ANIL MISHRA versus STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 385, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 385 : 2024 INSC 189
Anil Mishra 
v. 
State of U.P. & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1335 of 2024)
01 March 2024
[Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether High Court was justified in setting aside the entire 
proceedings of the case against the accused on the basis of a 
Settlement Agreement where the complainant in the FIR was not 
made a party.
Headnotes
During the pendency of the trial, a Settlement Agreement was 
executed between the accused persons, i.e. Respondent Nos. 
2 to 4; and one of the victims i.e. Respondent No.5 – Trial 
Court on considering the said agreement rejected the same by 
observing that (i) chargesheet has been filed under Sections 
147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 of the IPC of which Section(s) 147, 
148, 149, 364 of the IPC are non-compoundable in nature;(ii) 
the FIR was lodged by the Appellant yet he was not made a 
party to the Settlement Agreement; and (iii) the Appellant had 
filed objections to the Settlement Agreement – Aggrieved, 
an application was filed by the accused persons before the 
High Court under Section 482 CrPC – High Court set aside 
entire proceedings.
Held: Appellant herein is (i) an injured victim qua the alleged 
offence; and (ii) the original complainant in the FIR. Appellant 
neither entered into any settlement with the accused persons nor 
was courting any such idea. This Court, in Gian Singh v. State of 
Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 laid down the principles governing the 
exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by High Courts 
vis-à-vis quashing of an FIR, criminal proceedings or complaint. 
In Gian Singh, this Court inter alia held that the High Court must 
consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of 
justice to continue with the criminal proceedings; or continuation 
of the criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process 
of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim
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and the wrongdoer; and whether to secure the ends of justice, it 
is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end; and if the 
answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High 
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal 
proceedings. In the present case, High Court has certainly erred 
by quashing the FIR and the criminal proceedings. The High 
Court failed to notice that the Appellant i.e., an injured victim and 
original complainant was not a party to the Settlement Agreement 
and nor was agreeable to such a course of action. Accordingly, 
the Impugned Order neither secured the ends of justice nor 
prevented an abuse of process of law, thus the Impugned Order 
was erroneous and contrary to the principles laid down in Gian 
Singh. [Paras 11 and 12].
Case Law Cited
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, [2012] 8 SCR 753 : 
(2012) 10 SCC 303 - relied on.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Quashing under Section 482 CrPC; Settlement Agreement; 
Settlement and compromise; Complainant not party to 
Settlement Agreement; Exercise of jurisdiction under Section 
482 CrPC- Principles; Contrary to the interest of justice; Securing 
the ends of justice; Prevention of abuse of process of law; Non 
compoundable.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1335 
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.04.2023 of the High
Court 
of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No.38114 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
Konark Tyagi, Adv. for the Appellant.
Yasharth Kant, Mrs. Anamika Agarwal, Ms. Sonal Kushwah, Rajesh 
Kumar, Navank Shekhar Mishra, Ms. Vimal Sinha, Aviral Kashyap, 
Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
387
Anil Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1.	
Leave granted. 
2.	
The present appeal is arising out of order dated 06.04.2023 passed 
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (the “High Court”) in 
an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973 (“CrPC”) bearing number 38114 of 2022, titled ‘Jitendra 
Mishra @ Sanjay and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.’ (the 
“Impugned Order”). 
3.	
The facts of the case reveal that the Appellant herein lodged a First 
Information Report on 07.08.1999 bearing number 966 of 1999 under 
Section(s) 364, 147, 148, 149 & 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 
(“IPC”) against Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (the “Accused Persons”) 
alleging inter alia that (i) the Appellant and Respondent No. 5 were 
beaten-up and accordingly, injured by Accused Persons who were 
wielding guns, rifles, revolvers and pistols; and (ii) Respondent No. 
5 was further abducted by the Accused Persons (the “FIR”).
4.	
The matter was investigated by the police and thereafter a charge-
sheet was filed against the Accused Persons qua offences under 
Sections 147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 of the IPC (the “Chargesheet”). 
Pursuant to the filing of the Chargesheet, Ld. Civil Judge, Junior 
Division, Tirwa, District, proceeded to take cognizance of the offences 
and inter alia issued process to the Accused Persons; and rejected 
objections filed by the Accused Persons vide order(s) dated (a)
29.11.1999; and (b) 18.04.2000 in Criminal Cases No. 1265 of 1999 
and 1264 of 1999 (the “Summoning Order”).
5.	
Aggrieved, the Accused Persons preferred (i) a criminal revision 
petition assailing inter alia the Summoning Order (the “Revision 
Petition”); and (ii) an application under Section 482 CrPC seeking the 
quashing of the Chargesheet before the High Court (the “Quashing 
Petition”). Pertinently, vide an order dated 28.05.2010, the High 
Court dismissed both (i) the Revision Petition; and (ii) the Quashing 
Petition (the “1st HC Order”).
6.	
Thereafter, the Appellant preferred an application before the Chief 
Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad (the “Trial Court”) for issuance of 
non-bailable warrants (“NBWs”) against Accused Persons. Vide an
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order dated 17.01.2020, the Trial Court ordered the issuance of non-
bailable warrants. On 28.09.2022, during the pendency of the trial 
before the Trial Court, the Accused Persons brought a settlement 
agreement dated 28.09.2022 executed inter alios the Accused 
Person(s) and Respondent No. 5 (the “Settlement Agreement”) to 
the notice of the Trial Court. Accordingly, an application was preferred 
by the Accused Persons under Section 482 CrPC before the High 
Court seeking quashing of the proceedings emanating from the 
FIR on the basis of the Settlement Agreement (the “1st Settlement 
Application”). However, vide an order dated 23.12.2022 in the 1st 
Settlement Application, the High Court directed the Trial Court to 
consider the Settlement Agreement; and pass appropriate order(s) 
within a period of 1 (one) month (the “2nd HC Order”). 
7.	
Pursuant to the 2nd HC Order, Trial Court considered the Settlement 
Agreement; and vide an order dated 23.01.2023, the Trial Court 
observed inter alia that (i) the Chargesheet has been filed under 
Sections 147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 of the IPC of which Section(s) 
147, 148, 149, 364 are non-compoundable in nature; (ii) the FIR 
was lodged by the Appellant herein who was an injured person, 
yet wasn’t made a party to the Settlement Agreement; and (iii) that 
the Appellant had filed an objection to the Settlement Agreement. 
Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid the Trial Court
rejected the 
Settlement Agreement (the “Underlying Order”).
8.	
Aggrieved by Underlying Order, another application was preferred by 
the Accused Persons before the High Court under Section 482 of the 
CrPC seeking the quashing of (i) the FIR; and (ii) the proceeding(s) 
emanating from the FIR on the basis of the Settlement Agreement 
(the “2nd Settlement Application”). The High Court vide the 
Impugned Order allowed the 2nd Settlement Application. The operative 
paragraph(s) of the Impugned Order are reproduced as under: 
“On behalf of the applicant, this application is filed under 
Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of Case No. 1288 of 2003, 
Case Crime No. 966 of 1999 under Section 364, 147, 148, 
149, 323 I.P.C., Police Station Kotwali Farrukhabad: District 
Farrukhabad which is under consideration of court of Learned 
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad on the ground that 
the entire proceeding should be cancelled on the basis of 
the agreement dated 28-09-2022 between the parties.
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389
Anil Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors.
Learned Counsel for the applicants and opposite party No. 
3 states that a settlement agreement has been reached 
between the parties on date 28-09-2022 in which it is 
mentioned that a First Information Report was lodged by 
the complainant against unknown people. The complainant 
has not taken the name of any accused in his statement 
under Section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. It has also been 
mentioned in the said agreement that the mutual relations 
between the two parties have become quite cordial and 
there is no dispute of any kind left between them. The 
attested copy of the said agreement has been attached 
to this application as Annexure 4. 
Learned counsel for the applicants and Mr. Md. Nadeem, 
learned counsel for opposite party number 3, have stated 
that they want disposal of the present case and do not want 
to pursue this issue further, hence the entire subsequent 
proceedings should be set aside. In support of his 
argument he cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme 
Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & 
Anr. 2014 Law Suit (SC) 202, Yogendra Yadav & Ors. 
v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., Dimpey Gujral W/o Vivek 
Gujral & Ors. v. Union Territory & Ors. and drawn the 
attention of the Court towards the said judgments. 
Hearing the learned counsel for the parties and the learned 
Additional Government Advocate and examining the file 
and after considering the above precedents of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, this application submitted under Section 
482 CrPC is eligible to be accepted. 
Accordingly, this application is accepted and the entire 
proceedings of the above mentioned case are set aside.” 
9.	
The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant has 
submitted that the Appellant is an injured victim of the alleged offence; 
and also, is the original complainant in relation to the FIR. Accordingly, 
it has been vehemently contended before us that the High Court erred 
in law as well as in facts by allowing the 2nd Settlement Application. It 
was also submitted before us that the Impugned Order suffers from 
perversity and illegality on account of the fact that it fails to consider 
that the Appellant i.e., the original complainant, was neither a party
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to the Settlement Agreement nor was amenable to such a course 
of action. In this context, it was submitted that the High Court ought 
not to have exercised its jurisdiction under 482 CrPC in favour of 
the Accused Persons.
10.	 On the other hand, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Accused 
Persons has submitted that the Accused Persons entered into a 
settlement / compromise with Respondent No. 5 i.e., the principal 
victim who was allegedly abducted, and accordingly, once Respondent 
No. 5 had settled the matter, there was no justifiable cause to continue 
criminal proceedings against the Accused Persons. Thus, it was 
submitted that the Impugned Order, was a well-reasoned order, that 
warrants no interference from this Court. 
11.	 We have heard the counsel(s) appearing on behalf of the parties and 
perused the record. Admittedly and undisputedly, the Appellant herein 
is (i) an injured victim qua the alleged offence; and (ii) the original 
complainant qua the FIR. Furthermore, from the materials placed on 
record and the arguments advanced, it can safely be concluded that 
the Appellant neither entered into any settlement with the Accused 
Persons nor was courting any such idea. Accordingly, in view of the 
aforesaid circumstances, we fail to understand how the High Court 
proceeded to quash the FIR; and the proceedings emanating thereof 
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. This Court in 
Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 authoritatively 
laid down principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under 
Section 482 CrPC by High Courts vis-à-vis quashing of an FIR, 
criminal proceeding or complaint. The same is reproduced as under: 
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion 
can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court 
in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in 
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different 
from the power given to a criminal court for compounding 
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power 
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has 
to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in 
such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to 
prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases 
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or 
FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim
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Anil Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors.
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts 
and circumstances of each case and no category can 
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, 
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and 
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of 
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, 
etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or 
victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. 
Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious 
impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the 
victim and the offender in relation to the offences under 
special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or 
the offences committed by public servants while working 
in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for 
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. 
But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and 
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for 
the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising 
from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership 
or such like transactions or the offences arising out of 
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes 
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature 
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this 
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal 
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of 
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the 
criminal case would put the accused to great oppression 
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to 
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and 
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In 
other words, the High Court must consider whether it would 
be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue 
with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal 
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law 
despite settlement and compromise between the victim and 
the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, 
it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and 
if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative,
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the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash 
the criminal proceeding.”
12.	 Thus, it is our considered opinion that the High Court has certainly 
erred by quashing (i) the FIR; and (ii) the criminal proceeding(s) 
emanating from the FIR on the basis of the Settlement Agreement. 
The High Court failed to notice that the Appellant i.e., an injured 
victim; and original complainant was not a party to the Settlement 
Agreement and nor was agreeable to such a course of action. 
Accordingly, we find that Impugned Order neither secured the ends 
of justice nor prevented an abuse of process of law, thus we find 
that the Impugned Order was erroneous and contrary to principles 
laid down in Gian Singh (Supra). 
13.	 With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is accordingly allowed, 
and the Impugned Order is set aside. The proceedings emanating 
from FIR i.e., Case No. 1288 of 2003, stand restored to the file of 
the Trial Court, with a direction to the Trial Court to dispose of the 
same expeditiously, preferably, within a period of one year, in view 
of the fact that the FIR pertains to the year 1999.
14.	 Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of. 
Headnotes prepared by: 
Result of the case: 
Adeeba Mujahid, Hony. Associate Editor 
Appeal allowed. 
(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)