SURESH CHAND GAUTAM versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
[2016] 1 S.C.R. 727, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2016] 1 S.C.R. 727 
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM 
v. 
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. 
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 690of2015) 
MARCH 11, 2016 
[DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.] 
Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 16(4-A), 16(4-B) and 335 
- Reservation in promotion for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes - Need for quantifiable data - Whether a writ or direction 
can be issued to the State Government to collect and gather the 
necessary data of the SC and the ST in the services of the State for 
granting reservation in promotion - Held: State is not bound to 
make reservation for SCs/STs in matters of promotion - There is no 
constitutional obligation - There is no duty - Writ of mandamus is 
sought to collect material or data which is in the realm of condition 
precedent for exercising a discretion which flows from the enabling 
constitutional provision - Direction of this nature would not come 
within the principle of exercise of power coupled with duty - To 
issue a mandamus to collect the data would tantamount to taking a 
step towards framing of a rule or a regulation for the purpose of 
reservation for SC and ST in matter of promotions - This would be 
in a way, entering into the domain of legislation - Thus, writ of 
mandamus of such a nature cannot be issued. 
Dismissing the writ petitions, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 It has been clearly laid down in * M. Nagaraj 
case that the State is not bound to make reservaticln for SCs/STs 
in matters of promotion. However, if the
State wishes to exercise 
the discretion and make such provision, it has to collect 
quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and 
inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment 
in addition to compliance with Article 335. The expression of the 
opinion clearly demonstrates that the regard being had to the 
enabling provisions of Articles 16(4-A) and (4-B), the State is not 
bound to make reservation. It has a discretion to do so and the 
State's discretion can only be exercised on certain conditions 
being satisfied. The submission of the petitioners is that a 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] I S.C.R. 
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command should be issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh to collect 
the data as enshrined in the Constitution Bench decision in M. 
Nagaraj so that benefit of reservation in promotion can be given. 
The relief sought may appear innocuous or simple but when the 
Court thinks of issue of a writ of mandamus, it has to apprise 
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itself of an existing right or a power to be exercised regard being 
had to the conception of duty. The concept of power coupled with 
duty is always based on facts. If the relief sought is scrutinized, 
the prayer is to issue a mandamus to the State and its functionaries 
to carry out an exercise for the purpose of exercising a discretion. 
The discretion is to take a decision to have the reservation, and 
to have reservation there is a necessity for collection of data in 
accordance with the principles stated in M. Nagaraj as the same 
is the condition precedent. A writ of mandamus is sought to collect 
material or data which is in the realm of condition precedent for 
exercising a discretion which flows from the enabling 
constitutional provision. Direction of this nature would not come 
within the principle of exercise of power coupled with duty. A 
direction for exercise of a duty which has inherent and 
insegretable nexus with the constitutional provision like Article 
21 of the Constitution or a statutory duty. There is an inclination 
to think so as the language employed in M.
Nagaraj clearly states 
that the State is not bound to make reservation in promotion. 
Thus, there is no constitutional obligation. [Para 42] [758-E-H; 
759-A-F] 
1.2 The Courts do not formulate any policy, remains away 
from making anything that would amount to legislation, rules and 
regulation or policy relating to reservation. The Courts can test 
the validity of the same when they are challenged. The court 
cannot direct for making legislation or for that matter any kind of 
sub-ordinate legislation. In certain decisions directions have been 
issued for framing of guidelines or the court has itself framed 
guidelines for sustaining certain rights of women, children or 
prisoners or under-trial prisoners. The said category of cases 
falls in a different compartment. They are in different sphere than 
what is envisaged in Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) whose 
constitutional validity have been upheld by the Constitution Bench 
with certain qualifiers. They have been regarded as enabling 
constitutional provisions. Additionally it has been postulated that
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
the State is not bonnd to make reservation for Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes in matter of promotions. Therefore; there 
is no duty. In such a situation, to issue a mandamus to collect the 
data would tantamount to asking the authorities whether there is 
ample data to frame a rule or regulation. This will be in a way, 
entering into the domain of legislation, for it is a step towards 
commanding to frame a legislation or a delegated legislation for 
reservation. The relief in the instant case, tantamounts to a prayer 
for issue of a mandamus to take a step towards framing of a rule 
or a regulation for the purpose of reservation for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in matter of promotions. A writ of 
mandamus of such a nature cannot be issued. [Para 43, 44) [759-
G-H; 760-A-C; 761-AJ 
*M Nagaraj & others v. Union of India & others (2006) 
8 SCC 212:2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 - relied on. 
U.P Power Corporation Limited v. Rajesh Kumar & 
others (2012) 7 SCC 1:2012 (4) SCR 118; Indra 
Sawhney & others v. Union of India & others (1992) 
Supp. 3 SCC 217:1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454; R.K. 
Sabharwa/ v. State of Pubjab 1995 (2) SCC 745: 1995 
(2) SCR 35; Sura} Bhan Meena & another v. State of 
Rajasthan & others (2011) 1 SCC 467:2010 (14) SCR 
532; Ganga Ram Moolchandani v. State of Rajasthan 
& others (2001) 6 SCC 89:2001 (3) SCR 992; M.A. 
Murthy v. State of Karnataka & Others (2003) 7 SCC 
517:2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 327; Madhav
Rao Jivaji Rao 
Scindia V. Union of India (1971) 1 sec 85:1971 (3) 
SCR 9; Ambica Querry Works v. State of Gujarat (1987) 
1 SCC 213:1987 (1) SCR 562; State of Rajasthan v. 
Harishan~er Raiendrapal AIR 1966 SC 296:1965 SCR 
402; Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India & others (2012) 
6 SCC 502:2012 (5) SCR 305; Aneesh D. LmMnde & 
others V. State of Goa & others (2014) 1 sec 554:2013 
(17) SCR 55; Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P. 
and others (2007) 8 SCC 338:2007 (10) SCR 245; 
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1995) 1 
SCC 574:1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 477; Commr. of Police 
v. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16:1952 SCR 135; 
Municipal Council, Rat/am v. Vardichan (1980) 4 SCC 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] l S.C.R. 
162:1.981 (1) SCR 97; D.K Basu v. State of West Bengal 
& others (2015) 8 SCC 744:2015 (7) SCR 814; Ranveer 
Yac/av v. State of Bihar (2010) 11 SCC 493:2010 (6) 
SCR 1073; Nagor Palika Nigam 1~ Krishi Upaj Mandi 
Samiti Affi 2009 SC 187:2008 (14) SCR 419; Ankush 
Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 6 SCC 
770: 2013 (8) SCR 863; Province of Bombay v. 
Khushaldas S. Advani AIR 1950 SC 222:1950 SCR 
621; Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union 
of India & others AIR 1992 SC 320; Tara Prasad Singh 
& others v. Union of India & others AIR 1980 SC 
1682:1980 (3) SCR 1042; Markand Dattatreya 
Sugavkar v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai 
& others (2013) 9 SCC 136; S.P. Gupta v. Union of 
India 1981 Supp (1) SCC 87; Supreme Court Advocates-
011-Record Association & others v. Union of India (1993) 
4 SCC 441:1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659; lmtiyaz Ahmad 
v. State of U.P. & others (2012) 2 SCC 688: 2012 (1 ) 
SCR 779; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of 
India and others (2014) 4 SCC 61:2014 (1) SCR 88; 
Lafarge Umiam Mining (P) Ltd. v. Union of India & 
others (2011) 7 SCC 338: 2011 (7) SCR 954; State of 
Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutt (1986) 4 SCC 632 1987 (1) 
SCR 136; Dr. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar and 
others (1973) 1 SCC 485; Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur 
v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College 1962 
Supp. 2 SCR 144; Sharif Ahmad and others v. Regional 
Transport Authority, Meerut and
others (1978) 1 SCC 
1:1978 (2) SCR 761; Director of Settlements, A.P. and 
others v. MR. Apparao and another (2002) 4 SCC 638: 
2002 (2) SCR 661; All India Judges· Association & 
others v. Union of India & others (2002) 4 SCC 
247:2002 (2) SCR 712; Vishaka & others v. State qf 
Rajasthan & others (1997) 6 SCC 241 :1997 (3) Suppl. 
SCR 404; Prakash Singh & others v. Un ion of India & 
others (2006) 8 SCC 1:2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 473; 
Chairman & Managing Director, Central Bank of India 
& Ors. v. Central Bank of India SC/ST Employees 
Welfare Association & Ors. 2015 (1) SCALE 169;
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
731 
Census Commissioner & other.1 v. R. Krishnamurthy 
A 
(2015) 2 sec 796 - referred to. 
Julius v Lord Bishop of O)Cford (1880) 5 AC 214; Bake1: 
Re Nichols v. Baker (1890) 44 Ch D 262 (CA); Padfield 
v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968) 1 
All _ER. 694 (HL); Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering 
B 
Union (1971) 2 QB 175 - referred to. 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action by De Smith 
1995, pp. 300-01; Administrative Law by Wade & 
Forsyth 9th Edn., p.23328; Hals bury s Laws of England 
Fourth Edn Volume 1 - referred to. 
c 
Case Law Reference 
20P. (4) SCR 118 
Referred to. 
Paras 2, 3, 7, 
8,9,13, 
14, 18,19 
1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454 
Referred to. 
Para3 
D 
1995 (2) SCR 35 
Referred to. 
Para4 
2010 (14 ) SCR 532 
Referred to. 
Paras 
20()~ (3) SCR 992 
Referred to. 
Para 15 
2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 327 
Referred to. 
Para 17 
1971 (3) SCR 9 
Referred to. 
Para 19 
E 
191!7 (1) SCR 562 
Referred to. 
Para 21 
1965 SCR 402 
Referred to. 
Para 21 
2012. (5) SCR 305 
Referred to. 
Para 22 
2013 (17) SCR 55 
Referred to. 
Para 23 
2007 (10) SCR 245 
Referred to. 
Para 23 
F 
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 477 
Referred to. 
Para 23 
1952 SCR 135 
Referred to. 
Para 23 
1981 (1) SCR 97 
Referred to. 
Para 23 
20t5 (7) SCR 814 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
2010 (6 ) SCR 1073 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
G 
2008 (14 ) SCR 419 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
201~ (8) SCR 863 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
1950 SCR 621 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
AIR 1992 SC
320 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
1980 (3) SCR 1042 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
(2013) 9 sec 136 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
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[2016] I S.C.R. 
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1981 Supp (1) sec 87 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659 
Referred to. 
Para 24 
2012 (1.) SCR 779 
Referred to. 
Para 29 
2014 (1) SCR 88 
Referred to. 
Para 32 
2011 (7) SCR 954 
Referred to. 
Para 32 
B 
1987 (1.) SCR 136 
Referred to. 
Para 36 
(197~) 1 sec 485 
Referred to. 
Para 37 
1962 Supp. 2 SCR 144 
Referred to. 
Para 37 
1~78 (2) SCR 761 
Referred to. 
Para 38 
c 
2!)02 (2) SCR 661 
Referred to. 
Para 40 
2002 (2) SCR 712 
Referred to. 
Para 41 
1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 404 
Referred to. 
Para 41 
2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 473 
Referred to. 
Para 41 
2015 (1) SCALE 169 
Referred to. 
Para 42 
D 
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 
Relied on. 
Para 42 
(2015) 2 sec 796 
Referred to. 
Para 44 
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 
690of2015 
E 
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
WITH 
W. P. (C) NOS. 715 AND 273 OF 2015 
Salman Khurshid, Avtaar Singh Rawat, K. V. Vishwanathan, 
F 
Mahalakshmi Pavani, Rajeev Kumar Bansal, Dr. Krishan Singh Chauhan, 
Ajit Kumar Ekka, Ravi Prakash, Chand Kiran, Murari Lal, Tej Singh 
Varun, K. K. L. Gautam, Santosh Krishnan for the Petitioner. 
Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Kumar Parimal, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Kabir 
Ghosh, Ravi P. Mehrotra, Ashutosh Kr. Sharma, Varun Thakur, Varinder 
G 
Kumar Sharma, Shraddha Saran for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. l. In this batch of Writ Petitions preferred 
under Article 32 of the Constitution
oflndia the prayer relates to issue of 
a direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to 
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enforce appropriately the constitutional mandate as contained under the
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
provisions of Articles 16( 4-A), 16( 4-B) and 335 of the Constitution of 
India or, in the alternative, directing the respondents to constitute a 
Committee or appoint a Commission chaired either by a retired Judge of 
the High Court or Supreme Court in making survey and collecting 
necessary qualitative data of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes in the services of the State for granting reservation in promotion 
in the light of direction gives by this Court in M. Nagaraj & others v. 
Union of India & others'. Let it be clarified in the beginning, apart 
from this prayer, other reliefs sought for in the petitions have not been 
argued and rightly so, as the said grievances have already been directed 
to be dealt with in interlocutory applications to be filed in the case of 
U.P. Power Corporation Limited v. Rajesh Kumar & others'. 
2. At the commencement of the hearing, Dr. K.S. Chauhan, 
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 
715 of2015, had submitted that the decision in M. Nagaraj(supra) by 
the Constitution Bench requires reconsideration. For the said purpose, 
he has made an effort to refer to certain passages from Indra Sawlmey 
& others v. Union of India & others' and R.K. Sabllarwal v. Stale of 
Pubjab4• We are not inclined to enter into the said issue as we are of 
the considered opinion that the pronouncement in M. Nagaraj (supra) is 
a binding
precedent and has been followed in number of authorities and 
that apart, it has referred to, in detail, all other binding previous authorities 
of larger Benches and there does not appear any weighty argument to 
convince us, even for a moment, that the said decision requires any 
reconsideration. The submission on the said score is repelled. 
3. The principal submission of Mr. Salman Khurshid, Mr. K.V. 
Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel and Dr. K.S. Chauhan learned 
counsel appearing for the respective petitioners is the alternative 
submission which can be put in three compartments:- (i) the decision 
rendered in M. Nagaraj (supra) has not been appositely applied (ii) the 
authority in Rajesh Kunmr(supra) has to apply prospectively and cannot 
have retrospective effect, and (iii) even if it is assumed, as interpreted in 
M. Nagaraj (supra), Articles 16( 4-A) and 16( 4-B) are enabling 
constitutional provisions, the concept of power coupled with duty requires 
the authorities to perform the duty and they are obliged to collect the 
1 (2006) s sec 212 
2 (2012)1sec1 
2 (1992) Supp. 3 sec 211 
• 1995 (2) sec 745 
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(2016) I S.C.R. 
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quantifiable data to enable them to take a decision on reservation in 
promotion and hence, a mandamus should be issued to all authorities to 
carry out the constitutional command. We have permitted Dr. Raj iv 
Dhavan to argue the matter as he had appeared for some of the 
respondents in the case of R"jesft Kum(lr (supra). 
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4. Articles 16(4), 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) read as under:-
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"Article 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public 
employment.-
( 4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making 
any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour 
of any backward class of citizens which, in the op in ion of the 
State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. 
( 4-A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making 
any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with 
consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the 
services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and 
the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not 
adequately represented in the services under the State. 
( 4-B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering 
any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being 
filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for 
reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4-A) as a separate 
class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or
years 
and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with 
the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for 
determining the ceiling of fifty per cent reservation on total number 
of vacancies of that year". 
5. In M. N"g"raj (supra), the Court has encompassed the facts 
in the following manner:-
"The petitioners have invoked Article 32 of the Constitution for a 
writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the Constitution (Eighty-
fifth Amendment) Act, 200 I inserting Article 16( 4-A) of the 
Constitution retrospectively from 17-6-1995 providing reservation 
in promotion with consequential seniority as being unconstitutional 
and violative of the basic structure. According to the petitioners, 
the impugned amendment reverses the decisions of this Court in
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan', Ajit Singh Januja 
v. State of Punjab' (Ajit Singh-I). Ajit Singh (JI) v. State of 
Punjab-, Ajit Singh (III) v. State of Punjab", Indra Sawhney 
v. Union of India (supra) and MG Badappanavar v. State of 
Karnataka'. The petitioners say that Parliament has appropriated 
the judicial power to itselfand has acted as an Appellate Authority 
by reversing the judicial pronouncements of this Court by the use 
of power of amendment as done by the impugned amendment 
and is, therefore, violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. 
The said amendment is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and is 
liable to be set aside. The petitioners have further pleaded that 
the amendment also seeks to alter the fundamental right of equality 
which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The 
petitioners say that the equality in the context of Article 16(1) 
connotes "accelerated promotion" so as not to include 
consequential seniority. The petitioners say that by attaching 
consequential seniority to the accelerated promotion, the impugned 
amendment violates equality in Article 14 read with Article 16( I). 
The petitioners further say that by providing reservation in the 
matter of promotion with consequential seniority, there is 
impairment of efficiency. The petitioners say that in Indra 
Sawhney (supra) decided on 16-11-1992, this Court has held that 
under Article
16(4), reservation to the Backward Classes is 
permissible only at the time of initial recruitment and not in 
promotion. The petitioners say that contrary to the said judgment 
delivered on 16-11-1992, Parliament enacted the Constitution 
(Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995. By the said amendment, 
Article 16( 4-A) was inserted, which reintroduced reservation in 
promotion. The Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 
1995 is also challenged by some of the petitioners. The petitioners 
say that if accelerated seniority is given to the roster-point 
promotees, the consequences would be disastrous .... " 
6. After referring to a series of authorities, the Court concluded 
as follows:-
·'(1995) 6 sec 684 
'(1996)2SCC715 
1 (1999)1 sec 209 
' (2000) 1 sec 430 
'(2001) 2 sec 666 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2016] l S.C.R. 
"12 l. The impugned constitutional amendments by which Articles 
16( 4-A) and 16( 4-B) have been inserted flow from Article 16( 4). 
They do not alter the structure of Article 16(4). They retain the 
controlling factors or the compelling reasons, namely, 
backwardness and inadequacy of representation which enables 
the States to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall 
efficiency of the State administration under Article 335. These 
impugned amendments are confined only to SCs and STs. They 
do not obliterate any of the constitutional requirements, namely, 
ceiling limit of 50% (quantitative limitation), the concept of creamy 
layer(qualitative exclusion), the sub-classification between OBCs 
on one hand and SCs and STs on the other hand as held in Indra 
Sawhney (supra), the concept of post-based roster with inbuilt 
concept of replacement as held in R.K. Sabharwal (supra). 
122. We reiterate that the ceiling limit of 50%, the concept of 
creamy layer and the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, 
inadequacy ofrepresentation and overall administrative efficiency 
are all constitutional requirements without which the structure of 
equality ofopportunity in Article 16 would collapse. 
123. However, in this case, as stated above, the main issue concerns 
the "extent of reservation". In this regard the State concerned 
will have to show in each case the existence of the compelling 
reasons,
namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and 
overall administrative efficiency before making provision for 
reservation. As stated above, the impugned provision is an enabling 
provision. The State is not bound to make reservation for SCs/ 
STs in matters of promotions. However, if they wish to exercise 
their discretion and make such provision, the State has to collect 
quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and 
inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment 
in addition to compliance with Article 335. It is made clear that 
even if the State has compelling reasons, as stated above, the 
State will have to see that its reservation provision does not lead 
to excessiveness so as to breach the ceiling limit of 50% or 
obliterate the creamy layer or extend the reservation indefinitely. 
124. Subject to the above, we uphold the constitutional validity of 
the Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995; the 
Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Act, 2000; the Constitution
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
(Eighty-second Amendment) Act, 2000 and the Constitution 
(Eighty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2001. 
125. We have not examined the validity of individual enactments 
of appropriate States and that question will be gone into in 
individual writ petition by the appropriate Bench in accordance 
with law laid down by us in the present case." 
7. In Rajesfl Kumar's case, a two-Judge Bench, apart from 
referring to the paragraphs we have reproduced hereinabove, also 
adverted to paragraphs 44, 48, 49, 86, 98, 99, I 02, 107, I 08, I I 0, I 17, 123 
and 124 and culled out certain principles. We think it absolutely 
appropriate to reproduce the said principles:-
"(i) Vesting of the power by an enabling provision may be 
constitutionally valid and yet "exercise of power" by the State in 
a given case may be arbitrary, particularly, if the State fails to 
identify and measure the backwardness and inadequacy keeping 
in mind the efficiency of service as required under Article 335. 
(ii) Article 16(4) which protects the interests of certain sections 
of the society has to be balanced against Article 16(1) which 
protects the interests of every citizen of the entire society. They 
should be harmonised because they are restatements of the 
principle of equality under Article 14. 
(iii) Each post gets marked for the particular category of 
candidates to be appointed against it and any subsequent vacancy 
has to be filled by that
category candidate. 
(iv) The appropriate Government has to apply the cadre strength 
as a unit in the operation of the roster in order to ascertain whether 
a given class/group is adequately represented in the service. The 
cadre strength as a unit also ensures that the upper ceiling limit of 
50% is not violated. Further, roster has to be post-specific and not 
vacancy based. 
(v) The State has to form its opinion on the quantifiable data 
regarding adequacy of representation. Clause ( 4-A) of Article 16 
is an enabling provision. It gives freedom to the State to provide 
for reservation in matters of promotion. Clause ( 4-A) of Article 
16 applies only to SCs and STs. The said clause is carved out of 
Article 16(4-A). Therefore, clause ( 4-A) will be governed by the 
two compelling reasons-"backwardness" and "inadequacy of 
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SUPREME COURf REPORTS 
[20 I 6] I S.C.R. 
representation", as mentioned in Article I 6( 4). If the said two 
reasons do not exist, then the enabling provision cannot be 
enforced. 
(vi) If the ceiling limit on the carry over of unfilled vacancies is 
removed, the other alternative time factor comes in and in that 
event, the timescale has to be imposed in the interest of efficiency 
in administration as mandated by Article 335. If the timescale is 
not kept, then posts will continue to remain vacant for years which 
would be detrimental to the administration. Therefore, in each 
case, the appropriate Government will now have to introduce the 
duration depending upon the fact situation. 
(vii) If the appropriate Government enacts a law providing for 
reservation without keeping in mind the parameters in Article I 6(4) 
and Article 335, then this Court will certainly set aside and strike 
down such legislation. 
(viii) The constitutional limitation under Article 335 is relaxed and 
not obliterated. As stated above, be it reservation or evaluation, 
excessiveness in either would result in violation of the constitutional 
mandate. This exercise, however, will depend on the facts of each 
case. 
(ix) The concepts of efficiency, backwardness and inadequacy 
ofrepresentation are required to be identified and measured. That 
exercise depends on the availability of data. That exercise depends 
on numerous factors. It is for this reason that the enabling
provisions are required to be made because each competing claim 
seeks to achieve certain goals. How best one should optimise 
these conflicting claims can only be done by the administration in 
the context oflocal prevailing conditions in public employment. 
(x)A1ticle 16(4), therefore, creates a field which enables a State 
to provide for reservation provided there exists backwardness of 
a class and inadequacy of representation in employment. These 
are compelling reasons. They do not exist in Article I 6( I). It is 
only when these reasons are satisfied that a State gets the power 
to provide for reservation in the matter of employment." 
8. Rajesft Kumar's case also referred to the authority in Suntj 
Bhan Meena & another v. State of Rajastlum & ot/lers' 0 wherein it 
has been ruled thus:-
'" (2011 l 1 sec 467
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.l 
"66. The position after the decision in M Nagaraj case (supra) 
is that reservation of posts in promotion is dependent on the 
inadequacy ofrepresentation of members of the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes and subject to the 
condition of ascertaining as to whether such reservation was at 
all required. 
67. The view of the High Court is based on the decision in M. 
Nagaraj cases(supra) as no exercise was undertaken in terms 
of Article 16( 4-A) to acquire quantifiable data regarding the 
inadequacy of representation of the Scheduled Caste and 
Scheduled Tribe communities in public services. The Rajasthan 
High Court has rightly quashed the Notifications dated 28-12-
2002 and 25-4-2008 issued by the State of Rajasthan providing 
for consequential seniority and promotion to the members of the 
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities and the same 
does not call for any interference." 
9. After referring to the said decision, the Court in Rajes/1 Kumar's 
case took note of the Social Justice Committee Report and the chart and 
opined that the said exercise was done regard being had to the population 
and vacancies and not keeping in view the concepts that have been 
evolved in M. N<rgaraj (supra). It is one thing to think that there are 
statutory rules or executive instructions to grant promotion but it cannot 
be forgotten that they were all subject to the pronouncement by
this 
Court in Virpal Singlt Cltaultan (supra) and Ajit Singh (2) (supra). 
Being of this view, the Court held that a fresh exercise in the light of the 
judgment of the Constitution Bench in M. Nagaraj (supra) is a categorical 
imperative. The stand that the constitutional amendments have facilitated 
the reservation in promotion with consequential seniority and have given 
the stamp of approval to the Act and the Rules cannot withstand close 
scrutiny inasmuch as the Constitution Bench has clearly opined that 
Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) are enabling provisions and the State can 
make provisions for the same on certain basis or foundation. The conditions 
precedent have not been satisfied. No exercise has been undertaken. 
On the said score, the Court did not accept the submission as the 
provisions of the Constitution are treated valid with certain conditions 
and riders. Thereafter the Court concluded:-
"ln the ultimate analysis, we conclude and hold that Section 3(7) 
of the 1994 Act and Rule 8-A of the 2007 Rules are ultra vi res as 
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they run counter to the dictum in M. Nagaraj (supra). Any 
promotion that has been given on the dictum of Indra Sawhney 
(supra) and without the aid or assistance of Section 3(7) and Rule 
8-A shall remain undisturbed." 
10. To have a complete picture, we may reproduce Section 3(7) 
B 
of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994 (for short, 
"1994 Act") which reads as follows:-
c 
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"Section 3. Reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes, 
Sclteduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes.-
(I )-(6) • 
• 
* 
(7) If, on the date of commencement of this Act, reservation was 
in force under government orders for appointment to posts to be 
filled by promotion, such government orders shall continue to be 
applicable till they are modified or revoked." 
11. Rule 8-A was inserted by the Uttar Pradesh Government 
Servants Seniority (First Amendment) Rules, 2002 (for short, '2002 Rules') 
in the U .P. Government Servants Seniority Rules, 1991, which is extracted 
below:-
"8-A. Entitlement of consequential seniority to a person 
belonging to Sclteduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 6, 7 or 8 of these 
Rules, a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled 
Tribes shall, on his promotion by virtue of rule of reservation/ 
roster, be entitled to consequential seniority also." 
12. Rule 8-A was
omitted on 13.05.2005 by the Uttar Pradesh 
Government Servants Seniority (Second Amendment) Rules, 2005. 
However, it was provided in the said Rules that the promotions made in 
accordance with the revised seniority as determined under Rule 8-A 
prior to the commencement of the 2005 Rules could not be affected. 
Thereafter, on 14.9.2007, by the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants 
Seniority (Third Amendment) Rules, 2007, Rule 8-A was inserted with 
the same language. It has been mentioned in the said Rule that it shall 
be deemed to have come into force on 17.6.1995. 
13. It is contended by Dr. Chauhan, that the decision in Rajesh 
Kumar (supra) has a prospective application. To buttress the said 
submission he has commended us to paragraphs 85 to 87.
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.l 
I4. Placing reliance on the said paragraphs, it is argued by Dr. 
Chauhan thatthe provisions of Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act remained in 
force upto 07.05.2012 as it was omitted by Uttar Pradesh Public Services 
(Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Backward Classes) Amendment Ordinance, 2012. We do not intend to 
address to the said facets. Suffice it to say, the Court in Rajesll Kumar 
(supra) has clearly held that Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act and Rule 8-A 
are ultra vires. What has been stated in the said judgment is that any 
promotion that has been given on the dictum of Indra Sawhney (supra) 
and without the aid or assistance of Section 3(7) and Rule 8-A was to 
remain undisturbed. Thus, the decision has made it distinctly clear what 
has been stated. 
15. The stand that the provisions remained in force till the State 
omits it by an omission has no force. When the statutory provisions and 
the rules have been declared ultra vi res, the two-Judge Bench was 
absolutely conscious what is to be stated and accordingly, has directed 
so. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision in Ganga 
Ram Moolclrandani v. State of Rajastllan & others", wherein a 
particular rule was declared ultra vires. A contention was advanced 
thatthe Court must hold that the decision would have prospective operation 
to avoid a lot of complications. The Court referred to the authorities in 
Ganga
Ram Moolc/1andani (supra) and observed thus:-
"To meet the then extraordinary situation that may be caused by 
the said decision, the Court felt that it must evolve some doctrine 
which had roots in reason and precedents so that the past may be 
preserved and the future protected. In that case it was laid down 
that the doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoked only in 
matters arising under the Constitution and the same can be applied 
only by this Court in its discretion to be moulded in accordance 
with the justice of the cause or matter before it." 
After so stating, the Court proceeded to hold as follows:-
"20. Accepting the lead given in the above decision, this Court 
has since extended the doctrine to the interpretation of ordinary 
statutes as well. In the cases of Waman Rao v. Union of Jndiae, 
Atam Prakash v. State of Hmyana", Orissa Cement Ltd. v. 
11 (2001)6 sec 89 
" ( 1980) 3 sec 587 
" ( 1986) 2 sec 249 
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State of Orissa1', Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan" 
and ManaRinR Direct01; ECIL v. B. Karunakar1' the device of 
prospective overruling was resorted to even in the case of ordinaty 
statutes. We find in the fitness of things, the law decided in this 
case be declared to be prospective in operation." 
B 
16. In the said case, eventually the Court, while declaring the 
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rules ultra vires, opined that:-
" .. It is made clearthat this judgment will not affect any appointment 
made prior to this date under the Rules which have been found to 
be invalid hereinabove ." 
17. In M.A. Murthy v. State of Karnataka & Others", it has 
been held that:-
" .. It is for this Court to indicate as to whether the decision in 
question will opera!~ prospectively. In other words, there shall be 
no prospective overruling, unless it is so indicated in the particular 
decision. It is not open to be held that the decision in a particular 
case will be prospective in its application by application of the 
doctrine of prospective overruling. The doctrine of binding 
precedent helps in promoting certainty and consistency in judicial 
decisions and enables an organic development of the law besides 
providing assurance to the individual as to the consequences of 
transactions forming part of the daily affairs. That being the 
position, the High Court was in error by holding that the judgment 
which operated on the date of selection was
operative and not the 
review judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma case No. JI". All the 
more so when the subsequent judgment is by way of review of 
the first judgment in which case there are no judgments at all and 
the subsequent judgment rendered on review petitions is the one 
and only judgment rendered, effectively and for all purposes, the 
earlier decision having been erased by countenancing the review 
applications. The impugned judgments of the High Court are, 
therefore, set aside." 
" ( 1991 J Supp 1 sec 430 
'' (1991) 1sec588 
"(1993)4 sec 727 
"(2003J7 sec 517 
H 
" ( 1997) 4 sec 18
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
18. Tested on the aforesaid principles, it is luminescent that the 
pronouncement in Rajesft Kumar (supra) is by no means prospective. 
The declaration is clear and the directions are absolutely limpid. The 
Court has not stated that the entire past promotions should be saved. It 
allows limited sphere of saving. Thus viewed, the submission that 
prospectivity is inhered in the said judgment does not appeal to us. If a 
promotee is saved as per the judgment of the said case, the same is 
saved; and for that reason, the Court has already directed in certain 
interlocutory applications that the promotees who have been reversed, 
their grievance shall be looked into by a committee and the decision of 
the committee can directly be challenged by way of interlocutory 
application before this Court in this case. We may ingeminate without 
any reservation that by no means prospectivity in entirety can be given 
to the said decision. 
19. The centripodal stand of the petitioners is that assuming the 
principle stated in M. Nagaraj (supra) is correct and what has been 
stated irr'Rajesft Kumar's case following the dictum in M. Nagaraj 
(supra) holds sound; then also the enabling constitutional provisions cannot 
remain absolutely static. The constitutional amendments have been 
brought in, and once they have been held valid, it is the obligation of the 
State and the competent authority to give effect to the same as
per the 
norms envisaged in the judgments of this Court. In case the said exercise 
is not carried out, it is the constitutional duty of this Court to see that the 
constitutional norm, philosophy and the purpose are worked out, especially 
keeping in view Articles 16(4), 16(4-A), 16(4-B), 46 and 335 of the 
Constitution oflndia and also the principle of affirmative action which is 
meant for certain historically disadvantaged groups. It is further argued 
that in M. Nagaraj (supra) Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) have been 
regarded as enabling provisions which confer powers on the State 
authorities to provide reservation in promotion with consequential 
seniority subject to the condition of availability of appropriate data to 
justify exercise of the enabling provision. The said authorities do not 
debar the State to carry out the said exercise and when it is not done, it 
is to be presumed that the State as a model employer has. failed in its 
duty and hence, it is obligatory on the part of this Court to require it to 
carry out the procedure so that the constitutional vision is realized. It 
has been highlighted before us that the concept of"power coupled with 
duty" comes into play in the instant case and, therefore, the court should 
issue appropriate direction to the State to collect the necessary qualitative 
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data. Reliance has been placed on eleven-Judge Bench decision in 
Madltav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India". We have been 
commended to paragraph 117 from the majority judgment by Justice 
J.C. Shah, which is to the following effect:-
" 117. There are many analogous provisions in the Constitution 
which confer upon the President a power coupled with a duty. 
We may refer to two such provisions. The President has under 
Articles 341 and 342 to specify Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes and he has done so. Specification so made carries for the 
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes certain 
special benefits e.g. reservation of seats in the House of the People, 
and in the State Legislative Assemblies by Articles 330 and 332, 
and of the numerous provisions made in Schedules V and YI. It 
may be noticed that Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are 
specially defined for the purposes of the Constitution by Articles 
366(24) and 366(25). If power to declare certain classes of citizens 
as belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes includes 
power to withdraw declaration without substituting a fresh 
declaration, the President will be destroying the constitutional 
scheme. The power to specify may cariy with it the power to 
withdraw specification, but it is coupled with a dutv to specify in a 
manner which makes the constitutional provisions operative." 
[underlining is ours]
20. Learned counsel has also drawn our attention to the opinion 
of Hegde, J. which reads as follows:-
"In my opinion Atiicle 366(22) imposes a duty on the President 
and for that purpose has conferred on him certain powers. In 
other words the power conferred on the President under that 
provision is one coupled with duty. There are similar powers 
conferred on the President under the Constitution. Under Chapter 
XVI of the Constitution certain special provisions were made for 
the benefit of the Scheduled Castes and certain Scheduled Tribes. 
Seats were reserved for them both in the Parliament as well as in 
the State Assemblies. Certain other benefits were also secured to 
them in the matter of appointments to services and posts in 
connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. But the 
Constitution did not specify which castes were Scheduled Castes 
H 
" (1971) 1 sec ss
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.l 
and which Tribes were Scheduled Tribes. Under Articles 341 (I) 
and 342( I) of the Constitution, the President was given power to 
specify the castes which he considered to be Scheduled Castes 
and the Tribes which he considered to be Scheduled Tribes. Though 
both the Articles say the President "may" specify the castes which 
he considers as Scheduled and Tribes which he considers 
Scheduled, it is clear that a constitutional duty was imposed on 
him to specify which castes were Scheduled Castes and which 
tribes were Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of the Constitution. 
The word "may" in those clauses must be read as "must" because 
ifhe had failed or declined to specify the castes and tribes, Articles 
330, 332, 334, 335, 338 and 340 would have become inoperative 
and the constitutional guarantees given to the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes would have become meaningless." 
21. Inspiration has also been drawn from Ambic(I Querry Works 
v. State of Gujarat'°. In the said case, the Court was engaged in 
interpretation of certain rules of Gujarat Minor Mineral Rules, 1966. On 
behalfofthe appellant therein, reliance was placed on St(lte of R(/j(lstlwn 
v. Harishanker Rajendrapa/" to advance a contention that the word 
'may' is to be read as 'shall' and thereby convey the meaning that it is 
mandatory. In that context, the Court observed:-
"Often when a public authority is vested with power, the
expression 
"may" has been construed as "shall" because power if the 
conditions for the exercise are fulfilled is coupled with duty. As 
observed in Craies on Statute Lm•', 7th Edn., p. 229, the expression 
"may" and "shall" have often been subject of constant and 
conflicting interpretation. "May" is a permissive or enabling 
expression but there are cases in which for various reasons as 
soon as the person who is within the statute is entrusted with the 
power, it becomes his duty to exercise it. As early as 1880 the 
Privy Council in Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford " explained 
the position. Earl Cairns, Lord Chancellor speaking forthe judicial 
committee observed dealing with the expression "it shall be lawful" 
that these words confer a faculty or power and they do not of 
themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. But the Lord 
Chancellor explained there may be something in the nature of the 
'" (1987) I SCC213 
" AIR 1966 SC 296 
22 (1880) 5AC 214 
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thing empowered to be done; something in the object for which it 
is to be done, something ii1 the conditions under which it is to be 
done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose 
benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power 
with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power 
is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so. 
Whether the power is one coupled with a duty must depend upon 
the facts and circumstances of each case and must be so decided 
by the courts in each case. Lord Blackburn observed in the said 
decision that enabling words were always compulsory where the 
words were to effectuate a legal right." 
Be it noted, in the said decision, the Court has approved and applied 
the principle stated in Julius (supra). 
22. We have also been referred to Brij Mo/tan Lal v. Union of 
India & others". In the said case, apart from other issues, the relief 
related to issue of direction to the respondents therein to stop the scheme 
and policy of appointment of retired District and Sessions Judges as 
ad hoc Judges of the Fast Track Courts (FTCs) in the State Judicial 
Services. We need not refer to the contentions raised and how the issue 
was eventually answered. In the said case, the two-Judge Bench 
deliberated on the question whether a writ of mandamus can at all be 
issued regard being had to the factual score of the case. The
Court took 
note of the fact that origin of FTC Scheme was in a pol icy decision by 
the Central Government and the said decision was taken to implement 
the FTC Scheme, particularly, to deal with the arrears of criminal cases 
in the country and it had taken upon itself the burden of financing the 
entire scheme. The Court referred to the concept of judicial review in 
policy matters and the scope of interference in that regard, adverted to 
the principles stated in S.P. Gupta's case and other decisions and opined 
thus:-
"I 06. This Court has consistently held that the writ of mandamus 
can be issued, perhaps not as regards the manner of discharge of 
public duty but with respect to the due exercise of discretion in 
the course of such duty. In S.P Gupta v. Union of India (supra) 
this Court issued directions to the Union of India to determine, 
within a reasonable time, the strength of permanent Judges required 
for disposal of cases instituted in the High Courts and to take 
tests to fill up the vacancies after making such determination. 
"(2012) 6 sec 502
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
747 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
111. It is, thus, clear that it is the constitutional duty of this Court 
to ensure maintenance of the independence of judiciary as well 
as the effectiveness of the justice delivery system in the country. 
The data and statistics placed on record, of which this Court can 
even otherwise take judicial notice, show that certain and effective 
measures are required to be taken by the State Governments to 
bring down the pendency of cases in the lower courts. It necessarily 
implies that the Government should not frame any policies or do 
any acts which shall derogate from the very ethos of the stated 
basic principle of judicial independence. Ifthe policy decision of 
the State is likely to prove counterproductive and increase the 
pendencfof cases, thereby limiting the right to fair and expeditious 
trial to the litigants in this country, it will tantamountto infringement 
of their basic rights and constitutional protections. Thus, we have 
no hesitation in holding that in these cases, the Court could issue a 
mandamus. The extent of such power, we shall discuss shortly 
hereinafter." 
The aforesaid decision, in our considered opinion, is quite 
distinguishable. The Court was referring to certain constitutional concepts, 
namely, constitutional duty, independence of judiciary, effectiveness of 
justice delivery system in the country, the infringement of specific rights 
and constitutional
protection. We will in course of our deliberations advert 
to whether the said principles can be taken recourse to in the case at 
hand. 
23. Reliance has also been placed by the learned counsel on the 
decision in Aneesh D. L(IW(lnde & others v. St(lte of Go(I & others", 
where the Court has referred to the authority in Julius (supra) and 
observed every public authority who has a duty coupled with power 
before exercising the power is required to understand the object of such 
power and the conditions in which the same is to be exercised. Learned 
counsel for the petitioners emphasizing on the conception of "power 
coupled with duty" has referred to series of judgments. We have already 
referred to some and we think it appropriate to refer to some. In 
Dlrnmpur Sug(lr Mills Ltd. v.St(lte of U.P. (Ind others", the attention 
of the two-Judge Bench was engaged in relation to constitution of the 
" (2014) 1sec554 
"(2007) s sec 338 
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Advisory Committee under Uttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 
1964. Before the High Court reliance was placed on Klwday distilleries 
Ltd. v. State of Karnataka" for inter alia that Section 3 of 1964 Act 
could merely be an enabling provision and thus, directory in nature and 
hence, the writ petitioner could not compel the State to constitute an 
Advisory Committee. The High Court referred to the decision in K/wday 
distilleries Ltd. (supra) and opined that the provision was directory in 
nature. This Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Act, the 
Rules framed under the Act and the notification issued thereunder and 
came to hold that the submission of the writ petitioner that such a 
Committee ought to have been constituted by the State was well founded. 
, It did not accept the view expressed by the High Court that the provision 
was directory. It observed that several statutes confer power on 
authorities and officers to be exercised by them at their discretion and 
they are couched in permissive language, such as, "it may be lawful", "it 
may be permissible", "it may be open to do", etc. But in certain situations, 
such power is coupled with duty and must be exercised. The Court 
referred to Baker, Re Nichols v. Baker', a passage from Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action", an instructive passage from 
Administrative Law", the authority in Padfield v. Minister of 
Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food-", Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas 
Bhanji" and Municipal Council, Rat/am v. Vardic/ian" and on that 
basis, concurred with the view expressed in Julius (supra) and eventually, 
held that it was obligatory on the Government to constitute a Committee 
to carry out the purpose and objective of the Act. The import and effect 
of the aforesaid authorities we shall dwell upon when we will be addressing 
the issue whether a writ of mandamus can be issued in the present 
factual matrix regard being had to the nature of constitutional provisions. 
24. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of another 
facet of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the 
petitioners. It is urged by them that it is the constitutional duty and 
obligation of the authorities to work out the constitutional provisions to 
effectuate the affirmative action meant for scheduled castes and the 
"(1995) I SCC574 
" ( 1890) 44 Ch D 262 (CA) 
28 De Smith. Judicial Revie\v of Administrative Action. I 995. pp. 300-01 
'" Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law. 9th Edn .. p.233 
'" [ 1968] I All ER 694 (HL) 
"AJR 1952 SC 16 
H 
"(1980)4 sec 162
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.l 
scheduled tribes persons and regard being had to the principles stated in 
M. Nagaraj (supra), the reservation in promotion with consequential 
seniority cannot be thought of without collection of the necessary 
quantitative data in regard to certain aspects. Mechanisms are to be 
provided for collection of such data. It is contended that failure to do so 
tantamounts to failure of performance of constitutional duty. Elaborating 
further, it is highlighted that when there is apathy in taking the steps to 
live up to the constitutional obligation, the Court is expected in law to 
issue a mandamus to command the authorities to carry out the 
constitutional duty, for non-performance of such duty would affect and 
eventually jeopardize the fundamental affirmative facets of the 
Constitution. It is also argued that this Court has in many an authority 
framed the guidelines, issued directions for performance of duty and 
also filled the gaps wherever required and, therefore, in the present 
situation, the Court can direct for collection of the requisite data so that 
ultimate constitutional goal is achieved . In this regard, we have been 
commended to D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal & ot/1ers·'-', Ranveer 
Yt!.dav v. State of Bihar'', Nagar Pa/ika Nigam v. Kris/ii Upaj Mandi 
SamitP.', Ankush ShiV<lji Gaikwad v. State of Maharaslitra"', 
Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani·", Sub-Committee on 
Judicial
Accountability v. Union of India & others-", Tara Prasad 
Singh & others v. Union of India & others-", Markand Dattatreya 
Sugavkar v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & others'', 
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India" and Supreme Court Advocates-on-
Record Association & others v. Union of India''. 
25. In S.P. Gupta (supra) the larger Bench has held thus:-
"lt is true that the words in Article 216 of the Constitution are 
undoubtedly empowering but it has been so often decided as to 
have become an axiom that in public statutes words only directory, 
permissory or enabling may have a compulsory force where the 
33 (2015)8SCC744 
" (2010) 11sec493 
" AIR 2009 SC 187 
"(2013)6SCC770 
37 AIR 1950 SC 222 
" AIR 1992 SC 320 
" AIR 1980 SC 1682 
'" (2013) 9 sec 136 
41 1981 Supp(l}SCC87 
"(1993)4SCC441 
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thing to be done is for the public benefit or in advancement of 
public justice. Thus, the enabling power cannot be refused to be 
exercised by the repository of that power, as such refusal would 
be contrary to the constitutional principles and such action is not 
permissible under the scheme of the Constitution." 
26. Relying on the said decision, learned counsel would submit 
the said principle has not been upset by the nine-Judge Bench in Supreme 
CourtAdvocates-on-Record(supra). We have been also apprised that 
the seven-Judge Bench has approved the principle stated in Julius (supra), 
wherein it has been held thus:-
"there may be something in the nature of thing empowered to be 
done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something 
in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title 
of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be 
exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it 
the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed, to exercise 
that power when called upon to do so." 
· 
' 
27. Immense emphasis has been laid on D.K Basu (supra) wherein 
the Court was dealing with Section 21 of the Protection of Human Rights 
Act, 1993 which deals with setting up of State Human Rights 
Commission. Interpreting the said provision, the Court has observed:-
"A plain reading of the above would show that Parliament has 
used the word "may" in
sub-section(!) of Section 21 while 
providing for the setting up of a State Human Rights Commission. 
In contrast Parliament has used the word "shall" in Section 3(1) 
while providing for constitution of a National Commission. The 
argument on behalf of the defaulting States, therefore, was that 
the use of two different expressions which dealing with the subject 
of analogous nature is a clear indication that while a National 
Hu1nan Rights Co1n1nission is 1nandatory a State Co1111nission is 
not. That argument is no doubt attractive, but does not stand close 
scrutiny. The use of the word "may" is not by itself determinative 
of the true nature of the power or the obligation conferred or 
created under a provision. The legal position on the subject is 
fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. The 
stated position is that the use of the word "may" does not always 
mean that the authority upon which the power is vested may or 
may not exercise that power. Whether or not the word "may'·
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
fDIPAK MISRA, J .l 
should be construed as mandatory and equivalent to the word 
"shall" would depend upon the object and the purpose of the 
enactment under which the said power is conferred as also related 
provisions made in the enactment. The word "may" has been 
often read as "shall'' or "must" when there is something in the 
nature of the thing to be done which must compel such a reading. 
In other words, the conferment of the power upon the authority 
may having regard to the context in which such power has been 
conferred and the purpose of its conferment as also the 
circumstances in which it is meant to be exercised carry with 
such power an obligation which compels its exercise." 
28. In the said case reference was made to Julius (supra) and 
the opinion of Justice Cairns, L.C. was quoted and thereafter, the opinion 
of Lord Blackburn which is to the following effect was reproduced:-
"! do not think thlfwords 'it shall be lawful' are in themselves 
ambiguous at all. They are apt words· to express that a power is 
given; and as, prima facie, the donee of a power may either 
exercise it or leave it unused, it is not inaccurate to say that, prima 
facie, they are equivalent to saying that the donee may do it; but if 
the object for which the power is conferred is for the purpose of 
enforcing a right, there may be a duty cast on the donee of the 
power, to exercise it for the benefit of those who have that right, 
when
required on their behalf." 
29. As is evident, the Court has referred to number of judgments 
tbat the word "may" at times can assume the character of "shall". In 
the said case, stress was laid on access of justice and in that context, 
reliance was placed on lmtiyaz Ahmad v. State of U.P. & others". 
After referring certain recommendations, the Court issued number of 
directions. 
30. Learned counsel for the petitioner, as stated earlier, has founded 
his argument on the principles stated in many authorities which pertain 
to interpretation of "power coupled with duty". Reference has been 
made to Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union" which has been 
cited by the House of Lords in Pru/field (supra) wherein their Lordships 
considering the discretion of statutory authority under the Agriculture 
Marketing Act, 1958 (UK) opined:-
" (2012) 2 sec 688 
"(1971) 2 QB 175, 190 
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"The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a 
discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means 
at least this: the statutory body must be guided by relevant 
considerations and not by irrelevant. !fits decision is influenced 
by extraneous considerations, which is ought not to have taken 
into account, then the decision cannot stand." 
31. The said view has been accepted by the Court in S.P. Gupta 
(supra). 
32. In T.N. Godavarnum Tllirumulpad v. Union of India and 
otlters'' the Court referred to the decision in Lafarge Umiam Mining 
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India & otlters'', reproduced a paragraph from it 
and observed:-
"[! will be clear from the italicised portions of the order of this 
Court in Lafarge Umiam Mining (PJ Ltd. (supra) extracted above 
that this Court on an interpretation of Section 3(3) of the 
Environment (Protection)Act, 1986 has taken a view that it confers 
a power coupled with duty to appoint an appropriate authority in 
the form of a Regulator at the State and at the Central level for 
appraising projects, enforcing environmental conditions for 
approvals and to impose penalties on polluters and has, accordingly, 
directed the Central Government to appoint a National Regulator 
under the said provision of the Act. Mr Parasaran is, therefore, 
not right in arguing that in Lafarge Umiam Mining (PJ Ltd. (supra), 
this Court has merely suggested that a
National Regulator should 
be appointed and has not issued any mandamus to appoint a 
National Regulator." 
33. The argument is, assuming the principles stated in M. Nagmj 
(supra) are correct, it is the duty of the State to give effect to the same 
and it cannot remain in apathy or lie in slumber. In such a situation, the 
Court has the power under the Constitution, when moved, to direct them 
to wake up and act. 
34. The core issue is whether in the context of Articles 16( 4-A) 
and 16(4-B), a writ or direction can be issued to the State Government 
or its functionaries or the instrumentalities of the State to collect and 
gather the necessary data for the purpose of taking a decision as regards 
the promotion and consequential fixation of seniority. In this regard, it is 
"(2014) 4 sec 61 
"(2011) 7 sec 338
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
753 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
imperative to appreciate in proper perspective the concept of mandamus 
A 
and the circumstances in which it can be issued. 
35. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume I, it 
has been stated:-
"89. Nature of mandamus. The order of mandamus"' is of a 
most extensive remedial nature, and is, in form, a command issuing 
from the High Court of Justice, directed to any person, corporation, 
or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them to do some particular 
thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and 
is in the nature ofa public duty. Its purpose is to remedy defects 
of justice and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may 
be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no 
specific legal remedy for enforcing that right"'; and it may issue 
in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy yet 
that mode of redress is less convenient beneficial and effectual49." 
36. This Court in State of Kera/(I v. A. Lakshmikutt 50, while 
dealing with the concept of mandamus, opined thus:-
" ... It is well settled that a writ of mandamus is not a writ of 
course or a writ of right, but is, as a rule, discretionary. There 
must be a judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which 
a mandamus will lie. The legal right to enforce the performance 
of a dutv must be in the applicant himself. In general. therefore. 
the court will only
enforce the performance of statutory duties by 
public bodies on application ofa person who can show that he has 
himself a legal right to insist on such performance .... " 
[Emphasis addedl 
37. In Dr. Unwkm1t Saran v. State of Bihar and others'', the 
Court referred to its earlier decision in Dr. Rai Sldvemlra Balwdur v. 
The Governing Body of the Na/and a College", and observed that in 
order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, 
it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved 
party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. 
"Lee District Board v. LCC (1989) 82 LT 306: R v. Marshland Smeeth and Fen 
DistrictCommr[I920] 1KB155,DC 
'" R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop of London, (I 812) 15 East 117. at 136 
49 R. v. Bank of England, (1819) 2 B &Aid 620. at 622; R v. Thomas (1892) I QB 426 
'" (I 986) 4 sec 632 
"(1973) 1 SCC485 
" 1962 Supp. 2 SCR 144 
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38. In Sharif Ahmad and others v. Regional Transport 
Authority, Meerut and others", the Court observed thus:-
"Mr A.K. Sen, learned counsel for the appellants drew our attention 
to what S.A. de Smith has pointed out at p. 59 of the third Edn. of 
his well known treatise "Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action": 
"It may describe any duty, the discharge of which involves no 
element of discretion or independent judgment. Since an order 
of mandamus will issue to compel the performance of a 
ministerial act, and since, moreover, wrongful refusal to carry 
out a ministerial duty may give rise to liability in tort, it is often 
of practical importance to determine whether discretion is 
present in the performance of a statutory function. The cases 
on mandamus show, however, that the presence of a minor 
discretionary element is not enough to deter the Courts from 
characterising a function as ministerial." 
We think that the Regional Transport Authority, pursuant to the 
order of the Appellate Tribunal, had merely to perform a ministerial 
duty and the minor discretionary element given to it for finding out 
whether the terms of the Appellate Order had been complied with 
or not is not enough to deter the Courts from characterising the· 
function as ministerial. Dn the facts and in the circumstances of 
this case by a writ of mandamus the said authority must be directed 
to perform its function." 
39. Dr.
Dhavan, who has been permitted to argue, has placed 
reliance on the said decision only to point out that the mandamus sought 
in the present case does not come in the nature of mandamus that the 
Court has dealt with, in the aforesaid case. It is his submission that the 
facts in which directions have been issued are quite different and that 
apart, the Court has issued a writ of mandamus in cases which involved 
minor discretionary element but not where a major policy decision is 
involved. It is his submission that when the authority has a discretion to 
exercise the discretion ornot regard being had to many an administrative 
contingencies, the Court should refrain from issuing a mandamus. It is 
because at this stage there is neither any semblance of right nor exercise 
of power coupled with duty. 
"(1978) 1sec1
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADE.SH 
rDIPAK MISRA, J .l 
40. In this regard reference to the decision in Director of 
Settlements, A.P. and others v. M.R. Apparao and another" would 
be fruitful. In the said case, a three-Judge Bench of the Court, while 
dealing with the order of the High Court to issue mandamus, opined:-
" ... One of the conditions for exercising power under Article 226 
for issuance of a mandamus is that the Court must come to the 
conclusion thatthe aggrieved person has a legal right, which entitles 
him to any of the rights and that such right has been infringed. In 
other words, existence of a legal right of a citizen and performance 
of any corresponding legal duty by the State or any public authority, 
could be enforced by issuance of a writ of mandamus. 
"Mandamus" means a command. It differs from the writs of 
prohibition or certiorari in its demand for some activity on the part 
of the body or person to whom it is addressed. Mandamus is a 
command issued to direct any person, corporation, inferior courts 
or Government, requiring him or them to do some particular thing 
therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in 
the nature of a public duty. A mandamus is available against any 
public authority including administrative and local bodies, and it 
would lie to any person who is under a duty imposed by a statute 
or by the common law to do a particular act. In order to obtain a 
writ or order in the nature of
mandamus, the applicant has to 
satisfy that he has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty 
by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and such right 
must be subsisting on tlte date of the petition (Kalyan Singh 
v. State of UP. 55 ). The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus 
may be one imposed by the Constitution, a statute, common law 
or by rules or orders having the force oflaw .... " 
41. Having stated about general principles relating to mandamus, 
the question arises -
whether a court should issue a direction to 
effectuate an enabling constitutional provision which has to be exercised 
by the State in its discretion on being satisfied of certain conditions 
precedent. There can be no doubt that certain constitutional duties are 
inferred from the various Articles of the Constitution and this Court has 
issued directions. Certain directions have been issued in S.P. Gupta 
(supra) and Supreme Court Advocates-on-RecordAssocimion (supra) 
(Ilnd Judges case) but they are based on principles of secure operation 
"(2002) 4 sec 638 
"AIR 1962SC 1183 
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of legal system, access to justice and speedy disposal of cases. In All 
India Judges' Association & others v. Union of India & others", the 
Court issued directions by stating that it is the constitutional obligation to 
ensure that the backlog of cases is decreased and efforts are made to 
increase the disposal of cases. Keeping in view the concept of 
constitutional silence or abeyance, guidelines were issued in Vislwka & 
others v. State of Rajastlwn & others" and for the said purpose, reliance 
was placed on international Treaties, norms of gender equality and right 
to life and liberty of working women. Guidelines have been issued in 
D.K. Basu (supra) to lay down the procedure to be followed in case of 
arrest and detention based on fundamental rights of convicts, prisoners 
and under trials under Article 21 of the Constitution. Similarly, in Prakllsh 
Singh & others v. Union of Intfill & others", the Court has laid down 
specific guidelines for police reform so as to insulate the police machinery 
from political/executive interference and the same is founded on the 
backdrop of right to life and the enhancement of the criminal justice 
delivery ~ystem. 
42. In the case at hand, we are concerned with the enabling power 
as engrafted under Articles 16, 16( 4-A)and 16( 4-B). The said Articles 
being enabling provisions, there is no power coupled with duty. In Ajit 
Singh (II) (supra), it has been held
that no mandamus can be issued 
either to provide for reserv_ation or for relaxation. Recently, in Clwirman 
& Mllnllging Director, Central Bank of India & Ors. v. Central 
Blink of lntfill SC/ST Employees We/fllre Association & Ors.;• it has 
been held thus:-
"In the first instance, we make it clear that there is no dispute 
about the constitutional position envisaged in Articles 15 and 16, 
insofar as these provisions empower the State to take affirmative 
action in favour of SC/ST category persons by making reservations 
for them in the employment in the Union or the State (or for that 
matter, public sector/authorities which are treated as State under 
Article 12 of the Constitution). The laudable objective underlying 
these provisions is also to be kept in mind while undertaking any 
exercise pertaining to the issues touching upon the reservation of 
such SC/ST employees. Further, such a reservation can not only 
" (2002) 4 sec 247 
" ( 1997) 6 sec 241 
'" (2006) s sec 1 
"2015 (I) SCALE 169
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.l 
be made at the entry level but is permissible in the matters of 
promotions as wells. At the same time, it is also to be borne in 
mind that Clauses 4 and 4A of Article 16 of the Constitution are 
only the enabling provisions which permit the State to make 
provision for reservation of these category of persons. Insofar as 
making of provisions for reservation in matters of promotion to 
any class or classes of post is concerned, such a provision can be 
made in favourofSC/STCivil Appeal No. of2015 & Ors. (arising 
out ofSLP (C) No. 4385 of2010 & Ors.) category employees if, 
in the opinion of the State, they are not adequately represented in 
services under the State. Thus, no doubt, power lies with the State 
to make a provision, but, at the same time, courts cannot issue 
any mandamus to the State to necessarily make such a provision. 
It is for the State to act, in a given situation, and to take such an 
affirmative action. Of course, whenever there exists such a 
provision for reservation in the matters of recruitment or the 
promotion, it .would bestow an enforceable right in favour of 
persons belonging to SC/ST category and on failure on the part of 
any authority to reserve the posts, while making selections/ 
promotions, the beneficiaries of these provisions can approach 
the Court to get their rights enforced. What is to be highlighted is 
that existence of provision for reservation in the matter of
selection 
or promotion, as the case may be, is the sine qua non for seeking 
mandamus as it is only when such a provision is made by the 
State, a right shall accrue in favour of SC/ST candidates and not 
otherwise." 
The aforesaid passage makes its luminescent that existence of a 
provision for reservation in the matter of selection or promotion is the 
sine qua non for seeking mandamus. The right accrues in favour of 
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes candidates when there 
is a provision. Weare absolute in conscious that the controversy before 
us is quite different. The relief is not sought on the basis of existence of 
a provision. The grievance pertains to steps being not taken to collect 
the quantifiable data as has been envisaged in M. Nagaraj (supra). To 
appreciate the relief in its quintessence, it is imperative to clearly 
understand the ratio laid down in M. Nagaraj (supra). The Constitution 
Bench while opining that Articles 16(4-A) and (4-B) are enabling 
provisions' had observed thus:-
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" ... Extent of reservation, as stated above, will depend on the facts 
of each case. Backwardness and inadequacy of representation 
are compelling reasons for the State Governments to provide 
representation in public employment. Therefore, if in a given case 
the court finds excessive reservation under the State enactment 
then such an enactment would be liable to be struck down since it 
would amount to derogation of the above constitutional 
requirements." 
· 
After so stating, the larger Bench has clearly held that Article 
16(4-A) and 16 (4-B) do not alter the structure of Article 16(4). The 
said Articles are confined to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes and do not obliterate any of the constitutional requirements, namely, 
ceiling limit of50% (quantitative limitation), the concept of creamy layer 
(qualitative exclusion), the sub-classification between OBCs on one hand 
and SCs and STs on the other hand as held in Indra Sawlmey (supra), 
the concept of post-based roster with inbuilt concept of replacement as 
held in R.K. Sablutrwa/ (supra). After so stating, the Court has adverted 
to the concept of "extent of reservation". In that regard, it has been 
opined that the State concerned is required to show in each case the 
existence of the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy 
of representation and overall administrative efficiency before making 
provision for
reservation. It has been clearly laid down that the State is 
not bound to make reservation for SCs/STs in matters of promotion. 
However, ifthe State wishes to exercise the discretion and make such 
provision, it has to' collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of 
the class and inadequacy of representation of that class in public 
employment in addition to compliance with Article 335. The expression 
of the opinion clearly demonstrates that the regard being had to the 
enabling provisions of Articles 16( 4-A) and ( 4-B), the State is not bound 
to make reservation. It has a discretion to do so and the State's discretion 
can only be exercised on certain conditions bei1ig satisfied. In Rajesli 
Kumar's case, after culling out the principles stated in M. Nagaraj 
(supra) the Court has graphically stated that a fresh exercise in accord 
with the law laid down in M. Nagaraj (supra) is a categorical imperative. 
It has been held that the State can make provisions for reservation in 
promotion with consequential seniority on certain basis or foundation 
and conditions precedents have to be satisfied. The Court has declared 
Section 3(9) of the 1994 Act and Rule 8-A of the 2002 Rules as 
unconstitutional as no fresh exercise had been undertaken. The
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that a command 
should be issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh to collect the data as 
enshrined in the Constitution Bench decision in M. Nagamj (supra) so 
that benefit ofreservation in promotion can be given. The relief sought 
may appear innocuous or simple but when the Court thinks of issue of a 
writ of mandamus, it has to apprise itself of an existing right or a power 
to be exercised regard being had to the conception of duty. The concept 
of power coupled with duty is always based on facts. If we keenly 
scrutinize the relief sought, the prayer is to issue a mandamus to the 
State and its functionaries to carry out an exercise for the purpose of 
exercising a discretion. To elucidate, the discretion is to take a decis_ion 
to have the reservation, and to have reservation there is a necessity' for 
collection of data in accordance with the principles stated in M. Nagaraj 
(supra) as the same is the condition precedent. A writ of mandamus is 
sought to collect material or data which is in the realm of condition 
precedent for exercising a discretion which flows from the enabling 
constitutional provision. Direction of this nature, in our considered 
opinion, would not come within the principle of exercise of power coupled 
with duty. A direction for exercise of a duty which has inherent and 
insegretable nexus with the constitutional provision like
Article 21 of the 
Constitution or a statutory duty which is essential for prayer as laid down 
in Julius (supra) where a power is deposited with a public officer but 
the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically 
pointed out with regard to whom a discretion is applied by the Legislature 
on the conditions upon which they are entitled. We are inclined to think 
so as the language employed in M.Nagaraj (supra) clearly states that 
the State is not bound to make reservation in promotion. Thus, there is 
no constitutional obligation. The decisions wherein this Court has placed 
reliance on Julius (supra) and the other judgments of this Court and 
issued directions, the language employed in the statute is different and 
subserves immense public interest in the said authorities, the purpose 
and purport are quite different. 
43. Be it clearly stated, the Courts do not formulate any policy, 
remains away from making anything that would amount to legislation, 
rules and regulation or policy relating to reservation. The Courts can 
test the validity of the same when they are challenged. The court cannot 
direct for making legislation or for that matter any kind of sub-ordinate 
legislation. We may hasten to add that in certain decisions directions 
have been issued for framing of guidelines or the court has itself framed 
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guidelines for sustaining certain rights of women, children or prisoners 
or under-trial prisoners. The said category of cases falls in a different 
compartment. They are in different sphere than what is envisaged in 
Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) whose constitutional validity have been 
upheld by the Constitution Bench with certain qualifiers. They have been 
regarded as enabling constitutional provisions. Additionally it has been 
postulated that the State is not bound to make reservation for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in matter of promotions. Therefore, there 
is no duty. In such a situation, to issue a mandamus to collect the data 
would tantamount to asking the authorities whether there is ample data 
to frame a rule or regulation. This will be in a way, entering into the 
domain of legislation, for it is a step towards commanding to frame a 
legislation or a delegated legislation for reservation. 
44. R_ecently in Census Commissioner & others v. R. 
Krishnamurthy'° a three-Judge Bench while dealing with the 
correctness of the judgment of the high court wherein the High court 
had directed that the Census Department of Government of India shall 
take such measures towards conducting the caste-wise census in the 
country at the earliest and in a time-bound manner, so as to achieve the 
goal of social justice in its true sense, which is the need of the hour, the 
court analyzing the context
opined thus:-
"Interference with the policy decision and issue of a mandamus 
to frame a policy in a particular manner are absolutely different. 
The Act has conferred power on the Central Government to issue 
notification regarding the manner in which the census has to be 
carried out and the Central Government has issued notifications, 
and the competent authority has issued directions. It is not within 
the domain of the court to legislate. The courts do interpret the 
law and in such interpretation certain creative process is involved. 
The courts have the jurisdiction to declare the law as 
unconstitutional. That too,, where it is called for. The court may 
also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of 
constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are not to plunge 
into policy-making by adding something to the policy by ways of 
issuing a writ of 1nanda1nus." 
We have referred to the said authority as the court has clearly 
held that it neither legislates nor does it issue a mandamus to legislate . 
.... (2015) 2 sec 796
SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
761 
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l 
The relief in the present case, when appositely appreciated, tantamounts 
A 
to a prayer for issue of a mandamus to take a step towards framing of a 
rule or a regulation for the purpose of reservation for Scheduled Castes 
arnil Scheduled Tribes in matter of promotions. In our considered opinion 
a writ of mandamus of such a nature cannot be issued. 
I 
45. Consequently, the Writ Petitions, being devoid of merit, stand 
B 
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 
Nidhi Jain 
Writ Petitions dismissed.