PRAHLAD RAUT versus ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES
[2019] 11 S.C.R. 809, Supreme Court of India, 2019
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
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PRAHLAD RAUT
v.
ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES
(Civil Appeal No. 6640 of 2019)
AUGUST 27, 2019
[R. BANUMATHI AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: s. 21 – Limitation –
Suspension of appellant-Steward on charges of embezzlement and
misappropriation – Registration of FIR – Thereafter, appellant
committed theft in public place and registration of second FIR and
conviction u/s. 379 IPC – Issuance of Memorandum removing
appellant from service from the date of his conviction and direction
to refund the subsistence allowance received by him – After a decade
on account of compromise between the appellant and respondent,
first FIR quashed by the High Court – Representation moved by
appellant demanding retiral benefits – After 13 years from the date
of Memorandum, application filed by appellant challenging the
Memorandum – Tribunal set aside the memorandum and granted
all benefits to the appellant – Writ petition by the respondent –
Allowed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Sub-Section (3) of
Section 21 is attracted when there is sufficient cause for the delay
in filing an appeal beyond the period of limitation – Finding of the
tribunal that the application had been filed within limitation, is
patently erroneous and was rightly not accepted by the High Court
– Successive representations do not save limitation and does not
justify delay of about thirteen years in approaching the tribunal –
Memorandum had to be challenged before
the tribunal within the
period of limitation as prescribed in s. 21(1)(b), which would start
running from the date of expiry of six months from the date of filing
of appeal or alternatively the appellant would have to show
sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application beyond the
period prescribed by limitation – It cannot be said that the quashing
of the first FIR gave rise to afresh cause of action – Forfeiture of
pensionary benefits by reason of a punitive order of termination is
not a continuing cause of action – First FIR was not quashed on
the ground that the same did not disclose any offence or was
   [2019] 11 S.C.R. 809
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otherwise frivolous, vexatious or harassive – Also it cannot be said
that absolute penury led the appellant  to commit the offence u/s.
379 – Any sympathy for the appellant would be completely misplaced
– Thus, the order of the High Court is upheld – Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 – r. 19(1).
Limitation: Object of – Held: Law of limitation is founded on
public policy – Object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and
dead disputes – Person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim
after a long delay – When retiral benefits are withheld without cause,
there would be a continuing cause of action – However, when
retirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, the
order would necessarily have to be challenged within the period of
limitation or alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause
for the delay.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Sub–Section (3) of Section 21 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is attracted when there is
sufficient cause for the delay in filing an appeal beyond the period
of limitation. The finding of the tribunal that the Original
Application had been filed within limitation, is patently erroneous
and has rightly not been accepted by the High Court. It is well
settled that successive representations do not save limitation
and certainly does not justify delay of about thirteen years in
approaching the tribunal.
[Para 27, 28][821-A, C]
1.2 Removal under Rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 entails the
consequence of forfeiture of retiral benefits such as pension. The
order of 6.01.2000 necessarily had to be challenged before the
Tribunal within the period of limitation or alternatively the
appellant would have to show sufficient cause for the delay in
filing the Original Application beyond the period prescribed by
limitation. The question of entitlement, if at all, of the appellant
to gratuity and provident fund, notwithstanding his removal by
the Memorandum dated 6.01.2000 was neither raised before nor
considered by the Tribunal. Nor was the question considered by
the High Court. The question cannot be raised at the stage of
this appeal. [Para 32][823-E, F]
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1.3 The High Court has very rightly taken note of the fact
that the first FIR had been quashed pursuant to a settlement
between the parties in terms whereof the appellant paid an amount
of Rs.2 lakhs and another amount of Rs.2,46,130/– by way of
bankers’ cheque, by way of compensation for the loss caused to
the Cooperative Society. [Para 34, 35][824-C]
1.4 The order of dismissal dated 6.1.2000 under Rule 19(i)of
CCS(CCA) Rules, 1985 was challenged on 2013 after almost 13
years. Even assuming that the appeal was never decided, the
cause of action for filing an application before the tribunal would
have arisen on expiry of six months from the date of filing the
appeal, in view of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act. The application to
the tribunal would have to be filed within the period of limitation
as prescribed in Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, which would start
running from the date of expiry of six months from the date of
filing of appeal. The contention of the appellant that the quashing
of the first FIR gave rise to afresh cause of action is completely
misconceived. The High Court rightly declined to accept the
finding of the tribunal that the O.A. was within the period of
limitation. [Para 37, 39][824-E-F; 825-B,F]
1.5 The High Court rightly held that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy.  The object of limitation is to put a
quietus on stale and dead disputes. A person ought not to be
allowed to agitate his claim after a long delay. There can
be no
doubt that when retiral benefits are withheld without cause, there
would be a continuing cause of action.  However, when retirement
benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, the order would
necessarily have to be challenged within the period of limitation
or alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause for the
delay. Once there is cessation of employer–employee relationship
by an order of termination, the cause of action would necessarily
arise when the order of termination is passed. The forfeiture of
pensionary benefits by reason of a punitive order of termination
is not a continuing cause of action. [Para 44][827-E-G]
1.6 It cannot be said that this Court take a sympathetic
view of the plight of the appellant considering that the first FIR
PRAHLAD RAUT v. ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF
MEDICAL SCIENCES
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was quashed and after the conviction pursuant to the second FIR
the appellant was released on probation of good conduct after
which there was no further complaint against him. The first FIR
was quashed pursuant to a settlement between the appellant and
the respondent in terms whereof the appellant compensated the
pecuniary loss caused by him to the Cooperative Society. The
FIR was not quashed on the ground that the same did not disclose
any offence or was otherwise frivolous, vexatious or harassive.
While under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary
proceedings for misconduct related to the first FIR, the appellant
committed theft of a bag containing money at a public place for
which he was convicted under Section 379 IPC. It cannot be said
that absolute penury led him to commit the offence since the
appellant was receiving subsistence allowance while under
suspension. Any sympathy for the appellant would be completely
misplaced. Thus, the judgment and order of the High Court does
not call for any interference. [Para 45, 46, 47][827-H; 828-A-D]
Sardar Singh v. Union of India (1991) SCC Online
P&H 1943; Union of India and Others v. Tarsem Singh
(2008) 8 SCC 648 : [2008] 12 SCR 104; Union Bank
of India and Others v. C.G. Ajay Babu and Another
(2018) 9 SCC 529 : [2018] 9 SCR 995; S.S. Rathore v.
State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 582 : [1989] 1
Suppl. SCR 43; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Syed
Qamarali (1967) 1 SLR
228; State of Punjab and Others
vs. Gurdev Singh (1991) 4 SCC 1 : [1991] 3 SCR 663
– referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2008] 12 SCR 104
referred to
Para 28
[2018] 9 SCR 995
referred to
Para 29
[1989] 1 Suppl. SCR 43
referred to
Para 33
(1967) 1 SLR 228
referred to
Para 38
[1991] 3 SCR 663
referred to
Para 40
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6640
Of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated  24.07.2017  of the  High
Court  of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5977 of 2016
Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Puneet Singh Bindra, Ms. Simran
Jeet, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dushyant Parashar, Adv. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
INDIRA BANERJEE, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal is against a judgment and order dated 24.07.2017
of the Delhi High Court, allowing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5977 of 2016
filed by the respondent, and setting aside the order dated 29.02.2016
passed by the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal at
New Delhi, whereby the learned Tribunal had allowed Original Application
(O.A.) No.3381 of 2013 filed by the appellant challenging an order dated
6.1.2000 removing the appellant from the service of the respondent.
3. The appellant was appointed by the respondent as Bearer on
09.02.1972 and was promoted to the post of Steward on 15.10.1987. He
was elected as an executive member of the Cooperative Society known
as AIIMS Cooperative, Thrift and Credit Society, hereinafter referred
to as “Cooperative Society”, run by the respondent, and became its
treasurer.
4. On or about 5.3.1991, a First Information Report being  FIR
No.91 of 1991 under Sections 406/420/ 468/471/477A/120B of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC), hereinafter referred to as the first FIR,  was registered
against the
appellant at the Defence Colony Police Station at New Delhi,
allegedly for causing loss to the tune of Rs.5 Lakhs to the Cooperative
Society by forging the signatures of its members.
5. The appellant was arrested on 05.06.1991 and was in custody
till 12.06.1991.  By reason of his detention for more than 48 hours, the
appellant was, by an order dated 7.8.1991, placed under deemed
suspension in terms of Rule 10(2) of the Central Civil Services
PRAHLAD RAUT v. ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF
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(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, hereinafter referred to
as “CCS (CCA) Rules” and subsistence allowance was paid to him.
6. While the appellant was under suspension, another FIR No.868
of 1991 under Sections 356/379/411 of the IPC, hereinafter referred to
as the second FIR, was registered against the appellant at the Connaught
Place Police Station at New Delhi, allegedly for snatching a bag containing
cash of Rs.290/- and two lottery tickets from one Jai Ram son of Chimma
Ram. Criminal proceedings commenced in pursuance of the second FIR.
By a judgment and order dated 15.9.1993, the appellant was convicted
by the Metropolitan Magistrate Delhi under Section 379 of the Indian
Penal Code.
7. Admittedly, the second FIR was registered against the appellant
while he was under suspension. On behalf of the respondent, it has been
contended that the respondent had no knowledge of the second FIR or
of the judgment and order dated 15.09.1993, of conviction of the appellant
under Section 379 of the IPC, for about 7 years.
8. On 16.09.1993, the respondent had been released on probation
of good conduct for a period of one year, on condition of furnishing a
personal bond and one surety of Rs.5,000/-.  These orders were apparently
concealed from the respondent.
9. It is the case of the respondent, that the respondent came to
know about the second FIR and the conviction of the appellant pursuant
thereto, after about
7 years, after which the respondent was removed
from service by a memorandum dated 6.1.2000 issued under Rule 19(i)
of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The said Memorandum is extracted
hereinbelow:-
“Whereas Shri Prahlad Raut, Steward (under suspension) from
5.6.1991 on charge of embezzling and mis-appropriation in
view of F.I.R. No.91 dated 3.3.1991 under Section 406/420/
468/471/477-A and 120-B IPC
And whereas Shri Prahlad Raut was later on charge for an
offence of theft of a bag in public place, he had been
convicted by the Court of Shri D.K. Saini, Metropolitan
Magistrate, New Delhi under section 356/379/411 IPC vide
judgment dated 16.9.1993.
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As whereas it is considered that the conduct of the said Shri
Prahlad Raut which had held to his conviction is such as to
render his further retention in the service of the Institute
undesirable.
And whereas Shri Prahlad Raut was given an opportunity
to offer his written explanation.
And whereas the said Shri Prahlad Raut has given a written
explanation which has been duly considered by the
undersigned.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by the
Rule 19 (1) of the C.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rule 1965 the undersigned
removes the said Shri Prahlad Raut from the service of the
Institute from the date of the conviction i.e. 16.9.1993.
Shri Prahlad Raut therefore is directed to deposit the
subsistence allowance as received by him from the A.I.I.M.S.
beyond 16.9.1993.”
10. By the said memorandum dated 6.01.2000, issued under Rule
19(i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the respondent removed the appellant
from service with retrospective effect from 16.9.1993, being the date of
his conviction, pursuant to the second FIR, and directed him to refund
the subsistence allowance received by him from 16.9.1993 onwards.
11. Rule 19 of the CCS(CCA) Rules is set out hereinbelow for
convenience:
“19. Special procedure in certain cases
Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 14 to Rule 18-
(i) where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant
on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction
on a criminal charge, or
(ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied
for reasons
to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in
these rules, or
PRAHLAD RAUT v. ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF
MEDICAL SCIENCES [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
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(iii) where the President is satisfied that in the interest of
the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold any
inquiry in the manner provided in these rules.
The Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances
of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit:
[Provided that the Government servant may be given an
opportunity of making representation on the penalty
proposed to be Imposed before any order is made in a
case under Clause (i):
Provided further that the Commission shall be consulted,
where such consultation is necessary, [and the Government
servant has been given an opportunity of representing the
advice of the Commission,] before any orders are made in
any case under this rule.]”
12. The memorandum dated 6.1.2000 indicates compliance of the
requisites for imposition of penalty under Rule 19(i) of the CCS(CCA)
Rules.  It is a matter of record that the appellant was convicted of offence
under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code for committing theft at a
public place. The said memorandum reveals that the conduct of the
appellant of committing theft in a public place, while under suspension
on the serious charge of embezzlement and misappropriation, for which
he was convicted under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code was duly
considered. On such consideration the concerned authority found
retention of the appellant in the service of the respondent to be undesirable.
13. The appellant
has apparently been given an opportunity of
hearing.  The memorandum dated 6.1.2000 records that the appellant
had submitted a written explanation which had duly been considered
before removing the appellant from the service of the respondent, from
the date of his conviction.
14. According to the appellant, aggrieved by the said decision, the
appellant appealed to the President of the respondent, to which there
was no response. The respondent claims that the appeal was rejected in
the same year, that is, in 2000. However, no order of rejection is traceable.
15. Over a decade after the appellant was removed from service,
he entered into a settlement with the  respondent, in terms whereof he
compensated the respondent for the loss caused by him to the Cooperative
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Society.  As a consequence of the compromise, the first FIR, that is, FIR
No. 91 of 1991 was quashed by the High Court of Delhi on 2.11.2012.
Thereafter, the appellant made a representation demanding Pension,
Gratuity and Provident Fund with interest from the respondent. This is
not in dispute.
16. The appellant has also alleged that he made a request to the
respondent for withdrawal and/or cancellation of the Memorandum dated
6.1.2000, to which there was no response.
17. On or about 24.7.2013, that is, over thirteen years after the
issuance of the Memorandum dated 6.1.2000, removing the appellant
from service of the respondent, with retrospective effect from the date
of his conviction, the appellant filed Original Application No.3381 of 2013
before the learned Tribunal, challenging the Memorandum dated 6.1.2000.
18. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which
prescribes the period of limitation for filing an application in an
Administrative Tribunal provides:
“21. LIMITATION.-
(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,-
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in
clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in
connection with the grievance unless the application is made,
within one year from the date on which such final order has
been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is
mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has
been made and a period of six months had expired
thereafter
without such final order having been made, within one year
from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
where-
(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made
had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during
the period of three years immediately preceding the date on
which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal
PRAHLAD RAUT v. ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF
MEDICAL SCIENCES [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
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becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to
which such order relates; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had
been commenced before the said date before any High Court,
the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is
made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the
case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period
of six months from the said date, whichever period expires
later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the
period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of
sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months
specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the
Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the
application within such period.”
19. The pleadings of the appellant, in his application before the
Tribunal with regard to limitation, are extracted herein below :-
“3  Limitation
The application is within the period of limitation as prescribed
in Section 21 of the A.T. Act, 1985. Moreover, the applicant
challenges a per se illegal order of removal from service with
retrospective effect as well as his pension/GPF is withheld
and thus are continuing wrongs.”
20. Along with O.A. No.3381 of 2013 the appellant had filed an
application seeking condonation of delay and an affidavit stating that the
application for
condonation of delay had been filed in exercise of abundant
caution and to comply with procedural requirements.
21. In the application for condonation of delay, it was contended
that (i) the order of removal with retrospective effect being void ab
initio, the law of limitation would not apply; (ii) Delhi High Court had
quashed the first FIR by an order dated 2.11.2012 and this order gave
rise to a fresh cause of action; (iii) the respondent had filed an appeal
dated 21.01.2013 to the Appellate Authority, seeking review of the order
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of removal, to which there had been no response; (iv) the appellant had
continuing cause of action as pension/provident fund amount had illegally
been withheld; (v) the appellant being 67 years of age, had retired from
service, and was in a state of penury.
22. By an order dated 29.2.2016, the learned Tribunal set aside
the Memorandum dated 6.1.2000 and granted all the benefits to the
appellant. The Learned Tribunal held:-
“11. Having considered the matter, we are of the firm view
that the OA was filed within the period of limitation. It is not
a matter of dispute that the punishing authority has
retrospectively removed the applicant from service with effect
from 16.09.1993, that being the date of his conviction in a
criminal case by means of impugned order dated 06.01.2000.
Such orders are illegal, void ab initio and can be challenged
at any time.  The Hon’ble Apex Court in a celebrated judgment
in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Syed Qamarali
1967(I) SLR 228, which was subsequently followed in many
decisions, has authoritatively ruled that the order of dismissal
having been made in breach of mandatory provision of the
rules, such order of dismissal had, therefore, no legal existence
and it was not necessary for the respondents to have the order
set aside by the court. The defence of limitation which was
based only on contention that the order has to be set aside by
a court before it became invalid must, therefore, be rejected.
12. Not only that,
the applicant claimed that he has filed the
appeal on 23.02.2000 (Annexure A-5 Colly) to the Appellate
Authority which was received by the office of the President,
AIIMS, on 25.02.2000. Subsequently, he moved a
representation dated 21.01.2013 (Annexure A-6 Colly)
claiming all the consequential benefits by ignoring the
impugned removal order.
13. The contesting respondents have neither specifically
denied nor produced any cogent record even to indicate that
applicant has not filed any appeal (Annexure A-5 Colly)/
representation (Annexure A-6 Colly) or the same were decided
by the Appellate Authority. Moreover, the applicant has
claimed all consequential benefits along with amount of
PRAHLAD RAUT v. ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF
MEDICAL SCIENCES [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
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pension and other emoluments along with interest, which to
our mind, is recurring and continuing cause of action.
14. Thus, seen from any angle, it cannot possibly be said that
the OA filed by the applicant is barred by limitation as contrary
urged on behalf of respondents.  Hence, it is held that the
main OA filed by the applicant is within the prescribed period
of limitation and the crux of law laid down in Syed Qamarali
(supra) is fully applicable in the present case.
15. Once it is held that the main OA has been filed within the
period of limitation, learned counsel for applicant then
contended with some amount of vehemence that there is no
provision of law/rules that the applicant can retrospectively
be removed from his service with effect from 16.09.1993, the
date of his conviction, that too, simply on the ground of his
conviction in a criminal case by the impugned order dated
06.01.2000 by the competent authority.”
23. Aggrieved by the order dated 29.2.2016 passed by the learned
Tribunal, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 5977 of 2016, which has
been allowed by the High Court of Delhi by the judgment and order
dated 24.7.2017 impugned in this appeal.
24. We have heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Dushyant Parashar, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent and perused the documents on
record.
25. Ms. Arora submitted that the learned Tribunal
had rightly set
aside the order of removal on the ground that the same could not have
been passed with retrospective effect from 16.9.1993. Furthermore, a
mere conviction in a criminal case could not, as held by the learned
Tribunal, justify an order under Rule 19, which postulates satisfaction by
the Disciplinary Authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the
conduct of the employee, which had led to his conviction in the criminal
trial, was such that the punishment should be imposed.
26. Ms. Arora argued that the appellant had filed the Original
Application before learned Tribunal within limitation, which is also
supported by the non obstante clause in sub-Section (3) of Section 21
of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
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27. Sub-Section (3) of Section 21 has no application in the facts
and circumstances of this case, since the appellant contended and the
learned Tribunal accepted that the Original Application had been filed
within limitation. It was not the case of the appellant that there was
sufficient cause for the delay of about thirteen years beyond the period
of limitation in filing the Original Application. Nor has the Tribunal arrived
at any finding that there was good and sufficient cause for the delay of
about thirteen years, in filing the Application.
28. Sub-Section (3) of Section 21 is attracted when there is
sufficient cause for the delay in filing an appeal beyond the period of
limitation.  The finding of the learned Tribunal that the Original Application
had been filed within limitation, as argued by the appellant, is patently
erroneous and has rightly not been accepted by the High Court. It is well
settled that successive representations do not save limitation and certainly
does not justify delay of about thirteen years in approaching the Tribunal.
The judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court in Sardar Singh v. Union of India1 was rendered in the special
facts and circumstances of the case, where the claim of a soldier for
payment of disability pension was being denied only on the ground that
the disability was not attributable to, or aggravated by, military service.
29. In support of her argument that the learned Tribunal was
right
in entertaining and allowing the Original Application, Ms. Arora cited
Union of India and Others v. Tarsem Singh2where this Court held :-
“7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim
will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where
remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where
remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative
Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases
relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim
is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if
there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the
date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such
continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But
there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in
respect of any order or administrative decision which related
to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the
1 1991 SCC Online P&H 1943
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issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the
claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates
to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be
granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of
third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to
seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would
render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will
be applied. …..”
30. The proposition of law laid down by this Court in Tarsem
Singh (supra) is unexceptionable. It is well settled that where there is a
continuing wrong in relation to a service related claim, relief may be
granted notwithstanding delay, provided the granting of the relief does
not unsettle matters settled and affect third parties. The judgment was,
however, rendered in the context of discretionary relief in proceedings
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for which there is no
limitation prescribed.  Where the cause of action is not a continuing one
the High Courts refuse monetary claim on the ground of delay, specially
arrears. In this context it would be pertinent to refer to the concluding
part of Paragraph (7) and Paragraph (8) of the judgment of this Court in
Tarsem Singh (supra) extracted hereinbelow:
“7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will
be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is
sought by filing a writ
petition) or limitation (where remedy is
sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of
the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing
wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing
wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking
remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong
commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source
of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance
is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related
to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the
issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim
will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment
or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of
delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the
claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc.,
affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine
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of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential
relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the
principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a
consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief
relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the
date of filing of the writ petition.
8. In this case, the delay of sixteen years would affect the
consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified
in directing payment of arrears relating to sixteen years, and that
too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to
arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or
from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was
lesser. It ought not to have granted interest on arrears in such
circumstances.”
31. Ms. Arora argued that the appellant had not been paid pension,
gratuity and general provident fund even though the appellant had
completed service of over 20 years from 1972 to 1993. The appellant
had otherwise, actually completed 28 years of service. Ms. Arora also
attacked the direction on the appellant, in the Memorandum dated
6.1.2000, to return the subsistence allowance with effect from 16.9.1993.
32. Removal under Rule 19(i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965
entails the consequence of forfeiture of retiral benefits such as pension.
The order of 6.01.2000 necessarily had to be challenged before the
learned Tribunal
within the period of limitation or alternatively the appellant
would have to show sufficient cause for the delay in filing the Original
Application beyond the period prescribed by limitation. The question of
entitlement, if at all, of the appellant to gratuity and provident fund,
notwithstanding his removal by the Memorandum dated 6.01.2000 was
neither raised before nor considered by the learned Tribunal. Nor was
the question considered by the High Court. The question cannot be raised
at the stage of this appeal.
33. The question of retrospective discharge and removal cannot
be raised after lapse of thirteen years. Whether the judgment of this
Court in Union Bank of India and Others vs. C.G. Ajay Babu and
Another3 cited by Ms. Arora, at all has any application, cannot be
examined at the stage of this appeal.
3 (2018) 9 SCC 529
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34. As recorded by the High Court, as early as on 5.03.1991, FIR
No.91 (the first FIR) had been registered against the appellant who had
been elected Executive Member of the Cooperative Society. That FIR,
as observed above, was under Sections 406/420/468/471/477A/120B of
the IPC for causing, as Treasurer, pecuniary loss to the tune of Rs.5
lakhs to the Society, by forging signatures of its members.
35. The appellant was arrested on 5.06.1991 and had remained in
custody till 12.06.1991. By an order dated 7.08.1991 the appellant was
placed under deemed suspension from the date of his arrest i.e., 5.06.1991
and paid subsistence allowance. The High Court has very rightly taken
note of the fact that the first FIR had been quashed pursuant to a
settlement between the parties in terms whereof the appellant paid an
amount of Rs.2 lakhs and another amount of Rs.2,46,130/- by way of
bankers’ cheque, by way of compensation for the loss caused to the
Cooperative Society.
36. The judgment and order under appeal records that the appeal
filed by the appellant to the President, AIIMS was rejected in 2000.
However, a copy of the rejection order is not available and was not
brought on record.
37. Be that as it may, the order of dismissal dated 6.1.2000 under
Rule 19(i)of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1985 was challenged on 2013 after almost
13 years. Even assuming that the appeal was never decided, the cause
of action for filing an application
before the Tribunal would have arisen
on expiry of six months from the date of filing the appeal, in view of
Section 20(2)(b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 set out
hereinbelow:-
“20. Application not to be admitted unless other
remedies exhausted:
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be
deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him
under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances;-
(a) …..
(b) where no final order has been made by the Government
or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass
such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation
made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on
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which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has
expired.”
The application to the Tribunal would have to be filed within the
period of limitation as prescribed in Section 21(1)(b) of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, which would start running from the date of expiry of six
months from the date of filing of appeal. The contention of the appellant
that the quashing of the first FIR gave rise to afresh cause of action is
completely misconceived.
38. In S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh4, a Constitution
Bench of this Court held:-
“21. It is appropriate to notice the provision regarding limitation
under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Sub-section
(1) has prescribed a period of one year for making of the application
and power of condonation of delay of a total period of six months
has been vested under sub-section (3). The civil court’s jurisdiction
has been taken away by the Act and, therefore, as far as
government servants are concerned, Article 58 may not be
invocable in view of the special limitation. Yet, suits outside the
purview of the Administrative Tribunals Act shall continue to be
governed by Article 58.
22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform.
Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or
representation provided by law is disposed of, cause of action
shall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiry
of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or
representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue.
Submission of just a memorial or representation to the head of the
establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter
of fixing limitation.”
39. In our considered opinion, the High Court rightly declined to
accept the finding of the Tribunal that the O.A. was within the period of
limitation.
40. The learned Tribunal opined that the O.A. had been filed within
limitation, relying on a judgment of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh
vs. Syed Qamarali5 and held that orders such as the order of removal
of the appellant which were illegal or void ab initio could be challenged
4 (1989) 4 SCC 582
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at any time. As such orders had no legal existence, it was not necessary
for the respondent to have the order set aside by Court. The learned
Tribunal has misconstrued the law laid down by this Court in Syed
Qamarali (supra).
41. The High Court rightly found that, in Syed Qamarali (supra)
the suit challenging the order of termination, which was held to be invalid,
had been filed within the prescribed period of limitation of six years
under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which was the residuary
article. In Syed Qamarali’s case the appeal had been rejected on
9.04.1947 and the suit filed on 8.12.1952. The period of six years has
been reduced to three years under Article 113 of the Limitation Act,
1963.
42. On the other hand, in the State of  Punjab and Others vs.
Gurdev Singh6referred to and relied upon by the High Court, this Court
held:-
“8. But nonetheless the impugned dismissal order has at least
a de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be void
or nullity by a competent body or court. In Smith v. East Elloe
Rural District Council [1956 AC 736, 769 : (1956) 1 All ER
855, 871] Lord Radcliffe observed: (All ER p. 871)
“An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable
of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its
forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law
to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or
otherwise upset, it will
remain as effective for its ostensible
purpose as the most impeccable of orders.”
9. Apropos to this principle, Prof. Wade states [See Wade:
Administrative Law, 6th edn., p. 352] : “the principle must be
equally true even where the ‘brand’ of invalidity” is plainly
visible; for there also the order can effectively be resisted in
law only by obtaining the decision of the court. Prof. Wade
sums up these principles: [ Ibid.]
“The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an
order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in
the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be
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hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it
because of the plaintiff’s lack of standing, because he does
not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived
his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case
the ‘void’ order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It
follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid
for another; and that it may be void against one person but
valid against another.
10. It will be clear from these principles, the party aggrieved
by the invalidity of the order has to approach the court for
relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative
and not binding upon him. He must approach the court within
the prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limit
expires the court cannot give the declaration sought for.”
43. In this case the order of removal was passed on 6.01.2000.
The respondent had filed an appeal on 23.02.2000 Even assuming, as
contended by the appellant that the appeal was not disposed of, the
limitation started running upon expiry of six months from 23.2.2000, that
is, around 23.8.2000. The Original Application was patently barred by
limitation, there being delay of 13 years in approaching the learned
Tribunal. Such inordinate delay could not have been condoned.
44. The High Court rightly held that the law of limitation is founded
on public policy.  The object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and
dead disputes. A person ought not
to be allowed to agitate his claim after
a long delay. There can be no doubt that when retiral benefits are withheld
without cause, there would be a continuing cause of action. However,
when retirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, the
order would necessarily have to be challenged within the period of
limitation or alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause for the
delay. Once there is cessation of employer-employee relationship by an
order of termination, the cause of action would necessarily arise when
the order of termination is passed. The forfeiture of pensionary benefits
by reason of a punitive order of termination is not a continuing cause of
action.
45. We are unable to accept Ms Arora’s submission that this Court
take a sympathetic view of the plight of the appellant considering that
the first FIR was quashed and after the conviction pursuant to the second
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FIR the appellant was released on probation of good conduct after which
there was no further complaint against him.
46. It is reiterated, at the cost of repetition that the first FIR was
quashed pursuant to a settlement between the appellant and the
respondent in terms whereof the appellant compensated the pecuniary
loss caused by him to the Cooperative Society.  The FIR was not quashed
on the ground that the same did not disclose any offence or was otherwise
frivolous, vexatious or harassive.  While under suspension in contemplation
of disciplinary proceedings for misconduct related to the first FIR, the
appellant committed theft of a bag containing money at a public place
for which he was convicted under Section 379 of the IPC. It cannot be
said that absolute penury led him to commit the offence as argued by
Ms. Arora since the appellant was receiving subsistence allowance while
under suspension. Any sympathy for the appellant would, in our view, be
completely misplaced.
47. The judgment and order of the High Court under appeal does
not call for any interference. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the
judgment and order of the High Court, under appeal is affirmed.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal dismissed.