R. SREENIVASA versus STATE OF KARNATAKA
[2023] 12 S.C.R. 55, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2023] 12 S.C.R. 55 : 2023 INSC 803
CASE DETAILS
R. SREENIVASA
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 859 of 2011)
SEPTEMBER 06, 2023
[VIKRAM NATH AND AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: High Court if justiﬁ ed in reversing the 
acquittal order passed by the Trial Court qua the appellant-accused acquitting 
him of oﬀ ences u/ss.302 and 201, IPC by which it held that the prosecution 
had failed to prove that the deceased was last seen in the company of the 
appellant.
Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory – When 
cannot be invoked:
Held: The ‘last seen’ theory can be invoked only when the same 
stands proved beyond reasonable doubt – In the present case, there is no 
deﬁ nitive evidence of last seen and that theory itself is in doubt – Also, 
there is a long time-gap between the alleged last seen and the recovery of 
the body – Further, there is major discrepancy in the charge framed and 
the statement of the witnesses- the speciﬁ c allegation that co-accused was 
the one who had taken away the deceased from his house, whereas during 
deposition the deceased’s wife and his brother stated that it was the appellant 
who had taken away the deceased is enough to raise doubts with regard to 
the veracity and authenticity of such statements – Also, the fact that the 
deceased, late at night, agreed to go to the house of the appellant, when seen 
in the backdrop of the allegation that there was strong animosity between 
the two, appears
to be highly improbable – Further, it does not appear that 
the deceased’s family took any steps to ﬁ nd out as to where the deceased 
had gone despite being missing for more than two days – The deceased’s 
wife even testiﬁ ed that relations between the parties were cordial, and did 
not hint at animosity – Thus, in the absence of other corroborative pieces 
55
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
56
of evidence, it cannot be said that the chain of circumstances is so complete 
that the only inference that could be drawn is the guilt of the appellant – 
Unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellant on such evidence, where the 
chain is incomplete – Presumption of innocence is in favour of the accused 
and when doubts emanate, the beneﬁ t accrues to the accused, and not the 
prosecution – Impugned judgment set aside. [Paras 13, 15, 16 and 17]
Practice and Procedure – Acquittal – Interference by appellate 
Court:
Held: An appellate court, in the case of an acquittal, must bear in 
mind that there is a double presumption in favour of the accused – When 
two views are possible, the one favouring the accused is to be leaned on – 
Criminal Law. [Para 18]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254 : [2006] 8 Suppl. 
SCR 501 – held not applicable.
Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715 : [2014] 3 SCR 
744; Nizam v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC 550 : [2015] 10 SCR 786; 
Chotkau v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 6 SCC 742; Laxman Prasad 
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 6 SCC 399; Chandrappa v. State of 
Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : [2007] 2 SCR 630; Jafarudheen v. State of 
Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 – relied on.
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 
116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan v. State of Gujarat,
(2020) 14 SCC 750 :
[2019] 14 SCR 270; Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v. State 
of Maharashtra, 2023 INSC 749 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.859 
of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.10.2010 of the High Court of 
Karnataka at Bangalore in Crl. A. No.1952 of 2005.
57
Appearances:
Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., S. J. Amith, Ms. Aishwarya Kumar, Ms. 
Vidushi Garg, Krishna Kumar, B. Purushothama Reddy, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin 
Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
Aman Panwar, AAG, V. N. Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta, Shivam 
Singh Baghal, Varun Varma, Advs. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
     Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The present criminal appeal, under The Supreme Court (Enlargement 
of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, is directed against the Final 
Judgment and Order dated 20.10.2010 in Crl. A. No.1952/2005 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) passed by the High Court of 
Karnataka at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”), 
whereby the High Court was pleased to allow the appeal ﬁ led by the State 
qua the sole appellant.
THE FACTUAL PRISM:
3. The appellant was a co-accused along with one other. Upon trial, 
both were acquitted. However, in appeal before the High Court preferred 
by the State of Karnataka, the appellant has been convicted under Section 
30211 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”) 
and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment.
4. According to the prosecution story, on 03.01.2002 at about 4:30 
P.M., an unidentiﬁ ed dead body of a male was found by the Complainant 
(PW1) in his ﬁ eld leading to institution of complaint with police. Later, 
the body was identiﬁ ed to be that of one
Krishnappa. The allegation is that 
Accused No.1 (appellant herein) along with Accused No.2 with a common 
1 
302. Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits murder shall be punished with 
death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to ﬁ ne.
R. SREENIVASA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
58
intention killed the deceased. The motive statedly being that the deceased 
had developed illicit intimacy with the appellant’s sister. It is alleged that 
both accused had further tried to destroy evidence by setting ﬁ re to the dead 
body by pouring petrol. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses including 
the Complain-ant/PW1 and one of the attestors to the inquest.
5. Upon trial, the Principal Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural District, 
Bangalore by Judgment and Order dated 09.06.2005 acquitted the accused of 
oﬀ ences under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC, holding that the prosecution 
had failed to prove that the deceased was last seen in the company of the 
accused and had also failed to prove the extra-judicial confession.
6. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Order dated 09.06.2005, the State 
of Karnataka ﬁ led Criminal Appeal No.1952 of 2005 before the High Court. 
The High Court vide the Impugned Judgment reversed the order of acquittal 
passed by the Trial Court qua the appellant whereas the appeal against the 
co-accused-Accused No.2 (hereinafter referred to as “A2”) was dismissed. 
The same is under challenge in the present appeal by the appellant.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT:
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the ground for 
acquittal by the Trial Court is based on evidence and the reasons given are 
cogent for holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against 
the accused under Sections
302 and 2012 of the IPC. It was further submitted 
2 
201. Causing disappearance of evidence of oﬀ ence, or giving false information to 
screen oﬀ ender.—Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an oﬀ ence has been 
committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that oﬀ ence to disappear, with the 
intention of screening the oﬀ ender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any 
information respecting the oﬀ ence which he knows or believes to be false,
if a capital oﬀ ence.—shall, if the oﬀ ence which he knows or believes to have been 
committed is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description 
for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to ﬁ ne;
if punishable with imprisonment for life.—and if the oﬀ ence is punishable with 
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three 
years, and shall also be liable to ﬁ ne;
if punishable with less than ten years’ imprisonment.—and if the oﬀ ence is 
punishable with impris-onment for any term not extending to ten years, shall be punished 
with imprisonment of the description provided for the oﬀ ence, for a term which may extend
59
that the High Court erred in reversing the order of acquittal against the 
appellant whereas not interfering with the acquittal of the A2 as, basically, 
the role(s) assigned to both is the same.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the charge framed 
by the Trial Court, it was clearly mentioned that the speciﬁ c allegation was 
that A2 was the person who had come to the house of the deceased two 
days prior to the fateful incident and taken him away on the pretext that 
the appellant’s father wanted to meet him whereas during deposition, PW3 
and PW8 have stated that it was the appellant who had come and taken the 
deceased with him.
9. Learned counsel submitted that this very basic aspect which 
completely changes the theory of last seen cannot result in conviction of 
the appellant as that is the sole ground for reversal of acquittal by the High 
Court. It was submitted that the only material to hold that the deceased 
was last seen in the company of the appellant, by the High Court, was the 
testimony of PW10, that too based on the extra-judicial confession by the 
appellant before the police, when PW10 during trial had turned hostile. 
Thus, it was contended that such ﬁ nding and reliance on the testimony of 
PW10 is erroneous. It was submitted that even the alleged recovery is not 
proved and most importantly there was no forensic examination conducted 
to prove that the blood belonged to the deceased. The theory of the appellant 
buying petrol
from PW10, who has turned hostile, is also, according to 
learned counsel for the appellant, enough to entitle the appellant to beneﬁ t 
of doubt.
10. It was further submitted that even the deceased’s wife stated in her 
evidence that there was cordial relationship between the appellant and family 
of the deceased and thus, the theory of strong animosity also stands negated.
to one-fourth part of the longest term of the im-prisonment provided for the oﬀ ence, or with 
ﬁ ne, or with both.
Illustration
A, knowing that B has murdered Z, assists B to hide the body with the intention of 
screening B from punishment. A is liable to imprisonment of either description for seven 
years, and also to ﬁ ne.
R. SREENIVASA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
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[2023] 12 S.C.R.
60
11. Learned counsel submitted that had there been such strong enmity 
between the two sides, there was no occasion for the deceased to have 
accompanied the appellant to his house and that too late in the night. It was 
urged that a strong pointer to the falsity of the allegation(s) is the fact that 
the deceased’s wife admitted during deposition that even when the deceased 
did not return for two-three days, she had not made any complaint and a 
very vague reason for such conduct is given say-ing that even in the past 
he (the deceased) used to go away for two-three days.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
12. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, in support of 
the Judgement impugned submitted that there was a strong motive for the 
appellant to kill the deceased. Learned counsel for the State relied upon 
the decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan v Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 
SCC 254, the relevant being at Paragraphs 19-23, for the proposition that 
once the accused is found to be the person with whom the deceased was 
last seen, the onus is on the accused to explain as to where the victim had 
gone or how the incident occurred:
‘19. Before adverting to the decisions relied upon by the counsel for 
the State, we may observe that whether an inference ought to be drawn 
under Section 106 Evidence Act is a question which must be determined 
by reference to proved3. It is ultimately a matter of appreciation of
evidence and, therefore, each case must rest on its own facts.
20. In Joseph v. State of Kerala [(2000) 5 SCC 197 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 
926] the facts were that the deceased was an employee of a school. The 
appellant representing himself to be the husband of one of the sisters 
of Gracy, the deceased, went to St. Mary’s Convent where she was 
employed and on a false pretext that her mother was ill and had been 
admitted to a hospital took her away with the permission of the sister 
in charge of the Convent, PW 5. The case of the prosecution was that 
later the appellant not only raped her and robbed her of her ornaments, 
but also laid her on the rail track to be run over by a passing train. It 
was also found as a fact that the deceased was last seen alive only in 
3 
There is a typographical error in the text of the judgment.
61
his company, and that on information furnished by the appellant in the 
course of investigation, the jewels of the deceased, which were sold 
to PW 11 by the appellant, were seized. There was clear evidence to 
prove that those jewels were worn by the deceased at the time when 
she left the Convent with the appellant. When questioned under Section 
313 CrPC, the appellant did not even attempt to explain or clarify the 
incriminating circumstances inculpating and connecting him with 
the crime by his adamant attitude of total denial of everything. In the 
background of such facts, the Court held: (SCC p. 205, para 14)
“Such incriminating links of facts could, if at all, have been only 
ex-plained by the appellant, and by nobody else, they being personally 
and exclusively within his knowledge. Of late, courts have, from the 
falsity of the defence plea and false answers given to court, when 
questioned, found the missing links to be supplied by such answers 
for completing the chain of incriminating circumstances necessary to 
connect the person concerned with the crime committed (see State of 
Maharashtra v. Suresh [(2000) 1 SCC 471 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 263]). 
That missing link to connect the accused-appellant, we ﬁ nd in this 
case provided by the blunt and outright denial of every one and all 
the incriminating circumstances pointed out which, in our view, with 
suﬃ  cient and reasonable certainty on the facts proved, connect the 
accused with the death and the cause for
the death of Gracy.”
21. In Ram Gulam Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [(2001) 8 SCC 311 
: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1546] the facts proved at the trial were that the 
deceased boy was brutally assaulted by the appellants. When one 
of them declared that the boy was still alive and he should be killed, 
a chhurablow was inﬂ icted on his chest. Thereafter, the appellants 
carried away the boy who was not seen alive thereafter. The appellants 
gave no explanation as to what they did after they took away the boy. 
The question arose whether in such facts Section 106 of the Evidence 
Act applied. This Court held: (SCC p. 320, para 24)
“In the absence of an explanation, and considering the fact that the 
appellants were suspecting the boy to have kidnapped and killed the 
child of the family of the appellants, it was for the appellants to have 
explained what they did with him after they took him away. When the 
R. SREENIVASA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
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[2023] 12 S.C.R.
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abductors withheld that information from the court, there is every 
justiﬁ cation for drawing the inference that they had murdered the boy. 
Even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be in-tended to 
relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused 
beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases like 
the present, where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts 
from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. 
The appellants by virtue of their special knowledge must oﬀ er an 
explanation which might lead the Court to draw a diﬀ erent inference.”
22. In Sahadevan v. State [(2003) 1 SCC 534 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 382] 
the prosecution established the fact that the deceased was seen in the 
company of the appellants from the morning of 5-3-1985 till at least 5 
p.m. on that day when he was brought to his house, and thereafter his 
dead body was found in the morning of 6-3-1985. In the background 
of such facts the Court observed: (SCC p. 543, para 19)
“Therefore, it has become obligatory on the appellants to satisfy 
the court as to how, where and in what manner Vadivelu parted 
company with them. This is on the principle that a person who is last 
found in the company of another, if later found missing, then the person 
with whom he was last found has to explain the circumstances in which 
they parted company. In the instant case the appellants have failed to 
discharge
this onus. In their statement under Section 313 CrPC they 
have not taken any speciﬁ c stand whatsoever.”
23. It is not necessary to multiply with authorities. The principle is 
well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself 
are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is 
especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that 
fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he 
must oﬀ er an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He 
must furnish an explanation which appears to the court to be probable 
and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his 
burden. If he fails to oﬀ er an explanation on the basis of facts within 
his spe-cial knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him 
by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial 
evidence if the accused fails to oﬀ er a reasonable explanation in
63
discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional 
link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does 
not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon 
the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not 
throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge 
and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible 
with his innocence, the court can consider his failure to adduce any 
explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. The 
principle has been succinctly stated in Naina Mohd., Re. [AIR 1960 
Mad 218 : 1960 Cri LJ 620]’
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
13. Having bestowed thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions 
and taking into account the totality of the circumstances, this Court ﬁ nds 
that the Impugned Judgment cannot be sustained. The fact that there is 
major discrepancy in the charge framed by the Court and the statement 
of the witnesses - the speciﬁ c allegation that A2 was the one who had 
taken away the deceased from his house, whereas during deposition the 
deceased’s wife and his brother have stated that it was the appellant who 
had taken away the deceased is enough to raise doubts with regard to the 
veracity and authenticity of such statements. Furthermore, the fact that the 
deceased, late at night, agreed to go to the house of the appellant, when seen 
in the backdrop of the allegation that there was strong
animosity between 
the two, appears to be highly improbable. These circumstances creating a 
doubt as to the appellant’s involvement in the crime attain more credence 
when gauged apropos the factum of the deceased being missing for more 
than two days, yet neither his wife nor his brother re-ported the deceased as 
missing. It does not appear that the deceased’s family took any steps to ﬁ nd 
out as to where the deceased had gone. The deceased’s wife has testiﬁ ed that 
relations between the parties were cordial, and has not hinted at animosity.
14. The decision relied upon by learned counsel for the State [Kashi 
Ram (supra)] is not relevant in the instant facts and circumstances for 
the simple reason that in the said case, the fact of ‘last seen’ had been 
established and thus, it was held that the accused therein, in whose company 
the victim was last seen had to explain as to what happened. Whereas in the 
present case, the very fact whether the deceased had in fact gone with the 
R. SREENIVASA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
64
appellant, after which his dead body was found had not been proved, as is 
the requirement in law. In Kashi Ram (supra) itself, this is evincible from 
the subsequent paragraph:
‘24. There is considerable force in the argument of counsel for the 
State that in the facts of this case as well it should be held that the 
respondent having been seen last with the deceased, the burden was 
upon him to prove what happened thereafter, since those facts were 
within his special knowledge. Since, the respondent failed to do so, it 
must be held that he failed to discharge the burden cast upon him by 
Section 106 of the Evidence Act. This circumstance, therefore, provides 
the missing link in the chain of circumstances which prove his guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt.’
(emphasis supplied)
15. The burden on the accused would, therefore, kick in, only when the 
last seen theory is established. In the instant case, at the cost of repetition, 
that itself is in doubt. This is borne out from subsequent decisions of this 
Court, which we would advert to:
(a) Kanhaiya Lal v State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715, where it was 
noted:
‘12. The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and 
necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed 
the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity 
between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part 
of the appellant, in our considered opinion, by
itself cannot lead to 
proof of guilt against the appellant.’
(emphasis supplied)
(b) Nizam v State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC 550, the relevant discussion 
contained at Paragraphs 16-18, after noticing Kashi Ram (supra):
‘16. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether in the facts and 
circumstances of this case, the courts below were right in invoking 
the “last seen theory”. From the evidence discussed above, deceased 
Manoj allegedly left in the truck DL 1 GA 5943 on 23-1-2001. The body 
of deceased Manoj was recovered on 26-1-2001. The prosecution has
65
contended that the accused persons were last seen with the deceased 
but the accused have not oﬀ ered any plausible, cogent explanation 
as to what has happened to Manoj. Be it noted, that only if the 
prosecution has succeeded in proving the facts by deﬁ nite evidence 
that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused, 
a reasonable inference could be drawn against the accused and then 
only onus can be shifted on the accused under Sec-tion 106 of the 
Evidence Act.
17. During their questioning under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant-
accused denied Manoj having travelled in their Truck No. DL 1 GA 
5943. As noticed earlier, the body of Manoj was recovered only on 
26-1-2001 after three days. The gap between the time when Manoj is 
alleged to have left in Truck No. DL 1 GA 5943 and the recovery of 
the body is not so small, to draw an inference against the appellants. 
At this juncture, yet another aspect emerging from the evidence needs 
to be noted. From the statement made by Shahzad Khan (PW 4) the 
internal organ (penis) of the deceased was tied with rope and blood 
was oozing out from his nostrils. Maniya Village, the place where 
the body of Manoj was recovered is alleged to be a notable place for 
prostitution where people from diﬀ erent areas come for enjoyment.
18. In view of the time gap between Manoj being left in the truck and 
the recovery of the body and also the place and circumstances in which 
the body was recovered, possibility of others
intervening cannot be 
ruled out. In the absence of deﬁ nite evidence that the appellants and 
the deceased were last seen together and when the time gap is long, 
it would be dangerous to come to the conclusion that the appellants 
are responsible for the murder of Manoj and are guilty of commit-
ting murder of Manoj. Where time gap is long it would be unsafe 
to base the conviction on the “last seen theory”; it is safer to look 
for corroboration from other circumstances and evidence adduced 
by the prosecution. From the facts and evidence, we ﬁ nd no other 
corroborative piece of evidence corroborating the last seen theory.’
(emphasis supplied)
R. SREENIVASA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
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[2023] 12 S.C.R.
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16. The cautionary note sounded in Nizam (supra) is important. The 
‘last seen’ theory can be invoked only when the same stands proved beyond 
reasonable doubt. A 3-Judge Bench in Chotkau v State of Uttar Pradesh, 
(2023) 6 SCC 742 opined as under:
‘15. It is needless to point out that for the prosecution to successfully 
invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, they must ﬁ rst establish 
that there was “any fact especially within the knowledge of the”
appellant. …’
(emphasis supplied)
17. In the present case, given that there is no deﬁ nitive evidence 
of last seen as also the fact that there is a long time-gap between the 
alleged last seen and the recovery of the body, and in the absence of 
other corroborative pieces of evidence, it cannot be said that the chain 
of circumstances is so complete that the only inference that could 
be drawn is the guilt of the appellant. In Laxman Prasad v State of 
Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 6 SCC 399, we had, upon considering Sharad 
Birdhichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 and 
Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan v State of Gujarat, (2020) 14 SCC 750,
held that ‘… In a case of circumstantial evidence, the chain has to be 
complete in all respects so as to indicate the guilt of the accused and also 
exclude any other theory of the crime.’ It would be unsafe to sustain the 
conviction of the appellant on such evidence, where the chain is clearly 
incomplete. That apart, the presumption of
innocence is in favour of the 
accused and when doubts emanate, the beneﬁ t accrues to the accused, 
and not the prosecution. Reference can be made to Suresh Thipmppa 
Shetty v State of Maharashtra, 2023 INSC 749 .
18. That apart, in Chandrappa v State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 
415, it was laid down that an appellate court, in the case of an acquittal, must 
bear in mind that there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. It 
was also emphasised that when two views are possible, the one favouring 
the accused is to be leaned on. The powers of the appellate Court have been 
recently summarised in Jafarudheen v State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440
at Paragraphs 25-27. On these factors as well, the Impugned Judgment is 
untenable.

67
19. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed. The Impugned 
Judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court is set aside. 
The appellant is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds.
Headnotes prepared by:  
Appeal allowed.
Divya Pandey
R. SREENIVASA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]