RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 484, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
CASE DETAILS
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No(s). 252 of 2023)
AUGUST 25, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Petitioner serving a sentence of life 
imprisonment for commission of oﬀ ences punishable u/ss.302/34 of the 
IPC, 1860 and s.27 of the Arms Act, 1959 sought direction for his premature 
release on the ground that he has been in custody for 24 years without grant 
of remission or parole.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Grant of:
Held: Remission Board rejected the petitioner’s application for 
premature release twice – The reason for rejection of the petitioner’s 
application was the adverse report submitted by the presiding judge in 
the ﬁ rst round, which was perfunctorily relied upon and reiterated in the 
report submitted by the then presiding judge in the second round as well – 
Both the reports submitted by the presiding judges (at the relevant time), 
demonstrate a casual opinion, based solely on the judicial record which 
presumably consisted of the ﬁ nding of guilt, by the trial court and High Court 
– Overemphasis on the presiding judge’s opinion and complete disregard 
of comments of other authorities, while arriving at its conclusion, would 
render the appropriate government’s decision on a remission application, 
unsustainable – The appropriate government, should take a holistic view 
of all the opinions received (in terms of the
relevant rules), including the 
judicial view of the presiding judge of the concerned court, keeping in mind 
the purpose and objective, of remission – Remission Board to reconsider the 
petitioner’s application for remission afresh – Concerned presiding judge 
to provide an opinion on the petitioner’s application for premature release, 
by examining the judicial record, and provide adequate reasoning, taking 
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 484 : 2023 INSC 771
484
485
into account the factors laid down in Laxman Naskar case – Given the long 
period of incarceration already suﬀ ered by the writ petitioner and his age, 
the Remission Board should render its decision, preferably within three 
months from the date of this judgment.[Paras 14-17, 25]
Sentencing – Judicial exercise vis-à-vis executive function – 
Statutory and Constitutional powers– s.432 CrPC; Articles 72, 161, 
Constitution of India:
Held: Sentencing is a judicial exercise of power – The act thereafter 
of executing the sentence awarded, however, is a purely executive function 
which includes the grant of remission, commutation, pardon, reprieves, or 
suspension of sentence – This executive power is traceable to Article 72 
and 161 of the Constitution of India – Whilst the statutory (u/s.432 CrPC) 
and constitutional (under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution) powers 
are distinct- the former limited power, is still an imprint of the latter (much 
wider power), and must be understood as such and placed in this context – 
This executive power which is inherently discretionary in nature, has to be 
exercised fairly, reasonably, and not arbitrarily – Absence to do so, would 
compel the court to exercise its judicial review and in appropriate cases 
remit the matter for reconsideration – Procedure laid out in s.432(2), has 
been held to be mandatory.[Paras 9 and 10]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Parameters to 
be considered – Discussed.[Para 11]
Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Role of presiding 
judge’s view – Weightage to be attached:
Held: The discretion that the executive is empowered with in executing 
a sentence, would be denuded of its content, if the presiding judge’s view- 
which is formed in all likelihood, largely (if not solely) on the basis of the 
judicial record- is mechanically followed by the concerned authority – Such 
an approach has the potential to strike at the heart, and subvert the concept 
of remission- as a reward and incentive encouraging actions and behaviour 
geared towards reformation- in a modern legal system – If the presiding 
judge’s report is only reﬂ ective of the facts and circumstances that led to 
the conclusion of the convict’s guilt, and is merely a reiteration of those 
circumstances available to the judge at the time of sentencing (some 14 or 
more years earlier, as the case may be), then the appropriate government 
should attach weight to this ﬁ nding, accordingly – Such a report, cannot be 
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS.
486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
relied on as carrying predominance, if it focusses on the crime, with little 
or no attention to the criminal.[Paras 16 and 17]
Sentencing – Heinous crimes:
Held: Even at the stage of sentencing, the judge ideally is to exercise 
discretion after looking at a wide range of factors relating to the criminal 
and not just the crime; but as noticed in numerous precedents that have dealt 
with sentencing in the commission of heinous crimes, this is unfortunately, 
often not the reality – Guidance has been oﬀ ered by this court on how to 
mitigate this in recent years, but it is pragmatic to acknowledge that it will 
require time for our criminal justice system to incorporate, and uniformly 
reach such standards.
Sentencing – Imprisonment – Aim and goal of – Discussed.[Para 
19]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Report submitted 
by the SP in the second round was adverse – Duty of the appropriate 
government:
Held: Report submitted by the Superintendent of Police in the second 
round (was diametrically diﬀ erent from that which was submitted in the 
ﬁ rst round), was adverse – In each case, the appropriate government has 
to be cognizant of the latent (not always) prejudices of the crime, that the 
police as well as the investigating agency, may be citing- especially in a 
case such as the present one, where the slain victims were police personnel 
themselves, i.e., members of the police force – These biases may inform 
the
report, and cannot be given determinative value – Apart from the other 
considerations (on the nature of the crime, whether it aﬀ ected the society 
at large, the chance of its recurrence, etc.), the appropriate government 
should while considering the potential of the convict to commit crimes 
in the future, whether there remains any fruitful purpose of continued 
incarceration, and the socio-economic conditions, review: the convict’s age, 
state of heath, familial relationships and possibility of reintegration, extent 
of earned remission, and the post-conviction conduct including, but not 
limited to- whether the convict has attained any educational qualiﬁ cation 
whilst in custody, volunteer services oﬀ ered, job/work done, jail conduct, 
whether they were engaged in any socially aimed or productive activity, and 
the overall development as a human being – The Board should not entirely 
rely either on the presiding judge, or the report prepared by the police – It
487
would also serve the ends of justice if the appropriate government had the 
beneﬁ t of a report contemporaneously prepared by a qualiﬁ ed psychologist 
after interacting/interviewing the convict that has applied for premature 
release. [Paras 20 and 21]
Adminstration of Criminal Justice – Sentencing – Balancing 
societal interests with the rights of the convict:
Held: The majority view and the minority view in Sriharan underlined 
the need to balance societal interests with the rights of the convict (that in 
a given case, the sentence should not be unduly harsh, or excessive) – The 
court acknowledged that it lies within the executive’s domain to grant, or 
refuse premature release; however, such power would be guided, and the 
discretion informed by reason, stemming from appropriate rules.[Para 22]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Diﬀ erent policies 
on the date of conviction and on the date of consideration for premature 
release: 
Held: This court had grappled with the situation of diﬀ erent remission 
policies/rules prevailing at diﬀ erent points of the convict’s sentence- i.e., 
when the policy on the date of conviction, and on the date of consideration for 
premature release, are diﬀ erent – It has been held that the policy prevailing 
on the date of the conviction20 , would be applicable – However, in Jagdish
it was also recognised that if a more liberal policy exists on the date of 
consideration, the beneﬁ t should be provided – In the present
case, on the date 
of conviction (24.05.2001), it is the pre-2002 policy that was applicable – In 
the old pre-2002 policy, there is no mention of any ineligibility criteria, much 
less one that is analogous to Rule 529(iv)(b) of the 2002 policy, which was 
cited by the Remission Board in its rejection of the petitioner’s application 
on 20.04.2023. [Paras 23 and 24]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Union of India v. V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613 – followed.
State of Haryana v. Jagdish [2010] 3 SCR 716; Laxman Naskar v. State 
of W.B (2000) 2 SCC 595 : [2000] 1 SCR 796 – relied on.
Sangeet v. State of Haryana [2012] 13 SCR 85; Gopal Vinayak Godse 
v. State of Maharashtra [1961] 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram v. Union of India
[1981] 1 SCR 1196; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961] 2 
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
SCR 133; Kehar Singh v. Union of India [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 1102; State of 
Haryana v. Mohinder Singh [2000] 1 SCR 698; Sangeet v. State of Haryana
[2012] 13 SCR 85; Rajan v. The Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil 
Nadu [2019] 6 SCR 1035; Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh [2022] 4 
SCR 1103; Union of India v. V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613; Laxman Naskar 
v. State of W.B. (2000) 7 SCC 626 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 62; Jaswant Singh 
v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 35; Swamy Shraddananda 
(2) @ Mural Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93; 
Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra [2009] 9 
SCR 90; Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chattisgarh [2018] 14 SCR 355; 
Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 14 SCR 585; 
and Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR 452; Maru Ram v. 
Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196; State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, (2021) 
9 SCC 292 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal) 
No. 252 of 2023.
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)
Appearances:
Randhir Kumar Ojha, Adv. for the Petitioner.
Azmat Hayat Amanullah, T. G. Shahi, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. 
1. The petitioner, currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment 
for commission of oﬀ ences punishable under Section 302/34
of the Indian 
Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 approaches this 
court under its Article 32 jurisdiction, seeking appropriate direction to the 
ﬁ rst respondent to prematurely release him, on the ground that he has been 
in custody for 24 years without grant of remission or parole.
489
2. The petitioner (aged 40, at the time), with three other co-accused 
persons, was convicted1 on 24.05.2001 for the murder of three persons – two 
of which were police personnel (dafadars) and the third being a chowkidar, 
who were all on duty during a village mela – by indiscriminate ﬁ ring, while 
they were waiting to be served food. The petitioner was accused to be one 
among those who had shot at the deceased victims, in a premediated and 
planned manner. The trial court sentenced the petitioner and three other 
co-accused persons to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life; while three 
other accused were acquitted on all charges. A co-accused (Baudha Mandal), 
who was the ﬁ rst to ﬁ re at the victims, was killed during the pendency of 
investigation/trial in a police encounter. The petitioner’s conviction and 
sentence (along with that of three other co-accused convicts), was aﬃ  rmed 
by the High Court on 01.09.2005.2 Owing to a lack of means and awareness, 
the petitioner could not approach this court to challenge the same, and his 
conviction by the High Court, attained ﬁ nality.
3. Pursuant to an order of this court, after notice was issued, the 
respondent-state has ﬁ led an aﬃ  davit indicating the computation of his 
period of sentence undergone, the status of his plea for remission to be 
granted, as well as the remission policies (as amended from time to time) 
of the state government. This aﬃ  davit conﬁ rms that the petitioner long 
completed 14 years of
actual imprisonment (on 19.07.2013), and in fact 
has, as on 26.07.2023, completed over 24 years of actual imprisonment. 
Accounting for the remission earned (of over 4 years and 8 months of 
remission, i.e., a total 1694 days), he has served 28 years, 8 months and 
21 days. It is pertinent to mention that he completed 20 years of actual 
imprisonment on 19.07.2019, and if computed with remission earned as 
per prevailing rules, then on 05.11.2014 itself. 
4. After the completion of the mandatory 14 years actual imprisonment, 
and 20 years of custody with remission, the petitioner’s case (application 
dated 14.04.2021) was considered by the Remission Board on 19.05.2021. 
In accordance with the prescribed rules, prior to this meeting, the opinion 
of the Presiding Oﬃ  cer of the convicting court, probation oﬃ  cer and 
1 
By the Sessions Court, Madhepura in Sessions Case No. 123/2000 and Sessions Case 
No. 194/2000. 
2 
By the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 327/2001 (which was disposed 
along with Criminal Appeal No 309/2001, ﬁ led by three co-accused persons). 
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
Superintendent of Police, was also sought. The Board rejected the petitioner’s 
application for premature release – despite a favourable report by the 
Probation Oﬃ  cer and Superintendent of Police – noting the adverse report 
by the Presiding Judge. 
5. After this rejection, a writ petition was ﬁ led before the High Court, 
seeking relief similar to what is sought in the present petition. It was 
however dismissed for non-prosecution. Later, in terms of prevailing rules3, 
the petitioner’s proposal was again put up before the Remission Board in 
its meeting dated 20.04.2023. This time, the proposal was rejected in light 
of adverse/negative opinions received from the Superintendent of Police, 
Purnea and the Presiding Oﬃ  cer of the convicting court, and noting Rule 
529(iv)(b) of the remission policy contained in the Bihar Jail Manual (as 
amended by Notiﬁ cation dated 10.12.2002 and notiﬁ ed on 28.12.2002). The 
relevant rule is extracted below: 
“(iv)Ineligibility for premature release 
The following category of convicted prisoners undergoing life sentence 
may not be considered eligible for premature release. – 
a) 
Prisoners convicted of the heinous oﬀ ences such as rape, dacoity, 
terrorist crimes, etc. 
b) 
Prisoners who have been convicted for organized murder in a 
premeditated manner and in an organized manner. 
c) 
Professional murders who have been found guilty of murder by 
hiring. 
d) 
Convicted prisoners, who
commit murder while involving in 
smuggling operations or who are guilty of murder of public 
servants on duty” 
(emphasis supplied)
6. These are the facts, leading to the present writ petition. 
Analysis and conclusion 
7. Section 432(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter 
‘CrPC’) empowers the appropriate government to suspend or remit sentences 
and applies only in the case of additional remission, over and above what is 
earned as per the jail manual or statutory rules.4 Section 432(2) prescribes 
3 
Rule 6(d) of the Notiﬁ cation No. 3106 dated 10.12.2002 which stipulates that rejection 
of proposal for pre-mature release shall not be a bar for reconsideration. 
4 
Sangeet v. State of Haryana[2012] 13 SCR 85.
491
the procedure whereby the appropriate government may seek the opinion of 
the Presiding Judge of the court before, or by which the applicant had been 
convicted, on whether the applications should be allowed or rejected, along 
with reasoning. Section 432(2) of the CrPC is extracted for ready reference: 
“432. Power to suspend or remit sentences.—(1)***
(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government 
for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate 
Government may require the Presiding Judge of the Court before or 
by which the conviction was had or conﬁ rmed, to state his opinion as 
to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with 
his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement 
of such opinion a certiﬁ ed copy of the record of the trial or of such 
record thereof as exists.”
8. This statutory power to grant remission is limited by Section 433A 
(which was incorporated in the CrPC subsequently5) when it comes to those 
convicted for an oﬀ ence where death is one of the punishments: 
“433-A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in 
certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, 
where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction 
of a person for an oﬀ ence for which death is one of the punishments 
provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has 
been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, 
such person
shall not be released from prison unless he had served at 
least fourteen years of imprisonment.”
9. Sentencing is a judicial exercise of power. The act thereafter of 
executing the sentence awarded, however, is a purely executive function 
– which includes the grant of remission, commutation, pardon, reprieves, 
or suspension of sentence.6 This executive power is traceable to Article 72 
and 161 of the Constitution of India, by which the President of India, and 
Governor of the State, respectively, are empowered to grant pardons and to 
suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases. Whilst the statutory 
5 
By Act 45 of 1978, sec. 32 (w.e.f. 18.12.1978). 
6 
See Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra [1961] 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram v. 
Union of India[1981] 1 SCR 1196; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961] 2 
SCR 133; Kehar Singh v. Union of India [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 1102. 
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
(under Section 432 CrPC) and constitutional (under Articles 72 and 161 of 
the Constitution) powers are distinct- the former limited power, is still an 
imprint of the latter (much wider power), and must be understood as such 
and placed in this context. This framework of executive power and how it 
is to be exercised, is lucidly explained, in the judgment of State of Haryana 
v. Jagdish7:
“27. Neverthelesswe may point out that the power of the sovereign to 
grant remission is within its exclusive domain and it is for this reason 
that our Constitution makers went on to incorporate the provisions 
of Article 72 and Article 161 of the Constitution of India. This 
responsibility was cast upon the executive through a constitutional 
mandate to ensure that some public purpose may require fulﬁ lment 
by grant of remission in appropriate cases. This power was never 
intended to be used or utilised by the executive as an unbridled power 
of reprieve. Power of clemency is to be exercised cautiously and in 
appropriate cases, which in eﬀ ect, mitigates the sentence of punishment 
awarded and which does not, in any way, wipe out the conviction. 
It is a power which the sovereign exercises against its own judicial 
mandate. The act of remission of the State does not undo what has 
been done judicially. The punishment awarded through a judgment 
is not overruled but the convict gets beneﬁ t of a liberalised policy of 
State pardon. However,
the exercise of such power under Article 161 
of the Constitution or under Section 433-A CrPC may have a diﬀ erent 
ﬂ avour in the statutory provisions, as short-sentencing policy brings 
about a mere reduction in the period of imprisonment whereas an 
act of clemency under Article 161 of the Constitution commutes the 
sentence itself.”
10. That this executive power which is inherently discretionary in 
nature, has to be exercised fairly, reasonably, and not arbitrarily, has been 
held by this court in numerous cases.8 Absence to do so, would - like is the 
7 
[2010] 3 SCR 716 [hereafter referred to as ‘Jagdish’]
8 
State of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh [2000] 1 SCR 698; Sangeet v. State of Hary-
ana[2012] 13 SCR 85; Union of India v. V. Sriharan[2015] 14 SCR 613; Rajan v. The Home 
Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu [2019] 6 SCR 1035; Ram Chander v. State of 
Chhattisgarh [2022] 4 SCR 1103.
493
case for other executive action- compel the court to exercise its judicial 
review, and in appropriate cases remit the matter for reconsideration.9 The 
procedure laid out in Section 432(2), has been held to be mandatory by a 
ﬁ ve-judge bench of this court, in Union of India v. V. Sriharan10. The court 
also observed how the said procedure operated as a safeguard, much like 
the ones provided under Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution: 
“141. […] Therefore, when in the course of exercise of larger 
constitutional powers of similar kind under Articles 72 and 161 of the 
Constitution it has been opined by this Court to be exercised with great 
care and caution, the one exercisable under a statute, namely, under 
Section 432(1)CrPC which is lesser in degree should necessarily be 
held to be exercisable in tune with the adjunct provision contained in 
the same section. Viewed in that respect, we ﬁ nd that the procedure 
to be followed whenever any application for remission is moved, the 
safeguard provided under Section 432(2)CrPC should be the sine qua 
non for the ultimate power to be exercised under Section 432(1)CrPC.
142. By following the said procedure prescribed under Section 
432(2), the action of the appropriate Government is bound to survive 
and stand the scrutiny of all concerned, including the judicial forum. 
It must be remembered, barring minor oﬀ ences, in cases involving 
heinous crimes like, murder, kidnapping, rape, robbery, dacoity, etc. 
and such
other oﬀ ences of such magnitude, the verdict of the trial 
court is invariably dealt with and considered by the High Court and 
in many cases by the Supreme Court. Thus, having regard to the 
nature of opinion to be rendered by the Presiding Oﬃ  cer of the court 
concerned will throw much light on the nature of crime committed, 
the record of the convict himself, his background and other relevant 
factors which will enable the appropriate Government to take the right 
decision as to whether or not suspension or remission of sentence 
should be granted. It must also be borne in mind that while for the 
exercise of the constitutional power under Articles 72 and 161, the 
9 
See Rajan and Ram Chander (ibid). 
10 [2015] 14 SCR 613 [hereafter referred to as ‘Sriharan’].
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
Executive Head will have the beneﬁ t of act and advice of the Council 
of Ministers, for the exercise of power under Section 432(1)CrPC, the 
appropriate Government will get the valuable opinion of the judicial 
forum, which will deﬁ nitely throw much light on the issue relating to 
grant of suspension or remission.”
The court then proceeded to approve the following reasoning in Sangeet 
v. State of Haryana11 on this point (Sangeet SCR pp. 119-120): 
“63. It appears to us that an exercise of power by the appropriate 
Government under sub-section (1) of Section 432CrPC cannot be suo 
motu for the simple reason that this sub-section is only an enabling 
provision. The appropriate Government is enabled to “override” a 
judicially pronounced sentence, subject to the fulﬁ lment of certain 
conditions. Those conditions are found either in the Jail Manual or 
in statutory rules. Sub-section (1) of Section 432CrPC cannot be 
read to enable the appropriate Government to “further override” the 
judicial pronouncement over and above what is permitted by the Jail 
Manual or the statutory rules. The process of granting “additional” 
remission under this section is set into motion in a case only through 
an application for remission by the convict or on his behalf. On such 
an application being made, the appropriate Government is required 
to approach the Presiding Judge of the court before or by which the 
conviction was made or conﬁ rmed to
opine (with reasons) whether the 
application should be granted or refused. Thereafter, the appropriate 
Government may take a decision on the remission application and 
pass orders granting remission subject to some conditions, or refusing 
remission. Apart from anything else, this statutory procedure seems 
quite reasonable inasmuch as there is an application of mind to the 
issue of grant of remission. It also eliminates “discretionary” or en 
masse release of convicts on “festive” occasions since each release 
requires a case-by-case basis scrutiny.”
(emphasis supplied)
11 [2012] 13 SCR 85[hereafter referred to as ‘Sangeet’]
495
11. This court, in various judgments, has outlined the parameters to 
be considered, when considering grant of remission. In Jagdish (supra) this 
court held: 
“38. At the time of considering the case of premature release of a life 
convict, the authorities may require to consider his case mainly taking 
into consideration whether the oﬀ ence was an individual act of crime 
without aﬀ ecting the society at large; whether there was any chance 
of future recurrence of committing a crime; whether the convict had 
lost his potentiality in committing the crime; whether there was any 
fruitful purpose of conﬁ ning the convict any more; the socio-economic 
condition of the convict’s family and other similar circumstances.”
(emphasis supplied)
This was based on an earlier judgment (though not expressly cited in 
Jagdish) - Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B12 which prescribed ﬁ ve guiding 
factors. 
12. In Sriharan (supra), the court went on to discuss speciﬁ cally, 
the role of the report submitted by the presiding oﬃ  cer, and held that the 
“ultimate order of suspension or remission should be guided by the opinion 
to be rendered by the Presiding Oﬃ  cer of the court concerned.”13 This in 
turn, was relied upon, and explained recently, in Ram Chander v. State of 
Chhattisgarh14 as follows: 
“20. In Sriharan [Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 
1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695] , the Court observed that the opinion of 
the Presiding Judge shines a light on the nature of the
crime that has 
been committed, the record of the convict, their background and other 
relevant factors. Crucially, the Court observed that the opinion of the 
Presiding Judge would enable the Government to take the “right” 
decision as to whether or not the sentence should be remitted. Hence, 
it cannot be said that the opinion of the Presiding Judge is only a 
12 (2000) 2 SCC 595[para 6] [hereafter referred to as ‘Laxman Naskar’]. These factors 
were reiterated in Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B. (2000) 7 SCC 626 [para 6] as well. 
13 Para 143.
14 [2022] 4 SCR 1103[hereafter referred to as ‘Ram Chander’]
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
relevant factor, which does not have any determinative eﬀ ect on the 
application for remission. The purpose of the procedural safeguard 
under Section 432(2)CrPC would stand defeated if the opinion of the 
Presiding Judge becomes just another factor that may be taken into 
consideration by the Government while deciding the application for 
remission. It is possible then that the procedure under Section 432(2) 
would become a mere formality.
21. However, this is not to say that the appropriate Government 
should mechanically follow the opinion of the Presiding Judge. If the 
opinion of the Presiding Judge does not comply with the requirements 
of Section 432(2) or if the Judge does not consider the relevant factors 
for grant of remission that have been laid down in Laxman Naskar v. 
Union of India [Laxman Naskar v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595 
: 2000 SCC (Cri) 509], the Government may request the Presiding 
Judge to consider the matter afresh.
22. In the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the 
Presiding Judge took into account the factors which have been laid 
down in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India [Laxman Naskar v. Union 
of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 509] . These factors 
include assessing:
(i)  whether the oﬀ ence aﬀ ects the society at large;
(ii)  the probability of the crime being repeated;
(iii)  the potential of the convict to commit crimes in future;
(iv)  if any fruitful purpose is being
served by keeping the convict 
in prison; and
(v)  the socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.
In Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B. [Laxman Naskar v. State of 
W.B., (2000)7 SCC 626: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1431] and State of Haryana 
v. Jagdish [State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 : (2010) 
2 SCC (Cri) 806], this Court has reiterated that these factors will be 
considered while deciding the application of a convict for premature 
release.
497
23. In his opinion dated 21-7-2021 the Special Judge, Durg 
referred to the crime for which the petitioner was convicted and simply 
stated that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case it would 
not be appropriate to grant remission. The opinion is in the teeth of 
the provisions of Section 432(2)CrPC which require that the Presiding 
Judge’s opinion must be accompanied by reasons. Halsbury’s Laws of 
India (Administrative Law) notes that the requirement to give reasons 
is satisﬁ ed if the authority concerned has provided relevant reasons. 
Mechanical reasons are not considered adequate. The following extract 
is useful for our consideration:
“[005.066] Adequacy of reasons Suﬃ  ciency of reasons, in a 
particular case, depends on the facts of each case. It is not 
necessary for the authority to write out a judgment as a court of 
law does. However, at least, an outline of process of reasoning 
must be given. It may satisfy the requirement of giving reasons 
if relevant reasons have been given for the order, though the 
authority has not set out all the reasons or some of the reasons 
which had been argued before the court have not been expressly 
considered by the authority. A mere repetition of the statutory 
language in the order will not make the order a reasoned one.
Mechanical and stereotype reasons are not regarded as adequate. 
A speaking order is one that speaks of the mind of the adjudicatory 
body which passed the order. A reason such as ‘the entire
examination of the year 1982 is cancelled’, cannot be regarded 
as adequate because the statement does explain as to why the 
examination has been cancelled; it only lays down the punishment 
without stating the causes therefor.” [Halsbury’s Laws of India 
(Administrative Law) (Lexis Nexis, Online Edition).]
24. Thus, an opinion accompanied by inadequate reasoning 
would not satisfy the requirements of Section 432(2)CrPC. Further, 
it will not serve the purpose for which the exercise under Section 
432(2) is to be undertaken, which is to enable the executive to make 
an informed decision taking into consideration all the relevant 
factors.”
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
13. Noting that the presiding judge’s opinion did not consider the ﬁ ve 
parameters laid out in Laxman Naskar (supra), a coordinate bench of this 
court in Ram Chander (supra) directed the presiding oﬃ  cer of the concerned 
court, to consider the matter afresh and in light of these factors, so that the 
appropriate government could in turn reconsider the petitioner’s application 
for premature release. A similar fate awaited the writ petitioner in Jaswant 
Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh15 (wherein both writ petitions arose from the 
same facts and commission of oﬀ ence). 
14. In the present case, the Remission Board rejected the petitioner’s 
application for premature release twice. A brief glance at all the reports 
submitted by the authorities to the Remission Board before each of its two 
meetings where it considered the petitioner’s case, is telling: 
Considered in Remission Board 
meeting dated 19.05.2021
Considered in Remission Board meeting 
dated 20.04.2023
Jail Superintendent report dated 
27.04.2021: 
“conduct of prisoner is satisfactory. 
Recommended for premature release from 
jail.”
Jail Superintendent report dated 
15.09.2022:
“Recommended for premature release.”
Probation Officer’s report dated 
05.04.2021:
“can be considered to release the prisoner 
prematurely in accordance with Rules”
Probation Officer’s report dated 
08.06.2022:
“Keeping in view at the residential resources 
and means for livelihood for the
convicts, the 
social and economic status of the household, 
the no- objection and acceptance of the 
people of the family and the society , the need 
for rehabilitation and the possibility of living 
as a normal citizen a clear recommendation 
is made regarding the timely release of the 
above convicted prisoner.”
Police Superintendent’s report dated 
11.01.2021:
“…DPO has reported that on release of 
prisoner, there does not seem to be any 
Police Superintendent’s report dated 
22.07.2022:
Noting the input received from the concerned 
DPO - “…The local people have got the
15 Jaswant Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 35
499
possibility of any law-and-order problem 
will arise” 
information regarding his premature release. 
The local people speak in the crossroads 
about the adverse eﬀ ect of his release due 
to his premature release, an atmosphere of 
unrest and fear will arise in the society and 
criminal incidents may also increase NCR 
(Sanha) No. 211 dated 10.07.2022 is marked 
in this regard. In this context, the premature 
release of the said prisoner does not seem 
appropriate”
Remarks of the Presiding Judge dated 
15.12.2018:
“…I perused the judgment and 
supplementary case record of above noted 
sessions case, from which it appears that 
it is a triple murder case in which two 
dafadars were killed under a calculated 
move and in plan manner and both Dafadar 
and Chaukidar were sincere in duty and 
dedicated to their work and they used 
to jointly move from duty, as a result of 
which the criminals were under constant 
fear psychosis and the criminals including 
the convicts murdered these two oﬃ  cials. 
Considering the manner of occurrence and 
seriousness of the case, in my opinion the 
application remission and commutation 
of sentence ﬁ led on behalf of the convict 
petitioner should be refused.”
Remarks of the Presiding Judge dated 
02.07.2022: 
Noting the report submitted earlier by the 
then presiding oﬃ  cer on 15.12.2018, stated
“….Further having gone through the case 
record, I also ﬁ nd that the manner of the 
occurrence in alleged oﬀ ence done by the
Rajo@Rajua@Rajendra mandal along 
with other co-accused person was so harsh 
and professional under such facts and 
circumstances, I also agreed with the opinion 
of the then P.O of this court. Therefore prayer 
for remission and commutation of sentence 
in favor of Rajo@Rajua@Rajendra Mandal 
may be refused.”
Screening Committee/ Inspector General:
Took note of the adverse reports of Police 
Superintendent and Presiding Judge and 
noted that 
“2. In the Notification No. 3106 dated 
10.012.2002 of the Home (Special) 
Department Bihar, it is provided in clause (iv) 
(b) that the prisoners who are convicted for 
organizing murders in a systematic manner 
shall not be eligible for premature release.
3. In that light, the proposal for untimely 
release from prison can be rejected.”
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
Taking note of the reports before it at the time, the Remission Board 
concluded as follows: 
Remission Board meeting dated 
19.05.2021 
Remission Board meeting dated 20.04.2023
“Favourable report by Probation 
Oﬃ  cer/ Superintendent of Police, but 
adverse report by Presiding Judge”
Taking note of the adverse reports by the 
Police Superintendent, Presiding Judge, and 
conclusion of the Screening Committee/
Inspector General regarding clause (iv)(b) – 
“3. After due consideration, the proposal for 
premature release from prison is rejected.”
15. The record clearly indicates that the reason for rejection of the 
petitioner’s application, is the adverse report submitted by the presiding 
judge in the ﬁ rst round, which was perfunctorily relied upon and reiterated 
in the report submitted by the then presiding judge in the second round as 
well. Both the reports submitted by the presiding judges (at the relevant 
time), demonstrate a casual opinion, based solely on the judicial record 
which presumably consisted of the ﬁ nding of guilt, by the trial court and 
High Court. This oﬀ ers only a dated insight on the petitioner, one that has 
limited opportunity to consider the progress the convict has made in the 
course of serving his sentence. Yet, the Remission Board has privileged 
the presiding judge’s opinion over the other authorities – like the Probation 
Oﬃ  cer, and Jail authorities, who are in a far better position to comment
on 
his post-conviction reformation – oﬀ ering a cautionary tale. 
16. In this court’s considered view, overemphasis on the presiding 
judge’s opinion and complete disregard of comments of other authorities, 
while arriving at its conclusion, would render the appropriate government’s 
decision on a remission application, unsustainable. The discretion that the 
executive is empowered with in executing a sentence, would be denuded of 
its content, if the presiding judge’s view– which is formed in all likelihood, 
largely (if not solely) on the basis of the judicial record– is mechanically 
followed by the concerned authority. Such an approach has the potential to 
strikes at the heart, and subvert the concept of remission – as a reward and 
incentive encouraging actions and behaviour geared towards reformation 
– in a modern legal system.
501
17. All this is not to say that the presiding judge’s view is only one 
of the factors that has no real weight; but instead that if the presiding 
judge’s report is only reﬂ ective of the facts and circumstances that led to 
the conclusion of the convict’s guilt, and is merely a reiteration of those 
circumstances available to the judge at the time of sentencing (some 14 or 
more years earlier, as the case may be), then the appropriate government 
should attach weight to this ﬁ nding, accordingly. Such a report, cannot be 
relied on as carrying predominance, if it focusses on the crime, with little 
or no attention to the criminal. The appropriate government, should take 
a holistic view of all the opinions received (in terms of the relevant rules), 
including the judicial view of the presiding judge of the concerned court, 
keeping in mind the purpose and objective, of remission. 
18. The views of the presiding judge, are based on the record, which 
exists, containing all facts resulting in conviction, including the nature of 
the crime, its seriousness, the accused’s role, and the material available at 
that stage regarding their antecedents. However, post-conviction conduct, 
particularly, resulting in the prisoner’s earned remissions, their age and 
health, work done, length of actual incarceration, etc., rarely fall within the 
said judge’s domain. Another factor to bear in mind, is that the presiding 
judge would not be the same presiding judge who had occasion to
observe 
the convict (at a much earlier point in time) and thus form an opinion. 
The presiding judge, at this stage, would only look into the record leading 
to conviction. This judicial involvement in executive decision making is 
therefore, largely limited to the input it provides regarding the nature of the 
crime, its seriousness, etc. Undoubtedly, even at the stage of sentencing, the 
judge ideally is to exercise discretion after looking at a wide range of factors 
relating to the criminal and not just the crime; but as noticed in numerous 
precedents16 that have dealt with sentencing in the commission of heinous 
crimes, this is unfortunately, often not the reality. Guidance has been oﬀ ered 
by this court17 on how to mitigate this in recent years, but in this court’s 
16 Sangeet (supra); Swamy Shraddananda (2) @ Mural Manohar Mishra v. State of Kar-
nataka [2008] 11 SCR 93; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra
[2009] 9 SCR 90; Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chattisgarh [2018] 14 SCR 355; Rajen-
dra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 14 SCR 585; and Manoj v. State of 
Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR 452. 
17 Ibid. 
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
considered view, it is pragmatic to acknowledge that it will require time 
for our criminal justice system to incorporate, and uniformly reach such 
standards. In fact, earlier cases of conviction (such as the present one - in 
2001), have an even lesser probability of a judicial record which reﬂ ects 
consideration of such multi-dimensional factors at the sentencing stage; the 
lack of which should not serve as an obstacle to the convict seeking release 
(after serving almost two decades, or more), erasing the reformative journey 
they may have undertaken as a result of their long incarceration. 
19. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the aim, and ultimate 
goal of imprisonment, even in the most serious crime, is reformative, after 
the oﬀ ender undergoes a suﬃ  ciently long spell of punishment through 
imprisonment. Even while upholding Section 433A, in Maru Ram v. Union 
of India18, this court underlined the relevance of post-conviction conduct, 
stating whether the convict, 
“Had his in-prison good behavior been rewarded by reasonable 
remissions linked to improved social responsibility, nurtured by familial 
contacts and liberal parole, cultured by predictable, premature release, 
the purpose of habilitation would have been served, If law—S. 433-A 
in this case—rudely refuses to consider the subsequent conduct of the 
prisoner and forces all convicts, good, bad and indiﬀ erent, to serve 
a ﬁ xed and arbitrary minimum it is
an angry ﬂ at untouched by the 
proven criteria of reform.”
20. Another aspect of note in this case, is the report submitted by 
the Superintendent of Police in the second round (which is diametrically 
diﬀ erent from that which was submitted in the ﬁ rst round), was adverse. 
Without casting aspersions on the veracity of it, or questioning it on merits, 
it is appropriate to ﬂ ag another concern in such a context. In each case, 
the appropriate government has to be cognizant of the latent (not always) 
prejudices of the crime, that the police as well as the investigating agency, 
may be citing – especially in a case such as the present one, where the slain 
victims were police personnel themselves, i.e., members of the police force. 
These biases may inform the report, and cannot be given determinative value. 
Doing so will potentially deﬂ ect the appropriate government from the facts 
18 [1981] 1 SCR 1196
503
relevant for consideration for premature release, and instead, focus almost 
entirely upon facts which evoke a retributive response. 
21. Apart from the other considerations (on the nature of the crime, 
whether it aﬀ ected the society at large, the chance of its recurrence, etc.), 
the appropriate government should while considering the potential of the 
convict to commit crimes in the future, whether there remains any fruitful 
purpose of continued incarceration, and the socio-economic conditions, 
review: the convict’s age, state of heath, familial relationships and possibility 
of reintegration, extent of earned remission, and the post-conviction 
conduct including, but not limited to – whether the convict has attained any 
educational qualiﬁ cation whilst in custody, volunteer services oﬀ ered, job/
work done, jail conduct, whether they were engaged in any socially aimed 
or productive activity, and the overall development as a human being. The 
Board thus should not entirely rely either on the presiding judge, or the report 
prepared by the police. In this court’s considered view, it would also serve 
the ends of justice if the appropriate government had the beneﬁ t of a report 
contemporaneously prepared by a qualiﬁ ed psychologist after interacting/
interviewing the convict that has applied for premature release. The Bihar 
Prison Manual, 2012 enables a convict to earn remissions, which are limited 
to one third of the total sentence imposed. Special remission
for good 
conduct, in addition, is granted by the rules.19 If a stereotypical approach 
in denying the beneﬁ t of remission, which ultimately results in premature 
release, is repeatedly adopted, the entire idea of limiting incarceration for 
long periods (sometimes spanning a third or more of a convict’s lifetime 
and in others, result in an indeﬁ nite sentence), would be defeated. This 
could result in a sense of despair and frustration among inmates, who might 
consider themselves reformed– but continue to be condemned in prison. 
22. The majority view in Sriharan (supra) and the minority view, had 
underlined the need to balance societal interests with the rights of the convict 
(that in a given case, the sentence should not be unduly harsh, or excessive). 
The court acknowledged that it lies within the executive’s domain to grant, 
or refuse premature release; however, such power would be guided, and 
the discretion informed by reason, stemming from appropriate rules. The 
19 See Rules 405 and 413 of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012. 
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
minority view (of Lalit and Sapre JJ) had cautioned the court from making 
sentencing rigid: 
“73. […] Any order putting the punishment beyond remission will 
prohibit exercise of statutory power designed to achieve same purpose 
Under Section 432/433 Code of Criminal Procedure In our view Courts 
cannot and ought not deny to a prisoner the beneﬁ t to be considered for 
remission of sentence. By doing so, the prisoner would be condemned 
to live in the prison till the last breath without there being even a ray of 
hope to come out. This stark reality will not be conducive to reformation 
of the person and will in fact push him into a dark hole without there 
being semblance of the light at the end of the tunnel.”
This concern suﬀ uses the reasoning in Ram Chander(supra). 
23. This court, on earlier occasion, had grappled with the situation 
of diﬀ erent remission policies/rules prevailing at diﬀ erent points of the 
convict’s sentence – i.e., when the policy on the date of conviction, and on 
the date of consideration for premature release, are diﬀ erent. It has been 
held that the policy prevailing on the date of the conviction20, would be 
applicable. However, in Jagdish(supra) it was also recognised that if a 
more liberal policy exists on the date of consideration, the beneﬁ t should 
be provided: 
“43. […] The State authority is under an obligation to at least exercise 
its discretion in relation to an honest expectation
perceived by the 
convict, at the time of his conviction that his case for premature 
release would be considered after serving the sentence, prescribed 
in the short-sentencing policy existing on that date. The State has 
to exercise its power of remission also keeping in view any such 
beneﬁ t to be construed liberally in favour of a convict which may 
depend upon case to case and for that purpose, in our opinion, it 
should relate to a policy which, in the instant case, was in favour 
of the respondent. In case a liberal policy prevails on the date of 
consideration of the case of a “lifer” for premature release, he should 
be given beneﬁ t thereof.”
20 See State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, (2021) 9 SCC 292 [para 16].
505
24. Applying these principles in the case at hand, on the date of 
conviction (24.05.2001), it is the pre-2002 policy21 that was applicable. The 
relevant extract is as follows: 
“[…] the State Government has decided that to give remission to the 
accused who has been sentenced to life imprisonment and subsequently 
to release him from prison, life imprisonment should be considered 
as imprisonment for 20 years and the following procedure should be 
adopted in the matter of releasing the prisoners sentenced for life 
imprisonment – 
1. 
Under Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
Act No. 2 of 1974, the prisoner who gets life imprisonment will 
not get the beneﬁ t of presumptive report (ambiguous) i.e. in the 
case in which he has been sentenced to life imprisonment, the 
period spent in jail during the period of enquiry, investigation 
and disposal of the case and before the date of conviction may 
be deducted from the imprisonment of 20 years.
2. 
Upon conviction, if any person has been sentenced to imprisonment 
for life for an oﬀ ense for which one of the punishments is death 
or if the death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment 
under Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and 
where such sentence of imprisonment for life has been awarded 
on or after 18.12.1978, such prisoner shall be released from 
prison only if-
a.  
He has spent a period of 14 years in prison from the date 
of conviction.
b.  
The total of the period of
remission and imprisonment is 20 
years.
 [….]”
It is pertinent to point out that in the old pre-2002 policy, there is no 
mention of any ineligibility criteria, much less one that is analogous to Rule 
529(iv)(b) of the 2002 policy, which was cited by the Remission Board in 
its rejection of the petitioner’s application on 20.04.2023. 
21 No. A/P.M-03/91-550 dated 21.01.1984. 
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE 
OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
25. In light of these ﬁ ndings and the precedents discussed above, it 
would be appropriate if the Remission Board reconsidered the petitioner’s 
application for remission afresh, considering the reports of the police and 
other authorities, the post-prison record of the petitioner, the remissions 
earned (including that which is earned for good conduct) his age, health 
condition, family circumstances, and his potential for social engagement, 
in a positive manner. The concerned presiding judge is hereby directed to 
provide an opinion on the petitioner’s application for premature release, 
by examining the judicial record, and provide adequate reasoning, taking 
into account the factors laid down in Laxman Naskar (supra), within one 
month from the date of this judgment. With the beneﬁ t of this new report, 
the Remission Board may reconsider the application – without entirely 
or solely relying on it, but treating it as valuable (maybe weighty) advice 
that is based on the judicial record. Given the long period of incarceration 
already suﬀ ered by the writ petitioner and his age, the Remission Board 
should endeavour to consider the application at the earliest and render its 
decision, preferably within three months from the date of this judgment. 
A copy of this judgment shall be marked by the Registry of this Court, to 
the Home Secretary, Government of Bihar, who is the chairperson of the 
Remission Board, as well as the
concerned Presiding Judge, through the 
Registrar, High Court of Judicature at Patna High Court.
 Before parting, this court would like to place on record its deep 
appreciation for the valuable assistance provided by Mr. Randhir Kumar 
Ojha, appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Azmat Hayat Amanullah, 
appearing on behalf of the State.
26. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. Pending 
applications, if any, are disposed of.
Headnotes prepared by: 
Writ petition allowed.
Divya Pandey