DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 81, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 81 
DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES 
A 
v. 
UNION OF INDIAANDANOTHER 
(Writ Petition (C) No. 441 of 2015) 
B 
JULY 23, 2015 
[M.Y. EQBALANDARUN MISHRA, JJ.] 
Constitution of India, 1950 -Art. 32 - Jurisdiction under 
- Invoked by Medical Institute challenging refusal of Medical c 
Council of India-MC/ to recommend the renewal of 
permission for admitting students for academic year in the 
MBBS Course of the petitioner institutes and consequent 
refusal of Union Government to renew such permission -
Held: Supreme Court u!Art 32 would not interfere with an D 
administrative order where the constitutionality of the statute 
or the order made thereunder is not challenged on the ground 
of contravention of Fundamental Rights - If the validity of 
the provisions of statute is challenged on the ground other 
than the contravention of fundamental rights, this Court would E 
not entertain that challenge in a proceeding u!Art. 32 - On 
facts, decision to grant permission of renewal was based on 
the inspection reports submitted by the teams of MCI -
Jurisdiction of MCI or Central Government to grant or refuse 
F 
to grant permission has not been challenged - Under Art. 
32, the Court is not supposed to go into findings of facts 
recorded by the Authorities - Moreover, Medical Institute 
though have right to establish institutions for imparting 
medical and technical education, but the rights so claimed G 
by them are not fundamental rights, hence, cannot be
agitated directly before this Court u!Art. 32. 
Dismissing the Writ Petitions, the Court 
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
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HELD: 1.1 The sole object of Article 32 is the 
enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. It follows that no question other than 
relating to the Fundamental Right will be determined in 
a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution. The 
B difference between Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution 
is that while an application under Article 32 lies only for 
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, the High Court 
under Article 226 has a wider power to exercise its 
jurisdiction not only for the enforcement of Fundamental 
C Rights but also ordinary legal right. [Para 17] (89-H; 90-
A-C] 
1.2 This Court under Article 32 would not interfere 
with an administrative order where the constitutionality 
D of the statute or the order made thereunder is not 
challenged on the ground of contravention of 
Fundamental Rights. At the same time if the validity of 
the provisions of statute is challenged on the ground 
other than the contravention of Fundamental Rights, this 
E Court would not entertain that challenge in a proceeding 
under Article ~2 of the Constitution. [Para 18] (90-D-E] 
1.3 The petitioners have challenged the decision of 
MCI and the Central Government refusing to grant 
F permission or renewal to carry on their courses for the 
Academic Session 2015-16. The decisions are based on 
the inspection reports submitted by the teams of MCI. 
The jurisdiction of MCI or the Central Government to grant
or refuse to grant permission has not been challenged. 
G Hence, it is well within the jurisdiction of MCI which is 
statutory body to take a decision based on the 
inspection of the college to satisfy itself the compliance 
of various provisions of the acts, rules and regulations. 
H [Para 26)(97-G-H; 98-A] 
· 
-
DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v. 
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UNION OF INDIA 
1.4 Under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court is A 
not supposed to go into finding of facts recorded by the 
authorities and to come to a different conclusion. The 
petitioners, even though have a right to establish 
institutions for imparting medical and technical 
education, such right is not a fundamental right, hence, B 
the same cannot be agitated directly before th_is Court 
under Article 32 of the Constitution. The writ petitions 
are dismissed. However, this would not prevent the 
petitioners from agitating their grievances before the c 
appropriate forum including the High Court having 
jurisdiction to deal with the matter. [Paras 27 and 28) (98-
8-D] 
Priyadarshini Dental College and Hospital vs. Union 
of India & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 623: 2011 (2) SCR 945; 
D 
Northern Corporation VS. Union of India (1990) 4 sec 
239: 1990 (3) SCR 621; Kanubhai Brahmbhatt vs. State 
of Gujarat AIR 1987SC1159: 1987 (2) SCR 314; Ram 
Jawaya Kapur vs. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 
549:(1955) 2 SCR 225; Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti vs. 
E 
Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 352: 1990 (1) SCR 588; 
J. Fernandes. & Co. vs. Dy. Chief Controller oflmports 
and Exports (1975) 1 SCC 716: 1975 ( 3) SCR 863; 
Ujjam Bai vs. State ofU.PAIR 1962 SC 1621: (1963) 1 
F 
SCR 778 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
2011 (2) SCR 945 
referred to. 
Para 10 
1990 (3) SCR 621 
referred to. 
Para 19 
G 
1987 (2) SCR 314 
referred to. 
Para 20
(1955) 2 SCR 225 
referred to . 
Para 21 
• 
1990 (1) SCR 588 
referred to. 
Para 22 
1975 (3) SCR 863 
referred to. 
Para 23 
(1963) 1 SCR 778 
referred to. 
Para 24 
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 
441 of2015 
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India 
B 
WITH 
Writ Petition (C) Nos. 448 of 2015 
Kapil Sibal, Nizam Pasha, Shadan Farasat for the 
Petitioner. 
c 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
M. Y. EQBAL, J. 1. Knocking the doors of this Court in 
the first instance under the garb of a petition under Article 32 
D of the Constitution, instead of approaching the High Court, for 
the enforcement of right claimed in these writ petitions is the 
preliminary question we are deciding herein. 
2. In these two writ petitions, the petitioners have invoked 
E 
the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution 
of India challenging the refusal of the Medical Council of India 
(MCI) to recommend the renewal of permission for admitting 
students forthe academic year2015-16 in the MBBS Course 
of the petitioner institutes and the consequent refusal of the 
F . Union Government to renew such permission. 
W.P; (Civil) No. 441 of2015: 
3. The petitioner institute was said to have been granted 
permission for admitting 150 students in the MBBS course for 
G the academic year 2013-14 and permission was renewed for 
the academic year 2014-15. The petitioner applied for renewal 
of permission for the academic year 2015-16 pursuantto which 
• 
the assessors from the MCI conducted an inspection on 12th 
and 131h December, 2014 and submitted a report dated 
H
15.12.2014 in which no deficiencies were alleged to have been 
pointed out.
DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v. 
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UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
4. However, the assessors from MCI were alleged to have A 
made another surprise inspection on 5tti February, 2015 at 3. 00 
PM and directed the Dean to call for a faculty meeting at 3.30 
PM. Many teachers could not attend the meeting alleged to 
have left the college for lunch or Friday prayers or having gone 
home for the weekend while many others who came after 3.30 
B 
PM from different parts of the campus were not allowed to 
· attend the meeting. Many of the Resident Doctors were stated 
to have been absent on account of the imminent State Level 
PG Entrance Test. Another inspection was conducted on 7th 
February, 2015. The inspection report was alleged to have C 
been inaccurate and signed in protest by the Dean. 
5. The aforesaid report was considered by the Executive 
Committee of the MCI on 101h February, 2015 and it was 
decided not to recommend the renewal of the permission of D 
the petitioner and the same was communicated to the Union 
Government, which sent letter dated 04.03.2015 to the 
petitioner to appear for a hearing. After the hearing where the 
petitioner was said to have justified the deficiencies that were 
pointed out, the Central Government sent letter dated E 
22.05.2015 directing the MCI to conduct a reassessment. 
However, the MCI was alleged to have not done a re-inspection 
as directed on the ground that a decision had already been 
made not to recommend the
renewal by invoking Regulation 8 
F . 
(3) (1) (a) of the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 
1999. 
6. Thereafter, the Union Government published a list on 
17 .06.2015 stating that the permission of the petitioner college 
for the academicyear2015-16 had not been renewed and a G 
letter dated 15.06.2015 was sent to the petitioner informing 
the same. 
7. The petitioner filed the present petition praying for 
declaring the second inspection conducted on 5th and 7th 
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
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February, 2015 to be illegal and for directing the MCI to 
recommend the renewal of the approval of the petitioner college 
for the academic year 2015-16 on the basis of the first 
inspection conducted on 12th and 13th December, 2014. A 
prayer has also been made for directing the Central 
B Government to issue the letter of renewal accordingly. 
W.P. (Civil} No.448 of 2015 
8. The petitioner-college was granted provisional affiliation 
c for starting the MBBS course for the academic session 
2014-15 with 150 students. It appears that a surprise 
inspection was made by MCI and many deficiencies were 
pointed out. The Executive Committee of MCI after 
considering the inspection report recommended disapproval 
o of the college. The Central Government directed the MCI to 
reconsider the matter. However, the MCI reiterated its stand 
of not recommending the renewal of permission for the 
sessions 2015-16. The petitioner has challenged the decision 
of the Medical Council of India. 
E 
9. We have heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel 
appearing in W.P. (Civil) No.441 of 2015 and Mr. V. Giri, 
learned senior counsel appearing in W.P.(Civil) No. 448 of 
2015 on the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 
. F of the Constitution of India. 
10. Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the 
. petitioner, submitted that because of the time schedule fixed 
in Priya Gupta's case, 2012 (7) SCC 433, the petitioner
has 
G no option but to move this Court in order to get the relief by 
issuance of appropriate directions to the respondents. 
Learned senior counsel also drawn our attention to para 13 of 
the judgment rendered by this Court in Priyadarshini Dental 
College and Hospital vs. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 4 
H sec 623.
DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v. 
87 
UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
11. Mr. V. Giri,. learned senior counsel appearing in one A 
of the writ petitions, advanced the same arguments for filing 
the writ petition before this Court under Article 32 of the 
Constitution instead of approaching the High Court. 
12. Both the learned senior counsel, however, claimed 
B 
their right guaranteed under Article 19( 1 )(g) of the Constitution 
of India. 
13. At the very outset, we wish to extract the relevant 
portion of Article 19 of the Constitution which reads as under:- c 
"19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of 
speech etc 
ill All citizens shall have the right 
.(fil to freedom of speech and expression; 
.(Q1 to assemble peaceably and without arms; 
{fil to form associations or unions; 
@to move freely throughout the territory of India; 
.(fil to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; 
and 
.ill omitted 
.{gl to practise any profession, or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business 
.(21------
.@l-------
.(£------~ 
!fil------~ 
!fil Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect 
. the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, 
or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in 
the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions 
on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub 
clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub clause 
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shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it 
relates to, or prevent the State from making any law 
relating to, 
ill the professional or technical qualifications necessary 
for practising any profession or carrying on any 
occupation, trade or business, or 
® the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned 
or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry 
or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, 
of citizens or otherwise." 
14. From a bare reading of the provision contained in 
Article 19( 1 )(g) it is evidently clear that the citizens have been 
conferred with the right to practice any profession or carry on 
any occupation, trade or business, but such right is subject to 
D the restriction and imposition of condition as provided under 
Article 19(6) of the Constitution. 
· 15. In Unni Krishnan's case, 1993 (1) SCC 645, the 
right guaranteed under Article 19(1 )(g) has been elaborately 
E discussed by the five Judges Constitution Bench. The Court 
held that imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or 
business. Trade or business normally connotes an activity 
carried on with a profit motive. This Court observed that 
education has never been nor can it be allowed to become 
F commerce in this country. Education has always been treated 
in this country as religious and charitable activity and making 
it commercial is opposed to the ethos, tradition and
sensibilities of this nation. A citizen of this country may have a 
G rightto establish an educational institution but no citizen, person 
or institution has a right much less of fundamental right to 
affiliation or recognition. Their Lordships observed:-
H 
"67. Even on general principles, the matter could be 
approached this way. Educational institutions can be 
classified under two categories:
DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v. 
89 
UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
1. Those requiring recognition by the State and 
A 
2. Those who do not require such a recognition. 
67a. It is not merely an establishment of educational 
institution, that is urged by the petitioners, but, to run the 
educational institution dependent on recognition by the 
State. There is absolutely no fundamental right to 
recognition in any citizen. The right to establishment and 
run the educational institution with State's recognition 
arises only on the State permitting, pursuant to a policy 
· decision or on the fulfilment of the conditions of the statute. 
Therefore, where it is dependent on the permission under 
the statute or the exercise of an executive power, it cannot 
qualify to be a fundamental right. Then again, the State 
policy may dictate a different course. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
72. Accordingly, it is held that there is no fundamental 
right under Article 19(1 )(g) to establish an educational 
institution, if recognition or affiliation is sought for such 
an educational institution. It may be made clear that 
anyone desirous of starting an institution purely for the 
purposes of educating the students could do so but 
Sections 22 and 23 of the University Grants Commission 
Act which prohibits the award of degrees except by a 
University must be kept in mind." 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
. 16. Considering the facts of the case as averred by the 
petitioners and the rights claimed therein, we
are of the 
considered opinion that the petitioners, even though have a G 
right to establish institutions for imparting medical and technieal 
education, such right is not a fundamental right. 
17. From reading of Article 32, it is manifest that clause 
1 (i) of Article 32 guarantees the right to move the Supreme H
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
Court for an appropriate writ for the purpose of enforcing the 
Fundamental Rights included in Part-Ill of the Constitution. The 
sole object of Article 32 is the enforcement of Fundamental 
Rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It follows that no 
question other than relating to the Fundamental Right will be 
B determined in a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution. 
The difference between Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution 
is that while an application under Article 32 lies only for the 
enforcement of Fundamental Rights, the High Court under 
Article 226 has a wider power to exercise its jurisdiction not 
C only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also 
ordinary legal right. 
18. It is equally well settled that this Court under Article 
32 will not interfere with an administrative order where the 
D constitutionality of the statute or the order made thereunder is 
not challenged on the ground of contravention of Fundamental 
Rights. At the same time if the validity of the provisions of 
statute is challenged on the ground other than the contravention 
of Fundamental Rights, this Court will not entertain that 
E challenge in a pr9ceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution. 
19. In the case of Northern Corporation vs. Union of 
India, (1990) 4 SCC 239, a petition under Article 32 of the 
Constitution of India was moved by the transferee licence 
F 
holder. The maintainability of the application under
Article 32 
of the Constitution of India was seriously objected by t~e Union 
of India. Writing the judgment, Hon'ble Sabyasachi Mukherjee, 
the then CJI, held:-
G 
"11. However, there is a far more serious objection in 
entertaining this application under Article 32 of the 
Constitution, Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the 
right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of 
fundamental rights. If there is breach of the fundamental 
H 
rights, the petitioner can certainly have recourse to Article
DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v. 
UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
32 of the Constitution provided other conditions are 
satisfied. But we must, in all such cases, be circumventive 
of what is the right claimed. In this case. the petitioner as 
such has no fundamental right to clear the goods imported 
except in due process of law. Now in the facts of this 
case, such clearance can only be made on payment of 
duty as enjoined by the Customs Act. In a particular 
situation wheth_er customs duty is payable at the rate 
prevalent on a particular date or not has to be determined 
within the four corners of the Customs Act, 1962. The 
petitioner has no fundamental right as such to clear any 
goods imported without payment of duties in accordance 
with the law. There is procedure provided by law for 
determination of the payment of customs duty. The 
revenue has proceeded on that basis. The petitioner 
contends that duty at a particular rate prevalent at a 
particular date was not payable. The petitioner cannot 
seek to remove the goods without payment at that rate 
or without having the matter determined by the procedure 
envisaged and enjoined by the law for that determination. 
The petitioner without seeking to take any relief within 
the procedure envisaged under the Act had moved this 
Court for breach of fundamental right. This is not 
permissible and should never be entertained. In a matter 
of this nature where liability of a citizen to pay a particular 
duty
depends on interpretation of law and determination 
of facts and the provision of a particular statute for which 
elaborate procedure is prescribed, it cannot conceivably 
be contended that enforcing of those provisions of the 
Act would breach fundamental right which entitle a citizen 
to seek recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution. We 
are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that relief under Article 
32 of the Constitution is wholly inappropriate in the facts 
and the circumstances of this case. It has further to be 
reiterated that for enforcement of fundamental rig ht which 
91 
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[2015] 9 S.C..R. 
is dependent upon adjudication or determination of 
questions of law as well as question of fact without taking 
any resort to the provisions of the Act, it is not permissible 
to move this Court on the theoretical basis that there is 
breach of the fundamental right. Whenever a person 
complains and claims that there is a violation of law, it 
does not automatically involve breach of fundamental 
right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of the 
Constitution is attracted. It appears that the facts of this 
nature require elaborate procedural investigation and this 
Court should not be moved and should not entertain on 
these averments (sic) oftheArticle 32 of the Constitution.· 
This position is clearly well settled, but sometimes we 
are persuaded to accept that an allegation of breach of 
law is an action in breach offundamental right." 
20. In the case of Kanubhai Brahmbhatt vs. State of 
Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1159, this Court took serious concern 
of the litigants coming to this Court under Article 32 of the 
Constitution instead of first moving the appropriate High Court 
E for the redressal of their grievances. This Court observed as 
under: 
F 
G 
H 
"3 .. lf this Court takes upon itself to do everything which 
even the High Court can do, this Court will not be able to 
do what this Court alone can do under Article 136 of the 
Constitution of India, and other provisions conferring 
exclusive
jurisdiction on this Court. There is no reason to 
assume that the concerned High Court will not do justice. 
Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court 
entertains writ petitions at the instance of parties who 
approach this Court directly instead of approaching the 
concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of 
thousands of writ petitions would in course of time be 
instituted in this Court directly. The inevitable result will 
be that the arrears pertaining to matters in respect of
DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v. 
UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under 
the Constitution will assume more alarming proportions. 
As it is, more than ten years old civil appeals and criminal 
appeals are sobbing for attention. It will occasion great 
misery and immense hardship to tens of thousands of 
litigants if the seriousness of this aspect is not sufficiently 
realized. And this is no imaginary phobia. A dismissed 
government servant has to wait for nearly ten years for 
redress in this Court. Kashinth Dikshita v. Union of India, 
(1986) 3 SCC229: (AIR 1986) SC 2118).Alitigantwhose 
appeal has been dismissed by wrongly refusing to 
condone delay has to wait for 14 years before ~is wrong 
is 
righted 
by this 
Court. 
Shankarrao 
v. 
Chandrasenkunwar, Civil Appeal No.1335(N) of 1973 
decided on January 29, 1987. The time for imposing self-
discipline has already come, even if it involves shedding 
of some amount of institutional ego, or raising of some 
eyebrows. Again, it is as important to do justice at this 
level, as to inspire confidence in the litigants that justice 
will be meted out to them at the High Court level, and 
other levels. Faith must be inspired in the hierarchy of 
courts and the institution as a whole, not only in this Court 
alone. And this objective can be achieved only this Court 
showing trust in the High Court by directing the litigants 
to approach the High Court in the first
instance. Besides, 
as a matter of fact, if matters like the present one are 
instituted in the High Court, there is a likelihood of the 
same being disposed of much more quickly, and equally 
effectively, on account of the decentralisation of the 
process of administering justice. We are of the opinion 
that the petitioner should be directed to adopt this course 
and approach the High Court." 
93 
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21. In the case of Ram Jawaya Kapur vs. State of 
Punjab, AIR ·1955 SC 549 = (1955) 2 SCR 225, the petitioner H
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A was carrying on business of printing, publishing books for sale 
including text books used in the schools of State of Punjab. 
The State of Punjab decided in furtherance of their policy of 
nationalization of text books for the school students. According 
to the Policy, all recognized schools had to follow the course 
B of studies approved by the Government. The petitioners 
alleged in support of their petitions under Article 32 that the 
Punjab Government has in pursuance of their policy of 
nationalization of text books issued a series of notifications 
regarding the printing, publication and sale of these books and 
C thereby ousted them from the business altogether. Dismissing 
the writ petitipn, a five Judges Constitution Bench, headed by 
the then Chief Justice observed:-
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"21. As in our view the petitioners have no fundamental 
right in the present case which can be said to have been 
infringed by the action of the Government, the petition is 
bound to fail on that ground. This beingthe position, the 
other two points raised by Mr Pathak do not require 
consideration at all. As the petitioners have no 
fundamental right under Article 19(1 )(g) of the 
Constitution, the question whether the Government could 
establish a monopoly without any legislation under Article 
19(6) of the Constitution is altogether immaterial. 
Again a mere chance or prospect of having particular 
customers cannot be said to be a right to
property or to 
any interest in an undertaking within the meaning of Article 
31 (2) of the Constitution and no question of payment of 
compensation can arise because the petitioners have 
been deprived of the same. The result is that the petition 
is dismissed with costs." 
22. In the case of Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti vs. Union of 
India, (1990) 2 SCC 352, a similar question relating to the 
H maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 of the
DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v. 
95 
UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
Constitution came for consideration before a three Judges' A 
Bench of this Court for the enforcement of any Government 
policy. In the writ petition, the petitioner sought for issuance of 
the writ of mandamus directing Central Government to hold 
pre-medical and pre-dental examination in Hindi and regional 
languages, which according to the petitioner is mandated by B 
Article 29(2) of the Constitution of India. While permitting the 
petitioner to withdraw its petition, the Court observed that Article 
32 of the Constitution guarantees enforcement of Fundamental 
Rights but violation of Fundamental Right is the sine qua non c 
for seeking enforcement of those rights by the Supreme Court. 
In order to establish the violation of fundamental right, the Court 
has to consider the direct and inevitable consequences of the 
action which is sought to be remedied or the guarantee of 
which is sought to be enforced. Where the existence of D 
fundamental right has to be established by acceptance of a 
particular policy, or a course of action for which there is no 
legal compulsion or statutory imperative and on which there 
are divergent views, the same cannot be sought to be enforced 
by Article 32 of the Constitution. 
E 
23. In the case of J. Fernandes & Co. vs. Dy. Chief 
Control/erof/mportsandExports, (1975) 1SCC716, this 
Court, while considering writ petition under Article 32 of the 
.
Constitution, observed that a petition under Article 32 will not F 
be competent to challenge any erroneous decision of an 
authority. A wrong' application of law would not amount to a 
violation of fundamental right. If the provisions of law are good 
and the orders passed are within the jurisdiction of the 
authorities, .there is no infraction of fundamental right if the G 
authorities are right or wrong on facts. 
• 
24. In the case of Ujjam Bai vs. State of U.P, AIR 1962 
SC 1621=(1963) 1 SCR 778, before the seven Judges' 
Constitution Bench, a question came for consideration as to H
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[2015) 9 S.C.R. 
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whether an assessment made by an authority under the taxing 
statute which is intra vires and in the undoubted exercise of its 
jurisdiction can be challenged under Article 32 of the 
Constitution of India? Answering the question, Their Lordships 
held as under: 
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"21. In my opinion, the correct answer to the two questions 
which have been referred to this larger Bench must be in 
the negative. An order of assessment made by an 
authority under a taxing statute which is intra vi res and in 
the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction cannot be 
challenged on the sole ground that it is passed on a 
misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification 
issued thereunder. Nor can the validity of such an order 
be questioned in a petition under Article 32 of the 
Constitution. The proper remedy for correcting an error 
in such an order is to proceed by way of appeal, or if the 
error is an error apparent on the face of the record, then 
by an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. It 
is necessary to observe here that Article 32 of the 
Constitution does not give this Court an appellate 
jurisdiction such as is given by Arts 132 to 136. Article 
32 guarantees the right to a constitutional remedy and 
relates only to the enforcement of the rights conferred by 
Part Ill of the Constitution. Unless a question of the 
enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does 
not apply. There can
be no question of the enforcement 
of a fundamental right if the order challenged is a valid 
and legal order, in spite of the allegation that it is 
erroneous. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that 
no question of the enforcement of fundamental right arises 
in this case and the writ petition is not maintainable." 
25. Their Lordships further observed: 
H 
38. As I have said above, the submission of the learned
OM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v. 
97. 
UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.) 
Additional Solicitor General is well founded. It has the 
A 
support of the following decisions of this Court which I 
shall now deal with. In Gulabdas v. Assistant Collector of 
Custom 1957 AIR(SC) 733, 736.) it was held that ifthe 
order impugned is made under the provisions of a statue 
which is intra vires and the order is within the jurisdiction 
B 
of the authority making itthen whether it is right or wrong, 
there is no infraction of the fundamental rights and it has 
to be challenged in the manner provided in the Statute 
and not by a petition under Article 32. In that case the 
c 
petitioner was aggrieved by the order of the Assistant 
Collector of Customs who assessed the goods imported 
under a licence under a different entry and consequently 
a higher Excise Duty· was imposed. The petitioners 
feeling aggrieved by the order filed a petition under Article 
D 
32 and the objection to its maintainability was that the 
application could not be sustained because no 
fundamental right had been violated by the impugned 
order it having been properly and correctly made by the 
authorities competent to make it. The petitioner there 
E 
contended that the goods imported, which were called 
&'Lyra&' brand Crayons were not crayons at all and 
therefore imposition of a higher duty by holding them to 
be crayons was an infringement of fundamental right 
under Article 19( 1 )(f) & (g)." 
F 
26.
Coming back to the instant writ petitions, indisputably, 
the petitioners have challenged the decision of MCI and the 
Central Government refusing to grant permission or renewal 
to carry on their courses for the Academic Session 2015-16. G 
The decisions are based on the inspection reports submitted 
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by the teams of MCI. The jurisdiction of MCI or the Central 
Government to grant or refuse to grant permission has not been 
challenged. Hence, it is well within the jurisdiction of MCI which 
is statutory body to take a decision based on the inspection of H 
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98 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A the college to satisfy itself the compliance of various provisions 
of the acts, rules and regulations. 
27. Under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court is not 
supposed to go into finding of facts recorded by the authorities 
B and to come to a different conclusion. Moreover, having regard 
to the law settled by Constitution Bench of this Court in number 
of decisions, in our considered opinion, the rights so claimed 
by the petitioners are not fundamental rights; hence the same 
cannot be agitated directly before this Court under Article 32 
C of the constitution. 
28. We, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions filed under 
Article 32 of the Constitution. However, this will not prevent 
the petitioners from agitating their grievances before the 
o appropriate forum including the High Court having jurisdiction 
to deal with the matter. 
NidhiJain 
Writ Petitions dismissed. 
..
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