RAM LAL versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 808, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 808 : 2023 INSC 1047
808
CASE DETAILS
RAM LAL
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7935 of 2023)
DECEMBER 4, 2023
[J. K. MAHESHWARI AND K.V. VISWANATHAN, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the dismissal of the appellant-
constable from service pursuant to the departmental enquiry was justiﬁ ed; 
and what is the eﬀ ect of the acquittal, ordered by the appellate judge in the 
criminal trial, on the order of dismissal passed in the departmental enquiry.
Service law – Dismissal from service pursuant to the departmental 
enquiry on allegation of commission of fraud – Justiﬁ cation – Eﬀ ect 
of acquittal ordered by the appellate judge in the criminal trial, on 
the order of dismissal – Allegation against the appellant-constable 
of altering his date of birth in his 8th standard marksheet to project 
himself as having attained majority at the time of recruitment to 
the post – Initiation of departmental proceeding – Dismissal from 
service – Conviction and sentence of the appellant u/s. 420 IPC by the 
trial court, however, acquittal by the appellate court – Writ petition 
seeking quashing of the dismissal order and re-instatement in service 
– Dismissed by the High Court – Correctness:
Held: Inference drawn about the proof of the charges by ignoring 
the relevant and material evidence being  the deposition of the prosecution 
witness, the marksheet of 8th class of the appellant enclosed in the 
chargesheet and the original marksheet which
have direct bearing on the 
charge – Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority merely reiterated 
the reasoning in the enquiry report – Explanation given by the appellant 
that overwriting in the application form was only due to correction of 
an inadvertent error is accepted – As long as the original 8th standard
809
marksheet reflected his date of birth as 21.04.1972 and there is no 
correction or manipulation in that document, the appellant cannot 
be penalised – Furthermore, reading of the entire judgment clearly 
indicates that the appellant was acquitted after full consideration of the 
prosecution evidence and after noticing that the prosecution miserably 
failed to prove the charge – Findings of the appellate judge in the 
criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant 
was not just, “not proved”, in fact the charge even stood “disproved” 
by the very prosecution evidence – Charges were not just similar 
but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all 
the same – Thus, the order of termination, the order of the appellate 
authority, the orders refusing to reconsider and review the penalty, 
being illegal and untenable, are quashed – Judgment of the High Court 
is set aside – Issuance of direction to re-instate the appellant with all 
consequential benefits including 50% of the backwages.
Judicial review – Order of the Disciplinary Authority – Power 
of writ court to review:
Held: Is very limited – Scope of enquiry is only to examine 
whether the decision-making process is legitimate – Courts are entitled 
to consider whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority have 
ignored material evidence and if so the courts can interfere – Mere 
acquittal by a criminal court would not confer on the employee a right 
to claim any benefit,
including reinstatement – However, if the charges 
in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or 
similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and 
the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension – Court would 
be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that 
allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand would 
be unjust, unfair and oppressive. [Para 11-13]
Words and phrases – Expressions “benefit of doubt” and 
“honorably acquitted”, used in judgments – Effect:
Held: Said expressions are not to be understood as magic 
incantations – Court of law will not be carried away by the mere use 
of such terminology – Court in judicial review is obliged to examine 
RAM LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
810
the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression 
used. [Para 25]
Evidence Act, 1872 – Fact, when said to be ‘disproved’:
Held: A fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering 
the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or 
considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under 
the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition 
that it does not exist – Fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither 
“proved” nor “disproved”. [Para 26]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
G. M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others (2006) 5 SCC 446 – 
relied on.
State Bank of India v. A.G.D. Reddy 2023:INSC : 766 = 2023 
(11) Scale 530; United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee 
2022:INSC:117 = (2022) 13 SCC 329; Deputy Inspector General of 
Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598; State Bank 
of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657; Vijayee Singh and 
Others v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7935 
of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2018 of the High Court 
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SA No.484 of 2011.
Appearances:
Adarsh Priyadarshi, Abhijeet Sinha, Sarthak Gaurav, Ms. Rimmi 
Bharadwaj, Advs. for the Appellant.
Vishal Meghwal, Mrs. Padhmalakshmi Iyenger, Ms. Neha Kapoor, 
Milind
Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
811
RAM LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
K.V. VISWANATHAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Ram Lal (the appellant) was a Constable with the Rajasthan Armed 
Constabulary, 9th Battalion, Jodhpur.  He was appointed on 15.12.1991.  A 
First Information Report (F.I.R.) was registered on 2.9.2002 against him 
under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC.  Soon thereafter, on 
02.04.2003, a chargesheet in a departmental enquiry was also issued.  
3. The identical allegation in both the proceedings was that the 
Appellant altered his date of birth from 21.04.1974 to 21.04.1972 in his 8th 
standard marksheet.  It was alleged that this was done to project himself 
as having attained majority at the time of the recruitment.  The appellant 
denied the charges.
4.  Asked about the overwriting in the application, the appellant stated 
that it was possible that in the application form he might have written 
initially as 21.04.1974 and thereafter corrected it to 21.04.1972. He however 
maintained that his date of birth was 21.04.1972.
5.  Five witnesses were examined in the departmental proceeding. 
These very ﬁ ve witnesses were also examined in the criminal trial, apart 
from eight other witnesses who were also examined at the criminal trial.  The 
Enquiry Oﬃ  cer in the departmental proceeding found the charges proved 
and the Disciplinary Authority, by an order of 31.03.2004, dismissed the 
appellant from service.  The Appellate Authority also
dismissed the appeal. 
Attempts to have the order reviewed and the penalty reconsidered were also 
in vain.
6. At the criminal trial, the trial Court convicted the appellant for 
the oﬀ ence under Section 420 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo 
three years’ imprisonment along-with a ﬁ ne of Rs.5,000/-.  However, the 
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jodhpur [‘Appellate Judge’], vide 
judgment dated 24.08.2007, allowed the criminal appeal and acquitted the 
appellant.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
812
7. The appellant, thereafter, represented for his reinstatement. 
Subsequently, he ﬁ led a writ petition in August, 2008 for quashing the 
dismissal order dated 31.03.2004, the order of the Appellate Authority, and 
the orders refusing to review and reconsider the above-said orders.  
8.  The learned Single Judge, by his judgment dated 13.08.2008, 
dismissed the writ petition by holding that the standard of proof in a criminal 
proceeding and departmental proceeding is diﬀ erent.  The learned Single Judge 
found no inﬁ rmity in the order of the Disciplinary Authority.  The writ appeal 
ﬁ led by the appellant has also been dismissed by reiterating the ﬁ ndings of 
the learned Single Judge and by further elucidating as to how the parameters 
for a judicial review against an order in a departmental proceeding are limited 
and circumscribed.  Being aggrieved, the appellant is in appeal before us.
Questions for consideration:
9. The following two questions arise for consideration:
a) Whether the dismissal of the appellant from service pursuant to the 
departmental enquiry was justiﬁ ed?
b) On the facts of the case, what is the eﬀ ect of the acquittal, ordered 
by the Appellate Judge in the criminal trial, on the order of dismissal 
passed in the departmental enquiry?
10. We have heard Mr. Adarsh Priyadarshi, learned counsel for the 
appellant and Mr. Vishal Meghwal, learned counsel for the State. Learned 
counsels have reiterated their
contentions before the Courts below.
Legal Position:
11. We have examined both the questions independently.  We are 
conscious of the fact that a writ court’s power to review the order of the 
Disciplinary Authority is very limited. The scope of enquiry is only to 
examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate.  [See State Bank 
of India vs. A.G.D. Reddy, 2023:INSC:766 = 2023 (11) Scale 530]. As part 
of that exercise, the courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled 
to consider whether the ﬁ ndings of the Disciplinary Authority have ignored 
material evidence and if it so ﬁ nds, courts are not powerless to interfere. 
[See United Bank of India vs. Biswanath Bhattacharjee, 2022:INSC:117 
= (2022) 13 SCC 329]
813
RAM LAL V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
12. We are also conscious of the fact that mere acquittal by a criminal 
court will not confer on the employee a right to claim any beneﬁ t, including 
reinstatement.  (See Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. 
Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598). 
13. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the 
criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and 
circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a diﬀ erent 
dimension. If the court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the 
criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence 
and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in 
judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances.  The court will be 
entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing 
the ﬁ ndings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair 
and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. [See G.M. Tank vs. 
State of Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446, State Bank of Hyderabad 
vs. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 and S. Samuthiram (supra)]
Discussion:
Validity of the Disciplinary proceeding – Question No. 1:
14. A brief analysis of the facts of the case is essential. The origin of 
this dispute, which does not inspire conﬁ dence at all, is as follows. The 
appellant’s cousin Shravan Lal (PW-4 in the departmental enquiry and 
PW-6 in
the criminal case), deposed as under before the enquiry oﬃ  cer :- 
“Stated on enquiry that about 13 months ago, I was operating engine 
at Well. On that day at about 3.00 p.m., Ramlal after drinking liquor, 
came at well and switched oﬀ  the engine. Thereafter, Ramlal abused 
me and scuﬄ  ed with me and said that today I will operate the engine 
and you cannot do anything to me. I have received job by fooling 
the Government. When I enquired him that how you did that, then, 
Ramlal told me that I have received job by altering my date of birth 
as 21.04.1972 in my marksheet, whereas, my date of birth was 
21.04.1974. Thereafter I went to school and enquired about this fact, 
whereupon I came to know that his date of birth was 21.04.1974. Due 
to this reason, I produced an application before the Superintendent of 
Police, Ajmer and made one report to the Commandant, 9th Battalion,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
814
RAC, Tonk and I also made one report to the Hon’ble Chief Minister 
and one report to DIG, RAC, Rajasthan, Jaipur…..”
An F.I.R. was registered on 02.09.2002. A charge-sheet in the 
departmental proceeding was issued on 02.04.2003. It will be relevant to 
extract the two charges in the disciplinary proceedings:
“Charge No.1 :-
In the year 1991, an application for appointment on the post of 
constable was made by you, alongwith which, Marksheet of 8th pass 
issued by Government Secondary School, Tiloniya (Ajmer), bearing 
Roll No. 323 and Admission No. 2314, in which, your date of birth 
was mentioned as 21.04.1974, but you by altering it to 21.04.1972, 
fraudulently got recruited on the post of Constable.
Charge No.2:-
As a result of altering your date of birth from 21.04.1974 to 21.04.1972 
in the Marksheet issued by the Government Secondary School, Tiloniya 
(Ajmer), Crime No. 183/02 under Section 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC was 
registered against you in P.S. Mandor, District -Jodhpur.”
15. Five witnesses were examined in the departmental enquiry, namely, 
PW-1 Jagdish Chand, Principal in Government Secondary School, Village 
Tiloniya, PW-2 Bhawani Singh (constable who was tasked to bring the 
school records), PW-3 Karan Sharma, who was Circle Oﬃ  cer and had 
recorded the statement of Shravan Lal; PW-4 Shravan Lal and PW-5 Raj 
Singh who conducted the investigation of the criminal case. 
16. The evidence of PW-5/Raj Singh, as set out
in the enquiry report 
taken as it is, is signiﬁ cant since he clearly disproved the charge. He stated 
the following in the cross-examination before the enquiry oﬃ  cer:
“Raj Singh you conducted investigation of Crime No. 102  and sent the 
copy to Commandant, 9th Battalion, RAC, Tonk, what documents you 
sent alongwith the same - The documents which were sent by me were 
copy of FIR, copy of chargesheet which was submitted in the Court 
and   statements of witnesses recorded during the investigation and 
documents; whose photocopies were also given to the accused. Whether 
you had sent the copies of statements recorded in the aforesaid case to
815
the Commandant - I did not send the copies to Commandant Sahab. 
Which officer had submitted the chargesheet, order of result in 
the Court – the then SHO of P.S. Mandor, District - Jodhpur City 
namely Sh. Ram Pratap submitted result of investigation, order 
and chargesheet against the accused, in the Court.”
During the investigation, you had recorded statements of 
Dharmendra Kumar Jatav and Jairam Gurjar, did you record more 
statements and whether you would identify the copies of those 
statements - Yes, I recorded the statement of witnesses as it is. 
And I am producing herewith the statements of both the aforesaid 
witnesses. Whether those have been written by yourself - Yes, 
those statements have been written by me, which are Exh. D-1 and 
Exh. D-2. In Exh. D-1, I recorded statement of Teacher namely 
Rakishan Dev Murari on A to B part and I filled the marksheet 
of Ramlal, wherein, date of birth of Ramlal is mentioned as 
21.04.1972 in C to D part, which has been written as per the 
dictation of Checking Teacher Ramkishan Dev Murari. Date of 
birth of 21.07.1972 mentioned on E to F part, was not mentioned 
in deliberate manner, in fact, same has been written due to the 
human error, whether you are agree with this statement - This 
statement is correct, whereas, at the time of filling up form for 
recruitment in Police RAC, Ramlal could enclose T.C. of 9th Pass, 
and he was studying in 10th class.”
Thereafter, referring to the Exh. D-2 [Statement of Jairam
Gurjar], 
he deposed as under:-
“Similarly, in Exh. D-2, on A to· B part, you have shown me the 
photocopy of 8th class marksheet of Ramlal S/o Sh. Tejuram 
Chaudhary, R/o Tiloniya, on which, signatures of it’s issuer 
i.e. Teacher namely Sh. Dharmendra Kumar, Ramkishan Dev 
Murari and Headmaster Sh. Vishnu Miyani are mentioned. I am 
acquainted with their signatures.”
17. Most importantly dealing with the 8th class marksheet of 
the appellant, which formed the basis for his application seeking 
appointment as Constable, PW-5/Raj Singh stated as under:-
RAM LAL V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
816
“The 8th class marksheet of Ramlal enclosed in the documents, which 
is Exh. P-3, (sic) in which, whether any alteration has been found in the 
date of birth anywhere, and whether date of birth has been mentioned as 
21.04.1972 therein - Yes, no alteration has been made in the marksheet 
of 8th class and date of birth is 21.04.1972.”
18. It is very clear from the above that no alteration was found in 
the Appellant’s 8th class marksheet (which forms part of the enclosed 
documents sent to the Commandant) and the date of birth mentioned on it was 
21.04.1972.  Reference to ‘P-3’ in the above extract appears to be a mistake. 
The chargesheet and documents enclosed were Ex. P-12/1 to P-12/12. The 
defence also exhibited the original 8th class marksheet separately as Exh. 
D-3, as is clear from the chart of Exhibits set out in the enquiry report.
19. The Enquiry Oﬃ  cer, after setting out the depositions of the 
witnesses, set out the chart of the “P” series Exhibits and the Exhibits of 
the delinquent, namely the “D” series, and without any further discussion or 
marshaling of the evidence recorded the following with regard to charge-1: 
“On perusal of statement of witnesses namely PW-1 PW-2, PW-3, 
PW-4, PW-5 and Exh. P-1 to P-12, it is clear that correct date of birth 
of delinquent constable was 21.04.1974. When, delinquent constable 
submitted application for recruitment on the post of Constable, at 
that time, he did not complete
the age of 18 years, therefore, due to 
the apprehension of rejection of his application due to the less age, 
delinquent constable has altered his date of birth as 21.04.1972 from 
21.04.1974, therefore, Charge No.1 stands proved. 
Delinquent Constable has also passed 10th class, whose marksheet 
is Exh. P-4, in which, his date of birth is mentioned as 21.04.1974.”
In so far as charge-2 was concerned, it was merely noticed that challan 
had been ﬁ led in the criminal case as on 28.02.2004, the date of enquiry 
report, and that the trial had not concluded.
20. In the operative part of the enquiry report under the head, 
‘conclusions’, there is no reference to the 8th class marksheet, (which 
was part of the enclosed documents sent by Constable Raj Singh with the 
chargesheet) or to Exh.D-3 [the original 8th class marksheet] exhibited by 
the defence. There is also no reference to the statement of Raj Singh PW-5
817
in the enquiry, who had acknowledged that there was no alteration in the 
marksheet of the 8th class.  What is referred to in the chart of exhibits are 
letter of Jagdish Chand (Ex.P1); the duplicate marksheet of 8th class issued 
by Jagdish Chand (Ex.P2); the statement of Shravan Lal (Ex-P3); 10th 
class marksheet of Secondary Education Board Rajasthan, Ajmer, (Ex.P4); 
preliminary enquiry dated 16.10.2002 by Circle Oﬃ  cer, Kishangarh (Ex.
P5); FIR No. 183/2000, (Ex.P6); application submitted by Ram Lal for 
recruitment to the post of constable (Ex.P-7); letter of appointment dated 
08.11.1991 (ExP-8); veriﬁ cation letter ﬁ led by Ramlal (Ex.P9); appointment 
order dated 16.12.1991, (Ex-P-10); letter of Government School Tiloniya, 
Ex.P-11; and chargesheet dated 24.04.2003, Ex.P-12.
21. It is very clear that relevant and material evidence being, the 
deposition of PW-5/Raj Singh; the marksheet of 8th class of the appellant 
[enclosed to the chargesheet] and the original marksheet independently 
marked as Ex. D3 by the defence have been completely left out in the 
discussion and consideration.  Inference has been drawn about the proof 
of the charges by ignoring crucial, relevant and material evidence which 
had come on record.  The evidence of PW-5 Raj Singh and the marksheet 
enclosed in the documents annexed to the chargesheet and the original 
marksheet marked as Ex. D-3, were materials having a direct bearing on the 
charge. The Disciplinary Authority has merely
reiterated the reasoning in the 
enquiry report.  Equally so are the ﬁ ndings of the appellate authority.  It is 
well settled that if the ﬁ ndings of the disciplinary authorities are arrived at 
after ignoring the relevant material the court in judicial review can interfere. 
It is only to satisfy ourselves to this extent, that we have scrutinized the 
material to see as to what was reﬂ ected in the record. We are satisﬁ ed that 
the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated and deserves to be quashed. 
22. In this scenario, we are inclined to accept the explanation given 
by the appellant that overwriting in the application form was only due 
to correction of an inadvertent error. As long as the original 8th standard 
marksheet reﬂ ected his date of birth as 21.04.1972 and there is no correction 
or manipulation in that document, the appellant cannot be penalised.
Eﬀ ect of Acquittal in the Criminal Proceeding – Question No. 2:
23. With this above background, if we examine the criminal proceedings 
the following factual position emerges.  The very same witnesses, who were 
RAM LAL V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
818
examined in the departmental enquiry were examined in the criminal trial. 
Jagdish Chandra, Bhawani Singh, Shravan Lal, Raj Singh and Karan Sharma 
were examined as PW2, PW3, PW6, PW9 and PW13 respectively at the 
criminal trial. Apart from them, eight other witnesses were also examined. 
The gravamen of the charge in the criminal case was that the appellant had 
submitted an application for recruitment along with his marksheet and he, 
by making alteration in his date of birth to reﬂ ect the same as 24.04.1972 
in place of 21.04.1974, and obtained recruitment to the post of Constable. 
Though the Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 420 of IPC, 
the Appellate Court recorded the following crucial ﬁ ndings while acquitting 
the appellant:
“….Mainly the present case was based on the documents to 
this eﬀ ect whether the date of birth of accused is 21.04.1972 or 
21.04.1974. Exh. P-3 is original Marksheet, in which, the date 
of birth of accused has been shown as 21.04.1972 and same has 
also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the 
prosecution. Whatever the documents have been produced before 
the Court regarding the date of birth of 21.04.1974 are either the 
letters of Principal or are Duplicate T.C. or Marksheets. Neither 
the prosecution has produced any such original documents in the 
Subordinate Court to this eﬀ ect that when the admission form of 
accused was ﬁ lled, what date of birth was mentioned
by the accused 
in it, what was the date of birth in Roll Register of School, what 
date  of birth was mentioned by accused in the Examination Form 
of Secondary, and nor after bringing the original records from the 
concerned witnesses, same were got proved in the evidence. In 
these circumstances, this fact becomes doubtful that date of birth 
of accused was 21.04.1974, and accused is entitled to receive it’s 
beneﬁ t. In the considered opinion of this Court, the conviction 
made by the Ld. Subordinate Court merely on the basis of oral 
evidences and letters or duplicate documents, is not just and proper. 
It is justiﬁ able to acquit the accused.
Resultantly, on the basis of aforesaid consideration, the present 
appeal ﬁ led by the Appellant/Accused is liable to be allowed.”
[Emphasis supplied]
819
24. What is important to notice is that the Appellate Judge has clearly 
recorded that in the document Exh. P-3 – original marksheet of the 8th standard, 
the date of birth was clearly shown as 21.04.1972 and the other documents 
produced by the prosecution were either letters or a duplicate marksheet. No 
doubt, the Appellate Judge says that it becomes doubtful whether the date of 
birth was 21.04.1974 and that the accused was entitled to receive its beneﬁ t. 
However, what we are supposed to see is the substance of the judgment. A 
reading of the entire judgment clearly indicates that the appellant was acquitted 
after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and after noticing that the 
prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge [See S. Samuthiram 
(Supra).]
25. Expressions like “beneﬁ t of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”, used 
in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations.  A court of law 
will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology.  In the present 
case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Exh. P-3, the original marksheet 
carries the date of birth as 21.04.1972 and the same has also been proved by 
the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution.  The conclusion that 
the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the 
prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the 
charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety.  The 
court
in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment 
and not go by the form of expression used.
26. We are satisﬁ ed that the ﬁ ndings of the appellate judge in the criminal 
case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not 
proved” - in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution 
evidence.  As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after 
considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist 
or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does 
not exist.  A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor 
“disproved” [See Vijayee Singh and Others v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190].
27. We are additionally satisﬁ ed that in the teeth of the ﬁ nding of the 
appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon 
cannot be allowed to stand.  The charges were not just similar but identical and 
the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same.  This is a case 
RAM LAL V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
820
where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary 
authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, 
unfair and oppressive.  This case is very similar to the situation that arose in 
G.M. Tank (supra). 
28. Apart from the above, one other aspect is to be noted. The Enquiry 
Oﬃ  cer’s report makes a reference to the appellant passing 10th standard, and 
to a 10th standard marksheet exhibited as Exh. P-4 referring to the date of birth 
as 24.07.1974. Jagdish Chandra-PW1 (in the departmental enquiry) clearly 
deposed that since the appellant was regularly absent from Class 10, his name 
was struck oﬀ  and he did not even pass 10th standard.   The appellant has also 
come out with this version before the disciplinary authority, stating that the 
10th class certiﬁ cate of Ram Lal produced before the Enquiry Oﬃ  cer, is of 
some other Ram Lal. 
29. This issue need not detain us any further because it is not the case 
of department that the appellant sought employment based on 10th standard 
marksheet.  It is their positive case that the appellant sought employment on 
the basis of his 8th standard marksheet. Shravan Lal-PW-4 in the departmental 
enquiry had also furnished the 10th standard marksheet procured from the 
Secondary Education Board, Ajmer. In cross-examination, on being asked, he 
admitted that the appellant was recruited on the basis of 8th standard marksheet, 
and he
admitted that there was no alteration in the 8th standard marksheet. 
30. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated 
31.03.2004; the order of the Appellate Authority dated 08.10.2004; the orders 
dated 29.03.2008 and 25.06.2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty 
respectively, are all illegal and untenable.  
31. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the D.B. Special Appeal 
(Writ) No.484/2011 dated 05.09.2018. We direct that the appellant shall 
be reinstated with all consequential beneﬁ ts including seniority, notional 
promotions, ﬁ tment of salary and all other beneﬁ ts. As far as backwages are 
concerned, we are inclined to award the appellant 50% of the backwages. The 
directions be complied with within a period of four weeks from today.
32. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.
Headnotes prepared by: 
Appeal allowed.
Nidhi Jain