A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS versus PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT AND OTHERS
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 408, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
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[2016] 5 S.C.R. 408 
A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS 
v. 
PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT AND OTHERS 
(Civil Appeal No. 3053 of2008) 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 
[DIPAK MISRA, V. GOPALA GOWDA AND KURIAN 
JOSEPH, JJ.) 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - s. 33C(2) - Interpretation of. 
vis-a-vis a Voluntary Retirement Scheme - Workmen availed the 
Voluntary Retirement Scheme and received the special compensation 
package - Claim for lay-off compensation uls. 33C(2) - Held: 
Though there is cessation of relationship between the employee and 
the employer in VRS but if it does not cover the past dues like lay-off 
compensation, subsistence allowance, etc., the workman would be 
entitled to approach the Labour Court u/s. 33C(2) - If it is 
specifically covered, or the language of VRS would show that it 
covers the claim under the scheme, no forum will have any 
iurisdiction - On fact, claim pertaining to lay-off compensation 
having not been part of the VRS, the Labour Court has jurisdiction 
to adjudicate u/s. 33C(2) - Thus, matter is remitted to the Labour 
Court for adjudication in accordance with law. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 Though there is cessation of relationship 
between the employee and the employer in VRS but if it does not 
cover the past dues like lay-off compensation, subsistence 
allowance, etc., the workman would be entitled to approach the 
Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act. If it is specifically 
covered, or the
language of VRS would show that it covers the 
claim under the scheme, no forum will have any jurisdiction. [Para 
16) [420-C-D] 
1.2 With the said clarification, the matter would have been 
directed to be listed before the two-Judge Bench. It is not so 
required. It is noticeable that the claim relating to lay-off 
compensation is not covered in the VRS. The Labour Court, the 
Single Judge and the Division Bench declined to entertain the 
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A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS v .. PRESIDING 
OFFICER, LABOUR COURT 
claim on the ground that they had no jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the controversy. The claim pertaining to lay-off compensation 
having not been part of the VRS, the Labour Court has jurisdiction 
to adjudicate under Section 33C(2) of the Act. Therefore, the 
judgment and order of the High Court and that of the Labour 
Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Labour Court 
for adjudication in accordance with law. The Labour Court would 
finalise the claim preferred under Section 33C(2) of the Act on 
its own merits within the stipulated period. (Para 17, 18] (420-D-
G] 
National Buildings Construction Corporation v. Pritam 
Singh Gill and others (1972) 2 SCC 1 : 1973 (1) SCR 
40; A.K. Bindal and another v. Union of India and 
others (2003) 5 SCC 163:2003 (3) SCR 928; A. 
Satycmarayrma Reddy and others ~: Presiding Officer, 
Labour Court, Guntur and others (2008) 5 SCC 280 : 
2008 (7) SCR 105; Pal v. Pal VRS Employees Welfare 
Association 2002 - 1 LLJ Bombay 527; Government 
Soap Factory, Bangalore v. labour Court AIR 1970 
Mysore 225;Central Bank of India v. P.S. Rajagopalan 
(1964) 3 SCR 140; Mis Kesoram Coflan Mills Ltd. v. 
Gangadhar & others (1964) 2 SCR 809; U.P. Electric 
Supply Co. Ltd. v. R.K. Shukla and another 1969 (2) 
SCC 400:1970 (1) SCR 507 - referred to. 
Case law reference 
1973 (1) SCR 40 
referred to 
Para 1 
20Q~ (3) SCR 928 
referred to 
Para 1 
200~ (7) SCR 105 
referred to
Para 1 
2002 - 1 LLJ Bombay 527 referred to 
Para6 
AIR 1970 Mysore 225 
referred to 
Para6 
(1964) 3 SCR 140 
referred to 
Para 10 
(1964) 2 SCR 809 
referred to 
Para 10 
1970 (1) SCR 507 
referred to 
Para 11 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3053 
of2008. 
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[2016] 5 S.C.R. 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 13.04.2005 of the High Court 
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of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, in Writ Appeal No. 820 of2005. 
A. Subba Rao, Adv. for the Appellants. 
Mohanprasad Meharia, G. N. Reddy, Advs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. I. A two-Judge Bench while dealing with 
the interpretation of provisions of Sections 33C(2) of the Industrial 
Disputes Act, 194 7 (for short, "the Act") vis-a-vis a Voluntary Retirement 
Scheme framed by the State of Andhra Pradesh noticed that the 
conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra 
Pradesh in Writ Appeal No. 820 of2005, whereby it had given the stamp 
ofapproval to the judgment and order dated 21" March, 2005, passed by 
the learned Single Judge of the said Court in Writ Petition No. 4196 of 
2005, holding, inter alia, that once the workmen had availed the Voluntary 
Retirement Scheme and received the special compensation package, 
they could not have put forth a claim for lay-off compensation under 
Section 33C(2) of the Act and in that context perceived a discordant 
note in National Buildings Construction Corporation v. Pritam Sing It 
Gill and otlters
1 and A.K. Binda/ and anotlter v. Union of India and 
otlters~ and thereafter scanning the anatomy of the Act, referred the 
matter to a larger Bench in A. Satyanamymw Reddy anti otlters v. 
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur
and otlters' by stating tl~us:-
us. 
"The right of the workman to claim payment of lay off 
compensation is not denied or disputed. If the said claim has no 
nexus with the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, in our opinion, in a 
given case, like the present one, it is possible to hold that a 
proceeding under Section 33C(2) of the Act would be maintainable. 
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the question being one of 
some importance should be considered by the larger Bench as 
there exists an apparent conflict in the said decisions in National 
Buildings Construction Corporation (supra) and A.K. Bindal 
(supra)." 
Because of the aforesaid order, the matter has been placed before 
• (1972) 2 sec 1 
2 (2003J 5 sec 163 
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A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS v. PRESIDING 
OFFICER, LABOUR COURT [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
2.The expose of facts are that the appellants were employees of 
Nagarjuna Cooperative Sugars Limited (for short, "the Company"), a 
Government of Andhra Pradesh undertaking. It was declared as a "relief 
undertaking" in terms of the AP. Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) 
Act, 1971 (for brevity, "the 1971 Act"). As is evident, the management 
of the industrial undertaking declared lay-off wherefor compensation 
was to be paid. The employees-union of the Company preferred a writ 
petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh assailing the Memorandum 
No. 25027/SUG/A2/97-3 dated 5'h January, 1998, whereunder the 
workmen were not granted compensation and, in fact, were deprived of 
the same. It was urged by the workmen that the lay-off compensation 
was paid only for the months of June and July, 1995, though they were 
entitled to get the said compensation for the period 01.08.1995 to 
06.09.2002. 
3. When the matter stood thus, the State of Andhra Pradesh 
transferred the Company to one S.C.M. Sugars Limited, which absorbed 
some of the workmen, and out of the said absorbed employees, some of 
them were paid lay-off compensation and some were not extended the 
benefit. Be it stated, at one point of time all the employees had expressed 
their willingness to continue to work under the transferee-management. 
At a later stage, the Government of Andhra Pradesh allowed the said
transferee-Company to shift the factory to the State of Karnataka, as a 
.consequence of which, the workmen lost the opportunity to continue to 
be employed. 
4. As the factual matrix would unfurl, the Government of Andhra 
Pradesh issued G.O.Ms. No. 25 dated 21" May, 200 I, provided for a 
special compensation package for the employees. The condition that 
was incorporated in the package was to the effect that the amount of 
compensation was to be paid to the workmen only in the event if they 
had not opted for employment with the transferee Company. We shall 
refer to the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (YRS) at a later stage. 
5. As the factual score would further undrape, the appellants opted 
for voluntary retirement and they were paid the amount of special 
compensation in terms of the YRS. It is apposite to note here that as the 
said scheme did not make any provision for payment of lay-off 
compensation, the appellants moved the High Court under Article 226 of 
the Constitution oflndia by preferring Writ Petition No.16916of1998. 
The relief sought in the writ petition was resisted by the transferee 
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Company urging that the workmen having accepted the benefits under 
the VRS and there had been cessation of relationship between the 
employer and employee, the writ petition was not maintainable and the 
relief sought in the writ petition could not be acceded to. The learned 
Single Judge upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties opined that 
it would be appro!Jriate for the writ petitioners to approach the Industrial 
Tribunal and work out their remedies by way of a claim petition and by 
leading appropriate evidence before the said Court. The High Court, be 
it noted, granted liberty to the workmen to raise all issues which were 
available including those which had been raised in the writ petition, and 
accordingly disposed of the writ petition. 
6. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the workmen filed a petition 
under Section 33C(2) of the Act claiming lay-off compensation before 
the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur that fonned the subject matter 
of C.F.R. No. 43 I 9/2004 Ill Un-No. M.P. /2004. The Labour Court 
dismissed the application as not maintainable onthe foundation that the 
claimants were not workmen under Section 2(s) of the Act having 
received all the benefits under VRS. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order 
of the Labour Court, the appellants herein preferred W.P. No. 4196 of 
2005. The learned Single Judge referred to the authority in A.K. Bindlt/ 
(supra), adverted to the
decision of the Bombay High Court in Pll/ v. 
Pal VRS Employees Welfare Association", that dealt with ·'existing 
individual rights" in the context of Section 33C(2) of the Act, distinguished 
the decision rendered in Government Soap Factory, Bangalore v. 
Lllbour Court5 and eventually held that the Labour Court had correctly 
exercised the jurisdiction by coming to hold that the writ petitioners were 
no more workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and 
hence, there was no warrant for any interference in exercise of jurisdiction 
under Article 226 of the Constitution. Dissatisfaction of non-success 
compelled the writ petitioners to prefer Writ Appeal No. 820 of 2005 
and the Division Bench concurred with the view expressed by the learned 
Single Judge in view of the dictum of this Court in A.K. Bimla/ (supra). 
Hence, the present appeal by special leave. We have already noted 
how the matter has been placed before the three-Judge Bench. 
7. Section 2(s) of the Act defines the workman as follows:-
""workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed 
4 2002 - I LLJ Bombay 527 
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' AI.R 1970 Mysore 225
A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS v. PRESIDING 
OFFICER, LABOUR COURT [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, 
operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, 
whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for 
the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an 
industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been 
dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a 
consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or 
retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any 
such person -
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the 
Army Act,1950 (46of1950), ortheNavy Act, 1957 (62of1957); 
or 
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other 
employee of a prison; or 
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative 
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(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages 
exceeding [ten thousand rupees] per mensem or exercises, either 
by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of 
the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." 
8. Section 33C(2) of the Act reads as follows:-
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"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer 
any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in 
terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of 
money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should
be 
computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be 
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made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be 
specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a 
period not exceeding three months]: 
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court 
considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons 
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to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period 
as he may think fit." 
9. In A.K. Binda/ (supra) a two-Judge Bench was considering 
the grant of pay revision in respect of companies which came under the 
Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (for short, "BIFR"). 
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In the said case an issue also arose with regard to the framing of voluntary 
retirement scheme pertaining to the grievance ofnon-revision of the pay 
scale of the workmen. It was contended by the respondents therein that 
the employees having taken YRS and having taken the amount without 
any demur, the relationship of employee and employer had ceased to 
exist and, therefore, they cannot raise any grievance regarding the non-
revision of pay scale. The said submission was opposed on the ground 
that employees had no option in the matter and accepted YRS under 
compulsion and further under the YRS, the total compensation amounts 
have to be calculated as there was revision of pay scale since 1992 as 
claimed by the workmen and in that context opined thus:-
"34 .. This shows that a considerable amount is to be paid to an 
employee ex gratia besides the terminal benefits in case he opts 
for voluntary retirement under the Scheme and his option is 
accepted. The amount is paid not for doing any work or rendering 
any service. It is paid in lieu of the employee himself leaving the 
services of the company or the industrial establishment and 
foregoing all his claims or rights in the same. It is a package deal 
of give and take. That is why in the business world it is known as 
"golden handshake". The main purpose of paying this amount is 
to bring about a complete cessation of the jural relationship between
the employer and the employee. After the amount is paid and the 
employee ceases to be under the employment of the company or 
the undertaking, he leaves with all his rights and there is no question 
of his again agitating for any kind of his past rights with his 
erstwhile employer including making any claim with regard to 
enhancement of pay scale for an earlier period. If the employee 
is still permitted to raise a grievance regarding enhancement of 
pay scale from a retrospective date, even after he has opted for 
Voluntary Retirement Scheme and has accepted the amount paid 
to him, the whole purpose of introducing the Scheme would be 
totally frustrated. 
35. The contention that the employees opted for YRS under any 
kind of compulsion is not worthy of acceptance. The petitioners 
are officers of the two Companies and are mature enough to 
weigh the pros and cons of the options which were available to 
them. They could have waited and pursued their claim for revision 
of pay scale without opting for YRS. However, they in their
A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS v. PRESIDING 
OFFICER, LABOUR COURT [DIPAK MISRA, J.) 
wisdom thought that in the fact situation YRS was a better option 
available and chose the same. After having applied for YRS and 
taken the money it is not open to them to contend that they exercised 
the option under any kind of compulsion. In view of the fact that 
nearly ninety-nine per cent of employees have availed of the YRS 
Scheme and have left the Companies (FCI and HFC), the writ 
petition no longer survives and has become infructuous." 
10. In Pritam Singh Gill (supra), this Court was dealing with a 
case wherein the respondent was dismissed from service w.e.f. 
September 19, 1967. He was suspended on October 5, 1964 and the 
order of suspension remained in f,orce till September I 8, 196 7. During 
the period of suspension, on October 7, 1965, he was transferred to 
Delhi. After dismissal the respondent applied to the Labour Court at 
Delhi under Section 33C(2) of the Act for computing the benefits and 
amounts he was entitled to receive alleging that he had not been paid 
such amounts and benefits. The Labour Court framed certain issues 
and decided the claim in favour of the employee. The only question that 
arose before this Court pertained to jurisdiction of the Labour Court to 
entertain the employees' application under Section 33C(2) of the Act. 
According to the appellants, the respondent-employee having alre~dy 
been dismissed had ceased fo be the workman from the
date of application 
and, therefore, he had no locus standi to approach the Labour Court 
under Section 33C(2) of the Act. On behalf of the respondent, it was 
argued that if the period in respect of which benefits and amounts are 
claimed under Section 33C(2) of the Act was during the course of his 
employment prior to dismissal, then mere fact that he was dismissed by 
the employer before he could apply to the Labour Court under Section 
33C(2) would not deprive him of his right to claim reliefunder that Section. 
The Court posed the question whether Section 33C(2) of the Act can be 
invoked by dismissed workman in respect of benefits and salary due to 
him forthe period prior to the date of his dismissal. The Court referred 
to the authorities in Central Bank of India v. P.S. Rajagopalan6 and 
Mis Kesomm Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadltar & otlters 7 and 
distinguished the said cases as the factual background was different. 
However, it reproduced certain passages from P.S. Rajagopalan (supra) 
because the Court in the said decision has discussed the legislative history 
of Chapter Y-A and Section 33C of the Act and observed that:-
' (1964) 3 SCR 140 
7 ( 1964) 2 SCR 809 
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"In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-section 
(2) it is clear that if a workman's right to receive the benefit is 
dispute, that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. 
Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money the 
Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether 
the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is 
not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court 
can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; 
but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal with 
that question and decide whether the workman has the right to 
receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only ifthe Labour 
Court answers this point in favour of title workman that the next 
question of making necessary computation can arise." 
And again, 
"Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant's construction is 
accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option 
of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the 
remedy provided by sub-section (2) because he has merely to 
raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the 
workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour 
Court to entertain the workman's application. The claim under 
Section 33-C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the 
question about computing the benefit in terms
of money may, in 
some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence 
of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to 
the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour 
Court by sub-section (2)." 
11. After reproducing the said passages, the Court referred to 
the !lUthority in U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. R.K. Shukla mid 
another" wherein the Court after review of various decisions had upheld 
the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain application for lay off-
compensation under Section 33C(2) observing that such jurisdiction could 
not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workman's claim for computation 
of the benefit in terms of money, adding that the Labour Court had to go 
into the question and determine whether on the facts it had jurisdiction to 
make the computation. 
12. Thereafter, the Court in Pritam Singh Gill (supra) referred 
to number of decisions and posed the question thus:-
• AIR 1970 SC 237; 1969 (2) sec 400
A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS v. PRESIDING 
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OFFICER, LABOUR COURT [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
"The crucial point which requires consideration on the appellant's 
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argument is thus confined to the precise scope and meaning of 
the word "workman" used in Section 33-C(2) in the background 
of the definition of this word as contained in Section 2(s)." 
13. Thereafter, it was held:-
"This section was enacted for the purpose of enabling individual 
workman to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual 
rights against their employers without being compelled to have 
recourse to Section 10 by raising disputes and securing a reference 
which is obviously a lengthy process. Section 33-C of the Act has 
accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the Labour 
Court with the powers similar to those of an executing court so 
that the workman concerned receives speedy relief in respect of 
his existing individual rights. The primary purpose of the section 
being to provide the aggrieved workman with a forum similar to 
the executing courts, it calls for a broad and beneficial construction 
consistently with other provisions of the Act, which should serve 
to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. It may 
appropriately be pointed out that the mischief which Section 33-C 
was designed to suppress was the difficulties faced by individual 
workmen in getting relief in respect of their existing rights without 
having resort to Section I 0 of the Act. To
accept the argument of 
the appellant, it would always be open to an unfair, unsympathetic 
and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his 
employee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by 
Section 33-C and compel him to have resort to the lengthy 
procedure by way ofreference under Section I 0 of the Act thereby 
defeating the very purpose and object of enacting th is provision. 
This, in our view, quite clearly brings out the repugnancy visualised 
in the opening part of Section 2 of the Act and such a position 
could hardly have been contemplated by the Legislature. In order 
to remove this repugnancy Section 33-C(2) must be so construed 
as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed during 
the period in respect of which he claims relief, even though he is 
no longer employed at the time of the application. In other words 
the term "workman" as used in Section 33-C(2) includes all persons 
whose claim, requiring computation under this sub-section, is in 
respect of an existing right arising from his relationship as an 
industrial workman with his employer. By adopting th is construction 
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alone can we advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in 
accordance with the purpose and object of inserting Section 33-C 
in the Act. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the view 
taken by the Madras decisions and we approve of their approach. 
According to Shri Malhotra, in cases where there is no dispute 
about the employee's right which is not denied, he will be entitled 
to file a suit. Whether ornot the right of suit can be claimed by the 
employee, we are not persuaded on the basis of this argument to 
accept the construction canvassed on behalf of the appellant and 
deny to a dismissed employee the benefit of speedy remedy under 
Section 33-C(2) of the Act." 
[emphasis supplied] 
14. It needs to' be noted that after so stating, the three-Judge 
Bench clarified that its pronouncement was strictly in the context of the 
Act. The Court opined that in the case at hand they were only concerned 
with the Act and it should not be treated as expression of an opinion as 
regards the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. 
15. Be it stated immediately, in the case at hand to appreciate the 
applicability of the provisions contained in Section 33C(2) of the Act, it is 
necessary to appreciate the benefits available to the employees under 
the VRS. The benefits which are available are reproduced below:-
"BENEFITS: 
The following benefits are payable to the employees covered under 
the scheme. 
Terminal
benefits: 
The following benefits as statutorily due will be paid as per 
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eligibility. 
i. The balance in the P.F. Account payable as per the CPF 
regulation. 
ii.Cash equivalent of accumulated earned leave as per the rules 
of the enterprise. 
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iii. Gratuity as per the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act 
or other applicable Rules of the Organisation. 
Exgratia Benefits: 
i) An employee who is regular or permanent, whose request for 
VRS is accepted would· be entitled to an Ex-gratia payment 
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. equivalent to One and Half months emoluments (Pay+ DA) last
A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS v. PRESIDING 
OFFICER, LABOUR COURT [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
drawn, for each completed year of service or the monthly 
emoluments at the time ofretirement multiplied by the balance 
months of service left before normal date of retirement whichever 
is less, subject to a minimum of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty 
Thousand only). 
One month/three months notice pay, as per the service conditions 
applicable. 
If the application of an employee opting for YRS is accepted 
instantaneously and payment is arranged by the management on 
the same day, the concerned individual would be entitled for 
payment of ex-gratia along with pay for notice-period. 
Payment of ex-gratia for services rendered or left over 
service( whichever is less), as well as the amount payable for the 
Notice period should, however, not exceed the basic pay + DA 
that would have bee:l paid to the employee who has opted for 
YRS till the date of his superannuation. 
Where the management takes times to take a decision on the 
acceptance of an application submitted by the employees for YRS 
and allows the notice period to lapse or the employee concerned 
has drawn full salary during the notice period serve,d by him, the 
pay' for notice period would not be admissible as the employee 
has already drawn the salary for the notice period, 
In addition the Employee and his family would also be entitled to 
travel fare of the admissible class to his native place within the 
State of Andhra
Pradesh, which will be verified with reference to 
his L.T.C. file. 
. 
ii) For calculation of ex-gratia under the Scheme the fraction of 
service viz., 6 months and above will be treated as one year and 
service of\ess than 6 months will be ignored. 
• 
iii) EOL upto a period of one year will be considered for calculation 
of ex-gratia benefits, provided the Service Regulations of the 
concerned Organizations permit sanction of such EOL." 
16. We need not refer to the other clauses as they do not really provide 
for any kind ofbenefit but stipulate the various aspects for implementation 
of the YRS and the procedure to be adopted. On a perusal of the YRS, 
it is clear as day that it did not deal with the lay-off compensation. As 
has been laid down in Pritam Singll Gill (supra), a claim pertaining to 
non-payment of suspension allowance could be agitated under the said 
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provision in spite of the employee being dismissed from service. In A.K. 
Bindal (supra) the two-Judge Bench has held that after acceptance of 
the scheme and availing of benefits under YRS an employee could not 
claim higher wages. The controversy was different. If the YRS had 
mentioned about the lay-off compensation, needless to say, the claim 
would have been covered and the amount received by the workmen 
would have been deemed to have been covered the quantum of lay-off 
compensation. That is not the factual position. Therefore, the controversy 
that arose in Pritam Singh Gill (supra) and the dispute that emanated 
in A.K. Bindal (supra) are quite different. Hence, we are disposed to 
think that there exists no conflict between Pritam Singh Gill (supra) 
and A.K. Binda/ (supra). We think it appropriate to say that though 
there iS cessation ofrelationship between the employee and the employer 
in YRS but if it does not cover the past dues like lay-off compensation, 
subsistence allowance, etc., the workman would be entitled to approach 
the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act. If it is specifically 
covered, or .the language of YRS would show that it covers the claim 
under the scheme, no forum will have any jurisdiction. 
17. With the aforesaid clarification, we would have directed to list 
the matter before the two-Judge Bench. It is not so required. It is 
noticeable that the claim
relating to lay-off compensation is not covered 
in the YRS. The Labour Court, learned single Judge and the Division 
Bench have declined to entertain the claim on the ground that they had 
no jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. We have already held that 
claim pertaining to lay-off compensation having not been part of the 
YRS, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate under Section 33C(2) 
of the Act. Therefore, we set aside the judgment and order of the High 
Court and that of the Labour Court. 
18. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgments 
and orders are set aside and the matter is. remitted to the Labour Court 
for adjudication in accordance with law. The Labour Court shall finalise 
the claim preferred under Section 33C(2) of the Act on its own merits 
within three months hence. The parties are directed to appear before 
the Labour Court on J7•h October, 2016. There shall be no order as to 
costs. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal allowed.