VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR
[2023] 13 S.C.R. 1071, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2023] 13 S.C.R. 1071 : 2023 INSC 1026
1071
CASE DETAILS
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR.
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. 
NOVEMBER 28, 2023
(Criminal Appeal No. 3618 of 2023)
[VIKRAM NATH AND AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the order passed by the High Court 
refusing to discharge the accused in a criminal case and quashing an FIR 
calls for interference.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 239-240 – Trial of warrant-
cases by Magistrates – Application for discharge – Permissible extent of 
scrutiny – On facts, refusal of the High Court to discharge the accused-
appellant in a criminal case and quash an FIR – Interference with:
Held: Case for interference made out – There is no suspicion, much 
less strong or grave suspicion that the appellants are guilty of the oﬀ ence 
alleged, u/ss. 448, 454 and 380 IPC – Criminal case against the appellants 
amounts to clear abuse of the process of the Court – It would be unjustiﬁ ed 
to make the appellants face a full-ﬂ edged criminal trial – Appellants are 
to be protected against vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, 
and from unnecessarily being put through the rigours of an eventual trial, 
either through quashing a FIR/Complaint or by allowing an appeal against 
an order rejecting discharge or by any other legally permissible route, as 
the circumstances may be, in the deserving case, is a duty cast on the High 
Courts – High Court should have intervened and discharged the
appellants 
– Thus, there not being suﬃ  cient material on record to proceed against the 
appellants, they are discharged – Impugned judgment of the High Court 
as well as the order of the trial court dismissing the prayer for discharge 
are are unreasoned and set aside. [Para 14, 23, 24]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 239-240 – Trial of warrant-
cases by magistrates – Discharging of accused – Framing of charges 
– Reliance on Minakshi Bala’s case which held that at the stage of 
framing of charges, the court cannot usurp functions of a trial court to 
delve into and decide upon respective merits:
Held: If Minakshi Bala’s case is accepted as it, the necessary 
concomitant would be that despite examining the matter in detail, a 
court would ﬁ nd its freedom restricted while considering the discharge 
application – This would amount to forcing a person to stand trial, even when 
‘overwhelming’ material points to his/her innocence – Obviously, hands of 
a Court ought not to be tied down, and not against liberty – Thus, Minakshi 
Bala’s case is doubted on the limited aspect, however, not referred to the 
larger bench for reconsideration observing that the same would be done in 
a more appropriate case – Precedent. [Para 18, 25]
LISTS OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Minakshi Bala v Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: [1994] 3 SCR 
1008 – Doubted on limited aspect.
Ajoy Kumar Ghose v State of Jharkhand, (2009) 14 SCC 115: [2009] 
4 SCR 515; Rumi Dhar v State of West Bengal, (2009) 6 SCC 364: [2009] 
5 SCR 553; State of Tamil Nadu v N Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709: 
[2014] 1 SCR 135; State of Bihar v Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39: [1978] 
1 SCR 257; Union of India v Prafulla K Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4: [1979] 2 
SCR
229; Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v Dilip N Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 
715: [1989] 1 SCR 560; Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v Jitendra B 
Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76: [1990] 3 SCR 633; Dilawar B Kurane v State of 
Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135: [2002] 1 SCR 75; Chitresh K Chopra v 
State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605: [2009] 13 SCR 
230; Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: [2012] 7 SCR 
988; Dinesh Tiwari v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 137: [2014] 8 
SCR 207; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 
SCC 547: [2019] 6 SCR 701; State (NCT of Delhi) v Shiv Charan Bansal, 
(2020) 2 SCC 290: [2019] 17 SCR 1155; K P Raghavan v M H Abbas, 
AIR 1967 SC 740: 1967 AIR 740; Almohan Das v State of West Bengal, 
(1969) 2 SCR 520: [1969] 2 SCR 520; Sajjan Kumar v Central Bureau of
1073
Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368: [2010] 9 SCC 368; State of Gujarat v 
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 INSC 894 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
No.3618 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2017 of the High Court of 
Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in CN No.4929 of 2017.
Appearances:
Alok Kumar Mishra, Ashutosh Lal, Pramod Tiwari, Vivek Tiwari, 
Ms. Priyanka Dubey, Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Advs. for the Appellants.
Adarsh Upadhyay, Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the Final Judgment and Order dated 
02.08.2017 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) passed by 
the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter 
referred to as the “High Court”) in Case U/S 482/378/407 Cr.P.C. No.4929 
of 2017, by which the Order dated 02.06.2017 passed by the Chief Judicial 
Magistrate, Lucknow rejecting the prayer for discharge of the appellants, 
who are husband and wife, respectively, has been upheld.
THE FACTUAL PRISM:
3. In brief, the allegations are that the Complainant/Respondent No.2 
(hereinafter referred to as “R2”) was a tenant of a shop situated in the house 
of one Hari Narayan Shukla. On 29.06.2011, the appellants, along with 
others, locked the door of R2’s shop from inside, broke the wall and
looted 
wheat (APL), sale money, about INR 21,000 worth of kerosene oil, goods 
in stock, all the registers of the shop, documents and a two-wheeler bearing 
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. 
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
1074 
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
Registration Number UP32BX2356 which led to R2 ﬁ ling of the Hazratganj 
P.S. Case No.341 of 2011 dated 01.07.2011 (hereinafter referred to as the 
“FIR”) under Sections 448, 454 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 
(hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”).
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:
4. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that FIR itself 
would show that the allegation(s) is/are frivolous in nature and levelled 
with a view only to frustrate the appellants from enjoying their property, as 
admittedly, Appellant No.2 (hereinafter referred to as “A2”) is the owner of 
the shop referred to supra, being the bona ﬁ de purchaser through a registered 
Sale Deed.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that R2, who claimed 
to be the tenant of the property in question, had on 31.05.2011 ﬁ led Regular 
Suit No.104/2011 for permanent injunction before the Civil Judge (Senior 
Division) South, Lucknow which was based on a so-called ‘Memorandum 
of Agreement of Tenancy’ dated 24.11.2005, in which the present symbol of 
the Indian National Rupee i.e., ₹, has been shown but the said symbol came 
into being only in the year 20101 and thus, could not have been reﬂ ected 
in a ‘Memorandum’ of the year 2005, which clearly exposes the falsity 
of the claim. Moreover, it was submitted that this would also amount to 
perjury by ﬁ ling of a forged document before a Court of Law, for which 
the appellant(s) had ﬁ led an
application under Section 3402 of the Code of 
1 
To be precise, the symbol was oﬃ  cially approved on 26.08.2010 vide F.No.03/17/10-
Cy., Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Aﬀ airs (Cy. 
Section).
2 
340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195.—(1) When, upon an application 
made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the 
interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any oﬀ ence referred to in clause 
(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in 
relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document 
produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after 
such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,—
(a) record a ﬁ nding to that eﬀ ect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the ﬁ rst class having jurisdiction;
(d) take suﬃ  cient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, 
or if the alleged oﬀ ence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, 
send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
1075
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “CrPC”) before the 
concerned Court.
6. It was further submitted that the FIR lodged by R2 on 01.07.2011 
was for alleged oﬀ ences under Sections 4483, 4544 and 3805 of the IPC. 
However, it was contended that though no case was made out, still the 
police in collusion with R2 submitted Charge Sheet No.189 of 2011 dated 
07.08.2011 under Section 448, IPC against the appellants upon which the 
appellants were summoned and were put on trial. It was submitted that R2 
also ﬁ led an application under Section 1446, CrPC before the Additional 
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.

(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an oﬀ ence may, 
in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in 
respect of that oﬀ ence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be 
exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning 
of sub-section (4) of Section 195.

(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,—

(a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such oﬃ  cer of the 
Court as the Court may appoint;

(b) in any other case, by the presiding oﬃ  cer of the Court or by such oﬃ  cer of the 
Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf.
(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in Section 195.
3 
448. Punishment for house-trespass.—Whoever commits house-trespass shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one 
year, or with ﬁ ne which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
4 
454. Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking in order to commit oﬀ ence 
punishable with imprisonment.—Whoever commits lurking house-trespass or house-
breaking, in order to the committing of any oﬀ ence punishable with imprisonment, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to ﬁ ne; and if the oﬀ ence intended to be 
committed is theft, the term of the imprisonment may be extended to ten years.
5 
380. Theft in dwelling house, etc.—Whoever commits theft in any building, tent or 
vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling, or used for the 
custody of property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to ﬁ ne.
6 
 144. Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger.—(1) 
In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate 
or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in 
this behalf, there is suﬃ  cient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate 
prevention or speedy remedy
is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order 
stating the material facts of the case and served in the manner provided by Section 134, 
direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect 
to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate 
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
1076 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
City Magistrate (First), Lucknow, registered as Suit No.01 of 2012 against 
the appellants which, by Order dated 09.08.2012, was rejected as not 
maintainable. It was further submitted that A2 moved the High Court in 
Rent Control Case No.125 of 2012 and vide order dated 14.12.2012, the 
High Court directed the said Rent Control Case proceeding to remain in 
abeyance. 
7. Learned counsel submitted that the Trial Court, upon the Charge 
Sheet submitted by the police in the FIR, took cognizance on 07.08.2011, 
against which the appellants moved the High Court under Section 4827, 
considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction, 
annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health 
or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an aﬀ ray.
(2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where the 
circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against 
whom the order is directed, be passed ex parte.
(3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to per-
sons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally when frequenting or 
visiting a particular place or area.
(4) No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from 
the making thereof:
Provided that, if the State Government considers it necessary so to do
for preventing 
danger to human life, health or safety or for preventing a riot or any aﬀ ray, it may, by 
notiﬁ cation, direct that an order made by a Magistrate under this section shall remain in 
force for such further period not exceeding six months from the date on which the order 
made by the Magistrate would have, but for such order, expired, as it may specify in the 
said notiﬁ cation.
(5) Any Magistrate may, either on his own motion or on the application of any person 
aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section, by himself or any Magistrate 
subordinate to him or by his predecessor-in-oﬃ  ce.
(6) The State Government may, either on its own motion or on the application of any 
person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made by it under the proviso to sub-section 
(4).
(7) Where an application under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) is received, the 
Magistrate, or the State Government, as the case may be, shall aﬀ ord to the applicant an 
early opportunity of appearing before him or it, either in person or by pleader and showing 
cause against the order; and if the Magistrate or the State Government, as the case may 
be, rejects the application wholly or in part, he or it shall record in writing the reasons for 
so doing.
7 
482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be 
deemed to limit or aﬀ ect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders 
as may be necessary to give eﬀ ect to any order under this
Code, or to prevent abuse of 
the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
1077
CrPC, in Case No. U/S 482/378/407 No. - 2413 of 2012 which was disposed 
of vide order dated 10.04.2014 with the direction that the appellants may 
ﬁ le application for discharge before the Court concerned. 
8. It was submitted that on 18.12.2014, the Civil Judge (Junior 
Division), South, Lucknow in Miscellaneous Suit No.540031 C/2012, which 
was instituted on the application ﬁ led by the appellants under Section 340, 
CrPC, prima facie found that oﬀ ence under Section 4638, IPC had been 
committed by R2 and directed initiation of proceedings against him. 
9. Furthermore, it was pointed out that in terms of the High Court’s 
Order dated 10.04.2014, the appellants on 16.01.2016 ﬁ led application 
for discharge before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, in Case 
Crime No.368 of 2011, wherein one of the grounds taken was the order 
dated 18.12.2014 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), South, 
Lucknow.
10. Learned counsel submitted that Order dated 18.12.2014 was 
a clear-cut ﬁ nding by a Court of Law that the entire suit was premised 
on forged and fabricated document(s). He submitted that once the same 
has been established, the contention of R2 to be in possession of the 
property in question does not arise and clearly the FIR itself was a misuse 
and abuse of the process of law. Learned counsel submitted that despite 
there being suﬃ  cient material for discharge, the Trial Court by order 
dated 02.06.2017 rejected the application on vague grounds and thus,
the appellants had to move the High Court under Section 482, CrPC in 
Case U/S 482/378/407 Cr.P.C. No.4929 of 2017, which was dismissed 
by the Impugned Judgment.
11. Learned counsel pointed out that innocence of the appellants would 
be further established by the fact that despite the initial FIR having been 
registered under Sections 448, 454 and 380, IPC, the police did not ﬁ nd any 
case under Sections 454 and 380, IPC, to which R2 neither objected nor 
8 
463. Forgery.—Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part 
of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public 
or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with 
property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit 
fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
1078 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
ﬁ led any protest. Thus, it was contended that the acceptance of the fact that 
there was no lurking house-trespass or housebreaking in order to commit 
oﬀ ence punishable with imprisonment (Section 454, IPC) and no theft in 
dwelling house, etc. (Section 380, IPC) also make it amply clear that R2 was 
never in possession of the property in question and his entire case falls ﬂ at. 
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposed the prayer by 
the appellants seeking discharge, and supported the Impugned Judgment. 
Learned counsel sought dismissal of the appeal.
NON-APPEARANCE OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2:
13. Despite service, nobody appeared on behalf of R2.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
14. Having examined the matter in detail, a case for interference has 
been made out. The fact is that the Indian National Rupee symbol i.e., ₹ was 
not in existence during the time the purported ‘Memorandum’ was signed. 
Furthermore, R2 has based his entire claim of tenancy on a document which 
has been, prima facie, found to be forged and fabricated, for which the 
Court concerned has directed lodging of a criminal case. There is no other 
claim by R2 to show that he was in possession. When coupled with the fact 
that the police did not ﬁ nd any oﬀ ences having been made out against the 
appellants under Sections 454 and 380, IPC, the case against the appellants 
under Section 448, IPC ﬁ nds itself on
shaky ground. R2 never objected to 
the above nor took any further steps. R2, as noted above, has not entered 
appearance before this Court. Thus, the case against the appellants ﬁ nds itself 
on shakier ground. We are of the ﬁ rm view that A2 being the undisputed 
landlord, the criminal case ﬁ led by R2, in the facts and circumstances supra, 
amounts to clear abuse of the process of the Court. Moreover, we ﬁ nd that 
the Impugned Judgment and the judgment dated 02.06.2017 of the Chief 
Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow are unreasoned as to why discharge is to be 
denied. Thus far on facts and merits. Now, on the law.
 15. Although the instant case pertains to Trial of Warrant-Cases by 
Magistrates and is a case instituted on a police report, meaning Sections 239-
1079
2409, CrPC are relevant, we also propose to glance at Section 24510, CrPC 
(concerning trial of warrant-cases by Magistrates apropos cases instituted 
otherwise than on police report), as also Sections 227-22811, CrPC, which 
pertain to Trial before a Court of Session. 
9 
239. When accused shall be discharged.—If, upon considering the police report and 
the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, 
of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution 
and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge 
against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his 
reasons for so doing.
240. Framing of charge.—(1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if 
any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming 
that the accused has committed an oﬀ ence triable under this Chapter, which such 
Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately 
punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.
(2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be 
asked whether he pleads guilty of the oﬀ ence charged or claims to be tried.
10 245. When accused shall be discharged.—(1) If, upon taking all the evidence 
referred to in Section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, 
that no case against the accused has been made out which, if
unrebutted, 
would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging 
the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such 
Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless.
11  227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents 
submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the 
prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not suﬃ  cient ground for 
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons 
for so doing.

228. Framing of charge.—(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, 
the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has 
committed an oﬀ ence which—

(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against 
the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or 
any other Judicial Magistrate of the ﬁ rst class and direct the accused to appear before 
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the ﬁ rst 
class, on such date as he deems ﬁ t, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the oﬀ ence 
in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police 
report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the 
accused.

(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge 
shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked whether he 
pleads guilty of the oﬀ ence charged or claims to be tried.
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
1080 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
16. The extent of scrutiny permissible when an application for 
discharge is being considered has attracted this Court’s attention on a 
number of occasions. It is appropriate to take note of the leading precedents 
on the subject. Insofar as Section 245, CrPC is concerned, the decision of 
this Court in Ajoy Kumar Ghose v State of Jharkhand, (2009) 14 SCC 
115 is instructive:
‘19. The essential diﬀ erence of procedure in the trial of warrant case 
on the basis of a police report and that instituted otherwise than on the 
police report is particularly marked in Sections 238 and 239 CrPC on 
one side and Sections 244 and 245 CrPC on the other. Under Section 
238, when in a warrant case, instituted on a police report, the accused 
appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the Magistrate has to 
satisfy himself that he has been supplied the necessary documents like 
the police report, FIR, statements recorded under sub-section (3) of 
Section 161 CrPC of all the witnesses proposed to be examined by the 
prosecution, as also the confessions and statements recorded under 
Section 164 and any other documents which have been forwarded by 
the prosecuting agency to the court.
20.After that, comes the stage of discharge, for which it is provided 
in Section 239 CrPC that the Magistrate has to consider the police 
report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 CrPC and if 
necessary, has to examine the accused and has to hear
the prosecution 
of the accused, and if on such examination and hearing, the Magistrate 
considers the charge to be groundless, he would discharge the accused 
and record his reasons for so doing. The prosecution at that stage is 
not required to lead evidence. If, on examination of the aforementioned 
documents, he comes to the prima facie conclusion that there is a 
ground for proceeding with the trial, he proceeds to frame the charge. 
For framing the charge, he does not have to pass a separate order. It 
is then that the charge is framed under Section 240 CrPC and the trial 
proceeds for recording the evidence. Thus, in such trial prosecution 
has only one opportunity to lead evidence and that too comes only 
after the charge is framed.
Xxx
1081
2212. In the warrant trial instituted otherwise than the police report, the 
complainant gets two opportunities to lead evidence, ﬁ rstly, before the 
charge is framed and secondly, after the framing of the charge. Of course, 
under Section 245(2) CrPC, a Magistrate can discharge the accused at 
any previous stage of the case, if he ﬁ nds the charge to be groundless.
23. Essentially, the applicable sections are Sections 244 and 245 CrPC 
since this is a warrant trial instituted otherwise than on police report. 
There had to be an opportunity for the prosecution to lead evidence 
under Section 244(1) CrPC or to summon its witnesses under Section 
244(2) CrPC.This did not happen and instead, the accused proceeded 
to ﬁ le an application under Section 245(2) CrPC on the ground that the 
charge was groundless.
24.Now, there is a clear diﬀ erence in Sections 245(1) and 245(2) of 
CrPC. Under Section 245(1), the Magistrate has the advantage of the 
evidence led by the prosecution before him under Section 244 and he has 
to consider whether if the evidence remains unrebutted, the conviction of 
the accused would be warranted. If there is no discernible incriminating 
material in the evidence, then the Magistrate proceeds to discharge the 
accused under Section 245(1) CrPC.
25.The situation under Section 245(2) CrPC is, however, diﬀ erent. There, 
under sub-section (2), the Magistrate has the power of discharging the 
accused at any previous stage of the case i.e. even before
such evidence 
is led. However, for discharging an accused under Section 245(2) CrPC, 
the Magistrate has to come to a ﬁ nding that the charge is groundless. 
There is no question of any consideration of evidence at that stage, 
because there is none. The Magistrate can take this decision before the 
accused appears or is brought before the court or the evidence is led 
under Section 244 CrPC. The words appearing in Section 245(2) CrPC 
“at any previous stage of the case”, clearly bring out this position.
Xxx
12 Paragraph 22 was corrected vide Oﬃ  cial Corrigendum F.3/Ed.B.J./124/2009 issued on 
22.08.2009 by the Court.
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
36. The Magistrate has the power to discharge the accused under 
Section 245(2) CrPC at any previous stage i.e. before the evidence is 
recorded under Section 244(1) CrPC, which seems to be the established 
law, particularly in view of the decision in Cricket Assn. of Bengal v. 
State of W.B. [(1971) 3 SCC 239 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 446], as also the 
subsequent decision of the Bombay High Court in Luis de Piedade 
Lobo v. Mahadev Vishwanath Parulekar [1984 Cri LJ 513 (Bom)]. 
The same decision was followed by Kerala High Court in Manmohan 
Malhotra v. P.M. Abdul Salam [1994 Cri LJ 1555 (Ker)] and Hon’ble 
Justice K.T. Thomas, as the learned Judge then was, accepted the 
proposition that the Magistrate has the power under Section 245(2) 
CrPC to discharge the accused at any previous stage. The Hon’ble 
Judge relied on a decision of the Madras High Court in Mohd. Sheriﬀ  
Sahib v. Abdul Karim Sahib [AIR 1928 Mad 129 (1)], as also the 
judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Gopal Chauhan v. 
Satya [1979 Cri LJ 446 (HP)].
37. We are convinced that under Section 245(2) CrPC the Magistrate 
can discharge the accused at any previous stage i.e. even before 
any evidence is recorded under Section 244(1) CrPC. In that view, 
the accused could have made the application. It is obvious that the 
application has been rejected by the Magistrate. So far, there is no 
diﬃ  culty.’
(emphasis supplied)
17. Turning to Sections 239-240, CrPC, this
Court held as under in 
Minakshi Bala v Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142:
‘6. Having regard to the fact that the oﬀ ences, for which charge-sheet 
was submitted in the instant case and cognizance taken, were triable 
as a warrant case the Magistrate was to proceed in accordance with 
Sections 239 and 240 of the Code at the time of framing of the charges. 
Under the above sections, the Magistrate is ﬁ rst required to consider 
the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 
CrPC and examine the accused, if he thinks necessary, and give an 
opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard. If on 
such consideration, examination and hearing the Magistrate ﬁ nds the 
charge groundless he has to discharge the accused in terms of Section
1083
239 CrPC; conversely, if he ﬁ nds that there is ground for presuming 
that the accused has committed an oﬀ ence triable by him he has to 
frame a charge in terms of Section 240 CrPC.
7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a 
ﬁ nding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done 
in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, 
invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions 
Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 
CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to 
presume that he had committed any oﬀ ence for which he is charged 
and the revisional court if so satisﬁ ed can quash the charges framed 
against him. To put it diﬀ erently, once charges are framed under 
Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would 
not be justiﬁ ed in relying upon documents other than those referred 
to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justiﬁ ed in invoking 
its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same 
except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable 
compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such 
exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents 
which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant 
evidence.
8. Apart from the inﬁ rmity in the approach of the High Court in dealing 
with the matter which we have already noticed, we further
ﬁ nd that 
instead of adverting to and conﬁ ning its attention to the documents 
referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC the High Court has dealt 
with the rival contentions of the parties raised through their respective 
aﬃ  davits at length and on a threadbare discussion thereof passed the 
impugned order. The course so adopted cannot be supported; ﬁ rstly, 
because ﬁ nding regarding commission of an oﬀ ence cannot be recorded 
on the basis of aﬃ  davit evidence and secondly, because at the stage 
of framing of charge the Court cannot usurp the functions of a trial 
court to delve into and decide upon the respective merits of the case.’ 
(emphasis supplied)
18. With great respect, we express our reservations in fully acceding 
to what has been stated above. If Paragraph 8 of Minakshi Bala (supra) 
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
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is accepted as it is, the necessary concomitant would be that despite 
examining the matter in detail, a Court would find its wings clipped to 
intercede. This would amount to forcing a person to stand trial, even 
when the overwhelming material points to his/her innocence. Obviously, 
the hands of a Court ought not to be tied down, and especially not by a 
higher Court, and moreso not against liberty. Paragraph 7 of Minakshi 
Bala (supra) does enable examining unimpeachable documents. 
We are conscious that Minakshi Bala (supra) has been followed in 
later decisions by the Court. However, we have chosen to survey the 
precedents further, and then decide on the road we wish to take13.
19. In Rumi Dhar v State of West Bengal, (2009) 6 SCC 364, this 
Court held that the Judge concerned with an application under Section 
239, CrPC has to ‘… go into the details of the allegations made against 
each of the accused persons so as to form an opinion as to whether any 
case at all has been made out or not as a strong suspicion in regard 
thereto shall subserve the requirements of law.’
20. In State of Tamil Nadu v N Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 
709, it was observed notwithstanding the difference in language of 
Sections 227 and 239, CrPC, the approach of the Court concerned is 
to be common under both provisions. The principles holding the field 
under Sections 227 and 228, CrPC are well-settled, courtesy, inter alia, 
State of Bihar v
Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39; Union of India v 
Prafulla K Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4; Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad 
v Dilip N Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715; Niranjan Singh Karam Singh 
Punjabi v Jitendra B Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76; Dilawar B Kurane v 
State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135; Chitresh K Chopra v State 
(Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605; Amit Kapoor v 
Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460; Dinesh Tiwari v State of Uttar 
Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 137; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v 
State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547; and State (NCT of Delhi) v 
Shiv Charan Bansal, (2020) 2 SCC 290. We need only refer to some, 
starting with Prafulla K Samal (supra), where, after considering 
Ramesh Singh (supra), K P Raghavan v M H Abbas, AIR 1967 SC 
13 Yes, the allusion is to Robert Frost’s celebrated poem – The Road Not Taken.
1085
740 and Almohan Das v State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 520, it 
was laid down as under:
‘10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the 
following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the 
charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power 
to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of ﬁ nding 
out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has 
been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave 
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly 
explained the Court will be fully justiﬁ ed in framing a charge 
and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally 
depend upon the facts of each case and it is diﬃ  cult to lay down 
a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views 
are equally possible and the Judge is satisﬁ ed that the evidence 
produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not 
grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his 
right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of 
the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior 
and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Oﬃ  ce or a 
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad 
probabilities of the case, the total eﬀ ect of the evidence and 
the documents produced before the Court, any basic inﬁ rmities
appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that 
the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of 
the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.’
(emphasis supplied)
21. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi (supra), this Court 
was alive to reality, stating that ‘… it cannot be expected even at the initial 
stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is 
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.’ If a view 
gives rise to suspicion, as opposed to grave suspicion, the Court concerned 
is empowered to discharge the accused, as pointed out in Sajjan Kumar v 
Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368. The Court, in Dinesh 
Tiwari (supra) had reasoned that if the Court concerned opines that there is 
ground to presume the accused has committed an oﬀ ence, it is competent to 
frame a charge even if such oﬀ ence is not mentioned in the Charge Sheet. 
As to what is ‘strong suspicion’, reference to Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra 
Patel (supra) is warranted, where it was explained that it is ‘… the suspicion 
which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as 
suﬃ  cient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed 
the oﬀ ence.’
22. In a recent judgement viz. State of Gujarat v Dilipsinh Kishorsinh 
Rao, 2023 INSC 89414, this Court held:
‘7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to 
determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for 
proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the 
pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused 
when an application for discharge is ﬁ led. At that stage, the trial judge 
has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order 
to determine whether or not the grounds are suﬃ  cient to proceed
against the accused on basis of charge sheet material. The nature 
of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or 
the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there 
are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a 
charge would suﬃ  ce and such material would be taken into account 
for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no suﬃ  cient ground 
for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be 
discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration 
of the material there are grounds for presuming that accused has 
committed the oﬀ ence which is triable, then necessarily charge has 
to be framed.
14 
  2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294.
1087
8. At the time of framing of the charge and taking cognizance the 
accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the court 
to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any right to the 
accused to ﬁ le any material or document at the stage of framing of 
charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of 
the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been 
made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet 
material only.
9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge-sheet material 
at the stage of framing the charge which might drastically aﬀ ect the 
very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material 
should not be considered or ignored by the court at that stage. The main 
intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions 
as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr. P.C. is to assist the court 
to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. 
Nothing in the Code limits the ambit of such hearing, to oral hearing 
and oral arguments only and therefore, the trial court can consider 
the material produced by the accused before the I.O.
10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an 
application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption 
that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution 
is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the 
facts emerging
from the material taken on its face value, disclose the 
existence of the ingredients necessary of the oﬀ ence alleged. …
xxx
11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage 
when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record 
of the case” used in Section 227 Cr. P.C. is to be understood as the 
documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code 
does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at 
the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is 
to be conﬁ ned to the material produced by the investigating agency.
12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the 
test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative 
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
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value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by 
referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som 
Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, 
(2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the 
court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of 
prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the 
court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual 
ingredients constituting the oﬀ ence alleged and it is not expected to 
go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check 
whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at 
the conclusion of trial.’ 
(emphasis supplied)
23. On a careful conspectus of the legal spectrum, juxtaposed with 
our view on the facts and merits expressed hereinbefore, we are satisﬁ ed 
that there is no suspicion, much less strong or grave suspicion that the 
appellants are guilty of the oﬀ ence alleged. It would be unjustiﬁ ed to make 
the appellants face a full-ﬂ edged criminal trial in this backdrop. In an appeal 
dealing with the refusal of the High Court to quash an FIR under Section 
482, CrPC albeit, this Court, while setting aside the judgment impugned 
therein and quashing that FIR, took the view that ‘…the Appellants are to 
be protected against vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, and 
from unnecessarily being put
through the rigours of an eventual trial.’15 
The protection against vexatious and unwanted prosecution and from being 
unnecessarily dragged through a trial by melting a criminal proceeding into 
oblivion, either through quashing a FIR/Complaint or by allowing an appeal 
against an order rejecting discharge or by any other legally permissible 
route, as the circumstances may be, in the deserving case, is a duty cast on 
the High Courts. The High Court should have intervened and discharged the 
appellants. But this Court will intervene, being the sentinel on the qui vive.
 24. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The appellants, on bail, stand 
discharged of the liabilities of their bail bonds. The Impugned Judgment of 
the High Court as well as the order of the Trial Court dismissing the prayer 
15 Priyanka Mishra v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 INSC 729 | 2023 SCC OnLine SC 
978.
1089
for discharge are set aside. Consequently, there not being suﬃ  cient material 
on record to proceed against them, the appellants stand discharged in the 
criminal case. Our judgment shall not inﬂ uence pending civil proceeding(s), 
if any, between the private parties.
25. Insofar as Minakshi Bala (supra) is concerned, having taken the 
view that we have and expressed our doubt on the limited aspect, yet we do 
not ﬁ nd any need to burden a larger Bench to reconsider the said judgment, 
at this juncture. ‘In a more appropriate case…’, perhaps, as the saying goes.
Headnotes prepared by: 
Appeal allowed.
Nidhi Jain
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR 
PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]