UNION OF INDIA & ORS. versus K. SURI BABU
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 1046, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 1046 : 2023 INSC 1033
1046
CASE DETAILS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
v.
K. SURI BABU
(Civil Appeal No. 1320 of 2010)
NOVEMBER 29, 2023
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, C. T. RAVIKUMAR AND 
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the disciplinary proceedings against 
the respondent-workman, could be initiated under the Central Civil Services 
(Classiﬁ cation, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 or it could be done only 
under the Standing Orders certiﬁ ed for the Nuclear Fuel Complex-Hyderabad 
on 27.08.1973, under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 
1946.
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 – Central 
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 – 
Tribunal upheld the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings by the 
Nuclear Fuel Complex-Hyderabad, against the respondent under the 
Central Civil Services (Classiﬁ cation, Control and Appeal) Rules, 
1965 – Order set aside by High Court – Case of the respondent is that 
he being a workman will be covered by the Standing Orders under the 
1946 Act which contain provisions to deal with matters, inter alia, of 
disciplinary proceedings:
Held: Standing Orders made under the 1946 Act are Rules speciﬁ c 
to workmen in an industrial establishment – 1946 Act, Industrial Disputes 
Act, 1947 and other such legislations of this period, are worker friendly 
legislations, enacted to regulate the working conditions of workmen – 
Standing Orders grant a protection to a
workman, inter alia, when he 
faces a disciplinary proceeding initiated by the employer – Employer is 
undoubtedly on a much powerful position than a workman and has much 
stronger bargaining power and consequently the statute has been made to
1047
create a balance – The protection of the 1946 Act, cannot be denied to a 
workman merely for the reason that the employer grants him other services 
beneﬁ ts such as pension, gratuity etc. under CCA Rules – A standing order 
is no ordinary order – It has a statutory mandate – CCA Rules, 1965 are 
the general Rules whereas Standing Orders are the Special Rules and will 
override any other general Rule including CCA Rules, 1965 – Moreover, 
the Standing Orders cover a wide area of activities of a workman and are 
workmen speciﬁ c yet in view of s.13B of 1946 Act, a speciﬁ c notiﬁ cation 
can be made applying CCA Rules, 1965 to that speciﬁ c aspect – But a 
notiﬁ cation is necessary – In the present case, there is nothing on record 
to show that after the standing orders, which stood certiﬁ ed in the year 
1973 and were in force, any subsequent modiﬁ cation was made or any 
order passed curtailing these standing orders, u/s.10 of the 1946 Act – In 
the absence of notiﬁ cation u/s.13B of the 1946 Act, there is no fault with 
the order of the High Court holding that it will be the standing orders and 
not the CCA Rules, 1965 which will be applicable – Service conditions 
of respondents will be governed by the Standing Orders as far as the 
disciplinary proceedings are concerned – Order passed by the High Court 
upheld – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Service Law. [Paras 7, 8, 11, 17, 
18, 20 and 21]
 Service Law – Special Rules vis-à-vis General Rules – Standing 
Orders
under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 
vis-à-vis Central Civil Services (Classiﬁ cation, Control and Appeal) 
Rules, 1965:
Held: Standing Orders have the nature of Special Rules – Only in 
those cases, where the Special Rules fail to lay down provisions for dealing 
with certain subjects, can the General Rules be pressed into service – The 
CCA Rules are General Rules which apply to all Government Servants – In 
the present case, when the Standing Orders for the Department clearly laid 
down a procedure to be followed in cases of Disciplinary proceedings under 
Order Nos. 38, 39 & 40, there was no reason for the Department to initiate 
the said proceedings under the CCA Rules – NFC, Hyderabad failed to 
place on record any modiﬁ cation made u/s.10 of the 1946 Act to show that 
the Standing Orders certiﬁ ed for NFC-Hyderabad would not be applicable 
to the respondent. [Paras 19, 20]
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
1048 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 – Objective 
and purpose – Discussed.
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. [1984] 3 SCR 
325: (1984) 3 SCC 369; U.P. State Electricity Board and Another v. Hari 
Shankar Jain and Others, AIR 1979 SC 65 – relied on.
Salem-Erode Electricity Distribution Co. (P) Ltd. v. Employees’ Union 
[1966] 2 SCR 498, Management, Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light 
Railway Co. Ltd. v. S.S. Railway Workers Union [1969] 2 SCR 131; Agra 
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladdin and Others (1969) 2 SCC 598; 
Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [1974] 1 SCR 434: (1974) 3 SCC 
330; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Petroleum Coal Labour Union 
& Ors. [2015] 5 SCR 474 : (2015) 6 SCC 494 – referred to.
Air India v. Union of India ILR (1991) 1 Del 88 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.1320 of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.10.2008 of the High Court of 
A.P. at Hyderabad in WP No.9541 of 2008.
With
Civil Appeal No.1323 of 2010.
Appearances:
Gurmeet Singh Makker, R. Bala, Ms. Arunima Dwivedi, Nachiketa 
Joshi, Shubhendu Anand, Arkaj Kumar, Rajat Nair, Anuj Srinivas Udupa, 
Aakarsh Mishra, Shivam Shukla, Ms. Tanya Agarwal, Advs. for the 
Appellants.
Anand Padmanabhan R, V. Sridhar Reddy, V. N. Raghupathy, Advs. 
for the Respondent.
1049
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. These are the two appeals ﬁ led by the Union of India; Appeal 
No.1320/2010, is against the order dated 14.10.2008 passed by a Division 
Bench of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in 
Writ Petition No.9541 of 2008 and Appeal No. 1323/2010 is against the 
order dated 22.01.2009, of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature, 
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad passed in Writ Petition No.494/2009. The 
issue in both the Civil Appeals raised is identical, but for the sake of 
convenience, for facts we would be only referring to Civil Appeal No.1320 
of 2010. 
2. The High Court in the impugned order dated 14.10.2008 has 
allowed the Writ Petition of the respondent by setting aside the order (dated 
18.03.2008), passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for 
short ‘CAT’) which upheld the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings 
by the Nuclear Fuel Complex-Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘NFC’ 
or ‘Department’), against the respondent under the Central Civil Services 
(Classiﬁ cation, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short ‘CCA Rules 
1965’). The short question which was there before the High Court and 
which is now before us, is whether the disciplinary proceedings against 
the respondent (who is admittedly a workman), could be initiated under 
the CCA Rules 1965 or it could be done only under the Standing Orders 
certiﬁ ed for the NFC-Hyderabad on
27.08.1973 (hereinafter referred to as 
“Standing Orders”), under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) 
Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1946 Act’). 
3. NFC was set up in the 1970s, as a constituent unit of the Department 
of Atomic Energy, Government of India. The respondent was appointed 
as a ‘helper’ w.e.f. 05.05.2001 in NFC. Helper is the class IV post and it 
seems that the eligibility requirement for the post was a Class VI certiﬁ cate 
which the respondent had submitted in order to get the appointment. On 
23.04.2003 he received a memorandum which said that he had given a 
false declaration that he had passed Class VI as the transfer certiﬁ cate of 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
1050 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
Class VI submitted by him was found to be fake for which a disciplinary 
action was to be initiated against him under CCA Rules 1965. In response, 
the respondent denied the allegations and asserted that his certiﬁ cate is 
genuine and further contended that the disciplinary proceedings, if any, 
would be governed by the Standing Orders and not under the CCA Rules 
1965, and ultimately, he ﬁ led an OA before the CAT, Hyderabad, with a 
prayer to set aside the proceedings against him, inter alia, on the grounds 
that the disciplinary proceedings against him can only be initiated under the 
“Standing Orders”, and not under the CCA Rules. The CAT, dismissed his 
O.A. vide its order dated 18.03.2008. The CAT relied on his appointment 
order, as well as the circular dated 12.05.2005 issued by the Department 
to clarify that their employees were governed by the CCA Rules and not 
Standing Orders. This order of CAT, was challenged by the respondent in a 
writ petition before the High Court which was allowed and the order of the 
CAT was set aside and the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent 
were quashed. 
4. The case of the respondent is that he being a workman will be covered 
by the Standing Orders which contain provisions to deal with matters, inter 
alia, of disciplinary proceedings, and therefore the proceedings initiated 
against him under the CCA Rules, 1965 are without jurisdiction. On the 
other hand, the appellants
before this Court would argue that the respondent-
workman is governed by the CCA Rules 1965, being an employee of NFC, 
Hyderabad. One of the terms and conditions stated in his appointment order 
was that he would be governed under the CCA Rules, even for disciplinary 
proceedings. Further, it is under the CCA Rules where a large number of 
beneﬁ ts are liable to be given to the employees of the Department. On the 
date, an employee reaches the age of superannuation, he gets his pension 
only under the CCA Rules 1965, apart from a large number of other beneﬁ ts 
and therefore it is not open for the employee to say that as long he enjoys 
the beneﬁ ts, the Rules will be applicable, but the same Rules will not be 
applicable in the disciplinary proceedings against him. Such an argument 
is not tenable under the law, the department would argue.
5. We have heard Mr. Arkaj Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants 
and Mr. Anand Padmanabhan R. learned counsel for the respondent 
workman, at length and have perused the material on record.
1051
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
6. Learned counsel appearing for the Department has drawn our 
attention to the appointment order dated 05.05.2001, which states that in 
matters of disciplinary proceedings the employee will be governed by the 
CCA Rules. The relevant provision mentioned in the appointment order is 
as under:
“3. I am to add that other terms and conditions of your service 
including discipline will be governed by the rules as applicable to 
Central Government employees of your status in NFC from time to 
time. Your leave entitlement will be admissible to Industrial employees 
in departmental undertakings under Appendix-XI of CSR Vol. II (8th 
Edition) (Ref. Ministry of ﬁ nance Memo No. 7(84) E-IV(A)/B1, dt. 
17.11.61 as amended vide Ministry of Finance Memo No. B(1)-E-
IV(A)/70, dt. 27.03.71). Other conditions of service will be governed 
by the Rules and Orders of the Central Government in force from 
time to time.”
Since the Rules applicable to Central Government employees are the 
CCA Rules 1965, the reference in the appointment order to the applicable 
Rules, is of CCA Rules, 1965.
7. Standing Orders made under the Industrial Establishment (Standing 
Orders) Act, 1946 are however Rules speciﬁ c to workmen in an industrial 
establishment. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946, 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and a number of other legislations of this 
period, are worker friendly legislations, which were enacted
with a purpose 
i.e., to regulate the working conditions of workmen. Standing Orders 
grant a protection to a workman, inter alia, when he faces a disciplinary 
proceeding initiated by the employer. The employer is undoubtedly on a 
much powerful position than a workman and has much stronger bargaining 
power and consequently the statute has been made to create a balance. 
This position has been held by this Court in a catena of decisions, namely, 
Salem-Erode Electricity Distribution Co. (P) Ltd. v. Employees’ Union 
(1966) 2 SCR 4981, Management, Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light 
Railway Co. Ltd. v. S.S. Railway Workers Union (1969) 2 SCR 1312 and 
1 
Paragraph No. 8
2 
Paragraph No. 7
1052 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladdin and Others (1969) 2 SCC 
5983 etc. 
8. The protection of the 1946 Act, cannot be denied to a workman 
merely for the reason that the employer grants him other services beneﬁ ts 
such as pension, gratuity etc. under CCA Rules. The purpose behind this 
worker-friendly legislation was explained by this Court in Sudhir Chandra 
Sarkar v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (1984) 3 SCC 369:
“11. Parliament enacted the Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act, 1946 (“1946 Act” for short). The long title of the 
Act provides that it was an act to require employers in industrial 
establishments formally to deﬁ ne conditions of employment under 
them. The preamble of the Act provides that it is expedient to require 
employers in industrial establishments to deﬁ ne with suﬃ  cient 
precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the 
said conditions known to workmen employed by them. By Section 
3, a duty was cast on the employer governed by the Act to submit 
to the Certifying Oﬃ  cer draft standing orders proposed by him 
for adoption in his industrial establishment. After going through 
the procedure prescribed in the Act, the Certifying Oﬃ  cer has to 
certify the draft standing orders. Section 8 requires the Certifying 
Oﬃ  cer to keep a copy of standing orders as ﬁ nally certiﬁ ed under 
the Act in a register to be maintained for the purpose. Sub-section 
(2) of Section 13
imposes a penalty on employer who does any act 
in contravention of the standing orders ﬁ nally certiﬁ ed under the 
Act. The Act was a legislative response to the laissez faire rule of 
hire and ﬁ re at sweet will. It was an attempt at imposing a statutory 
contract of service between two parties unequal to negotiate, on the 
footing of equality. This was vividly noticed by this Court in Western 
India Match Company Ltd. v. Workmen [(1974) 3 SCC 330 : 1974 
SCC (L&S) 531 : (1974) 1 SCR 434 : (1973) 2 LLJ 403] as under : 
[SCC para 10, p. 334 : SCC (L&S) p. 536] 
“In the sunny days of the market economy theory people 
sincerely believed that the economic law of demand and supply 
3 
Paragraph No. 5
1053
in the labour market would settle a mutually beneﬁ cial bargain 
between the employer and the workman. Such a bargain, they 
took it for granted, would secure fair terms and conditions of 
employment to the workman. This law they venerated as natural 
law. They had an abiding faith in the verity of this law. But the 
experience of the working of this law over a long period has 
belied their faith.”
The intendment underlying the Act and the provisions of the Act 
enacted to give eﬀ ect to the intendment and the scheme of the Act 
leave no room for doubt that the Standing Orders certiﬁ ed under 
the 1946 Act become part of the statutory terms and conditions of 
service between the employer and his employee and they govern the 
relationship between the parties. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber 
Co [(1973) 1 SCC 813, 832 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 341, 360 : (1973) 
3 SCR 587, 612 : (1973) 1 LLJ 278] Workmen v. Buckingham and 
Carnatic Mills [(1970) 1 LLJ 26, 29 (SC)] and Glaxo Laboratories 
v. Presiding Oﬃ  cer Labour Court, Meerut [(1984) 1 SCC 1 : 1984 
SCC (L&S) 42]”
9. The submission made by the learned counsel for the NFC Shri Arkaj 
Kumar is that since the appointment order itself provides that disciplinary 
issues will be governed by the CCA Rules 1965, there should be no room for 
any doubt as to the applicability of the Rules in the disciplinary proceedings. 
This may not be always correct. An appointment order cannot lay down 
terms of service which are against what is
provided in the Standing Orders, 
as they are binding on the employer. This Court in the case of Western India 
Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (1974) 3 SCC 330 had directed reinstatement 
of a worker, who had been illegally terminated from service during his 
probation period, as this period was wrongly extended beyond what was 
permissible in the Standing Orders. This is what was said by this Court in 
Paragraph 11:
“11. The special agreement, in so far as it provides for additional four 
months of probation, is an act in contravention of the Standing Order. 
We have already held that. It plainly follows from Sections 4, 10 and 
13(2) that the inconsistent part of the special agreement cannot prevail 
over the Standing Order. As long as the Standing Order is in force, 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
1054 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
it is binding on the Company as well as the workmen. To uphold the 
special agreement would mean giving a go-by to the Act’s principle of 
three-party participation in the settlement of terms of employment. So 
we are of the opinion that the inconsistent part of the special agreement 
is ineﬀ ective and unenforceable.”
In Sudhir Chandra Sarkar (supra) it was ultimately held by this Court 
that the terms of a statutory contract of service was illegal because it denied 
gratuity to an employer which was against the Standing Orders that were 
legally binding on the employer.
10. Standing Orders are deﬁ ned under Section 2(g) of the 1946 Act 
as under: 
“2(g) “standing orders’ means rules relating to matters set out in the 
Schedule”
In the schedule to the 1946 Act, a whole list of topics is given which 
are related to workman, such as classiﬁ cation of workmen, their attendance, 
closing and reopening of the industrial establishment to suspension or 
dismissal for misconduct and as to what constitutes misconduct, etc.
The 1946 Act mandates under Section 3 that the employer shall 
submit before the certifying oﬃ  cer, draft standing orders proposed by him, 
for adoption in his industrial establishment. The draft standing orders after 
scrutinization under Section 4 of the 1946 Act are ﬁ nally certiﬁ ed under 
Section 5 of the 1946 Act. 
The standing orders are then notiﬁ ed under Section 7 of the Act, when it 
becomes eﬀ ective.
However, before these standing orders are notiﬁ ed under 
Section 7, it may go through a quasi-judicial process, as any party aggrieved 
by any provisions of the standing orders has a right to appeal under Section 
6 of the 1946 Act before the Appellate Authority. The standing orders which 
are ﬁ nally notiﬁ ed are then prominently posted by the employer in English 
as well as in the language understood by the majority of the workmen. 
Section 10 of the 1946 Act provides that the standing orders shall not be 
modiﬁ ed except by agreement between the parties within six months of the 
certiﬁ cation or the last modiﬁ cation of the Standing Orders. The Standing 
Order which the workman/respondent claims in the present case have gone
1055
through the above process and there is no order under Section 10 of the 1946 
Act which modiﬁ es the Standing Order applicable herein. 
11. A standing order is hence no ordinary order. It has a statutory 
mandate. The 1946 Act mandates all owners of industrial establishments 
which are employing 100 or more workmen to prepare standing orders 
which should cover all matters relating to employment of a workman which 
have been given in the schedule of the 1946 Act and then these standing 
orders further need to be certiﬁ ed by the authority under the 1946 Act. The 
objective and purpose of the 1946 Act was to have a certainty in service 
conditions of workmen and a responsibility was placed upon the employer 
to formulate fair conditions of industrial employment, including in its 
disciplinary proceedings against a workman. In other words, standing orders 
are a set of Rules which have to be strictly followed and cannot be ignored, 
modiﬁ ed or changed, except in accordance with law. 
12. The CCA Rules, 1965 on the other hand were framed under the 
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India which are applicable to 
employees of Central Government. The CCA Rules, 1965 are not speciﬁ c 
to workmen as these are general service rules applicable to all employees 
who work under the Central Government. These are not workman speciﬁ c 
Rules, unlike the standing orders. Rule 3 of the CCA Rules, 1965 provides 
for the applicability of the Rules, which reads as under: 
“3.
Application.– (1) These rules shall apply to every government 
servant including every civilian Government servant in the Defence 
Services, but shall not apply to– 
(a) any railway servant, as deﬁ ned in rule 102 of Volume I of the Indian 
Railway Establishment Code,
(b) any member of the All India Services.
(c) any person in casual employment,
(d) any person subject to discharge from service on less than one 
month’s notice, 
(e) any person for whom special provision is made, in respect of matters 
covered by these rules, by or under any law for the time being in force 
or by or under any agreement entered into by or with the previous 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
1056 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
approval of the President before or after the commencement of these 
rules, in regard to matters covered by such special provisions. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the President 
may by order exclude any class of Government servants from the 
operation of all or any of these rules. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), or the 
Indian Railway Establishment Code, these rules shall apply to every 
Government servant temporarily transferred to a Service or post 
coming within exception (a) or (e) in sub-rule (1), to whom, but for 
such transfer, these rules would apply. 
(4) If any doubt arises– 
(a) whether these rules or any of them apply to any person, or
(b) whether any person to whom these rules apply belongs to a 
particular Service.
the matter shall be referred to the President, who shall decide the same. 
13. The standing orders, on the other hand, as we have seen, cover 
a whole range of activities of work related to a workman in an industrial 
establishment which not only includes his working hours, the facilities to be 
given to a workman, his duties and responsibilities but even minor activities 
of a workman in an industrial establishment. There is hardly any area which 
is not covered under these standing orders. Another important feature of the 
standing orders is that it is totally focused on the activities, nature of work 
of a workman and the treatment he deserves
vis-a-vis the employer and the 
duties towards his employer. All these are comprehensively laid down. The 
CCA Rules, 1965 do not comprehensively cover the service conditions of 
a workman as a standing order does. 
14. The purpose and the scope of 1946 Act is explained best in the 
words of Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in U.P. State Electricity Board and 
Another v. Hari Shankar Jain and Others, AIR 1979 SC 65, which held 
as under: 
“6. Let us now examine the various statutory provisions in their 
proper context with a view to resolve the problem before us. First,
1057
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Before the 
passing of the Act, conditions of service of industrial employees were 
invariably ill-deﬁ ned and were hardly ever known with even a slight 
degree of precision to the employees. There was no uniformity of 
conditions of service for employees discharging identical duties in the 
same establishment. Conditions of service were generally ad-hoc and 
the result of oral arrangements which left the employees at the mercy 
of the employer. With the growth of the trade union movement and the 
right of collective bargaining, employees started putting forth their 
demands to end this sad and confusing state of aﬀ airs. Recognising the 
rough deal that was being given to workers by employers who would 
not deﬁ ne their conditions of service and the inevitability of industrial 
strife in such a situation, the legislature intervened and enacted the 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. It was stated in the 
statement of objects and reasons:
“Experience has shown that ‘Standing Orders’, deﬁ ning the 
conditions of recruitment, discharge, disciplinary action, 
holidays, leave etc., go a long way towards minimising friction 
between the management and workers in industrial undertakings. 
Discussion on the subject at the tripartite Indian Labour 
Conferences revealed a consensus of opinion in favour of 
legislation. The Bill accordingly seeks to provide for the framing 
of ‘Standing Orders’ in all industrial
establishments employing 
one hundred and more workers.”
It was, therefore, considered, as stated in the preamble “expedient to 
require employers in industrial establishments to deﬁ ne with suﬃ  cient 
precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the 
said conditions known to workmen employed by them”. The scheme 
of the Act, as amended in 1956 and as it now stands, requires every 
employer of an industrial establishment as deﬁ ned in the Act to submit 
to the Certifying Oﬃ  cer draft Standing Orders, that is, “Rules relating 
to matters set out in the Schedule”, proposed by him for adoption 
in his industrial establishment. This is mandatory. It has to be done 
within six months after the commencement of the Act. Failure to do 
so is punishable and is further made a continuing oﬀ ence. The draft 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
1058 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
Standing Orders are required to cover every matter set out in the 
schedule. The Schedule enumerates the matters to be provided in the 
Standing Orders and they include classiﬁ cation of workmen, shift 
working, attendance and late coming, leave and holidays, termination 
of employment, suspension or dismissal for misconduct, means of 
redress for wronged workmen etc. Item 11 of the Schedule is “Any 
other matter which may be prescribed”. By a notiﬁ cation dated 
November 17, 1959 the Government of Uttar Pradesh has prescribed 
“Age of superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or any other 
facility which the employer may like to extend or may be agreed upon 
between the parties” as a matter requiring to be provided in the 
Standing Orders. On receipt of the draft Standing Orders from the 
employee, the Certifying Oﬃ  cer is required to forward a copy of the 
same to the trade union concerned or the workmen inviting them to 
prefer objections, if any. Thereafter the Certifying Oﬃ  cer is required 
to give a hearing to the employer and the trade union or workmen 
as the case may be and to decide “whether or not any modiﬁ cation 
of or addition to the draft submitted by the employer is necessary to 
render the draft Standing Orders certiﬁ able under the Act”. Standing 
Orders are certiﬁ able under the Act only if provision is made therein for 
every matter set out in the schedule, if they are in conformity with the 
provisions
of the Act and if the Certifying Oﬃ  cer adjudicates them as 
fair and reasonable. The Certifying Oﬃ  cer is invested with the powers 
of a civil court for the purposes of receiving evidence, administering 
oaths, enforcing the attendance of witnesses etc. etc. The order of the 
Certifying Oﬃ  cer is subject to an appeal to the prescribed Appellate 
Authority. The Standing Orders as ﬁ nally certiﬁ ed are required to be 
entered in a register maintained by the Certifying Oﬃ  cer. The employer 
is required to prominently post the Certiﬁ ed Standing Orders on special 
boards maintained for that purpose. This is the broad scheme of the 
Act. The Act also provides for exemptions. About that, later. The Act, as 
originally enacted, precluded the Certifying Oﬃ  cer from adjudicating 
upon the fairness or reasonableness of the Draft Standing Orders 
submitted by the employer but an amendment introduced in 1956 now 
casts a duty upon the Certifying Oﬃ  cer to adjudicate upon the fairness 
or reasonableness of the draft Standing Orders. The scheme of the Act
1059
has been suﬃ  ciently explained by this Court in Associated Cement Co. 
Ltd. v. P.D. Vyas [AIR 1960 SC 665 : (1960) 2 SCR 974 : (1960) 1 LLJ 
563 : 20 FJR 59] , Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. 
State of U.P. [AIR 1966 SC 1471 : (1966) 2 SCR 863 : (1966) 2 LLJ 330 
: 29 FJR 76] , and Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [(1974) 3 
SCC 330 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 531 : (1974) 1 SCR 434] . The Industrial 
Employment (Standing Orders) Act is thus seen to be an Act specially 
designed to deﬁ ne the terms of employment of workmen in industrial 
establishments, to give the workmen a collective voice in deﬁ ning the 
terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the 
scrutiny of quasi-judicial authorities by the application of the test of 
fairness and reasonableness. It is an Act giving recognition and form 
to hard-won and precious rights of workmen. We have no hesitation 
in saying that it is a special Act expressly and exclusively dealing 
with the schedule-enumerated conditions of service of workmen in 
industrial establishments.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, it was held in Hari Shankar Jain (supra) that the Industrial 
Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a special act under which Standing 
Orders are laid down which deals with speciﬁ c conditions of a workman in 
an “industrial establishment”, and the hard won right of a workman cannot 
be taken away by a general enactment such as CCA Rules, 1965. 
“10. We have already shown that the
Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act is a special Act dealing with a speciﬁ c subject, namely 
the conditions of service, enumerated in the schedule, of workmen in 
industrial establishments. It is impossible to conceive that Parliament 
sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Act embodying as they do hard-won and precious 
rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure, 
including a quasi-judicial determination, by a general, incidental 
provision like Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act. It is obvious 
that Parliament did not have before it the Standing Orders Act when 
it passed the Electricity Supply Act and Parliament never meant that 
the Standing Orders Act should stand pro tanto repealed by Section 
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of the view that 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
the provisions of the Standing Orders Act must prevail over Section 
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the 
Standing Orders Act applies.”
15. The NFC was established in the 1970s as a unit of department 
of Atomic Energy, Government of India. The management of NFC after 
its establishment, in the capacity of an employer submitted draft Standing 
Orders under Section 3 of the 1946 Act before the certifying oﬃ  cer which 
was duly certiﬁ ed on 27th August, 1973, and thereafter notiﬁ ed. These 
Standing Orders are applicable to all industrial employees of NFC Hyderabad 
who are workmen as deﬁ ned under the 1946 Act. There is no doubt that the 
private respondents come under the deﬁ nition of workman. Clauses 38 to 44 
of the Standing Orders certiﬁ ed for the NCF-Hyderabad in 1973 provided 
for misconduct, disciplinary action, penalties, procedure, appeal and review. 
It is, however, true that the Ministry of Labour, Government of India 
had issued an OM dated 29th July, 1977 where it had clariﬁ ed that wherever 
Section 13B of the 1946 Act was applicable for the establishments, the 
standing orders need not be certiﬁ ed any longer and in case they have 
already been certiﬁ ed they would become invalid. All the same, the High 
Court of Andhra Pradesh in its impugned order correctly makes a distinction 
here which is that whereas for the Madras Atomic Power Project (similarly 
constituted as
NFC-Hyderabad) there is an exclusionary clause in terms 
of Section 13B of the 1946 Act in its Standing Orders but in the Standing 
Orders certiﬁ ed for NFC-Hyderabad, there is no mention of Section 13-B 
of the 1946 Act. 
16. It is also true that in the present case, both the private respondents 
when they were given employment, their appointment orders clearly said 
that their service conditions, including disciplinary proceedings, if any, 
would be governed under the CCA Rules, 1965. Therefore, the case of the 
employer is that disciplinary proceedings also have to be initiated under 
the CCA Rules, 1965 and the standing orders will have no applicability in 
the present case. 
The employer also relies upon Section 13B of the 1946 Act, which 
reads as follows: 
“13B. Act not to apply to certain industrial establishments.—Nothing 
in this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment in so far as the
1061
workmen employed therein are persons to whom the Fundamental 
and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classiﬁ cation, Control and 
Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, Revised 
Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence Service 
(Classiﬁ cation, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway 
Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations as may be 
notiﬁ ed in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Oﬃ  cial 
Gazette, apply.”
Relying on the above provision, the argument of the employer is that 
the 1946 Act will not apply to an industrial establishment, if for the industrial 
establishment CCA Rules, 1965 have been made applicable, and since the 
CCA Rules, 1965 have been made applicable and it was speciﬁ cally stated 
in the appointment orders of the respondents, the standing orders will have 
no application. 
17. Section 13B of the 1946 Act declares that to those workmen in an 
industrial establishment to whom the CCA Rules, 1965 are applicable, the 
provisions of the 1946 Act will not apply. The question which still remains 
is whether in order to oust the 1946 Act a separate notiﬁ cation under Section 
13 B would be necessary as Section 13 B speaks of “…as may be notiﬁ ed in 
this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Oﬃ  cial Gazette, apply”.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the impugned judgment, though is 
of the opinion that there is some ambiguity in Section 13B of the 1946 Act 
as to whether a
separate notiﬁ cation is required for only unspeciﬁ ed rules 
mentioned in Section 13B or will a separate notiﬁ cation also be necessary 
for the speciﬁ ed Rules such as CCA Rules, 1965. All the same, this question 
has been answered to a large extent by this Court in Hari Shankar Jain 
(supra). The question before this Court was whether the standing orders 
would be applicable to a workman or will it be the regulations framed under 
the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. In the said case, there were standing orders 
for the workmen, who were working for the U.P. State Electricity Board (as 
it was then), but subsequently a notiﬁ cation was issued by the Government 
of India on 28th May, 1970 speciﬁ cally under Section 13B of the 1946 Act. 
The notiﬁ cation read as under: 
“In pursuance of the provision of Section 13-B of the Industrial 
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Act No. 20 of 1946), the 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
Governor is pleased to notify in the oﬃ  cial Gazette that the U.P. 
State Electricity Board has made the following Regulations under 
sub-section (c) of Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Act 
No. 54 of 1948):
Notwithstanding any rule if an order or practice hitherto followed, 
the date of compulsory retirement of an employee of the Board will 
be the date on which he attains the age of 58 years; provided that—
(i) in the case of the inferior servants of the Board, whose 
counterparts under State Government are at present entitled to serve 
up to the age of 60 years, the age of compulsory retirement will be the 
date on which they attain the age of 60 years.
(ii) the Board or its subordinate appointing authority may require 
an employee to retire after he attains or has attained the age of 55 
years on three months’ notice or three months’ salary in lieu thereof 
without assigning any reason.”
We have also noticed that in the above case, there was a speciﬁ c 
notiﬁ cation under Section 13B of the 1946 Act, which admittedly is not 
there in the case at hand. What is important is that the notiﬁ cation (in the 
above case), was not of a general nature but it was speciﬁ c to “compulsory 
retirement”, of employees of the Electricity Board. An employee was to 
be compulsory retired after attaining the age of 58 years, subject to certain 
provisions. This Court held that essentially the Regulations, made under the
Electricity Supply Act are of a general nature, and the Standing Orders are 
the special rules. Therefore, the special rules would override the general. 
Nevertheless, since there is also an exclusion clause under Section 13B of 
the 1946 Act and there was indeed a notiﬁ cation under the said Act which 
we have already referred above, it will be the regulations made under the 
1948 Act which will be applicable, but only so far as it relates to compulsory 
retirement, since the notiﬁ cation dated, 28th May, 1970 was only limited to 
compulsory retirement. It has been held as under: 
“17. … In our view the only reasonable construction that we can put 
upon the language of Section 13-B is that a rule or regulation, if notiﬁ ed 
by the Government, will exclude the applicability of the Act to the extent 
that the rule or regulation covers the ﬁ eld. To that extent and to that
1063
extent only ‘nothing in the Act shall apply’. To understand Section 13-B 
in any other manner will lead to unjust and uncontemplated results. 
For instance, most of the Service Rules and Regulations expressly 
mentioned in Section 13-B do not deal with a large number of the 
matters enumerated in the schedule such as ‘Manner of intimating 
to workmen periods and hour of work, holidays, pay-days and wage 
rates’, ‘shift working’, ‘Attendance and late coming”, ‘conditions of, 
procedure in applying for, and the authority which may grant leave 
and holidays’, ‘Closing and reopening of sections of the industrial 
establishments and temporary stoppages of work and the rights and 
liabilities of the employer and workmen arising therefrom, etc. To 
exclude the applicability of Standing Orders relating to all these 
matters became the Fundamental Rules, the Civil Service Rules or the 
Civil Services Control, Classiﬁ cation and Appeal Rules provide for a 
few matters like ‘Classiﬁ cation of workmen’ or ‘suspension or dismissal 
for misconduct’ would be to reverse the processes of history, apart 
from leading to unjust and untoward results. It will place workmen 
once again at the mercy of the employer be he ever so benign and 
it will certainly promote industrial strife. We have indicated what 
according to us is the proper construction of Section 13-B. That is 
the only construction which gives meaning and sense to Section 13-B 
and that is a construction which can legitimately
be said to conform 
to the Directive Principles of State Policy proclaimed in Articles 42 
and 43 of the Constitution.”
It, then, went on to hold as further: 
“18. We, therefore, hold that the Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in 
the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with 
respect to any of those matters are of no eﬀ ect unless such regulations 
are either notiﬁ ed by the Government under Section 13-B or certiﬁ ed 
by the Certifying Oﬃ  cer under Section 5 of the Industrial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Act. In regard to matters in respect of which 
regulations made by the Board have not been notiﬁ ed by the Governor 
or in respect of which no regulations have been made by the Board, the 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act shall continue to apply. 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
In the present case the regulation made by the Board with regard to 
age of superannuation having been duly notiﬁ ed by the Government, 
the regulation shall have eﬀ ect notwithstanding the fact that it is a 
matter which could be the subject-matter of Standing Orders under 
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act.” 
Relying upon the aforesaid decision, the Delhi High Court in Air 
India v. Union of India, ILR (1991) 1 Del 88 held that in order to make 
the exclusion clause (under Section 13B of the 1946 Act) applicable a 
notiﬁ cation is required to be made and that too by none other than the 
Government of India.
The logical conclusion therefore would be that CCA Rules, 1965 
are the general Rules whereas Standing Orders are the Special Rules, 
and therefore the Standing Orders would override the CCA Rules, 1965. 
Moreover, the Standing Orders cover a wide area of activities of a workman 
and are workmen speciﬁ c yet in view of Section 13B of 1946 Act a speciﬁ c 
notiﬁ cation can be made applying CCA Rules, 1965 to that speciﬁ c aspect. 
But a notiﬁ cation is necessary. In view of the Hari Shankar Jain (supra), 
this can be the only interpretation of Section 13B of the 1946 Act.
18. The NFC was established much after the 1946 Act and the CCA 
Rules, 1965 had come into force. Yet a conscious decision was taken by 
the management of NFC to submit draft Standing Orders under Section 3 
of the 1946 Act, which was duly
certiﬁ ed by the certifying authority and 
then notiﬁ ed which then became applicable since then. Once the standing 
orders have been notiﬁ ed and have come into force, there is a procedure 
prescribed under the 1946 Act for modifying or withdrawing such a standing 
order, which we have stated in the preceding paragraphs. There is nothing 
or record to show that after the standing orders, which stood certiﬁ ed in 
the year 1973 and were in force, any subsequent modiﬁ cation was made 
or any order passed curtailing these standing orders, under Section 10 of 
the 1946 Act. 
Nothing has also been placed on record to suggest that a notiﬁ cation 
under Section 13B of the 1946 Act was made by Government of India, 
making its intentions clear that from henceforth for such and such matters, 
it will be the CCA Rules, 1965 which will be applicable and not the standing 
orders. In the absence of such notiﬁ cation, we do not ﬁ nd any fault with
1065
the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which has held that it will be 
the standing orders and not the CCA Rules, 1965 which will be applicable. 
19. This Court in the case of Hari Shankar Jain (supra)4 held that 
Standing Orders have the nature of Special Rules. It is a settled principle 
of law that only in those cases, where the Special Rules fail to lay down 
provisions for dealing with certain subjects, can the General Rules be 
pressed into service. The CCA Rules are General Rules which apply to 
all Government Servants. When the Standing Orders for the Department 
have clearly laid down a procedure to be followed in cases of Disciplinary 
proceedings under Order Nos. 38, 39 & 40, there is no reason for the 
Department to initiate the said proceedings under the CCA Rules. 
20. Any modiﬁ cation sought to be made to the service conditions of 
the respondent can only be done as per the procedure which is given under 
Section 10 of the Standing Orders Act, 1946. This Court in the case of Oil 
and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Petroleum Coal Labour Union & 
Ors. (2015) 6 SCC 494 was deciding the validity of a policy decision taken 
by ONGC to appoint CISF personnel to security posts. The temporary 
workmen who were appointed on the said posts were opposing this decision 
and it was their contention that their services should be regularised instead. 
This Court observed that the temporary workmen who had completed 240 
days in 12 months had acquired a right to be
regularised under Clause 2(ii) 
of the ‘Certiﬁ ed Standing Orders for Contingent Employees of the Oil and 
Natural Gas Commission’. Further, that any modiﬁ cation to the service 
conditions of the temporary workmen could only be done as per Section 10 
of the 1946 Act. Replying upon the seminal decision of this Court in Hari 
Shankar Jain (supra), it reads as under :-
“For the Corporation to implement such a provision which aﬀ ects 
the service conditions of its employees, it is necessary for the 
Corporation to ﬁ rst modify the Certiﬁ ed Standing Orders by following 
the procedure provided under Section 10 of the Industrial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 as the same is a special enactment and 
therefore, prevails over the provisions under the ONGC Act and the 
Recruitment Rules. The Corporation undisputedly has not made any 
4 
Paragraph No. 10
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]
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[2023] 15 S.C.R.
such modiﬁ cation to its Certiﬁ ed Standing Orders by following the 
procedure for modiﬁ cation of conditions of service as per Section 10 
of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.”
As we have already stated above NFC, Hyderabad has failed to place 
on record any modiﬁ cation made under Section 10 of the 1946 Act to 
show that the Standing Orders certiﬁ ed for NFC-Hyderabad would not be 
applicable to the respondent. 
Service conditions of respondents will be governed by the ‘Standing 
Orders’ as far as the disciplinary proceedings are concerned. ‘Standing 
Orders’ being in the nature of special Rules will override any other general 
Rule including CCA Rules, 1965. Further, in view of the law laid down in 
Hari Shankar Jain (supra) the ‘Standing Order’ will in any case prevail 
until modiﬁ ed under Section 10 of the 1946 Act, which has not been done. 
This position has been reiterated by this Cout in Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation Limited (supra) where conditions of appointment were held to 
be void and inapplicable to a worker if it makes any other Rule applicable 
in suppression of the ‘Standing Orders’ without there being a modiﬁ cation 
under Section 10 of the Standing Orders. 
21. In view of our ﬁ ndings given above, we dismiss these appeals and 
uphold the order dated 14.10.2008 passed by the High Court of Judicature, 
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. The order of status quo granted by this Court 
on
02.03.2009 is hereby vacated. 
No orders as to cost. 
Headnotes prepared by: 
Appeals dismissed.
Divya Pandey