TIRITH KUMAR & ORS. versus DADURAM & ORS.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 665, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 665 : 2024 INSC 1005
Tirith Kumar & Ors.
v.
Daduram & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 13516 of 2024)
19 December 2024
[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 could be applied to the 
parties to the instant lis.
Headnotes†
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.2(2) – Application of the Act – 
Constitution of India – Articles 366(25), 341, 342 – Central 
Provinces Laws Act, 1875 – ss.5, 6 – High Court held that the 
parties belonged to Sawara tribe, a notified scheduled tribe 
and thus, the HSA, 1956 does not apply to them – Granted a 
portion as property to M’s daughters and their descendants 
(respondents) on the grounds of justice, equity and good 
conscience – Correctness: 
Held: HSA, 1956 clearly states that scheduled castes and tribes 
shall be outside its purview of application – Thus, HSA, 1956 does 
not apply to scheduled tribes – Therefore, the Courts below erred 
on this count, and the High Court took the correct view – Parties 
did not produce any notification demonstrating that the Sawara tribe 
stands de-notified – Further, ‘M’ passed away in 1951, that is, prior 
to the enactment of HSA, 1956 – No error in the judgment of the 
High Court applying the provisions of the Central Provinces Laws 
Act, 1875 and more particularly s.6 thereof which postulates the 
application of the principle of justice, equity and good conscience, 
to account for possibilities not covered by s.5 of the Act – Appeal 
has no
merit, dismissed. [Paras 4-7, 9]
Tribals – Female Tribals – Right of survivorship to – 
Recommendation to Central Government, reiterated:
Held: Recommendation/suggestion made to the Central 
Government in the case of in Kamla Neti v. LAO to look into 
pathways to secure the right of survivorship to female tribals, 
reiterated – Hindu Succession Act, 1956. [Para 11]
* Author
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Case Law Cited
Kamla Neti v. LAO [2022] 18 SCR 441 : (2023) 3 SCC 528 – held 
not applicable.
Madhu Kishwar & Ors. v. State of Bihar [1996] Supp. 1 SCR 
442 : (1996) 5 SCC 125; M.V. Elisabeth and Others v. Harwan 
Investments and Trading Pvt. Ltd. Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, 
Vasco-De-Gama, Goa [1992]  1 SCR 1003 : (1993) Supp. 2 SCC 
433; M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439 : 1962 
SCC OnLine SC 147; State of Maharashtra v. Milind [2000] Supp. 
5 SCR 65 : (2001) 1 SCC 4; State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh 
[2024] 8 SCR 1321 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1860; Ahmedabad 
Women Action Group (AWAG) v. Union of India [1997] 2 SCR 
389 : (1997) 3 SCC 573; Bhuri v. Maroti, (2015) SCC OnLine Bom 
3173; Bhagwati v. Cheduram, 2019 SCC OnLine Chh 209; Bini 
B. (Dr.) v. Jayan P.R., 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 39489; M. Siddiq 
(Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das [2019] 18 SCR 1 : 
(2020) 1 SCC 1; Saraswathi Ammal v. Jagadambal [1953] 1 SCR 
939 : (1953) 1 SCC 362 – referred to.
List of Acts
Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875.
List of Keywords
Application of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Scheduled tribe; 
Sawara tribe, Notified scheduled tribe; Customs; Tribal community; 
Scheduled castes; Hindu law; Inheritance; Hindu Religion; 
Sufficiently hinduised; De-notified; Common ancestor; Succession 
of property; Principles of justice, equity and good conscience; 
Female tribals; Right of survivorship.
Case
Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13516 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.02.2019 of the High Court 
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in SA No. 270 of 2003
Appearances for Parties
Satish Pandey, Mahesh Kumar Tiwari, Ms. Nishi Prabha Singh, 
Ms. Jay Jaimini Pandey, Ms. Ayushi Pandey, Ms. Lalita Gupta, 
Abhishek Kumar Singh, Ms. Vijay Lakshmi, Braj Kishore Mishra, 
Advs. for the Appellants.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
667
Tirith Kumar & Ors. v. Daduram & Ors.
Rajeev Kumar Bansal, Parvinder, Manish Das, Mukul Biswas, 
Vidya Sagar, Arun Kumar Arunachal, Arjun D Singh, Ms. Ankita 
Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
THE CHALLENGE
1.	
This appeal questions the correctness of the judgment and order 
passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, in Second 
Appeal No. 270 of 2003, dated 6th February 2019 and it raises the 
question as to whether the Hindu Succession Act, 19561 could be 
applied to the parties to the instant lis? The Courts below i.e. the 
First Appellate Court2 in Civil Appeal No.09A/2001 vide judgment 
dated 27th January, 2003 and the Trial Court3 in Civil Suit No. 131A of 
1995, by judgment dated 16th December, 2000 found the appellants 
to be ‘sufficiently hinduised’, having given up their customs as part 
of a tribal community and therefore are governed by Hindu law, and 
thereby the respondents herein do not have any rights over the 
property originally belonging to Mardan. 
BRIEF FACTS
2.	
Brief facts as emanating from the record are:- 
2.1	 This dispute, at the heart of it, pertains to ownership of land 
between two sides of the same family, with a common ancestor 
by the name of Chuchrung. This common ancestor had two sons 
named Mardan and Puni Ram. The sons and legal heirs of Puni 
Ram set the law in motion, seeking a declaration that the suit 
property situated at village Bagri
Pali, measuring 13.95 acres 
bearing Khasra No. 26, belongs to them and for a permanent 
injunction against the respondents. 
1	
Hereinafter referred to as ‘HSA, 1956’.
2	
The Court of Additional District Judge, Sakti, District Bilaspur.
3	
The Court of Civil Judge Class-2, Sakti, District Bilaspur.
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2.2	 The following is the family tree:
2.3	 The dispute came before the Court of Civil Judge Class-2, Sakti, 
District Bilaspur, wherein six issues were framed. A perusal of 
the judgment shows that questions 2 to 6 were questions of 
fact. It was held as follows:
2.3.1	 Relying on the testimony and cross-examination of PW1, 
Anandram is now represented by the present appellants 
and also the statement of DW1, Daduram, it was held 
that both the plaintiffs and defendants “abide and follow 
the Hindu principles of law”. 
2.3.2	 The dispute regarding the death of Mardan was resolved 
with the Court observing that he had indeed died prior 
to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 
1956. To return such a finding, reliance was placed on 
the evidence of PW1, Ugrasen PW2 and Karamaha 
PW3. It was further stated that DW1 himself, in his cross-
examination, accepted such a fact. 
2.3.3	 Qua the possession of the suit property, it was held that 
post the death of Mardan in 1951, Puni Ram, father of 
the plaintiff, took possession. Any right possessed by 
Mardan would not have transferred over to his daughters 
as prior to the HSA 1956, a daughter does not receive 
any property upon the death of her father. 
2.3.4	 In conclusion, it was held that the defendants did not 
have any right of ownership over the property, which 
originally belonged to Mardan and that the successors 
of Puni Ram had the right over the said property. It
was

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Tirith Kumar & Ors. v. Daduram & Ors.
ordered that the defendants would not interfere in the 
ownership of the plaintiffs. 
2.4	 The defendants, aggrieved by the findings summarised above, 
appealed the judgment. The First Appellate Court agreed with the 
findings arrived by the Court below in as much as that both parties 
did indeed follow the Hindu Religion and that the death of Mardan 
was prior to coming into force of the HSA, 1956, and as a result, 
the daughters of Mardan had no right over the subject property. 
2.5	 Further aggrieved, the matter was carried to the High Court in 
the Second Appeal. The substantial questions of law framed 
are as under: 
1.	
Whether the parties follow the principle of Hindu Law 
and have been following as on today?
2.	
Whether Mardan and Puni Ram in succession the 
property which they had received and from the 
said property the income which accrued from the 
same both Mardan and Puni Ram purchased other 
property?
3.	
Whether the death of Mardan was done in the year 
1951 since then the property of Muni Ram in succession 
has received and at present the Plaintiffs are in use, 
occupation and possession of the said property?
4.	
Whether the defendants, in accordance with law, got 
their name entered and are in use, occupation and 
possession?
5.	
Assistance and expenses
6.	
Whether Mardan died before coming into force the 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in case yes and then 
the results? 
2.6	 The reasoning of the
High Court in overturning the findings 
returned by the Courts below is that:
2.6.1	 The Court noticed Section 2 (2) of the HSA, 1956 and 
the judgment of this Court in Madhu Kishwar & Ors. v. 
State of Bihar,4 and held that HSA, 1956 does not apply 
4	
(1996) 5 SCC 125
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to the parties as they are Sawara, a notified scheduled 
tribe within the meaning of Article 366(25), and there is 
no notification on record which de-notifies them or directs 
the application of HSA, 1956 to them. 
2.6.2	 In regard to the question of whether the parties have 
become sufficiently hinduised reference was made to Smt 
Butaki Bai & Ors. v. Sukhbati & Ors. In the present 
facts, it was held:
“The plaintiffs neither in the plaint nor in their 
evidence particularised the prevalent tribal customs 
except pleadings some ceremonies of marriage 
in their caste. It has neither been pleaded nor 
proved that they have abandoned their law of 
origin (customary law) and they have given up their 
customary succession and did not state anything so 
as to be governed by in their matter of succession 
and inheritance by any school of hindu law…” 
2.6.3	 In the aforesaid backdrop, the Court invoked the Central 
Provinces Laws Act, 1875 and in particular Sections 5 
and 6 thereof. Referring to the judgment of this Court 
in M.V. Elisabeth and Others v. Harwan Investments 
and Trading Pvt. Ltd. Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, 
Vasco-De-Gama, Goa,5 as also certain other authorities, 
the Court invoked the principles of justice, equity and 
good conscience to hold that the legal representatives 
of Mardan, i.e. his daughters and their successors-in-
interest, would be entitled to half share in the total suit 
property. The appeal was
partly allowed in these terms. 
2.7	 It is with this background that the present appeal has come up 
for consideration before this Court. 
OUR CONSIDERATION
3.	
The parties to the present lis claim to be Hindus and therefore ask that 
they be governed by Hindu law in matters of inheritance. The High 
Court has disallowed this contention on the ground that the parties 
5	
(1993) Supp. 2 SCC 433
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671
Tirith Kumar & Ors. v. Daduram & Ors.
are members of the Sawara tribe, which is a notified tribe under 
Article 342 of the Constitution of India. The constitutional position in 
regard to Articles 341 and 342, which deal with scheduled castes and 
tribes, respectively, has been delineated by a Constitution Bench of 
this Court in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore 6 in the following terms:
“20. …It was realised that in the Indian Society there 
were other classes of citizens who were equally, or may 
be somewhat less, backward than the Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes and it was thought that some special provision 
ought to be made even for them. Article 34(1) provides for 
the issue of public notification specifying the castes, races 
or tribes which shall, for the purposes of this Constitution, 
be deemed to be Scheduled Castes either in the State or 
the Union territory as the case may be. Similarly Article 
342 makes a provision for the issue of public notification 
in respect of Scheduled Tribes. Under Article 338(3), 
it is provided that references to the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes shall be construed as including 
references to such other Backward Classes as the 
President may, on receipt of the report of a commission 
appointed under Article 340(1) by order, specify and also 
to the Anglo-Indian community. It would thus be seen that 
this provision contemplates that some Backward Classes 
may by the Presidential order be included in
Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes.”
We may also notice the observations in State of Maharashtra v. 
Milind  7 in this context:
“11. By virtue of powers vested under Articles 341 and 342 
of the Constitution of India, the President is empowered 
to issue public notification for the first time specifying 
the castes, races or tribes or part of or groups within 
castes, races, or tribes which shall, for the purposes 
of the Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes 
or Scheduled Tribes in relation to a State or Union 
Territory, as the case may be. The language and terms of 
6	
1962 SCC OnLine SC 147
7	
(2001) 1 SCC 4
672
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Articles 341 and 342 are identical. What is said in relation 
to Article 341 mutatis mutandis applies to Article  342. 
The laudable object of the said articles is to provide 
additional protection to the members of the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes having regard to social and 
educational backwardness from which they have been 
suffering since a considerable length of time. The words 
“castes” or “tribes” in the expression “Scheduled Castes” 
and “Scheduled Tribes” are not used in the ordinary sense 
of the terms but are used in the sense of the definitions 
contained in Articles 366(24) and 366(25). In this view, 
a caste is a Scheduled Caste or a tribe is a Scheduled 
Tribe only if they are included in the President’s Orders 
issued under Articles 341 and 342 for the purpose of the 
Constitution. Exercising the powers vested in him, the 
President has issued the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) 
Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) 
Order, 1950. Subsequently, some orders were issued 
under the said articles in relation to Union Territories and 
other States and there have been certain amendments 
in relation to Orders issued, by amendment Acts passed 
by Parliament.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Recently, a seven-judge Bench in State of Punjab v. Davinder 
Singh 8 also made a reference to these judgments. 
4.	
As is clear from the aforesaid extracts, the lists made under 
Articles 341 and 342 are to be amended only
with the permission of 
the President. So, naturally, for a tribe to be notified as a scheduled 
tribe, a notification to that effect has to be issued and vice versa, 
i.e. for a tribe to be de-notified as well. The High Court noted that 
the parties did not produce any notification demonstrating that the 
Sawara tribe stands de-notified. There is no possibility of a different 
view on this question. 
5.	
The HSA, 1956, at the very outset, details as to whom the legislation 
would apply, and it clearly states that scheduled castes and tribes 
8	
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1860
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
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Tirith Kumar & Ors. v. Daduram & Ors.
shall be outside its purview of application. Section 2(2) thereof reads 
as under:
“2. Application of Act.― (1)This Act applies―
…
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section 
(1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the 
members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of 
clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution unless the 
Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, 
otherwise directs.”
6.	
The words of the section are explicit. The HSA, 1956, cannot apply 
to scheduled tribes. This position of law is well settled. We may 
reproduce with profit the observations made in certain judgments 
of this Court. 
6.1	 In Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar,9 MM Punchhi, J as his 
Lordship then was, noted the application of Section 2(2) of 
HSA as follows:
“4. …Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Hindu Succession 
Act significantly provides that nothing contained in the Act 
shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within 
the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution 
unless otherwise directed by the Central Government by 
means of a notification in the Official Gazette. Section 
3(2) further provides that in the Act, unless the context 
otherwise requires, words importing the masculine gender 
shall not be taken to include females. (emphasis supplied) 
General rule of legislative practice is that unless there 
is anything repugnant in the subject or context,
words 
importing the masculine gender used in statutes are to be 
taken to include females. Attention be drawn to Section 13 
of the General Clauses Act. But in matters of succession 
the general rule of plurality would have to be applied with 
circumspection. The afore provision thus appears to have 
been inserted ex abundanti cautela. Even under Section 
9	
(1996) 5 SCC 125
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3 of the Indian Succession Act the State Government is 
empowered to exempt any race, sect or tribe from the 
operation of the Act and the tribes of Mundas, Oraons, 
Santhals etc. in the State of Bihar, who are included in 
our concern, have been so exempted. Thus, neither the 
Hindu Succession Act, nor the Indian Succession Act, nor 
even the Shariat law is applicable to the custom-governed 
tribals. And custom, as is well recognized, varies from 
people to people and region to region.”
The aforesaid position was reiterated by a Bench of three 
learned judges in Ahmedabad Women Action Group 
(AWAG) v. Union of India.10
6.2	 We find that the aforesaid position has been consistently 
adopted by the High Courts as well. Reference may be made to 
Bhuri v. Maroti,11 Bhagwati v. Cheduram,12 and Bini B. (Dr.) 
v. Jayan P.R.13. Here only we may clarify that this reference 
to judgments of the High Courts shall not be construed as a 
comment upon their merits. 
7.	
Therefore, the Courts below clearly erred on this count, and the High 
Court took the correct view. Having observed this, the High Court 
then proceeded to grant a portion as property to Mardan’s daughters 
and their descendants on the grounds of justice, equity and good 
conscience, apparently but without explicit mention, taking cue from 
the dissenting judgment Madhu Kishwar (supra) by Ramaswamy, J., 
wherein he held as under: 
“38. Law is the manifestation of principles of
justice, 
equity and good conscience. Rule of law should establish 
a uniform pattern for harmonious existence in a society 
where every individual would exercise his rights to his best 
advantage to achieve excellence, subject to protective 
discrimination. The best advantage of one person could 
be the worst disadvantage to another. Law steps in to 
iron out such creases and ensures equality of protection 
10	
(1997) 3 SCC 573 
11	
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 3173
12	
2019 SCC OnLine Chh 209
13	
2015 SCC OnLine Ker 39489
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
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Tirith Kumar & Ors. v. Daduram & Ors.
to individuals as well as group liberties. Man›s status is a 
creature of substantive as well as procedural law to which 
legal incidents would attach. Justice, equality and fraternity 
are trinity for social and economic equality…
x
x
x
56. I would hold that the provisions of the Hindu Succession 
Act, 1956 and the Indian Succession Act, 1925 though 
in terms, would not apply to the Scheduled Tribes, the 
general principles contained therein being consistent with 
justice, equity, fairness, justness and good conscience 
would apply to them. Accordingly I hold that the Scheduled 
Tribe women would succeed to the estate of their parent, 
brother, husband, as heirs by intestate succession and 
inherit the property with equal share with the male heir 
with absolute rights as per the general principles of the 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as amended and interpreted 
by this Court and equally of the Indian Succession Act to 
tribal Christians…”
8.	
Let us examine a few pronouncements on the application of principle 
of justice, equity and good conscience. 
8.1	 In M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh 
Das,14 five learned judges extensively dealt with the concept 
of justice, equity and good conscience. A few of the relevant 
paragraphs are as under:
“1003. …The modification of general rules to the 
circumstances of the case is guided by equity, not in 
derogation or negation of positive law, but in addition
to it. 
It supplements positive law but does not supplant it. In a 
second sense, however, where positive law is silent as to 
the applicable legal principles, equity assumes a primary 
role as the source of law itself. Equity steps in to fill the 
gaps that exist in positive law. Thus, where no positive 
law is discernible, courts turn to equity as a source of 
the applicable law. In addition to these, Derrett notes that 
14	
(2020) 1 SCC 1
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there is a third sense in which equity or aequitas assumed 
importance — where established political authority is taken 
away or is in doubt and the formal sources of law are in 
doubt, the nature of judicial office requires a decision in 
accordance with ex bono et aequo. 
x
x
x
1019. …There is (at least in theory) a reduced scope for 
the application of justice, equity and good conscience when 
doctrinal positions established under a statute cover factual 
situations or where the principles underlying the system of 
personal law in question can be definitively ascertained. 
But even then, it would do a disservice to judicial craft to 
adopt a theory which excludes the application of justice, 
equity and good conscience to areas of law governed by 
statute. For the law develops interstitially, as Judges work 
themselves in tandem with statute law to arrive at just 
outcomes. Where the rights of the parties are not governed 
by a particular personal law, or where the personal law is 
silent or incapable of being ascertained by a court, where 
a code has a lacuna, or where the source of law fails or 
requires to be supplemented, justice, equity and good 
conscience may properly be referred to.
x
x
x
1022. The common underlying thread is that justice, 
good conscience and equity plays a supplementary 
role in enabling courts to mould the relief to suit the 
circumstances that present themselves before courts with 
the principal
purpose of ensuring a just outcome. Where 
the existing statutory framework is inadequate for courts 
to adjudicate upon the dispute before them, or no settled 
judicial doctrine or custom can be availed of, courts may 
legitimately take recourse to the principles of justice, equity 
and good conscience to effectively and fairly dispose of the 
case. A court cannot abdicate its responsibility to decide 
a dispute over legal rights merely because the facts of a 
case do not readily submit themselves to the application
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 
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Tirith Kumar & Ors. v. Daduram & Ors.
of the letter of the existing law. Courts in India have long 
availed of the principles of justice, good conscience and 
equity to supplement the incompleteness or inapplicability 
of the letter of the law with the ground realities of legal 
disputes to do justice between the parties. Equity, as an 
essential component of justice, formed the final step in 
the just adjudication of disputes.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8.2	 In a case concerning the devolution of property either by custom 
or by law, when it comes to a ‘dasi’, arising out of the State of 
Madras, M.C. Mahajan, J., as his Lordship then was observed 
in Saraswathi Ammal v. Jagadambal 15 as follows:
“21. … In the absence of proof of existence of a custom 
governing succession the decision of the case has to rest 
on the rules of justice, equity and good conscience because 
admittedly no clear text of Hindu law applies to such a 
case. The High Court thought that the just rule to apply 
was one of propinquity to the case, according to which 
the married and dasi daughters would take the mother›s 
property in equal shares. No exception can be taken to 
this finding given by the High Court. No other rule was 
suggested to us leading to a contrary result.”
8.3	 In M.V. Elisabeth (supra), the Court held as under:
“86. The judicial power of this country, which is an aspect 
of national sovereignty, is vested in the people and is 
articulated in the provisions of the
Constitution and the laws 
and is exercised by courts empowered to exercise it. It is 
absurd to confine that power to the provisions of imperial 
statutes of a bygone age. Access to Court which is an 
important right vested in every citizen implies the existence 
of the power of the Court to render justice according to 
law. Where statute is silent and judicial intervention is 
required, Courts strive to redress grievances according 
to what is perceived to be principles of justice, equity and 
good conscience.”
15	
(1953) 1 SCC 362
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9.	
Having considered the pronouncements of this Court as aforesaid, 
and keeping in view the fact that Mardan passed away in the year 
1951, that is, prior to the enactment of HSA, 1956, we find no error 
in the judgment of the High Court applying the provisions of the 
Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875 and more particularly Section 6 
thereof which postulates the application of the principle of justice, 
equity and good conscience, to account for possibilities not covered 
by Section 5 of the Act. 
10.	 We find that a coordinate Bench of this Court in Kamla Neti v. 
LAO,16 held in para 11 thereof that equity cannot supplant the law, 
and when the law is clear, the same has to be applied. That case 
pertains to the division of compensation awarded for land acquired, 
however, the present dispute pertains directly to succession of 
property, and therefore in our considered view, this case stands on 
a different footing. 
11.	 Kamla Neti (supra) is, therefore, distinguishable on facts and not 
applicable to the present case. However, the recommendation/
suggestion made therein to the Central Government to look into 
pathways to secure the right of survivorship to female tribals is 
hereby reiterated. For emphasis, the observations in this regard are 
also extracted herein below: 
“17. Before parting, we may observe that there may not be 
any justification to deny the right of survivorship so far as 
the female member of the tribal
community is concerned. 
When the daughter belonging to the non-tribal community 
is entitled to the equal share in the property of the father, 
there is no reason to deny such right to the daughter of 
the Tribal community. Female tribal is entitled to parity with 
male tribal in intestate succession. To deny the equal right 
to the daughter belonging to the tribal even after a period 
of 70 years of the Constitution of India under which right 
to equality is guaranteed, it is high time for the Central 
Government to look into the matter and if required, to 
amend the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act by 
which the Hindu Succession Act is not made applicable 
to the members of the Scheduled Tribe.
16	
(2023) 3 SCC 528
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Tirith Kumar & Ors. v. Daduram & Ors.
18. Therefore, though we dismiss the present appeal, 
it is directed to examine the question by the Central 
Government to consider it just and necessary to withdraw 
the exemptions provided under the Hindu Succession Act 
insofar as the applicability of the provisions of the Hindu 
Succession Act to the Scheduled Tribes is concerned and 
whether to bring a suitable amendment or not. We hope and 
trust that the Central Government will look into the matter 
and take an appropriate decision taking into consideration 
the right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 
of the Constitution of India.”
12.	 With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is dismissed as bereft 
of merit. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. 
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey