STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS versus DR. RAO, V.B.J. CHELIKANI AND OTHERS
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1366, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Issues
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1366 : 2024 INSC 894
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others 
v. 
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others 
(Civil Appeal No(s). 3791-3793 of 2011)
25 November 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna,* CJI and Dipankar Datta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose that whether the Government, like any private 
individual, have the absolute discretion to frame policy, distribute 
resources and enter into a contract with whomsoever it pleases, 
on any terms and conditions it so desires.
Headnotes†
Government policy – Land allocation policy – Distribution 
of State largesse – State distributing public land in the 
State of Telangana – Allotment of land parcels, vide several 
State Government Memoranda within the Greater Hyderabad 
Municipal Corporation limits through Cooperative Societies – 
GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005; GoM Nos. 420, 422 
to 425 dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008 
whereby MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS/State Government, 
Judges of the Constitutional Courts, and journalists classified 
as a separate class for allotment of land at the basic rate – 
Constitutional validity:
Held: GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005 quashed to 
the extent they classify MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS/State 
Government, Judges of the Constitutional Courts, and journalists 
as a separate class for allotment of land at the basic rate – GoM 
Nos. 419, 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008, and GoM No. 551 
dated 27.03.2008, declared bad in law, being violative of Art.14 –
Allocation of land at basic rates to select privileged groups reflects 
a “capricious”, “irrational” and arbitrary approach – This policy of the 
State Government, is an abuse of power meant to cater exclusively 
to the affluent sections of the society, disapproving and rejecting 
the equal right to allotment of the common citizen and the socio-
economically disadvantaged – Doctrine of manifest arbitrariness is 
*Author
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
applicable – Government servants, elected legislators, Judges in the 
Supreme Court and High Court, and prominent journalists do not 
belong to the “weaker” or per se deserving sections of the society, 
warranting special State reservations/preferential treatment to land 
allotment – When the government allocates land at discounted rates 
to the privileged few, it engenders a system of inequality, conferring 
upon them a material advantage that remains inaccessible to the 
common citizen – This preferential treatment conveys practices 
foster resentment and disillusionment among ordinary citizens, who 
perceive these actions as corrupt or unjust, thereby eroding trust 
in democratic institutions – This policy undermines solidarity and 
fraternity, reinforcing societal hierarchies rather than actively working 
to dismantle them – When land is offered at a discounted rate, it 
distorts the natural market forces that govern the value of land – 
This has severe financial ramifications for the public exchequer – 
Furthermore, the accredited journalists cannot be treated as a 
separate class for such preferential treatment – Core framework 
of these policies suffers from the malaise of unreasonableness 
and arbitrariness – It reeks of colourable exercise of power 
whereby the policymakers are bestowing valuable resources to 
their peers and ilk, triggering a cycle of illegal
distribution of State 
resources – Allotment policy fails to satisfy the requirements of the 
two-pronged classification test coupled with arbitrariness – To test 
the facts against the standards of substantive equality, the Judges 
of the Supreme Court and the High Court, MPs, MLAs, officers of 
the AIS, journalists etc. cannot be treated as a separate category 
for allotment of land at a discounted basic value in preference to 
others – Order of restitution passed and Cooperative Societies and 
their members, entitled to refund of the entire amount deposited 
by them, including stamp duty and registration fee, development 
charges/expenses paid by them, along with interest – Constitution 
of India – Art.14. [Paras 76, 77, 79, 80-83, 85-92, 94]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.11 – Res Judicata and 
constructive Res Judicata – Applicability – Plea of the 
Cooperative Societies and its members that the principle of 
res judicata and constructive res judicata would apply to the 
instant case:
Held: Res judicata will not apply, as the previous judgment did 
not examine the constitutional validity of GoM Nos. 243 and 244 –
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GoM Nos. 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 had not been issued 
at the time the said judgment was pronounced and hence, could 
never have been challenged – Plea of the Cooperative Societies 
that the principle of constructive res judicata should apply to the 
examination of the challenge to GOM Nos. 243 and 244, cannot be 
accepted – Principles of constructive res judicata should not have 
been applied, given the significant public interest at stake – Once 
the allotments were cancelled and the writ petition was allowed, 
the State had the opportunity to re-evaluate the entire issue in 
light of the findings recorded – Members of the public cannot be 
restrained in filing writ petition challenging GoM Nos. 243 and 244 – 
Constructive res judicata applies only when the cause of action is 
identical – Causes of action in the two litigation proceedings should 
not be considered identical, as the first litigation focused on the 
allotment and its terms and conditions – GoM Nos. 243 and 244 
are separate and distinct from the allotment itself, and challenging 
these notifications constitutes a separate and independent cause 
of action. [Paras 35, 38, 39]
Constitution of India – Art.14 – Equality before law – Test of 
reasonable classification – Concept of substantive equality – 
Substantive equality test – Explained. [Paras 48, 52, 56, 59, 
67, 68, 73, 74]
Case Law Cited
Forward Construction Company and Others v. Municipal
Corporation 
of Greater Bombay [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 766 : (1986) 1 SCC 
100; State of Karnataka and Another v. All India Manufacturers 
Organisation and Others [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 86 : (2006) 4 SCC 
683; V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India and Others [2001] 
Supp. 4 SCR 411 : (2001) 10 SCC 305; National Confederation 
of Officers Association of Central Public Sector Enterprises and 
Others v. Union of India and Others [2021] 10 SCR 954 : (2022) 
4 SCC 764; Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of 
U.P. [1990] 3 SCR 72 : 1989 Supp (1) 504; Erusian Equipment 
and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1975] 2 SCR 674 : 
(1975) 1 SCC 70; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International 
Airport Authority of India [1979] 3 SCR 1014 : (1979) 3 SCC 489; 
Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India [1996] 
Supp. 9 SCR 296 : (1996) 6 SCC 530; Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State 
of Uttar Pradesh [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 625 : (1991) 1 SCC 212;
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1369
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation 
[2014] 9 SCR 283 : (2014) 8 SCC 682; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. 
Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959] 1 SCR 279 : AIR 1958 SC 538; 
Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao and Others [1973] 3 SCR 
39 : (1973) 1 SCC 500; In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979] 
2 SCR 476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali 
Sarkar [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) 1 SCC 1; Kathi Raning Rawat 
v. State of Saurashtra [1952] 1 SCR 435 : (1952) 1 SCC 215; 
State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa [1974] 1 SCR 
771 : (1974) 1 SCC 19; Hiral P. Harsora and Others v. Kusum 
Narottamdas Harsora and Others [2016] 9 SCR 515 : (2016) 10 
SCC 165; Union of India v. N.S. Rathnam & Sons [2015] 8 SCR 
751 : (2015) 10 SCC 681; LIC v. Consumer Education Centre 
[1995] Supp. 1 SCR 349 : (1995) 5 SCC 482; Indian Council 
for Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India [1995] 1 SCR 
304 : (1995) 1 SCC 732; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi 
[1981] 2 SCR 79 : (1981) 1 SCC 722; A.L. Kalra v. Project and 
Equipment Corporation of India Ltd [1984] 3 SCR 646 : (1984) 3 
SCC 316, 328; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 
621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Shayara Bano v. Union of India [2017] 
9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; National Legal Services Authority 
v. Union of India and Others [2014] 5 SCR 119 : (2014) 5 SCC 
438; Navtej Johar v. Union of
India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 
10 SCC 1; Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India [2021] 4 SCR 633 
: (2021) 15 SCC 125; Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India 
[1950] 1 SCR 869 : AIR 1951 SC 41; Anuj Garg and Others v. 
Hotel Association of India and Others [2007] 12 SCR 991 : (2008) 
3 SCC 1; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [1974] 2 SCR 
348 : (1974) 4 SCC 3; Joseph Shine v. Union of India [2018] 
11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39; Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of 
Haryana [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 541 : (1985) 3 SCC 267; NOIDA 
Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA and Others [2011] 8 SCR 
25 : (2011) 6 SCC 508 – referred to.
Greenhalgh v. Mallard (1947) 2 All England Reporter 255 (CA); 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143; 
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] 
1 SCR 497; R. v. Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483; Withler v. Canada 
(Attorney General) [2011] 1 SCR 396; Quebec (Attorney General) 
v. A [2012] 1 SCR 61; Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General) [2020] 
3 SCR 113; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 – referred to.
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Books and Periodicals Cited
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Alienation of State Lands & Land 
Revenue Rules, 1975; Sandra Fredman, “Substantive Equality 
Revisited”, I.CON (2016), Vol. 14 No. 3, 712-738 – referred to.
List of Acts
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Alienation of State Lands & 
Land Revenue Rules, 1975; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Andhra 
Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F; Stamp Act, 
1899; Assignment of House Sites in Villages & Towns in Telangana 
Area Rules, 1975.
List of Keywords
Absolute discretion to frame policy; Distribution of resources; State 
largesse; State distributing public land in the State of Telangana; 
Allotment of land parcels; Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation 
limits; GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005; GoM Nos. 420, 
422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008; GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008; MPs, 
MLAs, AIS/State Government officers, Judges of the Constitutional 
Courts, and journalists classified as separate class for allotment 
of land at basic rate; Allocation of land at basic rates to select 
privileged groups; Capricious and irrational approach; Executive 
action; Arbitrariness; Policy of the State Government; Abuse 
of power; Affluent sections of the society; Right to allotment of 
common citizen and socio-economically disadvantaged; Doctrine 
of manifest arbitrariness; Arbitrariness inherent in land allocation 
policy; State reservations to land allotment; Land, finite
and highly 
valuable resource; Densely populated urban areas; Access to 
land for housing and economic activities; System of inequality; 
Preferential treatment; Eroding trust in democratic institutions; 
Societal hierarchies; Diminishes public revenue; Financial 
ramifications; Public exchequer; Accredited journalists; Preferential 
treatment; Higher echelons of three wings of the government, 
legislators, bureaucrats; Judges of Supreme Court and High Courts; 
Journalists; Fourth pillar of democracy; Distribution of extraordinary 
State benefits; Healthy checks and balances within the democratic 
system; Malaise of unreasonableness and arbitrariness; Colourable 
exercise of power; Policymakers; Illegal distribution of State 
resources; De facto trustees and agents/repositories; Allotment 
policy; Two-pronged classification test coupled with arbitrariness;
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1371
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
Standards of substantive equality; Allotment of land; Object of 
policy perpetuates inequality; Promotes social-economic exclusion; 
Small and privileged section/group; Equality and fairness standards; 
Policy or law allotting land to public servants; Classification; 
Substantive equality; Order of restitution; Cooperative Societies; 
Refund of entire amount deposited; Stamp duty; Registration 
fee; Development charges/expenses; Interest; Lease deeds; Res 
Judicata; Constructive Res Judicata; Principles of constructive res 
judicata; Public interest; Causes of action; Equality before law; 
Test of reasonable classification; Concept of substantive equality; 
Substantive equality test.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 3791-3793 
of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2010 of the High Court 
of A.P. at Hyderabad in WP Nos. 7956, 7997 and 23682 of 2008
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 3794-3796, 3797-3799, 3800-3802, 3803, 3804-
3806, 3807-3809 and 3810 of 2011, Civil Appeal No. 13060 of 2024 
and Contempt Petition (Civil) Nos. 1122-1124 of 2023 In Civil Appeal 
Nos. 3797-3799 of 2011
Appearances for Parties
R. Venkataramani, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, Tapesh Kumar Singh, 
Sr. Adv./A.A.G., Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Raghenth Basant, 
S.S. Prasad, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Rajshekhar Rao, Ms. Vibha 
Dutta Makhija, Rajiv Dutta, Tapesh Kumar Singh, K.
Ramakantha 
Reddy, Sr. Advs., Ms. Devina Sehgal, Amit Bhandari, Ms. Somaya 
Gupta, Praveen Kumar Singh, Ms. Priyansha Sharma, R.V. 
Yogesh Venkata, Ms. Kaushitaki Sharma, Ms. Prerna Acharya, 
Ms. Twinkle Rathi, M/s. Mclm & Co., Prashant Bhushan, Anurag 
Tiwary, R. Nedumaran, Ms. C.K. Sucharita, Vinod Kumar Gupta, 
Lavkesh Bhambhani, Utkarsh Pratap, Harshwardhan Thakur, 
Chandan Kumar, Manoj C. Mishra, Pawan Sharma, Anuj Shah, 
Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates, 
Ashutosh Srivastava, Ms. Abhipsa Mohanty, Rajeev Singh, Guntur 
Prabhakar, Ranjan Mukherjee, Amit Pawan, K.V. Vijayakumar, S. 
Thananjayan, Ms. K. Enatoli Sema, Ms. Limayinla Jamir, Amit
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Kumar Singh, Ms. Chubalemla Chang, Prang Newmai, Kumar 
Dushyant Singh, Siddharth Dutta, Ms. Subasri Jaganathan, Ms. 
G. Indira, Abinash Kumar Mishra, T.V. Ratnam, S. Udaya Kumar 
Sagar, Bijoy Kumar Jain, Ms. Promila, C.K. Sasi, Ms. Meena K 
Poulose, B. Krishna Prasad, Raghvendra Kumar, Gopal Singh, 
Amrish Kumar, Mrs. Swati Ghildiyal, Navanjay Mahapatra, Mrs. 
Sonali Jain, Raman Yadav, Chitvan Singhal, Kartikay Aggarwal, 
Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Sateesh Galla, C. Raghavendren, Ch. 
Leela Sarveswar, Saurabh Gupta, N. Rajaraman, Ms. Lihzu Shiney 
Konyak, Ms. Astha Sharma, Narendra Kumar, Shuvodeep Roy, 
Kabir Shankar Bose, Saurabh Tripathi, Devashish Bharuka, Ms. 
Komal Agarwal, Ms. Kavya Vijay, Ms. Ashtha Chaudhary, Umesh 
Chandra Srivastava, Ms. Praseena Elizabeth Joseph, Ms. Tulika 
Mukherjee, Beenu Sharma, Venkat Narayan, Rushab Aggarwal, 
Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Astik Gupta, Ms. Riddhima J Aggarwal, 
Japnish Singh Bhatia, D. Abhinav Rao, Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, 
Polanki Gowtham, K.V. Girish Chowdary, T. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy, 
Ms. Rajeswari Mukherjee, Meeran Maqbool, Ms. Archita Nigam, R. 
Ravi, Manish Dua, Somanatha Padhan, G. Sheshagiri Rao, Ms. 
Anu Gupta, Azmat H. Amanullah, Tirupati Gaurav Shahi, Avijit Mani 
Tripathi, T.K. Nayak, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjiv Khanna, CJI
Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 19838 of 2010.
2.	
This common judgment
decides the cross appeals which impugn 
the judgment dated 05.01.2010, of the Division Bench of the High 
Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition Nos. 7956, 7997, and 
23682 of 2008. These Writ Petitions challenged the allotment of 
land parcels, vide several State Government Memoranda,1 within 
the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation limits. The land was 
allocated to Cooperative Societies composed of members of various 
groups, including Members of Parliament,2 Members of both houses 
1	
For short, “GoM”.
2	
For short, “MP”.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1373
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
of the State Legislature,3 officers of All India Services,4 Judges of 
the Supreme Court and High Court,5 State Government employees, 
defence personnel, journalists and individuals from weaker sections 
of society.
3.	
The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has partly allowed the 
Writ Petitions, quashing the GoMs that laid down the allotment 
policy and facilitate the allotments to the Cooperative Societies. It 
held that the parcels of land allotted to the respondents were to be 
restored to the Government, and that fresh allotments can only be 
made following the issuance of appropriate GoMs consistent with the 
judgment. The High Court further directed that before such GoMs 
are issued, the State shall call for details of members who meet the 
eligibility criteria; ensure they sign affidavits declaring their eligibility; 
and publish this information on its website for public access. Any 
false declaration will result in cancellation of the allotment, and 
initiation of civil and criminal proceedings.
4.	
While the Cooperative Societies, their members, and the State of 
Telangana6 have preferred appeals contesting these directions, Mr. 
Keshav Rao Jadhav, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 23682/2008, 
has filed a cross-appeal. Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav prays that 
preferential allotment of land – particularly at basic rates – to MLAs, 
MPs, journalists, officers of the
AIS and Judges, is illegal, arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, as it violates the right to equality guaranteed 
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Facts of the Case
5.	
On 28.02.2005, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued three 
GoMs – Nos. 242, 243 and 244. GoM No. 242 established a 
comprehensive policy for managing land resources and housing in 
urban and semi-urban areas. GoM No. 243 outlined categories of 
individuals eligible for land allotment, while GoM No. 244 provided 
guidelines for this process. 
3	
For short, “MLA”.
4	
For short, “AIS”.
5	
We note that while the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court have withdrawn their claims and 
are not seeking allotment, we have addressed their category for the purpose of tackling the legal issue 
arising out of allotment made under GoM No. 243.
6	
Refer to the order dated 30.03.2016 passed by this Court, giving directions for amendment in the Cause 
Title.
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6.	
GoM No. 242 emphasized the urgent need for prudent management 
of land resources in urban and semi-urban areas due to rising 
urbanization and increasing demand for housing. Due to growing 
urbanisation, demand for land for housing purposes has surged. 
It highlighted the challenges faced by the working middle class, 
as private developers often artificially inflate land prices, making it 
difficult for them to secure plots. Recognizing that providing shelter is 
a top priority for the State, the Government had previously formulated 
a housing scheme for the poor. However, there was no fixed policy 
catering to “other deserving sections” of the society. Consequently, 
the Government decided that a comprehensive policy was necessary, 
leading to the issuance of GoM No. 242. Key stipulations of the 
GoM include:
	•
Creation of a land bank, source-pooled for allotment to various 
housing Cooperative Societies and other target groups. 
	•
The source of the land bank would consist of land located in 
and around 120 municipalities with clear titles. 
	•
The land would be within a radius of 25 kilometres for Category 
“A” municipalities, 15 kilometres for Category “B” municipalities 
and 10 kilometres for Category “C” municipalities. 
	•
Government land available with various departments which was 
not being used for specified categories such as Horticulture, 
Agriculture, Roads and Buildings amongst other categories, 
was
also to be subsumed and put in the land bank. 
	•
Surplus ceiling land, endowment lands and private lands that 
had been acquired were to also form a part of the land pool. 
	•
Revenue department was responsible for collecting details 
of large chunks of available land which would fall in the said 
categories. 
	•
The Collector and District Magistrate was nominated as the 
Competent Authority for transfer of the government land to 
the land bank in consultation with concerned government 
departments. 
	•
The Collector and District Magistrate would also be competent 
to acquire private land for public purposes, after examining
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
the demand and after consulting the agencies in-charge of 
the land bank. 
	•
Each category of land was to be treated as a distinct entity till 
the same was alienated to the applicant. The objective was to 
plough back the cost of land acquisition. 
	•
The Empowered Committee chaired by the Chief Commissioner 
of Land Administration and comprising five members was vested 
with the power to decide allotment of the land, its apportionment 
and its use, based upon the hierarchy of needs, and submit 
proposals to the Government.
	•
 The designated officers who would be the members of the 
Empowered Committee, while recommending allotment of land 
in favour of the Cooperative Societies, would also recommend 
the price to be fixed for the land proposed for allotment. 
	•
The recommended price was to be fixed after taking into account 
the acquisition cost of land, activity of the beneficiary institution 
and demand for the land. 
	•
Separate orders were to be issued on the methodology to be 
adopted for selecting the housing society/institution for allotment 
of land from the land bank; deciding conditions of allotment; 
and ownership rights.
7.	
On 28.02.2005, GoM No. 243 was also issued. It stated that land 
from the land bank could be allotted for housing and institutional 
purposes. For housing, the Government encouraged allocation of 
land for independent housing sites in
areas where such housing 
schemes were prevalent, and for the construction of flats in regions 
where flats were established. The key stipulations of the GoM are 
outlined below:
	•
The Government might alienate lands, preferably for construction 
of flats in view of land scarcity, in the Municipal Corporation 
of Hyderabad, Warangal, Vijayawada, Guntur, Rajahmundry, 
Visakhapatnam, Kurnool and Nellore. 
	•
Land was not to be allotted to individual beneficiaries, but to 
groups or Cooperative Societies of which the beneficiaries 
would be members.
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	•
A Cooperative Society or group was to have a minimum of 12 
eligible members. 
	•
The applications for allotment of flat/housing site were to be 
made to the Collector and District Magistrate, who in turn 
had to obtain necessary approval for land allotment from the 
Empowered Committee and the Government. 
	•
The Collector was to be nominated as the Nodal Authority and 
was tasked with the duty to make the Scheme operational. 
	•
For allotment of the land to institutions, the Collector was to 
submit the proposal to the Empowered Committee. 
	•
The allotment for the Cooperative Societies comprising Judges, 
MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS, officers of the Andhra Pradesh 
cadre, officers of other State cadres who were natives of 
Andhra Pradesh and who had worked on deputation with the 
Andhra Pradesh Government, officers of the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, and journalists, would be in satellite towns 
of Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy districts. 
	•
The lands located in prime locations would only be allotted to 
government organisations for public purposes or for institutional 
use. 
	•
Government lands located in the proposed Outer Ring Road 
would not be allotted for housing sites for group of individuals 
or Cooperative Housing Societies. 
	•
The Cooperative Society or group concerned which would be 
allotted land by the Government, shall further allot individual 
housing sites/flats to its individual members.
	•
Land
would be allotted without any development, which had to 
be undertaken by the Cooperative Society or group. 
	•
Time limit fixed for the completion of development of land and 
infrastructure facilities (road, water supply, electricity etc.) was 
one year from the date of alienation of land, failing which the 
land would be repossessed by the government. 
	•
Cost and categorisation of sections of the society was prescribed 
in the following manner:
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
“CATEGORISATION FOR PRICING:
i)	
MLAs, MPs, Judges of Supreme Court and High 
Court, All India Services Officers.
ii)	
Accredited Journalists from recognized and 
registered newspapers. 
iii)	
State Government Employees and Panchayat 
Raj Teachers working in the State of Andhra 
Pradesh. 
iv)	
Recognised National and International Sports 
persons and eminent persons in the field of 
Culture and Arts. 
v)	
Defence Employees, Central Government 
employees and employees of PSUs. 
vi)	
Widows of Kargil and other war heroes and 
extremist violence who are hailing from Andhra 
Pradesh. 
vii)	 Weaker Sections. 
viii)	 Institutions - Educational/Charitable/Religious 
etc., 
The land shall be allotted to the categories figuring 
at Sl. No. i to iv at the basic value of the land; for 
category v and viii at prevailing market value; for 
category vi on free of cost and for category vii as per 
the policy of the Government in vogue. The acquired 
land shall be alienated on cost basis, which means 
that the actual cost paid to the landowners shall be 
fixed as cost of land.”
	•
The following conditions of allotment were laid down:

o
The Cooperative Society/group would ensure that its 
members were seeking allotment of land for the first time.
o
All the members were to file an affidavit stating that they 
had not received benefit of concessional allotment from 
the government earlier, nor were they a member of any 
Cooperative Society/group to which concessional allotment 
had been made earlier.

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o
The members would also give an undertaking that they 
would not avail of such facility in the future.

o
Allotment process had to be completed within six months 
from the date of alienation of land.

o
The allottee/beneficiary would have to complete the 
development within a period of two years from the date 
of allotment by the Cooperative Society/group.

o
The beneficiary/allottee would not have any right to sell 
the property allotted for a period of 15 years.

o
The Cooperative Societies/groups were restricted from 
allotting open spaces in the layout or making changes in 
the layout without approval of the Competent Authority.

o
In satellite townships being developed by the urban 
development agencies in Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy 
districts, certain categories of persons, such as Class IV 
Employees, NGOs etc., who may not be in a position make 
an investment for buying a plot, would be considered for 
allotment of housing sites at an appropriate rate.
o
However, the conditions for allotment in respect of 
government employees would be issued separately.
	•
The Supreme Court and High Court Judges, MLAs, MPs, and 
officers of AIS would be allotted plots of 500 square yards. 
	•
Government employees would be allotted plots of 100-400 
square yards.
	•
Journalists would be allotted plots of 300 square yards. 
	•
The Cooperative Society/group would decide whether they 
would like to build the houses themselves or would like to avail 
assistance of Andhra Pradesh Housing Board.
8.	
On 28.02.2005, GoM No. 244 was also issued, whose key stipulations 
read: 
	•
The Collector would be the Nodal Authority to make the scheme 
operational and would be competent to allot the land to the 
Cooperative Society or the group.

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1379
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
	•
The Collector would monitor implementation of the scheme very 
closely and send a monthly progress report to the Government. 
	•
The Government would alienate land to the Cooperative Society 
or the group, which would in turn convey the title of the plot/flat 
to the members through a registered sale deed. 
	•
Following conditions of allotment were laid down:

o
The employee must be a member of the Cooperative 
Society or the group.
o
To facilitate the Cooperative Society to arrive at an 
estimation of the land required, they were advised to 
complete the admission of its members before making an 
application to the authorities.

o
Where some employees did not form part of an existing 
society, they could form a separate Cooperative Society/
group and make a request for allotment.

o
The Cooperative Societies/groups would not allot housing 
sites/flats to any other member whose name did not figure 
in the application submitted to the Competent Authority.

o
The employee would have to be an approved probationer 
in service of the Government or local body, who has 
completed a minimum of five years in service.

o
Only one housing site/flat would be allotted to a particular 
government servant.

o
If both the husband and wife were in government service, 
they would be eligible for allotment of only one housing 
site/flat.

o
The allotment of the housing site/flat was to be completed 
within six months from the date of alienation of the land.

o
The allotment of house site/flat would be done by draw 
of lots.

o
The Cooperative Societies/group would complete 
construction on the allotted land within two years from 
the date of allotment.

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o
Construction would be done directly or through the Housing 
Board or through any other agency as mutually agreed 
upon by the members.
o
The employee who was once allotted a housing site/flat 
would not be permitted to sell the same for a period of 
15 years.

o
The society would not allot open spaces indicated in the 
layout or change the layout without the approval of the 
Competent Authority.

o
The allotment of housing site/flat would be recorded in the 
service book of the employee.

o
The employee would be entitled for concessional allotment 
of land only once during the period of service.

o
Members of the Cooperative Society would have to file an 
affidavit stating that they had not received the benefit of 
concessional allotment earlier, nor were they a member 
of a society to which concessional allotment of land had 
been made earlier.

o
All members would have to furnish an undertaking stating 
that they would not avail of such facilities in the future.

o
Indian Administrative Service,7 Indian Police Service,8 
and Indian Foreign Service9 officers belonging to Andhra 
Pradesh cadre would be entitled to a plot size of 500 
square yards.

o
Non-cadre Head of Departments, Fourth Level Gazetted 
Officers and above were entitled to a plot size of 400 
square yards.

o
Second and Third Level Gazetted Officers were entitled 
to a plot size of 300 square yards.

o
First Level Gazetted Officers were entitled to a plot size 
of 250 square yards. 
7	
For short, “IAS”.
8	
For short, “IPS”.
9	
For short, “IFS”.

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1381
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
o
Superintendents, Assistant Section Officers, Senior 
Assistants, Telephone Operators, LD Stenos, TCAs, Junior 
Assistants, etc. and persons holding equivalent posts were 
entitled to a plot size of 175 square yards.

o
Attenders, Record Assistants, drivers, etc., and persons 
holding equivalent posts were entitled to plot size of 100 
square yards.
o
In case sufficient land was not available, Category 1 
officers, namely, those belonging to IAS, IPS and IFS were 
to retain the mentioned plot size of 500 square yards, but 
there would be a reduction of plot size in terms of ratio of 
4 : 3 : 2.5 : 1.75 : 1 for Categories 2 to 5.
9.	
Thereafter, on 04.05.2006, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued 
GoM No. 522. The GoM stated that based upon representations 
from various individuals or groups i.e., Judges of the High Court, 
MLAs, MPs, officers of the AIS, people of eminence and journalists, 
the Collector of Ranga Reddy District had proposed allotment of 
government land for housing purpose on payment of basic value 
through the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Hyderabad. 
The Government, after careful examination of the proposal, had 
directed allotment of government land to the extent of 245 acres 
in villages of Ranga Reddy District in favour of Judges of the 
High Court, MLAs, MPs, serving left over officers of pre-1989 AIS 
batches, AIS officers serving since 1989, serving AIS officers of 
other cadre with Andhra Pradesh nativity, people of eminence and 
working journalists, as a one-time benefit as per their eligibility. 
The allotment was made in relaxation of the order issued in GoM 
No. 243 dated 28.02.2005, subject to the guidelines and filing of 
affidavit proforma 1 and 2 appended to the order. The stipulations 
of the GoM were:-
	•
72 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 276 of
Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal to the MLAs and 
MPs.
	•
38 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 149 of 
Nanakramguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal in favour of 
Judges, people of eminence, and serving left over officers of 
pre-1989 AIS batches.
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	•
32 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 454/1 of 
Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal in favour of serving 
post-1989 AIS officers and serving AIS officers of other cadre 
with Andhra Pradesh nativity who are working or had worked 
on deputation in Andhra Pradesh.
	•
33 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 132 of 
Vattinagulapalli Village to AIS officers serving post 1989, in the 
order of seniority.
	•
32 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 332 of Nizampet 
Village and 38 acres of land was to be allotted in Survey No. 
35/2 of Pet Basheerabad Village to media persons. 
	•
Judges of the High Court, MPs, MLAs, serving AIS officers and 
persons of eminence were to be allotted plots of 500 square 
yards. 
	•
Former members of the Legislative Assembly, their widows and 
working journalists were to be allotted plots of 300 square yards. 
	•
The land was to be allotted to Hyderabad Urban Development 
Authority,10 which in turn would develop layouts in the five 
blocks at the respective locations for allotment of housing sites 
to individuals. 
	•
Advance possession of the land would be given to HUDA.
	•
HUDA will commence work from its own reserves. Each allottee 
would reimburse the said amount to HUDA as per the time 
schedule fixed.
	•
Format of the townships was to be based on the gated community 
concept.
	•
Appendix to the GoM stated that the allotment to the members 
of Legislature,
Judiciary, Executive and the press was a one-time 
beneficial measure, irrespective of any other private ownership 
of land, to ensure equity and to avoid discrimination. 
	•
The appendix laid down the details including approximate 
number of housing sites etc. with stipulation regarding the size 
of the plots which would be allotted. 
10	
For short, “HUDA”.

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1383
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
	•
The general conditions of eligibility read:

o
Members of the categories listed at serial no. 3 to 6 under 
item 1, i.e. Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, 
AIS officers, persons of eminence and journalists, should 
not have availed any benefit of allotment of land in the 
cities of Hyderabad, Secunderabad, and Ranga Reddy 
district or any other district.

o
All the sitting MLAs and MPs were to be given a plot, 
provided they did not have a house or housing site in 
Hyderabad or Secunderabad.

o
All eligible persons who were being allotted the land 
would have to file an affidavit agreeing to the conditions 
and stipulations.
o
No person who was allotted a plot shall alienate or transfer 
it using the instrument of General Power of Attorney11 within 
a period of 10 years from the date of allotment. 
	•
Committees and sub-committees were formed to process 
allotment applications. 
	•
Government would allot land to HUDA at the basic rate, and 
as already noted above, HUDA would develop layouts in the 
five blocks at the respective locations.
	•
The allottees were to pay the actual cost of the plot, i.e., the 
basic value plus cost of development, as worked out by HUDA, 
in three equal instalments, within six months from the date of 
allotment. 
	•
The plot will not be handed over and registered till full payment 
is made by the allottee to HUDA. 
	•
In case of default, the Screening Committee could recommend 
the Government to delete such names from the list. 
	•
Construction of houses was to commence within a period of two 
years from the date of handing over the plot to the individual 
allottee.
11	
For short, “GPA”.
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10.	 GoM No. 522 dated 04.05.2006, was challenged by Mr. V.S. Bose, 
Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani and Mr. O.M. Debara in the High Court in 
Writ Petition No. 13730 of 2006. It was submitted that:
	•
Land worth Rs. 700 crores was sought to be allotted to the 
specified categories at a throw-away price compared to the 
market value. 
	•
The government, as a trustee of the public land, cannot dispose 
of land except by way of a policy which was consistent with 
Articles 14, 38 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India. 
	•
Majority of the beneficiaries were affluent persons with good 
social standing. 
	•
Land prices have escalated substantially and hence, land 
allotment at basic value without auction was detrimental to 
public interest. 
	•
There was no rational basis or object which was sought to be 
achieved through such a land allotment policy. 
	•
Lastly, there was no justification for allotting the land to preferred 
individuals at a fraction of the market value. 
	•
GoM No. 243 had completely prohibited allotment of land to 
individuals who had already received benefit of concessional 
allotment from the Government. This requirement was deleted/
removed through GoM No. 522. The policy also permitted 
allotment of land to those who own or possess land in their own 
name or in the name of their spouse or children. Reference 
was made to the amendment made vide GoM No. 1424 dated 
28.09.2006.
11.	 The Writ Petition was allowed
by judgment dated 08.10.2007. At 
the outset, we must notice that the judgment of the Division Bench 
specifically recorded that the petitioners therein had not questioned 
the vires of GoM Nos. 242, 243 and 244, which established the 
policy, categories, and guidelines for land allocation. Therefore, the 
validity of these GoMs was not examined. The focus of the Writ 
Petition concerning GoM No. 522 was the relaxation of conditions 
which had been prescribed in the earlier GoMs.
12.	 The High Court referred to Rules 3 and 10 of the Andhra Pradesh 
(Telangana Area) Alienation of State Lands & Land Revenue
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1385
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
Rules, 1975,12 which pertain to the alienation of land to local 
authorities. The Court recorded that according to the 1975 Rules, 
land acquired by the State could be alienated to a local body/
authority for unremunerative public purposes without charging a 
price. However, when the land was to be allocated for remunerative 
public purposes or to private entities, it could only be done at 
market value. Rule 10 allows the Government to deviate from the 
established procedures. However, any such deviation must follow 
a reasonable process for land alienation, including auction, where 
such alienation/sale is deemed necessary. 
13.	 The Court noted that a reading of GoM No. 522 made it clear that it 
relaxed the conditions of GoM No. 243, with the intent of providing 
undue benefits to individuals who would not otherwise qualify for 
land allotment under GoM No. 243. The relaxation was made in 
favour of (i) Sitting and former MLAs, including widows of deceased 
MLAs; (ii) Sitting MPs from Andhra Pradesh in Lok Sabha and Rajya 
Sabha; (iii) Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh; (iv) AIS 
officers; (v) Persons of eminence and (vi) Journalists. There was 
no justification for allotting land to these categories of persons by 
relaxing conditions, to make them eligible for allotment of land even 
if they had a house in their name, or in the name of their spouse or 
children,
or had earlier been allotted a plot of land at a concessional 
rate, provided they did not have any house in the cities of Hyderabad 
or Secunderabad. The Appendix to GoM No. 522, which lists the 
categories of beneficiaries entitled to the relaxation, only states that 
the allotment to such categories was done irrespective of their private 
possessions, in order to “ensure equity and avoid discrimination”. The 
Court found no plausible reason for relaxing the restrictions outlined 
in GoM No. 243, stating that the revised policy under GoM No. 522 
was contrary to public interest and it favoured certain individuals at 
the cost of the public exchequer. The State was unjustifiably giving 
the benefit of concessional land allotment to some affluent persons, 
who had no pressing need for housing sites, while depriving the 
persons who were genuinely in need of a housing plot. Further, the 
State was also losing out on a substantial amount of revenue that 
it could have generated by duly auctioning the Government land 
instead of allotting it at such low rates.
12	
For short, “1975 Rules”.
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14.	 The Court held that the principle of equality had been undermined by 
the policy. GoM No. 1424, dated 28.09.2006, was deemed consistent 
with GoM No. 243, with the stipulation that the restrictions outlined in 
GoM No. 243 would apply to land allotted by the Cooperative Society 
to its members. The High Court held that the Government would 
be well advised to impose additional restrictions against allotments 
to individuals who owned a house in their name or that of their 
spouse or children, and this recommendation should apply to the 
allotments made to Respondent No. 4 therein. The directive of the 
High Court did not preclude the Government from making allotments 
in accordance with the policy under GoM No. 243. It was also open 
for the identified category of individuals to form a new society and 
submit the necessary registration applications. 
15.	 Following this judgment, the State of Andhra Pradesh issued six 
GoMs (Nos. 419 to 425), all dated 25.03.2008, although GoM 
No. 421 was later rescinded. GoM No. 419 states that, based on 
representations from the four wings—Legislature, Judiciary, Executive, 
and Media—land allotments for housing sites had been made under 
GoM No. 522, albeit the same was subsequently struck down by the 
High Court on 08.10.2007. The Court had directed the Government 
that it would be well advised to incorporate additional restrictions 
for those who owned a house or housing site in
their name or that 
of their spouse or children.
16.	 In issuing GoM No. 1424, which allocated land for Respondent No. 
4 therein, the Government confirmed that all restrictions in GoM 
No. 243 would apply to those allotments. The Government decided 
to accept and implement the order of the High Court and to allot 
housing sites to members and societies according to GoM Nos. 
242, 243, and 244. Consequently, 3.25 acres of government land in 
Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, 
was earmarked for allotment to Uday Civil Services Cooperative 
Mutually Aided House Building Society, specifically for AIS officers 
with Andhra Pradesh nativity and those who had worked or were 
working in the State for at least three years. 
17.	 The allotment was to be done at the basic value of land per acre as 
on 04.05.2006, for housing purposes. Conditions specified in GoM 
No. 419 included adherence to the policies outlined in GoM Nos. 
242, 243, and 244. Members who had received any prior allotment
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1387
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
at a concessional rate, either directly or through a society, would 
not be eligible. Members in service as on 29.04.2006, would qualify, 
and in cases where both spouses were employed, only one would 
be eligible. Development of the land would be carried out by the 
Cooperative Society or a designated agency, adhering to applicable 
zoning regulations. Each member was eligible for a plot of 500 square 
yards, and no allottee could transfer or dispose of the land via GPA 
for a period of ten years from the date of allotment. Allotments were 
to be made within six months of the alienation date. A member who 
was allotted a housing site was to complete the construction of the 
house within a period of two years. Affidavit would be furnished by 
every allottee on a non-judicial stamp paper in accordance with the 
prescribed format.
18.	 On similar terms and conditions, vide GoM No. 420, an allotment 
of 72 acres of land in Puppalaguda Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, 
Ranga Reddy district, was made to Indira Legislators Mutually Aided 
Cooperative Housing Society Limited on the basic value of land. It 
was further stipulated that MLAs and MPs who have previously been 
allotted a housing site on a concessional rate, either directly or as 
party of any society, would not be eligible for allotment.
19.	 GoM No. 422 provided for allotment of 48.15 acres of land in 
Puppalaguda
Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District to 
Adarshnagar Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society on payment 
of the basic value of land per acre as on 04.05.2006 on the same 
terms and conditions. Allotment of 16 acres of land at Nanakramguda 
Village, Serilingapalli Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, was made in 
favour of Koh-Ei-Noor Civil Services MACHSL, Hyderabad Officers 
of AIS pre-1989 service, vide GoM No. 423 on payment of the basic 
value of land per acre on 04.05.2006 on similar terms. GoM No. 424 
was for allotment of 32 acres in village Nizampet and 38 acres in Pet 
Basheerabad village in Qutubullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District 
in favour of Jawaharlal Nehru Journalists Mutually Aided Cooperative 
Housing Society Limited on payment of the basic value of land per 
acre as existing on 04.05.2006. However, in this case, each member 
was eligible for 300 square yards of land. Other terms and conditions 
were the same. GoM No. 425 refers to three letters – two letters 
written by the Collector, Ranga Reddy District and one by the Chief 
Commissioner of Land Administration, Hyderabad, furnishing the 
Collector’s proposal, which reported the requisition made by the Indian
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Revenue Service Officers Housing Society for allotment of 50 acres 
of Government land for housing purposes in Puppalaguda Village, 
Rajendranagar Mandal. The Government had carefully considered 
the proposal and had agreed to allot 30 acres of land in Gopannapalli 
Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District in favour of 
Indian Revenue Service13 Officers (Income Tax) Housing Society on 
payment of the basic value. The conditions relating to the basic value 
on allotment within Outer Ring Road project prescribed in GoM No. 
243 were relaxed in favour of the Cooperative Society. The terms and 
conditions fixed as per the annexure stipulate that the IRS officers 
should be natives of Andhra Pradesh, working in Andhra Pradesh or 
any other part of the country. In case of non-Andhra IRS Officers, one 
should have worked a minimum of 5 years in Andhra Pradesh and 
should be serving in Andhra Pradesh as on 01.01.2008. If not a native 
of Andhra Pradesh, one should have declared any place in Andhra 
Pradesh as his hometown/place of settlement after retirement, through 
a formal declaration to Income Tax Department. Each eligible member 
was to be allotted 500 square yards. A member already allotted land 
by any other government was not eligible. An allottee was not entitled 
to alienate/transfer/dispose of the land using the instrument of GPA 
for a period of 10 years from the date of allotment. Through GoM No. 
451
dated 27.03.2008, land was allotted to A.P. S.P. MACHS Ltd. to 
the extent of 21 acres, on somewhat identical terms. 
20.	 After the said notification was issued, the three Writ Petitions 
mentioned in paragraph 1 above were filed. The lead Writ Petition 
No. 7956/2008 was filed by Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani who was also 
a co-petitioner in the first Writ Petition No. 13730/2006. In addition, 
M/s Campaign for Housing and Tenural Rights (CHATRI) filed Writ 
Petition No. 7997/2008 and Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav filed Writ Petition 
No. 23682/2008. It may be relevant to reproduce the prayers made 
in the Writ Petitions, which read:
“Petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 
praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit 
filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ, 
order or direction more particularly one in the nature of 
writ of Mandamus declaring G.O.Ms. No.419 to 425 & 
13	
For short, “IRS”.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1389
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
551 Revenue (ASN.V) Department dated 25.3.2008 & 
dated 27.3.2008 respectively issued by 1st respondent 
as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional, without jurisdiction, 
void ab initio and violative of petitioners fundamental 
rights guaranteed under article 14 orders dated 8.10.2007 
in W.P.No.13730 passed by the Hon’ble High Court and 
consequently to set-aside the same and to pass such 
other order or orders.
xx
xx
xx
Petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 
praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit 
filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ, 
order or, direction more particularly one in the nature of 
writ of Mandamus declaring the
i)	
G.O.Ms. No.243, 28.2.2005 issued by the 1st 
respondent providing for the allotment of land to 
persons categorized in Sl. Nos. i to V & Vii detailed 
therein.
ii)	
G.O.Ms. No.244 dated 28.2.2005 issued laying 
guidelines for allotment of land to Govt. of Employees 
and the methodology ·therefor including the entitlement 
to varying extents of land and
iii)	
The consequential allotment. of lands to the respondents 
4 to 11 vide the impugned to G.O.Ms. No.419 to 425 
dt.25.3.2008 and G.O.Ms. No.551 dt.27.3.2008 as 
arbitrary unreasonable opposed to public interest 
of violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India 
being contrary to the Judgment of this Hon’ble Court 
in W.P.No.13730 of
2006 dt.8.10.2007 and also Rule 
10(a) of the A.P. Telangana Area Revenue Rules 
and to set aside same and consequently direct 
the respondents to forthwith forbear from acting in 
pursuance of the impugned policy and pass such 
other order or orders as are deemed fit and proper 
in the facts and circumstances of the case.
xx
xx
xx
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Petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 
praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit 
filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue 
a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the 
nature of writ of Mandamus declaring the 
iv)	
G.O.Ms. No.243, 28.2.2005 issued by the 181 
respondent providing for the allotment of land to 
persons categorized in Sl.Nos. i to V & Vii detailed 
therein.
v)	
G.O.Ms. No.244 dated 28.2.2005 issued laying 
guidelines for allotment of land to Govt. of Employees 
and the methodology therefor including the entitlement 
to varying extents of land and, 
vi)	
The consequential allotment of lands to the 
respondents 4 to 11 vide the impugned to G.O. Ms. 
No.419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425 dt.27th March, 
2008 and all the consequential actions including the 
execution the execution of the sale deeds. as arbitrary, 
unreasonable, opposed to public interest, violative of 
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, being contrary to 
the Judgment of this Hon’ble Court in W.P. No.13730 
of 2006 dt.8.10.2007 and the provisions of the A.P. 
Telangana Area Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and 
the Rules made thereunder and set aside same and 
consequently direct the respondents to forthwith 
forbear from acting in pursuance of the impugned 
policy and pass such other or orders.”
21.	 The housing Cooperative Societies were also made parties to the 
said Writ Petitions.
In Writ Petition No. 7956/2008, the petitioner 
prayed for striking down GoM Nos. 419 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 
and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008, as being illegal, arbitrary, 
unconstitutional, without jurisdiction, void ab initio and being in 
violation of the fundamental rights and the judgment of the High 
Court dated 08.10.2007 in Writ Petition No. 13730 of 2006. However, 
in the Writ Petition filed by M/s Campaign for Housing and Tenural 
Rights (CHATRI) and Keshav Rao Jadhav, the petitioners prayed 
for setting aside the categorisation and guidelines of the policy 
itself, as envisaged under GoM No. 243 and GoM No. 244 dated
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1391
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
28.02.2005, along with striking down the consequential allotment 
of lands to Respondent Nos. 4 to 11 vide GoM Nos. 419 to 425 
dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008. All the 
above GoMs were challenged as being arbitrary and opposed to 
public interest, as well as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution 
of India and being contrary to the judgment dated 08.10.2007, in 
Writ Petition 13730/2006. Reference was also made to Rule 10 (a) 
of the 1975 Rules.
Impugned Judgment
22.	 The High Court rejected the preliminary submission made by the 
Respondents on the principle of res judicata in the second round 
of litigation. However, the Court held that principles of constructive 
res judicata would apply, emphasizing that the petitioners in Writ 
Petition No. 13730/2006 should also have challenged GoM Nos. 
243 and 244. Reference was made to the judgments of this Court 
in Forward Construction Company and Others v. Municipal 
Corporation of Greater Bombay,14 and State of Karnataka and 
Another v. All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others,15 
stating that in public interest litigations, when Writ Petitions are filed 
on identical grounds, the principles of res judicata and constructive 
res judicata are applicable. 
23.	 The question of locus standi was decided in favour of the petitioners, 
who were recognized as public-spirited individuals espousing a public
cause. The High Court held that the petitioners could legitimately 
claim that the measures for land allotment concern not only them 
but also the public at large. The plea of laches was dismissed, as 
the fresh allotment made after the judgment dated 08.10.2007, in 
Writ Petition 13730/2006, constituted a fresh cause of action. The 
Court further stated that the Writ Petitions acted as a class action. 
24.	 Regarding the validity of GoM Nos. 419, 420, and 422 to 425, the 
High Court noted that the earlier decision dated 08.10.2007, in Writ 
Petition 13730/2006, had outlined restrictions on land allotment for 
individuals who had already received similar government concessions, 
either directly or through Cooperative Societies. Contrary to the 
14	
[1985] Supp. 3 SCR 766 : (1986) 1 SCC 100
15	
[2006] Supp. (1) SCR 86 : (2006) 4 SCC 683
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Respondents’ claims, the Division Bench did not leave the final 
decision solely to the Government. It observed that the new GoM 
Nos. 419 to 425 failed to bar allotment to individuals who already 
owned land in their own name or that of their spouse or children. 
The earlier decision was unequivocal in stating that the principle of 
equality had been violated, as it did not restrict allotment of land to 
those who had already been allotted land at concessional rates or 
who privately owned a house or housing site. 
25.	 The High Court further noted that while the earlier Division Bench 
could have quashed GoM No. 522, it chose to give the government 
an opportunity to comply with its directions. It went on to observe that 
the government improperly issued the new GoMs, rendering them 
invalid. It held that the allotment of land to those who already owned 
land in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children, 
cannot be sustained. As a result, the Division Bench quashed all the 
GoMs in its judgment dated 05.01.2010, and directed that the various 
parcels of land be restored to the Government. Fresh allotments 
could be made only after issuing new GoMs in accordance with the 
High Court’s directions. 
Contentions and Arguments Raised by the Parties
26.	 To avoid prolixity and repetition, we will not separately refer to the 
arguments raised by the counsels for Cooperative Societies and 
their members as well
as State of Telangana on one side, and the 
counsel for the Writ Petitioners, who, as noted above, have also 
challenged the impugned judgment.
27.	 The contentions and pleas raised by the counsel for the Cooperative 
Societies, its members, and State of Telangana, can be crystallised as:
(i)	
Successive governments have allotted lands in Hyderabad at 
concessional rates till 1989.
(ii)	
The GoM Nos. 419 to 425 were issued after almost 18 years 
for allotment of housing sites as a one-time benefit.
(iii)	 Allotment to members of AIS, government service, etc. on 
preferential basis does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of 
India, as these officers constitute a separate class. Government 
servants play a vital role in governance and contribute to the 
society through their toil and sacrifice. They have an unwavering
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
commitment towards societal welfare and public services. 
However, at the same time, their salary and pay structures never 
match those of their counterparts in the private sector. Their 
carry home pay is much less than the persons with similar level 
of education and experience in the private sector. There is much 
less scope for wealth accumulation. Post-retirement benefits 
are also limited. They suffer on account of opportunity cost. 
Due to the transferable nature of their jobs, they do not have 
a permanent residence and, therefore, the scheme envisages 
allotment of housing sites to enable them to have a semblance 
of residential security.
(iv)	 The allotment of housing sites, in view of the aforesaid 
differentiation and classification, has a rational nexus and 
objective. The policy provides stability to the lives of these officers 
and reduces dependence on government accommodation. It 
is a symbolic gesture of the government’s commitment to the 
welfare of the officers given the importance of their role and 
the challenges they face. No government largesse is given to 
the government employees.
(v)	
The Cooperative Societies to whom land has been allotted 
have made substantial payments towards the price of the plots 
as also towards stamp duty.16 In many cases, the employees 
have retired and in some cases they have even died without 
getting benefit of the plots
though they had made payments. 
Some of the societies have also undertaken development work 
at their own expense.
(vi)	 Since journalists constitute a separate class, several Governments 
have allotted housing sites to them at concessional rates. 
16	
The details of the payments made by some of the Cooperative Societies towards the land cost and 
infrastructure development and conversion charges is as under:
	•
Respondent No. 4 – M/s Indira Legislators Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society has spent 
more than Rs. 20 crores.
	•
Respondent No. 6 – Adarshnagar Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society has spent more 
than Rs. 10 crores.
	•
Respondent No. 7 – Koh-Ei-Noor Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. has spent 
around Rs. 9.75 crores.
	•
Respondent No. 8 – Jawaharlal Nehru Journalists Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society 
has spent around Rs. 13.8 crores.
	•
Respondent No. 9 – M/s Indian Revenue Services Officers’ (Income-Tax) Housing Society has 
spent around Rs. 3.9 crores.
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(vii)	 Allotment of plots at the basic rate, is legal and valid. Price 
determination falls within the exclusive domain of the Executive. 
Procedure under the law has been duly followed. Reliance is 
placed upon Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue 
Act, 1317F17 and the alienation rules framed thereunder which 
we shall refer to subsequently. 
(viii)	Basic market value is determined by the Collector as per the 
Telangana Revision of Market Value Guideline Rules, 1998 
which have been made in exercise of the power under Section 
47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Sale value cannot be less 
than the basic value. Since market value is highly volatile, 
there cannot be any uniform system of determining the market 
value. It cannot be argued, therefore, that the land has been 
granted at a concessional rate as it has been sold at basic 
market value.
(ix)	 There are enough safeguards in the impugned GoMs which 
ensure that the allotments made are not maliciously converted 
into a profiteering exercise. One such safeguard is that allotment 
is not made directly to individuals, but through a society. Further, 
an employee is entitled to such allotment only once during her/
his service. A cut-off date is also prescribed. If both spouses 
are in government service, only one of them is eligible for land 
allotment. The allotment is not alienable or transferable by any 
instrument, including GPA, for a period of ten years
from the 
date of allotment.
(x)	
Allotments to specified categories also includes family members 
of AIS officers who died in harness prior to their retirement, 
including those killed by Naxalites while on duty, and had not 
availed facilities of allotment of housing sites at concessional 
rates.
28.	 On behalf of the Writ Petitioners, it is submitted that:
(i)	
A policy or an executive decision should be backed by a 
social and welfare purpose. It should not be for the profit 
or benefit of private individuals or a particular class. Public 
interest should be the paramount consideration. Departure 
17	
Year 1906 according to the Gregorian Calendar.
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1395
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
from these principles should be for compelling reasons that 
must be rational and not suggestive of discrimination, bias, 
jobbery or nepotism.
(ii)	
Land is a natural resource and being so it should be expended 
to best subserve the common good. It should not be dissipated 
at a consideration lower than the actual worth. One set of 
citizens, without good reason and justification, cannot prosper 
at the cost of the other set of citizens. 
(iii)	 Valuable government property of around Rs. 10,000 crores 
belonging to the people of the State, which is held in trust by the 
State Government, is sought to be transferred in favour of the 
privileged section or class of persons without an overwhelming 
or legitimate public purpose. The eight categories of persons 
include MLAs, MPs, officers of the AIS, journalists, Judges 
of the Supreme Court and High Court, State Government 
employees, etc.
(iv)	 The size of plots which are being sold at the basic price clearly 
shows arbitrariness and discrimination as Judges of the Supreme 
Court and High Court, MPs, MLAs, and officers of the AIS are 
being allotted plots of 500 square yards, whereas others have 
been allotted smaller plots.
(v)	
Almost all MPs, MLAs, Judges of the Supreme Court and High 
Court, officers of the AIS and even journalists, already own a 
plot or a house within the State. Therefore, they should not be 
shown any
indulgence in distribution of the State’s largesse 
which would allow them to profiteer at the cost of the State 
and the common man.
(vi)	 The State Government had acquired 5,000 (five thousand) 
acres of land in various villages in Ranga Reddy District for 
Information Technology projects, Biotech Park, Apparel Park, 
Discovery City and Hardware Park etc. The landowners were 
poor agriculturists who were paid meagre amounts when their 
lands were acquired. The land is now being transferred to the 
privileged section of the society without a public auction, on 
payment of an amount which is much less than the market value. 
While the allottees will become rich overnight, the villagers and 
the agriculturists who were the erstwhile owners of the land,
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along with the general public and the society, will be denied 
the benefits of the surged land prices. 
(vii)	 Past allotments, if any, made contrary to law, would not justify 
allotments in the present date, if the same were in violation 
of the rule of law and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 
While the State is entitled to frame and take policy decisions, 
such decisions cannot be arbitrary and violate the principles 
of equity and fairness. The Constitution of India does not vest 
absolute discretion with the Executive. Public interest is the 
paramount consideration. Land, including property, should be 
sold and disposed of by public auction or by inviting tender. It 
is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right, and 
not allow perpetuation of the wrongdoing.
(viii)	 Land in the concerned area is scarce, as is accepted by the 
Cooperative Societies, its members and others. This cannot be 
a reason to make preferential allotment to a select few who are 
the privileged or better off members of our society. Allotment of 
government land to such members is contrary to public interest, 
when a considerable portion of the population of the State lives 
below the poverty line, struggling for basic amenities, and is 
without shelter. The impugned land allotment policy is a cloaked 
attempt of the Executive at the aggrandisement of certain 
privileged groups such as bureaucrats, Judges, journalists
etc.
(ix)	 Allotment of individual housing plots to persons belonging 
to weaker sections of the society in Hyderabad and Ranga 
Reddy district was prohibited by the Government Memo dated 
17.11.2004 on the ground that there is paucity and dearth of 
government land in those areas. Construction of only G+3 
multi-storeyed flats was allowed. However, in case of the 
respondents, except for Respondent No. 1 – M/S Campaign for 
Housing and Tenural Rights (CHATRI) in C.A. No. 3792/2011, 
all Cooperative Societies have been allowed to make allotment 
of plots to its members. No principle has been followed and 
there is no justification for taking the said decision, which is 
without any rhyme or reason. 
(x)	
Reliance placed upon the 1975 Rules is misplaced as they do 
not have any application. Allotment of housing sites is governed 
by Assignment of House Sites in Villages & Towns in Telangana
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1397
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
Area Rules, 1975. This aspect, as mentioned above, will be 
referred to subsequently.
Analysis – Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
29.	 The issue with regard to res judicata and constructive res judicata has 
been raised before us and was also argued before and considered 
by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The plea of res judicata 
was rejected by the High Court, but it upheld the plea of constructive 
res judicata raised by the Cooperative Societies, their members and 
the State Government.
30.	 In Forward Construction Company (supra), this Court, relying 
upon Explanation (IV)18 to Section 11 of the Code of the Civil 
Procedure, 1908,19 observed that any matter that might or ought to 
have been made a ground of attack in a former suit is deemed to 
have been made a matter directly or substantially an issue in the 
said suit. Therefore, res judicata impacts not only the actual matter 
determined, but every other matter which the parties might or ought 
to have litigated and have decided as incidental to, or essentially 
connected with the subject matter of the litigation. It includes every 
matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action, 
both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. The judgment 
explains that the underlying principle in Explanation (IV) is that where 
the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter,
that 
should have been taken to be the same thing as if the matter had 
been actually controverted and decided.
31.	 However, in the said case the contention relying upon Explanation (IV) 
was rejected observing that when a matter has been constructively 
in issue, it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. 
Reference was also made to Explanation (VI) to Section 11.20 It is 
observed that the said explanation will apply when the conditions 
mentioned in that explanation are satisfied. This means that the 
Court should be satisfied that the decision in the litigation shall bind 
18	
Explanation IV.—Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in 
such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
19	
For short, “CPC”. 
20	
Explanation VI.—Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed 
in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this 
section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
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all persons interested in the right litigated. Onus of proving want 
of bona fides in respect of the previous litigation is on the parties 
seeking to avoid the said decision. Referring to the Explanation, it is 
said that Section 11 applies to public interest litigation as well. Such 
litigation has to be a bona fide litigation in respect of a right which 
is common and agitated in common with others. In the said case, 
this Court approved the decision of the High Court that Section 11 
will not be applicable in view of the finding recorded by the High 
Court, observing that the first Writ Petition was not a bona fide one.
32.	 In All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others (supra), 
this Court examined the question of res judicata observing that it is 
based upon larger public interest, being founded on two grounds: 
firstly, no one should be vexed twice for one and the same cause; 
and secondly, there should be an end to the same litigation. This 
Court further observed that Section 11 is a statutory recognition of 
the principle of res judicata and, therefore, not a complete code, 
or exhaustive of the general law and principle of res judicata. This 
Court thereafter observed, that a judgment in public interest litigation, 
when the litigation is bona fide, operates in rem. It binds the public 
at large. Thereafter, it examined Explanations (III) and (IV) to Section 
11. Specific reference is made to the judgment
in Greenhalgh v. 
Mallard,21 which observes that it would be an abuse of the process 
of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of 
the same issue which has already been decided. This principle 
will equally apply to every other matter where the parties might or 
ought to have litigated. The principle applies when issues have been 
decided incidentally or essentially connected with the subject matter 
of litigation so as to come within the purview of the original action 
both in respect of the matter of claim and defence. 
33.	 In V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India and Others,22 a question 
that arose before this Court was whether the principle of constructive 
res judicata should be applied as there was an earlier judgment. 
The contention was rejected as being devoid of any substance, by 
observing that the earlier Writ Petition under Article 32 was regarding 
cancellation of 15 allotments of petroleum and gas dealerships and 
21	
(1947) 2 All England Reporter 255 (CA).
22	
[2001] Supp. 4 SCR 411 : (2001) 10 SCC 305
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1399
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
final directions given to the High Court to dispose of the pending 
Writ Petition after examining the individual cases. Clearly, in the 
present matter also, in the first litigation and decision which has 
been quoted above, allotments made were quashed and therefore, 
the effect thereof was that none of the Cooperative Societies or its 
members would have been entitled to any benefit. 
34.	 A more authoritative pronouncement on the said subject is to be 
found in a recent decision of this Court in National Confederation 
of Officers Association of Central Public Sector Enterprises and 
Others v. Union of India and Others,23 wherein it takes notice of 
the argument relating to applicability of res judicata and constructive 
res judicata to PILs. This judgment not only examines the provisions 
of Section 11 of the CPC but the judgment of this Court in Rural 
Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P.,24 wherein it 
is observed that in PILs, every technicality in procedural law is not 
available in defence. Therefore, it would be wrong to dismiss a matter 
involving grave public importance, to entertain the plea of res judicata. 
Reference was also made to All India Manufacturers Organisation 
and Others (supra) which also elucidates the question of bona 
fides. It is observed that the petitioner therein who had filed the first 
litigation had special technical
expertise on the matter to impute the 
project on the ground that he did. Further, the first judgment had 
references to the issue of plan, types of plan required, etc. Lastly, 
the claims and the arguments raised in the second petition were 
largely and substantially same in the first petition. After referring to 
the first judgment, it is observed: 
“35. As a matter of fact, in a public interest litigation, the 
petitioner is not agitating his individual rights but represents 
the public at large. As long as the litigation is bona fide, a 
judgment in a previous public interest litigation would be 
a judgment in rem. It binds the public at large and bars 
any member of the public from coming forward before 
the court and raising any connected issue or an issue, 
which had been raised should have been raised on an 
earlier occasion by way of a public interest litigation. It 
23	
[2021] 10 SCR 954 : (2022) 4 SCC 764
24	
[1990] 3 SCR 72 : 1989 Supp (1) 504
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cannot be doubted that the petitioner in Somashekar 
Reddy was acting bona fide. Further, we may note that, 
as a retired Chief Engineer, Somashekar Reddy had 
the special technical expertise to impugn the Project on 
the grounds that he did and so, he cannot be dismissed 
as a busybody. Thus, we are satisfied in principle that 
Somashekar Reddy, as a public interest litigation, could 
bar the present litigation.”
35.	 The main argument raised on behalf of the Cooperative Societies 
and its members is that the principle of res judicata and constructive 
res judicata would apply in the present case. We are of the opinion 
that the question of res judicata will certainly not apply, as the 
previous judgment did not, as accepted by everyone, examine the 
constitutional validity of GoM Nos. 243 and 244. GoM Nos. 420, 
422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 had not been issued at the time the 
said judgment was pronounced and hence, could never have been 
challenged. On the question of constructive res judicata, we must 
accept that the same will have limited application to public interest 
litigation. 
36.	 The contention is that Writ Petition No. 13730 of 2006 was filed in 
public interest by Mr. V.S. Bose, Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani and Mr. 
O.M. Debara, which petition was disposed of vide judgment dated 
08.10.2007. The judgment, as noticed above, specifically records that 
the petitioners therein had not challenged GoM Nos. 243 and 244
dated 28.02.2005. However, this judgment had in fact quashed the 
allotment made in terms of GoM No. 522 dated 04.05.2006, insofar 
as the GoM had permitted allotment of land to individuals, who are 
not members of Cooperative Societies and groups, or who may 
have received benefit of concessional allotment, either in individual 
capacity or as a member of a Cooperative Society or group to which 
preferential allotment had been made. The said judgment directed 
that the Government should identify the category of persons who 
may form a new Cooperative Society, get the same registered and 
make an application as a group for the purpose of allotment of land 
in terms of the policy contained in GoM Nos. 242 and 243 dated 
28.02.2005. It further ruled that all allotments must be in accordance 
with the stipulations in GoM Nos. 242, 243 and 244. Further, the Court 
observed that the Government would be well advised to incorporate 
a condition of inapplicability of the policy to those who own a house
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1401
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
or housing site in their own name, or in the name of their spouse 
or children, so as to make it applicable to all future allotments. We 
would like to quote the relevant paragraphs from the judgment: 
“In the result, the writ petition is allowed and G.O.Ms.
No.522, dated 04.5.2006 is quashed insofar as it provides 
for allotment of land to individuals, who are not members 
of the societies/groups and who may have received the 
benefit of concessional allotment from the government 
earlier or as member of any society or group to which 
concessional allotment was made. G.O.Ms.No.1424, 
dated 28.9.2006 whereby the land has been earmarked 
for respondent No.4 is declared to be in consonance with 
the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.2.2005 
subject to the rider that all the restrictions contained in 
that G.O. will apply to the allotment of land by respondent 
No.4 to its members. The government will also do well to 
incorporate an additional restriction against the allotment 
of land to those who own house or house-site in their own 
name or in the name of their spouse or children and make 
the same applicable to the allotment made to respondent 
No.4 and all future allotments, which may be made in 
accordance with the policy enshrined in G.0.Ms.Nos.242 
and 243 dated 28.2.2005.
However, it is made clear that this order of ours will not 
preclude the government from
making allotment to societies 
or groups of the identified categories in accordance with 
the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.2.2005 
and it will be open to the identified categories of persons 
to form new society and get the same registered or make 
applications as groups for the purpose of allotment of 
land in terms of the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243, 
dated 28.2.2005.
Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary 
to mention that the provision contained in the impugned 
G.O. for processing of the applications of the individual 
High Court Judges by the sub-committee comprising 
Advocate General, Secretary, Legal Affairs and Registrar 
General, A.P. High Court, with senior-most among them
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being its Chairman had the pernicious effect of demeaning 
the status of the members of the superior judiciary and 
seriously eroding the confidence of the common man 
in the system of administration of justice because, then 
the individual Judges would have been required to make 
applications for allotment of land to the government 
and their applications would have been processed by a 
committee comprising two officers who are constitutionally 
subordinate to the High Court. It is a matter of satisfaction 
that the government has taken corrective measure, 
removed the offending clause and earmarked the land 
for respondent No.4, which is bound to be allotted to the 
members of the said respondent, who do not suffer from 
any disability incorporated in G.O.Ms.No.243 and the 
restriction, which may be imposed by the government in 
terms of the observations made in this order.”
37.	 In view of the legal position, we reject the contention of the Cooperative 
Societies etc. that the principle of constructive res judicata should 
apply to our examination of the challenge to GOM Nos. 243 and 
244. We, therefore, set aside the reasoning of the High Court to 
this extent. 
38.	 We believe that the principles of constructive res judicata should not 
have been applied, given the significant public interest at stake in 
this public interest litigation. It is clear that GoM Nos. 243 and 244 
were not part of the challenge in the
first litigation, as the petitioners 
then believed that simply quashing the allotments would suffice. Once 
the allotments were cancelled and the Writ Petition was allowed, 
the State of Telangana had the opportunity to re-evaluate the entire 
issue in light of the findings recorded. 
39.	 It will not be correct to put fetters on the members of the public 
in filing a Writ Petition challenging GoM Nos. 243 and 244 in this 
factual background. Constructive res judicata applies only when the 
cause of action is identical. In our view, the causes of action in the 
two litigation proceedings should not be considered identical, as the 
first litigation focused on the allotment and its terms and conditions. 
GoM Nos. 243 and 244 are separate and distinct from the allotment 
itself, and challenging these notifications constitutes a separate and 
independent cause of action.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1403
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
Constitutional Validity of Impugned Government Memoranda
40.	 To assess the constitutional validity of GoM Nos. 243 and 244 
dated 28.02.2005; GoM Nos. 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008 and 
GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008; it is crucial to consider the factual 
context of their stipulations.25 The core issue at hand pertains to 
the distribution of State largesse—the generosity exercised by the 
State in distributing public resources—in this instance, public land 
in the State of Telangana. The term “State largesse” often implies 
a level of discretion in how these resources are allocated and can 
be seen as a reflection of a government’s priorities or policies. 
Consequently, the exercise of such “generosity” or “discretion” 
has significant implications for the citizenry, their rights, and the 
functioning of democracy. 
41.	 The question that arises is – Can the Government, like any private 
individual, have the absolute discretion to frame policy, distribute 
resources and enter into a contract with whomsoever it pleases, on 
any terms and conditions it so desires? 
42.	 In Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West 
Bengal,26 this question was posed to this Court. The then Chief 
Justice,27 on behalf of the Bench, responded that the Government 
is not like a private individual who can pick and choose the person 
with whom it will deal. When the Government is
trading with the 
public, the democratic nature of Government demands equality 
coupled with an absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in 
such transactions. The activities of the Government have a public 
element and, therefore, they should be conducted with fairness and 
equality. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but 
if it does so, it must do so fairly, without discrimination and without 
adopting an unfair procedure. 
43.	 In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of 
India,28 relying upon the principle established by Erusian Equipment 
(supra), this Court, observed:
25	
See paragraphs 7 and 8 of this judgment for specifics of GoM Nos. 243 and 244. 
26	
[1975] 2 SCR 674 : (1975) 1 SCC 70
27	
A.N. Ray, CJI.
28	
[1979] 3 SCR 1014 : (1979) 3 SCC 489
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“…This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing 
by the Government with the public, where the interest 
sought to be protected is a privilege. It must, therefore, be 
taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing 
with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering 
into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other 
forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily 
at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with 
any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity 
with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or 
irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in 
the matter of grant of largesse including award of jobs, 
contracts, quotas, licences, etc. must be confined and 
structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory 
standard or norm and if the Government departs from 
such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, 
the action of the Government would be liable to be struck 
down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the 
departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid 
principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable 
or discriminatory.”
44.	 These principles were reiterated in Common Cause, A Registered 
Society v. Union of India,29 where this Court quashed certain 
petroleum pump allotments made by the Minister in exercise of his 
discretionary power. This Court observed: 
“22. The
Government today — in a welfare State — provides 
large number of benefits to the citizens. It distributes wealth 
in the form of allotment of plots, houses, petrol pumps, gas 
agencies, mineral leases, contracts, quotas and licences 
etc. Government distributes largesses in various forms. 
A Minister who is the executive head of the department 
concerned distributes these benefits and largesses. He is 
elected by the people and is elevated to a position where 
he holds a trust on behalf of the people. He has to deal with 
the people’s property in a fair and just manner. He cannot 
commit breach of the trust reposed in him by the people.”
29	
[1996] Supp. 9 SCR 296 : (1996) 6 SCC 530
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
45.	 In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,30 this Court 
unequivocally rejected the argument of absolute discretion of the 
administrative authorities and immunity of their action from judicial 
review. The Court observed:
“21. … In our opinion, it would be alien to the constitutional 
scheme to accept the argument of exclusion of Article 14 
in contractual matters. The scope and permissible grounds 
of judicial review in such matters and the relief which may 
be available are different matters but that does not justify 
the view of its total exclusion. This is more so when the 
modern trend is also to examine the unreasonableness 
of a term in such contracts where the bargaining power 
is unequal so that these are not negotiated contracts but 
standard form contracts between unequals.
xx
xx
xx
29. It can no longer be doubted at this point of time 
that Article 14 of the Constitution of India applies also 
to matters of governmental policy and if the policy 
or any action of the Government, even in contractual 
matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it 
would be unconstitutional.”
(emphasis supplied)
46.	 Thus, time and again, this Court has held that while the power to 
distribute and redistribute public assets and resources lie within the 
State’s discretion, such discretion is not absolute. Article 14 and the 
logic of equality impose fetters on
the exercise of this discretionary 
power. Therefore, it cannot be questioned or contested that state 
policy and executive action must satisfy the rigours of Article 14. 
47.	 This leads us to the subsequent inquiry – how do we ascertain 
whether a State policy or executive action has violated the fetters 
imposed by Article 14? In other words, what are the tests applicable 
to evaluate the legality of State conduct in terms of Article 14? Do 
GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005; GoM Nos. 420, 422-425 
dated 25.03.2008 and GoM No. 551 dated 27.03.2008 pass the 
constitutional muster? 
30	
[1990] Supp. 1 SCR 625 : (1991) 1 SCC 212
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48.	 The test of reasonable classification, developed several decades 
ago, continues to be a dominant test permeating our constitutional 
discourse. It consists of two prongs: 
(i)	
the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia 
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together 
from others that are left out of the group; and 
(ii)	
the differentia must have a rational relation with the object 
sought to be achieved by the statute/policy in question. 
49.	 Referring to the two-fold classification test, a Constitution Bench of 
this Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of 
Investigation,31 emphasised that there must be a nexus between 
the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation/
policy under consideration. The Court also referred to its earlier 
Constitution Bench decision in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice 
S.R. Tendolkar,32 which observes that the legislature is free to 
recognise varying degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions 
on classification to those cases where the need is most evident. 
However, the courts can interfere when there is nothing on the face 
of law or the surrounding circumstances which reasonably support 
the classification. In such cases, the presumption of constitutionality 
does not extend to suggesting that there are always undisclosed 
reasons for subjecting certain individuals or entities to discriminatory
legislation. The rationale for classification may be specified in the 
statute, policy etc., or inferred from the surrounding circumstances 
known or brought to the notice of the court.
50.	 In Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao and Others,33 a 
Constitution Bench of this Court emphasised that the object itself 
should be lawful and cannot be discriminatory. If the object is to 
discriminate against a section of the minority, such discrimination 
cannot be justified on the grounds of reasonable classification, even 
if it has a rational connection to the intended objective.
51.	 In a reference made to this Court under Article 143(1) of the 
Constitution of India regarding the constitutional validity of the 
31	
[2014] 9 SCR 283 : (2014) 8 SCC 682
32	
[1959] 1 SCR 279 : AIR 1958 SC 538
33	
[1973] 3 SCR 39 : (1973) 1 SCC 500
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
Special Courts Bill, 1978, a seven-Judge bench of this Court in 
In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978,34 concluded that the State 
possesses the authority to enact laws that operate differently on 
various groups or classes of individuals to achieve specific ends. 
Constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of 
laws sets a goal that cannot be achieved through rigid formulae. 
Therefore, courts should not demand delusive exactness or apply 
doctrinaire tests. Classification is justified as long as it is not palpably 
arbitrary. Laws must be applied equally to all individuals placed in 
similar situations, and reasonable classification involves segregating 
groups based on shared properties and characteristics. This power 
of classification enables the State to recognise and deal with the 
needs and exigencies of the society as suggested by experience, 
which includes recognition of given degree of evil. What is necessary 
is that there should be a nexus between them.
52.	 The basis of classification, and object of the legislation are distinct 
things. Article 14 postulates the need for a rational nexus. Therefore, 
mere designation of a classification based on an identified objective 
does not lead to an automatic satisfaction of Article 14. Such an 
approach can devolve into legal formalism, which risks disregarding 
the substantive implications of the
constitutional guarantee of 
equality. This Court, to avoid such formalism, has transitioned from 
an exclusive reliance on the test of classification to a concurrent 
application of the doctrine of arbitrariness when actions are not 
grounded in valid reasons. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits 
class discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities 
on individuals arbitrarily selected from a larger group in similar 
circumstances concerning the privileges sought or the liabilities 
imposed. The classification must never be arbitrary, artificial or 
evasive.
53.	 The foundations of arbitrariness in the context of the classification 
test were laid by Bose J. in State of West Bengal v. Anwar 
Ali Sarkar35 and subsequently in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State 
of Saurashtra.36 Bose J. has questioned the propriety of the 
34	
[1979] 2 SCR 476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380
35	
[1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) 1 SCC 1
36	
[1952] 1 SCR 435 : (1952) 1 SCC 215
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classification test by propounding that mere classification by itself 
is not enough, for the simple reason that anything can be classified 
and every discriminatory action must of necessity fall in some 
category of classification. Classification is nothing more than dividing 
of one group of things from another, and unless some difference 
or distinction is made in a given case, no question under Article 
14 can arise. Mere classification is only a means of attaining the 
desired result. Therefore, the ends cannot be entirely ignored and 
consequently, the Court in a limited way is not precluded from 
examining the legitimacy of the legislative object. 
54.	 In a number of decisions of this Court, a similar approach has been 
taken. In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa,37 
this Court cautioned that classification can pose a danger of creating 
artificial inequalities and thus to overdo classification is to undo 
equality. Therefore, classification has to be demonstrably based 
upon substantive differences and should promote relevant goals 
that have constitutional validity.38 The legitimacy of the object, in a 
limited way, is a necessary element to be considered for assessing 
validity of any classification. The classification must be just and fair, 
which necessitates that the court scrutinizes the underlying purpose 
of the law. Many a case will ex-facie or demonstrably meet the equity 
compliance, some
will be declared constitutional after in-depth judicial 
examination. This Court in LIC v. Consumer Education Centre,39 
had accordingly struck down an insurance policy which was limited 
to employees of the Government or reputed commercial firms, as 
violating Article 14 on the ground that it did not meet the test of 
equality, fairness and justice. Significantly, the Court had observed 
that the doctrine of classification is simply a subsidiary rule that 
the judiciary has evolved to give practical content to the doctrine 
of equality. In Indian Council for Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar 
Council of India,40 the stipulation that advocates must be under 
the age of 45 for enrolment was invalidated as being discriminatory, 
despite its intention to address specific demographics. The criterion 
37	
[1974] 1 SCR 771 : (1974) 1 SCC 19
38	
Also see Hiral P. Harsora and Others v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Others (2016) 10 SCC 
165, and Union of India v. N.S. Rathnam & Sons (2015) 10 SCC 681, where similar views have been 
expressed.
39	
[1995] Supp. 1 SCR 349 : (1995) 5 SCC 482
40	
[1995] 1 SCR 304 : (1995) 1 SCC 732
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
was found to be unreasonable and consequently, impinging upon 
the principle of equality.
55.	 Thus, it is crucial to recognise that the unreasonableness of a 
law, policy or state action can be both relative and absolute. First, 
unreasonableness can be comparative, meaning it is assessed 
in relation to something else. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib 
Sehravardi,41 this Court stipulated that a policy in question must 
satisfy two requirements under the reasonable classification test – 
(a) the classification must be reasonable; and (b) it must fulfil the 
twin conditions of intelligible differentia and rational nexus. Second, 
a policy may perpetrate discrimination inherently, instead of inter 
se discrimination vis-à-vis others. In A.L. Kalra v. Project and 
Equipment Corporation of India Ltd.,42 this Court held that one need 
not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between 
two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An 
action/policy can per se be arbitrary, and such arbitrariness in itself 
constitutes a violation of the equal of protection under law. 
56.	 It follows that the rigours of Article 14 cannot be interpreted in a narrow, 
pedantic or lexicographical manner.43 The doctrine of classification 
is neither a mere restatement of Article 14 nor is it the objective 
and end of that Article.44 In a catena of judgments, this
Court has 
held that the reasonable classification doctrine is a judicial formula 
to assess whether legislative or executive actions are arbitrary, 
thus amounting to a denial of equality.45 It is arbitrariness that lies 
at the heart of the reasonable classification test. The principle of 
reasonableness – both legally and philosophically – is an essential 
element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervading Article 14 like a 
“brooding omnipresence”.46 
57.	 In recent pronouncements, this Court has clearly expounded India’s 
equality jurisprudence – from a reliance on the test of classification 
and arbitrariness to a more substantive interpretation of equality. 
41	
[1981] 2 SCR 79 : (1981) 1 SCC 722
42	
[1984] 3 SCR 646 : (1984) 3 SCC 316, 328
43	
Ibid. 
44	
Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1
45	
Ajay Hasia (supra); Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra). 
46	
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248. Also see Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 
SCC 1
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For instance, A.K. Sikri J., in National Legal Services Authority 
v. Union of India and Others,47 had referred to the relationship 
between equality and dignity. In Navtej Johar v. Union of India,48 
D.Y. Chandrachud, J. (as his Lordship then was) explicitly articulated 
the principle of substantive equality and remarked:
“Equating the content of equality with the reasonableness of 
a classification on which a law is based advances the cause 
of legal formalism. The problem with the classification test is 
that what constitutes a reasonable classification is reduced 
to a mere formula: the quest for an intelligible differentia 
and the rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. 
In doing so, the test of classification risks elevating form 
over substance. The danger inherent in legal formalism lies 
in its inability to lay threadbare the values which guide the 
process of judging constitutional rights. Legal formalism 
buries the life-giving forces of the Constitution under a mere 
mantra. What it ignores is that Article 14 contains a powerful 
statement of values – of the substance of equality before 
the law and the equal protection of laws. To reduce it to a 
formal exercise of classification may miss the true value of 
equality as a safeguard against arbitrariness in state action. 
As our constitutional jurisprudence has evolved towards 
recognizing the substantive content of liberty and equality, 
the core
of Article 14 has emerged out of the shadows of 
classification. Article 14 has a substantive content on which, 
together with liberty and dignity, the edifice of the Constitution 
is built. Simply put, in that avatar, it reflects the quest for 
ensuring fair treatment of the individual in every aspect of 
human endeavor and in every facet of human existence.”
58.	 Similarly, in Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India,49 the Court referred 
to jurisprudence relating to indirect discrimination which may also be 
a valid reason to strike down a legislation. This decision refers to the 
principle of substantive equality and that the right of equality should 
not be seen through a narrow lens. The court should examine the 
47	
[2014] 5 SCR 119 : (2014) 5 SCC 438
48	
(2018) 10 SCC 1
49	
[2021] 4 SCR 633 : (2021) 15 SCC 125
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
impact of the law, and whether the law or a policy adversely affects 
members of a particular disadvantaged group disproportionately. In 
other words, when the courts examine the question of rationality 
of a classification, they in a way also examine non-classificatory 
arbitrariness. No doubt, in doing so, the court does show a degree 
of deference. There are decisions of this Court which hold that 
under- inclusiveness will not result in invalidity of a statute, and 
that the State is not obligated to extend a policy to all such cases 
to which it would otherwise apply.50 These decisions are based on 
the premise that a legislation is permitted to recognise degrees of 
harm and may confine its restrictions or benefits to those cases 
where the need is the clearest. Legislative or executive action does 
not deal with absolutes. 
59.	 Thus, over the years, there is a discernible and marked shift from 
mere formal equality to the broader concept of substantive equality, 
which encompasses various dimensions of the principle of equality.51 
On one hand, substantive equality focuses on correction of historical 
wrongs, checking stereotypes, stigma, prejudice etc.,52 while on the 
other, it also scrutinizes if a law or policy is inherently discriminatory. 
The latter principle applies when the legitimacy of the objective is 
flawed and manifests arbitrariness. We shall
subsequently elaborate 
on the legal meaning of substantive equality.
60.	 This evolution of the law under Article 14 aligns with judicial decisions 
in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa. For 
our purposes, we will refer to some decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Canada that exemplify the development of Canada’s approach 
to equality as articulated in Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, 1982.53
61.	 Section 15 of the Canadian Charter54 aims to provide substantive 
50	
See Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) and Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41
51	
Jahnavi Sindhu and Vikram Aditya Narayan, “Equality under the Indian Constitution: Moving away from 
Reasonable Classification” (November 29, 2022). 
52	
Sandra Fredman, “Substantive Equality Revisited”, I.CON (2016), Vol. 14 No. 3, 712-738.
53	
For short, “Canadian Charter”.
54	
Section 15 – (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
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equality.55 To begin, in 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,56 interpreted 
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter to include both direct and 
indirect discrimination. Subsequently, in Law v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration),57 a three-fold test was laid down.58 
This included identifying a comparator group of individuals in similar 
circumstances and determining whether the law’s disadvantage 
constituted an impairment of human dignity. The Supreme Court of 
Canada later modified the test in R. v. Kapp,59 reframing the doctrine 
of substantive equality and held that it should prevail over formal 
equality. The court noted that the human dignity aspect, included in 
the third part of the Law v. Canada (supra) test, had not achieved 
the intended philosophical enhancement. However, human dignity 
remains a fundamental value underlying the principle of equality. 
62.	 In the context of Section 15, which is divided into subsections 
(1)  and  (2)—the latter addressing reverse discrimination and 
ameliorative measures—the inquiry for classification under Kapp 
(supra) requires the government to demonstrate that a program 
has an ameliorative and remedial purpose and specifically targets 
a disadvantaged group identified by enumerated or analogous 
grounds. The test was further refined in Withler v. Canada (Attorney 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law,
program or activity that has as its object the amelioration 
of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of 
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex or mental or physical disability.
55	
A literal reading of the Constitution of India shows that our founders envisaged a progressive and 
substantive framework of equal protection of laws. See Article 14, read with Articles 15, 16, 17, and 18 
of the Constitution of India. 
56	
[1989] 1 SCR 143
57	
[1999] 1 SCR 497
58	
The three-part test is as follows:
A court that is called upon to determine a discrimination claim under s. 15(1) should make the following 
three broad inquiries: 
A.	
Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the 
basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already 
disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment 
between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? 
B.	
Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated and analogous 
grounds? 
and
C.	
Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a benefit 
from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or 
personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the
view 
that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a 
member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration? 
59	
[2008] 2 SCR 483
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
General),60 wherein the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly rejected 
the notion that formal equality alone is adequate, emphasizing the 
necessity of substantive equality, stating:
“Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, rejects the 
mere presence or absence of difference as an answer 
to differential treatment. It insists on going behind the 
facade of similarities and differences. It asks not only 
what characteristics the different treatment is predicated 
upon, but also whether those characteristics are relevant 
considerations under the circumstances. The focus of 
the inquiry is on the actual impact of the impugned law, 
taking full account of social, political, economic and 
historical factors concerning the group. The result may be 
to reveal differential treatment as discriminatory because 
of prejudicial impact or negative stereotyping. Or it may 
reveal that differential treatment is required in order to 
ameliorate the actual situation of the claimant group.”
63.	 Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has significantly reshaped 
the comparator group requirement, providing a broader and wider 
meaning to equality claims. The test poses two questions – (1) Does 
the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous 
ground? and (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by 
perpetuating prejudice or stereotypes? The purpose of the distinction
component is to demonstrate that the claimant has been treated 
differently from others—specifically, that they have been denied a 
benefit available to others or are burdened in a way that others are 
not, due to personal characteristics that qualify as enumerated or 
analogous grounds.
64.	 In Quebec (Attorney General) v. A,61 the court observed that 
substantive equality is not compromised merely because a 
disadvantage is imposed; rather, it is denied when that disadvantage is 
unfair or objectionable. This is often the case when the disadvantage 
perpetuates prejudice or stereotypes. Such discrimination can 
overlook significant harms, including marginalization, oppression, 
and the deprivation of essential benefits. The focus should be on 
60	
[2011] 1 SCR 396
61	
[2012] 1 SCR 61
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the execution and impact of the law, rather than the government’s 
intent, when applying this test. 
65.	 Section 15 is violated when distinctions lead to the perpetuation of 
arbitrary disadvantages based on an individual’s membership in an 
enumerated or analogous group. Importantly, the test requires a 
flexible and contextual inquiry. Lastly, we will refer to the decision of 
Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General),62 where the court summarized 
the law on the adverse effects of discrimination, noting that this occurs 
when a seemingly neutral law disproportionately impacts members of 
groups protected on the basis of enumerated or analogous grounds.
66.	 In this manner, the development of equality jurisprudence in 
Canada bears resemblances with the progressive development of 
constitutional jurisprudence in India. In the Indian context, the mere 
fact that a policy caters to a distinct, intelligible class, does not 
automatically imply that the rigours of Article 14 are satisfied. The 
second prong of the reasonable classification test mandates that 
the distinction created by the policy between the two classes must 
have a rational nexus with the object that policy seeks to achieve. 
Furthermore, the objective of the classification should not itself be 
illogical, unfair and unjust.
67.	 The substantive equality test, as enunciated in our recent 
pronouncements, is broader and is not confined to a single principle. 
No
doubt, it accommodates the legislature and the executive’s right 
to achieve structural change, but this right should be exercised to 
benefit those who are disadvantaged, marginalized, or those in need 
or grouped, while excluding others from the benefit or for imposition of 
the burden or obligation. It is crucial for the Court to consider both the 
intent behind legislation or policy and its practical impact, especially 
when it reflects discrimination based on proscribed grounds.63
68.	 Substantive equality is satisfied when the law or policy genuinely 
intends to and provides, an equal chance of satisfying the criteria for 
access to a particular social or economic good. It respects individual 
dignity, which encompasses three characteristics: (i) a sense of 
self-worth, (ii) protection of basic choices an individual makes, and 
62	
[2020] 3 SCR 113
63	
The expression “proscribed grounds” has reference to Articles 15 to 18 of the Constitution of India. These 
Articles and their impact on Article 14, have been examined later.
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State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
(iii) protection of individuals against harmful stereotypes. Lastly, 
substantive equality is achieved when legislation or policies enhance 
participation and representation, countering both political and socio-
economic exclusion. The last aspect permits anti-subordination, 
as it focuses on the group which has suffered the disadvantage 
and examines whether the legislation or policy aims at neutrality 
or incorporates affirmative action to rectify the disadvantage or 
discrimination. Anti-subordination promotes structural change and 
aims to rectify disadvantages. In this sense, substantive equality 
factors in multiple aspects of inequality offering a multidimensional 
approach that allows the Court to address the interplay of various 
aspects of equality, and equally accommodate differences instead 
of masking them with formal equality.64
69.	 A literal reading of the Constitution’s equality provisions – Articles 14, 
15, 16, and 17 which collectively form the core of equality – supports 
an interpretation of substantive equality. While these Articles are 
broadly interconnected, they also confer independent rights. Article 
18, which prohibits the granting of titles to Indian citizens, aligns 
with this objective, serving as a response to the colonial practice of 
elevating certain Indians over others. 
70.	 Article 15(1) explicitly bars discrimination on the grounds of
race, 
religion, caste, sex, and place of birth. These can be loosely called 
proscribed grounds for classification.65 Classifications based on 
these criteria will be unconstitutional, unless permitted by clauses 
(3), (4), (5), and (6) of Article 15 of the Constitution of India, when 
they are justified on the ground of anti-subordination. Latter clauses 
specifically permit the State to create special provisions for women 
and children, and for the advancement of socially and educationally 
backward classes, including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes. These are anti-subordination grounds.66 The clauses permit 
64	
Supra note 50.
65	
However, as held, classification on the basis of proscribed grounds is not forbidden vide Article 14, albeit 
it should satisfy principles of anti-subordination and non-arbitrariness. Classification based on proscribed 
grounds must at the same time, to be valid, independently meet the mandate of Articles 15 to 18 of the 
Constitution. Articles 15 to 18 confer independent rights to equality, which are not diluted or foregone 
in compliance to Article 14. However, it would be rare that such a situation would arise, once the test of 
substantive equality is satisfied.
66	
Anti-subordination grounds refer to the objectives of the legislation. They are not classifications. As in 
case of proscribed grounds for classification, in case of anti-subordination grounds, the court’s scrutiny 
is not totally prohibited, albeit substantive equality
test will be satisfied when anti-subordination principle
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provisions for their admission to educational institutions, whether aided 
or unaided by the State, with the exception of minority educational 
institutions. Under Article 15(6), the State is authorized to enact laws 
for the economically weaker sections, allowing for up to ten percent 
reservation in employment. Article 16, which deals with equality of 
opportunity in matters of public employment, prohibits discrimination 
of any citizen on the ground or religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth 
or residence. However, it permits the State to make provisions for 
reserving appointments for backward classes that are inadequately 
represented, as well as for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
in State services.
71.	 Article 14, which provides for equality before the law, and mandates 
that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law 
or equal protection of laws, does not specifically refer to a particular 
classification unlike Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, allowing 
greater legislative flexibility. This design is intentional; the framers 
understood that rigid classifications could hinder the legislature’s 
ability to address emerging societal issues and adapt to the evolving 
needs of future generations. By avoiding specificity, the Constitution 
enables lawmakers to make laws on futuristic grounds which may 
arise with the struggles and challenges faced by the new generation.67
72.
Therefore, this Court has taken the view that Article 14 allows for 
reasonable and fair classification but prohibits class legislation. 
Classifications based on the categories outlined in Articles 15 and 
16 are acceptable as long as they have a rational connection to their 
intended objectives. These classifications—such as those pertaining 
to other backward classes, scheduled castes and tribes, and women 
and children—aim to fulfil the principle of equal ends. This approach 
accepts and accommodates the said difference. They adopt an anti-
subordination approach, treating these groups differently to promote 
greater equality. In this manner, Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution 
of India explicitly recognize the necessity for legislative measures 
aimed at uplifting certain disadvantaged sections to achieve equality. 
is not violated, and the classification does not result in indirect discrimination. 
67	
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, which dealt with the 14th amendment to the United States 
Constitution, observes that the framers knew that times could blind them to certain truths and later 
generations could see the laws once thought necessary and proper, in fact, serve only the oppressed. 
The Constitution endures, a person of every generation can invoke its principles in search for greater 
freedom.
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Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
73.	 The substantive equality test will also fail in case the legislation or 
the policy, in its operation, results in indirect discrimination.68 The 
principle of indirect discrimination comes into play when legislation 
or policy applies equally to all but disproportionately disadvantages 
individuals or groups based on protected characteristics, which 
cannot be justified. It refers to inequality of results and outcomes. 
Substantive equality also encompasses equality of opportunity, 
addressing institutional discrimination and rejecting policies that 
promote imbalances rather than equalize starting points. Policies 
should not impose additional obstacles for those requiring protection, 
or who have faced historical discrimination or do so in the present. 
74.	 Therefore, unless a law meets these criteria of substantive equality, 
it would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 
75.	 At this juncture, we will apply the law to the facts of the case. To 
quote from the GoM No. 242, the land allotment policy seeks to 
serve the following objective: 
“Providing shelter is amongst the top priorities of the 
Government. There are well defined schemes for providing 
housing for the poor. In so far as meeting the requirement 
of the other deserving sections of the society, there is no 
fixed policy and mechanism for alienation of land to such 
sections and Allotment was
done case by case, for the land 
identified. Therefore, Government have decided to have 
a comprehensive policy of meeting housing requirement 
of targeted sections of society by creation of land bank 
and· accordingly order the following...”
We would like to emphasise that the policy, while not targeted 
towards the poor, is also aimed towards “other deserving sections 
of the society”, to meet their “housing requirement”. 
76.	 The category of people who have been identified as beneficiaries 
of this State largesse as “other deserving sections of the society” 
are: Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court, MPs, MLAs, 
journalists, State and Central Government employees. It would be 
apt to note that, not only are these classes of people being allotted 
68	
See Lt. Col. Nitisha (supra). Also see Anuj Garg and Others v. Hotel Association of India and Others 
(2008) 3 SCC 1
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land preferentially, the price of such land is also discounted to the 
basic rate, instead of the prevalent market rate. 
77.	 The State of Telangana, in its defence, has contended that the 
abovementioned category of people forms a distinct class. However, 
we have already enunciated above that, not only must a distinct 
classification exist but such classification should not be arbitrary, 
artificial or artful, and should be rationally tailored to serve the 
objective. 
78.	 In the present case, the principle of arbitrariness, as expounded 
in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu in its puritan form, is 
applicable.69 The classification giving State largesse to Judges of 
Constitutional Courts, MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS, journalists, etc. 
favours a privileged segment of society, which is already better off 
compared to the vast majority of marginalized and socio-economically 
disadvantaged individuals. The benefits granted to these privileged 
and well-off classes come at a cost, as they effectively deprive and 
deny the essentials to the marginalized and socially vulnerable 
populations.
79.	 The allocation of land at basic rates to select privileged groups reflects 
a “capricious” and “irrational” approach. This is a classic case of 
executive action steeped in arbitrariness, but clothed in the guise of 
legitimacy, by stating that the ostensible purpose of the policy was 
to allot land to “deserving sections of
society”. Shorn of pretence, 
this policy of the State Government, is an abuse of power meant to 
cater exclusively to the affluent sections of the society, disapproving 
and rejecting the equal right to allotment of the common citizen and 
the socio-economically disadvantaged. It would not be wrong to say 
that the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness, as expounded in Shayara 
Bano v. Union of India is applicable.70
80.	 The arbitrariness inherent in the land allocation policy is further 
reflected in GoM No. 244. This order stipulates that if the available 
land is insufficient to meet the prescribed allocations for AIS officers, 
the size of the plots may be reduced according to a specified ratio. 
However, an exception is carved out for Category 1 beneficiaries, 
69	
(1974) 4 SCC 3
70	
[2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; also see Navtej Johar (supra) and Joseph Shine v. Union of India 
(2019) 3 SCC 39
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1419
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
which includes IAS, IPS, and IFS officers. This category is afforded 
preferential treatment without any justification for such a distinction, 
highlighting an undue bias in favour of the most privileged subset 
within an already irrational classification. 
81.	 In this regard, members of the AIS have asserted that they are 
“underprivileged”, or have made “sacrifices”, which entitles them 
to the privilege of preferential land allotment at a discounted rate. 
We reject this argument as fallacious and untenable. Government 
servants, elected legislators, Judges in the Supreme Court and High 
Court, and prominent journalists do not belong to the “weaker” or 
per se deserving sections of our society, warranting special State 
reservations to land allotment. 
82.	 Land is a finite and highly valuable resource, particularly in densely 
populated urban areas, where access to land for housing and 
economic activities is increasingly scarce. When the government 
allocates land at discounted rates to the privileged few, it engenders 
a system of inequality, conferring upon them a material advantage 
that remains inaccessible to the common citizen. This preferential 
treatment conveys the message that certain individuals are entitled 
to more, not due to the necessities of their public office or the 
public good, but simply because of their status. Such practices 
foster resentment
and disillusionment among ordinary citizens, 
who perceive these actions as corrupt or unjust, thereby eroding 
trust in democratic institutions. This policy undermines solidarity 
and fraternity, reinforcing societal hierarchies rather than actively 
working to dismantle them. 
83.	 The policy has wider economic ramifications as well. When land is 
offered at a discounted rate, it distorts the natural market forces that 
govern the value of land. The true market price of land reflects its 
demand and utility, but when individuals receive land at a discount, 
it artificially devalues the property and consequently diminishes 
public revenue. This has severe financial ramifications for the public 
exchequer.
84.	 In Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana,71 this Court observed 
that, typically, the State is under an obligation to sell public property 
71	
[1985] Supp. (1) SCR 541 : (1985) 3 SCC 267
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only at the market price, with the sole exception of achieving a 
constitutionally recognised public purpose: 
“…Disposal of public property partakes the character 
of a trust in that in its disposal there should be nothing 
hanky panky and that it must be done at the best price 
so that larger revenue coming into the coffers of the State 
administration would serve public purpose viz. the welfare 
State may be able to expand its beneficient activities 
by the availability of larger funds. This is subject to one 
important limitation that socialist property may be disposed 
at a price lower than the market price or even for a token 
price to achieve some defined constitutionally recognised 
public purpose, one such being to achieve the goals set 
out in Part IV of the Constitution. But where disposal is 
for augmentation of revenue and nothing else, the State 
is under an obligation to secure the best market price 
available in a market economy…A welfare State exists for 
the largest good of the largest number more so when it 
proclaims to be a socialist State dedicated to eradication of 
poverty. All its attempt must be to obtain the best available 
price while disposing of its property because the greater 
the revenue, the welfare activities will get a fillip and shot 
in the arm…”
85.	 We are also of the opinion that, accredited journalists cannot be 
treated as a separate class for such preferential treatment. In fact,
a careful study of the policy indicates that higher echelons of all the 
three wings of the government, —legislators, bureaucrats, and Judges 
of the Supreme Court and High Courts—have been afforded such 
preferential treatment. Journalists, who are considered the fourth 
pillar of democracy, have also been included. These four pillars 
of democracy are expected to act as checks and balances on the 
arbitrary exercise of the State’s power. However, the distribution of 
such extraordinary State benefits renders nugatory the very optics 
of healthy checks and balances within our democratic system.
86.	 Thus, the core framework of these policies suffers from the malaise 
of unreasonableness and arbitrariness. It reeks of colourable exercise 
of power whereby the policymakers are bestowing valuable resources 
to their peers and ilk, triggering a cycle of illegal distribution of State
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1421
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
resources. The State holds all its resources in trust for its citizens, 
to be utilised in larger public and social interest. The State, including 
the three organs – Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary, are de 
facto trustees and agents/repositories which function and govern for 
the benefit of the citizens who are the beneficiaries.72 
87.	 Thus, the allotment policy fails to satisfy the requirements of the 
two-pronged classification test coupled with arbitrariness. As noted 
earlier, the jurisprudence surrounding equality law has evolved beyond 
a purely technical analysis, embracing an approach that considers 
not only the intent behind legislation or policy but also its real-world 
impact. We are of the opinion that the policies in question are a 
relevant example to show that merely likes being treated alike can 
lead to injustice. The pursuit of consistency through classification, 
while appealing in theory, does not ensure that the classification is 
either appropriate or equitable in practice. The substantive equality in 
contemporary equality jurisprudence calls not for a conceptually tidy 
“test”, but a multi-pronged approach to equality, which acknowledges 
the diverse ways in which inequality and discrimination may be 
perpetuated.73 To test the facts against the standards of substantive 
equality, we are of the opinion that Judges of the Supreme Court 
and
the High Court, MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS, journalists 
etc. cannot be treated as a separate category for allotment of land 
at a discounted basic value in preference to others. The object 
of the policy perpetuates inequality. The policy differentiates and 
bestows largesse to an advantwaged section/group by resorting 
to discrimination and denial. It bars the more deserving, as well as 
those similarly situated, from access to the land at the same price. It 
promotes social-economic exclusion, to favour a small and privileged 
section/group. The policy does not meet the equality and fairness 
standards prescribed by the Constitution. 
88.	 Of course, the State has the discretion and duty under the Constitution, 
to distribute its resources to marginalised sections of society, or 
other imminent and deserving personalities, to the extent necessary 
to discharge their public functions. Personalities who contribute to 
72	
NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA and Others (2011) 6 SCC 508
73	
The impugned policies are not in furtherance of anti-subordination principle, and they do not raise a 
presumption of constitutionality.
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the nation’s progress through excellence in sports or other public 
activities may also be compensated through reasonable and non-
arbitrary distribution of State largesse. We would also like to clarify 
that a policy or law allotting land to public servants may be justifiable 
provided such allotment is within the confines of Article 14. Unless the 
classification satisfies the twin prong test and the substantive equality 
benchmark, the mandate of Article 14 is not met. The State cannot 
exercise discretion to benefit a select few elites disproportionately, 
especially ones who are already enjoying pre-existing benefits and 
advantages. 
89.	 Reliance placed by some of the Cooperative Societies and members 
on the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317F, 
and the 1975 Rules, including Section 25,74 is misconceived. Section 
25 states that the land can be assigned for special purposes and 
such assignment shall be lawful. However, it does not mean that 
the land can be allotted in violation of principle of equality enshrined 
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
90.	 Further, Rule 2(b) of the 1975 Rules states that alienation of land 
means placing land at the disposal of a third person for a public 
purpose or a specified cause. Alienation of land revenue, as defined 
in Section 2(c), means the grant of exemption from payment. Section 
2(i) defines market value to mean value of the land that
would fetch 
in the open market if sold, subject to appropriate charge for land 
revenue. Rule 10, which is relied upon by the Cooperative Societies 
and its members, states that notwithstanding anything contained 
in the rules, the Government, if it so desires, can sell or otherwise 
alienate the land or other property in Telangana area by following 
reasonable procedure, including public auction where alienation 
is deemed necessary. This rule does not support or assist the 
Cooperative Societies and their members in their argument.
91.	 At this juncture, it is worth noting that during the pendency of the Writ 
Petition before the High Court, several members of the Judiciary, to 
74	
25. Assigning of land for special purpose to be lawful – When a village is under settlement, the 
Commissioner of Survey Settlement or the Commissioner of Land Records in that Village and in 
other cases with the sanction of the Board of Revenue, the Collector may, subject to the orders of the 
Government, set apart any Khalsa land not in the lawful occupation of any person or class for pasturage 
of cattle or for grass reserves or for other Government purposes or for the purposes of public benefit; 
provided that it does not interfere with any right of any person or class. The land so set apart shall not be 
otherwise appropriated without the order of the Board of Revenue.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
1423
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.  
Dr. Rao, V.B.J. Chelikani and Others
their credit, decided to withdraw their applications for allotment of 
land. Recognizing the constitutional limitations and acknowledging that 
such allotment would violate Article 14, they made this decision upon 
thoughtful consideration. However, many others continued to defend 
the allotment, vigorously presenting arguments that they constituted a 
separate class with a rational nexus to the policy. These arguments, 
however, are devoid of merit and must be unequivocally rejected.
Conclusion and Directions
92.	 In view of the aforesaid findings and discussion, we dismiss the 
appeals preferred by the State of Telangana, the Cooperative 
Societies and their members, and we allow the appeal preferred by 
Mr. Keshav Rao Jadhav challenging the judgment dated 05.01.2010 
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh 
in Writ Petition Nos. 7956, 7997 and 23862 of 2008. The said 
Writ Petitions are allowed, thereby issuing a Writ of certiorari and 
quashing GoM Nos. 243 and 244 dated 28.02.2005 to the extent 
they classify MPs, MLAs, officers of the AIS/State Government, 
Judges of the Constitutional Courts, and journalists as a separate 
class for allotment of land at the basic rate. As a sequitur, GoM 
Nos. 419, 420, 422 to 425 dated 25.03.2008, and GoM No. 551 
dated 27.03.2008, are declared to be bad in law, being violative of 
Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, and are quashed by issuing 
a Writ of certiorari.
93.	 The interim directions passed by this Court in some of these cases will 
now stand merged with the final direction. Parties will be accordingly 
bound by the same.
94.	 We also deem it appropriate to pass an order of restitution and 
direct that the Cooperative Societies and their members, as the case 
may be, will be entitled to a refund of the entire amount deposited 
by them, including the stamp duty and the registration fee paid by 
them, along with the interest which may be quantified by the State 
of Telangana. The rate of interest will not exceed the Reserve Bank 
of India’s rate of interest applicable from time to time, as may be 
deemed fit by the State of Telangana. The lease deeds executed 
by the State of Telangana in favour of the societies/members will be 
treated as cancelled. Similarly, development charges/expenses paid 
by the Cooperative Societies/members, as reflected in the books of 
accounts of the Cooperative Societies /members, duly certified by
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the income-tax returns, will be refunded to them along with interest 
at the rates specified.
95.	 It will be open to the State of Telangana to deal with the land in the 
manner it deems fit and proper and as per law, keeping in mind the 
observations and findings recorded in this judgment.
96.	 The appeals and the contempt petitions are accordingly disposed 
of. All pending applications also stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals and contempt petitions disposed of.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain