CHAUDHARY CHARAN SINGH HARYANA AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY, HISAR & ANR.  versus MONIKA & ORS.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 954, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 954 : 2024 INSC 911
Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana  
Agricultural University, Hisar & Anr.  
v. 
Monika & Ors. 
(Civil Appeal No. 10800 of 2024) 
29 November 2024
[Dipankar Datta* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the 
Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court in treating 
the first respondent as qualified for consideration and consequent 
appointment; and whether the first respondent, in terms of the 
Advertisement, was eligible to be awarded half a mark (0.5) under 
the category of ‘experience’ vis-à-vis her engagement as outsourced 
manpower for the concerned time period, in light of the Rules and 
Circulars of the State as adopted by the University. 
Headnotes†
Service Law – Appointment – Selection process – Candidate, if 
eligible for marks under the category of experience vis-a-vis her 
engagement as outsourced manpower for the concerned time 
period – First respondent appointed under the Outsourcing 
Policy by service provider as clerk-cum-typist in the University, 
when no sanctioned post exists – Service provider awarded 
certificate of experience countersigned by the University – 
Thereafter, the University invited applications for direct 
recruitment to various Group-C (non-teaching) posts – First 
respondent applied and scored 75 marks in written test, falling 
short of selection – Claim of 0.5 marks for her experience for 
the service rendered when employed by
service provider – 
Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High 
Court held that the respondent was eligible for 0.5 marks for 
the service rendered – Interference:
Held: Refusal to award any mark for experience to the first 
respondent would go against the constitutional duty of ensuring 
equality and securing social justice for the deprived – Non-grant 
of mark for experience to the first respondent not proper and 
* Author
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955
Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,  
Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.
legal – It has not been shown that either the Recruitment Rules or 
the Advertisement specifically bars aspirants from securing marks 
for experience gained from contractual/outsourced employment – 
Primary concern is the nature of work performed by the candidate 
has any nexus with the purported work to be undertaken during 
the course of regular service – First respondent rendered service 
for a statutory body in excess of six months and thus, had valid 
claim for securing 0.5 mark for experience – It is not open for the 
University to now deny marks on the basis of a technical procedural 
deviation that the experience certificate was not issued by the 
University, but rather by the service provider – It is accepted that 
the certificate was per se not issued by the University, the fact 
that it was countersigned by the Head of the Department validates 
the first respondent’s claim that she had indeed gained certain 
experience which deserved to be given credit – First respondent, 
thus, cannot be denied the benefit of mark for experience merely 
because at the time of appointment as outsourced manpower, 
she was not appointed on a sanctioned post – It would occasion 
a failure of justice to exclude such individual – If said was the 
requirement, it had to be made explicitly clear in the Advertisement 
without any ambiguity so as not to generate false hopes in the
minds of individuals aspiring for public employment – Any other 
view would be against both the principles of equality and non-
arbitrariness enshrined in the Constitution as well as principles of 
natural justice – Tested on the touchstone of Arts. 14 and 16, the 
impugned decision of the University cannot sustain – Whenever 
a conflict arises between the powerful and the powerless, social 
justice commands the Courts to lean in favour of the weaker 
and poorer sections where the scales are evenly balanced –  
Thus, interference with the impugned judgment of the Division 
Bench not called for, though on different reasons – Constitution 
of India – Arts 14, 16. [Paras 20, 22, 25-30]
Case Law Cited
Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [2006] 3 SCR 953 : 
(2006) 4 SCC 1 – distinguished. 
Sachivalaya Dainik Vetan Bhogi Karamchari Union v. State of 
Rajasthan & Ors. (2017) 11 SCC 421; Dr. Kumar Bar Das v. 
Utkal University [1998] Supp. 3 SCR 315 : (1999) 1 SCC 453; 
Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar [2019] 15 SCR 273 : 
(2019) 20 SCC 17; Union of India v. M. Bhaskar [1996] Supp. 2
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SCR 358 : (1996) 4 SCC 416; P Kumaraswamy v. State Transport 
Appellate Tribunal, Madras [1976] 2 SCR 214 : (1976) 1 SCC 
373 – referred to. 
List of Acts
Haryana and Punjab Agricultural Universities Act, 1970.
List of Keywords
Appointment; Eligible to be awarded marks of experience; 
Engagement as outsourced manpower; Outsourcing Policy by 
service provider; Sanctioned post;  Service provider; Certificate 
of experience; Direct recruitment; Group-C (non-teaching) posts; 
Recruitment Rules; Advertisement;  Contractual/outsourced 
employment; Mode of employment; Benefit of mark for experience; 
Security of service; Public employment; Principles of equality 
and non-arbitrariness; Principles of natural justice; Social justice; 
Constitutional duty; Non-grant of mark for experience.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10800 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2023 of the High Court 
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No. 562 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
Manu Mridul, Pratap Singh Rawat, Jitin Chaturvedi, Advs. for the 
Appellants.
Jayprakash Bansilal Somani, Nishant Verma, Rajnish Kumar, 
Manoj Kumar Chowdhary, Ms. Shisba Chawla, Ms. Ekta Verma, 
Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
The Appeal
1.	
The present appeal assails the judgment and order dated 6th 
December, 2023 passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and
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957
Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,  
Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.
Haryana High Court at Chandigarh1 in LPA No. 562/2022 (O&M), 
affirming the decision of the Single Judge whereby the first respondent 
was directed to be considered and offered appointment in the first 
appellant-Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University2 
on the post of Clerk.
The Question
2.	
The short question arising for decision in the appeal is, whether the 
Single Judge and then the Division Bench of the High Court were 
in error in treating the first respondent as qualified for consideration 
and consequent appointment.
Resume of facts 
3.	
The relevant facts essential to decide the present appeal are as 
follows: 
I.	
In 1970, the University was established upon enactment of the 
Haryana and Punjab Agricultural Universities Act, 1970. 
II.	
In 2009, the second respondent-State of Haryana3 vide Circular 
No. 43/5/2001-IGSI introduced an outsourcing policy relating 
to engagement of persons on contract basis through service 
providers.4 This circular was adopted by the University vide 
memo dated 24.02.2010. 
III.	
In 2014, the SoH issued a further Circular bearing No. 
43/5/2001-3GSII relating to issuance of experience certificates 
to persons engaged under the aforementioned outsourcing 
policy. This circular too was adopted by the University on 
25.06.2014.5 
IV.	
In 2017, the University invited tenders for the purpose of 
providing manpower
relating to office/hospitality and lab/
technical under Part I of the Outsourcing Policy. Vide Office 
Order dated 29.03.2017, the contract was awarded to two 
1	
High Court, hereafter
2	
University, hereafter
3	
SoH, hereafter
4	
Outsourcing Policy, hereafter 
5	
Circular dated 25.06.2014, hereafter
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service agencies by the University. The first respondent was 
engaged by one of the service agencies, namely, M/s Lavnya 
Enterprises,6 to work as a clerk-cum-typist as outsourced 
manpower for the time period between 05.05.2017 and 
31.03.2018 in the University. 
V.	
A certificate of experience was awarded to the first respondent 
by Lavnya dated 01.04.2018. This certificate was countersigned 
by the Professor and Head of the Department of Soil Science 
of the University. 
VI.	 Vide an advertisement,7 the University invited applications for 
direct recruitment to various Group-C (non-teaching) posts. 
Under the criteria for selection, the advertisement prescribed 
a maximum of five (5) out of hundred (100) marks for 
‘Experience’. It specified that half a mark (0.5) would be given 
for experience in the same or higher post in any department / 
board / corporation / company / statutory body / commission / 
authority of the Government of Haryana, for each year or part 
thereof which exceeds six months but limited to a maximum 
of ten (10) years. 
VII.	 In pursuance of the advertisement, the first respondent had 
applied and offered her candidature. Admittedly, the first 
respondent scored 75 marks in the written test and was, 
accordingly, placed in Sl. No 103 and ranked Gen-92 in the 
merit list, and fell short of selection. 
VIII.	 Aggrieved, the first respondent invoked the writ jurisdiction of 
the High Court by filing
WPC No. 4402/2020 (O&M)8 impleading 
the University, the SoH and two selected candidates as the first, 
second, third and fourth respondents, respectively. 
IX.	 A Single Judge of the High Court by his judgment and order 
dated 24.05.2022 ruled that the first respondent was eligible for 
0.5 mark for the service rendered by her between 05.05.2017 
and 31.03.2018. As noted above, this decision was affirmed 
by the Division Bench.
6	
Lavnya, hereafter
7	
Advertisement, hereafter
8	
Writ Petition, hereafter
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959
Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,  
Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.
Impugned Judgments
4.	
Since the first respondent had admittedly worked in the University for 
a period exceeding six months, her Writ Petition was allowed by the 
Single Judge directing allotment of 0.5 mark to the first respondent. 
The University was directed to consider her for appointment as well 
as to offer appointment, without disturbing any selected candidate. 
Aggrieved, the University carried the judgment and order allowing 
the Writ Petition in a Letters Patent Appeal. The Division Bench 
dismissed the appeal presented by the University on the ground 
that the order of the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any 
illegality, thereby leaving the University still aggrieved.
5.	
Having perused the judgment and order of the Single Judge, since 
affirmed by the Division Bench, we have found the judgment and 
order of both the writ court as well as the appellate court to be rather 
cryptic. Exception cannot be taken to any judgment merely on the 
ground of its brevity but if the judgment is cryptic and conclusions are 
reached without proper analysis of facts and materials on record, the 
party aggrieved would be justified in seeking setting aside of such 
judgment. It is, perhaps, for such reason notice had been issued by 
a coordinate Bench pursuant whereto the first respondent appeared; 
and, thereafter, the parties argued their cases fully. However,
since 
focused consideration, due application of judicial mind and clarity 
of reasoning are the imperatives of a proper judicial decision, we 
have thought it fit to reflect on the issue arising for decision with the 
seriousness the same deserves. 
Contentions
6.	
The impugned judgment has been assailed by the University on the 
grounds that: 
I.	
Paragraph 1 of Part I of the Outsourcing Policy stipulates that 
services may be outsourced as and when required partly or 
completely by the departments where posts have not been 
sanctioned. Part II deals with engagement of persons on contract 
basis where the regular posts exist. In the instant case, the first 
respondent was deputed in one of the universities through a 
service provider under Part I of the Outsourcing Policy. 
II.	
Since the first respondent was engaged in the University by 
the service provider, Lavnya, under the Outsourcing Policy
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for the requirements of office work and not appointed on any 
regular or sanctioned post of clerk, the experience acquired 
by her cannot be equated with the experience of working on a 
sanctioned post of clerk. 
III.	
Considering that the post was not a regular or sanctioned 
post, the first respondent cannot be deemed to have gained 
experience of working in the same or higher post, as required 
by the Advertisement.
IV.	
Experience Certificate was not issued by the University but 
rather by Lavnya. Merely because it was countersigned by the 
Head of the Department does not make it a certificate issued 
by the University. Attention was drawn to the Circular dated 
25.06.2014, which prohibits issuance of an experience certificate 
by any authority where persons are engaged through a service 
provider, i.e., under Part I of the Outsourcing Policy. 
V.	
The High Court overlooked the fact that the first respondent’s 
application described her engagement for the concerned time 
period as contractual employment and that her employer was 
the University, which is incorrect as the first respondent was 
neither appointed by the University nor ever worked with the 
University on any temporary or permanent post. 
VI.	 The first respondent has not submitted the valid experience 
certificate issued by the department / board / corporation  / 
company / statutory body / commission / authority of the 
Government of Haryana; therefore,
the scrutiny committee has 
not considered the so-called experience of the first respondent 
and allotted her marks which is justified on facts and in the 
circumstances. 
VII.	 The last candidate who was selected (securing 75 marks) is 
still 8 ranks higher than the first respondent. If the relief granted 
by the High Court is upheld, then the seniority of the appointed 
candidates will have to be disturbed. Moreover, the select list 
having been exhausted, the appointment cannot be given to 
the first respondent. 
7.	
Based on these grounds, interference with the impugned judgment 
and order of the Division Bench was claimed by the University.
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Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,  
Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.
8.	
Representing the first respondent, her learned counsel contended 
that the judgment and order of the Single Judge is well-considered 
and well-reasoned; hence, it is unexceptionable and no interference 
is warranted.
9.	
It was further contended that: 
I.	
The first respondent though had rendered services to the 
University on contract, she had done the work like other similarly 
situated persons working under either the outsourcing policy 
or on regular basis. 
II.	
As per the Policy, the essential requirement of experience is 
that the candidate must be working in any department of the 
Government of Haryana irrespective of the mode of recruitment 
because government institutes can hire manpower in any of 
the two modes and in both the cases, work is done in the 
government department. 
III.	
The University did not disclose the fact that the post of Clerk-
cum-Typist is a sanctioned post. 
IV.	
Denying marks of experience to the first respondent is 
unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 15, 16, 19 
and 21 of the Constitution of India.
V.	
The last candidate selected in the general category secured 
76 marks and if the mark (0.5) for experience is granted to 
the first respondent, she would enter the zone of selection for 
appointment on the post of clerk. 
VI.	 There are 13 posts lying vacant and the selection list is valid 
for one year.
VII.	 That in the case of Sachivalaya Dainik Vetan Bhogi 
Karamchari Union v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,9 this Court 
upheld the policy of the State of Rajasthan for giving weightage 
to the services rendered by the employees, where services 
were used by the State either temporarily or on ad-hoc basis. 
9	
 (2017) 11 SCC 421.
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VIII.	 The University has also issued 2nd Appointment List wherein, 
two candidates who have secured 75 marks have been selected 
and appointed for the said post, i.e., the third and the fourth 
respondent.
10.	 Learned counsel concluded by submitting that the University read 
words in the Advertisement to exclude the first respondent from the 
zone of consideration, which was rightly interdicted by the Single 
Judge and the Division Bench in its concurrent findings. As a sequel 
thereto, the appeal deserves outright dismissal.
Analysis And Reasons
11.	 The crux of the dispute is whether the first respondent, in terms of 
the Advertisement, was eligible to be awarded half a mark (0.5) under 
the category of ‘experience’ vis-à-vis her engagement as outsourced 
manpower for the concerned time period, in light of the Rules and 
Circulars of the SoH as adopted by the University. 
12.	 It is an admitted fact that the first respondent was appointed under 
Part I of the Outsourcing Policy, which relates only to employment 
made when no sanctioned post exists. Although the first respondent 
has urged that the University has not disclosed the existence of a 
sanctioned post either before the High Court or this Court, nothing turns 
on it. It is not in dispute that the first respondent was never directly 
appointed by the University on any sanctioned post of Clerk. Having 
regard to the Outsourcing Policy, through which the first
respondent 
came to be appointed, we shall proceed with our analysis resting on 
the premise that no sanctioned post of Clerk existed at the time when 
the first respondent was first engaged in the University through the 
service provider or, even if one existed, the first respondent could 
not have been accommodated there at the relevant time. 
13.	 The point that would engage our consideration in this case is whether 
the noun ‘post’ in the subject advertisement would invariably mean a 
sanctioned post and whether a candidate would not be eligible for mark 
for experience if he/she has not worked on a regular/sanctioned post.
14.	 We have not been referred by the parties to any precedent having 
a direct bearing on the question arising for decision here. However, 
prior to looking at the Advertisement, it would be worthwhile to bear 
in mind what this Court held in the decisions noted below.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
963
Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,  
Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.
15.	 In Dr. Kumar Bar Das v. Utkal University,10 a case concerning the 
provision of marks for experience in connection with recruitment, a 
3-Judge Bench of this Court noted that one must not apply the words 
in the advertisement in a technical sense but must rather give effect 
to the words mentioned in the advertisement: 
“29. No doubt, in clause 9 of the endowment, it was stated 
that the procedure for selection would be the same as 
followed for a Professor’s selection. This, in our view, was 
referable merely to the procedure. If the advertisement 
stressed on the research experience also and not merely 
the teaching experience, the column in the pro forma for 
awarding marks when it referred to ‘teaching experience’ 
has to be treated as one meant to cover teaching and 
research experience. The Selection Committee and the 
Syndicate followed the right procedure but the Chancellor 
went wrong in confining himself to the actual language of 
the pro forma and in omitting to give effect to the words ‘and/
or research experience’ contained in the advertisement and 
the UGC Regulations. This, in our view, is a clear illegality 
in the order of the Chancellor. The High Court ought to 
have, therefore, come to the rescue of the appellant and 
set right the illegality.”
(emphasis supplied)
16.	  Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar11 arose out of a case 
where
the advertisement provided for the grant of marks for work 
experience after appointment on a regular/contract basis in the 
government hospitals. In the advertisement, it was also stated that 
only work experience in government hospitals of the Government 
of Bihar would be counted for this purpose. This Court, therefore, 
in interpreting the term “government hospital” held: 
“20. It is a settled canon of statutory interpretation that 
as a first step, the courts ought to interpret the text of the 
provision and construct it literally. Provisions in a statute 
must be read in their original grammatical meaning to give 
10	
[1998] Supp. 3 SCR 315 : (1999) 1 SCC 453. 
11	
[2019] 15 SCR 273 : (2019) 20 SCC 17.
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its words a common textual meaning. However, this tool of 
interpretation can only be applied in cases where the text 
of the enactment is susceptible to only one meaning. [Nathi 
Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271, para 13.] 
Nevertheless, in a situation where there is ambiguity in 
the meaning of the text, the courts must also give due 
regard to the consequences of the interpretation taken.
…
23. …The phrase ‘government hospital’ therefore cannot 
be construed to exclude other non-private hospitals which 
are otherwise run exclusively with the aid and assistance 
of the Governments. Additionally given the difference in 
common usage wherein ‘government hospital’ refers to 
all non-private hospitals and not hospitals established by 
a particular Government, Rules 5 & 6(iii) would not be 
bound by Rule 2(a).”
(emphasis supplied)
17.	 The first respondent has also referred us to the decision of Sachivalaya 
Dainik Vetan Bhogi Karamchari Union (supra). It would be 
appropriate to delve into the facts in that case before deciding the 
applicability of the law laid down therein in this present dispute. In that 
case, the members of the Workers Union were Class-IV employees. 
The employees filed a writ petition seeking regularisation of service. 
When the writ petition came up for hearing, it was represented that 
the dispute was settled out of Court and the terms were reduced to 
writing. Thereafter, the respondent
issued an advertisement inviting 
tenders from contractors for the supply of Class IV employees. The 
Workers Union approached the High Court once again by way of a 
writ petition challenging the advertisement on the ground that those 
conditions were contrary to the settlement. During the pendency of this 
writ petition, another advertisement was invited and the respondent 
decided to provide some weightage in favour of the members of the 
Union by taking a decision to accord certain bonus marks in favour 
of those who had been working with the Department on a temporary 
basis. This decision of the respondent was once more challenged 
and the High Court ruled that the grant of these marks was arbitrary 
and directed that a lower weightage be given. Aggrieved, the State 
of Rajasthan carried the matter to this Court. During its pendency
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Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,  
Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.
before this Court, an Hon’ble Division Bench of the Rajasthan High 
Court ruled in the pending writ petition [WP No. 3235/2004] that the 
settlement entered into between the parties cannot be enforced due to 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka 
v. Umadevi (3).12 While this Court, no doubt, upheld the settlement 
deed wherein the respondent awarded bonus marks to the candidates 
for working in certain ad-hoc positions, it did so in the background of 
the complex and labyrinthine facts and circumstances that had played 
out before the Rajasthan High Court. There is no doubt in our mind 
that this case must be distinguished from the instant case as it does 
not lay down a general rule regarding the provision of experience 
marks while working in a contractual/non-regular post, but rather is 
limited to the enforcement of an already existing settlement agreement 
between the State and the concerned contractual employees. 
18.	 In a different context, where promotion was the matter of concern 
before this Court in Union of India v. M. Bhaskar,13 it was held that:
“15. The aforesaid decision has been challenged in this 
appeal by the Union of India by contending that 2 years’ 
period of experience has to be reckoned, not from 11-
10-1988, but from 21-9-1989. There is no dispute that 
the eligibility condition is 2 years’ experience in Grade
II. Now, this respondent having really started working in 
Grade II pursuant to the order of 21-9-1989, he could not 
have gained experience prior to the date he had joined 
pursuant to this order. The mere fact that his promotion 
in Grade II was notionally made effective from 11-10-
1988 cannot be taken to mean that he started gaining 
experience from that day, because to gain experience one 
has to work. Notional promotions are given to take care of 
some injustice, inter alia, because some junior has come 
to be promoted earlier. But we entertain no doubt that the 
person promoted to higher grade cannot gain experience 
from the date of the notional promotion; it has to be from 
the date of the actual promotion.”
(emphasis supplied) 
12	
[2006] 3 SCR 953 : (2006) 4 SCC 1 
13	
[1996] Supp. 2 SCR 358 : (1996) 4 SCC 416
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19.	 Also, while not a decision related to service jurisprudence, in 
P Kumaraswamy v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras,14 
this Court held that the rule that prescribes marks to applicants who 
have business or technical experience in the road transport service, 
did not make any distinction between passenger transport or lorry 
transport. Upon a perusal of the decision, it is clear that a literal 
reading of the applicable framework is essential for any determination. 
20.	 Taking a cue from the aforesaid decisions, our observation is this. It 
cannot be gainsaid that even though the modalities for engagement 
of two individuals for executing similar nature of work could differ, 
there can be no quarrel that none can gain experience without being 
asked to work. One vital difference in working on a sanctioned post 
as a permanent employee and being employed in the exigencies 
of administration without having a right to post is that in the former, 
the appointee enjoys procedural safeguards bringing in a sense of 
security of service in him while in the latter the individual concerned 
may not have any such sense of security. But, in case, both perform 
the work of clerks, the experience gained would not be much at 
a variance subject, of course, that the job requirement is not too 
different. It would also be relevant to bear in mind stipulations in 
the advertisement if, at all, they call for any special
requirement for 
marks to be secured for experience, viz. previous service rendered 
on a sanctioned post or if salary, as is specified, has to be received 
for service rendered in order to be eligible to apply. 
21.	 Moving on to the Advertisement in this case calling for our attention, 
we find that it required:
“(d) Experience: One half (= 0.5) mark for each year or 
part thereof exceeding six months of experience, out of 
a maximum of 10 years, on the same or a higher post in 
any Department/Board/ Corporation/Company/Statutory 
Body/Commission/Authority of Government of Haryana. No 
marks will be awarded for a period less than six months. 
(a maximum of 5 marks)”
22.	 A literal reading of the terms relating to experience confirms that 
marks could be secured by an aspirant for experience gathered 
14	
[1976] 2 SCR 214 : (1976) 1 SCC 373
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Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,  
Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.
while working in the enumerated departments of the Government 
of Haryana; however, while referring to ‘same or a higher post’, 
the term ‘sanctioned’ as a prefix is conspicuous by its absence. 
Additionally, neither the Outsourcing Policy nor the Advertisement 
defines the word “post”. What follows is that an aspirant, to secure 
mark for experience, must prove with documents that he/she has 
been employed for performing work of the nature required by the 
same or a higher post. Importantly, it has not been shown that 
either the Recruitment Rules or the Advertisement specifically bar(s) 
aspirants from securing marks for experience gained from contractual /
outsourced employment. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that 
the mode of employment is not the primary concern. To our mind, 
the primary concern is the nature of work performed and whether the 
work undertaken by the candidate has any nexus with the purported 
work to be undertaken during the course of regular service. That the 
first respondent had rendered service for a statutory body in excess 
of six months and is, therefore, covered by the last part of clause 
(d) does not admit of any doubt and hence, she had a valid claim 
for securing 0.5 mark for experience.
23.	 The state policy, specifying that the individual must have worked 
on a post equal to or higher than the advertised posts in any of the
enumerated departments to secure marks for experience, also reflects 
the state’s belief that the experience in such departments is directly 
relevant to the advertised posts. It is not open for the University to 
now deny marks on the basis of a technical procedural deviation 
that the experience certificate was not issued by the University, 
but rather by the service provider. While we accept the contention 
raised by the University that the certificate was per se not issued by 
it, the fact that it was countersigned by the Head of the Department 
validates the first respondent’s claim that she had indeed gained 
certain experience which deserved to be given credit. 
24.	 We also do not agree with the contention of the University that the first 
respondent did not work on the post of Clerk and rather performed 
“office work”. The certificate awarded to her evidently mentions that 
the work she was required to undertake is the work of Clerk-cum-
Typist. Moreover, the certificate also mentions that her work was 
found quite satisfactory. The first respondent has also brought on 
record a memo by the Professor and Head of the Department which 
specifically acknowledges that she has been designated as a Clerk-
cum-Typist during her tenure.
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25.	 The first respondent, thus, cannot be denied the benefit of mark for 
experience merely because at the time of appointment as outsourced 
manpower, she was not appointed on a sanctioned post. 
26.	 The true thrust of every selection process ought to be to find out 
and select suitable candidates, having experience in the related work 
and fulfilling other criteria, from among eligible candidates and to go 
ahead with appointing the more meritorious of those found suitable. If 
indeed an individual without having any security of service performs 
up to the mark and receives commendation from none other than 
the Head of the Department, who must have closely watched his/her 
performance, it would occasion a failure of justice to exclude such 
individual for no better reason than that he/she did not work on a 
sanctioned post. If indeed such be the requirement, it had to be made 
explicitly clear in the Advertisement without any ambiguity so as not 
to generate false hopes in the minds of individuals aspiring for public 
employment. Any other view would be against both the principles of 
equality and non-arbitrariness enshrined in the Constitution as well 
as principles of natural justice. Tested on the touchstone of Articles 
14 and 16, the impugned decision of the University cannot sustain.
27.	 An underlying current throughout the Constitution is the theme of 
“social justice”. The Preamble, as well as Article 38 of
the Constitution, 
enjoins upon the State instrumentalities the duty to promote the 
welfare of the people by securing and protecting, as effectively as it 
may, a social order, in which justice – social, economic and political – 
shall inform all the institutions of national life and endeavour to 
eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. Whenever 
a conflict arises between the powerful and the powerless, social 
justice commands the Courts to lean in favour of the weaker and 
poorer sections where the scales are evenly balanced. 
28.	 In this case, for the foregoing reasons, refusal to award any mark 
for experience to the first respondent would go against the grain 
of the constitutional duty of ensuring equality and securing social 
justice for the deprived. 
Conclusion
29.	 Bound as we are to apply the Constitutional mandate prescribed 
in Articles 14 and 16 read with the preambular promise of securing 
social justice, we hold that non-grant of mark for experience to the 
first respondent was not proper and legal.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 
969
Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,  
Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.
30.	 For reasons somewhat different from those assigned by the High 
Court, we concur with the ultimate conclusion and hold that the 
impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High 
Court warrants no interference. The same is, thus, affirmed.
31.	 The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed without any order for costs. 
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain