GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THROUGH ITS SECRETARY, LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT & ANOTHER versus M/S K.L. RATHI STEELS LIMITED AND OTHERS
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 949, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Unknown
Segment: Issues
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 949 : 2024 INSC 454
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, 
Land and Building Department & Another 
v. 
M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
(Miscellaneous Application No. 414 of 2023) 
In 
Civil Appeal No. 11857 of 2016
17 May 2024
[Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose to resolve as to which of the two views on maintainability 
of the Review petitions-Hon’ble Judge presiding over the Bench 
ruling in favour of maintainability of the review petitions whereas 
the Hon’ble companion Judge on the Bench holding that the review 
petitions were not maintainable, is the correct view; can the review 
petitioners, on the basis of the pleadings in the review petitions, 
be considered persons aggrieved; whether the last sentence of 
paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] case grants ‘liberty’ to 
any party to seek a review of Pune Municipal Corporation case; if 
affirmative, did such ‘liberty’ survive after the decision in Manoharlal 
[5-Judge, lapse] case; can the RPs be held to be maintainable, 
giving due regard to the Explanation in r. 1 of Ord. XLVII, CPC 
vis-à-vis Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] case; if no, do the review 
petitions still deserve to be entertained on the other grounds urged 
therein; and if the miscellaneous applications are maintainable.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLVII r.1 – Application 
for review of judgment – Review petitions – In Govt. of NCT of 
Delhi v. K.L. Rathi
Steels Limited, split verdict by two Hon’ble 
judges – Hon’ble Judge presiding over the Bench ruled in 
favour of maintainability of the review petitions whereas 
the Hon’ble companion Judge on the Bench held that the 
review petitions were not maintainable – In view of difference 
of opinion, the review petitions referred to larger Bench to 
resolve which of the two views on maintainability of the review 
petitions is the correct view – Issue arose as regards if the 
review petitioners, on the basis of the pleadings in the review 
petitions, could be considered persons aggrieved; whether the
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last sentence of paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] case 
grants ‘liberty’ to any party to seek a review of Pune Municipal 
Corporation case; did such ‘liberty’ survive after the decision in 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] case; can the review petitions be 
held to be maintainable, giving due regard to the Explanation 
in Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC vis-à-vis Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] case and if no, do the review petitions still deserve to 
be entertained on the other grounds urged therein; and are 
the miscellaneous applications maintainable:
Held: No review is available upon a change or reversal of a 
proposition of law by a superior court or by a larger Bench of 
this Court overruling its earlier exposition of law whereon the 
judgment/order under review was based – Notwithstanding the 
fact that Pune Municipal Corporation case has since been wiped 
out of existence, the said decision being the law of the land when 
the Civil Appeals/Special Leave Petitions were finally decided, the 
subsequent overruling of such decision and even its recall, for that 
matter, would not afford a ground for review within the parameters 
of Ord. XLVII – Opinion expressed by the Hon’ble companion Judge 
on the said Division Bench is concurred with and this Court is not 
in agreement with the Hon’ble presiding Judge – Judgments and 
orders under review were right on the dates they were rendered, 
the review petitioners are not considered
as persons aggrieved who 
can maintain a review petition citing either Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] and Shailendra [3-Judge] – However, it is held that the 
review petitioners can yet be considered persons aggrieved – 
Last sentence of paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] case 
does not grant ‘liberty’ to any party to seek a review of Pune 
Municipal Corporation’s case – Review petitions cannot be held 
to be maintainable, giving due regard to the Explanation in r. 1 of 
Ord. XLVII vis-à-vis Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] case – Review 
petitions do not deserve to be entertained on the other grounds 
urged – Miscellaneous applications not maintainable – Under 
the circumstances, dismissal of the RPs and miscellaneous 
applications would have been logical – However, having regard to 
the disclosures made in course of progress of other proceedings 
before this Court, which followed immediately after judgment on 
the Review Petitions and miscellaneous applications was reserved, 
taking an overall and holistic view of the matter and in the light 
of the larger public interest certain directions issued – Time limit 
for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings in terms of the
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951
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
provisions contained in s. 24(2) of the 2013 Act is extended by 
a year whereupon compensation to the affected landowners may 
be paid in accordance with law – Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Act, 2013. [Paras 104, 117, 118, 119, 121] 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLVII r.1 – Review – 
Application for review of judgment – Review petitioners, on 
the basis of the pleadings in the review petitions, if could be 
considered persons aggrieved:
Held: In the eyes of an unsuspecting person, obviously the 
review petitioners are persons aggrieved because of declaration 
of land acquisition proceedings initiated by them as deemed to 
have lapsed – However, the dates on which the High Court had 
disposed of the writ petitions by declaring that the land acquisition 
proceedings were deemed to have lapsed, the law laid down by 
a binding authority-Pune Municipal Corporation’ case was holding 
the field at the relevant time and which the High Court applied in 
reaching its conclusions – This Court too had dismissed the Civil 
Appeals and the Special Leave Petitions bearing in mind that the 
issue raised was no longer res integra in view of Pune Municipal 
Corporation’s case – Since the judgments and orders under review 
were right on the dates they were rendered,
the review petitioners 
could not be considered as persons aggrieved who could maintain 
a review petition citing either Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] and 
Shailendra [3-Judge] case – However, the review petitioners can 
yet be considered persons aggrieved. [Paras 107, 108]
Review – Review petitions – Liberty to apply for Review – 
Last sentence of paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] 
case, if grants ‘liberty’ to any party to seek a review of Pune 
Municipal Corporation’ case – Such ‘liberty’ if, survived after 
the decision in Manoharlal [5- Judge, lapse] case – Plea of the 
review petitioners that paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] 
case irrespective of anything else, did grant them ‘liberty’ to 
apply for review, that availing such ‘liberty’ granted by this 
Court the Review Petitions were filed, and thus, the Review 
Petitions maintainable –
Held: Decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] case cannot come to the 
rescue of the review petitioners – Majority in Shailendra [3-Judge] 
case intended that if review petitions were pending on the date 
of the decision, seeking review of decisions which had been
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rendered relying on the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation 
case, such review petitions could be entertained and considered 
on the basis of the discussion in Shailendra [3-Judge] case 
declaring Pune Municipal Corporation’s case per incuriam and 
the decisions reviewed; nothing more, nothing less – Majority in 
Shailendra [3-Judge] case could not have and did, in fact, give a 
carte blanche to the land acquiring authorities to apply for review of 
decisions already made by courts relying on the decision in Pune 
Municipal Corporation case, even though the remedy of appeal or 
review had not been pursued earlier and without the successful 
landowners being on record before the court – Plea of review 
petitioners if accepted, would result in utter chaos and confusion 
in the justice delivery system apart from disturbing the principle 
of finality of judicial decisions – Phrase “open to be reviewed in 
appropriate cases” occurring in paragraph 217 of the decision in 
Shailendra [3-Judge] case could not have been perceived by the 
review petitioners as opening up an avenue for them to apply for 
review – Assuming arguendo that the submission touching ‘liberty’ 
granted by Shailendra [3-Judge] case is correct, the plinth thereof 
crumbles by reason of paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] case and, thus, is rendered non-existent. [Paras 78, 80, 83]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLVII r.1 Explanation – 
Review
– Application for review of judgment – Maintainability 
of the review peitions, giving due regard to the Explanation 
in r. 1 of Order XLVII, CPC vis-à-vis Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] case:
Held: An alternative remedy, carved out by r. 1 of Ord. XLVII, 
already exists which the review petitioners have pursued – 
Recourse to s. 151, CPC, would not be available, the object of 
which is to supplement and not replace the remedies provided 
under the CPC – Attempt of the review petitioners has been to 
draw inspiration from the ground “any other sufficient reason” 
appearing in r. 1 – No review is available upon a change or 
reversal of a proposition of law by a superior court or by a larger 
Bench of this Court overruling its earlier exposition of law whereon 
the judgment/order under review was based – Notwithstanding 
the fact that Pune Municipal Corporation’s case has since been 
wiped out of existence, the said decision being the law of the 
land when the Civil Appeals/Special Leave Petitions were finally 
decided, the subsequent overruling of such decision and even its
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
953
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
recall, for that matter, would not afford a ground for review within 
the parameters of Ord. XLVII – Plea that an aggrieved party can 
seek a review “for any other sufficient reason” and overruling 
of Pune Municipal Corporation’s case followed by recall thereof 
brings the claims of the review petitioners within the coverage of 
this particular ground cannot be accepted – Thus, review petition 
not maintainable. [Para 99, 100, 104-105]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLVII r.1 explanation – 
Review – Application for review of judgment – Review 
petitions not held to be maintainable, giving due regard to the 
explanation in r. 1 of Ord. XLVII vis-à-vis Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] case – Review petitions if could be entertained on the 
other grounds urged therein:
Held: Review petitions include under the caption ‘grounds’ 
reference to points which, according to the review petitioners, 
are sufficient to review the judgments/orders under review, apart 
from reference to the so-called ‘liberty’ granted by this Court 
vide Shailendra [3-Judge] case – ‘Grounds’ in each of the review 
petitions are factual in nature – In fact, the review petitioners 
have raised ‘Grounds’ without even averring what was pleaded in 
their counter affidavits filed before the High Court and what were 
the defences raised which, because of
non-consideration by this 
Court, could be said to amount to an error apparent on the face 
of the record – Review petitions are silent as to on which specific 
ground referrable to r. 1 of Order XLVII the review has been asked 
for – Even then, having considered such ‘Ground’, the judgments/
orders under review do not suffer from any error apparent on the 
face of the record – Review petitions could not be entertained on 
the other grounds urged therein. [Paras 109-111]
Miscellaneous applications – Maintainability – Miscellaneous 
applications seeking recall of certain orders of this Court, 
whereby some of the land acquisition proceedings were 
declared to have lapsed:
Held: Miscellaneous applications not maintainable – Said 
applications filed in the form of miscellaneous applications, 
were in essence akin to the review petitions as they also seek 
reconsideration of this Court’s orders – Since these miscellaneous 
applications also rely on Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] case as a 
ground for review/reconsideration of the previous orders, they 
are squarely covered by the analysis in this judgment – If it is
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held otherwise, the review petitioners would be permitting to do 
something indirectly that is seeking review through miscellaneous 
applications, which they could not have done directly i.e., seeking 
review through review petitions – This would open the law to 
being misused and lead to by-passing the legislative intent behind 
introduction of Explanation 1 to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC which 
cannot be permitted by the Court – This does not imply an absolute 
prohibition against filing of miscellaneous applications seeking 
‘clarification,’ ‘modification,’ or ‘recall’ following the initial disposal of 
a matter – Only the Court need to exercise prudence and ascertain 
whether such an application is, in substance, in the nature of a 
review petition – In case such an application is found to be nothing 
but a disguised version of a review petition, it ought to be treated 
in similar manner a review petition is treated. [Paras 113, 116]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLVII r.1 explanation – 
Review – Application for review of judgment – Maintainability 
of the Review peitions:
Held: Ord. XLVII does not authorize a review of a decree, which 
was right, on the happening of some subsequent event – In case 
of discovery of a new or important matter or evidence, such matter 
or evidence has to be one which existed at the time when the 
decree or order under review was passed or made – Resultantly, 
what the statute
prohibits, cannot be permitted by the Court – If 
permitted, the Court would be acting contrary to law  – What 
the Parliament has done, the Court cannot undo unless the law 
enacted by the Parliament is declared ultra vires – Vires of the 
Explanation not being under challenge during more than four 
decades of its existence, it is not for the Court to ignore the 
Explanation. [Paras 89, 90]
Constitution of India – Arts. 137 and 145 – Supreme Court 
Rules, 2013 – Ord. XLVII r.1 – Review – Review jurisdiction – 
Exercise of, by the Supreme Court:
Held: Power of the Supreme Court to review its own judgment and/
or order has its genesis in Arts. 137 and 145 of the Constitution 
read with Ord. XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – r. 1 of 
Ord. XLVII of the Rules lays down that no application for review 
in a civil proceeding would be entertained by this Court except 
on the ground mentioned in r. 1 Ord. XLVII CPC – Review in civil 
proceedings is governed by s. 114 CPC read with Ord. XLVII 
thereof – First and foremost condition that is required to be satisfied
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
955
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
by a party to invoke the review jurisdiction of the court, whose 
order or decree, as the case may be, is sought to be reviewed, 
is that the said party must be someone who is aggrieved by the 
order/decree – Meaning of words “person aggrieved” has to be 
ascertained with reference to the purpose and provisions of the 
statute – In one sense, the said words could correspond to the 
requirement of ‘locus standi’ in relation to judicial remedies – Need 
to ascertain the ‘locus standi’ of a review petitioner could arise, if 
he is not a party to the proceedings but claims the order or decree 
to have adversely affected his interest – In terms of Ord. XLVII of 
the 2013 Rules read with Ord. XLVII, CPC, a petition for review at 
the instance of a third party to the proceedings too is maintainable, 
the quintessence being that he must be aggrieved by a judgment/
order passed by this Court – Normally, in the context of r. 1 of Ord. 
XLVII, CPC, it is that person (being a party to the proceedings) 
suffering an adverse order and/or decree who, feeling aggrieved 
thereby, usually seeks a review of the order/decree on any of the 
grounds outlined therein – Circumstances where a review would 
lie are spelt out in clauses (a) to (c) but Ord. XVLII does not end 
with the circumstances – Review power u/s. 114 read with Order 
XLVII, CPC is
available to be exercised, subject to fulfilment of 
the conditions, on setting up by the review petitioner any of the 
following grounds: discovery of new and important matter or 
evidence; or mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; 
or any other sufficient reason. [Paras 34, 38, 39]
Constitution of India – Art. 142 – Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908 – ss. 114, 151, Order XLVII – Inherent powers – Review 
power – Distinction:
Held: Constitutional courts have inherent powers and this Court 
is also vested by Art. 142 of the Constitution with powers to pass 
such decree or make such order as is necessary to do complete 
justice in any cause or matter pending before it – Superior court, 
in exercise of its inherent power, is authorized to do justice that 
the cause before it demands – Upon satisfaction being reached 
by a court that a mistake has been committed by it, which is 
gross and palpable, it is not the law that the mistake has to be 
corrected by exercising the power of review only – Such power can 
be exercised, only if the person aggrieved by the order or decree 
applies therefor – On its terms, s. 114 CPC rw Ord. XLVII thereof 
does not conceive of a suo motu power of review being exercised
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by the court –Words “court on its own motion” are absent in the 
statutory provision – However, once the court is satisfied that a 
mistake committed by it needs to be rectified, it is always open to 
exercise the inherent powers to achieve the desired result – An 
order of court, be it judicial or administrative which is made per 
incuriam or in violation of certain Constitutional limitations or in 
derogation of principles of natural justice can always be remedied 
by the court ex debito justitiae – It can do so in exercise of its 
inherent jurisdiction in any proceeding pending before it without 
insisting on the formalities of a review application – To own up 
the mistake when judicial satisfaction is reached does not militate 
against its status or authority; perhaps, it would enhance both – 
On the other hand, when it involves invocation of the power of 
review and such power is traceable in a statute, which also has 
provisions regulating the exercise of the review power, it has to 
be held that the power of review is not an inherent power – If a 
power of review is statutorily conferred, it would be inappropriate, 
nay incompetent, for the court exercising review power to travel 
beyond the contours of the provision conferring the very power – 
Statutorily conferred power to review is not to be confused with 
the inherent power of the court to recall any order – Said power 
inheres in every court to prevent
miscarriage of justice or when a 
fraud has been committed on court or to correct grave and palpable 
errors – Furthermore, inherent powers of the court u/s. 151, CPC 
cannot be invoked if there exists a remedy made available by the 
CPC itself. [Para 92, 94, 96]
Precedents – Decision when, per incuriam – Shailendra 
[3-Judge] case, declaring Pune Municipal Corporation’ case 
per incuriam – Correctness:
Held: Shailendra [3-Judge] case declared Pune Municipal 
Corporation [3-Judge] case per incuriam without having the benefit 
of the caution sounded by the Constitution Bench in Vikramjit 
Singh’s case and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community’s 
case though it considered in excess of 250 decisions – There 
is absolutely no scope for a Bench of three-Hon’ble Judges to 
declare a previous decision of a Bench of co-equal strength per 
incuriam – Shailendra [3-Judge] case, at the highest, could have 
doubted Pune Municipal Corporation case and referred it for 
decision by a yet larger Bench but could not have, by any stretch 
of reasoning, declared it per incuriam. [Para 74]
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957
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
Precedents – Decision when, per incuriam – Shailendra 
[3-Judge] case, if per incuriam:
Held: There is absolutely no scope for a Bench of three-Hon’ble 
Judges to declare a previous decision of a Bench of co-equal 
strength per incuriam – Shailendra [3-Judge] case declared Pune 
Municipal Corporation [3-Judge]’s case per incuriam without having 
the benefit of the caution sounded by the Constitution Bench 
in Vikramjit Singh’s case and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra 
Community’s case – Shailendra [3-Judge] case, at the highest, could 
have doubted Pune Municipal Corporation case and referred it for 
decision by a yet larger Bench but could not have, by any stretch 
of reasoning, declared it per incuriam – Same logic applicable to 
this Bench too – Following, the Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra 
Community’s case, and also having regard to the sense of judicial 
discipline and propriety, this Court restrains itself from declaring 
Shailendra [3-Judge] case as per incuriam notwithstanding the 
firm conviction in this behalf – Shailendra [3-Judge] case is not 
held to be per incuriam. [Para 74]
Precedent – Precedent of a previous Bench – Maintenance of 
judicial discipline and propriety:
Held: Supreme Court of India, a revered institution, is one Court 
which operates through separate Benches owing to administrative 
exigency and
practical expedience – These Benches are essential 
to efficiently manage the diverse and voluminous cases that come 
before the Court and to discharge the solemn judicial duty for which 
the Court exists – Each Bench speaks for the Court as a whole, 
contributing to the intricate symphony of justice that defines the 
Supreme Court of India – Thus, the need arises for a Bench to be 
careful, cautious, and circumspect while being critical of a precedent 
of a previous Bench – Every Bench is supposed to bear in mind 
two overriding considerations – First is that of deference to the 
views expressed by a Bench in a primary decision and the other 
is maintaining judicial discipline and propriety if, upon threadbare 
consideration, it is found difficult to assent to the justification for 
such primary decision – In such an eventuality, dignity and decency 
would demand disagreement voiced by the subsequent Bench 
and reference of the matter to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for 
constitution of a larger Bench which is not a critical observations 
and adverse comments in respect of the primary decision rendered 
by a coordinate Bench. [Paras 69, 70]
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Judicial Discipline – Maintenance of:
Held: If a judgment and/or order has attained finality because a 
judicial remedy is either not available in law or even if available, 
such remedy has been lost, it is not open for a higher court of 
law by a judicial fiat either to create a remedy for the party on 
the losing side to pursue or to grant liberty to him to pursue an 
otherwise available remedy which by passage of time might have 
been lost-behind the back of a party who would obviously be se-
riously affected if he were compelled to contest the proceedings 
once again – Such an act of court would be without the authority 
of law. [Para 81] 
Case Law Cited
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra 
[2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1054 : (2005) 2 SCC 673 – followed.
Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club [2005] 1 
SCR 173 : (2005) 4 SCC 741; Jagmohan Singh v. State of Punjab 
[2008] 7 SCR 117 : (2008) 7 SCC 38 – distinguished.
Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Ors. 
[2023] 6 SCR 209 : (2023) SCC OnLine SC 288; Pune Municipal 
Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [2014] 1 SCR 783 :  
(2014) 3 SCC 183; Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra 
(2018) 1 SCC 733; Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra 
[2018] 2 SCR 1 : (2018) 3 SCC 412; State of Haryana v. GD 
Goenka Tourism Corporation Ltd. (2018) 3 SCC 585; Indore 
Development Authority v. Shyam Verma (2020) 15
SCC 342; State 
of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd.) (2018) 
SCC Online SC 3600; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal 
[2020] 3 SCR 1 : (2020) 8 SCC 129; Indore Development Authority 
v. Manoharlal [2019] 15 SCR 1085 : (2020) 6 SCC 304; Pune 
Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [2014] 1 
SCR 783 : (2020) SCC OnLine SC 1471; Chajju Ram v. Neki AIR 
(1922) PC 112; Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik [2006] 3 SCR 
87 : (2006) 4 SCC 78; BSNL v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 1; 
Neelima Srivastava v. State of UP [2021] 8 SCR 167 : (2021) SCC 
Online SC 610; Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad 
[2018] 14 SCR 239 : (2019) 18 SCC 586; Moran Mar Basselios 
Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [1955] 1 SCR 
520 : AIR (1954) SC 526; Syed Liaqat Husain v. Mohd. Razi, 
AIR (1944) Oudh 198; Lachhmi Narain Balu v. Ghisa Bihari, AIR
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
959
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
(1960) Punjab 43; Patel Naranbhai Jinabhai v. Patel Gopaldas 
Venidas, AIR (1972) Gujarat 229; Thadikulangara Pylee’s Son 
Pathrose v. Ayyazhiveettil Lakshmi Amma’s son Kuttan, AIR 
(1969) Kerala 186; Sudananda Moral v. Rakhal Sana XXXI CWN 
822 : AIR (1927) Cal 920; Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma 
Rao v. Raja Vellanki Venkatrama Rao, 7 LR (1899-1900) 27 IA 
197; Ravella Krishnamurthy v. Yarlagadda, AIR (1933) Madras 
485; Shanti Devi v. State of Haryana (1999) 5 SCC 703; Union 
of India v. Mohd Nayyar Khalil (2000) 9 SCC 252; Nand Kishore 
Ahirwar v. Haridas Parsedia (2001) 9 SCC 325; State of West 
Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta [2008] 10 SCR 4 : (2008) 8 SCC 
612; Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu [2014] 1 SCR 
308 : (2014) 5 SCC 75; Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy 
[2021] 1 SCR 681 : (2021) 3 SCC 1; A.C. Estates v. Serajuddin 
[1966] 1 SCR 235; Raja Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan 
[1971] Supp. 1 SCR 433 : (1971) 2 SCC 200; Kamlesh Verma v. 
Mayawati [2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8 SCC 320; S. Madhusudhan 
Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [2022] 11 SCR 42 : (2022) SCC 
OnLine SC 1034; Vikramjit Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 
(1992) Supp. 3 SCC 62; Shri Ram Sahu and Others v. Vinod 
Kumar Rawat [2020] 11 SCR 865 : (2021) 13 SCC 1; Indian 
Bank v. Satyam Fibres [1996] Supp. 4 SCR 464 : (1996) 5 SCC 
550; A.R. Antulay v.
R.S. Nayak [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 
SCC 602; Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji 
(1971) 3 SCC 844; Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1961] 
1 SCR 884 : (1961) 1 SCR 884; My Palace Mutually Aided Co-
operative Society v. B. Mahesh & Others (2022) SCC OnLine 
SC 1063; Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others 
[2000] Supp. 2 SCR 496 : (2000) 7 SCC 296; Supertech Ltd. v. 
Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association and Others 
[2021] 10 SCR 569 : (2023) 10 SCC 817 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Supreme 
Court Rules, 2013; Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Act, 2013; Code of Civil Procedure, 1877; Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1882; Limitation Act, 1963.
List of Keywords
Review petitions; Persons aggrieved; Shailendra [3-Judge] case; 
Pune Municipal Corporation’ case; Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
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case; Maintainability of the Review petitions; Change or reversal 
of a proposition of law by a superior court; Larger Bench of this 
Court overruling its earlier exposition of law; Public interest; Review 
jurisdiction; Review in civil proceedings; Locus standi; Judicial 
remedies; Liberty to apply for Review; Per incuriam; Principle 
of finality of judicial decisions; Discovery of a new or important 
matter or evidence; Inherent powers; Review power; Court on 
its own motion; Derogation of principles of natural justice; Ex 
debito justitiae; Alternative remedy; Subsequent overruling of 
decision; Miscellaneous applications; Recall of certain orders; Land 
acquisition; Compensation; Rightful claimant; Judicial discipline; 
Judicial propriety; Administrative exigency; Judicial duty; Precedent 
of a previous Bench.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Miscellaneous Application No. 
414 of 2023
In
Civil Appeal No. 11857 of 2016
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2016 of the Supreme 
Court of India in C.A. No.11857 of 2016
With
MA No.808 of 2023 In C.A. No.12239 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.882 of 2017 
In C.A. No. 11846 of 2016, MA No.159 of 2018 In C.A. No.11857 of 
2016, R.P.(C) No.396 of 2023 In C.A. No. 11857 of 2016, R.P.(C) 
No.409 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8511 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.410 of 2023 
In C.A. No. 8925 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.412 of 2023 In C.A. No. 12114 
Of 2016, R.P.(C) No.414 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8898 of 2016,
R.P.(C) 
No.416 of 2023 In C.A. No. 4599 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.419 of 2023 
In C.A. No. 10206 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.418 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8505 
of 2016, R.P.(C) No.425 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8929 of 2016, R.P.(C) 
No.428 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8545 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.1731 of 2023 
In C.A. No. 9598 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.429 of 2023 In C.A. No. 11256 
of 2016, R.P.(C) No.431 of 2023 In C.A. No. 9597 of 2016, R.P.(C) 
No.432 of 2023 In C.A. No. 11841 of 2016, Conmt.Pet.(C) No.735 of 
2018 In C.A. No. 11857 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.398 of 2023 In C.A. No. 
8529 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.399 of 2023 In C.A. No. 11857 of 2016, 
R.P.(C) No.400 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8899 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.401
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
961
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
of 2023 In C.A. No. 8527 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.402 of 2023 In C.A. 
No. 8547 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.403 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8952 of 2016, 
R.P.(C) No.405 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8935 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.406 
of 2023 In C.A. No. 8954 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.407 of 2023 In C.A. 
No. 9049 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.408 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8559 of 2016, 
R.P.(C) No.411 of 2023 In C.A. No. 9214 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.413 
of 2023 In C.A. No. 9595 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.397 of 2023 In C.A. 
No. 8909 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.417 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8921 of 2016, 
R.P.(C) No.420 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8904 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.421 
of 2023 In C.A. No. 9719 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.423 of 2023 In C.A. 
No. 8957 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.424 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8922 of 2016, 
R.P.(C) No.426 of 2023 In SlP(C) No. 17316 of 2016, R.P.(C) No.430 
of 2023 In C.A. No. 11854 of 2016, C.A. No.1522 of 2023 DiAry No. 
14831 of 2023, DiAry No. 15893 of 2023, R.P.(C) No. 422 of 2023 In 
C.A. No. 12046 of 2016, R.P.(C) No. 404 of 2023 In C.A. No. 12111 
of 2016, And R.P.(C) No. 415 of 2023 In C.A. No. 11853 of 2016
Appearances for Parties
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, K M Nataraj, A.S.Gs., Sanjay Poddar, Sanjiv 
Sen, Kailash Vasdev, Sanijiv Sen, Shyam Divan, V.Giri, Kailash 
Vasudev, Neeraj Kr Jain, Vivek Chib, Sr. Advs., Ms. Qurratulain, 
Govind Kumar, Pratish Goel, Anil Kumar Goyal, Ms. Niharika
Ahluwalia, Arpit Sharma, M/s. Saharya & Co., Nitin Mishra, Ishaan 
Sharma, Ms. Mitali Gupta, Ms. Shagun Sabharwal, Ms. Binu Tamta, 
Ravi Bharuka, Ashwani Kumar, Arpit Singh, Ms. Anjali Singh, Ms. 
Radha Gupta, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Ms. Purnima Singh, Rustam 
Singh Chauhan, Ms. BLN Shivani, Ashwin Joesph, Ms. Arti Singh, 
Ms. Shalini Chandra, Dinesh Kumar Garg, Abhishek Garg, Dhananjay 
Garg, Ms. Anshula L. Bakhru, Ishaan Tiwari, Chanakya Gupta, R. 
P. Bansal, Ms. Malvika Kapila, Ms. Tanwangi Shukla, Ms. Manika 
Tripathy, Ashutosh Kaushik, Atul Kumar, Ms. Sweety Singh, Ms. 
Archana Kumari, Rahul Pandey, N Balraj, Ms. Shambhavi Sharma, 
Ms. Prachi Bajpai, Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, Siddhesh Shirish Kotwal, Ms. 
Ana Upadhyay, Ms. Manya Hasija, Tejasvi Gupta, Pawan Upadhyay, 
Ms. Suveni Bhagat, B.V.Niren, Rakesh Kumar, M/s. Vedya Partners, 
Bharat Arora, Alok Gupta, T. N. Singh, Vikas Kumar Singh, Ms. 
Rajshree Singh, Dr. Sham Chand, D.K. Garg, Ms. Ishita Bist, Ankur 
Bansal, Davesh Bhatia, Sadre Alam, Vivek Sharma, Ms. Diksha Rai, 
Ms. Ragini Pandey, Arijit Dey, Anirudh Bakru, Ms. Akriti Chaubey, 
Ayush Puri, Ms. Anshula Laroiya, R Jawaharlal, Siddharth Bawa, Anuj
962
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Garg, Mayank Kshirsagar, Ms. Smita Maan, Rajiv Ghawana, T. V. S. 
Raghavendra Sreyas, Siddharth Vasudev, Neelaksh Sharma, Vikalp 
Chandela, Divyanshu Goyal, Mayank Kapoor, Ms. Divya Sharma, Ms. 
Jasmine Damkewala, Akhil Sachar, Ms. Vaishali Sharma, Sudeep 
Singh, Amit Malik, Bhavya Sethi, Akul Mahendru, Prakash Kumar, 
Sameer Malik, Ms. Neelam Singh, Rajiv Raheja, Ravi Ranjan, Abhinav 
Shrivastava, Sharath Nambiar, B K Satija, Kanu Agarwal, Raman 
Yadav, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Ms. Astha Tyagi, Nishit Agrawal, Ajay 
Marwah, Shivam Goel, Govind Kumar, Ms. Ramya S Goel, Akash 
Katiyar, Rahatdeep Sharma, Praveen Swarup, Ajay Vikram Singh, 
Mrs. Priyanka Singh, Pankaj Kumar, Omkar, Shubham Singh, Puneet 
Singh Bindra, Akshay Sharma, Simran Jeet, Rishabh Gupta, Sameer 
Sethi, Manish Paliwal, N.S. Vasisht, Jyoti Kataria Bajaj, Advs. for 
the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
TABLE OF CONTENTS*
A. PREFACE.......................................................................... 4
B. THE REFERENCE ............................................................ 5
C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY .................................................. 6
D. FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE REVIEW PETITIONS...... 13
E. THE SPLIT VERDICT........................................................ 15
F. SUBMISSIONS.................................................................. 19
G. QUESTIONS BEFORE
US............................................... 25
H. LAW ON REVIEW JURISDICTION................................... 26
I. 
PRECEDENTS CONSIDERING THE EXPLANATION..... 36
J. OTHER PRECEDENTS ON REVIEW............................... 41
K. ANALYSIS.......................................................................... 45
L. CONCLUSION..................................................................... 79
A.	
PREFACE
1.	
Day in and day out, as Judges of this Court, we are majorly addressed 
by learned counsel for the parties that the High Courts are either 
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
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963
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
right or wrong; here, in view of a split verdict rendered by an Hon’ble 
Division Bench (“said Division Bench”, hereafter) comprising two 
Hon’ble Judges of this Court, we have been addressed by the parties 
that our distinguished colleagues on the Bench have been right 
and wrong at the same time. To complete the task that has been 
entrusted to us, one of the opinions of the Hon’ble Judges comprising 
the said Division Bench has to be held incorrect unless, of course, 
harmonization of the two opinions, in any manner, is possible. In 
the process of considering the rival claims, the exercise of declaring 
one view as correct and the other incorrect or to harmonize the two 
views, have necessarily taken us back to the basics of the substantive 
and procedural laws regulating review jurisdiction of this Court. The 
effort, we have no hesitation to say, has been really educative as 
well as rewarding because the erudite arguments advanced from 
the Bar opened up a new vista of thinking to appreciate points of 
debate that emerged not only from the facts of the petitions before 
us but also points arising from certain connected matters, decided 
by this Court. We record our sincere appreciation for the valuable 
assistance rendered by the members of the Bar who had the occasion 
to address this larger Bench.
B.	
THE REFERENCE
2.	
The two Hon’ble Judges comprising the said Division Bench were 
considering a clutch of review petitions (“RPs”, hereafter), presented 
either by the Delhi Development Authority or the Government of 
NCT, Delhi, or the Land and Building Department, etc. (“review 
petitioners”, hereafter). The RPs urged review of the judgments/
orders passed by this Court on either Civil Appeals or Special Leave 
Petitions carried by the review petitioners from judgments and 
orders of the High Court of Delhi (“High Court”, hereafter), declaring 
land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition 
Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”, hereafter) as deemed to have lapsed under 
section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (“2013 Act”, 
hereafter). By the judgments/orders under review, the said Civil 
Appeals/Special Leave Petitions stood dismissed. The RPs having 
been listed before the said Division Bench, the respondents therein 
(i.e., landowners) had questioned the maintainability of the same 
by referring to the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, Code of 
Civil Procedure (“CPC”, hereafter). As noted earlier, a split verdict
964
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emerged in Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. K.L. Rathi Steels Limited 
and ors.,1 being the lead matter. Briefly put, the Hon’ble Judge 
presiding over the Bench ruled in favour of maintainability of the 
RPs whereas the Hon’ble companion Judge on the Bench disagreed 
and held that the RPs were not maintainable. An order was, thus, 
made by the Bench on 17th March, 2023 requiring the papers of the 
RPs to be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Such order 
has been the immediate reason for His Lordship to constitute this 
larger Bench and refer the RPs to resolve which of the two views 
on maintainability of the RPs is the correct view; hence, all such 
RPs are now before this larger Bench.
C.	
JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY
3.	
Before delving deep into the intricacies presented by the reference, 
it would be apposite to trace the judicial trajectory of proceedings 
in this Court on interpretation of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act that 
preceded the split verdict.
4.	
The 2013 Act was enforced with effect from 1st January, 2014. Soon 
thereafter, the interpretation of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act fell for 
consideration before this Court. A three-Judge Bench (cor. Hon’ble 
R.M. Lodha, Hon’ble Madan B. Lokur and Hon’ble Kurian Joseph, 
JJ.) in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal 
Solanki 2 explained, in the light of section 31 of the 2013 Act what 
the expression “compensation has not been paid” occurring in section
24(2) meant. The verb “paid” in the same sub-section was also 
explained. Perhaps, since no argument was advanced, the Bench 
did not have the occasion to consider whether the conjunction “or” 
between the expressions “compensation has not been paid” and 
“possession has not been taken” in sub-section (2) should be read 
as “or” as it is, or read as “and”. 
5.	
However, Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was doubted by a 
two-Judge Bench (cor. Hon’ble Arun Mishra and Hon’ble Amitava Roy, 
JJ.) in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [2-Judge] 3 
wherein it was of the opinion that the issue should be considered 
by a larger Bench.
1	
[2023] 6 SCR 209 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 288
2	
(2014) 3 SCC 183
3	
(2018) 1 SCC 733
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
965
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
6.	
Consequently, a Bench of three-Judges (cor. Hon’ble Arun Mishra, 
Hon’ble A.K. Goel and Hon’ble M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.) was 
constituted. The majority speaking through Hon’ble Arun Mishra, J. 
in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [3-Judge] 4 held 
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam but deemed it 
not necessary to refer to a larger Bench. Relevant excerpts from 
such decision are set out hereunder:
216. With respect to the decision of this Court in Pune 
Municipal Corpn. we have given deep thinking whether to 
refer it to further larger Bench but it was not considered 
necessary as we are of the opinion that Pune Municipal 
Corpn. has to be held per incuriam, inter alia, for the 
following reasons:
***
217. The decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn., 
which is related to Question (i) and other decisions 
following, the view taken in Pune Municipal Corpn. are per 
incuriam. … The decisions rendered on the basis of Pune 
Municipal Corpn. are open to be reviewed in appropriate 
cases on the basis of this decision.”
7.	
It is relevant to highlight that one of the Judges (Hon’ble M. 
Shantanagoudar, J.) partly dissented by recording the following 
observations: 
“295.2. …However, according to me the judgment in Pune 
Municipal Corpn. is not rendered per incuriam. In view of 
the above, the judgment in
Pune Municipal Corpn. may 
have to be reconsidered by a larger Bench, inasmuch 
as Pune Municipal Corpn. was decided by a Bench of 
three Judges.”
8.	
The aforesaid decision, as it was destined, gave rise to uncertainty 
rendered by two contradictory decisions by Benches of co-equal 
strength. Hence, a three-Judge Bench (cor. Hon’ble Madan B. 
Lokur, Hon’ble Kurian Joseph and Hon’ble Deepak Gupta, JJ.) in 
4	
(2018) 3 SCC 412
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State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited5 
while deferring a hearing as to whether the matter should at all 
be referred to a larger Bench directed that pending decision on 
the question of reference, the High Courts may not deal with any 
case relating to the interpretation of or concerning section 24 of 
the 2013 Act. 
9.	
Two orders dated 22nd February, 2018 passed by different Benches 
of co-equal strength followed. While a Bench (cor. Hon’ble A.K. 
Goel and Hon’ble U.U. Lalit, JJ.) by an order passed in Indore 
Development Authority v. Shyam Verma 6 directed the matters to 
be placed before an appropriate Bench the next day as per orders of 
the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, a similar order was passed by 
a coordinate Bench (cor. Hon’ble Arun Mishra and Hon’ble Amitava 
Roy, JJ.) vide its order in State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap 
Charitable Trust (Regd).7
10.	 A five-Judge Constitution Bench (cor. Hon’ble Arun Mishra, Hon’ble 
Indira Banerjee, Hon’ble Vineet Saran, Hon’ble M.R. Shah and 
Hon’ble S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.) was thereafter constituted. 
11.	 Ultimately, vide the judgment in Indore Development Authority v. 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse],8 the controversy was finally put to 
rest. The conclusions in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) are 
recorded in paragraphs 365 and 366. However, paragraph 365 being 
relevant for a decision here, is quoted hereunder: 
“365. Resultantly, the
decision rendered in Pune Municipal 
Corpn. is hereby overruled and all other decisions in 
which Pune Municipal Corpn. has been followed, are also 
overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential 
Assn. cannot be said to be laying down good law, is 
overruled and other decisions following the same are also 
overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra 
[3-judge], the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 
24(2) and whether ‘or’ has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ 
was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision 
5	
(2018) 3 SCC 585
6	
(2020) 15 SCC 342
7	
Civil Appeal No. 4835/2015
8	
[2020] 3 SCR 1 : (2020) 8 SCC 129
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
967
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the 
present judgment.”
12.	 Ironically, during the hearing, a controversy was raised by the 
respondents therein regarding the composition of the Bench in 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). A preliminary objection for 
recusal of the presiding Judge of the said Constitution Bench was 
sought on the ground that His Lordship was a part of the three-Judge 
Bench in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) wherein the correctness of 
the three-Judge Bench decision in Pune Municipal Corporation 
(supra) was doubted and by 2:1 majority, held to be per incuriam. It 
was contended that in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), His Lordship 
did not merely express reservations about the precedent i.e., Pune 
Municipal Corporation (supra), instead, His Lordship effectively 
annulled the judgment by asserting that it held no legal value, 
departing thereby from established principles of stare decisis and 
judicial discipline. Rejecting the aforesaid arguments, a detailed order 
was rendered by His Lordship in Indore Development Authority v. 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, recusal].9 The plea of recusal was declined, 
and it was observed that “accepting the plea of recusal would 
sound a death knell to the independent system of justice delivery 
where litigants would dictate participation of judges of their
liking in 
particular cases or causes”.10 While the lead opinion was delivered 
by the concerned Judge, the four other member Judges on the 
Bench delivered a joint concurring opinion. 
13.	 For completing the narrative, it is to be noted that the ball did not 
stop rolling with Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). By an order 
dated 16th July, 2020 in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand 
Misirimal Solanki [Recall Order] ,11 a three-Judge Bench (cor. 
Hon’ble Arun Mishra, Hon’ble Vineet Saran and Hon’ble M.R. Shah, 
JJ.) allowed several applications, thereby recalling the judgment in 
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).
14.	 What is, therefore, laid bare by these facts is that firstly, Pune 
Municipal Corporation (supra) was doubted in Shailendra 
[2-Judge] (supra), whereafter it was declared per incuriam 
9	
[2019] 15 SCR 1085 : (2020) 6 SCC 304
10	
(2020) 6 SCC 304, Para 45
11	
 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1471
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in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), followed by its overruling in 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and ultimately recalled on 16th 
July, 2020 in Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [Recall Order] (supra).
D.	
FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE REVIEW PETITIONS
15.	 Immediately after Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was 
decided, several writ petitions came to be instituted not only in 
the High Court but also in different high courts across the country 
seeking similar declaration, viz. owing to the requisite conditions 
mentioned in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act being met, land 
acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act stood lapsed. 
These RPs arise out of writ proceedings on the file of the High 
Court, which have since attained finality by reason of the judgments 
and orders under review. 
16.	 The facts are noticed from the Review Petition arising out of the Writ 
Petition12 instituted by the first respondent, K.L. Rathi Steels Limited, 
which is the lead matter. Relying upon the decision of this Court in 
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and similar line of decisions, 
the High Court vide its judgment and order dated 7th July, 2015, 
allowed the writ petition taking a view that the necessary ingredients 
of section 24(2), as interpreted by this Court, having been met, the 
acquisition proceedings under challenge therein are deemed to have 
lapsed. Aggrieved, the first respondent carried such judgment and 
order in a
Civil Appeal13 praying for it to be set aside. This Court, 
vide a common judgment and order dated 29th November, 2016 
concerning various civil appeals, dismissed the appeals and granted 
a period of one year to the appellants (review petitioners herein) 
to exercise liberty granted under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for 
initiation of acquisition proceedings afresh. 
17.	 Availing what they call is a ‘liberty’ granted by this Court in Shailendra 
[3-Judge] (supra), the appellants in the Civil Appeal (review 
petitioners herein) approached this Court seeking a review of the 
aforesaid judgment and order dated 29th November, 2016. Although 
the review petition suffered from substantial delay, the same stood 
condoned by the said Division Bench after the split verdict. 
12	
W.P. (C) No. 9200/2014
13	
Civil Appeal No. 11857/2016
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
969
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
18.	 It is relevant to mention at this stage that during the entire period 
of controversy, the observation in paragraph 217 of Shailendra 
[3-Judge] (supra) was construed as ‘liberty’ by not only the appellants 
in the Civil Appeal but also by other similarly placed appellants/
special leave petitioners leading them to approach this Court seeking 
review of all those decisions whereby, relying upon Pune Municipal 
Corporation (supra) and similar line of cases, it was declared that 
land acquisition proceedings were deemed to have lapsed under 
section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
E.	
THE SPLIT VERDICT
19.	 Heavy reliance was placed by the review petitioners before the said 
Division Bench on paragraphs 365 and 366 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] (supra) and paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). 
They also relied on Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji 
Cricket Club14 in support of the contention that a party for sufficient 
reason could urge the court to exercise its review jurisdiction. On 
behalf of the respondent landowners, various decisions were cited 
to contend that the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC would 
not permit a review of the judgments/orders under review. 
20.	 The presiding Judge allowed the review/recall petitions. Noting the 
specific overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)
and 
all the decisions which were rendered following it by Manoharlal 
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra), and referring to paragraph 217 of the 
decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), the Hon’ble Judge 
felt that “some meaning” had to be given to such observations. 
The contention of the respondents that the case falls under Rule 
1 of Order XLVII, CPC and the subsequent overruling of Pune 
Municipal Corporation (supra) cannot be a ground to review the 
earlier judgments and orders was rejected by reasoning that “here 
is a peculiar case where the earlier decision in Pune Municipal 
Corporation (supra), upon which reliance has been placed earlier, 
was itself doubted in the subsequent decision in the case of … 
and that the matter was referred to the Constitution Bench and 
thereafter the Constitution Bench has declared the law as above, 
more particularly paragraphs 365 and 366 of the judgment in the 
case of …”. 
14	
[2005] 1 SCR 173 : 2005 4 SCC 741
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21.	 Lastly, it was noted that in most of the cases that were sought to be 
reviewed, the lands had already been utilised by the beneficiaries of 
acquisition and in view of the orders passed declaring the deemed 
lapse of acquisition, “(T)he resultant effect would be to return 
the possession of the land/s which might have been used by the 
beneficiary authorities”. It was, therefore held that the RPs should 
be allowed in the larger public interest and the authorities should be 
given an opportunity to put forward their case afresh, “which shall 
be in the larger public interest”.
22.	 In contrast, the Hon’ble companion Judge while dissenting with the 
Hon’ble presiding Judge proceeded to examine the RPs on the basis 
of their very maintainability, in the light of the Explanation to Rule 1 of 
Order XLVII, CPC. Multiple decisions of this Court, on the parameters 
on which a review petition could be entertained by this Court, were 
examined and it was held that in view of the specific bar that the 
Explanation creates on taking into consideration the subsequent 
overruling of a determinative judgment, the RPs could not be held to 
be maintainable. Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) being good 
law as on date when the impugned judgments were rendered, it was 
held that the said impugned judgments could not be reviewed on 
the ground of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) being overruled, 
the course of action being expressly
prohibited by the Explanation to 
Rule 1 of Order XLVII. It was further held that the decisions relying 
on Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) had attained finality and 
were binding on the parties, and that the decision to review such 
final decisions would fly in the face of the public policy underlining 
the Explanation i.e., interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is in the 
interest of the State that there should be an end to a litigation). In 
thus rejecting the RPs on the ground of maintainability, the Hon’ble 
Judge was guided, inter alia, by decisions of this Court in Chajju 
Ram v. Neki15 and Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik16 wherein this 
Court had held that the grounds for review laid down by Rule 1 of 
Order XLVII, CPC do not include within their ambit, the rehearing 
of a dispute solely on the ground that the judgment on which the 
decision in the dispute had been relied upon, was overruled. Netaji 
Cricket Club (supra) was distinguished by observing that “exercise 
15	
AIR 1922 PC 112
16	
[2006] 3 SCR 87 : (2006) 4 SCC 78
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
971
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
of review jurisdiction in that case, based on a subsequent event was 
confined to purely the facts of the said case involving a controversy 
between rival Cricket Associations” and hence could not be applied 
as a general ratio. 
F.	
SUBMISSIONS
23.	 It is as a consequence of the split-verdict that the RPs were heard by 
the present three-Judge Bench to decide the point of maintainability 
of the RPs and to settle the ancillary issues raised in K.L. Rathi 
Steels Limited (supra). 
24.	 Though it may not be absolutely necessary to note the elaborate 
submissions advanced from the Bar by learned senior counsel/counsel 
for the parties since such submissions have been captured in the 
minutest detail in the split-verdict, for the sake of completeness, we 
shall briefly refer to the same. 
25.	 Ms. Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of 
the review petitioners (the Govt. of NCT, Delhi), with all the passion at 
her command, argued that the RPs are maintainable and advanced, 
in support of maintainability, the following submissions: 
a)	
The specific and categoric overruling of Pune Municipal 
Corporation (supra), and all other decisions in which Pune 
Municipal Corporation (supra) was followed, leads to the 
conclusion, in absolute terms, that land acquisition proceedings 
cannot be deemed to have
lapsed under section 24(2) unless 
the conditions enumerated in paragraph 366 of Manoharlal 
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra) are satisfied. 
b)	
Vide order dated 16th July, 2020 in Pune Municipal Corporation 
[Recall Order] (supra), the decision in Pune Municipal 
Corporation (supra) has been recalled and the position of 
law, as expounded therein, stands erased, leading the findings 
operating inter se the parties to cease. 
c)	
To dismiss the review/recall petitions at the threshold as not 
being maintainable will lead to a great injustice and undermine 
the public interest, particularly in the light of the ‘liberty’ granted 
by this Court in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). The RPs deserve 
to be decided on merits on a case-to-case basis on various 
parameters including the stage of litigation, the reason for
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incomplete acquisition by the State, stage of acquisition, status 
of possession and compensation, reasons for the delay in filing 
review/recall petitions, and the purpose of the acquisition.
d)	
Urging this Court to equally weigh equitable considerations 
involved in the matter, Ms. Bhati prayed that the RPs may not 
be dismissed at the threshold. 
26.	 Mr. Kailash Vasdev, learned senior counsel, representing the Delhi 
Development Authority contended that having regard to the peculiar 
facts and circumstances that have emerged since overruling of 
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) by Manoharlal [5-Judge, 
lapse] (supra), public interest indeed is one of the factors requiring 
paramount consideration and, on the anvil thereof, the opinion of 
the Hon’ble presiding Judge of the said Division Bench ought to 
be accepted. According to him, it is justice that the courts are duty 
bound to dispense and it would not amount to dispensing justice if 
the respondent landowners’ objection to the maintainability of the 
RPs, based on an overruled judgment, were upheld. 
27.	 Mr. Sen, learned senior counsel, also appearing on behalf of the 
Delhi Development Authority, apart from adopting the submissions 
of Ms. Bhati and Mr. Vasdev, asserted the maintainability of the RPs 
by submitting as follows:
a)	
Maintainability of the RPs ought not to be decided by a blanket 
order as the RPs have been filed not on the solitary ground of
overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) but in terms 
of the ‘liberty’ granted by this Court in Shailendra [3-Judge] 
(supra), which has the force of law under Article 141 of the 
Constitution. In arguendo, Article 137 comes to the rescue of 
the review petitioners granting them the liberty to file a review. 
b)	
Public interest must be given precedence over private interest 
in case of a conflict. The present lands are required for 
implementing residential schemes for low-income groups and 
significant construction had already been carried out in other 
acquired portions. 
c)	
The jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution ought to 
be invoked to ensure substantial justice considering the threat 
to public good involved in the matter.
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Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
28.	 Urging that the RPs are maintainable and deserve a hearing on 
merits, Mr. Sen urged that the RPs be held maintainable and heard 
on its own merits.
29.	 The landowner respondents, represented by Mr. Divan, Mr. Giri, Mr. 
Chib and Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel and by Ms. Swaraj, learned 
counsel, supported the opinion expressed by the Hon’ble companion 
Judge on the said Division Bench and urged this Bench to take the 
same recourse. The following submissions were advanced by them: 
a)	
The decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) does not 
come to the rescue of the review petitioners, it must operate 
prospectively and cannot reopen claims which have attained 
finality. 
b)	
BSNL v. Union of India17 and Neelima Srivastava v. State of 
U.P.18 were relied upon to support the contention that overruling 
of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) merely takes away 
the precedential value; it, however, does not affect the binding 
nature of a decision that has attained finality inter se the parties. 
c)	
This Court has limited jurisdiction available in review and in terms 
of the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC, overruling 
of earlier judgments would not constitute a ground for review. 
d)	
Further, the decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) did 
not, in any manner whatsoever, endorse the purported
liberty 
granted by Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) in paragraph 217 to 
the review petitioners to file the present RPs; on the contrary, 
it has been overruled. Moreover, Shailendra [3-Judge], having 
been decided by a Bench of co-equal strength, could neither 
have granted liberty to file the RPs, nor could have declared 
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam. 
e)	
Most of the RPs had been filed after periods of inordinate delay 
where no sufficient explanation had been provided for the same 
by the review petitioners. In any event, the present RPs were 
also filed belatedly after the purported liberty granted by this 
Court in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra).
17	
(2006) 3 SCC 1
18	
[2021] 8 SCR 167 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 610
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30.	 Praying that the RPs are not maintainable, the learned counsel urged 
this Court to dismiss them in limine.
G.	
QUESTIONS BEFORE US
31.	 The parties have been heard and the materials on record perused, 
in the light of the law regulating exercise of power by the Supreme 
Court to review its earlier judgment/order under the extant laws. 
We are of the opinion that on the rival contentions, the following 
questions arise for answers on the facts of these RPs:
a)	
Can the review petitioners, on the basis of the pleadings in the 
RPs, be considered persons aggrieved? 
b)	
Whether the last sentence of paragraph 217 of Shailendra 
[3-Judge] (supra) grants ‘liberty’ to any party to seek a review 
of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)?
c)	
If the answer to (b) is in the affirmative, did such ‘liberty’ survive 
after the decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra)?
d)	
Can the RPs be held to be maintainable, giving due regard 
to the Explanation in Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC vis-à-vis 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra)? 
e)	
If the answer to (d) is in the negative, do the RPs still deserve 
to be entertained on the other grounds urged therein? 
f)	
Are the miscellaneous applications maintainable? 
32.	 While answering the aforesaid questions, we feel obliged and, hence, 
intend to address certain ancillary issues too. 
H.	
LAW ON REVIEW JURISDICTION
33.	 The law regulating exercise of review jurisdiction by the Supreme
Court is so well-settled that any detailed discussion would, in the 
first place, seem to be unnecessary. However, we cannot overlook 
the vociferous arguments on behalf of both the review petitioners 
and the respondents that the Hon’ble Judges of the said Division 
Bench have erred in their respective appreciation of the law relating to 
exercise of review jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. In view thereof 
and particularly in the light of the authorities considered in the split 
verdict and those which have been cited in course of the debate 
that unfolded before us, calls for a relook at the relevant provisions
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Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
and the precedents bearing in mind the respective approaches of 
the Hon’ble Judges in the split verdict: one of them has given public 
interest paramount importance, no matter what the law ordains; 
while the other has stuck to the law, no matter what public interest 
demands. 
34.	 Power of the Supreme Court to review its own judgment and/or 
order has its genesis in Articles 137 and 145 of the Constitution read 
with Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (“2013 Rules”, 
hereafter). Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the 2013 Rules, in no uncertain 
terms, lays down that no application for review in a civil proceeding 
will be entertained by this Court except on the ground mentioned in 
Rule 1 Order XLVII, CPC. Review in civil proceedings is governed 
by section 114 of the CPC read with Order XLVII thereof. It would, 
therefore, not be inapt to read section 114 and Rule 1 of Order 
XLVII, CPC once again:
114. Review.— Subject as aforesaid, any person considering 
himself aggrieved—
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by 
this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by 
this Code, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, 
may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed 
the decree or made the order, and
the Court may make such 
order thereon as it thinks fit.
ORDER XLVII
1. Application for review of judgment.— (1) Any person 
considering himself aggrieved—
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but 
from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or 
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not
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within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the 
time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account 
of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, 
or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of 
the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for 
a review of judgment of the Court which passed the decree or 
made the order.
35.	 Read in conjunction with section 114 of the CPC, Order XLVII Rule 
1 thereof has three broad components which need to be satisfied 
to set the ball for a review in motion – (i) ‘who’, means the person 
applying must demonstrate that he is a person aggrieved; (ii) 
‘when’, means the circumstances a review could be sought; and 
(iii) ‘why’, means the grounds on which a review of the order/decree 
ought to be made. Finally, comes the ‘what’, meaning thereby the 
order the Court may make if it thinks fit. Not much attention is 
generally required to be paid to components (i) and (ii), because 
of the overarching difficulties posed by component (iii). However, in 
deciding this reference, component (i) would also have a significant 
role apart from the Explanation inserted by way of an amendment 
of the CPC. 
36.	 Let us now briefly attempt a deeper analysis of the provision. We 
are conscious that the provisions relating to review have been 
considered in a catena of decisions, but the special features of these 
RPs coupled with the fact
that two Hon’ble Judges of this Court 
have delivered a split verdict make it imperative for us not to miss 
any significant aspect. 
37.	 A peep into the legislative history would reveal that Rule 1 of Order 
XLVII, CPC, which is part of the First Schedule appended thereto, 
bears very close resemblance to its predecessor statutes, i.e., Section 
623 of the Codes of Civil Procedure of 1877 and 1882. The solitary 
legislative change brought about in 1976 in Order XLVII, CPC resulted 
in insertion of an Explanation at the foot of Rule 1, which is at the 
heart of the controversy here. 
38.	 The first and foremost condition that is required to be satisfied by a 
party to invoke the review jurisdiction of the court, whose order or 
decree, as the case may be, is sought to be reviewed, is that the said 
party must be someone who is aggrieved by the order/decree. The
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Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
words “person aggrieved” are found in several statutes; however, the 
meaning thereof has to be ascertained with reference to the purpose 
and provisions of the statute. In one sense, the said words could 
correspond to the requirement of ‘locus standi’ in relation to judicial 
remedies. The need to ascertain the ‘locus standi’ of a review petitioner 
could arise, if he is not a party to the proceedings but claims the 
order or decree to have adversely affected his interest. In terms of 
Order XLVII of the 2013 Rules read with Order XLVII, CPC, a petition 
for review at the instance of a third party to the proceedings too is 
maintainable, the quintessence being that he must be aggrieved by 
a judgment/order passed by this Court. This is what has been held 
in Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad.19 That is, 
of course, not the case here. Normally, in the context of Rule 1 of 
Order XLVII, CPC, it is that person (being a party to the proceedings) 
suffering an adverse order and/or decree who, feeling aggrieved 
thereby, usually seeks a review of the order/decree on any of the 
grounds outlined therein. The circumstances where a review would 
lie are spelt out in clauses (a) to (c).
39.	 Order XVLII does not end with the circumstances as section 114, 
CPC, the substantive provision, does. Review power under section
114 read with Order XLVII, CPC is available to be exercised, subject 
to fulfilment of the above conditions, on setting up by the review 
petitioner any of the following grounds:
(i)	
discovery of new and important matter or evidence; or
(ii)	 mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
(iii)	 any other sufficient reason. 
40.	 Insofar as (i) (supra) is concerned, the review petitioner has to show 
that such evidence (a) was actually available on the date the court 
made the order/decree, (b) with reasonable care and diligence, it 
could not be brought by him before the court at the time of the order/
decree, (c) it was relevant and material for a decision, and (d) by 
reason of its absence, a miscarriage of justice has been caused in 
the sense that had it been produced and considered by the court, 
the ultimate decision would have been otherwise. 
19	
[2018] 14 SCR 239 : (2019) 18 SCC 586
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41.	 Regarding (ii) (supra), the review petitioner has to satisfy the court 
that the mistake or error committed by it is self-evident and such 
mistake or error can be pointed out without any long-drawn process 
of reasoning; and, if such mistake or error is not corrected and is 
permitted to stand, the same will lead to a failure of justice. There 
cannot be a fit-in-all definition of “mistake or error apparent on the 
face of the record” and it has been considered prudent by the courts 
to determine whether any mistake or error does exist considering 
the facts of each individual case coming before it.
42.	 With regard to (iii) (supra), we can do no better than refer to the 
traditional view in Chhajju Ram (supra), a decision of a Bench of 
seven Law Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It 
was held there that the words “any other sufficient reason” means 
“a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified 
immediately previously”, meaning thereby (i) and (ii) (supra). Notably, 
Chhajju Ram (supra) has been consistently followed by this Court in 
a number of decisions starting with Moran Mar Basselios Catholics 
v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius.20
43.	 There are recent decisions of this Court which have viewed ‘mistake’ 
as an independent ground to seek a review. Whether or not such 
decisions express the correct view need not detain us since the 
review here is basically prayed in
view of the subsequent event.
44.	 As noted above, the Explanation in Rule 1 Order XLVII was inserted 
in 1976. It reads:
“Explanation.— The fact that the decision on a question 
of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has 
been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of 
a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground 
for the review of such judgment.”
45.	 The above insertion was preceded by a recommendation contained 
in the 54th report of the Law Commission. The decisions in Syed 
Liaqat Husain v. Mohd. Razi,21 Lachhmi Narain Balu v. Ghisa 
Bihari 22 and Patel Naranbhai Jinabhai v. Patel Gopaldas 
20	
[1955] 1 SCR 520 : AIR 1954 SC 526
21	
AIR 1944 Oudh 198
22	
AIR 1960 Punjab 43
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Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
Venidas 23 held that the fact that the view of the law taken in 
a judgment has been altered by a subsequent decision of a 
superior court in another case, is not a ground for review of 
such judgment. On the contrary, in Thadikulangara Pylee’s Son 
Pathrose v. Ayyazhiveettil Lakshmi Amma’s son Kuttan 24 law 
was laid down that the fact that a subsequent binding authority 
took a different view of the law from what had been taken in the 
decision sought to be reviewed, was a good ground for review. 
Upon consideration of these decisions, the Law Commission had 
recommended as follows:
“Recommendation
It is felt that the position should be settled on this point. 
If the law is altered by judicial pronouncement of a higher 
court, the party affected should not, in our opinion, have 
a right to get the judgment reviewed. 
An amendment adopting the Kerala view will create a 
serious practical problem. It will keep alive the possibility 
of review indefinitely. Under the Limitation Act, the period of 
limitation for an application for review has been prescribed, 
but the delay can, ‘for sufficient cause’, be condoned by 
the Court under that Act. Where an application for review 
is made on the ground of a later binding authority, the party 
applying for review will usually be able to plead ‘sufficient 
cause’, because it is only
when the superior court has 
made a pronouncement that he will have a ground for 
review; and he can, therefore, argue with considerable 
force that there was ‘sufficient cause’ for his not making 
the application earlier.
Recommendation
We, therefore, recommend that the following Explanation 
should be added below Order 47/XLVII Rule 1.” 25
23	
AIR 1972 Gujarat 229
24	
AIR 1969 Kerala 186
25	
“Explanation.— The fact that the view taken on a question of law in the judgment of a Court has been 
reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in another case is not a ground for 
review of the judgment.”
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46.	 A comparative study of the terms of the Explanation recommended 
by the Law Commission and the Explanation, which ultimately had 
the approval of the Parliament and came to be inserted in Order 
XLVII are not in variance except alteration of some words.
47.	 It is of some worth to note that even prior to the decisions of the Oudh, 
Punjab and Gujarat High Courts considered by the Law Commission 
in its 54th report, two chartered high courts of the country had taken 
the same view. The High Court at Calcutta way back on 15th February, 
1927 in Sudananda Moral v. Rakhal Sana ,26 considering the decision 
of the Privy Council in Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. 
Raja Vellanki Venkatrama Rao ,27 opined that reversal of a relied-on 
decision subsequent to the decree in the suit was not a ground for 
review of the judgment. Also, the High Court of Madras in Ravella 
Krishnamurthy v. Yarlagadda 28 observed that for review on the 
ground of discovery of new and important matter, such matter must 
be in existence at the date of the decree. The exposition of law on the 
point, therefore, dates back to almost a quarter and a century back. 
I.	
PRECEDENTS CONSIDERING THE EXPLANATION
48.	 There are a few decisions of this Court where the Explanation to 
Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC has since been considered.
49.	 The earliest decision is Shanti Devi v. State of Haryana 29 where 
the Court rejected the review petition by holding
that the contention 
that the judgment sought to be reviewed was overruled in another 
case subsequently is no ground for reviewing the said decision. 
Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
clearly rules out such type of review proceedings.
50.	 Reference may next be made to the decision in Union of India v. 
Mohd Nayyar Khalil.30 There, the impugned order had followed 
a three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court. Such judgment was 
admittedly pending consideration before a Constitution Bench. Taking 
note of such facts, it was held that:
26	
XXXI CWN 822 : AIR 1927 Cal 920
27	
LR (1899-1900) 27 IA 197
28	
AIR 1933 Madras 485
29	
(1999) 5 SCC 703
30	
(2000) 9 SCC 252
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Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
“2. *** Even if the question regarding the legality of the said 
three-Judge Bench decision is pending scrutiny before the 
Constitution Bench the same is not relevant for deciding 
the review petition for two obvious reasons — firstly, this 
was not pointed out to the Bench which decided the civil 
appeal; and secondly, by the time the impugned order was 
passed the three-Judge Bench judgment had not been 
upset and even in future if the Constitution Bench takes a 
contrary view it would be a subsequent event which cannot 
be a ground for review as is clear from the explanation to 
Order 47 Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure ***”.
(emphasis supplied)
The principle, thus, laid down is that a decision being upset in the 
future would be a subsequent event which could not be a ground 
to seek review.
51.	 In Nand Kishore Ahirwar v. Haridas Parsedia,31 a Bench of three 
Hon’ble Judges, while dismissing the review petitions before it, 
made pertinent observations reaching out to the very core of the 
said Explanation. This Court observed that simply because there 
has been a Constitution Bench decision, passed in the aftermath of 
the judgment impugned, would be no ground for a review of the said 
judgment. It also went on to observe that a reference to a Constitution 
Bench would stand on a still weaker footing (emphasis
supplied).
52.	 The question arising for decision in State of West Bengal v. Kamal 
Sengupta 32 was whether a tribunal established under section 4 of 
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision on 
the basis of a subsequent order/decision/judgment rendered by a 
coordinate or larger Bench or any superior court or on the basis of 
subsequent event/development. It was contended on behalf of the 
State that any subsequent decision on an identical or similar point 
by a coordinate or larger Bench or even change of law cannot be 
made the basis for recording a finding that the order sought to be 
reviewed suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. 
After considering a host of decisions with a fine-tooth comb, the 
31	
(2001) 9 SCC 325 
32	
[2008] 10 SCR 4 : (2008) 8 SCC 612
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Court went on to cull out the principles of review in paragraph 35 of 
the decision which is extracted hereunder:
“35. The principles which can be culled out from the 
abovenoted judgments are:
(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision 
under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the 
power of a civil court under Section 114 read with Order 
47 Rule 1 CPC.
(ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the 
grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise.
(iii) The expression ‘any other sufficient reason’ appearing 
in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of 
other specified grounds.
(iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be 
discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be 
treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying 
exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f).
(v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in 
the guise of exercise of power of review.
(vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 
22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment 
of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a 
superior court.
(vii) While considering an application for review, the tribunal 
must confine its adjudication with reference to material 
which was available at the time of initial decision. The 
happening of some subsequent event or development 
cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/
decision as
vitiated by an error apparent.
(viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence 
is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review 
has also to show that such matter or evidence was not 
within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due 
diligence, the same could not be produced before the 
court/tribunal earlier.”
(emphasis supplied)
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Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
53.	 This Court, in Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu,33 has 
read the Explanation as follows: 
“52. *** The Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of Code 
of Civil Procedure 1908 provides that if the decision on 
a question of law on which the judgment of the court is 
based, is reversed or modified by the subsequent decision 
of a superior court in any other case, it shall not be a 
ground for the review of such judgment. Thus, even an 
erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the court to 
undertake review, as the first and foremost requirement 
of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review 
of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the 
face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality 
attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.”
54.	 The final one is a decision of the Constitution Bench in Beghar 
Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy.34 The majority was of the following 
view:
“2. The present review petitions have been filed against 
the final judgment and order dated 26-9-2018. We have 
perused the review petitions as well as the grounds in 
support thereof. In our opinion, no case for review of 
judgment and order dated 26-9-2018 is made out. We 
hasten to add that change in the law or subsequent 
decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself 
cannot be regarded
as a ground for review. The review 
petitions are accordingly dismissed.”
J.	
OTHER PRECEDENTS ON REVIEW
55.	 Precedents on the aspect of review are legion and we do not wish 
to burden this judgment by tracing all the decisions. However, only 
a few that were considered in the split verdict, some which were 
cited by the parties before us and some that have emerged on our 
research on the subject and considered relevant, are discussed/
referred to here. 
33	
[2014] 1 SCR 308 : (2014) 5 SCC 75
34	
[2021] 1 SCR 681 : (2021) 3 SCC 1
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56.	 Two of these decisions, viz. A.C. Estates v. Serajuddin 35 and 
Raja Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan 36 were rendered prior 
to introduction of the Explanation in Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC. 
Significantly, even without the Explanation, substantially the same 
view was expressed.
57.	 In A.C. Estates (supra), a bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this 
Court, while dismissing the civil appeal and upholding the order of 
the High Court at Calcutta, held as follows:
“Our attention in this connection is drawn to Section 29(5) 
of the Act which gives power to the Controller to review 
his orders and the conditions laid down under Order 47 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. But this cannot be a case of 
review on the ground of discovery of new and important 
matter, for such matter has to be something which exist 
at the date of the order and there can be no review of an 
order which was right when made on the ground of the 
happening of some subsequent event (see Rajah Kotagiri 
Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Raja Vellanki Venkatrama 
Rao 37).
(emphasis supplied)
58.	 The next is the decision of a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this 
Court in Raja Shatrunji (supra). While dismissing an appeal and 
upholding the order of the Allahabad High Court, reference was made 
to “any other sufficient reason” in Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC and 
the decision in Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao (supra) 
whereupon it was held:
“13. *** the
principles of review are defined by the Code 
and the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ in Order 47 
of the Code would mean a reason sufficient on grounds 
analogous to those specified immediately previously in 
that order. The grounds for review are the discovery of 
new matters or evidence which, after the exercise of due 
diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be 
35	
[1966] 1 SCR 235
36	
[1971] Supp. 1 SCR 433 : (1971) 2 SCC 200
37	
LR (1899-1900) 27 IA 197
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Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
produced by him at the time when the decree was passed 
or order made, or the review is asked for on account of 
some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. 
In Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Rajah Vellanki 
Venkatrama Rao Lord Davey at p. 205 of the Report said 
that ‘the section does not authorise the review of a decree 
which was right when it was made on the ground of the 
happening of some subsequent event’.”
(emphasis supplied)
59.	 What was laid down in Netaji Cricket Club (supra), upon reading 
Order XLVII, CPC, can be better understood in the words of the 
Hon’ble Judge authoring the judgment. The relevant passages are 
quoted hereunder: 
“88. *** Section 114 of the Code empowers a court to 
review its order if the conditions precedent laid down therein 
are satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not 
prescribe any limitation on the power of the court except 
those which are expressly provided in Section 114 of the 
Code in terms whereof it is empowered to make such 
order as it thinks fit.
89. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an 
application for review. Such an application for review 
would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new 
and important piece of evidence or when there exists an 
error apparent on the face of the record but also if the 
same is
necessitated on account of some mistake or for 
any other sufficient reason.
90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would 
include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may 
also call for a review of the order. An application for review 
would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason 
therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would 
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The 
words ‘sufficient reason’ in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code 
are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law 
by a court or even an advocate. An application for review 
may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine ‘actus 
curiae neminem gravabit’.”
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In the next paragraph, Their Lordships quoted a portion of paragraph 
32 from the Larger Bench decision in Moran Mar Basselios Catholics 
(supra) but held that “the said rule is not universal”.
60.	 Netaji Cricket Club (supra) was followed in Jagmohan Singh v. 
State of Punjab.38 It was held there that Rule 1 of Order XLVII, 
CPC does not preclude the High Court or a court to take into 
consideration any subsequent event and that if imparting of justice in 
a given situation is the goal of the judiciary, the court may take into 
consideration (of course on rare occasions) the subsequent events. 
61.	 This Court, in paragraph 20 of the decision in Kamlesh Verma 
v. Mayawati,39 after surveying previous authorities and following 
Chhajju Ram (supra) and Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra) 
summarized the principles of review and illustrated when a review 
would be and would not be maintainable. Despite the observation 
in Netaji Cricket Club (supra) limiting Moran Mar Basselios 
Catholics (supra), Kamlesh Verma (supra) thought it fit to agree 
with the latter decision. 
62.	 Recently, in S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy,40 a 
Bench of three Hon’ble Judges has accepted the meaning of the 
ground “for any other sufficient reason” as explained in Chhajju Ram 
(supra), Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra) and Kamlesh 
Verma (supra).
K.	
ANALYSIS
63.	 Before answering question (a), we take up questions (b), (c) and (d)
first with (b) and (c) together for answers. 
64.	 It was with more than sufficient intensity, force, vehemence and 
seriousness that learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the 
review petitioners argued, based on their understanding of paragraph 
217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) that, irrespective of anything 
else, the same did grant them ‘liberty’ to apply for review, that availing 
such ‘liberty’ granted by this Court the RPs were filed, and that this 
Bench being of co-equal strength, instead of taking a different view, 
ought to read the last sentence of paragraph 217 in the manner they 
38	
[2008] 7 SCR 117 : (2008) 7 SCC 38
39	
[2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8 SCC 320
40	
[2022] 11 SCR 42 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
987
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
(learned senior counsel) understood it, and to accept the same for 
holding the RPs maintainable. 
65.	 For reasons more than one, the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] 
(supra) cannot come to the rescue of the review petitioners.
66.	 The first reason is that the submission of a ‘liberty’ being granted 
by Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) makes it abundantly clear that but 
for such ‘liberty’, the review petitioners would not have even thought 
of applying for review since the law on the point was no longer res 
integra. It is, therefore, an admission on their part that the judgments 
and orders under review, as on the dates they were delivered/made, 
were neither erroneous (which is a possible ground for appeal, if an 
appeal were allowed by law) nor suffering from any error apparent 
on the face of the record (a possible ground for review). Therefore, 
merely based on Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), a subsequent event, 
the review jurisdiction of this Court which is a limited jurisdiction 
could not have been invoked.
67.	 Next, we need to consider whether the last sentence of paragraph 217 
of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) can at all be read and understood to 
have granted a ‘liberty’ of the nature claimed by the review petitioners. 
68.	 This Court sitting in a combination of five-Hon’ble Judges in Vikramjit 
Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh 41 had the occasion to consider 
an appeal where the facts were quite alike. A learned Judge 
(Varma, J.) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had granted bail to 
the appellant. While the appellant was enjoying the concession of 
bail and such order had not been challenged, a co-accused moved 
for bail. Noticing the earlier order granting bail in favour of the 
appellant, another learned Judge (Gupta, J.) in his order observed 
that the appellant did not deserve to be enlarged on bail, and that it 
was “a fit case where the State should apply for cancellation of bail 
of all the accused persons”. In view of this observation, the State 
filed a petition for cancellation of the bail order passed by Varma, 
J. In this application, neither any additional fact was stated nor any 
allegation was made against the appellant which could be relevant 
for cancellation of the earlier bail order. The prayer for cancellation 
was founded only on the observations in the order of Gupta, J., 
41	
1992 Supp (3) SCC 62
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which was verbatim quoted in the application. The same was listed 
before Gupta, J. who by the impugned order cancelled the earlier 
order of Varma, J. and while so doing made strong remarks against 
grant of bail in cases like the one under consideration. This order of 
cancellation was carried in appeal before this Court. The Constitution 
Bench observed that no bench can comment on the functioning of 
a co-ordinate bench of the same court, much less sit in judgment 
as an appellate court over its decision (emphasis supplied). While 
allowing the appeal, it was further observed that the State not having 
filed any appeal against the order of Varma, J. granting bail to the 
appellant, the same had become final so far as the high court was 
concerned and that in the absence of any allegation of misuse of 
the concession of bail by the appellant, Gupta, J. had no authority to 
upset the earlier order of Varma, J (emphasis supplied). In conclusion, 
it was also observed as follows:
“2. *** That which could not be done directly could also 
not be done indirectly. Otherwise a party aggrieved by 
an order passed by one bench of the High Court would 
be tempted to attempt to get the matter reopened before 
another bench, and there would not be any end to such 
attempts. Besides, it was not consistent with the judicial 
discipline which must be maintained by courts both in the 
interest of administration of justice by assuring the
binding 
nature of an order which becomes final, and the faith of 
the people in the judiciary ***.”
69.	 We do believe that what was said of a high court in this decision, 
would squarely apply to this Court. The Supreme Court of India, a 
revered institution, is one Court which operates through separate 
Benches owing to administrative exigency and practical expedience. 
These Benches are essential to efficiently manage the diverse and 
voluminous cases that come before the Court and to discharge the 
solemn judicial duty for which the Court exists. It would be an 
erroneous perception to regard this division as a cause for din within 
the Court. When faced with a peculiar circumstance as before us 
presently, one might just be compelled to ask whether one voice of 
this Court is louder than another? The answer to this is that this 
Court, as one, might speak through a singular voice or several voices 
as the occasion might demand. In any event, these voices, though 
marked by their individual tone(s), enjoin to form a collective melody,
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989
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
akin to a choir of justice. It cannot be forgotten that no matter the 
strength, all these voices bear the symbol of the Supreme Court of 
India. While we may have our specific functions and jurisdictions, 
the collective objective is to find our bearings towards धर्मम (duty) and 
न्यााय (justice). In this sense, it can be said that each Bench speaks 
for the Court as a whole, contributing to the intricate symphony of 
justice that defines the Supreme Court of India. 
70.	 It is here that the need arises for a Bench to be careful, cautious, 
and circumspect while being critical of a precedent of a previous 
Bench. Every Bench is supposed to bear in mind two overriding 
considerations. The first is that of deference to the views expressed 
by a Bench in a primary decision and the other is maintaining judicial 
discipline and propriety if, upon threadbare consideration, it is found 
difficult to assent to the justification for such primary decision. In such 
an eventuality, dignity and decency would demand disagreement 
voiced by the subsequent Bench and reference of the matter to the 
Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench in a tone 
that does not sound like critical observations and adverse comments 
in respect of the primary decision rendered by a coordinate Bench.
71.	 Here too, the grounds of the RPs
refer to the ‘liberty’ granted by the 
decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). The question, as noted 
above, is whether the Bench while deciding Shailendra [3-Judge] 
(supra) could have granted any ‘liberty’ to the review petitioners to 
apply for review, assuming that the words “open to be reviewed in 
appropriate cases” did mean ‘liberty to apply’.
72.	 Prior to attempting an answer to that question, it would also be 
apposite to note what the dicta in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra 
Community v. State of Maharashtra 42 is, as laid down by another 
Constitution Bench of this Court. The legal position summed up in 
paragraph 12 reads as follows:
“12. Having carefully considered the submissions made 
by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties and having 
examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches 
in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the 
legal position in the following terms:
42	
[2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1054 : (2005) 2 SCC 673
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(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered 
by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent 
Bench of lesser or coequal strength.
(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent 
from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. 
In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum 
can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and 
request for the matter being placed for hearing before a 
Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision 
has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a 
Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting 
the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of 
coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed 
for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger 
than the one which pronounced the decision laying down 
the law the correctness of which is doubted.
(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) the 
abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief 
Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster 
and who can direct any particular matter to be placed 
for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; 
and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the 
matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench 
of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view 
of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view 
is in doubt, needs correction or
reconsideration then by 
way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given 
by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the 
correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing 
with the need of a specific reference or the order of the 
Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. ***”
(emphasis supplied)
73.	 Although the larger Bench in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) appears 
to have considered in excess of 250 decisions, the above opinions of 
the Constitution Benches do not seem to have been presented before 
it. It is, thus, clear as crystal from the majority opinion delivered by 
Hon’ble Arun Mishra and Hon’ble A.K. Goel, JJ. that recourse was 
taken to declare Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam
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991
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
without having the benefit of the caution sounded by this Court in 
Vikramjit Singh (supra) and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra 
Community (supra). 
74.	 Having regard to the opinions expressed by Constitution Bench 
decisions of this Court, there is absolutely no scope for a Bench of 
three-Hon’ble Judges to declare a previous decision of a Bench of 
co-equal strength per incuriam. Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), at the 
highest, could have doubted Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) 
and referred it for decision by a yet larger Bench but could not have, 
by any stretch of reasoning, declared it per incuriam. But, the same 
logic applies to this Bench too. Respectfully following the binding 
dictum in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) and 
also having regard to our sense of judicial discipline and propriety, 
we restrain ourselves from declaring Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) 
as per incuriam notwithstanding our firm conviction in this behalf. 
75.	 However, nothing much turns on our restraint for there are weightier 
reasons to reject the contention of the review petitioners; and this, 
we say, to specifically answer question (c). 
76.	 In paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) itself, it 
has been held by the Constitution Bench that Shailendra [3-Judge] 
(supra) did not have the occasion to consider
certain aspects for 
which that decision cannot prevail. Learned senior counsel for the 
respondents, based on such statement, contended that Shailendra 
[3-Judge] (supra) stands overruled. This submission has been 
disputed by learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. 
According to them, Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) has not been 
expressly overruled; only because of aspects referred to in paragraph 
365 and the discussion preceding, it ceases to be a precedent. 
77.	 We have not held Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) to be per incuriam 
for the reason indicated above but the statement in paragraph 365 
of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) has to be given some 
meaning. Although it is true that Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) was 
not expressly overruled by Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), 
what stands out as a direct impact of paragraph 365 thereof is that 
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), not having considered certain vital 
aspects and more particularly as to how the conjunction ‘or’ in sub-
section (2) of section 24 of the 2013 Act has to be read as well as 
the proviso thereto, the very basis for Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra)
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to declare Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam stands 
removed. Since the reasoning for Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) to 
declare Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam does 
not survive, it would be unreasonable and inappropriate to hold 
that the consequential observation would nevertheless survive. 
Significantly, in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), one does not 
find any observation of like nature as in paragraph 217 of Shailendra 
[3-Judge] (supra).
78.	 That apart, being members of a larger Bench of co-equal strength 
as in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), we are not precluded by any 
law from interpreting the last sentence of paragraph 217 of the 
said decision and to say what the Court exactly intended even if 
it is assumed notwithstanding what has been said in paragraph 
365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) that the observation 
in paragraph 217 survives. In our humble understanding, what the 
majority in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) intended to say is that 
if review petitions were pending on the date of the decision, i.e., 
8th February, 2018, seeking review of decisions which had been 
rendered relying on the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation 
(supra), such review petitions could be entertained and considered 
on the basis of the discussion in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) 
declaring Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam and 
the decisions reviewed; nothing more, nothing
less. We do not think 
that the majority in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) could have and 
did, in fact, give a carte blanche to the land acquiring authorities 
to apply for review of decisions already made by courts relying on 
the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), even though 
the remedy of appeal or review had not been pursued earlier and 
without the successful landowners being on record before the court. 
79.	 The role of the Court, it is needless to observe, is to adjudicate; it 
cannot, in the absence of exercising its advisory jurisdiction under 
Article 143 of the Constitution, take upon itself the role of the advisor 
to any party to the proceedings, to wit, the land acquiring authorities. 
The maxim heavily relied on by the review petitioners, i.e., actus 
curiae neminem gravabit, in such a situation would kick in to prevent 
any harmful act being perpetrated. 
80.	 There is another perspective which cannot be lost sight of. If the 
understanding of learned senior counsel for the review petitioners
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Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
of the relevant sentence in paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] 
(supra) is accepted, it would result in utter chaos and confusion in 
the justice delivery system apart from disturbing the principle of 
finality of judicial decisions. Should we read “open to be reviewed” 
as connoting a ‘liberty’ granted to apply for review, any number of 
review petitions could be filed based on such liberty for review of 
decisions between parties which have attained finality not only in this 
Court but also in the high courts. From the practical point of view, 
the results could be pernicious. A landowner, satisfied with a final 
decision of a court, could find himself requiring to contest a review 
petition filed on the basis of the ‘liberty’ granted by none other than 
the Supreme Court of India in proceedings where such landowner 
was not even noticed. We would be inclined to the thought that no 
court, much less the Supreme Court (because of its status as the 
apex court), should pass any judicial order affecting the right of a 
party who has not been put on notice. If such an order is passed, 
there cannot be a more egregious violation of principles of natural 
justice. 
81.	 Notably, if a judgment and/or order has attained finality because a 
judicial remedy is either not available in law or even if available, such 
remedy has been
lost, it is not open for a higher court of law by a 
judicial fiat either to create a remedy for the party on the losing side 
to pursue or to grant liberty to him to pursue an otherwise available 
remedy - which by passage of time might have been lost - behind 
the back of a party who would obviously be seriously affected if he 
were compelled to contest the proceedings once again. Such an act 
of court would be without the authority of law, and this is precisely 
what Vikramjit Singh (supra) has held.
82.	 Moreover, as on the dates the RPs were filed, the decision in 
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) had not seen the light of the 
day. A review petition, under the law, cannot be filed in anticipation 
of a favourable judgment in the future.
83.	 For the reasons discussed above, we cannot be persuaded to accept 
that the phrase “open to be reviewed in appropriate cases” occurring 
in paragraph 217 of the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) 
could have been perceived by the review petitioners as opening up 
an avenue for them to apply for review. Assuming arguendo that the 
contention touching ‘liberty’ granted by Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra)
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is correct, the plinth thereof crumbles by reason of paragraph 365 
of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and, therefore, is rendered 
non-existent.
84.	 All these aspects, we say so with respect, escaped the attention of the 
Hon’ble Judge presiding over the said Division Bench. His Lordship’s 
opinion on the observations made in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] 
and Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) are erroneous. 
85.	 Questions (b) and (c) are answered accordingly, against the review 
petitioners.
86.	 Let us now move on to question (d) to answer it. 
87.	 The decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), according to 
the respondents, did not afford a ground for maintainability of the 
RPs while the contrary is argued by the review petitioners. According 
to Ms. Bhati, an aggrieved party can seek a review “for any other 
sufficient reason” and overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation 
(supra) followed by recall thereof brings the claims of the review 
petitioners within the coverage of this particular ground. That apart, 
it has been urged that when miscarriage of justice occasioned due 
to an earlier flawed decision is brought to the notice of this Court 
and when public interest would be a casualty resulting from the 
operation of such earlier decision, it ought to be the Court’s duty to 
pass appropriate orders to set things right. 
88.	 It has been noted that prior to the Explanation being inserted in 
Rule 1 Order XLVII,
with the sole exception of the Kerala High 
Court, there were decisions of the Privy Council dating back to the 
commencement of the twentieth century and at least of five High 
Courts, starting from 1927, to the effect that a subsequent judgment 
of a higher court reversing the judgment relied on in the order under 
review would not afford a ground for review. There are also at least 
half a dozen precedents of this Court reiterating such position of 
law, albeit with the aid of the Explanation. 
89.	 The relevant principles deducible from the precedents on the 
Explanation to Rule 1 that we have considered, for the purpose of 
deciding the present reference, are as follows:
a)	
in case of discovery of a new or important matter or evidence, 
such matter or evidence has to be one which existed at the
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995
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
time when the decree or order under review was passed or 
made; and
b)	
Order XLVII would not authorize the review of a decree or order 
which was right when it was made on the ground of some 
subsequent event. 
What follows is that Order XLVII of the CPC does not authorize 
a review of a decree, which was right, on the happening of some 
subsequent event (emphasis supplied).
90.	 With the introduction of the Explanation, there seems to be little room 
for any serious debate on the point under consideration. Parliament, 
in its wisdom, has accepted what the Law Commission recommended. 
Resultantly, what the statute prohibits, cannot be permitted by the 
Court. If permitted, the Court would be acting contrary to law. What 
the Parliament has done, the Court cannot undo unless the law 
enacted by the Parliament is declared ultra vires. The vires of the 
Explanation not being under challenge during more than four decades 
of its existence, it is not for the Court to ignore the Explanation. 
91.	 It is worthwhile to also note at this stage the decision dated 3rd 
November, 2020 in Shri Ram Sahu and others v. Vinod Kumar 
Rawat.43 Upon consideration of the decisions in Moran Mar Basselios 
Catholics (supra), Haridas Das (supra), Kamal Sengupta (supra), 
etc., this Court speaking through the Hon’ble presiding Judge of the 
said
Division Bench was of the opinion that the court of review has 
a limited jurisdiction, it cannot overstep such jurisdiction and has to 
strictly adhere to the grounds mentioned in Rule 1 of Order XLVII. 
It is a pity that the respondent landowners did not cite the aforesaid 
decision before the Hon’ble presiding Judge where the law has been 
correctly laid down by His Lordship. 
92.	 Concededly, the Constitutional courts have inherent powers and this 
Court is also vested by Article 142 of the Constitution with powers to 
pass such decree or make such order as is necessary to do complete 
justice in any cause or matter pending before it. 
93.	 Insofar as inherent powers are concerned, it has been held by this 
Court in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres 44 that: 
43	
[2020] 11 SCR 865 : (2021) 13 SCC 1
44	
[1996] Supp. 4 SCR 464 : (1996) 5 SCC 550
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“22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, 
specially under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment 
or order if it is obtained by fraud on court. In the case of 
fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the court may 
direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting 
aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers 
are powers which are resident in all courts, especially 
of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from 
legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the 
tribunals or courts themselves so as to enable them to 
maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and 
rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to 
punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for 
the orderly administration of the court’s business.”
94.	 A superior court, in exercise of its inherent power, is authorized to 
do such justice that the cause before it demands. Upon satisfaction 
being reached by a court that a mistake has been committed by 
it, which is gross and palpable, it is not the law that the mistake 
has to be corrected by exercising the power of review only. Such 
power can be exercised, only if the person aggrieved by the order 
or decree applies therefor. On its terms, section 114 of the CPC 
read with Order XLVII thereof does not conceive of a suo motu 
power of review being exercised by the court. The words “court 
on its own motion” are absent
in the statutory provision. However, 
once the court is satisfied that a mistake committed by it needs to 
be rectified, it is always open to exercise the inherent powers to 
achieve the desired result. As has been held by the Constitution 
Bench in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,45 an order of court – be it 
judicial or administrative – which is made per incuriam or in violation 
of certain Constitutional limitations or in derogation of principles 
of natural justice can always be remedied by the court ex debito 
justitiae. It can do so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any 
proceeding pending before it without insisting on the formalities of 
a review application. After all, “to err is human” is the oft-quoted 
saying and courts including the apex court are no exception. To 
own up the mistake when judicial satisfaction is reached does not 
45	
[1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602
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997
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
militate against its status or authority; perhaps, it would enhance 
both. On the other hand, when it involves invocation of the power 
of review and such power is traceable in a statute, which also has 
provisions regulating the exercise of the review power, it has to be 
held that the power of review is not an inherent power. That power 
of review is not an inherent power has been held in Patel Narshi 
Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji.46 If a power of review 
is statutorily conferred, it would be inappropriate, nay incompetent, 
for the court exercising review power to travel beyond the contours 
of the provision conferring the very power. A statutorily conferred 
power to review is not to be confused with the inherent power of the 
court to recall any order. The said power inheres in every court to 
prevent miscarriage of justice or when a fraud has been committed 
on court or to correct grave and palpable errors.
95.	 In any event, in the present case, we have not found exercise of 
inherent power under section 151, CPC or under Article 142 by the 
Hon’ble presiding Judge of the said Division Bench. 
96.	 It was urged that a court may recall or review any order exercising 
its inherent power saved by section 151, CPC to meet the ends 
of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This 
argument,
however, need not detain us for long in the light of the 
law, which stands well-settled by this Court. It is no longer res integra 
that inherent powers of the court under section 151, CPC cannot be 
invoked if there exists a remedy made available by the CPC itself. 
97.	 A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Padam Sen v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh 47 laid down the law in the following words:
“8. …The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to 
the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. 
They are complementary to those powers and therefore 
it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them 
for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code 
when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in 
conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code 
or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well 
46	
(1971) 3 SCC 844
47	
[1961] 1 SCR 884 : (1961) 1 SCR 884
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recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised 
in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the 
procedure expressly provided in the Code.”
(emphasis supplied)
98.	 Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in My Palace Mutually 
Aided Co-operative Society v. B. Mahesh & others 48 held thus:
“27. In exercising powers under Section 151 of the CPC, it 
cannot be said that the civil courts can exercise substantive 
jurisdiction to unsettle already decided issues. A Court 
having jurisdiction over the relevant subject matter has the 
power to decide and may come either to a right or a wrong 
conclusion. Even if a wrong conclusion is arrived at or an 
incorrect decree is passed by the jurisdictional court, the 
same is binding on the parties until it is set aside by an 
appellate court or through other remedies provided in law.
28. Section 151 of the CPC can only be applicable if 
there is no alternate remedy available in accordance 
with the existing provisions of law. Such inherent power 
cannot override statutory prohibitions or create remedies 
which are not contemplated under the Code. Section 151 
cannot be invoked as an alternative to filing fresh suits, 
appeals, revisions, or reviews. A party cannot find solace 
in Section 151 to allege and rectify historic wrongs and 
bypass procedural safeguards inbuilt in the CPC.”
(emphasis supplied)
99.	 An alternative remedy, carved out by Rule 1 of Order
XLVII, already 
exists which the review petitioners have pursued. Recourse to section 
151, CPC, therefore, would not be available, the object of which is to 
supplement and not replace the remedies provided under the CPC.
100.	Moving on further, we find that the attempt of the review petitioners 
has been to draw inspiration from the ground “any other sufficient 
reason” appearing in Rule 1. There have been decisions of this 
Court which have construed the words “any other sufficient reason” 
expansively, like Netaji Cricket Club (supra) and Jagmohan Singh 
48	
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1063
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
999
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
(supra), whereas there are decisions, including Moran Mar Basselios 
Catholics (supra), Raja Shatrunji (supra), Kamlesh Verma (supra) 
and S. Madhusudhan Reddy (supra), that have followed Chhajju 
Ram (supra) explaining that the ground “any other sufficient reason” 
means “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those 
specified immediately previously”. 
101.	However, with utmost respect, we do not find any of those decisions, 
which have taken an expansive view, looking at such ground in the 
manner we propose to look, for recording our concurrence with the 
view in Chhajju Ram (supra) that has unhesitatingly been followed 
over the years. If indeed “any other sufficient reason” were to take 
within its embrace any situation not analogous to “discovery of 
new matter or evidence” and “on account of some mistake or error 
apparent on the face of the record”, we wonder why the legislature 
chose to keep “any other sufficient reason” immediately after the 
aforesaid two grounds. If “any other sufficient reason” were to be 
read independent of the said two grounds, we believe the long line 
in Rule 1 after clauses (a) to (c) need not have been drafted in the 
manner it presently reads. In lieu of referring to the said two grounds 
as grounds on which a review could be sought, the legislature could 
well have kept it
open- ended as in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 
1963 where it is provided, without any strings attached, that any 
appeal or any application may be admitted after the prescribed 
period of limitation if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court 
that he had “sufficient cause” for not preferring the appeal or the 
application earlier. If the intention of the legislature were to give an 
expanded meaning, Order XLVII Rule 1 would have read somewhat 
like this: any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or 
order or decision of the nature indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) 
for any sufficient reason desires to obtain a review of the decree 
or order made against him, may apply for a review. But that is not 
what the provision says and means. Reading Order XLVII Rule 1 in 
juxtaposition to section 5 of the Limitation Act drives us to accept the 
view in Chhajju Ram (supra) as having interpreted the law correctly 
and acceptance of the same by this Court and high courts over the 
years, coupled with the fact that the Parliament did not consider it 
necessary to amend Rule 1 when it inserted the Explanation in 1976. 
Giving a wider meaning to the ground “any other sufficient reason” in 
Netaji Cricket Club (supra) and Jagmohan Singh (supra), therefore,
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must have been intended and necessitated by this Court because 
the justice of the cases so demanded but the same would have no 
application in a case of this nature. 
102.	Having regard to the aforesaid distinction in the exercise of review 
power and the power that inheres in every court, we are unable 
to be ad idem with the decision in Netaji Cricket Club (supra) as 
well as the decision in Jagmohan Singh (supra), which followed 
the former decision. The said two decisions are by benches of 
two Hon’ble Judges, with a common author. With the deepest of 
respect and reverence we have for His Lordship, we find limiting 
the application of the principles regarding exercise of the power of 
review, as expounded in Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra) 
(a decision rendered by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges, which 
has stood the test of time), to be against established principles 
flowing from Article 141 of the Constitution by which the Supreme 
Court is also bound. Also, laying down as a matter of principle that 
subsequent events could be considered while hearing a review 
petition, is unprecedented. The Court in Netaji Cricket Club 
(supra) and Jagmohan Singh (supra) read something in the statute 
which apart from being unnecessary, is seen to run contrary to the 
terms of Order XLVII, CPC as expounded in A.C. Estates (supra) 
(decision of a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges) and Raja Shatrunji 
(supra). To save Netaji
Cricket Club (supra) and Jagmohan Singh 
(supra) from being declared as decisions rendered per incuriam, 
we prefer to hold, as the Hon’ble companion Judge on the said 
Division Bench did, that such decisions turned on the very special 
facts and circumstances of the cases and cannot guide us in the 
present endeavor. 
103.	Ms. Bhati put forth the dissent authored by Hon’ble Dr. D.Y. 
Chandrachud, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) in Beghar 
Foundation (supra) to argue that the Explanation could not be a bar 
to the maintainability of the RPs in the present case. However, when 
a view is expressed by a member-Judge of a Constitution Bench 
which turns out to be the minority view, judicial discipline demands 
that a Bench of lesser strength does not accept the minority view 
in preference to the majority view. In any event, on a closer reading 
of the dissent itself, more particularly paragraph 18, it is revealed 
that the RPs had already been filed and were pending on the date 
when reference was made to a larger Bench for which His Lordship
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
1001
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
did not consider it necessary even to consider the Explanation. The 
issue before us, as held earlier, cannot be resolved without looking 
at the Explanation and, thus, the contention advanced by Ms. Bhati 
is rejected.
104.	We, thus, hold that no review is available upon a change or reversal 
of a proposition of law by a superior court or by a larger Bench of this 
Court overruling its earlier exposition of law whereon the judgment/
order under review was based. We also hold that notwithstanding the 
fact that Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has since been wiped 
out of existence, the said decision being the law of the land when 
the Civil Appeals/Special Leave Petitions were finally decided, the 
subsequent overruling of such decision and even its recall, for that 
matter, would not afford a ground for review within the parameters 
of Order XLVII of the CPC.
105.	Question (d) is, therefore, answered in the negative. 
106.	Let us now turn to question (a), which incidentally arises, and answer it.
107.	Reverting to the facts, these cases would not call for ascertainment 
of the ‘locus standi’ of the review petitioners, since they were parties 
to the proceedings from which the RPs have arisen. However, in 
the context of a review, a distinction can yet be drawn between a 
person who, not being a party to the original
proceedings, has the 
‘locus standi’ to invoke the review jurisdiction and a person who, 
despite being a party to the proceedings, can be considered as not 
aggrieved by the judgment/order of which he seeks a review. This 
question would obviously require a deep scrutiny, having regard to 
the materials on record and the objection to the maintainability of 
the RPs specifically raised by the respondent landowners. In the 
eyes of an unsuspecting person, obviously the review petitioners 
are persons aggrieved because of declaration of land acquisition 
proceedings initiated by them as deemed to have lapsed. But, as 
is evident from the factual narrative, the dates on which the High 
Court had disposed of the writ petitions by declaring that the land 
acquisition proceedings were deemed to have lapsed, it is the law 
laid down by a binding authority, i.e., Pune Municipal Corporation 
(supra) that was holding the field at the relevant time and which the 
High Court applied in reaching its conclusions. This Court too had 
dismissed the Civil Appeals and the Special Leave Petitions bearing 
in mind that the issue raised was no longer res integra in view of
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Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). If indeed the judgments and 
orders were right, could the review petitioners be categorized as 
aggrieved persons?
108.	For the reason that the judgments and orders under review were 
right on the dates they were rendered, we do not consider the 
review petitioners as persons aggrieved who can maintain a review 
petition citing either Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] and Shailendra 
[3-Judge] (supra). We, however, hold that the review petitioners 
can yet be considered persons aggrieved for what we proceed to 
say and hold immediately hereafter. 
109.	Insofar as question (e) is concerned, which has been framed based 
on the arguments of Mr. Sen, it is true that the RPs include under 
the caption ‘GROUNDS’ reference to points which, according to 
the review petitioners, are sufficient to review the judgments/orders 
under review, apart from reference to the so-called ‘liberty’ granted 
by this Court vide Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). Mr. Sen thus 
argued that even if the RPs are held not to be maintainable based 
on Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) and Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] 
(supra), the same ought to be decided upon consideration of such 
other grounds; and, for such purpose, the larger Bench may remit 
the RPs for being considered by an appropriate Bench on such 
other grounds. Viewed in the light of such contention, the review 
petitioners are persons aggrieved and the RPs cannot be shut
out on the ground that the same are not maintainable for reasons 
discussed above. However, this finding does not take the cause of 
the review petitioners any forward.
110.	We have perused the ‘GROUNDS’ in each of the RPs opposed by 
Mr. Divan and Mr. Giri. All such grounds are factual in nature. In 
fact, the review petitioners have raised ‘GROUNDS’ without even 
averring what was pleaded in their counter affidavits filed before 
the High Court and what were the defences raised which, because 
of non-consideration by this Court, could be said to amount to an 
error apparent on the face of the record. The RPs are silent as to 
on which specific ground referrable to Rule 1 of Order XLVII the 
review has been asked for. Even then, having considered such 
‘GROUNDS’, we are of the considered opinion that the judgments/
orders under review do not suffer from any error apparent on the 
face of the record.
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1003
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
111.	 Thus, we have no hesitation to reject Mr. Sen’s contention and 
answer question (e) against the review petitioners.
112.	As we approach the end, we need to address question (f) regarding 
the maintainability of several miscellaneous applications in the present 
batch that seek recall of certain orders of this Court, whereby some 
of the land acquisition proceedings were declared to have lapsed.
113.	Notably, while these have been filed in the form of miscellaneous 
applications, they are in essence akin to the RPs as they also seek 
reconsideration of this Court’s orders. Since these miscellaneous 
applications also rely on Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as 
a ground for review/reconsideration of the previous orders, they are 
squarely covered by the foregoing analysis in this judgment. If we 
were to hold otherwise, we would be permitting the review petitioners 
to do something indirectly—i.e., seeking review through miscellaneous 
applications, which they could not have done directly—i.e., seeking 
review through RPs. This would open the law to being misused 
and lead to by-passing the legislative intent behind introduction of 
Explanation 1 to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC which, as noticed in 
paragraph 91 of this judgment, cannot be permitted by the Court.
114.	In this regard, we find sufficient support in the
decision in Delhi 
Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others,49 where this 
Court held: 
“17. We next come to applications described as applications 
for ‘clarification’, ‘modification’ or ‘recall’ of judgments 
or orders finally passed. We may point out that under 
the relevant Rule XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 
a review application has first to go before the learned 
Judges in circulation and it will be for the Court to 
consider whether the application is to be rejected without 
giving an oral hearing or whether notice is to be issued. 
[…] However, with a view to avoid this procedure of ‘no 
hearing’, we find that sometimes applications are filed 
for ‘clarification’, ‘modification’ or ‘recall’ etc. not because 
any such clarification, modification is indeed necessary 
but because the applicant in reality wants a review and 
49	
[2000] Supp. 2 SCR 496 : (2000) 7 SCC 296
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also wants a hearing, thus avoiding listing of the same 
in chambers by way of circulation. Such applications, if 
they are in substance review applications, deserve to 
be rejected straight away inasmuch as the attempt is 
obviously to bypass Order XL Rule 3 relating to circulation 
of the application in chambers for consideration without 
oral hearing. By describing an application as one for 
‘clarification’ or ‘modification’, — though it is really one of 
review — a party cannot be permitted to circumvent or 
bypass the circulation procedure and indirectly obtain a 
hearing in the open court. What cannot be done directly 
cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. [See in this 
connection a detailed order of the then Registrar of this 
Court in Sone Lal v. State of U.P. (1982) 2 SCC 398 
deprecating a similar practice.]”. 
115.	Similarly, and more recently, this Court in Supertech Ltd. v. Emerald 
Court Owner Resident Welfare Association and others 50 held: 
“13. The hallmark of a judicial pronouncement is its stability 
and finality. Judicial verdicts are not like sand dunes which 
are subject to the vagaries of wind and weather [See, 
Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy, (2010) 8 SCC 383]. 
A disturbing trend has emerged in this Court of repeated 
applications, styled as miscellaneous applications, being 
filed after a final judgment has been pronounced. Such 
a practice has no legal foundation and must be firmly
discouraged. It reduces litigation to a gambit. Miscellaneous 
applications are becoming a preferred course to those 
with resources to pursue strategies to avoid compliance 
with judicial decisions. A judicial pronouncement cannot 
be subject to modification once the judgment has been 
pronounced, by filing a miscellaneous application. Filing 
of a miscellaneous application seeking modification/
clarification of a judgment is not envisaged in law. Further, 
it is a settled legal principle that one cannot do indirectly 
what one cannot do directly (‘Quando aliquid prohibetur 
ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum’)”.
50	
[2021] 10 SCR 569 : (2023) 10 SCC 817
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
1005
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
116.	We must clarify that our statement does not imply an absolute 
prohibition against filing of miscellaneous applications seeking 
‘clarification,’ ‘modification,’ or ‘recall’ following the initial disposal 
of a matter. We are only emphasizing the need for the Court to 
exercise prudence and ascertain whether such an application is, 
in substance, in the nature of a RP. In case such an application is 
found to be nothing but a disguised version of a RP, it ought to be 
treated in similar manner a RP is treated.
117.	In the light of the foregoing discussion, the miscellaneous applications 
are not maintainable.
L.	
CONCLUSION
118.	To sum up, our answers to all the questions [(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f)] 
are in the negative while (a) is partly negative and partly affirmative.
119.	We respectfully concur with the opinion expressed by the Hon’ble 
companion Judge on the said Division Bench and record our inability 
to be ad idem with the Hon’ble presiding Judge. 
120.	The reference is answered accordingly. 
121.	Under the circumstances, dismissal of the RPs and miscellaneous 
applications would have been logical and we could have ended our 
judgment here by ordering so. However, there is something more of a 
balancing act that needs to be done having regard to the disclosures 
that were made in course of progress of other
proceedings before 
us, which followed immediately after judgment on this set of RPs and 
miscellaneous applications was reserved. Such other proceedings 
arose out of appeals carried from orders of the High Court declaring 
land acquisition proceedings as lapsed based on the decision in 
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) as distinguished from RPs 
and miscellaneous applications of the nature under consideration. 
Since all such proceedings have more or less a common genesis 
and have followed similar trajectory, it would be eminently desirable 
to find a solution that benefits all. We may hasten to add here that 
the exercise of inherent powers conferred on this Court by Article 
142, in such circumstances, is not just inevitable but also pivotal 
for disposal of the matters at hand, given their impact on public 
interest at large as well as to secure uniformity and consistency in 
our decisions; hence, we consider it expedient to pass such orders 
or directions for ensuring complete justice in the matters under
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consideration before us. Notwithstanding our discussion on the 
reference which was necessitated to answer the question of law on 
which there was a disagreement between the Hon’ble Judges of the 
Division Bench, taking an overall and holistic view of the matter and 
in the light of the larger public interest that is involved, in each of 
the RPs and miscellaneous applications that have been dealt with by 
this judgment (except those remanded to the High Court and those 
de-tagged for separate listing infra), we issue the following directions: 
a)	
The time limit for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings in 
terms of the provisions contained in section 24(2) of the 2013 
Act is extended by a year starting from 01st August, 2024 
whereupon compensation to the affected landowners may be 
paid in accordance with law, failing which consequences, also 
as per law, shall follow;
b)	
The parties shall maintain status quo regarding possession, 
change of land use and creation of third-party rights till fresh 
acquisition proceedings, as directed above, are completed;
c)	
Since the landowners are not primarily dependent upon the 
subject lands as their source of sustenance and most of these 
lands were/are under use for other than agricultural purposes, 
we deem it appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 
142 of the Constitution and dispense with the compliance of 
Chapters II and III of the 2013 Act whereunder it is
essential 
to prepare a Social Impact Assessment Study Report and/or 
to develop alternative multi-crop irrigated agricultural land. We 
do so to ensure that the timeline of one year extended at (a) 
above to complete the acquisition process can be adhered to 
by the appellants and the GNCTD, which would also likely be 
beneficial to the expropriated landowners;
d)	
Similarly, compliance with sections 13, 14, 16 to 20 of the 2013 
Act can be dispensed with as the subject-lands are predominantly 
urban/semi-urban in nature and had earlier been acquired for 
public purposes of paramount importance. In order to simplify 
the compliance of direction at (a) above, it is further directed that 
every Notification issued under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act in 
this batch of cases, shall be treated as a Preliminary Notification 
within the meaning of section 11 of the 2013 Act, and shall be 
deemed to have been published as on 01st January, 2014;
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1007
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
e)	
The Collector shall provide hearing of objections as per section 
15 of the 2013 Act without insisting for any Social Impact 
Assessment Report and shall, thereafter, proceed to take 
necessary steps as per the procedure contemplated under 
section 21 onwards of Chapter-IV of 2013 Act, save and except 
where compliance of any provision has been expressly or 
impliedly dispensed with;
f)	
The landowners may submit their objections within a period 
of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this order. 
Such objections shall not question the legality of the acquisition 
process and shall be limited only to clauses (a) and (b) of 
section 15(1) of the 2013 Act;
g)	
The Collector shall publish a public notice on his website and 
in one English and one vernacular newspapers, within two 
weeks of expiry of the period of four weeks granted under 
direction (f) above;
h)	
The Collector shall, thereafter, pass an award as early as 
possible but not exceeding six months, regardless of the 
maximum period of twelve months contemplated under section 
25 of the 2013 Act. The market value of the land shall be 
assessed as on 01st January, 2014 and the compensation 
shall be awarded along with all other monetary benefits in 
accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act except the 
claim like rehabilitation etc.;
i)	
The Collector
shall consider all the parameters prescribed under 
section 28 of the 2013 Act for determining the compensation for 
the acquired land. Similarly, the Collector shall determine the 
market value of the building or assets attached with the land 
in accordance with section 29 and shall further award solatium 
in accordance with section 30 of the 2013 Act;
j)	
In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, since it is 
difficult to reverse the clock back, the compliance of Chapter 
(V) pertaining to “Rehabilitation and Resettlement Award” is 
hereby dispensed with; and 
k)	
The expropriated landowners shall be entitled to seek reference 
for enhancement of compensation in accordance with Chapter-
VIII of the 2013 Act.
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122.	Before we part, we must address a minor task that remains 
unfinished. Specifically, we are currently handling two sets of RPs. 
The first set pertains to landowners who continue to maintain their 
status as landowners from the date of Notification under section 
4(1) of the 1894 Act. The second set includes landowners who, 
subsequent to the aforementioned Notification under section 4(1), 
have transferred their properties—the subject of acquisition—to 
purchasers (“subsequent purchasers”, hereafter) through methods 
such as executing sale deeds, deeds of assignment, or even via 
power of attorney. In addition to the allegations regarding fraud by 
landowners by suppressing subsequent sale transactions, the second 
set may also involve ownership title disputes, etc.
123.	The cases falling under the second set are listed below:
a)	
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. TARUN KAPAHI 
[R.P.(C) No. 425/2023];
b)	
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. NARENDER SHARMA [R.P.(C) 
No. 426/2023];
c)	
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. M/S. RUNWEELL 
(INDIA) PVT. LTD. [R.P.(C) No. 428/2023];
d)	
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MAHARAJ SINGH 
[R.P.(C) No. 429/2023]; and
e)	
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SURENDER SINGH 
[R.P.(C) No. 409/2023].
124.	As a fact-finding inquiry is necessary to ascertain the rightful claimant 
for receiving the compensation, which is to be determined as directed 
in paragraph 121 supra, we hereby set aside the orders of the
High 
Court that were under challenge in the Civil Appeals out of which 
the aforementioned RPs have arisen. We revive the relevant writ 
petitions [W.P. (C) No. 5107/2015, W.P. (C) No. 5063/2014, W.P. (C) 
No. 4780/2014, W.P. (C) No. 1637/2015, W.P. (C) No. 6897/2014], 
which shall stand restored on the file of the High Court for this limited 
purpose on remand being ordered. The Chief Justice of the High 
Court is requested to constitute a dedicated bench to decide these 
writ petitions in the manner indicated hereafter. The nominated bench 
will accord an opportunity to the landowners/subsequent purchasers, 
the GNCTD, and the DDA to submit additional documents on affidavits 
whereupon such bench shall embark on an exercise to decide who
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
1009
Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through Its Secretary, Land and Building 
Department & Another v. M/s K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Others
between the landowner(s) and the subsequent purchaser(s) is the 
rightful claimant to receive compensation. The nominated bench will 
have the authority to obtain independent fact-finding enquiry reports, 
if deemed necessary. The inquiry could include determination as to 
whether after the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, any 
transfer could have been effected and even if effected, whether such 
transfer is permitted by any law. Once compensation is determined, the 
relevant authority in the land acquisition department shall deposit the 
same with the reference court. The reference court shall then invest 
the deposited amount in a short-term interest-bearing fixed deposit 
account with a nationalized bank, ensuring its periodical renewal 
until the relevant writ petition is disposed of by the nominated bench. 
Release of the invested amount together with accrued interest to 
the rightful claimant will be contingent upon the decision of the High 
Court. Upon enquiry being completed, the High Court shall decide 
the relevant writ petitions in accordance with law.
125.	The directions issued in paragraph 121 supra do not extend to 
eight miscellaneous matters that were erroneously included in the 
present batch. These cases shall be listed separately in the week 
commencing 22nd July, 2024. The details of the
cases are as follows:
a)	
In these two cases outlined below, no notice has been issued 
by this Court for condonation of delay and/or otherwise; hence, 
they need to be de-tagged and listed separately:
i.	
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. M/S. K.L. RATHI 
STEELS LTD. [M.A. No. 414/2023 in C.A. No. 11857/2016]; 
and 
ii.	
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. HARI PRAKASH 
[R.P. (C) No. 432/2023 in C.A. No. 11841/2016].
b)	
The following are three cases where neither a RP nor a 
miscellaneous application has been filed. These cases are 
Special Leave Petitions filed before this Court and thus 
necessitate separate hearing:
i.	
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. M/S BEADS 
PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. [C.A. No. 1522/2023];
ii.	
LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT v. RAM SINGH 
[Diary No. 14831/2023]; and
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iii.	
LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT v. SUMIT BANSAL 
[Diary No. 15893/2023].
c)	
The following two cases, although RPs, were filed before the 
change in law, i.e., prior to the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] 
(supra). Consequently, they need to be de-tagged to be assessed 
based on their individual merits:
i.	
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SWARN SINGH 
CHAWLA [R.P. (C) No. 882/2017 in C.A. No. 11846/2016]; 
and
ii.	
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS 
LTD. [M.A. No. 159/2019 in C.A. No. 11857/2016].
d)	
The following case concerns a contempt petition, viz. M/S K.L. 
RATHI STEELS LTD v. ANSHU PRAKASH [Conmt. Pet. (C) 
No. 735/2018 in C.A. No. 11857/2016]. The same needs to be 
de-tagged to be assessed on its individual merits.
126.	All other RPs and miscellaneous applications stand disposed of, 
without order for costs. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand 
disposed of. 
Result of the case: Review petitions and miscellaneous  
application disposed of.
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain