RAJINDER KUMAR BANSAL & ORS versus MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE & ORS.
[2021] 8 S.C.R. 225, Supreme Court of India, 2021
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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RAJINDER KUMAR BANSAL & ORS
v.
MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 8238 of 2013)
AUGUST 17, 2021
[HEMANT GUPTA AND A. S. BOPANNA, JJ.]
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973: s.
2(f) – Rented land – Ejectment petition – Maintainability of – Rented
land let out to a club with an implied permission to construct –
Construction of pavilion, which was used for the purpose of club
only – Respondent No. 2-tenant created a sub-lease and transferred
one portion of the property to the Municipal Committee – Ejectment
petition on the ground of non-payment of rent; subletting of the
premises; and that the property had been abandoned by the first
respondent which had ceased to exist and the premises now being
used for different purpose – Rent Controller as well as Appellate
Authority held that the rented land is being put to use for the purpose
of business and passed eviction order against the respondents –
High Court held that the club activities were not held as business
within the meaning of s. 2(f) so as to apply the Act to the rented
land – On appeal, held: Use of land as club for a pavilion is in
interest of section of the public, thus, land let out to a club which
for the purpose of construction and use of pavilion falls within the
scope of s. 2(f) of the Act – High Court erred in holding that the
land let out to the club used for pavilion is not for the purpose of
business – Thus, eviction petition is maintainable and the order
passed
by the High Court is set aside.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The use of land as club for a pavilion is in interest
of section of the public. Thus, land let out to a club which for the
purpose of construction and use of pavilion falls within the scope
of Section 2(f) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1973 and thus, eviction petition is maintainable under the
Act. [Para 12][234-G]
[2021] 8 S.C.R. 225
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The Model Town Welfare Council, Ludhiana v.
Bhupinder Pal Singh ILR 1971 (2) Punjab & Haryana
579 – approved.
1.2 The tenant has constructed a pavilion in the year 1911
and the said pavilion was mortgaged to the District Board. The
District Boards were constituted as part of local self-Government
under the Punjab District Boards Act, 1883. The said Act was
repealed when the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 was enacted. The
High Court was erroneous in holding that the land let out to the
club used for pavilion is not for the purpose of business. Since
the finding of fact was recorded by the Rent Controller and the
Appellate Authority has not been disputed, therefore, the order
of the eviction was rightfully passed against the respondents. The
order passed by the High Court is set aside. [Para 14-16][236-B-
E]
Narain Swadeshi Mills v. Commissioner of Excess
Profits Tax AIR 1955 SC 176 : [1955] 1 SCR 952;
Senairam Doongarmall v. Commissioner of Income Tax
AIR 1961 SC 1579 : [1962] 1 SCR 257; Manipur
Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh AIR 1964 SC
1533 : [1964] 5 SCR 574 – distinguished.
Haji Ismail Valid Mohmad v. Sports Club in the name of
Union Sports Club (1992) 1 SCC 315; Hazara Singh
and Others v. Dalip Singh and Others AIR 1981 Punjab
and Haryana 155; P.K. Kesayan Nair v C.K. Babu Naidu
AIR 1954 Mad. 8929; P. Vairamani Ammal v. K.N.K.
Rm. Kannappa 1970 (II) M.L.J. 689; Arjan Singh
Chopra v. Sewa Sadan Social Welfare
Centre, Ferozepur
Cantt. I.L.R. 1967 (II) Pb. & Hr. 6459 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
(1992) 1 SCC 315
referred to
Para 6
AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 155
referred to
Para 6
ILR 1971 (2) Punjab & Haryana 579
approved
Para 12
AIR 1954 Mad. 892
referred to
Para 9
1970 (II) M.L.J. 689
referred to
Para 9
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I.L.R. 1967 (II) Pb. & Hr. 645
referred to
Para 9
[1955] 1 SCR 952
distinguished
Para 14
[1962] 1 SCR 257
distinguished
Para 14
[1964] 5 SCR 574
distinguished
Para 14
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.8238 of
2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.03.2009 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No.2531 of 1994.
With
Civil Appeal No.8239 of 2013
P.S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv., Ms. Ekta Sikri, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi,
Ajay Pal Singh Kullar, Vikalp Mudgal, Advs. for the Appellants.
Shekhar Raj Sharma, Dy. AG, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Paras Dutta,
Ms. Adira A. Nair, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The landlord is in appeals aggrieved against an order passed by
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana on 04.03.2009 whereby the club
activities were not held as business within the meaning of Section 2(f) of
the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 19731 so as to
apply the Act to the rented land. The High Court has set aside the orders
passed by the Rent Controller as well as by the Appellate Authority
holding that the rented land is being put to use for the purpose of business.
2. The facts leading to the present appeals are that one Telu Ram
was the original owner of the property. Bhagwan Dass held occupancy
rights in terms of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. Bhagwan Dass earlier
executed a gift deed in favour of Louis club on 16.01.1909 for the purpose
of running a
club only after construction ofa building thereon in respect
of land bearing Khasra No. 770 comprising 15 bighas and 12 biswas and
Khasra No. 771 comprising of 0 bighas 8 and biswas i.e. total admeasuring
16 bighas. Bhagwan Dass had doubt about the gift since he had only
occupancy rights and therefore, a lease deed was executed, after
1 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’
RAJINDER KUMAR BANSAL & ORS v. MUNICIPAL
COMMITTEE & ORS.
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cancelling the gift deed, in favour of the Respondent No. 2 herein on
03.03.1909. The rent was Rs. 10/- per year besides land revenue. The
tenant was given authority to use land for the purpose of club. It further
provided that if there is any construction, the landlord will pay market
price of it.The lease deed in question reads as thus:
“I, Bhagwan Dass S/o Lala Bihari Lal Mahajan is resident of City
Ambala. That land in Khewat no. 10/12, Khasra No. 542, 543
measuring 15 Bigha 16 Biswa situated in Patti Acharjan, City
Ambala, executant has occupancy rights U/s 6 as per tenancy
law Punjab. That the executant with his own free will without any
pressure gave possession for Entertainment vide Gift dated
16-01-1909 in favour of Louis Club, Ambala City and possession
was also given to the Club. The gift deed was also got registered.
As gift deed as per condition on line no. 12, 13 of gift deed is not
legally valid, so said Gift deed was cancelled by the present deed.
Occupancy rights are given to Louis Club on perpetual leases. All
the rights are given to the club for its use. Club is in possession.
Club is authorized to use the land for the purpose of Club. For the
occupancy rights of executant the rent has been fixed at Rs.10/-
per year which will be paid yearly. Land revenue and amount to
be paid to the owner of the land will be paid by Club. Club is
authorised to get the said amount remitted from Govt. or owner
or
they may pay them. The condition is that if Club cease to exist
and land is not used then the land will come back to the executant.
If there is any construction the executant will pay the market
price. If executant does not pay the said price the Club is authorised
to remove his material or to sell the same to somebody else. The
executant will have no objection. The owners have given consent
separately for the above. That perpetual lease deed has been
scribed on 03-03-1909.”
3. It is an admitted fact that a pavilion was constructed, which
was used for the purpose of club only. The Respondent No. 2 herein
created a sub-lease in favour of Ladies Tandon Club. Later, one portion
of the property was transferred to the Municipal Committee. The
Municipal Committee changed the use of the property by sinkinga
tubewell for the use of residents of the town. Therefore, the appellants
filed a petition for ejectment inter alia on the ground of non-payment of
rent; (2) subletting of the premises without the consent of the landlord;
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and (3)that the property had been abandoned by the first respondent
which had ceased to exist and the premises were now being used for
the offices of different departments that is the property has been put to
unauthorized use.
4. The joint written statement was filed on behalf of the Respondent
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 i.e., Louis Club, Deputy Commissioner, State of Haryana
inter alia pleading that the premises had never been used for business
and commercial purposes. Therefore, it is not covered by the rent control
laws. The State claimed ownership of the property. It was further pleaded
that Ladies Tandon Club has been occupying a portion of the property
as a licensee since 1936 which is an unregistered society. Reference
was made to the gift deed in which mutation was sanctioned and
possession delivered to Louis Club.
5. An order of ejectment was passed by the Rent Controller on
18.2.1988. An appeal against the said judgment was preferred by Louis
Club through the Deputy Commissioner, State of Haryana. Such appeal
was dismissed on 19.03.1994. Aggrieved against the order passed by
the Appellate Authority, a Revision Petition was filed by the Municipal
Committee under Section115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though it
should have been under Section 15 (6) of the Act. The High Court allowed
the revision petition.
6. The High Court relied upon the judgment of this Court reported
as Haji Ismail Valid Mohmad v. Sports Club in the name of Union
Sports Club2 that the
activities of indoor and outdoor games of a club
would not lead to the conclusion that premises was let out for the purpose
of education. The High Court made reference to Hazara Singh and
others v. Dalip Singh and others3 wherein it was held that if the land
was not principally let for business or trade, the Act could not have been
applicable. The Full Bench judgment of the High Court reported as The
Model Town Welfare Council, Ludhiana v. Bhupinder Pal Singh4,
was distinguished that the Full Bench did not examine the question of
“rented land” and thus it is not applicable. It was also held that club
activities shall not mean business. In view of the said fact, the findings
recorded by the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority were set aside
and the eviction petition was dismissed as the authorities under the Act
had no jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment petition.
2 (1992) 1 SCC 315
3 AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 155
4 ILR 1971 (2) Punjab & Haryana 579
RAJINDER KUMAR BANSAL & ORS v. MUNICIPAL
COMMITTEE & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
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7. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment in
Model Town Welfare Council wherein, the word ‘business’ appearing
in Section 2(f) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which
is pari materia with the definition of the rented land in Section 2(f) of
the Act, framed the following questions for consideration:
“(1) Whether the word “business” has been used in the definition
of “rented land” in section 2(f) and in clause (b) of section
13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act in the restricted sense of commercial
business carried on with the motive of earning profit or in the
larger sense in which the expression includes everything which
engages the time, talent and interest of a man, i.e., something in
which a person proposes to engage himself either as a duty or in
discharge of the responsibilities of his office.”
8. The Full Bench of the High Court while deciding the said
question, held as under:
“24. Wherever the word “business” is defined in a particular
statute, it is to be given the meaning ascribed to it in that definition.
The question whether the word “business” has been used in a
narrower sense or in a larger sense arises in a case where no
statutory definition of that expression has been given in the relevant
piece of legislation. At page 164 of Aiyar’s Law Lexicon of British
India (1940 Edition), the word “business” in its larger sense has
been stated to mean “an affair requiring attention and care;
that
which busies or occupies one’s time, attention, and labour as his
chief concern.” In the same passage the word “business” is
mentioned to convey, in the narrower sense, mercantile pursuits;
that which one does for a livelihood; occupation; employment; as,
the business of a merchant; the business of agriculture.” It has
finally been stated that “the word ‘business’ is of large signification,
and in its broadest sense includes nearly all the affairs in which
either an individual or a corporation can be actors.” Referring to
the larger sense of the word, it has again been stated at page 165
that ‘business is that which engages the time, talents and interest
of a man; it is what a man proposes to himself; what belongs to a
person to do or see done, that is properly his business; and a
person is bound either by the nature of his engagements, or by
private and personal motives, to perform a service for another.
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31. After carefully considering the law laid down in all the above
cases. I am Inclined to hold :-
(1) That the word “business” is by itself not a word of art and is
capable of being construed both in the wider as well as in the
narrower sense depending on the context in which it occurs
(2) Since the “landlord” within the meaning of section 2(c) of the
Act can include an individual as well as juristic person and there
is no special restrictive definition of the word business in the Act
the expression “business” has been used in section 2(f) of the Act
(in the definition of “rented land”) as well as in section
13(3)(a)(ii)(b) in the wider sense and not in the narrower sense.
(3) The word business in section 2(f) and section 13(3)(a)(ii) of
the Act need not necessarily be commercial business carried on
with a profit motive. The word includes within its scope a
charitable business or a dealing in the interest of the public
or a section of the public.
(4) The scope of the word ‘business’ in the aforesaid provision of
the Act is not controlled or coloured by the word ‘trade’ occurring
alongside it in section 2(f) of the Act. Whereas every trade would
be a business, the reverse of it is not true. Business is a genus, of
which commercial and non-commercial business and trade are
some of the species.”(Emphasis Supplied)
9. The Full Bench of the High Court approved the judgment of
Madras High Court reported as P.K. Kesayan Nair v C.K. Babu
Naidu5 as also another
judgment of the same High Court reported asP.
Vairamani Ammal v. K.N.K. Rm. Kannappa6 and a Single Bench
judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court reported as Arjan Singh
Chopra v. Sewa Sadan Social Welfare Centre, Ferozepur Cantt.7
to arrive at the conclusions referred to above.
10. In Arjan Singh Chopra’s case, the tenant was sought to be
evicted in bonafide requirement of a residential building. The stand of
the tenant was that the building was being used for running of a school
by the tenant. The argument raised was that building is a non-residential
building. But if the landlord is able to show that the demised premises
5 AIR 1954 Mad. 892
6 1970 (II) M.L.J. 689
7 I.L.R. 1967 (II) Pb. & Hr. 645
RAJINDER KUMAR BANSAL & ORS v. MUNICIPAL
COMMITTEE & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
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are not being used solely for the purposes of business or trade, the same
would come within the definition of a residential building. The High Court
held that the activity which the tenant society carries on in running and
maintaining the school, by engaging teachers, as also some of the
ministerial staff, to carry on the school, and by carrying on teaching
activities, it is doing a business though it may not be making a profit. It
was held that the word business is of much wider connotation and so the
activity definitely falls within the scope of that word as used in section
2(d) of the Act. It was held as under:-
“5. In the present case the tenant society maintains and carries
on the school, in which connection it must necessarily engage
teachers and some ministerial staff to manage the school, and for
that purpose it must have funds which would be disbursed in
maintaining and running the school. There is no evidence but
probably part of such expense may be realised by some nominal
fees which the society may be charging from its pupils. So the
activity which the tenant society carries on in running and
maintaining the school, by engaging teachers, as also some
of the ministerial staff, to carry on the school, and by carrying
on teaching activity, it is doing a business though it may not
be making a profit. In view of the decision in the case cited its
activity would also come within the scope of the word ‘trade’.
However, the word business is obviously of much wider
connotation and so the activity definitely falls within the scope of
that word as used in section 2(d) of the Act. The learned counsel
for the landlord contends that the expression “business or trade”
in section 2(d) has reference to such activity as is carried on in a
shop, and hence carried on with a profit motive. If this was so,
nothing stops the Legislature from limiting a definition in section
2(d) in the Act to a shop, but that is not so. The definition of a
“non-residential building” applies to a building, whether shop or
otherwise, which is used solely for the purpose of trade or business.
So that the definition is not confined to a shop only nor does
it necessarily imply that the activity, that is ‘business or trade’,
must have with it profit motive.So this argument on the side of
the landlord cannot succeed and as the activity of the tenant-
society is ‘business’ within the meaning and scope of that word
as used in section 2(d), the demised premises are ‘non-residential
building’ with the result that the landlord cannot have ejectment
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of the tenant-society on the ground which is subject-matter of
argument at this stage.” (Emphasis Supplied)
11. A learned Single Bench of the Madras High Court in a judgment
reported as P. Vairamani Ammal, was examining a case, where the
tenant was using the premises as a rice and flour mill. The landlord has
sought the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of his bonafide
requirements for the purposes of distribution of water which was opposed
inter-alia on the ground that such purpose is not a business, which would
entitle the landlord to claim vacant possession. The High Court held as
under:
“4. The Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of the word
“business” as “being busy, task, duty……….habitual occupation,
profession, trade, serious work.” It is, therefore, to be seen that
the word has a very wide import and would cover every activity
where men keep themselves busy. In Halsbury’s Laws of England
3rd Edition, Volume 38, the word ‘business’ is stated as a wider
term than and not synonymous with, trade and means practically
anything which is an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure.
Examining the scheme of the Act it will be seen that the purpose
of the enactment is to consolidate the law relating to the regulation
of the letting of residential and non-residential buildings and the
control of rents of such building. In this context the meaning of
the word “business” will have to be determined………………….
The Object of the enactment being one to
regulate of occupation
of residential and non-residential buildings. I can see no prohibition
against the landlord putting the building to any legitimate use and
also requiring the building bonafide for any legitimate use. So
long as the object is a legitimate one and so long as the requirements
of the sub-section are fulfilled, I see no reason for restricting the
meaning of the term “for purposes of a business.” If the legitimate
activity by the landlord will be his business the ordinary meaning
of the word ‘business’ applies and there is no warrant for
commercial activities or activities of trade alone. Mr. Baluswami,
the learned Counsel, drew my attention Section 10(3)(b) and
submitted that special provision is made for a case of religious,
charitable, education or other public institution and if the word
‘business’ is given such a wind construction, there is no necessity
for providing for a separate provision for religious, charitable and
RAJINDER KUMAR BANSAL & ORS v. MUNICIPAL
COMMITTEE & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
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educational institutions. The contention cannot be construing the
word “business” in the very restricted way and to confine it to
accepted as Section 10(3)(b) is wider in its scope and the institution
get possession even though if it is in occupation of another building
in the same town. Further the religious institution is entitled to
possession even though the purpose may not be on that falls under
Section 10(3)(a)(i)(ii) and (iii). Sub-section 10(3)(c) would also
support the construction which I am putting on it, as the landlord
who is occupying only a partof the building may apply to the
Controller for an order directing a tenant occupying a portion of
the building to put the landlord in possession if he required additional
accommodation for residential purposes of or purposes of a
business which he is carrying on. The purport of this sub-section
would be that if the landlord is in occupation of a portion of a
residential or non-residential building he would be entitled to the
other portion, and I see no warrant in the section for restricting
his right to activities which are commercial in nature.
8. ……..On a consideration of the decisions and on a consideration
of the submissions made by the learned Counsel on either side, I
am satisfied that the learned District Judge was right in holding
that the carrying on the Thanneerpandal activity would be for
purposes of business as required under Section (3)(a)(iii) of
the
Act.”
12. We find that the High Court has distinguished the Full Bench
judgment in Model Town Welfare Council not for good reasons. The
rented land as defined in Section 2(f) of the Punjab Act is pari materia
with definition of rented land in the Act. It has been held that the
expression “business” appearing in Section 2(f) need not necessarily be
commercial business carried on with a profit motive. The word includes
within its scope a charitable business or adealing in theinterest of public
or a section of the public. Therefore, use of land as club for a pavilionis
in interest of section of the public. Thus, land let out to a club which for
the purpose of construction and use of pavilion falls within the scope of
Section 2(f) of the Act and thus eviction petition is maintainable under
the Act.
13. The judgment in Haji Ismail Valid Mohmad was a case
where the premises were let out to a club to hold entertainment
programmes and music concerts. It was found that the activities of club
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are more in the nature of cultural activities or recreational activities. A
perusal of the said judgment shows that the Bombay Rents, Hotel and
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 apply to premises let out to
residence, education, business, trade or storage and also open land let
out for building purposes. The argument was raised that the premises
were let out for purposes of education. However, the High Court took
the view that the premises let out to tenant were for promoting cultural
activities. Therefore, the tenant was entitled to protection of Section 6
of the Act. It was the said finding which was reversed by the Court, the
Court has held as under:
“16. We regret, we cannot agree with this conclusion of law. The
activities of the club are more in the nature of cultural activities or
recreational activities. They are certainly not for education. In
our view, in the context in which the term ‘education’ appears, it
does not refer to such cultural activities or recreational activities
as amounting to education. The basic purpose of the club activities
relate to fraternizing among the members by playing indoor or
outdoor games or otherwise. Such activities cannot lead to the
conclusion that the premises were let for purposes of education
and consequently the respondent/tenant was not entitled to the
protection of the Act. We are thus constrained to set aside the
impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the judgment of
the lower appellate court
and restore the judgment dated August
30, 1974 passed by the learned trial court. The appeal is allowed
with costs.”
14. The High Court has also relied upon Supreme Court judgments
reported as Narain Swadeshi Mills v. Commissioner of Excess
Profits Tax8, Senairam Doongarmall v. Commissioner of Income
Tax9, Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh10, as well as
the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court reported as Hazara
Singh. The judgment reported in Senairam Doongarmall arises out of
the Income-Tax Act, 1922 to determine the business income. The
judgment reported as Narain Swadeshi Mills is to determine the
existence of business under the Excess Profits TaxAct, 1940. The
judgment reported as Manipur Administration pertains to a control
8 AIR 1955 SC 176
9 AIR 1961 SC 1579
10 AIR 1964 SC 1533
RAJINDER KUMAR BANSAL & ORS v. MUNICIPAL
COMMITTEE & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
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order issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Each of the
statute is enacted for a particular objective in mind. The definition in one
statute cannot be used for interpreting the same word in another statute.
The judgment of the High Court in Hazara Singh is renting of an
agricultural land though within the municipal area. All these judgments
are clearly not applicable to the present case where the rented land was
let out to a club with an implied permission to construct. The Tenant has
constructed a pavilion in the year 1911 and the said pavilion was
mortgaged to the District Board. The District Boards were constituted
as part of local self-Government under the Punjab District Boards Act,
1883. The said Act was repealed when the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911
was enacted. The only question requires to be examined was whether
such sports activity can be said to be either business or trade.The Full
Bench of the High Court was erroneous in holding that the land let out to
the club used for pavilion is not for the purpose of business.
15. Learned Counsel for the State raised an argument that the
huge amount of property tax has not been paid by the lessee or the
successor. The fact is wholly inconsequential. Since the finding of fact
was recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority
has not been disputed, therefore, the order of the eviction was rightfully
passed against the respondents.
16.
Consequently, the present appeals are allowed. The order
passed by the High Court is set aside. The respondents are given three
months’ time to vacate the premises and handover the possession to the
appellants. It is needless to say that the appellants have to pay all taxes
which are due on the land before they are permitted to use the premises
for their purposes.
Nidhi Jain
Appeals allowed.