MISHRA AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.] versus SARAH C. URS & ORS.
[2019] 13 S.C.R. 1069, Supreme Court of India, 2019
Outcome: Disposed off
Segment: Ratio
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1069
SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS.
v.
SARAH C. URS & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No.6049 of 2007)
OCTOBER 24, 2019
[ARUN MISHRA AND  S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
Estoppel – When not attracted – Suit property let out to plaintiff
no.2 by the late father of defendant no.1 and defendant no.1 –
Father of defendant no.1, represented by defendant no.1 as power
of attorney, entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiffs for
Rs.1,50,000/- out of which Rs.1,00,000/- was received on the same
day – Plaintiffs continued to have the possession of suit property in
part performance of the agreement and stopped paying rent –
Defendant no.1 received the balance sale consideration from
plaintiff no.2 and undertook to execute the deed of conveyance –
Defendant no.1 was postponing to execute the registered sale deed
– Suit filed seeking specific performance – Trial court decreed the
suit – Affirmed by the High Court – Plea of defendants-appellants
that the agreement was with the father of defendant no.1 and not
with defendant no.1 who did not execute agreement of his share
and thus, the suit could not have been decree in toto – Held: Bare
reading of the agreement makes it clear that the “Vendors” was late
father of the defendant no.1 and not defendant no.1 – Defendant
no.1 acted as power of attorney – Said position may indicate that
plaintiffs were misled that only father of defendant no.1 was the
exclusive owner of the property – However, the statement of
plaintiff
no.2 clearly indicates that he was well aware of the fact that the
property devolved upon, in equal shares and that it was a joint
family property – Ownership of the defendant no.1 was known to
the plaintiffs and in spite of that they did not set up the case to bind
his share – They did not plead in the plaint that defendant no.1
owned the property – In the plaint, the plaintiffs did not take the
plea of estoppel  and now the case was set up that property had
been sold by defendant no.1 in his capacity – In view of the
agreement and the admission made by the plaintiffs, decree passed
 [2019] 13 S.C.R. 1069
1069
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1070
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
by the courts below modified to the extent of 50 per cent of the
shares of the late father of defendant no.1 and is set aside with
respect to the remaining ½ share of the defendant no.1 – Trial court
to divide the property in two equal proportions and it be given to
the parties – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.15 – Income Tax Act,
1961 – s.230-A.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The concurrent findings are recorded as to
receipt of consideration and execution of the agreement to sell.
There is no doubt about it that Plaintiff No.2 was earlier a counsel
and legal advisor to father of defendant no.1, but when the
agreement had been executed, he was not a lawyer and became a
Judge of the High Court. There are concurrent findings recorded
concerning the execution of the agreement, and it has been rightly
found established that signatures were not obtained on blank
papers. There is concurrent finding recorded by the courts below
that consideration has been paid. Thus, no case for interference
is made out in the aforesaid findings. The courts below have found
that correspondence was made by defendants No.1 to obtain
Income Tax clearance. The suit has been held not to be barred
by limitation. Given the facts and material placed on record, no
interference is called for with those findings also. [Paras 16,
17][1076-A-C]
1.2  A bare reading of the agreement makes it clear that
agreement is between late father of
defendant no.1 through power
of attorney, Defendant No.1. The “Vendors” is mentioned as late
father of defendant no.1 and not defendant no.1. Thus, it cannot
be said that defendant no.1 had executed the agreement on his
behalf, concerning his share in the property. There is no whisper
about the same in the agreement. The position mentioned above
may indicate that plaintiffs were misled by the Power of Attorney
holder that only late  father of defendant no.1 was the exclusive
owner of the property.  When the statement of Plaintiff No.2 is
considered it clearly indicates that he was well aware of the fact
that Princess Leelavathi owned the property and upon her death
the property devolved upon, in equal shares and he was aware of
the other sale deeds executed (Exhs. P 43, P-44, P-45, P-46).  It
is clear that plaintiff No.2 was aware as to the extant title of
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1071
defendant no.1 in the property and also the fact that it was a joint
family property. In the plaint, the plaintiffs have not taken the
plea of estoppel, and now the case was set up that property had
been sold by defendant no.1 in his capacity without any such plea
in the plaint. Thus, plaintiff No.2 was well aware of the fact as to
the title of defendant no.1 in the property and that late father of
defendant no.1 did not exclusively own the property. [Paras
20][1079-A-D]
1.3 There was no possibility of erroneous beliefs in the mind
of the plaintiffs as to title position in the property. No doubt about
it that defendant No.1 acted as a power of attorney, but at the
same time, did not act in his capacity as the owner of the property.
The ownership of defendant no.1 was known to the plaintiffs. In
spite of that the plaintiffs have not set up the case to bind his
share. They have not pleaded in the plaint that defendant no.1
owned the property. There is no whisper as to his title in the
plaint. They needed to plead the facts to attract the plea of
estoppel. That has not been done. Thus, the agreement which
had been executed was not concerning share of defendant No.1,
but of his late father as his power of attorney. [Paras 22][1081-
F-G]
1.4 In view of the agreement and the admission made by
the plaintiffs, it is appropriate to modify the decree passed by the
courts below to the extent of 50 per cent of the shares of the
deceased late father of defendant no.1
and to set it aside with
respect to the remaining ½ share of defendant No.1 in the
property, since the property devolved under section 15 of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956.  The plaintiffs to be entitled only to
the extent of ½ share in the suit property. The decree to the
remaining extent is set aside.  The plaintiffs would not be entitled
to refund of any consideration as by now the worth of property
has increased manifold. The trial court to divide the property in
two equal proportions and it be given to the parties. The division
be carried out within four months by the Trial Court.
[Paras 23-25][1081-H; 1082-A-C]
R.S. Madanappa (deceased) v. Chandramma & Anr.
AIR 1965 SC 1812 : [1965] SCR 283 – relied on.
SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1072
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
Case Law Reference
[1965] SCR 283
relied on
Para 18
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6049
of 2007.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.08.2007 of the High Court
of  Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 143 of 2000.
With
Civil Appeal No. 6050 of 2007.
A. K. Ganguli, V. Krishnamurthy, Sr. Advs., T. Harish Kumar,
Yuthister Singh, Navneet Dugar, Parijat Sinha, Advs. for the Appellants.
Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Adv., Ms. Anushree Menon, Vikas Mehta,
Abhishek, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. The appeals are preferred against the judgment and order dated
13.8.2007 passed by the High Court, affirming the judgment and order
of the trial court decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific
performance of an agreement of sale.
2. The plaintiffs filed the suit concerning suit scheduled property
inherited by Princess Leelavathi, wife of late K. Basavaraja Urs. She
had adopted the defendant No.1 and died during the year 1958-59. The
suit scheduled property along with adjoining properties devolved on late
K. Basavaraja Urs, father of K.B. Ramachandra Raj Urs, defendant
No.1, in terms of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The
Plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were the close relatives and friend of the family of
late K. Basavaraja Urs and the 2nd plaintiff apart from being a close
relative and friend of Defendant No.1, was also a Legal Advisor and
Advocate of
late K. Basavaraja Urs.
3. The property was let out to plaintiff No.2 in the year 1969 by
late K. Basavaraja Urs and defendant No.1. Late K. Basavaraja Urs
and defendant No.1 sold the adjoining property to various persons vide
registered sale deeds. Late K. Basavaraja Urs offered to sell the suit
scheduled property to the plaintiffs. On 24.4.1979, late K. Basavaraja
Urs, represented by his son, i.e., defendant No.1 as power of attorney,
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1073
entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiffs for a consideration
of Rs.1,50,000/- out of which a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was received on
the same day. The defendant No.1 agreed to obtain a clearance certificate
under section 230-A of the Income Tax Act as also under the provisions
of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. The plaintiffs continued to have the
possession of suit property in part performance of the agreement dated
24.04.1979 and stopped paying rent.
4. The defendant No.1 always ensured the plaintiffs to execute
the registered sale deed in terms of suit agreement after obtaining a
clearance certificate from the Income Tax Department and under the
Urban Land Ceiling Act. On 1.6.1993, defendant No.1 received the
balance sale consideration of Rs.50,000/- from 2nd plaintiff and executed
a stamped receipt in favour of the plaintiffs with an undertaking to execute
the deed of conveyance.
5. The defendant No.1, made the correspondence with the Income
Tax Department to obtain the Income Tax clearance. However, the need
to seek permission under the Urban Land Ceiling Authority vanished as
per the decision of this Court concerning section 27 of the said Act as
defendant No.1 was postponing to execute the registered sale deed on
one pretext or the other.  A legal notice dated 5.6.1990 was served, and
after that, the suit had been filed on 19.9.1990 seeking specific
performance.
6. Defendant Nos.1, 2, and 4 in their written statements contended
that the 2nd
plaintiff claimed to be a close relative of late K. Basavaraja
Urs. He was his lawyer and self-assumed trustee. He obtained the
signatures of defendant no.1 on blank papers, which has been misused
by the 2nd plaintiff to create the agreement in question dated 24.4.1979.
It was assured that agreement was obtained as a collateral document to
secure professional charges, which, according to the plaintiff, remained
unpaid.
7. The defendants denied the receipt of the sale consideration on
24.4.1979 and 1.6.1993 and also the subsequent correspondence between
plaintiff No.2 and defendant No.1 and his Tax Consultant.  The 2nd plaintiff
was never permitted to put up construction on the property by the
defendant No.1. After the demise of Princess Leelavathi, the suit property
devolved on late K. Basavaraja Urs and defendant No.1. The 1st defendant
has not conveyed his interest in the suit property in favour of plaintiffs.
SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1074
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
Defendants contended that no agreement was entered into with the
plaintiffs. The suit is barred by time.
8. Defendant No.5, in his written statement, took the plea that the
property being ancestral could not have been sold by defendant No.1 to
the detriment of the 5th defendant. There was no legal necessity to sell
the property.
9. The trial court decreed the suit and recorded a finding that the
agreement has been executed on 24.4.1979. The defendant No.1 has
admitted his signatures on the suit agreement dated 24.4.1979 and receipt
dated 1.6.1983. Defendant No.1 for himself and as a power of attorney
holder of late K. Basavaraja Urs, executed the suit agreement and,
therefore, he cannot be permitted to contend that he is not a party to the
suit agreement in his individual capacity. They were required to obtain
an income tax clearance certificate and after that to execute the registered
sale deed, in which they have failed. Late K. Basavaraja Urs owned
vast landed and house properties at Bangalore and Mysore. They were
statutorily bound to obtain a clearance certificate from the Income Tax
Department, and as they failed to obtain it, they cannot be permitted to
contend that suit is barred by limitation. The High Court has affirmed
the findings of the trial court.
10. The High Court has disbelieved the case set up by defendant
No.1 that he had put his signatures on blank paper. Plaintiff No.2 was
appointed as Judge of
the High Court during September 1978; therefore,
on 24.4.1979, there was no fiduciary relationship between them.  Plaintiffs
have also produced the original stamped receipt dated 1.6.1983 (Exhibit
P-19) admitting the receipt of remaining Rs.50,000 by defendants No.1
in which a sum of Rs.42,000 was paid in cash and Rs.8,000 was paid by
cheque. Defendant No.1 had admitted his signatures on Exh. P-19.
Defendant No.1 also admitted that he had encashed the cheque. The
plea of the 1st defendant is false and thus cannot be accepted. The High
Court has also referred to the order passed by the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal wherein the claim of 2nd plaintiff for exemption of Rs.50,000
under the Income Tax Act, paid to 1st defendant towards the remaining
sale consideration was allowed in terms of section 54(F) of Income Tax
Act.
11. The High Court has further found that the defendant has taken
an inconsistent and contrary stand. The defendant was visiting 2nd plaintiff
all along insisting on obtaining Income Tax Clearance Certificate, which
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1075
was postponed by the defendant No.1 on one pretext or the other. The
consideration has been paid under the agreement dated 24.4.1979.
12. The High Court has found that defendant No.1 has executed
the agreement not only as power of attorney for his father but also as a
son of late K. Basavaraja Urs. The stand of defendant No.1 is inconsistent.
Defendant No.1, allowed the plaintiffs to put up the construction in the
suit property. Thus, he was precluded from contending that he was not a
party to the agreement. The High Court has also held that defendant
No.1 has entered into the agreement and the entire consideration has
been received, it is not considered appropriate to grant the liquidated
damage or penalty for the breach of contract. The High Court has also
held that the property was held by Princess Leelavathi, wife of late
K. Basavaraja Urs, and after her death, the suit property devolved on
late K. Basavaraj Urs and defendant No.1 under section 15 of Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.
13. It was submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellants that plaintiff No.2, M.P. Chandrakanta Raj Urs, was
elevated as Judge of the High Court. Earlier, he was the Legal Advisor
of the late K. Basavaraja Urs. Thus, he could not have purchased the
property.  The agreement was not duly executed, and the suit was barred
by limitation.  The findings have been recorded that property was inherited
by K.B. Ram Chandra Raj Urs, i.e., defendant No. 1 from
Princess
Leelavathi. The agreement was with late K. Basavaraja Urs and not
with defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 did not execute agreement of his
share. The Courts below erred in decreeing the suit in toto. The suit
could have been decreed to the extent of the shares of the late
K. Basavaraja Urs.
14. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents
has supported the judgment and decree passed by the courts below. It is
further submitted that no case for interference is made out in the appeals
given the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the courts below. The
appeals deserve to be dismissed.
15. We deem it appropriate to place on record that learned counsel
for the parties had taken time to file the compromise, if reached. We
have been informed that no compromise could be arrived at between
the parties. Be that as it may. We proceed to decide the appeals on
merits.
SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1076
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
16. The concurrent findings are recorded as to receipt of
consideration and execution of the agreement to sell. There is no doubt
about it that M.P. Chandrakanta Raj Urs (Plaintiff No.2) was earlier a
counsel and legal advisor to K. Basavaraja Urs, but when the agreement
had been executed, he was not a lawyer and became a Judge of the
High Court. There are concurrent findings recorded concerning the
execution of the agreement, and it has been rightly found established
that signatures were not obtained on blank papers. There is concurrent
finding recorded by the courts below that consideration has been paid.
Thus, no case for interference is made out in the aforesaid findings.
17. The courts below have found that correspondence was made
by defendants No.1 to obtain Income Tax clearance. The suit has been
held not to be barred by limitation. Given the facts and material placed
on record, no interference is called for with those findings also.
18. Learned senior counsel submitted that agreement to sell dated
24.4.1979 was between “late K. Basavaraja Urs and “Smt. Sarah
C. Urs’, wife of M.P. Chandrakantaraj Urs and P. Chandrakantaraj Urs,
son of Late R. Putturaj Urs”. There was no dispute concerning ½ share
of K.B. Ram Chandra Raj Urs, which he had inherited from Princess
Leelavathi. Thus, the suit could not have been decreed in toto; it could
have been decreed only to the extent of the share of late K. Basavaraja
Urs
in the property. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the
decision of this Court in R.S. Madanappa (deceased) v. Chandramma
& Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1812.
19. The statement of plaintiff No. 2 has been pointed out, indicating
that he was aware that there were equal shares of K. Basavaraja Urs
and K. B. Ramchandra Raj Urs (defendant No.1) in the property. Thus,
plaintiff No.2 cannot plead that they were induced by erroneous belief
while entering into agreement, by the conduct of defendant No.1. The
plea of estoppel is, thus, not attracted. There is no proper foundation in
the pleading regarding the plea of estoppel. The submission raised by
learned counsel on behalf of respondent is that defendant No.1 acted as
power of attorney holder of his father and received the sale consideration
also. As such he is bound by the plea of estoppel to contend to the
contrary.
20. It is necessary to consider the agreement. The agreement is
extracted hereunder:
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1077
 “THIS AGREEMENT TO SELL is made on 24th day of April
1979 BETWEEN SRI K. BASAVARAJ URS, son of Late
Sri Muddaraj Urs, aged about 84 years, residing at 1-A (old No.5),
Palace Road, Bangalore – 560 001 (hereinafter referred to as the
“VENDOR” which expression shall unless the context otherwise
required include the heirs, assigns, administrators, successors and
legal representatives of the VENDOR) of the one part AND
SMT. SARAH C. URS, the wife of Sri M.P. Chandrakantaraj
Urs and SRI P CHANDRAKANTARAJ URS, son of late Sri R
Putturaj Urs, residing at 1B Palace Road, Bangalore – 560001,
(hereinafter called the “PURCHASERS” which expression shall
unless the context otherwise requires to include their heirs, assigns,
administrators, successors and legal representatives of the other
part.
  WHEREAS the VENDOR is the absolute owner of the
property at 1B, Palace Road, Bangalore – 560001, an whereas
the VENDOR is desirous of disposing of the said house together
with the plot of land, fixtures, fittings, etc. of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh Fifty Thousand only) and the PURCHASERS are
agreeable to buy the same at the said price.
NOW THEREFORE, THIS DEED/ WITNESSETH AS
FOLLOWS:
(1) That the VENDOR shall free from encumbrances the said
property situated at q-B Palace Road, Bangalore – 560 001,
and the PURCHASER shall buy the same at the said prices
and on the conditions hereinafter mentioned;
(2) That the said property consists of a single-storeyed house
with the
following boundaries:-
On the EAST: No.1-C
On the WEST: Vacant land of VENDOR
On the NORTH: Storm Drain
On the SOUTH: By Common Road
(3) That the consideration of the house shall be payable as
follows:-
SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1078
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
A sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only) paid on the
date of this agreement and the balance of Rs.5,40,000/-
(Rupees Fifty Thousand only payable on or before 23.4.1984.
(4) The VENDOR has delivered possession of the house, which
is the subject matter of this agreement to the PURCHASERS
on this day.
(5) This agreement shall subject to permission, express or implied,
being granted under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act. In the event such permission is not granted, the advance
of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) paid shall be
refunded to the PURCHASERS by the VENDOR:
(6) That in the event of the sale not materializing through the
default of the VENDOR, the amount of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh Only) shall be refunded to the PURCHASERS
with interest at 10 percent per annum from the date hereof to
the date of refund;
(7) That in the event of the sale not materializing through the
default of the PURCHASERS, 10 percent of the
consideration money shall be forfeited as earnest money and
the balance refunded by the VENDOR to the
PURCHASERS out of the advance of Rs.1,00,000/-
(Rupees One lakh only) received by the former;
(8) VENDOR or his Power of Attorney shall cause all licences
etc., to be sanctioned for any additions or alterations to be
made to the premise before the actual transfer of title in terms
of this agreement.
IN WITNESS where of the parties have set their hands the
day and the year first
above mentioned.
Sd/-
SELLER
WITNESSES:
1. Sd/-
2. Sd/-
   PURCHASERS”
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1079
A bare reading of the agreement described above makes it clear
that agreement is between late K. Basavaraja Urs through power of
attorney, K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. The “Vendors” is mentioned as
K. Basavaraja Urs and not K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. Thus, it cannot
be said that K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs had executed the agreement on
his behalf, concerning his share in the property. There is no whisper
about the same in the agreement. The position mentioned above may
indicate that plaintiffs were misled by the Power of Attorney holder that
only late K. Basavaraja Urs was the exclusive owner of the property.
When we consider the statement of M.P Chandrakanta Raj Urs (Plaintiff
No.2), it clearly indicates that he was well aware of the fact that Princess
Leelavathi owned the property and upon her death the property devolved
upon, in equal shares and he was aware of the other sale deeds executed
(Exhs. P 43, P-44, P-45, P-46). It is clear that plaintiff No.2 was aware
as to the extant title of K.B. Ram Chandra Raj Urs in the property and
also the fact that it was a joint family property. In the plaint, the plaintiffs
have not taken the plea of estoppel, and now the case was set up that
property had been sold by defendant No.1 in his capacity without any
such plea in the plaint. Thus, plaintiff No.2 was well aware of the fact as
to the title of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs in the property and that late
K. Basavaraja Urs did not exclusively own the property.
21. The plea
of estoppel in view the decision of this court in R.S.
Madanappa (deceased) v. Chandramma & Anr., (supra) is not
attracted, in which the Court has held that estoppel by conduct could not
arise when a person concerned knew the right position relating to the
title in property in his possession, he could not plead that he was induced
to hold an erroneous belief because of the conduct of real owner of that
property. This court has observed thus:
“6. We will consider the question of estoppel first. The conduct of
the first defendant from which the learned counsel wants us to
draw the inference of estoppel consists of her attitude when she
was served with a notice by the plaintiff, her general attitude
respecting Bangalore properties as expressed in the letter dated
17th January 1941, written by her to her stepmother and the
attestation by her and her husband on 3rd October 1944, of the
will executed on 25th January 1941 by Maddanappa. In the notice
dated 26th January 1948, by the plaintiff’s lawyer to the first
defendant it was stated that the plaintiff and the first defendant
SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1080
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
were joint owners of the suit properties which were in possession
of their father and requested for the cooperation of the first
defendant in order to effect the division of the properties. A copy
of this notice was sent to Maddanappa, and he sent a reply to it to
the plaintiff’s lawyers. The first defendant, however, sent no reply
at all. We find it difficult to construe the conduct of the first
defendant in not replying to the notice and is not cooperating with
the plaintiff in instituting a suit for obtaining possession of the
properties as justifying the inference of estoppel. It does not mean
that she impliedly admitted that she had no interest in the properties.
It is true that in Ex. 15, which is a letter sent by her on 17th
January 1941, to her stepmother she has observed thus:
“I have no desire whatsoever in respect of the properties
which are at Bangalore. Everything belongs to my father.
He has the sole authority to do anything…. We give our
consent to anything done by our father. We will not do
anything.”
But even these statements cannot assist the appellants because
admittedly, the father knew the true legal position. That is to say;
the father knew that these properties belonged to Puttananjamma
and that he had no authority to deal with these properties. No
doubt, in his written statement, Maddanappa had set up a case
that the properties belonged to him by virtue of the declaration
made by
Puttananjamma at the time of her death, but that case
has been negatived by the courts below. The father’s possession
must, therefore, be deemed to have been, to his knowledge, on
behalf of the plaintiff and the first defendant. There was thus no
possibility of an erroneous belief about his title being created in
the mind of Maddanappa because of what the first defendant had
said in her letter to her stepmother.
7. Insofar as the attestation of the will is concerned, the appellants’
position is no better. This “will” purports to make a disposition of
the suit properties along with other properties by Maddanappa in
favour of Defendants 3 to 8. The attestation of the will by the first
defendant and her husband, would no doubt affix them with the
knowledge of what Maddanappa was doing, but it cannot operate
as estoppel against them and in favour of Defendants 3 to 8 or
even in favour of Maddanappa. The will could take effect only
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1081
upon the death of Maddanappa and, therefore, no interest in the
property had at all accrued to Defendants 3 to 8, even on the date
of the suit. So far as Maddanappa is concerned, he, as already
stated, knew the true position and, therefore, could not say that an
erroneous belief about his title to the properties was created in his
mind by reason of the conduct of the first defendant and her
husband in attesting the document. Apart from that, there is nothing
on the record to show that by reason of the conduct of the first
defendant Maddanappa altered his position to his disadvantage.
8. Mr. Venkatarangaiengar, however, says that subsequent to the
execution of the will, he had effected further improvements in the
properties and for this purpose, spent his own moneys. According
to him, he would not have done so in the absence of assurance
like the one given by the first defendant and her husband to the
effect that they had no objection to the disposition of the suit
properties by him in any way he chose to make it. The short
answer to this is that Maddanappa, on his own allegations, was
not only in possession and enjoyment of these properties ever
since the death of Putananjamma but had made improvements in
the properties even before the execution of the will. In these
circumstances, it is clear that the provisions of Section 115 of the
Indian Evidence Act, which contain the law of estoppel by
representation, do not help him.”
22. Thus, it is clear that
there was no possibility of erroneous
beliefs in the mind of the plaintiffs as to title position in the property. No
doubt about it that defendant No.1 has acted as a power of attorney, but
at the same time, did not act in his capacity as the owner of the property.
The ownership of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs was known to the plaintiffs.
In spite of that the plaintiffs have not set up the case to bind the share of
K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. They have not pleaded in the plaint that
K.B Ramchandra Raj Urs owned the property. There is no whisper as
to the title of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs in the plaint. They needed to
plead the facts to attract the plea of estoppel. That has not been done.
Thus, the agreement which had been executed was not concerning share
of defendant No.1, but of late K. Basavaraja Urs as his power of attorney.
23. In view of the agreement and the admission made by the
plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate to modify
the decree passed by the courts below to the extent of 50 per cent of the
SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1082
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 13 S.C.R.
shares of the deceased late K. Basavaraja Urs and to set it aside with
respect to the remaining ½ share of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs
(defendant No.1) in the property, since the property devolved under
section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act.
24. Thus, we hold that the plaintiffs to be entitled only to the extent
of ½ share in the suit property. The decree to the remaining extent is set
aside. The plaintiffs would not be entitled to refund of any consideration
as by now the worth of property has increased manifold.
25. We direct the trial court to divide the property in two equal
proportions and it be given to the parties. Let the division be carried out
within four months by the Trial Court. The appeals are allowed to the
extent mentioned above. No costs.
Divya Pandey
Appeals disposed of.