MARKASH JAJARA versus THE STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 834, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2023] 14 S.C.R. 834 : 2023 INSC 1015
834
CASE DETAILS
MARKASH JAJARA
v.
THE STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No.3405 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 03, 2023
[SURYA KANT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: The appellant was held guilty of having 
committed the murder of his son-in-law. Whether the oﬀ ence attributed 
to the appellant falls within the ambit of Exception I of Section 300 IPC 
which deﬁ nes “murder”.
Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 and Exception I of s.300 IPC – The 
occurrence took place inside the house of the appellant – The informant 
had gone to the house of the appellant and found his brother, who had 
been staying with his in-laws, lying dead – Trial Court on consideration 
of the evidence held the appellant guilty of committing an oﬀ ence u/s. 
302 IPC and consequently, sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment 
– Appeal was dismissed by the High Court – Propriety:
Held: The appellant’s motive at best was to prevent the deceased from 
misbehaving with his daughter after consuming alcohol – The manner in 
which the occurrence appears to have taken place inside the house, does 
indicate that the appellant lost his self-control on account of persistent 
provocation and suddenly thrashed his son-in-law with the bamboo stick – 
It is a case where provocation seems to be brewing up since the deceased 
shifted to the appellant’s house – It acquired enormous gravity with each 
recurrence of humiliating stances of the appellant’s daughter – The fatal
occurrence was seemingly the ﬁ nal culmination of loss of the power of 
self-control – The simmering discontent of a frustrated and hapless father 
unfortunately led him to strike the deceased with a bamboo stick – The series 
of provocative acts attributable to the deceased indeed laid the foundation of
835
sustained provocation – In the facts and circumstances of the present case, 
it appears that the act of the appellant in causing injuries to the deceased 
falls within the expression of `culpable homicide’ which does not amount 
to `murder’ – In considered opinion of this Court, the ends of justice would 
be adequately met by converting the sentence of life imprisonment awarded 
to the appellant to rigorous imprisonment of ten years – The sentence as 
awarded by the courts below stands modiﬁ ed accordingly. [Paras 17,18,19]
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
No.3405 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2019 of the Gauhati High 
Court in CRLAJ No.118 of 2016.
Appearances:
Gaurav Agrawal, Adv. for the Appellant.
Nalin Kohli, Sr. AAG, Aastik Dhingra, Anshul Malik, Shuvodeep Roy, 
Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
1.  Leave granted.
2.  The Gauhati High Court has dismissed the jail appeal, vide the 
impugned judgment dated 12.03.2019, preferred by the appellant against the 
judgment and order dated 03.10.2016, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, 
Jorhat whereby the appellant was held guilty of having committed the murder 
of his son-in-law, namely, late Markush Borja and sentenced to undergo life 
imprisonment with a ﬁ ne of Rs.10,000/- with the stipulated imprisonment 
of six months on default of payment of the ﬁ ne amount in Sessions Case
No.188(J-T)/2015, arising out of Titabar P.S. Case No.65/2015.
3.  The above-stated FIR, under Section 302 IPC, was registered on 
the receipt of an ejahar submitted by P.W.8 (Well Borja), on the same day, 
MARKASH JAJARA v. THE STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.
836 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
to the eﬀ ect that his younger brother – Markush Borja had been assaulted 
and killed by the appellant with a bamboo stick. The occurrence took place 
inside the house of the appellant. The informant had gone to the house of 
the appellant and found his brother, who had been staying with his in-laws 
for the last 3/4 months, lying dead. 
4.  Following the registration of the FIR, the appellant was arrested and 
a chargesheet under Section 302 IPC was ﬁ led against him. The prosecution 
examined nine witnesses including the wife of the appellant – Mononit 
Jajara (P.W.5) and his daughter – Sarani Boria (P.W.6). The appellant’s wife 
supported the prosecution’s case to the extent that her son-in-law was killed 
by the appellant. However, she did not witness the occurrence as she could 
not enter the house out of fear. The statement of the appellant’s daughter, 
who is the wife of the deceased (P.W.6), has a direct and material bearing 
on the fate of this appeal. Hence, we propose to reproduce her statement in 
extenso, which reads as under:
“I know accused Sri Markash Jajara who is present in the dock 
of the court today. The accused is my father.
I also knew deceased Markush Borha who happened to be my 
husband.
The incident occurred about one & a half years back. On the date 
of incident I alongwith my husband proceeded towards the house of 
our parents as they were suﬀ ering from illness. 
On the date of incident I was present
at my work place. When I 
returned back home at about 4 P.M. I came to know that my husband 
had been murdered by my father [accused].
Out of fear I did not enter into the house. When police arrived at 
our house then only I entered into my house. I noticed the dead body 
of my husband lying in the ﬂ oor of the kitchen of the house.
I questioned my father about the incident and he confessed before 
me that he had murdered my husband. Police took the dead body of 
my husband to the hospital for post-mortem examination. My father 
was also taken to the police station.
837
CROSS-EXAMINATION : ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
I do not know anything about the incident. I did not witness the 
incident.
We reside separately from our parents. My parents resided 
alongwith my brother and his wife.
My husband was an alcoholic person. Prior to the date of incident 
my husband used to quarrel with me as well as with my father after 
consuming alcohol.
My father murdered my husband as he used to ill-treat me 
after consuming alcohol. My father confessed before me that he had 
murdered my husband with a piece of bamboo.”
5. The other material witness examined by the prosecution includes 
P.W.8 (Well Borja) – the brother of the deceased, who is also admittedly not 
an eye witness. Having come to know that his brother had been assaulted 
by the appellant, he reached the place of occurrence and saw his younger 
brother lying dead on the ﬂ oor.
6. It may also be mentioned at this stage that as per the postmortem 
report, the deceased suﬀ ered the following injuries:
“1. Laceration of size 7 cm x 1 cm x muscle deep is present over right 
forehead, 3 cm from mid-line and 2.5 cm above eyebrow.
2. Laceration of size 2 cm x 1 cm x muscle deep is present over left 
mastoid region.
3. Laceration of size 2 cm x 1 cm x muscle deep is present just below 
the chin and placed obliquely.” 
7.  Dr. Ved Prakash Gupta, who conducted the autopsy of the dead 
body, entered into the witness box as P.W.4 and while acknowledging the 
postmortem report prepared by him, opined that “the
injury sustained over 
the head by the deceased is fatal to cause instantaneous death.”
8. The Trial Court on consideration of the above-stated evidence held 
the appellant guilty of committing an oﬀ ence under Section 302 IPC and 
consequently, sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.
MARKASH JAJARA v. THE STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.
838 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
9. It appears that owing to his poor ﬁ nancial conditions, the appellant’s 
appeal was forwarded by the Jail Authorities and with the able assistance 
of an amicus curiae, the High Court on re-evaluation of the entire evidence 
came to the following conclusion:
“14. In view of the facts and circumstances, which are well supported 
by the witnesses, we disagree with the submission of the learned 
Amicus Curiae that the conviction of the accused appellant was 
based on suspicion only. We also disagree with the submission of the 
learned counsel that the word of the “confession” has to be recorded 
in the exact words of the accused speciﬁ cally when it is extra judicial 
confession. At para 8 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court passed 
in the case of Ajay Sing -Vs- State of Maharashtra reported in (2007) 
12 sec 341, it has been stated that though it is not necessary that the 
witness should speak the exact words, but there cannot be vital and 
material diﬀ erence. This very sentence shows that it is not necessary 
that the witness should give the exact words spoken by the accused 
who confessed but it would be suﬃ  cient if the material and vital parts 
of the confession has been stated by the witness. In this case, under 
the facts and circumstances, the fact that the PW-6 has stated in her 
deposition that her father confessed to her that he had murdered her 
husband when she questioned him is suﬃ  cient enough as the same
is 
clear, speciﬁ c, unambiguous and trustworthy.”
10. As regards the defence plea taken by the appellant that there was 
no eye witness to the occurrence and that the alleged confession made by 
him before his daughter (P.W.6) could not be relied upon, the High Court 
found no merit in those contentions and opined that:
17. Further, the PW-6 (daughter of the accused) stated that “I 
questioned my father about the incident and he confessed before me 
that he had murdered my husband” and PW-1 has stated that “the 
accused confessed before the villagers that he had committed the 
murder of his son-in-law with the help of bamboo lathi. The statements 
of the two witnesses are simple, clear and unambiguous and they 
clearly conveyed that the accused appellant had confessed that he had 
committed the murder of the victim deceased. It is true that the exact
839
words of the accused appellant were not stated by the two witnesses 
but the material substance of the fact stated by the accused have been 
conveyed. Moreover, the defence did not question the two witnesses 
on the same and not even tried to either controvert or discredit their 
statement. Thus, we ﬁ nd no reason not to believe the statement of the 
witnesses.
Further, the confessional statement of the accused as stated by 
the two witnesses is well supported by the circumstantial evidence that 
the incident took place in the precinct of the house of the accused- 
appellant himself and, the accused-appellant was alone with the dead 
body of the victim at the time of the incident”
11. We have heard Mr. Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on 
behalf of the appellant as well as Mr. Nalin Kohli, learned Senior Additional 
Advocate General, State of Assam, and carefully perused the material placed 
on record.
12. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the 
oﬀ ence attributed to the appellant falls within the ambit of Exception I of 
Section 300 IPC which deﬁ nes “murder”. Exception I reads as follows:
“Exception 1. —When culpable homicide is not murder. — 
Culpable homicide is not murder if the oﬀ ender, whilst deprived of 
the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the 
death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of 
any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following
provisos:—
First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily 
provoked by the oﬀ ender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to 
any person.
Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done 
in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise 
of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in 
the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
MARKASH JAJARA v. THE STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.
840 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden 
enough to prevent the oﬀ ence from amounting to murder is a question 
of fact.”
13. We ought to analyse the aforementioned issue with reference to the 
statement of P.W.6 (Sarani Boria), daughter of the appellant, as reproduced 
in para 5.
14. It may be seen that the Trial Court as well as the High Court have 
heavily relied upon the statement of the daughter of the appellant - Sarani 
Boria (P.W.6) to hold him guilty of committing the murder of his son-in-law 
predominantly in view of his purported confession made before his daughter. 
15. In our considered view, the statement of P.W.6 - Sarani Boria needs 
to be appreciated in its entirety. In her cross-examination, P.W.6 has candidly 
admitted that her husband was an alcoholic and he used to quarrel with her 
and also with the appellant after consuming alcohol. She has aﬃ  rmatively 
deposed that the deceased used to ill-treat her after consuming alcohol.
16. It seems to us from the version of P.W.6 that the deceased was an 
alcoholic and he used to misbehave not only with his wife but also with her 
family members. This version deserves appreciation in its right perspective. 
Such being the conduct of the deceased, the appellant’s only concern was to 
protect the life and dignity of his daughter, who was his only child. Reading 
the evidence on record, it is perceived that the appellant just wanted to create 
some kind
of psychological fear and restraint in the deceased’s mind, so 
that he could no longer assault or humiliate the appellant’s daughter. The 
appellant and the deceased were the only ones present in the house at the 
time of occurrence. The daily consumption of liquor by the deceased was an 
apparent factor that exhorted the appellant to assault the deceased not with 
an intent to commit his murder but only to force the deceased to mend his 
ways and mend his drinking problem. The appellant seemingly attacked the 
deceased without any intention to commit his murder. It was rather a crude 
attempt to forcibly change the deceased’s habits and help the appellant’s 
daughter to have peaceful and digniﬁ ed life. 
17. The appellant’s motive at best was to prevent the deceased from 
misbehaving with his daughter after consuming alcohol. The manner in 
which the occurrence appears to have taken place inside the house, does
841
indicate that the appellant lost his self-control on account of persistent 
provocation and suddenly thrashed his son-in-law with the bamboo stick. It is 
a case where provocation seems to be brewing up since the deceased shifted 
to the appellant’s house. It acquired enormous gravity with each recurrence 
of humiliating stances of the appellant’s daughter. The fatal occurrence was 
seemingly the ﬁ nal culmination of loss of the power of self-control. The fact 
that the deceased was living as a `ghar javai’ with the appellant, suﬃ  ciently 
indicates that the appellant did not have any pre-meditated intention to 
commit the murder of his son-in-law. But for the continuous harassment 
of the appellant’s daughter by the deceased who was a habitual drunkard, 
the appellant would not have lost his senses suddenly. The simmering 
discontent of a frustrated and hapless father unfortunately led him to strike 
the deceased with a bamboo stick. The series of provocative acts attributable 
to the deceased indeed laid the foundation of sustained provocation.
18. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, as noticed 
above, it appears to us that the act of the appellant in causing injuries to the 
deceased falls within the expression of `culpable homicide’ which does not 
amount to `murder’. We hold accordingly. The impugned judgments of the 
Trial Court as well as the High Court are modiﬁ ed to that extent.
19. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for 
the
parties on the quantum of sentence. In our considered opinion, the 
ends of justice would be adequately met by converting the sentence of 
life imprisonment awarded to the appellant to rigorous imprisonment of 
ten years. The sentence as awarded by the courts below stands modiﬁ ed 
accordingly.  The appeal is allowed in part. The appellant shall be released 
on completion of the requisite and reduced period of sentence, if he is not 
required in any other case.
20. As a sequel thereto, pending interlocutory applications, if any, also 
stand disposed of.
Headnotes prepared by:  
Appeal partly allowed.
Ankit Gyan
MARKASH JAJARA v. THE STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.