MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.  versus RAJENDRA ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.
[2022] 3 S.C.R. 876, Supreme Court of India, 2022
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
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MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.
v.
RAJENDRA ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5894 of 2019)
MAY 18, 2022
[AJAY RASTOGI AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
Hindu Succession Act, 1956: s.14 – Property of a female
Hindu to be her absolute property – Hindu widow – Right to hindu
undivided property – Held: Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is
a tangible right against the property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and the wife – Where a Hindu
widow is found to be in exclusive settled legal possession of the
HUF property, that itself would create a presumption that such
property was earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of
maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-parcener did
not earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-
existing right of maintenance – Word “possessed by” and
“acquired” used in s. 14(1) are of the widest amplitude and include
the state of owning a property – It is by virtue of s.14(1), that the
Hindu widow’s limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an
absolute right, when such property is possessed by her whether
acquired before or after the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu of
her right to maintenance – On facts, defendant no.1-hindu widow
was staying in the suit property before the death of her uncle-in-
law, and after his death was in possession and in charge of the said
property, and was
paying the house tax prior to 1956 and was
collecting the rent from the tenants in the suit property prior to and
after 1956 – In view of her pre-existing right to maintenance from
the estate of the HUF of her husband and in view of her exclusive
settled possession of the suit property prior to and after the
commencement of the 1956 Act, the defendant no.1 had acquired
the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance,
and that she had held the suit property as the full owner and not
limited owner by virtue of s. 14(1) – Thus, the High Court rightly
held that defendant no 1 had pre-existing right to maintenance in
the suit property that had ripened into full ownership by virtue of s.
14(1) of the Act.
[2022] 3 S.C.R. 876
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Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 From the plain reading of Section 14(1) of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 along with the Explanation thereto,
it emerges that in order to become a full owner and not a limited
owner, of a property by virtue of Section 14(1), a female Hindu,
before or after the commencement of Act of 1956, must be in
possession of the property, and it must have been acquired by
her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of
maintenance, or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person,
whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage or by
her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription, or in
any other manner whatsoever, or any such property must have
been held by her as stridhana immediately before the
commencement of the Act. [Paras 10-11][889-H; 890-A-B]
1.2 In the instant case, the concern is with the claim of
defendant no.1 of having become the full owner in respect of the
suit property on the ground that she was in settled legal
possession of the suit property before and after the
commencement of the Act, in lieu of her pre-existing right of
maintenance, and such limited ownership right had fructified into
full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). The Hindu Women’s
Rights to Property Act, 1937 conferred right on Hindu widow to
the property of her husband, who died after the commencement
of the said Act of 1937 and not prior thereto. Defendant no.1’s
husband having expired in 1936,
the said Act of 1937 would not
be applicable to facts of the case. However, prior to the said Act
of 1937, the right to maintenance of Hindu widow was recognised
in Shastric law. [Para 12][890-C-F]
1.3 Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property
of her husband or of the husband’s HUF, she has a right to be
maintained out of the said property. She is entitled to retain the
possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance.
Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto envisages liberal
construction in favour of the females, with the object of advancing
and promoting the socio-economic ends sought to be achieved
by the said legislation. The words “possessed by” used in Section
14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state
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of owning a property, even though the Hindu woman is not in
actual or physical possession of the same. Of course, it is equally
well settled that the possession of the widow, must be under some
vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not
contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any
right or title. [Para 14][895-B-D]
1.4 In the instant case, the husband of defendant no.1
expired in 1936, GN, the father-in-law of defendant no.1 expired
in 1938 and HR, the brother of GN died in 1953. Plaintiff was
adopted by SB in the year 1916. HR, GN and SB had common
ancestor GP. It is also not disputed that the suit property was an
ancestral property in the hands of HR and GN. It is also not
disputed that defendant no.1 was staying in the suit property before
the death of HR, and after his death she was in possession and in
charge of the said property, and was maintaining herself by
collecting rent from the tenants who were occupying part of the
suit property. [Para 15][895-D-F]
1.5 It clearly emerges that defendant no.1 was paying the
house tax prior to 1956 and was collecting the rent from the
tenants prior to and after 1956. Pertinently from the document
Exhibit-54, it emerges that in 1940 defendant no.1, when she
was staying with her in-laws, had no source of maintenance, and
therefore she was granted Rs. 2.50 per month by way of
maintenance, by the Punya Department of the Government. She
claiming to be a PARDANASHEEN lady had authorised the
plaintiff to collect the said amount of maintenance. The said
document clearly shows that defendant no.1 was residing in the
suit house since 1940. It was well established that defendant no.1
was in possession of the suit house before and after the death of
HR in 1953 and had continued to remain in possession thereafter
and was collecting rent from the tenants who were in occupation
of part of the suit premises since 1955, till the date of filing of the
suit in 1965 by the plaintiff. [Para 17][896-C-E]
1.6 It is clearly established that defendant no.1 had long
settled possession of the suit property, which she had acquired
in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, prior to the
commencement of the Act of 1956, which entitled her to become
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a full owner of the suit property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the
said Act. Her exclusive possession of suit property after the death
of HR in 1953 i.e., prior to coming into force of the said Act in
1956, was not only not disputed but was admitted by the plaintiff
in the plaint itself. Her pre-existing right to maintenance from
the estate of the HUF of her husband was also well established.
Her pre-existing right to maintenance, coupled with her settled
legal possession of the property, would be sufficient to create a
presumption that she had a vestige of right or claim in the
property, though no document was executed or specific charge
was created in her favour recognizing her right to maintenance
in the property. [Para 18][896-E-H; 897-A-B]
1.7 In the Will executed by HR in favour of the plaintiff,
there was no mention of the suit property. What was stated in the
Will was that whatever movable and immovable property, which
belonged to HR would be devolved upon the plaintiff. It was only
in the Probate proceedings filed by the plaintiff in respect of the
said Will, he had shown the suit property in the Schedule. It is
true that the objections raised by the defendant no.1 against
granting of Probate in favour of the plaintiff were not accepted by
the Probate Court, and the alleged Will executed by HR in favour
of the defendant no.1 was also not proved by her in the said
proceedings. Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing right to
maintenance from the
estate of the HUF of her husband and in
view of her exclusive settled possession of the suit property prior
to and after the commencement of the Act of 1956, the only
conclusion which could be drawn, would be that the defendant
no.1 had acquired the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing
right to maintenance, and that she had held the suit property as
the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of
the said Act of 1956. [Para 19][897-B-E]
1.8 A Hindu woman’s right to maintenance was not and is
not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a
matter of grace and generosity. The Hindu woman’s right to
maintenance is a tangible right against the property which flows
from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife.
Such right was recognized and enjoined under the Shastric Hindu
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Law, long before the passing of the 1937 and the 1946 Acts. Those
Acts merely gave statutory backing recognising the position as
was existing under the Shastric Hindu Law. Where a Hindu widow
is found to be in exclusive settled legal possession of the HUF
property, that itself would create a presumption that such property
was earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of
maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-parcener
did not earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-
existing right of maintenance. The word “possessed by” and
“acquired” used in Section 14(1) are of the widest amplitude and
include the state of owning a property. It is by virtue of Section
14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu widow’s limited interest
gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right, when such
property is possessed by her whether acquired before or after
the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu of her right to maintenance.
The High Court rightly held that defendant no.1 had pre-existing
right to maintenance in the suit property that had ripened into
full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. [Para
20, 21][897-E-H; 898-A]
V. Tulasamma and Ors. vs. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs.
(1977) 3 SCC 99 : [1977] 3 SCR 261 – relied on.
Ram Vishal (Dead) & Ors. by Lrs. v. Jagan Nath & Anr.
(2004) 9 SCC 302; Dindayal & Anr. v. Rajaram (1970)
1 SCC 786 : [1971] 1 SCR 298; Sadhu Singh v.
Gurdwara
Sahib Narike (2006) 8 SCC 75 : [2006] 5
Suppl. SCR 799; Shrimati Rani Bai v. Shri Yadunandan
Ram & Anr. (1969) 1 SCC 604 : [1969] 3 SCR 789;
Mst. Gaumati v. Shankar Lal AIR 1974 Raj. 147; Mool
Kanwar v. Jeewa Lal AIR 1982 Raj. 267; Bai Vajia
(Dead) by Lrs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai and Others
(1979) 3 SCC 300 : [1979] 3 SCR 291; Raghubar Singh
& Ors v. Gulab Singh & Ors. (1998) 6 SCC 314 : [1998]
3 SCR 555 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2004) 9 SCC 302
referred to
Para 6(i)
[1971] 1 SCR 298
referred to
Para 6(vi)
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[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799
referred to
Para 6(vii)
[1969] 3 SCR 789
referred to
Para 7
[1979] 3 SCR 291
referred to
Para 7(iv)
[1977] 3 SCR 261
relied on
Para 12, 14
[1998] 3 SCR 555
referred to
Para 13
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5894
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.07.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in S.B. Civil First
Appeal No. 120 of 1989.
Puneet Jain, Mrs. Christi Jain, Harsh Jain, Ms. Yashika Sharma,
Umang Mehta, Ms. Shrusti Singh, Yogit Kamat, Mann Arora,
Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advs. for the Appellants.
Pallav Shishodia, Rishabh Sancheti, Ms. Padma Priya, Anchit
Bhandari, Surya Jain, Ms. Saloni Bhandari, K. Paari Vendhan, Advs. for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree
dated 20.07.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan,
Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil First Appeal No.120 of 1989, filed by the
Appellants under Section 96 read with Order 41 of CPC, whereby the
High Court while allowing the said First Appeal has set aside the judgment
and decree dated 05.08.1989 passed by the Additional District & Sessions
Judge, Class-1, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in
Civil Suit  No.56/73, and has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff
Daulalji, the predecessor of the present appellants, against the defendant
no. 1 Bhonri Devi, the predecessor of
the present respondent Nos.1 to 3
and others.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the matter, it
would be beneficial to reproduce the genealogical table/pedigree of the
families of the parties.
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ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS.
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3. The original plaintiff Daulalji filed the suit being No.56 of 1973
seeking possession of the suit property alongwith the mesne profits, against
the original defendant - Smt. Bhonri Devi, widow of Late Shri Dhannalalji
and against the other defendant Nos. 2 to 12, who were the tenants in
the suit property. The suit property is the house property bearing No.1875,
Chokdi Topkhana Desh, Jaipur which was an ancestral property in the
hands of Harinarayanji and his brother Ganeshnarayanji. As per the case
of the plaintiff – Daulalji, he was adopted by Sri Bakshji, who was the
great-grandson of their common ancestor Gopalji on 11.06.1916. The
husband of the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi, i.e., Dhannalalji predeceased
his father Ganeshnarayanji in 1936. Ganeshnarayanji expired in 1938
and his brother Harinarayanji died issueless on 11.11.1953. As per the
further case of the plaintiff Daulalji, Harinarayanji had executed a Will
on 30.07.1949 in his favour, and upon his death, on 11.11.1953, he had
become the owner of the suit property alongwith other properties of
Harinarayanji by virtue of the said Will. Upon the death of Harinarayanji,
the defendant No.1 – Bhonri Devi started harassing the plaintiff and
therefore the plaintiff left the suit property on 25.12.1953, and since then
the defendant No.1 was in possession of the suit property. The defendant
Nos.2 to 12 were the tenants in the part of suit property. The plaintiff
Daulalji claimed that after the death of Harinarayanji, he being the only
male member in the family as well as the legatee under the Will of
Harinarayanji, had become the sole owner of the suit property and,
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therefore, was entitled to recover the possession of the suit property
from the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi, who had no legal right or interest
in the suit property.
4. The suit was resisted by the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi by
filing the written statement, denying the averments and allegations made
in the plaint. She also denied any Will having been executed by
Harinarayanji in favour of the plaintiff Daulalji and further contended
that Harinarayanji, with a view to take her care, after the demise of her
husband and father-in-law, had started residing with her in the suit
property, however, the plaintiff never resided in the suit property. It was
further contended that the defendant Nos.2 to 12 were giving rent to
her, she being the wife of Dhannalalji and daughter-in-law of
Ganeshnarayanji, and thus, was in possession of the suit property as an
owner and was maintaining herself from the income derived from the
suit property. It was also contended that the limited right vested in her
favour in the suit property, had enlarged into full ownership by virtue of
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which came into force
on 17.06.1956. She, therefore, contended that the suit at the instance of
the plaintiff was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. The
defendant Nos.2 to 8 and 10 to 12 had also filed their respective written
statements contending, inter alia, that the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi
was the owner of the suit property, and they
were her tenants and were
paying rent to her only.
5. It may be noted that the original plaintiff Daulalji expired on
10.11.1983 and original defendant No. 1 Bhonri Devi expired on
17.04.1979, pending the suit. Thereafter, the suit was prosecuted by
Munnidevi, daughter of original plaintiff – Daulalji and the legal
representatives i.e.  the nephews and niece of defendant No. 1 Bhonri
Devi, who were substituted in her place pending the suit. The suit was
decreed by the trial Court on 05.08.1989, against which the First Appeal
being No. 120/1989 was preferred by the legal representatives of the
defendant no. 1 Bhonri Devi. Pending the appeal, Munnidevi, daughter
of original plaintiff Daulalji also expired, and her legal representatives
were substituted in her place. The said First Appeal having been allowed
by the High Court vide the impugned order dated 20th July, 2017, the
present appeal has been filed by the heirs and legal representatives of
the said Munnidevi (hereinafter referred to as “the appellants”) against
the respondent nos. 1 to 4 (contesting respondents) and respondent nos.
5 & 6 (Proforma respondents).
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA
ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
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Submissions:
6. The learned Advocate Mr. Puneet Jain appearing for the
appellants assailing the impugned judgement passed by the High Court
made multiple submissions as follows:
(i)
The High Court had committed an error in holding that after
the death of Shri Ganeshnarayanji in 1938, a limited right in
the suit property was created in favour of Bhonri Devi and
that the said Bhonri Devi had a right of maintenance even
under the old Shastric Law, which had fructified into a full
right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
According to Mr. Jain, the Hindu Woman Right to Property
Act, 1937 had no application to the facts of the present
case, as the suit property was located in the erstwhile State
of Jaipur, where the said Act was not applicable. In the
State of Jaipur, the Hindu Woman Right to Property Act,
1947 which came into force on 24.09.1947, was applicable,
however, Shri Dhannalal having expired in 1936 and
Ganeshnarayanji having expired in 1938 i.e., before the
commencement of the Act of 1947, no limited right under
the Act of 1947 was created in favour of the said Bhonri
Devi. Even under Section 3(2) of 1937 Act, right in the joint
family property was created only in favour of the widow of
the deceased and not in favour of a daughter-in-law of a
pre-deceased son. In this regard, he has placed reliance on
the decision of this Court in case of Ram Vishal (Dead) &
Ors. by Lrs. Vs. Jagan Nath & Anr1.
(ii)
Mere possession of property or a right to maintenance under
the old Shastric Law did not give any right to the defendant
no. 1 Bhonri Devi under Section 14(1) of the said Act of
1956. In this regard, Mr. Jain took the Court to the pleadings
of the parties and submitted that there was no specific plea
raised by defendant no. 1 in this regard and it was only by
way of alternative contention raised in the written statement,
the defendant no.1 had sought to ascertain the plea of her
having become full owner under Section 14(1) of the said
Act of 1956.
1 (2004) 9 SCC 302
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(iii)
There was no limited ownership created in favour of the
defendant no.1 Bhonri Devi specifically in the suit property
and that no presumption of limited ownership as sought to
be asserted by her could be raised. The presumption must
necessarily flow from some statutory or customary law of
inheritance or by instrument or a decree or a device as
contemplated in the Explanation II of Section 14(1) of the
Act.
(iv)
The possession of suit property was never given to the
defendant no. 1- Bhonri Devi in the nature of right to possess
in lieu of her right of maintenance creating limited ownership
in the suit property. Mere possession without any vestige
of right in property would not attract Section 14(1). The
existence of a pre-existing “limited ownership” is a sine
qua non for the application of Section 14(1), inasmuch as it
is only the limited ownership which would fructify and
blossom into a full ownership under the said provision.
Where no such “limited ownership” is shown to have existed,
Section 14(1) has no application.
(v)
Right to maintenance is not a “Right in a specific property”
but it is a “Right against the properties of the joint family
generally.”
(vi)
Mere right to maintenance without acquisition of title also
would not be sufficient to attract Section 14. Placing reliance
on the decision in case of Dindayal & Anr. vs. Rajaram2,
he submitted that before any property could be said to be
possessed by a Hindu Woman, as provided in Section
14(1)
of the Act of 1956, it has to be established that the woman
had a right to the possession of the property in question and
that she must have been in possession of such property
either actually or constructively.
(vii)
A Hindu Female having a right to maintenance would not
ipso facto create any charge on the property. A right to
maintenance may amount to a legal charge if such charge
is created either by an agreement between the parties or
by a decree. In this regard, Mr. Jain has relied upon the
2 (1970) 1 SCC 786
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ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
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provisions of Section 27 of the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956 and the decision in case of Sadhu
Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike3.
(viii) In the alternative, Mr. Jain submitted that the defendant
no.1- Bhonri Devi’s claims based on her right to
maintenance could be raised only qua the share of Shri
Ganeshnarayanji in the suit property which was to the extent
of 1/4th of the suit property, and the remaining 3/4th share in
the property belonged to the legitimate right of Daulalji and
his heirs, as a consequence of the adoption of Daulalji and
the Will dated 30.07.1949 executed by Harinarayanji in his
favour. He also submitted that the probate in respect of the
said Will was granted to the plaintiff Daulalji and that the
claim of rival Will set up by the defendant no. 1 Bhonri
Devi was negated by the Probate Court.
(ix)
Lastly, he submitted that the suit property being an ancestral
property of the appellants, it should have been kept within
their family and the present respondents who are the
nephews and niece of the deceased Bhonri Devi, could not
claim any right in the suit property.
7. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pallav Shishodia appearing
for the contesting respondents, supporting the findings recorded by the
High Court in the impugned order, made following submissions:
(i)
The exclusive possession of widow of HUF property itself
would create a presumption that such property was
earmarked for
realization of her pre-existing right of
maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-
parcener did not earmark any alternative property for
recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance. In this
regard, Mr. Shishodia has invited the attention of the Court
to the ratio laid down by this Court in case of Shrimati
Rani Bai vs. Shri Yadunandan Ram & Anr4 and the
judgments of Rajasthan High Court in case of Mst.
Gaumati Vs. Shankar Lal5 and Mool Kanwar Vs. Jeewa
Lal6.
3 (2006) 8 SCC 75
4 1969 (1) SCC 604
5 AIR 1974 Raj.147
6 AIR 1982 Raj.267
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(ii)
The exclusive possession of defendant Bhonri Devi, after
the death of Harinarayanji was never questioned by the
plaintiff Daulalji. The suit property was only about 1/4th of
the total HUF properties held by Harinarayanji and
Ganeshnarayanji, yielding nominal rentals just enough for
her sustenance, as compared to much bigger house at Purani
Basti, two shops at Chandpole and other properties taken
away by the original plaintiff-Daulalji.
(iii)
As regards the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Act of
1956, he submitted that the pre-existing right of maintenance
in favour of a widow would have remained only a lofty
right throughout her life without any vindication, and would
have remained fettered at the mercy of surviving co-
parceners, if the case of the plaintiff was accepted that the
said Bhonri Devi enjoyed the suit property only by way of
grace and concession of the plaintiff-Daulalji. Otherwise,
the very purpose of Section 14(1) of the Act, which was
enacted to confer absolute ownership on the Hindu widow
in settled possession of HUF property in lieu of her pre-
existing right of maintenance, would be frustrated. Mr.
Shishodia drew the attention of the Court to the various
observations made and findings recorded by this Court in
case of V. Tulasamma and Ors. vs. Sesha Reddy (Dead)
by Lrs7. According to him, once the pre-existing right was
recognized, the consequences of Section 14(1) cannot be
denied to a Hindu widow.
(iv)
The expression
“possession” contained in Section 14(1) is
required to be given the widest possible meaning to include
actual as well as constructive possession, like attornment
of tenants in the present case. Likewise, the expression
“acquire” is also required to be given a widest possible
meaning to include acquisition by possession, especially
when such possession of widow already satisfied her pre-
existing right of maintenance. To elaborate his submission,
Mr. Shishodia has placed reliance on the decision of this
Court in case of Bai Vajia (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Thakorbhai
Chelabhai and Others8.
7 (1977) 3 SCC 99
8 (1979) 3 SCC 300
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ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
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(v)
Till the death of Harinarayanji in 1953, he held HUF
properties as karta and the last surviving co-parcener in
the direct line. However, all the rights, title and interest of
Harinarayanji and his successor were subject to the pre-
existing right of maintenance in favour of Bhonri Devi and,
therefore, even Harinarayanji could not have bequeathed
more than whatever right, title or interest he had in the
HUF properties, by executing the Will, in view of Section
30 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The plaintiff Daulalji,
therefore, had also got the suit property as a legatee or co-
parcener subject to the limited estate of Bhonri Devi, whose
pre-existing right of maintenance from the suit property,
made her absolute owner after Section 14(1) of the Act of
1956 came into force.
Analysis:
8. Though number of issues were raised by the parties during the
course of trial before the Trial Court and during the course of the appeal
before the High Court, the learned Counsel Mr. Puneet Jain for the
appellants has not disputed before this court that Bhonri Devi had a right
of maintenance from the estate of her husband’s joint family. He also
has not disputed that Bhonri Devi was residing in the suit house since
the time Harinarayanji was alive i.e., prior to 11.11.1953, and that after
the death of Harinarayanji, Bhonri Devi continued to live in the said
house and was collecting the rent from the tenants who were occupying
part of the suit premises. However, Mr. Puneet Jain has seriously disputed
Bhonri Devi’s right to maintenance from the suit property alone. He has
disputed her claim of acquiring the suit property in lieu of her maintenance
for being a full owner, as contemplated in Section 14(1) of the Act.
According to him, vestige of interest against the property could not be
said to be the same as the vestige in the property. In absence of creation
of any charge or execution of a document recognising her right of
maintenance in the suit property, it could not be said that she had pre-
existing or limited ownership in the suit property.
9. Similarly, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shishodia for the
concerned respondents has also not pressed into service the contentions
raised by Bhonri Devi in the suit with regard to the plaintiff Daulalji
being a stranger to the joint family of her husband, and with regard to his
adoption by Sri Bakshji. He has also not pressed into service the issue
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with regard to the Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Daulalji.
However, Mr. Shishodia urged that all rights, title or interest of
Harinarayanji were subject to the pre-existing right of maintenance of
Bhonri Devi, and he could not have bequeathed by way of Will to Daulalji,
more than whatever right or interest he had in the suit property. Admittedly,
Bhonri Devi was in possession of the suit property and was collecting
the rent from the tenants occupying part of suit property. Therefore,
according to Mr. Shishodia, her settled possession of suit property in lieu
of her pre-existing right of maintenance, entitled her to become full owner
of the suit property in view of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956.
10. The main issue therefore, whether Bhonri Devi, the
predecessor of the present respondents had become an absolute owner
on coming into force the Act of 1956, revolves around the interpretation
of Section 14 thereof. It reads as under:
“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.—
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether
acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall
be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited
owner.
Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both
movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu
by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of
maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any
person, whether a relative or not, before,
at or after her
marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or
by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also
any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before
the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any
property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other
instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under
an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument
or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in
such property.”
11. From the plain reading of Section 14(1) along with the
Explanation thereto, it emerges that in order to become a full owner and
not a limited owner, of a property by virtue of Section 14(1), a female
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Hindu, before or after the commencement of Act of 1956, must be in
possession of the property, and it must have been acquired by her by
inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance, or arrears
of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not,
before, at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion or by
purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, or any
such property must have been held by her as stridhana immediately
before the commencement of the Act.
12. In the instant case, we are concerned with the claim of Bhonri
Devi of having become the full owner in respect of the suit property on
the ground that she was in settled legal possession of the suit property
before and after the commencement of the Act, in lieu of her pre-existing
right of maintenance, and such limited ownership right had fructified into
full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). The High Court while discussing
about the right of a Hindu widow to the property, has observed that the
Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 was in force in the year
1937 when Ganeshnarayanji, father-in-law of Bhonri Devi expired in
1938, and that even prior to the said Act of 1937, the right of Hindu
widow was recognised as per the old shastric customs prevalent in the
area. In our opinion, the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937
conferred right on Hindu widow to the property of her
husband, who
died after the commencement of the said Act of 1937 and not prior
thereto. Bhonri Devi’s husband Dhannalalji having expired in 1936, the
said Act of 1937 would not be applicable to facts of the case. However,
prior to the said Act of 1937, the right to maintenance of Hindu widow
was recognised in Shastric law. This court in case of V.Tulasamma
and other vs. Sesha Reddy(Dead) (supra) has elaborately  considered
the pre-existing right to maintenance of a Hindu woman while considering
the provisions of Section 14 of the said Act of 1956. Justice fazal Ali, as
he then was, after quoting the authorities on the subject and elucidating
the nature and extent of right of a Hindu wife to maintenance, summarised
the position in para 62 as under: -
“62. We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions
which we have reached after an exhaustive consideration of
the authorities mentioned above on the question of law
involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of Sections
14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be
stated thus:
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“(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an empty
formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of
grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property
which flows from the spiritual relationship between the
husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure
Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even by
the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu.
Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right
against property and the husband has a personal obligation
to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the
female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a
charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said
right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even
without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a
pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising
such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses
or confirms the pre-existing rights.
(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been
couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally
construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object
of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends sought
to be achieved by this long-needed legislation.
(3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso
and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation
of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be
construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main
provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a
way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main
provision.
(4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments,
decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new
titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no
application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to
confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In
such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally
permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in this sphere.
Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises
a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or
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partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-
section has absolutely no application and the female’s limited
interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one
by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any,
under the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a
property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of
maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken
out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by
Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers
of the transferee.
(5) The use of express terms like ‘property acquired by a female
Hindu at a partition’, ‘or in lieu of maintenance’, ‘or arrears
of maintenance’, etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1)
clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories
which have been expressly excepted from the operation of
sub-section (2).
(6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the Legislature in Section
14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the
state of owning a property even though the owner is not in
actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a
widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree
before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but
had not been given actual possession under a final decree,
the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by
force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the
property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the
widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right
or title, because the section does not contemplate the
possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.
(7) That the words ‘restricted estate’ used in Section 14(2)
are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1)
and they include not only limited interest, but also any other
kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”
13. Following the said observations made in the case of
V.Tulasamma (supra), this court in Raghubar Singh & Ors vs Gulab
Singh & Ors9 held as under:
9 (1998) 6 SCC 314
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“22. The judgment in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] has
held the field till date. (See also with advantage: Ram
Kali v. Choudhri Ajit Shankar [(1997) 9 SCC 613]
and Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli Pedda
Verrappa [(1997) 10 SCC 673].)
23. Thus, we find that there is enough authority for the
proposition that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female
is a pre-existing right, which existed in the Hindu law long
before the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 came into force and
is not a creation of those statutes, which only recognised that
position. In the words of Fazal Ali, J. in Tulasamma
case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] : (SCC p. 135, para 62)
“(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an
empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a
matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against
property which flows from the spiritual relationship between
the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by
pure Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even
by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to
Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a
right against property and the husband has a personal
obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has
property, the female has the legal right to be maintained
therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a
female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At
any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is
doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring
or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but
merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.”
24. Accordingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a
Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship
between the husband and the wife and that right in the case
of a widow is “a pre-existing right”, which existed under
the Shastric Hindu law long before the passing of the 1937
or the 1946 Acts. Those Acts merely recognised the position
as was existing under the Shastric Hindu law and gave it a
“statutory” backing. Where a Hindu widow is in possession
of the property of her husband, she has a right to be
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maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain the possession
of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance.
25. Explaining the meaning of the expression “possessed” as
used by the legislature in Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act
in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] this Court held: (SCC
p. 136, para 62)
“(6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the legislature in
Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include
the state of owning a property even though the owner is not
in actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a
widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree
before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but
had not been given actual possession under a final decree,
the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by
force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the
property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the
widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right
or title, because the section does not contemplate the
possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.”
26. It is by force of Section 14(1) of the Act, that the widow’s
limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute
right notwithstanding any restriction placed under the
document or the instrument. So far as sub-section (2) of
Section 14 is concerned, it applies to instruments, decrees,
awards, gifts, etc., which create an
independent or a new title
in favour of the female for the first time. It has no application
to cases where the instrument/document either declares or
recognises or confirms her share in the property or her “pre-
existing right to maintenance” out of that property. As held
in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] sub-section (2) of
Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its
own, without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1)
of the Act.”
14. In view of the above, there remains no shadow of doubt that
a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance was not and is not an empty
formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and
generosity. It is a tangible right against the property, which flows from
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the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife. The said
right was recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law, which
existed even before the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those
Acts merely gave statutory backing recognising the position as was
existing under the Shastric Hindu Law. Where a Hindu widow is in
possession of the property of her husband or of the husband’s HUF, she
has a right to be maintained out of the said property. She is entitled to
retain the possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance.
Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto envisages liberal construction
in favour of the females, with the object of advancing and promoting the
socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by the said legislation. As
explained in V. Tulasamma (supra) case, the words “possessed by”
used in Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include
the state of owning a property, even though the Hindu woman is not in
actual or physical possession of the same. Of course, it is equally well
settled that the possession of the widow, must be under some vestige of
a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the
possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.
15. The undisputed facts in the instant case are that Dhannalalji,
the husband of Bhonri Devi expired in 1936, Ganeshnarayanji, the father-
in-law of Bhonri Devi expired in 1938 and Harinarayanji, the brother of
Ganeshnarayanji died on 11.11.1953. Daulalji was adopted by Sri Bakshji
in the year 1916. Harinarayanji, Ganeshnarayanji and Sri Bakshji had
common ancestor Gopalji. It is also not disputed that the suit property
was an ancestral property in the hands of Harinarayanji and
Ganeshnarayanji. It is also not disputed that Bhonri Devi was staying in
the suit property before the death of Harinarayanji, and after his death
she was in possession and in charge of the said property, and was
maintaining herself by collecting rent from the tenants who were
occupying part of the suit property.
16. Now it appears from the documents on record that the rent
notes (Exhibit A-2 to A-11) executed during the period 1955 to 1965 in
respect of the part of the suit property, were executed in the name of
Bhonri Devi. The concerned defendants in the suit had also filed their
written statements, stating that they were paying rent to Bhonri Devi
only. It further appears from the document (Exhibit A-13) that Daulalji
had raised an objection against Bhonri Devi paying the house tax in
respect of the suit property and that the Municipal Commissioner, Jaipur
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vide order dated 28.03.1957 had observed that Bhonri Devi was paying
the tax in the past also. An appeal against the said order was preferred
by Daulalji before the Administrator of Municipal Council, Jaipur however
the same was also rejected vide the order dated 28.01.1959. It was
observed therein that “In this case there is a dispute regarding ownership.
Municipal Commissioner who is the reversing authority in his judgment
dated 28.03.1957 held that Bhonri Devi who was paying tax to the
municipality in the past, should pay the tax and for question of title the
concerned party should seek remedy in the Civil Courts.”
17. From the said documents it clearly emerges that Bhonri Devi
was paying the house tax prior to 1956 and was collecting the rent from
the tenants prior to and after 1956. Pertinently from the document Exhibit-
54, it emerges that in 1940 Bhonri Devi, when she was staying with her
in-laws, had no source of maintenance, and therefore she was granted
Rs. 2.50 per month by way of maintenance, by the Punya Department
of the Government. She claiming to be a PARDANASHEEN lady had
authorised Daulalji to collect the said amount of maintenance. The said
document clearly shows that Bhonri Devi was residing in the suit house
since 1940. Be that as it may, it was well established that Bhonri devi
was in possession of the suit house before and after the death of
Harinarayanji in 1953 and had continued to remain in
possession thereafter
and was collecting rent from the tenants who were in occupation of part
of the suit premises since 1955, till the date of filing of the suit in 1965 by
the plaintiff Daulalji.
18. The afore-stated facts and circumstances clearly established
that Bhonri devi had long settled possession of the suit property, which
she had acquired in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, prior to
the commencement of the Act of 1956, which entitled her to become a
full owner of the suit property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the said Act.
Her exclusive possession of suit property after the death of Harinarayanji
in 1953 i.e., prior to coming into force of the said Act in 1956, was not
only not disputed but was admitted by the plaintiff Daulalji in the plaint
itself. Her pre-existing right to maintenance from the estate of the HUF
of her husband was also well established. The submission of Mr. Jain
for the appellants that mere right to maintenance would not ipso facto
create any charge on the property and that for creating legal charge
recognising right of Hindu women to maintenance required execution of
a document, device or agreement, cannot be countenanced. Her pre-
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existing right to maintenance, coupled with her settled legal possession
of the property, would be sufficient to create a presumption that she had
a vestige of right or claim in the property, though no document was
executed or specific charge was created in her favour recognizing her
right to maintenance in the property.
19. It may be noted that in the Will executed by Harinarayanji in
favour of Daulalji, there was no mention of the suit property. What was
stated in the Will was that whatever movable and immovable property,
which belonged to Harinarayanji would be devolved upon Daulalji. It
was only in the Probate proceedings filed by Daulalji in respect of the
said Will, he had shown the suit property in the Schedule. It is true that
the objections raised by Bhonri Devi against granting of Probate in favour
of Daulalji were not accepted by the Probate Court, and the alleged Will
executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Bhonri Devi was also not proved
by her in the said proceedings. Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing
right to maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and in
view of her exclusive settled possession of the suit property prior to and
after the commencement of the Act of 1956, the only conclusion which
could be drawn, would be that Bhonri Devi had acquired the suit property
in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, and that she had held the
suit property as the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section
14(1) of the said Act of 1956.
20. As stated earlier, Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a
tangible right against the property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and the wife. Such right was recognized
and enjoined under the Shastric Hindu Law, long before the passing of
the 1937 and the 1946 Acts. Where a Hindu widow is found to be in
exclusive settled legal possession of the HUF property, that itself would
create a presumption that such property was earmarked for realization
of her pre-existing right of maintenance, more particularly when the
surviving co-parcener did not earmark any alternative property for
recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance. The word “possessed
by” and “acquired” used in Section 14(1) are of the widest amplitude
and include the state of owning a property. It is by virtue of Section
14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu widow’s limited interest gets
automatically enlarged into an absolute right, when such property is
possessed by her whether acquired before or after the commencement
of 1956 Act in lieu of her right to maintenance.
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21. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High
Court had rightly held that Bhonri Devi had pre-existing right to
maintenance in the suit property that had ripened into full ownership by
virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956.
22. The present appeal being devoid of merits is dismissed.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)