M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. & ANR versus M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. & ANR.
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 821, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 821 : 2023 INSC 1059
821
CASE DETAILS
M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
& ANR.
v.
M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 2669 of 2013)
DECEMBER 11, 2023
[ABHAY S. OKA AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether Article 116 of the Limitation Act 
1963, applies to proceedings under the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok 
Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 and; 
if the Limitation Act does not apply then, in the absence of Limitation being 
placed within the text of the Statute in question, could the Appeal ﬁ led 
against the Order of the Commissioner of Payments be held as maintainable 
having been ﬁ led after a period of nearly three years from the said order.
Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition 
Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 – Limitation Act 1963 – Article 
116 – Applicability of Article 116 to proceedings under the 1990 Act – 
Absence of particular period of time prescribed in the statute to ﬁ le an 
appeal – Principle of ‘reasonable time’ to govern:
Held: The 1990 Act is not governed by the prescription of limitation 
u/Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the appeal thereunder, from an 
order of the Commissioner of payments cannot be said to be an appeal under 
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908– Legislature of the State of Assam has 
been categorical in limiting the application of the code to certain aspects of 
the Act only –
Given that the Jogighopa Act allows for a Judge of the High 
Court to be the Commissioner of Payments and then categorically provides 
for an appeal to lie therefrom, Division Bench of the High Court further 
evidences the sui generis nature of the appeal procedure provided therein – 
Further, in the absence of any particular period of time being prescribed to
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
822
ﬁ le an appeal, the same would be governed by the principle of ‘reasonable 
time’, for which, no straitjacket formula can be laid down and it is to be 
determined as per the facts and circumstances of each case – Claimant-
appellants were aggrieved by order of The Commissioner of Payments 
dtd.13.04.2005 – The appeal ﬁ led thereagainst was on 05.112008 – It was 
submitted that in the intervening period, appellants pursued remedies by 
way of Contempt Petition before the High Court which was disposed of on 
01.04.2008 without any particular relief having been granted – Appeal before 
the District Judge, u/s.22(8), Jogighopa Act, came to be ﬁ led thereafter and 
the order in question was passed on 05.112008 – Neither the general nor the 
speciﬁ c statute providing for an appeal from an order of the Commissioner of 
Payments within a speciﬁ ed period of time, the Claimant–Appellants’ appeal 
cannot be said to be barred by time and is thus, maintainable – File restored 
to the docket of the concerned District Judge – Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908– Interpretation of Statutes– “expression unius est exclusion alterius”. 
[Paras 28, 30.1, 30.2]
Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition 
Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 – ss.22(6), (7) – Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Applicability 
of the Codes:
Held: s.22(6) of the Jogighopa Act makes suﬃ  ciently clear the 
commissioner “for
the purpose of making and investigation under this act” 
shall have the powers vested in “a civil court” under the Code to the limited 
extent as mentioned in (a), (b), (c), (d) – Not only u/s.22 (6) is the application 
of the code limited but further u/s.22 (7) – The application thereof is also 
equally well circumscribed therein, the Commissioner has been deemed to 
be a Civil Court for the purposes of s.195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – The description of the powers of either 
clearly testiﬁ es to the intent of the state legislature to speciﬁ cally restrict 
the application of both the said Codes, to only the extent provided – The 
principle of statutory interpretation: expression unius est exclusion alterius 
(the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other) supports such a 
view – Therefore, it is clear that the vesting of select few powers upon a 
Tribunal, or as in the present case, a statutory authority, does not equate the 
same to be a Court within the meaning of the Code – Further, s.22(6) stating
823
“the Commissioner shall have the power to regulation his own procedure in 
all matters arising out of the discharge of his functions including the place or 
places at which he will hold his sittings” also supports the proposition that the 
Code does not apply to the proceedings of the Commissioner. [Paras 15-18]
Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition 
Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 – s.22(8) – Plea of the respondent 
that by virtue of s.22 (8) providing for an appeal to a court of Original 
Civil Jurisdiction thereby the appeal being brought under the Code, 
implies that the Jogighopa Act itself shall be governed by the Code:
Held: s.22 (8) of the Jogighopa Act cannot be said to be an appeal 
under the code governed by Article 116 of the Limitation Act – Thus, the 
period of limitation mentioned under such article of the Limitation Act shall 
not apply to s.22 (8) of the Jogighopa Act. [Para 21]
Limitation – No express limitation provided in regard to the 
exercise of a right to assail the order – Duty of Court:
Held: When a Court is seized of a situation where no limitation stands 
provided either by speciﬁ c applicability of the Limitation Act or the special 
statute governing the dispute, the Court must undertake a holistic assessment 
of the facts and circumstances of the case to examine the possibility of delay 
causing prejudice to a party – When no limitation stands prescribed, it would 
be inappropriate for a Court to supplant the
legislature’s wisdom by its own 
and provide a limitation, more so in accordance with what it believes to be 
the appropriate period – A court should, in such a situation consider in the 
facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the conduct of the parties, the 
nature of the proceeding, the length of delay, the possibility of prejudice 
being caused, and the scheme of the statute in question – Also, when a party 
to a dispute raises a plea of delay despite no speciﬁ c period being prescribed 
in the statute, such a party also bears the burden of demonstrating how the 
delay in itself would cause the party additional prejudice or loss as opposed 
to, the claim subject matter of dispute, being raised at an earlier point in time 
– However, when a statute, either general or speciﬁ c in application, provides 
for a limitation within which to ﬁ le an appeal, the parties interested in doing 
so are put to notice of the requirement to act with expedition – Opposite 
thereto, in cases such as the present one where neither statute provides for 
an explicit limitation, such urgency may be absent – Although, this does 
M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
824
not entitle parties to litigate issues decades later, however shorter delays, in 
such circumstances, would not attract delay and laches – Jogighopa (Assam) 
Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) 
Act, 1990 – Limitation Act 1963. [Paras 25, 27]
Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition 
Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 – ss.17, 19, 20 – Scheme of the Act 
– Omission of period of limitation in s.22 (8) of the Act:
Held: It is evident from the provisions of the Act that the state 
legislature was conscious of the aspect of limitation and categorically 
therefore, prescribed periods for claims to be made so as to not leave open 
the possibility of a claim, indeﬁ nitely – However, crucially, the legislature 
omitted placing any period of limitation when it came to s.22 (8) of the 
Act. [Para 26]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel & Ors., [1964] SCR 129 : 
AIR 1964 SC 1099 – held inapplicable.
International Asset Reconstruction Company of India v. Oﬃ  cial 
Liquidator, [2017] 10 SCR 199 : (2017) 16 SCC 137; State of Punjab & 
Ors. v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union, [2007] 11 
SCR 14 : (2007) 11 SCC 363; Securities and Exchange Board of India 
v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan & Ors., (2023) 2 SCC 643; Jagdish v. State of 
Karnataka, (2021) 12 SCC 812; Madras Aluminium Co Ltd v. Tamil Nadu 
State Electricity Board, (2023) 8
SCC 240; SEBI v. Bhavesh Pabari, (2019) 
5 SCC 90; Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service 
Society Ltd., [1999] 2 SCR 505 : (1999) 6 SCC 82 – relied on.
Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking 
Corporation, [2009] 12 SCR 54 : (2009) 8 SCC 646; Uttam Namdeo 
Mahale v. Vithal Deo & Ors., [1997] 1 Suppl. SCR 257 : (1997) 6 SCC 73; 
Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of W.B., [2013] 2 SCR 484 : (2013) 4 SCC 
52; Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner, [2019] 6 SCR 872 : (2020) 14 SCC 
210; State of M.P v. Anshuman Shukla, [2008] 8 SCR 349 : (2008) 7 SCC 
487; P. Sarathy v. SBI, [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 402 : (2000) 5 SCC 355; Aga 
Mahomed Hamadani v. Cohen, (1886) ILR 13 Cal 221; Ramasami Pillai v.
825
Deputy Collector of Madura, AIR 1920 Mad 407; Dropati v. Hira Lal, ILR 
(1912) 34 All 496; Purohit & Co. v. Khatoonbee, [2017] 2 SCR 1 : (2017) 
4 SCC 783 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2669 of 2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.07.2011 of the High Court of 
Guwahati, Assam in CRP No. 263 of 2009.
Appearances:
Parthiv K Goswani, Sr. Adv., Ms. Charu Mathur, Pradhuman Gohil, 
Ms. Taruna Singh Gohil, Ms. Ranu Purohit, Alapati, Ms. Nidhi Mittal, Ms. 
Atiga Singh, Advs. for the Appellants.
Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Adv., Ms. Liz Mathew, Areeb Amanullah, Harshil 
Wason, Ms. Mallika Agarwal, Advs. for the Respondents. 
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KAROL J.,
1. The questions to be determined in this lis are: 
A) Whether Article 116 of the Limitation Act 1963, applies to 
proceedings under the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper 
Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990.
B) Contingently, if the Limitation Act does not apply then, in the 
absence of Limitation being placed within the text of the Statute 
in question, could the Appeal ﬁ led against the Order of the 
Commissioner of Payments be held as maintainable having been 
ﬁ led after a period of nearly three years from the said order?
THE APPEAL 
2. This Civil Appeal assails a judgement of the Gauhati High Court 
passed in CRP No. 263 of 2009 dated 21 July 2011, by which the Civil 
M/S
NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
826
Revision Petition against the Order dated 14 May 2009 passed by the learned 
District Judge, Kamrup, Gauhati in M.A Case No. 18/2008 stands allowed. 
BACKGROUND OF FACTS AND PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS 
3. The Claimant-Appellants1 and Respondents2 are both companies 
registered under the Companies Act, 1956. The Appellant had received 
Orders to supply certain goods to the Respondents. After doing so, they 
raised certain bills which were only partly paid by the Respondents.
3.1 Subsequently, the Respondents was declared “a sick company” 
under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1935. For 
the necessitated rejuvenation of the industry, the Government of Assam 
promulgated the  Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited 
(Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 19903.
3.2 The Appellant ﬁ led its claim under Section 16 of the Jogighopa Act 
for a sum of 1,58,375/- along with interest-against which the Commissioner 
of Payments awarded4 the principle sum but no interest. The award of such 
amount was communicated to the Claimant - Appellants vide forwarding 
letter dated 16 July 19975. By letter dated 16 July 19976, the Claimant - 
Appellants, under protest, accepted the payment of principal amount in 
full. They raised grievance in respect of non-payment of any interest for the 
periods of January 1983 to March 1993 and from March 1993 to the date 
of payment, i.e., 16 July 1997. In such letter, the total
amount of interest 
claimed was 21,49, 698/-at 18% interest per annum.
3.3 Aggrieved by the non-payment of such interest claimed, a 
Writ Petition7 before the High Court was ﬁ led seeking direction to the 
Commissioner to consider an award interest on the principal amount due. 
Such a request without adjudication of rights of the parties was acceded to by 
1 
 Respondents before the High Court.  Hereinafter referred to as Claimant-Appellant.
2 
 Review Petitioner before the High Court
3 
 Hereinafter referred to as the Jogighopa Act
4 
 In Claim Case No. CP/Cat.VI/91/153. By Order dated 30 October 1994
5 
 Not on record. The date of such forwarding letter is as reﬂ ected in Appellants’ response 
thereto. 
6 
 Bearing Ref- NECIL/97-98
7 
 Bearing No. 4210 of 1997. Order Dated 10 November 1997
827
the High with a direction to consider the claims within a period of 3 months.
3.4 The Commissioner upon consideration of the request for grant of 
interest on delayed payment, amounting to 6,83,688/-8  granted the same. 
Still aggrieved thereby, the claimants once again knocked the doors of the 
High Court9.
3.5 In such proceedings, the High Court in observing that the 
entitlement of interest of the claimant company could not be questioned, 
referred the matter back to the Commissioner of Payments to calculate the 
interest payable afresh, in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of the Interest 
on Delayed Payments to Small-Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertaking 
Act 199310. It was directed that any additional interest, if found payable, 
shall be paid within 60 days of the Order.
3.6 Against the said Order, the Respondents – non-claimants herein 
ﬁ led Review Application11. The ground of assail was that the amount payable 
against the bills pending, have already been paid and therefore no ground 
for re-calculation of interest is made out. The High Court, in consideration 
of the 1993 Act under which the interest was claimed held that, the interest 
calculable and due would only be from 23rd September, 1992 as the Act was 
brought into force on such date. 
3.7 On further remand12, the Commissioner recorded lack of funds to 
consider the request any further and stated that upon further recalculation, 
as it is, no further amount payable was found.
3.8 Subsequently, the
Claimant - Appellants ﬁ led an appeal there 
against as also, moved an Application before the District Judge, Guwahati 
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 for condonation of delay in 
ﬁ ling Appeal No. 18/2008.
8 
Made vide letter dated 9 August 2001 by Managing Director of the Appellant. The 
same is not on record. The record does show a representation dated 9 May 2001 in 
which the claim of interest on delayed payment is worth 15, 93,957. However, the 
Commissioner’s letter of award records that to have been an error in calculation.
9 
Writ Petition No. 4520 of 2002. Order dated 19 May 2004
10 For short, “the 1993 Act”
11 Review Application 91 of 2001
12 Order bearing No- DI(V)APM/NEC/199/2005/26; Dated 13 April 2005
M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. [SANJAY KAROL, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
828
3.9 It was observed by the learned District Judge vide Order dated 14 
May 2009 that since no speciﬁ c time has been provided for preferring an 
Appeal upon dissatisfaction with the decision of the Commissioner, before 
the Principal Civil Court, such an Appeal is ﬁ t to be admitted.
3.10 It is against this Order that the Order impugned before us in Civil 
Revision13 came to be passed.
THE IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT
4. The Learned Single Judge in Civil Review, examined the Limitation 
Act, 1963 along with various decisions rendered by this Court and concluded, 
after detailed consideration that since an Appeal under Section 22 (8) has 
been provided to a Principal Court of Civil jurisdiction without being 
restricted by a period of Limitation it would be treated as an Appeal provided 
under the Code, that is the Code of Civil Procedure14, to a Court subordinate 
to that of a High Court and to such an Appeal, the period of Limitation as 
prescribed under Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. In the 
instant facts therefore, the conclusion was that the Appeal was erroneously 
admitted by the District Judge and the same to have been dismissed as not 
maintainable on the ground of limitation.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES
5. We have heard at great length, the Learned Senior Counsel appearing 
for both parties, Mr. Parthiv K Goswami for the Claimant - Appellants and 
Mr. Rajshekhar Rao for the Respondent and have also
perused the written 
submissions ﬁ led.
A. Claimant - Appellants 
6. It is submitted that, the Learned Single Judge’s reliance on 
Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel & Ors.15 (Five-Judges Bench) 
to arrive at the conclusion that the Appeal under Section 22(8) would be 
covered by Article 116 of The Limitation Act, 1963 was mistaken as, the 
majority view therein was that to attract Article 156 of The Limitation Act 
13  Petition No. 263/2009
14  Hereinafter referred to as “The Code”
15  AIR 1964 SC 1099 (Five-Judge Bench)
829
1908, the corresponding Section to Article 116 of the present Act, it was 
not necessary that the Appeal should be conferred by the Code itself. 
It would be suﬃ  cient if the procedure governing the Appeal would be 
according to the Code.
6.1 Unlike the fact situation in Vidyacharan Shukla (supra) where 
the concerned provision was 116A (2) of the Representation of People 
Act, 1951, The Special Act herein and particularly the Appeal provision 
mentioned therein does not provide that the procedure governing the 
Appeal shall be in accordance with the Code. In particular, reliance 
is placed on paras 6-8, 18, 19 and 33 of the said Constitution Bench 
judgement.
6.2 Another “condition precedent” for the employment of Article 
116 is that the Appeal governed thereby arise from an Order or a Decree. 
It is submitted that, in the present case, the Order passed is  neither a 
Decree nor an Order. Further it is submitted that the Order dated 13 April 
2005 which was the Order against which the subject Appeal had been 
ﬁ led, was an Order passed by an executive oﬃ  cer who is neither a Court 
nor a Civil Court as recognised in Law. The Learned Senior Counsel 
relies on Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hongkong & Shanghai 
Banking Corporation16. In particular, paras 26, 67 – 69, 71 – 73, 85, 
86 and 89 are relied upon.
6.3 The powers of the Civil Court, conferred upon the Commissioner 
of payments are for a very limited purpose. It is for this reason that Article 
116 would
not apply. Thereby meaning that the present Appeal is outside 
the purview of the Limitation Act and can be ﬁ led at any time. Reference 
is made to Uttam Namdeo Mahale v. Vithal Deo & Ors.17 
6.4 It is further submitted that without prejudice to the contentions 
made, even if it is concluded that Article116 of the Limitation Act would 
apply or that the time period to ﬁ le Appeal would be “a reasonable 
period”, the matter may be remanded to the District Judge, as the 
Principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction (being the Appellate 
16  (2009) 8 SCC 646
17  (1997) 6 SCC 73
M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. [SANJAY KAROL, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
830
Court herein) for consideration of the application under Section 5 of 
the Limitation Act.
B. Respondent
7. It is submitted that to attract Article 116 of the Limitation Act, it 
is not necessary that such Appellate remedy should be conferred by the 
Code. It is only that the procedure for such Appeal be governed under 
the Code. 
7.1 The Act provides for an Appeal from the Order passed by the 
Commissioner of payments to lie to a principal Civil Court of original 
jurisdiction which, by all intent and purposes is governed by the Court. 
7.2 A reading of the Statutory scheme, it is submitted, suggests 
that the Legislature intended the Commissioner to function as the Civil 
Court for “all practical purposes”. The fact that an Appeal therefrom lies 
to a Principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction, further substantiates 
such intention.
7.3 It is submitted that Article 116 provides for Limitation in 
cases of Appeal under the Code from any Decree or Order to High 
Court. Vidyacharan Shukla carved out a third category where the 
Appeal is not governed by the provisions of the Code but the procedure 
therefore and the powers for dealing there with, are governed by the 
Code.
7.4 The Claimant - Appellants contention, it was submitted, runs 
strictly contrary to the very objective of the Law of Limitation which is 
to ensure that a dispute does not survive endlessly and that the parties 
subject thereto are not forever, in the land
of uncertainty.
7.5 The Appeal before the District Judge, was ﬁ led 3 years 6 months 
and 22 days after passing of the Order by the Commissioner of Payments. 
It is submitted that the delay in Condonation Application, which states 
that it was only then that the Appellant came to know of the provisions 
of Section 22(8) of the Jogighopa Act, amounts to ignorance of Law 
which is not an excuse permissible.
7.6 It is further submitted that, it is now well settled that the Courts 
are not to take a liberal approach in condonation of delay in the absence
831
of suﬃ  cient cause. To substantiate this position, Learned Senior Counsel 
refers to Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of W.B.18 
7.7 It is further submitted without prejudice, that in the absence of a 
prescribed Statutory Limitation, approaching the Court, is to be done within 
“reasonable time”. Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner19 is relied on.
7.8 Section 19 of the Act provides for a claim before the Commissioner 
to be ﬁ led within 30 days from the speciﬁ ed date. It provides that if such 
authority is satisﬁ ed that the claimant was prevented by suﬃ  cient cause, he 
may entertain the claim within a further period of 30 days, but no later – this 
suggests that the intention was to provide for a summary and expeditious claim 
disposal mechanism. This further suggests, it is submitted, that it would be 
unfair to suggest that the Legislature had provided a strict timeline for claims 
but intended to provide an endless opportunity for appeals.
CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT
8. The term “Court” is not deﬁ ned under the Code. What it does deﬁ ne 
is a decree and an order in Section 2(2) and Section 2(14) respectively. The 
said deﬁ nitions are extracted below. 
“Section 2(2) “Decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication 
which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines 
the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in 
controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or ﬁ nal. It shall 
be deemed to include the rejection
of a plaint and the determination of 
any question within 1*** section 144, but shall not include.
(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an 
order, or
(b) any order of dismissal for default.
Explanation. A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to 
be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is ﬁ nal when 
such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly 
preliminary and partly ﬁ nal.”
18  (2013) 4 SCC 52
19  (2020) 14 SCC 210
M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. [SANJAY KAROL, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
832
“Section 2(14) “order” means the formal expression of any decision 
of a Civil Court which is not a decree.”
9. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deﬁ nes the word “Courts” as under:- 
“3…..“Court”.––“Court” includes all Judges and Magistrates, and 
all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence.”
However, this Court in State of M.P v. Anshuman Shukla20 while 
referring to a judgment of the Calcutta High Court21 observed that the 
deﬁ nition under the said Act is not exhaustive, but all authorities authorized 
to take evidence must be held to be courts under the meaning of said 
provision. 
10. In P. Sarathy v. SBI22 this Court has observed 
“13. The Court referred to the earlier decisions in Bharat Bank 
Ltd. v. Employees [1950 SCC 470 : AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950 SCR 
459] ; Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay [AIR 1953 SC 325 : 1953 
SCR 730] and Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain [AIR 1956 SC 66 : 
(1955) 2 SCR 955] . The Court approved the rule laid down in these 
cases that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, 
an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having 
some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or 
a deﬁ nitive judgment which has ﬁ nality and authoritativeness which 
are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.”
11. Article 116 of the Limitation Act provides the period of limitation 
for an appeal, a) to a High Court i.e.,
90 days from the date of order/decree; 
and b) to any other court from an order, 30 days from the date of order/decree. 
12. The Claimant - Appellants contend that this court judgment in 
Vidyacharan Shukla (supra) is clearly distinguishable from the present 
dispute. In the said case, inter alia, the court was faced with a statute 
(Representation of Peoples Act, 1951), to which the Court has been made 
expressly applicable, whereas the same is not the case here. On the other 
20  (2008) 7 SCC 487
21  Empress v. Ashootosh Chuckerbutty [ILR (1879-80) 4 Cal 483]
22  (2000) 5 SCC 355
833
hand, the respondents argue that since an appeal under Section 22 (8) of 
the Jogighopa Act is to a principal court of original civil jurisdiction, which 
qualiﬁ es as an appeal ‘governed by the Court’ – Article 116 of the Limitation 
Act shall be attracted. 
13. The Constitution Bench in Vidyacharan Shukla referred to 
three judgments of High Courts in Aga Mahomed Hamadani v. Cohen23, 
Ramasami Pillai v. Deputy Collector of Madura24, and Dropadi v. Hira 
Lal25. In each of these three decisions, the respective High Courts were 
tasked with the question of application of Article 156 of the Limitation Act 
(now Article 116) to the Burma Court’s Act, the Provincial Insolvency Act, 
1907 and Land Acquisition Act, 1894 respectively. In Cohen (supra) it was 
observed that “the natural meaning of an appeal under the Civil Procedure 
Code appears to us to be an appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure 
so far as procedure is concerned”. In Hira Lal (Supra) the full bench of the 
Allahabad High Court observed that the objection of Section 47 thereof 
appears to be to attract the provisions of the Code. In Ramasami Pillai 
(supra), it was held that by virtue of Section 54, the procedure in its entirety 
set out in the code to govern appeals, was made applicable to the Land 
Acquisition Act.  Similar to the above said decisions of the High Courts this 
Court in the said decision was also dealing with a statute which expressly 
made applicable26, the provisions of the code.
The holding, therefore, is 
that appeals provided for in special statutes that are governed by the code, 
can be said to be appeals under the code for the purposes of Article 116 of 
the Limitation Act. 
14. We may now refer to Section 22(6) of the Jogighopa Act which 
deals with the powers vested in the Commissioner under the Act. The relevant 
portion of which reads as under: -
“(6) The commissioner shall have the power to regulate his own 
procedure in all matters arising out of the discharge of his functions, 
including the place or places at which he will hold his sittings and 
23  (1886) ILR 13 Cal 221
24  AIR 1920 Mad 407
25  ILR (1912) 34 All 496 (FB)
26  Section 90 of Representation of Peoples Act, 1951
M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. [SANJAY KAROL, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
834
shall, for the purpose of making an investigation under this Act, have 
the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of 
Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely:-
(a) The summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and 
examining him on Oath :
(b) the discovery and production of any document or other material 
object producible as evidence ;
(c) the reception of evidences on aﬃ  davits;
(d) the issuing of any commission for the examination of witness.” 
15. A perusal of the above extracted section of the Jogighopa Act 
makes suﬃ  ciently clear the commissioner “for the purpose of making and 
investigation under this act” shall have the powers vested in “a civil court” 
under the Code to the limited extent as mentioned in (a), (b), (c), (d).
16. The intent of the Assam State Legislature is quite clear. Not only 
under Section 22 (6) is the application of the code limited but further under 
Section 22 (7)27. The application thereof is also equally well circumscribed 
therein, the Commissioner has been deemed to be a Civil Court for the 
purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973. Section 195 provides for Prosecution for contempt of 
lawful authority of public servants, for oﬀ ences against public justice 
and for oﬀ ences relating to documents given in evidence. Chapter XXVI 
relates to Provisions as to Oﬀ ences Aﬀ ecting the Administration
of Justice.
17. The above description of the powers of either the Code or 
Cr.P.C. clearly testiﬁ es to the intent of the state legislature to speciﬁ cally 
restrict the application of both the said codes, to only the extent provided. 
The principle of statutory interpretation: expression unius est exclusion 
alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other) supports 
such a view.  We also notice this Court holding International Asset 
27 “7.Any investigation before the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a judicial 
proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and 
the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Section 195 
and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.”
835
Reconstruction Company of India vs Oﬃ  cial Liquidator28 as extracted 
below:
“9. The fact that the Tribunal may be vested with some of the powers 
as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, regarding summoning 
and enforcing attendance of witnesses, discovery and production of the 
documents, receiving evidence on aﬃ  davits, issuing commission for the 
examination of witnesses or documents, reviewing its decisions, etc. does 
not vest in it the status of a court. Section 22(1), in fact, provides that the 
Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedures under CPC, and can regulate 
its own procedures in accordance with natural justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Therefore, it is clear from the above extracted decision that the 
vesting of select few powers upon a Tribunal, or as in the present case, 
a statutory authority, does not equate the same to be a Court within the 
meaning of the code.  It is also noteworthy that Section 22 (6) states “the 
Commissioner shall have the power to regulation his own procedure in all 
matters arising out of the discharge of his functions including the place or 
places at which he will hold his sittings”; This also supports the proposition 
that the Code does not apply to the proceedings of the Commissioner. 
19. We must consider now, the contention of the respondent that by 
virtue of Section 22 (8) providing for an appeal to a court of Original Civil 
Jurisdiction thereby the appeal being brought under the code, implies that
the Jogighopa Act itself shall be governed by the code. Section 22 (8) reads 
as under: –
“8. A Claimant, who is dissatisfied with the decision of the 
Commissioner, may prefer an appeal against such decision to the 
principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of 
whose jurisdiction the undertaking of the Government Company is 
situated 
Provided that where a person who is a Judge of High Court is appointed 
to be the Commissioner such appeal shall lie to the High Court at 
28  (2017) 16 SCC 137 
M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. [SANJAY KAROL, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
836
Guwahati, and such appeal shall be heard and disposed of by not less 
than two Judges of that High Court.”
20. The above noticed maxim of statutory interpretation would suggest 
otherwise. As discussed, the state legislature has been conscious to make 
only certain parts of the Jogighopa Act governable by the code. Here only 
we may note the proviso to Section 22 (8) which states that in case the 
Commissioner under the Jogighopa Act is a Judge of a High Court, then 
an appeal from an order of such Commissioner shall lie before no less than 
two Judges of the High Court. 
21. It is in this light that we ﬁ nd Section 22 (8) of the Jogighopa Act 
cannot be said to be an appeal under the code governed by Article 116 of 
the Limitation Act. The conclusion which beckons then is that the period of 
limitation mentioned under such article of the Limitation Act shall not apply 
to Section 22 (8) of the Jogighopa Act. The Claimant - Appellants contention 
of the impugned judgement’s reliance on with Vidyacharan Shukla (supra) 
being misplaced, therefore, has to be accepted.
22. Having come to the conclusion as above, we are required 
to consider, whether the instant appeal, ﬁ led against the order of the 
Commissioner of Payments is maintainable or not? Prior to delving into such 
a question, we would also need to examine as to whether in the absence of 
an expressly prescribed limitation, can an appeal from an order passed by the
Commissioner of Payments, be entertained, irrespective of passage of time?
23. This dispute concerns the exercise of a statutory right. The issue 
of no express limitation being provided in regard to the exercise of a right 
to assail the order has captured the attention of this Court, earlier, on certain 
occasions. We may refer to some decisions hereinbelow: –
23.1 In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Bhatinda District Cooperative 
Milk Producers Union29 this Court observed that -
“18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, 
statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable 
period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend 
29  (2007) 11 SCC 363
837
upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and 
other relevant factors.”
The principle stands reiterated in Securities and Exchange Board of 
India v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan & Ors.30
23.2 In Jagdish v. State of Karnataka31, this Court referred to a 
number of decisions to reiterate that where the statute in question 
does not prescribe a limitation, the rights conferred therein must 
be exercised within reasonable time.
23.3 This aspect of reasonable time was recently discussed by this 
Court in Madras Aluminium Co Ltd v. Tamil Nadu State 
Electricity Board32, having referred a three-Judge Bench 
decision in SEBI v. Bhavesh Pabari33 stating that the concept is 
to be applied and judged in each case per its own peculiar facts. 
24. We further refer to observations made in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind 
Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd.34 to the eﬀ ect 
that Courts should be wary of prescribing speciﬁ c period of limitation 
in cases where the legislature has refrained from doing so. It was further 
observed that where the defence of delay is employed in a situation where 
no limitation is prescribed vide statute, the exact prejudice or loss suﬀ ered 
by the party if such a delay is condoned, must be shown on facts. In other 
words, in the absence of a speciﬁ c limitation it would be improper for courts 
to dismiss a plea is solely on the ground of delay without having examined 
the nature of laws order prejudice caused to the other party
in the facts and 
circumstances of the case at hand.
The holding in Ajaib Singh (supra) was aﬃ  rmed by a three-Judge 
Bench of this court in Purohit & Co. v. Khatoonbee.35
25. In light of above discussion, it is clear that when a Court is seized of 
a situation where no limitation stands provided either by speciﬁ c applicability 
30  (2023) 2 SCC 643
31  (2021) 12 SCC 812
32  (2023) 8 SCC 240
33  (2019) 5 SCC 90
34  (1999) 6 SCC 82
35  (2017) 4 SCC 783
M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. [SANJAY KAROL, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
838
of the Limitation Act or the special statute governing the dispute, the Court 
must undertake a holistic assessment of the facts and circumstances of the 
case to examine the possibility of delay causing prejudice to a party. When 
no limitation stands prescribed it would be inappropriate for a Court to 
supplant the legislature’ s wisdom by its own and provide a limitation, more 
so in accordance with what it believes to be the appropriate period. A court 
should, in such a situation consider in the facts and circumstances of the 
case at hand, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the proceeding, the 
length of delay, the possibility of prejudice being caused, and the scheme 
of the statute in question. It may be underscored here that when a party to 
a dispute raises a plea of delay despite no speciﬁ c period being prescribed 
in the statute, such a party also bears the burden of demonstrating how 
the delay in itself would cause the party additional prejudice or loss as 
opposed to, the claim subject matter of dispute, being raised at an earlier 
point in time. 
26. In determining the question at hand, it would also be useful to 
take note of the statutory scheme of the Jogighopa Act.  Section 17 of the 
Act states that the State government or government company shall, within 
30 days of the appointed day, pay in cash all amounts under Sections 8 
and 9 of the Act to the Commissioner for discharge of the liability of the
company. Section 19 states that every person having a claim to payments 
under the schedule shall make a claim before the Commissioner within a 
period of 30 days from speciﬁ ed date. The proviso thereto states that the 
Commissioner also has the power to entertain claims made for an additional 
30 days after the expiry of the initial period, but not thereafter. Section 20 
read with the schedule, prescribes priority of payments when discharging 
the liabilities. As evident from the above referred to provisions, the state 
legislature was conscious of the aspect of limitation and has categorically 
therefore, prescribed periods for claims to be made so as to not leave open 
the possibility of a claim, indeﬁ nitely. Crucially, the legislature omitted 
placing any period of limitation when it came to Section 22 (8) of the Act.
27. When a statute, either general or speciﬁ c in application, provides 
for a limitation within which to ﬁ le an appeal, the parties interested in doing 
so are put to notice of the requirement to act with expedition. However, 
opposite thereto, in cases such as the present one where neither statute
839
provides for an explicit limitation, such urgency may be absent. While it 
is still true that, as held in Ajaib (supra), this does not entitle parties to 
litigate issues decades later, however shorter delays, in such circumstances, 
would not attract delay and laches.
28. The present facts are that the Claimant - Appellants are aggrieved 
by an order of The Commissioner of Payments dated 13 April 2005. The 
appeal ﬁ led thereagainst was on 5 November 2008. In the intervening 
period, it is submitted by the Claimant - Appellants that they pursued 
remedies by way of a Contempt Petition before the High Court36 which 
came to be disposed of on 1 April 2008 without any particular relief having 
been granted. The appeal before the District Judge, under section 22(8) of 
the Jogighopa Act, came to be ﬁ led thereafter and the order in question 
was passed on 5 November 2008.
29. Consequent to the discussion made hereinabove, i.e., neither 
the general nor the speciﬁ c statute providing for an appeal from an order 
of the Commissioner of Payments within a speciﬁ ed period of time, the 
Claimant – Appellants’ appeal cannot be said to be barred by time. The 
same would therefore, be maintainable. 
30. The questions raised in this appeal are answered as under-
30.1 The Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited 
(Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990, is not 
governed by the prescription of limitation under Article 116 
of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the appeal
thereunder, from 
an order of the Commissioner of payments cannot be said 
to be an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for 
the Legislature of the State of Assam has been categorical in 
limiting  the application of the  code  to certain aspects of the 
Act only.  Given that the Jogighopa Act allows for a Judge of 
the High Court to be the Commissioner of Payments and then 
categorically provides for an appeal to lie therefrom, Division 
Bench of the High Court further evidences the sui generis nature 
of the appeal procedure provided therein.
36  Contempt Case 293 Of 2005, ﬁ led on 11 May 2005.
M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. 
v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. [SANJAY KAROL, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 15 S.C.R.
840
30.2 In the absence of any particular period of time being prescribed 
to ﬁ le an appeal, the same would be governed by the principle 
of ‘reasonable time’, for which, by virtue of its very nature, no 
straitjacket formula can be laid down and it is to be determined 
as per the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present lis, 
having regard to the sequence of events, as taken note of above-
the Claimant - Appellants cannot be said to have transgressed 
the boundaries of reasonable time in ﬁ ling their appeal before 
the District Judge.  
31. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. The ﬁ le is restored to 
the docket of the concerned District Judge for him to proceed in accordance 
with law and in light of the discussions made herein. The same be decided 
possibly within a period of three months from the date on which a copy of 
this judgment and order is received by the District Judge, as is necessitated 
by the attending facts and circumstances.
32. Parties to bear respective costs.
Headnotes prepared by: 
Appeal allowed.
Divya Pandey