SUDARSAN PUHAN versus JAYANTA KU. MOHANTY & ANR. ETC.
[2018] 12 S.C.R. 1101, Supreme Court of India, 2018
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
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1101
SUDARSAN PUHAN
v.
JAYANTA KU. MOHANTY & ANR. ETC.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 3798-3799 of 2016)
SEPTEMBER 20, 2018
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – s.173 – Appeal under – Appellant-
claimant while going on a motorcycle met with an accident and
suffered severe injuries – He filed claim petition u/s.166 of MV Act
before the Tribunal against the respondents (owner of the motorcycle
and the Insurance company) – Tribunal awarded a total sum of
Rs.24,62,065/- compensation to the claimant, holding the
respondents liable for payment – Both claimant and the Insurance
company filed appeal before the High Court – High Court allowed
the appeal filed by the Insurance company in part and reduced the
compensation from Rs.24,62,065/- to Rs.20,00,000/-  – Aggrieved,
only claimant filed appeal – Held: An appeal before the High Court
u/s.173 of MV Act is essentially in the nature of first appeal like
s.96 of CPC and, therefore, the High Court is equally under legal
obligation to decide all issues arising in the case both on facts and
law after appreciating the entire evidence – In instant case, it was
the duty of the High Court to decide the appeals keeping in view
the requirements of Or.XX, r.4(2) r/w Or.XLI, r.31 of CPC which
requires that judgment/order shall contain a concise statement of
the case, points for determination, decisions thereon and the
reasons – However, the High Court neither set out the facts of the
case of the parties
in detail, nor dealt with any of the submissions
urged by them, nor took note of the grounds raised by the claimant
and nor made any attempt to appreciate the evidence in the light of
the settled legal principles applicable to the issues arising in the
present case – Thus, matter remanded to the High Court to examine
the question as to whether any case for further enhancement in the
quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal made out or not
and, if so, on what grounds – Furthermore, as the Insurance
Company chose not to file any appeal against the impugned order
of the High Court, therefore, claimant alone will have right to
 [2018] 12 S.C.R. 1101
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prosecute his appeal on merits after remand of the case to the High
Court – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 –s.96, Or.XX, r.4(2) r/w
Or.XLI, r.31.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The order of the High Court would show that the
High Court neither set out the facts of the case of the parties in
detail, nor dealt with any of the submissions urged except to
mention them, nor took note of the grounds raised by the claimant
and nor made any attempt to appreciate the evidence in the light
of the settled legal principles applicable to the issues arising in
the case and proceeded to allow the appeal filed by the Insurance
Company and reduced the compensation from Rs.24,62,065/- to
Rs.20,00,000/-. [Para 34][1111-D-E]
2. The High Court only observed “Considering the
submissions of the learned counsel for the parties” and “I  feel that
compensation should have been awarded as  Rs.20,00,000/- and
not Rs.24,62,065/-”. No reasons were given by the  High Court
as to why the amount of compensation should be reduced from
Rs.24,62,065/- to Rs.20,00,000/- and why it cannot be enhanced.
Since the appellant-claimant had also filed appeal for enhancement
of the compensation, the entire controversy was again open for
decision before the High Court at the instance of  the claimant
and Insurance Company.  It was, therefore, necessary for the
High Court to assign the reasons for not granting enhancement
of compensation and/or
its reduction. [Para 35] [1111-F-G]
3.  The Insurance Company did not choose to file any special
leave to appeal in this Court against the impugned order of the
High Court. The effect of non-filing of appeal is that the Insurance
Company has in principle accepted the High Court’s order.
[Para 36] [1111-H; 1112-A]
4. In this view of the matter, the appellant-claimant alone
will have a right to prosecute his appeal on merits before the
High Court after remand of the case by this Court wherein the
High Court will examine the question as to whether any case for
further enhancement in the quantum of compensation awarded
by the Tribunal is made out or not and, if so, on what grounds.
[Para 38] [1112-D]
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B. V Nagesh & Anr. v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010)
13 SCC 530 : [2010] 11 SCR 784 ; Santosh Hazari v.
Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs. (2001) 3 SCC
179: [2001] 1 SCR  948 ; H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith
(2005) 10 SCC 243 – relied on.
Madhukar & Ors. v. Sangram & Ors. (2001) 4 SCC
756 : [2001] 3 SCR  138 ; Jagannath v. Arulappa &
Anr. (2005) 12 SCC 303 ;  State Bank of India & Anr.
v. Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr. (2011) 12 SCC
174 : [2011] 10 SCR 436 ; Uttar Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation v. Mamta & Ors. (2016) 4 SCC
172 ; National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Naresh Kumar
& Ors. (2000) 10 SCC 198 ; State of Punjab & Anr. v.
Navdeep Kuur & Ors. (2004) 13 SCC 680
– referred to.
Kurian Chacko v. Varkey Ouseph AIR 1969 Kerala
316 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2001] 1 SCR 948
    relied on
Para 25
[2001] 3 SCR 138
    referred to
Para 26
(2005) 10 SCC 243
    relied on
Para 27
(2005) 12 SCC 303
    referred to
Para 28
[2010] 11 SCR 784
    relied on
            Para 29
[2011] 10 SCR 436
    referred to
Para 30
(2016) 4 SCC 172
    referred to
Para 30
(2000) 10 SCC 198
    referred to
Para 31
(2004) 13 SCC 680
    referred to
Para 31
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeal Nos. 3798-
3799 of 2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated  09.11.2015 of the High Court
of Orissa at Cuttack in M.A.C.A. Nos. 690 and 839 of 2014.
SUDARSAN PUHAN v. JAYANTA KU. MOHANTY & ANR.
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Alakh Alok Srivastava, Kedar Nath Tripathy, Advs. for the
Appellant.
Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, Adv. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. These appeals are filed
by the appellant-claimant against the final judgment and order dated
09.11.2015 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in M.A.C.A.
No.690 of 2014 and M.A.C.A. No.839 of 2014 whereby the High Court
allowed the appeal filed by the Insurance Company and reduced the
compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (in short
‘the Tribunal”) from Rs.24,62,065/- to Rs.20,00,000/- and in consequence
dismissed the M.A.C.A. No.690 of 2014 filed by the appellant-claimant
in terms of the main order passed in M.A.C.A. No.839 of 2014.
2. In order to appreciate the issue involved in these appeals, few
facts need mention infra.
3. The appellant herein was the claimant before the Tribunal
whereas respondent-owner of the vehicle (motorcycle) was the non-
applicant No.1 and the Insurance Company was non-applicant No.2 in
the appellant’s claim petition.
4. On 31.10.2012, the appellant-claimant with one Dipak Kumar
Pradhan was going on a motorcycle bearing No.OR-07 S 3133 from
Baisinga to Baripada on National Highway 18 in the State of Orissa.
The abovesaid Motorcycle met with an accident with a Mini Truck (407)
wherein the appellant-claimant suffered severe injuries. The motorcycle
was owned by Jayanta Kumar
Mohanty (respondent No.1 in CA 3798/
2016 & respondent No.2 in CA No.3799/2016) and was insured with
the National Insurance Company Ltd. (respondent No.2 in CA 3798/
2016 & respondent No.1 in CA 3799/2016).
5. According to the appellant-claimant, he was in the age group of
25-27 years at the time of accident and suffered the disease of
“paraplegia” (injury in spinal cord) as a result of the abovesaid accident.
6. The appellant-claimant, therefore, filed a claim petition before
the Tribunal, Mayurbhanj Baripada (Orissa) under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the MV Act”)
against the respondents (owner of the motorcycle and the Insurance
company) and claimed reasonable compensation for the injuries sustained
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by him and other statutory compensation payable under the MV Act for
causing such injuries. The respondents contested the claim petition.
7. By award dated 17.05.2014, the Tribunal allowed the appellant’s
claim petition in part and holding the respondents(non-applicants) liable
for payment of the compensation to the appellant-claimant jointly and
severely awarded a total sum of Rs.24,62,065/- with interest payable at
the rate of 7% per annum under various heads.
8. The appellant-claimant and the Insurance Company both felt
aggrieved by the award, filed appeals in the High Court of Orissa at
Cuttack.
9. So far as M.A.C.A.No.690/2014 is concerned, it was filed by
the appellant-claimant for enhancement of the amount awarded by the
Tribunal whereas so far as M.A.C.A.No.839/2014 is concerned, it was
filed by the Insurance Company against the award challenging therein
the quantum of compensation to be on a higher side.
10. By impugned order, the High Court allowed the appeal filed
by the Insurance Company (M.A.C.A.No.839/2014) in part and
accordingly reduced the compensation from Rs.24,62,065/- to
Rs.20,00,000/-.  As a result of the main order passed in favour of the
Insurance Company in their appeal, the appeal filed by the appellant-
claimant (M.A.C.A. No.690/2014) seeking enhancement in the quantum
of compensation was dismissed as having rendered infructuous.
11. The appellant-claimant felt aggrieved by the order of the High
Court filed two appeals by way
of special leave in this Court. One is
filed against an order by which the claimant’s appeal for enhancement
in the quantum of compensation was dismissed as having rendered
infructuous and the other is filed against an order by which the Insurance
Company’s appeal was partly allowed by reducing the quantum of
compensation from Rs.24,62,065/- to Rs.20,00,000/-.
12. It may be mentioned that so far as the Insurance Company is
concerned, they have not filed any appeal against the order of the High
Court.  In other words, the Insurance Company seems satisfied with the
quantum of compensation amount of Rs.20,00,000/-awarded by the High
Court by the impugned order.
13. The short question, which arises for consideration in these
two appeals, is whether the High Court was justified in allowing the
SUDARSAN PUHAN v. JAYANTA KU. MOHANTY & ANR.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
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Insurance Company’s appeal (M.A.C.A. No.839/2014) and was,
therefore, justified in  reducing the quantum of compensation amount
from Rs.24,62,065/- to Rs.20,00,000/- and, in consequence, was justified
in  dismissing the claimant’s appeal for enhancement of the quantum of
compensation as having rendered infructuous.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant-claimant while assailing the
legality and correctness of the impugned order contended that the High
Court without adverting to any factual and legal issue arising in the case
simply allowed the Insurance Company’s appeal and reduced the
compensation from Rs.24, 62,065/- to Rs.20,00,000/- awarded by the
Tribunal and, in consequence, dismissed the appellant-claimant’s appeal
in a cryptic manner.
15. According to learned counsel, the High Court neither set out
the facts, nor dealt with any issue, nor appreciated the ocular and
documentary evidence much less in its proper perspective, nor examined
the legal principles applicable to the issues arising in the case and nor
rendered its findings on any contentious issues decided by the Tribunal
except to observe “Considering the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties” and “I feel, the interest of justice would be
best served if the awarded compensation amount of Rs.24,62,065/-
is modified and reduced to Rs.20,00,000/-”.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it was not
the  consideration of the case
of either parties at all and yet the Insurance
Company succeeded in their appeal and appellant-claimant lost which
caused prejudice to him due to reduction in quantum of compensation.
17. Learned counsel further contended that it was the duty of the
High Court exercising its first appellate powers under Section 173 of the
M.V. Act to have dealt with all the submissions urged by the parties and
after appreciating the entire evidence should have come to its own
conclusion one way or the other keeping in view the legal principles
governing the issues as to whether any case was made out for
enhancement or reduction in quantum of compensation, as the case may
be.  It was urged that since it was not done by the High Court, a
jurisdictional error is committed which renders the impugned order legally
unsustainable.
18. Lastly, the learned counsel urged that if his arguments are
accepted, the remand of the case to the High Court to decide the appeal
filed by the appellant-claimant alone on merits is inevitable.
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19. Learned counsel for the respondents (Insurance Company),
however, supported the impugned orders and urged that they do not call
for any interference.
20. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
of the record of the case, we find force in the submissions of the learned
counsel for the appellant-claimant.
21. The powers of the first Appellate Court while deciding the
first appeal are indeed well defined by various judicial pronouncements
of this Court and are, therefore, no more res integra.
22. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge – V.R. Krishna Iyer, J
(as His Lordship then was the judge of Kerala High Court) while deciding
the first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) Kurian Chacko vs. Varkey
Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala 316, reminded the first appellate court of its
duty to decide the first appeal. In his distinctive style of writing with
subtle power of expression, the learned judge held as under:
“1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two Courts, has come up
here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one
for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The
defendant disputed the plaintiff’s title to the property as
also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned
Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the
plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the
learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter
glibly
and briefly, in a few sentences.
2. An appellate court is the final Court of fact ordinarily and
therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and
independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate
stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have
no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate
Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an
appellate Court. Although there is furious contest between
the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they
appear to agree with me in this observation…..”
                                  (Emphasis supplied)
SUDARSAN PUHAN v. JAYANTA KU. MOHANTY & ANR.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
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23. This Court also in various cases reiterated the aforesaid
principle and laid down the powers of the Appellate Court under Section
96 of the Code while deciding the first appeal.
24. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the decisions.
25. In Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by
L.Rs. (2001) 3 SCC 179, this Court held (at pages 188-189) as under:
“.……..the appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or
affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a
valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law,
the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on
questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate
court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of
mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the
issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and
pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate
court……while reversing a finding of fact the appellate
court must come into close quarters with the reasoning
assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons
for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court
hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had
discharged the duty expected of it…………”
26. The above view was followed by a three-Judge Bench decision
of this Court in Madhukar & Ors. v. Sangram & Ors.,(2001) 4 SCC
756, wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is
the duty of
the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence
led by the parties before recording its findings.
27. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith,(2005) 10 SCC 243,
this Court (at p. 244) stated as under: (SCC para 3)
“3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on
law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard
both on questions of law as also on facts and the first
appellate court is required to address itself to all issues
and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the
High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding
either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court
it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues
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and the evidence led by the parties before recording the
finding regarding title.”
28. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa & Anr., (2005) 12 SCC
303, while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code, this Court
(at pp. 303-04) observed as follows: (SCC para 2)
“2. A court of first appeal can reappreciate the entire
evidence and come to a different conclusion……...”
29. Again in B.V Nagesh & Anr. vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy,
(2010) 13 SCC 530, this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of
this court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words:
“3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the
appellate court/High Court has been considered by this
Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals
from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31
mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state:
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied,
the relief to which the appellant is entitled.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm
the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable
right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole
case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact
and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore,
reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings
supported by reasons, on all the issues
arising along with
the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for
decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first
appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the
issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording
its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties
have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on
facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself
to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving
SUDARSAN PUHAN v. JAYANTA KU. MOHANTY & ANR.
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reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v.
Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 at p. 188, para 15
and Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 at p. 758,
para 5.)
5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through
the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has
failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first
appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is
cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been
noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory
manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular
first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which
are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly,
without going into the merits of the claim of both parties,
we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High
Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court
for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.”
30. The aforementioned cases were relied upon by this Court
while reiterating the same principle in State Bank of India & Anr. vs.
Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr., (2011) 12 SCC 174 and Uttar
Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mamta & Ors. (2016)
4 SCC 172.
31. An appeal under Section 173 of the M.V. Act is essentially in
the nature of first appeal alike Section 96 of the Code and, therefore, the
High Court is equally under legal obligation to decide all issues arising in
the case both on
facts and law after appreciating the entire evidence.
[See National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Naresh Kumar & Ors.
((2000) 10 SCC 198 and State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Navdeep Kuur &
Ors. (2004) 13 SCC 680].
32. As observed supra, as a first Appellate Court, it was the duty
of the High Court to have decided the appeals keeping in view the
requirements of Order XX Rule 4 (2) read with Order XLI Rule 31 of
the Code which requires that judgment/order shall contain a concise
statement of the case, points for determination, decisions thereon and
the reasons.
33. Coming now to the facts of the case at hand, we consider it
appropriate to reproduce the order of the High Court infra:
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“Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties and keeping in view the quantum of
compensation amount awarded and the basis on which the
same has been arrived at I feel, the interest of justice would
be best served if the awarded compensation amount of
Rs.24,62,065/- is modified and reduced to Rs.20,00,000/-
which is payable to the claimant along with the awarded
interest. The impugned award is modified to the said extent.
The appellant-Insurance Company is directed to deposit
the modified compensation amount of Rs.20,00,000/- along
with awarded interest with the learned Tribunal within six
weeks hence.  On deposit of the amount, the same shall be
disbursed to the claimant proportionately, as per the
direction of the learned Tribunal given in the impugned
award. “
34. Mere perusal of the afore-quoted order of the High Court
would show that the High Court neither set out the facts of the case of
the parties in detail, nor dealt with any of the submissions urged except
to mention them, nor took note of the grounds raised by the claimant and
nor made any attempt to appreciate the evidence in the light of the settled
legal principles applicable to the issues arising in the case and proceeded
to allow the appeal filed by the Insurance Company and reduced the
compensation from Rs.24,62,065/- to Rs.20,00,000/-.
35. The High Court only observed “Considering the submissions
of the learned counsel for the parties” and “I  feel that
compensation
should have been awarded as  Rs.20,00,000/- and  not
Rs.24,62,065/-”. No reasons were given by the  High Court as to why
the amount of compensation should be reduced from Rs.24,62,065/- to
Rs.20,00,000/- and why it cannot be enhanced.  Since the appellant-
claimant had also filed appeal for enhancement of the compensation, the
entire controversy was again open for decision before the High Court at
the instance of  the claimant and Insurance Company.  It was, therefore,
necessary for the High Court to assign the reasons for not granting
enhancement of compensation and/or its reduction.  In the absence of
any reasons, we are unable to uphold the impugned orders of the High
Court.
36. As mentioned above, the Insurance Company did not choose
to file any special leave to appeal in this Court against the impugned
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order of the High Court. The effect of non-filing of appeal is that the
Insurance Company has in principle accepted the High Court’s order.
37. This Court having allowed the claimant’s appeal and setting
aside the impugned order, it results in dismissal of the appeal filed by the
Insurance Company (M.A.C.A. No.839 of 2014) and allowing of the
appeal (M.A.C.A.No.690/2014) filed by the claimant. Had the Insurance
Company filed special leave to appeal against the impugned order in this
Court seeking further reduction in the compensation awarded by the
High Court  like what the Insurance Company did when they had filed
appeal before the High Court questioning inter alia the quantum of
compensation being on higher side, the Insurance Company too would
have been entitled to prosecute their appeal on merits after remand before
the High Court in terms of this order.  It was, however, not done by the
Insurance Company.
38. In this view of the matter, the appellant-claimant alone will
have a right to prosecute his appeal (M.A.C.A. No.690 of 2014) on
merits before the High Court after remand of the case by this Court
wherein the High Court will examine the question as to whether any
case for further enhancement in the quantum of compensation awarded
by the Tribunal is made out or not and, if so, on what grounds.
39. In view of the foregoing discussion, we remand only the
appellant-claimant’s appeal (M.A.C.A. No.690 of 2014) to
the High
Court for deciding the question as to whether any case is made out for
further enhancement from Rs.24,62,065/- awarded by the Tribunal and,
if so, on what grounds.  Needless to say, the Insurance Company will
have a right to oppose the appellant-claimant’s appeal on the merits.
40. However, we make it clear that we have not applied our mind
to the merits of the issues involved in the case having formed an opinion
to remand the case to the High Court and hence the High Court would
decide M.A.C.A. No.690/2014 strictly in accordance with law on merits
uninfluenced by any of our observations.  We request the High Court to
decide the appeal preferably within six months.
41. The appeals thus succeed and are accordingly allowed in part.
The impugned orders are set aside.  No costs.
Ankit Gyan
                      Appeals partly allowed.