SAVITRI DEVI versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 512, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Facts
A 
B 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 512 
SAVITRI DEVI 
v. 
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 4506of2015 etc.) 
May 14, 2015. 
[H.L. DATTU, CJI, A.K. SIKRI AND ARUN MISHRA, JJ.] 
c 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894- s. 5A and 17(1) and (4) -
Land acquisition by Notification dated 12.03.2008-lnvoking 
urgency provisions dispensing with the right of objection uls. 
5A - Challenged by the /and-owners - Some Land-owners 
a/so challenged the Notifications of the years 1979or1980 
D - High Court dismissed the cases challenging the 
Notifications of 197911980 as barred by limitation- However 
other cases were not dismissed on the ground of delay and 
/aches- On merit High Court held that invocation of urgency 
clause was unwarranted- But in view of the fact that substantial 
E development work had been carried out, third party interest 
was created, compensation was also paid, etc., High Court 
in order to balance the equities, instead of quashing the 
notification, enhanced the provisional compensation to 
64. 7% and directed allotment of developed abadi Land to 
F the extent of 10% of the acquired land- However, notification 
in respect of three villages was quashed where no 
development work had been carried out-Appeal of the Land-
holders - Held: In the facts of the case, the cases may not 
have been maintainable on the ground of delay and /aches 
G - But the High Court had gone an extra.mile in finding the 
solutions and balancing the equities in a manner 'tlhich was 
favourable to
the /and-owners by adequately compensating 
them - The directions of High Court are given in unique and 
H 
512
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
513 
peculiar circumstances and hence would not form precedent A 
- Interference u/Art. 136 not warranted in the present cases. 
~ -
Disposing of the appeals and the contempt petitions, 
the Court. 
, ) 
HELD: 1. The appellants were not aggrieved by the B 
acquisition per se in the manner it was done by the 
respondents. As per their own case, they became 
aggrieved only when they found that land was not 
utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired namely c 
industrial development, but a large portion thereof was 
sought to be given away to the builders for development 
of the land as residential. The High Court, acc~pted such 
a plea of the land owners on the ground of'l~ches and 
delay. [Para 35) [558-C-E] 
·~ 
D 
Nand Kishore Gupta and Ors. v. State of UP. and Ors. 
2010 (11 ) SCR 356 = (2010) 10 SCC 282 - referred to. 
2. After the land was acquired, which was of very 
large quantity and in big chunks, further steps were taken E 
by passing the award, taking possession and paying 
compensation. In many cases, actual possession was 
taken and in rest of the cases, paper possession was 
taken where because of the land under Abadi, actual F 
possession could not be taken on spot immediately. 
Where possession was taken, these land owners/ 
appellants even received compensation. All these 
petitions have been filed only thereafter which may not 
be maintainable stricto sensu. Looking into the matter G 
from the aforesaid
prospective, the plea that giving away 
of the land by allotment to the private developers for 
construction of residential units gave them ·the fresh 
cause of action, gets dented to a great extent. [Paras 37, 
38] [560-A-F] 
H
514 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. 197 4 
AIR 2077 = 1975 (1) SCR 802 - followed . 
Murari and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 1996 ( 8 ) 
Suppl. SCR 313 = 1997 ( 1 ) SCC 15; Ravi Khullar and Anr. 
B v. Union of India and Ors. 2007 (4) SCR 598 = 2007 (5) SCC 
231; Anand Singh and Anr. v. State of U .P. and Ors. 201 O (9 ) 
SCR 133 = 2010 (11) SCC 242- relied on. 
3. Though the High Court has not dismissed the writ 
c petitions filed by the appellants on the ground of delay 
and laches accepting the plea of the appellants that they 
felt aggrieved on coming to know that the land was 
sought to be given to the private persons for 
development. In this way, discretion is exercised by the 
D High Court in entertaining the writ petitions on merits. 
Since such a discretion is exercised, this Court would 
not interfere with that discretion, more so, when a very 
fair stand is taken by the NOi DA Authority. It was equally 
possible to dismiss these writ petitions as the same were 
E filed belatedly after passing of the award and when in 
most of the cases, possession was taken and 
compensation paid. Thus, the High Court has gone an 
extra mile in finding the solution to the problem and 
balancing the equities in a manner which is favourable 
F to the land owners. [Para 38] [560-F-G; 561-A-C] 
4. Many residents of Patwari village had entered into 
agreement with the authorities agreeing to accept 
enhanced
compensation at the rate of 64. 7%. This 
G additional compensation was, however, agreed to be 
paid by the authorities only in respect of land owners of 
Patwari village. The High Court has bound the authorities 
with the said agreement by applying the same to all the 
_ land owners thereby benefiting them with 64. 7% 
H additional compensation. There could have been
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
515 
argument that the authorities cannot be fastened with A 
this additional compensation, more particularly, when 
machinery for determination for just and fair 
compensation is provided under the Land Acquisition 
Act and the land owners had, in fact, invoked the said 
machinery by seeking reference under Section 18 B 
thereof. Likewise, the scheme for allotment of land to the 
land owners provides for 5% and 6% developed land in 
NOIDA and Greater NOIDA respectively. As against that, 
the High Court has enhanced the said entitlement to 10%. -
It could be an arguable case as to whether High Court C 
could grant additional land contrary to the policy. 
Notwithstanding the same, the NOIDA Authority have 
now accepted this part of the High Court judgment after 
the dismissal of the appeals filed by the NOi Of' Authority. 0 
[Para 39] [561-0-H; 562-A] 
5. On the one hand, invocation of urgency 
provisions u/s 17 of the Act and dispensing with the right 
to file objection under Section 5A of the Act, is found to 
be illegal by the High Court. On the other hand, because E 
of delay in challenging these acquisitions by the land 
owners, developments have taken place in these villages 
and in most of the cases, third party rights have been 
created. Faced with this situation, the High Court came F 
out with the solution which is equitable to both sides. 
Thus, the High Court considered the ground realities of 
the matter and arrived at a
more practical and workable 
solution by adequately compensating the land owners 
in the form of compensation as well as allotment of G 
developed Abadi land at a higher rate i.e. 10% of the land 
acquired of each of the land owners against the eligibility 
and to the policy to- the extent of 5% and 6% of NOIOA 
and Greater NOIOA land respectively. [Para 40] [562-H; 
563-A-D] 
H
516 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015]7 S.C.R. 
A 
Bondu Ramaswamy and Others v. Bangalore 
Development Arthority 2010 (6) SCR 29 = 2010 (7) SCC 129 
- referred to. 
6. The allegation of some of the appellants that their 
8 abadi land was acquired, is specifically denied. There is 
specific averment made by the NOIDA Authority at so 
many places that village abadi land was not acquired. 
Abadi area is what was found in the survey conducted 
prior to Section 4 Notification and not what is alleged or 
c that which is far away from the dense village abadi. It 
has been the consistent stand of the NOIDA Authority 
that prior to the issuance of Section 4 Notification under 
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, survey was conducted 
and the abadi found in that survey was not acquired. 
D There has been a long gap between acquisition of the 
land and filing of the writ petitions in the High Court by 
the appellants challenging the acquisition. If they have 
undertaken some construction during this period they 
cannot be allowed to take advantage thereof. Therefore, 
E the plea of the appellants based on parity with three 
villages in respect of which the High Court has given 
relief by quashing the acquisition cannot be accepted. 
[Para 41] [563-E-F, H; 564-A-C] 
F 
7. The present cases are not such, where this Court 
should interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. 
However, it is clarified that directions of the High Court 
are given in the unique and peculiar/specific background
of the cases and, therefore, it would not form precedent 
G for future cases. [Para 43] [564-G-H; 565-A] 
H.M. T. Housing Building Co-operative Society v. Syed 
Khader & Ors. 1995 (2) SCR 200 = 1995 (2) SCC 677; H. M. T. 
House 
Building 
Cooperative 
Society 
v. 
M. 
Venkataswamappa and others 1995 (3) SCC 128; Bangalore 
H City Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. State of
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
517 
Karnataka and others 2012 (3) SCR 295 = 2012 (3) SCC A 
727; S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab 1964-SCR 73; S.P. 
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and others 1993 (3) 
Suppl.' SCR 422 = 1994 (1) SCC 1 ;r Vyalikaval 
Housebuilding Coop. Society v. II. Chandrapp,a and others 
B 
2007 (2) SCR 277 = 2007 (9) SCC 304; Royal Orchid Hotels 
Limited and Anr. v. G. Jayarama Reddy and Ors. 2011 (11) 
SCR 701=2011 (10) SCC 608 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
c 
1995 (2) SCR 200 
referred to 
para 27 
1995 (3) sec 128 
referred to. para 27 
2012 (3) SCR 295 
referred to 
para 27 
.. . ,,,. 
D 
1964 SCR 73 
referred to 
para 28 
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 422 
referred to 
para 29 
2007 (2) SCR 277 
referred to 
para 29 
E 
2011 (11) SCR 701 
referred to 
para 30 
2010 (11) SCR 356 
referred to 
para 36 
1975 (1) SCR 802 
followed 
para 37 
F 
1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 313 
relied on 
para 37 
2007 (4) SCR 598 
relied on' ..,, para 37 
2010 (9) SCR 133 
relied on 
Para 37 
G 
2010 (6) SCR 29 
referred to 
para 39 
' 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
4506 of 2015 etc. 
H
518 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A 
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.10.2011 in 
B 
CMWP No. 62649 of 2008 of the High Court of Judicature at 
Allahabad. 
with 
C.A. No. 4830, 4508-12, 4513-17, 4518-24, 4819, 4525-
26, 4527, 4529-30, 4531, 4532, 4533, 4534, 4535, 4536, 
4537,4538,4539,4540,4541,4543,4544,4545,4546,4547, 
4548,4549,4550,4551,4552,4553,4554,4555,4556,4557, 
c 4558, 4559, 4560, 4561, 4563, 4564-67, 4568-73, 4575-76, 
4577, 4578, 4579-80, 4581-89, 4591, 4592, 4593, 4594, 
4595,4596,4597-98,4599,4600,4601,4602,4603,4604, 
4605-07, 4608, 4609, 4610, 4611, 4612, 4613-15, 4616, 
4617,4618,4619,4620,4621,4622,4623,4624,4625-30, 
D 4631,4632,4633,4634,4635,4636,4637,4638,4639,4640, 
4641, 4642-4643, 4644, 4645, 4646-4647, 4648-4650, 4651, 
4652, 4653-4660, 4661-4666, 4667, 4668, 4669, 4670, 4671, 
4672,4673,4674,4675,4677,4678,4679,4680,4681,4682, 
4683,4690-4691,4692,4693,4694,4695,4696-4697,4698, 
E 4699, 4700, 4701-702, 4703-4704, 4705-4706, 4707-4709, 
4710-4711,4712,4713,4714-4715,4716,4717,4718,4719, 
4720, 4721, 4722, 4723, 4724, 4726, 4727, 4728, 4729, 
4730-4731, 4732-4733, 4734, 4735-4736, 4737, 4738, 4739, 
4740-4741,4742-45,4746,4747,4748,4749,4750,4751-
F 53,4754,4755,4756,4757,4758,4759-60,4761-63,4764-
65, 4766-4768, 4769-4770, 4771, 4772-74, 4775, 4776, 
4777,4778,4779,4780,4781,4782,4783,4784,4785,4786, 
4787,4788,4789,4790,4791,4792,4793,4794-95,4796, 
4797,4798-99,4800,4801,4802,4803,4804,4805,4806, 
G
4807,4808,4809,4810-18,4837,4807,4809,4808,4809 
of 2015 
H 
C.A. Nos. 2197,2195,2198,2199, 2225, 2226,2704, 
2705, 3022 of 2013
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH 
519 
C.A. Nos. 4902, 4928 of 2014 
A 
Comtempt Petition ( c) Nos. 237-238 of 2013 in SLP (c) 
Nos. 1082-1083 of2012. 
Comtempt Petition (c) Nos. 444 of 2013 in SLP (c) No. B 
5566of2012. 
· 
Comtempt Petition (c) No. 21 of 2015 in SLP (c) No. 
27023of2012. 
L.N. Rao, PN. Misra, Nagendra Rai, Pramod Kr. Jain, lndu C 
Malhotra, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Kailash Vasdev, Mahabir Singh, 
Pallav Shishodia, J.C. Gupta, Vijay Hansaria, S.C. 
Maheshwari, Nidhesh Gupta, S. R. Singh, Rakesh Khanna, 
Amrendra Saran, Ajay Kumar Misra, J.M. Sharma, Rakesh 
Dwivedi, Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Rakesh Kr. Khanna, D 
Pramod Swarup, Reena Singh, AAG, Ravindra Kumar, 
Kedarnath Tripathi, Shashank Samru, Aakash Kumar, Prerna 
Singh, Chandra Prakash, Sunder Khatri, Shital Khatri, Rajesh 
Goyal, GauravYadav, Kuldip Singh, Chinmoy Khaladkar, B.K. 
Pal, Manu Shanker Mishra, Nishant Kumar, Nitin Jain, Manish E 
Kumar, A.A. Chaudhary, Alex Joseph, Amit Gupta,Sarwa · 
Mitter, for Mitter & Mitter Co., GautamAwasthi, Bhopal Singh, 
Ayush Choudhary, Deep Shikha Bharati, Anish Kumar Gupta, 
Prashant R. Dahat, Pu nit Yadav, R.K. Adsure, K.B. Rohatgi, 
F 
Mahesh Kasana, Aparna Rohatgi Jain, Preeti Singh, 
Gagandeep Sharma,Abhishek Jain, RK. Gupta, S.K. Gupta, 
M.K. Singh, B.P. Gupta, ShekharKumar, RahulVerma, Susmita 
Lal,AdarshAgarwal, Wajeeh Shah, Sanjay K. Tyagi, Prabhat 
K. Rai, Himanshu Tyagi, Asha Gopalan Nair, Dr. Rajeev G 
Sharma, Pankaj Dubey, Raghuvir Sharma, Vipin
Kumar 
Sharma, Dharmendra Sharma, Karmendra Pratap Singh, 
Rovin Babu, Rishu Mishra, Vikas Mahajan, Vined Sharma, B.Y. 
Kulkarni, Vishal Mahajan, Anuradha Mutatkar, A.N. Singh, 
Anisha Jain, V.P. Singh, Dr. Vipin Gupta, Prem Prakash, Anshul H
520 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
Naf~yan, Ankur Prakash, Priyanka Singh, Piyush Singh, Aditya 
Parolia, RD. Upadhyay, GiridharG Upadhyay,Asha Upadhyay, 
Sanjay Sharma, Yogesh Tiwari, Sanjay K. Agrawal, Dinesh K. 
Garg, Abhihek Garg, Dhananjay Garg, Deepak Mishra, B.S. 
Billowria, Kumar Mihir, Vishal Gupta, Rakesh Kumar, Prabhat 
B Kaushik, ManeeshArora, Gaurav Jain, Arjun Bhandari, Bimlesh 
Kumar Singh, Rajeev Kumar Gupta, K.S. Rana, Dharm Singh, 
Manoj Gorkela, Nagesh Gajghate, Priya Sharma, Rameshwar 
Prasad Goyal, Manoj Kumar, Gopal Prasad, Dr. Surat Singh, 
Brajesh Kumar Singh, Sudhansu Palo, Dr. Anil Kr. Tandale, 
C Jetendra Singh, Gaurav Kumar, S.K. Sabharwal, Vikal Mudgal, 
Ashok Kumar Sharma, D.N. Goburdhun, Prabal Bagchi, Lal 
Singh Thakur, Tabrez Ahmed, Bhopal Singh, Syed Mehdi 
Imam, Balraj Dewan, Zaki Khan, Mohd. Farhan Khan, Sandeep 
D Sethi, Shirin Zaidim, Yashpal Dhingra, Sandhya Goswami, 
M.P.S. Tomar, Jabar Singh, Nikhar Berry, Sanjay Krishna, 
Ranvir Singh, Ravi Nanda, Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Priya 
Sahadeo, Mayank Pandey, Ravindra Kumar, D.K. Sharma, 
Surya Nath Pandey, Ajay Kr. Singh, Rajesh Gupta, Harpreet 
E Singh, Sumit R. Sharma, PuneetTaneja,Arun K. Sinha, Rakesh 
Singh, Md. ShahidAnwar,Arvind Kumar, C.S. Chauhan, K. V. 
Bharathi Upadhaya, Yogesh Tiwari, Sanjay K. Agrawal, 
Gyanendra Singh, Nagendra Singh, Vishwa Pal Singh,Ankur 
Prakash,Aditya Parolia, Piyush Singh, Dr. Shiva Sharma, D.K. 
F Sharma, Manoj Gorkela, Shashi Kiran,
Abhiuday Chandra, Jai 
Singh, Rana S. Biswas, Sunil Kr. Sharma, Sharmila Upadhyay, 
Deepak Goel, Sunando Raha, Ankit Goel, Devender Kumar 
Go~I. N.P. Singh, S.K. Singh, Praveen Kumar Singh, Bal 
Krishan Sharma, Md. Ziaudding Ahmad, Rajiv Shankar 
G Dvivedi, Mohit Baksh.i, Dheeraj Nair, Himanshu Sharma, 
Anuvrat Sharma, Sum it Bansal, Ateev Mathur, Jagriti Ahuja, 
Gagan Gupta, Atul Bandhu, Rakesh K. Sharma, Tulika 
Mukherjee, Anuradha D. Misra, Kumar Anurag Singh, For 
Anuradha &Associates, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia,Ajai Kumar 
H Bhatia, Sagar Bansal, F ateh Singh Chauhan, Arun Sharma,
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
521 
Amiet Andlay, Tatini Basu, Mukul Kumar, Tulika Prai<ash, A 
Sheeba Khan, Arvind Kumar Shukla, Amit Shukla, SWeta Rani, 
Pradeep Verma, Himanshu, Praveen Swarup,' Sushma 
Verma, Suvesh Kumar, Prashant Chaudhary, Pawanshree 
Agrawal, S.K. Sinha, Tanmay Nagar,Ashok KumarYadav,Anil 
Sharma, K.S. Rana, Ajit Sharma, Shikha Beri, Nitin Singh, 
B 
Sameer Singh, Akshat Sharma, Pulkit Manuja, Sanchit Garga, 
For Col. P.S. Sharma, Tripurari Ray, B.S. Billowria, Vishnu 
Sharma, R. Chandrachud, Rajnish Singh, Sansriti Pathak, 
Utkarsh Kulvi, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Bina Madhavan, Bipin 
Kumar, Suresh Chandra Sharma, For Lawyers Knit & Co., C 
Farhan Khan, H.P. Sahu, Kamlesh Mishra, Shivkant Mishra, 
V.K. Sidharthan, Ajai K. Bhatia, Sagar Bansal, J.K. Bhatia, 
Amit Pawan, Abhishek Amritanshu, Shailendra Kumar, 
Suryodaya Prakash Tiwari, Sudhakar Prasad Tiwari, Shashi D 
Kiran, Meenakshi, Jyoti Sharma, Harshivir Pratap Sharma, 
Naresh Kumar, Nitin Singh, Sanchit Garg, Akshat Sharma, 
Pulkit, Ajit Sharma, Shikha Beari, Bhopal Singh Rawal, 
Sandeep Singh Rawal, GautamAwasthi, S. Chauhan, K. S. 
Rana, Anirudh Tanwar, Y. D. Nagar, Lalit Kumar, Gyanendra E 
Singh, Vishwa Pal Singh, S.K. Sabharwal, Satpal Singh, 
Dushyant Bhati, Vishwajit Singh, Abhindra ~.faheshwari, Veera 
Kaul Singh, Pankaj Singh, Gau~av Singh, Atul Kumar, S.K. 
Verma, Sudhir Kulshrestha, Sushma Singh, Sarvesh Bisaria, 
P.C. Sharma, S. Usha Reddy, Anuvrat Sharma, Alka Sinha, F
Braham Singh, P.K. Bajaj, N.S. Vidhudi, R.D. Upadhyay, S.B. 
Tripathi, AnkurYadav, Avnish Singh, Arvind Kumar Shukla, Alok 
Shukla, Amit Shukla, NihalAhmad, Nayanak Shekhar Mishra, 
. Mayank Singh Chauhan, Arvind Kumar Shukla, Rushi Khan, 
Tripurari Ray, Anil Kaushik, Rajinder Singh, Vishnu Sharma, G 
Charu Ambwani, Prashant Kumar, For A.P. & J. Chambers, 
Anurag Tomar, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Sagar Bansal, J.K. 
Bhatia, Shiv Kumar Suri, Shikhil Suri, Akriti Gupta, Satendra 
Kumar, Ankur Yadav, Avnish Singh, Rajesh Srivastava, Yash 
Pal Dhingra, Sonal Jain, Rajiv M. Brahma, Dr. Satish Chandra, H
522 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A Abhiuday Chandra, A.D.N. Rao, Annam Venkatesh, Sudipto 
Sircar, Vaishali R., Neelam Jain, K.K.L. Gautam, Devavrat 
Anand, Krishan Kumar R.S., Pardeep Gupta, Parinav Gupta, 
Mansi Ajamani, M.A. Chinnasamy, V. Senthil Kumar, Nanita 
Sharma, Vivek Sharma, Ajay Narain Mathur, Niranjana Singh, 
B Ram Bhaj, Arti Singh, Namita Choudhary, Rabin Majumder, 
Mahua Kalra, Mohd. lrshad Hanif, Pahlad Singh Sharma, Ajay 
Kumar Singh, Vis ha I Gupta, San jay Kumar Tyagi, B. K. Satija, 
Avinash Kr. Lakhanpal, Naresh Kumar, Brij Bhusan, Rishi 
Malhotra, Ghan Shyam Vasisht, Jyoti Mendiratta, Sudarshan 
C Rajan, Ajit Sharma, S. Usha Reddy, E.C. Agrawala, 
Subramonium Prasad, Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, P.N. Gupta, 
Sumit Attri, Abhishek Sharma, Rekha Pandey, Shiv Sagar 
Tiwari, Dinesh Kr. Tiwary, Chandan Kumar, Santosh Kumar 
0 Tripathi, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Prakhar Sharma, Dipankar 
Das, Vijaya Lakshmi, Devesh Singh, Anu Gupta, Pramod 
Dayal, Rakesh Dahiya, lrshadAhmad, SamirAli Khan, Sunil 
Kumar Jain, Ashok K. Mahajan, Subhash Chandra Jain, 
Rajesh Goyal, Amit Sharma, S.M. Jadhav & Company, Dinesh 
E Kumar Garg, Ravindra Kumar, Sarla Chandra, Daya Krishan 
Sharma, Bimlesh Kumar Singh, Nitin Kumar Thakur, Aditi 
Gupta, Aftab Ali Khan, Devesh Kumar, Ritesh Agrawal, 
Ashwani Bhardwaj, Venkateswara RaoAnumolu, Liz Mathew, 
Shrish Kumar Misra, C.S.N. Mohan Rao,AnkolekarGurudatta, 
F Shomila Bakshi, Binu Tamta, Vikas Mahajan, Vinod Sharma, 
Bhaskar Y.
Kulkarnim, Dheeraj Nair, Sanjay Kumar Visen, 
Saravesh Singh Baghel, Gunnam Venkateswara Rao, 8. 
Sunita Rao, Brahm S. Nagar,Ashok Mathur, Surya Kant, for 
G 
the appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. These matters were heard in detail for 
few days and hearing was concluded on 05.02.2015. 
H Thereupon, we communicated the result in the open Court by 
pronouncing that appeals were dismissed and the reasons
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
523 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
shall follow. These are, thus, our reasons for dismissing the A 
appeals. 
Leave is granted in all the special leave petitions. 
PROLOGUE: 
B 
(2) The subject matter of most of these appeals are the 
Notifications dated 12-03-2008 issued by the State of U.P. 
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act ("Act" for short) 
read with Section 17 of the Act as well as declaration issued 
under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred C 
to as the 'Act') vide Notification dated 30.06.2008. Land 
situate in various villages of Naida and Greater Naida in Tehsil 
Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagarwas acquired. Some other 
Notifications under same provisions of the Act rn respect of D 
lands of these villages was also acqufred by earlier 
Notifications. The purpose stated in the notifications was 
'Planned Industrial Development'. Urgency provisions under 
Section 17(1) and 17(4). of the Act were invoked thereby 
dispensing vvith the right 9f objection otherwise given to the E 
land holds rs under Section SA of the Act. The total land which 
was acquired by these notification was S89.188 hectares. 
Some writ petitions were initially filed in the High Court of 
Allahabad challenging the said Notifications, with primary 
contention that invocation of emergency provision and taking F 
away valuable right of the land holders under Section SA of the 
Act was illegal, ma/a fide, arbitrary and colourable exercise
of 
power. Some of the writ petitions came up before the Division 
Bench of the said High Court. One was Writ Petition (C) 4S777 
of 2008 in the case of Harish Chand and Others v. State of G 
U.P. and Others wherein the High Court upholding the very 
same Notifications, on arriving at the conclusion that invocation 
of Section 17 of the Act was justified, dismissed that writ 
petition. It so happened that another Division Bench of the 
same High Court decided Writ Petition (C) No. 17068 of 2009; H
524 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A titled Karan Singh v. State of U.P. and others. The Division 
Bench rendered its judgment dated 19-07-2011 in the said 
case accepting the aforesaid contention of the writ petitioners 
and holding that invocation of provisions of Section 17 of the 
Act was notjustified.Accordingly, the Division Bench quashed 
B these Notifications. 
(3) As a sequel, spate of writ petitions came to be filed 
challenging the lands acquired not only by the notification dated 
12-03-2008 but even by earlier notifications as well. When 
C these petitions came up before another Division Bench it 
noticed the aforesaid two conflicting views expressed by two 
different Division Benches. This led the said Division Bench 
to refer the matter to the larger Bench and orders dated 26-
07-2011 were passed in this behalf. This is how the matters 
D were placed before the Full Bench and by that time as many 
as 471 writ petitions had accumulated. All these writ petitions 
were taken up analogously by the Full Bench and disposed of 
vide judgment dated 21.10.2011 with leading case known as 
Gajraj vs. State of U.P. (W.P. (C) 37443 of201 !). The Full Bench 
E of the High Court has accepted the plea of the land holders 
that invocation of emergency clause contained in Section 17 
of the Act was impermissible and unwarranted. At the same 
time, the High Court also noticed that in respect of land of many 
F villages, possession had already been taken and substantial
development work carried out. Even compensation was paid 
in such cases, the High Court, instead of quashing the 
Notifications in respect of those villages, chose to adopt the 
middle path in an endeavour to balance the equities of both 
G sides. Thus, it enhanced the provisional compensation and 
also directed allotment of developed Abadi land to the extent 
10% of their acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 sq. 
mtrs. However, in respect of three villages, when it found that 
no development work had been carried out at all by the 
H Authorities during the intervening period, the High Court chose
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH 
525 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
to quash the Notifications including consequential actions and A 
directed restoration of the land to the respective land owners. 
(4) It may also be noticed at this stage that when there 
was flurry of writ petitions in the High Court challenging the 
invocation of Section 17 and the Division Bench of the High B 
Court in Harkaran Singh (supra) had held invocation of urgency 
powers to be bad in law, some land owners whose land was 
acquired much earlier by invoking clause (some of the 
Notifications of such land date back to 1979 or early 1980s as 
' 
~· 
well) took adventurous step to file the writ petitions in the year C 
2011 challenging those Notifications. All these writ petitions, 
however, have been dismissed by tJle impugned judgment of 
the High Court on the ground that they are filed with inordinate 
delay and laches. 
D 
(5) From the aforesaid, it is clear that three sets of 
directions are issued by the High Court, namely, (I} dismissing 
writ petitions filed with unexplained delays and laches; (ii) 
quashing the Notification in respect of three villages where no 
development work had taken place; and (iii) in respect of other E 
villages, instead of quashing the action of acquisition of land 
in spite of accepting the plea that Section 17 was wrongly 
invoked, it has enhanced the compensation as well as extent 
of entitlement for allotment of developed Abadi plot. · 
(6) The State GovernmenVU.P.
Development Board as well 
F 
as many land owners have challenged the said Full Bench 
decision of the High Court. Insofar as special leave petitioners/ 
appeals of the Government and Authority are concerned, they 
have already been dismissed. In these batches of matters, G 
thus, we are concerned with the appeals of the land owners. 
(7) Most of these appeals are filed against the Full Bench. 
However, some of the appeals arise. against the earlier Division 
Bench judgment dated 25-11-2008 whereby the High Court H
526 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A had upheld the same Notifications and rejected the challenge 
to the acquisition of land. Some appeals are filed by the NOIDA 
authority where the Division Bench had quashed the 
notification. 
B 
(8)After narrating these preliminaries of the matters, we 
c 
advert to the facts and events of the cases. For the sake of 
convenience, we will refer to the facts appearing in the writ 
petition of Gajraj as that was the lead case before the High 
Court as well. 
FACTUAL MATRIX 
(9) This writ petition was filed by 27 writ petitioners claiming 
themselves to be Bhumidaars with transferable right and 
0 owners of different plots of land situate in Village Patwari, 
Pargana, Tehsil - Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar. The 
Notification dated 12-03-2008 was issued by the State 
Government under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 notifying that the land mentioned 
E in the schedule is needed for the public purpose namely, for 
the "planned industrial development" in Gautam Buddha Nagar. 
Inquiry under Section 5A having been dispensed with vide 
Notification dated 12-03-2008, State Government proceeded 
to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition 
F Act dated 30-06-2008. 
(10) The petitioners had pleaded in the writ petition that 
dispensation of the inquiry under Section 5A can only be an 
exception where the urgency cannot brook the delay. The 
G respondents, without application of mind,
dispensed with the 
inquiry. The acquisition proceedings were deprecated as void, 
unconstitutional, tainted with malafide, abuse of authority/power 
and non application of mind. It was pleaded that the procedure 
under Section 5A is mandatory which embodies a just and _ 
H wholesome principle that a person whose property is being
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
527 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
acquired or intended to be acquired should have occasion to A 
persuade the authorities that his property be not touched for 
acquisition. !twas also argued that land use of village Patwari 
was changed in the Master Plan 2021 after the issuance of 
notifications under sections 4 and 6, which is colourable 
exercise of powers and entire exercise is arbitrary, illegal and B 
infringes rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14, 
19 and 300A of the Constitution of India. These petitioners 
also stated in the writ petition that though there was some delay 
in filing the writ petition if counted from the date of notification 
but the writ petition was filed only when it came to their C 
knowledge that the land use of village Patwari was changed in 
the Master Plan 2021 after the notifications under Sections 4 
and 6 and land was sought to be allotted to the private builders, 
thereby giving go by to the objective for which the land was D 
acquired. The petitioners further claimed that the part of the 
property of the petitioners is situate in village Abadi. It was 
pleaded that the authority had executed a lease deed dated 
31-03-2010 in favour of respondent no. 4 M/s. Supertech Ltd, 
a company engaged in the construction, allotting 2,40,00 E 
square meters land for constructing multi-storied complexes. 
It was also stated that although land was acquired for industrial 
development but the same had now
been allotted to the 
builders by the Authority which clearly indicates that neither 
there was any appropriate plan and scheme for industrial F 
development nor there was any urgency in the matter and the 
whole proceeding amounted to colourable exercise of power. 
( 11) The State Government as well as Authority contested 
the matter by putting its justification to the invocation of Section G 
17 of the Act. It was pleaded that land was acquired for the 
purpose of industrial development. It was also stated that the 
Authority had been constituted vide Notification dated 28-01-
1998 issued under the U.P. lndustrialArea DevelopmentAct, 
1976 (hereafter referred to as the '1976 Act') and the land H
528 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A was to be developed in accordance with the aims and 
objectives contained in the said Act included development of 
the land forresidential and other purposes as well and was 
not confined to industrial development alone. Objection was 
raised to the maintainability of the writ petitions by contending 
B that except few petitioners, all other had received 
compensation on various dates and, therefore, they were 
estopped from challenging the acquisition, once the 
possession of the land was taken, award was passed and 
compensation received. The Authorities also stated that land 
C owner of about 83% of the land area had already been paid 
the compensation. In terms of numbers, out of 1605 persons, 
1403 persons had accepted the compensation. Development 
works had been carried out in the area in question which had 
0 already been demarcated into various sectors. The nature of 
development carried out was stated in detail in the affidavit. 
Invocation of urgency clause was also sought to be justified. 
(12) M/s. Supertech Limited, to whom certain area was 
allotted for development of the housing colony was also 
E impleaded as the respondent. On its impleadment, this 
respondent also filed its counter affidavit stating the 
circumstances under which it was allotted the land for 
development of residential units. It also contended that the 
F substantial work had already been undertaken by the said 
Company. So much so, out of
6000 residential units which were 
proposed to be constructed, 4471 units had already been 
booked by the members of public and paid part considerations. 
It was pleaded that in this manner third party interest had also 
G been created. It would be relevant to point out here that apart 
from M/s. Supertech Limited, there were at least 10 more such 
developers who had been allotted the various chunks of 
acquired land for similar housing projects etc. 
H 
JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH 
529 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
( 13) After noticing the aforesaid facts and the contentions A 
and having regard to the plethora of writ petitions which were 
filed pertaining to different villages, the High Court·deemed it 
appropriate to categorize these writ petitions in different 
groups, village wise. 65 village wise categories were, 
accordingly, carved out. Out of these group 1-41 pertained to B 
different villages of Greater NOIDA whereas villages in group 
42-65 fell in NOIDA. Village Patwari was taken up as group 1. 
The High Court, thereafter, discussed the factual position in 
respect of each group which need not be mentioned, as 
unnecessary for our purposes. However, wherever this C 
exercise is deemed proper, we would be referring to such 
factual details at the relevant steps. 
(14) Keeping in view the various s.ubmissions made by 
the writ petitioners in their petitions, the High Cour:t framed as D 
many as 17 issues or1he points of consideration which had 
fallen for its discussion and decision. It would be apposite to 
take note of those issues at this juncture: 
"(i) Object and Purpose of the 1976 Act: Whether the E 
development of industries is the dominant purpose and 
object of U.P. lndustrialArea Developmer:itAct, 1976. 
(ii) Whether Acquisition Compulsory: Whether for carrying 
out the development of industrial area under 1976 Act, it F 
is compulsory and necessary to acquire the land by the 
Authority? 
(iii) Delay
and Laches : Whether the delay and laches in 
the facts of the present case can bar the invocation or G 
Constitutional remedy under Article 226 of the 
Constitution of India. 
(iv) National Capital Regional Planning Board Act, 1985, 
its Consequences: Whether the Authority can carry out H
530 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A 
development, utilise the land acquired as per its Master 
Plan 2021 without its approval/clearance by National 
Capital Regional Planning Board, and what is effect on 
its function of land acquisition after enforcement of 1985 
Act? 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
(v) Invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4): Whether 
invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land 
Acquisition Act and dispensation of inquiry under section 
5A was in accordance with law in the cases which are 
under consideration? 
(vi) Pre-notification and Post-notification delay: Whether 
delay caused before issuance of notification under 
Section 4 and delay caused subsequent to notification 
under Section 4 can be relied for determining as to 
whether urgency was such t,b.at invocation of Section 
17(1) and 17(4) was necessary? 
(vii) Colourable Exercise of Power: Whether acquisition 
of land are vitiated due to mala fide and colourable 
exercise of powers? 
(viii) Taking of possession: Whether the possession of 
the land acquired was taken under Section 17(1) of the 
Land Acquisition Act in accordance with law? 
(ix) Vesting: Whether after taking possession under 
Section 17(A) of the Act the challenge to the notifications 
under Section 4 read with 17(1) and 17(4) and Section 
6 cannot be entertained due to the reason that land which 
has already been vested in the State cannot be divested? 
(x) Section 11A; Whether acquisition under challenge has 
lapOsed under
Section 11A of the Act due to non-
declaration of the award within two years from the date 
of publication of the declaration made under section 6?
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH 
531 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
(xi) Section 17(3A): Whether non payment of 8~% of the A 
compensation as required by Section 17(3A) ofthe Land 
Acquisition Act is fatal to the acquisition o pr~~~edings? 
(xii) Waiver: Whether the petitioners who have accepted 
compensation by agreement have waived their right to B 
challenge the acquisition proceedings? 
(xiii) Acquiescence: Whether the petitioners due to having 
accepted the compensation by agreement have 
acquiesced to the proceedings of land acquisition and c 
they are estopped from challenging the acquisition 
proceedings at this stage? 
(xiv) Third Party Rights, Development and Construction: 
Whether due to creation of third party rights, development D 
carried out by the Authority and developments and 
coOnstructions made by the allottees on the acquired land 
subsequent to the acquisition, the petitioners are not 
entitled for the relief of quashing the notifications under 
I• 
Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(4) and Section E 
6oftheAct? 
(xv) Effect of Upholding of some of the notifications in 
some writ petitions earlier decided: What are the 
consequences and effect of earlier Division Bench F 
judgment upholding several notifications which are 
subject matter of challenge in some of these writ 
petitions? 
.. ,., 
(xvi) Conflicts in views of Division Benches: Which of the 
Division Bench decisions i.e. Harkaran Singh's case G 
holding that invocation of Section 17(1) and
17(4) was 
invalid or earlier Division Bench judgment in Harish 
Chand's case holding that invocation of Section 17(1) 
and 17(4) was in accordance with law, has to be H 
approved?
532 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
(xvii) Relief: To what relief, if any, the petitioners are 
entitled in these writ petition?" 
(15) We are purposely eschewing the detailed discussion 
by the High Court on all the aforesaid issues. Suffice it to state 
B here that after noticing the object and purpose of 1976 Act 
and discussing its provisions contained in this Act with 
reference to case law explaining the legal position of such 
statutory authorities entrusted with the task of development 
works, the High Court concluded that the stand of the Authority 
C that unless the land is acquired by it. It cannot carry out any 
development works until the 1976 Act was misconceived and 
incorrect. The High Court remarked that the Authority was 
labouring under the aforesaid misconception and, therefore, 
concentrated only on acquisition of the land without taking care 
D of other modes and means of industrial development and 
excessive acquisition of fertile agriculture land was due to the 
above mindset of the Authority. Insofar as issues pertaining to 
compulsive acquisition and invocation of Section 17(1) and 
17(4) are concerned, the High Court has arrived at a finding 
E that such invocation of emergency/urgency clauses, thereby 
depriving the land owners of their most invaluable right to file 
objections under Section 5A of the Act, was illegal and 
unwarranted. As this issue is decided in favour of the land 
F owners and against this finding appeals preferred
by the State 
as well as the Authority have already been dismissed, it is not 
necessary to explain the raison d'etre behind these findings. 
We would be proceeding on the basis that invocation of 
Section 17(1) and Section 17(4) was wrong. Similarly, the 
G findings of:the High Court that exercise of power by the State 
was colourable and arbitrary need not be restated in detail, 
the same reason. 
(16)As far as the issue no. 4 pertaining the NCR planning 
H Board Act is concerned, the High Court has held that land could 
not be acquired without the permission of the Board. Opinion
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH 
533 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
of the High Court on this aspect was questioned by the State A 
of U. P. as well as Authority in its appeals. However, it was found 
that as. a matter of fact, insofar as these cases are concerned 
consent of the Board had been obtained. Havfifg regard to 
this position, while dismissing the appeals of the State/ 
Authority, we have left the said question of law open, namely, 
B 
whether permission of the deemed under the Act of 1985 is a 
pre-condition before acquisition of the land. Therefore, that 
aspect also needs no elaboratio;i at our end in these appeals. 
(17) It becomes clear from the above that the High Court C 
arrived at a conclusion that since invocation of Section 17 ( 1) 
and 17(4) was uncalled for and unwarranted, the acquisition 
of the land of the appellants herein was illegal. Notwithstanding, 
the same, the High Court did not grant the relief of setting aside 
the entire acquisition and restoring the land to the appellants. D 
After the aforesaid findings, the High Court observed that 
insofar as grant of particular relief to the land owners in land 
acquisition proceedings is concerned, it depends on several 
important factors. Thus, the issue of 'reliefs
1 has been 
discussed specifically and independently under the aforesaid E 
caption. Here, the High Court has observed that the creation 
of third party rights, development undertaken over the land in 
dispute as well as the steps taken by
the land owners after 
declaration made under Section 6 of the Act would be the F 
relevant consideration in determining the kind of-relief that is 
to be granted to the land owners. Discussing the aforesaid 
aspects in the contexts of these proceedings, thetiigh Court 
pointed out that in majority of cases third.party rights had been 
created after issue of declaration under Sectioo :6 and after G 
taking possession of the land, substantial developments 
including constructions had been undertaken. Thus, in those 
cases where substantial development had taken place and/or 
third party rights had been created, the High Court deemed it 
H
534 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A proper not to interfere with the acquisition. At the same time in 
order to balance the equities, it felt that grant of higher 
compensation and better share in the developed land to these 
land owners would meet the ends of justice. The exact relief 
8 given in this behalf shall be stated at the appropriate stage. · 
(18) The High Court also found that in three villages no 
such third party rights had been created and no developments 
had taken place. So far as these villages are concerned, the 
C High Court deemed it apposite to release the land in favour of 
the land owners of those villages. 
(19) The High Court also found that many writ petitions 
were filed challenging the acquisitions in respect of which 
D notifications were issued much earlier, were totally stale and 
suffered from !aches and delays. In the opinion of the High 
Court, all those writ petitions which pertained to notifications 
issued prior to the year 2000 and the writ petitions were filed 
in the year 2011, these writ petitions deserved to be dismissed 
E on the ground of inordinate delay and !aches. 
(20) In nutshell, relief was categorised in three 
compartments. In the first instance, those writ petitions which 
F were filed belatedly were dismissed. In the second category, 
three villages, namely, Devala (Group 40), village Yusufpur 
Chak Sahberi (Group 38) and VillageAsdullapur (Group 42) 
the acquisition was set aside. Land acquisition in respect
of 
remaining 61 villages is concerned, the acquisition vyas 
G allowed to remain but the additional compensation was 
increased to 64.7% with further entitlement for allotment of 
development abadi plot to the extent of 10% of the acquired 
land of those land owners subject to maximum of 2500 sq. 
mtrs. 
H
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
535 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
(21) We now reproduce the exact nature of direction given A 
by the High Court, which reads as follows: 
"In view of the foregoing conclusions we order as follows: 
1. The Writ Petition No. 45933 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 8 
47545 of 2011 relating to village Nithari, Writ Petition 
No. 47522 of 2011 relating to village Sadarpur, Writ 
Petition No. 45196of2011, Writ Petition No. 45208 of 
2011, Writ Petition No. 45211 of2011, Writ Petition No. 
45213 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45216 of 2011, Writ c 
Petition No. 45223 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45224 of 
2011, Writ Petition No. 45226 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 
45229 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45230 of 2011, Writ 
Petition No. 45235 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45238 of 
2011, Writ Petition No. 45283 of 2011 relating to village D 
Khoda, Writ Petition No. 46764 of 2011, Writ Petition 
No. 46785 of 2011 relating to village Sultanpur, Writ 
Petition No. 46407 of 2011 relating to village Chaura 
Sadatpur and Writ Petition No. 46470 of 2011 relating 
to village Alaverdipur which have been filed with. E · 
inordinate delay and laches are dismissed. 
2(i). The writ petitions of Group 40 (Village Devla~ being 
Writ Petition No. 31126 of2011, Writ Petition No. 59131 
of 2009, Writ Petition No. 22800 of 2010, Writ Petition F 
No. 37118 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 42812 of2009, Writ 
Petition No. 50417 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 54424 of 
2009, Writ Petition No. 54652 of2009,
Writ Petition No. 
55650 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 57032 of 2009, Writ 
Petition No. 58318 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 22798 of G 
2010, Writ Petition No. 37784 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 
37787 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 31124 of 2011, Writ 
Petition No. 31125 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 32234 of 
2011, Writ Petition No. 32987 of2011, Writ Petition No. 
35648 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 38059 of 2011, Writ H
536 
"A 
B 
c 
D 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
Petition No. 41339 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47427 of 
2011 and Writ Petition No. 4 7 412 of 2011 are allowed 
and the notifications dated 26.5.2009 and 22.6.2009 and 
all consequential actions are quashed. The petitioners 
shall be entitled for restoration of their land subject to 
deposit of compensation which they had received under 
agreement/award before the authority/Collector. 
2(ii) Writ petition No. 17725 of 2010 Omveer and others 
Vs. State of U.P. (Group 38) relating to village Yusufpur 
Chak Sahberi is allowed. Notifications dated 10.4.2006 
and 6.9.2007 and all consequential actions are quashed. 
The petitioners shall be entitled for restoration of their 
land subject to return of compensation received by them 
under agreement/award to the Collector. 
2(iii) Writ Petition No. 47486 of2011 (Rajee and others 
Vs. State of U.P. and others) of Group-42 relating to 
village Asdullapur is allowed. The notification dated 
27 .1.2010 and 4.2.2010 as well as all subsequent 
E 
proceedings are quashed. The petitioners shall be 
entitled to restoration of their land. 
F 
G 
H 
3. All other writ petitions except as mentioned above at 
(1) and (2) are disposed of with following directions: 
(a) The petitioners shall be entitled for payment of 
additional compensation to the extent of same ratio (i.e. 
64. 70%) as paid for village Patwari in addition to ·the 
compensation received by them under 1997 Rules/ 
award
which payment shall be ensured by the Authority 
at an early date. It may be open for Authority to take a 
. decision as to what proportion of additional 
compensation be asked to be paid by allottees. Those 
petitioners who have not yet been paid compensation 
may be paid the compensation as well as additional
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
537 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
compensation as ordered above. The payment of A 
additional compensation shall be without any prejudice 
to rights of land owners under section 18 of the Act, if 
any. 
(b) All the petitioners shall be entitled for allotment of B 
developed Abadi plot to the extent of 10% of their 
acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 square 
meters. We however, leave it open to the Authority in 
cases where allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 6% 
or 8% have already been made either to make allotment C 
of the balance of the area or may compensate the land 
owners by payment of the amount equivalent to balance 
area as per average rate of allotment made of developed 
residential plots. 
4. The Authority may also take a decision as to whether 
benefit of additional compensation and allotment of abadi 
plot to the extent of 10% be also given to; 
D 
(a) those land holders whose earlier writ petition E 
challenging the notifications have been dismi~sed 
upholding the notifications; and 
(b) those land holders who have not come to the Court, 
relating to the notifications which are subject matter of F 
challenge in writ petitions mentioned at direction No.3. 
5. The Greater NOIDA and its allotees are directed not 
to carry on development and not to implement the Master 
Plan 2021 till the observations and directions of the 
National Capital Regional Planning Board are G 
incorporated in Master Plan 2021 to the satisfaction of
the National Capital Regional Planning Board. We make 
it clear that this direction shall not be applicable in those 
cases where the development is being carried on in H 
accordance with the earlier Master Plan of·Greater
538 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A 
NOIDA duly approved by the National Capital Regional 
Planning Board. 
6. We direct the Chief Secretary of the State to appoint 
officers not below the level of Principal Secretary (except 
B 
the officers of Industrial Development Department who 
have dealt with the relevant files) to conduct a thorough 
inquiry regarding the acts of Greater Naida (a) in 
proceeding to implement Master Plan 2021 without 
approval of N.C.R.P. Board, (b) decisions taken to 
C 
change the land use, (c) allotment made to the builders 
and (d) indiscriminate proposals for acquisition of land, 
and thereafter the State Government shall taken 
appropriate action in the matter." 
D 
(22) We may point out at this stage that in respect of all 
E 
these three categories, the High Court has provided its 
justification for granting relief in the aforesaid nature. We shall 
be referring to the same while discussing the cases of 
appellants belonging to one or the other category. 
· 
(23) In nutshell, it may be pointed out that 65 villages which 
were the subject matter of bunch of writ petitions before the 
Full Bench of the High Court were grouped in 65 groups, village-
wise and facts of acquisition, possession, if any, payment of 
F compensation, developments, the nature of utilisation of those 
lands, and/or creation of third party rights were taken note of. 
Out of these 65 villages, 41 villages fall in Greater NOi DA and 
24 in NOIDA. The High Court
discussed the issue of !aches 
and delays under Issue No. 3, as mentioned above, after 
G referring to various judgments of this Court and culling out the 
principles contained therein on that basis. The High Court 
accepted the plea of inordinate delay insofar as acquisition of 
land in respect of village Nithari, Village Chauyra Sadedpur, 
Village Khoda, Village Sultanpur are concerned. These writ 
H petitions are dismissed on the ground of delay. In respect of
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH 
539 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
other villages, the Court repelled the contention of delay raised A 
by the department, accepting the explanation given by land 
owners of those villages that they did not oppose the acquisition 
earlier at the time of issuance of notificatibn as the land was 
taken for industrial development. However, it is only when these 
land owners had come to know that instead of developing the B 
land for the purpose for which it was acquired, the acquiring 
authority had transferred the land to the private persons and 
builders, that these land owners felt aggrieved and cheated 
and, therefore, there was sufficient explanation for coming to 
the Court at a time when these land owners discovered that C 
the acquired land had been transferred to private persons. The 
Court, therefore, held that such writ petitions were to be 
entertained on merits, ignoring the delay. 
(24) Some of the appeals are filed by the land owners in D 
respect of aforesaid villages where their petitions are 
dismissed on the ground of delay and !aches. We are of the 
opinion that their writ petitions were rightly rejected by the High 
Court applying the principle of delays and !aches. We are, thus, 
dismissing these appeals, upholding the order of the High E 
Court .. 
The Arguments: Appellants 
(25) Though many counsel appeared on behalf of F 
appellants and argued the appeals, Mr. Amarendra Sharan; 
Mr. Rajiv Shankar Dwivedi, Mr. Jitendra Mohan
Sharma, Mr. 
Mahabir Singh, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Mr. 
S.C. Maheshwari, Senior Advocates and Dr. Suraj Singh, 
Advocate were the main architects who built the edifice of the G 
appellants' appeals. Among themselves, they covered almost 
all the aspects which arise in these appeals. Other counsel 
either adopted those submissions or some of them pointed 
out some distinctive and peculiar facts of their cases. It is not 
necessary to reproduce the submission of each of the H
540 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 
A aforesaid senior counsel separately as we think that better 
course of action would be to spell out these submissions in 
consolidated form to avoid any repetition. The arguments 
which were advanced by these counsel, in support of their 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
appeals, are recapitulated hereunder: 
(I) 
In the first instance, the illegalities committed in issuing 
the notifications for acquisition of land were pointed out 
which were even accepted by the High Court in the 
impugned judgment, in the following manner: 
(a} No permission of NCR Board was taken before issuing 
the notifications. 
(b) There was violation of Section 5-A of the Act which goes 
to the root of the matter, coupled with the finding that it 
amounted to colourable exercise of power. 
(c) There was violation of mandatory provision contained 
in Section 11-A of the Act as well. 
(d) Though, Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act 
were invoked, 80% of the compensation, which is 
mandatory requirement, was not paid to the appellants. 
(e} After acquiring the land purportedly for the purpose of 
industrial development, it was sold to private developers/ 
I. 
real estate agencies for residential purposes, that too 
at a much higher rate. 
As per the appellants, it would amply demonstrate that 
G the Government acted more like a property dealer with intention 
to make money at the cost of the land owners/agriculturists. 
H 
(II) It was further argued that even when
status quo orders 
were passed in many writ petitions, the Government had 
violated those orders and in this manner, third party rights
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
541 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
were created, thereby committing contempt of court. A 
When the third party interest were created in the 
aforesaid manner, the High Court should not have 
influenced itself by the said consideration in denying 
the relief to the appellants after holding that acquisition 
was illegal. 
B 
(Ill) It was also argued that in a case like this, doctrine of 
severance should have been applied by excluding only 
those portions of land in respect of which third party 
rights were created or development had taken place C 
inasmuch as large chunk of land in these villages have 
still not been utilised for any purpose as ~hese are thickly 
inhabited. By applying the doctrine of severance, Abadi 
land should have been included for the purpose of giving 
relief, when the acquisition was admittedly bound to be D 
illegal. It was only, in this manner, equities could be 
balanced. 
(IV) It was sought to be argued that in respect of three 
villages where acquisition is set aside on the ground E 
that no development has taken place and third party 
rights are not created, this very principle should have 
been applied in respect of lands of those appellants in 
other villages where no third party rights were created 
or there was Abadi or where no possession was taken F 
by the authorities and no compensation taken by the 
land owners and the land owners who belong to lower 
str~ta of society. 
In nutshell, the submission is that
such cases are exactly G 
at par with the cases of 3 villages falling in para 2 of the 
direction, where the land acquisition has been quashed 
even when the compensation was taken and same· 
treatment be accorded to at least those appellants who 
fall in this category. 
1
' 
H
542 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
(V) It was also argued that after holding the acquisition 
illegal, the Court had three alternatives namely: 
(a) payment of 67.4% compensation plus restoring 10% 
of the developed land to the land owners, which is 
s 
followed by the High Court. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
(b) directing restoration of possession in all these cases 
with liberty to the Government to negotiate with the land 
owners. 
(c) permitting fresh acquisition. 
SubmissiOfl was that first alternative was not the best 
alternative adopted by the High Court and in the interest 
of justice, the second or third alternative should have 
been resorted to, more so, when it was found to be case 
of malice in law which can clearly be inferred from the 
findings arrived at by the High Court, on the ~asis of 
material established on record. 
(26) In support of these submissions, learned counsel for 
the appellants referred to the following judgments: 
(i) Anand Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & 
Ors.1 
"50. Use of the power by the government under Section 
17 for 'planned development of the city' or 'the 
development of residential area' or for 'housing' must 
not be as a rule but by way of an exception. Such 
exceptional situation may be for the public purpose viz., 
rehabilitation of natural calamity affected persons; 
rehabilitation of persons uprooted due to commissioning 
of dam or housing for lower strata of the society urgently; 
H 
1 c2010) 11 sec 242
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
543 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
rehabilitation of persons affected by time bound projects, A 
etc. The list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In any 
case, sans real urgency and need for immediate 
possession of the land for carrying out the stated purpose, 
~eavy onus lies on the government to justify exercise of 
s~p~~ 
B 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
55. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, 
therefore, the Government has completely failed to justify c 
the dispensation of an enquiry under Section 5A by 
invoking Section 17(4). For this reason, the impugned 
notifications to the extent they state that Section 5A shall 
not apply suffer from legal infirmity. The question, then, 
arises whether at this distance of time, the acquisition D 
proceedings must be declared invalid and illegal. 
56. In the written submissions of the GOA, it is stated 
that subsequent to the declaration made under Section 
6 of the Act in the month of December, 2004, award has E 
been made and out of the 400 land owners more than 
370 have already received compensation. It is also stated 
that out of the total cost of Rs. 8,85,14,000/- for 
development of the acquired land, an amount of Rs. 
5,28,00,000/- has already been spent by the GOA and F 
more than 60% of work has been completed. It, thus, 
seems that barring the appellants and few others all other 
tenure holders/land owners have accepted the 'takings' 
of their land. It is too late in the day to undo
what has 
already been done. We are of the opinion, therefore, that G 
in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the 
appellants are not entitled to any relief although 
dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A was not 
justified. 
H
544 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
57. On behalf of the appellants, it was vehemently argued 
that the government may be directed to release their land 
from proposed acquisition. It was submitted by the 
appellants that houses/structures and buildings (including 
educatiC?nal building) are existing on the subject land and 
as per.the policy framed by the State Government, the 
land deserves to be exempted from acquisition. The 
submission of the appellants has been countered by the 
respondents and in the written submissions filed by the 
GDA, it is stated that the houses/structures and buildings 
which are claimed to exist, have been raised by the 
appellants subsequent to the notification under Section 
4(1) of the Act and, therefore, they are not entitled to 
release of their land from acquisition. 
58. In our view, since the existence of houses/structures 
and buildings as on November 22, 2003/February 20, 
2004 over the appellants' land has been seriously 
disputed, it may not be appropriate to issue any direction 
to the State Government, as prayed for by the appellants, 
for release of their land from acquisition. However, as 
the possession has not been taken, the interest of justice 
would be subserved if the appellants are given liberty to 
make representation to the State authorities under 
Section 48(1) of the Act for release of their land. We, 
accordingly, grant liberty to the appellants to make 
appropriate representation to
the State Government and 
observe that if such representation is made by the 
appellants within two months from today, the State 
Government shall consider such representation in 
accordance with law and in conformity with the State 
policy for release of land under Section 48(1) without any 
discrimination within three months from receipt of such 
representation."
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
545 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
(27) In support of the arguments that the equities were to A 
be balanced on the facts of the case which according to 
the appellant were in their favour, following judgments 
were referred: 
(ii) H.M. T. Housing Building Co-operative Society v. B 
Syed Khader & Ors. 2 
"22. In the present case there has been contravention of 
Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act inasmuch as there was no prior 
approval of the State Government as required by the said c 
section before steps for acquisition of the lands were 
taken. The report of Shri G.K.V. Rao points out as to how 
the appellant-Society admitted large number of persons 
as members who cannot be held to be genuine 
members, the sole object being to transfer the lands D 
acquired for "public purpose", to outsiders as part of 
commercial venture, undertaken by the office- bearer of 
the appellant-Society. We are in agreement with the 
finding of the High Court that the statutory notifications 
issued under Sections4(1) and 6(1) of the Act have been E 
issued due to the role played by Mis S.R. Constructions, 
Respondent 11. On the materials on record, the High 
Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the 
proceedings for acquisition of the lands had not been 
initiated because the State Government was satisfied F 
about the existence of the public purpo~e but at the 
instance of agent who had collected more than a crore 
of rupees for getting the lands acquired
by the State 
Government. 
· 
23. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. But in the 
circumstances of the case there shall be no orC:lers as to 
costs. 
2 (1995) 2 sec 677 
G 
H
546 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
24. We direct that as a result of quashing of the land 
acquisition proceedings including the notifications as 
aforesaid, the possession of the lands shall be restored 
to the respective landowners irrespective of the fact 
whether they had challenged the acquisition of their lands 
or not. On restoration of the possession to the 
landowners they shall refund the amounts received by 
them as compensation or otherwise in respect of their 
lands. The appellant, the respondents and the State 
Government including all authorities/persons concerned 
shall implement the aforesaid directions at an early date." 
(iii) H.M. T. House Building Cooperative Societyv. M. 
Venkataswamappa and others3 
(iv) Bangalore City Cooperative Housing Society 
Limited v. State of Karnataka and others4 
"87. The three Judge Bench also approved the view taken 
by the High Court that the acquisition of land was vitiated 
because the decision of the State Government was 
influenced by the Estate Agent with whom the Appellant 
had entered into an agreement. Paras 21 and 22 of the 
judgment, which contain discussion on this issue are 
extracted hereunder: (1st H.M.T. House Building Coop. 
Society v. Syed Khader and others, (1995) 2 SCC 677 
"21. Mr. G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel 
appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that 
merely because the appellant Society had entered into 
an agreement with Respondent 11, M/s S.R.
Constructions, in which the latter for the consideration 
paid to it had assured that the lands in question shall be 
acquired by the State Government, no adverse inference 
• (1995).3 sec 12a 
H • c2012) 3 sec 121
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
547 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
should be drawn because that may amount to a tall claim A 
made on behalf of M/s S.R. Constructions in the 
agreement. He pointed out that the notifications under 
Sections 4( 1) and 6( 1) have been issued beyond the time 
stipulated in the agreement and as such, it should be 
held that the State Government has exercised its statutory B 
power for acquisition of the lands in normal course, only 
after taking all facts and circumstances into 
consideration. There is no dispute that in terms of 
agreement dated 1-2-1985 payments have been made 
by the appellant Society to M/s S.R. Constructions. This C 
circumstance alone goes a long way to support ihe 
contention of the writ Petitioners that their lands have not 
been acquired in the normal course or for any public 
purpose. In spite of the repeated query, the learned D 
counsel appearing for the appellant Society could not 
point out or produce any order of the State Government 
under Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act granting prior approval 
and prescribing conditions and restrictions in respect of, 
the use of the lands which were to be acquired for a public E 
purpose. There is no restriction or bar on the part of the 
appellant Society on carving out the size of the plots or 
the manner of allotment or in respect of construction over 
the same. That is why the framers of the Act have required 
the appropriate Government to grant prior approval of F 
any housing
scheme presented by any cooperative 
society before the lands are acquired treating such 
requirement and acquisition for public purpose. It is 
incumbent on the part of the appropriate Government 
while granting approval to examine different aspects of G · 
the matter so that it may serve the public interest and not 
the interest of few who can as well afford to acquire such 
lands by negotiation in open market. According to us, 
the State Government has not granted the prior approval 
in terms of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act to the housing H
548 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
scheme in question. The power under Sections 4( 1) and 
'6(1) of the Act has been exercised for extraneous 
consideration and at the instance of the persons who 
had no role in the decision-making process - whether 
the acquisition of the lands in question shall be for a public 
purpose. This itself is enough to vitiate the whole 
acquisition proceeding and render the same invalid. 
22. In the present case there has been contravention of 
Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act inasmuch as there was no prior 
approval of the State Government as required by the said 
section before steps for acquisition of the lands were 
taken. The report of Shri GK.V. Rao points out as to how 
the appellant-Society admitted large number of persons 
as members who cannot be held t9 be genuine 
members, the sole object being to transfer the lands 
acquired for "public purpose", to· outsiders as part of 
commercial venture, undertaken by the office- bearer of 
the appellant-Society. We are in agreement with the 
finding of the High Court that the statutory notifications 
issued under Sections 4( 1) and 6( 1) of the Act have been 
issued due to the role played by M/s S.R. Constructions, 
Respondent 11. On the materials on record, the High 
Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the 
proceedings for acquisition of the lands had not been 
initiated because the State Government was satisfied 
about the existence of the public
purpose but at the 
instance of agent who had collected more than a crore 
of rupees for getting the lands acquired by the State 
Government. 
xx 
xx 
xx 
95. The Division Bench of the High Court in Subramani, 
ILR 1995 Kant 3139, noted that the terms of the 
H 
agreement entered into between the Society and Mis.
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
549 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
Devatha Builders was not for the acquisition of land but A 
only for development of the acquired land. The Division 
Bench also noted that the agreement was entered into 
between the Society and the owners in 1985, whereas 
the Government gave approval for acquisition in 1985 
and the agreement with the developer was of 1986. The B 
Division Bench also noted that no stranger had been 
inducted as a member of the society. However, the 
acquisition which was under challenge in Writ Petition 
No. 28707 of 1995 was declared illegal because the 
House Building Cooperative Society concerned has not C 
framed any housing scheme and obtained approval 
thereoffrom the State Government. The Division Bench 
also expressed the view that remedy under Article 226 
was discretionary and it was not inclined to nullify the D 
acquisition made for the society because the petitioners 
had approached the Court after long lapse of time and 
there was no explanation for the delay. 
xx 
xx 
xx E 
132. Before concluding we consider it necessary to 
observe that in view of the law laid down in the 1st H.M.T. 
case (paragraphs 19, 21and22), which was followed in 
2nd H.M.T. case and Vyalikawal House Building 
Cooperative Society's case, the view taken by the F 
Division Bench of the High Court in Narayana Raju's case 
that the framing of scheme and approval thereof can be 
presumed from the direction given by the State 
Government to the
Special Deputy Commissioner to take 
steps for issue of notification under Section ~cannot G 
be treated as good law and the mere fact that this Court 
had revoked the certificate granted by the High Court 
cannot be interpreted as this Court's approval of the view 
expressed by the High Court on the validity of the H
550 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
acquisition. 
133. In the result, the.appeals are dismissed. However, 
keeping in view the fact that some of the members of the 
appellant may have built their houses on the sites allotted 
B 
to them, we give liberty to the appellant to negotiate with 
the respondents for purchase of their land at the prevailing 
market price and hope that the landowners will, 
notwithstanding the judgments of the High Court and this 
Court, agree to accept the market price so that those 
C 
who have built the houses may not suffer. 
134. At the same time, we make it clear that the appellant 
must return the vacant land to the respondents 
irrespective of the fact that it may have carved out the 
o 
sites and allotted the same to its members. This must 
be done within a period of three months from today and 
during that period the appellant shall not change the 
present status of the vacant area/sites. The members of 
the appellant who may have been allotted the sites shall 
E 
also not change the present status/character of the land. 
The parties are left to bear their own costs." 
(28) In support of the prop~sition that it was a case of 
malice in law, reference was made to the judgment in the case 
F of S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab5. 
(29) Countering the arguments of delay and laches putforth 
by the respondents even in appellants cases, the reference 
was made to the judgment in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya 
G Naidu v. Jagannath
and others6, in support of the plea that 
fraud vitiates all action and it was a case of fraud where land 
was acquired for one purpose but thereafter the Government 
"'AIR 1964 SC 72 
H 
6' (1994) 1 sec 1
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
551 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
sought to utilise it for some other purpose. In this behalf, A 
reliance was also placed in the case of Vya/ikaval 
Housebuilding Coop. Society v. \I. Chandrappa and 
others7: 
"3. This writ petition was contested by the appellant B 
society as the respondent and it was alleged that it was 
hopelessly barred by time being delayed by 14 years 
and it was also submitted that the writ petitioners had 
participated in the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act 
and have also received substantial amount from the C 
appellant society pursuant to the agreement executed in 
their favour. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ 
petition on the ground of being hopelessly barred by time 
and the writ petitioners participated in the proceedings 
therefore they have acquiesced in the matter. Aggrieved 
D 
against this order passed by learned Single Judge, a 
writ appeal was filed by the respondents which came to 
be allowed by the Division Bench for the reasons 
mentioned in another writ appeal decided by the same 
Division Bench headed by the Chief Justice of the High 
E 
Court on 17 .1.2000. In that writ appeal the Division Bench 
held that the entire acquisition on behalf of the appellant 
society was actuated with fraud as held in Narayana 
Reddy v. State of Karnataka ILR 1991 Kar. 2248. In that F 
case it was held as follows: 
"As seen from the findings of G.V.K. Rao Inquiry Report, 
in respect of five respondent societies
and the report of 
the Joint Registrar in respect ofVyalikaval House Building 
Co-operative Society, these societies had indulged in G 
enrolling large number of members illegally inclusive of 
ineligible members and had also indulged in enrolling 
large number of bogus members. The only inference that 
1 c2007) g sec 304 
H
552 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
is possible from this is that the office-bearers of the 
societies had entered into unholy alliance with the 
respective agents for the purpose of making money, as 
submitted for the petitioners otherwise, there is no reason 
as to why such an agreement should have been brought 
about by the office-bearers of the society and the agents. 
Unless these persons had the intention of making huge 
profits as alleged by the petitioners, they would not have 
indulged in enrolment of ineligible and bogus members. 
The circumstance that without considering all these 
relevant materials the Government had accorded its 
approval, is sufficient to hold that the agents had 
prevailed upon the Government to take a decision to 
acquire the lands without going into all those relevant 
facts. The irresistible inference flowing from the facts and 
circumstances of these cases is, whereas the power 
conferred under the Land Acquisition Act is for acquiring 
lands for carrying out housing scheme by a housing 
society, in each of the cases the acquisition of lands is 
not for a bona fide housing scheme but is substantially 
for the purpose of enabling the concerned office-bearers 
of respondent-societies and their agents to indulge in 
sale of sites in the guise of allotment of sites to the 
members/ associate members of the society to make 
money as alleged by the petitioners and therefore it is a 
clear case of colourable
exercise of power. Thus the 
decision of the Government to acquire the lands suffers 
from legal mala fides and therefore the impugned 
notifications are liable to be struck down." 
(30) Judgment in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels 
Limited and Anr. v. G Jayarama Reddy and Ors. 8 also relied 
upon to counter the plea of delay and !aches, wherein this Court 
H • c2011) 10 sec soa
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
553 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
held: 
A 
"24. The first question which needs consideration is 
whether the High Court committed an error by granting 
relief to Respondent 1 despite the fact that he filed the 
writ petition after a long lqpse of time and the explanation B 
given by him was found unsatisfactory by the learned 
Single Judge, who decided the writ petition after remand 
by the Division Bench. 
25. Although the Framers of the Constitution have not c 
prescribed any period of limitation for filing a petition 
und~r Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the 
power conferred upon the High Court to issue to any 
person or authority including any Government, directions, 
orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas D 
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and 
certiorari is not hedged with any condition or constraint, 
in the last 61 years the superior courts have evolved 
several rules of self-imposed restraint including the one 
that the High Court may not enquire into belated or stale E 
claim and deny relief to the petitioner if he is found guilty 
of iaches. The principle underlying this rule is that the 
one who is not vigilant and does not seek intervention of 
the Court within reasonable time from the date of accrual 
of cause of action or alleged violation of constitutional, F 
legal or other right is not entitled to relief under Article 
226 of the Constitution. Another reason for the High 
Court's
refusal to entertain belated claim is that during 
the intervening period rights of third parties may have 
G 
crystallized and it will be inequitable to disturb those 
rights at the instance of a personwho has approached 
the Court after long lapse of time and there is no cogent 
explanation for the delay. We may hasten to add that no 
hard-and-fast rule can be laid down and no straightjacket H
554 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
formula can be evolved for deciding the question of delay/ 
!aches and each case has to be decided on its own facts. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
xx 
xx 
xx 
31. In the light of.the above, it is to be seen whether the 
discretion exercised by the Division Bench of the High 
Court t~ ignore the delay in filing of writ petition is vitiated 
by any patent error or the reasons assigned for rejecting 
the appellants' objection of delay are irrelevant and 
extraneous. Though it may sound repetitive, we may 
mention that in the writ petition filed by him, Respondent 
1 had not only prayed for quashing of the acquisition 
proceedings, but also prayed for restoration of the 
acquired land on the ground that instead of using the 
same for the public purpose specified in the notifications 
issued under Sections 4(1) and 6, the Corporation had 
transferred the same to private persons. Respondent 1 
and the other landowners may not be having any serious 
objection to the acquisition of their land for a public 
purpose and, therefore, some of them not only accepted 
the compensation, but also filed applications under 
Section 18 of the Act for determination of market value 
by the court. However, when it was discovered that the 
acquired land has been transferred to private persons, 
they sought intervention of the Court and in the three 
cases, the Division Bench of the High Court nullified the 
acquisition on the ground of fraud and misuse of the
provisions oftheAcf." 
The Arguments : Respondents 
(31) Mr. L.N. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for 
the official respondents, emphatically countered the aforesaid 
submissions. He argued that in most of these appeals, writ 
H petitions were filed in the High Court challenging the acquisition
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH 
555 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
after passing of the award and taking possession of the land A 
and in most of the cases, the land owners had even received 
the compensation. Therefore, these writ petitions were not 
maintainable and should have been dismissed on the ground 
of laches and delay inasmuch as acquisition cannot be 
challenged after the award is passed an<.i compensation is B 
received. He sought to distinguish the judgments cited by the 
appellants' counsel. He submitted that the High Court has 
wrongly fixed the cut-off date as 06.07 .2011. He also submitted 
that the High Court was in error in rejecting the arguments of 
acquiescence as acceptance of compensation clearly meant C 
that these land owners had acquiesced into the action of the 
authorities in acquiring the land. His submission was that case 
should have been examined keeping in view the aforesaid 
factors and the plea taken by the writ petitioners that they felt D 
aggrieved only when they came to know land was allotted/sold 
to private builders, was totally irrelevant and could not have 
been the ground to entertain the writ petitions on merits. 
(32) It was also argued by Mr. Rao that the High Court 
could not have enhanced the compensation by 64. 7% in writ E 
petition filed under Article 226 as it was not a public law remedy. 
His plea in this behalf was that Land Acquisition Act provided 
for complete machinery for determination of the compensation 
and
reference by the land owners under Section 18 of the Act F 
had already been sought and present way to matters are 
pending before the Reference Court to determine the market 
value of the land. He argued that merely because in the case 
of Patwari village, the Government had entered into an 
agreement with some of the villagers for payment of G 
compensation by increasing it by 6~.70%, would ndt mean 
that High Court could extend that to all villages in the absence 
of any agreement with those parties. lri the same wave length, 
he challenged the direction for allotment of developed Abadi 
plot to the extent of 10% of the acquired land subject to H
556 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A maximum of 2~00 square metres by pointing out that the 
aforesaid allotment was under the scheme of the Government 
which provided for allotment of 5% developed Abadi plot in 
respect of Naida land and 6% of developed Abadi plot where 
the land acquired was situated in Greater Naida. Here again, 
B it was i:-'eaded, the Hi'.1h Court could not tinker with the said 
policy by enhancing the entttlement for allotment to 10%. It was 
also argued that in any case once the compensation was 
enhanced, there was no reason to give allotment of larger are1 
C of land and it amounted to giving double benefit to the land 
owners. 
(33) Without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, Mr. 
Rao submitted that in spite of these serious infirmities in the 
judgment of the High Court, insofar as Government authorities 
D are concerned, theywere ready to pay the higher compensation 
and even allot land to the extent of 10% subject to the condition 
that quietus is given to all these cases with no further benefits. 
He pointed out that 64. 7% additional compensation had 
already been given to about ninety percent land owners. 
E Further, 6% of land/flats had already been allotted to ninety 
percent farmers. He further argued that care was taken at the 
time of acquisition itself not to touch the Abadi land. 
(34) Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi and Mr. Pramod Swarup, senior 
F advocates, who appeared for private respondents/builders to 
whom the land was
allotted, supported the aforesaid 
submissions of Mr. Rao and submitted that substantial justice 
had been done by the High Court in these cases and, therefore, 
in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution of 
G India, the Court should not interfere with the exercise done by 
the High Court. 
Our Analysis of the subject matter: 
H 
(35) We have bestowed our serious consideration to the
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
557 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
submissions made by learned counsel for parties on both A 
sides. No doubt, the High Court has held that it was wrong 
exercise in law on the part of the Government to invoke the 
provisions of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, thereby 
dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act which 
amounted to taking away the valuable right of the land owners. 
B 
That is a finding on merit. However, it is subject to the caveat 
that the writ petitions filed by the appellants herein could be 
considered on merits and were not to be dismissed on the 
grounds of laches and delay. Such a contention was indeed 
taken by the respondents/ authorities before the High Court. C 
However, the same has been repelled. Primary reason given 
by the High Court in this behalf is that the delay was explained 
satisfactorily inasmuch as the'land acquired for the purposes 
of industrial development was, at a later period of time, allotted D 
to private builders for development of residential units and when 
this was done it came to the knowledge of the appellants. 
Aggrieved by this step taken by the Noida authorities, the 
appellants filed the writ petitions. Thus, in nutshell, allotment of 
the land by the Naida authorities at a subsequent point of time E 
has weighed with the High Court. In other words, it is clear that 
the appellants did not challenge the acquisition per se inasmuch 
as when the land was acquired even after
invoking urgency 
provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act and dispensing 
with the requirement of Section 5A of the Act, this position was 
F 
accepted by the land owners. They even allowed the authorities 
to proceed further in passing the award and taking possession 
from many of these land owners and .even paying compensation 
to them. It is a matter of record that before coming to the Court 
and filing the writ petitions, most ,of these appellants had G 
. received the compensation. They also sought reference under 
Section 18 of the Act for higher compensation. Physical 
possession of land of many ofthese appellants have also been 
taken. In many other cases, paper possession had been taken 
before filing of the writ petition.Agreat deal of argument was H
558 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A made as to whether such physical possession/paper 
possession should be treated as taking possession in the eyes 
of law, it would be a debatable point inasmuch as in various 
judgments, this Court has held that whenever there is large 
scale of acquisition and possession of large chunk of land 
B belonging to number of persons is to be taken, paper 
possession would be a permissible mode, particularly when it 
is Abadi land. We are not going into this controversy since the 
ultimate outcome is not influenced by the aforesaid factor, as 
would be noticed in the later part of judgment. However, what 
C we highlight and reiterate is that these appellants were not 
aggrieved by the acquisition per se in the manner it was done 
by the respondents. As per their own case, they became 
aggrieved only when they found that land was not utilised for 
0 the purpose for which it was acquired namely industrial 
development but a large portion thereof was sought to be given 
away to the builders for development of the land as residential. 
The High"Court, while accepting such a plea of the land owners 
on the ground of laches and delay, has referred to certain 
E judgments which were relied upon before us as well and taken 
note of above. 
(36) This leads to an incidental issue as to whether 
development of land for residential purposes is impermissible 
F and could have given a fresh cause of action to the land owners 
to approach the Court.
Here, we would like to refer to the 
judgment of this Court in Nand Kishore Gupta and Ors. v. 
State of U.P. and Ors. 9 which concerns the same Act viz. U. P. 
lndustrialArea DevelopmentAct, 1976. lnthatcase, forYamuna 
G Express Project, the land was acquired setting it to be 'public 
purpose'. The land was utilised for construction of Yamuna 
Expressway and along therewith development of the part of 
the land was undertaken for comme.'cial, amusement, 
H •(2010) 10 sec 202
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
559 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
industrial, institutional and residential purposes as well. It was A 
accepted that construction of Yamuna Expressway was work 
of public importance. However, the utilisation of land for 
development of other purposes, namely, commercial, 
amusement, industrial, institutional and residential etc. was 
challenged, as not amounting to acquisition for 'public purpose'. B 
There was another feature namely for the development of the 
land in the aforesaid manner Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
was formed and private parties were asked to undertake the 
development on BOT (Built, Operate and Transfer) basis. Such 
PPP on BOT basis was also challenged as colourable exercise C 
of power in which private parties were involved. The challenge 
was repelled by this Court holding that acquisition of land along 
Yamuna Express for development of the same for commercial, 
amusement, industrial, institutional and residential purposes D 
was complimentary to creation of Expressway. Such 
complimentary purpose was also treated as 'public purpose'. 
It was also contended by the land owners that the acquisition 
was not for "public purpose" because: (a) its object was not 
covered by Section 3(f) of the Act, (b) it really fell not under E 
Part II of the Act but under Part VII thereof as it virtually amounted 
to acquisition of land for the contractor Company J, (c) the 
compensation was coming wholly from J and not from the
Government or YEIDA, (d) the acquisition for so-called 
interchange was not at all necessary and was a colourable F 
exercise of power. They further contended that the application 
of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) oftheActwaswholly unnecessary 
and therefore, the enquiry under Section 5-A could not have 
been dispensed with. All the aforesaid cm1tentions were 
rejected. Going by the dicta in the aforesaid judgment, it is G 
contended by the authorities that merely because the part of 
the land is utilised for residential purpose, it cannot be said 
that the respondents-authorities have not adhered to the 
purpose for which the land is acquired. As per them, this would 
be complimentary purpose to the main purpose. 
H
560 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
(37) We have to keep in mind that in all these cases, after 
the land was acquired, which was of very large quantity and in 
big chunks, further steps were taken by passing the award, 
taking possession and paying compensation. In many cases, 
actual possession was taken and in rest of the cases, paper 
B possession was taken where because of the land under Abadi, 
actual possession could not be taken on spot immediately. 
Fact remains that in many such cases where possession was 
taken, these land owners/appellants even received 
compensation. All these petitions have been filed only thereafter 
C which may not be maintainable stricto sensu having regard to 
the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in 
Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. 10 and 
the dictum of this judgment is followed consistently by this Court 
0 in various cases [See Murari and Ors. v. Union of India and 
Ors. 11 , Ravi Khullar and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. 12, 
Anand Singh and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 13] 
(38) Once we look into the matter from the aforesaid 
prospective, the argument of the appellants that giving away 
E of the land by allotment to the private developers for 
construction of residential units gave them the fresh cause of 
action, gets dented to a great extent. No doubt, following Royal 
Orchid Hotels Limited case and other similar cases, the High 
F Court has not dismissed the writ petitions
filed by the appellants 
on the ground of delay and !aches accepting the plea of the 
appellants that they felt aggrieved on coming to know that the 
land was sought to be given to the private persons for 
development. In this way, discretion is exercised by the High 
G Court in entertaining the writ petitions on merits. Since such a 
10AIR 1974 SC 2077 
11 (1997) 1 sec 15 
12(2001) s sec 231 
H 
13 (201 oi 11 sec 242
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
561 
[AK. SIKRI, J.] 
discretion is exercised, we would not like to interfere with that A 
discretion, more so, when a very fair stand is taken by Mr. Rao, 
learned senior counsel appearing for the Naida authority, as 
mentioned above. However, the aforesaid position in law is 
stated to highlight that it was equally possible to dismiss these 
writ petitions as the same were filed belatedly after passing of B 
the award and when in most of the cases, possession was 
taken and compensation paid. When we examine the matter 
from the aforesaid angle, we reach an irresistible conclusion 
that the High Court has gone an extra mile in finding the solution 
to the problem and balancing the equities in a manner which C 
is favourable to the land owners. 
(39) We have also to keep in mind another important 
feature. Many residents of Patwari village had entered into 
agreement with the authorities agreeing to accept enhanced D 
compensation at the rate of 64. 7%. This additional 
compensation was, however, agreed to be paid by the 
authorities only in respect of land owners of Patwari village. 
The High Court has bound the authorities with the said 
agreement by applying the same to all the land owners thereby E 
benefiting them with 64.7% additional compensation. There 
could have been argument that the authorities cannot be 
fastened with this additional compensation, more particularly, 
when machinery for determination for just and fair F
compensation is provided under the Land Acquisition Act and 
the land owners had, in fact, invoked the said machinery by 
seeking reference under Section 18 thereof. Likewise, the 
scheme for allotment of land to the land owners provides for 
5% and 6% developed land in Naida and Greater Naida G 
respectively. As against that, the High Court has enhanced the 
said entitlement to 10%. Again, we find that it could be an 
arguable case as to whether High Court could grant additional 
land contrary to the policy. Notwithstanding the same, the Naida 
authority have now accepted this part of the High Court H
562 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A judgment after the dismissal of the appeals filed by the Noida 
authority, and a statement to that effect was made by Mr. Rao. 
We may point out that while dismissing the appeals of Noida 
authority, following remarks were made: 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
"9. Insofar as allotment of 1.0 per cent of the plots is 
concerned, the High Court, in exercise of its discretionary 
power, has thought it fit, while sustaining the notification 
issued by the authority for protecting them for allotting 
10 per cent of the developed plots; and, there again they 
have put a cap of 2,500 sq.mtrs. In fact, in the course of 
the order, the High Court has taken into consideration 
the agreement that was entered into by the authority with 
the villagers of Patwari and, in some cases. the authority 
itself has agreed to raise 6 to 8 per cent of the developed 
plots to the agriculturists. The High Court has also taken 
into consideration the observations made by this Court 
in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy Vs. Bangalore 
Development Authority, 2010 (7) SCC 129, where this 
Court has gone to the extent of directing the authorities 
to allot 15 per cent of the developed plots. In our view 
and in the peculiar facts and circumtances of these cases, 
since the relief that is given to the respondents/ 
agriculturists is purely discretionary relief by the Court in 
order to sustain the notification issued by the authorities, 
we do not find any good ground to
interfere with the 
impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the High 
Court, at the instance of the petitioners/appellants/ 
authorities, namely, NOIDAand Greater NOIDA. 
10. This order shall not be treated as a precedent in any 
other case." 
(40) Thus, we have a scenario where, on the one hand, 
invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act 
H and dispensing with the right to file objection under Section
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
563 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
5AoftheAct, is found to be illegal. On the other hand, we have A 
a situation where because of delay in challenging these 
acquisitions by the land owners, developments have taken in 
these villages and in most of the cases, third party rights have 
been created. Faced with this situation, the High Court going 
by the spirit behind the judgment of this Court in Bondu B 
Ramaswamy and Others (supra) came out with the solution 
which is equitable to both sides. We are, thus, of the view that 
the High Court considered the ground realities of the matter 
and arrived at a more practical and workable solution by 
adequately compensating the land owners in the form of C 
compensation as well as allotment of developed Abadi land 
at a higher rate i.e. 10% of the land acquired. of each of the 
land owners against the eligibility and to the policy to the extent 
of 5% and 6% of Noida and Greater Noida land respectively. 
D 
(41) Insofar as allegation of some of the app~ellants that 
their abadi land was acquired, we find that this allegation is 
specifically denied disputing its correctness. There is specific 
averment made by the NOIDAAuthority at so niany places that 
village abadi land was not acquired. It is mentioned that abadi E 
area is what was found in the survey conductedp}ior to Section 
4 Notification and not what is alleged or that which is far away 
from the dense village abadi. It is also mentioned that as
a 
consequence of the acquisition, the Authority spends crores F 
and crores of rupees in developing the infrastructure such as 
road, drainage, sewer, electric and water lines etc. in the 
unacquired portion of the village abadi. During the course of 
hearing, Chart No. 2 in respect of each village of Greater Noida 
was handed over for the consideration of this Court, wherein G 
the amount spent by the Authority on the development, including 
village development (which is the unacquired village abadi}, 
has been given in Column No. 4 thereof. It has been the 
consistent stand of the NOIDA Authority that prior to the 
issuance of Section 4 Notification under the Land Acquisition H
564 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 
A Act, 1894, survey was conducted and the abadi found in that 
survey was not acquired. In fact, affidavits in this respect have 
also been filed not only in this Court but also in the High Court. 
We have mentioned that there has been a long gap between 
acquisition of the land and filing of the writ petitions in the High 
B Court by these appellants challenging the acquisition. If they 
have undertaken some construction during this period they 
cannot be allowed to take advantage thereof. Therefore, it is 
difficult to accept the argument of the appellants based on 
parity with three villages in respect of which the High Court 
C has given relief by quashing the acquisition. 
D 
E 
F 
(42) To sum up, following benefits are accorded to the 
land owners: 
(a) increasing the compensation by 64.7%; 
(b) directing allotment of developed abadi land to the extent 
of 10% of the land acquired of each of the land owners; 
(c) compensation which is increased atthe rate of64.7% 
is payable immediately without taking away the rights 
of the land owners to claim higher compensation under 
the machinery provided in the Land Acquisition Act 
wherein the matter would be examined on the basis of 
the evidence produced to arrive at just and fair market 
value; 
This, according to us, provides substantial justice to 
the appellants. 
G 
Conclusion 
(43) Keeping in view all these peculiar circumstances, we 
are of the opinion that these are not the
cases where this Court 
should interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. However, 
H we make it clear that directions of the High Court are given in

SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH 
565 
[A.K. SIKRI, J.] 
the aforesaid unique and peculiar/specific background and, A 
therefore, it would not form precedent for future cases. 
(44) We may record that some of the appellants had tried 
to point out certain clerical mistakes pertaining to their specific 
cases. For example, it was argued by one appellant that his B 
land falls in a village in Naida but wrongly included in Greater 
Naida. These appellants, for getting such clerical mistakes 
rectified, can always approach the High Court. 
(45) The Full Bench judgment of the High Court is, c 
accordingly, affirmed and all these appeals are disposed of in 
terms of the said judgment of the Full Bench. 
(46) In view of the aforesaid, the contempt petitions also 
stand disposed of. 
Kalpana K Tripathy 
Appeals and Contempt 
Petitions disposed of. 
D