RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIA versus SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIA AND OTHERS
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 369, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 369 
RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIA 
v. 
SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIAAND OTHERS 
(Civil Appeal Nos.7213-7214 of2015 etc.) 
SEPTEMBER 18, 2015 
[ANIL R.DAVE, KURIAN JOSEPH AND AMITAVA 
ROY,JJ.) 
A 
B 
Evidence Act, 1872 - Admission -
Withdrawal of -
C 
Permissibility- Suit for partition - Two of the defendants in 
their written statements made admissions regarding 
relinquishment of their right in the suit property - After 25 
years, seeking amendment of written statement withdrawing 
their admissions- Held: A party cannot be permitted to wholly D 
withdraw the admission in the pleadings - However, the 
admission can be clarified or explained by way of amendment 
and the basis of admission can be attacked in a substantive 
proceedings - Delay by itself may not be crucial in such 
amendment -
Therefore, the claim of defendants for E 
withdrawal of their admissions is rejected - However, they 
are given opportunity to explain/clarify their admissions. 
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court 
F 
HELD: 1. The attempt to wholly resile from the 
admission made after twenty-five years cannot be 
permitted. Delay in itself may not be crucial on an 
application for amendment in a written statement, be it 
for introduction of a new fact or for explanation or G 
clarification of an admission or for taking an alternate 
position. It is seen that the issues have been framed in 
the present case only in 2009. The nature and character 
of the amendment and the other circumstances are 
H
370 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 12 S.C.R. 
A relevant while considering the delay and its 
consequence on the application for amendment. But a 
party cannot be permitted to wholly withdraw the 
admission in the pleadings. However, the admission can 
be clarified or explained by way of amendment and the 
B basis of admission can be attacked in a substantive 
proceedings. [Paras 22, 23 and 25] [383-G-H; 384-A-B; 
385-C] 
2. In view of the averment in the application for 
C amendment and in view of the counter affidavit filed 
before this Court by Defendant Nos. 5 and 12, this Court 
does not intend to make the suit filed in the year 2005 
otherwise infructuous. The application for amendment 
withdrawing the admissions made in the written 
D statement on relinquishment of the claim to the suit 
property by Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 is rejected. 
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, 
Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 should be given an opportunity 
to explain/clarify the admissions made in the written 
E statement. Accordingly, Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 are 
permitted to file an application limiting their prayer only 
to the extent of explaining/clarifying the disputed 
admissions in the written statement which will be 
F considered on its merits and in the light of the 
observations made in th.is judgment. [Paras 25, 26 and 
27] [385-C-G; 386-C-B] 
G 
Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram lchharam alias 
Brijram and others 1974 (2) SCR 544: (1974) 1 
SCC 242; Gautam Sarup v. Leela
Jelly and others 
2008 (4) SCR 523: (2008) 7 SCC 85- relied on. 
Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay 
and Another (1984) Supp. SCC 594 - partly 
H 
overruled.

RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIA v. SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIA 
371 
AND OTHERS 
Sushi/ Kumar Jain v. Mano} Kumar and another 
A 
(2009) 14 SCC 38; Modi Spinning and Weaving 
Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co. 1977 (1) 
SCR 728: (1976) 4 SCC 320; Revajeetu Builders 
and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and Sons and 
others 2009 (15) SCR 103: (2009) 10 SCC 84 -
B 
referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
(1984) Supp. sec 594 
partly overruled. 
Para 17 
c 
(2009) 14 sec 38 
referred to. 
Para 18 
1977 (1) SCR 728 
referred to. 
Para 19 
2008 (4) SCR 523 
relied on. 
Para 20 
D 
2009 (15) SCR 103 
referred to. 
Para 21 
197 4 (2) SCR 544 
relied on. 
Para 23 
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. E 
7213 & 7214 of2015 
From the Judgment and Order No. dated 09.09.2010 of 
the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in APO No. 324 
of 2008 arising out of Partition Suit being No. C.S. No. 696 of 
1978, GA. No. 297 of 2004 
F 
WITH 
C. A. No. 7215 of 2015 
Vijay Hansaria, K. Datta, Abinav Hansaria, Ra haul· G 
Malhotra, PraveenAgrawal,Abhay Kumar, Rahul Malhotra, Niti 
Arora for the Appellant. 
Pradip Kumar Dutta, Debnath Ghosh, (for Abhijit 
Sengupta), Partha Sil, Tavish B. Prasad for the Respondents. H 
•
372 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
KURIAN, J. 1. Leave granted. 
2. Whether a defendant in a suit for partition can be 
permitted to withdraw an admission made in the written 
B statement after a pretty long period, is the issue arising for 
consideration in these cases. 
3. Partition Suit No. 696of1978, filed in the High Court 
of Calcutta on Original Side, pertains to the partition of 
C premises No.6, Russel Street, Calcutta, originally belonging 
to one Motilal Kajaria. Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 are the son 
and widow, respectively, of the predeceased son, viz., Mahabir 
Prasad of Motilal Kajaria. In the Partition Suit, Defendant Nos. 
5 and 12 filed a joint written statement on 16.08.1979, inter 
D alia, stating as under: 
"1. These defendants state that there is no cause of action 
against these defendants and these defendants are 
unnecessary parties and as such the suit against these 
E 
defendants should be dismissed with costs, ... 
F 
G 
H 
"a) 
:xxx 
:xxx 
:xxx 
b) In the year 1942, the said Mahabir Prasad Kajaria, 
since deceased separated from his father Motilal Kajaria 
since deceased and his brothers, namely the defendants 
No. 1 to 4 in food, estate and business. Since his 
separation from his father and brothers the said Mahabir 
Prasad Kajaria was carrying on his independent 
business and holding his own separate property. The 
said "Mahabir Prasad Kajaria" also renounced all his 
interests in all the
properties and assets of his father the 
said Motilal Kajaria since deceased. 
c) These defendants state that neither of them is a co-
sharer for the Premises No. 6, Russel Street, Calcutta
RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIA v. SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIA 
373 
ANb OTHERS [KURIAN, J.] 
and nor they have any right title or interest whatsoever in A 
the said premises. These defendants further state that 
after the death of Motilal Kajaria neither of these 
defendants had inherited his property nor business as 
the said Mahabir Prasad separated from his father and 
brothers in 1942 and renounced all his rights, title and 
B 
interest in the properties of the said Motilal Kajaria." 
4. Prior to the filing of the written statement, they had 
also filed an affidavit dated 29.11.1978 while opposing an 
application for appointment of receiver in respect of the suit C 
property stating that: 
"I state that my late father Mahabir Prasad Kajaria was 
separated from my grand father late Motilal Kajaria in 
the year 1942 and severed all his connections with his o 
father and brothers and since then my father was carrying 
independent business and holding separate property. 
I further state neither I nor my mother is co - sharer of the 
Premises No. 6, Russel Street, Calcutta and ';Ne have no E 
right, title and interest whatsoever in the said Premises 
No. 6, Russel Street, Calcutta nor we have inherited the 
shares of my grand father Late Motilal Kajaria and as 
such I state that we have been unnecessarily joined as 
defendants." 
F 
5. In the Order dated 02.05.1979, while appointing a 
Court Receiver in respect of the suit property, the court 
recorded the following findings: 
" ... Mahabir
Prasad Kajaria had no interest in the G 
property as such respondent No. 5 (Sheo Prakash 
Kajaria) also can have no interest in the said property. 
The allegation that the co-owners have not received any 
money towards their shares is incorrect. .. " 
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374 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A 
6. After Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 filed written statement 
on 14 .09 .1979, Smt. Bhagwani Devi Kajaria-Defendant No.16, 
who is the mother of late Mahabir Prasad Kajaria (Grand 
mother of Defendant No.5 and mother-in-law of Defendant 
No.12), filed a written statement clearly stating that late Mahabir 
B Prasad had separated from his father and other brothers as 
early as in 1942 and had also renounced all his rights in the 
movable and immovable properties of his father Motilal 
Kajaria. The relevant portion of the written statement of the 
grand mother of Defendant No.5 reads as follows: 
c 
D 
E 
F 
"b) The defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the sons of this 
defendant and defendant No. 5 is the grandson of this 
defendant. This defendant's second son Mahabir Prasad 
Kajaria father of the defendant No. 5 Sheo Prakash 
Kajaria and husband of the defendant No. 12 Sm. Ginia 
Devi Kajaria was separated from his father and brothers 
in food, estate and business in 1942. He renounced all 
his right, title and interests in the moveable and 
immoveable properties of his father the said Motilal 
Kajaria. The said Mahabir Prasad died in 1949. Since 
Mahabir Prasad Kajaria separated from his father he 
was carrying on his independent business and also 
acquired properties." 
7. On 13.12.1979, the petitioner herein, who is Defendant 
No.4, had also filed his written statement on the same lines 
indicated above. 
8. On 02.07.1980, the
learned Single Judge, on an 
G application for perjury, had recorded the following findings: 
"Pannalal Kajaria had three sons Matilal, Jaharmal and 
Onkarmal Kajaria. Before the death of Motilal Kajaria on 
5th June, 1952 his second son, Mahabir Prasad Kajaria 
H 
was separated from him in 1942 in food and in estate
RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIA v. SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIA 
375 
AND OTHERS [KURIAN, J.] 
and renounced all his claim over the properties of Motilal. A 
Kajaria . 
. . . There was a declaration given by Smt. Ginia Devi 
Kajaria, widow of Mahabir Prasad Kajaria on 251h 
February, 1956 before the Joint Arbitrators statin~ that B 
her husband Mahabir Kajaria separated himself from his 
father Matilal Kajaria and his brothers in food, estate and 
business renounced his right title and interest in the said 
joint immovable properties in favour of his brothers and 
father." 
C 
9. On 09.01.1989, Plaintiff No. 6, viz. Sulochna Devi had 
filed an application seeking leave for withdrawal of the suit 
wherein also there was a statement regarding relinquishment 
of the claims of Defendant Nos. 5 and 12. 
D 
10. It is to be noted that Defendant No. 5 is a 
businessman, and going by his date of birth, he was 37 in 
1978 when he filed the affidavit, 38 when he filed the written 
statement on behalf of his mother and in 1989, he was aged E 
49years. 
11. After about 15 years of the written statement, on 
17.01.2004, Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 filed an application for 
amendment of the written statement mainly seeking to resile F 
from the admissions regarding relinquishment of their right in 
the suit property. 
12. After one year of the said application for amendment 
of the written statement, they also filed a civil suit (Civil Suit 
No.9 of 2005) on 19.01.2005, seeking a declaration attacking G 
the
arbitration award dated 13.09.1956 regarding the partition 
of the property and claiming right in the suit property. 
13. On 13.09.2008, the learned Single Judge dismissed 
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376 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A the application. However, the intra-court appeal filed by 
Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 was allowed by the Division Bench 
of the High Court and hence these appeals. 
14. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment has 
B taken the view that the rejection of the application for 
amendment would result in failure of justice and would cause 
irreparable injury to Defendant Nos. 5 and 12. According to 
the Division Bench, in the impugned Judgment: 
C 
"In our view, there was no justification of denying such an 
opportunity to the appellants to prove the amended 
version on the ground of mere delay, the effect of which 
will be, to unjustly permit the opposing defendants to reap 
the benefit of an apparent admission, which is not 
D 
conclusive proof of the fact contained in the pleading in 
accordance with the law of the land, and which may not 
be true. Moreover, for considering the question whether 
the amendment is a malafide one, we cannot lose sight 
of the fact it is not even the case of the opposing 
E 
defendants that by way of relinquishing his interest, 
Mahabir got any property of the Coparcenary in lieu of 
relinquishment. Thus, malafide on the part of the 
appellants cannot be inferred from the apparent facts of 
F 
the present case. 
We, thus, find that the learned Single Judge, while 
rejecting the application for amendment of the written 
statement filed by the appellants, did not follow the well-
accepted principles,
which are required to be followed, 
G 
while deciding this type of an application for amendment 
of the written statement. Thus, it was a case of improper 
exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge by not 
following the binding precedents, which justified 
interference by the appellate Court." 
H
RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIA v. SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIA 
377 
AND OTHERS [KURIAN, J.] 
15. 
We are afraid the view taken in the impugned A 
judgment is not true to facts. Even according to Defendant Nos. 
5 and 12, they had their separate property and they were doing 
independent business. In the affidavit filed on 29.11.1978 
before the High Court (Annexure-P5), it is stated as follows: 
B 
"1. I am a respondent No. 5 herein and Smt. Giniya Devi 
Kajaria, respondent No. 12 is my mother and I am 
acquainted with the facts and circumstances of this case 
and as such I am competent to affirm this affidavit on 
behalf and on behalf of my mother Smt. Giniya Devi C 
Kajaria the respondent No. 12.1 have read a copy of the 
Notice of Motion taken out by the Advocate of the 
petitioner on 19th September, 1978 and a petition 
affirmed by Shreelall Kajaria on 19th September, 1978 
to be intended to be used as grounds in support of the D 
said Notice of Motion and I state that I have understood 
the meaning, intents and purposes thereof. 
2. I state that my late father Mahabir Prasad Kajaria was 
separated from my grand father Late Motilal Kajaria in E 
the year 1942 and severed all his connections with his 
father and brothers and since then my father was carrying 
on independent business and holding separate property. 
3. I further state neither I nor my mother is a co-sharer of F 
the Premises No. 6, Russel Street, Calcutta and we have 
no right, title and interest whatsoever in the said
Pre~ises 
No. 6, Russel Street, Calcutta nor we have inherited the 
shares of my grand father Late Motilal Kajaria and as 
such I state that we have been unnecessarily joined as G 
defendants. 
4. I state that my grand father Late Motilal Kajaria died 
on 5th June, 1952 and disputes and differences arose 
between the heirs and legal representatives of Late H
378 
A 
8 
c 
D 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
Motilal Kajaria in respect of immovable properties left 
by my said grand father which disputes were referred to 
an arbitration of Dulichand Kheria, Sheo Prasad Patadia 
and Ramnath Kanoria and in the said Arbitration 
Proceedings my mother Smt. Giniya Devi Kajaria 
defendant No. 12 herein made a declaration in writing 
on 251h February, 1956 before the Arbitrators stating that 
my Late father Mahabir Prasad Kajaria separated 
himself from father and his brothers in food, estate and 
business and renounced the right, title and interest in the 
joint immovable property in favour of his brothers and 
father. A copy of the said declaration dated 25th February, 
1956 of my mother Smt. Giniya Devi Kajaria defendant 
No. 12 herein addressed to the Arbitrators is enclosed 
herewith and marked with letter "A". 
5. I state and submit that the petition is not maintainable 
and should be dismissed with cost. 
6. With reference to paragraph 20 of the said petition I 
E 
deny that I have got 2.78% in the said premises No.6, 
. Russel Street, Calcutta as alleged or at all which will also 
appear from the Registered Award dated 131h 
September, 1956 of the said Arbitrators. Save and 
except I have no knowledge in the allegations made in 
F 
different paragraphs of the said petition and I do not 
admit the same. 
7. I state that the petition No.1 Shreelall Kajaria after he 
was released from imprisonment he was serving as my 
G
employee in my firm M/s. Evergreen Industries at Sonepat 
Haryana at a monthly salary of Rs.400/- per month upto 
the year 1972 and was staying at Sonepat Haryana till 
he was under my service." 
H 
16. The clear stand taken by Defendant No. 5 when he
RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIA v. SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIA 
379 
AND OTHERS [KURIAN, J.] 
was aged 37 and when he was in active business is that his A 
father had separated from the grandfather in the year 1942 
and since then, he was carrying on independent business and 
holding separate property. It is crucially relevant to note that 
the declaration of Defendant No. 12 before the Arbitrators 
regarding the relinquishment was produced by them only. 
B 
17. Learned Counsel for Defendant Nos. 5 and 12, in 
the impugned order has placed heavy relevance on Panchdeo 
Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay and Another1. It was 
a case where the plaintiff moved an application for amendment C 
of the plaint regarding the relationship of the second defendant. 
It was stated in the plaint that he was the uterine brother of one 
R. Later, an application for amendment was moved for deletion 
of the word "uterine" from the plaint. The Trial Court allowed 
the application but in Revision, the High Court set aside the D 
order. While restoring the order passed by the Trial Court, this 
Court held at Paragraph-3 of the Judgment as follows: 
"3. Even if the High Court was justified in holding that the 
deletion of the word 'Uterine' has some significance and E 
may work in favour of either side to a very great extent 
yet that itself would not provide any justification for 
rejecting the amendment in exercise of its revisi~:inal 
jurisdiction. We may, in this connection, refer to Ganesh 
Trading Co. v.
Moji Ram wherein this Court after a review F · 
of number of decisions speaking through Beg, C.J. 
observed that procedural law is intended to facilitate and 
not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. But the· 
learned counsel for the respondents contended that by 
the oevice of amendment a very important admission is G 
being withdrawn. An admission made by a party may be 
withdrawn or may be explained away. Therefore, it cannot 
1 (1984) Supp. SCC594 
H
380 
A 
·s 
c 
D 
E 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
be said that by amendment an admission of fact cannot 
be withdrawn. The learned Trial Judge, granting the 
application for amendment was satisfied that in order to 
effectively adjudicate upon the dispute between the 
parties, amendment of the pleading was necessary. The 
High Court in its revisional jwisdiction for a reason which 
is untenable ought not to have interfered with the order 
inade by the trial court. The learned counsel for the 
respondents in this connection read one unreported 
decision of this Court in which this Court upheld the 
decision of the High Court setting aside the order granting 
amendment in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. We 
have gone through the judgment. The decision does not 
lay down any particular principle of law and appears to 
be a decision on its own facts. And ordinarily, it is well 
settled that unless there is an error in exercise of 
jurisdiction by the trial court, the High Court would not 
interfere with the order in exercise of its revisional 
jurisdiction." 
18. The above decision was followed in Sushi I Kumar 
Jain v. Manoj Kumar and another2. The case pertained to 
eviction proceedings. The original stand taken by the tenant 
was that there were different tenancies. However, an 
F application for amendment was moved stating that there are 
three different portions under one tenancy and not different 
portions under different tenancies. The Court, at
Paragraph-
12, held as follows: 
G 
"12. In our view, having considered the averments made 
in the application for amendment of the written statement, 
it cannot be said that in fact neither any admission was 
made by the appellant in his original written statement 
H 
2 (2009) 14 sec 38
RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIA v. SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIA 
381 
AND OTHERS [KURIAN, J.] 
nor had the appellant sought to withdraw such admission A 
made by him in his written stateme~t. That apart, after a 
careful reading of the application for amendment of the 
written statement, we are of ttie view that the appellant 
seeks to only elaborate and clarify the earlier 
inadvertence and confusion made in his written B 
statement. Even assuming that there was admission 
made by the appellant in his original written statement, 
then also, such admission can be explained by 
amendment of his written statement even by taking 
inconsistent pleas or substituting or altering his defence." C 
19. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant 
mainly referred to three Judgments of this Court. In Modi 
Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co.3, 
it was held as follows at Paragraph-10: 
D 
"10. It is true that inconsistent pleas can be made in 
pleadings but the effect of substitution of paras 25 and 
26 is not making inconsistent and alternative pleadings 
but it is seeking to displace the plaintiff completely from 
E 
the admissions made by the defendants in the written 
statement. If such amendments are allowed the plaintiff 
"Yill be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the 
opportunity of extracting the admission from the 
defendants. The High Court rightly rejected the F 
application for amendment and'agreed with the trial 
court." 
20. In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly and
others4, after 
considering Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (supra) and Modi G 
Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co. 
' (1976) 4 sec 320 
• (2008) 7 sec 85 
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382 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A (supra) and several other decisions dealing with the 
amendment on withdrawal of admissions in the pleadings, it 
was held at Paragraph-28 as follows: 
"28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions 
B 
made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission 
cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be 
explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to 
an admission or explaining away the same, however, 
would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It 
C 
may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative 
plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually 
destructive of each other." 
21. On amendments generally, in the decision reported 
o in Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy 
and Sons and others5, after referring to Gautam Sarup 
(supra), the principles on amendment have been summarized 
at Paragraph-63. It has been held as follows: 
E 
F 
"63. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian 
cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be 
taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the 
application for amendment: 
( 1) whether the amendment sought is imperative 
for proper and effective adjudication of the case; 
(2) whether the application for amendment is 
bona fide or mala fide; 
G 
(3) the amendment should not cause such 
prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated · 
adequately in terms of money; 
H • (2009) 10 sec 84
RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIAv. SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIA 
383 
AND OTHERS [KURIAN, J.] 
(4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to A 
injustice or lead to multiple litigation; 
(5) whether the proposed amendment 
constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and 
character of the case; and 
B 
(6) as a general rule, the court should decline 
amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would 
be barred by limitation on the date of application. 
These are some of the important factors which may be C 
kept in mind while dealing with application filed under 
Order 6 Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not 
exhaustive." 
22. In the case before us, we are afraid, many of the D 
factors referred to above, have not been satisfied. It is 
significant to note that Defendant Nos. 5 and 12, after moving 
an application for amendment withdrawing the admissions 
made in the written statement, have filed a substantive suit 
attacking the alleged relinquishment of their claim in the family E 
property and we are informed that the trial is in progress. In 
that view of the matter, we do not propose to deal with the 
matter any further lest it should affect the outcome of the suit 
filed by Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 since the declaration sought F 
in the suit filed in 2005 is to take away the basis of the said 
relinquishment of the claim in the suit property. However, as 
far as amendment is concerned, the attempt to wholly resile 
from the admission made aftertwentyfive years, we are
afraid, 
cannot be permitted. 
G 
23. Delay in itself may not be crucial on an application 
for amendment in a written statement, be it for introduction of 
a new fact or for explanation or clarification of an admission or 
for taking an alternate position. It is seen that the issues have H
384 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A been framed in the case before us, only in200B. The nature 
and character of the amendment and the other circumstances 
as in the instant case which we have referred to above, are 
relevant while considering the delay and its consequence on 
the application for amendment. But a party cannot be permitted 
B to wholly withdraw the admission in the pleadings, as held by 
this Court in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram lchharam alias 
Brijram and others6. To quote Paragraph-27: 
c 
D 
E 
F 
"27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the 
principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing 
of the decree, there was some material before the Court, 
on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie 
satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for 
eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so 
satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently 
passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. 
Such material may take the shape either of evidence 
recorded or produced in the case, or, it rnay partly or 
wholly be in the shape of an express or implied 
admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. 
Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of 
the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial 
admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the 
Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or 
before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing 
than
evidentiary admissions. The former class of 
admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them 
and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can 
G 
be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On 
the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are 
receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, 
not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
H • (1974) 1 sec 242 __ _
RAM NIRANJAN KAJARIA v. SHEO PRAKASH KAJARIA 
385 
AND OTHERS [KURIAN, J.] 
24. We agree with the position in Nagindas Ramdas A 
(supra) and as endorsed in Gautam Sarup (supra) that a 
categorical a_dmission made in the pleadings cannot be 
permitted to be withdrawn by way of an amendment. To that 
extent, the proposition of law that even an admission can be 
withdrawn, as held in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (supra), 
B 
does not reflect the correct legal position and it is overruled. 
25. However, the admission can be clarified or 
explained by way of amendment and the basis of admission 
can be attacked in a substantive proceedings. In this context, C 
we are also mindful of the averment in the application for 
amendment that: 
"11. 
, ... Mahabir Prasad Kajaria died at age of 24 
years on 7th May, 1949 when the defendant No. 5 was D 
only 2 years and the defendant No. 12 was only 21 years. 
Till the death of Mahabir and even thereafter, the 
petitioners had been getting benefits from income of the 
joint properties. The defendant No.5 and his two sisters, 
namely, Kusum and Bina were brought up and were E 
maintained from the income of the joint family properties. 
The petitioners after the death of Mahabir, they continued 
to live in the joint family as members and till now 
members of the joint family. In the marriage of the two 
sisters of the defendant no.5 Kusum and Bina (now after F 
marriage Smt. Kusum Tulsian and Smt. Bina Tulsian) the 
. . 
expenses were wholly
borne out from the incomes of the 
joint family properties. The said facts are Well known to 
all the family members and their relations." 
26. In the counter affidavit filed before this Court, 
Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 have stated as follows: 
'The alleged letter of 1956 allegedly issued by the widow 
G 
of Mahabir Prasad used in the arbitration proceedings H
386 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 12 S.C.R. 
A 
where she was not a party admitting relinquishment of 
the share of her husband and thereafter admitting such 
letter in the original pleading is not what the answering 
respondents want to resile and/or withdraw from but by 
the present amendment had only ought to explain the 
B 
circumstances in which such letter has been written." 
27. In the above circumstances, we do not intend to 
make the suit filed in the year 2005 otherwise infructuous. The 
application for amendment withdrawing the admissions made 
C in the written statement on relinquishment of the claim to the 
suit property by Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 is rejected. However, 
we, in the facts and circumstances of the case, are of the view 
that Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 should be given an opportunity 
to explain/clarify the admissions made in the written statement. 
D Accordingly, Defendant Nos. 5·and 12 are permitted to file an 
application within one month from today limiting their prayer 
only to the extent of explaining/clarifying the disputed 
admissions in the written statement which will be considered 
on its merits and in the light of the observations made herein 
E above. 
28. Though the learned Counsel for the appellant · 
vehemently pressed for costs, we reluctantly refrain from 
passing any order in that regard. After all, it is a suit for partition 
F of the family property. At any stage, the parties can have a 
change of heart and ignore the law or facts
or other 
technicalities and reach an amicable settlement. 
29. The appeals are partly allowed as above. The 
G impugned Judgment will stand modified to the extent indicated 
herein above. 
30. There shall be no order as to costs. 
H 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeals partly allowed.