RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA versus STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
[2023] 13 S.C.R. 289, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
[2023] 13 S.C.R. 289 : 2023 INSC 878
289
CASE DETAILS
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA
v.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 2239-2240 of 2011)
OCTOBER 06, 2023
[M.M. SUNDRESH AND J.B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issues for consideration : The contention raised was that the High 
Court erred in holding the appellant guilty of oﬀ ence punishable under 
Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 
(NDPS Act) as Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not complied with. It was 
contended that the High Court committed error in recording the ﬁ nding that 
Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not applicable in the present case as the 
recovery of the contraband substance was not made as a result of the personal 
search of the accused but on account of the search of his bag.
The issue was whether Section 50 of the NDPS Act was at all applicable 
to the present case. The question, therefore, that required consideration 
was what meaning should be assigned to the phrase “to search any person” 
occurring in Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Whether the phrase “to search any 
person” means (a) search of articles on the person or body of the person; 
(b) would include search of articles in immediate possession as such bag 
or other luggage carried by him or in physical possession of the person to 
be searched; (c) would include search of bag or luggage which is presumed 
to be in possession of the person even though it may be lying in a house or 
railway compartment or at the
airport; or (d) whether application of Section 
50 could be extended to a case of search of a place, a conveyance or a house 
if the accused is physically present at the time of the search.
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Search in 
bag of accused – Applicability of s.50 – What would be included within 
“search of a person” as stipulated u/s.50 – Term “person” – How to be 
construed – Whether a bag carried by the accused can be considered
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
290
to be inextricably linked to the accused, and therefore, any recovery of 
a contraband from such a bag without complying with s.50 would be 
inadmissible – Interpretation of Statutes.
Held: According to Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case, the 
provisions of s.50 will come into play only in the case of personal search 
of the accused and not of some baggage like a bag, article or container, etc. 
which he may be carrying – In the three Judge bench decision in Pawan 
Kumar case, it was held that the term “person” under s.50 would mean a 
natural person or a living unit and not an artiﬁ cial person i.e., a bag or a 
briefcase  – The three Judge Bench in Pawan Kumar case concluded that 
an external article which does not form part of body is outside the ambit of 
the word “person” occurring in s.50 of the NDPS Act – In view of plain and 
unambiguous statutory provision, there is no scope of interpreting section 
50 in any other manner than the interpretation explained in Baldev Singh 
and Pawan Kumar – One must adhere to the principle of law as explained 
by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh and the three Judge Bench in 
Pawan Kumar  – In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court 
was justiﬁ ed in holding the appellant guilty of the oﬀ ence under the NDPS 
Act and at the same time, the High Court was also correct in saying that 
s.50 of the NDPS Act was not required to be complied with as the recovery 
was from
the bag. [Paras 49, 83, 114, 124 and 125]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.50 – 
Object of:
Held: The main object of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is to avoid the 
allegation of planting something or fabricating evidence by the prosecution 
or the authorized oﬃ  cer. [Para 33]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.50 – 
Phrase “to search any person” occurring in s.50 – Meaning of – Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.100(3).
Held :  The phrase “to search any person” would mean only search of 
the body or wearing apparels of such person and in that case the procedure 
which is required to be followed would be the one prescribed under Section 
50 of the NDPS Act  – In contrast, if search of any building, conveyance or
291
place, including a public place, is to be carried out, then there is no question 
of following the procedure prescribed under Section 50 – However, when a 
suspected or arrested person is to be searched, then the procedure prescribed 
under Section 50 comes into operation and the procedure thereunder is 
required to be followed  – This can be seen by referring to Section 100(3) of 
the CrPC 1973 which provides that where any person is reasonably suspected 
of concealing about his person any article for which search should be made, 
such person may be searched and if such person is a woman, the search shall 
be made by another woman with strict regard to decency– The concealment 
which is suspected is on the person or about his person. [Para 36]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.50 – 
When applicable and when not:
Held : Where a police oﬃ  cer is in the normal course of investigation of 
an oﬀ ence or suspected oﬀ ences as provided under the provisions of CrPC 
1973 and in the course of such investigation when a search is completed 
and in that process happens to stumble upon possession of a narcotic drug 
or psychotropic substance, the question of invoking Section 50 would not 
arise – One can easily understand that without any prior information as 
to possession of any narcotic drug and psychotropic substance, a police 
oﬃ  cer might have held a search in the course of discharge of his duties as 
contemplated under the provisions of CrPC 1973 and,
therefore, it would 
be well-neigh impossible to state that even under such a situation, the 
application of Section 50 would get attracted  – s.50 is applicable only in 
case of search of person of the suspect under the provisions of the NDPS 
Act, and would have no application where a search was conducted under 
any other statute in respect of any oﬀ ence. [Paras 42 and 64]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.50 – 
Rights of the accused – Right to be informed about the search to be 
conducted in presence of Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate.
Held : The person intended to be searched under Section 50 must be 
told in clear and unambiguous words that he has a right to have the search 
conducted in presence of either a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate  – The 
person concerned must be made aware of his right and must be given only 
two options that have been provided under the section. [Para 56]
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.50 – 
Accused waiving right to be searched in  presence of Gazetted Oﬃ  cer 
or Magistrate – Eﬀ ect of  – Whether it is still mandatory that his search 
be conducted only before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate:
Held : There is no requirement to conduct the search of the person, 
suspected to be in possession of a narcotic drug or a psychotropic substance, 
only in the presence of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, if the person 
proposed to be searched, after being apprised by the empowered oﬃ  cer 
of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a 
Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistate categorically waives such right by electing 
to be searched by the empowered oﬃ  cer –  The words “if such person so 
requires”, as used in Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act would be rendered 
otiose, if the person proposed to be searched would still be required to 
be searched only before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, despite having 
expressly waived “such requisition”, as mentioned in the opening sentence 
of sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act –  In other words, the 
person to be searched is mandatorily required to be taken by the empowered 
oﬃ  cer, for the conduct of the proposed search before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or 
Magistrate, only “if he so requires”, upon being informed of the existence 
of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate and not
if 
he waives his right to be so searched voluntarily, and chooses not to exercise 
the right provided to him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act – However, 
even when the suspect being apprised by the empowered oﬃ  cer of his right 
under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer 
or Magistrate waives such right by electing to be searched by the empowered 
oﬃ  cer, such waiver on the part of the suspect should be reduced into writing 
by the empowered oﬃ  cer – To put it in other words, even if the suspect says 
that he would not like to be searched before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate 
and he would be ﬁ ne if his search is undertaken by the empowered oﬃ  cer, 
the matter should not rest with just an oral statement of the suspect – The 
suspect should be asked to give it in writing duly signed by him in presence 
of the empowered oﬃ  cer as well as the other oﬃ  cials of the squad – This 
would lend more credence to the compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS 
Act –  In other words, it would impart authenticity, transparency and credit 
worthiness to the entire proceedings. It is clariﬁ ed that this compliance shall 
henceforth apply prospectively. [Paras 62, 63]
293
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.50 – 
Rights of the accused – Right to be informed about the search to be 
conducted in presence of Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate – Manner of 
communication of such right when multiple persons are to be searched.
Held: In case of multiple persons to be searched, each of them has to 
be individually communicated of their right, and each must exercise or waive 
the same in their own capacity – Any joint or common communication of 
this right would be in violation of Section 50. [Para 64]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.50 – 
Recovery of contraband under NDPS Act during search under statute 
other than NDPS Act – Whether provisions relating to NDPS Act would 
apply.
Held: Where during a search under any statute other than the NDPS 
Act, a contraband under the NDPS Act also happens to be recovered, the 
provisions relating to the NDPS Act shall forthwith start applying, although 
in such a situation Section 50 may not be required to be complied for the 
reason that search had already been conducted. [Para 64]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.50 – 
Burden of proof – Deﬁ ned.
Held: The burden is on the prosecution to establish that the obligation 
imposed by Section 50 was duly complied with before the search was 
conducted. [Para 64]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Recovery 
in violation of s.50 – Consequences of – Whether non-compliance of 
s.50
would vitiate the trial.
Held: Any incriminating contraband, possession of which is punishable 
under the NDPS Act and recovered in violation of Section 50 would be 
inadmissible and cannot be relied upon in the trial by the prosecution, 
however, it will not vitiate the trial in respect of the same – Any other 
article that has been recovered may be relied upon in any other independent 
proceedings. [Para 64]
Interpretation of Statutes – Literal rule of interpretation – 
Explained.
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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Held: It is a well-settled principle in law that the Court should not 
read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous – 
A statute is an edict of the legislature – The language employed in a statute 
is the determinative factor of the legislative intent – The ﬁ rst and primary 
rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in 
the words used by the legislature itself – The question is not of what may 
be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. [Para 115]
Interpretation of Statutes –  Principle of Construction – Casus 
omissus.
Held: A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the 
case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of 
the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily 
inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be 
construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with 
reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to 
be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole 
statute – This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause 
leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been 
intended by the legislature.[Para 118]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172 : [1999] 3 SCR 977 
and Keshav
Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay North, 
Ahmedabad  [1965] 2 SCR 908 – followed.
State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350 : [2005] 3 SCR 417 
– relied on.
SK. Raju alias Abdul Haque alias Jagga v. State of West Bengal (2018) 
9 SCC 708 : [2018] 10 SCR 731 and State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand and 
Another (2014) 5 SCC 345 : [2014] 3 SCR 522 – held not applicable.
Yasihey Yobin. v. Department of Customs, Shillong (2014) 13 SCC 
344 – held not good law.
Arif Khan alias Agha Khan v. State of Uttarakhand (2018) 18 SCC 380 
: [2018] 6 SCR 787; State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh (2019) 10 SCC 473 :
295
[2019] 13 SCR 520; State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1994) 3 SCC 299 : [1994] 
2 SCR 208; Gurjant Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 13 SCC 603 : [2013] 12 
SCR180; Ali Mustaﬀ a Abdul Rahman Moosa v. State of Kerala (1994) 6 SCC 
569 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 52; Saiyad Mohd. Saiyad Umar Saiyad and Ors. v. 
State of Gujarat (1995) 3 SCC 610 : [1995] 3 SCR 117; Manohar Lal v. State 
of Rajasthan (1996) 11 SCC 391 : [1996] 1 SCR 837; Joseph Fernandez v. 
State of Goa (2001) 1 SCC 707; Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of M.P. (2004) 
2 SCC 56 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 444; Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State 
of Gujarat (2011) 1 SCC 609 : [2010] 13 SCR 255; Kalema Tumba v. State 
of Maharashtra (1999) 8 SCC 257 : [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 670; Sarjudas v. 
State of Gujarat (1999) 8 SCC 508; Birakishore Kar v. State of Orissa (2000) 
9 SCC 541; Kanhaiya Lal v. State of M.P. (2000) 10 SCC 380: Gurbax Singh 
v. State of Haryana (2001) 3 SCC 28 : [2001] 1 SCR 882; Beckodan Abdul 
Rahiman v. State of Kerala (2002) 4 SCC 229 : [2002] 3 SCR 53; Madan 
Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2003) 7 SCC 465 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 
716; State of Punjab v. Makhan Chand (2004) 3 SCC 453; Saikou Jabbi v. 
State of Maharashtra  (2004) 2 SCC 186 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 456; Namdi 
Francis Nwazor v. Union of India (1998) 8 SCC 534; Abdul Rashid Ibrahim 
Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2000) 2 SCC 513 : [2000] 1 SCR 542; State of 
Rajasthan v. Daulat Ram (2005) 7 SCC 36 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 880; State 
of Haryana v. Mai
Ram (2008) 8 SCC 292 : [2008] 11 SCR 586; Balbir Kaur 
v. State of Punjab (2009) 15 SCC 795 : [2009] 10 SCR 29; Ajmer Singh v. 
State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 746 : [2010] 2 SCR 785; Jarnail Singh v. State 
of Punjab (2011) 3 SCC 521 : [2011] 2 SCR 888; Suresh v. State of Madhya 
Pradesh (2013) 1 SCC 550 : [2012] 10 SCR 1157; Union of India v. Shah 
Alam (2009) 16 SCC 644 : [2009] 9 SCR 1118; Dayalu Kashyap v. State of 
Chhattisgarh  (2022) 12 SCC 398; Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of 
Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277 : [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 336; D.R. 
Venkatchalam v. Dy. Transport Commissioner (1977) 2 SCC 273 : [1977] 2 
SCR 392; Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. (2000) 
5 SCC 515 : [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 38; Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. 
State T.N. & Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 : [2002] 2 SCR 383 and State of H.P. v. 
Pawan Kumar  (2004) 7 SCC 735 – referred to.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547; Artemiou v. Procopiou
(1966) 1 QB 878; Luke v. IRC [1963] AC 557 : (1963) 1 All ER 655 – referred 
to.
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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John C. Derrnbachet.al., A Practical Guide to Legal Writing and Legal 
Method (1994) – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 
2239-2240 Of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.08.2010 and 16.09.2010 of 
the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in CRLA No. 356 of 1999.
Appearances:
Mrs. Pragya Baghel, Adv. for the Appellant.
Anil Nag, Adv. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
J. B. PARDIWALA, J. 
1. The captioned appeals are at the instance of a convict accused 
of the oﬀ ence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, “the NDPS Act”) and are 
directed against the judgment and order of conviction dated 20.08.2010 
and the order of sentence dated 16.09.2010 resply passed by the High 
Court of Himachal Pradesh in the Criminal Appeal No. 356 of 1999 by 
which the High Court allowed the appeal ﬁ led by the State of Himachal 
Pradesh and thereby set aside the judgment and order of acquittal passed 
by the Sessions Judge, Kullu dated 31.03.1999 in the Sessions Trial No. 
44 of 1998. With the High Court allowing the State’s acquittal appeal, the 
appellant herein stood convicted of the oﬀ ence punishable under Section 
20 of the NDPS Act. 
2. The appellant was heard on the point of sentence and ultimately, 
the High Court vide order dated 16.09.2010
sentenced the appellant herein 
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay ﬁ ne 
of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only), and in default of payment 
of ﬁ ne to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six months.
297
CASE OF THE PROSECUTION 
3.  On 23.08.1998 ASI Lal Singh (PW 14) was on patrolling duty along 
with Head Constable Mohan Lal (PW 12), Constable Sant Ram (PW 13) 
and Constable Baldev Dass (PW 6).  At about 6.30 pm while they all were 
at Dhalpur, the ASI Lal Singh (PW 14) received a secret information that 
one well built person wearing a white T-shirt and green trouser was standing 
at the Sarwari bus stand and was ready to board a bus bound for Delhi. The 
information was that the said person at the bus stand had in his possession 
contraband in the form of charas.  The secret information was recorded by 
the PW 14 and forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Kullu through the 
Constable Baldev Dass (PW 6). The ASI Lal Singh (PW 14), HC Mohan Lal 
(PW 12) and Constable Sant Ram (PW 13) accordingly left for Sarwari bus 
stand and reached there at about 6.45 pm.  The oﬃ  cers were able to locate 
and identify the said person at the bus stand carrying a bag on his shoulder. 
In the presence of two independent witnesses, the said person was asked 
to disclose his identity. The person standing at the bus stand disclosed his 
identity as Ranjan Kumar Chadha son of Shri Ved Parkash Chadha resident 
of New Delhi.  As the police oﬃ  cials suspected that he may be carrying 
charas, they gave him the option of being searched before the police or 
before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or  Magistrate. The person concerned consented 
to be searched before the police.  Before the search of the
person of the 
accused was undertaken, the police oﬃ  cials got themselves searched before 
the witnesses. The bag which the accused was carrying along with him was 
also searched. The search of the bag resulted in recovery of three polythene 
bags containing charas. Many other articles like the driving licence, etc. 
were also recovered from his bag. On being weighed, the charas was found 
to be 1 kg. 250 gms.  
4. Two samples of  25 grams each were drawn from the polythene 
bags containing charas and the remaining charas was sealed with seal “H”. 
Seal impression was also taken on the NCB form and seal was handed over 
to the PW 9 Surinder Kumar. The charas was taken into possession vide 
recovery memo Ext. PK which was signed by the witnesses PW 9 Surinder 
Kumar, PW 10 Karam Singh and PW 12 Mohan Lal resply. The accused was 
informed of the grounds of his arrest, etc. vide memo Ext. PL. Ruqua Ext. 
PG was prepared and sent to the police station through the Constable Sant 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
298
Ram. The site plan Ext. PP was prepared on the spot. The statements of the 
witnesses were recorded. Thereafter, PW 14 came to the Police Station along 
with the accused and deposited the case property including the samples and 
the NCB form before the SHO who resealed the case property and samples 
with seal-X. One of the samples was sent for chemical examination to the 
CIL, Kandaghat and vide report Ext. PO the samples were found to be of 
charas having resin content of 33.58%. On this basis the accused was charge 
sheeted with having committed an oﬀ ence as aforesaid.
5. The accused pleaded not guilty before the Trial Court and claimed 
to be tried. The defence of the accused was that when the bus was about 
to leave for Delhi and while the accused was sitting in the bus with some 
other passengers, one unclaimed bag was found and the accused was 
wrongly stated to be the owner of the said bag. In short, the case of the 
accused before the Trial Court was that he was falsely implicated in the 
case.
6. The Trial Court upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary 
evidence came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove 
its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and accordingly, 
acquitted the accused.
7. The State of  Himachal Pradesh, being dissatisﬁ ed with the judgment 
and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, went in appeal before the 
High Court. The appeal came to be allowed
by the High Court and the 
appellant herein stood convicted for the oﬀ ence under Section 20 of the 
NDPS Act. 
8. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before 
this Court with the present appeals. 
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
9. Mrs. Pragya Baghel, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, 
vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a serious error in 
holding the appellant guilty of the oﬀ ence under the NDPS Act. She would 
submit that the High Court should not have disturbed a well reasoned 
judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The learned counsel 
submitted that the High Court committed a serious error in recording the
299
ﬁ nding that Section 50 of the NDPS Act is not applicable in the present case 
as the recovery of the contraband substance was not made as a result of the 
personal search of the accused but on account of the search of his bag. 
10. It was argued that the expression “to search any person” occurring 
in Section 50 of the NDPS Act means search of  articles on the person 
or body of the person to be searched as well as the search of articles in 
immediate possession like bag and other luggage carried by him or in 
physical possession of the person to be searched.  
11. The learned counsel argued that Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not 
complied with in its letter and spirit as although the case of the prosecution 
is that the appellant was given the option to be searched before the police 
or a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, yet the appellant accused was not told 
that it is his right to be searched in the presence of a Magistrate or  Gazetted 
Oﬃ  cer. The learned counsel argued that the fact that the accused was also 
given a third option of being searched before the police oﬃ  cer itself violated 
Section 50 of the NDPS Act.  She would argue that Section 50 of the NDPS 
Act is mandatory and the Trial Court rightly held that Section 50 of the 
NDPS Act was not complied with.
12. In the last, the learned counsel argued that in case of search of 
person of the accused as well as the luggage which is in his immediate 
possession, then even in such circumstances Section 50
of the NDPS Act 
will apply and would have to be complied with. She would argue that in 
the case on hand not only the search of the person of the accused was 
undertaken but the search of the bag was also undertaken. To fortify this 
submission, the learned counsel relied on the decision of this Court in the 
case of SK. Raju alias Abdul Haque alias Jagga v. State of West Bengal
reported in (2018) 9 SCC 708. According to the learned counsel, the ratio 
of the decision of this Court in SK. Raju (supra) is that if the search is of 
both the bag as well as the person of the accused, Section 50 of the NDPS 
Act would be attracted. 
13. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel 
prayed that there being merit in her appeals, the same be allowed and the 
judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court 
may be set aside.
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
14. Mr. Anil Nag, the learned counsel appearing for the State, on the 
other hand, vehemently opposed these appeals submitting that no error, not 
to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the 
High Court in passing the impugned judgment and order of conviction and 
sentence. He would argue that the High Court was justiﬁ ed in holding the 
appellant herein guilty of the oﬀ ence punishable under Section 20 of the 
NDPS Act. It was vehemently argued that Section 50 of the NDPS Act is 
not applicable at all in the present case as the search was made only of the 
bag which the appellant was carrying on his shoulder and the person of the 
appellant was not searched. It was argued that the decision of this Court in 
SK. Raju (supra) is of no avail to the appellant herein as in the said case not 
only the person of the accused was searched but even the bag was searched 
and as the recovery of the contraband was from the bag, this Court took the 
view that Section 50 of the NDPS Act would be attracted.  
15. The learned counsel appearing for the State in support of his 
aforesaid submission placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court 
in the case of State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh reported in (2019) 10 
SCC 473.
16. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel 
appearing for the State prayed that there being no merit in the appeals, those 
may be
dismissed.
ANALYSIS
17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and 
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls 
for our consideration is, whether the High Court committed any error in 
holding the appellant herein guilty of the oﬀ ence punishable under Section 
20 of the NDPS Act?
18. Before we advert to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, 
we must look into the relevant ﬁ ndings recorded by the High Court as well 
as by the Trial Court.  
19. The Trial Court in its judgment of acquittal, while discussing 
Section 50 of the NDPS Act and its compliance, held as under:-
301
“11. Regarding compliance of provisions of section 5O of the Act, 
which is also a mandatory provisions under the Act, none of the 
witnesses of this consent memo EX.PG have supported the version 
of the prosecution. PW-9 Surinder Kumar and PW-10 Karam Singh 
independent witnesses joined in the raiding party have categorically 
stated that no such notice was given in their presence to the accused 
nor accused gave in writing the endorsement EX. PG/1 in their 
presence. There is only bare statement of PW-14 ASI Lal Singh that 
this notice was given to the accused but when there were admittedly 
independent witnesses present on the spot as per case of the 
prosecution, who have been declared hostile in court, it was for the 
prosecution to prove that these witnesses have suppressed truth from 
the court, but nothing has been proved against them as to why they 
should have deposed falsely against the prosecution or in favour of 
the accused and therefore, it is held that the prosecution has failed 
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the compliance of Section 50 of 
the Act, which is mandatory provision and on this score the accused 
Ranjan Chadha is entitled to acquittal. Moreover the recovery of 
charas from the bag of the accused is alleged to have taken place 
in presence of PW-9 Surinder Kumar and PW-10 Karam Singh in 
addition to PW-12 HC Mohan Lal, PW-13 Sant Ram and PW-14 ASI 
Lal Singh. However both the independent witnesses PW-9 Surinder 
Kumar and PW-10 Karam Singh
have been declared hostile when 
they deposed that no bag was found in possession of the accused 
in their presence nor search of the accused was conducted in their 
presence and nothing has been proved against them, in their cross 
examination as to why they should have deposed falsely. From the 
statements of these witnesses, who have been declared hostile, I am 
of the opinion that reasonable doubt has been created in the case 
of the prosecution by the accused regarding alleged recovery of 
charas from the conscious and exclusive possession of the accused 
and accordingly by giving the beneﬁ t of doubt to the accused, it is 
held that the prosecution has failed to prove that on 23.8.1998 at 
6.30 pm 1.250 grams of charas was recovered from the conscious 
and exclusive possession of the accused point No. I is accordingly 
answered.”
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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20. The High Court, while reversing the judgment and order of acquittal 
passed by the Trial Court and more particularly on the issue of applicability 
of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, held as under:-
“As far as Section 50 of the Act is concerned the same is not at 
all applicable to the facts of the present case. The recovery of the 
contraband substance was not made as a result of the personal search 
of the accused but on account of the search from his bag. In such 
eventuality the police is not required to comply with Section 50 of the 
Act. In this behalf reference may be made to the decision of the Apex 
Court in State of Himachal Pradesh Versus Pawan Kumar Latest 
HLJ 2004 [SC] 1247.”
ORAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD:-
21. We shall now look into the deposition of PW 12 Mohan Lal. Head 
Constable No. 175, Kullu Police Station. PW 12 in his examination in chief 
has deposed as under:-
“Stated that I am posted in P.S. Kullu since 1997. On 23.8.1998 I 
with ASI Lal Singh, Constable Sant Ram and Baldev Dass proceeded 
from P.S. Kullu at 5.30 p.m. for patrolling. At about 6.30 p.m. ASI 
received secret information at Dhalpur. Whereupon ASI Lal Singh 
prepared Information Report and sent to S.P. through Const. Baldev 
Dass and I and ASI Lal Singh and Const. Sant Ram went to Bus 
Stand. Kullu (Sarbari). We reached Sarbari Bus Stand at 6.45 p.m. 
Surender, Bus Stand lncharge and Karam Singh were made to join 
the investigation. Accused Ranjan
Chadha present in the court was 
standing in the verandah of Bus Stand and he had a black blue colour 
bag on his shoulder. Before witnesses Surender and Karam Singh, 
notice was issued by ASI Lal Singh to the accused to the eﬀ ect that ASI 
has apprehension that you may be having charas in your possession 
and whether he wants to give his search to ASI or before G.O. or 
Magistrate. Accused gave in writing that he wants his search to be 
conducted by the police. Memo of this was also prepared. Accused 
told his name as Ranjan Kumar Chadha. After that accused along 
with witnesses was taken to a room which is adjacent to the room of 
Incharge of Bus Stand. ASI searched the bag and besides personal 
luggage of Ranjan Chadha, Charas in three polythene packets were
303
recovered from the bag and it was weighed and the charas was found 
to be 1 kg. 250 gms. Out of which two samples of 25 gm. each were 
taken and sample and recovered charas were separately sealed in two 
packets with seal H. After aﬃ  xing seal on samples, the seal was handed 
over to Surender Kumar witness. After that ASI prepared Rukka and 
gave it to constable who took the Rukka to police station. Accused was 
arrested and accused was told of the ground of arrest and sentence. 
Accused and witnesses Surender Singh, Karam Singh and I aﬃ  xed our 
respective signature on the Consent Memo Exh.PJ, Recovery Memo 
Exh.PK, Grounds of Arrest Exh.PN. Exh.P.1 packet and Exh.P.2 sample 
are same. Personal search of accused was conducted. Exh.PE the 
memo of personal search bears my signature as witness.”
22. We also looked into the cross examination of the PW 12 by the 
defence counsel. We take notice of the fact that nothing substantial could 
be elicited from the PW 12 in his cross examination. We also take notice of 
the fact that except suggestions put to the witness, there is no other form of 
cross examination. 
23. We shall now look into the evidence of PW 14 ASI Lal Singh of 
Kullu Police Station.  The PW 14 in his examination in chief has deposed 
as under:-
“Stated that I am posted in P.S. Kullu since 1997. On 23.8.98, I along 
with HC Mohan Lal, Constables Sant Ram and Baldev Dass moved 
out of police station Kullu at 5.30 p.m. for patrolling. The departure 
report
was entered in the GD. When we were present at Dhalpur at 
6.30 p.m., I got information from informer that one person wearing 
white T Shirt and green pajama and having French cut beard and is 
healthy is having one big bag with him and he with charas is ready 
to go to Delhi by bus from Sarbari Bus Stand. Thereupon I prepared 
information report and sent it to SP, Kullu through Constable Baldev 
Dass. Exh.PB is copy of it. After that I, with HC Mohan Lal, Constable 
Sant Ram went to Sarbari Bus Stand on foot and we reached Sarbari 
bus stand at 6.45 p.m. Surender Kumar, Bus Stand Incharge and Karam 
Singh were asked to join the investigation who joined the investigation. 
The person with same features as told by informer was found standing 
at that bus stand who had a bag on his shoulder. Before witnesses I 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
304
asked name of that person whereupon that person told his  name as 
Ranjan Kumar Chadha S/o Ved Prakash Chadha, Sarva Priya Vihar, 
New Delhi. Before the witnesses, I asked that person that police has 
apprehension that he is in possession of charas and whether he wants 
that his personal search is to be conducted by police or by any G.0. or 
Magistrate. The accused present in the court is the same person who 
had given his consent in writing and verbally that he is ready to give 
his search to me. Consent Memo Exh.PJ was prepared in this regard 
and accused has given his consent thereon by writing the same in his 
handwriting. After that I gave my personal search through Exh.PM in 
the presence of witnesses. Then the bag which accused was holding 
was searched before the witnesses. Bag was black blue colour on 
which MITRE was found written. On search of bag, besides other 
belongings of accused such as D.L., Diary, etc., three polythene packets 
were recovered in which Charas in the form of Battis and tablets 
were recovered. On weighing, charas 1 kg. 250 gms. was found out of 
recovered charas, 2 samples of 25 grns. each were taken out and charas 
and samples were sealed with seal H. After ﬁ lling up NCB Form and 
sample seal, seal was handed over to witness Surender Kumar. Charas 
was seized through seizure memo Exh.PJ on which accused aﬃ  xed his 
signature and witnesses aﬃ  xed their signatures. Accused was informed 
through
Exh.PN regarding grounds of arrest, etc. Rukka Exh.PH was 
prepared and sent to Police Station through Constable Sant Ram and 
after registration of FIR he brought the ﬁ le from police station. Site 
plan Exh.PP was prepared correctly. Statements of witnesses were 
recorded. Statement of Surender Kumar Marked X, now Exhibited as 
Exh.PQ and statement of Karam Singh marked Y now exhibited as 
Exh.PR have been correctly recorded by me as given by them. Nothing 
was left out and nor anything was added of my own in their statements. 
Memo of personal search Exh.PE was prepared and tickets Exh.PF 
for Delhi Bus was recovered from accused. Thereafter I with accused 
and case property came to police station. Case property, sample and 
NCB Form were submitted by me to SHO who sealed case property 
and sample with seal X. Parcels are Exh.P1 and Sample is Exh.P2. 
Accused was produced in the court on 24.8.98 and remand of accused 
obtained. During investigation, accused informed that charas has been
305
given to him by Nathan Ashley for taking the same to Delhi and that 
person is staying at Nest Guest House located near bus stand. We went 
to that Guest House but no person of this name was found there. On 
25.8.98 I prepared special report and sent to SP through. constable 
Lakshman Dass and Exh.PC is copy of the same. After completing the 
investigation, documents and papers were given to SHO who (SHO) 
has prepared the challan.”
24. We also looked into the cross examination of the PW 14 by the 
defence counsel. We take notice of the fact that nothing substantial could 
be elicited from the PW 14 in his cross examination. We also take notice of 
the fact that except suggestions put to the witness, there is no other form of 
cross examination. 
25. What is pertinent to note in the oral evidence of PW 12 and PW 14 
respectively referred to above, is that the appellant herein was told or rather 
informed that if he so desired, he may get himself searched before the ASI 
or before the Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or  Magistrate. Thus, it is evident from the 
oral evidence of both PW 12 and PW 14 resply that three options were given 
to the appellant herein – ﬁ rst to be searched before the ASI i.e. Assistant 
Sub-Inspector, second, before the Gazetted Oﬃ  cer and third, before any 
Magistrate. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant was not informed 
in so many words that it is his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to 
seek search before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate.
26. So far as the issue of applicability of Section 50 of the NDPS 
Act is concerned, there are two aspects of the same. Even if we hold that 
Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not complied with, then the second 
question would be, whether Section 50 could at all be made applicable 
to the case on hand. 
27. We have no hesitation in recording a ﬁ nding that Section 50 of 
the NDPS Act was not complied with as the appellant could not have been 
oﬀ ered the third option of search to be conducted before the ASI. Section 
50 of the NDPS Act only talks about a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate. 
What is the legal eﬀ ect if an accused of the oﬀ ence under the NDPS Act is 
being told,  whether he would like to be searched before a police oﬃ  cer or 
a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate? 
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STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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28. This  Court in State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand and another,
(2014) 5 SCC 345, held that it is improper for a police oﬃ  cer to tell the 
accused that a third alternative is also available i.e. the search before 
any independent police oﬃ  cer. This Court also took the view that a joint 
communication of the right available under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to 
the accused would frustrate the very purport of Section 50. We quote the 
relevant observations made by this Court as under:-
“15. Thus, if merely a bag carried by a person is searched without 
there being any search of his person, Section 50 of the NDPS Act 
will have no application. But if the bag carried by him is searched 
and his person is also searched, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will 
have application. In this case, respondent 1 Parmanand’s bag was 
searched. From the bag, opium was recovered. His personal search 
was also carried out. Personal search of respondent 2 Surajmal was 
also conducted. Therefore, in the light of the judgments of this Court 
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, Section 50 of the NDPS Act 
will have application.
16. It is now necessary to examine whether in this case, Section 50 of 
the NDPS Act is breached or not. The police witnesses have stated that 
the respondents were informed that they have a right to be searched 
before the nearest gazetted oﬃ  cer or the nearest Magistrate or before 
PW 5 J.S. Negi, the Superintendent. They were
given a written notice. 
As stated by the Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh 
(1999) 6 SCC 172, it is not necessary to inform the accused person, 
in writing, of his right under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act. His right 
can be orally communicated to him. But, in this case, there was no 
individual communication of right. A common notice was given on 
which only respondent 2 Surajmal is stated to have signed for himself 
and for respondent  1 Parmanand. Respondent 1 Parmanand did not 
sign.
17. In our opinion, a joint communication of the right available under 
Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act to the accused would frustrate the very 
purport of Section 50. Communication of the said right to the person 
who is about to be searched is not an empty formality. It has a purpose. 
Most of the oﬀ ences under the NDPS Act carry stringent punishment
307
and, therefore, the prescribed procedure has to be meticulously 
followed. These are minimum safeguards available to an accused 
against the possibility of false involvement. The communication of this 
right has to be clear, unambiguous and individual. The accused must 
be made aware of the existence of such a right. This right would be 
of little signiﬁ cance if the beneﬁ ciary thereof is not able to exercise it 
for want of knowledge about its existence. A joint communication of 
the right may not be clear or unequivocal. It may create confusion. 
It may result in diluting the right. We are, therefore, of the view that 
the accused must be individually informed that under Section 50(1) 
of the NDPS Act, he has a right to be searched before the nearest 
gazetted oﬃ  cer or before the nearest Magistrate. Similar view taken 
by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Paramjit Singh v. State of 
Punjab, (1977) 1 Crimes 242 (P&H) and the Bombay High Court in 
Dharamveer Lekhram Sharma v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 1 Crimes 
586 (Bo0m) meets with our approval. 
18. It bears repetition to state that on the written communication of 
the right available under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act, respondent 
Surajmal has signed for himself and for respondent 1 Parmanand. 
Respondent 1 Parmanand has not signed on it at all. He did not 
give his independent consent. It is only to be presumed that he had 
authorized respondent 2 Surajmal to sign on his behalf and convey 
his consent.
Therefore, in our opinion, the right has not been properly 
communicated to the respondents. The search of the bag of respondent 
1 Parnanand and search of person of the respondents is, therefore, 
vitiated and resultantly their conviction is also vitiated.
19. We also notice that PW 10 SI Qureshi informed the respondents 
that they could be searched before the nearest Magistrate or before the 
nearest gazetted oﬃ  cer or before PW 5 J.S. Negi, the Superintendent, 
who was a part of the raiding party. It is the prosecution case that the 
respondents informed the oﬃ  cers that they would like to be searched 
before PW 5 J.S. Negi by PW 10 SI Qureshi. This, in our opinion, is 
again a breach of Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act. The idea behind 
taking an accused to the nearest Magistrate or the nearest gazetted 
oﬃ  cer, if he so requires, is to give him a chance of being searched in 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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the presence of an independent oﬃ  cer. Therefore, it was improper for 
PW 10 SI Qureshi to tell the respondents that a third alternative was 
available and that they could be searched before PW 5 J.S. Negi, the 
Superintendent, who was part of the raiding party. PW 5 J.S. Negi 
cannot be called an independent oﬃ  cer. We are not expressing any 
opinion on the question whether if the respondents had voluntarily 
expressed that they wanted to be searched before PW 5 J.S. Negi, 
the search would have been vitiated or not. But PW 10 SI Qureshi 
could not have given a third option to the respondents when Section 
50(1) of the NDPS Act does not provide for it and when such option 
would frustrate the provisions of Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act. On 
this ground also, in our opinion, the search conducted by PW 10 SI 
Qureshi is vitiated.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Thus, from the oral evidence on record as discussed above it is 
evident that Section 50 of the NDPS Act stood violated for giving a third 
option of being searched before a police oﬃ  cer. 
30. However, the important question that falls for our consideration is 
whether Section 50 of the NDPS Act is at all applicable to the present case? 
We have noticed few discrepancies in the oral evidence of PW 12 and PW 
14 respectively and the ﬁ nding recorded by the High Court.  The High Court 
in its impugned judgment has said in so many words that the appellant was 
searched in presence
of the independent witnesses and the bag, which was on 
the shoulder of the appellant was also searched. But for the discrepancies, we 
could have considered applying the ratio as enunciated by this Court in the 
case of SK. Raju (supra)  as well as Parmanand (supra). However, there is 
nothing in the oral evidence of the police oﬃ  cers on record to indicate that 
the search of the person of the appellant was also undertaken along with the 
bag. Therefore, we proceed on the assumption that it is only the bag which 
was searched which led to the recovery of the contraband.  
31. The question, therefore, that requires consideration is what meaning 
should be assigned to the phrase “to search any person” occurring in Section 
50 of the NDPS Act.  Whether the phrase “to search any person” means (a) 
search of articles on the person or body of the person; (b) would include 
search of articles in immediate possession as such bag or other luggage
309
carried by him or in physical possession of the person to be searched; (c) 
would include search of bag or luggage which is presumed to be in possession 
of the person even though it may be lying in a house or railway compartment 
or at the airport; or (d) whether application of Section 50 could be extended 
to a case of search of a place, a conveyance or a house if the accused is 
physically present at the time of the search.
32. Section 50 of the  NDPS Act is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“Section 50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be 
conducted. 
(1) When any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about 
to search any person under the provisions of section 41, section 
42 or section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take such 
person without unnecessary delay to nearest Gazetted Officer of 
any of the departments mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest 
Magistrate.
(2) If such requisition is made, the oﬃ  cer may detain the person until 
he can bring him before the Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or the Magistrate referred 
to in sub-section (1).
(3) The Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or the Magistrate before whom any such 
person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, 
forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search 
be made.
(4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female.
(5) When an oﬃ  cer duly authorised under section 42 has reason to 
believe that it is not possible to take the person to be searched to the
nearest Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate without the possibility of the 
person to be searched parting with possession of any narcotic drug 
or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance or article or 
document, he may, instead of taking such person to the nearest Gazetted 
Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, proceed to search the person as provided under 
section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the oﬃ  cer shall 
record the reasons for such belief which necessitated such search and 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate oﬃ  cial 
superior.”
33. Ordinarily, it could be said or argued that “to search any person” 
would mean, to search the articles on the person or body of the person to 
be searched and would normally not include the articles which are not on 
the body of the person to be searched. When we are deliberating on the 
scope and true purport of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, we should bear in 
mind that the main object of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is to avoid the 
allegation of planting something or fabricating evidence by the prosecution 
or the authorized oﬃ  cer.
34. The aforesaid interpretation is made clear to a certain extent by 
Section 50(4) of the NDPS Act which provides for search of a female. 
Section 50(4) of the NDPS Act provides that “no female shall be searched 
by anyone excepting a female”. If the articles to be searched are not on the 
person or body, then there is no question of a search being carried out by a 
female. But when articles which are on the body of the person to be searched, 
then such search could be only done by another female.  This is necessary 
as the law enjoins strict regard to decency. This provision also gives some 
clue as to how to interpret the phrase “to search any person” occurring in 
Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
35. There is a similar provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898 (for short, “CrPC 1898”) and also in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 
1973 (for short, “CrPC 1973”). Section 51, Part III, of the CrPC 1898, 
provides that the oﬃ  cer making the arrest or, when the arrest is made by 
a private person, the police oﬃ  cer to whom he makes over the person 
arrested, may search such person, and place in safe custody all articles, other 
than necessary wearing apparel, found upon him. With regard to search 
of a female, Section 51(2) of the CrPC 1973, provides that whenever it is 
necessary to cause a female to be searched, the search shall be made by 
another female with strict regard to decency. Same safeguards are provided 
under Section 102(3) of the CrPC 1898 and Section 100 of the CrPC 1973.
36. Considering the aforesaid provisions, the inference which can be 
drawn is that “to search any person” would mean only search of the body 
or wearing apparels of such person and in that case the procedure which is 
required to be followed would be the one prescribed under Section 50 of
311
the NDPS Act. In contrast, if search of any building, conveyance or place, 
including a public place, is to be carried out, then there is no question of 
following the procedure prescribed under Section 50. However, when a 
suspected or arrested person is to be searched, then the procedure prescribed 
under Section 50 comes into operation and the procedure thereunder is 
required to be followed. This can be seen by referring to Section 100(3) of 
the CrPC 1973 which provides that where any person is reasonably suspected 
of concealing about his person any article for which search should be made, 
such person may be searched and if such person is a woman, the search shall 
be made by another woman with strict regard to decency. The concealment 
which is suspected is on the person or about his person.
37. The provisions of Section 50 were exhaustively construed by this 
Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 299. We 
may refer to the relevant observations made in paragraph 21 of the aforesaid 
judgment which deals with this aspect. It is as under:-
“21. Both under Sections 41 and 42, the oﬃ  cers empowered can enter 
and search the place and also arrest the person suspected to have 
committed the oﬀ ence either on the basis of his own knowledge or on 
the basis of information reduced to writing. If an arrest is made and 
a person is to be searched, then as noted above Section 50 comes into 
operation and the search of the person has to be
carried out in the 
manner provided thereunder. …”
(Emphasis supplied) 
38. The aforesaid observations make it clear that when search of an 
arrested person is to be carried out, then the procedure prescribed under 
Section 50 is to be followed and not in those cases where search is to be 
carried out of any building, a conveyance or any premises which may be 
public or private where bags and baggage containing narcotic drugs are 
lying. The object and purpose of such search is also discussed in the said 
judgment and the relevant observations are as under:-
“4. … This provision obviously is introduced to avoid any harm to 
the innocent persons and to avoid raising of allegation of planting 
or fabrication by the prosecuting authorities. It lays down that if the 
person to be searched so requires, the oﬃ  cer who is about to search 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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him under the provisions of Sections 41 to 43, shall take such person 
without any unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Oﬃ  cer of any of 
the departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest magistrate. 
One of the questions raised is that what meaning is to be given to the 
words “if the person to be searched so requires”. Do they cast a duty 
upon the oﬃ  cer about to make the search to intimate such person that 
if he so requires he would be taken before the nearest Gazetted Oﬃ  cer 
or the nearest magistrate for the purpose of making search in their 
presence or it is for such person to make such a request on his own 
without being informed by the oﬃ  cer? …”
In paragraph 5, the Court observed:-
“5. … But when a police oﬃ  cer carrying on the investigation including 
search, seizure or arrest empowered under the provisions of the CrPC 
comes across a person being in possession of the narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances then two aspects will arise. If he happens to 
be one of those empowered oﬃ  cers under the NDPS Act also then he 
must follow thereafter the provisions of the NDPS Act and continue 
the investigation as provided thereunder. If on the other hand, he is not 
empowered then the obvious thing he should do is that he must inform 
the empowered oﬃ  cer under the NDPS Act who should thereafter 
proceed from that stage in accordance with the provisions of the 
NDPS Act. But at this stage the question
of resorting to Section 50 and 
informing the accused person that if he so wants, he would be taken 
to a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer and taking to Gazetted Oﬃ  cer thus would not 
arise because by then search would have been over. As laid down in 
Section 50 the steps contemplated thereunder namely informing and 
taking him to the Gazetted Oﬃ  cer should be done before the search. 
When the search is already over in the usual course of investigation 
under the provisions of CrPC then the question of complying with 
section 50 would not arise.”
39. Thereafter the Court considered the provisions of Sections 100 and 
165 resply of the CrPC 1973 which deal with the search of the premises 
and the person. Section 100(1) deals with the search of a closed place and 
Section 100(3) deals with search of a person, whereas Section 165 deals with 
search by a police oﬃ  cer from any place. The Court observed that if there
313
is non-compliance of Section 100 or 165 that itself cannot be a ground for 
rejecting the prosecution case outright. The eﬀ ect of such non-compliance 
will have a bearing on appreciation of evidence of oﬃ  cial witnesses and 
other material depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In 
carrying out such searches if they come across any substance covered by 
the NDPS Act, the question of complying with the provisions of the said 
Act including Section 50 at that stage would not arise. When the contraband 
seized during such arrest or search attracts the provisions of the NDPS 
Act, then from that stage the other relevant provisions of the NDPS Act 
would be attracted and further steps have to be taken in accordance with 
the provisions of the said Act.
40. Thereafter, the Court considered whether the failure to comply with 
the conditions laid down in Section 50 of the NDPS Act by the empowered 
or authorised oﬃ  cer while conducting the search aﬀ ects the prosecution case, 
and held as under:-
“18. … It is obvious that the legislature while keeping in view the menace 
of illicit drug traﬃ  cking deemed it ﬁ t to provide for corresponding 
safeguards to check the misuse of power thus conferred so that any 
harm to innocent persons is avoided and to minimise the allegations 
of planting or fabricating by the prosecution, Section 50 is enacted.”
The Court thereafter held as under:-
“20. …When such is the importance of a right given to an accused 
person in
custody in general, the right by way of safeguard conferred 
under Section 50 in the context is all the more important and valuable. 
Therefore it is to be taken as an imperative requirement on the part of 
the oﬃ  cer intending to search to inform the person to be searched of 
his right that if he so chooses, he will be searched in the presence of 
a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate. Thus the provisions of Section 50 
are mandatory.”
41. When we refer to the decision of this Court in Balbir Singh (supra), 
what has been held therein as a broad principle in para 25(1), is as under:-
“25. The questions considered above arise frequently before the trial 
courts. Therefore we ﬁ nd it necessary to set out our conclusions which 
are as follows:
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(1) If a police oﬃ  cer without any prior information as contemplated 
under the provisions of the NDPS Act makes a search or arrests 
a person in the normal course of investigation into an oﬀ ence or 
suspected oﬀ ences as provided under the provisions of CrPC and 
when such search is completed at that stage Section 50 of the NDPS 
Act would not be attracted and the question of complying with the 
requirements thereunder would not arise. If during such search or 
arrest there is a chance recovery of any narcotic drug or psychotropic 
substance then the police oﬃ  cer, who is not empowered, should 
inform the empowered oﬃ  cer who should thereafter proceed in 
accordance with the provisions of the NDPS Act. If he happens to be 
an empowered oﬃ  cer also, then from that stage onwards, he should 
carry out the investigation in accordance with the other provisions 
of the NDPS Act.”
42. The said principle clearly postulates a situation where a police 
oﬃ  cer in the normal course of investigation of an oﬀ ence or suspected 
oﬀ ences as provided under the provisions of CrPC 1973 and in the course 
of such investigation when a search is completed and in that process 
happens to stumble upon possession of a narcotic drug or psychotropic 
substance, the question of invoking Section 50 would not arise. When 
that principle is examined carefully one can easily understand that 
without any prior information as to possession of any narcotic
drug and 
psychotropic substance, a police oﬃ  cer might have held a search in the 
course of discharge of his duties as contemplated under the provisions 
of CrPC 1973 and, therefore, it would be well-neigh impossible to state 
that even under such a situation, the application of Section 50 would get 
attracted. The facts involved in Balbir Singh (supra) would indicate that 
the police oﬃ  cer eﬀ ected the arrest, search and seizure on reasonable 
suspicion that a cognizable oﬀ ence was committed and not based on any 
prior information that any oﬀ ence punishable under the NDPS Act was 
committed and, therefore, it was argued that complying with the provisions 
of the NDPS Act at the time of the said arrest, search and seizure did not 
arise inasmuch as such arrest, search and seizure was substantially in 
accordance with the provisions of CrPC 1973. It was, therefore, contended 
that such arrest, search and seizure cannot be declared as illegal. While 
examining the contention in the said background, Principle 1 in para 25
315
referred to above came to be rendered. (See : Gurjant Singh v. State of 
Punjab (2014) 13 SCC 603).
43. It all started with the Constitution Bench decision of this Court 
in the case of State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172. The 
Constitution Bench had to be constituted in view of the cleavage of opinion 
expressed by this Court in the State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh reported in 
(1994) 3 SCC 299, Ali Mustaﬀ a Abdul Rahman Moosa v. State of Kerala
reported in (1994) 6 SCC 569, and Saiyad Mohd. Saiyad Umar Saiyad and 
Ors. v. State of Gujarat reported in (1995) 3 SCC 610. 
44. This Court in Baldev Singh (supra) held that Section 50 would 
come into play only in cases where search of a person is conducted under 
the NDPS Act as contemplated under Section 42. Where there is no search 
of a person under the NDPS Act, Section 50 would have no application. 
However, where in the course of a general search being conducted under 
the CrPC, 1973 in connection with any oﬀ ence or suspected oﬀ ence except 
one under the NDPS Act, there is recovery of any contraband, the provisions 
of the NDPS Act shall forthwith apply in such cases also. The relevant 
observations made are reproduced below:-
“12.On its plain reading, Section 50 would come into play only in 
the case of a search of a person as distinguished from search of any 
premises etc. However, if the empowered oﬃ  cer, without any prior 
information as contemplated by Section 42 of the Act makes a search 
or
causes arrest of a person during the normal course of investigation 
into an oﬀ ence or suspected oﬀ ence and on completion of that search, 
a contraband under the NDPS Act is also recovered, the requirements 
of Section 50 of the Act are not attracted.
13. Vide Section 51, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973 shall apply, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions 
of the NDPS Act, to all warrants issued and arrests, searches and 
seizures made under the NDPS Act. Thus, the NDPS Act, 1985 after 
incorporating the broad principles regarding search, seizure and arrest 
etc. in Sections 41, 42, 43, 49 and 50 has laid down in Section 51 that 
the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply insofar 
as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the NDPS Act. The 
expression “insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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this Act” occurring in Section 51 of the NDPS Act is of signiﬁ cance. 
This expression implies that the provisions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure relating to search, seizure or arrest apply to search, seizure 
and arrest under the NDPS Act also except to the extent they are 
“inconsistent with the provisions of the Act”. Thus, while conducting 
search and seizure, in addition to the safeguards provided under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, the safeguards provided under the NDPS 
Act are also required to be followed. Section 50(4) of the NDPS Act 
lays down that no female shall be searched by anyone excepting a 
female. This provision is similar to the one contained in Section 52 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and Section 51(2) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to search of females. Section 51(2) 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 lays down that whenever 
it is necessary to cause a female to be searched, the search shall be 
made by another female with strict regard to decency. The empowered 
oﬃ  cer must, therefore, act in the manner provided by Section 50(4) 
of the NDPS Act read with Section 51(2) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 whenever it is found necessary to cause a female to 
be searched. The document prepared by the investigating oﬃ  cer at 
the spot must invariably disclose that the search was conducted in the 
aforesaid manner and the name of the female oﬃ  cial who carried
out 
the personal search of the female concerned should also be disclosed. 
The personal search memo of the female concerned should indicate 
compliance with the aforesaid provisions. Failure to do so may not 
only aﬀ ect the credibility of the prosecution case but may also be found 
as violative of the basic right of a female to be treated with decency 
and proper dignity.
14. The provisions of Sections 100 and 165 CrPC are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of the NDPS Act and are applicable for aﬀ ecting 
search, seizure or arrest under the NDPS Act also. However, when 
an empowered oﬃ  cer carrying on the investigation including search, 
seizure or arrest under the provisions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, comes across a person being in possession of the narcotic 
drug or the psychotropic substance, then he must follow from that stage 
onwards the provisions of the NDPS Act and continue the investigation 
as provided thereunder. If the investigating oﬃ  cer is not an empowered
317
oﬃ  cer then it is expected of him that he must inform the empowered 
oﬃ  cer under the NDPS Act, who should thereafter proceed from that 
stage in accordance with the provisions of the NDPS Act. In Balbir 
Singh case after referring to a number of judgments, the Bench opined 
that failure to comply with the provisions of CrPC in respect of search 
and seizure and particularly those of Sections 100, 102, 103 and 165 
per se does not vitiate the prosecution case. If there is such a violation, 
what the courts have to see is whether any prejudice was caused to the 
accused. While appreciating the evidence and other relevant factors, 
the courts should bear in mind that there was such a violation and 
evaluate the evidence on record keeping that in view.”
45. This Court in Baldev Singh (supra) further observed that the 
conditions prescribed in Section 50 are an obligation imposed upon the 
empowered oﬃ  cer and the same must be duly complied with before 
conducting any search of a person. The relevant observations are reproduced 
hereunder:-
“24. … There is, thus, unanimity of judicial pronouncements to the 
eﬀ ect that it is an obligation of the empowered oﬃ  cer and his duty 
before conducting the search of the person of a suspect, on the basis of 
prior information, to inform the suspect that he has a right to require 
his search being conducted in the presence of a gazetted oﬃ  cer or 
a Magistrate and that the failure to inform the suspect of his right, 
would render
the search illegal because the suspect would not be able 
to avail of the protection which is inbuilt in Section 50. Similarly, if the 
person concerned requires, on being so informed by the empowered 
oﬃ  cer or otherwise, that his search be conducted in the presence of 
a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, the empowered oﬃ  cer is obliged 
to do so and failure on his part to do so would also render the search 
illegal and the conviction and sentence of the accused bad.”
(Emphasis supplied)
46. This Court in Baldev Singh (supra) also explained the purpose 
behind the safeguards engraved under Section 50 and the reason as to why 
the right of the suspect to have his search conducted before a Gazetted 
Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate ought to be zealously guarded by the courts. It was 
held as under:- 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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“25. To be searched before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, if the 
suspect so requires, is an extremely valuable right which the legislature 
has given to the person concerned having regard to the grave 
consequences that may entail the possession of illicit articles under the 
NDPS Act. It appears to have been incorporated in the Act keeping in 
view the severity of the punishment. The rationale behind the provision 
is even otherwise manifest. The search before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a 
Magistrate would impart much more authenticity and creditworthiness 
to the search and seizure proceeding. It would also verily strengthen 
the prosecution case. There is, thus, no justiﬁ cation for the empowered 
oﬃ  cer, who goes to search the person, on prior information, to eﬀ ect 
the search, of not informing the person concerned of the existence of 
his right to have his search conducted before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a 
Magistrate, so as to enable him to avail of that right. It is, however, not 
necessary to give the information to the person to be searched about 
his right in writing. It is suﬃ  cient if such information is communicated 
to the person concerned orally and as far as possible in the presence 
of some independent and respectable persons witnessing the arrest 
and search. The prosecution must, however, at the trial, establish that 
the empowered oﬃ  cer had conveyed the information to the person 
concerned of his right of
being searched in the presence of a Magistrate 
or a gazetted oﬃ  cer, at the time of the intended search. Courts have 
to be satisﬁ ed at the trial of the case about due compliance with the 
requirements provided in Section 50. No presumption under Section 
54 of the Act can be raised against an accused, unless the prosecution 
establishes it to the satisfaction of the court, that the requirements of 
Section 50 were duly complied with.
26. The safeguard or protection to be searched in the presence of a 
gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate has been incorporated in Section 50 
to ensure that persons are only searched with a good cause and also 
with a view to maintain the veracity of evidence derived from such 
search. We have already noticed that severe punishments have been 
provided under the Act for mere possession of illicit drugs and narcotic 
substances. Personal search, more particularly for oﬀ ences under the 
NDPS Act, are critical means of obtaining evidence of possession and 
it is, therefore, necessary that the safeguards provided in Section 50
319
of the Act are observed scrupulously. The duty to inform the suspect 
of his right to be searched in the presence of a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a 
Magistrate is a necessary sequence for enabling the person concerned 
to exercise that right under Section 50 because after Maneka Gandhi 
v. Union of India it is no longer permissible to contend that the right 
to personal liberty can be curtailed even temporarily, by a procedure 
which is not “reasonable, fair and just” and when a statute itself 
provides for a “just” procedure, it must be honoured. Conducting 
a search under Section 50, without intimating to the suspect that he 
has a right to be searched before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, 
would be violative of the “reasonable, fair and just procedure” and the 
safeguard contained in Section 50 would be rendered illusory, otiose 
and meaningless. Procedure based on systematic and unconscionable 
violation of law by the oﬃ  cials responsible for the enforcement of law, 
cannot be considered to be a “fair”, just or reasonable procedure. We 
are not persuaded to agree that reading into Section 50, the existence of 
a duty on the part of the empowered oﬃ  cer, to intimate to the suspect, 
about the existence of his right to be searched in the presence of a 
gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, if he so requires, would place any 
premium on ignorance of the law. The argument loses sight of a clear 
distinction between ignorance of the law and ignorance of the right 
to a
“reasonable, fair and just procedure”.

x

x

x

x
28. This Court cannot overlook the context in which the NDPS Act 
operates and particularly the factor of widespread illiteracy among 
persons subject to investigation for drug oﬀ ences. It must be borne 
in mind that severer the punishment, greater has to be the care taken 
to see that all the safeguards provided in a statute are scrupulously 
followed. We are not able to ﬁ nd any reason as to why the empowered 
oﬃ  cer should shirk from aﬀ ording a real opportunity to the suspect, 
by intimating to him that he has a right “that if he requires” to be 
searched in the presence of a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, he shall 
be searched only in that manner. As already observed the compliance 
with the procedural safeguards contained in Section 50 are intended 
to serve a dual purpose — to protect a person against false accusation 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
320
and frivolous charges as also to lend creditability to the search and 
seizure conducted by the empowered oﬃ  cer. The argument that keeping 
in view the growing drug menace, an insistence on compliance with all 
the safeguards contained in Section 50 may result in more acquittals 
does not appeal to us. If the empowered oﬃ  cer fails to comply with the 
requirements of Section 50 and an order or acquittal is recorded on that 
ground, the prosecution must thank itself for its lapses. Indeed in every 
case the end result is important but the means to achieve it must remain 
above board. The remedy cannot be worse than the disease itself. The 
legitimacy of the judicial process may come under a cloud if the court 
is seen to condone acts of lawlessness conducted by the investigating 
agency during search operations and may also undermine respect for 
the law and may have the eﬀ ect of unconscionably compromising the 
administration of justice. That cannot be permitted.” 
(Emphasis supplied)
47. As to what would be the consequences of a recovery made in 
violation of Section 50, it was observed in Baldev Singh (supra) that it 
would have the eﬀ ect of rendering such incriminating material inadmissible 
in evidence and hence, cannot be relied upon to hold the accused guilty for 
being found to be in unlawful possession of any contraband. The Court further 
held that it would not impede the prosecution from relying upon recovery 
of any
other incriminating article in any other independent proceedings. It 
was further held that the burden of proving that the conditions of Section 
50 were complied with, would lie upon the prosecution to establish. The 
relevant observations are being reproduced hereunder:- 
“32. However, the question whether the provisions of Section 50 are 
mandatory or directory and, if mandatory, to what extent and the 
consequences of non-compliance with it does not strictly speaking arise 
in the context in which the protection has been incorporated in Section 
50 for the beneﬁ t of the person intended to be searched. Therefore, 
without expressing any opinion as to whether the provisions of Section 
50 are mandatory or not, but bearing in mind the purpose for which 
the safeguard has been made, we hold that the provisions of Section 
50 of the Act implicitly make it imperative and obligatory and cast 
a duty of the investigating oﬃ  cer (empowered oﬃ  cer) to ensure that
321
search of the person (suspect) concerned is conducted in the manner 
prescribed by Section 50, by intimating to the person concerned about 
the existence of his right, that if he so requires, he shall be searched 
before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate and in case he so opts, 
failure to conduct his search before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate 
would cause prejudice to the accused and render the recovery of the 
illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of the 
accused, where the conviction has been recorded only on the basis 
of the possession of the illicit article, recovered during a search 
conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. The 
omission may not vitiate the trial as such, but because of the inherent 
prejudice which would be caused to an accused by the omission to be 
informed of the existence of his right, it would render his conviction 
and sentence unsustainable. The protection provided in the section to 
an accused to be intimated that he has the right to have his personal 
search conducted before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, if he so 
requires, is sacrosanct and indefeasible — it cannot be disregarded 
by the prosecution except at its own peril.
33. The question whether or not the safeguards provided in Section 
50 were observed would have, however, to be determined by the 
court on the basis of the evidence led at the trial and the ﬁ nding on 
that issue, one way or the other, would be
relevant for recording an 
order of conviction or acquittal. Without giving an opportunity to the 
prosecution to establish at the trial that the provisions of Section 50 
and, particularly, the safeguards provided in that section were complied 
with, it would not be advisable to cut short a criminal trial.

x

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x

x
45. … Prosecution cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own 
wrong. Conducting a fair trial for those who are accused of a criminal 
oﬀ ence is the cornerstone of our democratic society. A conviction 
resulting from an unfair trial is contrary to our concept of justice. 
Conducting a fair trial is both for the beneﬁ t of the society as well 
as for an accused and cannot be abandoned. While considering the 
aspect of fair trial, the nature of the evidence obtained and the nature 
of the safeguard violated are both relevant factors. Courts cannot 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
322
allow admission of evidence against an accused, where the court is 
satisﬁ ed that the evidence had been obtained by a conduct of which the 
prosecution ought not to take advantage particularly when that conduct 
had caused prejudice to the accused. If after careful consideration 
of the material on record it is found by the court that the admission 
of evidence collected in search conducted in violation of Section 50 
would render the trial unfair then that evidence must be excluded. 
In R. v. Collins, (1987) 1 SCR 265 (Canada),  the Supreme Court of 
Canada speaking through Lamer, J. (as his Lordship, Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of Canada then was) opined that the use of evidence 
collected in violation of the Charter rights of an accused would render 
a trial unfair and the evidence inadmissible. …

x

x

x
x
55. We, therefore, hold that an illicit article seized from the person of 
an accused, during search conducted in violation of the safeguards 
provided in Section 50 of the Act, cannot by itself be used as admissible 
evidence of proof of unlawful possession of the contraband on the 
accused. Any other material/article recovered during that search 
may, however, be relied upon by the prosecution in other/independent 
proceedings against an accused notwithstanding the recovery of that 
material during an illegal search and its admissibility would depend 
upon the relevancy of that material and the facts and circumstances 
of that case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
48. This Court ultimately summed up its ﬁ ndings with the following 
ten conclusions reproduced below:- 
“57. On the basis of the reasoning and discussion above, the following 
conclusions arise: 
(1) That when an empowered oﬃ  cer or a duly authorised oﬃ  cer acting 
on prior information is about to search a person, it is imperative for 
him to inform the person concerned of his right under sub-section 
(1) of Section 50 of being taken to the nearest gazetted oﬃ  cer or the 
nearest Magistrate for making the search. However, such information 
may not necessarily be in writing;
323
(2) That failure to inform the person concerned about the existence 
of his right to be searched before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate 
would cause prejudice to an accused; 
(3) That a search made, by an empowered oﬃ  cer, on prior information, 
without informing the person of his right that, if he so requires, he 
shall be taken before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate for search 
and in case he so opts, failure to conduct his search before a gazetted 
oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, may not vitiate the trial but would render the 
recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and 
sentence of an accused, where the conviction has been recorded only 
on the basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from his 
person, during a search conducted in violation of the provisions of 
Section 50 of the Act; 
(4) That there is indeed need to protect society from criminals. The 
societal intent in safety will suﬀ er if persons who commit crimes are 
let oﬀ  because the evidence against them is to be treated as if it does 
not exist. The answer, therefore, is that the investigating agency must 
follow the procedure as envisaged by the statute scrupulously and the 
failure to do so must be viewed by the higher authorities seriously 
inviting action against the concerned oﬃ  cial so that the laxity on the 
part of the investigating authority is curbed. In every case the end result 
is important but the means to achieve it must remain above board. 
The
remedy cannot be worse than the disease itself. The legitimacy of 
judicial process may come under cloud if the court is seen to condone 
acts of lawlessness conducted by the investigating agency during 
search operations and may also undermine respect for law and may 
have the eﬀ ect of unconscionably compromising the administration of 
justice. That cannot be permitted. An accused is entitled to a fair trial. 
A conviction resulting from an unfair trial is contrary to our concept 
of justice. The use of evidence collected in breach of the safeguards 
provided by Section 50 at the trial, would render the trial unfair.
(5) That whether or not the safeguards provided in Section 50 have 
been duly observed would have to be determined by the Court on the 
basis of evidence led at the trial. Finding on that issue, one way or 
the other, would be relevant for recording an order of conviction or 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
324
acquittal. Without giving an opportunity to the prosecution to establish, 
at the trial, that the provisions of Section 50, and particularly the 
safeguards provided therein were duly complied with, it would not be 
permissible to cut-short a criminal trial; 
(6) That in the context in which the protection has been incorporated 
in Section 50 for the beneﬁ t of the person intended to be searched, we 
do not express any opinion whether the provisions of Section 50 are 
mandatory or directory, but hold that failure to inform the concerned 
person of his right as emanating from sub-section (1) of Section 50, 
may render the recovery of the contraband suspect and the conviction 
and sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law;
(7) That an illicit article seized from the person of an accused during 
search conducted in violation of the safeguards provided in Section 50 
of the Act cannot be used as evidence of proof of unlawful possession 
of the contraband on the accused though any other material recovered 
during that search may be relied upon by the prosecution, in other 
proceedings, against an accused, notwithstanding the recovery of that 
material during an illegal search;
(8) A presumption under Section 54 of the Act can only be raised after 
the prosecution has established that the accused was found to be in 
possession of the contraband in a search conducted in accordance 
with the mandate of Section 50. An illegal
search cannot entitle the 
prosecution to raise a presumption under Section 54 of the Act. 
(9) That the judgment in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection 
(Investigation), (1974) 1 SCC 345, cannot be understood to have laid 
down that an illicit article seized during a search of a person, on prior 
information, conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of 
the Act, can by itself be used as evidence of unlawful possession of 
the illicit article on the person from whom the contraband has been 
seized during the illegal search; 
(10) That the judgment in Ali Mustaﬀ a’s case correctly interprets 
and distinguishes the judgment in Pooran Mal’s case and the broad 
observations made in State of H.P. v. Pirthi Chand, (1996) 2 SCC 
37,  and State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (1996) 1 SCC 288, case are
325
not in tune with the correct exposition of law as laid down in Pooran 
Mal’s case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
49. Thus, the Constitutional Bench in express terms laid down that 
although the non-compliance of Section 50 may not vitiate the trial yet 
would render the recovery of the contraband doubtful and may vitiate 
the conviction of the accused. The emphasis laid by the Court is on illicit 
articles seized from the “person of an accused” during the search conducted 
in violation of safeguards provided in Section 50 of the NDPS Act. In other 
words, according to Baldev Singh (supra), the provisions of Section 50 will 
come into play only in the case of personal search of the accused and not of 
some baggage like a bag, article or container, etc. which he may be carrying. 
When Section 50 could be said to be complied with? 
50. This Court in a number of cases has dealt with this very aspect 
and laid down the principles with respect to when Section 50 be said to be 
complied with. This Court in Manohar Lal v. State of Rajasthan reported 
in (1996) 11 SCC 391, held that Section 50 only requires the option to be 
given to the accused to say whether he would like to be searched in the 
presence of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate. The relevant observations 
made therein are reproduced below:- 
“2. … The provision only requires the option to be given to the accused 
to say whether he would like to be searched in the presence of a 
Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate; and on
exercise of that option by 
the accused, it is for the oﬃ  cer concerned to have the search made in 
the presence of the nearest Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or the nearest Magistrate 
whosoever is conveniently available for the purpose in order to avoid 
undue delay in completion of that exercise. It is clear from Section 50 
of the NDPS Act that the option given thereby to the accused is only to 
choose whether he would like to be searched by the oﬃ  cer making the 
search or in the presence of the nearest available Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or 
the nearest available Magistrate. The choice of the nearest Gazetted 
Oﬃ  cer or the nearest Magistrate has to be exercised by the oﬃ  cer 
making the search and not by the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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51. In Joseph Fernandez v. State of Goa reported in (2001) 1 SCC 707, 
this Court held that only substantial compliance of Section 50 is required, and 
informing the suspect that if he wishes he may be searched in presence of a 
Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate without the use of the word “right” would not 
amount to breach of Section 50. The relevant observations made therein  are 
reproduced below:-
“2. Learned counsel tried to highlight a point that Section 50 of the 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act has not strictly been 
complied with by PW 8, the oﬃ  cer who conducted the search. According 
to the learned counsel for the appellant the searching oﬃ  cer should have 
told the person who was subjected to search that he had a right to be 
searched in the presence of a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate. In this 
case PW 8 has deposed that she told the appellant that if he wished he 
could be searched in the presence of the gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate 
to which the appellant had not favourably reciprocated. According to 
us the said oﬀ er is a communication about the information that the 
appellant has a right to be searched so. It must be remembered that the 
searching oﬃ  cer had only Section 50 of the Act then in mind unaided by 
the interpretation placed on it by the Constitution Bench. Even then the 
searching oﬃ  cer informed him that “if you wish you may be searched 
in the presence of a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a
Magistrate”. This according 
to us is in substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 50. 
We do not agree with the contention that there was non-compliance with 
the mandatory provision contained in Section 50 of the Act.”
52. In Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of M.P. reported in (2004) 2 
SCC 56, this Court held that for the purpose of due compliance of Section 50 
there is no speciﬁ c word or form in which the communication is to be made 
and it is not necessary to use the word “right”, as the person to be searched 
is only required to be made aware that he has a choice of having his search 
conducted before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate. The relevant observations 
made in it are reproduced hereunder:- 
“11. ... What the oﬃ  cer concerned is required to do is to convey about 
the choice the accused has. The accused (suspect) has to be told in a 
way that he becomes aware that the choice is his and not of the oﬃ  cer 
concerned, even  though there is no speciﬁ c form. The use of the word
327
“right” at relevant places in the decision of Baldev Singh case seems 
to be to lay eﬀ ective emphasis that it is not by the grace of the oﬃ  cer 
the choice has to be given but more by way of a right in the “suspect” 
at that stage to be given such a choice and the inevitable consequences 
that have to follow by transgressing it.”
53. However, a ﬁ ve-Judge Bench of this Court in Vijaysinh Chandubha 
Jadeja v. State of Gujarat reported in (2011) 1 SCC 609, overruled the 
decisions in Prabha Shankar Dubey (supra) and Joseph Fernandez (supra) 
and disapproved the concept of “substantial compliance” and held that the 
obligation under Section 50 is mandatory and the failure to comply with the 
same would render the recovery of illicit article suspicious and vitiate the 
conviction, more particularly if the basis of conviction is the recovery of 
illicit article from the accused during search. The person to be searched is to 
be speciﬁ cally informed that he has a right to be searched in presence of a 
Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate. The Court also held that while it is the choice 
of police to take the suspect either before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or  Magistrate, 
an endeavour should be made to take him before  Magistrate. The relevant 
observations made therein are reproduced below:- 
“29. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the ﬁ rm opinion 
that the object with which the right under Section 50(1) of the NDPS 
Act, by way of a safeguard, has been conferred on the
suspect viz. to 
check the misuse of power, to avoid harm to innocent persons and to 
minimise the allegations of planting or foisting of false cases by the 
law enforcement agencies, it would be imperative on the part of the 
empowered oﬃ  cer to apprise the person intended to be searched of his 
right to be searched before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate. We have 
no hesitation in holding that insofar as the obligation of the authorised 
oﬃ  cer under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is concerned, 
it is mandatory and requires strict compliance. Failure to comply with 
the provision would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect 
and vitiate the conviction if the same is recorded only on the basis of 
the recovery of the illicit article from the person of the accused during 
such search. Thereafter, the suspect may or may not choose to exercise 
the right provided to him under the said provision.

x

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x

x
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
328
31. We are of the opinion that the concept of “substantial compliance” 
with the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act introduced and read 
into the mandate of the said section in Joseph Fernandez and Prabha 
Shankar Dubey is neither borne out from the language of sub-section 
(1) of Section 50 nor it is in consonance with the dictum laid down 
in Baldev Singh case. Needless to add that the question whether or 
not the procedure prescribed has been followed and the requirement 
of Section 50 had been met, is a matter of trial. It would neither be 
possible nor feasible to lay down any absolute formula in that behalf.
32. We also feel that though Section 50 gives an option to the empowered 
officer to take such person (suspect) either before the nearest 
gazetted oﬃ  cer or the Magistrate but in order to impart authenticity, 
transparency and creditworthiness to the entire proceedings, in the 
ﬁ rst instance, an endeavour should be to produce the suspect before 
the nearest Magistrate, who enjoys more conﬁ dence of the common 
man compared to any other oﬃ  cer. It would not only add legitimacy 
to the search proceedings, it may verily strengthen the prosecution as 
well.”
(Emphasis supplied)
54. In Parmanand (supra) this Court held that Section 50 confers 
a right upon the accused to be searched either by a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or 
Magistrate, and as such while informing the suspect of its right, only the 
aforesaid two options can be provided. Section 50 could be said to be 
violated where a third option is also oﬀ ered, be it that of being searched by 
the superintendent of police or by the police oﬃ  cer himself.  
55. Although a superintendent of police is a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer, yet the 
reason why this court in Parmanand (supra) held the third option to be 
bad in law is because,  ﬁ rst, in that case the Superintendent of Police was 
a part of the raiding party and as such was not an independent witness and 
secondly,  as discussed, Section 50 provides for only two options,  either a 
Magistrate or  Gazetted Oﬃ  cer. 
56. Thus, the person intended to be searched under Section 50 must be 
told in clear and unambiguous words that he has a right to have the search 
conducted in presence of either a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate. The person 
concerned must be made aware of his right and must be given only two 
options that have been provided under the section.
329
57. This Court in Parmanand (supra) has also held that a joint 
communication of the right under Section 50 would be bad in law. The right 
under Section 50 could be said to be violated where in a case of multiple 
persons intended to be searched, only a joint communication has been given 
or where the right has been exercised or declined by one of them on behalf 
of the other. While, a written communication of the right is not required, the 
right has to be communicated in clear words to each person individually whose 
search is intended to be conducted, and no person can either waive or exercise 
this right at the behest of another. Thus, in case of multiple persons, each of 
them must be individually communicated of their right and must exercise or 
waive the same in their own individual capacity. 
58. We also looked into the decision of this Court in Arif Khan alias 
Agha Khan v. State of Uttarakhand reported in (2018) 18 SCC 380, wherein 
it was held that even where the accused after being informed of his right under 
Section 50, chooses to decline the same, his search by the police must be 
conducted in presence of either a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate. The relevant 
observations are as under:- 
“4. … On apprehending the accused, he was informed by the police 
personnel that he has a legal right to be searched in the presence of a 
gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate to which the accused replied that he has 
faith in the raiding police party and consented to be
searched by them.
5. The raiding police party accordingly obtained his consent in writing 
to be searched by the raiding police party. The raiding police party then 
searched the accused which resulted in seizure of “charas” weighing 
around 2.5 kg in quantity from his body.

x

x

x

x
24. We do not agree to this ﬁ nding of the two courts below as, in our 
opinion, a search and recovery made from the appellant of the alleged 
contraband “charas” does not satisfy the mandatory requirements of 
Section 50 as held by this Court in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja. This 
we say for the following reasons:
24.1. First, it is an admitted fact emerging from the record of the 
case that the appellant was not produced before any Magistrate 
or gazetted oﬃ  cer.
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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24.2. Second, it is also an admitted fact that due to the 
aforementioned ﬁ rst reason, the search and recovery of the 
contraband “charas” was not made from the appellant in the 
presence of any Magistrate or gazetted oﬃ  cer.
24.3. Third, it is also an admitted fact that none of the police 
oﬃ  cials of the raiding party, who recovered the contraband 
“charas” from him, was the gazetted oﬃ  cer and nor they could 
be and, therefore, they were not empowered to make search 
and recovery from the appellant of the contraband “charas” as 
provided under Section 50 of the NDPS Act except in the presence 
of either a Magistrate or a gazetted oﬃ  cer.
24.4. Fourth, in order to make the search and recovery of the 
contraband articles from the body of the suspect, the search 
and recovery has to be in conformity with the requirements of 
Section 50 of the NDPS Act. It is, therefore, mandatory for the 
prosecution to prove that the search and recovery was made from 
the appellant in the presence of a Magistrate or a gazetted oﬃ  cer.
25. Though, the prosecution examined as many as ﬁ ve police oﬃ  cials 
(PW 1 to PW 5) of the raiding police party but none of them deposed 
that the search/recovery was made in presence of any Magistrate or 
a gazetted oﬃ  cer.
26. For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the considered opinion 
that the prosecution was not able to prove that the search and recovery 
of the contraband (charas) made from the
appellant was in accordance 
with the procedure prescribed under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Since 
the non-compliance of the mandatory procedure prescribed under 
Section 50 of the NDPS Act is fatal to the prosecution case and, in 
this case, we have found that the prosecution has failed to prove the 
compliance as required in law, the appellant is entitled to claim its 
beneﬁ t to seek his acquittal.”
59. However, in our opinion, the observations made in Arif Khan
(supra) are in direct conﬂ ict with the Constitution Bench decision of Baldev 
Singh (supra). It appears that the attention of the learned Judges while 
rendering the decision of Arif Khan (supra) was seemingly not invited to 
the words “if the person to be searched so requires” used in section 50.
331
60. Section 50 of the NDPS Act only goes so far as to prescribe 
an obligation onto the police oﬃ  cer to inform the suspect of his right to 
have his search conducted either in the presence of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or 
Magistrate. Whether or not the search should be conducted in the presence 
of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate ultimately depends on the exercise of 
such right as provided under Section 50. In the event the suspect declines 
this right, there is no further obligation to have his search conducted in the 
presence of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, and in such a situation the 
empowered police oﬃ  cer can proceed to conduct the search of the person 
himself. To read Section 50 otherwise would render the very purpose of 
informing the suspect of his right a redundant exercise. We are of the view 
that the decision of this Court in Arif Khan (supra) cannot be said to be an 
authority for the proposition that notwithstanding the person proposed to be 
searched has, after being duly apprised of his right to be searched before a 
Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, but has expressly waived this right in clear 
and unequivocal terms; it is still mandatory that his search be conducted 
only before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate.
61. A plain reading of the extracted paragraphs of Arif Khan (supra) 
referred to above would indicate that this Court while following the ratio 
of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja 
(supra) held that the
same has settled the position of law in this behalf to 
the eﬀ ect that, whilst it is imperative on the part of the empowered oﬃ  cer to 
apprise the person of his right to be searched only before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer 
or Magistrate; and this requires strict compliance; this Court simultaneously 
proceeded to reiterate that in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja (supra) “it is 
ruled that the suspect person may or may not choose to exercise the right 
provided to him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act”.  
62. There is no requirement to conduct the search of the person, 
suspected to be in possession of a narcotic drug or a psychotropic substance, 
only in the presence of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, if the person 
proposed to be searched, after being apprised by the empowered oﬃ  cer of 
his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted 
Oﬃ  cer or Magistate categorically waives such right by electing to be 
searched by the empowered oﬃ  cer. The words “if such person so requires”, 
as used in Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act would be rendered otiose, if the 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
332
person proposed to be searched would still be required to be searched only 
before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, despite having expressly waived 
“such requisition”, as mentioned in the opening sentence of sub-Section (2) 
of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. In other words, the person to be searched is 
mandatorily required to be taken by the empowered oﬃ  cer, for the conduct 
of the proposed search before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, only “if he so 
requires”, upon being informed of the existence of his right to be searched 
before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate and not if he waives his right to be 
so searched voluntarily, and chooses not to exercise the right provided to 
him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
63. However, we propose to put an end to all speculations and debate 
on this issue of the suspect being apprised by the empowered oﬃ  cer of his 
right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted 
Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate. We are of the view that even in cases wherein the 
suspect waives such right by electing to be searched by the empowered 
oﬃ  cer, such waiver on the part of the suspect should be reduced into writing 
by the empowered oﬃ  cer. To put it in other words, even if the suspect says 
that he would not like to be searched before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate 
and he would be ﬁ ne if his search is undertaken by the empowered oﬃ  cer, 
the matter should not rest with just an oral
statement of the suspect. The 
suspect should be asked to give it in writing duly signed by him in presence 
of the empowered oﬃ  cer as well as the other oﬃ  cials of the squad that “I was 
apprised of my right to be searched before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate 
in accordance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, however, I declare on my 
own free will and volition that I would not like to exercise my right of being 
searched before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate and I may be searched by 
the empowered oﬃ  cer.” This would lend more credence to the compliance 
of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. In other words, it would impart authenticity, 
transparency and credit worthiness to the entire proceedings. We clarify that 
this compliance shall henceforth apply prospectively.
64. From the aforesaid discussion, the requirements envisaged by 
Section 50 can be summarised as follows:-
(i) Section 50 provides both a right as well as an obligation. The 
person about to be searched has the right to have his search 
conducted in the presence of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or  Magistrate
333
if he so desires, and it is the obligation of the police oﬃ  cer to 
inform such person of this right before proceeding to search the 
person of the suspect. 
(ii) Where, the person to be searched declines to exercise this right, the 
police oﬃ  cer shall be free to proceed with the search. However, 
if the suspect declines to exercise his right of being searched 
before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate, the empowered oﬃ  cer 
should take it in writing from the suspect that he would not like 
to exercise his right of being searched before a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer 
or Magistrate and he may be searched by the empowered oﬃ  cer.
(iii) Before conducting a search, it must be communicated in clear 
terms though it need not be in writing and is permissible to convey 
orally, that the suspect has a right of being searched by a Gazetted 
Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate. 
(iv) While informing the right, only two options of either being 
searched in presence of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate must be 
given, who also must be independent and in no way connected to 
the raiding party.
(v) In case of multiple persons to be searched, each of them has to be 
individually communicated of their right, and each must exercise 
or waive the same in their own capacity. Any joint or common 
communication of this right would be in violation of Section 50.
(vi) Where the right under Section 50 has been exercised, it is the 
choice of the police oﬃ  cer to decide whether to take the suspect 
before a Gazetted
Oﬃ  cer or Magistrate but an endeavour should 
be made to take him before the nearest Magistrate.
(vii) Section 50 is applicable only in case of search of person of the 
suspect under the provisions of the NDPS Act,  and would have 
no application where a search was conducted under any other 
statute in respect of any oﬀ ence.
(viii) Where during a search under any statute other than the NDPS Act, 
a contraband under the NDPS Act also happens to be recovered, 
the provisions relating to the  NDPS Act shall forthwith start 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
334
applying, although in such a situation Section 50 may not be 
required to be complied for the reason that search had already 
been conducted.
(ix) The burden is on the prosecution to establish that the 
obligation imposed by Section 50 was duly complied with 
before the search was conducted.
(x) Any incriminating contraband, possession of which is 
punishable under the NDPS Act and recovered in violation of 
Section 50 would be inadmissible and cannot be relied upon 
in the trial by the prosecution, however, it will not vitiate 
the trial in respect of the same. Any other article that has 
been recovered may be relied upon in any other independent 
proceedings.
Whether Section 50 is applicable while searching a bag of the 
accused?
65. Baldev Singh (supra), discussed above, gave rise to a debate 
as to what would be included within “search of a person” as stipulated 
under Section 50. This Court started interpreting the expression 
giving a literal or strict interpretation of the word “person”, thereby 
distinguishing the search of a person from that of a bag or vehicle or 
premises. As a result, even if there was no compliance with Section 
50 while searching the accused person’s bag, the evidence of recovery 
would still be deemed admissible. However, over a period of time, this 
Court started reading the word “person” in a slightly broader sense so 
as to mandate that Section 50 be complied with even  while conducting 
a search
of anything that is inextricably linked to the accused. As a 
result, a bag which was being carried by the accused was considered 
to be inextricably linked to the accused, and therefore, any recovery 
of a contraband from such a bag without complying with Section 50 
would be inadmissible.   
66. We shall now look into the various decisions of this Court on 
the interpretation of Section 50.
Section 50 does not cover a bag being carried by the accused
335
67. In Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1999) 
8 SCC 257, 2 kgs of heroin was recovered from a bag belonging to the 
accused. It was argued that as the requirements under Section 50 were not 
complied with, the contraband recovered in the course of the search would 
be inadmissible. This Court, while rejecting such argument and relying upon 
Baldev Singh (supra), held that Section 50 would not apply to the search of 
a bag belonging to the accused. The relevant paragraph is as under:-
“4. … As rightly pointed out by the High Court search of baggage of 
a person is not the same thing as search of the person himself. In State 
of Punjab v. Baldev Singh this Court has held that the requirement of 
informing the accused about his right under Section 50 comes into 
existence only when person of the accused is to be searched. The 
decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, wherein it 
was held that though poppy straw was recovered from the bags of 
the accused, yet he was required to be informed about his right to 
be searched in presence of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, now 
stands overruled by the decision in Baldev Singh’s case (supra). If a 
person is carrying a bag or some other article with him and narcotic 
drug or the psychotropic substance is found from it, it cannot be said 
that it was found from his “person”. In this case heroin was found 
from a bag belonging to the appellant and not from his person and 
therefore it was not
necessary to make an oﬀ er for search in presence 
of a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate.”    
(Emphasis supplied)
68. In Sarjudas v. State of Gujarat reported in (1999) 8 SCC 508, the 
contraband was recovered from a bag which was hanging on the accused’s 
scooter, which he was riding. This Court while holding the bag not to be 
included in the “search of the person” held as under:- 
“4. What is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant is 
that the appellants were not informed of their right under Section 50 
of the NDPS Act that they were entitled to be examined in presence 
of a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate and, therefore, the search of the 
appellants was illegal and the evidence regarding recovery of charas 
from their possession could not have been relied upon.
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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5. We do not ﬁ nd any substance in this contention as the charas was 
not found on the person of the appellants but it was found kept in a bag 
which was hanging on the scooter on which they were riding. Therefore, 
this was not a case where the person of the accused was searched and 
from his person narcotic drug or psychotropic substance was found. 
The correct position of the law on this point has been stated by this 
Court in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh”                 (Emphasis supplied)
69. In Birakishore Kar v. State of Orissa reported in (2000) 9 SCC 
541, the contraband was recovered from a plastic bag on which the accused 
was sitting while travelling in a train. As the body of the accused was not 
searched, Section 50 was held to be inapplicable. This Court held as under:- 
“3. What is now contended by the learned counsel for the appellant is 
that the mandatory requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, 1985, 
viz., that the person to be searched should be told about his right to 
be examined in the presence of a Magistrate or a gazetted oﬃ  cer was 
not complied with in this case. This contention is really misconceived. 
In this case it was not the person of the appellant which was searched. 
He was found sitting on a plastic bag which belonged to him and which 
contained poppy straw. As pointed out by this Court in State of Punjab 
v. Baldev Singh [(1999) 6 SCC 172], Section 50 would come into play 
only in the
case of search of a person as distinguished from search 
of any premise etc. As we do not ﬁ nd any substance in this appeal, it 
is dismissed.”                                                      (Emphasis supplied)
70. In Kanhaiya Lal v. State of M.P. reported in (2000) 10 SCC 380, 
opium was recovered from the bag which was being carried by the accused. 
Section 50 was not made applicable as it was held that the recovery was 
made from the bag and not the person, and it was held as under:- 
“2. The only point raised in this appeal is that the mandatory 
requirement of Section 50 of the Act was not complied with in this case 
and therefore the conviction of the appellant is illegal. In our opinion, 
there is no substance in this contention because 1 kg of opium was 
not found from the person of the appellant but it was found from a 
bag which was being carried by the appellant. Therefore, this cannot 
be said to be a case where on search of the person of the accused, a 
narcotic drug or psychotropic substance was found. In our opinion,
337
the courts below have correctly held that the appellant is guilty of 
committing the said oﬀ ence. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.”  
(Emphasis supplied)
71. Similarly, in Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2001) 
3 SCC 28, the accused therein was apprehended while disembarking from 
a train carrying a gunny bag containing poppy straw weighing 7 kgs. The 
counsel for the State therein argued that the procedure under Section 50 
was not required to be followed as nothing was recovered from the person. 
This Court while accepting the said argument and referring to Baldev Singh 
(supra) held that:-
“8. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Constitutional Bench, in 
our view, no further discussion is required on this aspect. However, we 
may mention that this right is extension of right conferred under Section 
100(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-Section (1) of Section 
100 of the Code provides that whenever any place liable to search or 
inspection is closed, any person residing in, or being in charge of, 
such place, shall, on demand of the oﬃ  cer or other person executing 
the warrant, and on production of the warrant, allow him free ingress 
thereto, and aﬀ ord all reasonable facilities for a search therein. Sub-
Section (3) provides that where any person in or about such place is 
reasonably suspected of concealing about his person any article for 
which search should be made, such person may be searched and if 
such person is a woman, the
search shall be made by another woman 
with strict regard to decency. Sub-section (7) of Section 100 further 
provides that when any person is searched under sub-section (3) a list 
of all things taken possession of shall be prepared and a copy thereof 
shall be delivered to such person. This would also be clear if we refer 
to search and seizure, procedure provided under Sections 42 and 43 
of the building, conveyance or place. Hence, in our view, Section 50 
of the NDPS Act would be applicable only in those cases where the 
search of the person is carried out.”     
     (Emphasis supplied)
72. In Beckodan Abdul Rahiman v. State of Kerala reported in 
(2002) 4 SCC 229, the contraband had been recovered from a polythene bag 
hidden in the folds of the dhoti, which the accused was wearing. The Court 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
338
acquitted the accused as Section 50 was not complied with while searching 
the accused. It was held as under:-
“3. … After referring to a host of judgments, the Constitution Bench of 
the Court held that the provisions of Sections 42 and 50 are mandatory 
and their non- compliance would render the investigation illegal. It 
was reiterated that severer the punishment, greater the care to be taken 
to see that all the safeguards provided in the statute are scrupulously 
followed. The safeguards mentioned in Section 50 are intended to serve 
a dual purpose ─ to protect the person against false accusation and 
frivolous charges as also to lend credibility to the search and seizure 
conducted by the empowered oﬃ  cer. If the empowered oﬃ  cer fails 
to comply with the requirements of the Section, the prosecution is to 
suﬀ er for the consequences. The legitimacy of the judicial process may 
come under the cloud if the court is seen to condone acts of lawlessness 
conducted by the investigating agency during search operations and 
may also undermine respect for the law and may have the eﬀ ect of 
unconscionably compromising the administration of justice.

x

x

x
x
5. … Similarly the provisions of Section 50 have not been complied with 
as the accused has not been given any option as to whether he wanted 
to be searched in presence of a gazetted oﬃ  cer or the Magistrate. The 
compliance of Section 50 is held to have been fulﬁ lled on his (PW 
1) asking the accused “whether I should search him in the presence 
of senior oﬃ  cers or gazetted oﬃ  cer”. The accused was required to 
be apprised of his right conferred under Section 50 giving him the 
option to search being made in presence of a gazetted oﬃ  cer or the 
Magistrate. The accused is not shown to have been apprised of his 
right nor any option oﬀ ered to him for search being conducted in the 
presence of the Magistrate.
6. We are of the ﬁ rm opinion that the provision of sub-section (2)  of 
Section 42 and the mandate of Section 50 were not complied with by 
the prosecution, which rendered the case as not established. In view 
of the violation of the mandatory provision of the Act, the appellant 
was entitled to be acquitted. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
339
73. In Madan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2003) 7 
SCC 465, the recovery was eﬀ ected from the search of a bag placed inside 
the accused person’s car. This Court, while diﬀ erentiating between the 
search of a person and a vehicle in terms of the applicability of Section 50, 
held as under:- 
“16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in case of 
personal search of a person. It does not extend to search of a vehicle 
or a container or a bag or premises (See Kalema Tumba vs. State of 
Maharashtra and Anr., State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh, Gurbax Singh 
vs. State of Haryana). The language of section is implicitly clear that 
the search has to be in relation to a person as contrast to search of 
premises, vehicles, or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt 
by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh’s case (supra). Above being 
the position, the contention regarding non-compliance of Section 50 
of the Act is also without any substance.”
(Emphasis supplied)
74. In State of Punjab v. Makhan Chand reported in (2004) 3 SCC 
453, the accused was apprehended from a bus with a tin box in his hand from 
which the contraband was recovered. The High Court therein had acquitted 
the accused on the ground of non-compliance of Section 50. On the ﬁ nding 
that Section 50 would apply to the case, the judgment of the High Court was 
reversed and the accused was convicted. It was held that:-
“7. Apart from the aforesaid question, we are also of
the view that 
Section 50 of the Act would not apply to a situation where the search 
undertaken is not of the person of the accused but of something carried 
in his hand. …”   
                                (Emphasis supplied)
75. In another decision of this Court in Saikou Jabbi v. State of 
Maharashtra reported in (2004) 2 SCC 186, the contraband was recovered 
from the accused’s suitcase after its screening. This Court held that when the 
suitcase was searched during the screening, the same cannot be considered 
to be a personal search of the accused, and held as under:-
“11. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in case of 
personal search of a person. It does not extend to search of a vehicle 
or a container or a bag or premises. (See Kalema Tumba v. State of 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
340
Maharashtra,  State of Punjab  v.  Baldev Singh and  Gurbax Singh v. 
State of Haryana). The language of Section 50 is implicitly clear that 
the search has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to search 
of premises, vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond 
doubt by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case. Above being 
the position, the contention regarding non-compliance with Section 
50 of the Act is also without any substance.
12. In the case at hand, the contraband articles were suspected to be 
hidden in the blue suitcase of the accused, and was not in his physical 
possession. The suitcase was put on the screening machine. This cannot 
be equated with a recovery made from the person of the accused by 
a personal search.”
Test of item being inextricably linked to person
76. This Court gave another interpretation, wherein it said that the items 
such as bags or containers which are “inextricably linked” to the person of 
the accused should be included within the ambit of Section 50. As a result, 
a wider meaning was given to the word “person”.  
77. In Namdi Francis Nwazor v. Union of India reported in (1998) 8 
SCC  534, the luggage of a foreign national was searched on the basis of some 
information. Nothing incriminating was recovered from the hand bags, but 
narcotics were recovered from the check-in baggage. Accordingly, he was 
charged under the NDPS Act. The petitioner therein pleaded that
there was 
non-compliance with Section 50 while searching his baggage. This Court 
while dismissing the appeal held that as the bag was not in the immediate 
possession of the accused, there was no requirement to comply with Section 
50. However, this Court went on to elaborate that had the contraband been 
recovered from the handbags, which were on the person of the accused at 
the time of the search, Section 50 would have to be complied with. The 
relevant observations made by the three-Judge Bench are as under:- 
“3. On a plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 50, it is obvious 
that it applies to cases of search of any person and not search of any 
article in the sense that the article is at a distant place from where the 
oﬀ ender is actually searched. This position becomes clear when we
341
refer to Sub-section (4) of Section 50 which in terms says that no female 
shall be searched by anyone excepting a female. This would, in eﬀ ect, 
mean that when the person of the accused is being searched, the law 
requires that if that person happens to be a female, the search shall be 
carried out only by a female. Such a restriction would not be necessary 
for searching the goods of a female which are lying at a distant place at 
the time of search. It is another matter that the said article is brought 
from the place where it is lying to the place where the search takes place 
but that cannot alter the position in law that the said article was not 
being carried by the accused on his or her person when apprehended. 
We must hasten to clarify that if that person is carrying a handbag or 
the like and the incriminating article is found therefrom, it would still 
be a search of the person of the accused requiring compliance with 
Section 50 of the Act. However, when an article is lying elsewhere and 
is not on the person of the accused and is brought to a place where 
the accused is found, and on search, incriminating articles are found 
therefrom it cannot attract the requirements of Section 50 of the Act 
for the simple reason that it was not found on the accused person. So, 
on the facts of this case, it is diﬃ  cult to hold that Section 50 stood 
attracted and non-compliance with that provision was fatal to the 
prosecution case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
78. Thereafter, in Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat 
reported in (2000) 2 SCC 513, this Court (a three-Judge Bench) adopted 
a similar approach. It is relevant to note that the Bench was presided over 
by Dr. A.S. Anand, CJ, who authored the Constitution Bench decision in 
Baldev Singh (supra). In the said matter, four gunny bags were found in 
an auto rickshaw, which the accused was driving and no other person was 
present. The argument based on non-compliance of Section 50 as explained 
in the case of Baldev Singh (supra) was rejected on the ground that the 
gunny bags were not inextricably connected with the person of the accused. 
It was held that:- 
“12. In the present case, even the appellant has no case that he was 
searched by the police party. The place where the gunny bags were 
found stacked in the vehicle was not inextricably connected with the 
person of the appellant. Hence it is an idle exercise in this case, on 
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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the fact-situation, to consider whether there was non-compliance with 
the conditions stipulated in Section 50 of the Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
79. Thereafter, in Yasihey Yobin. v. Department of Customs, Shillong 
reported in (2014) 13 SCC 344, the test of an item being “inextricably linked 
to the person” was laid down while relying upon Namdi (supra). This Court 
held that in cases where the line of separation between the search of a person 
and an artiﬁ cial object is thin and ﬁ ne, the test of inextricable connection 
should be applied and then conclusion should be reached whether the search 
was that of a person or not. It was held that:-
“10. This position in law is settled by the Constitution Bench in the 
case of State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh,  and in Megh Singh v. State 
of Punjab, (2003) 8 SCC 666, where application of Section 50 is only 
in case of search of a person as contrasted to search of premises, 
vehicles or articles. But in cases where the line of separation is thin 
and ﬁ ne between search of a person and an artiﬁ cial object, the test of 
inextricable connection is to be applied and then conclusion is to be 
reached as to whether the search was that of a person or not. The above 
test has been noticed in the case of Namdi Francis Nwazor v. Union of 
India and Anr. (1998) 8 SCC 534, wherein it is held that if the search 
is of a bag which is inextricably connected with the person, Section 
50 of the Act will
apply, and if it is not so connected, the provisions 
will not apply. It is when an article is lying elsewhere and is not on 
the person of the accused and is brought to a place where the accused 
is found, and on search, incriminating articles are found therefrom it 
cannot attract the requirements of Section 50 of the Act for the simple 
reason that the bag was not found on the accused person.
11. In the instant case, the bag is brought by A-2 and the contents of 
the bag are taken out by him and given for search which is thereafter 
seized by the oﬃ  cials after having found contraband substance. In such 
a case the inextricable connection between the search of a person and 
the bag cannot be established but rather it is only the search of the bag 
and therefore the search and seizure conducted by the gazetted oﬃ  cer 
need not comply with the requirements under Section 50 of the Act.”

(Emphasis supplied)
343
80. However, it is important to note that the law down in Yasihey 
(supra) is no longer a good law. A three-Judge Bench in State of H.P. v. 
Pawan Kumar reported in (2005) 4 SCC 350, distinguished Namdi (supra) 
and held that the observations relied upon in it were obiter on this point.  It 
was held as under:-
“16. …  The Bench then ﬁ nally concluded that on the facts of the 
case Section 50 was not attracted. The facts of the case clearly show 
that the bag from which incriminating article was recovered had 
already been checked in and was loaded in the aircraft. Therefore, 
it was not at all a search of a person to which Section 50 may be 
attracted. The observations, which was made in the later part of the 
judgment (reproduced above), are more in the nature of obiter as 
such a situation was not required to be considered for the decision of 
the case. No reasons have been given for arriving at the conclusion 
that search of a handbag being carried by a person would amount to 
search of a person. It may be noted that this case was decided prior 
to the Constitution Bench decision in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh. 
After the decision in Baldev Singh, this Court has consistently held 
that Section 50 would only apply to search of a person and not to any 
bag, article or container, etc. being carried by him.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The term “person” ought to be construed strictly
81. The decision of the larger Bench in Pawan Kumar (supra) came 
as a result of a reference by a Division Bench of this Court in State of 
H.P. v. Pawan Kumar reported in (2004) 7 SCC 735. In the said matter, 
opium was recovered from the accused’s bag upon a search conducted by 
a constable. The High Court acquitted the accused as during the search of 
the bag, Section 50 was not complied with. Justice Y.K. Sabharwal agreeing 
with the High Court’s order held that since the bag was inextricably linked 
to the accused, Section 50 ought to have been complied with. The ﬁ nding 
recorded by Justice Sabharwal are reproduced hereunder:-
“21. The case of the prosecution itself is that the accused was carrying 
a bag on his shoulder; opium like smell was coming from the bag; and 
the Head Constable informed the Deputy Superintendent of Police who 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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came to the spot. Before search, the Deputy Superintendent of Police 
was informed of the suspected possession of the opium. The testimony 
of PW 7 is that the person of the accused was then searched by the 
Deputy Superintendent of Police and on search, bag containing opium 
was found. On this fact situation, it cannot be held that the search was 
not of a person but was of a bag. Both are inextricably connected. It has 
to be held that the search was that of the respondent’s person. Clearly, 
Section 50 of the NDPS Act was applicable but was not complied. 
Therefore, the conviction of the respondent could not be sustained 
and the High Court rightly held that Section 50 had been breached.”
82. Justice Arijit Pasayat while relying upon Gurbax Singh (supra) 
diﬀ ered from Justice Sabharwal and held that the non-compliance with 
Section 50 would not render the recovery as inadmissible as the recovery 
was from the bag and not from the person of the accused. Justice Pasayat 
held as under:-
“24. Baldev Singh’s case (supra) made the position clear that the said 
provision has application in case of search of a person. The crucial 
question would be whether search of a bag carried on the shoulder 
or back of a person is covered by Section 50. I am of the view that 
it would not be so. There can be no basis for making a distinction 
between search of a bag found near a person and a bag carried by 
him. In Kanhaiya Lal v. State of M.P.,
(2000) 10 SCC 380, it was held 
that when a bag carried by the accused is searched, Section 50 has 
no application. In Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana, (2001) 3 SCC 
28, it was held that when a bag was being carried on the accused’s 
shoulder, Section 50 has no application.”
83. Accordingly, the matter was referred to a larger bench and came 
to be decided in Pawan Kumar (supra) wherein the view taken by Justice 
Pasayat was aﬃ  rmed. This Court held that the term “person” under Section 
50 would mean a natural person or a living unit and not an artiﬁ cial person 
i.e., a bag or a briefcase. 
84. The case of the prosecution in Pawan Kumar (supra) was that two 
head constables namely, Hukum Singh and Munshi Ram and some police 
personnel were checking buses at the bus - stand, Mandi in the night of 
18.07.1994. While checking a bus at about 8.45 p.m., they noticed that the
345
accused Pawan Kumar (respondent accused therein), who was carrying a 
bag, slipped out from the rear door of the bus and thereafter started running 
towards the Subzi Mandi side. The police personnel got suspicious and 
after a chase apprehended him near the gate of bus stand. They felt smell of 
opium emitting from the bag, and, therefore, telephonically informed Prem 
Thakur, Deputy S.P./S.H.O., P.S. Sadar, Mandi. Prem Thakur came to the 
spot and inquired from the accused whether he wanted to be searched by 
police or by a Magistrate. The accused disclosed his name and expressed 
his willingness to be searched by the police. A search of the accused and 
the bag being carried by him was then conducted and 360 gms. of opium 
wrapped in polythene was found inside the bag.
85. This Court interpreted Section 50 strictly and stated that the cardinal 
rule of interpretation of statutes is to read the statute literally and give the 
words their grammatical and natural meaning. In this regard, it was held 
as under:-
“8. One of the basic principles of interpretation of statutes is to 
construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning 
of the words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express 
intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any 
absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must 
then be modiﬁ ed, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an 
inconvenience, but no further. The onus of
showing that the words do 
not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. He 
must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical 
construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead 
to some manifest absurdity (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh ed. 
page 83-85). In the well known treatise - Principles of Statutory 
Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, the learned author has enunciated 
the same principle that the words of the Statute are ﬁ rst understood in 
their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences 
are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that 
leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or 
in the object of the Statute to suggest the contrary (See the Chapter 
- The Rule of Literal Construction -p. 78 – 9th Edn.). This Court has 
also followed this principle right from the beginning. In Jugalkishore 
Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.: (1955) 1 SCR 1369 , S.R. Das, J. said:- 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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“The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute 
literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the legislature 
their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, 
such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible 
of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no 
such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt 
the ordinary rule of literal interpretation.”  (Emphasis supplied)
86. The larger Bench also considered the dictionary meanings of the 
word “person” and held that any article like a bag, briefcase or container 
cannot under any circumstance be considered as a person or a part thereof. 
This Court stated that one of the tests could be, where in the process of 
search the human body comes into contact or shall have to be touched by 
the person carrying out the search. If that be so, then it will be search of a 
person. However, this Court was quick to clarify that a bag or briefcase or 
any such article cannot be interpreted to mean a person. It was held as under:-
“10. We are not concerned here with the wide deﬁ nition of the word 
“person”, which in the legal world includes corporations, associations 
or body of individuals as factually in these type of cases search of 
their premises can be done and not of their person. Having regard to 
the scheme of the Act and the context in which it has been used in the 
Section it naturally means a human
being or a living individual unit 
and not an artiﬁ cial person. The word has to be understood in a broad 
common sense manner and, therefore, not a naked or nude body of a 
human being but the manner in which a normal human being will move 
about in a civilized society. Therefore, the most appropriate meaning 
of the word “person” appears to be – “the body of a human being as 
presented to public view usually with its appropriate coverings and 
clothings”. In a civilized society appropriate coverings and clothings 
are considered absolutely essential and no sane human being comes 
in the gaze of others without appropriate coverings and clothings. 
The appropriate coverings will include footwear also as normally it is 
considered an essential article to be worn while moving outside one’s 
home. Such appropriate coverings or clothings or footwear, after being 
worn, move along with the human body without any appreciable or 
extra eﬀ ort. Once worn, they would not normally get detached from the
347
body of the human being unless some speciﬁ c eﬀ ort in that direction 
is made. For interpreting the provision, rare cases of some religious 
monks and sages, who, according to the tenets of their religious belief 
do not cover their body with clothings, are not to be taken notice 
of. Therefore, the word “person” would mean a human being with 
appropriate coverings and clothings and also footwear.
11. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can, under no 
circumstances, be treated as body of a human being. They are given a 
separate name and are identiﬁ able as such. They cannot even remotely 
be treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending upon the 
physical capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like 
a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a 
holdall, a carton, etc. of varying size, dimension or weight. However, 
while carrying or moving along with them, some extra eﬀ ort or energy 
would be required. They would have to be carried either by the hand 
or hung on the shoulder or back or placed on the head. In common 
parlance it would be said that a person is carrying a particular article, 
specifying the manner in which it was carried like hand, shoulder, back 
or head, etc. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within 
the ambit of the word “person” occurring in Section 50 of the Act. 
12. An incriminating article can be kept concealed in the body or 
clothings or
coverings in diﬀ erent manner or in the footwear. While 
making a search of such type of articles, which have been kept so 
concealed, it will certainly come within the ambit of the word “search 
of person”. One of the tests, which can be applied is, where in the 
process of search the human body comes into contact or shall have 
to be touched by the person carrying out the search, it will be search 
of a person. Some indication of this is provided by Sub-section (4) of 
Section 50 of the Act, which provides that no female shall be searched 
by anyone excepting a female. The legislature has consciously made 
this provision as while conducting search of a female, her body may 
come in contact or may need to be touched and, therefore, it should 
be done only by a female. In the case of a bag, briefcase or any such 
article or container, etc., they would not normally move along with the 
body of the human being unless some extra or special eﬀ ort is made. 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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Either they have to be carried in hand or hung on the shoulder or 
back or placed on the head. They can be easily and in no time placed 
away from the body of the carrier. In order to make a search of such 
type of objects, the body of the carrier will not come in contact of 
the person conducting the search. Such objects cannot be said to be 
inextricably connected with the person, namely, the body of the human 
being. Inextricable means incapable of being disentangled or untied 
or forming a maze or tangle from which it is impossible to get free.” 
(Emphasis supplied)
87. The larger Bench also relied upon Baldev Singh (supra) while 
analysing the scope of Section 50 and held that:-
“13. The scope and ambit of Section 50 of the Act was examined in 
considerable detail by a Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. 
Baldev Singh and para 12 of the reports is being reproduced below: 
“12. On its plain reading, Section 50 would come into play only 
in the case of a search of a person as distinguished from search 
of any premises etc. However, if the empowered oﬃ  cer, without 
any prior information as contemplated by Section 42 of the Act 
makes a search or causes arrest of a person during the normal 
course of investigation into an oﬀ ence or suspected oﬀ ence and 
on completion of that search, a contraband under the NDPS Act 
is also recovered, the requirements of Section 50 of the Act are 
not attracted.” 
The Bench recorded its
conclusion in para 57 of the reports and sub-
paras (1), (2), (3) and (6) are being reproduced below :

x

x

x

x
14. The above quoted dictum of the Constitution Bench shows that the 
provisions of Section 50 will come into play only in the case of personal 
search of the accused and not of some baggage like a bag, article or 
container, etc. which he may be carrying.”       (Emphasis supplied)
88. Accordingly, the Court held that the beneﬁ t of Section 50 of the 
NDPS Act cannot be extended to include bags or articles as the same may 
lead to an unworkable understanding of the provision. It was held as under:-
349
“18. There is another aspect of the matter, which requires 
consideration. Criminal law should be absolutely certain and clear 
and there should be no ambiguity or confusion in its application. The 
same principle should apply in the case of search or seizure, which 
come in the domain of detection of crime. The position of such bags 
or articles is not static and the person carrying them often changes 
the manner in which they are carried. People waiting at a bus stand 
or railway platform sometimes keep their baggage on the ground 
and sometimes keep in their hand, shoulder or back. The change 
of position from ground to hand or shoulder will take a fraction of 
a second but on the argument advanced by learned counsel for the 
accused that search of bag so carried would be search of a person, 
it will make a sharp diﬀ erence in the applicability of Section 50 of 
the Act. After receiving information, an oﬃ  cer empowered under 
Section 42 of the Act, may proceed to search this kind of baggage 
of a person which may have been placed on the ground, but if at 
that very moment when he may be about to open it, the person lifts 
the bag or keeps it on his shoulder or some other place on his body, 
Section 50 may get attracted. The same baggage often keeps changing 
hands if more than one person are moving together in a group. Such 
transfer of baggage at the nick of time when it is about to be searched 
would again create practical problem. Who in such a case would 
be
informed of the right that he is entitled in law to be searched 
before a Magistrate or a gazetted oﬃ  cer? This may lead to many 
practical diﬃ  culties. A statute should be so interpreted as to avoid 
unworkable or impracticable results. In Statutory Interpretation by 
Francis Bennion (3rd  Edn.), para 313, the principle has been stated 
in the following manner : 
“The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that 
produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this 
is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes 
however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a 
construction, for example where it appears that Parliament really 
intended it or the literal meaning is too strong.”

x

x

x

x
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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26. The Constitution Bench decision in Pooran Mal v. The Director of 
Inspection: (1974) 1 SCC 345, was considered in State of Punjab v. 
Baldev Singh, and having regard to the scheme of the Act and especially 
the provisions of Section 50 thereof it was held that it was not possible 
to hold that the judgment in the said case can be said to have laid down 
that the “recovered illicit article” can be used as “proof of unlawful 
possession” of the contraband seized from the suspect as a result of 
illegal search and seizure. Otherwise, there would be no distinction 
between recovery of illicit drugs, etc. seized during a search conducted 
after following the provisions of Section 50 of the Act and a seizure 
made during a search conducted in breach of the provisions of Section 
50. Having regard to the scheme and the language used a very strict 
view of Section 50 of the Act was taken and it was held that failure to 
inform the person concerned of his right as emanating from sub-section 
(1) of Section 50 may render the recovery of the contraband suspect and 
sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law. As a corollary, 
there is no warrant or justiﬁ cation for giving an extended meaning to 
the word “person” occurring in the same provision so as to include 
even some bag, article or container or some other baggage being 
carried by him.”                                           (Emphasis supplied)
89. Thus, in Pawan Kumar
(supra) the larger Bench while answering 
the reference in no uncertain terms stated that “a bag, briefcase or any such 
article or container, etc. can, under no circumstances, be treated as body 
of a human being. They are given a separate name and are identiﬁ able as 
such. They cannot even remotely be treated to be part of the body of a human 
being.”  The Court reasoned that a person of varying capacity can carry 
diﬀ erent items on his or her body but that does not make those items as a 
part of body. The Court observed, “Depending upon the physical capacity 
of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase, a 
suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of 
varying size, dimension or weight. However, while carrying or moving along 
with them, some extra eﬀ ort or energy would be required. They would have 
to be carried either by the hand or hung on the shoulder or back or placed 
on the head. In common parlance it would be said that a person is carrying 
a particular article, specifying the manner in which it was carried like hand, 
shoulder, back or head, etc.” Therefore, Pawan Kumar (supra) concluded
351
that an external article which does not form part of body is outside the ambit 
of the word “person” occurring in Section 50 of the NDPS Act.   
90. What is most important to note in Pawan Kumar (supra) is that 
the search was not only of the bag, but also of the person of the accused, 
however, the contraband was recovered only from the bag and not from the 
person of the accused therein. What we are trying to highlight is that although 
in Pawan Kumar (supra) the search was of the accused as well as the bag, 
yet since the recovery of the contraband was only from the bag, this Court 
took the view that Section 50 would have no application.
91. In State of Rajasthan v. Daulat Ram reported in (2005) 7 SCC 
36, opium was recovered from a bag being carried on the accused person’s 
head. This Court while relying upon Pawan Kumar (supra) held that 
the recovery made from the accused person’s bag would not constitute 
personal search of the accused and thus, would not attract Section 50. It 
was held as under:-
“9. … In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment 
of this Court, there is no scope for the argument that in the facts and 
circumstances of this case, the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS 
Act were attracted. The judgment and order of the High Court must, 
therefore, be set aside.”
92. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mai Ram reported in (2008) 8 
SCC 292, while examining the scope of Section 50 held as under:-
“14. … A bare reading of Section
50 shows that it only applies in 
case of personal search of a person. It does not extend to search of a 
vehicle or a container or a bag, or premises. (See  Kalema Tumba  v. 
State of Maharashtra, State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh and Gurbax 
Singh v. State of Haryana).
15. The language of Section 50 is implicitly (sic explicitly) clear that 
the search has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to search 
of premises, vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond 
doubt by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case [(1999) 6 SCC 
172]. A similar question was examined in Madan Lal v. State of H.P. 
[(2003) 7 SCC 465].”
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 13 S.C.R.
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93. In Balbir Kaur v. State of Punjab reported in (2009) 15 SCC 795, 
the contraband was recovered from two bags on which the accused was 
sitting but no personal search was conducted. This Court while holding that 
Section 50 would not be applicable held as under:-
“22. It is also to be noted at this stage that the recovery of poppy husk 
was made from the bags carried by the appellant, so the submission that 
there was violation of the provisions of Section 50 is legally untenable.”
94. The aforesaid view was aﬃ  rmed in the case of Ajmer Singh v. 
State of Haryana reported in (2010) 3 SCC 746, wherein while searching the 
shoulder bag of the accused, some contraband was recovered. This Court held 
that compliance under Section 50 was not warranted and stated as under:-
“15. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the provision 
of Section 50 of the Act would also apply, while searching the bag, 
brief case etc., carried by the person and its non-compliance would 
be fatal to the proceedings initiated under the Act. We ﬁ nd no merit in 
the contention of the learned counsel. It requires to be noticed that the 
question of compliance or non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS 
Act is relevant only where search of a person is involved and the said 
Section is not applicable nor attracted where no search of a person 
is involved. Search and recovery from a bag, brief case, container, 
etc., does not come within the
ambit of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, 
because ﬁ rstly, Section 50 expressly speaks of search of person only. 
Secondly, the Section speaks of taking of the person to be searched by 
the gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate for the purpose of search. Thirdly, 
this issue in our considered opinion is no more res-integra in view of the 
observations made by this court in the case of Madan Lal vs. State of 
Himachal Pradesh (2003) 7 SCC 465.”                   (Emphasis supplied)
95. Pawan Kumar (supra) was also relied upon in Jarnail Singh v. 
State of Punjab reported in (2011) 3 SCC 521. In the said case, opium was 
recovered from a bag which the accused was carrying. Section 50 was held 
to be not applicable as accused was not searched. It was held that:-
“16. This apart, it is accepted that the narcotic/opium, i.e., 1 kg. and 
750 grams was recovered from the bag (thaili) which was being carried 
by the appellant. In such circumstances, Section 50 would not be
353
applicable. The aforesaid Section can be invoked only in cases where 
the drug/narcotic/NDPS substance is recovered as a consequence of 
the body search of the accused. In case, the recovery of the narcotic is 
made from a container being carried by the individual, the provisions 
of Section 50 would not be attracted.”                   (Emphasis supplied)
96. In Suresh v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2013) 1 SCC 
550, illicit articles were recovered from the polythene bags placed in a 
vehicle found to be in the possession of the accused person upon their 
personal search. This Court held that though the requirement of Section 
50 was not complied with qua the personal search of the accused, yet 
the provision was inapplicable qua the recovery made from the vehicle. 
Therefore, this Court gave a restricted interpretation to Section 50 and held 
as under:- 
“19. Though a portion of the contraband (opium) was recovered from 
the vehicle for which Section 50 is not applicable, if we exclude the 
quantity recovered from the vehicle, the remaining would not come 
within the mischief of “commercial quantity” for imposition of such 
conviction and sentence. Taking note of the length of period in prison 
and continuing as on date and in view of non-compliance with sub-
section (1) of Section 50 in respect of recovery of contraband from 
the appellants, we set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on 
them by the trial court and conﬁ rmed by the High Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
97. Accordingly, Section 50 was read to be understood as applicable 
only to the personal search of a person and that would not extend to search of 
a vehicle or a container or a bag. The language of Section 50 was interpreted 
to include search  in relation to a person and not to a search of premises, 
vehicles or articles. 
Judgments taking the view that Section 50 must be complied with when 
search of a bag as well as that of a person is carried out
98. However, in Dilip v. State of M.P. reported in  (2007) 1 SCC 450, 
a contrary view was taken to that of Pawan Kumar (supra). In the said 
case, Section 50 was not complied with while conducting the search of the 
person and drugs were recovered from the accused’s scooter. This Court 
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while acquitting the accused held that the recovery made from the scooter 
ought to be inadmissible. It is pertinent to note that in this case the judgement 
in Pawan Kumar (supra) was not looked into.  The Court held as under:-  
“12.  Before seizure of the contraband from the scooter, personal search 
of appellants had been carried out and, admittedly, even at that time 
the provisions of Section 50 of the Act, although required in law, had 
not been complied with.

x

x

x

x
15. Indisputably, however, eﬀ ect of a search carried out in violation 
of the provisions of law would have a bearing on the credibility of the 
evidence of the oﬃ  cial witnesses, which would of course be considered 
on the facts and circumstances of each case. 
16. In this case, the provisions of Section 50 might not have been 
required to be complied with so far as the search of scooter is 
concerned, but, keeping in view the fact that the persons of the 
appellants were also searched, it was obligatory on the part of PW 
10 to comply with the said provisions. It was not done.”
(Emphasis supplied)
99. The decision of Dilip (supra) was relied upon in Union of India v. 
Shah Alam reported in (2009) 16 SCC 644, wherein packets of heroin were 
recovered from the accused’s shoulder bag. This Court rejected the argument 
of the State that Section 50 was not applicable as no further recoveries 
were made from the person of the accused after the recovery from the bag. 
Accordingly, the recovery was held to be in violation of Section 50 and the 
accused’s acquittal was upheld. It was held that:-
“15.  The legal proposition advanced by Mr. Terdal, based on the 
distinction between search of someone’s person and the baggage 
carried by him/her is unexceptionable but his submission is not 
supported by the facts of this case. We have carefully gone through 
the records of this case. From the evidence of the complainant, PW 1 
and the seizure memo (fard baramdegi) Ext Ka-2 it is evident that the 
two respondents were subjected to a body search in course of which 
packets of heroin were found in the shoulder bags carried by them 
and were recovered from there.
355
16.   The facts of the case in hand are very close to another decision 
of this Court in Dilip and Anr. v. State of M.P. where it was observed 
in paragraphs 12, 15 and 16 as under: 
…
17. On the facts of the case we ﬁ nd that the alleged recovery of heroin 
from the respondents was made in complete violation of the provisions 
of Section 50 of the Act.”
100. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in 
Parmanand (supra). This Court was called upon to consider whether Section 
50 ought to apply when the search of the person and his bag is carried out. 
This Court held that if the bag is searched without searching the accused, 
then Section 50 would have no application. However, as a corollary it was 
held that if the bag carried by the accused is searched along with his search, 
then Section 50 would be applicable. The relevant portion is as under:-
“15. Thus, if merely a bag carried by a person is searched without 
there being any search of his person, Section 50 of the NDPS Act 
will have no application. But if the bag carried by him is searched 
and his person is also searched, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will 
have application. In this case, Respondent  1 Parmanand’s bag was 
searched. From the bag, opium was recovered. His personal search was 
also carried out. Personal search of Respondent 2 Surajmal was also 
conducted. Therefore, in light of judgments of this Court mentioned 
in the preceding paragraphs, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will have
application.”                                                       (Emphasis supplied)
101. Parmanand (supra) was relied upon by a three-Judge Bench in 
SK. Raju (supra). In the said case, the police received information that a 
drug dealer was likely to visit a park. The accused after being apprehended 
was searched and was found to be in possession of 1.5 kgs of charas, which 
was recovered from a jute bag he was carrying. This Court, while holding 
that the search was not vitiated as Section 50 was complied with, held that 
whenever a person and his or her bag is searched, irrespective from where 
the recovery is made, Section 50 must be complied with. It stated that:-
“20. The question which arises before us is whether Section 50(1) 
was required to be complied with when charas was recovered only 
from the bag of the appellant and no charas was found on his person. 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
356
Further, if the ﬁ rst question is answered in the aﬃ  rmative, whether 
the requirements of Section 50 were strictly complied with by PW 2 
and PW 4.
21. … The appellant agreed to search PW 2 before the latter carried 
out his search. On conducting the search, only personal belongings 
of PW 2 were found by the Appellant. On the search of the appellant 
in the presence of the gazetted oﬃ  cer, a biscuit-coloured jute bag was 
recovered from the Appellant, and Rs. 2400 cash in the denomination of 
24 notes of Rs. 100 each was found in the left pocket of the Appellant’s 
trouser. When the bag was opened, a black polythene cover containing 
nineteen rectangular broken sheets of a blackish/deep brown colour 
weighing 1.5 kilograms was recovered. The sheets were tested and 
were found to be charas. 
22. PW 2 conducted a search of the bag of the appellant as well as of 
the appellant’s trousers. Therefore, the search conducted by PW 2 was 
not only of the bag which the appellant was carrying, but also of the 
appellant’s person. Since the search of the person of the appellant was 
also involved, Section 50 would be attracted in this case. Accordingly, 
PW 2 was required to comply with the requirements of Section 50(1). 
As soon as the search of a person takes place, the requirement of 
mandatory compliance with Section 50 is attracted, irrespective of 
whether contraband is recovered from the person of the detainee or 
not. It was,
therefore, imperative for PW 2 to inform the appellant 
of his legal right to be searched in the presence of either a gazetted 
oﬃ  cer or  a  magistrate. …”                                   (Emphasis supplied)
102. Thus, one view which originated from Dilip (supra) and relied 
upon in SK. Raju (supra) implied that if a person is searched and along with 
him or her, his or her bag is also searched, then the beneﬁ t of Section 50 
should be extended while conducting the personal search of the accused.
103. However, it is pertinent to note that although Pawan Kumar
(supra) has been referred to and considered in SK. Raju (supra) yet, the 
Court in SK. Raju (supra) overlooked the fact that in Pawan Kumar (supra) 
also the search was not only of the person of the accused but also of his 
bag. Even in such circumstances, the larger Bench in Pawan Kumar (supra) 
took the view that Section 50 would not apply if nothing incriminating is
357
recovered from the person of the accused. Thus, there is an apparent conﬂ ict 
between the two decisions. 
Section 50 not applicable when recovery made from bag, conveyance, 
etc.
104. A three-Judge Bench in the State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh 
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 473 considered the question:-
“8. …
If a person found to be in possession of a vehicle containing 
contraband is subjected to personal search, which may not be in 
conformity with the requirements under Section 50 of the Act; but 
the search of the vehicle results in recovery of contraband material, 
which stands proved independently;
would the accused be entitled to beneﬁ t of acquittal on the ground 
of non-compliance of Section 50 of the Act even in respect of material 
found in the search of the vehicle?”
105. In the aforesaid case,  poppy husk was recovered from the accused’s 
vehicle. This Court, while explaining the object of Section 50 and relying on 
the Constitution Bench judgement in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja (supra), 
held that:-
“10. Section 50 of the Act aﬀ ords protection to a person in matters 
concerning “personal search” and stipulates various safeguards. It is 
only upon fulﬁ lment of and strict adherence to said requirements that 
the contraband recovered pursuant to “personal search” of a person 
can be relied upon as a circumstance against the person.

x

x

x
x
12. Subsequently, another Constitution Bench of this Court in Vijaysinh 
Chandubha Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat, had an occasion to consider 
the case from the standpoint whether the person who is about to be 
searched ought to be informed of his right that he could be searched in 
the presence of a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate. While considering the 
said question, this Court also dealt with the judgment rendered in Baldev 
Singh’s case and the discussion in paragraphs 24 and 29 was as under: 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
358
“24. Although the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case 
[(1999) 6 SCC 172] did not decide in absolute terms the question 
whether or not Section 50 of the NDPS Act was directory or 
mandatory yet it was held that provisions of sub-section (1) 
of Section 50 make it imperative for the empowered oﬃ  cer to 
“inform” the person concerned (suspect) about the existence 
of his right that if he so requires, he shall be searched before a 
gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate; failure to “inform” the suspect 
about the existence of his said right would cause prejudice to 
him, and in case he so opts, failure to conduct his search before 
a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, may not vitiate the trial but 
would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate 
the conviction and sentence of an accused, where the conviction 
has been recorded only on the basis of the possession of the illicit 
article, recovered from the person during a search conducted in 
violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The 
Court also noted that it was not necessary that the information 
required to be given under Section 50 should be in a prescribed 
form or in writing but it was mandatory that the suspect was made 
aware of the existence of his right to be searched before a gazetted 
oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate, if so required by him. We respectfully 
concur with these conclusions. Any other interpretation of the 
provision would make
the valuable right conferred on the suspect 
illusory and a farce.

x

x

x

x 
29. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the ﬁ rm 
opinion that the object with which the right under Section 50(1) 
of the NDPS Act, by way of a safeguard, has been conferred on 
the suspect viz. to check the misuse of power, to avoid harm to 
innocent persons and to minimise the allegations of planting or 
foisting of false cases by the law enforcement agencies, it would 
be imperative on the part of the empowered oﬃ  cer to apprise 
the person intended to be searched of his right to be searched 
before a gazetted oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate. We have no hesitation 
in holding that insofar as the obligation of the authorised oﬃ  cer
359
under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is concerned, 
it is mandatory and requires strict compliance. Failure to comply 
with the provision would render the recovery of the illicit article 
suspect and vitiate the conviction if the same is recorded only 
on the basis of the recovery of the illicit article from the person 
of the accused during such search. Thereafter, the suspect may 
or may not choose to exercise the right provided to him under 
the said provision.”                                    (Emphasis supplied)
106. The Court went on to hold that Section 50 would be applicable 
only to the personal searches and not to the searches of vehicles or bags. This 
was in line with the ratio laid down in Pawan Kumar (supra) and Baldev 
Singh (supra). This Court held that:-
“15. As regards applicability of the requirements under Section 50 of 
the Act are concerned, it is well settled that the mandate of Section 
50 of the Act is conﬁ ned to “personal search” and not to search of a 
vehicle or a container or premises. 
16. The conclusion (3) as recorded by the Constitution Bench in Para 
57 of its judgment in Baldev Singh clearly states that the conviction 
may not be based “only” on the basis of possession of an illicit article 
recovered from personal search in violation of the requirements under 
Section 50 of the Act but if there be other evidence on record, such 
material can certainly be looked into. 
17. In the instant case, the personal search of
the accused did not result 
in recovery of any contraband. Even if there was any such recovery, 
the same could not be relied upon for want of compliance of the 
requirements of Section 50 of the Act. But the search of the vehicle and 
recovery of contraband pursuant thereto having stood proved, merely 
because there was non-compliance of Section 50 of the Act as far as 
“personal search” was concerned, no beneﬁ t can be extended so as 
to invalidate the eﬀ ect of recovery from the search of the vehicle. Any 
such idea would be directly in the teeth of conclusion (3) as aforesaid.”
(Emphasis supplied)
107. It is pertinent to note here that in Baljinder Singh (supra) the 
decision of SK. Raju (supra) was not looked into, however, the decision 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
360
in the case of Dilip (supra) was considered and held to be not laying down 
the correct law on the ground that it did not consider the decision of Baldev 
Singh (supra). This Court held that:-
“18. The decision of this Court in Dilip’s case, however, has not 
adverted to the distinction as discussed hereinabove and proceeded 
to confer advantage upon the accused even in respect of recovery 
from the vehicle, on the ground that the requirements of Section 50 
relating to personal search were not complied with. In our view, the 
decision of this Court in said judgment in Dilip’s case is not correct 
and is opposed to the law laid down by this Court in Baldev Singh 
and other judgments.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Settling the conﬂ ict between SK. Raju and Baljinder Singh 
108. The High Court of Delhi in Akhilesh Bharti v. State reported 
in 2020 SCC OnLine Del 306 : (2020) 266 DLT 689, had the occasion to 
look into the cleavage of opinion expressed in Baljinder Singh (supra) and 
SK. Raju (supra). The High Court therein, noted the thin line of distinction 
drawn by SK. Raju (supra) where the contraband is recovered from an object 
which is held by the accused in his hand. In such a situation the High Court 
held that even if nothing is recovered from the person, Section 50 ought to 
be complied with. The High Court held as under:-
“26. It is essential to observe that vide the verdict of the Hon’ble three 
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court dated 05.09.2018 in “SK. 
Raju alias Abdul Haque alias Jagga Vs. State of West Bengal” (2018) 
9 SCC 708, it has speciﬁ cally been observed to the eﬀ ect that where 
merely a bag carried by a person is searched without there being any 
search of his person, Section 50 of the NDPS Act, 1985 will have no 
application but if the personal search of the accused is also conducted, 
the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, 1985 would wholly 
apply. The verdict of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 15.10.2019 in 
“State of Punjab Vs. Baljinder Singh and Another” is also a verdict 
of the Hon’ble three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 
which the personal search of the accused did not result into recovery 
of any contraband but there was a recovery of contraband eﬀ ected
361
from the vehicle in which the accused persons were seated with one of 
them being the driver. Though, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “State 
of Punjab Vs. Baljinder Singh and Another” (supra) has observed to 
the eﬀ ect that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dilip’s 
case is not correct and is opposed to the decision to the law laid down 
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baldev Singh’s and other judgments, 
the observations in the verdict of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “S.K. 
Raju alia Abdul Haque alias Jagga Vs. State of West Bengal” (supra) 
dated 05.09.2018 (which are not adverted to in “State of Punjab Vs. 
Baljinder Singh and Another” (supra) dated 15.10.2019) lay down a 
ﬁ ne distinction and in these circumstances thus, where the contraband 
is recovered from an object which is held by an accused in his hand and 
the search of the person of such an accused is also conducted which 
lead to no recovery of any contraband, though, there are recoveries 
of other personal assets of a person from his personal search, in view 
of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “SK. Raju alia 
Abdul Haque alias Jagga Vs. State of West Bengal” (supra), the non 
compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, 1985 would prima facie 
vitiate the recovery.”                                           (Emphasis supplied)
109. Akhilesh Bharti (supra) referred to above was considered by a 
co-ordinate Bench of the Delhi High Court in Kamruddin v. State (NCT of 
Delhi), 2022 SCC
OnLine Del 3761, and held as under:-
“23. In the decision of S.K. Raju (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court 
has clearly held that since the search of the person of the appellant 
therein was also involved, therefore, Section 50 of the NDPS Act would 
be attracted in that case and accordingly the requirement of Section 
50(1) of the NDPS Act was insisted.
24. So far as the decision relied upon by learned APP for the state in 
the case of State of HP Vs. Pawan Kumar is concerned, it is to be stated 
that in paragraph No. 17 of the decision in the case of S.K. Raju (supra) 
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken note of the decision in the case 
of Pawan Kumar (supra). The distinction between the two situations 
has been considered and if a bag, article or container etc. being 
carried by an accused is subjected to search independently without 
there being any search of the person of the appellant, the decision in 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
362
the case of Pawan Kumar (supra) would have application. However, 
in a case where the person of accused is subjected to search along 
with the search of bag, article or container which he holds in his hand, 
there is requirement of compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
110. It appears that the Delhi High Court laboured under an erroneous 
impression that in Pawan Kumar (supra) the search was only of the bag 
and not of the accused. However, at the cost of repetition, we state that in 
Pawan Kumar (supra) the search was of both the accused as well as the 
bag which he was carrying. This is evident from para 2 of the judgment in 
Pawan Kumar (supra) wherein it has been observed as under:-
“2. … A search of the accused and the bag being carried by him was 
then conducted and 360 gm of opium wrapped in polythene was found 
inside the bag. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
111. In Than Kunwar v. State of Haryana reported in (2020) 5 SCC 
260, this Court took a diﬀ erent view. In the said case, the personal search 
of the accused did not lead to any recovery. However, upon conducting 
the search of the bag, opium was recovered. This Court acknowledged the 
divergent views and noted that the decision of SK. Raju (supra) was not 
considered while deciding Baljinder Singh (supra). However, the latter 
was applied and was read to be in line with Baldev Singh (supra). It was 
held that:-
“22. Having regard to the judgment by the
three-Judge Bench, which 
directly dealt with this issue, viz., the correctness of the view in Dilip 
(supra) reliance placed by the appellant on para 16 may not be 
available. As already noticed, we are not oblivious of the observation 
which has been made in the other three-Judge Bench judgment of this 
Court in SK. Raju (supra), which it appears, was not brought to the 
notice to the Bench which decided the case later in Baljinder Singh 
(supra). We notice however that the later decision draws inspiration 
from the Constitution Bench decision in Baldev Singh (supra). We 
also notice that this is not a case where anything was recovered on 
the alleged personal search. The recovery was eﬀ ected from the bag
363
for which it is settled law that compliance with Section 50 of the Act 
is not required.”        
(Emphasis supplied)
112. Baljinder Singh (supra) was followed by this Court in Kallu 
Khan v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2021 SCC OnLine 1223, wherein 
the search and seizure was made from the accused’s motorcycle. This Court 
while holding that the search cannot be said to be vitiated on account of 
non-compliance of Section 50 as the same only applies to a search of a 
person, held as under:-
“15. Simultaneously, the arguments advanced by the appellant 
regarding non-compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act is bereft of 
any merit because no recovery of contraband from the person of the 
accused has been made to which compliance of the provision of Section 
50 NDPS Act has to follow mandatorily. In the present case, in the 
search of motor cycle at public place, the seizure of contraband was 
made, as revealed. Therefore, compliance of Section 50 does not attract 
in the present case. It is settled in the case of Vijaysinh (supra) that in 
the case of personal search only, the provisions of Section 50 of the 
Act is required to be complied with but not in the case of vehicle as in 
the present case, following the judgments of Surinder Kumar (supra) 
and Baljinder Singh (supra). Considering the facts of this case, the 
argument of non-compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act advanced by 
the counsel is hereby repelled.”
(Emphasis supplied)
113. Similarly, in a recent judgement,
this Court in Dayalu Kashyap v. 
State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2022) 12 SCC 398, held that an extended 
view of Section 50 cannot be given to include a polythene bag containing 
narcotics being carried by the accused. This Court rejected the argument that 
as three options were given to the accused to get himself searched from the 
oﬃ  cer which was in violation of Section 50, the search conducted, even of 
the polythene bag, ought to be vitiated. It was held as under:-
“4. The learned counsel submits that the option given to the appellant 
to take a third choice other than what is prescribed as the two choices 
under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the Act is something which 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
364
goes contrary to the mandate of the law and in a way aﬀ ects the 
protection provided by the said section to the accused. To support his 
contention, he has relied upon the judgment of State of Rajasthan v. 
Parmanand [State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand, (2014) 5 SCC 345], 
more speciﬁ cally, SCC para 19. The judgment in turn, relied upon a 
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Baldev 
Singh [State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172] to conclude 
that if a search is made by an empowered oﬃ  cer on prior information 
without informing the person of his right that he has to be taken before 
a Gazetted Oﬃ  cer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts, 
failure to take his search accordingly would render the recovery of 
the illicit article suspicious and vitiate the conviction and sentence of 
the accused where the conviction has been recorded only on the basis 
of possession of illicit articles recovered from his person. The third 
option stated to be given to the accused to get himself searched from 
the Oﬃ  cer concerned not being part of the statute, the same could 
not have been oﬀ ered to the appellant and thus, the recovery from 
him is vitiated.
5. In the conspectus of the facts of the case, we ﬁ nd that the recovery 
was in a polythene bag which was being carried on a kanwad. The 
recovery was not in person. The learned counsel seeks to expand 
the scope of the observations made by
seeking to contend that if the 
personal search is vitiated by violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, 
the recovery made otherwise also would stand vitiated and thus, cannot 
be relied upon. We cannot give such an extended view as is sought to 
be contended by the learned counsel for the appellant.”
(Emphasis supplied)
FINAL ANALYSIS
114. The only idea with which we have referred to the various decisions 
of this Court starting with Balbir Singh (supra) till Dayalu Kashyap 
(supra) is to highlight that Section 50 of the NDPS Act has been tried to be 
interpreted and understood in many ways. As noted earlier, in some of the 
decisions of this Court, the concept of “inextricably linked to person” was 
applied. In other words, if the bag, etc. is in immediate possession of the 
accused and the search is undertaken of such bag, etc., even then, according
365
to those decisions, Section 50 would be applicable. It could legitimately 
be argued that the  interpretation of Section 50 restricting its scope only 
to the search of a person of the accused would frustrate the object as the 
apprehension of the person concerned may continue to subsist that he may 
still be implicated by the police or any other person for more stringent 
punishment of carrying commercial quantity by getting rid of the rigor of 
the mandatory provision of Section 50 by implanting the contraband in a 
vehicle, bag, etc. accompanying the person.  What we are trying to convey 
has been explained in the case of State v. Klein [See : John C. Derrnbachet.
al., A Practical Guide to Legal Writing and Legal Method (1994)]. In the said 
case, the issue before the U.S. Court was that whether a person can be held 
guilty for the oﬀ ence of burglary more particularly when such person did 
not enter the house per se but tried to steal the object with the help of tree 
snips. The statute clearly declared that for burglary to happen, the defendant 
should be physically present. In this case, although the defendant never 
entered the house, yet he did extend his tree snips through the window. The 
Court held that, “there is no meaningful diﬀ erence between the snips and 
his arm because the penetration by the snips was merely an extension of 
Klein’s person.”   Therefore, in the said case, the object which a person was 
carrying was held to be part of his body. A
similar view could also have been 
adopted while interpreting the term “personal search”. However, in view of 
plain and unambiguous statutory provision, there is no scope of interpreting 
Section 50 in any other manner than the interpretation explained in Baldev 
Singh (supra) and Pawan Kumar (supra).
115. It is a well-settled principle in law that the Court should not 
read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. 
A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute 
is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The ﬁ rst and primary 
rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in 
the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be 
supposed and has been intended but what has been said. Judge Learned Hand 
said, “Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some 
imagination of the purposes which lie behind them”. (See :  Lehigh Valley 
Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). The view was reiterated in Union of 
India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277. 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
366
116. In D.R. Venkatchalam  v.  Dy. Transport Commissioner, (1977) 
2 SCC 273, it was observed that the Courts must avoid the danger of an 
a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own 
preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the 
provision to be interpreted is somewhat ﬁ tted. They are not entitled to usurp 
the legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.
117. While interpreting a provision, the Court only interprets the law 
and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the 
abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal 
it, if deemed necessary. (See :  Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. 
Capital Services Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 515). The legislative casus omissus 
should not be supplied by judicial interpretative process.  The language of 
Section 50 of the NDPS Act is plain and unambiguous.  There is no scope 
of reading something into it as was done in many decisions of this Court 
which we have referred to in our judgment.
118. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus 
and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole — appear to be 
well settled. Under the ﬁ rst principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied 
by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for 
it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a 
casus omissus
should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the 
parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause 
of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other 
clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision 
makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so 
if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or 
anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. 
“An intention to produce an unreasonable result”, said Danckwerts, L.J., 
in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1966) 1 QB 878 : (1965) 3 All ER 539 : (1965) 
3 WLR 1011 (CA)] (at All ER p.544-I), “is not to be imputed to a statute if 
there is some other construction available”. Where to apply words literally 
would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly 
unreasonable result”, we must “do some violence to the words” and so 
achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per 
Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC [1963 AC 557 : (1963) 1 All ER 655 : (1963) 2
367
WLR 559 (HL)] where at AC p. 577 he also observed : (All ER p. 664-I) 
“This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it 
rarely emerges.”] (See : Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State T.N. 
& Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 533)
119. As such, there is no direct conﬂ ict between SK. Raju (supra) and 
Baljinder Singh (supra). It is pertinent to note that in SK. Raju (supra) the 
contraband was recovered from the bag which the accused was carrying, 
whereas in Baljinder Singh (supra)  the contraband was recovered from the 
vehicle. This makes a lot of diﬀ erence even while applying the concept of 
any object being “inextricably linked to the person”. Parmanand (supra) 
relied upon the judgment in Dilip  (supra) while taking the view that if both, 
the person of the accused as well as the bag is searched and the contraband 
is ultimately recovered from the bag, then it is as good as the search of 
a person and, therefore, Section 50 would be applicable. However, it is 
pertinent to note that Dilip (supra) has not taken into consideration Pawan 
Kumar (supra) which is of a larger Bench. It is also pertinent to note that 
although in Parmanand (supra) the Court looked into Pawan Kumar (supra), 
yet ultimately it followed Dilip (supra) and took the view that if the bag 
carried by the accused is searched and his person is also searched, Section 
50 of the NDPS Act will have application. This is something travelling 
beyond what has been stated by the large
Bench in Pawan Kumar (supra). 
Baljinder Singh (supra), on the other hand, says that Dilip (supra) does not 
lay down a good law. 
120. In the facts of the present case, there is no scope of applying the 
ratio of Parmanand (supra) and SK. Raju (supra). At the cost of repetition, 
we may state that in the case on hand, there is nothing to indicate that the 
search of the person of the accused was also undertaken along with the bag 
which he was carrying on his shoulder. 
121. We do not propose to say anything further as regards SK. Raju 
(supra) as well as Baljinder Singh (supra). We adhere to the principles of 
law as explained by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh (supra) and the 
larger Bench answering the reference in Pawan Kumar (supra).
122. It has been observed in Baldev Singh (supra) that drug abuse is a 
social malady. While drug addiction eats into the vitals of the society, drug 
traﬃ  cking not only eats into the vitals of the economy of a country, but 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
368
illicit money generated by drug traﬃ  cking is often used for illicit activities 
including encouragement of terrorism. It has acquired the dimensions of an 
epidemic, aﬀ ects the economic policies of the State, corrupts the system and 
is detrimental to the future of a country. Reference in the said decision has 
also been made to some United Nation Conventions which the Government 
of India has ratiﬁ ed. It is, therefore, absolutely imperative that those who 
indulge in this kind of nefarious activities should not go scot-free on technical 
pleas which come handy to their advantage in a fraction of second by slight 
movement of the baggage, being placed to any part of their body, which 
baggage may contain the incriminating article. 
123. This matter reminds us of the observations made by a seven-Judge 
Bench of this Court in the case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner 
of Income Tax, Bombay North, Ahmedabad, (1965) 2 SCR 908 : AIR 1965 
SC 1636. We quote the relevant observations:-
“23. In dealing with the question as to whether the earlier decisions 
of this Court in the New Jehangir Mills case, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 249, and the 
Petlad Co. Ltd. case, [1963] Supp, 1 S.C.R. 871, should be reconsidered 
and revised by us, we ought to be clear as to the approach which should 
be adopted in such cases. Mr. Palkhivala has not disputed the fact that in 
a proper case, this Court has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and revise
its earlier decisions, and so, the abstract question as to whether such 
a power vests in this Court or not need not detain us. In exercising this 
inherent power, however, this Court would naturally like to impose certain 
reasonable limitations and would be reluctant to entertain pleas for the 
reconsideration and revision of its earlier decisions, unless it is satisﬁ ed that 
there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so. It is general judicial 
experience that in matters of law involving questions of construing statutory 
or constitutional provisions, two views are often reasonably possible and 
when judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably 
possible views, the process of decision making is often very diﬃ  cult and 
delicate. When this Court hears appeals against decisions of the High Courts 
and is required to consider the propriety or correctness of the view taken 
by the High Courts on any point of law, it would be open to this Court to 
hold that though the view taken by the High Court is reasonably possible, 
the alternative view which is also reasonably possible is better and should
369
be preferred. In such a case, the choice is between the view taken by the 
High Court whose judgment is under appeal, and the alternative view which 
appears to this Court to be more reasonable; and in accepting its own view 
in preference to that of the High Court, this Court would be discharging its 
duty as a court of appeal. But diﬀ erent considerations must inevitably arise 
where a previous decision of this Court has taken a particular view as to the 
construction of a statutory provision as, for instance, Section 66(4) of the Act. 
When it is urged that the view already taken by this Court should be reviewed 
and revised, it may not necessarily be an adequate reason for such review 
and revision to hold that though the earlier view is a reasonably possible 
view, the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is 
more reasonable. In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court 
should ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other 
valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should 
be revised. When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under 
Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it 
must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and 
maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in 
the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier 
decisions on
the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the 
Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain 
and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to 
say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisﬁ ed that its earlier 
decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but 
before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court 
must be satisﬁ ed with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that 
a revision of the said view is fully justiﬁ ed. It is not possible or desirable, 
and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which 
should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of 
reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon 
several relevant considerations:- What is the nature of the inﬁ rmity or error 
on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based? 
On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain 
unnoticed, or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant and 
material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this Court 
bearing on the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing such plea fairly 
RANJAN KUMAR CHADHA v. 
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
370
unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view? What would be 
the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public 
good? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions 
either by this Court or by the High Courts? And, would the reversal of the 
earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? These 
and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever 
this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its 
earlier decisions. These considerations become still more signiﬁ cant when 
the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous decision of a Bench of ﬁ ve 
learned Judges of this Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
124. The aforesaid observations made by the seven-Judge Bench of 
this Court, more particularly the last three lines referred to above, “These 
considerations become still more signiﬁ cant when the earlier decision 
happens to be a unanimous decision of a Bench of ﬁ ve learned Judges of 
this Court.” persuade us to say that we must adhere to the principle of law 
as explained by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh (supra) and the 
larger Bench in Pawan Kumar (supra).
125. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High 
Court was justiﬁ ed in holding the appellant guilty of the oﬀ ence under the 
NDPS Act and at the same time, the High Court was also correct in saying 
that Section 50 of the NDPS
Act was not required to be complied with as 
the recovery was from the bag.
126. In the result, both the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.

127. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of accordingly.
Headnotes prepared by: 
Appeals dismissed.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose
Assisted by: Neha Sharma, LCRA