PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI  KARMUR AND ORS. versus STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.
[2017] 10 S.C.R. 12, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2017] IOS.C.R. 12 
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PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI 
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KARMUR AND ORS. 
v. 
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 1723 of2017) 
OCTOBER 4, 2017 
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND 
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
s. 482 - Inherent jurisdiction - Exercise of by the High 
Court - Quashing of FIR/criminal proceedings - Complaint alleging 
that accused and others hatched a conspiracy resulting into tramfer 
of valuable land belonging to complainant a11d his siblings on the 
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basis of the forged documents - Registration of FIR u!ss. 384, 467, 
468, 471, I20-B, 506(2) - Quashing of FIR sought on the ground 
of amicable settlement between the parties - Rejection by the High 
Court - On appeal, held: High Court was just(fied in declining to 
quash the FIR - Instant case, is not merely one i11volving a private 
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dispute over a land transaction between two contesting parties who 
entered into a settlement later - Case involves a/legations of 
extortion, forgery, .fabrication of documents, utilization of.fabricated 
documents to effectuate tramfers of title before the registering 
authorities and deprivation of the complainant of his interest in 
land on the basis of a fabricated power of attorney - Allegations 
implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital societal interest 
in securing the probity of titles to or interest in land - Such offences 
cwtnot be construed to be merely private or civil but
implicate 
societal interest in prosecuting serious crime - Penal Code, 1860 -
ss. 384, 467. 468, 471, I20-B, 506(2). 
s. 482 - Inherent powers of the High Court - Quashing of 
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FIR/criminal proceedings - Principles to be kept in mind - Stated. 
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A complaint was filed against the appellants and other co-
accused alleging that they hatched a conspiracy resulting into 
transfer of valuable land belonging to the complainant and his 
siblings on the basis of the forged documents. The appellants 
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PARBATBHAI AAHIR@ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI 
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KARMUR v. STATE OF GUJARAT 
filed a petition seeking quashing of the First Information Report 
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on the ground that the appellants had amicably settled the dispute 
with the complainant. The High Court rejected the prayer to quash 
the FIR. Hence the present appeal. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The principles to be kept in mind while quashing 
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FIR/criminal proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C. are: 
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High 
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or 
to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer 
new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers C 
which inhere in the High Court; 
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to 
quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding 
on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at 
between the offender and the victim is not the same as 
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the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of 
compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, 
the power of the court is governed by the provisions of 
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The 
power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the 
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offence is non-compoundable. 
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding 
or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its 
jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must 
evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify
the 
exercise of the inherent power; 
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a 
wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to 
secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of 
the process of any court; 
(v) The decision as .to whether a complaint or First 
Information Report should be quashed on the ground that 
the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves 
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and 
no exhaustive elaboration of principles can b1• formulated; 
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[2017] 10 S.C.R. 
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and 
while dealing with a pica that the dispute has been settled, 
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and 
gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences 
involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, 
rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though 
the victim or the family of the victim have settled the 
dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in 
nature but have a serious impact upon society. The 
decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded 
on the overriding element of public interest in punishing 
persons for serious offences; 
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may 
be criminal cases which ·have an overwhelming or 
predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a 
distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent 
power to quash is concerned; 
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from 
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar 
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in 
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have 
settled the dispute; 
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal 
proceedmg if in view of the compromise between the 
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and 
the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause 
oppression and prejudice; and
(x) Economic offences involving the financial and economic 
well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond 
the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. 
The High Court would be justified in declining to qu:ish 
where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a 
financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The 
conse<1uences of the act complained of upon the financial 
or economic system will weigh in the balance. [Para 15] 
[25-E-H; 26-A-H; 27-A-B]
PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI 
KARMUR v. STATE OF GUJARAT 
1.2 The High Court was justified in declining to entertain 
the application for quashing the First Information Report in the 
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has adverted 
to two significant circumstances. Each of them has a bearing on 
whether the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 to 
·quash the FIR would sub serve or secure the ends of justice or 
prevent an abuse of the process of the court. The first is that the 
appellants were absconding and warrants had been issued against 
them under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
The second is that the appellants have criminal antecedents. The 
High Court adverted to the modus operandi which had been 
followed by the appellants in grabbing valuable parcels o.f land 
and noted that in the past as well, they were alleged to have been 
connected with such nefarious activities by opening bogus bank 
accounts. It was in this view of the matter that the High Court 
observed that in a case involving extortion, forgery and conspiracy 
where all the appellants were acting as a team, it was not in the 
interest of society to quash the I<IR on the ground that a 
settlement had been arrived at with the complainant. The view of 
the High Court is accepted. The instant case, as the allegations 
in the FIR would demonstrate, is not merely one involving a 
private dispute over a land transaction between two contesting
parties. The case involves allegations of' extortion, forgery lllld 
fabrication of documents, utilization of fabricated documents to 
effectuate transfers of title before the registering authorities and 
the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the 
basis of a fabricated power of attorney. If the allegations in the 
FIR are construed as they stand, it is evident that they implicate 
serious offences having a bearing on a vital societal interest in 
securing the probity of titles to or interest in land. Such offences 
cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes but 
implicate the societal interest in prosecuting serious crime. In 
these circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in 
declining to quash the FIR which had been registered under 
Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of' the Penal Code. 
[Para 16] [27-B-H; 28-A] 
Gian Singh v State of Punjab 2012 (8) SCR 753 : 2012 
(10) SCC 303; Narinder Singh v State c~l Pw1jab 2014 
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[2017] IOS.C.R. 
(4) SCR 1012 : 2014 (6). SCC 466; State of 
Maharashtra v Vikram Anantrai Doshi 2014 (15) SCC 
29; Central Bureau of Investigation v Maninder Singh 
2015 (10) SCR 277:2016 (1) SCC 389; State of Tamil 
Nadu v R Vasanthi Stanlev 2015 (9) SCR 772 : 2016 
(1) sec 376 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
[2012] 8 SCR 753 
referred to 
Para 8 
[2014] 4 SCR 1012 
referred to 
Paras 
2014 (15) sec 29 
referred to 
Para 12 
[2015] 10 SCR 277 
referred to 
Para 13 
[2015] 9 SCR 772 
referred to 
Para 14 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
No. 1723 of20!7 
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2016 of the High Court 
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of Gujarat atAhmedabad in Cr!. Misc.Application No. 30903 of 2016. 
Raktim Gogoi, Kartikeya Singh, Ms. Aashta Mehta, Anupam Lal 
Das, Advs. for the Appellant. 
Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ms. Mamta Singh, Ms. 
Shodhika Sharma, Ashok Anand, Rakesh Kumar Singh, Somanatha 
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Padhan, Ms. Aastha Mehta, Advs. for the Respondents. 
Tile Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DR. D. Y • .CHANDRACHUD, J. 1. Leave granted. 
2. By its judgment dated 25 November 2016, the High Court of 
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Gujarat dismissed an application under Section 482 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973.The appellants sought the quashing of a First 
Information Report registered against them on i8 June 2016 with the 
City 'C' Division Police Station, District .Tamnagar, Gujarat for offences 
punishable under Sections 384, 467,
468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of the 
Penal Code. The second respondent is the complainant. 
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3. In his complaint dated 18 June 2016, the second respondent 
stated that certain land admeasuring 17 vigha comprised in survey 1408 
at Panakhan Gokulnagar in Jamnagar city was his ancestral agricultural 
land.The land was converted to non-agricultural use on 21 June 1995 
and 5 January 2000 pursuant to orders of the District Collector. One 
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hundred and three plots were carved out of the land. Amongst them,
PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR 
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v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
plots 45 to 56 admeasuring 32,696 sq.ft. were in the joint names of six 
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brothers and a sister (represented by the complainant). According to the 
complainant, a broker by the name of Bachhubhai Veljibhai Nanda 
approached him with Parbatbhai Ahir, the first appellant stating that he 
desired to purchase the land. On the next day, the first appellant 
approached the complainant with his partner Hasmukhbhai Patel (the 
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third appellant) to purchase the land. The complainant was requested to 
provide a photocopy of the lay out plan of the plot, which he did. On the 
following day the first appellant is alleged to have gone to the house of 
the complainant with the second and the third appellants at which point 
in time, parties agreed that the land would be sold at the rate of Rs 4,221 
per sq.ft. and a deal was struck for a consideration of Rs. I, 13,58,711/-
out of which an amount of Rs 11 lakhs was given in cash to the 
complainant for plot no.56. The complainant's case is that while the 
discussion was on, he was requested by the second and the third appellants 
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that since the power of attorney was old and unreadable all ·the plot 
holders should give their passport size photographs. Accordingly, a D 
document was reduced to writing by which it was agreed that the sale 
transaction for plot no.56 would be completed within two months against 
full payment.
According to the complainant, when he demanded the 
remaining payment for the plot from the second and third appellants, the 
second appellant provided him seven cheques each in the amount of Rs 
6 lakhs in the name of the six brothers (one brother being given two 
cheques). Thereafter when the complainant followed up for the payment 
of the remaining amount with the purchasers, the balance was not paid 
and, on the contrary, the complainant was threatened of a forcible transfer 
of the land. According to the complainant, when he visited the office of 
the Sub-registrar about three days before lodging the complaint, it came 
to his knowledge that a sale deed has been registered not only in respect 
of the plot in question( which was agreed to be sold) but also in respect 
of plot nos.45 to 55 on 27 January 2016. It was then that the complainant 
realised that the purchaser in the sale deed was shown as the fourth 
appellant, Jayesh Arvindbhai Patel, and the name of the seventh appellant, 
Jitudan Nankudan Gadhavi, resident of Payalnagar society, Naroda, 
Ahmedabad was shown as the holder of a power of attorney.The 
witnesses to the registered sale deed were the fifth appellant,Rabari 
Hiteshbhai and the sixth appellant, Patel Indravaden Dineshbhai. 
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4. The complaint came to be lodged on the complainant having 
realised that the power of attorney in the name of his siblings had been 
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[20171 I 0 S.C.R. 
forged. The complainant stated that neither he nor any of his siblings 
had given a power of attorney in favour of the seventh appellant. 
According to the complainant, neither the non-judicial stamp dated 25 
January 2016 in the amount of Rs I 0,.30.0001- nor the judicial stamp 
dated 27 January 2016 has been purchased by him. In fact. according to 
the complainant, it was the fourth appellant who had purchased the judicial 
stamp dated 27 January 2016. 
5. According to the complaint, plots no.45 to 55 admeasuring 30,005 
sq.ft. are valued at Rs 12.50 crores. It has been alleged that a conspiracy 
was hatched by the appellants and by the other co-accused resulting 
into the transfer of valuable land belonging to the compbinanl and his 
siblings, on the basis of forged documents. 
6. The High Court noted thatthe fourth appellant had moved Special 
Criminal Application no.4538 of 2016 which had been rejected by the 
coordinate bench of the High Court on 3 August 2016. While rejecting 
the earlier application under Section 482, the High Court had observed 
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"19. Primary details revealed the complaint had led this Court 
examine the papers of the investigation. The evidence so far 
collected prima facie reveal the involvement of the petitioner. 
This Court also could notice that it is a case v. here under the 
pretext of buying only a particular Plot No.56 from the 
complainant and his family members, the
power of attorney has 
been forged usurping nearly I 0 other plots which value nearly 11 
crores and odd by allegedly conniving with each other, and 
therefore, the payment of Rs 42 lakhs by the cheques to the 
complainant in relation to one of the plots also would pale into 
insignificance. This, by no means, even at a prima facie level, 
can be said to be a civil dispute, given a colour of criminality. It 
would be in the interest of both the sides for this Court to either, 
at this stage not to make a roving inquiry or divulge anything 
which may affect the ongoing investigation. Suffice it to note 
that, the petition does not deserved to be entertained an the same 
stands rejected." 
Before the High Court, the plea for quas_hing the First Information Report 
was advanced on the ground that the appellants had amicably settled the 
dispute with the complainant. The complainant had also filed an affidavit 
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PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAl BHIMSJNHBHAI KARMUR 
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v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
7. On behalf of the prosecution, the Public Prosecutor opposed 
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the application for quashing on two grounds. First - the appellants were 
absconding and warrants had been issued against them under Section 
70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.Second, the appellants had 
criminal antecedents, the details of which are contained in the following 
chart submitted before the High Court: 
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I Paiixttbhai Bhim;inhbhai 
City "A" Division Jamnagar 
P.I 
Karmrn· 
CR No 1-251/20 JO 
2 Ramdc Bhikha Nanadaniya 
City "A'"Division Jamnagar 
P2 
CR No.1-135/2016 
2 
City "A" Division Jamnagar 
CR No.1-105/2016,. 
City "A" Division Jamnagar 
2 
CR No. l-251 /20 JO 
3 
Ha~mtkh Harnrajbhai Patel 
Gandhinagar M-Casc No. I /2014 
P.3 
City "A" Division Jamnagar 
CR No.1-105/2016 
4 lndravadan Dineshbhai 
City "A: Di vision famnagar 
P.6 
Patel 
CR No.l-105/2016 
5 Jitendra Somabhai Modi 
City "A" Division Jamnagar 
P.7 
CRNo.1-105/2016 
Odhav Police Station 
CR No.1-180/2015 
6 Vishnu@T oto Rabari 
Gandhinagar M-Casc No.1/2014 
City "A: Division Jamnagar 
CR No.1-105/2016 
. 
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The High Court observed that it had been given "a fair idea" about the 
modus operandi adopted by the appellants for grabbing the. land, in the 
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course of which they had opened bogus bunk accounts. The High Court 
held that the ease involves exto1iion, forgery and conspiracy
and al\ the 
appellants have acted as a team. Hence, in the view of the High Com1, 
it was not in the interest of society at large to accept the settlement and 
quash the FIR. The High Court held that the charges are of a serious 
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nature and the activities of the appellants render them a potential threat 
to society. On this ground, the prayer to quashthe First Information 
Report has been rejected. 
8. On behalf of the appellants, reliance has been placed on the 
decisions rendered by this Court in Gian Singh v State of Punjab 1and 
in Narinder Singh v State of Punjab2.Learned counsel submitted that 
the dispute between the complainant and the appellants arose from a 
transaction for the sale of land. It was urged that the dispute is essentially 
of a civil nature and since parties have agreed to an amicable settlement, 
the proper course for the High Court would have been to quash the FIR 
in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 482 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 
state has supported the judgment of the High Court. Learned counsel 
emphasised the circumstances which weighed with the High Court, 
including (i) the seriousness of the allegations; (ii) the conduct of the 
appellants who were absconding; and (iii) the criminal antecedents of 
the appellants. Hence, it was urged that the appellants were not entitled 
to the relief of quashing the FIR merely because they had entered into a 
settlement with the complainant. 
I 0. Section 482 is prefaced with an overriding provision.The statute 
saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a superior
court, to make 
such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of 
any court; or (ii)otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In Gian Singh 
(supra) a bench of three learned Judges of this Court adverted to the 
body of precedent on the subject and laid down guiding principles which 
the High Court should con.sider in determining as to whether to quash an 
FIR or complaint in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. The 
considerations which must weigh with the High Court are: 
"61 ... the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal 
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent 
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a 
criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 
of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory 
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline 
engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or 
I (2012) lOSCC 303 
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PARBATBHAI AAHIR@ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR 
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v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRA CHUO, J.] 
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases 
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power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may 
be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their 
dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
case and no category can be prescribed. However, before 
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to 
the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences 
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. 
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's 
family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences 
are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender 
in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention 
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants 
while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis 
for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But 
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the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly 
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civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of 
quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, 
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions 
or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or 
the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal 
in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In 
this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal 
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between 
the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote 
and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the 
accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice 
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite 
full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In 
other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be 
unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the 
criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding 
would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement 
and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and 
whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriatethat the 
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above 
question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within 
its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 
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11. In Narinder Singh (supra), Dr Justice AK Sikri, speaking for 
a bench of two learned Judges of this Court observed that in respect of 
offences against society, it is the duty of the state to punish the offender.In 
consequence, deterrence provides a rationale for punishing the offender. 
Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender and 
victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society that the offender 
should be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime. On 
the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the 
correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more 
weightage than the theory of deterrence.In such a case, the court may 
be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to 
better relations between them and would resolve ·a festering private 
dispute. The court observed that the timing of a settlement is of 
significance in determining whether the jurisdiction under Section 482 
should be exercised: 
"29. 7 ... Those cases where the settlement is arrived at 
immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the 
matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal 
in accepting the settlement to guash the criminal proceedings/ 
investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the 
investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been 
filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the 
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, 
the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers 
favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the 
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, 
where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the 
conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, 
normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power 
under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court 
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits ... " 
This Court held, while dealing with an offence under Section 307 of the 
Penal Code that the following circumstances had weighed with it in 
quashing the First Information Report: 
"33. We have gone through the FIR as well which was recorded 
on the basis of statement of the complainant/victim. It gives an 
indication that the complainant was attacked allegedly by the 
accused persons because of some previous dispute bctwc<?n the
PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR 
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v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
parties, though nature of dispute etc. is not stated in detail. 
However, a very pertinent statement appears on record viz., 
"respectable persons have been trying for a compromise up till 
now, which could not be finalized". This becomes an important 
aspect. It appears that there have been some disputes which led 
to the aforesaid purported attack by the accused on the 
complainant. In this context when we find that the elders of the 
village, including Sarpanch. intervened in the matter and the parties 
have not only buried their hatchet but have decided to live 
peacefully in future, this becomes an important consideration. 
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The evidence is yet to be led in the.Court. It has not even started. 
In view of compromise between parties, there is a minimal 
chance of the witnesses coming forward in support of the 
prosecution ease. Even though nature of injuries can still be 
established by producing the doctor as witness who conducted 
medical examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who 
caused these injuries. The chances of conviction, therefore, 
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appear to be remote. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to drag 
these proceedings ... " 
12. In State of Maharashtra v VikramAnantrai Dosbi3, a bench 
of two learned Judges of this Court explained the earlier decisions and 
the principles which must govern !n deciding whether a criminal 
proceeding
involving a non-compoundable offence should be quashed. 
In that case, the respondents were alleged to have obtained Letters of 
Credit from a bank in favour of fictitious entities. The charge-sheet 
involved offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 read with 
Section 120-B of the Penal Code. Bogus_ beneficiary companies were 
alleged to have got them discounted by attaching fabricated bills. 
MrJustice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) 
emphasised that the case involved an allegation of forgery; hence the 
court was not dealing with a simple case where "the accused had 
borrowed money from a bank, to divert it elsewhere". The court held 
that the manner in which Letters of Credit were issued and funds were 
siphoned off had a foundation in criminal law: 
" ... availing of money from a nationalized bank in the manner, as 
alleged by the investigating agency. vividly exposits fiscal impurity 
and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated 
'c2014) 15 sec 29 
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in the chargesheet cannot be put in the compartment of an 
individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has 
immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling 
of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly 
conceived contrivance to avail of these kindofbenefits it cannot 
be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predomi1wtingly 
of ci\dl character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates 
a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of 
the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation.'' 
The judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings was 
hence set aside by this Court. 
13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of 
Investigation v Maninder Singh4 by a bench of two learned Judges 
of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its 
inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceelimgs under Sections 
420, 467, 468 and471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While 
allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau oflnvestigation Mr Justice 
Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the 
case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds 
of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled 
with the bank would not justify a recourse to the power under Section 
482: 
·' ... In economic offences
Court must not only keep in view that . 
money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but 
also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a 
theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we arc 
concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate 
design with an eye of personal profit regardless ofconsequence 
to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the 
ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank 
would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the 
economic offenders are not allowed to continue. the entire 
community is aggrieved." 
14. In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi 
Stanley5,the court rejected the submission that the first respondent was 
a woman "who was following the command of her husband" and had 
• c2016) 1 sec 389 
'c2016)1 sec 376
PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI'BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR 
25 
v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 
signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud 
A 
which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, 
this Court held that: 
" ... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be 
considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission 
assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An 
B 
offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not 
depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain 
provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of 
jurisdiction.Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether 
pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or C 
getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents. 
cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the gmund of her gender 
as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argOl'nent. 
The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on 
this score ... " 
" ... A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for 
D 
that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent 
in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on 
the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when 
the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the 
load on the system ... " 
E 
15. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on
the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:· 
(i) 
Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to 
prevent an abuse of the process of any court .or to secure the ends 
of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only 
F 
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; 
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First 
Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a 
settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim 
is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of G 
compounding an offence. Whilecompounding an offence, the power 
· of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under 
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 
H
26 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 10 S.C.R. 
A (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint 
should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, 
the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would 
justify the exercise of the inherent power; 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and 
plenitude it has to be exercised; (i)to secure the ends of justice or 
(ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; 
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report 
should be quashed on the ground th~t the offender and victim have 
settled the dispute, revolves u:timately on the facts and 
circumstances of each case and no exhau&t;ve elaboration of 
principles can be fonnulated; 
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing 
with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must 
have due regard to the nature and. gravity of the offence. Heinous 
and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such 
as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though 
the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such 
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious 
impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such 
cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in 
punishing persons for serious offences; 
(vii) As distinguished from
serious offences, there may be criminal cases 
which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil 
dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of 
the inherent power to quash is concerned; 
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, 
financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an 
essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing 
where parties have settled the dispute; 
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding 
ifin view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility 
of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal 
proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 
(viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial
PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR 
v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CIIANDRACHUD, J.] 
and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie 
beyond the domain of a meredispute between private disputants. 
The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the 
offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic 
fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained 
ofupon the financial or economic system will .weigh in the balance. 
16. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid 
down in the decisions of this Court, we are of the view that the High 
Court was justified in declining to entertain the application for quashing 
the First Information Report in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. 
27 
A 
B 
The High Court has adverted to two significant circumstances. Each of 
them has a bearing on whether the exercise of the jurisdiction under 
C 
·Section 482 to quash the FIR would subserve or secure the ends of 
justice or prevent an abuse of the process of the court. The first is that 
the appellants were absconding and warrants had been issued against 
them uncle~ Section 70 0f the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The 
second isthat the appellants havecriminal antecedents, reflected in the 
chart which has been extracted in the earlier part of this judgment. The 
High Court adverted to the modus operandi which had been followed 
by the appellants in grabbing valuable parcels of land and
·noted that in 
the past as well, they were alleged to have been connected with such 
nefarious activities by opening bogus bank accounts. It was in this view 
of the matter that the High Court observed that in a case involving 
extortion, forgery and conspiracy where all the appellants w.ere acting 
as a team, it was not in the interest of society to quash the FIR on the 
ground that a settlement had been arrived at with the complainant. We 
agree with the view of the High Court. The present case, as the allegations 
in the FIR would demonstrate, is not merely one involving a private 
dispute over a land transaction between two contesting parties. The 
case involves allegations of extortion, forgery and fabrication of 
documents, utilization of fabricated documents to effectuate transfers 
D 
E 
F 
of title before the registering authorities and the deprivation of the 
complainant of his interest in land on the basis of a fabricated power of 
attorney. If the allegations in the FIR are construed as they stand, it is 
G 
evident that they implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital 
societal interest in securing the probity of titles to or interest in land. 
Such offences cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes 
but implicate the societa\ interest in prosecuting serious crime. In these 
H
28 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] IO S.C.R. 
A 
circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in declining to 
quash the FIR which had been registered under Sections 384, 467, 468, 
471, 120-B and 506(2) of the Penal Code. 
17. We do not, for the above reasons, find any merit in the appeal. 
The Criminal Appeal shall accordingly stand dismissed. 
B 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal dismissed.