ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ & OTHERS versus TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY & ANOTHER
[2016] 6 S.C.R. 611, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Case Allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2016] 6 S.C.R. 611 
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ & OTHERS 
; A 
v. 
TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVEASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS 
SECRETARY & ANOTHER 
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 455 of2015) 
B 
· FEBRUARY 12, 2016 
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.] 
Constitution of India - Arts.14, 19(/){g), 21, 105, 194 -
Members of State Legislative Assembly - Suspension for breach of · C 
privileges - First assembly resolution whereby suspension of 
nineteen members including petitioners, from the House for the 
remainder period of the current Session - Members allegedly 
obstructed proceedings of the assenibly - Thereafter, constitution 
of Privileges Committee which held that the actions of the petitioners 
amounted to breach of privilege, and recommended the action to be 
taken against them - Second Assembly Resolution passed whereby 
suspensiOn of the petitioners for ten days of the next session of the 
House - Members not to be paid their salaries or given other benefits 
- Writ petition challenging the second Resolution - Held: By 
preventing the legislator from participating in the proceedings of 
the House, though there is a curtailment of the petitioner-members' 
right of free speech in the Legislative Assembly to which they are 
entitled u!Art. 194 but the impugned order does not violate 
fundamental rights of petitioners guaranteed under!A'd. 19(/)(a). -· 
Right to participate in the proceedings of the legis/ptive. bodies is 
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not a fundamental right falling u/Art. 19(/)(g) - Member
of the. F 
legislative assembly cannot be treated as pursuing an 'occupation' · 
u!Art. 19(/)(g) - Further, the only material relied upon by the 
Privileges Committee to identify all the members and recommend 
action against them for breach of privilege was the video recording 
- It was the legal obligation of the Committee to ensure that a copy 
of the video recording was supplied to the members·- Failure to 
supply a copy of the video recording or affording an opportunity to 
the petitioners to view the video recording resulted in the violation 
of the principles of natural justice-denial of a reasonable 
opportunity to meet the case - Thus, the second resolution passed 
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[2016] 6 S.C.R. 
A 
by the State Legislative Assembly set aside - Tamil Nadu Legislative 
Assembly Rules - r.121(2) - Principles of natural justice. 
Arts. 105, 194, 19(l)(a) - Freedom of ~peech available to a 
member of the legislative body and freedom of speech inhering in a 
citizen - Scope and amplitude of - Held: Are totally different -
B 
Citizen has a right to enter the legislative body and exercise his 
freedom of speech after he gets elected to a legislative body - After 
the cessation of the membership of the legislative body, legislator 
would not continue to enjoy the freedom of speech contemplated 
u/Arts. 105 and 194. 
c 
Judicial review - Scope of- In matters relating to action taken 
against members by the legislative bodies - Held: Is limited -
Non-compliance with the principles of natural justice is one of the 
limited grounds. 
Allowing the writ petition, the Court 
D 
HELD: 1.1 It is clear from the scheme of Articles 105 and 
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194 of the Constitution that the constitutional declaration of 
freedom of speech in the legislative bodies creates a constitutional 
right in favour of the members of such legislative bodies. The 
dimensions and contours of such right are greatly different from 
the dimensions and contours of the fundamental right of speech 
and expression guaranteed under Article 19(l)(a). Therefore, the 
scope and amplitude of the freedom of speech inhering in a citizen 
and available to a member of the
legislative body are totally 
different. No citizen has a right to enter the legislative body and 
exercise his freedom of speech unless he first gets elected to 
such a legislative body in accordance with law. No legislator would 
continue to enjoy the freedom of speech contemplated under 
Articles 105 and 194 after the cessation of the membership of 
the legislative body. [Para 18) [622-A-B; 623-C; 624-A-B) 
1.2 No doubt, when a legislator is prevented from 
participating in the proceedings of the House during the currency 
of the membership .by virtue of some proceedings taken against 
such a legislator, there would be a curtailment of the legislator's 
constitutional right of free speech in the House of which such 
legislator is a member. But such curtailment is sanctioned by 
Constitution in view of the fact that such a right is made subject
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU 
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY 
to other provisions of the Constitution, the rules and standing 
orders regulating the procedure of the legislative bodies. 
Therefore, though there is a curtailment of the petitioners' right 
of free speech in the Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu to which 
they are entitled under Article 194 by virtue of the impugned 
order, the said impugned order does not, violate the fundamental 
rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 19(l)(a). [Paras 
19, 20] [624-B-D] 
1.3 The right to contest an election to the legislative bodies 
established by the Constitution is held not to be a fundamental 
right. Therefore, logically it would be difficult to accept that the 
right to participate in the proceedings of the legislative bodies 
can be a fundamental right falling under Article 19(l)(g). No citizen 
is entitled as of right either to become or continue for the whole 
lifetime as member of a legislative assembly. Acquisition of the 
membership depends on the decision of the electorate and is 
conferred by a process established by law. Even after election, 
the tenure is limited. Fundamental rights do not come into 
existence upon the volition of others. They inhere in the citizens 
and are capable of being exercised independently without the 
need for any action or approval of others subject only to the 
restrictions imposed by law. Any member of a legislative assembly 
holds office until
such membership comes to an end by some 
process established by law. Any monetary benefit incidental to 
the holding of such offices is only to compensate for the time and 
energy expended by the holder of the office in the service of the 
nation. It is for this very reason that a member of a legislative 
assembly cannot be treated as holding office for the purpose of 
eking out a livelihood. The economic underpinnings of an 
'occupation' under Article 19(1 )(g) and the transient and incidental 
nature of economic benefits flowing from the office of a legislator 
must inevitably lead to the conclusion that a member of the 
legislative assembly cannot be treated as pursuing an 'occupation' 
under Article 19(1)(g). [Para 25, 26) [628-B-G] 
1.4 This Court in Raja Ram Pal case held that salary and 
other benefits to which the members of a legislative body are 
entitled to during their tenure are purely incidental to the 
membership and they don't even create an independent and 
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[2016) 6 S.C.R. 
indefeasible constitutional right. Therefore, the the deprivation 
of their salaries and other benefits incidental to the membership 
of the legislative assembly during the period of suspension 
amounted to deprivation of fundamental right under Article 21 
does not arise.[Para 29] [629-DJ 
1.5 The scope of judicial review in matters relating to action 
taken against members by the legislative bodies is limited. 
However, the non-compliance with the principles of natural justice 
is one of the limited grounds on which judicial review could be 
undertaken against the internal proceedings of the legislative 
bodies in appropriate cases. (Para 30) (629-F) 
1.6 From the writ petition, it appears that there was 
considerable correspondence between the Privileges Committee 
and the petitioners. The Privileges Committee called for an 
explanation from the six petitioners as to why action could not be 
taken against them, though it is not clear from the record as to. 
the basis on which the six petitioners were chosen out of the 19 
MLAs who were suspended initially. Each of the petitioners gave 
their explanation by separate letters. After consideration of the 
explanation, the Privileges Committee concluded that there was 
indeed breach of privilege, and recommended action against them. 
This recommended action formed the basis of the assembly 
resolution. (Para 31) (630-B-D) 
1.7 From the minutes of the
Privileges Committee meeting, 
it is clear that the only material relied upon by the Committee to 
identify all the six petitioners and recommend action against them 
for breach of privilege was the video recording. The minutes of 
the Privileges Committee meeting clearly show that the 
video-recording played an important role in arriving at the 
conclusions that the Privileges Committee did. The video 
recording was specifically shown to the members of the Privileges 
Committee "since some of them would have forgot only the video 
recordings were shown again", which indicates that the 
Committee was not willing to rely solely on the memory of the 
members of the Committee. The video recording served as the 
common factual platform for all the members of the Privileges 
Committee, from where the members discussed the actions of 
the six petitioners, and recommended action against them. (Paras 
35, 38) (632-C, G; 633-A-B)
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU 
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY 
1.8 The Pl"ivileges Committee should have necessarily 
offered the opportunity to see the video recording to the 
petitioners in order to make the process adopted by it with the 
requirements of Article 14. Perhaps they might have had an 
opportunity to explain why the video r<;cording does not contain 
any evidence/material for recommending action against all or some 
of them or to explain that the video recording should have been 
interpreted differently. It is not the petitioners' burden to request 
for a copy of the video recording. It is the legal obligation of the 
Privileges Committee to ensure that a copy of the video recording 
is supplied to the petitioners in order to satisfy the requirements· 
of the principles of natural justice. The failure to supply a copy of 
the video recording or affording an opportunity to the petitioners 
to view the video recording relied upon by the committee clearly 
resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice i.e. a 
denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the case. Therefore, 
the impugned resolution passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative 
Assembly is set aside. The consequence thereof, is that the salary 
and other benefits incidental to the membership of the assembly 
stand restored to the six petitioners. [Paras 42, 43) [634-B"E) 
Raja Ram Pal v. Hon 'ble Speaker. Lok Sabha & Others 
2007 (1) SCR 317:(2007) 3 SCC 184; Gujarat
State 
Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotel AIR 1983 SC 848: 
(1983) 3 SCC 379; Air India Statutory Corpn. v. United 
Labour Union AIR 1997 SC 645: (1997) 9 SCC 
377:1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 579; P. V. Narasimha Rao v. 
State (CBJISPE) 1998 (2) SCR 870:(1998) 4 sec 626; 
T.MA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 2002 (3) 
Suppl. SCR 587:(2002) 8 SCC 481; Sodan Singh v. 
New Delhi Municipal Committee 1989 4 SCC 105; Jagjit 
Singh v. State of Haryana 2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 521: 
(2006) 11 sec 1 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
20Q7. (1) SCR317 
AIR 1983 SC 848 
1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 579 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
Para9 
Para 12 
Para 12 
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1998 (2) SCR 870 
referred to 
Para 18 
2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587 
referred to 
Para22 
1989 4 sec 105 
referred to 
Para 23 
2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 521 
referred to 
Para 40 
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 455 
of2015. 
Under Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia. 
Jaideep Gupta, Sanjay R. Hegde, Sr. Advs., S. Nithin, Prabhu 
Ramasubramaniam, Babu M, Anil Kumar Mishra-I, Advs. for the 
Appellant. 
Shekhar Naphade, Subramonium Prasad, Sr. Advs., B. Balaj i, Ms. Meha 
Aggrawal, Muthukishan, Advs. for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
CHELAMESWAR, J. I. This is a petition filed by six petitioners 
invoking Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia. They are members of 
the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly representing different 
constituencies. By a resolution of the assembly dated I 9.02.2015, 
nineteen members of the assembly, including the six petitioners, have 
been suspended from the House for the remainder of the period of the 
then current Session. The resolution suspended the nineteen members 
for allegedly obstructing the proceedings of the legislative assembly. 
Sl!bsequently, a Privileges Committee was constituted to inquire into 
whether the conduct of the members during the incident dated I 9.02.2015 
amounted to a breach of privilege. The Privileges Committee held that 
the actions of the six petitioners were a breach of privilege, and 
recommended
the action to be taken against the six petitioners. Such a 
recommendation was passed by a resolution of the assembly dated 
31.03.2015. Through this resolution, the petitioners were suspended for 
a period of ten days of the next session of the House. Further, it was 
resolved that the petitioners should not be paid their salaries or given 
other benefits which are due to them as members of the Legislative 
Assembly for the period of suspension. 
2. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed the instant writ 
petition praying as follows:-
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHAN RAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY (J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
a) 
Issue a writ of order declaring the impugned resolution 
dated 31.03.2015 passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative 
Assembly, as unconstitutional, illegal, null and void. 
b) 
Issue a writ of order and strike down the suspension 
beyond the second period. 
c) 
Issue a writ of order and pem1it the petitioners to use the 
office and their residential premises. 
d) 
Issue a writ of order and restore all benefits other than that 
which is connected with the house. 
e) 
Issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records pertaining 
to the resolution of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly 
dated 19.02.2015 and 31.03.2015 in awarding multiple 
punishments to the petitioners on the file of the first 
respondent so as to quash the same. 
f) 
Issue a writ of order declaring the proceedings of breach 
of privilege against the petitioner herein, right from 
commencement of the proceedings by the 2nd respondent 
herein under Rule 226 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative 
Assembly framed under Article 208 of Constitution oflndia 
to the subsequent proceedings carried out by the privilege 
committee under rule 229 of the rules including the 
resolution of the house under rule 229( d) dated 19.02.2015 
and 31.03.2015 respectively are illegal, failure to comply 
with the principles ofnaturaljustice, perverse, irrational and 
violative of the petitioners statutory right under the Tamil 
Nadu
payment of salaries Act, 1951. 
g) 
Pass such other/further order as this Hon'ble Court may 
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the 
present case." 
3. All the six petitioners are members ofa political party known 
as DMDK. 
4. The basic facts leading to the present writ petition are as follows:-
On 19.2.2015, the petitioners allegedly resorted to unruly conduct 
while the session was in progress. When the Speaker directed the 
Marshalls to evict the first petitioner from the House because of the 
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alleged unruly conduct, the remaining petitioners ran to the Speaker's 
podium allegedly to attack the Speaker. However, they were prevented 
by the Marshalls. Thereafter, the Speaker passed an Order suspending 
19 members of the Legislative Assembly belonging to the DMDK party 
from the Assembly for the remainder of the Session with immediate 
effect. 
5. Such a decision was taken by the Speaker allegedly in exercise 
of the power under Rule 121 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Assembly Rules. 
6. The Speaker also referred to the Privileges Committee of this 
Assembly the incident dated 19.02.15 to identify those members who 
attempted to assault the Speaker and the Watch and Ward Staff. The 
Privileges Committee, after an inquiry, recorded a conclusion that the 
conduct of the six petitioners was in breach. of the privileges of the 
House and, therefore, recommended to the House that these six 
petitioners be removed from the Assembly for 10 days from the 
commencement of the next session of the Legislative Assembly and 
also that during the said period, the petitioners be not paid the salary and 
be given other benefits to which the members of the House are entitled. 
Hence, the writ petition. 
7. Various submissions are made on behalf of the petitioners which 
can be summarized as follows:-
(i) That the decision to suspend the petitioners not only for the 
current session in which the alleged breach of privilege
occurred but also for a certain period of the next session is 
beyond the authority of the House and the Speaker under 
Article 194. 
(ii) The incidents which took place outside the premises of the 
Legislative Assembly could not form the basis for taking 
action on the ground that such incidents resulted in the 
breach of the privileges of the House. 
(iii) The non-supply of certain material (video recording) to the 
petitioners which was relied upon to record the conclusion 
that the petitioners are guilty amounted to denial of a 
reasonable opportunity and, therefore, non-compliance with 
the principles of natural justice vitiating the assembly 
resolution dated 31.03.2015.
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHAN RAJ v .. T AMlL NADU LEGISLATIVE 
619 
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
(iv) The State legislature and the Speaker do not have the 
A 
authority to seize the office and the residential premises in 
the legislative hostel allotted to the petitioners by virtue of 
their membership in the Legislative Assembly. 
· 8. At the very threshold, the petitioners were cal led upon to satisfy 
this Court regarding the maintainability of the instant writ petition as for 
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the maintenance ofa writ petition under Article 32, the petitioners must 
demonstrate that there is an infraction of one of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed to the petitioners under Part lil of the Constitution. 
9. The response of the petitioners is twofold. 
(!) That the petitioners' fundamental rights guaranteed under 
Articles 19( 1 )(a), 19( 1 )(g), 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution 
have been violated by the impugned resolution; 
(2) This Court in the case of R"ja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, 
c 
Lok Sablta & Otllers, (2007) 3 SCC 184, examined the 
constitutionality of the proceedings of the Speaker of the Lok · D 
Sabha in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the 
Constitution of India. Therefore, the present petition also is 
maintainable. 
I 0. We shall first deal with the second submission of the petitioners. 
The question whether a petition under Article 32 is maintainable to 
determine the legality of the action by legislative bodies against its
members on the ground that they indulged in conduct which is in breach 
of the privileges oft~e House was never raised either by the respondents 
nor did the Court go into that question in Raja Ram Pal case. On the 
other hand, it appears from the said judgment that this Court was not 
only dealing with the writ petitions filed under Article 32 but certain 
transferred cases though exact details of those cases and from where 
they were transferred are not available from the judgment. In our opinion, 
Raja Ranr Pal case is not an authority for the proposition that a writ 
petition such as the one on hand is maintainable under Article 32. The 
question must be examined independently. 
11. Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the rightto move this 
Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of rights conferred 
by Part III of the Constitution. Article 32 insofar as it is relevant for the 
present purpose reads as follows:-
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"32. (I) The right to move the Supreme Comt by appropriate 
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this 
Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or 
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever 
may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights 
conferred by this Part." 
I 2. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 in contradistinction 
to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 is limited. While 
the High Courts in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 can 
issue writs for the enforcement of any right conferred by Part Ill and 
for"any other purpose", the jurisdiction under Article 32 is only confined 
to the enforcement of the rights conferred under Part III of the 
Constitution. This distinction is wel I recognised by this Comt in number 
of cases'. Therefore, in order to maintain the present petition, the question 
whether there is any breach of fundamental rights of the petitioners is 
required to be examined. 
13. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned 
action is violative of the petitioners' fundamental right of speech and 
expression guaranteed under Article 19( I )(a) and their fundamental right 
to carry on an occupation guaranteed under Article 19( 1 )(g). It is also 
the·case of the petitioners
that the alleged non-compliance with the 
requirement of the principles of natural justice in the process of enquiry 
into the alleged unruly conduct of the petitioners and award of the 
punishment is violative of Article 14. It is also argued that the impugned 
action insofar as it deprives (although for a limited period) the petitioners 
of their salary and other facilities attached to their membership of the 
house is a violation of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
I 4. We proceed to examine the claim of the petitioners that by the 
impugned action their fundamental rights under Articles 19( I )(a) and (g) 
are violated. 
15. It is well settled now that the fundamental rights guaranteed 
1 See. G1ifarat State Financial Corporation v. lotus Hotel, AIR 1983 SC 848: ( 1983) 3 
SCC 379: Air India Starutory Corpn. 1: Cnited labour L"nion, AIR 1997 SC 645. 680 
H 
: (1997) 9 sec 377.
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLYREP.BYITSSECRETARY[J.CHELAMESWAR,J.] 
under Article 19 are available only to the citizens of this country whereas 
the other fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 are available to 
every person who is subjected to the laws of this country. The six 
freedoms enumerated under Article I 9 of the Constitution inhere in all 
the citizens, by virtue of their citizenship without the need for anything 
further. 
16. Two questions are required to be examined in the context; (i) 
when a member of a State Legislature participates in the proceedings of 
the House, is that member exercising a fundamental right of speech and 
expression under Article 19(1 )(a)? (ii) Whether any action, either of that 
legislative body or any other authority, acting pursuant to any law, disabling 
either temporarily or otherwise a member from participating in tlie 
proceedings of the legislative body, amounts to deprivation of the 
fundamental rightto freedom of speech under Article 19( 1 )(a) of such a 
legislator? 
17. To answer the above question, a closer scrutiny of some of 
the provisions of the Constitution is required. Articles 105 and 194 are 
relevant in the contexf. These two articles deal with the Parliament 
and the State Legislature respectively. They declare inter alia that 
"there shall be freedom of speech" in the said legislative bodies. Articles 
I 05(2) and 194(2) further declare that no member of either the Parliament 
or
the State Legislature "shall be liable to any proceedings in any court 
in respect of any thing said" in such legislative bodies or any committee 
thereof. 
2 Relevant portions of the Articles: 
Article I 05. (I) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and 
standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament. there shall be freedom of 
speech in Parliament. 
(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect 
ofany thing said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and 
no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of 
either House of Parliament of any report, paper. votes or proceedings. 
Article 194. (I) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and 
standing orders regulating the procedure of the Legislature. there shall be freedom of 
speech in the Legislature of every State. 
(2) No member of the Legislature ofa State shall be liable to any proceedings in any 
court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any 
committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or 
under the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, votes or 
proceedings. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 6 S.C.R. 
I 8. It is clear from the scheme of these two articles that the 
constitutional declaration of freedom Q.f speech in the legislative bodies 
creates a constitutional right in favour of the members of such legislative 
bodies. Such a freedom had its origin in the privileges of the House of 
Commons'. The dimensions and contours of such right are greatly 
different from the dimensions and contours of the fundamental right of 
speech and expression guaranteed under Article I 9( I )(a). 
(i) While the fundamental right of speech guaranteed under Article 
19( I )(a) inheres in every citizen, the freedom of speech contemplated 
under Articles 105 and 194 is not available to every citizen except the 
members of the legislative bodies, though, by virtue of the operation of 
other provisions of the Constitution, citizenship of this country is a 
condition precedent for acquiring the membership of the legislative bodies; 
· the constitutional right of free speech· in the legislative bodies is not 
inherent to the citizenship but is to be acquired by getting elected to 
those bodies. 
(ii) The fre_~dom of speech contemplated in Articles I 05 and 194 
is available only during the tenure of the membership of those bodies. 
No citizen can be deprived ofits citizenship and therefore the fundamental 
right under Article I 9( I )(a) is inalienable. 
(iii) The constitutional right of free speech under Articles I 05 and 
194
is limited to the premises of the legislative bodies. Whereas, the 
freedom of speech under Article 19(1 )(a) has no such geographical 
limitations. 
(iv) While the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1 )(a) 
is subject to reasonable restriction that could be imposed by law which is 
compliant with the limitations specified under Articles 19( I )(2), the right 
3 PV Narasimlia Rao v. State (CBJISPE) (1998) 4 SCC 626 
'11 o. 
xx.xx 
xxxxx 
xx.xx 
xxxx 
The privileges of the House of Commons, as distinct from those of the House of Lords, 
were defined as 
"the sum of the fundamental rights of the House and of its individual Members as 
against the prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of the ordinary courts of law 
and the special rights of the House of Lords". 
The privileges of the House of Commons included the freedom of speech, which had 
been claimed in 1554. This comprised the right of the House to provide for the due 
composition of its own body, the right to regulate its own proceedings, the right to 
exclude strangers, the rightto prohibit publication of its debates and the right to enforce 
observation of its privileges by fine. imprisonment and expulsion.
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHAN RAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 
623 
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
of free speech availabl.~ to a legislator, either under Articles 105 or 194, 
is not subject to any such limitation that could be imposed by law. 
However, such a freedom, as it appears from the opening clauses of 
these two· articles, is subject to "other provisions of the Constitution and 
to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of the legislative 
bodies"•. One express limitation on such freedom is found under Articles 
121 and 211 which prohibit, in express terms, any discussion in the 
legislative bodies with respect to the conduct of any Judge of Supreme. 
Court or of the High Court in the discharge of his duties. Further, Articles--
118 and 208 authorise the legislative bodies to make rules for regulating 
their procedure and the conduct of their business; 
Therefore, the scope and amplitude of the freedom of speech 
inhering in a citizen and available to a memberofthe legislative body are 
'PV N"r"simll" Rao C(ISe. (1998) 4 SCC 626 
27. Clause (I) secures freedom of speech in Parliament to its Members. The said 
freedom is '"subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing 
orders regulating the procedure of Parliament''. The words "subject to the provisions of 
this Constitution" have been construed to mean subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution which regulate the procedure of Parliament, viz., Articles
118 and 12 L 
(See: .1/.5.Jl. Sharma, .. Sri Krishna Sinha SCR at p. 856 and Special Reference Xo. I 
of 1964 also known as the Legislative Privileges case SCR at p. 441.) The freedom of 
speech that is available to Members of Parliament under Article I 05( I) is wider in 
amplitude than the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 
19( I )(a) since the freedom of speech under Article I 05( I) is not subject to the limitations 
contained in Article 19(2) 
109. By reason of sub-article (I) of Article 105, Members of Parliament enjoy freedom 
of speech subject only to the provisions of the Constitution and the rules and standing 
orders regulating the procedure of Parliament. That express provision is made for 
freedom of speech in Parliament in sub-article (I) of Article 105 suggests that this 
freedom is independent of the freedom of speech conforred by Article 19 and unrestricted 
by the exceptions contained therein. This is recognition of the fact that Members need 
to be free of all constraints in the matter of what they say in Parliament if they are 
effectively to represent their constituencies in its deliberations. Sub-article (2) of Article 
I 05 puts negatively what sub-article (I) states affirmatively. Both sub-articles must be 
read together to determine their content. By reason of the first part of sub-article (2) no 
Member is answerable in a court of law or any similar tribunal for what he has said in 
Parliament. This again is
recognition of the fact that a Member needs the freedom to say 
what he thinks is right in Parliament undeterred by the fear of being proceeded against. 
J 10. 
:\.""\."\.."\..'-
XXX:":X 
:\...""\."'\."'\.""\ 
X\.\."\..'-'X 
The provisions of Article 194(2). therefore. indicated that the freedom of speech referred 
to in sub-article (I) thereof was different from the freedom of speech and expression 
guaranteed under Article 19( I )(a) and could not be cut down in any way by any law 
contemplated by Article 19(2). 
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totally different. No citizen has a right to enter the legislative body and 
exercise his freedom of speech unless· he first gets elected to such a 
legislative body in accordance with law. No legislator would continue to 
enjoy the freedom of speech contemplated under Articles'I05 and 194 
after the cessation of the membership of the legislative body. 
19. No doubt, when a legislator is prevented from participating in 
the proceedings of the House during the currency of the membership by 
virtue of some proceedings taken against such a legislator, there would 
be a curtailment of the legislator's constitutional right of free speech in 
the House of which such legislator is a member. But such curtailment is 
sanctioned by Constitution in view of the fact that such a right is made 
subject to other provisions of the Constitution, the rules and standing 
orders regulating the procedure of the legislative bodies. 
20. Therefore, we are of the opinion that though there is a 
curtailment of the petitioners' right of free speech in the Legislative 
Assembly ofTamil Nadu to which they are entitled under Article 194 by 
virtue of the impugned order, the said impugned order does not, in the 
context, violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under 
Article 19( I )(a). 
21. Our view is fully supported by an opinion of this Court In re 
under Article 143 of Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 7455 ,
which 
'31. It will be noticed thatthe first three material clauses of Article I 94 deal with three 
different topics. Clause (I) makes it clear that the freedom of speech in the legislature 
of every State which it prescribes, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and 
to the rules and standing orders, regulating the procedure of the legislature. While 
interpreting this clause, it is necessary to emphasise that the provisions of the 
Constitution to which freedom of speech has been conferred on the legislators, are not 
the general provisions of the Constitution but only such of them as relate to the 
regulation of the procedure of the legislature. The rules and standing orders may regulate 
the procedure of the legislature and some of the provisions of the Constitution may 
also purport to regulate it; these are. for instance. Articles 208 and 2 I I. The adjectival 
clause '"regulating the procedure of the legislature" governs both the preceding clauses 
relating to "the provisions of the Constitution" and "the rules and standing orders". 
Therefore, clause (I) confers on the legislators specifically the right of freedom of 
speech subject to the limitation prescribed by its first part. It would thus appear that 
by making this clause subject only to the specified provisions of the Constitution, the 
Constitution-makers wanted to make it clear that they thought it necessary to confer 
on the legislators freedom of speech separately and. in a sense,
independently of Article 
I 9( I )(a). !fall that the legislators "·ere entitled to claim was the freedom of speech and 
expression enshrined in Article 19( J)(a), it would have been unnecessary to confer the 
same right specifically in the manner adopted by Article I 94( I); and so, it would be
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 
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ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
view was reiterated by a Constitution Bench in Raja R"m Pal'i Hon'ble 
A 
Speaker, Lok Sabha & Others, (2007) 3 SCC 1846 and in P. V. 
Narasimha Rao v. State (CBIISPE), (1998) 4 SCC 6267• 
22. According to the petitioners, the tenn 'occupation' under Article 
19(1 )(g) is of the widest amplitude, and includes the office ofa member 
oflegislative assembly: 
B 
For this proposition, the counsel places reliance on Paragraph 239 
of the T.M.A P"i Foundation v. State of K"rn"t"ka, (2002) 8 SCC 
481. 
"239 ...... Article 19 confers on all citizens rights specified in sub-
clauses (a) to (g). 
The fundamental rights enshrined in sub-
clause (g) of clause (I) of Article 19 of the Constitution are to 
legitimate to conclude thatArticle 19( I )(a) is not one of the pro\'isions of the Constitution 
which controls the first part of clause O) of Article 194. 
32. Having conferred freedom of speech on the legislators, clause (2) emphasizes the 
fact that the said freedom is intended to be absolute and unfettered. Similar freedom is 
guaranteed to the legislators in respect of the votes they may give in the legislature or 
any committee thereof. In other words, even if a legislator exercises his right of freedom 
of speech in violation, say, of Article 211, he would not be liable forany action in any 
court. Similarly, ifthe legislator-by his speech or vote, is alleged to have
violated any of 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution in the Legislative 
Assembly. he would not be answerable for the said contravention in any court. If the 
impugned speech amounts to libel or becomes actionable or indictable under any other 
provision of the law, immunity has been conferred on him from any action in any court 
by this clause. He may be answerable to the House for such a speech and the Speaker 
may take appropriate action against him in respect ofit; but that is another matter. It is 
plain that the Constitution-makers attached so mu.ch importance to the necessity of 
absolute freedom in debates within the legislative chambers that they thought it necessary 
to confer complete immunity on the legislators from any action in any court in respect 
of their speeches in the legislative chambers in the wide terms prescribed by clause (2). 
Thus, clause (I) confers freedom of speech on the legislators within the legislative 
chamber and clause (2) makes it plain that the freedom is literally absolute and unfettered. 
'' Powers, privileges am/ immu11ities-Genert1lly 
130. Taking note of Pandit Sharma fl) it was reiterated in L".P. Assembly case 
(Special Reference No. 1 of 1964) that clause (I) of Article 194 no doubt makes a 
substantive provision of the said clause subject to the provisions of the Constitution; 
but in the context. those provisions cannot take in Article 19( l)(a). because the latter 
article does not purport to
regulate the procedure of the legislature and it is only such 
provisions of the Constitution which regulate the procedure of the legislature which are 
included in the first part of Article 194( I). 
7 See FIN 4 supra 
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practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or 
business. 
We are concerned here with the right to establish 
educational institutions to impart education at different levels, 
primary, secondary, higher, technical, professional etc. Education 
is essentially a charitable object and imparting education is, in my 
view, a kind of service to the community, therefore, it cannot be 
brought under "trade or business" nor can it fall under "profession". 
Nevertheless, having regard to the width of the meaning of the 
term "occupation" elucidated in the judgment of the Hon'ble the 
Chief Justice, the service which a citizen desires to render by 
establishing educational institutions can be read in "occupation". 
This right, like other rights enumerated in sub-clause (g), is 
controlled by clause (6) of Article 19. The mandate of clause (6) 
is that nothing in sub-clause (g) shall affect the operation of any 
existing law, insofar as it imposes or prevents the State from making 
any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable 
restrictions 'on the exercise of right conferred by the said sub-
clause and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shal I affect 
the operation of any existing law insofar as it relates to or prevents 
the State from making any law relating to: (i) the professional or 
technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession 
or carrying
on any occupation, trade or business; or (ii) the carrying 
on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the 
State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the 
exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. Therefore, 
it may be concluded that the right of a citizen to run educational 
institutions can be read into "occupation" falling in sub-clause (g) 
of clause (I) of Article 19 which would be subjectto the discipline 
of clause (6) thereof." 
In our opinion, it does not, in any way, support the claim of the 
petitioner that the impugned action is violative of their fundamental right 
under Article 19( I )(g). To decide the correctness of the submission, we 
need to examine both the etymological and contextual meaning of the 
expression occupation occurring in Article 19( I )(g). 
23. This Court in Soda11 Si11gli v. New Del/ii Municipal 
Committee, 1989 4 SCC I 05, had an occasion to examine the question 
and held; 
-
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
"The guarantee under Article 19( I )(g) extends to practice any 
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 
'Profession' means an occupation carried on by a person by virtue 
of his personal and specialized qualifications, training or skill. The 
word 'occupation' has a wide meaning such as any regular 
work, profession, job, principal activity, employment, 
business or a calling in which an individual is engaged. 
'Trade' in its wider sense includes any bargain or sale, any 
occupation or business carried on for subsistence or profit, it is an 
act of buying and selling of goods and services. It may include 
any business carried on with a view to profit whether manual or 
mercantile. 'Business' is a very wide term and would include 
anything which occupies the time, attention and labour of a man 
for the purpose of profit. 
It may include in its form trade, 
profession, industrial and commercial operations, purchase and 
sale of goods, and would include anything which is an occupation 
as distinguished from pleasure. 
The object of using four 
analogous and overlapping words in Article 19(l)(g) is to 
make the guaranteed right as comprehensive as possible 
to include all the avenues and modes through which a man 
may earn his livelihood. In a nutshell the guarantee takes 
into its fold any activity carried on by a citizen of India to 
earn his living.
The activity must of course be legitimate and 
not anti-social like gambling, trafficking in women and the like."8 
Thus, it can be seen that the essence of the right is to pursue an 
activity which enables a citizen to earn livelihood. 
24. In T.M.A Pai Foundation (supra), this court held that 
"Article 19( I )(g) employs four expressions viz. profession, 
occupation, trade and business .... Article 19(1 )(g) uses the four 
expressions so as to cover all activities of a citizen in respect of 
which income or profit is generated, and which can consequently 
be regulated under Article 19(1 )(6)".9 
The amplitude of the tenn 'occupation' is limited by the economic 
iµiperative of livelihood generation. Therefore, all the activities 
contemplated under Article 19( I )(g) are essentially activities which enable 
' Paragraph 28. 
• Paragraph 20. 
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a citizen to generate economic benefits. The primary purpose and thrust 
of Article 19( 1 )(g) is to generate economic benefit and to protect the 
fruits of one's Jabour. 
25. The right to contest an election to the legislative bodies 
established by the Constitution is held not to be a fundamental right. 
Therefore, logically it would be difficult to accept the submission that 
the right to participate in the proceedings of the legislative bodies can be 
a fundamental right falling under Article 19(1 )(g). No citizen is entitled 
as ofright either to become or continue for the whole lifetime as member 
of a legislative assembly. Acquisition of the membership depends on the 
deciSton of the electorate and is conferred by a process established by 
law. Even after election, the tenure is limited. Fundamental rights do 
not come into existence upon the volition of others. They inhere in the 
citizens and are capable of being exercised independently without the 
need for any action or approval of others subject only to the restrictions 
imposed by law. Any member of a legislative assembly holds Qffice until 
such membership comes to an end by some process established by law. 
Constitutional offices commencing from the office of the President of 
India are meant for and established for securing the goals adumbrated in 
the preamble to the Constitution.· Each of these offices is a component 
in larger machinery
established to make it possible forthe people of this 
country to realise the goals indicated in the preamble of the Constitution. 
Any monetary benefit incidental to the holding of such offices is only to 
compensate for the time and energy expended by the holder of the office 
in the service of the nation. It is for this very reason that a member of 
a legislative assembly cannot be treated as holding office for the purpose 
of eking out a livelihood. 
26. The economic underpinnings of an 'occupation' under Article 
19(1 )(g) and the transient and incidental nature of economic benefits 
flowing from the office of a legislator must inevitably lead to the conclusion 
that a member oftfie legislative assembly cannot be treated as pursuing 
an 'occupation' under Article 19( 1 )(g). We, therefore, reject the 
contention that the issue at hand involves the rights of the petitioners 
under Article 19(1 )(g). 
27. Coming.to the question of violation offundamental right under 
Article 21 of the petitioners, the case of the petitioners is that by virtue 
of the impugned action the petitioners have been deprived of their salaries 
and other benefits incidental to the membership of the legislative assembly
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 
629 
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
during the period of suspension and, therefore, it is violative of their 
A 
fundamental right under Article 21. 
28. No clear authority is cited before us, nor any tenable submission 
is made to demonstrate that there is violation of Article 21 except a bare 
assertion. On the other hand, in Raja Ram Pal case, it was argued that 
such depravation resulting from the expulsion of a member from the 
B 
house would result in violation of the 'constitutional rights' of the members 
of the parliament10 and therefore the expulsion would be bad. 
29. This Court repelled the submission and held: 
" ... in the present case, where there is a lawful expulsion, the 
Members cannot claim that the provisions relating to salaries and 
duration of the House create such rights for the Members that 
would have supremacy over the power of expulsion of the House." 
In other words, this Court held that salary and other benefits to 
which the members of a legislative body are entitled to during their tenure 
are purely incidental to the membership and they don't even create an 
independent and indefeasible constitutional right. Therefore, the question 
that the deprivation of such benefits amounted to deprivation of 
fundamental right under Article 21 does not arise at all. 
30. We now deal with the submissions of the petitioners that the 
impugned proceedings are violative of the
fundamental right of the 
petitioners under Article 14. According to the petitioners, the said 
proceedings have been taken in violation of the principles of natural 
justice. It is settled law that the scope of judicial review in matters 
relating to action taken against members by the legislative bodies is limited. 
However, it is likewise well settled that the non-compliance with the 
principles ofnaturaljustice is one of the limited grounds on which judicial 
review could be undertaken against the internal proceedings of the 
legislative bodies in appropriate cases.'' 
'"Para 151. lt was further argued by the petitioners. that provisions in the Constitution 
relating to salary and the term for which they serve in the House are constitutional 
rights of the Members and the power of expulsion, by termin~ting their membership 
violates these constitutional rights. 
II Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) II sec I. "We may hasten to add that 
howsoever limited may be the field of judicial review, the principles of natural justice 
have to be complied with and in their absence, the orders would stand vitiated." -
Para 
14. 
See also paragraphs 671 and 672 of Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and 
Others, (2007) 3 SCC 184. 
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31. We now examine the petitioners' claim that there has been a 
violation of the principles of natural justice. It is rather difficult to cull 
out from the body of the clumsily drafted writ petition (the counter is no 
better though very long) the precise factual grievance of the petitioners. 
The substance we could cull out is that a copy of the videograph relied 
upon by the Privileges Committee was not provided to them. From a 
reading of paragraphs 3 .12 to 3 .18 of the writ petition, it appears that 
there was considerable correspondence between the Privileges 
• Committee and the petitioners. The Privileges Committee called for an 
explanation from the six petitioners herein as to why action could not be 
taken against thein, though it is not clear from the record as to the basis 
on which the six petitioners were chosen out of the 19 MLAs who were 
suspended initially. Each of the petitioners gave their explanation by 
separate letters. After consideration of the explanation, the Privileges 
Committee concluded that there was indeed breach of privilege, and 
recommended action against the six petitioners. This recommended action 
formed the basis of the assembly resolution dated 31.03.2015. 
32. It is argued before us that the Privileges Committee relied 
upon certain video recordings for arriving at the conclusion that the 
petitioners are guilty of conduct which is in breach of the privileges of
the house but a copy of the video recording was not provided to the 
petitioners". 
33. It is clear from the record that the video recording played a 
crucial role in the deliberations of the Privileges Committee. 13 Upon 
"Apart from the vague reference in Para 3.12 of the facts, the petitioners take it as a 
ground (Ground No. 38) in the instant writ. Para 3.12 reads ''The petitioner No. I sent 
his reply to the letter seeking explanation by the Privilege Committee; The letter was 
received by the Petitioner only on 23.2.2014, but the explanation was sought for on or 
before 27.2.2015. Further, the petitioner sought permission to give further explanation 
immediately when the video clipping of the incident. A true copy of the letter sent by 
Petitioner No. I to Secretary of the Legislative Assembly dated 27.2.2015 is annexed 
herewith and marked as Annexure-P7." Ground No. 38 reads "The respondents never 
gave a copy of the alleged videography''. Apart from this one sentence. the petitioners 
do not elaborate any further. 
13 From a perusal of the minutes of the privileges committee meeting dated 20.02.2015, 
it is evident that the viewing of a video recording of the incident dated 19.2.2015 
formed the basis for application of mind by the members of the privileges committee 
Tellingly, the minutes read 
[Chairman of the Privileges Committee]-
'·After viewing the video clippings each member can record their own opinion''
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
viewing the recording of the incident dated 19.02.2015 in which nineteen 
members belonging to the DMDK party were allegedly involved, the 
Privileges Committee reached a conclusion that the conduct of the six 
petitioners is in breach of the privilege of the house. The proceedings of 
the Privileges Committee make repeated references to video recording. 
34. FIR No. Cr. No. 09/2015 dated 20.2.2015 filed by Mr. Vijayan, 
[Chairman of the Privileges Committee]· 
'"After viewing the video clippings each member can record their own opinion·• 
[Chairman of the Privileges Committee]-
'"! request the members of the committee that before recording your opinion I request 
to view the video recordings taken on 19.02.2015 in the House. I request you to 
record your opinions after viewing the video recordings" 
''This meeting is held to find out the members who are all have involved in the 
undue acts after viewin2 the video records and to decide as to what action can be 
taken _l!gainst them" 
"Let [us] first view the video footage and then the committee shall come to a conclusion" 
[Mr. J.C.D. Prabhakar. member. privileges committec]-
.. Here you showed the video recording to the members clearly .. :· 
This member then goes on to discuss the events as depicted in the. video recording and 
individuates the six petitioners as indulging in actions which amount to a breach of
privilege. 
[Mrs. S. Vijayadharani. member. privileges committee]-
·'The expressing of the anger by V.C. Chandira Kumar is very clearly seen from the 
video clipping··. 
This member then goes on to record her opinion that one of the petitioners is not 
involved in the scume. 
[Mr. A. Lasar, member, privileges committee]-
"We have seen the video footage with respect to that incident. Hence we are speaking 
here in the way that in this regard that hereafter these types of incidents should not 
happen" 
[Mr. K.S.N. Venugopalu. member. privileges committee]-
" ... I saw from my seat that the incident happened yesterday on 19.02.2015 was very 
much brutal. We have again see in in the video .... I give the opinion that the 6 members 
who involved in this terrible act namely Mr. Alagapuram R. Mohan Rah, Mr. V.C. 
Chandra Kumar. Mr. C. H. Sekhar. Mr. K. Dinakaran. Mr. S.R. Parthiban. Mr. L. 
Venkatesan should be suspended for one year in such a way that they should not come 
to the house.". 
[Mr. Challenger Dorai@ Doraisamy]· 
··we have also seen the incident in the video footage also .. :·. · 
[Hon'ble leader of the house]· 
··All the members present here all arc included in the Legislative Assembly. Hence you 
would have seen the incidents happened with your eyes Not only was that, the 
video recordings also shown. Since some of them would have forgot only the 
video recordings were shown again" 
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a special sub-inspector deployed in the Tamil Nadu legislative assembly, 
which is one of the pieces of evidence used against the petitioners, 
mentions the names of only two· of the six petitioners (Petitioner No. 4 
and Petitioner No.5). In his FIR, Mr. Vijayan makes an omnibus statement 
that all members belonging to the DMDK party rushed to the Speaker's 
chair in an unruly fashion and were ordered to be sent out of the house 
for that reason. He then proceeds to specifically state the two accused 
(Petitioner No. 4 and Petitioner No.5) attacked him. 
35. In this light, the question is: How did the Privileges Committee 
identify six members as having breached the privilege of the house? 
From the minutes of the Privileges Committee meeting, it is clear that 
the only material relied upon by the Committee to identify all the six 
petitioners and recommend action against them for breach of privilege 
was the video recording. 
36. The petitioners' case, though not elegantly pleaded, is that they 
have not been granted the opportunity to watch the video recording or 
comment on the content and authenticity of the video. In the questions 
of law raised in the writ petition, the petitioners raised the question of 
"Whether denial of the right to comment on the video material would 
amount to breach of natural justice?" In the grounds taken by the 
petitioners, they pray for the writ to be allowed "because on
the question 
of authenticity of videography and as to how far it can be pressed into 
service, further, the respondents never gave a copy of.. the alleged 
videography to the petitioner". 
37. It is the case of the respondents, thatthe disciplinary proceedings 
are not based solely on the video clippings. At para 76 of the counter 
affidavit, it is stated that the violent incidents on 19.2.2015 had been 
witnessed by all Members in the House including those in the Privileges 
Committee and thus the videograph is not the sole basis for award of 
punishment.'"' 
38. The minutes of the Privileges Committee meeting clearly show 
that the video-recording played an important role in arriving at the 
conclusions that the Privileges Committee did. The video recording was 
14 Even at Para 70'ofthe counter affidavit, the respondents assert that as the incident 
on 19.2.2015 happened inside the assembly chamber, the speaker and other present 
members were eye-witnesses to the incident, and that the nature of the incident was 
known to all members in the house, including the members of the privileges committee.
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHAN RAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] 
specifically shown to the members of the Privileges Committee "since 
some of them would have forgot only the video recordings were shown 
again"';. Giving some allowance for bad translation - the said sentence 
only indicates that the Committee was not willing to rely solely on the 
memory of the members of the Committee. At the risk of repetition, we 
reiterate that the video recording served as the common factual platform 
for all the members of the Privileges Committee, from where the members 
discussed the actions of the six petitioners, and recommended action 
against them. 
39. This Court in Raja Ram Pal case, while dealing with the 
question of the rules of natural justice in the context of proceedings in 
the legislative bodies, held as follows: 
"As already noted the scope of judicial review in these matters is 
restricted and limited. Regarding non-grant of reasonable 
opportunity, we reiterate what was recently held in Jagjit Singh 
v. State of Haryana that the principles of natural justice are not 
immutable but are flexible; they cannot be cast in a rigid mould 
and put in a straitjacket and the compliance therewith has to be 
considered in the facts and circumstances of each case." 16 
40. In Jagjit Singlr ':State of Hllryana, (2006) 11 SCC I, this 
Court discussed the scope of the principles ofnaturaljustice in the context 
of the proceedings in the
legislature (action under X'h Schedule of the 
Constitution) and held thus: 
"Undoubtedly, the proceedings before the Speaker which is also 
a tribunal albeit of a different nature have to be conducted in a 
fair manner and by complying with the principles of natural justice. 
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However, the principles of natural justice cannot be placed in a 
F 
straitjacket. These are flexible rules. Their applicability is 
determined on the facts of each case ... " 11 
41. The principles of natural justice require that the petitioners 
ought to have been granted an opportunity to see the video recording. 
Perhaps they might have had an opportunity to explain why the video 
G 
recording does not contain any evidence/material for recommending 
" See F/.N 12. 
16 Extracted portion is a part of Paragraph 446 in the judgment. 
17 The extracted portion is a part of paragraph 44 in the judgment. 
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action against all or some of them or to explain that the video recording 
should have been interpreted differently. 
42. The Privileges Committee should have necessarily offered 
this opportunity, in order to make the process adopted by it compliant 
with the requirements of Article 14. Petitioner No. I in his reply letter to 
the notice issued by the Privileges Committee seeks permission to give 
further explanation when the video recording is provided to him. The 
Petitioner No. 3 in his reply letter states that he beUeves his version of 
his conduct will be proven by the video recording. The other petitioners 
do not mention the video recording in their reply letters. However, it is 
not the petitioners' burden to request for a copy of the video recording. 
It is the legal obligation of the Privileges Committee to ensure that a 
copy of the video recording is supplied to the petitioners in order to 
satisfy the requirements of the principles ofnaturaljustice The failure 
to supply a copy of the video recording or affording an opportunity to the 
petitioners to view the video recording relied upon by the committee in 
our view clearly resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice 
i.e. a denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the case. We, therefore, 
have no option but to set aside the impugned resolution dated 31.03.2015 
passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. The same is
accordingly 
set aside. 
43. The consequence of setting aside the impugned resolution of 
the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly dated 31.3.2015 is that the salary 
and other benefits incidental to the membership of the assembly stand 
restored to the six petitioners herein. 
44. In view of the conclusion recorded above, we see no need to 
deal with the other submissions advanced by the petitioners. 
45. The writ petition is allowed as indicated above. 
Nidhi Jain 
Writ Petition allowed.