RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
[2023] 6 S.C.R. 643, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
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   [2023] 6 S.C.R. 643
RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1617 of 2023)
MAY 19, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss. 3(1)(x), 18 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 323,
325, 392, 452, 504, 506 – Prosecution case that the appellant was
engaged in an altercation with the second respondent-complainant
over the issue of drainage of water – It was alleged that during this
altercation, the appellant verbally hurled caste related abuses
towards the complainant and his family members, and subsequently
physically assaulted the complainant causing him multiple injuries
– Two FIRs were filed – First FIR by the complainant against the
appellant and second FIR by appellant against the complainant –
First FIR was registered against the appellant u/ss. 323, 504, IPC
and 3(1)(x), the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Charge-sheet filed – Appellant
sought quashing of criminal proceedings u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. before
the High Court – High Court held that without evidence, it was not
possible to ascertain the veracity of the allegations, therefore
application u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. was not sustained – On appeal, held:
Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of
a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence
(apart from the appellant, the complainant, his
wife and their son)
– Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in
any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting
section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent – Further, the
allegation in the first F.I.R. is that the appellant had beaten up the
complainant for which he sustained multiple injuries – Chargesheet
neither refer to any eye-witnesses other than complainant’s wife
and son nor any medical report – The nature of hurt suffered by the
complainant in the process is neither reflected from the first F.I.R.
nor the charge-sheet – On the contrary, the appellant had the injuries
suffered by him treated immediately after the incident – High Court
misdirected itself in failing to appreciate the challenge to the criminal
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proceedings including the charge-sheet in the proper perspective
and occasioned a grave failure of justice in rejecting such challenge.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the
complainant, is silent about the place of occurrence and who,
being a member of the public, was present when the appellant is
alleged to have hurled caste related abuses at the complainant.
However, on a reading of the second F.I.R. registered at the
behest of the appellant, it appears that the incident took place at
the house of the appellant. The first question that calls for an
answer is whether it was at a place within public view that the
appellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with an
intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to humiliate him. From
the charge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 filed by the I.O., it
appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence
of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant
of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and
3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than
the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R.
nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual
(a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from
the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since the
utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not
“in any place
within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting section
3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. This Court,
therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident
(of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by the
appellant), no member of the public was present. [Paras 16,
17][651-C-G]
2. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had
hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to
insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of
the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section
3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. It was noted from the first F.I.R. as well
as the charge-sheet that the same makes no reference to the
utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation
or to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the
allegation/observation that caste-related abuses were hurled. The
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legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or
intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an
offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course,
such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he
being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one
calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor)
in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute
an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or
offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a
person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it
may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words
are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST
Act bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under section 438,
Cr.PC and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST
Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is
subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section
3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public
view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to be
an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge-
sheet (which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses
recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable
the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case
of an offence under the SC/ST Act having
been committed for
forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before
it, prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited
test that has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the
charge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 does not make out any
case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under
section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial. [Para 18][651-G-
H; 652-A-F]
3. Section 323, IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily
causing hurt. Hurt is defined in section 319, IPC as causing bodily
pain, disease or infirmity to any person. The allegation in the
first F.I.R. is that the appellant had beaten up the complainant for
which he sustained multiple injuries. Although the complainant
alleged that such incident was witnessed by many persons and
that he sustained injuries on his hand, the charge-sheet does
neither refer to any eye-witness other than the complainant’s wife
and son nor to any medical report. The nature of hurt suffered by
RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH & ANR.
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the complainant in the process is neither reflected from the first
F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet. On the contrary, the appellant had
the injuries suffered by him treated immediately after the incident.
In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent (State) in the
present proceeding, there is no material worthy of consideration
in this behalf except a bald statement that the complainant
sustained multiple injuries “in his hand and other body parts”. If
indeed the complainant’s version were to be believed, the I.O.
ought to have asked for a medical report to support the same.
Completion of investigation within a day in a given case could be
appreciated but in the present case it has resulted in more
disservice than service to the cause of justice. The situation
becomes all the more glaring when in course of this proceeding
the parties including the first respondent are unable to apprise
the outcome of the second F.I.R. In any event, the court do not
find any ring of truth in the prosecution case to allow the
proceedings to continue vis-à-vis section 323, IPC. [Para 21][652-
H; 653-A-D]
Fiona Shrikhande and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra
(2013) 14 SCC 44 : [2013] 9 SCR 240 – relied on.
Mohd. Allauddin Khan v. The State of Bihar and Ors.
(2019) 6 SCC 107 : [2019] 5 SCR 876; State of
Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Hitesh Verma
v. The State of Uttarakhand and
Anr. (2020) 10 SCC
710 : [2020] 9 SCR 593 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2019] 5 SCR 876
referred to
para 9
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259
referred to
para 10
[2020] 9 SCR 593
referred to
para 10
[2013] 9 SCR 240
relied on
para 22
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No.1617 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No.38374 of 2018.
Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Abhishek Chaterjee, Advs. for the Appellant.
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Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, AAG, Adarsh Upadhyay,
Divyanshu Sahay, Ashish Madaan, Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Ajay Marwah,
Sanjay Shukla, Adhitya Srinivasan, Tapan Masta, Advs. for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal, by special leave, questions the judgment
and order dated 23rd May, 2022 passed by a learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (“High Court”, hereafter)
dismissing an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 19731 (“Cr. PC”, hereafter) instituted by the appellant seeking
quashing of the charge-sheet as well as the pending criminal proceedings2.
3. In a nutshell, the prosecution’s case is that on 14th January,
2016, at about 7.00 am, the appellant was engaged in an altercation with
the second respondent (“complainant”, hereafter) over the issue of
drainage of water. It is alleged that during this altercation, the appellant
verbally hurled caste related abuses towards the complainant and his
family members, and subsequently physically assaulted the complainant
causing him multiple injuries. Consequently, on 20th January, 2016, a First
Information Report (“first F.I.R”, hereafter) was registered against the
appellant under sections 323 and 504, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”,
hereafter) and 3(1)(x), the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”, hereafter).
4. Investigation was
conducted by the concerned Circle Officer
(“I.O.”, hereafter). Upon investigation, which was completed within a
day, the I.O. reached the conclusion that there were materials against
the appellant to send him up for trial and consequently, a charge-sheet
dated 21st January, 2016 under sections 323, 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/
ST Act was filed before the concerned court against him. The court
took cognizance of the offence on 3rd May, 2016.
5. It is important to emphasize at this juncture that the appellant
intended to lodge an F.I.R. arising out of the same incident. According to
him, he was badly beaten up by the complainant and his son with canes
1 Application u/s 482 No. 38374 of 2018
2 Case Crime No. 23 of 2016; Criminal Case No. 376 of 2016
RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
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and lathis on 14th January, 2016, as a result of which he too sustained
injuries. On the same date, when the appellant approached the police
station to lodge the F.I.R., it was not registered; instead, the appellant
was challaned and kept under detention by the concerned inspector in-
charge under sections 151, 107, and 116, Cr. PC. He was subsequently
released upon furnishing bail bond. Owing to the failure of the Police to
register the F.I.R., the appellant moved an application under section
156(3), Cr. PC. Pursuant to the order passed by the Magistrate, an F.I.R.
dated 18th February, 2016 (“second F.I.R.”, hereafter) was registered
for the offences under sections 323, 325, 392, 452, 504, 506, IPC against
the complainant (second respondent).
6. It is also noted that the appellant has instituted a suit3 before
the civil court seeking permanent injunction against the complainant’s
continued encroachment upon the appellant’s lands. The same is pending
consideration before the competent court.
7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid charge-sheet, the appellant invoked
the jurisdiction of the High Court on 5th October, 2018 by applying under
section 482, Cr. PC. He sought quashing thereof as well as the criminal
proceedings against him on the grounds that the said charge sheet
discloses no offence and the present prosecution has been instituted
with mala fide intention for the purposes of harassment.
8. Having held that a prima
facie case for grant of interim relief
was set up, the High Court, vide interim order dated 15th November,
2018, directed that no coercive action be taken against the appellant,
pending consideration of the application under section 482, Cr. PC.
9. However, upon a contested hearing, the High Court found no
material irregularity in the charge-sheet or the procedure followed by
the Court below in taking cognizance, and proceeded to dismiss the
appellant’s application under section 482, Cr. PC vide the impugned
judgment and order. The High Court held that, at this stage, it cannot be
concluded that a cognizable offence has not been disclosed, as the
allegations are factual in nature and would require leading of evidence
by the parties. Relying on the decision of this Court in Mohd. Allauddin
Khan vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.4, the High Court emphasized
that at the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under
3 C.S. No. 07 of 2017
4 (2019) 6 SCC 107
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section 482, Cr. PC, the court has limited jurisdiction and it cannot
appreciate the evidence in order to determine whether, prima facie, a
case has been made out against the accused. The High Court noted that
without evidence, it is not possible to ascertain the veracity of the
allegations at this stage; the application for quashing of a charge-sheet
or criminal proceedings under section 482 Cr. PC, therefore, cannot
sustain.
10. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Ms. Shukla, learned
counsel advanced the following submissions:
a.
The first F.I.R., which was registered after a delay of six
days, is an afterthought and creates serious doubts over
the allegations of the complainant.
b.
The charge-sheet was filed on the very next day of
registration of the first F.I.R., without conducting proper
investigation. The charge-sheet fails to take note of the
second F.I.R. registered at the instance of the appellant
and the medical report.
c.
The complainant, being an influential person in the village,
maliciously initiated criminal proceedings against the
appellant with an ulterior motive to scuttle the already
pending civil dispute in the civil court between the parties.
d.
The Police did not act on the appellant’s complaint. The
second F.I.R. dated 18th February, 2016 was registered only
after an order was passed on the appellant’s application
under section 156(3), Cr. PC by the Magistrate.
e.
State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.5
was placed in
support of the contention that if the contents
of the F.I.R., taken on their face value, does not make out
any case against the appellant, such an F.I.R. registered
with ulterior motive deserves to be quashed.
f.
Hitesh Verma vs. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr.6
was also placed to support the contention that the High
Court ignored the misuse and abuse of the provisions of the
SC/ST Act by the complainant; neither the contents of the
5 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
6 (2020) 10 SCC 710
RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
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first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet discloses the precise content
of abusive language employed by the appellant so as to
attract the provisions of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.
11. It was, accordingly, prayed that relief prayed for by the appellant
be granted.
12. Mr. Prasad, learned Additional Advocate General appearing
for the first respondent (State) while seeking dismissal of this appeal
contended as follows:
a.
The appellant had committed a serious crime as a result of
which the complainant had sustained multiple injuries in the
resultant altercation.
b.
The Police, on the basis of the statement given by the
complainant and the investigation that followed, filed the
charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016 before the trial court
after following due procedure.
c.
The High Court, vide the impugned judgment and order,
has rightly dismissed the application for quashing presented
by the appellant.
d.
It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.
PC should be sparingly exercised with complete
circumspection and caution and the High Court was not in
error in refusing to exercise jurisdiction.
13. Mr. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the complainant
(second respondent) supported the impugned judgment and order of the
High Court. According to him, completion of investigation within a day
by the I.O. may seem to be unusual but is not an impossibility. He also
contended that the charge-sheet having been
filed, the law must be
allowed to take its own course; and, if at all the appellant is aggrieved
by framing of charges, he may seek his remedy in accordance with law.
No case for interference having been set up by the appellant, Mr.  Shukla
prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
14. We have heard the parties and perused the judgment and
order of the High Court together with the materials on record.
15. Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, prior to its amendment
notified vide S.O. 152(E) dated 18th January, 2016, read as follows:
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“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. — (1) Whoever,
not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
—
***
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place
within public view;
***”
16. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the complainant,
is silent about the place of occurrence and who, being a member of the
public,was present when the appellant is alleged to have hurled caste
related abuses at the complainant. However, on a reading of the second
F.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears that the incident
took place at the house of the appellant.
17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at
a place within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abuses
at the complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to
humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016 filed by
the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence
of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant of
committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/
ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his
wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to
the presence of a fifth individual (a member of  the public) at the place
of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife
and
their son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not
“in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting
section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore,
hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste
related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the
public was present.
18.That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled
caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate
him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further
to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have
noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet that the same
makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course
RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]
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of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged,
except for the allegation/observation that caste-related abuses were
hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or
intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence
under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or
intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a
particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot
(bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public
view, this would obviously constitute an act  intended to insult or humiliate
by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed
generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe,
per se, it may not be sufficient to attractsection 3(1)(x) unless such
words are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST
Act bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under section 438, Cr.PC
and having regard to theoverriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other
laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for
alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made
by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R.
(which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events),
but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on
statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise)
so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes
out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed
for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it,
prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited test that
has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet dated
21st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having
been committed by the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him
to stand a trial.
19. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the decision in Hitesh Verma (supra)
cited by Ms. Shukla can be pressed in aid to support the view that we
have taken above.
20. The second question that would engage our attention is, whether
the criminal proceedings against the appellant should be allowed to be
taken further in view of the appellant facing accusation of offences
punishable under sections 323 and 504, IPC.
21. Section 323, IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily causing
hurt. Hurt is defined in section 319, IPC as causing bodily pain, disease
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or  infirmity to any person. The allegation in the first F.I.R. is that the
appellant had beaten up the complainant for which he sustained multiple
injuries. Although the complainant alleged that such incident was
witnessed by many persons and that he sustained injuries on his hand,
the charge-sheet does neither refer to any eye-witness other than the
complainant’s wife and son nor to any medical report. The nature of
hurt suffered by the complainant in the process is neither 
reflected
from the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet. On the contrary, the appellant
had the injuries suffered by him treated immediately after the incident.
In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent (State) in the present
proceeding, there is no material worthy of consideration in this behalf
except a bald statement that the complainant sustained multiple injuries
“in his hand and other body
parts”. If indeed the complainant’s
version were to be believed, the I.O. ought to have asked for a medical
report to support the same.  Completion of investigation within a day in
a given case could be appreciated but in the present case it has resulted
in more disservice than service to the cause of justice. The situation
becomes all the more glaring when in course of this proceeding the
parties including the first respondent are unable to apprise us the outcome
of the second F.I.R. In any event, we do not find any ring of truth in the
prosecution case to allow the proceedings to
continue vis-à-vis section
323, IPC.
22. What remains is section 504, IPC. In Fiona Shrikhande and
Anr. vs.  State of Maharashtra7, this Court had the occasion to hold
that:
“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz.
(a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give
provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend
or know that such provocation would cause another to break the
public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult
must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break
the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who
intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will
give provocation to any other person and such provocation will
cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence,
in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied.
One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there
7 (2013) 14 SCC 44
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should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult
and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as
such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section
504 IPC.”
23. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we have
little hesitation in holding that even though the appellant might have abused
the complainant but such abuse by itself and without anything more does
not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in t h e
clear absence of the ingredient of intentional insult of such a degree that
it could provoke a person to break public peace or commit any other
offence.
24. We record that the High Court misdirected itself in failing to
appreciate  the challenge to the criminal proceedings including the charge-
sheet in the proper perspective and occasioned a grave failure of justice
in rejecting such challenge.
25. For the reasons aforesaid, we unhesitatingly hold that it would
be an abuse of the process of law to allow continuation of Criminal Case
No.376 of 2016. While setting aside the impugned judgment and order
of the High Court, we also quash Criminal Case No.376 of 2016.
26. Consequently, this appeal succeeds. Parties shall, however,
bear their own costs.
Ankit Gyan
Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)