VINOD KUMAR & ORS. versus DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU & ORS.
[2023] 10 S.C.R. 387, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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VINOD KUMAR & ORS.
v.
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5107 of 2022)
JULY 07, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
National Highways Authority Act, 1956: s. 3H – Deposit and
payment of amount – Compulsory acquisition – Apportionment of
compensation – Land of the appellants acquired for public purpose
– Determination of the compensation payable to landowners by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer-SLAO – Dispute by respondents
regarding the apportionment of the compensation between
themselves and the appellants – Competent authority, SLAO
determined the shares of parties in the subject land and the
appellants were satisfied with the same – However, the respondents
challenged the same before the District Magistrate by invoking s.3G
(5) – District Magistrate granted higher shares in favour of the
respondents – Writ application by the appellants – Dismissed by
High Court – Correctness of – Held : When it comes to resolving
the dispute relating to apportionment of the amount determined
towards compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction which can do so – Principal Civil Court means the Court
of the District Judge – Dispute being of the nature triable by the
Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for that to be referred to
the decision of the Principal Civil Court – Thus, the order passed
by the District Magistrate is quashed and set aside – SLAO to refer
the dispute to the Principal Civil Court
of original jurisdiction in
accordance with sub-clause (4) of s. 3H of the Act.
Interpretation of Statutes – Rule of interpretation – Literal
rule – Explained.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, the High Court seems to
have completely misread the provisions of the National Highways
Authority Act, 1956. It fell into error as it failed to apply the well
settled principle of law that for construing a legal provision, the
[2023] 10 S.C.R. 387 : 2023 INSC 606
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first and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction.
All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the
provision state. If the provision is unambiguous and from the
provision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call
into aid the other rules of construction of statute. The other rules
of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent
is not clear. [Para 24][402-B-C]
1.2. The first and foremost principle of interpretation of a
statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of
interpretation. The other rules of interpretation, the mischief rule/
purposive construction, etc. can only be resorted to when the
plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible
results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the
statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and
unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of
interpretation other than the literal rule. The language employed
in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent.
The legislature is presumed to have made no mistakes. The
presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming
there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the
legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency.
[Para 25][402-C-F]
1.3. There is a fine distinction between determining the
amount to be paid towards compensation
and the apportionment
of the amount. The legislature has thought fit to confer powers
upon the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to determine
the dispute arising as to the apportionment of the amount. There
is a reason, why the legislature has thought fit to confer such
power to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within
the limits of whose jurisdiction is land is situated. [Para 26][402-
F-G]
1.4. The question of apportionment of compensation is not
free from difficulties. In apportioning the compensation, the Court
has to give to each claimant the value of the interest which he
has lost by compulsory acquisition. So stated, the proposition
may appear simple, but in its practical application numerous
complicated problems arise in apportioning the compensation
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awarded. The difficulty experienced is due to the nature of a
variety of interests, rights and claims to land which have to be
valued in terms of money. The compensation awarded for
compulsory acquisition is the value of all the interests which are
extinguished and that compensation has to be distributed
equitably amongst persons having interest therein and the Court
must proceed to apportion the compensation so that the
aggregate value of all interests is equal to the amount of
compensation awarded. But in the valuation of competing
interests, which from its very nature is dependent upon indefinite
factors and uncertain data, considerable difficulty is encountered.
Indisputably, in apportioning compensation the Court cannot
proceed upon hypothetical considerations but must proceed as
far as possible to make an accurate determination of the value of
the respective interests which are lost. The Court must, in each
case, having regard to the circumstances and the possibility of a
precise determination of the value having regard to the materials
available, adopt that method of valuation which equitably
distributes the compensation between the persons entitled
thereto. [Para 27][402-H; 403-A-D]
1.5. The only general principle is that apportionment under
sub clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956 is not a revaluation
but a distribution of the value already fixed among the several
persons interested in the land acquired in accordance with the
nature and
quantum of the respective interests. In ascertainment
of those interests, the determination of their relative importance
and the manner in which they can be said to have contributed to
the total value fixed are questions to be decided in the light of
the circumstances of each case and the relevant provisions of
law governing the rights of the parties. The actual rule for
apportionment has to be formulated in each case so as to ensure
a just and equitable distribution of the total value or compensation
among the persons interested in the land. [Para 28][403-E-F]
1.6. In the said circumstances, the legislature thought fit
to assign such function to none other than the Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction. [Para 29][403-G]
1.7. The submission that the dispute between the parties
is not one of apportionment but the same is with regard to giving
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
ORS.
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effect to the order passed by the Civil Court in the Civil Suit
cannot be accepted. What is perhaps sought to be argued is that
the shares in the land acquired should be determined on the basis
of some order passed by the Civil Court. Thus, if the private
respondents want to rely upon the order passed by the Civil Court,
they can do so before the Court of the Principal Judge of original
jurisdiction. The District Magistrate has no power or jurisdiction
in regard to the apportionment of the amount. [Para 30][403-H;
404-A-B]
1.8. It cannot be understood on what basis the High Court
in its impugned order observed that the District Magistrate is
competent to examine the order passed by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer and decide the dispute as to the apportionment
of the amount. When it comes to resolving the dispute relating
to apportionment of the amount determined towards
compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction which can do so. Principal Civil Court means the
Court of the District Judge. [Paras 31 and 33][404-C; 409-C]
1.9 If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the
amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or
any part thereof is payable, then, the competent authority shall
refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the
land is situated. The competent authority
possesses certain
powers of the Civil Court, but in the event of a dispute of the said
nature, the summary power, vesting in the competent authority
of rendering an opinion in terms of sub section (3) of Section 3H,
would not serve the purpose. The dispute being of the nature
triable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for that
to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction. The dispute regarding apportionment of the
amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or
any part thereof is payable, would then have to be decided by
that Court. [Para 34][409-D-F]
1.10 The order passed by the District Magistrate is quashed
and set aside. In view of the dispute between the parties as
regards apportionment of the amount of compensation, the Special
Land Acquisition Officer would now refer the dispute to the
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Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in accordance with
sub clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956. [Para 35][409-G]
Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha,
(1956) 60 Bom LR 1208 – approved.
Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar 2003 MhLJ Online (S.C.)
23 : AIR 2003 SC 942 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
AIR 2003 SC 942
referred to
Para 32
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.5107
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2020 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in WC No.7310 of 2020.
Gaurav Agrawal, Shubhranshu Padhi, Ashish Yadav, Ms. Rimjhim
Agnihotri, Ms. Rajeshawari Shankar, Niroop Sukrithy, Jay Nirupam,
Advs. for the Appellants.
Sharan Singh Thakur, AAG, V. K. Shukla, Mrs. Garima Prashad,
Sr. Advs., Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Divyanshu Sahay, Ashiwan Mishra,
Kamlendra Mishra, Arvind Kumar Shukla, Ms. Reetu Sharma, Shantanu
Shukla, Tushar Swami, Sarvesh Kumar Dubey, Nishit Agrawal, Advs.
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
This appeal is at the instance of unsuccessful original writ
petitioners and is directed against the order passed by a Division Bench
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 28th February, 2020
in Writ-C No. 7310 of 2020 by which the High Court rejected the writ
application filed by the appellants taking the view that the District
Magistrate is competent to look into the legality and validity of the order
passed by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer (for short, ‘SLAO’)
under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Authority Act, 1956 (for
short ‘the Act 1956’).
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The Central Government issued a notification dated 23.01.2015
in exercise of power under Section 3A(1) of the Act 1956 proposing to
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
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acquire few parcels of land situated in the District Mau for the purpose
of four lane widening of the National Highway No. 29. The said
notification included the land bearing Gat Nos. 158, 160 and 161 resply
of the village Ahirani Bujurg, District Mau (UP).
3. In the aforesaid context, a further notification dated 21.01.2016
was issued under Section 3D of the Act 1956 declaring that the land as
aforestated would be acquired for the public purpose. Upon issuance of
such notification, the land vested in the Central Government.
4. The competent authority i.e. the Special Land Acquisition Officer
vide award dated 28.11.2016 passed under Section 3G of the Act 1956
determined the compensation to be paid to the landowners (parties before
us) for the acquired land. The relevant portion of the award passed by
the competent authority reads thus:-
“By assuming the rate of Rs.4,50,00,000.00 as the stamp rate
determined for the transferable land as basis, compensation
of the land measuring 3.269 hec. situated in village Ahirani
Buzurg which is being acquired comes out to
Rs.14,71,05,000.00, double amount of which happens to be
Rs.29,42,10,000.00 and compensation of the structure and
tree comes at Rs.8,01,582.00, total double amount of which
comes out at Rs.15,29,06,582.00. Amount of 100% Solatium
amount on this amount comes out to Rs.30,00,11,582.00.
Additional Compensation of Rs.3,16,66,953.00 is payable at
the rate of 12% from
the last publication of Section 3A dated
6th March, 2015. Thus, total compensation amount comes out
to Rs.63,16,90,117.00 (Rupees sixty three crores sixteen lakhs
ninety thousand one hundred and seventeen only), I regard
to which I declare the Award. By recovering land acquisition
expenses of Rs.6,31,69,012.00 at the rate of 10% of the total
amount of compensation and 100 times of registered value of
less land revenue which comes out at Rs.7476.00 from the
Acquiring Authority, same be got deposited in the prescribed
Account Head. Accordingly, Notice be sent to the concerned
Tehsil for proceedings of making entry. While making one
copy of the Award Order to Indian National Highway
Authority, Gorakhpur, letter be sent for making available the
entire amount covered by the Award in question.”
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5. On 11.12.2019, the respondents herein raised a dispute regarding
apportionment of the compensation between themselves and the
appellants herein. With respect to the three parcels of land, the respondents
claimed half share of compensation in Gat No. 158 and 1/3rd share of
compensation in Gat Nos. 160 and 161 respectively, while the appellants
herein claimed 5/8th share in the compensation in Gat No. 158 and 13/
16th share in Gat Nos. 160 and 161 respectively.
6. In accordance with the legislative scheme i.e. Section 3H(3) of
the Act 1956, the competent authority is required to determine the shares
of the landowners in the compensation. In such circumstances, the
competent authority called for a report from the revenue authorities.
The revenue authorities vide its report dated 11.04.2019 reported the
share of the appellants and respondents herein. This report was in favour
of the appellants. The relevant portion of the report reads thus:-
“4. That on the basis of copy of Khasra No. 1353, Gata No.
213 is mentioned which is having present No. 232/ 51 min.
and present No. of Gata No. 213 B is 232 Min./183 and present
No. of 213 is 232 min./ 519. Similarly present No. of Gata
No. 233 is 214/ 644 acres and type of land is mentioned as
“Bagh Digar”. Apart from it, present No. of Gata No. 208 is
227 / 1.440 acres in which “Bagh Digar” is mentioned, which
is correct.
5. That names of Mahadav Shahi, son of Sitaram Shahi and
Bholanath, son of Ganga and Saryu, son
of Brijrnohan, Caste
Kandu are recorded in Khata No. 46 of Copy of Khatauni for
the crop year 1348, Ahirani Buzurg, in which Gata No. 232
acres is recorded and name of Mahadev, son of Sitaram Shahi
and Bholanath, son of Ganga and Saryu, son of Brijmohan,
Caste Kanu is recorded in respect of Gata No. 128 for the
crop year 1348. Gata No. 232/0.284 acres is mentioned in it
and names of Mahadev, son of Sitaram Shahi and Bholanath,
son of Brij Mohan, Caste Kandu are recorded in Khata No.
92. Gata No. 232/0.539 and Gata No. 233/0.644 two Gatas
admeasuring 1.163 acres are mentioned in it, which is correct.
On the basis of the crop year 1348, which has been mentioned
as Jamman 12. On its basis, ½ equal share in Gata No. 227 /
1.440, equal share of Salum in Gata No. 232 min./ 0.551,
232/ 0.183, 232/ 0.539 and 233/ 1.624 have been determined,
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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which road is situated on both sides of Hashiya Doharighat
to Gazipur, in which Applicant has got 1/3rd share in Gata
Nos. 232 and 233 and Applicants have got ½ share in Gata
No. 227 / 1.440 acres and present Gata No. 158, in regard to
which according to the order passed by the Additional Civil
Judge, Azamgarh on 31.05.1976, Applicants Suresh and
others have got 1/8th share in Gatas No. 232, 233 i.e. in present
Gata No. 158 measuring 0.583 and 1/16th share in Gatas No.
160 and 161.”
7. The respondents herein objected to the aforesaid report. Both
the parties were given opportunity to file their documents. An opportunity
of hearing was also given to the parties and thereafter the competent
authority i.e. SLAO, Mau proceeded to determine the shares of the
various parties in the land in question vide order dated 11.12.2019. This
order was passed under Section 3H(3) of the Act 1956. The SLAO
relied upon the earlier judgment of the Civil Court dated 31.05.1976. It is
the case of the appellants that the SLAO has correctly determined the
shares between the parties. The relevant portion of the order passed by
the competent authority/SLAO reads thus:-
“Above parties have been heard and evidences available in
the file have been duly perused. Khatauni for the crop year
1348 produced by the Objector in his support as evidence
have been examined. Present Khatauni for the crop year 1423-
1428, C. H. Form-41 and 45 and Form-11,
previous Khatauni
and order dated 31.05.1976 passed by the Hon’ble Court of
Additional Civil Judge, Azamgarh have been perused.
Hon’ble Court of Additional Civil Judge in its very passed
order has mentioned the pedigree of the family, which has
been mentioned by Tehsildar, Ghosi while perusing all the
documents. This pedigree and share mentioned in it confirms
the submission of the report. The Hon’ble Civil Court has
categorically spoken on the issue of share in the suit while
framing issue No.1 “Whether the Plaintiff is co- owner and
in the possession over the trees of list Ka to the extent of the
1/4th and list Kha 1/8th and 1/12th of the list Ga as alleged in
the plaint?” While deciding the above mentioned issue as well
as others, Hon’ble Court of Additional Civil Judge, Azamgarh
has clearly mentioned in its order “In view of the above
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pedigree and the documents, the share of Ganga, father of
Bhola and Sukdeo was 1/4th in the grove of plot No. 208 (new
number 158). “Further, “In view of what has been discussed
above, I arrived at the irresistible conclusion that Bhola had
1;sth share in Plot No. 208 (Old 227), 1/32nd share into trees
of plot No. 213 and 214 (232 and 233 old) and 1/16th share
in tree of Doharighat - Ghazipur Road.” In the above judicial
order, partition of trees with land and shares finds mention,
but balance of convenience is falling in favour of the
Respondent Vinod. In my view, all the people who are present
in the joint tenureship/co- tenureship their share is to be
decided on the basis of pedigree. Therefore, when the pedigree
has been decided by a competent Civil Court against which
the Defendants have never appealed, hence judicial estoppel
also in the same. Accordingly, the claim of Mr. suresh Gupta
is not justified. Even earlier also, report was sought from
Tehsil Ghosi in the present case in regard to objection on the
determination of the share, on which while granting sufficient
opportunity of hearing to both the parties, same was furnished
by Tehsildar Ghosi while determining the share. Even by
appearing before the Court, both the parties have expressed
the consent in regard to this fact that Suraj, Ganga, Baldev
Salik and Radhakrishan were the children of Shri Brijmohan,
in which Baldev died without children and thus, all of them
shall have 1/4th share in
the property of Brijmohan. Ganga
had two children namely Bholanath and Sukt1dev. Applicant
Suresh is the heir of Shri Dwarika, son of Parag, who had
bought the property from Bholanath in the auction.
Accordingly, Bholanath can auction out that much only of
which he is an owner lawfully. It shall also be pertinent to
mention this fact also that consolidation proceedings have
already been conducted in village Ahirani Buzurg, only after
which, present records CH Form 11, 23, 41 and 45 have been
prepared and Khatauni has been formed on their basis.
Applicant Suresh Gupta or any member of his family has
neither raised any objection in this regard before the Court
nor has produced any evidence of initiating any proceedings
in the Court, therefore, he is barred by Section 49 of the
Consolidation of Holding Act.
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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ORDER
Thus, in pursuance of the evidence available on the file,
present Khatauni, report of the then Tehsildar, Ghosi and
order of Hon’ble Court of Additional Civil Judge, share
produced on the file are satisfactory and correct. Accordingly,
by preparing file for payment of compensation, same be
produced. After doing needful, file be consigned to Record
Room.
Sd/- illegible
(Atul Vats)
Competent Authority/ SLAO
Mau
11.12.2019"
8. The respondents, being dissatisfied with the order dated
11.12.2019 passed by the SLAO referred to above, challenged the same
by filing a petition before the District Magistrate, Mau invoking Section
3G(5) of the Act 1956. It is the case of the appellants herein that the
District Magistrate, Mau without any jurisdiction and further without
giving any opportunity of hearing to the appellants proceeded to pass an
order dated 16.01.2020 granting higher shares in favour of the respondents
towards compensation. The operative portion of the order passed by the
District Magistrate, Mau reads thus:-
“ORDER
On the basis of the above examination, order dated
11.12.2019 of the competent Officer/Special Land Acquisition
Officer, Mau is set aside. File is remanded back to the
competent Officer with this direction that while duly examining
the records produced by the above parties, keeping in view
the ownership of the land acquired by the ancestors of the
objectors in the auction and according to the
separate
pedigrees of Khatedar, share of Khatedars be determined and
also produce the proposal from Tehsil for taking action against
the officials/employees who produced erroneous report.”
9. The appellants herein, being dissatisfied with the order passed
by the District Magistrate, Mau referred to above, challenged the same
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before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by filing Writ-C No.
7310 of 2020. The said writ application came to be rejected by a Division
Bench of the High Court vide its order dated 28.02.2020. The order
passed by the High Court reads thus:-
“1. Heard Sri Yadvendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for
petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for respondents.
2. Writ petition is directed against order dated 16.01.2020
passed by District Magistrate, Mau in purported exercise of
power under Section 3(G)(5) of National Highway Act, 1956
(hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1956”) whereby he has set
aside order passed by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Mau
passed on 11.12.2019 and remanded the matter for
redetermination.
3. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that
determination was already made but could not dispute that
District Magistrate was competent to examine the order passed
by Special Land Acquisition Officer and take appropriate
decision in accordance with law and order impugned in
present writ petition is not without jurisdiction. No otherwise
error could be shown in the impugned order.
4. Writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed.”
10. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants came
before this Court by filing the special leave petition. This Court vide
order dated 31.08.2020 issued notice and stayed the operation of the
order passed by the District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020. Later,
leave was granted and the appeal came to be
admitted.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
11. Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants, vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a serious
error in passing the impugned order. He submitted that the order which
came to be passed by the competent authority dated 11.12.2019 could
be said to be under Section 3H(3) of the Act 1956. If the respondents
had any grievance in regard to the order passed by the competent
authority the remedy available in law to them was to approach the
competent authority so that the competent authority could have referred
the matter to the Civil Court. According to the learned counsel, such
procedure is laid down under Section 3H(4) of the Act 1956.
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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12. The learned counsel further submitted that the District
Magistrate, Mau who is an arbitrator appointed by the Central
Government does not have any jurisdiction to decide the apportionment
of the compensation. He is empowered only to decide the quantum of
compensation under Section 3G(5) of the Act 1956 as an arbitrator.
13. The learned counsel submitted that challenge before the District
Magistrate, Mau was to the order dated 11.12.2019 passed by the
competent authority which he could not have entertained. The order
passed by the District Magistrate dated 16.01.2020 could be said to be
without jurisdiction.
14. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that even otherwise
the impugned order passed by the District Magistrate, Mau, could be
said to be without jurisdiction as no notice or any opportunity of hearing
was given to the appellants.
15. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel
prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed
and the order passed by the District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020
be quashed and set aside and the writ application filed by the appellants
before the High Court be allowed.
SUMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.
1 – DISTRICT MAGISGRATE, MAU AND THE
RESPONDENT NO. 2 - COMPETENT AUTHORITY/
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, MAU
16. Shri V.K. Shukla, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
District Magistrate, Mau (respondent No. 1)
and Competent Authority/
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Mau (respondent No. 2), very fairly
submitted that the High Court committed an error in rejecting the writ
application filed by the appellants herein. Shri Shukla submitted that the
District Magistrate, Mau could not have entertained any petition filed at
the instance of the respondents seeking to challenge the order passed by
the competent authority dated 11.12.2019 under Section 3H(3) of the
Act 1956. In such circumstances referred to above, Shri Shukla submitted
that appropriate relief be granted in favour of the appellants.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS.
4, 6 AND 16
17. Shri Arvind Kumar Shukla, the learned counsel appearing for
the respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 16, submitted that no error not to speak of
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any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High
Court in passing the impugned order. He submitted that the dispute, in
substance, is not one of apportionment but is in respect of the share in
the subject land. In such circumstances, the District Magistrate, Mau
had the jurisdiction and competence to look into the order passed by the
competent authority by relying upon the order dated 31.05.1976 passed
by the Principal Civil Judge, Azamgarh in Civil Suit No. 63 of 1970. In
such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that
there being no merit in the present appeal, the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
18. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the impugned order.
19. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either
side, we must look into few relevant provisions of the Act 1956.
20. Section 3A reads thus:-
“3A. Power to acquire land, etc.—(1) Where the Central
Government is satisfied that for a public purpose any land is
required for the building, maintenance, management or
operation of a national highway or part thereof, it may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, declare its intention to
acquire such land.
(2) Every notification under sub-section (1) shall give a brief
description of the land.
(3) The competent authority shall
cause the substance of the
notification to be published in two local newspapers, one of
which will be in a vernacular language.”
21. Section 3C provides for hearing of objections. Section 3D
provides for declaration of acquisition. Section 3E provides for power to
take possession. Section 3G is with respect to determination of amount
payable as compensation. Section 3G reads thus:-
“3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.—
(1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be
paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the
competent authority.
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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(2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an
easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall
be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose
right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any
manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount
calculated at ten per cent, of the amount determined under
sub-section (1), for that land.
(3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authority
shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers,
one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims
from all persons interested in the land to be acquired.
(4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and
shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in
person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in
sub-section (2) of section 3C, before the competent authority,
at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective
interest in such land.
(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either
of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either
of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed
by the Central Government.
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall
apply to every
arbitration under this Act.
(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while
determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section
(5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration—
(a)
the market value of the land on the date of
publication of the notification under section 3A;
(b)
the damage, if any, sustained by the person
interested at the time of taking possession of the
land, by reason of the severing of such land from
other land;
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(c)
the damage, if any, sustained by the person
interested at the time of taking possession of the
land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously
affecting his other immovable property in any
manner, or his earnings;
(d)
if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land,
the person interested is compelled to change his
residence or place of business, the reasonable
expenses, if any, incidental to such change.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Section 3H is with respect to deposit and payment of amount.
What is relevant for our purpose is sub-clause (4) of Section 3H.
Sub-clause (4) reads thus:-
“3H. Deposit and payment of amount.—
(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount
or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any
part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer
the dispute to the decision of the principal civil court of
original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction
the land is situated.”
23. The scheme of the Act 1956 and the statutory provisions
referred to above makes it very clear that once any land is acquired
under the Act 1956, the competent authority is obliged to pay an amount
by way of compensation. There is a procedure which has been prescribed
under Section 3G of the Act 1956. Sub-clause (5) of Section 3G makes
it abundantly clear that if the amount determined by the competent
authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 3G is not
acceptable to either of the parties,
the amount will have to be determined
by the arbitrator who may be appointed by the Central Government on
the strength of an application by either of the parties. Section 3H provides
that the amount determined towards compensation under Section 3G
will have to be deposited by the Central Government in accordance with
the rules. It is only after such amount is deposited by the competent
authority that the possession of the land can be taken. Sub-clause (4) of
Section 3H talks about apportionment of the amount. The language of
sub-clause (4) of Section 3H is plain and simple. It provides that if any
disputes arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof,
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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the competent authority is obliged to refer the dispute to the decision of
the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose
jurisdiction the land is situated.
24. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely
misread the provisions of the Act 1956. It fell into error as it failed to
apply the well settled principle of law that for construing a legal provision,
the first and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction. All
that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision
state. If the provision is unambiguous and from the provision the legislative
intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction
of statute. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when
the legislative intent is not clear.
25. It may be mentioned in the aforesaid context that the first and
foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of
interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of
interpretation, for example, the mischief rule/ purposive construction,
etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are
ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify
the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely
clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of
interpretation other than the literal
rule. The language employed in a
statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislature
is presumed to have made no mistakes. The presumption is that it intended
to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the
words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the
deficiency.
26. There is a fine distinction between determining the amount to
be paid towards compensation and the apportionment of the amount.
The legislature has thought fit to confer powers upon the Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction to determine the dispute arising as to the
apportionment of the amount. There is a reason, why the legislature has
thought fit to confer such power to the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction is land is situated. We
shall try to explain hereinafter.
27. The question of apportionment of compensation is not free
from difficulties. In apportioning the compensation, the Court has to give
to each claimant the value of the interest which he has lost by compulsory
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acquisition. So stated, the proposition may appear simple, but in its
practical application numerous complicated problems arise in apportioning
the compensation awarded. The difficulty experienced is due to the nature
of a variety of interests, rights and claims to land which have to be
valued in terms of money. The compensation awarded for compulsory
acquisition is the value of all the interests which are extinguished and
that compensation has to be distributed equitably amongst persons having
interest therein and the Court must proceed to apportion the compensation
so that the aggregate value of all interests is equal to the amount of
compensation awarded. But in the valuation of competing interests, which
from its very nature is dependent upon indefinite factors and uncertain
data, considerable difficulty is encountered. Indisputably, in apportioning
compensation the Court cannot proceed upon hypothetical considerations
but must proceed as far as possible to make an accurate determination
of the value of the respective interests which are lost. The Court must,
in each case, having regard to the circumstances and the possibility of a
precise determination of the value having regard to the materials available,
adopt that method of valuation which equitably distributes the
compensation between the persons entitled thereto. [See : Dossibai
Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha, (1956) 60 Bom LR 1208]
28. Thus, the only general principle one could state is
that
apportionment under sub-clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956 is not
a revaluation but a distribution of the value already fixed among the
several persons interested in the land acquired in accordance with the
nature and quantum of the respective interests.In ascertainment of those
interests, the determination of their relative importance and the manner
in which they can be said to have contributed to the total value fixed are
questions to be decided in the light of the circumstances of each case
and the relevant provisions of law governing the rights of the parties.
The actual rule for apportionment has to be formulated in each case so
as to ensure a just and equitable distribution of the total value or
compensation among the persons interested in the land.
29. In the circumstances referred to above, the legislature thought
fit to assign such function to none other than the Principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction.
30. We are not impressed by the submission canvassed on behalf
of the respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 16 that the dispute between the parties
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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is not one of apportionment but the same is with regard to giving effect
to the order passed by the Civil Court in Civil Suit No. 63 of 1970 decided
on 31.05.1976. What is perhaps sought to be argued is that the shares in
the land acquired should be determined on the basis of some order passed
by the Civil Court referred to above. Thus, if the private respondents
want to rely upon the order passed by the Civil Court, they can do so
before the Court of the Principal Judge of original jurisdiction. We hold
that the District Magistrate, Mau has no power or jurisdiction in regard
to the apportionment of the amount.
31. We fail to understand on what basis the High Court in its
impugned order has observed that the District Magistrate is competent
to examine the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer
and decide the dispute as to the apportionment of the amount.
32. In the decision in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, reported in
2003 MhLJ Online (S.C.) 23 = AIR 2003 SC 942, this Court had an
occasion to consider the ambit and scope of Sections 30 and 31 resply of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In analyzing and interpreting these
provisions, this Court held as under:-
“23. The two provisions contemplating power of the Collector
to make reference as contained in Section 18 and Section 30
of the Act need a comparative study. Under Section 18 the
subject-matter of reference can be a dispute as to any one or
more of
the following: (i) as to the measurement of the land,
(ii) as to the amount or the quantum of the compensation, (iii)
as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable, (iv)
as to the apportionment of the compensation among the
persons interested. Under Section 30 the subject matter of
dispute can be: (i) the apportionment of the amount of
compensation or any part thereof, (ii) the persons to whom
the amount of compensation or any part thereof is payable.
Though the expression employed in Section 18 is ‘the amount
of compensation’ while the expression employed in Section
30 is ‘the amount of compensation or any part thereof’, this
distinction in legislative drafting is immaterial and insignificant
and a dispute as to entitlement or apportionment of part of
the compensation would also be covered by Section 18 of the
Act on the principle that the whole includes a part too. Thus,
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at the first blush, it seems that Section 30 overlaps Section 18
in part; but as will be seen shortly hereinafter, it is not so.
24. Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar (supra) is a three-Judge
Bench decision of this Court wherein the scheme of the Act
by reference to the power vesting in the Collector to make a
reference came up for the consideration of the Court. The
three-Judge Bench by a majority of 2:1 laid down the
following principles :
(i) There are two provisions in the Act under which the
Collector can make a reference to the Court, namely,
Section 18 and Section 30. The powers under the two
sections are distinct and may be invoked in contingencies
which do not overlap. A person shown in that part of the
award which relates to apportionment of compensation who
is present either personally or through a representative or
on whom notice is issued under Section 12(2), must, if he
does not accept the award, apply to the Collector to refer
the matter to the Court under Section 18 within the time
prescribed thereunder. But a person who has not appeared
in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector may, if
he is not served with notice of filing, raise a dispute as to
apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable
and apply to the Court for a reference under Section 30,
for determination of his right to compensation which may
have existed before the award, or which may have devolved
upon him since the award. For a reference under Section
30, no period of limitation is prescribed.
(ii) It is not predicated of the exercise of the power to make
a reference under Section 30 that the Collector has not
apportioned the compensation money by his award.
(iii) The award made by the Collector under Section 11 is
not the source of the right to compensation. An award is
strictly speaking only an offer made by the Government to
the person interested in the land notified for acquisition;
the person interested is not bound to accept it and the
Government can also withdraw the acquisition u/s 48. It is
only when possession of the land has been taken by the
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
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Government u/s 16 that the right of the owner of the land
is extinguished. Therefore the appellant’s contention that
title to compensation is derived solely from and on the date
of the award could not be accepted.
(iv) The liability of the Government u/s 31 to pay
compensation to the person entitled thereto under the award
does not imply that only the persons to whom compensation
is directed to be paid under the award may raise a dispute
u/s 30. The scheme of apportionment by the Collector under
Section 11 is conclusive only between the Collector and
the persons interested and not among the persons
interested. Payment of compensation u/s 31 to the persons
declared in the award to be entitled thereto discharges the
State of its liability to pay compensation leaving it open to
the claimant to compensation to agitate his right in a
reference u/s 30 or by a separate suit.
(v) Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act the title of the
appellant to the land noticed for acquisition became vested
in the State and therefore the right to compensation for the
land acquired devolved upon the State. A dispute then arose
between the State Government and the appellant “as to
the persons to whom” compensation was payable.
The State had no right to the compensation payable for
the land under a title existing before the date of the
award of the Collector and no application could be
made by it as a person interested within the meaning of
Section 18. But a dispute between the appellant and
the State as to their conflicting claims to the
compensation money was clearly a dispute which could
be referred u/s 30 of the Act to the Court. There is
nothing in Section 30 which excludes a reference to the
Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom the title
of the owner of the land has since the award, devolved.
30. The scheme of the Act reveals that the remedy of reference
u/s 18 is intended to be available only to a ‘person interested’.
A person present either personally or through representative
or on whom a notice is served u/s 12(2) is obliged, subject to
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his specifying the test as to locus, to apply to the Collector
within the time prescribed u/s 18(2) to make a reference to
the Court. The basis of title on which the reference would be
sought for u/s 18 would obviously be a pre- existing title by
reference to the date of the award. So is Section 29, which
speaks of ‘persons interested’. Finality to the award spoken
of by Section 12(1) of the Act is between the Collector on one
hand and the ‘persons interested’ on the other hand and
attaches to the issues relating to (i) the true area, i.e.
measurement of the land, (ii) the value of the land, i.e. the
quantum of compensation, and (iii) apportionment of the
compensation among the ‘persons interested’. The ‘persons
interested’ would be bound by the award without regard to
the fact whether they have respectively appeared before the
Collector or not. The finality to the award spoken of by Section
29 is as between the ‘persons interested’ inter se and is
confined to the issue as to the correctness of the
apportionment. Section 30 is not confined in its operation
only to ‘persons interested’. It would, therefore, be available
for being invoked by the ‘persons interested’ if they were
neither present nor represented in proceedings before the
Collector, nor were served with notice u/s 12(2) of the Act or
when they claim on the basis of a title coming into existence
post award. The definition of ‘person interested’ speaks of
‘an interest in compensation to be
made’. An interest coming
into existence post award gives rise to a claim in compensation
which has already been determined. Such a person can also
have recourse to Section 30. In any case, the dispute for which
Section 30 can be invoked shall remain confined only (i) as
to the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any
part thereof, or (ii) as to the persons to whom the amount of
compensation (already determined) or any part thereof is
payable. The State claiming on the basis of a pre-existing
right would not be a ‘person interested’, as already pointed
out hereinabove and on account of its right being pre- existing,
the State, in such a case, would not be entitled to invoke either
Section 18 or Section 30 seeking determination of its alleged
pre-existing right. A right accrued or devolved post award
may be determined in a reference u/s 30 depending on
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
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Collector’s discretion to show indulgence, without any bar
as to limitation. Alternatively, such a right may be left open
by the Collector to be adjudicated upon in any independent
legal proceedings. This view is just, sound and logical as a
title post award could not have been canvassed upto the date
of the award and should also not be left without remedy by
denying access to Section 30. Viewed from this angle, Section
18 and 30 would not overlap and would have fields to operate
independent of each other.
37. The Collector acts as a representative of the State whilst
holding proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In fact,
he conducts the proceedings on behalf of the State. The award
of the Collector is not the source of the right to compensation;
it is the pre- existing right which is recognized by the Collector
and guided by the findings arrived at in determining the
objections, if any, the Collector quantifies the amount of
compensation to be placed as an offer of the appropriate
Government to the owner recognized by the State. The offeree
may accept or decline the offer. It he accepts the offer and
the Government takes possession over the land, the title of
the offeree is extinguished and vests absolutely in the
Government free from all encumbrances. The power to make
an award under Section 11 and to make a reference under
Sections 18 or 30 of the Act is a statutory power. The sweep
of jurisdiction of Court
to determine the disputes is also
statutory and is controlled by the bounds created by Section
17 or 30 whereunder the reference has been made to the Court.
The power has to be exercised to the extent to which it has
been conferred by the Statute and on availability of pre-
existing conditions on the availability of which and which
alone the power can be exercised.
38. Award made by the Collector is final and conclusive as
between the Collector and the ‘persons interested’, whether
they have appeared before the Collector or not, on two issues
: (i) as to true area, i.e. measurement of land acquired, (ii) as
to value of the land, i.e. the amount of compensation, and
(iii) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the
‘persons interested’ again, between the Collector and the
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‘persons interested’ and not as amongst the ‘persons interested’
inter se. In the event of a reference having been sought for u/
s 18, the Collector’s award on these issues; if varied by Civil
Court, shall stand superseded to that extent. The scheme of
the Act does not attach a similar finality to the award of the
Collector on the issue as to the person to whom compensation
is payable; in spite of the award by Collector and even on
failure to seek reference, such issue has been left available
to be adjudicated upon by any competent forum.”
33. We are of the view that when it comes to resolving the dispute
relating to apportionment of the amount determined towards
compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction
which can do so. Principal Civil Court means the Court of the District
Judge.
34. Our final conclusion is as under:- If any dispute arises as to
the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to
whom the same or any part thereof is payable, then, the competent
authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the
land is situated. The competent authority possesses certain powers of
the Civil Court, but in the event of a dispute of the above nature, the
summary power, vesting in the competent authority of rendering an
opinion in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 3H, will not serve the
purpose. The dispute
being of the nature triable by the Civil Court that
the law steps in to provide for that to be referred to the decision of the
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The dispute regarding
apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to
whom the same or any part thereof is payable, would then have to be
decided by that Court.
35. In such circumstance referred to above, the order passed by
the District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020 is hereby quashed and
set aside. The writ application No. 7310 of 2020 stands allowed. In view
of the dispute between the parties as regards apportionment of the
amount of compensation, the Special Land Acquisition Officer shall now
refer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in
accordance with sub-clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956.
36. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU &
ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

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37. There shall be no order as to costs.
38. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of accordingly.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)