SHENTO VARGHESE versus JULFIKAR HUSEN & ORS.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 409, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
* Author
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 409 : 2024 INSC 407
Shento Varghese 
v. 
Julfikar Husen & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 2531-2532 of 2024)
13 May 2024
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Aravind Kumar,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
What is the implication of non-reporting of the seizure forthwith 
to the jurisdictional Magistrate as provided under Section 102(3) 
Cr.P.C.; does delayed reporting of the seizure to the Magistrate 
vitiate the seizure order altogether.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.102(3) – Implication of 
non-reporting of the seizure forthwith to the jurisdictional 
Magistrate:
Held: The meaning of the word ‘forthwith’ as used in section 
102(3) has not received judicial construction – The said 
expression must receive a reasonable construction and in giving 
such construction, regard must be had to the nature of the act 
or thing to be performed and the prevailing circumstances of 
the case – When it is not the mandate of the law that the act 
should be done within a fixed time, it would mean that the act 
must be done within a reasonable time – It all depends upon the 
circumstances that may unfold in a given case and there cannot 
be a straight-jacket formula prescribed in this regard – In that 
sense, the interpretation of the word ‘forthwith’ would depend 
upon the terrain in which it travels and would take its colour 
depending upon the prevailing circumstances which can be 
variable – Therefore, in deciding whether the police officer has 
properly
discharged his obligation under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C., 
the Magistrate would have to, firstly, examine whether the seizure 
was reported forthwith – If it finds that the report was not sent 
forthwith, then it must examine whether there is any explanation 
offered in support of the delay – If the Magistrate finds that the 
delay has been properly explained, it would leave the matter at 
that – The non reporting of the seizure forthwith by the police
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officer to the jurisdictional court would not vitiate the seizure 
order, it also would not mean that there would be no consequence 
whatsoever as regards the police officer, upon whom the law has 
enjoined a duty to act in a certain way – If it finds that there is 
no reasonable explanation for the delay or that the official has 
acted with deliberate disregard/ wanton negligence, then it may 
direct for appropriate departmental action to be initiated against 
such erring official. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 23, 24]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.102(3) – Delay in reporting 
the seizures to the Magistrates:
Held: The delay in reporting the seizure to the Magistrate may, 
subject to proof of prejudice, at best, dent the veracity of the 
prosecution case vis-à-vis the date, time and occasion for seizure 
of the property – Since the proof of prejudice on part of the 
accused and the explanation for delay on part of the prosecution 
can only be demonstrated at trial, the effect of non-compliance 
becomes an issue to be adjudicated at the time of appreciation 
of evidence – Moreover, this Court has consistently held that 
even illegalities in the investigation (including illegality in search 
and seizures) is no ground for setting aside the investigation in 
toto. [Para 16]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.102(1) and s.102(3) – 
Whether validity of the seizure order is contingent on 
compliance with the reporting obligation:
Held: The validity of the power exercised under Section 102(1) 
Cr.P.C. is not dependent on the compliance with the duty 
prescribed on the police officer under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C. – 
The validity of the exercise of power under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. 
can be questioned either on jurisdictional grounds or on the 
merits of the matter – That is to say, the order of seizure can be 
challenged on the ground that the seizing officer lacked jurisdiction 
to act under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. or that the seized item does 
not satisfy the definition of ‘property’ or on the ground that the 
property which was seized could not have given rise to suspicion 
concerning the commission of a crime, in order for the authorities 
to justify the seizure – The pre-requisite for exercising powers 
under Section 102(1) is the existence of a direct link between 
the tainted property and the alleged offence – It is essential that 
the properties sought to be seized under Section 102(1) of the
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Cr.P.C. must have a direct or close link with the commission of 
offence in question. [Para 13]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.102(3) – Expression 
“shall forthwith report” – Discussed. [Paras 18-22]
Case Law Cited
Tmt. T .Subbulakshmi v. The Commissioner of Police 
(2013) 4 MLJ (Crl) 41; The Meridian Educational Society 
v. The State of Telangana (2022) 1 ALT (Cri) 229; Dr 
Shashikant D. Karnik v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 
CRL.L.J. 148; Ruqaya Akhter v. Ut Through Crime 
Branch (CRM(M) No.223/2022, Jammu & Kashmir and 
Ladakh High Court). Operation Mobilization India v. State 
of Telangana (2021) SCC OnLine TS 1529; Bharath 
Overseas Bank v. Minu Publication (1988) MLJ (Crl.) 
309; Ms Swaran Sabharwal v. Commissioner of Police 
(1990) 68 Comp Cas 652 Delhi (DB) – referred to.
Anwar Ahmad v. State of UP [1976] 1 SCR 779 : 
AIR (1976) SC 680; Nevada Properties (P) Ltd. v. 
State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2019] 15 SCR 223 : 
(2019) 20 SCC 119; State of Maharashtra v. Tapas 
D. Neogy [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 609 : 1999 INSC 417; 
Ravinder Kumar & Anr. v. State of Punjab [2001] 
Supp. 2 SCR 463 : (2001) 7 SCC 690; Bhajan Singh 
and Ors. v. State of Haryana [2011] 7 SCR 1 : 2011 
INSC 422; HN Rishbud v. State of Delhi [1955] 1 
SCR 1150 : (1954) 2 SCC 934; Sk. Salim v. State 
of West Bengal [1975] 3 SCR 394 : (1975) 1 SCC 
653; China Apparao and Others v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 175 : (2002) 8 SCC
440; Navalshankar Ishwarlal Dave v. State of Gujarat 
[1993] 3 SCR 676 : 1993 Supp. 3 SCC 754; Rao 
Mahmood Ahmad Khan v. Ranbir Singh [1995] 2 SCR 
230 : (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 275; Bidya Deb Barma v. 
District Magistrate [1969] 1 SCR 562 : (1968) SCC 
OnLine SC 82 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Edition; Wharton’s Law 
Lexicon, 17th Edition – referred to.
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List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1882; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898; Bharatiya Nagarik 
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 
1971; Preventive Detention Act, 1950; Gujarat Prevention of Anti-
Social Activities Act, 1985.
List of Keywords
Section 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 
102(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Implication 
of non-reporting of the seizure forthwith to the jurisdictional 
Magistrate; Reasonable construction; Seizure of property; 
Reporting obligation.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 
2531-2532 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.08.2023 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Madras in CRLOP Nos. 14029 and 14031 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Himinder Lal, Roy Abraham, Ms. Reena Roy, Adithya Koshy Roy, 
Ms. Anju Kanodiya, Advs. for the Appellant.
S. Mahendran, Adv. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Aravind Kumar J. 
1.	
Leave granted. 
2.	
These appeals have been preferred at the instance of the first informant 
in Crime No.318 of 2022. By the impugned order dated 09.08.2023, 
passed in Crl. O.P. Nos.14029 & 14031 of 2023 and Crl. M.P. 
Nos.8658 of 2023, the High Court of Madras has allowed the claim 
of the Respondents-accused for de-freezing of their bank accounts. 
The High Court has ordered for de-freezing on the
specific ground 
that there was delay on part of the police in reporting the seizure to
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Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.
the jurisdictional Magistrate. The facts in the instant case, which we 
shall advert to later below, have given rise to following question of law: 
What is the implication of non-reporting of the seizure 
forthwith to the jurisdictional Magistrate as provided 
under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C.? 
more specifically; 
Does delayed reporting of the seizure to the Magistrate 
vitiate the seizure order altogether? 
That is the question which needs to be answered in these appeals.
3.	
Our research indicates that there is no authoritative pronouncement 
of this Court on this issue. If we turn to the pronouncements of the 
High Courts, there are decisions1 which have directly confronted 
this question. Having reviewed these decisions, we find that, 
broadly, there are two prevailing strands of thought: one set of 
cases holding that delayed reporting to the Magistrate would, 
ipso facto, vitiate the seizure order; and the other view being that 
delayed reporting would constitute a mere irregularity and would 
not vitiate the seizure order. 
4.	
The former view has been justified on the grounds that: 
(a)	 the obligation [u/S 102(3) Cr.P.C.] to report the 
seizure forthwith to the Magistrate is mandatory 
and non-negotiable, breach of which would qualify 
as an illegality in following the prescribed statutory 
procedure2; 
(b)	 the employment of the word ‘shall’ in Section 102(3) 
makes it clear that non-compliance of the
mandatory 
requirement to report forthwith to the Magistrate goes 
to the root of the matter3; 
(c)	
the power to seize has been subjected to procedural 
requirements prescribed under Section 102(3) – 
1	
 See Table at Annexure A for a compilation of the 36 decisions on this issue. 
2	
Tmt. T .Subbulakshmi vs The Commissioner of Police 2013(4) MLJ (Crl) 41
3	
The Meridian Educational Society Vs. The State of Telangana, 2022 1 ALT(Cri) 229
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and breach of complying with follow-up procedures 
would render the exercise of the main power to be 
without authority and jurisdiction – in that sense, the 
requirement to report is in the nature of a condition 
subsequent clause.4 
5.	
The latter view has been sustained on the reasoning that:
a)	
The statutory provision provides no express 
consequence(s) for non-compliance and therefore, 
the procedural requirement is merely directory and 
not mandatory5; 
b)	
The power to seize property connected with a crime 
is plenary and the obligation to intimate is a mere 
incidental exercise of power – breach of the latter 
cannot affect the former6; 
c)	
the object of reporting is to facilitate disposal of 
property seized – prejudice caused by delayed 
reporting, if any, can always be demonstrated at 
the trial7; 
d)	
Neither is there any obligation to seek prior leave 
before exercising the power to seize nor is there any 
statutorily provided consequence for non-compliance 
of the reporting obligation8; 
e)	
No prejudice would be caused to the owner of a 
property by non-reporting of seizure to the concerned 
Magistrate during the investigation phase.
Therefore, it cannot be a case of illegality but such an 
omission may only be an irregularity.9
4	
Dr Shashikant D. Karnik Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2008 CRL.L.J. 148
5	
Ruqaya Akhter Vs Ut Through Crime Branch, CRM(M) No.223/2022, Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh 
High Court.
6
Operation Mobilization India Vs. State of Telangana 2021 SCC OnLine TS 1529
7	
Bharath Overseas Bank Vs. Minu Publication [1988] MLJ (Crl.) 309
8	
Supra, 7
9	
Supra, 5
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6.	
In light of conflicting precedents operating across various High Courts, 
we find it expedient and necessary to settle the conflict and bring in 
uniformity in adjudication. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Criminal 
Procedure 
Codes
Relevant Provision
188210
Section 523- Procedure by police upon seizure of 
property taken under Section 51 or stolen
The seizure by any Police-officer of property taken 
under Section 51, or alleged or suspected to have 
been stolen, or found under circumstances which 
create suspicion of the commission of any offence, 
shall be forthwith reported to a magistrate, who 
shall make such order as he thinks fit respecting the 
delivery of such property to the person entitled to 
the possession thereof, or, if such person cannot be 
ascertained, respecting the custody and production 
of such property. 
189811
Section 550- Powers to police to seize property 
suspected to be stolen: Any police-office may 
seize any property which may be alleged or 
suspected to have been stolen, or which may be 
found under circumstances which create suspicion 
of the commission of any offence. Such police-
officer, if subordinate to the office in charge of a 
police station, shall forthwith report the seizure to 
that officer.
197312
102. Power of police officer to seize certain 
property.—(1) Any police officer may seize any 
property which may be alleged or suspected to 
have been
stolen, or which may be found under 
circumstances which create suspicion of the 
commission of any offence. 
10	
Hereinafter referred to as “1882 Code”. 
11	
Hereinafter referred to as “1898 Code”.
12	
Hereinafter referred to as “1973 Code”.
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(2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in 
charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the 
seizure to that officer 
(3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1) 
shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate 
having jurisdiction and where the property seized is 
such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the 
Court, [or where there is difficulty in securing proper 
accommodation for the custody of such property, or 
where the continued retention of the property in police 
custody may not be considered necessary for the 
purpose of investigation,] he may give custody thereof 
to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to 
produce the property before the Court as and when 
required and to give effect to the further orders of 
the Court as to the disposal of the same: 
[Provided that where the property seized under sub-
section (1) is subject to speedy and natural decay 
and if the person entitled to the possession of such 
property is unknown or absent and the value of 
such property is less than five hundred rupees, it 
may forthwith be sold by auction under the orders 
of the Superintendent of Police and the provisions 
of Sections 457 and 458 shall, as nearly as may be 
practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale.]
202313
106. (1) Any police officer may seize any property 
which may be alleged or suspected to have been 
stolen, or which may be found under
circumstances 
which create suspicion of the commission of any 
offence. 
(2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in 
charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the 
seizure to that officer. 
13	
Hereinafter referred to as the “2023 Code”.
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(3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1) 
shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate 
having jurisdiction and where the property seized is 
such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the 
Court, or where there is difficulty in securing proper 
accommodation for the custody of such property, or 
where the continued retention of the property in police 
custody may not be considered necessary for the 
purpose of investigation, he may give custody thereof 
to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to 
produce the property before the Court as and when 
required and to give effect to the further orders of 
the Court as to the disposal of the same: Provided 
that where the property seized under sub-section 
(1) is subject to speedy and natural decay and if the 
person entitled to the possession of such property is 
unknown or absent and the value of such property is 
less than five hundred rupees, it may forthwith be sold 
by auction under the orders of the Superintendent of 
Police and the provisions of Sections 505 and 506 
shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the 
net proceeds of such sale.
7.	
The responsibility of the police officer to promptly inform the 
Magistrate about the seizure can be historically traced to the 1882 
Code. Oddly enough, this provision was absent in the 1898 Code. 
In the 1898 Code, however, it was provided that if the seizing officer 
was
below the rank of an officer-in charge of a police station, then 
such officer was under a duty to give information to his superior 
regarding the seized property. It appears that the provision as it 
existed in the 1898 Code was retained as is in the 1973 Code. Sub-
section (3) to Section 102 was inserted by way of an amendment 
only in the year 1978. This amendment reintroduced the reporting 
obligations of police officer to the Magistrate, as it originally existed 
in the 1882 Code. It also empowered the seizing officer to give 
custody of the seized property to any person, on such person 
executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the 
Court as and when required. There was no provision in the 1973 
Code nor the 1898 Code till the insertion of sub-section (3) by 
an amendment in 1978, empowering the police to take a bond 
from a person undertaking to produce the property entrusted to
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him by the police later on before the Court. The law as it existed 
then was that the bond could be entered before the Court but not 
in favour of the police. While setting aside the order of forfeiture 
in regard to the bond in favour of the police, this Court in Anwar 
Ahmad v State of UP14, pointed out the lacuna in the 1973 Code 
and suggested the insertion of a suitable provision. That is why this 
sub-section (3) empowering the police to execute the bond under 
certain conditionalities came to be inserted by way of the 1978 
Amendment. For the sake of completeness, it may be observed 
that Section 102 Cr.P.C. in its present form has been retained as 
is in the 2023 Code, which is scheduled to come into force on 1st 
July 2024 and replace the 1973 Code.
8.	
The Notes on Clauses appended to the 1978 Bill had set out the 
following reasons for inserting sub section (3) to Section 102 Cr.P.C.: 
“Clause 10- Section 102 is being amended (1) to provide 
that the police officer shall forthwith report the seizure 
of any property under sub-section (1) to the Magistrate, 
as there is a lacuna in the Law and (2) to give effect to 
the observations of the Supreme Court made in Anwar 
Ahmad vs. the State of U.P. (AIR 1976 SC 680) that the 
police should be given the power to get a bond from 
the person to whom the property seized is entrusted, 
particularly in cases where a bulky property like elephant 
or car, is seized and the
Magistrate is living at a great 
distance and it is difficult to produce the property seized 
before the Magistrate.”
9.	
The reason cited for inserting the amendment was to overcome a 
‘lacuna’ in the law. What could have been the lacuna in the law that 
impelled the insertion of this amendment? 
10.	 In our view, the answer to this question can be derived by referring 
to the provisions in Chapter XXXIV of the 1973 Code which is titled 
as ‘Disposal of Property’. Section 457 Cr.P.C. sets out the procedure 
to be followed by police upon seizure of the property. Sub section (1) 
begin with the words: ‘Whenever the seizure of property by any 
police officer is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of 
14	
[1976] 1 SCR 779 : AIR 1976 SC 680
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Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.
this Code, and such property is not produced before a Criminal Court 
during an inquiry or trial…..”. Similarly, we may refer to Section 459 
Cr.P.C. which empowers the Magistrate with the power to auction/
sell seized property in certain situations. It begins with the words: ‘If 
the person entitled to the possession of such property is unknown 
or absent and the property is subject to speedy and natural decay, 
or if the Magistrate to whom its seizure is reported is of opinion 
that……”. 
11.	 Both, Section 457 Cr.P.C. and Section 459 Cr.P.C. contemplates 
the act of seizure by police to be reported to the Magistrate so 
that necessary steps could be taken for its custody and disposal. 
However, the provision [Section 102(1) Cr.P.C.] which conferred 
substantive power on the police to seize property linked to a crime, 
did not impose on such officers a consequent duty to report the 
seizures made to the Magistrate. Section 523 in the 1882 Code 
had coupled the power to seize property linked to the crime and the 
duty to report forthwith the seizure to the Magistrate in the same 
provision. Since the relevant provisions in the 1898 Code and the 
1973 Code provided only for the substantive power to seize and 
did not impose any duty on such seizing officer to report to the 
Magistrate, there arose a need for amendment. That appears to 
us to be the lacuna in the law which was sought to be overcome. 
In fact, there
are several decisions which indicate that the purpose 
of reporting to the Magistrate is to ensure an order of the disposal 
of the seized property either on superdari, or otherwise, during the 
pendency of the case/investigations under Section 457 Cr.P.C. This 
further reinforces our view regarding the lacuna which was sought 
to be fixed. Therefore, the main object underlying the amendment 
appears to be a mere gap-filling exercise and an attempt to fix a 
basic omission in legislative drafting. 
12.	 It is in this background that we must consider whether ‘seizure orders’ 
can be set at naught for non-compliance with the procedural formality 
of reporting such seizure forthwith to the Magistrate. 
13.	 This requires us to consider whether validity of the seizure order is 
contingent on compliance with the reporting obligation? In our view, 
the validity of the power exercised under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. is 
not dependent on the compliance with the duty prescribed on the 
police officer under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C. The validity of the exercise
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of power under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. can be questioned either on 
jurisdictional grounds or on the merits of the matter. That is to say, 
the order of seizure can be challenged on the ground that the seizing 
officer lacked jurisdiction15 to act under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C. or that 
the seized item does not satisfy the definition of ‘property’16 or on the 
ground that the property which was seized could not have given rise 
to suspicion concerning the commission of a crime, in order for the 
authorities to justify the seizure.17 The pre-requisite for exercising 
powers under Section 102(1) is the existence of a direct link between 
the tainted property and the alleged offence. It is essential that the 
properties sought to be seized under Section 102(1) of the Cr.P.C. 
must have a direct or close link with the commission of offence in 
question.18
14.	 As stated hereinbefore, the obligation to report the seizure to the 
Magistrate is neither a jurisdictional pre-requisite for exercising the 
power to seize nor is the exercise of such power made subject to 
compliance with the reporting obligation. Contrast this with Section 
105E Cr.P.C., 1973 which provides for similar power of seizure 
and attachment of property. While Section 105E(1) confers the 
substantive power to make seizure under circumstances provided 
in that section, sub-section (2) of Section 105E declares that the 
order passed under Section 105E(1) ‘shall
have no effect unless 
the said order is confirmed by an order of the said Court, within a 
period of thirty days of its being made’. In that sense, the order of 
seizure, for it to take effect and have legal force, is subjected to a 
further statutory requirement of the seizure order being confirmed 
by an order of Court. It is only upon passing of the confirmation 
order within the stipulated period does the order of seizure take 
effect. Until then, it remains an order in form but without having 
any legal force. 
15.	 We find that there are certain other provisions19 in the 1973 Code which 
place similar obligation(s) on the police officer to report their actions 
to the jurisdictional Magistrate. For example, Section 157 Cr.P.C. 
15	
Nevada Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2019) 20 SCC 119 
16	
Ms Swaran Sabharwal Vs. Commissioner of Police, 1990 (68) Comp Cas 652 Delhi (DB)
17	
State of Maharashtra Vs. Tapas D. Neogy,1999/INSC/417
18	
Supra, 17.
19	
See, Section 168 Cr.P.C.
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provides that ‘if, from information received or otherwise, an officer 
in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission 
of an offence……he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a 
Magistrate’. As in the case of Section 102(3) Cr.P.C., Section 157 
Cr.P.C. does not provide for any consequence in the event there is 
failure to promptly comply with the reporting obligation. It would be 
helpful to understand how this Court has elucidated on the effect of 
such non-compliance in the context of Section 157 Cr.P.C. since the 
provision is nearly pari materia with Section 102(3). 
16.	 It is now too well settled that delay in registration of FIR is no ground 
for quashing of the FIR itself.20 It follows as a corollary that if delay 
in registration of FIR is no ground to quash the FIR, then delay in 
forwarding such FIR to the Magistrate can also afford no ground for 
nullification of the FIR. In fact, this Court has gone to the extent of 
holding that unless serious prejudice is demonstrated to have been 
suffered as against the accused, mere delay in sending the FIR 
to the Magistrate by itself will not have any deteriorating effect on 
the case of the prosecution.21 If prejudice is demonstrated and the 
prosecution fails to explain the delay, then, at best, the effect of such 
delay would only be to render the date and time of lodging the FIR 
suspect and nothing more.22 Drawing from this
analogy, the delay 
in reporting the seizure to the Magistrate may, subject to proof of 
prejudice, at best, dent the veracity of the prosecution case vis-à-vis 
the date, time and occasion for seizure of the property. Since the 
proof of prejudice on part of the accused and the explanation for 
delay on part of the prosecution can only be demonstrated at trial, 
the effect of non-compliance becomes an issue to be adjudicated 
at the time of appreciation of evidence. Moreover, this Court has 
consistently held that even illegalities in the investigation (including 
illegality in search and seizures) is no ground for setting aside the 
investigation in toto23.
17.	 In the background of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, the line 
of precedents which have taken the position that ‘seizure orders’ 
20	
Ravinder Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC 690
21	
Supra, 20. 
22	
Bhajan Singh and Ors. vs. State of Haryana, 2011/INSC/422
23	
HN Rishbud v. State of Delhi (1954) 2 SCC 934
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are vitiated for delay in compliance with the reporting obligation are 
declared to be manifestly erroneous and are accordingly, overruled. 
The relevant question to be determined was not whether the duty 
of the police to report the seizure to the Magistrate is mandatory or 
directory. Instead, what ought to have been inquired into was whether 
the exercise of the seizure power was subjected to compliance of 
reporting obligation, as illustrated in Section 105E Cr.P.C. 
18.	 Merely because we have held that non reporting of the seizure 
forthwith by the police officer to the jurisdictional court would not 
vitiate the seizure order, it would not mean that there would be no 
consequence whatsoever as regards the police officer, upon whom 
the law has enjoined a duty to act in a certain way. Since there is an 
obligation cast on the officer to report the seizure forthwith, it becomes 
necessary to understand the meaning of the expression forthwith 
as used in Section 102(3) CrPC. For, without a clear understanding 
of the said expression, the Magistrate would not be in a position to 
determine whether the obligation cast on the police officer has been 
properly complied with. In this background, the expression ‘shall 
forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate’ occurring in sub-
section (3) of the Section 102 requires to be examined.
19.	 The meaning of the word ‘forthwith’ as used in Section 102(3) 
has not received
judicial construction by this Court. However, this 
Court has examined the scope and contours of this expression as 
it was used under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971; 
Preventive Detention Act, 1950; Section 157(1) of the Cr.P.C.; and 
Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 in the case of 
Sk. Salim v. State of West Bengal24, Alla China Apparao and Others 
v. State of Andhra Pradesh25 and Navalshankar Ishwarlal Dave v. 
State of Gujarat26. 
20.	 This Court, in Rao Mahmood Ahmad Khan v. Ranbir Singh27, has held 
that the word ‘forthwith’ is synonymous with the word immediately, 
which means with all reasonable quickness. When a statute requires 
something to be done ‘forthwith’ or ‘immediately’ or even ‘instantly’, 
24	
[1975] 3 SCR 394 : (1975) 1 SCC 653 (para 10 and 11)
25	
[2002] Supp. 3 SCR 175 : (2002) 8 SCC 440 (para 9) 
26	
[1993] 3 SCR 676 : 1993 Supp (3) SCC 754 (para 9) 
27	
[1995] 2 SCR 230 : 1995 Supp (4) SCC 275
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
423
Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.
it should probably be understood as allowing a reasonable time for 
doing it28.
21.	 The expression ‘forthwith’ has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 
10th Edition as under:
“forthwith, adv. (14c) 1. Immediately; without delay. 2. 
Directly; promptly; within a reasonable time under the 
circumstances; with all convenient dispatch”
Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 17th Edition describes ‘forthwith’ as extracted:
Forthwith, When a defendant is ordered to plead forthwith, 
he must plead within twenty four hours. When a statute 
or rule of Court requires an act to be done ‘forthwith’, 
it means that the act is to be done within a reasonable 
time having regard to the object of the provision and the 
circumstances of the case [Ex parte Lamb, (1881) 19 Ch 
D 169; 2 Chit. Arch. Prac., 14th Edition]
22.	 From the discussion made above, it would emerge that the expression 
‘forthwith’ means ‘as soon as may be’, ‘with reasonable speed and 
expedition’, ‘with a sense of urgency’, and ‘without any unnecessary 
delay’. In other words, it would mean as soon as possible, judged 
in the context of the object sought to be achieved or accomplished.
23.	 We are of the considered view that the said expression must receive 
a reasonable construction and in giving such construction, regard 
must be had to the nature of the act or thing to be performed and the 
prevailing circumstances of the case. When it is not the mandate of 
the law
that the act should be done within a fixed time, it would mean 
that the act must be done within a reasonable time. It all depends 
upon the circumstances that may unfold in a given case and there 
cannot be a straight-jacket formula prescribed in this regard. In that 
sense, the interpretation of the word ‘forthwith’ would depend upon 
the terrain in which it travels and would take its colour depending 
upon the prevailing circumstances which can be variable. 
24.	 Therefore, in deciding whether the police officer has properly 
discharged his obligation under Section 102(3) Cr.P.C., the 
Magistrate would have to, firstly, examine whether the seizure 
28	
Bidya Deb Barma v. District Magistrate,1968 SCC OnLine SC 82
424
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
was reported forthwith. In doing so, it ought to have regard to the 
interpretation of the expression, ‘forthwith’ as discussed above. If 
it finds that the report was not sent forthwith, then it must examine 
whether there is any explanation offered in support of the delay. If 
the Magistrate finds that the delay has been properly explained, 
it would leave the matter at that. However, if it finds that there 
is no reasonable explanation for the delay or that the official has 
acted with deliberate disregard/ wanton negligence, then it may 
direct for appropriate departmental action to be initiated against 
such erring official. We once again reiterate that the act of seizure 
would not get vitiated by virtue of such delay, as discussed in 
detail herein above.
25.	 Having clarified the applicable legal position above, we now proceed 
to consider the facts in instant case. 
26.	 The Respondents-accused is said to have placed an order for 
purchase of forty-seven Kerala Model Gold Chains from the 
Appellant-first informant, who worked as a deliveryman in a company 
called ‘PR Gold’. In consideration for the supply of gold chains, 
the Respondents had agreed to provide gold bars of equivalent 
value. The allegations in the complaint suggest that the exchange 
took place on 20.12.2022. Shortly thereafter, the Appellant learns 
that gold bars handed over to him were fake. On this basis, the 
Appellant approached the police and
lodged the first information 
report. On registration of the first information report, the police 
initiated investigation and during such investigation, it was noticed 
that certain monies to the tune of Rs.19,83,036/- were deposited 
in the bank accounts of Accused 1 and 3. On 09.01.2023, the 
investigating officer wrote to the bank and ordered for freezing of their 
bank accounts. The order of freezing was reported to the Magistrate 
on 27.01.2023. The Respondents had unsuccessfully approached29 
the jurisdictional Magistrate for taking custody of the seized bank 
accounts. The Respondents then approached the High Court by 
filing an original petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and sought for 
de-freezing of the bank accounts. The High Court vide the impugned 
order has allowed the application of the Respondents-accused for 
de-freezing of the bank accounts, and therefore set at naught the 
29	
Application under Section 457 – Cr. M.C 2032 of 2023 was filed.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
425
Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.
seizure order on the sole ground that the order of seizure was not 
forthwith reported to the Magistrate. 
27.	 The reasoning adopted by the High Court cannot be sustained in the 
light of aforestated discussion. This takes us to the consequential 
question, namely, whether at this distance of time, we ought to direct 
freezing of the bank accounts afresh? The answer has to be in the 
negative, since undisputedly by virtue of the impugned order, the bank 
accounts of the respondents has been defreezed and resultantly, 
the Respondents would have operated the accounts and amount of 
Rs.19,83,036/- which had been frozen would have been withdrawn. 
The ends of justice would be met and the interest of prosecution would 
be served if the Respondents are called upon, forthwith, to execute 
a bond undertaking to deposit the amount (which has been thus far 
withdrawn from the seized bank accounts) before the jurisdictional 
Court in the event the Court were to return a finding of guilt against 
the accused persons. The Respondents would have to undertake 
to deposit the amount within four weeks from the date on which the 
Court passes an order of conviction. It is needless to say that the 
bond executed would stand discharged if the accused persons are 
acquitted at the end of trial. 
28.	 With these observations, appeals are allowed in part.
ANNEXURE ‘A’
CASES WHERE COURTS HAVE HELD THAT  
BREACH OF REPORTING CONDITIONS
IS ILLEGAL
S. 
No
CASE 
CITATION 
COURT 
1. 
Manish Khandelwal And Ors 
vs The State of Maharashtra 
And Ors
2019 SCC OnLine 
Bom 1412
Bombay 
High Court 
2. 
V Plus Technology Pvt Ltd 
vs The State (Nct Of Delhi) 
& Anr
2022/DHC/001595
Delhi HC
3. 
Muktaben M. Mashru vs 
State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr
2019 SCC OnLine 
Del 11509
Delhi HC 
4. 
Tmt.T.Subbulakshmi vs The 
Commissioner of Police
2013(4)MLJ(Crl)41
Madras 
High Court
426
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
5. 
Ms Swaran Sabharwal 
Versus Commissioner of 
Police
1990 (68) Comp 
Cas 652 Delhi (DB)
Delhi High 
Court
6. 
Uma Maheshwari Vs. The 
State Rep. By Inspector 
of Police, Central Crime 
Branch, Egmore, Channai; 
Criminal O.P. No.15467 of 
2013
2013 SCC OnLine 
Mad 3829
Madras 
HC
7. 
The Meridian Educational 
Society Vs. The State of 
Telangana; Writ Petition 
No.21106 of 2021
2022 1 ALT(Cri) 
229
Telangana 
HC
8. 
Padmini vs. Inspector of 
Police, Tirunelveli 
2008(3) Crimes 
716 (Mad.)
Madras 
HC 
9. 
R. Chandrasekar vs. 
Inspector of Police, Salem
2003 Criminal Law 
Journal 294
Madras 
HC 
10. Lathifa Vs. State of 
Karnataka
2012 Cri. L.J. 3487
Karnataka 
High Court
11. 
B. Ranganathan Vs. State 
and Ors
2003 Crl.L.J 2779
Madras 
HC
12. Shashikant D. Karnik Vs. 
The State of Maharashtra
II(2007)BC337
Bombay 
HC 
13. Karthika Agencies 
Export House vs The 
Commissioner of Police
W.P.No.17953 of 
2021
Madras 
High Court 
14. S. Ganapathi Vs. State and 
Ors.
Crl.O.P.No.800 of 
2014
Madras 
HC
15. R. Sivaraj Vs. State of Tamil 
Nadu
Criminal 
O.P.Nos.576 and 
577 of 2013
Madras 
HC 
16. Shri. Vilas S/o. Prabhakar 
Dange Vs. State of 
Maharashtra 
Criminal Writ 
Petition No. 
1033/2017
Bombay 
HC 
17. Purbanchal Road Service, 
Gauhati VS State
1991CRILJ2798
Gauhati 
High Court
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 
427
Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen & Ors.
18. S. T. Cleopatra VS 
Commissioner of Police, 
Chennai City, Vepery, 
Chennai
W.P.No.17953 of 
2021
Madras 
HC 
19. Kiruthika Vs. State rep. 
by Inspector of Police and 
another
Crl.O.P.No.14733 
of 2021
Madras 
HC
20. Dr.Shashikant D. Karnik Vs. 
State Of Maharashtra 
2008 CRL.L.J. 148
Bombay 
HC
21. Ali Trading and Anr v The 
State of Assam 
WA 296/2019
Gauhati 
HC 
22.
B. Kavitha v. Inspector of 
Police & ors 
Crl.OP. NO. 
14824/2019
Madras 
HC
CASES WHERE THE COURT HAS HELD THE REPORTING  
CONDITIONS ARE DIRECTORY AND NOT ILLEGAL
23. Dattasai (Kisan Seva 
Kendra) VS State of 
Telangana
2022 6 ALD 702
Telangana 
HC 
24. M/S SJS Gold Pvt. Ltd. 
Thru. Director Sunil Jaihind 
Salunkhe & Anr V. State of 
UP 
Criminal Misc. Writ 
Petition No. - 3511 
Of 2022
Allahabad 
High Court 
25. Amit Singh vs State of U.P. 
And Anr.
Criminal Misc. 
Writ Petition No. - 
11201 Of 202
Allahabad 
High Court
26. Ruqaya Akhter Vs Ut 
Through Crime Branch
CRM(M) 
No.223/2022
The 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
and 
Ladakh 
High Court
27. Narottam Singh Dhillon and 
another vs. State of Punjab 
Criminal Misc. 
No.43768 of 2004
Punjab-
Haryana 
High Court
28. Vinoshkumar 
Ramachandran Valluvar Vs. 
The State of Maharashtra
 2011(1) MWN (Cr) 
497
Bombay 
HC
428
[2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
29. C.Aranganayagam Vs. State 
by the Director of Vigilance 
and Anti-corruption, Erode 
and another
1999 SCC OnLine 
Mad 463
Madras 
HC
30. M/S. Ap Product vs State Of 
Telangana on 3 December, 
2020
AIR ONLINE 2020 
TEL 135
Telangana 
High Court
31. Mohd. Maqbool Ahmed @ 
Mateen And Anr. vs The 
Deputy Commissioner Of 
Police
1996(3) ALT215
Andhra 
High Court
32. State of Manipur v Canning 
Keishing
2021 SCC OnLine 
Mani 272
Manipur 
HC
33. M.S. Jaggi vs 
Subaschandra Mohapatra 
1977 CRILJ 1902
Orissa 
High Court
34. Bharath Overseas Bank v. 
Minu Publication
[1988] MLJ (Crl.) 
309
Madras 
HC
35. Dr. Shaik Haseena v State 
of Telangana
2020 SCC OnLine 
TS 2851
Telangana 
HC
36. Operation Mobilization India 
v. State of Telangana 
2021 SCC OnLine 
TS 1529: (2021) 1 
HLT 81
Telangana 
HC
Result of the case: Appeals partly allowed
†Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan