YASH DEVELOPERS versus HARIHAR KRUPA CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LIMITED & ORS.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1443, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1443 : 2024 INSC 559
Yash Developers 
v. 
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society 
Limited & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 8127 of 2024)
30 July 2024
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Development agreement in favour of the appellant was terminated 
by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee (AGRC) exercising 
its power under Section 13 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas 
(Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971. Order 
of termination upheld by the High Court. Issue as regards scope 
of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution against 
an order passed under Section 13; accountability of officers 
exercising power coupled with duty under Section 13; Performance 
audit of Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and 
Redevelopment) Act, 1971.
Headnotes†
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and 
Redevelopment) Act, 1971 – s.13 – Constitution of India – Article 
226 – Rehabilitation of slum dwellers – Appellant was appointed 
as a developer by respondent no. 1 – However, development 
was prolonged for over two decades – Development agreement 
terminated by the statutory authority – Apex Grievance 
Redressal Committee (AGRC) – Validity of the said power 
exercised by the AGRC – Order of termination upheld by 
the High Court – Plea of the appellant that the delay in 
implementation of the project was in various phases between 
2003 to 2011, 2011 to 2014 and 2014 to 2019 due to various
reasons inter alia long-drawn litigation with a competing 
builder, delay in obtaining the environmental clearances or the 
delay due to non-cooperation of certain slum dwellers, in which 
the appellant had no role and was not at all responsible for:
Held: Under s.13(2), Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) has the 
power to redevelop the project if it is satisfied that the development 
is not proceeding within the time specified – This power of SRA 
* Author
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is coupled with a duty to ensure that the project is completed 
within time – The provision is a statutory incorporation of time 
integrity in the performance of the duty – SRA is accountable 
for the performance of this duty – The primary responsibility to 
implement s.13 and allied provisions and to monitor compliances 
of schemes and agreements vests with the CEO – If the actions 
of CEO are based on the directions of the SRA, then the SRA 
must equally bear the responsibility – A writ of mandamus would 
lie against the concerned authorities if they do not perform the 
statutory duty of ensuring that the project is completed within 
the time prescribed – Delay of 8 years in resolving disputes 
with a competing builder cannot be a justification under any 
circumstance – Appellant being a developer fully understands 
the process of obtaining environmental clearances while other 
sanctions and permissions are pending, and it was for him to 
make all the necessary arrangements – Non-cooperation of some 
of the members cannot be a ground for delaying the project from 
2014 to 2019 – AGRC and High Court correctly held that the delay 
caused due to the sanction of the draft development plan for the 
construction of the road cannot be a justification for delaying the 
project from 2015 to 2019 – Justifications given by the appellant 
for delaying the project, rejected – No merit in the present appeal, 
costs imposed – Though the
justifications for delay are rejected, but 
there was dereliction of the statutory duty of the SRA in ensuring 
that the project is completed within time – There was negligence 
on the part of CEO and the SRA and they are accountable for 
their actions. [Paras 13, 14.1, 24, 26, 27]
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to life – Slum 
Rehabilitation Scheme – Rehabilitation of slum dwellers:
Held: Execution of the project under the Slum Rehabilitation 
Scheme cannot be viewed as a real estate development project – 
There is a public purpose involved inextricably connected to the 
right to life of some of our brother and sister citizens living in 
pathetic conditions. [Para 27]
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and 
Redevelopment) Act, 1971 – Performance audit of – Litigation 
under the Act, worrisome – Directions for comprehensive 
statutory audit issued – Problem with the statutory scheme 
w.r.t issues such as identification and declaration of land as a 
slum; identification of slum dwellers; selection of a developer;
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1445
Yash Developers v.  
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.
apportionment of the slum land between redevelopment area 
and sale area; obligation to provide transit accommodation for 
the slum dwellers pending redevelopment; issues of lack of 
independence and objectivity in the functioning of statutory 
authorities; effectiveness of statutory remedies; judicial review 
proceedings under Art. 226 cannot be a long-term solution:
Held: The problems arising out of the statutory scheme and 
policy framework should have come under review by the State 
of Maharashtra – Assessment of the working of the statute to 
realise if its purpose and objective achieved or not is the implied 
duty of the executive government – Reviewing and assessing the 
implementation of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law – It 
is in recognition of this obligation of the executive government 
that the constitutional courts have directed governments to carry 
performance audit of statutes – Role of judiciary elaborated – Chief 
Justice of the Bombay High Court requested to constitute a bench 
to initiate suo motu proceedings for reviewing the working of the 
statute to identify the cause of the problems indicated. [Para 35, 42]
Judicial review – Directions for review and assessment of the 
implementation of a Statute – Justification:
Held: Constitutional courts are fully justified in giving such 
directions as they are in a unique position of perceiving the
working of a statute while exercising judicial review, during 
which they could identify the fault-lines in the implementation of 
a statute. [Para 37]
Case Law Cited
Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. CEO, Slum Rehabilitation Authority 
& Ors. [2018] 1 SCR 1 : (2018) 2 SCC 230; Vijay Rajmohan v. 
CBI [2022] 19 SCR 563 : (2023) 1 SCC 329; State of Haryana v. 
Mukesh Kumar [2011] 14 SCR 211 : (2011) 10 SCC 404; Pravin 
Electricals (P) Ltd. v. Galaxy Infra & Engineering (P) Ltd. [2021] 1 
SCR 1162 : (2021) 5 SCC 671; Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand 
[2010] 9 SCR 1168 : (2010) 7 SCC 667; Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. 
Aptech Ltd. [2024] 3 SCR 73 : (2024) 5 SCC 313; Public Interest 
Foundation v. Union of India [2018] 10 SCR 141 : (2019) 3 SCC 
224 – referred to.
Galaxy Enterprises v. State of Maharashtra (2019) SCC OnLine 
Bom 897; Tulsiwadi Navnirman Co-op Housing Society Ltd. & Anr.
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v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2008 (1) Bom.C.R.1; New Janta 
SRA CHS Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2019) SCC Online Bom 
3896 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Justice in Adapting to Change, in R.W.M. Dias, JURISPRUDENCE, 
305-327 (5th edn., 2013).
List of Acts
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and 
Redevelopment) Act, 1971; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Section 13 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance 
and Redevelopment) Act, 1971; Judicial review under Article 226 of 
the Constitution; Development agreement; Developer; Performance 
audit of statute; Order of termination; Comprehensive statutory 
audit; Rehabilitation of slum dwellers; Delay in implementation of 
the project; Development agreement terminated; Redevelopment 
of the project; Rehabilitation building; Environmental clearance; 
Development plan;  Builders; Slum Rehabilitation Scheme; Right 
to life.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
8127 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.10.2022 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Bombay in WPL No.18022 of 2021
With
Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 217 of 2024 In SLP (C) No. 20844 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
Kapil Sibal, Sr. Adv., C.U. Singh, Vikas Mehta, Adit Nair, Prakash 
Shah, Ranbir Singh, Abhik Chimni, Ms. Rupali Samuel, Kartik, Advs. 
for the Appellant.
Sanjay Kharde, Shekhar Naphade, C.A. Sunderam, Dama 
Seshadri
Naidu, Dhruv Mehta, Huzeifa Ahmadi, Vinay Navare, 
Sr. Advs., Satyajeet Kharde, Sunil Kumar Verma, Anirudha Joshi, 
Shashibhushan P. Adgaonkar, Ms. Pradnya S. Adgaonkar, Aaditya
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 
1447
Yash Developers v.  
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.
Aniruddha Pande, Ms. Rukmini Bobde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, 
Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, 
Adarsh Dubey, Ms. Soumya Priyadarshinee, Ankit Ambasta, Amit 
Srivastava, Amlaan Kumar, Saket Sikri, Aman Vachher, Dhiraj, 
Ashutosh Dubey, Ms. Anshu Vachher, Ms. Abhiti Vachher, Akshat 
Vachher, Ms. Smriti Puri, Amit Kumar, P. N. Puri, Anil Nag, Zulfikar 
Ali, Mrs. Jaya, Ms. Monica Saini, Amit Agnihotri, Ms. Priyanka Midha, 
Ms. Priya Misra, M. Yogesh Kanna, Ms. Anshula Vijay Kumar Grover, 
Ms. Rucha Deshpande, Rajeev Maheshwaranand Roy, Nilesh Kumar, 
Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
Table of Contents*
I. Introduction :......................................................................
2
II. Scope of Judicial Review against an order under Section 
13 of the Act:........................................................................ 4
III. Accountability of officers exercising power coupled 
with duty under Section 13:................................................. 11
IV. Submissions and Analysis:..............................................
13
(i) The first phase of delay is between 2003 and 2011.....
14
(ii) The second phase relates to the delay in obtaining 
necessary permissions, approvals and environmental 
clearances from 2011 to
2014......................................... 17
(iii) The third phase of delay relates to the alleged 
non-cooperation of certain slum dwellers leading to 
the stalling of the project from 2014 to 2019................. 18
(iv) The next period of inaction is from 2015 to 2017. 
This is sought to be justified on the ground that the 
Municipal Corporation sanctioned a road that may 
pass through the property and published the draft 
development plan (DP) on 25.02.2015........................... 20
(v) Re: Appellant did not have the financial resources..... 21
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
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(vi) Re: Submission on maintainability of proceedings 
before AGRC................................................................... 25
(vii) Re: Locus or conflict of respondent no.6.............. 27
V.
Findings:.........................................................................
28
VI.
Conclusion:......................................................................
32
VII.
Re : Performance audit of statute:.................................. 32
1.	
Leave granted.
I.	
Introduction:
2.	
The present controversy is a manifestation of common battles between 
competing real estate developers under the pretext of rehabilitating 
slum dwellers under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, 
Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971.1 In the year 2003, the 
appellant was appointed as a developer by respondent no. 1, a co-
operative Housing Society of slum dwellers having their hutments on 
the subject land in Borivali, Mumbai which was declared as a ‘slum 
area’ under the Act. As the development was unduly prolonged for over 
two decades, the development agreement in favour of the appellant 
was terminated by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee2 by its 
order dated 04.08.2021. The order of termination was challenged 
by the appellant before the Bombay High Court.3 
3.	
The Bombay High Court formulated the following issues:
“(i) A developer being removed on the non-fulfillment of 
the basic requirement to commence construction
of a slum 
rehabilitation building for a long period of 18 years, whether 
is not fatal to the object and intention of a statutory intent 
behind a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.
(ii) Another question would be as to whether the right to 
shelter which is part of the slum dwellers’ right to livelihood 
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, can be 
1	
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Act”.
2	
For short, the ‘AGRC’.
3	
Writ Petition (L) No. 18022 of 2021.
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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.
continued to be nullified by such actions of unconscionable 
delay on the part of the developer, in not commencing 
construction of the slum project even by an inch more 
particularly when the nature of such work awarded to a 
developer for him is purely a commercial venture, for profit.” 
4.	
Apart from the above two issues, the High Court highlighted the 
limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution 
against the decision of the statutory authority-AGRC. The High Court, 
however, proceeded to examine the facts in full detail and dismissed 
the writ petition on facts, as well as on law.4 Thus, the present appeal. 
5.	
Even before us, the appellant argued the case only on facts, to the 
extent that we were under an illusion that we were hearing suit for 
specific performance involving an issue of ready and willingness. 
Having heard the learned counsels for the parties at length on 
facts, we will certainly deal with their submissions, but before that 
we must reiterate the limited scope of inquiry under Article 226 of 
the Constitution.
II.	
Scope of Judicial Review against an order under Section 
13 of the Act:
6.	
In this case, as in any other public law proceedings, we are concerned 
with the legality and validity of the power exercised by the AGRC 
in terminating the development agreement with the appellant by its 
order dated 04.08.2021. This
order is in exercise of power under 
Section 13 of the Act which is as under:
“13. Power of Competent Authority to redevelop 
clearance area:
(1)	
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) 
of Section 12 the Competent Authority may, at any 
time, after the land has been cleared of buildings in 
accordance with a clearance order, but before the work 
of redevelopment of that land has been commenced 
by the owner, by order, determine to redevelop the 
land at its own cost, if that Authority is satisfied that 
it is necessary in the public interest to do so.
4	
By judgment dated 14.10.2022, reported as 2022 SCC Online Bom 3712, hereinafter referred to as the 
impugned Judgment.
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(2)	
Where land has been cleared of the buildings in 
accordance with a clearance order, the Competent 
Authority, if it is satisfied that the land has been, 
or is being, redeveloped by the owner thereof in 
contravention of plans duly approved, or any restrictions 
or conditions imposed under sub-section (10) of Section 
12, or has not been redeveloped within the time, if 
any, specified under such conditions, may, by order, 
determine to redevelop the land at its own cost.
Provided that, before passing such order, the owner 
shall be given a reasonable opportunity of showing 
cause why the order should not be passed.”
(emphasis supplied)
7.	
Section 13(2) of the Act specifically empowers the competent 
authority to re-determine the agreement if it is satisfied that the 
re-development has not been done within the time specified. The 
provision is certainly a statutory incorporation of time integrity in 
the performance of the duty. We recognise this as a statutory duty 
of the competent authority to ensure that the project is completed 
within the prescribed time. We have no hesitation even in holding 
that a writ of mandamus would lie against the concerned authorities 
if they do not perform the statutory duty of ensuring that the project 
is completed within the time prescribed. 
8.	
In Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. CEO, Slum Rehabilitation Authority 
& Ors.,5 this Court held that Section 13(2) of the Act empowers the
statutory authorities to take action and hand over the project to some 
other agency if the development is being delayed. The relevant 
portions of the judgment are as under:-
“49. Otherwise, there would be an anomalous situation 
where the Society would have terminated its contract 
with Susme but the letter of intent issued by the SRA 
would continue to hold the field and it would be entitled 
to develop the land. The Society approached the SRA, 
in fact, asking it to take action against Susme. Since the 
SRA is the authority which issued the letter of intent, it will 
definitely have the power to cancel the letter of intent...
5	
[2018] 1 SCR 1 : (2018) 2 SCC 230
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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.
…
52. A bare reading of these provisions shows that in 
terms of clauses (c) and (d) of sub-section (3) of Section 
3-A of the Slum Act, the SRA not only has the power, 
but it is duty-bound to get the slum rehabilitation scheme 
implemented and to do all such other acts and things as 
will be necessary for achieving the object of rehabilitation 
of slums. In this case, the SRA was faced with a situation 
where the slum-dwellers were suffering for more than 25 
years and, therefore the action taken by SRA to remove 
Susme for the unjustified delay was totally justified.”
9.	
Case after case, the Bombay High Court has been ruling that, a) the 
developer is duty-bound to complete the project within the stipulated 
time and that b) the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) has not 
merely the power but a broader duty to ensure that the developer 
completes the project within time. We will refer to those judgments, 
not so much to certify that the issue is no more res-integra, but to 
emphasise that the rulings have not had the desired impact, much 
less compliance. The reason is that, neither the developer nor the 
authority is asked to face the consequences of their derelictions. 
That Section 13(2) is a power coupled with duty is clear from the 
judgments of this Court and many other judgments of the High 
Courts, however experience tells us that this recognition of a statutory
duty in itself is not sufficient. Until and unless duty is identified with 
accountability, judicial review is ineffective. 
10.	 In Galaxy Enterprises v. State of Maharashtra,6 the Bombay High 
Court observed:
“53. The record reveals that what M/s Saral could do in 
eight years of its appointment, was to get the Annexure II, 
namely the list of the 73 eligible occupants certified from 
the MHADA. It was, thus, expected from the petitioner 
that the revalidation of Annexure II, which was possibly 
not a complex formality be undertaken at the earliest. 
However this certainly did not happen and citing various 
reasons, which cannot be believed to be not attributable 
6	
2019 SCC OnLine Bom 897.
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to the petitioner, ultimately, the petitioner could not get the 
Annexure II certified only on 23 December 2013, which is 
after about eight years of the petitioner’s appointment. This 
fact itself raises a serious doubt as to the real intentions 
of the petitioner to undertake the scheme. The petitioner 
could not have simply blamed the authorities for the 
delay, as there is complete lack of concrete and/or any 
real steps which were to be taken by the petitioner to 
effectively seek different approvals, once the society had 
put the petitioner in the driver’s seat, in complete control 
of the project as rightly commented, in the impugned 
orders. Thus, the case of the petitioner, that from time to 
time steps were taken to implement the slum scheme as 
entrusted to it be the society cannot be accepted. These 
are the contentions of the petitioner, merely pointing out 
some movement of the files with the authorities. This 
was certainly not sufficient and what was required and 
expected by the petitioner was to take real effective steps 
to progress the slum redevelopment. The petitioner was 
expected to expeditiously obtain an Annexure II, as certified 
by the MHADA, thereafter obtain a LOI and then obtain a 
Commencement Certificate to start with the constructions 
and before that make a provision for temporary alternate 
accommodation for the slum dwellers to reside till 
completion of the scheme. There is not an iota
of material 
to show that any such steps much less expeditiously were 
taken by the petitioner which will show the real bonafides 
of the petitioner to undertake the scheme.
54. In fact the petitioner kept the slum dwellers/society 
in dark on any of the steps alleged to be taken by the 
petitioner. There was no transparency in the petitioner’s 
approach with the slum-dwellers whose anxious, impatient 
and painful wait of so many years for the slum scheme to 
start was continuously staring at the petitioner’s right from 
the word go. This was not what was expected of a diligent 
developer. The slum schemes are expected to be taken and 
pursued by the developers for genuine and bonafide object 
and purpose to redevelop the slums as reflected in the 
rules which is for the mutual benefit namely the benefit of
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Yash Developers v.  
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.
the slum dwellers of being provided a permanent alternate 
accommodation and so far as the developer, to exploit 
the free sale component, which is nothing but a business 
consideration for the developer. If this be the long and short 
of a slum scheme what can be the intention of a developer 
to sit tight on a slum scheme and not take expeditious 
measures to undertake and complete the scheme. The 
reasons can be innumerable, if the reasons are attributable 
to the authorities, the developer has certainly remedies in 
law to be immediately resorted. No forum competent to 
entertain such complaints would refuse to look into such 
grievances when the very right to livelihood of the slum 
dwellers who are living in inhuman conditions, being a 
concomitant of Article 21 of the Constitution, is involved 
and which becomes a matter of urgent concern and of 
utmost priority. A developer cannot shut his eyes to all 
these factors and attributes, once appointed by the society. 
For the developer, there has be relentless action on day 
to day basis as any delay in not implementing the slum 
scheme is not only detrimental to the slum dwellers, but 
to the society at large. Delay in effective implementation 
of the slum scheme would defeat the very goal, the ideals 
and the purpose of the slum redevelopment scheme.
55. A perusal of the record indicates that the society is 
correct in
contending that during the period from 2006 to 
2016 i.e. for about 10 years the petitioner did not take 
any concrete steps towards implementation of the slum 
rehabilitation scheme and the petitioner had clearly failed 
to obtain a LOI for such a long period. The society, thus, 
was constrained to file the application dated 15 March 
2016, under Section 13(2) of the Slums Act, praying for 
change of the petitioner as the developer. It is correct 
that Annexure-II was originally issued by MHADA on 16 
April 1998. The petitioner was appointed as developer 
in the month of June 2006 and it clearly took about 
seven to eight years for the petitioner to obtain revised 
Annexure-II which was obtained on 23 December 2013. 
Before the Chief Executive Officer and even before the 
appellate authority the petitioner has failed to show any
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justifiable reason as to why it took these many years for 
the petitioner to simply obtain a revised Annexure-II when 
as per norms issued by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority 
Annexure-II is required to be finalised within a period of 
four months when the hutment dwellers are below 500 in 
number. Further the record clearly indicates that even after 
obtaining the revised Annexure II, on 23 December 2013, 
the petitioner did not initiate immediate steps to obtain LOI 
for the next three years. There is, thus, much substance 
in the contention of the society that only after the society 
initiated proceedings under Section 13(2) of the Slums 
Act, the petitioner initiated steps to obtain a LOI.
...
57. There cannot be a myopic approach to these issues 
of a delay in implementation of a slum rehabilitation 
scheme. Things as they stand are required to be seen in 
their entirety. The only mantra for the slum schemes to be 
implemented is it’s time bound completion and a machinery 
to be evolved by the authorities, to have effective measures 
in that direction to monitor the schemes as a part of their 
statutory obligation to avoid delays. Non-commencement 
of the slum scheme for long years and substantial delay 
in completion of the slum schemes should be a thing of 
the past. In the present case, looked from any angle there 
is no plausible explanation forthcoming for the delay of 
so many years at the hands of the
petitioner to take bare 
minimum steps to commence construction.
58. The authorities should weed away and reprimand 
persons who are not genuine developers and who are 
merely agents and dealers in slum schemes. These 
persons after get themselves appointed as developers, 
to ultimately deal/sell the slum schemes, as if it is a 
commodity. Any loopholes in the rules to this effect, 
therefore, are required to be sealed.
...
64. Thus, it is quite clear that inordinate delay is a sufficient 
ground for removal of a developer. There is neither any
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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.
perversity nor any illegality in the findings as recorded by 
both authorities below, in observing that the petitioner had 
grossly delayed the implementation of the slum scheme in 
question. The findings as recorded in the impugned order 
passed by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee are 
also sufficiently borne out by the files produced before 
this Court…”
(emphasis supplied)
11.	 A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Tulsiwadi Navnirman Co-
op Housing Society Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,7 held 
that the SRA has been conferred with certain powers and each one 
of them is coupled with a duty. If the slum dwellers are eligible to be 
rehabilitated at the site and within a reasonable period, they cannot 
be left at the mercy of developers and builders. The slum dwellers 
cannot be expected to occupy a transit accommodation endlessly, 
without proper maintenance, and hygiene. An independent and 
impartial implementation, supervision and monitoring of the projects 
is the purpose for which the authority has been set up under the Act. 
12.	 In New Janta SRA CHS Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra,8 the High Court 
considered the dispute between two rival societies claiming rights 
over a slum scheme. The Court observed as under:-
“187. It thus cannot be accepted more particularly 
considering the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Slums Act 
that a slum society at
its sole discretion and/or without any 
control and regulations by SRA can change the developer. 
If such a course of action is made permissible, considering 
the hard realities and the hundreds of developers being 
available to take over such schemes, it would create a 
chaos and it is likely that a situation is created, that the slum 
rehabilitation scheme never takes off and it is entangled 
into fights between two factions within the society and/or 
two rival developers. This is certainly not the object of the 
legislation. It would be too farfetched to read such draconian 
rights available to the Managing Committee or to general 
7	
2008(1) Bom.C.R.1.
8	
2019 SCC Online Bom 3896.
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body of a society without any regulation, supervision and 
control of the SRA to change the developer. The SRA 
has all the powers not only to regulate and control such 
situations but to take a decision as to what is in the best 
interest of the slum dwellers and intended to achieve the 
object of the legislation.
188. Secondly it is not in dispute that the application of the 
petitioner for change of respondent no.5-developer was 
under Section 13(2) of the Slums Act. Having noted this 
provision in the foregoing paragraphs, Section 13(2) of the 
Slums Act would come into play only when the developer 
fails to adhere to the provisions of the development 
permissions granted by the SRA and a change of developer 
can be sought only when there is an inordinate delay or 
the construction carried on, is contrary to the sanctioned 
plans and/or the permissions. Considering this clear position 
falling under Section 13(2), in the context of this factual 
controversy as raised by the petitioner in regard to the 
consent of 70% of the slum dwellers being not available 
to respondent no.5, 1 am of the clear opinion that the view 
taken by both the authorities, in not accepting the petitioner’s 
contention, is required to be held to be correct and valid. “
III.	
Accountability of officers exercising power coupled with 
duty under Section 13:
13.	 Two facets of Section 13 (2) of the Act are that; a) the SRA 
has the power to
redevelop the project if it is satisfied that the 
development is not proceeding within the time specified, and 
b) that power of SRA is coupled with a duty to ensure that the project 
is completed within time. We hold that the SRA is accountable for the 
performance of this duty. Accountability need not be superimposed by 
the text of a statute, it exists wherever power is granted to accomplish 
statutory purpose. In Vijay Rajmohan v. CBI,9 this Court held:-
“34. Accountability in itself is an essential principle of 
administrative law. Judicial review of administrative action 
will be effective and meaningful by ensuring accountability 
of the officer or authority in charge.
9	
[2022] 19 SCR 563 : (2023) 1 SCC 329
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35. The principle of accountability is considered as a 
cornerstone of the human rights framework. It is a crucial 
feature that must govern the relationship between “duty 
bearers” in authority and “right holders” affected by their 
actions. Accountability of institutions is also one of the 
development goals adopted by the United Nations in 201510 
and is also recognised as one of the six principles of the 
Citizens Charter Movement.11
36. Accountability has three essential constituent 
dimensions: (i) responsibility, (ii) answerability, and (iii) 
enforceability. Responsibility requires the identification 
of duties and performance obligations of individuals in 
authority and with authorities. Answerability requires 
reasoned decision-making so that those affected by their 
decisions, including the public, are aware of the same. 
Enforceability requires appropriate corrective and remedial 
action against lack of responsibility and accountability to be 
taken.12 Accountability has a corrective function, making it 
possible to address individual or collective grievances. It 
enables action against officials or institutions for dereliction 
of duty. It also has a preventive function that helps to 
identify the procedure or policy which has become non-
functional and to improve upon it.”
14.	 For effective implementation of the principle of accountability of power 
under the
Act, we identify the duties and performance obligations of 
the CEO. It is evident from the statutory scheme that the responsibility 
vests in the CEO, defined under Section 2 (b+a) read with Section 
3A(2) of the Act. The CEO reports to the SRA, the duty of which 
is defined under Section 3B of the Act. One of the most important 
duties of the SRA is to ensure that the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme 
is implemented. 
10	
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 70/1 dated 25-9-2015.
11	
Citizens Charter adopted by the Government in the “Conference of Chief Ministers of various States and 
Union Territories” held in May 1997 in New Delhi, available from https://goicharters.nic.in/public/website/
home.
12	
See Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Who will be Accountable? Human 
Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agenda, available from http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/WhoWillBeAccountable.pdf
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14.1.	 The primary responsibility to implement Section 13 of the Act 
and allied provisions and to monitor compliances of schemes 
and agreements vests with the CEO. If the actions of CEO are 
based on the directions of the SRA, then the SRA must equally 
bear the responsibility. The CEO and/or the SRA must explain 
the delay in implementation, failing which, the consequences 
as determined by the court will follow. 
PART-II
IV.	
Submissions and Analysis:
15.	 Returning to facts of the case, Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel, 
appearing on behalf of the appellant, articulated the allegation of delay 
into six parts and in his inimitable style proceeded to explain how in 
each part, the appellant had no role and not at all responsible. We 
will deal with each phase of delay in the same manner as Mr. Sibal 
has presented the case before us. 
16.	 (i) The first phase of delay is between 2003 and 2011. The relevant 
facts are as follows. 
16.1.	The appellant was appointed by respondent no.1 to develop 
the Project under a development agreement dated 20.08.2003, 
following which the appellant made a proposal for development 
on 11.12.2003. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, 
however, assigned the re-development to a rival society, 
namely Omkareshwar Co-Operative Housing Society13 and a 
developer, namely Siddhivinayak Developers14 on 06.05.2004. 
Pursuant to this, on 07.09.2004, the SRA accepted the 
proposal
given by Omkareshwar and Siddhivinayak for the 
development of the Property. After a long-drawn litigation 
between the appellant and respondent no. 1 on one side, 
and Omkareshwar and Siddhivinayak on the other, the CEO, 
SRA finally settled the dispute by its order dated 07.06.2011 
and held that the appellant had the required 70% consent of 
individual slum dwellers to implement the project and also 
that the proposal of Omkareshwar was not valid as it was 
13	
Hereinafter, referred to as “Omkareshwar”.
14	
Hereinafter, referred to as “Siddhivinayak”.
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made after the proposal of respondent no.1. Dealing with 
the period, Mr. Sibal has submitted that multiple proceedings 
between the appellant and respondent no. 1 on one side and 
Omkareshwar and Siddhivinayak on the other consumed lot of 
time. While the High Court initially disposed of a writ petition 
recording a settlement that appellant and respondent no.1 are 
entitled to develop the Property, Omkareshwar challenged it 
leading to several rounds of litigation before the High-Powered 
Committee15 and the High Court. The issue was laid to rest 
only on 07.06.2011 by an order of the CEO, SRA holding that 
the appellant enjoyed the consent of 70% of eligible slum 
dwellers and hence was qualified to be the developer. Mr. 
Sibal has submitted that the consequence of this litigation is 
that the LOI could be issued in favour of the appellant only 
on 29.06.2011, i.e. after this dispute was settled. The eight 
years’ delay in obtaining the LOI was inevitable and was not 
due to any fault of the appellant.
16.2.	Per contra, Mr. C A Sundaram, learned senior counsel, 
appearing for the respondent no.6-Veena Developers, has 
submitted that the appellant did not have the financial capacity 
or the technical expertise to complete the project within the 
prescribed time of 3 years. It is due to this reason that the 
appellant was unable to commence construction even when 
all the
requisite permissions and approvals had been obtained. 
Further, Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel, 
appearing for respondent nos.8-48, who are some of the slum 
dwellers, has submitted that the delay in the construction is 
entirely attributable to the appellant. He submitted that the 
appellant did not take any action to obtain the LOI anytime 
between 2003-2011.
16.3.	While adjudicating on the delay in implementation of the 
project during 2003-2011, the AGRC relied on clause 11 
of the development agreement dated 20.08.2003 requiring 
the appellant to complete the development of the project 
within three years from the issuance of the Commencement 
Certificate dated 14.07.2014.
15	
Hereinafter, referred to as the “HPC”.
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16.4.	On the issue of delay from 2003 to 2011, the High Court 
examined the facts independently and upheld the findings of 
the AGRC. The High Court held that a delay cannot be viewed 
as reasonable. Further, the High Court held that the litigation 
with Omkareshwar did not prevent the appellant from starting 
the project, especially when the appellant had the consent of 
more than 70% of the slum dwellers at all material times. The 
High Court also observed that the appellant was not diligent 
in procuring the LOI.
17.	 (ii) The second phase relates to the delay in obtaining necessary 
permissions, approvals and environmental clearances from 2011 to 
2014. The SRA issued Annexure-III, certifying the financial capability 
of a developer on 21.06.2011 and this was followed by issuance 
of LOI dated 29.06.2011. The appellant applied for Environmental 
Clearance16 on 15.12.2011 and obtained it only on 28.04.2014. The 
Commencement Certificate for the construction of the rehabilitation 
building and the high-rise clearance by the Municipal Corporation 
of Greater Mumbai were issued to the appellant on 14.07.2014 and 
09.10.2014, respectively.
17.1.	In the above referred background, Mr. Sibal submitted that the 
EC had to be obtained before the Commencement Certificate 
could be issued for the construction of the rehabilitation 
building. For on-site construction of more than 20,000 square 
meters, EC is required and for this,
he relied on condition no. 
51 of the LOI dated 29.06.2011 and condition no. 38 of the 
intimation of approval dated 21.04.2012. While the appellant 
made an application for EC in the year 2011, it was granted 
only on 28.04.2014. He has submitted that the delay between 
2011-2014 was again unavoidable as certain mandatory 
permissions were required. Per contra, Mr. Ahmadi submitted 
that an EC was not required to commence construction of 
the rehabilitation building as the on-site construction did not 
exceed 20,000 square meters.
17.2.	Upon perusing the record, the AGRC found that the delay was 
indeed attributable to the appellant. The High Court also noticed 
that the appellant did not commence the construction after 
16	
Hereinafter, referred to as “EC”.
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getting the necessary approvals but waited for the EC. The 
High Court also noted that some parts of the project like the 
rehabilitation building did not require an EC for commencing 
construction. 
18.	 (iii) The third phase of delay relates to the alleged non-cooperation 
of certain slum dwellers leading to the stalling of the project from 
2014 to 2019. Mr. Sibal submitted that as some of the slum dwellers 
were not cooperative, applications under Sections 33 and 38 of the 
Act for eviction were made to the Assistant Municipal Commissioner, 
MCGM. Initially, the Deputy Collector passed orders on 05.11.2020 
observing that the eviction proceedings can be taken forward only 
after directions from the High Court and in the meanwhile directed the 
appellant to deposit 11 months rent concerning 30 non-cooperating 
slum dwellers. These applications under Sections 33 and 38 of the Act 
came to be decided only in 2021, and that is how, it is submitted, the 
project got delayed for reasons beyond the control of the appellant. 
18.1.	 Mr. Ahmadi submitted that the pendency of the eviction 
applications does not justify the extraordinary delay of 5 
years on the part of the appellant. Mr. Sundaram submitted 
that the mere filing of applications under Sections 33 and 38 
of the Act is not sufficient to justify the delay. It is submitted 
that the appellant has failed to take active
steps in getting the 
applications disposed of. This inaction suited the appellant as 
it did not have the capacity or the capability to complete the 
project.
18.2.	 Affirming the findings of the AGRC, the High Court observed that 
the appellant went into deep slumber after filing applications for 
eviction of non-cooperating slum dwellers between 2014-2015.
18.3.	 The fact that the appellant had to initiate proceedings against 
certain non-cooperating members and that the proceedings 
were pending for a long time, whether justified or not, should not 
have a bearing on the obligations of the appellant to complete 
and handover the project as per the development agreement. 
Under no circumstance, litigation of this nature would justify 
inaction from 2014 to 2019.
19.	 (iv) The next period of inaction is from 2015 to 2017. This is sought to 
be justified on the ground that the Municipal Corporation sanctioned
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a road that may pass through the property and published the draft 
development plan (DP) on 25.02.2015. 
19.1.	 The objections filed by the appellant on 03.04.2015 eventually 
came to be disposed of only on 12.11.2018 when the said road 
was deleted from the development plan. This period, Mr. Sibal 
submits, must be excluded as no development, much less any 
construction, is permissible once the draft plan is published.
19.2.	 Mr. Sundaram submitted that if the appellant had commenced 
the construction after the commencement certificate dated 
14.07.2014, the draft development plan published in 2015 
could never have affected the re-development at all. He 
further submitted that as LOI and IOA were issued in 2011 and 
2012, the so-called draft DP published in 2015 cannot be a 
justification. Mr. Ahmadi has submitted that except for 2 months 
between 25.02.2015 and 23.04.2015, there was no proposed 
development plan road in any of the plans. He would submit 
that the proposed DP road affected only the proposed sale 
building, not the entire project. In any event, he would submit 
that the sale building could not have commenced till substantial 
progress in rehabilitation building was made.
19.3.	 The observations of AGRC also go to show that draft DP could 
justify 2 years’ delay and no more. The High Court observed 
that the notification dated 25.02.2015 under no circumstances 
precluded the appellant from starting
construction of other 
parts of the Property.
20.	 (v) Re: Appellant did not have the financial resources. Dealing with 
the findings of the AGRC and the High Court that the appellant did 
not have the financial resources as evidenced by the agreements 
that they have executed in favour of third parties, Mr. Sibal 
submitted that this issue was never raised in the show-cause notice 
dated 04.12.2020, which initiated the proceedings leading to the 
termination of the development agreement of the appellant. The 
factual background is that from 2017 onwards, the appellant executed 
certain financial agreements with third parties. On 17.02.2017, an 
agreement with M/s Rajesh Habitat Private Limited was executed as 
per which the saleable rights under the project were transferred in 
favour of Rajesh Habitat in lieu of finance of Rs. 30 crores. Further, 
Rajesh Habitat mortgaged their rights in favour of M/s Vistra ITCL
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by a deed dated 22.03.2017, which later came to be cancelled on 
08.02.2019 and a deed of reconveyance between the appellant and 
Vistra was entered into. Later, one M/s Sanghvi Associates provided 
financial assistance of Rs. 50 crores to the appellant by way of a 
mortgage deed. In pursuance of these financing arrangements, 
Sanghvi Associates gave no objection to the appellant entering into 
an agreement with respondent no.6-Veena Developers. Following 
this, a joint development agreement dated 18.10.2019 was entered 
into between the appellant and respondent no. 6.
20.1.	 Mr. Sibal contended that the appellant has the requisite financial 
capacity of technical expertise to complete the project. He 
would submit that these agreements do not establish that the 
appellant does not have the financial capacity or the technical 
expertise to undertake and complete the project. That the 
appellant had the capacity is evidenced by the deposit of rents 
due to the slum dwellers and in fact, the SRA has certified the 
appellant’s financial capacity on 21.12.2019.
20.2.	 Mr. Sundaram submitted that all the documents were before 
the SRA and that the parties have made submissions on all 
aspects of the matter. He has taken us through the various 
findings of the High Court on the finances and the clauses in 
the agreements entered into with the third parties. The following 
findings
of the High Court were referred to:
“57. In any case, the petitioner struggled to avail 
finance and was facing severe financial crisis, this 
itself was material for the Chief Executive Officer of 
the SRA to come to a conclusion that it may not be 
possible for the petitioner to execute the scheme. The 
Chief Executive Officer however did not call upon the 
petitioner to satisfy that it had the appropriate finances 
to undertake the “entire scheme”. The Chief Executive 
Officer merely asking the petitioner to deposit the 
arrears of rent, can in no manner, whatsoever, be 
accepted as a certificate to the petitioner possessing 
a financial capacity to complete the project.
58.	 It is crystal clear from the petitioner’s own 
showing that the petitioner was required to take the 
crutches/financial assistance initially from Rajesh
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Habitat Pvt. Ltd., who in turn looked at Vistra ITCL 
India Ltd. and thereafter having failed with both these 
entities, with one M/s Sanghvi Associates, which is 
not for a small amount but for a substantial amount 
of Rs. 50 crores. Things however would not stop at 
this and subsequently it appears that now respondent 
no.6-Veena Developers was roped in, to provide 
working capital for the entire project described to be 
the business partners/joint developers of the petitioner 
as in para 1 of the petition.”
20.3.	 Mr. Sundaram also brought to our notice certain clauses in 
agreements with third parties and submitted that this amounts 
to complete subversion of the scheme. High Court has reflected 
on these clauses. The following findings of the High Court are 
important:
“73. Certainly, the period of two years as contractually 
agreed, under the development agreement cannot be 
stretched to such a long period of almost 17 to 18 years 
as in the present case, despite these circumstances, an 
attempt on the part of the petitioner to justify that such delay 
was not attributable to the petitioner, at least in the facts 
of the case, is wholly untenable. The AGRC examined the 
case of the petitioner and of the society and the situation 
persisting at the ground level. The AGRC however not 
agreeing with the findings of the Chief Executive Officer-
SRA, has reached a conclusion that the petitioner could 
not take the project
forward for reasons which were borne 
out by the record.
74. In these circumstances to upset the decision of the 
AGRC would amount to rewarding the petitioner of its 
defaults and the breaches committed by it, not only of the 
very terms and conditions of the Development Agreement, 
but also, the clear statutory mandate in undertaking Slums 
Rehabilitation Schemes. In fact, the petitioner has betrayed 
the trust of the society/slum dwellers. Even otherwise, a 
closer scrutiny of the petitioner’s actions clearly hint of the 
petitioner’s interest not in the rehabilitation of the slum 
dwellers but in its own private interest, solely in relation
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to the sale component. There cannot be a space for a 
pure commercial greed in taking up such projects which 
involves the basic rights of the slum dwellers.”
21.	 (vi) Re: Submission on maintainability of proceedings before 
AGRC. Finally, Mr. Sibal submitted that the complaints filed by 
the 12 members of the managing committee of respondent no.1 on 
18.11.2019 were withdrawn by 8 members on 31.12.2019 and by 
another member on 14.01.2020. Consequently, the show-cause notice 
dated 04.12.2020, based on these complaints, was rightly withdrawn 
on 16.03.2021. Secondly, although the managing committee of 
respondent no. 1 had initially terminated the development agreement 
on 02.02.2020, this termination was revoked on 28.02.2021. The 
revocation of termination was because the agreement was terminated 
by Mr. Rai, who did not have the requisite authorisation. Mr. Sibal has 
relied on the above to submit that respondent no.1 did not object to 
the withdrawal of the termination of the development agreement of 
the appellant, and in fact, wanted the appellant to continue as the 
developer. He would further submit that Mr. Rai was acting without 
the authorisation of the other members, and hence, he also could 
not have filed an appeal before the AGRC on behalf of respondent 
no.1 against the order of the respondent no. 3 – CEO, SRA dated 
16.03.2021 that dropped the proceedings
against the appellant. 
Mr. Navare, learned senior counsel, appearing for some of the 
slum dwellers, supported the submissions put forth by Mr. Sibal 
regarding the lack of authorisation of Mr. Rai to act on behalf of 
respondent no. 1. 
21.1.	 Mr. Sundaram submitted that the appeal before the AGRC 
against the order dated 16.03.2021 was maintainable even if 
some of the complaints filed on 18.11.2019 were withdrawn. 
He submits that Mr. Rai, who filed the appeal, had the requisite 
locus because he, along with some others, had also filed 
complaints that were not withdrawn. It is submitted that Mr. 
Rai was still a slum dweller and a member of respondent 
no.1 and hence, was an ‘aggrieved person’ against the 
order dated 16.03.2021. There were also, as many as 132 
complaints against the appellant by other slum dwellers who 
filed complaints in January and February, 2021 before the SRA 
under Section 13(2) of the Act alleging non-payment of rent. 
Lastly, he submits that in any case, the SRA has the power to
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suo moto proceed against the appellant under Section 13(2) of 
the Act and therefore the withdrawal of complaints is not fatal 
to proceeding against the appellant and does not preclude the 
AGRC from deciding the appeal. Mr. Ahmadi made a submission 
along the same lines and to the same effect. 
21.2.	Answering the question regarding the maintainability of the 
proceedings after the complaints dated 18.11.2019 were 
withdrawn, the High Court held that even if many complaints 
before the SRA were withdrawn, the complaint filed by Mr. 
Rai survived to be adjudicated. Further, the High Court 
rejected the contention of the appellant that Mr. Rai was not 
authorised by respondent no. 1 to take any action against the 
appellant. In order to reach this conclusion, the High Court 
observed that if the contention of the appellant was true, 
then respondent no. 1 would have supported the appellant 
before the High Court; however, this was not the case. The 
High Court also held that in any case, the SRA and the 
AGRC have the requisite power under Section 13(2) of the 
Act to suo moto examine the delay caused by the appellant 
in implementing the project.
22.	 (vii) Re: Locus or conflict of respondent no.6: Mr. Sibal concluded 
his submissions by arguing that respondent no.6 does not have the 
locus to take a stand contrary to that of the appellant as it has been 
involved with the venture from the time of the joint development
agreement dated 18.10.2019. For this reason, he would submit that 
the findings of AGRC and the High Court must apply to respondent 
no. 6 as well.
22.1.	 Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel, appearing for the 
administrator of respondent no.1 has argued that Section 13(2) 
of the Act empowers and places an obligation upon the SRA 
to take action against the developer when the project is not 
being implemented. Therefore, he submits that even if some 
of the complaints have been withdrawn, the termination of the 
development agreement is valid.
V.	
Findings:
23.	 Having considered the findings of the AGRC and the High Court in 
detail, we have found them to be correct on law and fact. Further, 
having independently considered the detailed submissions of the
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appellant and the respondents, on delay as well as on lack of 
financial and technical capabilities and maintainability of the appeal, 
we proceed to analyse and discuss them as follows.
24.	 Admittedly, the delay in executing the project, by the time of the 
termination order is more than 16 years. This period is sought to 
be explained by fragmenting it into bits and pieces falling between 
2003 to 2011, 2011 to 2014 and 2014 to 2019.
25.	 What amuses us is that we are called upon to hold that the order of 
termination for delaying the project for 16 years must be held to be 
bad by examining each episode of delay as independent and stand 
alone. Judicial Review Courts enquiring into these allegations would 
only examine whether it would be arbitrary and/or unreasonable to 
exclude the delay caused because of the incidents that occurred from 
2003 to 2019. In other words, the inquiry must be to see whether it 
would be unjust if we do not account for the long-drawn litigation with 
a competing builder between 2003 to 2011, the delay in obtaining the 
environmental clearances from 2011 to 2014, or the delay caused 
due to non-cooperation of certain slum dwellers. 
26.	  Having examined the matter, we are of the opinion that the delay of 
8 years in resolving disputes with a competing builder cannot be a 
justification under any circumstance. The appellant is a developer and
fully understands the process of obtaining environmental clearances 
while other sanctions and permissions are pending, and it is for him 
to make all the necessary arrangements. To say the least, the non-
cooperation of some of the members cannot be a ground for delaying 
the project from 2014 to 2019. The findings of the AGRC and the High 
Court are very clear, they have correctly held that the delay caused 
due to the sanction of the draft DP for the construction of the road 
cannot be a justification for delaying the project from 2015 to 2019.
27.	 In any event, execution of the project under the Slum Rehabilitation 
Scheme cannot be viewed as a real estate development project. 
There is a public purpose involved, and that is inextricably connected 
to the right to life of some of our brother and sister citizens who are 
living in pathetic conditions. While we reject the justifications given 
by the appellant for delaying the project, we are fully conscious of 
the dereliction of the statutory duty of the SRA in ensuring that the 
project is completed within time. We have already expressed our 
opinion that the CEO and the SRA are accountable for their actions.
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While we reject the justification for delay, we record our dissatisfaction 
about the indifference, amounting to negligence on the part of CEO 
and the SRA.
28.	 So far as the submissions relating to the financial resources are 
concerned, we have seen the number of agreements that the 
appellants have entered into. We need not examine this aspect 
independently as the findings are concurrent and thorough. The 
following findings of the High Court are sufficient for disposing of 
this issue:
“59. The petitioner time and again having approached 
third parties for financial requirements in the manner 
as discussed above, in fact was quite fatal and counter 
productive to the implementation of the slum scheme, for 
the reason that if any of the financers were to withdraw 
from their financial support and the commitments as made 
to the petitioner, the same would leave the petitioner with 
no remedy but to wander further hunting for fresh finance. 
Such financial instability of a developer certainly would 
have a devastating effect on the implementation of the 
slum scheme which could also result in the total collapse 
of the slum scheme being implemented and in fact a death 
knell for the slum scheme. It is for such reason, the real 
wherewithal and financial stability of a developer plays an 
extremely pivotal role, as finance is the very lifeline for 
successful implementation and completion of the slum 
scheme. The present
case is a classic case of how the 
petitioner is running helter-skelter to secure finance, that 
too without taking the society into confidence much less 
the authorities. This on the basis of a solitary clause in 
the Development Agreement which is being discussed 
hereafter.”
29.	 We will now deal with the submission on the maintainability of the 
appeal before the AGRC and that respondent no. 6 who was the 
collaborator of the appellant must face the same consequence as 
that of the appellant. This submission proceeds on the assumption 
that the statutory power under Section 13(2) of the Act is to be 
exercised only upon an application made to the authority. This is a 
complete misconception. We have already dealt with the scope and
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ambit of Section 13 of the Act, and in particular the duty followed 
by accountability of the SRA under the said provision. Irrespective 
of whether anybody applied or not, the authority is bound to ensure 
that the project is completed within the time stipulated. In any event, 
as the dispute before us is confined to the legality and propriety of 
the termination order, we are not concerned about the relationship 
of the appellant with respondent no. 6.
VI.	 Conclusion:
30.	 For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this appeal, and we 
dismiss the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 20844 of 2022 
with costs quantified at Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) payable 
to Supreme Court Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. 
In view of our decision, no further orders are necessary in the 
Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 217 of 2024.
31.	 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
VII.	 Re : Performance audit of statute:
32.	 Though we have disposed of this Civil Appeal by dismissing it, we 
must record that this case has provoked us to reflect on the working 
of this Act. 
33.	 The Act came into being in 1971 and since then, for over five decades, 
the High Court has been exercising judicial review jurisdiction, 
disposing of Writ Petitions raising claims or challenges to the exercise 
of powers or dereliction of duties by Authorities under the Act. Data
fetched from National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) reveals that a total 
of 1612 cases involving disputes arising under the Act are pending 
before the Bombay High Court. Of these, 135 cases are more than 
10 years old. In the last 20 years, 4488 cases have been filed and 
disposed of under the said Act. Latest data from the Bombay High 
Court reveal that about 923 cases on the Appellate side and 738 on 
the Original Side are pending adjudication. The Act is a beneficial 
legislation, intended to materialize the Constitutional assurance of 
dignity of the individual by providing basic housing, so integral to 
human life. However, the propensity and the proclivity of the statute 
to generate litigation are worrisome. There seems to be a problem 
with the statutory framework for realizing the purpose and object 
of the statute. In M/s. Galaxy Enterprises v. State of Maharashtra 
(supra) the Bombay High Court has remarked that:
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“3. …Nonetheless, considering the volumes of disputes 
still reaching the Courts, it can certainly be said that 
time is ripe, if not too late, to ponder, whether things are 
realistically working in the right direction, to eradicate slums 
and rehabilitate the slum dwellers, with the desired efficacy 
and expedition. This not only at the hands of the authorities 
but also at the hands of the other stake holders. The vital 
issue which has often led to controversy and disputes, is 
on the rules permitting, the selection and appointment of 
developers to undertake a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, 
being conferred on the slum dwellers, who are hardly 
expected to know the nitty-gritty of the slum redevelopment 
schemes. It is seen that the so called leaders of the slum 
dwellers who are themselves in need to be rehabilitated, 
are often lured by developers and their agents, and once 
a developer is appointed, what normally prevails is a 
constant fear of incertitude and scepticism amongst the 
slum dwellers, leading to disputes on variety of issues 
affecting their final rehabilitation. Such issues not only 
frustrate the very object of a speedy slum redevelopment 
but completely derail the slum schemes. It can be seen 
that scores of slum schemes have remained incomplete for 
years together and are languishing on such issues, either 
in litigation before Courts and/or before the authorities. 
These schemes need not face such
ordeal, including 
of an unending litigation. To change the developer is no 
answer as even this process involves dispute resolution 
and ultimately lengthy litigation from one forum to another.” 
33.1.	 Further, referring to the statutory scheme, as per which 
development is possible only when the slum dwellers feel the 
need and seek development, the High Court pointed out yet 
another problem about the statutory framework in the following 
terms;
“…It cannot be countenanced that the slums be 
redeveloped only when the slum dwellers feel the need 
of a redevelopment and the Government Authorities cannot 
initiate redevelopment and cannot initiate a suo motu action 
in that behalf. It is hence, for the Government and the 
Slum Authority to give its anxious consideration to these
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issues and in its wisdom to device a substantial, nay a 
full proof mechanism, by undertaking a study and identify 
these grey areas, so that the helping hand as extended by 
the legislature in providing this beneficial law as far back 
in 1971 that is almost 50 years back is held strongly and 
firmly by all concerned. It is never too late.”
34.	 The exasperation of the High Court about working of the Act is 
understandable. The present appeal is a classic example of why the 
High Court’s concern is genuine. It has been noticed that the statutory 
scheme is problematic with respect to: i) Identification and declaration 
of land as a slum. This problem involves an examination of the role of 
authorities in giving such recognition, insidious intervention of builders 
in the said process cast doubts on the independence and integrity in 
the decision-making process; ii) Identification of slum dwellers: This 
involves a complicated process of proof of such a status, the attendant 
problem of groupism, giving rise to competing claims inevitably leading 
to litigation; iii) Selection of a developer: The Act leaves this decision 
to the cooperative society of slum dwellers and the majority decision 
is manipulated by competing and rival developers; iv) Apportionment 
of the slum land between redevelopment area and sale area: This 
is yet another area where court has witnessed
developers seeking 
to increase the proportion of the sale area, leading to contestation; 
v) Obligation to provide transit accommodation for the slum dwellers 
pending redevelopment: Invariably, we see instances where the 
developer does not provide transit accommodation within time or 
provides an inadequate alternative in the form of a quantified amount 
towards rent, On the other hand, there are instances where some 
slum dwellers refuse to vacate the premises on the ground that the 
transit accommodation is either inconvenient or the amount offered 
is insufficient; vi) There are also issues of lack of independence and 
objectivity in the functioning of statutory authorities: This is a matter 
of serious concern. Courts have witnesses that the authorities have 
no independence and, their tenure is also short. Additionally, the 
functioning of these statutory authorities gives an indication that there 
could be a regulatory capture; vii) Another concern which exists is 
about the effectiveness of statutory remedies: Statutory remedies 
are ineffective and at the same time, lacking in accountability and 
vii) Judicial review proceedings under Art. 226 cannot be a long-
term solution: We have given details of the number of writ petitions 
pending before the High Court in Para 33.
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35.	 The above-referred problems arising out of the statutory scheme and 
policy framework should have come under review by the State of 
Maharashtra. Assessment of the working of the statute to realise if 
its purpose and objective achieved or not is the implied duty of the 
executive government. Reviewing and assessing the implementation 
of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law. It is in recognition of 
this obligation of the executive government that the constitutional 
courts have directed governments to carry performance audit of 
statutes.
36.	 Four aspects for achieving justice are well founded and articulated as, 
i) distribution of advantages and disadvantages of society, ii) curbing 
the abuse of power and liberty, iii) deciding disputes and, iv) adapting 
to change.17 Adapting to change is important for achieving justice, 
as failure to adapt produces injustice and is, in a sense, an abuse 
of power. Thus, failure to use power to adapt to change is in its own 
way an abuse of power. In fact, the issue is not one of change or not 
to change, but of the direction and the speed of change and such 
a change may come in various ways, and most effectively through 
legislation. Legal reform through legislative correction improves the 
legal system and it would require assessment of the working of 
the law, its accessibility, utility and abuse as well. The Executive 
branch has a constitutional duty to ensure
that the purpose and 
object of a statute is accomplished while implementing it. It has the 
additional duty to closely monitor the working of a statute and must 
have a continuous and a real time assessment of the impact that 
the statute is having. As stated above, reviewing and assessing 
the implementation of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law. 
The purpose of such review is to ensure that a law is working out 
in practice as it was intended. If not, to understand the reason and 
address it quickly. It is in this perspective that this court has, in a 
number of cases, directed the Executive to carry a performance/
assessment audit of a statute or has suggested amendments to 
the provisions of a particular enactment so as to remove perceived 
infirmities in its working.18
17	
See: Justice in Adapting to Change, in R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence, 305-327 (5th edn., 2013).
18	
State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar (2011) 10 SCC 404; Pravin Electricals (P) Ltd. v. Galaxy Infra & 
Engineering (P) Ltd. (2021) 5 SCC 671; Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667; Arif Azim 
Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd. (2024) 5 SCC 313; Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 224.
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37.	 Constitutional courts are fully justified in giving such directions as 
they are in a unique position of perceiving the working of a statute 
while exercising judicial review, during which they could identify 
the fault-lines in the implementation of a statute. This extraordinary 
capacity to assess the working of a statute is available to the 
judicial institution because of its unique position where, i) disputes, 
based on the statutory provisions unfold before it, ii) claims of rights 
or allegations of dereliction of duties are raised with varied, and 
sometimes, contradictory interpretations of the same text of the 
statute, iii) submissions of lawyers opens up a debate and as officers 
of the Court experienced lawyers would lay bare the fault-lines in 
the statutory scheme, iv) many a times court silently witnesses the 
play of statutory power relegating the deserving to the backseat, 
and the undeserving taking away all the benefits. 
38.	 Laws that are made by Parliament or the legislative assemblies 
create rights, entitlements, duties or liabilities. Application of such 
empowerments or disabilities gives rise to competing claims or 
conflicting interests. For resolution of these disputes, constitutional 
courts provide public law remedies19 where claims and contestations 
are decided by High Courts on a case by case basis. Judicial review 
is generally
episodic, and is intended to resolve the lis on a case-
to-case basis. Though cases are decided on their own merit and 
the lis disposed of, what is left behind is the institutional memory 
of the Court about the working of the statute and its interpretation 
preserved as precedents. Over a period of time, a critical mass of 
adjudicatory determinations on the working of the statute is built. 
This critical mass, coupled with the experiences gained by the 
Judges and the Court on the working of the statute, is of immense 
value for auditing the working of the legislation. It enables the 
court to assess whether the purpose and object of the Act is being 
achieved or not. 
19	
Judicial control of administrative action in our country, the effective and the most prolific, has evolved 
from its classical scrutiny of ultra vires exercise of power, to a whole set of procedural and substantive 
principles, such as: legality, procedural propriety, reasonableness, legitimate expectation, proportionality, 
transparency, legal certainty, accountability, level playing field, consultation or participation etc. These 
principles are now well entrenched in our judicial review processes and are part of our administrative law. 
In fact, bulk of judicial review proceedings initiate before the High Courts examine if the power exercised 
is with its bounds.
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39.	 The traditional perception of the constitutional role of writ courts 
was confined to judicial review of executive and legislative action. 
In that role, the courts were to decide the vires of the legislative 
and executive actions based on constitutional parameters. Not only 
have the tools of judicial review been reinvented (the rise of the 
proportionality and arbitrariness doctrines) but also the breadth of the 
judicial power has substantially expanded to areas that were hitherto 
forbidden (review of policy decisions, constitutional amendments and 
continuing mandamus being prime examples). However, even this 
expansive reading of judicial review does not capture the essence 
of the judicial branch in its entirety. 
40.	 There is yet another role which the judiciary can and ought to 
perform- that of facilitator of access to justice and effective functioning 
of constitutional bodies. In this role, the judiciary does not review 
executive and legislative actions, but only nudges and provides 
impetus to systemic reforms. The statute in question is one which 
was intended to benefit the marginalised and the impoverished. It 
is not easy for the intended beneficiaries of this legislation to carry 
their voice to legislative branch for effective reform. The exercise 
that this Court intends to direct presently is aimed at facilitating their 
access to legislative and executive reform, which this court believes 
is
an essential component of constitutional justice. That all justice 
is to be achieved only through courtroom debates is too myopic an 
understanding of constitutional justice. The facilitative role is not 
just inspired from the institutional role that the judiciary perceives 
for itself, but is also a directive of many of the fundamental rights 
in Part III and the cherished preambular vision of justice- social, 
economic and political. 
41.	 A peculiar feature of how our legislative system works is that an 
overwhelming majority of legislations are introduced and carried 
through by the Government, with very few private member bills being 
introduced and debated. In such circumstances, the judicial role does 
encompass, in this court’s understanding, the power, nay the duty 
to direct the executive branch to review the working of statutes and 
audit the statutory impact. It is not possible to exhaustively enlist 
the circumstances and standards that will trigger such a judicial 
direction. One can only state that this direction must be predicated 
on a finding that the statute has through demonstrable judicial data 
or other cogent material failed to ameliorate the conditions of the
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beneficiaries. The courts will also do well, to arrive the very least, at 
a prima facie finding that much statutory schemes and procedures 
are gridlocked in bureaucratic or judicial quagmires that impede or 
delay statutory objectives. This facilitative role the judiciary compels 
audit of the legislation, promote debate and discussion but does not 
and cannot compel legislative reforms. 
42.	 In light of the foregoing, considering that the Act is a state-legislation, 
implementation of which lies with the State of Maharashtra, and 
till date no comprehensive statutory audit has been undertaken, 
we request the Ld. Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court to 
constitute a bench to initiate suo motu proceedings for reviewing 
the working of the statute to identify the cause of the problems 
indicated in Paragraph 34. The concerned bench will hear the 
government, the statutory authorities, the necessary stakeholders 
including intended beneficiaries and perhaps take the assistance of 
some senior members of the bar specialising in this area as amici 
curae. We leave it to the High Court to devise such methods as it 
deems fit and appropriate. Having examined the matter, the bench 
may consider directing the government to constitute a committee for 
performance audit of the Act. The court’s jurisdiction extends only to 
that extent, and no further. The law-making, including
amendments, 
is the exclusive domain of the legislature.
Result of the case: Civil Appeal dismissed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey