AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. versus STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ANR.
[2017] 1 S.C.R. 286, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
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[2017] I S.C.R. 286 
AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. 
v. 
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. 
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 32-33 of2017) 
JANUARY 06, 2017 
[DIPAK MISRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.J 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Chapter XVII, s.353 -
Judgment - Trial court, after conclusion of criminal trial, recorded 
in order sheet that accused persons had been acquilled as per 
iudgment separately typed, signed and dated - Whether such order 
can be treated as judgment of acquittal having been pronounced -
Held: It is imperative on the trial court to pronounce the judgment 
in open court by delivering whole judgment or by reading out the 
whole judgment or by reading out the operative part of the 
iudgment - In the present case, judgment was not dictated in open 
court - There was only an incomplete judgment and no page thereof 
was signed by the presiding officer - If the judgment is not complete 
and signed, it cannot be a judgment in terms of s. 353, Cr.P.C. -
Non-availability of judgment can never be a judgment because there 
is no declaration by way of pronouncement in the open court. 
Constitution of India - Art. 227 - Administrative power 
under - Scope of - Trial court on conclusion of criminal trial 
recorded that the accused had been acquitted as per judgment 
separately typed, signed and dated - Complaint to High Court 
against the trial judge - On inquiry found that the judgment was 
not available on record as the same was not dictated. dated or
signed - Full court of High Court, in exercise of its administrative 
power treated the trial as pending and transferred the case to another 
court for rehearing and disposal - 'competence of the High Court 
to transfer the' case -
Held: Art. 22 7 confers powers of 
superintendence on the High Court - The High Court has 
iurisdiction and authority to exercise suo motu poll'er - High Court 
was under legal obligation to set aside the order as it had no effect 
in law - High Court by rectifying the grave error has acted in 
furthera111:e of the cause of justice - There is no illegality. 
286
AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. v. STATE OF 
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CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: l.l Though CrPC does not define the term 
"judgment", yet it has clearly laid down how the judgment is to 
be pronounced. The provisions of Cr.P.C. clearly spell out that it 
is imperative on the part of the trial judge to pronounce the 
judgment iu open court by delivel'iug the whole of the judgment 
or by reading out the whole of the judgment or by reading out the 
.operative part of the judgment and explaining the substance of 
the judgment in a language which is understood by the accused 
or his pleader. [Para 16) [297-C-D) 
1.2 In the present case, judgment was not dictated in open 
court. Cr.P.C. provides reading of the operative part of the 
judgment. It means that the trial judge may not read the whole of 
the judgment and may read operative part of the judgment but it 
does not in any way suggest that the result of the case will be 
announced and the judgment would not be available on record. 
Non- availability of judgment, can never be a judgment because 
there is no declaration by way of pronouncement in the open court 
that the accused has been convicted or acquitted. A judgment, as 
has been always understood, is the expression of an opinion after 
due consideration of the facts which deserve to be determined. 
Without pronouncement of a judgment in the open court, signed 
and dated, it is difficult to treat it as a judgment of conviction. 
[Para 17]
[297-E-1<'1. 
Re. Athipalayan and Ors. AIR 196(; Mad 507 - relied 
on. 
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1.3 On inquiry, the High Court in the administrative side 
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had found there was no judgment available on record. In the 
counter affidavit filed by the High Court, it has been mentioned 
that an incom1>lete typed judgment of 14 pages till paragraph 
No. 19 was available. The affidavit also states that it was 
incomplete and no page had the signature of ihe presiding officer. 
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If the judgment is not complete and signed, it cannot be a judgment 
in terms of Section 353 CrPC. It is unimaginable tha.t a judgment 
is pronounced without there being a judgment. It is gross 
illegality. · [Para 17) (297-G-H; 298-A-B] 
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(2017) I S.C.R. 
Stale of Punjab and others v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi 
[1984) 2 SCR 50 : (1984) 1 SCC 596 ~ followed. 
1.4 In the instant case, the judgment is not available on 
record and hence, there can be no shadow of doubt that the 
declaration of the result cannot tantamount to a judgment as 
prescribed in the CrPC. That leads to the inevitable conclusion 
that the trial in both the cases has to be treated to be pending. 
Wara 19] [299-C-D] 
2.1 Article 227 of the Constitution confers power of 
superintendence on the High Court over the courts and tribunals 
within the territory of the State. The High Court has the 
jurisdiction and the authority to exercise suo motu power. [Para 
20) [300-C) 
Achutananda Baidya v. Prafullya Kumar Gayen and 
others [1997) 3 SCR 709 : (1997) 5 SCC 76; Ranbir 
Yadav y. State of Bihar [1995) 2 SCR 826 : (1995) 4 
sec 392 - relied on. 
2.2 
In the present case, the High Court on the 
administrative side had transferred the case to the Sessions Judge 
by which it llas conferred jurisdiction on the trial court which has 
the jurisdiction to try the sessions case under CrPC. Thus, it 
has done so as it has, as a matter of fact, found that there was no 
judgment on record. There is no illegality. [Para 25) [303-C) 
2.3 The High Court was under legal obligation to set aside 
the order as it had no effect in law. The High Court has correctly 
done so as it has the duty to see that sanctity of
justice is not 
undermined. The High Court has done so as it has felt that an 
order which is a mere declaration of result without the judgment, 
should be nullified and become extinct. The High Court by 
rectifying the grave error has acted in furtherance of the cause of. 
justice. [Paras 25, 26) [303-D, G) 
-A.R.Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and another [1988) l Suppl. 
SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; Ouseph Mathai & others 
v. M Abdul Khadir [2001) 5 Suppl. SCR 118 : (2002) 
1 SCC 319; Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar [2002) 3 
Suppl. SCR 499 : (2002) 8 SCC 400; Surya Dev Rai v.
AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. v. STATE OF 
289 
CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. 
Ram Chander Rai and others [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 290 : 
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(2003) 6 SCC 675; P. Vijayan v. State of Kera/a and 
another (2010) 2 SCC 398 : [2010] 2 SCR 78; Smt. 
Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal and another (1981) 1 SCC 
500 : [1981] 2 SCR 485 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
B 
[2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 118 
referred to 
Para6 
(2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 499 
referred to 
Para6 
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 290 
referred to 
Para6 
(2010] 2 SCR 78 
referred to 
Para8 
(1981] 2 SCR 485 
referred to 
Para 14 
AIR 1960 Mad 507 
relied on 
Para 17 
(1984] 2 SCR 50 
followed 
Para 17 
(1997] 3 SCR 709 
relied on 
Para 21 
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[1995] 2 SCR 826 
relied on 
Para 23 
(1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 
referred to 
Para23 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 
Nos. 32-33 of2017. 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 24.08.2016 of the High Court 
ofChhattisgarh at Bilaspur, in Writ Appeal No 1~4 of2016 and Writ 
Appeal No. 181 of 2016. 
Praveen Chaturvedi, Baij Nath Patel, Ms. J. Chaturvedy, Advs. 
for the Appellants. 
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C. D. Singh, Ms. Sakshi Kakkar, Advs. for the Respondents. 
DIPAKMISRA, J. I. Performance of judicial duty in the manner 
prescribed by law is fundamental to the concept of rule of law in a 
democratic State. It has been quite often said and, rightly so, that the 
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judiciary is the protector and preserver of rule of law. Effective 
functioning of the said sacrosanct duty has been entrusted to the judiciary 
and that
entrustment expects the courts to conduct the judicial proceeding · 
with dignity, objectivity and rationality and finally determine the same in 
~ accordance with law. Errors are bound to occur but there cannot be 
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deliberate peccability which can never be countenanced. The plinth of 
justice dispensation system is founded on the faith, trust and confidence 
of the people and nothing can be allowed to contaminate and corrode 
the same. A litigant who comes to a court of law expects that inherent 
and essential principles of adjudication like adherence to doctrine of audi 
a/teram partem, rules pertaining to fundamental adjective and seminal 
substantive law shall be followed and ultimately there shall be a reasoned 
verdict. When the accused faces a charge in a court of law, he expects 
a fair trial. The victim whose grievance and agony have given rise to the 
trial also expects that justice should be done in accordance with law. 
Thus, a fair trial leading to a judgment is necessitous in law and that is 
the assurance that is thought of on both sides. The exponent on behalf 
of the accused cannot be permitted to command the trial as desired by 
his philosophy of trial on the plea of fair trial and similarly, the proponent 
on behalf of the victim should not always be allowed to ventilate the 
grievance that his cause has not been fairly dealt with in the name of fair 
trial. Therefore, the concept of expediency and fair trial is quite applicable 
to the accused as well asfo the victim. The result of such trial is to end 
in a judgment as required to be pronounced in accordance with law. 
And, that is how the
stability of the creditability in the institution is 
maintained. 
2. The above prefatory note has relevance, a significant one, to 
the case at hand. To appreciate the controversy, certain facts are requisite 
to be noted. The marriage between the appellant No. l and Ruby Singh, 
the deceased, was solemnized according to Hindu rites on 22.06.1997. 
She committed suicide at her matrimonial home on 01.12.1998. 
Kameshwar Pratap lodged FIR No. 194/98 at Police Station Lakhanpur, 
Distt. Sarguja against Ajay Singh (husband), Sureshwar Singh (father-
in-law), Dhanwanti Devi (mother-in-law) and Kiran Singh (sister-in-law) 
foroffences punishable under Section 304B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code 
(IPC) and other offences. After the criminal law was set in motion, 
investigating agency after commencement of investigation and after 
completion thereof laid charge sheet under Sections 304B, 498A/34, 
328 !PC read with Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against 
the accused persons before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, 
Ambikapur, who, in tum, committed the matter to the Court of Session 
"and eventually the matter was tried by Second Additional Sessions Judge, 
Ambikapur. We are, in the present case, not concerned with how many
AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. v. STATE OF 
CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
witnesses were examined by the trial court or how the trial continued. 
What needs to be stated is thatthe learned trial Judge passed an order in 
the order sheet that recorded that the accused persons had been acquitted 
as per the judgment separately typed, signed and dated. 
3. A member of the State Bar Council sent a complaint to the 
Registry of the High Court ofChhattisgarh, Bilaspur alleging that learned 
trial judge had acquitted the accused persons but no judgment had been 
rendered. The Registrar (Vigilance) of the High Court issued a 
memorandum to the District and Sessions Judge, Surguja at Ambikapur 
on 18.02.2008 to inquire into the matter and submit a report. The 
concerned District and Sessions Judge submitted the report to the High 
Court on the same date stating that no judgments were found in the 
records of such cases. It has also been brought to the notice of the High 
Court that in sessions trials being Sessions Trial No. 148 of 1999 and 
Sessions Trial No. 71 of\ 995 though the same trial judge had purportedly 
delivered the judgments but they were not available on record as the 
judgments had not actually been dictated, dated or signed. Thereafter 
the matter was placed before the Full Court of the High Court on 
04.03.2008 on which date a resolution was passed placing the concerned 
trial judge under suspension in contemplation of a departmental inquiry. 
At the same
time, the Full Court took the decision to transfer the cases 
in question from the concerned trial judge to the file of District and 
Sessions Judge, Surguja at Ambikapur for rehearing and disposal. It is 
worthy to note here that the concerned officer was put under suspension 
and after completion of inquiry was imposed with the punishment of 
compulsory retirement on 22.03.201 l. We make it clear that we are not 
concerned with the said punishment in the case. 
4. After the decision was taken for transferring the cases by the 
Full Court for rehearing, three writ petitions forming the subject matter 
of Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 2796 of2008, 2238 of2008 and 276 of 
2010 were filed. The accused in Sessions Trial No. 148of1999 filed 
Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 2796 of2008 and 2238 of2008 and accused 
in Sessions Trial No. 71 of 1995 filed the other writ petition, that is, Writ 
Petition (Criminal) No. 276 of20 I 0. 
5. The controversy really centers around two issues, namely, 
whether the learned trial judge had really pronounced the judgment of 
acquittal on 31. I 0.2007 and whether the High Court could have in exercise 
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of its administrative power treated the trial as pending and transferred 
the same from the Court of Second Additional Sessions Judge,Ambikapur 
to the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Surguja at Ambikapur for 
rehearing and disposal. 
6. It is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that the nature 
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of order passed by the learned trial judge would amount to a judgment 
and in the absence of any appeal preferred by the State there could not 
have been a direction for rehearing of the sessions case as such action 
runs contrary to the provisions of CrPC. Learned counsel would submit 
that the· High Court in exercise of power of the superintendence could 
not have transferred the case treating it as pending on its administrative 
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side. To bolster the said submission he has placed reliance on Ouseph 
Mathai & others v. M. Abdul Khadir', Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar' 
and Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others'. 
7. Mr. C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the State submitted that 
the approach of the High Court is absolutely infallible and does not warrant 
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8. To appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to refer to the 
order sheet in Sessions Trial No. 71 of 1995. The trialjudge on 28.1.2008 
had passed the following order:-
"28.1.2008: 
State represented by Shri Rajesh Tiwari, A.GP. 
Accused along with their Counsel Shri Arvind Mehta, Advocate 
The judgment has
been typed separately. The same has been 
dated, signed and announced. 
Resultantly, Accused T.P. Ratre is acquitted of the charge under 
Section 306 !PC. 
A copy of this judgment be sent to the District Magistrate, Surguja 
(Ambikapur) through A.GP. 
Proceedings completed. 
The result be noted in the register and the record be sent to the 
Record Room." 
Be it noted, in the other Sessions Trial, i.e., Sessions Trial No. 148 
of J 999 almost similar order has been passed. Be it stated, apart from 
the aforesaid order, as per the enquiry conducted by the learned District 
'(2002) I SCC319 
'(2002) s sec 400 
'(2003) 6 sec 675
AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. v. STATE OF 
CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J'.) 
Judge, there was nothing on record. The trial judge had not dictated the 
order in open court. In such a situation, it is to be determined whether 
the judgment had been delivered by the trial judge or not. 
9. Chapter XVIII of Cr PC provides for trial before a court of 
session. Section 227 empowers the trial judge to discharge the accused 
after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution and on 
being satisfied that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against 
the accused. The key words of the Section are "not sufficient ground 
for proceeding against the accused". Interpreting the said provision, the 
Court in P. Vijayan v. State of Kera/a and another has held that the 
Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the 
prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case 
in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the 
prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to 
enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing 
of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, 
after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge lias merely to 
sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient 
ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency 
of ground would take within
its fold the nature of the evidence recorded 
by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex 
facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused 
so as to frame a charge against him . 
. 
l 0. Section 228 empowers the trial judge to frame the charge. 
Section 229 provides ifthe accused pleads guilty, the Judge shall record 
the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. Section 230 
provides for date for prosecution evidence. Section 231 deals with the 
evidence for prosecution. Section 232 provides that if, after taking the 
evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the 
prosecution the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is 
no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall 
record an orderofacquittal. Section 233 stipulates that where the accused 
is not acquitted under Section 232 he shall be called upon to enter on his 
defence and adduce any evidence he may have in support thereof. Section 
234 provides for arguments. Section 235 which provides for judgment of 
acquittal or conviction reads as follows:-
'<20IO) 2 sec 398 
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"235. Judgment of acquittal or conviction. - (l) After hearing 
arguments and points oflaw (ifany), the Judge shall give a judgment 
in the case. 
(2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds 
in accordance with the provisions of section 360, hear the accused 
on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him 
according to law." 
11. Chapter XXIV provides for general provisions as to inquiries 
and trials. Chapter XXVJI deals with the judgment. Section 353 lays 
down the procedure for pronouncement of the judgment. The said 
provision reads as follows:-
"353. Judgment -
( 1) The judgment in every trial in any Criminal Court of original 
jurisdiction shall be pronounced in open Court by the presiding 
officer immediately after the termination of the trial or at some 
subsequent time of which notice shall be given to the parties or 
their pleaders,-
( a) by delivering the whole ofthc judgment; or 
(b) by reading out the whole of the judgment; or 
(c) by reading out the operative part of the judgment and explaining 
the substance of the judgment in a language which is understood 
by the accused or his pleader. 
(2) Where the judgment is delivered under clause· (a) of sub-section 
(I), the presiding officer shall cause it to be taken down in short, 
hand, sign the transcript and every page thereof as soon as it is 
made ready, and write on· the d.ate of the delivery of the
judgment 
in open Court. 
(3) Where the judgment or the operative part thereof is read out 
under clause (b) or clause ( c) of sub- section (I), as the case may 
be, it shall be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open 
•Court, and ifit is not written with his own hand, eve.ry page of the 
judgment shall be signed by him. 
(4) Where the judgment is pronounced in ti"' 01a1111er specified in 
clause (c) of sub-section ( J ), the whole judgment ora copy thereof 
shall be immediately made available for the perusal of the parties 
or their pleaders free of cost. 
(5) If the accused is in custody, he shall be brought up to hear the 
judgment pronounced.
AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. v. STATE OF 
CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
(6) If the accused is not in custody, he shall be required by the 
Court to attend to hear the judgment pronounced, except where 
his personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with 
and the sentence is one of fine only or he is ac_quitted: Provided 
that, where there are more accused than one, and one or more of 
them do not attend the Court on the date on which the judgment is 
to be pronounced, the presiding officer may, in order to avoid 
undue delay in the disposal of the case, pronounce the judgment 
notwithstanding their absence. 
(7) No judgment delivered by any Criminal Court shall be deemed 
to be invalid by reason only of the absence of any party or his 
pleader on the day or from the place notified for the delivery 
thereof, or of any omission to serve, or defect in serving, on the 
parties or their pleaders, or any of them, the notice of such day 
and place. 
(8) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any way 
the extent of the provisions of section 465." 
12. Section 354 provides for language and contents of the 
judgment. The said provision reads as follows:-
"354. Language and contents of judgment.-
(!) Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code, every 
judgment referred to in section 353,-
(a) shall be written in the language of the Court; 
(b) shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision 
thereon and the reasons for
the decision; 
(c) shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of 
the Indian Penal Code (45of1860) or other law under which, the 
accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced; 
( d) if it be a judgment of acquittal, shall state the offence of which 
the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty. 
(2) When the conviction is under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 
1860 ), and it is doubtful under which of two sections, or under 
which of two parts of the same section, of that Code the offence 
falls, the Court shall distinctly express the same, and pass judgment 
in the alternative. 
(3) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death 
or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment 
for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the 
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sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the 
special reasons for such sentence. 
(4) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with 
imprisonment for a term of one year or more, but the Court imposes 
a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three months, 
it shall record its reasons for awarding such sentence, unless the 
sentence is one of imprisonment till the rising of the Court or 
unless the case was tried summarily under the provisions of this 
Code. 
(5) When any person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall 
direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead. 
(6) Every order under section 117 or sub-section (2) of section 
138 and every final order made under section 125, section 145 or 
section 14 7 shall contain the point or points for determination, the 
decision thereon and the reasons for the decision." 
13. Section 362 has the heading "Court not to alter judgment." 
The said provision is as follows:-
"362. Court not to alter judgment. - Save as otherwise provided 
by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no 
Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of 
a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical 
or arithmetical error." 
14. Interpreting the said provision in the context of exercise of 
inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC this Court in 
Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal
and anotller; held thus:-
"5. The appellant points out that he invoked the inherent power of 
the High Court saved by Section 482 of the Code and that 
notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by Section 362 the High 
Court had power to grant relief. Now it is well settled that the 
inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that 
which is specifically prohibited by the Code (Sankatha Singh 1( 
State of U.P.6). It is true thatthe prohibition in Section 362 against 
the court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is 
"otherwise provided by this Court or by any other law for the time 
being in force". Those words, however, refer to those provisions 
only where the court has been expressly authorised by the Code 
'(1981) 1 sec soo 
'AIR 1962 SC 1208
AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. v. STArE OF 
297 
CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. [DJPAK MISRA . .l.) 
or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power 
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of the court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained 
in Section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power 
can be of no avail." 
We have referred to the aforesaid decision to illustrate that the 
CrPC confers absolute sanctity to the judgment once it is pronounced. 
It does not conceive of any kind of alteration. 
15. Section 363 provides copy of judgment to be given to the 
accused and other persons. Section 364 provides for the situation where 
the judgment requires to be translated. 
16. It is apposite to note that though CrPC does not define the 
term "judgment", yet it has clearly laid down how the judgment is to be 
pronounced. The provisions clearly spell out that it is imperative on the 
part of the learned trial judge to pronounce the judgment in open court 
by delivering the whole of the judgment or by reading out the whole of 
the judgment or by reading out the operative part of the judgment and 
explaining the substance of the judgment in a language which is understood 
by the accused or his pleader. 
17. We have already noted that the judgment was not dictated in 
open court. Code of Criminal Procedure provides reading of the operative 
part of the judgment. It means that the trial judge may not read the 
whole of the judgment and may read operative part of the judgment but 
it
does not in any way suggest that the result of the case will be announced 
and the judgment would not be available on record. Non-availability of 
judgment, needless to say, can never be a judgment because there is no 
declaration by way of pronouncement in the open court that the accused 
has been convicted or acquitted. A judgment, as has been always 
understood, is the expression of an opinion after due consideration of the 
facts which deserve to be determined. Without pronouncement of a 
judgment in the open court, signed and dated, it is difficultto treat it as a 
judgment of conviction as has been held in Re. Atliipaf<lyan and Ors'. 
As a matter of fact, on inquiry, the High Court in the administrative side 
had found there was no judgment available on record. Learned counsel 
for the appellants wou Id submit that in the counter affidavit filed by the 
High Court it has been mentioned that an incomplete typed judgment of 
14 pages till paragraph No. 19 was available. The affidavit also states 
'AIR 1960 Mad 507 
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that it was incomplete and no page had the signature of the presiding 
officer. If the judgment is not complete and signed, it cannot be a judgment 
in terms of Section 353 CrPC. It is unimaginable that a judgment is 
pronounced without there being a judgment. It is gross illegality. In this 
context, we may refer to a passage from State of Punjab and others v. 
Jagdev Singh Talwand1~ wherein expressing the opinion for the 
Constitution Bench, Chandrachud, CJ. observed thus:-
"30. We would like to take this opportunity to point out that serious 
difficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted 
by the High Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a 
reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which the 
. High Court intends to pass should not be announced until a reasoned 
judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that 
a final order without a reasoned judgment is announced by the 
High Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody 
of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the other, 
or that a person accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that 
a statute is unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a detenu 
be released from detention. If the object of passing such orders is 
to ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is more often 
defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in
this Court against the order passed by the High Court. That places 
this Court in a predicament because, without the benefit of the 
reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult forth is Court to allow 
the bare order to be implemented. The result inevitably is that the 
operation of the order passed by the High Court has to be stayed 
pending delivery of the reasoned judgment. 
3 I. It may be thought that such orders are passed by this Court 
and therefore there is no reason why the High C6urts should not, 
do the same. We would like to point out respectfully that the orders 
passed by this Court are final and no appeal lies against them. 
The Supreme Court is the final court in the hierarchy of our courts. 
Besides, orders without a reasoned judgment are passed by this 
Court very rarely, under exceptional circumstances. Orders passed 
by the High Court are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this 
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and other provisions 
of the concerned statutes. We thought it necessary to make these 
----
'(1984)1sec596
AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. v. STATE OF 
CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
observations in order that a practice which is not very desirable 
and which achieves no useful purpose may not grow out of its 
present infancy." 
I 8. We have reproduced the aforesaid two passages as the larger 
Bench has made such observations with regard to unreasoned judgments 
passed by the High Courts. The learned Chief Justice had noted that the 
practice is not desirable and does not achieve any useful purpose and it 
should not grow out of its present infancy. Despite the said observations, 
sometimes this Court comes across judgments and orders where the 
High Courts have announced the result of the case by stating "reasons 
to follow". We can only reiterate the observations of the Constitution 
Bench. 
• 
19. Having stated that, as is evincible in the instant case, the 
judgment is not available on record and hence, there can be no shadow 
of doubt that the declaration of the result cannot tantamount to a judgment 
as prescribed in the CrPC. That leads to the inevitable conclusion that 
the trial in both the cases has to be treated to be pending. 
20. The next issue that emerges for consideration is whether the 
High Court on its administrative side could have transferred the case 
from the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur to the c;.ourt of 
District and Sessions Judge, Surguja at Ambikapur. In this regard, it is 
suffice to understand the jurisdiction and authority
conferred under the 
Constitution on the High Court in the prescription of power of 
superintendence under Article 227.Article 227 of the Constitution reads 
as follows:-
"227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High 
Court:-( I) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all 
courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which 
it exercises jurisdiction. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, 
the High Court may-
( a) call for returns from such courts; 
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating 
the practice and proceedings of such courts; and 
( c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be 
kept by the officers of any such courts 
(3) The High Court may also settle tables offees to be allowed to 
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the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to 
attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein: 
Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables 
s~ttled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent 
with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall 
require the previous approval of the Governor 
(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High 
Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal 
constituted by or under any law relating to the Anned Forces." 
The aforesaid Article confers pov,,er of superintendence on the 
High Court over the courts and tribunals v,,ithin the territory of the State. 
The High Court has the jurisdiction and the authority to exercise suo 
motu power. 
21. In Ac/1ut11n11nd11 B11idyll v. Pmfullyll Kumllr Gllyen find 
otliers9 a two-Judge Bench while dealing with the power of 
superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 has opined that the 
power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the 
Constitution is not confined to administrative superintendence only but 
such power includes within its sweep the power of judicial review. The 
power and duty of the High Court under Article 227 is essentially to 
ensure that the courts and tribunals, inferior to High Court, have done 
what they were required to do. Law is well settled by various decisions 
of this Court that the High
Court can interfere under Article 227 of the 
Constitution in cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its 
jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error oflaw apparent on record 
as distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary or capricious 
exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, arriving 
at a finding which is perverse or based on no material, or resulting in 
manifest injustice. 
22. We have already stated that the Division Bench while 
COllCurring with the opinion of the learned single Judge has also quashed 
the order by. the learned trial judge on the ground that there was no 
judgment on record. There is no dispute about the fact that the Fu II 
Court of the High Court after coming to a definite conclusion that the 
learned trial judge had really not passed any judgment, resolved that the 
matter should be heard by the learned Sessions Judge and accordingly 
the Registrar General of the High Court communicated the decision to 
'.(1997) s sec 76
AJAY SINGH AND ANR. AND ETC. v. STATE OF 
CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
the concerned learned Sessions Judge. The submission of the learned 
counsel for the appellant is that such a power could not have been 
exercised by the Full Court on the administrative side, for in exercise of 
administrative authority, the High Court cannot transfer the case. The 
contention is that High Court can only transfer the case in exercise of 
power under Section 407 and that too on the judicial side. Our attention 
has also been drawn to Section 194 of Cr PC. Section I 94 empowers 
the Additional and Assistant Sessions Judges to try cases made over to 
them. The said provision reads as follows:-
"194. Additional and Assistant Sessions Judges to try cases 
made over to them. -An Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant 
Sessions Judge shall try such cases as the Sessions Judge of the 
division may, by general or special order, make over to him for 
trial or as the High Court may, by special order, direct him to try." 
23. It is argued that Section I 94 can be exercised on the 
administrative side before the commencement of the trial and not 
thereafter, whereas Section 407 can be taken recourse to on the judicial 
side and a case can be transferred on the basis of parameters laid down 
for transfer of a criminal trial. In this regard, we may usefully refer to 
tl)e authority in Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bilwr'0 wherein under certain 
circumstances the High Court had transferred the
sessions trial from 
the court of one Additional Sessions Judge to another by an administrative 
order at a stage when the trial had commenced. It was contended 
before this Court that the trial that took place before the transferee 
court was wholly without jurisdiction and consequently the conviction 
and sentence recorded by that court were null and void and were not 
curable under Section 465 CrPC. To sustain the said proposition oflaw, 
reliance was placed in A.R. Antu/ay v. R.S. Nayak <mt/ another". 
The two-Judge Bench perusing the material on record came to the 
conclusion that the order was passed by the High Court in its 
administrative jurisdiction. Thereafter, it proceeded to opine thus:-
"Under Article 227 of the Constitution oflndia every High Court 
has superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the 
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and it is trite 
that this power of superintendence entitles the High Court to pass 
orders for administrative exigency and expediency. In the instant 
,,, ( 1995) 4 sec 392 
II (1988)2 SCC602 
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the grievance of the victim should be comatosed in this manner. 
B 
27. Consequently, appeals are dismissed. The trial court to whom 
the cases have been transferred is directed to proceed in accordance 
with law. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeals dismissed.