ANIL KUMAR YADAV versus STATE (NCT) OF DELHI & ANR.
[2017] 11 S.C.R. 195, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2017] 11 S.C.R. 195 
ANIL KUMAR YADAV 
v. 
STATE (NCT) OF DELHI & ANR. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 1938 of2017) 
NOVEMBER 14,2017 
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.) 
Bail: 
Grant of bail-In a case u/s.302 & 308 dw s.34 IPC-Propriety 
of- Held: While considering question of grant of bail, it is necessary 
to consider prima facie case, an exhaustive exploration of the merits 
should be avoided - There is no hard and fast rule for grant or 
reji1sal of bail - Each case is required to be considered on its ow11 
merit - Jn the present case, Sessio11s Court seems lo have gone into 
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the merits of the prosecution case, while granting bail - In crimes 
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like murde1; the period of i11carceralion by itself would not entitle 
the accused to be e11/arged on bail - The materials on record show 
'prima facie' case against the accused- Sessions court granted bail 
on irrelevant co11siderations - Trial court is yet to record the 
testimony of material witnesses - For ensuring fair trial, it is 
11ecessary that accused are not enlarged on bail - Though liberty 
of the accused is a relevant consideration as he is only an under 
trial, it is equally important to consider the impact of their release 
on bail - A balance has to be struck, in order to ensure that during 
trial witnesses depose without fear and justice is done to the society 
- High Court rightly cancelled the bail granted by Sessions Court. 
Grant of bail - Interference with - By High Court -
Permissibility - Held:
Sessions Court grants bail in exercise of its 
discretion - Such discretion normally not be interfered with by High 
court - But can i11te1fere, if the bail order suffers from serious 
infirmities or perversity. 
Practice and Procedure: 
Framing of charges and grant of bail - By common order -
Propriety of such practice - Held: Considerations for framing of 
charge and for grant of bail are different - Therefore, such practice 
is not desirable. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] JI S.C.R. 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: I. The Sessions Court considered both framing of 
charges and also grant of bail to accused No.4 by way of a common 
order. Insofar as framing of charges, in a case before the Sessions 
Court, under Section 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the 
court is required to consider "whether there is ground for 
presuming thit the accused has committed an offence ..... " and 
then Court shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. 
For grant of bail, the court is required to consider several other 
factors. The considerations for framing of charge and grant of 
bail arc different. It is not desirable to frame charge and grant 
bail by way of a common order. [Para 17][204-D-F) 
2.1 While considering the question of grant of bail, Court 
should avoid consideration of details of the evidence as it is not a 
relevant consideration. While it is necessary to consider the prima 
fucie case, an exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case 
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should be avoided. [Para 16)[204-C] 
Puran v. Rambi/as and Another (2001) 6 SCC 338 : 
(2001) 3 SCR 432 - relied on. 
2.2 Whil11 granting bail, the relevant considerations arc:-
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(i) nature of seriousness of the offence; (ii) character of the 
evidence and circumstances which arc peculiar to the accused; 
and (iii) likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; (iv) the 
impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, 
its
impact on the society; and (v) likelihood of his tampering. No 
doubt, this list is not exhaustive. There arc no hard and fast rules 
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regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered 
on its own merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise 
of discretion by the Court. [Para 18][204-G-H) 
Stale of U.P. through CBI >: Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 
8 SCC 21 : (2005) 3 Suppl. SCR 454; Jayendra 
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Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N. (2005) 2 SCC 13 : 
(2005) I SCR 160 - relied on. 
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2.3 In the present case, accused No. 4 was granted bail by 
the Sessions Court mainly on the grounds:- (i) as per CCTV
ANIL KUMAR YADAV v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI & ANR. 
197 
footage deciphered by the Investigating Officer, no role could be 
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attributed to accused No. 4 that he inflicted injuries on the injured 
witness as well as to deceased and the photographs do not show 
the presence of the acc'used No. 4 (ii) CCTV footage do not 
corroborate the statement of the witnesses that the accused along 
with their cars were blocking the road; and (iii) accused No.4 has 
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been in custody since 31.10.2015. The Sessions Court pointed 
out that possibly no role could be attributed to him. (Para 21] (206-
E-GJ 
2.4 The Sessions Court appears to have gone into the merits 
of the matter, in particular the CCTV footage to hold that accused c 
No.4 could not have been present at the place of occurrence or 
participated in the incident. Further, the Sessions Court had also 
gone into the discrepancies of the statement of the witnesses. 
The probability or improbability of the prosecution version has 
to be judged bused on the materials available to the court at the 
time when bail is considered and not on the basis of discrepancies. 
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[Para 21][207-B-C] 
2.5 The High Court had gone into the details of CCTV 
, footage and noted the presence of accused No. 4 at the scene of 
occurrence that "he was seen entering into the Mercedes". The 
Sessions Court was not right in raising doubts about the presence 
of accused No. 4 and his role in inflicting injuries to deceased as 
well as to the injured witness
at the present stage. Since the 
Sessions Court proceeded· to grant bail on erroneous footing and 
also going into the merits of the materials collected, the High 
Court, rightly set aside the order granting bail to accused No. 4. 
[Para 23][208-B-D] 
2.6 In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused 
was in custody for more than one year, may not be a relevant 
consideration for grant of bail. The period of incarceration by 
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itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. [Para 
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Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of G1yarat and 
others (2008) 3 SCC 775 : [2008] 2 SCR 131; Ram 
Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and others (2002) 
3 SCC 598 : (2002] 2 SCR 521i - relied on.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] II S.C.R. 
2.7 Apart from CCTV footage, there arc other materials on 
record to show the "prima facic" case against the appellants/ 
accused viz. (i) statement of eye - witnesses who have named the 
accused and also given statements as to the overt acts of each of 
the accused; (ii) recoveries made from the accused; and (iii) the 
incident in which deceased and complainant have sustained 
injuries. The Sessions Court had not taken into consideration 
these relevant materials; but granted bail to the appellants/ 
accused on the ground of discrepancies in the statement of 
witnesses, CCTV footage and the period of incarceration of the 
accused which are not relevant considerations for grant of bail by 
the Sessions Court in the facts and stage of this case. (Para 
2711209-B-DJ 
Kanwar Singh Meena v. Stale of Rajasthan and Am: 
(2012) 12 SCC 180 : ( 2012] 10 SCR 847 - referred 
to. 
2.8 In the present case, the trial is at a very crucial stage. 
The trial court is yet to record the testimony of material witnesses 
including the complainant as well as all the material witnesses. 
For ensuring the fair trial, witnesses must be in a position to 
freely depose without fear. In the facts and circumstances of the 
case, the Court is convinced that a fair trial can be ensured only 
if the appellants arc not enlarged on bail. (Para 29](210-GJ 
2.9 The appellants arc only under-trials and their liberty is 
also a relevant
consideration. But equally important is to consider 
the impact of their release on bail on the prosecution witnesses 
and also its impact on society. In order to ensure that during trial 
the material witnesses depose without fear and justice being done 
to the society, a balance has to be struck. (Para 30](210-H; 211-
Al 
Masroor '" Stale of Ullar Pradesh and another (2009) 
14 SCC 286 : (2009] 6 SCR 1030; State of Bihar v. 
Rajballav Prasad alias Rajballav Prasad Yadav alias 
Rcy'ballabh Yadav (2017) 2 SCC 178 - relied on. 
2.10 The court while granting bail should exercise its 
discretion in a judicious manner. Of course, once discretion is 
exercised by the Sessions Court to grant bail on consideration of
ANIL KUMAR YADAV v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI& ANR. 
199 
relevant materials, the High Court would not normally interfere 
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with such discretion, unless the same suffers from serious 
infirmities or perversity. While considering the correctness of 
the order granting bail, the approach should be whether the order 
granting bail to the accused is vitiated by any serious infirmity, in 
which case, the High Court can certainly interfere with the B 
exercise of discretion. The materials available on record prima 
facie indicating the involvement of the accused, possibility of 
accused tampering with witnesses and the gravity of the crime 
were not kept in view by the Sessions Court. Since the Sessions 
Court granted bail to the appellants on irrelevant considerations 
and the same suffered from serious infirmity, the High Court C 
rightly set aside the order of grant of bail to the accused. The 
impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity warranting 
interference. (Para 3211212-F-H; 213-A] 
Case Law Reference 
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[2001) 3 SCR 432 
relied on 
Para6 
[2008) 2 SCR 131 
relied on 
Para 13 
[2012) IO SCR 847 
referred to 
Para 14 
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[2005) 3 Suppl. SCR 454 
relied on 
Para 19 
[2005] 1 SCR 160 
relied on 
Para 20 
[2002] 2 SCR 526 
relied on 
Para 24 
F 
[2009] 6 SCR 1030 
relied on 
Para 30 
c2011) 2 sec 178 
relied on 
Para 30 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JllRISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
1938of2017. 
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From the Judgment and Order elated 31.05.2017 by the High Court 
of Delhi in
Criminal Misc. (C) No. 844 of2017. 
WITH 
Crl.A.Nos.1940, 1939, 1942and 1941 of2017. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017) It S.C.R. 
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Sidharth Luthra, R. Basant, Sr. Advs .. Tanveer Ahmed Mir, 
Faheem N. Shah, Diviani Khanna, lshaan Shivkumar, Anoopam N. 
Prasad, Kartikeya Asthana, Ms. Mchaak, Ms. Liz Mathew, Shashank 
Singh, Arjun Minocha, KartikAshok, Samar Vijay Singh. Nikhil Ranjan 
Pahuja, Ms. Nicy Paulson, Saurav Vig, Advs. for the Appellant. 
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Dushyant Dave, Ms. Kiran Sw·i, Sr. Advs., Pawan K. Bahl,Ashish 
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Sharma, Rakesh K. Sharma, Harsh Khanna, Harish Pandey, Aman 
Usman, Subhash Tanwar, Vinod Kumar, Gaurav Baisla, Abhay Kumar, 
P. K. Dey, Sanjiv Das, B. V. Balaram Das, Advs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R. BANUMATHJ, J. I. Leave granted. 
2. These appeals arise from the order of the High Court of Delhi 
in and by which the High Court has cancelled the bail granted to the 
respondents-accused by two separate orders dated 31.05.2017 and 
08.09.2017. By virtue of the first impugned order, bail granted to Anil 
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Kumar Yadav (A4) was cancelled and by the second impugned order. 
bail granted to other accused were cancelled. 
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3. The case of prosecution is that on 21.10.2015, Rohit Bansal 
(injured witness) along with his friends Vineet, Sonu, Rupesh (deceased) 
and Monu had gone to Shanghai Club. Hauz Khas in two separate cars, 
i.e. Santro being registration No.UP-16-AM-6317 and Honda Civic being 
registration No.DL-?CF-4118. At around midnight 12.00-12.15, while 
dancing in the dub, Roh it Bansal
's hand struck an individual to whom he 
said "sorry". On this, the said individual abused and questioned Rohit 
Bansal and quarrel started between the two groups and the said individual 
took a glass from one of his friends and hit the complainant-Ro hit Bansal; 
but the matter was pacified by the bouncers/security personnel of the 
club. Thereafter, the complainant-Rohit Bansal and his friends were sent 
out of the club and after coming out of the club when they reached llT 
Gate, then Rohit Bansal realized that his mobile phone was missing which 
might have fallen during the quarrel and he along with his friends Rupesh, 
Sonu and Monu came back in Santro car to the club. When they came 
back, they found that a Mercedes and EON car had blocked the road 
and a Bolero car was parked on the road-side. When they asked them 
to let them pass, one of the accused with whom an altercation had taken 
place in the club, threatened to teach them a lesson. Thereafter, all the
ANIL KUMAR YADAV v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI & ANR. 
201 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
accused/assailants staiied beating them; one of the assailants brought 
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an iron rod from the car and started hitting Rupesh and when Rohit 
intervened to save Rupesh, he was also attacked. Thereafter, another 
assailant lifted a cemented brick arid hit Rupesh on his head and they all 
ran towards different directions to save themselves leaving Santro car 
at the spot. When Rohit Bansal returned back to take his car, he saw 
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Rupesh lying at the spot unconscious and sustained multiple injuries on 
his body. Complainant Rohit along with one Sunil took Rupcsh to the 
AIIMS Hospital and got him admitted in the Trauma Centre. 
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4. On receipt of DD regarding admission of Rupesh and Roh it 
Bansal (Complainant) in Trauma CentrcAIIMS, AS! Dalbir Singh went 
to the hospital and recorded the statement of the injured Roh it Bansal, 
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based on which FIR N o.1187/2015 was registered under Section 307, 
Section 308 read with Section 34 !PC. Rupesh succumbed to injuries on 
26.10.2015 and the FIR was altered into Sections 302, 308 !PC and201 
!PC read with 34 IPC. Upon completion .of the investigation, charge-
sheet was filed under Sections 302 and 308 IPC read with Section 34 
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IPC against Tarun @ Maddy (A 1 }, Vikas @ Slmmmi {A2), .Ashish 
Balguer (A3), Anil Kumar Yadav (A4), Vikas Balguer (AS) and Vishal 
Balguer {A6); charge-sheet against Siddhant@ Goldy {A7) was filed 
under Section 201/212 IPC. 
5.
The trial court granted bail to Anil Kumar Yadav (A4) vide 
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order dated 27.02.2017, inter a/ia, on the grounds: - (i) that no' other 
overt act had been attributed to Anil Kumar Yadav (A4); (ii) Based on 
CCTV footage, in drawing an inference that no specific role had been 
assigned to Anil Kumar Yadav (A4); and (iii) that Anil Kumar Yadav 
(A4) had been in custody for about sixteen months. 
6. The order of granting bail to Anil Kumar Yadav (A4) was 
assailed by the complainant before the High Court on the very next day. 
Pointing out that at the stage of granting bail, a detailed examination of 
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the evidence and elaborate documentation of the minute details of the 
case is not warranted and placing reliance upon Puran v. Rambilas 
and Another (2001) 6 SCC 338, the High Court set aside the order 
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passed by the trial court thereby cancelling the bail granted to Anil Kumar 
Yadav (A4). Being aggrieved by cancellation ofbail,Anil Kumar Yadav 
{A4) preferred appeal before this .Court. Vide order dated 16.06.2017, 
this Court issued notice and stayed sw-render of Anil Kumar Yadav {A4). 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017) I l S.C.R. 
7. While the appeal against grant of bail to Anil Kumar Yadav 
(A4) was under consideration before the High Court, rest of the accused 
were granted bail by the Sessions Court vide order dated 24.04.2017, 
imer alia. on the ground that co-accused Anil Kumar Yadav (A4) had 
already been granted bail and that they were in custody for about one 
and half years. 
8. When the appeal of Anil Kumar Yadav(A4) came up for further 
hearing before this Court, State took time to take steps to challenge the 
order of grant of bail to other accused also. By order dated 08.09.2017, 
the High Court cancelled the bail granted to other accused also. Being 
aggrieved, other accused have also filed their respective appeals before 
this Court. 
Contcntions:-
9. Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant 
Anil Kumar Yadav (A4) contended that Rohit Bansal who claims to be 
an injured eye witness, in his statement recorded on 22. 10.2015 did not 
name the accused Anil Kumar Yadav as the assailant nor stated about 
his overt act. It was submitted that the presence of accused Anil Kumar 
Yadav or use of baseball bat by him was not seen in the CCTV footage 
and also taking note of the fact that the accused had been in custody for 
more than sixteen months, the trial court granted bail to the appellant 
and the High Court erred in interfering with the exercise of discretion by 
the Sessions Court. 
JO. Taking us
through the order of the trial court dated 27.02.2017, 
Mr. R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Tarun @ Maddy 
(Al) contended that on the material availabk, the Sessions Court rightly 
observed that there was no pre-meditation and that the entire incident 
was at the spur of the moment and when the trial court had taken into 
consideration the relevant materials, the High Court erred in substituting 
its views and setting aside the order of the Sessions Court. It was further 
submitted that there was independent consideration of the materials and 
while so, the High Court misdirected itself in observing that bail was 
granted on the ground of parity. 
I l. On behalf of the accused Vikas Balguer (A5) and Ashish 
Balgucr (A3), Ms. Rebecca M. John learned Senior Counsel submitted 
that the Sessions Court has independently considered the relevant
ANIL KUMAR YADAV v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI & ANR. 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
materials and granted bail to the accused and while so, the High Court 
erred in proceeding on the erroneous footing that the accused persons 
were granted bail on parity with Anil Kumar Yadav. The learned Senior 
Counsel submitted that when the trial court had properly exercised its 
jurisdiction, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the exercise 
of discretion, more so, when the accused were granted bail after filing 
of the charge-sheet. 
12. Mr. Pa wan K. Bahl, learned counsel appearing on behalf of 
Vikas @ Shammi (A2) contended that because Shammi's name was 
not mentioned in the FIR and only after the main accused were arrested 
and only based on their statement recorded on 22.10.2015 and 23.l 0.2015, 
accused Vikas @ Shammi was arrested and there is no prima facie 
case showing involvement ofVikas@ Shammi and the trial court had 
rightly granted bail. It was contended that based on the consideration of 
relevant materials, the trial court exercised its discretion in granting bail 
to the accused and the High Court was not right in setting aside the 
same. 
13. On behalf of the prosecution, Ms. Kiran Suri, learned Senior 
Counsel has submitted that the statements ofinjured witness Rohit Bansal 
and other witnesses prima facie show involvement of the accused in 
attacking the deceased Rupesh Tanwar and injured witness Rohit Bansal. 
It was submitted that based on the statement recorded
from the accused, 
the incriminating articles were also recovered from the accused and the 
trial court ignored these relevant materials prima fade indicating 
involvement of the accused. It was submitted that the trial court granted 
bail based on the alleged discrepancies in CCTV footage and 
discrepancies in statement of the witnesses which are not relevant 
consideration for grant of bail and the High Court rightly set aside the 
order granting bail to the accused and the impugned orders warrant no 
interference. Placing reliance upon Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. 
State of Gujarat and Others (2008) 3 SCC 775, it was submitted that 
the period inside the jail is not a relevant consideration for grant of bail. 
14. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing for 
the complainant submitted that perversity in the order of the trial court 
flows from the fact that irrelevant materials had been taken into 
consideration and when the bail order is unjustified or perverse, the High 
Court rightly set aside the order. In support of his contention, the learned 
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Senior Counsel placed reliance upon Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna 
alias Munna Jaiswal and Anr. (2009) l SCC 678 and Kanwar Singh 
Meena v. State of Rajasthan and Am: (2012) 12 SCC 180. 
l 5. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival 
submissions made by the counsel appearing on either side. The PQ-int 
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falling for consideration is whether the Sessions Court ignored relevant 
materials while granting bail to the appellants accused and whether the 
order of the Sessions Court suffered from serious infirmities, justifying 
interference by the High Court in exercise ofjudicial discretion. 
16. As held in Puran case, wbile considering the question of grant 
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of bail, Colll1l should avoid consideration of details of the evidence as it is 
not a relevant consideration. While it is necessary to consider the prima 
fi1cie case, an exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case should be 
avoided. We, therefore, consciously refrain from considering the merits 
of the materials/evidence collected by the prosecution. 
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17. At the outset, it is to be pointed out that the Sessions Court 
considered both framing of charges and also grant of bail to accused 
Anil KumarYadav by way ofa common order. On 27.02.2017, charges 
were framed against all the accused and bail was granted to appellant 
Anil Kumar Yadav. Insofar as framing of charges, in a case before the 
Sessions Collrt, under Section 228 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, the 
court is required to consider "whether there is ground for presuming 
that the acc11sed has committed an offence ..... " and then Court shall 
frame in writing a charge against the accused. For grant of bail, the 
comt is required to consider several other factors. The considerations 
for framing of charge and grant ofbail arc different. It was stated by the 
Bar that by and large this is the procedure followed in Delhi. We may 
however indicate that it is not desirable to frame charge and grant bail 
by way of a common order. 
18. While granting bail, the relevant considerations arc:-(i) nature 
of seriousness of the offence; (ii) character of the evidence and 
circumstances which arc peculiar to the accused; and (iii) likelihood of 
the accused fleeing from justice; (iv) the impact that his release may 
make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on the society; and (v) 
likelihood of his tampering. No doubt, this list is not exhaustive. There 
are no hard and fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case 
has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for 
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judicious exercise of discretion by the Court.
ANIL KUMAR YADAV v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI & ANR. 
205 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
19. While considering the basic requirements for grant of bail, in 
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State of U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21, 
this Court has held as under:-
"18. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an 
application for bail arc (i) whether there is any prima fade or 
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the 
offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the 
punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused 
absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; ( v) character, behaviour. 
means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of 
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the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of 
the witnesses bei11g tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, 
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of justice being thwarted by gram of bail [see Prahlad Si11gh 
Bhati v. NCT. Delhi (2001) 4 SCC 280 and Gurcharan Singh v. 
State (DelhiAdmn.) (1978) 1SCC118]. While a vague allegation 
that the accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may 
not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character D 
that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or 
if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert 
justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We 
may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal 
of bail stated in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
Ra11jan 
(2004) 7 SCC 528: (SCC pp. 535-36, para 11) 
"11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well 
settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in 
a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at 
the stage of granting bail a detailed examination, of evidence 
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and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not 
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be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons 
for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted 
particularly where the accused is charged of having committed 
a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would 
suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for 
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the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, 
the following factors also before granting bail; they are: 
(a) The nature ofaccusation and the severity of punishment 
in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 11 S.C.R. 
(b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness 
or apprehension of threat to the complainant. 
(c) Prima facic satisfaction of the court in support of the 
charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. S11darshan Singh 
(2002) 3 SCC 598 and Pu ran v. Rambilas (200 l) 6 SCC 338. )"" 
20. The test to be applied for grant of bail was also considered in 
Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N., (2005) 2 SCC 13, 
wherein it was /leld as under:-
"16 ......... The considerations which normally weigh with the court 
in granting bail in non-bailable offences have been explained by 
this Court in State v. Capt. Jagjit Singh [ 1962] 3 SCR 622 and 
Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) ( 1978) I SCC 118 and 
basically they are -
the nature and seriousness of the offence; 
the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar 
to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the 
accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension 
of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public 
or the State and other similar factors which may be relevant in 
the facts and circumstances of the case ........... " 
21. In the present case, accused Anil Kumar Yadav was granted 
bail by the Sessions Court mainly on the grounds:- (i) as per CCTV 
footage deciphered by the Investigating Officer, no role could be attributed 
toAnil Kumar Yadav that he inflicted injuries on Rohit
Bansal as well as 
to deceased Rupesh Tanwar and the photographs do not show the 
presence of the accused Anil Kumar Yadav; (ii) CCTV footage do not 
corroborate the statement of the witnesses that the accused along with 
their cars were blocking the road; and (iii) accusedAnil Kumar Yadav 
has been in custody since 3 l.I 0.2015. The Sessions Court pointed out 
that possibly no role could be attributed to accused Anil Kumar Yadav 
and observed as under:-
" ....... Admittedly, the crux of the CCTV footage is deciphered by 
the IO in the chargesheet as mentioned above and in the said 
crux no role of accusedAnil Kumar Yadav is found. Furthermore, 
there arc other discrepancies pointed out by the counsel as 
discussed above which though could not be considered for the 
purpose of charge bnt could be considered as ground ofbail... ...... "
ANIL KUMAR YADAV v. STATE (NCI) OF DELHI & ANR. 
207 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
The Sessions Court though repeatedly observed that the court 
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ought not to go into the merits of the prosecution case actually the court 
appears to have gone into the merits of the matter. in particular the 
CCTV footage to hold that Anil Kumar Yadav could not have been 
present at the place of occurrence or participated in the incident. Further, 
the Sessions Court had also gone into the discrepancies of the statement 
of the witnesses. The probability or improbability of the prosecution 
version has to be judged based on the materials available to the court at 
the time when bail is considered and not on the basis of discrepancies. 
22. While considering the correctness of the above findings, the 
learned Judge of the High Court viewed the CCTV footage and observed 
that the camera installed at the place of occurrence was a revolving 
camera moving horizontaliy and vertically and further observed that the 
"CCTV footage possibly could not capture the whole instance from 
all angles at the same time". After personally viewing CCTV footage, 
the learned Judge had given graphic description of the various slots/ 
points and the relevant portion of the High Court judgment reads as 
under;-
"I have examined/viewed the CCTV footage/CD provided by the 
learned counsel for the respondent in the computer in chamber. 
Seemingly, the footage recorded in the CCTV did not cover the 
entire place of occurrence.
It was a revolving camera moving 
horizontally and vertically. Possibly, it could not capture the whole 
incident from all angles at the same time. In the CCTV footage, 
Mercedes car is seen to have arrived at the spot at I :30:26. It 
remained at the spot subsequent to it. At I ;39;34, the Mercedes is 
seen leaving the spot by reversing it. The respondent is seen 
entering into the Mercedes. It is, however, not clear as to when 
the said individual (the respondent) had come out of the said 
Mercedes. The petitioner has also placed on record photographs 
developed from the footage recorded in the CCTV. In photographs 
No. I, 2 and 4, the respondent is indicated inflicting injuries to the 
victim along with others at 1:37:30; 1:37:31; and 1:37:31 
respectively. 
In photograph No.3, Mercedes is seen at the spot at I :34:49. 
Jn photo No.5 the respondent is seen entering the Mercedes at 
l :38;29. It belies the respondent's contention that the Mercedes 
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entered for the first time in the lane of the occurrence only at 
I :37:56. In photos Mark 'A' and 'B' the respondent's car is seen 
at the spot at I :30:41 and I :31 :50 too." 
23. The High Court had gone into the details _of CCTV footage 
and noted the presence of accused Anil Kumar Yadav at the scene of 
occurrence that "he was seen entering into the Mercedes". The 
Sessions Court was not right in raising doubts about the presence of 
accusedAnil Kwnar Yadav and his role in inflicting injuries to deceased 
Rupesh Tanwar as well as to the injured Rohit Bansal at the present 
stage. Since the Sessions Court proceeded to grant bail on erroneous 
footing and also going into the merits of the materials collected, the High 
Court, in our view, rightly set aside the order granting bail to the accused 
Anil Kumar Yadav. 
24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for grant of bail to 
the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was 
in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact 
that the accused was in custody for more than one year, may not be a 
relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai case, it was observed 
that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to 
be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay 
v. Sudarshan Singh and others (2002) 3 SCC 598. 
25. On behalf of the prosecution, learned senior
counsel Ms. Suri 
and Mr. Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for the complainant 
submitted that CCTV footage is not the sole material relied upon by the 
prosecution. It was submitted that apait from CCTV footage, there are 
eight eye witnesses who named the accused persons and also stated the 
role of the accused persons. Our attention was drawn to Section 161 
Cr.P.C., statement of injured witness Rohit Bansal and other witnesses 
namely Vineet, Mohinder@ Monu, Jitender. Sagar S!iarma@ Sonu and 
Bouncers at the Club namely Sonu. Rohit Kumar, Pravccn and Chelan 
Prakash who have stated about the presence of the accused in the scene 
of occurrence and their overt acts. That apart, based on the statements 
of the accused persons, incriminating a1ticles were also recovered and 
at this stage, it is not necessary to elaborate upon the recoveries made 
and their relevance. 
26. By perus;,il of Post-Mortem certificate, it is seen that over 
twenty one injuries were inflicted on the various parts of the body of the
ANIL KUMAR YADAV v. STATE (NCJ) OF DELHI & ANR. 
209 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
deceased and he was disrobed and left unconscious on the spot. The 
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manner in which the deceased was allegedly attacked and the number 
of injuries inflicted on him prima facie indicate pre-meditation. Jnj ured 
witness Rohit Bansal also sustained laceration injuries over scalp. 
27. As rightly contended by the prosecution, apart from CCTV 
footage. there are other materials on record to show the "prima facie" 
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case against the appellants/accused viz. (i) statement of eye witnesses 
who have named the accused and also given statements as to the overt 
acts of each of the accused; (ii) recoveries made from the accused; and 
(iii) the incident in which deceased Rupesh Tanwar and complainant 
Rohit Bansal have sustained injuries. The Sessions Conrt had not taken 
into consideration these relevant materials; but the Sessions Court granted 
bail to the appellants/accused on the ground of discrepancies in the 
statement of witnesses, CCTV footage and the period of incarceration 
of the accused which arc not relevant considerations for grant of bail by 
the Sessions Court in the facts and stage of this case. 
28 .. In Kanwar Singh Meena case, the High Court granted bail 
ignoring the averments made against the accused thereon and statement 
of witnesses recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Pointing out that the 
High Court did not keep in view the prima facie materials against the 
accused, this Court
cancelled the bail. By setting aside the order ofbail, 
in para (IO), this Court observed as undcr:-
"10. Thus, Section 439 of the Code confers very wide powers on 
the High Court and the Court of Session regarding bail. But, while 
granting bail, the High Court and the Sessions Cou1i are guided 
by the same considerations as other courts. That is to say, the 
gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and 
status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, 
the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating 
the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses 
and obstmcting the course of justice and such other grounds arc 
required to be taken into consideration. Each c1iminal case presents 
its own peculiar factual scenario and. therefore, certain grounds 
peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by 
the court. The court has to only opine as to whether there is prima 
facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake 
meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police 
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and comment on the same. Such assessment of evidence and 
premature comments are likely to deprive the accused of a fair 
trial. While cancelling the bail under Section 439(2) of the Code, 
the primary considerations which weigh with the court are whether 
the accused is likely to tamper with the evidence or interfere or 
attempt to interfere with the due course of justice or evade the 
due course of justice. But, that is not all. The High Court or the 
Sessions Court can cancel the bail even in cases where the order 
grunting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage 
of justice. If the court granting bail ignores relevant materials 
indicating prima facie involvement of the accused or takes into 
account irrelevant material, which has no relevance to the question 
of grant of bail to the accused. the High Court or the Sessions 
Court would be justified in cancelling the bail. Such orders are 
against the well-recognised principles underlying the power to grant 
bail. Such orders are legally infirm and vulnerable leading to 
miscarriage of j us ti cc and absence of supervening circumstances 
such as the propensitv of the accused to tamper with the evidence. 
to flee from justice, etc. would not deter the court from cancelling 
the bail. The High Comt or the Sessions Court is bound to cancel 
such bail orders particularly when they arc passed releasing the 
accused involved in heinous
crimes because they ultimately result 
in weakc;ning the prosecution case and have adverse impact on 
the society. Needless to say that though the powers of this Court 
arc much wider, this Court is equally guided by the above principles 
in the matter of grant or cancellation ofhail." [underlying added] 
29. In the present case, the trial is at a very crucial stage. The 
trial court is yet to record the testimony of material witnesses including 
the complainant as well as all the material witnesses. The trial has 
commenced and the trial is said to be posted for04.l2.2017. For ensuring 
the fair trial, witnesses must be in a position to freely depose without 
fear. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we arc convinced that 
a fair trial can be ensured only if the appellants arc not enlarged on bail. 
30. We arc conscious of the fact that the appellants arc only m1dcr 
trials and their liberty is also a relevant consideration. But equally 
important is to consider the impact of their release on bail on the 
prosecution witnesses and also its impact on society. In order to ensure 
that during trial the material witnesses depose without fear and justice
ANIL KUMAR YADAV v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI & ANR. 
211 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
being done to the society, a balance has to be struck. Referring to Masroor 
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v. State of Uuar Pradesh and another (2009) 14 SCC 286 and other 
cases, in State of Bihar >: Rajhallav Prasad alias Rqjhal/av Prasad 
fodav alias Rajballabh Yadav (2017) 2 SCC 178, this Court held as 
under:-
"26. We are conscious of the fact that the respondent is only an 
undertrial and his liberty is also a relevant consideration. However, 
equally important consideration is the interest of the society and 
fair trial of the case. Thus, undoubte.dly the courts have to adopt a 
liberal approach while considering bail applications of the accused 
persons. However. in a given case. if it is found that there is a 
possibility of interdicting fair trial by the accused if released on 
bail, this public interest of fair trial would outweigh the personal 
interest of the accused while undertaking the task of balancing 
the liberty of the accused on the one hand and interest of the 
society to have a fair trial on the other hand. When the witnesses 
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low rate of conviction and many times even hardened criminals 
escape the conviction. It shakes public confidence in the criminal 
justice-delivery system. It is this need for larger public interest to 
ensure that criminal justice-delivery system work.~ efficiently, 
smoothly and in a fair manner that has
to be given prime importance 
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in such situations. After all, ifthcrc is a threat to fair trial because 
of intimidation of witnesses, etc., that would happen because of 
wrongdoing of the accused himself, and the consequences thereof, 
he has to suffer ........ " [underlying added] 
31. After referring to various case laws and observing that in a 
criminal trial, witnesses must be able to depose without fear, freely and 
truthfully, in Raj ball av Prasad case, this Com1 cancelled the bail granted 
to the accused thereon. In para (24) of the judgment, it was held as 
under:-
"24.As indicated by us in the beginning, prime consideration before 
us is to protect the fair trial and ensure that justice is done. This 
may happen only if the witnesses are able to depose without fear, 
freely and truthfully and this Court is convinced that in the present 
case, that can be ensured only ifthe respondent is not enlarged on 
bail. This imp01tance of fair trial was emphasised in Panchanan 
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Mishra v. Digambar Mishra (2005) 3 SCC 143 while setting 
aside the order of the High Court granting bail in the following 
terms: (SCC pp. 147-48, para 13) 
"13. We have given our careful consideration to the rival 
submissions made by the coWJsel appearing on either side. The 
object Wlderlying the cancellation of bail is to protect the fair 
trial and secure justice being done to the society by preventing 
the accused who is set at liberty by the bail order from tampering 
with the evidence in the heinous crime and if there is delay in 
such a case the underlying object of cancellation of bail 
practicaJly loses aJI its purpose and significance to the greatest 
prejudice and the interest of the prosecution. It hardly requires 
to be stated that once a person is released on bail in serious 
criminal cases where the punishment is quite stringent and 
deterrent, the accused in order to get away from the clutches 
ofthe same indulge in various activities like tampering with the 
prosecution witnesses, threatening the family members of the 
deceased victim and also create problems of law and order 
situation.''"' 
32. It was repeatedly urged that the High Court misdirected itself 
in interfering with the discretionary order of Sessions Court granting bail 
to the accused and there was absolutely nothing to show that the 
appcJiants arc likely to abuse the bail or tamper with evidence. The 
court while
granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious 
manner. Of course, once discretion is exercised by the Sessions Court 
to grunt bail on consideration ofrelevant materials, the High Court would 
not normally interfere with such discretion, unless the same suffers from 
serious infirmities or perversity. While considering the correctness of 
the order granting bail, the approach should be whether the order granting 
bail to the accused is vitiated by any serious infirmity, in which case, the 
High Court can certainly interfere with the exercise of discretion. The 
materials available on record primaji1cie indicating the involvement of 
the accused, possibility of accused tampering with witnesses and the 
gravity of the crime were not kept in view by the Sessions Court. Since 
the Sessions Court granted bail to the appellants on irrelevant 
considerations and the same suffered from serious infirmity, the High 
Court rightly set aside the order of grant of bail to the accused. The 
impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity wmranting interference.

ANIL KUMAR YADAV v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI & ANR. 
213 
[R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
33. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed. All the appellants/ 
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accused are directed to surrender before the Committal Court within 
one week from the date of this order. 
Kalpana · K. Tripathy 
Appeals dismissl-"CI.