MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. versus STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 594, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Ratio
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[2016) 8 S.C.R. 594 
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. 
v. 
STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE 
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 231-233 of2009) 
DECEMBER 09, 2016 
[PINAi(! CHANDRA GHOSE AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.) 
Penal Code, 1860: ss.147, 148, 324, 307, 302 - Gruesome 
attack - Murder of 8 family members - 21 accused - Conviction 
C and sentence of life imprisonment for each count and sentence of 
imprisonment for 10 years ordered to run consecutively - On appeal, 
held: Prosecution case was well established by the testimonies of 
eye-witnesses and duly corroborated wherein factum of unlawful 
assembly was proved -Accused-appellants caused the death of eight 
persons in a barbaric and brutal manner wherein merciless killing 
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of a child of only 1 Yi years was also involved - Therefore, conviction 
is upheld -
However, life sentences so awarded cannot be directed 
to run consecutively. 
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Disposing of the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. In the present case, motive is seen in the 
collective testimony of eye-witnesses (PW1-PW3) when accused 
came out from the bushes shouting "kill them", "lrnck them", 
''fire tllem", as also mentioned in the complaint. A child was also 
mercilessly attacked in the incident with a spear on his chest. 
Accused no.7 snatched away the child from her mother and killed 
her too with velstick. Even PW4 (though not an eye-witness of 
whole occurrence) also hid in the nearby bushes to save his life. 
In his statement, he also corroborated the factum of hearing
shooting and also after identifying accused No.7, stated that "his 
wife was also killed by accused No.7 ••• ".Prosecution case was 
well established by the testimonies of eye-witnesses PW1-PW3 
G and corroborated by PW4, wherein factum of unlawful assembly 
was proved. 
[Paras 13, 14) [601-E-G; 602-H; 603-A] 
2. The accused-appellants did cause the death of eight 
persons in a barbaric and brutal manner wherein merciless killing 
of a child of only 1 Y, years is also involved. Therefore, the accused 
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MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REPRESENTED BY 
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INSPECTOR OF POLICE 
in the present case do not deserve any sympathy. The judgment A 
passed by the High Court as far as awarding of sentences is 
concerned is upheld. However, the sentences shall run in 
conformity with the observations made by the Constitution Bench 
of this Court in its judgment dat~d 19.07.2016 passed in these 
appeals. 
[Paras 20, 21] [605-E-G] 
Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan (1971) 3 SCC 471; Willie 
(William) Stanley v. State of MP. AIR 1956 SC 116 : 
1955 SCR 1140; Chhitarmal" State of Rajasthan 2003 
(1) SCR 49 : (2003) 2 SCC 266; Umesh Singh & Anr. 
v. State of Bihar (2000) 6 SCC 89; Mnhan Singh v. · 
State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 174 :- 1962 Supp (3) 
SCR 848; Mahadeo Singh v. State of Bihar (1970) 3 
SCC 46; Shambhunath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 
1960 SC 725; Mizaji v. State of UP AIR 1959 SC 
572 : 1959 Suppl. SCR 940 - relied on. 
Case Law Reference 
(1971) 3 sec 471 
relied on 
Para 10 
1955 SCR 1140 
relied on 
Para 11 
2003 (1) SCR 49 
relied on 
Para 12 
(2000) 6 sec 89 
relied on 
Para 14 
1962 Supp (3) SCR 848 
relied on 
Para 15 
(1970) 3 sec 46 
relied on 
Para 16 
AIR 1960 SC 725 
relied on 
Para 18 
1959 Suppl. SCR 940 
relied on 
Para 19 
' 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
Nos. 231-233 of2009. 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2007 of the Madurai 
Bench of Madras High Court in Crl. A. (MD) No. 323, 328 and 451 of G 
2006. 
WITH 
Crl. A.
Nos. 225, 226-227, 895 of2009 
Crl. A. No. 429 of2015. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
A. T. M. Ranga Ramanujam, Sr. Adv., K. K. Mani, Ms. T. Archana, 
Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Amit Kumar Chawla, E. V. S. Venugopal, Ms. 
· Anu Gupta, G. Sivabalamurugan, M. Theepa, Ms. Vandana, L. K. Pandey, 
Vinodh Kanna B. S. Prabhu Rama Subramanian, Advs. for the Appellants. 
M. Yogesh Kanna, Ms. Nithya, Advs. for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. I. Brief facts giving rise to 
the initiation of criminal proceedings in these cases are as follows: A 
gruesome incident occurred in Taluk Ramanathapuram, District Tamil 
Nadu in whiclt the appellants, the deceased and few witnesses were 
related to each other. As per prosecution case, on 10.02.1994, accused 
persons assembled unlawfully with deadly weapons and with the common 
intention to commit murder, they chased the family members of deceased 
Rajendran when they got down from the bus in the village near 
Karisalkulam Branch Road. They were coming back to their village 
after attending the cremation ofRajendran, who died in another case on 
09 .02.1994, and the appel !ants herein and few others were accused in 
that case. The accused persons, in a gruesome attack on the family 
members, murdered 8 persons, including one who succumbed to the 
injuries later in the Hospital. PW-I immediately after the occurrence 
proceeded to Kovilankulam Police Station and lodged the complaint, 
Ex.Pl. PW-22 who was the
Sub-Inspector of Police at Kovilankulam 
Police Station registered the case as Crime No.6of1994 under Sections 
147, 148, 324, 307, 302 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC") and under 
Section 25( I) of Indian Arms Act. After completing the investigation, 
PW-23 filed the charge-sheet against the accused persons under Sections 
147, 148, 324, 307, 506(ii), 307 & 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 
2. Originally there were 21 accused persons. Accused Chandran 
died during the investigation. Hence, 20 accused persons (Al to A20) 
were tried by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, 
Ramanathapuram. However, accused No. 7 - Murugan@ Kodarai died 
during the trial. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, 
Ramanathapuram, convicted A I to A6 and AS to A20 each and sentenced 
them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for various offences. A 18 -
Malaiyandi died during the pendency of the appeal before the High Cou1i. 
The learned Additional Sessions Judge found the occurrence to be a 
brutal and gruesome attack by the accused persons forming unlawful
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REPRESENTED BY 597 
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
assembly and causing death of eight persons, including a I Yi years child, 
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with a common objective of eliminating everyone in the deceased's family. 
3. Learned Additional Sessions Judge delivered his judgment on 
30.05.2006, holding all the accused persons guilty and sentenced them 
as follows: 
ACCUSED 
CONVICTION 
SENTENCE 
B 
A-I to A-6& AS to A20 
U/s 148 !PC 
RI for one year 
A-I to A-6, A-9 to Al3, 
U/s 302 r/w S.34 !PC 
Imprisonment for life 
& A-15 
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A-8 and A-I 7 
U/s 302 r/w S.34 !PC 
Imprisonment for life for 
(2 counts) 
each count 
A-1 to A-6, A-9 to A-13 
U/s 302 r/w S.149 
Imprisonment for life for 
A-15, A-16, A-I 8 to A-
(7 counts) 
each count 
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A-14 
U/s 302 r/w S.149 !PC Imprisonment for life 
(8 counts) 
for each count 
A-8 and A-17 
U/s 302 r/w S.149 !PC Imprisonment for life for 
(6 counts) 
each count 
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A-14andA15 
U/s 307 !PC 
RI for I 0 years 
A I to A6, AS to A 13 
U/s 307 r/w S.149 !PC RI for I 0 years 
and AI6 to A20 
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4. Against the judgment and order dated 30.05.2006 passed by 
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, criminal appeals were preferred 
before Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court. The High Court while 
disposing of Criminal Appeal Nos.313, 323, 328, 406, 451 and 539 of 
2006, found that there was no evidence to warrant conviction of AS, 
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A 13, A 19 and A20 in the instant case. However, the High Court found 
all
other accused guilty of eight barbaric murders and attempt to murder 
while forming unlawful assembly. The High Court, in paragraph 66 of its 
judgment, modified the conviction and sentence i111posed by the lower 
Comi as follows: 
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[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
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i. 
"Al to A4, A6, AS to Al 2 and Al4 to Al 7 are convicted 
under section I 4S !PC and sentenced to undergo rigorous 
imprisonment for one year; 
ii. Al to A4, A6, AS to Al2, Al4 to Al7 are convicted under 
section 302 read with Section 149 IPC(SCounts) instead of 
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302 read with 34 !PC and sentenced to undergo imprisonme11t_" 
for life for each count; 
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iii. We confirm the conviction of Al to A4, A6, AS to Al2 and 
Al 4 to Al 7 under Section 307 read with Section 34 !PC and 
sentence them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years; 
iv. We set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on A5, 
AJ3, Al9 and A20." 
The High Court in paragraph 73 of the impugned judgment, confirmed 
the direction given by the Trial Court that the sentences of life 
imprisonment imposed for each count and sentence of imprisonment for 
I 0 years, shall run consecutively. Aggrieved by the judgment and order 
dated 14.12.2007, passed by the High Court, the appellants have 
approached this Court invoking the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the 
Constitution oflndia. All the connected appeals were clubbed together 
for common adjudication since they are arising out of same impugned 
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judgment. 
5. Since legitimacy of the consecutive life sentences in the I ight of 
Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in sho11 'Cr.P.C.) was 
challenged in these appeals, before arriving at the conclusive findings, a 
three-Judge Bench of this
Court referred the matter to larger Bench 
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and the said larger Bench - Constitution Bench, vi de its judgment dated 
19.07.2016, examined the legitimacy of consecutive sentences of life 
imprisonment and held that "while multiple sentences of imprisonment 
for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences 
punishable with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded 
cannot be directed to run consecutively." The Constitution Bench 
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further held as follows: 
"The power of the Court to direct the order in which sentences 
will run is unquestionable in view of the language employed in 
Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. The Court can, therefore, legitimately 
direct that the prisoners shall first undergo the term sentence before 
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the commencement of his life sentence. Such a direction shall be
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REPRESENTED BY 
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INSPECTOR OF POLICE [PINAKl CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
perfectly legitimate and in tune with Section 31. The converse A 
however may not be true for ifthe Court directs the life sentence 
to start first it would necessarily imply that the term sentence 
would run concurrently: That is be.cause once the prisoner spends 
his life in jail, there is no question of his undergoing any further 
sentence." 
6. Therefore, th..: only substantial question which remains for our 
consideration in the present case is whether the High Court in the facts 
and circumstances of the case, was justified in modifying the conviction 
from that under Section 302 read with Section 34 lPC to that of Section 
302 read with Section 149 IPC. 
7. Mr. ATM Ranga Ramanujam, learned senior counsel appearing 
for the appellants submitted that in view of the deposition of PW 12, all 
the eye-witnesses (PWl-PW4) cannot be believed as it casts suspicion 
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on the prosecution version as it is admitted by PWl2 in his cross-
examination that he saw only three bodies strewed and no injured person 
at the place of occurrence. He further submitted that the investigation 
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has not been done properly in the present case, and therefore, the accused 
persons deserve to be acquitted. It was further submitted that there is 
substantive difference between Section 34 and Section 149 oflPC and 
substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 would result in prejudice to the
accused and $erefore the same ffi!lY not be permitted. Further, no 
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satisfactory explanation to such substitution was given. He further 
submitted that there was delay in the lodging ofFIR which creates doubts. 
8. Per contra, Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna, learned counsel for 
respondent submitted that the volunteered statement of AS was reduced 
into writing, being Exh.29, whereby 7 aruvals, I 0 velsticks, a toy gun and 
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3 knives were recovered and it was clearly spoken to by the prosecution 
witnesses that Al stabbed deceased (in short 'D') DI with velkambu on 
his stomach; A2, A3, A4,A6,AIO,Al4,Al8 attacked 04, 05, D6with 
velstick and aruval; A 7 attempted to attack PW3 with velstick; AS stabbed 
07 with velstick on his left arm; A9 attacked DI repeatedly with aruval; 
A 11 stabbed 02 on his stomach with velstick; A 12 stabbed 03 with 
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velstick on his stomach and chest, left thigh and other parts of body; A 15 
attacked 02 with aruval on his left hand; A 16 attacked 03 with aruval 
on his right hand; A 17 attacked 07 with aruval on his left hand. It was 
further submitted that all the accused were armed with sharp and deadly 
weapons and were hiding in the bushes. When the deceased came near H
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[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
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the place of occurrence, appellants attacked them shouting slogans that 
"kill them", "hack them" and thus their act itself substantiates the 
commission of crime within the meaning of Section 302 read with 149 of 
IPC. 
9. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the 
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averments made by the appellants in the present case are not sustainable 
as eye-witnesses have vividly spoken about the presence and modus-
operandi of the offence committed showing their motive, which are 
also essential ingredients to confirm conviction under Section 149 of 
IPC. The plea of the appellants that a weapon, like velstick, cannot 
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cause death was rightly rejected by the High Court as it was observed 
by the High Court that cut injury could have been caused by velstick, 
depending upon the manner in which the weapon was used. Since PW-
12 is.not the eye-witness of the occurrence, he cannot state any 
substantive part of the offence and the manner in which the offence 
would have been committed. It was lastly submitted by the learned counsel 
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for the respondent that albeit there was agitated atmosphere at the village, 
complaint was given the same day at 05:30 pm and thus there was no 
delay in lodging the FIR. 
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10. Having heard the learned i:;ounsel on both sides, the legality of 
the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149, has been found 
disputed. As regards the case in the light of common intention as
per 
Section 34 !PC, this Court in Devi Lal Vs. State of Rajastlum, ( 1971) 
3 sec 471, in para 13 held that "the words 'in furtherance of the 
common intention of all' are a most essential part of Section 34 of 
the Indian Penal Code. It is C0//1//1011 intention to commit the crime 
actually com//litted The common intention is anterior in ti/lie to the 
co111111issio11 of the crime. Common intention means a pre-arranged 
plan: " 
11. But th is case doesn't appear to fulfil I the essentials ofcommon 
intention. The·emphasis of such sort of constructive liability and the 
legality of conviction by applying Section 34 or Section 149 !PC, have 
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been examined by Courts in several cases. In Willie (William) Stanley 
Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1956 SC 1I6, it was held as follows: 
"Section 34, 114 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code provide 
for crill1inal liability viewed ji·om different angles as regarding 
actual participants, accessories and men actuated by a 
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co//lmon object or a common intention and 'the charge is
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REPRESENTED BY 601 
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
rolled-up one involving the direct liability and the constructive . A 
liability' without specifying who are directly liable and who 
are sought to be made constructively liable. In such a situation, 
the absence of a charge under one or other of the various 
heads of criminal liability for the offence cannot be said to 
be fatal by itself, and before a conviction for a substantive B 
offence without a charge can be set aside, prejudice will have 
to be made out." 
12. Moreover, a distinction between "common intention' and 
'common object' was made out by this Court in the case of Cflflitarmal 
Vs. State of Raja!itllan, (2003) 2 SCC 266 as under: 
"A clear distinction is made out between common intention 
and common object in that common intention denotes action 
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in concert and necessarily postulates the existence of a pre-
arranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds, while 
common object does not necessarily require proof of prior 
meeting of minds or pre-concert. Though there is substantial D 
difference between the two sections, they also to some extent 
overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of 
each case whether the charge under section 149 overlaps the 
ground covered by section 34." 
13. In the present case, motive is ~een in the collective testimony E 
of eye-witnesses PW1-PW3 when accused came out from the bushes 
shouting "kill them",
"hack them", "fire them", as also mentioned in 
the complaint Exhibit P-1. A child was also mercilessly attacked in the 
incident with a spear on his chest. Accused No.7-Muthuramalingam 
snatched away the child from her mother Indira Gandhi and killed her 
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too with velstick. 
14. Even PW4 (though not an eye-witness of whole occurrence) 
also hid in the nearby bushes to save his life. In his statement he also 
corroborated the factum of hearing shooting and also after identifying 
accused Muthuramlingam stated that "his wife was also killed by G 
accused 
Muthuramlingam 
with 
knife 
and 
accused 
Dhakshinamoorthi cut his wife with aruval". In a similar case of 
Umesfl Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Biflar, (2000) 6 SCC 89, this Court 
observed: 
"A report was made by Jugeshwar Singh (PW 7) alleging that 
the appellants herein along with several other persons H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 
numbering about 20 came to the "khalihan" (threshing floor) 
of Bhola Singh where he and other members of his family 
were threshing paddy. They tried to take away the paddy. 
Upendra Singh threatened that any resistance would be met 
with such action which mil;ht <!Ven result in death. Thereafter 
Rajendra Singh hit Bhola Singh with a lathi and Upendra 
Singh moved backwards awl fired at Bhola Singh with a gun 
as a result of which Bhola Singh was hit and fell down writhing 
i11 pain. Saryu Singh was shot at by Rajendra Singh and 
Bhagwat Dayal Singh, who was also inflicted a bhala-blow 
by Arvind Singh, appellant in the connected matter, Umesh 
Singh and Sheonandan Singh fired at Rajdeo Singh as a result 
of which he fell down. When Dharmshila, wife of Bhola Singh 
reached the threshing floor with her child aged about one-
and-a-halj-years old in her arms, named Rinku, Sheonandan 
Singh snatched the child and threw the child on the ground 
as a result of which the child died. After investigation, the 
police submWed a charge-sheet against seven persons named 
in the FIR as three of them, had died during the pendency of 
the investigation. The trial court convicted Sheonandan Singh 
and Upendra Singh under Section 302 !PC and sentenced 
them to death, one of the accused -
Satyendra Singh, was 
acquitted and the rest of the accused persons were convicted 
under Section 302 !PC read with Section 149 and
sentenced 
to life imprisonment. They were further convicted under 
Section 324 read with Section 148 !PC and under Sectio11 27 
of ihe Arms Act. On appeal to the High Court, conviction was 
maintained while the sentence of death on Sheonandan Singh 
and Upendra Singh was reduced from one of death to life 
imprisonment thereafter. Appeals have been preferred before 
this Court". 
And later at Para No.3 of the judgment it was held: 
"Therefore, there is ample evidence on record in the shape of 
the evidence of the eyewitnesses and the witnesses who had 
sustai11ed injuries, sounding a ring of truth to the prosecution 
case pul forward, with the trial court and the High Court 
having taken identical views, we do not think there is any 
good reason to upset those findings.". 
Thus, we are of the considered opinion that prosecution case has been
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REPRESENTED BY 603 
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
well established by the testimonies of eye-witnesses PWl-PW3 and 
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corroborated by PW 4, wherein factum ofunlawful assembly was proved. 
15. Before arriving at the conclusion, we wish to supply emphasis 
in the case of Mohan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 174 = 
192 Supp (3) SCR 848, where the law on common object in an unlawful 
assembly was explained as under: 
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. "8. The true legal position in regard to the essential ingredients 
of an offence specified by s.149 are not in doubt. Section 
149 prescribes for vicarious or constructive criminal liability 
for all members of an unlawful assembly where an offence is 
committed by any member of such an unlawful assembly in c 
prosecution of the common object of that assembly or such 
as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be 
committed in prosecution of that object. lt would thus be 
noticed that one of the essential ingredients of section 149 is 
that the offence must have been committed by any member of 
an unlmtful assembly, ands. 141 makes it clear that it is only D 
where jive or more persons constituted an assembly that an 
unlawful assembly is born, provided, of course; the other 
requirements of the said section as to the common object of 
the persons composing that assembly are satisfied. Jn other 
words, it is an essential condition of an unla'tlful assembly E 
that its membership must be five
or more." 
16. Moreover, in the case of Maluu/eo Singh Vs. State of Bihar, 
( 1970) 3 SCC 46, it was observed by this Court: 
"10. In the present case the facts and the circumstances show 
that the assault and the demolition of the stairs of the well 
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took place in the same transaction because the members of 
the unlawful assembly attacked Ram Prasad and his people 
and injured some of them simultaneously or in 'quick 
succession. Sarjug Mahto and Sura} Mahto both said that at 
the instigation of accused Ram Charan accused Manogi gave 
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a bhala blow near the left elbow of Sarjug Malito. Sarjug 
also said that accused Shea Pujan gave him a bhala blow 
below the elbow of the left hand and the appellant gave him 
a bhala blow on the finger of right hand. According to Suraj 
Mahto the appellant struck Smjug Mahto on the finger of 
his right hand. Suraj and Sarjug then raised an alarm. On 
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[2016) 8 S.C.R. 
hearing the alarm Ram Prasad, Bharat and Lakhan came. 
Ram Prasad protested to the accused against the attack on 
Sarjug Mahto. At the instigation of accused Ram Charan 
accused Rajballam struck Ram Prasad With a bhala. Ram 
Prasad fell down and died there. Ram Lakhan then struck 
Bharat with a garasa. Ram Charan struck him on the head 
with a bhala. The assailants then fled away. The evidence 
proves that the common object of all the members of the 
assembly was that murder was likely to be committed in 
prosecution of a common object, namely, to commit murder, 
assault, mischief and criminal trespass. All the members of 
the assembly were armed with weapons; they knew that murder 
was to be committed in prosecution of that object. It cannot, 
therefore, be said that the appellant is not guilty of the charge 
under Sections 3021149 of the Indian Penal Code." 
17. However, an overt act is not always an inflexible requirement 
of rule of law to establish culpability of a member of an unlawful 
assembly. The crucial question is whether the assembly entertained a 
common unlawful object and whether the accused was oi1e of the 
members of such an assembly by intentionally joining it or by continuing 
in it being aware of the facts which rendered the assembly unlawful. 
Without unlawful object no assembly becomes an unlawful assembly. 
18. Further, in paragraph 6 of Shamblumath Singh Vs. State of 
Bilwr, AIR
1960 SC 725, it was held by this Court: 
"Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is declaratory of the 
vicarious liability of the members of an unlawjiil assembly 
for acts done in prosecution of the common object of that 
assembly or for such offences as the members of the unlaHful 
assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of 
that object. If an unla11ful assembly is formed with the common 
object of committing an offence, and if that offence is 
committed in prosecution of the object by any member of the 
unlawful assembly, all the members of the assembly will be 
vicariously liablefor that offence even if one or more, but 
not all committed the offence. Again, if an offence is committed 
by a member of an unlm11ful assembly and that offence is one 
which the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely 
to be committed in prosecution of the common object, every 
member who had that knowledge will be guilty of the offence
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REPRESENTED BY 605 
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
so committed. But "members of an unlawful assembly may A 
have a community of object upto a certain point, beyond which 
they may differ in their objects, and the knowledge possessed 
by each member of what is likely to be committed in 
prosecution of their common object may vary not only 
according to the information at his command, but also B 
according to the extent to which he shares the community of 
object and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 
149 of the Indian Penal Code may be different on different 
members of the same unlawful assembly. "Jahiruddin v. Queen 
Empress, !LR 22 Cal 306." 
19. Furthermore, in the case of Mizaji Vs. State of UP, AIR 1959 C 
SC 572, this Court observed: 
"From this conduct it appears that members of the unlawful 
assembly were prepared lo take forcible possession al any 
cost and the murder must be held to be immediately connected 
with the common object and therefore the case falls D 
under s.149, Indian Penal Code and they are all guilty of 
murder. This evidence of Hansram and Matadin which relates 
to a point of time immediately before the firing of the pistol 
shows that the members of the assembly at least knew that the 
offence of murder was likely to be committed to accomplish 
the common object of forcible possession. " 
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20. After careful consideration of the submissions made by the 
learned counsel on both sides,
we are of the considered opinion that the 
accused-appellants did cause the death of eight persons in a barbaric 
and brutal manner wherein merciless killing of a child of only I Y2 years 
is also involved. Therefore, the accused in the present case do not deserve 
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any sympathy. 
21. Hence, all the criminal appeals filed by the appellants are sans 
merit and are liable to be dismissed. We uphold the judgment passed by 
the High.Court as far as awarding of sentences is concerned. However, 
the sentences shall run in conformity with the observations made by the G 
Constitution Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 19.07.2016 passed 
in these appeals. The impugned judgment passed by the High Court is 
modified to the above extent and all the appeals are disposed of 
accordingly. 
Devika Gujral 
Appeals disposed of. 
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