ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM &   ORS. versus THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU &ANR.
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 1110, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Facts
[2015) 11 S.C.R. i110 
A 
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM & 
B 
c 
ORS. 
v. 
THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU &ANR. 
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 354 of 2006) 
DECEMBER 16, 2015 
[RANJAN GOGOi AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.] 
Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 25, 26 -
Appointments of Archakas in temple - Issuance of G. 0. No. 
118 dated 23. 05. 2006 by Tamil Nadu to the effect that, "any 
D person who is a Hindu and possessing the requisite 
qualification and training can be appointed as ·a Archaka in 
Hindu temples - Writ petitions challenging the G. 0. - Held: 
Appointments of Archakas will have to be made in 
accordance with the Agamas, subject to their due 
E identification as well as their conformity with the constitutional 
mandates and the principles - Requirement of constitutional 
conformity is inbuilt and if a custom or usage is outside the 
'protective umbrella afforded and envisaged by Arts 25 and 
26, the law would take its own course - Constitutional 
F legitimacy must supersede all religious beliefs or practices 
- Validity of the G 0. would depend on the facts of each case 
of appointment - What is prescribed by one particular or a 
set of Agamas for a solitary or a group of temples, would be 
determinative of the issue - Exclusion of some and ;nclusion 
G of a particular segment or denomination for appointment as 
Archakas would not violate Art 14 so Jong such inclusion/ 
exclusion is not based on the criteria of caste, birth or any 
other constitutionally
unacceptable parameter -
Determination of th.e contours of a claimed custom or usage 
H 
1110
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1111 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. 
would be imperative and in that light the validity of the said A 
G. 0. would be decided in each case of appointment of 
Archakas whenever such issue is raised- Tami/.Nadu Hindu 
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 -
G.O.No.118 dt 23.05.2006. 
B 
Disposing of the writ petitions, the Court, 
HELD: 1.1 Appointments of Archakas will have to 
be made in accordance with the Agamas, subject to their 
due identification as well as their conformity with the c 
Constitutional mandates and the principles. [Para 44] 
[1153-B] 
1.2 The rights guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26, are 
circumscribed and _are to be enjoyed within 0 
constitutionally permissible parameters. Often occasions 
will arise when it may become necessary to determine 
whether a belief or a practice claimed and asserted is a 
fundamental part of the religious practice of a group or 
denomination making such a claim before embarking E 
upon the required adjudication. A decision on such 
claims becomes the duty of the Constitutional Court. It 
is neither an easy nor an enviable task that the courts 
are called to perform. Performance of such tasks is not 
enjoined in the court by virtue of any ecclesiastical F 
jurisdiction conferred on it but in view of its role as the 
Constitutional arbiter. Any apprehension that the 
determination by the court of an essential religious 
practice itself negatives the freedoms guaranteed by 
Articles 25 and
26 will have to be dispelled on the G 
touchstone of constitutional necessity. Without such a 
determination there can be no effective adjudication 
whether the claimed right it is in conformity with public 
order, morality and health and in accord with the 
undisputable and unquestionable notions of social H
1112 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A welfare and reforms. A just balance can always be made 
by holding that the exercise of judicial power to 
determine essential religious practices, though always 
available being an inherent power to protect the 
guarantees u/Articles 25, 26, the exercise thereo_f must 
B always be restricted and restrained.[Para 36][1147-F-H; 
1148-A-C] 
1.3 A plain reading of Article 16(5), fortified by the 
debates that had taken place in the Constituent 
C Assembly, protects the appointment of Archakas from a 
particular denomination, if so required to be made, by 
the Agamas holding the field. The debates discloses that 
the suggestion that the operation of Article 16(5) should 
be restricted to appointment in offices connected with 
o administration of a religious institution was negatived. 
The exception in Article 16(5), therefore, would cover an 
office in a temple which also requires performance of 
religious functions. [Para 38][1148-F-H] 
E 
1.4 It would be, incorrect, if not self defeating, to 
take too pedantic an approach at resolution either by 
holding the principle of res judicata or locus to bar an 
adjudication on nierits or to strike down the impugned 
G.O. as an executive fiat that does not have legislative 
F approval, made explicit by the fact that though what has 
been brought by the G.O. dated 23.05.2006 was also 
sought to be incorporat~d in the statute by the 
Ordinance, eventually, the amending Bill presented
before the legislature specifically omitted the said 
G inclusion. The significance of the said .fact, however, 
cannot be underestimated. What is sought to be 
emphasized is that the same, by itself, cannot be 
determinative of the invalidity of the G.O. which would 
have to be tested on certain other premises and 
H foundation treating the same to be an instance of
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1113 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. 
exercise of executive power in an area not covered by A 
any specific law. [Para 39][1149-B-E] 
1.5 Sheshammal case is not an authority for any 
proposition as to what an Agama or a set of Agamas 
governing a particular or group of temples lay down with B 
regard to the question that confronts the court, namely, 
whether any particular denomination of worshippers or 
believers have an exclusive right to be appointed as 
Archakas to perform the poojas. Much less, has the 
judgment taken note of the particular class or caste to C 
which the Archakas of a temple must belong as 
prescribed by the Agamas. All that it does and says is 
that some of the Agamas do incorporate a fundamental 
religious belief of the necessity of performance of the 
Poojas by Archakas belonging to a particular and distinct D 
sect/group/denomination, failing which, there would be 
defilement of deity requiring purification ceremonies. 
Surely, if the Agamas in question do not proscribe any 
group of citizens from being appointed as Archakas on 
the basis of caste or class the sanctity of Article 17 or E 
·any other provision of Part Ill of the Constitution or even 
the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 would not be 
violated. What has been said in Sheshammal case is that 
if any prescription with regard to appointment of F 
Archakas is made by the Agamas, s. 28 of the Tamil Nadu 
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act
mandates the Trustee to conduct the temple affairs in 
accordance with such custom or usage. The 
requirement of Constitutional conformity is inbuilt and if G 
a custom or usage is outside the protective umbrella 
afforded and envisaged by Articles 25 and 26, the law 
would certainly take its own course. The constitutional 
legitimacy, naturally, must supersede all religious beliefs 
or P.ractices. (Para 41] (1150-D-H; 1151-A-B] 
H
1114 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
1.6 The difficulty lies in determining whether a claim 
of State action in furtherance thereof overrides the 
constitutional guarantees under Article 25 and 26 may 
often involve what has already been referred to as a 
delicate and unenviable task of identifying essential 
B religious beliefs and practices, sans which the religion 
itself does not survive. It is in the performance of this 
task that the absence of any exclusive ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction of th!s Court, if not other shortcomings and 
adequacies, that can be felt. Moreover, there is some 
C amount of uncertainty with regard to the prescription 
contained in the Agamas. Coupled with the above i~ .the 
lack of easy availability of established works and the 
declining numbers of acknowledged and undisputed 
0 
scholars on the subject. In Shirur Mutt case with regard 
to complete autonomy of a denomination to decide as 
to what constitutes an essential religious practice, a 
view that has also been subsequently echoed by this 
Court though as a "minority view". But it is clarified that 
E no such view of the Court can be understood to an 
indication of any bar to judicial determination of the issue 
as and when it arises. Any contrary opinion would go 
rise to large scale conflicts of claims and usages as to 
what is an essential religious practice with no acceptable 
F or adequate forum for resolution. That apart the 
"complete autonomy" contemplated in
ShirurMuttcase 
and the meaning of "outside authority" must not be torn 
out of the context in which the views came to be 
recorded. The exclusion of all "outside authorities" from 
G deciding what is an essential religion practice must be 
viewed in the context of the limited role of the State in 
matters relating to religious freedom as envisaged by 
Articles 25 and 26 itself and not of the Courts as the 
arbiter of Constitutional rights and principles. [Para 
H 42][1151-B-H; 1152-A-B]
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1115 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. 
1. 7 The validity or otherwise of the impugned G.O. A 
would depend on the facts of each case of appointment 
What is found and held to be prescribed by one 
particular or a set of Agamas for a solitary or a group of 
temples, as may be, would be determinative of the issue. 
It is re-emphasised that the exclusion of some and B 
inclusion of a particular segment or denomination for 
appointment as Archakas would not violate Article 14 so 
long such inclusion/exclusion is not based on the criteria 
of caste, birth or any other constitutionally unacceptable 
parameter. So long as the prescription(s) under a C 
particular Agama or Agamas is not contrary to any 
constitutional mandate the impugned G'.O. dated 
23.05.2006 by its blanket fiat to the effect that, "Any 
person who is a Hindu and possessing the requisite 0 
qualification and training can be appointed as a Archaka 
in Hindu temples" has the potential of falling foul of the 
dictum laid down in Seshammal case. A determination 
of the contours of a claimed custom or usage would be 
imperative and it is in that light that the validity of the E 
impugned G.O. dated 23.05.2006 would have to be 
decided in each case of appointment of Archakas 
whenever and wherever the issue is raised. The 
necessity of seeking specific judicial verdicts in the 
future is inevitable and unavoidable; the contours of the F 
instant case and the issues arisen. [Para
43][1152-C-H] 
2. The submission with regard to the maintainability 
of writ petitions cannot be accepted on two counts. 
Firstly, it is difficult to appreciate as to why the petitioners G 
should be non-suited at the threshold merely because 
the G.O. dated 23.05.2006 has not been given effect to 
by actual orders of the State Government. The institution 
of a writ proceeding need not await actual. prejudice and 
adverse effect and consequence. An apprehension of H
1116 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A such harm, if the same is well founded, can furnish a 
cause of action for moving the Court. The argument that 
the writ petition is founded on a cause relating to 
appointment in a public office· and hence not 
entertainable as a public interest litigation would be too 
B simplistic a S?lution to adoptto answer the issues which 
concerns the religious faith and practice of a large 
number of citizens of the country and raises claims of 
century old traditions and usage having the force of law. 
[Para 10] (1122-D-G] 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Seshammal and Others, Etc. Etc. Vs. State of 
Tamil Nadu 1972 (3) SCR 815: (1972) 2SCC11; 
Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Vs. Mis Bharat 
Coking Coal Limited & Anr. 1983 (1) SCR 
1000:(1983) 1 SCC 147; N. Adhithyan Vs. 
Travancore Devasom Board and Others 2002 (3) 
Suppl. SCR 76:(2002) 8 SCC 106; Sastri 
Yagnapurushadji and Others Vs. Mu/das 
Bhudradas Vaishya and Another 1966 (3) SCR 
242; Gopala Mooppanar and Others Vs. 
Subramania Iyer and others AIR 1915 Madras 
363; The Commissioner, Hindu Religious 
Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha 
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005; Sri 
Venkataramana Devaru and Others Vs. State of 
Mysore and others AIR 1958 SC 255:1958 SCR 
895; Durgah Committee, Ajmer and another Vs. 
Syed Hussain Ali and others AIR 1961 SC 
1402:1962 SCR 383; Commissioner of Police 
and Others Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda 
Avadhuta andAnother2004 (2) SCR 1019:(2004)
12 sec 770- referred to.

' 
ADI SAIVASIVACHARIYARGAL NALASANGAM v. 
1117 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. 
Case Law Reference 
A 
1983 (1) SCR 1000 
referred to. 
Para 12 
~002 (3) Suppl. SCR 76 
referred to. 
Para 13 
1966 (3) SCR 242 
referred to. 
Para 27 
B 
AIR 1915 Madras 363 
referred to. 
Para 30 
1954 SCR 1005 
referred to. 
Para 31 
1958 SCR895 
referred to. 
Para 33 
c 
1962 SCR 383 
referred to. 
Para 35 
2004 (2) SCR 1019 
referred to. 
Para 35 
1972 (3) SCR 815 
followed. 
Para 44 
D 
ORIGINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition 
(Civil) No. 354 of 2014 
[Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India] 
WITH 
E 
W. P. (C) Nos. 355, 383 and 384 of 2006 
Subramonium Prasad, AAG, K .. Parasaran, P. P. Rao, 
Colin Consalves, G Umapathy, Vineet Pandey, R. Mekhala, 
F 
Rakesli K. Sharma, A. Mukunda Rao, Arjun Singh, 
Gaichangpou Gangmei, Sridhar Potaraju, M. Yogesh Kanna, 
Sri Vignesh, Swarnendhu Chaterjee, Sabarish Subramanian, 
Praburama Subramanian, B. Subrahmanya Prasad, Naresh 
Kumar, P. R. Kovilan Poongkuntran, Mahalakshmi Pavani, S. G 
Raju, Geetha Kovila_n, V. G. Pragasam, S. Ramamani, B. 
Balaji, Rakesh Sharma, R. Shase for appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
H
1118 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
RANJAN GOGOi, J. 1. Religion incorporates the 
particular belief(s) that a group of people subscribe to. 
Hinduism, as a religion, incorporates all forms of belief without 
mandating the selection or elimination of any one single belief. 
It is a religion that has no single founder; no single scripture 
B and no single set of teachings. It has been described as 
Sanatan Dharma, namely, eternal faith, as it is the collective 
wisdom and inspiration of the centuries that Hinduism seeks 
to preach and propagate. ltis keeping in mind the above 
precepts that we will proceed further. 
c 
2. Before highlighting the issues that confronts the Court 
in the present case the relevant Constitutional provisions in 
Part Ill of the Constitution may be taken note of. Article 13, in 
clear and uhequivocal terms, lays down that all laws including 
D pre-constitution laws which are inconsistent with or in 
derogation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part 111 are 
void. Sub-Article (3) brings within the fold of laws, all Rules, 
Regulations, Notification, custom and usage having the force 
of law. While the several provisions of Part Ill would hardly 
E need to be re-emphasized, specific notice must be had of, in 
the context of the present case, the provisions contained in 
Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. While Article 25 makes 
the freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice 
F and propagate the religion to which
a person may subscribe, 
a fundamental right, the exercise of such right has beer:i made 
subject to public order, morality and health and also to the other 
provisions of Part Ill. Article 25(2)(b) makes it clear that main 
part of the provisions contained in Article 25 will not come in 
G the way of the operation of any existing law or prevent the State 
from making any law which provides for social welfare and 
reform or for throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a 
public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Similarly, 
Article 26 while conferring the right on every religious 
H denomination to manage its own affairs makes it clear that
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1119 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RAN JAN GOGOi. J ] 
the right to manage the affairs of any religious denomination A 
is restricted to matters of religion only. 
3. The provisions of Part Ill, as noted above, therefore 
makes it amply clear that while the right to freedom of religion 
and to manage the religious affairs of any denomination is 
B 
undoubtedly a fundamental right, the same is subject to public 
order, morality and health and further that the inclusion of such 
rights in Part Ill of the Constitution will not prevent the State 
from acting in an appropriate manner, in the larger public 
interest, as mandated by the main part of both Articles 25 and C 
26. Besides, the freedom of religion being subject to the other 
provisions of Part Ill, undoubtedly, Articles 25 and 26 of the 
Constitution has to be harmoniously construed with the other 
provisions contained in Part Ill. 
D 
4. The necessary facts may now be noticed. In order to 
amend and consolidate the law relating to administration and 
governance of Hindu religious and charitable institutions in the 
State of Tamil Nadu, the State Legislature has enacted the 
Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 
E 
1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tamil Nadu Act'). A 
passing reference may be made, at this stage, to Section 55 
of the Tamil Nadu Act which provided that in case where the. 
office holders or servants of a religious jnstitution are required 
to be
filled up on the principle of hereditary succession the 
F 
person next in line of succession is entitled to succeed. There 
were some exceptions to the above rule i.e. where the person 
next in line is a minor or suffers from some incapacity. The 
aforesaid provision (Section 55) was amended alongwith other 
related provisions by theAmendmentAct of 1970 which came G 
into force on January 8, 1971. By the aforesaid amendment 
the principle of next in line of succession was abolished. The 
amendment came to be challenged before this Court which 
d:~l!~r.~8 wa:. considered by a Constitution Bench of the Court. 
H
1120 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
In its judgment in Seshammal and Others, Etc. Etc. Vs. State 
of f."jmif Nadu' the Constitution Bench, while upholding the 
validity of the amendment, dealt with a further question, namely, 
though the principle of next in line was validly abolished, whether 
the appointment of office bearers or servants of t_he temples 
B 
are required to be made from a particular denomination/group/ 
sect as mandated by the Agamas i.e. treatises pertaining to 
matters like construction of temples; installation of idols and 
conduct of worship of the Deity. The Constitution Bench after 
an elaborate consideration of the matter, details of which will 
C be noticed subsequently, seems to have answered the 
aforesaid question in the affirmative. 
5. No controversy surfaced after the Constitution Bench 
judgment in Seshammal (supra) until a G.O. No. 118 dated 
D 23:05.2006 was issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, 
Department of Tamil Development, Cultural and Endowments 
to the effect that, "Any person who is a Hindu and 
possessing the requisite qualification and training can be 
appointed as a Archaka in Hindu temples". An Ordinance 
E (No. 5 /2006) dated 14.07 .2006 followed the aforesaid G.O. 
seeking to further amend sub-section (2) of Section 55 of the 
Tamil NaduAct. The said provision of theAct i.e. Section 55(2), 
by virtue of the 1971 amendment referred to above and the 
F 2006 Ordinance, read as follows. 
"(2) No person shall be
entitled to appointment to 
any vacancy referred to in sub-section (1) merely 
on the ground that he is next .in the. fine of 
succession to the last holder of office." [Change 
G 
brought about by amendment of S.55(2)] 
"or on the ground of any custom or usage". 
[Change brought about by Ordinance 512006) 
H 
1 (1972) 2 sec 11
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1121 · 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
· 6. The Explanatory statement to the Ordinance in para 4 A 
indicated the purpose behind further amendment of Section 
55(2) in the following terms. 
"Archakas of the Temples are to be appointed without 
any discrimination of caste and creed. Custom or usage B 
cannot be a hindrance to this. It is considered that the 
position is clarified in the Act itself and accordingly, it 
has been decided to amend Section 55 of the said Act 
suitably". 
7. The Ordinance was replaced by The Tamil NaduAct 
No. 15 of 2006 which received the assent of the Governor on 
29.08.2006. The Act, however, did not contain the amendment 
to Section 55 as was made by the Ordinance. In otherwords, 
c 
the said amendment brought by the Ordinance was dropped 0 
from the Amending Act 15 of 2006. 
8. The present writ petitions under Article 32 of the 
Constitution have been instituted by an Association of 
Archakas and individual Archakas of Sri Meenakshi Amman E 
Temple of Madurai. The writ petitions were filed challenging 
the G.O. No. 118 dated 23.05.2006 and Ordinance No. 5/2006 
(at that point of time the Amending Act of 2006 had not come 
into effect). As the amendment of Section 55(2) made by the 
Ordinance had not been continued by the Amending Act 15 of F 
2006 the said part of the challenge (as ag_ainst the ordinance) · 
made in the writ petitions became redundant leaving the legality 
and validity of the
G.O. 23.05.2006 as the sole issue for 
consideration in the present writ petitions. 
G 
9. Preliminary Objections have been raised to the 
maintainability of the writ petitions by Shri P.P. Rao and Shri 
. Colin Gonsalves, learned senior counsels appearing for 
respondents . It has been urged that the present writ petitions 
have not been filed as public interest litigations and in the H
. 1122 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R 
A 
absence of any specific orders in implementation of the 
impugned G.0. dated 23.05.2006 the writ petitions are 
premature. It is further contended that even if the writ petitions 
are to be considered as Plls the same raise questions with 
regard to appointment in public office i.e. Archakas in public 
B temples and therefore the writ petitions will also not be 
maintainable as public interest litigations. It is further urged 
that as and when the G.O. is given effect to by actual 
appointment of an Archaka or Archakas, as may be, it will be 
open for the petitioners to raise the issue and establish that 
C there is a usage or custom or customary practice governing 
the temple in question which require the appointment of the 
Archaka to be made from a particular denomination. 
10. It is difficult for us to acceptthe contentions advanced 
D on behalf of the respondents with regard to the maintainability 
of writ petitions on two counts. Firstly, it is difficult to appreciate 
as to why the petitioners should be non-suited at the threshold 
merely because the GO. dated 23.05.2006 has not been given 
effect to by actual orders of the State Government. The 
E institution of a writ proceeding need not await actual prejudice 
and adverse effect and consequence. An apprehension of such 
harm, if the same is well founded, can furnish a cause of action 
for moving the Court. The argument that the present writ 
F 
petition is founded
on a cause relating to appointment in a 
.public office and hence not entertainable as a public interest 
litigation would be too simplistic a solution to adopt to answer 
the issues that have been highlighted which concerns the 
religious faith and practice of a large number of citizens of the 
G country and raises claims of century old traditions and usage 
having the force of law. The above is the second ground, 
namely, the gravity of the issues that arise, that impel us to 
make an attempt to answer the issues raised and arising in 
the writ petitions for determination on the merits thereof. 
H
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1123 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
11. Shri K. Parasaran, learned senior counsel appearing A 
for the petitioners has submitted that the issues arising in the 
case stand squarely covered by the pronouncement of the 
Constitution Bench in Seshammal (supra). In fact, according 
to the learned senior counsel, the issues in the present case 
are resjudicata; the same having been decided inter-partes B 
in Seshammal (supra); the Archakas of the Agamas Temples 
and the respondent-State both being parties to the said 
decision. Specifically, Shri Parasaran, has urged that in 
Seshaminal (supra) the Constitution Bench has 
unambiguously held that the appointment of an Archaka has C 
to be as per the Agamas governing the particular temple and 
any deviation from the said age old custom and usage would 
be an infringement cif the freedom of religion and the rights of 
the religious denomination to manage its own affairs, as 0 
guaranteed, by Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The 
impugned G.O., by its prescription, as noted, therefore, seeks 
to override the declaration of law made by the Constitution 
Bench in Seshamma/(supra). 
12. Shri Parasaran has further urged that curtailment of E 
the freedoms guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of the 
Constitution can only be made by the legislature and even a 
· legislative exercise in this regard is circumscribed by the 
limitations contained in both Articles 25 and 26. In the present
F 
case the amendment of Section 55 of the Tamil Nadu Act as 
made by Ordinance No.6 of 2005 has not been continued by 
the Amendment Ad No.15 of 2006 (as already noted). The 
impugned G.0. has, therefore, to necessarily lose its efficacy. 
Reliance herein is placed on the following passage from the G 
report in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Vs. Mis Bharat 
Coking Coal Limited & Anr.2 
'(1983) 1sec147. 
H
1124 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
"25 ...... ..... The deponents of the affidavits filed into 
court may speak for the parties on whose behalf they 
swear to the statements. They do not speak for the 
Parliament. No one may speak for the Parliament and 
Parliament is never before the court. After Parliament 
B 
has said what it intends to say, only the court may say 
what the Parliament meant to say. None else. Once a 
statute leaves Parliament House, the Court is the only 
authentic voice which may echo (interpret) the 
c 
Parliament ........ " 
13. It was further contended that the G.O. wrongly relies 
on the decision in the case of N. Adhithyan Vs. Travancore 
Devasom Board and Others3 to justify its·promulgation. The 
reliance placed on Adhithyan (supra), in the face of the.law 
D laid down in Seshammal (supra), is wholly misplaced. Shri 
Parasaran has further argued that the impugned GO has to be 
read on its own terms and the validity thereof cannot be saved 
by what appears to be a "concession" made by the State in 
Para 51 of the counter affidavit to the effect that the State would 
E 
respect the distinction between Saiva and Vaishanava temples 
and the Archakas in each of such temples shall be appointed 
from either the Saivas or Vaishanavas, as may be, taking into 
account the indoctrination of the concerned Archakas in.the 
F Agamas. According to Shri Parasaran, neither all Saivas nor 
all Vaishnavas are ipso facto denominational. Only a Saiva
who satisfies the eligibility under the Sivagama and a 
Vaishnava satisfying the eligibility under the pancharatna or 
vaikhanasa can be referred to as denominations. A person 
G who is a member of such denomination alone can be appointed 
as a Archaka of a Saiva or a Vaishnava temple, as the case 
maybe. 
H ' (2002) s sec 1 OB
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1125 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
14. On the other hand, Shri P.P. Rao and Shri Colin A 
Gonsalves, learned Senior Counsels appearing for the 
respondents have contended that the decision of the 
Constitution Bench in Seshamma/ (supra) upholding the 
Constitution validity of the Amendment Act of 1970 had opened 
the avenue to all qualified Hindus irrespective of caste, 
B 
denominations, etc to be appointed as Archakas. It is 
contended that once the hereditary principle was held to be 
flexible, the exclusive right of a particular group to appointment 
necessarily stood negated and it is qualification coupled with 
merit and eligibility that has to be the crucial test for C 
appointment, consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the 
Constitution. Learned counsels have specifically referred to 
the Government Order No.1 of 2007 and in this regard the 
recommendation of the High Powered Committee appointed 0 
for making recommendations for effective implementation of 
the impugned GO dated 23.5.2006. It is contended, by referring 
to the report of the High P_owered Committee, that the same 
demonstrates the lack of familiarity of even temple priests with 
the Agamas and their lack of knowledge of such Ag am as and 
E 
the practices of the Temples as may be prescribed by the 
Agamas. It is submitted that not only the contents oftheAgamas 
have become uncertain, even assuming otherwise, the same 
cannot be an authority to confer
legitimacy to a practice which 
is inconsistent with and contrary to the provisions of the 
F 
Constitution, specially those contained in Part Ill thereof. It is 
further submitted that the impugned GO is consistent with and 
in fact effectuates the Fundamental Right of Equality and equal 
opportunity and no contrary practice overriding the said 
provisions of the Constitution would be legally acceptable. 
G 
Learned Counsels have further submitted that there is no 
conflict between the judgments in Seshamma/(supra) and N. 
Adithayan (supra) and it is possible to read the law deClared 
in both the cases in a manner consistent with the Constitutional 
requirements and principles. 
H
1126 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
15. An additional issue has been struck by Shri Gonsalves, 
learned Senior Counsel, that the impugned GO needs to be 
upheld on the touchstone of the principle enshrined by Article 
17 of the Constitution. The exclusive right of a particular group 
to enterthe sanctum sanctorum of a temple and perform the 
B rituals on the ground that performance of such rituals by any 
other person would defile the image is a thought and action 
which is prohibited by Article 17 of the Constitution. Violation 
and consequently commission of offences under the Protection 
of Civil Rights Act, 1955 has also been urged. 
c 
16. The issues arising and the arguments made centre 
around the true meaning, purport and effect of the Constitution 
Bench judgment in Seshamma/ (supra) and in the above 
context the effect of the decision of the numerically smaller 
D 
Bench in N. Adithayan (supra). We will therefore proceed to 
understand the above position at the outset. 
17. The contours of the challenge in Seshammal (supra) 
has already been noticed. To repeat, it is the validity of the 
E Amendment Act of 1970 which sought to amend, inter alia, 
Section 55 of the Tamil Nadu Act that was questioned in 
Seshammal (supra). The Statement of Objects and Reasons 
for the amendment Act of 1970 is stated as follows: 
F 
"In the year 1969 the Committee on Untouchability, 
Economic and Educational Development of the 
Scheduled Castes has suggested in its
report that the 
hereditary priesthood in the Hindu Society should be 
abolished, that the system can be replaced by an 
G 
ecclesiastical organisation of men possessing the 
requisite educational qualifications who may be trained 
in recognised institutions in priesthood and that the line 
should be open to all candidates irrespective of caste, 
creed or race. In Tamil Nadu Archakas, Gurukkals and · 
H 
Poojaries are all U/thurai servants.in Hindu temples.
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. . 1127 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
The duties of 'Ulthurai servants' relate mainly to the A 
performance of poojas rituals and other services to the 
deity, the recitation of mantras, vedas, prabandas, 
thevarams and similar invocations and the performance 
of duties connected with such performance and 
recitations. Sections 55 and 56 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu B 
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Tamil 
Nadu Act 22of1959), provide for appointment of office-
holders and servants in the religious institutions by the 
trustees by applying the rule of hereditary succession 
also. As a step towards social reform Hindu temples C 
have already been thrown open to all Hindus 
irrespective of caste .... " 
18. The arguments in support of the challenge were 
threefold namely, 
D 
"(a) The freedom ef hereditary succession to the office 
of Archaka is abolished although succession to it is an 
essential and integral parl of the faith of the Saivite and 
Vaishnavite worshippers. 
E 
(b) It is left to the Government in power to prescribe or 
not to prescribe such qualifications as they may choose 
to adopt for applicants to this religious office while the 
Act itself gives no indication whatever of the principles F 
on which the qualifications should be based. The . 
statement of objects and reasons which is adopted in 
the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State makes it clear 
that not only the scope but the object of the
Amendment 
Act is to override the exclusive right of the denomination G 
to manage their own affairs in the matter of religion by 
appointing Archakas belonging to a specific 
denomination for the purpose of worship. 
(c) The Amendment Act gives the right of appointment H
1128 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
for the first time to the trustee who is under the control 
of the Government under the provisions of the principal 
Act and this is the very negation offreedom of religion 
and the principle of non-interference by the State as 
regards the practice of religion and the right of a 
B 
denomination to manage its own affairs in the matter of 
religion." 
19. In the course of a very lengthy discourse and after 
considering the works.of learned scholars in the field; the law 
c laid down by this Court in respect of Articles 25 and 26 till date 
and particularly the efficacy of the Agamas the Constitution 
Bench came to the following conclusion. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
"Any State action which permits the defilement or 
pollution of the image by the touch of an Archaka not 
authorised by the Agamas would violently interfere with 
the religious faith and practices of the Hindu worshipper 
in a vital respect, and would, therefore, be prima facie 
invalid under Article 25(1) of the Constitution." 
20. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench by referring to 
several earlier pronouncements of this Court specifically 
mentioned in para 13 of the Repori identified the main 
principles underlying the provisions of Article 25 and 26 of the 
Constitution in the following manner. 
"The first is that the protection of these articles is not 
limited to matters of doctrine or belief they extend also 
to acts done in pursuance of religion and therefore
contain a guarantee for rituals and observances, 
ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral 
parts of religion. The second is that what constitutes an 
essential part of a religious or religious practice has to 
be decided by the courts with reference to the doctrine 
of a particular religion and include practices which are 
regarded by the community as a part of its religion."
ADI SAIVASIVACHARIYARGAL NALASANGAM v. 
1129 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
21. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts before A 
it the Constitution Bench identified the main thrust of the 
arguments made in support of the challeng~ to the amendment 
to be with regard to the vesting of powers and authority in the 
temple trustee to appoint any person as an Archaka so long 
as he was holding a fitness certificate from one of the B 
institutions referred to in Rule 12 of the Madras Hindu Religious 
Institutions (Officers and Servants) Service Rules, 1964. The 
Said Rule 12 required that anArchaka should be proficient in 
Mantras, Vedas, Prabandams etc., namely, that such a person ,, 
is fit and qualified for performing puja and having knowledge C 
of the rituals and other services. The Constitution Bench was 
told that the above position admits a situation where the 
requirement of Rule 12 can very well be dispensed with (by a 
· subsequent amendment of the Rules) thereby resulting in 
0 
conferment of virtually unguided and unbridled powers to the 
trustee to appoint any person as a Arch aka notwithstanding 
the fact that worship of the deity by a person other than one 
belonging to a particular denomination may have the effect of 
defiling the deity. As the temple trustee is to function under the E 
control of the State under Section 27 of the Tamil Nadu Act the 
question .highlighted before the Constitution Bench was 
whether by virtue of the amendment the
State had gained a 
. right to step into and control the Sanctum Sanctorum of a 
temple through the agency of the trustee and the Archaka 
F 
thereby transgressing the rights granted to a religious 
denomination by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. 
22. The Constitution Bench noticed that to counter the 
above situation the Advocate General of the State of Tamil Nadu G 
had contended that the power given to the trustee by virtue of 
the amendment to Section 55 was not a unqualified power but· 
was subject to the provisions of Section 28 of the Act which is 
in the following terms. 
H
1130 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
"Section 28.- Subject to the provisions of the Tamil 
Nadu TempleEntryAuthorisationAct, 1947, the trustee 
of every religious institution is bound to administer its 
affairs and to apply its funds and properties in 
accordance with the terms of the trust, the usage of the 
B 
institution and a/I lawful directions which a competent 
authority may issue in respect thereof and as carefully 
as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with such 
affairs, fund~ and properties if they were his own." 
C 
In this regard the Advocate General had virtually admitted 
that if the usage or practice of the institution required the 
' 
Archaka of a temple to be of a particular denomination the 
said usage would be binding on the trustee and he would be 
bound to make appointment under Section 55 in accordance 
D 
with such usage. The usage, practice or custom requiring an 
Archaka to be of a particular denomination, according to the 
Advocate General, was founded on religious beliefs and 
practices whereas the next in line principle, if is to be regarded 
as a usage, was a merely secular usage on which a legislation 
E would be competent under Article 25 (2)(a) of the Constitution. 
It was, alternatively, contended that if the hereditary principle 
is to be understood as a religious practice, alteration thereof 
can also be made by a legislation under Article 25(2)(b), such 
F 
legislation being for the purpose of social welfare and reform.
23.The Constitution Bench in Seshammal (supra) 
answered the question by holding that the hereditary principle 
which was of long usage was a secular principle and therefore 
a legislation to alter the said usage, i.e. theAmendmentAct of 
G 
1970, was competent under Article 25(2)(a). However, the 
Constitution Bench was quick to add that it is to the limited 
extent of the above exception alone, namely, the liberty to make 
the appointment from persons beyond next in line to the last 
H holder that the trustee is released from the obligation imposed
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1131 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
·on him by Section 28 of the Tamil Nadu Act which otherwise A 
requires the trustee to administer the affairs of the temple in 
accordance with the usage governing the temple. Para 22 of 
the Constitution Bench judgment wherein the aforesaid view 
finds mention may be noticed verbatim. 
"22. In view of sub-section (2) of Section 55, as it now 
stands amended, the choice of the trustee in the matter 
B 
of appointment of an Archaka is no longer limited by 
the operation of the rule of next-in-line of succession in 
temples where the usage was to appoint the Archaka C 
on the hereditary principle. The trustee is not bound to 
make the appointment on the sole ground that the 
candidate, is the next-in-line of succession to the last 
holder of office. To that extent, and to that extent alone, 
the trustee is released from the obligation imposed on D 
him by Section 28 of the principal Act to administer the 
affairs in accordance with that part of the usage of a 
temple which enjoined hereditary appointments. The 
legislation in this respect, as we have shown, does not 
interfere with any religious practice or matter of religion E 
and, therefore; is not invalid." 
24. A reading of the judgment of the Constitution Bench 
in Seshammal (supra) shows that the Bench considered the 
expanse of the Agamas both in Saivite and Vaishnavite F 
temples t0 hold that the said treatises restricted the
appointment of Archakas to a particular religious 
· denomination(s) and further that worship of the deity by persons 
who do not belong to the particular denomination(s) may have 
the effect of even defiling the idol requiring purification G 
ceremonies to be performed. The Constitution Bench further 
held that while the appointment of Archakas on the principle of 
next in line is a secular act the particular denomination from 
which Archakas are required to be appointed as per the 
H
1132 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A Ag a mas embody a long standing belief that has come to be 
firmly embedded in the practices immediately surrounding the 
worship of the image and therefore such beliefs/practice 
constitute an essential part of the religious practice which under 
Section 28 of the Act (extracted above) the trustee is bound to 
B follow. The above, which the petitioners contend to be the true 
ratio of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in 
Seshammal (supra), has been questioned by the respondents 
who argue that Seshamma/ (supra) is but the expression of 
an agreement of the Constitution Bench to what was a 
C concession made before it by the Advocate General of the 
State. According to the respondent in Seshammal (supra) the 
Constitution Bench had no occasion to deal with the issue 
arising herein, the challenge before it being confined to the 
0 
validity oftheAmendmentAct of 1970. 
E 
25. The answers to the above will be dealt with a little 
later and for the present what has to engage the attention of 
the Court is the true ratio of the law laid down by the numerically 
smaller Bench in Adithayan (supra). 
26. The facts confronting the Court in Adithayan (supra) 
may now be noticed. The challenge therein was by a 
Namboodri Brahmin to the appointment of a non-Namboodri 
Brahmin who was otherwise well qualified to be appointed as 
F a priest in the temple in question. The challenge was sought 
to be based on the ground that it
has been a long. standing 
practice and usage in the temple that its priests are appointed 
exclusively from Namboodri Brahmins and any departure 
therefrom is in violation of the rights of Namboodri Brahmins 
G under Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Upon a 
consideration of the various earlier decisions of this Court 
specifically referred to in Adithayan (supra), details of which 
need not again be noticed herein (such details are being 
H separately noticed later, though in a different context) including
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1133 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
the decision in Seshammal (supra) it was held that rights A 
claimed solely on the basis of caste cannot enjoy the protection 
of Article 25 and 26 and no earlier decision of this Court 
including Seshammal (supra) would support the contention 
that even duly qualified persons can be barred from performing 
Poojas on the sole ground that such a person is not a Brahmin 
B 
by birth or pedigree. After expounding the law in the above 
manner, it was held in Adithayan (supra) that even proof of 
any such practice since the pre-constitutional days (which in 
any case was not forthcoming) cannot sustain such a claim as 
the same would be in derogation of constitutional values and 
C 
opposed to public policy or social decency. We do not see 
how the above view of this Court in any way strikes a discordant 
note with the views expressed in any earlier decision including 
Seshamma/(supra). The issues in Seshamma/(supra) were 0 
entirely different and the discussions therein (para 12) 
proceeds on the basis that entry to the sanctum sanctorum for 
a particular denomination is without any reference to caste or 
social status. The reference to the opinion of Sri R. 
Parthasarathy Bhattacharya who has been referred to in the 
E 
above para 12 of the report as an undisputed scholar on the 
subject was cited to show that apart from the followers of the 4 
(four) traditions, so far as Vaishnava temples
are concerned 
" ..... none others, however high placed in societv as Pontiffs 
or Acharyas. or even other Brahmins could touch the idols, 
F 
do Pooja or enter the Garba Girha ... ..... " Exclusion solely on 
the basis of caste was not an issue in Seshamma/(supra) so 
as to understand the decision in Adithayan (supra) to be, in 
any way, a departure from what has been held in Seshammal 
(supra). 
G 
27. Before we go on to deliberate on the validity of the 
impugned GO. dated 23.05.2006 it will be useful to try to 
understand what is Hinduism? A broad answer is to be found 
in the preface to this report but, perhaps, we should delve a H
1134 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
little deeper into the issue. The subject has received an indepth 
consideration of the Country's philosopher President Dr. S. 
Radhakrishnan in the celebrated work" The Hindu way of Life''. 
The said work has been exhaustively considered in Sastri 
Yagnapurushadji and Others Vs. Muldas Bhudradas 
B 
Vaishya and Another' in the context of the question as co 
whether Swaminarayan sect is a religion distinguishable and 
separate from the Hindu religion and consequently the temples 
belonging to the said sect fell outside the scope of Section 3 
of the Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry 
C Authorisation) Act, 1956. The aforesaid Section 3 of the Act 
inter alia provided that every temple to which the Act applied 
shall be open to the excluded classes for worship in the same 
manner and to the same extent as other Hindus in general. 
D 
While the eventual decision of the Court which answered the 
question raised is in the negative, namely, that the sect in 
question was not a distinguishable and different religion, it is 
the very learned discourse that is to be found in the report with 
regard to the true tenets of Hinduism that would be of interest 
E so far the present case is concerned. The following passages 
from the report are truly worthy of reproduction both for the 
purpose of recapitulation and illumination. 
F 
G 
" ....................................................... When we 
think of the Hindu religion,
we find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to define Hindu religion or even adequately 
describe it. Unlike other religions in the world, the Hindu 
religion does not claim any one prophet; it does not 
worship any one God; it does not subscribe to any one 
dogma; it does not believe in any one philosophic 
concept; it does not follow any one set of religious rites 
or performances; in fact, it does not appear to satisfy 
the narrow traditional features of any religion or creed. 
H ' 1966(3) SCR 242
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1135 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.) 
It may broadly be described as a way of life and nothing A 
more. 
The Hindu thinkers reckoned with the striking fact that 8 
the men and women dwelling in lndi,a belonged to 
different communities, worshipped different gods, and 
practiced different rites (Kurma Purana). (Ibid p. 12.) 
"ft presents for our investigation a complex congeries 
of creeds and doctrines which in its gradual 
accumulation may be compared to the gathering 
· together of the mighty volume of the Ganges, swollen 
c 
by a continual influx of tributary rivers and rivulets, 
D 
spreading itself over an ever-increasing area of country 
and finally resolving itself into an intricate Delta of 
tortuous steams and jungly marshes ........ The Hindu 
religion is a reflection of the composite character of the 
Hindus, who are not one people but many. It is based E 
on the idea of universal receptivity. It has ever aimed at 
accommodating itself to circumstances, and has carried 
on the process of adaptation through more than three 
thousand years. It has first borne with and then, so to 
F 
speak, swallowed, digested, and assimilated something 
from all creeds." ("Religious Thought & Life in India" by 
Monier Williams, P 57.) 
The history of Indian thought emphatically brings out 
·the fact that the development of Hindu religion has G 
always been inspired by an endless quest of the mind 
for truth based on the consciousness
that truth has 
many facets. Truth is one, but wise men describe if 
differently. The Indian mind has, consistently through H
1136 
A 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
the ages, been exerCised over the problem of the nature 
of godhead the problem that faces the spirit at the end 
of life, and the interrelation between the individual and 
the universal soul. "If we can abstract from the variety 
of opinion", says Dr. Radhakrishnan, "and observe the 
general spirit of Indian thought, we shall find that it has 
a disposition to interpret life and nature in the way of 
monistic idealism, though this tendency is so plastic, 
Jiving and manifold that it takes many forms and 
expresses itself in even mutually hostile 
teachings".(lbid, p.32.) 
Though philosophic concepts and principles evolved 
by different Hindu thinkers and philosophers varied in 
many ways and even appeared to conflict with each 
other in some particulars, they all had reverence for 
the past and accepted the Vedas as the sole foundation 
of the Hindu philosophy. Naturally enough, it was 
realised by Hindu religion from the very beginning of 
its career that truth was many-sided and different views 
contained different aspects of truth which no one could 
fully express. 
Do the Hindus worship at their temples the same set or 
number of gods ? That is another question which can 
be asked in this connection; and the answer to this 
question again has to be in the negative. Indeed, there 
are certain sections of the Hindu community which do 
not believe in the worship of idols; and as regards those 
sections
of the Hindu community which believe in the 
worship of idols their idols differ from community to 
community and it cannot be said that one definite idol 
or a definite number of idols are worshipped by all the 
Hindu in general. In the Hindu Pantheon the first goods 
that were worshipped in Vedic times were mainly Indra,
ADI SAIVASIVACHARIYARGALNALASANGAMv. 
1137 
GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU [RANJAN GOGOi, J .] 
Varuna, Vayu and Agni. Later, Brahma, Vishnu and A 
Mahesh came to be worshipped. In course of time, 
Rama and Krishna secured a place of pride in the Hindu 
Pantheon, and gradually as different philosophic 
concepts held sway in different sects and in different 
sections of the Hindu community, a large number of B 
gods were added, with the result that today, the Hindu 
Pantheon presents the spectacle of a very large number 
of gods wh9 are worshipped by different sections of the 
Hindus. 
· 
c 
The development of Hindu religion and philosophy 
shows that from time to time saints and religious 
reformers attempted to remove from the Hindu thought 
and practices elements of corruption and superstition 
and that led to the formation of different sects. Buddha D 
stated Buddhism; Mahavir founded Jainism; Basava 
became the founderofLingayat religion, Dnyaneshwar 
and Tukaram initiated the Varakari cult; Guru Nanak 
inspired Sikhism; Dayananda founded Arya Sama}, 
and Chaitanya began Bhakti cult; and as a result of the E 
teachings of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, Hindu 
religion flowered into its most attractive, progressive and 
dynamic form. If we study the teachings of these saints 
and religious reformers, we would notice an amount of F 
divergence in their respective views; but underneath 
that divergence, there is a kind of subtle indescribable 
unity which keeps them within the
sweep of the broad 
and progressive Hindu religion. 
Tilak faced this complex and difficult problem of defining G 
or at least describing adequately Hindu religion and 
he evolved a working formula which may be regarded 
as fairly adequate and satisfactory. Said Tilak : 
"Acceptance of the Vedas with reverence; recognition H
1138 
A 
B 
c 
D 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 11 S.C.R. 
of the fact that the means or ways to salvation are 
diverse and realisation of the truth that the number of 
gods to be worshipped is large, that indeed is the 
distinguishing feature of Hindu religion. This definition 
brings out succinctly the broad distinctive features of 
Hindu religion. It is somewhat remarkable that this broad 
sweep of Hindu religion has been eloquently described 
by Toynbee. Says Toynbee : "When we pass from the 
plane of social practice to the plane of intellectual 
outlook, Hinduism too comes out well by comparison 
with the religions an ideologies of the South-West Asian 
group. In contrast to these Hinduism has the "same 
outlook as the pre-Christian and pre-Muslim religions 
and philosophies of the We stem half of the old world. 
Like them, Hinduism takes it for granted that there is 
more than one valid approach t~ truth and to salvation 
and that these different approaches are not only 
compatible with each other, but are complementary". 
28. The fact that reference to Hindus in the Constitution 
E includes persons professing the Sikh, Jain and Buddhist 
religions and the statutory enactments like Hindu Marriage Act, 
Hindu Succession Act etc. also embraces Sikhs, Jains and 
Buddhists within the ambit of the said enactments is another 
F 
significant fact that was highlighted and needs to be specially 
taken note of. 
29. What is sought to be emphasized is that all the above 
would
show the wide expanse of beliefs, thoughts and forms 
of worship that Hinduism encompasses without any divergence 
G or friction within itself or amongst its adherents. It is in the 
backdrop of the above response to the question posed earlier 
"what is Hinduism"? that we have to proceed further in the 
matter. 
H 
30. Image worship is a predominant feature of Hindu
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1139 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
religion. The origins of image worship is interesting and a A 
learned discourse on the subject is available in a century old 
judgment of the Madras High Court in Gopala Mooppanar 
and Others Vs. Subramania Iyer and others5. In the said 
report the learned Judge (SadasivaAiyar, J.) on the basis of 
accepted texts and a study thereof had found that in the "first B 
stage" of existence of mankind God was worshiped as 
immanent in the heart of everything and worship consisted 
solely in service to ones fellow creatures. In the second age, 
the spirit of u1•iversal brotherhood has lost its initial efficacy 
and notions of inferiority and superiority amongst men surfaced C 
leading to a situation where the inferior man was asked to 
worship the superior man who was considered as a 
manifestation of God. Disputes arose about the relative 
superiority and inferiority which was resolved by the wise sages D 
by introducing image worship to enable all men to worship 
God without squabbles about their relative superiorities. With 
passage of time there emerged Rules regulating worship in 
temples which came to be laid down in the treatises known as 
Agamas and the Thantras. Specifically in Gopala Moopanar E 
(supra), it was noticed that the Agamas prescribed rules as 
regards "what caused pollution to a temple and as regards 
the ceremonies for removing pollution when caused." In the 
said judgment
it is further mentioned that, "There are, it is well 
known Thanthries in Malabar who are specialists in these 
F 
matters of pollution. As the temple priests have got the 
special saivite initiation or dheeksha which entitles them to 
touch the inner most image, and as the touch of the persons 
·who have got no such initiation. even though they be 
Brahmins. was supposed to pollute the image. even G 
Brahmins other than the temple priest were in many temples 
not allowed to go into the garbhagraham. The Ag a mas also 
contain other prescriptions including who is entitled to worship 
s AIR 1915 Madras 363 
H
1140 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A from which portion of the temple. In one of the Agamas it is 
said (as freely translated) thus: "Saivite Brahmin priests are 
entitled to worship in the anthrala portion. Brahmins learned 
in the Vedas are entitled to worship in the arthamantapa, other 
Brahmins in the front Mantapa, Kings and Vaisyas in the 
B dwaramantapa, initiated Sudras in the Bahir Mantapa" and 
so on." The legal effect of the above prescriptions need not 
detain us and it is the portion underlined which is of particular 
importance as the discussions that follow would reveal. 
C 
-31. The Ecclesiastical jurisprudence in India, sans any 
specific Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, revolves around the 
exposition of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 25 
and 26 as made from time to time. The development of this 
branch of jurisprudence primarily arises out of claimed rights 
D of religious groups and denominations to complete autonomy 
and the prerogative of exclusive determination of essential 
religious practices and principles on the bedrock of the 
constitutional guarantees under Articles 25 and 25 of the 
Constitution and the judicial understanding of the inter-play 
E between Article 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution in the 
context of such claims. In The Commissioner, Hindu 
Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra 
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt6 (Shirur Mutt) while 
F dealing with the issue of autonomy of a religious
denomination 
to determine what rights and ceremonies are essential 
according to the tenets of its religion it has been stated that-
G 
"Under article ?B(b), therefore a religious denomination 
or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter 
of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are 
essential according to the tenets of the religion they 
hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to 
H 
6 1954 SCR 1005
• 
• 
ADI SAIVASIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1141 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
interfere with their decision in such matters." - (Page A 
1028) 
32. Besides the above, recognition of the aforesaid 
principle is also to be found in the fact that in Shirur Mutt 
(supra), though the eventual conclusion of the Court upholds 
B 
the validity of the Act (Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable 
EndowmentsAct, 1951) certain specific provisions i.e. Section 
21 which empowered the Commissioner and his subordinates 
to enter the premises of any religious institution at any time for 
performance of duties enjoined under the Act has been struck C 
down indicating consistency with the principle extracted above .. 
The relevant of the report (page 1030/31) will require a specific 
notice and therefore is extracted below. 
'We agree, however, with the High Court in the view taken . o 
by it about section 21. This section empowers 
the Commissioner and his subordinate officers and 
also persons authorised by them to enter the premises 
of any religious institution or place of worship for the· 
purpose of exercising any power conferred or any duty E 
imposed by or under the Act. It is well known that there 
could be no such thing as an unregulated and 
unrestricted right of entry in a public temple or 
other religious institution, for persons ·who. are not 
connected with the spiritual functions thereof. It is a F 
traditional custom universally observed not to allow 
access to
any outsider to the partic·u1arly sacred parts 
of a temple as for example, the place where the deity is 
located. There are also fixed hours of worship and rest 
for the idol when no disturbance by any member of the G 
public is allowed. Section 21, itis to be noted, does not 
confine the right of entry to the outer portion of the 
premises; it does not even exclude the inner sanctuary 
"the Holy of Holies" as it is said, the sanctity of which is H
1142 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
zealously preserved. It does not say that the entry may 
be made after due notice to the head of the institution 
and at such hours which would not interfere with the due 
observance of the rites and ceremonies in the institution. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
We think that as the section stands, it interferes with the 
fundamental rights of the Mathadhipati and the 
denomination of which he is head guaranteed under 
articles 25 and 26 of th~ Constitution. Our attention has 
been drawn in this connection to section 91 of the Act 
which, it fs said, provides a sufficient safeguard against 
anyabuseofpowerundersection 21. We cannot agree 
with this contention. Clause (a) of section 91 excepts 
from the saving clause all express provisions of the Act 
within which the provision of section 21 would have to 
be included. Clause (b) again does not say anything 
about custom or usage obtaining in an institution and it 
does not indicate by whom and in what manner the 
question of interference with the religious and spiritual 
functions of the Math would be decided in case of any 
dispute arising regarding it. In out opinion, 
section 21 has been rightly held to be invalid." - (Page 
1030131) 
33. The decision of this Court in Sri Venkataramana 
F 
Devaru and Others Vs. State of Mysore and others' may 
now be considered. In the said case this Court was called 
upon to answer as to whether Section 3 of the Madras Temple 
Entry Authorization Act
violated the guarantee under Article 
26(b) insofar as Gaura Saraswati Brahmins are concerned 
G by making· provisi.ons to the effect that Shri Venkataramana 
Temple at Moolky was to be open to all excluded classes of 
Hindus. It was the contention of the aforesaid sect that the 
temple in question was founded for the exclusive use and 
H 
'AIR 1958 SC 255 
•
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1143 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.) 
benefit of Gaura Saraswati Brahmins. This Court in its report A 
elaborately discussed the practice of idol/image worship; 
regulation thereo"f by the Agamas and the efficacy and 
enforceability of such Ag a mas. Paras 17 and 18 of the Report 
which deals with the above aspect may be usefully extracted 
~~ 
B 
"17. The Gods have distinct forms ascribed to them and 
their worship at home and in temples is ordained as 
certain means of attaining salvation. These injunctions 
have had such a powerful hold over the minds of the C 
people that daily worship of the deity in temple came to 
be regarded as one of the obligatory duties of a Hindu. 
It was during this period that temples were constructed 
all over the country dedicated to Vishnu, Rudra, Devi, 
Skanda, Ganesha and so forth, and worship in the D 
temple can be said to have become the practical 
religion of all sections of the Hindus ever since. With 
the growth in importance of temples and of worship 
therein, more and more attention came to be devoted 
to the ceremonial law relating to the construction of E 
temples, installation of idols therein and conduct of 
worship of the deity, and numerous are the treatises that 
came to be written for its exposition. These are known · 
as Agamas, and there are as many as 28 of them F 
relating to the Saiva temples, the most important of 
them being the Kamikagama, the Karanagama and the
Suprabedagama, while the Vikhanasa and the 
Pancharatra are the chief Agamas of the Vaishnavas. 
These Agamas, contain elaborate rules as to how the G 
temple is to be constructed, where the principal deity is 
to be consecrated, and where the other Devatas are to 
be installed and where the several classes of 
worshippers are to stand and worship. The following 
passage from the judgment of Sadasiva Aiyar J. in H
1144 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar: (1914) 27 MLJ 
253, gives a summary of the prescription contained in 
one of the Agamas : 
"In the Nirvachanapaddhathi it is said that Sivadwijas 
B 
should worship in the Garbargriham, Brahmins from the 
ante chamber or Sabah Mantabam, Kshatriyas, Vysias 
and Sudras from the Mahamantabham, the dancer and 
the musician from the Nrithamantabham east of the 
Mahamantabham and that castes yet lower in scale 
C 
should content themselves with the sight of the 
Gopuram." 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
The other Agamas also contain similar rules." 
18. According to the Agamas, an image becomes 
defiled if there is any departure or violation of any of 
the rules relating to worship, and purificatory ceremonies 
(known as Samprokshana) have to be performed for 
restoring the sanctity of the shrine. Vide judgment of 
Sadasiva Aiyar J. in Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania 
Aiyar (supra). In Sankaralinga Nadan v. Raja 
Rajeswara Dorai, it was held by the Privy Council 
affirming the judgment of the Madras High Court that a 
trustee who agreed to admit into the temple persons 
who were not entitled to worship therein, according to 
the Agamas and the custom of the temple was guilty of 
breach of trust. Thus, under the ceremonial law 
pertaining to temples, who are entitled to enter into them 
for worship and where they are entitled to stand and 
worship and how the worship is to be conducted are all 
matters of
religion. The conclusion is also implicit in 
Art. 25 which after declaring that all persons are 
entitled freely to profess, practice and propagate 
religion, enacts that this should not affect the 
operation of any Jaw throwing open Hindu religious
ADI SAIVASIVACHARIYARGAL NALASANGAM v. 
1145 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
institutions of a public character to all classes and A 
sections of Hindus. We have dealt with this question 
· at some length in view of the argument of the 
learned Solicitor-General that exclusion of persons 
from temple has not been shown to be a matter of 
religion with reference to the tenets of Hinduism. B 
We must accordingly hold that if the rights of the 
appellants have to be determined solely with 
reference to Art. 26(b), thens. 3, of Act Vof 1947, 
should be held to be bad as infringing it." 
Eventually, this Court went on to hold that the provisions 
of Article 26(b) are also subject to those contained in Article 
25(2)(b) arfd accordingly dismissed the plea set up by the 
Gaura Saraswati Brahmins in the suit out of which the 
proceedings arose. 
34. The explicit reiteration of the Court's power to decide 
on what constitutes an essential religious practice in Sri 
Venkataramana Dev.aru (supra) again found manifestation 
c 
D 
in Durgah Committee, Ajmer and another Vs. Syed E 
Hussain Ali and others8• Gajendragadkar, J. (as His 
Lordship then was) was of the view, 
" ....... that in order that the practices in question should 
be treated as a part of religion they must be regarded F 
by the said religion as its essential arid integral part; 
otherwise even purely secular practices which aie not 
an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be 
clothed with a
religious form and m?Y make a claim for 
being treated as religious practices within the meaning G 
of Article 26. Similarly, even practices though religious 
may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and 
may in that sense be extraneous and unessential 
' AIR 1961 SC 1402 
H
1146 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
accretions to religion itself Unless such practices are 
found to constitute an essential and integral part of a 
religion their claim for the protection unde.r Article 26 
may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words, 
the protection must be confined to such religious 
B 
practices as are an essential and an integral part of it 
and no other." 
35. Almost half a century later, we find a reiteration of the 
same view in the majority judgment rendered in 
C Commissioner of Police and Others Vs. Acharya 
Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and Another'l though the 
minority view in the said case preferred to take a contrary 
opinion relying, interalia, on ShirurMutt(supra) and Jesse 
Cantwell Vs. State of Connecticut10 and United States 
D Vs. Ballard''· Para 57 of the minority opinion containing the 
E 
F 
G 
discordant note would be worthy of reproduction. 
"57. The exercise of the freedom to act and practise in 
pursuance of religious beliefs is as much important as 
the freedom of believing in a religion. In fact to persons 
believing in religious faith, there are some forms of 
practising the religion by outward actions which are as 
much part of religion as the faith itself The freedom to 
act and practise can be subject to regulations. In our 
Constitution, subject to public order, health and morality 
and to other provisions in Part Ill of the Constitution. 
However, in evefY case the power of regulation must be 
so
exercised with the consciousness that the subject of 
regulation is ff.le fundamental right of religion, and as 
not to unduly infringe the protection given by the 
Constitution. Further. in the exercise of the power to 
• (2004) 12 sec no 
"84 L Ed 1.213: 310 US 296 (1939) 
H "88 L Ed 1148: 322 US 78 (1943)
ADI SAIVASIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1147 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
regulate. the authorities cannot sit in judgment over the A 
professed views of the adherents of the religion and to 
determine whether the practice is warranted by the 
religion or not. That is not their function. (See Jesse 
Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, L Ed at pp. 1213-1218, 
United States v. Ballard, L Ed at pp. 1153, 1154.)" 
B 
36. That the freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 
of the Constitution is not only confined to beliefs but extends to 
religious practices also would hardly require reiteration. Right 
of belief and practice is guaranteed by Article 25 subject to C 
public order, morality and health and other provisions of Part-
111 of the Constitution. Sub-Article (2) is an exception and 
makes the right guaranteed by Sub-article (1) subject to any 
existing law or to such law as may be enacted to, inter alia, 
provide for social welfare and reforms or throwing or proposing D 
to throw open Hindu religious institutions of a public character 
to all classes and sections of Hindus. Article 26(b) on the other 
hand guarantees to every religious denomination or section 
full freedom to manage its own affairs insofar as matters of 
religion are concerned, subject.once again, to public order, 
E 
morality and health and as held by this Court subject to such 
laws as may be made under Article 25(2)(b). The rights 
guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26, therefore, are
circumscribed 
and are to be enjoyed within constitutionally permissible F 
parameters. Often occasions will arise when it may become. 
necessary to determine whether a belief or a practice claimed 
and asserted is a fundamental part of the religious practice of 
a group or denomination making such a claim before 
embarking upon the required adjudication. A decision on such G 
claims becomes the duty of the Constitutional Court. It is neither 
an easy nor an enviable task that the courts are called to 
perform.Performance of such tasks is notenjoined in the court 
by virtue of any ecclesiastical jurisdiction conferred on it but in 
view of its role as the Constitutional arbiter. Any apprehension 
H
1148 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . 
[2015] 11 S.C.R 
A that the determination by the court of an essential religious 
practice itself negatives the freedoms guaranteed by Articles 
25 and 26 will have to be dispelled on the touchstone of 
constitutional necessity. Without such a determination there 
can be no effective adjudication whether the claimed right it is 
B in conformity with public order, morality and health and in 
accord with the undisputable and unquestionable notions of 
social welfare and reforms. A just balance can always be made 
by holding that the exercise of judicial power to determine 
essential religious pr<!ctices, though always available being 
C an inherent power to protect the guarantees under Articles 25 
and 26, the exercise thereof must always be restricted and 
restrained. 
37. Article16(5) which has virtually gone unnoticed till date 
D and, therefore, may now be seen is in the following terms: 
"16(5) - Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation 
of any law which provides that an incumbent of an office 
in connection with the affairs of any religious or 
E 
denominational institution or any member of the 
governing body thereof shall be a person professing a 
particular religion or belonging to a particular 
denomination." 
F 
38. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision i.e. Article 
16(5), fortified by the debates that had taken place in the 
Constituent Assembly, according to us, protects the 
appointment of Archakas from a particular
denomination, if so 
required to be made, by the Agamas holding the field. The 
G debates in the ConstituentAssembly referred to discloses that 
the suggestion that the operation of Article 16(5) should be 
restricted to appointment in offices connected with 
administration of a religious institution was negatived. The 
exception in Article 16(5), therefore, would cover an office in a 
H temple which also requires performance of religious functions.
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1149 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
In fact, the above though not expressly stated could be one of A 
the basis for the views expressed by the Constitution Bench in 
Sheshammal (supra). 
39. The preceding discussion indicates the gravity of the 
issues arising and the perc~ptible magnitude of the impact B 
thereof on Hindu Society. It would be, therefore, incorrect, if 
not self defeating, to take too pedantic an approach at 
resolution either by holding the principle of res judicata or locus 
to bar an adjudication on merits or to strike down the impugned 
G 0. as an executive fiat that does ncit have legislative approval, C 
made explicit by the fact that though what has been brought by 
the G 0. dated 23. 05.2006 was also. sought to be incorporated 
in the statute by the Ordinance, eventually, the amending Bill 
presented before the legislature specifically omitted the 
aforesaid inclusion. The significance of the aforesaid fact, 
D 
however, cannot be underestimated. What is sought to be 
emphasized is that the same, by itself, cannot be determinative 
of the invalidity of the G 0. which will have to be tested on certain 
other premises and foundation treating the same to be an 
instance of exercise of executive power in an area not covered 
E 
by any specific law. 
40. The issue of untouchability raised on the anvil of 
Article 17 of the Constitution stands at the extreme opposite 
end of the pendulum. Article 17 of the
Constitution strikes at F 
caste based practices built on superstitions and beliefs that 
have no rationale or logic. The exposition of the Agamas made 
a Century back by the Madras High Court in Gopala Moopnar 
(supra) that exclusion from the sanctum sanctorum and duties 
of performance of poojas extends even to Brahmins is G 
significant. The prescription with regard to the exclusion of 
even Brahmins in Gopala Moopnar(supra) has been echoed 
in the opinion of Sri Parthasarthy Bhattacharya as noted by 
the Constitution Bench in Seshammal (supra). Such exclusion H
1150 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
is not on the basis of caste, birth or pedigree. The provisions 
of Article 17 and the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, 
therefore, would not be of much significance for the present 
case. Similarly, the 'offer' of the state in its affidavit to appoint 
Shaivite as Archakas in Shiva temples and Vaishnavas in 
B Vaishanvite Temples is too narve an understanding of a 
denomination which is, to say the least, a far more sharply 
indentified subgroup both in case of shaivite and vaishanvite 
followers. However, what cannot be ignored is the 'admission' 
inbuilt in the said offer resulting in some flexibility in the 
C impugned G. 0. that the state itself has acknowledged. 
41. Sheshammal (supra) is not an authority for any 
proposition as to what an Agama or a set of Ag a mas governing 
a particular or group of temples lay down with regard to the 
D question that confronts the court, namely, whether any particular 
denomination of worshippers or believers have an exclusive 
right to be appointed asArchakas to perform the poojas. Much 
less, has the judgment taken note of the particular class or 
caste_ to which the Archakas of a temple must belong as 
E prescribed by the Agamas. All that it does and says is that 
some oftheAgamas do incorporate a fundamental religious 
belief of the necessity of performance of the Poojas by 
Archakas belonging to a particular and distinct secUgroup/ 
F denomination, failing which, there will
be defilement of deity 
requiring purification ceremonies. Surely, if the Agamas in 
question do not proscribe any group of citizens from being 
appointed as Archakas on the basis of caste or class the 
sanctity of Article 17 or any other provision of Part Ill of the 
G Constitution or even the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 
will not be violated. What has been said in Sheshammal 
(supra) is that if any prescription with regard to appointment of 
Archakas is made by the Agamas, Section 28 of the Tamil 
Nadu Act mandates the Trustee to conduct the temple affairs 
H in accordance with such custom or usage. The requirement of
ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1151 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
Constitutional conformity is inbuilt and if a custom or usage is A 
outside the protective umbrella afforded and envisaged by 
Articles 25 and 26, the law would certainly take its own course. 
The constitutional legitimacy, naturally, must supersede all 
religious beliefs or practices. 
B 
42. The difficulty lies not in understanding or restating 
the constitutional values, There is not an iota of doubt on what 
they are. But to determine whether a claim of state action in 
furtherance thereof overrides _the constitutional guarantees 
under Article 25 and 26 may often involve what has already C 
been-referred to as a delicate and unenviable tasl< of iaentifying 
essential religious beliefs and practices, sans which the 
religion itself does not survive. It is in the performance of this 
task that the absence of any exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
of this Court, if not other shortcomings and adequacies, that D 
can be felt. Moreover, there is some amount of uncertainty with 
regard to the prescription contained in theAgamas. Coupled 
with the above is the lack of easy availability of established 
works and the ·declining n~mbers of acknowledged and 
undisputed scholars on the subject. In such a situation one is 
E 
reminded of the observations, if not the caution note struck by 
Mukherjea, J. in ShirurMutt (supra) with regard to complete 
autonomy of a denomination to decide a.> to
what constitutes 
an .essential. religious practice, a view that has also been 
F 
subsequently echoed by this Court though as a "minority view".· 
But we must hasten to clarify that no such view of the Court 
can be understood to an indication of any bar to judicial 
determination of the issue as and when it arises. Any contrary 
opinion would go rise to large scale conflicts of claims and. G 
usages as to what is an essential religious practice with no 
acceptable or adequate forum for resolution. That apart the 
"complete autonomy" contemplated in Shirur Mutt (supra) and 
the meaning of "outside authority" must not be torn out of the 
context in which the views, already extracted, came to be H
1152 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
recorded (page 1028). The exclusion of all "outside authorities" 
from deciding what is an essential religion practice must be 
viewed in the context of the limited role of the State in matters 
relating to religious freedom as envisaged by Articles 25 and 
26 itself and not of the Courts as the arbiter of Constitutional 
B 
rights and principles. 
43. What then is the eventual result? The answer defies 
a straight forward resolution and it is the considered view of 
the court that the validity or otherwise of the impugned G.O. 
C would depend on the facts of each case of appointment. What 
is found and l'!eld to be prescribed by one particular or a set of 
Agamas for a solitary or a group of temples, as may be, would 
be determinative of the issue. In this regard it will be necessary 
to re-emphasise what has been already stated with regard to 
D the purport and effect of Article 16(5) of the Constitution, namely, 
that the exclusion of some and inclusion of a particular segment 
or denomination for appointment asArchakas would not violate 
Article 14 so long such inclusion/exclusion is not based on the 
.E criteria of caste, birth or any other constitutionally unacceptable 
parameter. So long as the prescription(s) under a particular 
Agama or Agamas is not contrary to any constitutional mandate 
as discussed above, the impugned GO. dated 23.05.2006 by 
its blanket fiat to the effect that, "Any person who is a Hindu 
F and
possessing the requisite qualification and training can 
be appointed as a Archaka in Hindu temples" has the 
potential of falling foul of the dictum laid down in Seshammal 
(supra). A determination of the contours of a claimed custom 
or usage would be imperative and it is in that light that the 
G validity of the impugned GO. dated 23.05.2006 will have to be 
decided in each case of appointment of Archakas whenever 
and wherever the issue is raised. The necessity of seeking 
specific judicial verdicts in the future is inevitable and 
unavoidable; the contours of the present case and the issues 
H arising being what has been discussed.

ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL NALA SANGAM v. 
1153 
GOVERNMENT OFT. N. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] 
44. Consequently and in the light of the aforesaid A 
discussion, we dispose of all the writ petitions in terms of our 
findings, observations and directions above reiterating that as 
held in Seshammal (supra) appointments of Archakas will 
have to be ma<;113 in accordance with the Agamas, subject to 
their due identification as well as their conformity with the B 
· Constitutional mandates and principles as discussed above. 
Nidhi Jain 
Writ petitions disposed of ..