PRABHAKAR versus JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE DEPARTMENT &ANR.
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 890, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
A 
B 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 890 
PRABHAKAR 
V. 
JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE DEPARTMENT &ANR. 
(Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27080 of 2015) 
SEPTEMBER 07, 2015 
[A. K. SIKRI AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.] 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - s. 10, 2(k) - Industrial 
c Dispute -
Delay in raising - Power of appropriate 
Government to make a reference of the dispute - On facts, 
termination of services of petitioner-worker, however industrial 
dispute raised after 14 years - Award by Labour Court 
directing reinstatement of petitioner in service without back 
D wages and other benefits - Writ petition by Management 
dismissed by Single Judge of the High Court- However, writ 
appeal by Management allowed by Division Bench of the 
High Court- Correctness of- Held: High Court was correct 
holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e. after 
E fourteen years of termination without any justifiable 
explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had no 
jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing 
dispute - Although there is no limitation prescribed under 
the Act for making a reference u/s. 10(1), yet it is for the 
F 'appropriate Government' to consider whether it is expedient 
or not to make the reference - Words 'at any time' used ins. 
10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of 
reference - However, very stale claims should not be 
generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there 
G is satisfactory explanation for delay since it is risky
to 
industrial peace. 
H 
Doctrines- Doctrine of /aches and delays and doctrine 
of acquiescence - Formulation of - Explained. 
890
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
891 
· DEPARTMENT 
Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Court 
A 
HELD: 1.1 High Court correctly decided the issue 
holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e. 
after fourteen years of termination without any justifiable 
explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had s 
no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-
existing dispute. [Para 43] [923-H'; 924-A] 
1.2 An industrial dispute has to be referred by the 
appropriate Government for adjudication and the c 
workman cannot approach the Labour Court or 
Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which 
are covered by Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 
.Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those 
cases where the appropriate Government forms an o 
opinion that 'any Industrial dispute exists or is 
apprehended'. The words 'industrial dispute exists' are 
of paramount importance unless there is an existence 
of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended 
or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near E 
future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or 
apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non 
for making the reference .. No doubt, at the time of taking 
a decision whether a reference is to be made· or not, the 
appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of F 
the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative 
function. At the same time, on the basis of material on
record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial 
dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is 
necessary. Such existence/apprehension of. industrial G 
dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though 
it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material 
on record. Dispute or difference arises when one party 
make a demand and other party rejects the same. Before H
892 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015]9 S.C.R. 
A raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a 
necessary pre-condition. In such a scenario, if the 
services of a workman are terminated and he does not 
make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging 
wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within 
B reasonable time and raises the same after considerable 
lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial 
dispute still exists. Since there is no period of limitation, 
it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even 
belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long 
C period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute 
still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of 
limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the 
workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this. 
0 
purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable 
period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such 
delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute 
cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give 
satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and 
E demonstrate that the circumstances discloses that issue 
is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of 
the reason that law of limitation has no application. On 
the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no 
longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then 
F it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be 
referred. In those cases where
there was no agitation by 
the workman against his termination and the dispute is 
raised· belatedly and the delay or laches remain 
unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived 
G his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, 
therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had 
become stale and was not an 'existing dispute'. In such 
circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse 
to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/ 
H Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
893 
DEPARTMENT 
dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act A 
and, therefore, no relief can be granted. [Para 40) [920-F-
H; 921-A-H; 922-A-H; 923-A-B] 
1.3 In those cases where the Court finds that 
dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always B 
permissible for the Court to take the aspect of delay into 
consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is 
still open for the Court to either grant reinstatement 
without back wages or lesser back wages or grant 
compensation instead of reinstatement. The law on this C 
issue has to be applied in the said perspective in such 
matters. [Para 41) [923-B-D] 
1.4 Although there is no limitation prescribed under 
the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the o 
Act, yet it is for the 'appropriate Government' to consider 
whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The 
words 'at any time' used in Section 10(1) do not admit of 
any limitation in making an order of reference and laws 
of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the E 
Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that 
very stale claims should not be generally encouraged 
or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory 
explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to 
industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after F 
long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account 
the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on
the 
employers' financial· arrangement and to avoid 
dislocation of an industry. [Para 42) [923-D-G] 
1.5 It is now a well recognised principle of 
jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time 
is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period 
prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, 
G 
in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches H
894 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[20~5] 98.C,R. 
A and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-
suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly 
without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action 
after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an 
application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities". 
B This principle is applied in those cases where 
discretionary orders of the Court are claimed, such as 
specific performance, permanent or temporary 
injunction, appointment of receiver etc. These principles 
are also applied in the writ petitions filed under Articles 
C 32 and 226 of Constitution of India. In such cases, Cou'rts 
can still refuse relief where the delay on the petitioner's 
part has prejudiced the respondent even though the 
petitioner might have come to Court within the period 
0 prescribed by the Limitation Act. [Paras 36, 37) [919-C-F] 
1.6 Likewise, if a party having a right stands by and 
sees another·acting in a manner inconsistent with that 
right and makes no objection while the act is in progress 
he cannot afterwards complain. This principle is based 
E on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a 
case party who did not make any objection acquiesced 
into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and, 
therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged 
F wrong. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation 
is pn~scribed within which the action is to be brought 
befo're'the Court, if the
action is not brought within that 
prescribed period the aggrieved party loses remedy 
and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of 
G limitation is over. Likewise, in other cases even where 
no limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the 
aggrieved party does not approach the machinery 
provided under the law for redressal of his gri9vance, it 
can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground 
H of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the
·1PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
895 
DEPARTMENT 
presumption that such person has waived his right or A 
acquiesced into the act of other. These principles as part 
of equity are based on principles relatable to sound 
public policy that if a person does not exercise his right 
for a Ion~ time then such a right is non-existent. [Paras 
38, 39] [919-G-H; 920-A-D] 
B 
Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana 
Roadways, Hissar(2014) 10 SCC 301; Sapan Kumar . 
Pandit v: U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. 2001 (3) 
SCR 1081: (2001) 6 SCC 222; State of Madras v. C.P. 
Sarathy &Anr. (1953) 4 SCR 334; Western India Match 
Company Ltd. v. The Western India Match Co. Workers 
Union & Ors. 1970 (3) SCR 370: (1970) 1 SCC 225; 
Ram Avtar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr. 
1985 (3) SCR 686: (1985) 3 SCC 189; The Se~retary, 
Indian Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat & Ors. 2000 
(1) SCR 787: (2000) 3 SCC 93; Prem Kakarv. State of 
Haryana &Anr. 1976 (3) SCR 1010: (1976) 3 SCC 433; 
Sultan Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr. 1995 (6) Suppl. 
SCR 629: (1996) 2 SCC 66; Shalimar Works Ltd. v. 
Their Workmen (1960) 1 SCR 150; Vazir Sultan 
Tobacco Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1964) 
1 LLJ 622; Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty 
& Ors.2000 (1) SCR 459: (2000) 2 SCC 455 - referred 
to. 
Blacks Law Dictionary 51" Edn p 424 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
(2014) 10 sec 301 
2001 (3) SCR 1081 
(1953) 4 SCR 334 
referred to. 
Para 3, 25 
referred to. 
Para 5, 24
referred to. 
Para 9, 10,17 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H

896 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
1970 (3) SCR 370 
referred to. 
Para 10 
1985 (3) SCR 686 
referred to. 
Para 15 
2000 (1) SCR 787 
referred to. 
Para 17 
1976 (3) SCR 1010 
referred to. 
Para 17 
B 
1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 629 referred to. 
Para 17 
(1960) 1 SCR 150 
referred to. 
Para 20 
(1964) 1 LLJ 622 
referred to. 
Para 22 
c 2000 (1) SCR 459 
referred to. 
Para 23 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave 
. Petition (Civil) No. 27080 of 2015 
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.06.2011 of the 
D High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in Writ 
Appeal No. 6145 of2009. 
Sharanagouda Patil, Supreeta Patil, (for S-legal. 
Associates) for the Petitioner. 
E 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
A. K. SIKRI, J. Delay condoned. 
1) This special leave petition arises from the judgment 
F 
dated.June 06, 2011 passed by the High CourtofKarnataka, 
Circuit Bench at Dharwad, whereby writ appeal of the 
respondents (hereinafter referred to as the 'Management') 
herein was allowed resulting in setting aside the award of the 
G Labour Court directing reinstatement of the petitioner herein 
in service without back wages and other benefits, even when 
the said order was _up_held by the Single Judge of the said 
High Court in the writ petition filed by the Management 
challenging the award. 
H
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
897 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
2) We may state at the outset that the main factor with A 
which the High Court has been influenced is that the petitioner, 
whose services were terminated on April 01, 1985, raised the 
industrial dispute only in the year 1999, i.e. after a period of 
more than fourteen years. On the facts of this case, the High 
Court has held that there was no 'live' dispute and even when 
B 
no period of limitation is provided for raising the disputes under 
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 
the 'Act') and provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not 
applicable, there could not have been a reference at such a 
belated stage, inasmuch as, after a lapse of such abnormal C 
time, the dispute ceases to exist and, therefore, the appropriate 
Government had no jurisdiction or power to make a reference 
of a non-existent dispute. The petitioner has questioned the 
appropriateness of this view taken by the High Court. 
D 
3) Primary submission of the learned counsel appearing 
for the petitioner is that once it is accepted that the law of 
limitation does not apply, the Government could make the 
reference even if the dispute was raised belatedly and in such 
circumstances power of the Labour Court is to mould the relief. 
E 
In support of this contention, learned counsel referred to the 
judgment of this Court in Raghubir Singh v. General 
Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar1• 
In order to
appreciate the aforesaid contention, we scan through the basic 
F 
facts of the present case. 
4) The petitioner was appointed as a Clerk in the 
Sericulture Department, Government of Karnataka, Belgaum 
on April 01, 1984. His services were terminated on April 01, 
1985. During the period April 01, 1985 till 1999, the petitioner G 
did not approach any judicial/quasi-judicial authority 
challenging the said termination. In fact, not even a notice or 
legal notice was served upon the Management questioning 
1 (2014) 10 sec 301 
H
898 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[20~5]9 S.C.R. 
A the validity of the said termination. However, some time in the 
year 1999, the petitioner approached the appropriate 
Government alleging that his services were terminated illegally 
and in violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. 
Insofar as delay is concerned, in the claim made by the 
B petitioner, only explanation given was that he had approached 
the Management on several occasions with request to reinstate 
him in service and pay back wages and other consequential 
benefits He also alleged that though the Management initially 
assured that they would reinstate him, but dragged on the 
C matter on one pretext or the other and when they ultimately 
told him that they would not reinstate him into service, he had 
no alternative but to raise the industrial dispute. The 
conciliation proceedings have started, which ended in failure. 
0 
Thereafter, the appropriate Government referred the matter 
regarding validity of termination of the petitioner for 
adjud 1cation. 
5) The Management had taken a specific plea in the 
conciliation proceedings as well as before the Labour Court 
E that such a reference was not competent and the Retitioner 
was not entitled to any relief when he had raised the dispute 
after fourteen years of his termination. On merits it was pleaded 
that the Management had not termi.nated the services and, in 
F fact, it is the petitioner who left th;e services. Various issues 
were framed by the
Labour Court, which included a specific 
issue as to whether any relief could be given when the dispute 
was raised after fourteen years of alleged termination. After 
the evidence was led, the Labour Court passed !Pe.award 
G holding that the petitioner had worked for more;than 240 days 
and his services were terminated by the Management without 
complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The 
termination was, thus, held to be invalid. The contention of the 
Management that the petitioner had left the service of his own 
H was negatived by the Labour Court with the reason that no
PRABl;IAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
899 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
person would give UP. the work easily without any cause and A 
as the petitioner had not got any alternate employment 
anywhere, the question of leaving his job by himself did not 
arise. Insofar as the issue of raising the dispute belatedly is 
concerned, the Labour Court held that even ifthere was a delay 
of fourteen years, only relief was required to be moulded B 
because of that reason. Thus, the Labour Court ordered 
reinstatement, but denied back wages or other benefits. For 
this purpose, the Labour Court referred to the judgment of this 
. Court in Sapan Kumar Panditv. U.P. State Electricity Board 
&~2 
c 
6) As pointed out above, the writ petition preferred by 
the Management against this award was dismissed by the 
Single Judge of the High Court. Against the order of dismissal 
passed by the learned Single Judge, the Management D 
preferred writ appeal, which has been allowed by the Division 
Bench vide impugned judgment dated June 06, 2011. This 
special leave petition is preferred challenging the said 
judgment and there is also a delay of 1438 days in filing the E 
same. 
7) F_rom the facts narrated above, it becomes clear that 
for a period of fourteen years no grievance was made by the 
petitioner qua his alleged termination. Though it was averred 
that the petitioner had approached the Management time and 
F 
again and was given assurance that he would be taken back 
in service,
there is nothing on record to substantiate this. No 
notice was served upon the Management. 
There is no 
assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of 
. time. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. Pertinently, even G 
the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation 
anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised 
after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind the 
2 (2001) s sec 222 
H
900 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen, 
namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was 
appropriate. 
8) It may be stated that the question is of utmost 
B importance as it is seen that many times, as in the instant case, 
the workers raise dispute after number of years of the cause 
of action. Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? 
Or whether it can be said that dispute does not exist when the 
concerned workmen after his say termination kept quiet for 
C 
number of years and thus acquiesced into the action? 
9) Before we proceed to deal with the aforesaid 
questions, it would be proper to discuss the power of 
'appropriate Government' under Section 10 of the Act in 
o referring or refusing to refer the dispute for adjudication. It is a 
peculiar position provided under the Act that an aggrieved 
workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial 
Tribunal directly for adjudication of !industrial dispute'. Except 
those cases falling under Section 2A of the Act, he has to seek 
E 
reference of dispute to Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under 
Section 10 of the Act. 'Appropriate Government', as defined 
under Section 2(a) oftheAct, is empowered to referthe dispute. 
Section 10( 1) stipulates that 'appropriate Government' may, 
at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute to a Board, 
F 
Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal where 'it is of the opinion 
that any industrial
dispute exists or is apprehended'. 
Interpreting this Section, way back in the year 1953, this Court 
in the case of State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy &Anr. 3 stated 
the following propositions: 
G 
H 
"(i) The Government should satisfy itself, on the facts 
and circumstances brought to its notice, in its 
subjective opinion that an 'industrial dispute' exists 
or is 'apprehended'; 
3 (1953) 4 SCR 334
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
· (ii) the factual existence of a dispute or its 
apprehension and the expediency of making 
reference are matters entirely for the Government 
to decide; 
(iii) the order making a reference is an 
administrative act and it is not a judicial or a quasi-
judicial act; and 
(iv) the order of reference passed by the 
Government cannot be examined by the High Court 
in its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution 
to see if the Government had material before it to 
support the conclusion that the dispute existed or 
was apprehended." 
901 
A 
B 
c 
D 
These propositions were based on unamended Act 
which did not contain the words 'where the appropriate 
Government is of the opinion'. 
10) In Western India Match Company Ltd. v. The 
Western India Match Co. WorketS Union & OtS.4 , this Court E 
took support of C.P. Sarathy's5 case to hold that function of 
the appropriate Government to make reference under Section 
10(1) is an administrative function. This view that the 
appropriate Government is performing an administrative act F 
and not judicial or quasi-judicial act while making reference is 
found in various judicial pronouncements made by this Court 
even thereafter. 
11) The satisfaction of the existence of an industrial 
dispute or the satisfaction that an industrial dispute is G 
apprehended is 'a condition precedent to the order of 
reference'. An order of reference cannot be made mechanically
• c1e10) 1 sec 22s 
5 Note 3 above 
H
902 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9S.C.R. 
A without forming an opinion. For formation of the necessary 
opinion, the 'appropriate Government' must also be satisfied 
that a person whose dispute is being referred for adjudication 
is a 'workman'. If the dispute is not between an employer and 
his workman, it is not an 'industrial dispute' and the Government 
B can justifiably refuse to refer the dispute. From the material 
placed before it, the Government reaches an administrative 
decision whether there exists an existing or apprehended 
industrial dispute. In either event, it can exercise the power 
under this Section. 
c 
12) The adequaey or the sufficiency of the material on 
which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of juaicial 
scrutiny. If the action of the Government in making the reference 
is impugned by a party, it·would be open to such a party to 
D show that what was referred was not an industrial dispute and 
that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But if 
the dispute was an industrial dispute, its factual existence and 
the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of 
a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to 
E decide upon and it will not be competent for the Court to hold 
the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of 
jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no 
material before the Government on which it could have come 
F to an affirmative conclusion on those matters. 
13) When
the 'appropriate Government' makes a 
reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication, it does not 
decide any question of fact or law. The only condition, which 
the exercise of that power should satisfy, is that there should 
G be the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute. When 
once the Government is satisfied about this question, it 
acquires jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication. 
However, the condition precedent to the formation of such 
H opinion, that there should be an _existing or apprehended
, PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
·903 
'industrial dispute', is imperative and the recitals of the A 
existence or apprehension of the industrial dispute cannot 
preclude the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and 
to determine whether, in fact, there was any material before 
the 'appropriate Government' and if there was; whether the 
Government applied its mind in coming to the conclusion that B 
an industrial dispute was in existence or was apprehended 
and it was expedientto make the reference. Therefore, an order 
of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the 
appropriate Government had no material before it or it has not 
applied its mind to the material before it or has not taken into C 
consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken 
into consideration. 
14)"Likewise, when the appropriate Government refuses 
to make reference, it is also amenable to judicial review if it is D 
shown that the appropriate Government did not tak!3 into 
consideration the relevant material which could show existence 
or apprehension of industrial dispute or if it is shown that the 
reasons for refusing to make reference are irrelevant or not 
germane to the formation of opinion. 
E 
15) It has been held in catena of judgments that while 
performing this administrative function, the Government would 
not decide the dispute between the parties which may be. 
termed as judicial function and such judicial
function is to be 
F 
discharged by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal only. In Ram 
Avtar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana &Anr.6, this Court 
held that ifthe Government, while refusing to make reference 
delves into the merits of the dispute, it is not permissible under 
law and the appropriate course to make reference and such G 
dispute are to be settled/decided by the Labour Court/Industrial 
Tribunal as an adjudicatory authority. Following observations 
, of the Court are worth noting: 
6 (1985) 3 sec 189 
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904° 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
"Therefore the view that while exercising power 
under Section 10(1) the functions performed by the 
appropri~te Government is ans administrative 
function and not a judicial or quasi-judicial function 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
is beyond the pale of controversy. 
Now if the Government performs an administrative 
act while either making or refusing to make a 
reference under Section 10(1 ), it cannot delve into 
the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the 
determination of lis. That would certainly be in 
excess of the power conferred by Section 10. 
Section 10 requires the appropriate Government 
to be satisfied that the industrial dispute exists or 
is apprehended. This may permit the appropriate 
Government to determine prima facie whether an 
industrial dispute exists or claim is frivolous or 
bogus or put forth extraneous and relevant reasons 
not for justice of industrial peace and harmony. Every 
administrative determination must be based on 
ground relevant and germane to the exercise of 
power. If the administrative determination is based 
on the relevant, extraneous or grounds not germane 
to the exercise of power, it is liable to be questioned 
in exercise of the power of judicial review." 
16) From the aforesaid discussion, it clearly follows that 
even when making a reference by the appropriate Government 
is an administrative act, before making such a reference it 
has to form an opinion as to whether any industrial
dispute 
G exists or is apprehended. While forming this opinion, the 
appropriate Government is supposed to take all relevant facts 
into consideration touching upon this aspect. If the power is 
not exercised properly, it is amenable to judicial review. Thus, 
H where an industrial dispute exists or his apprehended, but the
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
905 
DEPARTMENT[A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
appropriate Government refuses to make reference, such a A 
refusal can be challenged in the court of law. Conversely, which 
is equally true, if the reference is made even when no dispute 
exists or is apprehended, such a reference will also be subject 
to judicial review. 
B 
17) We may refer to the judgment in the case of The 
Secretary, Indian Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat & 
Ors. 7 In that case, the "appropriate Government" refused to 
make a reference on the ground that the concerned employee 
who had raised the dispute was not 'workman' within the C 
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. While doing so, the 
Government considered the salary and allowances drawn by 
the employee as well as the nature of work performed by him, 
including his power to sanction expenses incurred by his Office. 
The concerned employee (respondent in the said case) filed D 
a writ petition against the order of the appropriate Government 
refusing to make reference and the High Court in that writ 
petition directed the Government to make the reference as to 
· whether he was a workman. Appeal filed by the appellant 
therein was also dismissed and in these circumstances the E 
appellant preferred Special Leave Petition and that is how the 
matter came up for consideration before this Court. Granting 
leave and ultimately allowing the appeal of the appellant, this 
Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and
upheld the F 
order of the Government refusing to make reference. Relying 
upon its earlier judgment in the case of C.P. Sarathy8, Prem 
Kakarv. State of Haryana &Anr.9, and Sultan Singh v. State 
of Haryana & Anr.10, the Court observed that the order under 
Section 10 of the Act was an administrative order and the 
Government was entitled to go into the question whether 
7 c2000) 3 sec 93 
8 Note 3 above. 
9 (1976) 3 sec 433 
10 (1996) 2 sec 66 
G . 
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.9P.6, .. ,. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
'[2015]9'S.C.R · 
A 
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and it will be only 
subjective satisfaction on the basis of material on records and 
being an administrative' order no /is is involved. The position 
in law was summarised as under: 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
.G 
H 
(i) the appropriate Government would not be 
justified in making a reference under Section 10 of 
the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and 
circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial 
dispute exists or apprehended and if such a 
reference is made it is desirable, wherever 
possible, for the Government to indicate the nature 
of dispute in the order of reference; 
(ii) the order of the appropriate Government making 
a reference under Section 10 of the Act is an 
administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-
judicial one and the Court, ther~fore, cannot 
canvass the order of the reference closely to see if 
there was any material before the Government to 
support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-
judicial order; 
(iii) an order made by the appropriate Government 
under Section 10 of the Act being an administrative 
order no /is is involved, as such an order is made 
on the subjective satisfaction of the Government; 
(iv) if it appears from the reasons given that the 
appropriate Government took into account any 
consideration irrelevant or foreign material, the 
Court may in a given case consider the case for a 
writ of mandamus and;
(v) it would, however, be open to a party to show 
that what was referred by the Government was not 
an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act.
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
DEPARTMENT [A K. SIKRI, J.] 
907 -l 
,, 
18) At this stage, it may be pointed out that admittedly'~ A 
the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes. 
Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the 
Industrial DisputesActand under the Industrial DisputesAct 
no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled 
by series of judgments of this Court. 
B 
19) On the reading of these judgments, which are 
discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some 
decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of 
considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference C 
but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but 
denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted 
compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in 
some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there 
was no time prescribed to exercise power under Section 10 D 
of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of 
time to revive matters which had since been settled or had to 
become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at 
this juncture. 
E 
20) As early as in 1959, this Court in the case of Shalimar 
Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen11 pointed out that there is no 
limitation prescribed in making a reference of disputes to 
Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act. Atthe same 
time, the Court also remarked that the dispute should be F 
referred as soon as
possible after they have arisen and after 
conciliation proceedings have failed. In that case, reference 
was made after four year of dispute having arisen. In these 
circumstances, this Court held that relief of reinstatement 
should not be given to the discharged workmen in such a G 
belated and vague reference. 
21) Again, in Western India Match Company Ltd.12, 
though upholding the reference of dispute made nearly six years 
11 (1960)1SCR150 
12 Note 4 above 
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A after the previous refusal to make the reference, the Court 
observed that in exercising its discretion to make reference, 
the Government will take into consideration the tirne which had 
lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it 
decides to reconsider it in the interest of justice and industrial 
B peace. Following observations from this judgment need to be 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
noticed for the purposes of the present case: 
"8. From the words used in Section 4(k) of the Act 
there can be no doubt that the Legislature has left 
the question of making or refusing to make a 
reference for adjudication to the discretion of the 
Government. But the discretion is neither unfettered 
nor arbitrary for the section clearly provides that 
·there must exist an industrial dispute as defined by 
the Act or such a dispute must be apprehended 
when the Government decides to refer it for 
adjudication. No reference thus can be made 
unless at the time when the Government decides 
to make it an industrial dispute between the 
employer and his employees either exists or is 
apprehended. Therefore, the expression "at any 
time", though seemingly without any limits, is 
governed by the context in which it appears. 
Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would 
arise after conciliation proceedings have been 
gone through and the conciliation officer has made 
a failure report. But the Government need not wait 
until such a
procedure has been completed. In an 
urgent case, it can "at any time", i.e., even when 
such proceedings have not begun or are still 
pending, decide to referthe dispute for adjudication. 
The expression "at any time" thus takes in such 
cases as where the Government decides to make 
a reference without waiting for conciliation
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
DEPARTMENT [AK. SIKRI, J.] 
proceedings to begin or to be completed. As 
already stated, the expression "at any time" in the 
context in which it is used postulates that a 
reference can only be made if an industrial dispute 
exists or is apprehended. No reference is 
contemplated by the section when the dispute is 
not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no 
longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, 
where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which 
there is an agreement or a settlement between the 
parties or where the industry in question is no longer 
in existence. 
xx 
xx 
xx 
13. It is true that where a Government reconsiders 
its previous decision and decides to make the 
reference, such a decision might cause 
inconvenience to the employer because the 
employer in the meantime might have acted on the 
belief that there would be no proceedings by way 
of adjudication of the dispute between him and his 
workmen. Such a consideration would, we should 
think, be taken into account by the Government 
whenever, in exercise of its discretion, it decides 
to reopen its previous decision as also the time 
which has lapsed between its earlier decision and 
the date when it decides to reconsider it. These 
are matters which the Government would have to 
take into account while deciding whether it should 
reopen its former decision in the interest of justice 
and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its
jurisdiction under Section 4(k) of the Act. Whether 
the intervening period may be short or long wouid 
necessarily depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case, and therefore, in 
• 
909 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
construing the expression "at any time" in Section 
4(k) it would be impossible to· lay down any limits 
to it." 
22) Again in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Companyv. State 
8 
of Andhra Pradesh13 , the Andhra Pradesh High Court held 
that reference made nearly six years after the dispute 
amounted to inordinate, unreasonable and unjustifiable. 
23) In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty & 
C 
Ors. 14, the Court cautioned that power of reference should be 
exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a 
mechanical fashion. It was specifically observed that power 
to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled 
matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory 
D limitation period, The Court not only reiterated that the courts· 
had power of judicial review, though to limited extent, but also 
made following pertinent observations on delay: 
"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the 
E 
appropriate Government to .exercise its powers 
under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power 
can be exercised at any point of time and to revive 
matters which had since been settled. Power is to 
be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. 
F 
There appears to us to be no rational basis on which 
the Central Government has exercised powers in 
this case after a lapse of about seven years of the 
order dismissing the respondent from servic~. At 
the time reference was made no industrial
dispute 
G 
existed or could be even said to have been 
apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not 
be the subject-matter of reference under Section 
10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to 
13 (1964) i LLJ 622 
H 
1• (2000) 2 sec 455
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
911 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
be stale would depend on the facts and 
A 
circumstances of each case. When the matter has 
become final, it appears to us to be rather 
incongruous that the reference be made under 
Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the 
present one. In fact it could be said that there was 
no dispute pending at the time when the reference 
In question was made. The only ground advanced 
by the respondent was that two other employees 
who were dismissed from service were reinstated. 
Under what circumstances they were dismissed 
and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. 
Demand raised by the respondent for raising an 
industrial dispute was ex facie bad and 
incompetent. 
7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the 
respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which 
resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or 
there was even any irregularity. He availed his 
remedy of appeal under the rules governing his 
conditions of service. It could not be said that in the 
circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was · 
even apprehended after a lapse of about seven 
years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever 
a workman raises some dispute it does not 
become an industrial dispute and the appropriate 
Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make 
the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as 
an industrial dispute. The Central Government 
lacked power to make
reference both on the ground 
of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of 
the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing 
or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is 
to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
present reference is destructive to the industrial 
peace and defeats the very object and purpose of 
the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the 
High Court seeking an order to quash the reference 
in question. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a 
reference has been made under Section 10 of the 
Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and 
the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in 
the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a 
correct proposition to state. An administrative order 
which does not take into consideration statutory 
requirements or travels outside that is certainly 
subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. 
The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 
226 of the Constitution to consider the question of 
the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National 
Engg. Industries Ltd. v. Staff] of Rajasthan {(2000) 
1 SCC 371} this Court observed: 
"24. 
It will be thus seen that High Court has 
jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is 
an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and 
none apprehended which could be the subject 
matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial 
Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a 
question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, 
which could be examined by the High Court in Its 
writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial 
Tribunal (sic
dispute) which would clothe the 
appropriate Government with power to make the 
reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate 
it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or 
apprehended the appropriate Government lacks 
power to make any reference."
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
913 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
24) Even in Sapan Kumar Pandit15 , the Court A 
emphasized that limitation period for making the reference is 
co-extensive with the existence of dispute, meaning thereby 
that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision 
was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. 
In the facts of that case, the Court found that dispute remained 
B 
alive and, therefore, reference was legally made. What is 
significant is that the Court in that judgment interpreted the 
words 'at any time' occurring in Section 10 of the Act and 
clarified that though these words, prima facie, indicate that 
there is no time limit for making the reference, but such a C 
meaning cannot be assigned to these words and the real test 
is the existence of a dispute cin the date of reference for 
adjudication. We would like to reproduce paras 8 and 9 
elaborating this principle: 
"8. The above section is almost in tune with Section 
10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the 
difference between these two provisions does not 
relate to the points at issue in this case. Though no 
time limit is fixed for making the reference for a 
dispute for adjudication, could any State 
Government revive a dispute which had submerged 
in stupor by long lapse of time and rekindled by 
making a reference of it to adjudication? The words 
"at any time" as used in the section are prima facie 
indicator to a period without
boundary. But such an 
interpretation making the power unending would be 
pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this sub-
section itself to indicate that the time has some 
circumscription. The words ''where the Government 
is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is 
apprehended" have to be read in conjunction with 
the words "at any time". They are, in a way, 
.,.,,_ __ 
15 Note 2 above 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
914 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
complimentary to each other. The Government's 
power to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication 
has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be 
done only so long as the dispute exists. In other 
words, the period envisaged by the enduring 
expression "at any time" terminates with the eclipse 
of the industrial dispute. It, therefore, means that if 
the dispute existed on the day when the reference 
was made by the Government, it is idle (sic- ideal) 
to ascertain the number of years which elapsed 
since the commencement of the dispute to 
determine whether the delay would have 
extinguished the power of the Government to make 
the reference. 
9. Hence the real test is, was the industrial dispute 
in existence on the date of reference for 
adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then 
the Government's power to make a reference would 
have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer 
is in positive terms the Government could have 
exercised the power whatever be the range of the 
period which lapsed since the inception of the 
dispute. That apart, a decision of the Government 
in this regard cannot be listed (sic) on the possibility 
of what another party would think, whether any 
dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if 
in the opinion of the Government the dispute 
existed then the Government could make the 
reference. The only authority which can form such 
an opinion
is the Government. If the Government 
decides to make the reference, there is a 
presumption that in the opinion of the Government, 
·there existed such a dispute."
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
915 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
25) In Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana A 
Roadways, Hissar16 , this Court scanned through most of the 
available case law on the subject and emphasized that the 
words 'at any time' occurring in Section 10 of the Act would 
imply that law of limitation did not apply. On facts, the Court 
held that the State Government had rightly exercised its power B 
and referred the dispute to Labour Court within reasonable 
time considering circumstances in which the appellant therein 
was placed. In fact, the Court accepted the explanation for 
delay given by the workman in raising the dispute. In that case, 
it was found that there was a criminal case pending against C 
the workman and further the Management had assured him 
that he would be reinstated on his acquittal. It was also noticed 
that even despite delay, there was no loss or unavailability of 
evidence due to the said delay. 
,26) The aforesaid case law depicts the following: 
(a) Law of limitation does not apply to the 
proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 
D 
1947. 
E 
(b) The words 'at any time' used in Section 10would 
support that there is no period of limitation in making 
an order of reference. 
(c) At the same time, the appropriate Government 
has to keep in mind as to whether the dispute is 
still existing or live dispute and has not become a 
stale claim and if that is so, the reference can be 
refused. 
(d) Whether
dispute is alive or it has become stale/ 
non-existent at the time when the workman 
·approaches the appropriate Government is an 
16 (2014) 10 sec 301 
F 
. G 
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[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
aspect which would depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case and there cannot be 
any hard and fast rule regarding the time for making 
the order of reference. 
B 
27) If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid 
perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. 
At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the 
reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the 
workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding 
C the relief only. On the other hand, in some other decisions, 
this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated 
or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the 
reference should be refused. Which parameters are to be 
kept in mind while taking one or the other approach needs to 
D be discussed with some elaboration, which would include 
discussion on certain aspects that would be kept in mind by 
the courts for taking a particular view. We, thus, intend to 
embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central 
aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the 
E dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government 
had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour 
Court/ lndu:;;trial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming 
before it. 
F 
28) In this process, let us first examine as to what would 
constitute 'industrial dispute' because of the simple reason 
that the appropriate Government has
power to refer what is 
known as an 'industrial dispute' and likewise the Labour Court/ 
Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide if there is an 
G industrial dispute. We are not go"ing into the entire gamut of 
what constitutes 'industrial dispute' within the meaning of 
Section 2(k} of the Act. Our focus is only on the aspect that 
what can be referred should be the dispute which is existing 
H and in praesenti when the reference ::; sought. To put it
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
917 
otherwise, if it no longer r~mains an industrial dispute or A 
industrial dispute 'does not exist' at that time, there would not 
be any question on making reference or adjudicating the matter 
as it is not an industrial dispute. 
29) Section 2(k) of the IDA defines 'industrial dispute' B 
and it reads as under: 
"'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference 
between employers and employers, or between 
employers and workmen, or between workmen and 
workmen, which is connected with the employment 
or non-employment or the terms of employment or 
with the conditions of labour, of any persons;" 
c 
30) As per Section 2A dispute relating to discharge, 
dismissal, retrenchment or termination of an individual are also D 
deemed as industrial dispute and, therefore, an individual is 
given right to raise these disputes. 
31) The term 'industrial dispute' connotes a real and 
substantial difference having some element of persistency, and 
E 
likely, if not adjusted, to endanger the industrial peace of the 
community. The expression 'dispute or difference' as used in 
the definition, therefore, means a controversy fairly definite and 
of real substance, connected with the employment or non-
employment or with the terms of employment or the conditions F 
of labour of any person, and is one in which the contesting 
parties are directly interested in maintaining the respective 
contentions. 
32) To
understand the meaning of the word 'dispute', it G 
would be appropriate to start with the grammatical or dictionary 
meaning of the term: 
'Dispute': "to argue about, to contend for, to oppose 
by argument' to call in question -to argue or debate 
H
918 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
(with about or over), - a contest with words; an 
argument; a debate; a quarrel; 
B 
c 
33) Blacks law dictionary, 5th Edition, page 424 defines 
'dispute' as under: 
" A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or 
rights; an assertion of a right, claim or demand on 
one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on 
the other. The subject of litigation; the matter for 
which a suit is brought and upon which issue is 
joined, and in relation to which jurors are cal.led and 
witnesses examined." 
34) Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand 
is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other 
D side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an 'industrial 
dispute' cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is 
made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the 
employer. How such demand should be raised and at what 
E stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this 
aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no 
demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action 
arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be 
the consequence if after the termination of the services of 
F petitioner on April 01, 1985, the petitioner does not dispute 
his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand . 
for reinstatement for number of years? Can it still be said that 
there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make 
such demand after
lapse of several years and on making such 
G demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can 
always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after 
the termination of the services when the workmen did not raise 
any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer 
presumed that the workmen has accepted his termination and, 
H therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
919 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
can be said that workmen, in such a case, acquiesced into A 
the act of the employer in terminating his services and, 
therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse 
of several years make a demand and then convert it into a 
'dispute' what had otherwise become a buried issue. 
35) Let us examine the matter from another aspect, viz. 
!aches and delays and acquiescence. 
B 
36) It is now a well recognised principle of jurisprudence 
that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even c 
when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute 
relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have 
coined the doctrine of !aches and delays as well as doctrine of 
acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached 
the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for D 
bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of !aches 
is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats 
equities". 
37) This principle is applied in those cases where E 
discretionary orders of the Court are claimed, such as specific 
performance, permanent or temporary injunction, appointment 
of receiver etc. These principles are also applied in the writ· 
petitions filed under Articles 32 and 226 of Constitution of India. 
In such cases, Courts can still refuse relief where the delay on 
F 
the petitioner's part has prejudiced the respondent even though 
the
petitioner might have come to Court within the period 
prescribed by the Limitation Act. 
38) Likewise, if a party having a right stands by and sees G 
another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and 
makes no objection while the act is in progress he cannot 
afterwards complain. This principle is based on the doctrine 
of acquiescence implying that in such a case party who did 
not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful H
920 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain 
against that alleged wrong. 
39) Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is 
prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the 
s Court, ifthe action is not brought within that prescribed period 
the aggrieved party looses remedy and cannot enforce his legal 
right after the period of limitation is over. Likewise, in other 
cases even where no limitation is prescribed, but for a long 
period the aggrieved party does not approach the machinery 
C provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it can 
be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground of 
unexplained delay and !aches and/or on the presumption that 
such person has waived his right or acquiesced into the act of 
other. As mentioned above, these principles as part of equity 
D are based on principles relatable to sound public policy that if 
a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such 
a right is non-existent. · 
40) On the basis of aforesaid discussion, we summarise 
E the legal position as under: 
An industrial dispute has to be referred by the 
appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman 
cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, 
F except in those cases which are covered by Section 2A of the 
Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those 
cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion 
that
'any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended'. The 
words 'industrial dispute exists' are of paramount importance 
G unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the 
dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute 
may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, 
existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine 
qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of 
H taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not,
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
921 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the A 
dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. 
At the same time, on the basis of material on record, 
satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the 
apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such 
existence/apprehension of industri~I dispute, thus, becomes B 
a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective 
satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not 
concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there 
is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows 
would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. Dispute or C 
difference arises when one party make a demand and other 
party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in number of 
cases that before raising the industrial disp.ute making of 
demand is a necessary pre-condition. In such a scenario, if D 
the services of a workman are terminated and he does not 
make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful 
termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time 
and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, 
whether it can be said thafindustrial dispute still exist. Since E 
there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to 
raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is 
raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether
such 
a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of 
limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that F 
there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to 
demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and 
there are !aches and delays, such delay has not resulted into 
making the industrial dispute seized to exist. 
Therefore, if 
the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these G 
!aches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances 
discloses that issue is still alive, delay would notcome in his 
way because of the reason that law of limitation has no 
application. On the other hand, if because of such delay 
dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", 
H
922 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R. 
A then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 
Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice 
after his termination, questioning the termination and 
demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were 
discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to 
B sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there 
were assuran~s by the Management to the effect that he would 
be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he 
did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the 
labour authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the 
C remedy under Section 2AoftheAct. In such a scenario, it can 
be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the 
workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very 
example, even· if the notice of demand was sent but itdid not 
0 
evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection 
by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and 
thereafter he sleeps over the matter for number of years, it can 
be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and 
rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the 
E said rejection. Take another example. A workman approaches 
the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which 
was pending for number of years and was ultimately dismissed 
. on the ground that Civil. Court did not have jurisdiction to 
enforce the contract of personal
service and does not grant 
F any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed 
or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under 
the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that dispute is still alive as 
the workman had not accepted the termination but was 
agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. In contrast, In 
G those cases where there was no agitation by the workman 
against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and 
the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed 
that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of 
termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is 
H raised it had become stale and was not an 'existing dispute'.
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE 
92a 
DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.] 
In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse A 
to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/. 
Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" 
within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no 
relief can be granted. 
41) We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where 
the Court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, 
B 
it is always permissible for the Court to take the aspect of delay 
into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still 
open for the Court to either grant reinstatement without back C 
wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead 
of reinstatement. We are of the opinion that the law on this 
issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such 
matters. 
42) To summarise, although there is no limitation 
prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 
D 
10( 1) of the Act, yet it is for the 'appropriate Government' to 
consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. 
The words 'at any time' used in Section 10(1) do not admit of E 
~ny limitation in making an order of reference and laws of 
limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act. 
However, t~e policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale 
claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed 
inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay
F 
as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the 
entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary 
also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely 
to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid 
dislocation of an industry. 
G 
43) On the application of the aforesaid principle to the 
facts of the present case, we are of the view that High Court 
correctly decided the issue holding that the reference at such 
a belated stage i.e. after fourteen years of termination without H

924 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 9 S.C.R 
A any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate 
.Government had not jurisdiction or power to make reference 
of a non-existing dispute. 
44) This special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed. 
B 
Nidhi Jain 
SLP dismissed.