AJAY ARJUN SINGH versus SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 151, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
j 
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 151 
AJAY ARJUN SINGH 
v. 
SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS 
(Civil Appeal No. 8254of2016) 
AUGUST 23, 2016 
(J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABBAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.) 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. VL r. 16 - Striking out 
pleadings - Application u/Or. VJ, r. 16 - For striking out certain 
pleadings in election petition - Dismissed - On appeal, held: The 
purpose of the Rule is to ensure that parties to a legal proceeding 
are entitled to ex debito justitiae to have the case against them 
presented in an intelligible form - The court should exercise the 
power under the'Rule with circumspection and on the basis of 
rational principle - The averments in the election petition are 
presumed to be }actually correct until proved otherwise - In the 
present· cases, the applicant did not disclose on which grounds 
contemplated u/Or. VL r. 16, various pleadings were required to be 
struck out - He rather gave explanalion with respect to each 
allegation - The moment the court is a~ked to examine the defence 
of returned candidate in an election petition, the petition can neither 
be dismissed for want of cause of action nor any part of the pleading 
cqn be struck out u/Or. VL r. 16 - None of the pleadings except the 
pleading contained in Paragraph 14M of the election petition can 
be said to be irrelevant in the -context of the prayer in the election 
petition - Therefore, only Paragraph 14M of the election petition is 
struck out - Representation of the People Act, 195I: '
Representation of the People Act, 1951 - s. 77, Explanations 
1 and 2 -
Expenditures in connection with election - Exempted 
expenditure -
Held: While computing the expenditure in election, 
the expenditure incurred by Star Campaigner is exempted, but such 
exemption is limited only on account of travel for propagating the 
programme of the political party and that too when the travel 
expenditure is incurred by star campaigner himself - Other 
expenditures are not exempted. · 
Practice and Procedure - Preliminary objections - In Election 
petition - When to be raised- Held: Preliminary objections in election 
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petition, if are more than one, are to be taken at the earliest point of 
time and in one go - Such course would avoid delay in adjudication 
of the election petition which are mandated to be decided within a 
period of six months - Later of such successive petitions must be 
dismissed by High Courts in limine on that count alone - Election 
Laws - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. Vl r. 16 and Or. Vil, 
r. II. 
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. Order VI Rule 16 of CPC authorises the court to 
order that any matter in any pleading before it be struck out on 
the grounds specified under clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. Each 
one of them is a distinct ground. Clause (a) authorises the court 
to strike out the pleadings which may be (i) unnecessary, (ii) 
scandalous, (iii) frivolous, (iv) vexatious. If a pleading or part of 
it is to be struck out on the ground that it is unnecessary, the test 
to be applied is whether the allegation contained in that pleading 
is relevant and essential to grant the relief sought. 
Allegations 
which are unconnected with the relief sought in the proceeding 
fall under this category. 
Similarly, if a pleading is to be struck 
out on the ground that it is scandalous, the court must first record 
its satisfaction that the pleading is scandalous in the legal sense 
and then enquire whether such scandalous allegation is called 
for or necessary, having regard to
the nature of the relief sought 
in the proceeding. The authority of the court under clause (c) is 
much wider. Obviously, such authority must be exercised with 
circumspection and on the basis of some rational principles. The 
very purpose of the Rule is to ensure that parties to a legal 
proceeding are entitled ex debito justitiae to have the case against 
them presented in an intelligible form so that they may not be 
embarrassed in meeting the case. [Paras 5 and 6)(157-D, F-G;158-
A-C) 
2.1 The allegations regarding the commission of corrupt 
practices falling under Section 123(1) of Representation of the 
People Act, 1951 are to be found in para 19 of the election petition. 
The allegations are not disputed by the appellant. He chose to 
explain his conduct. Whether the explanation is factually correct 
and, if so, what are the legal implications of the said explanation 
are matters to be decided in trial of the election petition. If the
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS 
explanation is either found to be untrue or legally unacceptable, 
the allegation made in para 19 of the election petition is sufficient 
to hold that the appellant is guilty of the corrupt practice under s. 
123(1). Therefore, there is no error in the order of the High Court 
in refusing to strike off the pleadings in para 19 of the election 
petition. [Paras 12 and 13) (161-A, D-E; 162-A] 
3.1 Various sub-paragraphs of paragraph 14 and paragraphs 
15, 16 and 17 of the election petition indicate that the excess 
expenditure have been incurred by the appellant and the same 
falls under three heads. The appellant furnished inaccurate 
information to the District Election Officer: (i) regarding the 
quantity and quality of the material used in the campaign by him; 
(ii) regarding the cost of the various items so used by giving 
false information based on deliberate under-valuation of the 
material actually used, and (iii) Total non-disclosure of certain 
expenditure incurred by him for (a) organizing a meeting of one 
of the top functionaries of the political party at the election, and 
(b) the use of a helicopter by him during the relevant period. 
[Para 14][162-B-D] 
3.2 The allegations and counter allegations regarding the 
quantity and quality of the material used by the appellant during 
the course of his election campaign and value of such material 
are pure questions of fact which are required to be established 
on
evidence. The law in this regard is that until proved otherwise, 
the allegations in the election petition must be presumed to be 
true. The burden of establishing the truth of all those allegations 
is essentially on the respondent/election petitioner. The values 
fixed by the Election Commission or its functionaries are not 
conclusive. There is no statutory basis for such an exercise. The 
valuation made by the Election Commission obviously would be 
based on the samples supplied by the candidates. There can never 
be any presumption that the candidates used the same quality of 
material in the actual process of campaigning. The High Court 
rightly rejected the application of the appellant on this count. 
[Paras 15 and 18][162-E-F; 164-G-H; 165-A] 
3.3 Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 
obligates every candidate in an election to keep a separate current 
account of all expenditures in connection with the election 
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between the dates on which such a candidate has been nominated 
and the date of the declaration of result of that election. However, -
clause (a) of explanation 1 to Section 77 of the Act declares "the 
expenditure incurred by leaders of a political party on account of 
travel by air or by any other means of transport for propagating 
programme of the political party" shall not form part of the 
expenditure of the candidate. The expression "leaders of political 
party" occurring in explanation 1 is itself explained in explanation 
2 to the said Section. It can be seen from explanation 2, to qualify 
to be called 'a leader of the political party' for the purpose of 
such an election under Section 77, the name of such a person is 
communicated to the Election Commission and the Chief Electoral 
Officer of th.e State by the concerned political party. Persons 
whose names have been so communicated to the Election 
Commission popularly came to be called 'star campaigners' in 
connection with an election. [Paras 25, 26, 27 and 28][168-C-D; 
D . 169-B-C) 
3.4 However, the entire expenditure incurred (on 
whatsoever count) by such star campaigners or on behalf of such 
star campaigners is not exempted under Section 77 for the 
purpose of determining the total expenditure incurred by any 
candidate in an election. The language of explanation 1 to Section 
E 
77 makes it clear that only the expenditure incurred by the star
campaigner that too on account of travel for propagating the 
program~e of the political party is ex<;luded for the purpose of 
computing the expenditure incurred by the candidate. In other 
words, the expenditure incurred in connection with arrangements 
F 
like erection of pandals etc. for a meeting of a star campaigner 
does not form part of the exempted expenditure under explanation 
1. Secondly, under explanation 2, the star campaigners' travel 
expenditure must have been incurred by the star campaigner 
himself. It is obvious from the opening clause of explanation 1 
"the expendit-ute incurred by leaders of a political party". If such 
G 
expenditure is incurred by any person other than the star 
campaigner, different considerations would arise. [Para 29)[169-
D-F] 
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3.5 The specific pleading in the election petition at 
paragraph 14M is that the appellant used the helicopter on many
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS 
155 
occasions during the relevant period outside his constituency. 
The admitted fact is that the appellant was one of the star 
campaigners for the said election for the State of Madhya Pradesh. 
Therefore, he was required to campaign for his political party, 
not only in his constituency but also in other constituencies of 
the _State. In the absence of any allegation that the appellant 
used the helicopter for traveling within his constituency for the 
purpose of campaigning, the expenditure incurred on that account, 
cannot be included in the election expenditure of the appellant. 
Therefore, paragraph 14M of the election petition is liable to be 
struck off and is, accordingly, struck off. [Para 31)(170-D-E; 171-
A] 
3.6 The application i.e. filed by the appellant u/Or. VI Rule 
16 CPC does not disclose on which one of the grounds 
contemplated under Order VI Rule 16, the various paragraphs 
of the election petition are required to be struck out. On the 
other hand, the appellant gave an elaborate explanation with 
respect to each of the allegations contained in the various 
paragraphs of the election petition which are prayed to be struck 
out. 
The moment court is asked to examine the defence of the 
returned candidate in an election petition, the election petition 
can neither be dismissed for want of cause of action nor any part 
of the pleading can be struck out under Order VI Rule 16. In the 
absence of the
availability of any one of the grounds mentioned 
in Order VI Rule 16, CPC striking out is impermissible. [Para 
30)(169-G-H; 170-A) 
3. 7 The averments contained in the election petition at this 
stage must be presumed to be factually correct. The only possible 
scrutiny of such statement is whether those allegations are 
relevant in the context of the relief sought in the election petition. 
None of the allegations contained in the various sub paragraphs 
of paragraph 14, except paragraph 14M can be said to be 
irrelevant in the context of the prayer in the election petition. 
[Para 30][170-B-C] 
4. The procedure adopted by the appellant in initially filing 
a petition under Order VII Rule 11 praying that the election 
petition be dismissed and filing the instant application after a long 
gap is to be deprecated. Preliminary objections, if any, (in cases 
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where there is more than one) in an election petition are to be 
taken at the earliest point of time and in one go. 
The practice 
snch as the one adopted by the appellant only tends to delay the 
adjudication of the election petition which are mandated by the 
Parliament to be decided within a period of six months. The 
later of such successive petitions must be dismissed by High 
Courts ill limille on that count alone. [Para 32Jl l 71-A-C] 
Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and Another Vs. Brijlal Nandlal 
Biya11i and Ors. AIR 1965 SC 610 : 1964 SCR 642; 
Ponnala Lakshmaiah Vs. Kommuri Pratap Reddy and 
Ors. (2012) 7 SCC 788 : 2012 (6) SCR 851; Liverpool 
& London SP. and I Assn. Ltd. VI·. M V. Sea Success I 
(2004) 9 SCC 512 : 2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 851 - relied 
on. 
GoldinR J".~. Wharton Salt Works (1876) 1 Q B D 374 -
referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
1964 SCR 642 
relied on 
Para 7 
2012 (6) SCR 851 
relied on 
Para 7 
2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 851 
relied on 
Para 8 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8254 
of2016. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.11.2014 of the High Court 
of Madhya Pradesh Principal Seat at Jabalpur in I. A. No. 12911 of 
2014 in Election Petition No. I of2014. 
Salman Khurshid. Sr. Adv., Vikramaditya Singh. Navin Prakash, 
Ms. Mee1L1 Singh. Ms. Sakshi Kotiyal, Alishn Panda. Advs. for the 
Appellant. 
Naman Nagrath. Sr. Adv .. Praknsh Upadhyay, Vikas Upadhyay. 
Niha Gaur, Kaustubh
Anshuraj, Advs. for the Respondems. 
Mahendra Bhaiya Dixit, Respondent-in-person. 
The Judgment of the Court wns delivered by 
ClrnLAMESWAR, .J. I. Leave granted. 
:?.. Aggrieved by the Order dated 17.11.2014 of the order of the 
High Court of Madhya Prndesh in I.A. No. 12911 of:?.014 in Election 
Petition No. I of2014. the unsuccessful applicant therein preferred the
I 
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
instant appeal. 
3. The appellant herein is the returned candidate from 76-Churhat 
Assembly constituency of the State of Madhya Pradesh in the General 
Elections held in the year2013. He was a candidate sponsored by the 
Indian National Congress Party and won by margin of 19,356 votes. 
Challenging the legality of the election of the appellant, the first respondent 
herein, one of the other candidates at the said election, filed Election 
Petition No. I of2014. 
4. The appellant herein filed I.A. No.129 l l of2014 invoking Order 
VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) praying various 
paragraphs of the election petition be struck oft' on the ground that the 
allegations contained in those paragraphs are frivolous and vexatious 
etc. By the order impugned in this appeal, the said I.A. was dismissed. 
Hence the instant appeal. 
· 
s: Before we examine the various questions that arise in this 
appeal, we think it profitable to examine the scheme of Order VI, Rule 
16. 
. "16. Striking out pleadings - The Court may at any stage of 
· the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in 
any pleading-
: (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, 
or 
(b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial 
: of the suit, or 
· (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court." 
It authorises the cou1t to order that any matter in any
pleading 
before it be struck out on the grounds specified under clauses (a), (b) 
and (c). Each one of them is a distinct ground. For example, clause (a) 
authorises the court to strike but the pleadings which may be (i) 
unnecessary, (ii) scandalous, (iii) frivolous, (iv) vexatious. If a pleading 
or part of it is to be struck out on the ground that it is unnecessary, the 
test to be applied is whether the allegation contained in that pleading is 
relevant and essential to grant the relief sought. Allegations which are 
unconnecied with the relief sought in the proceeding fall under this 
1 Para 25 .. That. thi.: <.1nswerin£, respondent. thcrcfon:. resp~ctfully submi{s tl1at 
paragraphs 14(A). 14(0) from pays241o 29 hi.:ginning fro1n ··in 1hi.: Shado\\ 
Expense Register ... Ann<AAre P/l~f". 14{f,), J4(F). 14(G) (i). 14{H) (i). 14(1). 
f41LJ.14{1vl). 14iNJ. ft(O). paral?[<lphs 15to 17 and 19 bestru<k <>ff from Jhc 
pleading; ao;. t!lc. same are. irtelevan~ uMecessary. frivolQUs and ve:;xatious. 
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categoiy. Similarly, if a pleading is to be struck out on the ground that 
it is scandalous, the court must first record its satisfaction that the 
pleading is scandalous in the legal sense and then enquire whether such 
scandalous allegation is called for or necessaiy having regard to the 
nature of the relief sought in the proceeding. The authority of the court 
under clause ( c) is much wider. Obviously, such -authority must be 
exercised with circumspection and on the basis of some rational principles. 
6. The veiy purpose of the Rule is to ensure that parties to a legal 
proceeding are eqtitled ex debito justitia to have the case against them 
presented in an intelligible form so that they may not be embarrassed in 
meeting the case: 
· 
7. In the context of the application of Order VI Rule 16, CPC to 
the election petition, this Court in Bliikaji Kesliao Joslti anciAnotlter 
Vs. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and Others, AIR 1965 SC 610 held that a 
court examining an election petition may order striking out of charges 
which are vague' 
8. In Ponnala Laksl1mai<tli Vs. Kommuri Pratap Reddy and 
Otliers (2012) 7 SCC 788, this Court considered the scope of an 
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Such an application was 
filed by the returned candidate praying that the election petition be 
dismissed for non-disclosure of any cause of action. This Court opined 
that for the purpose of determining such an
application, the averments in 
the election petition must be taken to be factually correct and thereafter 
examine whether such averments furnish the cause of action for granting 
the relief to the petitioner. Such a conclusion was recorded on the basis 
of the law laid down in an earlier judgment of this Court'. We are of the 
: Golding Vs. Wharton Salt Works, (1876) 1 QB D 374 
' it should have ordered a striking out of such of the charges which remained 
vague and called upon the petitioners to substantiate the allegations in respect of 
those which were reasonably specific. 
' Liverpool & London S.P. and l Assn. Ltd. Vs. M. V. Sea Success l, (2004) 9 SCC 
512, 
Para 8.'" To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Liverpool & London S.P. 
and I Assn. Ltd. Vs. M. V. Sea Success I where this Court held that the disclosure of 
a cause of action in the plaint is a questfon of fact and the answer to that question 
must be found only from the reading of the plaint itself. The court trying a suit or 
an election petition, as the position is in the present case. shall while examining 
whether the plaint or the petition discloses a cause of action, to assume that the 
averments made in the plaint or the petition are factually correct. 
It is only if 
despite the averments being taken as factually correct, the court finds no cause of
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TTWARI & OTHERS 
rcHELAMESWAR, J.l 
opinion the same principles oflaw are applicable even while adjudicating 
the application under Order VI Rule 16. 
' 9. In the light of the above principles oflaw, we proceed to examine 
the case on hand. The election of the appellant is challenged on the 
ground of commission of various corrupt practices falling under Section 
123(1), 123(3)and 123(6)oftheRepresentationofthePeopleAct, 1951 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act"): 
"123. Corrupt practices.-The following shall be deemed to 
be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act:-
(1) "Bribery", that is to say-
( A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by 
any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election 
agent of any gratification, to any person whomsoever, with the 
object, directly or indirectly of inducing-
( a) a person to stand or not to stand as; or to withdraw or not 
to withdraw from being a candidate at an election, or 
(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or 
as a reward to-
( i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having 
withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or 
(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting; 
(8) the receipt of, or agreement to receive, any gratification, 
whether as a motive or a reward-
( a) by a person for standing ornot standing as, or for withdrawing 
or not withdrawing from being, a candidate; or 
(b) by any person
whomsoever for himself or any other person 
for voting or refraining from voting, or inducing or attempting 
to induce any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or any 
action emerging from the averments that it may be justified in rejecting the plaint .... 
Para I 0. Applying the above principles to the case at hand, we do not see any error 
in the order passed by the High Court refusing to dismiss the petition in limine on 
the ground that the same discloses no cause of action. 
The averrnents made in the 
election petition if taken to be factually correct, as they ought to for purposes of 
determining whether a case for exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 has been 
made out, do in our opinion, disclose a cause of action. 
The High Court did not, 
therefore, commit any error much less an error resulting in miscarriage of justice, to 
warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 
136 of the Constitution. 
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candidate to withdraw or not to withdraw his candidature. 
(3) The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person 
with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or 
refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, 
race, caste, community or language or the use of, or appeal to 
religious symbols or the use of, or appeal to, national symbols, 
such as the national flag or the national emblem, for the furtherance 
of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially 
affecting the election of any candidate: 
Provided that no symbol allotted under this Act to a candidate 
shall be deemed to be a religious symbol or a national symbol for 
the purposes of this clause. 
;· 
(6) The incurring or authorizing of expenditure in contravention of 
section 77." 
i.e. bribery, soliciting votes on the ground ofreligion and incurring 
of expenditure in contrav.ention of Section 77 of the Act. 
I 0. The allegations regarding the commission of corrupt practices 
falling under Section 123( I) are to be found in para 19 of the election 
petition. The allegations regarding commission ofcorrupt practices falling 
under Section 123(3) are contained in paragraph 18 of the election petition, 
which is not one of the paragraphs which was prayed to be struck offS. 
11. All the remaining paragraphs which were prayed to be struck 
off, pertain to the allegation of corrupt
practice falling under Section 
123(6). The allegations contained in each one of these paragraphs pertain 
to the expenditure incurred under different heads by the appellant in 
connection with the election campaign6• According to the Respondent 
the total amount of expenditure so incurred by the appellant is iii excess 
of the limit prescribed under Section 77 of the Act. 
' See Footnote I. 
'' That is the admitted case (rightly) even of the appellant at para 3 of the I.A. 
12911 of2014. it is stated, 
.. The entire election petition is based on :-
(a) Under valuation of the items used in the election campaign 
(b) Non disclosure of expenses in respect of certain items alleged to have 
been used in such election"
-
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS 
. fCHELAMESWAR, J.] 
12. The allegations contained in para 197 of the election petition 
are not disputed by the appellant. On the other hand, he chose to explain 
his conduct in para 24 of the I.A. 
"24. The answering respondent hereby respectfully submits 
that an amount of Rs .. 20 lacs is earmarked for expenditure 
by every member of the M.P. Legislative Assembly every 
year in his constituency. A Minister and Leader of 
Opposition are provided Rs. 20 lacs per year for voluntary 
grant. The manner in which this grant is to be distributed is 
the sole discretion of such Minister/Leader of Opposition. 
The Minister/Leader of Opposition gives a list to the 
Secretary of the Vidhan Sabha containing the names of the 
persons and the amount to whom the grant is to be made. 
Accordingly, the drafts are issued to the persons 
concerned as per procedure." 
13. Whether the explanation is factually correct and, if so, what 
are the legal implications of the said explanation are matters to be decided 
in trial of the election petition. If the explanation is either found to be 
untrue or legally unacceptable, the allegation made in para 19 of the 
election petition is sufficient to hold that the Appellant is guilty of the 
corrupt practice under S. 123( I). Therefore, we do not find any error in 
the order of the High Court in refusing to strike off the pleadings in para 
7 19. That during model code of conduct, to bribe voters, INC
Candidate/respondent 
no.I through his representative Shri Bharat Singh. (Vidhayak Pratinidhi) has 
distributed large quantity of demand drafts/cheques issued by different account 
maintained at T.T. Nagar Bhopal. The petitioner came across with one of the 
said cheques/demand draft issued in favour of one Charka Kol who is voter from 
polling station Dhanaha. E\'en during election the dratis \\"ere distributed by 
Bharat Singh as I ldhayak pratinidhi. since INC Candidate Respondent No. I is 
Member of Legislati\'e Assembly continuously and known as Vidhayak. The 
Election agent of petitioner has made a complaint to observer in this regard. The 
copy of complaint made to observer by election Agent is being filed herewith a~ 
Annexure P-53. HoweYer e\'en then the same corrupt practice continued b) 
representative of INC Candidate/Respondent no.I representative Shri Bharat Singh 
and anti dated cheques/Demand Drafts were given to \'Oters to influence their 
votes. Another such drat! drawn in favour of Rajkumari Saket has been brought 
to the notice of petitioner who was not able to encash it as she don't have any 
account. When the petitioner enquired from her she disclosed that the same has 
been given to her by Shri Bharat Singh on 12/ I I /2013 with a request that "Rah ul 
Bhaiya .. has arranged the fund for her employment and ha\'e requested for vote 
of her and her family member. The copy of demand drall is being filed herewith 
as Annexure P-54. 
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A 
19 of the election petition. 
14. We now examine the validity of the impugned order insofar as 
it pertains to the incurring of expenditure (by the appellant herein) beyond 
the permissible limits prescribed by law. An analysis of the allegations 
contained in various sub-paragraphs of paragraph 14 and in paragraphs 
B 
15, 16 and 17 of the election petition indicates thatthe excess expenditure 
said to have been incurred by the appellant falls under three heads. 
c 
Furnishing of inaccurate information8 to the District Election 
Officer: 
(i) regarding the quantity and quality of the material used in the 
campaign by the appellant herein, 
(ii) regarding the cost of the various items so used by the returned 
candidate by giving false information based on deliberate under-valuation 
of the material actually used by the appe II ant, 
D 
(iii) Total non disclosure of certain expenditure incurred by the 
· appellant for (a) organizing a meeting of one of the top functionaries of 
the political party (Shri Rahul Gandhi) which sponsored the appellant at 
the election, and (b) the use of a helicopter by the appellant during the 
relevant period. 
E 
F 
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15. The allegations and counter allegations regarding the quantity 
and quality of the material used by the appellant during the course of his 
election campaign and value of such material are pure questions of fact 
which are required to be established on evidence. 
The law in
this 
regard as already noticed is that until proved otherwise the allegations in 
the election petition must be presumed to be true. 
The burden of 
establishing the truth of all those allegations is essentially on the 
respondent/election petitioner. We have meticulously gone through the 
various ailegations in this regard contained in various sub-paragraphs of 
·paragraph 14 and we are of the opinjon that there is nothing which 
warrants striking out of all those pleadings invoking Order VI Rule 16 
' An obligation flowing from Section 78 of the RP Act. 1951 
"Section 78. Lodging of account with the district election officer.-Every 
contesting candidate at an election shall, within thirty days from the date of 
election of the returned candidate or, if there are more than one returned 
candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later 
of those two dates, lodge with the district election officer an account of his 
election e·xpenses which shall be a true copy of the account kept by him or 
by his election agent under section 77."
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS 
fCHELAMESWAR, J.l 
CPC. Each of the paragraphs contains allegations that the appellant 
incurred some expenditure (specified) under some head or the other. 
The sum total of such amount would exceed the permissible limits of 
expenditure under Section 77 of the Act. 
16. The only question which deserves our attention in this regard 
is that it .is the case of the appellant that under the procedure that is 
being followed by the Election Commission a rate list has been finalized 
with respect to each one of the items to be utilized in the campaign by 
any one of the candidates at an election. The appellant's declaration of 
his expenditure with regard to the various items used during the process 
of campaign is consistent with such determination made by the Election 
Commission. Therefore there cannot be any further enquiry regarding 
the correctness of the declaration made by him about the expenditure 
incurred in connection with those materials. The appellant's pleading in 
this regard in I.A. is as follows:-
"5. That, under Rule 90 of Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 
the maximum election expenses to be incurred by a 
candidate in respect of M.P. State Legislative Assembly 
election has been fixed at Rs. 16 lacs. In order to have a 
check over the limit of election expenses the Collector/ 
District Election Officer prepared a rate list of various items 
which were sought to be used in the election campaign by 
appointing a
Sub Committee of three responsible officers. 
The Committee pursuant thereto ascertained the rates of . 
such material from open market in consultation with the 
representatives of major political parties and thereafter 
prepared a final rate list of various items used in the election. 
The answering respondent is filing copy of proceedings of 
the Collector/District Election Officer fixing the rates of 
different items used in the election as Document No. 1. 
The petitioner has filed a copy of rate list as Annexure-P-
3. The publication of rate list preceded the proceedings held 
in that behalf by the_ District Election Officer, which the 
answering respondent has now filed as Document No. I. 
The rate list so prepared by the Election Officer has not 
been disputed by any of the political party or their 
representatives. 
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6. That, certain items which could not find place in the rate 
list so prepared by the Collector have since been included 
in the 'shadow register' of each candidate prepared by the 
Election Expense Observers. Such rate list and the shadow 
register are final and conClusive. The rate list and the 
'shadow register' are not open to challenge and the valuation 
in respect of such items cannot be reassessed and revalued 
by this Court in an election process." 
******** 
******** 
******* 
9. That, the present election petition will not be maintainable 
in respect of expenses incurred by the answering respondent 
which have been accepted by the District Election Officer 
(for short, 'DEO') inasmuch as this Court will not sit over 
rate list or shadow register to give its own valuation of the 
election material, as the same would be beyond the scope 
of trial of election petition under the Representation of 
People Act of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the "1951 
Act"). 
17. On the other hand, it is the case of the respondent that the 
determination made by the Election Commission is not conclusive of the 
prices of the material used by any candidate at the election. Apart from 
that, the actual quantity of the campaign material used by any candidate 
at an election and its cost is always a question of fact. After an election 
is concluded, it is always open to any election petitioner to demonstrate 
in an
election petition that the campaign material used by the returned 
candidate is more expensive than what was determined by the Election 
Commission, after all the value of the material qepends both upon the 
quality and quantity of the material used. All these are questions of fact 
which are required to be examined and determined by the court in an 
election petition. 
18. We accept the submission of the election petitioner. The values 
fixed by the Election Commission or its functionaries are not conclusive. 
There is no statutory basis for such an exercise. The valuation made by 
the Election Commission obviously would be based on the samples supplied 
by the candidates. There can never be any presumption that the 
candidates used the same quality of material in the actual process of 
campaigning. Apart from that the quantity and the quality of the material
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS 
rcHELAMESWAR, J.l 
used in the election campaign and the real cost of the material actually 
used by any candidate are always questions of fact, which are required 
to be established in evidence. We are of the opinion that the High Court 
rightly rejected the application of the appellant on this count. 
19. The only major issue which requires an examination is 
regarding the third head mentioned (Para 14) above. It is once again 
required to be divided into two sub-headings, 
(a) The expenditure allegedly incurred in connection with the public 
meeting of Shri Rahul Gandhi at the District Headquarters, Sidhi 
on 20'h November, 2013. The allegations in the regard are to be 
found in para I 4(L) of the election petition. 
The substance of the allegation is that though the meeting was 
held at Sidhi which is beyond the territorial limits of Churhat 
Constituency (from which the parties herein contested), the 
appellant was not only present at such meeting but also shared 
the dais with Shri Rahul Gandhi (Vice-Chairman of the Indian 
National Congress). The appellant mobilized lot of voters from 
his constituency and hired vehicles for that purpose incurring 
expenditure. The appellant also incurred expenditure in connection 
with the erection of the pandals, security arrangement etc. 
According to the respondent, suc_h expenditure would be 
Rs.13,88,073/- and the same is required to be added to .the election 
expenditure of the
appellant. 
(b) Thatthe appellant between 4.11.2013 to 19.11.20139 traveled 
on 8 occasions by chartered flights between Bhopal to' Sidhi. 
According to the respondent, on this count alone the appellant 
incurred an expenditure ofRs.40 lakhs. The details of such flights 
and the allegations are to be found at para 14(M) of the election 
petition. 
20. The response of the appellant as disclosed by IANo.12911 of 
2014 with regard to the abovementioned two allegations is found at 
paragraph nos.19 and 20. It can be seen therefrom that the appellant 
does not dispute thatthere was a public meeting in the grounds of San jay 
Gandhi College at Sidhi on 20.11.2013 attended by Shri Rahul Gandhi. 
According to the appellant, the venue of the meeting is within the 
9 Periods relevant for the purpose of deciding the expenditure incurred under 
Section 77. 
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territorial limits of 77 Sidhi Assembly Constituency but not within the 
territory of 76 - Churhat Assembly Constituency. The meeting was 
organized by one Shri Kamleshwar Dwivedi who was the candidate of. 
the Indian National Congress Party contesting from the said constituency. 
The said Kamleshwar Dwivedi lodged the account under Section 78 of 
the Act disclosing the details of the expenditure incurred by him for 
conducting the aforesaid meeting which was duly accepted by the 
Returning Officer of77 - Sidhi Assembly Constituency. It is the specific 
plea of the appellant that he was present in the said meeting because he 
was also one of the "star campaigners" forthe Indian National Congress 
Party in the said election. According to the appellant, the appellant is 
under no legal obligation to account for the expenditure incurred for 
organizing the said meeting10• 
21. It is significant to notice that there is no specific denial by the 
appellant of the allegation in the election petition that the appellant herein 
had hired a large number of-vehicles 11 to facilitate voters from his 
constituency to attend the said public meeting. IA No.12911 of2014 is 
absolutely silent regarding that allegation. The appellant does not even 
deny the allegation. We must not be understood to be holding that ifthe 
appellant had denied the allegation, such denial would suffice to strike 
out of the pleadings. 
22.
Coming to the second limb of that head regarding the cost 
incurred for the construction of pandals or barricades in connection with 
the abovementioned meeting of Shri Rahul Gandhi, the stand taken by 
the appellant in the abovementioned IA is that the said meeting was held 
' 0 If expenses of such meeting have already been shown by the candidate in whose 
constituency the meeting was held, it \Vas not necessary or 9bligatory upon the 
answering respondent to account for the expenses of such meeting which had not 
'taken place in his Constituency. [See: IA No.12911 of2014. para 19) 
11 The perusal of permission application which was obtained by INC for the said 
meeting, would make it clear that presence of first respondent was the individual act 
of the first respondent, his presence was as a candidate of76 Churhat of INC, a large 
numbers of vehicle were illegally hired by INC Candidate/respondent no. I in order 
to facilitate voters from his constituency 76-Churahat to attend the said public meeting. 
There are around 44 buses and number of taxi permit vehicle along with private vehicle 
were used for transportation of voters to attend said public meeting. The posters 
used there have photo/picture of respondent no. I, therefore, the entire expenditure 
of the said meeting would be included in the expenditure of first respondent, as no-
other candidate of any other adjoining constituencies shared the dais with Mr. Rahul 
Gandhi. (See: Para 14-L of the Election Petition)
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TlWARI & OTHERS 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
beyond the territorial limit of the assembly constituency from which the 
appellant contested. The Indian National Congress Party's candidate 
contesting from Sidhi constituency had declared the expenditure incurred 
in connection with the said meeting. The appellant is under no legal 
obligation to make any declaration of the expenditure incurred by him in 
connection with the said meeting. 
23. It may be noted that the appel !ant does not make any categoric 
assertion that he did not incur any expenditure in connection with the 
said meeting. 
24. Coming to the use of the Helicopter, once again it is not a case 
of the appellant that he did not use the helicopter as alleged by the 
respondent - election petitioner. His defence is that he is one of the 
'star campaigners' contemplated under Section 77 of the Act. The 
expenditure was incurred by him for the use of the Helicopter as a 'star 
campaigner'. In that capacity he had to travel throughout the State 
holding public meetings propagating programme of the Indian National 
Congress Party. The expenditure for the use of the helicopter was 
-"borne by the Indian National Congress" and, therefore, outside the 
purview of the election expenditure of the appellant. The relevant portion 
of the pleading at para 20 of the IA No.12911 of2014 reads as follows: 
"In this view of the mater, the expenses so incurred in 
the use of helicopter has since been borne by
the 
Indian National Congress, New Delhi and the same is _ 
outside the purview of election expense so far as the 
answering respondent is concerned by virtue of Explanation 
I (a) to Section 77 referred to above. It is, however further 
added that the answering respondent besides being a star 
campaigner was also a leader of opposition in the last M.P. 
State Legislative Assembly. The answering respondent is 
otherwise a veteran leader of the Indian National Congress 
Party and on account of his capacity as such, he was 
appointed as Star Campaignenmd has traveled throughout 
the State, holding public meetings, propagating programme 
of the Indian National Congress Party. The expenditure so 
incurred in use of helicopter in propagating the programme 
of the party throughout the State cannot be included in the 
election expense of the answering respondent in respect of 
his election from 76, Churhut Vidhan Sabha Constituency. 
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It is further made clear that he never used helicopter for 
his election campaign in 76, Churhut Vidhan Sabha 
Constituency. Thus, in view of Explanation 1 (a) to Section 
77 of the 1951 Act, the entire pleadings contained in 
paragraph l 4(M) are liable to be struck off being absolutely 
vexatious and frivolous providing no cause of action for 
trial of election petition." 
(emphasis supplied) 
25. Section 77'" of the Act obligates every candidate in an election 
to keep a separate current account of all expenditures in connection 
with the election between the dates on which such a candidate has been 
nominated and the date of the declaration of result of that election. 
However, clause (a) of explanation (I) to Section 77 of the Act declares 
"the expenditure incurred by leaders of a political party on account of 
travel by air or by any other means of transport for propagating programme 
of the political party" shall not form part of the expenditure of the 
candidate. 
26. The expression "leaders of political party" occurring in 
explanation I is itself explained in explanation 2 to the said Section. 
E 
"Explanation 2.-For the purpose of clause (a) of 
Explanation I, the expression "leaders ofa political party", 
in respect of any election, means,-
(i) where such political party is a recognised political party, 
such persons not exceeding forty in number, and 
F 
(ii) where such political party is other than a
recognised 
political party, such persons not exceeding twenty in 
number, 
whose names have been communicated to the Election 
Commission and the Chief Electoral Officers of the States 
G 
by the political party to be leaders for the purposes of such 
election, within a period of seven days from the date of the 
12 Section 77. Account of election expenses and maximum thereof.-( 1) Every 
candidate at an election shall, either by himself or by his election agent, keep a separate 
and correct account of all expenditure in connection with the election incurred or 
authorized by him or by his election agent between the date on which he has been 
H 
nominated and the date of declaration of the result thereof, both dates inclusive.
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS 
rcHELAMESWAR, J.] 
notification for such election published in the Gazette of 
India or Official Gazette of the State, as the case may be, 
under this Act." 
27. It can be seen from explanation 2, to qualify to be called 'a 
leader of the political party' for the purpose of such an election under 
Section 77, the name of such a person is communicated to the Election 
Commission and the Chief Electoral Officer of the State by the concerned 
political party. Such a communicat'ion is required to be made within a 
period of 7 days from the notification of such election published in the 
gazette of India etc. 
28. Persons whose names have been so communicated to the 
Election Commission popularly came to be called 'star campaigners' in 
connection with an election. It is the admitted case of the parties before 
us that both Shri Rahul Gandhi and the appellant are star campaigners/ 
leaders of the Indian National Congress Party for the election in question. 
29. However, the entire expenditure incurred (on whatsoever 
count) by such star campaigners or on behalf of such star campaigners 
is not exempted under Section 77 for the purpose of determining the 
total expenditure incurred by any candidate in an election. The language 
of explanation I to Section 77 makes it clear that only the expenditure 
incurred by the star campaigner that too on account of travel for 
propagating the programme of the political party is excluded for the
purpose of computing the expenditure incurred by the candidate. In 
other words, the expenditure incurred in connection with arrangements 
like erection of pan dais etc. for a meeting of a star campaigner does not 
form part of the exempted expenditure under explanation 1. Secondly, 
under explanation II, the star campaigners' travel expenditure must have 
been incurred by the star campaigner himself. It is obvious from the 
opening clause of explanation 1 "the expenditure incurred by leaders of 
a political party". If such expenditure is incurred by any person other 
than the star campaigner, different considerations would arise. 
30. The application i.e. IA No. 12911 of2014 does not disclose on 
which one of the grounds contemplated under Order VI Rule 16, the 
various paragraphs of the election petition are required to be struck out. 
On the other hand, the appellant gave an elaborate explanation with 
respect to each of the allegations contained in the various paragraphs of 
the election petition which are prayed to be stru~k out. The moment 
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court is asked to examine the defence of the returned candidate in an 
election petition, the election petition can neither be dismissed for want 
of cause of action nor any part of the pleading can be struck out under 
Order VI Rule 16. In the absence of the availability of any one of the 
grounds mentioned in Order VI Rule 16, CPC striking out is impermissible. 
As observed by this Court in the context of the application under Order 
VU Rule 11, the averments contained in the election petition at this stage 
must be presumed to be factually correct. The only possible scrutiny of 
such statement is whether those allegations are relevant in the context 
of the relief sought in the election petition. None of the allegations 
contained in the various sub paragraphs of paragraph 14, except 
paragraph l 4M, can be said to be irrelevant in the context of the prayer 
in the election petition. 
31. The specific pleading in the election petition at paragraph 14M 
is that the appellant herein used the helicopter on many occasions during 
the relevant period only between Bhopal and Sidhi, both of which are 
outside the constituency of the appellant 13 • The admitted fact is that the 
appellant was one of the star campaigners for the said election for the 
State of Madhya Pradesh. Therefore, he was required to campaign for 
his political party, not only in his constituency but also in other 
constituencies of the
State. In the absence of any allegation that the 
appellant used the helicopter for traveling within 76-Churahat constituency 
for the purpose of campaigning, the expenditure incurred on that account, 
in our opinion, cannot be included in, the election expenditure of the 
13 '"M ........ , . During election between 4/ I I /2013 to 1911112013 there were eight 
charter flights between Bhopal to Sidhi/Churhat which respondent no. I has used these 
flights to come from his Kerwa Kothi Bhopal to assembly constituency 76-Churahat 
for his election campaign. In fact the firsnespondent on the date of filing of 
nomination has used charter flight to arrive at District Head Quarter at' Sidhi and 
thereafter proceeded to Churahat. The details are as under: 
i) 
4/11/2013 
(Panwar) Sidhi to Bhopal 
ii) 
05/11/2013 
Bhopal to Sidhi (Panwar) 
iii) 
08/11/2013 
Bhopal to Sidhi (Pamrnr) 
iv) 
1111112013 
Bhopal to Sidhi (Panwar) 
v) 
12/11/2013 
Sidhi (Panwar) to Bhopal 
vi) 
16/1112013 
Bhopal to Sidhi (Panwar) 
vii) 
18/1112013 
Bhopal to Sidhi (Panwar) 
viii) 
19/11/2013-
Sidhi (Panwar) to Bhopal 
The estimated cost of these charter flight would be Rs.40,00,000/- (Forty Lac) (@ 
Rs.Five Lakh per flight). True copy of permission of these flights are cumulatively 
filed as Annexure P-42.
AJAY ARJUN SINGH v. SHARADENDU TIWARI & OTHERS 
171 
[CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
appellant. Therefore, paragraph 14M of the election petition is liably to 
A 
be struck off and is, accordingly, struck off. 
32. Before parting with this case, we would like to place on record 
that the procedure adopted by the appellant in initially filing a petition. 
under Order VII Rule 11 petition 14, praying that the election petition be 
dismissed and filing the instant application after a long gap'; is to be 
B 
deprecated. 
Preliminary objections, if any, (in cases where there is 
more than one) in an election petition are to be taken at the earliest point 
of time and in one go. 
The practice such as the one adopted by the 
appellant only tends to delay the adjudication of the election petition 
which are mandated 16 by the Parliament to be decided within a period of c 
six months. We declare that the later of such successive petitions must . 
be dismissed by High Courts in limine on that count alone. 
33. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed striking out only 
paragraph l~M of the election petition. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal partly allowed. 
14 Filed on I. 7.2014 
"I.A. No. 12911/2014 in Election Petition No.1/2014 was filed on 11.9.2014 
16 S. 86(7). The Representation of the People Act. 1951 
D