V. SENTHIL BALAJI versus THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 393, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 393 : 2024 INSC 739
V. Senthil Balaji 
v. 
The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
(Criminal Appeal No. 4011 of 2024)
26 September 2024
[Abhay S. Oka* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to grant of bail to former Tamil Nadu transport 
minister against whom complaint was filed for offence u/s.3 PMLA, 
which is punishable u/s.4 PMLA for his alleged involvement in the 
job racket scam.
Headnotes†
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – ss.3, 4, 45(1)  
(iii) – Offence of money-laundering – Appellant-former Tamil 
Nadu transport minister’s alleged involvement in the job 
racket scam – Arrested by the Enforcement Directorate in 
connection with the Enforcement Case Information Report – 
Bail application in connection with the alleged offence u/s.3, 
which is punishable u/s.4 – Rejected by the Single Judge of 
the High Court – Challenge to:
Held: Appellant has been incarcerated for more than 15 months 
in connection with the offence punishable u/s.4 – There are 
more than 2000 accused in the three scheduled offences, and 
the number of witnesses proposed to be examined exceeds 
600  – Trial of the scheduled offences and, consequently, the 
PMLA offence is not likely to be completed in three to four years 
or even more – If the appellant’s detention is continued, it would 
amount to an infringement of his fundamental right u/Art.21 of 
speedy trial – Stringent provisions regarding the grant of bail, 
such as
s.45(1)(iii), cannot become a tool which can be used to 
incarcerate the accused without trial for an unreasonably long 
time – At this stage, it would be very difficult to hold that there 
is no prima facie case against the appellant in the complaint 
u/s.44(1)(b) and material relied upon therein – Furthermore, when 
the trial of the complaint under PMLA is likely to prolong beyond 
* Author
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reasonable limits, the Constitutional Courts will have to consider 
exercising their powers to grant bail – s.45(1)(ii) does not confer 
power on the State to detain an accused for an unreasonably long 
time, especially when there is no possibility of trial concluding 
within a reasonable time  – Reasonable time would depend 
on the provisions under which the accused is being tried and 
other factors – If the Constitutional Courts do not exercise their 
jurisdiction in such cases, rights of the undertrials u/Art.21 would 
be defeated – In a given case, if undue delay in the disposal of the 
trial can be substantially attributed to accused, the Constitutional 
Courts can always decline to exercise jurisdiction to issue 
prerogative writs – Considering the apprehension of the appellant 
tampering with the evidence, stringent conditions imposed –  
Appellant to be enlarged on bail till the final disposal of the case 
pending before the Principal Session Judge, on the condition that 
he would furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.25,00,000/- with two 
sureties in the like amount; surrender passport; appear before the 
Enforcement Directorate, and not to directly or indirectly attempt 
to contact or communicate with the prosecution witnesses and 
victims – Constitution of India. [Paras 21, 25, 27, 29-31]
Criminal trial – Expeditious disposal – Crimes under the 
statutes-PMLA, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 
and
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985:
Held: Considering the gravity of the offences in such statutes, 
expeditious disposal of trials for the crimes under these statutes is 
contemplated – Expeditious disposal of the trial is also warranted 
considering the higher threshold set for the grant of bail – Hence, 
the requirement of expeditious disposal of cases must be read into 
these statutes – Inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial and 
the higher threshold for the grant of bail cannot go together – Bail 
is the rule, and jail is the exception – These stringent provisions 
regarding the grant of bail, such as s.45(1)(iii) of the PMLA, cannot 
become a tool which can be used to incarcerate the accused 
without trial for an unreasonably long time. [Paras 24, 25]
Case Law Cited
Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024) SCC OnLine 
SC 1920; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [2021] 1 SCR 443 : 
(2021) 3 SCC 713 ; P. Dharamraj v. Shanmugam and Others 
[2022] 9 SCR 972 : (2022) 15 SCC 136; Y. Balaji v. Karthik
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 
395
V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
Desari and Another [2023] 8 SCR 1026 : (2023) SCC OnLine 
SC 645 – referred to.
List of Acts
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973; Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Bail; Grant of bail to former Tamil Nadu Transport minister; 
Job racket scam; Offence of money-laundering; Enforcement 
Directorate; Bail; Incarcerated for more than 15 months; 
Infringement of fundamental right u/Art.21; Speedy trial; 
Constitutional Courts; Undertrials; Enlarged on bail; Imposition 
of stringent conditions; Criminal trial; Expeditious disposal of 
trial; Inordinate delay; Justice delivery system; Clean acquittal 
by criminal courts; Compensation claim.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 4011 
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2024 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Madras in CRLOP No. 1525 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Mukul Rohatgi, Siddharth Luthra, S. Prabakaran, N. R. Elango, 
Aditya Sondhi, Sr. Advs., Ma Gouthaman, N. Bharanikumar, Mrs. 
Usha Prabakaran, Maheswaran Prabakaran, Naveen M, Ms. Misha 
Rohatgi, Thangadurai, Agilesh Kumar S, Kartikeya Dang, Shashir 
Seth, Ms. Aishwarya S M, Ms. Meghna S M, G Jai Singh, Muthu 
Ganesa Pandian, Mrs. Harini Ramsankar, Dr. Ram Sankar (for M/s. 
Ram Sankar & Co.),
Advs. for the Appellant.
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Kanu Agrawal, Zoheb Hussain, Arkaj 
Kumar, Merusagar Samantaray, Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Balaji Srinivas, 
Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Respondent.
S Gurukrishnakumar, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Sr. Advs., Pranav 
Sachdeva, Jatin Bhardwaj, Abhay Nair, Ashwin Kumar, Ms. Neha 
Rathi, Balaji Srinivasan, Vishwaditya Sharma, Advs. for the 
Intervenors.
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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Abhay S. Oka, J.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1.	
Leave granted. 
2.	
This appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated 28th 
February 2024 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court 
of Judicature at Madras by which a bail application preferred by the 
appellant under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973 has been rejected. The bail application was filed in connection 
with an alleged offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money 
Laundering Act, 2002 (for short, ‘the PMLA’), which is punishable 
under Section 4 of the PMLA. 
3.	
Between 2011 and 2016, the appellant was holding the post of 
Transport Minister in the Government of Tamil Nadu. Broadly, the 
allegation against the appellant is that while discharging his duties 
as a Minister, in connivance with his personal assistant and his 
brother, he collected large amounts by promising job opportunities 
to several persons in various positions in the Transport Department. 
This led to the registering of three First Information Reports against 
the appellant and others. The said First Information Reports are FIR 
no.441 of 2015 dated 29th October 2015 (CC Nos. 22 and 24 of 
2021), FIR No.298 of 2017 registered on 9th September 2017 (CC 
No.19 of 2020) and FIR no. 344 dated 13th August 2018 (CC No. 25 
of 2020). In the first FIR, six charge sheets have been filed. More 
than 2000 accused have been
named in the charge sheets. 550 
witnesses have been named. In the case of the second FIR, there 
are 14 accused named in the chargesheet. In connection with this 
FIR, 24 witnesses have been cited. In the third FIR, 24 accused have 
been named in the charge sheet and 50 prosecution witnesses have 
been cited. The offences alleged in the aforementioned crimes are 
mainly under Sections 120B, 419, 420, 467 and 471 of the Indian 
Penal Code and Sections 7, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of 
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Section 34 of the Indian Penal 
Code has been invoked. These offences are scheduled offences 
within the meaning of Section 2(y) of the PMLA. Therefore, relying 
on the final reports filed in aforementioned scheduled offences, for an
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V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA punishable 
under Section 4, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) registered an 
Enforcement Case Information Report (for short “ECIR”) bearing 
ECIR No. MDSZO/21/2021 on 29th July 2021.
4.	
The appellant was arrested on 14th June 2023 in connection with 
the said ECIR and was remanded to judicial custody. A complaint 
was filed for the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA Act, which 
is punishable under Section 4, on 12th August 2023. The appellant 
is the only accused named in the complaint. Cognizance has been 
taken based on the complaint by the Special Court under the 
PMLA. The scheduled offences cases have been transferred to the 
learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Additional Special Court for Trial 
of Criminal Cases related to Elected Members of Parliament and 
Members of Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu (Special MPMLA 
Court), Chennai. 
SUBMISSIONS
5.	
Learned senior counsel appearing in support of the appeal pointed 
out that in this case, ED is relying upon material collected by the 
investigating agencies investigating the scheduled offences. He 
submitted that five articles were allegedly seized during the search on 
6th February 2020 in the appellant’s premises. He invited our attention 
to the averments made in the complaint and, in particular, paragraph 
no.14.5, which deals with incriminating documents relating to
money 
collected for providing jobs in the posts of Drivers, Conductors, Junior 
Tradesmen, Junior Engineers, Assistant Engineers, etc. He pointed 
out that the prosecution mainly relies upon a file named CS AC, 
allegedly found in the seized pen drive. The file allegedly gives details 
regarding the amounts received against each post. He submitted that 
the Tamil Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory (TNFSL)’s analysis of 
the seized pen drive shows that the said file CS AC was not found 
on the pen drive, and a file named csac.xlsx was found. As regards 
the allegation of the prosecution of the deposit of cash amount of 
Rs.1.34 crores in the appellant’s bank account, the learned senior 
counsel urged that said amount represents the income received 
by way of remuneration as MLA and agriculture income. Learned 
senior counsel submitted that in any event, all the documents and 
all relevant electronic evidence have been seized in the predicate 
offences and statements of the witnesses under Section 50 of the
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PMLA have been recorded. He submitted that the appellant has 
undergone incarceration under the PMLA Act for more than 14 
months. He pointed out that as far as three predicate offences are 
concerned, charges have not even been framed. There are more 
than 2000 accused and 600 prosecution witnesses in the predicate 
offences and therefore, there is no possibility of trial of scheduled 
offences getting over in the near future. He submitted that unless the 
trials pertaining to scheduled offences are concluded, the complaint 
under the PMLA cannot be finally decided. He would, therefore, 
submit that there is no possibility of the trial for the PMLA offence 
concluding within five to six years and hence, the appellant deserves 
to be enlarged on bail. The learned senior counsel extensively relied 
upon a recent decision of this Court in the case of Manish Sisodia1 
and especially what is observed in paragraph 54. He submitted that 
on facts, this case is similar to the case of Manish Sisodia.1 He 
also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Union of 
India v. K.A. Najeeb.2
6.	
The learned Solicitor General of India and learned counsel appearing 
for the E.D. have made separate detailed submissions. The first 
submission is that there is no discrepancy in the description of file 
name CS AC in the pen drive and the file name of the same file in the 
TNFSL report dated 31st March 2023, which shows collection of
the 
sum of Rs. 67.74 crores by the appellant for providing employment 
in the various posts in the Transport Department. He submitted that 
if the TNFSL report is perused, the document at Sr.No.24 has the 
same name, CS AC. He submitted that the portion “.xlsx” is only 
a file extension, which signifies that it is a Microsoft Excel sheet. 
He submitted that a printout of the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet file 
with the name CS AC found in the seized pen drive was certified 
by the Special MPMLA Court, which is relied upon in the complaint. 
He submitted that at this stage, there is no reason to doubt the 
correctness of the printout of the file CS AC provided by the Special 
MPMLA Court. The learned counsel appearing for ED also pointed 
out that there is no discrepancy in the seizure of the H.P. hard disk. 
The learned counsel submitted that the salary/remuneration payable 
to MLAs is directly credited to the bank account of the concerned 
1	
(2024) SCC OnLine SC 1920
2	
[2021] 1 SCR 443 : (2021) 3 SCC 713
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V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
MLAs. Therefore, there is no question of any cash amount being 
received on the said count. He pointed out that the appellant claims 
that there is a cash deposit of salary to the tune of 68 lakhs in his 
account. He also pointed out that the appellant’s agricultural income 
between 2014 and 2020 is to the tune of Rs. 20.24 lakhs, and 
therefore, the justification that a substantial part of the deposit of 
Rs.1.34 crores is his agricultural income must be rejected. Learned 
counsel pointed out that there is an unexplained cash deposit of Rs. 
20.24 lakhs even in the appellant’s wife’s account. 
7.	
Learned counsel also pointed out other documentary evidence 
indicating the appellant’s involvement in the job racket scam, 
including the file AC1.xlsx. He pointed out that there is sufficient 
material on record to show that the posts of Drivers, Conductors, 
Junior Assistants and Technicians were priced and sold at Rs.1.5 
lakhs, Rs.2.0 lakhs, Rs.1.25 lakhs and Rs.4 lakhs, respectively. He 
submitted that there is material on record to show that an amount of 
at least Rs.38 crores was collected from candidates by giving them 
the promise of providing jobs. He submitted that there are a large 
number of email communications indicating more than prima facie 
material about the involvement of the appellant. His submission is 
that, in fact, the twin conditions under clause (ii) of
sub-section (1) 
of Section 45 of the PMLA have not been satisfied in this case. 
8.	
The Learned Solicitor General of India pointed out that three rounds 
of litigations have travelled to this Court arising out of scheduled 
offences. He pointed out that the decisions of this Court indicate how 
the complainants were won over and how a so-called compromise 
between the complainants and the accused was brought about. He 
submitted that the appellant had been a minister for a long time in 
the Tamil Nadu government. He pointed out that he continued to 
be a Minister without portfolio, even during the first few months of 
his detention, and that he continues to be a Member of Legislative 
Assembly (MLA). 
9.	
He submitted that observations made by this Court indicate that the 
appellant will be able to influence the witnesses if he is enlarged 
on bail. Learned Solicitor General relied upon a decision of this 
Court in the case of P. Dharamraj v. Shanmugam and others.3 
3	
[2022] 9 SCR 972 : (2022) 15 SCC 136
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He submitted that the High Court’s decision to quash one of the 
scheduled offences based on an alleged compromise between 
bribe givers and bribe recipients was under scrutiny in the case. He 
pointed out that this Court heavily came down on such compromises 
in the said decision. He relied upon various paragraphs of the said 
decision. He submitted that the argument of learned senior counsel 
for the appellant in the said case that one Shri Shanmugam, who 
is allegedly involved, was not his personal assistant, has been 
expressly rejected. This Court found that he was working as a 
personal assistant of the appellant. 
10.	 Learned SG relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Y. 
Balaji v. Karthik Desari and Another.4 He pointed out observations 
made from paragraph 17 onwards of the said decision. He pointed out 
that this Court objected strongly to not registering offences under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He pointed out the observations 
of this Court regarding the compromise entered in the scheduled 
offence. It was observed that two teams were created just for the 
record, and an investigation was carried out as if it were a friendly 
match between the complainants and the accused. This Court further 
observed that it was only because of the position of the appellant as a 
Minister that the complainants purported to enter into a compromise. 
He submitted that there is very strong material on
record to show 
the appellant’s involvement in the offence punishable under Section 
4 of the PMLA and the predicate offences. He submitted that the 
appellant brought about such an illegal settlement between bribe 
givers and bribe receivers. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt 
that once he comes out, he will influence the witnesses proposed to 
be examined by the prosecution, as he wields considerable influence 
in the State due to his political clout.
11.	 He submitted that though there are a large number of accused and 
witnesses in the scheduled offences, if a competent special public 
prosecutor is appointed, perhaps the prosecution may be in a position 
to drop a large number of witnesses. He submitted that in Misc. 
Application no.1381 of 2024 arising out of the decision of this Court 
in Criminal Appeal no.1677 of 2023, there is already a prayer made 
for the appointment of a special public prosecutor.
4	
[2023] 8 SCR 1026 : (2023) SCC OnLine SC 645
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V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
12.	 We have also heard learned senior counsel for the intervenors who 
supported the ED.
CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
13.	 We have carefully considered the submissions. The main document 
relied upon by the ED showing incriminatory material against the 
appellant is a part of the pen drive seized by the State police from 
the appellant’s premises in connection with scheduled offences. The 
concerned Court dealing with the scheduled offences has provided 
the printed version of the soft files in the seized pen drive. There is 
no reason, at this stage, to doubt the authenticity of the soft files. 
There is also prima facie material to show a deposit of cash amount 
of Rs.1.34 crores in the appellant’s bank account. At this stage, the 
contention of the appellant regarding the deposit of remuneration 
received as MLA and agriculture income cannot be accepted in the 
absence of any prima facie evidence to show the existence of the 
appellant’s cash income as MLA and the appellant’s agriculture 
income. Therefore, at this stage, it will be very difficult to hold that 
there is no prima facie case against the appellant in the complaint 
under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA and material relied upon therein.
EFFECT OF THE DELAY IN DISPOSAL OF THE CASES
14.	 As of now, the appellant has been incarcerated for more than 15 
months in connection with the offence punishable under Section 4 
of
the PMLA. The minimum punishment for an offence punishable 
under Section 4 is imprisonment for three years, which may extend 
to seven years. If the scheduled offences are under paragraph 2 of 
Part A of the Schedule in the PMLA, the sentence may extend to 
10 years. In the appellant’s case, the maximum sentence can be of 
7 years as there is no scheduled offence under paragraph 2 of Part 
A of Schedule II alleged against the appellant. 
15.	 We have already narrated that there are three scheduled offences. 
In the main case (CC Nos. 22 and 24 of 2021), there are about 2000 
accused and 550 prosecution witnesses cited. Thus, it can be said that 
there are more than 2000 accused in the three scheduled offences, 
and the number of witnesses proposed to be examined exceeds 600.
16.	 This Bench is also dealing with MA no.1381 of 2024 seeking various 
reliefs such as a transfer of investigation of scheduled offences, 
appointment of special public prosecutor etc. The orders passed
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in the said application would reveal that the sanction to prosecute 
all public servants, including the appellant, has now been granted. 
Charges have not been framed in the scheduled offences. 
17.	 Thus, on the issue of framing of charge or discharge, a large 
number of accused will have to be heard. The trial of the scheduled 
offences will be a warrant case. Therefore, even if the trials of the 
scheduled offences are expedited, the process of framing charges 
may take a few months as many advocates representing more than 
2000 accused persons will have to be heard. There are bound to 
be further proceedings arising out of orders on charge. After that, 
more than 600 witnesses will have to be examined. Documentary 
and electronic evidence is relied upon in the scheduled offences. 
Even if few witnesses are dropped, a few hundred witnesses will 
have to be examined. Presence of all the accused will have to be 
procured and their statements under Section 313 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure,1973 will have to be recorded. Therefore, even 
in ideal conditions, the possibility of the trial of scheduled offences 
concluding even within a reasonable time of three to four years 
appears to be completely ruled out.
18.	 In the offence under the PMLA, the charge has not been framed. 
In view of Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 44 of PMLA, 
the procedure for sessions trial will have to be followed for the 
prosecution of
an offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA. 
In view of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 44, it is possible 
to transfer the trial of the scheduled offences to the Special Court 
under the PMLA.
19.	 The offence of money laundering has been defined under Section 
3 of the PMLA which reads thus:
“3. Offence of money-laundering.—Whosoever directly 
or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or 
knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process 
or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including 
its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and 
projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be 
guilty of offence of money-laundering. 
[Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby 
clarified that,—
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V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
(i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if 
such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted 
to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is 
actually involved in one or more of the following processes 
or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:— 
(a) concealment; or 
(b) possession; or 
(c) acquisition; or 
(d) use; or 
(e) projecting as untainted property; or 
(f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner 
whatsoever; 
(ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of 
crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time 
a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of 
crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or 
use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as 
untainted property in any manner whatsoever.] 
20.	 Existence of proceeds of crime is a condition precedent for the 
offence under Section 3. Proceeds of crime have been defined in 
Section 2(u) of the PMLA which reads thus:
“2 …………………………………………… 
(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or 
obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result 
of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the 
value of any such property or where such property is taken 
or held outside the country, then the property equivalent 
in value held within the country [or abroad]; 
Explanation.—For the
removal of doubts, it is hereby 
clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only 
derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also 
any property which may directly or indirectly be derived 
or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to 
the scheduled offence;”
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21.	 Hence, the existence of a scheduled offence is sine qua non for 
alleging the existence of proceeds of crime. A property derived or 
obtained, directly or indirectly, by a person as a result of the criminal 
activity relating to a scheduled offence constitutes proceeds of crime. 
The existence of proceeds of crime at the time of the trial of the 
offence under Section 3 of PMLA can be proved only if the scheduled 
offence is established in the prosecution of the scheduled offence. 
Therefore, even if the trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds, 
it cannot be finally decided unless the trial of scheduled offences 
concludes. In the facts of the case, there is no possibility of the trial 
of the scheduled offences commencing in the near future. Therefore, 
we see no possibility of both trials concluding within a few years.
22.	 In the case of K.A. Najeeb,2 in paragraph 17 this Court held thus:
“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory 
restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does 
not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant 
bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. 
Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as 
the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction 
can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of 
proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the 
legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours 
of such
provisions will melt down where there is no 
likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable 
time and the period of incarceration already undergone 
has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed 
sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against 
the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of 
the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of 
bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to 
speedy trial.” 
(emphasis added)
23.	 In the case of Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement1 in 
paragraphs 49 to 57, this Court held thus:
“49. We find that, on account of a long period of 
incarceration running for around 17 months and the 
trial even not having been commenced, the appellant 
has been deprived of his right to speedy trial.
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V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
50. As observed by this Court, the right to speedy trial 
and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights. On denial of 
these rights, the trial court as well as the High Court ought 
to have given due weightage to this factor.
51. Recently, this Court had an occasion to consider 
an application for bail in the case of Javed Gulam Nabi 
Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra 6 wherein the accused was 
prosecuted under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act, 1967. This Court surveyed the entire 
law right from the judgment of this Court in the cases of 
Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of 
Andhra Pradesh,7 Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of 
Punjab,8 Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, State 
of Bihar,9 Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb 10 and Satender 
Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation.11 The Court 
observed thus:
“19. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the 
court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect 
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy 
trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution 
then the State or any other prosecuting agency should 
not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the 
crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution 
applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.”
52. The Court also reproduced the observations made in 
Gudikanti Narasimhulu
(supra), which read thus:
“10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the 
trial courts and the High Courts of what came to be 
observed by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. 
Public Prosecutor, High Court reported in (1978) 1 SCC 
240. We quote:
“What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants 
reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial 
custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal. Lord 
Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]:
“I observe that in this case bail was refused for the 
prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the,
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magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld 
as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are 
merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.” ”
53. The Court further observed that, over a period of 
time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten 
a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to 
be withheld as a punishment. From our experience, we 
can say that it appears that the trial courts and the High 
Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail. The 
principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, 
at times, followed in breach. On account of non-grant of 
bail even in straight forward open and shut cases, this 
Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby 
adding to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial 
courts and the High Courts should recognize the principle 
that “bail is rule and jail is exception”.
54. In the present case, in the ED matter as well as the 
CBI matter, 493 witnesses have been named. The case 
involves thousands of pages of documents and over 
a lakh pages of digitized documents. It is thus clear 
that there is not even the remotest possibility of the 
trial being concluded in the near future. In our view, 
keeping the appellant behind the bars for an unlimited 
period of time in the hope of speedy completion of 
trial would deprive his fundamental right to liberty 
under Article 21 of the
Constitution. As observed 
time and again, the prolonged incarceration before 
being pronounced guilty of an offence should not be 
permitted to become punishment without trial.
55. As observed by this Court in the case of Gudikanti 
Narasimhulu (supra), the objective to keep a person in 
judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal is 
to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.
56. In the present case, the appellant is having deep roots 
in the society. There is no possibility of him fleeing away 
from the country and not being available for facing the 
trial. In any case, conditions can be imposed to address 
the concern of the State.
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407
V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
57. Insofar as the apprehension given by the learned 
ASG regarding the possibility of tampering the evidence is 
concerned, it is to be noted that the case largely depends 
on documentary evidence which is already seized by the 
prosecution. As such, there is no possibility of tampering 
with the evidence. Insofar as the concern with regard to 
influencing the witnesses is concerned, the said concern 
can be addressed by imposing stringent conditions upon 
the appellant.
……………………………………….”
(emphasis added)
24.	 There are a few penal statutes that make a departure from the 
provisions of Sections 437, 438, and 439 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973. A higher threshold is provided in these statutes 
for the grant of bail. By way of illustration, we may refer to Section 
45(1)(ii) of PMLA, proviso to Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, ‘NDPS Act’). The 
provisions regarding bail in some of such statutes start with a non-
obstante clause for overriding the provisions of Sections 437 to 439 
of the CrPC. The legislature has done so to secure the object of 
making the penal provisions in such enactments. For example, the 
PMLA provides for Section 45(1)(ii) as money laundering poses a 
serious threat not only to the country’s financial system but also to 
its integrity
and sovereignty. 
25.	 Considering the gravity of the offences in such statutes, expeditious 
disposal of trials for the crimes under these statutes is contemplated. 
Moreover, such statutes contain provisions laying down higher 
threshold for the grant of bail. The expeditious disposal of the trial 
is also warranted considering the higher threshold set for the grant 
of bail. Hence, the requirement of expeditious disposal of cases 
must be read into these statutes. Inordinate delay in the conclusion 
of the trial and the higher threshold for the grant of bail cannot go 
together. It is a well-settled principle of our criminal jurisprudence that 
“bail is the rule, and jail is the exception.” These stringent provisions 
regarding the grant of bail, such as Section 45(1)(iii) of the PMLA, 
cannot become a tool which can be used to incarcerate the accused 
without trial for an unreasonably long time.
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26.	 There are a series of decisions of this Court starting from the decision 
in the case of K.A. Najeeb,2 which hold that such stringent provisions 
for the grant of bail do not take away the power of Constitutional 
Courts to grant bail on the grounds of violation of Part III of the 
Constitution of India. We have already referred to paragraph 17 of 
the said decision, which lays down that the rigours of such provisions 
will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed in 
a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone 
has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. One of 
the reasons is that if, because of such provisions, incarceration of an 
undertrial accused is continued for an unreasonably long time, the 
provisions may be exposed to the vice of being violative of Article 
21 of the Constitution of India. 
27.	 Under the Statutes like PMLA, the minimum sentence is three years, 
and the maximum is seven years. The minimum sentence is higher 
when the scheduled offence is under the NDPS Act. When the trial 
of the complaint under PMLA is likely to prolong beyond reasonable 
limits, the Constitutional Courts will have to consider exercising their 
powers to grant bail. The reason is that Section 45(1)(ii) does not 
confer power on the State to detain an accused for an unreasonably 
long time, especially when there is no possibility of trial concluding 
within a
reasonable time. What a reasonable time is will depend on the 
provisions under which the accused is being tried and other factors. 
One of the most relevant factor is the duration of the minimum and 
maximum sentence for the offence. Another important consideration 
is the higher threshold or stringent conditions which a statute provides 
for the grant of bail. Even an outer limit provided by the relevant law 
for the completion of the trial, if any, is also a factor to be considered. 
The extraordinary powers, as held in the case of K.A. Najeeb,2 can 
only be exercised by the Constitutional Courts. The Judges of the 
Constitutional Courts have vast experience. Based on the facts on 
record, if the Judges conclude that there is no possibility of a trial 
concluding in a reasonable time, the power of granting bail can 
always be exercised by the Constitutional Courts on the grounds of 
violation of Part III of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the 
statutory provisions. The Constitutional Courts can always exercise 
its jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 226, as the case may be. 
The Constitutional Courts have to bear in mind while dealing with the
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409
V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
cases under the PMLA that, except in a few exceptional cases, the 
maximum sentence can be of seven years. The Constitutional Courts 
cannot allow provisions like Section 45(1)(ii) to become instruments 
in the hands of the ED to continue incarceration for a long time when 
there is no possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence and the PMLA 
offence concluding within a reasonable time. If the Constitutional 
Courts do not exercise their jurisdiction in such cases, the rights of 
the undertrials under Article 21 of the Constitution of India will be 
defeated. In a given case, if an undue delay in the disposal of the 
trial of scheduled offences or disposal of trial under the PMLA can be 
substantially attributed to the accused, the Constitutional Courts can 
always decline to exercise jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs. An 
exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents 
of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming 
a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue 
prerogative writs is always discretionary. 
28.	 Some day, the courts, especially the Constitutional Courts, will 
have to take a call on a peculiar situation that arises in our justice 
delivery system. There are cases where clean acquittal is granted 
by the criminal courts to the accused after very long incarceration 
as an undertrial. When we say
clean acquittal, we are excluding 
the cases where the witnesses have turned hostile or there is a 
bona fide defective investigation. In such cases of clean acquittal, 
crucial years in the life of the accused are lost. In a given case, it 
may amount to violation of rights of the accused under Article 21 of 
the Constitution which may give rise to a claim for compensation.
29.	 As stated earlier, the appellant has been incarcerated for 15 months 
or more for the offence punishable under the PMLA. In the facts of 
the case, the trial of the scheduled offences and, consequently, the 
PMLA offence is not likely to be completed in three to four years or 
even more. If the appellant’s detention is continued, it will amount 
to an infringement of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India of speedy trial. 
30.	 The decisions the learned SG relied upon indicate that the 
appellant’s influential position in the State may have resulted in a 
so-called compromise between the bribe givers and the bribe takers. 
Considering the apprehension of the appellant tampering with the 
evidence, stringent conditions must be imposed.
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31.	 Therefore, the appeal is allowed, and the appellant shall be enlarged 
on bail till the final disposal of CC No. 9 of 2023 pending before 
the Principal Session Judge, Chennai, on the following conditions: 
a.	
The appellant shall furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.25,00,000/- 
(Rupees twenty-five lakhs only) with two sureties in the like 
amount;
b.	
The appellant shall not directly or indirectly attempt to contact 
or communicate with the prosecution witnesses and victims of 
the three scheduled offences in any manner. If it is found that 
the appellant directly or indirectly made even an attempt to 
contact any prosecution witness or victim in the scheduled as 
well as offences under the PMLA, it will be a ground to cancel 
the bail granted to the appellant;
c.	
The appellant shall mark his attendance every Monday and 
Friday between 11 am and 12 noon in the office of the Deputy 
Director, the Directorate of Enforcement at Chennai. He shall 
also appear on the first Saturday of every calendar month before 
the investigating officers of the three scheduled offences;
d.	
Before the appellant is enlarged on bail, he shall surrender 
his passport to the Special Court under the PMLA at Chennai;
e.	
The appellant shall regularly and punctually remain present 
before the Courts dealing with scheduled offences as well as 
the Special Court and shall cooperate with the Courts for early 
disposal of cases; and
f.	
If the
appellant seeks adjournments on non-existing or frivolous 
grounds or creates hurdles in the early disposal of the cases 
mentioned above, the bail granted to him shall be liable to be 
cancelled.
32.	 The appeal is allowed on the above terms.
Result of the Case: Appeal allowed
†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain