MAQBOOL versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
[2018] 12 S.C.R. 885, Supreme Court of India, 2018
Outcome: Leave Granted & Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
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MAQBOOL
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
(Criminal Appeal  No. 1143 of 2018)
SEPTEMBER 07, 2018
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.326A and 326B – Offence under,
whether attracted, if the injury in an acid attack is simple – Plea of
appellant for discharge u/s.326A on the ground that the injury
caused was simple as per the medical report hence, he cannot be
charged u/s.326A, rejected – Propriety of – Held: It is not the
percentage or gravity of injury, which makes the difference – Be it
simple or grievous, if the injury falls under the specified eight types
u/s.326A on account of use of acid, the offence u/s.326A is
attracted – Merely because the title to s.326A speaks about
grievous hurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement under the
Section that the injuries caused should be invariably grievous –
s.326B would be attracted in case the requirements specified are
met on an attempted acid attack – Appeal dismissed – The Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act, 2013.
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.326A and 326B – Difference between
– Discussed.
Interpretation of Statutes – Title of the provision and its
contents – Conflict between – Held: Title to the provision need not
invariably indicate the contents of the provision – In the event of a
conflict between the plain expressions in the provision and the
indicated title, the title cannot control the contents of the provision
– Title is only a broad and general indication of the nature of
the
subject dealt under the provision.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:  1.1  Section 326A, IPC carries title of “voluntarily
causing grievous hurt by use of acid” whereas Section 326B, IPC
does not carry any such indication in the title regarding the
nature of injury as grievous. But, both the Sections provide for
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eight types of injuries -  (i) permanent damage, (ii) partial
damage, 
(iii) 
deformity, 
(iv) 
burns, 
(v) 
maiming,
(vi) disfigurement, (vii) disability or (viii) grievous hurt. The first
seven of the injuries referred to in the Sections are classified
based on the normal aftereffect of acid attack whereas the eighth
one is on the gravity of the effect. Under Sections 326A and 326B,
grievous hurt is only one among the eight injuries. In view of the
explanation under Section 326B, the resultant damage or
deformity under 326A or 326B is not required to be irreversible.
The other seven injuries may be either simple or grievous. The
nature of injury being simple or grievous, is irrelevant for
distinguishing between Section 323, Section 326 and Section 326A
of IPC or between Section 326A and Section 326B of IPC. If the
injury referred to under Section 326A or 326B is one among the
specified eight injuries, whether the seven of them be simple or
grievous, the special provisions are attracted. [Paras 6, 7]
[890-E-H; 891-A]
1.2  The basic difference between Sections 326A and 326B
of IPC is the presence of actual injury under Section 326A. The
resultant injury has made the offence more serious with a
mandatory minimum punishment of ten years which may extend
to imprisonment for life and, in either case, with a fine. The fine
is mandatory and the quantum should be just and reasonable in
the sense that it should be, in any
case, sufficient to meet the
medical expenses for the treatment of the victim. Therefore, the
second proviso under Section 326A requires that the fine
imposed should be paid to the litigant. Under Section 326B, the
mere act of throwing or attempt to throw or attempt to
administer or attempt to use any other means with the intention
of causing any of the injuries referred to in the Section, is to be
visited with a mandatory minimum imprisonment of five years,
which may extend to seven years and fine.  Thus, merely
because the title to Section 326A of IPC speaks about grievous
hurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement under the Section that
the injuries caused should be invariably grievous. Even if the
seven injuries are simple, Section 326A, and under Section 326B
the mere act of throwing or attempt, as indicated in the Section,
would attract the offence. [Paras 8, 9] [891-B-D]
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1.3  The title to the provision need not invariably indicate
the contents of the provision. If the provision is otherwise clear
and unambiguous, the title pales into irrelevance. On the
contrary, if the contents of the provision are otherwise
ambiguous, an aid can be sought from the title so as to define the
provision. In the event of a conflict between the plain
expressions in the provision and the indicated title, the title
cannot control the contents of the provision. Title is only a broad
and general indication of the nature of the subject dealt under
the provision. [Para 10] [891-E-F]
1.4  It is not the percentage or gravity of injury, which makes
the difference. Be it simple or grievous, if the injury falls under
the specified types under Section 326A on account of use of acid,
the offence under Section 326A is attracted. Section 326B would
be attracted in case the requirements specified are met on an
attempted acid attack. [Para 16] [894-A-B]
1.5  The observations and findings in the present Judgment
are only for the purpose of reaching the conclusion as to whether
charge under Section 326A of IPC has been correctly framed and
whether the trial court committed an error in rejecting the
application for discharge under Section 326A of IPC. All other
aspects would remain to be considered during the trial which
shall be conducted uninfluenced by any of the observations on
the merits of the matter. [Para 17] [894-C-D]
Laddu Ram v. State of Rajasthan
[Criminal
Miscellaneous Petition No. 681 of 2017 decided on
06.02.2017 by Rajasthan High Court] ;  M. Siluvai
Murugan @ Murugan v. State  2018 SCC OnLine Mad
2332 – overruled.
Raichurmatham Prabhakar and Another v. Rawatmal
Dugar (2004) 4 SCC 766 : [2004] 3 SCR 1130 ;
Union of India (UOI) and Another v. National
Federation of the Blind and Others (2013) 10 SCC
772 :  [2013] 9 SCR 1023 – relied on.
MAQBOOL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
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    Case  Law Reference
[2004] 3 SCR 1130
   relied on
        Para 11
[2013] 9 SCR 1023
   relied on
        Para 11
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal
No. 1143 of 2018
From the Order dated 19.07.2018 of the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 2231 of 2018
L. B. Rai, Askari Husain, Saurav Singhla, Kartik Rai, Shankar
Divate, Advs. for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KURIAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. In an acid attack, if the injury is simple, whether an offence
under Section 326A of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as
‘IPC’) is attracted, is the main question for consideration in this case.
And if the injury is only simple, whether charge can be framed under
Section 326B is the incidental issue.
3. Section 326A was introduced by The Criminal Law
(Amendment)Act, 2013 pursuant to the recommendations contained in
the Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law,
popularly known as J.S. Verma Committee Report. The pre-amended
provision covering such injuries is Section 326. To quote:
“326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous
weapons or means.—Whoever, except in the case provided for
by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any
instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which,
used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means
of fire or any heated substance, or by
means of any poison or any
corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or
by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human
body to inhale, to swallow, or to re-ceive into the blood, or by
means of any animal, shall be pun-ished with 1[imprisonment for
life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
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4. “Grievous hurt” is defined under Section 320 of IPC and “hurt”
under Section 319 of IPC. To quote:
“319. Hurt.—Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity
to any person is said to cause hurt.”
“320. Grievous hurt.—The following kinds of hurt only are
designated as “grievous”:—
First       — Emasculation.
Secondly — Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
Thirdly    — Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear,
Fourthly — Privation of any member or joint.
Fifthly     — Destruction or permanent impairing of  the
           powers of any member or joint.
Sixthly     — Permanent disfiguration of the head  or face.
Seventhly— Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
Eighthly   — Any  hurt   which  endangers  life  or  which
causes    the   sufferer  to   be   during    the
                     space of   twenty  days   in   severe   bodily
pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.”
5. Injuries caused or attempted to be caused by use of acid, have
been, under the amendment, categorized differently as separate or
special offences under Sections 326A and 326B of IPC:
“326A. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid,
etc.-Whoever causes permanent or partial damage or deformity
to, or burns or maims or disfigures or disables, any part or parts of
the body of a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on
or by administering acid to that person, or by using any other
means with the intention of causing or with the
knowledge that he
is likely to cause such injury or hurt, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be
less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life,
and with fine;
          Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet
the medical expenses of the treatment of the victim;
MAQBOOL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
[KURIAN, J.]
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             Provided further that any fine imposed under this section
shall be paid to the victim.”
“326B.Voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid.-
Whoever throws or attempts to throw acid on any person or
attempts to administer acid to any person, or attempts to use any
other means, with the intention of causing permanent or partial
damage or deformity or burns or maiming or disfigurement or
disability or grievous hurt to that person, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be
less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
        Explanation I.—For the purposes of section 326A and this
section, “acid” includes any substance which has acidic or corrosive
character or burning nature, that is capable of causing bodily injury
leading to scars or disfigurement or temporary or permanent
disability.
       Explanation 2.— For the purposes of section 326A and this
section, permanent or partial damage or deformity shall not be
required to be irreversible.”
6. Section 326A carries title of “voluntarily causing grievous hurt
by use of acid” whereas Section 326B does not carry any such
indication in the title regarding the nature of injury as grievous. But on
closer analysis, it can be seen that both the Sections provide for eight
types of injuries - (i) permanent damage, (ii) partial damage,
(iii) deformity, (iv) burns, (v)
maiming, (vi) disfigurement, (vii) disability
or (viii) grievous hurt.
7.  The first seven of the injuries referred to in the Sections are
classified based on the normal aftereffect of acid attack whereas the
eighth one is on the gravity of the effect. Under Sections 326A and
326B, grievous hurt is only one among the eight injuries. In view of the
explanation under Section 326B, the resultant damage or deformity
under 326A or 326B is not required to be irreversible. The other seven
injuries may be either simple or grievous. The nature of injury being
simple or grievous, is irrelevant for distinguishing between Section 323
and Section 326A of IPC or between Section 326A and Section 326B of
IPC. If the injury referred to under Section 326A or 326B is one among
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the specified eight injuries, whether the seven of them be simple or
grievous, the special provisions are attracted.
8. The basic difference between Sections 326A and 326B of IPC
is the presence of actual injury under Section 326A. The resultant injury
has made the offence more serious with a mandatory minimum
punishment of ten years which may extend to imprisonment for life and,
in either case, with a fine. The fine is mandatory and the quantum should
be just and reasonable in the sense that it should be, in any case,
sufficient to meet the medical expenses for the treatment of the victim.
Therefore, the second proviso under Section 326A requires that the fine
imposed should be paid to the litigant. Under Section 326B, the mere act
of throwing or attempt to throw or attempt to administer or attempt to
use any other means with the intention of causing any of the injuries
referred to in the Section, is to be visited with a mandatory minimum
imprisonment of five years, which may extend to seven years and fine.
9. Thus, merely because the title to Section 326A of IPC speaks
about grievous hurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement under the
Section that the injuries caused should be invariably grievous. Even if
the seven injuries are simple, Section 326A, and under Section 326B the
mere act of throwing or attempt, as indicated in the Section, would
attract the offence.
10.The title to the provision need not invariably indicate the
contents of the
provision. If the provision is otherwise clear and
unambiguous, the title pales into irrelevance. On the contrary, if the
contents of the provision are otherwise ambiguous, an aid can be sought
from the title so as to define the provision. In the event of a conflict
between the plain expressions in the provision and the indicated title, the
title cannot control the contents of the provision. Title is only a broad and
general indication of the nature of the subject dealt under the provision.
11. We are benefitted with two precedents in this regard -
(i) Raichurmatham Prabhakar and another v. Rawatmal Dugar1
and (ii) Union of India (UOI) and another v. National Federation
of the Blind and others2.
12. In Raichurmatham Prabhakar (supra), it was held by the
Court at paragraph-14 of the judgment as follows:
1 (2004) 4 SCC 766
2 (2013) 10 SCC 772
MAQBOOL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
[KURIAN, J.]
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          “14. The view is now settled that the headings or titles
pre-fixed to sections or group of sections can be referred to in
construing an Act of the legislature. But conflicting opinions have
been expressed on the question as to what weight should be
attached to the headings or titles. According to one view, the
headings might be treated as preambles to the provisions
following them so as to be regarded as giving the key to opening
the mind of the draftsman of the clauses arranged thereunder.
According to the other view, resort to heading can only be taken
when the enacting words are ambiguous. They cannot control the
meaning of plain words but they may explain ambiguities.
(See: Principles of  Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh,
9th Edn., 2004, pp.152,155). In our opinion, it is permissible to
assign the heading or title of a section a limited role to play in the
construction of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and
general indicators of the nature of the subject-matter dealt with
thereunder. The heading or title may also be taken as a
condensed name assigned to indicate collectively the
characteristics of the subject-matter dealt with by the enactment
underneath; though the name would always be brief having its
own limitations. In case of conflict between the plain language of
the provision and the meaning of the heading or title, the heading
or title would not control the meaning which
is clearly and plainly
discernible from the language of the provision thereunder.”
13.      In National Federation of the Blind (supra):
       “44. It is settled law that while interpreting any provision of
a statute the plain meaning has to be given effect and if language
therein is simple and unambiguous, there is no need to traverse
beyond the same. Likewise, if the language of the relevant
section gives a simple meaning and message, it should be
interpreted in such a way and there is no need to give any weightage
to headings of those paragraphs. This aspect has been clarified in
Prakash Nath Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax
and Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 686. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment is
relevant which reads as under:
“13. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read
anything into a statutory provision which is plain and
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unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The
language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of
legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that
the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by
the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed
and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should
be construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand
said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the
purposes which lie behind them”. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co.
v. Yensavage.) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip
Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama and Padma Sundara
Rao v. State of T.N.””
14. In the present case, the appellant sought discharge under
Section 326A of IPC on the ground that the injury caused was simple as
per the medical report. The trial court rejected the application and the
same has been upheld by the High Court. Learned Counsel for the
appellant has submitted that even if the entire prosecution story is
accepted to be true and correct, no grievous hurt has been caused to the
victim since the injuries are reported to be simple, and hence, he cannot
be charged under Section 326A. Reliance is sought to be placed on two
decisions, one of the High Court of Rajasthan in Laddu Ram v. State of
Rajasthan decided on 06.02.2017 in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition
No. 681 of 2017 and the other of the High Court of Madras in
M.
Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan v. State decided on 30.07.2018 in
Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2016 (2018 SCC OnLine Mad 2332).
15. In Laddu Ram (supra), the High Court of Rajasthan has taken
the view that the injury caused being simple in nature, Section 326A of
IPC is not attracted but only Section 326B of IPC would apply. Similarly,
the High Court of Madras in M. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan
(supra) held that if the injury caused by use of acid is simple in nature,
there cannot be any conviction under Section 326A of IPC. In M. Siluvai
Murugan @ Murugan (supra), though the High Court has analysed
the legal position correctly, it has unfortunately committed a patent error
in taking note of the nature of injury as simple and altering the conviction
to Section 326B of IPC on the ground that the injury as per medical
report was simple being chemical injury at twelve per cent.
MAQBOOL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
[KURIAN, J.]
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16. As we have already discussed above, it is not the percentage
or gravity of injury, which makes the difference. Be it simple or
grievous, if the injury falls under the specified types under Section 326A
on account of use of acid, the offence under Section 326A is attracted.
Section 326B would be attracted in case the requirements specified are
met on an attempted acid attack. Therefore, both the High Court of
Rajasthan in Laddu Ram (supra) and High Court of Madras in
M. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan (supra) do not lay down the correct
position of law and they are overruled.
17. The appeal is hence dismissed. However, we make it clear
that the observations and findings in this Judgment are only for the
purpose of reaching the conclusion as to whether charge under Section
326A of IPC has been correctly framed and whether the trial court
committed an error in rejecting the application for discharge under
Section 326A of IPC. All other aspects would remain to be considered
during the trial which shall be conducted uninfluenced by any of the
observations on the merits of the matter.
Divya Pandey
               Appeal dismissed.