MANGU SINGH versus DHARMENDRA & ANR.
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 1035, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 1035 
MANGUSINGH 
v. 
DHARMENDRA&ANR. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 2230 of 2011) 
DECEMBER 16, 2015 
A 
B 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND R.K. AGRAWAL, JJ.) 
Penal Code, 1860- s. 302 rlw. s. 25 of Arms Act, 1959 -
Prosecution under- Initial FIR on the basis of confessional c 
statement of the accused - Later another FIR by PW1 - In -
statement u/s. 313 Cr.P.C. accused pleaded not guilty and 
took defence that the alleged murder was due to a loot- Trial 
court convicted the accused - High Court acquitted him -
On appeal, held: In the facts of the case, PW-1 cannot be D 
said to be an eye-witness - The evidence of another eye-
witness PW-4 is also not reliable -
There are material 
alterations in the testimonies of the witnesses- Second FIR 
is an outcome of manipulation, deliberation, concoction and 
is a sham ante-timed document - Confessional FIR is also E 
not reliable in the facts of the case - The prosecution has 
failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt -
The 
accused was rightly acquitted by High Court-Arms Act, 1959 
-s.25. 
Evidence Act, 1872: 
ss. 101 and 106 -
s. 106 does not absolve the 
prosecution's burden uls. 101 to prove its case regarding guilt 
of accused, beyond reasonable doubt. 
s.27- What is required to be proved is not the material 
recovery, but the disclosure, based upon which the recovery 
is made. 
~035 
F 
G 
H
1036 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A 
Evidence - Motive - Evidentiary value - Motive is not a 
necessary element in deciding culpability but an equally important 
missing link which can be used to corroborate the evidences. 
Criminal Trial:-
8 
Standard of proof- The defence needs to establish its case 
c 
based on probability, whereas the prosecution has to prove the 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD :1. Motive is not a necessary element in deciding 
culpability but it is an equally important missing link which 
can be used to corroborate the evidences. In the present 
case, the motive of the accused was stated to be two-fold. 
D One being that he was in love with a girl, whom he wanted to 
marry but his wife and daughter were the hindrance. The 
other immediate motive was the non-fulfillment of dowry 
demand by PW1 (father of one of the deceased). Even if the 
fact of alleged relation is presumed to be true, still PW1 's 
E deposition to this fact is hearsay. PW1 neither stated this 
fact in the FIR nor in the statement made before the police, 
and it was only after two and half years later that it was stated 
in his deposition before the Court. In the investigation no 
such fact came to light, nor the wife of PW1 (who had 
F disclosed this fact to PW1) was summoned for making 
statements before the police or before the Court. The 
witness even testified that this alleged relation of the 
accused was reported to the
accused's father upon which 
he apologized for his conduct, however, the said fact was 
G not proved. As against the immediate cause, which again is 
a material addition at the time of deposition before the Court, 
neither such fact was made before the police nor 
investigated by the police. The Court did not even try the 
H accused/respondent for the alleged offence of dowry
MAN GU SINGH v. DHARMENDRA &ANR. 
1037 
demand, as prima facie no case was made out. [Para 8] [1042-
A 
F-H; 1043-A-D] 
2. PW1 came to the spot after information was sent to 
him by the police. The intimation was him after the 
accused is alleged to have made the written FIR. In these B 
circumstances, PW1 cannot be said to be.an eye-witness. 
to the offence. PW4 is the actual eye-witness. At the 
outset, it was admitted by PW1 that PW4 was his distant 
brother living in the same village. The deposition of PW4, 
is unnatural and not to be trustworthy. His deposition is C 
contradictory to the medical evidence. The blood-stained 
clothes of the victims or bullet ridden car parts were not 
recovered. It was not investigated at all as to in which portion 
of the car the victims were killed. [Para 9] [1043-E-F; 1044-B-
~ 
D 
3. There also appears a material alteration in the 
testimonies of the witnesses. The conduct of PW4 seemed 
unnatural. Facts of the case also make the conduct of PW1 
very unnatural and suspicious. The facts, clearly suggest E 
that the second FIR (lodged by PW1) is an outcome of 
manipulation, deliberation, concoction and is a sham 
ante-timed document. [Paras 9 and 10] [1044-E; 1045-F-
G] 
F 
4. The series of events cast doubts on the time of 
the confessional FIR. The facts of that FIR remained 
disproved and hence the FIR is not reliable. The trial court 
laid undue stress on the non-explanation of the fact of 
death of the victims by the accused
respondent. The trial G 
court though based the conviction upon the testimony of 
PW4, yet it shifted the burden on the accused respondent 
under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872, to prove 
the incident. The High Court, rightly reversed the finding 
on this point of law. Section 106 does not absolve the H
1038 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A prosecution's burden under Section 101 to prove its case 
of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The 
prosecution has miserably failed tQ explain the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the lodging of both the FIRs, 
and the testimony of PW4 is proved to be crooked. The 
B prosecution case was never a case of circumstantial 
evidence as the prosecution, till the end laid stress on 
the testimonies of eye-witnesses. [Para 11] [1046-C-F] 
5. The sequence of events and the injuries do not 
C exclude the defence version. It is a settled law that the 
defence needs to only establish its case based on 
probability, whereas the prosecution has to prove the 
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 12] 
[1047-C] 
D 
6. The prosecution as well as the trial court relied on 
the recovery of the country-made pistol and an empty 
cartridge. However the High Court pointed out·the 
relevant provision i.e. Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 
E 1872, and clarified that it is not the material recovery 
which has to be proved, but the disclosure based upon 
which the recovery is made. The pivotal fact is making 
of the statement to the police which leads to recovery. 
The High Court rightly pointed out that during the 
F investigation, no statement disclosing the fact/material 
to be discovered was proved before the Court. The High 
Court is correct to point out this serious lacunae. [Para 
13] [1047-0-G] 
G 
7. The
prosecution has failed to prove its case 
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused and the 
High Court was justified in doubting the veracity of the 
prosecution case and recording the verdict of acquittal, 
which does not suffer from the vice of perversity. [Para 
H 14] [1048-A-B]
MANGU SINGH v. DHARMENDRA&ANR. 
1039 
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: CriminalAppeal A 
No. 2230 of 2011 
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.08.201 Oof the 
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 
1417 of2006 
WllH 
CriminalAppeal No. 1707 of2015 
B 
Ratnakar Dash, Abhisth Kumar, Som Raj Choudhury, 
Sudeep Kumar, Hema Sahu, Rajendra, Rishabh Sahu (for C. c 
L. Sahu), Kamlendra Mishra for the Appellant. 
Anurag Dubey, Anu Sawhney, Meenesh Dubey, Ila Haldia, 
Meenakshi Parihar (for S. R. Setia) for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. 1.Leave granted in 
SLP(Crl.) No.9148 of2011. 
D 
2. These appeals have been directed against the judgment E 
and order dated 06.08.2010 passed by the High Court of 
Judicature atAllahabadin Criminal Appeal No.1417 of2006, 
wherein the accused/respondent was acquitted by the High 
Court against the Judgment of life imprisonment as awarded 
by the Trial Court. Criminal Appeal No.2230 of 2011 has been 
F 
filed by the complainant/informant and the connected matter, 
i.e. Special leave Petition (Criminal) No.9148 of 2011 is filed 
by the State against the acquittal of the accused/respondent. 
3. The brief facts necessary to dispose of these appeals G 
are that The respondent/accused came on 18.11.2003 to 
Police Station, Simbhaoli, District Ghaziabad, and confessed 
vide a written report Ext. Ka 22, of having killed his wife and 
daughter. The accused's father in-law (PW1) was
informed 
and subsequently inquest proceedings were conducted to 
H
1040 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A which the PW1 is the formal witness. PW1 then lodged another 
FIR against his son-in-law for having committed the murder of 
his daughter through a gun-shot injury and also of his wife by 
throttling. Investigation was thrown into the offence and at the 
instance of the accused a country-made 12-bore pistol and 
B empty shell Ext. A-6, were recovered on 19.11.2003. Since 
the occurrence was found to have taken place in territorial 
jurisdiction of Police Station, Babugarh, the senior officers 
sought to g_et the investigation conducted through Police 
Station, Babugarh after about one month since the FIR was 
C lodged. 
4. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the 
accused. After considering the material on record and hearing 
the counsel, the accused was charged for the offences 
D punishable under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 
(hereinafter referred to as "IPC") and also Section 25 of the 
Arms Act. The charges were read over and explained to the 
... 
accused. The accused pleaded not guilty and in his statement 
under Section 313, rebutted thatthe alleged murder was due 
E to loot in which his daughter and wife were killed and he had 
sustained gun-shot injury in his thigh. The confessional written 
statement which formed the basis of the first FIR was replied 
by the accused to be under threat from the police anrj he 
F claimed to be falsely implicated in the case. 
5. The Trial Court by its
judgment and order dated 251h 
January, 2006, convicted the accused for both the offences 
charged and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The 
convictions.were based on the evidences of the eye witnesses 
G and the recovery of the weapons used which were further 
corroborated by the admission made to the police officers, 
the motive being established and also non-explanation by the 
accused of the facts within his knowledge as mandated under 
H Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The accused
MAN GU SINGH v. DHARMENORA &ANR. 
1041 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
challenged the conviction order before the High Court and the A 
High Court by the impugned judgment and order allowed the 
appeal on the ground that the prosecution failed to bring home 
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The acquittal 
was based on ground that both the Fl Rs were ante-timed and 
the eye witnesses who were relied upon by the Trial Court were B 
interested and unreliable witnesses. The motive was neither 
investigated nor established and the conviction order was 
perverse and against the sound legal principles. 
6. The Informant PW1 has filed the present appeal before C 
this Court. The State is also before us by filing special leave 
petition against the acquittal order. The learned counsel for 
the State has argued in line of the decision arrived at by the 
Trial Court. It is vehemently argued that the motive of the 
accused that he wanted to get rid of the victims so that he D 
could marry his love, was proved by the testimony of PW1. 
The respondent was ~lone with the two victims and it was his 
duty as provided under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence 
Act, 1872, to give a reasonable explanation regarding the 
homicidal death of the two victims. Over this, the respondent E 
took a false plea of loot being committed upon him and his 
family and he created a false minor injury to support his story. 
He made a written statement in his own handwriting to the 
police,
confessing his crime which is admissible in evidence 
F 
as he was not an accused at the time of making the statement. 
Finally it was argued that the recovery of the country-made 
pistol and an empty shell was made at the instance of the 
accused himself. Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel 
appearing for the State of U.P. substantiated his case by G 
arguing that in addition to the above, PW4 is the eye witness 
of the incident of murder who saw the accused with the gun in 
his hand. It is further argued that the medical reports and the 
testimonies of the formal witnesses further strengthened the 
case of the State. 
H
1042 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A 
7. The learned senior counsel for the respondent accused 
has made various submissions countering the arguments put 
forward by the appellant. It is argued that the motive was neither 
investigated nor proved. PW1 deposed about the motive that 
the accused wanted to get rid of his wife and daughter as he 
B wanted to marry a girl he loved. However, it is argued that the 
same is hearsay evidence and neither PW1 nor the 
Investigating Officer inquired upon this fact. Against the second 
FIR, it was argued that it was ante-timed, false and 
manufactured, PW1 was not himself an eye-witness and as 
C per his testimony he could not have been in the police station 
to lodge the FIR at the time stated in the FIR. PW4 was argued 
to be an interested witness and his testimony was marked by 
severe lacunae and is itself proved to be self-contradictory 
0 
and hence, unworthy of any reliance. The bullet injury received 
by the accused is proved not to be self-inflicted and hence 
there exits some truth in the claim of the accused about the 
loot. The recovery was proved to be concocted. 
8. In our considered opinion, four main issues are argued 
E before this Court and we shall now examine each and every 
contention in light of the arguments adduced before us. It is a 
settled lawthat motive is not a necessary element in deciding 
culpability but it is an equally important missing link which can 
F 
be used to corroborate the evidences.
In the present case, the 
motive of the accused was stated to be two-fold. One being 
that he was in love with a girl, whom he wanted to marry but his 
· wife and daughter were the hindrance. The other immediate 
motive was the non-fulfillment of dowry demand by PW1 (father 
G of the girl). Upon perusal of the records, it appears that PW1 
has deposed that the accused/respondent was in love with a 
girl who lives in Ghaziabad and this fact was told to him· by his 
wife, who got this information from her daughter Geeta 
(deceased). Even if the said fact is presumed to be true, still 
H PW1 's deposition to this fact is hearsay and in fact, his wife
MANGU SINGH v. DHARMENDRA&ANR. 
1043 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
should have been examined to testify this fact. PW1 neither A 
stated this fact in the FIR nor in the statement made before the 
police, and it was only after two and half years later that this 
fact was stated in his deposition before the Court. The 
Prosecution also laid heavy emphasis on the said fact. 
However, in the investigation no such f~ct came to light, nor B 
the wife of PW1 was summoned for making statements before 
the police or before the Court. The witness even testif:ed that 
this alleged relation of the accused was reported to the 
accused's father upon which he apologized for his conduct, 
however, the said fact was not proved. As against the C 
immediate cause, which again is a material addition at the 
time of deposition before the Court, neither such fact was made 
before the police nor investigated by the police. The Court did 
not even try the accused/respondent for the alleged offence of 0 
dowry demand, as prima facie no case was made ou!.· . 
9. The second issue which is of paramount consideration 
is the testimony of the eye-witnesses. PW1 and PW4 are the 
eye-witnesses, out of which PW1 is the father of the first victim 
and maternal grand-father of the second victim. The police E 
investigation itself disclosed that PW1 came to the spot after 
information was sent to him by the police. The intimation was 
him after the accused is alleged to have made the written FIR. 
· In these
circumstances, PW1 cannot be said to be an eye-
F 
witness to the offence. PW4 is the actual eye-witness. At the 
outset, it was admitted by PW1 that PW4 was his distant 
brother living in the same village. PW1 deposed that when he, 
along with lshwar, was going back to their village, they saw the 
victim Geeta (daughter of PW1) lying in the pool of blood in 
G 
the rear seat of the car with the accused/respondent standing 
nearby with a country-made pistol. The time was about 6:30 
pm. He further deposed that the accused respondent 
threatened both PW4 and lshwar to flee away or else they would 
meet the same fate. Upon this threatening, PW4 flew away H
1044 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A 
from the spot and did not disclose the fact to anybody. Neither 
he approached the police for help, nor did he inform this to 
PW1. It was only after 3-4 days that he narrated the facts to 
PW1. Even after that, PW1 and PW4 did not approach the 
police to get the statement of PW4 recorded. It was only after 
B 
one month of the incident that PW4 was summoned at the 
Police Station, Babugarh, and his statement was recorded. If 
one carefully examines the deposition of PW4, it seems 
unnatural and not to be trustworthy. PW4 in his testimony firstly 
stated that victim Geeta was shot in his presence, but he did 
C not know as to in which part of the body she was shot. Then he 
corrected himself by deposing that the bullet had pierced her 
abdomen and blood started oozing out from her body. This 
deposition is contradictory to the medical evidence as the 
0 
cause of death of Geeta was strangulation and she never 
received any gun-shot injury. Moreover, the blood-stained 
clothes of the victims or bullet ridden car parts were not 
recovered. It was not investigated at all as to in which portion 
of the car the victims were killed. Apart from this, there appears 
E 
a material alteration in the testimonies of the witnesses. Both 
PW1 and PW4 deposed that they saw the dead body in the 
rear seat of the car, whereas the police investigation reveals 
that the dead body was lying in the front left side seat of the 
car. PW4 was
thoroughly cross-examined but more suspicions 
F 
arose in his testimony. The conduct of PW4 seemed unnatural 
that he did not sought for any help, nor did he inform anybody 
in the village that a daughter from his village was killed. PW4 
admitted that tie was accompanied by one lshwar but he was 
never examined in order to strengthen the prosecution case. 
G PW4 also stated in his deposition that he did not remember 
as to whether victim Geeta was wearing a saree or a suit, yet 
he remembered the registration number of the car. The place 
of incident is proved to be secluded one and on a small link 
road, which raises suspicion that PW4 saw the number plate 
H in dark hours of evening of the winter season.
MANGU SINGH v. DHARMENDRA&ANR. 
1045 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
1 O.Pertinent here is the FIR lodged by PW1. PW1 
A 
deposed that he was informed at about 7. 00 pm by the police 
that his son in-law has lodged a confessional FIR of having 
committed the murder of his wife Geeta and his daughter 
Rakhi. Thereafter, PW1 reached the place of incident at about 
8.00 p.m. and since then he was a witness to inquest B 
proceedings of both the victims Geeta and Baby Rakhi. The 
inquest proceedings of Geeta were recorded from 9:30-10:30 
pm and inquest proceedings of Baby Rakhi were recorded 
from 11-11:55 pm., and thereafter, he proceeded to Police 
Station, Simbhaoli, which under no circumstances can be C 
before 12.00 mid-night. Yet the FIR is stated to have been 
lodged at 10:05 pm. Moreover, the jurisdictional police station 
is of Babugarh and PW1 specifically deposed that he crossed 
the Police Station, Babugarh, en-route to Police Station, 0 
Simbhaoli, from Madhu Nursi'ng Home, yet he chose not to 
lodge the FIR at the nearest police station but at Simbhaoli 
Police Station, which did not even have the jurisdiction. This 
jurisdictional flaw came to the knowledge of PW1 after 3-4 
days, yet he preferred not to go or pursue his case at the proper E 
police station. In the FIR the informant (PW1) failed to mention 
the material facts, like he having been informed about the 
incident by the police, his participation in the inquest, receiving 
ornaments seized by the police
from the place of the incident, 
two male wrist watches, he being accompanied by two other F 
person to the place of incident from his village. Even the motive 
was not mentioned in the FIR. This makes the conduct of PW1 . 
very unnatural and suspicious. The above facts, clearly suggest 
thatthe second FIR is an outcome of manipulation, deliberation, 
concoction and is a sham ante-timed document. 
G 
11. The third issue is the confessional FIR. The Trial Court 
proceeded to believe the FIR as admission of guilt by the 
accused. Not only the lodging of the Fl R was delayed but it 
was suspected to be ante-timed. The police investigation 
H
1046 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 10 S.C.R. 
A 
disclosed that FIR (Ext. Ka 22/23) was lodged by the accused/ 
respondent and thereafter at about 8:30pm PW1 was informed. 
However, as per the deposition of PW1, he received the 
information about the FIR at about 7.00 pm, thereafter he 
proceeded to the place of incident and was a witness to 
B inquest proceedings. The accused respondent has taken the 
defence that he was forced to scribe it at the dictation of the 
Investigating Officer, after being assaulted at the police station 
and it was registered ante-timed. The series of events above 
stated, thus, cast doubts on the time of the FIR. The facts of 
C the FIRremained disproved and hence Ext. Ka 22/23 is not 
reliable. The Trial Court laid undue stress on the non-
explanation of fact of death of the victims by the accused 
respondent. It is established that the Trial Court based the 
0 
conviction upon the testimony of PW4, yet it took a 'U' turn to 
shift the burden on the accused respondent under Section 106 
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to prove the incident. The 
High Court, in our considered view, rightly reversed the finding 
on this point of law. Section 106 does not absolve the 
E prosecution's burden under Section 101 to prove its case of 
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As stated above, 
the prosecution has miserably failed to explain the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the lodging of both the Fl Rs, and 
the testimony of PW4 is
proved to be crooked. The prosecution 
F 
~ase was never a case of circumstantial evidence as the 
prosecution, till the end laid stress on the testimonies of eye-
witnesses. 
12. At this juncture the defence version needs to be 
G examined. The accused respondent stated that they were 
stopped by two unknown persons and he stopped only 
because his wife recognized those persons to be from her 
village. The two persons then attempted to loot them, and in 
the process two gun-shots were fired - one at Baby Rakhi 
H and another at accused/respondent. Victim Geeta was
MANGU SINGH v. :JHARMENDRA&ANR. 
1047 
[PINAKI CHANDRAGHOSE, J.] 
strangulated to death. Upon perusal of the medical evidences, 
A 
the gun-shot injury to Baby Rakhi was proved to be at point 
blank range, whereas no such assertion was made in case of 
accused respondent's gun-shot wound. The accused 
respondent stated that he was hit by one fire-shot and he 
neither knew upon whom second shot was fired, nor did he B 
know as to how his wife was killed. The accused respondent 
further deposed that he ran towards the nearby hotel for 
seeking help. The sequence of events and th.:'! injuries do not 
exclude the defence version. It is a settled law that the defence 
needs to only establish its case based on probability, whereas 
the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
13.The next aspect for our consideration is the recovery 
c 
of the country-made pistol and an empty cartridge. To begin D 
with, it is undisputed from the ballistic report that the gun was 
the same from which the shot was fired and also the formal 
witnesses stood the test which established that the gun was 
recovered in their presence. The prosecution strongly relied 
on this evidence, and even the trial court was convinced by E 
this piece of evidence. However the High Court pointed out 
the relevant provision i.e. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence 
Act, 1872, and clarified that it is not the material recovery which 
has to be proved, but the disclosure based upon which
the 
F 
recovery is made. The pivotal fact is making of the statement 
to the police which leads to recovery. The High Court rightly 
pointed out that during the investigation, no statement 
disclosing the fact/material to be discovered was proved before 
the Court. In our opinion, the High Court is correct to point out G 
this serious lacunae. 
14. We have given our careful and thoughtful consideration 
to the rival contentions put forward by either sides and have 
also scanned through the entire materials available on record, 
H

1048 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 10 S.C.R. 
A including the impugned judgment. It appears that the 
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable 
doubt against the accused and the High Court was justified in 
doubting the veracity of the prosecution case and recording 
the verdict of acquittal, which does not suffer from the vice of 
B perversity. 
15. Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we find no 
compelling and substantial reasons to interfere with the 
judgment passed by the High Court. The appeals are, 
C accordingly, dismissed. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeals dismissed.