RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU ETC. versus STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 961, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 961 
RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU ETC. 
A 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1279-1281 of 2011) 
B 
FEBRUARY 27, 2015 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND R.K. AGRAWAL, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860: 
c 
s.3048 - Interpretation of - Held: The use of word 
'shown' instead of 'proved' in s.3048 indicates that the 
onus cast on the prosecution would stand satisfied on the 
anvil of a mere preponderance of probability -
Thereafter, 
D 
the word 'deemed' used in that Section is to be read down 
to require an accused to prove his innocence, but beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
s.3048 - Dowry death - Conviction of husband and E 
brothers-in-law and sister-in-law on the ground that 
prosecution proved that due to non-fulfl1/ment of demand 
of dowry the deceased was harassed, tortured and treated 
with cruelty- Defence challenged conviction by relying .on 
the exculpatory dying declaration - Held: Since the burden F 
of proving innocence beyond reasonable doubt shifted to 
the accused, it was imperative for the defence to prove the 
sequence of events which led to the recording of the 
alleged dying declaration by the Tehsi/dar - Neither the 
Doctor who 
certified that the deceased was in a fit G 
condition to make a statement nor the Tehsildar who wrote 
down the alleged Dying Declaration 
stated the 
circumstances in which the Dying declaration was recorded 
961 
H
962 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A - Dying Declaration had mysteriously popped up and was 
referred to at the time of consideration of bail application 
-
The alleged exculpating Dying Declaration was, 
therefore, shrouded in suspicion -
Defence having failed 
to give credible version of their innocence, interference with 
B the order of conviction not called for. 
Criminal law: Dying declaration - Concept Proof 
of its authenticity - Procedure to be followed when a 
person is brought to the hospital in serious injured 
C condition - Discussed. 
D 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 
1. The prosecution has 'shown' that 
Section 3048 stood attracted since the death of the 
wife occurred within seven years of the solemnization 
of the marriage; indubitably, it was an unnatural death. 
It also came in evidence that immediately after her 
marriage a demand for a scooter was made and this 
demand recurred with regularity and that about fifteen 
E days prior to the unnatural death of the hapless young 
wife, her Grandfather PW1 first did not accede to the 
request of the Accused to send the deceased/victim to 
her matrimonial house because of their harassment 
and cruelty towards her for not meeting their demands 
F of dowry. Only when the Accused assured her 
Grandfather that she would not be ill-treated, that she 
was sent back to her matrimonial house. The 
statement of the Mother PW2 was also to the same 
effect. Therefore, the requirement of Section 3048,
IPC 
G that the dowry demand should have been made soon 
before the death stood satisfied. [Para 4] [968-F-H; 969-
A-C] 
2. The risks while admitting a Dying Declaration 
H and the state.merits falling within the domain of Section
RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU v. STATE OF U.P. 
963 
32(1) run higher in contrast to other sundry evidences, A 
and this entails a huge bearing on their admissibility 
and credibility. Such statements are neither made on 
oath nor the maker of the statement would be available 
for cross-examination nor are they made under the 
influence of the supremacy and the solemnity of the B 
court-room. However, once a Dying Declaration is held 
to be authentic, inspiring full confidence beyond the 
pale of doubt, voluntary, consistent and credible, 
barren of tutoring, significant sanctity is endowed to 
it; such is the sanctitude that it can even be the C 
exclusive and the solitary basis for conviction without 
seeking any corroboration. [Para 5] [969-G-H; 970-A-
C] 
3. Whenever a person is brought to a hospital in D 
an injured state which indicates foul-play, the hospital 
authorities are enjoined to treat it as a medico-legal 
case and inform the police. If the doctor, who has at-
tended the injured, is of the opinion that death is likely 
to ensue, it is essential for him to immediately report E 
the case to the police; any delay in doing so will al-
most never be brooked. The police in turn should be 
alive to the need to record a declaration/statement of 
the injured person, by pursuing a procedure which 
would make the recording of it beyond the pale of F 
doubt. This is why an investigating officer (1.0.) is 
expected to alert the jurisdictional Magistrate of the 
occurrence, who
in turn should immediately examine 
the injured. When this procedure is adopted, condi-
tional on the certification of a doctor that the injured, G 
is in a fit state to make a statement, a Dying Declara-
tion assumes incontrovertible evidentiary value. Only 
if it is impossible for the Magistrate to personally per-
form this duty, should he depute another senior offi· 
cial. Non-adherence to this procedure would need· H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A lessly and avoidably cast a shadow on the recording 
of a Dying Declaration. The prosecution, therefore, 
would be expected to prove that every step was dili-
gently complied with. [Paras 8, 9] [972-E-H; 973-A-E] 
8 
4. Since the burden of proving innocence beyond 
reasonable doubt shifts to the Accused in the case of 
a dowry death, as it was in the present case, it was 
imperative for the defence to prove the sequence of 
events which led to the recording of the alleged Dying 
C Declaration by the Tehsildar DW1. This burden was not 
even faintly addressed. At the time of seeking bail, the 
accused had requested the Sessions Court to call for 
the alleged Dying Declaration. Keeping in perspective 
that none of the Accused was present when the de-
D ceased was receiving medical treatment in the hospi-
tal, or when the Dying Declaration was allegedly re-
corded, or at the time of death, or even at the time of 
cremation, the manner in which the Accused learnt of 
the existence of the Dying Declaration was not dis-
E closed. The burden and necessity of proving this se-
quence of events stood transferred to the shoulders of 
the Accused since Section 3048 of the IPC was at-
tracted. The 1.0. deposed that all the Accused, includ-
ing the late father-in-law, had absconded after the in-
F cident. Neither the Doctor DW2 who allegedly certi-
fied that the deceased was in a fit condition to make 
a statement nor the Tehsildar who had
allegedly writ-
ten down the alleged Dying Declaration stated the 
G manner in which the Tehsildar had been conscripted 
or located to perform this important recording. The 
Dying Declaration appeared to have mysteriously 
popped up and referred to at the time of praying for 
bail. The chain or sequence of events which led to its 
H recording remained undisclosed. In his statement, the
RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU v. STATE OF U.P. 
965 
Tehsildar did not clarify the manner in which he hap-
A 
pened to record the Dying Declaration and the timing 
of its transmission to the Court. Since the onus of 
proof had shifted to the Accused, this alleged se-
quence of events should have been proved beyond 
reasonable doubt by them. The Tehsildar as well as the B 
Doctor who allegedly certified that the deceased was 
in a fit state to make the Dying Declaration was pro-
duced by the defence. The Doctor should have spoken 
of the sequence of events in which the Tehsildar came 
to record the Dying Declaration. The alleged exculpat-
C 
ing Dying Declaration was, therefore, shrouded in sus-
picion. The Accused were present on the scene at the 
time of the occurrence, which turned out to be fatal, 
and that added to their responsibility to give a cred-
0 
ible version of their innocence in tt:ie dowry death. 
[Para 10] [973-H; 974-A-H; 975-A-D] 
Sher Singh v. State of Punjab (2008) 4 SCC .265: 
2008 (2) SCR 959 - relied on. 
Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474: 1992 
( 2 ) SCR 197; Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v. State of 
Gujarat (1992) 4 SCC 69; Vithal v. State of Maharashtra 
(2006) 13 SCC 54; Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi 
E 
v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 15 SCC 455: 2007 (11 ) F 
. SCR 1; Samadhan Dhudaka Kofi v. State of Maharashtra 
(2008) 16 SCC 705: 2008 (17 ) SCR 1025; Surinder 
Kumar v. State of Punjab (2012) 12 SCC 120: 
2012 (9) 
SCR 1019 - distinguished.
G 
Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 155: 
2008 (17) SCR 379 - referred to. 
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition); Shepard v. U.S., 
Kan., 290 U.S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 - referred 
to. 
H

966 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
Case Law Reference 
2008 (2 ) SCR 959 
relied on. 
Para 3 
2008 (17) SCR 379 
referred to. 
Para 4 
B 
1992 ( 2 ) SCR 197 
distinguished. 
Para 11 
(1992) 4 sec 69 
distinguished. 
Para 11 
(2006) 13 sec 54 
distinguished. 
Para 11 
c 
2007 (11 ) SCR 1 
distinguished. 
Para 11 
2008 (17 ) SCR 1025 
distinguished. 
Para 11 
2012 (9) SCR1019 
distinguished. 
Para 11 
D 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal 
Appeal Nos. 1279-1281 of 2011. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.07.2010 of the 
E 
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow bench in 
Criminal Appeal No. 184, 186 & 187 of 1999. 
P. N. Misra, T. N. Singh, V. K. Singh for the Appellant. 
Abhishek Singh, Amit Kumar Singh Samir Ali Khan, for 
F the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. These Appeals assail the 
Judgment dated 13.07.2010 of the learned Single Judge, 
G High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow, who had 
affirmed the conviction of the Appellants and the sentencing 
under Sections 498A and 3048 of the IPC pronounced by 
the VII Ith Additional District & Sessions Judge, Faizabad on 
H 15.4.1999. The essay, therefore, is to reverse the
RAMAKANT MISHRA@ LALU v. STATE OF U.P. 
967 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.) 
concurrent findings and sentence of the Courts below. 
A 
2. The endeavour of the learned counsel for the 
Appellants is almost entirely predicated on an exculpatory 
Dying Declaration allegedly made by the deceased, who 
was the wife of the 1'1 Appellant and the sister-in-law of the B 
2nct Appellant and the 3rct Appellant. The deceased Vijay 
Lakshmi was married to the 1st Appellant, Ramakant Mishra, 
in 1989 and from that wedlock a son named Sonu was 
begotten. Sonu has been living with his maternal 
grandparents who have cared for all his requirements, C 
without any efforts on the part of the Accused towards taking 
over his custody or making any contribution for his 
expenses. The prosecution has shown/proved that due to 
non-fulfillment of demands of dowry the deceased was 
harassed, tortured and treated with cruelty. The exact date D 
of the marriage is not forthcoming, but it avowedly took 
place much before the expiry of seven years of the 
unnatural death of Vijay Lakshmi. On the morning of 
21.9.1994 she has been shown by the prosecution to have 
been put on fire after sprinkling kerosene oil on her body. 
E 
The husband/Appellant No.1 and the other Accused appear 
to have admitted her in a hospital and, thereafter, 
disappeared from the scene, not even being bothered to 
be present at her cremation. She succumbed to 90-95 per F 
cent burn injuries at 11.30 p.m. that very day. Jagdamba, 
Appellant
No.2 and brother-in-law of the deceased, has 
stated that when the deceased was preparing milk on the 
ehulah, Sonu toppled the container of kerosene oil and its 
contents spilled on the floor; in her endeavour to pick up G 
her son Sonu, her saree allegedly got caught in the chulah, 
resulting in the saree catching fire and her receiving 90-95 
per cent burns. In the Impugned Order it has been noted 
that the opinion of the Doctor was that death resulted from 
burn injuries. The Chargesheet was submitted against four H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 2 S.C.R. 
A Accused named in the FIR, one of whom (the father-in-law 
of the deceased) has died. 
3. Very recently, this Court had the opportunity of 
interpreting Section 3048 of the IPC in Criminal Appeal 
8 No.1592 of 2011, titled Sher Singh v. State of Haryana, 
[reported in (2015) 1 SCR 29) which was authored by one 
of us (Vikramajit Sen,J.). Succinctly stated, it had been 
held therein that the use of word 'shown' instead of 
'proved' in Section 3048 indicates that the onus cast on 
C the prosecution would stand satisfied on the anvil of a 
mere preponderance of probability. In other words, 'shown' 
will have to be read up to mean 'proved' but only to the 
extent of preponderance of probability. Thereafter, the word 
'deemed' used in that Section is to be read down to require 
D an accused to prove his innocence, but beyond reasonable 
doubt. The 'deemed' culpability of the accused leaving no 
room for the accused to prove innocence was, accordingly, 
read down to a strong 'presumption' of his culpability. 
However, the accused is required to dislodge this 
E presumption by proving his innocence beyond reasonable 
doubt as distinct from preponderance of possibility. 
4. In harmony with the ratio of Sher Singh, so far as 
the present case is concerned, there can be no cavil that 
F the prosecution has 'shown' that Section 3048 stands 
attracted since the death of the wife occurred within seven 
years of the solemnization of the
marriage; indubitably, it 
was an unnatural death. It has also come in evidence that 
immediately after her marriage a demand for a scooter was 
G made and this demand recurred with regularity. It is in 
evidence that about fifteen days prior to the unnatural 
death of the hapless young wife, her Grandfather PW1 first 
did not accede to the· request of the Accused to send the 
H deceased/victim to her matrimonial house because of the;,
RAMAKANT MISHRA@ tALU v. STATE OF U.P. 
969 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 
harassment and cruelty towards her for not meeting their A 
demands of dowry. Only when the Accused assured her 
Grandfather that she would not be ill-treated, that she was 
' 
sent back to her matrimonial house. The statement of the 
Mother PW2 is also to the same effect. We are not 
persuaded, therefore, to hold that there was no live link B 
between the dowry demand and the death or that the 
Accused have succeeded in proving that the demand, if 
any, was of a much earlier vintage, on which count no 
support can be rallied from the judgment in Tarsem Singh 
v. State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 155. Therefore, the C 
requirement of Section 3048 of the IPC that the dowry 
demand should be made soon before the death stands 
satisfied. Accordingly, it appears to us that the prosecution 
has succeeded in showing, or proving prima facie, that D 
dowry demands had been made by the Accused even 
shortly before the death of the deceased. 
5. The defence has rested very heavily nay, almost 
entirely, on the alleged Dying Declaration attributed to the 
deceased. The admissibility of a Dying Declaration as a E 
piece of evidence in a Trial is governed by Section 32(1) 
of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 32, as a whole, 
enunciates the exceptions to the rule of non-admissibility 
. of hearsay evidences, eventuated out of necessity to give F 
relevance to the statements made by a person whose 
attendance cannot be procured
for reasons stipulated in the. 
section. Postulating the essential ingredients to define what 
exactly would constitute a hearsay is an arduous task, and 
since we are only concerned with one of its exceptions, we G 
should forbear entering into the entire arena. The risks while 
admitting a Dying Declaration and the statements falling 
within the domain of Section 32(1) run higher in contrast to 
other sundry evidences, and this entails a huge bearing on 
their admissibility and credibility. Such statements are H
970 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A neither made on oath nor the maker of the statement would 
be available for cross-examination nor are they made under 
the influence of the supremacy and the solemnity of the 
court-room. This is the reason why this Court has 
consistently underlined the necessity to examine this specie 
B of evidence with great circumspection and care. However, 
once a Dying Declaration is held to be authentic, inspiring 
full confidence beyond the pale of doubt, voluntary, 
consistent and credible, barren of tutoring, significant 
sanctity is endowed to it; such is the sanctitude that it can 
C even be the exclusive and the solitary basis for conviction 
without seeking any corroboration. At this juncture, it is 
worthwhile noting that the sanctity attached to a Dying 
Declaration springs up from the rationale that a person 
D genuinely under the sense of imminent death would speak 
only the truth. In addition to the Dying Declaration, which 
is only one of the species of the genus of Section 32(1), 
there could be other statements, written or verbal, which 
also would be encompassed within the sweep of this 
E section, and at this point the Indian law drifts from the 
English law. This is further evident from the usage of 
phraseology in the section, embracing not only statements 
made about "cause of death" but also about "any of the 
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the 
F death", whether or not the person making the
statement was 
under "expectation of death". These statements could be 
in the form of a suicide note, a letter, a sign or a signal, or 
a product of any reliable means of communication; their 
genuineness and credibility shall, of course, be reckoned 
G by the Court entertaining the concerned matter. A Dying 
Declaration enjoys a higher level of credence vis-a-vis any 
other statement abovementioned, which is on account of 
the former being made in the "contemplation of death". 
"Contemplation of death" is the primal factor to segregate 
H Dying Declarations from other statements. But no hard-and-
RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU v. STATE OF U.P. 
971 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.) 
fast rule can be laid down to confine the contemplation A 
within the circumference of few hours or a few days in which 
death of the maker of the statement must happen so as to 
elevate that statement to the level of a Dying Declaration. 
Moreover, the state of mind of the maker would also be 
material in discerning completely as to whether the maker B 
was mentally fit to make the statement and whether the 
maker actually could have contemplated death. 
6. Definition of this legal concept found in Black's Law 
Dictionary (51" Edition) justifies reproduction: 
Dying C 
Declarations - Statements made by a person who is lying 
at the point of death, and is conscious of his approaching 
death, in reference to the manner in which he received the 
injuries of which he is dying, or other immediate cause of 
his death, and in reference to the person who inflicted such D 
injuries or the connection with such injuries of a person who 
is charged or suspected of having committed them; which 
statements are admissible in evidence in a trial for homicide 
(and occasionally, at least in some jurisdictions, in other 
cases) where the killing of the declarant is the crime E 
charged to the defendant. Shepard v. U.S., Kan., 290 U.S. 
96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196. Generally, the admissibility 
of such declarations is limited to use in prosecutions for 
homicide; but is admissible on behalf of accused as well F 
as for
prosecution. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil 
action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while 
believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause 
or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending 
death is not excluded by the hearsay rule. Fed.Evid.R. G 
804(b)(2). 
7. When a person makes a statement while being 
aware of the prospect that his death is imminent and 
proximate, such a statement assumes a probative value H
972 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A which is almost unassailable, unlike other statements which 
he may have. made earlier, when death was not lurking 
around, indicating the cause of his death. 
That is to say 
that a person might be quite willing to implicate an innocent 
person but would not do so when death is knocking at his 
B door. That is why a Dying Declaration, to conform to this 
unique specie, should have been made when death was 
in the contemplation of the person making the statemenU 
declaration. • 
C 
8. In the case before us, the statement, if made by the 
deceased, would .qualify to be treated as a Dying 
Declaration because she was admitted in the hospital, 
having sustained 90-95 per cent burn injuries, and because 
of this grave burn injuries, she would be expecting to 
D shortly breathe her last. 
9. The central question, however, remains as to 
whether the alleged Dying Declaration attracts authenticity. 
Since the prosecution has succeeded in showing/proving 
E by preponderance of probability that a dowry death has 
occurred, the burden of proving innocence has shifted to 
the accused. 
It appears to us to be unexceptionable that 
whenever a person is brought to a hospital in an injured 
state which indicates foul-play, the hospital authorities are 
F enjoined to treat it as a medico-legal case and inform the 
police. If the doctor, who has attended the injured, is of the 
opinion that death is likely to ensue, it is essential for him 
to
immediately report the case to the police; any delay in 
G doing so will almost never be brooked. The police in turn 
should be alive to the need to record a declaration/ 
statement of the injured person, by pursuing a procedure 
which would make the recording of it beyond the pale of 
doubt. This is why an investigating officer (1.0.) is expected 
H to alert the jurisdictional Magistrate of the occurrence, who
RAMAKANT MISHRA @ LALU v. STATE OF U.P. 
973 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 
in turn should immediately examine the injured. When this A 
procedure is adopted, conditional on the certification of a 
doctor that the injured is in a fit state to make a statement, 
a Dying Declaration assumes incontrovertible evidentiary 
value. We cannot conceive of a more important duty cast 
on the Magistrate, since the life & death of a human being 
B 
is of paramount importance. We think that only if it is 
impossible for the Magistrate to personally perform this 
duty, should he depute another senior official. Non-
adherence to this procedure would needlessly ar.d 
avoidably cast a shadow on the recording of a Dying C 
Declaration. The prosecution, therefore, would be expected 
to prove that every step was diligently complied with. The 
prosecution would have to produce the doctor or the 
medical authority to establish that on the examination of D 
the injured/deceased, the police had been immediately 
informed. The 1.0. who was so informed would then have 
to testify that he alerted the Magistrate, on whose non-
availability, some responsible person was deputed for the 
purpose of recording the Dying Declaration. We are not E 
in any manner of doubt that where medical opinion is to 
the effect that a person is facing death as a consequence 
of unnatural events, the responsibility of the Magistrate to 
record the statement far outweighs any other responsibility. 
There may be instances where there
was no time to follow F 
this procedure, but that does not seem to be what has 
transpired in the case in hand. In cases where some other 
person is stated to be recipient of a Dying Declaration, 
doubts may reasonably arise. 
10. Since the burden of proving innocence beyond 
reasonable doubt shifts to the Accused in the case of a 
dowry death, as it has in the present case, it was imperative 
for the defence to prove the sequence c• events which lead 
G 
to the recording of the alleged Dyin~ Declaration by the H
974 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A Tehsildar DW1. This burden has not even been faintly 
addressed. It appears that at the time of seeking bail the 
accused had requested the Sessions Court to call for the 
alleged Dying Declaration. Keeping in perspective that none 
of the Accused was present when the deceased was 
B receiving medical treatment in the hospital, or when the 
Dying Declaration was allegedly recorded, or at the time of 
death, or even at the time of cremation, the manner in which 
the Accused learnt of the existence of the Dying Declaration 
has not been disclosed. The statement of the 1.0. also does 
C not clarify the position; he has stated that he learnt of the 
existence of the Dying Declaration from the relatives of the 
deceased. On the application of Sher Singh, the burden 
and necessity of proving this sequence of events stood 
D transferred to the shoulders of the Accused since Section 
3048 of the IPC had been attracted. The 1.0. has deposed 
that all the Accused, including the late father-in-law, Gorakh 
Nath, had absconded after the incident. In fact, in the cross-
examination, the 1.0. states that - "there is no reliable 
E information about the Dying Declaration... On keeping this 
information that the Dying Declaration of Vijay Lakshmi was 
recorded by the Magistrate I did not consider any need of 
this thing". Neither the Doctor DW2 who had allegedly 
certified that the deceased was in a fit condition to make a 
F statement nor the
Tehsildar who had allegedly written down 
the alleged Dying Declaration has stated the manner in 
which the Tehsildar had been conscripted or located to 
perform this important recording. The Dying Declaration 
appears to have mysteriously popped up and referred to 
G at the time of praying for bail. The chain or sequence of 
events which lead to its recording remains undisclosed. In 
his statement, the Tehsildar has not clarified the manner in 
which he happened to record the Dying Declaration and the 
timing of its transmission to the Court. Since the onus of 
H proof had shifted to the Accused, this alleged sequence of
RAMAKANT MISHRA@ LALU v. STATE OF U.P. 
975 
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 
events.should have been proved beyond reasonable doubt A 
by them. We may emphasise that the Tehsildar as well as 
the Doctor who allegedly certified that the deceased was 
in a fit. state to make the Dying Declaration has been 
produced by the defence. The Doctor should have spoken 
of the sequence of events in which the Tehsildar came to B 
record the Dying Declaration. The alleged exculpating Dying 
Declaration is, therefore, shrouded in suspicion and we 
have not been persuaded to accept that it is a genuine 
document. The defence has failed to comply with Section 
1138 of the Evidence Act. The Accused being charged of C 
the commission of a dowry death ought to have entered the 
witness box themselves. The Accused were present on the 
·scene at the time of the occurrence, which turned out to 
be fatal, and that added to their responsibility to give a D 
credible version of their innocence in the dowry death. 
11. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474, 
Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v. State of Gujarat (1992) 4 SCC 
69, Vithal v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 13 SCC 54, 
Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi v. State of E 
Maharashtra (2007) 15 SCC 455, Sher Singh v. State of 
Punjab (2008) 4 SCC 265, Samadhan Dhudaka Kali v. State 
of Maharashtra (2008) 16 SCC 705 and Surinder Kumar v. 
State of Punjab (2012) 12 SCC 120, are distinguishable on 
F 
facts because in the case in hand we are not convinced of 
the
authenticity of the Dying Declaration; in contradiction 
to its form, or the mental stability or lucidity of the deceased 
at the time when she allegedly made the statement 
attributed to her. 
G 
12. The Appeals are dismissed in the above terms. 
The interim Order is recalled. 
Devika Gujral 
Appeal dismissed. 
H