UNION OF INDIA versus SANJIV CHATURVEDI
[2023] 2 S.C.R. 59, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Matter referred to larger bench
Segment: Issues
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UNION OF INDIA
v.
SANJIV CHATURVEDI
(Civil Appeal No.1587 of 2023)
MARCH 03, 2023
[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 – Transfer of OA –
Respondent no.1-original writ petitioner filed Original Application
(OA) before Nainital Circuit Bench, CAT – Union of India filed
application for transfer of OA from Nainital Circuit Bench to the
Principal Bench, New Delhi – By an order dated 04.12.2020
Chairman of the Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi transferred
it to the Principal Bench, New Delhi – It was challenged before
High Court of Uttarakhand and High Court had set aside the
aforesaid order – On appeal, held : The matter involving the issue
of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court to decide a challenge to
an order passed by the Chairman, CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi
requires reconsideration by a larger Bench.
Referring the matter to larger Bench, the Court
HELD : 1. Regard being had to the important issues raised
by the respondent no.1 and Union of India and having gone
through the judgment(s) and order(s) passed by this Court in
L. Chandra Kumar and Alapan Bandyopadhyay. The issue
involved is with respect to the territorial jurisdiction of the High
Courts and the effect of introduction of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution of India and the statement of the Law Minister while
introducing Article 226(2) of the Constitution referred and that
the issue involved affects a large number of employees and is of
public
importance, it would be appropriate that the matter
involving the issue of territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High
Court to decide a challenge to an order passed by the Chairman,
CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi should be considered by a
Larger Bench. [Para 6][71-C-E]
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC
261 : [1997] 2 SCR 1186; Kusum Ingots and Alloys
[2023] 2 S.C.R. 59
59
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Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. (2004) 6 SCC 254 :
[2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 841; Alchemist Ltd. and Anr. v.
State Bank of Sikkim and Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 335 :
[2007] 4 SCR 46; Union of India Vs. Alapan
Bandyopadhyay (2022) 3 SCC 133 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1997] 2 SCR 1186
referred to
Para 3.5
[2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 841
referred to
Para 4
[2007] 4 SCR 46
referred to
Para 5.5
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1587
of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.10.2021 of the High Court
of Uttarakhand at Nainital in WPSB No. 407 of 2020.
Arvind Kumar Sharma, Adv. for the Appellant.
Tushar Mehta, SGI, K M Natraj, ASG, Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv.,
Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Vyom Raghuvanshi, Adith Deshmukh,
Ms. Purvat Goel, Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Rajat Nair, Kanu Agrawal,
Adit Khorana, Ms. Aakansha Kaul, Anukalp Jain, Manek Singh, Aman
Sahani, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Hrishikesh Baruah, Ms. Radhika Gupta,
Himanshu Shekhar, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Leave granted
2.  Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 23.10.2021 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at
Nainital in WPSB No. 407/2020, by which, the High Court has allowed
the said writ petition and has set aside order dated 04.12.2020 passed by
the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Principal Bench,
New Delhi by which the learned Principal Bench of the
Tribunal
transferred Original Application (OA) No. 331/109/2020 filed by the
original writ petitioner, from the Allahabad Bench (Nainital Circuit Bench)
to the Principal Bench, New Delhi, the Union of India has preferred the
present appeal.
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3. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are under:-
3.1 That the contesting respondent No. 1 herein – original writ
petitioner filed original application (OA) before the Nainital Circuit Bench,
CAT with the following prayers: -
“a. To call for records and issue appropriate direction/order
for quashing present system of 360 degree appraisal being used
in empanelment of officers at the level of Joint Secretary and
above in Central Government, being arbitrary, unreasonable, in
violation of principles of natural justice, being in supersession of
statutory rules and finding of Parliamentary Committee Report.
b. To restrain the respondents from filling up the posts of
Joint Secretary/equivalent to Joint Secretary rank and also posts
above in rank of Joint Secretary in Central Government, through
contract system, in future.
c. To set aside all those provisions of present Central
Staffing Scheme, governing constitution of and evaluation by
Expert Panel for the purpose of empanelment at Joint Secretary
level in Government, issued vide O.M. 36/77/94-EO Central
(SM-1)” date 05.01.1996 and modified subsequently, being
arbitrary, unreasonable, violative of principles of natural justice
and in violation of basic federal structure enshrined into the
Constitution.
d. To direct the respondents to remove huge artificial time
lag created between empanelment of officers of different services
and between same levels in Central Government and State
Government,
in case of All India Service Officers.
e. To direct the respondents to consider the case of
Applicant for empanelment to the level of Joint Secretary in view
of fulfillment of all the eligibility criteria regarding completion of
requisite number of years of service and elevation into Level-14
of Pay Matrix; or alternatively, issue directions to respondents not
to reject abovementioned case of Applicant, on any ulterior/
subjective/oblique consideration, and decide the same objectively,
on merit, facts and in accordance with law only.
f. To order and appropriate investigation so as to fix
responsibility into various irregularities into recruitment process
UNION OF INDIA v. SANJIV CHATURVEDI
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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of Joint Secretary rank officers through contract system, taken
place in the year 2019, in view of irregularities brought out in para
3.5 of factual matrix.”
3.2 That thereafter, the Union of India filed transfer application
under Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act, 1985)
seeking transfer of OA filed by the writ petitioner from Nainital Circuit
Bench to the Principal Bench, New Delhi. That by order dated 04.12.2020,
the Chairman of the Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, ordered
transfer of the said OA to the Principal Bench, New Delhi by observing
that: -
“A perusal of the prayer in the O.A. discloses that the very
procedure for empanelment for the post of Joint Secretary is sought
to be assailed. The matters of this nature have their own impact
on the very functioning of the Central Government. It is felt that
the O.A. deserves to be heard by Principal Bench. Since the
hearings are taking place through video conferencing, no prejudice
are taking place through video conferencing, no prejudice would
be caused to the respondent in the P.T., i.e. applicant in the O.A.
also’”
3.3 The order dated 04.12.2020 transferring OA No. 331/109/
2020 from Nainital Circuit Bench to the Principal Bench, New Delhi
came to be challenged by the original writ petitioner – original applicant
before the High Court of Uttarakhand. It was submitted on behalf of the
original writ petitioner before the High Court that
what was challenged
in the OA was the recruitment selection process for the post of Joint
Secretary. He was also aggrieved of the fact that although eligible
candidates were available for the post of Joint Secretary, within the All-
India Services, a policy decision has been taken by the Central
Government that the post of Joint Secretary would be filled by hiring
persons on contractual basis for a period of three to five years and the
said policy decision would adversely affect the rights of the persons
who are in the All-India Services. It was also submitted on behalf of the
original writ petitioner – original applicant that the ground on which the
Union of India sought transfer of OA that, since the original writ petitioner
has challenged a policy decision and since the policy decision has
“nationwide repercussion”, therefore, the OA deserves to be transferred
to the Principal Bench, New Delhi, is untenable. It was submitted that if
the Parliament were of the opinion that issues of “national importance”
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need to be decided only by the Principal Bench, a provision would have
existed in the Administrative Tribunals Act, debarring other Benches of
CAT from hearing issues of “national importance” or having “nationwide
repercussion.” However, there is no such bar contained in the
Administrative Tribunals Act, preventing other Benches of CAT, which
are considered to be equivalent to the Principal Bench, from hearing or
from examining a policy decision of the Central Government. It was
submitted that all the Benches constituted under Section 5 of the Act,
1985 would have equal jurisdiction.
3.4 The petition was opposed on behalf of the Union of India. The
Union of India challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of
Uttarakhand to entertain the writ petition. It was submitted on behalf of
the Union of India that since all the relevant files and papers are at New
Delhi the case should be transferred to New Delhi. It was also the case
on behalf of the Union of India that since no cause of action had arisen
in Uttarakhand, the Nainital Circuit Bench does not have the territorial
jurisdiction to hear the petition. It was submitted that as the policy was
framed in New Delhi, the names were invited for selection in New Delhi,
the selection process begins and ends in New Delhi, therefore, only the
Principal Bench at New Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to hear the OA.
It was also submitted that since the relevant files are lying in New Delhi
and since
the relevant witnesses would be available in New Delhi, it
would be in the interest of justice to transfer the case to the Principal
Bench, rather than keeping the case pending before the Nainital Circuit
Bench. It was lastly submitted that since the decision with regard to a
policy decision of the Central Government would have nationwide
repercussions, therefore, only the Principal Bench would be the suitable
bench for deciding the validity of the policy decision. Therefore, it was
submitted that the Chairman has rightly transferred the OA from the
Nainital Circuit Bench to the Principal Bench in exercise of powers
under Section 25 of the Act, 1985. In the rejoinder, it was the case on
behalf of the original writ petitioner as regards the cause of action, that
part cause of action has arisen in Uttarakhand as the names of the
eligible candidates for the post of Joint Secretary are called from the
States; thus, the names are recommended by the States; the service
records of the eligible candidates are with the State and the service
records are forwarded by the State. Moreover, as the decision to appoint
the Joint Secretaries on contractual basis adversely affects his right of
consideration for the post of Joint Secretary, hence, the impact of the
UNION OF INDIA v. SANJIV CHATURVEDI
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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policy decision deprives his right in the State of Uttarakhand and
therefore, a part of cause of action has arisen in the State of Uttarakhand
and therefore, the Nainital Circuit Bench has jurisdiction to hear the
OA.
3.5 That thereafter, after considering the relevant provisions of
the Act, 1985 and following the decision of this Court in the case of L.
Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261, the High
Court has allowed the writ petition and has set aside the order dated
04.12.2020 passed by the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal,
New Delhi by observing that there is no requirement of law that a policy
decision must, necessarily, be challenged before the Principal Bench
and that there is no provision under the Act, 1985 that a challenge to a
policy decision can be heard only by the Principal Bench.
3.6 Feeling aggrieved with the impugned judgment and order passed
by the High Court, Union of India has preferred the present appeal.
4. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing on
behalf of the Union of India has vehemently submitted that as such the
High Court of Uttarakhand has erred in entertaining the writ petition. It
is submitted that as such no cause of action has arisen within the territory
of Uttarakhand High Court, the Uttarakhand High Court lacked the
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the order passed
by the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal,
Principal Bench, New
Delhi. Heavy reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case
of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) as well as on the decision of this Court
in the case of Union of India Vs. Alapan Bandyopadhyay (2022) 3
SCC 133.
4.1 In the caseof Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) after
considering and following the decision of this Court in the case of L.
Chandra Kumar (supra), it is specifically observed and held that “all
decisions of Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of
the Constitution will be subject to the scrutiny before a Division Bench
of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls.”
It is submitted that before this Court an identification question arises.
That before this Court in the case of Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra)
the High Court at Calcutta set aside the order passed by the Principal
Bench, New Delhi transferring the OA and its files from the Calcutta
Bench to the Principal Bench (New Delhi). That it is observed and held
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by this Court that the Calcutta High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction.
Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General heavily relied upon
paragraphs 15 to 17.
4.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions it is vehemently submitted by Shri Tushar Mehta, learned
Solicitor General that the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court of Uttarakhand is wholly without jurisdiction.
4.3 Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General has made
elaborate submissions on merits also, namely, on the powers of the
Chairman conferred under Section 25 of the Act, 1985.
5. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on
behalf of the original writ petitioner. On the submissions made on behalf
of the Union of India that the High Court of Uttarakhand would have no
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition challenging the decision of the
Chairman, CAT, to transfer the OA from Nainital Circuit Bench to
Principal Bench, New Delhi, it is vehemently submitted by Shri Shyam
Divan, learned Senior Advocate that under Article 226 (2) of the
Constitution of India any High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article
226 provided a part cause of action has arisen in its jurisdiction irrespective
of whether the authority or government which passed the order is not
located within the jurisdiction of the said High Court. Thus, there can be
no doubt that the High Court can exercise the powers under Article 226,
if the cause of action, wholly
or in part, arises in the territorial jurisdiction
of that High Court.
5.1 It is submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of L.
Chandra Kumar (supra) while recognising the jurisdiction of a High
Court under whose jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, may not be read to be
limiting the jurisdiction of other High Court under Article 226(2), if
otherwise available. It is submitted that the decision of this Court does
not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court under whose jurisdiction
the Tribunal falls. It is submitted that the judgment ought not to be read
as constricting the scope of Article 226(2). Therefore, to this extent the
decision of this Court in the case of Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra)
may require reconsideration.
5.2 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior
Advocate that under the Constitutional scheme, the remedies under Article
226 and Article 227 are extremely valuable remedies available to citizens
UNION OF INDIA v. SANJIV CHATURVEDI
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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where they reside or carry on business or are posted. The scheme does
not require citizens to come exclusively all the way to Delhi to seek
redressal. Thus, limiting the remedy under Article 226 is contrary to the
spirit of the Constitution, contrary to the spirit and principle of access to
justice and contrary to the basic structure of the Constitution which enables
judicial review across the country and not at one concentrated location.
5.3 It submitted that this Court, by way of a judicial order, ought
not to take away jurisdiction from other high courts which are otherwise
empowered under Article 226(2) to entertain a Writ Petition against the
order of a Tribunal located in the territory beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the said high courts. It is further submitted that if such an interpretation
is taken to its logical conclusion, then it would result in undue hardship
and inconvenience to the employees of the central government itself
who are posted across the country.
5.4 Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate has taken us to
the historical background of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and
the development of the law on the jurisdiction of the High Courts including
the statement of objects and reasons to the Constitution (Fifteenth
Amendment) Act, 1963 and the remarks of the then Law Minister at the
time of introducing the amendment.
5.5 It is submitted that in the subsequent decision of this
Court in
the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 254, which was after the introduction of Article
226(2), has observed and held that the High Court would have jurisdiction
if a part of the cause of action arises in its jurisdiction irrespective of
location/residence of the authority.
5.6 It is submitted that this Court in the case of Alchemist Ltd.
and Anr. Vs. State Bank of Sikkim and Ors., (2007) 11 SCC 335,
noting the development of law in relation to the territorial jurisdiction of
the High Courts under Article 226 has held that “the legislative history of
the constitutional provisions, therefore, makes it clear that after 1963,
cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted
in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action
in whole or in part arises.”
5.7 It is further submitted that the observations made by this Court
in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) that all decisions of tribunals
would be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court
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within whose jurisdiction the tribunal concerned falls, is not an exclusion
of the jurisdiction of the other high courts which may have jurisdiction,
particularly, under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. It is
submitted that therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Alapan
Bandyopadhyay (supra) may require reconsideration.
5.8 In support of his above request, he has made following
submissions: -
(i)
The Judgement of this Court in the case of Alapan
Bandyopadhyay (supra) arose out of an order passed by
the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal exercising
powers under Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985 transferring the O.A. filed by the Respondent
therein from the Calcutta Bench of the Central
Administrative Tribunal to the Principal Bench at New Delhi.
The said Transfer Order was quashed by the Calcutta High
Court by allowing the Writ Petition filed by the Respondent
therein.
(ii)
The Order of the Calcutta High Court was challenged by
the Union of India on the ground that a challenge against
the order passed in the Transfer Application by the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench at New Delhi, was
maintainable only before the High Court of Delhi as the
Principal Bench of the Tribunal lies within its territorial
jurisdiction.
(iii)
This Hon’ble Court, referring to paragraph 99 of the
Judgment in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), held that any
decision of the Tribunal can only be subjected to scrutiny
before a
Division Bench of a High Court within whose
jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. Consequently, it
was held that the jurisdiction lies with the High Court of
Delhi since the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative
Tribunal is located at New Delhi.
5.9 It is submitted that the relevant paragraphs from the judgment
of this Hon’ble Court in Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) are reproduced
herein below:
“36. In view of the reasoning adopted the Constitution Bench in
L. Chandra Kumar case [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India,
UNION OF INDIA v. SANJIV CHATURVEDI
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] held Section 28 of the
Act and the “exclusion jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations
enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B, to the extent
they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles
226/227 and the Supreme Court under Article 32, of the
Constitution, was held unconstitutional besides holding clause 2(d)
of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the same
extent, as unconstitutional.
37. Further, it was held thus : (L. Chandra Kumar case [L.
Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997
SCC (L&S) 577] , SCC p. 311, para 99) “99. … The jurisdiction
conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon
the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part
of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this
jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may
perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred
by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals
created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution
are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity
of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals
will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench
of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal
concerned falls.”
(emphasis supplied)
38. When once a Constitution Bench of this
Court declared the
law that “all decisions of Tribunals created under Article 323-A
and Article 323-B of the Constitution will be subject to the scrutiny
before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction
the Tribunal concerned falls”, it is impermissible to make any further
construction on the said issue. The expression “all decisions of
these Tribunals” used by the Constitution Bench will cover and
take within its sweep orders passed on applications or otherwise
in the matter of transfer of original applications from one Bench
of the Tribunal to another Bench of the Tribunal in exercise of the
power under Section 25 of the Act.
39. In other words, any decision of such a Tribunal, including the
one passed under Section 25 of the Act could be subjected to
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scrutiny only before a Division Bench of a High Court within
whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. This unambiguous
exposition of law has to be followed scrupulously while deciding
the jurisdictional High Court for the purpose of bringing in challenge
against an order of transfer of an original application from one
Bench of Tribunal to another Bench in the invocation of Section
25 of the Act.
40. The law thus declared by the Constitution Bench cannot be
revisited by a Bench of lesser quorum or for that matter by the
High Courts by looking into the bundle of facts to ascertain whether
they would confer territorial jurisdiction to the High Court within
the ambit of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. We are of the
considered view that taking another view would undoubtedly result
in indefiniteness and multiplicity in the matter of jurisdiction in
situations when a decision passed under Section 25 of the Act is
to be called in question especially in cases involving multiple parties
residing within the jurisdiction of different High Courts albeit
aggrieved by one common order passed by the Chairman at the
Principal Bench at New Delhi.”
5.10 It is submitted that the Constitution Bench in L. Chandra
Kumar (supra) was dealing with a challenge to the constitutional
validity of Article 323-A(2d), Article 323- B(3d) of the Constitution of
India and Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 which
excluded jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
under Article 32
and of the High Courts under Article 226. The final conclusion reached
by the Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) at paragraph
99, was that:
(a)
the power of Judicial Review guaranteed under Article 32
and Article 226/227 is part of the inviolable basic structure
of our constitution.
(b)
the provisions under challenge were declared
unconstitutional to the extent that they exclude the jurisdiction
of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Article
226/227 and 32 of the Constitution of India respectively.
(c)
However, it was held that all service matters must at the
first instance go to the Administrative Tribunal and upon
the tribunal delivering the judgment the same could be
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[M. R. SHAH, J.]
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subjected to a challenge under the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court within whose jurisdiction the tribunal falls.
5.11 It is submitted that judgment in the case of L. Chandra
Kumar (supra) ought not to be read to have held that only the High
Court under whose territorial jurisdiction the tribunal falls will have
jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition against the order of the said
tribunal.
5.12 The effect of the Judgment in Alapan Bandyopadhyay
(supra) is that only the High Court under whose territorial jurisdiction
the tribunal falls would have jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition against
the order of the said Tribunal.
5.13 It is submitted that as is clear from the section dealing with
the development of law relating to the territorial jurisdiction of the High
Courts, the intent and purpose behind adding clause (2) under Article
226 would be defeated if paragraph 99 of L. Chandra Kumar (supra)
is interpreted in such a manner.
5.14 It is further submitted that the power of judicial review is an
integral and essential feature of the Constitution and even a constitutional
amendment cannot exclude the power of the high courts and the Supreme
Court to exercise their power of judicial review and this power can
never be ousted.
5.15 It is respectfully submitted that this Court, by way of a judicial
order, ought not to take away jurisdiction from other high courts which
are otherwise empowered under Article 226(2)
to entertain a Writ Petition
against the order of a Tribunal located in the territory beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the said high courts.
5.16 It is submitted that under the Constitutional scheme, all
twenty-five High Courts have equivalent jurisdiction, and no discrimination
or special treatment is envisaged to any particular High Court. This is
one of the facets of independence of judiciary.
5.17 It is further submitted that if such an interpretation is taken
to its logical conclusion, then it would result in undue hardship and
inconvenience to the employees of the central government itself who
are posted across the country. For example, if an application were to be
filed by an aggrieved employee before the Ernakulam Bench of the
Central Administrative Tribunal, and an Order for its Transfer to another
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Bench were to be passed by the Principal Bench at Delhi, the aggrieved
would be forced to travel all the way from Ernakulam to Delhi to challenge
the Transfer Order and contest the case. As already submitted above,
this would defeat the very purpose of inserting Article 226(2) into the
Constitution with the specific intent of providing a cheap, effective and
efficacious remedy in law at the doorstep of the aggrieved person.
5.18 It is therefore prayed that the decision of this Hon’ble Court
rendered in Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) case ought to be
reconsidered in light of the submissions made above.
6. Regard being had to the important issue raised by Shri Shyam
Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No.
1 and the submissions made by Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor
General and having gone through the judgment(s) and order(s) passed
by this Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) and Alapan
Bandyopadhyay (supra) and that the issue involved is with respect to
the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts and the effect of introduction
of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India and the statement of the
Law Minister while introducing Article 226(2) of the Constitution referred
to hereinabove and that the issue involved affects a large number of
employees and is of public importance, we think it appropriate that the
matter involving the issue of territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High
Court to decide a challenge to an order
passed by the Chairman, CAT,
Principal Bench, New Delhi should be considered by a Larger Bench.
Let the registry place the matter before the Chief Justice of India for
appropriate orders at the earliest so that the aforesaid issue is resolved
at the earliest.
Ankit Gyan
Matter referred to larger Bench.
(Assisted by : Abhishek Agnihotri, LCRA)
UNION OF INDIA v. SANJIV CHATURVEDI
[M. R. SHAH, J.]