KARNAIL SINGH  versus STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 894, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Case Allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 894 : 2024 INSC 424
Karnail Singh  
v. 
State of Haryana & Ors.
Review Petition (Civil) No.526 of 2023  
In 
(Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014)
16 May 2024
[B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Judgment and order under review ignored the law laid down by the 
Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram & others vs. State of Punjab 
& others which had a direct bearing on the issue in question and 
took a view totally contrary thereto and held that the vesting in the 
Panchayat is complete on mere assignment under Section 18(c) 
of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of 
Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was also held that the unutilized land 
was not available for redistribution amongst the proprietors and 
the land reserved for common purposes cannot be re-partitioned 
amongst the proprietors only because at a particular given time, the 
land so reserved was not put to common use and; once the land 
has been reserved for common purposes, it cannot be reverted 
to the proprietors for redistribution. Ignoring the law laid down by 
the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram and taking a contrary view, 
if would amount to a material error, manifest on the face of the 
order. Also, non-consideration of the reasoning given by the Full 
Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II relying on the judgment of 
the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram, if would also amount to 
an error, apparent on the face of the record.
Headnotes
Haryana Village Common Lands
(Regulation) Act, 1961 – Sub-
clause (6) to s.2(g) and its explanation, as inserted by Haryana 
Act No.9 of 1992 – East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and 
Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 – ss.18(c), 23-A, 24 
– Judgment under review (JUR), ignoring the law laid down 
by the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram & others vs. State 
of Punjab & others, took a view contrary thereto, if the same 
would amount to a material error manifest on the face of the 
order and needs to be recalled:
* Author
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
Held: Though this Court in the JUR referred to the Constitution 
Bench judgments in Ranjit Singh and Ajit Singh, there is not even 
a whisper about the Constitution Bench judgment in Bhagat Ram, 
except in paragraph 11, though it had a direct bearing on the issue 
in question – Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bhagat 
Ram in unequivocal terms held that the management and control 
does not vest in the Panchayat u/s.23-A of the Consolidation Act 
till possession has changed u/s.24 of the said Act – It further held 
that, the rights of the holders are not modified or extinguished 
till persons have changed possession and entered into the 
possession of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme – 
The specific contention raised by the State that the requirements 
as contemplated u/ss.23, 24 and 21(2) of the Consolidation Act 
were already complete and as such, the acquisition had already 
taken place before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) 
Act, 1964, was rejected – All these steps are subsequent to the 
assignment u/s.18(c) of the Consolidation Act – In the light of these 
findings of the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram, the finding of 
this Court in the JUR that the vesting in the Panchayat is complete 
on mere assignment u/s.18(c) of the Consolidation Act is totally 
contrary to the findings recorded in the Constitution Bench judgment 
in Bhagat Ram – It was also held in Bhagat Ram that
since the 
Panchayat would fall within the definition of the word “State” under 
Article 12 of the Constitution, if the acquisition is for the purposes 
of providing income to the Panchayat, it would defeat the whole 
object of the second proviso and the Consolidation Officer could 
easily defeat the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by 
reserving for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the 
land belonging to a person holding land within the ceiling limit – 
Except the cursory reference in the JUR, this Court did not even 
refer to the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court 
in Bhagat Ram – A judgment of the Constitution Bench would be 
binding on the Benches of a lesser strength – A bench strength 
of two Judges could not have ignored the law laid down by the 
Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram – Ignoring the law laid down 
by the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram and taking a view totally 
contrary to it would amount to a material error, manifest on the 
face of the order and would undermine its soundness – Further, 
the non-consideration of the reasoning given by the Full Bench 
of the High Court in Jai Singh II, which findings were given by 
relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court
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in Bhagat Ram, and not showing as to how the findings therein 
were erroneous in law, would also amount to an error, apparent 
on the face of the record – Furthermore, the non-consideration 
of the reasoning given by the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai 
Singh II, that on account of more than 100 decisions rendered by 
various Benches of the High Court, the doctrine of stare decisis 
is applicable, would also be an error apparent on the face of the 
record – Judgment and order of this Court dated 07.04.2022 in Civil 
Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is restored to 
file. [Paras 54-58, 46, 65, 67, 69]
Review Jurisdiction – Scope:
Held: Scope of review by this Court is very limited – Review 
would be permissible only if there is a mistake or error apparent 
on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason is made 
out – Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original 
hearing of the case – The review of the judgment would be 
permissible only if a material error, manifest on the face of the 
order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of 
justice – Such an error should be an error apparent on the face 
of the record and should not be an error which has to be fished 
out and searched. [Paras 12, 13]
Case Law Cited
Bhagat Ram & others v. State of Punjab & others [1967] 2 SCR 
165 : AIR 1967 SC 927 – followed.
Ranjit Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others [1965] 
1 SCR 82
: AIR 1965 SC 632 – held inapplicable.
Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab & another [1967] 2 SCR 143 : AIR 
1967 SC 856; Jai Singh & others v. State of Haryana (2003) SCC 
OnLine P&H 409; State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh and others 
(2001) SCC OnLine SC 1488; Sow Chandra Kante and another 
v. Sheikh Habib [1975] 3 SCR 933 : (1975) 1 SCC 674; Parsion 
Devi and others v. Sumitri Devi and others [1997] Supp. 4 SCR 
470 : (1997) 8 SCC 715; Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech 
Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and others [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 
517 : (2005) 6 SCC 651; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and others 
[2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8 SCC 320; Union of India v. Sandur 
Manganese and Iron Ores Limited and others [2013] 2 SCR 1045  : 
(2013) 8 SCC 337; Shanti Conductors Private Limited v. Assam
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
897
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
State Electricity Board and others [2019] 16 SCR 252 : (2020) 2 
SCC 677; Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through legal representatives 
and others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others [2020] 11 SCR 865  : 
(2021) 13 SCC 1 – referred to.
List of Acts
Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961; East Punjab 
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948; 
Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964; Punjab Holdings 
(Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949.
List of Keywords
Review; Scope of review jurisdiction; Material error apparent/
manifest on the face of the order/record; Miscarriage of justice; 
Constitution Bench judgment ignored; View contrary to Constitution 
Bench judgment; Common pool of land; “shamilat deh”; Unutilized 
land not available for redistribution amongst the proprietors; 
Common purposes; Land reserved for common purposes cannot 
be re-partitioned amongst the proprietors; Reserved Land not put 
to common use; Vesting in the Panchayat; Land reserved but 
not earmarked for any common purpose under the Consolidation 
Scheme; Proprietary body; Title of land vests in the proprietary 
body; Management of the lands done on behalf of the proprietary 
body; Bachat lands; Gram Panchayat; Lands within the ceiling 
limit or not; Reservation of land for income of the Panchayat; 
“acquisition by the State”; “modification or extinguishment of 
rights”; Doctrine of stare
decisis.
Case Arising From
INHERENT JURISDICTION: Review Petition (Civil) No. 526 of 2023 
In
Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.04.2022 of the Supreme 
Court of India in C.A. No. 6990 of 2014
Appearances for Parties
B.K. Satija, A.A.G., Narender Hooda, Rameshwar Singh Malik, 
Pradeep Kant, Sr. Advs., Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, Rahul Rathore, 
Akshay Kjindal, Shiv Bhatnagar, Shaurya Lamba, Gautam Sharma, 
Dr. Monika Gusain, Jitesh Malik, Chander Kiran, Rahul Govil, Varun
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Shobit, Raj Singh, Ashok Kumar, Ms. Beena, Satish Kumar, Ms. 
Anubha Agrawal, Pardeep Gupta, Parinav Gupta, Mrs. Mansi Gupta, 
Rakshit Rathi, Mrs. Shashi Verma, Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Sanjay 
Rathi, Sanchya Bhardwaj, Mukesh Sansanwal, Rajiv, Ms. Megha 
Gaur, Vibhav Mishra, Parmanand Gaur, Daya Krishan Sharma, D K 
Sharma, Yashdeep, Mrs. Sunita Sharma, Rohit Vats, Piyush Goel, 
Ankit Bhanot, Shubham Rana, Pushkar Vats, Ms. Simranjeet Singh 
Rekhi, Shubham Kumar, Harsh Saxena, Ravindra Bana, Rajesh 
Kumar, Ranbir Singh Yadav, Prateek Yadav, Puran Mal Saini, Ms. 
Akansha Singh Yadav, Yogesh Yadav, Ms. Shivika Nehra, Chander 
Shekhar Ashri, Ashok Kumar Singh, Shantwanu Singh, Rahul Dubey, 
Raj Kishor Sinha, Ms. Pragya Singh, Sunny Singh, Akshay Singh, Ajay 
Pal, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor, Ms. Srishti Singla, Shrey Kapoor, 
A. Venayagam Balan, Ankit Swarup, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, J.
INDEX*
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND…………
Paras 1 to 3
II.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
Paras 4 to 11
III.
CONSIDERATION ON THE SCOPE OF 
REVIEW JURISDICTION
Paras 12 to 14
IV.
CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 
THE FULL BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT 
IN JAI SINGH II
Paras 15 to 21
V.
CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
BENCH JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT IN 
RANJIT SINGH, AJIT SINGH AND BHAGAT 
RAM
Paras 22 to 58
VI.
CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 
THE FULL BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT 
IN JAI SINGH II
REFERRING ITS EARLIER 
JUDGMENT IN GURJANT SINGH AND 
SEVERAL OTHER JUDGMENTS
Paras 59 to 65
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
VII.
CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 
THE FULL BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT IN 
JAI SINGH II WITH REGARD TO DOCTRINE 
OF STARE DECISIS
Paras 66 to 67
VIII.
CONCLUSION
Para 68 to 69
I.	
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.	
The present review petition has been filed by the original respondent 
No.28 in the Appeal, seeking review of the judgment of this Court 
passed on 7th April 2022, thereby allowing the Civil Appeal No. 6990 
of 2014 filed by the State of Haryana against the judgement and 
order passed by the Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and 
Haryana at Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as “Full Bench of 
the High Court”) in Civil Writ Petition No. 5877 of 1992 dated 13th 
March 2003
2.	
The bare necessary facts giving rise to the present review petition 
are thus:
2.1	 The State of Haryana, by way of Government Gazette 
Notification dated 11th February 1992 (hereinafter referred to as 
“Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992”) inserted sub-clause (6) to Section 
2(g) of the Haryana1 Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 
1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1961 Act”) along with an 
explanation to the said sub-clause which received the assent 
of the President on 14th January 1992. The sub-clause (6) to 
Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act reads thus:
“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires – 
xxx    xxx      xxx
(g) “shamilat deh” includes-
xxx    xxx      xxx
(6) lands reserved for the common purposes of a 
village
under Section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings 
(Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 
1	
For the word “Punjab” deemed to have been substituted w.e.f. 01.11.1966 vide Haryana Act No.15 of 
2021, the Haryana Short Titles Amendment Act 2021 dated 05.04.2021.
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1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the management 
and control whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat 
under section 23-A of the aforesaid Act. 
Explanation – Lands entered in the column of 
ownership of record of rights as “Jumla Malkan 
Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hassab Rasad”, “Jumla 
Malkan” or “Mushtarka Malkan” shall be shamilat 
deh within the meaning of this section.” 
2.2	 Being aggrieved by the said amendment, the present review 
petitioner along with similarly situated landowners, holding land 
in villages, who contribute a share of their holdings to form a 
common pool of land called ‘shamilat deh’, meant exclusively 
for the common purposes of the village inhabitants filed a batch 
of Writ Petitions before the High Court. Considering the matter 
to be involving important questions of law, likely to arise in a 
large number of cases and involving a large chunk of land; the 
Hon’ble Division Bench, then seized of the matter vide Orders 
dated 01st June, 1993 directed the papers of the case to be 
placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constituting a Full 
Bench of the High Court for determination of the vires of the 
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and the explanation thereof. The 
Full Bench of the High Court vide judgement dated 18th January 
1995 allowed the batch of Writ Petitions, wherein the judgement 
came to be recorded in CWP No. 5877 of 1992. 
2.3	 The State of Haryana challenged the decision of the Full Bench
of the High Court before this Court vide Civil Appeal No. 5480 
of 1995; wherein this Court held that certain essentials of Article 
31-A of the Constitution of India were overlooked and remanded 
the matter back to the High Court for re-consideration of the 
issues in light of Article 31A of the Constitution of India. 
2.4	 Accordingly, the Full Bench of the High Court vide judgement 
and order dated 13th March 2003, partly allowed the petition in 
terms of the following:
“In view of the discussion made above, we hold that:
(i)	
The sub-section (6) of Section 2(g) of the Punjab 
Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 
and the explanation appended thereto, is only an
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
elucidation of the existing provisions of the said 
Act read with provisions contained in the East 
Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention 
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948.
(ii)	
the un-amended provisions of the Act of 1961 
and, in particular, Section 2(g)(1) read with 
Sections 18 and 23-A of the Act of 1948 and 
Rule 16(ii) of the Rules of 1949 cover all such 
lands which have been specifically earmarked in 
a consolidation scheme prepared under Section 
14 read with Rules 5 and 7 and confirmed under 
Section 20, which has been implemented under 
the provisions of Section 24 and no other lands;
(iii)	 the lands which have been contributed by the 
proprietors on the basis of pro-rata cut on their 
holdings imposed during the consolidation 
proceedings and which have not been earmarked 
for any common purpose in the consolidation 
scheme prepared under Section 14 read with 
Rules 5 and 7 and entered in the column of 
ownership as Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran 
Hasab Rasad Arazi Khewat and in the column 
of possession with the Gram Panchayat or the 
State Government, as the case may be, on 
the dint of sub-section (6) of Section 2(g) and 
the explanation appended thereto or any other 
provisions of the Act of 1961 or the Act of 1948;
(iv)	 all such lands, which have been, as per the 
consolidation scheme, reserved for common 
purposes, whether utilized or not, shall vest with 
the State Government or the Gram
Panchayat, 
as the case may be, even though in the column 
of ownership the entries may be Jumla Mustarka 
Malkans Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad 
Arazi Khewat etc.”
2.5	 The Full Bench of the High Court also issued certain 
consequential directions with regard to certain mutation entries 
made by the Revenue Authorities.
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2.6	 Being aggrieved thus, the State of Haryana filed a Civil 
Appeal No. 6990 before this Court, which came to be allowed 
by judgement and order under review dated 07th April 2022 
(hereinafter referred to as “JUR”); and the Writ Petition of the 
Original Writ Petitioners was consequently dismissed.
2.7	 Seeking review, the present Review Petition has been filed by 
the review petitioner. This Court on 31st January. 2023 passed 
the following order in the present Review Petitions:
“List this review petition for hearing in open Court.”
2.8	 Subsequently, this Court on 10th April, 2023 passed the following 
order:
“1. Permission to file review petition(s) is granted.
2. Delay Condoned.
3. Issue Notice on the I.A. (Diary) Nos. 69003 
and 69005 of 2023 in Diary No. 14941 of 2022, 
M.A. (Diary) No. 13972 of 2023 and on the review 
petition(s), returnable on 24.04.2023. 
4. In addition to normal mode of service, liberty is 
granted to serve the Standing Counsel for the State.”
3.	
Accordingly, we have heard Shri Narender Hooda, learned Senior 
Counsel and Shri Pradeep Gupta, learned counsel appearing on 
behalf of the review petitioner, Shri Pradeep Kant, learned Senior 
Counsel and Shri B.K. Satija, learned Additional Advocate General 
appearing for the respondent-State of Haryana. 
II.	
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
4.	
Shri Narender Hooda submits that the JUR is totally contrary to the 
law laid down by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in the case of 
Bhagat Ram & others vs. State of Punjab & others2 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Bhagat Ram”). It is submitted that the JUR also does 
not correctly consider the law laid down by the Constitution Bench 
of this Court in the case of Ranjit Singh and others vs. State of 
Punjab and others3 (hereinafter referred to as “Ranjit Singh”) so 
2	
[1967] 2 SCR 165 : AIR 1967 SC 927 
3	
[1965] 1 SCR 82 : AIR 1965 SC 632
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
also another Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case 
of Ajit Singh vs. State of Punjab & another4 (hereinafter referred 
to as “Ajit Singh”). 
5.	
Shri Hooda submits that after considering the provisions of Section 
23-A and Section 24 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and 
Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 
“the Consolidation Act”), this Court in Bhagat Ram has clearly held 
that, till possession has changed under Section 24, the management 
and control does not vest in the Panchayat under Section 23-A. It 
has also been held that the rights of the holders are not modified or 
extinguished till persons have changed possession and entered into 
the possession of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme. He 
therefore submits that the Full Bench of the High Court in the case 
of Jai Singh & others vs. State of Haryana5 (hereinafter referred to 
as “Jai Singh II”) has correctly relying on Bhagat Ram held that the 
land which is reserved, but not earmarked for any common purpose, 
would not come under the purview of Section 2(g)(6) of the 1961 
Act, as inserted by Haryana Act No.9 of 1992.
6.	
Shri Hooda submits that the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ajit 
Singh was dealing with the lands which were reserved for common 
purposes such as khals, paths, khurrahs, panchayat ghars and 
schools etc. It was held that in view of Rule 16(ii) of the Punjab
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 
1949 (hereinafter referred to as “the Consolidation Rules”), the title 
still vests in the proprietary body, and the management of the said 
lands is done on behalf of the proprietary body. It was further held 
that the land was used for the common needs and benefits of the 
estate or estates concerned. This Court held that a fraction of each 
proprietor’s land was taken and formed into a common pool so that 
the whole may be used for the common needs and benefits of the 
estate as mentioned above. It has been held that the proprietors 
naturally would also be entitled to a share in the benefits along with 
others. In the facts of the said case, this Court held that all such 
lands, which had been specifically earmarked in the Consolidation 
Scheme for the purposes mentioned therein and were used for the 
4	
[1967] 2 SCR 143: AIR 1967 SC 856
5	
2003 SCC OnLine P&H 409
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purposes therein for the benefit of the proprietors among others, 
would not amount to acquisition, but a ‘modification’ of the rights. 
It was held that, by such ‘modification’, the beneficiary was not the 
State and as such, would not be hit by the second proviso to Article 
31-A of the Constitution of India. 
7.	
Shri Hooda further submits that even in Ranjit Singh, the Consolidation 
Scheme earmarked lands reserved under Section 18(c) of the 
Consolidation Act for various common purposes. The Constitution 
Bench of this Court held that the provisions for the assignment of 
lands to village Panchayat for the use of the general community, or 
for hospitals, schools, manure pits, tanning grounds etc. enures for 
the benefit of rural population and it must be considered to be an 
essential part of the redistribution of holdings and open lands.
8.	
Shri Hooda further submitted that in a catena of judgments, this 
Court has held that the lands, though reserved but not earmarked 
and put for any common purpose under the Consolidation Scheme 
prepared under Section 14 of the Consolidation Act read with Rules 
5 and 7 of the Consolidation Rules and entered in the column of 
ownership as ‘Jumla Mustarka Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab 
Rasad Arazi Khewat’ and in the column of possession with the 
proprietors, also known as Bachat lands, would not vest in the Gram 
Panchayat or the State Government. Shri Hooda submits that based 
on
such judgments, thousands of transactions have been entered 
into between the parties. It is submitted that, though invoking the 
doctrine of stare decisis was not necessary, this Court in the JUR 
has not even touched that aspect of the matter. All the judgments 
which have been holding the field for decades and thousands of 
transactions which have been entered into between the parties, have 
been set at naught at the stroke of a pen by the JUR. 
9.	
Shri Hooda further submits that in view of the JUR, the rights of the 
parties which were crystalized by the judgments of the High Court 
and which was affirmed by this Court by judgment dated 27th August, 
20016 have also been adversely affected without such parties having 
been heard. He therefore submits that the JUR needs to be recalled 
and the appeals filed by the State deserve to be dismissed. 
6	
2001 SCC OnLine SC 1488 [State of Punjab vs. Gurjant Singh and others (CA Nos.5709-5714 of 2001 
@ SLP(C) Nos.16173-16178 of 2000)
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
10.	 Per contra, Shri Pradeep Kant, learned Senior Counsel appearing 
on behalf of the respondent-State of Haryana submits that the 
present review petition itself is not maintainable. It is submitted that 
the review applicant was a party respondent to the appeal and the 
JUR has been delivered after hearing the learned counsel for the 
parties. It is submitted that the scope of review is very limited. It is 
also submitted that under the guise of a review, a party cannot be 
permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already 
been addressed and decided. He placed reliance on the following 
judgments of this Court in support of his submissions:
(i)	
Sow Chandra Kante and another vs. Sheikh Habib7
(ii)	 Parsion Devi and others vs. Sumitri Devi and others8
(iii)	 Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Hitech Electrothermics 
& Hydropower Ltd. and others9
(iv)	 Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and others10
(v)	 Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Limited 
and others11
(vi)	 Shanti Conductors Private Limited vs. Assam State 
Electricity Board and others12
(vii)	 Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through legal representatives and 
others vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others13
11.	 With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have 
scrutinized the material on record. 
III.	
CONSIDERATION ON THE SCOPE OF REVIEW JURISDICTION
12.	 At the outset, we must reiterate that the scope of review by this
Court is very limited. The scope of review jurisdiction has been 
delineated by this Court in a catena of judgments. We would not like 
7	
[1975] 3 SCR 933 : (1975) 1 SCC 674
8	
[1997] Supp. 4 SCR 470 : (1997) 8 SCC 715
9	
[2005] Supp. 2 SCR 517 : (2005) 6 SCC 651
10	
[2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8 SCC 320
11	
[2013] 2 SCR 1045 : (2013) 8 SCC 337
12	
[2019] 16 SCR 252 : (2020) 2 SCC 677
13	
[2020] 11 SCR 865 : (2021) 13 SCC 1
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to burden the present judgment by reproducing all those judgments. 
This Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and others 
(supra), after surveying the earlier law laid down by this Court has 
summarized the principles thus:
“Summary of the principles
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of 
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i)	
Discovery of new and important matter or 
evidence which, after the exercise of due 
diligence, was not within knowledge of the 
petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii)	
Mistake or error apparent on the face of the 
record;
(iii)	 Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” have been 
interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 
: (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by 
this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most 
Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 
1 SCR 520] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds 
at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The 
same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. 
Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 
: JT (2013) 8 SC 275]
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i)	
A repetition of old and overruled argument is 
not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii)	
Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii)	 Review proceedings cannot be equated with
the original hearing of the case.
(iv)	 Review is not maintainable unless the material 
error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines 
its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
(v)	
A review is by no means an appeal in disguise 
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and 
corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi)	 The mere possibility of two views on the subject 
cannot be a ground for review.
(vii)	 The error apparent on the face of the record 
should not be an error which has to be fished 
out and searched.
(viii)	 The appreciation of evidence on record is 
fully within the domain of the appellate court, 
it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the 
review petition.
(ix)	 Review is not maintainable when the same relief 
sought at the time of arguing the main matter 
had been negatived.”
13.	 It is thus settled that the review would be permissible only if there is 
a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other 
sufficient reason is made out. We are also equally aware of the fact 
that the review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing 
of the case. The review of the judgment would be permissible only 
if a material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its 
soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. We are also aware that 
such an error should be an error apparent on the face of the record 
and should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. 
14.	 In the light of the aforesaid principles, we will have to examine the 
present case. 
IV.	
CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE FULL BENCH 
OF THE HIGH COURT IN
JAI SINGH II
15.	 The background in which Jai Singh II has been decided has already 
been stated by us in the beginning. In the first round of litigation, 
the High Court had held the provisions of Section 2(g)(6) of the 
1961 Act to be unconstitutional being violative of second proviso to 
Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. This Court in the first round 
has set aside the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court and 
remanded the matter for deciding the factual aspect as to whether 
the lands in question were within the ceiling limit or not.
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16.	 As such, the scope of the dispute in the second round was very 
limited. The Full Bench of the High Court, after coming to a finding 
of fact that the lands in question were within the ceiling limit, partly 
allowed the petition. The operative part of the judgment of the 
Full Bench of the High Court has already been reproduced by us 
hereinabove in paragraph 2.4.
17.	 The State was not aggrieved with the findings on issue nos. (i), (ii) 
and (iv).
By clause (i), the Full Bench of the High Court held that sub-section 
(6) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act and the explanation appended 
thereto is only an elucidation of the existing provisions of the said 
Act read with the provisions contained in the Consolidation Act. 
By clause (ii), it held that the unamended provisions of the 1961 Act 
and, in particular, Section 2(g)(1) read with Sections 17 and 23-A 
of the Consolidation Act and Rule 16(ii) of the Consolidation Rules 
cover all such lands which have been specifically earmarked in a 
consolidation scheme prepared under Section 14 read with Rules 5 
and 7 and confirmed under Section 20, which has been implemented 
under the provisions of Section 24 and no other lands. 
By clause (iv), the Full Bench of the High Court held that, all 
such lands in the consolidation scheme which were reserved 
for common purposes, whether utilized or not, shall vest with 
the State Government or the Gram Panchayat, as the case may 
be;
even though in the column of ownership the entries may be 
‘Jumla Mustarka Malkans Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad Arazi 
Khewat’ etc.
18.	 The grievance of the State was only with regard to clause (iii), 
wherein it has been held that the lands which had been contributed 
by the proprietors on the basis of pro-rata cut on their holdings 
imposed during the consolidation proceedings and which have 
not been earmarked for any common purpose in the consolidation 
scheme prepared under Section 14 read with Rules 5 and 7 and 
have been entered in the column of ownership as ‘Jumla Malkan 
Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad Arazi Khewat’, and in the column 
of possession with the Gram Panchayat or the State Government, 
would not vest in the Gram Panchayat or the State Government but 
continue to vest with the proprietors.
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19.	 This Court in the JUR has held that conclusion no.(iii) arrived at by 
the High Court was erroneous and not sustainable and accordingly 
set it aside. It has been held that the unutilized land was not 
available for redistribution amongst the proprietors. This Court 
further held that the findings recorded by the different benches of 
the High Court were clearly erroneous and not sustainable. This 
Court held that the land reserved for common purposes cannot be 
re-partitioned amongst the proprietors only because at a particular 
given time, the land so reserved has not been put to common use. 
This Court held that the ’common purpose’ is a dynamic expression 
as it keeps changing due to the change in requirement of the 
society and the passing times and therefore, once the land has 
been reserved for common purposes, it cannot be reverted to the 
proprietors for redistribution.
20.	 The limited enquiry that would be permissible for us in these 
proceedings is as to whether the said finding is a material error, 
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or 
results in the miscarriage of justice or not. 
21.	 At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that it will not be permissible 
for us to hear the matter as if it was an appeal arising from the JUR. 
V.	
CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BENCH 
JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT IN RANJIT SINGH, AJIT 
SINGH AND BHAGAT RAM
22.	 For considering the
controversy, a reference to three Constitution 
Bench Judgments of this Court would be necessary. 
23.	 The first one is in the case of Ranjit Singh. In the said case, the 
Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned with the consolidation 
proceedings in which portions of land from those commonly owned 
by the appellants therein as proprietors, had been reserved for 
the village Panchayat and handed over to it for diverse purposes; 
whereas, other portions had been reserved either for non-proprietors 
or for the common purposes of the villages. In the said case, in the 
village Virk Kalan, 270 kanals and 13 marlas had been given to the 
village Panchayat for management and realization of income, even 
though the ownership was still shown in village papers as Shamilat 
Deh in the names of the proprietors; 10 kanals and 3 marlas had 
been reserved for abadi to be distributed among persons entitled
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thereto, and 3 kanals and 7 marlas had been reserved for manure 
pits. Similarly, in village Sewana, certain lands were set apart for the 
village Panchayat for extension of the abadi and to enable grants of 
certain land to be made to each family of non-proprietors and certain 
lands had been reserved for a primary school and some more for 
a phirni. Similarly, in village Mehnd, land had been reserved for the 
village Panchayat, a school, tanning ground, hospital, cremation 
ground and for non-proprietors. The proprietors were not paid 
compensation for the lands and as such, taking away and allotment 
of the lands was the subject matter of challenge in those appeals 
in the said case. 
24.	 The appeals before this Court were heard and closed for judgment 
on 27th April 1964. The judgment had to be postponed till after the 
vacation. However, before the Court could reassemble after the 
vacation on 20th July 1964, the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) 
Act, 1964 received the assent of the President i.e. on 20th June, 
1964. Vide the said Amendment, a new sub-clause (a) in clause (2) 
of Article 31-A was substituted retrospectively and added a proviso 
to clause (1). The appeals were set down to be mentioned on July 
20/23, 1964, and counsel were asked if, in view of the amendment, 
they wished to say anything. However, neither of parties wished to 
argue. The appeals were thus decided on the old arguments, though 
it was
clear to the Court that the amendment of Article 31-A, which 
had a far-reaching effect, must have affected one or other of the 
parties. The Constitution Bench upheld the judgment of the High 
Court which had held that the transfer of shamilat deh owned by the 
proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purposes of management 
and the conferral of proprietary rights on non-proprietors in respect 
of lands in abadi deh was not ultra vires Article 31 inasmuch as, no 
compensation was payable. 
25.	 It must be noted that the judgment of the High Court was rendered 
by interpreting Article 31-A as it existed prior to the Constitution 
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. This Court though called upon 
the parties to address the Court on the effect of the Constitution 
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, no arguments were advanced. 
As such, in Ranjit Singh, this Court did not have the occasion to 
consider the effect of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) 
Act, 1964 by which the second proviso was added to Article 31-A 
of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, the judgment
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ranjit Singh will not have 
a bearing on the present matter.
26.	 In the case of Ajit Singh (supra), again the challenge was to the 
scheme made under the provisions of the Consolidation Act. One of 
the grounds raised before the High Court as well as this Court was 
that the compensation must be paid to the appellant for the land 
reserved in the scheme for various purposes in accordance with 
the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) inserted by the Constitution 
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.
27.	 It will be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs in Ajit Singh: 
“6. Coming now to the third point raised by Mr Iyenger, we 
may first mention that it was held by this Court in Ranjit 
Singh v. State of Punjab [(1965) 1 SCR 82] that the Act was 
protected from challenge by Article 31-A. It is necessary to 
set out the relevant constitutional provisions. The relevant 
portion of Article 31-A reads as under:
“31-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in 
Article 13, no law providing for—
(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or 
of any rights therein or the extinguishment or 
modification of any such rights……….
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that 
it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges 
any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 
19 or Article 31:
Provided that * * *
Provided further that where any law makes any 
provision for
the acquisition by the State of any 
estate and where any land comprised therein is 
held by a person under his personal cultivation, 
it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire 
any portion of such land as is within the ceiling 
limit applicable to him under any law for the 
time being in force or any building or structure 
standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless 
the law relating to the acquisition of such land,
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building or structure, provides for payment of 
compensation at a rate which shall not be less 
than the market value thereof.
(2)(b) the expression ‘rights’ in relation to an 
estate shall include any rights vesting in a 
proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, 
tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other 
intermediary and any rights or privileges in 
respect of land revenue.”
Relevant portions of Articles 19 and 31 may also 
be set out because the learned counsel have 
laid stress on the language employed therein.
“19. (1) All citizens shall have the right—
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
31. (1) No person shall be deprived of his 
property save by authority of law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired 
or requisitioned save for a public purpose and 
save by authority of a law which provides for 
compensation for the property so acquired or 
requisitioned and either fixes the amount of 
the compensation or specifies the principles 
on which, and the manner in which, the 
compensation is to be determined and given; 
and no such law shall be called in question in 
any court on the ground that the compensation 
provided by that law is not adequate.
(2-A) Where a law does not provide for the 
transfer of the ownership or right to possession 
of any property to the State or to a corporation 
owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be 
deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition 
or
requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that 
it deprives any person of his property.”
7. It would be noticed that Article 31-A(1)(a) mentions 
four categories; first acquisition by the State of an estate;
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
second, acquisition by the State of rights in an estate; 
third, the extinguishment of rights in an estate, and, 
fourthly, the modification of rights in an estate. These four 
categories are mentioned separately and are different. 
In the first two categories the State “acquires” either an 
estate or rights in an estate. In other words, there is a 
transference of an estate or the rights in an estate to the 
State. When there is a transference of an estate to the 
State, it could be said that all the rights of the holder of 
the estate have been extinguished. But if the result in the 
case of the extinguishment is the transference of all the 
rights in an estate to the State, it would properly fall within 
the expression “acquisition by the State of an estate”. 
Similarly, in the case of an acquisition by the State of a 
right in an estate it could also be said that the rights of 
the owner have been modified since one of the rights of 
the owner has been acquired.
8. It seems to us that there is this essential difference 
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and 
“modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other 
that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in 
the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the 
extinguishment is not the State. For example, suppose the 
State is the landlord of an estate and there is a lease of 
that property, and a law provides for the
extinguishment 
of leases held in an estate. In one sense it would be 
an extinguishment of the rights of a lessee, but it would 
properly fall under the category of acquisition by the State 
because the beneficiary of the extinguishment would be 
the State.
9. Coming now to the second proviso to Article 31-A, it 
would be noticed that only one category is mentioned in 
the proviso, the category being “acquisition by the State of 
an estate”. It means that the law must make a provision for 
the acquisition by the State of an estate. But what is the 
true meaning of the expression “acquisition by the State 
of an estate”. In the context of Article 31-A, the expression 
“acquisition by the State of an estate” in the second proviso 
to Article 31-A(1) must have the same meaning as it has
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in clause (1)(a) to Article 31-A. It is urged on behalf of the 
respondents before us that the expression “acquisition 
by the State of any estate” in Article 31-A(1)(a) has the 
same meaning as it has in Article 31(2-A). In other words, 
it is urged that the expression “acquisition by the State 
of any estate” means transfer of the ownership or right 
to possession of an estate to the State. Mr. Iyengar on 
the other hand urges that the expression “acquisition by 
the State” has a very wide meaning and it would bear 
the same meaning as was given by this Court in State of 
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [(1964) SCR 587] , 
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning & 
Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674] 
Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. [(1955) 1 SCR 707] and 
Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of 
Bombay [(1958) SCR 1122] . In these cases this Court 
had given a wide meaning to the word “acquisition”. In 
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning & 
Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674] 
Mahajan, J., observed at p. 704 as follows:
“The word ‘acquisition’ has quite a wide concept, 
meaning the procuring of property or the taking of it 
permanently or temporarily. It does not necessarily 
imply the acquisition of legal title by the State in the 
property taken possession of.”
He further observed at p. 705:
“I prefer to follow the view of the majority of the
Court, 
because it seems to me that it is more in consonance 
with juridical principle that possession after all is nine-
tenths of ownership, and once possession is taken 
away, practically everything is taken away, and that 
in construing the Constitution it is the substance and 
the practical result of the act of the State that should 
be considered rather than its purely legal aspect.”
Bose, J., observed at p. 734 as follows:
“In my opinion, the possession and acquisition 
referred to in clause (2) mean the sort of ‘possession’ 
and ‘acquisition’ that amounts to ‘deprivation’ within
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
the meaning of clause (1). No hard and fast rule 
can be laid down. Each case must depend on its 
own facts. But if there is substantial deprivation, 
then clause (2) is, in my judgment, attracted. By 
substantial deprivation I mean the sort of deprivation 
that substantially robs a man of those attributes of 
enjoyment which normally accompany rights to, or 
an interest in, property. The form is unessential. It is 
the substance that we must seek.”
10. Let us now see whether the other part of the second 
proviso throws any light on this question. It would be 
noticed that it refers to ceiling limits. It is well known that 
under various laws dealing with land reforms, no person 
apart from certain exceptions can hold land beyond a 
ceiling fixed under the law. Secondly, the proviso says 
that not only the land exempted from acquisition should be 
within the ceiling limit but it also must be under personal 
cultivation. The underlying idea of this proviso seems to 
be that a person who is cultivating land personally, which 
is his source of livelihood, should not be deprived of that 
land under any law protected by Article 31-A unless at 
least compensation at the market rate is given. In various 
States most of the persons have already been deprived 
of land beyond the ceiling limit on compensation which 
was less than the market value. It seems to us that in 
the light of all the considerations mentioned above
the 
words “acquisition by the State” in the second proviso 
do not have a technical meaning, as contended by the 
learned counsel for the respondent. If the State has in 
substance acquired all the rights in the land for its own 
purposes, even if the title remains with the owner, it cannot 
be said that it is not acquisition within the second proviso 
to Article 31-A.
11. But the question still remains whether even if a wider 
meaning is given to the word “acquisition” what has been 
done by the scheme and the Act is acquisition or not 
within the meaning of the second proviso. In other words, 
does the scheme only modify rights or does it amount to 
acquisition of land? The scheme is not part of the record,
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but it appears that 89B-18B-11B (Pukhta) of land was 
owned by the Gram Panchayat prior to consolidation, which 
was used for common purposes. Some further area was 
reserved for common purposes as khals, paths, khurrahs, 
panchayat ghars and schools etc. after applying cut upon 
the rightholders on pro-rata basis. It does not appear 
that any land, apart from what was already owned by 
the Panchayat, was reserved for providing income to the 
Panchayat. Therefore, in this case we are not concerned 
with the validity of acquisition for such a purpose.”
28.	 A perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs would reveal that in paragraph 
6, this Court reproduced the provisions of Article 31-A, as amended. 
29.	 In paragraph 7, this Court carved out 4 categories covered by Article 
31-A as under:
(i)	
acquisition by the State of an estate;
(ii)	
acquisition by the State of rights in an estate;
(iii)	 the extinguishment of rights in an estate; and 
(iv)	 the modification of rights in an estate. 
30.	 Analyzing the said provision, the Constitution Bench held that, in the 
first two categories, the State “acquires” either an estate or rights 
in an estate i.e., there is a transference of an estate or the rights 
in an estate to the State. The Constitution Bench held that when 
there is a transference of an estate to the State, it could be said that 
all the rights of the holder of the estate have been extinguished. It 
further held that, if
the result in the case of the extinguishment is 
the transference of all the rights in an estate to the State, it would 
properly fall within the expression “acquisition by the State of an 
estate”. It further held that, in the case of an acquisition by the 
State of a right in an estate it could also be said that the rights of 
the owner have been modified since one of the rights of the owner 
has been acquired.
31.	 In paragraph 8, the Constitution Bench carved out the difference 
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and “modification 
or extinguishment of rights” on the other. It held that in the first case, 
the beneficiary is the State while in the latter case the beneficiary of 
the modification or the extinguishment is not the State.
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
32.	 In paragraph 9, this Court recorded that in the second proviso to 
Article 31-A, only one category is mentioned i.e., “acquisition by the 
State of an estate”. It observed that the law must make a provision 
for the acquisition by the State of an estate. It went on to analyze 
the true meaning of the expression “acquisition by the State of 
an estate”. It was sought to be urged before this Court, that the 
expression “acquisition by the State” has a very wide meaning and 
it would bear the same meaning as was given by this Court in a 
catena of judgments. 
33.	 In paragraph 10, this Court recorded that the second proviso to 
Article 31-A refers to ceiling limits. It was further observed that the 
proviso provides that, not only the land exempted from acquisition 
should be within the ceiling limit but it also must be under personal 
cultivation. The Court held that the underlying idea of this proviso 
was that a person who is cultivating land personally, which is his 
source of livelihood, should not be deprived of that land under any 
law protected by Article 31-A unless at least compensation at the 
market rate is given. The Court held that the words “acquisition by 
the State” in the second proviso cannot be given a technical meaning, 
as was contended on behalf of the State. It held that, if the State has 
in substance acquired all the rights in the land for its own purposes, 
even if the title remains
with the owner, it cannot be said that it is 
not acquisition within the second proviso to Article 31-A.
34.	 In paragraph 11, this Court recorded the facts in the said case. It 
recorded that some of the lands were owned by the Gram Panchayat 
prior to consolidation, which was used for common purposes. Some 
further area was reserved for common purposes as khals, paths, 
khurrahs, panchayat ghars and schools etc. after applying a cut upon 
the rightholders on pro-rata basis. It observed that apart from what 
was already owned by the Panchayat, no other land was reserved 
for providing income to the Panchayat. As such, the Court was not 
concerned with the validity of acquisition for such a purpose. 
35.	 It will also be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs of the 
said judgment in Ajit Singh:
“12. Rule 16 (ii) of the Punjab Holdings (Consolidation 
and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949, provides:
“In an estate or estates where during consolidation 
proceedings there is no shamlat Deh land or such
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land is considered inadequate, land shall be reserved 
for the Village panchayat and for other common 
purposes, under Section 18(c) of the Act, out of the 
common pool of the village at a scale prescribed 
by the Government from time to time. Proprietary 
rights in respect of land so reserved (except the area 
reserved for the extension of abadi of proprietors and 
non-proprietors) shall vest in the proprietary body of 
estate or estates concerned and it shall be entered 
in the column of ownership of record of rights as 
(Jumla Malkan wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab 
Rasad Raqba). The management of such land shall 
be done by the Panchayat of the estate or estates 
concerned on behalf of the village proprietary body 
and the panchayat shall have the right to utilise the 
income derived from the land so reserved for the 
common needs and benefits of the estate or estates 
concerned.”
It will be noticed that the title still vests in the property 
body, the management of the land is done on behalf of 
the proprietary body, and the land is used for the common 
needs and benefits of the estate or estates concerned. In 
other words a fraction of each proprietor’s land is taken 
and formed into a common pool so that the whole may 
be used for the common needs and benefits of the estate, 
mentioned above. The proprietors naturally would also 
share in the benefits along with others.
13. In Attar Singh v. State of U.P. [(1959) Supp 1
SCR 
928 at p 938] Wanchoo J., speaking for the Court, said 
this of the similar proviso in a similar Act, namely, the 
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U.P. Act 5 of 1954) 
as amended by the U.P. Act 16 of 1957:
“Thus the land which is taken over is a small bit, 
which sold by itself would hardly fetch anything. 
These small bits of land are collected from various 
tenureholders and consolidated in one place and 
added to the land which might be lying vacant so 
that it may be used for the purposes of Section 14(1)
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
(ee). A compact area is thus created and it is used 
for the purposes of the tenure-holders themselves 
and other villagers. Form CH-21 framed under Rule 
41(a) shows the purposes to which this land would 
be applied, namely, (1) plantation of trees, (2) pasture 
land, (3) manure pits, (4) threshing floor, (5) cremation 
ground, (6) graveyards, (7) primary or other school, 
(8) playground, (9) Panchayatghar, and (10) such 
other objects. These small bits of land thus acquired 
from tenure-holders are consolidated and used for 
these purposes, which are directly for the benefit 
of the tenure-holders. They are deprived of a small 
bit and in place of it they are given advantages in 
a much larger area of land made up of these small 
bits and also of vacant land.”
In other words, a proprietor gets advantages which he 
could never have got apart from the scheme. For example, 
if he wanted a threshing floor, a manure pit, land for 
pasture, khal etc. he would not have been able to have 
them on the fraction of his land reserved for common 
purposes.
14. Does such taking away of property then amount to 
acquisition by the State of any land? Who is the real 
beneficiary? Is it the Panchayat? It is clear that the title 
remains in the proprietary body and in the revenue records 
the land would be shown as belonging to “all the owners 
and other right holders in proportion to their areas”. The 
Panchayat will manage it
on behalf of the proprietors and 
use it for common purposes; it cannot use it for any other 
purpose. The proprietors enjoy the benefits derived from 
the use of land for common purposes. It is true that the 
non-proprietors also derive benefit but their satisfaction 
and advancement enures in the end to the advantage of 
the proprietors in the form of a more efficient agricultural 
community. The Panchayat as such does not enjoy any 
benefit. On the facts of this case it seems to us that the 
beneficiary of the modification of rights is not the State, 
and therefore there is no acquisition by the State within 
the second proviso.
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15. In the context of the 2nd proviso, which is trying to 
preserve the rights of a person holding land under his 
personal cultivation, it is impossible to conceive that such 
adjustment of the rights of persons holding land under their 
personal cultivation in the interest of village economy was 
regarded as something to be compensated for in cash.”
36.	 In paragraph 12, after reproducing Rule 16(ii) of the Consolidation 
Rules, this Court observed that the title still vests in the proprietary 
body. However, the management of the land is done on behalf of 
the proprietary body, and the land is used for the common needs 
and benefits of the estate or estates concerned. It further held that a 
fraction of each proprietor’s land is taken and formed into a common 
pool so that the whole area may be used for the common needs 
and benefits of the estate, mentioned above. It further held that the 
proprietors naturally would also share in the benefits along with others.
37.	 In paragraph 14, this Court held that it was clear that the title remains 
in the proprietary body and in the revenue records the land would 
be shown as belonging to “all the owners and other right holders 
in proportion to their areas”. This Court held that the Panchayat 
would manage it on behalf of the proprietors and use it for common 
purposes and that it cannot use it for any other purpose. This Court 
held that the proprietors also enjoy the benefits
derived from the use 
of land for common purposes. It observed that the non-proprietors 
also derive benefit but their satisfaction and advancement enures 
in the end to the advantage of the proprietors in the form of a more 
efficient agricultural community. The Panchayat as such does not 
enjoy any benefit. This Court held, in light of the facts of the said 
case, that the beneficiary of the modification of rights was not the 
State, and therefore there was no acquisition by the State within the 
meaning of the second proviso.
38.	 In paragraph 15, this Court, referring to second proviso, held that it is 
impossible to conceive that such adjustment of the rights of persons 
holding land under their personal cultivation in the interest of village 
economy was regarded as something to be compensated for in cash.
39.	 It can thus be seen that in Ajit Singh, this Court was considering 
the portion of lands which was taken from the proprietors; formed 
into a common pool and used for common needs and benefits of 
the estate or estates concerned. It was held that the said land could
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
not be used for any other purpose. It has further affirmed that the 
proprietors also enjoy the benefits derived from the use of land for 
common purposes. 
40.	 It is further pertinent to note that in Ajit Singh, this Court held that 
the words “acquisition by the State” in the second proviso cannot 
be given a technical meaning. It has been held that if the State has 
in substance acquired all the rights in the land for its own purposes, 
even if the title remains with the owner, it cannot be said that it is 
not acquisition within the ambit of the second proviso to Article 31-A.
41.	 Justice M. Hidayatullah (as his Lordship then was) in his minority 
judgment disagreed with the majority view. He held that when the 
State acquires almost the entire bundle of rights, it is acquisition 
within the meaning of the second proviso and compensation at 
market rates must be given. 
42.	 The third judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court is in the 
case of Bhagat Ram, which would be the most relevant for the 
present purpose. 
43.	 It will be relevant to note that judgments in both Ajit Singh and 
Bhagat Ram were delivered on the very same day.
44.	 In the said case (i.e. Bhagat Ram), the Court was considering the 
question, as to whether the reservation of land for income of the 
Panchayat is acquisition of land by the State within the ambit of the 
second proviso to Article 31-A?
45.	 It will be relevant to
refer to the following observations of the 
Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram in the judgment 
delivered by Hon. S.M. Sikri, J (as his Lordship then was):
“2. The first question that arises is whether the scheme 
insofar as it makes reservations of land for income of the 
Panchayat is hit by the second proviso to Article 31-A. The 
scheme reserves lands for phirni, paths, agricultural paths, 
manure pits, cremation grounds, etc., and also reserves an 
area of 100 kanals 2 marlas (standard kanals) for income 
of the Panchayat. We have already held in Ajit Singh 
case [(1967) 2 SCR 143] that acquisition for the common 
purposes such as phirnis, paths, etc., is not acquisition by 
the State within the second proviso to Article 31-A. But this 
does not dispose of the question whether the reservation
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of land for income of the Panchayat is acquisition of land 
by the state within the second proviso to Article 31-A. We 
held in that case that there was this essential difference 
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and 
“modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other 
that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in 
the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the 
extinguishment is not the State. Here it seems to us that the 
beneficiary is the Panchayat which falls within the definition 
of the word “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. The 
income derived by the Panchayat is in no way different 
from its any other income. It is true that Section 2(bb) of 
the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention 
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, defines “common purpose” 
to include the following purposes:
“… providing income for the Panchayat of the village 
concerned for the benefit of the village community.”
Therefore, the income can only be used for the benefit 
of the village community. But so is any other income of 
the Panchayat of a village to be used. The income is the 
income of the Panchayat and it would defeat the whole 
object of the second proviso if we were to give any other 
construction. The Consolidation Officer could easily defeat 
the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by reserving 
for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the land
belonging to a person holding land within the ceiling limit. 
Therefore, in our opinion, the reservation of 100 kanals 2 
marlas for the income of the Panchayat in the scheme is 
contrary to the second proviso and the scheme must be 
modified by the competent authority accordingly.”
46.	 It can thus be seen that, this Court held that there was an essential 
difference between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and 
“modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other hand. It was 
held that in the first case, the beneficiary was the State while in the 
latter case, the beneficiary of the modification or the extinguishment 
was not the State. This Court held that since the Panchayat would 
fall within the definition of the word “State” under Article 12 of the 
Constitution, if the acquisition is for the purposes of providing income
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
923
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
to the Panchayat, it would defeat the whole object of the second 
proviso. This Court held that the Consolidation Officer could easily 
defeat the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by reserving 
for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the land belonging 
to a person holding land within the ceiling limit. 
47.	 The second argument which was advanced before this Court in 
Bhagat Ram was that acquisition had already taken place before 
the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 came into 
force and therefore the scheme was not hit by the second proviso 
to Article 31-A. It was sought to be argued that the requirements as 
contemplated under Sections 23, 24 and 21(2) of the Consolidation 
Act were already complete and as such, the acquisition had already 
taken place before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 
1964.
48.	 It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court 
in the majority judgment in Bhagat Ram while rejecting the aforesaid 
submissions:
“4. It is clear from this affidavit that possession has not been 
transferred in pursuance of the repartition. The learned 
Counsel for the petitioners relies on this fact and says that 
in view of Section 23-A and Section 24 the “acquisition” 
does not take place till all the persons entitled to possession 
of holdings under the Act have entered into possession 
of the holdings. Sections 23-A and 24 read
as follows:
“23-A. As soon as a scheme comes into force, the 
management and control of all lands assigned or 
reserved for common purposes of the village under 
Section 18, shall vest in the Panchayat of that village 
which shall also be entitled to appropriate the income 
accruing therefrom for the benefit of the village 
community, and the rights and interest of the owners 
of such lands shall stand modified and extinguished 
accordingly.
24. (1) As soon as the persons entitled to possession 
of holdings under this Act have entered into 
possession of the holdings respectively allotted to 
them, the scheme shall be deemed to have come into
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force and the possession of the allottees affected by 
the scheme of consolidation, or, as the case may be, 
by repartition, shall remain undisturbed until a fresh 
scheme is brought into force or a change is ordered 
in pursuance of provisions of sub-section (2), (3) and 
(4) of Section 21 or an order passed under Section 
36 or 42 of this Act.
(2) A Consolidation Officer shall be competent to 
exercise all or any of the powers of a Revenue Officer 
under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act 17 of 
1887), for purposes of compliance with the provisions 
of sub-section (1).”
5. It seems to us clear from these provisions that 
till possession has changed under Section 24, the 
management and control does not vest in the Panchayat 
under Section 23-A. Not only does the management and 
control not vest but the rights of the holders are not modified 
or extinguished till persons have changed possession and 
entered into the possession of the holdings allotted to them 
under the scheme. Mr Gossain, the learned Counsel for 
the State, tried to meet this point by urging that by virtue 
of repartition under Section 21, the rights to possession of 
the new holdings were finalised and could be enforced. This 
may be so; but this cannot be equivalent to “acquisition” 
within the second proviso to Article 31-A.
6. In the result we hold that the scheme is hit by the second 
proviso to Article 31 A insofar as it reserves 100 kanals 
2
marlas for the income of the Panchayat. We direct the 
State to modify the scheme to bring it into accord with the 
second proviso as interpreted by us, proceed according 
to law. There would be an order as to costs.”
49.	 It can thus clearly be seen that the Constitution Bench of this Court 
in Bhagat Ram held that, upon reading of Sections 23-A and 24 of 
the Consolidation Act it was clear that, till possession has changed 
under Section 24, the management and control does not vest in the 
Panchayat under Section 23-A of the Consolidation Act. It further 
held that not only does the management and control not vest but 
the rights of the holders are not modified or extinguished till persons
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Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
have changed possession and entered into the possession of the 
holdings allotted to them under the scheme. Though the counsel 
for the State tried to urge that, by virtue of repartition under Section 
21, the rights to possession of the new holdings were finalized and 
could be enforced, this Court held that this cannot be equivalent 
to “acquisition” within the second proviso to Article 31-A of the 
Constitution of India. 
50.	 The Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Jai Singh II has 
drawn a fine distinction between the land reserved for common 
purposes under Section 18(c) of the Consolidation Act which might 
become part and parcel of a scheme framed under Section 14, for 
the areas reserved for common purposes, though they have actually 
not been put to any common use and may be put to common use 
in a later point of time on one hand and the lands which might have 
been contributed by the proprietors on pro-rata basis but have not 
been reserved or earmarked for common purposes in the scheme. 
It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Full 
Bench of the High Court:
“The land reserved for common purposes under Section 
18(c), which might become part and parcel of a scheme 
framed under Section 14, for the areas reserved for common 
purposes, vests with the Government or Gram Panchayat, 
as the case may be, and the proprietors are left with no right 
or interest in such lands
meant for common purposes under 
the scheme. There is nothing at all mentioned either in the 
Act or the rules or the scheme, that came to be framed, 
that the proprietors will lose right only with regard to land 
which was actually put to any use and not the land which 
may be put to common use later in point of time. In none 
of the sections or Rules, which have been referred to by 
us in the earlier part of scheme envisages only such lands 
which have been utilized. That apart, in all the relevant 
sections and the rules, words mentioned are ‘reserved 
or assigned’. Reference in this connection may be made 
to sub-section (3) of Section 18 and Section 23-A. The 
provisions of the statute, as referred to above, would, thus, 
further fortify that reference is to land reserved or assigned 
for common use, whether utilized or not.
***    ***    ***
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The lands which, however, might have been contributed 
by the proprietors on pro-rata basis, but have not been 
reserved or earmarked for common purposes in a scheme, 
known as Bachat land, it is equally true, would not vest 
either with the State or the Gram Panchayat and instead 
continue to be owned by the proprietors of the village in 
the same proportion in which they contribute the land 
owned by them. The Bachat land, which is not used for 
common purposes under the scheme, in view of provisions 
contained in Section 22 of the Act of 1948, is recorded 
as Jumla Mustarka Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab 
Rasad Arazi Khewat but the significant differences is 
that in the column of ownership proprietors are shown in 
possession in contrast to the land which vests with the 
Gram Panchayat which is shown as being used for some 
or the other common purposes as per the scheme. 
We might have gone into this issue in all its details but 
in as much as the point in issue is not res-integra and in 
fact stands clinched by string of judicial pronouncements 
of this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is 
no necessity at all to interpret the provisions of the Act 
and the rules any further on this issue.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram and ors. Vs. 
State of Punjab and ors. AIR 1967 Supreme Court 927, 
dealt with reservation of certain area in the consolidation 
scheme for income of the Panchayat. Brief facts of
the case 
aforesaid would reveal that a scheme made in respect of 
consolidation of village Dolike Sunderpur was questioned 
on the ground that in as much as it makes reservation 
of land for income of the Gram Panchayat, it is hit by 
second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. 
The scheme in question reserved lands for phirni, paths, 
agricultural paths, manure pits, cremation grounds etc. and 
also reserved an area of 100 kanals 2 marlas (standard 
kanals) for income of the Panchayat. It was held as under:
“The income derived by the Panchayat is in no way different 
from its any other income. It is true that Section 2(bb) of 
the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
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927
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, defines “common purpose” 
to include the following purposes:
“… providing income for the Panchayat of the village 
concerned for the benefit of the village community.”
Therefore, the income can only be used for the benefit 
of the village community. But so is any other income of 
the Panchayat of a village to be used. The income is the 
income of the Panchayat and it would defeat the whole 
object of the second proviso if we were to give any other 
construction. The Consolidation Officer could easily defeat 
the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by reserving 
for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the land 
belonging to a person holding land within the ceiling limit. 
Therefore, in our opinion, the reservation of 100 kanals 2 
marlas for the income of the Panchayat in the scheme is 
contrary to the second proviso and the scheme must be 
modified by the competent authority accordingly.”
The ratio of the judgment aforesaid would clearly suggest 
that it is the land reserved for common purposes under the 
scheme which would be saved, which, otherwise, would 
be hit by second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution 
of India. Surely, if the land, which has not been reserved 
for common purposes under the scheme and is Bachat 
or surplus land, i.e., the one which is still left out after 
providing the land in scheme for common purposes, if it is 
to vest with the
State or Gram Panchayat, the same would 
be nothing but compulsory acquisition within the ceiling 
limit of an individual without payment of compensation 
and would offend second proviso to Article 31-A of the 
Constitution of India.”
51.	 As has been observed earlier, the Constitution Bench of this Court 
in Bhagat Ram, in no uncertain terms, held that till possession has 
changed under Section 24 of the Consolidation Act, the management 
and control does not vest in the Panchayat under Section 23-A of 
the said Act. It further held that not only does the management and 
control not vest but the rights of the holders are not modified or 
extinguished till persons have changed possession and entered into 
the possession of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme.
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Construing this, the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II held 
that, if the land which has not been reserved for common purposes 
under the scheme and is Bachat or surplus land, i.e., the land which 
is still left out after providing the land under the scheme for common 
purposes; if it is to vest with the State or Gram Panchayat, the same 
would be nothing but compulsory acquisition of land within the ceiling 
limit of an individual without payment of compensation and would 
offend the second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.
52.	 It can thus be seen that the judgment of the Full Bench of the High 
Court in Jai Singh II is based basically on the Constitution Bench 
judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagat Ram, which clearly held 
that, until possession has changed under Section 24, the management 
and control does not vest in the Panchayat under Section 23-A of the 
Consolidation Act. It further held that, not only does the management 
and control not vest but the rights of the holders are not modified or 
extinguished till persons have changed possession and entered into 
the possession of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme.
53.	 In the JUR, except a cursory reference to Bhagat Ram in paragraph 
11, this Court held that there was no dispute about the said proposition 
in the present appeals. 
54.	 With great respect, we may state that when the judgment of the Full 
Bench of the
High Court rested on the law laid down by the Constitution 
Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram, the least that was expected 
of this Court in the JUR was to explain as to why the Full Bench 
of the High Court was wrong in relying on Bhagat Ram. However, 
leave aside the cursory reference in the JUR in paragraph 11, there 
is no reference in the entire judgment to Bhagat Ram. Though this 
Court in the JUR has referred to the Constitution Bench judgments in 
Ranjit Singh and Ajit Singh, there is not even a whisper about the 
Constitution Bench judgment in Bhagat Ram, except in paragraph 
11, though it had a direct bearing on the issue in question. 
55.	 The Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bhagat Ram in 
unequivocal terms held that the management and control does not 
vest in the Panchayat under Section 23-A of the Consolidation Act till 
possession has changed under Section 24 of the said Act. It further 
held that, the rights of the holders are not modified or extinguished till 
persons have changed possession and entered into the possession 
of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme. In the said case,
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929
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
the specific contention raised by the State that the requirements as 
contemplated under Sections 23, 24 and 21(2) of the Consolidation 
Act were already complete and as such, the acquisition had already 
taken place before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 
1964, was specifically rejected by this Court. Needless to state that, 
all these steps are subsequent to the assignment under Section 
18(c) of the Consolidation Act. 
56.	 In the light of these findings of the Constitution Bench of this Court in 
Bhagat Ram, the finding of this Court in the JUR that the vesting in 
the Panchayat is complete on mere assignment under Section 18(c) 
of the Consolidation Act is totally contrary to the findings recorded 
in paragraph 5 of the Constitution Bench judgment in Bhagat Ram. 
57.	 As already discussed herein above, except the cursory reference 
in paragraph 11 in the JUR, this Court has not even referred to the 
ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 
5 in Bhagat Ram. No law is required to state that a judgment of 
the Constitution Bench would be binding on the Benches of a lesser 
strength. Bhagat Ram has been decided by a strength of Five 
Learned Judges, this Court having a bench strength of two Learned 
Judges could not have ignored the law laid down by the Constitution 
Bench in paragraph 5 in Bhagat Ram. 
58.	 We find that ignoring the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench of 
this Court in Bhagat Ram and taking a view totally contrary to the 
same itself would amount to a material error, manifest on the face of 
the order. Ignoring the judgment of the Constitution Bench, in our view, 
would undermine its soundness. The review could have been allowed 
on this short ground alone. However, the matter does not rest at that. 
VI.	 CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE FULL BENCH 
OF THE HIGH COURT IN JAI SINGH II REFERRING ITS 
EARLIER JUDGMENT IN GURJANT SINGH AND SEVERAL 
OTHER JUDGMENTS
59.	 It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Full 
Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II:
“Division Bench of this Court, in which one of us (V.K. 
Bali, J.) was a member, after referring to case law on the 
subject from 1967 to 1997 in Bhagat Ram vs. State of 
Punjab, (1967) 69, PLR, 287, Des Raj vs. Gram sabha
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of Village Ladhot, 1981 PLJ, 300, Chhajju Ram vs. The 
Joint Director, Panchayats, (1986-1) 89, PLR, 586, Gram 
Panchayat, Gunia Majri vs. Director Consolidation of 
Holdings, (1991-1) 99 PLR, 342, Gram Panchayat Sahara 
(formerly Dhuma) vs. Baldev Singh, 1977 PLJ, 276, Baj 
Singh vs. State of Punjab (1992-1) 101 RLR, 10, Kala 
Singh vs. Commissioner, Hisar Division, 1984 PLJ, 169, 
Joginder Singh vs. The Director Consolidation of Holdings 
(1997-2) 116 PLR 116, Bhagwan Singh vs. The Director 
Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, (1997-2) 116 PLR, 472 
and Gram Panchayat, Village Bhedpura vs. The Additional 
Director, Consolidation, (1997-1) 115 PLR, 391, held that 
the Bachat land, i.e., land which remains unutilized after 
utilizing the land for the common purposes so provided 
under the consolidation scheme vests with the proprietors 
and not with the Gram Panchayat”. It was further held that 
“the unutilized land after utilizing the land earmarked for 
the common purposes, has to be redistributed amongst 
the proprietors according to the share in which they 
had contributed the land belonging to them for common 
purposes”. There is no need to give facts of the judicial 
precedents relied upon in Gurjant Singh’s case (supra) as 
the same stand mentioned already therein and reiteration 
thereof would necessarily burden this judgment.
The decision of Division Bench of this Court in Gurjant 
Singh’s case (supra) was tested, at
the instance of the State 
of Punjab, in Civil Appeal No. 5709-5714 of 2001. Only, 
the general directions given in the judgment recorded in 
Gurjant Singh’s case (supra) for distribution of land to the 
proprietors were set aside and that too on the concession 
of learned counsel, who represented the Respondents in 
the case aforesaid. Order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme 
Court on August 27, 2001, reads thus:-
“Leave granted.
Mr. Harsh N. Salve, learned Solicitor General, 
submitted that the State of Punjab takes objection 
only in regard to the following observations made in 
the impugned judgment:-
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931
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
“This exercise, it appears, has not been done 
throughout the State of Punjab and Haryana 
and villages forming part of Union Territory, 
Chandigarh, even though there is a specific 
provision for doing that.
This exercise be done as expeditiously as 
possible and preferably within six months 
proceedings for repartition must commence. 
Liberty to apply in the event of non-compliance 
of directions referred to above.”
Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that they 
had no objection in deleting the aforesaid portions 
from the impugned judgment. We allow these appeals 
to be extent of deleting of the above said passage 
from the impugned judgment.
These appeals are disposed of accordingly.”
60.	 It is thus clear that the Full Bench of the High Court has referred to 
the judgment of the Division Bench of the said Court in the case of 
Gurjant Singh.
61.	 It is pertinent to note that in the case of Gurjant Singh, the Division 
Bench of the High Court had noted a series of judgments delivered by 
the said High Court relying on the law laid down by the Constitution 
Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram. All these decisions had held 
that the land which remains unutilized after utilizing the land for the 
common purposes so provided under the consolidation scheme 
vests with the proprietors and not with the Gram Panchayat. It 
was further held that the unutilized land i.e., the Bachat land, left 
after utilizing the
land earmarked for the common purposes, has to 
be redistributed amongst the proprietors according to the share in 
which they had contributed the land belonging to them for common 
purposes. 
62.	 It is to be noted that the JUR referred to the judgment in the case 
of Gurjant Singh and the order passed by this Court in Civil Appeal 
Nos.5709-5714 of 2001, wherein the State had objected only with 
regard to the observations wherein the time limit was provided for 
effecting redistribution of the Bachat land amongst the proprietors 
according to their share.
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63.	 It is thus clear that the State itself did not press the appeals with 
regard to the directions for redistribution of the Bachat land amongst 
the proprietors according to their share. Its only grievance was with 
regard to the directions to do it within a specified period of time. 
However, this Court in the JUR held that the doctrine of merger 
would not be applicable. However, we do not wish to go into the 
correctness of that finding since we are sitting in review jurisdiction. 
64.	 The JUR referred to various judgments of the Punjab & Haryana 
High Court which took the view that the Bachat lands are entitled 
for redistribution. The JUR cursorily observed in paragraph 84 that 
the findings recorded by the different Benches of the High Court are 
clearly erroneous and not sustainable. When a catena of judgments 
were delivered by the various Benches of the High court relying on 
the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram, 
the least that was expected in the JUR was a reasoning as to how 
the findings of the various Benches of the High Court including in 
Gurjant Singh, relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench 
of this Court in Bhagat Ram, are erroneous.
65.	 In our considered view, the non-consideration of the reasoning given 
by the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II, which findings 
were given by relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of 
this Court in Bhagat
Ram, and not showing as to how the findings 
therein were erroneous in law, would also amount to an error, apparent 
on the face of the record. 
VII.	 CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE FULL BENCH 
OF THE HIGH COURT IN JAI SINGH II WITH REGARD TO 
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
66.	 Thirdly, the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II in the 
alternative held that, a consistent view has been taken in more than 
100 judgments by the Punjab & Haryana High Court and applying 
the doctrine of stare decisis, such a view cannot be upset. While 
holding so, the Full Bench of the High Court has relied on various 
judgments of this Court as well as the various High Courts. However, 
in the JUR, there is not even a reference to the reasoning given by 
the Full Bench of the High Court with regard to the applicability of 
the doctrine of stare decisis. There are catena of judgments of this 
Court explaining the doctrine of stare decisis and its application. 
However, we do not propose to go into them since the scope in
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
933
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
review jurisdiction is limited. We do not wish to go into the question 
as to whether the doctrine of stare decisis would be applicable in 
the facts of the present case or not. However, the least that the JUR 
was expected was to consider the reasoning given by the Full Bench 
of the High Court and to consider as to how the said reasoning was 
not sustainable in law. However, the JUR does not even refer to the 
said discussion in its judgment. 
67.	 In our considered view, the non-consideration of the reasoning given 
by the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II, that on account 
of more than 100 decisions rendered by various Benches of the High 
Court, the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable, would also be an 
error apparent on the face of the record. 
VIII.	 CONCLUSION
68.	 In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the 
JUR needs to be recalled on the aforesaid grounds mentioned by us. 
69.	 In the result, we pass the following order:
(i)	
The Review Petition is allowed.
(ii)	
The judgment and order of this Court dated 7th April 2022 in 
Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is 
restored to file.
(iii)	 The appeal is directed to be listed for hearing peremptorily on 
7th August 2024 at Serial No.1. 
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
Result of the case: 

Review Petition allowed.