AVITEL POST STUDIOZ LIMITED & ORS. versus HSBC PI HOLDINGS (MAURITIUS) LIMITED (PREVIOUSLY NAMED HPEIF HOLDINGS 1 LIMITED)
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 971, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Facts
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 971 : 2024 INSC 242
Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. 
v. 
HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited 
(Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
(Civil Appeal Nos. 3835 – 3836 of 2024)
04 March 2024
[Hrishikesh Roy and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The High Court facilitated the enforcement of the final Award dated 
27.09.2014 issued at Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
(SIAC). The appellants’ objection to enforcement of the foreign 
Award, in terms of s.48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 
was rejected and the High Court had also directed that the order of 
attachment against the Award Debtors-appellants shall continue to 
operate during the execution proceedings to be undertaken by the 
respondent-Award Holder. Whether the High Court was correct in 
its decision to reject the objection u/s. 48(2)(b) of Indian Arbitration 
Act against enforcement of the foreign Award on the grounds of 
arbitral bias and violation of public policy. Further, whether the 
ground of bias could be raised at the enforcement stage u/s. 48(2)
(b) for being violative of the “public policy of India” and the “most 
basic notions of morality or justice”.
Headnotes
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.48 – Chapter 1 
Part II – Foreign Award – According to the appellants-Award 
Debtors , the Presiding Arbitrator, CL, one of the three-
member Arbitral Tribunal, had failed to make a full and frank 
disclosure of material facts and
circumstances concerning 
conflict of interest and therefore the Award rendered by the 
Tribunal presided by CL cannot be enforced as it is against 
public policy in terms of s.48(2) (b)of the Indian Arbitration 
Act – Propriety:
Held: The Award in the instant matter was passed in Singapore, 
a New York Convention Country and notified as a reciprocating 
territory by India – Chapter 1 Part II of the Indian Arbitration Act 
is applicable in the present case – The parties had expressly 
chosen Singapore as the seat of Arbitration – It is the seat court
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which has exclusive supervisory jurisdiction to determine claims 
for a remedy relating to the existence or scope of arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction or the allegation of bias – A contrary approach would 
go against the scheme of the New York Convention which has 
been incorporated in India – The jurisdiction was therefore chosen 
based on the perceived neutrality by the parties aligning with the 
principle of party autonomy – In the instant case, no setting aside 
challenge based on bias was raised before the Singapore Courts 
by the appellants within the limitation period – None of the grounds, 
which are now being pressed, were raised during the arbitration 
or in the time period available to the appellants to apply, to set 
aside the Award in Singapore – Bonafide challenges to arbitral 
appointments have to be made in a timely fashion and should 
not be used strategically to delay the enforcement process – In 
other words, the Award Debtors should have applied for setting 
aside of the Award before the Singapore Courts at the earliest 
point of time – As far as allegations of bias against Presiding 
Arbitrator CL is concerned, the High Court after adverting to the 
IBA guidelines concluded that there was no identity or conflict of 
interest between CL and the award holder, or any of its affiliates 
including its holding company – In assessment of this Court, the 
High Court correctly suggested that CL neither had a duty to
disclose nor did he fail to discharge his legal duty of disclosure 
in accepting the assignment as the Presiding Arbitrator – In the 
circumstances here, it cannot be inferred that there was a bias 
or likelihood of bias of the Presiding Arbitrator – Award Debtors 
therefore cannot claim that there is any violation of the public 
policy, which would render the foreign award unenforceable in 
India – The award debtors have failed to meet the high threshold 
for refusal of enforcement of a foreign award u/s. 48 of the Indian 
Arbitration Act – Accordingly, the decision given by the High Court 
for enforcement/execution of the foreign award stands approved. 
[Paras 27, 28, 29, 35.1, 36, 43]
Arbitration – Foreign Award – Bias – Standard of public policy 
in India:
Held: Embracing international standards in arbitration would foster 
trust, certainty, and effectiveness in the resolution of disputes on 
a global scale – In India, an internationally recognized narrow 
standard of public policy must be adopted, when dealing with the 
aspect of bias – It is only when the most basic notions of morality
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973
Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
or justice are violated that this ground can be attracted – The 
Supreme Court in Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. 
v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) had noted that the 
ground of most basic notions of morality or justice can only be 
invoked when the conscience of the Court is shocked by infraction 
of fundamental notions or principles of justice – There can be no 
difficulty in holding that the most basic notions of morality and 
justice under the concept of ‘public policy’ would include bias – 
However, Courts must endeavor to adopt international best practices 
instead of domestic standards, while determining bias – It is only 
in exceptional circumstances that enforcement should be refused 
on the ground of bias. [Paras 25 and 26]
Arbitration – Foreign Award – Bias – Challenge at enforcement 
stage:
Held: If the ground of arbitral bias is raised at the enforcement 
stage, it must be discouraged by the Courts to send out a clear 
message to the stakeholders that Indian Courts would ensure 
enforcement of a foreign Award unless it is demonstrable that there 
is a clear violation of morality and justice – The determination of 
bias should only be done by applying international standards – 
Refusal of enforcement of foreign award should only be in a rare 
case where, non-adherence to International Standards
is clearly 
demonstrable. [Para 42]
Case Law Cited
In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under 
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 and the Indian 
Stamp Act,1899 [2023] 15 SCR 1081 : 2023 INSC 
1066 – followed.
Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. 
National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) [2019] 7 
SCR 522 : (2019) 15 SCC 131 – relied on.
Avitel Post Studioz v HSBC PI Holdings [2020] 10 SCR 
91 : (2021) 4 SCC 713; NN Global Mercantile Private 
Ltd. v. M/s Indo Unique Flame Ltd. [2023] 9 SCR 285 : 
(2023) 7 SCC 1; Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General 
Electric Co. [1993] Suppl. 3 SCR 22 : (1994) Supp (1) 
SCC 644; Union of India v. Vedanta [2020] 12 SCR 
1 : (2020) 10 SCC 1; Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto
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Grano SpA [2013] 13 SCR 599 : (2014) 2 SCC 433; 
Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E. Sistemi SRL [2020] 4 
SCR 336 : (2020) 11 SCC 1 – referred to.
Perma Container(UK) Line Limited v. Perma Container 
Line(India) Ltd. 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 575 – referred 
to.
J. Burrough, Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229 
at 252; Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. The Football 
Association Ltd. [1971] Ch 591; Parsons & Whittemore 
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du 
Papier 508 F.2d 969 (1974); Halliburton Co. v Chhub 
Bermuda Insurance Ltd. [2020] UKSC 48; Hancock 
v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd. [2022] NSWSC 724; 
Dutch Shipowner v. German Cattle and Meat Dealer, 
Bundesgerichtshof, Germany 1 February 2001, XXIX 
Y.B.Com. Arb. 700 (2004) – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Travaux Préparatoires, Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 
1958) Commission on International Trade Law (United 
Nations); Nigel Blackaby KC, and others, Redfern 
and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th Edn, 
OUP 2022), 594; Article 1514 of French Code of Civil 
Procedure 1981; Gary Born, International Commercial 
Arbitration(3rd ed,2021) 2838; Robert Briner, Philosophy 
and Objectives of the Convention’ in Enforcing 
Arbitration Awards under the New York Convention. 
Experience and Prospects (United Nations 1999); 
George A Bermann, ‘Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The
Interpretation and 
Application of the New York Convention by National 
Courts’ in George A. Bermann(ed) Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Springer 2018) 
60; Committee On International Commercial Arbitration, 
‘Application Of Public Policy As A Ground For Refusing 
Recognition Or Enforcement Of International Arbitral 
Awards’ In International Law Association Report Of 
The Seventieth Conference(New Delhi 2000); Fali 
Nariman and others, ‘The India Resolutions for the 
1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Awards’ in Dushyant Dave and others(ed)
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
975
Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
Arbitration in India (Kluwer 2021); Reinmar Wolff (ed), 
A Review of New York Convention: Article-by-Article 
Commentary (2nd edn Beck/Hart, 2019) 352; Stavroula 
Angoura, ‘Arbitrator’s Impartiality Under Article V(1)(d) 
of the New York Convention’ (2019) 15 (1) AIAJ 29; 
Gary Born(n 12)3937; William W. Park, ‘Arbitrator Bias’ 
(2015) TDM 12; Sumeet Kachwaha, ‘The Rule Against 
Bias and the Jurisprudence of Arbitrator’s Independence 
and Impartiality’(2021) 17(2) AIAJ 104; Vibhu Bakhru J, 
‘Impartiality and Independence of the Arbitral Tribunal’ in 
Shashank Garg(ed),Arbitrator’s Handbook (Lexis Nexis 
2022); Gary Born (n 12) 3946; AV Dicey and L. Collins, 
Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of laws(15th edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell 2018) [16-36]; Oscar Wilde, Act III, 
Lady Windermere’s Fan, 1893 – referred to.
List of Acts
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords
Arbitration; Foreign award; Seat of Arbitration; Exclusive 
supervisory jurisdiction; Existence or scope of arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction; Bias; Allegation of bias; New York Convention; Arbitral 
appointments; Bonafide challenges to arbitral appointments; 
Conflict of interest; Legal duty of disclosure; Enforcement of foreign 
award; Enforcement process; Violation of the public policy; Basic 
notions of morality or justice; Principles of justice; International
best practices; Domestic Standard; Refusal of enforcement of 
foreign award.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3835-3836 
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2023 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Bombay in AP No.833 of 2015 and NOM No.2475 
of 2016
Appearances for Parties
Mukul Rohatgi, Vikram Nankani, Sr. Advs., Shridhar Y. Chitale, Sumeet 
Nankani, Karan Bharihoke, Ms. Manali Singhal, Ankur Yadav, Advs. 
for the Appellant.
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Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Darius Khambata, Nikhil Sakhardande, Sr. Advs., 
Rajendra Barot, Ms. Priyanka Shetty, Ms. Sherna Doongaji, Ayush 
Chaddha, Dhaval Vora, Shanay Shroff, Dhruv Sharma, Raghav 
Agarwal, Ms. Sonali Jain, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1.	
Delay condoned.
2.	
Leave granted.
3.	
Heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Vikram Nankani, learned senior 
counsel appearing for the appellants (Award Debtors). Also heard 
Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul and Mr. Darius Khambata, learned senior 
counsel appearing for the respondent (Award Holder).
4.	
The challenge in these appeals is to the order dated 25.04.2023 in 
the Arbitration Petition No. 833 of 2015 and Notice of Motion No. 2475 
of 2016 respectively whereunder, the High Court has facilitated the 
enforcement of the final Award dated 27.09.2014 issued in the SIAC 
Arbitration No. 088 of 2012. The appellants’ objection to enforcement 
of the foreign Award, in terms of Section 48 of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short “Indian Arbitration Act”)was rejected 
and the High Court also directed that the order of attachment against 
the Award Debtors shall continue to operate during the execution 
proceedings to be undertaken by the respondent. Accordingly, the 
Award Debtors were called upon to place on record disclosure 
affidavits as regards their properties.
Facts
5.	
This case has a chequered history and it is essential to
note the 
background facts for the present challenge.
5.1.	 The respondent-HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited (for 
short “HSBC”) is a company incorporated under the laws of 
Mauritius. The appellant No. 1 Avitel Post Studioz Limited (for 
short “Avitel India”) is a company incorporated under the laws 
of India and it is the parent company of Avitel Group. It holds 
entire issued capital of Avitel Holdings Limited, which in turn, 
holds entire issued share capital of Avitel Post Studioz FZ LLC. 
Appellant No. 2 is the founder of Avitel Post Studioz Limited,
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977
Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
being its Chairman and Director, while Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 
are his sons, who are directors of Appellant No. 1.
5.2.	 On 21.4.2011, a Share Subscription Agreement was entered 
between HSBC & Avitel India whereby HSBC made an 
investment in the equity capital of Avitel India for a consideration 
of US 60 million dollars to acquire 7.8% of its paid-up capital. This 
agreement contained an arbitration clause which provided that the 
disputes shall be finally resolved at the Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre (SIAC). Singapore was designated as the 
seat of arbitration and Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act was 
excluded, except Section 9 thereof. Thereafter, the parties 
also entered into a Shareholders’ Agreement(6.5.2011) which 
defined the relationship between the parties and contained an 
identical arbitration clause.
5.3.	 It is the case of HSBC(Award Holder) that the appellants at a 
very advanced stage made certain representations to HSBC 
stating that the investment of US$ 60 Million was required 
to service a significant contract with the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC).
5.4.	 Following the investment, according to HSBC, the appellants 
ceased to provide any information regarding the contract with 
BBC, despite numerous follow-up attempts. At this stage, 
HSBC engaged their independent investigation agency,
where 
it was discovered that the purported BBC Contract was non-
existent and the invested amount was siphoned off to different 
Companies.
5.5.	 On 11.05.2012, HSBC invoked the arbitration clause under the 
SIAC Rules and claimed damages of US$ 60 million from the 
appellants. On 14.5.2012, SIAC Appointed Mr. Thio Shen Yi, 
SC as an Emergency Arbitrator. On 17.5.2012, the appellants’ 
challenge to the appointment of the Emergency Arbitrator was 
considered by SIAC & Rejected. On 28.05.2012 and 29.5.2012, 
the emergency arbitrator passed two interim Awards, in favour of 
HSBC inter alia, directing the appellants to refrain from disposing 
of/diminishing the value of their assets upto US$ 50 million. On 
27.7.2012, the Emergency Arbitrator made an amendment to 
Interim Awards granting further relief to HSBC by rejecting to 
desist investigations against Avitel Dubai and Avitel Mauritius.
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5.6.	 According to HSBC, the appellants made several attempts 
to delay and frustrate the proceedings. The arbitral tribunal 
consisted of three members. Mr. Christopher Lau, SC, was 
the Chairman, while Justice F.I. Rebello (retired) and Dr. 
Michael Pryles were members of the arbitral tribunal. On 
27.09.2014, the tribunal rendered its final award and directed 
the appellants to pay US$ 60 million as damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentations.
5.7.	 The respondent had initiated proceedings under Section 9 of 
the Indian Arbitration Act before the Bombay High Court. A 
direction was issued to the appellants to deposit US$ 60 million 
for the purpose of enforcement of the Award. Aggrieved by 
the same, the appellants filed a Special Leave Petition before 
this Court where it was contended, inter alia, that the dispute 
is non-arbitrable under Indian law as it involved allegations 
of fraud which included serious criminal offenses such as 
forgery and impersonation. Settling the law on the arbitrability 
of fraud, this Court in the earlier round in Avitel Post Studioz 
v HSBC PI Holdings1, held that the dispute was arbitrable and 
that HSBC had a strong prima facie case in the enforcement 
proceedings, in the context of Section 9 proceedings in which 
HSBC had sought maintenance of the entire claim amount in 
Avitel’s bank account.
5.8.	 Since the appellants failed to abide by the direction given by 
this Court to deposit the
amount, a contempt proceeding was 
initiated against them. On 11.07.2022, this Court found that Avitel 
had deliberately and willfully disobeyed its order and hence, the 
appellants were directed to remain present before this Court. 
The Appellant Nos.2 to 4 however went abroad defying the 
direction given by this Court, as a result of which, warrants and 
look-out notices were also issued, with a further direction to the 
Ministry of External Affairs and Central Bureau of Investigation 
for issuance of Red-Corner Notice. Ultimately, appellant Nos.2 to 
4 surrendered and despite tendering an unconditional apology, 
this Court refused to accept the same and for their conduct, 
appellant Nos. 2 to 4 were sentenced to imprisonment. 
1	
[2020] 10 SCR 791 : (2021) 4 SCC 713
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979
Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
Submissions
6.	
According to the appellants, the Presiding Arbitrator, Mr. Christopher 
Lau of the three-member Arbitral Tribunal, had failed to make a full 
and frank disclosure of material facts and circumstances concerning 
conflict of interest and therefore the Award rendered by the Tribunal 
presided by Mr. Lau cannot be enforced as it is against public policy 
in terms of Section 48(2)(b)of the Indian Arbitration Act.
7.	
The counsel for the appellants refers to the IBA Guidelines on Conflict 
of Interest in International Arbitration, 2004 (“IBA Guidelines”) along 
with the Red, Orange and Green lists appended thereto covering 
matters concerning disclosure and conflict of interest to argue that 
the High Court ought to have refused enforcement of the Award. The 
specific contention is that the Presiding Arbitrator failed to disclose 
his conflict of interest to adjudicate the dispute. According to the 
Award Debtors the independence and impartiality of the Presiding 
Arbitrator was compromised, as per General Standard 3 of the IBA 
Guidelines.
8.	
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent (Award 
Holder) would submit that the concerned party here is HSBC PI 
Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, which is a subsidiary of HSBC Holdings 
PLC (United Kingdom). The other subsidiary is HSBC (Singapore) 
Nominees Pte Ltd. which is
alleged to have a contractual association 
with Wing Tai. The HSBC (Singapore) held 6.29% of Wing Tai’s equity 
capital on a trustee/nominee basis, as of 15.09.2014. But the said 
Wing Tai has no relationship with the Award Holder and is not part 
of the HSBC Group. 
9.	
Insofar as the Presiding Arbitrator Mr. Christopher Lau is concerned, 
the respondent submits that he has been an independent non-
executive Director of Wing Tai since 28.10.2013 and also the 
Chairman of the Audit and the Risk Committee of Wing Tai. But Mr. 
Lau is not an employee of Wing Tai and therefore it is contended 
that it is wrong to say that he cannot discharge responsibility as 
an independent arbitrator or was incapacitated in any manner, in 
rendering the final Award dated 27.09.2014.
10.	 Initially, the Award Holders argued before the High Court that bias 
could not be raised under the concept of “public policy of India”. 
However, later on, submissions were made to demonstrate that
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even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the issue could 
be raised at the stage of enforcement, no disclosure was required 
on the part of the arbitrator.
11.	 Before this Court, the appellants attempted to raise an additional 
challenge to the award under Section 48(1)(b) of the Indian Arbitration 
Act on account of ‘inability to present their case’.
12.	 Another ground mentioned in the SLP was to consider the effect 
of the dictum of the five-judge bench of this Court in NN Global 
Mercantile Private Ltd. v M/s Indo Unique Flame Ltd2 (for short “NN 
Global”) delivered on 25.04.2023 as per which the Share Subscription 
Agreement being insufficiently stamped would be unenforceable in 
India. However, during the pendency of the present proceedings, the 
Supreme Court in In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements 
under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 and the Indian Stamp 
Act,18993 delivered on 13.12.2023 has overruled the decision in NN 
Global (supra). The 7-judge bench had noted, inter alia, that the 
purpose of the Stamp Act,1899 is to protect the interests of revenue 
and not arm litigants with a weapon of technicality by which they 
delay the adjudication of the lis. This may be the reason why the 
Counsel chose not to orally argue on this point.
13.	 The two grounds noted above, need not detain us as the fundamental 
issue that requires determination is whether enforcement can be 
refused on
the ground of bias. In these proceedings, challenging 
the High Court’s judgment, the appellants reiterate their contention 
that the enforcement of the award is impermissible on the ground 
of arbitral bias and is contrary to the “public policy of India” as per 
Section 48(2)(b) of the Indian Arbitration Act. 
Discussion
14.	 Against this background, the consideration to be made in these 
matters is whether the High Court was correct in its decision to 
reject the objection under Section 48(2)(b) of Indian Arbitration Act 
against enforcement of the foreign Award on the grounds of arbitral 
bias and violation of public policy. This raises a further question as 
to whether the ground of bias could be raised at the enforcement 
2	
[2023] 9 SCR 285 : (2023) 7 SCC 1
3	
[2023] 15 SCR 1081 : (2023) INSC 1066
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Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
stage under Section 48(2)(b) for being violative of the “public policy 
of India” and the “most basic notions of morality or justice”?
15.	 India was one of the earliest signatories to the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (for 
short “New York Convention”)4. The New York Convention superseded 
the Geneva Convention of 1927 to facilitate the enforcement of 
foreign Arbitral Awards5. Article V(2) of the New York Convention 
reads as under:
“2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may 
also be refused if the competent authority in the country 
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a)	 The subject matter of the difference is not capable 
of settlement by arbitration under the law of that 
country; or
(b)	 The recognition or enforcement of the award would 
be contrary to the public policy of that country.”
16.	 The precursors to the New York Convention on the contrary provided 
for an expansive scope for invoking the public policy ground based 
on the violation of the “fundamental principles of the law”. Although 
the notion that ‘public policy’ is ‘a very unruly horse’ has gained 
traction over the years6, one would also do well to remember 
the words of Lord Denning who said that, “With a good man in 
the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control.”7 This
would 
suggest that a proper understanding of this branch of law by the 
horse rider would be necessary. In that context, one of the earliest 
cases that dealt with the aspect of “public policy” and the general 
pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention was the decision 
in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de 
L’Industrie du Papier,8 where the United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit noted:
4	
Ratified on 13.7.1960
5	
Travaux Préparatoires, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(New York, 1958) Commission on International Trade Law’ (United Nations) 
6	
J. Burrough, Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 2 Bing. 229 at 252
7	
Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. The Football Association Ltd., [1971] Ch 591
8	
508 F.2d 969 (1974)
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“8. …The general pro-enforcement bias informing the 
Convention and explaining its supersession of the Geneva 
Convention points toward a narrow reading of the public 
policy defense. An expansive construction of this defense 
would vitiate the Convention’s basic effort to remove 
preexisting obstacles to enforcement… Additionally, 
considerations of reciprocity — considerations given 
express recognition in the Convention itself— counsel 
courts to invoke the public policy defense with caution 
lest foreign courts frequently accept it as a defense to 
enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in the United 
States.
9. We conclude, therefore, that the Convention’s public 
policy defense should be construed narrowly. Enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only 
where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most 
basic notions of morality and justice.”
17.	 The above decision has been followed in various jurisdictions 
including the Supreme Court of India in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. 
v. General Electric Co9. The articulation of the “forum State’s most 
basic notions of morality and justice” has been legislatively adopted 
in the Indian Arbitration Act,1996. The legal framework concerning 
enforcement of certain foreign awards in International Commercial 
Arbitration is contained in Part II of the said Act. In this jurisdiction, 
we must underscore that minimal judicial intervention to a foreign
award is the norm and interference can only be based on the 
exhaustive grounds mentioned under Section 48.10 A review on the 
merits of the dispute is impermissible11. This Court in Vijay Karia v. 
Prysmian Cavi E. Sistemi SRL,12 had noted that Section 50 of the 
Indian Arbitration Act,1996 does not provide an appeal against a 
foreign award enforced by a judgment of a learned Single Judge of 
a High Court and therefore the Supreme Court should only entertain 
the appeal with a view to settle the law. It was noted that the party 
9	
[1993] Suppl. 3 SCR 22 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644
10	
Union of India v. Vedanta, [2020] 12 SCR 1 : (2020) 10 SCC 1
11	
Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v Progetto Grano SpA [2013] 13 SCR 599 : (2014) 2 SCC 433
12	
[2020] 4 SCR 336 : (2020) 11 SCC 1
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Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
resisting enforcement can only have “one bite at the cherry” and when 
it loses in the High Court, the limited scope for interference could 
be merited only in exceptional cases of “blatant disregard of Section 
48”. This principle of pro-enforcement bias was further entrenched 
by the Supreme Court in Union of India v Vedanta13.
18.	 At this point, we may also note that Courts in some countries have 
recognized that when applying their own public policy to Convention 
Awards, they should give it an international and not a domestic 
dimension14. The Arbitration legislation in France15, for instance, 
makes an explicit distinction between national and international 
public policy, limiting refusal of enforcement only to the latter ground. 
Scholars have noted that the New York Convention’s structure and 
objectives argue strongly against the notion that reliance should be 
placed on local public policies without international limitations.16 The 
objective behind such a distinction is to make it less difficult to allow 
enforcement on public policy grounds. Most Courts have interpreted 
the public policy exception extremely narrowly17.
19.	 The Indian Supreme Court in Renusagar (supra) had noted that 
there is no workable definition of international public policy, and 
“public policy” should thus be construed to be the “public policy of
India” by giving it a narrower meaning. Later on, in Shri Lal Mahal 
Ltd. v Progetto Grano SpA18, the Supreme Court held that the wider 
meaning given to ‘public policy of India’ in the domestic sphere under 
Section 34(2)(b)(ii) would not apply where objection is raised to 
the enforcement of the Award under Section 48(2)(b) of the Indian 
Arbitration Act. This would indicate that the grounds for resisting 
enforcement of a foreign award are much narrower than the grounds 
available for challenging a domestic award under Section 34 of the 
Indian Arbitration Act.
13	
[2020] 12 SCR 1 : (2020) 10 SCC 1 
14	
Nigel Blackaby KC, and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th Edn, OUP 2022), 
594
15	
Article 1514 of French Code of Civil Procedure 1981
16	
Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration(3rd ed,2021) 2838; Robert Briner, Philosophy and 
Objectives of the Convention’ in Enforcing Arbitration Awards under the New York Convention. 
Experience and Prospects (United Nations 1999).
17	
George A Bermann, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Interpretation and 
Application of the New York Convention by National Courts’ in George A. Bermann(ed) Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Springer 2018) 60
18	
[2013] 13 SCR 599 : (2014) 2 SCC 433
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20.	 At this point, we may also benefit by noting that the International 
Law Association issued recommendations19 at a conference held 
in New Delhi in 2002 on international commercial arbitration and 
advocated using only narrow and international standards, while 
dealing with “public policy”. The recommendations have been 
regarded as reflective of best international practices. The ILA also 
defined international public policy as follows:
"(i)	 fundamental principles, pertaining to justice or 
morality, that the State wishes to protect even when 
it is not directly concerned; 
(ii)	
rules designed to serve the essential political, social 
or economic interests of the State, these being known 
as ‘lois de police’ or ‘public policy rules’; and
(iii.)	 the duty of the State to respect its obligations towards 
other States or international organizations.”
21.	 Being a signatory to the New York Convention, we must therefore 
adopt an internationalist approach20. What follows from the above 
is that there is a clear distinction between the standards of public 
policy applicable for domestic arbitration and international commercial 
arbitration. Proceeding with the aforedeclared proposition to have 
a narrow meaning to the doctrine of public policy and applying an 
international outlook, let us now hark back to whether a foreign Award 
can be refused enforcement on the ground of bias. 
22.	 Even though the New York Convention
does not explicitly mention 
“bias”, the possible grounds for refusing recognition of a foreign 
award are contained in Article V(1)(d)(irregular composition of 
arbitral tribunal), Article V(1)(b) (due process) and the public policy 
defence under Article V(2)(b). Courts across the world have applied 
a higher threshold of bias to prevent enforcement of an Award than 
the standards set for ordinary judicial review21. Therefore, Arbitral 
19	
Committee On International Commercial Arbitration, ‘Application Of Public Policy As A Ground For 
Refusing Recognition Or Enforcement Of International Arbitral Awards’ In International Law Association 
Report Of The Seventieth Conference(New Delhi 2000) 
20	
Fali Nariman and others, ‘The India Resolutions for the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Awards’ in Dushyant Dave and others(ed) Arbitration in India (Kluwer 2021)
21	
Reinmar Wolff (ed), A Review of New York Convention: Article-by-Article Commentary (2nd edn Beck/
Hart, 2019) 352
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985
Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
awards are seldom refused recognition and enforcement, considering 
the existence of a heightened standard of proof for non – recognition 
and enforcement of an award, based on alleged partiality22. It invokes 
a higher threshold than is applicable in cases of removal of the 
arbitrator.23 This is for the reasons that, greater risk, efforts, time, 
and expenses are involved in the non-recognition of an award as 
against the removal of an arbitrator during the arbitral proceedings. 
23.	 What is also essential to note is that Courts across the world do 
not adopt a uniform test while dealing with allegations of bias24. The 
standards for determining bias vary across different legal systems 
and jurisdictions25. English Courts26, for instance, adopt the “informed 
or fair minded” observer test to conclude whether there is a “real 
possibility of bias”. Australia27 adopts the “real danger of bias” test and 
Singapore28 prefers the standard of “reasonable suspicion” rejecting 
the “real danger of bias” test. Therefore, the outcome of a challenge 
on the ground of bias would vary, depending on domestic standards. 
24.	 Cautioning against applying domestic standards at the enforcement 
stage, Gary Born29 emphasizing on the adherence to international 
standards, makes the following observation:
“In light of developing sources of international
standards 
with regard to arbitrators’ conflict of interest, it should 
be possible to identify and apply international minimum 
standards of impartiality and independence... 
More generally, in considering whether to deny recognition 
of an award under Article V, national courts should not 
apply domestic standards of independence and impartiality 
without regard to their international context. Although 
22	
Stavroula Angoura, ‘Arbitrator’s Impartiality Under Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention’ (2019) 15 
(1) AIAJ 29 
23	
Gary Born(n 12)3937
24	
William W. Park, ‘Arbitrator Bias’ (2015) TDM 12; Sumeet Kachwaha,’The Rule Against Bias and the 
Jurisprudence of Arbitrator’s Independence and Impartiality’(2021) 17(2) AIAJ 104
25	
Vibhu Bakhru J, ‘Impartiality and Independence of the Arbitral Tribunal’ in Shashank Garg(ed),Arbitrator’s 
Handbook (Lexis Nexis 2022)
26	
Halliburton Co. v Chhub Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48
27	
Hancock v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 724
28	
Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni [2007] 1 SLR(R) 85 at [75]–[76]
29	
Gary Born (n 12) 3946
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national standards of independence and impartiality may 
be relevant to identifying international standards, just 
as domestic standards of procedural fairness can be 
relevant under Article V(1)(b), these standards should be 
considered with caution in international contexts. ….Only 
in rare cases should domestic standards of independence 
or impartiality be relied upon to produce a different result 
from that required by international standards”. 
25.	 Embracing international standards in arbitration would foster trust, 
certainty, and effectiveness in the resolution of disputes on a global 
scale. The above discussion would persuade us to say that in India, 
we must adopt an internationally recognized narrow standard of public 
policy, when dealing with the aspect of bias. It is only when the most 
basic notions of morality or justice are violated that this ground can 
be attracted. This Court in Ssangyong Engineering & Construction 
Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)30 had noted 
that the ground of most basic notions of morality or justice can only 
be invoked when the conscience of the Court is shocked by infraction 
of fundamental notions or principles of justice. 
26.	 In view of the above discussion, there can be no difficulty in holding 
that the most basic notions of morality and justice under the concept 
of ‘public policy’ would include bias. However, Courts must endeavor 
to adopt
international best practices instead of domestic standards, 
while determining bias. It is only in exceptional circumstances that 
enforcement should be refused on the ground of bias. 
27.	 Let us now turn to the present facts. The Award in this matter was 
passed in Singapore, a New York Convention Country and notified31 
as a reciprocating territory by India. Chapter 1 Part II of the Indian 
Arbitration Act is applicable in the present case. The parties had 
expressly chosen Singapore as the seat of Arbitration. It is the seat 
court which has exclusive supervisory jurisdiction to determine 
claims for a remedy relating to the existence or scope of arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction or the allegation of bias32. A contrary approach would go 
30	
[2019] 7 SCR 522 : (2019) 15 SCC 131
31	
Gazette Notification S.O.542(E) dated 06.7.1999
32	
AV Dicey and L. Collins, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of laws(15th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
2018) [16-36]
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987
Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
against the scheme of the New York Convention which has been 
incorporated in India. The jurisdiction was therefore chosen based 
on the perceived neutrality by the parties aligning with the principle 
of party autonomy. Interestingly in the present case, no setting aside 
challenge based on bias was raised before the Singapore Courts 
by the appellants within the limitation period. In this context, the 
Bombay High Court in a judgment in Perma Container (UK) Line 
Limited v Perma Container Line (India) Ltd33 had noted that since the 
objection of bias was not raised in appropriate proceedings under 
the English Arbitration Act,1996, it could not be raised at the post-
award Stage. Similarly, this Court in Vijay Karia (supra) had noted 
that no challenge was made to the foreign award under the English 
Arbitration Law, even though the remedy was available. Rejecting 
the challenge to the award on the ground of bias, the Court in Vijay 
Karia (supra) remarked that the Award Debtors were indulging in 
“speculative litigation with the fond hope that by flinging mud on a 
foreign arbitral award, some of the mud so flung would stick”. Similar 
view has also been taken by the German Supreme Court in Shipowner 
(Netherlands) v Cattle and Meat Dealer (Germany)34, where it was 
held that the objection of bias must be first raised in the Country
of origin of the Award and only if the objection was rejected or was 
impossible to raise, could it be raised at the time of enforcement. 
28.	 In the present case also, the Award Holders had challenged the 
appointment of Mr. Christopher Lau SC and Dr Pryles before SIAC 
only on the ground that the Tribunal had intentionally fixed November 
2013 for hearing knowing that it coincided with the Diwali vacation 
and that the Indian counsel would therefore not be available. This 
challenge was dismissed by the SIAC Committee of the Court of 
Arbitration in its decision dated September 13, 2014. Therefore, 
none of the other grounds now being pressed were raised during 
the arbitration or in the time period available to the appellants to 
apply, to set aside the Award in Singapore.
29.	 It needs emphasizing that bonafide challenges to arbitral appointments 
have to be made in a timely fashion and should not be used 
strategically to delay the enforcement process. In other words, the 
33	
2014 SCC OnLine Bom 575
34	
Dutch Shipowner v. German Cattle and Meat Dealer, Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 1 February 2001, 
XXIX Y.B.Com. Arb. 700 (2004)
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Award Debtors should have applied for setting aside of the Award 
before the Singapore Courts at the earliest point of time. 
Implications of the IBA Guidelines
30.	 The High Court in this case applied the reasonable third-person 
test contained in the IBA Guidelines to conclude that there is no 
requirement of disclosure and bias. The IBA Guidelines are a collective 
effort of the arbitration community to define as to what constitutes 
bias. However, bias has to be determined on a case-to-basis but 
Courts should attempt to apply international standards, while dealing 
with challenges at the enforcement stage.
31.	 The implications of the IBA Guidelines and their application will now 
have to be considered.
32.	 The IBA Guidelines have also been adopted in the V and VII Schedule 
to the Indian Arbitration Act and since the Award here is dated 
27.09.2014, the IBA Guidelines of the year 2004 would be relevant 
and applicable. The working group of the IBA had determined the 
standards/guidelines to bring about clarity and uniformity of application 
and accordingly, the Red, Orange and Green lists were appended 
to the Guidelines, to ensure consistency and to avoid unnecessary 
challenges and withdrawals and removals of arbitrators. The IBA 
Guidelines require an arbitrator to refuse appointment in case of 
any doubts as to impartiality or independence. The Arbitrator is also 
expected to disclose such facts or circumstances
to the parties which 
might compromise the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. In the 
event of any doubt on whether an arbitrator should disclose certain 
facts or circumstances, the issue should be resolved in favour of 
disclosure. This is because an arbitrator is not expected to serve in 
a situation of conflict of interest. An arbitrator is also under a duty 
to make reasonable enquiry to investigate any potential conflict of 
interest.
33.	 The relevant entries in the non-waivable Red list, the waivable Red 
list, the Orange list and the Green list would suggest that those were 
intended to ensure the fairness of the process and also make certain 
that the arbitrator is impartial and also independent of the parties. 
Such position of the arbitrator vis-à-vis the dispute should exist not 
only while accepting the appointment but must continue throughout 
the entire arbitration proceeding until it terminates.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
989
Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
34.	 In the impugned judgment, the High Court adverted to the IBA 
Guidelines in some detail and noticed that Mr. Christopher Lau 
(Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal) was an independent non-executive 
Director of two companies – Wing Tai and Neptune. The learned 
judge then considered whether he ought to have disclosed such 
relationship before taking up the assignment of arbitration. The 
Court noticed that the Award Debtors raised an omnibus objection 
and had invoked the non-waivable Red list as well as the waivable 
Red list as also the Orange list of the IBA Guidelines to claim that 
the arbitrators were under a duty of disclosure. With such broad-
based contentions, the appellants urged that Mr. Lau having failed to 
disclose the circumstances, the likelihood of bias was very strong and 
this would vitiate the foreign Award, sought to be enforced in India.
35.	 Adverting to the specific entries in the IBA Guidelines, pertaining to 
the alleged bias of Mr. Christopher Lau (the Chairman of the Arbitral 
Tribunal), the High Court reached the following conclusion:
35.1.	 The circumstance alleged by the award debtor for arbitral bias 
is the business interaction between one of the group companies 
of the award holder with independent private companies i.e., 
Wing Tai and Neptune wherein Mr. Lau was an independent 
non-executive
director. However, neither Wing Tai or Neptune 
fall within the definition of “affiliate” of the award holder as 
per the IBA Guidelines. It was therefore concluded that no 
reasonable third person would conclude that justifiable doubts 
arise about impartiality or independence of Mr. Lau. Thus, there 
exists no identity or conflict of interest between Mr. Lau and 
the award holder, or any of its affiliates including its holding 
company i.e. HSBC PLC (UK).
35.2.	 While the award debtors’ suggest their case implies a need 
for disclosure beyond the ‘Red’ or ‘Orange’ lists, and the 
inapplicability of the ‘Green list, the ‘reasonable third person’ 
test is the measure for assessing conflict of interest. The High 
Court concluded that the award debtors have not established 
that an impartial observer, aware of all facts, would doubt 
Mr. Lau’s impartiality or independence and consequently, the 
likelihood of bias of the arbitrator is not discernible. 
35.3.	 The award holder provided ample evidence countering the 
award debtors’ claims about its affiliate’s roles as book-runners
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and underwriters with Wing Tai and Neptune, by showing 
joint participation of various other banks. The allegation of a 
significant shareholding by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
award holder’s affiliate in Wing Tai and Neptune was found 
unsupported by evidence. The affiliate was one amongst 
many in the fund-raising and held the shares in trust during 
the course of business.
35.4.	 Even upon applying the subjective approach for disclosure, 
wherein the disclosure requirement is viewed from the Award 
Debtors’ point of view, certain limitations apply, as per the 
Green list of the IBA Guidelines. Placing reliance upon Clauses, 
4.5 and 4.53 of the Green list, the learned Judge of the High 
Court found no conflict of interest between the arbitrator and 
the award holder or its affiliates. In case, the circumstances 
alleged fall under the green list, no duty of disclosure is owed 
by the arbitrator.
36.	 The above discussion in the impugned judgment in our assessment 
correctly suggests that Mr. Christopher Lau neither had a duty to 
disclose nor did he fail to discharge his legal duty of disclosure 
in accepting the assignment as the Presiding Arbitrator. In the 
circumstances here, we cannot infer bias or likelihood of bias of the 
Presiding Arbitrator. Award Debtors therefore cannot claim that there 
is any violation of the public policy, which would render the foreign 
award unenforceable in India.
37.
Nevertheless, it would also be appropriate to address one specific 
contention raised by the Award Debtors on the communication 
addressed by Mr. Christopher Lau to an enquiry made on 03.02.2016, 
by one Ms. Pauline. In his response, Mr. Lau refused to accept the 
suggested assignment stating that there is conflict of interest in his 
taking action against HSBC. The circumstances under which the 
above communication was addressed by Mr. Lau are explained in 
detail in Mr. Lau’s letter dated 26.04.2016. A reading of the response 
would show the reason for the response to Ms. Pauline. It would 
also additionally confirm that Mr. Christopher Lau during the phase 
when he acted as the Presiding Arbitrator between the appellants 
and the respondent, was not subject to any conflict of interest. He 
is held to have duly complied with the disclosure obligation and no 
bias or improper conduct can be attributed to rendition of the Award 
dated 27.09.2014 by Mr. Lau, as the President of the Arbitral Tribunal.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 
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Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
38.	 Another point on the above aspect i.e. the timing of the communication 
would also need our attention. The communication by Ms. Pauline 
was made in the year 2016, much after the final Award was rendered 
on 27.09.2014. When the explanation of Mr. Christopher Lau in his 
communication dated 26.04.2016 is examined in the context of the 
roving query made by the third party, well beyond the Award, we 
have no hesitation to hold that there was no disability on the part of 
Mr. Lau to conduct the arbitral proceedings between the appellants 
and the respondent.
39.	 We, therefore, conclude that there is no bias factor operating against 
Mr. Lau that would violate the most basic notions of morality and 
justice or shock the conscience of the Court. 
Onerous Travails 
40.	 This case has unfortunately seen a protracted and arduous battle 
to enforce an award for over 10 long years, with multiple phases 
of litigation. The arbitration itself commenced in Singapore on 
11.05.2012, when notice of arbitration was issued by the respondent. 
Then the SIAC Emergency Awards were rendered on 28.05.2012 
and 29.05.2012. Proceedings were then initiated by the award 
holder under S. 9 of Indian Arbitration Act at the Bombay High Court, 
seeking deposit of security amount to the extent of their claims. In the 
meanwhile, the award debtors’ objections
on the grounds of jurisdiction 
were dismissed by the arbitral tribunal through a Final Partial Award 
on 17.12.2012. In the Section 9 proceedings, the appellants were 
directed to deposit a certain sum for enforcement of the award. The 
award debtor challenged the same before the Supreme Court, which 
was subsequently dismissed and culminated in an order to maintain 
the specified amount in the award debtor’s account. However, the 
award debtors’ failure to maintain their account to the ordered extent, 
led to the contempt proceedings before the Supreme Court, which 
were disposed of vide orders dated 02.09.2022 & 09.09.2022.
41.	 Meanwhile, the Final Award was issued on 27.09.2014, which was 
sought to be set aside by the award-debtor through an application 
under 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act before the High Court. The 
same was dismissed as not maintainable on 28.09.2015. An appeal 
against the same was filed & dismissed subsequently. Simultaneously 
the award holder sought to enforce the award through an Arbitration 
Petition before the High Court. As a result, the enforcement
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proceedings culminated in the impugned orders dated 25.04.2023 of 
the High Court whereby the final award was rendered enforceable.
42.	 This long list of events points to a saga of the award-holder’s 
protracted and arduous struggle to gather the fruits of the Award. The 
Award Debtors raised multiple challenges and also defied the Court’s 
order. They had to serve jail time for such contemptuous actions. In 
this backdrop, the travails of Award holders suggest a Pyrrhic victory. 
It is not unlike the situation articulated by the playwright & author 
Oscar Wilde who commented - “In this world, there are only two 
tragedies. One is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting 
it.”35 As can be noticed, in this case, despite the award being in their 
favour, the award-holders found themselves embroiled in multiple 
litigations in different forums by the concerted and unmerited action 
of the appellants. It will bear mention here, that in every forum the 
award debtors have lost and Courts’ verdicts are in the favour of 
the award holders. Despite this, the benefit of the foreign award is 
still to reach the respondents. This sort of challenge where arbitral 
bias is raised at the enforcement stage, must be discouraged by our 
Courts to send out a clear message to the stakeholders that Indian 
Courts would ensure enforcement of a foreign Award unless it is 
demonstrable that there is a clear violation of morality and
justice. The 
determination of bias should only be done by applying international 
standards. Refusal of enforcement of foreign award should only be 
in a rare case where, non- adherence to International Standards is 
clearly demonstrable.
43.	 The High Court in this matter has rightly held that the award-debtors 
have failed to substantiate their allegation of bias, conflict of interest 
or the failure by the Presiding Arbitrator to render disclosure to 
the parties, as an objection to the enforcement of the award. The 
award debtors have failed to meet the high threshold for refusal 
of enforcement of a foreign award under Section 48 of the Indian 
Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the decision given by the High Court for 
enforcement/execution of the foreign award stands approved. The 
appeals are found devoid of merit.
44.	 Even as the appeals filed by the award debtors are dismissed, the 
respondents, notwithstanding their victory in all the legal battles until 
35	
Oscar Wilde, Act III, Lady Windermere’s Fan, 1893
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Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) 
Limited (Previously Named Hpeif Holdings 1 Limited)
now, must not be allowed to feel that theirs is a case of winning the 
battle but losing the war. In the circumstances, we emphasize the 
need for early enforcement of the foreign award by the competent 
forum, without showing any further indulgence to the award debtors. It 
is ordered accordingly. The appeals stand dismissed on these terms. 
45.	 Pending application(s), if any, shall stand closed.
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
Result of the case: 

Appeals dismissed.