VINOD KUMAR versus STATE OF PUNJAB
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 504, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
A 
B 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 504 
VINOD KUMAR 
V. 
STATE OF PUNJAB 
(Criminal Appeal No. 554 of 2012) 
JANUARY 21, 2015. 
[DIPAK MISRA AND ROHINTON FALi NARIMAN, JJ.] 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 7 and 13(2) -
Public servant taking illegal gratification - Public servant-
C octroi inspector accepting bribe - Conviction and sentence 
ulss. 7 and 13(2) on basis of the trap laid, examination and 
cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses by the courts 
below - On appeal held: On facts, presumption can be drawn 
that the inspector had received or accepted the said currency 
D notes on his own volition -
Testimony of PW6, an 
independent witness and PW-7 show that the prosecution was 
able to prove demand, acceptance fWd recovery of the 
amount - Though PW 7 was cross-examined after 20 months 
which resulted in his pre-varication from the examination-in-
E chief, he was declared hostile and re-examined, reading the 
evidence in entirety, his evidence cannot be brushed aside 
- Thus, order passed by the courts below upheld. 
Criminal trial - Inordinate delay in holding trial in respect 
of serious offences relating to corruption - Adjournments 
F sought by the counsel for cross-examination - Duty of the 
court - Held: Adjournments sought on the drop of a hat by 
the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, is 
contrary to all principles of holding a trial - It is necessary that 
if the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination 
G should be
completed on the same day - If the examination 
of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned 
to the next day for cross-examination - Cross-examination 
should not be deferred for a long time - Special reasons are 
H 
504
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
505 
to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note 
A 
of - If adjournments are granted in this manner it would 
tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such 
trials to a farce - Trial judges directed to follow the principles 
relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer cross-
examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of B 
the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an 
apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer 
chicanery - Administration of criminal justice - Practice and 
procedure - Adjournments. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
c 
HELD: 1. Mere recovery of the tainted money is not 
sufficient to record a conviction unless there is evidence 
that bribe had been demanded or money was paid 
voluntarily as bribe. In the absence of any evidence of D 
demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal 
gratification, recovery would not alone be a ground to 
convict the accused. PW6-clerk supported the recovery 
in entirety. He stood firm and remained unshaken in the 
cross-examination and nothing has been elicited to 
E 
dislodge his testimony. Further, from. the testimony of PW 
7 it is absolutely clear that he supported in entirety about 
the demand, acceptance and recovery of money. PW7 
was examined-in-chief on 30.9.1999 and was cross-
examined on 25.5.2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months. 
F 
The delay in said cross-examination, had given enough
time for prevarication due to many a reason. A fair trial is 
to be fair both to the defence and the prosecution as well 
as to the victim. An offence registered under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with all 
G 
seriousness. There is failure to appreciate how the trial 
Judge could exhibit such laxity in granting so much time_,,. · 
for cross-examination in a case of this nature. It would 
have been absolutely appropriate on the part of the trial 
Judge to finish the cross-examination on the day the said 
H
506 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason 
whatsoever it was deferred and the cross-examination 
took place after 20 months. The witness had all the time 
in the world to be gained over. He was declared hostile 
and re-examined. Reading the evidence in entirety, the 
B evidence of PW-7 cannot be brushed aside. However, part 
of his testimony does not commend acceptance in the 
backdrop of entire evidence in examination-in-chief and 
the re-examination. Further, the evidence of PW6 and 
PW7 have got corroboration from PW8. He in all material 
c particulars stated about the recovery and proven the 
necessary documents pertaining to the test carried with 
phenolphthalein powder. The appellant was caught red-
handed with the currency notes smeared with the powder 
by PW 8. The appellant in his statement recorded under 
0 
Section 313 CrPC took the plea that he is innocent and 
was falsely implicated due to animosity. No explanation 
was given as regards the recovery. Therefore, legitimately 
a presumption can be drawn that the accused-appellant 
had received or accepted the said currency notes on his 
E own volition. The factum of presumption and the 
testimony of PW6 and 7 go a long way to show that the 
prosecution was able to prove demand, acceptance and 
recovery of the amount. Thus, the trial judge and the High 
Court appositely concluded that the charges leveled 
against the accused have duly been proven by the 
F
prosecution. It is not a case that there is no other 
evidence barring the evidence of the complainant. On the 
contrary there are adequate circumstances which 
establish the ingredients of the offences in respect of 
which he was charged. [Para 39-40] [537-A-D; 538-D-H; 
G 539-D-G; 540-8-D] 
2. Agony and anguish is expressed in the manner in 
which trials jn respect of serious offences relating to 
corruption are being conducted by the trial courts. 
H Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
507 
counsel, even though the witness is present in court, 
contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after 
the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, 
adjournment is sought for cross-examination and the 
disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The 
law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of 
time but the same is not taken note of. There has to be a 
fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while 
conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the 
law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind 
A 
B 
its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on th.e basis of c 
the material brought on record. If an accused for his 
benefit takes the ttial on the path of total mockery, it 
cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty 
to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If 
adjournments are granted in this manner it would 
tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn 
such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and 
jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are 
expected in law to follow the command of the procedure 
relating to trial and not yield to the request of the counsel 
to grant adjournment for non-accepta~ble reasons. In fact, 
it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross-
exam ination after such a long span of time. It is 
imperative if the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-
examination should be completed on the
same day. If the 
examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial 
can be adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. 
It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination 
should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema 
D 
E 
F 
to the concept of proper and fair trial. The duty of the 
court is to see that not only the interest of the accused 
G 
as per law is protected but also the societal and collective 
interest is safe-guarded. It is distressing to note that 
despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of 
granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. There 
is a constant discomfort. Therefore, it is appropriate that 
H
508 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A the copies of the judgment be sent to the Chief Justices 
of all the High Courts for circulating the same among the 
trial Judges with a command to follow the principles 
relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the 
cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the 
B leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the 
trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society 
to suffer chicanery. Law cannot allowed to be lonely; a 
destitute. [Para 41] [540-G-H; 541-A-G] 
Gumaib Singh V. State of Punjab 2013 (3) SCR 563 = 
C (2013) 7 SCC 108; Swaran Singh V. State of Punjab 2000 
(3) SCR 572 = 2000 (5) SCC 668, State of U.P. V. Shambu 
Nath Singh (2001) 5 SCC 667, Raghubir Singh V. State of 
Haryana 1974 (2) SCR 799: 1974 (4) SCC 560; Madhukar 
Bhaskarrao Joshi V. State of Maharashtra 2000 (4) Suppl. 
D SCR 475 = 2000 (8) SCC 571; B. Jayaraj V. State of Andhra 
Pradesh (2014) 4 SCALE 81; M.R. Purushotham Vs. State 
of Kamataka (2014) 11 SCALE 467; Sat Paul V. Delhi 
Administration 1976 (2) SCR 11 = 1976 ( 1 ) SCC 727; State 
of Bihar V. Basawan Singh (CB) (1959) SCR 195, Major E.G. 
E Barsey V. State of Bombay (1962) 2 SCR 195, Bhanupratap 
Hariprasad Dave V. State of Gujarat (1969) 1 SCR 22; MO 
Shamshuddin V. State of Kera/a 1995 ( 2 ) SCR 900 = 1995 
( 3 ) SCC 351; C. M. G Babu V. C. B. I., Cochin 2009 (2 ) 
SCR 1-021 = 2009 (3 ) SCC 779; and Benarsi Das V. State 
F of Haryana 2010 (4 ) SCR
383 = 2010 (4 ) SCC 450; Shiv 
Bahadur Singh V. State of Vindhya Pradesh 1954 
SCR 1038 =AIR 1954 SC 322 , Bhagwan Singh V. State of 
Rajasthan 1976 ( 1 ) SCC 15 , Megha Singh V. State of 
Haryana 1996 (11 ) SCC 709, State vs. V. Jayapau/ (2004) 
G 5 SCC 223 State of U.P. V. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi 1964 
SCR 71 = 1964 AIR 221, S.Jeevanatham V. State (through 
Inspector of Police, TN.) 2004 (1 ) Suppl. SCR 607 = 2004 
(5) SCC 230; Bhagwan Singh V. State of Haryana 1976 (2) 
SCR 921 = 1976 (1) SCC 389, Khuji@ Surendra Tiwari V. 
H State of Madhya Pradesh1991 ( 3) SCR 1 = 1991 ( 3) SCC
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
509 
627, Rabindra Kumar Dey V. State of Orissa 1977 ( 1 ) SCR 
A 
439 = 1976 ( 4 ) SCC 233; and Syad Akbar V. State of 
Karnataka 1980 ( 1 ) SCR 95 = 1980 ( 1 ) SCC 30, Rammi 
@ Rameshwar V. State of Madhya Pradesh 1999 (3 ) Suppl. 
SCR 1 = 1999 (8 ) SCC 649, Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi 
Administration) 1980 (2) SCR 1051 = 1980 (2) SCC 390;Sita 
B 
Ram v. State of Rajasthan 1975 ( 2 ) SCC 227; M. Narsinga 
Rao v. State of A.P 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 584 = 2001 ( 1 ) 
SCC 691; Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1979 (4) 
SCC 725; 
Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. 
State of 
Maharashtra1998 ( 1 ) Suppl. SCR 608 = 1998 ( 7 ) SCC c 
337;M.R. Purushotham v. State of Karnataka 2014 (11) 
SCALE 467; T. Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu 
2006 (1 ) SCR 180 = 2006 (1 ) SCC 401, Madhukar 
Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra 2000 ( 4 ) Suppl. 
SCR 475 = 2000 ( 8 ) SCC 571 , Raj Rajendra Singh Seth v. 
D 
State of Jharkhand and Anr. 2008 (11 ) SCR 66 = 2008 (11) 
SCC 681; State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao 
Wankhede 2009 (11 ) SCR 513 = 2009 (15) SCC 200, C.M. 
Girish Babu v. C.B.I., Cochin 2009 (2 ) SCR 1021 = 
2009 AIR 2022, K. S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka 2013 
E 
(4 ) SCR 155 = 2013 (3 ) SCC 721 and Satvir Singh v. State 
of Delhi (2014) 13 SCC 143 - referred to. 
Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd (1911) 1 
KB 988 : 1911 WN 53 DPP V. Hester (1972) 3 All ER 1056; 
OPP V. Kilbourne (1973) 1 All ER 440- referred to. 
F 
Case
Law Reference 
2013 (3) SCR 563 
referred to 
para 4 
2000 (3) SCR 572 
referred to 
para 5 
G 
(2001) 5 sec 667 
referred to 
para 6 
1974 (2) SCR 799 
referred to 
para 13 
2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 475 referred to 
para 13 
H

510 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
(2014) 4 SCALE 81 
referred to 
para 14 
(2014) 11 SCALE 467 
referred to 
para 14 
1976 (2) SCR 11 
referred to 
para 15 
B 
(1959) SCR 195 
referred to 
para 15 
(1962) 2 SCR 195 
referred to 
para 15,20 
(1969) 1 SCR 22 
referred to 
para 15,21 
1995 (2) SCR 900 
referred to 
para 15,22 
c 
2009 (2) SCR 1021 
referred to 
para 16 
2010 (4) SCR 383 
referred to 
para 16 
1954 SCR 1038 
referred to 
para 19 
D 
1976 (1) sec 15 
referred to 
para 23 
1996 (11) sec 109 
referred tcf 
para 24,26 
(2004) 5 sec 223 
referred to 
para 25,27 
E 
1964 SCR 71 
referred to 
para 25,26 
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 607 
referred to 
para 27,28 
1976 (2) SCR 921 
referred to 
para 29 
F 
1991 (3) SCR 1 
referred to 
para 29 
1977 (1) SCR 439 
referred to 
para 29 
1980 (1) SCR 95 
referred to 
para 29 
1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 1 
referred to 
para 30 
G 
1980 (2) SCR 1051 
referred to 
para 33 
1975 (2) sec 221 
referred to 
para 34 
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 584 referred to 
para 35 
H
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
511 
1979 (4) sec 725 
referred to 
para 35 
1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 608 referred to 
para 35 
2014 (11) SCALE 467 
referred to 
para 38 
2006 (1) SCR 180 
referred to 
para39 
2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 475 referred to 
para 39 
2008 (11) SCR 66 
referred to 
para 39 
2009 (11) SCR 513 
referred to 
para 39 
2009 AIR 2022 
referred to 
para 39 
2013 (4) SCR 155 
referred 
para 39 
(2014) 13 sec 143 
referred to 
para 39 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 
No. 554 of 2012. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.10.2011 of the 
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRA No. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1280-SB of 2001 (0 & M) 
E 
Sushil Kumar jain, Puneet Jain, Khushbhu Jain, Abhinay 
Gupta, Manu Maheshwari, Pratibha Jain for the Appellant. 
V. Madhukar, AAG, Anvita Cowshish, Kuldeep Singh tor 
the respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by. 
F 
D.IPAK MISRA, J. 1. If one is asked a question, what 
afflicts the legally requisite criminal trial in its conceptual 
G 
eventuality in this country the two reasons that may earn the 
status of phenomenal signification are, first, procrastination of 
trial due to non-availability of witnesses when the trial is in 
progress and second, unwarranted adjournments sought by the 
H
512 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
counsel conducting the trial and the unfathomable reasons for 
acceptation of such prayers for adjournments by the trial courts, 
despite a statutory command under Section 309 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and series of 
pronouncements by this Court. What was a malady at one time, 
B with the efflux of time, has metamorphosed into malignancy. 
What was a mere disturbance once has become a disorder, a 
diseased one, at present. 
2. The instant case frescoes and depicts a scenario that 
c exemplifies how due to passivity of the learned trial Judge, a 
witness, despite having stood embedded absolutely firmly in 
his examination-in-chief, has audaciously and, in a way, 
obnoxiously, thrown all the values to the wind, and paved the 
path of tergiversation. It would not be a hyperbole to say that it 
o is a maladroit and ingeniously designed attempt to strangulate 
and crucify the fundamental purpose of trial, that is, to arrive at 
the truth on the basis of evidence on record. The redeeming 
feature is, despite the malevolent and injurious assault, the 
cause of justice has survived, for there is, in the ultimate 
E eventuate, a conviction which is under assail in this appeal, by 
special leave. 
3. The narration of the sad chronology shocks the judicial 
conscience and gravitates the mind to pose a question, is it 
F justified for any conscientious trial Judge to ign_ore the statutory 
command, not recognize "the
felt necessities of time" and 
remain impervious to the cry of the collective asking for justice 
or give an indecent and uncalled for burial to the conception of 
trial, totally ostracizing the concept that a civilized and orderly 
G society thrives on rule of law which includes "fair trial" for the 
accused as well as the prosecution. 
4. In the aforesaid context, we may recapitulate a passage 
from Gurnaib Singh V. State of Punjab. 1 
H 
1. 
(2013) 7 sec 10s.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
513 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
" ...... We are compelled to proceed to reiterate the law and 
express our anguish pertaining to the manner in which the 
trial was conducted as it depicts a very disturbing scenario. 
As is demonstrable from the record, the trial was 
conducted in an extremely haphazard and piecemeal 
manner. Adjournments were granted on a mere asking. 
The cross-examination of the witnesses was deferred 
without recording any special reason and dates were 
given after a long gap. The mandate of the law and the 
views expressed by this Court from time to time appears 
to have been totally kept at bay. The learned trial Judge, 
as is perceptible, seems to have ostracised from his 
memory that a criminal trial has its own gravity and sanctity. 
In this regard, we may refer with profit to the 
pronouncement in Ta/ab Haji Hussain v.· Madhukar 
Purshottam Mondkai' wherein it has been stated that an 
accused person by his conduct cannot put a fair trial into 
jeopardy, for it is the primary and paramount duty of the 
criminal courts to ensure that the risk to fair trial is removed 
and trials are allowed to proceed smoothly without any 
interruption or obstruction." 
5. Be it noted, in the said case, the following passage from 
Swaran Singh V. State of Punjab3 , was reproduced. 
"It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal 
case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and 
gives up. It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers
to get 
adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is 
won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he 
is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even 
bribed. There is no protection for him. In adjourning the 
matter without any valid cause a court unwittingly becomes 
party to miscarriage of justice." 
2. 
AIR 1958 SC 376. 
3. 
(2000) 5 sec 668. 
A 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
514 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
6. In this regard, it is also fruitful to refer to the authority in 
State of UP. V. Shambu Nath Singh4 , wherein thts Court 
deprecating the practice of a Sessions Court adjourning a case 
in spite of the presence of the witnesses willing to be examined 
fully, opined thus: 
"9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present 
in court he must be examined on that day. The court must 
know that most of the witnesses could attend the court only 
at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own 
avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income. 
The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness 
may be paid by the court is generally a poor solace for the 
financial loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the trial 
courts that witnesses who are called through summons or 
other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till 
evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case 
is adjourned to another day. This primitive practice must 
be reformed by the presiding officers of the trial courts and 
it can be reformed by everyone provided the presiding 
officer concerned has a commitment towards duty." 
7. With the aforesaid concern and agony, we shall 
presently proceed to adumbrate the necessitous facts. We have 
already stated that despite the impasse, there is a conviction 
by the trial Judge and an affirmation thereof by the High Court. 
F 
Elucidating the factual score,
be it noted, the instant appeal is 
directed against the judgment and order dated 13.10.2011 
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh 
in Criminal Appeal No. 1280-SB of 2001 (O&M) wherein the 
learned Single Judge has given the stamp of approval to the 
G judgment and order dated 24.10.2001 passed by the learned 
Special Judge, Patiala whereby he had convicted the appellant 
under Section 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 
1988 (for brevity, 'the Act') and sentenced him to undergo 
H 
4. 
(2001) 5 sec 667.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
515 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a 
A 
fine of Rs.2,000/- with a default clause. 
8. The prosecution case, as has been unfurled, is that Baj 
Singh, PW-5, used to bring earth in tractor trolley within the 
municipal area of Rajpura. The appellant, at the relevant time, 
was posted as Octroi lnspector·and he demanded Rs.20/- per 
trolley for permitting him to enter into the municipal area. 
Eventually, a deal was struck that the accused-appellant would 
B 
be paid Rs.500/- per month for the smooth operation. As the 
prosecution story further unfolds, on 25.1.1995, Baj Singh met 
C 
Jagdish Verma, PW-7, and disclosed before him the fact about 
the demand of the accused for permitting the entry of the tractor 
trolley inside the municipal area and thereafter, as he was not 
desirous of obliging the accused, he narrated the entire story 
to DSP Vigilance, who in his turn, with the intention to lay the 
trap, explained it to Baj Singh, PW-5, and Jagdish Verma, PW-
D 
7 about the procedure of the trap. As alleged, Baj Singh gave 
five notes of Rs.100/- to the DSP Vigilance who noted the 
numbers of the notes and completed other formalities like 
applying phenolphthalein powder on the currency notes. 
Thereafter, they proceeded to the place of the accused and a 
trap was laid. Eventually, currency notes amounting to Rs.500/ 
E 
- were recovered from the trouser of the appellant and were 
taken into
possession. The statements of the witnesses were 
recorded and after completing the investigation chargesheet 
was placed for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 
13(2) of the Act. 
9. To bring home the charges against the accused-
appellant, the prosecution examined eight witnesses. PW-1 to 
PW-4 are formal witnesses. PW-5, the complainant resiled from 
his previous statement and was cross-examined by the 
prosecution. Sher Singh, PW-6, a clerk in the office of 
Tehsildar, Rajpura had joined the police party as an 
independent witness. He supported the case of the prosecution 
in detail. Jagdish Verma, PW-7, in his examination-in-chief, 
F 
G 
H
516 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A supported the prosecution case in all aspects, but in cross-
examination, resiled from his examination-in-chief. The witness, 
PW-7, was declared hostile on a prayer being made by the 
Public Prosecutor and was re-examined. Narinder Pal Kaushal, 
PW-8, DSP of Vigilance Bureau who had led the raiding party 
B on 25.1.1995, in his deposition, deposed in detail about the 
conducting of the raid and recovery of the amount. 
10. The accused, in his statement under Section 313 
CrPC, denied the allegations and took the plea of false 
implication due to party faction and animosity. It was his further 
C stand that he was brought from his office and was taken to the 
office of thic Tehsildar and thereafter to the Vigilance office. 
11. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the evidence 
brought on record, came to hold that though the complainant 
D had not supported the case of the prosecution yet prosecution 
had been able to prove the demand and acceptance of the 
bribe and the recovery of the tainted money from the accused 
and, therefore, the presumption as envisaged under Section 20 
of the Act would get attracted and accordingly convicted the 
E accused and sentenced him, as has been stated hereinbefore. 
12. In appeal, it was contended before the High Court that 
when the testimony of Baj Singh, PW-5, and Jagdish Verma, 
PW-7, the shadow witness, was absolutely incredible, the same 
could not have been pervertedly filtered by
the learned trial 
F Judge to convict the accused-appe11ant for the crime in 
question. It was also urged that mere recovery of the currency 
notes would not constitute the offence under Section 7 of the 
Act. It was also propounded that the offence under Section 
13(2) of the Act would not get attracted unless the demand and 
G acceptance were proven. Non-involvement of any independent 
witness in the raid was also seriously criticised. The High Court 
posed the question whether the prosecution had been able to 
prove the factum of demand of bribe, its acceptance and the 
recovery of the money from the possession of the accused. With 
H regard to demand of bribe, the High Court placed reliance on
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
517 
[DIPAK ~ISRA, J.] 
the testimony of the independent witness Sher Singh, PW-6, 
A 
and the examination-in-chief of Jagdish Verma, PW-7, and 
came to hold that the demand. of bribe had been proven. It 
appreciated the deposition of PW-7 and the documents, 
especially, the Chemical Examiner's report of the hand wash 
liquid and came to hold there had been acceptance of bribe. 
B 
Relating to the recovery of the tainted money, the High Court 
took note of the fact that the ocular testimony had been duly 
corroborated by the documentary evidence and hence, the 
recovery had been proved. 
13. Be it noted, the High Court placed reliance upon 
C 
Raghubir Singh V. State of Haryana 5 and Madhukar 
Bhaskarrao Joshi V. State of Maharashtra6 and eventually 
came to hold that the prosecution had proven its case to the 
hilt and resultantly affirmed the conviction and order of sentence 
passed by the trial Court, but reduced the sentence of 2 years' 
D 
rigorous imprisonment to one year. 
14. Criticizing the conviction as recorded by the learned 
trial Judge and affirmed by the High Court, it is submitted by 
Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant that when the 
informant had not supported the case of the prosecution, it was 
E 
not justifiable on the part of the learned trial Judge to record a 
conviction against the accused. It is his submission that on the 
basis of the testimony of PW-6 to PW-8, the conviction could 
not have been
recorded, for Sher Singh, PW-6, is not a witness 
either to the demand or acceptance of the bribe by the appellant 
F 
and further the version PW-7 requires careful scrutiny, regard 
being had to the fact that he is a hostile witness. It is also urged 
that the evidence of PW-8 deserves to be discarded as he is 
an interested witness. To bolster the aforesaid submissions, 
learned senior counsel has drawn inspiration from B. Jayaraj 
G 
V. State of Andhra Pradesh7 and M. R. Purushotham Vs. State 
of Karnataka8 . 
5. 
(1974) 4 sec 560. 
6 
(2000) 8 sec 571. 
7. 
(2014) 4 SCALE 81. 
8. 
(2014) 11 SCALE 467. 
H
518 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
15. Apart from above, it is further put forth by him that as 
PW-7 has not supported the prosecution story and stated to 
have been tutored to give statement, his whole testimony should 
have been thrown out of consideration and no reliance should 
have been placed on it. It is contended by him that the High 
B Court has failed to appreciate the importance of cross-
examination of PW-7 and hence, the judgment affirming the 
conviction is absolutely flawed. To buttress the said submission, 
reliance has been placed on Sat Paul V. Delhi Administration9. 
It is the further stand of Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel that 
c the evidence of the trap witnesses, PW-6 and PW-8 should 
have been wholly ignored as they are partisan witnesses and 
their statements could not have been given any credence to 
inasmuch as there has been no corroboration. In this context, 
he has commended us to the authorities in State of Bihar V. 
0 
Basawan Singh (CB)1°, Major E G. Barsey V. State of 
Bombay11, Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave V State of Gujarat12 
and MO Shamshuddin V. State of Kerala. 13 
16. Learned senior counsel would contend, solely on the 
basis of evidence of recovery, a conviction is not sustainable 
E and in the obtaining factual matrix, the presumption under 
Section 20 of the Act would not be attracted. To substantiate 
the said proposition, strength has been drawn from C.M. Girish 
Babu V. C.8.1., Cochin 14 and Benarsi Oas V. State
of 
Haryana15". 
F 
G 
H 
17. The last plank of submission of Mr. Jain, is that in the 
instant case, the prosecution was launched by Narinder Pal 
9. 
(1976) 1 sec 727. 
10. (1959) SCR 195. 
11. (1962) 2 SCR 195. 
12. (1969) 1 SCR 22. 
13. (1995) 3 sec 351. 
14. (2009) 3 sec 779. 
15. (201 oi 4 sec 450.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
519 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
Kaushal, PW-8, who has investigated into the case and, 
A 
therefore, the concept of fair investigation, has been totally 
marred as a consequence of which, the trial is vitiated. Learned 
senior counsel would contend that a person who is a part of 
the trap party is an interested witness and he would be 
enthusiastic to see that the trap is sustained in every manner 
B 
and in such a situation, it is per se an. unfair and biased 
investigation that frustrates the essential principle inhered under 
Article 21 of the Constitution and eventually the trial. 
18. Mr. Madhukar, learned senior counsel appearing for 
the State of Punjab, per contra, would contend that the view 
C 
expressed by the learned trial Judge and the High Court cannot 
be found fault with, for a conviction under the Act can be based 
on the evidence of trap witnesses, if they are trustworthy and 
the ingredients of the offence are satisfied and in the case at 
hand, the High Court on x-ray of the evidence has so recorded. 
D 
It is urged by him that neither the learned trial Judge nor the 
High Court has fallen into error by applying the principle of 
presumption as engrafted under Section 20 of the Act. It is 
canvassed by Mr. Madhukar that the evidence of the hostile 
witness can be placed reliance upon by the prosecution and 
E 
in the obtaining factual matrix, the testimony of PW-7, one of 
the shadow witnesses, renders immense assistance for
establishing the case of the prosecution. He has with great 
pains, taken us through the evidence to substantiate the stand 
that the conviction recorded against the appellant is totally 
F 
defensible. 
19. Keeping in abeyan9e what we intend to say on the facet 
of anguish expressed by us in the beginning, we shall proceed 
to deal with the proponement of Mr. Jain that when the 
investigation conducted by Mr. Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, is 
vitiated on the foundation that he has lodged the FIR, the trial 
is also vitiated. Though the said submission has been raised 
and taken note of by us as the last plank, yet we think it seemly 
to deal with it first as it goes to the root of the matter. On a 
G 
H
520 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A perusal of the material on record, it is manifest that PW-8 is a 
part of the raiding party, a shadow witness, and admittedly had 
also sent the complaint through a Constable to the concerned 
police station for lodging of FIR. This being the factual score, 
we are required to take note of certain authorities in this regard. 
B In Basawan Singh (supra), the Constitution. Bench, after 
referring to the decision in Shiv Bahadur Singh V. State of 
Vindhya Pradesh 16 , opined that the said decision does not lay 
down an invariable rule that the evidence of the witness of the 
raiding party must be discarded in the absence of any 
c independent corroboration. The larger Bench proceeded to 
state thus: 
D 
E 
F 
" ...... The correct rule is this: if any of the witnesses are 
accomplices who are particeps criminis in respect of the 
actual crime charged, their evidence must be treated as 
the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are not 
accomplices but are partisan or interested witnesses, who 
are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence 
must be tested in the same way as other interested 
evidence is tested by the application of diverse 
consideration which must vary from case to case, and in 
a proper case, the Court may even look for independent 
corroboratio·n· before ·donvicting the accused person. If a 
Magistrate puts himself in the position of a partisan or 
interested witness, he cannot claim any higher
status and 
must be treated as any other interested witness." 
20. In Major E.G. Barsey (supra), while dealing with the 
evidence of a trap witness, the court opined that though a trap 
witness is not an approver, he is certainly an interested witness 
G in the sense that he is interested to see that the trap laid by 
him succeeds. The Court further laid down that he can at least 
be equated with a partisan witness and it would not be 
admissible to rely upon his evidence without corroboration, but 
his evidence is not a tainted one. 
H 
16. AIR 1954 SC 322.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
521 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
21. In Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave (supra), the Court 
A 
observed that the police witnesses can be said to be partisan 
witnesses as they are interested in the success of the trap laid 
by them, but it cannot be said that they are accomplices. 
Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state that their evidence 
must be tested in the same way as any other interested witness 
B 
is tested and in an appropriate case, the Court may look for 
independent corroboration before convicting the accused 
person. The three-Judge Bench reiterated the principle thus: 
" .... It is now well settled by a series of decisions of this 
C 
Court that while in the case of evidence of an accomplice, 
no conviction can be based on his evidence unless it is 
corroborated in material particulars but as regards the 
evidence of a partisan witness it is open to a court to 
convict an accused person solely on the basis of that 
evidence, If it is satisfied that that evidence is reliable. But 
D 
it may in appropriate case look for corroboration". 
22. In MO Shamshuddin (supra), the Court, after referring 
to the decisions in OPP V. Hester17 and OPP V. Kilbourne 18, 
made a distinction between accomplice and an interested 
witness. The Court, referred to the authority in Basawan Singh 
(supra) at length and eventually adverted to the concept of 
corroborating evidence. In that context it has been ruled thus: 
" ....... Now coming to the nature of
corroborating evidence 
that is required, it is well-settled that the corroborating 
evidence can be even by way of circumstantial evidence. 
No general rule can be laid down with respect to quantum 
E 
F 
of evidence corroborating the testimony of a trap witness 
which again would depend upon its own facts and 
circumstances like the nature of the crime, the character 
G 
of trap witness etc. and other general requirements 
17. (1972) 3 All ER 1056. 
18. (1973) 1 All ER 440. 
H
52-2 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
oecessarv to sustain the conviction in that case. The court 
should weigh the evidence and then see whether 
corroboration is necessary. Therefore as a rule of law it 
cannot be laid down that the evidence of every complainant 
in a bribery case should be corroborated in all material 
B 
particulars and otherwise it cannot be acted upon. Whether 
eorroboration is necessary and if so to what extent and 
wh-at should be its nature depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. In a case of bribe, the person 
who pays the bribe and those who act as intermediaries 
c 
are the only persons who can ordinarily be expected to 
give evidence about the bribe and it is not possible to get 
absolutely independent evidence about the payment of 
bribe." 
From the aforesaid authorities it is clear that a trap witness 
D is an interested witness and his testimony, to be accepted and 
relied upon requires corroboration and the corroboration would 
depend upon the facts and circumstances, nature of the crime 
and the character of the trap witness. 
E 
23. There is no doubt that the status of PW8 is that of an 
interested witness. There is no cavil over the fact that he had 
sent the FIR and conducted the investigation, but the question 
posed is whether the investigation by him is vitiated. In this 
context we may, with profit, refer to the decision in Bhagwan 
F Singh V. State of Rajasthan19 , where one Ram Singh, who was 
a Head
Constable, was the person to whom the offer of bribe 
was alleged to have been made by the appellant therein and 
he was the informant who had lodged the First Information 
Report for taking action against the appellant. He himself had 
G undertaken the investigation. In that factual backdrop the Court 
ruled thus: 
"Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere with 
concurrent findings of fact reached by the trial court and 
H 
19. (1976) 1 sec 1s.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
523 
. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
the High Court on an appreciation of the evidence. But this 
is one of those rare and exceptional cases where we find 
that several important circumstances have not been taken 
into account by the trial court and the High Court and that 
has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice calling for 
interference from this Court. We may first refer to a rather 
disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed such an unusual 
feature that it is quite surprising that it should have 
escaped the notice of the trial court and the High Court. 
Head Constable Ram Singh was the person to whom the 
offer of bribe was alleged to have been made by the 
appellant and he was the informant or complainant who 
lodged the first information report for taking action against 
the appellant. It is difficult to understand how in these 
circumstances Head Constable Ram Singh could 
undertake investigation of the case. How could the 
complainant himself be the investigator? In fact, Head 
Constable Ram Singh, being an officer below the rank of 
Deputy Superintendent of Police, was not authorised to 
investigate the case but we do not attach any importance 
to that fact, as that may not affect the validity of the 
conviction. The infirmity which we are pointing out is not 
an infirmity arising from investigation by an officer not 
authorised to do so, but an infirmity arising from 
investigation by a Head Constable who was himself the 
person to
whom the bribe was alleged to have been 
offered and who lodged the first information report as 
informant or complainant. This is an infirmity which is 
bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case". 
24. In Megha Singh V. State of Haryana20 , the Court 
noticed the discrepancy in the depositions of PW-2 and PW-3 
and absence of independent corroboration. Be it noted, the 
Court was dealing with an offence under Section 6(1) of the 
20. (1996) 11 sec 709. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
524 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985. In that 
context the Court observed that the testimony of the said 
witnesses did not inspire confidence about the reliability of the 
prosecution's case. Proceeding further, the Court held: 
B 
c 
D 
" .... We have also noted another disturbing feature in this 
case. PW 3, Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the 
accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol 
and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was 
on his complaint a formal first information report was 
lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant 
should not have proceeded with the investigation of the 
case. But it appears to us that he was not only the 
complainant in the case but he carried on with the 
investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161 
CrPC. Such practice, to say the least, should not be 
resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to 
suspect fair and impartial investigation". 
25. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the pronouncement 
in State vs. V. Jayapauf21 wherein the Court posed the question 
E whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal 
proceedings on the ground that the police officer, who had 
lodged/recorded the FIR regarding the suspected commission 
of certain cognizable offence by the respondent should not have 
investigated the case. The case against the accused was that 
F 
he was indulging in corrupt
practices by extracting money from 
the drivers and owners of the motor-vehicles while conducting 
check of the vehicles and making use of certain bogus notice 
forms in the process. The charge-sheet was filed under 
Sections 420 and 201 l.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with 
G Section 13(1 ){d) of the Act. The Court referred to the decision 
in the State of UP. V. Bhagwant Kishore JoshP2 , wherein it 
has been ruled thus: 
21. (2004) 5 sec 223. 
22. AIR 1964 SC 221. 
H
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
525 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
"Section 154 of the Code prescribes the mode of A 
recording the information received orally or in writing by 
an officer in charge of a police station in respect of the 
commission of a cognisable offence. Section 156 thereof 
authorises such an officer to investigate any cognisable 
offence prescribed therein. Though ordinarily investigation 
B 
is undertaken on information received by a police officer, 
the receipt of information is not a condition precedent for 
investigation. Section 157 prescribes the procedure in the 
matter of such an investigation which can be initiated 
either on information or otherwise. It is clear from the said c 
provisions that an officer in charge of a police station can 
start investigation eit.her on information or otherwise." 
26. After reproducing the said paragraph, the Court 
proceeded to state thus: 
"Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on 
which the High Court quashed the proceedings was that 
the investigation by the same officer who "lodged" the FIR 
would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating 
officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We 
find no principle or binding authority to hold that the 
moment the competent police officer, on the basis of 
information received, makes out an FIR incorporating his 
name as the informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. 
If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the 
ground
of bias or real likelihood of bias on thn part of the 
investigating officer. The question of bias would depend 
on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not 
proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, 
in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court, 
that whenever a police officer proceeds to investigate after 
registering the FIR on his own, the investigation would 
necessarily be unfair or biased. In the present case, the 
police officer received certain discreet information, which, 
according to his assessment, warranted a probe and 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
526 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
therefore made up his mind to investigate. The formality 
of preparing the FIR in which he records the factum of 
having received the information about the suspected 
commission of the offence and then taking up the 
investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any 
B 
semblance of reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the 
ground of bias or the like factor. If the reason which 
weighed with the High Court could be a ground to quash 
the prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on 
the police officers would be unduly hampered for no good 
c 
reason. What is expected to be done by the police officers 
in the normal course of discharge of their official duties will 
then be vulnerable to attack." 
D 
Be it noted, the Court distinguished the decisions in 
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra) and Megha Singh (supra). 
27. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to refer to 
S.Jeevanatham V. State (through Inspector of Police, T.N.} 23 . 
In the said case, the appellant was found guilty under Section 
8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii) of the Narcotic Drugs and 
E Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. One of the contentions that 
was canvassed was that PW-8, who lodged the FIR had himself 
conducted the investigation and hence, the entire investigation 
was vitiated. The Court referred to the decision in Jayapaul 
(supra) and opined thus: 
F 
G 
"In the instant case, PW 8 conducted the search and 
recovered the contraband
article and registered the case 
and the article seized from the appellants was narcotic 
drug and the counsel for the appellants could not point out 
any circumstances by which the investigation caused 
prejudice or was biased against the appellants. PW 8 in 
his official capacity gave the information, registered the 
case and as part of his official duty later investigated the 
case and filed a charge-sheet. He was not in any way 
H 
23. (2004) s sec 230.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
527 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
personally interested in the case. We are unable to find 
A 
any sort of bias in the process of investigation." 
B 
28. In the instant case, PW-8, who was a member of the 
raiding party had sent the report to the police station and 
thereafter carried the formal investigation. In fact, nothing has 
been put to him to elicit that he was anyway personally 
interested to get the appellant convicted. In our considered 
view, the decision in S. Jeevanatham (supra) would be 
squarely applicable to the present case and, accordingly, 
without any reservation we repel the submission so assiduously 
C 
urged by Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant. 
29. The next aspect which requires to be adverted to is 
whether testimony of a hostile evidence that has come on 
record should be relied upon or not. Mr. Jain, learned senior 
counsel for the appellant would contend that as PW-7 has 
totally resiled in his cross-examination, his evidence is to be 
discarded in toto. On a perusal of the testimony of the said 
witness, it is evincible that in examination-in-chief, he has 
supported the prosecution story in entirety and in the cross-
examination he has taken the path of prevarication. In Bhagwan 
Singh V. State of Haryana24 , it has been laid down that even if 
a witness is characterised has a hostile witness, his evidence 
is not completely effaced. The said evidence remains 
admissible in the trial and there is no legal
bar to base a 
conviction upon his testimony, if corroborated by other reliable 
evidence. In Khuji @ Surendra Tiwari V. State of Madhya 
Pradesh 25 , the Court after referring to the authorities in 
Bhagwan Singh (supra), Rabindra Kumar Dey V. State of 
Orissa26 and Syad Akbar V. State of Karnataka27 , opined that 
the evidence of such a witness cannot be effaced or washed 
24. (1976) 1 sec 389. 
2s. (1991) 3 sec 627. 
26. (1976) 4 sec 233. 
21. (1980) 1 sec 30. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
528 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
off the record altogether, but the same can be accepted to the 
extent it is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. 
30. In this context, we think it apt to reproduce some 
passages from Rammi @ Rameshwar V. State of Madhya 
B Pradesh28 , where the Court was dealing with the purpose of re-
examination. After referring to Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 
the Court held thus: 
c 
D 
E 
F 
"There is an erroneous impression that re-examination 
should be confined to clarification of ambiguities which 
have been brought down in cross-examination. No doubt, 
ambiguities can be resolved through re-examination. But 
that is not the only function of the re-examiner. If the party 
who called the witness feels that explanation is required 
for any matter referred to in cross-examination he has the 
liberty to put any question in re-examination to get the 
explanation. The Public Prosecutor should formulate his 
questions for that purpose. Explanation may be required 
either when the ambiguity remains regarding any answer 
elicited during cross-examination or even otherwise. If the 
Public Prosecutor feels that certain answers require more 
elucidation from the witness he has the freedom and the 
right to put such questions as he deems necessary for that 
purpose, subject of course to the control of the court in 
accordance with the other provisions. But the court cannot 
direct him to confine his questions to ambiguities
alone 
which arose in cross-examination. 
Even if the Public Prosecutor feels that new matters should 
be elicited from the witness he can do so, in which case 
the only requirement is that he must secure permission of 
G 
the court. If the court thinks that such new matters are 
necessary for proving any material fact, courts must be 
liberal in granting permission to put necessary questions''. 
H 
2s. (1999) s sec 649.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
529 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
31. We have reproduced the aforesaid paragraphs to 
A 
highlight that when the prosecution has such a right in the 
process of re-examination, as a natural corollary, the testimony 
of a hostile witness cannot be brushed aside. On the contrary, 
both the prosecution and the defence can rely for their stand 
and stance. Emphasis on re-examination by the prosecution is 
B 
not limited to any answer given in the cross-examination, but 
the Public Prosecutor has the freedom and right to put such 
questions as it deems necessary to elucidate certain answers 
from the witness. It is not confined to clarification of ambiguities, 
which have been brought down in the cross-examination. 
c 
32. Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel has propounded that 
testimony of PW7 deserves to be discredited, and the learned 
trial Judge as well as the High Court having not ignored have 
committed a grave error. We will be dealing with the aspect 
whether the evidence of PW-7 should be totally ignored or not 
D 
while we will be dwelling upon the credibility and acceptability 
of his testimony. 
33. As a contention has been raised that once the informant 
has resiled totally from his earlier statement no conviction can 
be recorded on the basis of evidence of the trap witnesses, it 
required to be carefully dwelled upon. In this regard, reference 
to the authority in Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Administration)29 
would be apt. In the said case a
police Constable was convicted 
under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 
on the allegation that he had demanded and received Rs.60/-
from the informant who was examined as PW-3 and had resiled 
from his previous statement and was declared hostile by the 
prosecution. Official witnesses had supported the prosecution 
version. Keeping in mind the evidence of the official witnesses 
the trial Court had convicted the appellant therein which was 
affirmed by the High Court. A contention was raised that in the 
absence of any direct evidence to show that the police 
29. (1980) 2 sec 390 
E 
F 
G 
H
530 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
constable demanded or accepted bribery no presumption under 
Section 4 of the Act, 194 7 could be drawn merely on the-
strength of recovery of the marked currency notes from the said 
police constable. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the two-
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
Judge Bench observed as follows:-
" ... lt is not necessary that the passing of money should be 
proved by direct evidence. It may also be proved by 
circumstantial evidence. The events which followed in quick 
succession in the present case lead to the only inference 
that the money was obtained by the accused from PW 3. 
Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act the court may 
presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to 
have happened, regard being had to the common course 
of natural events, human conduct and public and private 
business, in their relation to facts of the particular case. 
One of the illustrations to Section 114 of the Evidence Act 
is that the court may presume that a· person who is in 
possession of the stolen goods soon after the theft, is 
either the thief or has received the goods knowing them 
to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. So 
too, in the facts and circumstances of the present case the 
court may presume that the accused who took out the 
currency notes from his pocket and flung them across the 
wall had obtained them from PW 3, who a few minutes 
earlier was shown to have been in possession of the 
notes. Once
we arrive at the finding that the accused had 
obtained the money from PW 3, the presumption under 
Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is 
immediately attracted." 
G 
34. It is pertinent to note here that in the aforesaid case 
the decision rendered in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan30 was 
pressed into service. In the case of Sita Ram (supra) the 
complainant had turned hostile in the court of Special Judge. 
H 
30. (1975) 2 sec 227.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
531 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
However, the trial Judge convicted the accused who was tried 
A 
along with another accused, namely, Vikram Singh. The High 
court on appreciation ofthe evidence acq.uitted Vikram Singh 
but maintained the conviction against Sita Ram. This Court 
opined that the presumption under Section 4(1) of the 194 7 Act 
could not be drawn in the facts of the case. The question, 
B 
whether the rest of the evidence was sufficient to establish that 
the accused had obtained the money from the complaint was 
not considered. The Court in Hazari Lal (supra) distinguished 
the pronouncement in Sita Ram (supra) by stating thus:-
" ... The question whether the rest of the evidence was 
C 
sufficient to establish that the accused had obtained the 
money from the complainant was not considered. All that 
was taken as established was the recovery of certain 
money from the person of the accused and it was held that 
mere recovery of money was not enough to entitle the 
drawing of the presumption under Section 4(1) of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court did not consider 
D 
the further question whether recovery of the money along 
with other circumstances could establish that the accused 
had obtained gratification from any person. In the present 
E 
case we have found that the circumstances established by 
the prosecution entitled the court to hold that the accused 
received the gratification from PW 3. In Suraj Mal v. State
(Delhi Admn.) 31 , also it was said mere recovery of money 
divorced from the circumstances under which it was paid 
F 
was not sufficient when the substantive evidence in the 
case was not reliable to prove payment of bribe or to show 
that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. There can 
be no quarrel with that proposition but where the recovery 
of the money coupled with other circumstances leads to 
G 
the conclusion that the accused received gratification from 
some person the court would certainly be entitled to draw 
the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of 
31. (1979) 4 sec 725. 
H
532 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
Corruption Act. In our view both the decisions are of no 
avail to the appellant and as already observed by us 
conclusions of fact must be drawn on the facts of each 
case and not on the facts of other cases." 
B 
35. In this context it would be germane to understand what 
has been stated in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P32. In the 
said case, allegations against the accused- appellant were that 
one Satya Prasad, PW1 therein was to get some amount from 
Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Cooperative Federation 
for transporting milk to or from the milk chilling centre at 
C Luxettipet (Adilabad District). He had approached the appellant 
for taking steps to enable him to get money disbursed. The 
appellant 
demanded 
Rs.5000/-
for 
sending 
the 
recommendation in favour of payment of the amount due to 
PW1. As the appellant persisted with his demand PW1 yielded 
D to the same. But before handing over the money to him he 
lodged a complaint with DSP of Anti-Corruption Bureau. On the 
basis of the said complaint all arrangements were ma<;ie for a 
trap to catch the corrupt public servant red-handed. Thereafter 
the Court adverted how the trap had taken place. The court took 
E note of the fact that PW1 and PW2 made a volteface in the trial 
court and denied having paid any bribery to the appellant and 
also denied that the appellant demanded the bribe amount. The 
stand of the accused before the trial court under Section 313 
of
CrPC was that one Dr. Krishna Rao bore grudge and had 
F orchestrated a false trap against him by employing PW1 and 
PW2. Be it stated, in his deposition PW1 had stated that he 
had acted on the behest of one Dr. Krishna Rao. It was further 
the stand of the accused-appellant that the tainted currency 
notes were forcibly stuffed into his pocket. The trial court and 
G the High Court had disbelieved the defence evidence and found 
that PW1 and PW2 were won over by the appellant and that is 
why they turned hostile against their own version recorded by 
the investigating officer and subsequently by a Magistrate under 
H 
32. (2001) 1 sec 691.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
533 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
Section 164 of CrPC. The Special Judge ordered the 
witnesses to be prosecuted for perjury and the said course 
suggested by the trial Judge found approval of the High Court 
also. While dealing with the controversy this court took note of 
the fact that the High Court had observed that though there was 
no direct evidence to show that the accused had demanded 
and accepted the money, yet the rest of the evidence and the 
circumstances were sufficient to establish that the accused had 
accepted the amount and that gave rise to a presumption under 
Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act that he accepted 
A 
B 
c 
the same as illegal gratification, particularly so, when the 
defence theory put forth was not accepted. It was contended 
before this court that presumption under Section 20 of the Act 
can be drawn only when the prosecution succeeded in 
establishing with direct evidence that the delinquent public 
servant had accepted or obtained gratification. It was further 
0 
urged that it was not enough that some currency notes were 
handed over to the pubic servant to make it acceptance of 
gratification and it was incumbent on the part of the prosecution 
to further prove that what was paid amounted to gratification. 
In support of the said contention reliance was placed on Sita 
Ram (supra) and Sura) Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.}33 . The 
three-Judge Bench referred to Section 20(1) of the Act, the 
pronouncements
in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. 
Ltd34 and Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra35 
and adverted to the facts and came to hold as follows:-
"From those proved facts the court can legitimately draw 
E 
F 
a presumption that the appellant received or accepted the 
said currency notes on his own volition. Of course, the said 
presumption is not an inviolable one, as the appellant could 
rebut it either through cross-examination of the witnesses 
G 
cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. But if 
the appellant fails to disprove the presumption the same 
33. (1979) 4 sec 725. 
34. (1911) 1 KB 988: 1911 WN 53. 
35. (1998) 7SCC 337. 
H
534 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
would stick and then it can be held by the court that the 
prosecution has proved that the appellant received the 
said amount." 
36. It is apt to note here the three-Judge Bench referred 
8 
to the observations in Hazari Lal (supra) and opined thus:-
"The aforesaid observation is in consonance with the line 
of approach which we have adopted now. We may say with 
great respect to the learned Judges of the two-Judge 
Bench that the legal principle on this aspect has been 
C 
correctly propounded therein." 
37. In this regard Mr. Jain has placed reliance on the 
authority B. Jayaraj (supra). In the said case the complainant 
did not support the prosecution version and had stated in his 
0 
deposition that the amount that was paid by him to the accused 
was with a request that it may be deposited in the bank as fee 
for renewal of his licence for the fair price shop. The court 
referred to Section 7 of the Act and observed as follows:-
E 
F 
G 
H 
"Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is 
a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification 
is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere 
recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence 
under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable 
doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money 
knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been 
succinctly laid down in several judgment of this Court. By 
way of illustration
reference may be made to the decision 
in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P36. and C.M. Girish Babu 
V. C.B./.37" 
After so observing, the court proceeded to state thus:-
"ln the present case, the complainant did not support the 
36. (2010) 15 sec 1. 
37. (2009) 3 sec 779.
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
535 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is 
concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other 
witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly 
handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove 
that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the 
accused. When the complainant himself has disowned 
what he had stated in the initial complaint (exbt. P-11) 
before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove that 
the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW-
1 and contents of Exbt. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come 
A 
B 
to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof c 
of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, 
therefore, inclined to hold that the Ld. Trial court as well 
as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand 
alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only 
other material available is the recovery of the tainted 
currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact, 
such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere 
possession and recovery of the currency notes from the 
accused without proof of demand will not bring home the 
offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive 
insofar as the offence under Section 13(1 )(d)(i)(ii) is 
concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for 
illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or 
abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any 
valuable
thing of pecuniary advantage cannot be held to 
be established." 
38. The said principle has been followed in M.R. 
Purushotham v. State of Karnataka 38. On an attentive and 
cautious reading of the aforesaid decisions it is noticeable that 
D 
E 
F 
the court disbelieved the story of the prosecution as no other 
G 
evidence was brought on record. In N. Narsinga Rao case the 
accused was charged for the offences punishable under 
Sections 7 read with Section 13(1 )(d) & (2) of the Act. The court, 
38. 2014 (11) SCALE 467. 
H
536 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A as we have stated earlier, had referred to section 20(1) of the 
Act and opined that from the proven facts the court can 
legitimately draw a presumption that the delinquent officer had 
received and accepted money. As we notice, the authorities 
in 8. Jayaraj (supra) and M.R. Purushotam (supra) do not lay 
B down as a proposition of law that when the complainant turns 
hostile and does not support the case of the prosecution, the 
prosecution cannot prove its case otherwise and the court 
cannot legitimately draw the presumption under Section 20 of 
the Act. Therefore the proposition, though industriously, 
C presented by Mr. Jain that when Baj Singh, PW5, the 
complainant, had turned hostile the whole case of the 
prosecution would collapse is not acceptable and accordingly 
hereby rejected. 
39. Presently, we shall refer to the evidence of PW6, a clerk 
D in the office of Tehsildar, Rajpura. He has deposed that on 
25.1.1995, on the day of the raid, he joined the police party 
headed by Narinder Pal Kaushal, DSP, on the instruction of 
Tehsildar. He was introduced to Baj Singh, the complainant and 
Jagdish Verma, a shadow witness. Thereafter, the complainant 
E and the shadow witness, Jagdish Verma, were sent to the octroi 
post and he stopped at some distance along with Narinder Pal 
Kaushal who was waiting for signal and on receiving signal they 
went inside the octroi post. As per his testimony Narinder Pal 
K.aushal
introduced himself as DSP and thereafter a glass of 
F water was procured and sodium was added to it. Both the 
hands of the accused were dipped in the glass of water and 
the water turned pink. On search of the accused Rs.500/- in the 
denomination of Rs.100/- were recovered. The numbers tallied 
with the numbers mentioned in the memo, Ex. PE. The notes 
G were taken into possession vide Ex. PH. As is manifest that 
the said witness has supported the story of the prosecution in 
ioto. The submission of Mr. Jain is that he is merely a witness 
to recovery and solely on the basis of recovery no conviction 
can be recorded. There can be no quarrel over the proposition 
H that on the basis of mere recovery an accused cannot be found
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
537 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
guilty. It is the settled principle of law that mere recovery of the 
A 
tainted money is not sufficient to record a conviction unless 
there is evidence that bribe had been demanded or money was 
paid voluntarily as bribe. In the absence of any evidence of 
demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification, 
recovery would not alone be a ground to convict the accused. 
B 
This has been so held in T Subramanian v. The State of Tamil 
Nadu 39, 
Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi · v. 
State of 
Maharashtra 40, Raj Rajendra Singh Seth v. State of 
Jharkhand and Anr., 41 State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar 
Laxman Rao Wankhede 42 , C.M. Girish Babu v. C.B./., 
Cochin43, K. S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka44 and Satvir 
Singh v. State of Delhi45. The fact remains that PW6 has 
supported the recovery in entirety. He has stood firm and 
remained unshaken in the cross-examination and nothing has 
been elicited to dislodge his testimony. His evidence has to be 
appreciated regard being had to what has been deposed by 
Jagdish Verma, PW7. In examination-in-chief he has deposed 
that he had met tne DSP, Narinder Pal Kaushal who had 
introduced him to Sher Singh, PW6. He has further stated that 
c 
D 
he and PW5, Baj Singh, went inside the octroi post where 
Vinod Kumar demanded bribe from Baj Singh whereupon Baj 
Singh gave Rs.500/- to him, and at that juncture, he gave the 
signal to the vigilance party to come inside where
after and they 
came and apprehended the accused. Apart from stating about 
the demand and acceptance he had also stated that the hands 
of the accused were dipped in that water and the colour of the 
water had turned light pink. It was transferred into a quarter 
39. AIR 2006 SC 836. 
40. (2000) a sec 571. 
41. AIR2008SC3217. 
42. (2009) 15 sec 200. 
43. AIR 2009 SC 2011. 
44. (2012) 3 sec 121. 
45. (2014) 13 sec 143. 
E 
F 
G 
H
538 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A bottle and was sealed and was taken into possession vide 
recovery memo Ex.PG which was attested by him and Baj 
Singh. The amount of Rs.500/- was recovered from right side 
pant pocket of the accused. After making the arrangement for 
the pant of the accused, the right side pocket of the pant of the 
B accused was dipped in the mixture of water and sodium and 
its colour turned light pink. It was also transferred into a quarter 
bottle which was duly sealed and was taken into possession 
vide recovery memo Ex.PJ. The pant was also taken into 
possession vide recovery memo Ex.PJ. The notes recovered 
c from the accused were compared with the numbers mentioned 
in the memo and those tallied. The notes were taken into 
possession vide recovery memo Ex.PF. A sum of Rs.310/- was 
recovered from the further search of the accused which was 
taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex.PK. Thus, from 
0 
the aforesaid testimony it is absolutely clear that he has 
supported in entirety about the demand, acceptance and 
recovery of money. It is necessary, though painful, to note that 
PW? was examined-in-chief on 30.9.1999 and was cross-
examined on 25.5.2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months. The 
E delay in said cross-examination, as we have stated earlier had 
given enough time for prevarication due to many a reason. A 
fair trial is to be fair both to the defence and the prosecution 
as well as to the victim. An offence registered
under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with all seriousness. 
We fail to appreciate how the learned trial Judge could exhibit 
F such laxity in granting so much time for cross-examination in a 
case of this nature. It would have been absolutely appropriate 
on the part of the learned trial Judge to finish the cross-
examination on the day the said witness was examined. As is 
evident, for no reason whatsoever it was deferred and the 
G cross-examination took place after 20 months. The witness had 
all the time in the world to be gained over. We have already 
opined that he was declared hostile and re-examined. It is 
settled in law that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied 
upon by the prosecution as well as the defence. In re-
H
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
539 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
examination by the public prosecutor this witness has accepted 
A 
about the correctness of his statement in the court on 13.9.1999. 
He has also accepted that he had not made any complaint to 
the Presiding Officer of the Court in writing or verbally that the 
Inspector was threatening him to make a false statement in the 
Court. It has also been accepted by him that he had given the 
B 
statement in the Court on account of fear of false implication 
by the Inspector. He has agreed to have signed his statement 
dated 13.9.99 after going through and admitting it to be correct. 
It has come in the re-examination that he had not stated in his 
statement dated 13.9.99 in the Court that recovery of tainted c 
money was not effected in his presence from the accused or 
that he had been told by the Inspector that amount has been 
recovered from the accused. He had also not stated in his said 
statement that the accused and witnesses were taken to the 
Tehsil and it was there that he had signed all the memos. 
0 
40. Reading the evidence in entirety, his evidence cannot 
be brushed aside. The delay in cross-examination has resulted 
in his pre-varication from the examination-in-chief. But, a 
significant one, his examination-in-chief and the re-examination 
impels us to accept the testimony that he had gone into the 
E 
octroi post and had witnessed about the demand and 
acceptance of money by the accused. In his
cross-examination 
he has stated that he )1ad not gone with Baj Singh to the 
vigilance department at any time and no recovery wa.s made 
in his presence. The said part of the testimony, in our 
F 
considered view, does not commend acceptance in the 
backdrop of entire evidence in examination-in-chief and the re-
examination. The evidence of PW6 and PW7 have got 
corroboration from PW8. He in all material particulars has stated 
about the recovery and proven the necessary documents 
G 
pertaining to the test carried with phenolphthalein powder. The 
fact remains that the appellant's pocket contained 
phenolphthalein smeared currency notes when he was 
searched. It is apt to take note of the fact that the currency notes 
H
540 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A that have been recovered from the right side of the pant pocket 
were actually prepared by PW8 by smearing them with 
phenolphthalein powder. The appellant was caught red-handed 
with those currency notes. In is statement recorded under 
Section 313 of CrPC he has taken the plea that he is innocent 
B and has been falsely implicated due to animosity. No 
explanation has been given as regards the recovery. Therefore, 
from the above facts, legitimately a presumption can be drawn 
that the accused-appellant had received or accepted the said 
currency notes on his own volition. The factum of presumption 
c and the testimony of PW6 and 7 go a long way to show that 
the prosecution has been able to prove demand, acceptance 
and recovery of the amount. Hence, we are inclined to hold that 
the learned trial Judge and the High Court have appositely 
concluded that the charges leveled against the accused have 
0 duly been proven by the prosecution. It is not a case that there 
is no other evidence barring the evidence of the complainant. 
On the contrary there are adequate circumstances which 
establish the ingredients of the offences in respect of which he 
was charged. 
E 
41. Before parting with the case we are constrained to 
reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have 
expressed our agony and anguish the manner in which trials in 
respect of serious offences relating to corruption are being 
conducted by the trial courts.
Adjournments are sought on the 
F drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is present 
in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, 
after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment 
is sought for cross-examination and the disquieting feature is 
that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons 
G to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note 
of. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the cross-
examination has taken place after a year and 8 months allowing 
ample time to pressurize the witness and to gain over him by 
adopting all kinds of tactics. There is no cavil over the 
H
VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 
541 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.) 
proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the 
A 
duty of the court while conducting the trial to be guided by the 
mandate of the law, the conceptual fairness and above all 
bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on the 
basis of the material brought on record. If an accused for his 
benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be 
countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial 
B 
is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this 
manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and 
eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible 
and jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected 
in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to trial 
and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant adjournment 
for non-acceptable reasons. In fact, it is not all appreciable to 
call a witness for cross-examination after such a long span of 
time. It is imperative if the examination-in-chief is over, the 
cross-examination should be completed on the same day. If the 
examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can 
be adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is 
inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should be 
deferred for such a long time. It is anathema to the concept of 
proper and fair trial. The duty of the court is to see that not only 
the interest of
the accused ·as per law is protected but also the 
societal and collective interest is safe-guarded. It is distressing 
to note that despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit 
of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. How long 
shall we say, "Awake! Arise!". There is a constant discomfort. 
Therefore, we think it appropriate that the copies of the 
judgment be sent to the learned Chief Justices of all the High 
Courts for circulating the same among the learned trial Judges 
with a command to follow the principles relating to trial in a 
requisite manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a 
witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, 
for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels 
the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that 
law cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H

542 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] t S.C.R. 
A 
42. In the ultimate analysis, we perceive no merit in the 
appeal and consequently the same stands dismissed. As the 
appellant is on bail, his bail bonds are cancelled. He be taken 
into custody forthwith to suffer the sentence. 
B 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal dismissed •