MUMTAZ @ MUNTYAZ versus STATE OF U.P. (NOW UTTARAKHAND)
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 434, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Facts
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[2016] 3 S.C.R. 434 
MUMTAZ @ MUNTYAZ 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. (NOW UTTARAKHAND) 
(Criminal Appeal No. 2084 of2009) 
JULYl,2016 
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ] 
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 rw. s. 34 - Death of victim-
informant 's nephew on sustaining burn injuries - FIR by informant-
PW 1 that he along with his other nephew-PW 2 ll'itnessed appellant 
and his associates setting his nephew on fire - PW 1 and 2 rushed 
there and put quilt on the victim - Recording of the dying declaration 
of the victim by SDM-PW 5 that the appellants had set him on fire -
Certificate by PW 8-doctor that victim was in a '/it state of mind to 
give declaration - Thereafter, victim succumbed to· burn injuries -
Conviction and sentence u/s. 302134 by the courts below relying 
upon the testimony of PW 1 and 2 as well as the cMng declaration 
- On appeal, held: Even if the eyewitness account is taken to be 
inconsistent with the part of the dying declaration, once the dying 
declaration is found reliable, trustworthy and consistent with 
circumstantial evidence on record, such dying declaration by itself 
is adequate to bring home the· case against the accused - On facts, 
evidence of SDM-PW 5 and doctor-PW 8 found trustworthy and 
dying declaration held to be reliable - Defence of alleged grave 
provocation cannot be accepted since the victims was found with 
his hand tied - Thus, order of conviction and sentence of appellant-
M by the courts below upheld - As regards
appellant-D, since ·he 
was juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act on the day of occurrence and 
guilty of offence ivith which he was tried, sentence of life 
imprisonment set aside and matter remitted to the Jurisdictional 
Juvenile Justice Board for determining the appropriate quantum of 
fine- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. 
Disposing of the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 PW-5-SDM clearly stated that all through the 
recording of his statement, the victim remained in fit condition 
and that the witness had got this fact confirmed from the Doctor 
on duty; The dying declaration bears appropriate endorsement 
434
MUMTAZ@ MUNTYAZ v. STATE OF U.P, (NOW 
UTTARAKHAND) 
of the Doctor on duty which endorsement was proved by PW-8-
doctor. There is nothing in ·the cross examination of either PW-5 
or PW-8 nor in the dying declaration which could -raise any doubt. 
The evidence in that behalf is trustworthy and· the dying 
declaration is held to be reliable. [Para 14] [442-C~DJ 
1.2 It is true that the victim was found at 3:00 a.m. in the 
house of the brother of appellant-M .. The eye witness account 
shows that his hands were tied and he was set ablaze. The 
memorandum of the seizure of burnt shawl clearly corroborates 
said assertion. Therefore, mere presence of the victim in the 
house of the brother of appellant itself does not support the theory 
of grave provocation specially when the victim was found with 
his hands tied. Not a single witness was examined "on behalf of 
the defence nor is there any material to support such theory. 
What kind of provocation and in what manner was if made are all 
matters of evidence, which are completely absent on ·record. [Para 
15] [442-F-G] 
1.3 It is true that in the dying dedaration the deceased had 
stated that he did not know the person who extinguished the fire 
by pouri'ng water. It could be that while he was. in flame~, the 
deceased could not identify the pers~n who tried to save him. 
The prompt lodging of the FIR arid the fact that one pf the 
eyewitnesses was having burn injuries establishes the presence 
of the eyewitnesses. In any case,
even if the eyew.itn~ss account 
is taken to be inconsistent with this part of die dying declaration, 
once the dying declaration is found reliable, trustworthy and 
consistent with circumstantial evidence on record, such dying 
declaration by itself is adequate to bring home. the ca,se against 
the accused. [Para 16] f 443-A-B] 
lA Having gone through the material on record, there is 
no reason to upset the findings recordi;d by the trial court and 
the High Court regarding conviction and sentence of appellant-
M. [Para 17] [443-C] 
2.1 As regards D, the District and Sessions Judge, was 
directed to cause inquiry with regard to juvenility of the appellant. 
The report clearly shows that on considering the entirety of the 
matter the claim was found to be acceptable. On the date of 
occurrence D was more than 16 years of age but less than 18 
years of age. In terms of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 which 
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was in force at that time, he was not a juvenile and was rightly 
tried and convicted by the trial court. While the appeal against 
his conviction and sentence was pending, on and with effect from 
1.04.2001, the 2000 Act came into force which repealed the 1986 
Act. The 2000 Act inter alia raised the age of juvenility from 16 
to 18 years and in terms of Section 20 of the 2000 Act, the 
determination of Juvenility was required to be done in all pending 
matters in accordance with Section 2(1) of the 2000 Act. [Paras 
18, 19) (443-B-G) 
2.2 In terms of Section 20 of the 2000 Act, in all cases where 
the accused was above 16 years but below 18 years of age on the 
date of occurrence, the proceedings pending in the court would 
continue and be taken to the logical end subject to an exception 
that upon finding the juvenile to be guilty, the court would not 
pass an order of sentence against him but the juvenile would be 
referred to the Board for appropriate orders under the 2000 Act. 
The subsequent repeal of the 2000 Act on and with effect from 
15.01.2016 would not affect the inquiry in which such claim was 
found to be acceptable. Section 25 of the 2015 Act makes it very 
clear. Thus, while holding appellant D to be juvenile in terms of 
the 2000 Act as on the day of occurrence and guilty of the offence 
with which he was tried, the sentence of life imprisonment passed 
against him is set aside and the
matter is remitted to the 
Jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining the 
appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied on the appellant 
D and the compensation that should be awarded to the family of 
the deceased, keeping in mind the directions issued in *Jitendra 
Singh and another v. State of U.P.'s case. [Paras 24, 26 and 27) 
(446-G-H; 447-G-H; 448-A] 
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710; 
Pratap Singh v. State of .Jharkhand and another 2005 
(1) SCR1019 : (2005) 3 SCC 551; Bijender Singh v. 
State of Haryana and another 2005 (2) SCR 1131 : 
(2005) 3 SCC 685; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) 
and another 2010 (5) SCR137 : (2010) 5 SCC 344; 
4alu v., State of Haryana (2012) 8 SCC 34 - referred 
to. 
*.!itendra Singh and another v. State of U.P. (2013) 11 
sec 193 - relied on.
MUMTAZ@ MUNTYAZ v. STATE OF U.P. (NOW 
437 
UTTARAKHAND) 
Case Law Reference 
A 
(2002) 6 sec no 
referred to 
Para 14 
2005 (1) SCR1019 
referred to 
Para 19 
2005 (2) SCR 1131 
referred to 
Para 21 
2010 (5) SCR137 
referred to 
Para 22 
(2012) s sec 34 
referred to 
Para23 
(2013) 11 sec 193 
relied on 
Para 27 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
No. 2084 of2009. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.04.2009 in Criminal Appeal 
No. 270 of200 I of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital. 
WITH 
Criminal Appeal No. 460 of20 I 0 
K. T. S. Tulsi, Sr. Adv. Prafulla Kumar Behera, Rakesh Kumar 
Tewari, Kuber Boddh, S.S. Nehra, Advs. for the Appellant. 
Tanmaya Agarwal, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Advs. for the 
Respondent. 
The judgment of the Cou11 was delivered by 
UDAY U. LALIT, J. I. These appeals by special leave at the 
instance of Appellants Mumtaz alias Muntyaz and Dilshad alias Pappu 
challenge correctness of the decision of the High Court ofUttarakhand 
at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.270 of200 I affirming their conviction 
and sentence for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 
34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short the "IPC") passed in Sessions 
Trial N o.15 of 1991 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Roorkee. 
2. On 27.12.1990 atabout6.30AM PW-I Radhey Shyam lodged 
FIR Ext.A- I with Pol ice Station Manglaur that his nephew Pawan Kumar 
had left his house at about 8.00 PM on the previous day and that in the 
intervening
night of 26th and 27th December 1990 PW-I heard shrieks 
of Pawan Kumar from the house of one Raees in the neighbourhood, 
whereafter PW-I along with his other nephew PW-2 Anil Kumar came 
out of the house and saw that the hands of Pawan Kumar were tied and 
he was ablaze in the courtyard of the house ofRaees. Both PWs I and 
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2 rushed there and put a quilt on Pawan Kumar. In this report, PW- I 
Radhey Shyam further stated that he had seen the appellants and their 
associates Naseem Khan and Anees Khan setting Pawan Kumar on 
fire. Soon after this reporting, the police came to the spot and sent 
Pawan Kumar to Primary Health Centre, Manglaur for medical attention. 
Aforesaid FIR Ext.A- I led to registration of Crime No.328 of 1990 at 
Police Station Manglaur relating to offences punishable under Sections 
307 and 342 IPC. 
3. At Primary Health Centre, a dying declaration Ext.A-24 of 
Pawan Kumar was recorded at 7.35 AM by PW-5 Satya Prakash Mishra, 
Sub~Divisional Magistrate in which Pawan Kumar stated that the 
appellants had set him on fire. The translation of the relevant portion of 
the dying declaration Ext.A-24 is as under: 
"Two persons after pouring kerosene set me on fire. I was 
set on fire this morning at about 2.00- 2.30 AM. I was set 
on fire by Pappu, son of unknown, Rio Landhaura and 
Mumtaz, son of unknown, Rio Landhaura. Mumtaz works 
in the flour mill of Pappu. When I was coming after running 
a VCR on the way, I was taken to house of a Pathani lady 
whose name is Joulie. Joulie. is wife of Raees, Rio 
Landhaura. In the presence of Joulie, Pappu and Mumtaz 
poured kerosene on me and set me on fire and ran away. 
When I sta11ed burning. I shouted and a person who is not 
known to me came there and extinguished fire by
pouring 
water. Thereafter what happened I do not know. I do not 
know why Pappu and Mumtaz set me on fire. Pappu's 
flour mill is on Lakshar Road. Name of brother of Pappu is 
Zinda Hasan." 
Below the above dying declaration Ext.A-24, a cet1ificate to the 
effect that Pawan Kumar was in a fit state of mind to give the dying 
declaration was recorded by Dr. S.K. Mittal. 
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4. On 27.12.1990 itself PW-2 Anil Kumar who had burnt his 
hands while trying to save Pawan Kumar, was examined by PW-7 Dr. 
N.D. Arora, who prepared injury report Ext.A-23. This report mentioned 
that when he came to the Primary Health Centre, there were burn injuries 
on the hands of PW-2 Anil Kumar. 
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5. On 27 .12.1990 at about 4.30 PM Pa wan Kumar succumbed
MUMTAZ@ MUNTYAZ v. STATE OF U.P. (NOW 
UTTARAKHAND) [UDAY U. LAUT, J.] 
to burn injuries while he was being taken to Meerut for medical treatment. 
Crime No.328 of 1990 was thereafter converted to one under Section 
302 !PC. Afterthe death of Pawan Kumar, PW-6 Sub-Inspector Saudan 
Singh, Investigating Officer took the dead body in his possession at about 
5.30 PM on 27.12.1990 and prepared inquestreport Ext.A-9. Thereafter 
. by letter Ext.A-8 he sent the body for post-mortem. PW-6 Investigating 
Officer had interrogated the witnesses and had also taken in possession 
quilt, match box, shawl and kerosene from the spot vide Memorandum 
Ext.A-12, A-13, A-14 and A-16. 
6. PW-4 Dr. Rakesh Kumar conducted post-mortem on the dead 
body of Pawan Kumar at about 12.30 PM on 28.12.1990 and found 
ante-mortem injuries on the body and opined that the deceased had died 
due to shock from bufn injuries. 
7. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet Ext.A-16 was 
filed against the appellants as well as Naseem Khan and Anees Khan. 
The prosecution examined 9 witnesses. PW-1 Radhey Shyam and PW-
2 Anil Kumar were examined as eye witnesses and so also PW-3 
Narendra Kmnar who had seen the accused taking Pawan Kumar and 
setting him on fire. PW-4 Dr. Rakesh Kumar who had conducted post 
mortem on the dead body of deceased Pawan Kumar proved this post 
mortem report Ext.A-2. According to him, the cause of the death was 
shock from burn injuries. PW-5 Satya Prakash Mishra proved dying
declaration Ext.A-4. The Investigating Officer Saudan Singh was 
examined as PW-6 who proved Site Plans Ext.A-4 and A-5, sample seal 
memo Ext.A-7, Inquest Report Ext. A-9, Seizure Memo of quilt Ext. A-
l 0, Seizure Memo of burnt clothes offawan Ext.A- I I, Seizure Memo 
of burnt shawl Ext.A-14 and other relevant documents. PW-7 Dr. N. 
D. Arora was examined to prove injuries on the person of PW-2 Anil 
Kumar and injury report Ext. A-23. PW-8 Dr. R. D. Shanna proved the 
endorsement of Dr. S.K. Mittal on the dying declaration of Pa wan Kumar 
Ext.A-22. No witness was examined on behalf of the defence. 
8. The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 19.12.1994 
found the appellants guilty of the charges punishable under Section 302 
read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to imprisonment for life 
and also directed them to pay fine ofRs.5,000/-, in default whereof they 
were directed to undergo further imprisonment for one year. Naseem 
Khan and Anees Khan were however acquitted of all the charges. 
9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the 
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appellants preferred Criminal Appeal No.2007of1994 in the High Court 
of Judicature at Allahabad. The appeal was thereafter transferred to 
the High Court ofUttarakhand atNainital and re-numbered as Criminal 
Appeal No.270 of2001. The High Court by its judgment and order under 
appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence passed against the appellants. 
The High Court principally relied upon eye-witness account through PW-
1 Radhey Shyam and PW-2 Anil Kumar as well as dying-declaration 
Ext.A-24. 
I 0. After granting special leave to appeal, by orders dated 
15.11.20 I 0 and 03.01.2011 appellant Mumtaz@Muntyaz and appellant 
Di I shad@ Pappu respectively were ordered to be released on bail during 
pendency of these appeals. Thereafter, on an application preferred by 
Dilshad @ Pappu seeking permission to take additional documents on 
record to submit that he was a juvenile on the date of the incident, following 
order was passed by this Court on 07.08.2014. 
"Application seeking permission documents on record is 
allowed. It is submitted by Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior . 
counsel that the appellant Di I shad.@ Pappu was a juvenile 
on the date of occurrence i.e. 27.12.1990 inasmuch as his 
date of birth is 22.07 .1974, as is reflected from the School 
leaving Certificate, contained in Annexure A-I at page 9. 
Learned senior counsel wou Id submit that an inquiry shou Id 
be held by the District and
Sessions Judge, Roorkee, and 
the report be made available to th is Com1 and thereafter 
the hearing may take place. 
· 
Regard being had to the language employed in Section 7 A 
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) 
Act, 2000, it is directed that the concerned District & 
Sessions Judge, Roorkee shall cause an inquiry with regard 
to juvenility of the appellant, Dilshad @ Pappu, after 
following the procedure as engrafted under Rule 12 of the 
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 
2007 and submit his report within a period of30 days from 
the date of receipt of the order passed today. Learned 
District & Sessions Judge shall submit the documents 
forming the basis of his report." 
11. An appropriate enquiry was thereafter conducted by the First 
Additional and District Sessions Judge, Roorkee, Haridwar who by his
MUMTAZ@ MUNTYAZ v. STATE OF U.P. (NOW 
UTTARAKHAND) [UDAY U. LAUT, J.] 
report dated 05.09.2014 concluded as under:-
" 13. Hence from the above discussion the date of birth of 
Dilshad@Pappu is discernible from Exhibits Ka4 to Ka5. 
The entries made therein have not been controverted by 
the Counsel appearing for the State and there is nothing on 
record to refute or rebut the factum of date of birth as 
entered in above Exhibits. Hence the inquiry under Rule 
12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) 
Rules, 2007 has beeu fully satisfied. The Cou11 accordingly 
determines that Dilshad@Pappu date ofbit1h is 22-7-1974 
(Twenty two July Nineteen Seventy Four) and on date of 
occurrence i.e. 27-12-1990 he was 16 years 5 months and 
5 days old and hence a juvenile as per Juvenile Justice (Care 
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. 
14. Let a certified copy of the findings of this Court be 
forwarded to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indian in 
compliance of its order." 
12. On 14.01.2015 when the matters were taken up, the counsel 
appearing for the State submitted that the decision of this Court in Jitendm 
Singh and another v. State of U.P. 1 which was relied upon by the 
counsel for the appellants required re-consideration. On and with effect 
from 15.0l.2016, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) 
Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "the 2015 Act") came into force 
which repealed the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) 
Act,
2000 (hereinafter referred to as "the 2000 Act"). 
13. The matters were thereafter taken up for hearing. We heard 
Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Advocate in support of these appeals 
and Mr. Tanmaya Agarwal, learned Advocate for the State. In so far as 
the appeal ofMumtaz@ Muntyaz is concerned the submissions of the 
learned Senior Advocate as detai.led in his Written Submissions were as 
under:-
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"l. There are several discrepancies, inconsistencies and 
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contradictions that raise a serious doubt about the reliability 
of the dying declaration. When all the attendant 
circumstances are taken together, the cumulative effect is 
that the d) ing declaration fails the test of credibility. 
'(2013)11SCCl93 
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2. The prosecution case and the dying declaration itself 
furnishes the defense of grave provocation as a result of 
which every nonnal human being will be deprived of the 
power of self-control. The fact that the deceased is found 
at the house of appel I ant's brother at 03 :00 am with whose 
wife he was suspected to be having an illicit liaison it 
estabiishes grave provocation. The case would fall within 
the exception 4 of Section 300 ofIPC making him liable for 
sentence only under Section 304 part-II of !PC." 
14. We have gone through dying declaration Ext.A-24 and the 
examination of PW-5 Satya Prakash Mishra. The witness clearly stated 
that all through the recording of his statement, Pawan Kumar remained 
in fit condition and that.the witness had got this fact confirmed from the 
Doctor on duty. The dying declaration bears appropriate endorsement 
of the Doctor on duty namely Dr. S.K. Mittal which endorsement was 
proved by PW-8 Dr. R. D. Sharma. There is nothing in the cross 
examination of either PW-5 or PW-8 nor in the dying declaration Ext.A-
24 which could raise any doubt. Relying on the law laid down by this 
Court in L"xnum v. St"te of M"lwr"shtra2, we find the evidence in 
that behalf trustworthy and hold dying declaration Ext. A-24 to be reliable. 
We, therefore, reject the first submission advanced by the learned Senior 
Advocate for the appellant Mumtaz@ Muntyaz. 
. 15. The second
submission advanced by the learned Senior 
Advocate is based on the theory or defence ofalleged grave provocation. 
It is true that deceased Pawan Kumar was found at 3:00 a.m. in the 
house of the brother of appellant Mumtaz@ Muntyaz. The eye witness 
account shows that his hands were tied and he was set ablaze. The 
memorandum of the seizure of burnt shawl clearly corroborates said 
assertion. Therefore, mere presence of Pawan Kumar in the house of 
the brother of appellant Mumtaz alia Muntyaz by 'itself does not support 
the theory of grave provocation specially when Pa wan Kumar was found 
with his hands tied. Not a single witness was examined on behalf of the 
defence nor is there any material to support such theory. What kind of 
provocation and in what manner was it made are all matters of evidence, 
which are completely absent on record. In the circumstances, we do 
not find any circumstance or material to support the second submission 
advanced on behalf of accused Mumtaz @ Muntyaz. We, therefore, 
reject the second submission as well. 
'(2002) 6sec110
MUMTAZ@ MUNTYAZ v. STATE OF U.P. (NOW 
UTTARAKHAND) [UDAY U. LAUT, J.] 
I 6. It is true that in the dying declaration Ext. A-24, the deceased 
had stated that he did not know the person who extinguished the fire by 
pouring water. It could be that while he was in flames, the deceased 
could not identify the person who tried to save him. The prompt lodging 
of the FIR and the fact that one of the eyewitnesses was having burn 
injuries establishes the presence of the eyewitnesses. In any case, even 
ifthe eyewitness account is taken to be inconsistent with this part of the 
dying declaration, once the dying declaration is found reliable, trustworthy 
and consistent with circumstantial evidence on record; such dying 
declaration by itself is adequate to bring home the case against the 
accused. 
I 7. Having gone through the material on record, we do not see 
any reason to upset the findings recorded by the Trial Court and the 
High Court regarding conviction and sentence of appellant Mumtaz@ 
Muntyaz. Confirming his conviction and sentence we dismiss Criminal 
Appeal No.2084 of2009 preferred by appellant Mumtaz@ Muntyaz. 
I 8. As regards Dilshad@Pappu, by order dated 7.08.20 I 4 District 
and Sessions Judge, Roorkee was directed to cause inquiry with regard 
to juvenility of the appellant. The report dated 5.09.20 I 4, clearly shows 
that on considering the entirety of the matter the claim was found to be 
acceptable. The counsel appearing for the Stat~ could not refute or
rebut the fact that his date of birth was 22.07.1974 and that on the date 
of occurrence he was 16 years 5 months and 5 days old. 
19. Thus, on the date of occurrence Di I shad @ Pappu was more 
than 16 years of age but less than 18 years of age. In terms of the 
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986(hereinafter referred to as "the 1986 Act") 
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which was in force at that time, he was not a juvenile and was rightly 
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tried and convicted by the Trial Court vide its judgment dated 19.12.1994. · 
While the appeal against his conviction and sentence was pending, on 
and with effect from 1.04.2001, the 2000 Act came into force which 
repealed the 1986Act. The 2000 Act inter alia raised the age ofjuvei1ility 
from 16 to 18 years and in terms of Section 20 of· the 2000 Act, the 
determination ofJuvenility was required to be done in all pending matters 
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in accordance with Section 2( I) of the 2000 Act. 
20. The effect of Section 20 of the 2000 Act was considered in 
Pratap Singh v. State of Jlwrklumd and <mother3 and it was stated 
"31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special provision 
'(2005) 3 sec 55 t 
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in respect of pending cases and begins with a non obstante clause. The 
sentence "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings 
in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on 
which this Act came into force" has great significance. The proceedings 
in respect of a juvenile pending in any court referred to in Section 20 of 
the Act are relatable to proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came 
into force and which are pending when the 2000 Act came into force. 
The term "any court" would include even ordinary criminal courts. If 
the person was a "juvenile" under the 1986 Act the proceedings would 
not be pending in criminal courts. They would be pending. in criminal 
courts only if the boy had crossed 16 years or the girl had crossed 18 
years. This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where a person had 
ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the 
age of 18 years then the pending case shall continue in that court as if 
the 2000 Act has not been passed and ifthe cotn1 finds that the juvenile 
has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of 
passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall forward the juvenile 
to the Board which shall pass orders in respect oft!rntjuvenile." 
21. In Bijender Singh v. St(lfe of H"ry"n" mu/ "not her, the 
legal position as regards Section 20 was stated in following words:
"8. One of the basic distinctions between the 1986 Act and 
the 2000 Act relates to the age of males and females.Under 
the I 986Act, ajuvenile means a male juvenile who has not 
attained the age of 16 years, and a female juvenile who has 
not attained the age of 18 years. In th.e 2000 Act, the 
distinction between male and female juveniles on the basis 
of age has not been maintained. The age-limit is 18 years 
for both males and females. 
9. A person above 16 years in terms of the 1986 Act was 
not a juvenile. In that view of the matter the question whether 
a person above 16 years becomes "juvenile" within the 
purview of the 2000 Act must be answered having regard 
to the object and purport ~hereof. 
10. In tenns of the 1986Act, a person who was notjuvenile 
could be tried in any court. Section 20 of the 2000 Act takes 
care of such a situation stating that despite the same the 
trial shall continue in that court as if that Act has not been 
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• (2005) 3 sec 685
MUMTAZ@ MUNTYAZ v. STATE OF U.P. (NOW 
UTTARAKHAND) [UDAY U. LAUT, J.] 
passed and in the event, he is found to be guilty of 
commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be 
recorded in the judgment of conviction, if any, but instead 
of passing any sentence in relation to the juvenile, he would 
be forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board (in short "the 
Board") which shall pass orders in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act as if it has been satisfied on inquiry 
that a juvenile has committed the offence. A legal fiction 
has, thus, been created in the said provision. A legal fiction 
as is well known must be given its full effect although it has 
its limitations ........... .. 
11. ............ . 
12. Thus, by reason oflegal fiction, a person, although not 
a juvenile, has to be treated to be one by the Board for the 
purpose of sentencing, which takes care of a situation that 
the person although not a juvenile in terms of the 1986 Act 
but still would be treated as such under the 2000 Act for 
the said limited purpose." 
22. In Dlum1111bir v. State (NCTof Delhi) and another' the 
determination of juvenility even after conviction was one of the issues 
and it was stated: 
"11. It is plain from the language of the Explanation to 
Section 20 that in all pending cases, which would include 
not only trials but even subsequent proceedings by way of 
revision or appeal, etc., the determination ofjuvenility ofa 
juvenile has to be in terms of clause (I) of
Section 2, even if 
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the juvenile ceases to be ajuvehile on or before 1-.4-2001, 
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when the Act of2000 came into force, and the provisions 
of the Act would apply as if the said provision had been in 
force for all purposes and for all material times when the 
alleged offence was committed. 
12. Clause (I) of Section 2 of the Act of2000 provides that 
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'juvenile in conflict with law" means a 'juvenile" who is 
alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed 
eighteenth year of age as on the date of commission of 
such offence. Section 20 also enables the court to consider 
'(20IOJ s sec 344 
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[2016] 3 S.C.R. 
and detennine the j uven i I ity ofa person even after conviction 
by the regular court and also empowers the court, while 
maintaining the conviction, to set aside the sentence imposed 
and forward the case to the Juvenile Justice Board 
concerned for passing sentence in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act of2000." 
23. Similarly in K(l/u v. S/(lfe of H"rymw6 this Court summed up 
as under: 
"21. Section 20 makes a special provision in respect of 
pending cases. It states that notwithstanding anything 
contained in the Juvenile Act, all proceedings in respect of 
a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on 
which the Juvenile Act comes into force in that area shall 
be continued in that court as if the Juvenile Act had not 
been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has 
committed an offence, it shall record such finding and 
instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile 
forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders 
in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions 
of the Juvenile Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry 
under the Juvenile Act that the juvenile has committed the 
offence. The Explanation to Section 20 makes it clear that 
in all pending cases, which would include not only trials but 
even subsequent proceedings by way ofrevision or appeal, 
the detennination ofjuvenility ofajuvenile would be in terms 
of clause (I)
of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceased to be 
a juvenile on or before 1-4-2001, when the Juvenile Act 
came into force, and the provisions of the Juvenile Act would 
apply as if the said provision had been in force for all 
purposes and for all material times when the alleged offence 
was committed." 
24. It is thus well settled that in terms of Section 20 of the 2000 
Act, in all cases where the accused was above 16 years but below 18 
years of age on the date of occurrence, the proceedings pending in the 
Court would continue and be taken to the logical end subject to an 
exception that upon finding thejuvenile to be guilty, the Court would not 
pass an order of sentence against him but the juvenile would be referred 
to the Board for appropriate orders under the 2000 Act. 
,, t2012i s sec 34
MUMTAZ@ MUNTYAZ v. STATE OF U.P. (NOW 
UTTARAKHAND) [UDAY U. LAUT, J.] 
25. What kind of order could be passed in a matter where claim 
of juvenility came to be accepted in a situation similar to the present 
case, was dealt with by this Court in Jitendra Si11glz (llld (lnotlter v. 
St(lfe of U.P. (supra) in following terms: 
"32. A perusal· of the "punishments" provided for under 
the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 indicate that given the nature 
of the offence committed by the appellant, advising or 
admonishing him [clause (a)] is hardly a "punishment" that 
can be awarded since it is not at all commensurate with the 
gravity of the crime. Similarly, considering his age of about 
40 years, it is completely illusory to expect the appellant to 
be released on probation of good conduct, to be placed 
under the care of any parent, guardiap or fit person [clause 
(b )]. For the same reason, the appellant cannot be released 
on probation of good conduct under the care of a fit institution 
[clause (c)] nor can he be sent to a special home under 
Section I 0 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 which is intended 
to be for the rehabilitation and reformation of delinquent 
juveniles [clause (d)]. The only realistic punishment that 
can possibly be awarded to the appellant on the facts of 
this case is to require him to pay a fine under clause (e) of 
Section 21 (I) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986." 
26. In Jitendra Si11glt (111t/ mwtlzer v. St(lfe of U.P. (supra), 
having found the
juvenile guilty of the offence with which he was charged, 
in accordance with the law laid down by this Court as stated above, 
the matter was remanded to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board 
constituted under the 2000 Act for determining appropriate quantum of 
fine. The view taken therein is completely consistent with the law laid 
down by this Court and in our opinion the decision in Jitem/r(l Singh 
and a11otller v. State of U.P. (supra) does not call for any reconsideration. 
The subsequent repeal of the 2000 Act on and with effect from 15.01.2016 
would not affect the inquiry in which such claim was found to be 
acceptable. Section 25 of the 2015Act makes- it very clear. 
27. Thus, while holding appellant Dilshad@Pappu to be juvenile 
in terms of the 2000 Act as on the day of occurrence and guilty of the 
offence with which he was tried, we set aside the sentence of life 
imprisonment passed against him and remit the matter to the Jurisdictional 
Juvenile Justice Board for determining the appropriate quantum of fine 
447 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
448 
A 
B 
c 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
T2016J3 S.C.R. 
that should be levied on the appellant Dilshad @ Pappu and the 
compensation that should be awarded to the family of the deceased, 
keeping in mind the directions issued in Jitendra Singh and another v. 
State of U.P. (supra). 
28. Criminal Appeal No.2084 of 2009 is thus dismissed while 
Criminal Appeal No.460 of20 I 0 is allowed to the aforesaid extent and 
the matter as regards Appellant Dilshad @Pappu stands remitted to the 
Jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for detennination as aforesaid. The 
bail bonds furnished by Appellant Mumtazalias Muntyaz are cancelled 
and he shall be taken in custody forthwith to undergo the sentence 
awarded to him. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeals disposed of.