SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE  versus SIDDHA MATH & ORS.
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 46, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Ratio
[2015] 15S.C.R.46 
A 
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE 
B 
v. 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 7729 of 2009) 
DECEMBER 16, 2015 
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.] 
Sri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 - ss. 2, 5, 33 - Orissa 
C Estate Abolition Act, 1951 - s.2(oo), 3, 3A- Estate of Shri 
Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije Puri- Vesting of- Issuance of 
notification dated 18.03.1974 u/s. 3A of the OEAAct by the 
State Government whereby estate of Shri Jagannath vested 
in State Government- Said notification upheld by this Court 
D in the case of *Lord Jagannath - Thereafter, the temple filed 
claim case for recording the lands in favour of Shree 
Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri, Temple Managing 
Committee - OEA Collector and Tahsildar settled the suit 
lands in favour of the Temple - Writ petition by respondent-
E Math challenging the said order on the ground that the lands 
were accorded the status of 'amrutamanohi' and were 
recorded as Trust Estate as defined u/s. 2(oo) - High Court 
set aside the order of Tahsildar __: On appeal, held: Estate of 
Lord Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri vested in the Temple 
F Management Committee - State Legislature had already 
enacted the Temple Act, 1955 and vested the land belonging 
to the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri in the Temple 
Management Committee by virtue of ss. 5 and 33 of the Act 
of 1955 - Once the land already vested in the Temple 
G Committee u/ss. 5 and 33 of the Act of 1955 which is a special 
enactment to deal with
the properties endowed to the Temple 
Committee, the same could not have been divested by 
applying the amended provisions-ss. 2(oo) and 3A of the OEA 
Act, 1951-Proviso to s. 2(00), by which the estates belonging 
H 
46
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
47 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. 
to the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning A 
of the Temple Act, 1955 are deemed to be Trust Estates is in 
direct contravention of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, 
and is struck down - Notification dated 18. 03. 197 4, whereby 
the estate of Lord Jagannath vested in the State Government 
in view of the amended provision of the proviso to s. 2(oo) of B 
the OEA Act, is quashed to that extent -Also, the Math did 
not have the right to prefer claim in respect of the Temple 
Lands and initiate the proceedings under the OEA Act by 
virtue of being an intermediary - Furthermore, the decision 
of this Court in the case of *Lord Jagannath does not bar the C 
instant case by res judicata since the subject matter in the 
two cases are not identical - Judgment in the case of *Lord 
Jagan nath was passed only on consideration of the OEA Act, 
and provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, which is the principal 0 
Act that applies to the Lord Jagannath Temple, Puri were not 
adverted to. 
Interpretation of Statutes -
Rule of harmonious 
construction '- Held: Rule of harmonious construction must 
be given effect to as far as possible - When the provisions of E 
two statutes are irreconcilable, it needs to be decided as to 
which provision must be given effect to - There is a clear 
conflict between the proviso of s. 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 
and ss. 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 - Section 2(oo)
proviso in its entirety is not violative of the provisions of the · F 
Temple Act -
Only the first part of the proviso is in 
contravention of the Temple Act, 1955, and to that extent is 
struck down and both the provisions would be able to operate. 
Judgment- When per incuriam - Held: Judgment can G 
be said to be per incuriam when it is passed in forgetfulness 
or ignorance of a statute operating in that field- Decision of 
this Court in the case of *Lord Jagannath, wherein this Court 
upheld the validity of the notification dated 18. 03. 197 4 in so 
far as it pertains to the estate of Lord Jagannath is per-
H
48 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
incuriam for non-consideration of the provisions of ss. 5 and 
33 of the Temple Act, 1955. 
Doctrines I Principles - Doctrine of stare decisis - Is 
crucial to maintain judicial discipline - Decisions rendered 
8 
in ignorance of existing statutes and law laid down by this 
Court cannot bind subsequent Benches of this Court. 
Disposing of the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The first part of the proviso of Section 
c 2(oo) of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951, which 
pertains to the properties of Lord Jagannath Temple at 
Puri is struck down. The notification issued by the State 
Government under Section 3A of the OEA Act, 1951 is 
quashed to the extent, it applies to the lands and estate 
D of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri. The striking down of 
. the first part of the proviso to Section2(oo) and quashing 
, of the notification would be prospective and this 
judgment shall not be applicable to the settled claim of 
the claimants hitherto under the provisions of the OEA 
E Act of 1951 in so far as the lands of the Lord Jagannath 
Temple at Puri are concerned. [Para 34] [1361-E-F] 
2.1 The decision of this Court in the case of* Lord 
Jagannath does not bar the instant case by res judicata. 
F In the Lord Jagannath case, this Court was concerned 
only with the validity of the vesting notification dated 
18.03.197 4, whereas in the instant case, the validity of 
the order dated 30.11.1992 is examined, along with the 
question
whether land once vested for a particular 
G purpose, namely, as property of Lord Jagannath can be 
divested by operation of another legislation. Since the 
subject matter of the two cases is not identical, the bar 
of res judicata does not operate on the proceedings in 
the instant case. It is well settled law that a qu~stion of· 
H
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
49 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. 
law can be raised at any time during the proceedings. A 
[Para 15] [1334-G-H; 1335-G-H; 1336-A-B] 
2.2 The decision of this Court in the case of Lord 
Jagannath, wherein this Court upheld the validity of the 
notification dated 18.03.197 4 in so far as it pertains to B 
the estate of Lord Jagannath is per-incuriam for non-
consideration of the provisions of Sections 5 and 33 of 
the Temple Act, 1955 and the law laid down by this Court 
as regards between the two State enactments, which 
one will be the Special Act over other. While the. doctrine C 
of stare decisis is crucial to maintain judicial discipline, 
what cannot be lost sight of the fact-is that decisions 
which are rendered in ignorance of existing statutes and 
law laid down by. this Court cannot bind subsequent 
Benches of this Court. It becomes clear that a judgment D 
can be said to be per incuriam when it is passed in 
forgetfulness or ignorance of a statute operating in that 
field. The notification dated 18.03.197 4 vested the estates 
of Lord Jagannath, Puri in the State Government in view 
of the amended provision ofthe proviso to Section 2( oo) 
E 
of the OEAAct, 1951 inserted by way of an Amendment 
in the year 1974. The judgment in the case of Lord 
Jagannath was passed orily on consideration of the OEA 
Act, 1951. The provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, which 
is the principal Act that applies to the Lord Jagannath F 
Temple, Puri were
not adverted to at all. [Para 16] [1336-. 
E-G; 1337-C-D] 
*Lord Jagannath through Jagannath Singri 
Narasingh Das Mahapatra Sridhar Panda and Ors 
G 
v. State of Orissa 1989 ( 1) Suppl.Sec 553 : 1988 
(3) Suppl. SCR 732 - per incuriam. 
2.3 The Temple and the Math are two distinct legal 
entities. The OEAAct, 1951 was enacted to provide for H
50 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A the abolition of all rights, title and interest in the land of 
intermediaries and vesting the same in the State. Keeping 
in view the growing irregularities in the management of 
the affairs of the temple, the Temple Act, 1955 was 
. enacted by the state, which received the assent of the 
B President on 15.10.1955. As far as the Jagannath Temple 
of Puri and its endowments are concerned, the 
provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, being the special law, 
take priority over the provisions of any other legislation 
is accepted. Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 makes it 
C clear that the properties and endowments of the Temple 
stand statutorily vested in the Temple Committee. [Para 
21] [1341-F-G; 1343-E] 
2.4 It cannot be said that the provisions of the OEA 
D Act, 1951 would apply to the land of the appellant Temple 
Committee over the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, 
which is clearly the special legislation. A perusal of the 
objects and reasons of the 1951 Act makes it clear that 
the said amendment clearly encroaches upon the field 
E of the Temple Act, 1955. The said amendment has been 
enacted with a view to ensuring the proper performance 
of traditional rites and rituals in the religious institutions. 
As far as the Lord Jagannath Temple, Puri, the State 
F Legislature had already enacted the Temple Act, 1955 
and vested the land belonging to the Temple in the 
Temple Management Committee by virtue of ss. 5 and 
33 of
the Act of 1955. The object of the Act was to provide 
for better administration and governance of the affairs 
G of the Temple and its properties. Thus, proviso to Section 
2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951, by which the estates 
belonging to the Temple of Lord Jagannath, Puri within 
the meaning of the Temple Act, 1955 are deemed to be 
Trust Estates is in direct contravention and subversion · 
H of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955. Even the
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
51 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. 
submission that a subsequent legislation takes A 
precedence over a prior decision is untenable in law. 
[Para 22] [1345-D; 1346-A-E] 
2.5 In the instant case, there is a clear conflict 
between the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 
B 
1951 and Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955. It is 
also clear that both the above statutory provisions of 
the Acts cannot survive together. While the rule of 
harmonious construction must be given effect to as far 
as possible, when the provisions of two statutes are C 
irreconcilable, it needs to be decided as to which 
provision must be given effect to. In the instant case, 
Section 2(oo) proviso in its entirety is not violative of the 
provisions of the Temple Act. It is only the first part of 
the proviso which is in contravention of the Temple Act, D 
1955. If that part of the proviso continues to be given 
effect, Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955, by 
which the estates of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri are 
vested in the Temple Committee will lose their meaning. 
By striking down Section 2(oo) proviso to that extent, E 
both the provisions will be able to operate. [Para 23] 
[1349-D-E; 1350-A-B] 
2.6 The first part of the proviso of Section 2(oo) of 
the OEAAct, 1951 cannot be allowed to sustain. Clearly, 
F 
the intention of the legislature could not have been to 
render virtually the entire Temple Act, enacted on the 
specific subject,
meaningless, by way of enacting a 
proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as an 
amendment in 1974, which is the general legislation in G 
the instant case. Section 2( oo) of the OEAAct, 1951, thus, 
to that extent requires to be struck down so that both 
the OEAAct, 1951 as well as the Temple Act, 1955 can be 
given due effec~ in their respective field of operation. In 
H
52 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A exercise of the powers conferred under Article 142 of 
the Constitution, this Court can pass any order as may 
be "necessary for doing complete justice" in a case 
before it. [Para 24] [1352-B-E] 
B 
2.7 Once a property is vested by an Act of 
legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same 
cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent 
general law and vest such property under such law. 
Similarly, if in the instant case, the submissions on behalf 
C of the respondent Math were accepted, then Sections 5 
and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955would be rendered useless 
and nugatory and thereby the laudable object and 
intendment of the Temple Act would be defeated and the 
interest of the public at large would be affected. Thus, 
D the notification dated 18.03.1974 issued by the State 
Government under Section 3-A of the OEA Act, 1951, 
whereby the estate of Lord Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, 
Puri vested in the State Government is quashed to that 
extent. As a consequence, the order dated 30.09.1981 
E passed by the OEA Tahsildar, who falls within the 
inclusive definition of Collector in terms of Section 2 (d) 
of the OEAAct, 1951, settling the land in favour of the 
Mahantas of various Maths as Marfatdars of the Shri 
Jagannath Mohaprabhu Bije, Puri is in violation of the 
F provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 and is set aside. [Para 
25] [1352-G-H; 1353-A·C] 
3.1 The Form 'H' submitted in terms of the OEAAct, 
1951 in
Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 reveals that while 
G Column 9-whether with respect to the lands in 
possession of the applicant or his temporary lessee or 
mortagagee on the date of vesting]" is marked as 'Self 
Possession', and Column 11-lf in the possession of a 
temporary lessee or mortgagee give full details of the 
H
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
53 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. 
lessee or mortgage, has been left blank. Therefore, the A 
claim of the respondent Math and the basis of its claim 
is not stated in the claim petition. In the absence of the 
same, its claim as intermediary to prefer claim under 
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 of the OEA Act, 1951 before the 
Tahsildar is wholly untenable in law. Further, the order, B 
passed in OEA Claim Case filed by the respondent Math 
to settle the lands in their favour has been passed by 
the Tahsildar, Puri. S~ction 8-Aof the Act clearly provides 
that the claims have to be filed before the Collector. The 
submission that the definition of Collector in the OEA C 
Act, 1951 is an inclusive one, and therefore he had the 
authority to determine the rights of the respondent, · 
cannot be accepted. The proceedings under Section 8-
A are quasi judicial in nature. [Para 29] [1355-C-H] 
D 
3.2 A quasi judicial function cannot be delegated 
and therefore, the inclusive reading of the definition of 
Collector under Section 2(d) of the OEAAct, 1951 to also 
include Tahsildar can be applied only as far as it pertains 
to the discharge of administrative powers of the E 
Collector. Since the Tahsildar performs only an 
administrative function under the OEAAct, 1951 and not 
a quasi judicial function, thus, .he was not competent to 
pass the order of settlement of claim either under Section F 
6 or 7 or 8 of the OEA Act, 1951. The vesting of the suit 
lands in
favour of the Math is bad in law. Further, once 
the land already vested in the Temple Committee under 
Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 which is a 
special enactment to deal with the properties endowed G 
to the appellant Temple Committee, the same could not 
haye been divested by applying the provisions of the 
OEA Act, 1951 by way of an amendment to the Act by 
insertion of Sections 2(oo) and 3A in the OEAAct, 1951, · 
as the operation of the said Act and the Temple Act, 1955 H
54 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A are in different fields and the objects and intendment of 
. the abovementioned two Acts are entirely different. 
[Paras 30, 31) [1356-C-D; 1357-B·D] 
3.2 The point no. 1 being held in favour of the 
B Temple, there was no need for the Temple Committee to 
file claim proceedings under Section 8-A of the OEAAct, 
1951, in respect of its own lands which were already 
vested in it under Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955. The 
suit lands vest in the Temple Committee itself. Thus, in 
C view of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, the 
settlement of the suit lands in favour of the respondent 
Math cannot be sustained, as it is bad in law. [Para 31) 
[1360-C-D) 
o 
3.3 Since the provisions of the OEAAct, 1951 have 
no application to the lands of the Lord Jagannath Temple 
at Puri, there is no need to pass an order in favour of the 
Temple under the OEAAct, 1951 as the suit lands were 
already vested in favour of the Lord Jagannath Temple 
E at Puri by virtue of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955. 
F 
G 
H 
[Para 33) [1360-G-H] 
Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa AIR 1964 
SC 150; Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das v. 
Surjanarayan Das AIR 1967 SC 256 : 1966 
SCR 436; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi 
Kassab Jamat (2005) 8 SCC 534 : 2005 (4 ) 
Suppl. SCR 582; R. Unnikrishnan v. V.K. 
Mahanudevan (2014) 4 SCC 434 : 2014 (1 ) 
SCR 350; Muncipa/ Corporation of Delhi v. 
Gurnam Kaur(1989) 1SCC101 : 1988 (2) Suppl. 
SCR
929; State of U.P v. Synthetics and 
Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139; Fuerst Day 
Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2001) 6 SCC 
356: 2001 (3) SCR 479; Sheodan Singh v. Daryao
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITIEE v. 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. 
Kunwar AIR 1966 SC 1332 : 1966 SCR 300; 
Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai & Ors. v. Mohd.Hanifa 
& Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1569: 1976 (3) SCR 721; 
National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Naresh Kumar 
Badrikumar Jagad (2011) 12 SCC 695 : 2012 (14) 
SCR 472; U.P State Electricity Board & Anr. v. 
Hari Shankar Jain & Ors. (1978) 4 SCC 16 : 1979 
( 2 ) SCR 355; Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan 
v. Binani Cements Ltd. & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 319 
: 2014 (3) SCR 1; KC Gajapati Narayan Dea & 
Ors. v. State of Orissa AIR 1953 SC 375: 1954 
SCR 1; UC v. D. J. Bahadur AIR 1980 SC 2181 
: 1981 (1) SCR 1083; Commercial Tax Officer v. 
Binani Cements Ud. (2014) 8 SCC 319 : 2G14 
(3) SCR 1; J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving 
Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1961) 3 SCR 185; 
Bharat Bihari Mishra v. State of Orissa 2012 (II) 
OLR 968; Basanti Kumar Sahu v. State of Orissa 
(1998) 8 SCC 722; Calcutta Gas Company Ltd. 
v. State of West Bengal AIR 1962 SC 1044: 1962 
Suppl. SCR 1 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
1988 (3) Suppl. SCR 732 ' 
referred to 
Para 1 
AIR 1964 SC 150 
referred to 
Para 6 
1966 SCR 436 
referred to 
Para 9 
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 582 
referred to 
Para 11 
2014 (1) SCR 350 
referred to 
Para 11 
1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929. 
referred to 
Para 13 
(1991) 4 sec 139 
referred to 
Para 13 
2001 (3) SCR 479 
referred to 
Para 13 
1966 SCR 300 
referred to 
Para 15 
55 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
56 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15S.C.R. 
1976 (3)"SCR 721 
referred to 
Para 15 
2012 (14) SCR 472 
referred to 
Para 15 
1979 (2) SCR 355 
referred to 
Para 17 
2014 (3) SCR 1 
referred to 
Para 17 
1954 SCR 1 
referred to 
Para 21 
1981 (1) SCR 1083 
referred to 
Para 22 
2014 (3) SCR 1 
referred to 
Para 23 
(1961) 3 SCR 185 
referred to 
Para 23 
2012 (II) OLR 968 
referred to 
Para 29 
(1998) 8 sec 122 
referred to 
Para 30 
1962 Suppl. SCR 1 
referred to 
Para 31 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 
7729 of 2009 
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.07.2009 of the 
High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in OJC No. 2421 of 2000 
WITH 
Civil Appeal Nos. 7730 of 2009, 142, 221, 2981, 3414, 
3415, 3446 and 9627 of 2010 and 14631-14632 of 2015. 
H.P. Raval, J. K. Das, M. L. Varma, M.·L. Verma, Sr. 
Advs., S. K. Das, Swetaketu Mishra, Anando Mukherjee, Ms. 
Divya Anand, Nipun Saxena, Anirush Sharma, V. K. Monga, 
F 
Sandeep Das, Shibashish Misra, Ashish Kumar Sinha, Radha 
Shyam Jena, Vinoo Bhagat, Rutwik Panda, Anshu Maiik, 
Rajdipa Behura, V. S. Lakshmi, A. Venayagam Balan, Atul 
Kumar, A. Mukherjee, Ms. Gargi Tuli, Pulak Bagchi, S. K. 
Verma, Rakesh Kumar Gupta, Satya Mitra, Kunal Verma, 
G Prasanna Mohan, Ms. Keki Vajpei, Ms. Rajdipa Behura, V. S. 
H 
Lakshmi, Ashok Panigrahi, Sibo Sankar Mishra, Raj iv S. Roy, 
Pranab Kumar Mullick, A. Jyoti Chatterjee, Sukumar, Soma 
Mullick, Jayasree Saha Chatterjee, Abhijit S. Roy, Sebat 
Kumar Deuria, C. K.
Sasi, Advs. for the appearing parties.
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
57 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
A 
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted in the Special 
Leave Petitions. 
2. The present appeals arise out of the impugned 
judgment and order dated 07.07.2009 passed in Original 
B 
Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 and other Writ Petitions 
which were disposed of in terms of the judgment dated 
07 .07 .2009 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, whereby 
the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the 
respondents he~ein and held that as the disputed land was C 
earlier settled in the name of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije 
Puri, Marfat Siddha Brundaban Ramanuj Das and thus; the 
subsequent settlement made in favour of the Temple Managing 
Committee in OEA Claim Case No. 68/90 was without 
jurisdiction. 
3. As the facts in all the appeals are common, for the 
sake of corivenience, we refer to the facts of Civil Appeal No. 
7729 of 2009, which are stated inbrief hereunder: , 
The present case revolves around the ancient temple of 
D 
E 
Lord Jagannath of Puri. The lands in question have been 
accorded the status of 'amrutamanohi' properties. On 
18.03.1974, the State Government of Orissa issued a 
notification under Section 3-A of the Orissa Estate Abolition 
F 
Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the "OEA Act, 1951 "), 
whereby the estate of Lord Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri 
vested in the State Government. The vesting notification was 
challenged
by the Temple before the High Court of Orissa in 
Original Jurisdiction Case No. 233 of 1977. The High Court G 
rejected the claim of the Temple. The same was upheld by this 
Court vide its judgment in the case of Lord Jagannath 
through Jagannath Singri Narasingh Das Mahapatra 
Sridhar Panda and Ors v. State of Orissa1• We will advert to 
'1989 (1) Suppl.sec 553 
H
58 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
this judgment in detail at a later part of this judgment. The State 
Government of Orissa subsequently issued a notification dated 
18.04.1989 and extended the time for filing claims under 
Section 8-Aofthe OEAAct, within which the Temple filed Claim 
Case No. 68 of 1990 for recording the lands in question in 
B favour of Shree Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri, Marfat 
Shree Jagannath Temple Managing Committee. Vide order 
dated 30.11.1992, the OEA Collector and Tahsildar, Puri 
observed that the suit lands in question have been recorded 
in the name of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Srikhetra, 
C and accordingly settled the suit lands in favour of the Temple. 
In the year 2000, the respondent-Math filed a Writ Petition 
before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Original 
Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000, challenging the order of 
0 
the Tahsildar dated 30.11.1992 on the ground that the lands in 
question have been accorded the status of 'amrutamanohi' 
and that they were recorded as Trust Estate as defined under 
Section 2( oo) of the OEAAct, 1951 and that lands had wrongly 
been settled in favour of the Temple. The High Court by the 
E 
impugned judgment dated 07.07.2009 set aside the order of 
the Tahsildar dated 30.11.1992 and held as under: 
F 
G 
H 
" ...... it is seen in the instant case, the property has been 
dedicated as Amrutmonahi to Lord Sri Jagannath of 
Puri and the marfatdar of the property is Mahanta
Siddha Brundaban Ramanuj Das. Thus, the property is 
attached with a charge of rendering service to Lord 
Jagannath by using the usufructs thereof as food offering 
. to Lord Jagannath by using the usufructs threof as food 
offering to Lord Jagannath. It is further found that on the 
above analysis, the property cannot be held to be under 
the control of the administrator of Shri Jagannath Temple 
but is a trust property attached with a charge and the 
trustee has to fulfil the wish of the dedicator of the said 
property by offering the usufructs to Lord Jagannath as
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
59 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
food offering. However, since the trustee/marfatdar is 
A 
the Mahanta of Siddha Math, it cannot be said that the 
math has absolutely no interest over the said property 
just because it is recorded as Amrutmonohi. Applying 
the ratio of the decision in the case of Mahanta Shri 
Srinivas Ramanuj Das (supra) of the Supreme Court, it 
B 
is seen that the Siddha Math is an institution, which 
comes within the definition of 'Math' as given in section 
3 (vii) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 
1951. The property involved in this Writ Petition comes 
within the definition of"Trust Estate" as defined in section C 
2(oo) of the O.E.A Act and vested in the State 
Government pursuant to the notification made under 
Section 3-Aofthe O.E.AAct issued on 18.03.1974. It is 
also an admitted position that upon such vesting, the 
D 
· intermediary had a right to make an application under 
sections 6 and 7 of the O.E.AAct. As a matter of fact, 
as stated earlier, such application was made by the 
marfatdar of the property, i.e Mahanta of Siddha Math 
and the land was settled in the name of Shri Jagannath 
E 
Mohaprabhu Bije, Puri marfat Mahanta Siddha 
Brundaban Ramanuj Das. Hence there was no scope 
for the administrator of Shri Jagannath Temple to make 
a subsequent application under sections 6 and 7 of the 
O.E.AActforre-settlementofthe land and the impugned 
F 
order dated 30.11.1992
having been passed without 
jurisdiction cannot be sustained and the said order is 
accordingly quashed." 
Hence, the present appeals have been filed by the appellant G 
Temple and State Government and others. 
4. We have heard the learned senior counsel for both, 
the parties. We have also heard Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, the learned 
counsel appearing on behalf of the Math in the C.As. @ 
H
60 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010 and 
Ms. V.S. Lakshmi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 
Math in .C.A. No. 9627 of 2010. On the basis of the factual 
evidence on record produced before us, the circumstan.ces of 
the case and also in the light of the rival legal contentions urged 
B by the learned senior counsel for both the parties, we have 
broadly framed the following points which require our attention 
and consideration:-
c 
D 
1) Whether the suit lands can vest in the respondent 
Math in the light of the provisions of the Shri 
Jagannath Temple Act, 1955? 
2) Whether even otherwise, the Math had the right to 
prefer claim rights in respect of the Temple Lands 
and initiate the proceedings under the OEAAct, 
1951 by virtue of being an intermediary? 
3) What order? 
Answer to Point No.1 
E 
5. At the outset, before we advert to the rival legal 
contentions of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf 
of both the parties, it is important for us to examine the 
provisions of the relevant Acts, as well as the previous 
judgments of this Court on the issue. There are two important 
F 
acts which operate in the instant case. The first is the Shri 
Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Temple Act, 1955"). The long title of the Act reads as follows: 
"An Act to provide for better administration and 
·G 
governance of Shri Jagannath Temple at Puri and its 
endowments." 
The
Preamble of the Temple Act, 1955 states as under: 
"Whereas the ancient Temple of Lord Jagannath of 
H 
Puri has ever since its inception been an institution of
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
61 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.) 
unique national importance in which millions of Hindu A 
devotees from regions far and wide have reposed their 
faith and belief and have regarded it as the epitome of 
their tradition and culture. 
And whereas by Regulation IV of 1809 passed by the 
B 
Governor-General in Council on 28th April, 1809 and 
thereafter by other laws and regulations and in 
pursuance of arrangement entered into with the Raja of 
Khurda, later designated the Raja of Puri, the said Raja 
came to be entrusted hereditary with the management c 
of the affairs of the Temple and its properties as 
Superintendent subject to the control and supervision 
of the ruling power; 
And whereas in view of grave and serious irregularities 
thereafter Government had to intervene on various D 
occasions in the past; And whereas the administration 
under the Superintendent has further deteriorated and 
a situation has arisen rendering it expedient to 
reorganize the scheme of management of the affairs of 
the Temple and its properties and provide better E 
administration and governance therefore in 
supersession of all previous laws. regulations and 
arrangements, having regard to the ancient customs and 
usages and the unique and traditional nitis and rituals 
F 
contained in the Record-of-Rights prepared under the 
. 
-
Puri Shri Jagannath Temple (Administration)Act, 1952 
(OrissaActXIVof 1952) ............ " 
(emphasis laid
by this Court) 
Section 2 of the Temple Act, 1955 bars the operation of the G 
Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 on the Temple, 
and reads as follows: 
"2 (1): The provisions of the Orissa Hindu Religious 
Endowments Act, 1951 (Orissa Act 2 of 1952) shall 
H
62 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
cease to apply to the said Temple except with respect 
to actions taken, things done and contributions levied 
and the same shall be deemed to have been validly 
taken, done and levied as if this Act had not been 
B 
passed: 
(2) All laws, regulations and other enactments passed 
for the purpose of providing for the management of the 
affairs of the Temple and its properties and all deeds 
executed in favour of and all arrangements entered into 
c 
for the said purpose with the Raja of Khurda or the Raja 
of Puri, as the case may be, prior to the commencement 
of this Act, in so far as such enactments, deeds or 
arrangements are inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Act, shall cease to have any effect." 
D 
E 
F 
Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 provides for the setting up 
of a Temple Managing Committee as under: 
"5. Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time 
being in force or custom, usage or contract, Sanad, 
deed or engagement, the administration and the 
governance c:if the Temple and its endowments shall vest 
in a Committee called the Shri Jagannath Temple 
Managing Committee constituted as such by the State 
Government, and it shall have the rights and privileges 
in respect thereof as provided in Section 33." 
Section 30 of the Temple Act, 1955 grants power of general 
superintendence of the Temple and its endowments to the State 
Government which may pass orders for the maintenance and 
G
administration of the temple, which reads as under: 
H 
"30. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act the general 
superintendence of the Temple and its endowments shall 
vest in the State Government which may pass any orders 
that may be deemed necessary for the proper
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
63 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
maintenance or administration of the Temple or its A 
endowments or in the interest of the general public 
worshipping in the Temple." 
Section 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 empowers the Committee 
to be in possession of all the moveable and immoveable B 
properties belonging to the Temple. It reads as under: 
"33. (1) The Committee shall be entitled to take and be 
in possession of all movable and immovable properties 
including the Ratna Bhandar and funds and jewelries, 
C 
records, documents and other assets belonging to 
Temple." 
. 6. A Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion 
to examine the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 in detail, 
0 
while adjudicating upon its constitutional validity in the case of 
Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa2• Wanchoo, J., 
speaking for the bench observed as under: 
"This review of the provisions of the Act shows that 
broadly speaking the Act provides for the management E 
of the secular affairs of the Temple and does not 
interfere, with the religious affairs thereof, which have 
to be performed according to the record of rights 
prepared under the Act of 1952 and where there i 
s 
no such record of rights in accordance with custom and 
F 
usage obtaining in the Temple. It is in this background 
that we have to consider the attack on the 
constitutionality of the Act." 
After adverting to the history of the administration of the
Temple, 
G 
it was also held: 
"Finally the preamble says that the administration under 
the superintendent has further deteriorated and a 
2 AIR 1964 SC 1501 
H
64 
A 
B 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
situation has arisen rendering it expedient to reorganize 
the scheme of management of the affairs of the Temple 
and its properties and provide better administration and 
governance therefore in supersession of all previous 
laws. regulations and arrangements. having regard to 
the ancient customs and usages and the unique and 
traditional nitis and rituals contained in the record of 
rights prepared under the 1952 Act. So for all these 
reasons the appellant was removed from the sole 
superintendence of the Temple and a committee was 
appointed bys. 6 of the Act for its management." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
A perusal of the provisions of the Act and the decision of this 
Court in the case of Raja Bira Kishore Deb referred to supra 
D clearly shows that as far as Shri Jagannath Temple of Puri is 
concerned, the position of law is that all the endowments and 
properties belonging to the Temple vest in the Shri Jagannath 
Temple Managing Committee. 
E 
F 
G 
H 
7. We now turn our attention to the OEAAct, 1951. The 
Act received the assent of the President on 23.01.1952. The 
long title of the Act reads as follows: 
"An act to provide for the abolition of all the rights, title 
and interest in land of intermediaries by whatever name 
known, including the mortgagees and lessees of such 
interest, between the raiyat and the state of Orissa, for 
vesting in the said state of the said right, title and interest 
and to
make provision for other matter connected 
therewith ...... " 
All estates of the intermediaries were thus, abolished and by 
way of a notification, stood vested in the State Government. 
Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct, 1951 (which was ins.erted by 
way of an Amendment in 197 4) defines a Trust Estate as under:
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
65 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
'"trust estate' means an estate the whole of the net A 
income whereof under any trust or other legal obligation 
has been dedicated exclusively to charitable or religious 
purposes of a public nature without any reservation of 
pecuniary benefit to any individual : 
B 
Provided that all estates belonging to the Temple of Lord 
Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the Shri 
Jagannath Temple Act. 1955 and all estates declared 
to be trust estates by a competent authority under this 
Act prior to the date of coming into force of the Orissa c 
Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be 
deemed to be trust estates." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
Section 3 of the OEA Act, 1951 provides for vesting of an 
D 
estate in the State by way of a notification as under: 
"3. Notification vesting an estate in the State- (1) 
The State Government, may from time to time by 
notification, declare that the estate specified in the 
E 
notification has passed to and become vested in the 
State free from all encumbrances." 
"(3) Such publication shall be conclusive evidence of 
the notice of the declaration to everybody whose interest 
is affected by it." 
F 
8. Section 2(oo)was inserted byway of an amendment 
on 26.02.1974. On 18.03.1974, a notification was issued by 
the State Government under Section 3-A whereby the estate 
of Lord Jagannath vested with the State Government. The G 
validity of
the notification was challenged, which came for 
consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case 
of Lord Jagannath referred to supra. This Court upheld the 
validity of the notification declaring the estate of Lord Jagannath 
as 'trust estate' after giving the reasons as follows: 
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66 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
"It is true that an order was passed under s.13-G 
declaring the petitioner's estate as a trust estate" and 
further by the insertion of clause (oo) in s 2 the 
petitioner's estate continued to be a 'trust estate'', but 
the question is as to what is the legal effect flowing from 
B 
such a declaration This aspect is dealt within s.13-1, 
which is quoted as under (omitting sub-section (2) which 
is not relevant in the present context): 
"13-1. Effect of orders passed under section 13-G: (I) 
C 
All estates declared under this Chapter to be trust 
estates by the Tribunal or the High Court, as the case 
may be; shall he deemed to have been excluded 
from the operation of the vesting notification and never 
D 
to have vested in the State in pursuance thereof." 
It is manifest from the language of the Section that it 
saves a "trust estate" so declared under s.13-G from 
the operation of a notification issued under s. 3 or 3-A, 
but does not extend the benefit any further The provisions 
E 
do not confer protection from the Act itself and cannot 
be interpreted to clothe it with a permanent immunity 
from being vested by a later notification issued under 
the Act Such an estate could be vested in the State of 
Orissa by a subsequent notification was made clear by 
F 
clause (b) of s 13-K which reads as follows: 
G 
H 
'(a) ... 
(b)nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to debar 
the State Government from vesting any trust estate
by 
the issue of a notification under Section 3.' 
Sections 7 -A, 8-A, 8-D and X-E of the Act include special 
provisions for a trust estate and unmistakably indicate 
that trust estates" are within the purview of the Act. The
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
67 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
benefit they receive from a declaration under s.13-G is A 
limited and referable only to a vesting notification issued 
earlier. There is thus, no merit in the argument of the 
learned counsel for the appellant that the petitioner's 
estate could not be vested in the State by a notification 
issued subsequently." 
B 
It is important to note at this stage that while upholding the 
validity of the notification, this C9urt did not advert to the 
provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 at all. 
9. Another judgment of this Court which is important to 
be examined is the Constitution Bench decision in the case of 
Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das v. Surjanarayan Das3, 
which examined the nature of 'amrutamanohi'properties. 
c 
10. Mr. M. L. Varma, the learned senior counsel D 
appearing on behalf of the respondent Math contends that the 
· controversy in the instant case is squarely covered by two 
judgments of this Court, the Division Bench judgment in the 
case of Lord Jagannath and the Constitution Bench judgment E 
in the case of Surjanarayan Das referred to supra. The 
learned senior counsel places strong reliance on the following 
paragraphs of the decision in the case of Surjanarayan Das 
(supra): 
"40. We may now consider the properties in schedule 
F 
Kha said to be the Amruta Monohi properties of Lord 
Jagannath and held by the plaintiff as marfatdar. The 
plaintiff alleges that these
properties were acquired 
either by purchase or 'krayadan' or by way of gift subject G 
to a charge of some offering to Lord Jagannath which 
depended upon the individual judgment and discretion 
of the plaintiff, and that the public had no concern with 
the enjoyment or management of the usufruct thereof. 
3 AIR 1967 SC 256 
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[2015) 15 S.C.R. 
A 
The Gazetteer makes a reference to such properties 
and states:-
'Both Saiva and Vaishnava Maths exist in Puri. The 
lands of the latter are known asAmruta Manohi (literally 
B 
nectar food), because they were given with the 
intention that the proceeds thereof should be spent in 
offering bhoga before Jagannath and that the 
Mahaprasad thus.obtained should be distributed 
among pilgrims, beggars and ascetics; they are 
c 
distinct from the Amrut Manohi lands of the Temple 
itself which are under the superintendence of the Raja.' 
This statement makes it clear that lands endowed to 
the temple of Lord Jagannath are distinct from the lands 
D 
or property endowed to the Vaishnava Maths for the 
purpose of utilising the proceeds of those properties 
for offering bhoga before Lord Jagannath and the 
subsequent distribution of that Mahaprasad among 
pilgrims, beggars and ascetics, presumably visiting the 
E 
Math, or approaching its authorities for a po.rtion of the 
Maha Prasad. The mere fact that the proceeds of the 
properties were to be so used, would not justify the 
conclusion that these properties were not endowed to 
the Maths but were endowed to the temple of Lord 
F 
Jagannath. Properties endowed to the temple of Lord 
Jagannath were. according to this statement. in the 
Gazetteer. not under the superintendence of any Math 
or Mahant but under the superintendence of the Raja of 
Puri himself. 
G 
41. As already stated,
these Amrut Manohi properties 
are properties which are endowed to the Math by the 
devotees for a particular service, which is done to Lord 
Jagannath by the Mahant on behalf of the Math. The 
H 
properties are therefore properties endowed to the Math
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITIEE v. 
69 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. ] 
and not merely gifted to the plaintiff or, as had been A 
suggested, to Lord Jagannath." 
( emph~sis laid by this Court) 
11. The learned senior counsel contends that since an 
B 
earlier decision of this Court already covers the controversy in 
the instant case, the same is binding on the parties as well as 
this Court and this Court should respect the principle of stare 
decisis. He further contends that the judgments delivered in 
the case of Surjanarayan Das and Lord Jagannath have C 
held field since 1967 and 1989, respectively. The learned 
senior counsel places reliance on a seven judges Bench 
decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti 
Ku res hi Kassab Jamat, 4 wherein, while examining the scope 
of the doctrine of stare decisis, it was held as under: 
. o 
"111. Stare decisis is a Latin phrase which means "to 
stand by decided cases; to uphold precedents; to 
maintain former adjudication". This principle is 
expressed in the maxim "stare decisis et .non quieta E 
movers" which means to stand by decisions and not to 
disturb what is settled. This was aptly put by Lord Coke 
in his classic English version as "Those things which 
have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace". 
However, according to Justice Frankfurter, the doctrine 
F 
of stare decisis is not "an imprisonment of reason" 
(Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyer, 3rd 
Edition 2005, Volume
4, p. 4456). The underlying logic 
of the doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid 
uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view which G 
has held the field for a long time should not be disturbed 
only because another view is possible. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
• (zoos) a sec 534 
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70 
A 
B 
c 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 15 S.C.R. 
119. Sir John Salmond, while dealing with precedents 
and illustrating instances of departure by the House of 
Lords from its own previous decisions, states it to be 
desirable as 'it would permit the House (of Lords) to 
abrogate previous decisions which were arrived at in 
different social conditions and which are no longer 
adequate in present circumstances. This view has been 
succinctly advocated by Dr. Goodhart who said: "There 
is an obvious antithesis between rigidity and growth, 
and if all the emphasis is placed on absolutely binding 
cases then the law looses the capacity to adapt itself to 
the changing spirit of the times which has been 
described as the life of the law". This very principle has 
been well stated by William O' Douglas in the context of 
constitutional jurisprudence. He says: "So far as 
constitutional law is concerned, stare decisis must give 
way before the dynamic component of history. Once it 
does, the cycle starts again"." 
The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the 
E judgment of this Court in the case of R. Unnikrishnan v. V.K. 
F 
G 
Mahanudevan5, wherein it was held as under: 
"19. It is trite that law favors finality to binding judicial 
decisions pronounced by Courts that are competent to 
deal with the subject matter. Public interest is against 
individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind 
of litigation. The binding character of judgments 
pronounced by
the Courts of competent jurisdiction has 
always been treated as an essential part of the rule of 
law which is the basis of the administration of justice in 
this country. We may gainfully refer to the decision of 
Constitution Bench of this Court in the Daryao v. State 
of U.P. where the Court succinctly summed up the law 
in the following words: 
H • (2014) 4 sec 434
SRIJAGANNATHTEMPLEMANAGINGCOMMITIEE v. 
71 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
'It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality A 
should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by 
Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the 
public interest that individuals should not be vexed 
twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding 
character of judgments pronounced by courts of B 
competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the 
rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of 
the administration of justice on which the Constitution 
lays so much emphasis.' 
20. That even erroneous decisions can operate as res-
judicata is also f.airly well settled by a long line of · 
decisions rendered by this Court. In Mohanlal Goenka 
v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee this Court observed: 
'There is ample authority for the proposition that even 
an erroneous decision on a question of law operates 
c 
D 
as 'res judicata' between the parties to it. The 
correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no 
bearing upon the question whether or not it operates E 
as 'res judicata.' 
21. Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar 
Bhattacharjee this Court reiterated the above principles 
in the following words: 
F 
'A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as 
much binding between the parties as a right one and 
may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals 
or other procedure like review which the law provides.'
G 
22. The recent decision of this Court in Kalinga Mining 
Corporation v. Union of India is a timely reminder of the 
very same principle. The following passage in this 
regard is apposite: 
H
72 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
'In our opinion, if the parties are allowed to reagitate 
issues which have been decided by a court of 
competent jurisdiction on a subsequent change in the 
law then all earlier litigation relevant thereto would 
always remain in a state of flux. In such circumstances, 
B 
every time either a statute or a provision thereof is 
declared ultra vires, it would have the result of 
reopening of the decided matters within the period of 
limitation following the date of such decision." 
C 
12. The learned senior counsel contends that the decision 
rendered by this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred 
to supra cannot be wished away by brariding it as per incuriam. 
It is an extremely serious matter to contend that a judgment is 
per incuriam. It is contended that in order to render a judgment 
D per incuriam, it must be first shown that the oversight or 
inadvertence is a glaring and obtrusive omission. 
13. Mr. Harin P. Raval, the learned senior counsel 
appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee, on 
E the other hand, contends that the decision of this Court in the 
case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra is per incuriam as 
it was passed in ignorance of the Temple Act, 1955. The 
learned senior counsel contends that the judgment does not 
even notice Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955. The judgment 
F was passed only on considering the provisions of the OEA 
Act, 1951. The judgment held that it cannot be said
that the 
estate of Lord Jagannath could not be vested in the State 
government by a notification issued subsequently. The learned 
senior counsel contends that the OEAAct, 1951 is an Act which 
G was principally enacted for the purpose of abolishing all rights 
in land of "intermediaries" between the Raiyats and the state 
by whatever name known and for the vesting of the same in 
the state. It could thus, only divest the intermediaries of its rights 
in land by vesting it in the State but cannot affect the statutory 
H
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
73 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
vesting of all endowments in the managing committee under A 
Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955. Thus, the provisions of the 
OEAAct, 1951 even by way of insertion of Section 3Aand the 
issue of a subsequent notification cannot divest the absolute 
ownership of the endowments of the Temple. The learned 
"Senior counsel submits that the endowments vested in the 
B 
managing committee and hence it ceased to be an 
intermediary interest and became the absolute vested property 
of Lord Jagannath. The learned senior counsel contends that 
a decision given in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the 
force of a statue can be held to be per incuriam, as was held C 
by a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Muncipal 
Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur. The learned senior 
counsel further places reliance on another decision of this 
Court in the case of State of U.P v. Synthetics and 0 
Chemicals Ltd.,7 wherein the principle of per incurJam was 
discussed as under: 
'"lncuria literally means 'carel'essness'. In practice per 
in curium appears to mean per ignoratium.' English 
Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the E 
rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided 
and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute 
or other binding authority' (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane 
Ltd.). Same has been accepted, approved and adopted 
by this Court while
interpreting Article 141 of the F 
Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents 
as a matter of law. In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey, 
this Court while pointing out the procedure to be followed 
when conflicting decisions are placed before a Bench G 
extracted a passage from Halsbury Laws of England 
incorporating one of the exceptions when the decision 
of an Appellate Court is not binding." 
• (1989) 1 sec 101 
1 (1991) 4 sec 139 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the 
decision of this Court in the case of Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. 
v. Jindal Exports Ltd., 8 wherein this Court examined the prior 
decisions on the issue of per incuriam at length and arrived at 
B 
the following conclusion: 
"23. A prior decision of this court on identical facts and 
law binds the Court on the same points of law in a latter 
case. This is not an exceptional case by inadvertence 
or oversight of any judgment or statutory provisions 
C 
running counter to the reason and result reached. Unless 
it is a glaring case of obtrusive omission, it is not 
desirable to depend on the principle of judgment 'per 
incuriam'. It is also not shown that some part of the 
decision based on a reasoning which was demonstrably 
D 
wrong, hence the principle of per incuriam cannot be 
applied ......... " 
14. The learned senior counsel contends that in the Lord 
Jagannath case, not only did the Court ignore the provisions 
E of the Temple Act, 1955, it also ignored the decision of the 
Constitution Bench in the case of Raja Kishore Deb referred 
to supra, wherein this Court has held that the Lord Jagannath 
Temple occupies a unique position in the State of Odisha and 
is a temple of national importance and no other temple in that 
F state can be compared with it. It stands in a class by itself and 
with respect to be a subject of special consideration by the 
State Government
and thus requires special .treatment. 
15. We are unable to agree with the contention advanced 
G by Mr. M.L. Varma, the learned senior counsel appearing on 
behalf of the respondent Math. The decision of this Court in 
the case of Lord Jagannath (supra) does not bar the present 
case by res judicata. The principle of res judicata, codified in 
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been examined 
H • (2001) 6 sec 356
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
75 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.} 
in a catena of cases by this Court. A Constitution Bench of this A 
Court in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar8, held as under: 
"A plain reading of s, 11 shows that to constitute a matter 
res judicata, the following conditions must be satisfied, 
namely- (i) The matter directly and substantially in issue s 
in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter 
which was directly and substantially in issue in the former 
suit; (ii) The former suit must have been a suit between 
the same parties or between parties under whom they 
or any of them claim; (iii) The parties must have litigated C 
under the same title in the former suit; (iv) The court which 
decided the former suit must be a court competent to 
try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is 
subsequently raised; and (v) The matter directly and 
substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have D 
been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first 
suit." 
The above legal principles laid down by this Court have been 
reiterated in the case of Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai & Ors. v. 
E 
Mohd.Hanifa & Ors.10, as under: 
" ....... it may be necessary to mention that before a plea 
of res judicata can be given effect, the following 
conditions must be proved-(1) that the litigating parties 
F 
must be the same; (2) that the subject-matter of the su'it 
also musf be identical; (3) that the matter must be finally
decided between the parties; and ( 4) that the suit must 
. be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction." 
G 
In the Lord Jagannath case referred to supra, this Court was 
concerned only with the validity of the vesting notification dated 
18.03.197 4, whereas in the instant case, it is the validity of the 
9 AIR 1966 SC 1332 
10 AIR 1976 SC 1569 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
order dated 30.11.1992 that is being examined, along with 
the question whether land once vested for a particular purpose, 
namely, as property of Lord Jagannath can be divested by 
operation of another legislation. Since the subject matter of 
the two cases is not identical, the bar of res judicata does not 
B 
operate on the proceedings in the instant case. Further, it is 
well settled law that a question of law can be raised at any 
time during the proceedings. In the case of National Textile 
Corporation Ltd. v. Naresh Kumar Badrikumar Jagad11, it 
was held as under:-
c 
"19. There is no quarrel to the settled legal proposition 
that a new plea cannot be taken in respect of any factual 
controversy whatsoever, however, a new ground raising 
a pure legal issue for which no inquiry/proof is required 
D 
can be permitted to be raised by the court at any stage 
of the proceedings." 
16. We agree with the contention advanced by the 
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant 
E 
Temple Committee. Most respectfully, we opine that the 
decision of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred 
to supra, wherein this Court upheld the validity of the notification 
dated 18.03.197 4 in so far as it pertains to the estate of Lord 
Jagannath is per-incuriam for non-consideration of the· 
F 
provisions of Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 and 
the law laid down by this Court as regard!? between the two
State enactments, which one will be the Special Act over other. 
While the doctrine of stare decisis is crucial to maintain judicial 
discipline, what cannot be lost sight of the fact is that decisions 
G which are rendered in ignorance of existing statutes and law 
laid down by this Court cannot bind subsequent Benches of 
this Court. In the case of Moti Kureshi.Jamatreferred to supra, 
it was held as under: 
H " (2011J12 sec 695
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
77 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
"112. The trend of judicial opinion, in our view, is that A 
stare decisis is not a dogmatic rule allergic to logic and 
reason; it is a flexible principle of law operating in the 
province of precedents providing room to collaborate 
with the demands of changing times dictated by social 
needs, State policy and judicial conscience." 
B 
It becomes clear from a perusal of the case law adverted to by 
the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant 
Temple Committee that a judgment can be said to be per 
incuriam when it is passed in forgetfulness or ignorance of a C 
statute operating in that field. The notification dated 
18.03.197 4 vested the estates of Lord Jagannath, Puri in the 
State Government in view of the amended provision of the 
proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct, 1951 inserted byway 
of an Amendment in the year 197 4. The judgment in the case D 
of Lord Jagannath was passed only on consideration of the 
OEAAct, 1951. TheprovisionsoftheTempleAct, 1955, which 
is the principal Act that applies to the Lord Jagannath Temple, 
Puri were not adverted to at all. 
17. We now turn our attention to the validity of the vesting 
order dated 30.11.1992 passed by the Tahsildar of Puri in 
O.E.A Claim Case No. 68 of 1990, by which the suit lands 
were settled in favour of the Temple. 
18. Mr. Harin P. Raval, the learned senior counsel 
appearing on pehalf of the
appellant Temple Committee 
contends that in view of Section 5 of the Temple ACt, 1955 
read with Sections 16 and 33 of the said Act, all endowments 
E 
F 
of the temple, including the properties belonging to or given or G 
endowed for the support of the Temple or given or endowed 
for the performance of any service including the service of 
offerings to the deity or charity connected therewith vest in 
Temple Committee. The learned senior counsel contends that 
the Temple Act, 1955 is a special legislation enacted by the H
78 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
State Government of Odisha and thus overrides any general 
law enacted. The learned senior counsel contends that by 
Section 5 of the said Act, the property vested in Temple 
Committee. The vesting of the property in the Temple 
Committee is statutory in nature by virtue of Section 5 of the 
B 
Temple Act, 1955. He further contends that once land has been 
vested with the State, the same is not available for vesting 
again merely on the application of the amended provisions 
inserted later in another Act. The learned senior counsel further 
contends that the Temple Act, 1955 is a special law enacted 
C by which the properties and endowments of Lord Jagannath 
Temple, Puri stood statutorily vested in the Temple Committee. 
The OEAAct, 1951, on the other hand, was enacted for the 
purpose of abolishing all rights of 'intermediaries' between the 
D raiyats and the State by whatever name known and for the 
vesting of the same in the State. Thus, the provisions of the 
OEAAct, even by way of insertion of Section 3A and the issue 
of a subsequent notification cannot divest the absolute 
ownership of the endowments of the Temple. The learned 
E 
senior counsel contends that the endowments ve~ted in the 
Temple Committee, and thus, ceased to be an intermediary 
interest and became the absolute vested property of Lord 
Jagannath. The learned senior counsel places reliance on the 
judgment of this Court in the case of U.P State
Electricity 
F Board & Anr. v. Hari Shankar Jain & Ors. 12, wherein this 
Court while holding that the provisions of a special statute must 
prevail over those of a general statute held as under: 
G 
"8. The maxim "Generalia Specialibus non derogant" is 
quite well known. The rule flowing from the maxim has 
been explained in Mary Seward v. The Owner of the 
'Vera Cruz" as follows: 
Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are 
general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and 
H 
12 (1978) 4 sec 16
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITIEE v. 
79 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. ] 
sensible application without extending them to subjects A 
specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to 
hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly 
repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of 
such general words, without any indication of a 
particular intention to do so. 
B 
9. The reason for the rule that a general provision should 
yield to a specific provision is this: In passing a Special 
Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a 
particular subject. When a General Act is subsequently c 
- passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not 
repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it 
appears that the Special Act again received 
consideration from Parliament. ........ " 
D 
The learned senior counsel further places reliance on a more 
recent judgment of this Court, in the case of Commercial Tax 
Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani Cements Ltd. & Anr.13, wherein 
after adverting to a number of previous decisions on the aspect, 
it was held as under: 
.E 
"46. In Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State :>f_ Bihar this 
• Court has observed that while deterri1ining the question 
whether a statute is a general or a special one, focus 
must be on the principal subject-matter coupled with a 
F 
particular perspective with reference to the intendment 
cf the Act. With this basic prindp:e in mind, the 
provisions must be examined to
find out whether it is 
possible to construe harmoniously the two provisions. If 
it is not possible then an effort will have to be mede to 
G 
ascertain whethGr the legislature had intended to accord 
a special treatment vis-a-vis the general entries and a 
further endeavour will have to be made to find out 
whether the specific provision excludes thi.: app!icabi!ity 
"· (2014) s sec 319 
'l 
r.
80 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
of the general ones. Once we come to the conclusion 
that intention of the legislation is to exclude the general 
provision then the rule "general provision should yield 
to special provision" is squarely attracted. 
B 
4 7. Having noticed the aforesaid, it could be concluded 
that the rule of statutory construction that the specific 
governs the general is not an absolute rule but is merely 
a strong indication of statutory meaning that can be 
overcome by textual indications that point in the other 
C 
direction. This rule is particularly applicable where the 
legislature has enacted comprehensive scheme and 
has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific 
solutions. A subject specific provision relating to a 
specific, defined and descriptable subject is regarded 
D 
as an exception to and would prevail over a general 
provision relating to a broad subject." 
19. Mr. M.L. Varma, the learned senior counsel 
appearing on behalf of the respondent Math, on the other hand, 
Ii: 
contends that Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 only pertains 
to the administration and governance of the Temple and its 
endowments that vest in the committee. The Temple Act, 1955 
was enacted because of serious irregularities in the 
administration and governance of the Temple and its 
F endowments and for reorganizing the scheme of management 
of the affairs of the temple and its properties. Only what was 
being managed by the Raja of Puri
was taken over under the 
Temple Act, 1955. The learned senior counsel places reliance 
on B.K Mukherjea's 'The Hindu Law of Religious and 
G Charitable Trust' and contends that the respondent Math is a 
Vaishnava Math of Puri. The Math and the Jagannath Temple 
have co existed for centuries. Each is a separate legal entity, 
holding its properties separately and performing its religious 
and other functions in accordance with religious customs and 
H
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
81 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
usage. The Math and the Temple hold their own properties A 
separately. Acquisition of property can be done only through 
transfer or succession. The learned senior counsel contends 
that the appellant Temple Committee has not produced any 
evidence on record through which it could claim the ownership 
over the property of the respondent Math. The learned senior B 
counsel contends that the 'amrutamanohi' properties are 
endowed to two different legal entities- the Temple and the 
Math. Thus, it cannot be contended that the properties of the 
Math belong to the Temple. 
20. The learned senior counsel further contends that 
Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct, 1951 which defines Trust Estate, 
was inserted in the year 1974. Under the proviso, all estates 
belonging to the temple of Lord Jagannath were deemed to 
c 
be trust estates. Thus, the estate of Lord Jagannath came to D 
be vested in the State Government vide notification dated 
18.03.1974. The amendments to the OEAAct, 1951 were 
effected when the Temple Act, 1955 was in force. The learned 
senior counsel contends that it is a well settled principle of law 
that a subsequent legislation prevails over a prior legislation. 
E 
21. We accept the contentions advanced by the learned 
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple 
Committee and are unable to agree with the contentions 
advanced by the learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf F 
of the respondent Math. The Temple and the Math are two 
distinct legal entities. The OEA Act, 1951 was enacted to 
provide for the abolition of all rights, title and interest in the 
land of intermediaries and vesting the same in the State. The 
Act was thus meant to abolish the interest of the intermediaries G 
in the land. A Constitution Bench of this Court, upholding the 
constitutional validity of the Act in the case of K. C Gajapati 
Narayan Deo & Ors. v. State of Orissa14 held as under: 
14 AIR 1953 SC 375 
H
82 
A 
8 
c 
D 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15S.C.R. 
'The primary purpose of the Act is to abolish all zamindari 
and other proprietary estates and interests in the State 
of Orissa and after eliminating ail the intermediaries. to 
bring the ryots or the actual occupants of the lands in 
direct contact with the State Government. It may be 
convenient here to refer briefly to some of the provisions 
of the Act which are material for our present purpose. 
The object of the legislation is fully set out in the preamble 
to the Act which discloses the public purpose underlying 
it. Section 2(g) defines an "estate" as meaning any land 
held by an intermediary and included under one entry in 
any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and 
revenue-free lands prepared and maintained under the 
law for the time being in force by the Collector of a district. 
The expression "intermediary" with reference to any 
estate is then defined nnd it means a proprietor, sub-
~roprietor, landlord, land-holder ... thikadar, tenure-
holder, under-tenure-hoider and includes the holder of 
inam estate, jagir and maufi tenures and all ether 
interests of sim:lar nature between tha ryot 3nd t!-:;; State. 
Section 3 of the Act empowers the State Government 
to declare, by notification, tr.at the esta~e described in 
the notification has vested in the State free from all 
encumbrances. Under section 4 it is open t0 the State 
Government, at any time before issuing such
notif:cation, 
to invite proposals from "intermeoinries" for surrender 
of their estates and if such proposals are accepted, the 
surrendered estate shall vest in the Government as soon 
as the agreement embodying the terms of surrender is 
executed. The consequences of vesting either by issue 
of notific3tion or as a result of surrehder are described 
in detail in section 5 of the Act. It would be sufficient for 
our present purpose to ·state that the primary 
consequence is that al! lands comprised in the estate 
including communaJ lands, non-ryoti lands, waste lands,
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
83 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
trees, orchards, pasture lands, forests, mines and 
A 
minerals, quarries rivers and streams, tanks, water 
channels, fisheries, ferries, hats and bazars, and 
buildings or structures together with the land on which 
they stand shall, subject to the other provisions of the 
Act, vest absolutely in the State Government free from B 
all encumbrances and the intermediary shall cease to 
have any interest in them." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
c 
On the other hand, keeping in view the growing irregularities 
in the management of the affairs of the temple, the Temple 
Act, 1955 was enacted by the state, which received the assent 
of the President on 15.10.1955. We agree with the contention 
advanced by Mr. Harin P. Raval, the learned senior counsel D 
appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee that 
' 
as far as the Jagannath Temple of Puri and its endowments 
are concerned, the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, being 
the $pecial law, take priority over the provisions of any other 
legislation. Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 makes it clear E 
that the properties and endowments of the Temple stand 
statutorily vested in the Temple Committee. The Constitution 
Bench judgment in the case of Surjanarayan Das referred to 
supra draws a distinction between the 'amrutamanohi' 
properties of the Math and the Temple in the following terms: 
F 
"40. The Gazetteer makes a reference
to such properties 
and states:-
"Both Saiva and Vaishnava Maths exist in Puri. The G 
lands of the latter are known asAmruta Manohi (literally 
nectar food), because they were given with the 
intention that the proceeds thereof should be spent in 
offering bhoga before Jagannath and that the 
Mahaprasad thus obtained should be distributed H
84 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
among pilgrims, beggars and ascetics; they are 
distinct from theAmruth Manohi lands of the Temple 
itself which are under the superintendence of the Raja". 
B 
c 
D 
E 
This statement makes it clear that lands endowed to 
the temple of Lord Jagannath are distinct from the lands 
or property endowed to the Vaishnava Maths for the 
purpose of utilising the proceeds of those properties 
for offering bhoga before Lord Jagannath and the 
subsequent distribution of that Mahaprasad among 
pilgrims, beggars and ascetics, presumably visiting the 
Math, or approaching its authorities for a portion of the 
Maha Prasad. The mere fact that t~e proceeds of the 
properties were to be so used, would not justify the 
conclusion that these properties were not endowed to 
the Maths but were endowed to the temple of .Lord 
Jagannath. Properties endowed to the temple of Lord 
Jagannath were. according to this statement. in the 
Gazetteer. not under the superintendence of any Math 
or Mahant but under the superintendence of the Raja of 
Puri himself." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
22. The OEAAct, 1951 was enacted with a view to abolish 
F the rights, title and interest of intermediaries in the land in the 
State of Odisha. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of 
the OEAAct, 1951 reads as under: 
G 
H 
" ...... in the interest of the cultivators of the soil and for 
the general, material and social advancement of the 
Province, it is necessary to
remove all intermediaries 
between the Government and the ryots. The general 
consensus of opinion is that the zamindari system has 
perpetuated assessment which has no relation to the 
productive capacity of the land and has further led to
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
85 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
loss of contact between the Government and the actual 
A 
cultivator and has acted as a break in agricultural 
improvement. ..... It seems without a social change in 
the existing system of land tenure no coordinated plan 
of agricultural reconstruction can be undertaken with a 
fair rent, fixity of tenure, proper maintenance of irrigation 
B 
sources and consequent increases of crop yield and 
extension of cultivation ....... " 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
The OEA Act, 1951 was thus enacted with a view to protecting c 
the interest of the cultivators of the soil and to do away with the 
evils of the zamindari system. In the light of the same, it cannot 
be said that the provisions of the OEAAct, 1951 will apply to 
the land of the appellant Temple Committee over the provisions 
of the Temple Act, 1955, which is clearly the special legislation D 
in the instant case. At this stage., it is also crucial to examine 
the statement of objects and reasons of the Amendment Act 
of 197 4 by virtue of which Section 2( oo) was inserted in the 
OEAAct, 1951. It states as under: 
"The Orissa·Estates Abolition Act, 1951 provides for E 
the abolition of temporarily and permanently settled 
zamindaris and other intermediary interests and tenures 
in the State of Orissa. All estates except trust estates 
have vested in the Government by virtue of notific;;ations 
F 
issued in that behalf by the
Government under the Act. 
For carrying out the purposes of trusts efficiently and to 
ensure proper performance of traditional rites and rituals 
in the religious institutions when trust estates are vested 
in the Government. ..... and that any land or building G 
(being part of a trust estate) vested in the Government 
maybe settled in certain circumstances with the person 
who immediately before such vesting was an 
intermediary in respect of such land or building." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) H ·
86 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
A perusal of the aforementioned objects and reasons makes 
it clear that the said amendment clearly encroaches upon the 
field of the Temple Act, 1955. 
The said amendment has been enacted with a view to ensuring 
B the proper performance of traditional rites and rituals in the 
religious institutions. As far as the Lord Jagannath Temple at 
Puri is concerned, the State Legislature had already enacted 
the Temple Act, 1955 and vested the land belonging to the 
Temple in the Temple Management Committee by virtue of 
C Sections 5 and 33 of the Act of 1955. The object of the said 
Act was to provide for better administration and governance 
of the affairs of the Temple and its properties. Thus, proviso to 
, 
Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct, 1951, by which the estates 
belonging to the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the 
D meaning of the Temple Act, 1955 are deemed to be Trust 
Estates is in direct contravention and subversion of the 
provisions of the Temple Act, 1955. Further, even the contention 
advanced on behalf of the respondent Math that a subsequent 
legislation takes precedence over a prior decision is liable to 
E be rejected as the same is not tenable in law. The same 
becomes clear from the decision of this Court in the case of 
U.P State Electricity Board referred to supra, wherein a three 
judge bench had to adjudicate the operation of a subsequent 
F general legislation in the following terms: 
G 
"We have
already shown that the Industrial Employment 
(Standing orders) Act is a Special Act dealing with a 
Specific subject, namely the conditions of service, 
enumerated in the Schedule, of workmen in industrial 
establishments. It is impossible to conceive that 
Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of the 
Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act embodying 
as they do hard-won and precious rights of workmen 
and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure,
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
87 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
including a quasi-judicial determination, by a general, 
A 
incidental provision like Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity 
Supply Act. It is obvious that Parliament did not have 
before it the Standing orders Act when it passed the 
Electricity Supply Act and Parliament never meant that 
the Standing orders Act should stand protanto re pealed 
B 
by Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly 
of the view that the provisions of the Standing orders 
Act must prevail over S. 79( c) of the Electricity Supply 
Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing orders 
Act applies." 
C 
Further, Justice Krishna Iyer in the case of LIC v. D.J. 
Bahadur15, while examining the difference between general 
and special statutes held as under: 
"In determining whether a statute is a special or a general 
one, the focus must be on the principal subject matter 
plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, 
D 
an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it 
may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when 
E 
dealing with finer points of law. In law, we have a cosmos 
of relativity not absolutes-so too in life. The ID Act is a 
special statute devoted wholly to investigation and 
settlement of industrial disputes which provides 
definitionally for the nature of industrial disputes coming 
F 
within its ambit. It creates an infrastructure for 
investigation into, solution of
and adjudication upon 
industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary 
machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. 
From alpha to omega the ID Act has one special G 
mission-the resolution of industrial disputes through 
specialised agencies according to specialised 
procedures and with special reference to the weaker 
15 AIR 1980 SC 2181 
H
88 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
categories of employees coming within the definition 
of workmen. therefore, with reference to industrial 
disputes between employers and workmen, the ID Act 
is a special statute, and the L.l.C. Act does not speak 
at all with specific reference to workmen. On the other 
hand, its powers relate to the general aspects of 
nationalisation, of management when private 
businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems 
which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of existing 
employees of insurers. The workmen qua workmen and 
industrial disputes between workmen and the employer 
as such are beyond the orbit of and have no specific or 
special place in the scheme of the L.l.C. Act. And 
whenever there was a dispute between workmen and 
management the ID Act mechanism was resorted to." 
Further, on the point of a subsequent legislation taking 
precedence over a prior legislation, he observed as under: 
"The general rule. that prior statutes are held to be 
repealed by implication by subsequent statutes if the 
two are repugnant: is said not to apply if the prior 
enactment is special and the subsequent enactment is 
general, the rule of law being, as stated by Lord 
Selbourne in Seward v. Vera Cruz (1884) 10AC 59 "that 
where there are general words in a later Act capable of 
reasonable and sensible application without extending 
them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier 
legislation, you are
not to hold that earlier and special 
legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated 
from merely by force of such general words, without any 
indication of a particular intention to do so", "There is a 
well-known rule which has application to this case. which 
is that a subsequent general Act does not affect a prior 
special Act by implication. That this is the law cannot
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
89 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
be doubted, and the cases on the subject will be found A 
collected in the third edition of Maxwell is generalia 
specialibus non derogant-i.e. general provisions will not 
abrogate special provisions. "When the legislature has 
given its attention to a separate subject and made 
provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent B 
general enactment is not intended to interfere with the 
special provision unless it manifests that intention very 
clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that 
respect according to its own subject-matter and its own c 
terms." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
23. In the instant case, there is a clear conflict between 
the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct, 1951 and Sections D 
5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955. It is also clear that both the 
above statutory provisions of the Acts cannot survive together. 
While the rule of harmonious construction must be given effect 
to as far as possible, when the provisions of two statutes are 
irreconcilable, it needs to be decided as to which provision 
E 
must be given effect to. In the instant case, Section 2(oo) 
proviso in its entirety is not violative of the provisions of the 
Temple Act. At the cost of repetition, we reproduce the relevant 
part of Section 2( oo) of the OEAAct, 1951 as under: 
"Provided that all estates belonging to the Temple of 
Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the
Shri 
Jagannath Temple Act. 1955 and all estates declared 
F 
to be trust estates by a competent authority under this 
Act prior to the date of coming into force of the Orissa G 
Estate Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be 
deemed to be trust estates." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
H
90 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 15 S.C.R. 
A 
It is only the first part of the proviso which is in contravention of 
the Temple Act, 1955. lfthat part of the proviso continues to be 
given effect, Sections 5 and 30 of the Temple Act, 1955, by 
which the estates of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri are vested 
in the Temple Committee will lose their meaning. By striking 
B down Section 2(oo) proviso to that extent, both the provisions 
will be able to operate. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
In Commercial Tax Officer v. Binani Cements Ltd. 16 
this Court held as under: 
"It is well established that when a general law and a 
special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the 
general law are in question, the rule adopted and 
applied is one of harmonious construction whereby the 
general law. to the extent dealt with by the special law. 
is impliedly repealed. This principle finds its origins in 
the latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant, 
i.e., general law yields to special law should they operate 
in the same field on same subject." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
In J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. 
v. State of U.P. 17, a three judge bench of this Court held as 
under: 
"9 .... We reach the same result by applying another well 
known rule of construction that general provisions yield 
to special provisions. The learned Attorney-General 
seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is 
G 
applicable to resolve the conflict between the general 
provision
in one Act and the special provision in another 
Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between 
general and special provisions in the same legislative 
" (2014 J a sec 31.9 
H 
17 (1961) 3 SCR 185
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
91 
SI DOHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
instrument. This suggestion does not find support in 
A 
either principle or authority. The rule that general 
provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an 
arbitrary principle made by lawyers and Judges but 
springs from the common understanding of men and 
women that when the same person gives two directions B 
one covering a large number of matters in general and 
another to only some of them his intention is that these 
latter directions should prevail as regards these while 
as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have 
effect. In Pretty v. Solly (quoted in Craies on Statute Law C 
at p.m. 206, 5tti Edn.) Romilly, M.R., mentioned the rule thus: 
The rule is. that whenever there is a particular enactment 
and a general enactment in the same statute and the 
latter. taken in its most comprehensive sense. would o 
overrule the former, the particular enactment must be 
operative, and the general enactment must be taken to 
affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may 
properly apply. 
The rule has been applied as between different E 
provisions of the same statute in numerous cases some 
of which only need be mentioned: De Winton v. Brecon, 
Churchill v. Crease, United States v. Chase and 
Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. 
F 
10. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of 
conflict between a specific provision and a general 
provision the
specific provision prevails over the general 
provision and the general provision applies only to such 
cases which are not covered by the special provision, G 
we must hold that Clause 5(a) has no application in a 
case where the special provisions of Clause 23 are 
applicable." 
(emphasis laid by this Court) H
92 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
. [2015) 15 S.C.R. 
A 
It becomes clear from a perusal of the above mentioned two 
judgments of this Court that while provisions of different statutes 
must be harmoniously constructed as far as possible, in cases 
where it is not possible, the Court needs to examine as to 
B 
which provision must be given effect to. 
24. In the case in hand, the first part of the proviso of 
Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 cannot be allowed to 
sustain. Clearly, the intention of the legislature could not have· 
been to render virtually the entire Temple Act, enacted on the 
C specific subject, meaningless, by way of enacting a proviso to 
Section 2(oo)ofthe OEAAct, 1951 as an amendment in 1974, 
which is the general legislation in the instant case. Section 
2(oo)of the OEAAct, 1951, thus, to that extent requires to be 
struck down so that both the OEA Act, 1951 as well as the 
D Temple Act, 1955 can be given due effect in their respective 
field of operation. In exercise of the powers conferred under 
Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court can pass any order 
as may be "necessary for doing complete justice" in a case 
before it. In the instant case, great injustice will be caused to 
E the appellant Temple ifthe rights conferred upon it by the Temple 
Act are allowed to be taken away by operation of the proviso 
to Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct. Therefore, we have to strike 
down the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct and also 
quash the notification
dated 18.03.197 4 in so far as it relates 
F to the property of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri. 
25. Further, it is a settled principle of law that once a 
property is vested by an Act of legislature, to achieve the 
laudable object, the same cannot be divested by the enactment 
G of any subsequent general law and vest such property under 
such law. Similarly, if in the instant case, we were to accept the 
contentions advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing 
on behalf of the respondent Math, then Sections 5 and 33 of 
H the Temple Act, 1955 will be rendered useless and nugatory
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
93 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
and thereby the laudable object and intendment of the Temple 
A 
Act will be defeated and the interest of the public at large will 
be affected. Thus, the notification dated 18.03.197 4 issued 
by the State Government under Section 3-A of the OEAAct, 
1951, whereby the estate of Lord Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, 
· Puri vested in the State Government (in terms of Point (ii) of B 
the notification), is liable to be quashed to that extent. As a 
consequence, the order dated 30.09.1981 passed by the OEA 
Tahsildar, who falls within the inclusive definition of Collector 
in terms of Section 2 (d) of the OEAAct, 1951, settling the . 
land in favour of the Mahantas of various Maths as Marfatdars C 
of the Shri Jagannath Mohaprabhu Bije, Puri is in violation of 
the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 and is thus, liable to be 
set aside. 
Answer to Point No. 2 
D 
26. We will now examine whether even according to the 
provisions of the OEAAct, 1951, the respondent Math had the 
right to file an application for settlement of the suit lands in 
terms of Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act, 1951 . There are 
E 
certain provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 which need to be 
appreciated at this stage. 
Section 2(hh) of the OEA Act, 1951 defines an 
intermediary interest as follows: 
"'Intermediary interest' means an estate or any rights or 
interest therein held or owned by or vested in an 
Intermediary and
any reference to 'estate' in this Act shall 
be construed as including a reference to 'Intermediary 
Interest' also" 
Section 8-A provides for filing of claims under Section 
6,7 and 8 of the OEAAct, 1951 which reads as under: · 
F 
G 
"8-A. Filing of claims under Section 6, 7 and 8 and 
dispute relating thereto-(1) The Intermediary shall file 
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his claim in the prescribed manners for settlement of 
fair and equitable rent in respect of lands and building 
which are deemed to be settled with him under Section 
6 or Section 7 before the Collector within 6 (six) months 
B 
from the date of vesting." 
27. Mr. M .L. Varma, the learned senior counsel appearing 
on behalf of the respondent Math contends that Section 2( oo )of 
the OEAAct, 1951 was amended in the year 1974, in terms of 
which all estates belonging to the temple of Lord Jagannath 
c were deemed to be trust estates. Thus, the same vested in 
the State Government after notification of 18.03.197 4. Thus, 
the provisions of Section 8A of the OEAAct, 1951 come into 
play, and accordingly an intermediary had the right to file its 
claim before the Collector within six months. The learned senior 
D counsel contends that the lands of the respondent Math were 
recorded in the Record of Rights, and the Tahsildar issued an 
inquiry report which stated that the said respondents were in 
possession of the lands. The lands were accordingly settled 
in favour of the respondent Math vide order dated 30.09.1981. 
E The learned senior counsel further contends that the application 
filed by the appellant Temple Committee under Section 8-A, 
in which an order dated 30.11.1992 settling the lands in their 
favour was passed was liable to be set aside, as the 
respondent Math herein was not a party to the same. It is further 
F
contended that the order was liable to be set aside, as the 
lands already settled by way of order dated 12.01.1982 in 
favour of the respondent Math, could not be re-settled as the 
same were not available for the Collector to do so in view of 
G the earlier order, referred to supra. 
H 
28. Mr. Shibasis Mishra, the learned counsel appearing 
oh behalf of the State of Odisha, the appellant in Civil Appeal 
No.142 of 2010 contends that after the decision of this Court 
in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra, the State
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITIEE v. 
95 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
Government vide notifications dated 18.04.1989 and A 
20.11.1990, extended the time period for filing of claims in 
respect of estates of Lord Jagannath. On 20.11.1990, the 
Temple Committee lodged its claim recording the estates of 
Lord Jagannath in favour of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, 
Puri, Marfat through Shri Jagannath Temple Managing B 
Committee by filing Claim Case No. 68 of 1990. On. 
· 30.11.1992, the order was passed by the OEA Collector 
recording the properties in favour of the Temple Committee. 
29. We cannot accept the contentions advanced by the 
C 
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent 
Math. The Form 'H' sabmitted in terms of the OEAAct, 1951 in 
Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 reveals that while Column 9 
"{Whether with respect to the lands in possession of the 
applicant or his temporary lessee or mortagagee on the date D 
of vesting]" is marked as 'Self Possession', and Column 11 
"{If in the possession of a temporary lessee or mortgagee 
give full details of the lessee or mortgagee ...... ]" has been 
left blank. Therefore, the claim of the respondent Math and the 
basis of its claim is not stated in the claim petition. In the E 
absence of the same, its claim as intermediary to prefer claim 
under Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 of the OEA Act, 1951 before the 
Tahsildar is wholly untenable in law. Further, the order dated 
12.01.1982, passed in. OEA
Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 filed 
by the respondent Math to settle the lands in their favour has 
F 
been passed by the Tahsildar, Puri. Section 8-A of the Act 
clearly provides that the claims have to be filed before the 
Collector. Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, the learned senior counsel 
appearing on behalf of the Tahsildar contends that the definition G 
of Collector in the OEAAct, 1951 is an inclusive one, and 
therefore he had the authority to determine the rights of the 
respondent. We cannot agree with this legal contention 
advanced by the learned senior counsel. The proceedings 
under Section 8-A, OEAAct, 1951 are quasi judicial in nature. 
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A 
The Orissa High Court in the case of Bharat Bihari Mishra v. 
State of Orissa18, has held as under: 
"All the above provisions of the Act and the Rules go to 
indicate that the proceeding under Section 8-A(1) is 
B 
quasi judicial in nature. The procedure for conduct of 
the proceeding has been provided in the Act and the 
different Rules as noted above." 
30. It is well settled in law that a quasi judicial function 
C cannot be delegated and therefore, the inclusive reading of 
the definition of Collector under Section 2(d) of the OEAAct, 
1951 to also include Tahsildar can be applied only as far as it 
pertains to the discharge of administrative powers of the 
Collector. In reference to the role of the Tahsildar under the 
D OEAAct, 1951, this Court has held that the Tahsildar performs 
an administrative function and not a quasi judicial one. In the 
case of Basanti Kumar Sahu v. State of Orissa19 a three 
judge bench of this Court has held as under: 
E 
F 
"If it had been an order made on the quasi-judicial side, 
the High Court would have held that the Tribunal had 
jurisdiction under Section 38-B and there would have 
been no occas'ion to interfere with the order. The High 
Court justified the Board's order to the extent it annulled 
the Tahsildar's order dated 17-12-1977 but interfered 
with it solely on the ground that the Board. had no 
jurisdiction since the Tahsildar's order was not a quasi-
judicial order. In
other words, according to the High Court, 
the Tahsildar's orderwas an administrative order. If that 
G 
be so; one fails to understand why the matter should be 
remitted to the Tahsildar once again to take an 
administrative decision? The order of the High Court 
is, therefore, unsustainable." 
18 2012 (II) OLR 968 
H 
1• (1998) 8 sec 722
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
97 
SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
31. Since the Tahsildar performs only an administrative A 
function under the OEA Act, 1951 and not a quasi judicial 
function, thus, he was not competent to pass the order of 
settlement of claim either under Section 6 or 7 or 8 of the OEA 
Act, 1951. For the reasons stated in answer to Point No.1 
above, vesting of the suit lands in favour of the Math is bad in 
B 
law. Further, as we have already held supra that once the land 
already vested in the Temple Committee under Sections 5 and 
33 of the Temple Act, 1955 which is a special enactment to 
deal with the properties endowed to the appellant Temple 
Committee, the same could not have been divested by applying 
C 
the provisions of the OEAAct, 1951 by way of an amendment 
to the Act by insertion of Sections 2(oo) and 3A in the OEA 
Act, 1951, as the operation of the said Act and the Temple 
Act, 1955 are in different fields and the objects and intendment 0 
of the abovementioned two Acts are entirely different. A 
constitution bench of this Court in the case of Calcutta Gas 
Company Ltd. v. State of West Benga/20 held that in case of 
a conflict or overlap between different entries, the rufe of 
harmonious construction must be applied to give effect to all 
E 
the entries. This Court held as under: 
"8 ....... Before construing the said entries is would be 
useful to notice some of the well settled rules of 
interpretation laid down
by the Federal Court and this 
Court in the matter of constructing the entries. The power F 
to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by · 
Article 246 of the Constitution. The entries in the three 
Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation; 
they demarcate the area over which the appropriate G 
Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that 
widest amplitude should be given to the language of 
the entries. But some of the entries in the different List 
or in the same List may overlap and sometimes may · 
20 AIR 1962 SC 1044 
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also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is 
then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and 
bring about harmony between them. When the question 
arose about reconciling entry 45 of List I, duties of excise, 
and entry 18 of List II, taxes on the sale of goods, of 
B 
Government of India Act, 1935, Gwyer, C.J., in In re The 
Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938, 
observed: 
"A grant of the power in general terms, standing by 
C 
itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; 
but it may be qualified by other express provisions in 
the same enactment, by the implication of the context, 
and even by considerations arising out of what appears 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
to be the general scheme of the Act." 
The learned Chief Justice proceeded to state : 
" ....... : ... an endeavour must be made to solve it, as the 
Judicial Committee have said by having recourse to 
the context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation 
attempted between two apparently conflicting 
jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and 
by interpreting, and, where necessary, modifying the 
language of the one by that of the other. ff indeed such 
a reconciliation should prove impossible, then, and 
only then, will the non-obstante clause operate and the 
federal power prevail." 
The Federal Court in that case held that the entry "taxes 
on the sale of goods" was not covered by the entry 
"duties of excise" and
in coming to that conclusion, the 
learned Chief Justice observed : 
"Here are two separate enactments, each in one 
aspect conferring the power to impose a tax upon
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
99 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
goods; and it would accord with sound principles of A 
construction to take the more general power, that 
which extends to the whole of India, as subject to an 
exception created by the particular power, that which 
extends to the provinced only. It is not perhaps strictly 
accurate to speak of the provincial power as being 
B 
excepted out of the federal power, for the two are 
independent of one another and exist side by side. 
But the underlying principle in the two cases must be 
the same, that a general power ought not to be so 
construed as to make a nullity of a particular power C 
conferred by the same Act and operating in the same 
field,when by reading the former in a more restricted 
sense effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary 
and natural meaning." 
D 
The rule of construction adopted by that decision for 
the purpose of harmonizing the two apparently conflicting 
entries in the two Lists would equally apply to an 
apparent conflict between two entries in the same List. 
Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, held in State of E 
Bqmbay v. Narothamdas Jethabai, that the words 
"administration of justice" and "constitution and 
organization of all courts" in item one of List II of the 
Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, 
F 
must be understood in a restricted sense excluding from 
their scope "jurisdiction and powers of courts" 
specifically dealt
with in item 2 of List II. In the words of 
the learned Judge, if such a construction.was not given 
"the wider construction of entry 1 would deprive entry 2 G 
of all its content and reduce it to useless lumber." This 
rule of construction has not been dissented from in any 
of the subsequent decisions of this Court. It may, 
therefore. be taken as a well settled rule of construction 
that every attempt should be made to harmonize the 
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apparently conflicting entries not only of different Lists 
but also of the same List and to reject that construction 
which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and 
make it nugatory." 
B 
(emphasis laid by this Court) 
In the light of the reasons assigned by us in answer to Point 
No.1 and held in favour of the Temple, there was no need for 
the Temple Committee to file claim proceedings under Section 
C 8-A of the OEAAct, 1951, in respect of its own lands which 
were already vested in it under Section 5 of the Temple Act, 
1955. The suit lands vest in the Temple Committee itself. Thus, 
in view of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, the settlement 
of the suit lands in favour of the respondent Math cannot be 
D sustained, as it is bad in law. 
Answer to Point No. 3 
32. In view ofthe findings and reasons recorded on Point 
Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the appellant Temple Committee, the 
E 
impugned judgment and order dated 07.07.2009 passed in 
Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 by the High Court 
of Orissa at Cuttack is liable to be set aside and accordingly, 
we set aside the same. 
F 
33. Since we have categorically recorded the finding both 
on facts and in law while answering Point No. 1 in favour of the 
appellant Temple Committee holding that the provisions of the 
OEAAct, 1951 have no application to the lands of the Lord 
Jagannath Temple at Puri, there is no need for us to pass an 
G order in
favour of the Temple under the OEAAct, 1951 as the 
suit lands were already vested in favour of the Lord Jagannath 
Temple at Puri by virtue of the provisions of the Temple Act, 
1955. 
• H
SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. 
101 
SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
34. For the foregoing reasons, we pass the following 
A 
order:-
i) 
C.A. Nos.7729 of 2009, 7730 of 2009, 142 of 2010, 
221 of 2010, 2981 of 2010, 3414 of 2010,3415 of 
2010 and 3446 of 2010 are allowed. The impugned 
B 
judgment and order dated 07 .07 .2009 passed in 
Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 by the 
High Court of Orissa at Cuttack is hereby set aside. 
ii) 
We strike down the first part of the proviso of Section 
2(oo) of the OEAAct, 1951, which pertains to the c 
properties of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri. 
iii) The notification dated 18.03.197 4 issued by the State 
Government under Section 3Aofthe OEAAct, 1951 
in so far as point No. (ii) is concerned, is also quashed 
D 
by this Court, to the extent, it applies to the lands and 
estate of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri. 
iv) We make it very clear that the striking down of the first 
part of the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct, 
E 
1951 as mentioned above and quashing of the 
notification referred to supra will be prospective and 
this judgment shall not be applicable to the settled 
claim of the claimants hitherto under the provisions of 
the OEAAct of 1951 in so far as the lands of the Lord 
F 
Jagannath Temple at Puri are concerned. 
v) 
In view of the disposal of appeals above-mentioned 
in favour of the Temple Managing Committee, C.A. 
Nos. @SLP (C) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010 (filed by Sri 
Raghab Das
Math) and C.A. No. 9627 of 2010 (filed G 
by Bauli Matha) are hereby dismissed. 
v.i) 
No costs are awarded in these proceedings. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeals disposed of. 
H