GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI versus RAVINDER KUMAR JAIN & ORS.
[2023] 7 S.C.R. 311, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI
v.
RAVINDER KUMAR JAIN & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3621 of 2023)
MAY 18, 2023
[ABHAY S. OKA AND RAJESH BINDAL, JJ.]
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2) –
Locus of a subsequent purchaser to invoke s.24(2) to claim lapse
of acquisition – Writ petition filed by the respondent no.1 invoking
s.24(2) was allowed, acquisition in question was held to have lapsed
– Correctness of – Held: A subsequent buyer of the property after
issuance of the notification u/s.4 of the 1894 Act has no locus to
invoke s.24(2) of the 2013 Act – In the present case, notification u/
s.4 of 1894 Act was issued on 25.11.1980 and the sale deed in
favour of the respondent no.1 was registered on 18.6.2003 – Rather
it is evident from the affidavit filed by the Land Acquisition Collector
in the High Court that the respondent no.1 purchased the land from
one ‘BB’ who had purchased the same vide sale deed dated
09.06.1981, which itself was after the issuance of notification u/s.4
of the 1894 Act on 25.11.1980 – Hence, the respondent did not
have right to invoke jurisdiction of the High Court to claim that the
acquisition in question had lapsed in view of s.24(2) of the 2013
Act – Impugned order passed by High Court set aside – Writ petition
filed by the respondent No.1 dismissed – Land Acquisition Act, 1894
– s.4 – Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 – s.8 –
Land Acquisition.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The process of acquisition of land in question
started with the issuance of notification of Section 4 of the 1894
Act on 25.11.1980. Subsequently, notification under Section 6 was
issued on 27.05.1985. The owner of the land at that stage
challenged the acquisition by filing W.P.(C) No.1229 of 1986.
Award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act was announced by the
Land Acquisition Collector on 05.06.1987. The writ petition was
dismissed for non-prosecution on 09.12.2004. The High Court
[2023] 7 S.C.R. 311
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also recorded that the issue raised in the petition is otherwise
also covered by various judgments. The respondent no.1 had
purchased the land in question vide registered sale deed dated
18.06.2003. The fact that he had knowledge about the acquisition
of land, is evident from two facts. Firstly, that it was sought to be
pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent no. 1 that he had obtained permission from the
competent authority in terms of the provisions of the 1972 Act
for transfer of the land, which had already been acquired. Though,
in para 13 of the sale deed a vague averment has been made in
that regard, however, no such certificate was produced. Even
production thereof may not be of any help to the respondent no.
1. Secondly, the writ petition was filed by the respondent no. 1
bearing W.P.(C) No.3701 of 2008 challenging the acquisition
proceedings. The same was dismissed as withdrawn on 22.10.2008
with liberty to the petitioner therein to avail of the remedy of
review/ recall of the order dated 09.12.2004 vide which the writ
petition filed by the predecessor in interest of the respondent
no.1, challenging the acquisition, was dismissed for non-
prosecution. It is the admitted position that an application filed
by the respondent No.1 for reviewing/ recalling was dismissed.
[Paras 5, 6][314-G-H; 315-A-E]
1.2 A subsequent buyer of the property after issuance of
the notification under
Section 4 the 1894 Act has no locus to
invoke Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. In the case in hand it is the
admitted position on record that notification under Section 4 of
1894 Act was issued on 25.11.1980 and the sale deed in favour of
the respondent no. 1 was registered on 18.6.2003. Rather it is
evident from the affidavit filed by the Land Acquisition Collector
in the High Court that the respondent no.1 purchased the land
from ‘BB’ vide registered sale deed dated 18.06.2003, who had
purchased the same from M/s. Ansal Housing and Estates (P)
Ltd. vide sale deed dated 09.06.1981, which itself was after the
issuance of notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act on
25.11.1980. Hence, the respondent will not have right to invoke
jurisdiction of the High Court to claim that the acquisition in
question had lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The
impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the
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writ petition filed by the respondent No.1 in the High Court is
dismissed. [Paras 9-11][320-H; 321-A, D-E]
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others
2020 SCC OnLine SC 316 – followed.
Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 2019
(10) SCC 229 – relied on.
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharma Trust (2017) 6
SCC 751 : [2017] 4 SCR 232 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
2019 (10) SCC 229
relied on
para 1
[2017] 4 SCR 232
referred to
para 8
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3621
of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.03.2015 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WP (C) No. 6912 of 2014.
Ms. Rachana Shrivastav, Sr. Adv., Ms. Monika, Chandra Prakash,
Vivek Singh, C. P. Rajwar, Ms. Somi Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv., Amit Gupta, Harisankar Mahapatra, Shiv
Verma, Nitin Mishra, Ishaan Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RAJESH BINDAL, J.
1. Challenge in the present appeal is to the order passed by the
High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No.6912 of 2014 vide which the writ
petition filed by the respondent no.1 invoking Section 24(2) of the Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as
“the 2013 Act”) was allowed and it was held that the acquisition in
question had lapsed for the reason that neither the possession of the land
was taken nor the compensation therefor was paid.
2. The argument raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant is that the original owner of the land challenged the
acquisition by filing W.P.(C) No.1229 of 1986 which was dismissed for
non-prosecution on 09.12.2004. The respondent No.1 claimed that he
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. RAVINDER KUMAR
JAIN & ORS.
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had purchased the land in question from the original owner in terms of
the no objection certificate granted to him under Section 8 of the Delhi
Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as
“the 1972 Act”), vide sale deed dated 18.06.2023. The respondent No.1
also filed writ petition challenging the acquisition, after the purchase of
the land, bearing W.P.(C) No.3701 of 2008, which was dismissed on
22.10.2008 leaving it open to the respondent no.1 to file review/recall of
the order dated 09.12.2004, vide which the writ petition filed by the
original owner, challenging the acquisition of land, was dismissed. It was
submitted that the aforesaid application was also dismissed. Referring
to the judgment of this Court in Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors.1, it was submitted that a subsequent buyer of the land
after the process of acquisition is complete does not have any locus to
invoke Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, to claim that the acquisition in
question has lapsed. Hence, the writ petition itself being not maintainable
deserves to be dismissed. The order passed by the High Court be set
aside.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent no.1 submitted that it is a case where neither the compensation
has been paid nor the possession of the land has been taken. The
respondent no.1 has already constructed his house on the land in question
and living
there for more than a decade. He is assessed to house tax,
which is being paid regularly. At this stage, disturbing his possession will
be quite harsh as he would be deprived of shelter on his head. He further
submitted that the sale deed in the case was registered after due
permission from the authorities under the provisions of the 1972 Act.
Hence, at this stage, he should not be deprived of his possession. The
appeal be dismissed.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper
book.
5. The basic facts which are not in dispute are that the process of
acquisition of land in question started with the issuance of notification of
Section 4 of the 1894 Act on 25.11.1980. Subsequently, notification under
Section 6 was issued on 27.05.1985. The owner of the land at that stage
challenged the acquisition by filing W.P.(C) No.1229 of 1986. Award
under Section 11 of the 1894 Act was announced by the Land Acquisition
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Collector on 05.06.1987. The writ petition was dismissed for non-
prosecution on 09.12.2004. The High Court also recorded that the issue
raised in the petition is otherwise also covered by various judgments.
6. The respondent no.1, Ravinder Kumar Jain had purchased the
land in question vide registered sale deed dated 18.06.2003. The fact
that he had knowledge about the acquisition of land, is evident from two
facts. Firstly, that it was sought to be pointed out by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 1 that he had obtained
permission from the competent authority in terms of the provisions of
the 1972 Act for transfer of the land, which had already been acquired.
Though, in para 13 of the sale deed a vague averment has been made in
that regard, however, no such certificate was produced. Even production
thereof may not be of any help to the respondent no. 1. Secondly, the
writ petition was filed by the respondent no. 1 bearing W.P.(C) No.3701
of 2008 challenging the acquisition proceedings. The same was dismissed
as withdrawn on 22.10.2008 with liberty to the petitioner therein to avail
of the remedy of review/ recall of the order dated 09.12.2004 vide which
the writ petition filed by the predecessor in interest of the respondent
no.1, challenging the acquisition, was dismissed for non-prosecution. It
is the admitted position that an application filed by the respondent No.1
for reviewing/ recalling was dismissed.
7. As regards the
locus of a subsequent purchaser to invoke Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act to claim that the acquisition had lapsed, the law is
well settled. The three Judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Kumar (supra)
while deciding the point in law has held as follows:
“18. Even otherwise, proviso to Section 24(2) does not
recognise a purchaser after Section 4 notification inasmuch
as it provides that where an award has been made, and the
compensation in respect of a majority of landholdings has
not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then,
all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition
issued under the 1894 Act, shall be entitled to compensation
under the provisions of the 2013 Act. The proviso makes it
clear that in case of compensation concerning the majority
of landholdings has not been deposited, then recorded
owner(s) at the time of issuance of notification under Section
4 of the 1894 Act shall have the right to receive the
compensation. Purchasers after Section 4 notification have
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. RAVINDER KUMAR
JAIN & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]
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not been given the right to receive the higher compensation
under the provisions contained in the 2013 Act.
19. The 2013 Act presupposes that a person is required to be
rehabilitated and resettled. Such a person who has purchased
after Section 4 notification as sale deed is void under the
1894 Act, cannot claim rehabilitation and resettlement as per
policy envisaged under the 2013 Act, as his land has not been
acquired, but he has purchased a property which has already
been acquired by the State Government, he cannot claim even
higher compensation, as per proviso to Section 24(2) under
the 2013 Act. An original landowner cannot be deprived of
higher value under the 2013 Act, which higher compensation
was not so contemplated when the void transaction of sale
had been entered, and right is conferred under the proviso to
Section 24(2) on recorded owners under the 1894 Act. We
have come across instances in which after notifications under
Section 4 were issued and, the property was purchased at
throwaway prices by the builders and unscrupulous persons,
such purchases are void and confer no right even to claim
higher compensation under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as
it is to be given to the owner as mentioned in the notification.
20. Given that, the transaction of sale, effected after Section
4 notification, is void, is ineffective to transfer the land, such
incumbents cannot invoke the provisions of Section 24. As
the
sale transaction did not clothe them with the title when
the purchase was made; they cannot claim “possession” and
challenge the acquisition as having lapsed under Section 24
by questioning the legality or regularity of proceedings of
taking over of possession under the 1894 Act. It would be
unfair and profoundly unjust and against the policy of the
law to permit such a person to claim resettlement or claim the
land back as envisaged under the 2013 Act. When he has not
been deprived of his livelihood but is a purchaser under a
void transaction, the outcome of exploitative tactics played
upon poor farmers who were unable to defend themselves.
21. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act,
challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over of
possession under the 1894 Act cannot be made, based on a
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void transaction nor declaration can be sought under Section
24(2) by such incumbents to obtain the land. The declaration
that acquisition has lapsed under the 2013 Act is to get the
property back whereas, the transaction once void, is always
a void transaction, as no title can be acquired in the land as
such no such declaration can be sought. It would not be legal,
just and equitable to give the land back to purchaser as land
was not capable of being sold which was in process of
acquisition under the 1894 Act. The 2013 Act does not confer
any right on purchaser whose sale is ab initio void. Such
void transactions are not validated under the 2013 Act. No
rights are conferred by the provisions contained in the 2013
Act on such a purchaser as against the State.
22. “Void is, ab initio,” a nullity, is inoperative, and a person
cannot claim the land or declaration once no title has been
conferred upon him to claim that the land should be given
back to him. A person cannot enforce and ripe fruits based
on a void transaction to start claiming title and possession of
the land by seeking a declaration under Section 24 of the
2013 Act; it will amount to conferment of benefit never
contemplated by the law. The question is, who can claim
declaration/rights under Section 24(2) for the restoration of
land or lapse of acquisition. It cannot be by a person with no
title in the land. The provision of the 2013 Act cannot be said
to be enabling or authorising a purchaser
after Section 4 to
question proceeding taken under the Act of 1894 of taking
possession as held in U.P. Jal Nigam [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra
Properties (P) Ltd., (1996) 3 SCC 124] which is followed in
M. Venkatesh [M. Venkatesh v. BDA, (2015) 17 SCC 1 : (2017)
5 SCC (Civ) 387] and other decisions and consequently claim
declaration under Section 24 of the 2013 Act. What cannot
be done directly cannot be permitted in an indirect method.
23. The provisions of the 2013 Act aimed at the acquisition of
land with least disturbance to the landowners and other
affected families and to provide just and fair compensation
to affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed
to be acquired or are affected and to make adequate
provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. RAVINDER KUMAR
JAIN & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]
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and resettlement. The provisions of the 2013 Act aim at ousting
all inter-meddlers from the fray by ensuring payment in the
bank account of landholders under Section 77 of the Act.
24. The intendment of the 2013 Act is to benefit farmers, etc.
Subsequent purchasers cannot be said to be landowners
entitled to restoration of land and cannot be termed to be
affected persons within the provisions of the 2013 Act. It is
not open to them to claim that the proceedings have lapsed
under Section 24(2).”
 26. In Manav Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav
Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] ,
even the provisions of the Act of 2013 have not been taken
into consideration, which prohibits such transactions in
particular provisions of Section 11, including the proviso to
Section 24(2). Apart from that, it was not legally permissible
to a Division Bench to ignore the decisions of the larger Bench
comprising of three Judges and of coordinate Bench. They
were not per incuriam and were relevant for deciding the issue
of taking possession under the 1894 Act, at the instance of
purchaser. In case it wanted to depart from the view taken
earlier, it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench.
It has been ignored that when a purchase is void, then no
declaration can be sought on the ground that the land
acquisition under the 2013 Act has lapsed due to illegality/
irregularity of proceedings of taking
possession under the
1894 Act. No declaration can be sought by a purchaser under
Section 24 that acquisition has lapsed, effect of which would
be to get back the land. They cannot seek declaration that
acquisition made under the 1894 Act has lapsed by the
challenge to the proceedings of taking possession under the
1894 Act. Such right was not available after the purchase in
2000 and no such right has been provided to the purchasers
under the 2013 Act also. Granting a right to question
acquisition would be against the public policy and the law
which prohibits such transactions; it cannot be given effect
to under the guise of subsequent legislation containing similar
provisions. Subsequent legislation does not confer any new
right to a person based on such void transaction; instead, it
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includes a provision prohibiting such transactions without
permission of the Collector as provided in Section 11(4).
27. Thus, we have to follow the decisions including that of
larger Bench mentioned above, laying down the law on the
subject, which still holds the field and were wrongly
distinguished. The binding value of the decisions of larger
and coordinate Benches have been ignored while deciding
Manav Dharam Trust case [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav
Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] ,
it was not open to it to take a different view. The decision in
Manav Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam
Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] is per
incuriam in light of this decision of this Court in Mamleshwar
Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal [Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya
Lal, (1975) 2 SCC 232] , A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri)
372] , State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [State of
U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139] , B.
Shama Rao v. State (UT of Pondicherry) [B. Shama Rao v.
State (UT of Pondicherry), AIR 1967 SC 1480] , MCD v.
Gurnam Kaur [MCD v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101] ,
State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [State of M.P. v.
Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC
(Civ) 875 : AIR 2011 SC 1989] , Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd.
v. State of Orissa [Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of
Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 38] and Sant
Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. [Sant
Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd.,
(2010) 13 SCC 336 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 904]
28. We hold that Division Bench in Manav Dharam Trust [State
(NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 :
(2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] does not lay down the law correctly.
Given the several binding precedents which are available and
the provisions of the 2013 Act, we cannot follow the decision
in Manav Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav
Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611]
and overrule it. Shri S.N. Bhatt, learned counsel submitted
that in case this Court does not agree with the Manav Dharam
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. RAVINDER KUMAR
JAIN & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]
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Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust, (2017) 6
SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] , the case may be referred
to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India under the provisions
of Order 6 Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. He has
relied upon the decision of this Court in Vineeta Sharma v.
Rakesh Sharma [Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2019)
6 SCC 162 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 171] in which, in view of the
conflict of opinion of two Division Bench judgments [Prakash
v. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] ,
[Danamma v. Amar, (2018) 3 SCC 343 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ)
385] of this Court as to the interpretation of Section 6 of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the matter was referred to the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, for constituting an
appropriate Bench. However, in the instant case, the issue is
different, whether we have to follow the decision in Manav
Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust,
(2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] or the earlier
decisions of this Court mentioned above. It is apparent that
the decisions of the three-Judge Bench are binding on us,
and in view of other consistent decisions of this Court, we
have to follow them. It is not appropriate to refer the case to
larger Bench under Order 6 Rule 2 of the Supreme Court
Rules. We find no fault in the judgments laying down the law
that the purchase after Section 4 notification is void as against
the
State. We are not impressed with the submission raised on
behalf of the purchasers to refer the matter for the constitution
of a larger Bench to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. When
decisions of larger Bench and other Division Bench are
available, the case cannot be referred to a larger Bench.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. The earlier judgment of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v.
Manav Dharma Trust2 was held to be not laying down good law.
9. Subsequent thereto, Constitution Bench of this Court in Indore
Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others3 had reiterated
the same legal position that a subsequent buyer of the property after
2 (2017) 6 SCC 751
3 2020 SCC OnLine SC 316
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issuance of the notification under Section 4 the 1894 Act has no locus to
invoke Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Reference can be made to the
relevant paragraph of the judgement.
“340. …….. The beneficiaries i.e. landowners contemplated
under the proviso to Section 24(2), are the ones who were so
recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of issuance of
notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. The provision is
not meant to be invoked on the basis of void transactions,
and by the persons who have purchased on the basis of power
of attorney or otherwise, they cannot claim the benefit under
Section 24 as is apparent from the proviso to Section 24(2)
and the decision in Shiv Kumar v. Union of India”.
(emphasis supplied)
10. In the case in hand it is the admitted position on record that
notification under Section 4 of 1894 Act was issued on 25.11.1980 and
the sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 1 was registered on
18.6.2003. Rather it is evident from the affidavit filed by the Land
Acquisition Collector in the High Court that the respondent no.1 purchased
the land from Behl Brothers vide registered sale deed dated 18.06.2003,
who had purchased the same from M/s. Ansal Housing and Estates (P)
Ltd. vide sale deed dated 09.06.1981, which itself was after the issuance
of notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act on 25.11.1980. Hence,
the respondent will not have right to invoke jurisdiction of the High Court
to claim that the acquisition in question had
lapsed in view of Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act.
11. For the aforementioned reasons, the appeal is allowed. The
impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition
filed by the respondent No.1 in the High Court is dismissed.
Divya Pandey
Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. RAVINDER KUMAR
JAIN & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]