SMITA SUBHASH SAWANT versus JAGDEESHWARI JAGDISHAMIN & ORS.
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 600, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
c 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 600 
SMITASUBHASH SAWANT · 
v. 
JAGDEESHWARI JAGDISHAMIN & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No.6848 of 2015) 
SEPTEMBER 04, 2015 
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND 
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.] 
Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888: 
s. 33(1) and 28(k) - Limitation period - For filing election 
petition - Challenging election of Municipal Corporator -
Held: Period of 10 days for filing election petition, as 
prescribed uls.33(1) begins from the date on which the list 
D prescribed under clause (k) of s. 28 was available for sale or 
inspection - In the present case, the list prepared by the 
Returning Officer on 17. 2.2012 was issued uls. 28(k) and such 
list was also available for sale and inspection to the voters of 
the ward on 17.2.2012 itself- Thus, the limitation for filing 
E the election petition would begin from 17.2.2012 upto 
27.2.2012- The petition in the present case, since was filed 
on 28.2.2012 Would be barred by limitation and hence liable 
to be dismissed. 
F 
s.28(k) - Power under- To State Election Commission 
- To frame rules - Rules not framed by the Commission -
Leading to ambiguity in interpretation of s.28(k) - Held: In 
absence of the rules, the provision should be interpreted in · 
a manner which may benefit the elected candidate ratherthan 
G the election petitioner- The Commission is required to frame 
appropriate rules within reason.able time - Interpretation of 
Statutes. 
s.33(1) - Interpretation of- With the aid of s. 10 and 32 
H 
600
SMITASUBHASH SAWANTv. JAGDEESHWARI 
601 
JAGDISHAMIN 
of the Act- For deciding the issue of limitation - Permissibility A 
- Held: s. 33(1) cannot be interpreted with the aid of ss. 1 O or 
32 as these provisions are not mentioned in s.33(1)- Court 
can neither read any words which are not mentioned in the 
section nor can substitute any word in place of those 
mentioned in the Section - Words of a statute has to be B 
interpreted giving their natural meaning - Interpretation of 
Statutes. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
c 
HELD: 1. A plain reading of the words "any person 
enrolled in the municipal election roll may; at any time, 
within ten days from the date on which the list prescribed 
under clause (k) of section 28 was available for sale or 
inspection apply to the Chief Judge of the Small Causes o 
Court" occurring in Section 33 (1) of the Mumbai 
Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 .shows that the period 
of 10 days prescribed for. filing the election petition 
begins from "the date" on which the list prescribed 
under clause (k) of Section 28 of the Act was available E · 
for sale or inspection. [Paras 12 and 13] [610-E-H] 
2. The State Election Commissioner has failed to 
frame the Rules for proper Implementation of the 
functions set out in Section 28(k) of the Act and due to F 
that reason, there appears to be some kind of ambiguity 
noticed in its Interpretation. In that case, such provision 
should be interpreted as far as possible in a manner 
which may benefit
the elected candidate rather than the 
election petitioner. [Para 18) [612-B-C] 
G 
Anandilal and another vs. Ram Narain and others AIR. 
1984 SC 1383: 1984 (3) SCR 806 - relied on. 
3~ The list prepared by the Returning Officer on H 
17.02.2012 was in conformity with all the requirements
602 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A specified in Section 28(k) of the Act. After reading the 
statement of the elected candidate and that of the election 
petitioner, it is also evident that the list prescribed under 
Section 28(k) was made available to all the parties 
including the voter of the ward in question on 17 .02.2012 
B by the Returning Officer. There is no ground to disbelieve 
the sworn testimony of the appellant (elected candidate). 
As soon as the results were announced on 17.02.2012, 
the appellant and respondent No.1 were given their 
respective certificates in Form-21 C as prescribed in Rule 
C 103 of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai 
conduct of Election Rules, 2006 by the Returning Officer. 
Respondent No.1 (election petitioner) herself inspected 
the list prepared by the Returning Officer, which she 
0 
could not do unless the list was made available for 
inspection on 17.02.2012 by the Returning Officer. The 
Returning Officer could not have announced the results 
unless he had first prepared the list specifying therein 
the necessary details which were required for declaring 
E the result of election and there was no reason for not 
making the list available to the voter on 17 .02.2012 and 
keep withholding when it was prepared on that day itself 
by the Returning Officer for declaration of the result of 
the election. [Paras 22 and 26] [613-B; 615-F-H; 616-A-
F D] 
4. Respondent No.1 is not correct in contending that 
the
limitation would begin from 21.02.2012, for filing 
election petition which is the date on which the election 
G results were declared and then were published in the 
official gazette as provided. in Section 10 read with 
Section 32 of the Act. Section 33 (1) only mentions 
Section 28(k) and does not refer to any other section 
much less Section 10 or/and 32 for deciding the issue of 
H limitation. If the intention of the legislature was to 
calculate the period of limitation from the date of issuance
SMITASUBHASH SAWANTv. JAGDEESHWARI 
603 
JAGDISHAMIN 
of Official Gazette as provided in Section 10 and/or A 
Section 32, then instead of mentioning Section 28(k), the 
legislature would have mentioned Section 10 and/or 
Section 32 in Section 33(1) of the Act. However, it was 
not done. The legislative intention, therefore, appears to 
be clear leaving no ambiguity therein by including B 
Section 28(k) only and excluding Section 10 and 32 in 
Section 33 (1). [Paras 28 and 29] [616-H; 617-A-F] 
5. It is a settled principle of rule of interpretation that 
the Court cannot read any words which are not C 
mentioned in the Section nor can substitute any words 
in place of those mentioned in the section and at the 
same time cannot ignore the words mentioned in the 
section. Equally well settled rule of interpretation is that 
if the language of statute is plain, simple, clear and D 
unambiguous then the words of statute have to be 
interpreted by giving them their natural meaning. The 
interpretation of Section 33(1) read with Section 28(k) is 
in the light of this principle. [Para 30] [617-F-H; 618-A] 
Interpretation of statute by (;.P Singh gth Edition page 
44/45 - referred to. 
E 
6. Thus, the list prescribed under Section 28(k) was 
available for inspection and sale to the voters of the ward F 
in question on 17.02.2012. In view of this finding, the 
limitation to file election petition would begin from 
17.02.2012 and it will be up to 27.02.2012. Since the 
election
petition was filed on 28.02.2012, a date beyond 
27 .02.2012, it was liable to be dismissed as being barred G 
by limitation. In the absence of any provision made in 
the Act for condoning the delay in filing the election 
petition, the Chief Judge had no power to condone the 
delay in filing the election petition beyond the period of 
limitation prescribed in law. [Paras 31 and 32] [618-B-E] H
604 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
7. The State Election Commissioner would be at 
liberty to frame Rules under Section 28(k) for Its proper 
Implementation. Indeed, when the legislature has 
conferred a rule making power on the specified authority 
for proper and effective Implementation of Section 28(k) 
B then such power should be exercised by the State 
Election Commissioner within reasonable time by 
framing appropriate Rules. [Para 33) [618-F-G] 
c 
Case Law Reference 
1984 (3) SCR 806 
relied on. 
Para 19 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
6848 of 2015. 
D 
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.02.2015 of the 
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 9388 
of2014. 
Vinay Navare, Satyajeet Kumar, Keshav Ranjan, Gwen 
E K. B., Abha R. Sharma for the Appellant. 
Sudhanshu S. Chol.ft'.lhari, Vatsalya Vigya, Vijay Kumar, 
Aparna Jha, Jayashree Wad, Ashish Wad, Sangram Singh 
Bhonsle, · Paromota Majumdar, J. S. Wad & co. for the 
F Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. 
Leave granted. 
G 
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and 
order dated 09.02.2015 passed by the High Court of. 
Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 9388 of 2014 which 
arises out of judgment and order dated 24.09.2014 passed 
by the Court of Small Causes at Bombay in Municipal Election 
H Petition No. 129 of2012 holding thatthe election petition filed
SMITA SUB HASH SAWANT v. JAGDEESHWARI 
605 
JAGDISH AMIN [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
by respondent No.1 herein questioning the appellant's election A· 
as a Councilor of the Bruh an Mumbai Municipal Corporation 
from Ward No.76 is within the period of limitation prescribed 
under Section 33 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 
1888 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 
3. In order to appreciate the issue involved in this appeal, 
it is necessary to state a few relevant facts: 
B 
(a) The election schedule for General Election 2012 of 
Councilors under the Act was publish.!=!d by Notification dated c 
02.02.2012 declaring the date of poll as 16.02.2012 and 
counting of votes on 17 .02.2012. The said Notification also 
declared that the list of elected candidates along with total 
number of valid votes polled by them will be published in the 
Government Gazette on or before 21.02.2012 as required o 
under the provisions of Sections 10, 28(k) and 32 of the Act. 
(b) The appellant and respondent No.1 herein contested 
the election from Ward No.76 for Municipal Corporator. The 
election was held on 16.02.2012 and after counting, which to?k E 
place on 17.02.2012, the Election Officer declared the 
appellant herein to have been elected as a Municipal 
Corporator from Ward No. 76. A certificate to that effect was 
also issued by the Election Officer in favour of the appellant 
herein in Form No. 21-C as per Rule 103 of Municipal F 
Corporation of Greater Mumbai conduct of
Election Rules 
2006 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') on 17.02.2012. 
Thereafter on 21.02.2012, the Municipal Commissioner 
published the Official Gazette declaring the names of the 
candidates elected from all the 227 wards of the Municipal G 
Corporation with the names of their political parties and the 
votes polled by them as per Section 10 and Section 32-(i) of 
the Act and Rule 104 of the Rules. 
.. 
(c) Challenging the election of the appellant herein, on 
H
606 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
. A 
28.02.2012, respondent No.1 filed Election Petition No. 129 
of 2012 in the Court of Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, 
Mumbai. After service of notice, the appellant herein appeared 
before the Chief Judge and filed written statement contesting 
inter a/ia on the ground that the said election petition filed by 
B respondent No.1 herein was barred by limitation as provided 
in Section 33 (1) of the Act. According to the appellant, the 
election petition was required to be filed within 1 O days from 
the date on which the list prescribed under clause (k) of Section 
28 was available for sale or inspection as provided in Section 
C 33 (1) of the Act. It was contended that since in this case, the 
list was published and was available for sale or inspection on 
17.02.2012, hence, the limitation to file election petition was 
up to 27.0'2.2012 as prescribed under Section 33 (1) of the 
0 
Act whereas the election petition was filed on 28.02.2012 by 
the election petitioner. It was, therefore, barred by limitation 
and hence liable to be dismissed as being barred by time. 
She also filed an application before the Chief Judge praying 
forframing the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue. Initially, 
E the Chief Judge had rejected the said application but thereafter 
by order dated 30. 07.2013 issued direction to try the said issue 
as a preliminary issue. After hearing the parties, by judgment 
and order dated 24.09.2014, the
Chief Judge held that the 
election petition was within limitation. He accordingly 
F entertained the election petition filed by respondent No.1 herein 
for being tried on merits. 
(d)Aggrieved by the saidjudgment, the appellant herein 
approached the High Court of Bombay by way of W.P. No. 
G 9388 of 2014. By judgment and order dated 09.02.2015, the 
learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the petition 
and upheld the judgment of the Chief Judge. The High Court 
also held that the election petition filed by respondent No.1 
. herein is within limitation as prescribed under Section 33 (1) 
H oftheAct.
SMITA SUB HASH SAWANT v. JAGDEESHWARI 
607 
JAGDISHAMIN [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
( e) Against the said judgment, the present appeal has been A 
filed by way of special leave. 
4. Heard Mr. Vinay Navare, learned counsel for the 
appellant and Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, learned counsel 
for respondent No.1, Ms. Jayashree Wad, learned counsel for B 
respondent No.2 and Mr. Vijay Kumar, learned counsel for 
respondent No.3. 
5. Learned Counsel for the appellant while assailing the 
legality and correctness of the impugned order reiterated the c 
submissions, which were urged by him before the Courts 
below. According to the learned counsel, both the Co~rts below 
erred in holding that the election petition filed by respondent 
No. 1 herein (election petitioner) is within limitation as 
prescribed under Section 33 (1) of the Act. In other words, it o 
was his submission that both the Courts below should have 
held that the election petition filed by respondent No. 1 herein 
was beyond the period of limitation and in consequence was 
liable to be dismissed as being barred by limitation. 
6. Elaborating the aforementioned submissions, learned 
counsel contended that in order to decide the question of 
limitation and how it will apply to the facts of the case in hand, 
two Sections are relevant, namely, Section 33 ( 1) and Section 
E 
28 (k) of the Act. Learned counsel contended that Section 33 
F 
(1) prescribes limitation of 10 days for filing the election petition 
and the
period of 10 days has to be counted from the date on 
which the list prescribed under Section 28 (k) of the Act is · 
available for sale or inspection. 
G 
7. Learned counsel pointed out that the election in 
question was held on 16.02.2012 and counting of votes was 
done on 17.02.2012 followed by declaration of election result. 
declaring the appellant to have won the election and finally 
issuance of certificates of the election result as required under H
608 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
Rule 103 of the Rules in the prescribed format (Form No. 21-
C) were given to the appellant herein and the election petitioner 
(respondent No. 1 herein) on the same day, i.e., 17.02.2012 
by the Returning Officer. Similarly, it was pointed out that the 
list of the ward was also made available for sale or/and 
B inspection on 17.02.2012 to all including the candidates 
immediately after declarati~n of result and handing over the 
certificates in Form No. 21-C to both the candidates by the 
Returning Officer. Learned counsel thus contended that in the 
light of these admitted facts, the limitation to file Election Petition 
C began from 17.02.2012 as prescribed under Section 33 (1) 
and ended on 27.02.2012. Since the election petition was filed 
by respondent No.1 on 28.2.2012, it was liable to be dismissed 
as being barred by limitation. 
D . 
8. In reply, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 while 
supporting the reasoning and the conclusion of the High Court, 
contended that the view taken by the High Court is just and 
proper and hence it does not call for any interference by this 
Court. It was his submission that the limitation to file election 
E petition began from 21.02.2012, this being the date on which 
the gazette publication of election results in the official Gazette 
was published by the Election Commissioner as required under 
Section 10 read with Section 32 of the Act and Rule 104 of the 
F 
Rules. According to
learned counsel, 10 days' period 
prescribed for limitation therefore beganfrom 21.02.2012 and 
·ended on 02 .. 03.2012. Learned counsel, therefore, urged that 
the election petition filed by the election Petitioner (respondent 
no. 1) on 28.02.2012 was within limitation and hence was rightly 
G held to be within time for being tried on merits. 
9. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and 
on perusal of the record of the case including their written 
submissions, we find force in the submissions of the learned 
H counsel for the appellant. 
...
SMITA SUB HASH SAWANT v. JAGDEESHWARI 
609 
JAG DISH AMIN [ABHAY MANO HAR SAP RE, J.] 
10. The question which arises for consideration in this A 
appeal is whether the election petition filed by respondent No.1 
against the appellant under Section 33 (1) of the Act before 
the Chief Judge is within limitation as prescribed under Section 
33 (1) of the Act? 
B 
11. Section 28 (k) and Section 33 ( 1) of the Act, which are 
relevant for deciding the aforesaid question, read as under: 
" 
Section 28 (k) 
(k) the State Election Commissioner shall, as soon C 
as may be, declare the result of the poll, specifying 
the total number of valid votes given for each 
candidate, and shall cause lists to be prepared for 
each ward, specifying the name of all candidates, 0 
and the number of valid votes given to each 
candidate. In accordance with such rules as the 
State Election Commissioner may frame for the 
purpose and on payment of such fee as may be 
prescribed by him a copy of such list shall be E 
supplied to any candidate of the ward and shall be 
available for inspection to any voter of the ward. 
Section 33 (1) 
Election petitions to be heard and disposed of by F 
Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court. · 
(1) If .the qualification of any person declared to be 
elected for being a councilor is disputed, or if the 
validity of any election is questioned, whether by G 
reason of the improper rejection by the State 
Elections Commissioner of a nomination or of the 
improper reception
of refusal of a vote, or for any 
other cause or if the validity of the election of a 
person is questioned on the ground that he has H
610 
A 
B 
c 
D 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015]9 S.C.R 
committed a corrupt practice within the meaning 
of section 28F, any person enrolled in the municipal 
election roll may, at any time, within ten days from 
the date on which the list prescribed under clause 
(k} of section 28 was available for sale or inspection 
apply to the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court. 
If the application is for a declaration that any 
particularcandidate·shall be deemed to have been • 
elected, the applicant shall make parties to his 
application all candidates who although not 
declared elected, have, according to the results 
declared by the State Election Commissioner under 
section 32, a greater number of votes than the said 
candidate, and proceed against them in the same 
manner as against the said .candidate. 
(emphasis supplied)" 
12. The question is-what is the true meaning of the words 
"any person enrolled in the municipal election roll may, 
E at any time, within ten days from the date on which the 
list prescribed under clause (k) of section 28 was 
available for sale or inspection apply to the Chief Judge 
of the Small Causes Court" occurring in Section 33 (1) of 
the Act 
F 
13. A plain reading of the aforementioned words shows 
that the period of 10 days prescribed for filing the election 
petition begins from "the date" on which the list prescribed 
under clause (k) of Section 28 of the Act was available for sale 
G or inspection. Ir. other words, the starting point of
limitation for 
filing the election petition for counting 10 days is "the date" on 
which the list prescribed under clause (k) of Section 28 of the 
Act was available for sale or inspection. Therefore, in order to 
see as to when the list was prepared and mac:le available for 
H sale or inspection, it is necessary to read Section 28 (k) of the
SMITASUBHASH SAWANTv. JAGDEESHWARI 
611 
JAGDISHAMIN [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
M. 
A 
14. Section 28 (k) oftheActprovides thatthe State Election 
Commissioner shall, as soon as may be, declare the result of 
the poll, specifying the total number of the valid votes given for 
each candidate and shall cause lists to be prepared for each B 
ward, specifying the names of all candidates and the number 
of valid votes given to each candidate. It also confers power 
on the State Election Commissioner to frame Rules for 
payment of such fee as may be prescribed by him for supply 
of a copy of such list to any candidate of the ward and for its C 
inspection by any voter of the ward. 
15. It is pertinent to mention here that till date the State 
Election Commissioner has not framed any Rules as required 
under Section 28 (k) of the Act. 
D 
16. Section 29 empowers the State Government to frame 
rules for the conduct of election on the subjects specified in 
clause (a) to (i). In addition, the State is also empowered to 
make rules on other subjects regarding conduct of election as E 
it may think proper. The State has accordingly framed rules 
called Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Conduct of 
Election Rules 2006. 
17. Rule 2 (q) of the Rules defines "Returning Officer" 
F 
as an Officer appointed as such under Rule 3. Rule 3 enables 
the Municipal Commissioner designate to nominate any officer 
· of the State Government not below the rank of.Deputy Collector 
or of the
Corporation not below the rank of Assistant Municipal 
Commissioner as the Returning Officer for the purpose of G 
conducting the election. Rule 103 provides that the Returning 
Officer shall complete and certify the return of election in Form-
21 C and send the signed copies thereof to the Municipal 
Commissioner and State Election Commissioner. Rule 104 
inter alia provides for grant of certificate of election to returned 
H
612 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 9 S.C.R. 
A 
candidate as required under Section 32 and also empowers 
the State Election Commis_sion to publish the result in the 
Official Gazette. 
18. At the outset, we consider it apposite to state that if 
s the State Election Commissioner has failed to frame the Rules 
for proper implementation of the functions set out in Section 
28 (k) of the Act and due to that reason, there appears to be 
some kind of ambiguity noticed in its interpretation, then in our 
considered opinion, such provision should be interpreted as 
C far as possible in a manner which may benefit the elected 
candidate rather than the election petitioner. 
19. Th is Court in Anandilal and another vs. Ram Narain 
and others [AIR 1984 SC 1383) had the occasion to construe 
o Section 15 of the Limitation Act. While construing the said 
section, the learned Judge AP. Sen J. speaking forthe Bench 
observed in para 10 "It is also true that in construing statutes 
of limitation considerations of hardship and anomaly are out 
of place. Nevertheless, it is, we think, permissible to adopt a 
E beneficent construction of a rule of limitation if alternative 
constructions are possible." Our observations made above 
are also in line keeping in view this principle. 
20. This we have said because we find that the High Court 
F 
in Para 30 has held that since no rules have been framed and 
there appears to be some ambiguity in applying Section 28 
(k), therefore, in such
circumstances while interpreting such 
provision, its benefit must go to the election petitioner 
(defeated candidate) ratherthan to the elected candidate. We 
G do not agree with the High Court on this issue as in our opinion 
it should be the other way round as held by us supra. 
21. On perusal of the impugned judgment, we find that the 
High Court in Para 23 has held that the list was prepared by 
H the Returning Officer immediately after the declaration of the
SMITASUBHASH SAWANTv. JAGDEESHWARI 
613 
JAG DISH AMIN [AB HAY MANO HAR SAPRE, J.] 
result of the election on 17.02.2012 and it satisfied all the A 
requirements of Section 28 (k) of the Act. The High Court 
therefore held that the list was issued under Section 28 (k) of 
the Act. 
22. We are in agreement with this finding of the High Court B 
as in our opinion also, the list prepared by the Returning Officer 
on 17.02.2012 was in conformity with all the requirements 
specified in Section 28 (k) of the Act. 
23. The next question that needs to be examined is on c 
which date such list was available for sale or inspection to the 
voter of the ward. To decide this question, we consider it 
apposite to read the evidence adduced by the parties on this 
issue in the affidavits. 
D 
24. This is what the appellant (respondent No. 3 in the 
election petition) said on affidavit on this issue: 
"5. I say that the Election Result of Ward No. 76 of 
Mumbai Municipal Corporation was declared by the 
Returning Election Officer on 17th Feb. 2012 at E 
about 12.30 p.m. I say that after the counting was 
over the Election officer prepared list of votes polled 
by each contesting candidate as prescribed under 
clause (k) of section 28 of Mumbai Municipal F 
Corporation Act which is a same list annexed hereto 
as Exhibit A and also annexed as Exhibit E of the 
Election Petition. I say that the said Election result 
as contemplated under section 28 (k) of MMC Act 
was available for sale and
inspection since 17th G 
Feb. 2012. I say that the Petitioner and his election 
Agent and his Counting Agents who were present 
in the counting Hall during Counting of votes, took 
inspection of the Election Result declared by the 
Returning/Election officer I prepared as per Section H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
28 (k) of the MMC Act. I say that thereafter the copy 
of the Election Result was taken by the Petitioner 
on 17.02.2012 itself which is annexed as Exhibit E 
to the Election Petition. 
B 
6 .. - ...................................................................... . 
7. I say that on the date- of counting i.e. on 
17.02.2012, I was present in the counting hall and 
c 
the Petitioner was also present in counting hall with 
her Election Agent and counting Agents. I further 
say that after counting was completed on the same 
day, the concerned election officer had published 
the Election Result as prescribed under section 28 
o 
(k) of the MMC Act and gave inspection and copies 
of the Result to all the candidates present on 
17 .02.2012. I say that the Petitioner himself took the 
inspection of the result on the same day i.e. 
17 .02.2012 and thereafter collected the copy of the 
E 
Result sheet as declared by the Election officer 
under section 28 (k) of the Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation Act. The copy of the same is filed by 
the Petitioner and marked as exhibit "E" to the 
election petition." 
F 
25. So far as the election petitioner is concerned, she did . 
not deny much less categorically the statement of the appellant 
quoted above in her affidavit and instead said as under: 
G 
"3. I say that in so far as preliminary issue framed 
by this Hon'ble Court in regard to the limitation is 
concerned, I say that result of the
Municipal 
Elections in question was declared on 17.02.2012. 
My advocate, thereafter, had taken up the matter 
H 
with the Respondent No. 1 Corporation so as to 
ascertain as to when, the list prescribed under
SMITASUBHASH SAWANTv. JAGDEESHWARI 
615 
JAGDISH AMIN [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
clause (k) of section 28 has been made available A 
for sale and inspection by his letter dated 
23.02.2012. Accordingly, the Deputy Election Officer 
of Respondent No. 1 Corporation by its letter dated 
28.02.2012 informed my advocate that Gazette 
Notification under Section 10 to 32 of the MMC Act B 
was published in Government Gazette on 
21.02.2012. I hereby produce original letter dated 
28.02.2012 addressed by the Dy. Election Officer 
attached to the respondent No. 1 as Document c 
No.1, I, therefore, pray that the said letter issued by 
the respondent No. 1 through its Dy. Election Officer 
be read into as evidence in relation to the 
preliminary issue framed by this Hon'ble Court. 
4. I thus, say that the Respondent No. 1 notified D 
result of the election in the Official Gazette by its 
Notification dated 21st Februa_ry, 2012 as required 
under Section 28 (k) of the Municipal Corporation 
of Greater Murnbai. 
E 
5. I, therefore, say that since the above-said Gazette 
Notification was published on 21.02.2012, election 
petition filed by me is within limitation considering 
Section 33(1) of the said Act." 
F 
26. After reading the aforesaid two statements of the 
parties, we have no hesitation in holding that the list prescribed 
under Section 28 (k) was made available to all the parties 
including the voter of the ward in question on 17.02.2012 by 
the Returning Officer. This we say so
for the reasons that firstly, 
G 
there is no ground much less sufficient ground to disbelieve 
• 
the sworn testimony of the appellant wherein she said that the 
appellant and respondent No.1 herein (election petitioner) 
including their voting agents and other persons were throughout 
present in-person on 17.02.2012 during counting of votes. 
H
616 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
Indeed, counting of votes is always done in presence of the 
candidates and their agents and in this case also it was done 
in presence of the candidates, who contested the election. 
Secondly, as soon as the results were announced on 
17.02.2012, the appellant and respondent No.1 herein were 
B given their respective certificates in F orm-21 C as prescribed 
in Rule 103 of the Rules by the Returning Officer. Thirdly, 
respondent No.1 herself inspected the list prepared by the 
Returning Officer, which she could not do unless the list was 
made available for inspection on 17.02.2012 by the Returning 
C Officer. Fourthly, the Returning Officer could not have 
announced the results unless he had first prepared the list 
specifying therein the necessary details which were required 
for declaring the result of election and lastly, there was no reason 
0 
for not making the list available to the voter on 17.02.2012 
and keep withholding when it was prepared on that day itself 
by the Returning Officer for declaration of the result of the 
election. 
27. When we read the statement of respondent No. 
E 1 (election petitioner) extracted supra, we find that she did not 
deny her presence on the whole day on 17.02.2012 nor she 
denied what was specifically stated by the appellant in her 
affidavit. All that respondent No.1 herein said was that on 
F 23.02.2012, her advocate wrote a letter to the Corporation as 
to when the list would be
available and the Corporation by letter 
dated 28.02.2012 informed her that the Gazette Notification 
under Sections 10 and 32 of the Act was published on 
21.02.2012. On this basis, respondent no. 1 claimed that 
G limitation to file election petition would begin from 21.02.2012 
and not from 17.02.2012. 
28. Learned counsel for respondent No.1, therefore relying 
upon the aforesaid statement, made attempt to contend that 
H the limitation would begin, as held by the High Court in her 
favour from :21.02.2012, for filing elt:ction petition which is the 
... 
..
SMITASUBHASH SAWANTv. JAGDEESHWARI 
617 
JAGDISHAMIN [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
date on which the election results were declared and then were A 
publishetj in the official gazette as provided in Section 10 read 
with Section 32 of the Act and hence 10 days will have to be 
counted from 21.02.2012. Learned counsel, thus submitted 
that the election petition filed by respondent No.1 on 
28.02.2012 was within limitation because 10 days period B 
prescribed under Section 33 (1) ended on 02.03.2012. 
29. We do not agree with this submission. It is, in our 
opinion, wholly misplaced in the facts of this case. Firstly, 
Section 33 ( 1) only mentions Section 28 (k) and does not refer C 
to any other section much less Section 10 or/and 32 for 
deciding the issue of limitation. !n other words, Section 33 (1) 
is conb;olled by Section 28 (k) only and not by any other section 
of the Act for deciding the issue of limitation. Secondly, if the 
intention of the legislature was to calculate the period of D 
limitation from the date of issuance of Official Gazette as 
provided in Section 10 and/or Section 32, as contended by 
the learned counsel for respondent No.1, then instead of 
mentioning Section 28 (k), the legislature would have 
mentioned Section 10 and/or Section 32 in Section 33(1) of E 
the Act. However, it was not done. The legislative intention, 
therefore, appears to be clear leaving no ambiguity therein by 
including Section 28 (k) only and excluding Section 10 and 32 
in
Section 33 (1 ). 
F 
30. It is a settled principle of rule of interpretation that the 
Court cannot read any words which are not mentioned in the 
Section nor can substitute any words in place of those 
mentioned in the section and at the same time cannot ignore 
the words mentioned in the section. Equally well settled rule G 
of interpretation is that if the language of statute is plain, simple, 
clear and unambiguous then the words of statute have to be 
interpreted by giving them their natural meaning. [See. 
Interpretation of statute by GP. Singh 91h Edition page 44/45]. 
H 
Our interpretation of Section 33 ( 1) read with Section 28 (k) is
618 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 9 S.C.R. 
A 
in the light of this principle. 
31. We accordingly, hold that the list prescribed under 
Section 28(k) was available for inspection and sale to the 
voters of the ward in question on 17.02.2012. In view of this 
B finding, the limitation to file election petition would begin from 
17.02.2012 and it will be up to 27.02.2012. In other words, . 
period of limitation of 10 days prescribed for filing the election 
petition in Section 33 (1) of the Act would begin from 
17.02.2012 and it would be up to 27.02.2012. 
c 
32. It was, .therefore, necessary for respondent No.1 
(election petitioner) to have filed the election petition on any 
day between 17.02.2012 to 27.2.2012. Since the election 
petition was filed on 28.02.2012, a date beyond 27.02.2012, 
D it was liable to be dismissed as being barred by limitation. In 
the absence of any provision made in the Act for condoning 
the delay in filing the election petition, the Chief Judge had no 
power to condone the delay in filing the election petition beyond 
the period of limitation prescribed in law. Indeed, no such 
E argument was advanced by the learned counsel for respondent 
No.1 in this regard. 
33. Before parting with the case, we consider it appropriate 
to observe that the State Election Commissioner would be at 
F liberty to frame Rules under Section 28 (k) for its proper 
implementation. Indeed, when the legislature has conferred a 
rule making power on the specified
authority for proper and 
effective implementation of Section 28 (k) then in our opinion, 
such power should be exercised by the State Election 
G Commissioner within reasonable time by framing appropriate 
Rules. 
34. In view of the foregoing discussion, we cannot agree 
...
with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the two 
H courts below when both proceeded to hold t~at the election

.. 
SMITA SUB HASH SAWANT v. JAGDEESHWARI 
619 
JAGDISHAMIN [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 
petition filed by respondent No.1on28.02.2012 was within A 
limitation. We accordingly hold that the election petition filed 
by respondent No.1 out of whicli this appeal arises was barred 
by limitation and hence it should have been dismissed as being 
barred by limitation. 
35. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Impugned 
judgment is set aside. As a consequence, Election Petition 
No.129 of 2012 filed by respondent No.1 is dismissed as 
barred by limitation. There shall be no order as to costs. 
Kalpana K. Tripa.thy 
Appeal allowed. 
B 
c