MAHARAJI EDUCATIONAL TRUST versus SGS CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. & ORS
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 92, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
· (2015] 7 S.C.R. 92 
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUST 
v. 
SGS CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. & ORS 
(Civil appeal No. 4494 of 2015) 
MAY 15, 2015 
[H. L. DATTU, CJI., S. A. BOBDE AND 
ARUN MISHRA, JJ.] 
c 
Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parish ad Adhiniyam, 
1965: 
Object of- Discussed. 
s. 15 - Boundary dispute - Default in repayment of 
D loan amount taken by appellant-Trust from HUDCO resulting 
in mortgage of immovable properties including property in 
dispute-A portion of property in dispute exchanged by Trust 
from Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and exchange deed 
deposited with HUDCO- Recovery proceedings by HUDCO, 
E pending on objection of builder- Objection of builder on the 
strength of agreement to sell entered with Trust - Builder 
preferred writ petition for seeking relief of issuance of 
mandamus commanding the Avas to demarcate land- High 
F Court directed the Avas to demarcate 42.45 acres of the 
mortgaged land and 21 acres as unencumbered land out of 
total area of 63. 45 acres- Challenged- Held: It was not the 
function of Avas to demarcate the land on the basis of an 
agreement entered into inter se between the Trust and Builder 
G - It was for the parties to agitate the questions before the 
ORT where the recovery proceedings were pending at the 
instance of HUDCO with whom the property had been 
mortgaged by the Trust- Principle of noscitur a socii will be 
applicable in construing s. 15 and the words 'to make 
H investigation, examination or survey of any
property' in 
92
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
93 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. 
s. 15(1 )(m) will take their meaning and colour from the other A 
phrases employed in s.15(1) - Avas, the housinf:J ..,oard, 
therefore, could not have demarcated the land by invoking 
powers uls. 15 - Principle of noscitur a socii. 
Writ jurisdiction : Writ petition seeking direction to declare B 
any property as encumbered one - Held : It is not within the 
ken of the High Court in writ jurisdiction to declare any 
property as encumbered one - Such rights between private 
parties cannot be made subject matter of writ jurisdiction~ 
Jurisdiction: Recovery proceedings pending in Delhi - Writ 
petition at Lucknow at the instance of HUDCO - Held: Not 
maintainable. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court · 
c 
D 
HELD: 1. The objections had been preferred by 
the Builder before the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery 
Tribunal, Delhi. Admittedly, 21 acres of land, out of the 
total of63.45 acres which was mortgaged to HUDCO had 
been exchanged by the Trust with Avas Evam Vikas E 
Parishad (Avas). Thus, the exchange was with the 
property which was under mortgage with HUDCO and 
the exchange deed had been deposited by the Trust with" 
HUDCO. Before the Recovery Officer, New Delhi, prayer F 
has been made by the Builder to sell property No~.1 to 5 
and not to sell property No.6 with respect to which he 
has entered into an agreement with the Trust. Though, 
there is serious dispute between the parties to the lis 
whether
the said land is unencumbered, finding has G 
been given by the High Court that 21 acres of land is 
unencumbered. It was not open to the High Court to 
enter into the arena, which of the property is 
encumbered. The sale in realization of debt is the outlook 
of the Recovery Officer, ORT, Delhi, where the recovery H
94 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A proceedings are pending, including the objections 
preferred by the Builder. It was not open to the Builder 
to file a writ application for the aforesaid reliefs. The High 
Court could not have adjudicated on the property rights 
under the guise of directing Avas to demarcate the land 
B and give finding that it was unencumbered land. [Paras 
10, 12 and 13] [101-F-H; 102-A; 103-C-E, F] 
2. It was for the parties to agitate the questions 
before the ORT where the recovery proceedings are 
C pending at the instance of HUDCO with whom the 
property had been mortgaged by the Trust. Prima facie, 
on the strength of the agreement to sell, particularly 
when possession had not been handed over to the 
Builder, it was not open to him to file a writ application 
D for demarcation of the property as unencumbered 
property or otherwise. What was sought to be achieved 
by filing a writ petition, was to get rid of the proceedings 
pending before the Recovery Officer, ORT at Delhi, and 
to save land at serial No.6 from being sold which 
E includes 21 acres of land, and an attempt was made to 
get the 21 acres of land declared as unencumbered orie. 
As a matter offact, such disputed questions with respect 
to the properties inter se between the Builder and the 
F Trust as to demarcation, writ petition could not be said 
to be appropriate remedy, particularly when the order 
passed by the Recovery Officer, ORT, was not in question 
and the order
passed by the ORT, Delhi, could not have 
been questioned before the Lucknow Bench of High 
G Court of Allahabad. [Paras 14 and 15) [104-B-F] 
3. No part of the cause of action to the Builder 
has arisen at Lucknow where the Head Office of Avas is 
situated. Avas was not at all answerable to the Builder. 
H As way-back in the year 2007, much before agreement 
to sell was entered into, it had exchanged its 21 acres of
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
95 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. 
land with the Trust. Moreover, no application was ever A 
filed by the Builder to Avas for seeking demarcation of 
the land. Thus, in case of dispute inter se between the 
Builder and the Trust based upon subsequent 
agreement to sale entered into in 2010, there was no right 
available to the Builder to askAvas to demarcate the land B 
which it had already given to the Trust. After the 21 acres 
of land had been given to the Trust, Avas had nothing to 
do with that land. This, it was a wholly misconceived 
venture on the part of the Builder to ask Avas to 
demarcate the land given to the Trust, particularly when C 
the Avas was not having any housing scheme with 
respect to the land which had been given to the Trust. 
Thus, filing of the writ petition at' Lucknow Bench was 
totally uncalled for and the propriety required that it D 
should not have been entertained at Lucknow Bench. 
No part of the cause of action has arisen at Lucknow, 
and it was not the function of Avas to demarcate the 
property in case of dispute between private party or.for 
the purpose of proceeding before the ORT and that the E 
property was situated in the district of Ghaziabad 
wherein not under territorial jurisdiction of Bench at 
Lucknow. Thus, the writ petition was not maintainable 
at Lucknow Bench. [Paras 16 and 22] [105-A-F; 113-F-G] 
,. " 
Sri Nasiruddin etc. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal 
etc. 1975 (2) SCC 671 : 1976
(1)'SCR 505; Oil and 
Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors. 
1994 (4) SCC 711: 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 252; Nationa/J 
Textile Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Haribox Swalram & 
Ors. 2004 (9) SCC 786: 2004 (3) SCR 738; Alchemist 
Ltd. & Anr. v. State Bank of Sikkim & Ors. 2007 (11) 
SCC 335: 2007 (4) SCR 46; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & 
Ors. v. Kalyan Banerjee 2008 (3) SCC 456: 2008 
(3) SCR 920 - referred to. 
F 
G 
H
96 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
...,, . 
A 
4. Section 15 deals with the functioning of the 
Board and the provisions of the Act. As per the provisions 
Jll .. 
of section 15, the power to make investigation, 
examination or survey of any property is to be exercised 
by the Board in connection with its functions enjoined 
B in the Act. The principle of noscitur a socii will be 
applicable in construing Section 15 of the Act and the 
words "to make investigation, examination or survey of 
any property" in section 15(1)(m) will take their meaning 
and colour from the other phrases employed in section 
C 15(1). [Paras 25 and 27] [117-F; 118-B-C] 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Rohit Pulp & Paper Mi/ls Ltd. v. Collector of Central 
Excise, Baroda 1990 (3) SCC 447: 1990 (2) SCR 797 
- relied on. 
Case Law Reference 
1976 (1) SCR 505 
referred to. 
Para 17 
1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 252 referred to. 
Para 18 
2004 (3) SCR 738 
referred to. 
Para 19 
2007 (4 ) SCR 46 
referred to. 
Para 20 
2008 (3) SCR 920 
referred to. 
Para 21 
1990 (2) SCR 797 
dC. 
relied on. 
Para 21 
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
4494 of2015. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.09.2013 of the 
High Court of Judicature atAllahabad, Lucknow Bench in W.P. 
No. 11669 (M/B) of2011. 
WITH 
H C. A. Nos. 4495 and 4496 of 2015
MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS 
97 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. 
Ranjit Kumar, S. G., Dr. A. M. Singhvi, Jayant Bhushan, A 
K. V. Vishwanathan, Vikas Singh, Rajeev Dhavan, Krishnan 
Venugopal, Ashutosh Khaitan, Navpreet Singh Ahluwalia, 
Kanishk V. Shahi, Deepak Chawla, Adhish Sharma, Manoj 
Kumar, Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Rohit Kumar, A. K. Singh, B. 
Subrahmanya Prasad, Abhindra Maheshwari, Pankaj Singh, B 
Ridhima Singh, Vishwajit Singh, Aarohi Bhalla, Mayank Gulati, 
Devadatt Kamat, Omita Unnarkar, M. Y. Deshmukh, Sujata 
Kurdukar, Rajesh lnamdar, Deepeika Kalia, Kapish Seth, 
lrshadAhmad,Abhisth Kumar,Abhishek Kumar Singh, Somraj 
Choudhary, T. Harish Kumar, E. C.Agrawala for the appearing C 
parties. 
' ' 
The Judgment of the Court was"delivered by 
Jt'· 
~RUN MISHRA, J. 1. Leave granted in all the special D 
leave petitions. 
2. In the appeals the judgment and order dated 
25.9.2013 passed by the High Court of Allahabad, Bench at 
Lucknow, has been questioned by Maharaji Educational Trust E 
(for short 'the Trust'), U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (for short 
'Avas Evam Vikas Parishad') and Housing and Urban 
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'HUDCO') 
whereby the High Court has directed the Avas Evam Vikas 
Parishad to demarcate 42.45 acres of the mortgaged land 
F 
and 21 acres as unencumbered land out of total area of 63.45 
acres in writ petition filed by SGS Construction & Development 
(P) Ltd. (for short 'Builder'). 
3. The factual matrix
indicate that the Trust has takeh'a G 
loan from HUDCO. The outstanding figure at present is stated 
to be approximately Rs.433 crores. There was default in 
making the payment. The Trust had mortgaged the immovable 
properties mentioned from serial Nos.1 to 5 and also the 
property at serial No.6 which is in question in the present matter H
98 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A in an area of 63.45 acres of vacant land situated at village 
Akbarpur, village Behrampur and village Mirzapur, Pargana-
Loni, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad. Out of the property 
mentioned at serial No.6 which was mortgaged with HUDCO, 
the Trust had exchanged the land in area 21 acres fromAvas 
B Evam Vikas Parishad vide Exchange Deed dated 4.5.2007. 
Thereafter, the Trust had also deposited the deed of exchange 
of the said land with HUDCO on 27.7.2011. 
4. As the loan was not repaid by the Trust, HUDCO had 
C started proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal at 
Delhi. The recovery proceedings are pending before the 
Recovery Officer, in which the builder has filed objections which 
are stated to be pending. The objections have been filed by 
the Builder in respect of property No.6 against the action 
D initiated by HUDCO for sale of mortgaged property under 
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Security lnterestAct, 2002 (hereinafter referred 
to as 'the SARFAESI Act'). 
E 
5. The Builder has filed objections on the strength of an 
agreement to sell dated 26.8.2010 entered with Trust which 
was initially unregistered for purchase of 63.45 acres of land 
comprised in property No.6, which includes the 21 acres of 
land which was exchanged by the Trust with the Avas Evam 
F Vikas Parish ad. The agreement was executed between the 
Builder and the Trust for consideration of Rs.154 crores.
Out 
of the same, it is submitted that sum of Rs.9 crores has been 
paid by the Builder to the Trust. The agreement had been 
registered subsequently, which has been questioned by the 
G Trust and writ petition is pending in High Court at Allahabad. A 
civil suit is also stated to be pending. 
6. Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid 
proceedings, the Builder preferred writ petition in question 
H before the High Court of Allahabad, Bench at Lucknow claiming
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
99 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARLIN MISHRA, J.] 
following reliefs: 
A 
"i) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding 
... 
the Respondent/Opposite Party No.1 i.e. U.P. Awas Evam 
Vikas Parishad to demarcate lands measuring 42.45 
acres·out of 63.45 acres, which are mortgaged so that if 
B 
at a later date the properties at SI. No.6 as mentioned in 
Annexure P/1 were to be sold by the Respondent No.3, 
there would be no ambiguity in identifying the mortgaged 
property. 
ii) Issue a writ, order or direction commanding the 
Respondent No.2 to implement its order dated 61h 
September, 2011 in a time bound manner preferably with 
a period of 3 months in order to sell properties at SI. 
c 
No.1 to 5 as mentioned in Annexure P/1 and further 
o 
restrain the Respondent No.2 to proceed with the 
application filed by the Respondent No.3 dated 
20.10.2011 (Annexure P/7) till the properties at SI. No.1 
to 5 are not sold. 
iii) Issue any writ, direction or orders as may be deemed 
fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case." 
Second prayer had been abandoned at the time of final hearing 
of the writ petition. 
7. On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that it is 
not the function of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate 
E 
F 
the land on the basis of an agreement entered into inter se 
between the Trust and the Builder. Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam 
Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (in short referred to as G 
Adhiniyam of
1965) has been enacted so as to further various 
kinds of housing schemes and development projects. The 
powers under Section 15 of the Adhiniyam of 1965 cannot be 
exercised out of context of the Act. It was also submitted that H 
Lucknow Bench had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
100 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A The High Court could not have treated the property exchanged 
by Avas Evam Vlkas Parishad with the Trust as unencumbered 
one. It was further submitted that on the strength of unregistered 
agreement to sell, no right, title or interest passes to the Builder. 
The registration of agreement to sale which had been obtained 
B subsequently, has been stayed by the High Court in the 
pending writ application. The writ petition was a misconceived 
venture. By virtue of section 70 of the Transfer of Property Act 
(for short 'the TP Act'), HUDCO was having a right over the 
property of Trust obtained in exchange with mortgaged property. 
C The Deed of Exchange has also been deposited by the Trust 
with HUDCO. No application was ever filed by the Builder 
with theAvas Evam Vikas Parishad for demarcation of land. 
There was no housing scheme framed by Avas Evam Vikas 
D Parishad with respect to the land which had been given in 
exchange to the Trust. Thus, provision of section 15 of the 
Adhiniyam of 1965 is not attracted. It was also submitted on 
behalf of the appellants that the Builder is dilly dallying the 
recovery proceedings by filing frivolous litigation. 
E 
8. Per contra, on behalf of the Builder, it was submitted 
that the agreement to sell has been executed in favour of the 
Builder by the Trust with respect to 63.45 acres of land which 
includes 21 acres of the land given by Avas Evam Vikas 
F Parishad to the Trust in
exchange. Recovery proceedings 
against the Trust are pending before the Deb't Recovery 
Tribunal, New Delhi, in which objections have been preferred 
by the Builder which are pending consideration. The Builder 
having entered into an agreement, had the right to apply to 
G Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land it had 
exchanged with the Trust. The direction for demarcation is 
beneficial to all concerned. No case for interference is made 
out. The Builder has submitted a proposal under section 56 of 
the T.P. Act to the Chairman of HUDCO. The land given by the 
H Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to the Trust was unencumbered.
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
101 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
The 21 acres of land obtained in exchange was not mortgaged A 
with HUDCO. Indubitably, Lucknow Bench had the jurisdiction 
as the Head Office of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad is situated 
at Lucknow. TheAvas Evam Vikas Parishad had the onus to 
demarcate the land as provided under section 15(1) (e), (k) 
(m) and (o). The Builder had the right to know/identify the B 
property i.e. 21 acres of land which was unencumbered. The 
land received by theAvas Evam Vikas Parishad from the Trust 
has been utilised for a housing scheme. Thus, the impugned 
order calls for no interference. 
9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length, 
we are of the considered opinion that it was a misadventure 
on the part of the Builder to file a writ petition for the kind of 
reliefs prayed for and that too could not have been entertained 
c 
by the Bench at Lucknow. 
D 
10. It is not in dispute that property Nos.1 to 6 had been 
mortgaged with HUDCO by the Trust. Property No.6 which is 
in dispute comprised of 63.45 acres of land which was initially 
mortgaged by the Trust with HUDCO. Proceedings for E 
recovery of debt which seems to have presently amassed to 
more than Rs. 433 crores under the SARFAESI Act, are stated 
to be pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Delhi. The 
property is admittedly situated in the district of Ghaziabad, 
State of U. P. and Ghaziabad falls within the territorial limits
of F 
the main seat of the High Court of Allahabad. Undisputedly, 
objections had been preferred by the Builder before the 
Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Delhi. Admittedly, 
21 acres of land, out of the total of 63.45 acres which was 
mortgaged to HUDCO as item No.6, had been exchanged by G 
the Trust with Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. Thus, the exchange 
was with the property which was under mortgage with HUDCO 
and the exchange deed had been deposited by the Trust with 
HUDCO on 11. 7.2011. Before the Debt Recovery Officer, New H
102 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A Delhi, prayer has been made by the Builder to sell property 
Nos.1 to 5 and not to sell property No.6 with respect to which 
he has entered into an agreement with the Trust. 
11. The writ petition filed for the aforesaid twin reliefs, 
B was not maintainable before the writ court; firstly, it is not within 
ken of the High Court in writ jurisdiction to declare any property 
as unencumbered one. Such rights between private parties 
cannot be made subject-matter of writ jurisdiction as has been 
ordered in the impugned judgment and order that out of a total 
C of 63.45 acres of land, 21 acres be demarcated as an 
unencumbered property and to maintain status quo. Following 
is the operative portion of the order passed by the Division 
Bench at Lucknow : 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
"In the premises discussed hereinabove, we are of the 
considered view that the relief as sought in prayer no.1 
can be granted by directing respondent no.1 to 
dem~rcate 42.45 acres, said to be mortgaged, and 21 
acres as unencumbered, out of the total area of 63.45 
acres, as mentioned at serial no.6, in the list of properties 
as detailed in the foregoing paragraphs. Thus, we allow 
this petition and direct respondent no. 1 to carry out the 
aforesaid exercise of demarcation either itself or being 
an instrumentality of the State, and having statutory duties 
as extracted and reproduced hereinabove, with the help 
of revenue authorities concerned. Moreover, in
view of 
the chequered background of the litigation in respect of 
the l~nds/properties in question, and the conduct of 
respondent no.3, as noticed above, we also deem it 
expedient in the interest of justice to direct and thus it is 
ordered that the parties shall maintain status quo qua 
the lands, namely, 21 acres out of the total area of 63.45 
acres as mentioned at serial no.6. We also direct that 
the said area of21 acres of the land at serial no. 6 shall
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
103 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
not be alienated and/or transferred in any manner till the 
A 
exercise of demarcation is fully carried out in accordance 
with law. Additionally, it is further directed that tile area of 
42.45 acres, said to be encumbered and 21 acres, as 
unencumbered shall be clearly identified and segregated 
in the presence of the parties." 
B 
12. Though, there is serious dispute between the parties 
to the lis whether the said land is unencumbered, finding has 
been given by the High Court that 21 acres of land is 
unencumbered. The High Court could not have treated 21 acres C 
of land as unencumbered one. out of 63.45 acres. It was not 
open to the High Court to enter into the aforesaid arena, which 
of the property is encumbered and to be sold in realization of 
debt is the outlook of the Recovery Officer, ORT, Delhi, where 
the recovery proceedings are pending, including the objections D 
. 
.n1;. 
preferred by the Builder. 
13. In our opinion, it was not open to the Builder to file a 
writ application for the aforesaid reliefs. Though the second 
relief had been abandoned at the time of final arguments but E 
the first relief could not have been granted witho'ut going into 
the said question. The High Court in writ jurisdiction has made 
a declaration that the property 21 acres"of land is 
unencumbered. The High Court could not have adjudicated 
on the property rights under the guise of directing
Avas Evam F 
Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land and give findfng that it 
was unencumbered land. The High Court has erred in law in 
giving a finding on merits on effect of exchange and that section 
70 of TP Act is not applicable. It was not the functi~n of the 
High Court to decide these questions under writ jurisdiction. G 
Section 70 of the TP Act is extracted hereunder : 
."70. Accession to mortgaged property.-lf, after the date 
of a mortgage, any accession is made to the mortgaged 
property, the mortgagee, in the absence of a contract to 
H
104 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
the contrary, shall, for the purposes of the security, be 
entitled to such accession." 
~-
14. We could have decided the aforesaid question 
finally. However, we refrain from doing so as, in our opinion, it 
B was not open to the High Court to take up these questions 
under writ jurisdiction and to declare the properties as 
unencumbered. It was for the parties to agitate the questions 
before the ORT where the recovery proceedings are pending 
at the instance of HUDCO with whom the property had been 
C mortgaged by the Trust. 
15. Prima facie, we are of the view that on the strength 
of the agreement to sell, particularly when possession had not 
been handed over to the Builder, it was not open to him to file 
o a writ application for demarcation of the property as 
unencumbered property or otherwise. What was sought to be 
achieved by filing a writ petition, was to get rid of the 
proceedings pending before the Recovery Officer. ORT at 
Delhi, and tO' save land at serial No.6 from being sold which 
E includes 21 acres of land, and an attempt was made to getthe 
21 acres of land declared as unencumbered one. As a matter 
of fact, sue~, ~isputed questions with respect to the properties 
inter se between the Builder and the Trust as to demarcation, 
writ petition could not be said to be appropriate remedy, 
F particularly when the order passed by the Recovery Officer, 
ORT, was not in question and the order passed by the ORT,
Delhi, could not have been questioned before the Lucknow 
Bench of High Court of Allahabad. 
'" 
G 
16. It was submitted on behalf of the Builder that the 
writ petition was filed before the Lucknow Bench of the High 
Court of Allahabad as the Head Office of Avas Evam Vikas 
Parishad is located at Lucknow and part of the cause of action 
has arisen at Lucknow. In view of the fact that the Avas Evam 
H Vikas Parishad had exchanged the 21 acres of land with the
·MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
105 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
Trust and it had a statutory duty enjoined under section 15 of A 
the Adhiniyam of 1965 so as to conduct survey and demarcate 
the land. In our considered opinion, no part of the cause of 
action to the Builder has arisen at Lucknow where the Head 
Office of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad is situateo. Avas Evam 
Vikas Parishad was not at all answerable to the Builder. As B 
way-back in the year 2007, much before agreement to sell 
was entered into, it had exchanged its 21 acres of land with 
the Trust. Moreover, no application }'Jas ever filed by the Builder 
toAvas Evam Vikas Parishad for seeking demarcation of the 
land. Thus, in case of dispute inter se between the Builder C 
and the Trust based upon subsequent agreement to sale 
entered into in 2010, there was no right available to the Builder 
to askAvas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land which 
it had already given to the Trust. After the 21 acres of land had D 
been given to the Trust, Avas Evam Vikas.:.i;>e,rishad had 
nothing to do with that land. This, it was a wholly misconceived 
venture on the part of the Builder to ask Avas Evam Vikas 
" 
Parishad to demarcate the land given to the Trust, particularly 
when the Parishad was not having any housing scheme with E 
respect to the land which had been given to tbe Ju..1st. 
Thus, filing of the writ petition at Lucknow. Bench was 
totally uncalled for and the propriety required
that it should not 
have been entertained at Lucknow Bench. Merely because F 
the transfer petition filed in this court for transfer of case was 
withdrawn and the direction was issued by the Chief Justice 
of High Court to decide at an early date, would not confer 
jurisdiction on Bench at Lucknow, all the questions had been 
left open to be agitated at the time of hearing. In our opinion, G 
Bench at Lucknow ought not to have entertained the petition 
as it lacked the jurisdiction. 
17. With respect to the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench, 
the Builder has relied upon the decision of this Court in Sri H
106 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A Nasiruddin etc. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal etc. 
(1975 (2) SCC 671]. Reliance has been placed upon paras 
37 and 38 and the same are reproduced hereunder: 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
"37. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High 
Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression 
"cause of action" in an application under Article 226 would 
be as the expression is understood and if the cause of 
action arose because of the appellate order or the 
revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow 
then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original 
order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. 
It may be that the original order was in favour of the person 
applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate 
order might be the cause of action. The expression 
"cause of action" is well- known. If the cause of action 
arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified 
Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If 
the cause-Of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh 
areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would 
have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause 
of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh 
it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to 
have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to 
go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In 
such cases, it is incorrect to say that the
litigant chooses 
any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the 
jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause 
of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Similarly, ifthe cause of action can be said to have arisen 
partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside 
the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice 
to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. 
The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction 
of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
action. 
38. To sum up, our conclusions are as follows. First, there 
is no permanent seat of the High Court atAllahabad. The 
seats atAllahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in 
accordance with the provisions of the Order. Second, 
the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to 
increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to 
time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by 
the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for 
changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power 
under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order 
to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases 
arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any 
case or class of cases are those which are instituted at 
Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that 
the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief Justice to 
order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh 
areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad inst~ad of 
Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means that cases 
which have already been instituted or filed at Lus;,!<now 
may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second 
proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order be directed;tQ be 
heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression "cause of 
action" with regard to a civil matter means that it should 
be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench 
or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of
action 
arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the 
cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the 
Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the 
cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas 
in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause 
of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and 
part of the cause of action arises outside the specified 
areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case 
107 
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appropriately to 2ttract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow 
or at Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises where the 
offence has been committed or otherwise as provided 
in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the 
jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some 
B 
cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding 
jurisdiction, it may arise in either place." 
18. Learned counsel for the appellants has strongly 
relied upon the decision of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas 
C Commission v: Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors. [1994 (4) SCC 711} 
as follows: 
D 
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"12. Pointing out that after the issuance of the notification 
by the State Government under Section 52( 1) of the Act, 
the notified land became vested in the State Government 
free from all encumbrances and hence it was not 
necessary for the respondents to plead the service of 
notice under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate 
direction or order under Article 226 for quashing the 
notification acquiring the land. This Court, therefore, held 
that no part of the cause of action arose within the 
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court deeply 
regretted and deprecated the practice prevalent in the 
High Court of exercising jurisdiction and passing 
interlocutory orders in matters where it lacked territorial 
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the strong observations 
made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the
earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed 
that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising 
jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause 6f 
action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed 
a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the 
country should appear to have developed a tendency to 
assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner
MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
before it resides in or carries on business from a 
registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all 
the more pained that notwithstanding the observations 
of this Court made time and again, some of the learned 
Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently 
while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 
10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University and Anr. 
v. Vi nay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. and Anr., 
[1994 (4) SCC 71 OJ this Court observed: 
"We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court 
of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a 
case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction." 
In that case, the contract in question was executed at 
Aligarh, the constructjon work was to be carried out at 
Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the event of dispute 
the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction, the Arbitrator 
. was appointed atAligarh and was to function atAligarh 
and yet merely because the respondent was a Calcutta 
based firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High 
Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction where it 
had none whatsoever. It must be remembered that the 
image and prestige of a Court depends on how the 
members of that institution conduct themselves. If an 
impression gains ground that even in cases which fall 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, certain 
members of the Court would be willing
to exercise 
jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial 
and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred 
within the jurisdiction of the said Court, litigants would 
seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before 
such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That 
would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire 
system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if 
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we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we 
will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution 
and the system of administration of justice. We do hope 
that we will not have another occasion to deal with such 
a situation." 
B 
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19. Reliance has also been placed on National Textile 
Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Haribox Swalram & Ors. [2004 (9) 
sec 786] as follows: 
"10. Under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, 
the High Court is empowered to issue writs, orders or 
directions to any Government, authority or person 
exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within 
which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the 
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of 
such Government or authority or the residence of such 
person is not within those territories. Cause of action as 
understood in the civil proceedings means every fact 
which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to 
prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the 
court. To put it in a different way, it is the bundle of facts 
which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the 
plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. In Union of 
India v. Adani Exports Ltd. [2002 (1) SCC 567] in the 
context of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, it 
has been explained that each and every fact pleaded in 
the writ petition does not ipso facto lead to
the conclusion 
that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the 
court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded 
are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that 
is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with 
the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to 
a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on 
the court concerned. Asimilar question was examined in
MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties [1985 (3) SCC 
217]. Here certain properties belonging to a company 
which had its registered office in Calcutta were sought 
to be acquired in Jaipur and a notice under Section 52 · 
of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act was served 
upon the company at Calcutta. The question which arose 
for consideration was whether the service of notice at 
the head office of the company at Calcutta could give 
rise to a cause of action within the State of West Bengal 
· to enable the Calcutta High Court to exercise jurisdiction 
in a matter where challenge to acquisition proceedings 
conducted in Jaipur was made. It was held thatthe entire 
cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land 
under Section 152 of the Rajasthan Act arose within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court and it 
was not necessary for the company to plead the service 
of notice upon them at Calcutta for grant of appropriate 
writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the 
Constitution for quashing the notice issued by the 
Rajasthan Government under Section 52 of the Act. It 
was thus held that the Calcutta High Court had no 
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 
xx xx x ...,., ' 
12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ 
petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply 
to the correspondence made by it was received at
Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, 
therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to 
entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken 
by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the 
above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 
However, in order to avoid any further harassment to the 
parties .and to put an end to the litigation, we would 
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examine the matter on merits as well." 
20. Reliance has also been placed with respect to 
jurisdiction of the High Court in the decision of this Court in 
Alchemist Ltd. & Anr. v. State Bank of Sikkim & Ors. [2007 
B (11) SCC 335] as follows: 
"20. It may be stated that the expression "cause of action" 
has neither been defined in the Constitution nor in the 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It may, however, be 
c 
described as a bundl~ of essential facts necessary for 
the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed. Failure to 
prove such facts would give the defendant a right to 
judgment in his favour. Cause of action thus gives 
occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. 
D 
E 
xxxxx 
22. For every action, there has to be a cause of action. If 
there is no cause of action, the plaint or petition has to 
be dismissed. 
xxxxx 
25. The learned cour;isel for the respondents referred to 
several decisions of this Court and submitted that 
F 
y.ihether a particular fact constitutes a cause of action or 
not must be decided on the basis of the facts and 
circumstances of each case. In our judgment, the test is 
whether a particular fact(s) is (are) of substance and can 
be said to be material, integral or essential part of the /is 
G 
between the parties. If it is, it forms a part of cause of 
action. If it is not, it does not form a part of cause of action. 
It is also well settled that in determining the question, the
substance of the matter and not the form thereof has to 
be considered. 
H
MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS 
113 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
xxxxx 
A 
38. In the present case, the facts which have been 
pleaded by the appellant Company, in our judgment, 
cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts 
so as to constitute a part of "cause of action" within the 
B 
meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High 
Court, in our opinion, therefore. was not wrong in 
dismissing the petition." 
....... 
21. Reliance was also place91on the decision of this c 
Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. v. Ka/yan Banerjee 
[2008 (3) sec 456) to the' following effect : 
"13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the 
Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose 
in Mugma area within the State of Jharkhand, we are of 
the opinion that only because the head office of the 
appellant Company was situated in the State of West 
Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction 
upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the head 
office had nothing to do with the order of punishment 
passed against the respondent." 
D 
E 
22. We have held that no part of the cause of action 
has arisen at Lucknow, and itwas notthefunction ofAvas Evam F 
Vikas Parishad to demarcate the property in case of dispute 
between private party or for the purpose of proceeding before 
the ORT and that the property was situated in the district of 
Ghaziabad which is not under territorial jurisdiction of Bench 
at
Lucknow. Thus, the writ petition was not maintainable at G 
Lucknow Bench. 
23. Apart from that, we find that there is no merit in the 
submission that the Housing Board could have demarcated 
the land in exercise of powers within the purview of section 15 H
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[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A of the Act of 1965. The objective of the Act of 1965 is to tackle 
the housing and development problems of urban areas. The 
objective of the Act is extracted hereunder: 
"Migration of people from rural to urban area, influx of 
B 
displaced persons, increasing impact of the development 
activity generated by the Five Year Plans and several 
other factors have resulted in rapid increase of population 
in towns of this State. Construction of new houses and 
the planned development of towns has, however, not kept 
C 
pace with this rapid increase of urban population. The 
efforts in this direction made by the State Government, 
Nagar Mahapalikas, Nagar Palikas, Improvement Trusts, 
Development Board and other Smaller Local Bodies 
have, for want of effective co-ordination and control, not 
D 
met with the desired success. The said local bodies with 
their limited resources and know-how and due to other 
factors have not been able to relieve the housing 
shortage and to undertake the requisite development of 
E 
F 
G 
land. There are areas in this State with immense 
potentialities of development, but they still remain as they 
were a decade or so back. It is now considered absolutely 
essential for tackling the housing and development 
problems of practically all the fast growing urban areas, 
and areas with potentialities of development, that an 
autonomous central body to be known as Housing and 
Development Board be created for
the whole State. A 
Comprehensive Bill, called the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam 
Vikas Parishad Vidheyak has accordingly been prepared 
to provide for the establishment, incorporation and 
·functioning of a Housing and Development Board in this 
State. This bill is being introduced accordingly." 
24. The provision~ of section 15 of Adhiniyam of 1965 
H have been relied upon. Same are extracted below:
MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
"15. Functions of the Board.-(1) Subject to the 
provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations, the 
functions of the Board shall be-
(a) 
To frame and execute housing and 
improvement schemes and other projects; 
(b) 
To plan and co-ordinate various housing 
activities in the State and to ensure expeditious and 
efficient implementation of housing and improvement 
schemes in the State; 
' 
(c) 
To provide technical advice for and scrutinise 
various projects under housing and improvement 
schemes sponsored or assisted by Central 
Government or the State Government; 
(d) 
To assume management of such immovable 
properties belonging to the State Government as may 
be transferred or entrusted to it for this purpose; 
(e) 
To maintain, use, allot, lease, or otherwise 
transfer plots, buildings and other properties of the 
Board or of the State Government placed under the 
control and managementofjhe Board; 
(f) To organise and run workshops and stores for the 
manufacture and stockpiling of building materials; 
(g) 
On such terms and conditions as may be 
agreed upon between the Board and the State 
Government, to declare houses constructed by it in 
execution of any scheme to be houses subject to the 
U.P. Industrial Housing Act, 1955 (U.P. Act XXlll of 
1955); 
(h) 
To regulate building operations; 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
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(i) 
To improve and clear slums; 
0) To provide roads, electricity, sanitation, water supply 
and other civic amenities and essential services in 
areas developed by it; 
(k) 
To acquire movable and immovable 
properties for any of the purposes before mentioned; 
(I) To raise loans from the market, to obtain grants and 
loans from the State Government, the Central 
Government, local authorities and other public 
corporations, and to give grants and loans to local 
authorities, other public corporations, housing co-
operative societies and other persons for any of the 
purposes before mentioned; 
(m) 
To make investigation, examination or survey 
of any property or contribute towards the cost of any 
such investigation, examination or survey made by any 
local authority or the State Government; 
(n) 
To levy betterment fees; 
(o) 
To fulfil any other obligation imposed by or 
under this Act or any other law for the time being in 
force; and 
(p) 
To do all such other acts and things as may 
be necessary for tlie discharge of the functions before 
mentioned. 
(2) Subjectto the provisions of this Act and the rules and 
regulations, the Board may undertake, where it deems 
necessary, any of the following functions, namely-
(a) To promote research forthe purpose of expediting 
the construction of and reducing the cost of buildings;
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
(b) To execute works in the State on behalf of public 
institutions, local authorities and other public 
corporations, and departments of the Central 
Government and the State Government; 
(c) To supply and sell building materials; 
(d) To co-ordinate, simplify and standardise the 
production of building materials and to encourage and 
organise the prefabrication and mass production of 
structural components; 
(e) With a view to facilitating the movement of the 
population in and around any city, municipality, town 
area or notified area, to establish, maintain and 
operate any transport service, to construct widen, 
strengthen or otherwise improve roads and bridges 
and to give financial help to others for such purposes; 
(f) To do all such other acts and things as may be 
necessary for the discharge of the functions before 
mentioned." 
25. Chapter Ill of Adhiniyam of 1965 deals with the 
powers and functions of the Board constituted under section 
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3. Section 15 deals with the functioning of the Board and the 
provisions of the Act. It is crystal clear from the provisions of F 
section 15 that the power to make investigation, examination 
or survey of any property is to be exercised by the Board in 
connection with its functions enjoined in the Act. The power is 
not general in nature. Section 18 deals with types of housing 
schemes. Sections 19 to 27 deal in details with
the schemes G 
provided in section 18(1 )(a) to (i). Other sections 28 to 49 deal 
with acquisitions, framing of schemes, its execution, transfer 
of property to Board, streets, square etc. 
26. It is apparent from the scheme of the Adhiniyam of H
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[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 1965 that.the provisions contained in section 15(1)(m) are not 
to be read in isolation but with reference to the objectives of 
the Adhiniyam of 1965 and its functions relating to housing 
and development issues. 
B 
27. The principle of noscitur a socii will be applicable 
in construing Section 15 of the Act and the words-"to make 
investigation, examination or survey of any property" in section 
15(1 )(m) will take their meaning and colour from the other 
phrases employed in section 15( 1). As held by this Court in 
C Roh it Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 
Baroda (1990 (3) SCC 447]: 
"12. The principle of statutory interpretation by which a 
generic word receives a limited interpretation by reason 
o 
of its context is well established. In the context with which 
we are concerned, we can legitimately draw upon the 
"noscitur a sociis" principle. This expression simply 
means that "the meaning of a word is to be judged by the 
company it keeps." Gajendragadkar, J. explained the 
E 
scope of the rule in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor 
Sabha (1960 (2) SCR 866) in the following words: (SCR 
pp. 873-74) 
"This rule, according to Maxwell, means that, when 
F 
two or more words which are susceptible of 
analogous meaning are coupled together they are 
understood to be used in their cognate sense. They 
take as it were their colour from each other, that is, 
the more general is restricted to a sense
analogous 
G 
to a less general. The same rule is thus interpreted 
in "Words and Phrases" (Vol. XIV, p. 207). 
"Associated words take their meaning from one 
another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the 
philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful 
H 
word may be ascertained by reference to the
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine 
is broader than the maxim ejusdem generis" In fact 
the latter maxim "is only an illustration or specific 
application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis". 
The argument is that certain essential features of 
attributes are invariably associated with the words 
"business and trade" as understood in the popular 
and conventional sense, and it is the colour of these 
attributes which is taken by the other words used in 
the definition though their normal import may be 
much wider. We are not impressed by this 
argument. It must be borne in mind that noscitur a 
sociis is merely a rule of construction and it am not 
prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider 
words have been deliberately used in ordertQ:fTlake 
the scope of the defined word correspondingly 
wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature 
in associating wider words with words of narrower 
significance is doubtful, or otherwise not cle~r that 
the present rule of construction can be usefully 
applied. It can also be applied where the meaning 
of the words of wider import is doubtful, but, where 
the object of the legislature in using wider words is 
clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction 
in question cannot be pressed into service." 
This principle has been applied in a number of contexts 
in judicial decisions where the court is clear in its mind
that the larger meaning of the word in question could not 
have been intended in the context in which it has been 
used." ·. 
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28. The Trust has submitted ~n application for limited 
purpose of approval of site plan of housing society to Avas 
Evam Vikas Parishad which was not pressed by it. The said H 
/ 
I
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 7 S.C.R. 
·.ii' 
A application Yt.as not for the purpose of demarcation and would 
not enure to the benefit of the Builder. The objective of builder 
in writ petition was to get land demarcated as unencumbered. 
29. For the purpose of demarcation the remedy is 
B available before the concerned authority under section 24 of 
the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006. Section 24 of the 
Code is extracted below: 
c 
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"24. Disputes regarding boundaries.- (1) The Sub-
Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an 
application made in this Qehalf by a person interested, 
decide, by summary inquiry, any dispute regarding 
boundaries on the basis of existing survey map or, where 
the same is not possible, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings 
Act, 1953, on the basis of such map. 
(2) If in the course of an inquiry into a dispute under sub-
section J1 ), the Sub-Divisional Officer is unable to satisfy 
himself as to which party is in possession or if it is shown 
that possession has been obtained by wrongful 
dispossession of the lawful occupant, within a period of 
three months preceding the commencement of the 
inquiry, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall-
( a) in the first case, ascertain by summary inquiry who is 
the person best entitled to the property, and shall put such 
person in possession. 
(b) i.n the second case, put the person so dispossessed 
in possession, and for that purpose
use or cause to be 
used such force as may be necessary an shall then fix 
the boundary accordingly. 
(3) Every proceeding under this section shall, as far as 
possible, be concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer
MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS 
121 
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
within six months from the date of the application. 
A 
(4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Sub-
Divisional Officer may prefer an appeal before the 
Commissioner within 30 days of the date of such order. 
The order of the Commissioner shall be final." 
B 
The corresponding provision in the U.P. Land Revenue 
Act, 1901 was section 41. The recourse to provision of the 
Adhiniyam of 1965 in such cases was not available. 
30. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellants C 
that the agreement which was entered into between the Trust 
and the Builder was required to be registerediunder the 
provisions of the Registration Act as per Section 17 read with 
. section 49 of the Registration Act as applicable;:in U.P. and D 
section 3 read with section 54 of the TP Act. We decline to 
entertain and examine the submissions as it would not be 
proper to do so in the present proceedings ancf as effect of 
non-registration and validity of registration made subsequently 
has been questioned in Writ Petition [CJ No:3S596/2013 E 
pending consideration before the High Court of Allahabad. 
Thus, it is for the High Court to adjudicate upon the aforesaid 
questions. 
31. In view of the afore discussion, we allow the appeals, 
F 
set aside the judgment and order pass~d by the Lucknow 
Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, and dismiss the writ 
petition filed by the Builder - respondent No.1·:... with
costs 
quantified at Rs.5 lakhs to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal 
Services Committee, within a period of six weeks from today. G 
Devika Gujral 
Appeals allowed.