BIJAY KUMAR MANISH KUMAR HUF versus ASHWIN BHANULAL DESAI
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 859, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: IA disposed
Segment: Issues
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 859 : 2024 INSC 445
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF 
v. 
Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
(I.A. No.120219 of 2020) 
In 
Special Leave Petition (C) No.4049 of 2020
17 May 2024
[J.K. Maheshwari and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The interlocutory applications have been filed seeking direction for 
payment of rent and other associated benefits in connection with 
the property which is the subject matter of the dispute.
Headnotes†
Rent Control and Eviction – Non-payment of rent – The 
lis governs four different tenancies – Petitioner-applicant 
landlord alleges non-payment of rent and has filed 
applications in the pending SLPs seeking direction for 
payment of ‘monthly occupational charges’ following the 
prevalent market rate:
Held: On account of non-payment of rent, the lease was 
forfeited/determined – However, the respondent-tenant has 
neither delivered the possession of the property nor paid the 
rent – Also, the petitioner submitted a report of an independent 
valuer – The assessment of the rentals, made by the valuer, is @ 
INR 41/- per Sq.ft. – It is settled that a tenant who once entered 
the property in question lawfully, continues in possession after 
his right to do so stands extinguished, is liable to compensate 
the landlord for such time period after the right of occupancy 
expires – Prima facie, it is clear that the respondent-tenant 
had delayed the payment of rent and/or other dues, payable 
to the petitioner-applicant landlord – This denial of
monetary 
benefits accruing from the property, when viewed in terms of 
the unchallenged market report forming part of the record is 
undoubtedly substantial – This order for deposit of the amount 
claimed by the petitioner-applicant is being passed, to ensure 
* Author
860
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
complete justice inter se the parties – It is important to note that 
when a property is rented out, it is to ensure that the landlord 
by way of the property is able to secure some income – If the 
income remains static over a long period of time or in certain 
cases, as in the present case, yields no income, then such a 
landlord would be within his rights, subject of course, to the 
agreement with their tenant, to be aggrieved by the same – 
Therefore, the respondent is directed to deposit the amount of 
Rs. 5,15,05,512/-. [Paras 13, 19, 21 and 23]
Case Law Cited
Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. [2004] 
Supp. 6 SCR 843 : (2005) 1 SCC 705; State of Maharashtra & 
Anr. v. Super Max International Private Limited and Ors. [2009] 
13 SCR 801 : (2009) 9 SCC 772; Achal Misra v. Ram Shanker 
Singh & Ors. [2005] 3 SCR 439 : (2005) 5 SCC 531; Achal Misra 
(2) v. Rama Shankar Singh & Ors. [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 617 : 
(2006) 11 SCC 498; G.L. Vijain v. K. Shankar [2006] Supp. 9 
SCR 583 : (2006) 13 SCC 136; Martin and Harris (P) Ltd. v. 
Rajendra Mehta [2022] 16 SCR 38 : (2022) 8 SCC 527; Indian 
Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Sudera Realty Private Limited [2022] 19 
SCR 462 : (2022) SCC OnLine 1161; Mohammad Ahmed & Anr. 
v. Atma Ram Chauhan & Ors. [2011] 6 SCR 822 : (2011) 7 SCC 
755 – relied on.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Halsbury’s Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 23; Wharton’s Law 
Lexicon Seventeenth Edn.; Burton’s
Legal Thesaurus 3rd Edn. – 
referred to.
List of Acts
West Bengal Tenancy Act, 1997; Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
List of Keywords
Rent; Non-payment of Rent; Monthly Occupational charges; 
Independent valuer; Possession of property; Right of occupancy; 
Denial of monetary benefits; Corpus Juris Secundum; Tenancy at 
sufferance; Mesne Profit; Expiry of lease; Determination of lease; 
Forfeiture; Termination.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
861
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: I.A. No. 120219 of 2020
In
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 4049 of 2020
With
I.A. No. 120227 of 2020 In SLP(C) No. 4050 of 2020, I.A. No. 120235 
of 2020 In SLP(C) No. 4051 of 2020 and I.A. No. 120248 of 2020 In 
SLP(C) No. 4052 of 2020
Appearances for Parties
Rana Mukherjee, Sr. Adv., Ms. Vijaya Bhatia, Ganesh Shaw, Kunal 
Chatterji, Ms. Maitrayee Banerjee, Rohit Bansal, Ms. Kshitij Singh, 
Sohhom Sau, Samarth Mohanty, Arjun Bhatia, Advs. for the Petitioner.
Rupak Ghosh, Debdut Mukherjee, Ms. Sonia Dube, Ms. Kanchan 
Yadav, Ms. Surbhi Anand, Tanishq Sharma, Ms. Saumya Sharma, 
M/s. Legal Options, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
1.	
These petitions for special leave to appeal seek to lay a challenge 
to the judgment and order dated 7th November 2019 passed in 
C.O.Nos.1582-85 of 2019 by the High Court of Calcutta. The learned 
Single Judge while deciding the issue as to whether the West Bengal 
Tenancy Act, 19971 or the Transfer of Property Act, 18822 was to 
be applied for framing of the issues in the instant landlord-tenant 
dispute, held that the Tenancy Act would govern the same. 
2.	
Impugning the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the present 
Special Leave Petitions were filed before this Court. However, the 
reasoning adopted therein is not within the scope of the present 
adjudication.
During the pendency of these Special Leave Petitions 
1	
Tenancy Act
2	
T.P. Act
862
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
interlocutory applications have been filed seeking direction for 
payment of rent and other associated benefits in connection with 
the property which is the subject matter of the present dispute. It is 
these Interlocutory Applications that are sought to be disposed of 
by way of the present judgment.
3.	
It would, however, be apposite to have a bird’s eye view of the 
controversy. It is not in dispute that the lis governs four different 
tenancies. Due to alleged non- payment of rent, the lease was 
forfeited, and the petitioner-applicant initiated proceedings for 
ejectment under the T.P. Act. Suit(s) were filed before the City Civil 
Court at Calcutta seeking inter alia, a) recovery of possession by 
eviction of defendant (respondent- tenant herein); b) permanent 
injunction against the present respondents and his agents, servants, 
employees or associates etc., from alienating, transferring or parting 
with possession of the property. The respondent-tenant, in opposition 
thereto, filed an application seeking the rejection of the plaint, on the 
grounds of jurisdiction, and for the premises to be governed under 
the Tenancy Act alleging particularly that, possession has been 
sought in respect of a lease that is yet undetermined; the claim is 
bad in law, illegal and arbitrary; the suit has been misvalued and the 
plaint is insufficiently stamped, among others. The same came to be 
rejected by the concerned Court by
order dated 3rd February 20153. 
It was observed: –
“…Without a full-fledged trial and evidence the court 
cannot come to conclusion that the averments made 
in the plaint are false and frivolous or that there is any 
suppression of material fact. Notice of determination of 
lease, if not at all served upon the defendant and if it is 
mandatory, then the suit may fill in future. But that cannot 
come under the ambit of the provision of O 7 R 11 CPC. 
This court cannot take the view for rejection of plaint 
without giving or affording opportunity to the parties to 
bring evidence justifying their plea. On the other hand, 
because of action of the suit has to be found out on the 
conjoint reading of all paragraphs of the plaint. Because of 
3	
Annexure P 11 of the paper book at page 132
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
863
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
action does not mean only a date. Above all, the Plaintiff 
has specifically mentioned cause of action in paragraph 
15 of the plaint. The allegations or the averments made 
in the plaint has to be proved by the Plaintiff had the 
time of trial by producing evidence and it is the duty of 
the Plaintiff to prove that the lease has been determined 
properly or not.”
Allowing the matter not to rest there, the respondent-tenant pursued 
the matter further. The High Court, in its Civil Revisional Jurisdiction 
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, vide order dated 31st 
March 20154 upheld the dismissal of the application under Order 
VII Rule 11. Eventually, this Court vide judgment and order dated 
12th December 20185 directed the remand of the matter, observing 
thus: –
“9. Taking into consideration the peculiar facts and 
circumstances of the case, since the suit is still in the 
preliminary stage, we dispose of the appeal is directing the 
trial court to frame the issue, relating to the maintainability 
of the suit and applicability of enactments, as mentioned 
supra and decide the same in accordance with law as a 
preliminary issue as expeditiously as possible, preferably 
within a period of 6 months from the date of communication 
of this judgment.”
4.	
The Trial Court thereafter framed the following issues:-
"1.	
Is the suit triable under the provisions of the W.B.P.T 
Act, 1997 or the
Transfer of Property Act 1882?
2.	
Whether the suit is maintainable as framed or at all?”
5.	
The Trial Court in all four suits, answered the issues in favour of 
the plaintiff, primarily on the ground that since the tenancy, subject 
matter of the suit, was created with w.e.f. 20th November 1992 and 
the Tenancy Act came into force w.e.f. 10th July 2001. The agreement 
inter se the parties, therefore, was governed only by the T.P. Act. 
The observation of the trial court is extracted as under: –
4	
Annexure P 12 of the paper book at page 138
5	
Annexure P - 29 of paper book
864
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
“… It is pertinent to mention here that the lease deed was 
executed on 20.11.1992 for the period of 99 years and the 
W. B. P. T. Act, 1997 came into force on 10. 07. 01 i.e. 
much more earlier than the enforcement of the W. B. P. T. 
Act, 1997 and there is or was no express word in the W. 
B. P. T. Act, 1997 that alright accrued by any party from 
the prevailing any law will be extinguished since the W. B. 
P. T. Act, 1997 came into force on 10. 07.01. Therefore, 
it can be said that the present suit squarely governed by 
the T. P. Act and no under West Bengal Premises tenancy 
act, 1997 and in view of such factual aspect the present 
is perfectly maintainable…”
6.	
It is in appeal from such order of the Trial Court that the impugned 
judgment with particulars as noticed above, came to be passed. The 
High Court while upholding the jurisdictional issue in favour of the 
respondent-tenant, dismissed all the four suits of the plaintiff for the 
same not to be maintainable. Thus, the issue as already observed 
is as to whether the order passed by the High Court holding the 
respondent-tenant to be governed by the Tenancy Act, is legally 
sustainable or not.
7.	
In these Special Leave Petitions preferred by the landlord, notice 
was issued on 17th February 2020.
8.	
During the course of the hearing on 15th February 2024 petitioner-
applicant (landlord) had offered time to the tenants to vacate the 
premises. Certain
suggestions for amicably resolving the dispute for 
all times to come were exchanged, and as such the matters were 
adjourned. We are now informed that the petitioner-landlord’s offer of 
giving time to the tenant to hand over the vacant possession of the 
premises stands rejected. Thus, the landlord insisted on the disposal 
of the applications asking the tenant to pay the rent at the market 
rate for the lis to have been determined at the institution of the plaint. 
I.A. No.120219/2020 in SLP(C)No.4049/2020 :
9.	
The Interlocutory Application bearing the above particulars has been 
taken as the primary application for the sake of facts. It is noted that 
similar applications seeking similar prayer have been filed in other 
special leave petitions which shall be disposed of in accordance 
with this order.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
865
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
10.	 We notice that these applications in issue have been pending for 
almost three years. 
11.	 The applicant (petitioner in the SLP) seeks direction for payment of 
‘monthly occupational charges’ following the prevalent market rate. 
The prayer as made, is reproduced below:-
“(a) Direct the Respondent to forthwith pay monthly 
occupational charges at the rate of INR 41/- (Indian 
Rupees Forty One) per Square feet, for 1208 Sq.ft = INR 
49528/- since August, 2007 during the pendency of the 
present Special Leave Petition in respect of the present 
lease in dispute…”
12.	 Certain facts are required to be taken note of. The property in 
question is situated in the Dalhousie area, which has been termed 
as a commercial hub in Kolkata. The lease Agreement inter se 
the parties was entered into on 23rd February 1991 executed by 
the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. It is alleged that the 
respondent has been in default on payment of rent since 2002 and 
in default on payment of his share of municipal tax since 1996.
13.	 On account of non-payment of rent, the lease was forfeited/
determined. However, the respondent has neither delivered the 
possession of the property nor paid the rent. The petitioner has 
submitted a report of an independent valuer dated 12th March 2020. 
The assessment of the rentals, made by the valuer, it is submitted, 
is fair and reasonable @ INR 41/- per Sq.ft.
14.	 It
is submitted on behalf of the respondent that since no court has 
declared the end of the landlord-tenant relationship, the petitioner-
applicant asking the respondent to pay occupational charges as 
opposed to contractual rent would amount to the re-writing of the 
tenancy Agreement. Further, it is argued that occupation charges are 
only payable after the lease is validly determined or after the decree of 
eviction. Since both these eventualities are yet to occur, no question 
of such payment arises. It is also urged that the petitioner-applicant 
accepted rent from the respondent till August 2002 but thereafter 
refused to do so. According to the respondent-tenant, a total amount 
of Rs,2,06,400/- is payable on their part to the petitioner-applicant 
in the following terms :-
866
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
PARTICULARS
ARREARS OF RENT 
FROM SEPTEMBER, 
2002 TO FEB, 2024
INTEREST 
CALCULATED 
@10% TILL FEB, 
2024
TOTAL
Tenancy 1 
(Car Parking)
Rs.50/- X 258 
months = Rs.12900/-
Rs.14625/-
Rs.27525/-
Tenancy 2 
(Godown1)
Rs.150/- X 258 
months = Rs.38700/-
Rs.43875/-
Rs.82575/-
Tenancy 3 
(Godown 2)
Rs.250/- X 258 
months = Rs.64500/-
Rs.73125/-
Rs.137625/-
Tenancy 4 
(Office Space)
Rs.350/- X 258 
months = Rs.90300/-
Rs.102375/-
Rs.192675/-
TOTAL 2,06,400 + 2,34,400         =          Rs.4,40,400/-
15.	 On the other hand, the petitioner-applicant’s(landlord) calculation is 
tabulated as under:-
SLP No.
SLP(C) 4049 
of 2020
SLP(C) 4050 of 
2020
SLP(C) 4051 of 
2020
SLP(C) 4052 of 
2020
Date of 
Lease 
Deed
23.02.1991
20.11.1992
20.11.1992
20.11.1992
Area
1208 sqft
2500 sqft.
1650 sq.ft
800 sq.ft
Rent 
Amount 
per month
Area * Rs.41 
per sq.ft 
=Rs.49,258/-
Area * Rs.41 
per sq.ft 
=Rs.1,02,500 
Area * Rs.41 per 
sq.ft =Rs.67,650
Area * Rs.41 
per sq.ft 
=Rs.32,800/-
Rent due 
till date 
(from 
2007)
Amount* (17 
years* 12 
months)= 
Rs.1,01,03712
Amount* (17 
years* 12 
months)= 
Rs.2,09,10,000/-
Amount* (17 
years* 12 
months)= 
Rs.1,38,00,600/-
Amount * 
(17 years * 
12 months) 
=Rs.66,91,200
TOTAL 
Rs.5,15,05,512/-
16.	 Landlord-tenant disputes often make their way to this Court, and 
obviously, the payment of rent/mesne profit/occupation charges/
damages becomes, more often than not a matter of high contest. 
Determination,
as alleged to have taken place by the petitioner, 
can take place at the instance of both the landlord and the tenant. 
Halsbury’s Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol.23 defines ‘determination 
by landlord’ as follows :
“The tenancy is impliedly determined by the landlord when 
he does any act on the premises which is inconsistent with
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
867
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
the continuance of tenancy; for example, when he re-enters 
to take possession (b), or puts in a new tenant (c), or cuts 
down trees or carries away stone (d), the trees and stone 
not being excepted from the demise (e), and also when 
he does an act off the premises which is inconsistence 
with the tenancy, as when he conveys the reversion (f), or 
grants a lease of the premises to commence forthwith (g). 
An act done off the premises, however, does not determine 
the tenancy until the tenant has notice of it (h).” 
16.1	According to the petitioner, as already taken note of above, the 
lease was ‘forfeited’ due to non-payment of rent. Forfeiture, as 
defined by Corpus Juris Secundum is “the right of the lessor to 
terminate a lease because of lessee’s breach of covenant or 
other wrongful act”. Further, it mentions as under :
“The word as used in a lease does not, strictly 
speaking, refer to any right given to the lessee to 
terminate the lease. Accordingly, it has been held that 
provisions for forfeiture, cancelation or termination 
of a lease are usually inserted for the benefit of the 
lessor and because of some default on the part of 
the lessee. A forfeiture is in the nature of a penalty 
of doing of failing to do a particular thing, and results 
from failure to keep an obligation.” 
16.2	It would also be useful to refer to the concept of tenant at 
sufferance. As defined in the very same
treatise, such a tenant 
is a person who enters upon a land by lawful title,but continues 
in possession after the title has ended without statutory authority 
and without obtaining consent of the person then entitled. 
16.3	Wharton’s Law Lexicon Seventeenth Edn. discusses ‘tenancy 
at sufferance’ in the following terms :
“Sufferance, Tenancy at, This is the least and lowest 
estate which can subsist in realty. It is in strictness 
not an estate, but a mere possession only it arises 
when a person after his right to the occupation, 
under a lawful title, is at an end, continues (having 
no title at all) in possession of the land, without the 
agreement or disagreement of the person in whom
868
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
the right of possession resides. Thus if A is a tenant 
for yes, and his terms expires, or is a tenant at will, 
and his lessor dies, and he continues in possession 
without the disagreement of the person who is entitled 
to the same, in the one and the other of these cases 
he said to have the possession by sufferance – that 
is, merely by permission or indulgence, without any 
right : the law esteeming it just and reasonable, and 
for the interest of the tenant, and also of the person 
entitled to the possession, to deem the occupation 
to be continued by the permission of the person who 
has the right, till it is proved that the tenant withholds 
the possession wrongfully, which the law will not 
presume. As the party came to the possession by 
right, the law will esteem that right to continue either 
in point of estate or by the permission of the owner 
of the land till it is proved that the possession is held 
in opposition to the will of that person.”
17.	 Before adverting to the present facts and claims advanced by the 
parties it would be appropriate to refer to certain pronouncements 
of this Court where mesne profit, which is the mainstay of the 
interlocutory application(s) before us, have been awarded.
17.1	The respondent has referred to Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. 
v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd.6 to submit that the landlord’s claim 
for mesne profit is not maintainable, given that, no decree of 
ejectment stands
passed by the concerned civil court. We may 
refer to the observations made in the said judgment, which 
are, thus:
“9…….The power to grant stay is discretionary and 
flows from the jurisdiction conferred on an appellate 
court which is equitable in nature. To secure an 
order of stay merely by preferring an appeal is not 
a statutory right conferred on the appellant. So also, 
an appellate court is not ordained to grant an order of 
stay merely because an appeal has been preferred 
6	
[2004] Supp. 6 SCR 843 : (2005) 1 SCC 705
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
869
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
and an application for an order of stay has been 
made. Therefore, an applicant for order of stay must 
do equity for seeking equity. Depending on the facts 
and circumstances of a given case, an appellate court, 
while passing an order of stay, may put the parties 
on such terms the enforcement whereof would satisfy 
the demand for justice of the party found successful 
at the end of the appeal. In South Eastern Coalfields 
Ltd. v. State of M.P. [(2003) 8 SCC 648] this Court 
while dealing with interim orders granted in favour 
of any party to litigation for the purpose of extending 
protection to it, effective during the pendency of 
the proceedings, has held that such interim orders, 
passed at an interim stage, stand reversed in the 
event of the final decision going against the party 
successful in securing interim orders in its favour; 
and the successful party at the end would be justified 
in demanding compensation and being placed in the 
same situation in which it would have been if the 
interim order would not have been passed against it. 
The successful party can demand (a) the delivery to 
it of benefit earned by the opposite party under the 
interim order of the High Court, or (b) compensation 
for what it has lost, and to grant such relief is the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court. In our opinion, while 
granting an order of stay under Order 41 Rule 5 CPC, 
the appellate court does
have jurisdiction to put the 
party seeking stay order on such terms as would 
reasonably compensate the party successful at the 
end of the appeal insofar as those proceedings are 
concerned. 
x                         x                          x                        x
18. That apart, it is to be noted that the appellate court 
while exercising jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 5 of 
the Code did have power to put the appellant tenant 
on terms. The tenant having suffered an order for 
eviction must comply and vacate the premises. His 
right of appeal is statutory but his prayer for grant of
870
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
stay is dealt with in exercise of equitable discretionary 
jurisdiction of the appellate court. While ordering stay 
the appellate court has to be alive to the fact that it 
is depriving the successful landlord of the fruits of 
the decree and is postponing the execution of the 
order for eviction. There is every justification for the 
appellate court to put the appellant tenant on terms 
and direct the appellant to compensate the landlord 
by payment of a reasonable amount which is not 
necessarily the same as the contractual rate of rent. 
In Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) 
Ltd. [(1999) 2 SCC 325] this Court has held that 
once a decree for possession has been passed and 
execution is delayed depriving the judgment-creditor 
of the fruits of decree, it is necessary for the court to 
pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne 
profits which may be equivalent to the market rent is 
paid by a person who is holding over the property.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17.2	A Bench of three learned Judges in State of Maharashtra & 
Anr. v. Super Max International Private Limited and Ors7 
observed as under :
“67. The way this Court has been looking at the 
relationship between the landlord and the tenant 
in the past and the shift in the Court’s approach in 
recent times have been examined in some detail in the 
decision in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India [(2008) 
5 SCC 287] . In that decision one of us (Singhvi,
J.) speaking for the Court referred to a number of 
earlier decisions of the Court and (in para 12 of the 
judgment) observed as follows: (SCC pp. 304-05)
“12. Before proceeding further we consider 
it necessary to observe that there has been 
a definite shift in the Court’s approach while 
interpreting the rent control legislations. 
7	
[2009] 13 SCR 801 : (2009) 9 SCC 772
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
871
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
An analysis of the judgments of 1950s to 
early 1990s would indicate that in majority 
of cases the courts heavily leaned in 
favour of an interpretation which would 
benefit the tenant—Mohinder Kumar v. 
State of Haryana [(1985) 4 SCC 221] , 
Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T.N. [(1987) 
4 SCC 238], D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India 
[(1995) 1 SCC 104] and C.N. Rudramurthy 
v. K. Barkathulla Khan [(1998) 8 SCC 
275] . In these and other cases, the Court 
consistently held that the paramount 
object of every rent control legislation is 
to provide safeguards for tenants against 
exploitation by landlords who seek to take 
undue advantage of the pressing need 
for accommodation of a large number 
of people looking for a house on rent for 
residence or business in the background 
of acute scarcity thereof. However, a 
different trend is clearly discernible in the 
later judgments.”
x                 x               x               x               x
68. The learned Judge then referred to some later 
decisions and (in para 14 at SCC p. 306 of the 
judgment) quoted a passage from the decision in 
Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal [(2002) 5 SCC 
397], to the following effect: (Joginder Pal case [(2002) 
5 SCC 397] , SCC p. 404, para 9)
“14. … ‘9. … The courts have to adopt 
a reasonable and balanced approach 
while interpreting rent control legislations 
starting with an assumption that an equal 
treatment has
been meted out to both the 
sections of the society. In spite of the overall 
balance tilting in favour of the tenants, 
while interpreting such of the provisions as 
to take care of the interest of the landlord
872
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
the court should not hesitate in leaning in 
favour of the landlords. Such provisions 
are engrafted in rent control legislations 
to take care of those situations where the 
landlords too are weak and feeble and 
feel humble.’ ”
(emphasis in original)
x                 x                  x                  x                    x
79. Before concluding the decision one more question 
needs to be addressed: what would be the position if 
the tenant’s appeal/revision is allowed and the eviction 
decree is set aside? In that event, naturally, the status 
quo ante would be restored and the tenant would 
be entitled to get back all the amounts that he was 
made to pay in excess of the contractual rent. That 
being the position, the amount fixed by the court over 
and above the contractual monthly rent, ordinarily, 
should not be directed to be paid to the landlord 
during the pendency of the appeal/revision. The 
deposited amount, along with the accrued interest, 
should only be paid after the final disposal to either 
side depending upon the result of the case.”
17.3	It has been held that tenants shall be liable to pay a rent 
equivalent to mesne profit, from the date they are found not to 
be entitled to retain possession of the premises in question. In 
Achal Misra v. Ram Shanker Singh & Ors.8 this Court held -
“23. From the material available on record it does not 
appear that any rate of rent was appointed at which 
rent
would be payable by the respondents to the 
landlord. The respondents also do not seem to have 
taken any steps for fixation of rent of the premises 
in their occupation. They have been happy to have 
got the premises in a prime locality, occupying and 
enjoying the same for no payment. We make it clear 
8	
[2005] 3 SCR 439 : (2005) 5 SCC 531
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
873
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
that the respondents shall be liable to pay the rent 
equivalent to mesne profits with effect from the date 
with which they are found to have ceased to be entitled 
to retain possession of the premises as tenant and 
for such period the landlord’s entitlement cannot be 
held pegged to the standard rent. Reference may 
be had to the law laid down by this Court in Atma 
Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. 
[(2005) 1 SCC 705].”
This position was reiterated in Achal Misra (2) v. Rama Shankar 
Singh & Ors.9.
17.4	The power to grant stay on the execution proceedings which 
would then result into an order for payment of mesne profit is 
what has been described as incidental or subject to the final 
outcome of the case. This Court has observed, in G.L. Vijain 
v. K. Shankar10 as under - 
“10. It must be borne in mind that incidental power 
is to be exercised in aid to the final proceedings. 
In other words an order passed in the incidental 
proceedings will have a direct bearing on the result 
of the suit. Such proceedings which are in aid of the 
final proceedings cannot, thus, be held to be on a par 
with supplemental proceedings which may not have 
anything to do with the ultimate result of the suit.
11. Such a supplemental proceeding is initiated 
with a view to prevent the ends of justice from 
being defeated. Supplemental proceedings may not 
be taken recourse to in a routine manner but
only 
when an exigency of situation arises therefor. The 
orders passed in the supplemental proceedings may 
sometimes cause hardships to the other side and, 
thus, are required to be taken recourse to when it is 
necessary in the interest of justice and not otherwise. 
9	
[2006] Supp. 1 SCR 617 : (2006) 11 SCC 498
10	
[2006] Supp. 9 SCR 583 : (2006) 13 SCC 136
874
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
There are well-defined parameters laid down by the 
Court from time to time as regards the applicability 
of the supplemental proceedings.
12. Incidental proceedings are, however, taken 
recourse to in aid of the ultimate decision of the suit 
which would mean that any order passed in terms 
thereof, subject to the rules prescribed therefor, may 
have a bearing on the merit of the matter. Any order 
passed in aid of the suit is ancillary power.”
17.5	This Court in Martin and Harris (P) Ltd. v. Rajendra Mehta11 
speaking through one of us (J.K. Maheshwari, J.) observed that - 
“18. Thus, after passing the decree of eviction 
the tenancy terminates and from the said date the 
landlord is entitled for mesne profits or compensation 
depriving him from the use of the premises. The view 
taken in Atma Ram [Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. 
v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705] has 
been reaffirmed in State of Maharashtra v. Super 
Max International (P) Ltd. [State of Maharashtra v. 
Super Max International (P) Ltd., (2009) 9 SCC 772 : 
(2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 857] by three-Judge Bench of this 
Court. Therefore, looking to the fact that the decree 
of eviction passed by the trial court on 3-3-2016 has 
been confirmed in appeal; against which second 
appeal is pending, however, after stay on being asked 
the direction to pay mesne profits or compensation 
issued by the High Court is in consonance to the 
law laid down by this Court,
which is just, equitable 
and reasonable.
19. The basis of determination of the amount of 
mesne profits, in our view, depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case considering the place 
where the property is situated i.e. village or city or 
metropolitan city, location, nature of premises i.e. 
11	
[2022] 16 SCR 38 : (2022) 8 SCC 527
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
875
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
commercial or residential area and the rate of rent 
precedent on which premises can be let out are the 
guiding factor in the facts of individual case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18.	 A perusal of the judgments extracted above as also other cases 
where Atma Ram Properties (supra) one common factor can be 
observed, i.e., the decree of eviction stands passed and the same 
having been stayed, gives rise to the question of payment of mesne 
profit. As observed above, the respondent contends that since, in the 
present case no decree of eviction is passed, and there is no stay 
awarded, the question of such payment does not arise. 
19.	 While the above-stated position is generally accepted, it is also 
within the bounds of law, that a tenant who once entered the 
property in question lawfully, continues in possession after his 
right to do so stands extinguished, is liable to compensate the 
landlord for such time period after the right of occupancy expires. 
In this regard, we may refer to Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. 
Sudera Realty Private Limited12, wherein this Court in para 64 
observed as under :
“64. A tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of 
the lease may be treated as a tenant at sufferance, which 
status is a shade higher than that of a mere trespasser, 
as in the case of a tenant continuing after the expiry of 
the lease, his original entry was lawful. But a tenant at 
sufferance is
not a tenant by holding over. While a tenant 
at sufferance cannot be forcibly dispossessed, that does 
not detract from the possession of the erstwhile tenant 
turning unlawful on the expiry of the lease. Thus, the 
appellant while continuing in possession after the expiry 
of the lease became liable to pay mesne profits.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20.	 It is to be noted that the Court in Sudera Realty (supra) observed 
that mesne profits become payable on continuation of possession 
12	
[2022] 19 SCR 462 : 2022 SCC OnLine 1161
876
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
after ‘expiry’ of lease. In our considered view, the effect of the words 
‘determination’, ‘expiry’, ‘forfeiture’ and ‘termination’ would, subject 
to the facts applicable, be similar, i.e., when any of these three 
words are applied to a lease, henceforth, the rights of the lessee/
tenant stand extinguished or in certain cases metamorphosed into 
weaker iteration of their former selves. Illustratively, Burton’s Legal 
Thesaurus 3rd Edn. suggests the following words as being similar to 
‘expire’ - cease, come to an end; ‘determine’ is similar to - come to 
a conclusion, bring to an end; ‘forfeiture’ is similar to – deprivation/
destruction of a right, divestiture of property; and ‘terminate’ is similar 
to – bring to an end, cease, conclude. Therefore, in any of the these 
situations, mesne profit would be payable.
21.	 Having considered the submissions made across the Bar, we note that 
the disputed nature of the lease deed, in other words, its continuation 
or forfeiture on account of non-payment is heavily contested and 
stemming therefrom, so is the nature of payment to be made. We also 
note that the location of demised premises is in the heart of Kolkata 
and if the submissions of the petitioner are to be believed, they have 
been deprived of rent for a considerable period of time. Taking a lock 
stock and barrel view of the present dispute, the averments and the 
documents placed before us, we may record a prima facie
view, 
that the respondent-tenant has for the reasons yet undemonstrated, 
been delaying the payment of rent and/or other dues, payable to the 
petitioner-applicant landlord. This denial of monetary benefits accruing 
from the property, when viewed in terms of the unchallenged market 
report forming part of the record is undoubtedly substantial and as 
such, subject to just exceptions, we pass this order for deposit of the 
amount claimed by the petitioner-applicant, to ensure complete justice 
inter se the parties, After all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that 
the very purpose for which a property is rented out, is to ensure that 
the landlord by way of the property is able to secure some income. 
If the income remains static over a long period of time or in certain 
cases, as in the present case, yields no income, then such a landlord 
would be within his rights, subject of course, to the agreement with 
their tenant, to be aggrieved by the same. The factors considered 
by us have been referred to in Martin and Harris (Supra). We are 
supported in our conclusion by the observations and guidelines issued 
by this Court in Mohammad Ahmed & Anr. v. Atma Ram Chauhan
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 
877
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
& Ors.13. We reproduce the ones relevant to the adjudication of the 
present dispute hereinbelow-
“21. According to our considered view majority of these 
cases are filed because the landlords do not get reasonable 
rent akin to market rent, then on one ground or the other 
litigation is initiated… 
(i) The tenant must enhance the rent according to the 
terms of the agreement or at least by ten per cent, after 
every three years and enhanced rent should then be 
made payable to the landlord. If the rent is too low (in 
comparison to market rent), having been fixed almost 
20 to 25 years back then the present market rate should 
be worked out either on the basis of valuation report or 
reliable estimates of building rentals in the surrounding 
areas, let out on rent recently.
(ii) Apart from the rental, property tax, water tax, 
maintenance charges, electricity charges for the actual 
consumption of the tenanted premises and for common 
area shall be payable by the tenant only so that the 
landlord gets the actual rent out of which nothing would 
be deductible. In case there is enhancement in property 
tax, water tax or maintenance charges, electricity charges 
then the same shall also be borne by the tenant only.
x                  x                    x                     x
(v) If the present and prevalent market rent assessed and 
fixed between the parties is paid by the tenant then the 
landlord
shall not be entitled to bring any action for his 
eviction against such a tenant at least for a period of 5 
years. Thus for a period of 5 years the tenant shall enjoy 
immunity from being evicted from the premises.
(vi) The parties shall be at liberty to get the rental fixed by 
the official valuer or by any other agency, having expertise 
in the matter.
13	
[2011] 6 SCR 822 : (2011) 7 SCC 755
878
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
(vii) The rent so fixed should be just, proper and adequate, 
keeping in mind the location, type of construction, 
accessibility to the main road, parking space facilities 
available therein, etc. Care ought to be taken that it does 
not end up being a bonanza for the landlord.”
22.	 Since the Special Leave Petitions are pending adjudication, we 
make it clear that directions made in the above-stated Interlocutory 
Applications herein are subject to the final outcome of the former. 
Keeping in view the location of the demised premises, the rent as 
agreed, the alleged non-payment of rent, the default in payment of 
interest, as alleged, and other such like factors we are inclined to 
accept the calculation of dues as made by the petitioner-applicant, 
submitted to this Court during hearing, as reproduced hereinabove.
23.	 Consequently, keeping in view the observations made in Super 
Max International (supra) and G.L. Vijain (supra), we direct the 
respondent to deposit the above-stated amount of Rs.5,15,05,512/- 
with the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today. An 
affidavit of compliance shall be filed in the Registry of this Court within 
a week thereafter. Failure to comply with the aforementioned shall 
entail all consequences within the law, including wilful disobedience 
of the order. The Registry is directed to place the amount received 
in a short-term, interest-bearing fixed deposit. 
24.	 The
Interlocutory Applications for directions seeking similar relief filed in 
SLP(C)Nos.4050 (I.A. No.120227/2020), 4051 (I.A. No.120235/2020), 
and 4052 (I.A. No.120248/2020) of 2020 shall stand disposed of 
in the same and similar terms as the I.A. No.120219/2020 filed in 
SLP(C)No.4049/2020, discussed above.
25.	 Let the Special Leave Petitions appear in the month of July, 2024.
Result of the case: IAs disposed of.
†Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan