IBRAT FAIZAN versus OMAXE BUILDHOME PRIVATE LIMITED
[2022] 4 S.C.R. 632, Supreme Court of India, 2022
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
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IBRAT FAIZAN
v.
OMAXE BUILDHOME PRIVATE LIMITED
(Civil Appeal No. 3072 of 2022)
MAY 13, 2022
[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
Constitution of India: Art. 227 – Petition under –
Maintainability of, against the order of National Consumer Dispute
Redressal Commission in an appeal u/s. 58(1)(a)(iii) – Held: Is
maintainable – National Commission can be said to be a ‘tribunal’
which is vested by Statute the powers to determine conclusively the
rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter
in controversy between them – It satisfies the test of an authority
vested with the judicial powers of the State and thus, regarded as a
‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Art. 227 and/or 136 – Also, in a
given case, this Court may not exercise its powers u/Art. 136, in
view of the remedy available to the aggrieved party before the
concerned High Court u/Art 227, as it is appropriate that aggrieved
party approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ petition
u/Art. 227 – Also, remedy by way of special leave u/Art. 136 may be
too expensive and can be said to be inaccessible for it to be real
and effective – Thus, the High Court did not commit any error in
entertaining the writ petition u/Art. 227 against the order passed by
National Commission – Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – ss.
58(1)(a)(iii), 67.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the present case, the appeal before the
National Commission was
against the order passed by the State
Commission under Section 47(1)(a) of the Consumer Protection
Act, 2019. Therefore, against the order passed by the State
Commission passed in a complaint in exercise of its powers
conferred under Section 47(1)(a) of the 2019 Act, an appeal to
the National Commission was maintainable, as provided under
Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act. As per Section 67 of the
2019 Act, any person, aggrieved by an order made by the National
Commission of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) or (ii) of
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clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 58, may prefer an appeal
against such order to the Supreme Court. Therefore, an appeal
against the order passed by the National Commission to this
Court would be maintainable only in case the order is passed by
the National Commission in exercise of its powers conferred
under Section 58(1)(a)(i) or under Section 58(1)(a)(ii) of the 2019
Act. No further appeal to this Court is provided against the order
passed by the National Commission in exercise of its powers
conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or under Section 58(1)(a)(iv)
of the Act. In that view of the matter, the remedy which may be
available to the aggrieved party against the order passed by the
National Commission in an appeal u/s.58(1)(a)(iii) or s. 58(1)(a)
(iv) would be to approach the concerned High Court having
jurisdiction u/Art. 227. [Para 11][641-D-G]
1.2 The National Commission can be said to be a ‘Tribunal’
which is vested by Statute the powers to determine conclusively
the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any
matter in controversy between them. Therefore, it satisfies the
test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State
and therefore may be regarded as a ‘Tribunal’ within the meaning
of Article 227 and/or 136 of the Constitution of India. Also, in a
given case, this Court may not exercise its powers under Article
136 , in view of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved
party before the
concerned High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, as it is appropriate that aggrieved party
approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. [Para 12][642-H;
643-A-C]
Associated Cement Companies Limited v. P. N. Sharma
AIR 1965 SC 1595 : [1965] SCR 366 – followed.
1.3 The remedy by way of an appeal by special leave under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India may be too expensive.
The said remedy can be said to be inaccessible for it to be real
and effective. Therefore, when the remedy under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India before the concerned High Court is
provided, in that case, it would be in furtherance of the right of
access to justice of the aggrieved party, may be a complainant, to
approach the concerned High Court at a lower cost, rather than a
IBRAT FAIZAN v. OMAXE BUILDHOME PRIVATE LIMITED
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Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
[Para 13][645-B-D]
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC
261 : [1997] 2 SCR 1186 – followed.
1.4 In the instant case, the High Court has not committed
any error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 227 against
the order passed by the National Commission which has been
passed in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a) (iii) of the 2019 Act.
The view taken by the High Court is upheld. However, at the
same time, it goes without saying that while exercising the powers
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
subjects itself to the rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and
the High Court has to exercise the jurisdiction u/Art.227 within
the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be
exercised. [Para 14][645-D-F]
1.5 While exercising the powers under Article 227 of the
Constitution, the High Court has to act within the parameters to
exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even
while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence
under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting
any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution against an order passed by the National Commission,
the same shall always
be subject to the rigour of the powers to be
exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. [Para
15][645-G-H; 646-A-B]
1.6 It cannot be said that a writ petition under Article 227
of the Constitution of India before the concerned High Court
against the order passed by the National Commission in an appeal
under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act was not maintainable.
The view taken by the High Court is upheld. [Para 16][646-B-C]
State of Karnataka v. Vishwabarathi House Building
Co-operative Society and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 412 :
[2003] 1 SCR 397; Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P)
Ltd. (2001) 8 SCC 97 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 68;
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Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel (2022) SCC
Online SC 29 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1965] SCR 366
followed
Para 12
[1997] 2 SCR 1186
followed
Para 12.1, 13
[2003] 1 SCR 397
referred to
Para 12.2
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 68
referred to
Para 14.1
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3072
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.2021 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CM(M) No. 1196 of 2021.
Sudeepta Kr. Pal, Sunil Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Karanjot Singh Mainee, Ms. Shreya Gupta, Sudarshan Rajan,
Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned interim
order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi dated 22.12.2021
passed in CM(M) No. 1196/2021, by which the learned Single Judge of
the High Court has stayed order dated 9.12.2021 passed by the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (for short,
National Commission’), while hearing a writ petition filed under Article
227 of the Constitution of India, in which the respondent herein
challenged the judgment and order passed by the National Commission
in First Appeal No. 250/2021, the original respondent before the High
Court has preferred the present appeal.
2. Pursuant to the earlier order passed by this Court dated
21.03.2022 in the special leave petition, by a detailed order dated
31.03.2022, the learned Single Judge of the High Court has answered
the
question of jurisdiction and has held that against the order passed by
the National Commission dated 9.12.2021 in First appeal No. 250/2021,
a writ petition would be maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India. By way of Interlocutory Application No. 58657/2022, the appellant
IBRAT FAIZAN v. OMAXE BUILDHOME PRIVATE LIMITED
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herein has sought permission to amend the special leave petition, which
is allowed.
3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the
High Court holding that against the order passed by the National
Commission passed in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2019
Act’), a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
would be maintainable, the original respondent before the High Court
has preferred the present appeal before this Court.
4. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, against the order passed by the National
Commission, in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act, is
the moot question for consideration before this Court.
5. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as
under:
The appellant herein booked a flat in the project floated by the
respondent herein. According to the appellant herein, despite the payment
of sale consideration, the possession of the flat was not handed over and
therefore the appellant filed a consumer complaint before the Delhi State
Consumer Redressal Forum (for short, ‘State Commission’) on 10.08.2013
on the grounds of deficiency of service and unfair trade practice. By
order dated 16.10.2020, the State Commission allowed the said complaint
directing the respondent herein to handover possession of the flat booked
by the appellant subject to their meeting the requirements. The State
Commission also directed the respondent herein to pay to the complainant
– appellant herein compensation for the delayed period in the form of
simple interest at the rate of 9% for the period from the date of possession
of the flat was due to be delivered till the delivery of the possession.
5.1 The appellant herein – original complainant filed an execution
and contempt petition before the State Commission. Vide order dated
12.03.2021, the State Commission directed the decree holder – appellant
herein to place on record the details of the bank accounts or the
properties of the respondent herein which are to be attached for not
implementing the judgment and order dated 16.10.2020 passed by the
State Commission. Thereafter, the respondent-builder preferred an appeal
before the National Commission. Vide order dated 30.03.2021, the
National Commission granted stay of the State Commission’s order,
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subject to deposit of the entire cost of the flat along with 9% interest on
the amount paid till date in the Registry of the State Commission or face
the execution action by the State Commission.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 30.03.2021
passed by the National Commission, the respondent herein preferred
writ petition before the High Court by way of Writ CM(M) No. 374/
2021 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India contending, inter alia,
that the National Commission ought not to have directed the builder to
deposit the entire cost of the apartment along with the compensation
awarded by the State Commission. The High Court, vide order dated
25.05.2021, stayed the operation of the order of National Commission
dated 30.03.2021, subject to the builder depositing with the State
Commission 50% of the amount directed to be deposited by way of
interest towards compensation within four weeks. A further order came
to be passed by the High Court on 17.08.2021 in Writ CM(M) No. 374/
2021. Thereafter, the National Commission passed a final order in
First Appeal No. 250/2021 vide order dated 09.12.2021 and
confirmed the order passed by the State Commission dated 16.10.2020.
5.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the final order dated
09.12.2021 passed by the National Commission, confirming the order
dated 16.10.2020 passed by the State Commission, the respondent- builder
again approached the High Court by way of present writ petition
being
CM(M) No. 1196/2021. By the impugned interim order dated 22.12.2021,
till the next date of hearing, the High Court has stayed the operation of
final order dated 09.12.2021 passed by the National Commission in First
Appeal No. 250/2021.
5.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned interim
order passed by the High Court in Writ CM(M) No. 1196/2021, under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the original complainant has
preferred the present appeal.
6. At the time of admission hearing via Video Conferencing on
21.03.2022, this Court passed the following order:
“The jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, against the order passed by the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) is the moot
question for consideration. As the matter is pending before the
High Court and the next date of hearing is reported to be
IBRAT FAIZAN v. OMAXE BUILDHOME PRIVATE LIMITED
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29.03.2022, we request the High Court to decide the issue with
respect to the jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India, against the order passed by the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) first which
may be decided on or before 18.04.2022. The decision of the
High Court on the jurisdiction shall be placed before this Court on
or before the next date of hearing.
Put up on 21.04.2022.
It is agreed by learned counsel appearing for the respective parties
that they shall not ask for any adjournment on any ground
whatsoever before the High Court.”
7. That accordingly, by the impugned further order dated
31.03.2022, the learned Single Judge of the High Court has decided on
the question of jurisdiction and it has held that against the order passed
by the National Commission dated 09.12.2021 passed in First appeal No.
250/2021, impugned before it, a writ petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India would be maintainable. By way of amendment,
which was allowed, the subsequent order dated 31.03.2022 is also
challenged and is now the subject matter before this Court in the present
appeal.
8. Shri Sudeepta Kumar Pal, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant has vehemently submitted that against the order passed
by the National Commission in First Appeal No. 250/2021, a writ petition
before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
would not be maintainable.
8.1 It is submitted that as such against the order passed by the
National Commission, an appeal provided under Section 27A(1)(c) of
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 would be maintainable. It is contended
that without exhausting the said remedy, the High Court ought not to
have entertained the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, which was against the order passed by the National Commission
in First Appeal No. 250/2021.
8.2 In the alternative, it is submitted that assuming that the writ
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order
passed by the National Commission, impugned before the High Court,
was maintainable, in that case also, in the limited jurisdiction available
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court ought not
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to have stayed the order passed by the National Commission dated
09.12.2021 passed in first appeal No. 250/2021.
9. Shri Karanjot Singh Mainee, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent has vehemently submitted that as the appeal before
the National Commission was under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019
Act, there is no further appeal provided against the order of the National
Commission, as provided to the Supreme Court under section 67 of the
2019 Act, against the order passed by the National Commission under
Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act. Hence, a writ petition under Article
227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable. In support of his
submission, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent –
original writ petitioner before the High Court has heavily relied upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Associated Cement Companies
Limited v. P.N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595 (paras 44 & 45), and
the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar
v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261.
9.1 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
decisions, it is submitted that the High Court has rightly observed and
held that against the judgment and order passed by the National
Commission, impugned before the High Court, a writ petition under Article
227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at
length.
As observed
hereinabove, the short question which is posed for
the consideration of this Court is, “whether, against the order passed by
the National Commission in an appeal under Section 58 (1)(a)(iii) of the
2019 Act, a writ petition before the concerned High Court under Article
227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable?”
11. While answering the aforesaid issue/question, the relevant
provisions of the 2019 Act, which are relevant for our purpose, i.e.,
Sections 58 and 67 are required to be referred to. Sections 58 & 67 of
the 2019 Act read as under:
“58. Jurisdiction of National Commission.—(1) Subject to
the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall
have jurisdiction—
(a) to entertain—
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(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid
as consideration exceeds rupees ten crore:
Provided that where the Central Government deems it
necessary so to do, it may prescribe such other value, as it
deems fit;
(ii) complaints against unfair contracts, where the value of
goods or services paid as consideration exceeds ten crore
rupees;
(iii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;
(iv) appeals against the orders of the Central Authority; and
(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any
consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided
by any State Commission where it appears to the National
Commission that such State Commission has exercised a
jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction
illegally or with material irregularity.
(2) The jurisdiction, powers and authority of the National
Commission may be exercised by Benches thereof and a Bench
may be constituted by the President with one or more members
as he may deem fit:
Provided that the senior-most member of the Bench shall preside
over the Bench.
(3) Where the members of a Bench differ in opinion on any point,
the points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority,
if there is a majority, but if the members are equally divided, they
shall state the point or points on which they differ, and make a
reference to the President who shall either hear the point or points
himself or refer the case for hearing on such point or points by
one or more of the other members and such point or points shall
be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members
who have heard the case, including those who first heard it:
Provided that the President or the other member, as the case
may be, shall give opinion on the point or points so referred
within a period of two months from the date of such reference.
                             xxx    xxx   xxx
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67. Appeal against order of National Commission.—Any
person, aggrieved by an order made by the National Commission
in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) or (ii) of
clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 58, may prefer an appeal
against such order to the Supreme Court within a period of thirty
days from the date of the order:
Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after
the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that
there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person who is required to
pay any amount in terms of an order of the National Commission
shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless that person
has deposited fifty per cent of that amount in the manner as
may be prescribed.”
It is not in dispute that in the present case, the appeal before the
National Commission was against the order passed by the State
Commission under Section 47(1)(a) of the 2019 Act. Therefore, against
the order passed by the State Commission passed in a complaint in
exercise of its powers conferred under Section 47(1)(a) of the 2019
Act, an appeal to the National Commission was maintainable, as provided
under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act. As per Section 67 of the
2019 Act, any person, aggrieved by an order made by the National
Commission of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) or (ii) of clause
(a) of sub-section (1) of Section 58, may prefer an
appeal against such
order to the Supreme Court. Therefore, an appeal against the order
passed by the National Commission to this Court would be maintainable
only in case the order is passed by the National Commission in exercise
of its powers conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(i) or under Section
58(1)(a)(ii) of the 2019 Act. No further appeal to this Court is provided
against the order passed by the National Commission in exercise of its
powers conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or under Section 58(1)(a)(iv)
of the 2019 Act. In that view of the matter, the remedy which may be
available to the aggrieved party against the order passed by the National
Commission in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or Section 58(1)(a)
(iv) would be to approach the concerned High Court having jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
12. Whether the National Commission can be said to be a tribunal
for the purpose of exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution
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of India by the High Court is concerned, has been considered by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Associate Cement
Companies Limited (supra), which is required to be referred to. In
paragraphs 44 and 45, it is observed and held as under:
“44. An authority other than a court may be vested by statute
with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it
would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define
exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case as it arises,
and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the authority can
be truly described as judicial functions or judicial powers of the
State. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to say that any
outside authority empowered by the State to determine conclusively
the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any
matter in controversy between them satisfies the test of an authority
vested with the judicial powers of the State and may be regarded
as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136. Such a power of
adjudication implies that the authority must act judicially and must
determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts on
the materials before it and by application of the relevant law to
those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be exhaustive,
and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this test are also
tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the
power of
adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An
authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an
agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal
acting under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within Article 136. It matters
little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a
court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of
the trappings of a court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
vests an authority acting under Section 10-A of the Act with many
of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not
tribunals.
45. The word “tribunal” finds place in Article 227 of the Constitution
also, and I think that there also the word has the same meaning as
in Article 136.”
Therefore, the National Commission can be said to be a ‘Tribunal’
which is vested by Statute the powers to determine conclusively the
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rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in
controversy between them. Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the
aforesaid decision, it satisfies the test of an authority vested with the
judicial powers of the State and therefore may be regarded as a ‘Tribunal’
within the meaning of Article 227 and/or 136 of the Constitution of India.
Also, in a given case, this Court may not exercise its powers under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in view of the remedy which
may be available to the aggrieved party before the concerned High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as it is appropriate that
aggrieved party approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
12.1 At this stage, another Constitution Bench decision of this
Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) is required to be referred
to. While dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India in respect of powers of judicial review,
it is observed and held in para 90 as under:
“90. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of
judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in
respect of the power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded. It has
been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed
to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of
legislations is
questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling
matters where constitutional issues are not raised. We cannot
bring ourselves to agree to this proposition as that may result in
splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a
view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise
constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to
directly approach the High Courts and thus subvert the jurisdiction
of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law,
some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions
on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large
majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and
16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power
to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve
the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand,
to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of
the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before
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a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial
jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes.
While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action
vested in the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution,
it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the
process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also
have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of
use to it in finally deciding the matter.”
That thereafter, it is observed and held that against the order passed
by the tribunal, the aggrieved party may approach the concerned High
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
12.2 We may also refer to the decision of this Court in State of
Karnataka vs. Vishwabarathi House Building Co-operative
Society and Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 412. In the said case, the contest
before this Court was with regard to the Constitutional validity of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The validity of the Act was challenged,
inter-alia, on the ground that the Parliament, was not empowered to
establish a hierarchy of Courts, which would operate parallelly with the
Courts established under the Constitution. Upholding the validity of the
Act, this Court observed that the very fact that a given party could always
approach the High Court under Article 227, or the Supreme Court, as
the case may be, against an order of a Commission
constituted under the
Act, was itself an adequate safeguard. The observations of this Court,
to the effect that a party aggrieved by an order of a Commission
constituted under the Act, could approach a High Court, or this Court,
have been extracted as under:
“52. The very fact that in a given case a party under the said Act
may approach upto this Court and or may otherwise take recourse
to the remedy of judicial review, the interest of the parties must be
held to have been sufficient safeguard.
53. The provisions relating to power to approach appellate court
by a party aggrieved by a decision of the forums State Commissions
as also the power of High Court and thus Court under Article 226/
227 of the Constitution of India and Article 32 of this Court apart
from Section 23 of the Act provide for adequate safeguards.
Furthermore, primarily the jurisdiction of the forum/commissions
is to grant damages. In the event, a complainant feels that he will
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have a better and effective remedy in a civil court as he may
have to seek for an order of injunction, he indisputably may file a
suit in an appropriate civil court or may take recourse to some
other remedies as provided for in other statutes.”
13. No so far as the remedy which may be available under Article
136 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it cannot be disputed that
the remedy by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India may be too expensive and as observed and held
by this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the said remedy
can be said to be inaccessible for it to be real and effective. Therefore,
when the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before
the concerned High Court is provided, in that case, it would be in
furtherance of the right of access to justice of the aggrieved party, may
be a complainant, to approach the concerned High Court at a lower
cost, rather than a Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
14. In view of the above, in the present case, the High Court has
not committed any error in entertaining the writ petition under Article
227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the National
Commission which has been passed in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)
(iii) of the 2019 Act. We are in complete agreement with the view taken
by the High Court. However, at the same time, it goes without saying
that while exercising the
powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court subjects itself to the rigour of Article 227 of the
Constitution and the High Court has to exercise the jurisdiction under
Article 227 within the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required
to be exercised.
15. The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the
Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case of Estralla
Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97, which has been
consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court
in the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC
Online SC 29). Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article
227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the parameters
to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It goes
without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/
relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence
IBRAT FAIZAN v. OMAXE BUILDHOME PRIVATE LIMITED
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 4 S.C.R.
under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting any interim
stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against
an order passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be
subject to the rigour of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
16. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated
above and subject to the observations made hereinabove, it cannot be
said that a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
before the concerned High Court against the order passed by the National
Commission in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act was
not maintainable. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by
the High Court. As the matter on merits is yet to be considered by the
High Court, we do not express anything on merits in favour of either of
the parties.   However, it is observed that while considering the question
of interim relief/stay, the High Court will bear in mind the observations
made hereinabove.
17. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. However, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)