SITA SOREN versus UNION OF INDIA
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 462, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Reference answered
Segment: Issues
* Author
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 462 : 2024 INSC 161
Sita Soren 
v. 
Union of India
(Criminal Appeal No. 451 of 2019)
04 March 2024
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, A.S. Bopanna,  
M. M. Sundresh, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha,  
J.B. Pardiwala, Sanjay Kumar and Manoj Misra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Instant Reference pertains to reconsideration of the correctness 
of the view of the majority judgment in *PV Narasimha Rao’s case 
granting immunity from prosecution to a member of the legislature 
who has allegedly engaged in bribery for speaking or casting a vote.
Headnotes
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 196 – Powers, privileges 
and immunities of the Houses of Parliament or Legislature, as 
the case may be, and of members and committees – Member of 
Parliament or the Legislative Assembly, if can claim immunity 
from prosecution on a charge of bribery in a criminal court – 
Reconsideration of the correctness of the majority view in*PV 
Narasimha Rao’s case which grants immunity from prosecution 
to a member of the legislature who has allegedly engaged in 
bribery for casting a vote or speaking:
Held: Judgment of the majority in *PV Narasimha Rao’s case 
has wide ramifications on public interest, probity in public life and 
parliamentary democracy – There is a grave danger of this Court 
allowing an error to be perpetuated if decision not reconsidered 
– Thus, said case not concurred with and overruled. [Para 188]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 196 – Powers,
privileges 
and immunities of the Houses of Parliament or Legislature, 
and of members and committees – Allegation against the 
member of Legislative Assembly that she accepted bribe from 
an independent candidate for casting her vote in his favour 
in the Rajya Sabha elections, however, in an open ballot, she 
did not cast her vote in favour of the alleged bribe giver but 
her own party candidate – Chargesheet against the member –
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Petition for quashing of criminal charges, claiming protection 
of Art.194(2), relying on *PV Narasimha Rao’s case that member 
would enjoy immunity from prosecution for accepting bribe 
for speaking or giving their vote in Parliament – Rejected by 
the High Court – Matter before the Supreme Court where the 
two-judge bench referred the matter to three-judge bench, who 
further referred to five-judges bench – Bench of five-judges 
doubted the correctness of *PV Narasimha Rao wherein the 
majority judgment held that the legislator is conferred with 
immunity when they accept bribe for speaking or giving their 
vote in Parliament, whereas minority held that giving bribe 
to influence legislator to vote or speak in Parliament, not 
protected by Arts. 105(2) and 194(2), and referred the matter 
to bench of seven judges:
Held: Interpretation placed on the issue in question in the judgment 
of the majority in *PV Narasimha Rao’s case results in a paradoxical 
outcome – Such an interpretation is contrary to the text and purpose 
of Arts. 105 and 194 – Reconsidering *PV Narasimha Rao’s case 
does not violate the principle of stare decisis – Members of the 
House or indeed the House itself cannot claim privileges which are 
not essentially related to their functioning – Constitution envisions 
probity in public life – Corruption and bribery of members of the 
legislature erode the foundation of the Parliamentary democracy 
– Bribery
is not protected by parliamentary privilege – Delivery of 
result irrelevant to the offence of bribery – Voting for elections to 
the Rajya Sabha falls within the ambit of Art. 194(2) – Thus, said 
case not concurred with and overruled. [Paras D, G, I, 188]
Judicial Precedent – Overruling of the long-settled law in *PV 
Narasimha Rao’s case, if warranted:
Held : Period of time over which the case has held the field is not 
of primary consequence – It is not appropriate for this Court to 
confine itself to a rigid understanding of the doctrine of stare decisis 
– Ability of this Court to reconsider its decisions is necessary for 
the organic development of law and the advancement of justice – If 
this Court is denuded of its power to reconsider its decisions, the 
development of constitutional jurisprudence would virtually come to 
a standstill – Thus, reconsidering *PV Narasimha Rao’s case does 
not violate the principle of stare decisis – *PV Narasimha Rao’s 
case has wide ramifications on public interest, probity in public 
life and the functioning of parliamentary democracy – It contains 
several apparent errors, its interpretation of the text of Art. 105; 
its conceptualization of the scope and purpose of parliamentary
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privilege and its approach to international jurisprudence all of 
which resulted in a paradoxical outcome – There is an imminent 
threat of allowing an error to be perpetuated if the decision in *PV 
Narasimha Rao’s case is not reconsidered – Mistaken interpretation 
of the Constitution, must not be perpetuted merely because of 
rigid allegiance to a previous opinion of five judges of this Court. 
[Paras 31, 33, 40, 44, 188.1]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 194 – Parliamentary 
privileges, if collective right of the house – Two constituent 
elements of privileges:
Held: First is the sum of rights enjoyed by the House of Parliament 
collectively and the second is the rights enjoyed by members 
of the House individually – Rights and immunities such as the 
power to regulate its own procedure, the power to punish for 
contempt of the House or to expel a member, belong to the first 
element of privileges held by the House as a collective body for 
its proper functioning, protection of members, and vindication of 
its own authority and dignity – Second element of rights exercised 
individually by members of the House includes freedom of speech 
and freedom from arrest, among others – Privilege exercised by 
members individually is in turn qualified by its necessity, in that 
the privilege must be such that “without which they could not 
discharge their functions” – These privileges enjoyed by members 
of the House
individually are a means to ensure and facilitate 
the effective discharge of the collective functions of the House 
– Privileges enjoyed by members of the House which exceed 
those possessed by other bodies or individuals, are not absolute 
or unqualified – Thus, the privileges and immunities enshrined in 
Arts. 105 and 194 belong to the House collectively – Exercise of 
the privileges individually by members must be tested on the anvil 
of whether it is tethered to the healthy and essential functioning 
of the House. [Paras 76, 77, 84]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 194 – Parliamentary 
privileges – Necessity test to claim and exercise a privilege:
Held: Members of the House or indeed the House itself cannot 
claim privileges which are not essentially related to their functioning 
– Assertion of a privilege by an individual member of Parliament or 
Legislature would be governed by a twofold test, first, the privilege 
claimed has to be tethered to the collective functioning of the House, 
and second, its necessity must bear a functional relationship to 
the discharge of the essential duties of a legislator – Burden of
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satisfying that a privilege exists and that it is necessary for the 
House to collectively discharge its function lies with the person or 
body claiming the privilege – Houses of Parliament or Legislatures, 
and the committees are not islands which act as enclaves shielding 
those inside from the application of ordinary laws – Lawmakers 
are subject to the same law that the law-making body enacts for 
the people it governs and claims to represent. [Paras 87, 90, 91]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 194 – Parliamentary 
privilege – Privileges, if attract immunity to a member of 
Parliament or of the Legislatures who engages in bribery in 
connection with their speech or vote:
Held: Bribery is not protected by parliamentary privilege – Bribery 
is not in respect of anything said or any vote given – Bribery is 
not immune under clause (2) of Art.105 and Art.194 because a 
member engaging in bribery commits a crime which is unrelated 
to their ability to vote or to make a decision on their vote – Same 
principle applies to bribery in connection with a speech in the 
House or a Committee – Individual member of the legislature 
cannot assert a claim of privilege to seek immunity u/Arts 105 and 
194 from prosecution on a charge of bribery in connection with a 
vote or speech in the legislature – Such a claim to immunity fails 
to fulfil the twofold test that the claim is tethered to the collective 
functioning of the House and
that it is necessary to the discharge 
of the essential duties of a legislator. [Para G, 188.4, 188.7]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 194 – Parliamentary 
privilege – Expression ‘in respect of’ and ‘anything’ in Clause 
(2) of Art. 105 – Interpretation:
Held: Clause (2) of Art. 105 grants immunity “in respect of anything” 
said or any vote given – Extent of this immunity must be tested 
on the anvil of the test of intrinsic relation to the functioning of 
the House and the necessity test – Phrase “in respect of” is 
significant to delineate the ambit of the immunity granted under 
Clause (2) of Art. 105 – Words “in respect of” in Clause (2) 
apply to the phrase “anything said or any vote given,” and in the 
latter part to a publication by or with the authority of the House 
– Expressions “anything” and “any” must be read in the context 
of the accompanying expressions in Arts 105(2) and 194(2) – 
Words “anything” or “any” may not be interpreted without reading 
the operative word on which it applies i.e. “said” and “vote given” 
respectively – Words “anything” and “any” when read with their 
respective operative words mean that a member may claim immunity
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to say as they feel and vote in a direction that they desire on any 
matter before the House – These are absolutely outside the scope 
of interference by the courts – Words “in respect of” means ‘arising 
out of’ or ‘bearing a clear relation to’ and cannot be interpreted to 
mean anything which may have even a remote connection with 
the speech or vote given. [Paras 99, 102-103, 188.6]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 194 – Power, privileges 
and immunity in Parliament – Purpose and object:
Held: Constitution envisions probity in public life – Purpose and 
object for which the Constitution stipulates powers, privileges 
and immunity in Parliament must be borne in mind – Privileges 
are essentially related to the House collectively and necessary 
for its functioning – Hence, the phrase “in respect of” in Art. 105 
must have a meaning consistent with the purpose of privileges 
and immunities – Arts. 105 and 194 seek to create a fearless 
atmosphere in which debate, deliberations and exchange of ideas 
can take place within the Houses of Parliament and the state 
legislatures – Purpose is destroyed when a member is induced 
to vote or speak in a certain manner not because of their belief/
position on an issue but because of an act of bribery – Corruption 
and bribery of members of the legislature erode the foundation of 
Indian Parliamentary democracy – It is destructive of the aspirational 
and deliberative ideals of the
Constitution and creates a polity which 
deprives citizens of a responsible, responsive and representative 
democracy. [Paras 104, 188.5, 188.8]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 194 – Parliamentary 
privileges – Courts and the House, if exercise parallel 
jurisdiction over allegations of bribery:
Held: Issue of bribery is not one of exclusivity of jurisdiction by 
the House over its bribe-taking members – Purpose of a House 
acting against a contempt by a member for receiving a bribe 
serves a purpose distinct from a criminal prosecution – Jurisdiction 
which is exercised by a competent court to prosecute a criminal 
offence and the authority of the House to take action for a breach 
of discipline in relation to the acceptance of a bribe by a member 
of the legislature exist in distinct spheres – Scope, purpose and 
consequences of the court exercising jurisdiction in relation to a 
criminal offence and the authority of the House to discipline its 
members are different – Potential of misuse against individual 
members of the legislature is neither enhanced nor diminished by 
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court to prosecute a member of
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the legislature who is alleged to have indulged in an act of bribery. 
[Paras 188.9, 188.10]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 194 – Parliamentary 
privileges – Offence of bribery, stage at which it crystallizes:
Held: Offence of a public servant being bribed is pegged to receiving 
or agreeing to receive the undue advantage and not the actual 
performance of the act for which the undue advantage is obtained 
– Delivery of results is irrelevant to the offence of bribery – To read 
Arts. 105(2) and 194(2) in the manner proposed in the majority 
judgment in PV Narasimha Rao’s case results in a paradoxical 
outcome – Such an interpretation results in a situation where a 
legislator is rewarded with immunity when they accept a bribe and 
follow through by voting in the agreed direction – On the other hand, 
a legislator who agrees to accept a bribe, but may eventually decide 
to vote independently will be prosecuted – Such an interpretation 
belies not only the text of Arts. 105 and 194 but also the purpose 
of conferring parliamentary privilege on members of the legislature 
– Offence of bribery is agnostic to the performance of the agreed 
action and crystallizes on the exchange of illegal gratification – It 
does not matter whether the vote is cast in the agreed direction 
or if the vote is cast at all – Offence of bribery is complete at the 
point in time when the legislator accepts the bribe – Prevention of 
Corruption
Act, 1988 – s. 7. [Paras 117, 126, 188.11]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105 and 194 – Parliamentary 
privileges – Votes casted by elected members of the state 
legislative assembly in an election to the Rajya Sabha, if 
protected by Art. 194(2):
Held: Voting for elections to the Rajya Sabha falls within the 
ambit of Art.194(2) – Text of Art. 194 consciously uses the term 
‘Legislature’ instead of ‘House’ to include parliamentary processes 
which do not necessarily take place on the floor of the House or 
involve ‘lawmaking’ in its pedantic sense – Rajya Sabha or the 
Council of States performs an integral function in the working of the 
democracy and the role played by Rajya Sabha constitutes a part 
of the basic structure of the Constitution – Role played by elected 
members of the state legislative assemblies in electing members of 
Rajya Sabha is significant and requires utmost protection to ensure 
that vote is exercised freely and without fear of legal persecution 
– Any other interpretation belies the text of Art.194(2) and the 
purpose of parliamentary privilege – Protection Arts. 105 and 194 
colloquially called “parliamentary privilege” and not “legislative
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privilege” – It cannot be restricted to only law-making on the floor 
of the House but extends to other powers and responsibilities of 
elected members, taking place in the Legislature or Parliament, 
even when the House is not sitting. [Paras 180, 187]
Constitution of India – Art. 194 – Use of the term “Legislature” 
instead of the “House of Legislature” at appropriate places 
– Effect:
Held: It is evident from the drafting of the provision that the two 
terms have not been used interchangeably – First limb of Art. 
194(2) pertains to “anything said or any vote given by him in the 
Legislature or any committee thereof” – However, in the second 
limb, the phrase used is “in respect of the publication by or under 
the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, 
votes, or proceedings” – There is a clear departure from the term 
‘Legislature’ used in the first limb, to use the term “House of such a 
Legislature” in the second limb of the provision – Provision creates 
a distinction between the two – Terms “House of Legislature” and 
“Legislature” have different connotations – “House of Legislature” 
refers to the juridical body, which is summoned by the Governor 
pursuant to Art. 174 – Term “Legislature”, on the other hand, refers to 
the wider concept under Art. 168, comprising the Governor and the 
Houses of the Legislature – Use of the phrase “in the Legislature” 
instead of “House of Legislature” is
significant. [Paras 174, 175.]
Constitution of India – Arts. 105, 194 – Parliamentary privilege 
under:
Held: Is integral to deliberative democracy in facilitating the 
functioning of a parliamentary form of governance – It ensures 
that legislators in whom citizens repose their faith can express 
their views and opinions on the floor of the House without ‘fear or 
favour’ – Legislator belonging to a political party with a minuscule 
vote share can fearlessly vote on any motion; a legislator from 
a remote region of the country can raise issues that impact her 
constituency without the fear of being harassed by legal prosecution; 
and a legislator can demand accountability without the apprehension 
of being accused of defamation. [Para 1]
Constitution of India – Art. 105, clause (1), (2), (3), (4) – Powers, 
privileges, etc. of the Houses of Parliament and of the members 
and committees thereof – Explanation:
Held: Clause (1) declares that there shall be freedom of speech 
in Parliament, subject to the Constitution and to the rules and
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standing orders regulating the procedure in Parliament – First 
limb of Clause (2) prescribes that a member of Parliament shall 
not be liable before any court in respect of “anything said or any 
vote given” by them in Parliament or any committee thereof and 
second limb prescribes that no person shall be liable before any 
court in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either 
House of Parliament of any report, paper, vote or proceedings 
– Clauses (1) and (2) explicitly guarantee freedom of speech in 
Parliament – Clause (1) is a positive postulate which guarantees 
freedom of speech whereas Clause (2) is an extension of the 
same freedom postulated negatively – Clause (3) states that in 
respect of privileges not falling under Clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 
105, the powers, privileges and immunities, shall be such as may 
from time to time be defined by Parliament by law – Clause (3) 
allows Parliament to enact a law on its privileges from time to 
time – Clause (4) extends the freedoms in the above clauses to 
all persons who by virtue of the Constitution have a right to speak 
in Parliament – Thus, four clauses in Arts. 105 and 194 form a 
composite whole which lend colour to each other and together form 
the corpus of the powers, privileges and immunities of the Houses 
of Parliament or Legislature, and of members and committees. 
[Paras 63-66, 73]
Parliamentary privileges – History of privileges of
legislatures 
in India:
Held: History can be traced to the history of parliamentary privileges 
in the House of Commons in the UK as well as the struggle of 
the Indian Legislatures to claim these privileges under colonial 
rule – Unlike the House of Commons in the UK, India does not 
have ‘ancient and undoubted’ privileges which were vested after 
a struggle between Parliament and the King – Statutory privilege 
transitioned to a constitutional privilege after the commencement 
of the Constitution. [Paras 49, 188.2]
Parliamentary privileges – Bribery vis-à-vis privileges – 
Jurisprudence in foreign jurisdictions – Evolution and position 
of the law on privileges vis-a-vis bribe received by a member 
of Parliament in other jurisdictions-United Kingdom, United 
States of America, Canada, and Australia – Explained and 
discussed. [Paras 128-167]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s. 7 – Offence relating 
to public servant being bribed – Offence of bribery, when 
complete – Constituent elements of the offence:
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Held: Under s. 7, the mere “obtaining”, “accepting” or “attempting” 
to obtain an undue advantage with the intention to act or forbear 
from acting in a certain way is sufficient to complete the offence 
– It is not necessary that the act for which the bribe is given be 
actually performed – First explanation to the provision strengthens 
such an interpretation when it expressly states that the “obtaining, 
accepting, or attempting” to obtain an undue advantage shall itself 
constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by 
a public servant has not been improper – Thus, the offence of a 
public servant being bribed is pegged to receiving or agreeing to 
receive the undue advantage and not the actual performance of 
the act for which the undue advantage is obtained. [Para 117]
Judicial review – Amenability – Claim to parliamentary 
privilege :
Held: Claim to parliamentary privilege conforms to the parameters 
of the Constitution, as such amenable to judicial review. [Para 188.3]
Judicial discipline – Procedure of:
Held: Decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is 
binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength 
– A Bench of lesser strength cannot disagree with or dissent 
from the view of the law taken by the bench of larger strength 
– However, a bench of the same strength can question the 
correctness of a decision rendered by a co-ordinate bench – 
In such situations, the case is
placed before a bench of larger 
strength – In consonance with judicial discipline, the correctness 
of the decision in PV Narasimha Rao’s case was only doubted 
by the co-equal bench of five judges of this Court in a detailed 
order and accordingly, the matter was placed before this bench 
of seven judges – Thus, no infirmity in the reference to seven 
judges bench to reconsider the decision in *PV Narasimha Rao’s 
case. [Paras 24, 25, 30]
Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of stare decisis – Meaning:
Held: Doctrine of stare decisis provides that the Court should not 
lightly dissent from precedent – However, the doctrine is not an 
inflexible rule of law, and it cannot result in perpetuating an error 
to the detriment of the general welfare of the public – Larger bench 
of this Court may reconsider a previous decision in appropriate 
cases, bearing in mind the tests formulated in the precedents of 
this Court – This Court may review its earlier decisions if it believes 
that there is an error, or the effect of the decision would harm the
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
interests of the public or if it is inconsistent with the legal philosophy 
of the Constitution – In cases involving the interpretation of the 
Constitution, this Court would do so more readily than in other 
branches of law because not rectifying a manifest error would be 
harmful to public interest and the polity. [Paras 33, 188.1]
Interpretation of Constitution – Interpretation of a provision 
of the Constitution:
Held: Court must interpret the text in a manner that does not do 
violence to the fabric of the Constitution. [Para 92]
Interpretation of Constitution – Marginal note to the Article 
– Importance of:
Held: With reference to Articles of the Constitution, a marginal note 
may be used as a tool to provide some clue as to the meaning and 
purpose of the Article – However, the real meaning of the Article 
is to be derived from the bare text of the Article – When language 
of the Article is plain and ambiguous, undue importance cannot be 
placed on the marginal note appended to it – Furthermore, marginal 
note to a Section in a statute does not control the meaning of the 
body of the Section if the language employed is clear. [Para 173]
Interpretation of statutes – Principles of statutory interpretation 
– Illustrations appended to s. 7 of the Prevention of Corruption 
Act – Relevance:
Held: Illustrations appended to a Section are of value and relevance 
in construing the text of a statutory provision and they should
not 
be readily rejected as repugnant to the Section – Illustration to 
the first explanation of s. 7 of the PC Act aids in construing the 
provision to mean that the offence of bribery crystallizes on the 
exchange of the bribe and does not require the actual performance 
of the act – Similarly, in the formulation of a legislator accepting a 
bribe, it does not matter whether she votes in the agreed direction 
or votes at all – At the point in time when the bribe is accepted, 
the offence of bribery is complete – Prevention of Corruption Act, 
1988. [Para 118]
Case Law Cited
*PV Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), [1998] 2 SCR 
870 : (1998) 4 SCC 626 – overruled.
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1 : 
(2006) 7 SCC 1 – Clarified.
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[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
651; Chaturdas Bhagwandas Patel v. State of Gujarat, 
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(1973) 4 SCC 225; K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. 
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[2010] 3 WLR 1707; Makudi v. Baron Triesman of 
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408 US 501 (1972); Gavel v. United States, 408 US 
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(1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 439 US 1066 (1979); R 
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Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du 
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Obeid v. Queen, [2017] NSWCCA 221 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
SK Nag, Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India 
till 1947, Sterling Publication, (1978), 317-18; SK 
Nag, Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India 
till 1947, Sterling Publication, (1978), 102-103; SK 
Nag, Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India till 
1947, Sterling Publication, (1978), 139-141, 158; SK 
Nag, Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India
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till 1947, Sterling Publication, (1978), 322; Report of 
the Reforms Enquiry Committee (1924), 75; SK Nag, 
Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India till 1947, 
Sterling Publication, (1978), 213-214; Granville Austin, 
The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, OUP 
(1972), ix; Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: 
Cornerstone of a Nation, OUP (1972), xiii; CAD Vol VIII 
19 May, 1949 Draft Article 85; Subhash C. Kashyap, 
Parliamentary Procedure—Law, Privileges, Practice and 
Precedents, 3rd ed., Universal Law Publishing Co, 502; 
MN Kaul and SL Shakdher, Practice and Procedure of 
Parliament, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Metropolitan Book 
Co. Pvt. Ltd., 7th ed., 229; Justice GP Singh, Principles 
of Statutory Interpretation, 15th Ed. (2021), 136; Justice 
GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 15th 
Ed. (2021), 188-189 – referred to.
Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, 
Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, LexisNexis, 
25th ed. (2019) 239; Erskine May’s Treatise on the 
Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 
LexisNexis, 25th ed. (2019) 242 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; 
Government of India Act, 1833; Charter Act, 1853; Indian Council 
Act, 1861; Government of India Act, 1909; Representation of the 
People Act, 1951; Government of India Act, 1919; Government of 
India Act, 1935; Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment)
Act, 1978.
List of Keywords
Bribery for speaking or casting a vote; Bribery vis-à-vis privileges; 
Parliamentary privilege; Legislative privilege; Ancient privileges; 
Statutory privilege; Constitutional privilege; History of privileges of 
legislatures; Immunities of the Houses of Parliament or Legislature; 
Reconsideration of PV Narasimha Rao case; Probity in public life; 
Parliamentary democracy; Principle of stare decisis; Elections 
to Rajya Sabha; Overruled; Judicial Precedent; Constitutional 
jurisprudence; Freedom of speech; House of Parliament; Necessity 
test; Collective functioning of the House; Immunity “in respect of 
anything” said or any vote given; Parallel jurisdiction; House of 
Legislature; Legislature; Colonial rule; House of Commons in the
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
UK; Foreign jurisdictions; Obtaining, accepting or attempting to 
obtain an undue advantage; Judicial review; Judicial discipline; 
Illustrations appended to a Section; Marginal note to a Section; 
Reforms of Committee, 1924.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.451 
of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.02.2014 of the High Court 
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in WPCRL No.128 of 2013
Appearances for Parties
Paramjit Singh Patwalia, Sr. Adv.(Amicus Curiae), Ms. Harshika 
Verma, Dipanshu Krishnan, Gauravjit Singh Patwalia, Manan Daga, 
Ms. Samradhi Srivastava, Gaurav Agrawal, Advs.
Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv., Kaushik Laik, Vivek Singh, Ashay 
Kaushik, M.V. Mukunda, Shashank Tiwari, Rahul Arya, Pratap 
Shankar, Ms. Devyani Gupta, Ms. Tanvi Anand Advs. for the Appellant.
R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, Tushar Mehta, Solicitor 
General, K M Nataraj, A.S.G., K Parmeshwar, Kanu Agrawal, Ms. 
Chinmayee Chandra, Udai Khanna, Akshay Amritanshu, Ankur 
Talwar, Anmol Chandan, Anandh Venkataramani, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi 
Venkataramani, Vinayak Mehrotra, Ms. Mansi Sood, Chitvan Singhal, 
Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Raman Yadav, Kartikey 
Aggarwal, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Respondent.
Gopal Sankaranarayan, Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Advs., Ashwini Kumar 
Upadhyay, Ashwani Kumar Dubey, Vishal Sinha, Ms. Jhanvi Dubey, 
Ms. Tanya Shrivastava, Ms. Aditi Gupta, Ms. Trisha Chandran,
Vaibhav 
Tiwari, Rishabh Shukla, Ms. Sneha Kalita, Ms. Kavya Jhawar, Ms. 
Jessy Kurian, K.S. Bhati, Ms. SR. Leona, Ms. Shilpa Bagade, Ms. 
Joyshree Barman, Shubham Singhal, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Ms. 
Rooh-e-hina Dua, Arav Pandit, Harshit Khanduja, Ms. Dhanakshi 
Gandhi, Sahib Kochhar, Ms. Shreya Arora, Randeep Sachdeva, 
Dr. Vivek Sharma, K.V. Dhananjay, A Velan, Pawan Shyam, Ms. 
Navpreet Kaur, Sushant VA, Ojaswi, Dheeraj SJ, Mritunjay Pathak, 
Sachin S, Anand Nandan, Amit Pawan, Aakash, Zubair, Vikash, Dr. 
Dhruv Mishra, Mohd Faiz, Ms. Shivangi, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, 
Advs. for the Intervenor/Impleadors.
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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
Table of Contents*
A.	
Reference	
4
B.	
Overview of the judgment in PV Narasimha Rao	
8
C.	
Submissions	
14
D.	
Reconsidering PV Narasimha Rao does not 
violate the principle of stare decisis	
22
E.	
History of parliamentary privilege in India	
34
F.	
Purport of parliamentary privilege in India	
44
I.	
Functional analysis	
44
II.	
Parliamentary privilege as a collective 
right of the House	
54
III.	
Necessity test to claim and exercise a privilege	
60
G.	
Bribery is not protected by parliamentary privilege	
65
I.	
Bribery is not in respect of anything 
said or any vote given	
65
II.	
The Constitution envisions probity in public life	
72
III.	
Courts and the House exercise parallel 
jurisdiction over allegations of bribery	
76
IV.	
Delivery of results is irrelevant to the 
offence of bribery	
79
H.	
International position on bribery vis-à-vis privileges	
87
I.	
United Kingdom	
87
II.	
United States of America	
99
III.	
Canada	
108
IV.	
Australia	
114
I.	
Elections to the Rajya Sabha are within the 
remit of Article 194(2)	
118
J.	
Conclusion	
131 
* Ed. Note: Pagination is as per the original Judgment.
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477
Sita Soren v. Union of India
1.	
Parliamentary privilege, codified in Articles 105 and 194 of the 
Constitution, is integral to deliberative democracy in facilitating the 
functioning of a parliamentary form of governance. It ensures that 
legislators in whom citizens repose their faith can express their views 
and opinions on the floor of the House without ‘fear or favour’. With 
the protection of parliamentary privilege, a legislator belonging to a 
political party with a minuscule vote share can fearlessly vote on any 
motion; a legislator from a remote region of the country can raise 
issues that impact her constituency without the fear of being harassed 
by legal prosecution; and a legislator can demand accountability 
without the apprehension of being accused of defamation.
2.	
Would a legislator who receives a bribe to cast a vote in a certain 
direction or speak about certain issues be protected by parliamentary 
privilege? It is this question of constitutional interpretation that this 
Court is called upon to decide.
A.	
Reference
3.	
The Criminal Appeal arises from a judgment dated 17 February 2014 
of the High Court of Jharkhand.1 An election was held on 30 March 
2012 to elect two members of the Rajya Sabha representing the 
State of Jharkhand. The appellant, belonging to the Jharkhand Mukti 
Morcha,2 was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Jharkhand. 
The allegation against the appellant is that she accepted a bribe 
from an independent
candidate for casting her vote in his favour. 
However, as borne out from the open balloting for the Rajya Sabha 
seat, she did not cast her vote in favour of the alleged bribe giver 
and instead cast her vote in favour of a candidate belonging to her 
own party. The round of election in question was annulled and a 
fresh election was held where the appellant voted in favour of the 
candidate from her own party again.
4.	
The appellant moved the High Court to quash the chargesheet and 
the criminal proceedings instituted against her. The appellant claimed 
protection under Article 194(2) of the Constitution, relying on the 
judgment of the Constitution bench of this Court in PV Narasimha 
1	
Writ Petition (Criminal) No 128 of 2013
2	
“JMM”
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Rao v. State (CBI/SPE)3. The High Court declined to quash the 
criminal proceedings on the ground that the appellant had not cast 
her vote in favour of the alleged bribe giver and thus, is not entitled 
to the protection under Article 194(2). The High Court’s reasoning 
primarily turned on this Court’s decision in PV Narasimha Rao 
(supra). The controversy in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) and the 
present case turns on the interpretation of the provisions of Article 
105(2) of the Constitution (which deals with the powers, privileges, 
and immunities of the members of Parliament and Parliamentary 
committees) and the equivalent provision in Article 194(2) of the 
Constitution which confers a similar immunity to the members of 
the State Legislatures.
5.	
On 23 September 2014, a bench of two judges of this Court, 
before which the appeal was placed, was of the view that since the 
issue arising for consideration is “substantial and of general public 
importance”, it must be placed before a larger bench of three judges 
of this court. On 7 March 2019, a bench of three judges which heard 
the appeal observed that the precise question was dealt with in a 
judgment of a five-judge bench in PV Narasimha Rao (supra). The 
bench was of the view that “having regard to the wide ramification 
of the question that has arisen, the doubts raised and the issue 
being a matter of public importance”, the matter must be referred 
to a larger
bench. 
6.	
Finally, by an order dated 20 September 2023, a five-judge bench of 
this Court recorded prima facie reasons doubting the correctness of 
the decision in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) and referred the matter 
to a larger bench of seven judges. The operative part of the order 
reported as Sita Soren v. Union of India4, is extracted below: 
“24. We are inclined to agree …that the view which has been 
expressed in the decision of the majority in PV Narasimha 
Rao requires to be reconsidered by a larger Bench. Our 
reasons prima facie for doing so are formulated below:
Firstly, the interpretation of Article 105(2) and the 
corresponding provisions of Article 194(2) of the Constitution 
3	
[1998] 2 SCR 870 : (1998) 4 SCC 626
4	
[2023] 12 SCR 753 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1217
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
must be guided by the text, context and the object and 
purpose underlying the provision. The fundamental purpose 
and object underlying Article 105(2) of the Constitution 
is that Members of Parliament, or as the case may be 
of the State Legislatures must be free to express their 
views on the floor of the House or to cast their votes 
either in the House or as members of the Committees 
of the House without fear of consequences. While Article 
19(1)(a) of the Constitution recognises the individual right 
to the freedom of speech and expression, Article 105(2) 
institutionalises that right by recognising the importance 
of the Members of the Legislature having the freedom to 
express themselves and to cast their ballots without fear 
of reprisal or consequences. In other words, the object 
of Article 105(2) or Article 194(2) does not prima facie 
appear to be to render immunity from the launch of criminal 
proceedings for a violation of the criminal law which may 
arise independently of the exercise of the rights and duties 
as a Member of Parliament or of the legislature of a state;
Secondly, in the course of judgment in PV Narasimha 
Rao, Justice S.C. Agarwal noted a serious anomaly if the 
construction in support of the immunity under Article 105(2) 
for a bribe taker were to be accepted: a member would 
enjoy immunity from prosecution for such a charge if the 
member accepts the bribe for speaking or giving their vote
in Parliament in a particular manner and in fact speaks or 
gives a vote in Parliament in that manner. On the other 
hand, no immunity would attach, and the member of the 
legislature would be liable to be prosecuted on a charge of 
bribery if they accept the bribe for not speaking or for not 
giving their vote on a matter under consideration before the 
House but they act to the contrary. This anomaly, Justice 
Agarwal observed, would be avoided if the words “in 
respect of” in Article 105(2) are construed to mean ‘arising 
out of’. In other words, in such a case, the immunity would 
be available only if the speech that has been made or the 
vote that has been given is an essential and integral part 
for the cause of action for the proceedings giving rise to 
the law; and
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Thirdly, the judgment of Justice SC Agarwal has specifically 
dwelt on the question as to when the offence of bribery 
would be complete. The judgment notes that the offence 
is complete with the acceptance of the money or on the 
agreement to accept the money being concluded and is 
not dependent on the performance of the illegal promise by 
the receiver. The receiver of the bribe would be treated to 
have committed the offence even when he fails to perform 
the bargain underlying the tender and acceptance of the 
bribe. This aspect bearing on the constituent elements of 
the offence of a bribe finds elaboration in the judgment 
of Justice Agarwal but is not dealt with in the judgment 
of the majority.
…
26. For the above reasons, prima facie at this stage, we are 
of the considered view that the correctness of the view of 
the majority in PV Narasimha Rao should be reconsidered 
by a larger Bench of seven judges.”
7.	
The scope of the present judgment is limited to the reference made 
by the order of this Court dated 20 September 2023 doubting 
the correctness of PV Narasimha Rao (supra). The merits of the 
appellant’s case and whether she committed the alleged offence are 
not being adjudicated by this Court at this stage. Nothing contained 
in this judgment may be construed as having a bearing on the merits 
of the trial or any other proceedings arising from it.
B.	
Overview of the judgment in PV Narasimha Rao
8.	
The
general elections for the Tenth Lok Sabha were held in 1991. 
Congress (I) emerged as the single largest party and formed a 
minority government with Mr PV Narasimha Rao as the Prime 
Minister. A motion of no-confidence was moved in the Lok Sabha 
against the government. The support of fourteen members was 
needed to defeat the no-confidence motion. The motion was defeated 
with two hundred and fifty-one members voting in support and two 
hundred and sixty-five members voting against the motion. A group 
of Members of Parliament5 owing allegiance to the JMM and the 
5	
“MP”
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
Janata Dal (Ajit Singh) Group6 voted against the no-confidence 
motion. Notably, one MP belonging to the JD (AS), namely, Ajit 
Singh, abstained from voting. 
9.	
A complaint was filed before the Central Bureau of Investigation7 
alleging that a criminal conspiracy was devised by which the above 
members belonging to the JMM and the JD (AS) entered into an 
agreement and received bribes to vote against the no-confidence 
motion.8 It was alleged that PV Narasimha Rao and several other MPs 
were parties to the criminal conspiracy and passed on “several lakhs 
of rupees” to the alleged bribe-takers to defeat the no-confidence 
motion.9 
10.	 A prosecution was launched against the alleged bribe-givers and 
bribe-takers, and cognizance was taken by the Special Judge, Delhi. 
The accused moved the High Court of Delhi to quash the charges. 
The High Court dismissed the petitions. Appeals were preferred 
to this Court and culminated in the PV Narasimha Rao (supra) 
decision. Two major questions came up for consideration before 
the Court. First, whether by virtue of Article 105 of the Constitution, 
an MP can claim immunity from prosecution on a charge of bribery 
in a criminal court. Second, whether an MP falls within the purview 
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and who is designated 
as the sanctioning authority for the prosecution of an MP under the 
PC Act. In the present judgment, we are concerned solely with the
holding of the five-judge bench on the first question, i.e., the scope 
of the immunity from prosecution under Article 105(2) when an MP 
is charged with bribery. 
11.	 Three opinions were authored in the case – by SC Agarwal, J (for 
himself and Dr AS Anand, J), SP Bharucha, J (for himself and S 
Rajendra Babu, J) and an opinion by GN Ray, J. 
12.	 Justice SP Bharucha (as the learned Chief Justice then was) held 
that the alleged bribe-takers who cast their vote against the no-
confidence motion enjoyed immunity from prosecution in a court 
of law under Article 105(2) of the Constitution. However, Ajit Singh 
6	
“JD (AS)”
7	
“CBI”
8	
“Bribe-takers”
9	
“Bribe-givers”
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(who abstained from voting) and the alleged bribe-givers were 
held not to enjoy the same immunity. Justice Bharucha held that 
for breach of parliamentary privileges and its contempt, Parliament 
may proceed against both the alleged bribe-takers and bribe-givers. 
Justice Bharucha held: 
12.1.	 The provisions of Article 105(1) and Article 105(2) suggest that 
the freedom of speech for MPs is independent of the freedom 
of speech and its exceptions contained in Article 19. MPs must 
be free of all constraints about what they say in Parliament. 
A vote is treated as an extension of speech and is given the 
protection of the spoken word; 
12.2.	 The expression “in respect of” in Article 105(2) must receive 
a “broad meaning” and entails that an MP is protected from 
any proceedings in a court of law that relate to, concern or 
have a connection or nexus with anything said or a vote given 
by him in Parliament;
12.3.	 The alleged bribe-takers are entitled to immunity under Article 
105(2) as the alleged conspiracy and acceptance of the bribe 
was “in respect of” the vote against the no-confidence motion. 
The stated object of the alleged conspiracy and agreement 
was to defeat the no-confidence motion and the alleged bribe-
takers received the bribe as a “motive or reward for defeating” 
it. The nexus between the alleged conspiracy, the bribe and 
the no-confidence motion was explicit; 
12.4.	 The object of the protection under
Article 105(2) is to enable 
MPs to speak and vote freely in Parliament, without the fear of 
being made answerable on that account in a court of law. It is 
not enough that MPs should be protected against proceedings 
where the cause of action is their speech or vote. To enable 
them to participate freely in parliamentary debates, MPs need 
the wider protection of immunity against all civil and criminal 
proceedings that bear a nexus to their speech or vote. It is not 
difficult to envisage an MP who has made a speech or cast 
a vote that is not to the “liking of the powers that be” being 
troubled by legal prosecution alleging that he had been paid 
a bribe to achieve a certain result in Parliament;
12.5.	 The seriousness of the offence committed by the bribe-takers 
does not warrant a narrow construction of the Constitution.
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
Such a construction runs the risk of impairing the guarantee 
of an effective parliamentary democracy; 
12.6.	 The immunity under Article 105(2) is operative only insofar 
as it pertains to what has been said or voted. Therefore, Ajit 
Singh, the MP who abstained from voting, was not protected 
by immunity and the prosecution against him would proceed; 
12.7.	 With regard to whether the bribe-givers enjoy immunity, since 
the prosecution against Ajit Singh would proceed, the charge 
against the bribe-givers of conspiracy and agreeing with Ajit 
Singh to do an unlawful act would also proceed. Further, Article 
105(2) does not provide that what is otherwise an offence is 
not an offence when it is committed by an MP. The provision 
merely provides that an MP shall not be answerable in a 
court of law for something that has a nexus to his speech or 
vote in Parliament. Those who have conspired with the MP in 
the commission of that offence have no such immunity. The 
bribe-givers can, therefore, be prosecuted and do not have 
the protection of Article 105(2). 
13.	 On the other hand, SC Agarwal, J held that neither the alleged bribe-
takers nor the alleged bribe-givers enjoyed the protection of Article 
105(2). An MP does not enjoy immunity under Article 105(2) from 
being prosecuted for an offence involving the offer or acceptance of a 
bribe for speaking or giving his vote in parliament or any committee. 
In his opinion,
Justice Agarwal held as follows: 
13.1.	 The object of the immunity under Article 105(2) is to ensure 
the independence of legislators for the healthy functioning of 
parliamentary democracy. An interpretation of Article 105(2) 
which enables an MP to claim immunity from prosecution for 
an offence of bribery would place them above the law. This 
would be repugnant to the healthy functioning of parliamentary 
democracy and subversive of the rule of law;
13.2.	 The expression “in respect of” precedes the words “anything 
said or any vote given” in Article 105(2). The words “anything 
said or any vote given” can only mean speech that has been 
made or a vote that has already been given and does not 
extend to cases where the speech has not been made or the 
vote has not been cast. Therefore, interpreting the expression 
“in respect of” widely would result in a paradoxical situation. An
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MP would be liable to be prosecuted for bribery if he accepted 
a bribe for not speaking or not giving his vote on a matter, but 
he would enjoy immunity if he accepted the bribe for speaking 
or giving his vote in a particular way and actually speaks or 
gives his vote in that manner. It is unlikely that the framers of 
the Constitution intended to make such a distinction; 
13.3.	 The phrase “in respect of” must be interpreted to mean “arising 
out of”. Immunity under Article 105(2) is available only to give 
protection against liability for an act that follows or succeeds 
as a consequence of making the speech or giving of vote by 
an MP and not for an act that precedes the speech or vote 
and gives rise to liability which arises independently of the 
speech or vote;
13.4.	 The offence of criminal conspiracy is made out on the 
conclusion of an agreement to commit the offence of bribery 
and the performance of the act pursuant to the agreement 
is not of any consequence. Similarly, the act of acceptance 
of a bribe for speaking or giving a vote against the motion 
arises independently of the making of the speech or giving 
of the vote by the MP. Hence, liability for the offence cannot 
be treated as “in respect of anything said or any vote given 
in Parliament;” and
13.5.	 The international trend, including law in the United States, 
Australia and Canada, reflects the position that legislators 
are liable to be prosecuted
for bribery in connection with their 
legislative activities. Most of the Commonwealth countries 
treat corruption and bribery by members of the legislature 
as a criminal offence. In the United Kingdom also there is a 
move to change the law in this regard. There is no reason why 
legislators in India should not be covered by laws governing 
bribery and corruption when all other public functionaries are 
subject to such laws.
14.	 GN Ray, J in a separate opinion concurred with the reasoning of 
Agarwal, J that an MP is a public servant under the PC Act and on 
the question regarding the sanctioning authority under the PC Act. 
However, on the interpretation of Article 105(2), GN Ray, J concurred 
with the judgment of Bharucha, J. Hence, the opinion authored by 
Bharucha, J on the interpretation of Article 105(2) represents the
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
view of the majority of three judges of this Court.10 The opinion 
authored by SC Agarwal, J on the other hand, represents the view 
of the minority.11
C.	
Submissions
15.	 Over the course of the hearing, we have heard Mr Raju Ramachandran, 
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr R 
Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, Mr Tushar Mehta, Solicitor 
General of India, Mr PS Patwalia, senior counsel, amicus curiae, 
Mr Gopal Sankarnarayanan, senior counsel, and Mr Vijay Hansaria, 
senior counsel, appearing on behalf of intervenors. This Court being 
a court of record, the submissions made by the learned advocates 
are briefly listed below. 
16.	 Mr Raju Ramachandran, senior counsel appearing on behalf of the 
appellant submitted that the judgment of the majority in PV Narasimha 
Rao (supra) is squarely applicable to the present case. Further, he 
argued that the majority judgment is well-reasoned and there are 
no grounds to reconsider the settled position of law. In this regard, 
he made the following submissions: 
16.1.	 The overruling of long-settled law in PV Narasimha Rao 
(supra) is unwarranted according to the tests laid down by 
this court on overturning judicial precedents;12 
16.2.	 The object behind conferring immunity on MPs and MLAs was 
to shield them from “being oppressed by the power of the 
crown”. The apprehension of parliamentarians being arrested 
shortly before or after the actual
voting or making of a speech 
in the Parliament (such vote or speech directed against the 
Executive) was the precise reason for introducing the concept 
of privileges and immunities;
16.3.	 The concept of constitutional privileges and immunities is not 
in derogation of the Rule of Law, but it is a distinct feature of 
our constitutional structure. The majority judgment preserves 
10	
The opinion authored by SP Bharucha, J has been referred to as majority judgment hereinafter
11	
The opinion authored by SC Agarwal, J has been referred to as minority judgment hereinafter
12	
Keshav Mills Co. Ltd v. CIT, 	[1965] 2 SCR 908 : AIR 1965 SC 1636, para 23; Krishena Kumar v. Union 
of India, [1990] 3 SCR 352 : (1990) 4 SCC 207, para 33; Shanker Raju v. Union of India, [2011] 2 SCR 1: 
(2011) 2 SCC 132, para 10; Shah Faesal and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI), [2020] 3 SCR 1115 : (2020) 4 
SCC 1, para 17
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the privilege of MPs and MLAs to protect their dignity as 
legislators and is not opposed to the rule of law;
16.4.	 The majority judgment gave due regard and recognition 
to Parliament’s exclusive powers to take appropriate 
steps against corrupt practices by its members, just as 
the Parliament recognizes the limits on discussions in the 
House, such as the inability to entertain discussions on the 
conduct of judges of constitutional courts under Article 121 
of the Constitution;
16.5.	 The present position on parliamentary privilege in India and the 
UK entails that (a) it is fundamental to a democratic polity and 
courts have exercised judicial restraint; and (b) the privilege 
must necessarily relate to the exercise of “legislative functions”, 
which in India relates to voting and making of speeches. While 
determining whether an act is immune from judicial scrutiny, 
the ‘necessity test’ is to be applied, i.e., whether there is a 
nexus between the act in question and the legislative process 
of voting/making speeches;
16.6.	 The so-called “anomaly” in the majority judgment flows from 
the plain language of Articles 105(2) and 194(2) and any 
attempt to whittle down their protective scope to adhere to 
what is seemingly “logical”, “fair” or “reasonable” would be 
constitutionally unjustified. However, while advancing his oral 
submissions in rejoinder, Mr Ramachandran conceded that the 
view that an abstention from
voting would not be protected 
under Article 105(2) was incorrect and abstaining from voting, 
in fact, constitutes casting a vote; 
16.7.	 The minority judgment in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) has 
erred in reading “in respect of” as “arising out of”. Such a 
reading is not warranted by either the plain language or the 
intent of the provision;
16.8.	 The fact that the offence of bribery in criminal law is complete 
when the bribe is given and is not dependent on the 
performance of the promised favour is of no consequence to 
the constitutional immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2). 
Once a speech is made or a vote is given, the nexus, i.e., “in 
respect of”, is fulfilled;
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
16.9.	 The overruling of the majority judgment will have severe 
unintended consequences. In view of political realities, if the 
parliamentary immunity conferred upon MPs/ MLAs is whittled 
down, it would enhance the possibility of abuse of the law by 
political parties in power; and 
16.10.	Voting in the Rajya Sabha Elections is within the scope of 
protection of Article 194(2) as it has all the “trappings” of any 
other law-making process in the legislature.
17.	 Mr Venkataramani, the learned Attorney General for India advanced 
a preliminary submission that the decision in PV Narasimha Rao 
(supra) is inapplicable to the instant case. He submitted that the 
exercise of franchise by an elected member of the legislative assembly 
in a Rajya Sabha election does not fall within the ambit of Article 
194(2), and thus, PV Narasimha Rao (supra) does not have any 
application to the present case. He submits that the objective of Article 
194(2) is to protect speech and conduct in relation to the functions 
of the legislature. Therefore, any conduct which is not related to 
legislative functions, such as the election of members to the Rajya 
Sabha, will fall outside the ambit of Article 194(2). According to the 
learned Attorney General, the election of members to the Rajya 
Sabha is akin to any other election process and cannot be treated 
as a matter of business or function of the legislature. 
18.	 In response to the learned
Attorney General’s submissions that the 
polling for Rajya Sabha cannot be considered a proceeding of the 
House, Mr Ramachandran has submitted that the cases relied on by 
the learned Attorney General were not rendered in a context where 
parliamentary privilege or immunity was sought to be invoked and 
the passing reference to the concept of ‘legislative proceedings’ was 
in an entirely different context. Further, certain legislative processes 
such as ad-hoc committees, standing committees, elections of the 
constitutional offices of the President/Vice President, and members 
of the Rajya Sabha, do not necessarily take place on the floor of the 
House when it is in session. However, they have all the ‘trappings’ 
of carrying out the ‘legislative process’.
19.	 Mr P S Patwalia, amicus curiae has submitted that the majority 
judgment must be reconsidered, and the view of the minority reflects 
the correct position of law. In this regard, Mr Patwalia made the 
following submissions:
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19.1.	 The majority judgment has erroneously given a wide 
interpretation to the expression “in respect of” and granted 
immunity to MPs from criminal prosecution when they accept 
a bribe to cast a vote in Parliament. The object of Article 
105 is not to place MPs above the law when the offence 
has been committed before the MP enters the House of 
Parliament;
19.2.	 The ratio of the judgments of this court rendered after PV 
Narasimha Rao (supra) militates against the grant of immunity 
to MPs for taking a bribe for casting votes;13
19.3.	 The minority judgment correctly notes that the offence of bribery 
is complete before the member even enters the House and 
therefore, the offence has no connection or correlation with 
the vote that she may cast in Parliament. The protection under 
Articles 105(2) and 194(2) is not available when the alleged 
criminal acts are committed outside Parliament;
19.4.	 The proposition that MPs are immune from prosecution for an 
offence of bribery in connection with their votes in Parliament 
is subversive of the rule of law; 
19.5.	 The majority judgment results in an anomalous situation, where 
an MP who accepts a bribe and does not cast his vote can 
be prosecuted, while a member who casts his vote is given 
immunity; 
19.6.	 The position of law in the United Kingdom, as developed over 
the years, confirms the proposition that the claim of privilege 
cannot be extended to immunity from
prosecution for the 
offence of bribery; and 
19.7.	 The international trend (particularly in the United States, 
Canada and Australia) is that parliamentary privilege does not 
extend to the offence of bribery. This trend is correctly relied 
on in the minority judgment, while the majority judgment relies 
on decisions which have been subsequently diluted even in 
their original jurisdictions. 
13	
Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker Lok Sabha, [2007] 1 SCR 317 : (2007) 3 SCC 184, Lokayukta, Justice 
Ripusudan Dayal v. State of M.P. [2014] 3 SCR 242 : (2014) 4 SCC 473 and State of Kerala v. K. Ajith, 
[2021] 6 SCR 774 : (2021) SCC OnLine 510
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
20.	 Mr Gopal Sankarnarayan, senior counsel appearing on behalf of the 
intervenor endorsed the view taken by the amicus curiae. Additionally, 
he made the following submissions: 
20.1.	 While the majority judgment has been doubted on multiple 
occasions, the minority judgment has been extensively relied 
on by this Court;
20.2.	 The word “any” employed in Articles 105 and 194 of the 
Constitution ought to be given a narrow interpretation and 
should not mechanically be interpreted as ‘everything’, 
especially as it grants an exceptional immunity not available 
to the common person;
20.3.	 The expression “in respect of” must be read narrowly. It 
must be tied down to ‘legitimate acts’ that are a part of the 
legislative process involving speech or a vote in Parliament 
or before a committee. Any other interpretation would violate 
the sanctity of the democratic process and the trust placed in 
the legislators by the public;
20.4.	 Strict interpretation ought to be given to laws dealing with 
corruption which affects the public interest;
20.5.	 The offence of bribery is complete on receipt of the bribe well 
before the vote is given or speech is made in Parliament. The 
offence under Section 7 (and Section 13) of the PC Act does 
not require ‘performance’. Therefore, the delivery of results is 
irrelevant to the offence being established and the distinction 
created by the majority is artificial; 
20.6.	 The effect of the
majority judgment is that it creates an 
illegitimate class of public servants which is afforded 
extraordinary protection which would be a violation of Article 
14, as also being manifestly arbitrary; and
20.7.	 Internationally, the legal position in the USA, UK, Canada, 
Australia, South Africa and New Zealand supports the minority 
judgment.
21.	 Mr Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General of India highlighted 
the significance of preserving parliamentary privileges. He submitted 
that the issue for consideration before this Court is not the contours 
of parliamentary privileges but whether the offence of bribery is
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complete outside the legislature. Mr Mehta submitted that the 
offence of bribery under the PC Act, both before and after the 2018 
amendment, is complete on the acceptance of the bribe and is not 
linked to the actual performance or non-performance of the official 
function to which the bribe relates.
22.	 Mr Vijay Hansaria, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the 
intervenor, supplemented the arguments assailing the majority 
judgment. He submitted that the principle of parliamentary privilege 
must be interpreted in the context of the criminalization of politics and 
through the prism of constitutional morality. In his written submissions, 
Mr A Velan, Advocate for the intervenor supported the submission 
that the majority judgment in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) ought to 
be reconsidered. 
D.	
Reconsidering PV Narasimha Rao does not violate the 
principle of stare decisis
23.	 We begin by addressing the preliminary argument of Mr Raju 
Ramachandran, that overruling of the long-settled law in PV Narasimha 
Rao (supra) is unwarranted by the application of the tests laid down 
by this Court on overturning judicial precedent. The order of reference 
provides reasons for prima facie doubting the correctness of the 
decision in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) including its impact on the 
“polity and the preservation of probity in public life.” However, since 
the learned Senior Counsel has reiterated the preliminary objection 
to
reconsidering the decision in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) before 
this bench of seven judges, the argument has been addressed below. 
24.	 A decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any 
subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. A Bench of lesser 
strength cannot disagree with or dissent from the view of the law 
taken by the bench of larger strength. However, a bench of the same 
strength can question the correctness of a decision rendered by a 
co-ordinate bench. In such situations, the case is placed before a 
bench of larger strength.14 
25.	 In the present case, the case was first placed before a bench of 
two judges who referred the case to a bench of three judges. The 
14	
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community vs. State of Maharashtra, [2004] Suppl. 6 SCR 1054 : 
(2005) 2 SCC 673, para 12
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
bench of three judges referred the case to a bench of five judges. In 
consonance with judicial discipline, the correctness of the decision 
in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) was only doubted by the co-equal 
bench of five judges of this Court in a detailed order. Accordingly, 
the matter has been placed before this bench of seven judges. 
26.	 Doubts about the correctness of the decision in PV Narasimha Rao 
(supra) have been raised by this Court in several previous decisions 
as well. For instance, in Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India,15 one of 
us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J) observed: 
“221. The view of the minority was that the offence of 
bribery is made out against a bribe-taker either upon 
taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in 
a certain manner. Following this logic, S.C. Agrawal, J. 
held that the criminal liability of a Member of Parliament 
who accepts a bribe for speaking or giving a vote in 
Parliament arises independent of the making of the speech 
or the giving of the vote and hence is not a liability “in 
respect of anything said or any vote given” in Parliament. 
The correctness of the view in the judgment of the 
majority does not fall for consideration in the present 
case. Should it become necessary in an appropriate 
case in future, a larger Bench may have to consider 
the issue.”
(emphasis supplied)
27.	 Similar observations have been made by this Court in Raja Ram 
Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok
Sabha.16 The Court has relied on the 
minority judgment in several decisions, notably Kuldip Nayar v. 
Union of India.17 and Amarinder Singh v. Punjab Vidhan Sabha.18 
As the correctness of the decision in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) did 
not directly arise in these cases the Court refrained from making a 
reference or conclusive observations about the correctness of this 
decision. However, the present case turns almost entirely on the law 
laid down in PV Narasimha Rao (supra). 
15	
[2018] 4 SCR 1 : (2018) 7 SCC 1
16	
[2007] 1 SCR 317 : (2007) 3 SCC 184
17	
(2006) 7 SCC 1
18	
[2010] 4 SCR 1105 : (2010) 6 SCC 113
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28.	 That the correctness of PV Narasimha Rao (supra) arises squarely 
in the facts of this case becomes clear from the impugned judgment 
of the High Court. The High Court formulated the question for 
consideration to be “whether Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India 
confers any immunity on the Members of the Legislative Assembly 
for being prosecuted in a criminal court of an offence involving offer 
or acceptance of bribe.” This is the precise question that this Court 
adjudicated on in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) as well, in the context 
of Article 105(2). 
29.	 Further, both the counsel for the appellant and the counsel for CBI 
relied on the reasoning in PV Narasimha Rao (supra). The High 
Court, in its analysis, held that since Article 194(2) is pari materia 
to Article 105(2), the law laid down in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) 
covers the field. The High Court relied on PV Narasimha Rao (supra) 
in holding that an MP who has not cast his vote is not covered by 
the immunity. Since the appellant did not vote as agreed, she was 
held not to be protected from immunity under Article 194(2). 
30.	 The issue which arose before the High Court turned on the decision 
in PV Narasimha Rao (supra). Therefore, this proceeding provides 
the correct occasion to settle the law once and for all. There is no 
infirmity in the reference to seven judges to reconsider the decision 
in PV Narasimha Rao (supra). 
31.	 Mr Raju Ramachandran,
senior counsel appearing on behalf of 
the appellant has argued that a position of law which has stood 
undisturbed since 1998 should not be interfered with by the Court. 
We do not consider it appropriate for this Court to confine itself to 
such a rigid understanding of the doctrine of stare decisis. The ability 
of this Court to reconsider its decisions is necessary for the organic 
development of law and the advancement of justice. If this Court is 
denuded of its power to reconsider its decisions, the development 
of constitutional jurisprudence would virtually come to a standstill. 
In the past, this Court has not refrained from reconsidering a prior 
construction of the Constitution if it proves to be unsound, unworkable, 
or contrary to public interest. This delicate balance was eloquently 
explained by HR Khanna, J in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. 
Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay19 in the following terms: 
19	
[1975] 1 SCR 1 : (1974) 2 SCC 402
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493
Sita Soren v. Union of India
“22. […] The Court has to keep the balance between the 
need of certainty and continuity and the desirability of 
growth and development of law. It can neither by judicial 
pronouncements allow law to petrify into fossilised rigidity 
nor can it allow revolutionary iconoclasm to sweep away 
established principles. On the one hand the need is to 
ensure that judicial inventiveness shall not be desiccated or 
stunted, on the other it is essential to curb the temptation 
to lay down new and novel principles in substitution of 
well-established principles in the ordinary run of cases 
and the readiness to canonise the new principles too 
quickly before their saintliness has been affirmed by the 
passage of time. […]”
32.	 A Bench of seven judges of this Court in Bengal Immunity Company 
Limited v. State of Bihar and Ors.,20 delineated the powers of 
this Court to reconsider its own decisions in view of the doctrine of 
stare decisis. Both SR Das, CJ and Bhagwati, J, in their separate 
opinions, detailed the power of this Court to reconsider its judgments, 
particularly when they raise issues of constitutional importance. SR 
Das, J explored the judgments delivered in various jurisdictions, 
such as England, Australia, and the United States to conclude 
that this Court cannot be denuded of its power to depart from its 
previous decisions, particularly on questions of interpretation of the 
Constitution. The Court observed that an
erroneous interpretation 
of the Constitution could result in a situation where the error is not 
rectified for a long period of time to the detriment of the general 
public. The test laid down by the Court was rooted in establishing 
the “baneful effect” of the previous decision on the “general interests 
of the public”. It was observed: 
“15. […] in a country governed by a Federal Constitution, 
such as the United States of America and the Union 
of India are, it is by no means easy to amend the 
Constitution if an erroneous interpretation is put upon 
it by this Court. (See Article 368 of our Constitution). 
An erroneous interpretation of the Constitution may 
quite conceivably be perpetuated or may at any rate 
20	
[1955] 2 SCR 603 : 1955 SCC OnLine SC 2
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remain unrectified for a considerable time to the great 
detriment to public well being … There is nothing in 
our Constitution which prevents us from departing 
from a previous decision if we are convinced of its 
error and its baneful effect on the general interests of 
the public. Article 141 which lays down that the law 
declared by this Court shall be binding on all courts 
within the territory of India quite obviously refers 
to courts other than this Court. The corresponding 
provision of the Government of India Act, 1935 also 
makes it clear that the courts contemplated are the 
subordinate courts.”
(emphasis supplied)
NH Bhagwati, J also emphasized the distinction between deviating 
from a decision dealing with the interpretation of statutory provisions 
and an interpretation of the Constitution, while opining that while 
an incorrect interpretation of a statute may be corrected by the 
legislature, it is not as easy to amend the Constitution to correct an 
unworkable interpretation. Akin to the exposition by SR Das, J, the 
test to reconsider previous decisions in the opinion of Bhagwati, J 
is whether the previous decision is “manifestly wrong or erroneous” 
or “public interest” requires it to be reconsidered.
33.	 The doctrine of stare decisis provides that the Court should not lightly 
dissent from precedent. However, this Court has held in a consistent 
line of cases,21 that the doctrine is not an inflexible
rule of law, and it 
cannot result in perpetuating an error to the detriment of the general 
welfare of the public. This Court may review its earlier decisions if 
it believes that there is an error, or the effect of the decision would 
harm the interests of the public or if “it is inconsistent with the legal 
philosophy of the Constitution”. In cases involving the interpretation 
of the Constitution, this Court would do so more readily than in other 
branches of law because not rectifying a manifest error would be 
harmful to public interest and the polity. The period of time over 
which the case has held the field is not of primary consequence. 
21	
See Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of W.B., [1974] 1 SCR 1 : (1973) 1 SCC 856; Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh 
v. Union of India, [1961] 2 SCR 828; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 3 SCR 316 : (1989) 2 SCC 
754; Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, [2002] 3 SCR 100 : (2002) 5 SCC 
111; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, [2015] 13 SCR 1 : (2016) 5 SCC 1
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This Court has overruled decisions which involve the interpretation 
of the Constitution despite the fact that they have held the field for 
long periods of time when they offend the spirit of the Constitution.
34.	 The judgment of the majority in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) deals 
with an important question of constitutional interpretation which 
impacts probity in public life. The decision has been met with notes of 
discord by various benches of this Court ever since it was delivered 
in 1998. An occasion has arisen in this case to lay down the law and 
resolve the dissonance. This is not an instance of this Court lightly 
transgressing from precedent. In fact, this case is an example of the 
Court giving due deference to the rule of precedent and refraining 
from reconsidering the decision in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) until 
it arose squarely for consideration. 
35.	 The appellant has relied on judgments of this Court in Shanker 
Raju v. Union of India22, Shah Faesal v. Union of India23, Keshav 
Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT24 and Krishena Kumar v. Union of India25. 
These judgments reiterate the proposition that (i) the doctrine of 
stare decisis promotes certainty and consistency in law; (ii) the 
Court should not make references to reconsider a prior decision in 
a cavalier manner; and (iii) a settled position of law should not be 
disturbed merely because an alternative view is available. However, 
all these judgments recognize
the power of this Court to reconsider 
its decisions in certain circumstances – including considerations of 
“public policy”; “public good” and to “remedy continued injustice”. In 
the facts which arose in those cases, this Court found that there was 
no compelling reason to reconsider certain judgments of this Court. 
36.	 In Shanker Raju (supra), this Court was dealing with the interpretation 
of the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 2006 and the 
appointment of a judicial member of the Central Administrative 
Tribunal. The two-judge Bench observed that it was bound by the 
decision of a bench of larger strength adjudicating a similar issue 
and could not reconsider the view taken in that decision merely 
because an alternative view was available. 
22	
[2011] 2 SCR 1 : (2011) 2 SCC 132
23	
[2020] 3 SCR 1115 : (2020) 4 SCC 1
24	
[1965] 2 SCR 908
25	
[1990] 3 SCR 352 : (1990) 4 SCC 207
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37.	 In Shah Faesal (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court was 
adjudicating on the question of whether the petitions were to be 
referred to a larger bench of seven judges on the ground that there 
were purportedly two contradictory decisions by benches of five 
judges. The Court observed that references to larger benches cannot 
be made casually or based on minor inconsistencies between two 
judgments. In that context, the Court found that the decisions were 
not irreconcilable with each other nor was one of the decisions per 
incuriam. While laying down the law on the doctrine of stare decisis, 
the Court held that in certain cases the Court may reconsider 
its decisions, particularly when they prove to be “unworkable” or 
“contrary to well-established principles”. The Court also adverted to 
the transition in the practice of the House of Lords in the UK, from 
an absolute prohibition on reconsidering previous decisions to the 
present position, which permits overruling of decisions in certain 
circumstances. The Court also quoted the Canadian position to the 
effect that while precedent should not routinely be deviated from 
reconsidering previous decisions is permissible when it is necessary 
in “public interest”.
38.	 The decision in Keshav Mills (supra) interpreted the provisions of 
the Income Tax Act, 1922 and in the circumstances of that case, the 
Court did not find any compelling reasons to reconsider
previous 
decisions on a similar point of law. The Court recognized that it 
is permissible in circumstances where it is in the “interests of the 
public” or if there are any other “valid” or “compulsive” reasons, 
to reconsider a prior decision. Further, the Court noted that it 
would not be wise to lay down principles to govern the approach 
of the Court in reviewing its decisions as it is based on several 
considerations, including, the impact of the error on the “general 
administration of law” or on “public good”. This exposition is, in 
fact, contained in the same paragraph that the appellant relies 
on to advance a rigid understanding of stare decisis. The bench 
of seven judges of this Court (speaking through Gajendragadkar, 
CJ) observed: 
“23. […] In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this 
Court should ask itself whether in the interests of the 
public good or for any other valid and compulsive 
reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision 
should be revised. When this Court decides questions
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of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all 
courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the 
constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce 
and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the 
interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by 
this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on 
the ground that the view pressed before it later appears 
to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend 
to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which 
must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if 
on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that 
its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should 
hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous 
decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the 
Court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity 
amongst its members that a revision of the said view is 
fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any 
case, it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles 
which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing 
with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier 
decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant 
considerations: —What is the nature of the infirmity or 
error on which a plea for a review and revision of the 
earlier view is based? On the earlier occasion, did some 
patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed, or was 
the
attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant and 
material statutory provision, or was any previous decision 
of this Court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the Court 
hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an 
error in the earlier view? What would be the impact of 
the error on the general administration of law or on 
public good? Has the earlier decision been followed 
on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by the 
High Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier 
decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or 
mischief? These and other relevant considerations must 
be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is called 
upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its 
earlier decisions. These considerations become still more 
significant when the earlier decision happens to be a
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unanimous decision of a Bench of five learned Judges 
of this Court.”
(emphasis supplied)
39.	 Similarly, Krishena Kumar (supra) was a case about pension 
payable to government employees. There, too, although the Court 
did not find compelling reasons to reconsider its previous decisions 
in that factual context, it recognized that the Court does have the 
power to do so in order to “remedy continued injustice” or due to 
“considerations of public policy”. 
40.	 The context in the above cases cited by the appellant is not comparable 
with the present case. As set out in the order of reference and in the 
course of this judgment, the decision in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) 
has wide ramifications on public interest, probity in public life and 
the functioning of parliamentary democracy. The majority judgment 
contains several apparent errors inter alia in its interpretation of the 
text of Article 105; its conceptualization of the scope and purpose of 
parliamentary privilege and its approach to international jurisprudence 
all of which have resulted in a paradoxical outcome. The present 
case is one where there is an imminent threat of this Court allowing 
an error to be perpetuated if the decision in PV Narasimha Rao 
(supra) is not reconsidered. 
41.	 Finally, the appellant also relies on the judgment of this Court in 
Ajit Mohan v. Legislative Assembly, National Capital Territory of 
Delhi26, where this Court observed that
there are “divergent views” 
amongst constitutional experts on “whether full play must be given 
to the powers, privileges, and immunities of legislative bodies, as 
originally defined in the Constitution, or (whether it) is to be restricted.” 
However, it has been urged, that this Court refused to express its 
views on the matter on the ground that such an opinion must be left to 
the Parliament. The appellant submits that similarly, in this case, the 
Court must refrain from taking a conclusive view and leave the issue 
for the determination of Parliament. The argument is misconceived.
42.	 This judgment does not seek to determine or restrict the “powers, 
privileges, and immunities” of the legislature as defined in the 
Constitution. Rather, this judgment has a limited remit which is to 
26	
[2021] 14 SCR 611 : (2022) 3 SCC 529
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
adjudicate on the correct interpretation of Article 105 and Article 194 
of the Constitution. Therefore, this Court is adjudicating upon the 
interpretation of the Constitution as it stands, and not on the question 
of whether “full play” should be given to the privileges.
43.	 In a separate but concurring opinion in Mark Graves v. People of 
the State of New York27 while overruling two previous decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court on a question of constitutional 
importance, Frankfurter, J pithily observed: 
“Judicial exegesis is unavoidable with reference to an 
act like our Constitution, drawn in many particulars with 
purposed vagueness so as to leave room for the unfolding 
future. But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality 
is the Constitution itself and not what we have said 
about it.”
(emphasis supplied)
44.	 The above formulation holds true for the Constitution of India as well, 
which is a transformative document that raises delicate issues of 
constitutional interpretation. Cognizant of the consequences of the 
majority judgment, we endeavour to stay true to what the “Constitution 
itself” fathomed as the remit of Articles 105(2) and 194(2) even if 
it may be at the cost of moving away from “what we have said 
about it” in PV Narasimha Rao (supra). We believe that we must 
not perpetuate a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution, merely 
because of rigid allegiance to a previous opinion of five
judges of 
this Court.
45.	 Having adverted to the background, submissions and preliminary 
issues, we turn to the subject which arises for consideration.
E.	
History of parliamentary privilege in India
46.	 In a deliberative democracy, the aspirations of the people are met 
by discourse in democratic institutions. The foremost among these 
institutions are Parliament and the State Legislatures. The object of the 
Constitution to give life and meaning to the aspirations of the people 
is carried out by its representatives through legislative business, 
deliberations, and dialogue. Parliament is called the “grand inquest 
27	
306 US 466 (1939)
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of the nation.” Not only can the actions and legislative priorities of 
the government of the day be scrutinised and criticised to hold it 
accountable, but Parliament also acts as a forum for ventilating the 
grievances of individuals, civil society, and public stakeholders. When 
the space for deliberation in the legislature shrinks, people resort to 
conversations and democratic actions outside the legislature. This 
privilege of the citizens to scrutinise the proceedings in Parliament is a 
concomitant right of a deliberative democracy which is a basic feature 
of the Constitution. Our Constitution intended to create institutions 
where deliberations, views and counterviews could be expressed 
freely to facilitate a democratic and peaceful social transformation. 
47.	 Parliament is a quintessential public institution which deliberates 
on the actualisation of the aspirations of all Indians. The fulcrum 
of parliamentary privileges under a constitutional and democratic 
set up is to facilitate the legislators to freely opine on the business 
before the House. Freedom of speech in the legislature is hence a 
privilege essential to every legislative body.
48.	 A deliberative democracy imagines deliberation as an ethic of good 
governance and is not restricted to the parliamentary sphere alone. 
The opinion of Sanjeev Khanna, J. in Rajeev Suri v DDA,28 elucidates 
the contours of deliberative democracy as follows:
“653.
Deliberative democracy accentuates the right of 
participation in deliberation, in decision-making, and in 
contestation of public decision-making. Contestation before 
the courts post the decision or legislation is one form of 
participation. Adjudication by courts, structured by the legal 
principles of procedural fairness and deferential power of 
judicial review, is not a substitute for public participation 
before and at the decision-making stage. In a republican 
or representative democracy, citizens delegate the 
responsibility to make and execute laws to the elected 
government, which takes decisions on their behalf. 
This is unavoidable and necessary as deliberation and 
decision-making is more efficient in smaller groups. 
The process requires gathering, processing and drawing 
inferences from information especially in contentious 
28	
[2021] 15 SCR 283 : (2022) 11 SCC 1
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501
Sita Soren v. Union of India
matters. Vested interests can be checked. Difficult, yet 
beneficial decisions can be implemented. Government 
officers, skilled, informed and conversant with the issues, 
and political executive backed by the election mandate 
and connected with electorate, are better equipped and 
positioned to take decisions. This enables the elected 
political executive to carry out their policies and promises 
into actual practice. Further, citizens approach elected 
representatives and through them express their views 
both in favour and against proposed legislations and 
policy measures. Nevertheless, when required draft 
legislations are referred to Parliamentary Committees 
for holding elaborate consultation with experts 
and stakeholders. The process of making primary 
legislation by elected representatives is structured 
by scrutiny, consultation and deliberation on different 
views and choices infused with an element of garnering 
consensus. 
…
656. However, delegation of the power to legislate and 
govern to elected representatives is not meant to deny the 
citizenry›s right to know and be informed. Democracy, by 
the people, is not a right to periodical referendum; or 
exercise of the right to vote, and thereby choose elected 
representatives, express satisfaction, disappointment, 
approve or disapprove projected policies. Citizens’ 
right to know and the Government’s duty to inform 
are embedded in the democratic form of
governance 
as well as the fundamental right to freedom of speech 
and expression. Transparency and receptiveness are 
two key propellants as even the most competent and 
honest decision-makers require information regarding the 
needs of the constituency as well as feedback on how the 
extant policies and decisions are operating in practice. 
This requires free flow of information in both directions. 
When information is withheld/denied suspicion and doubt 
gain ground and the fringe and vested interest groups 
take advantage. This may result in social volatility. [ With 
reference to Olson’s 7th implication, “7. Distributional
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coalitions … reduce the rate of economic growth…”. 
‘The Rise and Decline of Nations’ by Mancur Olson and 
subsequent studies.]”
(emphasis supplied)
The freedom of elected legislators to discuss and debate matters 
of the moment on the floor of the House is a key component of a 
deliberative democracy in a Parliamentary form of government. The 
ability of legislators to conduct their functions in an environment 
which protects their freedom to do so without being overawed by 
coercion or fear is constitutionally secured. As citizens, legislators 
have a fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression. 
Going beyond that, the Constitution secures the freedom to speak 
and debate in the legislatures both of the Union and States. This is 
the protection afforded to individual legislators. The recognition of that 
right is premised on the need to secure the institutional foundation 
of Parliament and the State legislatures as key components of the 
dialogue, debate and critique which sustains democracy. 
49.	 In the Indian context, deliberative democracy as well as the essential 
privilege of freedom of speech in legislatures cannot be understood 
without reference to its history and development in the aftermath of the 
struggle for independence from colonial rule. India provides an example 
in history where representative institutions have evolved in stages. 
The privileges of legislatures in India have been closely
connected 
with the history of these institutions. This history can be traced to the 
history of parliamentary privileges in the House of Commons in the 
UK as well as the struggle of the Indian Legislatures to claim these 
privileges under colonial rule. The steps which were initiated under 
colonial rule to bring political and parliamentary governance to India 
always fell short of the aspirations of Indians. This can primarily be 
attributed to the fact that British rule was resistant to the desire of 
Indians to be independent. Hence, the Indian legislatures were not 
acknowledged to have comparable privileges to those of the House 
of Commons in the UK. In Kielly v. Carson29, the Privy Council had 
propounded that the House of Commons in the UK had acquired 
privileges by ancient usage and colonial legislatures had no lex 
et consuetudo parliament or the law and custom of Parliament as 
29	
(1841-42) 4 Moo. PC 63
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their rights emanated from a statute. This implied that there were no 
inherent rights granted to legislatures under colonial rule.
50.	 Under the rule of the East India Company, law making lay in the 
exclusive domain of the executive till 1833. The Government of 
India Act 1833 redesignated the Governor-General of Bengal as the 
Governor-General of India with exclusive legislative powers. The 
Governor-General was to have four members one of whom would be 
a law member who was not entitled to act as a member of the Council 
except for legislative purposes. This was an introductory measure for 
legislatures in India because the Council of the Governor-General 
would hold distinct meetings to transact its executive functions and 
legislative functions. This procedure was envisaged for convenience 
in enacting laws in the vast and diverse social milieu in India rather 
than a desire to provide representation as a means for framing better 
laws. However, reflecting the need for legislative privileges in carrying 
out the duties of the legislators, the first law member, Lord Macaulay, 
made efforts to secure some special facilities in the nature of powers 
by his draft standing orders. These special facilities included providing 
complete information on the subject of the legislation, the right to 
be present in all meetings of the Council of the Governor-General, 
freedom of speech, and freedom of voting.30
51.	 The privileges
of attendance and voting even in non-legislative 
business were extended by the Charter Act 1853. It marked a further 
separation of the executive and legislative functions. The Legislative 
Council was to have additional members to help transact the legislative 
business and give their independent considerations to the laws under 
scrutiny. These members in the Legislative Council did not have any 
privileges by statute, but the absence of restrictions on their freedom 
of speech was construed as conferring inherent rights and privileges 
on them. The Council therefore attempted to assume to itself powers 
akin to a mini Parliament modelled around the House of Commons 
in the UK. The Legislative Council under the Acts of 1833 and 1853 
had the power to frame their own rules of procedure.
52.	 This power was taken away in the Indian Council Act 1861. However, 
Section 10 of the 1861 Act introduced between six and twelve non-
official members into the Legislative Councils, who could be British 
30	
SK Nag, Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India till 1947, Sterling Publication, (1978), 317-18
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or Indians. There was an implicit recognition of the freedom of 
speech and vote of these additional members. The British Parliament 
had recognised the existence of the privilege for the members of 
the Indian Councils, which was also confirmed by the Secretary of 
State for India.31 Nevertheless the provisions of the 1861 Act were 
sufficiently stringent and did not allow the Council to have any activity 
beyond the limited sphere prescribed by the Act. Moreover, there 
was a marked difference between the freedom of speech effectively 
enjoyed by official members and nominated Indian members.32
53.	 The Government of India Act 1909 marked a significant shift in the 
evolution of India’s political institutions. The Act allowed more Indians 
to be a part of Legislative Councils and enlarged their functions. 
Members were allowed to ask questions and supplementary 
questions to the executive. The Act was a way forward for electoral 
and representative governance by prescribing the indirect election of 
Indians to the Council. However, even in these Councils, discussion 
on certain subjects was not permitted. Non-official members continued 
to assert the privilege of free speech in the Council. Despite being 
indirectly elected, the Indian members of legislatures in India diluted 
the rigidity of colonial governance in India. In the absence of official 
support, privileges grew as a convention rather than law. The executive
felt at liberty to violate the privileges of the Legislative Council and 
at any rate maintained that the Councils in India did not have any 
privilege akin to the UK House of Commons.33 
54.	 The Government of India Act 1919 separated the legislatures from 
executive control. It introduced dyarchy, by prescribing two classes of 
administrators – the Executive councillors who were not accountable 
to the legislature and the ministers who would enjoy the confidence 
of the legislature. The Act extended more powers to the legislatures 
than previously enjoyed by them. However, members were restricted 
on the range of subjects which they could discuss, participate in and 
vote upon. Many privileges were not specified in the 1919 Act or 
rules of the procedure of the House. Nevertheless, the legislature 
claimed privileges as an inherent right of the legislature in the face of 
31	
Legislative Dispatch No. 14 of 9 August 1861, para 23
32	
SK Nag, Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India till 1947, Sterling Publication, (1978), 102-103
33	
SK Nag, Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India till 1947, Sterling Publication, (1978), 139-141, 158
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an unwilling executive. The reason for the hesitation of the colonial 
Government of India was that a government run by a foreign power 
was not willing to extend parliamentary privileges to Indian legislators 
as a recognition of their possessing sovereign powers.34 The 1919 
Act gave a qualified privilege of freedom of speech to the Houses 
of Legislature. Section 24(7) of the 1919 Act read thus:
“(7) Subject to the rules and standing orders affecting the 
Council, there shall be freedom of speech in the Governors’ 
Legislative Councils. No person shall be liable to any 
proceedings in any court by reason of his speech or vote 
in any such Council or by reason of anything contained in 
any official report of the proceedings of any such Council.”
A corresponding provision was made in Section 11(7) of the Act with 
respect to provincial Legislative Councils. The freedom of speech in 
the Legislative Councils was subject to the Rules promulgated by the 
Governor-General. Therefore, while freedom of speech was extended 
to the Legislative Councils, they were ultimately made subject to the 
pleasure of the Governor-General and the Secretary of State for 
India for the legislature’s rule making power. The Act therefore did 
not make provisions to grant freedom of speech to Indian legislatures 
but rather aimed to place restrictions on the freedom of speech in 
the House. These restrictions materially impeded the ability of the
legislatures to hold discussions on issues of public importance and 
introduce legislation. The Act however did grant the legislature power 
to define its own privilege. 
55.	 A committee was set up in 1924 within a few years of the introduction 
of the Government of India Act 1919. The committee was tasked 
with enquiring into the difficulties or defects in the 1919 Act and 
exploring remedies for securing them. The Reforms Committee of 
1924 made reference to the privileges of Indian legislative bodies 
and opined that:
“…at present such action would be premature. At the same 
time we feel that the legislatures and the members thereof 
have not been given by the Government of India Act all 
the protection that they need. Under the statute there is 
34	
SK Nag, Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India till 1947, Sterling Publication, (1978), 322
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freedom of speech in all the legislatures and immunity 
from the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of speeches 
or votes. Under the rules the Presidents have been given 
considerable powers for the maintenance of order, but 
there the matter ends.”35 
56.	 Interestingly, the committee suggested that certain additional 
privileges be granted to Indian Legislatures. The committee further 
recommended introducing a penal provision for influencing votes 
within the legislature through inter alia bribery. The report stated: 
“We are given to understand that there are at present no 
means, of dealing with the corrupt influence of votes within 
the legislature. We are unanimously of opinion that the 
influencing of votes of members by bribery, intimidation 
and the like should be legislated against. Here again we 
do not recommend that the matter should be dealt with 
as a breach of privilege. We advocate that these offences 
should be made penal under the ordinary law.”
57.	 The government introduced a Legislative Bodies Corrupt Practices 
Bill which proposed to penalise (i) the offering of bribe to a member 
of a legislature in connection with his functions; and (ii) the receipt on 
demand by a member of the legislature of a bribe in connection with 
his functions.36 The Bill ultimately lapsed and was not reintroduced.
58.	 The provisions of the 1919 Act were substantially retained in Section 
28(1) of the Government of India
Act 1935. Section 28(1) read thus:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules 
and standing orders regulating the procedure of the 
Federal Legislature, there shall be freedom of speech in 
the Legislature, and no member of the Legislature shall 
be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of 
anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature 
or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable 
in respect of the publication by or under the authority of 
either Chamber of the Legislature of any report, paper, 
votes or proceedings.”
35	
Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee (1924), 75
36	
SK Nag, Evolution of Parliamentary Privileges in India till 1947, Sterling Publication, (1978), 213-214
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A corresponding provision was made in Section 71(1) of the 1935 Act 
with respect to Provincial Legislatures. The House was empowered 
to make rules for the conduct of proceedings. However, they were 
always to give way to the rules framed by the Governor-General 
for the House. Parliamentary privileges had struck root in India on 
legislators demanding parity with the UK House of Commons with 
reasonable adjustments to account for Indian needs. This was because 
legislators in India felt that their discharge of legislative functions would 
be adversely affected in the absence of these privileges. Prominent 
among the demands of legislators were the power to punish for 
contempt of the House, supremacy of the Chair in matters of the 
House, and freedom of speech and freedom from arrest to allow 
members to partake in the proceedings and discharge their functions. 
59.	 At no point were these privileges demanded as a blanket immunity 
from criminal law. Even in the face of colonial reluctance, the demand 
for parliamentary privileges in India was always tied to the relationship 
which it bore to the functions which the Indian legislators sought to 
discharge. 
60.	 This background prevailed when the Constituent Assembly was 
deciding the fate of Articles 85 and 169 of the draft Constitution 
which have since become Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution. 
Our founding parents intended the Constitution to be a ‘modernizing’
force. Parliamentary form of democracy was the first level of this 
modernizing influence envisaged by the framers of the Constitution.37 
The Constitution was therefore born in an environment of idealism 
and a strength of purpose born of the struggle for independence. 
The framers intended to have a Constitution which would light the 
way for a modern India.38
61.	 When the Constituent Assembly convened to discuss Article 85 
of the draft Constitution, Mr HV Kamath moved an amendment to 
remove the reference to the House of Commons in the UK and 
replace it with the Dominion Legislature in India immediately before 
the commencement of the Constitution. Opposing this amendment Mr 
Shibban Lal Saxena said, “So far as I know there are no privileges 
which we enjoy and if he wants the complete nullification of all our 
37	
Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, OUP (1972), ix
38	
Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, OUP (1972), xiii
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privileges he is welcome to have his amendment adopted.”39 The 
members of the Constituent Assembly were therefore keenly aware 
that their privileges under the colonial rule were not ‘ancient and 
undoubted’ like the House of Commons in the UK but a statutory 
grant made by successive enactments and assertion by legislatures.
F.	
Purport of parliamentary privilege in India
I.	
Functional analysis
62.	 Article 105 which is located in Part V Chapter II of the Constitution 
stipulates the powers, privileges, and immunities of Parliament, its 
members and committees. An analogous provision concerning State 
Legislatures is in Article 194 of the Constitution. Article 105 reads 
as follows:
“105. Powers, privileges, etc., of the Houses of 
Parliament and of the members and committees 
thereof.
(1)	 Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to 
the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure 
of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in 
Parliament.
(2)	 No member of Parliament shall be liable to any 
proceedings in any court in respect of anything 
said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any 
committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable 
in respect of the publication by or under the authority 
of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, 
votes or proceedings.
(3)	
In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities 
of each House of Parliament, and of the members and 
the
committees of each House, shall be such as may 
from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, 
and, until so defined, shall be those of that House and 
of its members and committees immediately before 
the coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution 
(Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
39	
CAD Vol VIII 19 May, 1949 Draft Article 85
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(4)	 The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply 
in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution 
have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take 
part in the proceedings of, a House of Parliament 
or any committee thereof as they apply in relation 
to members of Parliament.”
63.	 Article 105 of the Constitution has four clauses. Clause (1) declares 
that there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament. This freedom 
is subject to the Constitution and to the rules and standing orders 
regulating the procedure in Parliament. Therefore, the freedom of 
speech in Parliament would be subject to the provisions that regulate 
its procedure framed under Article 118. It is also subject to Article 
121 which restricts Parliament from discussing the conduct of any 
Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court in the discharge 
of their duties except upon a motion for presenting an address to 
the President praying for the removal of the Judge. The freedom of 
speech guaranteed in Parliament under Article 105(1) is distinct from 
that guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). In Alagaapuram R Mohanraj 
v. TN Legislative Assembly40 this Court delineated the differences 
in these freedoms as follows:
a.	
While the fundamental right of speech guaranteed under 
Article 19(1)(a) inheres in every citizen, the freedom of speech 
contemplated under Articles 105 and 194 is not available to 
every citizen but only to a member of
the legislature;
b.	
Article 105 is available only during the tenure of the membership 
of those bodies. On the other hand, the fundamental right under 
Article 19(1)(a) is inalienable;
c.	
Article 105 is limited to the premises of the legislative bodies. 
Article 19(1)(a) has no such geographical limitations; and
d.	
Article 19(1)(a) is subject to reasonable restrictions which are 
compliant with Article 19(2). However, the right of free speech 
available to a legislator under Articles 105 or 194 is not subject to 
such limitations. That an express provision is made for freedom 
of speech in Parliament in clause (1) of Article 105 suggests 
that this freedom is independent of the freedom of speech 
40	
[2016] 6 SCR 611 : (2016) 6 SCC 82
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conferred by Article 19 and is not restricted by the exceptions 
contained therein.
64.	 Clause (2) of Article 105 has two limbs. The first prescribes that a 
member of Parliament shall not be liable before any court in respect 
of “anything said or any vote given” by them in Parliament or any 
committee thereof. The second limb prescribes that no person shall 
be liable before any court in respect of the publication by or under 
the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, 
vote or proceedings. The vote given by a member of Parliament 
is an extension of speech. Therefore, the freedom of a member of 
Parliament to cast a vote is also protected by the freedom of speech 
in Parliament. In Tej Kiran Jain v. N Sanjeeva Reddy,41 a six-judge 
bench of this Court held that Article 105(2) confers immunity in respect 
of “anything said” so long as it is “in Parliament.” Therefore, the 
immunity is qualified by the fact that it must be attracted to speech 
during the conduct of business in Parliament. This Court held that 
the word “anything” is of the widest import and is equivalent to 
“everything”. It is only limited by the term “in Parliament”. 
65.	 Clauses (1) and (2) explicitly guarantee freedom of speech in 
Parliament. Clause (1) is a positive postulate which guarantees 
freedom of speech whereas Clause (2) is an extension of the same 
freedom postulated negatively. It does so by protecting the speech,
and by extension a vote, from proceedings before a court. Freedom 
of speech in the Houses of Parliament and their committees is a 
necessary privilege, essential to the functioning of the House. As 
we have noted above, the privilege of free speech in the House of 
Parliament or Legislature can be traced to the struggle of the Indian 
legislators and was granted in progression by the colonial government. 
This privilege is not only essential to the ability of Parliament and 
its members to carry out their duties, but it is also at the core of 
the function of a democratic legislative institution. Members of 
Parliament and Legislatures represent the will of the people and their 
aspirations. The Constitution was adopted to have a modernizing 
influence. The Constitution is intended to meet the aspirations of the 
people, to eschew an unjust society premised on social hierarchies 
and discrimination, and to facilitate the path towards an egalitarian 
41	
[1971] 1 SCR 612 : (1970) 2 SCC 272
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society. Freedom of speech in Parliament and the legislatures is 
an arm of the same aspiration so that members may express the 
grievances of their constituents, express diverse perspectives and 
ventilate the perspectives of their constituents. Freedom of speech 
in Parliament ensures that the government is held accountable by 
the House. In Kalpana Mehta (supra) one of us (DY Chandrachud, 
J) had occasion to elucidate the importance of this privilege:
“181. […] Parliament represents collectively, through the 
representative character of its Members, the voice and 
aspirations of the people. Free speech within Parliament is 
crucial for democratic governance. It is through the fearless 
expression of their views that Parliamentarians pursue 
their commitment to those who elect them. The power 
of speech exacts democratic accountability from elected 
governments. The free flow of dialogue ensures that in 
framing legislation and overseeing government policies, 
Parliament reflects the diverse views of the electorate 
which an elected institution represents.
182. The Constitution recognises free speech as a 
fundamental right in Article 19(1)(a). A separate articulation 
of that right in Article 105(1) shows how important the 
debates and expression of view in Parliament have been 
viewed by the draftspersons. Article 105(1) is not a simple 
reiteration or for that matter, a surplusage. It embodies the 
fundamental value
that the free and fearless exposition 
of critique in Parliament is the essence of democracy. 
Elected Members of Parliament represent the voices of the 
citizens. In giving expression to the concerns of citizens, 
Parliamentary speech enhances democracy. […]”
(emphasis supplied)
66.	 Notably, unlike the House of Commons in the UK, India does not 
have ‘ancient and undoubted’ rights which were vested after a 
struggle between Parliament and the King. On the contrary, privileges 
were always governed by statute in India. The statutory privilege 
transitioned to a constitutional privilege after the commencement 
of the Constitution. However, while the drafters of the Constitution 
expressly envisaged the freedom of speech in Parliament, they left 
the other privileges to be decided by Parliament through legislation.
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Clause (3) of Article 105 states that in respect of privileges not falling 
under Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 105, the powers, privileges and 
immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and 
the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to 
time be defined by Parliament by law. Until Parliament defines these 
privileges, they are to be those which the House and its members 
and committees enjoyed immediately before the coming into force of 
Section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. 
Section 15 reads as follows:
“15. Amendment of article 105.-In article 105 of the 
Constitution, in clause (3), for the words “shall be those 
of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the 
commencement of this Constitution”, the words, figures and 
brackets “shall be those of that House and of its members 
and committees immediately before the coming into force 
of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) 
Act, 1978” shall be substituted.”
67.	 The privileges enjoyed by the House and its members and 
committees immediately before the coming into force of Section 
15 of the Forty-fourth amendment to the Constitution were those 
enjoyed by the House of Commons in the UK at the commencement 
of the Constitution of India. This was also the case with Clause 
(3) of Article 194 which was amended by Section 26 of the
Forty-
fourth amendment to the Constitution. The reference to the House 
of Commons was accepted by the Constituent Assembly for two 
reasons. First, Indian legislators did not enjoy any privilege prior to 
the commencement of the Constitution and therefore a reference 
to the Dominion Parliament would leave the House with virtually no 
privileges. Second, it was not possible to make an exhaustive list 
of privileges at the time nor was it preferable to enlist such a long 
list as a schedule to the Constitution.42 
68.	 Clause (3) allows Parliament to enact a law on its privileges from 
time to time. It may be noted here that the House of Commons in 
42	
See reply of Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and Dr BR Ambedkar to the Constituent Assembly, CAD Vol 
VIII 19 May 1949 Draft Article 85 and Vol X 16 October 1949 Draft Article 85.
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the UK does not create new privileges.43 Its privileges are those 
which have been practiced by the House and have become ancient 
and undoubted. 
69.	 Further, unlike the House of Commons in the UK, Parliament in India 
cannot claim power of its own composition. The extent of privileges 
in India has to be within the confines of the Constitution. Within 
this scheme, the Courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the 
privilege claimed by the House of Parliament or Legislature in fact 
exists and whether they have been exercised correctly. In a steady 
line of precedent, this Court has held that in the absence of legislation 
on privileges, the Parliament or Legislature may only claim such 
privilege which belonged to the House of Commons at the time of 
the commencement of the Constitution and that the House is not 
the sole judge to decide its own privilege. 
70.	 When the Parliament or Legislatures enact a law on privileges, such a 
law would be subject to the scrutiny of Part III of the Constitution. The 
interplay between Part III of the Constitution and Article 105(3) arose 
in the decision of this Court in MSM Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha,44 
where a Constitution bench speaking through SR Das, CJ held that 
the privileges of the House of Parliament under Clause (3) of Article 
105 are those which belonged to the House of Commons in the UK at 
the commencement of the Constitution which would prevail over the
fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the 
Constitution. However, if the Parliament were to enact a law codifying 
its privilege then it may not step over the fundamental rights of citizens 
by virtue of Article 13 of the Constitution. K Subba Rao, J (as the 
learned Chief Justice then was) dissented from the majority and held 
that the import of privileges held by the House of Commons in the UK 
was only a transitory provision till the Parliament or legislatures enact 
a law codifying their respective privileges. Therefore, Justice Subba 
Rao held in his dissent that the legislature cannot run roughshod over 
the fundamental rights of citizens who in theory have retained their 
rights and only given a part of it to the legislature.
43	
 It was agreed in 1704 that no House of Parliament shall have power, by any vote or declaration, to create 
new privilege that is not warranted by known laws and customs of Parliament. The symbolic petition by 
the Speaker of the House of Commons to the crown claiming the ‘ancient and undoubted’ privileges of 
the House of Commons are therefore not to be changed.
44	
[1959] Suppl. 1 SCR 806 : AIR 1959 SC 395
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71.	 In Special Refence No. 1 of 1964,45 a seven-judge Bench of this 
Court opined on the privileges of the State Legislature upon a 
Presidential reference. The reference was in the aftermath of the 
Speaker of the UP Legislative Assembly directing the arrest and 
production of two judges of the High Court. The two judges had 
interfered with a resolution to administer reprimand to a person 
who had published a pamphlet libelling one of the members of the 
Assembly. Gajendragadkar, CJ speaking for the majority did not 
disagree with the decision in MSM Sharma (supra) which held that 
Article 105(3) and Article 194(3) would prevail over Article 19(1)(a) 
of the Constitution. However, the Court held that Article 21 was to 
prevail over Articles 105(3) and 194(3) in a conflict between the two. 
The Court held that the Parliament or Legislature is not the sole 
judge of its privileges and the courts have the power to enquire if a 
particular privilege claimed by the legislature in fact existed or not, 
by consulting the privileges of the Commons. The determination of 
privileges, the Court held, and whether they conform to the parameters 
of the Constitution is a question that must be answered by the courts. 
This Court opined that:
“37. The next question which faces us arises from the 
preliminary contention raised by Mr Seervai that by his 
appearance before us on behalf of the House, the House 
should not be taken to have
conceded to the Court the 
jurisdiction to construe Article 194(3) so as to bind it. As 
we have already indicated, his stand is that in the matter 
of privileges, the House is the sole and exclusive judge 
at all stages. […]
…
42. In coming to the conclusion that the content of Article 
194(3) must ultimately be determined by courts and not 
by the legislatures, we are not unmindful of the grandeur 
and majesty of the task which has been assigned to the 
legislatures under the Constitution. Speaking broadly, all 
the legislative chambers in our country today are playing 
a significant role in the pursuit of the ideal of a Welfare 
State which has been placed by the Constitution before our 
45	
[1965] 1 SCR 413 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 21
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country, and that naturally gives the legislative chambers 
a high place in the making of history today. […]”
(emphasis supplied)
72.	 The opinion in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (supra) was further 
affirmed by another seven-judge bench of this Court in State of 
Karnataka v. Union of India46 which held that whenever a question 
arises whether the House has jurisdiction over a matter under its 
privileges, the adjudication of such a claim is vested exclusively in 
the courts. Relying on Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (supra) 
and State of Karnataka (supra) a Constitution bench of this Court 
in Raja Ram Pal (supra) held that the court has the authority and 
jurisdiction to examine if a privilege asserted by the House (or even 
a member by extension) in fact accrues under the Constitution. 
Further, in Amarinder Singh (supra) a Constitution bench of this 
Court held that the courts are empowered to scrutinise the exercise 
of privileges by the House.47 The interplay between fundamental 
rights of citizens and the privileges of the Houses of Parliament or 
Legislature is pending before a Constitution bench of this Court in 
N Ravi v. Speaker, Legislative Assembly Chennai.48 
73.	 Clause (4) of Article 105 extends the freedoms in the above clauses 
to all persons who by virtue of the Constitution have a right to speak 
in Parliament. The four clauses in Articles 105 and 194 form a 
composite whole which lend colour to each
other and together form 
the corpus of the powers, privileges and immunities of the Houses 
of Parliament or Legislature, as the case may be, and of members 
and committees. 
74.	 We have explored the trajectory of parliamentary privileges, especially 
that of freedom of speech in the Indian legislatures. It has been a 
timeless insistence of the legislators that their freedom of speech 
to carry out their essential legislative functions be protected and 
sanctified. Whereas the drafters of our Constitution have expressly 
guaranteed the freedom of speech in Parliament and legislature, 
they left the other privileges uncodified. 
46	
[1978] 2 SCR 1 : (1977) 4 SCC 608, para 63
47	
(2010) 6 SCC 113, para 54
48	
WP (Crl) No. 206-210/2003 etc.
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75.	 In a consistent line of precedent this Court has held that – firstly, 
Parliament or the state legislature is not the sole judge of what 
privileges it enjoys and secondly, Parliament or legislature may only 
claim privileges which are essential and necessary for the functioning 
of the House. We have explored the first of these limbs above. We 
shall now analyse the jurisprudence on the existence, extent and 
exercise of privileges by the House of Parliament, its members and 
committees. 
II.	
Parliamentary privilege as a collective right of the House
76.	 According to Erskine May, parliamentary privilege is the sum of 
certain rights enjoyed by each House collectively as a constituent 
part of the “High Court of Parliament” and by members of each 
House individually, without which they could not discharge their 
functions, and which exceed those possessed by other bodies or 
individuals.49 The term ‘High Court of Parliament’ dates back to the 
time when all powers of legislating and dispensing justice vested 
in the Monarch who in turn divested them to a body which would 
carry out the function of the legislature as the King sitting in the 
High Court of Parliament. To that extent, the term is redundant in 
the Indian context where the Constitution is supreme and the power 
of the Parliament over its domain flows from and is defined by the 
Constitution. However, the definition provides an authoritative guide 
to
understanding the meaning and remit of parliamentary privileges. 
The definition evidently divides privileges into two constituent 
elements. The first is the sum of rights enjoyed by the House of 
Parliament and the second is the rights enjoyed by members of 
the House individually. Rights and immunities such as the power 
to regulate its own procedure, the power to punish for contempt of 
the House or to expel a member for the remainder of the session 
of the House, belong to the first element of privileges held by the 
House as a collective body for its proper functioning, protection 
of members, and vindication of its own authority and dignity. The 
second element of rights exercised individually by members of 
the House includes freedom of speech and freedom from arrest, 
among others. 
49	
Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, LexisNexis, 25th 
ed. (2019) 239.
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77.	 The privilege exercised by members individually is in turn qualified 
by its necessity, in that the privilege must be such that “without which 
they could not discharge their functions.” We shall elucidate this 
limb later in the course of this judgment. These privileges enjoyed 
by members of the House individually are a means to ensure and 
facilitate the effective discharge of the collective functions of the 
House.50 It must therefore be noted that whereas the privileges 
enjoyed by members of the House exceed those possessed by 
other bodies or individuals, they are not absolute or unqualified. The 
privilege of an individual member only extends insofar as it aids the 
House to function and without which the House may not be able to 
carry out its functions collectively. 
78.	 Subhash C Kashyap has explained parliamentary privileges as 
they may be understood in the Indian context.51 In his book on 
parliamentary procedure, the author has opined as follows:
“[…] In Parliamentary parlance the term ‘privilege means 
certain rights and immunities enjoyed by each House of 
Parliament and its Committees collectively, and by the 
members of each House individually without which they 
cannot discharge their functions efficiently and effectively. 
The object of parliamentary privilege is to safeguard the 
freedom, the authority and the dignity of the institution 
of Parliament and its members. They are granted by the
Constitution to enable them to discharge their functions 
without any let or hindrance. Parliamentary Privileges 
do not exempt members from the obligations to the 
society which apply to other citizens. Privileges of 
Parliament do not place a member of Parliament on 
a footing different from that of an ordinary citizen in 
the matter of the applications of the laws of the land 
unless there are good and sufficient reasons in the 
interest of Parliament itself to do so. The fundamental 
principle is that all citizens including members of Parliament 
should be treated equally before the law. The privileges 
50	
Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, LexisNexis, 25th 
ed. (2019) 239.
51	
Subhash C. Kashyap, Parliamentary Procedure—Law, Privileges, Practice and Precedents, 3rd ed., Uni-
versal Law Publishing Co, 502.
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are available to members only when they are functioning 
in their capacity as members of Parliament and performing 
their parliamentary duties.”
(emphasis supplied)
79.	 The understanding which unequivocally emerges supports the claim 
that the privileges which accrue to members of the House individually 
are not an end in themselves. The purpose which privileges serve 
is that they are necessary for the House and its committees to 
function. Therefore, we may understand parliamentary privileges as 
those rights and immunities which allow the orderly, democratic, and 
smooth functioning of Parliament and without which the essential 
functioning of the House would be violated. 
80.	 The framers of the Constitution intended to establish a responsible, 
responsive and representative democracy. The value and importance 
of such a democracy weighed heavily on the framers of the Constitution 
given the history of an oppressive colonial government to which India 
had been subjected. The history of parliamentary democracy shows 
that the colonial government denied India a responsible government 
where initially Indians were kept out of legislating on laws which 
would be enforced on its diverse social tapestry. Even when Indians 
were allowed in legislatures, a responsive government which could 
be accountable to the people in a meaningful way was yet a distant 
reality in the colonial period. The ability of the legislature in turn
to scrutinise the actions of the executive was effaced and despite 
the statutory guarantee of freedom of speech for members of the 
House in the Government of India Act 1919, the guarantee remained 
illusory to the extent that many subjects were restricted from being 
discussed in the legislatures. 
81.	 In that sense, the foundations of a deliberative democracy premised 
on responsibility, responsiveness, and representation sought to 
ensure that the executive government of the day is elected by 
and responsible to the Parliament or Legislative Assemblies which 
comprise of elected representatives. These representatives would 
be able to express their views on behalf of the citizens and ensure 
that the government lends ear to their aspirations, complaints and 
grievances. This aspect of the functioning of the House is essential 
to sustain a meaningful democracy. This necessitates that members 
of the House be able to attend the House and thereafter speak their
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minds without fear of being harassed by the executive or any other 
person or body on the basis of their actions as members of the 
House in the exercise of their duties. In the absence of this feature 
Parliament and the state legislatures would lose the essence of their 
representative character in a democratic polity. 
82.	 The privileges enshrined under Article 105 and Article 194 of the 
Constitution are of the widest amplitude but to the extent that they 
serve the aims for which they have been granted. The framers of the 
Constitution would not have intended to grant to the legislatures those 
rights which may not serve any purpose for the proper functioning of 
the House. The privileges of the members of the House individually 
bear a functional relationship to the ability of the House to collectively 
fulfil its functioning and vindicate its authority and dignity. In other 
words, these freedoms are necessary to be in furtherance of fertilizing 
a deliberative, critical, and responsive democracy. In State of Kerala 
v. K Ajith,52 one of us (DY Chandrachud, J) held that a member of 
the legislature, the opposition included, has a right to protest on the 
floor of the legislature. However, the said right guaranteed under 
Article 105(1) of the Constitution would not exclude the application 
of ordinary criminal law against acts not in direct exercise of the 
duties of the individual as a member of the House. This
Court held 
that the Constitution recognises privileges and immunities to create 
an environment in which members of the House can perform their 
functions and discharge their duties freely. These privileges bear a 
functional relationship to the discharge of the functions of a legislator. 
They are not a mark of status which makes legislators stand on an 
unequal pedestal.
83.	 MN Kaul and SL Shakdher have in their celebrated work on the 
Practice and Procedure of Parliament endorsed this view by stating 
that53
“In modern times, parliamentary privilege has to be viewed 
from a different angle than in the earlier days of the struggle 
of Parliament against the executive authority. Privilege at 
that time was regarded as a protection of the members of 
52	
[2021] 6 SCR 774 : (2021) 17 SCC 318
53	
MN Kaul and SL Shakdher, Practice and Procedure of Parliament, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Metropolitan 
Book Co. Pvt. Ltd., 7th ed., 229.
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Parliament against an executive authority not responsible 
to Parliament. The entire background in which privileges 
of Parliament are now viewed has changed because 
the Executive is now responsible to Parliament. The 
foundation upon which they rest is the maintenance 
of the dignity and independence of the House and of 
its members.”
(emphasis supplied)
The privileges enjoyed by members of the House are tethered 
intrinsically to the functioning of the House collectively. A House of 
Parliament or Legislature functions through the collective will of its 
individual members. These members acting as constituents of the 
House may not claim any privilege or immunity unconnected with 
the working of the entire House. 
84.	 While some cherished freedoms exercised individually by members 
of the House, including the freedom of speech, have been undeniably 
understood to be essential to the functioning of the House as 
a whole, other exercises such as damaging public property or 
committing violence are not and cannot be deemed to have immunity. 
The privileges and immunities enshrined in Articles 105 and 194 
of the Constitution with respect to Houses of Parliament and the 
Legislatures, their members and committees, respectively belong 
to the House collectively. The exercise of the privileges individually 
by members must be tested on the anvil of whether it is tethered to 
the healthy and essential functioning of the House.
III.	
Necessity test to claim and exercise a privilege
85.	 Having established that the privileges and immunities exercisable by 
members of the House individually must be tethered to the functioning 
of the House we must now explore which privileges may be deemed 
to accrue to the House collectively and by extension to individual 
members. In State of Karnataka (supra) a seven-Judge bench of 
this Court speaking through MH Beg, CJ held that the powers under 
Article 194 (as well as Article 105) are those which depend upon 
and are necessary for the conduct of the business of each House. 
In that sense, these powers may not even apply to all the privileges 
which accrue to the House of Commons but may not be necessary 
for the functioning of the House. The learned Chief Justice stated:
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“57. It is evident, from the Chapter in which Article 194 
occurs as well as the heading and its marginal note 
that the “powers” meant to be indicated here are not 
independent. They are powers which depend upon 
and are necessary for the conduct of the business of 
each House. They cannot also be expanded into those 
of the House of Commons in England for all purposes. 
For example, it could not be contended that each House 
of a State Legislature has the same share of legislative 
power as the House of Commons has, as a constituent 
part of a completely sovereign legislature. Under our law 
it is the Constitution which is sovereign or supreme. The 
Parliament as well as each Legislature of a State in India 
enjoys only such legislative powers as the Constitution 
confers upon it. Similarly, each House of Parliament or 
State Legislature has such share in legislative power as 
is assigned to it by the Constitution itself. […]”
(emphasis supplied)
86.	 This Court held that in India the source of authority is the Constitution 
which derives its sovereignty from the people. The powers and 
privileges claimed by a House cannot traverse beyond those which 
are permissible under the Constitution. The Constitution only allows 
exercise of those powers, privileges, and immunities which are 
essential to the functioning of the House or a committee thereof. 
MN Kaul and SL Shakdher have opined that54
“In interpreting these
privileges, therefore, regard must 
be had to the general principle that the privileges of 
Parliament are granted to members in order that “they 
may be able to perform their duties in Parliament 
without let or hindrance”. They apply to individual 
members “only insofar as they are necessary in order that 
the House may freely perform its functions. They do 
not discharge the member from the obligations to society 
which apply to him as much and perhaps more closely in 
that capacity, as they apply to other subjects”. Privileges 
54	
MN Kaul and SL Shakdher, Practice and Procedure of Parliament, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Metropolitan 
Book Co. Pvt. Ltd., 7th ed., 229.
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of Parliament do not place a member of Parliament on 
a footing different from that of an ordinary citizen in the 
matter of the application of laws unless there are good 
and sufficient reasons in the interest of Parliament itself 
to do so.”
(emphasis supplied)
87.	 The evolution of parliamentary privileges as well as the jurisprudence 
of this Court establish that members of the House or indeed the House 
itself cannot claim privileges which are not essentially related to their 
functioning. To give any privilege unconnected to the functioning of 
the Parliament or Legislature by necessity is to create a class of 
citizens which enjoys unchecked exemption from ordinary application 
of the law. This was neither the intention of the Constitution nor the 
goal of vesting Parliament and Legislature with powers, privileges 
and immunities.
88.	 In Amarinder Singh (supra) a Constitution bench of this Court held 
that the test to scrutinise the exercise of privileges is whether they 
were necessary to safeguard the integrity of legislative functions. KG 
Balakrishnan, CJ after exploring a wealth of material on the subject 
opined that privileges serve the distinct purpose of safeguarding the 
integrity of the House. This Court held that privileges are not an end 
in themselves but must be exercised to ensure the effective exercise 
of legislative functions. The Chief Justice observed that:
“35. The evolution of legislative
privileges can be traced 
back to medieval England when there was an ongoing 
tussle for power between the monarch and Parliament. 
In most cases, privileges were exercised to protect the 
Members of Parliament from undue pressure or influence 
by the monarch among others. Conversely, with the gradual 
strengthening of Parliament there were also some excesses 
in the name of legislative privileges. However, the ideas 
governing the relationship between the executive 
and the legislature have undergone a sea change 
since then. In modern parliamentary democracies, 
it is the legislature which consists of the people’s 
representatives who are expected to monitor executive 
functions. This is achieved by embodying the idea of 
“collective responsibility” which entails that those
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who wield executive power are accountable to the 
legislature.
36. However, legislative privileges serve a distinct purpose. 
They are exercised to safeguard the integrity of 
legislative functions against obstructions which could 
be caused by members of the House as well as non-
members. Needless to say, it is conceivable that in some 
instances persons holding executive office could potentially 
cause obstructions to legislative functions. Hence, there 
is a need to stress on the operative principles that can be 
relied on to test the validity of the exercise of legislative 
privileges in the present case.
…
47. […] the exercise of legislative privileges is not an 
end in itself. They are supposed to be exercised in order 
to ensure that legislative functions can be exercised 
effectively, without undue obstructions. These functions 
include the right of members to speak and vote on the 
floor of the House as well as the proceedings of various 
Legislative Committees. In this respect, privileges can be 
exercised to protect persons engaged as administrative 
employees as well. The important consideration for 
scrutinising the exercise of legislative privileges is 
whether the same was necessary to safeguard the 
integrity of legislative functions. […].”
(emphasis supplied)
89.	 In Lokayukta, Justice Ripusudan Dayal v. State of MP,55 a 
three-judge bench of this Court held that the scope of a privilege 
enjoyed by a House
and its members must be tested on the basis 
of the necessity of the privilege to the House for its free functioning. 
This Court further held that members of the House cannot claim 
exemption from the application of ordinary criminal law under the 
garb of privileges which accrue to them as members of the House 
under the Constitution. P Sathasivam, CJ opined that
55	
[2014] 3 SCR 242 : (2014) 4 SCC 473
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“51. The scope of the privileges enjoyed depends upon 
the need for privileges i.e. why they have been provided 
for. The basic premise for the privileges enjoyed by the 
Members is to allow them to perform their functions as 
Members and no hindrance is caused to the functioning 
of the House. […]
52. It is clear that the basic concept is that the privileges 
are those rights without which the House cannot 
perform its legislative functions. They do not exempt 
the Members from their obligations under any statute which 
continue to apply to them like any other law applicable 
to ordinary citizens. Thus, enquiry or investigation into 
an allegation of corruption against some officers of the 
Legislative Assembly cannot be said to interfere with the 
legislative functions of the Assembly. No one enjoys any 
privilege against criminal prosecution.
…
76. It is made clear that privileges are available only 
insofar as they are necessary in order that the House 
may freely perform its functions. For the application of 
laws, particularly, the provisions of the Lokayukt Act and 
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the jurisdiction 
of the Lokayukt or the Madhya Pradesh Special Police 
Establishment is for all public servants (except the Speaker 
and the Deputy Speaker of the Madhya Pradesh Vidhan 
Sabha for the purposes of the Lokayukt Act) and no 
privilege is available to the officials and, in any case, they 
cannot claim
any privilege more than an ordinary citizen to 
whom the provisions of the said Acts apply. Privileges do 
not extend to the activities undertaken outside the House 
on which the legislative provisions would apply without 
any differentiation.”
(emphasis supplied)
90.	 The necessity test for ascertaining parliamentary privileges has struck 
deep roots in the Indian context. We do not need to explore the well-
established jurisprudence on the necessity test in other jurisdictions 
beyond the above exposition of Indian jurisprudence on the subject 
at this juncture. The evolution of parliamentary privileges in various
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parliamentary jurisdictions has shown a consistent pattern that when 
an issue involving privileges arises, the test applied is whether the 
privilege claimed is essential and necessary to the orderly functioning 
of the House or its committee. We may also note that the burden 
of satisfying that a privilege exists and that it is necessary for the 
House to collectively discharge its function lies with the person or 
body claiming the privilege. The Houses of Parliament or Legislatures, 
and the committees are not islands which act as enclaves shielding 
those inside from the application of ordinary laws. The lawmakers 
are subject to the same law that the law-making body enacts for the 
people it governs and claims to represent. 
91.	 We therefore hold that the assertion of a privilege by an individual 
member of Parliament or Legislature would be governed by a twofold 
test. First, the privilege claimed has to be tethered to the collective 
functioning of the House, and second, its necessity must bear a 
functional relationship to the discharge of the essential duties of a 
legislator.
G.	
Bribery is not protected by parliamentary privilege
I.	
Bribery is not in respect of anything said or any vote given
92.	 The question remains as to whether these privileges attract immunity 
to a member of Parliament or of the Legislatures who engages in 
bribery in connection with their speech or vote. The test of intrinsic 
relation
to the functioning of the House and the necessity test evolved 
by this Court in the context of determining the remit of privileges 
under Articles 105(3) and 194(3) must weigh while delineating the 
privileges under Clauses (1) and (2) of the provisions as well. When 
this Court is called upon to answer a question of interpretation of a 
provision of the Constitution, it must interpret the text in a manner 
that does not do violence to the fabric of the Constitution. This 
Court’s opinion in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) hinged on two phrases 
in clause (2) of Article 105 of the Constitution. These phrases were 
“in respect of” and the following word “anything.” Clause (2) of the 
Article reads as follows
“(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any 
proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or 
any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee 
thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the
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publication by or under the authority of either House of 
Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.”
93.	 In State (NCT of Delhi) v Union of India,56 Dipak Misra, CJ observed 
that the Court should interpret a constitutional provision and construe 
the meaning of specific words in the text in the context in which the 
words occur by referring to the other words of the said provision. 
This Court held in that case that the meaning of the word “any” can 
be varied depending on the context in which it appears and that 
the words “any matter” was not to be understood as “every matter”.
94.	 The decision in Tej Kiran Jain (supra) interpreted the word “anything” 
in Clause (1) of Article 105 to be of the widest amplitude and only 
subject to the words appearing after it which were “in Parliament.” 
The clause does give wide freedom of speech in Parliament. The 
word ‘anything’ cannot be interpreted to allow interference of the 
court in determining if the speech had relevance to the subject it was 
dealing with at the time the speech was made. In Tej Kiran Jain 
(supra) the followers of a religious head who had made a speech 
on untouchability filed a suit in the High Court seeking damages for 
defamation alleged to have been committed in the Lok Sabha during 
a calling attention motion on the speech. This Court held that the 
Court cannot dissect a speech made in Parliament and adjudicate 
if the speech has a direct
relation to the subject matter before it. 
Parliament has absolute control over which matters it directs its 
attention towards and thereafter the members or persons at liberty 
to speak may not be subjected to the fear of prosecution against 
anything that they may say in the House. 
95.	 That context evidently changes in Clause (2) of Article 105 which 
gives immunity to members of the House and the committees thereof 
in any proceeding in any court in respect of “anything” said or any 
vote given in the House. MH Beg, CJ in State of Karnataka (supra) 
had foreseen a situation where a criminal act may be committed in 
the House and had observed that it could not be protected under 
the Constitution. The Chief Justice opined that :
“63. […] A House of Parliament or State Legislature cannot 
try anyone or any case directly, as a Court of Justice can, 
56	
[2018] 7 SCR 1 : (2018) 8 SCC 501
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but it can proceed quasi-judicially in cases of contempts 
of its authority and take up motions concerning its 
“privileges” and “immunities” because, in doing so, it only 
seeks removal of obstructions to the due performance of 
its legislative functions. But, if any question of jurisdiction 
arises as to whether a matter falls here or not, it has to be 
decided by the ordinary courts in appropriate proceedings. 
For example, the jurisdiction to try a criminal offence, 
such as murder, committed even within a House vests 
in ordinary criminal courts and not in a House of 
Parliament or in a State Legislature. […]”
(emphasis supplied)
96.	 In K Ajith (supra) a member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly was 
accused of climbing over the Speaker’s dais and causing damage 
to property during the presentation of the budget by the Finance 
Minister of the State. The question which arose before this Court 
was whether the member could be prosecuted before a court of 
law for his conduct inside the House of the Legislature. This Court 
speaking through one of us (DY Chandrachud, J) after exploring the 
evolution of law in this regard in the UK observed that:
“36. […] it is evident that a person committing a criminal 
offence within the precincts of the House does not hold an 
absolute privilege. Instead, he would possess a qualified 
privilege, and would receive the immunity only if the action 
bears nexus to the effective
participation of the member 
in the House.”
97.	 This Court further held that privileges accruing inside the legislature 
are not a gateway to claim exemption from the general application 
of the law:
“65. Privileges and immunities are not gateways to claim 
exemptions from the general law of the land, particularly 
as in this case, the criminal law which governs the 
action of every citizen. To claim an exemption from 
the application of criminal law would be to betray the 
trust which is impressed on the character of elected 
representatives as the makers and enactors of the 
law. The entire foundation upon which the application for
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withdrawal under Section 321 was moved by the Public 
Prosecutor is based on a fundamental misconception of 
the constitutional provisions contained in Article 194. The 
Public Prosecutor seems to have been impressed by the 
existence of privileges and immunities which would stand 
in the way of the prosecution. Such an understanding 
betrays the constitutional provision and proceeds on a 
misconception that elected members of the legislature stand 
above the general application of criminal law.”
(emphasis supplied)
98.	 In Lokayukta, Justice Ripusudan Dayal (supra) criminal proceedings 
were initiated against administrative officers of the Madhya Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly for allegedly engaging in corruption and financial 
irregularity. The Speaker of the Assembly initiated proceedings for 
breach of privilege against the Lokayukta and vigilance authorities. 
This Court while holding that initiation of criminal proceedings for 
corruption may not amount to a breach of privilege had opined that: 
“48. It is clear that in the matter of the application of 
laws, particularly, the provisions of the Lokayukt Act 
and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, insofar as 
the jurisdiction of the Lokayukt or the Madhya Pradesh 
Special Establishment is concerned, all public servants 
except the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the 
Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha for the purposes of 
the Lokayukt Act fall in the same category and
cannot 
claim any privilege more than an ordinary citizen to 
whom the provisions of the said Acts apply. […].
49. As rightly submitted by Mr K.K. Venugopal, in India, 
there is the rule of law and not of men and, thus, 
there is primacy of the laws enacted by the legislature 
which do not discriminate between persons to whom 
such laws would apply. The laws would apply to all 
such persons unless the law itself makes an exception 
on a valid classification. No individual can claim privilege 
against the application of laws and for liabilities fastened 
on commission of a prohibited act.”
(emphasis supplied)
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99.	 The principle which emerges from the above cases is that the 
privilege of the House, its members and the committees is neither 
contingent merely on location nor are they merely contingent on the 
act in question. A speech made in Parliament or Legislature cannot 
be subjected to any proceedings before any court. However, other 
acts such as damaging property or criminal acts may be subjected 
to prosecution despite being within the precincts of the House. 
Clause (2) of Article 105 grants immunity “in respect of anything” 
said or any vote given. The extent of this immunity must be tested 
on the anvil of the tests laid down above. The ability of a member 
to speak is essentially tethered to the collective functioning of the 
House and is necessary for the functioning of the House. A vote, 
which is an extension of the speech, may itself neither be questioned 
nor proceeded against in a court of law. The phrase “in respect of” 
is significant to delineate the ambit of the immunity granted under 
Clause (2) of Article 105.
100.	In PV Narasimha Rao (supra) the majority judgment interprets the 
phrase “in respect of” as having a broad meaning and referring to 
anything that bears a nexus or connection with the vote given or 
speech made. It therefore concluded that a bribe given to purchase 
the vote of a member of Parliament was immune from prosecution 
under Clause (2) of Article 105. By this logic, the majority
judgment 
concluded that a bribe-accepting member who did not comply with 
the quid pro quo was not immune from prosecution as his actions 
ceased to have a nexus with his vote. As we have noted above, the 
interpretation of a phrase which appears in a provision cannot be 
interpreted in a way that does violence to the object of the provision. 
The majority in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) has taken the object 
of Article 105 to be that members of Parliament must have the 
widest protection under the law to be able to perform their function 
in the House. This understanding of the provision is overbroad and 
presumptive of enhanced privileges translating to better functioning 
of members of the House.
101.	Privileges are not an end in themselves in a Parliamentary form of 
government as the majority has understood them to be. A member 
of Parliament or of the Legislature is immune in the performance 
of their functions in the House or a committee thereof from being 
prosecuted because the speech given or vote cast is functionally 
related to their performance as members of the legislature. The claim
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of a member to this immunity is its vital connect with the functioning 
of the House or committee. The reason why the freedom of speech 
and to vote have been guaranteed in Parliament is because without 
that Parliament or the legislature cannot function. Therefore, the extent 
of privilege exercisable by a member individually must satisfy the 
two fold test laid down in Part F of this judgment namely its tether 
to the collective functioning of the House and its necessity. 
102.	The words “in respect of” in Clause (2) of Article 105 apply to the 
phrase “anything said or any vote given,” and in the latter part to 
a publication by or with the authority of the House. We may not 
interpret the words “anything” or “any” without reading the operative 
word on which it applies i.e. “said” and “vote given” respectively. The 
words “anything said” and “any vote given” apply to an action which 
has been taken by a person who has the right to speak or vote in 
the House or a committee thereof. This means that a member or 
person must have exercised their right to speak or abstained from 
speaking inside the House or committee when the occasion arose. 
Similarly, a person or member must have exercised their option of 
voting in favour, against, or in abstention to claim immunity under 
Articles 105(2) and 194(2). 
103.	The words “anything” and “any” when read with their respective 
operative words mean that a member may claim
immunity to say as 
they feel and vote in a direction that they desire on any matter before 
the House. These are absolutely outside the scope of interference by 
the courts. The wide meaning of “anything” and “any” read with their 
companion words connotes actions of speech or voting inside the 
House or committee which are absolute. The phrase “in respect of” 
applies to the collective phrase “anything said or any vote given.” The 
words “in respect of” means arising out of or bearing a clear relation 
to. This may not be overbroad or be interpreted to mean anything 
which may have even a remote connection with the speech or vote 
given. We, therefore, cannot concur with the majority judgment in 
PV Narasimha Rao (supra).
II.	
The Constitution envisions probity in public life
104.	The purpose and object for which the Constitution stipulates 
powers, privileges and immunity in Parliament must be borne in 
mind. Privileges are essentially related to the House collectively 
and necessary for its functioning. Hence, the phrase “in respect of”
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must have a meaning consistent with the purpose of privileges and 
immunities. Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution seek to create 
a fearless atmosphere in which debate, deliberations and exchange 
of ideas can take place within the Houses of Parliament and the 
state legislatures. For this exercise to be meaningful, members 
and persons who have a right to speak before the House or any 
committee must be free from fear or favour induced into them by a 
third party. Members of the legislature and persons involved in the 
work of the Committees of the legislature must be able to exercise 
their free will and conscience to enrich the functions of the House. 
This is exactly what is taken away when a member is induced to 
vote in a certain way not because of their belief or position on an 
issue but because of a bribe taken by the member. Corruption and 
bribery of members of the legislature erode the foundation of Indian 
Parliamentary democracy. It is destructive of the aspirational and 
deliberative ideals of the Constitution and creates a polity which 
deprives citizens of a responsible, responsive and representative 
democracy.
105.	The minority judgment in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) held that the 
words “in respect of” must be understood as “arising out of” and 
that a bribe taken by a member of the House cannot be deemed 
as arising out of his vote. The minority opined that:
“46. […] The expression “in respect of” in
Article 105(2) 
has, therefore, to be construed keeping in view the object 
of Article 105(2) and the setting in which the expression 
appears in that provision.
47. … the object of the immunity conferred under Article 
105(2) is to ensure the independence of the individual 
legislators. Such independence is necessary for healthy 
functioning of the system of parliamentary democracy 
adopted in the Constitution. Parliamentary democracy 
is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. An 
interpretation of the provisions of Article 105(2) which 
would enable a Member of Parliament to claim immunity 
from prosecution in a criminal court for an offence of 
bribery in connection with anything said by him or 
a vote given by him in Parliament or any committee 
thereof and thereby place such Members above the law
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would not only be repugnant to healthy functioning of 
parliamentary democracy but would also be subversive 
of the rule of law which is also an essential part of the 
basic structure of the Constitution. It is settled law that 
in interpreting the constitutional provisions the court should 
adopt a construction which strengthens the foundational 
features and the basic structure of the Constitution. (See: 
Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India 
[(1991) 4 SCC 699] SCC at p. 719.) […]”
(emphasis supplied)
106.	The minority then points out the paradoxical result which would 
emerge if members were given immunity from prosecution for their 
speech or vote but would not be protected if the bribe was received 
for not speaking or not voting. The minority goes on to hold that:
“47. […] Such an anomalous situation would be avoided 
if the words “in respect of” in Article 105(2) are construed 
to mean “arising out of”. If the expression “in respect of” 
is thus construed, the immunity conferred under Article 
105(2) would be confined to liability that arises out of or is 
attributable to something that has been said or to a vote 
that has been given by a Member in Parliament or any 
committee thereof. The immunity would be available only 
if the speech that has been made or the vote that has 
been given is an essential and integral part of the cause 
of action for the proceedings giving rise to the liability.
The immunity would not be available to give protection 
against liability for an act that precedes the making of the 
speech or giving of vote by a Member in Parliament even 
though it may have a connection with the speech made 
or the vote given by the Member if such an act gives rise 
to a liability which arises independently and does not 
depend on the making of the speech or the giving of vote 
in Parliament by the Member. Such an independent liability 
cannot be regarded as liability in respect of anything said 
or vote given by the Member in Parliament. The liability 
for which immunity can be claimed under Article 105(2) 
is the liability that has arisen as a consequence of the 
speech that has been made or the vote that has been 
given in Parliament.”
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107.	The offence of bribery is complete on the acceptance of the money or 
on the agreement to accept money being concluded. The offence is 
not contingent on the performance of the promise for which money is 
given or is agreed to be given. The minority opinion in PV Narasimha 
Rao (supra) based its view on another perspective which was not 
dealt with by the majority. The minority opinion stated that the act 
of bribery was the receipt of illegal gratification prior to the making 
of the speech or vote inside the House. Interpreting the phrase “in 
respect of” to mean “arising out of”, the minority concluded that the 
offence of bribery is not contingent on the performance of the illegal 
promise. The minority observed that:
“50. … the expression “in respect of” in Article 105(2) 
raises the question: Is the liability to be prosecuted arising 
from acceptance of bribe by a Member of Parliament for 
the purpose of speaking or giving his vote in Parliament 
in a particular manner on a matter pending consideration 
before the House an independent liability which cannot be 
said to arise out of anything said or any vote given by the 
Member in Parliament? In our opinion, this question must 
be answered in the affirmative. The offence of bribery is 
made out against the receiver if he takes or agrees to take 
money for promise to act in a certain way. The offence 
is complete with the acceptance of the money or on the
agreement to accept the money being concluded and is 
not dependent on the performance of the illegal promise 
by the receiver. The receiver of the money will be treated 
to have committed the offence even when he defaults in 
the illegal bargain. For proving the offence of bribery all 
that is required to be established is that the offender has 
received or agreed to receive money for a promise to act 
in a certain way and it is not necessary to go further and 
prove that he actually acted in that way.”
108.	A Constitution bench of this Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu,57 
while deciding on the validity of the Constitution (Fifty Second 
Amendment) Act 1985 which introduced the Tenth schedule to the 
Indian Constitution opined that the freedom of speech in Parliament 
57	
[1992] 1 SCR 686 : 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651
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under clause (2) of Article 105 is not violated. This Court understood 
the provision to necessarily mean that the politically sinful act of floor 
crossing is neither permissible nor immunized under the Constitution. 
This Court held that: 
“40. The freedom of speech of a Member is not an 
absolute freedom. That apart, the provisions of the Tenth 
Schedule do not purport to make a Member of a House 
liable in any ‘Court’ for anything said or any vote given 
by him in Parliament. It is difficult to conceive how Article 
105(2) is a source of immunity from the consequences of 
unprincipled floor-crossing.
…
43. Parliamentary democracy envisages that matters 
involving implementation of policies of the government 
should be discussed by the elected representatives of the 
people. Debate, discussion and persuasion are, therefore, 
the means and essence of the democratic process. During 
the debates the Members put forward different points of 
view. Members belonging to the same political party may 
also have, and may give expression to, differences of 
opinion on a matter. Not unoften (sic) the views expressed 
by the Members in the House have resulted in substantial 
modification, and even the withdrawal, of the proposals 
under consideration. Debate and expression of different 
points of view, thus, serve an essential and healthy purpose 
in the functioning of Parliamentary democracy. At times 
such an expression of views
during the debate in the 
House may lead to voting or abstinence from voting in 
the House otherwise than on party lines.”
III.	
Courts and the House exercise parallel jurisdiction over 
allegations of bribery
109.	Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned senior advocate on behalf of the 
Petitioner, has argued that bribery has been treated as a breach 
of privilege by the House which has used its powers to dispense 
discipline over bribe-taking members. He argues that immunity for a 
vote, speech or conduct in the House of Parliament does not in any 
manner leave culpable members blameless or free from sanction. 
Such members have been punished including being expelled by the
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House. Mr Ramachandran cites many examples of actions taken by 
the House against its members who were found to have received 
bribes. In our exposition of the history of parliamentary privileges in 
India, we have illustrated how bribery was initially deemed to be a 
breach of privilege by the House of Commons in the UK. Based on 
the position of law in the UK the British government was uncertain 
about the position in India but assumed it to be governed as a 
matter of breach of privilege in the absence of an express statutory 
enactment. The Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee in 1924 had 
recommended bribery to be made a penal offence so that members 
may be prosecuted for crimes before a court of law. 
110.	The issue of bribery is not one of exclusivity of jurisdiction by the 
House over its bribe-taking members. The purpose of a House 
acting against a contempt by a member for receiving a bribe serves 
a purpose distinct from a criminal prosecution. The purpose of the 
proceedings which a House may conduct is to restore its dignity. 
Such a proceeding may result in the expulsion from the membership 
of the House and other consequences which the law envisages. 
Prosecution for an offence operates in a distinct area involving 
a violation of a criminal statute. The power to punish for criminal 
wrongdoing emanates from the power of the state to prosecute 
offenders who violate the criminal law. The latter applies
uniformly 
to everyone subject to the sanctions of the criminal law of the land. 
The purpose, consequences, and effect of the two jurisdictions are 
separate. A criminal trial differs from contempt of the House as it is 
fully dressed with procedural safeguards, rules of evidence and the 
principles of natural justice.
111.	 We therefore disagree with Mr Ramachandran that the jurisdiction 
of the House excludes that of the criminal court for prosecuting an 
offence under the criminal law of the land. We hold this because of 
our conclusion above that bribery is not immune under clause (2) of 
Article 105. A member engaging in bribery commits a crime which 
is unrelated to their ability to vote or to make a decision on their 
vote. This action may bring indignity to the House of Parliament or 
Legislature and may also attract prosecution. What it does not attract 
is the immunity given to the essential and necessary functions of a 
member of Parliament or Legislature. 
112.	We may refer to the opinion of SC Agrawal, J who arrived at the 
same view in which he was in the minority:
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“45. It is no doubt true that a Member who is found to 
have accepted bribe in connection with the business of 
Parliament can be punished by the House for contempt. 
But that is not a satisfactory solution. In exercise of its 
power to punish for contempt the House of Commons 
can convict a person to custody and may also order 
expulsion or suspension from the service of the House. 
There is no power to impose a fine. The power of 
committal cannot exceed the duration of the session 
and the person, if not sooner discharged by the 
House, is immediately released from confinement on 
prorogation. (See: May’s Parliamentary Practice, 21st 
Edn., pp. 103, 109 and 111.) The Houses of Parliament 
in India cannot claim a higher power. The Salmon 
Commission has stated that “whilst the theoretical 
power of the House to commit a person into custody 
undoubtedly exists, nobody has been committed to 
prison for contempt of Parliament for a hundred years 
or so, and it is most unlikely that Parliament would 
use this power in modern conditions”. (para 306) The 
Salmon Commission has also expressed the view that 
in view of the special expertise that is necessary for 
this type of inquiry the Committee of Privileges do 
not provide an investigative machinery comparable 
to that of a police investigation.”
(emphasis supplied)
113.	Therefore, we hold that clause (2) of Article 105 does not grant 
immunity against bribery to any person as
the receipt of or agreement 
to receive illegal gratification is not “in respect of” the function of a 
member to speak or vote in the House. Prosecution for bribery is not 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the criminal court merely because 
it may also be treated by the House as contempt or a breach of its 
privilege. 
IV.	
Delivery of results is irrelevant to the offence of bribery
114.	Another aspect that arises for consideration is the stage at which 
the offence of bribery crystallizes. It has been urged by the Solicitor 
General that the offence is complete outside the legislature and is 
‘independent’ of the speech or the vote. Therefore, the question of
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privilege does not arise in the first place and the question is answered 
by the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Similarly, 
Mr Gopal Sankarnarayan, learned senior counsel has submitted that 
the offence of bribery is complete on receipt of the bribe well before 
the vote is given or speech made in Parliament. It has been urged 
that the performance of the promise is irrelevant to the offence being 
made out, and hence, the distinction made in PV Narasimha Rao 
(supra) is entirely artificial.
115.	 Interestingly, the judgment of the majority in PV Narasimha Rao 
(supra) did not consider this question at all. The minority judgment, 
on the other hand, discusses this aspect and notes that the offence 
is complete with the acceptance of the money or on the agreement 
to accept the money being concluded and is not dependent on the 
performance of the illegal promise by the receiver. Agarwal, J observed: 
“50. The construction placed by us on the expression “in 
respect of” in Article 105(2) raises the question: Is the 
liability to be prosecuted arising from acceptance of bribe 
by a Member of Parliament for the purpose of speaking 
or giving his vote in Parliament in a particular manner 
on a matter pending consideration before the House 
an independent liability which cannot be said to arise 
out of anything said or any vote given by the Member 
in Parliament? In our opinion, this question must be
answered in the affirmative. The offence of bribery is 
made out against the receiver if he takes or agrees 
to take money for promise to act in a certain way. 
The offence is complete with the acceptance of the 
money or on the agreement to accept the money being 
concluded and is not dependent on the performance 
of the illegal promise by the receiver. The receiver 
of the money will be treated to have committed the 
offence even when he defaults in the illegal bargain. 
For proving the offence of bribery all that is required 
to be established is that the offender has received 
or agreed to receive money for a promise to act in a 
certain way and it is not necessary to go further and 
prove that he actually acted in that way.”
(emphasis supplied)
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116.	Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 reads as follows: 
“7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed. 
— Any public servant who, — 
(a)	 obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from 
any person, an undue advantage, with the intention 
to perform or cause performance of public duty 
improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause 
forbearance to perform such duty either by himself 
or by another public servant; or 
(b)	 obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue 
advantage from any person as a reward for the 
improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or 
for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself 
or another public servant; or 
(c)	
performs or induces another public servant to perform 
improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear 
performance of such duty in anticipation of or in 
consequence of accepting an undue advantage from 
any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment 
for a term which shall not be less than three years 
but which may extend to seven years and shall also 
be liable to fine. 
Explanation 1. —For the purpose of this section, the 
obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an 
undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even 
if the performance of a public duty by public servant, 
is not or has not been improper. 
Illustration. —A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ 
to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to
process his routine ration card application on time. 
‘S’ is guilty of an offence under this section. 
Explanation 2.—For the purpose of this section,— 
(i)	
the expressions “obtains” or “accepts” or “attempts 
to obtain” shall cover cases where a person being 
a public servant, obtains or “accepts” or attempts to 
obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
person, by abusing his position as a public servant or 
by using his personal influence over another public 
servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means; 
(ii)	
it shall be immaterial whether such person being a 
public servant obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain 
the undue advantage directly or through a third party.” 
(emphasis supplied)
117.	Under Section 7 of the PC Act, the mere “obtaining”, “accepting” or 
“attempting” to obtain an undue advantage with the intention to act 
or forbear from acting in a certain way is sufficient to complete the 
offence. It is not necessary that the act for which the bribe is given 
be actually performed. The first explanation to the provision further 
strengthens such an interpretation when it expressly states that the 
“obtaining, accepting, or attempting” to obtain an undue advantage 
shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public 
duty by a public servant has not been improper. Therefore, the offence 
of a public servant being bribed is pegged to receiving or agreeing 
to receive the undue advantage and not the actual performance of 
the act for which the undue advantage is obtained. 
118.	 It is trite law that illustrations appended to a section are of value and 
relevance in construing the text of a statutory provision and they should 
not be readily rejected as repugnant to the section.58 The illustration 
to the first explanation aids us in
construing the provision to mean 
that the offence of bribery crystallizes on the exchange of the bribe 
and does not require the actual performance of the act. It provides a 
situation where “A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ to give him 
an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card 
application on time. ‘S’ is guilty of an offence under this section.” It is 
clear that regardless of whether S actually processes the ration card 
application on time, the offence of bribery is made out. Similarly, in 
the formulation of a legislator accepting a bribe, it does not matter 
whether she votes in the agreed direction or votes at all. At the point 
in time when she accepts the bribe, the offence of bribery is complete.
119.	Even prior to the amendment to the PC Act in 2017, Section 7 
expressly delinked the offence of bribery from the actual performance 
58	
Justice GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 15th Ed. (2021), 136.
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of the act for which the undue advantage is received. The provision 
read as follows: 
“7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal 
remuneration in respect of an official act. —
Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, 
accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain 
from any person, for himself or for any other person, any 
gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a 
motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official 
act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise 
of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person 
or for rendering or attempting to render any service or 
disservice to any person, with the Central Government 
or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature 
of any State or with any local authority, corporation or 
Government company referred to in clause (c) of Section 
2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, 
shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not 
less than six months but which may extend to seven years 
and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanations. —
…
(d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who 
receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing 
what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, 
or has not done, comes within this expression.
…”
(emphasis supplied)
120.	The unamended text of Section 7 of the PC Act also indicates that 
the act of
“accepting”, “obtaining”, “agreeing to accept” or “agreeing to 
obtain” illegal gratification is a sufficient condition. The act for which the 
bribe is given does not need to be actually performed. This was further 
clarified by Explanation (d) to the provision. In explaining the phrase ‘a 
motive or reward for doing’, it was made clear that the person receiving 
the gratification does not need to intend to or be in a position to do 
or not do the act or omission for which the motive/reward is received.
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121.	In Chaturdas Bhagwandas Patel v. State of Gujarat59 a two-
judge Bench of this Court reiterated that to constitute the offence of 
bribery, a public servant using his official position to extract illegal 
gratification is a sufficient condition. It is not necessary in such a 
case for the Court to consider whether the public servant intended 
to actually perform any official act of favour or disfavour. In the facts 
of the case, the public servant induced the complainant to give a 
bribe to get rid of a charge of abduction. It was later revealed that no 
complaint had even been registered against the complainant for the 
alleged abduction. However, the Court held that the mere demand 
and acceptance of the illegal gratification was sufficient, regardless 
of whether the recipient of the bribe performed the act for which the 
bribe was received. 
122.	Recently, in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi)60 a Constitution 
Bench listed out the constituent elements of the offence of bribery 
under Section 7 of the PC Act (as it stood before the amendment in 
2017). Justice BV Nagarathna formulated the elements to constitute 
the offence: 
“5. The following are the ingredients of Section 7 of the Act:
(i)	
the accused must be a public servant or expecting 
to be a public servant;
(ii)	
he should accept or obtain or agrees to accept or 
attempts to obtain from any person;
(iii)	 for himself or for any other person;
(iv)	 any
gratification other than legal remuneration; and
(v)	
as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do 
any official act or to show any favour or disfavour.”
Consequently, the actual “doing or forbearing to do” the official act 
is not a constituent part of the offence. All that is required is that 
the illegal gratification should be obtained as a “motive or reward” 
for such an action or omission – whether it is actually carried out 
or not is irrelevant. 
59	
[1976] 3 SCR 1052 : (1976) 3 SCC 46
60	
[2023] 2 SCR 997 : (2023) 4 SCC 731
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123.	During the course of the hearing, a hypothetical question arose in 
this regard. What happens in a situation when the bribe is exchanged 
within the precincts of the legislature? Would the offence now fall 
within the ambit of parliamentary privilege? This question appears to 
be ill-conceived. When this Court holds that the offence of bribery is 
complete on the acceptance or attempt to accept undue advantage 
and is not dependent on the speech or vote, it automatically pushes 
the offence outside the ambit of Articles 105(2) and 194(2). This is 
not because the acceptance of undue advantage happened outside 
the legislature but because the offence is independent of the “vote 
or speech” protected by Articles 105(2) and 194(2). The remit of 
parliamentary privilege is intricately linked to the nexus of the act to 
the ‘vote’ or ‘speech’ and the transaction of parliamentary business. 
124.	The majority judgment in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) did not delve 
into when the offence of bribery is complete or the constituent 
elements of the offence. However, on the facts of the case, the 
majority held that those MPs who voted as agreed were covered by 
the immunity, while those who did not vote at all (Ajit Singh) were 
not covered by the immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2). This 
erroneously links the offence of bribery to the performance of the 
act. In fact, in the impugned judgment as well, the High Court has 
relied
on this position to hold that the appellant is not covered by 
the immunity as she eventually did not vote as agreed on and voted 
for the candidate from her party. 
125.	The understanding of the law in the judgment of the majority in PV 
Narasimha Rao (supra) creates an artificial distinction between 
those who receive the illegal gratification and perform their end of 
the bargain and those who receive the same illegal gratification but 
do not carry out the agreed task. The offence of bribery is agnostic 
to the performance of the agreed action and crystallizes based on 
the exchange of illegal gratification. The minority judgment also 
highlighted the prima facie absurdity in the paradox created by the 
majority judgment. Agarwal, J observed that: 
“47. […] If the construction placed by Shri Rao on the 
expression “in respect of” is adopted, a Member would 
be liable to be prosecuted on a charge of bribery if he 
accepts bribe for not speaking or for not giving his vote 
on a matter under consideration before the House but
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he would enjoy immunity from prosecution for such a 
charge if he accepts bribe for speaking or giving his vote 
in Parliament in a particular manner and he speaks or 
gives his vote in Parliament in that manner. It is difficult 
to conceive that the framers of the Constitution 
intended to make such a distinction in the matter of 
grant of immunity between a Member of Parliament 
who receives bribe for speaking or giving his vote 
in Parliament in a particular manner and speaks 
or gives his vote in that manner and a Member of 
Parliament who receives bribe for not speaking or 
not giving his vote on a particular matter coming 
up before the House and does not speak or give 
his vote as per the agreement so as to confer an 
immunity from prosecution on charge of bribery on 
the former but denying such immunity to the latter. 
Such an anomalous situation would be avoided if the 
words “in respect of” in Article 105(2) are construed to 
mean “arising out of” […]”
(emphasis supplied)
126.	Indeed, to read Articles 105(2) and 194(2) in the manner proposed 
in the majority judgment results in a paradoxical outcome. Such an 
interpretation results in a situation where a legislator is rewarded 
with immunity when they accept a bribe and follow through by voting 
in the agreed direction. On the other hand, a legislator who agrees 
to accept a bribe, but may eventually decide to vote independently 
will be prosecuted. Such an
interpretation belies not only the text of 
Articles 105 and 194 but also the purpose of conferring parliamentary 
privilege on members of the legislature. 
H.	
International position on bribery vis-à-vis privileges
127.	The above exposition has sought to elucidate the law governing 
the subject of parliamentary privileges in India and its implications 
on a member of the legislature engaging in bribery. It has been the 
leitmotif of most judgments on the subject in India to delve into the 
law in other jurisdictions before outlining the position of parliamentary 
privileges in India. The jurisprudence on parliamentary privileges 
in India has since grown in its own right and we have referred to 
the rich jurisprudence of this Court and the history of parliamentary
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privileges in India. However, since both the majority and the minority 
judgments in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) have relied heavily on 
jurisprudence in foreign jurisdictions, it is appropriate to lay out, in 
brief, the evolution and position of the law on privileges as it relates 
to the issue of a bribe received by a member of Parliament in other 
jurisdictions. We shall first direct our attention to the position of law 
in the United Kingdom followed by the United States of America, 
Canada, and Australia.
I.	
United Kingdom
128.	As we have explored above, the law on parliamentary privileges in 
UK was developed after a struggle by the House of Commons with 
the Tudor and Stuart Kings. In The King v. Sir John Elliot,61 at the 
peak of the confrontation between the Commons and the King in 
1629, the King’s Bench prosecuted three members of the House of 
Commons, Sir John Elliot, Denzel Hollis and Benjamin Valentine, for 
making seditious speech, disturbing public tranquillity, and violently 
holding the Speaker in his position to stop the House from being 
adjourned. The members of Parliament were found guilty, fined and 
imprisoned. Sir John Elliot was sent to be imprisoned in a tower where 
his health declined and he ultimately passed away. The report of the 
trial came to be published in 1667 and was noticed by the House of 
Commons. The House resolved that the judgment was illegal and 
against the privileges of
Parliament. On a writ of error presented 
by Denzel Hollis, the House of Lords reversed the judgment of the 
King’s Bench.
129.	With the glorious revolution of 1688, the last of the Stuart Kings, 
James, was expelled and a new dynasty was instated. The bitter 
struggle led to a firmly established constitutional monarchy with the 
House of Commons ultimately claiming both sovereignty and certain 
privileges which became ancient and undoubted as a result of the 
persistence of the House and its gradual recognition. Erskine May 
notes that: 
“at the commencement of every Parliament it has been 
the custom for the Speaker, in the name, and on behalf 
of, the Commons, to lay claim by humble petition to their 
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ancient and undoubted rights and privileges; particularly 
to freedom of speech in debate, freedom from arrest, 
freedom of access to Her Majesty whenever occasion 
shall require; and that the most favourable construction 
should be placed upon all their proceedings.”62
130.	The clause stipulating freedom of speech in Parliament and immunity 
from prosecution flows from the Bill of Rights 1689. The Act was a 
crucial constitutional initiative by Parliament in England to lay claim 
to its status by grounding it in statute. The statute was to secure 
Parliament from royal interference in or through the courts. Article 
IX of the Bill of Rights stipulates:
“That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings 
in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in 
any court or place out of Parliament.”
The clause guarantees freedom of speech in Parliament and protects 
it from being “impeached or questioned” in any court or place out 
of Parliament. 
131.	Two aspects of Article IX of the Bill of Rights may be outlined at the 
outset. First, the privilege under Article IX in UK is not attached to 
individual members only. It immunizes the freedom of speech and 
debates or proceedings in Parliament and stipulates that it shall not 
be ‘impeached or questioned.’ Secondly, Article IX stipulates that the 
proceedings in Parliament may only be ‘impeached or questioned’ in 
Parliament. This has led to debate as to whether any
material from 
Parliamentary proceedings can be placed before the Courts and 
whether the jurisdiction of Parliament ousts the jurisdiction of the 
Courts. As we shall elucidate below, the position as it stands allows 
for material from Parliamentary proceedings in the UK to be placed 
before the Court provided that it is not used to imply or argue mala 
fides behind the action. The courts in the UK have also interpreted a 
narrow scope for the nexus required for non-legislative activities to be 
immune. This has led to the holding that the jurisdiction of Parliament 
to discipline a member for taking bribe would not automatically oust 
the jurisdiction of the courts.
62	
Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, LexisNexis, 25th 
ed. (2019) 242.
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132.	The parliamentary immunity attracted to speech made in Parliament 
came to be applied in the case of Ex Parte Wason,63 where a 
member of Parliament was accused of conspiring to make a statement 
which they knew to be false. A person had furnished a petition to 
Earl Russel to present before the House of Lords which charged 
the Lord Chief Baron of deliberately telling a falsehood before a 
Parliamentary committee. This would have led to the removal of the 
Lord Chief Baron upon an address by both Houses of Parliament 
for such a removal. Earl Russel, Lord Chelmsford, and Lord Chief 
Baron conspired to make speeches in the House of Lords to the effect 
that the allegations of falsehood were unfounded despite knowing 
that the allegations were true. The magistrate refused to take the 
applicant’s recognizance on the grounds that a speech made in 
Parliament could not disclose any indictable offence. The Queen’s 
Bench affirmed the order.
133.	Cockburn, CJ opined that speeches made in either House could 
not give rise to civil or criminal proceedings regardless of the injury 
caused to the interests of a third person. Concurring with the opinion 
Lush, J held that:
“[…] I am clearly of opinion that we ought not to allow it 
to be doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions 
of members of either House cannot be inquired into by 
criminal proceedings with respect to anything they may 
do or say in the House.”
The
Queen’s Bench therefore held that a speech made inside the 
House cannot be questioned in any proceeding before a court in 
a civil or criminal action and neither can the motives behind the 
performance of such acts be questioned.
134.	The issue of bribery was only governed by common law till 1889. 
Different common law offences were attracted based on corruption 
by different offices and their functions. The Public Bodies Corrupt 
Practices Act 1889, which applied only to local government bodies, 
created the first statutory offence of corruption. Subsequently, the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 extended the offence of corruption 
to the private sector. Neither of these statutes covered the acceptance 
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Sita Soren v. Union of India
of bribe by a member of Parliament. In the absence of a statute, the 
question of taking bribe by a member of Parliament had remained a 
question of breach of privilege and only the House was empowered 
to take action against such corruption. 
135.	The Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life, 
chaired by Lord Salmon, submitted its report in 1976 which inter alia 
recommended bringing “corruption, bribery and attempted bribery of 
a Member of Parliament acting in his Parliamentary capacity within 
the ambit of the criminal law.” While presenting his report to the 
House of Lords, Lord Salmon said:
“To my mind equality before the law is one of the pillars of 
freedom. To say that immunity from criminal proceedings 
against anyone who tries to bribe a Member of Parliament 
and any Member of Parliament who accepts the bribe, 
stems from the Bill of Rights is possibly a serious mistake. 
The passage in the Bill of Rights is: “That the Freedom 
of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court 
or Place out of Parliament.” Now this is a charter for 
freedom of speech in the House. It is not a charter for 
corruption. To my mind, the Bill of Rights, for which 
no one has more respect than I have, has no more 
to do with the topic which we are discussing than 
the Merchandise Marks Act. The crime of corruption 
is complete when the bribe is offered or given or
solicited and taken.
We have recommended that the Statutes relating to 
corruption should all be replaced by one comprehensive 
Statute which will sweep away the present anomalies. If 
you are not an agent—and Members of Parliament neither 
of this House nor of the other place are agents—if you 
are not the member of a public body (and we are not 
members of public bodies) the Statutes do not touch you. 
At Common Law you cannot be convicted of bribery and 
corruption unless you are the holder of an office, and most 
of us are not the holders of an office.”
(emphasis supplied)