V. VASANTHAKUMAR versus H.C. BHATIA AND ORS.
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 51, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Matter referred to larger bench
Segment: Issues
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 51 
V. VASANTHAKUMAR 
v. 
H.C. BHATIA AND ORS. 
(Writ Petition (C) No. 36 of2016) 
JULY 13,2016 
[T.S. THAKUR, CJI, R. BANUMATHI AND UDAY UMESH 
LALIT, JJ.] 
Reference to larger bench: Constitution 'of India - Art.136 -
Special leave petition - Need for restrained approach towards grant 
of special leave petition - Matter relating to establishment of 
National/Regional Courts of Appeal to tackle issue of pending cases 
and long delay in disposal of cases in Supreme Court - Matter 
referred to Co11stitutional Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. 
Referring the matter to a larger Bench, the Court 
HELD: 1. The Supreme Court was never meant to be a 
regular court of appeal. It was meant to exercise its powers under 
Article 136 of the Constitution only in cases which raised 
important questions involving interpretation of the Constitution 
or questions of general public importance or questions of 
constitutionality of State or Central legislations or those raising 
important issues touching Centre-State relationship etc. The 
jurisdiction may also have been available to the Court where it 
found gross miscarriage of justice or an error so outrageous as 
no reasonable person would countenance. The power to interfere 
was not meant to be exercisable just because prolonged argument 
would eventually reveal some error or irregularity or a possible 
alternative view on a subject that did not cause any miscarriage 
of justice of a kind that would shock the
conscience of the court 
on the subject. The fact, however remains that the filing of cases 
in the Supreme Court over the past six decades has grown so 
sharply that the Judge strength in the Supreme Court is proving 
inadequate to deal with the same. Statistics show that more than 
3f4'h of the total number of cases filed are dismissed in limine. 
Even so, the dismissal is only after the court has applied its mind 
and heard arguments which consume considerable time of the 
Judges. Dismissal of an overwhelming number of cases has not 
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and does not discourage the litigants or the member of the Bar 
from filing cases. That is why the number of cases filed is on the 
rise every year. [Para 20) [65-B-F) 
2. It was contended that the way forward is setting up of 
Regional Courts of Appeal, firstly, because the same would take 
justice closer to the doorsteps of the litigants, especially those 
living at distant places and secondly, because an intermediary 
court would reduce the burden of the Supreme Court without 
denying to the litigants an opportunity to agitate his case before 
a court higher than the High Court. The only difference in that 
situation will be that in place of the Supreme Court the Court of 
Appeal would look into the matter and correct whatever needs 
to be corrected in the judgment impugned before it. It was in 
that backdrop that following questions have arisen arise for 
consideration: With access to justice being a fundamental right, 
would the said right stand denied to litigants, due to the unduly 
long delay in the disposal of cases in the S\lpreme Court; Would 
the mere increase in the number of judges be an answer to the 
problem of undue delay in disposal of cases and to what extent 
would such increase be. feasible; Would the division of the 
Supreme Court into a Constitutional wing and an appellate wing 
be an answer to the problem; Would the fact that the Supreme 
Court oflndia is situate in the far North, in
Delhi, rendering travel 
from the Southern states and some other states in India, unduly 
long and expensive, be a deterrent to real access to justice; 
Would the Supreme Court sitting in benches in different parts of 
India be an answer to the last mentioned problem; Has the 
Supreme Court of India been exercising jurisdiction as an 
ordinary court of appeal on facts and law, in regard to routine 
cases of every description; Is the huge pendency of cases in the 
Supreme Court, caused by the Court not restricting its 
consideration, as in the case of the Apex Courts of other 
countries, to Constitutional issues, questions of national 
importance, differences of opinion between different High Courts, 
death sentence cases and matters entrusted to the Supreme 
Court by express provisions of the Constitution; Is there a need 
for having Courts of Appeal, with exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
and finally decide the vast proportion of the routine cases, as
V. VASANTHAKUMAR v. H. C. BHATIA AND ORS. 
well as Article 32 petitions now being decided by the Supreme 
Court of India, especially when a considerable proportion of the 
four million cases pending before the High Court may require 
review by a higher intermediate court, as these judgments of the 
High Courts may fail to satisfy the standards of justice and 
competence expected from a superior court; If four regional 
Courts of Appeal are established, in the Northern, Southern, 
Eastern and Western regions of the Country, each manned by, 
say, fifteen judges, elevated or appointed to each Court by the 
Collegium, would this not satisfy the requirement of 'access to 
justice' to all litigants from every part of the country; As any such 
proposal would need an amendment to the Constitution, would 
the theory of 'basic structure' of the Constitution be violated, if 
in fact, such division of exclusive jurisdiction between the 
Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal, enhances the efficacy 
of the justice delivery system without affecting the independence 
of the judicial wing of the State; In view of cases pending in the 
Supreme Court of India on average for about 5 years, in the High 
Courts again for about 8 years, and anywhere between 5-10 years 
in the Trial Courts on the average, would it not be part of the 
responsibility and duty of the Supreme Court of India to examine 
through a Constitution Bench, the issue of divesting the Supreme 
Court of about 80% of the pendency
of cases of a routine nature, 
to recommend to Government, its opinion on the proposal for 
establishing four Courts of Appeal, so that the Supreme Court 
with about 2500 cases a year instead of about 60000, may regain 
.its true status as a Constitutional Court?Keeping in view the 
importance of the above questions and the need for reforms which 
have been long felt, we deem it proper to refer the same to a 
Constitutional Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. [Paras 
22, 23) (66-A-G; 67-A-H; 68-A) 
Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice and Others 
1987 (1) SCR 295 : 1986 (4) sec 767; Mathai @ 
Joby v. George & Anr. (2010) 4 SCC 358 : 2010 (3) 
SCR 533 ; N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss (2007) 9 
SCC 196: 2007 (2) SCR 419; Bengal Chemical & 
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Employees AIR 1959 SC 
633 : 1959 Suppl. SCR 136; Kunhayammed v. State 
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of Kera/a (2000) 6 SCC 359 : 2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 
538; State ()f Bombay v. Rusy Mistry AIR 1960 SC 391; 
Municipal Board, Pratabgarh v. Mahendra Sinf{h 
Chawla (1982) 3 SCC 331; Ram Saran Das and Bros. 
v. CTO AIR 1962 SC 1326 : 1962 Suppl. SCR 276; 
Pritam Singh v. State AIR 1950 SC 169 : 1950 SCR 
453 ; Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar 
(2004) 5 SCC 1 : 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 494; Jamslied 
Hormusji Wadia v. Port ()f Mumbai (2004) 3 SCC 214 : 
2004 (1) SCR 483; N01pa1 Singh v. Jaipur Development 
Authority (2002) 4 SCC 666 : 2002 (3) SCR 365; Ashok 
· Nagar Welfare Assn. v. R.K. Sharma (2002) 1 SCC 749 
: 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 662; Pritam Singh E The State 
1950 SCR 453; Penu Balakrishnu Iyer & Ors " Ariya 
M f?.amaswami Iyer & Ors. (1964) 7 SCR 49; Union 
Carbide Corporation & Ors. i: Union of India & Ors. 
(1991) 4 sec 584 : 1991 (I) Suppl. SCR 251 -
referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
1987 (1) SCR 295 
referred to 
Para..f 
2010 (3) SCR 533 
referred to 
Para8 
2007 (2) SCR 419 
referred to 
Para8 
1959 Suppl. SCR 136 
referred to 
Para8 
2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 538 
referred to 
Para8 
AIR 1960 SC 391 
referred to 
Pa;·a8 
(1982) 3 sec 331 
referred to 
Para8 
1962 Suppl. SCR 276 
referred to 
Para8 
1950 SCR 453 
referred to 
Pa1·a 8 
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR494 
referred to 
Para8 
2004 (1) SCR 483 
referred to 
Para8 
2002 (3) SCR 365 
referred to 
Para 8 
2001 (5) Suppl. SCR662 
referred to
Para8

V. VASANTHAKUMAR v. H. C. BHATIA AND ORS. 
55 
1950 SCR 453 
(1964) 7 SCR 49 
1991 (1) Suppl. SCR 251 
referred to 
Para 11 
referred to 
Para 11 
referred to 
Para 11 
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 
A 
36of2016. 
B 
Mukul Rohatgi, AG, K. K. Venugopal (A.C.), T. R. Andhyarujina, 
Salman Khurshid (A.C.), Sr. Advs., lmtiaz Ahmed (A.C.) (For Mis. 
Equity Lex Associates), Ms. Pooja Dhar, Ram Sankar, S. Muthu Krishnan, 
Ms. G. Ananda Selvam, Mayilsamy K., Y. Lokesh, Devashish Bharuka, 
Ms. Diksha Rai, Ajay Sharma, Ms. Madhvi Dewan, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, 
C 
Ms. Anu Tyagi, Samit Khosla, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, B. Krishna Prasad, 
Ms. Arnita Singh Kalka), Dr. Shiva Sharma, Advs. for the appearing 
parties. 
V. Vasanthakumar, Petitioner-in-Person. 
Applicant-in-person. 
The Judgment of the Com1 was delivered by 
T.S. THAKUR, CJI. I. This petition, filed in public interest, 
raises questions touchi 11g possible structural reforms at the highest 
echelons of the Indian judicial system. Similar questions have been 
addressed in the past not only by the Law Commission but also by this 
Court on the judicial side. We may briefly refer to the same to place the 
issues that fall for determination in proper perspective. 
2. In its 14th Report dated 26th September, 1958, the Law 
Commission of India advocated the need for a restrained approach 
towards grant of sp~cial leaves to appeal against judgments and orders 
passed by the High Com1s. The Commission felt that a
liberal grant of 
leave to appeal had the tendency to adversely affect the prestige of the 
High Courts. It said: 
"(13) Although the exercise of the jurisdiction under 
Article 136 of the Constitution by the Supreme Court in 
criminal matters sometimes serves to prevent injustice, 
yet the Court might be more chary of granting special 
leave in such matters as the practice of granting special 
leave fi'eely has a tendency to affect the prestige of the 
High Courts. " 
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3.Then came the 95th report dated 1st March, 1984 in which the 
Law Commission proposed the setting up of a Constitutional Division 
within the Supreme Court, in the following words: 
'"6.4 If the proposed constitutional division is lo be 
created, it will have lo be assigned a part of the business 
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of the Supreme Court within its jurisdiction as at present 
provided. The second issue that falls to be considered 
is, what matters should be assigned to that division. In 
this connection, there are two principal alternatives to 
be considered as per (a) and (b) below: 
c 
(a) This division may be entrusted with the adjudication 
of all public law cases within the Supreme Courts 
iurisdiction. If this alternative is accepted, itsjurisdiction 
would comprise-
(i) every case involving a substantial question of law 
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as to the interpretation of the Constitution, or an order 
or rule issued under the Constitution; 
(ii) every case involving a question of Constitutional 
lmv, not falling within (1) above: 
(iii) every appeal against the decision of a High Court, 
E 
rendered under Article 226 of the Constitution; 
(iv) every appeal against the decision of a tribunal 
under article 136 of the Constitution (whether such 
tribunal is created by law passed by virtue of article 
323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution or otherwise), 
F 
where a question of administrative law is involved. 
{b) In the alternative, only matters of
Constitutional lmv 
may be assigned to the proposed Constitutional Division. 
If this alternative is accepted, its jurisdiction would only 
the items (i) and (ii) mentioned in (a) above. The 
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;urisdiction would then cover only the following: 
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(i) every case involving a substantial question of law 
as to the interpretation of the Constitution or an order 
or rule issued under the Constitution, and 
(ii) every case involving a question of constitutional
V. VASANTHAKUMAR v. H. C. BHATIA AND ORS. 
[T.S. THAKUR, CJ!] 
law, not falling within (i) above. 
Our preference is for alternative (b) above. It is easier 
lo define precisely and locale such mailers, co1?fined to 
constitutional law proper. We appreciate that question 
of constitutional and administrative law often dovetail 
into each other, particularly in proceedings under 
article 226 of the Constitution (which may reach the 
Supreme Court on appeal). But. in our opinion, it would 
be desirable to make the jurisdiction of the proposed 
division narrow and compact, at least for the present. 
Accordingly, we recommend that the proposed 
Constitutional Division of the Supreme Court should 
be entrusted with the cases of the nature mentioned in 
alternative (b) above. It follows that other matters 
coming to the Supreme Court will be assigned to its 
Legal Division. 
6.5. Of course, the creation of two divisions in the 
abstract does not end the matter. For practical 
implementation of the proposed scheme, it will be 
necessary to deal with at least two concrete matters. 
namely, (I) when can a constitutional issue be said to 
be "involved" and (ii) what will be the machinery for 
allocating cases between two divisions. 
As to the first mailer, which relates to the criterion to be 
adopted, we should make it clear that a case should be 
regarded as "involving a" constitutional issue only when 
the decision of that issue is absolutely necessary for 
the disposal of the
controversy. The mere fact that a 
party has raised a constitutional issue is not enough. 
Although, it may not always be possible to determine at 
the outset (at the time of allocation of the case), whether 
the case "involves" a constitutional issue in the above 
sense, it may still be useful to bear this aspect in mind" 
4. Two years later in Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief 
Justice and Others ( 1986) 4 SCC 767, a Constitution Bench of this 
Court while disposing ofa Writ Petition in which the petitioner had prayed 
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for adoption of a uniform approach and sensitivity in special leave petitions 
filed by the less fortunate of the litigants as was shown in the case of 
two big industrialists for whom the Court had held a late night sitting to 
consider their prayer for bail, held that special leave petitions filed by 
"small men" were entitled to the same consideration as is given to those 
filed by "big industrialists". This Court declared that it had always reg:irded 
the poor and the disadvantaged to be entitled to preferential consideration 
over the rich and the affluent, the businessmen and the industrialists. 
That is because the weaker section of the Indian humanity had been 
deprived of justice for several years on account of their poverty, ignorance 
and illiteracy, and on account of their social and economic backwardness 
and resultant lack of capacity to assert their rights. This Court rejected 
the suggestion that it was not giving to the "small men" the same treatment 
as it was giving to the ·'big industrialists". 
5. Having said that, this Court declared that it was never intended 
to be a regular cou11 of appeal against orders made by the High Courts 
and the Sessions Courts or the Magistrates. It was created as an apex 
court for the purpose of laying down the law for the entire country and 
forthat purpose it was given the extraordinary jurisdiction to grant special 
leave to appeal under Article 136 of
the Constitution so that it could 
interfere whenever it found that the law was not correctly appreciated 
or applied by the lower courts or tribunals. The jurisdiction was also held 
to be available for correction of grave miscarriage of justice. More 
importantly, this Court held that every case, where the apex court finds 
some error, need not be entertained for otherwise, the Court would 
become a regular court of appeal and be reduced to a position where it 
will not be able to remedy any injustice at all, on account of the tremendous 
backlog of cases which will get accumulated. This Court said: 
'"We must realise that in the vast majority of cases the 
High Courts must become final even if they are wrong. 
The apex court can also be wrong 011 occasions but 
since there is no further appeal. what the apex court 
says is final. That is why one American Judge said of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: .. We are right 
because we are final: we are not final because we are 
right". We must, therefore, reconcile ourselves to the 
idea that like the apex court which may be wrong on 
occasions, the High Courts may also be wrong and it is
V. VASANTHAKUMAR v. H. C. BHATIA AND ORS. 
[T.S. THAKUR, CJI] 
not every error of the High Court which the apex court 
can possibly correct. We think it would be desirable to 
set up a National Court of Appeal which would be in a 
position to entertain appeals by special leave from the 
decisions of the High Courts and the Tribunals in the 
country in civil, criminal, revenue and labour cases and 
so far as the present apex court is concerned, it should 
concern itself only with entertaining cases, involving 
questions of constitutional l(J)V and public law. But until 
any such policy decision is endorsed by the government, 
the apex court must interfere only in the limited class of 
cases where there is a substantial question of law 
involved which needs to be finally laid at rest by the 
apex court for the entire country or where there is grave, 
blatant and atrocious miscarriage of justice. " 
6. The Law Commission of India took another two years after 
the above observations to reiterate its recommendation whereunder it 
had proposed the splitting of the Court into two divisions. While doing so 
the Law Commission gave an additional reason namely the handicap 
which the litigant from more distant parts of the Country like Tamil Nadu 
in South, Gujarat in the West and Assam and other States in the East 
face in the matter of accessing justice before the Supreme Court. The 
Commission observed: 
" ...... The result is that those coming from distant places 
like Tamil Nadu
in the South, Gujarat in the West and 
Assam and other States in the East have to spend huge 
a111ount on travel to reach the Supreme Court. There is 
a practice of bringing ones own lawyer who handled 
the 111atter in the High Court to the Supre111e Court. That 
adds to the cost. And an adjournment becomes 
prohibitive. Adjournment is a recurrent phenomenon in 
the Court. Costs get multiplied. Now if the Supreme 
Court split into Constitutional Court and Court of 
Appeal or a Federal Court of Appeal, no serious 
exception could be taken to the Federal Court of Appeal 
sitting in Benches in places North, South, East, West 
and Central India. That would not only considerably 
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reduce costs but also the litigant will have the advantage 
of his case being argued by the same advocate who has 
helped him in the High Court and who may not required 
to travel to long distances. Whenever questions of 
constitutionality occw~ as pointed out in that report. 
the Supreme Court can sit in en bane at Delhi and deal 
with the same. This cost benefit ratio is an additional 
but important reason for reiterating support to the 
recommendations made in that report. " 
7. Then came the 229th report dated 5th August, 2009 submitted 
by the Law Commission, whereunder, it once again recommended 
restructuring of the Supreme Court by setting up of a Constitution Bench 
at Delhi and Cessation benches in four regions namely; Delhi, Chennai/ 
Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai. Drawing support from the system 
prevalent in other countries like Italy, Egypt, Portugal, Ireland, United 
States and Denmark the Commission recommended that: 
"(l) A Constitution Bench be set up at Delhi to deal 
with constitutional and other allied issues as aforesaid. 
(2) Four Cassation Benches be set up in the Northern 
region/zone at Delhi, the Southern region/zone at 
Chennai/Hyderabad, the Eastern region/zone at 
K1Jlkata and the Wes/em region/zone al Mumbai to deal 
with all appellate work arising out <~f the orders/ 
iudgments of the High Courts of the part icula;· region. 
(3) If it is found that Article 130 <~f the
Co11stitutio11 
cannot he stretched to make ii possible to implement the 
above reco111111e11dations, Parliament should enact a 
suitable legislation/ Constitutional amendment for this 
purpose." 
8. In Mathai@ Joby v. George & Anr., (20 I 0) 4 SCC 358, this 
Court was once more confronted with the question whether Special 
Leave Petitions should or shOLild not be ente11ained against every kind 
of order. This Court noticed that Special Leave Petitions were being 
tiled by the litigants against almost every kind of order resulting in piling 
up of huge arrears and converting this Court into an ordinary appel'. •te 
court which was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution
V. VASANTHAKUMAR v. H. C. BHATIA AND ORS. 
[T.S. THAKUR, CJI] 
when they enacted Article 136 and empowered the Supreme Court to 
intervene by granting special leave to appeal to an aggrieved I itigant. 
Relying upon the decisions of this Court in N. Suriyakala v. A. 
Mohandoss (2007) 9 SCC 196, Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical 
Works Ltd. v. Employees AIR 1959 SC 633, Kunhayammed v. State of 
Kera/a (2000) 6 SCC 359, State of Bombay v. Rusy Misfly AIR 1960 
SC 391, Municipal Board, Pratabgarh v. Mahendra Singh Chawla 
(1982) 3 SCC 331, Ram Saran Das and Bros. v. CTO AIR 1962 SC 
1326, Pritam Singh v. State AIR 1950 SC 169, Tirupati Balaji 
Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC I, Jamshed 
Hormusji Wadia v. Port of Mumbai (2004) 3 SCC 214, Na1pat Singh 
v. Jaipur Development Authority (2002) 4 SCC 666, Ashok Nagar 
Welfare Assn. v. R.K. Sharma (2002) I SCC 749, this Court held that 
the exercise of jurisdiction under Atiicle 136 of the Constitution by the 
Supreme Court was discretionary and that the provision did not confer a 
vested right of appeal to a party in litigation. 
9. This Court further held that the extraordinary jurisdiction vested 
by the Constitution implied that the Court ought to exercise extraordinary 
care and caution while making use of that power. Having said that this 
Court lamented the filing of special leave petitions against all kind of 
orders of the High Court or other authorities without realising the true 
scope of Article 136 of
the Constitution thereby giving rise to an alarming 
situation whereby this Court had converted itself into a mere court of 
appeal as though it was obliged to correct every error which it found in 
any judgment delivered by any Court or Tribunal exercisingjurisdiction 
under any statute. 
I 0. On a conspectus of the dimensions of the question this Cot11i 
held that exercise of jurisdiction under A1iicle 136 of the Constitution 
should be limited to certain specific category of cases and referred the 
question of interpretation of A11icle 136 to a Constitution Bench in the 
light of Article 145(3) of the Constitution. 
11. The Constitution Bench, however, declined to look into the 
question of interpretation of Article 136 of the Constitution or to enumerate 
the circumstances in which the extraordinary power vested in this Court 
under the said provision could or ought to be exercised. Relying upon the 
decisions of this Court in Pritam Singh v. The State 1950 SCR 453 at 
page 457 Penu Balakrishna Iyer & Ors v. Ariya M Ramaswami Iyer 
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& Ors. ( 1964) 7 SCR 49 at Page 53 and Union Carbide Co1poration 
& Ors. " Union of India & Ors. ( 1991) 4 SCC 584, the Constitution 
Bench held that power under Article 136 had to be exercised with 
circumspection but considered it unnecessary to I imit the use thereof 
forever by a process of interpretation. The Court was of the view that 
the question referred to the Constitution Bench stood answered by the 
three decisions mentioned above. 
12. lt is in the above backdrop that the petitioner who is a practicing 
Advocate has filed the present petition in which he has sought a 
mandamus directing the respondents to consider his representation and 
to take steps for implementation of the suggestion of the Constitution 
Bench of this Court in Bihar Legal Suppor( Society :S case (supra) by 
establishing a National/Regional Courts of Appeal. 
13. When the writ petition came up for preliminary hearing before 
us on 26th February, 2016, while issuing notice, we requested Shri Mukul 
Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India to assist us in the matter. In 
addition, we requested Shri K.K. Venugopal and Shri Salman Khurshid, 
learned Senior Counsel to appear and assist the Court as Amicus Curiae. 
14. We have, accordingly, heard at some length the petitioner, the 
learned Attorney General and the learned Amicus Curiae. We have 
also heard at some length Shri Andhyarujina who intervened to make his 
submissions
in support of the prayer made in the writ petition. Relying 
upon a report prepared by Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy on "the need 
for efficient and effective Supreme Court" by reference in particular to 
the issues of backlog and regional disparities in access to justice, Mr. 
Yenugopal argued that the statistics quoted by Vidhi and the analysis 
thereof based on round table discussions with several eminent lawyers 
and jurists, clearly established that the Supreme Court had strayed from 
its original character as a Constitutional Comi and gradually converted 
itself illto a mere court of appeal to correct every error it found in the 
decisions of the 24 High Courts and numerous Tribunals subordinate to 
it. 
15. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Collli, argued Mr. Venugopal, 
was now being invoked in relation to matters falling within45 categories 
listed in the Practice and Procedure Handbook. It was submitted that 
there was an urgent need for a comprehensive re-appraisal of the role 
of the Supreme Court and the need for restoring its exclusivity as
V. VASANTHAKUMAR v. H. C. BHATIA AND ORS. 
[T.S. THAKUR, CJI] 
suggested by Shri Andhyarujina in his article "Studying US Supreme 
Court Working" 1994 (4} SCC Journal 1. It was urged that filing of 
cases in the Supreme Court since 1950 had increased exponentially for 
as against 1215 cases filed in total in the Supreme Court in the year 1950 
the total number of cases filed in the year 2014 (Upto November) were 
no less than 81,853. This argued Mr. Venugopal showed a cumulative 
annual growth rate of 6.8 per cent per year. It also suggested that the 
number of cases filed in the Supreme Court doubled every year or so 
and the trend continued. The Supreme Court was by that standard likely 
to be facing a burden of nearly 1.5 lakh cases by the year 2025. 
16. Shri Venugopal, further argued that on account of the distance 
at which the Supreme Court is located from other parts of the country, 
access to justice before the Supreme Court had been adversely effected 
in as much as litigants from far off places were unable to reach the 
Supreme Court as against those from High Courts that are closer in 
proximity. This according to the learned Counsel denied equal justice to 
citizens from these far off places in breach of the Constitutional mandate 
of equal access of justice to all. According to the learned counsel the 
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lack of access had led to a demand for Regional Benches of the Supreme 
Court in different parts of the country or for setting up of National/
Regional Courts of Appeal. Shri Venugopal drew our attention to the 
position in other countries, where too, because of the huge backlog of 
cases, the systems had been reformed to provide Courts of Appeal as · E 
.an intermediary Court between the High Courts and the Supreme Court. 
He referred to a speech delivered by Hon 'hie Mr. Justice Susan Delham, 
Chief Justice oflreland to argue that despite several initiatives like case 
· management, use of information technology, mediation for amicable 
settlement encouraged by the Courts, the burden that came to fall upon 
the Irish Supreme Court was making it difficult for that Court to cope up 
with the situation. The solution which a working Group suggested was 
referred to by the Chief Justice oflreland in the following passage of his 
speech: 
"Solution 
The solution advocated by the Working Group on a 
Court of Appeal in the report published in 2009 was 
the establishment of a Court of Appeal. This would be 
a permanent court which would have several divisions, 
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[2016) 5 S.C.R. 
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to hear appeals in civil cases and to hear appeals in 
criminal cases. Thus, there would be a permanent Court 
of Appeal, with permanent judges on that Court, which 
would sit in several divisions - civil and criminal. 
All the other common law countries have a Court of 
B 
Appeal in their legal system, placed between the Courts 
equivalent to our High Court, and the Supreme Court." 
17. The Indian story was no different contended Mr.Venugopal. 
The working of the Supreme Court and the ever increasing burden which 
has grown to almost unmanageable limits has made it extremely difficult 
c 
for the Judges of this Court to contain the piling arrears to a reasonable 
limit making it necessary for this Court to examine the possibility of 
structural reforms and· to make suitable recommendations to the 
Government for taking corrective measures including a possible 
amendment of the Constitution. 
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18. Shri Andhyarujina while adopting the submissions made by 
Shri Venugopal submitted that because of increased awareness, legal 
literacy, development and resultant prosperity in the country, the number 
of cases is bound to increase. Experie.~c_e shows that these cases leave 
little time for the Court to take up important constitutional matters which 
ought to engage the attention of this Court as its primary duty. He urged 
that it is time to give a thought to the formidable challenge that judiciary 
is facing at the
highest level and to push reforms that would not only 
restore this Court to the glory it was meant to enjoy but also make access 
to justice a reality by setting up Courts of Appeal which can be 
approached by every litigant without having to travel long distances to 
Delhi. 
I 9. Mr. Rohatgi, learned Attorney General, on the other hand 
argued that the Writ Petition was not maintainable as the petitioner has 
suppressed certain important facts which disentitle him to relief. It was 
also contended that the proposed National Court of Appeal or Regional 
Courts of Appeal were neither constitutionally permissible nor otherwise 
feasible. He contended that Article 136 of the Constitution gives to the 
citizens of this country an inalienable rightto invoke the appellate power 
of this Court. That power being a basic feature of the Constitution, it 
could not be taken away or conferred upon another Court or forum. Mr. 
Rohatgi submitted that what was perhaps required was self restraint by
V. VASANTHAKUMAR v. H. C. BHATIA AND ORS. 
65 
[T.S. THAKUR, CJI] 
this Court in the matter of entertaining special leave petitions as it was 
A 
not necessary for this Court to correct every error committed by the 
High Court or the statutory Tribunals set up to decide cases involving 
different subjects and dimensions. 
20. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions 
made at the Bar. Certain facts are beyond dispute. It is not in dispute 
that the Supreme Court was never meant to be a regular court of appeal. 
It was meant to exercise its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution 
only in cases which raised important questions involving interpretation 
of the Constitution or questions of general public importance or questio-ns 
of constitutionality of State or Central legislations or those raising 
important issues touching Centre-State relationship etc. The jurisdiction 
may also have been available to the Court where it found gross miscarriage -
of justice or an error so outrageous as no reasonable person would 
countenance. The power to interfere was not meant to be exercisable 
just because prolonged argument would eventually reveal some error or 
irregularity or a possible alternative view on a subject that did not cause 
any miscarriage of justice of a kind that would shock the conscience of 
the court on the subject. The-long line of decisions of the Court to which 
we have made reference earlier supports that view. The fact, however 
remains that
the filing of cases in the Supreme Court over the past six 
decades has grown so sharply that the Judge strength in the Supreme 
Court is proving inadequate to deal with the same. Statistics show that 
more than 3f4th of the total number of cases filed are dismissed in limine. 
Even so, the dismissal is only after the court has applied its mind and 
heard arguments which consume considerable time of the Judges. 
Dismissal of an overwhelming number of cases has not and does not 
B 
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discourage the litigants or the member of the Bar from filing cases. That 
F 
is why the number of cases filed is on the rise every year. 
21. It is common knowledge thatthe huge backlog of cases in the 
Supreme Court not only attracts criticism from the litigant public but also 
from independent observers of the judicial systems. To add to the woes 
of the Court there are a number of new legislations which provide for a 
G 
first appeal to the Supreme Court, a role which the Supreme Court was 
never intend§d to play in the Constitutional scheme. Suffice it to say 
that the pronouncement of this Court sounding notes of caution against 
liberal grant of special leave to appeal or exercise of restraint in the 
matter of entertaining cases have lead to no meaningful improvement in 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016) 5 S.C.R. 
the situation. 
22. What then is the way forward? Mis. VC'nugopal and 
Andhyarujina argue that the way forward is setting ~~fR:~gional Courts 
of Appeal, firstly, because the same would take justice closer to the 
doorsteps of the litigants, especially those living at distant places and 
secondly, because an intermediary court would reduce the burden of the 
Supreme Court without denying to the litigants an opportunity to agitate 
his case before a court higher than the High Court. The only difference 
in that situation will be that in place of the Supreme Court the Court of 
Appeal would look into the matter and correct whatever needs to be 
corrected in the judgment impugned before it. It is in that backdrop that 
following questions arise for our consideration: 
. l 
. 
' 
I. With access to justic~ being a fundamental right, would 
the said right stand denied to litigants, due to the unduly 
long delay in the disposal of cases in the Supreme Court? 
2. Would the mere increase in the number of judges be an 
answer to the problem of undue delay in disposal of cases 
and to what extent would such increase be feasible? 
3. Would the division of the Supreme Court into a 
Constitutional wing and an appellate wing be an answer to 
the problem? 
4. Would the fact that the Supreme Court oflndia is situate 
in the. far North, in Delhi, rendering travel from the Southern 
states and some other states in India,
unduly long and 
.expensive, be a deterrent to real access to justice? 
5. Would the Supreme Court sitting in benches in different 
parts oflndia be an answer to the last mentioned problem? 
6. Has the Supreme Court of India been exercising 
jurisdiction as an ordinary court of appeal on facts and law, 
in regard to routine cases of every description? 
7. Is the huge pendency of cases in the Supreme Court, 
caused by the Court not restricting its consideration, as in 
the case of the Apex Courts of other countries, to 
Constitutional issues, questions of national importance, 
differences of opinion between different High Courts, death
V. VASANTHAKUMAR v. H. C. BHATIA AND ORS. 
[T.S. THAKUR, CJI] 
sentence cases and matters entrusted to the Supreme Court 
by express provisions of the Constitution? 
8. ls there a need for having Courts of Appeal, with 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and finally decide the vast 
proportion of the routine cases, as well as Article 32 petitions 
now being decided by the Supreme Court of India, especially 
· when a considerable proportion of the four million cases 
pending before the High Court may requirereview by a 
higher intermediate court, as these judgments of the High 
Courts may fail to S!\tisfy the standards of justice and 
competence expected from a superior court?· 
9. lffour regional Courts of Appeal are established, in the 
Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western regions of the 
Country, each manned by, say, fifteen judges, elevated or 
al?pointed to each Court by the (ollegium, would this not 
·satisfy the requirement of' access to justice' to all litigants . 
from every part of the country? 
I 0. As any such proposal would need an amendment to the · 
Constitution, would the theory of 'basic structure' of the· 
Constitution be violated, ifin fact, such division of exclusive 
jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the Courts of 
Appeal, enhances the efficacy of the justice delivery system 
without affecting the independence of the judicial wing of 
the State? 
11. In view of cases pending in the Supreme Court oflndia 
on average for about 5 years, in the High
Courts again for 
.about 8 years, and anywhere between 5-10 years in the 
Trial Courts on the average, would it not be part of the 
responsibility 'IIld duty of the Supreme Court of India. to 
examine throu6h a Constitution Bench, the issue of divesting 
the Supreme Court of about 80% of the pendency of cases 
of a routine nature, to recommend to Government, its opinion 
, on the proposal for establishing four Courts of Appeal, so 
that the Supreme Court with about 2500 cases a year instead 
of about 60000, may regain its true status as.a Constitutional 
Court? 
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[2016] 5 S.C.R. 
A 
23. Keeping in view the importance of the above questions and 
B 
the need for reforms which have been long felt, we deem it proper to 
refer the same to a Constitutional Bench for an authoritative 
pronouncement. The Registry shall, accordingly, place the record before 
the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate bench. 
Devika Gujral 
Matter referred to larger bench.