BABAN BALAJI MORE (DEAD) BY LRS. & OTHERS versus BABAJI HARI SHELAR (DEAD) BY LRS. & OTHERS
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 593, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
* Author
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 593 : 2024 INSC 203
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others 
v. 
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
(Civil Appeal No. 8356 of 2017)
14 March 2024
[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 
had application to the subject Watan lands; whether the appellants 
(legal heirs of the original Watandar) were right in proceeding against 
the tenants u/ss.5, 11 & 11A, Maharashtra Hereditary Offices Act, 
1874 after the death of the original Watandar, in February/March, 
1958; whether the tenancy in question was lawfully subsisting on 
Tillers’ Day and were the tenants entitled to exercise their right 
of statutory purchase of the tenanted agricultural Watan lands. 
Interpretation and harmonious construction of the 1874 Act, 1948 
Act and the Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Offices) 
Act, 1962.
Headnotes
Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 – ss.88, 
88CA, 29-31, 32-32-R – Maharashtra Hereditary Offices Act, 
1874 – ss.5, 11, 11A – Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition 
of Offices) Act, 1962 – s.8 – Applicability of the 1948 Act to 
the subject Watan lands – After the Abolition Act that came 
into effect from 01.01.1963, lawfully leased Patel Watan land 
whose lease was subsisting as on 01.01.1963, if was covered 
by the Tenancy Act and the tenant of such Watan land if had 
the right to purchase such land:
Held: All Watan lands were not to be
treated as Government 
lands – Subject Watan lands were not covered by s.88(1)(a), 
Tenancy Act and could not be treated as Government lands – By 
virtue of the ‘Explanation’ to s.88(1)(a) of the Tenancy Act, all other 
Watan lands, including the subject Watan lands, were covered by 
all the provisions of the Tenancy Act – However, s.88CA thereof, 
introduced in July, 1958, granted such Watan lands exemption 
from ss.32 to 32-R, 33-A, 33-B and 33-C – Therefore, ss.29 and
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31, Tenancy Act were very much applicable to such Watan lands 
all through – Thus, the heirs of the original Watandar (appellants) 
could not have aspired to secure possession without reference to 
the procedure u/s.29, 31 – Limited exemption from certain provisions 
of the Tenancy Act, afforded by s.88CA thereof, continued until 
the Abolition Act came into force on 01.01.1963 – Thereafter, as 
the very institution of Patel Watan stood abolished, the limited 
exemption extended to such Watan lands u/s.88CA, Tenancy Act 
also ceased – Therefore, after the advent of the Abolition Act, Patel 
Watan land which was lawfully leased, and the lease of which was 
subsisting as on 01.01.1963, stood covered by the Tenancy Act 
in its entirety and the tenant of such Watan land was entitled to 
all the benefits under the provisions thereof, including the right to 
purchase such land – It was not open to the appellants (legal heirs 
of the original Watandar) to proceed against the tenants under 
the provisions of ss.5, 11 & 11A, 1874 Act after the death of the 
original Watandar, in February/March, 1958 as the provisions of the 
Tenancy Act were very much applicable to the subject lands by then 
and more so, ss.29 and 31 thereof – Thus, the appellants could 
not have taken lawful possession of these lands from the tenants 
pursuant to the order dtd. 18.04.1961 passed u/ss.5, 11 & 11A, 
1874 Act – The same was rightly held to be invalid
in the revisionary 
order and that finding was correctly held to be justified by High 
Court– Thus, the tenancy was lawfully subsisting on 01.04.1957, 
i.e., Tillers’ Day, and the tenants were entitled to exercise their 
right of statutory purchase of these tenanted agricultural Watan 
lands u/s.32 of the Tenancy Act in terms of s.8 of the Abolition 
Act, after the exemption afforded by s.88CA ceased to exist – That 
right became operational on 27.11.1964, when these Watan lands 
were regranted to the heirs of the original Watandar – Impugned 
judgment not interfered. [Paras 20-23, 33]
Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 – s.88(1)
(a) – Explanation – Merely explained the position and was not 
substantive in nature – Maharashtra Hereditary Offices Act, 
1874 – ss.5, 23:
Held: Insertion of the ‘Explanation’ was not an amendment of the 
provision which would have prospective effect and not apply to the 
application filed on 14.06.1958 u/s.5 of the Maharashtra Hereditary 
Offices Act, 1874 – The ‘Explanation’ merely explained the position 
and was not substantive in nature – It is, therefore, deemed to
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
595
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
have come into operation from the date on which s.88(1) was 
amended in August, 1956 – Thereby, the limited applicability of 
the provision to certain Watan lands was clearly delineated – The 
‘Explanation’ to s.88 clarified the position w.r.t Watan lands, other 
than those covered by s.23 of the 1874 Act, as it manifests that only 
Watan land assigned as remuneration to an officiator performing 
service u/s.23 of the 1874 Act etc. shall be deemed to be land 
belonging to the Government – Thus, only Watan lands covered 
by s.23, 1874 Act were to be treated as Government lands as 
per s.88(1)(a) – This is further clarified by s.88CA inserted in the 
year 1958, which stated that ss.32 to 32-R, 33-A, 33-B and 33-C 
would not apply to land held as Inam or Watan for service useful 
to the Government, excepting land assigned as remuneration 
u/s.23 of the 1874 Act etc. – Thus, only Watan lands assigned as 
remuneration for service u/s.23 of the 1874 Act were to be treated 
as Government lands and stood excluded from the provisions of 
the Tenancy Act – Admittedly, predecessor of the appellants was 
not an ‘officiator’ covered by s.23 of the 1874 Act. [Paras 19, 20]
Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Offices) Act, 1962 
– s.8 proviso to – Application of existing tenancy law:
Held: The proviso to s.8 indicates that for the purpose of fixing 
the purchase price under
the provisions of the Tenancy Act so as 
to enable the purchase of such land by the tenant, the lease shall 
be deemed to have commenced from the date of regrant of the 
land u/ss.5, 6 or 9, as the case may be – The argument of the 
appellants that the tenants ought to have challenged the regrant 
order dated 27.11.1964 is without merit – In fact, the tenants were 
benefited by the said regrant order as the exercise of their right to 
purchase the land hinged upon the passing of that regrant order, 
in terms of the proviso to s.8 – The argument to the contrary is 
rejected. [Paras 23, 31]
Case Law Cited
Sadashiv Dada Patil v. Purushottam Onkar Patil (Dead) 
by LRs., [2006] Supp. 6 SCR 843 : (2006) 11 SCC 
161 – relied on.
Dattatraya Keshav Deshpande v. Tukaram Raghu 
Chorage, AIR 1921 Bom 17; Govind Ramchandra Patil 
v. Bapusaheb Krishnarao Patil and others, Special Civil
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Application No.1741 of 1961, decided on 13.12.1962; 
Kallawwa Shattu Patil and others v. Yallappa Parashram 
Patil and another, (1992) 1 Mah.LJ 34; Pradeeprao @ 
Virgonda Shivgonda Patil v. Sidappa Girappa Hemgire 
since deceased through his heirs and LRs. Ginnappa 
Sidappa Hemgire and others, (2004) 3 Mah. L.J. 75; 
Kondabai Ganu Barkale (since deceased) through her 
Legal Heirs Smt. Housabai P Bhongale and others v. 
Pandit @ Shankar D. Patil (since deceased) through 
his Legal Heirs Waman S.Patil and others, (2016) 2 
Mah. LJ 282 – relied on.
List of Acts
Maharashtra Hereditary Offices Act, 1874; Maharashtra Tenancy 
and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948; Maharashtra Revenue Patels 
(Abolition of Offices) Act, 1962; Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939.
List of Keywords
Watan lands; Watandar; Patel Watan; Tillers’ Day; Statutory 
purchase; Tenanted agricultural Watan lands.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8356 of 2017
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.02.2005 of the High Court 
of Bombay in WP No.1774 of 1982
Appearances for Parties
B.H. Marlapalle, Sr. Adv., Shivaji M. Jadhav, Brij Koshor Sah, Ms. 
Apurva, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Vignesh Singh, Aditya S. Jadhav, 
Avinish Kumar Saurabh, Ajit Pravin Wagh, Ramnesh Kumar Sahu, 
Alok Kumar, Rahul Kumar, M/s. S.M. Jadhav and Company, Sushil 
Sonkar, Arvind S. Avhad, Advs. for the Appellants.
V. Giri, Vinay Navare, Sr. Advs., Pramod Gore, Nitin S. Tambwekar,
Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, Prashant Pakhiddey, Manav Gill, Byron 
Sequeria, K. Rajeev, Ms. Kavya S. Lokande, Hitesh Kumar 
Sharma, Vidrendra Mohan Sharma, Akhileshwar Jha, Abhijit 
Kamble, Ms. Sandhya S. Pawar, Ms. Madhvi S. Sawant, Naresh 
Kumar, Shashibhushan P. Adgaonkar, Omkar Jayant Deshpande, 
Mrs. Pradnya Shashibhushan Adgaonkar, Rana Sandeep Bussa,
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
597
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
Col. Amit Kumar, M/s. Lawyer S Knit & Co, Ms. Bina Madhavan, 
S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, N.V. Vechalekar, Eeshan D. Khaire, Ms. 
Niharika Tanneru, Sanjay Kharde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya 
Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, C.K. 
Sasi, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Kumar, J
1.	
This appeal entails correlation of three vintage legislations, requiring 
not only their interpretation but also their harmonious construction. 
The oldest of the three statutes is the Maharashtra Hereditary Offices 
Act, 1874 (for brevity, ‘the 1874 Act’). The next is the Maharashtra 
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for brevity, ‘the Tenancy 
Act’), and the third is the Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of 
Offices) Act, 1962 (for brevity, ‘the Abolition Act’). 
2.	
The 1874 Act was enacted to declare and amend the law relating to 
Watans, i.e., hereditary offices. Balaji Chimnaji More, the predecessor 
of the present appellants, held a Patel Watan since prior to August, 
1898. He was assigned Watan property, viz., a 50% share in an 
extent of 20 acres of land in Survey No. 386 and a 50% share in an 
extent of 16 acres in Survey No. 410 of Village Chikhali. Babaji Hari 
Shelar and Ganapati Dhondiba Tapkir (or Tapkire), the predecessors 
of the respondents herein, were cultivating this Watan property
as 
tenants since 1955-56 or thereabouts.
3.	
While so, Balaji Chimnaji More died sometime in February/March, 
1958. Thereupon, his legal heirs, namely, Baban Balaji More, Rama 
Balaji More and Jagannath Balaji More, filed an application on 
14.06.1958 under Section 5 of the 1874 Act. As per this provision, a 
Watandar was not competent to mortgage, charge, alienate or lease, 
for a period beyond the term of his natural life, any Watan or any 
part thereof or any interest therein to or for the benefit of any person 
who was not a Watandar of the same Watan, without the sanction 
of the State Government or the Commissioner, as the case may 
be. By order dated 18.04.1961, the Assistant Collector, I/C, Haveli 
Taluka, Poona, held that the tenancy created by the father of the 
applicants could not extend beyond his lifetime and the applicants
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would, therefore, have the right to recover possession of the said 
lands after the death of their father. He, accordingly, allowed their 
application and ordered that possession of the lands falling to their 
share should be handed over to them under Sections 11 and 11A 
of the 1874 Act. 
4.	
Aggrieved thereby, the tenants, viz., Babaji Hari Shelar and the legal 
heirs of late Ganapati Dhondiba Tapkir, namely, Laxman Ganapati 
Tapkir, Rama Ganapati Tapkir, Damu Ganapati Tapkir and Babu 
Ganapati Tapkir, filed Watan Appeal No. 6 of 1961 before the Additional 
Collector, Poona, under Section 77 of the 1874 Act. However, the 
said appeal was dismissed, vide order dated 27.03.1962. 
5.	
Thereupon, the tenants carried the matter to the Additional 
Commissioner, Poona Division, Poona, on 14.04.1962. Order dated 
12.06.1962 was passed by the Additional Commissioner, treating 
the proceeding as an appeal instituted against the order dated 
27.03.1962 passed in Watan Appeal No. 6 of 1961. Thereby, the 
Additional Commissioner rejected the appeal. The appellants would 
argue that this proceeding cannot be treated as an appeal, inasmuch 
as the statutory scheme allowed only one appeal under Section 77 
of the 1874 Act, and they would contend that this proceeding should 
be construed to be a revision filed under Section 79 thereof, with 
necessary consequences. This aspect will be dealt with hereinafter. 
6.	
In any event, during the
pendency of this proceeding, the possession 
of the lands in question was handed over on 22.04.1962 to the 
legal heirs of the deceased Watandar, in terms of the order dated 
18.04.1961 passed by the Assistant Collector, I/C, Haveli Taluka, 
Poona. 
7.	
At this stage, the Abolition Act was promulgated and it came into effect 
from 01.01.1963. As per Section 3 thereof, all Patel Watans stood 
abolished from the appointed date, i.e., 01.01.1963. In consequence, 
all incidents appertaining to the said Watans, including the right to 
hold office and Watan property, stood extinguished. Further, Section 
3(c) provided that, subject to the provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 9, 
all Watan lands stood resumed and were subject to payment of land 
revenue under the provisions of the relevant Code, as if they were 
unalienated land. Section 5 thereof, however, provided for regrant 
of the Watan land to the Watandar. Section 5(1) stated that Watan 
land resumed under Section 3 shall on an application therefor,
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
599
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
being in relation to cases not falling under Sections 6 and 9, be 
regranted to the Watandar of the Watan to which it appertained on 
payment by or on behalf of the Watandar to the State Government 
of the occupancy price equal to twelve times the amount of the 
full assessment of such land within the prescribed period and in 
the manner prescribed and, thereupon, the Watandar shall be an 
occupant within the meaning of the relevant Code in respect of any 
such land and shall be primarily liable to pay land revenue to the 
State Government in accordance with the provisions of that Code. 
The proviso to Section 5(1) stipulated that in respect of Watan land 
which was not assigned under the existing Watan law as remuneration 
of an officiator, the occupancy price equal to six times the amount 
of the full assessment of such land shall be paid by or on behalf of 
the Watandar for the regrant of such land. 
8.	
The appellants made an application under Section 5 of the Abolition 
Act for regrant of the Watan lands, as their case did not fall within 
the ambit of either Section 6 or Section 9 of the 1874 Act. By order 
dated 27.11.1964, the Mamlatdar, Haveli, noted that they had paid 
an amount equal to six times the assessment on 17.11.1964; that 
a Certificate of the Talhati stating to that effect was also on record; 
and accordingly ordered that the said lands be
regranted to them, 
subject to conditions. 
9.	
In the meanwhile, it appears that the tenants filed a revision before 
the Government assailing the orders passed against them. However, 
the appellants claim that it was only on 11.12.1964 that they suddenly 
received a copy of the letter dated 10.07.1964 addressed to Damu 
Ganapati Tapkir by the Officer on Special Duty, Revenue and Forest 
Department, Government of Maharashtra, stating that, pursuant 
to Government Letter dated 01.11.1963, he was to state that the 
Government was pleased to set aside the order dated 18.04.1961 
passed by the Pranth Officer, Taluka Haveli, District Poona; the 
order dated 27.03.1962 passed by the Collector, Poona, in Watan 
Appeal 6 of 1961; and the order dated 12.06.1962 passed by the 
Commissioner, Poona Division, in Case No. W.T.N.P.6/33. Thereupon, 
the Collector, Poona, directed the Mamlatdar, Haveli, to ensure 
delivery of possession of the lands to the tenants.
10.	 Aggrieved by this development and complaining that they were not 
given notice or a hearing prior to the Government’s decision, the
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appellants preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Poona, 
assailing the direction of the Collector, Poona, to the Mamlatdar, 
Haveli, to hand over possession of the subject lands to the tenants. 
The Commissioner, Poona, rejected their request, vide letter dated 
02.12.1964. They then approached the Chief Minister, State of 
Maharashtra, by way of written representation dated 11.12.1964. 
However, they were informed by the Officer on Special Duty, Revenue 
and Forest Department, Government of Maharashtra, vide letter dated 
30.12.1964, that their representation dated 11.12.1964 could not be 
considered. Aggrieved by the rejection of their representation under 
letter dated 30.12.1964, the appellants filed Special Civil Application 
No. 61 of 1965 before the Bombay High Court under Article 227 of 
the Constitution. Interim stay was granted therein on 15.01.1965 and 
the case was disposed of on 25.03.1969, in these terms: 
‘By consent, the Court makes absolute the rule granted 
by it on 15.01.1965, sets aside the order of the State 
Government dated 01.11.1963 communicated to the 
petitioners on 10.07.1964 by the Officer on Special Duty 
and remands the matter to Government with a direction to 
rehear the matter after giving opportunity to the petitioners 
and the respondents to be heard in their defence.
No order as to costs.’
11.	 The revision was taken up as Case No. PTIL-3464/102644-L-5 by 
the Officer on Special
Duty (Appeals and Revisions), Revenue and 
Forest Department, Government of Maharashtra. This revision was 
allowed by Order dated 03.05.1982 and all the orders passed by 
the authorities against the tenants were set aside. In consequence, 
the lands were directed to be restored to the tenants. In the order 
dated 03.05.1982, it was noted that the Abolition Act had come 
into force on 01.01.1963 but as on that date, the tenants were not 
in possession as it was an admitted fact that the appellants were 
delivered possession on 24.04.1962. However, the revisional authority 
opined that the mere factum of losing possession would not be 
determinative of termination of the tenancy and if the order to that 
effect was based on a wrong presumption or wrong interpretation of 
law, the tenancy could not be said to have been terminated even if 
such an order was executed. The authority opined that the argument 
that the possession of the tenants became unauthorized upon the
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601
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
death of the original Watandar and that no tenancy rights subsisted 
on the appointed date, viz., 01.01.1963, could not be accepted. The 
authority concluded that the Assistant Collector’s and Additional 
Collector’s orders in deciding the case under Section 11 of the 1874 
Act, ignoring the provisions of the Tenancy Act, were wrong. In effect, 
the authority held that the tenancy must be presumed to be continuing 
and that the orders passed to the contrary were improper and illegal 
and, consequently, execution of such orders had no effect on the 
rights of the tenants. Holding so, the authority allowed the tenants’ 
revision, set aside the orders passed against them and directed that 
the lands be restored to them.
12.	 Assailing this order, the appellants filed Writ Petition No. 1774 of 1982 
before the Bombay High Court. In the judgment dated 01.02.2005 
passed therein, the High Court observed that possession of the lands 
was delivered to the heirs of the Watandar on 24.04.1962 during 
the pendency of revisional proceedings, only because there was no 
stay of the order passed by the lower authority, and held that such 
delivery would be subject to final determination of the rights of the 
parties. Further, taking note of the fact that the Abolition Act came 
into effect on 01.01.1963, the High Court held that the tenancy was 
still subsisting on that day
despite the delivery of possession of the 
lands to the heirs of the Watandar, as the proceedings were still 
pending and execution of the order directing delivery of possession 
was subject to the final outcome thereof. The High Court, therefore, 
concluded that the tenancy was not legally and validly determined. 
As regards the appellants’ contention that Section 5 of the 1874 Act 
automatically determined the tenancy, the High Court rejected it on 
the ground that once a legal and valid tenancy was subsisting on 
01.01.1963, the tenants would be entitled to all the benefits under 
Section 8 of the Abolition Act and the provisions of the Tenancy 
Act. The High Court accordingly held that there was no merit in the 
writ petition and dismissed it. It is this judgment that is subjected to 
challenge before us in this appeal.
13.	 While issuing notice on 04.04.2005, this Court, directed status quo 
existing as on that day to be maintained. This order is still in operation. 
14.	 It would be appropriate at this stage to note the statutory scheme of 
the 1874 Act and the other relevant provisions thereof. Section 4 of 
the 1874 Act defines Watan property and Watandar. The definition 
of Watan property, to the extent relevant, reads thus:
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‘Watan property” means the moveable or immovable 
property held, acquired, or assigned for providing 
remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining 
to an hereditary office. It includes a right to levy customary 
fees or perquisites, in money or in kind, whether at fixed 
times or otherwise……’ 
Watandar is defined as under: 
‘Watandar” means a person having an hereditary interest 
in a watan. It includes a person holding watan property 
acquired by him before the introduction of the British 
Government into the locality of the watan, or legally 
acquired subsequent to such introduction, and a person 
holding such property from him by inheritance. It includes a 
person adopted by an owner of a watan or part of a watan, 
subject to the conditions specified in sections 33 to 35’
Section 5 of the 1874 Act, to the extent relevant, reads thus: 
‘5. (1) Without the sanction of the State Government, or 
in the case of a mortgage, charge, alienation, or lease of 
not more than thirty years, of the Commissioner it shall 
not be competent— 
(a) to a watandar to mortgage, charge, alienate or lease, 
for a period beyond the term of his natural life, any watan, 
or any part thereof, or any interest therein, to or for the 
benefit of any person who is not a watandar of the same 
watan; …..’
15.	 Section 11 of 1874 Act authorized the Collector to declare any 
alienation of the nature described in Section 10 thereof to be null
and void, if it had taken place, otherwise than by virtue of, or in 
execution of a decree or order of any Court, after recording his 
reasons in writing. Section 11A empowered the Collector to either 
summarily resume possession of the property in relation to which 
an order of the Court had been passed on receipt of his certificate 
under Section 10, or on his own declaration under Section 11, and 
the said property shall thenceforward revert to the Watan.
16.	 Much controversy was generated in the context of the proceeding 
filed before the Additional Commissioner, Poona Division, Poona,
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Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
that resulted in the order dated 12.06.1962. The appellants would 
contend that this ‘proceeding’ must be construed to be a revision filed 
under Section 79 of the 1874 Act and the State Government could 
not have entertained another revision thereafter, as the statutory 
scheme speaks of only one revision being maintainable under that 
provision. However, perusal of the order dated 12.06.1962 passed 
by the Additional Commissioner, Poona Division, Poona, reflects 
that the same was dealt with as an ‘appeal’ and not as a ‘revision’. 
Trite to state, appellate jurisdiction is vastly different from revisional 
jurisdiction, in terms of its scope and extent of review, and when the 
authority dealing with matter proceeded under the impression that it 
was exercising appellate jurisdiction the same cannot be construed 
to be revisional jurisdiction, contrary to what has been stated in the 
order itself. The entertainment of this ‘appeal’ has been explained by 
pointing out that Section 203 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 
1879, titled ‘Appeals and Revision’, states to the effect that, in the 
absence of any express provision or any law to the contrary, an 
appeal shall lie from any decision or order passed by a Revenue 
Officer under the Code or any other law for the time being in force 
to that Officer’s immediate superior. However, as pointed out by the 
appellants,
the scheme of the 1874 Act did not permit a ‘second’ 
appeal being maintained under Section 77 thereof. In effect, the 
proceeding before the Additional Commissioner, Poona Division, 
Poona, was utterly misconceived and was not maintainable. However, 
once such a misconceived ‘appeal’ was entertained and resulted 
in the order dated 12.06.1962, which was bereft of jurisdiction, a 
statutory revision came to be filed before the State Government 
under Section 79 of the 1874 Act. Significantly, this revision called in 
question the appellate order dated 27.03.1962 also and upon being 
heard afresh, pursuant to the ‘consent order’ of the High Court in 
Special Civil Application No. 61 of 1965, it culminated in the order 
dated 03.05.1982. Having consented to the remand of the revision 
for hearing afresh, the appellants cannot, in any event, raise this 
issue now. Therefore, the contention of the appellants in this regard 
is without merit and is rejected accordingly. 
17.	 Before we proceed to take a look at the provisions of the Tenancy 
Act, it may be noted that the precursor thereof was the Bombay 
Tenancy Act, 1939. It was applicable to the whole of the Province of 
Bombay, except Bombay City, and was intended to protect tenants
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of agricultural lands. This statute stood repealed upon the Tenancy 
Act coming into force in December, 1948. The Tenancy Act was 
enacted to amend the law relating to tenancy of agricultural lands 
and to make certain other provisions in regard to those lands. It was 
placed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and stood protected 
under Article 31(b) thereof. Section 88 of the Tenancy Act exempted 
Government lands and certain other lands from the provisions thereof. 
18.	 Agrarian reforms were undertaken to alleviate the plight of agricultural 
tenants and resulted in beneficial measures being introduced for 
them from 01.04.1957. This day came to be known as ‘Tillers’ Day’. 
Amendments were made to the Tenancy Act in this context and a 
separate Chapter enabling purchase of tenanted lands by the tenants 
was inserted therein. Sections 32 to 32-R were introduced thereby 
in the Tenancy Act. Section 32 is titled ‘Tenants deemed to have 
purchased land on Tillers’ day’ and Section 32(1) stated that, on 
the first day of April, 1957, every tenant shall, subject to the other 
provisions of that section and of the next succeeding sections, be 
deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances 
subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as a tenant. 
Sections 32-A to 32-R gave effect to the tenant’s right to purchase 
the tenanted agricultural land. 
19.	 The issue presently is whether the
Tenancy Act had application to 
the subject Watan lands. The appellants would contend that it had 
no application, be it on Tillers’ Day or in February/March, 1958, when 
Balaji Chimnaji More, the original Watandar, died and an application 
was made by his legal heirs under Sections 5 of the1874 Act. It is their 
case that the exemption under Section 88 of the Tenancy Act was 
applicable to these lands. To the extent relevant, the said provision, 
after its amendment with effect from 01.08.1956, reads as under:
‘88. Exemption to Government lands and certain other lands.- 
(1) [Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), nothing 
in the foregoing provisions of this Act] shall apply,-
[a] to lands belonging to or held on lease from, the 
Government;
……………………’
An ‘Explanation’ was inserted in relation to the above clause (a) in 
July, 1958. It reads as under:
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
605
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
‘[Explanation.- For the purposes of clause (a) of sub-section 
(1) of this section land held as inam or watan for service 
useful to Government and assigned as remuneration to 
the person actually performing such service for the time 
being, under Section 23 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices 
Act, 1874, or any other law for the time being in force, 
shall be deemed to be land belonging to the Government.]’
Insertion of this ‘Explanation’ was not an amendment of the provision, 
which would have prospective effect and, thereby, not apply to the 
application filed on 14.06.1958 under Section 5 of the 1874 Act. The 
‘Explanation’ merely explained the position and was not substantive 
in nature. It is, therefore, deemed to have come into operation from 
the date on which Section 88(1) was amended in August, 1956. 
Thereby, the limited applicability of the provision to certain Watan 
lands was clearly delineated.
In turn, Section 23 of the 1874 Act reads as follows:
‘23. Subject to the provisions of this Act and or any other 
law for the time being in force regarding Service Inams, 
Cash allowances and Pensions, it shall be the duty of 
the Collector to fix the annual emoluments of officiators 
appointed under the provisions of this Act, and to direct 
the payment thereof to the officiators for the time being. 
It shall be lawful for the Collector for this purpose to
assign watan property, or the profits thereof, towards the 
emoluments of officiators. The existing assignments shall, 
until altered by competent authority, be taken to have 
been made under this section. With the sanction of the 
State Government the Collector may, as occasion arises, 
alter the assignment and may increase or diminish it in 
value, such increase or diminution being made rateably 
among the holders in proportion to the profit derived by 
such holders respectively from the watan.’
Thereafter, Section 88CA was inserted in the Tenancy Act by 
Amendment Act No.63 of 1958 with effect from 11.07.1958. It reads 
thus:
‘88CA. Sections 32 to 32R not to apply to certain service 
lands.- Nothing in sections 32 to 32-R (both inclusive),
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33-A, 33-B, 33-C shall apply to land held as inam or 
watan for service useful to Government but not assigned 
as remuneration to the person actually performing such 
service for the time being under section 23 of the Bombay 
Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, or any other law for the time 
being in force.’
20.	 A conjoint reading of the above provisions indicates that all Watan 
lands were not to be treated as Government lands. The ‘Explanation’ 
to Section 88 clarified the position with regard to Watan lands, other 
than those covered by Section 23 of the 1874 Act, as it manifests 
that only Watan land assigned as remuneration to an officiator 
performing service under Section 23 of the 1874 Act etc. shall be 
deemed to be land belonging to the Government. Thus, only Watan 
lands covered by Section 23 of the 1874 Act were to be treated as 
Government lands as per Section 88(1)(a). This is further clarified by 
Section 88CA inserted in the year 1958, which stated that Sections 
32 to 32-R, 33-A, 33-B and 33-C would not apply to land held as 
Inam or Watan for service useful to the Government, excepting land 
assigned as remuneration under Section 23 of the 1874 Act etc. It 
is, therefore, clear that only Watan lands assigned as remuneration 
for service under Section 23 of the 1874 Act were to be treated as 
Government lands and stood excluded from the provisions of the 
Tenancy Act. Admittedly, Balaji Chimnaji More was not an
‘officiator’ 
covered by Section 23 of the 1874 Act. This is also demonstrated 
by the fact that his legal heirs paid only six times the assessment 
for regrant of the Watan lands under Section 5 of the Abolition Act 
and not twelve times, as would be applicable to an officiator. Ergo, 
the subject Watan lands were not covered by Section 88(1)(a) of 
the Tenancy Act and could not be treated as Government lands. 
21.	 By virtue of the ‘Explanation’ to Section 88(1)(a) of the Tenancy 
Act, all other Watan lands, including the subject Watan lands, were 
covered by all the provisions of the Tenancy Act. However, Section 
88CA thereof, introduced in the statute book in July, 1958, granted 
such Watan lands exemption from Sections 32 to 32-R, 33-A, 33-B 
and 33-C. Therefore, Sections 29 and 31 of the Tenancy Act were 
very much applicable to such Watan lands all through. Section 29, 
titled ‘Procedure of taking possession’, states to the effect that no 
landlord shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held 
by a tenant except under an order of the Mamlatdar and for obtaining
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607
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
such an order, he should make an application in the prescribed 
form within the prescribed time. Section 31 is titled ‘Landlord’s right 
to terminate tenancy for personal cultivation and non-agricultural 
purpose’ and provided the mode and method in which a landlord 
could terminate the tenancy of any land, except a permanent tenancy. 
Thereunder, the landlord had to file an application for possession 
before the Mamlatdar before Tillers’ Day. This being the position, 
the heirs of the original Watandar could not have aspired to secure 
possession without reference to this procedure. 
22.	 The limited exemption from certain provisions of the Tenancy Act, 
afforded by Section 88CA thereof, continued until the Abolition Act 
came into force on 01.01.1963. Thereafter, as the very institution 
of Patel Watan stood abolished, the limited exemption extended 
to such Watan lands under Section 88CA of the Tenancy Act also 
ceased. This is made clear by Section 8 of the Abolition Act, which 
reads as under:
‘8. Application of existing tenancy law- if any watan land has 
been lawfully leased and such lease is subsisting on the 
appointed day, the provisions of the relevant tenancy law 
shall apply to the said lease, and the rights and liabilities 
of the holder of such land and his tenant or tenants shall, 
subject to the provisions of this Part, be governed by the
provisions of that law:
Provided that, for the purposes of application of the 
provisions of the relevant tenancy law in regard to the 
compulsory purchase of land by a tenant, the lease shall be 
deemed to have commenced from the date of the regrant 
of the land under section 5 or 6 or 9, as the case may be.
Explanation- For the purposes of this section, the 
expression “land” shall have the same meaning as is 
assigned to it in the relevant tenancy law.’
23.	 Therefore, after the advent of the Abolition Act, Patel Watan land 
which was lawfully leased, and the lease of which was subsisting 
as on 01.01.1963, stood covered by the Tenancy Act in its entirety 
and the tenant of such Watan land was entitled to all the benefits 
under the provisions thereof, including the right to purchase such 
land. The proviso to Section 8 indicates that, for the purpose of fixing 
the purchase price under the provisions of the Tenancy Act so as to
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enable the purchase of such land by the tenant, the lease shall be 
deemed to have commenced from the date of regrant of the land 
under Sections 5, 6 or 9, as the case may be. 
24.	 Earlier, this Court had occasion to consider this proviso in Sadashiv 
Dada Patil vs. Purushottam Onkar Patil (Dead) by LRs.1. The 
respondent therein was a tenant of Watan land and the appellant was 
the landlord. The issue was whether Section 32-O of the Tenancy Act 
had application in view of the proviso to Section 8 of the Abolition 
Act. Section 32-O is titled ‘Right of Tenant whose tenancy is created 
after Tillers’ Day to purchase land’. It stated that in respect of any 
tenancy created after Tillers’ Day and if the landlord is not a serving 
member of the Armed Forces, a tenant cultivating such land personally 
shall be entitled, within one year from the commencement of such 
tenancy, to purchase the land held by him from the landlord. The 
issue before this Court was whether a tenant of Watan land was 
required to exercise his right to purchase the land within one year 
of the regrant, in view of the proviso to Section 8 of the Abolition Act 
stating that the lease is deemed to have commenced from the date 
of such regrant of the land. In effect, the question was whether the 
tenancy is to be treated as a fresh lease commencing on the date 
of the regrant. At the outset, this Court opined that, indisputably, the 
rights and obligations
of the parties were governed by the Tenancy 
Act. Section 31 thereof was taken note of and as no termination of 
the tenancy had been effected thereunder, this Court held that the 
tenancy continued till the declaration of Tillers’ Day on 01.04.1957. 
Thereafter, by virtue of Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, the tenant 
was deemed to have purchased the tenanted agricultural land from 
his landlord. Noting that the provisions of the Abolition Act and the 
Tenancy Act were required to be construed harmoniously, keeping 
in view the purport and object that they seek to achieve, this Court 
observed that Section 32 of the Tenancy Act conferred an absolute 
right upon the tenant. Therefore, the proviso to Section 8 of the 
Abolition Act could not be read in such a manner as to divest the 
tenant of the vested right of purchase created under Section 32 of 
the Tenancy Act. The proviso was held to have merely fixed the 
date of the lease for reckoning the purchase price to be paid to the 
landlord. Thereby, no new tenancy was created and Section 32-O of 
1	
[2006] Supp. 6 SCR 843 : (2006) 11 SCC 161
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
609
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
the Tenancy Act did not stand attracted. It was held that the proviso 
to Section 8 had a limited role to play and it merely postponed the 
operation of the statute. It was held that it had to be read in the 
light of Section 32G and Section 32O of the Tenancy Act and be 
interpreted accordingly, i.e., it did not create any right in favour of 
the landlord nor did it take away the right of the tenant. 
25.	 It would be apposite at this stage to take note of the decisions 
of the Bombay High Court on various issues arising under these 
three legislations. In its Full Bench decision in Dattatraya Keshav 
Deshpande vs. Tukaram Raghu Chorage2, the Court held that 
Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the 1874 Act were framed to protect 
Watan property from unauthorized alienations and the Collector 
is empowered under Section 11 to declare any such unauthorized 
alienation to be null and void after recording his reasons in writing. 
This judgment, having been rendered long before the other two 
legislations came into existence, has to be understood keeping in 
mind the later developments in the context of the Tenancy Act and 
the Abolition Act. The 1874 Act, therefore, cannot be treated as an 
independent, self-contained and complete code in itself. 
26.	 In Govind Ramchandra Patil vs. Bapusaheb Krishnarao Patil 
and others3, a Division Bench dealt with the question as to whether
a lease granted by a Watandar would continue to operate to the 
benefit of the tenants by virtue of the provisions of the Tenancy 
Act despite the Abolition Act. The Bench opined that the intention 
of the legislature was clear that the tenants on the land, who were 
lessees before the Tenancy Act came into force, should continue to 
be on the land unless the landlord himself required the land for his 
personal cultivation or the tenant was guilty of any defaults mentioned 
in Section 14 of the Tenancy Act. The Bench, therefore, concluded 
that it was not open to the Watandar to ask for a declaration under 
Section 11 of the 1874 Act that the lease became null and void and 
pray for restoration of possession of the land. Though it was argued 
that the Watandar was only asking for a declaration under Section 
5 of the 1874 Act that the tenancy had become null and void on 
account of the death of the original Watandar, the Bench opined 
2	
AIR 1921 Bom 17
3	
Special Civil Application No.1741 of 1961, decided on 13.12.1962
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that Section 14(1) of the Tenancy Act provided that the tenancy of 
a land held by a tenant shall not be terminated unless the tenant is 
guilty of the defaults mentioned therein. Further, as Section 29(2) 
of the Tenancy Act provided that a landlord shall not be entitled to 
claim possession of the land leased out to a tenant otherwise than 
by way of an application to the Mamlatdar under the Tenancy Act, 
the Bench concluded that the landlord could recover possession of 
the land from the tenant only on the grounds provided in the Tenancy 
Act and in no other way could the landlord obtain possession from 
the tenant. 
27.	 In Kallawwa Shattu Patil and others vs. Yallappa Parashram Patil 
and another4, a learned Judge noted that suo motu proceedings 
initiated by the Revenue authorities under Section 32G of the Tenancy 
Act had to be dropped in view of the fact that the land was found 
to be Watan land and no purchase price in respect thereof could 
be fixed till the date of regrant of the land in favour of the landlord. 
On facts, the learned Judge found that the Watan land was lawfully 
leased in favour of the tenant long before 01.04.1957 and the said 
lease was subsisting on the appointed day. The provisions of the 
Tenancy Act, therefore, became applicable to the lease forthwith and 
only the compulsory purchase of the land, as per Section 32G of the 
Tenancy Act, could not be availed of by the tenant until the regrant
of the said land to the landlord under the Abolition Act. The learned 
Judge held that the landlord did not create a fresh tenancy in favour 
of the tenant on 01.04.1957 and Section 32O of the Tenancy Act 
had no application, as it would not be attracted to a case where the 
land was already leased out to the tenant prior to 01.04.1957. The 
proviso to Section 8 of the Abolition Act was stated to create a legal 
fiction for an extremely limited purpose, i.e., for the purpose of fixing 
the price in respect of the statutory purchase of the land. For that 
limited purpose, the land is deemed to have been leased out from 
the date of regrant but it did not follow therefrom that the landlord 
created a fresh lease in respect of the said land on the date of the 
regrant as the old lease had never come to an end. 
28.	 In Pradeeprao @ Virgonda Shivgonda Patil vs. Sidappa Girappa 
Hemgire since deceased through his heirs and LRs. Ginnappa 
4	
(1992) 1Mah.LJ 34
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611
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
Sidappa Hemgire and others5, a learned Judge again affirmed the 
aforestated legal position and held that merely because there was a 
regrant of the Watan land in favour of the Watandar, it did not mean 
that a new lease was created on that day in favour of the tenant. 
The learned Judge found that after the Watan was abolished, the 
landlord paid the amount towards the occupancy price within the 
prescribed time and the land stood regranted to him. As the land 
stood regranted, the tenant acquired the right to purchase the said 
land by virtue of the provisions of the Tenancy Act.
29.	 In Kondabai Ganu Barkale (since deceased) through her Legal 
Heirs Smt. Housabai P Bhongale and others vs. Pandit @ Shankar 
D. Patil (since deceased) through his Legal Heirs Waman S.Patil 
and others6, a learned Judge noted that the Tribunal had erred in 
holding that the tenancy in that case was created long after Tillers’ 
Day. The learned judge found that there was no dispute as to the 
fact that the tenancy in respect of the said land was created long 
before Tillers’ Day and by virtue of Section 88CA of the Tenancy Act, 
Section 32 to Section 32–R of the Tenancy Act were inapplicable 
thereto at that time. However, after the Abolition Act and regrant 
of the Watan land to the landlord thereunder, the provisions of the 
Tenancy Act became applicable to the subject land with
full vigour. 
Such application, by operation of law, was not to be treated as the 
creation of a new tenancy by the landlord after Tillers’ Day. The 
Tribunal was, therefore, held to be in clear error in applying the 
provisions of Section 32O of the Tenancy Act to the case.
30.	 We find ourselves in respectful and complete agreement with the 
views expressed by the Bombay High Court in the above decisions. 
In the case on hand, it is the contention of the appellants that there 
was no lease subsisting as on 01.01.1963, owing to the order dated 
18.04.1961 passed upon the application made by the legal heirs under 
Section 5 of the 1874 Act after the death of the original Watandar. They 
would further contend that as the possession of the Watan lands was 
actually restored to the legal heirs on 22.04.1962, the tenants were not 
even in possession on the appointed date, viz., 01.01.1963. In effect, 
their argument is that neither a lawful lease was in existence nor were 
5	
(2004) 3 Mah. L.J. 75
6	
(2016) 2 Mah. LJ 282
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the tenants in physical possession on the said date. However, this 
argument loses sight of the fact that the order dated 18.04.1961 had 
not attained finality inasmuch as the tenants subjected it to challenge 
before the higher authorities and their challenge was still pending. 
No doubt, the High Court erroneously referred to the ‘misconceived 
appeal’ filed by them as ‘revisional proceedings’ but notwithstanding 
the nomenclature, the inescapable fact remains that the challenge to 
the initial order dated 18.04.1961 was subsisting as on 22.04.1962, 
the date of delivery of possession, and such proceedings of challenge 
concluded in favour of the tenants when their revision was allowed, 
vide the order dated 03.05.1982. Merely because no stay was 
granted in such proceedings and, in consequence, the tenants stood 
divested of actual physical possession, it did not lend any finality to 
the order impugned in those proceedings and, therefore, the purported 
termination of the lease still hung in balance. 
31.	 Further, in the light of the aforestated discussion, the argument of 
the appellants that the tenants ought to have challenged the regrant 
order dated 27.11.1964 is without merit. In fact, the tenants were 
benefited by the said regrant order as the exercise of their right to 
purchase the land hinged upon the passing of that regrant order, in 
terms of the proviso to Section 8 of the Abolition Act. The argument 
to
the contrary is, therefore, rejected. 
32.	 It appears that during the pendency of this litigation, the subject 
agricultural Watan lands became part of the extended city limits 
of Pimpari Chinchwad Municipal Corporation and are presently 
reserved for Defence purposes (Red Zone) in the development plans 
sanctioned by the Government of Maharashtra. In consequence, 
these lands cannot be alienated without the prior approval of the 
Government of India and the Government of Maharashtra. While so, 
we find that both sides have been merrily entering into transactions 
with third parties to alienate/transfer the subject lands. However, our 
decision in this case relates back to a time when the subject lands 
were still agricultural in nature and use and it would have no impact 
on the present position and the consequences flowing therefrom. 
Further, inter se disputes, be it betwixt the appellants or betwixt 
the tenants, are not the subject matter of this appeal and have 
not been dealt with. All such disputes would have to be addressed 
independently before the appropriate forum in accordance with law, 
if still permissible.
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613
Baban Balaji More (Dead) by LRs. & others v.  
Babaji Hari Shelar (Dead) by LRs. & others
33.	 On the above analysis, we hold that it was not open to the appellants 
to proceed against the tenants under the provisions of Sections 5, 
11 and 11A of the 1874 Act after the death of Balaji Chimnaji More, 
the original Watandar, in February/March, 1958. This is because 
the provisions of the Tenancy Act were very much applicable to the 
subject lands by then and more so, Sections 29 and 31 thereof. 
Therefore, the legal heirs of the original Watandar could not have 
taken lawful possession of these lands from the tenants pursuant 
to the order dated 18.04.1961 passed under Sections 5, 11 and 
11A of the 1874 Act. The same was rightly held to be invalid in the 
revisionary order dated 03.05.1982 and that finding was correctly 
held to be justified by the Bombay High Court. We also hold that 
the tenancy was lawfully subsisting on 01.04.1957, i.e., Tillers’ Day, 
and the tenants were entitled to exercise their right of statutory 
purchase of these tenanted agricultural Watan lands under Section 
32 of the Tenancy Act in terms of Section 8 of the Abolition Act, after 
the exemption afforded by Section 88CA ceased to exist. That right 
became operational on 27.11.1964, when these Watan lands were 
regranted to the heirs of the original Watandar. 
Viewed thus, we find no grounds made out, either on facts or in law, 
to interfere with the impugned judgment dated
01.02.2005 passed 
by the Bombay High Court. 
The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Pending I.A.s shall also stand dismissed. 
In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
Result of the case: 
Appeal dismissed.