NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX versus DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS
[2016] 6 S.C.R. 1, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
f2016] 6 S.C.R. 1 
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX 
v. 
DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS 
(Civil Appeal Nos. 6203-6204of2016) 
JULY 13,2016 
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, DIPAK MISRA, 
MADAN B. LOKUR, PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE 
AND N. V. RAMANA, JJ.] 
CONSTITUTION OF IND/A: 
Art.155 - Appointment and status of Governor - Held: A 
Governor is appointed by a warrant issued under the hand and 
seal of the President under Art.155, and his term of office enures 
under Art.156, during the pleasure of the President - A Governor 
is an executive nominee, and his appointment flows from the aid 
and advice tendered by the Council ·of Ministers with the Prime 
Minister as the head, to the President. 
Art. 163 - Power of Governor to exercise his discretion -
Scope of - Held: Art.163 does not give the Governor a general 
discretionary power to act against or without the advice of his 
Council of Ministers - The area for the exercise of his discretion is 
limited - Even in this limited area, his choice of action should not 
be arbitrary or fanciful - It must be a choice dictated by reascm, 
actuated by good faith and tempered by caution - Under Art.163(1) 
the discretionary power of the Governor extends to situations, 
wherein a constitutional pr.ovision expressly·requires the Governor 
to act in his own discretion - Any discretion exercised beyond the 
Governor '.s jurisdictional authority, would certainly be subject to 
iudicial review - The judgment rend_ered in the Mahabir Prasad 
Sharma by the High Court
of Calcutta does not lay down the correct 
legal position as it confers excessive powers on the Governor, well 
beyond his status as a formal or constitutional head of the Executive 
- The' constitutional position declared therein, With reference to 
Af't.163(2), is accordingly set aside. 
Arts.163, 17 4, 179 - Removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy 
Speaker) under Art.179 - Role of Governor:._ Held: Governor has 
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no role whatsoever, in the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy 
Speaker) under Art.179 - The question of adoption or rejection of 
a notice of resolution, for the removal of the Speake1~ is to be 
determined by the legislators - If the resolution for the Speakers 
removal is supported by a simple majority of the members of the 
House, the motion has lo be adopted, and the Speaker has to be 
removed - Failing ll'hich, the motion has to be rejected -Any action 
taken by the Governor, based on disputations, with reference to 
activities in ll'hich he has no role to play, is liable to be considered 
as extraneous. 
Arts. 163, 166, 168 - Powers of Governor to exercise executive 
and legislation function - Held: Governor has a limited scope of 
authority, relating to the exercise of executive functions, in his own 
discretion, i.e., without any aid and advice - The said limited power 
of the Governor is exercisable in situations, expressly provided for 
"by or under" the provisions of the Constitution - Likewise, even 
though Art.168 includes the Govern01; and pronounces him to be a 
part of the State Legislature, the provisions of the Constitution extend 
no legislative responsibility to him, within the precincts of the House 
or Houses of the State Legislature -
Governor does not participate 
in debates within the Legislature, nor does he have any role in any 
activity which would result in the passing of a
Bill, on the floor of 
the House -
All in all, the legislative jimctionality constitutionally 
extended to the Governor, is extremely limited. 
Arts.163, 174, 179 - Role of Governor in scheduling the 
functioning of the Assembly - Held: It is not for the Governor to 
schedule the functioning of the Assembly - It is also not in the 
Governor~· domain, to schedule the agenda of the House - The 
Governor has no role ll'ith reference to the ongoings in the Assembly 
- The Governor must keep away. ji·om all that goes on, within the 
House - The order of the Governor dated 9.12.2015 preponing the 
6th session of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, from 
14.1.2016, to 16.12.2015 is violative of Art.163 r.w. Art.174 and as 
such, is quashed- The message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, 
directing the manner of conducting proceedings during the 61h session 
of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, from 16.12.2015 
to 18.12.2015, is violative of Art.163 1:w. Art.175 and as such, is 
quashed - All steps and decisions taken by the Arunachal Pradesh
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
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AND OTHERS 
Legislative Assembly. pursuant to the Governors order and message 
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dated 9.12. 2015, are unsustainable - The same are accordingly set 
aside. 
Art.163(1) - Expression 'required' - Held: The expression 
'required' signifies that the Governor can exercise his discretionary 
powers only if there is a compelling necessity to do so. 
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Art.163 - Historical background behind its enactment -
Discussed - Government of India Act, 1935 - s.50 - Indi.a 
(Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 - Paragraph 3(2). (per 
Madan B. Lokur, J.) 
Arts.163, 174 - Relationship of the Governor vis-a-vis the 
Executive and the relationship of the Governor vis-a-vis Legislature 
- Distinction between - Art.163 deals with the relationship of first 
category and Art.17 4 deals with the relationship of second 
category. (per Madan B. Lokur, J.) 
Art.163(1) - Governor bound by the advice of his Councilof 
Ministers - Exceptions - Held: There are only three exceptions -
Governor may in exercise of his functions act in his discretion as 
conferred by the Constitution; the Governor may in exercise of his 
functions, act in his discretion as conferred under the Constitution; 
and the Governor may in exercise of his functions act in his 
individual judgment in instances specified by the Constitution. (per 
Madan B. Lokur, J.) 
Art.163 - Interpretation of - Reference made to reports of 
Justice Sarkaria Commission and Justice Punchhi
Commission on 
Union-State Relations to define the role of Governor - Justice 
Sarkaria Commission looked at Art.163(1) in two parts namely, the 
Governor exercising his discretion when required by the Constitution 
and when required under the Constitution - Functions of Governor 
placed in four categories i.e. Governor acting in his discretion; in 
his individual judgment; in his discretion independently of the 
Council of Ministers and in in his discretion under the Constitution 
- Justice Punchhi Commission did not disagree with the Justice 
·Sarkaria Commission on any issue relating to the functions and 
duties of the Governor - No reason to take view different from that 
expressed by these reports. (per Madan B. Lokw; J.) 
Art.163, 174 - Duty of Governor when advice of Council of 
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J\,{inisters not available - Options available to the Governor - In 
dealing with the situation in Arunachal Pradesh, the Governor was 
obliged to adhere to and follow the constitutional principle, that is 
to be bound by the advice of Council of Ministers - In the event 
that advice was not available and re!>ponsible government was not 
possible, the Governor could have resorted to the .. breakdown 
provisions" and left it to the President to break the impa,_sse -
Governor had another option - If Governor had any doubt about 
the continuance of a responsible government as a result of the 
shenanigans that were going on in Arunachal Pradesh , he could 
very well have required the Chief Minister to prove that he had the 
confidence of the Assembly - Therefore, the unilateral act of 
summoning the Assembly by the Governor was certainly not in the 
language of the law or the spirit of parliamentary democracy and 
responsible government and is declared unconstitutional. (per 
Madan B. Lokur, J.) 
Art.17 4 - Power of Governor vested under Art.17 4 - Exercise 
of, without any aid and advice - Scope of - Held: In ordinary 
circumstances during the period when the Chief Minister and his 
Council of Ministers enjoy the confidence of the majority of the 
House, the power vested with the Governor under Art.174, to 
summon, prorogue and dissolve the House(!>) must be exercised in 
consonance with the aid and advice of
the Chief Minister and his 
Council of Ministers - In the above situation, he is precluded to 
take an individual call on the issue at his own will, or in his own 
discretion - In a situation where the Governor has reasons to believe, 
that the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers have lost the 
confidence of the House, it is open to the Governor, to require the 
Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers to prove their majority 
in the House, by a floor test - Only in a situation, where the 
Government in power on the holding of such floor test is seen to 
have lost the confidence of the majority, it would be open to the 
Governor to exercise the powers vested with him under Art.174 at 
his own, and without any aid and advice - Since it is not a matter of 
dispute, that the Governor never called for a floor test, it is 
reasonable to infer, that the Governor did not ever entertain any 
doubt, that the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers were 
still enjoying the confidence of the majority, in the House - Nor 
was a motion of no confidence moved against the Government - In
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
the above situation, the Governor just could not have summoned 
the House, by his order dated 9.12.20 I 5, in his own discretion, by 
preponing the 6
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" session of the Legislative Assembly ji·om 14.I.20I6 
to I6.I2.20I5. 
Art. I 74 - Historical background behind its enactn~ent -
Discussed -
Government of India Act, I935 -
s.62. (per 
Madan B. Lokw; J.) 
Art. I 79 - Power of Governor to remove Speaker/Deputy 
Speaker - Held: Issue of removal of the Speaker (or Deputy 
Speaker), squarely rests under the jurisdictional authority of the 
Members of the Legislative Assembly, who must determine at their 
own, whether the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker 
(or the Deputy Speaker) should be adopted or rejected - Neither 
the Chief Minister nor the Council of Ministers has any determinative 
role on the subject of removal of the Speaker/Deputy Speaker -
Their individual participation is limited to their individual vote either 
in favour or against the motion for the removal of the Speaker/ 
Deputy Speaker - Even that bit is not available to the Governor -
Therefore no direct or indirect role can be assumed by Governor 
under Art. I 79(c). 
Art. I 79(c) - Interpretation of expression "all the then 
members" - Held: Art. I 79(c) provides, that a Speaker (or Deputy 
Speaker), "may be removed ji·om his office by a resolution of the 
Assembly passed by a .majority of all the then members of the 
Assembly" -
The words "passed by a majority of all the then 
members", would prohibit the Speaker from going ahead with the 
disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule, as the same 
would negate the effect of the words "all the then members", after 
the disqualification of one or more MLAs from the House - Any 
change in the strength and composition of the Assembly, by 
disqualifying sitting MLAs, for the period during which the notice 
of resolution for the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker) 
is pending, would conflict with the express mandate of Art. I 79(c), 
requiring all "the then members" to determine the right of the 
Speaker to continue. (per Dipak Misra, J.) 
Art. I 79(c), first proviso - Interpretation of- Held: When there 
is an expression of intention to move the resolution to remove 
Speake1; it is requisite that he should stand the test and then proceed 
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- That is the intendment of Art.179(c) and the said interpretation 
serves the litmus test of sustained democracy founded on rule of 
law - It would be anathema to the concept of constitutional 
adjudication, if the Speaker is allowed to initiate proceedings under 
Tenth Schedule after intention to remove him from his office is moved 
- The fourteen days period being mandatory, the words "all the 
then members" gain importance. (per Dipak Misra, J.) 
Art.181 - Nature of participation of Speaker when the question 
of his removal arises - Discussed. (per Dipak Misra, J.) 
Office of Speaker - Held: Speaker has duty to see that 
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business of the House is carried out in a decorous and disciplined 
manner -
Importance of office of Speaker, discussed. (per 
Dipak Misra, J.J 
Art.356 - Scope of - Held: This Article provides an escape 
route to the Governor - Governor can make a report to the President 
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in the event there is a failure of constitutional machinery in the 
State - This escape route is available in case where the Governor 
dismisses a Government but the Government refuses to recognize 
the dismissal order.(per Madan B. Lokur, J.) 
Art.371-H - Scope of- Held: Art.371-H provides for the 
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Governor exercising his "individual judgment" in discharge of his 
functions relating to law and order in Arunachal Pradesh - Therefore, 
the exercise of individual judgment by the Governor of Arunachal 
Pradesh is permitted by the
Constitution, but is limited to issues of 
law and order only. (per Madan B. Lokur, J.) 
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Tenth Schedule, Paragraph 6 - Role of Governor in 
disqualification of members of the Assembly - Held: Governor has 
no role, in the disqualification of members of the Assembly - The 
·exclusive jurisdiction in this issue, rests with Speaker of the Assembly,· 
under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule - Whether Speakers 
actions fall within the framework of the Constitution, or otherwise, 
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does not fall within the realm of consideration of the Governor -
The remedy for any wrong doing under the Tenth Schedule, lies by 
way of judicial review - Neither the provisions of the Constitution 
nor the 'Conduct of Business Rules' assign any such role to the 
Governor - Judicial review. 
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Tenth Schedule - Power of Governor to interfere with the
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
functions of the Speaker - Held: It does not lie ·within the domain 
of the Governor, to interfere with the functions of the Speaker -
Governor is not a guide or mentor to _the Speaker - Governor cannot 
require the Speaker to discharge his functions in the manner he 
considers const~tutionally appropriate - Both the Governor and 
the Speaker have independent constitutional responsibilities. 
Tenth Schedule - Propriety of Speaker in conducting 
proceedings under the Tenth Schedule when his own position as 
the Speaker of Legislative Assembly is under challenge - Held: The 
constitutional purpose and constitutional har111ony would be 
maintained and preserved, if a Speaker refrains from adjudication 
of a petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, whilst 
his own position, as Speaker. is under challenge - This would also, 
allow the two provisions (Art.179(c), and the Tenth Schedule) to 
operate in their individual constitutional space, without encroaching 
on the other - Therefore, it would be constitutionally i111permissible 
for a Speaker to adjudicate upon disqualification petitions under 
the Tenth Schedule, while a notice of resolution for his own removal 
from the office of Speaker, is pending. 
Tenth Schedule - Power, position and the status of office of 
Speaker - Held: Speaker enjoys the power of constitutional 
adjudication - He is expected to 111aintain propriety as an 
adjudicator - Speaker
when functions as a tribunal has the 
jurisdiction/authority to pass adverse orders - Power which flows 
from the introduction of Tenth Schedule by constitutional amendment 
is required to be harmoniously construed with Art. J 79(c) - Both the 
provisions of the Constitution are meant to sub-serve the purpose 
of sustenance of democracy which is basic feature of the 
Constitution. (per Dipak Misra, J.) 
Tenth Schedule - Power of Deputy Speaker of Legislative 
Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh to set aside the order of the Speaker 
of the Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh by which the 
Speaker had disqualified fourteen 111e111bers of the Legislative 
Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh (including Deputy Speaker) under 
the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution - Held: Deputy Speaker 
had no authority to set aside the decision of the Speaker passed 
under the Tenth Schedule - Moreover, Deputy Speaker was himself 
disqualified from the membership of the Legislative Asse111bly by the 
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Speaker and he could certainly not set aside the order passed against 
him and in respect of which he would be beneficiary. 
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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: Constitution of India -
Guidelines for understanding the text, context, the words and the 
purpose of a constitutional provision - Discussed. 
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CONDUCT OF BUSINESS 
IN ARUNACHAL PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY: Role of 
Governor in terms of the Rules - Held: These Rules are ji-amed by 
Legislative Assembly in exercise of powers conferr:!d under Art.208 
- Even these Rules give the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh limited 
discretionary powers but more particularly so in the matter of 
summoning the Legislative Assembly - Constitution of India -
Art.208.(per Madan B. Lokur, J.) 
ARUNACHAL PRADESH RULES OF EXECUTIVE BUSINESS, 
1987: n:8, 14, 33 - Held: The Governor has no independent 
o · discretion or authority to summon the Legislative Assembly -
Constitution of India - Art.166. (per Madan B. Lokur, J.) 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 
PER .JAGDISH SINGH 
KHEHAR, .J.: 
1.1. Undoubtedly, all executive actions of the Government of a 
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State are expressed in the name of the Governor, under Article 
166. That, however, does not per se add to the functions and 
powers of the Governor. In the discharge of executive functions, 
the Governor of a State has the power to grant pardons, reprieves, 
respites or remissions of punishments or to suspend, remit or
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commute sentences (under Article 161). The Governor's power 
under Article 161, is undisputedly exercised on the aid and advice 
of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers. The Governor 
has power to frame rules for the convenient transaction of 
executive business of the Government, under Article 166. The 
instant responsibility is also discharged, on aid and advice. All in 
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all, it is apparent, that the Governor is not assigned any significant 
role in the executive functioning of the State. [Para 137] [172-C-
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1.2. The duties and responsibilities of the Governor in the 
legislative functioning of a State are incorporated in Part VI 
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Chapter Ill of the Constitution, which includes Articles 168 to
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
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AND OTHERS 
212. Even though Article Hi8 postulates, that the legislature of 
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a State would comprise of the Governor, yet the Governor is not 
assigned any legislative responsibility in any House(s) of the State 
Legislature, irrespective of whether it is the legislative process 
relating to Ordinary Bills or Money Bills. Insofar as the legislative 
process is concerned, the only function vested with the Governor · 8 
is expressed through Article 200 which inter a/ia provides, that a 
Bill passed by the State Legislature, is to be presented to the 
Governor for his assent. And its ancillary provision, namely, 
Article 201 wherein a Bill passed by the State Legislature and 
presented to the Governor, may be reserved by the Governor 
for consideration by the President. The only exception to the 
non-participation of the Governor in legislative functions, is 
postulated under Article 213 which apparently vests with the 
Governor, some legislative power. The Governor under Article 
213 can promulgate Ordinances, during the period when the 
House(s) of the State Legislature, is/are not in session. This 
function is exercised by the Governor, undisputedly, on the aid 
and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as 
the head. The Governor is also required to summon the House 
or Houses of State Legislature, or to prorogue or dissolve them 
under Article 17 4. Articles 178 to 187 deal with the officers of 
the
State Legislature, including the Speaker and the Deputy 
Speaker, as well as, the secretariat of the State Legislature. These 
Articles are on the subject of appointment and removal of the 
Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, as 
also, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Legislative 
Council, as well as, other ancillary matters. In neither of these 
Articles, the Governor has any assigned role. The only 
responsibility allocated to the Governor under Article 208, is of 
making rules as to the procedure with respect to communications 
between the two Houses of State Legislature. All in all, it is 
apparent, that the Governor is not assigned any significant role 
even in the legislative functioning of the State. [Para 137] [172-
E-H; 173-A-E) 
2. The scope and extent of the discretionary power of the 
Governor, is provided for through Article 163(1). Article 163(1) 
provides for the principle of ministerial responsibility. The 
Constituent Assembly debates, leave no room for any doubt, that 
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the framers of the Constitution desi.red to embody the general 
and basic principle, describing the extent and scope of the 
discretionary power of the Governor, in sub-article (1) of Article 
163, and not in sub-article (2) thereof. As regard the constitutional 
role of the Governor, in paragraph 4.2.14 of the Justice M.M. 
Punchhi Commission report, it was observed that in a very limited 
field, the Governor may exercise certain functions in his 
discretion, as provided in Article 163(1). The first part of Article 
163(1) requires the Governor to act on the advice of his Council 
of Ministers. There is, however, an exception in the latter part of 
the clause in regard to matters where he is by or under the 
Constitution required to function in his discretion. The expression 
"required" signifies that the Governor can exercise his 
discretionary powers only if there is a compelling necessity to do 
so. The inferences drawn in the Justice M.M. Punchhi 
Commission report are in consonance with the scheme of the 
functions and powers assigned to the Governor, with reference 
to the executive and legislative functioning of the State, and more 
particularly with reference to the interpretation of Article 163. 
Insofar as the exercise of discretionary powers vested with the 
Governor is concerned, the same is limited to situations, wherein 
a constitutional provision expressly so provides, that the 
Governor
should act in his own discretion. Additionally, a 
Governor can exercise his functions in his own discretion, in 
situations where an interpretation of the concerned constitutional 
provision, could not be construed otherwise. The finality 
expressed in Article 163(2) would apply to functions exercised 
by the Governor in his own discretion, as are permissible within 
the framework of Article 163(1), and additionally, in situations 
where the clear intent underlying a constitutional provision, so 
requires i.e., where the exercise of such power on the aid and 
advice, would run contrary to the constitutional scheme, or would 
be contradictorr in terms. [Paras 139, 140, 142) (174-E; 175-A-
B, E-G; 177-B-C; 178-A-B, DJ 
Mahabir Prasad Sharma v. Prafulla Chandra Ghose 
(1968) 72 C.W.N. 328; Pratapsinf( Raojirao Rane v. 
Governor of Goa AIR 1999 (Born.) 53 - Not correct 
law.
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
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AND OTHERS 
3.1. Interpretation of Section 174 - Power of summoning 
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Assembly. 
The draft Article 153 was renumbered as Article 174 of the 
Constitution. The most significant feature of draft Article 153 
was expressed in sub-article (3) thereof, wherein it was provided, 
that the functions of the Governor with reference to sub-clauses 
(a) and (c), namely, the power to summon and dissolve the House 
or Houses of the State Legislature " ... shall be exercised by him 
in his discretion." The words used in sub-article (3) of draft Article 
153, were in consonance with the requirements postulated under 
Article 163(1). Under Article 163(1), the Governor can exercise 
only such functions in his own discretion which he is expressly 
required, by or under the Constitution, to exercise in his 
discretion. The manner in which draft Article 153(3) was originally 
drawn, leave no room for any doubt, that the Governor would 
definitely have had the discretion to summon or dissolve the 
House or Houses of the State Legislature, without any aid or 
advice. After the debate, draft Article 153 came to be renumbered 
as Article 174. Article 174 reveals, that sub-article (3) contained 
in draft Article 153 was omitted. The omission of sub-article (3) 
of draft Article 153, is a matter of extreme significance, for a 
purposeful confirmation of the correct intent underlying the 
drafting of Article 174. The only legitimate and rightful
inference, 
that can be drawn in the final analysis is, that the framers of the 
Constitution altered their original contemplation, and consciously 
decided not to vest discretion with the Governor, in the matter 
of summoning and dissolving the House, or Houses of the State 
Legislature, by omitting sub-article(3), which authorized the 
Governor to summon or dissolve, the House or Houses of 
Legislature at his own, by engaging the words " .. shall be exercised 
by him in his discretion ... ". [Para 149) [180-H; 181-C-G] 
3.2. A Governor under the Constitution, is not an elected 
representative. A Governor is appointed by a warrant issued 
under the hand and seal of the President under Article 155, and 
his term of office enures under Article 156, during the pleasure 
of the President. A Governor is an executive nominee, and his 
appointment flows from the aid and advice tendered by the 
Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head, to the 
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President. The President, on receipt of the above advice, appoints 
the Governor. Likewise, the tenure of the Governor rightfully 
subsists, till it is acceptable to the Council of Ministers with the 
Prime Minister as its head, as the Governor under Article 156 
holds office, during the pleasure of the President. Such a nominee, 
cannot have an overriding authority, over the representatives of 
the people, who constitute the House or Houses of the State 
Legislature (on being duly elected from their respective 
constituencies) and/or even the executive Government 
functioning under the Council of Ministers with the Chief 
Minister as the head. 
[Para 150) [181-H; 182-B-C) 
3.3. In a situation where the Governor has reasons to 
believe, that the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers have 
lost the confidence of the House, it is open to the Governor, to 
require the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers to prove 
their majority in the House, by a floor test. Only in a situation, 
where the Government in power on the holding of such floor test 
is seen to have lost the confidence of the majority, it would be 
open to the Governor to exercise the powers vested with him 
under Article 17 4 at his own, and without any aid and advice. 
Since in the instant case, the Governor never called for a floor 
test, it is reasonable to infer, that the Governor did not ever 
entertain any doubt, that the Chief
Minister and his Council of 
Ministers were still enjoying the confidence of the majority, in 
the House. Nor was a motion of no confidence moved against the 
Government. In the above situation, the Governor jnst could 
not have summoned the House, by his order dated 9.12.2015, in 
his own discretion, by preponing the 6th session of the Legislative 
Assembly from 14.1.2016 to 16.12.2015. This, for the simple 
reason, that the Governor neither had the jurisdiction nor the 
power to do so, without the aid and advice of the Council of 
Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head. [Paras 153, 154) 
[185-F-H; 186-A-BJ 
4.1. Article 175 of the Constitution: Section 63 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935 was a precursor to Article 175. 
A perusal of Section 63 of the Act of 1935, reveals that sub-section 
(2) thereof had the words "in his discretion", incorporated therein, 
with reference to the scope and am bit of the Governor's
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
messages, to the Legislature. It is therefore apparent, that under 
the Act of 1935, the discretion to send messages to the 
Legislature, was clearly bestowed on the Governor, as he may 
consider appropriate, in his own wisdom. Article 175 has no such 
or similar expression. It is apparent, therefore, that the framers 
of the Constitution did not intend to follow the regimen, which 
was prevalent under Section 63 of the Act of 1935. It must have 
been for the above reason, that the Constituent Assembly framed 
Article 175, by excluding and omitting the discretion which was 
vested with the Governor, in the matter of sending messages, 
under the Government of India Act, 1935. [Para 159) [189-A-D] 
4.2. The Governor's messages with reference to matters 
(as were expressed in the message dated 9.12.2015), do not flow 
from the functions assigned to him. The Governor cannot likewise 
interfere in the activities of the Assembly, for the reason that the 
Chief Minister, or the entire Council of Ministers, or an individual 
Minister in the Cabinet, or for that matter even an individual 
MLA, are not functioning in consonance with the provisions of 
the Constitution, or in the best interest of the State. The State 
Legislature, does not function under the Governor. In sum and 
substance, the Governor just cannot act as the Ombudsman of 
the State Legislature. The messages addressed by the Governor 
to the Assembly, must
abide by the mandate contained in Article 
163(1), namely, that the same can only be addressed to the State 
Legislature, on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers 
with the Chief Minister as the head. The message of the Governor 
dated 9.12.2015, was therefore beyond the constitutional authority 
vested with the Governor. (Paras 161, 162) (190-G-H; 191-A-CJ 
5. The appointment of the Governor is made under Article 
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155, not by way of an electoral process, but by a warrant issued 
under the hand and seal of the President. The constitutional 
Governor, is to- hold his office under Article 156, during the 
pleasure of the President. Since the President exercises his 
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functions on the aid and advice of the Prime Minister and his 
Council of Ministers, the tenure of the office of the Governor 
has also to coincide with the aid and advice of the Prime Minister 
and his Council of Ministers. Insofar as the issue of the removal 
of the Speaker is concerned, the same would depend on the result 
H
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of the vote, on the notice of resolution for his removal. If the 
majority votes in favour of the motion, the resolution is liable to 
be adopted. Failing which, it is liable to be rejected. In the above 
situation, it is apparent, that neither the Chief Minister, nor the 
Council of Ministers, has any determinative role on the subject 
of removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker). Their 
individual participation is limited to their individual vote, either 
in favour or against the motion for the removal of the Speaker 
(or the Deputy Speaker). Even the above bit, is not available to 
the Governor. The Governor has no role whatsoever in the 
removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker). Therefore, no 
role direct or indirect can be assumed by the Governor, under 
Article 179(c). The assumption of such a role, and the fulfillment 
thereof by addressing a message to the Assembly under Article 
175, can only be ascribed as an ingenuity, without any constitutional 
sanction. In the above view of the matter, the impugned message 
of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, cannot be endorsed as 
constitutionally acceptable. [Paras 166, 167) (193-A-B, C-F] 
6.1. Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule inter alia postulates, 
that if a question arises, whether a member of the Legislative 
Assembly has become subject to disqualification, the adjudicatory 
role for determining the above question, will fall within the
exclusive authority of the Speaker; and in case of a member of 
the Legislative Council, solely on the shoulders of the Chairman. 
Sub-paragraph (2) of Paragraph 6, by a constitutional fiction, adopts 
all proceedings carried out by the Speaker or the Chairman under 
the Tenth Schedule, as proceedings of the State Legislature. It 
is apparent from the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, that no 
role whatsoever has been assigned to the Governor, in the matter 
of removal of a member of the Assembly/Council. In the above 
view of the matter, even where a petition is filed for 
disqualification of one or more MLAs under the Tenth Schedule, 
the Governor's direct or indirect participation in the same, is 
impermissible. Besides the fact that the Governor has no role 
whatsoever in the proceedings carried out under the Tenth 
Schedule, he cannot have any interest in the outcome of the 
disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule. The 
Governor can, therefore, never be concerned with the proceedings 
under the Tenth Schedule, one way or the other. Accordingly,
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
any exercise of authority by the Governor based on pending 
proceedings against members of the Legislative Assembly, under 
the Tenth Schedule, are clearly beyond his constitutional authority. 
[Paras 170, 171] [195-B-F.] 
6.2. When the position of a Speaker is under challenge, 
through a notice of resolution for his removal, it would "seem" 
just and appropriate, that the Speaker first demonstrates his right 
to continue as such, by winning support of the majority in the 
State Legislature. The action of the Speaker in continuing, with 
one or more disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule, 
whilst a notice of resolution for his own removal, from the office 
of Speaker is pending, would "appear" to be unfair. If a Speaker 
truly and rightfully enjoys support of the majority of the MLAs, 
there would be no difficulty whatsoever, to demonstrate the 
confidence which the members of the State Legislature, repose 
in him. The office of Speaker, with which the Constitution vests 
the authority to deal with disqualification petitions against MLAs, 
must surely be a Speaker who enjoys confidence of the Assembly. 
Article 179(c) provides, that a Speaker (or Deputy Speaker), "may 
be removed from his office by a resolution of the Assembly passed 
by a majority of all the then members of the Assembly". A notice 
of resolution for the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy 
Speaker) of the Assembly, would therefore,
have to be passed by 
a majority "of all the then members of the Assembly". The words 
"all the then members" were consciously added to Article 179(c), 
and their substitution was not accepted by the Constituent 
Assembly. The words "passed by a majority of all the then 
members of the Assembly", would prohibit the Speaker from 
going ahead with the disqualification proceedings under the Tenth 
Schedule, as the same would negate the effect of the words "all 
the then members", after the disqualification of one or more MLAs 
from the House. The words "all the then members", demonstrate 
an expression of definiteness. Any change in the strength and 
composition of the Assembly, by disqualifying sitting MLAs, for 
the period during which the notice of resolution for the removal 
of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker) is pending, would conflict 
with the express mandate of Article 179(c), requiring all "the 
then members" to determine the right of the Speaker to continue. 
[Para 173, 175] (196-F-H; 198-F-G; 199-A-C] 
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6.3. The Tenth Schedule was inserted in the Constitution, 
by the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, with 
effect from 24.4.1993. The purpose sought to be achieved 
through the Tenth Schedule, is clear and unambiguous. The same 
is unrelated to, and dist!nct from, the purpose sought to be 
achieved through Article 179(c). Neither of the above provisions, 
can be seen as conflicting with the other. Both, must therefore 
freely operate, within their individual constitutional space. Each 
of them will have to be interpreted, in a manner as would serve 
the object sought to be achieved, without treading into the 
constitutional expanse of the other. The interpretation would 
have to be such, as would maintain constitutional purpose and 
harmony. [Para 176) [199-D-E) 
6.4. If a Speaker survives the vote, on a motion for his 
removal from the office of Speaker, he would still be able to 
adjudicate upon the disqualification petitions filed under the Tenth 
Schedule. The process of judicial review, cannot alter the above 
position. But, if a disqualification petition is accepted by the 
Speaker, the disqualified MLAs will have no right to participate 
in the motion moved against the Speaker under Article 179(c). A 
disqualified MLA, can assail the order of his disqualification, by 
way of judicial review. If he succeeds, and his disqualification 
from the House is set aside, such a disqualified MLA,
would be 
deprived of the opportunity to participate in the motion against 
the Speaker, under Article 179(c). In this situation, the process 
of judicial review, can also alter the position, if a disqualification 
order passed by the Speaker, is set aside by a Court of competent 
jurisdiction. In the event of an MLA having been disqualified by 
the Speaker, the notice of resolution for the removal of the 
Speake1; would surely be dealt with, and will be disposed of, during 
the period when the concerned MLA stood disqualified. 
Alternatively, if an MLA has not been disqualified when the 
motion for the removal of the Speaker is taken up, he would have 
the right to vote on the motion pertaining to the removal of the 
0 
Speaker, whereafter, the petition for his own disqualification would 
H 
certainly be considered and decided, by the Speaker. It is 
apparent, that the difficulty arises only, if the disqualification 
petition is taken up first, and the motion for the removal of the 
Speaker is taken up thereafter. The possibility ofa disqualification
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
petition being decided on political considerations, rather than on 
merits, cannot be ignored. In fact, that is a real possibility. The 
constitutional purpose and constitutional harmony would be 
·maintained and preserved, if a Speaker refrains from adjudication 
of a petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, whilst 
his own position, as Speaker, is under challenge. This would 
also, allow the two provisions (Article 179(c), and the Tenth 
Schedule) to operate in their individual constitutional space, 
without encroaching on the other. For the reasons recorded, it 
would be constitutionally impermissible for a Speaker to adjudicate 
upon disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule, while a 
notice of resolution for his own removal from the office of Speaker, 
is pending. [Para 177, 178] [199-F-H; 200-A-D, G-H; 201-A) 
7.1. It is not within the realm of the Governor to embroil 
himself in any political thicket. The Governor must remain aloof 
from any disagreement, discord, disharmony, discontent or 
dissension, within individual political parties. The activities within 
a political party, confirming turbulence, or unrest within its ranks, 
are beyond the concern of the Governor. The action of the 
Governor, in bringing these factual position to the notice of the 
President, in his monthly communications, may well have been 
justified for drawing the President's attention to the political
scenario of the State. But, it is clearly beyond the scope of the 
Governor's authority, to engage through his constitutional 
position, and exercise his constitutional authority, to resolve the 
same. 
It is open to the Governor to take into consideration, 
views of a breakaway group. Under Paragraph 4 of the Tenth 
Schedule, legitimacy is bestowed on a breakaway group which 
comprises of not less than two thirds of the members of the 
concerned legislature party. In the present case, the breakaway 
group belonging to the ruling INC comprised of 21 members, 
whereas the INC had 47 MLAs in the prevailing 60-member 
Legislative Assembly. 21 MLAs belonging to the INC did not 
constitute a legitimate and recognizable breakaway group. The 
Governor could not in support of the protests and assertions of 
an invalid breakaway group, adopt a constitutional course, 
recourse whereof could be taken only in case of a constitutional 
crisis. As for instance, when the Government is seen to have 
lost the confidence of the House. It has never been the position 
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of the Governor, that the Chief Minister had lost the confidence 
of the House. Nor, that the INC could not sustain its majority in 
the Assembly. Had that been the position, the Governor would 
have called for a floor test. Admittedly, the Governor never called 
for a floor test, nor did he ever require the Chief Minister to 
establish his majority in the House. The Governor's actions, 
based on feuds and wrangles of a breakaway group, which is not 
recognized under the Tenth Schedule, cannot be constitutionally 
condescended. [Paras 191 and 192] [211-A-B, D, E-H; 212-A] 
7.2. There is no justification for a Governor to be disturbed 
about proceedings in connection with the disqualification ofMLAs 
under the Tenth Schedule. Because, the Governor has no role 
therein. Even the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers, 
have no concern with the disqualifkation proceedings 
contemplated under the Tenth Schedule. Therefore, the legitimacy 
or illegitimacy thereof, is beyond consideration of the Governor. 
That being the constitutional position, there can be no justification 
in the Governor initiating action, based on proceedings 
commenced against MLAs, under the Tenth Schedule. Any action 
taken by the Governor, based on the proceedings being carried 
on under the Tenth Schedule, would be a constitutional 
impropriety. It is open to individual MLAs, against whom 
disqualification proceedings are taken (or
who have been 
disqualified, and consequently have lost their membership of the 
House), to seek judicial review thereof. [Para 195] [212-E-H] 
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831: 
1975 (1) SCR 814; Sardari Lal v. Union of India (1971) 
1 SCC 411; PU Myllai Hlychho v. State of Mizoram 
(2005) 2 sec 92: 2005 (1) SCR 279; State of 
Meghalaya v. KA Brhyien Kurkalang (1972) 1 SCC 
148; Bhuri Nath v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (1997) 2 
SCC 745: 1997 (1) SCR 138; Samatha v. State of A.P. 
(1997) 8 sec 191: 1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305; Dr. 
Kashinath G Jalmi v. The Speaker (1993) 2 SCC 703:. 
1993 (2) SCR 820; B.P. Singhal v. Union of India 
(2010) 6 SCC 331; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 
3 SCC 1; Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah 
Chowdhary (1979) 3 SCC 324: 1979 (3) SCR 802; 
K.A. Mathialagan v. P. Srinivasan AIR 1973 (Madras)
NABAM REBlA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
371; State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang AIR 1969 SC 
903: 1969 SCR 478; Nipamacha Singh v. Secretary, 
Manipur Legislative Assembly AIR 2002 (Gauhati) 7; 
Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment v. State 
of Madhya Pradesh (2004) 8 SCC 788: 2004 (5) Suppl. 
SCR 1020; State of Gujarat v. Justice R.A. Mehta (2013) 
3 SCC 1: 2013 (1) SCR 1; Kesavananda Bharati v. 
State of Kera/a (1973) 4 SCC 25; State of Maharashtra 
v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (1982) 2 SCC 463; 
Rajendra Singh Verma v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi) 
(2011) 10 sec 1 - referred to. 
M.N Kaul and S.L. Shakdher - "Practice and Procedure 
of Parliament", (5th Edition), published by the Lok 
Sabha Secretariat - referred, to. 
PER DIPAK MISRA, J.: (SUPPLEMENTING) 
HELD: 1. Office of the Speaker in our history had its origin 
in 1921 when the Central Legislative Assembly was constituted 
under the Montague-Chelmsford reforms. At that time, office of 
the Speaker did not enjoy much importance. But, a significant 
one, after the Constitution came into force, as is evident from 
the constitutional scheme, the Speaker enjoys high constitutional 
status and the Constitution reposes immense faith in him. For 
this reason alone, the Speaker is expected to have a sense of 
elevated independence, impeccable objectivity and irreproachable 
fairness, and above all absolute impartiality. This expectation is 
the constitutional warrant; not a fond hope and expectation of
any individual or group. The Speaker has the duty to see that 
business of the House is carried out in a decorous and disciplined 
manner. This functioning requires him to have unimpeachable 
faith in the intrinsic marrows of the Constitution, constitutionalism 
and, "Rule of Law". The faith, should be a visible and apparent 
one. (Paras 9, 10] [218-B-E] 
2. Article 179(a) postulates that a Speaker or a Deputy 
Speaker of the Assembly shall vacate his office if he ceases to be 
a member of the Assembly. Article 179(b) deals with resignation 
from the office. In the case at hand, neither clause (a) nor clause 
(b) of Article 179 is attracted. In the obtaining fact situation,.the 
controversy pertains singularly to the understanding of clause (c). 
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Article 179(c) lays focus on two aspects, namely, (i) resolution of 
the Assembly, and (ii) the resolution to be passed by a majority of 
all the then members of the Assembly. The first proviso 
commands that no resolution for the purpose of clause (c) shall 
be moved unless fourteen days; notice has been given of the 
intention to move the resolution. The fourteen days' time as 
mandated by the constitutional provision gives protection to the 
Speaker. It has a salutary purpose. The Founding Fathers of the 
Constitution had thought it appropriate that a resolution to be 
moved for removal of the Speaker is a matter of grave 
constitutional consequence and, therefore, the "intention to move 
the resolution", has to precede the act of moving of the resolution. 
The Rules are framed under Article 208 of the Constitution for 
regulating the procedure of a House of the Legislature of a State 
and the conduct of its business and said procedures prescribe 
the manner of expressing the intention to move the resolution. 
While prescribing a resolution to be passed by the majority, the 
framers of the Constitution have also provided for "all the then 
members of the Assembly". It indicates the intention of the 
Founding Fathers that "all the then members of the Assembly" 
have to be regarded as to be the actual or real figure. [Paras 2, 
13, 14) [213-H; 214-A; 220-A-E) 
3.1. The fulcrum of the controversy is
"disqualification". 
Different disqualifications find mention under Article 191(1) of 
the Constitution. These contingencies are quite different than 
the situation enshrined under Article 191(2) which has been 
inserted by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985. 
The said sub-Article specifically refers to disqualification under 
the Tenth Schedule. Article 189 provides for voting in Houses, 
power of Houses to act notwithstanding vacancies and corum. 
Sub-Article (1) of Article 189 stipulates that save as otherwise 
provided in the Constitution, all questions at any sitting ofa House 
of the legislature of a State shall be determined by a majority of 
votes of the members present and voting, other than the Speaker 
or Chairman, or person acting as such. The said sub-Article also 
provides that Speaker or Chairman or person acting as such shall 
not vote in the first instance, but shall have and exercise a casting 
vote in the case of an equality of votes. The said sub-Article, 
thus, clearly states about the majority of votes of the members
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
present and voting and secondly, it empowers the Speaker to 
exercise his power of voting in case of equality of votes. In 
contradistinction to the same, Article 181 provides that Speaker 
or the Deputy Speaker not to preside while resolution for his 
1·emoval from office is under consideration and he is entitled to 
vote in the first instance on such resolution but not in the case of 
an equality of votes. Under the Constitution, the Speaker is 
entitled to take part in the proceedings and speak. Therefore, 
he is in a position to contest. 
Appreciating the scheme of the 
Constitution and especially keeping in view the language 
employed in the first proviso to Article 179(c) it is quite clear 
that it is the constitutional design that the Speaker should not do 
any act in furtherance of his interest till the resolution is moved. 
[Paras 15, 17, 18] [220-F-G; 223-A-G] 
3.2. Regard being had to the language employed in the 
Article 179 ( c) of the Constitution and the role ascribed to the 
Speaker under the Tenth Schedule, it is necessary that the 
Speaker as a tribunal has to have complete detachment and 
perceivable impartiality. When there is an expression of intention 
to move the resolution to remove him, it is requisite that he 
should stand the test and then proceed. That is the intendment 
of Article 179(c) and the said interpretation serves the litmus 
test of sustained democracy founded on Rule of Law;
and the 
founding fathers had so intended and the constitutional value, 
trust and morality unequivocally so suggest. It would be an 
anathema to the concept of constitutional adjudication, if the 
Speaker is allowed to initiate proceeding under the Tenth 
Schedule of the Constitution after intention to remove him from 
his office is moved. The fourteen days period being mandatory, 
the words "all the then members" gain more significance. The 
Constitution has confidence in the Speaker. Simultaneously, the 
command is to have the confidence of the majority of the "actual 
or real figure". This understanding is gatherable from the 
express provisions of the Constitution and it clearly brings in 
harmony between "constitutional confidence" or trust and the 
"constitutional control". [Para 21] [225-E-H; 226-A] 
State of Karnataka v. Union of India and another (1977) 
4 SCC 608: 1978 (2) SCR 1; S.R Chaudhuri v. State 
of Punjab and others (2001) 7 SCC 126: 2001 (1) 
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Suppl. SCR 621; M Nagaraj and others l~ Union of 
India and others (2006) 8 SCC 212: 2006 (7) Suppl. 
SCR 336; Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu and others 
(1992) 1 SCC 309; Manoj Narztla v. Union of India 
(2014) 9 SCC 1: 2014 (9) SCR 965 - relied on. 
B 
PER MADAN B. LOKUR, J.: (SUPPLEMENTING) 
HELD: 1.1. Article 163 of the Constitutiou traces its origins 
first to Section 50 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and then 
to Article 143 in the draft Constitution. Two important 
expressions find mention in Section 50 of the Government of 
c 
India Act, 1935 namely, "in his discretion" and "his individual 
judgment". These expressions are noticed in several Sections 
of the Government of India Act, 1935 and came up for discussion 
when Section 9 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (relating to 
the Council of Ministers) was discussed in the House of Commons 
on 281h February, 1935. In the debate, the view expressed by one 
D 
of the Members of Parliament was that the Governor-General 
acts "in his discretion" when he is not obliged to consult the 
Council of Ministers. On the other hand, he acts in "his individual 
judgment" when he consults the Council of Ministers but does 
not necessarily accept its advice. Thus it is clear that the 
E 
expression "his individual judgment" obliges the Governor to 
take the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers but he is not 
bound by that advice and may act in his judgment. After
Independence, there was no intention to permit the Governor to 
exercise any discretion or to take any decision in his individual 
judgment. This is clear from the India (Provisional Constitution) 
F 
Order, 1947 issued in exercise of powers conferred by Section 
9(1)(c) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Paragraph 3(2) of 
the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 explicitly deletes 
the expressions "in his discretion", "acting in his discretion" 
and "exercising his individual judgment" wherever they occur in 
G 
the Government of India Act, 1935. The expression "his individual 
judgment" did not find mention in Article 143 in the draft 
Constitution. This is as clear an indication that the framers of our 
Constitution did not intend that the Governor could disregard 
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. [Paras 7, 8, 12, 13, 
16] [227-H; 228-A, E-F; 229-A; 232-C-D, E-F; 234-D-E] 
H
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
1.2. The sum and substance of the historical background 
leading to Article 163 of the Constitution, as enacted, is this: (i) 
The Council of Ministers will aid and advise the Governor in the 
exercise of his functions. This is the first part of Article 163 (1) of 
the Constitution. The Governor then has two options - (a) To 
reject the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and act in 
"his individual judgment". This. is an illusory and non-existent 
option since the Constitution does not permit it. (b) To act on the 
aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. By default this is the 
only reai option available to him. (ii) If the exercise of function is 
beyond the purview of the aid and advice of the Council of 
Ministers but is by or under the Constitution, the Governor can 
act "in his discretion". Article 163(2) of the Constitution will have 
reference only to the last part of Article 163(1) of the Constitution 
and is not all-pervasive. If there is a break-down in 
communications between the Council of Ministers and the 
Governor (as imagined by Mr. Churchill), then the Governor will 
not have the benefit of the aid and advice of the Council of 
· Ministers. In that event, the Governor may "take the matter 
into his own hands and act freely." The break-down of 
communications was a possibility under the Government of India 
Act, 1935 since it was "in the main undemocratic" and there could 
be a
break-down of communications between the representative 
of His Majesty and the Council of Ministers. However, if such a 
situation were to arise today in independent India, namely, a 
break-down of communications between the Governor of a State 
and the Council of Ministers, it would be most unfortunate and 
detrimental to our democracy. In the unlikely event of a complete 
break-down of communications, the Preside~t can and must 
intervene to bring in constitutional order. [Paras 20, 21] [238-F-
G; 239-A-C] 
2. The historical background and the debates pertaining 
to Article 174 (and Article 85) of the Constitution lead to the 
conclusion that it is only the Governor who may summon the 
Legislative Assembly, but only on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers and not suo moto. In other words, the G~>Vernor cannot 
summon the Legislative Assembly "in his discretion". If the 
Governor disregards the advice of the Council of Ministers the 
pleasure of the President can be withdrawn since the Governor 
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3.1. The Justice Sarkaria Commission looked at Article 
163(1) of the Constitution in two parts, namely, the Governor 
exercising his discretion when required by the Constitution and 
when required under the Constitution. The exercise of discretion 
conferred by the Constitution would relate to an express provision 
of the Constitution (such as those relating to the Tribal Areas of 
Assam) or by necessary implication; while the latter expression 
would include the exercise of discretion from n11Ps and orders 
made under the Constitution. Given this interpretation, according 
to the Justice Sarkaria Commission, "The scope of discretionary 
powers has to be strictly construed, effectively dispelling the 
apprehension, if any, that the area for the exercise of discretion 
covers all or any of the functions to be exercised by the Governor 
under the Constitution. In other words, Article 163 does not give 
the Governor a general discretionary power to act against or 
without the advice of his Council of Ministers." The Justice 
Sarkaria Commission studied the Constitution and placed the 
functions of the Governor in four categories: i) The Governor 
acting in his discretion; (ii) The Governor acting in his individual 
judgment; (iii) The Governor acting in his discretion 
independently of the Council of Ministers. (iv) The Governor 
acting in his
discretion under the Constitution. (Paras 86, 87] 
[265-C-G] 
3.2. In March 2000, Justice Punchhi submitted a Report 
on Centre-State Relations. The broad mandate of the Commission 
was "to review the existing arrangements between the Union 
and States as per the Constitution of India in regard to powers, 
functions and responsibilities in all spheres. The Justice Punchhi 
Commission did not disagree with the Justice Sarkaria 
Commission on any issue relating to the functions and duties of 
the Governor. It must therefore be taken that the functions, 
duties and powers of the Governor by or under the Constitution 
are "cabined, cribbed, confined". However, if"discretion" is given 
a broad meaning as desired by the respondents and is given 
greater weightage than "his individual judgment" then there 
would be "saucy doubts and fears" of the arbitrary exercise of 
discretion by the Governor as has happened in the present case,
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
and other cases. First and foremost, it is important to note that 
the rules of procedure framed by the Legislative Assembly for 
regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business under 
Article 208 of the Constitution do not need anybody's approval, 
including that of the Governor of the State. The Rules of 
Procedure and Conduct of Business in Arunachal Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly ("the Rules") framed by the Legislative 
Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh in exercise of powers conferred 
by Article 208 of the Constitution carry forward the intention of 
the Constituent Assembly as well as the decisions of this Court 
to the effect that the Governot: is a constitutional or formal head 
not only of the Executive but, in some respects, also of the 
Legislature. The Rules give the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh 
limited discretionary powers, but more particularly so in the 
matter of summoning the Legislative Assembly. Rule 3 and 3A 
provides that the Governor can summon the Assembly only if 
the Chief Minister (in consultation with the Speaker) so advises 
him. There is no exception to this. However, Article 174 of the 
Constitution would be violated if the Chief Minister does not so 
advise the Governor to summon the Assembly for a period of six 
months, or if the Governor does not summon the Assembly 
despite the advice of the Chief Minister. As mentioned by Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru when the First Amendment to
the Constitution 
was discussed in Parliament, either the Chief Minister or the 
Governor (as the case may be) would have to bear the 
consequences of violating the Constitution. In matters pertaining 
to the Assembly, the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh has been 
given an additional 'discretionary power'. This is with regard to 
the election of the Speaker of the Assembly. Rule 7(1) of the 
Rules provides that when a new Assembly is constituted or there 
is a vacancy in the office of the Speaker and the election of the 
Speaker is necessary, the Governor shall fix a date for holding 
the election. To this extent the Governor has a role to play in the 
Assembly in his capacity as a constituent of the Legislature, as 
postulated by Article 168 of the Constitution. [Paras 100, 102, 
106, 107, 109, 110) [269-E-F; 270-D-E; 271-C-F; 272-E-H; 273-
AJ 
3.3. The Governor has yet another discretionary duty to 
perform which is when the office of the Speaker as well as the 
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Deputy Speaker is vacant, even when the Assembly is not a new 
Assembly. In that event the Governor has the discretionary duty 
to appoint a member of the Assembly as a Speaker. This is 
provided for in Article 180(1) of the Constitution as well as Rule 
8B of the Rules. Though summoning the Legislative Assembly 
might be an executive function of the Governor, that function can 
be exercised by him only after such a proposal is seen by the 
Chief Minister and sent to him. Reading this with the Rules of 
Procedure and Conduct of Business in Arunachal Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly, the Chief Ministt-r can make a proposal 
to the Governor for summoning the Legislative Assembly only 
in consultation with the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly who 
is, in a sense, the Master of the House. In other words, the 
Governor has no independent discretion or authority to summon 
the Legislative Assembly, in terms of the Rules of Procedure 
and Conduct of Business in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative 
Assembly framed under Article 208 of the Constitution or the 
Arunachal Pradesh Rules of Executive Business, 1987 framed 
under Article 166 of the Constitution to summon the Legislative 
Assembly in his discretion. In case the Chief Minister fails in hfs 
-duty to put forward a proposal before the Governor for summoning 
the Legislative Assembly or if the Governor does not accept the 
proposal of the Chief Minister of Arunachal
Pradesh for 
summoning the Legislative Assembly, necessary consequences 
will follow as mentioned in the debates in Parliament when the 
first amendment to the Constitution was considered. [Paras 111, 
121, 122) [273-C; 276-B-E] 
4. Article 371-H of the Constitution provides for the 
Governor exercising "his individual judgment" in the discharge 
of his functions relating to law and order in Arunachal Pradesh. 
Specifically, therefore, the exercise of individual judgment by the 
Governor of Arunachal Pradesh is permitted by the Constitution, 
but is limited to issues of law and order only. Under Arti~le 163(1) 
of the Constitution, the Governor is bound by the advice of his 
Council of Ministers. There are only three exceptions ["except 
in so far as"] to this: (i) The Governor may, in the exercise of his 
functions, act in his discretion as conferred by the Constitution; 
(ii) The Governor may, in the exercise of his functions, act in his
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
discretion as conferred under the Constitution; and (iii) The 
Governor may, in the exercise of his functions, act in his individual 
judgment in instances specified by the Constitution. [Paras 123, 
124, 125] [276-G; 277-G] 
5. Our Constitution expects all constitutional authorities 
to act in harmony and there must be comity between them to 
further the constitutional vision of democracy in the larger 
interests of the nation. It must be appreciated that no one is 
above the law and equally, no one is not answerable to the law 
and the debate on the First Amendment to the Constitution 
clearly indicates so. As is evident from our constitutional history, 
there are three areas in which a Governor might function: Areas 
in which he can act only on the aid and advice of the Council of 
Ministers. This is in all areas of the executive functions of the 
State Government [Article 166). Areas in which he can act in his 
discretion by or under the Constitution and in which he does not 
need to take the advice of the Council of Ministers [Article 163 
- "except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required 
to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion."] or, 
areas in which he might take the advice of the Council of Ministers 
but is not bound by it enabling him to act in his individual judgment 
by or under the Constitution. Areas that have no concern with 
the Constitution. For example, where
he is acting eo nomine. A 
distinction needs to be drawn between the relationship of the 
Governor vis-fl-vis the Executive and the relationship of the 
Governor vis-fl-vis the Legislature. Article 163 deals with the 
relationship of the first category and Article 174 (among others) 
deals with the relationship of the second category. [Paras 136, 
137] [282-D-H; 283-A-C] 
6. If the functions of the Governor were to be read as his 
power, and an untrammeled one at that (in view of Article 163 of 
the Constitution, as contended), then the Governor has the power 
27 
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to literally summon the Assembly to meet "at such time and place 
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as he thinks fit" that is in any city and at any place other than the 
Legislative Assembly building and at any odd time. This is nothing 
but arbitrary and surely, an arbitrary exercise of power is not 
what our Constitution makers either contemplated in the hands 
of the Governor or imagined its wielding by any constitutional 
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authority. In dealing with the situation in Arunachal Pradesh, the 
Governor was obliged to adhere to and follow the constitutional 
principle, that is, to be bound by the advice of the Council of 
Ministers. In the event that advice was not available and 
responsible government was not possible, the Governor could 
have resorted to the "breakdown provisions" and left it to the 
President to break the impasse. The Governor had the advice of 
the Council of Ministers but chose to ignore it; he assumed (well 
before the advice was tendered) that the advice would be such 
that he might not be bound by it; the Governor, despite being the 
'first citizen' of the State, chose to take no steps to break the 
impasse caused by a collapse of communications between him 
and the Chief Minister; finally, the Governor took no steps to 
resort to the breakdown provisions and obtain impartial advice 
from the President. Instead, the Governor acted in a manner 
opposed to the rule of law and, therefore, arbitrarily and in a 
manner that certainly surprises "a sense of juridical propriety". 
[Para 139, 146] [284-B-C; 287-E-H] 
7. The Governor had yet another option available to him -
to invoke what is referred in Canada as the "confidence 
convention" in which "the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are 
responsible to, or must answer to, the House of Commons for 
their actions and must enjoy the support and the confidence of a
majority of the Members of that Chamber to remain in office." If 
the Governor had any doubt about the continuance of a responsible 
government as a result of the shenanigans that were going on in 
Arunachal Pradesh at the relevant time, he could very well have 
required the Chief Minister to prove that he had the confidence 
of the Assembly, but he chose not to exercise this option also. In 
other words, all possible constitutional options were unilaterally 
discarded and disregarded by the Governor in summoning the 
Assembly to meet on l61h December, 2015 and cancelling the 
session fixed for 141h January, 2016. The actions of the Governor 
were certainly not in the language of the law or the spirit of 
parliamentary democracy and responsible government. In these 
circumstances, it must be held that the Governor's unilateral act 
of summoning the Assembly is unconstitutional. [Para 147] [288-
A-D]
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
29 
AND OTHERS 
8. Relations between the Governor, the Executive and the 
A 
Legislature 
8.1. The issue may also be looked at from an entirely different 
perspective based on the provisions of the Constitution. Article 
158 of the Constitution provides that the Governor shall not be a 
Member of Parliament or of a State Legislature and if such a 
Member is appointed as a Governor, he shall be deemed to have 
vacated his seat in the House when he enters upon his office as 
Governor. This is significant since it insulates the Legislature 
from the Governor. Article 164 of the Constitution provides for 
the appointment of the Chief Minister of the State by the Governor 
and the appointment of other Ministers on the advice of the Chief 
Minister. The appointment of the Chief Minister is based on the 
postulate that he commands or is expected to command the 
support of a majority of Members of the Legislative Assembly. 
Therefore, it is not as ifthe Governor has untrammeled discretion 
to nominate anyone to be the Chief Minister of a State. Similarly, 
if the Governor chooses to 'withdraw his pleasure' in respect of 
a Minister he must exercise his discretion with the knowledge 
of the Chief Minister and not by keeping him in the dark or 
unilaterally. Article 165 of the Constitution deals with the 
appointment of the Advocate General for the State. He is appointed 
by the Governor and holds office during the pleasure of the
Governor and receives such remuneration as the Governor may 
determine. The purpose of all these provisions is to indicate that 
the discretion given to the Governor is not all-pervasive or all-
encom passing. Article 166 of the Constitution provides that all 
executive action of the Government shall be expressed to be 
taken in the name of the Governor, orders and instruments shall 
be executed in the name of the Governor and the Governor shall 
make rules for the more convenient transaction of business of 
the Government and allocation of business among the Ministers 
"in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor 
is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion." 
This clearly has reference to Article 163 of the Constitution and 
must be understood as meaning that framing the rules under 
Article 166(3) of the Constitution is not the discretion of the 
Governor but an executive exercise undertaken by the Council 
of Ministers. Article 167 of the Constitution relates to the duty 
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A 
of the Chief Minister of a State to communicate the decisions of 
the Council of Ministers to the Governor and furnish information 
to the Governor. Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution is, 
therefore, quite compact and delineates the relations between 
the Executive and governance of the State. [Paras 148, 149, 150] 
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[288-D-E, F-G; 289-B-D, E-H; 290-A-BJ 
8.2. Amongst others, Article 174 of the Constitution 
provides that the Governor shall summon the Legislative 
Assembly from time to time and may prorogue and dissolve the 
Legislative Assembly. Summoning the House was described by 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in the debate on 16'h May, 1951 on the 
First Amendment to the Constitution as "an indirect duty" of the 
President. He went on to say that by the President, he meant the 
government of the day. Applying this to Article 174 of the 
Constitution, the Governor is obliged to perform this indirect 
duty. Since this indirect duty is executive in character, it cannot 
be performed except on the aid and advice of the Council of 
Ministers so as to avoid a "futile operation" and subject to the 
procedure mentioned in the Rules referred to above. Addressing 
the House under Article 175(1) of the Constitution or making a 
special address under Article 176 of the Constitution would also 
be executive functions performed by the Governor on the aid 
and advice of the Council of Ministers. Sending a message to
the 
House under Article 175(2) of the Constitution might not strictly 
be an executive function but would fall in a separate category 
altogether which might be described as having a quasi-executive 
or quasi-legislative flavour. This entitlement specifically provided 
for in the Constitution is exercised by the Governor as a 
constituent of the Legislature and therefore not traceable to the 
aid and advise of the Council of Ministers. [Paras 152, 153] [290-
E-G; 291-A-C] 
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. The State of Punjab 
1955 2 SCR 225 - relied on. 
9. There are other executive functions that a Governor is 
required to perform with respect to the Legislature. If the 
provisions of Article 163 of the Constitution are read into all other 
executive functions relatable to the Legislature and the exercise 
of discretion of the Governor cannot be questioned then the
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS 
Legislature could and would be dominated by the Governor -
something completely unthinkable in a parliamentary democracy, 
where the Governor cannot dominate the Executive but could 
dominate the Legislature. Except in specified matters, executive 
functions of the Governor whether relating to governance issues 
or issues pertaining to the Legislature are required to be 
performed by him on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers 
and the Rules framed by the House. The only discretion available 
to the Governor under Article 163 of the Constitution is in respect 
of matters provided for by or under the Constitution not relatable 
to the Council of Ministers and the Judiciary. The Speaker gave 
a notice to fourteen members of the Legislative Assembly on 71h 
December, 2015 requiring them to show cause why they should 
not be disqualified under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. 
Thereafter, by an order dated 15'h December, 2015 the Speaker 
disqualified them from their membership in the Legislative 
Assembly. The correctness of this order and the procedure 
followed has now been decided by the Gauhati High Court and 
the correctness of that decision is not before this Court. The 
Deputy Speaker passed an order on 151h December, 2015 inter 
alia, on the ground that the Speaker lacked the competence to 
pass the disqualification order and that he had nqt followed the 
constitutional and legal procedures.
He had had lost his 
.competence to pass the disqualification order since a notice of 
his removal dated 19'h November, 2015 was pending and was to 
come up before the 
Legislative Assembly on 16'h December, 
2015. 
In passing his order of 15'h December, 2015 the Deputy 
Speaker purported to derive his power from the message given 
by the Governor to the Legislative Assembly on 9th December, 
2015 requiring the Deputy Speaker to conduct the proceedings 
of the House on the resolution for removal of the Speaker. The 
Deputy Speaker was to preside over the House on 16'h December, 
2015. He certainly had no derivative power from the message of 
the Governor dated 9'h December, 2015 to take over the functions 
of the Speaker or to sit in judgment over the decision of the 
Speaker of 15'h December, 2015. Even the Speaker does not have 
the power to review the decision taken by him under the Tenth 
Schedule of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, there 
is absolutely no question of the Deputy Speaker setting aside 
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the order of the Speaker passed under the Tenth Schedule of the 
Constitution. The Deputy Speaker was himself disqualified from 
the membership of the Legislative Assembly by the Speaker and 
he could certainly not have set aside the order passed against 
him and in respect of which he would be the beneficiary. [Paras 
154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163) [291-C, D-E, G-H; 292-A, G-H; 
293-A-D, E-G] 
MP. Special Police Establishment v. State of MP. (2004) 
8 sec 788: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 1020; Kihoto 
Hollohan v. Zachillhu 1992 Supp.(2) SCC 651: 1992 
(1) SCR 686; Kashinath Jalmi v. Speaker (1993) 2 
SCC 703: 1993 ( 2) SCR 820 - relied on. 
Mahabir Prasad Sharma v. Prafulla Chandra Ghose 
(1968) 72 CWN 328; Pratapsingh Raojirao Rane v. 
Governor of Goa AIR 1999 Bombay 53 - Not correct 
law. 
State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang 1969 1 SCR 478; 
Pema Khandu v. The Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly MANU/GH/0118/2016 [decided 
on 30th March, 2016; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab 
(1974) 2 SCC 831: 1975 (1) SCR 814; Sardari Lal v. 
Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 411 ; Sardari Lal and 
Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana (1964) 5 SCR 
29; Pu Myllai Hlychho v. State of Mizoram (2005) 2 
SCC 92: 2005 (1) SCR 279; State of Gujarat v. R.A. 
Mehta (2013) 3 SCC 1: 2013 (1) SCR 1; UN.R. Rao v. 
Indira Gandhi (1971) 2 SCC 63: 1971 (0) Suppl. SCR 
46; S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC 
126: 2001 (1)
Suppl. SCR 621- referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
Per Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.: 
1975 (1) SCR 814 
referred to 
Para 43 
(1971) 1 sec 411 
referred to 
Para 43 
2005 (1) SCR 279 
referred to 
Para 46 
2905 (1) SCR 279 
referred to 
Para 46 
1997 (1) SCR 138 
referred to 
Para 46 
1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305 
referred to 
Para 46 
1993 (2) SCR 820 
referred to 
Para 53 
(201Q) 6 sec 331 
referred to 
Para 95
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
33 
AND OTHERS 
(1994) 3 sec 1 
referred to 
Para 96 
A 
1979 (3) SCR 802 
referred to 
Para 98 
AIR 1973 (Madras) 371 
referred to 
Para 99 
AIR 1999 (Born.) 53 
referred to 
Para 99 
1969 SCR 478 
referred to 
Para 101 
AIR 2002 (Gauhati) 7 
referred to 
Para 101 
B 
2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 1020 
referred to 
Para 114 
2013 (1) SCR 1 
referred to 
Para 114 
(1968) 72 C.W.N. 328 
Not correct law Para 144 
AIR 1999 (Born.) 53 
Not correct law Para 144 
(1973) 4 sec 2s 
referred to 
Para 118 
(2011) 10 sec 1 
referred to 
Para 124 
c 
(1982) 2 sec 463 
referred to 
Para 124 
Per Dinak Misrai J.: 
1978 (2) SCR 1 
relied on 
Paras 
2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 621 
relied on 
Para6 
D 
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 
relied on 
Para 7 
(1992) 1 sec 309 
relied on 
Para 19 
2014 (9) SCR 965 
relied on 
Para 20 
-~ 
Per Madan B. Lokuri J.: 
1955 2 SCR 225 
relied on 
Para 41 
E 
(1968) 72 CWN 328 
Not correct law Para 45 
1969 1 SCR 478 
referred to 
Para 51 
1975 (1) SCR 814 
referred to 
Para 62 
(1971) 1 sec 411 
referred to 
Para 62 
(1964) 5 SCR 29 
referred to 
Para 70 
F 
AIR 1999 Bombay 53 
Not correct law Para 72 
2004 (5) Suppl. SCR1020 
relied on 
Para 78 
2005 (1) SCR 279 
referred to 
Para 81 
2013 (1) SCR 1 
referred to 
Para 82 
1971 ( 0) Suppl. SCR 46 
referred to 
Para 144 
2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 621 
referred to 
Para 145 
G 
1992 (1) SCR 686 
relied on 
Para 145 
1993 ( 2) SCR 820 
relied on 
Para 162 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal Nos. 6203-
6204of2016. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.01.2016 of the High Court 
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of Gauhati in W. P. (C) No. 7745 of 2015 and W. P. (C) No. 7998 of 
2015. 
Fali S. Nariman, Kapil Sibal, Vivek Tankha, Ashok Desai, 
Subramonium Prasad, T. R. Andhyarujina, Satya Pal Jain, Ram 
Jethmalani, Sr. Advs., Arunabh Chaudhary, Ms. Heena Khan, Subhash 
Sharma, Vaibhav Tomar, G. Panmei, Ankur Chawla, Nizam Pasha, Ms. 
Kanika Singh, Ms. Megha Gupta, Ashish Jha, Samir Malik, D. Kumanan, 
Varun K. Chopra, Sachin Pujari, Parth T. (for Sarvesh Singh Baghel), 
Raj iv Dalal, Ashmeet Singh, Anmol Chandan, Mrs. Deepika Kalia, Abhay 
Kumar, Tenzing Tsering, Ms. Meha Aggarwal, Aditya Singh Bhakti, 
Vardhan Singh, Vikas Singh Ja11gra, Vikramjit Banerjee, Amit Kumar 
Pathak, Siddharth Sijoria, Soumik Ghosal, Ms. Madhavi Divan, Ms. Nidhi 
Khanna, Jayant Mohan, Advs. for the appearing parties. 
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by 
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. I. Leave granted. 
2. The 5th session of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative 
Assembly (hereinafter referred to as, the Assembly/House) was 
concluded on 2 I .10.2015. On 3.11.2015, the Governor issued an order 
summoning the 6th session of the Assembly, to meet on 14.1.20 I 6 in the 
Legislative Assembly Chamber at Naharlagun. The instant order was 
passed by the Governor, on the aid and advice of the Chief Minister, and 
in consultation with the Speaker of the House. The 6th session of the 
House was preponed by the Governor from 14.1.2016 to 16.12.2015,
by 
an order dated 9.12.2015 indicating imer alia the manner in which the 
proceedings of the House should be conducted. In its support, the 
Governor issued a message on 9.12.2015. These actions of the Governor, 
according to learned senior counsel for the appellants, demonstrate an 
extraneous and inappropriate exercise of constitutional authority. The 
above order and message of the Governor, without the aid and advice of 
the Council of Ministers and the Chief Minister, constitute the foundation 
of the challenge raised by the appellants. 
3. When hearing in these appeals commenced, the impression 
given out was, that the sequence of facts relating to the affairs of the 
House and the MLAs, by itself wquld be sufficient to establish, that 
constitutional responsibilities were exercised in such manner, as would 
be sufficient for this Court to strike down the same. The same position 
was espoused on behalf of the respondents, who also advocated that the 
factual back~round, would establish the legal and constitutional validity 
\
NABAM REBIA, AND BA.MANG fELJI){ v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
35 
AND OTHERS t1AGDISH SffiGH KHEHAR, J.] 
of the Governor's actions. And also, that the Governor had passed the 
A 
impugned order, and issued the impugned message, bona fide. The 
narration of facts, therefore assumes significance. 
The foundation of the appellants case: 
The first sequence of facts: 
4. 
In order to project the correct narrative (as per the 
understanding, of learned counsel, representing the appellants), towards 
highlighting the factual position, it was urged, that the political posturing 
in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, commenced after the Governor -
Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa assumed charge on 1.6.2015. 
5. It was suggested, that when the Governor assumed office, 
there was a brewing discord amongst members of the ruling Indian 
National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the INC). Only a few 
days after the Governor took over charge, the President of the Arunachal 
Pradesh Congress Committee - Padi Richo addressed his first 
communication to theChiefMinister-Nabam Tuki (on 18.6.2015), inviting 
his attention to reports received from party workers, regarding breach 
of party discipline. On the same lines, another letter was addressed by 
the party President, to the Chief Minister on 1.9.2015. The text of the 
same is extracted hereunder: 
"In reference to my earlier letter no.nil dated 18/6/2015 in 
connection with repo11s received from party workers regarding 
breach of discipline by some of the
Congress legislators by their 
active involvement in anti-party activities, which has been seriously 
viewed by the AICC and APCC. But despite of that, it has been 
reported by party functionaries and workers that some of the 
congress legislators are still actively indulging in indiscipline and 
various anti-party activities. 
Therefore, all the Congress legislators are requested to refrain 
themselves from indulging in such anti-party activities and maintain 
paify discipline." 
6. It was submitted, that strenuous efforts were ongoing, to quell 
the intra-party dissidence. It was asserted, that resignation letters of 
two MLAs belonging to the INC - Wanglam Sawin and Gabriel D. 
Wangsu were accepted on 6.10.2015, whereupon, they stood removed 
from the House. The details of the ongoing disruptive activities within 
the Congress Legislature Party, as also, the involvement of the Governor, 
was sought to be demonstrated, by placing reliance on two further 
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communications, the first of which (dated 11.10.2015), was addressed 
by the removed MLAs, to the Governor. A relevant part of the same, is 
reproduced hereunder: 
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"Sub: Commission of an enquiry into the forceful resignation. 
Your Ex_cellency, 
With great pain and indignation, we the undersigned Members of 
Legislative Assembly of the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative 
Assembly would like to apprise your benign authority about some 
disturbing, degraded and inglorious conduct of the leader of the 
Congress Legislative Party-cum-incumbent Chief Minister and 
his supporters for favour of your kind information and necessary 
action please; 
Your Excellency, on 14111 Sept 2015 at around 5 pm, we were 
repeatedly informed through phone calls requesting us to join "a 
get-together dinner party", purportedly on the invitation of Mr. 
Mama Natung, HMLA, at his residence at Senki View area, 
Itanagar. Some 18 MLA colleagues from the Congress Party 
visited his residence for the dinner but were instead asked to join 
an informal discussion on the prevailing political crisis faced by 
the Congress led State Government under the ChiefMinistership 
of Mr. Nabam Tuki. All members participated in the discussion 
which revolved around support for Mr. Tuki and further the issue 
of initiating actions against any member not adhering to the decision 
to be loyal to Tuki was discussed. Also it was decided to form a 
group of
'like-minded' legislators and accordingly formed S-18 or 
Super-18, besides forming one Action Committee tasked to take 
necessary actions against those MLAs who do not abide by the 
decisions takenjointly by the group. Thereafter, we had our dinner 
and left. 
Your Excellency, on l 61h September' 2015, we were informed by 
Mr. Nyamar Karbak, MLA who was the coordinator of S-18 to 
join a dinner party at the official residence of Hon'ble Chief 
Minister Mr. Nabam Tuki. Like the other day, this time also 17 of 
us went together to attend the dinner hosted by the Chief Minister 
which amongst other included, i) Gabriel D.Wangsu, ii) Mr. 
Wanglarri Sawin, iii) Phurpa Tsering, iv) Mr. Jam bey Tashi, v) Mr. 
TirongAboh, vi) Mr. Dikto Yikar, vii) Mr. Mama Natung, viii) Mr. 
Pani Taram, ix) Mr. Nikh Kamin, x)-Mr. Nyamar Karbak, xi) Mr.
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
37 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Bamang Felix, xii) Mr. Techi Kaso, xiii) Mr. Tatung Jamoh, xiv) 
A 
Mr.Alo Libang, xv) Mr. Tapuk Taku, xvi) Kumsi Sidisow, xvii) 
Mrs. Karya Bagang. 
Like the preceding night, some of the MLAs like Mr. Nyamar 
Karbak, Mr. Bamang Felix, Mr. Mama Natung and Mr. Nikh 
Kamen suddenly started discussion on the political matter and 
8 
requested 17 of us to support Tuki and to protect his leadership 
from being ousted by the dissident group of the party. Most of us 
participated in the said discussion though reluctantly with certain 
reservations in our mind and heart. The gathering instead of being 
a dinner party was turning more into a political meeting and some 
MLAs, to our anxiety and panic, aggressively tried to persuade 
C 
and prevail upon us thereby, putting all of us in a very stressful 
and awkward situation. There was little room left for further 
discussion or dissent. 
Thereafter. some of our MLA colleagues came up with a strange 
proposal to sign and submit irrevocable resignation letter in the 
hand of HCM to show our loyalty to his leadership. We were 
baffled and dumbstruck by hearing the undemocratic. dangerous 
and inappropriate proposition placed before us by him. All of us 
were confused and couldn't gather the courage to protest against 
the said proposal in the presence of the CM, Speaker of the 
Assembly and PCC president. Then some of the loyalists of Mr. 
Tuki
namely Nyamar Karbak and Bamang Felix holding ready 
and prepared stereotype resignation letters in their hands came to 
us and handed over to each of us and asked us to put our signatures. 
The whole drama took place in presence of Mr. Nabam Tuki, CM 
and Mr. Padi Richo, President, Pradesh Congress Committee and 
putting us in strained mental torment and duress compelled us to 
hurriedly sign the resignation letter without even reading the content 
thereon, against our will and against the spirit of democracy. After 
getting us to sign the papers they collected the same and handed 
over to the Chief Minister Mr. Nabam Tuki. 
Furthermore, we were given strict instruction and direction not to 
mention the date in our signatures. And just before the dinner, 
after concluding the meeting and signing of the resignation letters, 
surprisingly Speaker Nabam Rebia to arrived and joined in the 
dinner party at the CM's official residence. Soon thereafter a 
group namely 'S-1 S'was formed in the Whatsapp. However, both 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
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of us were removed from the group on 6
1h October 2015. 
Now under the above circumstances, we would like to inform 
you that those resignation letters were signed by all 17 of us under 
complete duress having obtained illegally and wrongfully. In this 
regard, the following arguments may be taken into considerations; 
i) That we were invited to attend an informal dinner party hosted 
by the HCM for 17 of us. It was neither a CLP meeting nor a 
party meeting to discuss politics as only 17 ofus were invited for 
the dinner at the official bungalow of the HCM. It is equally true 
that we were invited for a dinner and not for signing our own 
resignation letters. 
ii) That none of us could muster the courage and spirit to protest 
the unholy and vicious agenda of the HCM that too in his presence 
and that of the Speaker, both holding high constitutional posts, and 
President, PCC. 
iii) That all the resignation letters signed by us were stereotype or 
identical copies of one single letter which speaks volume about 
the dishonest intention of the HCM, Speaker and his supporters 
as he was ready with the resignation letters which again established 
that everything was planned before hand with the help and support 
of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly to obtain our signatures 
in the resignation letters by hook or crook and insti II fear in our 
mind. Invitation to the dinner party was only a ploy to trap us
in 
the larger game plan to secure the Chief Ministerial Chair. 
iv) These disgracing, undemocratic and unethical action has brought 
disgrace to the benign office of the Chief Minister and the Speaker 
as their conduct are completely unbecoming of a Chief Minister 
as well as for holding the prestigious and dignified chair of the 
Speaker. Their illegal and wrongful act of obtaining our signatures 
by putting us in duress is nothing but criminalization of politics and 
brute murder of democracy and its values and principles for their 
vested personal interest which is punishable under relevant law 
of the land. 
v) !fan elected representative is not allowed to take any decision 
out of his conscience and free will it tantamounts to murder of the 
very basic fabric of democracy which will bear negative impact 
in overall contribution to the state's governance, and above all 
that would be murder of democracy.
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
vi) The reason quoted in the resignation letter is also highly 
inconceivable and ludicrous. How could any elected representative 
including us after being elected by the people would tender the 
resignation on such irrational, unjust and unfounded ground. 
Your Excellency, vide our letter dated 01-10-2015 addressed to 
the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly which we had submitted 
to the office of the Speaker on 05-10-2015 before noon. we have 
elucidated the facts and circumstances under which our signatures 
in the resignation letters were obtained on 16-09-2015 at the official 
bungalow of CM and that the same was obtained under duress 
against our consent and free will, therefore requested the Speaker 
not to accept the resignation letter and to treat the same as invalid, 
null and void until and unless we come in person to submit the 
resignation letters. 
However, ironically, after submission of our letter, it came to our 
knowledge that the Speaker had without following the provisions 
as enshrined in Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution and Rule 
200(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the 
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly had purp01iedly issued 
a notification dated 01-10-2015 accepting our resignation and 
declaring our respective seats to have fallen vacant. The said 
notification was published in the evening of 05-10-2015 only 
immediately after
submission of our withdrawal letters to the 
Speaker. 
Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution reads as follows; 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
Rule 200(3) of the Business Rules reads as follows; 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
Thus, the abovementioned provisions casts an obligation on the 
Speaker to make inquiry regarding the voluntariness and 
genuineness of the resignation letters when the resignation letters 
are not submitted in person but since the Speaker himself is a 
party to the whole episode playing hand in glove with the CM, 
therefore, he choose to do away with the laid provisions of the 
law. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
Your Excellency, since the notification dated 01-10-2015 was 
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issued by the Speaker without following the established principles, 
therefore we had approached the Hon'ble Gauhati High Cout1 
challenging the said notification vi de WP (C) No.6193/2015. The 
Hon 'ble Gauhati High Court after considering the whole facts 
and circumstances of the case was inter-al ia pleased to stay the 
operation of the impugned notification dated 01-10-2015 vide order 
dated 07-10-2015. The Hon'ble Court further observed that prima-
facie the requirement of Rule 200(3) of the Procedure and Conduct 
of Business and the incorporated proviso to A11icle 190(3 )(b) of 
the Constitution do not seem to have been complied and directed 
the Election Commission not to take any action on the basis of the 
said notification. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
Your Excellency, along with us, 15 other MLAs had also signed 
the resignation letters and handed over the same to the CM in the 
presence of the PCC Chief, but why only our resignation letters 
were entertained and accepted by the Speaker. What happened 
to the other resignation letters signed by 15 other MLAs? Why 
no action has been taken till date on the resignation letters of 
other 15 MLAs who till date has not withdrawn their resignation 
letters? 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
We, therefore, request your Excellency to look into the issue 
seriously to uneatth the unholy nexus between the Chief Minister, 
the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and PCC, President. 
And
why the Chief Minister has adopted such wrongfol and illegal 
means to obtain the resignation letters from us, and what compelled 
him for such a criminal act is the million dollar question. 
In view of the above facts and circumstances, it is our humble 
requestto your august office to immediately enquire into the whole 
resignation incident through independent investigating agency like 
CBI because both the culprits are holding high constitutional posts, 
i.e. Chief Minister and Speaker and there cannot be free: and fair 
investigation, iif conducted by the State Investigation agency and 
take stringent wction against all the persons involved in the whole 
crime by booki1ng each and everyone under appropriate provision 
of law."
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
According to learned counsel, it is shocking and distressing, that the 
above letter should have been addressed to the Governor, who has no 
role in intra-party affairs. The above letter and inferences, according to 
learned counsel, were suggestive of political motivation. The second 
communication dated I I.I 0.2015 was addressed (to the Governor) by 
20 MLAs of the INC, jointly with two Independent MLAs. A relevant 
extract of the instant communication is reproduced below: 
"Sub: Complaint against the policy of absolutism of the Chief 
Minister. 
Your_ Excellency, 
We the incumbent MLAs of INC party amongst them some are 
sitting Ministers in the present ruling dispensation of the State 
being perturbed and disillusioned with the current dismal and grim 
state of affairs of the State Government and the tyrannical style 
of incumbent Chief Minister Shri Nabam Tuki in running the 
government would with profound veneration most humbly like to 
state the following few lines for favour of your perusal and 
necessary appropriate action; 
His Excellency, it has been learnt through the print media that the 
Chief Minister _is contemplating to literally drop four veteran, 
experienced and highly regarded leaders like i) Mr. Chowna Mein, 
Agriculture Minister, ii) Mr. Kamlung Mossang, Food & Civil 
Supply Minister, iii) Mr. Kumar Wai, Cooperation Minister and 
Mr. Wanglin Lowangdong. Social
Welfare Minister from the council 
of Minister without articulating any cogent reasons either implicit 
or explicit for taking such a drastic and unpleasant measure at 
this particular junction when the State is experiencing acute 
financial crisis having occasioned due to the misrule, 
shortsightedness, autocratic policies and wrong decisions of the 
incumbent Chief Minister coupled with excessive unplanned, 
wasteful expenditures and financial mismanagement leading the 
state to a complete stalemate with development activities in the 
State in a complete standstill and clouding the State with complete 
darkness of financial depression. 
His Excellency, your benign authority may be well aware of the 
fact that the State under the leadership of Mr. Nabam Tuki, CM 
has been reeling under the burden of humongous financial liabilities, 
insurmountable debts and burden of overdrafts for last 3 years 
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due to gross and unprecedented level of corruption, fraudulent 
misappropriation and embezzlement of the project specific funds 
and revenues of the government. 
His Excellency, it is ve1y unfortunate that there are serious charges 
of criminal misconduct, nepotism and corruption against Shri 
Nabam Tuki on numerous counts which are as follows; 
I) Awarding contract to his family and relatives by abusing his 
12ower and position without floating tenders and secured pecuniary 
gain by illegal and dishonest means in clear v~()lation of coda! 
formalities. The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court tal-;ing cognizance 
of the allegations against Nabam Tuki, CM vide Judgement and 
Order dated 21-08-2015 in WP (C) No. 1267 /20 I 0 has directed 
the CBI to register a case and conduct investigation against the 
alleged misconduct ofShri Nabam Tuki in awarding contracts to 
his wife, sister-in-law, brother and other near relatives without 
calling tenders by abusing his official position as a Minister. The 
Hon 'ble Court also directed the CBI to probe and investigate the 
alleged UCO bank transaction of Rs.30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty 
Lacs) only allegedly deposited in the account number of Mr. 
Nabam Tuki by Mr. N .N. Osik, the then Director of Food & Civil 
Supplies. 
2) Serious allegation against the incumbent CM who also holds 
the charges of Finance, Planning and Disaster & ReliefMinistries 
for gross misuse and
embezzlement ofrelieffunds under NDRF 
& SDRF. In this connection also two PILs are pending in the 
Hon'ble Gauhati High Court being numbered as PIL No. 62/201 S 
& 65/20 l Sand vidc order dated 06/08/20 l S the Hon' blc Gauhati 
High Court was pleased to admit both the PILs by rejecting the 
preliminary objection of the State Government on the issue of 
maintainability of the cases and made an observation that "there 
appears to be some prima facic case to be enquired into the 
justification of the State in making assessments regarding natural 
disaster". In this connection the Controller and Auditor General 
oflndia is also conducting an enquiry into the allegation. 
3) Gross misuse and siphoning of Rroiect specific funds under 
Centrally Sr.onsored Scheme (CSS) as a result of which majority 
of the projects or works under abovementioned schemes has not 
been completed and/or are under progress. Worst some have even
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
not been commenced and will never see the light of the day because 
all the grant and assistance provided by the GO! has been 
whimsically and capriciously diverted and misused under Non-
Plan head and PDS. Though majority of the works and projects 
has not been completed but the funds have been completely 
exhausted creating colossal financial liabilities to the tune of 
Rs.6911.55 Crores. That is the sole reason, why the state 
government is unable to furnish the UC as demanded by the GOL 
The Ministry of DONER has instituted an enquiry to unearth the 
degree of corruption. 
4) The State Government is reeling under the burden ofoverdraft 
for consecutively two years. The Government committed an 
overdraft of Rs.(-) 449.76 Crores during 2013-14 and Rs.(-) 
581.38 Crores during last financial year 2014-15. The current 
overdraft till May' 2015 is Rs.(-) 222 Crores bringing the total 
overdraft to the tune of Rs. (-) 1,253 .14 Crores. The amount of 
overdraft are to be repaid by the State government to the RBI 
with 13% interest rate which in turn will affect the development 
of the State, as the Government will be forced to utilize the plan 
money for the repayment of the overdraft. 
Your Excellency, overdraft, suspension of government bank 
transactions, inordinate delay in disbursement of pension, GPF, 
TA/DA and other benefits to the government employees, transfer 
of funds in the
civil deposits of the government, non-payment of 
bil Is to the contractors and suP12liers against the completed works 
and non-payment of stipend to the students has become an order 
of the day. 
Your Excellency. Shri Nabam Tuki. CM is adopting all sorts of 
illegal and unlawful means in order to quell and crush the voices 
of dissent who having been disillusioned and disenchanted with 
his misdeed and style ofrunnlng the State Government in a despotic 
and autocratic manner has intensified their demand in recent days 
for a change in the leadership. He is even indulging in criminal 
and immoral activities to secure his Chief Ministerial post. It is 
very disheartening that Shri Nabam Tuki. CM with the suppo11 of 
handful of his protagonist invited 17 MLA's for a dinner pmty at 
his official bungalow and has forcefully obtained signatures of the 
17 MLA's in a resignation letters authored and produced at his 
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residence by putting them under intense duress and pressure with 
the objective to use the same as a tool to blackmail them not to 
shift their loyalty or allegiance. 
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xxx 
xxx 
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7. Your Excellency, in a democratic and parliamentary form of 
government, the legislators of the single largest pa1ty in the 
legislative assembly select a leader amongst themselves to lead 
them who is called as a leader of the legislative party and the 
selected leader accordingly becomes the Chief Minister and forms 
a government. If the leader upon being selected loses the goodwill, 
trust and confidence of the legislators who have selected him, the 
legislators can change or replace the said leader with more 
efficient, capable and competent leader to run the government. 
In context to the present prevailing political scenario of the State 
the CM has lost the goodwill, trust and confidence of majority of 
the legislators which can gauged from the CLP meeting which 
was held on 29-09-2015 where only 22 party legislators attended 
the meeting. Immediately thereafter a Cabinet was also summoned 
by the CM and similarly the meeting not attended by majority of 
the Cabinet Ministers and was less than the necessary quorum 
for taking any major decisions, therefore, it is the CM who should 
be tendering his resignation papers rather than dropping highly 
respected and decorated sitting Ministers who have serving the 
State to
the best of their caRability and capacity without any 
complaint or blemish on their integrity. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
Therefore, in view of the above facts and circumstances of the 
case, it is our collective earnest request and appeal to your 
esteemed office not to ente1tain the decision of the incumbent 
CM as he is running a minority government and enjoys the support 
of only handful of legislators as he has lost the confidence and 
goodwill of the majority of the legislators. If the CM is allowed to 
prevail then it will tantamount to murder of democracy and 
parliamentary form of government. 
With regards, 
signed by 20 INC MLAs and 
2 Independent MLAs. 
Yours faithfully,"
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDJSH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
It was submitted, that despite the position being clear, that a Governor 
has no role in internal party feuds, details as noticed in the letter extracted 
above, were being provided to the Governor. Illustratively it was 
submitted, that the manner of functioning of the Chief Minister, or the 
likely change in the composition of the Cabinet, or the manner in which 
financial affairs of the State were being handled, or the prevailing 
allegations of corruption against the Government, and such I ike matters, 
are beyond the realm of cognition and responsibility of the Governor. 
And yet, were being brought to the notice of the Governor. It was 
urged, that all this was being done, because of the belief of the dissident 
faction, that the Governor would act thereon. This, because of the tacit 
support, by MLAs belonging to the Bharatiya Janata Party (hereinafter 
referred to as, 'the BJP'). It was highlighted, that the involvement of 
two Independent MLAs along with 20 MLAs of the INC, in the letter 
dated 11.10.2015, needed to be pointedly noticed. Because it 
demonstrates, not only dissension within the party, but also the involvement 
of support from outsiders. The connotations of the above second letter, 
according to learned counsel, were also suggestive of political motivation. 
7. 
Having highlighted the alleged divisive activities of the 
breakaway group ofMLAs within the INC, itz
was submitted, that the 
party President - Padi Richo, was right in perceiving, that the above 
actions amounted to breach of party discipline. The party President 
accordingly, addressed individual communications dated 12.10.2015, to 
the defaulting MLAs, wherein he brought to their attention, the party's 
impressions. A relevant extract of one of the said communications is 
~eing reproduced hereunder: 
"It has been reported by pmiy functionaries and workers of your 
constituency and the Block/District Congress Committee that you 
are indulging in various activities which amounts to breach of 
discipline of the Party under Claus 4(a), (b) and (c) of the 
Constitution of Indian National Congress. In this connection I 
have also issued a Circular to all Party MLAs and Leaders on 1" 
September 2015 making it clear that action will be taken against 
any such leader indulging in indiscipline and anti-party activities. 
The matter was placed before the Executive Committee of the 
PCC on 6!h October 2015 and the Committee is of the view that 
there is a prima facie breach of discipline from your side. You are 
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hereby called upon to explain the charges made against you within 
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[2016] 6 S.C.R. 
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15 days time as to why disciplinary action as it may deem fit is not 
taken against you." 
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Your failure to reply within the above stated time will be considered 
as that you have no explanation or reply to be given, and appropriate 
action as deemed fit, will be taken against you without any further 
notice." 
g, At the instant juncture, a meeting inviting all members of the 
Congress Legislature Party was convened for g.11.2015, which was to 
be attended by representatives of the central leadership. An extract of 
the communication dated 5.11.2015, calling the above meeting, is 
reproduced below: 
"No.CM(AP - 11/2015 dtd 05
1
" Nov, 2015[:] Please convey the 
following message by quickest means as under[.] quote[.] From 
Shri Nabam Tuki, Chief Minister to all Congress MLAS/ 
Parliamentary Secretaries/Ministers[.] As directed by Shri V. 
Narayanasami, General Secretary, AICC, In-Charge, Arunachal 
Pradesh a meeting of all members of Congress Legislature Party 
(CLP) convened on gm _J.J_o_y~mber, 20 l 5(Sunday) at 4.30 PM 
repeat gm November,2015 at 4.30 PM at Raj iv Gandhi Bhawan, 
Itanagar[.] Meeting will be attended by [.] One[.] Shri V 
Narayanasami, General Secretary, AICC, In Charge[.] Two[.] 
Dr. Jayakumar, AICC Secretary,[.] Three[.] Shri Padi Richo, 
President PCC among others[.] Request to attend the meeting as 
directed by Shri V Narayanasami, GS, AICC positively[.] 
unquote[.] Plse confirm N.T.T."
Immediately on receipt of the aforesaid invitation, the same 21 dissident 
MLAs, addressed a joint statement to the party leadership, that they 
would not be attending the meeting (scheduled for g. f 1.2015), as the 
Chief Minister - Nabam Tuki had lost all moral credibility to lead the 
House. An extract of the contents of above joint assertion is reproduced 
below: 
" ... It has come to our notice that a CLP meeting has been 
convened on g'" November 2015. There are already differences 
of opinion with regards to autocratic way of functioning and 
disrespect for inner democracy of the party with the present CLP 
leader Mr. Nabam Tuki. Were clearly denounce his legitimacy as 
the leader of Congress Legislature Party of Arunachal Pradesh.
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
47 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Under this circumstances any meeting called under his leadership 
A 
do not carry any substance and holds no water. He has lost all 
the moral credibility to lead the party in the house. 
Therefore, we the undersigned Congress legislature party members 
have unanimously decided not to attend the CLP meeting called 
under the leadership of Mr. Nabum Tuki." 
8 
signed by 21 MLAs of the INC. 
9. On 12. I 0.2015, the President of the Congress Legislature Party 
issued a show cause notice to 19 MLAs belonging to the INC, for indulging 
in activities, indicative of breach of sincerity and commitment towards 
the INC. Another communication was also issued to all MLAs belonging 
to the INC, to attend a party meeting, at the residence of the leader of 
Congress Legislature Party. It was submitted, that the same 21 legislators 
belonging to the INC again addressed a joint statement to the Chief 
Minister, wherein they contested his legitimacy, as leader of the INC. 
The said legislators, again refused to attend the meeting. They also 
issued a press note, to openly announce their aforesaid stance. In a 
meeting held on 8.11.2015, the central leadership of the Congress Party 
affirmed, its support to the Chief Minister- Nabam Tuki. It was pointed 
out, that thereafter, another notice was issued for holding a meeting of 
the legislators, belonging to the INC, on 18. I I .2015. Yet again, the same
21 MLAs did not attend the meeting, and reiterated their point of view, 
with reference to the leadership of the Chief Minister. It was asse11ed 
on behalf of the appellants, that this was a revolt of sorts, within the 
INC. 
10. In their narration, learned cotinsel also pointed out, that on 
16.11.2015, a notice ofresolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker 
- Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, was moved. The same was allegedly moved 
by 16 MLAs, belonging to the INC. As a matter of clarification, it would 
be pertinent to mention, that the Deputy Speaker had been elected as an 
MLA, on the nomination of the INC. 
11. On 19.11.2015, a notice of resolution for the removal of the 
Speaker of the Assembly- Nabam Rebia, was moved by the 13 MLAs 
- 11 belonging to the BJP, and 2 Independent MLAs. It was submitted, 
that the aforesaid notice was issued under Article 179( c) read with A11icle 
181, and Rules 151 and 154 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of 
Business of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, framed under 
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[2016] 6 S.C.R. 
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Article 208 (hereinafter referred to as, the 'Conduct of Business Rules'). 
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The notice depicted the following grounds for the removal of the Speaker: 
"(i) The Constitution and democracy are not safe in the hands of 
the Speaker, as he has unseated two members of the Arunachal 
Pradesh Legislative Assembly; 
(ii) That he has flagrantly violated the Constitution; 
(iii) That Speaker has not been functioning as a neutral person; 
(iv) That the Speaker has been appointing secretarial staff/persons 
without following administrative procedure." 
12. Yet another meeting ofMLAs belonging to the INC, was held 
on 18.11.2015. The allegedly errant 21 MLAs belonging to the INC, did 
not again attend the meeting. It was asserted, that in order to take stock 
of the ongoing activities of the 21 dissident MLAs, another meeting of 
the Congress Legislature Party was held on 3.12.2015, wherein the 
participants took note of the prevailing situation, by recording the following 
proceedings: 
"This meeting of the Congress Legislature Party, Arunachal 
Pradesh, held on today, the 3™ December at 4.00 P.M. at Itanagar 
unanimously resolves to request the Party Leadership and the 
Congress High Command at Delhi, bringing to your kind attention 
;i letter dated 2llil November 2015 signed by 21 elected members 
of the Congress Legislature Paity Arunachal Pradesh, in clear 
undemocratic, indis..£!.Rline and unheard manner dictating
terms 
and excuses for absenting and voluntarily distancing from the 
Congress Legislature Patty, Arunachal Pradesh against procedure 
established by the rules and regulations of the pa1ty, challenging 
the democratically elected Congress Legislature Party leaders 
authority, instead of participating in the meeting as members of 
the Congress Legislature Party and express whatever opinion, 
suggestion or grievances which can be resolved or decided by the 
Congress Legislature Party in its meeting. 
It is also requested that the Congress High Command may make 
it clear that whether the signatories of the letter are staying back 
in Delhi as per the advice of the AI CC in spite of the fact that, the 
above group of Legislatures voluntarily abstained from the earlier 
CLP meeting held on l 61h November, 2015, which was attended
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
49 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
by the General Secretary, AICC in charge of Arunachal Pradesh 
A 
Shri V. Narayanaswamy, Dr. Jayakumar, Secretary AICC and 
Shri Padi Richo President APCC on the same grounds. 
The meeting of the Congress Legislature Party also bring to the 
notice of the Party Leadership that the activities of the above 21 
MLAs who have formed a separate group distancing themselves 
from the Congress Party, is working against the interests of the 
Party and the democratically elected Government of the Party, 
which is taking all-round efforts to develop the State and working 
untiringly to improve and help the people of Arunachal Pradesh, 
which got elected with an unprecedented mandate in the Assembly 
election held on 2014." 
13. It was submitted, that the said 21 dissident MLAs, were 
publicly proclaiming, that V. Narayanasamy, a former Union Minister, 
and the All India Congress Committee in-charge for North Eastern States, 
was supporting them in their cause. V. Narayanasamy had to address 
identical letters to all the 21 dissident MLAs, on 6.12.2015, to repudiate 
their assertion of his support. The text of the aforesaid communications 
is reproduced below: 
"AICC has received copies of letters dat(;':d I 5. 11.2015 and 
02.12.2015 addressed to the Chief Minister written by you and 20 
other MLAs of the Congress Legislative Pai1v, Arunachal Pradesh 
in which you have claimed and alleged that I
have advised you to 
stay back in Delhi to bring a solution to the present stalemate in 
the Party. 
2. The above statements are false and against the directions given 
by me and the Party Leadership at Delhi and Itanagar. In the 
CLP meeting held on 16.11.2015 at Itanagar, I categorically made 
a statement that the Party Leadership is wholly supporting the 
present Chief Minister, Shri Nabam Tuki who is CLP leader having 
majority and if any grievance, any of the CLP member is having 
can be sorted out in the Pai1y forum instead of giving public 
statements and working against the Chief Minister or the Govt. of 
Arunachal Pradesh. 
3. You have also willfully did not attend three consecutive CLP 
meetings and boycotted the same. 
4. Instead of listening to my statement and direction, you have 
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made contrary statements and false allegations against me and 
the Party Leadership which is not acceptable." 
The President of the Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee - Padi 
Richo was required to deliver the said letters to the 21 dissident MLAs, 
and also, to obtain their acknowledgement. Which he did. 
14. It was highlighted, that the aforesaid activities of the dissident 
members of the INC, compelled the President - Padi Richo, to again 
issue identical letters to the concerned MLAs on 7.12.2015, with a copy 
to the Chief Whip of the Congress Legislature Party - Rajesh Tacho. 
The text of the above letter is reproduced below: 
"AICC has taken serious note of your activities against the party, 
continuous attacks, defamatory and unfounded allegations and 
propaganda against the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers 
of Arunachal Pradesh and the Congress Party calculated to lower 
the prestige of the party, inspite ofour repeated directions not to 
indulge in any such activities which amounts to breach of discipline 
of the party. 
By such continuous actions and activities you have distanced 
Y-9Jl\]elf and ft:g_!}lyour conduct we have come to the conclusion 
that you have voluntarily given up your membership of Indian 
National Cong[ess and the Congress Legislature Party. 
I am enclosing herewith he letter received from the General 
Secretary, AICC vi de dated 06/ 12/20 I 5, addressed to you in
this 
regard." 
I 5. It was also pointed out, that a very important event, sponsored 
by the respondents, took shape on 19.11.2015. The 13 MLAs who had 
issued the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker- Nabam 
Rebia, forwarded its copy to the Governor, with a covering letter dated 
19.11.2015, wherein, they requested the Governor, to prepone the 6th 
session of the Assembly. Their prayer was aimed at expediting the 
removal of the Speaker-Nabam Rebia. This, according to the appellants, 
is apparent from the fact, that the request for preponement was sought 
on the ground, that the issue ofremoval should be taken up immediately 
after completion of the 14 days notice, mandated under Article l 79(c). 
The 13 MLAs also pressed, through their above letter, that the party 
composition in the House, be not altered, till the resolution for removal of 
the Speaker, was finally disposed of.
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
16. In narrating the facts, it was pointed out, that in the meeting of 
the members of the Congress Legislature Party held on 3.12.2015, the 
activities of the dissident members of the party were highlighted, indicating 
their rebellious postuting. The central leadership of the INC, at this 
juncture, again supported the leadership of Chief Minister- Nabam Tuki. 
The central leadership further took note of the fact, that 21 members of 
the Congress Legislature Party, had distanced themselves from the party. 
It was therefore, that the Chief Whip of the Congress Legislature Party 
- Rajesh Tacho, filed a petition under Paragraph 2( 1 )(a) of the Tenth 
Schedule on 7.12.2015, seeking disqualification of 14 MLAs of the INC. 
The disqualification of the 14 MLAs had been sought on the ground, that 
they had snapped their ties with the INC, by their refusal to respond to, 
or associate with the political leadership in the State, and fortheir having 
expressly refused to attend the meetings of the party held on 29.9.2015, 
8.11.2015, 18.11.2015 and 3.12.2015. And also, for having issued a press 
note, to publicly air their views. The above disqualification petition, was 
presented to the Speaker. It would be relevant to mention, that the name 
of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, figured at serial 
no.14, in the disqualification petition. On receipt of the aforesaid petition, 
the
Speaker issued notices to the concerned 14 MLAs, on 7.12.2015 
itself. The 14 MLAs belonging to the INC, were required to submit 
their response(s), and thereupon to appear before the Speaker, on 
14.12.2015. 
-
17. It was contended on behalfofthe appellants, that the factual 
position noticed above, triggered the stage for a political upmanship. 
Not between the legislators of the INC and the BJP, but between two 
factions of the INC. With one faction of the INC legislators, garnering 
support from BJP legislators. It was alleged, that the BJP legislators, in 
order to topple the Government in p_pwer, were extending support to the 
faction opposing the continuation of the Chief Minister- Nabam Tuki. 
The impugned orders: 
I 8. The Governor of the State of Arunachal Pradesh, according 
to learned counsel, without consulting the Chief Minister- Nabam Tuki, 
and his Council of Ministers, or even the Speaker-Nabam Rebia, issued 
an order dated 9. 12.2015, whereby, he preponed the 6th session of the 
Assembly scheduled to be held on 14.1.2016, to 16.12.2015. The instant 
order passed by the Governor, has been assailed by the appellants. A 
relevant extract of the order, is reproduced below: 
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"WHEREAS I, Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa, the Governor of Arunachal 
Pradesh. had issued an Order on 3 November, 2015 under clause 
(I) of article 17-4 oftne Constitution oflndia summoning the Sixth 
Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh to meet for its sixth 
session at 10.00 AM on 14 January, 2016 in the Legislative 
Assembly Chamber at Naharlagun: 
WHEREAS subsequent to the issue of the aforesaid order by 
me. a notice ofresolution for removal ofShri Nabam Rebia. from 
the office of the Speaker of. the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative 
Assembly has been received on 19 November, 2015 with a copy 
endorsed to me by the notice givers namely Shri Tamiyo Taga. 
the Leader of Opposition in the said Assembly along with 12 other 
Members of the Legislative Assembly: 
WHEREAS the notice ofresolution for removal of the Speaker 
as aforesaid has complied with the notice period of 14 days on the 
4 December, 2015 (excluding the day of notice and 4 December, 
2015 - 14 days clear notice) as required under the first proviso to 
article l 79(c) of the Constitution oflndia: 
WHEREAS it has been judicially held in Nipamacha Singh and 
Others Vs. Secretary, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Others 
[AIR 2002 Gauhati 7] as under: 
'"' 13 ... the powers to consider or to reject a motion for.removal of 
the Speaker from his office did not vest in the Speaker but in the 
Legislative Assembly under article 179 and 181 of the
Constitution ... " 
WHEREAS in view of the above judicial order. it is a Constitutional 
obligation on my part to ensure that the resolution for removal of 
Speaker is expeditiouslv placed before the Legislative Assembly: 
WHEREAS I have also received a request from the notice givers 
of the resolution for removal of the Speaker that the sitting of the 
sixth session of the SixthArunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly 
originally slated for 14 January, 2016 may be advanced so as to 
enable the House to urgently consider the resolution for removal 
of the Speaker: 
WHEREAS, the time gap between the 4 December, 2015 and 
the intended date of first sitting of the sixth session i.e. l 4 January, 
20 l 6 i.e. the earliest date on which the resolutions for removal of 
H 
Speaker can be taken up for consideration by the House, is 42
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
53 
AND OTHERS [JAGDLSH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
days (including 4 December, 2015 and 14 January, 2016): 
A 
WHEREAS any such notice ofresolution in relation to an Officer 
of the Legislative Assembly (Speaker or Deputy Speaker) needs 
to be expeditiously considered by the Legislative Assembly in view 
of (i) past precedents in the Lok Sabha and (ii) the seriousness 
and urgency accorded to such resolutions in paragraph 2 of Rule 
B 
151 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the 
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and (iii) the utmost 
immediacy with which the cloud cast by the notice ofresolutiun 
over the continuance of the incumbent in the office of the Speaker 
has to be cleared: 
WHEREAS I am personally satisfied that the time gap between 
the date of compliance of the notice with the notice period 
prescribed in the first proviso to article 179(c) of the Constitution 
of India and the date of the intended first sitting of the ensuing 
session. as computed in the aforesaid manner, is long and 
unreasonable and may cause damage to the goals and ideals of 
provisions in the Constitution oflndia and the Rules of Procedure 
of the House concerning speedy disposal of such resolutions: 
WHEREAS I am further satisfied that, for any exercise of 
advancing, the date of the sixth session under clause (I) of article 
174 of the Constitution of India to a date earlier than the date 
mentioned in the Summons dated 3'd
November, 2015 for 
facilitating the House to expeditiously consider resolutions for 
removal of Speaker, I may not be bound by the advice of the 
Council of Ministers, since the subject matter of the notice for 
removal of the Speaker is not a matter, falling under the executive 
jurisdiction of the Chief Minister, Arunachal Pradesh not such a 
subject matter finds a mention in the Rules of Executive Business 
of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh framed under article 
166 of the Constitution oflndia thereby restricting the role of the 
Chief Minister in advising me in exercise of my powers under 
article 174(1) of the Constitution oflndia only to the matters for 
which the Chief Minister, under the Constitution of India, is 
responsible". 
AND NOW THEREFORE -
In exercise of powers conferred upon me by clause (1) of article 
174 of the Constitution oflndia, I, Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa, Governor 
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A 
of Arunachal Pradesh do herby modify the order issued by me 
under the said provision of the Constitution of India on 3rd 
November, 2015 summoning the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly to meet for its sixth-session on l 4'h January, 
2016 to the following extent: . 
8 
(i) For '14th January, 2016' read '16th December, 2015' 
(ii) For ' 18th January, 2016' read '18th December, 2015' 
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2. Accordingly, in pursuance of the order issued by me under 
clause (I) of article 174 of the Constitution of India on 3rd 
November, 2015 as modified herein, the Arunachal Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly shall now meet at 10.00 AM on 16th 
December, 2015 at the Legislative Assembly Chamber at 
Naharlagun. 
JYOTI PRASAD RAJKHOWA 
Governor" 
19. It was pointed out, that the order extracted above reveals, 
that it was prompted by a notice of resolution for the removal of the 
- Speaker, coupled with the assumption, that a constitutional obligation 
was cast on the Governor, to ensure that the above resolution was 
expeditiously taken up for consideration. Because, any delay in taking 
up the same, on the scheduled date of summoning of the 6th session of 
the House (- 14.1.2016), would" ... cause damage to the goals and ideals 
of the provisions of the Constitution, besides the Conduct of Business 
Rules ... ".And that, the Governor was not obliged, in the peculiar 
background referred to above, to seek the advice of the
Chief Minister 
and his Council of Ministers. Admittedly, the Governor had issued the 
above order at his own, without any aid and advice. 
20. On the same day-9.12.2015, the Governor issued a message 
under Article 175(2) inter alia fixing the resolution for the removal of 
the Speaker, as the first item of the House agenda, at the first sitting of 
its 6th session. A relevant extract of the same is reproduced hereunder: 
"I. The1·esolution for removal of Speaker shall be the first item 
on the agenda of the House at the first sitting of the Sixth Session 
of the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly; 
2. As the resolution for removal of the Speaker shall be the first 
item of business, at the first sitting of the Sixth Sess_ion of the 
Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, the Deputy Speaker
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
shall preside over the House from the first moment of the first 
sitting of the House in accordance with provisions in article 181 ( 1) 
of the Constitution oflndia; 
3. The proceedings of the House on the leave, discussion and 
voting on the resolution for removal of the Speaker shall be 
completed at the first sitting of the session itself; 
4. The Deputy Speaker shall conduct the proceedings peacefully 
and truthfully and shall communicate the results of the voting on 
the resolution on the same day. The proceedings of the House on 
the resolution shall be video graphed and an authenticated copy 
of the video record shall also be sent to me on the same day; and 
5. Until the session is prorogued, no Presiding Officer shall alter 
the party composition in the House." 
The above message of the Governor, has also been assailed by the 
appellants. The message predetermined the procedure which the 
Assembly was mandated to follow, particularly with reference to the 
notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker. The message also 
e1itailed, that the " ... party composition in the House ... " would not be 
altered until the 6th session of the House was prorogued. It was pointed 
out, that by the above edict, the proceedings initiated by the Chief Whip 
of the Congress Legislature Party under the Tenth Schedule, against 14 
MLAs of the INC, would automatically be put on hold, till the
6th session 
of the House was prorogued. 
Resumption of, the first sequence of facts: 
21. It was pointed out, that consequent upon the above 
development, a meeting of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers 
was convened on 14.12.2015. Based on the opinion tendered by the 
Advocate General of the State of Arunachal Pradesh dated 12.12.2015, 
the State Cabinet resolved, that the order of the Governor dated 
9.12.2015, was violative of Article 174 read with Article 163 of the 
Constitution, and Rule 3 of the 'Conduct of Business Rules'. It was 
resolved, that the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, infringed 
Article 175 of the Constitution, read with Rule 245 of the 'Conduct of 
Business Rules'. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the Speaker -
Nabam Rebia issued a letter dated 14.12.2015, bringing the aforesaid 
legal position to the notice of the Governor, and requested the Governor, 
to allow the House to function, in consonance with the provisions of the 
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Constitution. The Governor was accordingly urged, to convene the 6th 
·session of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, as was originally 
scheduled (-for 14.1.2016). It was submitted, that the aforesaid 
communication addressed by the Speaker to the Governor, was neither 
responded to nor acknowledged. 
22. It was also the case of the appellants, that the disqualification 
proceedings against the 14 legislators of the JNC (initiated through the 
notice dated 7.12.2015), were taken up for consideration by the Speaker 
- Nabam Rebia on 14.12.2015. None of the 14 ML'..s sought to be 
disqualified, responded to the notice issued to them. They did not even 
enter appearance before the Speaker on thereturnable date- 14.12.2015. 
Accordingly, the Speaker deferred the disqualification proceedings, to 
the following day- 15.12.2015. On 15.12.2015, a disqualification order 
was passed against all the 14 MLAs of the INC, ex parte. As a natural 
corollary, the constituencies from which the 14 disqualified MLAs were 
elected, were declared vacant (through a notification published in the 
Arunachal Pradesh Gazette dated 15.12.2015). 
23. Jt was the pointed contention of the appellants, that on the 
same day, - 15. 12.2015, when the aforesaid 14 MLAs belonging to the 
INC, were declared disqualified, in a purely unprecedented and 
unconstitutional manner, the Deputy Speaker-Tenzing Norbu Tongdok 
quashed the order
of disqualification, even though he himself had been 
unseated through the disqualification order. Relevant extract of the above 
order dated 15.12.2015, is reproduced hereunder: 
"ARUNACHAL PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
OFFICE OF DEPUTY SPEAKER 
No.APLA/D8/68/MEM/2015 
15 DECEMBER, 2015 
ORDER 
UNDER 
TENTH 
SCHEDULE 
TO 
THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF JNDIA AND 
RULE 
MADE 
THEREUNDER 
WHEREAS the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh had issued an 
order dated 91h December, 2015 under article 174( I) of the 
Constitution of India preponing the Sixth Session of the Sixth 
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly to l 6'h December, 2015 
from J 41h January, 2016; 
WHEREAS the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh preponed the 
Sixth Session as aforesaid in order to enable the House to
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
57 
AND OTHERS [JAGDJSH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
expeditiously consider and dispose of a notice of Resolution for 
A 
removal of Shri Nabam Rebia from the Office of the Speaker. 
WHEREAS the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh had further issued 
a message to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly under 
article 175(2) of the Constitution pflndia, of which, the following 
part has significance of clipping the abuse of power of the 
incumbent Speaker. 
"Until the session is prorogued the Presiding Officer shall not 
alter the party composition in the House." 
WHEREAS the resolution for removal of Speaker Sh Nabam 
Rebia is listed as the first item of business at the first sitting of 
Sixth Session of the Legislative Assembly on the\ 6th December, 
2015; ' 
WHEREAS the Speaker who is facing the resolution for removal 
has deliberately refrained from issuing the necessary Bulletin part 
II notifying the resolution and also the list of business for the 
16.12.2015 including the resolution for transaction by the. House, 
despite the message of the Governor and in total defiance of the 
Constitution, rules, norms and ideals thereby subverting the vary 
Constitution oflndia; 
WHEREAS the Deputy Speaker who was tasked by the Governor 
to conduct the proceedings of the House on the resolution for 
removal of the Speaker in accordance with article 181 of the 
Constitution oflndia read with relevant rules of procedure of the 
House, prepared the
Bulletin Part II and list of business for \6th 
December, 2015 thereby conforming to the Constitution and the 
mandate issued by the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh: 
WHEREAS the Speaker, in order to escape the consequence of 
the resolution of his removal slated for transaction on the 16th 
December, 2015, suddenly a day before the first sitting of the 
Sixth Session i.e. on the 15'h December, 20 IS disqualified following 
14 MLAs by 2 Notification of even number with No.LA/LEG-
37 /2015 dated the 15th December, 2015 under the Tenth Schedule 
to the Constitution oflndia: 
(I) 
Shri Perna Khandu 
(2) 
Shri Kumar Waii 
(3) 
Srhi Kameng Do lo 
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(4) 
Shri Markio Tado 
(5) 
Shri JarkarGamlin 
(6) 
Shri P.D. Sona 
(7) 
Shri Mutchu Mithi 
(8) 
Shri Kamlung Mossang 
(9) 
Shri Phosum Khimhun 
(10) 
Shri Wanglin Lowangdong 
(11) 
Shri T. Wangham 
(12) 
Shri Lombo Tayeng 
(13) 
Shri Kalikho Pu! 
(14) 
Shri T.N. Thongdok 
WHEREAS THE Speaker has disqualified the above 14 MLAs 
without following basic procedure oflaw and justice in regard to: 
(i) Receipt of petition for Disqualification. 
(ii) Forwarding the petition for comments of the respondents. 
(iii) Hearing the respondents. 
WHEREAS Rule 7(7) of the Members of Arunachal Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) 
provides as under, according to which, no MLAcan be disqualified 
under the Tenth Schedule without affording an opportunity of 
personally being heard: 
" ..... neither the Speaker nor the committee shall come to any 
finding that a member has become subject to disqualification 
under the Tenth Schedule without affording a reasonable 
opportunity to such members to represent his case and to be 
heard in person." 
WHEREAS, when a notice ofresolution is staring at the face of 
Speaker, he is completely incapacitated from making any order 
on the membership of other MLAs when his own fate is hanging 
in balance: 
WHEREAS the Speaker, as Constitutional functionary, is not vested 
with omnipotent powers to cause injury to the powers of 
Honourable Governor who had
already issued a message as 
aforesaid to maintain the integrity of party-wise composition of 
the House:
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
WHEREAS the Speaker, in committing this ma la fide and perverse 
action, has not even spared the Deputy Speaker whom the 
Governor had appointed to preside over the proceedings of the 
House when it takes up consideration of the resolution for removal 
of the Speaker: 
WHEREAS a Speaker who is facing a removal resolution before 
the House has no competence whatsoever to pass instantaneous 
orders under the Tenth Schedule to manipulate a majority in favour 
of him and also Speaker who has been directed to face the House 
over the resolution for his own removal11as no power whatsoever 
to escape his defeat by throwing out chunks of MLAs abusing his 
powers.under the Tenth Schedule: 
WHEREAS the orders of the Speaker disqualifying 14 MLAs as 
aforesaid squarely challenges the position of the Governor which 
the Constitutio'i\ oflndia had designed him to occupy in the scheme 
of Constitution: 
NOW THEREFORE, 
I, Shri T.N. Thongdok, Deputy Speaker appointed by the Governor 
to preside over the first sitting of the sixth session of the sixth 
Arunachal Legislative Assembly, hereby quash the orders of the 
Speaker and notification issued by the Secretary of the Legislative 
Assembly as aforesaid disqualifying above named named fourteen 
members of the Legislative Assembly and such orders and 
notifications may be deemed as non est for want of competence 
on the part of the Speaker who passed the
order not only for not 
following constitutional and legal procedures but also for having 
lost his competence to do so since a notice of resolution dated 
19.11.2015 for his removal is pending against him and which is to 
come before the house on 16.12.2015. 
2. The effect of this order is that all the above named 14 MLAs 
continue to be members of the sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative 
Assembly as though the order of the delinquent Speaker is ab 
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3. All the aforesaid 14 MLAs shall attend all the sessions of the 
sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly without let or 
hindrance. 
4. Any authority, civil or police, obstructing their attendance of the 
ensuing session shall be committing grave breach of privilege of· 
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[2016] 6 S.C.R. 
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the legislative assembly as also shall come directly under the 
disciplinary jurisdiction of all law enforcing authorities including 
the Governor. 
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Naharlagun 
15th December 2015 
T.N. Thongdok 
Deputy Speaker" 
24. It was also the case of the appel !ants, that on 16.12.2015, the 
Deputy Speaker conducted the proceedings of the 6th session of the 
Assembly, outside the official premises of the State Assembly. lt was 
submitted, that the House assembled at Techi Takar Community Hall, G 
Sector, Naharlagun. It was contended, that at the aforesaid 
unconstitutional session of the Assembly (presided over by the Deputy 
Speaker), the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, passed an 
order declaring, that the erstwhile Speaker - Nabam Rebia's 
announcement that the 6th session of the Assembly would not commence 
on 16.12.2015, was illegal. Having so declared, the Deputy Speaker 
further ordered, that the 6th session of the Assembly would be convened 
as rescheduled by the Governor, with effect from 16.12.2015. It was 
also ordered, that the 6th session of the Assembly would continue upto 
18.12.2015. The order passed by the Governor on 9.12.2015 was thus 
reiterated, and also given effect to. When the House assembled for the 
preponed 6th session on 16.12.2015, the notice for a vote of confidence 
against the Speaker was taken up for consideration. The resolution for 
removal of the Speaker- Nabam Rebia, was
adopted.by the Assembly 
on 16.12.2015 itself. The list of business issued by the Deputy Speaker 
- Tenzing Norbu Thongdok provided, that the following motions would 
betaken upon 17.12.2015: 
(i) 
vote of confidence of the Council of Ministers headed by 
Shri Nabam Tuki -the then Chief Minister, and 
(ii) 
expression of confidence in Kalikho Pu!, to head the new 
Council of Ministers. 
G 
The second sequence of facts: 
25. It is also relevantto mention, that the Speaker-Nabam Rebia, 
filed Writ Petition (C) No.7745of2015 before the Gauhati High Court, 
challenging inter a/ia the Governor's order dated 9.12.2015, the 
Governor's message dated 9.12.2015, the alleged holding of the preponed 
H 
6th session of the Assembly, outside the House on 16.12.2015, the Deputy
NABAM REBJA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Speaker- Tenzing Norbu Thongdok'rnrder dated 15.12.2015, quashing 
the disqualification order of the 14 MLAs, belonging to the INC, and the 
resolution dated 16.12.2015 adopting the resolution for removal of the 
Speaker- Nabam Rebia, and its consequential notification. 
26. A Single Bench of the Gauhati High Court, by an interim order 
dated 17.12.2015 stayed all the aforementioned impugned decisions, till 
the n-ext date of hearing - 1.2.2016. A relevant extract of the interim 
order passed by the High Court is reproduced below: 
"23. The disturbing developments in the State of Arunachal Pradesh 
noticed from the various steps taken since November 2015 
indicates the tussle for power by opposing group and it is clear 
that the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Assembly are 
heading the opposite camps. Understandably the action of the 
MLAs are motivated by political exigencies and a manifestation 
of this can be seen from the FIR dated 20.12.2015. In such situation, 
the Governor as the constitutional head. is expected to discharge 
his role with dispassion and within the constitutional framework. 
But the impugned steps taken by the State's Governor which 
facilitated the political battle to move in certain direction in the 
tussle for power, reflects the non neutral role of the constitutional 
head and this is undermining the democratic process. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
25. Taking all the
above factors into account meanwhile, the 
impugned decision(s) are ordered to be kept in abeyance until the 
case is considered next. List on 1.2.2016." 
A perusal of the interim order passed by the High Court, it was contended, 
reveals that the High Court had entertained a primafacie view, that the 
Governor, was facilitating the political conflict between the parties towards 
a definite direction, in a prejudicial manner. And also, that the Governor 
had not acted in a dispassionate manner. The appellants, during the 
course of hearing, left no stone unturned, to endorse the above noted 
impression of the Single Bench. The decisions kept in abeyance;· by the 
interim order extracted above, were: 
(i) the order passed by the Governor dated 9.12.2015 
(ii) the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015 
(iii) the order passed by the Deputy Speaker dated 15.12.2015 
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setting aside the disqualification of the 14 MLAs; and 
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(iv) the resolution dated 16.12.2015, removing the Speaker. 
Thereafter, based on an order obtained by the Joint Registrar (Judicial) 
of the Gauhati High Court from the acting Chief Justice of the High 
Court, on the administrative side, the above Writ Petition (C) No. 7745 of 
2015, was placed before a different Single Bench of the High Court. 
During the course of hearing of the above writ petition on 19.12.2015, 
the Governor-Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa, and the State Government, were 
impleaded as parties. Two further interlocutory applications bearing 
nos. 2822 and 2823 of2015, were filed by 13 and 7 applicants respectively, 
seeking impleadment in Writ Petition (C) No.7745 of2015, and were 
allowed. Through the above applications, the applicants besides seeking 
impleadment, assailed the maintainability of Writ Petition (C) No.7745 
of 2015. They also sought modification/vacation of the interim order 
(staying the impugned decisions), dated 17.12.2015. 
27. It was submitted, that when the Assembly met on 17.12.2015, 
and the Government headed by the Chief Minister - Nabam Tuki was 
declared to have lost confidence of the House, Kalikho Pul, another 
JNC MLA, was chosen as the new leader of the House. 
28. The learned Single Bench, before whom the matter came to 
be posted by the acting Chief Justice of the High Court (after the interim 
order extracted above, had been passed), issued notice for
modification/ 
vacation of the interim order (passed by the previous Single Bench) 
dated 17.12.2015. It was submitted, that without any notice to the 
appellant, and without affording an opportunity of hearing to the counsel 
representing the appellant, the successor Single Bench restrained 
reconvening of the House till 4. l .2016. 
29. The two MLAs belonging to the INC (- Bamang Felix and 
Nyamar Karbak) also approached the High Court by filing Writ Petition 
(C) No. 7998of2015. The petitioners in the aforesaid writ petition, inter 
alia assailed the same decisions, as were impugned by Nabam Rebia in 
Writ Petition (C) No.7745 of2015 (more or less, on the same grounds). 
The instant matter came up for hearing, before yet another Single Bench · 
of the High Co-urt. On its first date of hearing, Writ Petition (C) No. 7998 
of2015 was directed to be posted for hearing on 4.1.2016, along with 
the first writ petition - Writ Petition (C) No.7745of2015. Resultantly, 
both the writ petitions came to be posted before the same Single Bench 
(nominated by the acting Chief Justice, on 18.12.2015).
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
30. Dissatisfied with the listing of the matters, the appellant herein 
- Nabam Rebia, filed an Interlocutory Application in Writ Petition (C) 
No.7745of2015, on the judicial side on 23.12.2015, seeking the recusal 
of the Single Bench, nominated to hear the case by the acting Chief 
Justice. Writ Petition (C) No. I 0of2016, was independently filed in the 
High Court, impugning the order of the acting Chief Justice dated 
18.12.2015 (communicated by the Joint Registrar (Judicial), after 
obtaining instructions from the acting Chief JusticeJ, directing the posting 
of Writ Petition (C) No.7745of2015, before a different Single Bench of 
the High Cour1. 
31. As already noticed above, a prayer for recusal was also made 
to the learned Single Bench, before which the matter had been posted, 
by the acting Chief Justice. The learned Single Bench, was asked to 
recuse from the proceedings in Writ Petition (C) No.7745 of2015. The 
acting Chief Justice of the High Court, entertained an Interlocutory 
Application with a similar prayer, in his chambers on the administrative 
side, and rejected the same on 4.1.2016. Writ Petition (C) No. I 0 of2016 
was dismissed on 7.1.2016 by a Single Bench (other than the OI1e, which 
had passed the interim order dated 17.12.2016, as also, other than the 
one to which the acting Chief Justice had assigned Writ Petition (C) No. 
7745 of 2015 for hearing - after the
passing of the interim order dated 
17.12.2016). Dissatisfied with the above determination, the appellant 
filed Special Leave Petition (C) No.189 of 2016, before this Court. It 
would be pertinent to mention, that the above special leave petition was 
withdrawn by the petitioner on 13.1.2016. 
The legal challenge, on behalf of the appellants: 
32. The High Court disposed of Writ Petition (C) Nos.7745 and 
7998of2015 by a common order dated 13.1.2016. The instant order is 
subject matter of challenge~ through Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.1259-
1260of2016. 
33. Despite the challenges to the various orders passed by the 
High Court through different petitions, it was contended on behalf of the 
appellants, that the determination of Special Leave Petitions (C) 
Nos.1259-1260 of 2016 would completely and effectively, result in the 
adjudication of all the issues canvassed at the hands of the appellants, in 
the connected matters. 
34. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants, that for an 
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effective adjudication of the present controversy, it is necessary to 
understand the duties and responsibilities of the Governor, as envisaged 
in the scheme of the ConstitLition. It was highlighted, that the position of 
the Governor, should not be confused with the impression created by 
Article 168 - that the State Legislature includes the Governor. It was 
submitted, that the Governor cannot be considered even as an officer of 
the House. Despite the above two express assertions, it was submitted, 
that it cannot be disputed that the Governor _of a State is a part of the 
State Legislature-just like the President, is a part of the Parliament. It 
was asserted, that the Governor functions and operates as a bridge 
between the executive and the legislature. Through an address by the 
Governor under Article 175, the executive informs the Assembly, about 
the policies of the Government. The power vested with the'Governor, to 
give his assent to a Bill passed by the Assembly, or to require the matter 
to be retonsidered by returning the Bill to the legislature, it was pointed 
out, w'ere powers which a Governor exercised beyond the precincts of 
the Assembly. This function/power resting with the Governor, according 
to learned counsel, was clearly beyond the scope oflegislative business, 
conducted within the Assembly. lt was pointed out, 'that when a Governor 
summons the House, he does not do so at his own
will. He summons the 
House, on the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of 
Ministers, after due consultation with the Speaker. The only responsibility 
entrusted to the Governor, according to learned counsel, is provided for 
in Article 174, inasmuch as, it is the obligation of the Governor to ensure, 
that the interval between the last sitting of the previous session, and the 
first sitting of the succeeding session, is not more than six months . 
. 35. For substantiating the propositions canvassed in the foregoing 
paragraph, reliance was first placed on Article 158, which expressly 
provides, that the" ... Governor shall not be a member of either House of 
Parliament or of a House of the Legislature of any State specified in the 
First Schedule ... ". It was pointed out, that as a matter of abundant 
caution, Article 158 also provides, that in case an incumbent member of 
the Assembly (or that of the Parliament) is appointed as Governor of a 
State " ... he shall be deemed to have vacated his seat in that House on 
the date on which he enters his office as Governor". Additionally, reliance 
was placed on Article 163 to demonstrate, that the Governor is bound by 
the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers. It 
was acknowledged, that the Governor is also authorized tp act 
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independently,-on his own, but only in respect of such functions, wherein
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
he is expressly authorized to do so, by or under the Constitution. It was 
acknowledged, that in such matters which the Governor considers as 
·falling within his independent judgment," ... the decision of the Governor 
in his discretion shall be final. .. ". And that, the exercise of such 
discretion, cannot be called in question. It was however pointed out, that 
such exercise ofindependentjudgment, can only be questioned by way 
. of judicial review. 
36. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Governor as 
a bridge between the executive and the legislature, reliance was placed 
by learned counsel on Article 167, which provides that it would be the 
duty of the Chief Minister, to communicate all decisions cifthe Council 
of Ministers relating to administration of affairs of the State to the 
Governor, as well as, proposals with reference to matters on which 
legislation is contemplated. It was therefore submitted, that the intent 
expressed in Article 168 should not be determined from a peripheral 
reading thereof, but from the scheme envisioned by the surrounding 
provisions. It was urged, that even though Article 168 provides, that 
every State Legislature "shall" consist of the Governor, the fact of the 
matter is, that the Governor has no role in any legislative activity of the 
House. 
3 7. It was acknowledged, that the Governor was obliged to address 
the Assembly, in
consonance with Article 175( 1 ). It was however urged, 
that the Governor's address to the House, was obligated to be in 
consonance with, the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council 
of Ministers. It was pointed out, that the same position prevailed, in the 
matter of sending messages to the House under Article 175(2), which 
according to learned counsel, was subject to similar aid and advice. 
38. Inviting the Court's attention to Article 178 it was submitted, 
that the instant Article is a part of Chapter III - under Part VI (which 
includes Articles 178 to 189), of the Constitution. It was pointed out, 
that Chapter III bears the heading - "Officers of the State Legislature". 
It was pointed out, that the Speaker and the DeP.uty Speaker are the 
only two officers of the State Legislative Assembly. And likewise, the 
Chairman and the Deputy Chainnan, are the only officers of the State 
Legislative Council. Besides the above officers, the staff of a State 
Legislative Assembly, comprises of the personnel appointed, for carrying 
on ministerial responsibilities of the secretariat of the Leg-islature. It 
was submitted, that no other functionary could be considered as an officer 
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of the State Legislature. The pointed contention oflearned counsel was, 
that the Governor could not be considered, as an officer of a State 
Legislative Assembly. 
39. In the present sequence of submissions, learned counsel, last 
of all, referred to Article 208, and urged, that the same allows every 
State Legislative Assembly to frame rules for regulating the procedure 
for conducting business of the House. Having drawn the Court's attention 
to sub-article (3) of Article 208, it was submitted, that the power vested 
with the Governor· to make rules thereunder, was limited to 
communications between the two Houses (the State Legislative 
Assembly and the State Legislative Council). It was accordingly 
contended, that the framing of the above rules of procedure, should not 
be confused with, the rules for carrying on the business of the House 
itself. Having invited our attention to Article 163, it was asserted, that 
the power vested with the Governor under Article 208 by necessary 
implication, had to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Chief 
Minister and his Council of Ministers. 
40. Having premised his submissions on the aforementioned 
provisions, reference was made by learned counsel to Paragraph 6 of 
the Tenth Schedule. Paragraph 6( I), according to learned counsel, leaves 
no room for any doubt, that on the subject of disqualification of an MLA, 
the functional authority is vested only
with the Speaker. It was further 
submitted, that reference to Article 212 (cited in Paragraph 6(2), of the 
Tenth Schedule), was for the sole purpose of grantingjudicial immunity, 
to the actions taken on a disqualification motion under Paragraph 6. 
Most importantly, it was pointed out, that the Governor has no role 
whatsoever, on the question ofremoval ofMLAs. And as such, according 
to learned counsel, it was not open to the Governor to be concerned 
with, what might or might not emerge, from proceedings conducted by 
the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule. 
41. It is relevant to mention, that learned counsel representing the 
appellants, also made a reference to Article 361, which postulates inter 
alia, that the Governor of a State is not" ... answerable to any court for 
the exercise and performance of powers and duties of his office or for 
any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and 
performance of those powers and duties ... ". Despite the aforesaid 
protection afforded to the Governor, it was submitted, that in the present 
controversy, the Governor - Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa had moved an
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. I)EPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
application for being permitted to be arrayed as a party respondent. 
This action of the Governor, according to learned counsel, was sufficient 
to infer, that the actions of the Governor were partisan. It was submitted, 
that the facts of the case reveal, that the actions of the Governor, were 
supportive of the BJP for purely political considerations, and that, they 
were pointedly prejudicial to the interest of the INC. It was asserted, 
that an analysis of actions of the Governor would reveal, that the 
Governor was making concerted efforts towards dislodging the INC 
Government, and/or weakening it by extending support to the faction of 
the INC MLAs seeking the removal of the Chief Minister - Nabam 
Tuki. 
42. In order to support his contentions, learned counsel placed 
reliance on debates of the Constituent Assembly. With reference to 
Article 163, it was submitted, that the Governor was mandated to 
discharge his functions in consonance with the aid and advice of the 
"Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head". The only 
exception to the above position was in situations, where an express 
provision of the Constitution, required the Governor to exercise his 
functions in his own discretion/judgment. It would be relevant to mention, 
that draft Article 143 eventually came to be renumbered as Article 163 
in the Constitution. The debate highlighted, with reference
to. the 
concerned provision, is extracted hereunder: 
"Shri H.V. Karnath: (C.P. & Berar: General): Mr. President, Sir, 
I move: 
"That in clause(]) of article 143, the words 'except in so far as 
he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions 
or any of them in his discretion' be deleted." 
If this amendment were accepted .by the House, this clause of, 
article 143 would read thus:.-
"There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at 
the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his 
functions." 
Sir, it appears from a reading of this ·clause that the Government 
oflndiaAct of 1935 has been copied more or less blindly without 
mature consideration. There is no strong or valid reason for giving 
the Governor more authority either in his discretion or 
otherwise vis-a-vis his ministers, th'an has been given to the 
President in relation to his ministers. If we turn to article 61(1), 
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"There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at 
the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his 
functions." 
When you, Sir, raised a very important issue, the other day, 
Dr. Ambedkar clarified this clause by saying that the President is 
bound to accept the advice of his ministers in the exercise ofall of 
his functions. But here article 143 vests certain discretionary powers 
in the Governor, and to me it seems that even as it was, it was bad 
enough, but now after having amended a1ticle 131 regarding 
election of the Governor and accepted nominated Governors, it 
would be wrong in principle and contrary to the tenets and principles 
of constitutional Government, which you are going to build up in 
this country. It would be wrong I say, to invest a Governor with 
these additional powers, namely, discretionary powers. I feel that 
no departure from the principles of constitutional Government 
should be favoured .except for reasons of emergency and these 
discretionary powers must be done away with. I hope this 
amendment of mine will commend itself to the House. I move, 
Sir. 
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Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: Mr. President, I am afraid I will have 
to oppose the amendment moved by my honourable Fri.end 
Mr. Karnath, only for the reason that he has not understood the 
scope of the article clearly and his amendment arises out of a
misapprehension. 
Sir, it is no doubt true, that certain words from this article may be 
removed, namely, those which refer to the exercise by the 
Governor of his functions where he has to use his discretion 
irrespective of the advice tendered by his Ministers. Actually, I 
think this is more by way of a safeguard, because there are specific 
provisions in this Draft Constitution which occur subsequently 
where the Governor is empowered to act in his discretion 
irrespective of the advice tendered by his Council of Ministers. 
There are two ways of formulating the idea underlying it. One is 
to make a mention of this exception in this article 143 and 
enumerating the specific power of the Governor where he can 
exercise his discretion in the articles that occur subsequently, or
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
to leave out any mention of this power here and only state it in the 
appropriate article. The former method has been followed. Here 
the general proposition is stated that the Governor has normally to 
act on the advice of his Ministers except in so far as the exercise 
of his discretions covered by those articles in the Constitution in 
which he is specifically empowered to act in his discretion. So 
long as there are articles occurring subsequently in the Constitution 
where he is asked to act in his discretion, which completely cover 
all cases of depa11ure from the normal practice to which I see 
my honourable Friend Mr. Karnath has no objection, I may refer 
to article 188, 1 see no harm in the provision in this article being as 
it is. If it happens that this House decides that in all the subsequent 
articles, the discretionary power should not be there, as it may 
conceivably do, this pa11icular provision will be ofno use and will 
fall into desuetude. The point that my honourable Friend is trying 
to make, while he concedes that the discretionary power of the 
Governor can be given under article 188, seems to be pointless. If 
it is to be given in article 188, there is no harm in the mention of it 
remaining here. No harm can arise by specific mention of this 
exception of article 143. Therefore, the serious objection that 
Mr. Karnath finds for mention of this exception is
pointless. I 
therefore think that the article had better be passed without any 
amendment. If it is necessary for the House either to limit the 
discretionary power of the Governor or completely do away with 
it, it could be done in the articles that occur subsequently where 
specific mention is made without which this power that is mentioned 
here cannot at all be exercised. That is the point that I would like 
to draw the attention of the House to and I think the article had 
better be passed as it is. 
Dr. P.S. Deshmukh: (C.P. & Berar: General): Mr. President, Mr. 
T. T. Krishnamachari has clarified the position with regard to this 
exception which has been added to clause (1) of article 143. lf 
the Governor is, in fact, going to have a discretionary power, then 
it is necessary that this clause which Mr. Karnath seeks to omit 
must remain. 
Sir, Besides this, 1 do not know if the Drafting Committee has 
deliberately omitted or they are going to provide it at a later stage, 
and I would like to ask Dr. Ambedkar whether it is not necessary 
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to provide for the Governor to preside at the meetings of the 
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Council ofMinisters. I do not find any provision here to this effect. 
Since this article 143 is a mere reproduction of section 50 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935, where this provision does exist 
that the Governor in his discretion may preside at the meetings of 
the Council of Ministers, I think this power is very necessary. 
Otherwise, the Ministers may exclude the Governor from any 
meetings whatever and this power unless specifically provided 
for, would not be available to the Governor. l would like to draw 
the attention of the members of the Drafting Committee to this 
and to see if it is possible either to accept an amendment to article 
143 by leaving it over or by making this provision in some other 
part. I think this power of the Governor to preside over the meetings 
of the Cabinet is an essential one and ought to be provided for. 
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Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru: (United Provinces: General): Mr. 
President I should like to ask Dr. Ambedkar whether it is 
necessary to retain after the words "that the Governor will be 
aided and advised by his Ministers". the words "except in regard 
to certain matters in respect of which he is to exercise his 
discretion". Supposing these words, which are reminiscent of the 
old Government oflndiaAct and the old order, are omitted, what 
harm will be done? The functions of the Ministers legally will be 
only to aid and advice the Governor. The article
in which these 
words occur does not lay down that the Governor shall be guided 
by the advice of his Ministers but it is expected that in accordance 
with the Constitutional practice prevailing in all countries where 
responsible Government exists the Governor will in all matters 
accept the advice of his Ministers. This does not however mean 
that where the Statute clearly lays down that action in .regard to 
specified matters may be taken by him on his own authority this 
article 143 will stand in his way: 
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I should like to say one word more before I close. If article 143 is 
passed in its present form, it may give rise to misapprehensions of 
the kind that my honourable Friend Dr. Deshmukh seemed to 
be labouring under when he asked that a provision should be 
inserted entitling the Governor to preside over the meetings of the 
Council of Ministers. The Draft Constitution does not provide for 
H
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
this and I think wisely does not provide forth is. It would be contrary 
to the traditions of responsible government as they have been 
established in Great Britain and the British Dominions, that the 
Governor or the Governor-General should, as a matter of right, 
preside over the meetings of his cabinet. All that the Draft 
Constitution does is tcr lay on the Chief Minister the duty of 
informing the Governqr of the decisions come to by the Council 
of Ministers in regard to administrative matters and the 
legislative programme of the government. In spite of this, we see 
. thatthe article 143, as it is worded, has created a misunderstanding 
in the mind of a member like Dr. Deshmukh who takes pains to 
follow every article of the Constitution with care. This is an 
additional reason why the discretionary power of the Governor 
should not be referred to in article 143. The speech of my Friend 
Mr. Krishnamachari does not hold out the hope that the suggestion 
that I have made has any chance ofbe.ing accepted. Nevertheless, 
I feel it my duty to say that the course proposed by Mr. Karnath is 
better than what the Drafting'. Sub-Committee seem to approve. 
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Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar: (Madras: General): Sir, there is 
really no difference between those who oppose and those who 
approve the amendment. In the first place, the general principle is 
laid down in article 143
namely, the principle of ministerial 
responsibility, that the Governor in the various spheres of executive 
activity should act on the advice of his ministers. Then the article 
goes on to provide "except in so far as he is by or under this 
- Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in 
his discretion. So long as there are article in the Constitution which 
enable the Governor to act in his discretion and in certain 
circumstances, it may be, to over-ride the cabinet ·or to refer to 
the President, this article as it is framed is perfectly in order. If 
· 1ater on the House comes to the <:onclusion that those articles 
which enable the Governor to act in his discretion in specific cases 
should be deleted, it will be open to revise this artic;le. But so long 
as there are later articles which pennit the Governor to act in his 
discretion and not on ministerial responsibility, the article as drafted 
is perfectly in order. 
Shri H.V. Pataskar: (Bombay: General): Sir, article 143 is perfectly 
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clear. With regard to the amendment of my honourable Friend 
Mr. Karnath various points were raised, whether the Governor is 
to be merely a figure-head, whether he is to be a constitutional 
head only or whether he is to have discretionary powers. To my 
mind the question should be looked at from and entirely different 
point of view. Article 143 merely relates to the functions of the 
ministers. It does not primarily relate to the powers and functions 
of a Governor. It only says: 
"There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at 
the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his 
functions." 
Granting that we stop there, is it likely that any complications will 
arise or that it will interfere with the discretionary powers which 
are proposed to be given to the Governor? In my view article 188 
is probably necessa1y and I do not mean to suggest for a moment 
that the Governo(s powers to act in an emergency which powers 
are given under article 188, should not be there. My point is this, 
whether if this Provision, viz., "except in so far as he is by or 
under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of 
them in his discretion", is not there, is it going to affect the powers 
that are going to be given to him to act in his discretion under 
article 188? I have carefully listened to my honourable Friend and 
respected constitutional lawyer. Mr. Alladi
Krishnaswami Ayyer, 
but I was not able to follow why a provision like this is necessary. 
He said that instead later on, while considering article 188, we 
might have to say "Notwithstanding anything contained in article 
143." In the first place to my mind it is not necessary. In the next 
place, even granting that it becomes necessary at a later stage to 
make provision in mticle 188 by saying "notwithstanding anything 
contained in article 143", it looks so obnoxious to keep these words 
here and they are likely to enable certain people to create a sort 
ofunnecessa1y and unwarranted prejudice against ce1tain people. 
Article 143 primarily relates to the functions of the ministers. Why 
is it necessary at this stage to remind the ministers of the powers 
of the Governor and his functions, by tel I ing them that they shall 
not give any aid or advice in so far as he, the Governor is required 
to act in his discretion? This is an article which is intended to 
, define the powers and functions of the Chief Minister. At that 
point to suggest this, looks like lacking in courtesy and politeness.
NABAM REBIA, AND 13AMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH· SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Therefore I think the question should be considered in that way. 
The question is not whether we are going to give discretionary 
powers to the Governors or not. The question is not whether he is 
to be merely a figure-head or otherwise. These are questions to 
be debated at their proper time and place. When we are 
considering article 143 which defines the functions of the Chief 
Minister it looks so awkward and unnecessary to say in the same 
article "except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution 
required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion." 
Though I entirely agree that article 188 is absolutely necessary 1 
suggest that in this article 143 these words are entirely.unnecessary 
and should not be there. Looked at from a practical point of view 
this provision is misplaced and it is not courteous, nor polite, nor 
justified nor relevant. I therefore suggest that nothing would be 
lost by deleting these words. I do not know whether my suggestion 
would be acceptable but I think it is worth being considered from 
a higher point of view. 
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The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Mr. President, Sir, I did not 
think that it would have been necessary for me to speak and take 
part in this debate after what my Friend, Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari, 
had said on this amendment of Mr. Karnath, but as my 
Friend, Pandit Kunzru, pointedly asked me the
question and 
demanded a reply, I thought that out of cou11esy I should say a 
few words. Sir, the main and the crucial question is, should the 
Governor have discretionary powers? It is that question which is 
the main and the principal question. After we come to some decision 
on this question, the other question whether the words used in the 
last part of clause (I) of article 143 should be retained in that 
article or should be transferred somewhere else could be usefully 
considered. The first thing, therefore, that I propose to do so is to 
devote myself of this question which, as I said, is. the crucial 
question. It has been said in the course of the debate that the 
retention of discretionary power in the Governor is contrary to 
responsible government in the provinces. It has also been said 
that the retention of discretionary power in the Governor smells 
of the Government of India Act, 1935, which in the main was 
undemocratic. Now, speaking for myself, I have no doubt in my 
mind that the retention in or the vesting the Governor with certain 
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discretionary powers is in no sense contrary to or in no sense a 
negation ofresponsible government. I do not wish to rake up the 
point because on this point I can very well satisfy the House by 
reference to the provisions in the Constitution of Canada and the 
Constitution of Australia. I do not think anybody in this House 
would dispute that the Canadian system of government is not a 
fully responsible system of government, nor will anybody in this 
House cha I lenge that the Australian Government is not a 
responsible form of government. Having said that, I would like to 
read section 55 of the Canadian Constitution. 
"Section 55.-Where a Bill passed by the Houses of Parliament 
is presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent, he 
shall, according to his discretion, and subject to provisions of this 
Act, either assent thereto in the Queen's name, or withhold the 
Queen's assent or reserve the Bill for the signification of the 
Queen's pleasure." 
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The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: I think he has misread the 
article. I am sorry I do not have the Draft Gonstitution with me. 
"Except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution," those are 
the words. If the words were "except whenever he thinks that he 
should exercise this power of discretion against the wishes or 
against the advice of the ministers", then I think the criticism made 
by my honourable Friend Pandit Kunzru would
have been valid. 
The clause is a very limited clause; it says: "except in so far as he 
is by or under this Constitution". Therefore, article 143 will have 
· to be read in conjunction with such other articles which specifically 
reserve the power to the Governor. It is not a general clause 
giving the Governor power to disregard the advice of his ministers 
in any matter in which he finds he ought to disregard. There, I 
think, lies the fallacy of the argument of my honourable Friend, 
Pandit Kunzru. 
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Therefore, as I said, having stated that there is nothing incompatible 
with the retention of the discretionary power in the Governor in 
specified cases with the system of responsible Government, the 
only question that arises is, how should we provide for the mention 
of this discretionary power? It seems to me that there are three 
ways by which this could be done. One way is to omit the words 
H
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SlNGH KHEHAR, J.) 
from article 143 as my honourable Friend, Pandit Kunzru, and 
others desire and to add to such articles as 175, or 188 or such 
other provisions which the House may hereafter introduce, vesting 
the Governor with the discretionary power, saying notwithstanding 
article 143, the Governor shall have this or that power. The other 
way would be to say in article 143, ''that except as provided in 
articles so and so specifically mentioned-articles 175, 188, 200 or 
whatever they are". But the point I am t1ying to submit to the 
House is that the House cannot escape from mentioning in some 
manner that the Governor shall have discretion. 
Now the matter which seems to find some kind of favour with 
my honourable Friend, Pandit Kunzru and those who have spoken 
in the same way is that the words should be omitted from here 
and should be tra1isferred somewhere else or that the specific 
articles should be mentioned in article 143. It seems to me that 
this is a mere method of drafting. There is no question of substance 
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and no question of principle. I personally myself would be quite 
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willing to amend the last portion of clause (I) of ai1icle 143 if I 
knew at this stage what are the provisions that this Constituent 
Assembly proposes to make with regard to the vesting of the 
Governor with discretionary power. My difficulty is that we have 
not as yet come either to article 175
or 188 nor have we exhausted 
all the possibilities of other provisions being made, vesting the 
E 
Governor with discretionary power. If I knew that, I would very 
readily agree to amend article 143 and to mention the specific 
article, but that cannot be done now. Therefore, my submission is 
that no wrong could be done ifthe words as they stand in article 
143 remain as they are. They are ce11ainly not inconsistent. 
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Shri H. V. Karnath: Is there no material difference between article 
61(1) relating to the President vis-a-vis his ministers and this 
article? 
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Of course there is because 
we do not want to vest the President with any discretionary power. 
Because the provincial Governments are required to work in 
subordination to the Central Government, and therefore, in order 
to see that they do act in subordination to the Central Government 
the Governor will reserve certain things in order to give the 
President the opprn1unity to see that the rules under which the 
provincial Governments are supposed to act according to the 
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Constitution or in subordination to the Central Government are 
observed. 
Shri H.V. Karnath: Will it not be better to specify certain articles 
in the Constitution with regard to discretionary powers, instead of 
conferring general discretionary powers like this? 
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: I said so, that I would very 
readily do it. I am prepared to introduce specific articles, if I 
knew what are the articles which the House is going to incorporate 
in the Constitution regarding vesting of the discretionary powers 
in the Governor. 
Shri H.V. Karnath: Why not hold it over? 
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: We can revise. This House 
is perfectly competent to revise article 143. If after going through 
the whole of it, the House feels that the better way would be to 
mention the articles specifically, it can do so. It is purely 
a logomachy." 
It is not necessary for us to summarise any inferences or conclusions, 
from the above debate, as the same are apparent from the suggestions 
and responses, highlighted above. 
43. Reliance was then placed on the decision rendered by a 
Constitution Bench of this Court in Sam sher Singh v. State of Punjab 1• 
The question that arose for consideration in the above case was; whether 
the Governor as a constitutional head of the State, could exercise powers 
or functions ofappointment and removal of members of the subordinate 
judicial service, personally? The
contention of the State Government 
was, that the Governor was obliged to exercise powers of appointment 
and removal, conferred on him by or under the Constitution, like the 
other executive power of the State Government, only on the aid and 
advice of the Council of Ministers, and not personally. As against the 
above stance, the appellants before this Court placed reliance on the 
decision in Sardari Lal v. Union of India', wherein this Court had held, 
that the President or the Governor, as the case may be, on being satisfied 
would make an order under Article 311 (2), and more particularly, under 
proviso (c) thereof. It was further held, that the satisfaction of the 
President or the Governor, in the above matter, was his "personal 
satisfaction". It was therefore, the contention of the appellants before 
I (1974)2SCC831 
' (1971) l sec 411
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
this Court, in the above case, that in exercise of powers vested with the 
Governor under Article 234, the appointment/termination of subordinate 
judges was to be made by the Governor in exercise of his "personal 
discretion". It would also be relevant to mention, that the Samsher Singh 
case' was decided by a seven-Judge Bench, which examined the 
correctness of the decision rendered in the Sardari Lal case~. While 
debating the issue, this Cou1t in the Sam sher Singh case', examined the 
distinction between Articles 74 and 163, and held as under: 
"16. It is noticeable that though in Article 74 it is stated that there 
shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the 
head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions, 
there is no provision in Article 74 comparable to Article 163 that 
the aid and advice is except in so far as he is required to exercise 
his functions or any of them in his discretion. 
17. It is necessary to find out as to why the words 'in his discretion' 
are used in relation to some powers of the Governor and not in 
the case of the President. 
18. Article 143 in the Draft Constitution became Article 163 in 
the Constitution. The Draft Constitution in Article 144(6) said that 
the functions of the Governor under that article with respect to 
the appointment and dismissal of Ministers shall be exercised by 
him in his discretion.
Draft Article 144(6) was totally omitted when 
Article 144 became Article 164 in the Constitution, Again Draft 
Article 153(3) said that the functions of the Governor under clauses 
(a) and (c) of clause (2) ofthe article shall be exercised by him in 
his discretion. Draft Article 153(3) was totally omitted when it 
became Article 174 ofour Constitution. Draft A1ticle 175 (proviso) 
said that the Governor "may in his discretion return the Bill together 
with a message requesting that the House will reconsider the Bill". 
Those words that "the Governor may in his discretion" were 
omitted when it became Article 200. The Governor under 
Article 200 may return the B ii I together with a message requesting 
that the House will reconsider the Bill. Draft Article 188 dealt 
with provisions in case of grave emergencies. Clauses (1) and (4) 
in Draft Article 188 used the words "in his discretion" in relation 
to exercise of power by the Governor. Draft Article 188 was totally 
omitted. Draft Article 285(1) and (2) dealing with composition 
and staff of Public Service Commission used the expression "in 
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his discretion" in relation to exercise of power by the Governor in 
regard to appointment of the Chairman and Members and making 
of regulation. The words "in his discretion" in relation to exercise 
of power by the Governor were omitted when it became 
Article 316. In Paragraph 15(3) of the Sixth Schedule dealing with 
annulment or suspension of Acts or suspension of Acts and 
resolutions of District and Regional Councils it was said that the 
functions of the Governor under the Paragraph shall be exercised 
by him in his discretion. Sub-paragraph 3 of Paragraph 15 of the 
Sixth Schedule was omitted at the time of enactment of the 
Constitution. 
19. It is, therefore, understood in the background of these illustrative 
draft articles as to why Article 143 in the Draft Constitution which 
became Article 163 in our Constitution used the expression "in 
his discretion" in regard to some powers of the Governor. 
20. Articles where the expression "acts in his discretion" is used 
in relation to the powers and functions of the Governor are those 
which speak of special responsibilities of the Governor. These 
articles are 371A(l)(b), 371A(l)(d), 371A(2)(b) and 371A(2)(f). 
There are two paragraphs in the Sixth Schedule, namely, 9(2) and 
18(3) where the words "in his discretion" are used in relation to 
certain powers of the Governor. Paragraph 9(2) is in relation to 
determination ofamount ofroyalties payable
by licensees or lessees 
prospecting for, or extracting minerals to the District Council. 
Paragraph 18(3) has been omitted with effect from January 21, 
1972. 
. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
30. In all cases in which the President or the Governor exercises 
his functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution with 
the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers he does so by making 
rules for convenient transaction of the business of the Government 
oflndia or the Government of the State respectively or by allocation 
among his Ministers of the said business, in accordance with 
A11icles 77(3) and 166(3) respectively. Wherever the Constitution 
requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the 
exercise of any power or function by the President or the Governor, 
. as the case may be, as for example in Articles 123, 213, 311 (2) 
proviso(c), 317, 352(1), 356 and 360 the satisfaction required
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY: SPEAKER 
79 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President 
A 
or of the Governor but is the satisfaction of the President or of the 
Governor in the constitutional sense under the Cabinet system of 
Government. The reasons are these. It is the satisfaction of the 
Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the 
Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions. Neither 
Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of 
power. Both Articles 77(3) and 166(3) provide that the President 
under Article 77(3) and the Governor under Article 166(3) shall 
make rules forthe more convenient transaction of the business of 
B 
the Government and the allocation of business among the Ministers 
of the said business. The Rules of Business and the allocation 
among the Ministers of the said business all indicate that the 
decision of any Minister or officer under the Rules of Business 
made under these two articles viz., Article 77(3) in the case of 
the President and Article 166(3) in the case of the Governor of 
the State is the decision of the President or the Governor 
respectively." 
44. Based on the determination rendered by this Court in the 
Samsher Singh case 1, it was submitted, that all functions discharged by 
the Governor, Jou Id have to be based on the aid and advice of the 
Council of Ministers (with the Chief Minister as the
head), and in the 
instant case, it is apparent, that the Governor had acted on his own, 
while issuing the order dated 9.12.2015, for summoning the House for 
16.12.2015, under Article 174. It was pointed out, that the Governor in 
the above order had himself recorded, that " ... I may not be bound by 
the advice of the Council of.Ministers ... "and had also expressed therein, 
" ... it is a constitutional obligation on my part to ensure that the resolution 
for removal of the Speaker is expeditiously placed before the Legislative 
Assembly ... ". And likewise, the message of the Governor dated 
9.12.2015, directing that the composition of the House should not be 
changed, and the manner in which the business of the House was to be 
conducted when it assembled on 16.12.2015, was issued without any aid 
and advice. 
45. Based on the conclusions recorded in the Samsher Singh case1, 
it was contended, that the disqualification process contemplated under 
the Tenth Schedule, is of no concern, of the Governor. While, it was 
acknowledged, that the Tenth Schedule was introduced into the 
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Constitution, to maintain and sustain the process of democratic 
governance, and therefore, the same could not be put on a backburner 
or suspended. Learned counsel was emphatic in his submission, that the 
Governor has no role in the disqualification process contemplated under 
the Tenth Schedule. And the Speaker alone, has the authority to effectuate 
in his exclusive discretion, the schedule which needed to be adopted, in 
the process of disqualification ofMLAs. As such, it was asserted, that 
the fluidity of the democratic process, could not be treated as some kind 
of justification, for the Governor's order and message dated 9.12.2015. 
46. Learned senior counsel also contended, that all actions of the 
Governor, ought to be in conformity with the aid and advice tendered to 
him by the Council of Ministers and the Chief Minister, except when 
mandated otherwise. It was submitted, that where such an express 
discretion is not provided for, by or under a constitutional provision, the 
Governor is precluded from exercising his own discretion. Illustratively, 
he invited our attention to Articles 371-A(1 )(b ), 3 71-A( I)( d), 3 7 l-A(2)(b) 
and 371-A(2)(t), wherein the Articles themselves postulate that the 
Governor would discharge his functions in his individual discretion/ 
judgment. Reliance in this behalf, was placed on PU Myllai Hlychho v. 
State of Mizoram'. It was submitted, that similar dis9retion
has also 
been vested with the Governor under the provisions of the Fifth and the 
Sixth Schedules to the Constitution. In this behalf, reference was made 
to State ofMeghalaya v. KA Brhyien Kurkalang", Bhuri Nath v. Sate of 
Jammu & Kashmir', and Samatha v. State of A.P.6• Illustratively, 
reference was also made to Articles 167, 200 and 356 wherein the 
Governor is presumed to exercise his powers at his own discretion, 
because the above provisions cannot be construed otherwise. It was 
accordingly asserted, that individual discretion could be exercised by the 
Governor, only when the Governor was so expressly authorized by a 
constitutional provision, to exercise his discretion at his own. And not 
otherwise. 
47. It was pointed out, that the functions of the office of the 
Governor vis-a-vis the State Legislature, are coruparable to those of the 
President with reference to the Parliament and the Central Government. 
In order to highlight the contours of the duties and responsibilities of the 
' (2005J 2 sec n 
• (1972) 1 sec 148 
' (1997) 2 sec 745 
H 
'(1997)8SCCl91
NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 
AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 
Governor, and the extent to which he can participate in the legislative 
process, reliance was placed on a treatise by M.N Kaul and S.L. Shakdher 
- "Practice and Procedure of Parliament", (5th Edition), published by 
the Lok Sabha Secretariat. In order to highlight the extent of the 
Governor's power and authority, on the subject of summoning the 
Assembly, reference was made to the following position narrated in 
Chapter IX, which bears the heading-._"Summoning, Prorogation of the 
Houses of Parliament and the Dissolution of the Lok Sabha": 
"Summoning of Lok Sabha-
The power to summon Lok Sabha is vested in the President. He 
exercises this power on the recommendation of the Prime Minister 
or the Cabinet. He may make informal suggestions to the Prime 
Minister as to the more convenient date and time of summoning 
the House, but the ultimate advice in this matter rests with the 
Prime Minister. 
In West Bengal consequent on the resignation of eighteen 
members, inctuding one Minister, from the ruling United Front on 
6 November, 1967, prima facie doubts arose about majority support 
to the Government in the Legislative Assembly. The Governor 
desired that the Assembly be summoned on 23 November, so that 
a confidence vote might be taken, but the Chief Minister said that 
he would call the Assembly into session on 18 December, as 
scheduled. Thereupon, the Governor dismissed the
Ministry on 
21 November. 
The crisis in West Bengal, as observed by Speaker Reddy, was 
not unavoidable, for the Governor need not have precipitated 
matters by insisting on the Chief Minister to convene the Assembly 
earlier than scheduled, when the interval between the two dates 
was only of a few days. 
In a Resolution adopted at the Conference of Presiding Officers, 
it was recommended that the Government of India should, in the 
light of the following observations, take urgent and suitable steps 
in regard to the powers of Governors to summon or prorogue the 
Legislatures and to dismiss Ministries: 
That a Governor shall summon or prorogue the Legislature on the 
advice of the ChiefMinister. A convention shall be developed that 
the Chief Minister may fix the dates of summoning or prorogation 
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after consulting the Presiding Officer concerned. The Governor 
may suggest an alternative date but it shall be left to the Chief 
Minister or the Cabinet to revise their decision or not. Where, 
however, there is undue delay in summoning a Legislative 
Assembly and the majority of members of the Legislative Assembly 
desire to discuss a Motion of No-confidence in a Ministry and 
make a request to that effect in writing to the Chief Minister, the 
ChiefM inister shal I advise the Governor to summon the Assembly 
within a week of such request. 
The proposal to summon Lok Sabha is initiated by the Minister of 
Parliamentary Affairs (and by the Leader of the House in case 
_the Prime Minister is not the Leader of the House) and submitted 
to the Prime Minister, after an informal consultation with the 
Speaker in regard to the date of commencement and the duration 
of the session. The Prime Minister may agree with the suggestion 
or refer it to the Cabinet. The proposal as finally agreed to by the 
Prime Minister or the Cabinet is formally submitted to the Speaker. 
If the Speaker also agrees (in the case of a rare disagreement, he 
may refer the matter back to the Prime Minister for 
reconsideration), he directs the Secretary-General to obtain the 
order of the President to summon Lok Sabha on the date and time 
specified. After the President has signed the order, the Secretariat 
notifies it in the Gazette
Extraordinary and issues a press 
communique for wider publicity in the Press as well as over the 
All India Radio and Doordarshan." 
And from ChapLer XLI under the title - "Parliament and the States", 
our attention was invited to the following narration: 
"Prorogation of the Assembly 
As regards prorogation, the Governor should normally act on the 
advice of his Council of Ministers. Where a notice ofno-confidence 
against his Ministry is pending in the Assembly, the Governor should 
G 
first satisfy himself that the notice is not frivolous and is a genuine 
exercise of the parliamentary right of the Opposition to challenge 
the Government's majority. If so satisfied, the Governor should 
ask the Chief Minister to face the Assembly and allow the motion 
to be debated and voted upon. To prorogue the Assembly otherwise 
would amount to avoidance of responsibility of the Council of 
H 
Ministers to the Assembly.