BALVIR SINGH versus STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[2023] 12 S.C.R. 815, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Issues
CASE DETAILS
BALVIR SINGH
v.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
(Criminal Appeal No. 301 of 2015)
OCTOBER 06, 2023
[J. B. PARDIWALA AND PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: The High Court aﬃ  rmed the judgment and 
order of conviction passed by the Trial Court holding appellant-husband 
guilty of the oﬀ ence of murder punishable u/s.302 of the IPC alongwith the 
oﬀ ence punishable u/s. 498A of the IPC and appellant-mother-in-law guilty 
of the oﬀ ence punishable u/s. 498A of the IPC r/w. 34 of the IPC, whether 
the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment 
and order.
Penal Code, 1860 – s.302, s.498A – Prosecution case was that victim 
died due to poisoning – At the time of death only her appellant-husband 
was present – Poison was found in the examination of viscera of the 
deceased – Appellant-husband had not informed family of victim after 
her death – Earlier, victim-deceased had written letters to her family 
informing them regarding harassment from her appellant-husband and 
appellant-mother-in-law for dowry:
Held: The cause of death was due to poisoning – The poison detected 
in the viscera was aluminium phosphide, which is used a fumigant to control 
the insects and rodents – Defense of the convicts to say that the presence of 
aluminium phosphide in the viscera could be due to the medicines which 
the deceased used to take for her heart ailment cannot be accepted – No 
evidence led by the appellant-husband that he had taken victim
to the hospital 
in Delhi – The dubious conduct of the convict-husband of not informing the 
family members about the death of their daughter – In the case on hand it 
has been established or rather proved to the satisfaction of the court that the 
deceased was in company of her husband i.e., the appellant-convict at a point 
[2023] 12 S.C.R. 815 : 2023 INSC 879
815
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
816
of time when something went wrong with her health and therefore, in such 
circumstances the appellant-convict alone knew what happened to her until 
she was with him – Appellant-convict (husband) has not explained in any 
manner as to what had actually happened to his wife more particularly when 
it is not in dispute that the appellant-convict was in company of his wife i.e., 
deceased – Although, the appellant-convict tried to project a picture that no 
sooner the deceased fell sick than he immediately took her to the Hospital at 
Delhi – If it is his case, that his wife was declared dead on being brought at 
the hospital then it is diﬃ  cult to believe that the hospital authorities allowed 
the appellant to carry the dead body back home without completing the 
legal formalities – The circumstances in the instant case constitute more 
than a prima facie case to enable the prosecution to invoke s.106 of the 
Evidence Act and shift the burden on the accused husband to explain what 
had actually happened on the date his wife died – Section 106 does not cast 
any burden upon an accused in a criminal trial, but that, where the accused 
throws no light at all upon the facts which ought to be especially within his 
knowledge, and which could support any theory of hypothesis compatible 
with his innocence, the Court can also consider his failure to adduce any 
explanation, in consonance with the principle of the passage in Deonandan
Mishra – The courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner 
and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities, 
perfunctory investigation or insigniﬁ cant lacunas in the evidence – In result, 
both the appeals fail. [Paras 29,52,53,56,61 and 62]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Applicability – Meaning of word 
“especially”:
Held: s.106 of the Evidence Act provides that when any fact is 
especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that 
fact is upon him – The word “especially” means facts that are pre-eminently 
or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused – The ordinary rule 
that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to 
prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modiﬁ ed by the rule of facts 
embodied in s.106 of the Evidence Act – s.106 of the Evidence Act is an 
exception to s.101 of the Evidence Act. [Para 34]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 does not absolve the prosecution from 
duty of proving crime:
817
Held: Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the 
prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of 
the accused – This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the 
prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to 
establish the oﬀ ence – It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of 
proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter speciﬁ cally 
within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden of 
the accused to show that no crime was committed. [Para 42]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Distinction exists between the burden 
of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence:
Held: Generally, the burden of proof upon any aﬃ  rmative proposition 
necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but 
the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one 
side to the other according to the testimony – Thus, if the prosecution has 
oﬀ ered evidence which if believed by the court would convince them of the 
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is in a position where 
he should go forward with counter-vailing evidence if he has such evidence 
– When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden 
is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an 
aﬃ  rmative or negative one – He is not required to do so even though a 
prima facie case has been
established, for the court must still ﬁ nd that he 
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict – However, the 
accused's failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the 
court as conﬁ rming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented 
by the prosecution or as conﬁ rming presumptions which might have been 
rebutted. [Para 46]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – “Prima facie” in context of s.106:
Held: Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the 
prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a 
reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. [Para 48]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer AIR 1956 SC 404 : [1956] 
SCR 199; Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar (2021) 10 SCC 725; Tulshiram 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
818
Sahadu Suryawanshi and Another v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 10 SCC 
373 : [2012] 7 SCR 1083; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra
(2006) 10 SCC 681 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 156; State of W.B. v. Mir 
Mohammad Omar and Others (2000) 8 SCC 382 : [2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 
712; Ram Gulam Chaudhary and Others v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC 
311 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 279; Deonandan Mishra v. The State of Bihar 
AIR 1955 SC 801; Kalu alias Laxminarayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh 
(2019) 10 SCC 211 : [2019] 14 SCR 327; Sawal Das v. State of Bihar (1974) 
4 SCC 193 : [1974] 3 SCR 74 – relied on.
Leland v. State 343 U.S. 790=96 L.Ed. 1302; Raﬀ el v. U.S. 271 U.S. 
294=70 L.Ed. 1054 – referred to.
Smith v. R. 1918 A.I.R. Mad. 111 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
301 of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.03.2014 of the High Court of 
Uttarakhand at Nainital in CRLA No.273 of 2013.
With
Criminal Appeal No. 2430 of 2014.
Appearances:
Manisha Bhandari, Omkar Shrivastava, Divyadeep Chaturvedi, Ayush 
Jain, Dhruv Chandra, Shashwat Sidhant, Advs. for the Appellant.
Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Krishnam Mishra, Param Kumar Mishra, 
Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra, Advs. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.:
1. Since both the captioned appeals arise from a common judgment 
and order passed by the
High Court dismissing two criminal appeals of two
819
accused persons tried in one sessions case those were heard analogously 
and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 
2. These appeals are at the instance of two convicts and are directed 
against a common judgment and order dated 24.03.2014 passed by the High 
Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in the Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 2013 
and Criminal Appeal No. 274 of 2013 respectively by which the High Court 
dismissed both the appeals and thereby aﬃ  rmed the judgment and order of 
conviction passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge Kotdwar, 
Garhwal in the Sessions Trial No. 48 of 2008 holding Balvir Singh (husband) 
guilty of the oﬀ ence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the Indian 
Penal Code, 1860, (for short, ‘the IPC’) alongwith the oﬀ ence punishable 
under Section 498A of the IPC and Maheshwari Devi (mother-in-law) guilty 
of the oﬀ ence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC read with Section 
34 of the IPC. 
CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
3. The deceased, namely, Sudha was married to Balvir Singh. The 
marriage of the deceased with Balvir Singh was solemnised on 12.12.1997. 
In the wedlock a son was born. On 02.06.2007, father of the deceased, 
namely, Virendra Singh (PW1) preferred an application in the court of the 
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kotdwar, Garhwal under Section 156(3) 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’), seeking a direction 
to the Police to register an FIR in connection with the death of
his daughter 
in suspicious circumstances. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kotdwar, 
Garhwal, passed the following order dated 04.06.2006:
“Order
04.06.2006 
Applicant Virendra Singh had ﬁ led application under section 156(3) 
Cr.P.C. for passing order for registration of First Information Report 
against accused persons, wherein, applicant has mentioned as under that 
marriage of daughter of applicant Sudha had been solemnized on 12.12.1997 
with Balvir Singh son of late Mahavir Singh, resident of village Ratanpur, 
Kumbhuchau, Halqa-Saneh, Kotdwar, Garhwal at Uttari Jhandichaur, Police 
Station Kotdwar and out of their wedlock, one son was born to them. After 
sometime from solemnization of marriage Balvir Singh and Smt. Maheshwari 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
820
Devi mother of Balvir Singh connived together and started harassing my 
daughter in diﬀ erent ways and started raising demand of Rs. One lakh cash 
in dowry. Applicant’s daughter informed applicant about the same through 
letters. Balvir Singh has been working in a Private Nursing Home in Delhi 
and he is very well acquainted with medicines. According to the Applicant, 
Balvir Singh before committing murder of his daughter managed to arrange 
fake prescription slips which he has kept with him. Despite reluctance of 
his daughter, on 09.05.07 Balvir left his son at Kotdwar and forcibly took 
my daughter Sudha who was in healthy condition to Mangolpuri, Delhi. 
Before leaving, Applicant’s daughter expressed her wish to her uncle over 
telephone about her reluctance for going to Delhi. On 13.05.07 at about 
1.30 o’clock in the night Applicant’s younger brother Harender Singh 
received information from Delhi over phone that his daughter Sudha has 
all of a sudden left for her heavenly abode in Mangolpuri. Balvir Singh did 
not give this information to any of the other family member rather some 
neighbour gave this information to the younger brother of Harender Singh; 
Shivcharan, who resides in Delhi. Shivcharan visited Mangolpuri in the night 
itself, where he came to know that she was in good health on that night and 
Balvir Singh after the death of the deceased, took her dead body to his home 
at Ratanpur, Kotdwar by private
ambulance without giving information to 
anyone. When the applicant came to know about this fact, he informed the 
police of Police Station Kotdwar. There were reddish injury marks apparent 
on the throat of the applicant’s daughter, due to which the Police initiated 
inquest proceedings and arranged postmortem of the dead body.
On calling for the report from Police Station on the application ﬁ led 
by applicant, Police Station has submitted that no First Information Report 
is lying registered at Police Station on the basis of facts mentioned in the 
application moved by applicant under section 156(3) Cr.P.C Applicant 
has ﬁ led photocopies of letters written by his daughter and photocopies 
of applications lodged by him with Inspector Incharge of Police Station 
Kotdwar and Deputy District Magistrate, Kotdwar in court in support of 
his application ﬁ led under section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
On the basis of documents filed by applicant in support of his 
application, prima facie oﬀ ence seems to be made out. Therefore, in such 
circumstances, registration of First Information Report seems to be essential.
821
Therefore, S.H.O., Police Station Kotdwar is ordered that hiving registered 
First Information Report in the light of application ﬁ led by applicant under 
section 156(3) Cr.P.C and to conduct investigation.
Sd/-
 Judicial Magistrate”
4. Pursuant to the aforesaid order passed by the learned Judicial 
Magistrate, the First Information Report came to be registered at the 
Kotdwar Police Station on 09.06.2007 for the oﬀ ence punishable under 
Sections 302, 498A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 
4 respectively of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act 
1961’). The First Information Report reads thus: 
“Sir, Applicant Virendra Singh, son of late Mohan Singh, resident 
of Village Mawasa, Patti –Ajmer Pall, Tehsil Kotdwar Garhwal 
respectfully submits as under:- 
1. That the marriage of my daughter Sudha had been solemnized on 
12.12.1997 with Balvir Singh, son of late Mahavir Singh, resident of 
village Ratanpur, Kumbhuchaur, Halqa-Saneh, Kotdwar, Garhwal, 
from the house of my younger brother located at Uttari Jhandichaur, 
Police Station Kotdwar and out of the wedlock, one son was born 
to them. 
2. That sometime after marriage, Balvir Singh and Smt. Maheshwari 
Devi who is the mother of Balvir Singh, in connivance with him, 
started harassing my daughter in diﬀ erent ways and raising demand 
of Rupees One lakh cash in dowry. Smt. Maheshwari Devi has been 
getting pension and also owns landed property. Balvir Singh is a 
greedy person and
under the greed of pension of his mother, he has 
been harassing my daughter and subjecting her to beatings, not 
providing food to her, and that the women of the village somehow 
provided her food by hiding themselves from these people. My 
daughter wrote letters to us complaining about this fact. When 
Balvir Singh and his mother came to know about these letters, then 
they pressurized my daughter for asking back the said letters and we 
accordingly returned those letters, but letter dated 20.05.04 which 
has been lodged by us at Police Station, remained with us. In this 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
822
letter also my daughter has put her grievances and harassment that 
she faced. 
3. That on getting knowledge of this incident me, my few relatives, 
Panch, and Pradhan Ratanpur visited and tried to convince Balvir 
Singh and his mother not to indulge in such acts so that in future my 
daughter may stay there properly and I did not lodge any report. 
However, Maheshwari Devi and Balvir Singh kept on hatching 
conspiracy for eliminating my daughter Sudha. Once they had made 
my daughter consumed poison also but my daughter had not told this 
fact to anyone. 
4. That Balvir Singh has been working in a Private Nursing Home 
in Delhi and he is very well acquainted with medicines. Before 
committing murder of my daughter, he managed to arrange fake 
and forged prescription slips, which has been shown to police also, 
and investigation about these slips & medicines is required. Despite 
reluctance of my daughter on 09.05.07 Balvir left his son at Kotdwar 
in healthy condition and took my daughter Sudha at Mangolpuri, Delhi 
forcibly. Before leaving, my daughter expressed her unwillingness to 
go to Delhi, to my younger brother Harender over telephone. 
5. That on 13.05.07 at about 1.30 o’clock in the night my younger 
brother Harender Singh received information from Delhi over phone 
that my daughter Sudha has left for her heavenly abode all of a sudden 
in Mangolpuri. Balvir Singh did not give this information to any of 
our family
member rather some neighbour gave this information to 
the younger brother of Harender Singh; Shivcharan, who resides in 
Delhi. Shivcharan visited Mangolpuri in the night, where he came 
to know that my daughter was in good health on that night and 
Balvir Singh after the death of my daughter, took her dead body to 
his home at Ratanpur, Kotdwar by private ambulance without giving 
information to anyone. When we came to know about this fact, then 
we informed the police of Police Station Kotdwar but we could not 
provide all details at that time. As reddish injury marks were apparent 
on the neck of my daughter, Police initiated inquest proceedings and 
arranged postmortem of her dead body. Sir, I have reason to believe 
that the said Maheshwari Devi and her son Balvir Singh have killed
823
my daughter having hatched a conspiracy and have also induced her 
little child also in their favour. 
6. That her mother-in law and her husband Balvir Singh caused 
inhuman harassment to my daughter which amounts to a heinous 
crime. Photocopies of her letters are being annexed herewith. I had 
lodged report at Police Station and Deputy District Magistrate also 
that she has been killed, but no ﬁ rst information report has not been 
registered till now. Therefore, it is prayed to please order police of 
Police Station Kotdwar to register First Information Report and get 
the oﬀ enders punished for the oﬀ ence committed by them. 
Dated : 02.06.07. Applicant - Sd/- Virendra Singh son of late Mohan 
Singh, resident of Village Mawasa, Patti –Ajmer Palla, Tehsil –
Kotdwar, District –Pouri Garhwal. 
Note: I, HC 14 Kabool Singh Prajapati do hereby certify that copy of 
formal report has been recorded word to word which is clearly legible. 
Sd/- 
HC 14 Kabool Singh
 Police Station Kotdwar 
Dated : 09.06.07”
5. Upon registration of the FIR, the investigation was carried out. 
The dead body of the deceased on being brought from Delhi to Kotdwar, 
was sent for post mortem. The inquest panchnama was drawn in presence 
of the independent panch witnesses. The statements of various witnesses 
were recorded by the investigating oﬃ  cer under Section 161 of the CrPC. 
The viscera collected during the course of the post mortem was sent to the 
forensic science laboratory. Both the
appellants herein were arrested and 
remanded to judicial custody. 
6. Upon conclusion of the investigation, chargesheet was ﬁ led for the 
oﬀ ences enumerated above. To the charge framed by the trial court vide order 
dated 21.02.2009, the appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
7. The prosecution led the following oral evidence:
a. 
PW1 Virendra Singh (Father of the deceased)
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
824
b. 
PW2 Dr. Indra Singh Samant, Govt. Hospital (the Doctor who 
performed the post mortem)
c. 
PW3 Harender Singh (Uncle of the deceased)
d. 
PW4 Balbir Singh (Another uncle of the deceased)
e. 
PW5 M.M.S. Bisht (Senior Sub Inspector)
f. 
PW6 Baldev Singh (Panch witness to the inquest proceedings)
h. 
PW7 Kabool Singh (Head Constable)
8. 
Prosecution also led documentary evidence as under: 
a. 
Post mortem report Exh.Ka-4
b. 
Inquest report Exh. Ka-5
c.  Two letters written by the deceased to her father i.e., PW1 Exh.
Ka-1 and Ka-2.
9. The appellants herein examined Shivam Rawat the son of the 
deceased as a defence witness (DW-1). The appellants also examined 
one Anoop Singh cousin brother of the deceased as a defence witness 
(DW-2). 
10. Upon conclusion of the oral evidence, the further statement of 
both the appellants was recorded by the trial court. Two speciﬁ c questions 
were put by the trial court to the convict Balvir Singh and the reply to the 
two questions were as under: 
“Question No. 14:- Do you have anything else to say? 
Answer:- I am innocent. Complainant has lodged a false case. 
Question No. 15 :- Poison has been found in the examination of viscera 
of the deceased. What do you have to say in this regard? 
Answer:- I do not have knowledge as to how the poison has been found, 
but the deceased was a heart patient and used to consume medicines.”
11. The mother-in-law of the deceased stated in her further
statement 
recorded under Section 313 CrPC that she was innocent and had been 
falsely implicated.
825
12. The trial court upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary 
evidence on the record held the husband guilty of the oﬀ ence of murder 
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and also for causing harassment 
punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. The trial court sentenced the 
husband to undergo rigorous imprisonment with ﬁ ne of Rs. 10,000/- The 
mother-in-law, namely, Maheshwari Devi came to be acquitted by the trial 
court of the oﬀ ence of murder, however, she stood convicted by the trial 
court for the oﬀ ence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC and was 
sentenced to undergo 2½ years of imprisonment. 
13. The trial court while holding the appellants guilty of the oﬀ ence 
enumerated above, recorded the following ﬁ ndings: 
“21. Deceased died of poison. Although prosecution could not bring 
clear evidence that victim was administered poison by accused, but 
regarding harassment PW-1 and PW-2 have produced evidence. This 
is established by Exhibit A1 and Exhibit A2 too. Moreover, after her 
death poison was found in viscera report. However, nothing has been 
said by the defence about how it entered the body of the deceased. 
Accused statement was registered under section 313 of Criminal 
Procedure Code and he was clearly asked that poison was found in 
deceased’s visceral examination report, what you have to say about 
it? Regarding this accused Balvir Singh said that “I do not have 
knowledge how it was found, but deceased was heart patient and
was on medication”. Regarding this, defence examined DW-1 who 
is deceased’s son and who said in his examination-in-chief that “my 
mother was undergoing treatment at Delhi, where she died”. He further 
said “my grandmother and father love me a lot and treated my mother 
nicely”. He is a child witness. This witness told that the death of the 
deceased took place during treatment but, nothing is said about where 
she was undergoing treatment, or how she died. Defence argued that 
deceased was a heart patient and because of which death occurred but 
this argument is negated by viscera report. DW-2 produced by defence 
said in his examination-in-chief that “accused was getting the deceased 
continuously treated at Delhi. Deceased Sudha was distressed because 
of her illness. Accused use to take care of Sudha. Balvir Singh and 
his mother did not harass her, and that she may have done something 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
826
to herself because of her illness”. This witness produced by defence 
has based his evidence on new facts. During cross-examination, 
examination of prosecution witness by defence, no question regarding 
such matter was asked as to whether the deceased was distressed either 
before her illness or because of her illness. DW-1 who is deceased’s 
son and on whom defence stressed upon, has not stated anything 
regarding the deceased being distressed due to her illness. DW-1 has 
only stated that death occurred during treatment, while DW-2 has 
based his evidence on new facts which are not concurring with the facts 
of defence because they have said that treatment was given at Escorts 
Hospital. Regarding this defence has questioned PW-1 that in year 
2006 accused paid a bill of rupees 3,82,500/-at Escorts Hospital which 
was refuted by him. Regarding this defence has produced documents. 
I have examined those documents. Although defence have not proved 
those documents but in ﬁ le page number 48A/2 a document of rupees 
3,82,500/-is present which was given by Dr. Nitish Chandra, but said 
document is not a bill of payment instead it is an estimate required 
for complete checkup and operation, because in the document it is 
written that –‘Advance payment may please be made at the time of 
admission by case/demand draft in favour of Escorts Heart Institute 
and Research Centre Ltd. Payable at New Delhi’. By looking at the 
document it is
clear that accused and others did not pay any money. 
Apart from this there is no document in the ﬁ le for payment of rupees 
3,82,500/-. regarding this there is no statement from defence.
22. Apart from this prosecution witness PW-4’s cross-examination 
was conducted. In his cross-examination by defence the witness has 
said “it is true that in the inquest report deceased’s husband stated 
that my wife after delivery of son, used to remain ill. Often, she had 
episodes of unconsciousness. On the night of 13 May 2007 at 10:00 
pm, she had an attack and did not regain consciousness. I took her 
to Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Hospital, where she was declared dead 
by the Doctor”. This witness gave statement in his cross-examination 
that deceased died at Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Hospital regarding 
which no document was ﬁ led. Although this witness in his cross-
examination also admitted that he was told this by Balvir Singh. This 
witness is supporting defence, but this witness statement is contrary to
827
the oral and documentary evidence in the ﬁ le. If the accused admitted 
deceased to Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Hospital after she had an attack 
on 13.5.2007, then there are no documents regarding this in the ﬁ le 
and the defence has not given any statement as to this.
23. Defence has argued that deceased Sudha died on 13.5.2007. On 
13.5.2007 her last rites were performed and complainant got the case 
registered under· section 156(3) on 2.6.2007. Application was ﬁ led 
very late and this delay has not been. explained. I am not in agreement 
with this argument of defence. Victim died on 13.5.2007 and it is said 
that on 13.5.2007 her last rites were performed, but on receiving the 
news of death prosecution witness immediately put forward his doubt. 
In inquest report it is clearly written that deceased Sudha’s death is 
suspicious, and postmortem should be done. In above said inquest 
report PW-1 is one of the witnesses, he is deceased’s father too. and 
was examined as PW1. During evidence witness has said that “Balvir 
lives in Mangolpuri at Delhi. Shivcharan was informed by neighbours 
that Sudha had died and they brought the dead body to Ratanpur. Next 
day I came to Kotdwar. I gave this information to Police station. Then 
Police and I came to Ratanpur. There police prepared inquest report. In 
inquest report I too was made a witness”. As soon as witness received 
this information he raised a suspicion on the incident. Police station 
was informed. This witness
further said “I wrote a letter to Police 
station to investigate into her death. In this regard I made a written 
complaint to S.D.M., Kotdwar”. This witness further said “then, with 
my lawyer’s help I ﬁ led a petition under section156(3) of Criminal 
Procedure Code on which court ordered to register a case”. This 
witness on receiving information about incident immediately raised 
suspicion and asked for a postmortem to be carried out. On 14.5.2007 
an application was written to Police station to investigate into the 
death of the Deceased. Police made inquest report and conducted 
postmortem. In this situation, defence cannot take beneﬁ t of the fact that 
complaint was registered under section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure 
Code, because this witness had informed Police station and S.D.M. 
Because of this information given by him to police, police came to 
spot and made inquest report.
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
828
24. In viscera report FSL has detected poison, in such situation the 
burden was on accused to prove whether deceased herself consumed 
poison and whether the deceased was under mental stress due to 
which she might have consumed poison, but defence did not make any 
statement of such kind during the whole trial. In the end DW-2 has 
presented this evidence that deceased was distressed because of her 
illness, but during the whole trial defence argued that deceased was 
a heart patient and was on treatment for it. Defence has argued that 
deceased was on medication and that because of chemical reaction 
medicine can naturally convert into poison, but no evidence was 
produced by defence regarding this, and no medical opinion was 
taken that deceased was taking medicine of such nature which due to 
chemical reaction could convert into poison in the body. As this was 
brought up by defence, in such situation burden was on them to prove 
it, but no statement was made about it. According to Indian Evidence 
Act section 114(g) - that evidence which could be and is not produced 
would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it.
25. In the presenting case this is argued by defence that because of 
chemical reaction medicine can turn into poison in deceased’s body, 
therefore the burden of proof was on defence, but regarding this no 
evidence was produced by defence. In such situation under section 
114(g) it is important
to presume that if any evidence was produced 
by accused then it would have been against him, because of which 
no evidence was produced by defence. But deceased’s death took 
place at Delhi. Accused Balvir Singh brought dead body from Delhi 
to Kotdwar. PW-1 in his examination-in-chief has said that “it is true 
that my daughter was living with accused at Delhi”. On the basis of 
statement given by PW-1, deceased’s death took place at Delhi, where 
she was living with accused Balvir Singh. On the basis of viscera report 
deceased died of poison. At the time of death only accused Balvir 
Singh was present. Accused Maheshwari Devi was not in Delhi. Since, 
deceased died at Delhi, in such situation charge under, section 302 of 
Indian Penal Code is not found against Maheshwari Devi.
26. As far as the question of dowry is concerned, PW-1 and PW-2 
have adduced evidence in this matter against accused Balvir Singh
829
and Shrimati Maheshwari Devi that they are demanding dowry. This 
fact is also proved by document letters exhibit A-1 and exhibit A-2 
present in the ﬁ le. Charge under section 498A of Indian Penal Code 
against accused Balvir Singh and Shrimati Maheshwari Devi is proved 
beyond doubt.
27. After above arguments I have reached the conclusion that 
prosecution has proved that accused Balvir Singh and Maheshwari 
Devi mistreated and harassed deceased for dowry and demanded 
rupees 1 lakh from deceased. Therefore accused Balvir Singh and 
Maheshwari Devi are ﬁ t to be convicted under section 498A/34 Indian 
Penal Code. Because in this incident deceased has died and it has 
come up in the evidence that deceased was living with accused Balvir 
Singh in Delhi, therefore charge under section 302 of Indian Penal 
Code against accused is proved and he is ﬁ t to be convicted for the 
said charge. As prosecution could not prove that accused Shrimati 
Maheshwari Devi was at Delhi with Balvir Singh during the time 
of deceased’s death and no role of Maheshawari Devi is proved in 
deceased’s death, therefore no charge under section 302 of Indian 
Penal Code is proved against Shrimati Maheshwari Devi and therefore, 
she is ﬁ t to be discharged of the above said charge.”
14. The appellants feeling dissatisﬁ ed with the judgment and order 
of conviction passed by the trial court went in appeal before the High 
Court. The High Court dismissed both the appeals and thereby aﬃ  rmed the
judgment and order of the conviction passed by the trial court. The High 
Court while aﬃ  rming the judgment and order of conviction passed by the 
trial court held as under: 
“3. In the chargesheet it was clearly held out that the death, in the 
instant case, was by poisoning. No sooner, the death was reported, 
PW1, looking at the dead body, insisted for an inquest and the same 
was done. In course of inquest, he expressed doubt as to the cause 
of death and demanded post-mortem. Accordingly, post-mortem was 
done. The doctor, who conducted post-mortem, could not determine 
the reason for the death. He, accordingly, preserved a part of the heart 
and the viscera of the deceased for the purpose of analysis. Viscera 
was sent for analysis and Forensic Science Laboratory, Agra, to whom 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
830
the same was sent, reported that the same contained poison known as 
“Aluminium Phosphide”. All these facts were in the charge- sheet. The 
death, according to the chargesheet, had taken place at Delhi, when 
A1 alone was present with the victim. It is A1, who caused the dead 
body of the victim to be brought to Ratanpuri, Kotdwara. It was not the 
contention of A1 that the victim, at any point of time, had any suicidal 
tendency or that he suspects that the victim committed suicide. It was 
the contention of A1, as is evident from the trend of cross-examination 
of the prosecution witnesses, and, in particular, suggestions given to the 
prosecution witnesses that the victim was suﬀ ering from heart disease, 
for that, matter required frequent treatment and administration of 
medicine. It was suggested that such medicine, so administered, turned 
into the aforementioned poison. That being an assertion on behalf of 
A1, it was he, who was required to establish the same by tendering 
adequate evidence, which he miserably failed. A dead person, whose 
cause of death was by poisoning, was, accordingly, found on the lap of 
A1. A1 had special knowledge pertaining thereto. He failed to disclose· 
anything in relation thereto. The Court below, in the circumstances, 
has taken adverse inference against A 1 under Section 114(g) of the 
Evidence Act. We think that the Court below was entitled to take such 
inference in the backdrop of the
case as depicted above.
4. We, accordingly, ﬁ nd no reason for interference. The Appeal 
is dismissed. The judgment of the Court below is aﬃ  rmed. The 
Application (CRMA No. 1744 of 2013) ﬁ led for examining applicant 
as witness for the defence is not pressed. The same is dismissed. A1 is 
in Jail. He will serve out the sentence as awarded by the Court below. 
A2 is on bail. Her bail bond is cancelled. She is directed to surrender 
forthwith to serve out the sentence awarded against her.”
15. In such circumstances referred to above, the appeals are here before 
this Court with the captioned two appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
16. Ms. Manisha Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing for the 
appellant vehemently submitted that the trial court as well as the High Court 
committed a serious error in holding the appellants guilty of the oﬀ ence as 
enumerated above. It was argued that the case is one of “No Evidence” so
831
far as the charge of murder is concerned. According to the learned counsel, 
the husband was working in Delhi past sometime before the date of incident 
whereas the deceased along with her son was staying at their native home 
town in the State of Uttarakhand. It was also sought to be argued that the 
deceased was not keeping well as she was suﬀ ering from a heart ailment. 
It was pointed out from the post mortem report as well as from the oral 
evidence of the doctor that the deceased had an enlarged heart and the 
ailment relating to heart could be the cause of sudden death. The learned 
counsel in the alternative put forward the theory of suicide. This theory of 
suicide was put forward by the defence on the basis of the fact that poison 
was detected in the viscera, in the form of “aluminium phosphide”. An 
attempt was made to argue that the deceased might have consumed poison 
and committed suicide as she was tired of her ailment. 
17. It was also argued that the evidence of the two defence witnesses 
would suggest that there was no harassment of any nature to the deceased 
either by the husband nor by the mother-in-law. It was also argued that 
no sooner the deceased passed away than the husband immediately 
informed the family members of the deceased about her sudden death. 
It is the husband who carried the dead body from Delhi to his village at 
Uttarakhand. 
18. It was argued that the entire case hinges on circumstantial evidence. 
It is a primary principle
that the accused must be and not merely may be 
guilty. 
19. The learned counsel submitted that the facts which, the prosecution 
has so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt 
of the accused that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other 
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances are not of 
a conclusive nature and tendency. The circumstances do not exclude every 
possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. 
20. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that this Court may set 
aside the conviction for the oﬀ ence of murder and substitute the same with 
the oﬀ ence of abetting the commission of suicide punishable under Section 
306 of the IPC. It was pointed out that the convict-husband is undergoing 
sentence past more than 9 years. 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
832
21. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed 
that there being merit in both her appeals, those may be allowed. 
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
22. Mr. Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, the learned counsel appearing 
for the State vehemently submitted that no error not to speak of any 
error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court 
as well as by the trial court in holding the appellants guilty of the 
respective offences. 
23. It was sought to be vehemently argued that the deceased along 
with her son was residing at their village whereas the husband was doing 
some job in Delhi. The husband on the pretext of medical treatment 
of the deceased brought her from the village to Delhi and within three 
days of their arrival in Delhi, the incident occurred. It was argued that 
if the case put forward by the husband is to be accepted then it is to 
be believed that while something went wrong with the deceased, the 
husband was very much present because according to the husband he 
had immediately taken the deceased to the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital. 
On being declared dead at the hospital, he thereafter brought the dead 
body to the village. 
24. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel 
appearing for the State submitted that in view of Section 106 of the 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the Evidence Act’ or ‘the Act 
1872’), it is for the convict-husband to explain as to
what had actually 
transpired. It is the convict-husband who could be said to be in special 
knowledge of things that might have transpired at the relevant point 
of time. 
25. It was argued that the presence of poison in the viscera would 
indicate that the same had been administered to the deceased in some 
manner and no one except the husband could have administered the 
poison. It was also argued that there was a strong motive for the 
husband to commit the crime. The husband has also been held guilty 
of causing lot of harassment to his wife and the same is evident from 
the two letters written by the deceased to her father and are exhibited 
in the evidence.
833
26. The learned counsel laid much stress on the fact that both the 
appellants have maintained complete silence especially of the facts 
which could be said to be within their personal knowledge. The failure 
to explain, the circumstances in which the death occurred is sufficient 
to hold the convict-husband guilty of the offence. 
27. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed 
that there being no merit in the appeals those may be dismissed. 
ANALYSIS 
28. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and 
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for 
our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing 
the impugned judgment and order. 
29. We take note of the following circumstances emerging from the 
facts on record: 
a.  The cause of death is due to poisoning. The poison detected in 
the viscera was aluminium phosphide. Aluminium phosphide is used as a 
fumigant to control the insects and rodents in the foodgrains and ﬁ elds. It is 
too much for the convicts to say that the presence of aluminium phosphide 
in the viscera could be due to the medicines which the deceased used to take 
for her heart ailment. Such medicines even in high dosage would not lead 
to formation of aluminium phosphide in the body. This theory which has 
been put forward could be termed as something very absurd. No particular 
question in this direction has been put to the expert witness (doctor) while
he was in the witness box. In such circumstances, the only inference that 
can be drawn is that aluminium phosphide either in the liquid form or in 
the form of tablets was procured by the accused husband and the same was 
administered to the deceased. 
b. We completely rule out the theory of suicide as sought to be put 
forward on behalf of the appellants 
c. If it is the case of the convict-husband that he had taken the 
deceased to the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital at Delhi then he should have led 
some evidence to indicate how she was taken to the hospital, in what type 
of vehicle and who attended the deceased at the hospital? In the case of the 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
834
present type, it is very diﬃ  cult to believe that if the deceased had been taken 
to the hospital and declared dead on arrival, the hospital authorities would 
allow the convict-husband to carry the dead body of his wife back home. It 
would become a medico-legal case and the hospital would deﬁ nitely inform 
the police.
d. The dubious conduct of the convict-husband of not informing the 
family members about the death of their daughter. Though in his further 
statement, the convict-husband has said that he had informed the family 
members of the deceased yet the evidence of PW3 Harender Singh (uncle 
of the deceased) is otherwise. In his oral evidence, he has deposed as under: 
“My niece Sudha had died on 13.5.2007. Information thereof was 
given to me by my brother Shivcharan over the telephone. Shivcharan 
was living in Delhi. Then I told Shivcharan to inquire into the matter. 
Shivcharan went to the house of Balvir but he was not there. Then I 
gave this information in the Police Station, Kotdwar at 2 o’clock in 
the night over the telephone and also informed my brother Virendra. 
Thereafter, my brother came to the Police Station, Kotdwar in the 
morning. I also went to the police station. Then I had gone to the 
village of Balvir. There I saw the dead body of Sudha. I do not know 
as to whether Sudha died in Delhi or in the village.”
30. In the aforesaid context, the oral evidence of the PW1 Virendra 
Singh (father of the
deceased) is also relevant. In his oral evidence, PW1 
has stated as under: 
“Balvir Singh took my daughter to Delhi in the year 2007 and left his 
son here in the village itself. At the time of going, she telephoned my 
brother Harender, who lives in Jhandi Chaur, and had told him that 
she does not want to go to Delhi. She unwillingly went, but I cannot 
tell how she had gone. 
Two days after going to Delhi, my brother received information that 
Sudha had died. My brother Shivcharan informed about it. Balvir 
was living in Mangolpuri in Delhi. The neighbours told Shivcharan 
that Sudha had died. Then, Balvir came to Ratanpur with the dead 
body of Sudha. Then, I came to Kotdwar the next day and gave this 
information in the police station. Then the police came with me to
835
Ratanpur. There the police prepared the inquest report and I was the 
panch in the inquest proceedings. 
There was a mark of injury on the neck of my daughter. I was suspicious 
of her death and so, I asked for a post-mortem. The witness was shown 
the inquest report Paper No. 9Ka, upon which he admitted his signature 
at the opinion of the Panches. Thereafter the dead body was sent for 
the post-mortem.”
31. We shall now look into the two letters addressed by the deceased 
to her father (PW1). Both these letters have been proved through the oral 
evidence of the PW1 and have been exhibited. The letter dated 20.05.2004, 
Exh. Ka-1 reads thus:
“Dated : 20.05.04 
Respected mother and father, please accept my pranam with folded 
hands. At the moment I am alive and pray before the Almighty for 
wellbeing of your whole family. Father Saheb, the reason behind 
writing this letter is that I am feeling quite harassed here. There is no 
faith of life as to when it may come to an end, any untoward incident 
may happen with me at any time. Father Saheb, since the time my 
marriage was solemnized, I have been feeling extremely harassed 
from the acts of my mother-in-law and husband but I have not told you 
about this till date thinking that good sense will prevail with passage 
of time but, both of these intend to eliminate me. They say that your 
father has not given anything in dowry. They told me that if you bring 
Rs.1 lakh cash from your father then only you can stay here,
otherwise 
you go to your parents’ home, or else we will eliminate you. I told them 
that my father is a labourer, and he cannot arrange Rs. 1 lakh. On 
account of this, my mother-in-law and husband have been beating me. 
They did not provide me food for several weeks. I remained hungry 
& thirsty and the women of village somehow provided me food by 
hiding themselves from these people. My mother-in-law even forbade 
me from giving milk to my 9-month-old son and forced me to bring 
ﬁ rewood from jungle. Even after that, food was not provided to me. 
I have been staying at my matrimonial home throughout. You invited 
us several times for various functions and ceremonies but they neither 
allowed me to go nor they went themselves. They say that if you wish 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
836
to go then bring Rs. One lakh otherwise you will not be allowed to 
return here. They say that your parents and family members should 
not come here, if they do then it would not be good for me. My father, 
I do not have any support, I am surviving here at mercy of God. I have 
been staying here hungry & thirsty. On account of the beatings being 
given by them, I have not been keeping good health. Till date I have 
concealed all these facts. My father if you can arrange Rs. One lakh 
then my life can be saved, otherwise I do not know as to what will 
happen with me, any untoward incident may happen with me. Please 
do not tell anyone about this letter otherwise they will eliminate me.
Yours daughter 
Village Mangolpuri”
32. The second letter, Exh. Ka-2 reads thus:
“Respected mother and father, accept Pranam from your daughter 
Sudha with folded hands. Love to Krishna, Manoj, Mukesh from their 
sister. I am well here and pray before Almighty for your well-being. 
I need my previous letter which I had written to you. I am not asking 
for the letter under pressure from anyone. I am happy at my home. I 
heard that uncle Anil is coming here and so I request you to send that 
letter through him. My father, if you wish to see me happy then please 
send the letter through Anil uncle. I have to stay here only. I am not 
asking for it under pressure from anyone, I want that letter. If you do 
not send that letter through Anil uncle then
treat that your daughter is 
no more. I am very well here. Don’t think more, just send the letter only, 
I will wait for the same. Your son-in-law has been behaving properly 
with me. If he behaves with me properly, then everything is alright and 
you should not be concerned. You just send the letter through uncle, 
as I need that letter and there is no beneﬁ t in keeping that letter with 
you. I am alright here; you should feel happy about it. Sonu is ﬁ ne. 
Your daughter Sudha.”
PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING THE APPLICABILITY 
OF SECTION 106 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT
33. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, states as under:
837
“106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.— When 
any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden 
of proving that fact is upon him.
Illustration
(a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that 
which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden 
of proving that intention is upon him.
(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The 
burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.”
34. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that 
when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden 
of proving that fact is upon him. The word “especially” means facts that 
are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. 
The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the 
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modiﬁ ed 
by the rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 
106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence 
Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in 
a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is 
certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed 
to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or at any 
rate disproportionately diﬃ  cult for the prosecution to establish the facts 
which are, “especially
within the knowledge of the accused and which, he 
can prove without diﬃ  culty or inconvenience”. 
35. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer reported in AIR 
1956 SC 404, this Court while considering the word “especially” employed 
in Section 106 of the Evidence Act speaking through Vivian Bose, J., 
observed as under: 
“11. … The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that 
are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section 
were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling 
conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to 
prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know 
better than he whether he did or did not. 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
838
It is evident that that cannot be the intention & the Privy Council 
has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain 
other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused 
person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. 
These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) 
and Seneviratne v. R, 1936-3 All ER 36 at p. 49 (B).”
36. The aforesaid decision of Shambhu Nath (supra) has been referred 
to and relied upon in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar reported in (2021) 10 
SCC 725, wherein this Court observed as under: 
“22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases 
where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from 
which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence 
of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the 
accused. When the accused fails to oﬀ er proper explanation about the 
existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate 
inference.
23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused 
fails to oﬀ er a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed 
on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure 
may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case 
governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances 
which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established,
the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of 
the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, 
falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
37. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Another v. State of 
Maharashtra reported in (2012) 10 SCC 373, this Court observed as under: 
“23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule in law of 
evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain 
other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other 
set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and 
reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above 
position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act,
839
1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which 
it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall 
have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, 
etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the 
principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be 
utilised. We make it clear that this section is not intended to relieve 
the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution 
has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference 
can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless 
the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, 
failed to oﬀ er any explanation which might drive the court to draw a 
diﬀ erent inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in 
State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar [(2000) 8 SCC 382 : 2000 SCC 
(Cri) 1516]: (SCC p. 393, para 38)
“38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the 
Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in 
which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish 
certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the 
accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer [AIR 1956 SC 
404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794] the learned Judge has stated the legal 
principle thus: (AIR p. 406, para 11) 
‘11. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal 
case the
burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 
106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On 
the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional 
cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate 
disproportionately diﬃ  cult for the prosecution to establish 
facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the 
accused and which he could prove without diﬃ  culty or 
inconvenience.
The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are 
pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.’””

(Emphasis supplied)
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
840
38. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra reported in 
(2006) 10 SCC 681, this Court was considering a similar case of homicidal 
death in the conﬁ nes of the house. The following observations are considered 
relevant in the facts of the present case: 
“14. If an oﬀ ence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such 
circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and 
commit the oﬀ ence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, 
it will be extremely diﬃ  cult for the prosecution to lead evidence to 
establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial 
evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A Judge 
does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent 
man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does 
not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions [1944 AC 315 : (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL)] — quoted 
with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh 
[(2003) 11 SCC 271 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 135].) The law does not enjoin 
a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is 
almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely diﬃ  cult to be led. 
The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable 
of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 
Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section
106 of the Evidence Act 
which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of 
any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) 
appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope 
of this provision and it reads:
“(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The 
burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.”
15. Where an oﬀ ence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a 
house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be 
upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led 
by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required 
in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a 
comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence 
Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house 
to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The

841
inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and 
oﬀ ering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to 
establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no 
duty at all on an accused to oﬀ er any explanation.

xxx

xxx
xxx 
22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his 
wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that 
shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or 
the oﬀ ence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also 
normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does 
not oﬀ er any explanation how the wife received injuries or oﬀ ers an 
explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance 
which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
39. The question of burden of proof, where some facts are within the 
personal knowledge of the accused, was examined by this Court in the case 
of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Others reported in (2000) 8 
SCC 382. In this case, the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased from the 
house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the accused, and 
took him away at about 2:30 in the night. The next day in the morning, his 
mangled body was found lying in the hospital. The trial court convicted the 
accused under Section 364, read with Section 34 of the IPC, and sentenced 
them to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The accused preferred an appeal 
against their conviction before the High Court and the State also ﬁ led an 
appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for the charge of murder. The 
accused had not given any explanation as to what happened to the deceased 
after he was abducted by them. The Sessions Judge, after referring to the 
law on circumstantial evidence, had observed that there was a missing link 
in the chain of evidence after the deceased was last seen together with the 
accused persons, and the discovery of the dead body in the hospital, and 
concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder 
against the accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt. This Court took 
note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and laid down 
the following principles in paras 31 to 34 of
the report:
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
842
“31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution 
to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised 
doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The 
doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it 
impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional 
rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be 
wrapped in pedantic coverage, the oﬀ enders in serious oﬀ ences 
would be the major beneﬁ ciaries and the society would be the 
casualty.
32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the 
afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence 
of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for 
the court to rely on in conditions such as this.
33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one 
fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of 
such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of 
evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain 
other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other 
set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and 
reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The 
above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when 
Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the 
court to presume the
existence of any fact which it thinks likely to 
have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the 
common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to 
the facts of the case.
34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh 
was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the 
accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. 
If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction 
the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the 
presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can 
be disrupted if the accused would tell the Court what else happened 
to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.”

(Emphasis supplied)
843
40. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court while maintaining 
the conviction under Section 364 read with Section 34 of the IPC, 
reversed the order of acquittal under Section 302 read with Section 
34 of the IPC, and convicted the accused under the said provision and 
sentenced them to imprisonment for life.
41. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident 
that the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal 
cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application 
to criminal cases. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in 
this country that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of 
the accused is not in any way modified by the provisions contained in 
Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 
42. Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the 
prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt 
of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction 
unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the 
elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the 
prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even 
though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused 
and it does not throw the burden of the accused to show that no crime 
was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of 
reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are 
not by
themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the 
prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is 
established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused.
43. Section 106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the 
accused is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution 
unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within 
his knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution 
nugatory. If in such a situation, the accused gives an explanation which 
may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the accused gets 
the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be able to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation. But if the accused 
in such a case does not give any explanation at all or gives a false or 
unacceptable explanation, this by itself is a circumstance which may 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
844
well turn the scale against him. In the language of Prof. Glanville 
Williams:
“All that the shifting of the evidential burden does at the ﬁ nal stage 
of the case is to allow the jury (Court) to take into account the silence 
of the accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing 
from his evidence.” 
44. To recapitulate the foregoing : What lies at the bottom of the various 
rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence in 
proof of one’s case as opposed to the persuasive burden or burden of proof, 
i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution and which 
never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly 
convincing evidence on certain issues from its own hand and it is therefore 
for the accused to give evidence on them if he wishes to escape. Positive 
facts must always be proved by the prosecution. But the same rule cannot 
always apply to negative facts. It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and 
eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate an 
accused. Again, when a person does not act with some intention other than 
that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not for 
the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions. If the accused 
had a diﬀ erent intention that is a fact especially within his knowledge and 
which he must prove (see Professor Glanville Williams—Proof of
Guilt, 
Ch. 7, page 127 and following) and the interesting discussion—para 527 
negative averments and para 528—“require aﬃ  rmative counter-evidence” 
at page 438 and foil, of Kenny’s outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958.
45. But Section 106 has no application to cases where the fact in 
question having regard to its nature is such as to be capable of being known 
not only by the accused but also by others if they happened to be present 
when it took place. From the illustrations appended to the section, it is 
clear that an intention not apparent from the character and circumstances 
of the act must be established as especially within the knowledge of the 
person whose act is in question and the fact that a person found travelling 
without a ticket was possessed of a ticket at a stage prior in point of time 
to his being found without one, must be especially within the knowledge 
of the traveller himself : see Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 
illustrations (a) and (b).
845
46. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and 
the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of 
proof upon any aﬃ  rmative proposition necessary to be established as the 
foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the 
burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the 
testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has oﬀ ered evidence which if believed 
by the court would convince them of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the accused is in a position where he should go forward with counter-
vailing evidence if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within 
the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of 
such facts, whether the proposition is an aﬃ  rmative or negative one. He is 
not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, 
for the court must still ﬁ nd that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before 
it can convict. However, the accused’s failure to present evidence on his 
behalf may be regarded by the court as conﬁ rming the conclusion indicated 
by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as conﬁ rming presumptions 
which might have been rebutted. Although not legally required to produce 
evidence on his own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter 
ﬁ nd it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden 
of proof resting upon the prosecution (Wharton’s Criminal
Evidence, 12th 
Edn. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 2 p. 37 and foil). Leland v. State reported in 343 U.S. 
790=96 L.Ed. 1302, Raﬀ el v. U.S. reported in 271 U.S. 294=70 L.Ed. 1054.
WHAT IS “PRIMA FACIE CASE” IN THE CONTEXT OF 
SECTION 106 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT?
47. The Latin expression prima facie means “at ﬁ rst sight”, “at ﬁ rst 
view”, or “based on ﬁ rst impression”. According, to Webster’s Third 
International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case 
established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evi-Ideuce 
suﬃ  cient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question 
unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote 
that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has suﬃ  cient evidence to 
proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, 
the plaintiﬀ  or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them 
to present prima facie evidence for each element of the charges against the 
defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, or if an opposing 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
846
party introduces contradictory evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed 
without any need for a response by other parties.
48. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the 
prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a 
reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. 
49. The presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one 
fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference 
is disproved. 
50. To explain what constitutes a prima facie case to make Section 
106 of the Evidence Act applicable, we should refer to the decision of this 
Court in Mir Mohammad (supra), wherein this Court has observed in paras 
36 and 37 respectively as under: 
“36. In this context we may proﬁ tably utilise the legal principle 
embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows: 
“When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the 
burden of proving that fact is upon him.”
37. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to 
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section 
would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving 
facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the 
existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his 
special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to oﬀ er any explanation 
which might drive the court to
draw a diﬀ erent inference.”
(Emphasis supplied)
51. We should also look into the decision of this Court in the case of 
Ram Gulam Chaudhary and Others v. State of Bihar reported in (2001) 
8 SCC 311, wherein this Court made the following observations in para 24 
as under: 
“24. Even otherwise, in our view, this is a case where Section 106 
of the Evidence Act would apply. Krishnanand Chaudhary was 
brutally assaulted and then a chhura-blow was given on the chest. 
Thus chhura-blow was given after Bijoy Chaudhary had said “he is 
still alive and should be killed”. The appellants then carried away
847
the body. What happened thereafter to Krishnanand Chaudhary is 
especially within the knowledge of the appellants. The appellants 
have given no explanation as to what they did after they took away the 
body. Krishnanand Chaudhary has not been since seen alive. In the 
absence of an explanation, and considering the fact that the appellants 
were suspecting the boy to have kidnapped and killed the child of the 
family of the appellants, it was for the appellants to have explained 
what they did with him after they took him away. When the abductors 
withheld that information from the court, there is every justiﬁ cation 
for drawing the inference that they had murdered the boy. Even though 
Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the 
prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases like the present, 
where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a 
reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The appellants 
by virtue of their special knowledge must oﬀ er an explanation which 
might lead the Court to draw a diﬀ erent inference. We, therefore, see 
no substance in this submission of Mr Mishra.”  
(Emphasis supplied)
52. In the case on hand it has been established or rather proved to the 
satisfaction of the court that the deceased was in company of her husband 
i.e., the appellant-convict at a point of time when something went wrong 
with her health and
therefore, in such circumstances the appellant-convict 
alone knew what happened to her until she was with him.
FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT-CONVICT 
IN OFFERING ANY PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION IN HIS 
FURTHER STATEMENT RECORDED UNDER SECTION 313 
OF THE CRPC
53. We take notice of the fact that the appellant-convict (husband) has 
not explained in any manner as to what had actually happened to his wife 
more particularly when it is not in dispute that the appellant-convict was in 
company of his wife i.e., deceased. It is important to bear in mind that the 
deceased died on account of poisoning. The poison which was detected in 
the viscera was found to be “aluminium phosphide”. Although, the appellant-
convict tried to project a picture that no sooner the deceased fell sick than 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
848
he immediately took her to the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital at Delhi, yet, there 
is no evidence worth the name in this regard. The appellant-convict was 
expected to lead some evidence as to what had transpired at the Sanjay 
Gandhi Hospital. He has maintained a complete silence. It is only the 
appellant-convict who could have explained in what circumstances and in 
what manner he had taken his wife to the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital and who 
attended his wife at the hospital. If it is his case, that his wife was declared 
dead on being brought at the hospital then it is diﬃ  cult to believe that the 
hospital authorities allowed the appellant to carry the dead body back home 
without completing the legal formalities. 
54. In the aforesaid context, we must look into the decision of this 
Court in the case of Deonandan Mishra v. The State of Bihar reported in 
AIR 1955 SC 801. In the said decision, there is a very important passage 
in which, the learned Judges deal with the eﬀ ect of failure of the accused 
to oﬀ er any explanation for circumstances appearing in evidence against 
him in a prosecution based upon circumstantial evidence. At the cost of 
repetition, the law is very clear that the accused is not bound to oﬀ er any 
explanation, that there is no burden cast upon him to do so and that the onus 
of proof does not shift in respect of the vital matter of guilt at any stage of 
a criminal trial. But as stated by this Court: 
“It is
true that in a case of circumstantial evidence not only should the 
various links in the chain of evidence be clearly established, but the 
completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood 
of the innocence of the accused. But in a case where the various links 
have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the 
accused as the probable assailant, with reasonable deﬁ niteness and in 
proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he oﬀ ers 
no explanation, which, if accepted, though not proved, would aﬀ ord 
a reasonable basis for a conclusion on the entire case consistent with 
his innocence, such absence of explanation or false explanation would 
itself be an additional link which completes the chain.”  
(Emphasis supplied)
55. In our view, the aforesaid passage applies with great force to the 
facts and circumstances of the present case.
849
56. Even where there are facts especially within the knowledge of the 
accused, which could throw a light upon his guilt or innocence, as the case 
may be, the accused is not bound to allege them or to prove them. But it is 
not as if the section is automatically inapplicable to the criminal trials, for, if 
that had been the case, the Legislature would certainly have so enacted. We 
consider the true rule to be that Section 106 does not cast any burden upon an 
accused in a criminal trial, but that, where the accused throws no light at all 
upon the facts which ought to be especially within his knowledge, and which 
could support any theory of hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the 
Court can also consider his failure to adduce any explanation, in consonance 
with the principle of the passage in Deonandan Mishra (supra), which we 
have already set forth. The matter has been put in this form, with reference 
to Section 106 of the Evidence Act, in Smith v. R. reported in 1918 A.I.R. 
Mad. 111, namely, that if the accused is in a position to explain the only 
alternative theory to his guilt, the absence of explanation could be taken 
into account. In the present case, taking the proved facts together, we are 
unable even to speculate about any alternative theory which is compatible 
with the innocence of the accused.
57. In the aforesaid context, we may also refer to and rely on a decision 
of this Court in Kalu alias Laxminarayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 211, wherein this Court after referring to its 
various other decisions on the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence 
Act observed as under: 
“16. In view of our conclusion that the prosecution has clearly 
established a prima facie case, the precedents cited on behalf of the 
appellant are not considered relevant in the facts of the present case. 
Once the prosecution established a prima facie case, the appellant 
was obliged to furnish some explanation under Section 313 CrPC 
with regard to the circumstances under which the deceased met an 
unnatural death inside the house. His failure to oﬀ er any explanation 
whatsoever therefore leaves no doubt for the conclusion of his being 
the assailant of the deceased.” 
(Emphasis supplied)
58. We should also look into the decision of this Court in the case 
of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar reported in (1974) 4 SCC 193. In the said 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 12 S.C.R.
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case the trial court had come to the conclusion that, upon the established 
circumstances listed above, no other inference was left open to the Court 
except that the appellant and his father and stepmother had conjointly 
committed the murder of the deceased Smt. Chanda Devi on the morning 
of 28.05.1965 and that the appellant and his father had then hastily and 
stealthily disposed oﬀ  the body in order to conceal the commission of the 
oﬀ ence. It had also taken into account, in coming to this conclusion, the fact 
that the appellant had unsuccessfully set up a plea, in his written statement, 
that, Smt. Chanda Devi, who was alleged by him to be wearing a nylon 
Saree said to have caught ﬁ re accidentally while she was using a kerosene 
stove in her room, died of extensive burns on her body and collapsed. The 
appellant had alleged that Smt. Chanda Devi was debilitated and kept bad 
health due to frequent pregnancies and was also suﬀ ering from asthma, a 
weak heart, and abdominal complaints. She had given birth to six children.
59. In view of the aforesaid facts, this Court held as under: 
“8. We think that the burden of proving the plea that Smt. Chanda Devi 
died in the manner alleged by the appellant lay upon the appellant. 
This is clear from the provisions of Sections 103 and 106 of the Indian 
Evidence Act. Both the trial Court and the High Court had rightly 
pointed out that the appellant had miserably failed to give
credible 
or substantial evidence of any facts or circumstances which could 
support the pleas that Smt. Chanda Devi met her death because her 
Nylon Saree had accidentally caught ﬁ re from a kerosene stove. The 
trial Court had rightly observed that the mere fact that some witnesses 
had seen some smoke emerging from the room, with a kitchen nearby 
at a time when food was likely to be cooked, could not indicate that 
Smt. Chanda Devi’s saree had caught ﬁ re. Neither the murdered woman 
nor the appellant nor any member of his family was shown to have 
run about or called for help against a ﬁ re.
9. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that Section 106 of the 
Evidence Act could not be called in aid by the prosecution because that 
section applies only where a fact relating to the actual commission of 
the oﬀ ence is within the special knowledge of the accused, such as the 
circumstances in which or the intention with which an accused did a 
particular act alleged to constitute an oﬀ ence. The language of Section
851
106 of the Evidence Act does not, in our opinion, warrant putting 
such a narrow construction upon it. This Court held in Gurcharan 
Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1956 SC 460 : (1956) Cri LJ 827] that 
the burden of proving a plea speciﬁ cally set up by an accused, which 
may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him. It 
is a diﬀ erent matter that the quantum of evidence by which he may 
succeed in discharging his burden of creating a reasonable belief, that 
circumstance, absolving him from criminal liability may have existed, 
is lower than the burden resting upon the prosecution to establish the 
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of the Evidence Act 
could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging 
its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond 
reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence 
which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or, which makes out a 
prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which 
the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. The crucial question 
in the case before us is : Has the prosecution discharged its initial 
or general and primary burden of proving the guilt of the appellant 
beyond reasonable doubt?”
(Emphasis supplied)
60. We also pose the very same question like the one posed in Sawal 
Das (supra) referred to above, “has the prosecution discharged its initial or 
general and primary burden of proving the guilt of the appellants beyond 
reasonable doubt?”
61. We are of the view that the circumstances narrated by us in para 
28 of this judgment constitute more than a prima facie case to enable the 
prosecution to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act and shift the burden 
on the accused husband to explain what had actually happened on the date 
his wife died. 
62. These appeals remind us of what this Court observed in the case 
of Dharam Das Wadhwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh: “The rule of beneﬁ t 
of reasonable doubt does not imply a frail willow bending to every whiﬀ  of 
hesitancy. Judges are made of sterner stuﬀ  and must take a practical view 
BALVIR SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
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[2023] 12 S.C.R.
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of legitimate inferences ﬂ owing from evidence, circumstantial or direct.”
The role of courts in such circumstances assumes greater importance and 
it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic 
manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural 
technicalities, perfunctory investigation or insigniﬁ cant lacunas in the 
evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and 
the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going 
unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving 
crime against women. 
63. In the result, both the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. 
64. However, as Maheshwari Devi (mother-in-law) appellant of 
Criminal Appeal No. 2430 of 2014 has been convicted only for the oﬀ ence 
punishable under Section 498A of the IPC, we reduce her sentence to the 
period already undergone. Even otherwise, she is on bail. Maheshwari Devi 
need not now surrender. Her bail bonds stand discharged. 
65. Pending applications if any shall stand disposed of. 
Headnotes prepared by:  
Appeals dismissed.
Ankit Gyan