SHARIF AHMED AND ANOTHER versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 86, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Facts
* Author
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 86 : 2024 INSC 363
Sharif Ahmed and Another 
v. 
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
(Criminal Appeal No. 2357 of 2024)
01 May 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna* and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Nature of chargesheets filed in some jurisdictions by the State/
Police, without stating sufficient details of the facts constituting the 
offense or putting the relevant evidence on record; significance of 
chargesheets for taking cognizance, summoning of the accused 
etc. by the Magistrate; chargesheets and criminal proceedings 
against the appellants, if to be quashed.
Headnotes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.173 – Report of police 
officer on completion of investigation – Nature and standard 
of evidence in chargesheet – Chargesheet when complete:
Held: The requirement of “further evidence” or a “supplementary 
chargesheet” as referred to u/s.173(8) is to make additions to 
a complete chargesheet and not to make up or reparate for a 
chargesheet which does not fulfil requirements of s.173(2) – The 
chargesheet is complete when it refers to material and evidence 
sufficient to take cognizance and for the trial – The nature and 
standard of evidence to be elucidated in a chargesheet should 
prima facie show that an offence is established if the material and 
evidence is proven – The chargesheet is complete where a case 
is not exclusively dependent on further evidence and the trial can 
proceed on the basis of evidence and material placed on record
with the chargesheet – This standard is not overly technical or 
fool-proof, but a pragmatic balance to protect the innocent from 
harassment due to delay as well as prolonged incarceration, and yet 
not curtail the right of the prosecution to forward further evidence in 
support of the charges – However, chargesheet need not elaborately 
evaluate the evidence, as the process of evaluation is a matter of 
trial – This does not mean that the chargesheet should not disclose 
or refer to the facts as to meet the requirements of s.173(2), and 
the mandate of the State rules – It is the police report which would 
enable the Magistrate to decide a course of action from the options
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
available to him – The details of the offence and investigation are 
not supposed to be a comprehensive thesis of the prosecution case, 
but at the same time, must reflect a thorough investigation into 
the alleged offence – It is on the basis of this record that the court 
can take effective cognisance of the offence and proceed to issue 
process in terms of s.190(1)(b) and s.204, CrPC – Investigating 
officer must make clear and complete entries of all columns in the 
chargesheet so that the court can clearly understand which crime 
has been committed by which accused and what is the material 
evidence available on the file – Statements u/s.161 of the Code and 
related documents have to be enclosed with the list of witnesses 
– Role played by the accused in the crime should be separately 
and clearly mentioned in the chargesheet, for each of the accused 
persons – Chargesheet and summoning order quashed in Cr.A. 
2357 of 2024, appellants discharged – Chargesheet in SLP (Crl.) 
No.9482/2021 bereft of details and particulars, summoning order 
quashed. [Paras 13, 23, 24, 31, 40, 45]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.173(2), 190, 204, 251 
– Chargesheet integral to the process of taking cognisance, 
summoning of the accused, the issue of notice, framing of 
charge:
Held: There is an inherent connect between the chargesheet 
submitted under Section 173(2), cognisance which is taken 
u/s.190,
issue of process and summoning of the accused u/s.204, 
and thereupon issue of notice u/s.251, or the charge in terms of 
Chapter XVII of the Code – The details set out in the chargesheet 
have a substantial impact on the efficacy of procedure at the 
subsequent stages – The chargesheet is integral to the process 
of taking cognisance, the issue of notice and framing of charge, 
being the only investigative document and evidence available to 
the court till that stage – Substantiated reasons and grounds for 
an offence being made in the chargesheet are a key resource for 
a Magistrate to evaluate whether there are sufficient grounds for 
taking cognisance, initiating proceedings, and then issuing notice, 
framing charges etc. – These provisions, however, have to be read 
along with the power of the police to investigate under sub-section 
(8) to s.173 even when they have submitted a report u/sub-section 
(2) to s.173. [Para 20]
Deprecation – Of filing of chargesheets without stating 
sufficient details of the facts constituting the offense or putting 
the relevant evidence on record:
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Held: In some states, the chargesheets merely carry a reproduction 
of the details mentioned by the complainant in the FIR, and then 
proceed to state whether an offence is made out, or not made 
out, without any elucidation on the evidence and material relied 
upon – In the format prescribed for the State of Uttar Pradesh, 
column 16 requires the investigating officer to state brief facts 
of the case – State of Uttar Pradesh issued circular stating that 
the investigation provisions contained in the Code and the police 
regulations with reference to s.173, CrPC were not consistently 
complied with and followed by the investigating officers and the 
supervising officers – The need to provide lead details of the 
offence in the chargesheet is mandatory as it is in accord with 
paragraph 122 of the police regulations – Similar directions were 
issued following the direction of the High Court of Judicature at 
Allahabad that brief narration of the material collected during 
investigation, which forms the opinion of the investigating officer, 
should be mentioned in the chargesheet. [Paras 2, 30]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.190, 204 – Cognizance 
of offences by Magistrates – Issue of process – “cognisance”:
Held: It indicates the juncture at which the court or Magistrate takes 
judicial notice of the offence with a view to initiate proceedings 
in respect of such an offence – This is different from initiation of
proceedings – Rather, it is a condition precedent to the initiation of 
proceedings by a Magistrate or judge – At this stage, the Magistrate 
has to keep in mind the averments in the complaint or the police 
report, and has to evaluate whether there is sufficient ground for 
initiation of proceedings – This is not the same as the consideration 
of sufficient grounds for conviction, as whether evidence is sufficient 
for supporting the conviction or not, can be determined only at the 
stage of trial, and not at the stage of cognisance – s.204 does not 
mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issue of 
summons and this is not a prerequisite for deciding the validity of 
the summons – Nevertheless, the requirement of the Code is that 
the summons is issued when it appears to the Magistrate that there 
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused – Magistrate 
in terms of s.204 is required to exercise his judicial discretion with a 
degree of caution, even when he is not required to record reasons, 
on whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding. [Paras 16, 17]
Criminal Law – Police investigation – Object and purpose – 
Discussed. [Para 26]
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
Non-bailable warrants – Charge sheet filed u/ss.323, 504, 506, 
120B, 308, 325, Penal Code, 1860 – Bailable warrants issued 
– Application for exemption from personal appearance was 
filed which was rejected – Non-bailable warrants issued – 
High Court dismissed the petition u/s.482, CrPC to quash the 
criminal proceedings:
Held: Non-bailable warrants cannot be issued in a routine 
manner and the liberty of an individual cannot be curtailed unless 
necessitated by the larger interest of public and the State – While 
there are no comprehensive set of guidelines for the issuance of 
non-bailable warrants, this Court has observed on several occasions 
that non-bailable warrants should not be issued, unless the accused 
is charged with a heinous crime, and is likely to evade the process 
of law or tamper/destroy evidence – Non-bailable warrants issued 
in appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9482/2021 are quashed 
being unsustainable. [Paras 46]
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.406, 420, 503 – Offences under, when 
not made out – Discussed. [Paras 36, 37, 39]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.205 – Application for 
exemption from personal appearance was rejected by the 
Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, recording that as bail was 
not obtained till then and there is no provision for granting 
exemption from personal appearance prior to obtaining bail 
– Correctness: 
Held: Not correct, as the power to
grant exemption from personal 
appearance under the Code should not be read in a restrictive 
manner as applicable only after the accused has been granted 
bail – The power to grant exemption from personal appearance 
should be exercised liberally, when facts and circumstances 
require such exemption – s.205 states that the Magistrate, 
exercising his discretion, may dispense with the personal 
attendance of the accused while issuing summons, and allow 
them to appear through their pleader – While provisions of the 
Code are considered to be exhaustive, cases arise where the 
Code is silent and the court has to make such order as the 
ends of justice require – In such cases, the criminal court must 
act on the principle, that every procedure which is just and fair, 
is understood as permissible, till it is shown to be expressly or 
impliedly prohibited by law. [Para 47]
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Criminal Law – Civil disputes not involving criminal offence 
– Duty of a Magistrate:
Held: A Magistrate needs to be cautious in examining whether the 
facts of the case disclose a civil or a criminal wrong – Attempts at 
initiating vexatious criminal proceedings should be thwarted early on, 
as a summoning order, or even a direction to register an FIR, has 
grave consequences for setting the criminal proceedings in motion 
– Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims which do not involve 
any criminal offence, by way of applying pressure through criminal 
prosecution, should be deprecated and discouraged. [Para 44]
Case Law Cited
Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand [2024] 3 SCR 614 : 
(2024) SCC Online SC 269; K. Veeraswami v. Union 
of India and Others [1991] 3 SCR 189 : (1991) 3 SCC 
655; H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi 
[1955] 1 SCR 1150 : (1954) 2 SCC 934 – relied on.
Tara Singh v. State [1951] 1 SCR 729 : AIR 1951 SC 441; 
R.K. Dalmia etc. v. Delhi Administration [1963] 1 SCR 
253 : AIR 1962 SC 1821; State Through Central Bureau 
of Investigation v. Hemendhra Reddy & Anr. [2023] 7 
SCR 134 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 515; Bhagwant Singh 
v. Commissioner of Police and Another [1985] 3 SCR 
942 : (1985) 2 SCC 537; Minu Kumari and Another v. 
State of Bihar and Others [2006] 3 SCR 1086 : (2006) 
4 SCC 359; Bhushan Kumar and Another v. State (NCT 
of Delhi) and another [2012] 2 SCR 696 : (2012) 5 
SCC 424; R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab [1960] 3 SCR 
388 : AIR 1960 SC 866; State of Haryana and Others v. 
Bhajan Lal and Others [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : 1992 
Supp (1) SCC 335; Parkash Singh Badal and Another 
v. State of Punjab and Others [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 
197 : (2007) 1 SCC 1; Narendra Kumar Amin v. Central 
Bureau of Investigation and Others (2015) 3 SCC 417; 
Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai and Another 
[2002] 2 SCR 889 : (2002) 5 SCC 82; Zakia Ahsan Jafri 
v. State of Gujarat and Another [2022] 6 SCR 1 : 2022 
INSC 653; Satya Narain Musadi and Others v. State of 
Bihar (1980) 3 SCC 152; Abhinandan Jha and Others v. 
Dinesh Mishra [1967] 3 SCR 668 : AIR 1968 SC 117;
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal, AIR 1968 SC 
700; Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others 
[2006] Supp. 3 SCR 704 : (2006) 6 SCC 736; Central 
Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU(X), New Delhi v. 
Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. Calcutta [1996] Supp. 3 
SCR 360 : (1996) 5 SCC 591; Manik Taneja and Another 
v. State of Karnataka and Another [2015] 1 SCR 156 : 
(2015) 7 SCC 423; Deepak Gaba and Others v. State 
of U.P. and Another (2023) 3 SCC 423; Inder Mohan 
Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal and Others 
[2007] 10 SCR 847 : (2007) 12 SCC 1; Vikas v. State 
of Rajasthan [2013] 8 SCR 208 : (2014) 3 SCC 321; 
Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Another v. Rani Jethmalani 
[1979] 2 SCR 378 : (1979) 4 SCC 167; Puneet Dalmia 
v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad [2019] 
15 SCR 134 : (2020) 12 SCC 695; Popular Muthiah v. 
State Represented by Inspector of Police [2006] Supp. 
3 SCR 100 : (2006) 7 SCC 296 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1898; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Chargesheets; Police report; Chargesheets bereft of details/
particulars; Cognizance; Summoning of the accused; Complete 
chargesheet; Further evidence; Supplementary chargesheet; 
Framing of charge; Issue of Process/Notice; Opinion of investigating 
officer; Non-bailable warrants; Bailable warrants; Exemption from 
personal
appearance; Heinous crime, Evading process of law; 
Tamper/destroy evidence; Civil disputes not involving criminal 
offence; Civil wrong/criminal wrong.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.2357 
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.01.2017 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLMA No. 960 of 2017
With 
Criminal Appeal Nos. 2359 and 2358 of 2024
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Appearances for Parties
Syed Mehdi Imam, Mohd Parvez Dabas, Uzmi Jamil Husain, 
Mushtaque Ahmad Khan, Tabrez Ahmad, Aamir Dabas, Rauf Rahim, 
Ali Asghar Rahim, Ms. Meenakshi Kalra, Saad Sharif, Pravir Singh, 
Anurag Malik, S.N. Kalra, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, A.A.G., Sarvesh Singh Baghel, 
Arun Pratap Singh Rajawat, Ashish Madaan, Ms. Ananya Sahu, 
Ms. Saumya Sharma, Adarsh Upadhyay, Ms. Shubhali Pathak, Ms. 
Pallavi Kumari, Aman Pathak, Dushyant Parashar, Dinesh Pandey, 
Manu Parashar, Rajesh Srivastava, Gaurav Verma, Neeraj Dutt Gaur, 
Sanjay Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjiv Khanna, J.
Leave granted in the above matters.
2.	
The concerns which have arisen during the course of hearing the 
present appeals are of particular significance for meeting the ends 
of criminal justice, and relate to the nature of chargesheets filed in 
some jurisdictions by the state/police. For the sake of convenience, we 
would divide the judgment into two parts. The first part relates to the 
legal issue, that is, the contents of the chargesheet in terms of Section 
173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731. The second part 
deals with the factual aspects of each of the cases, and our decision.
PART I
3.	
The issue in the first part relates to chargesheets being filed 
without stating sufficient details of the facts constituting the offense 
or putting the
relevant evidence on record. In some states, the 
chargesheets merely carry a reproduction of the details mentioned 
by the complainant in the First Information Report2, and then 
proceed to state whether an offence is made out, or not made out, 
without any elucidation on the evidence and material relied upon. 
On this issue, the recent judgment of this Court in Dablu Kujur 
1	
“Code”, for short.
2	
“FIR”, for short.
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
v. State of Jharkhand3 aptly crystallises the legal position in the 
following words:
“17. Ergo, having regard to the provisions contained in 
Section 173 it is hereby directed that the Report of police 
officer on the completion of investigation shall contain the 
following:—
(i)	
A report in the form prescribed by the State 
Government stating-
(a)	 the names of the parties;
(b)	 the nature of the information;
(c)	 the names of the persons who appear to be 
acquainted with the circumstances of the case;
(d)	 whether any offence appears to have been 
committed and, if so, by whom;
(e)	 whether the accused has been arrested;
(f)	
whether he has been released on his bond and, 
if so, whether with or without sureties;
(g)	 whether he has been forwarded in custody 
under section 170.
(h)	 Whether the report of medical examination of the 
woman has been attached where investigation 
relates to an offence under sections 376, 376A, 
376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or 
section 376E of the Penal Code, 1860”
(ii)	 If upon the completion of investigation, there is no 
sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion 
to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, 
the Police officer in charge shall clearly state in the 
Report about the compliance of Section 169 Cr. P.C.
(iii)	 When the report in respect of a case to which Section 
170 applies, the police officer shall forward to
the 
3	
[2024] 3 SCR 614 : 2024 SCC Online SC 269
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Magistrate along with the report, all the documents 
or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution 
proposes to rely other than those already sent to the 
Magistrate during investigation; and the statements 
recorded under Section 161 of all the persons whom 
the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.
(iv)	 In case of further investigation, the Police officer 
in charge shall forward to the Magistrate a further 
report or reports regarding such evidence in the form 
prescribed and shall also comply with the details 
mentioned in the above sub para (i) to (iii).”
4.	
The decision in Dablu Kujur (supra) refers to Section 157 of the 
Code which inter alia states that, if on information received or 
otherwise, an officer of the police station has reason to suspect 
commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 
to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to the 
Magistrate empowered to take cognisance of the offence. Further, 
he shall proceed in person or depute any of his subordinate officers 
to proceed to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances 
of the case, and if necessary, to take measures for discovery and 
arrest the offender. Such report is in the nature of a preliminary 
report. As per Section 169 of the Code, if it appears to the officer 
in-charge of the police station that there is not sufficient evidence 
or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify
forwarding the accused 
to the Magistrate, then the officer shall release the person if he is 
in custody on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, with a 
direction to such person to appear if and when so required, before 
the Magistrate empowered to take cognisance of the offence from 
the police report.4
4	
We clarify and respectfully agree with the view expressed by this Court in Siddharth v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh and Another, (2022) 1 SCC 676, which has interpreted Section 170 of the Code. The word 
‘custody’ used in the said Section does not contemplate either police or judicial custody, for otherwise 
the Section would lead to unpalatable and incongruous consequences. It is observed that in normal and 
ordinary course, the police should avoid arresting a person and sending him to jail, if it is possible for the 
police to complete the investigation without his arrest and if every kind of cooperation is provided by the 
accused to the investigating officer in completing the investigation. The word ‘custody’ in Section 170 has 
to be interpreted liberally and merely connotes presentation of the accused by the investigating officer. 
This is because personally liberty is an important aspect of the constitutional mandate. Existence of the 
power of arrest, and justification for exercise thereof are two different aspects. Section 170 of the Code 
does not impose an obligation on the officer in-charge to arrest each and every accused before or at the 
time of
filing of the chargesheet.
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
5.	
Section 170 of the Code deals with the cases where it appears to 
the officer that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground to 
proceed. In such an event he is required to submit a police report 
or chargesheet under Section 173(2) of the Code. Elucidating on 
Section 173(2) of the Code in Dablu Kujur (supra), this Court 
observed: 
“12. We are more concerned with Section 173(2) as we 
have found that the investigating officers while submitting 
the chargesheet/Police Report do not comply with the 
requirements of the said provision. Though it is true that 
the form of the report to be submitted under Section 
173(2) has to be prescribed by the State Government 
and each State Government has its own Police Manual to 
be followed by the police officers while discharging their 
duty, the mandatory requirements required to be complied 
with by such officers in the Police Report/Chargesheet are 
laid down in Section 173, more particularly sub-section 
(2) thereof.
13. It may be noted that though there are various reports 
required to be submitted by the police in charge of the 
police station before, during and after the investigation 
as contemplated in Chapter XII of Cr. P.C., it is only the 
report forwarded by the police officer to the Magistrate 
under sub-section (2) of Section 173 Cr. P.C. that can form 
the basis for the competent court for taking cognizance 
thereupon. A
chargesheet is nothing but a final report of 
the police officer under Section 173(2) of Cr. P.C. It is 
an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the 
concerned court that on the material collected during the 
course of investigation, an offence appears to have been 
committed by the particular person or persons, or that no 
offence appears to have been committed.
xx
xx
xx
15. The issues with regard to the compliance of Section 
173(2) Cr. P.C., may also arise, when the investigating 
officer submits Police Report only qua some of the 
persons-accused named in the FIR, keeping open the
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investigation qua the other persons-accused, or when all 
the documents as required under Section 173(5) are not 
submitted. In such a situation, the question that is often 
posed before the court is whether such a Police Report 
could be said to have been submitted in compliance with 
sub-section (2) of Section 173 Cr. P.C. In this regard, it 
may be noted that in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of 
Bihar, this Court has observed that statutory requirement 
of the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with 
if various details prescribed therein are included in the 
report. The report is complete if it is accompanied with all 
the documents and statements of witnesses as required 
by Section 175(5)…”
6.	
We would like to elaborate on certain aspects, as submission of the 
chargesheet is for taking cognisance and summoning of the accused 
by the Magistrate, which stages are of considerable importance and 
significance.
7.	
Section 173 of the Code reads:
“173. Report of police officer on completion of investigation.—
(1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be 
completed without unnecessary delay.
(1A) The investigation in relation to an offence under 
sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 
376DB or 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall 
be completed within two months from the date on which 
the information was recorded by the officer in charge of 
the police station.
(2) (i) As soon as it
is completed, the officer in charge of the 
police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to 
take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report 
in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating—
(a)	 the names of the parties;
(b)	 the nature of the information;
(c)	
the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted 
with the circumstances of the case;
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
(d)	 whether any offence appears to have been committed 
and, if so, by whom;
(e)	 whether the accused has been arrested;
(f)	
whether he has been released on his bond and, if 
so, whether with or without sureties;
(g)	 whether he has been forwarded in custody under 
section 170.
(h)	 whether the report of medical examination of the 
woman has been attached where investigation 
relates to an offence under [sections 376, 376A, 
376AB, 376B, 
376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or section 376E of the Indian 
Penal Code (45 of 1860).
(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner 
as may be prescribed by the State Government, the 
action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the 
information relating to the commission of the offence 
was first given.
(3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed 
under section 158, the report shall, in any case in which 
the State Government by general or special order so 
directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, 
pending the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer in 
charge of the police station to make further investigation.
(4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this 
section that the accused has been released on his bond, 
the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of 
such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit.
(5) When such report is in respect of a case to which 
section 170 applies, the police
officer shall forward to the 
Magistrate along with the report—
(a)	 all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which 
the prosecution proposes to rely other than those 
already sent to the Magistrate during investigation;
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(b)	 the statements recorded under section 161 of all the 
persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine 
as its witnesses.
(6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any 
such statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of 
the proceedings or that its disclosure to the accused is 
not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient 
in the public interest, he shall indicate that part of the 
statement and append a note requesting the Magistrate 
to exclude that part from the copies to be granted to the 
accused and stating his reasons for making such request.
(7) Where the police officer investigating the case finds it 
convenient so to do, he may furnish to the accused copies 
of all or any of the documents referred to in sub-section (5).
(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude 
further investigation in respect of an offence after a 
report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the 
Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer 
in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, 
oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate 
a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the 
form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to 
(6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report 
or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded 
under sub-section (2)”.
8.	
Sub-section (2) to Section 173 makes a considered
departure from 
sub-Section (1) to Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
18985. Sub-section (1)(a) to Section 173 of the 1898 Code had 
stipulated that as soon as the investigation is completed, the officer 
in-charge of the police station shall forward to the Magistrate, a report 
in the form prescribed by the local government, sending forth the 
names of the parties, nature of the information and the names of the 
people who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the 
case and state whether the accused person has been forwarded in 
custody or released on a bond.
5	
“1898 Code”, for short.
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
9.	
We have referred to Section 173 of the 1898 Code, in view of reliance 
placed during the course of hearing on the decision of this Court in 
Tara Singh v. State6 and R.K. Dalmia etc. v. Delhi Administration7, 
which refer and relate to the 1898 Code.
10.	 In Tara Singh’s case (supra), the question which had arisen was 
whether the challan preferred by the police was complete so as to 
enable the court to take cognisance within the meaning of Section 
190(1)(b) of the 1898 Code. It was held that a challan submitted 
in the said case was complete except for submission of the report 
of the Imperial Serologist and drawing of the sketch map of the 
occurrence. In this context, reference was made to Section 173(1) 
of the 1898 Code and that the report/challan should set forth, viz. 
the names of the parties, nature of the information and names of 
persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the 
case. The cognisance, it was held, was proper.
11.	 In R.K. Dalmia (supra), again a reference was made to Section 173(1) 
of the 1898 Code and that the chargesheet must contain name of 
the parties, nature of the information and the names of persons who 
appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case. These 
observations were made in the context of the submission made on 
behalf of the accused that there was a change in the stand of the 
prosecution, which contention was
rejected on several grounds, as 
mentioned in paragraphs 325 and 326 of the footnoted citation. 
12.	 It is, therefore, apparent from the language of the legislation, that 
under the Code, that is, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the 
requirement and the manner of providing details in the chargesheet, 
stand verified. 
13.	 The question of the required details being complete must be 
understood in a way which gives effect to the true intent of the 
chargesheet under Section 173(2) of the Code. The requirement of 
“further evidence” or a “supplementary chargesheet” as referred to 
under Section 173(8) of the Code, is to make additions to a complete 
chargesheet,8 and not to make up or reparate for a chargesheet 
6	
[1951] 1 SCR 729 : AIR 1951 SC 441
7	
[1963] 1 SCR 253 : AIR 1962 SC 1821
8	
State Through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Hemendhra Reddy & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 515
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which does not fulfil requirements of Section 173(2) of the Code. 
The chargesheet is complete when it refers to material and evidence 
sufficient to take cognizance and for the trial. The nature and standard 
of evidence to be elucidated in a chargesheet should prima facie 
show that an offence is established if the material and evidence is 
proven. The chargesheet is complete where a case is not exclusively 
dependent on further evidence. The trial can proceed on the basis 
of evidence and material placed on record with the chargesheet. 
This standard is not overly technical or fool-proof, but a pragmatic 
balance to protect the innocent from harassment due to delay as 
well as prolonged incarceration, and yet not curtail the right of the 
prosecution to forward further evidence in support of the charges9.
14.	 In the context of the present issue, it would be apt to refer to Section 
190 and Section 204 of the Code, along with the provisions relating 
to contents of charge, namely, Sections 211 to 213 and Section 218 
of the Code, which read as under:
“190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.—(1) 
Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate 
of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class 
specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), 
may take cognizance of any offence—
(a)	 upon receiving a complaint of facts which 
constitute such offence;
(b)	 upon a police report of such facts;
(c)	
upon information received from any person 
other than a police officer, or upon his own 
knowledge, that such offence has been 
committed.
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any 
Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance 
under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his 
competence to inquire into or try.
xx
xx
xx
9	
See also, para 21 below on the power of the police to investigate under Section 173(8) of the Code.
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101
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
204. Issue of process.—(1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate 
taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground 
for proceeding, and the case appears to be—
(a)	 a summons-case, he shall issue his 
summons for the attendance of the 
accused, or
(b)	 a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, 
or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing 
the accused to be brought or to appear at 
a certain time before such Magistrate or (if 
he has no jurisdiction himself) some other 
Magistrate having jurisdiction.
(2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the 
accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution 
witnesses has been filed.
(3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in 
writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-
section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such 
complaint.
(4) When by any law for the time being in force any 
process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall 
be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not 
paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss 
the complaint.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the 
provisions of Section 87.
xx
xx
xx
211. Contents of charge.—(1) Every charge under this 
Code shall state the offence with which the accused is 
charged.
(2) If the law which creates the offence gives it any specific 
name, the offence may be described in the charge by that 
name
only.
(3) If the law which creates the offence does not give it 
any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence
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must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter 
with which he is charged.
(4) The law and section of the law against which the 
offence is said to have been committed shall be mentioned 
in the charge.
(5) The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a 
statement that every legal condition required by law to 
constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular 
case.
(6) The charge shall be written in the language of the 
Court.
(7) If the accused, having been previously convicted of any 
offence, is liable, by reason of such previous conviction, 
to enhanced punishment, or to punishment of a different 
kind, for a subsequent offence, and it is intended to prove 
such previous conviction for the purpose of affecting the 
punishment which the Court may think fit to award for 
the subsequent offence, the fact, date and place of the 
previous conviction shall be stated in the charge; and if 
such statement has been omitted, the Court may add it 
at any time before sentence is passed.
212. Particulars as to time, place and person.—(1) 
The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time 
and place of the alleged offence, and the person (if any) 
against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which, it 
was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the 
accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.
(2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach 
of trust or dishonest
misappropriation of money or other 
movable property, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross 
sum or, as the case may be, describe the movable property 
in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been 
committed, and the dates between which the offence 
is alleged to have been committed, without specifying 
particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed 
shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the 
meaning of Section 219:
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
Provided that the time included between the first and last 
of such dates shall not exceed one year.
213. When manner of committing offence must be 
stated.—When the nature of the case is such that the 
particulars mentioned in Sections 211 and 212 do not give 
the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he 
is charged, the charge shall also contain such particulars 
of the manner in which the alleged offence was committed 
as will be sufficient for that purpose.
xx
xx
xx
218. Separate charges for distinct offences.—(1) For 
every distinct offence of which any person is accused 
there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge 
shall be tried separately:
Provided that where the accused person, by an application 
in writing, so desires and the Magistrate is of opinion 
that such person is not likely to be prejudiced thereby, 
the Magistrate may try together all or any number of the 
charges framed against such person.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation of 
the provisions of Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223.
15.	 On the submission of the police report, Dablu Kujur (supra) refers to 
an earlier decision of this Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner 
of Police and Another10, and discusses the power and the role of 
the Magistrate when he receives the police report and the options 
available to him, in the following words:
“14. When such a Police Report
concludes that an offence 
appears to have been committed by a particular person or 
persons, the Magistrate has three options: (i) he may accept 
the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue 
process, (ii) he may direct further investigation under sub-
section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a 
further report, or (iii) he may disagree with the report and 
10	
[1985] 3 SCR 942 : (1985) 2 SCC 537
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discharge the accused or drop the proceedings. If such 
Police Report concludes that no offence appears to have 
been committed, the Magistrate again has three options: 
(i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or 
(ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view 
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take 
cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (iii) he 
may direct further investigation to be made by the police 
under sub-section (3) of Section 156.”
It is in this context that the provisions of Sections 190 and 204 of 
the Code become important. Clause (a) of Section 190 states that 
the Magistrate can take cognisance of an offence on receiving a 
complaint of facts which constitute such offence. Clause (b) relates 
to a situation where the Magistrate receives a police report carrying 
such facts, i.e., facts which constitute such offence. In Minu Kumari 
and Another v. State of Bihar and Others11 this Court referred to 
the options available to the Magistrate on how to proceed in terms 
of Section 190(1)(b) of the Code, and held:
“11...The position is, therefore, now well settled that 
upon receipt of a police report under Section 173(2) a 
Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence 
under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code even if the police 
report is to the effect that no case is made out against 
the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the 
statements
of the witnesses examined by the police 
during the investigation and take cognizance of the 
offence complained of and order the issue of process 
to the accused. Section 190(1)(b) does not lay down 
that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence 
only if the investigating officer gives an opinion that the 
investigation has made out a case against the accused. 
The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by 
the investigating officer and independently apply his 
mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and 
take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, exercise 
his powers under Section 190(1)(b) and direct the issue 
11	
[2006] 3 SCR 1086 : (2006) 4 SCC 359
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105
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound 
in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in 
Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance 
of a case under Section 190(1)(a) though it is open to 
him to act under Section 200 or Section 202 also. (See 
India Carat (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [(1989) 2 SCC 
132 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 306 : AIR 1989 SC 885] .)
12. The informant is not prejudicially affected when the 
Magistrate decides to take cognizance and to proceed 
with the case. But where the Magistrate decides that 
sufficient ground does not subsist for proceeding further 
and drops the proceeding or takes the view that there 
is material for proceeding against some and there are 
insufficient grounds in respect of others, the informant 
would certainly be prejudiced as the first information 
report lodged becomes wholly or partially ineffective. 
This Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police held 
that where the Magistrate decides not to take cognizance 
and to drop the proceeding or takes a view that there is 
no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the 
persons mentioned in the first information report, notice 
to the informant and grant of opportunity of being heard 
in the matter becomes mandatory. As indicated above, 
there is no provision in the Code for issue of a notice in 
that regard.
13. We may add here that the expressions
“charge-sheet” 
or “final report” are not used in the Code, but it is understood 
in Police Manuals of several States containing the rules 
and the regulations to be a report by the police filed under 
Section 170 of the Code, described as a “charge-sheet”. 
In case of reports sent under Section 169 i.e. where there 
is no sufficiency of evidence to justify forwarding of a case 
to a Magistrate, it is termed variously i.e. referred charge, 
final report or summary. Section 173 in terms does not 
refer to any notice to be given to raise any protest to the 
report submitted by the police. Though the notice issued 
under some of the Police Manuals states it to be a notice 
under Section 173 of the Code, there is nothing in Section 
173 specifically providing for such a notice.”
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16.	 This Court in Bhushan Kumar and Another v. State (NCT of Delhi) 
and Another12 while referring to Sections 190 and 204 of the Code 
has observed that the expression “cognisance” in Section 190 merely 
means “becoming aware of”, and when used with reference to a 
court or a judge it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates 
the juncture at which the court or Magistrate takes judicial notice of 
the offence with a view to initiate proceedings in respect of such an 
offence. This is different from initiation of proceedings. Rather, it is a 
condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by a Magistrate or 
judge. At this stage, the Magistrate has to keep in mind the averments 
in the complaint or the police report, and has to evaluate whether 
there is sufficient ground for initiation of proceedings. This is not the 
same as the consideration of sufficient grounds for conviction, as 
whether evidence is sufficient for supporting the conviction or not, 
can be determined only at the stage of trial, and not at the stage of 
cognisance. This aspect is important and will be subsequently referred 
to when we examine the decision of this Court in K. Veeraswami v. 
Union of India and Others13, and the observations therein which 
have been referred to on several occasions in other judgments.
17.	 Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to 
explicitly state the reasons for issue of summons and
this is not a 
prerequisite for deciding the validity of the summons. Nevertheless, 
the requirement of the Code is that the summons is issued when it 
appears to the Magistrate that there is sufficient ground for proceeding 
against the accused. Summons is issued to the person against whom 
the legal proceedings have commenced. Wilful disobedience is liable 
to be punished under Section 174 of the Indian Penal Code, 186014. 
As a sequitur, keeping in mind both the language of Section 204 of 
the Code and the penal consequences, the Magistrate is mandated 
to form an opinion as to whether there exists sufficient ground for 
summons to be issued. While deciding whether summons is to be 
issued to a person, the Magistrate can take into consideration any 
prima facie improbabilities arising in the case. The parameters on 
which a summoning order can be interfered with are well settled by 
the decision of this court in Bhushan Kumar (supra). The Magistrate 
12	
[2012] 2 SCR 696 : (2012) 5 SCC 424
13	
[1991] 3 SCR 189 : (1991) 3 SCC 655
14	
“IPC”, for short.
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107
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
in terms of Section 204 of the Code is required to exercise his 
judicial discretion with a degree of caution, even when he is not 
required to record reasons, on whether there is sufficient ground for 
proceeding. Proceedings initiated by a criminal court are generally 
not interfered with by High Courts, unless necessary to secure the 
ends of justice.15 
18.	 The decision in Bhushan Kumar (supra) also refers to Section 251 
of the Code, which is a stage post appearance of the accused, and 
observes:
“20. It is inherent in Section 251 of the Code that when 
an accused appears before the trial court pursuant to 
summons issued under Section 204 of the Code in a 
summons trial case, it is the bounden duty of the trial 
court to carefully go through the allegations made in the 
charge-sheet or complaint and consider the evidence to 
come to a conclusion whether or not, commission of any 
offence is disclosed and if the answer is in the affirmative, 
the Magistrate shall explain the substance of the accusation 
to the accused and ask him whether he pleads guilty 
otherwise, he is bound to discharge the accused as per 
Section 239 of the Code.”
19.	 Sections 211 to 213 and Section 218 of the Code deal with the 
contents of the charge. The object and purpose of these provisions 
is to bring the nature of allegations against the accused to his 
notice. These allegations have to be proved and
established by 
leading evidence. The accused should not be taken by surprise or 
be unbeknownst so as to cause prejudice to him. The provisions 
of the Code also prescribe how to interpret the words used in the 
charge in terms of Section 214 of the Code, the effect of defects in 
the charge in terms of Section 215 of the Code, the power of the 
court to alter the charge and recall of the witnesses when a charge 
is altered in terms of Sections 216 and 217 of the Code. 
20.	 There is an inherent connect between the chargesheet submitted 
under Section 173(2) of the Code, cognisance which is taken under 
Section 190 of the Code, issue of process and summoning of the 
15	
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866; State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
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accused under Section 204 of the Code, and thereupon issue of 
notice under Section 251 of the Code, or the charge in terms of 
Chapter XVII of the Code. The details set out in the chargesheet 
have a substantial impact on the efficacy of procedure at the 
subsequent stages. The chargesheet is integral to the process 
of taking cognisance, the issue of notice and framing of charge, 
being the only investigative document and evidence available to 
the court till that stage. Substantiated reasons and grounds for 
an offence being made in the chargesheet are a key resource for 
a Magistrate to evaluate whether there are sufficient grounds for 
taking cognisance, initiating proceedings, and then issuing notice, 
framing charges etc.
21.	 These provisions, however, have to be read along with the power of 
the police to investigate under sub-section (8) to Section 173 of the 
Code even when they have submitted a report under sub-section 
(2) to Section 173 of the Code. The police also has the power to 
produce additional documents and evidence, as has been held 
by this Court in Parkash Singh Badal and Another v. State of 
Punjab and Others16; Narendra Kumar Amin v. Central Bureau of 
Investigation and Others17; and Central Bureau of Investigation 
v. R.S. Pai and Another18.
22.	 Recently a three Judge Bench of this Court in Zakia Ahsan Jafri v. 
State of Gujarat and Another19, has observed:
“11. This Court in Dayal Singh noted
that the investigating 
officer is obliged to act as per the Police Manual and 
known canons of practice while being diligent, truthful 
and fair in his/her approach and investigation. It has been 
noted in the reported decision that an investigating officer 
is completely responsible and answerable for the manner 
and methodology adopted in completing his investigation. 
Concededly, upon completion of investigation, the 
investigating officer is obliged to submit report setting 
out prescribed details, to the Magistrate empowered 
16	
[2006] Supp. 10 SCR 197 : (2007) 1 SCC 1
17	
(2015) 3 SCC 417
18	
[2002] 2 SCR 889 : (2002) 5 SCC 82
19	
[2022] 6 SCR 1 : 2022 INSC 653
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109
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
to take cognizance of the offence referred to therein, 
without unnecessary delay. The report so presented is 
the conclusion reached by the investigating officer on 
the basis of materials collected during investigation. The 
duty of the investigating officer is to collate every relevant 
information/material during the investigation, which he 
must believe to be the actual course of events and the 
true facts unraveling the commission of the alleged crime 
and the person involved in committing the same. He is 
expected to examine the materials from all angles. In the 
event, there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground 
that an offence appears to have been committed and 
the person committing such offence has been identified, 
the investigating officer is obliged to record his opinion 
in that regard, as required by Section 173(2)(i)(d) of the 
Code. In other words, if the investigating officer intends 
to send the accused for trial, he is obliged to form a 
firm opinion not only about the commission of offence, 
but also about the involvement of such person in the 
commission of crime. 
12. Such opinion is the culmination of the analysis of 
the materials collected during the investigation - that 
there is “strong suspicion” against the accused, which 
eventually will lead the concerned Court to think that 
there is a ground for “presuming” that the accused “has” 
committed the
alleged offence; and not a case of mere 
suspicion. For being a case of strong suspicion, there 
must exist sufficient materials to corroborate the facts and 
circumstances of the case; and be of such weight that it 
would facilitate the Court concerned to take cognizance 
of the crime and eventually lead it to think (form opinion) 
that there is ground “for presuming that the accused has 
committed an offence”, as alleged – so as to frame a 
charge against him in terms of Section 228(1) or 246(1) 
of the Code, as the case may be. For taking cognizance 
of the crime or to frame charges against the accused, the 
Court must analyze the report filed by the investigating 
officer and all the materials appended thereto and then 
form an independent prima facie opinion as to whether
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there is ground for “presuming” that the accused “has” 
committed an offence, as alleged. (It is not, “may” have 
or “likely” to have committed an offence, but a ground 
for presuming that he has committed an offence). The 
Magistrate in the process may have to give due weightage 
to the opinion of the investigating officer. If such is to be 
the eventual outcome of the final report presented by 
the investigating officer, then there is nothing wrong if he 
applies the same standard to form an opinion about the 
materials collected during the investigation and articulate 
it in the report submitted under Section 173 of the Code. 
It may be useful to refer to the decisions adverted to in 
Afroz Mohd. Hasanfata including in the case of Ramesh 
Singh and I.K. Nangia.
xx
xx
xx
63. Needless to underscore that every information coming 
to the investigating agency must be regarded as relevant. 
However, the investigating agency is expected to make 
enquiries regarding the authenticity of such information and 
after doing so must collect corroborative evidence in support 
thereof. In absence of corroborative evidence, it would be 
merely a case of suspicion and not pass the muster of 
grave suspicion, which is the pre-requisite for sending the 
suspect for trial. This is the mandate in Section 173(2)(i)(d) 
of the Code, which postulates that the investigating officer 
in his report must indicate whether any offence appears to 
have
been committed and if so, by whom. The opinion of 
the investigating officer formed on the basis of materials 
collected during the investigation/enquiry must be given due 
weightage. That would only be the threshold, to facilitate 
the concerned Court to take cognizance of the crime and 
then frame charge if it is of the opinion that there is ground 
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence 
triable under Chapter XIX of the Code.”
23.	 In K. Veeraswami (supra), K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. pronounced the 
judgment for himself and M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then 
was) on the question of contents of the chargesheet and observed:
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
“75. In the view that we have taken as to the nature 
of the offence created under clause (e), it may not be 
necessary to examine the contention relating to ingredient 
of the offence. But since the legality of the charge-sheet 
has been impeached, we will deal with that contention 
also. Counsel laid great emphasis on the expression 
“for which he cannot satisfactorily account” used in 
clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act. He argued that 
that term means that the public servant is entitled to an 
opportunity before the Investigating Officer to explain the 
alleged disproportionality between assets and the known 
sources of income. The Investigating Officer is required to 
consider his explanation and the charge-sheet filed by him 
must contain such averment. The failure to mention that 
requirement would vitiate the charge-sheet and renders 
it invalid. This submission, if we may say so, completely 
overlooks the powers of the Investigating Officer. The 
Investigating Officer is only required to collect material 
to find out whether the offence alleged appears to have 
been committed. In the course of the investigation, he 
may examine the accused. He may seek his clarification 
and if necessary he may cross check with him about his 
known sources of income and assets possessed by him. 
Indeed, fair investigation requires as rightly stated by Mr 
A.D. Giri, learned Solicitor General,
that the accused 
should not be kept in darkness. He should be taken into 
confidence if he is willing to cooperate. But to state that 
after collection of all material the Investigating Officer 
must give an opportunity to the accused and call upon him 
to account for the excess of the assets over the known 
sources of income and then decide whether the accounting 
is satisfactory or not, would be elevating the Investigating 
Officer to the position of an enquiry officer or a judge. The 
Investigating Officer is not holding an enquiry against the 
conduct of the public servant or determining the disputed 
issues regarding the disproportionality between the assets 
and the income of the accused. He just collects material 
from all sides and prepares a report which he files in the 
court as charge-sheet.”
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The latter portion of the aforesaid paragraph, referring to the details 
of the offence and the requirement for them to be proved in order 
to bring home the guilt of the accused at the later stage (the stage 
of trial) by adducing acceptable evidence, has to be understood 
in the context that the chargesheet need not elaborately evaluate 
the evidence, as the process of evaluation is a matter of trial. This 
does not mean that the chargesheet should not disclose or refer 
to the facts as to meet the requirements of Section 173(2) of the 
Code, and the mandate of the State rules. Further, the earlier 
portion of the same paragraph, while referring to the opinion of 
the investigating officer, does so to demonstrate the significance 
of the opinion of the investigating officer at this stage. However, 
this does not preclude the Magistrate from exercising her powers 
in adopting an approach independent from such opinion, as has 
been held by this Court in Bhagwant Singh (supra) and Minu 
Kumari (supra). 
24.	 It is the police report which would enable the Magistrate to decide a 
course of action from the options available to him. The details of the 
offence and investigation are not supposed to be a comprehensive 
thesis of the prosecution case, but at the same time, must reflect 
a thorough investigation into the alleged offence. It is on the basis 
of this record that the court can take effective cognisance of the 
offence
and proceed to issue process in terms of Section 190(1)(b) 
and Section 204 of the Code. In case of doubt or debate, or if no 
offence is made out, it is open to the Magistrate to exercise other 
options which are available to him. 
25.	 In support of our reasoning, we would refer to the very next paragraph 
in the judgment of Shetty, J. in K. Veeraswami (supra) which reads 
as under:
“76. The charge-sheet is nothing but a final report of police 
officer under Section 173(2) of the CrPC. The Section 
173(2) provides that on completion of the investigation 
the police officer investigating into a cognizable offence 
shall submit a report. The report must be in the form 
prescribed by the State Government and stating therein 
(a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the 
information; (c) the names of the persons who appear 
to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d)
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
whether any offence appears to have been committed 
and, if so, by whom (e) whether the accused has been 
arrested; (f) whether he had been released on his bond 
and, if so, whether with or without sureties; and (g) whether 
he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170. As 
observed by this Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of 
Bihar that the statutory requirement of the report under 
Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various 
details prescribed therein are included in the report. 
This report is an intimation to the magistrate that upon 
investigation into a cognizable offence the Investigating 
Officer has been able to procure sufficient evidence for 
the court to inquire into the offence and the necessary 
information is being sent to the court. In fact, the report 
under Section 173(2) purports to be an opinion of the 
Investigating Officer that as far as he is concerned he 
has been able to procure sufficient material for the trial 
of the accused by the court. The report is complete if it 
is accompanied with all the documents and statements of 
witnesses as required by Section 175(5). Nothing more 
need be stated in the report of the Investigating Officer. 
It is also not necessary that all the details of the offence 
must be stated. The details of the offence are required 
to be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused at 
a later stage i.e. in the course of
the trial of the case by 
adducing acceptable evidence.
This paragraph examines the contents of the chargesheet and 
on elaboration of the same holds that it is in accordance with the 
terms of Section 173(2) of the Code as well as the provisions of the 
penal enactment. In furtherance of this, reference is made to Satya 
Narain Musadi and Others v. State of Bihar20, in stating that the 
chargesheet should comply with the statutory requirements, and the 
various details prescribed therein should be included in the report.
26.	 The object and purpose of the police investigation is manyfold. It 
includes the need to ensure transparent and free investigation to 
ascertain the facts, examine whether or not an offence is committed, 
20	
(1980) 3 SCC 152
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identify the offender if an offence is committed, and to lay before the 
court the evidence which has been collected, the truth and correctness 
of which is thereupon decided by the court.
27.	 In H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi21, this Court 
notes that the process of investigation generally consists of: 1) 
proceeding to the concerned spot, 2) ascertainment of facts and 
circumstances, 3) discovery and arrest, 4) collection of evidence 
which includes examination of various persons, search of places 
and seizure of things, and 5) formation of an opinion on whether 
an offence is made out, and filing the chargesheet accordingly. 
The formation of opinion is therefore the culmination of several 
stages that an investigation goes through. This Court in its decision 
in Abhinandan Jha and Others v. Dinesh Mishra22 states that 
the submission of the chargesheet or the final report is dependent 
on the nature of opinion formed, which is the final step in the 
investigation. 
28.	 The final report has to be prepared with these aspects in mind and 
should show with sufficient particularity and clarity, the contravention 
of the law which is alleged. When the report complies with the said 
requirements, the court concerned should apply its mind whether 
or not to take cognisance and also proceed by issuing summons 
to the accused. While doing so, the court will take into account the 
statement of witnesses recorded
under Section 161 of the Code and 
the documents placed on record by the investigating officer.
29.	 In case of any doubts or ambiguity arising in ascertaining the facts 
and evidence, the Magistrate can, before taking cognisance, call 
upon the investigating officer to clarify and give better particulars, 
order further investigation, or even record statements in terms of 
Section 202 of the Code. 
30.	 Our attention has been drawn to the format prescribed for the State 
of Uttar Pradesh, which by column 16 requires the investigating 
officer to state brief facts of the case. In addition, the State of Uttar 
Pradesh has issued a circular dated 19.09.2023, which refers to an 
earlier circular bearing No. 59 of 2016 dated 20.10.2016, and states 
21	
[1955] 1 SCR 1150 : (1954) 2 SCC 934
22	
[1967] 3 SCR 668 : AIR 1968 SC 117
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
115
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
that the investigation provisions contained in the Code and the police 
regulations with reference to Section 173 of the Code are not being 
consistently complied with and followed by the investigating officers 
and the supervising officers. The need to provide lead details of 
the offence in the chargesheet is mandatory as it is in accord with 
paragraph 122 of the police regulations. Similar directions were 
issued on 09.09.2022 following the direction of the High Court of 
Judicature at Allahabad that brief narration of the material collected 
during investigation, which forms the opinion of the investigating 
officer, should be mentioned in the chargesheet.
31.	 Therefore, the investigating officer must make clear and complete 
entries of all columns in the chargesheet so that the court can clearly 
understand which crime has been committed by which accused and 
what is the material evidence available on the file. Statements under 
Section 161 of the Code and related documents have to be enclosed 
with the list of witnesses. The role played by the accused in the crime 
should be separately and clearly mentioned in the chargesheet, for 
each of the accused persons.
PART II
32.	 As we turn to the second part of our judgment, it would be appropriate 
to lead our decision in each case with a brief overview of its pertinent 
facts:
A.	
Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1074/2017
●
The appellants have been involved in a drawn-out litigation 
with several parties over the ownership of Property No. 
80-A, 23,072 sq. ft., forming a part of Khasra no. 1016/647 
and 645, situated within Chandrawli/Shahdara, now in 
Abadi, at Circular Road, Shahdara, Delhi- 110032.23

●
Appellant No.2 – Sharif Ahmad and Appellant No.3 – Anwar 
Ahmad (since deceased), purchased a part in the subject 
property on behalf of their partnership firm Dream Land & 
Co., while Appellant No.1 – Vakil Ahmad (since deceased) 
had done so in his individual capacity.
23	
“subject property”, for short.

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●
To avoid prolixity, we would refrain from setting out the 
facts of the litigation in detail.

●
The challenge before us relates to the First Information 
Report No. 108/2016 dated 23.05.2016, filed by Respondent 
No.2/complainant - Mohd. Iqbal, under Sections 420, 406 
and 506 IPC at police station Hafizpur, Hapur, U.P. against 
the appellants. The FIR stated that the appellants had 
agreed to sell the subject property to Respondent No. 
2 and had received part payment for the registry of the 
subject property. However, the appellants did not register 
the property and also failed to refund the concerned amount 
to Respondent No. 2.

●
The Police recorded the statements of Respondent No.2, 
and the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code.
●
According to these statements, the appellants had refused 
to refund the amount paid by Respondent No. 2 despite 
repeated requests to do the same.

●
A complaint dated 03.09.2016 was filed against Respondent 
No. 2 at Police Station Tis Hazari by relatives of the 
appellants on account of receiving threats to their life.

●
The appellants challenged FIR No. 108/2016 in W.P. 
(Cr.) No.20221/2016 before the Allahabad High Court 
and sought quashing of the proceedings. By an order 
dated 15.09.2016, the High Court stayed the arrest of the 
appellant until filing of the chargesheet.

●
On 24.10.2016, a chargesheet was filed against the 
appellants under Sections 405 and 506 IPC.

●
The appellants approached the Allahabad High Court 
in Cr. M.A. No. 960/2017 seeking the quashing of the 
chargesheet and of proceedings in Case No. 410/2016. 
The appellants submitted that the chargesheet is vague, 
filed without proper investigation, and fails to make out 
any offence.

●
The Allahabad High Court dismissed the application for 
quashing of the chargesheet through the impugned order 
dated 12.01.2017.

[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
117
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
●
Hence, the appellants have filed the present appeal.
33.	 The FIR as registered, on the question of intimidation states that on 
19.03.2016 the appellants had flatly refused to refund the money and 
had told Respondent No. 2 that they can do whatever they want. 
They had threatened the entire family of the complainant.
34.	 The chargesheet submitted by the investigating officer in the present 
case, under column 16 referring to the facts of the case, reads as 
under:
“Sir, the above said case was got registered by the 
complainant Shri Iqbal on 23/5/16 at this police station, 
the investigation of which handed over to me S.I., the 
investigation of which done by me S.I. and from all the 
investigation till now, statement of the complainant, 
statement of the witnesses and inspection of place of 
occurrence, the deal of plot measuring 2600 which is at 
behind Sadar Police Station was finalized by the accused 
persons with the complainant and his partner Surender 
Sharma for 4 crore, for which by not getting executed 
the registry of the same at the time of the complainant 
and after receiving a sum of Rs. 1 crore of his partner 
Surender Sharma as earnest money, selling of plot to 
Kusum Jain and D.K. Jain, by not refunding a sum of 
Rs. 1 crore of the complainant and his partner, grabbing 
by doing breach of trust, making pretexts on demanding 
again and again and the threat to kill, hence the offence 
under section 406, 506 I.P.C. is thoroughly proved upon 
the accused
persons Sharif Ahmed, Anwar Ahmed, Vakil 
Ahmed, Aadil Ahmed, the occurrence of section 420 I.P.C. 
is not found, hence the challan of the accused persons, by 
charge sheet No. 153/16 is filled in the court, it is prayed 
that punishment may be given by calling the proof.”
35.	 A reading thereof would indicate that it refers to the complaint made 
by Respondent No. 2 – Iqbal on 23.05.2016 relating to the deal of 
a plot in respect of which part consideration was paid as earnest 
money. But thereafter, the appellants had sold the plot and were not 
refunding the earnest money and by doing so have committed breach 
of trust under Section 406 of the IPC. It also refers to the alleged 
pretexts being made by the appellants on money being demanded
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and a threat to kill being extended. It is also recorded that an offence 
under Section 506 has been proved to have been committed. At the 
same time, the chargesheet states that no offence under Section 
420 of the IPC is found to have been committed.
36.	 An offence under Section 406 of the IPC requires entrustment, which 
carries the implication that a person handing over any property or 
on whose behalf the property is handed over, continues to be the 
owner of the said property. Further, the person handing over the 
property must have confidence in the person taking the property to 
create a fiduciary relationship between them. A normal transaction 
of sale or exchange of money/consideration does not amount to 
entrustment.24 Clearly, the charge/offence of Section 406 IPC is not 
even remotely made out.
37.	 The chargesheet states that the offence under Section 420 is not 
made out. The offence of cheating under Section 415 of the IPC 
requires dishonest inducement, delivering of a property as a result 
of the inducement, and damage or harm to the person so induced. 
The offence of cheating is established when the dishonest intention 
exists at the time when the contract or agreement is entered, for the 
essential ingredient of the offence of cheating consists of fraudulent 
or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him to deliver 
any property, to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or 
omit if he
had not been deceived. As per the investigating officer, 
no fraudulent and dishonest inducement is made out or established 
at the time when the agreement was entered.
38.	 An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused 
intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter 
whether the victim is alarmed or not. The intention of the accused 
to cause alarm must be established by bringing evidence on record. 
The word ‘intimidate’ means to make timid or fearful, especially: to 
compel or deter by or as if by threats.25 The threat communicated 
or uttered by the person named in the chargesheet as an accused, 
should be uttered and communicated by the said person to threaten 
24	
See Section 405 of the IPC and judgments of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal AIR 
1968 SC 700; Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others (2006) 6 SCC 736; Central Bureau of 
Investigation, SPE, SIU(X), New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta (1996) 5 SCC 591
25	
“intimidate”. Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, 2024.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
119
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind. The word ‘threat’ 
refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the other. 
Injury involves doing an illegal act. 
39.	 This Court in Manik Taneja and Another v. State of Karnataka 
and Another26, had referred to Section 506 which prescribes 
punishment for the offence of ‘criminal intimidation’ as defined in 
Section 503 of the IPC, to observe that the offence under Section 
503 requires that there must be an act of threating another person 
with causing an injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the 
person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. 
This threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person 
threatened or to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or 
omit to do an act which he is entitled to do. Mere expression of any 
words without any intent to cause alarm would not be sufficient to 
bring home an offence under Section 506 of the IPC. The material 
and evidence must be placed on record to show that the threat 
was made with an intent to cause alarm to the complainant, or to 
cause them to do, or omit to do an act. Considering the statutory 
mandate, offence under Section 506 is not shown even if we accept 
the allegation as correct.
40.	 In view of the aforesaid position, we quash the chargesheet and 
the summoning order. The appellants are discharged. We
clarify 
that the observations made above will have no bearing on the civil 
proceedings, if any, already initiated or which may be initiated in 
future by the respondent/complainant.
B.	
Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5419/2022

●
On 26.06.2019 the complainant – Wakeel Ahmad filed a 
complaint before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, 
alleging that the accused persons, including the appellant 
– Imran, routinely take money on the pretext of bainama 
of property, and subsequently deny entering into such 
agreement and receiving any money.

●
The court allowed the said complaint and ordered the 
concerned Police Station to register the complaint under 
Sections 420 and 120B IPC. FIR No. 519/2019 dated 
26	
[2015] 1 SCR 156 : (2015) 7 SCC 423

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26.07.2019 was registered at Police Station Chandpur, 
Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh. The complainant also stated that the 
accused persons had threatened the complainant against 
pursuing legal action against them.

●
By an order dated 19.09.2019, the High Court partly allowed 
the appellant’s anticipatory bail application and directed 
the police not to arrest the appellant till the submission 
of the chargesheet.
●
Chargesheet No. 582/2019 dated 18.10.2019 was filed, 
submitting that charges under Sections 420 and 120B IPC 
are established. The chargesheet lists the details of the 
accused as mentioned in the FIR and the relevant column 
relating to brief facts in the chargesheet reads:
“Requesting to the Hon’ble Court is that on 
28.07.2019 the Hon’ble Court ordered under 
section 156(3) Cr. P.C. for registering a FIR 
No. 519/2019 under the section of 420, 120B 
IPC against 
1.	
Ziyauddin S/o Gyasudding aged about 
70 years 
2.	
Zamaluddin S/o Gyasuddin aged about 
65 years 
3.	
Kamaluddin S/o Gyasuddin aged about 
50 years 
4.	
Rahisuddin S/o. Unknown 
5.	
Imran aged about 36 years S/o Zamaluddin 
6.	
Kahsif S/o Zamaluddin aged about 31 
all are residence of Mohalla Ktarmal, 
kasba Chandpur, Chanpur, Bijnor, UP. 
the crime under section 420, 120B IPC 
is proved against the Ziyauddin S/o 
Gyasudding, Zamaluddin S/o Gyasuddin, 
Kamaluddin S/o Gyasuddin, Rahisuddin 
S/o Unknown, Imran S/o Zamaluddin, 
Kahsif S/o Zamaluddin.

[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
121
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
Hence, filing this charge sheet before the 
Hon’ble court and requesting to this Hon’ble 
court to punish the all the accused.”
●
By an order dated 10.05.2021, the Allahabad High 
Court granted interim anticipatory bail to the appellant 
till 03.01.2022, in terms of the conditions mentioned in 
the order, and observed that the appellant herein may 
approach the High Court again if so advised, in case of 
a change in circumstances.

●
On 23.03.2022, Allahabad High Court dismissed the 
Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application No.2235/2022 
filed by the appellant, on the grounds of non-bailable 
warrants having been issued against the appellant and 
the chargesheet having been filed.
●
Hence, the appellant has filed the present appeal.
41.	 We have already referred to the facts and also to the ingredients 
of the offence under Section 420 IPC. The assertions made in the 
FIR allege that the accused are frauds who have taken bainama 
(earnest money on the property), but thereafter are making excuses. 
The complainant had visited the accused at their house who had 
then threatened them to implicate them in false cases. They denied 
having received the money. 
42.	 We allow the present appeal and direct that in the event of the 
appellant being arrested, he shall be released on bail by the arresting 
officer/investigating officer/trial court on the terms and conditions to 
be fixed by the trial court. 
43.	 However, what is surprising and a matter of concern in the present 
case, is that the police had initially rightly not registered the FIR, which 
had prompted the complainant to approach the Court of Additional 
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandpur, Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh, alleging 
that he is an honest and respected person in the society and is well 
established in business, while the accused are fraudulent individuals. 
The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had subsequently ordered 
for the FIR to be registered on the basis of the written complaint.
44.	 We would also like to emphasise on the need for a Magistrate to 
be cautious in examining whether the facts of the case disclose a 
civil or a criminal wrong. Attempts at initiating vexatious criminal
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proceedings should be thwarted early on, as a summoning order, 
or even a direction to register an FIR, has grave consequences for 
setting the criminal proceedings in motion.27 Any effort to settle civil 
disputes and claims which do not involve any criminal offence, by 
way of applying pressure through criminal prosecution, should be 
deprecated and discouraged.28 
C.	
Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9482/2021

●
The complainant and Respondent No. 2 herein – Rajesh 
Wangvelu made a written complaint to the Station 
Officer, Police Station Aliganj, Lucknow, alleging that on 
23.12.2019 at about 12:15 p.m. two officers of the National 
Research Laboratory for Conservation of Cultural Property, 
Lucknow29, namely, Bachhan Singh Rawat, Security Officer 
and Mahendra Kumar, Division Clerk/Caretaker had 
attacked him with a helmet and lathi, and had threatened 
to kill him. At about 1:12 p.m. FIR No. 556/2019 dated 
23.12.2019 was registered against Bachhan Singh Rawat 
and Mahendra Kumar under Section 323, 504 and 506 IPC.
●
A statement under Section 161 of the Code was also 
recorded, where Rajesh Wangvelu stated that he was 
discriminated against for belonging to a different State. He 
had done nothing wrong and did not allow his subordinates 
to do anything wrong, for which reason Bachhan Singh 
Rawat and Mahender Kumar remained angry with him. He 
added in his statement that the appellant – Manager Singh 
was also present during this altercation. He had abused 
him and stated – “maaro sale ko, bahut imandaar banta 
hai” i.e., “hit him, he wants to be too honest”. Bachhan 
Singh Rawat and Mahendra Kumar had hit him till he 
fainted. When he regained consciousness, they had left 
the place.

●
Manager Singh, as the Director General of the NRLC, 
claims that he had noticed several discrepancies and 
27	
Deepak Gaba and Others v. State of U.P. and Another, (2023) 3 SCC 423
28	
Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others (2006) 6 SCC 736
29	
“NRLC”, for short.

[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
123
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
administrative errors committed by Rajesh Wangvelu, 
who was working as the Library and Information Officer.

●
After issuing show-cause notices to Rajesh Wangvelu and 
considering his response, the Ministry of Culture issued a 
letter dated 02.08.2019, under the signature of appellant, 
indicating that Rajesh Wangvelu prima facie appeared to 
have committed temporary embezzlement of Rs. 38,338/- 
and for which action should be taken.
●
A decision to shift the library was also confirmed by a 
committee, to which Rajesh Wangvelu had expressed 
his displeasure. On the day of shifting, i.e. 23.12.2019, a 
physical altercation occurred between Rajesh Wangvelu 
and the officers Bachhan Singh Rawat and Mahendra 
Kumar.

●
Manager Singh has relied upon written communication 
of Bachhan Singh Rawat in which he has stated that 
on 23.12.2019 at about 12:00 noon, he was informed 
by Mahendra Kumar, that Rajesh Wangvelu had taken 
some items in his bag without the gate pass. Information 
in this regard had been given to Manager Singh and the 
Vigilance Officer. When Bachhan Singh Rawat had tried 
to frisk Rajesh Wangvelu, he had, in presence of another 
staff member Dr. Neeta Nigam, threatened Bachhan Singh 
Rawat and Mahendra Kumar with dire consequences and 
had sprayed chemical on their faces. Rajesh Wangvelu 
had assaulted them and thereupon had run away from 
the spot. On 23.12.2019 Manager Singh had accordingly 
written a letter to the Station Officer of Aliganj Police 
Station, informing him of the incident. Manager Singh 
is also relying on the communication dated 26.12.2019 
written by him to the Director General of Police, Lucknow, 
and the communication dated 06.01.2020 by the appellant 
Manager Singh to the sub-inspector, and inquiry officer 
Police Station Aliganj.
●
Rajesh Wangvelu was examined at 01:30 p.m., and his 
medical legal report dated 23.12.2019 refers to six injuries 
which have been found to be caused by a hard and 
blunt object. The injuries were simple. Rajesh Wangvelu,

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however, also relies upon a report dated 24.12.2019, 
obtained by a private diagnostic centre, which states that 
there was a fracture at the head of the fifth metacarpal 
bone of the left hand.

●
Manager Singh filed a petition for quashing of the 
proceedings arising out of FIR No. 556/2019 before the 
Allahabad High Court. He was given the benefit of arrest 
till the filing of the chargesheet, by an order of the High 
Court dated 09.01.2020.
●
On 04.02.2020, a chargesheet was filed with an addition 
of Sections 308, 325 and 120B IPC, and impleading 
Manager Singh as an accused. The chargesheet under 
Section 173 of the Code, submitted before the court in 
the present case, under the column relating to brief facts 
of the case reads as under:
“Sir, the aforesaid case was registered on 
the basis of written report/complaint of the 
complainant of the case and the investigation 
was being done by the S.I. Shri Ramchandra 
Mishra. On 15.01.2020 I have received the 
investigation. During the investigation, on the 
basis of the statement of the complainant 
as well as on the basis of medical report, 
section 120B/308/325 IPC was added and 
the name of accused Manager Singh has 
come into light, in which Bachan Sing Rawat 
and Mahendra Kumar were sent in judicial 
custody on 24.12.19. Till the filing of charge 
sheet, the accused Manager Singh has been 
granted stay of arrest by the court. The offences 
under Section 323/504/506/120B/308/325 IPC 
are duly proved against the accused Bachan 
Singh Rawat, Mahendra Kumar and Manger 
Singh. Therefore, charge sheet is filed against 
the accused Bachan Singh Rawat, Mahendra 
Kumar and Manager Singh under Section 
323/504/506/120B/308/325 IPC before the 
Hon’ble Court. It is requested to summon the 
proof and punish and accused.”

[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
125
Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
●
On the chargesheet being submitted in the court of the 
Magistrate, order dated 10.02.2020 was passed recording 
that the chargesheet has been submitted for offences under 
323, 504, 506, 120B, 308, 325 of the IPC against Bachhan 
Singh Rawat, Mahendra Kumar and Manager Singh. The 
order, taking cognisance and issuing summons, reads:
“The chargesheet was filed under the offence number 
556/2019, Section 323, 504, 506, 120B, 308, 325, 
IPC, Police Station Aliganj against the accused 
Bachan Singh Rawat, Mahendra Kumar and Manager 
Singh. Reviewed all prosecution forms. The grounds 
for taking cognizance are sufficient. Cognizance is 
taken.
ORDER
Register the case. The copies are ready attached. 
Accused Bachan Singh Rawat and Mahendra Kumar 
are out on bail. Jamanatnama is attached in the file 
and the arrest of the accused Manager Singh was 
a stay on the arrest till the filing of the chargesheet 
in the sequence of the order of the Hon’ble High 
Court, Miscellaneous Bench – 262/2020 order dated 
09-01-20. Summons issued against the accused. 
Giving copy for paperwork. Attendance should be 
presented on 01-03-2020.”
●
It appears that the matter was taken up for hearing 
by the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow on 
18.02.2021, which records the presence of the counsel for 
Rajesh Wangvelu and that application for exemption from 
personal appearance was moved on behalf of Bachhan 
Singh Rawat and Mahendra Kumar. Manager Singh was 
absent and bailable warrants were issued against him, 
and he was required to appear on 04.03.2021.

●
On 04.03.2021, an application for exemption from personal 
appearance was moved on behalf of Manager Singh on 
the ground that he had gone out for personal reasons 
where he had taken ill. This application was rejected 
on 04.03.2021 by the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, 
recording that Manager Singh had not obtained bail till

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then and there is no provision for granting exemption from 
personal appearance prior to obtaining bail. Therefore, 
non-bailable warrants have been issued against him.

●
Another order dated 04.03.2021 records that bailable 
warrants were issued against Manager Singh but he had 
remained absent. To ensure his personal appearance 
non-bailable warrants were issued against him.

●
By the impugned order dated 16.03.2021, the High Court 
had dismissed the petition filed by Manager Singh under 
Section 482 of the Code, to quash the criminal proceedings 
against him.
●
On 03.09.2021, the High Court granted a further period of 
10 days’ time to Manager Singh to surrender. He did not 
surrender and filed another application seeking extension 
of time to surrender.

●
On 03.12.2021, Manager Singh filed the present appeal 
challenging correctness of the impugned order dated 
16.03.2021.

●
Rajesh Wangvelu has, before us, referred to FIR No. 
224 of 2020 registered under Sections 406, 419, 420, 
467, 468, 471 IPC on account of certain contracts having 
been awarded by Manager Singh, Dr. Neeta Nigam, 
Bachhan Singh Rawat, Mahendra Kumar, to M/s. V.K. 
Singh Construction Company, Punjab, in which case a 
final report has been submitted to the court. He has also 
referred to an office order dated 03.09.2021 passed by 
the Government of India, Ministry of Culture, terminating 
services of Manager Singh with immediate effect. 
45.	 Having regard to the facts of the present case, including the 
chargesheet as filed, which in our opinion is bereft of all details and 
particulars, we quash the summoning order against Manager Singh. 
The Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, would re-examine the entire 
matter in terms of the observations made in the present judgment 
and thereupon proceed in accordance with law.
46.	 We, however, would allow the present appeal to the extent that 
the non-bailable warrants issued against Manager Singh are 
unsustainable and should be quashed. It is a settled position of law
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
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Sharif Ahmed and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
that non-bailable warrants cannot be issued in a routine manner 
and that the liberty of an individual cannot be curtailed unless 
necessitated by the larger interest of public and the State. While 
there are no comprehensive set of guidelines for the issuance of 
non-bailable warrants, this Court has observed on several occasions 
that non-bailable warrants should not be issued, unless the accused 
is charged with a heinous crime, and is likely to evade the process 
of law or tamper/destroy evidence.30
47.	 Further, the observation that there is no provision for granting 
exemption from personal appearance prior to obtaining bail, is not 
correct, as the power to grant exemption from personal appearance 
under the Code31 should not be read in a restrictive manner as 
applicable only after the accused has been granted bail. This Court 
in Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Another v. Rani Jethmalani32 
held that the power to grant exemption from personal appearance 
should be exercised liberally, when facts and circumstances require 
such exemption.33 Section 205 states that the Magistrate, exercising 
his discretion, may dispense with the personal attendance of the 
accused while issuing summons, and allow them to appear through 
their pleader. While provisions of the Code are considered to be 
exhaustive, cases arise where the Code is silent and the court has 
to make such order as the ends of
justice require. In such cases, 
the criminal court must act on the principle, that every procedure 
which is just and fair, is understood as permissible, till it is shown 
to be expressly or impliedly prohibited by law.34 
48.	 It is also directed that Manager Singh shall be released on bail by 
the arresting officer/ investigating officer/trial court on the terms 
and conditions to be fixed by the trial court in connection with the 
chargesheet originating from FIR No. 556 of 2019. The direction 
given by the High Court in its order dated 09.01.2020 restricting the 
grant of anticipatory bail till the filing of the chargesheet is accordingly 
30	
Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal and Others (2007) 12 SCC 1; Vikas v. State 
of Rajasthan (2014) 3 SCC 321
31	
Section 205 of the Code. Also see, Section 317 of the Code.
32	
[1979] 2 SCR 378 : (1979) 4 SCC 167
33	
See also, Puneet Dalmia v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad (2020) 12 SCC 695
34	
See, Popular Muthiah v. State Represented by Inspector of Police (2006) 7 SCC 296 and earlier 
judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Rahim Sheikh (1923) 50 Cal 872, 875
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modified. We have issued the said direction in exercise of power under 
Article 142 read with Article 136 of the Constitution of India in view of 
the peculiar facts of the present case, including issue of non-bailable 
warrants etc. by the court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate.
CONCLUSION
49.	 In view of the aforesaid discussion, 
(i)	
the appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1074/2017 preferred by 
Sharif Ahmed and Adil is allowed and the criminal proceedings 
are quashed;
(ii)	
the appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5419/2022 is allowed with 
the direction that in the event of being arrested, the appellants 
– Imran and Kamaluddin shall be released on anticipatory bail 
in connection with the chargesheet under Sections 420 and 
120B IPC arising out of FIR No. 519/2019 dated 26.07.2019 
registered at Police Station Chandpur, District Bijnor, Uttar 
Pradesh on terms and conditions to be fixed by the trial court. 
In addition, the appellants – Imran and Kamaluddin shall comply 
with the conditions mentioned in Section 438(2) of the Code;
(iii)	 the appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9482/2021 preferred 
by Manager Singh is partly allowed by – 
(a)	 quashing the summoning order issued against Manager 
Singh, with an order of remand to the Magistrate in terms 
of the observations in this judgment;
(b)	 quashing the non-bailable warrants issued against Manager 
Singh; and
(c)	
directing release of Manager Singh on bail
by the 
arresting officer/investigating officer/trial court on terms 
and conditions fixed by the trial court in connection with 
the chargesheet under Sections 323, 504, 506, 120B, 
308 and 325 IPC, arising out of FIR No. 556/2019 dated 
23.12.2019 registered at Police Station Aliganj, District 
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
Result of the case: 
Appeals disposed of.