GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. versus M/S BSK REALTORS LLP & ANR.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1159, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Unknown
Segment: Facts
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1159 : 2024 INSC 455
Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. 
v. 
M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 6604 of 2024)
17 May 2024 
[Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
a) Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one appellant 
in the first round operates as res judicata against the other appellant 
in the second round before this Court; b) Whether suppression of 
the first round of litigation by the appellants constitutes a material 
fact, thereby inviting an outright dismissal of the appeals at the 
threshold; c) Does the doctrine of merger operate as a bar to 
entertain the civil appeals in the present case; d) Whether the 
previous determination of the rights of subsequent purchasers in an 
inter se dispute precludes the same issue from being reconsidered 
between the same parties.
Headnotes†
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation 
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013 – Whether the dismissal of a civil 
appeal preferred by one appellant in the first round operates 
as res judicata against the other appellant in the second round 
before this Court:
Held: In the lead matter before this Court or for that matter the 
other appeals, the co-respondents before the High Court, namely, 
GNCTD and DDA did not have conflicting interests – Inter se them, 
neither was there any disputed issue, nor could have the High 
Court possibly adjudicated on any such
issue – Before this Court 
too, in the first round, there was no issue on which GNCTD and 
DDA were at loggerheads – In the light of this, in accordance with 
the legal principle, the applicability of res judicata is negated – Res 
judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same 
parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been 
conclusively determined by a court – However, it is crucial to note 
that the previous decision of this Court in the first round would not 
operate as res judicata to bar a decision on the lead matter and the
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other appeals; more so, because this rule may not apply hard and 
fast in situations where larger public interest is at stake – In such 
cases, a more flexible approach ought to be adopted by courts, 
recognizing that certain matters transcend individual disputes and 
have far-reaching public interest implications. [Paras 23 and 25]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation 
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013 – Whether suppression of the first 
round of litigation by the appellants constitutes a material 
fact, thereby inviting an outright dismissal of the appeals at 
the threshold:
Held: Law is well settled that the fact suppressed must be  
material in the sense that it would have an effect on the merits 
of the case – The concept of suppression or non-disclosure of 
facts transcends mere concealment; it necessitates the deliberate 
withholding of material facts—those of such critical import that 
their absence would render any decision unjust – Material facts, 
in this context, refer to those facts that possess the potential 
to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter 
its trajectory – This principle is not intended to arm one party 
with a weapon of technicality over its adversary but rather 
serves as a crucial safeguard against the abuse of the judicial  
process – Nevertheless, this Court has carefully considered the 
orders issued
during the first round of litigation, which are alleged 
to have been suppressed – Despite reviewing these orders, 
there are no compelling reason to dismiss the appeals based  
solely on the prior dismissal of appeals filed by some other appellant/
authority. [Paras 30 and 31]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation 
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013 – Does the doctrine of merger operate 
as a bar to entertain the civil appeals in the instant case:
Held: The concept of public interest need not be viewed narrowly 
only on the yardstick of loss to public exchequer and that these 
are the cases where public at large has acquired interest in the 
public infrastructures already complete or in process of completion, 
this Court is satisfied that if the doctrine of merger is applied 
mechanically in respect of Groups A (deals with M.A.s filed by 
the appellants-authorities primarily pleading change in law and
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
seeking recall of the judgments and orders of this Court dismissing 
the Civil Appeals and/or Review Petitions in the first round) and 
B.1 (includes cases where Civil Appeals were dismissed in the 
first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal) is pending before 
this Court in the second round) cases, it will lead to irreversible 
consequences – This Court is satisfied that the element of disparity 
between Groups A and B.1 cases visà-vis cases falling in Group 
C is liable to be eliminated and this can only be done by invoking 
extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so 
that complete justice is done between the expropriated landowners, 
the State and its developing agencies and most importantly the 
public in general who has acquired a vested right in the public 
infrastructure projects. [Para 41]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation 
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013 – Delhi Lands (Restrictions on 
Transfers) Act, 1972 – Whether the previous determination 
of the rights of subsequent purchasers in an inter se dispute 
precludes the same issue from being reconsidered between 
the same parties:
Held: Group E cases deal with allegations regarding fraud 
by landowners by suppressing subsequent sale transactions, 
ownership title disputes, etc – It is settled that transfer of land in 
respect of
which acquisition proceedings had been initiated, after 
issuance of Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, is void 
and a subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the validity of the 
notification or the irregularity in taking possession of the land –  
Also, the structure of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) 
Act, 1972 clearly indicates that any subsequent sale of the specified 
land without prior permission from the competent authority is not 
allowed, and if such sale is done through concealment, it amounts 
to fraud – The law with respect to “who” can invoke section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act has been well settled after the decision of 
this Court in Shiv Kumar wherein it was held that subsequent 
purchasers do not have the locus to contest the acquisition and/
or claim lapse of the acquisition proceedings – Coming to the 
specifics of each case qua subsequent purchasers or disputes 
regarding the title of the subject lands, this Court has clarified 
the scope of inquiry in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and 
others – As far as the concealment of material facts regarding
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subsequent sale transactions, earlier round of litigations etc. are 
concerned, it is noted that the landowners and affected parties 
are under no obligation to either confirm or deny the allegations 
levelled against them – Nor this Court has directed the appellants 
to furnish original records or documents to substantiate their claim 
of concealment and suppression of material facts – Engaging in 
a factual inquiry at such an advanced stage of the legal process, 
especially without providing adequate opportunities to all parties, 
may not be fair – The cases listed in Group E involve complex 
questions of fact and this Court being the Court of the last resort, 
ought not to be involved in such elaborate factfinding exercise – 
Therefore, deem it appropriate to remit these cases to the High 
Court for proper adjudication on points of law as well as facts. 
[Paras 42, 44, 45, 46, 48]
Doctrine/Principles – Res judicata – discussed.
Doctrine/Principles – Doctrine of merger – Exception:
Held: This Court takes notice of the exception carved out by this 
Court in Kunhayammed, to the effect that the doctrine of merger 
is not of universal or unlimited application and that the nature of 
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or 
subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid 
shall have to be kept in view – The exception that has been carved 
out in Kunhayammed, will only be permissible in
the rarest of 
rare cases and such a deviation can be invoked sparingly only – 
However, among such exceptions, the extraordinary constitutional 
powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of 
India, which is to be exercised with a view to do complete justice 
between the parties, remains unaffected and being an unfettered 
power, shall always be deemed to be preserved as an exception 
to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis.  [Para 33]
Public Interest – Land Acquisition – Elements of Public interest:
Held: a) While balancing the interest of the public exchequer against 
that of individuals, there are many other interests at stake, and 
it might not be possible to undo the acquisitions without causing 
significant cascading harms and losses to such other interests; 
b) Since development projects have either begun or most of the 
acquired lands have already been deployed for essential public 
projects such as hospitals, schools, expansion of metro, etc., the
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
effect of non-condonation of delay would go beyond mere financial 
loss to the exchequer and would extend to the public at large;  
c) It would be like unscrambling the egg if compensation paid 
would have to be clawed back or possession taken would have 
to be reversed; d) In many cases, the development projects might 
also have to be undone – The reversal of possession of even a 
small plot lying on projects such as an under-construction metro 
corridor would be practically impossible; e) These are the cases 
where rights are vested to the public at large given the public 
infrastructure that has come up on a large number of acquired lands; 
f) The fresh acquisition, if so is required to be done by the State, 
would be at the expense of delaying the construction of critical 
public infrastructure in our national capital – When balancing public 
with private interest, the comparative interest on the landowners 
would be nominal as compared to the public at large; and g) The 
multiplicity of contradictory judicial opinions on section 24 (2) 
of the 2013 Act has made the present set of circumstances sui 
generis – The constant flux in the legal position of law has posed 
significant challenges for the State and its authorities. [Para 40]
Case Law Cited
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal [2020] 3 SCR 1 : 
(2020) 8 SCC 129 – followed.
State of Gujarat and Others v. M.P. Shah
Charitable Trust and 
Others [1994] 3 SCR 163 : (1994) 3 SCC 552; Mathura Prasad 
Bajoo Jaiswal and Others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy [1970] 3 
SCR 830 : (1970) 1 SCC 613; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) 
Ltd v. State of Bihar and Others [2004] 3 SCR 56 : (2004) 7 SCC 
166; Arunima Baruah v. Union of India and Others [2007] 5 SCR 
904 : (2007) 6 SCC 120 – relied on.
Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and Others Civil Appeal No. 
6798 of 2024 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 26697/2019; Pune 
Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Mistrimal Solanki [2014] 
1 SCR 783 : (2014) 3 SCC 183; Govt (NCT) of Delhi v. Manav 
Dharam Trust and Another [2017] 4 SCR 232 : (2017) 6 SCC 
751; Shiv Kumar and Another v. Union of India and Others [2019] 
13 SCR 695 : (2019) 10 SCC 229; Kunhayammed and Others. 
v. State of Kerala and Another [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 
6 SCC 359; Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal 
Solanki (2020) SCC OnLine SC 1471 – referred to.
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Ranjana Bhatia v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another (2014) SCC 
OnLine Del 2151; Sparsh Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 
and Others (2014) SCC OnLine Del 6659 – referred to.
Munni Bibi (since deceased) and Another v. Tirloki Nath and Others 
AIR (1931) PC 114 – referred to.
List of Acts
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Act, 2013; Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972; 
Constitution of India; Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
List of Keywords
Land Acquisition; Res judicata; Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; 
Salus populi suprema lex esto; Public interest; Doctrine of merger; 
Article 142 of the Constitution of India; Elements of Public interest; 
Balancing the interest of the public exchequer; Public infrastructure; 
Balancing public with private interest; Fraud by Landowners;  
Concealment and suppression of material facts; Subsequent sale 
transactions; Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Act, 2013; Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6604 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2016 of the High Court of 
Delhi at New Delhi in WPC No.7442 of 2015
With
C.A. Nos. 6605, 6606, 6607, 6608, 6610, 6611, 6612, 6613 and 
6649 of 2024, M.A. No. 277 of
2023 In C.A. No. 8492 of 2016, M.A. 
…. D.No. 39901 of 2022, M.A. No. 278 of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 674 
of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 3577 of 2023, M.A. No. 346 of 2023, M.A. ... 
D.No. 5711 of 2023, C.A. No. 542 of 2016, C.A. Nos. 6614, 6615 and 
6650 of 2024, Conmt. Pet.(C) No. 189 of 2019 In C.A. No. 2690 of 
2017, C.A. Nos. 6651, 6616, 6618, 6652, 6619, 6653, 6620, 6621, 
6622, 6623, 6624, 6625, 6626, 6627, 6628, 6654 and 6655 of 2024, 
Slp(C) D.No. 21746 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6629 and 6656 of 2024, M.A. 
... D.No. 39898 of 2022, M.A. ... D.No. 40951 of 2022, M.A. ... D.No.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
42177 of 2022, M.A. ... D.No. 1215 of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 1713 of 
2023, M.A. No. 1888 of 2023 In C.A. No. 352 of 2023, C.A. Nos. 6630, 
6631, 6632 and 6633-6634 of 2024, M.A. No. 806 of 2020 in C.A. No. 
2690 of 2017, C.A. Nos. 6981, 6635, 6636, 6637, 6638, 6639, 6640, 
6641, 6642 and 6643 of 2024, SLP(C) D.No. 18142 of 2022, C.A. 
Nos. 6658 and 6644 of 2024, SLP(C) D. No.19142 of 2022, C.A. No. 
6659 of 2024, SLP(C) D. No.19687 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6660, 6648, 
6661, 6662, 6647 and 6663 of 2024, SLP(C) D. Nos. 20104 and 
20203 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6645, 6664 and 6646 of 2024 and M.A. ... 
D.No. 32991 of 2023.
Appearances for Parties
R. Venkataramani, Attorney General, Ms. Aishwariya Bhati, K 
M Nataraj, A.S.Gs., Ms. Rachna Shrivastva, Sanjay Poddar, V. 
Chitambaresh, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, C.A. Sundaram, Dhruv 
Mehta, Ashish Dholakia, Jayant Mehta, Vinay Garg, Ravinder Sethi, 
Kailash Vasdev, A.K Panda, Sr. Advs., Atul Kumar, Ms. Sweety 
Singh, Ms. Archana Kumari, Rahul Pandey, AVS Kadyan, Chintan 
Singhal, Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Pandey, Raman Yadav, Kartikay 
Aggarwal, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Ms. Monika, Ms. Poornima Singh, 
Ms. Manisha Chava, Ms. BLN Shivani, Rustam Singh Chauhan, 
Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia, Ms. Sonakshi Chaturvedi, M/s. Saharya & 
Co., Varun Punia, Ms. Manika Tripathy, Ashutosh Kaushik, Rony 
John, Ms. Astha Tyagi, Nishit Agrawal, Ms. Prachi Bajpai, Chandra 
Prakash,
Ms. Shalini Chandra, Ashwani Kumar, Kedar Nath Tripathy, 
Ram Naresh Yadav, Ms. Malvika Kapila, Ms. Tanwangi Shukla, Nitin 
Mishra, Ms. Sunieta Ojha, Ms. Vasudha Priyansha, Vineet Malhotra, 
Mohit Paul, Vishal Gohri, Ms. Rangoli Seth, Ms. Sanjleena Lal, 
N. Balraj, Soumik Ghosal, Pankaj Bhagat, Ms. Trisha Chandran, 
Vishal Sinha, Ms. Prerna Raman, Zafar Inayat, Ms. Rohini Musa, 
A. Gupta, M. C. Dhingra, Sumit Bansal, Udai Bir Singh Kochar, 
Utsav Garg, Mrs. Madhavi Yadav, Ms. Prashi Tyagi, Vikrant Yadav, 
Yashraj Singh Deora, Priyesh Mohan Srivastava, Abhishek Singh, 
Ms. Sonal K Chopra, Bharat Arora, Manikya Khanna, Raghav Bhatia, 
Sharath Sampath, Aprit Kumar Singh, Tarun Mehta, Aditya Krishna, 
M/s. Vedya Partners, Siddharth Batra, S.K. Raout, Chinmay Dubey, 
Ms. Shivani Chawla, Ms. Archna Yadav, Rhythm Katyal, Ashutosh 
Chugh, Pratyush Arora, Kunal Yograj Verma, Jasbir Singh Malik, 
Ms. Chandni Sharma, Ms. Divya Mishra, Manish Paliwal, Udaibir
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Singh Kochar, Parv Garg, Pawas Kulshreshtha, Karandeep Singh 
Rekhi, Puneet Sharma, Mahesh Prasad, Ms. Aashi Gupta, Shambu 
Prasad, Sher Singh, Alok K. Prasad, B.L. Shivhare, Rajesh Singh 
Chauhan, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ms. Sushma Suri, Ranjit Kumar 
Sharma, Rajeev Ghawana, Neelaksh Sharma, Vikalp Chandela, 
T.V.S. Raghavendra Sreyas, Siddharth Vasudev, Ms. Kiran Ahlawat, 
Prithvi Pal, S K Rout, Dr. N. Pradeep Sharma, Ganesh Singh, 
Priyonkoo Anjan Gogoi, Amit Acharya, Mayank Gupta, Ms. Sristhi 
Jain, Onkar Prasad, Ms. Shruti Vaibhav, Aman Mehrotra, Pramod 
B. Agarwala, Chandra Bhushan Prasad, Gagan Gupta, Udaibir 
Kochar, R.B. Singh, Mohit Kumar Gupta, Arvind Kumar Gupta, 
Vikas Kumar, Mukesh Kumar Verma, Vikas Gupta, Vivek Gupta, 
Lav Kumar Agrawal, Nikhil Tyagi, Ajay Marwah, Vinay K. Shailendra, 
Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Saksham Maheshwari, Abhimanyu Bhandari, 
N.S. Vasisht, M.P. Bhargava, Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, Sahib Kochhar, 
T. Mahipal, Ms. Charu Ambwani, N S Vasisht, Ms. Jyoti Kataria, M 
P Bhargava, Aashu Tyagi, Varun Kapur, Mehmood Umar Faruqui, 
Bankey Bihari, Rajender Pd. Saxena, N.P. Sahni, Vineet Sinha, V.S. 
Tomar, Rabin Majumder, Rajiv Ranjan Dwivedi, Ms. Rashmi Malhotra, 
Ravi Bharuka, Aman Mohit Hingorani, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Ms. 
Smita Maan, Vishal Maan, Aditya Singh, Aakash Sehrawat, Ms. 
Sunita Sharma, Hariom Singh R., Shalinder Saini, Ms. Mitali Gupta, 
Ishaan Sharma, Ms. Sambhaavi Sharma, Govind Kumar, Ms.
Shagun 
Sabharwal, Mrs. Sunita Sharma, Balendu Shekhar, Anukalp Jain, 
A.K Kaul, Rohit Pandey, Amrish Kumar, Gurmeet Singh Makker, 
Nachiketa Joshi, Pratyush Shrivastava, Prashant Rawat, Rajan 
Kumar Chourasia, Annirudh Sharma-ii, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Ms. 
Sakshi Kakkar, Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, Rakesh Kumar-I, Ms. Arti 
Singh, Mukul Kumar, Ms. Prachi Bajpai, Krishan Kumar, Dharamraj 
Ohlan, Ms. Charu Nagpal, Krishan Kaushik, Chirag Singhal, Mukesh 
Kumar, Vishwa Pal Singh, Dr. Rajeev Sharma, Prashant Sharma, 
Dharmendra Sharma, Vipin Kumar Sharma, Raghuvir Sharma, Ms. 
Devjani Deka Bharali, Ms. Meena Hasan, Anil Kaushik, Aishwary 
Jaiswal, Tarun Johri, Anil Kumar Panwar, Rajinder Juneja, Gaurav 
Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties. 
Petitioner-in-person
Respondent-in-person
Applicant-in-person
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
TABLE OF CONTENTS*
A.
PREFACE...........................................................................
5
B.
BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS ..........................................
7
C.
JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY ...............................................
11
D.
CATEGORIZATION OF CASES ...................................... 13
E.
SUBMISSIONS ................................................................ 18
F.
ANALYSIS .......................................................................
24
F.1 Res judicata................................................................
24
F.2 Suppression of material facts by appellants..............
28
F.3 Merger.........................................................................
31
F.4 Allegations of fraud committed by landowners........... 38
G.
CONCLUSION..................................................................
41
ANNEXURE 1.......................................................................... 53
1.	
In view of the reasons assigned in the judgment pronounced by 
Hon’ble Surya Kant, J., speaking for the three of us minutes before 
in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and others,1 delay in 
presentation of all the Special Leave Petitions (“SLPs”, hereafter) 
under consideration stands condoned except those mentioned in 
Group B.2, which have been rendered infructuous as discussed 
later in
this judgment, and Group D which we have directed to be 
de-tagged for separate listing.
2.	
Special leave is granted in all the SLPs except those in Group B.2 
and Group D.
A.	
PREFACE
3.	
We are confronted with a peculiar situation where the Latin maxim 
“interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it is in the interest of the State 
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1	
Civil Appeal No…………of 2024 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 26697/2019
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that there be an end to litigation) notwithstanding, it is the State 
itself that has initiated a second round of litigation before this Court 
after culmination of the first round and sown the seeds for days’ of 
hearing engaging our attention to erudite arguments from learned 
counsel on both sides. We are now tasked to decide on which side 
the Court should lean.
4.	
The quest for primacy between private interest and public interest 
has been a matter of debate for years together; the scales, however, 
seem to have tilted, ever so slightly, in favour of the latter. Yet, 
between the devil and the deep sea, we endeavour to construct 
a bridge—a ‘setu’—to strike a harmonious balance for the greater 
good; all, while adhering to the enduring Latin dictum “salus populi 
suprema lex esto”, a principle that reinforces the paramountcy of 
the people’s welfare as the supreme law. 
5.	
There is one other aspect which needs emphasis. Justice, alone 
of all virtues, implies a notion of duty. As Judges of this Court, 
we are duty-bound to not only uphold the law but also ensure its 
consistent application. In navigating through the crisis, chaos, and 
confusion presented by the several sets of appeals before us, we 
are committed to ensure consistency, clarity, and coherence and 
strike a delicate, yet, necessary balance to arrive at a harmonious 
resolution. In the course of rectifying the aftermath of rulings and 
overrulings, and
grappling with complexities surrounding questions 
of limitations, maintainability, merger doctrine, etc., our commitment 
to justice remains resolute. 
6.	
With these prefatory words, we now proceed to decide the various 
sets of appeals before us.  
B.	
BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS
7.	
While there are multiple civil appeals, which we are tasked to 
decide, a particular SLP2 was referred to a Bench of three Judges 
by a Bench of two Judges vide order dated 21st July, 2022. In view 
of grant of leave by us, this would be treated as the lead matter.  
8.	
We place on record that it is pursuant to the said order dated 21st 
July, 2022 that all these appeals have been listed before us, in 
deference to orders made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. 
2	
Diary No. 17623/2021
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
9.	
Before delving deep into the intricacies presented by these civil 
appeals, it would be apposite to trace the factual trajectory of the 
lead matter culminating in the present stage:
a)	
The facts are noticed from the Civil Appeal3 arising out of the 
Writ Petition4 instituted before the High Court of Delhi (“High 
Court”, hereafter) by the first respondent, M/s BSK Realtors 
LLP. Land acquisition proceedings had been initiated under 
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act,” hereafter) to 
acquire several parcels of lands. Land belonging to M/s BSK 
Realtors LLP comprised in Khasra No.623(5-10) measuring 5 
bighas 10 biswas in Chattarpur village also formed part of the 
proceedings. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 
11th January, 2016 allowed the writ petition. In so allowing, 
it relied on the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal 
Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki 
and others5 and similar line of decisions. It was held in Pune 
Municipal Corporation (supra) that if any one of the two 
ingredients of section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation 
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”, hereafter) was attracted, 
i.e., either the physical possession of the land was not taken 
or the compensation was not paid, as the case may be, the 
acquisition proceedings under challenge would be
deemed to 
have lapsed. As a matter of fact, the High Court found all the 
ingredients of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court to be satisfied despite Award No.15/87-
88 dated 5th June 1987 and hence, declared the acquisition 
proceedings to have lapsed. 
b)	
Aggrieved thereby, the beneficiary of the acquisition proceedings-
Delhi Development Authority (second respondent herein) 
(“DDA”, hereafter), carried such judgment and order in appeal 
praying for it to be set aside. After granting leave, a Bench of 
two Hon’ble Judges of this Court vide judgment and order dated 
3	
GNCTD & Anr. v. M/S BSK Realtors LLP & Anr., Diary No. 17623/2021
4	
W.P. (C) No. 7442/2015
5	
(2014) 3 SCC 183
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31st August, 2016 dismissed the Civil Appeal.6 It was observed 
that the issue, in principle, had already been adjudicated against 
DDA in a previous judgment and order of a co-ordinate Bench 
of this Court in a related matter.7 DDA was granted extension by 
a period of one year to avail the liberty of initiating acquisition 
proceedings afresh under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This 
marked the culmination of the first round of litigation. 
c)	
However, on 06th March, 2020, the decision in Pune Municipal 
Corporation (supra) was overturned by a Constitution Bench 
of five Hon’ble Judges in Indore Development Authority v. 
Manoharlal and others [5-Judge, lapse] 8 holding that land 
acquisition proceedings lapse only when the twin conditions 
are met, i.e., non-payment of compensation to the landowners 
together with failure of the State to take physical possession 
of the acquired lands. Leveraging this, Government of NCT of 
Delhi (first appellant herein) (“GNCTD”, hereafter) approached 
this Court through a SLP9 (the lead matter) wherein M/s BSK 
Realtors LLP and DDA were impleaded as the first and second 
respondents, respectively. It was contended on behalf of 
GNCTD that the judgment and order dated 11th January, 2016 
rendered by the High Court ought to be reconsidered in view 
of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). 
d)	
A preliminary objection qua the maintainability of the SLP was 
raised by M/s BSK Realtors LLP.
The first contention in line 
with the doctrine of merger was that the order of the High 
Court dated 11th January, 2016 had merged with the order 
dated 31st August, 2016 of this Court whereby the civil appeal 
at the instance of DDA was dismissed. Such dismissal, M/s 
BSK Realtors LLP further contended, was after grant of leave 
and by a speaking order upon hearing all the parties involved. 
M/s BSK Realtors LLP also contended that the order dated 
11th January, 2016, upon its merger with the order dated 31st 
August, 2016, ceased to exist and GNCTD being a party to the 
6	
Civil Appeal No. 8670/2016
7	
Civil Appeal No. 8477/2016 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8467/2015
8	
[2020] 3 SCR 1 : (2020) 8 SCC 129
9	
Diary No. 17623/2021
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civil appeal filed by DDA, the same would disentitle GNCTD 
from initiating a new round of litigation to have the order dated 
11th January, 2016 reversed on the specious ground that the 
decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) has been 
rendered after dismissal of the civil appeal of DDA, overruling the 
decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). Accordingly, 
it was submitted that the SLP not being maintainable deserved 
outright dismissal. 
e)	
Observing that the issue requires deeper examination, a 
Bench of two Hon’ble Judges, vide the said order dated 
21st July, 2022, directed that the matter be placed before a 
three-Judge Bench. The relevant portion of the said order is 
extracted hereunder: 
“According to the land-losers, rejection of challenge to 
the declaration of lapsing at the instance of Authority 
or State, would dis-entitle the other (i.e., Authority 
or State) to maintain successive petition against the 
same judgment; and especially where in the earlier 
round leave to appeal was granted by this Court and 
the appeal had been disposed of after hearing all 
concerned. In other words, the doctrine of merger is 
being invoked to buttress this preliminary objection.
On the other hand, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned 
Additional Solicitor General is relying on the 
observations/dictum of the Constitution Bench of 
this Court in Indore Development Authority vs.
Manoharlal & Ors. reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 to 
contend that the effect of the declaration or conclusion 
recorded therein is to efface all the orders passed in 
the concerned special leave petition or civil appeal 
following the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation 
& Anr. Harakchand Misirmal Solanki & Ors. reported 
in 2014 (3) SCC 183 — which has been expressly 
overruled and as noted in paragraph 365 of the 
reported decision. (Indore Development Authority).
It is urged that the effect of such overruling is to 
efface all the orders, including passed by this Court 
relying on Pune Municipal Corporation (Supra).
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[…]
Suffice it to observe that these matters require 
deeper examination, for which the same need to be 
placed before the three Judge Bench for hearing on 
17.08.2022.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
10.	 As observed above, it is by virtue of this order that we now have 
the occasion to decide the issue raised by parties on both the sides.
C.	
JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY
11.	 Having noticed the facts in the lead matter, we must at this stage 
acknowledge the predicament of being faced with a peculiar dusty 
situation where we are tasked not only to clear our path to adjudicate 
a similar issue on separate fronts but also to ensure that the law on 
this matter settles the dust so raised. This exercise would necessitate 
harmonising the different routes that we are bound to traverse to 
reach the same destination. Hence, notwithstanding the expense 
of reiterating the foregoing, it is imperative to navigate the broader 
judicial trajectory that has brought us to the current stage.
a)	
Relying upon the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal 
Corporation (supra) and similar line of decisions, the High Court 
vide various judgments and orders, allowed writ petitions filed 
by the several affected landowners (“landowners”, hereafter). 
b)	
Discontented, the aggrieved authorities [being the respondents 
in the writ petitions including DDA, GNCTD, Land Acquisition 
Collector (“LAC”, hereafter), and Land & Building Department 
(“L&B”,
hereafter)] carried such judgments and orders 
independently by way of their respective SLPs impleading the 
other, however, as a co-respondent. This triggered the first round 
of litigation (“first round”, hereafter) yielding diverse outcomes 
which are categorized as follows: first, in some cases, leave 
was granted but the civil appeals were subsequently dismissed 
(or allowed, in handful of cases); second, in some cases, leave 
was not granted and the SLPs were dismissed in limine; and 
third, where SLPs/civil appeals are still pending adjudication. 
c)	
Dismissal of the civil appeals/SLPs brought about a quietus. 
However, in the light of change in law consequent to the decision
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in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), such of the authorities 
(DDA, GNCTD, LAC, and L&B) who had not earlier challenged 
the judgments and orders of the High Court declaring land 
acquisition proceedings as lapsed, approached this Court by 
way of SLPs/Miscellaneous Applications (“M.A.s”, hereafter)/
Review Petitions. This triggered the second round of litigation 
(“second round”, hereafter), however, with the status of the 
aggrieved authorities being transposed. For instance, filing of 
SLP by GNCTD impleading DDA as the second respondent in 
the lead matter, as noticed above, whereas GNCTD was the 
second respondent in the first round initiated by DDA. 
d)	
Upon the appeals being placed before us, we are entrusted 
with resolving the issue, or for that matter issues, outlined 
later in the judgment. 
12.	 Since the authorities (DDA, GNCTD, LAC, and L&B) jointly harbour 
a shared grievance and individually act as appellants in the ongoing 
proceedings, they will be collectively denoted as “appellants” 
hereafter, notwithstanding the transposition of the authorities as 
parties or their status as respondents in the second round. Insofar 
as the affected landowners are concerned, they shall be referred to 
as “landowners” or “aggrieved parties”, as the context would require. 
D.	
CATEGORIZATION OF CASES
13.	 Each of the Civil Appeals/M.A.s before us may necessitate separate
directions. We have, therefore, categorised them in six groups based 
on varied outcomes in the first round of litigation and their respective 
status in the second round of litigation for ease of reference. 
14.	 A brief overview of the groups we have carved out for the facility 
of reference is as under:
a)	
Group A deals with M.A.s filed by the appellants-authorities 
primarily pleading change in law and seeking recall of the 
judgments and orders of this Court dismissing the Civil Appeals 
and/or Review Petitions in the first round.
b)	
Group B.1 includes cases where Civil Appeals were dismissed 
in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, leave 
having been granted by us) is pending before us in the second 
round.
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c)	
Cases categorized under Group B.2 encompass the following 
scenarios: 
i.	
Four cases where the Civil Appeals of the appellants-
authorities were allowed in the first round and the SLPs, 
filed during the pendency of the appeals in the first round, 
are pending before us in the second round (present batch). 
ii.	
One case where the appeal, filed by the appellant-authority 
subsequent to the SLP pending before us in the present 
round, was allowed after granting leave. 
d)	
Group C.1 covers a case where an SLP was dismissed in 
limine in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, 
leave having been granted by us) is pending before us in the 
second round. In this particular case, the land acquisition 
proceedings would lapse following the test laid down in 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions 
under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act are met [non-payment of 
compensation to the landowners together with failure of the 
State to take physical possession of the acquired lands].
e)	
Group C.2 covers a case where an SLP was dismissed in 
limine in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, 
leave having been granted by us) is pending before us in 
the second round. In this particular case, land acquisition 
proceedings would not lapse following the test laid down in 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions 
under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act are not met.
f)	
Group C.3
involves cases where during pendency of the SLP 
in the first round, the appellants approached this Court with 
a fresh SLP owing to a change in law. While in some cases 
both the SLPs (now Civil Appeals) are pending before us in 
the present batch, in some cases, the other SLP is pending 
separately and is not part of the present batch. There are also 
a few cases where there is only one SLP filed and the same 
is now pending as a Civil Appeal in the present batch after 
grant of leave. 
g)	
Group D are miscellaneous matters which have been tagged 
incorrectly with the present batch and they follow separate
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directions. Group D also involves cases where no notice has 
been issued by this Court till date. 
h)	
Cases falling under Group E generally involve allegations 
related to subsequent sale transactions by landowners. There 
are certain cases where this position is admitted. Some cases 
also include allegations regarding the ownership title of the 
land in question. Additionally, in a few instances, the appellants 
claim that the land in question is vested in Gaon Sabha, a fact 
which the landowners and affected parties have suppressed. 
These cases require thorough fact-finding, as determined later, 
and are therefore addressed separately. Cases categorized 
under Group E may overlap with Groups A to C (excluding 
Group B.2, which we propose to dismiss as infructuous infra). 
As a result, any directions issued under Group E are intended 
exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall be 
automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For 
added clarity, it is stated that all cases falling under Group E 
are proposed to be remitted to the High Court, regardless of 
their classification within the aforementioned categories.
i)	
We set out hereinbelow in tabular form the cases covered by 
the aforesaid groups:
GROUP
SUB-
GROUPS
DESCRIPTION
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
OF 
CASES
GROUP A 
(M.A.s) 
Not 
Applicable
M.A.s filed by the appellants-
authorities primarily pleading 
change in
law and seeking recall 
of the judgments and orders of 
this Court dismissing the Civil 
Appeals and/or Review Petitions 
in the first round.
2
GROUP B 
(Civil Appeal in 
first round)
Group 
B.1
Civil Appeal dismissed in the first 
round; SLP pending in the second 
round (present batch)
40
Group 
B.2
Civil Appeal allowed in the first 
round; SLP pending in the second 
round (present batch)
5
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GROUP C 
(SLP in first 
round)
Group C.1
SLP dismissed in limine in the first 
round; SLP pending in the second 
round (present batch)
•	 Land acquisition proceedings 
would lapse following the test laid 
down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] (supra) as the twin 
conditions under section 24(2) 
of the 2013 Act are met [non-
payment of compensation to the 
landowners together with failure 
of the State to take physical 
possession of the acquired 
lands].
1
Group C.2
SLP dismissed in limine in the first 
round; SLP pending in the second 
round (present batch)
•	 Land acquisition proceedings 
would not lapse following the 
test laid down in Manoharlal 
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the 
twin conditions under section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act are not met.
1
Group C.3
SLP from either the first round or 
both rounds is pending in the present 
batch
•	 Land acquisition proceedings 
would not lapse following the 
test laid down in Manoharlal 
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the 
twin conditions under section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act are not 
met.
16
GROUP D 
(Miscellaneous 
matters)
Group D.1
•	 Cases filed by landowners;
•	 Cases seeking a different relief;
•	 Cases where no notice has 
been issued either on delay or 
on merits 
5
Group D.2
Cases where no notice has been 
issued either on delay or on merits
11
TOTAL
81
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GROUP E
(Suppression 
of facts qua 
subsequent 
purchaser/title 
etc.)
Not 
Applicable
Cases where the landowners are 
alleged to have committed fraud by 
suppressing facts regarding them 
being subsequent purchasers and/or 
the land being vested in Gaon Sabha
32
Note: Cases categorized under Group E, owing to their distinct facts and 
circumstances, may overlap with Groups A to C (excluding Group B.2, which 
we propose to dismiss as infructuous). As a result, any directions issued under 
Group E are intended exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall 
be automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For added clarity, 
it is stated that all cases falling under Group E shall be remanded back to the 
High Court, regardless of their classification within the aforementioned categories.
A detailed table listing each case along with its respective group has 
been appended to this order for easy reference.
E.	
SUBMISSIONS 
15.	 Given the significance of the present exercise, an array of 
distinguished counsel from both sides — including the learned 
Attorney General, learned Additional Solicitor General, and other 
senior counsel — appeared before us. While it may not be necessary 
for the purpose of disposal of these appeals to record in detail the 
extensive submissions made at the Bar by them, for the sake of 
completeness, we propose to provide a concise overview
of the 
arguments presented. 
16.	 Counsel for the appellants prayed for allowing the civil appeals, 
while advancing the following arguments:
On merger, res judicata, and prospective overruling: 
a)	
The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional 
law nor a doctrine having statutory recognition. It is merely a 
common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety and 
does not have universal applicability. Even a speaking order 
dismissing the SLP would not attract the doctrine. 
b)	
Law declared by the Constitution Bench in Manoharlal 
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra) applies retrospectively from 01st 
January, 2014. Earlier decision of the previous court shall not 
operate as res judicata, if the law has been altered.
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c)	
In the first round, the appellants/authorities were arrayed as 
respondents merely as a formality, without being adequately 
heard. As a result, the doctrines of merger or res judicata do not 
apply and the judgment and order issued by this Court in the 
first round is not binding on these authorities. Such a situation 
could allow anyone to come forward, get the appeal dismissed, 
and conclude the lis forever, which is an undesirable outcome. 
d)	
By virtue of principles flowing from Rule 4 read with Rule 33 of 
Order XLI, Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC” hereafter), this Court 
possesses ample authority to do complete justice, aligned with 
principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. The mere fact 
that a petitioner who filed the SLP in the second round was a 
party to the first round as a respondent would not warrant the 
application of the doctrine of res judicata. 
e)	
Decisions rendered in the preceding round of litigation, solely 
relying on judgments that have since been invalidated and 
effaced, within a brief timeframe, should not be permitted to 
result in a miscarriage of justice under the pretext of the doctrine 
of merger. Each case possesses unique and distinct facts, even 
if they pertain to a common subject.
f)	
Any factual claim involved in the present appeals may be 
remanded to the High Court to ensure proper adjudication and 
prevent miscarriage of justice. 
On subsequent purchasers contesting
acquisition proceedings:
g)	
A judgment or decree obtained through fraudulent means is void 
and non-existent in the eyes of the law and can be contested 
even in a collateral proceeding.
h)	
Purchasers subsequent to the issuance of a Notification under 
section 4(1) of the 1894 Act lack the entitlement to assert the 
lapse of acquisition proceedings on any grounds. In cases 
where landowners engaged in fraudulent activities by entering 
into subsequent sale transactions with prior knowledge of the 
Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, such subsequent 
purchasers lack entitlement to initiate a case for declaration. 
They do not acquire any legal rights in the land, as the sale is 
fundamentally void ab initio, thereby disqualifying them from 
asserting the lapse of acquisition proceedings or claiming the 
land under the policy.
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
i)	
Although the Bench of two Hon’ble Judges in Govt (NCT) of 
Delhi v. Manav Dharam Trust and another10 had recognised 
the right of the subsequent purchasers, such decision is no 
longer good law in view of the same being overruled by a Bench 
of three Hon’ble Judges in Shiv Kumar and another v. Union 
of India and others11 and such decision having found approval 
in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra).
On principles of consistency and public interest
j)	
The constitutional tenets of consistency, the rule of law, and 
the principle of “actus curiae neminem gravabit” embody the 
fundamental and foundational principles of justice.
k)	
The Government and Public Sector Undertakings, acting in the 
public interest and with good faith, aim to avoid burdening the 
court dockets unnecessarily.
l)	
However, the appeals at hand present a unique situation not 
hitherto dealt with by any judicial pronouncement of this Court 
and bearing in mind the gravamen of the appellants’ complaint 
and the extent of public interest at stake, the Court may not take 
a view which would throw asunder the developmental works 
undertaken by the appellants on the acquired lands.  
17.	 Counsel for the landowners and the affected parties urged this Court 
to dismiss the appeals at the outset, being devoid of merits. The 
following submissions were advanced by them: 
On merger:
a)	
In cases where this Court had
previously granted leave and 
dismissed the appeal, the doctrine of merger would apply and 
the judgment and order of the High Court would stand merged 
into the judgment and order of this Court. The judgment and 
order of the High Court cannot thereafter be challenged by any 
party, as it has ceased to exist. The doctrine applies regardless 
of whether the appeal has been dismissed through a speaking 
or a non-speaking order. 
10	
[2017] 4 SCR 232 : (2017) 6 SCC 751
11	
[2019] 13 SCR 695 : (2019) 10 SCC 229
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b)	
Additionally, whether there has been a discussion of facts in the 
judgment(s) of this Court will be immaterial as it has resulted in 
a merger with the judgment and order of the High Court where 
the facts were discussed. 
On res judicata
c)	
The principles of res judicata and analogous principles embodied 
in section 11, CPC and its Explanations clearly apply to the 
present appeals. Even an erroneous decision, whether on 
facts or law, would bind the parties. The acquiring authorities 
(GNCTD, LAP, L&B Department), and the beneficiary (DDA) 
share a common interest in the acquisition of land for public 
purpose. When either of the parties litigates, one is deemed to 
litigate on behalf of all interested parties. Thus, the dismissal 
of a civil appeal preferred by one of the authorities, would act 
as res judicata against the other authority. 
d)	
The appellants were granted one-year period to commence 
fresh acquisition proceedings. With the expiry of this timeframe, 
the State’s right has been closed for all intents and purposes. 
It cannot now contest this Court’s order and assert a reversal 
of the lapse of acquisition proceedings.
On subsequent purchasers contesting acquisition proceedings:
e)	
None of the appeals has alleged any form of fraud practised 
by the affected parties. Legal principles dictate that when 
fraud is asserted, it must be expressly pleaded in accordance 
with the provisions of Order VI Rules
2 & 4, CPC. The law 
does not permit unsubstantiated assertions to be made solely 
through oral arguments. The appellants have not succeeded in 
establishing that a subsequent sale transaction occurred with 
prior knowledge after the Notification under section 4(1) of the 
1894 Act. Without evidence of such foresight and dishonest 
intention, the claim of fraud cannot be substantiated. 
f)	
The decisions of the High Court in Ranjana Bhatia v. Govt. 
of NCT of Delhi and another12 and Sparsh Properties Pvt. 
Ltd. v. Union of India and others13 sanctioned subsequent 
12	
(2014) SCC OnLine Del 2151
13	
(2014) SCC OnLine Del 6659
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
purchasers to pursue a declaration of a right that had already 
vested in the landowners under the deeming provision of section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act. These decisions were given a further seal 
of approval by the decision of a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges 
of this Court in Manav Dharam Trust (supra). Therefore, the 
change in law occasioned by its overruling in Shiv Kumar 
(supra) cannot be utilised as a crutch to claim that subsequent 
purchasers cannot seek a declaration of lapsing. 
g)	
In any event, the decision in Shiv Kumar (supra) is not good 
law and requires reconsideration by a larger Bench of this Court. 
F.	
ANALYSIS
18.	 Having heard the arguments presented by both sides at length on 
different issues, we propose segmenting our analysis accordingly. 
The following issues emerge for our consideration: 
a)	
Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one appellant 
in the first round operates as res judicata against the other 
appellant in the second round before us? 
b)	
Whether suppression of the first round of litigation by the 
appellants constitutes a material fact, thereby inviting an outright 
dismissal of the appeals at the threshold?
c)	
Does the doctrine of merger operate as a bar to entertain the 
civil appeals in the present case? 
d)	
Whether the previous determination of the rights of subsequent 
purchasers in an inter se dispute precludes the same issue
from 
being reconsidered between the same parties? 
F.1	 Res judicata
19.	 The first issue we noticed at the start of our analysis stems from the 
submission pertaining to res judicata. Counsel for the landowners, 
pressing the applicability of the principle of res judicata to the present 
appeals, submitted that the dismissal of a Civil Appeal preferred by 
one of the appellants in the first round, would act as res judicata 
against the other in subsequent round/s of litigation. The appellants 
contested the same and submitted that res judicata would not apply 
to the current proceedings.
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20.	 Would the rule of res judicata operate against the co-respondents 
before the High Court, namely GNCTD and DDA, and preclude us 
from looking into the merits of the present set of appeals, is the 
question that we propose to examine and answer now.  
21.	 Nearly a century ago, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Privy 
Council in Munni Bibi (since deceased) and another v. Tirloki 
Nath and others14 laid down the following three conditions for the 
application of res judicata between co-defendants:
“(1.) There, must be a conflict of interest between the 
defendants concerned; (2.) it must be necessary to decide 
this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims; 
and (3.) the question between the defendants must have 
been finally decided.”
22.	 In State of Gujarat and others v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust 
and others,15 a Bench comprising two Hon’ble Judges ruled that 
the principle of res judicata applies only when there has been a 
directly and substantially disputed issue between the parties, which 
the court has heard and conclusively resolved. The relevant extract 
of the decision is extracted hereunder: 
“17. […] For attracting the rule of res judicata between 
co-defendants — according to the terms in Section 11 of 
the Civil Procedure Code which provision of course is not, 
in terms, applicable to proceedings in a writ petition — it 
is necessary that there should have been some issue
directly and substantially in controversy between them 
which has been heard and finally decided by the court. 
Same would be the position, where a plea of res judicata 
is sought to be raised between co-respondents in a writ 
petition, on the general principles of res judicata. Since the 
said basic requirement is not satisfied, the said judgment 
cannot be treated as res judicata between the trust and 
the Government. 
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
14	
AIR 1931 PC 114
15	
[1994] 3 SCR 163 : (1994) 3 SCC 552
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23.	 In the lead matter before us or for that matter the other appeals, the 
co-respondents before the High Court, namely, GNCTD and DDA did 
not have conflicting interests. Inter se them, neither was there any 
disputed issue, nor could have the High Court possibly adjudicated 
on any such issue. Before this Court too, in the first round, there was 
no issue on which GNCTD and DDA were at loggerheads. In the 
light of this, in accordance with the aforementioned legal principle, 
the applicability of res judicata is negated.
24.	 A brief review of the ruling in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and 
others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy16 will also guide us to the 
resolution of the second issue on the applicability of res judicata. 
In the said decision, the first-instance court and the High Court 
rejected an application seeking fixation of standard rent, holding that 
the provisions of the Rent Act did not extend to open land, relying 
upon an earlier decision. However, this Court later overturned the 
said decision, affirming the applicability of the Rent Act to open land 
as well. When A filed a fresh application, B opposed it, claiming it 
was barred by res judicata. Dismissing this argument and affirming 
the application’s viability, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this 
Court observed thus: 
“5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of 
procedure: it cannot be exalted
to the status of a legislative 
direction between the parties so as to determine the 
question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting 
the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though 
no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and 
relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been 
determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a 
matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding 
between the same parties: the ‘matter in issue’ may be an 
issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. 
An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided 
by a competent Court is finally determined between the 
parties and cannot be re-opened between them in another 
proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue 
alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are 
16	
[1970] 3 SCR 830 : (1970) 1 SCC 613
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not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is 
the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, 
and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon 
proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. 
A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise 
to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. 
When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it 
is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon 
and cannot again be placed in contest between the same 
parties. A previous decision of a competent Court on facts 
which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law 
applicable to the determination of the transaction which is 
the source of the right is res judicata. A previous decision 
on a matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision 
on law cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts 
on which the right is founded. A decision on an issue of 
law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding 
between the same parties, if the cause of action of the 
subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous 
proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, 
nor when the law has since the earlier decision been 
altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision 
relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier 
proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid 
a transaction which is prohibited by law.
[…]
10. A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot 
be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous 
decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation 
of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, 
the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res 
judicata. Similarly, by an erroneous decision if the Court 
assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under 
the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata 
between the same parties, whether the cause of action in 
the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise.
11. It is true that in determining the application of the 
rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the
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correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The 
matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in 
the earlier proceeding by a competent Court must in 
a subsequent litigation between the same parties be 
regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A 
mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier 
proceeding between the same parties may not, for the 
same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding 
between the same parties. But, where the decision is on 
a question of law i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will 
be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the 
same parties where the cause of action is the same, for 
the expression ‘the matter in issue’ in Section 11 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between 
the parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or 
denied and the law applicable to the determination of that 
issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law 
and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of 
the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort 
to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision 
will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that 
order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure 
cannot supersede the law of the land.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
25.	 The law, as we noticed aforesaid, aptly resolves
the first issue. Res 
judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same 
parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been 
conclusively determined by a court. However, it is crucial to note 
that the previous decision of this Court in the first round would not 
operate as res judicata to bar a decision on the lead matter and the 
other appeals; more so, because this rule may not apply hard and 
fast in situations where larger public interest is at stake. In such 
cases, a more flexible approach ought to be adopted by courts, 
recognizing that certain matters transcend individual disputes and 
have far-reaching public interest implications. 
F.2	 Suppression of material facts by appellants
26.	 Counsel on behalf of the landowners have contended that the 
conduct of the appellants disqualifies them from seeking any relief.
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They assert that the appellants filed the present appeals, specifically 
under Group B.1, without disclosing that civil appeals filed by another 
appellant/authority against the same impugned order has already 
been dismissed. Furthermore, this action is deemed as providing an 
inaccurate declaration under Order XXI Rule 3(2) of the Supreme 
Court Rules, 2013. 
27.	 Before addressing the aforesaid contention, we may refer to the law 
laid down in this regard. 
28.	 A Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court in S.J.S. Business 
Enterprises (P) Ltd v. State of Bihar and others17 held that a fact 
suppressed must be material; that is, if it had not been suppressed, 
it would have influenced the merits of the case. It was held thus:
“13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a 
litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. 
This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts 
to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by 
deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material 
one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would 
have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be 
a matter which was material for the consideration of the 
court, whatever view the court may have taken […]
14. Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant 
that the suit had been filed by one of the Directors of the 
Company without the knowledge of the Director who almost
simultaneously approached the High Court under Article 
226 is unbelievable (sic), the question still remains whether 
the filing of the suit can be said to be a fact material to the 
disposal of the writ petition on merits. We think not. […] 
the fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant 
was not such a fact the suppression of which could have 
affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits.”
29.	 Further, a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Arunima 
Baruah v. Union of India and others18 following the aforesaid 
dictum, held thus:
17	
[2004] 3 SCR 56 : (2004) 7 SCC 166
18	
[2007] 5 SCR 904 : (2007) 6 SCC 120
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“12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse 
to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression 
must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, 
suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to 
obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case. Material fact would 
mean material for the purpose of determination of the 
lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether 
the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. 
If the fact suppressed is not material for determination 
of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse 
to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite 
that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of 
the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair 
of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and 
the hands become clean, whether the relief would still 
be denied is the question.”
30.	 Law is well settled that the fact suppressed must be material in the 
sense that it would have an effect on the merits of the case. The 
concept of suppression or non-disclosure of facts transcends mere 
concealment; it necessitates the deliberate withholding of material 
facts—those of such critical import that their absence would render 
any decision unjust. Material facts, in this context, refer to those 
facts that possess the potential to
significantly influence the decision-
making process or alter its trajectory. This principle is not intended 
to arm one party with a weapon of technicality over its adversary 
but rather serves as a crucial safeguard against the abuse of the 
judicial process.
31.	 Nevertheless, we have carefully considered the orders issued 
during the first round of litigation, which are alleged to have been 
suppressed. Despite reviewing these orders, we find no compelling 
reason to dismiss the appeals based solely on the prior dismissal 
of appeals filed by some other appellant/authority. 
F.3	 Merger
32.	 Extensive arguments have been advanced by the parties on the aspect 
of applicability/non-applicability of the doctrine of merger, either by 
relying upon or distinguishing the decision in Kunhayammed and
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others. V. State of Kerala and another,19 rendered by a Bench of 
three Hon’ble Judges of this Court. For the purpose of a decision 
on these appeals qua cases under Groups A and B.1, we do not 
consider it necessary to opine either way.
33.	 However, in the light of the settled propositions on the doctrine of 
merger and the rule of stare decisis, we respectfully concur with 
Kunhayammed (supra) and the decisions that have followed the 
same. We also take notice of the exception carved out by this Court 
in Kunhayammed (supra), to the effect that the doctrine of merger 
is not of universal or unlimited application and that the nature of 
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject 
matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be 
kept in view. The exception, in our considered opinion, that has been 
carved out in Kunhayammed (supra), will only be permissible in the 
rarest of rare cases and such a deviation can be invoked sparingly 
only. We, however, hasten to add that among such exceptions, the 
extraordinary constitutional powers vested in this Court under Article 
142 of the Constitution of India, which is to be exercised with a view 
to do complete justice between the parties, remains unaffected and 
being an unfettered power, shall always be deemed to be preserved 
as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis. 
34.	 We may now at this
stage look back to the Preface of this order where 
we have encapsulated our predicament to not only uphold the law 
but also to ensure its consistent application. It is our duty to enable 
consistency, clarity and coherence and strike a delicate balance 
through harmonious resolutions regardless of the crisis, chaos and 
confusion created by inconsistent judicial opinions on section 24(2) 
of the 2013 Act, making the present batch of lis a sui generis dispute. 
35.	 In this regard, it would be worthwhile to notice the conclusions 
recorded in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and what followed 
in the aftermath thereof. The conclusions read as follows:
“Conclusions of the Court
365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal 
Corpn. Is hereby overruled and all other decisions in 
which Pune Municipal Corpn.1 has been followed, are also 
19	
[2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359
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overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential 
Assn. cannot be said to be laying down good law, is 
overruled and other decisions following the same are also 
overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra5, 
the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) 
and whether ‘or’ has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ was 
not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too 
cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present 
judgment.
366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the 
questions as under:
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case 
the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of 
commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of 
proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under 
the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the 
window period of five years excluding the period covered 
by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall 
continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 
Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.
366.3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between 
possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or 
as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings 
under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where 
due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior 
to commencement of the said Act, the
possession of 
land has not been taken nor compensation has been 
paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, 
compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. 
Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has 
not been taken then there is no lapse.
366.4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of 
compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is 
provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not 
been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then
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all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification 
for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be 
entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions 
of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, 
interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. 
Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result 
in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of 
non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five 
years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to 
be paid to the ‘landowners’ as on the date of notification 
for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5. In case a person has been tendered the 
compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 
1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition 
has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or 
non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay 
is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). 
The landowners who had refused to accept compensation 
or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot 
claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under 
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to 
be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 
24(1)(b).
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act 
and as contemplated
under Section 24(2) is by drawing 
of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been 
passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 
Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided 
under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession 
has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a 
deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case 
authorities have failed due to their inaction to take 
possession and pay compensation for five years or more 
before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for 
land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as
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on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders 
passed by court has to be excluded in the computation 
of five years.
366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to 
new cause of action to question the legality of concluded 
proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a 
proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 
Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred 
claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor 
allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking 
possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of 
compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate 
acquisition.”
36.	 Soon after the decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) was 
pronounced, applications for recall of the judgment in Pune Municipal 
Corporation (supra) came to be filed. By an order dated 16th July, 
2020 in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal 
Solanki [Recall Order],20 a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges allowed 
such applications, thereby recalling the judgment in Pune Municipal 
Corporation (supra).
37.	 The net result of the aforesaid judicial decisions is that the judgment 
in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) loses its precedential 
value, having been recalled, although the said decision would be 
binding inter partes. We are informed that applications to recall the 
order dated 16th July, 2020 have
since been filed but are yet to be 
considered. Be that as it may.
38.	 At this stage, we may advert to the factual scenario of the cases 
in hand. These cases can be, in a way, further categorized as 
pre-Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). On the other hand, the 
cases which fall in Groups C, are where SLPs were dismissed 
in limine in the first round and/or such SLPs are pending in the 
second round. These cases, given the binding nature of the law 
laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), are covered 
by that decision against the landowners. It is a totally fortuitous 
and an incidental circumstance that one SLP arising out of the 
20	
2020 SCC OnLine SC 1471
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same acquisition may have been converted into a civil appeal and 
dismissed by this Court but another SLP, again arising out of the 
same acquisition, either might have been dismissed without granting 
leave or is still pending. The necessary consequence is that one 
parcel of land stands acquired and vested in the State free from 
all encumbrances under the 1894 Act whereas another parcel of 
adjoining land stands released on account of the acquisition having 
lapsed under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is also quite possible 
that the parcel of land qua which the acquisition is deemed to have 
lapsed already stands utilized fully or partially for the development 
of public infrastructure, and on the other hand the parcel of the land 
which has vested in the State is still lying unutilized as the public 
project is yet to be completed. 
39.	 This piquant situation created not by an act of State and rather 
being a consequence of inconsistent judicial pronouncements of 
this Court, has led to hostile discriminatory treatment to identically 
placed landowners. If not cured, it will lead to unexplained disparities. 
Not only this, it would cause a serious crisis and chaos as several 
projects of paramount public importance like the construction of 
metro, flyovers, schools, hospitals or other public utilities will have 
to be halted until the State re-acquires such parcels of land which 
are compelled to be released on
account of acquisition qua them 
having lapsed in the pre-Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) 
era. The consequences are extremely grave and would be totally 
detrimental to public interest.
40.	 The concept of ‘public interest’ need not be elaborately explained by 
us here for the reason that we have succinctly explained the same 
in our judgment pronounced separately in Tejpal (supra). There, we 
have summed up the following elements of ‘public interest’, which 
we employ mutatis mutandis in this batch of cases also:
a)	
While balancing the interest of the public exchequer against 
that of individuals, there are many other interests at stake, 
and it might not be possible to undo the acquisitions without 
causing significant cascading harms and losses to such other 
interests;
b)	
Since development projects have either begun or most of the 
acquired lands have already been deployed for essential public 
projects such as hospitals, schools, expansion of metro, etc., the
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effect of non-condonation of delay would go beyond mere financial 
loss to the exchequer and would extend to the public at large;
c)	
It would be like unscrambling the egg if compensation paid 
would have to be clawed back or possession taken would have 
to be reversed;
d)	
In many cases, the development projects might also have to 
be undone. The reversal of possession of even a small plot 
lying on projects such as an under-construction metro corridor 
would be practically impossible;
e)	
These are the cases where rights are vested to the public at 
large given the public infrastructure that has come up on a 
large number of acquired lands;
f)	
The fresh acquisition, if so is required to be done by the State, 
would be at the expense of delaying the construction of critical 
public infrastructure in our national capital. When balancing 
public with private interest, the comparative interest on the 
landowners would be nominal as compared to the public at 
large; and
g)	
The multiplicity of contradictory judicial opinions on section 24 
(2) of the 2013 Act has made the present set of circumstances 
sui generis. The constant flux in the legal position of law has 
posed significant challenges for the State and its authorities.
41.	 Having held that the concept of public interest need not be viewed 
narrowly only on the yardstick of loss to public exchequer and that 
these are the cases
where public at large has acquired interest 
in the public infrastructures already complete or in process of 
completion, we are satisfied that if the doctrine of merger is applied 
mechanically in respect of Groups A and B.1 cases, it will lead to 
irreversible consequences.  We are satisfied that the element of 
disparity between Groups A and B.1 cases vis-à-vis cases falling 
in Group C is liable to be eliminated and this can only be done by 
invoking our extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution 
of India so that we are able to do complete justice between the 
expropriated landowners, the State and its developing agencies and 
most importantly the public in general who has acquired a vested 
right in the public infrastructure projects. We will do so through the 
operative part of this order.
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F.4	 Allegations of fraud committed by landowners  
42.	 As stated aforesaid, Group E cases deal with allegations regarding 
fraud by landowners by suppressing subsequent sale transactions, 
ownership title disputes, etc.
43.	 The appellants contended that the landowners and affected 
parties deliberately concealed crucial facts from the High Court, 
including details about previous legal disputes and subsequent 
sale transactions. Such concealment constitutes fraud, and as a 
result, the landowners and affected parties should not be permitted 
to benefit from their own deceptive actions.
44.	 It is settled law that after the Notification under section 4(1) of the 
1894 Act is published, any encumbrance created by the owner does 
not bind the State. In such a scenario, a bona fide purchaser of 
land for value does not acquire any right, title or interest in the land, 
and he is only entitled to receive compensation if not objected to 
by the landowner/transferor. Therefore, transfer of land in respect 
of which acquisition proceedings had been initiated, after issuance 
of Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, is void and a 
subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the validity of the notification 
or the irregularity in taking possession of the land. 
45.	 We may also refer to the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) 
Act, 1972 (“1972 Act”, hereafter) which imposes certain restrictions 
on transfer of lands
which have been acquired. Section 3 prohibits 
the transfer of any land acquired by the Central Government under 
the 1894 Act. Section 4 mandates obtaining prior permission from 
the competent authority for transferring any land intended for 
acquisition, following a declaration by the Central Government 
under section 6 of the 1894 Act. Section 5 requires the transferor 
of a land mentioned in a Notification under section 4(1) to submit 
a written application to the competent authority. The structure of 
the 1972 Act clearly indicates that any subsequent sale of the 
specified land without prior permission from the competent authority 
is not allowed, and if such sale is done through concealment, it 
amounts to fraud.
46.	 The law with respect to “who” can invoke section 24(2) of the 2013 
Act has been well settled after the decision of this Court in Shiv 
Kumar (supra) wherein it was held that subsequent purchasers do
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
not have the locus to contest the acquisition and/or claim lapse of 
the acquisition proceedings. This decision has expressly overruled 
the previous decision of this Court in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) 
by recognizing the statutory intention behind the 2013 Act, which 
sought to benefit owners of lands who purchased the lands before 
the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act but not for the 
benefit of those who have purchased the lands after vesting of 
lands with the State. The relevant paragraphs of the decision are 
extracted hereunder:
“21. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 
Act, challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over 
of possession under the 1894 Act cannot be made, based 
on a void transaction nor declaration can be sought under 
Section 24(2) by such incumbents to obtain the land. The 
declaration that acquisition has lapsed under the 2013 
Act is to get the property back whereas, the transaction 
once void, is always a void transaction, as no title can 
be acquired in the land as such no such declaration can 
be sought. It would not be legal, just and equitable to 
give the land back to purchaser as land was not capable 
of being sold which was in process of acquisition under 
the 1894 Act. The 2013 Act does not confer any right 
on purchaser whose sale is ab initio void. Such void 
transactions are not validated under the 2013 Act.
No 
rights are conferred by the provisions contained in the 
2013 Act on such a purchaser as against the State.
26. […] No declaration can be sought by a purchaser 
under Section 24 that acquisition has lapsed, effect 
of which would be to get back the land. They cannot 
seek declaration that acquisition made under the 1894 
Act has lapsed by the challenge to the proceedings of 
taking possession under the 1894 Act. Such right was not 
available after the purchase in 2000 and no such right 
has been provided to the purchasers under the 2013 Act 
also. Granting a right to question acquisition would be 
against the public policy and the law which prohibits such 
transactions; it cannot be given effect to under the guise 
of subsequent legislation containing similar provisions.
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Subsequent legislation does not confer any new right 
to a person based on such void transaction; instead, it 
includes a provision prohibiting such transactions without 
permission of the Collector as provided in Section 11(4).
28. We hold that Division Bench in Manav Dharam Trust 
does not lay down the law correctly. Given the several 
binding precedents which are available and the provisions 
of the 2013 Act, we cannot follow the decision in Manav 
Dharam Trust […].”
47.	 Counsel representing the landowners have contested the correctness 
of the decision in Shiv Kumar (supra) and urged this Court to refer 
it to a larger Bench for reconsideration. This was a contention 
raised in desperation overlooking that Shiv Kumar (supra) has 
been approved by the Constitution Bench in Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] (supra). We are, thus, not impressed by the aforesaid 
contention and reiterate that Shiv Kumar (supra) represents the 
correct exposition of law. 
48.	 Coming to the specifics of each case qua subsequent purchasers 
or disputes regarding the title of the subject lands, we have already 
clarified the scope of our inquiry in Tejpal (supra). At the expense 
of reiterating, as far as the concealment of material facts regarding 
subsequent sale transactions, earlier round of litigations etc. are 
concerned, it is noted that the landowners and affected parties are 
under no obligation to either confirm or deny the allegations
levelled 
against them. Nor have we directed the appellants to furnish original 
records or documents to substantiate their claim of concealment 
and suppression of material facts. Engaging in a factual inquiry at 
such an advanced stage of the legal process, especially without 
providing adequate opportunities to all parties, may not be fair. The 
cases listed in Group E involve complex questions of fact and we 
being the Court of the last resort, ought not to be involved in such 
elaborate fact-finding exercise. We, therefore, deem it appropriate 
to remit these cases to the High Court for proper adjudication on 
points of law as well as facts.
G.	
CONCLUSION
49.	 The following conclusion has been reached regarding each category 
of cases outlined at the beginning:
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a)	
So far as the cases falling under GROUP A and B.1 are 
concerned (for which we have already condoned delay and 
have granted leave through para 1 and 2 of this judgment), 
we hold that, owing to the exceptional and unprecedented 
situation having arisen for the reasons already discussed 
elaborately, we do not deem it necessary to draw any distinction 
among the cases classified under Group A and B.1 vis-à-vis 
cases falling in Group C. Consequently, taking an overall view 
of the matter and upon due consideration of the principles 
of uniformity, consistency, and public interest involved, we 
exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 
142 of the Constitution and issue the following directions in 
each of the cases that have been dealt with by this judgment 
and classified under Groups A and B.1: 
i.	
The time limit for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings 
in terms of the provisions contained in section 24(2) of 
the 2013 Act is extended by a year starting from 01st 
August, 2024 whereupon compensation to the affected 
landowners may be paid in accordance with law, failing 
which consequences, also as per law, shall follow;
ii.	
The parties shall maintain status quo regarding 
possession, change of land use and creation of third-
party rights till fresh acquisition proceedings, as directed 
above, are completed;
iii.	
Since the landowners are not primarily
dependent upon 
the subject lands as their source of sustenance and 
most of these lands were/are under use for other than 
agricultural purposes, we deem it appropriate to invoke 
our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and 
dispense with the compliance of Chapters II and III of the 
2013 Act whereunder it is essential to prepare a Social 
Impact Assessment Study Report and/or to develop 
alternative multi-crop irrigated agricultural land. We do 
so to ensure that the timeline of one year extended at 
(a) above to complete the acquisition process can be 
adhered to by the appellants and the GNCTD, which 
would also likely be beneficial to the expropriated 
landowners;
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iv.	
Similarly, compliance with sections 13, 14, 16 to 20 of 
the 2013 Act can be dispensed with as the subject-lands 
are predominantly urban/semi-urban in nature and had 
earlier been acquired for public purposes of paramount 
importance. In order to simplify the compliance of direction 
at (a) above, it is further directed that every Notification 
issued under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act in this batch of 
cases, shall be treated as a Preliminary Notification within 
the meaning of section 11 of the 2013 Act, and shall be 
deemed to have been published as on 01st January, 2014
v.	
The Collector shall provide hearing of objections as 
per section 15 of the 2013 Act without insisting for any 
Social Impact Assessment Report and shall, thereafter, 
proceed to take necessary steps as per the procedure 
contemplated under section 21 onwards of Chapter-IV 
of 2013 Act, save and except where compliance of any 
provision has been expressly or impliedly dispensed with;
vi.	
The landowners may submit their objections within a 
period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of 
this order. Such objections shall not question the legality 
of the acquisition process and shall be limited only to 
clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(1) of the 2013 Act;
vii.	 The Collector shall publish a public notice on his website 
and in one English and one vernacular newspapers, within 
two weeks of expiry of the period of four weeks granted
under direction (f) above;
viii.	 The Collector shall, thereafter, pass an award as early 
as possible but not exceeding six months, regardless 
of the maximum period of twelve months contemplated 
under section 25 of the 2013 Act. The market value of 
the land shall be assessed as on 01st January, 2014 and 
the compensation shall be awarded along with all other 
monetary benefits in accordance with the provisions of 
the 2013 Act except the claim like rehabilitation etc.;
ix.	
The Collector shall consider all the parameters prescribed 
under section 28 of the 2013 Act for determining the 
compensation for the acquired land. Similarly, the
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Collector shall determine the market value of the building 
or assets attached with the land in accordance with section 
29 and shall further award solatium in accordance with 
section 30 of the 2013 Act;
x.	
In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, since 
it is difficult to reverse the clock back, the compliance of 
Chapter (V) pertaining to “Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Award” is hereby dispensed with; and 
xi.	
The expropriated landowners shall be entitled to 
seek reference for enhancement of compensation in 
accordance with Chapter-VIII of the 2013 Act. 
b)	
The SLPs under GROUP B.2 have been rendered infructuous 
as the appeals carried by the appellant-authorities have already 
been allowed by this Court and the impugned judgment and 
order of the High Court have been set aside after applying 
the law laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). No 
question of filing a subsequent SLP against the same judgment 
and order by the appellants, therefore, arises. These SLPs 
are accordingly dismissed at their threshold. 
c)	
In one case under GROUP C.1 (GNCTD VS. RAMPHAL 
SINGH [Diary No.- 19697/2022]), it is an admitted position of 
the appellant/GNCTD that neither possession has been taken 
nor compensation granted. With the twin conditions under 
section 24(2) of the 2013 Act having been met, applying the 
principles laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) 
is, therefore, unwarranted in this context. Thus, keeping in 
mind the principles of public interest that we have carved out 
earlier, it is imperative to invoke our jurisdiction under Article 
142 of the Constitution and subject this case to the eleven 
directions previously issued for Groups A and B.1. 
d)	
With respect to the SLPs (now civil appeals, leave having 
been granted by us) which fall in GROUP C.2 and C.3, the 
same are directed against one or the other judgment of the 
High Court where acquisition has been declared to have 
lapsed under section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. While doing so, 
the High Court has followed the decision of this Court in Pune 
Municipal Corporation (supra) case or such other decisions,
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all of which have since been overruled by the Constitution 
Bench in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). Since the twin 
conditions under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act have not been 
met in these Civil Appeals, the land acquisition proceedings 
would not lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal 
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra). These Civil Appeals are accordingly 
allowed, the impugned judgments of the High Court in each 
case are set aside and the acquisition of the landowners’ 
lands under the 1894 Act is accordingly upheld. This will, 
however, not preclude the landowners from recovery of the 
compensation amount, if already not paid or to the extent it 
is not paid, along with interest and other statutory benefits 
under the 1894 Act. Similarly, they shall be at liberty to seek 
reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act in accordance 
with law. The GNCTD and its authorities are directed to take 
physical possession of the lands falling under Group C.2 and 
C.3 forthwith, if not already taken and continue uninterruptedly 
to complete the public infrastructure projects. We may clarify 
that this will not prevent cases within this Group, if any, from 
being remanded to the High Court for the specific purpose of 
conducting a factual inquiry regarding fraud, as we intend to 
do in the subsequent sub-paragraph.
e)	
For the reasons given in Section F.4 (Allegations of fraud 
committed by landowners), the cases listed in
GROUP E are 
hereby remitted to the High Court for adjudication of the facts 
as well as the law as a fact-finding inquiry is necessary to 
ascertain the rightful claimant for receiving the compensation. 
We hereby set aside the orders of the High Court that were 
under challenge in the Civil Appeals/M.A.s and revive the 
relevant writ petitions which shall stand restored on the file 
of the High Court for this limited purpose on remand being 
ordered. We issue the following directions:
i.	
The Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to 
constitute a dedicated bench to decide these writ petitions 
in the manner indicated hereafter. The nominated bench 
will accord an opportunity to the landowners/subsequent 
purchasers, the GNCTD, and the DDA to submit additional 
documents on affidavits whereupon such bench shall 
embark on an exercise to decide who between the
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
landowner(s) and the subsequent purchaser(s) is the 
rightful claimant to receive compensation. The nominated 
bench will have the authority to obtain independent 
fact-finding enquiry reports, if deemed necessary. The 
inquiry could include determination as to whether after 
the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, any 
transfer could have been effected and even if effected, 
whether such transfer is permitted by any law. Once 
compensation is determined, the relevant authority in 
the land acquisition department shall deposit the same 
with the reference court. The reference court shall then 
invest the deposited amount in a short-term interest-
bearing fixed deposit account with a nationalized bank, 
ensuring its periodical renewal until the relevant writ 
petition is disposed of by the nominated bench. Release 
of the invested amount together with accrued interest to 
the rightful claimant will be contingent upon the decision 
of the High Court. 
ii.	
The question as to whether the cases in that group will 
be eventually covered by the directions issued by us in 
exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution 
of India or whether such case will be covered in terms 
of the direction contained in sub-paras above, will 
depend upon and will be decided by the High Court in 
accordance with law based upon facts and circumstances 
of each case.
50.	 The above directions
however shall not apply to the following 
miscellaneous matters (GROUP D) which have been incorrectly 
tagged in the present batch. While four of the cases in Group D.1 
have been filed by the landowners seeking relief different from the 
relief claimed in the appeals filed by the appellants, in one case the 
DDA is before us by way of an M.A. These cases shall be listed 
separately in the week commencing 22nd July, 2024. The details 
of the cases are as follows:
a)	
DELHI ADMINISTRATION AND ORS. VS. M/S AUTO GRIT 
(PETROL PUMP) AND ORS. [C.A. No. 542/2016]: The relief 
sought in this Civil Appeal is particularly regarding the release 
of the land under section 48 of the 1894 Act.
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b)	
RAJENDER SINGH CHAUHAN VS. TARUN KAPOOR AND 
ORS. [CONMT.PET. (C) NO. 189/2019 IN C.A. NO. 2690/2017]: 
In this Contempt Petition, the contempt petitioner-landowner, 
dissatisfied with the DDA’s lack of action in initiating new 
acquisition proceedings pursuant to the dismissal of the Civil 
Appeal vide judgment and order dated 13th February, 2017, 
has filed a contempt petition. 
c)	
DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH CHAUHAN AND ORS. [M.A. 
No. 806/2020]: This M.A. is connected to the case that led 
to the contempt petition mentioned earlier in point (ii). In this 
M.A., the DDA is seeking a modification of the judgment and 
orders dated 13th February, 2017 and 31st July, 2019, whereby 
the Civil Appeal and the Review Petition preferred by the 
DDA were dismissed, respectively. Although this M.A. could 
have been decided based on the directions we have issued 
for Group D, since it is connected to the aforementioned 
contempt petition and no notice either on delay or on merits 
has been issued in this M.A. so far, we deem it appropriate 
to separate it and have it heard independently along with the 
aforesaid contempt petition. 
d)	
GNCTD VS. SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA [M.A. No. 1888/2023]: 
This M.A. has been filed by the landowner seeking recall of 
the judgment and order dated 10th February, 2023 passed by 
this Court whereby the Civil Appeal preferred by the GNCTD 
against the judgment and order of the High Court was allowed 
in view
of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra).
e)	
LAC VS. VIVEK & ORS. [M.A. ...DIARY NO. 32991/2023]: 
This M.A. has been filed by the landowner seeking recall of 
the judgment and order dated 9th February, 2023 passed by 
a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court whereby the 
Civil Appeal preferred by the LAC was partly allowed and 
the judgment and order of the High Court was set aside and 
the same was remanded back to the High Court for a fresh 
determination. It is imperative to note that no notice has been 
issued, either on delay or on merits. 
51.	 Group D.2 involves the following cases where no notice has 
been issued so far by this Court either on delay or on merits. It
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
1203
Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
is, therefore, necessary in the interest of justice to de-tag these 
cases for separate listing in the week commencing 22nd July, 2024:
a)	
DDA VS. GITA SABHARWAL [DIARY NO. 21746/2022];
b)	
DDA VS. NARENDAR KUMAR [DIARY NO. 674/2023, MA];
c)	
DDA VS. BAL KISHAN [DIARY NO. 5711/2023, MA];
d)	
DDA VS. ISHAAQ [DIARY NO. 1713/2023, MA];
e)	
DDA VS. ABHISHEK JAIN [DIARY NO. 40951/2022, MA];
f)	
DDA VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES PVT LTD [DIARY NO. 
42177/2022, MA];
g)	
DDA VS. SHAKEEL AHMED [DIARY NO. 3577/2023, MA];
h)	
DDA VS. SURESH KUMAR NANGIA [DIARY NO. 39901/2022, 
MA]; 
i)	
DDA VS. PHIRE RAM AND ORS. [MA 278/2023];
j)	
DDA VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH [DIARY NO. 39898/2022, 
MA]; and
k)	
DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH DHANKAR [DIARY NO. 
1215/2023, MA].
52.	 The aforementioned civil appeals and miscellaneous applications 
are disposed of on the above terms. Pending applications, if any, 
shall stand disposed of. No order as to costs.
53.	 Before parting, we deem it appropriate to provide a cautionary 
note that the limited fact-finding conducted by this Court may not 
be entirely accurate due to the complex nature of cases involving 
subsequent sale transactions, earlier rounds of litigation, land titles, 
and status of compensation and/or possession. We accordingly grant 
liberty to the parties to approach the High Court if any disputes arise 
in future or if further clarification is required, which will
decide these 
cases based on the principles outlined above, taking into account 
the facts and, if necessary, the merits of the case. 
54.	 It is also needless to clarify that the High Court shall proceed to 
decide the cases remitted to it as expeditiously as possible, but 
subject to its convenience, in accordance with law.
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ANNEXURE 1 
CATEGORY OF CASES IN THE PRESENT BATCH
GROUP
SUB-
GROUPS
DESCRIPTION
CASE TITLE AND NUMBER
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
OF 
CASES
GROUP A
(M.A.s) 
Not 
Applicable
M.A.s filed by the 
appellants-authorities 
primarily pleading change 
in law and seeking recall of 
the judgments and orders 
of this Court dismissing the 
Civil Appeals and/or Review 
Petitions in the first round.
1.	 DDA VS. PHIRE RAM  
[MA 277/2023]
2.	 DDA VS. JAI PRAKASH GUPTA 
[MA 346/2023]
2
GROUP B
(Civil Appeal 
in first round)
Group B.1 Civil Appeal dismissed 
in the first round; SLP 
pending in the second 
round (present batch)
1.	 GNCTD & ANR VS. M/S BSK 
REALTORS LLP & ANR.  
[DIARY NO. 17623/2021]
2.	 LAC VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH & 
ORS. [DIARY NO. 32072/2022]
3.	 LBD VS. DEEKSHA SURI & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 18130/2021]
4.	 GNCTD & ANR VS. LATINDER 
SINGH & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19132/2021]
5.	 GNCTD & ANR VS. ANJU SHARMA 
& ORS.  
[DIARY NO.10132/2022]
6.	 GNCTD VS. ANIL MONGA & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 15707/2022]
7.	 LBD VS. JYOTSNA SURI & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 15710/2022]
8.	 GNCTD VS. KUSHAM JAIN & ANR. 
[SLP(C) NO. 19012/2022]
9.	 GNCTD VS. RS RETAIL STORES 
Pvt Ltd & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 25834/2022]
10.	DDA VS. CHANDRALEKHA 
SOLOMON & ORS. 
[SLP(C) 30127/2015]
11.	GNCTD VS. MATRIX INVESTMENT 
PVT. LTD. & ANR. 
[SLP(C) NO.11394/2016]
12.	LBD VS. VIKRAM MADHOK & ORS 
[DIARY NO. 22127/2021]
13.	GNCTD VS. BODE RAM & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 28216/2021]
14.	GNCTD VS. BAKSHI RAM AND
SONS (HUF) & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 3566/2022]
15.	GNCTD VS. M/S SANTOSH 
INFRATECH  PRIVATE LTD. & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 8414/2022]
16.	GNCTD VS. EMMSONS 
INTERNATIONAL LTD. & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 8556/2022]
40
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1205
Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
17.	GNCTD VS. SUDARSHAN KAPOOR 
& ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 10221/2022]
18.	GNCTD VS. M/S BGNS INFRATECH 
PVT LTD. COMPANY & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 10222/2022]
19.	GNCTD VS. BHIM SINGH & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 10474/2022]
20.	GNCTD VS. ISHWAR SINGH & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 10475/2022]
21.	GNCTD VS. ISHAAQ & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 15577/2022]
22.	LBD VS. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 15940/2022]
23.	GNCTD VS. HIMMAT SINGH & ORS 
[DIARY NO. 16176/2022]
24.	GNCTD VS. ALKA LUTHRA & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 27994/2022]
25.	LBD VS. M/S PRASHID ESTATE 
PVT LTD & ORS. 
[SLP (C) NO. 28847/2015]
26.	GNCTD VS. SH. ALIMUDDIN & ANR. 
[SLP (C) 26525/2015]
27.	GNCTD VS. LALIT JAIN & ORS. 
[SLP (C) 17207/2017]
28.	DDA VS. SURENDER SINGH & ANR. 
[SLP (C) 592-593/2020]
29.	GNCTD VS. GEETA GULATI AND 
ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 22388/2021]
30.	LBD & ANR. VS. ISHWAR SINGH 
AND ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 22391/2021]
31.	LBD & ANR. VS. PRAVEEN KUMAR 
JAIN & ANR. 
[DIARY NO. 23612/2021]
32.	LBD & ANR. VS. BRAHAM SINGH 
[DIARY NO. 24447/2021]
33.	GNCTD VS. AMAN SINGH & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 28971/2021]
34.	LAC VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES 
PVT LTD 
[DIARY NO. 2404/2022]
35.	GNCTD VS. GULBIR SINGH VERMA 
& ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 4937/2022]
36.	DDA VS. HARBANS KAUR & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 10090/2022]
37.	LBD VS. SUKHBIR SINGH 
[DIARY NO. 15722/2022]
38.	GNCTD VS. KRISHNA RAJAURIA 
[DIARY NO. 18873/2022]
39.	DDA VS. TEJPAL & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 20255/2022]
40.	DDA VS. TANVIR BEGUM & ORS. 
[DIARY
NO. 21620/2022]

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Group 
B.2
Civil Appeal allowed 
in the first round; SLP 
pending in the second 
round (present batch)
1.	 GNCTD VS. BHIM SAIN GOEL 
& ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 18142/2022]
2.	 LBD AND ORS VS. SATISH 
KUMAR 
[DIARY NO. 19142/2022]
3.	 LBD AND ANR VS. BHAGWAT 
SINGH & ORS 
[DIARY NO. 19687/2022]
4.	 DDA VS. OMBIR SINGH & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 20104/2022]
5.	 DDA VS. MEHAR CHAND 
SHARMA & ORS. [DIARY NO. 
20203/2022]
5
GROUP C
(SLP in first 
round)
Group 
C.1
SLP dismissed in limine 
in the first round; SLP 
pending in the second 
round (present batch)
•	
Land acquisition 
proceedings would 
lapse following 
the test laid down 
in Manoharlal 
[5-Judge, lapse] 
(supra) as the twin 
conditions under 
section 24(2) of the 
2013 Act are met 
[non-payment of 
compensation to the 
landowners together 
with failure of the 
State to take physical 
possession of the 
acquired lands].
1.	 GNCTD VS. RAMPHAL SINGH 
& ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19697/2022
1
Group 
C.2
SLP dismissed in limine 
in the first round; SLP 
pending in the second 
round (present batch)
•	
Land acquisition 
proceedings would 
not lapse following 
the test laid down 
in Manoharlal 
[5-Judge, lapse] 
(supra) as the twin 
conditions under 
section 24(2) of the 
2013 Act are not 
met.
1.	 GNCTD & ANR. VS. ANJU LATA 
& ANR. 
[DIARY NO. 19691/2022]
1
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
Group C.3 SLP from either the first 
round or both rounds is 
pending in the present 
batch
•	
Land acquisition 
proceedings would 
not lapse following 
the test laid down in 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] (supra) as the 
twin conditions under 
section 24(2) of the 
2013 Act are not met.
1.	 DDA VS. GYAN CHAND & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 32629/2022]
2.	 DDA VICE CHAIRMAN VS. SHANTI 
INDIA PVT LTD & ORS.  
[SLP(C) NO. 7215/2017]
3.	 LAC VS. SEWARAM & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 9628/2021]
4.	 GNCTD VS. GITA SABHARWAL 
& ANR. 
[DIARY NO. 29469/2021]
5.	 VS. GYAN CHAND & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 3812/2022]
6.	 DDA VS. SIMLA DEVI & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 20229/2022]
7.	 DDA VS. YOG RAJ & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 20555/2022]
8.	 DDA VS. SEWA RAM & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 33077/2022]
9.	 GNCTD & ANR. VS. ISHAQ (DEAD) 
& ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 6981/2021]
10.	DDA VS. GOPAL SINGH & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 18366/2022]
11.	GNCTD & ANR. VS. MADHU & 
ANR. 
[DIARY NO. 19685/2022]
12.	LBD & ANR. VS. NARENDER 
SINGH & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19689/2022]
13.	GNCTD VS. SURESH KUMAR & 
ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19693/2022]
14.	GNCTD VS. GHANSHYAM DASS 
& ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19694/2022]
15.	GNCTD VS. JYOTI DEVI & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19724/2022]
16.	DDA VS. PARSHOTAM JOSHI & 
ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 20260/2022]
16
GROUP D
(Miscella 
neous 
matters)
Group D.1 •	
Cases filed by 
landowners;
•	
Cases seeking a 
different relief
1.	 DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ORS. 
VS. M/S AUTO GRIT  
(PETROL PUMP) &
ORS. [CA 
542/2016]
2.	 RAJENDER SINGH CHAUHAN VS. 
TARUN KAPOOR & ORS.  
[CONMT.PET. (C) NO.189/2019 IN 
C.A. NO. 2690/2017]
3.	 DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH 
CHAUHAN & ORS.  
[MA 806/2020]
4.	 GNCTD VS. SUSHIL KUMAR 
GUPTA  
[MA 1888/2023]
5.	 LAC VS. VIVEK & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 32991/2023, MA]
5
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Group D.2 Cases where no notice 
has been issued either on 
delay or on merits
1.	 DDA VS. GITA SABHARWAL  
[DIARY NO. 21746/2022]
2.	 DDA VS. NARENDAR KUMAR  
[DIARY NO. 674/2023, MA]
3.	 DDA VS. BAL KISHAN  
[DIARY NO. 5711/2023, MA]
4.	 DDA VS. ISHAAQ  
[DIARY NO. 1713/2023, MA]
5.	 DDA VS. ABHISHEK JAIN  
[DIARY NO. 40951/2022, MA]
6.	 DDA VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES 
PVT LTD  
[DIARY NO. 42177/2022, MA]
7.	 DDA VS. SHAKEEL AHMED  
[DIARY NO. 3577/2023, MA]
8.	 DDA VS. SURESH KUMAR NANGIA 
[DIARY NO. 39901/2022, MA]
9.	 DDA VS. PHIRE RAM & ORS.  
[MA 278/2023]
10.	DDA VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH  
[DIARY NO. 39898/2022, MA]
11.	DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH 
DHANKAR  
[DIARY NO. 1215/2023, MA]
11
TOTAL
81
GROUP E
(Suppression 
of facts qua 
subsequent 
purchaser/
title etc.)
Not 
Applicable
Cases where the 
landowners are alleged to 
have committed fraud by 
suppressing facts regarding 
them being subsequent 
purchasers and/or the 
land being vested in Gaon 
Sabha
1.	 GNCTD & ANR VS. M/S BSK 
REALTORS LLP & ANR.  
[DIARY NO. 17623/2021]
2.	 LAC VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH 
& ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 32072/2022]
3.	 LBD VS. DEEKSHA SURI & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 18130/2021]
4.	 GNCTD & ANR. VS. ANJU SHARMA 
& ORS.  
[DIARY NO.10132/2022]
5.	 GNCTD VS. ANIL MONGA & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 15707/2022]
6.	 LBD VS. JYOTSNA SURI & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 15710/2022]
7.	 GNCTD VS. RS RETAIL STORES 
Pvt Ltd & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 25834/2022]
8.	 DDA VS. JAI PRAKASH GUPTA  
[MA
346/2023]
9.	 GNCTD VS. MATRIX INVESTMENT 
PVT. LTD. & ANR.  
[SLP(C) NO.11394/2016]
10.	LBD VS. VIKRAM MADHOK & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 22127/2021]
11.	GNCTD VS. BODE RAM & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 28216/2021]
12.	GNCTD VS. BAKSHI RAM AND 
SONS (HUF) & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 3566/2022]
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Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
13.	GNCTD VS. M/S SANTOSH 
INFRATECH PVT LTD. & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 8414/2022]
14.	GNCTD VS. EMMSONS 
INTERNATIONAL LTD. & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 8556/2022]
15.	GNCTD VS. SUDARSHAN 
KAPOOR & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 10221/2022]
16.	GNCTD VS. M/S BGNS 
INFRATECH PVT LTD. COMPANY 
& ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 10222/2022]
17.	GNCTD VS. ISHAAQ & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 15577/2022]
18.	LBD VS. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 15940/2022]
19.	GNCTD VS. ALKA LUTHRA & ORS.  
[DIARY NO. 27994/2022]
20.	GNCTD VS SH. ALIMUDDIN & ANR. 
[SLP (C) 26525/2015]
21.	GNCTD VS. LALIT JAIN & ORS. 
[SLP (C) 17207/2017]
22.	LAC VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES 
PVT LTD 
[DIARY NO. 2404/2022]
23.	LBD VS. SUKHBIR SINGH 
[DIARY NO. 15722/2022]
24.	DDA VS. GOPAL SINGH & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 18366/2022]
25.	GNCTD AND ANR VS. MADHU & 
ANR. 
[DIARY NO. 19685/2022]
26.	LBD AND ANR VS. NARENDER 
SINGH & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19689/2022]
27.	GNCTD AND ANR VS. ANJU LATA 
& ANR. 
[DIARY NO. 19691/2022]
28.	GNCTD VS. SURESH KUMAR & 
ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19693/2022]
29.	GNCTD VS. GHANSHYAM DASS 
& ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19694/2022]
30.	GNCTD VS. JYOTI DEVI & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 19724/2022]
31.	DDA VS. TEJPAL & ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 20255/2022]
32.	DDA VS. PARSHOTAM JOSHI & 
ORS. 
[DIARY NO. 20260/2022]
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Note: Cases categorized under Group E, owing to their distinct facts and circumstances, may overlap with 
Groups A to C (excluding Group B.2, which we have dismissed as rendered infructuous). As a result, any 
directions issued under Group E are intended exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall 
be automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For added clarity, it is stated that all cases 
falling under Group E shall be remanded back to the High Court, regardless of their classification within the 
aforementioned categories.
Result of the case: Civil Appeals and Miscellaneous applications 
disposed of.
†Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan