R.R. PAREKH versus HLGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR.
[2016] 5 S.C.R. 906, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
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[2016] 5 S.C.R. 906 
R.R. PAREKH 
v. 
HlGH.COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
(Civil Appeal Nos. 6116-6117of2016) 
JULY 12, 2016 
[T.S. THAKUR, CJI AND DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.) 
Service Law: 
Dismissal of service - Of judicial officer - Charges of 
misconduct. alleging that while trying two cases involving offence 
u/s. 135 of Customs Act, the manner and mode in which awarded 
sentence show that the decisions rendered were actuated by corrupt 
practice or oblique motive - Held: The delinquent had no convincing 
explanation for the alleged conduct - The charge of misconduct 
was thus established - However, punishment of 'dismissal' is not 
proportionate to the misconduct - Hence, it is substituted to 
'compulsory retirement' - Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and 
Appeals) Rules, 1971 - Rule 6. 
Judiciary - Judicial officer - Misdemeanour alleged -
Disciplinary proceedings - Held: Cases involving misdemeanour 
of judicial officer have to be dealt with sensitivity and care - A· 
charge of misconduct against a judicial officer must be distinguished 
from a purely erroneous decision whether on ·/aw or on fact - The 
circumstances let into evidence to establish misconduct have to be 
sifted and evaluated with caution - Service Lam 
Constitution of India:. 
Art.235 - Disciplinary jurisdiction of High Courr- Scope of 
- Held: In exercise of its disciplinary jurisdiciion, conferred u/Art. 
235, ~the High Court has an obligation to apply its 1~ind to a report
submitted by the Disciplinary Committee as regards its· acceptance 
- The Court is not bound by the .decision of Disciplinary Committee. 
Art.226 - Jurisdiction under - Scope. of~ While determining 
the correctness of charge of misconduct - Held: The High Court 
should not exercise its jurisdiction u/Art.226 unless the findings 
are found to be perverse or it is a case of no evidence - The 
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R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
sufficiency of evidence would notfall for re-appreciation or re-
evaluation before the High Court. 
Evidence - Standard qf proof - Jn disciplinary inquiry - Held: 
A charge of misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding has to be 
established on a preponderance of probabilities - Disciplinary 
proceeding is not governed by the strict rules of evidence which 
govern a criminal trial. 
Disciplinary inquiries (Disciplinary Inquiry No. 15 of 2000 
and 6 of2001) were initiated against the appellant-a judicial officer. 
Disciplinary Inquiry No. 15 of 2000 the appellant was on the 
charge of misconduct alleging that while trying two cases 
involving offence u/s. 135 of Customs Act, the appellant awarded 
sentence to the accused persons less than the minimum 
prescribed and that the decisions rendered were actuated by 
corrupt practice or oblique motive. In Inquiry No. 6 of 2001, the 
appellant was charged with dereliction of duty and with acting in 
a manner unbecoming of a judicial officer. Inquiry Officer came 
to the conclusion that the charges could 11£.t be proved. 
Disciplinary Committee as regards the charges in Inquiry No. 15 
was of the view that acts of the appellant were not totally bonafide, 
but the appellant should be exonerated. As regards the Inquiry 
No. 6, Disciplinary Committee upheld the Inquiry Report. Full 
Court of High Court, in chamber meeting resolved to remand 
the matter to the Disciplinary Committee. On remand
Disciplinary 
Committee upheld the finding ofln,quiry Officer. Full Court then 
resolved to reconstitute the Disciplinary Committee and called 
upon to look into the matter again. The reconstituted Disciplinary 
Commi'ttee d~greed with the report of the Inquiry Officer and 
concluded that t,he appellant w.~,iliable to be dismissed from 
service. Report of I}i_~rjplinary Co.m_mittee was adopted by Full 
Court and 'consequently t!ie appellant was dismissed from service. 
The appellant filed writ p£tition .u/Art. 226 of the Constitution 
assailing the fi~dings of Uis_ciP.ti'ltar-Y Com_mit·tee and the order of 
dismissal. High Court held that•the C~l!,l,ige in Inquiry No. 6 of 
2001 was not established. Ho~ever, it upheld the views of 
Disciplinary Committee and Full ~Q.uqt in Inquiry No. 15 of 2000 
and upheld the order 'of dismissal of appellant. 
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[2016] 5 S.C.R. 
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In appeal to this court it was interalia contended by the 
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appellant that once the Disciplinary Committee had decided in 
favour of the appellant, the Full Court, in the chamber meeting 
had no jurisdiction to revisit that decision. 
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. It is not correct to say that the Full Court was 
bound by the decision of Disciplinary Committee initially taken 
by it. Under Article 235 of the Constitution, the High Court 
exercises control over the district judiciary. The exercise of 
disciplinary control is a manffestation of that power, The High 
Court, in order to streamline the process governing the exercise 
of its disciplinary jurisdiction, may make procedural provisions 
regulating its exercise. The procedural provisions, regulating its 
disciplinary jurisdiction, have been enunciated by the Gurjarat 
High Court resolved by the Full Court in the meetings held on 
2nd March, 2004 and 26th December, 1998. As per the procedure, 
the recommendation which is submitted by the Disciplinary 
Committee on whether or not to accept the Report of an Inquiry 
Officer is not binding on the High Court. The Full Court has an 
obligation to apply its mind to a report which has been submitted 
by the Disciplinary Committee and to determine whether it should 
or should not be accepted. [Para 13) [917-G-H; 918-A-B, F-G] 
2.1 Cases involving misdemeanours of a judicial officer have 
to
be dealt with sensitivity and care. A robust common sense 
must guide the disciplinary authority. At one end of the spectrum 
are those cases where direct evidence of a misdemeanour is 
available. Yet in other cases, direct evidence of a decision being 
actuated by a corrupt motive may not be available. [Para 15] [919-
E-F) 
2.2 The issue of whether a judicial officer has been actuated 
by an oblique motive or corrupt practice has to be determined 
upon a careful appraisal of the material on the record. The issue 
which arises in such cases is whether there are circumstances 
from which an inference that extraneous considerations have 
actuated a judicial officer can legitimately be drawn. Such an 
inference cannot obviously be drawn merely from a hypothesis 
that a decision is erroneous. A wrong decision can yet be a bona
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
fide error of judgment. Inadvertence is consistent with an honest 
error of judgment. A charge of misconduct against a judicial officer 
must be distinguished from a purely erroneous decision whether 
on law or on fact. The legality of a judicial determination is· subject 
to such remedies as are provided in law for testing the correctness 
of the determination. It is not the correctness of the verdict but 
the conduct of the officer which is in question. The disciplinary 
authorify has to determine whether there has emerged from the 
record one or more circumstances that indicate that the decision 
which forms the basis of the charge of misconduct was not an 
honest exercise of judicial power. The circumstances let into 
evidence to establish misconduct have to be sifted and evaluated 
with caution. [Para 15] [919-C, F-H; 920-A-B] 
2.3 In the present case, the two criminal cases which were 
tried by the appellant involved offences under Section 135 of the 
Customs Act, 1962. The Appellant paid no heed whatsoever to 
the provisions of Section 135 under which the sentence of 
imprisonment shall not be less than three years, in the absence 
of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in 
the judgment of the Court. Most significant is the fact that the 
Appellant imposed a sentence in the case of each accused in such 
a manner that after the order was passed no accused would remain 
in jail any longer. Two of the
accused were handed down 
sentences of.five months and three months in such a manner that 
after taking account of the set-off of the period during which they 
had remained as under-trial prisoners, they would be released 
fro!ll jail. The Appellant had absolutely no convincing explanation 
for this course of conduct. As a judicial officer who was in service 
for over fourteen years, the appellant could not have been 
unmindful of an'd was duty bound to have read the governing 
provisions of the statute under which the offence was sought to 
be established. It is inconceivable that a judicial officer would do 
so in two successive trials without apprising himself of the law or 
the punishment provided by the legislature. [Paras 16, 17 and 
18] [920-D; 921-G-H; 922-A, C-D] 
3. A disciplinary inquiry, is not governed by the strict rules 
of evidence which govern a criminal trial. A charge of misconduct 
in a disciplinary proceeding has to be established on a 
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(2016] 5 S.C.R. 
preponderance of probabilities. The High Court while exercising 
its power of judicial review under Article 226 has to determine 
as to whether the charge of misconduct stands established with 
reference to some legally acceptable evidence. The High Court 
would not interfere unless the findings are found to be perverse. 
Unless it is a case of no evidence, the High Court would not 
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. If there is some legal 
evidence to hold that a charge of misconduct is proved, the 
sufficiency of the evidence would not fall for re-appreciation or 
re-evaluation before the High Court. Applying these tests, it is 
not possible to fault the decision of the Division Bench of the 
High Court on the charge of misconduct. The charge of 
misconduct was established in disciplinary Inquiry 15 of 2000. 
[Para 19] (922-E-G] 
4. Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and 
Appeals) Rules 1971 enunciates disciplinary penalties. Among 
them is (i) compulsory retirement; (ii) removal from service which 
shall not be a disqualification for future employment under 
Government; (iii) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily 
be a disqualification for future employment under Government. 
The punishment must be proportionate to the misconduct· 
established. Having due regard to the nature of the misconduct 
which has been found to be established and the totality of 
circumstances, the
punishment of dismissal should stand 
substituted by an order of compulsory retirement. The Appellant 
has attained the age of superannuation and would be entitled to 
his retirement benefits on that basis. [Para 20] [923-A-C] 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 6116-
6117 of2016. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 22-23.02.2012 of the High 
Court of Gujarat atAhmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 10760 
G 
of2009. 
H 
D. N. Ray, Lokesh K. Choudhary, Mrs. Sumita Ray, Advs. for the 
Appellant. 
Aniruddha P. Mayee, A. Selvin Raja, Advs. for the Respondents.
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J 1. Leave granted. 
2. These proceedings arise from a judgment of the High Court of 
Gujarat dated 23 February 2012 in an application filed by the Appellant 
challenging the punishment of dismissal imposed upon him upon a 
discip,inary inquiry. The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court found 
that the charges against the Appellant have been established in one (but 
not the second) of two disciplinary inquiries in respect of his conduct as 
ajudicial officer in the districtjudiciary. In view of its findings, the High 
Court declined to interfere with the punishment of dismissal. That has 
given rise to these proceedings. 
3. The Appellant was recruited as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) 
and Judicial Magistrate in 1981 in the judicial service ofthe State of 
Gujarat. He was promoted as a Civil Judge (Senior Division) in 1996. 
The charges which emanated against him from a chargesheet dated 31 
August 2001 related to his work as a judicial officer when he was posted 
as Chief Judicial Magistrate at Bhuj from 6 May 1996 to 15 June 1998. 
Two criminal cases involving offences punishable under Section 135 of 
the Customs Act 1962 and the Imports & Exports (Control) Act 1947 
were tried by him. 
4. In Criminal Case 1293 of! 995, the Appellant delivered a judgment 
on 22 January 1997 convicting the accused, but awarded a sentence of 
imprisonment less than the minimum
prescribed by Section 135. 
Moreover, the sentence of imprisonment was so structured that after 
allowing the benefit of a set-off, the accused was not required to remain 
in jail for a further period. In the second criminal case, Criminal Case 
675of1994, the trial involved offences inter a/ia under Section 135 of 
the Customs Act 1962. Fourteen accused were alleged to be involved in 
the smuggling of275 siJ.er slabs of a value of 5,86,50,620/-. The trial 
of two of the accused who are absconding was separated from the rest. 
. By a judgment dated 11 March 1997 the Appellant held the twelve 
accused who were brought to trial to be guilty of the charges. However, 
save and except for five of the accused persons, the Appellant awarded 
less than the minimum punishment prescribed under Section 135. All the 
accused were granted a set-off. Details of the sentences awarded are 
contained in the following table: 
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SI. 
AccLECC Nameofthe 
Pe1iod of Annunt 
lndefuult 
Set ct'fis 
NJ 
NJ. 
accused 
senterce 
offine 
of fine, 
allwed 
flt· th er 
senterce 
I 
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Sw-encl·a 
Gurud:epsiri1 
2 Yearn 
10.0001· 
I Year 
Yes 
2 
2 
Bhtperrlra 
2 Yearn 
10.0001-
I Year 
Yes 
Pvarelal 
3 
4 
NathaSamat 
2 Yearn 
10.0001-
I Year 
Yes 
4 
5 
Jivan Devdan 
2 Yews 
10.0001-
1 Year 
Yes 
5 
13 
Kana 
2 Yearn 
10.0001· 
I Ye<rr 
Yes 
Mal1adeva 
6 
3 
Gu lam Oiisti 
4 Yews 
15.0001-
I Year 
Yes 
7 
6 
Iqbal Husam 
4 Yearn 
15.0001· 
I Ye'1f 
Yes 
8 
7 
Jakab Bava 
4 Yearn 
15.0001-
I Year 
Yes 
9 
IO 
Ismail Sale 
3 Yews 
10,0001-
I Year 
Yes 
10 
II 
Nw-mamd 
5 
10.0001· 
1 mmth 
Yes 
Yakub 
morthi 
II 
14 
J1van Madeva 
3 
10.0001-
I mmtl1 
Yes 
morth; 
12 
12 
O;manAmir 
5 Yews 
25.0001-
1 Yem· 
Helias 
not 
remitted 
fine 
5. This formed the subject matter of departmental Inquiry I 5 of 
2000 in which a chargesheet was issued on 3 I August 2001. It was 
alleged that the Appellant who was a senior judicial officer was aware 
of the provisions of Section 135 which prescribe the award of at least a 
minimum sentence. The case involved smuggling of a huge quantity of 
contraband articles. The Appellant, it was alleged, was aware of judicial 
decisions mandating that a liberal view should not be taken in the award 
of sentences in such cases. Yet, with the intention of favouring the 
accused, the Appellant was alleged to have awarded
less than the 
minimum sentence without recording special or adequate reasons. 
Moreover, it was alleged that: 
"Though, it was a case of a huge quantity of contraband 
articles i.e. 275 Silver Slabs worth Rs. 5,86,50,6201-, you 
mvarded the sentence to each of the accused, keeping in mind, 
the period undergone by each of the accused as under trial 
prisoner and granted benefit of set off so that none of the 
accused had to remain in custody for any further period. " 
Consequently, the allegations against the Appellant were that:
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
[OR. 0. Y. CHANDRACHUDJ 
"Thus, the manner and mode in which you awarded the 
sentence in Cr!. Case Nos. 675194 & 1293195, clearly show 
that the accused had managed with you for showing favour 
in awarding sentence and accordingly, you awarded the 
punishment fixing the term of sentence in such a way that the 
accused need not have to remain in custody for any longer 
period and thereby: 
(a) You are guilty of indulging in Corrupt-practice. 
{b) You are guilty of dereliction in discharging your judicial 
functions. 
(c) You acted in a manner unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. 
These acts of yours, would amount to acts of grave misconduct 
and tantamount to conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer, 
violating the provisions contained in Rule 3 of the Gujarat 
Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971. " 
6. The Appellant denied the charges in his reply to the chargesheet. 
An Inquiry Officer was appointed. During the course of the inquiry, 
witnesses were examined in support of the charges, among them being 
the Special government prosecutor and Superintendent of Customs. The 
Inquiry Officer in his report dated 28 January 2004 came to the conclusion 
that there was no independent evidence to establish that the Appellant 
had engaged in a corrupt practice. The charges were held not to have 
been established. The report of the Inquiry Officer was placed before a 
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court consisting of two judges. The
Disciplinary Committee did not agree with the reasons adduced by the 
Inquiry Officer but nonetheless was of the view that the Appellant should 
be exonerated. In the view of the Committee, a huge quantity of 
contraband was involved and the Appellant ought not to have taken a 
lenient view, contrary to settled principles of law. The Disciplinary 
Committee held that though there was an absence of sufficient evidence 
to establish an oblique motive or an allegation 'ofcon-uption, an element 
of doubt existed from the manner in which the Appellant had sentenced 
each of the accused, bearing in mind the period of custody as under-trial 
prisoners. The Committee was of the view that the acts of the Appellant 
were not totally bona fide and proposed that this should be considered 
when the case of the Appellant for promotion arose in future. 
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7. The report of the Disciplinary Committee was considered at a 
Chamber meeting of the Full Court on 26 September 2005 when it was 
resolved to remand the matter to the same Disciplinary Committee for 
reconsideration. The Disciplinary Committee considered the matter again. 
The Disciplinary Committee took a fresh decision on 4April 2006 to the 
effect that there being no evidence about corruption, the finding of the 
inquiry officer was correct. The Committee, however, reiterated that 
the conduct of the Appellant should be borne in mind when his case for 
promotion came up for consideration. When the report of the Disciplinary 
Committee came up before the Full Court at a Chamber meeting held on 
5 March 2007, a reconstituted Disciplinary Committee was called upon 
to look into the matter again and to issue a notice to show cause to the 
Appellant. Upon the resolution of the Full Court, the Disciplinary 
Committee recorded tentative reasons to disagree with the report of the 
Inquiry Officer and called upon the Appellant to show cause why he 
should not be held guilty of the charges levelled and be dismissed from 
the service. The Appellant responded to the notice to show cause and 
was granted a personal hearing. The Disciplinary Committee arrived at 
a decision on I July 2009 holding the Appellant guilty of the charges of 
misconduct. The Committee held that as a seasoned judicial officer who 
was in
service since 1981, the Appellant would be aware about the basic 
principles of sentencing. The Committee rejected the explanation of the 
Appellant that even if an error was committed by him in awarding less 
than the prescribed sentence, this was of a bona fide nature. In the 
view of the Committee, the Appellant ought to have seen the provisions 
of the Customs Act 1962, and having held the accused guilty, he ought to 
have considered the provisions for punishment laid down in the statute. 
The Committee found it difficult to accept that as a judicial officer, the 
Appellant had passed an order of conviction and sentence without looking 
at the provisions. The Committee held that an inference could be drawn 
on the basis of material with regard to the existence of an oblique motive 
since neither a sufficient nor reasonable explanation was provided by 
the Appellant. Alternatively, the Committee held that even assuming that 
there was no oblique motive, the established facts reflected gross 
negligence and a dereliction of duty on the part of the Appellant. The 
Committee found the charge of misconduct was established and came 
to the conclusion that the Appellant should be dismissed from service 
under Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 
1971. The report of the Disciplinary Committee was adopted by the Full
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD] 
Court. The State Government by a notification dated 14 July 2009 
dismissed the Appellant from service. 
8. The conduct of the Appellant as a judicial officer formed the 
subject matter of another disciplinary inquiry (Inquiry 6 of200 I) in which 
a chargesheet was issued on 5 November 2001. The charges against 
the Appellant were that despite his transferon 23 April 1993, the Appellant 
had with an oblique motive requested the Chief Judicial Magistrate, 
Mehsana to transfer 26 out of several part-heard cases selectively, 
pertaining to offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 
The allegation was that these cases were indicated as being part-heard 
though no material evidence had been recorded. The second charge 
was that in 68 cases involving offences punishable under the Factories 
Act 1948 the Appellant had imposed negligible punishments of fine ranging 
from 1 I 00 to 1 500, contrary to the decisions of the High Court and had 
indulged in a corrupt practice. The Appellant was charged with a 
dereliction of duty and of acting in a manner unbecoming of a judicial 
officer. The Inquiry Officer exonerated the Appellant. 
9. The Disciplinary Committee of the High Court came to the 
conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to hold the Appellant 
guilty of an oblique motive or corrupt practice. At its Chamber meeting 
on 26 September 2005, the Full Court remanded the proceedings to the
Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee took a fresh 
decision and reiterated its earlier view. When a Full Court considered 
the view of the Disciplinary Committee on 5 March 2007 a fresh 
Disciplinary Committee was assigned tu relook into the matter and to 
issue a show cause notice to the Appellant. The Disciplinary Committee 
recorded its tentative disagreement with the report of the Inquiry Officer 
and issue a notice to the show cause to the Appel !ant. Upon considering 
the reply submitted by the Appellant the Disciplinary Committee in its 
decision rendered on 1 July 2009 held the charges to be proved and took 
the view that the Appellant was liable to be dismissed from service. The 
Full Court of the High Court resolved that the charges against the 
Appellant were proved and decided to dismiss the Appellant from service. 
The State Government acting on the decision of the High Court issue an 
order of dismissal on 14 July 2009. 
10. The Appellant initiated proceedings under Article 226 of the 
Constitution in order to assail the findings which were arrived at in the 
disciplinary proceedings and the punishment of dismissal. By its judgment 
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and order dated 23 February 2012 the Division Bench held that the charge 
of misconduct in Disciplinary Inquiry 6 of200 I was not established. The 
High Court, after adverting to the report of the Disciplinary Committee 
noted that there was no evidence in regard to which cases under the 
Prevention ofFood Adulteration Act were part-heard before the Appellant. 
This conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee was held to belie the 
charge that the Appellant was being selective about retaining part-heard 
cases. On the second charge, the Division Bench observed that the 
Disciplinary Committee had expressly concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence to hold the Appellant guilty of an oblique motive or 
corrupt practice in the award of punishments in the cases under the 
Factories Act 1948. Yet, the final conclusion of the Committee was that 
all the charges including the-charge of corrupt practice stood proved. 
The High Court noted that this was a clear error. The Disciplinary 
Committee having come to the conclusion of the absence of an oblique 
motive or corrupt practice, the High Court held that it was not open to 
convert the charge into one of gross negligence. For these reasons, the 
findings and conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee in Inquiry 6 of 
2001 were held not to be sustainable. 
11. The High Court, however, held that the charge of misconduct 
in Disciplinary Inquiry 15 of2000 was based
on evidence and it could 
not be held that the conclusions of the Disciplinary Committee, which 
were adopted by the Full Court, were based on no evidence. The High 
Court noted that the Appellant was a judicial officer since 1982, and had 
worked for nearly fourteen years as a Judge. While dealing with offences 
under the Customs Act 1962, he was expected to refer to the penal 
provisions under which punishment was being handed down after 
recording a conviction. The High Court noted that the stand of the 
Appellant appeared to be that he awarded the sentence without being 
aware of the statutory provisions. The High Court observed that the 
criminal case with which the Appellant was dealing was not the first 
case involving an offence under Section 135. The High Court noted that 
despite the minimum punishment prescribed under Section 135, the 
Appellant awarded less than the minimum in the case of several accused. 
No reasons appeared from the judgment for the grant of differential 
treatment to some of the accused. More significantly, the punishments 
awarded to all the accused were structured in such a manner that none 
of the accused would have to serve any further sentence, after accounting
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
917 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD] 
for the set-off for the period spent in jail as under- trial prisoner. The 
High Court noted that since the value of the goods in the case exceeded 
rupees one lakh, Section 135 provided for imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to seven years and with fine. Moreover, in the absence of 
special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the 
judgment of the Court, the imprisonment was not to be for less than 
three years. Section 135 (3) also specifies what shall not be considered 
as special and adequate reasons. The High Court upheld the view of the 
Disciplinary Committee (which were accepted by the Full Court) that 
an inference of oblique motive would have to be drawn from the record, 
having due regard to the fact that (i) the Appellant had recorded no 
special or adequate reasons for awarding less than the minimum 
sentence; and (ii) the sentences which were awarded to the accused 
were such that none of them would have to undergo any further term of 
imprisonment after taking into account the period undergone as an under-
trial. In the view of the High Court, the conclusions of the Committee 
which were accepted by the Full Court cannot be held to have been 
based on no evidence; there were strong circumstances indicating that 
the Appellant imposed punishments in serious offences under the Customs 
Act 1962 contrary to statutory mandate; his explanation that he was not 
aware
of the statutory provision (having been recently promoted as CJM) 
was not acceptable; there were glaring discrepancies in the award of 
punishments to various accused; and, most significantly, the sentence 
imposed on each accused was such that none of them would remain in 
jail any longer. The High Court held that the punishment of dismissal 
was not disproportionate to the charge of misconduct which has been 
found to be established. 
12. The first submission which has been urged on behalf of the 
Appellant is that there was no warrant for the Full Court to require a 
reconsideration of the decision initially taken by the Disciplinary 
Committee on 27 October 2004. The submission is that once the 
Disciplinary Committee concluded that the Appellant should be 
exonerated by accepting the report of the Inquiry Officer, the Full Court 
in the Chamber meeting had no jurisdiction to revisit that decision. 
13. The submission suffers from a fundamental fallacy. Under 
Article 235 of the Constitution, the High Court exercises control over 
the district judiciary. The exercise of disciplinary control is a manifestation 
of that power. Exercise of disciplinary control over the district judiciary 
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[2016 J 5 S.C.R. 
is vested in the High Court in pursuance of the provisions of Article 235. 
The High Court, in order to streamline the process governing the exercise 
of its disciplinary jurisdiction, may make - as High Courts in fact do 
make- procedural provisions regulating its exercise. The High Court of 
Gujarat in a meeting of a Full Court held on 2 March 2004 resolved that 
matters listed in annexure 'A' to the resolution should be dealt with and 
decided by the High Court as a whole.Action to be taken against judicial 
officers in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction was one of those 
matters. However, having due regard to the multitude of administrative 
matters over which the Full Court exercises jurisdiction, the High Court 
assigns and distributes its administrative functions to constituent 
committees. This is imperative for the efficient exercise of the control 
of the High Court over the district judiciary under Article 235. Distribution 
of work to a Committee of the High Court does not efface the jurisdiction 
that vests in the High Court. By a resolution that was passed in a Chamber 
meeting of the High Court held on 26 December 1998 a detailed 
procedure was enunciated for the conduct of disciplinary inquiries against 
judicial officers of the district judiciary. The procedure envisages that 
after an Inquiry Officer submits a report, the report together with 
underlying material on the record
would be examined by a Disciplinary 
Committee consisting of two judges. The Disciplinary Committee would 
submit its provisional conclusions in a report which would laid before the 
High Court and this would become a decision of the Court after a 
stipulated period. The second stage for the Disciplinary Committee to 
prepare and submit its report would be after issuing a notice to show 
cause to the officer and granting him a.personal hearing after which the 
Disciplinary Committee would prepare a report containing its reasoned 
conclusions regarding the punishment. Once again the report would be 
tabled before High Court and would become a decision of the Court 
after passage of a stipulated period. The recommendation which is 
submitted by the Disciplinary Committee on whether or not to accept 
the Report of an Inquiry Officer is not binding on the High Court. The 
Full Court has an obligation to apply its mind to a report which has been 
submitted by the Disciplinary Committee and to. determine whether it 
should or should not be accepted. Hence, there is no merit in the 
submission that the Full Court was bound by the decision of its Disciplinary 
Committee. 
· 
14. The second submission relates to the merits of the charges
R.R. PAREKH v. HJGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
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against the Appellant which have been found to be established. The 
submission of the Appellant is that his judgment at the conclusion of the 
trial involving offences inter alia under Section 135 of the Customs Act 
1962 was a judicial decision. The bas.is of the decision is contained in the 
reasons adduced by the Appellant. Even if the Appellant had erred in the 
matter of awarding the sentence under Section 135, that - it was urged 
- cannot form the subject of a disciplinary inquiry. Moreover, on the 
basis of the decision rendered by the Appellant in the two criminal cases, 
it was sought to be urged that the Appellant had indicated reasons for 
arriving at a finding of the guilt and on the award of the sentence. 
15. The issue of whether a judicial officer has been actuated by an 
oblique motive or corrupt practice has to be determined upon a careful 
appraisal of the material on the record. Direct evidence of corruption 
may not always be forthcoming in every case involving a misconduct of 
this nature. A wanton breach of the governing principles of law or 
procedure may well be indicative in a given case of a motivated, if not 
reckless disregard oflegal principle. In the absence ofa cogent explanation 
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to the contrary, it is for the disciplinary authority to determine whether a 
pattern has emerged on the basis of which an inference that the judicial 
officer was actuated by
extraneous considerations can be drawn. Cases 
involving misdemeanours of a judicial officer have to be dealt with 
sensitivity and care. A robust common sense must guide the disciplinary 
authority. At one end of the spectrum are those cases where direct 
evidence of a misdemeanour is available. Evidence in regard to the 
existence of an inoriminating trail must be carefully scrutinized to 
determine whether an act of misconduct is established on the basis of 
legally acceptable evidence. Yet in other cases, direct evidence of a 
decision being actuated by a corrupt motive may not be availabie. The . F 
issue which arises in such cases is whether there are circumstances 
from which an inference that extraneous considerations have actuated 
a judicial officer can legitimately be drawn. Such an inference cannot 
obviously be drawn merely from a hypothesis that a decision is erroneous. 
A wrong decision can yet be a bona fide error of judgment. Inadvertence 
is consistent with an honest error of judgment. A charge of misconduct 
against a judicial officer must be distinguished from a purely erroneous 
decision whetheron law or on fact. The legality ofajudicial determination 
is subject to such remedies as are provided in law for testing the 
correctness of the determination. It is not the correctness of the verdict 
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but the conduct of the officer which is in question. The disciplinary 
authority has to determine whether there has emerged from the record 
one or more circumstances that indicate that the decision which forms 
the basis of the charge of misconduct was not an honest exercise of 
judicial power. The circumstances let into evidence to establish 
misconduct have to be sifted and evaluated with caution. The threat of 
disciplinary proceedings must not demotivate the honest and independent 
officer. Yet on the other hand, there is a vital element of accountability to 
society involved in dealing with cases of misconduct. There is on the 
one hand a genuine public interest in protecting fearless and honest officers 
of the district judiciary from motivated criticism and attack. Equally there 
is a genuine public interest in holding a person who is guilty of wrong 
doing responsible for his or his actions. Neither aspect of public interest 
can be ignored. Both are vital to the preservation of the integrity of the 
administration of justice. 
16. In the present case, it must be emphasised that the charges 
against the Appellant involved rendering of decisions actuated by corrupt 
practice or by oblique motives. The two criminal cases which were tried 
by the Appellant involved offences under Section 135 of the Customs 
Act, 1962. Section 135 is as follows: 
"Section 135-
( I) Without prejudice to any action that may
be taken under this 
Act, if any person-
a. is in relation to any goods in any way knowingly concerned in 
any fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of any duty 
chargeable thereon or of any prohibition for the time being 
imposed under this Act or any other law for the time being in 
force with respect to such goods, or 
b. acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying, 
removing depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling 
or purchasing or in any other manner dealing with any goods 
which he knows or has reasons to believe are liable to 
confiscation under Section 111, he shall be punishable, -
c. in the case of an offence relating to any of the goods to which 
Section 123 applies and the market price whereof exceeds 
one lakh of rupees, with imprisonment for term which may 
extend to seven years and with fine : 
Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD] 
the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of the court, such 
imprisonment shall not be for less than three years; 
(ii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 
(2) ********** 
(3) For the purpose of sub-sections (1) and (2), the following shall 
not be considered as special and adequate reasons for awarding 
a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than one year, 
namely, -
(i) the fact that the accused has been convicted for the first 
time for an offence under this Act; 
(ii) the fact that in any proceedings under this Act, other than a 
prosecution, the accused has been ordered to pay a penalty or 
the goods which are the subject-matter of such proceedings 
have been ordered to be confiscated or any other action has 
been taken against him for the same act which constitutes the 
offence; 
(iii) the fact that the accused was not the principal offender 
and was acting merely as a carrier of goods or otherwise was 
a secondary party to the commission to the offence; 
(iv) the age of the accused." 
17. It is not in dispute that the cases in question related to goods to 
which Section 123 applied and the market price whereof exceeded rupees 
one lakh. The offences were punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to seven years and with fine. The proviso spells out 
that in the absence of special and adequate reasons
to the contrary to be 
recorded in the judgment of the Court, such imprisonment shall not be 
for less than three years. Sub-section 3 of Section 123 provides what 
would not be considered as special and adequate reasons for awarding 
a sentence of imprisonment for a term ofless than one year. The Appellant 
was evaluating, in Criminal Case 675of1994, a situation involving the 
smuggling of275 silver slabs worth' .5,86,50,620/-. The explanation of 
the Appellant that he was recently promoted to th.e cadre of CJM and 
was not aware of the provisions of Section 135 was not accepted by the 
Disciplinary Committee (or by the Full Court). As a judicial officer who 
was in service for over fourteen years, the Appellant could not_ have 
been unmindful of and was duty bound to have read the governing 
provisions of the statute under which the offence was sought to be 
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established. It is inconceivable that a judicial officer would do so in two 
successive trials without apprising himself of the law or the punishment 
provided by the legislature. The Appellant awarded sentences ranging 
from three months to five years of imprisonment to different accused. 
No reasons appear from the record of the judgment, for awarding less 
than the minimum sentence prescribed. 
18. We have duly perused the judgments rendered by the Appellant 
and find merit in the finding of the High Court that the Appellant paid no 
heed whatsoever to the provisions of Section 135 under which the 
sentence ofimprisonment shall not be less than three years, in the absence 
of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the 
judgment of the Court. Most significant is the fact that the Appellant 
imposed a sentence in the case of each accused in such a manner that 
after the order was passed no accused would remain in jail any longer. 
Two of the accused were handed down sentences of five months and 
three months in such a manner that after taking account of the set-off of 
the period during which they had remained as under-trial prisoners, they 
would be released from jail. The Appellant had absolutely no convincing 
explanation for this course of conduct. 
19. A disciplinary inquiry, it is well settled, is not gO\ ..:med by the 
strict rules of evidence which govern a criminal trial. A
charge of 
misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding has to be established on a 
preponderance of probabilities. The High Court while exercising its power 
of judicial review under Article 226 has to determine as to whether the 
charge of misconduct stands established with reference to some legally 
acceptable evidence. The High Court would not interfere unless the 
. findings are found to be perverse. Unless it is a case of no· evidence, the 
High Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. If there 
is some legal evidence to hold that a charge of misconduct is proved, the 
sufficiency of the evidence would not fall for re-appreciation or re-
evaluation before the High Court. Applying these tests, it is not possible 
to fault the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court on 
the charge of misconduct. The charge of misconduct was established in 
disciplinary Inquiry 15 of2000. 
· 20. That leads us to the issue of the punishment which has been 
imposed on the Appellant. The Appellant has been dismissed from service. 
The submission of the Appellant is that having regard to the fact that he 
has an unblemished record of service, the imposition of the punishment
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD] 
of dismissal would be disproportionate to the misconduct which has been 
found to be established. Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline 
and Appeals) Rules 197 f enunciates disciplinary penalties. Among them 
is (i) compulsory retirement; (ii) removal from service which shall not be 
a disqualification for future employment under Government; (iii) dismissal 
from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future 
employment under Government. The punishment must be proportionate 
to the misconduct established. Having due regard to the nature of the 
misconduct which has been found to be established and the totality of 
circumstances we are of the view that the punishment of dismissal should 
stand substituted by an order of compulsory retirement. The Appellant 
has attained the age of superannuation and would be entitled to his 
retirement benefits on that basis. 
• 21. We accordingly allow the Appeals in part. We confirm the 
judgment of the High Court in so far as it rejects the challenge by the 
Appellant to the finding of misconduct. However, for the reasons which 
we have indicated above we direct that the order of dismissal from 
service shall stand substituted with an order of compulsory retirement 
which shall take effect from 14 July 2009, the date on which the final 
order of penalty was imposed upon the Appellant. 
22. The Civil Appeals are disposed of accordingly. No
costs. 
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Appeals partly allowed. 
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