CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC SCIENCES & ANR. versus BIKARTAN DAS & ORS.
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 731, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
CASE DETAILS
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES & ANR.
v.
BIKARTAN DAS & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023)
AUGUST 16, 2023
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, CJI AND 
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: High Court, if erred in setting aside the order 
passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal and holding that respondent 
No.1 was entitled to the beneﬁ t of enhancement of retirement age from 60 
to 65 years as applicable to the AYUSH doctors working under the Ministry 
of AYUSH.
Service Law – Grant of beneﬁ t of enhancement of retirement age 
– Unsustainability:
Held: Respondent No.1 was appointed as a Research Assistant by the 
appellant-Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS) 
and was functioning as a Researcher under the Research Council and his 
service conditions were also diﬀ erent compared to the AYUSH doctors 
serving with the Ministry of AYUSH – Appellant-Council is a registered 
autonomous body and is administratively controlled by the Ministry of 
AYUSH, Government of India – The recruitment rules, procedure and the 
service conditions of its employees are governed by the Bye-Laws and 
Memorandum of Association of the Council – High Court misdirected itself 
saying that the beneﬁ t of enhanced age of superannuation can also be granted 
if the duties performed are the same like AYUSH doctors – Governing body 
of the Council is not obliged to take a decision in tune with the decision 
of the Ministry of AYUSH
regarding superannuation more particularly 
having made it clear that enhancement of retirement age is not applicable 
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 731 : 2023 INSC 733
731
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
to an autonomous body like CCRAS – Age of superannuation is always 
governed by the statutory rules governing appointment on a particular 
post – Hence, even if it is averred that the nature of work involved in the 
two posts is similar, the same cannot be a ground to increase or alter the 
service conditions of an employee as each post is governed by its own set 
of rules – Impugned order not sustainable, set aside – Society Registration 
Act, 1860. [Paras 23, 34, 44 and 48]
Service Law – Interim relief for continuation in service granted 
– Impropriety:
Held: Court or the Tribunal should be slow and circumspect in granting 
interim relief for continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of 
unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds, 
he can always be compensated – But if he fails, he would have enjoyed 
undeserved beneﬁ t of extended service and caused injustice to his immediate 
junior – In the present case, High Court went to the extent of granting interim 
relief extending the period of service beyond 60 years till the disposal of 
the Original Petition by the CAT – By virtue of such interim order which 
the High Court ordinarily should not grant, the respondent No. 1 although 
was to retire in 2018 yet continued in service till 2021 – It is only when 
Supreme Court stayed the operation of the impugned order passed by the 
High Court while issuing notice that the service of the
respondent No.1 
came to an end. [Para 48]
Service Law – Memorandum of Association of the Central Council 
for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences – Bye-Laws – Clauses 25(b), 34, 35 
and 47 – Plea of respondent No.1 was that the provisions of FR 56(bb) 
would apply to him in his capacity as an employee of the Council in view 
of Clause 35, Bye-Laws of the Council by which the provisions of the FR 
and SR would apply to the employees of the Council mutatis mutandis:
Held: Clauses 25(b), 34, 35 and 47 of the Bye-Laws in the Memorandum 
of Association indicate that the employees are recruited through a selection 
committee of the Council – It further indicates that the Fundamental Rules, 
1922 will have no direct application in cases where the governing body 
ﬁ nalises the rules of superannuation – In terms of Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws, 
the governing body had decided the age of superannuation to be 60 years 
on 01.12.1998 – The said decision was ratiﬁ ed on 27.01.2000 - CAT rightly
733
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS 
took the view that the plea canvassed on behalf of the respondent No.1 that 
the Council failed to consider the Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws which states 
that the FR, Supplementary Rule (SR) and General Financial Rules (GFR) 
as amended from time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees 
of the Council, was without any merit and deserved to be rejected – CAT 
rightly rejected such argument because the applicability would be subject 
to the provision speciﬁ c to the Clause 34 governing superannuation of the 
employees of the Council – There is nothing in Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws 
on the basis of which, it could be said that the same will have an overriding 
eﬀ ect on Clause 34 as regards the age of retirement – Clause 47 of the Bye-
Laws makes it abundantly clear that for the matters not speciﬁ cally provided 
in the Bye-Laws, the rules applicable to the government employees would 
apply – However, as there is a speciﬁ c provision regarding superannuation 
in Clause 34, the rules governing the government services in respect of 
superannuation are not applicable to the employees of the Council unless 
it is in accordance with Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws – Fundamental Rules, 
1922. [Paras 25, 28 and 29]
Words and Phrases – “or”, “and” – Interpretation – Plea of 
respondent No.1 that clause 34 of the Bye-Laws should be read in two 
parts- the ﬁ rst part states that the Rules governing the retirement
of 
employees of the Government of India as amended from time to time 
would apply to the employees of the Central Council; the second part 
of Clause 34 which reads “or as desired by the governing body” is 
merely an enabling provision empowering the governing body to take 
a decision whether an employee deserves to be retained beyond the 
prescribed age of superannuation and that such power should not be 
read in a negative form to clothe the governing body with the power to 
prescribe lesser age of superannuation than what has been prescribed 
by the Central Government from time to time:
Held: Such argument cannot be accepted – The word “or” is normally 
disjunctive and the word “and” is normally conjunctive – Both of them 
can be read as vice-versa, but that interpretation is adopted only where the 
intention of the legislature is manifest – In the present case, the language of 
Clause 34 is very clear. What is important to note while reading the Clause 
34 is the word “or” – Thereafter, there is a proviso which says that an
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
employee can be retained in service after prescribed age of superannuation 
if he continues to be physically ﬁ t and eﬃ  cient and it is in the interest of 
the Central Counsel to retain him in the service – The expression “the rules 
governing the retirement of employees of Government of India as amended 
from time to time” is separated from the rest of the part of the Bye-Law by the 
word “or” which is disjunctive and giving natural meaning to the said word 
separates the rules that may be framed by the Government of India and the 
rules that the Council may desire to frame as regards the age of retirement 
of the employees of the Council – Interpretation of Statutes. [Paras 30-32]
Service Law – Age of retirement vis-à-vis service conditions 
relating to pay and allowances and revision of pay – Respondent 
No.1 contended that as the terms and conditions of the services of the 
employees of the Council on all other aspects like the Provident Fund/
GPF, Pension, Gratuity, Leave Rules, Scales of Pay, Conduct Rules and 
other conditions of services are the same as applicable to the employees 
of the Central Government as set out in Clauses 31, 32, 33, 42, 44 and 
47 respectively of the Bye-Laws, the matter of age of superannuation 
of the respondent No. 1 should not be treated diﬀ erently:
Held: What should be the age of superannuation is a matter of policy 
– It is not within the domain of the court to legislate – It is only if a
policy 
decision or a notiﬁ cation is arbitrary it may invite the frowns of Article 14 
of the Constitution – The question of age of retirement stands on a diﬀ erent 
footing from the service conditions relating to pay and allowances and 
revision of pay. [Para 35]
Service Law – Claim of respondent No.1-Research Assistant 
that his age of superannuation be at par with the AYUSH Doctors – 
Infringement of Article 14 alleged:
Held: It is too late in the day for the respondent No.1 to raise all 
such issues including infringement of Article 14 on the ground of artiﬁ cial 
distinction between the Research Assistant and AYUSH Doctors – 
Respondent No.1 knew from the date of his appointment that he was being 
appointed as a Research Assistant – His service conditions and mode of 
recruitment are diﬀ erent compared to the AYUSH Doctors – It is a diﬀ erent 
thing that he might have treated the patients but that by itself would not
735
entitle him to claim that his age of superannuation should be at par with the 
AYUSH Doctors – Present case is not one of discrimination – Article 14 has 
no application having regard to the facts of the present case – Constitution 
of India – Article 14. [Paras 37 and 39]
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Extraordinary jurisdiction 
– Principles of law governing – Issue of Writ of certiorari – Discussed. 
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma and 
Others 2021 SCC Online SC 540 – held not applicable.
Central Council for Research in Unani Medicine v. Dr. Salma Khatoon 
and Others 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1332; V.M. Gadre v. M.G. Diwan and 
Others (1996) 3 SCC 454 : [1996] 3 SCR 480; Census Commissioner and 
Others v. R. Krishnamurthy (2015) 2 SCC 796 : [2014] 11 SCR 463; State of 
Himachal Pradesh and Others v. Rajesh Chander Sood and Others (2016) 
10 SCC 77 : [2016] 6 SCR 851; T.M. Sampath and Others v. Secretary
Ministry of Water Resources and Others (2015) 5 SCC 333 : [2015] 1 SCR 
748; State of Maharashtra and Another v. Bhagwan and Others (2022) 
4 SCC 193; Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General 
Subordinate Services Association and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and 
Others (1980) 3 SCC 97 : [1980] 1 SCR 1026; State of Bihar and Another 
v. Teachers’ Association of Govt. Engineering College and Others (2000) 
10 SCC 527; Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Associations v. State 
of Kerala and
Others AIR 2018 SC 2652 : [2018] 6 SCR 1139; Union of 
India and Others v. Lieut (Mrs) E. Iacats (1997) 7 SCC 334; New Okhla 
Industrial Development Authority and Another v. B D Singhal and Others
AIR 2021 SC 3457; T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another AIR 1954 
SC 440 : [1955] SCR 250; Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others 
AIR 1964 SC 477 : [1964] SCR 64; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai and 
Others (2003) 6 SCC 675 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 290; Hari Vishnu Kamath 
v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others AIR 1955 SC 233 : [1955] SCR 1104; K.M. 
Shanmugam v. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. and Others AIR 1963 SC 1626 : [1964] 
SCR 809; Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Others v. Mallikarjun 
Bhavanappa Tirumale AIR 1960 SC 137 : [1960] SCR 890; Indian Overseas 
Bank v. I.O.B. Staﬀ  Canteen Workers' Union and Another AIR 2000 SC 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS
736
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
1508 : [2000] 2 SCR 1212; Ebrahim Aboobakar and Hawabai Aboobakar 
v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi (1952) 1 SCC 
798; Parry and Company Limited v. Commercial Employees’ Association, 
Madras and Another (1952) 1 SCC 449 : AIR 1952 SC 179 : [1952] SCR 
519; Rai Brij Raj Krishna and Another v. Messrs S.K. Shaw and Brothers, 
AIR 1951 SC 115 : [1951] SCR 145; G. Veerappa Pillai v. Messrs Raman 
and Raman Ltd. Kumbakonam, Tanjore District and Others (1952) 1 SCC 
334 – referred to.
Justice G.P. Singh in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
(Thirteenth Edition 2012) page 485 – referred to.
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and Another 
(1969) 2 AC 147; King v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. (1922) 2 AC 128 (PC); 
Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan (1874) LR 5 PC 417; R. v. Brighton 
and Area Rent Tribunal (1950) 1 All England Reporter 946 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.3339 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.2020 of the High Court of 
Orissa at Cuttack in WPC No. 30620 of 2020.
Appearances:
Aman Lekhi, Sr. Adv., Harish Pandey, Adv. for the Appellants.
K. M. Nataraj, ASG, Col. R. Bala, Sr. Adv., Naresh Kumar, Gurmeet 
Singh Makker, Kanu Agrawal, Kush Chaturvedi, Ketan Paul, Madhav 
Sinhal, Dr. Arun Kumar Yadav, Yogesh Kumar Mahur, Harkesh Prashar, 
Ronak Karanpuria, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. This appeal by special leave is at the instance of the Central Council 
for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS), Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga
737
and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy (AYUSH), Government 
of India (appellant No. 1) and its Director General (appellant No. 2). The 
two appellants before us were the original respondents before the High 
Court of Orissa. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order 
dated 17.12.2020 passed by the High Court of Orissa, Cuttack in W.P. (C) 
No. 30620 of 2020 by which the High Court allowed the writ application 
ﬁ led by the original petitioner (respondent No. 1) before us, setting aside the 
order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Cuttack Bench, 
Cuttack and thereby holding that the respondent No. 1 herein, namely, Dr. 
Bikartan Das is entitled to the beneﬁ t of enhancement of retirement age 
from 60 to 65 years as applicable to the AYUSH doctors working under the 
Ministry of AYUSH. 
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The respondent No. 1 herein was appointed by the Council as a 
Research Assistant w.e.f. 07.10.1985. The Oﬃ  ce Order No. 183 of 1985 
dated 11.10.1985 reads thus: 
“No. P.1-67/86-CRIA/DDSR/Estt./748(5)   Dt 11.10.85 
OFFICE ORDER No. 183/85 
Dr. Bikartan Das is appointed as a Research Assistant (AY) with 
eﬀ ect from the forenoon of the 7th October, 1985 until further orders 
in the Central Research Institute (AY), Unit, Bhubaneshwar-9. He 
will be on probation for a period of two years from this date. He will 
draw a basic pay of Rs. 425/- per month in the scale of Rs. 425-15-500 
PB-15-560-20-700 with usual allowance admissible
under the rules. 
(Dr. PREM KISHORE ) 
 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AY) I/C”
3. The Government of India in its Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare vide letter dated 01.12.1998 addressed to the Council, approved 
the decision of the Council to enhance the beneﬁ t of extension in age of 
retirement from 58 years to 60 years in respect of employees of the Council 
w.e.f. 31.05.1998 in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Department 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

738
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
of Personnel and Training (DoPT) vide O.M. No. 25012/8/98-Estt. (A) dated 
13.05.1998. 
4. On 27.09.2017, the Union Cabinet took a decision to enhance 
the age of superannuation up to 65 years for the AYUSH doctors working 
under the Ministry of AYUSH (respondent No. 2 herein) and in the Central 
Government Health Scheme (for short, ‘the CGHS’) Hospitals. 
5. By way of letter dated 31.10.2017, the Ministry of AYUSH clariﬁ ed 
that the eﬀ ect of the Cabinet decision referred to above would be applicable 
only to the AYUSH doctors directly working under the Ministry of AYUSH 
and in the CGHS Hospitals. It was clariﬁ ed that the decision to enhance 
the age of superannuation up to 65 years would not be applicable to the 
autonomous bodies functioning under the Ministry of AYUSH. The letter 
dated 31.10.2017 addressed by the Ministry of AYUSH to the Director 
General, CCRAS and CCRUM, reads thus: 
“
FTS No. 32797/2017
Ministry of Ayurvedic, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha & 
Homoeopathy (AYUSH)
(Research Desk)
‘B’ – Block, GPO Complex, 
AYUSH Bhawan, Behind the INA Market,
New Delhi – 110023
Dated: 31st October, 2017
To

The Director General,

CCRAS and CCRUM

61-65, Institutional Area,

Opposite “D” Block,

Janakpuri, New Delhi – 110058.
Subject: Enhancement of superannuation age to 65 years -reg.
Sir, 
I am directed to say that the Ministry has been receiving a number 
of representations from various oﬃ  cials of the Councils regarding
739
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
enhancement of superannuation age to 65 years. It is stated that as per 
Press Information Bureau the Union Cabinet has taken the following 
decision:-
“The superannuation age has been enhanced to 65 years in 
respect of doctors under the administrative control of the respective 
Ministry/Department [M/o AYUSH (AYUSH Doctors), Department 
of Defence (civilian doctors under Directorate General of Armed 
Forces Medical Service), Department of Defence Production (Indian 
Ordnance Factories Health Service Medical Oﬃ  cers), Dental Doctors 
under D/o Health & Family Welfare, Dental doctors under Ministry of 
Railways and of doctors working in Higher Education and Technical 
Institutions under Department of Higher Education]”.
2. The decision of the Cabinet is applicable to the AYUSH doctors 
directly working under the administrative control of Ministry of AYUSH 
i.e. AYUSH doctors working under CGHS. The decision of the Union 
Cabinet is not applicable to autonomous bodies functioning under 
Ministry of AYUSH i.e. Research Councils/National Institutes.
3. All such representations are therefore being sent to the respective 
Councils. It is requested that the Councils may inform them accordingly.
Yours faithfully,
N. K. Lakhanpal
Senior Consultant”
6. By order dated 24.11.2017, the Ministry of AYUSH enhanced the 
age of superannuation to 65 years for the AYUSH doctors working in the
Ministry of AYUSH and in CGHS Hospitals w.e.f. 27.09.2017. The order 
dated 24.11.2017 reads thus:

“

F.NO. D.14019/4/2016-E-I(AYUSH)

Government of India
Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and 
Homoeopathy
 AYUSH Bhawan, 
‘B’ Block, GPO Complex,
740
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
INA, New Delhi - 110023 
Dated, the 24th November, 2017.
ORDER
The President is pleased to enhance the age of superannuation 
of the AYUSH doctors under the Ministry of AYUSH and working in 
CGHS Dispensaries/Hospitals to 65 years with eﬀ ect from 27.09.2017, 
i.e. the date of the approval of the Union Cabinet.
2. The doctors shall hold the administrative posts only till the date 
of attaining the age of 62 years and thereafter their services shall be 
placed in non-administrative positions.
(ROSHAN JAGGI) 
Joint Secretary to the Government of India 
Tel.24651953”
7. By notiﬁ cation dated 05.01.2018, the Ministry of Personnel, Public 
Grievances and Pensions, DoPT notiﬁ ed the Fundamental (Amendment) 
Rules, 2018 whereby Rule 56(bb) in the Fundamental Rules, 1922 (FRs) was 
substituted and the age of superannuation of AYUSH doctors was enhanced 
to 65 years. The notiﬁ cation reads thus:  
“MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES 
AND PENSIONS 
(Department of Personnel and Training) 
NOTIFICATION 
New Delhi, the 5th January, 2018 
G.S.R. 27(E).—In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso 
to article 309 of the Constitution, the President hereby makes the 
following rules further to amend the Fundamental Rules, 1922, 
namely:— 
(1) These rules may be called the Fundamental (Amendment) Rules, 
2018. 
(2) In the Fundamental Rules, 1922, in rule 56, for clause (bb), the 
following shall be substituted, namely:—
741
“(bb) The age of superannuation in respect of General Duty Medical 
Oﬃ  cers and Specialists included in Teaching, Non-Teaching and 
Public Health sub-cadres of Central Health Service, AYUSH doctors, 
Civilian doctors under Directorate General of Armed Forces Medical 
Services, Medical oﬃ  cers of Indian Ordnance Factories Health 
Services, dental doctors working under Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare, doctors of Indian Railways Medical Service and dental 
doctors under Ministry of Railways, doctors of General Duty Medical 
Oﬃ  cers sub-cadre of Central Armed Police Forces and Assam Riﬂ es 
and Specialist Medical oﬃ  cers of Central Armed Police Forces and 
Assam Riﬂ es shall be sixty-ﬁ ve years: 
Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any other 
rules, above doctors except in Central Armed Police Forces and Assam 
Riﬂ es shall hold the administrative posts till the date of attaining the 
age of sixty-two years and thereafter their services shall be placed in 
Non-Administrative positions.” 
[F.No.25012/4/2016-Estt.(A-IV)] 
GYANENDRA DEV TRIPATHI, Jt. Secy.”
8. By letter dated 25.01.2018, the appellant Council circulated the 
clariﬁ cation letter issued by the Ministry of AYUSH dated 31.10.2017 
referred to in para 5 as above. The letter reads thus:  
“F 3-8/2017-CCRAS/Vig/3094

Dated: 25 JAN 2018
To
 All the Heads of Institutes/Centres/Units functioning
under this Council.
Sub: - Enhancement of superannuation age of 65 years. 
Sir/Madam
The undersigned is directed to circulate herewith the clariﬁ cation 
on the subject mentioned above received from Ministry of AYUSH 
vide letter FTS No.32797/2017 dated 31.10.2017 for information. 
The contents of Ministry’s letter may be circulated among all oﬃ  cers 
working under your control. 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
742
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
 Yours faithfully
(SB MISRA)
Administrative Oﬃ  cer (Vigilance)
For Director General”
It is pertinent to note that the letter issued by the appellant Council 
dated 25.01.2018 referred to above was never made a subject matter 
of challenge. 
9. The respondent No. 1 herein preferred a representation dated 
22.03.2018 addressed to the appellant No. 2 herein with an appeal to enhance 
his age of superannuation up to 65 years i.e., up to 30.04.2023 instead of 
30.04.2018. It appears from the materials on record that the representation 
preferred by the respondent No. 1 herein before the above was rejected and 
a notiﬁ cation dated 04.04.2018 was issued by the Council stating that the 
respondent No. 1 herein would retire w.e.f. 30.04.2018 upon attaining the 
superannuation age of 60 years. The notiﬁ cation dated 04.04.2018 reads 
thus: 
“F. No. 26-3 / 2018-C.C.R.A.S. / Est. 17 
Date: 04.04.2018
Notiﬁ cation 
It is hereby notiﬁ ed that
Dr. Bikartan Das, Assistant Director (AYUSH), Central Ayurvedic 
Research Institute for Hepatobiliary Disorder, Bhubaneswar is retiring 
from Council service on attaining the age of superannuation at 60 
years on 30.04.2018 (pm). His date of birth is 04.04.1958.
Accordingly, his name will be removed from the list of C.C.R.A.S. 
Signature in English Illegible 
R.K. Ahluwalia 
Dated 27.03.2018 
Dy. Director (Administration) 
Through Director General”
743
10. The respondent No. 1 being dissatisﬁ ed with the aforesaid went 
before the CAT, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack by way of Original Application 
No. 210 of 2018 and prayed for the following reliefs: 
“The Hon’ble Tribunal may be graciously pleased to admit the 
Original Application, call for the records and issue notice to the 
Respondents and upon hearing the parties declare the impugned 
letter of clariﬁ cation of Ministry of AYUSH dtd. 31.10.2017 as under 
Annexure-4 Series and the letter dtd. 04.04.2018 under Annexure 3 
directing the Applicant to retire on 30.04.2018 on attaining age of 60 
years, to be illegal, arbitrary unreasonable and discriminatory and 
quash the same and direct the Respondent to allow the Applicant to 
continue in the service upto 65 years as per amended rules.

x

x
x
Pending ﬁ nalization of the Original Application, the Applicant prays to 
stay the order under Annexure-3 and allow the Applicant to continue 
in the service.”
11. By order dated 17.04.2018 the CAT issued notice, however, 
declined to grant any interim relief as prayed for by the respondent No. 1 
herein. As CAT declined to grant any interim relief and the respondent No. 
1 was to retire on 30.04.2018, he went before the High Court of Orissa, 
Cuttack by ﬁ ling W. P. (C) No. 6663 of 2018 questioning the order passed 
by the CAT declining to grant any interim relief. The High Court passed 
the following order dated 25.04.2018: 
“SI. No. of Order- 03 
Date of Order- 25.04.2018 
Heard Mr. B. Senapati, learned counsel for the petitioner and 
Mr. Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General. 
This Writ Petition has been ﬁ led by the petitioner challenging 
the order dated 17.04.2018 passed by the Central Administrative 
Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No. 260/210/2018 wherein 
the Tribunal while issuing notice directed the opposite parties to ﬁ le 
their reply on the interim prayers and regular counter. 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
744
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
As it appears that the Central Government has taken a decision 
under the Ministry of AYUSH to enhance the age of retirement of 
the Doctors up to 65 years. However, so far as the petitioner is 
concerned, since the notice of superannuation was issued to him, he 
has approached the Tribunal. Since the Original Application is pending 
before the Tribunal, without expressing any opinion on the merits of 
the case, we dispose of this Writ Petition with an observation that since 
the Doctors who are similarly after continuing the age of 65 years 
after attaining the age of 60 years, let the Petitioner continue in the 
service and let the notice of superannuation under Annexure-3 shall 
remain stayed till disposal of the Original Application. 
Mr. Bose, learned Assistant Solicitor General submitted that 
the central government will ﬁ le their counter within a period of two 
weeks from today before the Tribunal, in such event the Tribunal may 
dispose of the Original Application at the earliest, preferably by end 
of June, 2018. Accordingly, we request the Tribunal may dispose of 
the Original Application at the earliest/as per its schedule. However, 
the petitioner shall not claim any equity. 
Sd.- S. Panda, J. 
Sd.-K.R. Mohapatra”
12. Thus, from the aforesaid, it appears that the High Court protected 
the respondent No. 1 till the disposal of the original application by the CAT. 
By virtue of the aforesaid order, the respondent No. 1
continued in service 
beyond 30.04.2018. 
13. CAT ultimately adjudicated the original application ﬁ led by the 
respondent No. 1 herein and vide its order dated 02.11.2020 rejected the 
same holding that the respondent no. 1 is not entitled to seek parity with 
AYUSH doctors in regard to the age of superannuation. 
14. The sum and substance of the ﬁ ndings recorded by the CAT may 
be summarised as under: 
(i) The Fundamental Rules notiﬁ ed under Article 309 of the Constitution 
of India are applicable to the employees working directly under the 
Government of India. Its applicability to the employees of the Council 
is on account of Clauses 34 and 35 respectively of the Bye-Laws. This
745
issue was considered by the Hyderabad Bench of the CAT vide order 
dated 04.09.2020, wherein it was observed that-
“Clause 34 of the bye-law makes it crystal clear that the Governing 
Body has to take a decision in regard to the enhancement of the 
retirement age. The Governing body has no necessity to take a 
decision in the context of the Ministry of AYUSH, Govt. of India 
having made it clear that enhancement of retirement age is not 
applicable to an autonomous body like CCRAS. Therefore, the 
G.O.I. rule of not extending the enhancement of retirement age 
to CCRAS compliments the clauses 35 & 47 of the byelaws. We 
do not ﬁ nd any error in the decision taken by the respondents in 
terms of the bye laws.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(ii) CAT did not accept the respondent No. 1’s argument of Clause 
35 and application of the Fundamental Rules mutatis mutandis to 
the employees of the Council saying that the clause relates to the 
general applicability of FRs, Supplementary Rule (SRs) and General 
Financial Rules (GFRs) to the Council employees; the same is subject 
to the provision speciﬁ c to Clause 34 governing superannuation of the 
employees of the Council. There is nothing in Clause 35 of the Bye-
Laws to have an overriding eﬀ ect on Clause 34 regarding retirement 
age.
(iii) Clause 47 of the Bye-Laws makes it clear that for the matters 
not speciﬁ cally provided in the Bye-Laws, the rules applicable to 
the government employees would apply. But since there is a speciﬁ c
provision regarding superannuation in Clause 34, the rules governing 
government servants in respect of superannuation will not be applicable 
to the employees of the Council unless it is in accordance with Clause 
34 of the Bye-Laws.
(iv) There is nothing in the Cabinet resolution in question and in the 
amended FR-56(bb) to show that these decisions are applicable to 
the employees of the autonomous institutions. The assumption of the 
respondent No. 1 that the FR-56, as amended from time to time, is 
automatically applicable to the Council employees is not correct since 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
it is subject to the provisions of Clauses 34 & 35 respectively of the 
Bye-Laws.
(v) There is nothing wrong with the clarification letter dated 
31.10.2017. It cannot be stated to be overriding the Cabinet decision 
in question, and the objection to the letter on that ground is not 
sustainable. The clariﬁ cation letter was circulated by the Council by 
a subsequent letter dated 25.01.2018 among its oﬃ  cers, after issuance 
of the ﬁ rst amendment to FR-56. This implies that the Council, which 
is the employer of the respondent No.1, had consciously accepted the 
clariﬁ cation of the Ministry. The respondent No. 1 had not challenged 
the Council’s letter dated 25.01.2018 but had only challenged the 
AYUSH Ministry’s letter dated. 31.10.2017.
(vi) There is nothing in the pleadings of the respondent No.1 to show 
that the amended FR-56(bb) is applicable to the employees of the 
Council, except for citing the provisions of the Bye-Laws. As per 
Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws, the rules governing the retirement of the 
government employees will be applicable to the employees of the 
Council as adopted by the Governing Body. This means that the unless 
the Governing Body adopts the changes in rules for the retirement of 
government servants, such changes are not automatically applicable 
to the employees of the Council.
(vii) The CAT placed reliance on the decision of this Court in DDA 
v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats,
reported in (2008) 
2 SCC 672 to hold that there are certain speciﬁ c grounds on which 
a policy decision can be subjected to judicial review, and in this 
situation there was no valid ground to challenge the policy decision of 
the AYUSH Ministry as per the clariﬁ cation letter dated 31.10.2017.
(viii) In the last, the CAT considered that even if the respondent 
No.1’s contention that he had treated patients was to be accepted, such 
acceptance could not have negated the decision taken by the Ministry of 
AYUSH in its clariﬁ cation letter dated 31.01.2017, which was further 
accepted by the Council in its subsequent letter dated 25.01.2018.
15. The respondent No. 1 feeling dissatisﬁ ed with the aforesaid order 
passed by the CAT challenged the same before the High Court in W.P.(C)
747
No. 30620 of 2020. The High Court allowed the writ application ﬁ led by 
the respondent No. 1 holding as under: 
“On the analysis of the above factual matrix, we ﬁ nd that though the 
petitioner is functioning as Researcher under the Research Council/ 
National Institute, but as a requirement for upgrading the research 
skill, he treats patients in the OPD and IPD. In fact, he performs similar 
nature of duties like AYUSH doctor. Though his service condition is 
covered by diﬀ erent laws, but for all practical purposes, the petitioner 
is performing like a doctor. Though there is a clear-cut distinguishing 
features between the AYUSH doctor and that of the petitioner. The 
petitioner herein is also treating the patients like AYUSH doctors in 
the OPDs and IPDs on regular basis.
The Clause-34 and 35 of the bye-laws extends the force of the argument 
of the petitioner to be treated as AYUSH doctor, even though he has 
been appointed as Researcher.
Clauses-34 & 35 of the said bye-laws deal with superannuation which 
read as under:
“34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of the 
Government of India as amended from time to time or as desired 
by the Governing Body shall apply to the employees of the Central 
Council. Provided that an employee can be retained in service 
after prescribed age of superannuation if he continues to be 
physically ﬁ t and eﬃ  cient and it is in the interest of the Central 
Council to retain him in service. 
35. The Fundamental and
Supplementary Rules and General 
Financial Rules of Government of India as amended from time 
to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees of the Central 
Council.”
In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the view taken 
by the learned Tribunal vide its decision dated 02.11.2020 is 
erroneous. 
The learned CAT, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack has failed to consider the 
petitioner’s duty and devotion in treating the OPD and IPD patients. 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
Hence, the order dated 02.11.2020 passed by the learned CAT, Cuttack 
Bench, Cuttack is liable to be quashed and accordingly, it is quashed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Thus, the plain reading of the impugned order passed by the 
High Court referred to above would indicate that what weighed with the 
High Court was that the respondent No. 1 herein used to treat patients like 
AYUSH doctors in the Out-Patient Departments (OPDs) and In-Patient 
Departments (IPDs) on regular basis and the duty and devotion exhibited 
by the respondent No. 1 in treating the OPD and IPD patients would 
entitle him to claim the beneﬁ t of the enhanced age of superannuation 
i.e., up to 65 years. The High Court recorded the said ﬁ nding despite 
acknowledging that the respondent No. 1 was appointed as a researcher 
under the Research Council and his service conditions were governed by 
diﬀ erent laws. Of course, the High Court also took support of Clauses 
34 and 35 respectively of the Bye-Laws while granting relief to the 
respondent No. 1.
17. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants are here 
before this Court with the present appeal. 
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
18. Mr. Aman Lekhi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 
appellants made the following submissions: 
a. The issue involved in the present case is the entitlement to 
seek extension in superannuation age as per FR 56(bb) and its 
applicability to the appellant Council which is an autonomous 
body. The said FR has been amended from time to time and the 
rule applicable in the present case i.e. at the time of the retirement 
of the respondent No.
1 is of 05.01.2018. 
b.  The respondent No. 1 was an employee of CCRAS having joined 
as Research Assistant and his terms of service were governed under 
the Rules of CCRAS. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of 
Research Oﬃ  cer and at the time of superannuation he was holding 
the post of an Assistant Director.
749
c.  The relevant clauses of CCRAS which are applicable to the facts 
of the present case are Clauses 25(b), 34, 35 and 47 of CCRAS Bye-
Laws which are extracted herein for the sake of convenience:
“Appointments 
25.(a)... 
(b) Recruitments, appointments and promotions to all posts shall be 
made according to the recruitment rules laid down by the Governing 
Body or designated competent authority for the posts. Selection shall 
be made through the Selection Committees/Departmental Promotion 
Committees duly constituted with the approval of the respective 
appointing authority. 
Superannuation 
34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of Government 
of India as amended from time to time or as desired by the Governing 
Body shall apply to the employees of the Central Council. Provided 
that an employee can be retained in service after the prescribed age 
of superannuation if he continues to be physically ﬁ t and eﬃ  cient 
and it is in the interest of the Central Council to retain him in service. 
35. The Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General Financial 
Rules of Government of India as amended from time to time shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to employees of the Central Council.

Xxx

xxx
xxx
Other Conditions of Service
47. In respect of matters not provided for in these regulations the rules 
as applicable to Central Government servants regarding the general 
conditions of service, pay, allowances T.A. and daily allowances, 
foreign service terms, deputation in India and abroad, etc. and orders 
and decisions issued in this regard by the Central Government from 
time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of the 
Central Council.”
(Emphasis supplied)
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
d. A bare perusal of the aforesaid rules indicates that the employees 
are recruited through a selection committee of the Council and the FRs 
will not directly apply where the Governing Body ﬁ nalises the rules 
of superannuation. 
e. In terms of Clause 34, the Governing Body had decided to ﬁ x the 
age of superannuation to be 60 years on 01.12.1998. The said decision 
was ratiﬁ ed on 27.01.2000 in the 14th Meeting of the Governing Body 
of CCRAS as Agenda Item No. GB 14.4. 
f.  The decision of the Governing Body as aforementioned applied on 
30.04.2018 i.e. the date of superannuation of the Respondent.
g.  No reference has been made by the respondent No. 1 to the 
aforementioned decision of the governing body in his representation. 
In fact, the Respondent relied on Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws which on 
its terms indicates that the rules governing the retirement of employees 
of Government of India will not apply in the instant case.
h.  Reliance placed by the respondent No. 1 in its representation on the 
case of Salma Khatoon is equally inapt as the relevant rule in the said 
case was diﬀ erent from the Clause 34 of Bye-Laws herein. The said 
case pertained to the Central Council for Research in Unani Medicine 
(‘CCRUM’) which is governed by its own rules and regulation and 
the applicable rule in that case was worded diﬀ erently. Moreover, the 
said case is still pending before the High Court of Delhi. The interim 
order in
favour of Salma Khatoon was vacated by this Court in the 
case of Central Council for Research in Unani Medicine v. Dr. Salma 
Khatoon and Others reported as 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1332.
i.  The Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench (‘CAT’) 
rightly held that the assumption of the respondent No. 1 that FR 56 is 
automatically applicable is not correct as it is subject to Clause 34 of 
the Bye-Laws of CCRAS.
j.  The very same grounds as aforesaid were urged by the Appellants 
in the Counter Aﬃ  davit ﬁ led by them before the High Court of 
Orissa.
751
k.  While passing the impugned order, the High Court acknowledges 
that the respondent No. 1 was working as a Researcher and his service 
conditions were covered by a diﬀ erent clause. Strangely, however, 
the High Court makes no reference to Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws. 
This is despite the fact that the appellants had clearly pleaded that 
the respondent was not entitled to relief in terms of Clause 34 and 
that FR 56 was not applicable to him. Pertinently, this submission 
has been recorded by the High Court itself as also the clariﬁ cation 
of 31.10.2017 and the separate method of recruitment. These factors 
were not considered while passing the impugned order.
l. The impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable as it is against 
the following settled propositions of law:
(i) Even a Constitutional Court cannot substitute the existing 
service conditions of an employee. V.M. Gadre v. M.G. Diwan 
and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 454 para 10 at page 459. 
(ii) A writ in the nature of mandamus cannot be issued to frame 
a policy in a particular manner. Census Commissioner and 
Others v. R. Krishnamurthy, (2015) 2 SCC 796 para 25-26 at 
page 806-807. 
(iii) The Court cannot fasten monetary liability on State 
instrumentality unless it emerges from the rights and liabilities 
canvassed in the lis itself. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others 
v. Rajesh Chander Sood and Others, (2016) 10 SCC 77 para 
88 at page 160. 
(iv) Employees of autonomous bodies are governed by their 
own
rules and Bye-Laws and they cannot claim parity with 
government employees. T.M. Sampath and Others v. Secretary, 
Ministry of Water Resources and Others, (2015) 5 SCC 333 
para 3 at page 336 & para 15 at page 345; State of Maharashtra 
and Another v. Bhagwan and Others, (2022) 4 SCC 193 para 
24-26 at page 203-204.
m. The reliance placed by the respondent No. 1 on the judgment of 
this Court North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Ram Naresh 
Sharma and Others reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 540 is completely 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
misplaced. The issue in the said case pertained to diﬀ erent dates of 
enhancement of age of superannuation of AYUSH and CHS doctors 
of NDMC. In the said case, the policy decision of enhancing the age 
of superannuation to 65 years was adopted by NDMC for AYUSH 
doctors but it was applied from a later date which was found to 
be discriminatory. Whereas, in the present case the appellant is an 
autonomous body with its own service rules and the government 
decision was never adopted by the Governing Body at any point of 
time.
n.  The reference made to the appointment of Director of the Institute 
of Teaching and Research in Ayurveda (‘ITRA’) in context with the 
retirement age of 65 years is wholly misplaced. The appointments 
to ITRA are made as per the provisions of the Institute of Teaching 
and Research in Ayurveda Act, 2020. Section 5(e) of the Act, 2020 
provides for the tenure of the Director of 5 years or until the age of 
65 years whichever is earlier. Hence, the respondent No. 1 who is 
not covered under the provisions of the said Act cannot claim parity 
with the employees of ITRA.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1
19. Mr. Col. R. Balasubramanian, the learned Senior Counsel appearing 
for the respondent No. 1 made the following submissions: 
a. His client is an AYUSH Doctor being fully and duly qualiﬁ ed in 
Bachelor of Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery (BAMS). The fact that 
his client is an AYUSH Doctor is
admitted by the appellants in their 
counter aﬃ  davit ﬁ led before the CAT. As per the existing rule, those 
who have completed BAMS from any University of India, which is 
recognised by the Central Council for Indian Medicine (CCIM) and 
who have registered under any State Council of Indian Medicine or 
CCIM, New Delhi are AYUSH Doctors. This is also admitted by 
AYUSH in their RTI reply.
b. That being a duly qualiﬁ ed AYUSH doctor, the respondent No. 
1 was appointed as a Research Associate in the Central Research 
Institute (Ayurveda), Bhuvaneshwar under the Control of the Ministry 
of AYUSH, vide appointment letter dated 03.10.1985. The terms
753
of appointment speciﬁ cally stated inter alia, in para 2 (vi) & (vii) 
thereof, that “Private or Consultancy service is strictly prohibited” 
and that “Other terms and conditions of service will be governed by 
the rules and instruction applicable to similar personnel under the 
Government of India” respectively. Further it was stated that the 
pay and dearness allowances etc. will be as applicable to the Central 
Government servants of equivalent status and will be governed by 
the CCS Rules as amended by the Government of India from time 
to time.
c. The fact that the Institute where the respondent No. 1was serving is 
under the ‘pervasive control’ of the Government/Ministry is admitted 
by the appellants in their counter aﬃ  davit ﬁ led before the CAT and 
also in the Counter aﬃ  davit ﬁ led before the High Court. Therefore, 
two factual aspects are admitted and it is beyond any doubt that (i) the 
respondent No. 1 is an AYUSH Doctor and (ii) the Institute is under 
the administrative control of the Ministry of AYUSH.
d. In view of the aforesaid admitted facts, it is evident more particularly 
from the Union Cabinet decision of the appellants that the Government 
of India had approved the enhancement of age of superannuation 
from 60 to 65 years. This decision of the Cabinet was applicable 
to the respondent No. 1. In terms of the said decision at “iii. that 
the superannuation age has been enhanced to 65 years in respect of 
doctors under their administrative control
of the respective Ministries/ 
Departments [M/o of AYUSH (AYUSH Doctors,………”.
e. The Cabinet has not made any distinction or diﬀ erence in treatment 
between the AYUSH Doctors working under the administrative 
control of the Ministry of AYUSH in the matter of enhancement of 
retirement age up to 65 years. It is reiterated that only two conditions 
are required to be satisﬁ ed to avail the enhanced age of superannuation 
up to 65 years of age viz., (i) AYUSH Doctor and (ii) being under the 
Administrative Control of the Ministry. Therefore, the respondent No. 
1 is squarely covered by the Cabinet’s decision and is entitled to the 
enhanced age of retirement of 65 years.
f. That accordingly, Rule 56(bb) of the Fundamental Rules, 1922, 
which is a statutory rule framed under the Proviso to Article 309 of 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
the Constitution of India, was amended vide Gazette Notiﬁ cation 
dated 05th January, 2018 in terms of which the age of superannuation 
inter alia of the AYUSH doctors [3rd line of amended Rule (bb) 
shall be sixty-ﬁ ve years. This was further amended vide the Gazette 
Notiﬁ cation dated 11.08.2018 categorically laying down that the age 
of superannuation of doctors belonging to various cadres including 
AYUSH and working under the Ministry of AYUSH shall be 62 years 
unless they opt to continue in teaching, consultancy, etc in which case 
it shall extend up to 65 years. Therefore, even in the 2nd Gazette all 
the AYUSH doctors working under the Ministry of AYUSH were 
included without any distinction whether working in the Ministry or 
in any autonomous body.
g. That contrary to the Cabinet decision, the impugned letter dated 
31.10.2017 was issued denying the extension of age up to 65 years to 
the AYUSH doctors working in autonomous bodies like the respondent 
No. 1. Para 2 of said letter is not sustainable in law and on facts for 
the following amongst other reasons:-
i. That the decision was a Cabinet decision and the same could not have 
been diluted or misinterpreted by the impugned letter of a subordinate 
functionary viz., a Senior Consultant working in the Ministry of 
AYUSH by excluding the AYUSH Doctors working in the autonomous 
bodies under the administrative control of the Ministry of AYUSH.
ii. That there is no
Cabinet approval to exclude the AYUSH doctors 
working in autonomous bodies. Therefore, the impugned letter is 
contrary to the Cabinet decision and on this count alone the same 
cannot be enforced against the respondent No. 1. 
iii. The letter dated 31.10.2017 in any case stood overruled/superseded 
in view of the subsequent Gazettes dated 05.01.2018 and 11.08.2018 
respectively. 
iv. That the sub classiﬁ cation introduced by the impugned letter 
besides being contrary to the Cabinet decision, is a suspect 
classiﬁ cation, and it is directly violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 
respectively of the Constitution of India. The reason being ﬁ rst, there 
is no rationale or nexus with the object which it seeks to achieve i.e,
755
exclusion of the AYUSH Doctors working in autonomous bodies 
and secondly, it creates an artiﬁ cial distinction of AYUSH doctors 
working in the Ministry and elsewhere, although both are similarly 
qualiﬁ ed and discharge functions of OPD/IPD treatment of patients 
including surgery etc, albeit at diﬀ erent places. The respondent No. 
1 also drew NPA (Non-Practicing Allowance). These facts have not 
been disputed. 
v. That it is well settled in law where the classiﬁ cation has no nexus with 
the object it seeks to achieve and that there is artiﬁ cial distinction the 
same would fall foul of Articles 14 and 21 in the matter of conditions 
of service of an employee. 
vi. That even otherwise, the respondent No. 1 is entitled to the beneﬁ t 
of enhanced age of retirement of 65 years on the strength of plain 
reading of Clause 34 of the Society Rules extracted @ Pg 12 of the 
Judgement by the High Court, on which extensive reliance is placed 
by the appellants contending that the applicability of the extension 
of age is dependent upon the decision to be taken by the Governing 
Body of the autonomous body, and hence the Central Govt rule of age 
of superannuation is not automatic. This contention is not correct for 
the following reasons:
- 
 Clause 34 is in two parts. The ﬁ rst part is that the rules governing 
the retirement of employees of the Government of India as 
amended from to time shall apply to the employees of the Central 
Council. The plain and simple reading of
this part makes it clear 
and unambiguous that the rules governing the retirement of 
Central Government employees as amended from time to time 
shall apply. 
- 
The second part of Clause 34 “or as desired by the Governing 
Body” is merely an enabling provision to enable the Governing 
Body to take a decision regarding retention of an employee beyond 
the prescribed age of superannuation. In other words, the ‘desire’ of 
Governing Body is to extend the age of an employee even beyond 
prescribed age if he continues to be physically ﬁ t and eﬃ  cient and 
it is in the interest of the Council to retain him in service.
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
- 
 Therefore, the second part of Clause 34 really gives power to the 
Governing Body to retain an employee even after the prescribed 
age of superannuation provided the conditions for grant of such 
retention is met. This power cannot be negatively read to clothe the 
Governing Body with power to prescribe less age of superannuation 
than what is prescribed by the Central Government from time to 
time. 
- 
 While the age of superannuation of an employee of the Central 
Council shall be at par with the age of superannuation prescribed 
by the Central Government, the Governing body has the enabling 
power to retain the employee even beyond the age of superannuation 
in organisational interest. 
- 
 It is submitted that Clause 34 cannot be read negatively to deny 
the age of increase given by the Cabinet to AYUSH Doctors by 
wrongly interpreting Clause 34.
vii. That the terms and conditions of service of employees of the 
Council on all other aspects like Provident Fund/ GPF, Pension, Gratuity, 
Leave Rules, Scales of Pay, Conduct Rules, and other conditions of service 
are the same as applicable to Central Government employees as set out in 
Clauses 31, 32, 33, 42, 44, and 47 respectively of the Rules. Therefore, in 
the matter of age of superannuation the respondent No. 1 cannot be treated 
diﬀ erently. 
viii. That the appellants on one hand claim that the AYUSH doctors 
working in autonomous bodies are not entitled to increase in
age of 
superannuation up to 65 years whereas other AYUSH doctors working in the 
Ministry of AYUSH and other autonomous institutions have been granted 
extension of age up to 65 years. 
ix. That similarly, AYUSH doctors working in CGHS have been 
granted increase in age up to 65 years vide letter dated 24.11.2017. Therefore, 
the letter not to grant identical beneﬁ t to the respondent No. 1 is not only 
arbitrary but it is discriminatory and hence it is unsustainable.
h. This Court has dealt with the issue of extension of age of 
superannuation of similar AYUSH doctors working in the NDMC in Dr. Ram 
Naresh Sharma (supra), where in paras 23 and 24 it was held as follows:
757
“23. The common contention of the appellants before us is that 
classiﬁ cation of AYUSH doctors and doctors under CHS in diﬀ erent 
categories is reasonable and permissible in law. This however does not 
appeal to us and we are inclined to agree with the ﬁ ndings of the Tribunal 
and the Delhi High Court that the classiﬁ cation is discriminatory and 
unreasonable since doctors under both segments are performing the 
same function of treating and healing their patients. The only diﬀ erence 
is that AYUSH doctors are using indigenous systems of medicine 
like Ayurveda, Unani, etc. and CHS doctors are using Allopathy for 
tending to their patients. In our understanding, the mode of treatment 
by itself under the prevalent scheme of things, does not qualify as an 
intelligible diﬀ erentia. Therefore, such unreasonable classiﬁ cation and 
discrimination based on it would surely be inconsistent with Article 14 
of the Constitution. The order of AYUSH Ministry dated 24.11.2017 
extending the age of superannuation to 65 Years also endorses such 
a view. This extension is in tune with the notiﬁ cation of Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare dated 31.05.2016.
24. The doctors, both under AYUSH and CHS, render service to 
patients and on this core aspect, there is nothing to distinguish them. 
Therefore, no rational justiﬁ cation is seen for having diﬀ erent dates 
for bestowing the beneﬁ t of extended age of superannuation to these 
two categories of doctors. Hence, the order of
AYUSH Ministry 
(F. No. D. 14019/4/2016-E-I (AYUSH)) dated 24.11.2017 must be 
retrospectively applied from 31.05.2016 to all concerned respondent-
doctors, in the present appeals. All consequences must follow from 
this conclusion.”
i. The appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs and directions be 
issued to the appellants to release the consequential beneﬁ ts including arrears 
of salary for the period from 01.05 2018 to 30.04.2023 which would cover the 
entire period of 5 years of increase in age of superannuation. The respondent 
No. 1 worked from 25.04.2018 following the order of stay grated by the 
High Court till 05.04.2021 when stay was granted by this Court following 
which the services of the respondent No. 1 were abruptly ended.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERVENORS/
APPLICANTS IN I.A. NO. 90789 OF 2022 IN SLP (C) NO. 4110 OF 2021
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
20. It is the case of the intervenors/applicants that their W.P.(C) Nos. 
9554 of 2018 and 9584 of 2018 respectively are pending adjudication 
before the High Court of Delhi and one Original Application No. 272 of 
2020 before CAT, Lucknow Bench. They submitted that the ﬁ nal outcome 
of the present appeal will have a direct impact on the aforesaid litigations. 
The intervenors claim that they are doctors under another corporation of 
AYUSH, namely, CCRUM. 
21. Submissions canvassed on their behalf are as under: 
a. That the Intervenors/applicants are qualiﬁ ed Unani Doctors by 
qualiﬁ cation and are equivalent to any other qualiﬁ ed Doctors, 
be it MBBS Doctors or otherwise. 
b. The Intervenors/applicants are working under the Direct 
Administrative Control of Ministry of AYUSH and their 
service conditions are governed by the Ministry in spite of them 
performing the duties in CCRUM. 
c. The Intervenors/applicants have been receiving the Non-
Practicing Allowance while working under CCRUM which 
clearly indicates that the Intervenors/applicants are indeed 
qualiﬁ ed doctors at par with the other Doctors who also get the 
same allowances. 
d. The Recruitment Rules which apply to the Intervenors/
applicants are: “for functional purpose, a medical officer 
(Ayurveda) when posted in the Ministry of AYUSH will be 
designated as Research oﬃ  cer (Ayurveda) and thus the medical 
oﬃ  cer and Research oﬃ  cer are one and the same and
there cannot 
be any distinction between the two”. 
e. That the Government of India (Cabinet) vide its order has 
granted the beneﬁ t of enhancement of superannuation age to 
65 years to the doctors under the administrative control of the 
respective Ministries/Department (Ministry of AYUSH) (AYUSH 
doctors) which is fully applicable to the doctors working under 
the appellant council but the Ministry of AYUSH erroneously 
by their mis-interpretation has excluded the beneﬁ ts to doctors 
working under autonomous bodies like the council. It is because
759
of the wrong interpretation made by the Ministry of AYUSH, the 
said beneﬁ t was erroneously denied to the AYUSH doctors like 
the Intervenors/applicants.
f. That the Govt. of India vide its own order dated 02.11.2020 
has given the said beneﬁ t to the Director of ITRA and enhanced 
the age of superannuation to 65 years. Therefore, as per own 
interpretation made by the Ministry of AYUSH, the beneﬁ t of 
enhancement of superannuation of age is fully applicable to all 
doctors (working in any capacity including researcher) who are 
under the administrative control of AYUSH and when Govt. of 
India (Cabinet) did not exclude the autonomous institution like 
Intervenors/applicants council then the Ministry of AYUSH has 
no right to diﬀ erentiate and deny the beneﬁ t of superannuation to 
the Intervenors/applicants. 
g. It is submitted that Clauses-34 & 35 of the Bye-Laws issued 
by the CCRAS, deals with superannuation and prescribes that the 
Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General Financial 
Rules of the Government of India as amended from time to time 
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of the Central 
Council. 
h. It is submitted that the Intervenors/applicants during their entire 
tenure performed duties like treating patients in OPD and IPD 
along with research activities which would clearly establish that 
the Intervenors/applicants have been attending the patients, both, 
the OPDs and IPDs. The Intervenors/applicants have worked for 
prestigious
hospitals like the RML & DDU while performing duties 
which include treating the patients along with Research work.
i. It is submitted that Non-Practicing Allowance has been given 
to the doctors working under Intervenor/applicants council and 
the said beneﬁ t was given to the Intervenor/applicants as well 
which clearly contradicts the stand of council that the Intervenors/
applicants were not performing the duties of doctors. In fact, 
the Non-Practicing Allowance has been sanctioned only on the 
basis that the Intervenors/applicants are qualiﬁ ed doctors and are 
performing the duties of Clinical Doctor which includes the OPD 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
& IPD duties and thus are not allowed to practice outside the scope 
of their oﬃ  cial duties and in lieu were given the Non-Practicing 
Allowance.
j. It is submitted that those doctors are considered as AYUSH 
doctors who have completed the degree course either in BAMS, 
BHMS, BUMS, BNYS & BSM in Ayurveda, Homeopathy, 
Unami, Siddha, Yoga and Naturopathy and are at par with any 
other qualiﬁ ed Doctors. 
k. The Intervenors/applicants Council is an autonomous body 
under the Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India and the 
Council has a Governing Body comprising of the Union Minister-
In-Charge of AYUSH as its President and Secretary, Ministry of 
AYUSH as its Vice President. Its Bye-Laws reveal the pervasive 
control of the Union Government over the Central Council. 
l. The aforesaid is clearly depicted from the Bye-Laws of 
Intervenor/applicants council. That the Clauses - 34 and 35 of 
the Bye-Laws deal with the superannuation of the employees of 
the Council which are quoted herein below: Clauses-34 & 35 of 
the said Bye-Laws deal with superannuation which read as under: 
“34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of the 
Government of India as amended from time to time or as 
desired by the Governing Body shall apply to the employees 
of the Central Council. Provided that an employee can be 
retired in service after prescribed age of superannuation if 
he continues to be physically ﬁ t and eﬃ  cient and it is in the
interest of the Central Council to retain him in service. 
35. The Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General 
Financial Rules of Government of India as amended from 
time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees of the 
Central Council.” 
m. That, the clariﬁ cation of Ministry of AYUSH vide its letter dated 
31.10.2017 is not only misconceived but also uncalled for, arbitrary 
and discriminatory. The same is also contrary to the object for which 
the Central Council is established. The aforesaid clariﬁ cation would
761
rather frustrate the objectives for which the Central Council was 
established. The same is against Public Policy and liable to be struck 
down and the High Court of Orrisa rightly gave decision in favour of 
the respondent in the instant appeal.
n. That the Intervenor/applicants though were appointed as researcher 
but along with that they have been performing duties of doctors like 
treating patient in OPD, IPD etc. and for which requisite certiﬁ cate 
was issued to them time to time. 
ANALYSIS
22. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and 
having gone through materials placed on record the only question that falls 
for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in 
passing the impugned judgment? 
23. The appellant Council is an autonomous body registered under 
the Society Registration Act, 1860 and is administratively controlled by the 
Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India. It is a body constituted for the 
purpose of undertaking, cooperating, formulating, developing and promoting 
the research on scientiﬁ c guidelines in Ayurvedic Sciences. The recruitment 
rules, procedure and the service conditions of these employees are governed 
by the Bye-Laws and Memorandum of Association of the Council. 
24. With a view to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the 
litigating parties before us, we must look into the Clauses 25(b), 34, 35 
and 47 of the Bye-Laws in the Memorandum of Association of the Central 
Council for
Research in Ayurvedic Sciences:
“Appointments
25. (a)...
(b) Recruitments, appointments and promotions to all posts shall be 
made according to the recruitment rules laid down by the Governing 
Body or designated competent authority for the posts. Selection shall 
be made through the Selection Committees/Departmental Promotion 
Committees duly constituted with the approval of the respective 
appointing authority. 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
Superannuation
34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of the Government 
of India as amended from time to time or as desired by the Governing 
Body shall apply to the employees of the Central Council. Provided 
that an employee can be retained in service after the prescribed age 
of superannuation if he continues to be physically ﬁ t and eﬃ  cient 
and it is in the interest of the Central Council to retain him in service.
35. The Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General Financial 
Rules of Government of India as amended from time to time shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to employees of the Central Council.
Other Conditions of Service
47. In respect of matters not provided for in these regulations the rules 
as applicable to Central Government servants regarding the general 
conditions of service, pay, allowances T.A. and daily allowances, 
foreign service terms, deputation in India and abroad, etc. and orders 
and decisions issued in this regard by the Central Government from 
time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of the 
Central Council.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
25. A plain reading of the aforesaid clauses of the Bye-Laws would 
indicate that the employees are recruited through a selection committee of 
the Council. It further indicates that the Fundamental Rules, 1922 will have 
no direct application in cases where the governing body ﬁ nalises the rules 
of superannuation. In terms of Clause 34
of the Bye-Laws, the governing 
body had decided the age of superannuation to be 60 years on 01.12.1998. 
The said decision was ratiﬁ ed on 27.01.2000, in the 14th meeting of the 
governing body of the Council. 
26. In our view, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants 
is right in his submission that the decision of the governing body dated 
27.12.2000 applied on 30.04.2018 i.e., the date of superannuation of the 
respondent No. 1. It is not in dispute that the respondent No. 1 was working as 
a researcher and the service conditions of a Research Assistant are altogether 
diﬀ erent compared to the AYUSH Doctor. It is also not in dispute that the
763
method of recruitment of the respondent No. 1 is diﬀ erent compared to that 
with the AYUSH doctors. 
27. The principal argument canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel 
appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 is that the provisions of FR 
56(bb) would apply to the respondent No. 1 in his capacity as an employee 
of the Council in view of Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws of the Council referred 
to above, by which the provisions of the FR and SR would apply to the 
employees of the Council mutatis mutandis. On the other hand, the case 
put up by the appellants is that the said provisions are not applicable to the 
employees of the Council in view of the clariﬁ cation of the Ministry dated 
31.10.2017. In regard to the clariﬁ cation of the Ministry vide its letter dated 
31.10.2017, the stance of the respondent No. 1 is that such clariﬁ cation 
cannot override the decision of the Cabinet or the provisions of the FR 56 
as amended. 
28. The aforesaid aspect was duly considered by the CAT. The CAT 
rightly took the view that the argument canvassed on behalf of the respondent 
No. 1, that the Council failed to consider the Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws 
referred to above, which states that the FR, SR and (GFR) as amended from 
time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees of the Council, was 
without any merit and deserved to be rejected. The CAT in our opinion 
rightly rejected such argument. We say so because the applicability would be 
subject to the provision speciﬁ c
to the Clause 34 governing superannuation 
of the employees of the Council. 
29. There is nothing in Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws referred to above 
on the basis of which, it could be said that the same will have an overriding 
eﬀ ect on Clause 34 as regards the age of retirement. Clause 47 of the Bye-
Laws makes it abundantly clear that for the matters not speciﬁ cally provided 
in the Bye-Laws, the rules applicable to the government employees would 
apply. However, as there is a speciﬁ c provision regarding superannuation 
in Clause 34, the rules governing the government services in respect of 
superannuation are not applicable to the employees of the Council unless 
it is in accordance with Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws. 
30. We shall now deal with one another submission canvassed by 
Mr. R. Balasubramanian, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf 
of the respondent No. 1. It was submitted that Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
should be read in two parts. The ﬁ rst part states that the Rules governing the 
retirement of employees of the Government of India as amended from time 
to time would apply to the employees of the Central Council. According to 
the learned Senior Counsel, the second part of the Clause 34 which reads 
“or as desired by the governing body” is merely an enabling provision 
empowering the governing body to take a decision whether an employee 
deserves to be retained beyond the prescribed age of superannuation. 
According to the learned Senior Counsel such power should not be read in 
a negative form to clothe the governing body with the power to prescribe 
lesser age of superannuation than what has been prescribed by the Central 
Government from time to time. We are afraid, we are not in a position to 
accept such an argument. The language of Clause 34 is very clear. What is 
important to note while reading the Clause 34 is the word “or”. Thereafter, 
there is a proviso which says that an employee can be retained in service 
after prescribed age of superannuation if he continues to be physically ﬁ t 
and eﬃ  cient and it is in the interest of the Central Counsel to retain him in 
the service. 
31. The expression “the rules governing the retirement of employees 
of Government of India as amended from time to time” is separated from 
the rest of the part of the Bye-Law by the word “or” which is disjunctive 
and giving natural meaning to
the said word separates the rules that may be 
framed by the Government of India and the rules that the Council may desire 
to frame as regards the age of retirement of the employees of the Council. 
32. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that 
the word “or” is normally disjunctive and the word “and” is normally 
conjunctive. Both of them can be read as vice-versa, but that interpretation 
is adopted only where the intention of the legislature is manifest.
33. Justice G.P. Singh in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
(Thirteenth Edition 2012) page 485 has stated as follows:
“The word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally 
conjunctive but at time they are read as vice versa to give eﬀ ect to the 
manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. As 
stated by SCRUTTON, L.J.: “You do sometimes read “or” as ‘and’ and 
in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or’ 
does not generally mean ‘and’ and ‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’.
765
And as pointed out by LORD HALSBURY the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’ 
is not to be resorted to, “unless some other part of the same statute 
or the clear intention of it requires that to be done”. Where provision 
is clear and unambiguous the word ‘or’ cannot be read as ‘and’ by 
applying the principle of reading down. But if the literal reading of 
the words produces an unintelligible or absurd, result ‘and’ may be 
read for ‘or’ and ‘or’ for ‘and’ even though the result of so modifying 
the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention 
of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of 
‘and’ and ‘or’ produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense 
of the portion following ‘and’, ‘or’ cannot be read in place of ‘and’. 
The alternatives joined by ‘or’ need not always be mutually exclusive.”
34. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we reject the submission 
canvassed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 as regards the interpretation 
of the Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws. In this context, we may only say that 
the governing body of the Council is not obliged to take a decision in tune 
with the decision of the Ministry of AYUSH regarding superannuation more 
particularly having made it clear that enhancement of retirement age is not 
applicable to an autonomous body like CCRAS.
 35. We are also not impressed by the submission canvassed on behalf 
of the respondent No. 1 that as the terms and conditions of the services of 
the
employees of the Council on all other aspects like the Provident Fund/
GPF, Pension, Gratuity, Leave Rules, Scales of Pay, Conduct Rules and 
other conditions of services are the same as applicable to the employees 
of the Central Government as set out in Clauses 31, 32, 33, 42, 44 and 47 
respectively of the Bye-Laws, the matter of age of superannuation of the 
respondent No. 1 should not be treated diﬀ erently. What should be the age 
of superannuation is a matter of policy. It is not within the domain of the 
court to legislate. It is only if a policy decision or a notiﬁ cation is arbitrary 
it may invite the frowns of Article 14 of the Constitution. In any case, the 
question of age of retirement stands on a diﬀ erent footing from the service 
conditions relating to pay and allowances and revision of pay.
36. We may at this stage, refer to the following decision in Tamil Nadu 
Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
Association and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others reported in 
(1980) 3 SCC 97 : [ SCC pp. 99 SCC (L&S) p. 296, para 7]
“7. In Service Jurisprudence integration is a complicated administrative 
problem where, in doing broad justice to many, some bruise to a few 
cannot be ruled out. Some play in the joints, even some wobbling, 
must be left to government without fussy forensic monitoring, since 
the administration has been entrusted by the Constitution to the 
executive, not to the court. All life, including administrative life, 
involves experiment, trial and error, but within the leading strings of 
fundamental rights, and, absent unconstitutional ‘excesses’, judicial 
correction is not right. …..”
37. It is too late in the day for the respondent No. 1 to raise all such 
issues including infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution on the 
ground of artiﬁ cial distinction between the Research Assistant and AYUSH 
Doctors. The respondent No. 1 knew from day one i.e., from the date of his 
appointment that he was being appointed as a Research Assistant. His service 
conditions and mode of recruitment are diﬀ erent compared to the AYUSH 
Doctors. It is a diﬀ erent thing that he might have treated the patients but 
that by itself would not entitle him to claim that his age of superannuation 
should be at par with the AYUSH Doctors. 
38. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a decision 
of this Court in the
case of State of Bihar and Another v. Teachers’ 
Association of Govt. Engineering College and Others, reported in (2000) 
10 SCC 527 wherein, the respondents were teachers of three engineering 
colleges owned by the State of Bihar. They were recruited through the Bihar 
Public Service Commission. Their service conditions were governed by 
the Bihar Service Code. Under the relevant provisions of the Bihar Service 
Code, the age of superannuation up to 1989, was 58 years. However, with 
eﬀ ect from 01.10.1989 it was raised to 60 years. They claimed that their 
age of retirement should be the same as the age of retirement of Bihar 
Engineering College which was a college of the Patna University. Its teachers 
were recruited through the University Service Commission. Their service 
conditions were governed under the Patna University Act. At the relevant 
time, the age of retirement for university teachers was 62 years. However, 
with eﬀ ect from 15.08.1992 the age of retirement was reduced to 60 years.
767
The respondent’s claim was upheld by the High Court. Allowing the State’s 
appeal, this Court held: 
“5. The respondents contend that their age of retirement should be 
the same as the age of retirement of university teachers employed in 
Bihar Engineering College, Patna. But the terms and conditions of 
service of teachers in the three engineering colleges of the State are 
diﬀ erent from the terms and conditions of service of the university 
teachers employed in Bihar Engineering College at Patna. The 
authority responsible for recruitment is also diﬀ erent. The method of 
recruitment is diﬀ erent and service conditions are prescribed under 
diﬀ erent rules and regulations and/or under a separate Act. We fail 
to see how in respect of the teachers who are government servants, 
governed by the Bihar Service Code, the age of superannuation should 
be diﬀ erent from the age of superannuation for all other government 
servants governed by the Bihar Service Code. The High Court ought 
not to have equated the service conditions in the three State colleges 
with the service conditions in a University college. Application of 
Article 14, in these circumstances, is misconceived, when there are 
valid criteria for diﬀ erentiating between the service conditions in the 
two sets of colleges. In the premises the impugned judgment of the 
High Court insofar as it directs that the age of superannuation of 
teachers working in the three engineering colleges other than Bihar 
College
of Engineering, Patna should be brought on par with the age 
of superannuation of those working in Bihar College of Engineering 
at Patna, is set aside. The further direction to pay arrears or give 
beneﬁ ts ﬂ owing from the extended age of superannuation is also set 
aside. The appeals are allowed accordingly.”
39. The only idea with which we have referred to and relied upon 
the aforesaid decision is to convey that the case on hand is not one of 
discrimination. Article 14 of the Constitution has no application having 
regard to the facts of the present case. 
40. Mr. Lekhi, the learned Senior Council appearing for the appellants 
placed strong reliance on two decisions of this Court: (i) T.M. Sampath 
(supra) and (ii) Bhagwan (supra). Both these decisions have been relied 
upon to fortify the contention that the employees of autonomous bodies are 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
governed by their own rules and Bye-Laws and they cannot claim parity 
with the government employees. We must look into both these decisions. 
Paras 3, 15, 16 and 17 respectively of T.M. Sampath (supra) are as follows: 
“3. The facts of these appeals are brieﬂ y stated hereinafter. The 
appellants herein are the employees of National Water Development 
Agency (“NWDA”) which was established as a society in July 1982 and 
was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Society 
NWDA, which falls under the aegis and control, both administrative 
and ﬁ nancial, of the Ministry of Water Resources, is fully funded by 
the Government of India, headed by the Union Minister for Water 
Resources as the President. NWDA framed rules and regulations for 
its smooth functioning. Whatever emoluments have been prescribed 
for the government servants by the Central Government Office 
Memorandum (“the OM”, for short) the same apply mutatis mutandis 
to the employees of NWDA. Bye-law 28 of NWDA also mandates 
that the rules and orders applicable to the Central Government 
employees shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of NWDA 
subject to modiﬁ cation by the Governing Body concerning service 
conditions and only in case of any doubt, the matter has to be referred 
to the Governing Body for a decision. Bye-law 26(a) provides for 
the emoluments structure for all employees that will be adopted by 
NWDA, with the approval of the
Ministry of Finance (Department of 
Expenditure). Bye-law 28 provides that till such time NWDA frames 
its rules governing service conditions of the employees, rules and 
orders applicable to the Central Government employees shall apply 
mutatis mutandis, subject to such modiﬁ cations as made by NWDA 
from time to time.

xxx

xxx

xxx
15. In light of the facts and circumstances of this case and the 
submissions made by the learned counsel on both sides, it can be 
concluded that NWDA had framed its regulation: the CPF Rules, 1982 
and they were duly approved by the Governing Body of NWDA. 
As NWDA is an autonomous body under the Ministry of Water 
Resources, it has framed its own bye-laws governing the employees. 
It has been time and again reiterated that the court must adopt

769
an attitude of total non-interference or minimal interference in the 
matter of interpretation of rules framed by autonomous institutions.
In Kerala SRTC v. K.O. Varghese [(2007) 8 SCC 231 : (2007) 2 SCC 
(L&S) 862], this Court held : (SCC pp. 240-41, paras 18 & 21)
“18. … KSRTC is an autonomous corporation established under 
the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. It can regulate the 
services of its employees by making appropriate regulations in 
that behalf.

*

*
*
21. The High Court … is not correct in thinking that there is any 
compulsion on KSRTC on the mere adoption of Part III of KSR 
to automatically give all enhancements in pension and other 
beneﬁ ts given by the State Government to its employees.”
Thus, as the appellants are governed by the CPF Rules, 1982, the OM 
applicable to the Central Government employees is not applicable to 
them.”
16. On the issue of parity between the employees of NWDA and 
Central Government employees, even if it is assumed that the 1982 
Rules did not exist or were not applicable on the date of the OM i.e. 
1-5-1987, the relevant date of parity, the principle of parity cannot be 
applicable to the employees of NWDA. NWDA cannot be treated as 
an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution 
merely on the basis that its funds are granted by the Central 
Government. In Zee Teleﬁ lms Ltd. v. Union of India [(2005) 4 SCC 
649], it was held by this Court that the autonomous bodies having some 
nexus with the Government by itself would not bring them within the 
sweep of the expression “State” and each case must be determined on 
its own merits. Thus, the plea of the employees of NWDA to be treated 
on a par with their counterparts in the Central Government under 
sub-rule (6)(iv) of Rule 209 of the General Financial Rules, merely 
on the basis of funding is not applicable.
17. Even if it is presumed that NWDA is “State” under Article 12 of 
the Constitution, the appellants have
failed to prove that they are on 
a par with their counterparts, with whom they claim parity. As held 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
by this Court in UT, Chandigarh v. Krishan Bhandari [(1996) 11 SCC 
348 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 391], the claim to equality can be claimed 
when there is discrimination by the State between two persons who 
are similarly situated. The said discrimination cannot be invoked in 
cases where discrimination sought to be shown is between acts of 
two diﬀ erent authorities functioning as State under Article 12. Thus, 
the employees of NWDA cannot be said to be “Central Government 
employees” as stated in the OM for its applicability.” 
(Emphasis supplied)
41. The decision in the case of T.M. Sampath (supra) was later referred 
to and relied upon by this Court in the case of Bhagwan (supra). This Court 
in the Bhagwan (supra) observed in para 26 as under: 
“26. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the 
employees of the autonomous bodies cannot claim, as a matter of right, 
the same service beneﬁ ts on a par with the government employees. 
Merely because such autonomous bodies might have adopted the 
Government Service Rules and/or in the Governing Council there may 
be a representative of the Government and/or merely because such 
institution is funded by the State/Central Government, employees of 
such autonomous bodies cannot, as a matter of right, claim parity with 
the State/Central Government employees. This is more particularly, 
when the employees of such autonomous bodies are governed by their 
own Service
Rules and service conditions. The State Government and 
the autonomous Board/body cannot be put on a par.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
42. We must also look into the decision of this Court in the case 
of Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Associations v. State of Kerala 
and Others reported in AIR 2018 SC 2652, wherein the Assistant Public 
Prosecutors were seeking parity with respect to the age of superannuation 
to that of Public Prosecutors. This Court took notice of the fact that the 
method of selection between the two posts is very diﬀ erent and that the 
former are considered to be government employees, whereas the latter 
are not. The Court thereafter, proceeded to hold that merely because the 
nature of work between the two is similar, the same does not imply that the
771
age of superannuation ought to be similar as well. The relevant portion is 
produced hereunder: 
“6. … The fact that the nature of duties and functions of Assistant 
Public Prosecutors and Public Prosecutors are similar, per se, cannot 
be the basis to claim parity with Public Prosecutors in respect of age 
of superannuation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
43. In Union of India and Others v. Lieut (Mrs) E. Iacats, reported 
in (1997) 7 SCC 334, the respondent therein had ﬁ led a writ petition in the 
Guahati High Court challenging her retirement at the age of 55 years on the 
ground that in other nursing services under the military establishment the 
age of retirement was 58 years. It was argued before the High Court that it 
was discriminatory to retire the nurses who were appointed for local service 
only at the age of 55 years. The Petition was allowed by the High Court. 
The UOI came before this Court in appeal. This Court while allowing the 
appeal ﬁ led by the UOI, observed as under:
“ 3. … If diﬀ erent nursing services are constituted under separate 
army instructions carrying their own separate terms and conditions 
of service, one cannot complain of discrimination if the ages of 
retirement prescribed under these diﬀ erent services are diﬀ erent. Each 
will be governed by its own rules and regulations. The respondent 
is, therefore, not justiﬁ ed in claiming that she has been discriminated 
against because she has retired at the age of 55.”
(Emphasis supplied)
44. The age
of superannuation is always governed by the statutory rules 
governing appointment on a particular post. Hence, even if it is averred that 
the nature of work involved in the two posts is similar, the same cannot be a 
ground to increase or alter the service conditions of an employee as each post 
is governed by its own set of rules. The same was held in the case of New 
Okhla Industrial Development Authority and Another v. B D Singhal and 
Others, reported in AIR 2021 SC 3457, wherein this Court held as under: 
“24. … Since the enhancement of the age of superannuation is a 
‘public function’ channelised by the provisions of the statute and the service 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
regulations, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to challenge 
the action of NOIDA.”
(Emphasis supplied)
45. We shall now look into the decision of this Court in Dr. Ram 
Naresh Sharma (supra). This decision of this Court has been relied upon 
by Mr. R. Bala, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent 
No. 1. He has relied upon paras 23 and 24 respectively which read thus: 
“23. The common contention of the appellants before us is that 
classiﬁ cation of AYUSH doctors and doctors under CHS in diﬀ erent 
categories is reasonable and permissible in law. This however does not 
appeal to us and we are inclined to agree with the ﬁ ndings of the Tribunal 
and the Delhi High Court that the classiﬁ cation is discriminatory and 
unreasonable since doctors under both segments are performing the 
same function of treating and healing their patients. The only diﬀ erence 
is that AYUSH doctors are using indigenous systems of medicine 
like Ayurveda, Unani, etc. and CHS doctors are using Allopathy for 
tending to their patients. In our understanding, the mode of treatment 
by itself under the prevalent scheme of things, does not qualify as an 
intelligible diﬀ erentia. Therefore, such unreasonable classiﬁ cation and 
discrimination based on it would surely be inconsistent with Article 14 
of the Constitution. The order of AYUSH Ministry dated 24.11.2017 
extending the age of superannuation to 65 Years also endorses
such 
a view. This extension is in tune with the notiﬁ cation of Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare dated 31.05.2016.
24. The doctors, both under AYUSH and CHS, render service to 
patients and on this core aspect, there is nothing to distinguish them. 
Therefore, no rational justiﬁ cation is seen for having diﬀ erent dates for 
bestowing the beneﬁ t of extended age of superannuation to these two 
categories of doctors. Hence, the order of AYUSH Ministry (F. No. D. 
14019/4/2016EI (AYUSH)) dated 24.11.2017 must be retrospectively 
applied from 31.05.2016 to all concerned respondent doctors, in the 
present appeals. All consequences must follow from this conclusion.”
46. The aforesaid decision of this Court in the case of Dr. Ram Naresh 
Sharma (supra) upon which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the
773
respondent No. 1 is of no avail for the simple reason that in the said case, the 
only question that arose was whether the beneﬁ t of enhancement of age of 
retirement from 60 years to 65 years granted in favour of allopathy doctors 
was available even for ayurveda doctors or not? The said decision was based 
upon an order of the Ministry of AYUSH dated 24.11.2017. 
47. As seen from paragraph 23 of the said decision referred to above, 
the age of retirement of allopathy doctors was enhanced by an order dated 
31.05.2016 issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. This 
was followed by consequential amendment of the Fundamental Rules and 
Supplementary Rules, 1922. Since, Ayurveda doctors were not covered 
by the Ministry’s order dated 31.05.2016, the Ayurveda doctors ﬁ led 
applications before the Administrative Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal 
allowed the applications by an order dated 24.08.2017. The North Delhi 
Municipal Corporation (Employer) ﬁ led writ petitions before the High Court 
of Delhi challenging the decision of the Tribunal. During the pendency of 
the writ petitions, the Ministry of AYUSH issued an order dated 24.11.2017 
enhancing the age of retirement of AYUSH doctors also to 65 years, but 
w.e.f. 27.09.2017. It is in that context that this Court held as aforesaid in 
Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma (supra). Thus, this decision is in no manner helpful 
to the respondent No. 1. 
48. We may only say that the entire approach of the High Court towards
the present litigation was incorrect. We are a bit disappointed to observe 
that the High Court dealt with the present litigation in a very casual manner. 
First, the High Court went to the extent of granting interim relief 
extending the period of service beyond 60 years till the disposal of the 
Original Petition by the CAT. By virtue of such interim order which the 
High Court ordinarily should not grant, the respondent No. 1 although was 
to retire in 2018 yet continued in service till 2021. It is only when this Court 
stayed the operation of the impugned order passed by the High Court while 
issuing notice that the service of the respondent No. 1 came to an end. The 
Court or the Tribunal should, therefore, be slow and circumspect in granting 
interim relief for continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of 
unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds, 
he can always be compensated. But if he fails, he would have enjoyed 
undeserved beneﬁ t of extended service and merely caused injustice to his 
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immediate junior. At the cost of repetition, we may state that the High Court 
was conscious of the fact as very much recorded in the impugned order 
that the respondent No. 1 was appointed as a Research Assistant and was 
functioning as a Researcher under the Research Council and his service 
conditions were also diﬀ erent compared to the AYUSH doctors serving with 
the Ministry of AYUSH. The High Court misdirected itself saying that the 
beneﬁ t of enhanced age of superannuation can also be granted if the duties 
performed are the same like AYUSH doctors. We fail to understand how 
can the Court ﬁ x the age of superannuation of an employee saying that he 
is very much devoted towards his job. The age of superannuation is always 
governed by statutory rules & other service conditions. 
49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something 
important in the aforesaid context: 
Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary 
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly 
when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 
50. The ﬁ rst cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of 
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more 
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in 
granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of 
Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which 
the
determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes 
the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous 
but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The 
writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of 
the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be 
issued on mere asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary 
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even 
if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal 
and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction 
thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice 
between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary 
remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal 
injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this ﬂ exible power
775
to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal 
formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact 
situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with 
equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal 
formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing 
in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the ﬁ nal 
order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would 
render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not. 
52. The essential features of a writ of certiorari, including a brief 
history, have been very exhaustively explained by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in 
T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another, reported in AIR 1954 SC 440. 
The Court held that a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued in 
‘all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner’ so long as the broad and 
fundamental principles were kept in mind. Those principles were delineated 
as follows:
“7. … In granting a writ of ‘certiorari’, the superior court does 
not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not 
review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination 
of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the 
order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably 
erroneous, but does not substitute its own views for those of the 
inferior tribunal ….. 
8. The supervision of
the superior court exercised through writs of 
certiorari goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer 
in King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited [(1922) 2 AC 128, 156]. One is 
the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualiﬁ cations and conditions 
of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its 
exercise. ….
9. Certiorari may lie and is generally granted when a court has acted 
without or in excess of its jurisdiction.”
53. Relying on T.C. Basappa (supra), the Constitution Bench of this 
Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), laid down the following 
propositions as well established:
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“(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, 
as when an inferior court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in 
excess of it, or fails to exercise it.
(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts 
illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides 
without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates 
the principles of natural justice.
(3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a 
supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this 
is that the court will not review ﬁ ndings of fact reached by the inferior 
court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous.”
54. This Court explained that a court which has jurisdiction over a 
subject matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the 
Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, 
it would be defeating its purpose and policy if a superior court were to 
rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own ﬁ nding in certiorari.
55. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, reported in 
AIR 1964 SC 477, P.B. Gajendragadkar, CJ., speaking for the Constitution 
Bench, placed the matter beyond any position of doubt by holding that a writ 
of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed 
by inferior courts or tribunals. The observations of this Court in para 7 are 
worth
taking note of:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts 
in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently 
considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is 
no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting 
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these 
are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals 
without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to 
exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise 
of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or 
improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an 
opportunity to be heard to the party aﬀ ected by the order, or where the 
procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles
777
of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to 
issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court 
exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation 
necessarily means that ﬁ ndings of fact reached by the inferior Court or 
Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened 
or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent 
on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error 
of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a ﬁ nding of 
fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is 
shown that in recording the said ﬁ nding, the Tribunal had erroneously 
refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously 
admitted inadmissible evidence which has inﬂ uenced the impugned 
ﬁ nding. Similarly, if a ﬁ nding of fact is based on no evidence, that 
would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a 
writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, 
we must always bear in mind that a ﬁ nding of fact recorded by the 
Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari 
on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before 
the Tribunal was insuﬃ  cient or inadequate to sustain the impugned 
ﬁ nding. The adequacy or suﬃ  ciency of evidence led on a point and 
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said ﬁ nding are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be 
agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction 
conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari 
can be legitimately exercised…..”
56. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai and Others, reported in 
2003 (6) SCC 675, a Bench of two Judges held that the certiorari jurisdiction 
though available, should not be exercised as a matter of course. The High 
Court would be justiﬁ ed in refusing the writ of certiorari if no failure of 
justice had been occasioned. In exercising the certiorari jurisdiction, the 
procedure ordinarily followed by the High Court is to command the inferior 
court or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the High Court for its 
inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine, whether on the face 
of the record the inferior court has committed any of the errors as explained 
by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR 
1955 SC 233 occasioning failure of justice.
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57. From the aforesaid, it could be said in terms of a jurisdictional 
error that want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject 
matter so that the inferior court or tribunal might not have the authority to 
enter on the inquiry. It may also arise from the absence of some essential 
preliminary or jurisdictional fact. Where the jurisdiction of a body depends 
upon a preliminary ﬁ nding of fact in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari, 
the court may determine, whether or not that ﬁ nding of fact is correct. The 
reason is that by wrongly deciding such a fact, the court or tribunal cannot 
give itself jurisdiction.
58. In Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and 
Another, reported in (1969) 2 AC 147, the House of Lords has given a very 
broad connotation to the concept of ‘jurisdictional error’. It has been laid 
down that a tribunal exceeds jurisdiction not only at the threshold when 
it enters into an inquiry which it is not entitled to undertake, but it may 
enter into an enquiry within its jurisdiction in the ﬁ rst instance and then do 
something which would deprive it of its jurisdiction and render its decision 
a nullity. In the words of Lord Reid:
“But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction 
to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the 
course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a 
nullity. It may have given its
decision in bad faith. It may have made 
a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the 
course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. 
It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving 
it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it 
and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have 
refused to take into account something which it was required to take 
into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, 
under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. 
I do not intend this list to be exhaustive.”
59. So far as the errors of law are concerned, a writ of certiorari could 
be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. To attract the 
writ of certiorari, a mere error of law is not suﬃ  cient. It must be one which 
is manifest or patent on the face of the record. Mere formal or technical 
errors, even of law, are not suﬃ  cient, so as to attract a writ of certiorari.
779
As reminded by this Court time and again, this concept is indeﬁ nite and 
cannot be deﬁ ned precisely or exhaustively and so it has to be determined 
judiciously on the facts of each case. The concept, according to this Court in 
K.M. Shanmugam v. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. and Others, reported in AIR 1963 
SC 1626, ‘is comprised of many imponderables… it is not capable of precise 
deﬁ nition, as no objective criterion could be laid down, the apparent nature 
of the error, to a large extent, being dependent upon the subjective element.’ 
A general test to apply, however, is that no error could be said to be apparent 
on the face of the record if it is not ‘self-evident’ or ‘manifest’. If it requires 
an examination or argument to establish it, if it has to be established by a 
long drawn out process of reasoning, or lengthy or complicated arguments, 
on points where there may considerably be two opinions, then such an error 
would cease to be an error of law. (See : Satyanarayan Laxminarayan 
Hegde and Others v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, reported in AIR 
1960 SC 137.)
60. However, in our opinion, such a test should not be applied in a 
straitjacket formula and may fail because what might be considered by one 
Judge as an error self-evident, might not be considered so by another Judge.
61. At this stage, it may not be out of place to remind ourselves of 
the observations of this Court in Syed Yakoob (supra) on this point, which 
are as follows:
“Where it is manifest or
clear that the conclusion of law recorded by 
an inferior court or tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation 
of the relevant statutory provision, or something in ignorance of it, 
or may be even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons 
which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a 
writ of certiorari. Certiorari would also not lie to correct mere errors 
of fact even though such errors may be apparent on the face of the 
record. The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the court exercising it 
is not to act as an appellate court. It is well settled that the writ court 
would not re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion 
of fact for that recorded by the adjudicating body, be it a court or a 
tribunal. A ﬁ nding of fact, howsoever erroneous, recorded by a court 
or a tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for certiorari on 
the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before 
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the court or the tribunal was insuﬃ  cient or inadequate to sustain the 
impugned ﬁ nding.
It is also well settled that adequacy or suﬃ  ciency of evidence led on 
a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said ﬁ nding are 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and these points cannot 
be agitated before the writ court.”
62. In the aforesaid context, it will be proﬁ table for us to refer to the 
decision of this Court in the case of Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staﬀ  
Canteen Workers’ Union and Another, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1508. 
This Court observed as under:
“… The ﬁ ndings of fact recorded by a fact-ﬁ nding authority duly 
constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered 
to have become ﬁ nal, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of 
having been based on materials or evidence not suﬃ  cient or credible 
in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those ﬁ ndings at any rate, 
as long as they are based upon such materials which are relevant for 
the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which 
can be reasonably and possibly undertaken. …”
63. However, we may clarify that ﬁ ndings of fact based on ‘no 
evidence’ or purely on surmises and conjectures or which are perverse 
points could be challenged by way of a certiorari as such ﬁ ndings could be 
regarded as an error of law.
64. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, we have no 
hesitation in
reaching to the conclusion that a writ of certiorari is a high 
prerogative writ and should not be issued on mere asking. For the issue of 
a writ of certiorari, the party concerned has to make out a deﬁ nite case for 
the same and is not a matter of course. To put it pithily, certiorari shall issue 
to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure 
to exercise and also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there 
has been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or 
determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the proceedings. 
By its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected but not also a wrong 
decision. It should be well remembered at the cost of repetition that certiorari 
is not appellate but only supervisory.
781
65. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, is issued by a 
superior court in respect of the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions 
by another authority when the contention is that the exercising authority 
had no jurisdiction or exceeded the jurisdiction. It cannot be denied that 
the tribunals or the authorities concerned in this batch of appeals had the 
jurisdiction to deal with the matter. However, the argument would be that 
the tribunals had acted arbitrarily and illegally and that they had failed to 
give proper ﬁ ndings on the facts and circumstances of the case. We may 
only say that while adjudicating a writ-application for a writ of certiorari, the 
court is not sitting as a court of appeal against the order of the tribunals to 
test the legality thereof with a view to reach a diﬀ erent conclusion. If there 
is any evidence, the court will not examine whether the right conclusion is 
drawn from it or not. It is a well-established principle of law that a writ of 
certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a tribunal or authority 
is wrong in matter of facts or on merits. (See: King v. Nat Bell Liquors 
Ltd., (1922) 2 AC 128 (PC))
66. We may quote with proﬁ t a decision of this Court in the case of 
Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde (supra) to understand the true purport 
and meaning of an error apparent on the face of the record or an error which 
could be termed as self-evident. The facts of that case were as below:
67. The
respondent made an application in the Revenue Court of 
the Mamlatdar of Sirsi praying for the delivery of possession of property 
which the appellant was on that date possessing as the tenant under him on 
the basis of a ‘Mulegeni’ deed executed by the respondent’s predecessor-
in-interest in favour of the appellant’s predecessor-in-interest. The case 
was governed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, 
and one of the questions in controversy was whether before applying for 
the delivery of possession, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have 
given a notice terminating the tenancy. The Mamlatdar made an order for 
possession in favour of the respondent. The Collector allowed the appeal 
and set aside the order of the Mamlatdar. The Bombay Revenue Tribunal, 
to whom the matter was taken up on appeal, held that as the respondent 
had failed to terminate the tenancy by notice before instituting the action 
for ejectment, he was not entitled to entertain the application for recovery 
of possession.
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68. Thereafter, the respondent made an application to the High Court 
of Bombay under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for the quashing of 
the order of the Revenue Tribunal and the Collector and for the restoration 
of the order of the Mamlatdar. The High Court was of the opinion that the 
Tribunal had committed an error which was apparent on the face of the 
record in holding that an order of possession could not be made unless 
a notice terminating the tenancy had been given before the institution of 
the proceeding and it issued a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the 
Tribunal and restoring that of the Mamlatdar.
69. An appeal was ﬁ led against the order of the High Court and this 
Court reversed that order on the ground that the alleged error in the judgment 
of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, namely that an order for possession should 
not be made unless a previous notice required by Section 14 of the Bombay 
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, had been given, was not an error 
apparent on the face of the record so as to be capable of being corrected by 
a writ of certiorari and the following observations were made by this Court:
“17.…. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process 
of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions 
can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. 
As the above discussion of the rival contentions show the alleged error
in the present case is far from self-evident and if it can be established, 
it has to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments. We do 
not think such an error can be cured by a writ of certiorari according 
to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such 
a writ. .…”
70. We may also quote with proﬁ t one more decision of this Court 
explaining the true scope of issue of a writ of certiorari and what is an error 
apparent on the face of the record, which could be corrected by issue of a 
high prerogative writ like certiorari. In the case of Ebrahim Aboobakar and 
Hawabai Aboobakar v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New 
Delhi, reported in (1952) 1 SCC 798, this Court made the observations in 
paras 12, 13, 14 and 15, which we quote below:
“12. The remaining three questions canvassed before us, unless they are 
of such a nature as would make the decision of the respondent dated 
13-5-1950, a nullity, cannot be the subject-matter of a writ of certiorari.
783
It is plain that such a writ cannot be granted to quash the decision of 
an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision 
is wrong. Indeed, it must be shown before such a writ is issued that 
the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in 
excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Want of 
jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter, so that 
the inferior court might not have authority to enter on the inquiry 
or upon some part of it. It may also arise from the absence of some 
essential preliminary or upon the existence of some particular facts 
collateral to the actual matter which the court has to try and which are 
conditions precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by it. But once 
it is held that the court has jurisdiction but while exercising it, it made 
a mistake, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by 
law for setting matters right inasmuch as a court has jurisdiction to 
decide rightly as well as wrongly. The three questions agitated before 
us do not seem to be questions which bear upon the jurisdiction of the 
court of appeal, or its authority to entertain them.
13. It was contended that no court of limited jurisdiction can give itself 
jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of 
the case upon which the limit of its jurisdiction depends and that the 
questions involved in the appeal before the respondent were collateral
to the merits of the case. As pointed out by Lord Esher, M.R., in R. v. 
CIT [R. v. CIT, (1888) LR 21 QBD 313 (CA)] , the formula enunciated 
above is quite plain but its application is often misleading. The learned 
Master of the Rolls classiﬁ ed the cases under two categories thus : 
(QBD pp. 319-20)
“… When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to 
exercise the power of deciding facts, is ﬁ rst established by Act of 
Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will 
give that tribunal or body. It may in eﬀ ect say that, if a certain 
state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it 
proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such 
things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to 
decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the 
jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, 
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and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But 
there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature 
may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction which 
includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary 
state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, [and] on ﬁ nding 
that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. 
When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body 
with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever 
jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal 
from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second 
of the two cases, I have mentioned it is erroneous application 
of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves 
jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because 
the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts 
including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the 
further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were 
given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, 
there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.”
14. The tribunal constituted to hear appeals under Section 24 has been 
constituted in these terms:
“Any person aggrieved by an order made under Section 7, Section 
16, Section 19 or Section 38 may prefer an appeal in such manner 
and within such time as may be prescribed—
(a) to the
Custodian, where the original order has been passed 
by a Deputy or Assistant Custodian;
(b) to the Custodian General, where the original order has 
been passed by the Custodian, an Additional Custodian or an 
authorised Deputy Custodian.”
15. Like all courts of appeal exercising general jurisdiction in civil 
cases, the respondent has been constituted an appellate court in 
words of the widest amplitude and the legislature has not limited his 
jurisdiction by providing that such exercise will depend on the existence 
of any particular state of facts. Ordinarily, a court of appeal has not 
only jurisdiction to determine the soundness of the decision of the
785
inferior court as a court of error, but by the very nature of things it has 
also jurisdiction to determine any points raised before it in the nature of 
preliminary issues by the parties. Such jurisdiction is inherent in its very 
constitution as a court of appeal. Whether an appeal is competent, whether 
a party has locus standi to prefer it, whether the appeal in substance is 
from one or another order and whether it has been preferred in proper 
form and within the time prescribed, are all matters for the decision of 
the appellate court so constituted. Such a tribunal falls within Class 2 of 
the classiﬁ cation of the Master of the Rolls [R. v. CIT, (1888) LR 21 QBD 
313 (CA)] . In these circumstances, it seems to us that the order of the 
High Court of Punjab that a writ of certiorari could not be issued to the 
respondent quashing the order of 13-5-1950, was right. We are further of 
the opinion that none of the contentions raised has any merit whatsoever.”
71. This Court in Parry and Company Limited v. Commercial Employees’ 
Association, Madras and Another (1952) 1 SCC 449 : AIR 1952 SC 179, held:
“14. The records of the case do not disclose any error apparent on the 
face of the proceeding or any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the 
Labour Commissioner which goes contrary to the principles of natural 
justice. Thus there was absolutely no grounds here which would justify a 
superior court in issuing a writ of certiorari for removal of an order or
proceeding of an inferior tribunal vested with powers to exercise judicial or 
quasi-judicial functions. What the High Court has done really is to exercise 
the powers of an appellate court and correct what it considered to be an 
error in the decision of the Labour Commissioner. This obviously it cannot 
do. The position might have been diﬀ erent if the Labour Commissioner 
had omitted to decide a matter which he was bound to decide and in such 
cases a mandamus might legitimately issue commanding the authority to 
determine questions which it left undecided [Board of Education v. Rice, 
1911 AC 179 (HL)]; but no certiorari is available to quash a decision 
passed with jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal on the mere ground that 
such decision is erroneous. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, 
in our opinion, is plainly unsustainable. 
(Emphasis supplied)
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
72. In another case, the same Court held:
““A certiorari cannot be granted to quash the decision of the appellate 
tribunal on these points on the ground that the decision is wrong” - 
‘Ebrahim Aboobakar v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property’, 
1952 Mad W.N. 502 (SC).”
73. It is, therefore, clear that in all ﬁ ndings on matters of fact and 
interpretation of law except in cases of defective jurisdiction, the decision 
of the tribunal must be deemed to be ﬁ nal.
74. The position is authoritatively summed up in Halsbury’s Laws of 
England Vol.IX in para 1493 where it is laid down thus:
“1493. Where the proceedings are regular upon their face and the 
magistrates had jurisdiction, the superior court will not grant the writ 
of certiorari on the ground that the Court below has misconceived a 
point of law. When the Court below has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it 
cannot be deemed to exceed or abuse its jurisdiction, merely because it 
incidentally misconstrues a statute, or admits illegal evidence, or rejects 
legal evidence, or misdirects itself as to the weight of the evidence, or 
convicts without evidence. Nor will certiorari be granted to quash the 
decision of an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the 
decision is wrong in matters of fact, and the Court will not hear evidence 
impeaching the decision on the facts. ….”
75. Similarly in the case reported in - ‘Colonial Bank of Australasia 
v.
Willan’, (1874) LR 5 PC 417, it is observed by their Lordships thus: “The 
question is whether the inferior court has jurisdiction to enter upon the enquiry 
and not whether there has been miscarriage of the procedure in the course of 
enquiry.” At page 443 of the same case, the learned Judges observed - “An 
adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject-matter is, if no 
defect appears on the face of it, to be taken as conclusive of facts stated therein. 
“The case in (1874) LR 5 PC 417 has been approvingly cited by Fazl Ali, J. who 
held - ‘Rai Brij Raj Krishna and Another v. Messrs S.K. Shaw and Brothers’, 
AIR 1951 SC 115 that an error of law does not constitute an error of jurisdiction 
and that a wrong decision on facts or law cannot be questioned in a civil Court.
76. It being open to the tribunals to come to one or the other conclusion 
on the materials before them, it cannot by any means be said that the decisions
787
are incorrect so as to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction for interference by a 
writ of certiorari. In a King’s Bench decision in R. v. Brighton and Area Rent 
Tribunal, (1950) 1 All England Reporter 946, Lord Goddard, CJ. observed that:
“… As the tribunal had observed all the formalities of the Act, had oﬀ ended 
against none of its provisions or against the regulations made under it, 
there was no ground for holding that the tribunal’s determination was 
not in accordance with law, and, therefore, the motions for certiorari and 
mandamus should be refused”.
77. The purpose of certiorari, as we understand, is only to conﬁ ne 
the inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction, so as to avoid the irregular 
exercise, or the non-exercise or the illegal assumption of it and not to correct 
errors of ﬁ nding of fact or interpretation of law committed by them in the 
exercise of powers vested in them under the statute. The accepted rule is 
that where a Court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question 
which crops up in the case and whether its decision is correct or otherwise, 
it is bound to stand until reversed by a competent Court. This Court in G. 
Veerappa Pillai v. Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. Kumbakonam, Tanjore 
District and Others, (1952) 1 SCC 334 observed:
“26. Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously 
intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where 
the subordinate tribunals or bodies or oﬃ  cers act wholly
without 
jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of 
natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, 
or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such 
act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. 
However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is 
not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself 
into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the 
decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken 
or the order to be made.”
78. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached to the 
conclusion that the impugned order passed by the High Court is not 
sustainable in law and the same deserves to be set aside. 
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

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[2023] 11 S.C.R.
79. In the result, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned order 
passed by the High Court dated 17.12.2020 in the Writ Petition (C) No. 
30620 of 2020 is set aside. 
80. No order as to costs.
81. The interim application filed by the intervenors also stands 
disposed.
Headnotes prepared by :  
Appeal allowed.
Divya Pandey