S. KRISHNA SRADHA versus STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 466, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Matter referred to larger bench
Segment: Ratio
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[2017] 2 S.C.R. 466 
S. KRISHNA SRADHA 
v. 
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No, I 081 of2017) 
JANUARY 19, 2017 
[DIPAK MISRA AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.] 
Education: 
Admissions - MBBS Course - Wrongful deprivation of 
ad111ission - Duty of constitutional courts u!Arts. 32, 136 and 226 -
Re-consideration of decision in Jasmine Kaur's case holding grant 
of monetary compensation as the sole re111edy for non-ad111ission 
after lapse of prescribed time schedule when such lapse was a result 
of faults commitled by the counselinglad111inistrating authority -
Held: Meritorious students should not face any impedi111ent to get 
admission for so111e fault on the part of the institution or the persons 
involved with it - He/She has no other remedy but lo approach the 
Court for getting redressal of grievances - It is a grievance that 
pertains to fundamental right - When a !is ()f this nature co111es in a 
constitutional court, it beco111es the duty of the court to address 
11'hether the authority had acted within the powers conferred on it 
or deviated from the same as a consequence of which injustice has 
been caused to the aggrieved person - Redressal of a fundamental 
right cannot be weighed in ter111s of grant of compensation only -
Grant of compensation may be an additional relief - Compensation 
cannot be the adequate or sole re111edy for the wrongful deprivation 
of admission, as it affects the acade111ic career of a student -
Decision in
Jasmine Kaur's case requires re-consideration by a larger 
Bench-Maxims - "Lex non intend it aliquid impossibile" - Doctrines/ 
Principles - Doctrine of restitution. 
Admissions - MBBS Course - Appellant denied ad111ission 
to MBBS course in sports quota despite being 111ore meritorious 
than the selected candidates - High Court placing reliance on Jasmin 
Kaur's case denied benefit of admission to appellant and granted 
compensation on the ground that the cut-off date for admission 
had expired, though, holding that appellant was entitled to get 
466
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
ORS. 
priority and there were lapses on part of various authorities involved 
- Held:·Appel/ant-student approached the Court u/Art.226 in quite 
promptitude and there was no delay /aches on her part and did not 
fault in complying with procedure prescribed under the rules meant 
for the process of admission - Appellant directed to be admitted -
Constitution of India - Arts.14 and 21. 
Referring the matter to be placed before appropriate 
Lar~er Bench, the Court 
HELD: 1. Jasmine Kaur's case restricts the grant of relief 
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of admission, if it is within the time schedule prescribed, and 
then lays down if the seats are filled up and the scope for granting c 
admission is lost due to eclipse of time schedule, then under 
such circumstances, the candidate can only be granted appropriate 
compensation to off-set the loss caused. [Para 22) [485-C-D) 
Chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Jasmine Kaur 
and Ors. (2014) 10 SCC 521 : [2014] 9 SCR 1122 -
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held, needs reconsideration. 
2.1 This Court has always laid stress on the merit in the 
matters of admissions as meritorious students should not face 
any impediment to get admission for some fault on the part of the 
institution or the persons involved with it. He/She has no other 
remedy but to approach the Court for getting redressal of his/ 
her grievances. It is a grievance that pertains to fundamental 
right. A right is conferred on a person by rule of law and if he
seeks remedy through the process meant for establishing rule of 
law and it is denied to him, it would never subserve the cause of 
real justice. When a ii~· of this nature comes in a constitutional 
court, it becomes the duty of the court to address whether the 
authority had acted within the powers conferred on it or ,deviated 
from the same as a consequence of which injustice has been caused 
to the grieved person. The redressal of a fundamental right, 
cannot be weighed in terms of grant of compensation only. [Para 
26] [487-C-F] 
2.2 Grant of compensation may be an additional relief. 
Confining it to grant of compensation as the only measure would 
defeat the basic purpose of the fundamental rights which the 
Constitution has conferred so that the said rights are sustained. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[20 I 7] 2 S.C.R. 
It would be inapposite to recognize the right, record a finding 
that there is a violation of the right and deny the requisite relief. 
A young student should not feel that bis entire industry to get 
himself qualified in the examination becomes meaningless 
because of some fault or dramatic design of certain authorities 
and they can get away by giving some amount as compensation. 
It may not only be agonizing but may amount to grant of premium 
either to .laxity or evil design or incurable_greed of the authorities. 
In such a situation, justice may be farther away and the knocking 
at the doors of a constitutional court, a sisyphean endeavour, an 
exercise in futility. It is well known that the law intends not 
anythin~ impossible; "lex non intendit a/iq11id impossibile". But 
when it is in the realm of possibility; and denial of relief hurts the 
"majesty of justice'', it should not be denied. On the contrary, 
every effort has to be made to grant the relief. [Para 26] [487-F-
H; 488-A-B] 
Asha v. Pt. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences 
& Ors. (2012) 7 sec 389 : [2012] 6 SCR 876; 
Harsha/i D/o Sudamrao Wankhede v. State of 
Maharashtra & Ors. (2005) 13 SCC 464 - relied on. 
2.3 However, there are cases where this Court had granted 
compensation because there was no other option and the only 
way of redemption was to grant compensation. It is necessary to 
state that grant of relief as lawfully
due should be the primary 
duty of the court. Where doctrine of restitution can be applied 
and there is no impossibility it would be anathema to the cal!se of 
justice to deny the same. It is seemly to appreciate that restitution 
as a concept, as is traditionally understood, is the restoration of 
an aggrieved party to his condition prior to the wrongdoing. It 
could be limited to monetary quantification only if the breach is 
not capable of being remedied. That being so, compensation 
cannot be the adequate or sole remedy for the wrongful 
deprivation of admission, as it affects the academic career of a 
student. There may be cases where restitution may be too harsh. 
[Para 27] (488-D-F] 
2.4 In view of the aforesaid, the decision in Jasmine Kaur's 
case requires re-consideration by a larger Bench. [Para 31] [490-
C-D]
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
469 
.ORS. 
A nee sh D. Lawande & Ors. v. State· of Goa & Ors. 
(2014) 1 SCC 554 : [2013) 17 SCR 55 - explained .. 
State v. Falkner Walter Clark, American Jurist, I 921; 
MBBS!BDS Selection Board v. Chandan Mishra 
(1995) Supp. 3 SCC 77; Chandan Mishra v. MBBSI 
EDS Selection Board (1994) 77 Cut LT 624; Deptt. 
of Public Health, UT Chandigarh v. Ku/deep Singh 
(1997) 9 SCC 199 : [1997] 1 SCR 454; Jitlius v. Lord 
Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 AC 214; Commr. Of Police 
v. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16 : [1952) SCR 
135; K.S. Bhoir v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 10 
SCC 264: [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 593; Faiza Choudhary 
v. State of J & K (2012) 10 SCC-149 : [2012] 7 
SCR 528; Satyabrata Sahoo v. State of Orissa (2012) 
8 SCC 203 : [2012) 10 SCR 204; Medical Council of 
India v. State of Karnataka (1998). 6 SCC 131 : [1998) 
3 SCR 740; Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh 
(2012) 7 SCC 433 : [2012] 5 SCR 768; Christian 
Medical College v. State of Punjab (2010) 12 SCC 
167; State of Bihar v. Sanjay Kumar Sinha (1990) 4 
SCC 624 : [1989) 2 Suppl. SCR 168; Medical 
Council qf India v. Madhu Singh (2002) 7 SCC 258 : 
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 228; GSF Medical and 
Paramedical Assn. v. Assn. of Self Financing Technical 
Institutes (2003) 12 SCC 414; Dwarka Nath v. ITO 
AIR 1966 SC 81 : (1965] SCR 536; State of Punjab 
v. Sali/ Sabhlok (2003) 5 SCC 1 : [2003] 1 SCR 877; . 
S. Nihar Ahamed v. Dean Velammal Medical College 
Hospital and Research
Institute & Ors. (2016) 1 SCC 
662 : [2015] 10 SCR 242; Punjab Engineeriug 
College, Chandigarh through its Principal v. Sanjay 
Gulati & Ors. (1983) 3 SCC 517 : [1983] 2 SCR 801; 
Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141 : (1983] 
3 SCR 508; Sebastian Hongray v. Union of India AIR 
1984 SC 571 : [1984] 1 SCR 904; Chairman, Railway 
Board v. Chandrima Das (2000) 2 SCC 465 : [2000] 
1 SCR 480; Jang Singh v. Brij Lal & Ors. AIR 1966 
SC 1631 : [1964j SCR 145 - referred to. 
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[2017] 2 S:C.R. 
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Case Law Reference 
[2014] 9 SCR 1122 
held, needs 
reconsideration 
Paras 2, 31 
[2013] 17 SCR 55 
explained 
Para 19 
B 
(1995) Snpp. 3 sec 77 
referred to 
Para 15 
[1997] 1 SCR 454 
referred to 
Para 15 
[1952] SCR 135 
referred to 
Para 15 
[2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 593 
referred to 
Para 17 
c 
[2012] 7 SCR 528 
referred to 
Para 17 
[2012] 10 SCR 204 
referred to 
Para 17 
[1998] 3 SCR 740 
referred to 
Para 17 
[2012] 5 SCR 768 
referred to 
Para 18 
D 
(2010) 12 sec 167 
referred to 
Para 19 
[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 168 
referred to 
Para 20. 
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 228 
referred to 
Para 20 
(2003) 12 sec 414 
referred to 
Para 20 
E 
[1965] SCR 536 
referred to 
Para 21 
[2003] 1 SCR 877 
referred to 
Para 21 
[2015] 10 SCR 242 
referred to 
Para 22 
[1983] 2 SCR 801 
referred to 
Para 25 
F 
[2012] 6 SCR 876 
relied on 
Para 26 
(2005) n sec 464 
relied ou 
Para 26 
[1983] 3 SCR 508 
referred to 
Para 27 
G 
[1984] 1 SCR 904 
referred to 
Para 27 
[2000] 1 SCR 480 
referred to 
Para 27 
[1964] SCR 145 
referred to 
Para 28 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURJSDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1081 
of2017. 
H
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2016 of the High 
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Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the 
State of Andhra Pradesh in W. P. No. 327 l 0 of 2015. 
P. S. Narasimha, ASG(AC), Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv., K. 
Parameshwar, Ashwani Kumar N., Guntur Prabhakar, Ms. Prerna Singh, 
Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Y. Vismai Rao, Ms. Manjit Kirpal, P. Shadat Kumar, 
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Gaurav Sharma, Prateek Bhatia, Dhawal Mohan, Ms. Vara Gaur, Advs., 
for the appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. I. Leave granted. 
2. The centripodal issue that emerges for consideration in this 
appeal, by special leave, compels us to think and constraints us to ruminate 
over the principle whether grant of monetary compensation can be 
considered as the sole and adequate remedy for a student who fias been 
deprived of admission to the MBBS course, despite he or she being 
meritorious, vigilant and diligent and thereby abandoning the path of 
recalcitrance and eventually being found flawless, is forced to suffer 
non-admission to the course for which he had aspired for and found 
suitable because of lapses committed either by the counselling authority 
or the administrating authority intrinsically connected with the process 
ofadmission; and the ancillary issue that arises for deliberation is whether 
the constitutional courts, be it High Court or this Court, while exercising 
the power under
Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 or 
136 of the Constitution, would feel handicapped because of expiry of 
time schedule fixed by the Court to deny the relief to the candidate by 
pronouncing, "relief denied as the time has expired". Mr. Vikas Singh, 
learned senior counsel appearing for the Medical Council oflndia would 
support the proposition that grant of compensation is the only possible 
remedy on the strength of a two-Judge Bench decision in Clui1111ig"rh 
Administmtion & Anr. v. J"smine K"ur & Ors.' which has been 
placed reliance upon by the High Court in the impugned judgment and 
order to decline the relief to the appellant (as it had no other alternative), 
and that forces us to cogitate on "superstitious sanctity" as put forth by 
Walter Clark in St11te v. F11/kner' and simultaneously also recapitulate 
the saying by Oliver Wendell Holmes:-
'(201.\) IOSCC521 
2 Walter Clark. American Jurist. 1921 
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"To an imagination of any scope the most far-reaching 
form of power is not money, it is the command ofideas"3 
And above all we cannot be oblivious to our duty, a sanguine 
one, of the constitutional courts to protect and preserve the fundamental 
rights of the citizens as the sentinel on the qui vive. 
3. The facts which are necessary to be stated to appreciate the 
controversy lie in a narrow compass. The appellant preferred W.P. 
No.32710of2015 before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for 
the State of Telangana and State of Andhra Pradesh alleging that the 
Dr. NTR University of Health Sciences, the respondent No.2 herein, 
had rejected her candidature fortaking admission to the first year l\ABBS 
course for the academic Session 2015-2016 in Sports and Games quota 
and granted admission to the respondent Nos.7 and 8 on unacceptable 
grounds and on that basis sought issue of a writ of mandamus to the 
Universit)' to consider her case by giving priority over others in Sports 
and Games quota as she so deserved. We need not advert to the facts 
in detail as neither the University nor the Medical Council of India has 
challenged the order passed by the High Court. 
4. It is submitted by Mr. K. Parameshwar, learned counsel for 
the appellant that from the order passed by the High Court, it is clearly 
evident that the appellant was more meritorious in the Sports and Games 
quota than the candidates
who have been given admission. He has 
drawn our attention to certain passages from the judgment of the High 
Court. They read as follows:-
"! I ........ From the material placed before this Court, it is clear 
that petitioner participated in World Artistic Skating Championship, 
2014 held at Reus, Spain under senior division from 28'" 
September, to 12"' October, 2014 and certification to that effect 
is made by no other than Roller Skating Federation of India. 
When there is such certification on record, there is no reason to 
deny priority due to the petitioner on the ground that there was 
no response from the Sports Authority of India. It is relevant to 
mention here that 3'd respondent-SAAP has not taken immediate 
steps after collecting documents from the 2"d respondent-
university on 22.08.2015. From the averments made in the 
counter-affidavit filed by the 200 respondent university, it is clear 
'Oliver Wendell Holmes '·The Path of the Law," Collected Legal Papers. 1921
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
that academic session for the year 2015-2016 started from 
O 1.09.2015 and, further, 8'h respondent was admitted into the 
course based on the admission given as per the priority furnished 
by the 3'' respondent. It is stated that 8"' respondent started 
attending classes from 0I.I0.2015." 
And again:-
"13. Further, in the case of Chandigarh Administration (2 supra), 
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be 
teJescoping ofunfilled seats of one year with permitted seats of 
the subsequent year i.e. carry forward of seats cannot be 
petmitted how much ever meritorious a candidate is and deserved 
admission. In the case of Union Bank of India (3 supra), it is 
held by the Supreme Court that Courts should not place reliance 
on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation 
fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is 
placed. 
14. In the case on hand, it is clear that in spite of submitting the 
necessary material in support of the claim of the petitioner for 
reservation under sports and games category for admission into 
MBBS course, she was denied due priority and admission into 
MBBS course. Had the participation of the petitioner in World 
championship been considered as per the norms notified by the 
Government. she was entitled for priority I 0, in which event she 
was also entitled for admission into MBBS course. In spite of 
the fact that
certificates were collected by the authorities of the 
l"' respondent-SAAP on 22.08.2015. they have not acted quickly 
and diligently, if at all confirmation was required from the Sports 
Authority oflndia. As per the rules framed by the Government, 
confirmation is to be given only by the 3"' respondent. but not by 
another body. When there is statutory obligation on the )<J! 
respondent for confirmation of certificates. it cannot shirk its 
responsibility only on the ground that Sports Authority of India 
has not responded to letter dated 18.09.2015. In the absence of 
any dispute with regard to the participation of petitioner in World 
Championship, which is supported by the certificate issued by 
the Roller Skating Federation oflndia, only on the ground that 
there was no response to the letter dated 18.09.2015 addressed 
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by the Jr<! respondent, petitioner ought not to have been denied 
due priority. At the same time, having collected certificates on 
22.08.2015, there is no reason for the 3'' respondent-SAAP in 
addressing to the concerned authority only on 18.09.2015. By 
forwarding the priority lists at the fag end, i.e. 28-29.09.2015, 
petitioner was deprived of opportunity to put fo1th her grievance. 
At the same time, it is evident from the counter affidavit filed by 
the 2"' respondent-university.that academic session for the year 
2015-16 commenced from 01.09.2015, candidates under sports 
and games quota have started attending classes from 01 . I 0.2015. 
As such, no direction can be issued at this point of time for grant 
of admission to the petitioner for the academic session 2015-
2016." 
. 
[Emphasis supplied] 
5. From the aforesaid analysis, it is limpid, requiring no deep 
dwelling and deliberation that at times can vex the brain, that though the 
High Court has come to a categorical and unequivocal conclusion that 
the appellant was entitled to get priority, yet has denied the benefit of 
admission placing reliance on the decision in Jasmin Kaur's case and 
granted compensation ofRs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lac only). It is also 
noticed that the appellant was not extended the benefit of admission 
despite he was more meritorious than others on the basis of marks 
obtained solely on the ground that time had
expired. 
Therefor~, the 
pertinent question to be posed has to be, is it just or fair to a student who 
has approached the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in·quite 
promptitude and there is no delay and !aches on his part and further 
where he had not faulted in complying with any procedure prescribed 
under the rules or regulations meant for the process of admission, to 
mitigate his grievance by granting monetary compensation possibly 
perceiving the duty of the Court goes so far and no further. 
6. When the matter was listed on an earlier occasion, we had 
permitted the appellant-student to be admitted and accordingly she has 
been admitted. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel being assisted 
by Mr. Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the Medical 
Council of India has fairly conceded that the admission need not be 
disturbed and the appellant may be allowed to prosecute the course she 
has been admitted to. Therefore, any disputes as regards the appellant's
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
admission stands closed. And we record with appreciation the stand of 
Mr. Singh and Mr. Sharma on this score. 
7. Having said so, in all possibility, we would have disposed of 
the appeal. But Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned senior counsel, who has 
been appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court and Mr. K. 
Parameshwar, learned counsel for the appellant submit with all the humility 
and sincerity at their command that it is a recurring problem and by 
virtue of the judgment delivered in Jasmin Kaur (supra), an impediment 
has been created and as artificial obstruction has been conceived of for 
mitigating the real grievance of a meritorious candidate, and, in a way, it 
scuttles the power of the constitutional courts to grant real substantive 
relief or mould the relief and, therefore, the said decision requires 
reconsideration. 
8. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the 
Medical Council oflndia would strenuously support the said authority on 
the bedrock that the time fixed for admission by this Court has to be 
scrupulously followed and should never be allowed to be derailed, under 
no circumstances. 
9. It is submitted by Mr. Narasmiha, learned amicus curiae that 
the Court in As/ta v. Pt. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences 
·& Ors.', has recognized that the procedural sanctity of the admission 
process as an insegregable facet of Article 14 of the Constitution of 
India
and further ruled that in exceptional circumstances, the deadline of 
JQ<h September should not act as an obstacle for grant of full relief of 
admission, if three conditions are satisfied. Learned amicus would 
contend that a candidate must be meritorious and his approach to the 
Court should be unblemished; that he should have approached the Court 
absolutely expeditiously; and that denial of admission must have 
occasioned on account of some fault or negligence of the concerned 
authorities including the counseling authority. It is propounded by him 
that it is the obligation of the authorities while giving admission to higher 
educational courses to strictly adhere to the norms of fairness and are 
expected to remain totaily vigilant, scrupulously following the principle 
of transparency and when the constitutional court finds that there is 
deviation, the candidate cannot be allowed to suffer the deprivation of 
admission to the course. It is urged by him that grant of compen~ation in 
such cases would be contrary to fundamental principles and values 
'(2012) 7 sec 389 
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inherent in Article 14 of the Constitution and is likely to destroy the 
essential facet of Article 21 of the Constitution which recognizes right to 
life that encompasses manifold rights as expanded by this Court from 
time to time including the rightto achieve excellence in life as permissible 
in law. According to the learned senior counsel the said expanse siiould 
neither be narrowed nor crippled by the Court. 
I 0. At this juncture, we think it appropriate to have a look at the 
decisions that have been cited at the Bar. In Aslta (supra), the Court 
observed that it was the need of the hour and demand of justice that this 
Court clarified its decisions and stated the principles with greater precision 
so as to ensure elimination of colourable abuse and arbitrary exercise of 
power in the process of selection and admission to the professional 
courses by all concerned. The Court posed four questions. They are:-
"a) ls there any exception to the principle of strict adherence to 
the Rule of Merit for preference of courses and colleges regarding 
admission to such courses? 
b) Whether the cut-off date of30•h September of the relevant 
academic year is a date which admits any exception? 
c) What relief the courts can grant and to what extent they can 
mould it while ensuring adherence to the rule of merit, fairness 
and transparency in admission in terms of rules and regulations? · 
d) What issues need to be dealt
with and finding returned by the 
court before passing orders which may be more equitable, but 
still in strict compliance with the framework ofregulatior.s and 
judgments of this court governing the subject?" 
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11. While dealing with the second question, the Court held, thus:-
"30. There is no doubt that 30'h September is the cut-off date. 
The authorities cannot grant admission beyond the cut-off date 
which is specifically postulated. But where no fault is attributable 
to a candidate and she is denied admission for arbitrary reasons, 
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should the cut-off date be permitted to operate as a bar to 
admission to such students particularly when it would result in 
complete ruining of the professional career of a meritorious 
candidate, is the question we have to answer." 
12. After so stating, the Court proceeded to record a finding that 
H
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
it was unfortunate but apparently unfair that the appellant therein had 
been denied admission. Thereafter, it stated thus:-
"32. Though there can be rarest of rare cases or exceptional 
circumstances where the courts may have to mould the relief 
and make exceptiOn to the cut-off date of30'" September, but in 
those cases, the Court must first return a finding that no fault is 
attributable to the candidate, the candidate has pursued her rights 
and legal remedies expeditiously without any delay and that there 
is fault on the part of the authorities and apparent breach of 
some rules, regulations and principles in the process of selection 
and grant of admission. Where denial of admission violates the 
right to equality and equal treatment of the candidate, it would 
be completely unjust and unfair to deny such exceptional relief 
to the candidate. [Refer Arti Sapru v. State of J & K [( 1981) 2 
SCC 484]; Chavi Mehrotra v. Director General Health Services 
[(1994) 2 SCC 370]; and Aravind Kumar Kankane v. State of 
UP [(2001) 8 sec 355]." 
13. The Court added that even ifthe conditions are satisfied, still 
the Court wou Id be called upon to decide whether the reliefs should or 
should not be granted and, if granted, should it be with or without 
compensation. Thereafter, the Court adverted to certain facts and granted 
the relief in the following manner:-
"3 7. From the above data, it is clear that
the appellant has 
miserably failed to pursue her BOS course in accordance with 
Rules and, thus, she has not fulfilled even the pre-requisites for 
MBBS course, assuming that the BOS and MBBS courses are 
similar for the first six months. In these circumstances and finding 
that the appellant is at fault to this limited extent, we are of the 
considered view that the only relief the appellant can bt granted 
in the present appeal is a direction to the respondents to give the 
appellant admission to the MBBS course not in the academic 
year 2011-12 but in the current academic year i'.e. 2012-2013, 
that too, subject to the condition that she will pursue her MBBS 
course right from the beginning without any advantage of her 
course in the BOS. If any examinations have been held in the 
meanwhile, it shall be deemed that she had not appeared in those 
examinations and be treated as such for all intent and purpose. 
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While giving her admission to the MBBS course, preferably and 
if it is permissible, admission ofnone of the other candidates to 
the MBBS course may be disturbed. If for whatever reasons, it 
is not possible to do so, in that event, the candidate last in the 
merit who has been granted admission to the MBBS course shall 
be transferred to the BOS course and appellant shall be admitted 
to the MBBS course. We also direct that such candidate would 
not be required to commence her/his BOS course from the 
beginning provided the candidate has satisfied the attendance 
requirements of the Dental Council oflndia. 
xxx 
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41. For the reasons afore-recorded and with the directions as 
mentioned above, we direct the respondents to grant admission 
to the appellant to the MBBS course in the current academic 
year subject to the condition that she will pursue her MBBS 
course right from its beginning and to the conditions afore-noticed. 
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we award 
no costs." 
14. At this juncture, it is necessary to note that the appellant 
therein was not granted the benefit of admission for the academic year 
201 I-2012 as she had miserably failed to pursue her BOS course in 
accordance with Rules and had not really fulfilled even the pre-requisites 
for MBBS course assuming that the BOS and the MBBS courses are 
similar for the first six months. It is imperative to note
that though the 
Court did not grant the benefit of admission for the current year but 
directed her admission in the MBBS course in the subsequent academic 
year as it had arrived a definite conclusion that the denial of admission to 
the MBBS course was not only unfortunate but apparently unfair. 
15. In A11eesh D. Lawll11de & Ors. v. Stllte of Goa & Orl·.'), a 
two-Judge Bench was dealing with a sad scenario wherein State of Goa 
and its functionaries had allowed ingress of systemic anarchy throwing 
propriety to the winds. The Court referred to the three-Judge Bench 
decision in MBBS/BDS Selectio11 Board v. Chamla11 Mishra' where 
the Court had commented on the insensitivity of the authorities 
administering medical college admissions and approvingly reproduced a 
'(2014) 1 sec 554 
H 
'1995 supp.(3) sec 77
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.) 
sentence from the decision in C/wndlln Misftm v. MBBS/BDS Eelection 
Bollrtf' that proclaimed in sheer anguish "Shakespeare in Othello has 
written 'Chaos is come again'." The context in Aneesft 's ·case was 
admission to postgraduate courses in a single government medical college 
at Goa. It is necessary to state that though the factual score was different, 
yet the two-Judge Bench referred to the decision in Ashli (supra} to 
accentuate the saga of anguish that continued. The Court noted various 
irregularities and also the view expressed by the High Court. The Court 
referred to the authority in Deptt. Of Public Hell/tit, UT Clwndigllrft 
v. Ku/deep Singh' wherein the Court has reproduced the observations 
of Farl Cairns L.C. in the House of Lords in Julius v. Lord Bis/top of 
Oxford' which was quoted with approval by this Court in Commr. of 
Police v. Gordlumdlls Blu111ji10• The succinctly stated passage reads 
thus:-
"2 7 ... ' ... There may be something in the nature of the 
thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which 
it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to 
be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose 
benefitthe power is to be exercised, which may couple the power 
with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the 
power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to 
do so." 
16. And thereafter the Court
proceeded to observe that the State 
Government had really crucified the fate of the candidates who had 
been protected by the verdict of this Court. After lancinating the order 
passed by the High Court, the Court expressed:-
479 
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"26. The agony and woe do not end here. The anguish of the 
F 
students who were admitted on the basis of the Rules, in our 
considered opinion, deserves to be addressed. True it-is, they 
instead of approaching this Court knocked at the doo~s of the 
High Court, may be in anxiety, as the counselling for the 
candidates qualified in the NEET examination had commenced. 
By virtue of the order of the High Court they got provisional 
G 
admissions. They have prosecuted their studies for some time. 
'(1994) 77 Cut LT 624 
'(l997)9SCC 199 
9(1880) 5 AC 214 
"'AIR 1952 SC 16 
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[2017] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
Had the. NEET not been introduced, they would have been 
admitted under the Rules. But, presently the situation is totally 
different. With the intention to solve the problem we had directed 
issue ofnotice to the Medical Council oflndia." 
17. After referring to the decisions in K.S. Blwir v. State of 
B 
Maharashtra"; Faiw Cltoadltary v. State of J & K"; Satyal:lrata 
Sa/100 v. State of Orissa" and Medical Council of India v. State of 
Karnataka'", the Court culled out two principles. They are:-
c 
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"30. From the aforesaid decisions two principles emerge: 
(i) That there cannot be direction for increase of seats, and 
(ii) There cannot be telescoping of unfilled seats of one year 
with permitted seats of the subsequent years." 
18. The Court referred to the authority in Priya Gupta v. State 
of Cltltattisgarlt" wherein directions were issued permitting the 
appellants therein to complete the course and thereafter, the Court invoked 
the jurisdiction Article 142 of the Constitution to issue a direction so that 
it can act as a palliative at least for some of the students who had been 
given admission under the Rules. Eventually it held:-
"33. We have been apprised by Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel 
for the State and Ms. lndu Malhotra, learned senior counsel for 
the private respondents, that 21 seats of All India quota in 
postgraduate medical course and 7 seats in dental course have 
been transferred to the
State quota. Mr. Amit Kumar, learned 
counsel for the Medical Council of India, while not disputing 
the numbers, would submit thatthey are to be fi lied up on different 
parameters. We are absolutely conscious of the said position. 
However. regard being had to the special features of the case 
and the litigations that have cropped up and the mistake that the 
State Government has committed, we are inclined to di rec: that 
21 seats transferred to the State quota shall be filled up from 
among the students who had taken admissions under the 2004 
Rules. It needs no special emphasis to state that the admissions 
11(2001) 10 sec 264 
"(2012) 10 sec 149 
"(2012) s sec 203 
'« 1998) 6 sec 131 
"(2012)7SCC433
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
and the allocations of the stream shall be on their inte1 se merit 
as per the Rules. We may hasten to clarify that none of these 
candidates shall be allowed to encroach upon the streams that 
have already been allotted to the petitioners who were admitted 
having been qualified in the NEET examination. We have been 
further apprised at the Bar that there are some unfilled seats as 
some students have left the College. If the vacancies have 
occurred, the same can also be filled up regard being h~d to the 
merit as stipulated under the Rules. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
35. The next submission relates to the issue whether the 
students who cannot be adjusted in the seats of All India quota 
that have been transferred to the State quota of this year can be 
adjusted next year. During the course of hearing though there 
was some debate with regard to giving of admissions to such 
students in the academic year 2014-15, Mr. Amit Kumar, learned 
counsel forthe Medical Council oflndia, has seriously opposed 
the same and, thereafter, has cited the authorities which we have 
referred to herein before. We are bound by the said precedents. 
In certain individual cases where there is defective counselling 
and merit has become a casualtv. this Court has directed for 
adjustment in the next academic session but in the case at hand. 
it is not exactly so. Though we are at pains, yet we must express 
that it will not be
appropriate to issue directions to adjust them in 
respect of the subsequent academic year, for taking recourse to 
the same would affect the other meritorious candidates who would 
be aspirant to get admissions next year. For doing equity to some 
in praesenti we cannot afford to do injustice to others in future. 
Therefore, the submission stands repelled." 
[Emphasi3 added] 
19. The aforesaid decision has to be appropriately understood. 
The Court did not direct for adjustment of number of students who had 
to go out to be adjusted in the subsequent year, regard being had to the 
principles stated in Faiza Choudhary and Satyubratu Suhoo (supra), 
as the factual score was quite different. It needs to be stat~d in an 
elaborate manner. The State of Goa had framed a set of Rules, namely, 
the Goa (Rules for admission to Postgraduate degree and diploma courses 
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of the Goa University at the Goa Medical College) Rules, 2004 (for 
short "the Rules"). Rule 3 dealt with eligibility, preference and order of 
merit. Rule 3( I) dealt with eligibility criteria and Rule 3(2) with preference. 
The said Rule governed the admission to the singular medical cc.liege 
and the lone dental college, both Government colleges affiliated to Goa 
University. On 9.8.2012 the Government of Goa in the Department of 
Public Health, through its Under Secretary (Health) communicated to 
the Dean, Goa Medical College to implement Medical council oflndia's 
Notification on the NEET for the academic year 2013-14, which was 
challenged in Christian Medical College v. State of Punjab". During 
the pendency of the matter, the writ petitioners qualified for NEET and 
secured ranks for admission to postgraduate courses. When the matter 
was sub-judice before this Court the High Court of Bombay at Goa 
entertained Writ Petition No. 366 of2013 by the students, who had failed 
to qualify in the NEET examination but were eligible to get admission on 
the basis of their aggregate marks as provided under the Rules, and 
ordered counselling in respect of both the categories of students and 
permit admission to the students. 
On 25.7.2013, Additional 
Secretary (Health) directed the Goa Medical College to admit the students 
on the basis of aggregate marks and cancelled the admissions bas~d on 
NEET. The
candidates, who had qualified in the NEET examination 
and had been admitted, were compelled to leave the college and the 
students who had qualified under the Rules were admitted. The 
dissatisfaction impelled the grieved students to approach this Court under 
Article 32 of the Constitution and the Court on 30.7.2013 stayed the 
orderofthe State Government and thereafter on 7.8.2013 passed a 
mandatory order to the effect that the petitioners shall be permitted 
to continue their studies. However, the Court observed that in certain 
individual cases, there had been a defective counseling and merit had 
become a casualty, and accordingly directed for adjustment in the next 
academic session which followed the principle laid down in Priya Gupta 
(supra). 
20. In Jasmin Kaur & Ors. (supra), the two-Judge Bench 
referred to all the authorities in the field, namely, Priya Gupta (supra); 
State of Bihar v. Sanjay Kumar Sinha"; Medical Council of lndkt 
v. Mad/tu Singh"; GSF Medical and Paramedical Assn. v. Assn. of 
"<2010) 12 sec 167 
"< 1990) 4 sec 624 
"\2002) 1 sec 2ss
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
Se(f Financinf( Technical Institutes"; and Christian Medical Collef(e 
(supra) and distinguished the decision in Asha's case stating as follows:-
"31. In para 32 of Asha case, the exceptional circumstances 
which can be examined have been quoted in order to ensure that 
when any deviation is to be made from the normal rule, such 
similar principles should be kept in mind by the Courts. In para 
32, it was highlighted that in the rarest ofrare cases or exceptional 
circumstances, the Courts may have to mould the re!iefs and 
make an exception to the cut-off date of 30'h September but in 
those cases the Court must first return a finding that no fault 
was attributable to the candidate, that the candidate pursued her 
rights and legal remedies expeditiously without any delay and 
that there was fault on the part of the authorities and that there 
was no apparent breach of the rules, regulations and principles 
in the process of the selection and grant of admission. It was 
also highlighted that where denial ofadmission would violate the 
right to equal fry and equal treatment of the candidate, it would 
be completely unjust and unfair to deny such exceptional relief 
to the candidate. By relying upon the said part of the decision, 
the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the case of the 
contesting Respondent was squarely covered by the principle of 
an exceptional case and, therefore, the direction of
the Division 
Bench was well justified." 
21. The Court distinguished the decisions in Dwarka Natlt v. 
ITO" and State of Punjab v. Sali/ Sablt/ok" and proceeded to conclude 
thus:-
"33 .1 The schedule relating to admissions to the professional 
colleges should be strictly and scrupulously adhered to and shall 
not be deviated under any circumstance either by the courts or 
the Board and midstream admission should not be permitted. 
33 .2 Under exceptional circumstances, if the court finds that 
there is no fault attributable to the candidate i.e., the candidate 
has pursued his or her legal right expeditiously without any delay 
and that there is fault only on the part of the authorities or there 
"(2003) 12 sec 414 
"AIR 1966SC81 
"(2003) s sec 1 
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is an apparent breach of rules and regulations as well as related 
principles in the process of grant ofadmission which would violate 
the right to equality and equal treatment to the competing 
candidates and the relief of admission can be directed within the 
time schedule prescribed, it would be completely just and fair to 
provide exceptional reliefs to the candidate under such 
circumstance alone. 
33 .3 If a candidate is not selected during a particular academic 
year due to the fault of the Institutions/ Authorities and in this 
process if the seats are filled up and the scope for granting 
admission is lost due to eclipse of time schedule, then under such 
circumstances, the candidate should not be victimised for nc fault 
of his/her and the Court may consider grant of appropriate 
compensation to offset the loss caused, if any. 
33.4. When a candidate does not exercise or pursue his/her rights 
or legal remedies against his/her non-selection expeditiously and 
promptly, then the Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate 
in the form of securing an admission. 
33.5 Ifthe candidate takes a calculated risk/chance by subjecting 
himself/herself to the selection process and after knowing his/ 
her non- selection, he/she cannot subsequently turn around and 
contend that the process of selection was unfair. 
33 .6 If it is found that the candidate acquiesces or waive.s his/ 
her right to claim relief
before the Court promptly, then in. such 
cases, the legal maxim vigil anti bus et 11011 dormientibus Jura 
subveniunt, which means that equity aids only the vigilant and 
not the ones who sleep over their rights, will be highly appropriate. 
33.7 No relief can be granted even though the prospectus is 
declared illegal or invalid ifthe same is not challenged promptly. 
Once the candidate is aware that he/she does not fulfill the criteria 
of the prospectus he/she cannot be heard to state that, he/she 
G 
chose to challenge the same only after preferring the application 
and after the same is refused on the ground of eligibility. 
H 
33.8 There cannot be telescoping of unfilled seats of one year 
with permitted seats of the subsequent year i.e., carry forward 
of seats cannot be permitted how much ever meritorious a
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
485 
ORS. [D!PAK MISRA, J.] 
candidate is and deserved admission. In such circumstances, 
A 
the Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate but it is up to 
the candidate to re-apply in next academic year. 
33.9 There cannot be at any point of time a direction given either 
by the Court or the Board to increase the number of seats which 
is exclusively in the realm of the Medical Council of India. 
B 
33. I 0 Each of these above mentioned principles should be applied 
based on the unique and distinguishable facts and circumstances 
of each case and no two cases can be held to be identical." 
[Underlining is ours} 
22. The aforesaid authority, as the underlining portion would show, 
restricts the grant ofrelief of admission, if it is within the time schedule 
prescribed, and then lays down ifthe seats are filled up and t:1e scope 
for granting admission is lost due to eclipse of time schedule, then under 
such circumstances, the candidate can only be granted appropriate 
compensation to off-set the loss caused, if any. The said authority has 
been followed in S. Nilwr Alwmedv. Dean Ve/amnwl Medical College 
Hospital and Research Institute & Ors". 
23. In this context, a reference to the pronouncement by a three-
Judge Bench in Harslwli Dlo Sudamrao Wankhede v. State of 
Maharashtra & Ors. 23 would be apt. In the said case, the appellant 
was denied admission in MBBS first year course in academic year 2004-
05 despite
obtaining higher marks in the entrance test. The appellant 
therein had approached the High Court which had dismissed the writ 
petition on the ground that direction for grant of admission to the appellant 
could not be issued after the cut-off date, i.e. 30'h September 2004 in 
view of the decision of this Court in Madhu Singh (supra). T11e Court 
accepted the stand of the appellant with regard to her merit and directed 
as follows:-
"6. Learned Counsel for the college submits that the appellant 
can be granted admission in the present Academic Year 2005-
2006 out of the sanctioned intake of the college. Learned Counsel 
also states that the appellant would be required to pay only that 
fee which was required to be paid if admission had been granted 
against a government quota seat in Academic Year 2004-2005. 
"(2016) 1sec662 
"(2005) 13 sec 464 
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Further, it is stated that whatever fee has been paid by the appellant 
for getting admission into dental course for the last year or this 
year, due adjustment would be made while calculating payment 
of fee by her for the admission in the first year MBBS course in 
the present Academic Year 2005-2006. 
7. The question which still requires to be examined, which would 
be examined later, would also be about the loss of one year of 
career of the appellant. In view of the aforesaid, we direct that 
the appellant be granted admission in the first year MBBS course 
by 30.09.2005." 
24. The concern of the Court from the aforesaid two passages 
is writ large. As we understand the ratio, the three-Judge Bench was 
concerned with the non-granting of admission and the loss of one year 
of career of the student. 
25. Mr. Parameshwar, learned counsel has drawn our attention 
to a passage from a three-Judge Bench decision in Punjab Engineering 
College, Chandigarh through its Principal v. S1111jay Gulati & Ors.". 
The said passage reads as under:-
"Cases like these in which admissions granted to students in 
educational institutions are quashed raise a sensitive human issue. 
It is unquestionably true that the authorities who are charged 
with the duty of admitting students to educational institutions must 
act fairly and objectively. If admissions to these institutions are 
made on extraneous considerations and the
authorities v;olate 
the norms set down by the rules and regulations, a sense of 
resentment and frustration is bound to be generated in the minds 
of those unfortunate young students who are wrongly or 
purposefully left out. Indiscipline in educational institutions is not 
wholly unconnected with a lack of sense of moral values on the 
part of the administrators and teachers alike. But the problem 
which the courts are faced with in these cases is, that it ;snot 
until a period of six months or a year elapses after the admissions 
are made that the intervention of the court comes into play. Writ 
Petitions involving a challenge to such admissions are generally 
taken up by the High Courts as promptly as possible but even 
then, students who are wrongly admitted finish one or two 
semester of the course by the time the decision of the High 
------
"(1983)3 SCC517
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
Court is pronounced. A further appeal to this Court c0nsumes 
still more time, which creates further difficulties in adjusting 
equities between students who are wrongly admitted and those 
who are unjustly excluded. Inevitably, the Court has to rest content 
with an academic pronouncement of the true legal position. 
Students who are wrongly admitted do not suffer the 
consequences of the manipulations. if any, made on their behalf 
by interested persons. This has virtually come to mean that one 
must get into an educational institution by means, fair or foul: 
once you are in, no one will put you out. Law's delays work their 
wonders in such diverse fashions." 
[Emphasis added] 
26. As is seen, stress has always been laid on the me~it in the 
matters of all admissions as meritorious students should not face any 
impediment to get admission for some fault on the part of the institution 
or the persons involved with it. He/She has no other remedy but to 
approach the Court for getting redressal of his/her grievances. It is a 
grievance that pertains to fundamental right. It has to be remembered 
that a right is conferred on a person by rule of law and if he seeks 
remedy through the process meant for establishing rule of law and it is 
denied to him, it would never subserve the cause ofreal justice. When 
a /is of this nature comes in a constitutional court, it becomes th~ duty of 
the court to address
whether the authority had acted within the powers 
conferred on it or deviated from the same as a consequence of which 
injustice has been caused to the grieved person. The redressal of a 
fundamental right, if one deserves to have, cannot be weighed in terms 
of grant of compensation only. Grant of compensation may be an 
additional relief. Confining it to grant of compensation as the only measure 
would defeat the basic purpose of the fundamental rights which the 
Constitution has conferred so that the said rights are sustained. It would 
be inapposite to recognize the right, record a finding that there is a violation 
of the right and deny the requisite relief. A young student should not feel 
that his entire industry to get himself qualified in the examination becomes 
meaningless because of some fault or dramatic design of certain 
authorities and they can get away by giving some amount as compensation. 
It may not only be agonizing but may amount to grant of premiem either 
to laxity or evil design or incurable greed of the authorities. We are 
disposed to think, in such a situation, justice may be farther away and 
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the knocking at the doors of a constitutional court, a sisyphean endeavour, 
an exercise in futility. It is well known that the law intends not anything 
impossible; "lex 11011 i11te11dit a/iquid impossibile". But when it is in 
the realm of possibility; and denial ofreliefhurts the "majesty of justice'', 
it should not be denied. On the contrary, every effort has to be made to 
grant the relief. Needless to say, to get the relief, conditions precedent 
are to be satisfied; and that is what has precisely been stated in As/ta 
(supra) and Harslwli (supra). 
27. In this context, Mr. Narasimha, learned friend of the court 
submitted that the court in Jasmine Kaur (supra) has been guided by 
the principle adopted by this Court in the cases of constitutional tort. He 
has drawn our attention to the authorities in Rudu/ Shaft v. Stflte of 
Bi/tar", Sebastian Hongray v. Union of India" and Clwirnum, 
Railway Board v. Cftandrima Das", where the Court granted 
compensation because there was no other option and the only way of 
redemption was to grant compensation. It is necessary to state that 
grant of relief as lawfully due should be the primary duty of the court. 
Where doctrine ofrestitution can be applied and there is no impossibility 
it would be anathema to the cause of justice to deny the same, It is 
seemly to appreciate that restitution as a concept, as is traditionally 
understood, is the restoration of
an aggrieved party to his condition prior 
to the wrongdoing. It could be limited to monetary quantification only if 
the breach is not capable of being remedied. That being so, compensation 
cannot be the adequate or sole remedy for the wrongful deprivation of 
admission, as it affects the academic career of a student. There may be 
cases where restitution may be too harsh. Then, as we are inclined to 
think, telescoping albeit reasonably is not an impossible one. In Anees/1 
D. Lawande (supra) some of the candidates were adjusted as the 
government had played possum and telescoping was not allowed as the 
candidates had got into the course in contravention of the decision of 
this Court. The factual score was different. But when a right is 
comatosed by a maladroit design, we think, the right of the person 
presently aggrieved should matter, not the right of the future candidate. 
Present cannot be crucified at the alter of the present. 
Whether the 
beneficiary who has got in should go out or not, would depend upon the 
discretion of the Court. 
"<I983)4 sec 141 
"'AIR 1984 SC 571 
"(2000) 2 sec 465
S. KRISHNA SRADHA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND 
ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
28. In this regard, we may, with profit, refer to the dictum laid 
down in Ja11g Singh v. Brij Lal & Ors."· In the said case, t~1e Court 
applied the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit, namely, an act of 
the Court shall prejudice no one and in that context held:-
"lt is no doubt true that a litigant must be vigilant and take care 
but where a litigant goes to Court and asks for the assistance of 
the Court so that his obligations under a decree might be fulfilled 
by him strictly, it is incumbent on the Court, if it does not leave 
the litigant to his own devices, to ensure that the correct 
information is furnished. If the Court in supplying the information 
makes a mistake the responsibility of the litigant, though it does 
not altogether cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the 
litigant acts on the faith of that information the Courts cannot 
hold him responsible for a mistake which it itself caused. There 
is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one 
that no act of Courts should harm a litigant and it is the bounden 
duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of 
the Court he should be restored to the position he would have 
occupied but for that mistake. This is aptly summed up in the 
1naxim: "Actus curiae 11e111ine111 gravabit'~. 
29. And thereafter moulded the relief, set aside the judgment of 
the High Court by observing thus:-
"The mistake
committed by the Court must be set right. The 
case must go back to that stage when the mistake was committed 
by the Court and the appellant should be ordered to deposit the 
additional rupee for payment to Bhola Singh. lfhe fails to make 
the deposit within the time specified by us his suit may be 
dismissed but not before. We may point out, however, that we 
are not deciding the question whether a Court after passing a 
decree for premption can extend the time originally fixed for 
deposit of the decretal amount. That question does not arise 
here. In view of the mistake of the Court which needs to be 
righted the parties are relegated to the position they occupied on 
January 6, 1958, when the error was committed by the Court 
which error is being rectified by us nw1c pro tune." 
[Emphasis s•.1pplied] 
'"AIR 1966SC 1631 
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30. The three words that have been proclaimed in the said 
judgment, namely, nunc pro tune, is basically in the realm of doctrine of 
relation back and it is applied because of the fault of the .Court, the 
litigant should not suffer. At this juncture, we are obliged to sa;1 that 
when the courts have gone to the extent of saying that for the fault of 
the court, the litigant should not suffer, it is unimaginable that fur the 
fault of the administrators or the counselling body or for some kind of 
evil designer, grant of compensation should be regarded as the lone 
remedy. We think not; as we are reminded o_f what Justinian had said 
"Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render to everyone, his 
due". Needless, "his due" only can mean "due in law in praesenti." 
31. In view of the aforesaid, we think the decision in Clumdig(/rh 
(ldministration (supra) requires re-consideration by a larger Bench. 
Papers be placed before Hon 'ble the Chief Justice oflndia for constitution 
of the appropriate larger Bench. 
Divya Pandey 
Matter referred to Larger Bench.