M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. versus STATE OF KERALA
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 1, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Matter referred to larger bench
Segment: Ratio
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 1 
M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. 
A 
v. 
STATE OF KERALA 
(Civil Appeal Nos. 7034-7037 of2015) 
SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.] 
B 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894- ss. 23(1A), 28, 34- Land 
acquisition - Claim of solatium for the enhanced amount of c 
compensation and interest thereof- Interest on solatium -
Date of payment of solatium -Acquisition of rubber estate -
Award passed for solatium and interest on compensation 
including solatium - As regards enhanced compensation, 
High Court upheld that solatium is payable by State D 
Government for the enhanced compensation awarded for the 
market value of the entire land, thus, it provided solatium for 
that porlion of land value based on the capitalization method 
of yielding rubber trees and directed the respondents to 
compute balance amount payable under the decree -
E 
However, the High Courl awarded the interest on solatium 
w.e.f. 19.09.2001, the date of judgment delivered by 
Constitution Bench in Sunde r's case instead offrom the date 
of their entitlement under the provisions of ss. 23(1 A) and 28 
- On appeal, held: In view of difference of opinion between F 
two judges, matter referred to larger Bench. 
Referring the matter to larger Bench, the Court 
PER V. GOPALA GOWDA.J: 
G 
HELD: 1.1 From the interpretation of provisions of 
Sections 11, 15, 23, 24 and 31 of the Land Acquisition 
Act, 1894, it is clear that the amount of compensation in 
the Collector's
Award includes not only the amount H 
1
2 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A determined under Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition 
Act, 1894 but also the additional amount of solatium as 
stipulated under Section 23(2) and amount payable 
under Section 23(1A) of the Act. [Para 21] [15-G-H; 16-A] 
B 
1.2 The judgment rendered by the Constitution 
Bench of this Court in Sunder's case is the binding 
precedent on the question of payment of legislative 
statutory interest payable on solatium under Sections 
23(1A), 28 and 34 of the Act which cannot be deprived to 
C the claimant/decree holde·r by the court. As the said 
judgment is binding upon the State Government it cannot 
contend that it is not liable from the date as provided 
under the provisions of the Act. [Para 25] [19-G-H; 20-A] 
D 
1.3 The Constitution Bench judgment in Sunder's 
case is aptly applicable to the fact situation of the instant 
case for the reason that the enhanced compensation 
includes the solatium @30% as provided under Section 
23(2) of the Act. Therefore, the claimant/decree holder is 
E entitled for the interest on the solatium component which 
is part of the compensation payable by the State 
government to the claimant. The Execution Court held 
that the claimant/decree holder company is entitled to 
claim solatium only in respect of the enhanced 
F compensation provided for the land alone which has 
been separately fixed, but, not in respect of that portion 
of market value of the land based on capitalization 
method of the
yielding rubber trees for the planted area 
which was separately fixed by the Reference C::ourt in 
G its Award. The High Court was right in holding that the 
claimant is entitled for the interest not only in respect of 
the land but also with respect to the trees standing on 
the land of which the market value is determined by the 
H Reference Court. However, it awarded the interest on
M/S PERIYAR & PJ\REEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
3 
er KERALA 
solatium from 19.09.2001 and not for the prior period by A 
placing reliance on Gurpreet Singh case. [Para 26] [20-
B-F] 
1.4 From the facts of the instant case and in the 
light of law laid down on the question of payment of B 
interest on solatium by the Constitution Bench in 
Sunder's case, it is amply clear that the said case is the 
binding precedent. As far as Gurpreet Singh's case is 
concerned, the question which arose for its 
consideration was only with regard to the rule of C 
appropriation in execution of the Award passed under 
the provisions of the Act. While answering the said 
question of law after referring to the relevant provisions 
of the Act, it incidentally made some observation with 
regard to the payment of interest on solatium which is D 
only an obiter but not the binding precedent as that 
question did not fall for consideration before the 
Constitution Bench. For the reason that the binding 
precedent laid down by the Constitution Bench of this 
Court in Sunder's case on the question of payment of E 
interest on the solatium to the claimant/decree holder 
from the date of entitlement as provided under the 
provisions of the Act. [Para 30] [25-H; 26-A-E] 
1.5 In view of the reasons assigned with reference F 
to Sunder and Gurpreet Singh cases, the impugned 
common judgment and order with regard to awarding 
interest payable on solatium w.e.f. 19.09.2001 is vitiated 
in law. Accordingly,
that portion of the impugned 
judgment and order is set aside. The responde'nt-State G 
Government is directed to pay interest as provided under 
Sections 23(1A) and 28 of the Act on the compensation 
determined including solatium under Section 23(2) of the 
Act. The respondent-State Government is further H
4 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A directed to compute the same with reference to the 
compensation awarded by the Reference Court from the 
date when the claimant decree holder is entitled strictly 
in accordance with the said provisions of the Act 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
including the solatium. [Para 30] [26-E-H; 27-A] 
Sunderv. Union of/ndia (2001) 7 SCC 211: 2001 
(3) Suppl. SCR 176 - followed. 
Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 
457: 
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 422 - held 
inapplicable. 
Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers 
Corporation. Of India Ltd. (1996) 2 SCC 71: 1995 
(5) Suppl. SCR 790; Union of India v. Ram Mehar 
(1973) 1 sec 109: 1973 (2) SCR 120; Mir 
Fazeelath Hussain v. Special Deputy Collector, 
Land Acquisition (1995) 3 SCC 208: 1995 (2) 
SCR 985; Yadavrao P. Pathade v. State of 
Maharashtra (1996) 2 SCC 570: 1996 (1) SCR 
965; Periyar & Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State 
of Kera/a (1991) 4 SCC 195; Sunder v. Union of 
India (2000) 10 SCC 470; Kapur Chand Jain & 
Ors. v. State Government of H.P. & Ors (1999) 2 
SCC 89; State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji 
Vajesinghji Vaghela AIR 1968 SC 1481: 1968 
SCR 692; Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh AIR 
1961 SC 908: 1961 
SCR 
676; H.H. 
Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia 
Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 
530: 1971 (3) SCR 9; Director of Settlement v. 
M.R. Apparao (2002) 4 SCC 638: 2002 (2) SCR 
661; Deena v. Union of India (1983) 4 SCC 645: 
1984 (1) SCR 1; CCE v. Ratan Melting
& Wire 
Industries (2008) 13 SCC: 20!18 (14) SCR 653 
- referred to.
MIS PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
5 
OF KERALA 
PER ADARSH KUMAR GOEL. J: !DISSENTING) 
A 
Appellants relied upon* Land Acquisition Officer and 
Asstt. Commnr. Vs. Shivappa Maf/appa Jigalurwhich laid 
down that the question of payment of interest 
subsequent to 19-9-2001 did not arise, whereas the B 
counsel for the State submitted that the judgment in 
Shivappa's case did not apply to the instant case as the 
award dated 19th November, 1992 had attained finality. 
The counsel for the State relied upon **Chimanlal 
Kuberdas Modi vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn. C 
which laid down that the execution court cannot examine· 
the reasons so as to go behind the decree but if in the 
award passed, the Reference Court makes a specific 
reference to payment of interest but without any such 
reference to the payment of interest on solatium and D 
merely payment of interest on compensation is granted, 
then it would be open to the executing court to apply 
the ratio of Sunder and declare that the compensation 
awarded includes solatium, and consequently, interest 
on the amount could be directed to be deposited in E 
execution. That being the legal position as prevailing 
today, the observations made in the said judgment in 
Gurpreet Singh cannot be ignored and it is ordered 
accordingly that compensation awarded includes 
solatium and therefore interest ori the said amount shall F 
. be paid by the respondent in the pending execution. So 
long as judgments
relied upon by counsel for the State 
stand, the appellant cannot succeed. Any contrary view 
can be taken only by a larger Bench. Thus, the matter is G 
placed before a Bench of 3-Judges. [Paras 2- 4] [28-F; 
29-E-H; 30-A-E] 
**Chimanlal Kuberdas Modi vs. Gujarat Industrial 
Development Corpn. (2010) 10 SCC 635: 2010 
(13) SCR 722; Nadirsha Shapurji Patel vs. 
H

6 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
Collector & LAO (2010) 13 SCC 234: 2010 (15) 
SCR 516; Chhanga Singh vs. Union of India 
(2012) 5 sec 763: 2012 (4) SCR 27~ - relied 
on. 
B 
Gurpre9t Singh VS. Union of India (2006) 8 sec 
457: 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 422; *Land 
Acquisition Officer and Asstt. Commnr. vs. 
Shivappa Mallappa Jigalur (2010) 12 SCC 387: 
2010 (7) SCR 833- referred to. 
c 
Case Law Reference 
In the Judgment of Adarsh Kumar Goel, J 
1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 790 
D 1973 (2) SCR 720 
1995 (2) SCR 985 
1996 (1) SCR 965 
E (1991) 4 sec 195 
12000) 10 sec 470 
(1999) 2 sec 89 
1968 SCR 692 
F 1961 SCR 676 
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 176 
referred to. 
Para 11 
referred to. 
Para 16 
referred to. 
Para 16 
referred to. 
Para "16 
referred to. 
Para 17 
referred to. 
Para 19 
referred to. 
Para 19 
referred to. 
Para 21 
referred to. 
Para 22 
followed. 
Para 26, 30 
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 422 
held 
G 1971 (3) SCR 9 
2002 (2) SCR 661 
1984 (1) SCR 1 
H 2008 (14) SCR 653 
inapplicable. Para 27 
referred to. 
referred to. 
referred to. 
referred to. 
Para 28 
Para 29 
Para 29 
Para 29
'MIS PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
7 
OF KERALA 
In the Judgment of Adarsh Kumar Goel, J 
A 
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 422 
referred to. 
Para 2 
2010 (7) SCR 833 
referred to. 
Para 3, 4 
2010 (13 ) . SCR 722 
relied on. 
Para 4 
2010 (15) SCR 516 
relied on. 
Para 4 
B 
2012 (4) SCR 275 
relied on. 
Para 4 
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 
7034-7037 of 2015 
From the Judgment and Order dated 07 .04.2010 of the C 
High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRP Nos. 196, 199, 
205 of2009. 
by 
V. Giri, M. P. VinodfortheAppellant. 
Bina Madhavan for the Respondent. 
The Judgments and Order of the Court were delivered 
V; GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted. 
2'. These appeals by special leave are directed against 
D 
E 
the impugned common judgment and order dated 07 .04.2010 
passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Civil 
Revision Petition Nos. 196, 199, 205 and 208 of 2009 (filed 
F 
against the order dated 15.10.2008 of the learned Sub-Judge, 
Erna~ulam-the Execution Court), wherein the dispute between 
the parties related to the claim of solatium for the enhanced 
amount of compensation and interest thereon in respect of G 
the a,cquired land. The High Court has confirmed that solatium 
is pa~able on that portion of land value based on capitalization 
method of yielping rubber trees and directed to compute 
balance amount payable under the decree, but awarded the 
interest on solatium from 19.09.2001, the date when judgment H
8 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
by the Constitution Bench in the case of Sunder v. Union of 
lndia1 was delivered by this Court and not for the prior period. 
The legality and validity of the impugned judgment and order 
is seriously challenged urging various legal contentions as the 
appellant is aggrieved by the denial of the interest payable on 
B the component of solatium under Sections 23(1A), 23(2) read 
with Sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for 
short "the Act"). The solatium being the component of 
compensation payable to the claimanUdecree holder, the 
restriction upon its payment by the High Court placing reliance 
C upon another subsequent Constitution Bench judgment of this 
Court in the case of Gurpreet Singh v. Union of lndia2 is 
hereby challenged. 
D 
3. The brieffacts of the case are stated hereunder:-
Various portions of rubber estate of the appellant situated 
in village Kuttamangalam was acquired by the State 
Government in exercise of its eminent domain power pursuant 
to the notification dated 10.10.1978 issued under Section 4(1) 
E of the Act for the purpose of Periyar Valley Irrigation Project. 
4. In 1980 and 1981 Awards were passed by the Land 
Acquisition Officer awarding compensation, on the market 
value of land which were partly based on capitalization method 
F of the yielding rubber trees for the planted area and partly 
based on the value of bare land on which there were no yielding 
rubber plantation.
Awards included solatium and interest on 
compensation including solatium. 
G 
5. Being dissatisfied with the compensation, the appellant 
filed Land Acquisition Reference (LAR) Nos. 425, 42",7, 428, 
429, 432, 434, 435, 456, 458 and 463 of 1988 before the 
Court of 111 Additional Sub-Judge, Ernakulam (the R1~feirence 
Court) under Section 18 of the Act. 
H 
1 (2001) 1 sec 211 
2 c2006) a sec 457
M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
9 
OF KERALA [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
6. The Reference Court after perusal of the record, by A 
its common judgment, passed an Award on 19.11.1992 by 
enhancing the compensation partly based on capitalization 
method ofthe yielding rubber trees for the planted area and 
partly based on the value of bare land on which there were no 
rubber trees. The Reference Court held that the claimant is B 
entitled to get 30% solatium, 12% additional market value from 
the date of the notification i.e., 10.10.1978 till the date of Award 
passed against it and they are also entitled to get 9% interest 
for the first one year from the date of dispossession and 
thereafter at 15% till realization of the compensation awarded C 
in favour of the claimant/decree holder. 
7. In some of the abovesaid LARs, payments were made 
by respondent-State in full and final settlement of the enhanced 
compensation, solatium and. interest on compensation D 
including solatium. With respect to the remaining cases, the 
appellantfiled Execution Petition Nos. 152, 147, 146, 149 and 
145 of 1996 before the Execution Court for execution of the 
Award/decree passed by the Reference Court. 
8. The Execution Court on 15.10.2008 passed an order 
fixing balance amount payable by the State government after 
excluding solatium on that portion of the market value of the 
acquired land based on capitalization method of the yielding 
rubber trees for the planted area. 
9. Being
aggrieved by the said order of the Execution 
Court, the. appellant filed Civil Revision Petition (CRP) Nos. 
196, 199, 201, 205 and 208 of 2009 before the High Court of 
Kera la. 
E 
F 
G 
10. The High Court on 07.04.2010 passed the common 
impugned judgment and order in the said CRPs confirming 
that the solatium is payable by the state government for the 
enhanced compensation awarded for the market value of the 
H
10 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
entire land. Thus, it provided solatium for that portion of land 
the value of which was based on the capitalization method of 
yielding rubber trees and directed the respondents to compute 
balance amount payable under the decree. However, the High 
Court awarded the interest on solatium w.e.f. 19.09.2001, the 
B date of judgment delivered by Constitution Bench in Sunder's 
case (supra) instead offrom the date of their entitlement under 
the provisions of Sections 23(1A) and 28 of the Act. Hence, 
these appeals are filed by the appellant urging various grounds. 
C 
11. Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel on behalf of the 
appellant contended that the Awards in the instant case were 
passed in 1980 and 1981 and the Reference Court judgment 
and Award was passed in 1992, the time when there was no 
dispute regarding the payment of interest on solatium. It is only 
D in 1995 when this Court passed a judgment in the case of 
Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation. Of 
India Ltd. 3 which barred the payment of interest on solatium. 
But the decision in Prem Nath Kapur's case was 
subsequently reversed in Sunder's (supra) case. Therefore, 
E there was no justification and reason for the High Court to 
restrict the payment of interest on solatium prior to 19.09.2001 
by applying the observations made at paragraph 54 in the case 
of Gurpreet Singh (supra). 
F 
12. The learned senior counsel has further contended 
that the
respondent-State has already settled few cases 
covered by the Reference Court judgment by paying the full 
compensation, solatium and interest on compensation 
including solatium without any dispute. It shows that there was 
G no dispute between the parties as to the payment of interest 
on solatium by the respondents. Before the Execution Court, 
the dispute raised by the respondent-State was as to the 
amount of land value on which solatium was to be computed. 
H '(1996) 2 sec 71
M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
11 
OF KERALA [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
13. On the other hand, Ms. Bina Madhavan, learned A 
counsel on behalf of the respondent-State government sought 
to justify the impugned common judgment and order by placing 
strong reliance upon paragraph 54 of Gurpreet Sing h's case 
(supra), which is extracted in the reasoning portion of this 
judgment. 
B 
14. She further contended that the interest on solatium 
can be claimed only in pending execution cases and not in the 
closed cases and the execution courts are entitled to permit 
its recovery by the claimant/decree holder from 19.09.2001 
C 
i.e., from the date of judgment in Sunder's case and not for 
any prior period. 
15. With reference to the aforesaid rival legal 
submissions urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the D 
parties, this Court is required to examine the correctness of 
the impugned common judgment order passed in the aforesaid 
CRPs by the High Court in restricting the payment of statutory 
interest payable on the solatium component by placing reliance 
upon the cases of Sunder and Gurpreet Singh (supra). In 
E 
this connection, this Court is required to find out as to whether 
the payment of interest on solatium is the legislative statutory 
right conferred upon the land loser/claimant recognised by the 
Constitution Bench in Sunder's case. The High Court in the 
light of observations made in Gurpreet Singh's case (supra) 
F 
at paragraph 54 has fixed the
date of payment of interest 
payable on the solatium to the claimant/decree holder with 
effect from 19.09.2001. The correctness of the same is also 
required to be examined by this Court. 
16. For the aforesaid purpose, it would be necessary to 
refer to the question of law as referred to in Sunder's case 
(supra) wherein this Court deals with the conflicting decisions 
rendered on one hand in Union of India v. Ram Mehar (three 
'(1973) 1 sec 109 
G 
H
' 
12 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
Judge Bench) and on the other, in later decisions of co-equal 
Benches of this Court viz., Mir Fazeelath Hussain v. Special 
Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition5, Prem Nath Kapur 
(supra) and Yadavrao P. Pathade v. State of Maharai;htra6• 
B 
17. lnthecaseofUnionoflndiav. RamMehar(supra) 
this Court after examining the scope of the expression "market 
value" in Section 4(3) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment 
and Validation) Act, 1967, held that solatium cannot form part 
of the market value of the land, ratherthe "market value" is only 
C one of the components to be reckoned with in the determination 
of the amount of compensation. The relevant para 7 of the 
decision reads thus : 
"7 ..... If market value and compensation were intended 
0 
by the legislature to have the same meaning it is difficult 
to comprehend why the word "compensation" in Section 
28 and 34 and not "market value" was used. The key to 
the meaning of the word "compensation" is to be found 
in Section 23(1) and that consists (a) of the market value 
E 
of the land and (b) the sum of 15% on such market value 
which is stated to be the consideration for the compulsory 
nature of the acquisition. Market value is therefore only 
one of the components in the determination of the amount 
of compensation. If the Legislature has used the word 
F 
"market value" in Section 4(3) of the Amending Act of 
1967 it must be held that it was done deliberately and 
what
was intended was that interest should be payable 
on the market value of the land and not on the amount of 
compensation otherwise there was no reason why the 
G 
Parliament should not have employed the word 
"compensation" in the aforesaid provision of the 
Amending Act." 
H 
5 (1995) 3 sec 20s 
• (1996) 2 sec 570 
(emphasis supplied)
14 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
.G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
Prem Nath Kapurv. National Fertilizers Corpn. of India 
Ltd. and Yadavrao P. Pathade v. State of Maharashtra 
on the other. The later three-Judge Bench judgments have 
taken the view that solatium is not a part of compensation. 
However, in none of the later three-Judge Bench 
judgments the earlier view of the three-Judge Bench 
judgment in the case of Union of India v. Ram Mehar 
that solatium is a part of compensation, has been noticed 
or considered. Consequently, in our view, this matter 
requires to be decided by a Constitution/larger Bench of 
this Court. We, therefore, direct that the papers may be 
placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for 
placing the appeals arising out of these proceedings for 
final disposal before an appropriate Constitution/larger 
Bench of this Court. 
Prior to Sunder's Case (two Judge Bench), similar 
reference was made in Kapur Chand Jain & Ors. v. State 
Government of H.P. & Ors9 , the relevant paras of which read 
thus:-
"3. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited our 
attention to a three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court 
in Union of India v. Ram Mehar and also later two 
decisions of two-Judge Benches of this Court in Periyar 
and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kera/a and 
Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika. REilying on 
these judgments, he submitted that for applicability of 
Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 solatium 
has to be
considered as a component of compensation 
and interest could be paid thereon; and that the High Court 
has wrongly not granted interest on solatium. However, 
there is another three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court 
in Prem N.ath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corpn. of 
India Ltd. wherein a contrary view is taken and it has 
• (1999) 2 sec 89
M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
15 
OF KERALA [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
been held, that no interest is payable on solatium under A 
Section 23(2) or on additional amount payable under . 
Section 23(1-A). For coming to that conclusion, the 
Bench of three learned Judges relied upon another 
decision of this Court in P. Ram Reddy v. Land 
Acquisition Officer. 
B 
,, 
4. In view of this conflict of decisions and also in view of 
the further fact that the three-Judge Bench of this Court 
in Prem Nath Kapur had no opportunity to refer to the 
earlier decision of a three-Judge Bench in Ram Mehar c 
we direct that these special leave petitions be placed 
for decision before a th_ree-Judge Bench of this Court. 
The office may obtain suitable orders from the Hori'ble 
Chief Justice." ~ 
20. The question of reference to Constitution Bench in 
Sunder's case (supra) reads thus:-
•c 
"Is the State liable to pay interest on the amount envisaged 
under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ?" 
In other words, the question was whether for the purpose 
of Section 28 read with Section 34 of the Act, solatium is a 
part of compensation. The answer was in affirmation to the 
reference question by the Constitution Bench. By answering 
D 
E 
the said question it laid down the .law with regard to the question 
F 
of payment of interest. 
21. From the interpretation of provisions of Sections 11, 
15, 23, 24 and 31 of the Act and after placing reliance upon 
the decision of
this Court in State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji G 
Vajesinghji Vaghela 10, it is clear that the amount of 
compensation in the Collector's Award includes not only the 
. amount determined under Section 23(1) of the Act but also 
the additional amount of solatium as stipulated under Section 
10 AIR 1968 SC 1481 
H
! I 
I 
I 
16 
SUPREM
0
E COURT REPORTS 
· [2015] 11 S.C.R: . 
I 
. ' 
~' ,-< ' • . 
' 
·. I', -
A 23(2) of the Act. The relevant paragraph 9 of the said case 
reads thus: 
1 
" • 
· 
· 
8 
c 
. ' 
~9: ....... The collector has to make an; award of 
compensation under. Section 11 and having regard to 
Sec. 15 in determining the amount of compensation, he 
is guided by the provisions of Section 23 and 24. Section 
23 (1) requires an aware! of the markefvalue of the land. 
Section 23 (2) requires an additional award of a sum of 
fifteen percentl.lm on such market value, in consideration 
I, 
-
I 
, 
of the compulsory nature of acquisition., .. ." · · 
. 
. 
,. -
.. . 
22. Further, from the reading of Sections 28 a_nd 34 of 
the Act, it is clear that the 'purpose of interest' is to compensate 
an unpaid landowner who, on the one hand has been deprived 
D of the possession of his land in pursuance of compulsory 
acquisition by the State Government in exercise of its eminent 
domain power and on the other hand, has also been kept out 
of the use of the money due to him for.the acquisition by not 
being paid the money, :in full or in part, in lieii of: taking 
E · possession. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court . 
in the ease of Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh11 at paragraph 
~ 
F 
G 
19, whiCti reads thus: 
" 
·r ·" .· <' 
. 
I ' 
,,,, 
t t. ·: 
_ -., 
••· 
., I 
" 
... 
'"' ' 
i.,,. · 
, . "19 •.. : ... When a claim for payment of interest is made. 
by a person.whose·
irrirnovabJi;, property has been• 
acquired compulsorily he is riot making claill). for 
damages properly or technically so called; he is basing 
his claim on the general rule that if he is deprived of his 
land he should be put in possession of compensation 
"immediately; if not, in lieu of possession taken.by 
compulsory acquisition interest should be p~d to h!m 
on the said amount of compensation .... " . · · · · 
;, 
. 
\ 
·-" 
~-
, 
_. '· ._.,:, 
. ,·,·.~'--·- •, 
. ··--r 
. 23.'. Section 34 of the Act provides for the payment of 
interest on "amount of such compensation". The word "such". 
H 
. 
" AIR 1961SC908
M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
17 
OF KERALA [V. GO PALA GOWDA, J.] 
makes the reading of Section 34 read along with Section 31 
A 
necessary. Section 31 of the Act provides for the payment of 
compensation or deposit of the same in Court. Section 31 ( 1) 
says "On making an Award under Section 11; the Collector 
shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to 
the persons interested. entitled thereto according to the B 
Award ..... ~ Further, Section 28 of the Act provides for the 
direction which may be made to the Collector to pay the interest 
, < "I 
' 
-
--1 · 
-
• 
· 
. 
on excess compensation. It says "If the sum which, in the opinion 
o(ihe' 'court, the Collector ought to I have awarded as 
compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did C 
award as compensation ..... " Thus, it is clear from Section 34 
read with Section 31 and the term "sum" under Section 28 of · 
the Act that the Award includes not onl{the sum as is 
detemiined under Section 23(1) of theAct b_ut also the amounts 
payable' under Section 23(1A) and Section 23(2). The same 
has· been held· by the Constitution Bench of this Court in 
Sunder'$ case, the relevant paragraph 23 of which reads thus: 
•,:; 
ii (i; ; ; .' • •' ! ·, 
'' 
' 
' t ', • 
• 
• 
' 
I 
"23 .. , '.We make it clear that the compensation awarded 
.. , would include not only the total sum arrived at as per sub-
section (1) of Section 23 but the remaining sub-sections 
. . , , thereof a~ well. It
is thus. clear from Section 34 that the 
expression "awarded amount" would mean the amount 
.•. . of cornpensation worked out in accordance with the 
: ' .• provisions contained in Section 23; including all the sub-
•• 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
I 
, sectionst~ereof." ,:,,,,u .. ,, ·.. 
, , --· 1 
D 
E 
F 
24. After adverting tci'Sections 34, 28, 23(1); 23(1A), 
23(2), 24, 26 and 31 of the Act; the Constitution Bench in 
Sunder's.case (supra) answered the question regarding G 
payment of interest oh solatium in affirmation holding that 
Section 26 of the Act does not say that the Award would contain 
only the amounts granted under Section 23 (1) of the Act. It 
was further held that there can be no doubt that all the three 
heads specifie"d ln the three sub-sections of Section 23 of the H 
.. 
. ..
18 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A 
Act are the sums to be awarded by the court. The words "every 
award under this Part" in Section 26(1) of the Act cannot be 
treated as the Award after delinking the amounts awarded 
under sub-Section (1A) or sub-Section (2) of Section 23 of 
the Act. Further in paragraphs 20, 21 and 23 in Sunder's case 
B (supra), the Constitution Bench has held as under-
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
"20 ... whether exclusion of the factor" any disinclination 
of the person interested to part with the land acquired" 
from being considered as part of the compensation 
indicated in Section 24 of the Act would be of any aid for 
excluding solatium from the purview of interest accrual 
process .... " 
"21. It is apposite in this context to point out that during 
the enquiry contemplated under Section 11 of the Act 
the Collector has to consider the objections which any 
person interested has stated pursuant to the notice given 
to him. It may be possible that a person so interested 
would advance objections for highlighting his 
disinclination to part with the land acquired on account 
of a variety of grounds, such as sentimental or religious 
or psychological or traditional etc. Secti1Jn 24 
emphasises that no amount on account of any 
disinclination of the person interested to part with the land 
shall be granted as compensation. That aspect is 
qualitatively different from the solatium which the 
legislature wanted to provide "in consideration of the
compulsory nature of the acquisition." 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
23. In deciding the question as to what amount would 
bear interest under Section 34 of the Act, a peep into 
Section 31(1) of the Act would be advantageous. That 
sub-section says:-
31. (1) On making an award under Section 11, the 
Collector shall tender payment of the compensation
MIS PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
19 
OF KEP.ALA [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
awarded by him to the persons interested entitled A 
thereto according to the award, and shall pay itto them 
unless prevented by some one or more of the 
contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section ...... " 
Further, in the said case, after adverting to Section 34 of B 
the Act, this Court held thus:-
"24. The proviso to Section 34 of the Act makes the 
position further clear. The proviso says that "if such 
compensation" is not paid within one year from the date 
of taking possession of the land, interest shall stand C 
escalated to 15% per annum from the date of expiry of 
the said period of one year "on the amount of 
compensation or part thereof which has not been paid 
or deposited before the date of such expiry". It is D 
inconceivable that the solatium amount would attract only 
the escalated rate of interest from the expiry of one year 
and that there would be no interest on solatium during 
the preceding period. What the legislature intended was 
to make the aggregate amount under Section 23 of the 
E 
Act to reach the hands of the perspn as and when the 
award is passed, at any rate as soon as he is deprived 
of the possession of his land. Any delay in making 
payment of the said sum should enable the party to have 
interest on the said sum until he receives the payment. 
F 
Splitting up the compensation into different components 
for the purpose of payme.rit of interest under
Section 34 
was not in the contemplation of the legislature when that 
section was framed or enacted." 
25. The judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench 
of this Court in Sunder's case (supra) is the binding precedent 
G 
on the question of payment.of legislative statutory interest 
payable on solatium under Sections 23(1A), 28 and 34 of the 
Act which cannot be deprived to the claimanUdecree holder H
20 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
by the court. As the said judgment is binding upon the State 
Government it cannot contend that it is not liable from the date 
as provided under the provisions of the Act. 
2fi. The Constitution Bench judgment in Sunder''s case 
B (supra) is aptly applicable to the fact situation of the present 
case for the reason that the enhanced compensation includes 
the solatium @ 30% as provided under Section 23(2) of the 
Act. Therefore, the claimanVdecree holder is entitled for the 
interest on the solatium component which is part of the 
C compensation payable by the State government to the 
claimant. The Execution Court held that the claimanVdecree 
holder company is entitled to claim solatium only in respect of 
the enhanced compensation provided for the land alone which 
has been separately fixed, but, not in respect of that portion of 
D market value of the land based on capitalization method of the 
yielding rubber trees for the planted area which was separately 
fixed by the Reference Court in itsAward. The High Court was 
right in holding that the claimant is entitled for the interest not 
only in respect of the land but also with respect to thE~ trees 
E standing on the land of which the market value is determined 
by the Reference Court. However, it awarded the interest on 
solatiuni from 19.09.2001 and not for the prior period by placing 
reliance on Gurpreet Singh case (supra), the relevant 
F paragraph 54 of which is
extracted hereunder:-
G 
H 
"54. One other question also was sought to be raised 
and answered by this Bench though not referred to it. 
Considering that the question arises in various cases 
pending in courts all over the country, we permitted the 
counsel to address us on that question. That question is 
whether in the light of the decision in Sunder, the 
awardee/decreecholder would be entitled to claim 
interest on solatium in execution though it is not specifically 
granted by the decree. It is well settled that an execution
M/S PERIYAR & PP.~EEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
21 
OF KERALA [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 
court cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim A 
for interest on solatium had been made and the same 
has been negatived either expressly or by necessary 
implication by the judgment or decree of the Reference 
Court or of the appellate court, the execution court will 
have necessarily to reject the claim for interest on 
B 
solatium based on Sunder on the ground that the 
execution court cannot go behind the decree. But ifthe 
award of the Reference Court or that of the appellate 
court does not specifically refer to the question of interest 
on solatium or in cases where claim had not been made C 
and rejected either expressly or impliedly by the 
Reference Court or the appellate court, and merely 
interest on compensation is awarded, then it would be 
open to the execution court to apply the ratio of Sunder 0 
and say that the compensation awarded includes 
solatium and in such an event interest on the amount oould 
be directed to be deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. 
We also clarify that such interest on solatium can be 
claimed only in pending executions and not in closed 
E 
executions and the execution court will be entitled to 
permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in 
Sunder(19-9-2001) and not for any prior period. We also 
clarify that this will not entail any reappropriation or fresh 
appropriation by the decree-holder. This we have F 
indicated by
way of clarification also in exercise of our 
power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of 
India with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation on this 
question." 
' 
27. The decision of this Court in Gurpreet Singh's Case 
(supra), upon which the strong reliance is placed by learned 
counsel on behalf of respondent, is totally inapplicable to the 
fact situation of the instant case forthe reason thatthe question 
G 
that arose in the said case was distinct, which reads thus:-
H
22 
SUPREME COURT R~PORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
A 
"What is the rule of appropriation in execution of money 
decrees? Is the rule the same in the case of an award-
decree under the Land Acquisition Act or, is there 
anything in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended 
by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984) 
B 
making that rule inapplicable or not wholly applicable?" 
The issue in the said question was examined and 
answered by the Constitution Bench with reference to Prem 
Nath Kapur's case (supra) regarding the rule of appropriation 
c in execution of money decrees. The examination of Sections 
23(1 ), 23(1A), 23(2), 28, 31, 34 and 11 of the Act was made in 
this regard. 
28. At paragraph 54 of Gurpreet Singh's case, certain 
0 
observations are made regarding the payment of int19rest on 
solatium. The interest on solatium can be awarded at execution 
stage if the Reference Court or the Appellate Court cloes not 
specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium ior cases 
wherein claim had not been made and rejected either expressly 
E or impliedly by the Reference Court or the Appellate Court and 
merely interest on compensation is awarded. But where the 
Reference Court or appellate court has negatived the same · 
eith'er expressly or by implication then such interest on solatium 
cannot be awarded as it is a well settled rule of law that the 
F execution court cannot go behind the decree. Another point 
which is clearly made in the said judgment is
that the interest 
on solatium can be claimed only in pending execution cases 
and not in closed execution cases, recoverable from the date 
of the judgmentin Sunder's case i.e., 19.09.2001 and notfor 
G any prior period. It is also held in this case that this will not 
entail any appropriation or reappropriation by the claimant/ 
decree holder. But, it is noteworthy that this was not the question 
which was referred to the Court for consideration in the said 
case. Therefore, it is merely an observation of the court which 
H
M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
23 
OF KERALA [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
cannot be applied as binding precedent in the instant case A 
with regard to the entitlement of statutory interest payable under 
Sections 23(1A), 28 and 34 of the Act on the solatium. If 
applied, it would be contrary to the doctrine of stare decisis. In 
this regard, it is necessary to advert to the Constitution Bench 
(11 Judge Bench) judgment of this Court in H.H. B 
Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur 
& Ors. v. Union of lndia12, wherein at paragraph 138, it is 
held that it is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence 
occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from 
its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a C 
question when the question did not even fall to be answered in 
that judgment. The relevant portion of the paragraph reads as 
under:-
"138 ... The question as to the jurisdiction of the Courts D 
to entertain a claim for payment of Privy Purse did not 
fall to be determined in·Nawab Usman Ali Khan case. 
The only question raised was whether the Privy Purse 
was riot capable of attachment in execution of the decree 
of a Civil Court, because of the specific exemption of E 
political pensions under Section 60(1 )(g) of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. In Kunvar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh's 
case, the Court did not express any opinion that Article 
366(22) was a provision relating to a covenant within the 
meaning of Article 363.
In tliat case the petitioner who F 
was not recognised as a Ruler by the President 
abandoned at the hearing of his petition his claim to the 
Privy Purse payable to the Ruler of Dholpur, and pressed 
· his claim by succession under the Hindu Law to the G 
Private property of the former Ruler. The Court was not 
called upon to decide and did not decide that Article 
366(22) was a provision relating to a covenant within the 
meaning of Article 363. It is difficult to regard a word, a 
12AIR 1971SC530 
H
24 
A 
B 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of this Court. 
divorced from its context. as containing a full exposition 
of the law on a question when the question did not fall to 
be answered in that judgment." 
[Emphasis supplied] 
The said view has been followed and reiterated 
subsequently by this Court in a catena of cases regarding the 
distinction between ratio of a case and obiter dicta. 
c 
29. In the case of Director of Settlement v. M.R. 
D 
E 
Apparao13, this Court extensively elaborated upon the principle 
of binding precedent. The relevant para 7 is reproduced 
hereunder: 
"? ... Article 141 of the Constitution unequivocally 
indicates that the law declared by the Supreme Court 
shall be binding on all co1;1rts within the territory of India. 
The aforesaid Article empowers the Supreme Court to 
declare the law. It is. therefore. an essential function of 
the Court to interpret a legislation. The statements of the 
Court on matters other than law like facts may have no 
binding force as the facts of two cases may not be similar. 
But what is binding is the ratio of the decision and not 
any finding of facts. It is the principle found out upon a 
F 
reading of a judgment as a whole. in the light of the 
questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not 
any particular word or sentence. To determine whether a 
decision has "declared law" it cannot be said to be a law 
when a point is disposed of on
concession and what is 
G 
binding is the principle underlying a decision. A judgment 
of the Court has to be read in the context of questions 
which arose for consideration in the case in which the 
judgment was delivered. An "obiter dictum" as 
distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation 
H 
13 (2002) 4 sec 638
M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
25 
OF KERALA [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] 
by the Court on a legal question suggested •in a case A 
before it but not arising in such manner as to require a 
decision. Such a? obiter may not have a binding 
precedent as the observation was unnecessary for the 
decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may not 
have a binding effect as a precedent, but it cannot be B 
denied that it is of considerable weight. ... " 
.. , . . ' [Emphasis supplied] 
The decision of this Courf in the case of Deena v. Union 
of lndia14 is also p~rtaining to the· extension of ratio of a C 
decision to cases involving identical situations, be it factual or 
legal, but the same should not be mechanically applied to the 
facts of a case, the relevant para 1.!5 reads thus: 
' 
"15 .... It is permissible to extend the ratio of a decision 0 
to cases involving identical situations. factual and legal. 
but care must be taken to see that this is not done 
mechanically, that is. without a cl~e examination of the 
rationale of the decision which is cited as a precedent. 
Human mind, trained even in the strict discipline of law, 
E 
is not averse to taking th~ easy course of relying on 
decisions which have become famous and applying their 
ratio to supposedly identical situations .... " 
I 
(emphasis supplied) 
F 
The binding effect of judgment of this Court vis-a-vis State· 
and Central Government circulais is considered in the case of 
CCE v. Ratan Melting &
Wire lridustries15, wherein it is held 
thatthe law laid down by this Court is the law of the land. The 
law so laid down is binding on all 'Courts/Tribunals and bodies G 
and that the circulars issued @y the State or the Central 
Government cannot prevail over the la":' laid down by this Court. 
30. From the facts of the present case and in the light of 
law laid down on the question of payment of interest on solatium H 
14 (1983) 4 sec 645 
15 (2008) 13 $cc 1
26 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 11 S.C.R. 
A by the Constitution Bench in Sunder's case, it is amply clear 
that the said case is the binding precedent. As far as Gurpreet 
Singh's case is concerned, the question which arose for its 
consideration was only with regard to the rule of appropriation 
in execution of the Award passed under the provisions of the 
B Act. While answering the said question of law after refmring to 
the relevant provisions of the Act, at paragraph 54, it has 
incidental!y made some observation with regard to the 
payment of interest on solatium which is only an obiter but not 
the binding precedent as that question did not fall for 
C consideration before the Constitution Bench. Therefore, in yiew 
of the foregoing reasons, I hold that there is no need to advert 
to the other judgments upon which reliance was placed by the 
learned counsel for both the parties. For the reason that the 
0 binding precedent laid down by the Constitution Bench ofthis 
Court in Sunder's case on the question of payment of interest 
on the solatium to the claimimt/decree holder from the date of 
entitlement as provided under the provisions of the Act. 
E 
F 
G 
H 
·Accordingly, I pass the following order:-
a) In view of the aforesaid reasons assigned by me with 
reference to Sundera1nd Gurpreet Singh cases (supra), 
I am of the view that the impugned common judgment 
and order with regard to awarding interest payable on 
solatium w.e.f. 19.09.2001 is vitiated in law.
Accordingly, 
that portion of the impugned judgment and order is 
hereby set aside. 
b) The civil appeals a•re aHowed. The respondent-State 
Government is directed to pay interest as provided under 
Sections 23(1A) and ~~8 of the Act on the compensation 
determined includi,ng 11olatium underSection 23(2) of the 
Act. The respondemt-state Government is further directed 
to compute the same with reference to the compensation 
awarded by the Hefereince Court from the date when the 
claimant decree holder is entitled strictly in accordance
,'j 
M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
27 
OFKERALA 
with the abovesaid provisions of the Act including the A 
. solatium and pay to the appellant within 8 weeks from 
the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. No order as 
. to costs. 
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. I have perused the B 
proposed judgment prepared by my learned brother V. Gopala 
Gowda, J. I am in respectful disagreement with the same. 
Th~ facts have been broadly mentioned in the judgment of 
Gopa[a Gowda, J. and need not be repeated. 
c 
2. 
The award of the Reference Court is dated 191h 
November, 1992 which did not expressly award interest on 
solatium. In the impugned order, the High Court restricted the 
interest on solatium to the period post 19th September, 2001, 
following the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in o 
Gurpreet Singh vs. Union of lndia1 directing as follows : 
"54. One other question also was sought to be raised 
and answered by this Bench though not referred to it. 
Considering that the question arises in various cases E 
pending in courts all over the country, we permitted the 
counsel to address us on that question. That question 
is whether in the light of the decision in Sunder [(2001) 
7 sec 211], the awardeeldecree-holder would be 
entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution though 
F 
it is not specifically granted by the decree. It is well 
settled that an execution court cannot go behind the 
decree. If, therefore, the claim for interest on
solatium 
had been made and the same has been negatived 
either expressly or by necessary implication by the G 
judgment or decree of the Reference Court or of the 
appellate court, the execution court will have necessarily 
to reject the claim for interest on solatium based on 
Sunder on the ground that the execution court cannot 
1 (2oos) a sec 457 
H
28 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 11 S.C.R. 
go behind the decree. But if the award of the Reference 
Court or that of the appellate court does not specifically 
refer to the question of interest on solatium or in cases 
where claim had not been made and rejected either 
expressly or impliedly by the Reference Court or the 
appellate court, and merely interest on compensation 
is awarded, then it would be open to the execution court 
to apply the ratio of Sunder and say that the 
compensation awarded includes solatium and in such 
an event interest on the amount could be directed to 
be deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. We also 
clarify that such interest on solatium can be claimed 
only in pending executions and not in closed 
executions and the execution court will be entitled to 
permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in 
Sunder (19-9-2001) and not for any prior period. We 
also clarify that this will not entail any reappropriation 
or fresh appropriation by the decree-holder. This we 
have indicated by way of clarification also in exercise 
of our power under Articles 141 and 142 of the 
Constitution of India with a view to avoid multiplicity of 
litigation on this question." 
2. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon Land 
Acquisition Officer and Asstt. Commnr. Vs. Shivappa 
F Ma/Jappa Jigalur laying down as follows : 
"13. Coming now to the stipulatio_n that any interest on 
solatium can only be granted for the period subsequent
to 19-9-2001, the date of the decision in Sunder, it is 
G 
evident that this again, is a limitation on the power of 
the execution court. The direction is actually referable 
to those cases in which the award of the Reference Court 
or the appellate court being silent, it is left open to the 
execution court to give direction for the deposit of 
H 
2 c2010) 12 sec 387
M/S PERIYAR & PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE 
29 
OF KERALA [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] 
interest on solatium. In such cases, the Reference Court A 
can ask for interest only for the period subsequent to 
19-9-2001. The direction in no way circumscribes the 
power of the court dealing with the main proceeding 
relating to enhancement of the compensation. 
B 
14. The matter can be looked at from another angle. 
The appeal being the continuation of the original 
proceeding, in the facts of the cases in this sub-group, 
there can be no question of accrual of interest only after 
the date of the decision in Sunder. At this stage, it may c 
be recalled that the civil court had awarded solatium @ 
30% and interest @ 9% for the first year and @ 15% 
from second year onwards till the date of realisation. 
The States appeal against the judgment of the civil court 
was dismissed. Thus, the direction for payment of D ' 
solatium with interest at the rates indicated had become 
final. The High Court enhanced the rate of 
compensation. This would inevitably lead to an increase 
in the amount of solatium and consequently in the 
amount of interest on the unpaid amount of solatium. E 
Thus, looked at from any point of view, the question of 
payment of interest subsequent to 19-9-2001 does not 
arise." · 
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State F 
submitted that the judgment iri Shivappa (supra) does not 
apply to the present case as the award dated 191h November, 
1992 has
attained finality. She also relied upon Chimanlal 
Kuberdas Modi vs. Gujarat Industrial Development 
Corpn. 3 laying down as follows : 
G 
"15. It is no doubt true that the execution court cannot 
examine the reasons so as to go behind the decree 
but if in the award passed, the Reference Court makes 
a specific reference to payment of interest but without H 
3 c201 oi 10 sec eas
30 
A 
B 
c 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 11 S.C.R. 
any such reference to the payment of interest on 
solatium and merely payment of interest on 
compensation is granted, then it would be open to the 
executing court to apply the ratio of Sunder and declare 
that the compensation awarded includes solatium, and 
consequently, interest on the amount could be directed 
,. 
to be deposited irJ execution. That being the legal 
position as prevailing today, we cannot ignore the 
observations made in para 54 of the aforesaid judgment 
in Gurpreet Singh and we order accordingly that 
compensation awarded includes solatium and therefore 
interest on the said amount shall be paid by the 
respondent in the pending execution." 
To the same effect, she also relied upon Nadirsha 
D Shapurji Patel vs. Collector & LAO' and Chhanga Singh 
vs. Union oflndia5• 
4. · So long as judgments relied upon by learned 
counsel for the State stand, the appellant cannot succeed. Any 
E contrary view can be taken only by a larger Bench. It will thus 
be appropriate that the matter is placed before a Bench of 3-
Judges. 
F 
COMMON ORDER 
In view of divergence of opinion in terms of separate 
judgments pronounced by us in these appeals today, the 
Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon'ble the 
Chief Justice of India for appeals being assigned to an 
G appropriate Bench. 
Nidhi Jain 
• (2010) 13 sec 234 
s (2012) 5 sec 763 
Matter referred to larger bench.