SONI KUMARI versus DEEPAK KUMAR
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 305, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2lJ1b] 10 S.C.R. 305 
SONIKUMARI 
V. 
DEEPAK KUMAR 
(Civil Appeal No. 7164 of 2015) 
SEPTEMBER 16, 2015 
[M.Y. EQBALAND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.] 
A 
B 
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 142 - Invocation of 
power under-For waiving the cooling off period of 6 months c 
for filing second motion uls. 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act 
- Held: In the instant case, Family Court had made necessary 
efforts for reconciliation between the parties but efforts failed 
-Appellant-wife taking plea that respondent-husband has to 
leave India for job purpose and it was not possible for him to D 
return back in a year or two and, therefore, she would suffer 
mental agony and would also not be able to remarry- It is a 
fit case where in order to do complete justice to the parties, it 
is necessary to invoke the power u!Art. 142 in an 
irreconcilable situation - Cooling off period of 6 months E 
waived and decree of divorce by mutual consent granted -
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - s. 13-8(1 ). 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The order passed by the Family Court F 
clearly showed that before passing the impugned order 
under Section 13-8(1) of the Act, the Family Court made 
necessary efforts for reconciliation between the parties 
but the efforts yielded no fruitful result. The Family Court, G 
before passing the order, carefully perused the· entire 
materials on the record including the joint statement of 
the parties. It is also not disputed that the respondent-
husband would be leaving
India for his job purpose and 
305 
H

306 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015)108.C.R. 
A once he goes out of the country, it would not be possible 
for him to return back in a year or two. In the event the 
respondent is not returned within the stipulated time for 
second motion then the appellant-wife would not only 
suffer mental agony but would also be not able to 
B remarry. [Para 8) [311-G-H; 312-A-B] 
2. There is no connivance of any of the parties in 
the decision taken by the appellant and the respondent. 
It is a fit case where in order to do complete justice to 
C the parties it becomes necessary to invoke the power 
under Article 142 of the Constitution in an irreconcilable 
situation. [Para 12] [315-F] 
Vimi Vinod Chopra vs. Vinod Gulshan Chopra 
D 
(2013) 15 SCC 547; Devinder Singh Narula vs. 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Meenakshi Nangia (2012) 8 SCC 580: 2012 (7) 
SCR 372; Anil Kumar Jain vs. Maya Jain (2009) 
10 sec 415: 
2009 (14) 
SCR 90 
- relied 
on. 
Case Law Reference 
(2013) 15 sec 547 
·2012 (7) SCR 372 
relied on. 
relied on. 
2009 (14) 
SCR 90 
relied on. 
Para 9 
Para 10 
Para 11 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
7164of2015 
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.07.2015 of 
Family Court, South, Saket Court, New Delhi in HMA No. 613 
of2015. 
Dr. Nirmal Chopra for the Appellant.
SONI KUMARI v. DEEPAK KUMAR 
307 
Jatin Sapra (for Debasis Misra) for the Respondent. 
A 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
M.Y. EQBAL, J.: 1. Leave granted. 
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against order 8 
dated 14. 7 .201.5 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court 
South, Saket, New Delhi in HMA No.613 of 2015, whereby 
petition for first motion for divorce by mutual consent under 
section 13-8(1) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short, 'the Act') 
moved by the parties has been allowed. However, Family Court C 
rejected prayer for waiving of statutory period of six months 
prescribed under section 13-8(2) of the Act for filing second 
motion. 
3. The brief facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. 
D 
4. The appellant and the respondent married as per Hindu 
rites and customs at the parental house of the appellant 
sometime in the year 2009 and after marriage they shifted to 
Delhi. The parties ever since the marriage did not pull together E 
being of different habits, ideas and completely different in 
nature and temperament. They could not adjust with each other 
at all. Since February 2014, the appellant and the respondent 
started living separately as they had irreconcilable differences 
and there was no possibility of any reconciliation between them. 
F 
As a result, the appellant and the respondent filed a joint petition 
for divorce by mutual consent as contemplated under section 
13-8( 1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in the court of
Principal Judge, Family Court, South Saket, New Delhi. Along 
with that joint petition for divorce, parties placed on record a G 
true copy of details/confirmed air ticket from Delhi to Frankfurt 
for travel of the respondent on 16.07.2015 for his professional 
purpose. 
5. The Family Court recorded the joint statement of the H
308 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 10 S.C.R. 
A 
first motion under section 13-8(1) of the Act on 14.7.2015 
where they stated that the respondent-husband shall pay Rs.15 
Lakhs as full and final settlement of all her claims (past, present 
and future) and out of which, Rs.6 lakhs had already been 
received by the appellant-wife. It was further stated that there 
B was no possibility of any reconciliation between the parties. 
On 14. 7.2015, after recording joint statement of the first motion, 
the Principal Judge passed an interim order whereby she 
allowed the first motion petition for divorce and rejected the 
prayer for waiving of statutory period of six months prescribed 
C under section 13-8(2) of the Act for filing the second motion. 
Hence, it is the appellant who moved this Court seeking relief 
for waiver of the prescribed period of six months. 
6. For better appreciation, the order passed by the 
D Principal Judge, Family Court, South Saket, New Delhi is 
extracted hereinbelow: 
"1.0 
Smt. Soni Kumari and Sh. Deepak Kumar, both 
the petitioners, have jointly filed this petition u/s 13-8(1) 
E 
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to 
as "the Act") for Soni kumara and Deepak Kumar 
dissolution of their marriage by a decree of divorce 
consent. 
F 
2.0 
This Court made sincere efforts for reconciliation 
between the parties; but, the efforts for reconciliation 
yielded no fruitful result. Both the petitioners submitted 
that they have made up their
mind to part ways and take 
divorce by mutual consent, in terms of the compromise 
G 
effected between them. Consequently, the joint statement 
of the petitioners was recorded today i.e. 14.07.2015. 
I 
3.0 I have heard both the sides and have also carefully 
perused the entire material on the record including the 
H 
joint statement of the petitioners.
SONI KUMARI v. DEEPAK KUMAR 
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.] 
309 
4.0 Petitioners have testified that marriage between them A 
was solemnized on 27.11.2009 at Maharaj Ganj, 
Madhubani, Bihar according to Hindu rites and 
ceremonies. Proof of marriage- marriage photograph 
is Ex.P1 (Colly). It is stated that no child was born out of 
this wedlock. Petitioners have been living separately B 
since February 2014 due to temperamental differences; 
they have not resumed cohabitation since then. It is also 
stated that now there is no possibility of their living 
together as husband and wife. 
c 
4.1 Vide their joint statement, petitioners have also 
stated that both of them have amicably settled all their 
claims and disputes vis-a-vis each other, related to their 
marriage with regard to istridhan, permanent alimony and 
maintenance (past, present and future) etc. in full and D 
final as per the terms and conditions mentioned in the 
present petition Ex.PX and in the SettlementAgreement/ 
Compromise Deed, dated 6/7/2015, E.PY. 
4.2 As per settlement, petitioner no.2/husband shall pay E 
a total sum of Rs.15,00,000/-to the petitioner no.1/wife 
in full and final settlement of all her claims of stridhan, 
permanent alimony and maintenance (past, present and 
future). Out of the said amount, a sum of Rs.6,00,000/-
has been received by the petitioner no.1/wife from 
F 
petitioner no.2/husband on 02.07.2015. It has agreed 
that balance amount of Rs.9,00,000/- shall be paid by 
the petitioner
no.2/husband to petitioner no.1 /wife at the 
time of recording of statement in the second motion 
petition. 
G 
4.3 Both the petitioners undertook to withdraw all their 
cases/complaints/petitions, if any, and further not to file 
any case/complaint against each other/respective family 
members at any point of time in future with regard to this H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A 
marriage. Both the petitioners undertook to abide by the 
terms and conditions mentioned in the present petition, 
Ex.PX and in the Settlement Agreement/Compromise 
Deed, dated 06.07.2015, E.PY. 
B 
5.0 From the joint statement of the petitioners and 
documents placed on record, it has come on record that 
the petitioners were married on 27.11.2009 and have 
been living separately since Feb-Mar 2014 on account 
of temperamental differences. From their joint statement, 
C 
I am also satisfied that there is no collusion between the 
petitioners in filing this petition and their consent for 
divorce is free from any force, fraud, threat, pressure, 
coercion or undue influence. Petitioners have voluntarily 
decided to part ways amicably and seek dissolution of 
D 
_marriage by mutual consent in terms of settlement. 
6.0 In view of the above, as this petition complies with 
provisions of section 138( 1) of the Act, it is accepted. 
However, marriage of the petitioners cannot be dissolved 
E 
at this stage, keeping in view the provision of Section 
13-8(2) of the Act, which provides for a minimum waiting 
period of six months from the date of presentation of their 
motion petition u/s 13-B( 1) of the Act. 
F 
7.0 In view of the above, the petitioner are advised to 
reflect during this period and make further sincere efforts 
for reconciliation and revival of their matrimonial bond. 
In case, the petitioners fail to resolve their
differences 
and resume cohabitation and still feel that revival of their 
G 
matrimonial relationship is not possible and they wish to 
part ways permanently, they may take appropriate steps 
and seek dissolution of their marriage as per the 
provisions of Section 13-8(2) of the Act after statutory 
period of six months. 
H
SONI KUMARI v. DEEPAK KUMAR 
[M.Y. EQ8AL, J.] 
311 
8.0 In view of the above, present petition under section A 
13-8(1) of HMA is disposed of accordingly. 
9.0 File be consigned to Record Room. 
Announced in the open court today i.e. on 
8 
14.07.2015." 
7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the 
parties. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted 
that the appellant has made out the case for waiving of the 
statutory period of six months prescribed under Section 13-8 C 
of the Act in view of the fact that she has already received the 
entire compensation of Rs.15 lakhs as full and final settlement 
of all her claims (past, present and future) as per the settlement 
arrived at between the parties. It has been further submitted 0 
that non-waiving of statutory period of six months will increase 
the agony of the appellant as nothing survives in the relationship 
between the parties except the legal ties. It has been further 
submitted on behalf of the appellant that this 
Court can only waive statutory period of six months by E 
exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 
Learned counsel submitted that the respondent as well has to 
go out of India for his job purpose and in case he leaves India 
before filing of the second motion petition, there is no likelihood 
of his returning for at least another one or two years. Under F 
these circumstances, it will only increase mental agony of the 
appellant as she will have to wait for
respondent to return to 
,India and will not be able to remarry in spite of having received 
entire amount of compensation. 
8. From the order passed by the Family Court, it is clear 
that before passing the impugned order under Section 13-8(1) 
G 
of the Act, the Family Court made necessary efforts for 
reconciliation between the parties but the efforts yielded no 
fruitful result. The Family Court, before passing the order, 
H
312 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A carefully perused the entire materials on the record including 
the joint statement of the parties. It has also not been disputed 
that the respondent-husband has to leave India for his job 
purpose and once he goes out of the country, it would not be 
possible for him to retu: .1 back in a year or two. In the event 
B the respondent is not returned within the stipulated time for 
second motion then the appellant-wife would not only suffer 
mental agony bl!t would also be not aUe to remarry. 
9. In these facts, the only point to be considered is as to 
C whether it is a fit case where in order to give complete justice 
this Court should exercise power under Article 142 of the 
Constitution of India. Asimilar question came for consideration 
before this Court in the case of Vimi Vinod Chopra vs. Vi nod 
Gulshan Chopra, (2013) 15 SCC 547. In that case, after 
.D considering the terms of settlement arrived at between the 
parties, the Court observed: 
"7. Since the parties have also agreed for annulment of 
their marriage, we are satisfied that this is a fit case 
E 
where we may exercise our jurisdiction under Article 142 
of the Constitution of India to give quietus to the multiple 
disputes between them as this will enable complete 
justice between the parties. Consequently, we waive the 
statutory period and pass the decree of divorce under 
F 
Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. As a result 
of this, the marriage
solemnised between the parties on 
7-8-1993 stands dissolved." 
10. Reference may be made to the decision of this Court 
G in the case of Devinder Singh Naru/a vs. Meenakshi 
Nangia, (2012) 8 sec 580, where a similar question arose 
with regard to invocation of power under Article 142 of the 
Constitution of India for waiving the cooling off period of six 
months prior to filing of second motion under section 13-B of 
H
SONI KU MARI v. OEEPAK KUMAR 
[M.Y. EQ8AL, J.] 
313 
the Act. To do complete justice between the parties, the Court A 
observed: 
"8. We have carefully considered the submissions made 
on behalf of the parties and have also considered our 
decision in Anil Kumar Jain case, (2009) 10 SCC 415. 
8 
It is no doubt true that the legislature had in its wisdom 
stipulated a cooling off period of six months from the date 
of filing of a petition for mutual divorce till such divorce is 
actually granted, with tho intention that it would save the 
institution of marriage. It is also true that the intention of C 
the legislature cannot be faulted with, but there may be 
occasions when in order to do complete justice to the 
parties it becomes necessary for this Court to invoke its 
powers under Article 142 in an irreconcilable situation. 
In fact, in Kiran v. Sharad Dutt, which was considered in 
D 
Anil Kumar Jain case, after living separately for many 
years and 11 years after initiating the proceedings under 
Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the parties filed a 
joint application before this Court for leave to amend the 
divorce petition and to convert the same into a E 
proceeding under Seetion 13-8 of the Act. Treating the 
petition as one under Section 13-8 of the aforesaid Act. 
this Court by invoking its powers under Article 142 of the 
Constitution granted a decree of mutual divorce at the 
F 
stage of the SLP itself. In different cases, in different 
situations, this
Court had invoked its powers under Article 
142 of the Constitution in order to do complete justice 
between the parties." 
11. Reference can also be made to a decision of this G 
Court in the case of Anil Kumar Jain vs. Maya Jain, (2009) 
10 sec 415, where it has been held as under: 
"29. In the ultimate analysis the aforesaid discussion 
throws up two propositions. The first proposition is that H
314 
A 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
although irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not one 
of the grounds indicated whether under Sections 13 or 
13-8 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for grant of divorce, 
the said doctrine can b'e applied to a proceeding under 
either of the said two provisions only where the 
proceedings are before the Supreme Court. In exercise 
of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the 
Constitution the Supreme Court can grant relief to the 
parties without even waiting for the statutory period of 
six months stipulated in Section 13-8 of the aforesaid 
Act. This doctrine of irretrievable breakdown of marriage 
is not available even to the High Courts which do not 
have powers similar to those exercised by the Supreme 
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Neither the 
civil courts nor even the High Courts can, therefore, pass 
orders before the periods prescribed under the relevant 
provisions of the Act or on the grounds not provided for 
in Sections 13 and 13-8 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
30. The second proposition is that although the Supreme 
Court can, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under 
Article 142 of the Constitution, convert a proceeding 
under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, into 
one under Section 13-8 and pass a decree for mutual 
divorce, without waiting for the statutory period of six 
months, none of the other courts can exercise such 
powers. The other
courts are not competent to pass a 
decree for mutual divorce if one of the consenting parties 
withdraws his/her consent before the decree is passed. 
Under the existing laws, the consent given by the parties 
at the time of filing of the joint petition for divorce by mutual 
consent has to subsist till the second stage when the 
petition comes up for orders and a decree for divorce is 
finally passed and it is only the Supreme Court, which, in 
exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of
SONI KUMARI v. DEEPAK KUMAR 
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.] 
315 
the Constitution, can pass orders to do complete justice A 
to the parties. 
31. The various decisions referred to above merely 
indicate that the Supreme Court can in special 
circumstances pass appropriate orders to do justice to B 
the parties in a given fact situation by invoking its powers 
under Article 142 of the Constitution, but in normal 
circumstances the provisions of the statute have to be 
given effect to. The law as explained in Sureshta Devi 
case, (1991) 2 sec 25, still holds good, though with C 
certain variations as far as the Supreme Court is 
concerned and that too in the light of Article 142 of the 
Constitution." 
12. We have given our anxious consideration in the matter o 
and the terms of settlement arrived at between the parties and 
in furtherance of the settlement the appellant-wife has already 
received the entire amount of compensation from the 
respondent-husband. We have also considered the satisfaction 
recorded by the Family Court with regard to the intention of E 
the parties to mutually take divorce and there is no connivance 
of any of the parties in the decision taken by the appellant and 
the respondent. In our view, it is a fit case where in order to do 
complete justice to the parties it becomes necessary to invoke 
the power under Article 142 of the Constitution in an F 
irreconcilable situation. 
13. For the aforesaid reason, we allow the appeal and 
waive the cooling off period of
six months and grant a decree 
of mutual divorce to the parties and direct that the marriage G 
between the parties shall stand dissolved by mutual consent. 
Devika Gujral 
Appeal allowed.