GURJIT SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB
[2019] 14 S.C.R. 232, Supreme Court of India, 2019
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
GURJIT SINGH
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1492-1493 of 2010)
NOVEMBER 26, 2019
[NAVIN SINHA AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: s.498-A  – Cruelty and harassment on
account of dowry demand  – Prosecution proved that the deceased
was harassed with a view to force her and her parents to meet
unlawful demand for money and such a harassment was on account
of failure by her and her parents to meet such a demand –Thus,
charge under Explanation (b) of s.498-A was proved.
Penal Code, 1860: ss.306, 498-A – Whether when the
prosecution established cruelty under Explanation (b) of s.498-A
and also established that the deceased committed suicide within
seven years of the marriage, the accused could also be held guilty
for the offence punishable under s.306 with the aid of s.113-A of
the  Evidence Act – Held: Merely because an accused is found
guilty of an offence punishable under s.498-A and the death
occurred within a period of seven years of the marriage, the accused
cannot be automatically held guilty for the offence punishable under
s.306 by employing the presumption under s.113-A of the Evidence
Act – Unless the prosecution establishes that some act or illegal
omission by the accused drove the deceased to commit the suicide,
the conviction under s.306 would not be tenable – Though the
prosecution is successful in proving the case under s.498-A, the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
any
act or omission of the accused instigated the deceased to commit
suicide – There was no evidence on record to show that immediately
prior to the deceased committing suicide there was a cruelty meted
out to the deceased by the accused due to which the deceased had
no other option than to commit the suicide – The evidence on record
further showed that the time gap between the last visit of the deceased
to her parents with regard to the illegal demand and the date of
commission of suicide was about two months – As such, there was
   [2019] 14 S.C.R. 232
232
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
233
nothing to show a proximate nexus between the commission of
suicide and the illegal demand made by the appellant – Further, the
cases wherein the conviction under s.306 had been held tenable by
this court, even though the charge was only under s.304B, it was
found that the charge in those cases specifically stated that the
deceased was driven to commit suicide on account of cruelty meted
out to the deceased – However, in the instant case, the charge did
not state that the deceased was driven to commit suicide on account
of the harassment meted out to the deceased – It did not mention
that the accused had abetted in commission of suicide by the
deceased – Therefore, conviction under s.498-A is maintained and
conviction under s.306 is set aside – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113-A.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The evidence of PW-10, father of the deceased
corroborated to an extent by PW-13 showed that the prosecution
was able to prove that the deceased was harassed with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property.  On the basis of said evidence, the
prosecution proved the charge under Explanation (b) of Section
498-A of the IPC. [Para 11] [240-E-F]
2. Merely because an accused is found guilty of an offence
punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and the death has
occurred within a period of seven years of the marriage, the
accused cannot be automatically held guilty for the offence
punishable under Section 306 of the IPC by employing the
presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. Unless
the prosecution establishes that some act or illegal omission by
the accused has driven the deceased to commit the suicide, the
conviction under Section 306 would not be tenable. [Para 27]
[249-E-F]
3. The prosecution failed to prove that the cruelty was of
such a nature which left no choice to the deceased than to commit
suicide.  There was no material on record to show that
immdediately prior to the deceased committing suicide, there
was a cruelty meted out to the deceased by the accused due to
which the deceased had no other option than to commit suicide.
The evidence on record further showed that the time gap between
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
234
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
the last visit of the deceased to her parents with regard to the
illegal demand and the date of commission of suicide was about
two months. As such, there was nothing on record to show that
there was a proximate nexus between the commission of suicide
and the illegal demand made by the appellant. [Paras 33-34]
[251-B-D]
4. Another aspect is that the cases wherein this Court has
held that the conviction under Section 306 of the IPC was tenable
though charge was only under Section 304-B of the IPC, it was
found the charge specifically stated that the deceased was driven
to commit suicide on account of cruelty meted out to the
deceased. However, in the present case, the charge does not
state that the deceased was driven to commit suicide on account
of the harassment meted out to the deceased. It also does not
mention that the accused had abetted in commission of suicide
by the deceased. Conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC is
maintained and the conviction under Section 306 of the IPC is
set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section
306 of the IPC. [Paras 35-37] [251-F; 252-B-C]
State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC
73 ; Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC
257 : [2004] 2 SCR 678 ; Mangat Ram v. State of
Haryana (2014) 12 SCC 595 : [2014] 4 SCR 988
- relied on. 
K. Prema S. Rao and Anr. v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and
Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 217 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 339 ;
Modinsab
Kasimsab Kanchagar v. State of Karnataka
& Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 551 : [2013] 2 SCR 357 ; Thanu
Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 10 SCC 353 :
[2010] 12 SCR 710 ; Satish Shetty v. State of
Karnataka (2016) 12 SCC 759 : [2016] 3 SCR 145
- distinguished. 
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC
618 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247 ; Pinakin Mahipatray
Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013) 10 SCC 48 : [2013]
10 SCR 306 ; Narwinder Singh v. State of Punjab
(2011) 2 SCC 47 : [2011] 1 SCR 110 ; Sanju Alias
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
235
Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of M.P. (2002) 5 SCC
371 : [2002] 3 SCR 668 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247
referred to
Para 13
(1994) 1 SCC 73
relied on
Para 17
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 339 
distinguished
Para 18
[2004] 2 SCR 678
relied on
Para 20
[2013] 10 SCR 306
referred to
Para 23
[2014] 4 SCR 988  
relied on
Para 25
[2013] 2 SCR 357
distinguished
Para 29
[2010] 12 SCR 710
distinguished
Para 30
[2016] 3 SCR 145  
distinguished
Para 31
[2011] 1 SCR 110  
referred to
Para 32
[2002] 3 SCR 668
referred to
Para 34
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1492-1493 of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.02.2009 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. A. No. 5440DBA of 2001
and Crl. A. No. 959-SB of 2000.
Rajeshwar Singh Thakur, Nirmal Singh, Dinesh Verma, Subhasish
Bhowmick, Yash Pal Dhingra, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, Ms. Mandakini Singh, Advs. for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B. R. GAVAI, J.
1. These appeals by special leave challenge the judgment and
order dated 20.2.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 544-DBA of 2001 and
Criminal Appeal No. 959-SB of 2000. All the four accused, including the
appellant herein (accused No.3), who is husband of the deceased, were
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
236
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
charged and tried by the learned trial Court for the offence punishable
under Section 304-B and Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as “IPC”).  The other accused were the father
(accused No.1), the mother (accused No.2) and the sister-in-law (wife
of brother) (accused No.4) of the appellant. The Additional Sessions
Judge, Hoshiarpur, held that the prosecution had succeeded in proving
the case against accused Nos. 1  to 3 for the offence punishable under
Section 498-A of the IPC but has failed to prove the case against the
said accused (Nos. 1, 2 and 3) for the offence punishable under  Section
304-B of the IPC.  Insofar as accused No. 4 is concerned, it was held
that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against her for both the
offences and she was accordingly acquitted of the offence charged.
The trial Judge, therefore, convicted the appellant and his father and
mother for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and
sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three
years and to pay a fine of   Rs. 4000/- each and, in default of payment of
fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three
months.
2. Being aggrieved by the conviction and sentence under Section
498-A of the IPC, the appellant along with his parents preferred an
appeal (being Criminal Appeal No.959-SB of 2000) before the High
Court. So also, the State
preferred an appeal (being Criminal Appeal
No.544-DBA of 2001), being aggrieved by that part of the order by
which the trial Court acquitted accused No. 4 and also acquitted accused
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the
IPC.  The High Court upheld the conviction of accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3
for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. It also upheld
the acquittal of accused No. 4 and further held that, though the prosecution
could not bring the case under Section 304-B of the IPC, the appellant
herein was liable to be punished for the offence punishable under Section
306 of the IPC.  The High court maintained the order of the sentence
and fine as recorded by the trial Judge for the offence punishable under
Section 498-A of the IPC. For the offence under Section 306 of the
IPC, the High Court sentenced the appellant herein to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/-
and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a period of five months. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals
are preferred by the appellant.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
237
3. Shri Rajeshwar Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the appellant,
submitted that the conviction as recorded by the learned trial court and
confirmed by the High Court under Section 498-A of the IPC is not
tenable. It is submitted, that the conviction is only on the basis of the
evidence of PW-10 - Bishan Singh, the father of the deceased. It is
submitted, that there is no corroboration to the said evidence. It is
submitted, that in any case, the conviction under Section 306 of the IPC
is not tenable. It is contended that the charge was for the offence
punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC, the ingredients of which are
totally different than the ingredients of Section 306 of the IPC. It is
submitted that as such grave prejudice was caused to the appellant. It is
further submitted that the evidence shows that the father of the deceased,
PW-10, has stated, that even during the course of the trial, the appellant
was on congenial meeting terms with the father of the deceased and as
such the unnatural human conduct would discredit his testimony.
4. Per contra, Smt. Jaspreet Gogia, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the State, submitted that insofar as conviction under Section
498-A of the IPC is concerned, since there is a concurrent finding, no
interference is warranted. She further submitted, that since the ingredients
of Section 304-B and Section 306 of the IPC are almost similar, no
prejudice was caused to the appellant by convicting him under
Section
306 of the IPC though no charge was framed for the same. It is submitted
that all the ingredients necessary for conviction under Section 306 with
the aid of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 were duly
proved by the prosecution and as such no interference is warranted in
the present appeals.
5. The perusal of the record would reveal that though the appellant
has disputed the date of marriage to be 04.02.1989, both the courts have
disbelieved him and rightly so. The deceased died an unnatural death on
28.09.1994 by consuming poison. As such, the unnatural death occurred
within a period of seven years of the marriage. The learned trial Judge
has acquitted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section
304-B of  the IPC since the prosecution has failed to prove the demand
for dowry, while convicting him along with the parents for the offence
punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. The High Court maintained
the conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC, however, it also convicted
the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC
with the aid of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
6. The question that we are called upon to answer is as to whether
the conviction as confirmed by the High Court under Section 498-A of
the IPC and as recorded by it for the first time under Section 306 of the
IPC would be sustainable or not.
7. The relevant provisions of the IPC that fall for consideration
are as under:
“107. Abetment of a thing - A person abets the doing of a thing,
who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons
in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal
omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order
to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the
doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or
by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to
disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or
procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that
thing.
Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the
commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the
commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission
thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.
xxx
306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
xxx
498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or
the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
239
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—
For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful
conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman
to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb
or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)
harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view
to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of
failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”
8. The relevant provision of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that
also requires consideration is as follows:
“113-A.  Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married
woman. —When the question is whether the commission of
suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any
relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed
suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage
and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected
her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the
other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been
abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall
have the same meaning as in section 498A of the IPC (45 of
1860).]”
9. The perusal of the evidence of PW-10 - Bishan Singh, the father
of the deceased, would
establish that the deceased, Jaswinder Kaur
was married to appellant on 04.02.1989. His daughter had two issues.
The elder one was four years old and the son was about 1 ½  years old
at the time of the occurrence. He stated, that after the marriage, accused
were harassing his daughter for giving less dowry. In the year 1992, he
had given one steel almirah to his daughter but the accused were not
satisfied with the dowry article. In March 1993, he had purchased one
fridge through his son-in-law, Jagtar Singh, from the Military Canteen
for Rs. 6,600/-, which was given to the accused persons.  Even then the
accused were not satisfied. The accused were pressing his daughter,
Jaswinder Kaur, to bring Rs. 50,000/- from her parents. He further stated,
that the accused were compelling his daughter out of anger to bring
Rs. 50,000/-, in cash, as they were to purchase a plot at Hoshiarpur. He
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
240
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
further stated that on two-three occasions, his daughter came to his
Village Kharal Kalan and he requested her that Rs. 50,000/- were not
with him at that stage and after selling the paddy crop he can pay that
amount. He stated that, thereafter, after consoling his daughter, he sent
her to her in-laws house. He further stated, that on 28.09.1994 when he
was in his house, he came to know that his daughter had died. Suspecting
that his daughter was given poison or she consumed poison, he lodged a
report with the police.
10. To some extent, the evidence of PW-10 is corroborated by
the evidence of PW-13 - Iqbal Singh.  He has stated, that prior to the
occurrence, i.e., the death of the deceased there was a dispute
between the accused persons and the deceased, Jaswinder Kaur, as
Rs. 50,000/- was being demanded by the accused persons from the
parents of the deceased for purchasing a plot. He further stated, that the
parents of the deceased could not pay Rs. 50,000/- and promised to pay
the same after selling paddy crop. He further stated, that before demand
of Rs. 50,000/-, one refrigerator and one almirah was given to the accused
persons by the parents of the deceased on their demand and this was
over and above dowry given at the time of the marriage.
11.  Thus from the evidence of PW-10 which is corroborated to
an extent by PW-13, we have no hesitation to hold that the prosecution
has proved that the deceased was
harassed with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security or such a harassment was on account of failure by
her or any person related to her to meet such a demand.  We find, that
on the basis of aforesaid evidence, the prosecution has proved the charge
under Explanation (b) of Section 498-A of the IPC.
12. Now the question that would fall for consideration is as to
whether when the prosecution establishes cruelty under Explanation (b)
of Section 498-A of the IPC and also establishes that the deceased
committed suicide within seven years of the marriage, could the accused
be also held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the
IPC with the aid of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act.
13. The said question fell for consideration before the bench of
three learned Judges of this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar vs.
State of Chhattisgarh1.  This Court, after reproducing the provisions of
1 (2001) 9 SCC 618
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
241
Section 306 of the IPC and Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 observed thus:
“12. This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second)
Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a
social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married
women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the
husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually
available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and
hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the
house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption
is intended to operate against the accused in the field of criminal
law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof
must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract
applicability of Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman
has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within
a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the
husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to
cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid
circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been
abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband.
Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the
presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the
employment of expression “may presume” suggests. Secondly,
the existence and availability of the abovesaid three
circumstances
shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn;
before the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to
have regard to “all the other circumstances of the case”. A
consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may
strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the
court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression
— “the other circumstances of the case” used in Section 113-A
suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between
the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption.
Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one.
In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced
in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on
record may destroy the presumption. The phrase “may presume”
used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act,
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
which says — “Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court
may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved,
unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.
13. The present case is not one which may fall under
clauses secondly and thirdly of Section 107 of the Penal Code,
1860. The case has to be decided by reference to the first clause
i.e. whether the accused-appellant abetted the suicide by
instigating her to do so.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. It could thus be seen, that this Court has observed that to
attract the applicability of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, the
following conditions are required to be satisfied:
(i) The woman has committed suicide,
(ii) Such suicide has been committed within a period of  seven
years from the date of her marriage,
(iii) The husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected
her to cruelty.
15. This Court further observed that on the existence and availability
of the aforesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide
had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. It
has been held that the presumption is not mandatory; but only permissive
as the words “may presume” suggests.  It has further been held that the
existence and availability of the aforesaid three circumstances shall not,
like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn.  It has been held
that before a presumption being drawn, the court
shall have regard to all
other circumstances of the case. It has been held, that the consideration
of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption
or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the
presumption. It thus observed that the expression “the other
circumstances of the case” used in  Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence
Act suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between
the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption.
16. It has been further held that when the case does not fall under
clauses secondly and thirdly of Section 107 of the IPC, the case is to be
decided with reference to the first clause, i.e., whether the accused-
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
243
appellant abetted the suicide by instigating her to do so. It will be further
relevant to refer to following observations in Ramesh Kumar (supra):
“20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation
though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that
effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and
specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable
certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt
out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his
acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created
such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option
except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have
been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without
intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to
be instigation.
21. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73, this
Court has cautioned that the court should be extremely careful in
assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the
evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether
the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end
her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a
victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,
discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society
to which the
victim belonged and such petulance, discord and
differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced
individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of
the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused
charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.
22. Sections 498-A and 306 IPC are independent and constitute
different offences. Though, depending on the facts and
circumstances of an individual case, subjecting a woman to cruelty
may amount to an offence under Section 498-A and may also, if a
course of conduct amounting to cruelty is established leaving no
other option for the woman except to commit suicide, amount to
abetment to commit suicide. However, merely because an accused
has been held liable to be punished under Section 498-A IPC it
does not follow that on the same evidence he must also and
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
necessarily be held guilty of having abetted the commission of
suicide by the woman concerned…..”
(emphasis supplied)
17. The Court observed that instigation is to goad, urge forward,
provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”.  Though the court observed
that to satisfy the requirement of instigation, it is not necessary that
actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation
must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence.
However, it has been observed that a reasonable certainty to incite the
consequence must be capable of being spelt out.  Relying on the judgment
of this court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Orilal Jaiswal2, it
is observed that the court should be extremely careful in assessing the
facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the
trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the
victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide.  It
has further been held that Section 498-A and Section 306 of the IPC are
independent and constitute different offences. It has been observed,
that depending on the facts and circumstances of an individual case,
subjecting a woman to cruelty may amount to an offence under Section
498-A of the IPC. It has further been observed, that if a course of
conduct amounting to cruelty is established leaving no other option for
the woman except to commit suicide, it may also
amount to abetment to
commit suicide. It is further observed, that, however, merely because
accused had been held liable to be punished under Section 498-A of the
IPC, it does not follow that on the same evidence he must also and
necessarily be held guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide by
the woman concerned.
18. Another three-Judge bench of this Court in the case of K.
Prema S. Rao and Anr. vs. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Ors.3 had an
occasion to consider the question as to whether in the circumstances of
framing  charge only under Section 304-B of the IPC and not framing
the one under Section 306 of the IPC, could the conviction under Section
306 of the IPC read with Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act be
tenable?  In the said case, the Court found that the charge specifically
mentioned as under.
2 (1994) 1 SCC 73
3 (2003) 1 SCC 217
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
245
“That on or about the 22nd day of October, 1989, at your house at
Tunikipadu of Gampalagudem Mandal, Yedla Krishna Kumari, wife
of A-1 among you and daughter-in-law of A-2 and A-3 among
you, committed suicide by consuming poison, and that you all
subjected her to such cruelty and harassment as did drive her to
commit suicide, with the object of extracting ac. 5.00 of land as
dowry to A-1 and thereby committed an offence punishable under
Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and within the
cognizance of this court.
or alternatively
That, prior to the 22nd day of October, 1989, at your house at
Tunikipadu, you subjected Yedla Krishna Kumari, wife of A-1
among you and daughter-in-law of A-2 and A-3 among you, to
such cruelty and harassment as did drive the said Krishna
Kumari to commit suicide, and thereby committed an offence
punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
and within the cognizance of this court.”
19. The court, therefore, held that the ingredients to constitute an
offence under Section 306 of the IPC were already found in the charge
and as such no prejudice was caused to the accused therein, though no
separate charge was framed under Section 306 of the IPC.  Apart from
that, the evidence on record established that when the letters concealed
by the husband were discovered by the wife and handed over to the
father and she was driven out of the house, this cruel conduct of the
husband led the wife to commit suicide. It
could thus be seen, that in the
facts of the said case, the Court found that the conviction under Section
306 of the IPC could be recorded. It was found that, apart from the
earlier acts of harassment for parting with the land which she had
received in marriage as stridhana, there was an act of driving the deceased
out of the house which had direct nexus with the deceased committing
suicide.
20. The bench of two Judges of this Court had an occasion to
consider a similar issue in the case of Hans Raj vs. State of Haryana4.
It will be relevant to refer to following paragraphs:
“12. The question then arises as to whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case the appellant can be convicted of the
4 (2004) 12 SCC 257
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
offence under Section 306 IPC with the aid of the presumption
under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. Any person who
abets the commission of suicide is liable to be punished under
Section 306 IPC. Section 107 IPC lays down the ingredients of
abetment which includes instigating any person to do a thing or
engaging with one or more persons in any conspiracy for the doing
of a thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of
that conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing, or intentional
aid by any act or illegal omission to the doing of that thing. In the
instant case there is no direct evidence to establish that the appellant
either aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide or entered
into any conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide. In the absence
of direct evidence the prosecution has relied upon Section 113-A
of the Indian Evidence Act under which the court may presume
on proof of circumstances enumerated therein, and having regard
to all the other circumstances of the case, that the suicide had
been abetted by the accused. The explanation to Section 113-A
further clarifies that cruelty shall have the same meaning as in
Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code…...
13. Unlike Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, a statutory
presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on proof
of the circumstances enumerated in Section 113-A of the Indian
Evidence Act. Under
Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act,
the prosecution has first to establish that the woman concerned
committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of
her marriage and that her husband (in this case) had subjected
her to cruelty. Even if these facts are established the court is not
bound to presume that the suicide had been abetted by her husband.
Section 113-A gives a discretion to the court to raise such a
presumption, having regard to all the other circumstances of the
case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty it must
consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected,
having regard to the meaning of the word “cruelty” in Section
498-A IPC. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within
seven years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to
cruelty by her husband, does not automatically give rise to the
presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband.
The court is required to look into all the other circumstances of
the case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
247
by the court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature as
was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman……”
21. The court found that in the case there was no direct evidence
to establish that the appellant either aided or instigated the deceased to
commit suicide or entered into any conspiracy to aid her in committing
suicide. It has been held that when the allegation is of cruelty, it must
consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected having
regard to the meaning of the word “cruelty” in Section 498-A of IPC. It
has been held that one of the circumstances which has to be taken into
consideration by the court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such a
nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman.
22. This court in the case of Hans Raj (supra) has also referred
to the judgment of this court in the case of State of West Bengal vs.
Orilal Jaiswal (supra), wherein it is observed that the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the
introduction of Section 498-A of the IPC and Section 113-A of the Indian
Evidence Act.
23. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of
this Court in the case of Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal  vs.  State of
Gujarat5 :
“26. Section 113-A only deals with a presumption which the court
may draw in a
particular fact situation which may arise when
necessary ingredients in order to attract that provision are
established. Criminal law amendment and the rule of procedure
was necessitated so as to meet the social challenge of saving the
married woman from being ill-treated or forcing to commit suicide
by the husband or his relatives, demanding dowry. Legislative
mandate of the section is that when a woman commits suicide
within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband
or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty as per
the terms defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume
having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such
suicide has been abetted by the husband or such person. Though
a presumption could be drawn, the burden of proof of showing
5 (2013) 10 SCC 48
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
that such an offence has been committed by the accused under
Section 498-A IPC is on the prosecution. On facts, we have already
found that the prosecution has not discharged the burden that A-
1 had instigated, conspired or intentionally aided so as to drive the
wife to commit suicide or that the alleged extramarital affair was
of such a degree which was likely to drive the wife to commit
suicide.
27. Section 306 refers to abetment of suicide. It says that if any
person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such
suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. The action
for committing suicide is also on account of mental disturbance
caused by mental and physical cruelty. To constitute an offence
under Section 306, the prosecution has to establish that a person
has committed suicide and the suicide was abetted by the accused.
The prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the deceased committed suicide and the accused abetted the
commission of suicide. But for the alleged extramarital relationship,
which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been
brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had
provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide.”
24. It has thus been observed that though presumption could be
drawn, the burden of proof of showing that such an offence has been
committed by the
accused is on the prosecution. The prosecution has to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had instigated,
conspired or intentionally aided so as to drive the wife to commit suicide.
25. In Mangat Ram vs. State of Haryana6 this Court observed
thus:
“28. We have already indicated that the trial court has found that
no offence under Section 304-B IPC has been made out against
the accused, but it convicted the accused under Section 306 IPC,
even though no charge had been framed on that section against
the accused. The scope and ambit of Section 306 IPC has not
been properly appreciated by the courts below. ………..
Abetment of suicide is confined to the case of persons who aid or
abet the commission of the suicide. In the matter of an offence
6 (2014) 12 SCC 595
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
249
under Section 306 IPC, abetment must attract the definition thereof
in Section 107 IPC. Abetment is constituted by instigating a person
to commit an offence or engaging in a conspiracy to commit, aid
or intentional aiding a person to commit it. It would be evident
from a plain reading of Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC
that, in order to make out the offence of abetment or suicide,
necessary proof required is that the culprit is either instigating the
victim to commit suicide or has engaged himself in a conspiracy
with others for the commission of suicide, or has intentionally aided
by an act or illegal omission in the commission of suicide.”
26. After observing the aforesaid, this Court, relying on the
judgment of this Court in the case of Hans Raj (supra), observed that
even if it is established that the woman concerned had committed suicide
within a period of seven years from the date of marriage and that her
husband has subjected her to cruelty, the court is not bound to presume
that suicide has been abetted by her husband. It is required to take into
consideration all other circumstances of the case.
27. It could thus be seen, that the view taken by the three-Judge
Bench of this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar (supra)  that when
a case does not fall under clause secondly or thirdly, it has to be decided
with reference to the first clause, i.e., whether the accused has abetted
the commission of suicide by intentionally instigating her to do so;
has
been consistently followed. As such, we are of the view that merely
because an accused is found guilty of an offence punishable under Section
498-A of the IPC and the death has occurred within a period of seven
years of the marriage, the accused cannot be automatically held guilty
for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC by employing
the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. Unless the
prosecution establishes that some act or illegal omission by the accused
has driven the deceased to commit the suicide, the conviction under
Section 306 would not be tenable.
28. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao
(supra), on which the High Court had relied, is concerned, we have
already discussed hereinabove that in the said case there was evidence
on record proving that immediately prior to committing the suicide the
deceased was driven out of the house. As such, it was held that the said
cruelty would amount to abetment to commit suicide.
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
29. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in Modinsab Kasimsab
Kanchagar  vs.  State of Karnataka & Anr.7 is concerned, no doubt
that the learned counsel for the State is justified in relying on the said
judgment as the conviction in the said case is for the offence punishable
under Section 498-A of the IPC and Sections 3, 4 & 6 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. However, in the said case, the conviction under
Section 304-B of the IPC was set aside by this Court. However, the
question, as to whether when the charge is framed only under Section
304-B of the IPC could the conviction be recorded under Section 306 of
the IPC did not fall for consideration in the said case.
30. In the case of Thanu Ram vs. State of Madhya Pradesh8
this Court by observing that on account of interplay between Section
113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Sections 498-A, 107 and
306 of the IPC, held that the appellant was liable for conviction for the
offence punishable under Section 498-A and Section 306 of the IPC.
However, it is to be noted that in the said case the Court relied on the
dying declaration of the deceased wherein she stated that she had been
treated with both mental and physical cruelty. In the said case, there
was a dying declaration of the deceased which was believed by the
court. The said dying declaration was corroborated by the evidence of
PW-13, on the basis of which the Court held that the ill treatment was
such
which triggered her immediate intention to commit suicide.
31. In the case of Satish Shetty vs. State of Karnataka9 the
victim was found to have injuries on her person. Though, the deceased
and the husband had slept together in the same room before she consumed
poison, the appellant-husband had not at all explained the injuries sustained
by the victim. In these circumstances, the conviction under Section 306
of the IPC, as recorded by the High Court for the first time, was
maintained by this Court.
32. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in the case of Narwinder
Singh vs. State of Punjab10, it is by the two learned Judges of this
Court and it does not take into consideration the judgment by three learned
Judges of this Court in Ramesh Kumar (supra)..
7 (2013) 4 SCC 551
8 (2010) 10 SCC 353
9 (2016) 12 SCC 759
10 (2011) 2 SCC 47
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
251
33. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, we find
that though the prosecution is successful in proving the case under Section
498-A of the IPC, we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to
prove that the cruelty was of such a nature which left no choice to the
deceased than to commit suicide. The prosecution has not been in a
position to place on record any evidence to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that any act or omission of the accused instigated the deceased to
commit suicide.  There is no material on record to show that immediately
prior to the deceased committing suicide there was a cruelty meted out
to the deceased by the accused due to which the deceased had no other
option than to commit the suicide. We are of the view, that there is no
material placed on record to reach a cause and effect relationship between
the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising presumption.
34. It could further be seen from the evidence on record that the
time gap between the last visit of the deceased to her parents with regard
to the illegal demand and the date of commission of suicide is about two
months.   As such, there is nothing on record to show that there was a
proximate nexus between the commission of suicide and the illegal
demand made by the appellant.  In the case of Sanju Alias Sanjay
Singh Sengar vs.  State of M.P.11 this Court found that there was time
gap of 48 hours between the accused telling the deceased ‘to go
and
die’ and the deceased ‘committing suicide’.    As such, this Court held
that there was no material to establish that the accused had abetted the
suicide committed by the deceased.
35. Another aspect that needs consideration is that the cases
wherein this Court has held that the conviction under Section 306 of the
IPC was tenable though charge was only under Section 304-B of the
IPC, it was found the charge specifically stated that the deceased was
driven to commit suicide on account of cruelty meted out to the deceased.
However, in the present case, the charge reads thus:
“That you all on 28.9.94 in the area of Village Bohan, the death of
Jaswinder Kaur wife of you, Gurjit Singh and daughter-in-law of
you, Gurdial Singh and Mohinder Kaur and sister-in-law of Ranjit
Kaur, was caused otherwise than under normal circumstances,
you all being her relatives, within a period of seven years of her
marriage subjected to her to cruelty and harassment for all in
11 [(2002) 5 SCC 371]
GURJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
connection with demand for dowry and thereby committed an
offence of dowry death punishable under section 304-B of the
Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.”
36. It would thus be seen, that the charge does not state that the
deceased was driven to commit suicide on account of the harassment
meted out to the deceased. It also does not mention that the accused
had abetted in commission of suicide by the deceased. In that view of
the matter, we are of the considered view that the cases wherein
conversion is held to be permissible are clearly distinguishable.
37. In the foregoing circumstances, the appeals are partly allowed.
Conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC is maintained and the
conviction under Section 306 of the IPC is set aside. The appellant is
acquitted of the charge under Section 306 of the IPC.
38. The appellant is stated to be on bail, his bail bonds shall stand
discharged and he is directed to surrender within four weeks for serving
the remaining period of his sentence, if not already undergone.
Devika Gujral
Appeal partly allowed.