PAWAN KUMAR versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 261, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 261 : 2023 INSC 1012
261
CASE DETAILS
PAWAN KUMAR
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3548 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 21, 2023
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND SUDHANSHU DHULIA,JJ]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: The question which arise for determination is 
whether the appellant was a juvenile at the time of commission of oﬀ ence.
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 
– r. 12(3)(b) – Beneﬁ t of juvenility – Procedure to be followed in 
determination of age – When exact assessment of the age cannot be done: 
Held: Age of a juvenile has to be determined on the basis of the 
date of the alleged commission of the crime – In a case of juvenility 
where two views are possible, a liberal approach should be undertaken – 
Furthermore, as per sub-rule (3)(b) of r. 12, in the case exact assessment 
of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, the committee for 
the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary give 
beneﬁ t to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side 
within the margin of one year – On facts, as regards the appellant involved 
in a crime u/s. 302, 307/34 IPC there were some conﬂ icting aspects as to 
the age of the appellant, the margin of age was so thin – As per r. 12, the 
school certiﬁ cates are given more importance than a Panchayat Register, 
as such the School leaving certiﬁ cate of the ﬁ rst school attended by the 
appellant would be a certiﬁ cate liable to be
considered and is a valid 
proof of evidence for determination of the age of the appellant, whereby 
his age was less than 16 years when the oﬀ ence was committed – Second 
certiﬁ cate is the medical report, Bone Ossiﬁ cation Test which shows that 
he was about 19 years of age, which is not entirely accurate – Even if the 
medical report which shows the age of the appellant as 19 years is taken
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
to be correct even then an exact assessment of age was not possible – 
Considering the conﬂ icting reports and documents, as per sub rule 3(b) 
of r. 12, the Court ought to have given the appellant a beneﬁ t of one year 
– Thus, the report of the Additional Sessions Judge is accepted and it is 
declared that the appellant was a juvenile on the date of the commission 
of crime – Since the appellant has been detained beyond the maximum 
period, he is directed to be released forthwith – Juvenile Justice (Care and 
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – ss. 15, 16. [Para 26, 30-34]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Another [2005] 1 Scr 1019 
: (2005) 3 SCC 551; Satya Deo alias Bhoorey v. State of Uttar Pradesh 
[2020] 12 SCR 128 : (2020) 10 SCC 555; Hariram v. State of Rajasthan and 
Another [2009] 7 SCR 623 : (2009) 13 SCC 211; Shah Nawaz v. State of 
Uttar Pradesh and Another (2011) 13 SCC 751: [2011] 9 SCR 859; Vinod 
Katara v. State of U.P. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1204; Arnit Das v. State of 
Bihar [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 69 : (2000) 5 SCC 488; Mukarrab and Others 
v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2016] 8 SCR 557 : (2017) 2 SCC 210; Ashwani 
Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2012] 10 SCR 540 : (2012) 9 
SCC 750; Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 8 SCC 
602 – referred to. 
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 
3548 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.05.2019 of the High Court of 
Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in CRLA No.106 of 2000.
Appearances:
Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Rishad Murtaza, Ms. Ankeeta Appanna, Advs. 
for the Appellant.
Ardhendumouli Kumar Prasad, AAG, Rohit K. Singh, Aviral 
Saxena, Pritam Bishwas, Ashish Madan, Ms. Ananya Sahu, Advs. for the 
Respondents.
263
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellant before this Court has been convicted by the Additional 
Sessions Judge, Barabanki in Sessions Trial No.85 of 1996 for oﬀ ences under 
Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 
has been sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302/34 and rigorous 
imprisonment for 7 years under Section 307/34 with default stipulations. 
The conviction and sentence of the appellant was upheld in appeal by the 
High Court, in its order dated 07.05.2019. 
3. There were four accused in the case, which were Gaya Prasad Mishra, 
Gulab Chandra, Pawan Kumar and Babadeen. The accused Babadeen passed 
away during the trial and his case stood abated and the remaining three were 
convicted for the oﬀ ences as stated above. The said conviction has been 
upheld by the High Court of Judicature of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench). 
Meanwhile, as far as Gaya Prasad Mishra and Gulab Chandra are concerned, 
who are the father and brother of the present appellant respectively, they 
were released prematurely after remaining in jail for more than 19 years, 
under the remission policy of the State. Consequently, they have not ﬁ led 
any petition before this Court.
4. The appellant before this Court apart from challenging the impugned 
order on merits has also raised a claim of being a juvenile at the time of the 
alleged commission of the crime (dated 01.12.1995), a plea which has
been 
dismissed by the Trial Court and the High Court. 
5. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Vanshaja 
Shukla has submitted that the plea of juvenility may be considered ﬁ rst as 
the claim of the appellant indeed was that at the time of the incident, he 
was a juvenile and his plea of juvenility had not been considered in the true 
letter and spirit of the applicable law. Consequently, before going through 
the case on its merits, we have heard the counsel for the appellant at length 
on the plea of juvenility. 
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
6. We must state at the very outset that the appellant has been raising 
the claim of juvenility right since the time of his trial, although belatedly. 
The trial court as well as the appellate court after an enquiry have found 
that the appellant was not juvenile at the time of the incident. Since this plea 
was raised before this Court as well, this court had asked for a report from 
the concerned Additional Sessions Judge, Barabanki and consequently a 
report was ﬁ led on an earlier occasion before this Court, to which we shall 
refer in a while. However, the last report (dated 28.09.2022) ﬁ led by the 
Additional Sessions Judge, Barabanki diﬀ ers from the earlier ﬁ ndings, and 
the claim of the appellant being a juvenile at the time of the commission of 
crime has been accepted. We shall be referring to this report later.
7. The facts of this case must also be stated here. On 01.12.1995, 
while the father and brother of the Complainant-Guru Prasad Mishra were 
irrigating their land, water ﬂ ushed towards the adjacent ﬁ eld belonging to one 
Gaya Prasad Mishra. The present appellant, who is the son of Gaya Prasad 
Mishra reported this to his father and shortly thereafter Gaya Prasad Mishra 
along with his two sons, Gulab Chandra and Pawan Kumar (the present 
appellant), and one ‘Babadeen’ came to the spot armed with “lathis” and 
started assaulting the father and brother of the complainant. After hearing 
the ‘hue and cry’, the
complainant along with some village persons reached 
the spot and he was also assaulted by the accused persons. This incident 
resulted in grievous injuries on all and ultimately in the death of one Ganga 
Prasad, brother of the complainant. An FIR as Crime No.86 of 1995 was 
then ﬁ led in Subeha Police Station in Barabanki District, under Sections 307, 
504 and 323 IPC against the four named accused as mentioned above. As 
the brother of the complainant (Ganga Prasad) died the same day, Section 
302 was added in the FIR. 
8. Undoubtedly, the appellant belongs to the aggressor group and 
had attacked the deceased and caused injuries and ultimately the death 
of one of the injured persons. It is also true that some of the assailants, 
including the present appellant, were armed with “lathis”. We have placed 
these facts on record to show the nature of the incident. The accused have 
committed a heinous crime. Yet they are not hardened criminals. It is also 
not a premeditated cold-blooded murder.
265
9. While having his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC 
the age of the appellant was recorded as 18 years and upon further inquiry 
the appellant claimed that he was less than 16 years of age at the time of 
the commission of the oﬀ ence, i.e., on 01.12.1995. At the relevant time, 
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in force where a juvenile in case of a boy, 
was one who had not completed sixteen years of age. This age however, was 
increased to eighteen years by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of 
Children) Act, 2000 as we shall see later. A formal plea of juvenility was 
raised at the stage of trial. In support of his plea, the appellant produced the 
Scholar Register of the National Inter College, Barabanki which recorded 
his D.O.B. as 05.07.1980 which meant that on the date when the oﬀ ence 
was committed, the appellant would be 15 years, 6 months, and 26 days 
old. However, during cross-examination the clerk of National Inter College 
who had produced the Scholar Register, admitted that the entry was made 
on the basis of a transfer certiﬁ cate issued by Purva Madhyamik Vidhyalaya 
(hereafter referred to as High School, Kamela), which was not placed on 
record. Further, the Gram Panchayat Oﬃ  cer was examined who produced 
the Family Register of the appellant where D.O.B. of the appellant was 
recorded as 1975. The day and month of his birth were not mentioned in 
this Family Register. In any case, as per the Family Register of the Gram 
Panchayat,
the appellant would be around 20 years of age at the time of the 
commission of the oﬀ ence. 
In view of this contradiction, a bone ossiﬁ cation test was conducted 
under the supervision of the Chief Medical Oﬃ  cer of District Hospital, 
Barabanki where the age of the appellant was recorded as approximately 
19 years. Thus, by order dated 21.08.1999 it was concluded by the Trial 
Court that the beneﬁ t of juvenility cannot be extended to the appellant and 
he was directed to face the trial.
10. The appellant ﬁ led a Criminal Revision before the High Court 
against the said order dated 21.08.1999 passed by the Additional Sessions 
Judge, Barabanki. The High Court dismissed his criminal revision on 
16.09.1999. At the stage of ﬁ ling the criminal revision the trial was almost 
complete and the High Court did not consider it appropriate to interfere 
with the trial at such a belated stage. 
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
11. The Additional Sessions Judge, Barabanki continued with the trial, 
where all the accused persons (except Babadeen), including the appellant 
were convicted for oﬀ ences under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the IPC 
for which they were sentenced to life imprisonment and 7 years of rigorous 
imprisonment, respectively. One of the co-accused, Babadeen died on 
12.12.1998 during the trial and proceedings against him stood abated by 
order dated 04.01.1999 passed by the Trial Court. 
12. Against the order of conviction dated 11.02.2000 passed by the 
Trial Court all the accused ﬁ led their appeal before the High Court of 
Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench). During the pendency of the 
appeal, the appellant ﬁ led a Criminal Miscellaneous Application under 
Section 391 of the CrPC for placing additional evidence on record regarding 
his juvenility. Accordingly, the appellant produced Transfer Certiﬁ cate dated 
05.07.1995 issued by High School, Kamela based on which the Scholar 
Register of National Inter College, Barabanki which had recorded the age 
of the appellant as 05.07.1980. Nevertheless, the High Court vide its order 
dated 07.05.2019, dismissed the Criminal Appeal of all the three accused, 
including the plea of juvenility raised by the appellant. The High Court 
also noted that the State Government had meanwhile remitted the sentence 
of the other two co-accused as both had undergone more than 19 years of
imprisonment. However, the appellant was directed to surrender and to carry 
out his sentence. While rejecting the plea of juvenility, the reasons given 
by the High Court are as follows:
“20...It is undisputed that juvenility can be examined at any stage, 
if raised by the accused person. In the present case, appellant no. 3 
has raised the point of his juvenility before the trial court, which was 
dealt with after examining the court witnesses and evidences placed 
by means of parivar register, radiological report, C.M.O. report and 
the scholar register of Rashtriya Inter College and rejected by the 
court below vide order dated 21.08.1999. As no good ground has 
been taken in the present appeal of juvenility of appellant no. 3. It is 
also relevant to mention here that aforesaid order dated 21st August, 
1999 was challenged by the appellant no. 3 in Criminal Revision No. 
271 of 1999, which was also dismissed by this Court vide order dated 
16.09.1999”.
267
The appellant had mostly remained on bail during the period of trial 
and appeal, but consequent to the decision of the High Court, he surrendered 
on 29.07.2019 and since then he has been in jail. By now he has served a 
sentence of about 4 ½ years. 
13. The speciﬁ c grievance of the appellant in the present case is that the 
Trial Court had not accepted the veracity of the Scholar Register of National 
Inter College, Barabanki because it was based on a Transfer Certiﬁ cate 
issued by High School, Kamela which was not on record. However, when 
the appellant had placed the same on record, in his application under Section 
391 of CrPC, the same ought to have been considered. 
14. This Court passed order dated 08.10.2021 and directed the Trial 
Court to submit a fresh report on the plea of juvenility raised by the appellant, 
after appreciating the additional evidence. The order dated 08.10.2021 of 
this Court reads as under: - 
“…Learned counsel for the petitioner submits by reference to 
additional documents that CM No.96164/2012 was ﬁ led under Section 
391 of the Cr.P.C for taking on record additional documents in the 
form of transfer certiﬁ cate showing the date of birth of the applicant 
as 05.07.1980. She has also ﬁ led a document regarding listing of the 
applications as on 29.01.2020 before the High Court of Judicature at 
Allahabad, Lucknow Bench to show such application as pending as on 
01.11.2012 for disposal. It is thus, her submission that the application
seeking to bring on record additional documents in support of the plea 
of juvenility was never dealt with.
Our attention has been invited at para 20 of the impugned order 
which recognizes that plea of juvenility was raised before the trial Court 
and was rejected by the order dated 21.08.1999. It has been observed 
that no ground has been taken in the appeal of juvenility of appellant 
No.3 possibly because a Criminal Revision was ﬁ led against the order 
dated 21.08.1999 being Criminal Revision No.271/1999 which was 
also dismissed by the High Court on 16.09.1999.
It is correct that in the grounds of appeal before the High Court 
no plea of juvenility was raised. The plea of the petitioner is predicated 
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
only on CM No.96164/2012 ﬁ led seeking to raise the plea of juvenility 
based on the additional grounds. 
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of 
the view that the additional documents brought on record ought to 
have been examined and they require examination as to whether the 
petitioner can raise the plea of juvenility. 
We thus, refer the matter to the trial Court for recording evidence 
on the basis of the certiﬁ cates sought to be produced by the petitioner 
as a transfer certiﬁ cate and submit a report to this Court….”
15. Accordingly, the First Additional Sessions Judge, Barabanki 
in compliance of the order of this Court had submitted a Report dated 
28.02.2022. According to this report, the D.O.B of the appellant should be 
taken as recorded in the Family Register, which is 1975 and therefore at 
the time of the commission of the oﬀ ence he was not a juvenile. The Trial 
Court had examined the entry of the Scholar Register of the National Inter 
College, Barabanki where the D.O.B of the appellant was 05.07.1980. The 
D.O.B entered in the Scholar Register was based on a Transfer Certiﬁ cate 
dated 05.07.1995 issued by High School, Kamela which had also been 
placed on record by the appellant, however, the original records of High 
School, Kamela were not produced and the evidence of the Family Register 
and bone ossiﬁ cation test was also against the appellant. By comparing 
these evidences, the Trial
Court declared the D.O.B of the appellant to be 
1975 and consequently, the report of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 
28.02.2022 declared that the appellant was not a juvenile on the date of the 
commission of the alleged oﬀ ence. 
16. The report dated 28.02.2022 was examined by this Court and it 
was felt that the Trial Court did not examine the Transfer Certiﬁ cate of the 
appellant, which was placed before it. Hence, the issue was again remitted 
back to the Additional Sessions Judge, Barabanki on 15.07.2022 by this 
Court for fresh consideration on the aspect of juvenility and another report 
was directed to be ﬁ led. The Order of this Court dated 15.07.2022 is as 
follows: 
“We have perused the report of the First Additional Sessions Judge, 
Barabanki dated 28.02.2022 but that report does not analyze the
269
transfer certiﬁ cate which is the document sought to be relied upon by 
the petitioner as an additional document before the High Court for 
which an application had been ﬁ led before it. That is what is required 
to be considered.
Undisputedly, the other documents do not go in favour of the petitioner 
and show the age as more than 16 years.
It appears that the District Judge has not analysed the document or 
its veracity which is what is required to be considered.
We have thus, no option but to remit the matter back to the District 
Judge, Barabanki to appreciate the purport of our order and carry 
out the enquiry in that behalf and then submit a report to us.
Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the original document 
is in the possession of the petitioner and will be ﬁ led with an aﬃ  davit 
before the District Judge. 
The enquiry report to be submitted within a period of three months 
from the date of the receipt of this order. 
List on the enquiry report being received.”
17. In compliance of the said order the Additional Sessions Judge, 
Barabanki ﬁ led a fresh report dated 28.09.2022. In this report the D.O.B has 
been determined as 05.07.1980. If this report is accepted then the appellant 
was 15 years, 4 months, and 26 days old at the time of commission of the 
crime which occurred on 01.12.1995. The relevant observation of the report 
is given as under:
“18. In the end, it is humbly submitted that the date of birth of Pawan 
Kumar, right from the ﬁ rst
school where he was admitted, up to the 
last school where he has studied, as per the relevant documents of each 
school has remained the same i.e., 05.07.1980 (Annexure-1) which 
has been issued by the Principal of Pre-secondary School Kamela, 
mentioning his date of birth as 05.07.1980, matches with the date of 
birth of Pawan Kumar as has been mentioned in the relevant registers/
documents of each and every school, where the petitioner has studied 
at diﬀ erent stages of his education”.
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
18. On behalf of the appellant, we have heard ld. counsel Ms. Vanshaja 
Shukla and learned senior counsel Mr. Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, 
Additional Advocate General (AAG) for the State of Uttar Pradesh. Before 
we deal with the submissions made by both sides, it would be prudent to 
examine some of the relevant statutory provisions.
19. The age of a juvenile has to be determined on the basis of the date 
of the alleged commission of the crime. The present incident which involved 
the appellant in a crime inter alia under Section 302 IPC was allegedly 
committed on 01.12.1995. At the relevant point of time, the Act which was 
in force for juvenile oﬀ enders was known as Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. In 
the said Act, Section 2(h) deﬁ ned juvenile as follows:
“(h) “juvenile” means a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen 
years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years”
In the case of the present appellant, the relevant age apparently was 
16 years. In order to be a juvenile, he should not have attained the age of 
16 years. Till the time the sessions court ﬁ nally convicted the appellant, 
inter alia, under Section 302 of the IPC, the above provision of law was in 
force. The Trial court’s decision is of 11.02.2000. 
20. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the appeal before the High 
Court, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 
came into force on 01.04.2000, inter alia, repealing the
1986 Act. There 
were some major changes in the 2000 Act. The ﬁ rst and foremost was the 
deﬁ nition of juvenile itself. Section 2(k) deﬁ ned the “juvenile” as follows:
“(k) “juvenile” or “child” means a person who has not completed 
eighteenth year of age”
The deﬁ nition of “juvenile in conﬂ ict with law” under Section 2(l), 
which stood amended1in 2006 is as follows: 
“(l) “juvenile in conﬂ ict with law” means a juvenile who is alleged to 
have committed an oﬀ ence and has not completed eighteenth year of age 
as on the date of commission of such oﬀ ence” 
1 
 Prior to the 2006 amendment, it reads as follows:

(l) “juvenile in conﬂ ict with law” means a juvenile who is alleged to have committed 
an oﬀ ence. (w.e.f. 22.08.2006)
271
The 1986 Act made a distinction between a boy and a girl as to their 
claim of juvenility. In the case of boys, it was 16 years, whereas for girls 
it was 18 years. The 2000 Act, not only removed this distinction but also 
raised the age of juvenility from 16 years to 18 years. 
21. The majority opinion of 4:1 in a Constitution Bench decision of 
this Court in the case of Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Another 
(2005) 3 SCC 551, held as follows: 
“(a) The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the juvenile 
is the date of the oﬀ ence and not the date when he is produced before 
the authority or in the court.
(b) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any 
court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 
2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years 
of age as on 01.04.2001.”
Subsequent to the decision in Pratap Singh (supra) certain amendments 
were made in the 2000 Act. Section 7A was introduced which reads as 
follows: 
“[7-A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised 
before any court.—(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before 
any court or a court is of the opinion that an accused person was 
a juvenile on the date of commission of the oﬀ ence, the court shall 
make an enquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an 
aﬃ  davit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record 
a ﬁ nding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or
not, stating his 
age as nearly as may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court 
and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after ﬁ nal disposal of the 
case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions 
contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the 
juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement 
of this Act.
(2) If the court ﬁ nds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission 
of the oﬀ ence under sub-section (1), it shall forward the juvenile to the 
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
Board for passing appropriate order, and the sentence if any, passed 
by a court shall be deemed to have no eﬀ ect.]”
The deﬁ nition of “juvenile in conﬂ ict with law” was also amended 
which we have already referred above. 
22. In addition, comprehensive Rules known as Juvenile Justice (Care 
and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, were also made, inter alia, laying 
down a detailed procedure as to the determination of the age of a juvenile. 
Rule 12 of the said Rules is as follows: 
“12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.—(1) In every 
case concerning a child or a juvenile in conﬂ ict with law, the court 
or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in Rule 
19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or 
a juvenile in conﬂ ict with law within a period of thirty days from the 
date of making of the application for that purpose.
(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall 
decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the 
case may be the juvenile in conﬂ ict with law, prima facie on the basis 
of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to 
the observation home or in jail.
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conﬂ ict with law, 
the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the 
Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by 
obtaining—
(a)(i) the
matriculation or equivalent certiﬁ cates, if available; and in 
the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certiﬁ cate from the school (other than a play 
school) ﬁ rst attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certiﬁ cate given by a corporation or a municipal authority 
or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, 
the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical 
Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact
273
assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the 
case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, 
may, if considered necessary, give beneﬁ t to the child or juvenile by 
considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into 
consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical 
opinion, as the case may be, record a ﬁ nding in respect of his age and 
either of the evidence speciﬁ ed in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) 
or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof 
of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conﬂ ict with law.
(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conﬂ ict with law 
is found to be below 18 years on the date of oﬀ ence, on the basis of 
any of the conclusive proof speciﬁ ed in sub-rule (3), the court or the 
Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an 
order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, 
for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall 
be given to such juvenile or the person concerned.
(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, 
inter alia, in terms of Section 7-A, Section 64 of the Act and these rules, 
no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after 
examining and obtaining the certiﬁ cate or any other documentary 
proof referred to in
sub-rule (3) of this rule.
(6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those 
disposed of cases, where the status of juvenility has not been 
determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule 
(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the 
Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in 
conﬂ ict with law.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. Although, during the pendency of the appeal before the Allahabad 
High Court (Lucknow Bench), the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection 
of Children) Act, 2015 had come into force repealing the 2000 Act and 
subsequent to the 2015 Act, comprehensive and detailed Model Rules 
relating to “juvenile in conﬂ ict with law” known as Juvenile Justice (Care 
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
and Protection of Children) Model Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘JJ 
Rules, 2016’) were laid down. Rule 94 of the JJ Rules, 2016 also repeals 
the 2007 Rules. 
“94. Repeal.—The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) 
Rules, 2007 notiﬁ ed vide G.S.R. 679(E) dated 26th October, 2007 and 
as amended vide GSR 903(E) dated 26th December 2011, are hereby 
repealed:
Provided that any action taken or order issued under the provisions 
of the Rules of 2007 prior to the notiﬁ cation of these rules shall, in so 
far it is not inconsistent with the provisions of these rules, be deemed 
to have been taken or issued under the provisions of these rules.”
Nevertheless, the 2015 Act contains an important Section, which is 
Section 25, which reads as follows:
“25. Special provision in respect of pending cases.—Notwithstanding 
anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a child 
alleged or found to be in conﬂ ict with law pending before any Board 
or court on the date of commencement of this Act, shall be continued 
in that Board or court as if this Act had not been enacted.”
24. In Satya Deo alias Bhoorey v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 10 
SCC 555, the impact of Section 25 of the 2015 Act has been explained 
in detail. The expression “all proceedings” would not only mean the 
trial but will also include revision or appeal. Consequently, since at the 
commencement of 2015 Act the proceedings of the present
appellant were 
pending before the High Court (the appeal was decided on 07.05.2019), 
Section 25 of the 2015 Act would be attracted. It would mean that what 
would be applicable in the present case would be the 2007 Rules, including 
Rule 12 which we have referred above. This aspect has also been examined 
in great detail in Hariram v. State of Rajasthan and Another (2009) 13 
SCC 211. 
25. In other words, what would be applicable in the present case 
regarding the determination of the age of the appellant would be the 2000 
Act and the Rules framed therein i.e., 2007 rules. Rule 12 has an important 
bearing in the present case, which we have already referred above. The 
ﬁ rst document under the 2007 Rules which has to be considered for
275
determination of the age of a person who is claiming juvenility is the 
matriculation certiﬁ cate and the settled position here is that the appellant had 
not done his matriculation and there is no question of the appellant having 
such a certiﬁ cate. The other document which then becomes relevant is the 
school leaving certiﬁ cate of Primary School, Bhatgawan, which is also his 
certiﬁ cate of age.
26. One important aspect which was missed by the High Court as 
well as the Additional Sessions Judge in his report dated 28.02.2022, 
was the provisions of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules which are applicable for 
determination of age in the present case and, in particular, the provision under 
sub-rule (3)(b) of Rule 12 which states that “in the case exact assessment 
of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, 
the committee for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered 
necessary give beneﬁ t to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on 
lower side within the margin of one year”. We are of the considered view 
that in the present case, even assuming for the sake of argument that there 
were some conﬂ icting aspects as to the age of the appellant but since the 
margin of age was so thin, the aforesaid beneﬁ t ought to have been given 
to the appellant. 
27. From perusal of the report dated 28.09.2022 the following facts 
emerge. The appellant had attended three schools during his life time. The 
ﬁ rst was the Primary School at
Bhatgawan in Barabanki. The second was 
High School, Kamela, Barabanki and the third was National Inter College, 
Ranapur, Barabanki (in chronological order). The admitted position is 
that the appellant had not completed his matriculation at the time of the 
incident in the year 1995 and therefore the only evidence he could place 
before the authorities was the copy of the admission register of National 
Inter College and the transfer certiﬁ cate of the college, which had recorded 
his date of birth to be 05.07.1980. The appellant took admission in National 
Inter College, Barabanki on 25.07.1995 and thereafter since he could not 
pay his tuition fee, his name was removed as a student from the college 
register on 30.12.1995. The date of birth which was registered in the said 
school was 05.07.1980. The date of birth, however, was not taken to be 
the correct date of birth in the earlier ﬁ ndings, since the appellant had not 
produced any certiﬁ cate before the inquiry oﬃ  cer on the basis of which 
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
276 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
the date of birth i.e., 05.07.1980 was registered in the school register of 
National Inter College. In the subsequent enquiry though he submitted the 
transfer certiﬁ cate from the earlier school register but the same could not 
be veriﬁ ed to the satisfaction of the inquiry oﬃ  cer and consequently the 
date of birth as claimed by the appellant (05.07.1980) was not accepted. In 
the latest enquiry, which has been conducted by the Additional Sessions 
Judge, Barabanki dated 28.09.2022, the appellant had produced relevant 
certiﬁ cates of all three schools he had attended.
28. First is the certiﬁ cate from Primary School Bhatgawan, Barabanki, 
which was the ﬁ rst school attended by the appellant and where his date of 
birth recorded was 05.07.1980. The Sessions Judge himself has seen the 
school register of the school and had taken the statement of the principal 
of the school to consider the veracity of the school register. The other 
documents examined were the transfer certiﬁ cates of High School, Kamela 
and National Inter College and the relevant registers of the said schools. The 
Additional Sessions Judge, who did not doubt the veracity of any of these 
documents which were placed before him, has given a categorical ﬁ nding 
that what has been consistent is that, in all the schools that he has attended, 
his date of birth remains the same i.e., 05.07.1980. 
29. However, there are two certiﬁ cates which have not been
considered 
by the Additional Sessions Judge in his latest report. The ﬁ rst is the Family 
Register in which the year in which appellant was born is recorded as 1975. 
As deposed by the concerned Gram Panchayat Oﬃ  cer, there is no precise 
date of birth recorded in the Family Register and what has been recorded, 
is that the appellant was born in the year 1975. All the same this certiﬁ cate 
will not have the same evidentiary value as the school certiﬁ cates in the 
present case. Moreover, the entry is also not a precise entry. Under the 2007 
Rules (i.e., Rule 12), the school certiﬁ cates are given more importance 
than a Panchayat Register. The school leaving certiﬁ cate of the ﬁ rst school 
attended by the appellant which is Primary School, Bhatgawan will be a 
certiﬁ cate that is liable to be considered and the certiﬁ cate is a valid proof 
of evidence for determination of the age of the appellant. [Shah Nawaz 
v. Stateof Uttar Pradesh and Another (2011) 13 SCC 7512]. The second 
2 
Paragraph 24
277
certiﬁ cate is the medical report of the appellant i.e., Bone Ossiﬁ cation 
Test conducted on 05.02.1996 which is about two months after the alleged 
incident where the certiﬁ cate of the test show that he was about 19 years of 
age. The Radiologist (CW-3) who had conducted the test was examined in 
the trial, on being questioned about the veracity of the report by the defence, 
he said that although he had examined the appellant and conducted the Bone 
Ossiﬁ cation Test but, he did not give the precise years i.e., 19 years to be 
the age of the appellant. According to him this has been done by the Chief 
Medical Oﬃ  cer (CMO). The C.M.O was never examined in the trial. In any 
case, a bone ossiﬁ cation test, which is primarily done to determine the age, 
does not give the precise age but is at best an approximation. 
30. Further, it must also be kept in mind that the medical opinion based 
on Bone Ossiﬁ cation Test, is not entirely accurate. This Court in the case 
of Vinod Katara v. State of U.P. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1204 has held the 
following:
60. The bone ossiﬁ cation test is not an exact science that can provide 
us with the exact age of the person. As discussed above, the individual 
characteristics such as the growth rate of bones and skeletal 
structures can aﬀ ect the accuracy of this method. This Court has 
observed in Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 681 
: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1194, and Jyoti Prakash Rai v. State of Bihar, 
(2008) 15 SCC 223 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 796, that the ossiﬁ cation 
test is not conclusive for age determination because it does not reveal 
the exact age of the person, but the radiological examination leaves 
a margin of two years on either side of the age range as prescribed 
by the test irrespective of whether the ossiﬁ cation test of multiple 
joints is conducted. The courts in India have accepted the fact that 
after the age of thirty years the ossiﬁ cation test cannot be relied 
upon for age determination. It is trite that the standard of proof for 
the determination of age is the degree of probability and not proof 
beyond reasonable doubt.
31. In a case of juvenility where two views are possible, this Court 
has held that a liberal approach should be undertaken. This position was 
laid down by this Court in the case of Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 
SCC 488 where it was held that:
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
278 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
“19……….
(ii) a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted while 
appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of the accused in support 
of the plea that he was a juvenile and if two views may be possible 
on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the 
accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases; and”
This proposition of taking a liberal view and about extending the 
beneﬁ t of juvenility where two views are available has been reiterated by 
this Court in numerous subsequent decisions such as Mukarrab and Others 
v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2017) 2 SCC 210, Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. 
State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 9 SCC 7503 as well as Rishipal Singh 
Solanki v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 8 SCC 602 which concluded as 
follows in para 33.8:
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should 
lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline 
cases. This is in order to ensure that the beneﬁ t of the JJ Act, 2015 
is made applicable to the juvenile in conﬂ ict with law. At the same 
time, the court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by 
persons to escape punishment after having committed serious oﬀ ences.
32. Even if the medical report which shows the age of the appellant as 
19 years is taken to be correct even then in a case where an exact assessment 
of age was not possible, considering the conﬂ icting reports and documents 
in our considered opinion,
the provision given in sub-rule 3(b) of Rule 12 
would come into play and the Court ought to have given the appellant a 
beneﬁ t of one year in the present case.
Consequently, we accept the report of the Additional Sessions Judge, 
Barabanki dated 28.09.2022 and declare that the appellant was a juvenile 
on the date of the commission of crime i.e., on 01.12.1995. 
33. The other two co-accused i.e., Gaya Prasad Mishra and Gulab 
Chandra have been convicted and sentenced inter alia to life imprisonment. 
Although both of them have been prematurely released by the State 
3 
 Para 13
279
Government under its remission policy, yet the fact remains that they 
were convicted (along with the appellant), for the oﬀ ences under Sections 
302/34 and 307/34 by the Trial Court in trial as well as by the High Court 
in appeal after examining the entire evidence in detail. The role assigned 
to the present appellant is no diﬀ erent than the role assigned to the other 
two accused who were convicted under Sections 302 and 307 read with 
Section 34 IPC. It is exactly the same role and clearly section 34 of the 
Indian Penal Code is also attracted. We have already declared the appellant 
as a juvenile, but there is also an order of conviction against the appellant, 
which is based on the evidence placed by the prosecution against the other 
two accused and the present appellant, which is common. It is not possible 
therefore to take a diﬀ erent view for the present appellant than what has 
been taken by the Trial Court and the Appellate court against the other two 
accused regarding their conviction. Therefore, we sustain the conviction 
of the appellant under Sections 302 and 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, 
but all the sentences which have been awarded to him are hereby quashed 
as such sentences cannot be given to a juvenile, in view of Section 16 of 
the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.
34. The appeal is partly allowed on the question of juvenility as 
indicated hereinabove, and the order of the High Court will stand modiﬁ ed 
to this extent. The appellant is
presently in jail. He should be around 43 years 
of age as of now. Considering all the relevant aspects including the fact that 
the appellant has already been declared a Juvenile by this Court and in view 
of Sections 15 and 16 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, since the maximum 
period for which a juvenile can be detained is three years and the appellant 
has already undergone imprisonment for 4 ½ years, we hereby order that the 
appellant be released forthwith, unless he is required in some other crime.
Headnotes prepared by:  
Appeal partly allowed.
Nidhi Jain
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]