ANIL BHARDWAJ versus THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
[2020] 9 S.C.R. 442, Supreme Court of India, 2020
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
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ANIL BHARDWAJ
v.
THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3419 of 2020)
OCTOBER 13, 2020
[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
Service Law – Judicial Service – The appellant was selected
for the post of District Judge (Entry Level) – In his online
application, the appellant had mentioned that one FIR u/ss. 498/
406/34 was pending against him – On 14.09.2018, an order was
issued which declared the appellant ineligible and his name was
deleted from the select list for the said post – A writ petition was
filed by the appellant challenging the order dated 14.09.2018 –  It
was disclosed under the Right to Information Act that the joint meeting
of Administrative Committee (Higher Judicial Service) and
Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee dated
18.07.2018 had considered appellant not suitable for being
appointed – Meanwhile, the appellant was acquitted of the charge
framed against him vide judgment dated 18.09.2019 – The appellant
withdrew his earlier writ petition and filed a fresh writ petition
incorporating subsequent events, facts and acquittal order – The
said writ petition was dismissed by the High Court – Before the
Supreme Court, the appellant contended that his subsequent acquittal
should have been reconsidered by the High Court and the High
Court committed an error in not considering the appellant for
appointment – It was further contended that as per paragraph 6(viii)
of the
guidelines issued by the State on the subject ‘regarding issuing
of new guidelines for character verification’, the candidate will be
eligible for Government Service as appellant has been acquitted –
Held: There is no dispute that on the date when the Committee
declared the appellant unsuitable, criminal case against him u/s.
498A and 406 IPC was pending which was registered on a complaint
filed by the appellant’s wife – The mere inclusion in the select list
does not give an  indefeasible right to a candidate – The employer
has right to refuse appointment to the candidate included in the
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select list or any valid ground – The persons who occupy judicial
service of the State are persons who are expected to have impeccable
character and conduct – The decision of the Committee was well
within the jurisdiction and power of the Committee and cannot be
said to be unsustainable – There was no infirmity in the decision
taken by the Committee – The High Court did not commit any error
in dismissing the writ petition – The fact that subsequently the
appellant was acquitted in the criminal case did not furnish sufficient
ground for reconsidering the appellant for appointment on the post
– As far as the paragraph 6(viii) of the guidelines is concerned, the
same cannot came to the rescue of the appellant since at the time of
character verification the appellant had not been acquitted and he
was acquitted after more than a year from rejection of his candidature
– Thus, the appellant was not entitled for any relief in the writ
petition.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the present case, the decision of Examination-
cum-Section and Appointment Committee for holding the
appellant unsuitable was based on the relevant consideration,
i.e., a criminal case against the appellant under Section 498A/
406/34 IPC was pending consideration which was registered on
a complaint filed by the wife of the appellant. Such decision of the
Committee was well within the jurisdiction and power of the
Committee and cannot be said to be unsustainable. The mere
fact
that subsequently after more than a year when the person
whose candidature has been cancelled has been acquitted cannot
be a ground to turn the clock backward. [Para 23][452-G-H; 453-
A]
2. There being no infirmity in the decision dated 18.07.2018
of the Committee declaring the appellant unsuitable for the post
and consequential decision taken by the State to delete the name
of the appellant, the High Court did not commit any error in
dismissing the writ petition. The fact that subsequently the
appellant was acquitted in the criminal case did not furnish
sufficient ground for reconsidering the appellant for appointment
on the post. [Para 24][453-B-C]
3. The guidelines dated 05.06.2003 has been issued by
Government of Madhya Pradesh on the subject “regarding issuing
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of new guidelines for character verification.” Clause (viii) of
paragraph 6 on which the reliance is placed contemplates that
the candidate who has been acquitted on merit by the Court will
be eligible for the Government service. The aforesaid
contemplation relates to at the time of character verification. Thus,
at the time of character verification, if a candidate is found to be
acquitted on merits by the Court, the candidate shall be treated
to be eligible for Government Service. The Clause (viii) cannot
come to the rescue of the appellant who at the time of character
verification or at the time of consideration of the case of the
appellant by the committee on 18.07.2018 had not been acquitted.
Had the appellant in column 12 had mentioned about the acquittal
or at the time of character verification it was found that the
candidate has been acquitted on merit by the Court, Clause 6(viii)
would have been attracted but in the present case the said clause
is not attracted since at the time of character verification the
appellant had not been acquitted and he was acquitted after more
than a year from rejection of his candidature. [Paras 26 and
27][453-E-F; 454-B-D]
Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another v.
Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 : [2013] 13 SCR 432;
Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others (2016) 8 SCC
471 : [2016] 7 SCR 445; Union Territory, Chandigarh
Administration and Others v. Pradeep Kumar and
Another
(2018) 1 SCC 797 : [2018] 1 SCR 112 – relied
on.
Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and
Others (2015) 2 SCC 377 : [2014] 11 SCR 155 –
distinguished.
Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra and Others
AIR 2018 SC 4895; Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) and
Another v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission
and Others (2008) 17 SCC 703 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
AIR 2018 SC 4895
referred to
Para 8
(2008) 17 SCC 703
referred to
Para 12
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[2013] 13 SCR 432
relied on
Para 13
[2014] 11 SCR 155
distinguished
Para 15
[2016] 7 SCR 445
relied on
Para 17
[2018] 1 SCR 112
relied on
Para 18
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3419
of 2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.01.2020 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in WP-27779 of 2019.
R. Venkataramani, Sr. Adv., Danish Zubair Khan, Adv. for the
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been filed questioning the Division Bench
judgment dated 06.01.2020 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. The appellant in the
writ petition has prayed for quashing the orders dated 14.09.2018,
18.07.2018 and 21.09.2019 by which appellant has been held not suitable
for being appointed to the post of District Judge (Entry Level).
3. The brief facts of the case are:
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh issued an advertisement dated
09.03.2017 inviting applications for recruitment in the post of District
Judge (Entry Level) in the cadre of Higher Judicial Service by Direct
Recruitment from amongst the eligible Advocates. In pursuance to the
advertisement, the appellant submitted online application form. The
appellant after being declared successful in the Main Examination was
called for interview. The provisional select and waiting list was published
in which the name of the appellant was included at Serial No.13 in the
category of unreserved. The appellant received a communication on
06.04.2018 from the Law and Legislative Department informing that he
has been selected for the post of District Judge (Entry Level). He was
asked to appear before the Medical Board for the health tests. On
02.07.2018 the appellant was informed that in his attestation form FIR
No.852/2014 under Section 498/406/34 IPC is shown and the copy of
ANIL BHARDWAJ v. THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF
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the same was asked for. On 14.09.2018 order was issued by the Principal
Secretary, Madhya Pradesh, Law and Legislative Department declaring
the appellant ineligible and directing for deletion the name of the appellant
from the select list.  The Government also issued a Gazette notification
deleting the name of the appellant from the Merit No.13 of the main
select list.
4. The appellant filed a Writ Petition No.27434 of 2018 before the
High Court challenging the order dated 14.09.2018 and the Gazette
notification dated 21.09.2018. On application submitted under the Right
to Information Act, the appellant was provided extract of the Minutes of
the Joint Meeting of Administrative Committee (Higher Judicial Service)
and Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee dated
18.07.2018 by which proceedings the appellant was not considered suitable
for being appointed to the post of District Judge (Entry Level). On the
basis of a complaint by the wife of the appellant, a criminal case was
registered and vide judgment dated 18.09.2019 the appellant was acquitted
of the charge framed against him.
5. The appellant filed an application for amendment of the writ
petition to bring on record the order of the acquittal and other events
occurred during the pendency of the writ petition. The appellant was
permitted to withdraw his earlier writ petition with liberty to file a fresh
writ petition. Writ Petition No.27779 of 2019 was
filed by the appellant
incorporating subsequent events, facts and acquittal order which writ
petition has been dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 06.01.2020
by the High Court. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the appellant
has come up in this appeal.
6. We have heard Shri R. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel
for the appellant.
7. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the
appellant in his online application form has disclosed about the lodging of
FIR No.852/2014 under Section 498A/406/34 IPC. He submits that
appellant having disclosed the lodging of FIR against him has not
concealed any fact before the High Court and he having been selected
on merit was entitled to be appointed. Shri Venkataramani submits that
on the subsequent acquittal of the appellant on 18.09.2019 his case for
appointment was to be reconsidered by the High Court and the High
Court committed an error in not considering the appellant for appointment.
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The candidature of the appellant could not have been cancelled merely
on the ground of pendency of criminal case. The appellant could not
have been deprived of the employment after acquittal. There was no
other material on record to indicate that antecedent or conduct of the
appellant was not upto the mark. The High Court ought to have sent the
matter back before the Higher Judicial Service and Examination-cum-
Selection Committee for reconsideration.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the judgments
of this Court which have been relied by the High Court in the impugned
judgment. Learned counsel for appellant has also placed reliance on the
judgment of this Court in Mohammed Imran vs. State of Maharashtra
and others (C.A.No.10571 of 2018) decided on 12.10.2018. He
submits that the judgment of Mohammed Imran was also a case of a
judicial officer who was directed by this Court to be given appointment.
9. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for
the parties and perused the records.
10. The present is not a case where the name of the appellant
was deleted in the select list on the ground of any concealment of criminal
case against him. The appellant has brought on the record the proceedings
of Examination-cum-Selection Committee dated 18.07.2018. At Item
No.2 of the Agenda the Committee recorded the following decision:
“ITEM NO.02.Consideration on the matter relates to Character
Verification Reports of selected 13
candidates of MPHJS (District
Judge-Entry Level) (Direct from Bar) Exam-2016 & 2017,
received from Law Department, Bhopal for determination of their
eligibility for the said post.
1. Shri Anil Bhardwaj:-
Attestation Form submitted Shri Anil Bhardwaj and police
verification report submitted by Deputy Commissioner of Police,
Special Branch, New Delhi, goes to show that FIR 852/2014 under
Section 498A/406/34 of IPC has been registered against Shri Anil
Bhardwaj on the basis of complaint filed by Smt. Pooja wife of
Shri Anil Bhardwaj.
After due consideration resolved that a case against Shri
Anil Bhardwaj under Section 498A, 406-34 IPC is still pending
before Rohini Court, New Delhi. Therefore, he is not considered
ANIL BHARDWAJ v. THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF
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suitable for being appointed to the post of District Judge (Entry
Level).”
10. The FIR against the appellant was lodged by his wife under
Section 498A and 406 IPC in the year 2014 on the basis of which a
charge-sheet was submitted in the Court on 15.07.2017 under Section
498A and 406 IPC. The appellant has disclosed lodging of the FIR against
him in his online application form. The name of the appellant was included
in the select list which was forwarded to the State. The State after
character verification submitted a report which report was considered
on 18.07.2018 by the Administrative Committee (Higher Judicial Service)
and Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee and a
resolution was taken that due to pendency of the case under Section
498A, 406-34 IPC on the basis of complaint filed by the wife, Smt.
Pooja, the appellant is not considered suitable for being appointed to the
post of District Judge.
11. Before the High Court, the decision of the Committee dated
18.07.2018 as well as the order of the State dated 14.09.2018 for deleting
the name of the appellant was challenged in the writ petition. The main
issue to be considered was as to whether resolution dated 18.07.2018
suffered from error which requires judicial review by the High Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. The submission which has
been pressed by the counsel for the appellant is that appellant’s case
was required to be
reconsidered in view of his subsequent acquittal on
18.09.2019.
12. The recruitment to the Judicial Service is governed by the
provisions of Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik Seva (Bharti Tatha
Seva Sharten) Niyam, 1994. This Court issued direction to all States to
fill up the vacancies in subordinate Courts in a time schedule. The direction
was issued by this Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) and another vs.
Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission and others, 2008(17)
SCC 703. The selection process for filling up the post of District Judge
has to be completed by all the High Courts as per the time schedule
fixed by this Court. After declaration of the merit list the candidates
have to be given appointments in time bound manner so that they may
join the respective posts. There is no dispute that on the date when the
Committee declared the appellant unsuitable, criminal case against him
under Section 498A and 406 IPC was pending which was registered on
a complaint filed by the appellant’s wife, Smt. Pooja. The mere inclusion
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in the select list does not give an indefeasible right to a candidate. The
employer has right to refuse appointment to the candidate included in
the select list on any valid ground. The persons who occupy Judicial
Service of the State are persons who are expected to have impeccable
character and conduct. It is not disputed that the criminal case under
Section 498A and 406 IPC was pending at the time when the appellant
applied for the recruitment, when he appeared for the interview and
when the result was declared. The character verification report was
received from the State where pendency of the criminal case was
mentioned which was the reason for the Committee to declare the
appellant unsuitable. The submission which needs to be considered is
that whether in view of the subsequent acquittal of the appellant, his
case was required to be reconsidered and he was entitled to be appointed.
13. This Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and
another vs. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685, while considering a
case of antecedents verification for appointment into Delhi Police Service
made the following observation in paragraph 35:
“35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders
the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public
order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in
it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to
join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He
must have
impeccable character and integrity. A person having
criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is
acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or
discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has
been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility
of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of
the police force.…………”
14. The observation was made by this Court in the above case
that a candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person having
impeccable character and integrity. The above observations apply with
greater force to the Judicial Service. This Court further observed that
even in the case of acquittal, it has to be examined as to whether the
person was completely exonerated in the case or not. In the present
case the acquittal having taken place after the close of recruitment
process, there was no question of examining the acquittal order by the
High Court at the time of finalizing the selection process.
ANIL BHARDWAJ v. THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF
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15. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the judgment
of this Court in Joginder Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh
and others, (2015) 2 SCC 377, which was a case whether the appellant
was acquitted by the trial court for a case under Section 148/149/323/
325/307 IPC. In the above case acquittal took place even before the
appellant was called for the interview/medical examination. This fact
was recorded in paragraph 24 of the judgment in the following words:
“24. However, in the present case, we have observed that
the appellant was involved in a family feud and the FIR came to
be lodged against him on 14-4-1998, after he had applied for the
post of Constable. Further, he had been acquitted on 4-10-1999
i.e. much before he was called for the interview/medical
examination/written test………”
16. The above case is clearly distinguishable and does not help
the appellant.
17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Avtar Singh vs. Union
of India and others, (2016) 8 SCC 471, had occasion to examine
different aspects of verification form after selection including the question
of having criminal antecedents and pending of criminal case. This Court
laid down that in the event criminal case is pending and incumbent has
not been acquitted employer may well be justified in not appointing such
an incumbent. In paragraph 32 following has been laid down:
“32. No doubt about it that once verification form requires
certain
information to be furnished, declarant is duty-bound to
furnish it correctly and any suppression of material facts or
submitting false information, may by itself lead to termination of
his services or cancellation of candidature in an appropriate case.
However, in a criminal case incumbent has not been acquitted
and case is pending trial, employer may well be justified in not
appointing such an incumbent or in terminating the services as
conviction ultimately may render him unsuitable for job and
employer is not supposed to wait till outcome of criminal case. In
such a case non-disclosure or submitting false information would
assume significance and that by itself may be ground for employer
to cancel candidature or to terminate services.”
18. Even in a case where candidates have been acquitted in criminal
case, it was held that the decision of the Screening Committee being not
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actuated by mala fide regarding suitability of the candidate is to be
respected. This Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration
and others vs. Pradeep Kumar and another, (2018) 1 SCC 797,
laid down following in paragraphs 13 and 17:
“13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case
does not automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Still
it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine
whether he is suitable for appointment to the post. From the
observations of this Court in Mehar Singh, 2013 (7) SCC 685
and Parvez Khan, 2015 (2) SCC 591 cases, it is clear that a
candidate to be recruited to the police service must be of
impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal
antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably
acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the Screening
Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala
fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to the importance
of the trust reposed in it and must examine the candidate with
utmost character.
17. In a catena of judgments, the importance of integrity
and high standard of conduct in police force has been emphasised.
As held in Mehar Singh case5, the decision of the Screening
Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In the
case in hand, there is nothing to suggest that the decision of the
Screening Committee
is mala fide. The decision of the Screening
Committee that the respondents are not suitable for being appointed
to the post of Constable does not call for interference. The Tribunal
and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the decision
of the Screening Committee and the impugned judgment is liable
to be set aside.”
19. Now, we may notice the judgment of Mohammed Imran
(supra) which has been heavily relied by the learned counsel for the
appellant. In the above case the appellant was selected for Judicial Service
whose selection was cancelled on 04.06.2010 due to the character
verification report of the Police. Writ petition was dismissed by the High
Court. It was contended before this court that the appellant was acquitted
of the charge under Sections 363, 366, 34 IPC on 28.10.2004 that is
much before he cleared the examination for appointment in the year
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2009. The appellant disclosed his prosecution and acquittal by the Sessions
Court. This Court noticed the aforesaid fact in paragraph 9 of the
judgment in the following words:
“9. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir Gulabrao
Barde, who had been acquitted on 24.11.2009 in Case No.3022
of 2007 under Sections 294, 504, 34 IPC, has been appointed……”
20. This Court held that report received reveals that except for
the criminal case, in which he had already been acquitted, the appellant
has a clean record and there is no adverse material against him to deny
him the fruits of his academic labour. This Court found decision rejecting
the candidature of the appellant as untenable by making following
observation in paragraph 11:
“11. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the
case, we are of the considered opinion that the consideration of
the candidature of the appellant and its rejection are afflicted by a
myopic vision, blurred by the spectacle of what has been described
as moral turpitude, reflecting inadequate appreciation and
application of facts also, as justice may demand.”
21. There can be no dispute that in event it is found that decision
by which the candidature of a candidate is rejected is arbitrary or actuated
by malafide such decision can be interfered by the Constitutional Courts.
We have already noticed the judgment of this Court in Union Territory,
Chandigarh Administration and others vs.
Pradeep Kumar and
another (supra) that the decision of the Screening Committee must be
final unless it is mala fide.
22. There can be no dispute to the above proposition. But there
can be other valid reasons for not sustaining the decision of Screening
Committee/ Selection Committee apart from the ground of mala fide.
Any arbitrary decision taken by the Selection Committee can very well
be interfered by the Constitutional Courts in exercise of Judicial Review
Jurisdiction.
23. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the decision of
Examination-cum-Section and Appointment Committee for holding the
appellant unsuitable was based on the relevant consideration, i.e., a
criminal case against the appellant under Section 498A/406/34 IPC was
pending consideration which was registered on a complaint filed by the
wife of the appellant. Such decision of the Committee was well within
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the jurisdiction and power of the Committee and cannot be said to be
unsustainable. The mere fact that subsequently after more than a year
when the person whose candidature has been cancelled has been
acquitted cannot be a ground to turn the clock backward.
24. There being no infirmity in the decision dated 18.07.2018 of
the Committee declaring the appellant unsuitable for the post and
consequential decision taken by the State to delete the name of the
appellant, the High Court did not commit any error in dismissing the writ
petition. The fact that subsequently the appellant was acquitted in the
criminal case did not furnish sufficient ground for reconsidering the
appellant for appointment on the post.
25. One more submission advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioner needs also to be considered. The petitioner’s contention is that
the decision declaring the petitioner unsuitable on the ground of pendency
of criminal case under Section 498A, 406 IPC was contrary to the
guidelines issued by the Government of Madhya Pradesh for character
verification dated 05.06.2003. He submits that as per paragraph 6(viii)
of the guidelines on the acquittal on merit of the case by the Court, the
candidate will be eligible for Government service. He submits that the
above clause of the Government Order has been breached in declaring
the appellant unsuitable.
26. The guidelines dated 05.06.2003 has been issued by
Government of Madhya Pradesh on the subject “regarding
issuing of
new guidelines for character verification.” Paragraph 6 which has been
relied by the counsel for the appellant is regarding column 12 of the
Attestation form. It is useful to extract paragraph 6 and clause (viii)
which are as follows: -
“6. The Column 12 of the attestation form filled for character
verification by selected candidates for government service, criminal
background, judicial case and the information about acquittal or
conviction in it, willfully or erroneously or ignorantly kept vacant
subject to qualification for appointment in government service
taking into consideration the policy as per rules by the state
government with immediate effect decisions have been taken.
(i)………   …………   ……………
  …………   …………   ……………
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(viii) On the acquittal on merit of the case by the Hon’ble Court,
the candidate will be eligible for government service.”
27. Clause (viii) on which the reliance is placed contemplates that
the candidate who has been acquitted on merit by the Court will be
eligible for the Government service. The aforesaid contemplation relates
to at the time of character verification. Thus, at the time of character
verification, if a candidate is found to be acquitted on merits by the
Court, the candidate shall be treated to be eligible for Government
Service. The above clause (viii) as quoted above cannot come to the
rescue of the appellant who at the time of character verification or at
the time of consideration of the case of the appellant by the committee
on 18.07.2018 had not been acquitted. Had the appellant in column 12
had mentioned about the acquittal or at the time of character verification
it was found that the candidate has been acquitted on merit by the Court,
Clause 6(viii) would have been attracted but in the present case the said
clause is not attracted since at the time of character verification the
appellant had not been acquitted and he was acquitted after more than a
year from rejection of his candidature.
28. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly has contended that
due to deletion of the name of appellant from select list a stigma is
attached to him, for removal of which this Court may issue notice in this
SLP. As noted above, the appellant having already been acquitted by the
judgment dated 18.09.2019 stigma of criminal case has already washed
out and the criminal case having resulted in acquittal no stigma is attached
to the appellant’s name on the above ground. The apprehension of the
learned counsel for the appellant that a stigma shall continue with the
name of the appellant is misconceived, stigma, if any, is already over by
acquittal.
29. We, thus, are of the view that the High Court did not commit
any error in dismissing the writ petition. The appellant was not entitled
for any relief in the writ petition. In the result, while dismissing this appeal
we observe that stigma, if any, of the criminal case lodged against
appellant under Section 498A/406/34 IPC is washed out due to the
acquittal of the appellant vide judgment dated 18.09.2019.
Ankit Gyan
Appeal dismissed.