of scholarship, grant, allowance or other 
financial benefit shall be recovered from such person as an arrears 
of land revenue. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act for the time 
being in force, any Degree, Diploma or any other educational 
qualification acquired by such person after securing admission in 
any educational institution on the basis ofa Caste Certificate which 
is subsequently proved to be false shall also stand cancelled, on 
cancellation of such Caste Certificate, by the Scrutiny Conunittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
301 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
being in force, a person shall be disqualified for being a member 
A 
of any statutory body if he has contested the election for local 
authority, co-operative society or any statutory body on the seat 
reserved for any of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-
notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis) Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward 
Classes or Special Backward Category by procuring a false Caste 
Certificate as belonging to such Caste, Tribe or Class on such 
false Caste Certificate being cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee, 
B 
and any benefits obtained by such person shall be recoverable as 
arrears of land revenue and the election of such person shall he 
deemed to have been terminated retrospectively." 
Section 11 deals with offences and penalties and provides thus : 
"I !.{I) Whoever, -
(a) obtains a false Caste Ce11ificate by furnishing false information 
or filing false statement or documents or by any other fraudulent 
c 
means; or 
D 
(b) not being a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic 
Tribes, Other Backward Classes or Special Backward Category 
secures any benefits or appointments exclusively reserved for 
such Castes, Tribes, or Classes in the Government, local authority 
E 
or any other company or corporation owned or controlled by the 
Government or in any Government aided institution, or secures
admission in any educational institu1ion against a seat exclusively 
reserved for such Castes, Tribes or Classes or is elected to any of 
the elective offices of any local authority or Co-operative Society 
against the office, reserved for such Castes Tribes or Classes by 
F 
producing a false Caste Certificate; 
Shall, on conviction, be punished, with rigorous imprisonment for 
a term which shall not be less than six months but which may 
extend upto two years or with fine which shall not be less than 
two thousand rupees or both. 
G 
(2) No court shall take cognizance ofan offence punishable under 
this section except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the 
Scrutiny Committee or by any other officer duly authorized by the 
Scrutiny Coinmittee for this purpose." 
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Offences punishable under Section l l have been made cognizable and 
non bailable under Section 12. Section 13 imposes cnminal penalties 
upon a person dis¢hargmg the functions of a competent authority who 
intentionally issu~s a false caste certificate. 
15. Legislative intervcntwn in the State of Maharashtra by the 
enactment of 2000 puts into place a statutory framework covering the 
area from the issuance of caste I tribe certificates and traversing the 
scrutiny and verification of caste I tribe claims and withdrawal ofbenefits 
accruing upon a false claim. Stringent penalties are provided against 
violators by creating a regime of criminal offences which are punishable 
at law. An application for a caste certificate is required to be made to a 
designated authority constituted by the State Government. The competent 
authority has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim before it 
issues a caste certificate. Issuance of a caste certificate docs not in 
itself conclude the level of scrutiny. The next stage of scrutiny is 
contemplated before the Scrutiny Committee which is conferred with a 
statutory status by the provisions of the Act. Section 6 mandates in sub-
section (2) that a person who desires to avail of a benefit or concession 
provided to a desi~natcd caste, tribe orclass must make an application 
well in time to tl1e Scrutiny Committee for verification of the caste 
certificate
and for the issuance ofa validity ce11ificatc. Not only this, the 
appointing authority is obligated to move the Scrutiny Committee to 
conduct a verification of the caste certificate ofa person who has been 
selected for appointment. Section 7 empowers the Scrutiny Committee 
either suo mow or otherwise to enquire into the correctness of a caste 
certificate and, if it is of the opinion that the ce11ificatc was obtained 
fraudulently. it shall cancel and confiscate it after furnishing a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard. Section 7 operates in respect of all caste 
certificates whether obtained before or after the commencement of the 
Act. If a caste certificate has been obtained falsely by a person either 
claiming himself or his children to belong to a designated caste, tribe or 
class, the Scrutiny Committee is empowered to cancel it upon an opinion 
formed that it was obtained fraudulently. The fact that a person belongs 
to a designated caste, tribe or class is based on facts which are to the 
knowledge of the applicant and hence the burden of proof is placed on 
the claimant by Section 8. 
16. The sta(c legislature was evidently not content with a mere 
invalidation of a caste certificate which is founded on a false claim made 
by a candidate to belong to a designated caste, tribe or class. Section 6
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
(2) provides that a candidate who desires to obtain a benefit must apply 
well in time to the Scrutiny Committee for verification and similarly the 
appointing authority of a candidate who has been selected for appointment 
but has not obtained a validity certificate must apply to the Scrutiny 
Committee for verification. The legislature however was cognizant of 
the fact that by the time a scrutiny takes place before the Scrutiny 
Committee the candidate may have obtained the benefit of a concession 
reserved for a caste, tribe or class. As a matter of public interest, the 
legislation stipulates that the benefits which have been obtained on the 
basis of a false caste certificate shall be withdrawn upon the invalidation 
of the claim by the Scrutiny Committee. The ambit of Section I 0 (I) 
extends, among other things, to an admission which is secured in an 
educational institution against a scat reserved for one of the designated 
castes, tribes or classes; an appointment in the government, local authority 
or corporation owned or controlled by the government or any government 
institution or co-operative society against a reserved post. A benefit which 
is obtained on the foundation of a false caste claim which has been 
invalidated is not permitted to be retained by the candidate. There is a 
legislative mandate that the benefit of an admission granted or an 
appointment to a post
shall be withdrawn forthwith on the cancellation 
of a caste I tr.ibc certificate. Any amount which is paid by way of 
scholarship. grant, allowance or financial benefits has to be recovered 
as arrears of land revenue. Sub-Section (3) of Section 10 contains a 
11011-obsta11te provision as a result of which notwithstanding anything 
contained in any Act for the time being in force a degree, diploma or 
educational qualification acquired by a person after securing admission 
on the basis of a caste certificate which is proved to be false and is 
cancelled would also be invalid. Similarly, by sub-Section (4) a 
disqualification from holding an electoral office has been stipulated where 
a person has contested an election on the basis of a false caste certificate 
which is since cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee. To ensure that the 
stringent provisions made by it impose a sufficient deterrent, the legislature 
considered it fit in its wisdom to create offences and to impose criminal 
penalties in Section 11. 
17. The consequences which emanate from the cancellation of a 
caste certificate are distinct. The first is the withdrawal of benefits 
secured on the basis of a claim to belong to a designated tribe, group or 
class which has been held to be invalid. This is of a civil nature by which 
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the applicant is deprived of the benefits of a false caste certificate which 
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is cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee. The second consequence is the 
liability to be subject to a criminal prosecution. This is a criminal liability 
arising from an offence created by the legislature. 
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E Prec<•dent 
18. Several decisions of this Court have considered whether a 
person who has secured the benefit of public employment or admission 
to an educational institution on a reserved quota is entitled to retain the 
benefits obtained despite the invalidation of the claim to belong to the 
tribe or caste. In all such cases, equities arc pressed in aid, chief among 
them being the lapse of time since the acquisition ofbenefits on the basis 
of a claim to belong to a designated caste or tribe. As decided cases 
indicate, the claim for equity is coupled with a "voluntary" undertaking 
that the person would not secure or claim any future benefits on the 
basis that he or she belongs to the Scheduled Caste, Schedule Tribe or 
socially and educationally backward class on the basis of which the 
original appointment or admission was obtained. In the case of ad.missions 
to educational institutions, particularly institutions of higher learning, the 
additional ground which is often urged is that the withdrawal of benefits 
obtained in the past would a.mount to a societal loss since scarce productive 
resources of the nµtion are invested in providing for training and education 
to professionals ip a
discipline such as .medicine. 
19. ln Ma~huri Patil (supra), a Bench of two learned Judges set 
down a principlecll rationale as to why a claim for equity by a person who 
is not found to belong to the designated caste, tribe or class cannot be 
countenanced. The Court observed : 
"16. Whether appellants are entitled to their further continuance 
in the studies is the further question. Otten the plea of equities or 
promissory estoppel would be put forth for continuance and 
completion offurther course of studies and usually would be found 
favour with the courts. The courts have constitutional duty and 
responsibility, in exercise of the power of its judicial review, to see 
that constitutional goals set down in the Preamble, the Fundamental 
Rights and the Directive Principles of the Constitution, are 
achieved. A party that seeks equity, must co.me with clean hands. 
He who co.mes to the court with false claim, cannot plead equity 
nor the court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in 
his favour. There is no estoppel as no promise of the social status
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
305 
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is made by the State when a false plea was put forth for the social 
A 
status recognised and declared by the Presidential Order under 
the Constitution as amended by the SC & ST (Amendment) Act, 
1976, which is later found to be false. Therefore, the plea of 
promissory cstoppel or equity have no application. When it is found 
to be a case of fraud played by the concerned, no sympathy and 
B 
equitable considerations can come to his rescue. Nor the pica of 
estoppel is germane to the beneficial constitutional concessions 
and opportunities given to the genuine tribes or castes. Courts 
would be circumspect and wary in considering such cases." (Id. 
at p. 257) 
However, on the facts of that case the Bench of two Judges while 
upholding the cancellation of the status of Mahadeo Koli which was 
fraudulently obtained, directed that the student who had completed the 
course of medical studies be allowed to appear for the final year 
examination of the M.B.B.S. degree course but not as a candidate 
belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. The circumstance which weighed with 
the Court was that the student had approached the High Court for the 
grant of a caste certificate since the Additional Commissioner was not 
dealing with the matter. The student obtained admission pursuant to a 
direction of the High Court. It was the parents of the student who had 
put the career of the student in
jeopardy and since she had completed 
her course of study except to appear for the examination; she should be 
permitted to do so. The above directions were issued in the case of one 
of the two appellants, Suchita Laxman Patil. However, her sister Madhuri 
(who was the first appellant) was found to have approached an officer 
without jurisdiction and after showing the order of the High Court in the 
case of her sister Suchita, secured a caste certificate and got admission. 
This Court observed that though she was in the midst of her B.D.S. 
studies in the second year, .she could not continue as a student belonging 
to Mahadeo Kol i Scheduled Tribe. She could only obtain admission as 
a general candidate and continue her studies. These directions are 
referable to the jurisdiction confcn-cd on this Court under Article 142. 
20. The next decision which is of relevance on the issue, is a 
judgment of three Judges of this Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. 
State of Kcrala4 . In that case the appellant who did not belong to a 
designated reserved community obtained a caste certificate ·and was 
'(2004) 2 sec 105 
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selected as a Deputy Superintendent of Police on a seat reserved for 
the Scheduled Castes. However, it was found upon a complaint that the 
appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Caste and the Scrutiny Committee 
rejected his claim. The order of the Scrutiny Committee was upheld by 
the High Court and by this Court. Subsequently at the behest of the 
appellant the Central Administrative Tribunal directed that he should not 
be terminated from service without following the procedure under Article 
31 l. The High Court reversed that decision and the appeilant was 
dismissed from service. Before this Court the appellant inter alia sought 
protection since he had rendered nearly 27 years of service. Rejecting 
the submission this Court held that: 
"'15. This apatt, the appellant obtained the appointment in 
the service on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled 
Caste community. When it was found by the Scrutiny 
Committee that he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste 
community, then the very basis of his appointment was taken 
away. His appointment was no appointment in the eyes of 
law. He cannot claim a right to the post as he had usurped 
the post meant for a reserved candidate by playing a fraud 
and producing a false caste certificate. Unless the appellant 
can lay a claim to the post on the basis of his appointment he 
cannot claim the constitutional guarantee given under the 
Article 311 of the
Constitution. As he had obtained the appointment 
on the basis of a false caste ce1tificate he cannot be considered 
to be a person who holds a post within the meaning ofArticlc 3 11 of 
the Constitution of India, Finding recorded by the Scrutiny 
Committee that the appellant got the appointment on the basis of 
false caste certificate has become final. The position, therefore, 
is that the appellant has usurped the post which should have 
gone to a member of the Scheduled Caste. In view of the 
finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee and upheld upto 
this Court he has disqualified himself to hold the post. 
Appointment was void from its inception. It cannot be said 
that the said void appointment would enable the appellant to claim 
that he was holding a civil post within the meaning of Article 311 of 
the Constitution oflndia,As appellant had obtained the appointment 
by playing a fraud he cannot be all owed to take advantage of his 
own fraud in entering the service and claim that he was holder of
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
307 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.) 
the post entitled to be dealt with in terms of Article 3 l l of the 
A 
Constit'ution of India or the Rules framed thereunder. Where an 
appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud or 
deceit such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service 
and in such a situation Article ill of the Constitution is not attracted 
at all." (Id. at p. 115) (emphasis suppled) 
The Bench of three Judges also rejected the submission that since the 
appellant had rendered 27 years of service. the ordcrof dismissal should 
be substituted with an order of compulsory retirement or removal to 
protect his pensionary benefits. The Court observed: 
"l 9 ..... The rights to salary, pension and other service benefits 
are entirely statutory in nature in public service. Appellant obtained 
the appointment against a post meant for a reserved candidate by 
producing a false caste certificate and by playing a fraud. His 
appointment to the post was void and non est in the eyes oflaw. 
B 
c 
The right to salary or pension after retirement flow from a valid 
and legal appointment. The consequential right of pension and 
D 
monetary benefits can be given only if the appointment was valid 
and legal. Such benefits cannot be given in a case where the 
appointment was found to have been obtained fraudulently and 
rested on false caste certificate. A person who entered the service 
by producing
a false caste certificate and obtained appointment 
for the post meant for Scheduled Caste thus depriving the genuine 
Scheduled Caste of appointment to that post does not deserve 
any sympathy or indulgence of this Court. A person who, seeks 
equity must come with clean hands. He. who comes to the Court 
with false claims, cannot plead equity nor the Court would be 
justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favom. A person who 
seeks equity must act in a fair and equitable manner. Equity 
jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the case of a person who got 
the appointment on the basis of false caste certificate by playing 
a fraud. No sympathy and equitable consideration can come to 
his rescue. We are of the view that equity or compassion cannot 
be allowed to bend the arms oflaw in a case where an individual 
acquired a status by practising fraud." (Id. at p. 116) 
21. In Bank of India Vs. Avinash D. Mandivikar' the first 
respondent obtained an appointment in the service of the bank in October 
'(2oosi 1 sec 690 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
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1976 on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. The Scrutiny 
Committee found that he did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe and, 
therefore, invalidated the caste certificate. Following the termination of 
his services the first respondent moved the High Court which accepted 
his plea that the initiation of proceedings against him by the Scrutiny 
Committee for verification of the caste certificate in 1987 was beyond a 
reasonable period. The High Court, while allowing the pica. reinstated 
him in service with back-wages. In an appeal by the employer. this Court 
held that once a claim of the employee to belong to a Scheduled Tribe 
had been rejected, the employment was "no appointment in eye of 
law" and that he had "absolutely no justification for his claim" in 
respect of the post he usurped. Distinguishing the directions issued in 
Milind (under Article 142). this Court held that: 
"JO.The protection under the Milind's case (supra) cannot be 
extended to the respondent No. I-employee as the protection was 
given under the peculiar factual background of that case. The 
employee concerned was a doctor <ind had rendered long years 
of service. This Court noted that on a doctor public money has 
been spent and. therefore, it will not be desirable to deprive the 
society ofa doctor's service. Respondent No. I-employee in the 
present case is a bank employee and the factor which weighed 
with this Court cannot be
applied to him." (Id. at p. 698) 
The above observations of the court arc also an indication that para 38 
of the decision in Milind was construed as consisting of directions issued 
under Article 141. For it was on that basis that the court in Avinash 
Mandivikar held that no case was made out for protecting the services 
of a bank employee who had obtained employment on the basis of a 
F 
false claim. Besides, this Comt also held that the first respondent having 
perpetrated a fraud, a claim for protection will not be legally sustainable 
and a person who had obtained employment by illegitimate means could 
not continue to enjoy the fiuits of the appointment despite the clear finding 
by the Scrutiny Committee that "he does not even have a shadow of a 
right even to be considered for appointment". This Court relied upon the 
G 
earlier decision in Vishwanatha Pillai (supra) in coming to its conclusion. 
22. Another decision of two learned Judges was in Additional 
General Manager/Human Resou·rccs, Bharat Heavy Electricals 
Ltd. Vs. Suresh Ramakrishna Burde' where a Division Bench of 
H 
• t2001) s sec 336
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
the Bombay High Court had ordered reinstatement subject to the condition 
that the employee would not stake a claim to belong to the Scheduled 
Tribe in future. The ct<•im of the employee "to belong to the Halba 
Scheduled Tribe was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. The 
employee had been appointed in May 1982 to a clerical post and in 
August 1995 the Scrutiny Committee had invalidated the caste claim 
initially and again in August 200 I following an order of remand. A Writ 
Petition filed against the order of invalidation was withdrawn but 
thereafter, relying on the observations in the concluding paragraph in 
Milind (supra) the employee submitted a representation for the 
protection of his services. After the representation was rejected, the 
employee moved the High Court which directed his reinstatement but 
with the condition that he would not claim the benefit of belonging to a 
Schedule Caste in future. While construing the decision in Milind (supra) 
(upon which the High Court had placed reliance), this Court observed as 
follows: 
309 
A 
B 
c 
"7. The High Court has granted relief to the respondent D 
and has directed his reinstatement only on the basis of the 
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of 
Maharashtra v. Milind (2001) 1 SCC 4. In our opinion the 
said judgment docs not lay down any such principle of law 
that where a person secures an
appointment by producing 
E 
a false caste certificate, his services can be protected and 
an order of reinstatement can be passed if he gives an 
undertaking that in future he and his family members shall 
not take any advantage of being memher of a caste which is 
in reserved category. The questions which required 
consideration by the Constitution Bench, are noted in the very 
first paragraph of the judgment and they are being reproduced 
below: 
1) Whether at all, ii is permissible to hold enquiry and let in 
evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community 
F 
or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community is 
G 
included in the general name even though it is not specifically 
mentioned in the concerned Entry in the Constitution 
(Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950? 
2) Whether 'Halba Kosflti' caste is a sub-tribe within the 
meaning of Entry 19 (Halba!Halbi) of !he said Scheduled H
310 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] ll S.C.R. 
Tribes Order relating 10 State of Maharashtra. even though it 
is not specijically mentioned as such, 
8. Aller thorough discussion of the matter the conclusions of the 
Bench are recorded in paragraph 36 of the report. It was held 
that it is not at all permissible to hold any enquiry or let in any 
evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community 
or part ofor group within any tribe or tribal community is included 
in the gemiral name even though it is not specifically mentioned in 
the concerned Entry in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 
1950. It was fmther held that the notification issued under Clause 
( l) of Article 342, specifying Scheduled Tribes, can be amended 
only by law to be made by Parliament and it is not open to the 
State Governments or courts or any other authority to modify, 
amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in the 
notification issued under Clause ( l) of Article 342 and the 
Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order 1950. The law declared 
by the Constitution Bench docs not at all lay down that 
where a person secures an appointment by producing a 
false caste certificate, his services can be protected on his 
giving an undertaking that in future he will not take any 
advantaflie of being a member or the reserved category." 
(Id. at p. 340-341) (emphasis supplied) 
In this view of the matter, the High Court was held to be in error in 
setting
aside the order of termination and in directing reinstatement of 
the employee. 
23. ABeneh of two Judges of this Court in State of Maharashtra 
Vs. Sanjav K. Nimjc7 considered a case where the respondent had 
been appointed to the service of the state in June l 995 on a claim that he 
belonged to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee upon 
verifying the caste certificate found in its order of August 1989 that the 
employee was a Koshti (a Special Backward Class) and not a Halba. 
The respondent accepted the findings of the Scrutiny Committee but on 
G the basis of a Government Resolution dated 15 June 1995 sought the 
protection of his service. This Court noted that on 7 December 1994 
Koshtis were declared to be a Special Backward Class. As regards the 
G.R. dated 15 June l 995, this Court came to the conclusion that since 
the respondent was appointed on 29 June 1995, which was after the 
H 
'(2007) 14SCC48l
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
311 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
G.R., he was not entitled to protection in terms thereof. Moreover, 
A 
adverting to Section 10 of the Act enacted by the Maharashtra state 
legislature, this Court observed that : 
"16. The 2000 Act being a legislative Act would prevail over 
any government resolution. A government resolution may 
be beneficent in nature but it is well settled that a benefit 
B 
under a government resolution cannot be extended to a 
person who docs not satisfy the conditions precedent 
thereof. In any event, the effect of the judgment of this 
Court as aiso the provisions of a statute in the light of the 
constitutional provisions contained in Articles 341 and 342 
of the Constitution of India cannot be diluted by reason of a 
C 
government resolution or otherwise." (Id. at p. 487) (emphasis 
supplied) 
In the view of this Court : 
"18. We may also notice that ordinarily a person, who has obtained 
appointment on the basis of a false certificate, cannot retain the 
said benefit. (Sec Bank oflndia v. Avinash D. Mandivikar [(2005) 
7 SCC 690: 2005 SCC (L&S) 1011], Ram Saran v. JG of Police, 
CRPF [(2006) 2 sec 541 : 2006 sec (L&S) 351 : (2006) 2 Scale 
131] and Supdt. of Post Offices v. R. Valasina Babu ((2007) 2 
SCC 335] .) In a situation of this nature, whether the Court will 
refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 
of the Constitution of India or not would depend
upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case. This aspect of the matter has 
been considered recently by this Court in Sandcep Subhash 
Parnte v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 7 SCC 501 : (2006) 8 Scale 
503] ."(Id. at p. 487) 
Finally this Court held that the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXlll of 
200 l must apply. Though at one point in time indulgence had been shown 
to students or to persons who were found to have acted bona fide this 
"would not mean that this Court would pass an order contrary to 
or inconsistent with the provisions of a legislative act''. 
24. The position in law was reaffirmed in a subsequent decision 
of a Bench of three Judges in Union of India Vs. Dattatray'. The 
respondent was appointed as an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry in a 
'(2008) 4 SCC612 
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[2017] 11 S.C.R. 
government hospital on the strength of a claim to belong to a Scheduled 
Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee in an order of March 1999 found that the 
claim that he belonged to the Halba Tribe was false. The High Court 
upheld the invalidation of the tribe claim but held that the respondent 
would not be entitled to any benefit as a member of the Scheduled Tribe 
from the date of its decision. In consequence, the services of the 
respondent were directed not to be disturbed. This Court held that the 
High Court had misconstrued the decision of the Constitution Bench in 
Milind (supra) and adverted to the peculiar circumstances in which 
protection was granted in that case to a student who had been admitted 
to a medical course over 15 years ago. Distinguishing that decision with 
the case at hand this Court observed that : 
"5 ... When a person secures employment by making a false 
claim regarding caste/tribe, he deprives a legitimate 
candidate belonging to scheduled caste/tribe, of 
employment. In such a situation, the proper course is to 
cancel the employment obtained on the basis of the false 
certificate so that the post may be filled up by a candidate 
who is entitled to the benefit of reservation." (Id at p. 614) 
(emphasis supplied) 
The judgment of the High Court directing the continuance of the first 
respondent in service was accordingly set aside. 
25. In Yogcsh Ramchandra Naikwadi Vs. The State of
Maharashtra', the direction contained in paragraph 38 of the decision 
of the Constitution Bench in Milind (supra) for protecting a student 
who had completed his medical studies, when nearly 15 years had elapsed, 
was held to be referable to the power conferred upon by this Court by 
Article 142 of the Constitution. This Court observed: 
"7. There may however be cases where it will not be proper to 
permit the student to retain the degree obtained by making a false 
claim. One example is where the candidates secure scats by 
producing forged or fake caste certificates. There may be cases, 
where knowing full well that they do not belong to a Scheduled 
Tribe/Caste, candidates may make a false claim that they belong 
to a Scheduled Tribe/Caste. There may also be cases where even 
'(2008J s sec 652
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
313 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
before the date of admission, the caste certificates of the candidates 
A 
might have been invalidated on verification by the Scrutiny 
Committee. There may be cases where the admissions may be in 
pursuance of interim orders granted by courts subject to final 
decision, making it clear that the candidate will not be entitled to 
claim any equities by reason of the admission. The benefit extended 
B 
in Mi/ind [(2001) 1 sec 4 : 2001 sec (L&S) 1111 
and Vishwanatha Pillai [(2004) 2 SCC I 05 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 
350) cannot obviously be extended uniformly to all such cases. 
Each case may have to be considered on its own merits. Further 
what has precedential value is the ratio decidendi of the 
decision and not the direction issued while moulding the 
C 
relief in exercise of power under Article 142 on the special 
facts and circumstances of a case. We are therefore of the 
view that Mili11d [(2001) l SCC 4: 2001 SCC (L&S) ll7] 
and Vislnva11atha Pillai [(2004) 2 SCC 105: 2004 SCC (L&S) 
350] cannot be considered as laying down a proposition that 
0 
in every case where a candidate's caste claim is rejected 
by a Caste Verification Committee, the candidate should 
invariably be permitted to retain the benefit of the admission 
and the consequential degree, irrespective of the facts." 
(Id at p. 654) (emphasis supplied) 
In the case at hand, though the Scrutiny Committee had rejected
the 
claim of the appellant even prior to his admission to the professional 
degree course in engineering. the High Court had directed by an interim 
order the grant of provisional admission. This Court observed that since 
the admission to an engineering course had been obtained nearly 13 
years earlier and the candidate had already secured a degree, h~ should 
be permitted to retain the benefit of the degree subject to the condition 
that he would not claim any further benefit as a member of a Scheduled 
Tribe and any expenditure incurred in terms of an exemption from the 
foe or a grant of scholarship. would be recovered. 
The following decisions ofthis Court, the act of obtaining a benefit reserved 
for designated castes, tribes and classes by an individual who does not 
belong to the designated community. on the basis of a false caste claim 
has been held to constitute an egregious violation, even a fraud on the 
Constitution : 
E 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017 J II S.C.R. 
A 
i. In Anjan Kumar Vs. Union of India & Orsw this court held 
B 
c 
that: 
.. 14 ... A person not belonging to the Scheduled Castes or 
Scheduled tribes claiming himself to be a member of such caste 
by procuring a bogus caste certificate is a fraud under the 
Constitutiop oflndia. The impact of procuring fake/bogus caste 
certificate ahd obtaining appointment/admission from the reserved 
quota will h;1ve far-reaching grave consequences. The meritorious 
reserved candidate may be deprived of reserved category for 
whom the post is reserved. The reserved post will go into the 
hand of non-deserving candidate and in such cases it would be 
violative of the mandate of Articles !1 and £1 of the Constitution 
ofindia." 
ii. In Stat,c of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Ravi Prakash 
Babulalsing Parmar & Anr", this court observed thus: 
0 
"'23. The makers of the Constitution laid emphasis on equality 
amongst citizens. The Constitution oflndia provides for protective 
discrimination and reservation so as to enable the disadvantaged 
group to come on the same platform as that of the forward 
community. If and when a person takes an undue advantage of 
the said beneficent provision of the Constitution by obtaining the 
E 
benefits of reservation and other benefits provided under the 
Presidential Order although he is not entitled thereto, he not only 
plays a fraud on the society but in effect and substance plays a 
fr-dud on the Constitution.
When. therefore, a certificate is granted 
to a person who is not otherwise entitled thereto, it is entirely 
F 
incorrect to contend that the State shall be helpless spectator in 
the matter." 
iii. Similar observations are co11tai11ed i11 the judgment of this 
court in Regio11(1( M"""ger, Ce11fr(I( B"nk Vs. M"dhulika G11r11 
Prasad Dahir11: 
G 
"13 .. .It would suffice to state that except in a few decisions, 
where the admission/appointment was not cancelled because of 
peculiar factual matrix obtaining therein, the consensus of judicial 
"t2006) 3 SC 257 
"(2007J t sec 80 
H 
"!llR 12008) SC 3!66
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD. J.] 
opinion is that equity, sympathy or generosity has no place where 
the original appointment rests on a false caste certificate. A person 
who enters the service by producing a false caste certificate and 
obtains appointment for the post meant for a Scheduled Caste or 
Scheduled Tribe or OBC, as the case may be, deprives a genuine 
candidate falling in either of the said categories, of appointment to 
that post, docs not deserve any sympathy or indulgence of this 
Court. He who comes to the Court with a claim based on falsity 
and deception cannot plead equity nor the Court would be j ustificd 
to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. .... " 
315 
A 
B 
26. We may now advert to a line of precedent, upon which reliance 
C 
has been placed by the private party claimants, to indicate the 
circumstances in which recourse has been taken by this Court to its 
jurisdiction under Article 142. Sandip Subhash Paratc Vs. State of 
Maharashtra'·'. is a decision ofa Bench of two Judges of this Court. 
The claim of the appellant to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe formed 
the basis of his admission to the B.E. degree course at the University of D 
Pune. The claim was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. In a writ 
petition challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee the appellant 
had the benefit of an interim order. Eventually the Writ Petition was 
allowed and the proceedings were
remanded to the Scrutiny Committee. 
The Scrutiny Committee on remand rejected the claim against which 
another writ petition was filed. Though no interim relief was granted in 
the writ petition the appellant was allowed to continue with his studies 
and he completed engineering studies in 2004. Both the Writ Petition 
and the Review Petition before the High Court were dismissed. On 
these facts. the bench of two j udgcs held that prima fircie the case of 
the appellant indicated that he was under a bona fide belief that Koshti-
Halbns were members of a Scheduled Tribe particularly since he had 
obtained admi.ssion prior to the decision in Milind (supra). Hence in the 
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 the Bench observed that it 
did not find any lack of bona tides on his part. The decision then holds 
that: 
"15 ... We, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, 
arc not inclined to go into the question as regards purported 
commission of fraud by the appellant, particularly, when the 
University admitted him without any demur whatsoever. We are 
" ( 20061 7 sec so 1 
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F 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] l l S.C.R. 
doing so having regard to the doctrine of proportionality. The 
appellant has suffered a lot. He might not be entirely responsible 
therefor. l;le might have been under a bona fide belief .hat he 
comes within the purview of notified category. We, 
therefore, a/beir with much reluctance accept the fervent and 
impassionate plan made by the learned counsel appearing for the 
appellant that he be allowed to obtain the degree. The same shall, 
however, be subject to payment of Rs 1 lakh in favour of the 
State of Maharashtra so as to recompense the State to some 
extent th¢ amount spent on him for imparting education as a 
reserved category candidate." (Id at p. 507) 
27. In Central Warehousing Corporation Vs. Jagdishkumar 
Vithalrno Panjankar 14, decided on 16 January 2007. a Bench of two 
Judges of this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 
protected the services of the respondent who had worked from 1984 on 
the strength of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe though it 
was found that he was a Koshti. A similar protection has been granted in 
State of Maharashtra Vs. Om Raj 15 by a Bench of two Judges where 
admission, or as the case may be, appointment to a service was obtained 
on the basis of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe though 
the individuals concerned were found to be Koshti. The decision dealt 
with a batch of cases which were held to be covered by
Milind. 
28. The long tenure of an employee was pressed in aid in a 
judgment of a Bench of two Judges of this Court in Raju Ramsing 
Vasavc Vs. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar" as a ground for the 
exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. In that case the first 
respondent was, on the strength of a Scheduled Tribe certificate of August 
1987, employed in the State Pollution Control Board and his status as a 
member of a Scheduled Tribe was confirmed in a decision of the High 
Court in August 1988. The Scrutiny Committee, however, invalidated 
the claim of the respondent to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. 
However. the High Court held that its earlier decision of August 1988 
G 
had attained finality and that.the status of the first respondent could not 
be questioned again. This Court by its judgment held that when an 
advantage is obtained by a person in violation of the constitutional scheme 
H 
"C. A .No. 233 of 2007 
"(2007l t 4 sec 488 
,. (2008l 9 sec 54
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.) 
a constitutional fraud is committed. The earlier decision of the High 
Court which was rendered without a factual foundation was held not to 
operate as res judicata. However, since the Bombay High Court had 
allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent in 1988 and he had 
continued in service since long, recourse was taken to the jurisdiction 
under Article 142, to protect his service albeit on the basis that he belongs 
to the general category. The benefit of the protection of service was 
again granted by a Bench of two judges in Punjab National Bank Vs. 
Vilas Govindrao Bokade 17• A similar protection has been extended in 
Vijaykumar Vs. State of Maharashtra", Damodhar Vs. Secretary, 
Industrial, Energy & Labour Department", Raiwad Manojkumar 
Nivruttirno Vs. State of Maharashtra20 and Dattu Namdev Thakur 
Vs. State of Maharashtra". 
29. A decision rendered by this Court in 2012 in the case of 
Kavita Vasant Sohmke Vs. State of Maharashtra" involved a situation 
where the appellant applied for the post of a teacher in a high school 
which was reserved for a Scheduled Tribe claiming to be a Halba. She 
was appointed on probation in August 1995 and was confirmed in service. 
The proceeding before the Scrutiny Committee revealed that the appellant 
was a Koshti by caste and not a Halba as a result of which the caste 
certificate was cancelled. This led to the termination of the
services of 
the appellant on 23 February 2008. The School Tribunal dismissed the 
appeal filed by the appellant on 28 September 2008 and the writ petition 
before the High Court resulted in an order of rejection. This Court held 
that the Scrutiny Committee had not found that the caste certificate was 
false, fabricated or manipulated or that the Scrutiny Committee found 
any fraud, fabrication or misrepresentation. In the circumstances, this 
Court directed that the services of the appellant be protected but that 
she would not be entitled to any further benefits on the basis of the caste 
certificate cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee: 
"22. Applying the above to the case at hand we do not see any 
reason to hold that the appellant had fabricated or falsified 
"(2008) 14 sec 545 
"c2010) 14 sec 489 
"(2010) 15 sec 537 
'"l2011J 9 sec 798 
" r201 ZJ 1 sec 549 
"(2012)8SCC430 
317 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] ll S.C.R. 
the particulars of being a Scheduled Tribe only with a view 
to obtain an undeserved benefit in the matter of appointment 
as a teacher. There is, therefore, no reason why the benefit 
of protection against ouster should not be extended to her 
subject to the usual condition that the appellant shall not be ousted 
from service and shall be reinstated if already ousted. but she 
would not be entitled to any further benefit on the basis of the 
certificate ,which she has obtained and which was I 0 years after 
its issue cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee." (Id. at p. 440) 
(emphasis supplied) 
This decision of two lcamcdjudges docs not indicate that the provisions 
of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 were noticed. 
30. The issue was revisited in another decision of two judges in 
Shafini Gajananrao Dalal Vs. New English High Schoof 
Association23 • The appellant obtained a certificate of belonging to the 
Halba Scheduled Tribe in July 1974. On the strength ofa claim that the 
Gadwal Koshti caste (to which she belonged) had consanguinity to the 
Halba Scheduled Tribe, she was appointed as an Assistant Teacher and 
was confirmed in 1984. She was promoted as a Head Mistress in 1994. 
The Scrntiny Committee in August 2003 held that the caste certificate 
obtained by the appellant was invalid. A learned Single Judge of the 
High C()urt granted protection in service on the strength of a G.R. dated 
15 June 1995.
Thereafter protracted litigation ensued which eventually 
resulted in a Single Judge of the High Court setting aside the order of 
reinstatement passed by the School Tribunal. This order was confirmed 
in appeal by a Division Bench of the High Coutt. Summarising the position 
which emerged from earlier decisions of two judges, this Court has held 
that: 
"7.1. If any person has fraudulently claimed to belong to a 
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and has thereby obtained 
employment, he would be disentitled from continuing in 
employment. The rigour of this conclusion has been diluted only 
in instances where the coutt is confronted with the case of students 
who have already completed their studies or are on the verge of 
doing so, towards whom sympathy is understandably extended. 
'' (2013) 16 sec s26
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
319 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
7.2. Where there is some confusion concerning the eligibility to 
A 
the benefits flowing from Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe 
status, such as issuance of relevant certificates to persons claiming · 
to be "Koshtis" or "Halba-Koshtis" under the broadband of 
"Halbas'', protection of employment will be available with the rider 
that these persons will thereafter be adjusted in the geneml category 
B 
thereby rendering them ineligible to further benefits in the category 
of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe as the case may be. 
7.3. This benefit accrues from the decision of this Court inter alia 
in Raju 
Ramsing 
Vasave v. Mahesh 
Deorao 
Bhivapurkar ((2008) 9 SCC 54: (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 802) which 
was rendered under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 
C 
Realising the likely confusion in the minds of even honest persons 
the Resolutions/Legislation passed by the State Governments 
should spare some succour to this section of persons. This can be 
best. illustrated by the fact that it was in Mi/ind [State of 
Maharashtra v. Mi/ind, (2001) 1 SCC 4: 2001 SCC (t&S) 117] 
D 
that the Constitution Bench clarified that "Koshtis" or "Halba-
Koshtis" were not entitled to claim benefits as Scheduled Tribes 
and it was the "Halbas" alone who were so entitled. A perusal of 
the judgment in Vilas[Pwyab National Bank v. Vilas, (2008) 14 
SCC 545 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 143] by
Sirpurkar, J., as well 
as Solunke [Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 
E 
8 SCC 430 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 609) makes it clear that this 
protection is available by virtue of the decisions of this Court; it is 
not exclusively or necessarily predicated on any Resolution or 
Legislation of the State Legislature." (Id. at pgs. 533-534) 
The High Comt in that case had while rejecting the claim of the appellant 
relied upon the decision of three Judges in Dattatray (supra). However, 
this Court held that the decision in Dattatray cannot be construed to 
have overruled earlier decisions of two Judges. In that context this Court 
has held that : 
F 
"8. Areadingofthe impugnedjudgment [Shalini v. New English 
G 
High School Assn., LPA No. 527 of 2009, order dated 25-11-
2009 (Born)) requires us to clarify an important aspect of the 
doctrine of precedence. Dattatray [Union of India v. Dattatray, 
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(2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] is the only three-
Judge Bench decision, and therefore indisputably holds pre-
eminence. However, by that time several decisions had already 
been rendered by two-Judge Benches some of which have already 
been discussed above. It was within the competence 
of Dattatray [Union ol lndia v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : 
(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] Bench to overrule the other two-Judge 
Benches. Despite the fact that it has not done so the per incuriam 
principle would not apply to the decision because it was a larger 
Bench. However, no presumption can be drawn that 
the Da11atray [Union of India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : 
(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] three-Judge Bench decision was of the 
opinion that the earlier two-J udgc Bench decisions had articulated 
an incorrect interpretation of the law. That being so. the two-
Judge Bench views may still be relied upon so long as the ratio 
of Dallatray [Union of India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : 
(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] is not directly in conflict with their ratios. 
It is therefore imperative to distil the ratio of Da11a1ray [Union 
of India v. Da11a1ray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 
6] , which we have already discussed in some detail. We need 
only reiterate therefore that the three-Judge Bench was perceptibly 
incensed with the falsity of the claim of the employee to Scheduled 
Caste/Scheduled Tribe status. That
was not a case where a 
legitimate claim of consanguinity to a "Halba-Koshti", "Koshti" 
or "Gadwal Koshti'', etc. had been made, which was at the 
inception point considered to be eligible to beneficial treatment 
admissible to Scheduled Tribes, later to be reversed by the 
Constitution 
Bench 
decision 
in Mi/ind [State 
of 
Maharashtra v. Mi/ind, (2001) I SCC 4: 2001 SCC (L&S) 117) 
and declared to be the entitlement ofHalbas only." (Id. at p. 534) 
In the view of this Court, Section l 0 of the Act cancels any benefit 
which may have been derived by a person on the basis of a false caste 
certificate. Explaining the ambit of the provision, the Court has held that: 
"11 ..... Whilst "Caste Certificate" has been defined in Section 2(a) 
of the 2000 Act, "False Caste Certificate" has not been dealt with 
in the Definitions clause. There is always an element of 
deceitfulness, in order to derive unfair or undeserved benefit 
whenever a false statement or representation or stand is adopted
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDJSH 
321 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
by the person concerned. An innocent statement which later A 
transpires to be incorrect may be seen as false in general sense 
would normally not attract punitive or detrimental consequences 
on the person making it, as it is one made by error. An untruth 
coupled with a dishonest intent however requires legal retribution. 
It appears to us that Section I 0 applies in Dalla/ray [Union of B 
India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] 
mould only." (Id. at p. 536) 
The above extract indicates that this Court has in Shalini imported a 
requirement of dishonest intent, before the withdrawal of benefits 
mandated by Section l 0 of the State legislation can take effect. 
Since there was no falsity in the claim of the appellant, the Court held 
that Section l 0 would not apply to her case. The appellant was accordingly 
reinstated without any back-wages subject to the condition that she would 
not be entitled to any further promotion as a Scheduled Tribe candidate. 
c 
31. In R. Unnikrishnan Vs. V. K. Mahanudcvan 24 the D 
respondent applied for the grant of a Scheduled Caste certificate on the 
basis that he was a Thandan which was a notified Scheduled Caste. 
The Tahsi ldar found that the respondent did not belong to the Scheduled 
Caste in question. In the course of writ proceedings, the High Court 
directed the Tahsildar to issue a caste certificate following which
the 
respondent was appointed as an Assistant Executive Engineer in a Special 
E 
Recruitment Drive for Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe candidates. 
Subsequently, following the decision ofa Full Bench of the Kcrala High 
Co mt. the caste certificate of the respondent came under scrutiny and it 
was found that the respondent actually belonged to the Ezhuva community 
which fell in the OBC category. The respondent challenged the enquiry 
proceedings in a Writ Petition. The High Court quashed the enquiry. The 
D.ivision Bench of the High Court in appeal directed a fresh enquiry into 
the caste status of the respondent. A fresh enquiry resulted in the finding 
F 
that ihe claim of the respondent to belong to a Scheduled Caste was 
invalid. Following the order of the High Court the State Government 
held that the respondent did not belong to a Scheduled Caste but belonged 
G 
to a community which was designated as an OBC and if any benefits 
have been obtained on a wrongful basis, they would be recovered. Both 
the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court and in appeal the 
Division Bench held that the caste status of the respondent had already 
"(2014)4 SCC434 
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attained finality and could not be reopened. This Court observed that in 
Palghat Jilla Thandan Samndhaya Samrakshna Smithi Vs. State of 
Kerala25, it had held that the Thandan community being listed in the 
Scheduled Castes Order 1950, it was not open to the State to embark 
upon an enquiry whether a section ofEzhuva/ Thiyya which was called 
Thandan in the Malabar area was excluded from the benefits of the 
Order. This Court noted that by an amendment of2007 to the Constitution 
Scheduled Castes Order, Ezhuvas and Thiyyas in the erstwhile Cochin 
and Malabar areas are no longer Scheduled Castes with effect from 30 
August 2007 and would no longer be entitled to be treated as a Scheduled 
Caste nor will the benefits ofrescrvation be admissible. However, after 
adverting to the decisions in Milind, Kavita Solunke and Sandeep 
Pa rate this Court held that: 
"41. In the instant case there is no evidence oflack of bona fides 
by the respondent. The protection available under the decision 
of Mi/ind case [State of Maharashtra v. Mi/ind, (2001) l SCC 
4: 2001 SCC (L&S) 117] could, therefore, be admissible even to 
the respondent. It follows that even if on a true and correct 
construction of the expression "Thandan" appearing in the 
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 2007 did not include 
"Ezhuvas" and "Thiyyas" 1cr\9wn as "Thandan" and assuming that 
the two were different at all relevant points of time, the fact
that 
the position was not clear till the Amendment Act of2007 made a 
clear distinction between the two, would entitle all those appointed 
to serve the State up to the date the amending Act came into 
force, to continue in service." (Id. at pgs. 453-453) 
32. We may also at this stage advert to a judgment of two learned 
F 
judges of this Court in B. ff. Khawas Vs. Union of India". In that 
case, the appellant was appointed as a Chemical Engineer Grade-I in 
the Customs and Central Excise Department in June 1995 against a 
vacancy reserved for a Scheduled Tribe. The letter of appointment 
G 
H 
provided that the appointment was provisional and subject to verification 
of the caste certificate. His services were terminated in 2004 following 
a decision of the Scrutiny Committee that he belonged to the Koshti 
which is not a Scheduled Tribe in the State ofMaharashtra. The appellant 
submitted a representation on the receipt of the order of the Scrutiny 
"(1994J 1sec359 
"(2016) 8 SCC715
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D: Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
Committee claiming that he had not furnished false information and the 
caste certificate was obtained by him bona fide on the basis of the school 
record. The appellant also claimed that the issue as to whether the Koshti 
caste is a part of the Halba Scheduled Tribe was the subject matter of 
intense debate until it was resolved on 28 November 2000 by the 
Constitution Bench in Milind (supra). Eventually he moved the Central 
Administrative Tribunal which directed that the appointment of the 
appellant which was made prior to the decision in Milind (supra) should 
be protected. When the decision of the Tribunal was assailed, the Division 
Bench of the High Court relied on the decision in Dattatray (supra) and 
restored the order of termination dated 8 June 2004. In appeal before 
323 
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this Court, it was urged that the decision of the Constitution Bench in 
Milind (supra) protected all appointments which had become final. This 
Court observed that in paragraph 38 of the decision of the Constitution 
Bench in Milind it has been made clear that "the admissions and 
appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this 
judgment". The appointment of the appellant as ChcmicalEnginccrGrade-
D 
I was, it was held, provisional and subject to the verification of his caste 
claim. It was not treated as being final by the department till the order of 
termination was
issued. Since the appointment was made on a provisional 
basis subject to the verification of the caste certificate it was held that 
the appellant was not entitled to the protection of his service. Both the 
earlier decisions in Ka vita Sohmkc and in Shalini were distinguished 
on the ground that in the former the appointment had attained finality 
and could not be disturbed while in the subsequent decision also, the 
appointment as an Assistant Teacher had attained finality and she had 
been confirmed in service. Similarly in Unnikrishnan the Court was 
held to be dealing with a matter where the caste claim was already a 
subject matter of challenge before the Court and had been upheld. In 
this background, this Court in Khawas held as follows : 
"14. In none of the cases pressed into service by the appellant, 
the appointment, as in this case, was on provisional basis and 
subject to verification of caste certificate through proper channel. 
It necessarily follows that the principle expounded in the three 
decisions referred to above, can have no application to the case 
on hand. Indubitably, if the argument of the appellant was accepted, 
it would inevitably mean that alt appointments made before 28-
11-2000 must be protected even though it had not become final. 
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That would also mean that all caste certificates issued to persons 
belonging to Koshti community, as being Halba Scheduled Tribe 
in Maharashtra, prior to 28-11-2000 (the day on which Mi/ind 
case [Stare of Maharashtra v. Mi/ind, (200 I) 1 SCC 4 : 2001 
SCC (L&S) 117] was decided by the Constitution Bench), have 
been validated irrespective of the opinion of the Scrutiny 
Committee qua those certificates. That cannot be countenanced. 
For caste Koshti is neither a synonym nor part of a notified 
Scheduled Tribe Halba in Maharashtra." (Id. at p. 721) 
Following this principle. it was held thatthe appellant was not entitled to 
any relief on the finding that his appointment as Chemical Engineer had 
not attained finality. Once the Scrutiny Committee held that the appellant 
did not belong to the Halba community the High Court was held to be 
justified in allowing the writ petition filed by the Department. The order 
of termination was hence restored. 
The decision of this Court in Kha was specifically rejects the submission 
D 
that the decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind would protect all 
appointments made before 28 November 2000 even though they were 
not final. If the appointment was yet to be subject to scrutiny by the 
Caste Scrutiny Committee it would evidently not have attained finality 
prior to the date of the judgment in Milind (supra). 
E 
F Decisions of the Bombay High Court 
33. In R?mcsh Suresh
Kamble v. State of Maharashtra''. a 
Full Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Mr Justice RM 
Lodha (as the learned Chief Justice then was), Mr Justice SA Bobde 
(as the learned Judge then was) and Mr Justice SB Deshmukh considered 
F 
the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I. particularly Sections 
7( I) and I 0(1) in the context of the electoral disqualification ofa Councillor 
elected under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act following the 
invalidation of the caste certificate. After adverting to the decision of an 
earlier Full Bench in Sujit Vasant Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra", 
G 
the Full Bench held thus : 
"24 .... The inquiry under section 7(1) of Maharashtra Act No. 
XXIII of2001 by the Caste Scrutiny Committee is focussed on 
the correctness of the Caste Certificate obtained by such person 
"(2007) I Mh. L.J 423 
H 
"(2004) 3 Mh. L J 1109
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
325 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
from the Competent Authority. The, Caste Certificate is issued 
A 
by the Competent Authority on the application made by the 
concerned person disclosing certain information. If the 
Caste Certificate is cancelled by the Caste Scrutiny 
Committee, it obviously means that the Caste Cerlificatc 
has been obtained by that person from the Competent 
B 
Authority on incorrect facts or erroneous representation. 
It is not necessary that such claim or declaration must 
involve turpitude of mind. There may not be any 
deliberateness in it. The failure on the part of the candidate 
to establish his caste claim before the Scrutiny Committee 
and the declaration that the Certificate obtained from the 
C 
Competent Authority is invalid and thereby cancelled leads 
to necessary inference that such person made a false claim 
of his caste belonging to the reserved category to which he 
did not belong and, thus, incurring disqualification w1der section 
16(1C)(a)." (Id atp. 438) (emphasis supplied) 
Again, in the view of the Full Bench: 
"26. A candidate who sets up a claim as belonging to a particular 
caste by making an application to the Competent Authority and 
obtains the Caste Certificate based on such claim and information 
and contests the election of the Councillor from the reserved seat 
and gets elected and if, ultimately, the Scrutiny Committee upon 
inquiring into the correctness of
such certificate declares such 
certificate invalid and cancels the same, it is obvious that such 
Caste Certificate has been obtained by that person on the basis of 
the declaration or information or claim which was not correct or 
true and upon invalidation and cancellation of the Caste Certificate 
by the Scrutiny Committee, such person incurs disqualification 
automatically. There is no escape from it." (Id. at p. 438) 
D 
E 
F 
Another Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ganesh Rambhau 
Khalale Vs. State of Maharashtra" held that the directions which 
G 
were issued by the Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 38 of 
its decision in Milind were in exercise of the power conferred by Article 
142 of the Constitution. 
"(2009) 2 Mh. L,J. 788 
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34. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court m Priyanka 
Omprakash Panwar Vs. State of Maharashtra'" has construed the 
provisions of Section 10 of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I in holding 
thus: 
"3 .... The balance between the equitable consideration of 
protecting tbe interest of a student who has pursued his education 
and the public interest in protecting the reserved categories against 
the usw-pation of their constitutional entitlements by imposters has 
now been qrnde by the State Legislatw-e .... The Legisjature has 
expressly stipulated that a degree or diploma obtained on the basis 
of a caste claim which is in validated shall stand cancelled. In the 
face of an express legislative provision, this Colli"! shall not be 
justified in exercising its equitable jurisdiction. Considerations of 
equity that guide the Court in constitutional adjudication under 
Article 226 of the Constitution must be in accordance with the 
law enacted by the Legislature .... Stringent provisions have been 
made to protect the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other 
reserved categories. To dilute those provisions by importing 
equitable considerations for a candidate who has usurped benefits 
would be to defeat the law. The legislation was in this case 
conceived in the interests of protecting the constitutional scheme 
of reservations from usurpation by those who are not entitled." 
(Id. at p. 848) 
This decision
has been followed in a subsequent decision in A1mrva 
Ashok Gokhale Vs. State of Maharashtra". 
35. In Arun Vishwanath Sonone Vs. State of Maharashtra'', 
two questions were referred for decision to a Full Ben~h of the Bombay 
HighCow-t: 
"I. Whether the relief of protection of service after invalidation 
of the caste claim can be granted by the High Colli"! on the basis 
of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kavita Solunke 
v. State of Maharashtra and other, 2012(5) Mh. L.J. (S.C) 921 = 
2012 (8) sec 430 ? ... 
2. If the answer to question No. I is in the affirmative, can such 
relief of protection of service be granted by the High Court in a 
"(2009) 4 Mh L.J. 847 
31 (20131 I Mh. LJ 139 
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"(2015) I Mh L.J. 457
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
327 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
case where the same relief has been earlier refused by the High 
A 
Cowt'!" (Id at p. 465)" 
The Full Bench has held that a caste certificate whether issued prior to 
or after the coming into force of Maharashtra Act XXIII of200 I is valid 
subject to verification and the grant of a validity certificate by the Scrutiny 
Committee. The Full Bench has taken the view that Section I 0 of the 
B 
State Act regarding the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a 
false caste certificate operates with effect from 18 October 200 I. Section 
I 0, in the view of the High Court is "essentially penal in nature" and 
shall have no effect on the benefits secured or an appointment obtained 
prior to Jhe coming into force of the enactment. Hence, the view of the 
High Court is that : 
C 
"27 .... The consequences of discharge from employment or 
withdrawal of benefits secured or obtained by producing a false 
caste certificate shall not operate in respect of benefits or 
appointments obtained or secured prior to coming into force of 
the said Act." (Id. at p. 475) 
The full Bench has taken the view that the observations of this~ourt in 
Sbalini Gajananrao Dalal Vs. New English High School 
Association" impliedly overruled the earlier judgments of the Full 
Benches of the High Court in Sujit Vasant Patil and Ganesh Rambhau 
Khalalc (supra). In the view of the Full Bench an innocent
statement 
made by error should not in the absence of an element of deceitfulness 
operate to deprive a candidate of the benefits obtained on the foundation 
of a false certificate. The Full Bench held, following decision of this 
Court in Kavita Solunkc , that : 
"From the decision of the Apex Court in Ka vita Solunke's case, it 
can be gathered that the protection granted in Milind's case would 
not be available where any fraud or any fabrication or any 
misrepresentation is made with a view to obtain an undeserved 
benefit in the matterof appointment. lfthere is no accusation that 
the certificate was false, fabricated or manipulated by concealment 
or otherwise, the refusal of benefit flowing from the decision in 
Milind's case may not be justified." 
The judgment of the Full Bench also holds that the directions· which 
were issued by the Constitution Bench in Milind are in two parts - the 
"r201J) 16 sec 526 
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first bcmg to save the admission and degree secured while the other is 
of a general nature invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling to 
save admissions and appointments that have become final. Hence, 
according to the Putt Bench, the ratio of the earlier Full Bench judgment 
in Ganesh Ramhhau Khalalc holding that the clarificatory directions 
in :vtilind were referable to Article 142 would run contrary to the 
decisions in Kavi$a Solunkc and Shalini and would cease to be a binding 
precedent. Consequently, the first question which was referred to the 
Full Bench has been answered in the affirmative by holding that the 
relief of the protection of services after the invalidation ofa caste claim 
can be granted by the High Court on the basis of the decisions of this 
Court in Ka vita Solunkc and Shalini. 
G Submissions 
36. Jn the present batch of cases, the almost uniform facet is that 
the claim to belong to a reserved category has been rejected upon scrutiny. 
D 
37. On behalf of the persons whose caste or tribe claims have 
been rejected, the following submissions have been urged: 
i. The issue with regard to caste certificates granted prior to 28 
November 2000 is not res integra in view of the dictum laid down in 
paragraph 38 of the judgment of this Court in Milind. The decision in 
E 
Milind gave a positive direction to the effect that appointments that had 
become final on or before 28 November 2000 (the
date when the 
judgment was delivered) shall remain unaffected. The Constitution Bench 
dealt with appointments as welt as admissions to educational institutions. 
Following the decision in Milind this Court disposed of several cases 
relating to Halba-Koshti and did not disturb appointments which had 
F 
been made prior to 28 November 2000. The directions in lVIilind are 
based on the doctrine of prospective overruling; 
ii. No issue was joined before the High Court to the effect that 
the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIJI of 200 I arc retrospective and 
would interdict admissions or appointments made prior to the enforcement 
G 
of the Act. In any case such a stand would be contrary to the binding 
circulars issued by the State Government; and 
H 
iii. Maharashtra Act XXIII of2001 is not retrospective in operation. 
The statute being of a penal nature, it cannot be construed to be 
retrospective since that would render it violative of Article 20(!) of the
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FC! v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
Constitution. The Act was notified on 17 October 200 I with effect from 
18 October 200 I which is the relevant date under Section I (2). 
iv. While Section 7 empowers the Scrutiny Committee to cancel 
any certificate which has been obtained before or after the 
commencement of the Act, the expression "before or after the 
commencement of this Act" is absent in Sections I 0 and 11. Consequently, 
though Section 7 may be retroactive in operation, Sections I 0 and I I 
which relate to the withdrawal of benefits ard in regard to penal offences 
arc prospective. 
Besides the above submissions it has also been urged that in so far as 
Halba-Koshtis arc concerned : 
i. Though in Entry 19 of the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 only" 
Halba-Halbi" has been recognised as a Scheduled Tribe, until the decision 
329 
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of the Constitution Bench in Milind, Halba - Koshtis were "socially and 
officially" recognized and accepted as a sub-tribe ofHalba-Halbi. This 
may have been as a result of the judicial pronouncement made by the 
High Court from 1956 or the circulars issued by the State Government; 
D 
ii. It was on 28 November 2000 that the Constitution Bench in 
Milind held that Halba - Koshtis do not fall within the purview ofEntry 
19 of the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950. Hence, it cannot be said that a 
caste ce1tificate issued at any time prior to 28 November 2000 in favour 
of a citizen
who was a Halba Koshti was false or a fraud and it can only 
E 
be held that such a person ceased to be recognized as Halba-Halbi 
Scheduled Tribe; 
iii. Section I I of Maharashtra Act XXlll of2001 which is in the 
nature of a penal provision will not be applicable to caste certificates 
which were issued prior to 18 October 200 I; 
F 
iv. On 15 January 1995, a government resolution was issued by 
the Government of Maharashtra that appointments made prior to that 
date against reserved posts would remain protected even if the caste/ 
tribe claim of the appointee was invalidated or found to be false; 
v. Where an appointment in service has been acquired by practicing 
fraud or deceit such an appointment is no appointment in law and in such 
a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted. This position 
will not be applicable to claimants of the Halba - Kosh tis caste to whom 
caste certificates were issued and appointments were made prior to 28 
November 2000; and 
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vi. On IOAugust 2010, the Union Government in the Ministry of 
Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Depaitment of Personnel 
and Training issued an office memorandum to the effect that persons 
belonging to the Halba, Balbi I Koshti castes who got appointment against 
a vacancy reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of certificates 
issued by the COllllpetent authority and whose appointments have been 
rendered final prior to 28 November 2000 shall not be affected. 
vii. On 21 C>ctober 2015, the State of Maharashtra issued a circular 
directing that employees who have been appointed against posts reserved 
for Scheduled Tribes in governnmnt services between 15 January 1995 
and. 17 October 200 I, whose claims have been invalidated, shall not be 
disbanded/terminated until further orders. In view of this circular, the 
State Government is estopped from challenging the Full Bench decision 
of the High Court in A run Sononc. 
H PART II : Analysis 
D · 
38. Having put together the body of material on the subject, 
including the precedents and legislation governing the area, the stage for 
analysis is now reached. That is what this j udgmcnt now seeks to embark 
upon. 
39. The backdrop for the decision in Madhuri Patil (supra) was 
E 
provided by the significant scale on which benefits were secured by 
imposters by passing themselves off as members of castes, tribes and 
classes for whom reservations have been
earmarked pursuant to 
constitutional provisions. By its directions which this Court issued on 2 
September 1994 provision was made for the constitution of committees 
for verification of claims belonging to a designated caste, tribe or class. 
F 
This Court explained the modalities to be followed by the Scrutiny 
Committees and the manner in which action would be taken if a claim 
was found to be false. The directions which were issued by this Court 
envisaged that upon a claim being found to be false or spurious : 
(i) the Caste Scrutiny Committee should pass an order cancelling 
G 
and confiscating the certificate; 
H 
(ii) the cancellation of the certificate should be communicated to 
the educational institution where the candidate has been admitted or to 
the appointing authority where the candidate is employed;
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
331 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
(iii) upon this, the head of the institution or the appointing authority 
A 
should cancel the admission or appointment without further notice and 
debar the candidate from further study or continuance in office; and 
(iv) a prosecution should be launched against the candidate or, as 
the case may be, the parents or guardians responsible for making the 
false claim. The regime postulated in the judgment of this Court in 
Madhuri Patil (supra) took effect from 2 September 1994, which was 
the date of the judgment. Eventually in the State of Maharashtra these . 
directions received legislative recognition upon the enactment of the 
Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I which came into force in the State on 
18 October 2001. However, it is impo11ant to notice that even before the 
State Legislature stepped in to confer a statutory form to the directions 
which were issued by this Court in Madhuri Patil (supra) the regime, 
as it then obtained prior to the enactment of the law, also envisaged 
consequences upon a caste or tribe claim being found to be false upon a 
verification by the Scrutiny Committee. The cancellation ofa certificate 
would, as a necessary consequence, involve the invalidation of the 
appointment to a post or admission to an educational institution. Where a 
candidate had been appointed to a reserved post on the basis of the 
claim that he or she was a member of the group
for which the reservation 
is intended, the invalidation of the claim to belong to that group would, as 
a necessary consequence, render the appointment void ab initio. The 
rationale for this is that a candidate who would otherwise have to compete 
for a post in the general pool ofunreserved seats had secured appointment 
in a more restricted competition confined to the reserved category and 
usurped a benefit meant for a designated caste, tribe or class. Once it 
was found that the candidate had obtained admission upon a false 
representation to belong to the reserved category, the appointment would 
be vitiated by fraud and would be void ab initio. The falsity of the claim 
lies in a representation that the candidate belongs to a category of persons 
for whom the reservation is intended whereas in fact the candidate does. 
not so belong. The reason for depriving the candidate of the benefit 
which she or he has obtained on the strength of such a claim, is that a 
person cannot retain the fruits of a false claim on the basis of which a 
scarce public resource is obtained. The same principle would apply where 
a candidate secures admission to an educational institution on the basis 
of a false claim to belong to a reserved category. A candidate who does 
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so causes detriment to a genuine candidate who actually belongs 10 the 
reserved category who is deprived of the seat. For that matter a detriment 
is caused to the entire class of persons for whom reservations are 
intended. the members of which are excluded as a result ofan admission 
granted to an imposter who docs not belong to the class. The withdrawal 
of benefits. either in terms of the revocation of employment or the 
termination of an admission was hence a necessary corollary of the 
invalidation of the claim on the basis of which the appointment or 
admission was obtained. The withdrawal of the benefit was not based 
on mens rea or the intent underlying the assertion of a false claim. In the 
case of a criminal prosecution, intent would be necessary. On the other 
hand, the withdrawal of civil benefits flowed as a logical result of the 
invalidation of a claim to belong to a group or category for whom the 
reservation is intended. This was the position under the regime which 
prevailed following the decision in Madhuri Patil. 
40. The Constitution Bench of this Court which decided Milind 
(supra) was on a reference whether it is permissible to hold an enquiry 
and let in evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community 
or a part or group within the tribe or community is included in the general 
name. even though it is not so specifically mentioned in the entry contained 
in the
Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. The Constitution 
Bench held that it was not permissible either to hold an enquiry or to 
allow evidence 10 decide that though a tribe (or its sub group) is not 
specifically included in the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 it must, 
nonetheless. be treated or deemed to be included in the general name. 
The view of this Court is that an entry in the Order has to be read as it 
stands. However, the Constitution Bench in paragraph 38 of its decision, 
having due regard to the circumstances of the individual cases before 
the Court, protected the degree obtained by the candidate concerned. 
This Court also provided that having regard to the passage of time including 
interim orders which were passed, the admissions and appointments that 
have become final would remain unaffected by the judgment. The 
observations in paragraph 38 of the decision of the Constitution Bench 
have been construed in at least the following judgments of this Court as 
directions referable to Article 142 of the Constitution: 
(i) Bank of India Vs. Avinash D.Mandivikar"'; 
"(2005) 7 sec 690 at para 10
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
333 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
(ii) Additional General Manager- Human Resource, Bharat 
A 
Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde"; 
(iii) Union oflndia Vs. Dattatray, S/o. Namdeo Mcndhckar36 
;and 
(iv) Yogcsh Ramchandra Naikwadi Vs. State of 
Maharashtra". 
B 
41. Since the decision of the Bench of three judges in 
R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State ofKcrala (supra) the position oflaw 
which has been laid down by this Court is that where an appointment to 
a post or admission to an educational institution is made against a vacancy 
which is reserved for a Scheduled Caste or Tribe or a socially and 
C 
educationally backward class. the invalidation of the claim of the candidate 
would result in the appointment or, as the case may be, the admission 
being void and non est. This principle has been followed by another 
judgment of three Judges in Dattatray (supra). The same position has 
been propounded by a two judge bench in Bank of India Vs. Avinash 
Mandivikar (supra). The formal termination of an employment or the 
withdrawal of admission is a necessary consequence which flows out of 
D 
the invalidation of the caste or tribe claim. The only exception to this 
principle consists of those cases where, in exercise of the power conferred 
by Article 142, the Court considered it appropriate and proper to protect 
the admission which was granted or, as the case may be, the appointment 
to the post. 
42.
In Ka vita Sohmkc (supra) the appellant had been appointed 
on the strength of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in 
AugLL~t 1995. After the tribe claim was verified by the Scrutiny Committee 
E 
it was found that the appellant was in fact a Koshti and not a member of F 
the Halba Scheduled Tribe following which an order of termination was 
issued. The sole ground on which the termination was challenged and 
which was accepted by the bench of two judges was that since the 
appointment of the appellant had attained finality, it could not have been 
set aside on the ground that the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled 
G 
Tribe. Maharashtra Act XXlll of 200 I was evidently not placed before 
the court in Kavita Solunkc (supra) and has not been noticed. Upon 
"(2007) 5 sec 336 at paras 7-9 and 13 
·"' (2008) 4 sec 612 at paras 5-7 
"(2008) 5 sec 652 at paras 5 & 6 
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the enactment of the Act, the invalidation of a caste certificate by the 
Scrutiny Committee would as a statutory mandate result in the withdrawal 
of the benefits which had accrued on the strength of the claim and where 
a candidate had been appointed to a reserved post, termination would 
follow the finding that the candidate did not belong to the category for 
whom the post WflS reserved. If the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII 
of 200 I were to be considered by the bench of two judges, it would be 
apparent that under the provisions of Section 7 the Scrutiny Committee 
is empowered tQ verify a caste certificate whether issued before or 
after the commencement of the Act and if it comes to the conclusion 
that the caste certificate is fals·c and is obtained fraudulently it is 
empowered to order its cancellation and confiscation. Section I 0 provides 
for the withdrawal of benefits secured when a caste certificate is 
concerned for its falsity. Falsity is adjudicated upon when an order of 
cancellation is passed under Section 7. Once a caste certificate is 
cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee under Section 7, the individual 
0 
affected by the order has a remedy to challenge its cancellation before 
the High Court under Article 226. lfthe challenge fails or if the challenge 
is given up, and the only relief sought is of the protection of service, or of 
the admission to the course, the gmnt of such protective
relief simpliciter 
would be impermissible. The withdrawal of the benefit under Section 10 
follows an order of cancellation under Section 7. Once the conditions 
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for cancellation are fulfilled and an order of cancellation is passed under 
Section 7 withdrawal of all benefits which have accrued on the basis of 
the claim (which stands invalidated) cannot be opposed on a theory that 
there was an absence of dishonest intent. 
43. The rationale which weighed with the Bench of two Judges 
which decided Kavita Solunke (supra) was that if the Halba Koshti 
had been treated as Halba even before the appellant had joined the 
service and ifthe only ground for ouster was the law declared in Milind 
(supra), there was no reason why protection against ouster to appointees 
whose applications had become final be not also extended to the appellant. 
Placing reliance on the decision in Kavita Sohmkc (supra) another 
Bench of two Judges of this Court in Shalini (supm) propounded a test 
of dishonest intent for the grant or denial of protection to persons whose 
caste claims had been invalidated. The view of the Court emerges from 
the following extract contained in para 9 of the decision which reads 
thus:
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
335 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
"9. It is not the intent of law to punish an innocent person and 
A 
subject him to extremely harsh treatment. That is why this Court 
has devised and consistently followed that taxation statutes, which 
almost always work to the pecuniary detriment of the assessee, 
must be interpreted in favour of the assessee. Therefore, as we 
see it, on one bank of the Rubicon are the cases of dishonest and 
B 
mendacious persons who have deliberatc)y claimed consanguinity 
with the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, etc. whereas on 
the other bank are those marooned persons who honestly and 
correctly claimed to belong to a particular Scheduled Caste/ 
Scheduled Tribe but were later on found by the relevant authority 
not to fall within the particular group envisaged for protected 
C 
treatment. In the former group, persons would justifiably deserve 
the immediate cessation of all benefits, including termination of 
services. In the latter, after the removal of the nebulousness and 
uncertainty, while the services or benefits already enjoyed would 
not be negated, they would be disentitled to claim any further or D 
continuing benefit on the predication of belonging to the 'said 
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe." {Id. at pgs. 534-535) 
The above observations must be read together with those in paragraph 
11 (extracted earlier) where the Court held that a dishonest intent requires 
legal
retribution. In Shalini (supra) the.Court noticed the provisions of 
Section 10 ofMaharashtraAct XXIII of2001 (which the earlier decision 
E 
in Kavita Solunkc (supra) had not noticed) but nonetheless held that in 
order to attract the provisions of Section 10 a dishonest intent for the 
purpose of claiming a benefit reserved for the Scheduled Castes or Tribes 
or a designated backward class is necessary. The expression "false" 
contained in Section I 0 of the Maharashtra Act XXIII of200 I is construed 
F 
to necessarily require the presence of mens rea·or a dishonest intent. 
44. The object and purpose underlying the enactment of the state 
legislation is to regulate the issuance of caste certificates and to deal 
with instances which had come to light where persons who did not belong 
to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes or reserved categories were seeking 
G 
appointments or admissirns to the detriment of genuine candidates, The 
basic purpose and rationale for the legislation is to secure the just 
entitlements oflegitimate claimants. The judgment in Shalini (supra) is 
with respect in error in imputing the requirement of a dishonest intent 
intothe provisions of Section I 0. Sections 7 and 10 have to be construed 
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in harmony. Section 7 provides for the cancellation of a caste certificate 
where before or after commencement of the Act, a person who does 
not belong to a reserved category has obtained a false caste ce11ificate 
and the Scrutiny Committee, after enquiry. is of the opinion that the 
certificate was obtained fraudulently. These requirements have to be 
fulfilled before tj1e ce11ificate is cancelled. The falsity of the caste 
certificate and the opinion of the Scrutiny Committee of its being 
fraudulently obtained form the basis ofa cancellation under Section 7. 
Section I 0 presc11bes that a person who docs not belong to a reserved 
category and secures admission or obtains appointment against a reserved 
post by producing a false caste certificate shall upon its cancellation by 
the Scrutiny Committee be debarred from the institution or as the case 
may be discharged from employment and the benefits derived shall be 
withdrawn. Sub-section (2) provided for the recovery of all financial 
benefits while sub-section (3) provides for the cancellation of a degree, 
diploma or educational qualification. Sub-section (4) provides for 
disqualification from electoral office. The falsity of the cc11ificate is the 
basis of an order under Section 7. Section 10 provides the consequence. 
The challenge to an order of the Scrutiny Committee (invalidating a 
caste or tribe certificate) may fail or succeeds. If the challenge
before 
the High Court succeeds, no question of the consequence under Section 
10 arises. If the challenge fails, the consequence under Section I 0 follows 
the finding in the orderundcr Section 7 that the certificate is false. Similarly, 
if the orderunder Section 7 is not challenged. or ifthe challenge is given 
up, there is no occasion to protect the benefits secured on the basis of a 
certificate which is invalidated. The expression ~'false" must be construed 
in contra-distinction to that which is true, genuine or authentic. Falsity in 
this sense means the setting up of a claim to belong to a reserved category. 
45. Section 10. it must be noted. provides for the withdrawal of 
civil benefits which have accrued to an individual on the strength of a 
claim to belong to a reserved category, when the claim upon due enquiry 
and verification is invalidated. Section 10. as its marginal note indicates, 
provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false 
G 
caste certificate. Section 11 provides for offences and penalties. The 
invalidation of a caste certificate may result in two consequences : (i) 
immediate cancellation or withdrawal of the benefits received by the 
candidate on the basis of a false caste certificate; (ii) prosecution of a 
claimant who procw-es a certificate which is found to be false by the 
H 
Scrutiny Committee. The intent of a candidate may be of relevance only
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
ifthere is a prosecution for a criminal offence. However, where a civil 
consequence of withdrawing the benefits which have accrued on the 
basis of a false caste claim is in issue, it would be contrary to the legislative 
intent to import the requirement of a dishonest intent. In importing such 
a requirement, the bench of two Judges in Shalini (supra) has, with 
great respect, fallen into error. The judgment in Shalini (supra) must, 
therefore, be held not to lay down the correct principle. In the very 
nature of things it would be casting an impossible burden to delve into 
the mental processes of an applicant for a caste certificate. As the 
provisions of the Act indicate. a person, who claims to belong to a reserved 
category and who seeks the benefit of an appointment to a reserved 
post or ofadmission to an educational institution against a reserved seat 
or any other benefit provided by the provisions of Article 15(4), has to 
apply for the grant of a caste certificate. The burden of proof that he or 
she belongs to such a caste, tribe or class lies with the claimant. The 
legislature has legitimately assumed that a person who seeks a caste 
certificate must surely be aware of the caste, tribe or class to which he 
or she belongs and must establish the claim. If the claim to belong to the 
reserved category is found to be untrue, the caste certificate has to be 
cancelled on
the ground that it has been obtained falsely. The grant of 
the benefit to the candidate is fraudulent because the candidate has 
obtained a benefit reserved exclusively for a specified caste, tribe or 
class to which he or she is not entitled. The decision in Shalini (supra) 
would result in serious consequences and would eviscerate the statutory 
provision. The interpretation which has been placed on the provisions of 
Section I 0 by the judgment in Shalini (supra) is evidently incorrect. 
46. Service under the Union and the States, or for that matter 
under the instrumentalities of the State subserves a public purpose. These 
services arc instruments of governance. Where the State embarks upon 
public employment, it is under the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 to 
follow the principle of equal opportunity. Affirmative action in our 
Constitution is part of the quest for substantive equality. Available 
resources and the opportunities provided in the form of public employment 
are in contemporary times short of demands and needs. Hence the 
procedure for selection, and the prescription of eligibility criteria has a 
significant public element in enabling the State to make a choice amongst 
competing claims. The selection of ineligible persons is a manifestation 
of a systemic failure and has a deleterious effect on good governance. 
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Firstly, selection ofa person who is not eligible allows someone who is 
ineligible to gain access to scarce public resources. Secondly, the rights 
of eligible persons are violated since a person who is not eligible for the 
post is selected. Thirdly, an illegality is perpetrated by bestowing benefits 
upon an imposter undeservingly. These effects upon good governance 
find a similar echp when a person who does not belong to a reserved 
category passes of as a member of that category and obtains admission 
to an educational lnstitution. Those for whom the Constitution has made 
special provisions are as a result ousted when an imposter who does not 
belong to a reserved category is selected. The fraud on the constitution 
precisely lies in this. Such a consequence must be avoided and stringent 
steps be taken by the Court to ensure that unjust claims of imposters are 
not protected in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The 
nation cannot live on a lie. Courts play a vital institutional role in preserving 
the rule oflaw. The judicial process should not be allowed to be utilised 
to protect the unscrupulous and to preserve the benefits which have 
accrued to an imposter on the specious plea of equity. Once the legislature 
has stepped in, by enacting Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001, the power 
under Article 142 should not be exercised to defeat legislative prescription. 
The Constitution
Bench in Milind spoke on 28 November 2000. The 
state law has been enforced from 18 October 200 I. Judicial directions 
must be consistent with law. Several decisions of two judge benches 
noticed earlier, failed to take note of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. 
The directions which were issued under Article 142 were on the erroneous 
inarticulate premise that the area was unregulated by statute. Shalini 
noted the statute but misconstrued it. 
47. Cooley's Treatise on Constitutional Limitations" places the 
matter succinctly in the following terms : 
"An officer dejure is one who, possessing the legal qualifications, 
has been lawfully chosen to the office in question, and has fulfilled 
any conditions precedent to the performance of its duties. By 
being thus chosen and observing the precedent conditions, such a 
person becomes of right entitled to the possession and enjoyment 
of the office, and the public, in whose interest the office is created, 
is entitled ofright to have him perform its duties. Ifhe is excluded 
from it, the exclusion is both a public offence and a private injury." 
"g• Ed. Vo!.2 pages! 355-1358
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
339 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
In a recent judgment of this Court in Anurag Kumar Singh Vs. State 
A 
ofUttarakhand39, it has been held that judicial discretion can be exercised 
only when there are two or more possible lawful solutions. Courts cannot 
give a direction contrary to a statute in the purported exercise of judicial 
discretion. The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is one which 
is wielded with circumspection and not in a manner which would defeat 
statutory intent, purpose and language. Aharon Barak in his book titled 
"Judicial Discretion ( 1989)" states thus: 
"16 ...... Discretion assumes the freedom to choose among several 
lawful alternatives. Therefore, discretion does not exist when there 
is but one lawful option. In this situation, the Judge is required to 
select that option and has no freedom of choice. No discretion is 
involved in the choice between a lawful act and an unlawful act. 
The Judge rriust choose the lawful act, and he is precluded from 
choosing the unlawful act. Discretion, on the other hand, assumes 
the lack of an obligation to choose one particular possibility among 
several." (Id at p. 430) 
48. The Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High CoUit in Arun 
Sonune (supra) has essentially construed the judgments in Kavita 
Solunke (supra) and in Shalini (supra) as having impliedly overruled 
the earlier Full Bench judgments in Ganesh Rambhau Khalalc and 
Ramesh
Kamblc. In view of the conclusion which we have arrived at 
in regard to the earlier decisions rendered by the two Judge Benches in 
Kavita Solunke (supra) and Shalini (supra), we are unable to subscribe 
to the view expressed by the Full Bench in Arun Sonone (supra). The 
judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Arun Sonone 
(supra) holds that 
(i) mere invalidation of the caste claim by the Scrutiny Committee 
would not entail the consequences of withdrawal of benefits or discharge 
from employment or cancellation of appointments that have become 
final prior to the decision in Milind (supra) on 28 November 2000; 
(ii) the benefit of protection in service upon invalidation of the 
caste claim is available not only to persons belonging to Kosh ti and Halba 
Koshti but is also available to persons belonging to the special backward 
category on the same terms. The High Court has even gone to the extelrt 
"(2016) 9 sec 426 
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of holding that the decision in Milind (supra) was in the nature of 
prospective overruling of the law which was laid down by the Bombay 
High Court. The above view of the Bombay High Court is clearly 
unsustainable. Neither the judgment in Milind (supra) nor any of the 
judgments of this Court which have construed it have held that Milind 
(supra) was an e)\ercise in prospective overruling. The High Court was 
in error in holding so. The decision of the Full Bench in Arun Sononc 
(supra) is unsustijinable. The Full Bench had evidently failed to notice 
that cases where the protection was granted by this Court following the 
invalidation ofa caste claim was in exercise of the power conferred by 
Article 142 of the Constitution, depending upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. The jurisdiction under Article 142 is clearly 
not available to the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under 
Article 226. The High Court erred in arrogating that jurisdiction to itself. 
49. We do not find any merit in the submission which has been 
urged on behalf of the persons whose castes/ tribes claims have been 
invalidated that Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 cannot apply to 
admissions or appointments which were made prior to the date on which 
the Act came into force. 
50. The submission based on retrospectivity overlooks certain 
crucial links in the analysis. It is a cardinal principle of construction that
every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by 
necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. However, 
the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to 
affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing 
obligations. Equally the rule against retrospective construction is not 
applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites for its 
action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing40• Maharashtra 
Act XXIII of2001 provides in Section 1 (2) that it shall come into force 
on such dates as the State Government may, by notification in the oftieial 
gazette, appoint upon receiving assent of the President. The Act was 
notified to come into force by a government notification dated 17 October 
2001 with effect from 18 October 200 I. Prior to the enforcement of the 
Act, the regime which held the field was in terms of the directions that 
were issued by this Court in its judgment dated 2 September 1994 in 
Madhuri Patil. The directions which were issued by this Court 
comprehended: 
H 
·t11 c; P Singh, On the Interpretation of Statutes -4 Edition pages 580. 583
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
341 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
i. Applica~ions for the grant of caste certificates being made to a 
A 
notified officer; 
ii. Submission of an affidavit together with relevant particulars in 
support of the application; 
iii. Submission of an application for verification of the caste 
certificate before a Scrutiny Committee well in advance of seeking 
admission to an educational institution or appointment to a post ; 
iv. Grant of provisional admission or a provisional appointment 
where the verification by the Scrutiny Committee was likely to take 
ti~c; 
v. Constitution of Scrutiny Committees for verification of caste 
certificates; 
vi. Constitution ofVigilance Cells for the purpose ofinvestigating 
the social status of the candidate and affinity with the tribal group; 
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vii. Modalities to be followed for revoking caste certificates when 
D 
the claim for social status was found to be not genuine, doubtful, spurious 
or falsely or wrongly claimed; 
· viii. Passing of an order of cancellation and confiscation of the 
caste certificate if the claim was found to be false; 
ix. Prosecution of the candidate or, as the case may be, the parent 
or the guardian who had made a false claim; 
x. Cancellation of the admission granted or the appointment made 
where the caste certificate is invalidated and debarment of the candidate 
from further studies or to continue in a post. 
51. The regime which obtained since
2 September 1994 under the 
directions in Madhuri Patil was granted a statutory status by the 
enactment of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. Section 7 provides for 
the cancellation and confiscation of a false caste certificate whether it 
was issued before or after the commencement of the Act. The expression 
"before or after the commencement of this Act" indicates that the Scrutiny 
Committee constituted under Section 6 is empowered to cancel a caste 
certificate whether it was issued prior to 18 October 200 I or thereafter. 
Section I 0 which provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the 
basis of a false caste certificate which is withdrawn is essentially a 
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consequence of the cancellation of the caste certificate. Where a 
candidate has secured admission to an educational institution on the basis 
that he or she belongs to a designated reserved category and it is found 
upon investigation that the claim to belong to that category is false, 
admission to the institution necessarily falls with the invalidation of the 
caste certificate. Admission being founded on a claim to belong to a 
specified caste, tnibe or class, it is rendered void upon the claim being 
found to be untrue. The same must hold in the case ofan appointment to 
a post. Therefore. the absence of the words "before or after the 
commencement of this Act" in Section l 0 makes no substantive difference 
because a withdrawal of benefit is an event which flows naturally and 
as a plain consequence of the invalidation of the claim. Moreover, as we 
have seen even prior to the enactment of the state legislation, the benefit 
which was secured on the basis of a caste claim was liable to be 
withdrawn upon its invalidation. The Act has hence neither affected 
vested rights nor has it imposed new burdens. The Act does not impair 
existing obligations in Sections 7 and I 0. 
However, an analysis of the provisions of Section 11 demonstrates that 
the provision creates offences and provides for penalties. Under Section 
I I (I) (a) the off¢nce consists of obtaining a false caste certificate (by 
furnishing false
information). filing a false statement or document or by 
any fraudulent means. Under Section 11 (J)(b) the offence consists in 
securing a benefit exclusively reserved for designated castes, tribes or 
classes by a pers9n who does not belong to that category in terms of 
i. Appointment; 
ii. Admission in an educational institution against a reserved seat; 
or 
iii. Election to a local authority or cooperative society against an 
office which is reserved for that category. 
52. The provisions of Section I I ( 1) must be read and construed 
in a prospective sense having regard to the guarantee contained in Article 
G 
20 (I) of the Constitution. The offence having been created by 
Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I, the Act which constitutes the offence 
must relate to a period after the date of the enforcement of the Act. In 
terms of the penal provisions of Section l I, the statute in so far as it 
creates offences and provides for penalties must hence be construed 
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prospectively.
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
343 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
53. Administrative circulars and government resolutions are 
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subservient to legislative mandate and cannot be contrary either to 
constitutional norms or statutory principles. Where a candidate has 
obtained an appointment to a post on the solemn basis that he or she 
belongs to a designated caste, tribe or class for whom the post is meant 
and it is fow1d upon verification by the Scrutiny Committee that the 
claim is false, the services of such an individual cannot be protected by 
taking recourse to administrative circulars or resolutions. Protection of 
claims of a usurper is an act of deviance to the constitutional scheme as 
well as to statutory mandate. No government resolution or circular can 
override constitutional Or statutory nOrnlS. The principle that government 
is bound by its own circulars is well-settled but it cannot apply in a situation 
such as present. Protecting the services of a candidate who is found not 
to belong to the community or tribe for whom the reservation is intended 
substantially encroaches upon legal rights of genuine members of the 
reserved communities whose just entitlements are negated by the grant 
B 
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of a scat to an ineligible person. In such a situation where the rights of D 
genuine members of reserved groups or communities are liable to be 
affected detrimentally, government circulars or resolutions cannot operate 
\o their
detriment. 
54. One of the considerations which is placed in store before the 
court particularly when an admission to an educational institution is sought 
to be cancelled upon the invalidation of a caste or tribe claim is that the 
student h.as substantially progressed in the course of studies and a 
cancellation of admission would result in prejudice not only to the student 
but to the system as well. When the student has completed the degree 
or diploma, a submission against its withdrawal is urged afortiorari. In 
our view; the state legislature has made a statutory decision amongst 
competing claims, based on a public policy perspective which the court 
must respect. The argument that there is a loss of productive societal 
resources when an educational qualification is withdrawn ora student is 
compelled to leave the course of studies (when he or she is found not to 
belong to the caste or tribe on the basis of which admission to a reserved 
seat was pbtained) carmot possibly outweigh or nullify the legislative 
, mandate contained in Section I 0 of the state legislation. When a candidate 
is found to have' put forth a false claim of belonging to a designated 
caste, tribe or class for whom a benefit is reserved, it would be a negation 
of the rule oflaw to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 142 to protect 
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that individual. Societal good lies in ensuring probity. That is the only 
manner in which the sanctity of the system can be preserved. The legal 
system cannot be seen as an avenue to support those who make untrue 
claims to belong to a caste or tribe or socially and educationally backward 
class. These benefits arc provided only to designated castes, tribes or 
classes in accordance with the constitutional scheme and cannot be 
usurped by those who do not belong to them. The credibility not merely 
of the legal system but also of the judicial process will be eroded if such 
claims arc protcotcd in exercise of the constitutional power conferred 
by Article 142 despite the state law. 
55. This aspect has been considered in a recent j udgmcnt rendered 
by one of us in Nidhi Kaim and Another V. State o(Madhva Pradesh 
Ami Others'' , wherein, speaking for a Bench of three Judges, in a case 
of systemic fraud in relation to medical admissions in the State of Madhya 
Pradesh. It was observed as follows : 
"92 ... We are of the considered view that conferring rights or 
benefits on the appellants, who had consciously participated in a 
well thought out, and meticulously orchestrated plan, to circumvent 
well laid down norms, for gaining admission to the MBBS course, 
would amount to espousing the cause of "the unfair". It would 
seem like allowing a thief to retain the stolen property. It would 
seem as if the
Cou1i was not supportive of the cause of those 
who had adopted and followed rightful means. Such a course 
would cause people to question the credibility of the justice-delivery 
system itself. The exercise of jurisdiction in the manner suggested 
on behalf of the appellants would surely depict the Court's support 
in fa vow· of the sacrilegious. It would also compromise the integrity 
of the academic community. We are of the view that in the name 
of doing complete justice it is not possible for this Court to support 
the vitiated actions of the appellants through which they gained 
admission to the Ml3BS course." 
Explaining the matter further, this Court held that : 
"99 ..... Besides the consideration recorded by us in the foregoing 
paragraphs, we may confess, that we felt persuaded for taking 
the view that we have, for a very important reason -
national 
character. There is a saying-when wealth is lost, nothing is 
"(2017) 4 sec 1 
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CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
345 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
lost; when health is lost, something is lost; but when A 
character is lost, everything is lost. ..... 
The issue in hand has an infinitely vast dimension. Ifwe were to keep in 
mind immediate social or societal gains. the perspective of consideration 
would be different. The submission canvassed needs to be considered in 
the proper perspective. We shall venture to drive home the point by an 
illustration. We may well not have won our freedom, if freedom fighters 
had not languished in jails ... and if valuable lives had not been sacrificed. 
Depending on the situation, even civil liberty or life itself, may be too 
trivial a sacrifice. when national interest is involved. It all depends on the 
desired goal. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution rests on the 
foundation of governance on the touchstone of justice. The basic 
fundamental right of equality before law and equal protection of the 
laws is extended to citizens and non-citizens alike through Article 14 of 
the Constitution on the fountainhead of fairness. The actions of the 
appellants are founded on unacceptable behaviow·. and in complete breach 
of the Rule of Law. Their actions constitute acts of deceit invading into 
a righteous social order. National character, in our considered view, cannot 
be sacrificed for benefits-individual or societal. Ifwe desire to build a 
nation on the touchstone of ethics and
character and if ow· determined 
goal is to build a nation where only the Rule of Law prevails, then we 
cannot accept the claim of the appellants for the suggested societal gains. 
Viewed in the aforesaid perspective, we have no difficulty whatsoever 
in concluding in favour of the Rule of Law. Such being the position, it is 
not possible for us to extend to the appellants any benefit under Article 
142 of the Constitution." 
We are in respectful agreement with the above principle and statement 
of the legal position. 
56. Medical education is what middle-class parents across the 
length and breadth of the county aspire for their children (whether this 
will continue to be so in future is a moot question). There is intense 
competition for a limited number of under-graduate, post-graduate and 
super-speciality seats. This can furnish no justification for recow·se to 
unfair means including adopting a false claim to belong to the reserved 
category. The fault - lines of our system, be it in education, health or 
law, are that its lethargy and indolence furnish incentives for the few 
who choose to break the rules to gain an unfair advantage. In such a 
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A 
situation, the court as a vital institution of democratic governance must 
be firm in sending out a principled message that there is no incentive 
other than for behaviour compliant with rules and deviance will meet 
severe reprimands of the law. 
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I Conclusion 
57. For these reasons, we hold and declare that 
i. The directions which were issued by the Constitution Bench of 
this Court in panigraph 38 of the decision in Milind were in pursuance 
of the powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution; 
ii. Since the decision of this Court in Madhuri Patil which was 
rendered on 2 September 1994, the regime which held the field in 
pursuance of those directions envisaged a detailed procedure for (a) the 
issuance of caste certificates; (b) scrutiny and verification of caste and 
tribe claims by Scrutiny Committees to be constituted by the State 
Government: ( c) the procedure for the conduct of investigation into the 
authenticity of the claim; ( d) Cancellation and confiscation of the caste 
certificate where the claim is found to be false or not genuine; (e) 
Withdrawal of benefits in terms of the termination of an appointment, 
cancellation of an admission to an educational institution or disqualification 
from an electoral office obtained on the basis that the candidate belongs 
to a reserved category; and (f) Prosecution for a criminal offence; 
iii. The decisions of this Court in R.
Vishwanatha Pillai and in 
Datta tray which were rendered by benches of three Judges laid down 
the principle of law that where a benefit is secured by an individual -
such as an appointment to a post or admission to an educational institution 
- on the basis that the candidate belongs to a reserved category for 
which the benefit is reserved, the invalidation of the caste or tribe claim 
upon verification would result in the appointment or, as the case may be, 
the admission being rendered void or non est. 
iv. The exception to the above doctrine was in those cases where 
this Court exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to 
render complete justice; 
v. By Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 there is a legislative 
codification of the broad principles enunciated in Madhuri Patil. The 
legislation provides a statutory framework for regulating the issuance of 
caste certificates (Section 4); constitution of Scrutiny Committees for
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
347 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.) 
verification of claims (Section 6); submission of applications for 
A 
verification of caste certificates (Section 6(2) and 6(3); cancellation of 
caste certificates (Section 7); burden of proof (Section 8); withdrawal 
of benefits obtained upon the invalidation of the claim (Section 10); and 
initiation of prosecution (Section J l), amongst other things; 
vi. The power conferred by Section 7 upon. the Scrutiny Committee 
to verify a claim is both in respect of caste certificates issued prior to 
and subsequent to the enforcement of the Act on 18 October 200 J. 
Finality does not attach to a caste certificate (or to the claim to receive 
benefits) where the claim of the individual to belong to a reserved caste, 
tribe or class is yet to be verified by the Scrutiny Committee; 
vii. Withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a caste claim 
which has been found to be false and is invalidated is a necessary 
consequence which flows from the invalidation of the caste claim and 
no issue ofretrospcctivity would arise; 
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viii. The decisions in Ka vita Solunkc and Shalini of two learned D 
Judges are overruled. Shalini in so far as it stipulates a requirement ofa 
dishonest intent for the application of the provision of Section 10 is, with 
respect, erroneous and docs not reflect the correct position in law; 
ix. Mens rea is an ingredient of the penal provisions contained in
Section 11. Section 11 is prospective and would apply in those situations 
E 
where the act constituting the offence has taken place after the.date of 
its enforcement; 
x. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in 
A run Sononc is manifestly erroneous and is overruled; and 
xi. Though the power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of F 
the Constitution is a constitutional power vested in the court for rendering 
complete justice and is a power which is couched in wide terms, the 
exercise of the jurisdiction must have due regard to legislative mandate, 
where a law such as Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 holds the field. 
58. We will, now in the light of the reasons indicated above, proceed 
G 
to dispose of the individual cases in the following terms: 
I Chairman and Managing Director FCI Vs. Jagdish 
Balaram Bahira42 : 
42 C. A. No.8928 of2015 
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On 6 December 1984, Food Corporation of India offered 
appointment to the respondent on the post of Messenger- Depot which 
was reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste certificate 
dated 28August 1978 issued by the Executive Magistrate, Panvel, stating 
that the applicant was a Hindu Mahadev Kohli and hence belonged to a 
Scheduled Tribe. Upon a declaration submitted by the respondent he 
was appointed to the post on 8 January 1985 in the Scheduled Tribe 
quota. The resp011dcnt received promotional benefits in the post of Dusting 
Operator ( 13 August 1990), Senior Dusting Operator (30 December 
2000), Picker (I December 2003) and Senior Picker (20 December 2005). 
The caste certificate submitted by the respondent was invalidated by 
the Scrutiny Committee, Konkan Division, Thane. The claim of the 
respondent to belong to the Mahadco Koli Scheduled Tribe was found 
not to be established and the certificate was accordingly invalidated and 
cancelled. Following this his services were terminated on 4 October 
2013. 
The respondent instituted writ proceedings before the Bombay 
High Court to challenge the order of the Scrutiny Committee and his 
termination from service. By a judgment dated 4 April 2014 the High 
Court noted thaHhe respondent was seeking only protection ofhis services 
and was willing to give up the claim of belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. 
By its judgment, the High Court
accepted the contention of the respondent 
and held that he was entitled to protection of services with continuity 
while the mam1gemcnt would be at liberty to withdraw such benefits as 
were granted after 28 September 2000. The employer moved a Special 
Leave Petition and in pursuance of an interim order dated JI August 
2014, the respondent was reinstated in service and was granted further 
promotions. Eventually upon his superannuation on 31August2015 the 
respondent was granted his terminal benefits including gratuity, arrears 
of wage revision, medical reimbursement. leave encashmcnt, contributory 
provident fund and productivity linked incentive. 
During the pendcncy of the litigation, the respondent is retired 
from service and has even been paid his terminal dues. Hence, at this 
stage, all that can be observed is that no claim by a member ofMahdeo 
Koli, Scheduled Caste shall be made or entertained on behalf of the 
respondent or any member of his family on the strength of the caste 
certificate which has been invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. No
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 
349 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
further benefits of any nature whatsoever would be admissible to the 
A 
respondent on the basis of his claim which has been invalidated. However, 
in the peculiar facts. we are not inclined to order recovery has to be 
made from the respondent. The Civil Appeal is disposed ot: 
2. Shri Shivaji Shikshan Sanstha & Anr. Vs. Raju Laxman 
Gadckar & Ors.43 
B 
and 
3 State of Maharashtra Vs. Raju Laxman Gadckar & Ors44 : 
In September 1981, Raju Laxman Gadekar obtained a caste 
certificate that he belonged to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in Mahara~htra. 
C 
On the strength of the caste certificate, he was appointed as an Assistant 
Teacher in a post reserved for a Scheduled Tribe in Shri Shivaji High-
School, Dongaon on 24 June 1989. On 2 March 2005, he filled up an 
application in Fo1m E and submitted an affidavit in Form F through his 
employer to the Scrutiny Committee, which was invalidated on 20 
February 2008. Since the claim that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe 
D 
was invalidated, his services were terminated by the employer on 26 
February 2008. The challenge to the order of termination failed before 
the School Tribunal. The writ petition challenging the orclerofthe Scrutiny 
Committee was dismissed on 7 August 2009. The order of the School 
Tribunal was challenged in a separate Writ Petition which was allowed 
E 
by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 16 October 2009
and the 
employee was directed to be reinstated. In an appeal by the employer, 
the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge 
on 17 April 20 lO and dismissed the writ petition. A Special Leave Petition 
filed by the employee under Article 136 of the Constitution was dismissed 
by this Coult as not pressed on 1 October 2010. Thereafter the respondent 
F 
filed a writ petition praying for his reinstatement and protection of his 
service. By the judgment dated 5/8/9/I 0 July 2013 the High Comt held 
that the employee was entitled to the protection of his services. 
Froni the narration of the facts it is clear that the Writ Petition 
filed by the employee challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee 
was dismissL'd on 7 August 2009 and it has been held that he docs not 
belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The caste certificate which was 
obtained by the respondent has been demonstrated to be a false caste 
"(Civil Appeal No. 91 SS of 20\S) 
"(Civil Appeal No. 91S7 of2015) 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 11 S.C.R. 
certificate. The challenge to the order of termination also attained finality 
since the Special Leave Petition against the judgment of the High Court 
was dismissed as not pressed. In the circumstances, the High Court has 
clearly erred in allowing protection of service to the employee. Such a 
direction is also contra1y to the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXl!I of 
200 l. The appoin1tment secured by the respondent on the basis of a false 
caste claim was required to be withdrawn in terms of provisions of Section 
l 0. There has been a complete misuse of the process by the Respondent. 
We, therefore, allow the Civil Appeals and set aside the judgments and 
orders of the High C our! dated l 0 April 2013 and 5/8/9/ J 0 July 20 l3. 
In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 
4 Stak of Maharashtra Vs. Ku. Chham D/o.Hcmraj Nimjc 
& Ors.45 : 
Chhaya Nimje obtained a caste certificate on 20 July 1991 from 
the Executive Magistrate. Narkhcd to the effect that she belongs to the 
Halba Scheduled Tribe. On the basis of the caste certificate she obtained 
appointment as an Assistant Teacher on 24 December 1996 in Bhimrao 
Bapu Dcshmukh Adarsh Vidyalaya. On 9 March she filled up an 
application informE together with an affidavit in Form Funder Ruic 11 
of the Maharashtra ST (Regulation of!ssuance & Verification of) Caste 
Certificate Rules, 2003. The Vigilance Cell submitted a report showing 
that
her records were of the Koshti community. Before the Scrutiny 
Committee could decide her claim she approached the High Court in a 
writ petition see~ing protection of service. The High Court disposed of 
the writ petition on 30 January 2013, on the statement of the employer 
that her services will not be terminated unless the caste certificate is 
invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. She again filed a Writ Petition 
before the High Court seeking protection of her services. 
The respondent has no right to claim protection of her services. 
The respondent has misused the process oflaw by filing successive writ 
petitions to pre-empt un adjudication by the Scrutiny Committee and 
then confining the claim only to the protection of her services. 
For the reasons which arc indicated in the body of the judgment 
and for the above reasons, the Civil Appeal is allowed and impugned 
judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. No other submission 
is urged. 
';(Civil Appeal No.9160 of2015)
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGD!SH 
351 
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 
A 
5 State of Maharashtra & Anr. Vs. Mrs.Arundhati Surcsh 
Nimnvc & Anr.46: 
The respondent was appointed as a Lecturer on a post reserved 
for the Scheduled Tribes on 20 March 1997 on the basis of a caste 
certificate dated 18 May 1995 stating that she belongs to the Halba 
Scheduled Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee has invalidated the caste 
certificate and directed it to be confiscated. The High Court by its order 
dated 26 November 2012 has confirmed the order ofinvalidation but has 
granted protection of service. By a subsequent order the High Court has 
ordered the State to consider rcvision/refixation of pay scales. 
For the reasons indicated by this court while disposing of Civil 
Appeal Nos.9155 and 9157of2015 and for those contained in the body 
of the judgment, the Civil Appeals arc allowed. The impugned judgments 
and orders of the High Court arc set aside. No other submission is urged. 
There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 
6 Mnhatma Fulc Krishi Vidyapccth Vs .. Nagnath Baburao 
Mnngrule & Ors.47 : 
The respondent was appointed as an Agricultural Assistant on a 
post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 22 July 1996 on the basis of a 
caste certificate dated 3 February 1991 stating that he belongs to the 
Mahadco Kali tribe. On 26 August 2011 the respondent submitted his 
caste certificate and oti)er
documents for verification of the caste claim, 
which were forwarded to the Scrutiny Committee. In the meantime the 
appellant initiated a departmentul enquiry against the respondent and 
terminated the services of the respondent by its order dated 18 December 
20 l 2. Subsequently the Scrutiny Committee invalidated the caste claim 
of the respondent by its order dated 3 October 2013. The High Court by 
its order dated 4 April 2014 has confirmed the order of invalidation but 
has granted protection of service. 
For the reasons indicated in the body of the judgment and those 
indicated while allowing Civil Appeal Nos.9155 and 9157of2015, the 
Civil Appeal shall stand allowed. The impugned judgment and order of 
the High Com1 is set aside insofar as it protects the services of the 
respondent. 
"\Civil Appeal Nos .. 9203-04 of 2015) 
"(Civil Appeal No.8926 of2015) 
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