UNION OF INDIA & ORS. versus DILEEP KUMAR SINGH
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 882, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
c 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 882 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
v. 
DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
(Civil Appeal Nos.2466-2467 of 2015) 
FEBRUARY 26, 2015 
rr.s. THAKUR AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.] 
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, 
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 -
Proviso to s. 47 - Employee of Central Reserve Police Force 
(CRPF) permanently incapacitated - Relieved from serVice 
0 - Writ petition - High Court allowed the petition holding that 
the Notification dated 10.9.2002 issued under proviso to s. 
47 (exempting the CRPFfrom the rigours ofs.47) would be 
applicable only with reference to sub-section (2) of s. 47 
and not to the whole provision in view of the provisions uls. 
E 73(3) and (4)- On appeal, held: The proviso to s.47 would 
apply to the whole provision and not to sub-section (2) thereof 
alone - The proviso cannot be interpreted with reference to 
s. 73 - A proviso does not travel beyond the provision to 
which it is a proviso - Moreover, s.47 being the leading and 
F substantive provision and s. 73 being a subordinate and 
machinery provision,s. 47 will prevail - The exemption is 
based on intelligible differentia and has a rational relation 
with the object sought to be achieved i.e. "type of work" 
carried on in an establishment - Therefore, it is also not 
G discriminatory - The employee was rightly relieved from 
service - Service law. 
Interpretation of Statutes - The provisions of a statute 
H 
882
UNION OF INDIA v. DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
883 
must be read harmoniously - In case of conflict between A 
two Sections, when reconciliation thereof if not possible, it 
has to be determined as to which is leading and which is 
subordinate provision and as to which must given way to 
the other. 
B 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. One is to read Section 47 as a whole and 
being read as a whole it is clear from the proviso thereof 
that it would apply to "type of work" carried on in any c 
establishment and would, therefore, apply to both 
dispensing with service including reduction in rank as 
well as promotion. Section 47 proviso speaks of "this 
Section". The literal rule applied to this proviso would 
make it clear that it would apply to the entire Section, o 
for otherwise the words used would have been "this sub-
section". [paras 12 and 21] [892-F; 893-C-D] 
2.1. It is not correct that in vie.w of s. 73(3) arid (4), 
the proviso to s. 47 is only a proviso to sus-section (2) E 
of s. 47. T~ provisions of a statute must be read 
' 
harmoniously to~ther. However, if this is not possible, 
then where there ts. a conflict between two Sections, 
and the two cannot b~onciled, it ha~ to be determined 
which is the leading prov1slon a. nd which the subordinate F 
provision, and which musfgive way to the other. In the 
present case, Section 47 is the "leading provision" and 
Section 73 is the "subordinate provision". Further, 
Section 47 is a positive and clear provision.
This is 
because, Section 47 is the substantive provision G 
· exempting the subject matter of Section 47 as a whole 
as opposed to Section 73 which is only a machinery 
provision by which notifications made under Section 47 
are to be laid before each House of Parliament. {paras 
15, 16 and 19] [893-H; 894-A-C: 896-H; 897-A-B] ·· 
H
884 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
Smt. Laxmi Devi v. Sethani Mukand Kanwar and Two 
Others, 1965 (1) SCR 726- relied on. 
Institute of Patent Agents & Ors. v. Joseph Lockwood, 
1894 A.C. 347; Project Blue Sky Inc. v. Australian 
s Broadcasting Authority, 153 ALR 490 - referred to. 
2.2. A proviso does not travel beyond the provision 
to which it is a proviso. Therefore, the golden rule is to 
read the whole Section, inclusive of the proviso, in such 
c manner that they mutually throw light on each other and 
result in a harmonious construction. [para 20] [897-8-C] 
Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf. 1976 (1) SCR 
277 = (1976) 1 sec 128 - relied on. 
D 
3. In what facts and circumstances the Government 
exercises its discretion taking into account the type of 
work in an establishment is obviously to be guided by 
the object for which the beneficial legislation is enacted 
together with balancing the need for exempting some 
E establishments from a part or the whole of the provisions 
of the Act. On a true construction, it is clear that the 
legislation has "given" the Government the power to 
exempt any establishment from the rigours of the Act 
F not only qua promotion but also qua termination from 
service and reduction of rank. [para 23] [899-C-E] 
4. In view of the marginal note of Section 47 and 
Chapter VIII in which Section 47 falls, i.e. "non-
discrimination", it is clear that the idea of Section 47 is 
G not to discriminate against employees who
acquire 
disability during service. It is settled law that 
discrimination cannot be viewed in the abstract - the 
doctrine of classification is an important adjunct to the 
doctrine of discrimination. It is clear, therefore, that if 
H
UNION OF INDIA v. DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
885 
there is an intelligible differentia having a rational A 
relation to the object sought to be achieved, a provision 
will not be held to be discriminatory. Thus, an exemption 
provision is based on such a classification and 
exempting any establishment from not dispensing with 
service or reduction in rank or not granting promotions B 
has a rational relation to the object sought to be 
achieved, namely, that the "type of work" carried on in 
an establishment may be such that a disabled 
employee's services may have to be dispensed with and/ 
or promotion denied. [para 22] [898-E-H, 899-A] 
C 
5. It is not correct to say that the exemption 
notification dated 1 Oth September, 2002 will not apply 
for the reason that the accident took place prior to 2002. 
The relevant date, is the date of dispensing with service D 
and not the date on which the disability is incurred, for 
Section 47 prohibits an establishment from dispensing 
with the service of an employee who acquires disability 
during his service. Since service was dispensed with 
on 1•1 July, 2011 (that is long after the date of the E 
exemption notification), the notification will apply. [para 
25] [899-H; 900-A.S] 
6. The plea of discrimination has not been raised 
before the High Court, and the plea raised before this F 
Court is lacking in particulars and has to be dismissed 
for this reason also. [para 28] [902-B] 
· 
Kuna/ Singh v. Union oflndia &Anr. 2003 (1) SCR 1059
= (2003) 4 SCC 524- distinguished. 
. G 
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lehru & Ors. 2003 (2) 
SCR 495 = (2003) 3 SCC 338 - held inapplicable. 
Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2010 (3) H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A SCR 911 = (2010) 4 SCC 653; S.R. Bommai v. Union of 
India 1994 (2) SCR 644 = (1994) 3 sec 1 - cited. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
Case Law Reference 
2010 (3) SCR 911 
cited 
para 6 
1994 (2) SCR 644 
cited 
para 6 
1894A.C. 347 
referred to 
para 16 
153ALR 490 
referred to 
para 17 
1965 (1) SCR 726 
relied on 
para 18 
1976 (1) SCR 277 
relied on 
para 20 
2003 (2) SCR 495 
held inapplicable 
para 23 
2003 (1) SCR 1059 
distinguished 
para 24 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
2466-2467 of 2015 
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2014 of the 
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ 
Petition No. 42101 of 2011 with Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 
30278 of 2004. 
P. S. Patwalia, B. B. Sawhney, Natasha Vinayak, Tushar 
Bakshi, Sushma Suri for the Appellants. 
Mahabir Singh, Ayush Chaudharu, Gautam Awasthi for 
G the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was. delivered by 
R.F.NARIMAN, J. 1.Leave granted. 
H 
2. These appeals raise an interesting question as to the
UNION OF INDIA v. DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
887 
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.] 
interpretation of a proviso contained in Section 47 of the A 
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of 
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (in short the "1995 
Act"). 
3. The facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows:-
B 
On 1•1 January, 1998, the respondent was enlisted in 
the CRPF as Assistant Commandant. While on duty, on 19th 
October, 2001, he sustained grievous injuries in his spinal 
cord and legs while he was out on a visit checking night c 
guards. Thereafter, he was provided with specialized 
treatment in various hospitals, but nothing worked and, 
ultimately, a medical board in its report dated 22"d July, 2004 
categorized the respondent as PEE-5, i.e., a person who is 
permanently incapacitated and stated that he has 100% o 
disability and recommended that he be relieved from service 
on medical grounds. On 27th October, 2004, a show cause 
notice was served on the respondent along with a copy of 
the report of the medical board with a direction to submit his 
representation, if any, against the proposed invalidation from 
E 
service on medical grounds. Instead of representing against 
the show cause notice, the respondent filed writ petition 
No.30278/2004 challenging the said show cause notice. By. 
an interim order passed on 19th January, 2005, the appellants 
were directed not to pass any order pursuant to the report F 
given by the medical board against the
respondent. 
4. Pursuant to an order modifying the stay application, 
by an order dated 1st July, 2011,the respondent was relieved 
from service and given invalidation pension as admissible G 
under Rule 38 of the CCS (Pension) Rules of 1972. The 
respondent filed a second writ petition No.42101 of 2011 
challenging the aforesaid order. 
5. By the impugned judgment dated 8th January, 2014, H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A the Allahabad High Court held on a construction of Section 
· 4 7 of the said Act that a Notification dated 10'" September, 
2002 issued under Section 47 insofar as the CRPF is 
concerned, (exempting the CRPF from the rigours of Section 
47) would have to be read with reference to the field occupied 
B by Section 47(2) only. Thus, the High Court made it clear 
that the exemption provision would apply only to promotion 
and not to continuing the respondent in service. As a 
consequence, the order dated 1•1 July, 2011, was set aside 
and the Union was directed to treat the petitioner in service 
C and to adjust him against any suitable post or against a 
supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or until 
he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. 
6. Mr . .P.S. Patwalia, learned Additional Solicitor General, 
D appearing on behalf of the Union of India has placed the 
1995 Act before us. He referred to Section 33, Section 47 
and Section 73 and submitted that the penultimate proviso 
to Section 4 7 would apply to the entire Section and not merely 
to sub-section (2) thereof as is clear from the language of 
E the proviso which uses the words "this Section" and not "this 
sub-section". He further submitted that since there is no · 
ambiguity in the provision, no resort can be taken to Section 
73(3) and 73(4) which refers to the proviso in Section 47 as· 
F "the proviso to sub-section (?) of Section
47". He further 
submitted that the scheme of the Act would be disturbed by 
the impugned judgment inasmuch as Section 33 and Section 
47 cover the same ground - Section 33 being applicable 
pre-appointment and Section 47 being applicable after 
G appointment. He cited Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of 
Bihar & Ors., (2010) 4 SCC 653 at paragraph 179, which 
judgment refers to the literal rule of construction and S.R. 
Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 at paragraphs 
238 and 239, for the proposition that courts cannot supply a 
H cassus omissus.
UNION OF INDIA v. DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
889 
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.] 
7. Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned senior counsel for the A 
respondent, has argued before us that the impugned 
judgment is correct inasmuch as the 1995 Act is a beneficial 
legislation meant to help disabled persons and an expansive 
construction is, therefore, in order. 
B 
8. He argued that Sections 47 and 73 have to be 
harmoniously construed and so cbnstrued, Section 73 throws 
light on Section 4 7 and makes the proviso apply only to sub-
section (2) thereof. He argued that in no circumstance can a 
disabled person, once he acquires a disability during his C 
service, be terminated as it would go against the purpose of 
the Act. Further, he argued that the exemption notification 
dated 1 Olh September, 2002 would not apply on facts as the 
disability was incurred prior to the notification. He also argued 
that there was discrimination against the respondent in that D 
others with disabilities did not get their service terminated. 
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The 
Preamble of the 1995 Act states as follows:-
"An Act to give effect to the Proclamation on the Full 
Participation and Equality of the People with Disabilities 
in the Asian and Pacific Region 
E 
Whereas the Meeting to Launch the Asian and Pacific F 
Decade of Disabled Persons 1993-2002 convened by 
the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
Pacific held at Beijing on 1st to 5th December, 1992, 
adopted the Proclamation on
the Full Participation and 
Equality of People with Disabilities in the Asian and G 
Pacific Region; 
And Whereas India is a signatory to the said 
Proclamation; 
And Whereas it is considered necessary to implement H
890 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 2 S.C.R. 
A 
the Proclamation aforesaid." 
B 
c 
10. Sections 33, 47 and 73(3) & (4) are set out 
hereinbelow: 
"33. Reservation of posts.-Every appropriate 
Government shall appoint in every establishment such 
percentage of vacancies not less than three per cent 
for persons or class of persons with disability of which 
one per cent each shall be reserved for persons suffering 
from-
(1) blindness or low vision; 
(ii) hearing impairment; 
o 
(iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy, 
in the posts identified for each disability: 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Provided that the appropriate Government may, having 
regard to the type of work carried on in any department 
or establishment, by notification subject to such 
conditions, if any, as may be specified in such 
notification, exempt any establishment from the 
provisions of this section. • 
47. 
Non-discrimination 
in 
Government 
employment.-(1) No establishment shall dispense 
with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a 
disability during his service: 
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability 
is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be 
shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and 
service benefits: 
Provided further that if it is not possible to. adjust the
UNION OF INDIA v. DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
891 
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.) 
employee against any post, he· may be kept on a A 
supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or 
he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is 
earlier. 
(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on 
B 
the .ground of his disability:· 
Provided that the appropriate Government may, having 
regard to the type of work carried on. in any 
establishment, by notification and subject to such C 
conditions, if any, as may be specified in such 
notific~tion, exempt any establishment from the 
provisions of this section. 
73. Power of appropriate Government to make 
rules.-
(3) Every notification made by the Central Government 
under the proviso to Section 33, proviso to sub-section 
D 
. (2) of Section 47, every scheme framed by it under 
Section 27, Section 30, sub-section (1) of Section 38, 
E 
Section 42, Section 43, Section 67, Section 68 and every 
rule made by it under sub-section (1). shall be laid, as 
soon as may be after it is made, before each House of 
Parliament, while it is in session for a total period of F 
thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in 
two or more successive sessions, and if, before the 
expiry of the session immediately following the session 
or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree 
in making any modification in the rule, notification or G 
scheme, both Houses agree that the rule, notification or · 
scheme should not be made, the rule,
notification or 
scheme shall thereafter have effect only in such modified 
·form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, 
that any such modification or annulment shall be without H
892 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under 
that rule, notification or scheme, as the case may be. 
(4) Every notification made by the State Government 
under the proviso to Section 33, proviso to sub-section 
B 
(2) of Section 47, every scheme made by it under Section 
27, Section 30, sub-section (1) of Section 38, Section 
42, Section 43, Section 67, Section 68, and every rule 
made by it under sub-section (1), shall be laid, as soon 
as may be after it is made, before each House of State 
C 
Legislature, where it consists of two Houses or where 
such legislature consists of one House before that 
House." 
11. There is no doubt whatsoever that Mr. Mahabir Singh 
D is right in saying that this is a beneficial legislation passed 
pursuant to a proclamation on the full participation and 
equality of people with disabilities in the Asian and Pacific 
region to which India is a signatory. However, we find that 
for the reasons given hereinafter the impugned judgment 
E cannot be sustained. 
12. It will be noticed that Section 47 proviso speaks of 
"thi.s Section". The literal rule applied to this proviso would 
make it clear that it would apply to the entire Section, for 
F otherwise the words used would have been "this sub-section". 
Quite apart from this, the language of this proviso is similar 
to the language of the proviso contained in Section 33. Both 
provisions speak of an exemption being granted having
regard to the "type of work" carried on in any establishment. 
G It is clear that given the "type of work" carried on by the 
armed forces or the CRPF before us, persons who have 
disabilities may not have any reservation for them at all pre-
appointment, if exempted, for the simple reason that persons 
suffering with disabilities (which as defined under Section 
H 2(t) means a person suffering from not less than 40% of any
UNION OF INDIA v. DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
893 
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.] 
disability as certified by a medical authority) may be persons A 
wholly unfit for service required in the defence of the country. 
It is obvious that, if at the appointment stage, persons with 
disabilities need not have vacancies in posts reserved for 
them, equally after suffering a disability during service, a 
person may for the self-same reason not be able to perform B 
what is required of him in the defence of the nation, thereby 
justifying his discharge from service. 
13. The context of the provision is "type of work".· It is 
clear that given this context, there is no rationale for C 
exemption so far as "promotion" is concerned but no 
exemption so far as "dispensation" is concerned. 
14. One argument that weighed with the High Court was 
that under the second proviso to sub-section ( 1), if it is not o 
possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may 
be kept on a supernumerary post. From this it was sought 
to be inferred that under no circumstance can an employee 
who acquires disability during his service have his service 
dispensed with. This reasoning is fallacious for the reason 
E 
that sub-section (1) deals with dispensing with service as 
well as reduction in rank.· The argument that an employee's 
services can never be dispensed with under Section 47(1) 
having due regard to the second proviso thereof fails to take 
into account that there is no such requirement as far as 
F
reduction in rank is concerned. If an exemption can be given 
so far as reduction in rank is concerned, then there is no 
reason why such exemption cannot be given so far as 
dispensing with service is concerned, as both are contained 
in Section 47(1) of the Act. 
G 
15. We now come to what appealed to the High Court 
and was argued most vehemently before us. It was stated 
that Section 73(3) & (4) made it clear that the proviso is only 
a proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 47 and that therefore H
894 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 2 S.C.R. 
A it must be read only as such. To this again there are two 
answers. 
16. It is well settled that the provisions of a statute must 
be read harmoniously together. However, if this is not 
B possible then it is setiled law that where there is a conflict 
between two Sections, and you cannot reconcile the two, 
you have to determine which is the leading provision and 
which the subordinate provision, and which must give way 
to the other. This statement of the law is to be found in 
C Institute of Patent Agents & Ors. v. Joseph Lockwood, 
1894 A.C. 347 at 360. Lord Herschell, LC., stated this, as 
follows:-
"Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two sections 
o 
to be found in the same Act. You have to try and reconcile 
them as best you may. If you cannot, you have to 
determine which is the leading provision and which the 
subordinate provision, and which must give way to the 
other." 
E 
F 
G 
H 
17. This Judgment has been subsequently followed by 
the High Court of Australia in Project Blue Sky Inc. v. 
Australian Broadcasting Authority, 153 ALR 490, in the 
following terms: 
"A legislative instrument must be construed on the 
prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give 
effect to harmonious goals. Where conflict appears to 
arise from the language of particular provisions, the 
conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by 
adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to 
achieve that result
which will best give effect to the 
purpose and language of those provisions while 
maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions. 
Reconciling conflict provisions will often require the court
UNION OF INDIA v. DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
895 
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.) 
"to determine which is the leading provision and which A 
the subordinate provision, and which must give way to 
the other". Only by determining the hierarchy of the 
provisions will it be possible in many cases to give each 
provision the meaning which best gives effect to its 
purpose and language while maintaining the unity of the B 
statutory scheme." (at pages 509-510) 
18. Under similar circumstances, in Smt. Laxmi Devi v. 
C 
Sethani Mukand Kanwar and Two Others, 1965 (1) SCR 
726, a question arose as to how one. would harmonise 
Section 2(d} with Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. 
The effect of Section 2(d), which is a saving clause, is that 
the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act will apply to o 
transfers by operation of law. Whereas Section 5 of the 
Transfer of Property Act defines transfer of property as 
intended to take in transfers effected by acts of parties. 
Auction sales, being transfers effected by operation of law 
would, therefore, be within the purview of Section 100 (latter E 
part) read with Section 2(d). (Section 100 provides that no 
charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands 
of a person to whom such property has been transferred for 
consideration and without notice of the charge.) Section 
2(d) was held to prevail over Section 5 because it is a "positive F 
provision" which is "clear". This Court held: 
"This position, however, has become somewhat
complicated by reason of the provisions contained .in 
s.5 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 5 provides, G 
inter alia, that in the following sections "transfer of 
property" means an act by which a living person conveys 
property, in present or in future, to one or more other 
living persons. In other words, in terms, the definition of 
the expression "transfer of property" as used in all the H
896 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
sections of the Transfer of Property Act is intended to 
take in transfers effected by acts of parties inter vivos, 
and an auction-sale clearly is not such an act. Section 5 
would, therefore, appear to exclude auction sales from 
the purview of s.100 altogether. This result would appear 
to be consistent with the provision in the preamble of 
the Act which says that the Transfer of Property Act was 
enacted because it was thought expedient to define and 
amend certain parts of the law relating to the transfer of 
property by act of parties. That is the position which 
emerges from the reading of s.5 coupled with the 
preamble; and that naturally raises the question as to 
how to reconcile these two inconsistent positions. 
In our opinion, the positive provision contained ins. 2(d) 
must prevail over the definition of "transfer of property" 
prescribed by s.5. No doubt, the purpose of the definition 
is to indicate the class of transfers to which the provisions 
of the Transfer of Property Act are intended to be applied; 
but a definition of this kind cannot over-ride the clear 
and positive direction contained in the specific words 
used bys. 2(d). As we have already seen, the result of 
the saving clause enacted by s. 2(d) is to emphasise 
the fact that the provisions of 1).57 and those contained 
in Chapter JV must apply to transfer by operation of law. 
Such a positive provision cannot be made to yield
to 
what may appear to be the effect of the definition 
prescribed by s.5, and so, we are inclined to hold that 
notwithstanding the definition prescribed by s.5, the latter 
part of s.100 must be deemed to include auction sales." 
(at page 733) 
19. A reference to these two judgments makes it clear 
that Section 47 is the "leading provision" and Section 73 is 
H the "subordinate provision". Further, Section 47 is a positive
UNION OF INDIA v. DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
897 
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.] 
and clear provision. This is because, Section 47 is the A 
substantive provision exempting the subject matter of Section 
47 as a whole as opposed to Section 73 which is only a 
machinery provision by which notifications made under 
Section 47 are to be laid before each House of Parliament. 
B 
20. Equally, it is settled law that a proviso does not travel 
beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. Therefore, the 
golden rule is to read the whole Section, inclusive of the 
proviso, in sucli manner that they mutually throw light on 
each other and result in a harmonious construction. This is C 
laid down in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 
1 sec 128, as follows:-
"18. We may mention in fairness to Counsel that the' 
following, among other decisions, were cited at the Bar o 
bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes: C/Tv.lndo-
Mercantile Bank Ltd, [Al R 1959 SC 713 : 1959 Supp (2) 
SCR 256, 266 : (1959) 36 ITR 1] ; Ram Narain Sons 
Ltd. v. Asstt. CST [AIR 1955 SC 765 : (1955) 2 SCR 
483, 493 : (1955) 6 STC 627] .; Thompson v. Dibdin E 
[(1912)AC533,541 :81 LJKB918:28TLR490];Rex 
v. Dibdin [1910 Pro Div 57, 119, 125] and TahsildarSingh 
v.State ofU.P. [AIR 1959 SC 1012: 1959 Supp (2) SCR 
875, 893 : 1959 Cri LJ 1231] . The law is trite. A proviso 
must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting F 
clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso 
must prima facie be rear! and
considered in relation to 
the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a 
separate or independent enactment. "Words are 
dependent on the principal enacting words to which they G 
are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced 
from their context" (Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912AC 533). 
If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso 
should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter H
898 
A 
B 
c 
D 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. 
To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, 
sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a 
proviso must be considered in relation to the principal 
matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily 
is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the 
whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner 
that they mutually throw light on each other and result 
in a harmonious construction." 
21. Viewed at in this light also, one is to read Section 47 
as a whole and being read as a whole it is clear from the 
proviso that it would apply to "type of work" carried on in any 
establishment and would, therefore, apply to both dispensing 
with service including reduction in rank as well as promotion. 
22. Another interesting facet is brought out by the 
marginal note of Section 4 7 and Chapter VII I in which Section 
47 falls. Chapter VIII has as its heading "non-discrimination". 
Equally, the marginal note of Section 47 is "non-discrimination 
E in government employments". It is clear that the idea of 
Section 47 is not to discriminate against employees who 
acquire disability during service. It is settled law that 
discrimination cannot be viewed in the abstract- the doctrine 
of classification is an important adjunct to the doctrine of 
F discrimination. It is clear, therefore, that if there is an 
intelligible
differentia having a rational relation to the object 
sought to be achieved, a provision will not be held to be 
discriminatory. It is clear that an exemption provision is based 
on such a classification and exempting any establishment 
G from not dispensing with service or reduction in rank or not 
granting promotions has a rational relation to the object 
sought to be achieved, namely, that the "type of work" carried 
on in an establishment may be such that a disabled 
H employee's services may have to be dispensed with and/or
UNION OF INDIA v. DI LEEP KUMAR SINGH 
899 
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.] 
promotion denied. 
A 
23. Shri Mahabir Singh cited United India Insurance 
Co. Ltd. v. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 at page 345 for 
the proposition that in a beneficial legislation what the 
legislature gives for the benefit of those covered by it, the B 
court cannot take away. We are of the view that this authority 
will not apply for the basic reason that we are construing an 
exemption provision in a beneficial legislation. We have 
already held that the exemption provision will cover the 
entirety of the field of Section 47. In what facts and C 
circumstances the Government exercises its discretion taking 
into account the type of work in an establishment is obviously 
to be guided by the object for which the beneficial. legislation 
is enacted together with balancing the need for exempting 
some establishments from a part or the whole of the D 
provisions of the Act. On a true construction, it is clear that 
the legislation has "given" the Government the power to 
exempt any establishment from the rigours of the Act not 
only qua promotion but also qua termination from service 
and reduction of rank as has been held above. 
E 
24. Learned counsel also cited before us Kunal Singh 
v. Union of India & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 524. This judgment 
decided that the benefit of Section 4 7 would be available to 
a person as an additional benefit even though he may get F 
certain other benefits under the service Rules
applicable to 
him. No question as to the proviso to Section 47 arose before 
the court in that case and for the purposes of the present 
controversy, the ratio of that decision wil( have little or no 
bearing. 
G 
25. We now come to two other contentions raised by 
Mr. Mahabir Singh. According to him, the exemption 
notification dated 1 Qth September, 2002 will not apply for the 
reason that the accident took place prior to 2002. It is clear H
900 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 
A that the exemption notification will apply to all cases in which 
an employee's services are dispensed with. The relevant 
date, therefore, is the date of dispensing with service and 
not the date on which the disability is incurred, for Section 
47 prohibits an establishment from dispensing with the 
B service of an employee who acquires disability during his 
service. Since service was dispensed with on 1 •1 July, 2011 
(that is long after the date of the exemption notification), the 
notification will, obviously, apply. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
26. The plea of discrimination sought to be made by Mr. 
Mahabir Singh is based on an averment made in the reply 
affidavit on behalf of the petitioner (respondent herein) in 
the Supreme Court. The averment is as follows: 
"Further the contention of the petitioners that the 
disabled persons are not being retained in service is 
absolutely wrong because the persons disabled due to 
militant action etc. are retained and not being invalidated 
from service in accordance to Para 9(a)(i) of Standing 
Order No.7/99 of CRPF. Many disabled persons has 
been retained or re-instated in CRPF and other armed 
forces after enactment of the Act of 1995 and 
amendment of rule 20(2) of the C.C.S. (Leave) Rules 
1972 as well as the judgment passed by this Honorable 
Court reported in 2003(2) ESC (SC) Kunal Singh Vs. 
U.0.1.. Even the CRPF itself has retained such disabled 
officer Shri Pratap Singh, Deputy
Commandant till 
superannuation and retained Shri Y.N. Ray and Sameer 
Sh~astava who became disabled in the rank of 
Assistant Commandant and granted regular promotion 
and at present they are Commandant. Two other officers 
Sh. R.K. Singh and Sh. P.R. Mishra have also been 
retained in service despite their disability. Similarly the 
B.S.F. also has not only retained Shri Surinder Singh
UNION OF INDIA v. DILEEP KUMAR SINGH 
901 
[R.F.NARIMAN, J.] 
but had promoted him up to his present rank of Second A 
in Command. The Indian Army has retained similarly 
wheel chair bound physically disabled (paraplegic) 
Officer S.K. Rajdan and promoted him to the rank of 
Major General and Indian Air Force also retained its 
wheel chair bound disabled (paraplegic) trainee cadet B 
Harjot Singh." 
27. In the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants this 
averment is denied in the following terms:-
c 
"The contents of para 5 (G-H) of reply are wrong, 
misconceived and hence denied. It is submitted that 
Central Para Military forces perform a critical role in 
maintaining internal security and guarding of national 
borders. By very nature, the job requirements are D 
"technical' in nature requiring a high level of physical 
fitness and abilities. CRPF is exempted from the 
provisions of Section 4 7 of the Act. The Respondent 
does not come within the purview of Standing Order 71 
99 and has been declared 100% permanently E 
incapacitated for further service, he was dealt as per 
procedure laid down in Section VIII of CRPF medical 
manual. There is difference between NOT FIT FOR 
NORMAL ACTIVE DUTY AND 100% PERMANENT. 
INCAPACITATION FOR FURTHER SERVICE. Since F 
the Respondent comes under second category, he was 
dealt with as per procedure laid down in section VIII of 
CRPF Medical Manual. However, it is respectfully 
submitted that full Bench decision of Allahabad High
Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Mohd. Yasin G 
Ansari ((2006) 3 UPBEBC 2508] has held that a person 
in the armed forces even with lower degree of disability 
cannot be retained in services." 
28. Apart from the plea of the disabled officers mentioned H

902 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 2 S.C.R. 
A being vague, for no particulars are given as to the extent of 
their disability, the Union has made it clear that Standing 
Order No. 7 /99 will not apply and that since the job 
requirements demand a high level of fitness and ability CRPF 
is exempted from the provisions of Section 47 of the Act. 
B Not only has this plea not been raised before the High Court, 
but the plea raised before us is lacking in particulars and 
has to be dismissed for this reason also. 
29. We make it clear that the respondent, who has been 
C occupying official accommodation, will vacate such 
accommodation by 30
111 June, 2015. Mr. Patwalia has assured 
us that, given the facts of this case, no penal charges will be 
collected from him till the date on which he vacates the said 
accommodation. 
D 
30. The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The judgment 
of the Allahabad High Court is set aside. There will be no 
order as to costs. 
E Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal allowed.