MANIK TANEJA & ANR. versus STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 156, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
A 
B 
[2015) 1 S.C.R. 156 
MANIK TANEJA & ANR. 
V. 
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 2015) 
JANUARY 20, 2015. 
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Quashing 
of criminal proceedings - Permissibility - Comments posed 
c on Traffic Police Facebook page by the appellant against 
respondent-Po/ice Inspector alleging harassment - FIR by 
the Inspector against the appellants ulss 353 and 506 /PC -
Petition for quashing FIR - Dismissed by High Court as 
premature -
On appeal, held: The FIR was liable to be 
0 
quashed as it does not disclose the alleged commission of 
offence - Continuance of the prosecution would amount to 
abuse of process ()f the Court - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 353 
and 506. 
E 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. When a prosecution at the initial stage is 
asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court 
is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, 
prima facie, establish the offence. It is also for the Court 
F to take into consideration any special features which 
appear in a particular case to consider whether it is 
expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the 
prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the 
Court, the chances of ultimate conviction is bleak and no 
G useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a 
criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may quash 
the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary 
stage. [para 9]
[160-G-H; 161-A-B] 
H 
156
MANIK TANEJA & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 157 
ANR. 
State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal 1995 (1) SCR 712 = A 
(1995) 2 sec 449 - relied on 
2. The essential ingredients of the offence under 
Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the 
offence should have assaulted the public servant or used 
8 
criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the 
public servant from discharging his duty as such public 
servant. In the present case, there is absolutely nothing 
on record to show that the appellants either assaulted 
the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the 
C 
second respondent from discharging his official duty. 
Thus, the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 
IPC are not made out. [para 12] [162-B-C-D] 
3. T~e act of the appellants posting a comment on the 
Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal 
D 
intimidation in Section 503 IPC. In the instant case, the 
allegation is that the appellants have abused the 
complainant and obstructed the second respondent from 
discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of 
the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused 
E 
that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what 
he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal 
intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause 
alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit 
to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any 
F 
intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring
in the application of this section. But material has to be 
placed on record to show that the intention is to cause 
alarm to the complainant. From the facts and 
circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no 
G 
intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the 
minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in 
discharge of his duty. [para 15] [163-E, B-D] 
4. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 
Cr.P.C., the court should be extremely cautious to 
H
158 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A interfere with the investigation or trial of a criminal case 
and should not stall the investigation, save except when 
it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR 
does not disclose commission of offence and that 
continuance of the criminal prosecution would amount 
B to abuse of process of the court. In the facts and 
circumstances of the case, it would be unjust to allow the 
process of the court to be continued against the 
appellants and consequently the order of the High Court 
is liable to be set aside. [para 16) [163-F-G; 164-8) 
c 
Case L.aw Reference : 
1995 (1) SCR -712 
relied on 
para 9 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
0 
No. 141 of 2015 . 
. From the Judgment and Order dated 24.04.2014 of the 
. High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Petition No. 
252 of 2014. 
E 
Bharadwaj S. Iyengar, Vikas Upadhyay for the Appellants. 
F 
Joseph Aristotle, Priya Aristotle, M. B. Elakkumaran for the 
Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. Leave granted. 
2. This appeal by Special Leave arises out of the judgment 
dated 24:04.2014 passed by the Karnataka High Court in 
Criminal Petition No.252 of 2014, in and by which, the High 
G Court, while dismissing the petition, held that the petition· is 
premature and the same is filed even before the completion of 
the investigation. 
3. Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as 
H under:- The
appellant No.1 and his wife Sakshi Jawa met with
MANIK TANEJA & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 159 
ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
an accident with an auto rickshaw on 13.06.2013 at about 
A 
10.30 in the morning, while Sakshi Jawa was driving Maruti 
SX4 KA-03-MM-8646. One of the passengers, who was 
travelling by the auto, namely Mrs. Laxmi Ganapati, sustained 
injuries and she was duly admitted in the Santosh Hospital for 
treatment. Sakshi Jawa, the appellant No.2, is said to have paid 
B 
all the hospital expenses of the injured and the matter is said 
to have been amicably settled between the injured and the 
appellants and no FIR was lodged. The Constable, who was 
present at the time of incident, directed the appellants to meet 
Mr. Kasim, Police Inspector, Pulakeshi Nagar Traffic Police 
C 
Station, Bangalore City. The appellants allege that as soon as 
they entered the office of Mr. Kasim, he behaved in a rude 
manner. Further, Mr. Kasim summoned the appellant No.2 to 
produce her driving licence and other documents. As at that 
time no FIR was lodged, the appellant No. 2 questioned the 
0 
Police Inspector as to why she was being asked to produce 
those documents. Mr. Kasim, in reply, is alleged to have 
threatened appellant No.2 by saying that he would drag her to 
court if she continued to argue and she was also thrown out of 
his office. On the orders of Mr. Kasim, his deputy told the 
appellants that they are booking them on the charge of rash and 
negligent driving. 
E 
4. Being aggrieved with the manner with which
they were 
treated, the appellants posted comments on the Bangalore 
Traffic Police Facebook page, accusing Mr. Kasim of his 
F 
misbehaviour and also forwarded an email complaining about 
the harassment meted out to them at the hands of the 
Respondent Police Inspector. The Respondent No.2-Police 
Inspector filed a complaint regarding the posting of the 
comment on the Facebook by the appellants and subsequently 
G 
FIR was registered against the appellants for offences 
punishable under Sections 353 ,and 506 IPC on 14.06.2013. 
5. The appellants filed Criminal Petition No. 252 of 2014 
,.. 
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court seeking to 
H
160 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
_(2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A quash the FIR and the criminal proceedings initiated against 
them on the ground that the complaint is an afterthought. The 
High court vide its Order dated 24.04.2014 dismissed the 
petition stating that the petition was filed at a premature stage. 
The appellants by this special leave are seeking to assail the 
8 correctness of the above Order. 
6. Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that 
posting of a comment on the Facebook page of the traffic 
police does not amount to an offence under Sections 353 and 
506 IPC and the FIR was not sustainable in law. It was 
C submitted that Facebook page of the Bengaluru traffic police 
itself is a public forum meant for citizens to discuss and post 
their grievances and therefore, the comment of the appellants 
posted on the Facebook would not prima facie constitute the 
offence and the High Court erred in not appreciating the matter 
D in proper perspective. 
7. Per Contra, learned counsel for the Respondents 
contended that by posting a comment on the Facebook of the 
traffic police, the appellants obstructed the public duty of the 
E complainant and his staff by publicly making baseless 
allegations. It was submitted that such posting of derogatory 
comments on the Facebook page amounts to 'threatening' and 
'criminal intimidation' within the meaning of Section 506 IPC 
affecting the complainant's reputation and integrity and the High 
F Court rightly declined to quash the
FIR and the impugned order 
warrants no interference. 
8. We have considered the rival contentions and perused 
the impugned order and materials on record. 
G 
9. The legal position is well-settled that when a 
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test 
to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted 
allegations as made, prima facie, establish the offence. It is 
also for the Court to take into consideration any special features 
H which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is
MANIK TANEJA & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 161 
ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution 
A 
to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, the chances of 
ultimate conviction is bleak and no useful purpose is likely to 
be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the 
Court may quash the proceeding even though it may be at a 
preliminary stage. 
B 
10. In State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal [(1995) 2 SCC 
449] considering the scope of Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash 
the FIR/criminal proceedings, this Court has held as under:-
" .... The power of quashing an FIR and criminal proceeding 
C 
should be exercised sparingly by the courts. Indeed, the 
High Court has the extraordinary or inherent power to reach 
out injustice and quash the first information report and 
criminal proceedings, keeping in view the guidelines laid 
down by this Court in various judgments (reference in this 
D 
connection may be made with advantage to State of 
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal {1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) but the 
same has to be done with circumspection. The normal 
process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in a rather 
casual manner .... " 
E 
11. So far as the issue regarding the registration of FIR 
under Section 353 IPC is concerned, it has to be seen whether 
by posting a comment on the Facebook of the traffic police, 
the conviction under that Section could be maintainable. Before 
considering the materials on record, we
may usefully refer to 
Section 353 IPC which reads as follows:-
F 
"353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant 
from discharge of his duty.- Whoever assaults or uses 
criminal force to any person being a public servant in the 
G 
execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent 
to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty 
as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done 
or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful 
discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be 
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162 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
· [2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both." 
12. A reading of the above provision shows that the 
essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are 
8 
that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted 
the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to 
prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty 
as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on 
.record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to 
C commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record 
to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents 
or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from 
discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted 
allegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence under 
Section 353 IPC are not made out. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
13. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence 
of criminal intimidation. "Criminal intimidation" as defined in 
Section 503 IPC is as under:-
"503. Criminal Intimidation.- Whoever threatens another 
with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to 
the person or reputation of any one in whom that person 
is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or 
to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally 
bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is 
legally
entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the 
execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. 
Explanation.- A threat to injure the reputation of any 
deceased person in whom the person threatened is 
interested, is within this section." 
14. A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" 
would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to 
another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, 
H or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom
MANIK TANEJA & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 163 
ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.] 
the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with 
A 
the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must 
be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to 
do an act which he is legally entitled to do. 
15. In the instant case, the allegation is t:1at the appellants 
8 
have abused the complainant and obstructed the second 
respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the 
integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the 
accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether 
what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal 
intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm 
C 
to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any 
work. Mere ·expression of any words without any intention to 
cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application 
of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show 
that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From 
D 
the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there 
was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm 
in the minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in 
discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on the 
Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum 
E 
meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting 
a comment on the Facebook may not attract
ingredients of 
criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC. 
16. Of course, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 
482 Cr.P.C., the court should be extremely cautious to interfere 
with the investigation or trial of a criminal case and should not 
stall the investigation .. save except when it is convinced beyond 
any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission 
of offence and that continuance of the criminal prosecution 
would amount to abuse of process of the court. As noted 
earlier, the page created by the traffic police on the Facebook 
was a forum for the public to put forth their grievances. In our 
considered view, the appellants might have posted the 
comment online under the bona fide belief that it was within the 
F 
G 
H

164 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
permissible limits. As discussed earlier, even going by the 
uncontroverted allegations in the FIR, in our view, none of the 
ingredients of the alleged offences are satisfied. We are of the 
\ 
view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would 
be unjust to allow the process of the court to be continued 
B against the appellants and consequently the order of the High 
Court is liable to be set aside. 
17. In the result, the impugned order of the High Court in 
Criminal Petition No.252 of 2014 dated 24.4.2014 is set aside 
C and this appeal is allowed and the FIR in Crime No.174/2013 
registered against the appellants is quashed. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal allowed