RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. versus BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 800, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
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[2016) 9 S.C.R. 800 
RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. 
v. 
BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 8194 of2016) 
OCTOBER 18,2016 
[A.K. SIKRI AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.] 
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 -
Applicability of to suit pending before civil court w.r.t area which 
came within the sweep of rent legislation during pendency of the 
suit - Whether after the applicability of the Rent Act to. the premises 
in question, the Civil Judge ceases to have jurisdiction - Held: 
Rights of the parties get crystallised on the date of the institution of 
the suit - If during the pendency of the suit, Rent Act beco111es 
applicable it would not take away the jurisdiction of civil court - In 
D 
order to oust the jurisdiction of civil court there must be a specific 
provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the civil court -
Under the sche111e of the Rent Act, 1973, no protection provided to 
the ex-tenants and no provision 111ade for excluding the jurisdiction 
of civil courts in respect of pending cases, expressly or impliedly -
E 
F 
Further, on facts, wherein the appellants-landlords had filed suit 
after ter111inating the tenancy, the respondents-tenants had not onZv 
sublet the premises but had also not paid rent for 14 years - It il'ill 
be travesty of justice if the appellants/landlords are deprived of the 
fruits of the decree passed in their favour - Decree passed by trial 
court restored - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s. l 06 -
Rent
Control and Eviction. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. From At111a Ram Mittal, Vineet Kumar, Ram Saroop 
Rai, Rameslt Chandra and Shri Kislum alias Krishna K11111ar cases, 
the apparent principles which can be culled out, forming the ratio 
G decidemli of those cases, are as under: 
H 
i) Rights of the parties stand crystallised on the elate of 
the institution of the suit and, therefore, the law applicable on 
the date of filing of the suit will continue to apply until suit is 
disposed of or adjudicated. 
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RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. v. BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & 
ORS. 
ii) If during the pendency of the suit, Rent Act becomes 
applicable to the premises in question, that would be of no 
consequence and it would not take away the jurisdiction of civil 
court to dispose of a suit validly instituted. 
iii) In order to oust the jurisdiction of civil court, there 
must be a specific provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction 
of the civil court in respect of those cases also which were validly 
instituted before the date when. protection of Rent Act became 
available in respect of the said area/premises/tenancy. 
iv) In case aforesaid position is not accepted and the 
protection of the Rent Act is extended even in respect of suit 
validly instituted prior in point of time when there was no such 
protection under the Act, it will have the consequence of making 
the decree, that is obtained prior to the Rent Act becoming 
applicable to the said area/premises, inexecutable after the 
application of these Rent Act in respect of such premises. This 
would not be in consonance with the legislative intent. [Para 
16][814-G-H; 815-A-E] 
2. Applying the principles laid down above to the instant 
case, it is found that this case would fall in the category of Atma 
Ram Mittal and Mansoor Khan etc. as under the scheme of the 
Haryana Rent Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, 
no protection to the ex-tenants is provided and no provision is 
made excluding the jurisdiction of civil
courts in respect of pending 
cases, expressly or impliedly. On the other hand, in the facts of 
the present case, the respondents had not only sublet the 
premises but had not paid rent for a period of 14 years. His 
defence was struck off by the civil court and ultill1ately suit was 
even decreed. It is only during the pendency of the appeal that 
the notification was issued covering the area where suit premises 
are situate under the Rent Act. It will be travesty of justice if the 
appellants/landlords are deprived of the fruits of the said decree. 
[Para 21][817-E-G] 
· 
Ramesh Chandra v. Ill Addi. Distt. Judge & Ors. (1992) 
1 SCC 751 : 1992 (1) SCR 349; Mansoor Khan v. 
Moti Ram & Am: (2002) ~. SCC 462 : 2002 (2) SCR 
594; Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishll'ar Singh Puniab (1988) 4 
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[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
SCC 284 : 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 528; Vineet Kumar 
v. Mangat Sain Wadhera (1984) 3 SCC 352 : 1984 (2) 
SCR 333; Ram Saroop Rai v. Smt. Lilawati (1980) 3 
SCC 452 : 1980 -(3) SCR 1034; Shri Kishan alias 
Kris,,hna Kumar & Ors. v. Mano} Kumar & Ors. (1998) 
2 SCC 710 : 1998 (1) SCR 830 - relied on 
Mani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra (1980) 1 SCC 1 : 
1980 (2) SCR 141; Lakshmi Narayan Guin and_ Others 
v. Niranjan Modak (1985) 1 SCC 270 : 1985 '(2) SCR 
202 - explained. 
c 
Nand Kishore Marwah & Ors. v. Samundri Devi (1987) 
4 SCC 382 : 1988 (1) SCR 158; Harijeet Kaur v. 
Sarabjit Kaur 2013 (1) RCR (Rent) 74 - referred to. 
D 
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Case Law Reference 
2013 (1) RCR (Rent) 74 
referred to 
Para4 
198~ (1) SCR 158 
referred to 
Para4 
\ 
1992 (1) SCR 349 
relied on 
Para 16 
1984 (2) SCR 33:'> 
relied on 
Para i6 
1980 (3) SCR 1034 
relied on 
Para 16 
1998 (1) SCR 830 
relied on 
Para 16 
2002 (2) SCR 594 
relied on 
Para 19 
1980 (2) SCR 141 
explained 
Para 20 
1985 (2) SCR 202 
explained 
Para20 
1988 (2} Suppl. SCR 528 
relied on 
Para 21 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8194 
of2016. 
G 
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.02.2014 of the High Court 
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R. S. A. No. 3963 of2009. 
S. K. Katriar, Sr. Adv., J. S. Marahatta, Mrs. Santosh Singh, 
Siddharth Yadav, Wasim Ashraf, Praveen Swarup, Advs. for the 
Appellants. 
H 
V. K. Jain, Sr. Adv., Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Dr. Kai lash
Chand,

RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. v. BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & 
ORS. 
Gagan Gupta, Advs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
A.K. SIK.RI, J. 1. The appellants in this appeal are the landlords 
who had filed suit for eviction of the respondents herein, their tenants. 
Suit was filed in the Civil Court. The premises in-question were outside 
the ambit ofrent legislation. ft is because of this reason that civil suit for 
possession/ejectment was filed. However, during the pendency of the 
suit and before it could be finally decided, the area in question was brought 
within the sweep ofrent legislations by requisite notifications. The effect 
of such coverage was to give protective umbrella to the tenants. As a 
fo1tiorari, the landlord can now.evict the tenant only by taking recourse 
to the rent legislation, that too, by filing the petition for eviction under the 
Rent AcJ before the Rent.Controller/Tribunal constituted under the said 
Acts. Civil Court ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter insofar as 
eviction/ejectment of tenant is concerned. 
In this backdrop, the question that has arisen for consideration 
is as to whether the Civil Court would cease to have jurisdiction to tiy 
the suit of eviction ifthe suit property came under notified area during 
pendency of the suit? To put it differently, the question is: whether Rent 
Act would apply even to the pending suits or it will be enforced only 
from the date when notification covering the area
in-question is issued 
and, therefore, will have no effect on the suits which are already pending 
before the civi I courts? 
2. In the instant case, the premises in-question were in rural area 
in respect of which suit was filed by the appellants on Fcbrua1y 11, 
2002. These premises consist of a shop (suit prope1ty) which is situate 
at Barkali Hoda! Road, Punhana, Tehsil Punhana, District Gurgaon, 
Haiyana. In the State of Haryana, Rent Act, known as Ha1yana Rent 
Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short, 'Rent Act, 
1973 ') is promulgated. Its sweep, howe·ver, is over the urban areas of 
Haryana, as defined in the Act. As pointed out above, at the relevant 
time suit property was in rural area and, therefore, not covered by the 
said Rent Act, 1973. This suit was filed, after terminating the tenancy, 
by the landlord, namely, father of the appellants (predecessor of the 
appellants) under Section I 06 of the Transfer of Prope1ty Act, 1882. 
The ground taken was that shop was let out to one Rehmat who inducted 
his son (respondent/defendant herein) as a sub-tenant without the consent 
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of the landlords. Rehmat passed away in the year 1997 and had not 
even paid rent for 10 years. Therefore, possession of the respondent as 
sub-tenant was unauthorised and illegal. Notice of vacating the premises 
and handing over the possession was given on October 22, 2001 and as 
the respondent failed to vacate the premises, suit was filed on February 
11, 2002. In the suit, brother of the respondent, Yasin, was also imp leaded 
as a defendant, who did not appear and was proceeded ex-parte. Insofar 
as, Respondent No. 1 is concerned, though he had appeared but did not 
pay any rent for more than 14 years and, therefore, his defence was 
struck off by the civil court vide order dated May 26, 2008. 
3. Five months thereafter, i.e., on October 29, 2008, notification 
was issued whereby the area where the suit premises situate was 
declared as urbanised area and, thus, was brought within the fold of 
Rent Act, 1973. The Trial Court, however, after striking off defence of 
Respondent No. I continued with the suit, reqorded the evidence of the 
plaintiff and ultimately decreed the suit vi de judgment and decree dated 
December 12, 2008. Against this decree, respondent no. I filed Civil 
Appeal No. 11/9 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Nuh taking 
the plea that the Civil Judge ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter 
from October 29, 2008 when Municipal Committee, Punhana came into 
existence vide
notification dated October 29, 2008 and the area in-question . 
was included in municipal limits because of which Rent Act, 1973 became 
applicable to the suit premises. This contention found favour with the 
learned Additional District Judge who allowed the appeal vi de judgment 
dated March 16, 2009. Aggrieved by that judgment, the appellants herein 
preferred second appeal under Section I 00 CPC, being RSA No. 3963 
of 2009 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, but unsuccessfully 
inasmuch as the High Court has dismiss~d the appeal vide judgment 
dated February I 0, 2014. It is this judgment which is impugned in the 
present proceedings giving rise to the question of law that has been 
noticed in the earlier portion ofthisjudgment. 
4. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that law 
G 
applicable on the date of institution of the suit would govern the suit. On 
that basis, it is submitted that since on the date when the suits were filed 
by the ~ppellants in these appeals, the suit properties were not covered 
by the Rent Act which legislation came into effect on a subsequent date, 
when the law applicable on the date of institution is to be applied, Civil 
Court would have the jurisdiction in the matter in the vein and taking this 
H
. 
· RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. v. BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & 
ORS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
line of argument further, it was submitted that the Notification which is 
issued in respect of an area in-question, notifying the same' to be 
municipality, is·to take effect only from the date of such a Notification 
and such an Order/Notification cannot be given retrospective operation. 
In support of the aforesaid submission, counsel for the appellants relied 
upon the followingjudgments: 
(i) R{lmesh C/t{lndra Vs. Ill Addi. Distt. Jud!(e & Ors. 1 
(ii) M{lnsoor Kltan Vs. Moti R{lm & Anr. 2 
(iii) Naud Kis/10re Marwalt & Ors. Vs. S{lmundri Devi-'; AND 
(iv) H{lrijeet Kaur Vs. Sarabjit K{lur' [P&H High Court] 
5. The argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the 
respondents, on the other hand, was that having regard to the nature and 
scheme of the two legislations in-question, viz., .Rent Act, 1973 and 
Haryana Municipality Act, one has to keep in mind that the scheme 
contemplates two types of cases: (i) where the premises are covered 
by the Rent Act, 1973 but exemption in terms of Section 1(3) of the Rent 
Act is provided for a period of 10 years to certain.kinds of premises. It 
was argued that in respect of such' premises which are enjoying protection 
and during·that period suit is filed in the Civil Court, the rights of the 
parties to the suit would be seen on the date on which the suit was filed 
and even ifthe period of exemption expires during the pendency of the . 
suit, Civil
Court would continue to have the jurisdiction to try the said 
suif, and (ii) Other cases were thooe where the particular premises are 
notified as coming within the municipal area under the provisions of 
I-iaryana Municipal Act, which had the effect of covering these premise~ 
under the Rent Act as well. It was argued that in such cases the moment 
such an Order/Notification is passed and the premises get covered by 
the Rent Act, from the date of such a Notification, Civil Court will cease 
to have jurisdiction a:nd it will apply even to the pending suits by relegating 
the parties to the Court of Rent Controller/Tribunal created under the 
R~t~. 
. 
. 
The learned counsel further argued that the aforesaid distinction 
was discerned by the learn~d High Court in the impugned judgment 
'<1992) 1sec1s1 
2 (2002) s sec 462 
'(1987) 4 sec 382 
'2013 (I) RCR (Rent) 74 
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after scanning through the various judgments of the High Court as well 
as this Court. It was argued that such a distinction can ee found after 
reading those judgments and the attention of this Court was drawn to 
the followingjudgments, in particular: 
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(i) Mani Subrat Jain Vs. Raja Ram Vohra-' 
(ii) Lakshmi Narayan Guin a11dOtflers Vs. Nira11jan Modak6 
6. In order to find out the veracity of the aforesaid arguments and 
position taken by the learned counsel on either side and to give answer 
to the question that has arisen for determination, it becomes necessary 
to traverse through the judgments cited inasmuch as reading thereof 
would help in deciding as to on which side the scales are tilted. We 
would be going through these judgments in chronological order. In that 
order, first case that needs our attention is Mani Subrat Jain-'. In this 
case, the landlord had filed a suit for ejectment in Civil Court in the 
absence of any rent legislation at the relevant time when the suit was 
filed. The compromise decree was passed.against the tenant. After the 
said decree was passed, ·East·Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was 
extended to Chandigarh vide Notificati0i1 issued on November 04, 1972. 
House in dispute was situate in Chandigarh. By that time, the Act was 
extended to Chandigarh, the tenant had already suffered a decree but 
he was still in possession of the tenanted premises when the execution
petition was filed by the landlord seeking execution of the said decree. 
The tenant resisted the same claiming the protection of Section 13( I) of 
East Punjab Rent Restricti0n Act, 1949 which provided that a tena•]t 
could not be evicted in execution of a decree p_assed before or after the 
commencement of the said Act or otherwise and whether before or 
after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the said 
or in pursuance of an Order under Section 13 of the Rent Restriction 
Act. This Court held that even an ex-tenant will continue to be a tenant. 
A reading of the judgment, however, would show that the Court went by 
the definition of"tenant" contained in Section 2(i) of the Rent Restriction 
Act which included an ex-tenant also and more importantly the provisions 
of Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Act which specifically provided 
that a tenant will not be evicted even in execution of a decree passed 
either before or after the commencement of the Rent Restriction. Act, 
except in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 or in pursuance 
' ( 1980) I :jCC I 
'(1985) 1sec270
RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. v. BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & 
ORS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
of the order passed under Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Act. 
7. In Laksltmi Narayan Gubz6, ejectment decree was passed 
by the Civil Court against which appeal was pending. During the 
pendency·of the appeal, .Rent Act was made,applicable to the area where 
the pr.emises in-question situate. This Court took the view that since 
appeal was in coritinuation of the suit having regard to the fact that 
premises were now covered by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy 
Act, protection of the said Act would become available to the tenant 
having regard to the provisions of Section 13(1) of that Act which was 
-·of the same n\lture, as noticeii in Mani Subrat Jain-' case. 
8. Judgment in Atma Ram Mittal Vs. lsliwar Singlt Punia7, 
related to the situation where the premises in-question though covered 
by the Rent Control Act, were exempted from the provisions of the said 
Act for a particular period. That case arose under the same Haryana 
Act of 1973 which we are dealing with. It may be pointed out, at this 
stage, that Section 1 (3) of the Act, 1973 provides the exemption in the 
following manner: "Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the 
.construction of which is completed on or after the commencement of 
this Act, for a period often years from the date of its completion". 
9. Though, the area where the building is situate comes under the 
protected umbrella of the Act, 1973, still for a
period of 10 years the said 
protection is not available to the tenant in respect ofa newly constructed 
building, which is completed on or after the commencement of the Act. 
In such a case the tenancy in respect of that particular building shall be 
governed by contractual terms and under the provisions of the Tran'sfer. 
of Property Act. On the termination of tenancy in any ofthe manners 
stipulated in the Transfer of Property Act, the landlord is entitled to file 
suit for possession in th(! Civil Court. In this backdrop, in Atma Ram 
Mitta/7, this Court was ~oncerned with a situation where such a suit 
was filed by the landlord in respect ofnewly constructed premises during 
the period of exemption by virtue of Section I (3) of the Rent Act of 
1973. However, when the .suit was still pencjiiig period of I 0 years 
expired. The Court held that on this basis, the tenant argued that since 
the exemption period had expired, the effect thereof was that the Rent· 
Act had also become applicable'to the building in-question and, therefore, 
Civil Court ceased to.have jurisdiction to try even the pending suit. This 
contention was repelled by the Court holding that the Civil Court will 
1 (1988)4 sec 284 
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continue to have the jurisdiction. For coming to this conclusion, the 
C our! relied upon its earlier judgm en ls in Vineet Kumar Vs. Mangat 
Sain Wadllera8 and Ram Saroop Rai Vs. Smt. Lilawati9• 
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10. After referring to the aforesaid two judgments, the Court gave 
the following reasons in support of its conclusion: 
"It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the 
fault of the court or delay in the procedure. Broom has 
stated the maxim ·'actus curiae 11e111i11e111 gravabit"-an 
act of court shallprejudice no man. Therefore, having regard 
to the time normally consumed for adjudication, the ten 
years' exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent 
Act would become illusory, ifthe suit has to be filed within 
thattime and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge 
that unless a suit is instituted soon after the date ofletting it 
would never be disposed of within ten years and even then 
within that time it may not be disposed of. That will make 
the ten years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide 
no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve 
problem of shmtages of houses. The purpose oflegislation 
would thus be defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social 
amelioration legislation is an imperative, iffespective of 
anythii1g else. 
9. Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed 
in finding what is the intention of Parliament or in other
words, the will of the people. Blackstone tells us that the 
fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the 
legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the 
law was made, by signs most natural and probable. And 
these signs are either the words, the context, the subject-
matter. the effects and consequence, or the spirit and 
re~tson of the law (emphasis by the court) See 
Comme11taries 011 the Laws of E11g/a11d (facsimile of I st 
Edn. of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 
59). Mukhe1jea, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, in 
Poppatlal Shah v. State of lvladras ( 1953 SCR 677) said 
that each word, phrase or sentence was to be construed in 
, (1984) 3 sec 352 
'(1980) 3 sec 452
RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. v. BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & 
ORS. [A K. SIKRI, J.] 
the light of purpose of the Act itself. But words must be 
construed with imagination of purpose behind them said 
Judge Learned Hand, a long time ago. It appears, therefore, 
that though we are concerned with seeking of intention, we 
are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the 
legislature has used and the true meaning of what words 
as was said by Lord Reid in Black- Clml'son International 
Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof -Aschaffenburg A.G. We 
are clearly of the opinion that havi1ig regard to the language 
we must find the reason and the spirit of the law. If the 
immunity from the operation of the Rent Act is made and 
depended upon that ultimate disposal of the case within the 
period of exemption of ten years which is in reality an 
impossibility, then there would be empty reasons. In our 
opinion, bearing in mind the well-settled principle that the 
rights of the parties crystallise to (sicJ on the date of the 
institution of the suit as enunciated by this Court in Om 
Prakash Gupta v. Digvijendrapal Gupta, the meaningful 
construction must be that the exemption would apply for a 
period often years and will continue to be available until 
suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceeding 
must be instituted within the stipulated period often years. 
Once rights crystallise the adjudication must be in 
accordance with law." 
(Emphasis added) 
1 I. Judgment in Rames It C/wndra1,
falls in the category of Atma 
Jl.am Mitta/7 case. In that case also Court was dealing with the case of 
newly constructed property exempted from operation ofU.P. Rent Act 
and the decision was on the same lines as noted in Atma Ram Mitta/7. 
12. At this juncture, we would like to discuss another judgment of 
this Court rendered by a three Judge Bench in the case of Sltri Kislum 
alias Krishna Kumar & Ors. v. Manoj Kumar & Ors. '0 At the outset, 
it needs to be emphasised that it was also a case under the same very 
enactment ofHaryana, i.e. Rent Act, 1973, and this case also dealt with 
a newly constructed property which was exempted from operation of 
the said Act for a period of I 0 years and the suit was filed by the landlord 
during the exempted period. In this case also, the Court.held that the law 
'" (1998) 2 sec 110 
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applicable on the date of the institution of the suit would govern and as at 
that time the protection of the Rent Control Act was not available and 
thus Civil Court had the jurisdiction, the Civil Court will continue to have 
the jurisdiction even after the expiry of the said period of 10 years. 
While coming to this conclusion, the Court had relied upon Ramesh 
Clla11dra
1
, Atma Ram Mittaf and other such cases. 
The learned counsel appearing for the appellants heavily relied 
upon the reasbns given by the Court in taking the aforesaid view and on 
that basis it was argued that the principle laid down should be made 
applicable even in those cases where the protection of the Rent Control 
Act is extended in respect of the area in question after the filing of the 
suit, in an attempt to impress upon this Court to take the view that even 
in such cases the Civil Court should not be deprived of its jurisdiction in 
respect of pending cases, when on the dat\: of institution of the suit the 
·Civil Court had the requisite jurisdiction to.entertain the same. For this 
purpose, the learned counsel referred to the arguments of the tenant in 
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that case recorded in paragraph 5 thereof with tne submission that this 
. very argument was specifically rejected. Paragraph 5 thereof reads as 
under: 
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"5. It is argued that the Act is intended to be beneficial to 
the tenants and special protection is afforded to them.
According to the learned counsel for the purpose of the 
Act the expression "tenant" includes a tenant continuing in 
possession after the termination of his tenancy and at the 
expiry of period of ten years as set out in Section I (3) of 
the Act, the "building" comes within the fold of the Act and 
the tenant in occupation will automatically have the protection 
·afforded by the Act. Emphasis is laid on the wordings of 
Section 13( I) which prevents eviction of a tenant in 
possession except in accordance with the provisions of the 
section. According to the learned counsel the moment the 
Ac! becomes applicable to the building in question, the suit 
in relation thereto has to abate and the remedy of the 
landlord is to approach the Controller with an application 
. for eviction on any of the grounds set out in the section. 
According to him even if a decree is passed by the civil 
court it will not be enforceable and the tenant cannot be 
evicted from the building pursuant to the decree as the .bar
RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. v. BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & 
811 
ORS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
in Section 13(1) is absolute. In support of this contention, 
A 
learned counsel has placed reliance on some of the rulings 
of this Court which will be adverted to a little later." 
13. In order to appreciate this argument, we will have to notice 
the contention which was advanced by the counsel for the landlord in 
the said case as the judgment is ultimately passed on the acceptance of 
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those submissions. These are contained in paragraph 6 and we reproduce 
below that'paragraph as well: 
"6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents 
has placed before us the following proposition: 
(a) On the date when the suit was instituted it was to enforce 
a legal right which had already accrued to the plaintiff and 
stood crystallized under the law applicable to the building at 
that time. In the absence of any specific provision in the 
Act to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the 
issue pertaining to that right, it cannot be contended that by 
efflux often-year period mentioned in Section I (3) the Comi 
would lose its jurisdiction. 
· 
' 
(b) The maxim ubi }us, ibi remedium can be excluded 
only by a substantive legislation expressly extinguishing the 
sai.d right. The Act does not contain any such provision to -
bring to an end the right of the plaintiff which had already 
accrued and put in issue in the ·suit. A judicial vacuum cannot 
be created by preventing the Court
from deciding an issue 
which has arisen before it unless the right which had accrued 
in favour of one party is taken away by the legislation. 
(c) The principle of the maxim actus dtriae 11e111i11e111 
gravabit wo~tld apply and because the Court had taken a 
long time to dispose.of the matter before it, the party which 
had approached it cannot be made to suffer. 
{ d) The provisions of Section 1 (3) and Section 13(1) should 
be so construed as to advance the legislative intention and 
ifthe contention of the appellants is accepted it would defeat 
the purpose of the moratorium and make it futile. 
In support of the above contentions learned counsel has 
referred to several rulings of this Comi and submitted that 
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the consistent view taken by this Court is in his favour." 
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14. Arguments of both sides have been dealt with by the Court, 
thereafter, in the following manner: 
"7. Before referring to the decisions cited before us it is 
necessary to advert to the provisions of the Act. We have 
already quoted Sections 1(3) and 13(1). Apa11 from the 
legislative exemption contained in Section 1(3) there is a 
provision in Section 3 of the Act enabling the State 
Government to exclude any building or any class of buildings 
from the puryiew of the Act. Sections 4 to 8 deal with fair 
rent, deposit of rent etc. Sections 9 and 10 refer to the 
amenities to be provided to the tenant. Section 11 prevents 
conversion of a residential building into a non-residential 
building except with the permission in writing of the 
Controller. Section 12 deals with the situation where a 
landlord fails to make the necessary repa;;3. Section 13 
sets out the grounds on which eviction can be sought by a 
landlord. Section 13-A prescribes special procedure for 
disposal of the application by a landlord in certain cases 
such as members of the Armed Forces, government 
employees etc. Section 14 prevents reopening of decisions 
which have become final. Section 15 prescribes appellate 
and revisional authorities. Ses;tion 16 provides that an 
authority exercising powers under the Act shall have the 
same powers of summoning and enforcing the
attendance 
of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence as 
are vested in a court under the Civil Procedure Code. 
Sections 1 7 to 23 deal with order as to costs, execution, 
power to transfer proceedings, penalties etc. Section 24 
repeals the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 
(East Punjab Act 3 of 1949). 
8. There is no provision in the Act taking away the 
jurisdiction of a civil court to dispose of a suit validly 
instituted. There is also no provision preventing the execution 
of a decree passed in such a suit. Section 13( I) does not 
expressly refer to execution of a decree for possession. 
On a reading of all the provisions of the Act, it is evident 
that it has not prevented a civil court from adjudicating the
RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. v. BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & 
ORS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
rights accrued and the liabilities incurred prior to the date 
on which the Act became applicable to the building in 
question. If the legislature had intended to take away the 
jurisdiction of the civil court to decide a suit which had been 
validly instituted, it would have been worded differently. 
The purpose for which the exemption is granted statutorily 
under Section 1(3) is to encourage construction of new 
buildings. That purpose would be defeated ifthe owner of 
the building is deprived of his right to get possession of the 
building unless he gets a decree within a period often years 
from the date of its completion. In fact the logical 
consequence of the argument of the appellants if accepted 
would be that even if a decree is obtained by the landlord 
within ten years from its completion it cannot be executed 
after the expiry of the said period of ten years as such 
execution would not be in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act. It is common knowledge that a proceeding in a 
civil court for recovery of immovable property could be 
dragged on by the defendant easily for a period often years 
or more and thereby any tenant whose tenancy had ·been 
terminated validly before the suit would successfully make 
the proceeding infructuous by prolonging the litigation. The 
argument of the appellants cannot be accepted as otherwise 
the purpose of exemption would get defeated." 
(emphasis
supplied) 
15. Thereafter, the Court has referred to various earlier judgments 
and all these judgments are concerned with the provision of exemption 
contained in such Rent Acts. Therefore, all these judgments are authority 
on the issue that in those cases where exemption from operation of Rent 
Control Acts is provided for a particular period and suit for eviction is 
filed during the said period of exemption, the Civil Court shall continue to 
have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of the parties under the said 
suit even where the period of exemption has expired during the pendency 
of the suit. The reason was that as on the date of the institution of the 
suit legal right in favourofthe landlord had already accrued and it stood 
crystallised under the law applicable to the building at that time. The 
Court was also influenced by the consideration that the maxim ubijus, 
ibi remedium can be excluded only by substantial legislation expressing 
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extinguishing the said right. If the delay in disposal of the said suit had 
occurred, that was because of the Court where the suit kept pending 
and the principle of the maxim actus curiae 11e111ine111 gravabit shall 
apply. In this context, the Court interpreted the provisions of Section 
1 (3) and Section 13( 1) of the Act pointing out the purpose for which the 
Legislature had exempted the newly constructed buildings from the 
operation of the Rent Act. For this, the object of such an exemption 
from the applicability of the Act was specifically taken note of by 
extracting a passage from Ram Saroop Rai v. Lilav{(fil 1, as can be 
seen from paragraph 10 of the judgment: 
"l 0. In Ram Saroop Rai v. Lilavati while dealing with a 
case under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation ofLetting, 
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, Justice Krishna Iyer referred 
to the obje'ct of exemption from the applicability of the Act 
in the following words: (SCC p. 453, para 1) 
" ... Chronic scarcity of accommodation in almost every 
part of the country has made 'eviction' litigation 
explosively considerable, and the strict protection 
against ejectment, save upon restricted grounds, has 
become the policy of the State. Rent control legislation 
to give effect to this policy exists everywhere, and we 
are concerned with one such in the State ofU.P. (U.P. 
Act 13 of 1972). The legislature found that rent control 
law has a
chilling effect on new building construction, 
and so, to encourage more building operations, 
amended the statute to release, from the shackles of 
legislative restriction, 'new constructions' for a period 
often years. So much so, a landlord who has let out 
his new building could recover possession without 
impediment ifhe instituted such proceeding within ten 
years of completion." 
The aforesaid observations would apply in the present case 
too." 
16. From the aforesaid discussion in Afm{( Ram Mittal, Vi11eet 
Ku11wr, Ram Saroop Rai, Ramesh Cluuulra and Shri Kislum alias 
Krishna Kumar cases, the apparent principles which can be culled out, 
forming the ratio decidendi of those cases, are as under: 
H 
11 (1980) 3 sec 452
RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. v. BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & 
ORS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
i) Rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution 
of the suit and, therefore, the law <_1pplicable on the date of filing 
of the suit will continue to apply until suit is disposed of or 
adjudicated. 
ii) If during the pendency of the suit,_ Rent Act becomes applicable 
to the premises in question, that would be ofno consr.quence and 
it would not take away the jurisdiction of civil court to dispose of 
a suit validly instituted. 
iii) In order to oust the jurisdiction of civil court, there must be a 
specific provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the 
civil court in respect of those. cases also which were validly 
instituted before the date when protection of Rent Act became 
available in respect of the said area/premises/tenancy. . 
iv) In case aforesaid position is not accepted and the protection of 
the Rent Act is extended even in respect of suit validly instituted 
prior in point of time when there was no such protection under the 
Act, it will have the consj!quence of making the decree, that is 
obtained prior to the Rent Act becoming applicable to the said 
area/premises, inexecutable after the application of these Rent 
Act in respect of such premises. This would not be in consonance 
with the legislative intent. 
I 7. In laying down the aforesaid dicta, the Court also took supp01t 
of two well known maxims viz. (i) ubi }us ibi remedium which lays 
down
the principle that where there is a right there is a remedy and it 
can be excluded only by substantial legislation expressly extinguishing 
the said right AND (ii) actus curiae 11e111ine111 gravabit, which means 
that nobody should be allowed to suffer because ofthe act of the Comt. 
Here the act attributed is delay_in disposal of the case. Additionally, the 
Court took aid of purposive interpretation i.e. legislative intent in not 
making Rent Act applicable to new constructions for a period of ten 
years. 
18. What we notiee ls that in the impugnedjudgm.ent, the High 
Court has divided the cases into two categories and restricted the law 
laid down in the aforesaid judgments only in respect of those category of 
cases where Rent Act exempts from its applicability newly constructed 
properties for a period of ten years. Second category of cases carved 
out covers those cases where the Rent Act was not applicable when the 
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suit was filed but extended to the. area/premises in question during the 
pendency of the suit. In respect of later category the High Court held 
that the dicta in the aforesaid judgments would not be applicable and the 
moment Rent Act is extended to such areas where the premises are 
situate, civil court shall cease to have jurisdiction to continue with the 
suits though instituted even at a point of time when Rent Act was not 
applicable. This distinction, according to us, is illusory. The principles of 
law laid down in the aforesaid judgment as culled out above would apply 
in equal force to second category of cases as well inasmuch as the basic 
principle which is laid down in the aforesaid judgments is that rights of 
the parties get crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and 
the law applicable on the date of filing the suit would continue to govern 
such suit. 
19.Atthejuncture, we take note of the law laid down in Mm1soor 
Klian2 which is in tune with what we have stated above. That was a 
case which arose out of Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses 
and Rent Control Order, 1949. Clause 13 thereof provided protection to 
the tenants against eviction and stipulated grounds which would entitle a 
landlord to seek eviction of the tenant by filing a petition before the 
Controller appointed under-the said Act. This Order was applicable to 
certain areas but did not include
city ofRisod. The said area ofRisod in 
the erstwhile province of C.P. and Berar was covered under the Order, 
1949 by Notification dated October 09, 2010. However, much before 
this Notification, the landlord in that case had filed the suit for possession 
in the Civil Court after the lease had been determined. This Court held 
that Civil Court shall continue to have jurisdiction as Order, 1949 was 
not retrospective in operation and where the eviction suit had already . 
been initiated and was pending on the date when order became applicable 
to the area in which the suit premises was situate, provisions of the 
order would not affect validity of previously instituted proceedings and 
the Court was competent to pass eviction decree under the Transfer of 
Property Act. 
20. A significant question would be as to how we need to read 
judgments in Mani Subrat Jain and Laxii1i Narayan G11i11 cases, the 
outcome whereof went in other direction. However, when we understand 
the ratio of the aforesaid two cases appropriately, we find no contradiction 
between these two cases and other line of cases like Atma Ram Mittal 
etc. discussed above. Insofar as judgments in Mani S11brat Jain and
RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. v. BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & 
ORS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
Laxmi Narayan Guin are concerned, these were rendered keeping in 
view the definition ~f"tenant" appearing in the rent legislations therein, 
namely, East Punjab Rent Restriction Act and West Bengal Premises 
Tenancy Act. What was found that definition of tenant in those 
enactments included even an ex-tenant. This coupled with the fact that 
there was specific provision laying down that a tenant will not be evicted 
even in execution of a decree passed either before or after the 
commencement of the enactment, except in accordance with the 
provisions contained in the Rent Act, impelled the Court to take the view 
that the moment Rent Act became applicable to the area in question, the 
tenant or even ex-tenant stood protected and could be evicted only under 
the said Rent Acts. Therefore, the principles which we have culled out 
above in para 16 would be subject to one exception. Jn case definition 
of 'tenant' and provisions pertaining to eviction of tenants contained in 
Rent Acts cover even those cases where the tenancy has been terminated 
(or depending upon the provisions of the Rent Act, even when Civil 
Court has passed the decree) the protection provided under such provision 
would come to the rescue of the tenant even in respect of pending cases. 
It is because of the reason that such a Rent Act specifically provides for 
protection of this nature and bars the jurisdiction of civil court even
in 
respect of pending cases. On the other hand, where there is no such 
specific protection given under the provisions of_the said Rent Act, the 
principle as laid down in Mmzsoor Klum2will be applicable. 
21. When we apply the principles laid down above to the instant 
case, we find that this case would fall in the category of Atma Ram 
Milla/ and Mm1soor Khan etc. as under the scheme of the Rent Act, 
no protection to the ex-tenants is provided and no provision is made 
excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of pending cases, 
expressly or impliedly. On the other hand, in the facts of the present 
case, it needs to be highlighted again that the respondents had not only 
sublet the premises but had not paid rent for a period of 14 years. His 
defence wa_s struck off by the civil court and ultimately suit was even 
decreed. It is only during the pendency of the appeal that the notification 
was issued covering the area where suit premises are situate under the 
Rent Act. It will be travesty of justice ifthe appellants/landlords are 
deprived of the fruits of the said decree. 
22. We are, thus, unable to accept the view taken by the High 
Court. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the First 
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A 
App.ellate Court as well as High Court is set aside. As the only contention 
which was taken by the respondents before the First Appellate Court, 
challenging the decree of the tr!al court, was that civil court ceased to 
have jurisdiction, the sai~ first appeal preferred by the respondents stands 
dismissed.thereby restoring the.decree passed by the trial court. 
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_23. There shall, however, be no order as to cost. 
Divya Pandey 
Appeal allowed.