M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH versus NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA & ANR
[2023] 13 S.C.R. 220, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
[2023] 13 S.C.R. 220 : 2023 INSC 880
220
CASE DETAILS
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH
v.
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1959 of 2012)
OCTOBER 05, 2023
[BELA M. TRIVEDI AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: (i) Whether, while considering a private 
complaint alleging defamation, the Magistrate before summoning the 
accused ought to conﬁ ne himself to the allegations forming part of the 
petition only or he may, applying his judicial mind to the exceptions to s.499, 
IPC, dismiss the complaint holding that the facts alleged do not make out 
a case of defamation?
(ii) Whether and, if at all, to what extent, is it open to the High Courts 
to exercise inherent power saved by s.482, Cr. PC to quash proceedings for 
defamation by setting aside the summoning order upon extending the beneﬁ t 
of any of the Exceptions to s.499, IPC?
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Issue Process – Complaint of 
Defamation – Application of judicial mind by the Magistrate:
Held: In the context of a complaint of defamation, at the stage the 
Magistrate proceeds to issue process, he has to form his opinion based on 
the allegations in the complaint and other material (obtained through the 
process referred to in section 200/section 202) as to whether ‘suﬃ  cient 
ground for proceeding’ exists as distinguished from ‘suﬃ  cient ground for 
conviction’, which has to be left for determination at the trial and not at the 
stage when process is issued –
Although there is nothing in the law which 
in express terms mandates the Magistrate to consider whether any of the 
Exceptions to s. 499, IPC is attracted, there is no bar either – It is not the 
law that the Magistrate is in any manner precluded from considering if 
at all any of the Exceptions is attracted in a given case; the Magistrate is 
under no fetter from so considering, more so because being someone who
221
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA
is legally trained, it is expected that while issuing process he would have 
a clear idea of what constitutes defamation – If, in the unlikely event, the 
contents of the complaint and the supporting statements on oath as well as 
reports of investigation/inquiry reveal a complete defence under any of the 
Exceptions to s. 499, IPC, the Magistrate, upon due application of judicial 
mind, would be justiﬁ ed to dismiss the complaint on such ground and it 
would not amount to an act in excess of jurisdiction if such dismissal has 
the support of reasons.[Para 45]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Power of the High 
Court to quash proceedings for defamation by setting aside the 
summoning order upon extending the beneﬁ t of any of the Exceptions 
to s.499, IPC:
Held: The exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts u/s. 482, Cr.P.C., 
in a case where the oﬀ ence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have 
not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing 
is made, law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further 
and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials 
which were not there before the Magistrate – This is based on the simple 
proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may 
not do – It may not be understood to undermine the High Courts’ powers 
saved by s.482, Cr.P.C.; such powers are always
available to be exercised 
ex debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for administration 
of which alone the High Courts exist – The issue of process u/s. 204 r/w. 
s.200, Cr.P.C. does not ipso facto stand vitiated for non-consideration of 
the Exceptions to s.499, IPC unless, of course, before the High Court it 
is convincingly demonstrated that even on the basis of the complaint and 
the materials that the Magistrate had before him and without there being 
anything more, the facts alleged do not prima facie make out the oﬀ ence 
of defamation and that consequently, the proceedings need to be closed. 
[Paras 46 and 47]
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 499 – Exceptions to s.499 – Trial Court upon 
considering the complaint u/s. 200 Cr.P.C. returned a prima facie ﬁ nding 
in order dated 25.03.2010 that accused no.1, the appellant (accused 
no.2) and its district manager were responsible for writing, sending, 
publishing letters containing malicious and defamatory statements and
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
222
consequently summoned the three accused persons u/ss. 500/107/34, 
IPC – Propriety:
Held: At the stage, when the Trial Court made the summoning order, 
two aspects were required to be satisﬁ ed: (1) whether the uncontroverted 
allegations as made in the petition of complaint read with the examination 
of the complainant, prima facie, tend to suggest an oﬀ ence having been 
committed, and (2) whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to 
proceed – Keeping in view the allegations made in the petition of complaint 
and the evidence placed before the Trial Court by the complainant and on a 
plain reading of its order dated 25.03.2010 issuing summons to the accused, 
it does not appear that the ﬁ nding of a prima facie case having been made 
out at that stage is so outrageously illogical or in deﬁ ance of legal principles 
and acceptable standards that it would merit interference by this Court – 
Appellant would be free to appear before the Trial Court and raise whatever 
defence is available to it in law, not necessarily conﬁ ned to the Fourth 
Exception, for due consideration thereof by the Trial Court – Therefore, the 
Trial Court was not unjustiﬁ ed in issuing summons to the accused based on 
the materials before it. [Paras 49, 50]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.499 – Exceptions to s.499 – Whether a 
company can be prosecuted for defamation when the alleged defamatory 
statements are made not by it (the company) but by its
authorised agent:
Held: It must necessarily depend on the facts of each case, meaning 
thereby the quality of evidence that is led in course of the trial and the 
weight to be attached to it – In the instant case, the Power of Attorney is 
yet not proved by the appellant-company according to law and, therefore, 
could not have been considered by the Judge and cannot be considered by 
this Court as well – Even if proved, its eﬀ ect and import necessarily have 
to be considered by the Trial Court – However, if from evidence led it is 
established that the authorised agent had issued defamatory statements with 
the consent of the principal or that the principal, without giving consent, 
had due knowledge of such defamatory statements, yet, did not caution/
reprimand the agent for doing so or had not disowned the statements so 
made, there is no reason why a prosecution for defamation should be nipped 
in the bud on the specious ground that an authorised agent is supposed to act
223
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA
lawfully and not unlawfully – As far as the beneﬁ t of the fourth exception is 
concerned, it is for the appellant to demonstrate before the Trial Court that 
the Fourth Exception is attracted, or plead any other defence, and discharge 
its burden of proof in respect thereof during the course of the trial. [Paras 
54, 55, 56, 57]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Balraj Khanna & Ors. v. Moti Ram (1971) 3 SCC 399 : [1971] Suppl. 
SCR 447; Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia (1981) 3 SCC 208 : [1981] 
3 SCR 627; Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajabhau Surajmal Rathu (1996) 
6 SCC 263 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 771; Subramanian Swamy v. Union of 
India (2016) 7 SCC 221 : [2016] 3 SCR 865; Rajendra Kumar Sitaram 
Pande v. Uttam (1999) 3 SCC 134 : [1999] 1 SCR 580; Jawaharlal Darda 
v. Manoharrao Ganpatrao Kapsikar (1998) 4 SCC 112; Vadilal Panchal v. 
Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar [1961] 1 SCR 1; Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia 
v. State of Bombay [1958] SCR 618; National Bank of Oman v. Barakara 
Abdul Aziz (2013) 2 SCC 488 : [2012] 11 SCR 500 – relied on.
Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporated & Ors. (2011) 1 
SCC 74 : [2010] 14 SCR 591; Morgan Tetronics Ltd. v. State & Anr. LPA-
668/2010 dt. 17 th September 2010:  Aroon Purie v. State of NCT of Delhi
(2022) 15 SCALE 541; Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana (2023) SCC OnLine 
SC 765;  M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha (2001) 5 SCC 156 : [2001] 3 SCR 415; 
M.A.
Rumugam v. Kittu Alias Krishnamoorthy (2009) 1 SCC 101 : [2008] 
15 SCR 642; Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose [1964] 1 SCR 
639: Jeﬀ rey J. Diermeier v. State of West Bengal (2010) 6 SCC 243 : [2010] 
7 SCR 128; Manoj Kumar Tiwari v. Manish Sisodia 2022 SCC OnLine SC 
1434; B.R.K. Aathithan v. Sun Group 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1705; Kalyan 
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2005) 2 SCC 42; Jagdish Ram v. State 
of Rajasthan (2004) 4 SCC 432 : [2004] 2 SCR 846; Chand Dhawan (Smt.) 
v. Jawaharlal (1992) 3 SCC 317 : [1992] 2 SCR 83 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 
1959 of 2012.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
224
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.12.2010 of the High Court of 
Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC No.2845 of 2010.
Appearances:
Ms. Aparna Viswanathan, R. Gopalakrishnan, Advs. for the Appellant.
Manoj D. Taneja, Ms. Gauri K. Dass Mohanti, Snehasis Mukherjee, 
Sunil Fernandes, Ms. Priyansha Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
THE APPEAL 
1. This appeal, by special leave, is at the instance of a German company 
(“the appellant”, hereafter). It assails a short ﬁ ve-line order of a learned Judge 
of the High Court of Delhi (“learned Judge”, hereafter) dated 10th December 
2010. By such order, the learned Judge dismissed a petition1  under section 
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr. PC”, hereafter) presented 
by the appellant as not maintainable relying on the decision of this Court 
in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporated & Ors.2 and 
a Bench decision of the High Court of Delhi in Morgan Tetronics Ltd. v. 
State & Anr.3
CHALLENGE BEFORE THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI 
2. Appellant had approached the High Court of Delhi taking exception to 
an order dated 25th March 2010 passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan 
Magistrate (SE), New Delhi (“Trial Court”, hereafter) on a complaint4 lodged 
under section 200, Cr. PC by the respondent (“complainant”, hereafter). The 
Trial Court upon considering the complaint returned a prima facie ﬁ nding in 
the said
order that Mr. M.C. Aggarwal (accused no.1), the appellant (accused 
no. 2) and its District Manager (Asia), Mr. Lorenzo Boninsegna (accused 
1 
CRL. M.C. 2845/2010
2 
(2011) 1 SCC 74
3 
LPA-668/2010 dt. 17th September 2010
4 
CC No.465/1/09
225
no.3) were “jointly and severally responsible for writing, sending, publishing 
the above said letters containing malicious and defamatory statements and 
imputation against the complainant” and consequently summoned the three 
accused for oﬀ ences under sections 500/107/34, Indian Penal Code (“IPC”, 
hereafter). 
FACTS
3. The undisputed and relevant facts leading to the summoning order 
impugned before the learned Judge is noticed hereunder:
i. 
Global Tender No. EQ/Global/2007-09/01 was ﬂ oated by the 
Airports Authority of India (“AAI”, hereafter) for supply of 40 
(forty) Airﬁ eld Crash Fire Tenders at various airports across the 
country. The appellant, a Germany-based manufacturer of ﬁ re 
safety equipment, executed a Power of Attorney in favour of Mr. 
M.C. Aggarwal, the respondent no. 2 (“Aggarwal”, hereafter), 
who happened to be the Managing Director of Brijbasi Hi-Tech 
Udyog Ltd. Aggarwal was appointed to be the local representative 
of the appellant in India and he was empowered, inter alia, to 
ﬁ le suits and take all steps which were deemed expedient in 
furtherance of the tender process.
ii. 
The company of the complainant, Bhartiya Vehicles & 
Engineering Pvt. Ltd, was the Indian associate of one Rosenbauer 
International AG (“Rosenbauer”, hereafter), another bidder in 
the aforementioned tender process. 
iii. 
On 21st July 2008, AAI rejected the bid of the appellant and 
eventually awarded it to Rosenbauer. In the aftermath of the 
rejection, on various
occasions in 2008, Aggarwal issued 
four letters in the nature of complaints to diﬀ erent authorities 
including the Minister of Civil Aviation, Government of India, 
the Chairman of AAI, the Chief Vigilance Oﬃ  cer, AAI, and the 
Central Vigilance Commissioner, Government of India, inter 
alia, complaining of favouritism and irregularities in the tender 
process. These letters allege that the complainant, through illegal 
and wrongful methods, persuaded AAI to award the tender 
to Rosenbauer. Enumeration of the contents of such letters is 
avoided, lest the same prejudices the rights of the parties.
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
226
iv. 
Dissatisﬁ ed with the inaction of the aforementioned authorities 
to look into the letters of complaint, Aggarwal, in his capacity 
as the local authorised representative of the appellant, invoked 
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court on or about 12th August 
2008 by presenting a writ petition5  against the Union of 
India and AAI. It is pertinent to note that Bhartiya Vehicles & 
Engineering Pvt. Ltd., and Rosenbauer were also made parties 
to the proceedings. The writ petition was ﬁ nally dismissed 
on 13th February 2009 vide a detailed order, which was not 
challenged thereafter. 
v. 
On 30th April 2009, the complainant addressed a legal notice to 
the appellant and Aggarwal inter alia alleging that the contents 
of the aforementioned four letters of complaint given to the 
concerned authorities were defamatory. Pertinently, on 20th 
May 2009, the appellant responded to the legal notice inter 
alia stating that it had not authorised Aggarwal to write any 
such letter, and that the appellant was also not involved in their 
preparation. 
vi. 
It was in this context that the complainant lodged the complaint 
before the Trial Court alleging criminal defamation as well as 
its abetment under sections 107, 499, and 500 read with section 
34 of the IPC against the accused. 
vii. The Trial Court, after perusing the complaint and examining 
the witnesses in support thereof, ordered the accused to be 
summoned as it was of the
opinion that a prima facie case was 
made out against them. 
viii. The challenge by the appellant to the summoning order was 
spurned by the High Court vide the impugned order.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT
4. On behalf of the appellant, learned counsel Ms. Viswanathan 
argued that the High Court committed grave miscarriage of justice in 
5 
 WP (C) No.6155/2008
227
dismissing the petition by a cryptic order. She contended that several 
important questions of law were raised in the petition by the appellant. 
Although the objection as to whether a company is capable of being 
prosecuted on the ground that it is incapable of possessing necessary 
mens rea stood answered by the decisions relied on by the learned Judge, 
yet, according to her, the learned Judge should have considered the other 
objections raised by the appellant. Not having so considered, it was urged 
that the impugned order is indefensible.
5. Ms. Viswanathan, in support of the appeal, raised the following 
speciﬁ c contentions:
i. 
The impugned order of the learned Judge omitted to consider 
that the complaint did not disclose any oral or written 
words, spoken or written by the appellant, or sign or visible 
representation made by it; and, in the absence of disclosure of 
any imputation made by the appellant, the key ingredient of the 
oﬀ ence of defamation did not exist. The impugned order of the 
learned Judge failed to appreciate that issuance of a Power of 
Attorney cannot by law constitute an ingredient of an oﬀ ence 
under section 499, IPC since agents, under section 188 of the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872, are authorised to do only lawful 
acts; and, as a corollary, execution of such power of attorney 
did not amount to authorisation or consent given to Aggarwal 
to commit any alleged act of defamation.
ii. 
The learned Judge erred in not considering that a
writ 
petition instituted on behalf of the appellant cannot constitute 
an ingredient of an oﬀ ence under section 499, IPC, since 
documents ﬁ led in civil cases are protected by an “absolute 
privilege” and are also covered under the Fourth Exception to 
section 499, IPC.
iii. 
There has been a gross failure of justice in that the learned Judge 
ought to have corrected the manifest error committed by the 
Trial Court in issuing process against the accused without the 
Trial Court considering whether any of the exceptions to section 
499, IPC was applicable on facts and in the circumstances of 
the present case. 
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
228
iv. 
The impugned order of the learned Judge fails to explain why 
the decision of this Court in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande 
v. Uttam6 was not followed, whereby law has been settled 
that issuance of process by a Magistrate without applying the 
exceptions to section 499, IPC is unreasonable, excessive and 
palpably wrong resulting in failure of justice.
v. 
The decision in Aroon Purie v. State of NCT of Delhi7 was 
also cited for the proposition that there is no rigid principle 
that the beneﬁ t of exception can only be aﬀ orded at the stage 
of trial.
6. Resting on the aforesaid contentions, Ms. Viswanathan prayed 
that the proceedings emanating from the complaint be quashed.
CONTENTIONS OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT
7. Mr. Taneja, learned counsel representing the complainant invited 
our attention to various documents forming part of his counter aﬃ  davit 
to the special leave petition. According to him, the appellant withheld 
relevant materials from this Court and obtained an ex parte interim order 
on 29th April 2011 as a sequel whereto the entire proceedings before the 
Trial Court have been brought to a grinding halt. 
8. Our notice was first invited to the fact that Aggarwal had 
independently challenged the summoning order before the High Court of 
Delhi by presenting a petition8 under section 482, Cr. PC. By a detailed 
order dated 10th December 2010, the same learned Judge (who dismissed 
the petition of the appellant)
noted that Aggarwal was taking defence 
under exceptions to section 499 IPC and that “the Court cannot take the 
defence of the petitioner into account to quash the summoning order or to 
quash the complaint”. Based on such ﬁ nding, the learned Judge rejected 
the challenge. 
9. Mr. Taneja contended that the learned Judge on 10th December 
2010 had  considered the petitions of Aggarwal and the appellant, one after 
6 
(1999) 3 SCC 134
7 
2022 (15) SCALE 541
8 
CRL. M.C. 3350/2010
229
the other; and, although it is true that the learned Judge while dismissing 
the petition of the appellant dealt with the point that a company could be 
proceeded against in view of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. (supra) and 
Morgan Tetronics Ltd. (supra) and did not assign separate reasons for 
spurning the appellant’s challenge to the impugned order on the other 
grounds raised therein, the appellant was duly represented by its learned 
advocate when Aggarwal’s petition was considered and in his presence, 
the order of dismissal was dictated. What Mr. Taneja hinted at was that 
the learned Judge having passed a reasoned order rejecting Aggarwal’s 
challenge to the summoning order, the learned Judge may not have 
considered it necessary to repeat the reasons twice over while dismissing 
the petition of the appellant. 
10. Next, our attention was drawn by Mr. Taneja to the letters of 
complaint issued by Aggarwal before the various public authorities. It was 
contended that while acting on behalf of the appellant and also under its 
instructions, Aggarwal had made reckless and frivolous allegations against 
the complainant amounting to defamation and, in the process, lowered his 
reputation and fame in the eyes of the public. He further contended that 
the appellant cannot feign ignorance of the letters of complaint issued 
by Aggarwal. Referring to the writ petition of the appellant presented 
before the High Court of Delhi, he pointed out that the self-same letters 
of
complaint issued by Aggarwal were made part of such petition while 
challenging the appellant’s disqualiﬁ cation in course of the tender process; 
and, if indeed, such letters were issued without knowledge and consent 
of the appellant, it deﬁ es logic as to why they were made part of the writ 
petition in the ﬁ rst place where the appellant was arrayed as the writ 
petitioner.
11. Relying on the decision of this Court in Supriya Jain v. State of 
Haryana9, it was argued by Mr. Taneja that it is not open to the Courts 
to quash a complaint based on additional material placed by the accused 
which is not part of the record of proceedings before the court below. 
According to him, the Power of Attorney is not a piece of evidence that 
has been admitted or accepted by the complainant and, thus, it requires 
9 
(2023) SCC OnLine SC 765
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
230
proof by the appellant. Since the same is yet not proved by the appellant 
according to law, therefore, the same cannot be considered at this stage by 
this Court. Also, it is for the appellant to respond to the summons and to 
raise whatever defence is available to it by appearing before the Trial Court. 
12. Reliance was also placed on several decisions by Mr. Taneja, 
some of which we propose to refer to a little later, to buttress his contention 
that the petition of the appellant was rightly dismissed and that the appeal 
deserves dismissal with costs.  
THE QUESTIONS
13. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the 
complainant and on consideration of the materials on record, we are of the 
view that the following questions of law emerge for an answer:
i. 
Whether, while considering a private complaint alleging 
defamation, the Magistrate before summoning the accused ought 
to conﬁ ne himself to the allegations forming part of the petition 
only or he may, applying his judicial mind to the exceptions to 
section 499, IPC, dismiss the complaint holding that the facts 
alleged do not make out a case of defamation?
AND
ii. Whether and, if at all, to what extent, is it open to the High Courts 
to exercise inherent power saved by section 482, Cr. PC to quash 
proceedings for defamation by setting aside the summoning order 
upon extending the beneﬁ t of any of the Exceptions to section 499, 
IPC?  
14. After answering the aforesaid questions, we wish to answer the 
following questions emerging from the facts and circumstances of the appeal: 
a. Whether the appellant has made out any case for interference with 
the judicial orders of the Magistrate and the learned Judge under 
challenge?
b. Whether a company can be prosecuted for defamation when the 
alleged defamatory statements are made not by it (the company) 
but by its authorised agent?
231
c. Depending on the answers to the above, whether the beneﬁ t of 
the Fourth Exception to section 499, IPC, as claimed, should be 
accorded to the appellant? 
ANALYSIS
15. A survey of the decisions of this Court which were cited and those 
mentioned in the cited decisions as well as some other decisions, which we 
had the occasion to read and consider while preparing this judgment, would 
provide guidance and pave the way for us to decide the fate of this appeal. 
16. We would ﬁ rst consider the decisions cited by the parties and 
those decisions, though not cited by them, are traceable in such decisions, 
by maintaining the sequence of their origin.  
17. In Balraj Khanna & Ors. v. Moti Ram10, the respondent lodged a 
complaint against the ﬁ rst appellant and 6 (six) others under section 500, 
IPC, alleging that they had levelled allegations against him which were 
defamatory in character. On 2 (two) grounds, the Magistrate dismissed 
the complaint. The respondent unsuccessfully applied for revision of 
the order of dismissal before the Additional Sessions Judge, whereafter 
he approached the High Court of Delhi with success. The High Court, 
while setting aside the orders impugned, directed further inquiry. After 
considering various foreign decisions as well as decisions of the High 
Courts of Orissa, Nagpur, Allahabad and Mysore that were cited, this 
Court in paragraph 29 held as follows:
“29. Before concluding the discussion, it is to be stated that the 
trial
Magistrate has given an additional reason for dismissing the 
complaint. That reason is that the resolution passed by the Standing 
Committee on December 11, 1964 and the discussion preceding it 
by the members of the Standing Committee including the appellants, 
is covered by the Exceptions to Section 499 IPC. Unfortunately, 
the High Court also has touched upon this aspect and made certain 
observations. In our opinion, the question of the application of 
the Exceptions to Section 499 IPC, does not arise at this stage. 
Rejection of the complaint by the Magistrate on the second ground 
10 (1971) 3 SCC 399
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
232
mentioned above cannot be sustained. It was also unnecessary for the 
High Court to have considered this aspect and diﬀ ered from the trial 
Magistrate. It is needless to state that the question of applicability of 
the Exceptions to Section 499 IPC, as well as all other defences that 
may be available to the appellants will have to be gone into during 
the trial of the complaint.” 
                                                             (underlining ours, for emphasis)
18. The next decision is Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia11, 
rendered by a Bench of 3 (three) Hon’ble Judges. The appeal was directed 
against an order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in exercise 
of jurisdiction under section 397, Cr. PC, alternatively under section 482 
thereof. The respondent was the Chief Editor, Blitz. An article was published 
therein which was per se defamatory. Prosecution for an oﬀ ence under 
section 500, IPC which was launched stood quashed by the impugned order 
on the ground that the case “clearly falls within the ambit of Exception 9 of 
Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860”. The appeal was allowed by 
the majority and the order under challenge quashed. This is what the Court, 
speaking through Hon’ble A.P. Sen, J., said: 
“6. The order recorded by the High Court quashing the prosecution 
under Section 482 of the Code is wholly perverse and has resulted in 
manifest miscarriage of justice. The High Court has
prejudged the 
whole issue without a trial of the accused persons. The matter was at 
the stage of recording the plea of the accused persons under Section 251 
of the Code. The requirements of Section 251 are still to be complied 
with. The learned Magistrate had to ascertain whether the respondent 
pleads guilty to the charge or demands to be tried. The circumstances 
brought out clearly show that the respondent was prima facie guilty of 
defamation punishable under Section 500 of the Code unless he pleads 
one of the exceptions to Section 499 of the Code. ***
It is for the respondent to plead that he was protected under Ninth 
Exception to Section 499 of the Penal Code. The burden, such as it is, 
to prove that his case would come within that exception is on him. ***
11 (1981) 3 SCC 208
233
7. We are completely at a loss to understand the reasons which impelled 
the High Court to quash the proceedings. ***”
Hon’ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J., in a concurring judgment, made an 
illuminating discussion which would also be relevant for answering one of 
the questions formulated by us touching upon the facts of this appeal. We 
quote the concluding paragraph of His Lordship’s judgment, reading thus:
“18. Several questions arise for consideration if the Ninth Exception is 
to be applied to the facts of the present case. Was the article published 
after exercising due care and attention? Did the author of the article 
satisfy himself that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the 
imputations made by him were true? Did he act with reasonable care 
and a sense of responsibility and propriety? Was the article based 
entirely on the report of the Deputy Secretary or was there any other 
material before the author? What steps did the author take to satisfy 
himself about the authenticity of the report and its contents? Were 
the imputations made rashly without any attempt at veriﬁ cation? Was 
the imputation the result of any personal ill will or malice which the 
author bore towards the complainant? Was it the result of any ill will or 
malice which the author bore towards the political group to which the 
complainant belonged? Was the article merely intended to malign and 
scandalise the complainant or the party to which he belonged? Was the 
article intended
to expose the rottenness of a jail administration which 
permitted free sexual approaches between male and female detenus? 
Was the article intended to expose the despicable character of persons 
who were passing oﬀ  as saintly leaders? Was the article merely intended 
to provide salacious reading material for readers who had a peculiar 
taste for scandals? These and several other questions may arise for 
consideration, depending on the stand taken by the accused at the trial 
and how the complainant proposes to demolish the defence. Surely 
the stage for deciding these questions has not arrived yet. Answers to 
these questions at this stage, even before the plea of the accused is 
recorded can only be a priori conclusions. ‘Good faith’ and ‘public 
good’ are, as we said, questions of fact and matters for evidence. So, 
the trial must go on.”                                            
                                                            (underlining ours, for emphasis)
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
234
19. The decision of another Bench of 3 (three) Hon’ble Judges in 
Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajabhau Surajmal Rathu12 outlined the 
contours for exercise of jurisdiction to quash a complaint for defamation. 
Paragraph 13 being relevant is set out below:
“13. As regards the allegations made against the appellant in the 
complaint ﬁ led in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, at Nasik, 
on a reading of the complaint we do not think that we will be justiﬁ ed 
at this stage to quash that complaint. It is not the province of this Court 
to appreciate at this stage the evidence or scope of and meaning of 
the statement. Certain allegations came to be made but whether these 
allegations do constitute defamation of the Marwari community as a 
business class and whether the appellant had intention to cite as an 
instance of general feeling among the community and whether the 
context in which the said statement came to be made, as is sought 
to be argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, are all 
matters to be considered by the learned Magistrate at a later stage. At 
this stage, we cannot embark upon weighing the evidence and come 
to any conclusion to hold, whether or not the allegations made in the 
complaint constitute an oﬀ ence punishable under Section 500. It is the 
settled legal position that a court has to read the complaint as a whole 
and ﬁ nd out whether allegations disclosed constitute an oﬀ ence under
Section 499 triable by the Magistrate. The Magistrate prima facie came 
to the conclusion that the allegations might come within the deﬁ nition 
of ‘defamation’ under Section 499 IPC and could be taken cognizance 
of. But these are the facts to be established at the trial. The case set 
up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken or other steps 
of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage known to law. Prima 
facie we think that at this stage it is not a case warranting quashing 
of the complaint ﬁ led in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class at 
Nasik. To that extent, the High Court was right in refusing to quash 
the complaint under Section 500 IPC.”
                                                            (underlining ours, for emphasis)
12 (1996) 6 SCC 263
235
20. Then followed M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha13 where this Court, after 
applying the law laid down in Sewakram Sobhani (supra) and Shatrughna 
Prasad Sinha (supra), set aside the order of the Karnataka High Court and 
restored the order of the Magistrate issuing summons to the accused for 
oﬀ ence under section 500, IPC. 
21. In M.A. Rumugam v. Kittu Alias Krishnamoorthy14, the respondent 
ﬁ led a private complaint against the appellant for commission of the 
oﬀ ence of defamation under section 500, IPC. Taking cognizance of the 
said complaint, the Magistrate issued summons to the appellant. Aggrieved 
thereby, he ﬁ led a petition before the High Court of Judicature at Madras 
praying to call for the records pertaining to the complaint petition ﬁ led by the 
respondent and to quash the same. Before the High Court, a contention was 
raised that the backdrop of events and the manner in which the complaint 
petition had to be ﬁ led by the appellant would clearly establish that the action 
on his part was not in good faith. The said contention was negatived by the 
High Court. This Court had the occasion to consider the applicability of 
the provisions of section 482, Cr. PC for quashing of a complaint petition 
ﬁ led by the respondent against the appellant under section 500, IPC. While 
dismissing the appeal, the Court went on to apply the well-settled principle of 
law that those who plead exception must prove it and, therefore, the burden 
of proof that his action was
bona ﬁ de would, thus, be on the appellant alone.
22. In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India15, this Court considered 
the issue from a diﬀ erent angle. We can do no better than reproduce the 
contention and how the same was unhesitatingly repelled in the following 
words:
“209. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of the 
submission of Mr. Bhambhani, learned Senior Counsel. It is submitted 
by the learned Senior Counsel that Exceptions to Section 499 are 
required to be considered at the time of summoning of the accused but 
as the same is not conceived in the provision, it is unconstitutional. It is 
settled position of law that those who plead Exception must prove it. It 
13 (2001) 5 SCC 156
14 (2009) 1 SCC 101
15 (2016) 7 SCC 221
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
236
has been laid down in M.A. Rumugam that for the purpose of bringing 
any case within the purview of the Eighth and the Ninth Exceptions 
appended to Section 499 IPC, it would be necessary for the person 
who pleads the Exception to prove it. He has to prove good faith for 
the purpose of protection of the interests of the person making it or 
any other person or for the public good. The said proposition would 
deﬁ nitely apply to any Exception who wants to have the beneﬁ t of 
the same. Therefore, the argument that if the said Exception should 
be taken into consideration at the time of issuing summons it would 
be contrary to established criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, the 
stand that it cannot be taken into consideration makes the provision 
unreasonable, is absolutely an unsustainable one and in a way, a 
mercurial one. And we unhesitatingly repel the same.”
                                                             (underlining ours, for emphasis)
23. Now, we take up for consideration the ﬁ rst decision cited by Ms. 
Viswanathan, i.e., Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande (supra). The facts, the 
relevant issue and the ﬁ nding – all are captured in paragraph 7, which we 
reproduce hereunder: 
“The next question that arises for consideration is whether reading the 
complaint and the report of the Treasury Oﬃ  cer which was obtained 
pursuant to the Order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) of Section 
201, can it be said
that a prima facie case exists for trial or Exception 8 
to Section 499 clearly applies and consequently in such a case, calling 
upon the accused to face trial would be a travesty of justice. The 
gravamen of the allegations in the complaint petition is that the accused 
persons made a complaint to the Treasury Oﬃ  cer, Amravati, containing 
false imputations to the eﬀ ect that the complainant had come to the 
oﬃ  ce in a drunken state and abused the Treasury Oﬃ  cer, Additional 
Treasury Oﬃ  cer and the Collector and circulated in the oﬃ  ce using 
ﬁ lthy language and such imputations had been made with the intention 
to cause damage to the reputation and services of the complainant. In 
order to decide the correctness of this averment, the Magistrate instead 
of issuing process had called upon the Treasury Oﬃ  cer to hold an 
enquiry and submit a report and the said Treasury Oﬃ  cer did submit 
a report to the Magistrate. The question for consideration is whether
237
the allegations in the complaint read with the report of the Magistrate 
make out the oﬀ ence under Section 500 or not. Section 499 of the Penal 
Code, 1860 deﬁ nes the oﬀ ence of defamation and Section 500 provides 
the punishment for such oﬀ ence. Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly 
indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation 
against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that 
person with regard to the subject-matter of accusation. The report of the 
Treasury Oﬃ  cer clearly indicates that pursuant to the report made by 
the accused persons against the complainant, a departmental enquiry 
had been initiated and the complainant was found to be guilty. Under 
such circumstances the fact that the accused persons had made a report 
to the superior oﬃ  cer of the complainant alleging that he had abused 
the Treasury Oﬃ  cer in a drunken state which is the gravamen of the 
present complaint and nothing more, would be covered by Exception 
8 to Section 499 of the Penal Code, 1860. By perusing the allegations 
made in the complaint petition, we are also satisﬁ ed that no case of 
defamation has been made out. In this view of the matter, requiring the 
accused persons to face trial or even to approach the Magistrate afresh 
for reconsideration of the question of issuance of process would not be 
in the interest of justice. On the other hand, in our considered opinion, 
this is a ﬁ t case for quashing the order of issuance of
process and the 
proceedings itself. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the 
High Court and conﬁ rm the order of the learned Sessions Judge and 
quash the criminal proceeding itself. This appeal is allowed.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
24. The aforesaid determination makes it clear that on perusal of the 
allegations levelled in the petition of complaint, the Court was satisﬁ ed that 
no case of defamation had been made out therein and this precisely seems 
to be the reason why the Court felt that it would not be in the interest of 
justice to require the accused persons to face trial or even to approach the 
Magistrate afresh for reconsideration of the question of issuance of process. 
We do not read any law having been laid down by this Court in Rajendra 
Kumar Sitaram Pande (supra) that wherever a challenge to a summoning 
order passed on a complaint for defamation is laid before the High Courts in 
a petition under section 482, Cr. PC or such challenge travels to this Court, 
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
238
an endeavour must necessarily be made whether any of the exceptions 
is attracted so that the proceedings may be closed without subjecting the 
accused to long drawn proceedings. At best, we read the decision as one 
where, in the given facts and circumstances, the Court felt that requiring 
the appellants to undergo a trial would be a travesty of justice; hence, the 
decision must be held to be conﬁ ned to the facts of the case.
25. Now, it is time to consider the other decision relied on by Ms. 
Viswanathan, i.e., Aroon Purie (supra). In such decision, the decision in 
Jawaharlal Darda v. Manoharrao Ganpatrao Kapsikar16  was considered. 
Before we look into Aroon Purie (supra), we propose to ascertain whether 
Jawaharlal Darda (supra) lays down a law having the force of a binding 
precedent.
26. The decision in Jawaharlal Darda (supra) reveals that the 
respondent 1 had ﬁ led a complaint on 2nd February, 1987 in the court of the 
relevant Magistrate alleging that by publishing a news item in its newspaper 
‘Daily Lokmat’, on 4th February, 1984, the appellant being the then Chief 
Editor of that daily and 4 (four) others associated with the newspaper in one 
capacity or the other, had committed oﬀ ences punishable under sections 499, 
500, 501 and 502 read with section, 34 IPC. Process was issued against all 
the accused by the Magistrate. Upon a challenge being laid to such order, the 
relevant Sessions Court quashed it being of
the opinion that by publishing 
that news item, none of the accused had committed any oﬀ ence. That order 
was challenged by the complainant by ﬁ ling a petition in the High Court 
under section 482, Cr. PC. The High Court was of the opinion that the 
Sessions Court misinterpreted the publication. It was also of the view that 
when the Magistrate had found prima facie case against the accused and 
thought it ﬁ t to issue process, it was not proper for the Sessions Court to 
set aside that order by exercising revisional power. This Court restored the 
order of the Sessions Court holding as follows:
“4. As we have stated earlier, the news item was published on 4-2-
1984. The complaint in that behalf was ﬁ led by the complainant on 
2-2-1987. The news item merely disclosed what happened during the 
debate which took place in the Assembly on 13-12-1983. It stated 
16 (1998) 4 SCC 112
239
that when a question regarding misappropriation of government funds 
meant for Majalgaon and Jaikwadi was put to the Minister concerned, 
he had replied that a preliminary enquiry was made by the Government 
and it disclosed that some misappropriation had taken place. When 
questioned further about the names of persons involved, he had stated 
the names of ﬁ ve persons, including that of the complainant. The said 
proceedings came to be published by the accused in its Daily on 4-2-
1984. Because the name of the complainant was mentioned as one of 
the persons involved and likely to be suspended he ﬁ led a complaint 
before the learned CJM alleging that as a result of publication of the 
said report he had been defamed.
5. It is quite apparent that what the accused had published in its 
newspaper was an accurate and true report of the proceedings of 
the Assembly. Involvement of the respondent was disclosed by the 
preliminary enquiry made by the Government. If the accused bona ﬁ de 
believing the version of the Minister to be true published the report in 
good faith it cannot be said that they intended to harm the reputation of 
the complainant. It was a report in respect of public conduct of public 
servants who were entrusted with public funds intended to be used 
for public good. Thus the facts and circumstances of the case disclose 
that the news items were published for public good. All these aspects 
have been overlooked by the High Court.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
It is clear from the above reasoning that this Court went on to reverse 
the order of the High Court and restore that of the Sessions Court on the 
grounds that the accused published the report in good faith and bona ﬁ de 
believing the version of the Minister to be true, that it cannot be said that 
they intended to harm the reputation of the complainant, and that the 
news item was published for public good. Therefore, relief was given to 
the accused having regard to the facts obtaining therein and without there 
being any discussion on the point that we are seized of. This decision too 
appears to have been rendered by this Court considering the special facts 
and circumstances.
27. Signiﬁ cantly, the precedents which we have referred to at an 
earlier part of this judgment do not appear to have been cited by the parties 
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
240
in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande (supra) and Jawaharlal Darda (supra) 
and, thus, the Hon’ble Judges on the Bench did not have the beneﬁ t of 
considering the same. 
28. What Aroon Purie (supra) reveals is that the operative part of 
the Trial Magistrate’s order was extracted, wherein the decisions in Balraj 
Khanna (supra) and M.N. Damani (supra) were referred to; however, 
the case was decided without any express reference by the Court to such 
precedents.   
29. We need not examine the facts in Aroon Purie (supra) in any great 
detail in view of the question of law that the Court formulated and the answer 
to it. The question, in paragraph 18, reads as follows:
“We now turn to the question: whether the beneﬁ t of any of the 
exceptions to Section 499 of the IPC can be availed of and on the 
strength of such exception, the proceedings can be quashed at the 
stage when an application moved under Section 482 of the Code is 
considered?” 
After quoting paragraphs 5 and 7 from the decisions in Jawaharlal 
Darda (supra) and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande (supra), respectively, 
and conscious of the legal position, the Court cautiously proceeded to hold 
as follows:
“21. It is thus clear that in a given case, if the facts so justify, the beneﬁ t
of an exception to Section 499 of the IPC has been extended and it is 
not taken to be a rigid principle that the beneﬁ t of exception can only 
be aﬀ orded at the stage of trial.”
(underlining
ours, for emphasis)
30. Jawaharlal Darda (supra) and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande 
(supra), we reiterate, are decisions where the disputes arising before the 
Court were resolved without laying down any law capable of being treated as 
precedents within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. However, 
the approach adopted seems to have persuaded the Court in Aroon Purie 
(supra) to proceed to make the  observation, highlighted above, which has 
opened up an arena of debate as to whether, the beneﬁ t of an Exception to 
section 499, IPC could be aﬀ orded at the stage of trial only or whether, if the
241
facts of a given case so justify, such beneﬁ t can be extended and proceedings 
quashed at the stage a petition under section 482, Cr. PC is being dealt with.
31. At this stage, it would not be out of place to refer to and discuss 
a few other decisions of this Court which are considered relevant for 
the present adjudication. In all these decisions, the issue of legality of 
summoning orders was examined and resting on the discussion of the 
relevant laws vis-à-vis the facts of each case, the impugned order was either 
maintained/interdicted. While the ﬁ rst two decisions are of ancient vintage, 
viz. Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar17 and Chandra Deo 
Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose18, being decisions rendered by Benches 
of 3 (three) and 4 (four) Hon’ble Judges, respectively, the remaining three 
are decisions of not too distant an origin, viz. Jeﬀ rey J. Diermeier v. State 
of West Bengal19, Manoj Kumar Tiwari v. Manish Sisodia20 and B.R.K. 
Aathithan v. Sun Group21 rendered by Benches of 2 (two) Hon’ble Judges 
of this Court. 
32. Vadilal Panchal (supra) arose from the decision of the Bombay 
High Court reversing an order of the Presidency Magistrate under section 
203, Cr. PC. In course of a public agitation, one Sitaram died because 
of a gunshot injury inﬂ icted by the appellant. Upon a complaint being 
lodged before the Presidency Magistrate, he ordered an inquiry by the 
Superintendent of Police, CID. Materials collected in course of such inquiry
suggested that the appellant, who was accused of murdering Sitaram, had 
exercised his right of self-defence. Considering the same and after extending 
due opportunity to the complainant, the Presidency Magistrate dismissed 
the complaint. The Bombay High Court set aside the order of dismissal and 
directed the Presidency Magistrate to issue process against the appellant 
and deal with the case in accordance with law, on the ground that though 
Sitaram’s death was indisputable, the accused would have to establish the 
necessary ingredients of the right of private defence as laid down in section 
96 and onwards of the Indian Penal Code; that there was nothing in any of 
17 (1961) 1 SCR 1
18 (1964) 1 SCR 639
19 (2010) 6 SCC 243
20 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1434
21 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1705
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
242
the sections in Chapter XVI to show that such an exception can be held to 
be established from the mere report of the police; that there is nothing in 
sections 202 or 203 of the Cr. PC abrogating the rule as to the presumption 
laid down in section 105 of the Evidence Act and the mode of proof of 
exception laid down in imperative language in that section; and that it was 
not a proper case in which the Presidency Magistrate should have dismissed 
the complaint under section 203, there being no evidence before him as and 
by way of proof to establish the exception of the right of private defence 
pleaded by the accused.
32.1 The question that arose before this Court was, whether the High 
Court of Bombay was right in its view that when a Magistrate directs 
an enquiry under section 202 of the Cr. PC for ascertaining the truth or 
falsehood of a complaint and receives a report from the enquiring oﬃ  cer 
supporting a plea of self-defence made by the person complained against, 
is it not open to him to hold that the plea is correct on the basis of the report 
and the statements of witnesses recorded by the enquiring oﬃ  cer? Must the 
Magistrate, as a matter of law, issue process in such a case and leave the 
person complained against to establish his plea of self-defence at the trial?
32.2 While setting aside the impugned judgment and restoring the 
order of the Magistrate, this Court held that the Bombay High Court was 
in error
in holding in such case that as a matter of law, it was not open to 
the Presidency Magistrate to conclude that no oﬀ ence had been made out 
and there was no suﬃ  cient ground for proceeding further on the complaint 
on the materials before him.
32.3 After discussing the scheme of sections 200, 202 and 203, Cr. 
PC, this is what this Court held:
“10. Now, in the case before us it is not contended that the learned 
Presidency Magistrate failed to consider the materials which he had to 
consider, before passing his order under Section 203 CrPC. As a matter 
of fact the learned Magistrate fully, fairly and impartially considered 
these materials. What is contended on behalf of the respondent-
complainant is that as a matter of law it was not open to the learned 
Magistrate to accept the plea of right of self-defence at a stage when 
all that he had to determine was whether a process should issue or 
not against the appellant. We are unable to accept this contention as
243
correct. It is manifestly clear from the provisions of Section 203 that 
the judgment which the Magistrate has to form must be based on the 
statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the 
investigation or inquiry. The section itself makes that clear, and it is not 
necessary to refer to authorities in support thereof. But the judgment 
which the Magistrate has to form is whether or not there is suﬃ  cient 
ground for proceeding. This does not mean that the Magistrate is 
bound to accept the result of the inquiry or investigation or that he 
must accept any plea that is set up on behalf of the person complained 
against. The Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the materials 
on which he has to form his judgment. In arriving at his judgment he 
is not fettered in any way except by judicial considerations; he is not 
bound to accept what the Inquiring Oﬃ  cer says, nor is he precluded 
from accepting a plea based on an exception, provided always there are 
satisfactory and reliable materials on which he can base his judgment 
as to whether there is suﬃ  cient ground for proceeding on the complaint 
or not. If the Magistrate has not misdirected himself as to the scope of 
an enquiry under Section 202 and has applied his mind judicially to 
the materials before him, we think that if (sic, it) would be erroneous 
in law to hold that a plea based on an exception can never be accepted 
by him in arriving at his judgment. What bearing such a plea
has on 
the case of the complainant and his witnesses, to what extent they are 
falsiﬁ ed by the evidence of other witnesses — all these are questions 
which must be answered with reference to the facts of each case. No 
universal rule can be laid in respect of such questions.”
                                                         (underlining ours, for emphasis)
33. Proﬁ table reference can next be made to the decision in Chandra 
Deo Singh (supra), where a Bench of 4 (four) Hon’ble Judges had the 
occasion to consider a challenge to a judgment of the High Court at Calcutta. 
There, this Court was presented with a circumstance where two complaints 
alleging murder of a darwan were lodged before the Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate. The ﬁ rst complaint was lodged by a distant relative of the 
deceased accusing three persons of murder whereas the second complaint 
was lodged by the appellant accusing the respondent no.1 of murdering 
his uncle. By separate orders, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate directed a 
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
244
Magistrate, First Class, to conduct judicial inquiry. Separate reports were 
submitted by the Magistrate, First Class. In his ﬁ rst report, he opined that 
a prima facie case to proceed against the three accused persons had been 
made out whereas, in his second report, he opined that no prima facie 
case to proceed against the ﬁ rst respondent had been made out. The Sub-
Divisional Magistrate, perusing the second report, dismissed the complaint 
of the appellant against the respondent no.1 without assigning any reason. 
The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, however, issued summons against the three 
other accused. Thereafter, the appellant approached the Sessions Judge with a 
revision who, after hearing the respondent no.1, directed the Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate to make a further inquiry against him. Thence, the respondent 
no.1 preferred a revision application before the High Court challenging the 
direction of the Sessions Judge. The same was allowed by a Single Judge 
of the High Court and upon grant of certiﬁ cate under Article 134(1)(c) of 
the Constitution, the matter was carried to this Court. It was held that upon 
a ﬁ nding of a prima facie case, the Magistrate was bound to issue process 
despite the charged person having a defence. Further, it was held that the 
matter was to be decided by an appropriate forum at the appropriate stage, 
and issuance of process could not be refused. 
33.1 We consider it appropriate to quote
certain pertinent observations 
from such decision, hereinbelow:
“7. ***, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Chapter XVI 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person does not 
come into the picture at all till process is issued. This does not mean 
that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by 
a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a 
counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on. But 
since the very question for consideration being whether he should be 
called upon to face an accusation, he has no right to take part in the 
proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to 
do so. It would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open 
to the Magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of 
the person named as accused but against whom process has not been 
issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a 
person. Of course, the Magistrate himself is free to put such questions
245
to the witnesses produced before him by the complainant as he may 
think proper in the interests of justice. But beyond that, he cannot go. 
… No doubt, one of the objects behind the provisions of Section 202 
CrPC is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations 
made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein 
as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous 
complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it 
is to ﬁ nd out what material there is to support the allegations made in 
the complaint. It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making 
an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the 
interests of an absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to 
book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. 
Whether the complaint is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily 
to be determined on the basis of the material placed before him by 
the complainant. Whatever defence the accused may have can only 
be enquired into at the trial. An enquiry under Section 202 can in no 
sense be characterised as a trial for the simple reason that in law there 
can be but one trial for an oﬀ ence. Permitting an accused person to 
intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that 
is why the legislature has made no speciﬁ c provision permitting an 
accused person to take part in an enquiry. ***”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
33.2 Considering the decision in Vadilal Panchal (supra), what was 
said therein was explained in the following words:
“13. *** we may point out that since the object of an enquiry 
under Section 202 is to ascertain whether the allegations made in 
the complaint are intrinsically true, the Magistrate acting under 
Section 203 has to satisfy himself that there is suﬃ  cient ground 
for proceeding. In order to come to this conclusion, he is entitled 
to consider the evidence taken by him or recorded in an enquiry 
under Section 202, or statements made in an investigation under 
that section, as the case may be. He is not entitled to rely upon any 
material besides this. ***”
                                                (underlining ours, for emphasis)
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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In the same paragraph, after referring to the decision in Ramgopal 
Ganpatrai Ruia v. State of Bombay22, the Court proceeded to rule that:
“*** Thus, where there is a prima facie case, even though much can 
be said on both sides, a committing Magistrate is bound to commit 
an accused for trial. All the greater reason, therefore, that where there 
is prima facie evidence, even though an accused may have a defence 
like that in the present case that the oﬀ ence is committed by some 
other person or persons, the matter has to be left to be decided by the 
appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue of process cannot 
be refused. Incidentally, we may point out that the oﬀ ence with which 
Respondent 1 has been charged with is one triable by jury. The High 
Court, by dealing with the evidence in the way in which it has done, has 
in eﬀ ect sanctioned the usurpation by the Magistrate of the functions 
of a jury which the Magistrate was wholly incompetent to do.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
34. It is true that neither Vadilal Panchal (supra) nor Chandra Deo 
Singh (supra) arose out of proceedings for defamation but in both cases 
defence of the accused was considered in varying circumstances. As noted 
above, in Vadilal Panchal (supra) the order of the Presidency Magistrate 
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the accused had exercised his 
right of self-defence was restored upon setting aside of the order of the
High 
Court of Bombay; whereas, in Chandra Deo Singh (supra), the order of 
the Sub-Divisional Magistrate directing further inquiry was restored upon 
setting aside the order of the High Court at Calcutta. The decision in Vadilal 
Panchal (supra) was not overruled by the larger Bench in Chandra Deo 
Singh (supra). Such decisions, in our opinion, assume relevance because 
the guidance provided thereby carries great weight.     
35. In Jeﬀ rey J. Diermeier (supra), this Court was called upon to 
consider whether the High Court at Calcutta was right in refusing to quash 
a private complaint under section 500 read with section 34, IPC. It was 
held that it is for the accused to demonstrate, by leading evidence during 
trial, that the purportedly defamatory statement came under an exception 
22 1958 SCR 618
247
enumerated in section 499, IPC. The appellants therein had issued a public 
notice against the respondent no. 2, which the respondent no. 2 alleged to 
be defamatory in nature. The appellants pleaded that the aforesaid notice 
was published in public interest, and thus it was covered under the Tenth 
Exception to section 499, IPC. This Court held that it was trite law that 
the burden of proof for the accused could not be proof beyond reasonable 
doubt, yet the accused still had to show a preponderance of probability that 
his statement would be covered under an exception to section 499, IPC. 
A mere averment by the accused stating that his statement was in public 
good was not suﬃ  cient to accept his defence and he must justify the same 
by leading evidence during trial. Considering the complaint as a whole as 
well as for the aforesaid reasons, this Court held that the impugned order 
did not warrant interference. 
36. In Manoj Kumar Tiwari (supra), an order refusing to quash a 
summoning order was considered by this Court. Therein, the Additional 
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had issued a summons to one of the accused 
under section 500, IPC without going into the contents of the alleged 
defamatory statement. The High Court of Delhi, on the other hand, while 
examining the statements, upheld the summons by simply relying on 
section 499 of the IPC. This Court held that this was an erroneous approach 
because the Magistrate ought to have applied his mind to the
complaint 
and determined whether the statement was prima facie defamatory, 
before issuing summons to the accused. This Court further held that a 
complaint could not be sustained on statements which were, on the face 
of it, non-defamatory. Also, it was held that it is a fundamental rule of 
criminal jurisprudence that if the allegations contained in a complaint do 
not constitute the oﬀ ence complained of, then the accused should not be 
made to undergo the ordeal of a trial.
37. B.R.K. Aathithan (supra) is the decision of most recent origin. 
Therein, the factual conspectus was such that certain reportage concerning 
the appellant was telecast on a television channel of the respondents, and 
the same was contended as defamatory. This Court emphasised the need 
for application of judicial mind by the Judicial Magistrate, while noting 
the consideration of the Fourth Exception to Section 499, IPC at the stage 
of issuance of process. This Court observed there as follows:
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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“16. This essentially involved application of judicial mind to reach a 
deﬁ nite conclusion as to whether or not the accused be summoned. In 
the instant case, the learned Judicial Magistrate having found that the 
allegations made by the appellant were in the teeth of fourth exception 
to Section 499 IPC, he declined to issue process to the respondents. Such 
dismissal cannot be said to be without application of judicial mind. The 
application of judicial mind and arriving at an erroneous conclusion are 
two distinct things. The Court even after due application of mind may 
reach to an erroneous conclusion and such an order is always justiciable 
before a superior Court. Even if the said Order is set aside, it does not 
mean that the trial court did not apply its mind.”
38. We note that in a diﬀ erent context, this Court in National Bank 
of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz23 summed up the duty of a Magistrate as 
follows:  
“8. The duty of a Magistrate receiving a complaint is set out in Section 
202 CrPC and there is an obligation on the Magistrate to ﬁ nd out if there 
is any matter which calls for investigation by a criminal court. The scope 
of enquiry under this section is restricted only to ﬁ nd out the truth or 
otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint in order to determine 
whether process has to be issued or not. Investigation under Section 202 
CrPC is diﬀ erent from the investigation contemplated in Section 156
as it is only for holding the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is 
suﬃ  cient ground for him to proceed further. The scope of enquiry under 
Section 202 CrPC is, therefore, limited to the ascertainment of truth or 
falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint:
(i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the court;
(ii) for the limited purpose of ﬁ nding out whether a prima facie case for 
issue of process has been made out; and
(iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the 
complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused 
may have.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
23 (2013) 2 SCC 488
249
39. Undoubtedly, the decisions of this Court proceed on two lines. 
While there are several decisions where this Court has consistently laid 
down the law in one particular line that it is for the Magistrate to consider 
the Exceptions to section 499, IPC for extension of beneﬁ t thereof at the trial 
when a defence is pleaded by the party seeking to avail the same and upon 
the burden of proof being discharged by him and that such Magistrate while 
deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant may 
not advert to the possible defence of the accused at the time of exercising 
power under section 202, the other line of decisions seem to proceed 
on the premise that there is no bar in considering the Exceptions if the 
accused, even without appearing before the Magistrate in response to the 
summoning order, lays a challenge thereto under section 482, Cr. PC and 
satisﬁ es the relevant High Court, by referring to the complaint itself and 
the statements of the complainant and his witness, that the facts alleged 
(even if deemed to be true) do not constitute an oﬀ ence and hence, there 
was no suﬃ  cient ground for proceeding. In fact, Aroon Purie (supra) has 
observed that there is no rigid principle that the Exceptions can only be 
considered at the pre-trial stage; in other words, at the stage of consideration 
of a petition for quashing, it can be so extended in a given case, and the 
Court would be empowered to quash the proceedings if extension
of such 
beneﬁ t is justiﬁ ed on facts. 
40. What applies to Judges of the High Courts faced with decisions 
of this Court where a cleavage of opinion is discernible, and particularly 
when the High Courts are technically bound by both decisions, equally 
applies to Hon’ble Judges of this Court. It would be inappropriate for a 
Bench, comprised of 2 (two) Judges of this Court, to hold which line of 
decisions lays down the correct law. In such a scenario, when there are 
decisions of this Court not expressing views in sync with each other, the 
ﬁ rst course to be adopted is to ascertain which is the decision that has been 
rendered by a larger Bench. Obviously, inter se decisions of this Court, a 
decision of a Constitution Bench would be binding on Benches of lesser 
strength. None of the decisions that we have considered is rendered by 
a Constitution Bench. However, a sole judgment rendered by a Bench 
of 4 (four) Hon’ble Judges and 3 (three) decisions rendered by Benches 
comprised of 3 (three) Hon’ble Judges are there, which call for deference. 
Ordinarily, the decision of a larger Bench has to be preferred unless of 
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
250
course a Bench of lesser strength doubts an earlier view, formulates the 
point for answer and refers the matter for further consideration by a larger 
Bench in accordance with law. If, however, the decisions taking divergent 
views are rendered by Benches of co-equal strength, the next course to be 
adopted is to attempt to reconcile the views that appear to be divergent and 
to explain those contrary decisions by assuming, to the extent possible, 
that they applied to diﬀ erent facts. The other course available is to look at 
whether the previous decision has been noticed, considered and explained 
in the subsequent decision; if not, the earlier decision continues to remain 
binding whereas if the answer is in the aﬃ  rmative, the subsequent decision 
becomes the binding decision. We add a caveat that if the subsequent 
Bench, instead of deciding the matter before it ﬁ nally upon consideration 
of the decision of the earlier Bench, formulates the point of diﬀ erence 
and makes a reference for a decision by a larger Bench, it is the former 
decision that continues to govern the ﬁ eld so long the larger Bench does 
not decide the reference.
41. There is also authority for the proposition that while deciding 
cases on facts, more so in criminal cases, the courts should bear in mind 
that each case must rest on its own facts and the similarity of facts in one 
case cannot be used to bear in mind the conclusion of fact in another
case. 
We may usefully refer to the decision in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh 
Ranjan24 in this context. 
42. Bearing the above principles in mind, we have perused the 
decisions, apparently striking discordant notes, with utmost care. It is 
observed that the conclusions reached in each of the decisions are based on 
the particular facts in each case and that the questions arising for decision 
on this appeal can be answered by harmonising the law as declared upon 
drawing guidance therefrom.    
43. To the extent relevant, section 2(n) of the Cr. PC deﬁ nes “oﬀ ence” 
as any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being 
in force. Section 200 ordains what a Magistrate, inter alia, is required 
to do on receipt of a complaint. In taking cognizance of an oﬀ ence on a 
complaint, he is required to (i) examine upon oath the complainant and 
24 (2005) 2 SCC 42
251
the witness present, if any; (ii) reduce in writing the substance of such 
examination; (iii) get the signature of the complainant and the witness, if 
any, on such writing; and (iv) sign the same too. Section 202 is a provision 
that enables the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process against the 
accused and, if he thinks ﬁ t, either (a) inquire into the case himself or 
(b) direct an investigation to be made by (i) a police oﬃ  cer or (ii) by 
such other person he thinks ﬁ t. The statute permits the Magistrate to 
take such steps to facilitate a decision whether there is suﬃ  cient ground 
for proceeding against the accused by ascertaining the truth or falsity 
of the allegations made in the complaint. Section 203 authorizes the 
Magistrate, after considering the statements on oath of the complainant 
and the witness, if any, under section 200 or the result of the inquiry or the 
investigation under section 202, to dismiss a complaint, with brief reasons, 
should in his judgment there be no ‘suﬃ  cient ground for proceeding’. 
On the other hand, section 204 under Chapter XVI of the Cr. PC titled 
‘Commencement of Proceedings before Magistrates’ envisages that the 
Magistrate taking cognizance shall take steps for the issue of necessary 
process if in his opinion there is ‘suﬃ  cient ground for proceeding’. It is 
therefore abundantly clear, from the aforesaid general scheme, that the 
accused does not enter the arena of adjudication made by the Magistrate 
prior
to issuance of process.
44. Thus, when a Magistrate taking cognisance of an oﬀ ence proceeds 
under section 200 based on a prima facie satisfaction that a criminal oﬀ ence 
is made out, he is required to satisfy himself by looking into the allegations 
levelled in the complaint, the statements made by the complainant in 
support of the complaint, the documentary evidence in support of the 
allegations, if any, produced by him as well as statements of any witness 
the complainant may choose to produce to stand by the allegations in 
the complaint. Although we are not concerned with section 202 here, if 
an inquiry or an investigation is conducted thereunder, it goes without 
saying that the reports should also be looked into by the Magistrate before 
issuing process under section 204. However, there can be no gainsaying 
that at the stage the Magistrate decides to pass an order summoning the 
accused, examination of the nature referred to above ought not to be 
intended for forming an opinion as to whether the materials are suﬃ  cient 
for a ‘conviction’; instead, he is required to form an opinion whether the 
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
252
materials are suﬃ  cient for ‘proceeding’ as the title of the relevant chapter 
would indicate. Since the accused does not enter the arena at that stage, 
question of the accused raising a defence to thwart issuance of process does 
not arise. Nonetheless, the fact that the accused is not before the Magistrate 
does not mean that the Magistrate need not apply his judicial mind. Nothing 
in the applicable law prevents the Magistrate from applying his judicial 
mind to other provisions of law and to ascertain whether, prima facie, an 
“oﬀ ence”, as deﬁ ned in section 2(n) of the Cr. PC is made out. Without 
such opinion being formed, question of “proceeding” as in section 204 
does not arise. What the law imposes on the Magistrate as a requirement 
is that he is bound to consider only such of the materials that are brought 
before him in terms of sections 200 and 202 as well as any applicable 
provision of a statute, and what is imposed as a restriction by law on him 
is that he is precluded from considering any material not brought on the 
record in a manner permitted by the legal process. As a logical corollary to 
the above proposition, what follows is that the Magistrate while deciding 
whether to issue process is entitled to form a view looking into the materials 
before him. If, however, such materials themselves disclose a complete 
defence under any of the Exceptions, nothing prevents the Magistrate 
upon application of
judicial mind to accord the beneﬁ t of such Exception 
to prevent a frivolous complaint from triggering an unnecessary trial. 
Since initiation of prosecution is a serious matter, we are minded to say 
that it would be the duty of the Magistrate to prevent false and frivolous 
complaints eating up precious judicial time. If the complaint warrants 
dismissal, the Magistrate is statutorily mandated to record his brief reasons. 
On the contrary, if from such materials a prima facie satisfaction is reached 
upon application of judicial mind of an “oﬀ ence” having been committed 
and there being suﬃ  cient ground for proceeding, the Magistrate is under 
no other fetter from issuing process. Upon a prima facie case being made 
out and even though much can be said on both sides, the Magistrate would 
have no option but to commit an accused for trial, as held in Chandra 
Deo Singh (supra). The requirement of recording reasons at the stage of 
issuing process is not the statutory mandate; therefore, the Magistrate is 
not required to record reasons for issuing process. This is also the law
253
declared by this Court in Jagdish Ram v. State of Rajasthan25. Since it 
is not the statutory mandate that reasons should be recorded in support of 
formation of opinion that there is suﬃ  cient ground for proceeding whereas 
dismissal of a complaint has to be backed by brief reasons, the degree of 
satisfaction invariably must vary in both situations. While in the former it 
is a prima facie satisfaction based on probability of complicity, the latter 
would require a higher degree of satisfaction in that the Magistrate has to 
express his ﬁ nal and conclusive view of the complaint warranting dismissal 
because of absence of suﬃ  cient ground for proceeding. 
45. In the context of a complaint of defamation, at the stage the 
Magistrate proceeds to issue process, he has to form his opinion based on 
the allegations in the complaint and other material (obtained through the 
process referred to in section 200/section 202) as to whether ‘suﬃ  cient 
ground for proceeding’ exists as distinguished from ‘suﬃ  cient ground for 
conviction’, which has to be left for determination at the trial and not at the 
stage when process is issued. Although there is nothing in the law which 
in express terms mandates the Magistrate to consider whether any of the 
Exceptions to section 499, IPC is attracted, there is no bar either. After 
all, what is ‘excepted’ cannot amount to defamation on the very terms of 
the provision. We do realize that more often than not, it would be diﬃ  cult 
to
form an opinion that an Exception is attracted at that juncture because 
neither a complaint for defamation (which is not a regular phenomenon in 
the criminal courts) is likely to be drafted with contents, nor are statements 
likely to be made on oath and evidence adduced, giving an escape route to 
the accused at the threshold. However, we hasten to reiterate that it is not 
the law that the Magistrate is in any manner precluded from considering if 
at all any of the Exceptions is attracted in a given case; the Magistrate is 
under no fetter from so considering, more so because being someone who 
is legally trained, it is expected that while issuing process he would have 
a clear idea of what constitutes defamation. If, in the unlikely event, the 
contents of the complaint and the supporting statements on oath as well as 
reports of investigation/inquiry reveal a complete defence under any of the 
Exceptions to section 499, IPC, the Magistrate, upon due application of 
25 (2004) 4 SCC 432
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
254
judicial mind, would be justiﬁ ed to dismiss the complaint on such ground 
and it would not amount to an act in excess of jurisdiction if such dismissal 
has the support of reasons. 
 46. Adverting to the aspect of exercise of jurisdiction by the High 
Courts under section 482, Cr. PC, in a case where the oﬀ ence of defamation 
is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of 
the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, law seems to be well 
settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of 
inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there 
before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what 
the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be 
understood to undermine the High Courts’ powers saved by section 482, 
Cr. PC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, 
i.e., to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone the 
High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an F.I.R. or 
criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in 
exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr. PC not being substantially 
diﬀ erent from the tests laid down for quashing of a process issued under 
section 204 read with section 200, the High Courts on recording due 
satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, 
the substance of
statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if 
any, and documentary evidence as produced, no oﬀ ence is made out and 
that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the 
legal process. This too, would be impermissible, if the justice of a given 
case does not overwhelmingly so demand. 
47. Based on our understanding of the law and the reasoning that we 
have adopted, issue of process under section 204 read with section 200, Cr. 
PC does not ipso facto stand vitiated for non-consideration of the Exceptions 
to section 499, IPC unless, of course, before the High Court it is convincingly 
demonstrated that even on the basis of the complaint and the materials that 
the Magistrate had before him and without there being anything more, the 
facts alleged do not prima facie make out the oﬀ ence of defamation and 
that consequently, the proceedings need to be closed.   
48. The above discussion answers the questions of law formulated 
by us.
255
49. Moving on to answer question (a), what we ﬁ nd in the present 
case is that the Trial Court did not take recourse to section 202, Cr. PC and 
hence obtaining reports of inquiry or investigation, as the case may be, 
did not arise. Though not under any statutory requirement, the Trial Court 
has given brief reasons in its order showing application of mind. At the 
stage, when the Trial Court made the summoning order, two aspects were 
required to be satisﬁ ed: (1) whether the uncontroverted allegations as made 
in the petition of complaint read with the examination of the complainant, 
prima facie, tend to suggest an oﬀ ence having been committed, and (2) 
whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to proceed. Keeping 
in view the allegations made in the petition of complaint and the evidence 
placed before the Trial Court by the complainant and on a plain reading 
of its order dated 25th March, 2010 issuing summons to the accused, it 
does not appear to us that the ﬁ nding of a prima facie case having been 
made out at that stage is so outrageously illogical or in deﬁ ance of legal 
principles and acceptable standards that it would merit interference by this 
Court. If at all the beneﬁ t of the Fourth Exception or any other pleaded 
exception is to be availed of, the appellant would be free to appear before 
the Trial Court and raise whatever defence is available to it in law, not 
necessarily conﬁ ned to the Fourth Exception, for due consideration
thereof 
by the Trial Court.
50. On facts of this case, we are satisﬁ ed that the Trial Court was 
not unjustiﬁ ed in issuing summons to the accused based on the materials 
before it. 
51. We also hold that the omission of the learned Judge in dealing 
with the other points raised in the petition by the appellant does not aﬀ ord 
any ground for us to interfere, having noticed that by a detailed judgment 
delivered on the same day on the petition of Aggarwal, the learned Judge 
had applied his mind and spurned a similar challenge. However, it is 
observed that the learned Judge would have been well advised to add a 
sentence in the order impugned that no separate reason was being assigned 
to dispose of the other points raised by the appellant in view of the reasons 
already assigned for disposal of Aggarwal’s petition laying challenge to 
the summoning order.
52. Question (a), thus, stands answered against the appellant.
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NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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53. Having regard to what we have held above, questions (b) and (c) 
need not detain us for long. We could have left them unanswered but since 
some argument was advanced touching the same, we propose to brieﬂ y 
deal therewith. 
54. Answer to question (b) must necessarily depend on the facts of 
each case, meaning thereby the quality of evidence that is led in course 
of the trial and the weight to be attached to it. At this stage it would not 
be inappropriate to consider the other line of argument advanced by Mr. 
Taneja that those documents/materials on which the appellant seeks to 
rely have not been admitted or accepted by the complainant and are yet 
to be proved; hence, the same cannot be looked into while considering a 
prayer for quashing. The ratio of the decision in Supriya Jain (supra) ﬁ nds 
support from an earlier decision of this Court in Chand Dhawan (Smt.) v. 
Jawaharlal26, where it was held that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana 
was not justiﬁ ed in quashing the complaint and the criminal proceedings on 
the ground of abuse of the process of court by relying on additional material 
produced by the accused, which was not admitted in evidence or accepted 
by the complainant.
 55. The Power of Attorney is yet not proved by the appellant according 
to law and, therefore, could not have been considered by the learned Judge 
and cannot be considered by this Court as well. Even if proved, its eﬀ ect 
and import
necessarily have to be considered by the Trial Court in the light 
of the guiding factors for applicability of an Exception as indicated in 
the concurring judgment authored by Hon’ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in 
Sewakram Sobhani (supra).    
56. However, if from evidence led it is established that the authorised 
agent had issued defamatory statements with the consent of the principal 
or that the principal, without giving consent, had due knowledge of such 
defamatory statements, yet, did not caution/reprimand the agent for doing 
so or had not disowned the statements so made, there is no reason why a 
prosecution for defamation should be nipped in the bud on the specious 
ground that an authorised agent is supposed to act lawfully and not 
unlawfully. 
26 (1992) 3 SCC 317
257
57. Turning to question (c), it is for the appellant to demonstrate 
before the Trial Court that the Fourth Exception is attracted, or plead any 
other defence, and discharge its burden of proof in respect thereof during 
the course of the trial. This, in our opinion, is not the right stage to opine 
one way or the other and, therefore, we leave it open for being decided by 
the Trial Court in accordance with law. 
CONCLUSION
58. Having answered all the questions, what is left for us is to dismiss 
the appeal which we hereby order. The appeal is dismissed, with the result 
that the interim order shall stand vacated forthwith. There shall, however, 
be no order for costs.
59. Except to the extent decided by this judgment, all other points are 
left open to be urged by the appellant before the Trial Court for a decision 
by it.
60. Since the proceedings have been unduly delayed, the Trial Court 
is encouraged to expedite the same. 
Headnotes prepared by: 
 Appeal dismissed.
Ankit Gyan
M/S IVECO MAGIRUS BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. 
NIRMAL KISHORE BHARTIYA [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]