YOGESH SINGH versus MAHABEER SINGH & ORS.
[2016] 7 S.C.R. 713, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2016] 7 S.C.R. 713 
YOGESH SINGH 
v. 
MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
(Criminal Appeal No.1482 of 2013) 
OCTOBER 20, 2016 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860: 
s. 302 rlw s.149 - Murder - Head severed from trunk- Incident 
witnessed by daughter and also father of the deceased - Trial court 
convicted six persons - High Court acquitted the accused persons-
respondents - Appeal against acquittal by son of the deceased -
Held: It was not the case of the accused that they were prejudiced 
by the alleged delay in dispatch of the FIR to the nearest Magistrate 
competent to take cognizance of such offence - Non-recording of 
certain relevant entries in the inquest report did not constitute a 
material defect so grave to throw out the prosecution story and the 
otherwise reliable testimonies of prosecution witnesses that remained 
uncontroverted - There was no major contradiction either in the 
evidence of the witnesses or any conflict in medical or ocular 
evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the respondents 
- The minor improvements, embellishments etc., were insignificant 
and ignored since the evidence of the witnesses otherwise 
corroborated each other in material particulars - The view expressed 
by High Court was not plausible one - Trial court had correctly 
analyzed the material on record to arrive at its conclusion - Order 
of conviction passed by trial court restored 
Criminal Jurisprudence: 
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Burden to prove guilt - Held:
The guilt of the accused must be 
proved beyond all reasonable doubJs - However, the burden on the 
prosecution is only to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt 
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and not all doubts. 
Two views - Held: If two views are possible 011 the evidence 
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and 
the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the 
accused should be adopted. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 7 S.C.R. 
Evidence: 
Testimony of child witness - Evidentiary value of - Held: 
Evidence of a child witness must be evaluated carefully" and with 
greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed 
by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to 
tutoring. 
Medical evidence - Evidentiary value of - Held: Is only 
corroborative and not conclusive ...:. In case of a conflict between 
oral evidence and medical evidence, the former is to be preferred 
unless the medical evidence completely rules out the oral evidence. 
Testimony of related/interested witness - Evidentiary value of 
- Held: Evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that 
the witnesses are related to each other or to the deceased - In case 
the evidence has a ring of truth in it, is cogent, credible and 
trustworthy, it can be relied upon. 
Minor contradictions in prosecution evidence - Effect on 
prosecution case - Held: Minor contradictions, inconsistencies or 
insignificant embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution 
case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution 
evidence - The omission should create a serious doubt about the 
truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness - It is only the serious 
contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of 
the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission. 
Delay/Laches: 
Delay in examination of prosecution
witness/child witnesses 
- Effect of- Held: The trial court observed that child witness (PW5) 
was cross-examined on practically every detail of the prosecution 
story and her statement corroborated every part thereof - It was 
rightly observed by the Trial Judge that the delay was on account 
of the fact that the Investigating Officer wanted to assure himself of 
the veracity of her statement and hence, she was examined after 
she had time to recover from the shock of the incident and compose 
herself - Under these circumstances, any delay in examining this 
witness uls. 161 of Cr.P.C. will not prejudice the_pTosecution - Code -
·of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.161. 
Delay in sending FIR to Magistrate - Held: Although in terms
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
of s.J 57 Cr:P.C., the police officer concerned is required to forward 
a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance 
of such offence, promptly and without undue delay, it cannot be 
laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever there is 
some delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, the prosecution 
version becomes unreliable and the trial stands vitiated - When 
there is posiii"'le evidence to the fact that the FIR was recorded without 
unreasonable delay and investigation started on the basis of that 
FIR and there is no other infirmity brought to the notice of the Court, 
then in the absence of any prejudice to the accused, it cannot be 
concluded that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution 
story rendered unsupportable - Code of Criminal Procedure, I 97 3 
- s.157. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence 
that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable 
doubts. However, the burden on the prosecution is only to 
establish its case beyond all re"son"ble doubt and not "//doubts. 
JJ?ara 1~1 (729-CJ 
Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash 
1972 (2) SCR 765: (1972) 1 SCC 249; Ganga Kumar 
Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211 - relied 
on. 
1.2 If two views are possible on the evidence adduced in 
the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to 
his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should 
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be adopted. However, the rule regarding the benefit of doubt 
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does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resorting to surmises, 
conjectures or fanciful considerations. (Paras 16, 17] (730-B, D] 
State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal and Am: 1988 (2) Suppl. 
SCR 391: (1988) 4 SCC 302; Krishnan 1-: State (2003) 
7 SCC 56:2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 771: Va/son and Anr. v. 
G 
State of Kera/a (2008) 12 SCC 24: Bhaskar Ramappa 
Madt>r and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2009) 11 SCC 
690 : 2009 (5) SCR 256; Kali Ram v. State of Himachal 
Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808:1974 (1) SCR 722; State of 
Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 : 2003 (2) 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 7 S.C.R. 
Suppl. SCR 445; Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of 
Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: 2007 (2) SCR 630; 
Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa (2015) 11 SCC 
124:2015 (5) SCR 214; Go/bar Hussain & Ors. v. State 
of Assam and Anr. (2015) 11 SCC 242:2015 (5) SCR 
525; State of Punjab v. Jaf{ir SinKh (1974) 3 SCC 
277:1974 (1) SCR 328; Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & 
Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793:1974 
(1) SCR 489 - relied on. 
1.3. It is well-settled that the evidence of a child witness 
must find adequate corroboration, before it is relied upon as the 
rule of corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law. However, 
it is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be 
rejected, even if it is a found reliable.[Paras 22, 23][731-G; 732-B] 
Praka.sh v. State of M.P. (1992) 4 SCC 225; Baby 
Kandayanathi v. State of Kera/a 1993 Supp (3) SCC 
667; Raja Rum Yaduv v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 
287: 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 174; Dattu Ramrao Sakhare 
v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341; State of 
U.P. v. Ashok Dixit & Anr. (2000) 3 SCC 70 : 2000 (1) 
SCR 855; Suryanarayana v. State Of Karnataka (2001) 
9 SCC 129 : 2001 (1) SCR 1; Panchhi v. State of U.P., 
(1998) 7 SCC 177 : 1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 40 - relied 
on. 
1.4. The evidence of a closely related witnesses is required 
to be carefully scrutinised and appreciated before any conclusion 
is made to rest upon it, regarding the convict/accused in a
given 
case. Thus, the evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the 
ground that the witnesses are related to each other or to the 
deceased. [Para 28) [733-F-G] 
Dalip SinKh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1954 
SCR 145; Piara Singh and Ors. " State of Punjab AIR 
1977 SC 2274 : (1977) 4 sec 452:1978 (1) SCR 597; 
Hari Obula Reddy and Ors. v. The State of Andhra 
Pradesh (1981) 3 SCC 675; Ramashish Rai v. Jagdish 
Singh (2005) 10 SCC 498; Anil Rai v. State of Bihar 
(2001) 7 SCC 318: 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 298; State of 
U.P. v. Jagdeo Singh (2003) 1 SCC 456; Bhagalool
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
Lodh & Am: v. State of U.P. (2011) 13 SCC 206 : 2011 
(6) SCR 1037; Dahari & Ors. v. State of U. P. (2012) 
,.lo sec 256 : 2012 (8) SCR 1219; Raju @ 
Ba/achandran & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 12 
SCC 701 : 2012 (11) SCR 109; Gangabhavani v. 
Rayapati Venkat Reddy & Ors. (2013) 15 SCC 298 : 
2013 (14) SCR 155; Jodhan v. State of MP. (2015) 11 
SCC 52 : 2015 (4) SCR 789 - relied on. 
1.5. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies 
are not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be 
considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The test is 
whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of the Court. 
If the evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the test 
of prudence, then it may create a dent in the prosecution version. 
If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and 
ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such 
inconsistencies. Every omission cannot take place of a material 
omission and, therefore, minor contradictions, inconsistencies 
or insignificant embellishments do not affect the core of the 
prosecution case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject 
the prosecution evidence. [Para 29) [734-B-D] 
Rammi @ Rameshwar v. State of MP. (1999) 8 SCC 
649: l999 (3) Suppl. SCR 1; Leela Ram (dead) throul{h 
Duli Chand v. State of Haryana and Another (1999) 9 
SCC 5~ :· 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 435; Bihari Nath 
Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh & Ors.
(2004) 9 SCC 
186 : 2004 (2) SCR 623; Vijay @ Chinee v. State of 
Madhya Pradesh (2010) 8 SCC 191 : 2010 (8) SCR . 
1150; Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of _Police, 
Krishnagiri (2012) 4 SCC 124 ~ 2012 (2) SCR 289; 
Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (2012) 7 SCC 
646 ·: 2012 (10) SCR 95; Mritunjoy Biswas v. Pranab 
@ Kuti Biswas and Anr. (2013) 12 SCC 796 : 2013 (7) 
SCR 1105 - relied on. 
2.1. PWl and PW5 stated under oath that on the fateful day, 
the deceased and PW5 were going to another village via th~ir 
village house. 
The High Court noted .that there was no reason 
for the deceased to go through the fields of the accused since 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 7 S.C.R. 
there was a straight pathway for accessing the village from the 
tube-well and that the animosity between the informant and the 
accused persons was so deep that they had put restriction upon 
themselves not to trespass or pass through the fields of their 
opponents. This observation of the High Court is not accepted 
as well in the light of the categorical finding by the trial court that 
along the north also there were fields of the very same accused, 
meaning thereby that in either case the deceased while going 
from his tube-well to his house in the village, would necessarily 
have to pass through the fields of the accused. (Paras 31, 32) 
(735-E-H) 
2.2. The trial court observed that child witness (PW5) was 
cross-examined on practically every detail of the prosecution 
story and her statement corroborated every part thereof. 
Moreover, the delay in recording of the statement of PW5 was 
not unexplained. It was rightly observed by the Trial Judge that 
the delay was on account of the fact that the Investigating Officer 
wanted to assure himself of the veracity of her statement and 
hence, she was examined after she had time to recover from the 
shock of the incident and compose herself. Under these 
circumstances, any delay in examining this witness under Section 
161 of Cr.P.C. will not prejudice the prosecution. (Para 34) (736-
H; 737-A-B) 
C. Muniappan and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 
9
SCC 567:2010 (10) SCR 262 - relied on. 
State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit and Anr. (2000) 3 SCC 70 : 
2000 (1) SCR 855; Vijaybhai Bhanabhai Patel v. 
Navnitbhai Patel & Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 583; Jagjit 
Singh @ Jagga v. State of Punjab (2005) 3 SCC 689 : 
2005 (1) SCR 559; Vijaybhai Bhanabhai Patel v. 
Navnitbhai Patel & Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 583; State of 
U.P. v. Ashok Dixit and Anr. (2000) 3 SCC 70 : 2000 
(1) SCR 855; Jagjit Singh @ Jagga v. State of Punjab 
(2005) 3 sec 689 - held inapplicable. 
3. Although in terms of Section 157 Cr.P.C., the police officer 
· concerned is required to forward a copy of the FIR to the 
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence, 
promptly and without 'undue delay, it cannot be laid down as a
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
rule of universal application that whenever there is some delay 
in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, the prosecution version 
becomes unreliable and the trial stands vitiated. When there is 
positive evidence to the fact that the FIR was recorded wi~hout 
unreasonable delay and investigation started on the basis of that 
FIR and there is no other infirmity brought to the notice of the 
Court, then in the absence of any prejudice to the accused, ft 
cannot be concluded that the investigation was tainted and the 
prosecution story rendered ·unsupportable. (Para 40) (739-C-D] 
. 4. It is well-established that inquest report is not a 
.substantive piece of evidence and can only be looked into for 
testing tt,e veracity of the witnesses of inquest. The object of 
preparin~ such report is merely to ascertain the apparent cause 
of death, ~amely, whether it is suicidal, homicidal, accidental or 
caused by animals or machinery etc. and stating in what manner, 
or by what weapon or instrument, the injuries on the body appear 
to have been inflicted. In the present case, it is not the case of 
the accused that they have been prejudiced by the alleged delay 
· in dispatch of the FIR to the nearest Magistrate competent to 
take cognizance of such offence. Moreover, the no.n-recording of 
certain relevant entries in the inquest report do not constitute a 
material defect so grave to throw out the prosecution story and 
the otherwise reliable
testimonies of prosecution witnesses that 
have mostly remained uncontroverted. There is no reason to 
interfere with the judgments of the courts below on this ground. 
In any event, the evidentiary value of medical evidence is only 
corroborative and not conclusive and, hence, in case of a conflict 
between oral evidence and medical evidence, the former is to be 
preferred unless the medical evi~ence completely rules out. the 
oral evidence. (Paras 41,_ 42, 43) (739-F-G; 740-B-C, E) 
Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525; Subal 
Ghorai and Ors. v. State of West Bengal (2013) 4 SCC 
607; Pala Singh v. State of Punjab, (1972) 2 SCC 640 
: 1973 (1) SCR 964; Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab 
(1976) 4 SCC 369; Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (2001) 7 
SCC 318:2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 298; Munshi Prasad & 
Ors. v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 351: 2001 (4) 
Suppl. SCR 25; Aqeel Ahmad v. State of U.P. (2008) 
16 SCC 372: 2008 (17) SCR 1330~ Dharamveer v. 
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SUPREME COUR'{ REPORTS 
[2016) 7 $.C.R. 
State of U.P. (2010) 4 SCC 469 : 2010 (3) SCR 162; 
Sandeep v. State of U.P., (2012) 6 SCC 107: 2012 (5) 
SCR 952; Pedda Narayan v. State of A.P. (1975) 4 SCC 
153 : 1975 Suppl. SCR 84; Khl!iii v. State qf MP. (1991) 
3 SCC 627 : 1991 (3) SCR 1; Ku/dip Sinf!.h v. State qf 
Punjab 1992 Supp (3) SCC 1; Georf!.e and Ors. v. State 
of Kera/a and Anr. (2008) 4 SCC 605; Suresh Rai v. 
State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 84: 2000 (2) SCR 796; 
Amar Singh v. Ba/winder Singh (2003) 2 SCC 518:2003 
(1) SCR 754; Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P., 
(2006) 2 SCC 450:2006 (1) SCR 519; Sambhu Das v. 
State of Assam, (2010) 10 SCC 374:2010 (11) SCR 493; 
Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 
2 SCC 174; Mani Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Supp 
(3) SCC 18 : 1993 (2) SCR 852; State qf U.P. v. Krishna 
· Gopal & Anr., State of Haryana v. Bhagirath (1999) 5 
SCC 96 : 1999 (3) SCR 529; Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai 
Nayak v. State of Gujarat (2003) 5 SCC 223; Thaman . 
Kumar v. State of U. T. of Chandigarh (2003) 6 SCC 
380 : 2003 (3) SCR 1190; Krishnan " State, (2003) 7 
SCC 56 : 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 771; Khambam Raja 
Reddy & Am: v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. 
(2006) 11 SCC 239 : 2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 446; State 
of U.P. v. Dinesh (2009) 11 SCC 566 : 2009 (2) SCR 
1175; State qf U.P. v. Hari Chand (2009) 13 SCC 
542:2009 (7) SCR 149; Abdul Sayeed v. State of MP. 
(2010) 10 SCC 259: 2010 (13) SCR 311; Bhajan Singh
@Harbhajan Singh & Ors. v. State (2011) 7 SCC 421 
: 2011 (7) SCR l - relied on. 
~ 
5. There was no major contradiction either in the evidence 
of the witnesses or any conflict in medical or ocular evidence 
which would tilt the balance in favour of the respondents. The 
minor improvements, embellishments etc., apart from being far · 
G · yield of human faculties are insignificant and ought to be ignored 
since the evidence of the witnesses otherwise overwhelmingly 
corroborate each other in material particulars. [Para 44) (740-H; 
741-A-BJ 
6. The trial court found that there was sufficient motive with 
H 
the accusetl persons to commit the murder of the dec~ased since
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
the deceased had defeated accused in the Pradhan elections, thus 
putting an end to his position as Pradhan for the last 28-30 years .. 
The long nursed feeling of hatred and the simmering enmity 
between the family of the deceased and the accused persons most 
likely manifested itself in the outburst of anger resulting in the 
murder of the deceased. It is a settled legal proposition that even 
if the absence of motive, as alleged, is accepted that is of no 
consequence and pales into insignificance when direct evidence 
establishes the crime. Therefore, in case there is direct 
trustworthy evidence of witnesses as to commission of an offence, 
motive loses its significance. Therefore, if the genesis of the 
motive of the occurrence is not proved, the ocular testimony of 
the witnesses as to the occurrence could not be discarded only 
on the ground of absence of motive, if otherwise the evidence is 
worthy of reliance. The view expressed by the High Court, is 
not a plausible one. On the other hand, the trial court has correctly 
analyzed the material on record in the factual as well as legal 
perspectives to arrive at its conclusion. (Paras 46, 55) (741-F-H; 
742-A-B; 744-H; 745-A) 
Hari Shankar v. State o/U.P. (1996) 9 SCC 40 : 1996 
(2) Snppl. SCR 348; Bikau Pandey &'Ors. v. State of 
Bihar (2003) 12 SCC 616 : 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 201; 
State of U.P. v. Kishanpal & Ors. (2008) 16 SCC 73 : 
2008 (11) SCR 1048; Abu Thakir & Ors. v.
State of 
Tamil Nadu (2010) 5 SCC 91 : 2010 (4) SCR 794; Bipin 
Kumar Monda/ v. State of West Bengal (2010) 12 SCC 
91:2010 (8) SCR 1036; Lakahan Sao v. State of Bihar 
and Am: (2000) 9 SCC 82; State of Rajasthan v. Arjun 
Singh & Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 115 : 2011 (10) SCR 823; 
Manjit Singh and Am: v. State of Punjab (2013) 12 SCC 
746:2013 (11) SCR 107; Raj Kumar Singh@ Raju@ 
Batya v. State of Rajasthan (2013) 5 SCC 722; Nar 
Singh v. State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCC 496 : 2014 
(12) SCR 218; Darya Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 
1965 SC 328 : 1964(7) SCR 397; Raghubir Singh v. 
State of U.P. (1972) 3 SCC 79; Appabhai and Anr. v. 
State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp (l) SCC 241; Prithvi v. 
Mam Raj (2004) 13 sec 279: 2004 (2) SCR 530 -
relied on. 
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722 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
Case Law Reference 
1972 (Z) SCR 765 
relied on 
Para 13 
c200~) 6 sec 211 
relied on 
Para 14 
1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 391 
relied on 
Para 15 
B 
2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 771 
relied on 
Para 15 
(20010 12 sec 24 
relied on 
Para 15 
2009 (~) SCR 256 
relied on 
Para 15 
1974 n) SCR 722 
relied on 
Para 16 
c 
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 445 
relied on 
Para 16 
2007· (2) SCR 630 
relied on 
Para 16 
2015 (5) SCR 214 
relied on 
Para 16 
'D 
2015 (5) SCR 525 
relied on 
Para 16 
1974 V> SCR 328 
relied on 
Para 17 
1974.(1) SCR 489 
relied on 
Para 18 
) 
(1992) 4 sec 225 
relied on 
Para22 
E 
1993 Supp (3) sec 667 
relied on 
Para22 
1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 174 
relied on 
Para22 
1997) 5 sec 341 
relied on 
Para22 
2000 (1) SCR 855 
relied on 
Para22 
F 
2001 (1) SCR 1 
. relied on 
Para22 
1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 40 
relied on 
Para23 
1954 SCR 145 
relied on 
Para24 
.1?78 (1) SCR 597 
relied on 
Para25 
G 
(198~) 3 sec 675 
relied on 
. Para 26 
c2005) 10 sec 498 
relied on 
Para27 
2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 298 
relied on 
Para28 
c200~> 1. sec 456 
relied on 
Para28 
H 
2!Hl (6) SCR 1037 
relied on 
Para28

YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
723
724 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 7 S.C.R. 
A 
2012 (5) SCR 952 
relied on 
Para 40 
1975 Suppl. SCR 84 
relied on 
Para 41 
1991 (3) SCR 1 
relied on 
Para 41 
1992 Supp (3) sec 1 
relied on. 
Para 41 
B 
c2ooio 4 sec 605 
relied on 
Para 41 
~!JOO (2) SCR 796 
relied on 
Para 41 
2003 (1) SCR 754 
relied on 
Para 41 
2006 (1) SCR 519 
relied on 
Para 41 
c 
20~0 (11) SCR 493 
relied on 
Para 41 
(198~) 2 sec 114 
relied on 
Para 43 
1993 (Z) SCR 852 
relied on 
Para 43 
1999 (3) SCR 529 
relied on 
Para43 
D 
(2003) 5 sec 223 
relied on 
Para 43 
2!)03 (3) SCR 1190 
relied on 
Para43 
2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 771 
relied on 
Para43 
E 
2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 446 
relied on 
Para43 
2009 (2) SCR 1175 
relied on 
Para43 
2009 (7) SCR 149 
relied on 
Para 43 
2010 (13) SCR 311 
relied on 
Para43 
F 
_2011 (7) SCR 1 
relied on 
Para 43 
1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 348 
relied on 
Para46 
2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 201 
relied on 
Para 46 
2008 (11 ) SCR 1048 
relied on 
Para 46 
G 
2010 (4 ) SCR 794 
relied on 
Para46 
2010 (8 ) SCR 1036 
relied on 
Para 46 
c2000) 9 sec 82 
relied on 
Para 47 
20,1 .(10) SCR 823 
relied on 
Para 47 
H
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
725 
2013 (11) SCR 107 
relied on 
Para 47 
A 
c2913) 5 sec 122 
relied on 
Para 48 
2014 (12) SCR 218 
relied on 
Para49 
19~~ (7) SCR 397 
relied on 
Para50 
(1972) 3 sec 79 
relied on 
Para 51 
B 
. 1988 Supp (1) sec 241 
relied on 
Para52 
20Q~ (2) SCR 530 
relied on 
Para 53 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
1482 of2013. 
C 
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.02.2012 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 1734of1983. 
Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, Sr. Adv., Aditya Singh, Rajiv Dalal, 
Advs. for the Appellant. 
Nagender Rai, P. S. Dutta, Sr. Advs., P. N. Gupta, Dr. (Mrs.) 
Vi pin Gupta, C. D. Singh, Ms. Sy Iona Mahapatra, Manoj Kumar, Advs. 
for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. I. This appeal is directed 
against the judgment and order dated 17'h February, 2012 passed by the 
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.1734 of 
1983, whereby the High Court acquitted the accused persons -
respondents herein of the charges under Section 302 read with Section 
149 of the Indian Penal Code. 
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 26.06.1982 at about 8.00 
A.M., the deceased Mohan Singh, who was a resident of Village Garh 
Umrao, Tehsil Sadabad, District Mathura, U.P., after taking bath at the 
tube-well, was going to his house along with his minor daughter La.ijawati 
(PW-5). He was carrying his single barrel gun and
the strip of C(artridges 
with him. The respondents Phal Singh and Mahabir Singh, along with 
other accused Om Prakash and Gopi Chand, were clearing the irrigation 
channel of their field; whereas respondents Raj Pal and Satya Pal were 
scrapping grass in their respective fields. Jaipal Singh and Om Prakash 
were engaged in plucking the Moong Pods from the field. When deceased 
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Mohan Singh reached the ridge of the field of Om Prakash and Gopi 
Chand, Phal Singh and Jaipal Singh caught him by his hands whereas 
respondent Om Prakash came from behind, put his arm around him and 
put him down on the ground. In the meantime, other accused persons 
also reached there. Then the accused Jaipal and Om Prakash caught 
hands of the deceased and accused Rajpal and Satyapal caught the legs 
of the deceased. Rajpal hit the deceased with a Ballam. Accused Mahabir 
Singh and Phal Singh severed the head of the deceased Mohan Singh by 
hitting him with Phawara (Spade). 
3. At the time of the incident, Kalyan Singh (PW-I), who is the 
father of deceased Mohan Singh, and Bani Singh (PW-2) were sitting at 
the tube well of Bani Singh situated at a distance of around 150 yards 
from the place of incident. On hearing the cries of deceased Mohan 
Singh and Laijawati (PW-5), the aforesaid witnesses rushed to the place 
of incident. In the meantime, accused Harcharan also arrived at the 
place ofincident carrying his gun. In order to dissuade Kalyan Singh and 
Bani Singh, the accused respondents Phal Singh and Harcharan fired in 
the air. Then the accused persons tried to take away the body of deceased 
Mohan Singh by dragging it for some distance. But due to the hue and 
cry raised by the eye-witnesses, the accused fled away from the place 
of incident. Thereafter, Kalyan Singh (PW- I) went to Police
Station 
Sadabad with a written complaint of the incident, on the basis of which 
an FIR of the incident was lodged on the same day at around 11.00 
A.M. and Case Crime No.139of1982 was registered. 
4. Thereafter, investigation started and police sent the dead body 
ofMohan Singh for post-mortem, prepared Site Map of the place of the 
incident, and collected blood-stained soil and clothes of the deceased. In 
the evening, accused Harcharan was arrested and on the information 
given by him, a blood-stained Phawara (Spade) was recovered. All the 
articles recovered were sent for chemical examination. 
5. Dr. K.C. Jain (PW-4) conduced the post-mortem examination 
of deceased Mohan Singh which disclosed that there were three ante 
mortem injuries present on the corpse of Mohan Singh; head was severed 
from the body; and there was fracture on 61h and 7m vertebra. The 
doctor opined that the death was caused due to shock and hemorrhage 
due to above stated injuries. 
6. After the investigation was complete, seven persons, namely,
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.J 
Mahabir Singh, Phal Singh, Jaipal Singh, Om Prakash, Raj Pal, Satya 
Pal and Har Charan were challaned by the police and charge-sheet was 
submitted in Court. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of 
Sessions, it was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, 
Mathura. Thereafter, charges were framed against all the accused persons 
vide order dated 16.12.1982, they were tried for the respective offences 
and after hearing the counsel for the prosecution and also the counsel 
for the accused, the learned Sessions Judge vide his order dated 
26.07.1983, convicted six accused persons (respondents Nos. I to 6 herein) 
for committing the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 
IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 
life. TheywerealsoconvictedseverallyunderSections 147, 148 &379 
oflPC. The accused Har Charan was not found guilty of the offences 
punishable under Section 148 or Section 302/149 ofIPC and hence he 
was acquitted. 
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction passed by the 
learned Sessions Judge, Mathura, the accused respondents preferred an 
appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C., before the High Court of Judicature 
at Allahabad. The Allahabad High Court by its judgment dated 17.02.2012 
passed in Criminal Appeal No.1734of1983, allowed the appeal filed by 
the accused respondents and acquitted them of the charges under Section 
302 read with
Section 149 of WC. Hence, this appeal, by special leave, 
is filed before this Court by the son of the deceased challenging the 
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High Court. 
8. Respondent No.4 herein having died on I 0.12.2012, as supported 
by the Death Certificate filed in this Court, this appeal abates as against 
respondent No.4. 
9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant 
as also the learned counsel appearing for the respondents accused and 
perused the oral and documentary evidence on record. 
10. The Trial Court convicted the accused relying upon the 
successful establishment of the following facts by the prosecution: 
(a) the murder of the deceased vide Exh. Ka 7 (Panchnama), 
Exh. Ka 3 (post-mortem examination report) and the recovery 
of the head of the deceased that had been severed from the 
trunk; 
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(b) the place of occurrence vide recovery of personal articles of 
the deceased from the alleged place of occurrence as also 
blood stained earth from a pool of blood found at the alleged 
place of occurrence and the corresponding report of the 
Chemical Examiner and Serologist certifying it to be human 
blood; 
( c) motive for the commission of the offence; 
( d) the time and manner of occurrence of the incident from the 
evidence of PW!, PW2 and PW 5 (eye witnesses) was not 
only credible but co1Toborated by each other and in tum stood 
corroborated by the medical evidence. 
11. On the other hand, the High Court found that the prosecution 
story was not reliable since the eye-witnesses were interested and other 
witnesses were inimical and had the motive to falsely implicate the 
accused persons. Further, their presence at the scene of occurrence at 
the time of the incident was also doubted. It was further found that the 
aforesaid prosecution witnesses not only made false statements on the 
most material parts of the prosecution case, but were even otherwise 
not acceptable to a reasonable person. Moreover, the testimony of the 
formal witnesses was also found to be not trustworthy on account of 
serious lapses in recording of evidence, holding ofinquest and dispatching 
of FJR to the nearest Magistrate leading to an inference as to its 
antedating. Resultantly, the accused persons were acquitted by the
High 
Court. 
12. Before proceeding with an analysis of the various contentions 
raised by the parties or expressing opinion on the appreciation and findings 
of fact and law recorded by the courts below, we wish to reiterate the 
scope of interference by this Court in a criminal appeal against acquittal 
under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia. 
13. In Himachal Pradesh Administration Vs. Shri Om Prakash, 
(1972) I SCC 249, it was held by this Court as follows: 
"Jn appeals against acquittal by special leave under Article 
136, this Court has undoubted power to interfere with the 
findings of the fact, no distinction being made between 
judgments of acquittal and conviction though in the case of 
acquittals it will not be ordinarily interfere with the
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SrNGH & ORS. 
[PrNAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.) 
appreciation of evidence or on findings of fact unless the 
High Court "acts perversely or otherwise improperly." 
14. Further, in Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of Bihar, 
(2005) 6 sec 211, this Court a~ded one more ground, namely, where 
the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error oflaw of 
procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of 
record and misreading of the evidence. 
15. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt 
of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts. However, 
the burden on the prosecution is only to establish its case beyond all 
reasonable doubt and not all doubts. Here, it is worthwhile to reproduce 
the observations made by Venkatachaliah, J., in State ofU.P. Vs. Krishna 
Go pal and Anr., ( 1988) 4 SCC 302: 
"25 .... Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free 
from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford 
any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, 
it must be free from an overemotional response. Doubts 
must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the 
accused person arising from the evidence, or from the lack 
of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable 
doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; 
but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It 
must grow out of the evidence in the case. 
26. The
concept of probability, and the degrees ofit, cannot 
obviousiy be expressed in terms of units to be 
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units 
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an 
unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the 
degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic 
probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common 
sense and, ultimately on the trained intuitions of the judge. 
While the protection given by the criminal process to the 
accused persons is not to he eroded, at the same time, 
uainformed legitimization of trivialities would make a 
mockery ofadministration of criminal justice." 
[See also Krishnan Vs. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56; Valson 
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and Anr. Vs. State of Kerala, (2008) 12 SCC 24 and 
Bhaskar Ramappa Madar and Ors. Vs. State of 
Karnataka, (2009) 11 SCC 690). 
16. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the 
administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible 
on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the 
accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to 
the accused should be adopted. [Vi de Kali Ram Vs. State ofHimachal 
Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808; State ofRajasthan Vs. Raja Ram, (2003) 
8 SCC 180; Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 
SCC 415; Upendra Pradhan Vs. State ofOrissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124 
and Golbar Hussain & Ors. Vs. State of Assam and Anr., (2015) 11 
sec 242). 
17. However, the rule regarding the benefit of doubt does not 
warrant acquittal of the accused by resorting to surmises, conjectures or 
fanciful considerations, as has been held by this Court in the case of 
State of Punjab Vs. Jagir Singh, ( 1974) 3 SCC 277: 
"A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to 
give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns 
itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned 
at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. 
Crime is an event in real life and is the product ofinterplay 
of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion 
about the guilt of the accused charged
with the commission 
of a crime, the court has to judge, the evidence by the 
yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus 
of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have 
to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every 
reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts 
should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex 
facie trustworthy, on grounds which are fanciful or in the 
nature of conjectures." 
18. Similarly, in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. Vs. State of 
Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., stated thus: 
"The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, 
hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude 
reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go 
but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. 
Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise 
any practical system of justice will then break down and 
lose credibility with the community." 
19. Keeping in mind the aforesaid position oflaw, we shall examine 
the arguments advanced and the evidence adduced by the parties as 
also the materials on record and see in view of the nature of offence 
alleged to have been committed by the respondents whether the findings 
of fact recorded by the High Court call for interference in the facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
20. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the 
High Court has erred in rejecting the evidence of PWl, PW2 and PWS 
as also the formal witnesses by placing undue emphasis on minor/trivial 
issues not going to the root of the case. Per contra, the learned counsel 
for the respondents has supported the reasoning of the High Court and 
has further sought to point out cracks in the prosecution story by alleging 
absence of immediate motive, recovery of weapon being false and 
fabricated, belated introduction of story of marriage, the factum of which 
could not be proved, non-production of independent witnesses, 
'incongruence between the
medical evidence and prosecution story, non-
establishment ofballam injury, failure to put material questions regarding 
marriage to the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and finally the site 
plan belying the prosecution claim. 
21. For the sake of convenience, we shall first examine the general 
position of law on the various issues that found favour with the High 
Court in recording the order of acquittal in favour of the accused and 
then address the specific findings of fact and law by the High Court. 
Testimony of Child Witnesses 
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22. It is well-settled that the evidence ofa child witness must find 
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adequate corroboration, before it is relied upon as the rule of corroboration 
is of practical wisdom than of law. (See Prakash Vs. State of M.P., 
(1992) 4 SCC 225; Baby Kandayanathi Vs. State of Kerala, 1993 
Supp (3) SCC 667; Raja Ram Yadav Vs. State ofBihar, ( 1996) 9 SCC 
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287; Datto Ramrao Sakhare Vs. State of Maharashtra, ( 1997) 5 SCC 
341; State of U.P. Vs. Ashok Dixit & Anr., (2000) 3 SCC 70; 
Suryanarayana Vs. State OfKarnataka, (2001) 9 SCC 129). 
23. However, it is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence 
shall be rejected, even ifit is a found reliable. The law is that evidence of 
B 
a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater 
circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what 
others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring. [Vide 
Panchhi Vs. State ofU.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177]. 
Testimony of Interested/Inimical Witnesses 
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24. On the issue ofappreciation of evidence ofinterested witnesses, 
Dalip Singh Vs. State of PunJab, AIR 1953 SC 364 = 1954 SCR 145, 
is one of the earliest cases on the point. In that case, it was held as 
follows: 
"A witness is normally to be considered independent unless 
he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted 
and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such 
as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him 
falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen 
the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It 
is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause 
for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent 
person against whom a witness has a grudge along with 
the guilty, but
foundation must be laid for such a criticism 
·and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation 
is often a sure guarantee of truth." 
25. Similarly, ii1 Piara Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 
1977 SC 2274 = ( 1977) 4 SCC 452, this Court held: 
"It is we\1 settled that the evidence of interested or inimical 
witnesses is to be scrutinised with care but cannot be 
rejected merely on the grou~d of being a partisan evidence. 
If on a perusal of the evidence the Court is satisfied that 
the evidence is creditworthy there is no bar in the Court 
relying on the said evidence." 
26. In Hari Obula Reddy and Ors. Vs. The State of Andhra
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
733 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
Pradesh, (1981) 3 SCC 675, a three-judge Bench of this Court observed: 
A 
" .. it is well settled that interested evidence is not necessarily 
unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itselfis not a valid 
ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. Nor 
can it be laid down as an invariable rule that interested 
evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless 
corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by 
independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the 
evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to 
careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such 
scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically 
reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, 
in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a 
conviction thereon." 
27.Again, in Ramashish Rai Vs. Ja2dish Sin2h, (2005) 10 SCC 
498, the following observations were made by this Court: 
"The requirement of Jaw is that the testimony of inimical 
witnesses has to be considered with caution. If otherwise 
the witnesses are true and reliable their testimony cannot 
be thrown out on the threshold by branding them as inimical 
witnesses. By now, it is well-settled principle of law that 
enmity is a double-edged sword. It can be a ground for 
false implication. It also can be a ground for assault. 
Therefore, a duty is cast upon the court to examine the 
testimony of
inimical witnesses with due caution and 
diligence." 
28. A survey of the judicial pronouncements of this Court onthis 
point leads to the inescapable conclusion that the evidence of a closely 
related witnesses is required to be carefully scrutinised and appreciated 
before any conclusion is made to rest upon it, regarding the 
convict/accused in a given case. Thus, the evidence cannot be disbelieved 
merely on the ground that the witnesses are related to each other or to 
the deceased. In case the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, 
credible and trustworthy, it can, and certainly should, be relied upon. 
(See Anil Rai Vs. State ofBihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318; State ofU.P. Vs. 
Jagdeo Singh; (2003) I SCC 456; Bhagalool Lodh & Anr. Vs. State 
ofU.P., (2011) 13 SCC 206; Dahari & Ors. Vs. State ofU. P., (2012) 
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10 SCC 256; Raju@Balachandran & Ors.Vs. StateofTamilNadu, 
(2012) 12 SCC 701; Gang11hhavani Vs. Rayapati Venkat Reddy & 
Ors., (2013) 15 SCC 298; Jodhan Vs. State of M.P., (2015) 11 SCC 
52). 
Discrepancies in Evidence 
29. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies are not to 
be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be considered from the 
point of view of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same inspires 
confidence in the mind of the Court. If the evidence is incredible and 
cannot be accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent in 
the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root 
of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage 
of such inconsistencies. It needs no special e11Jphasis to state that every 
omission cannot take place of a material omission and, therefore, minor 
contradictions, inconsistencies or insignificant embellishments do not affect 
the core of the prosecution case and should not be taken to be a ground 
to reject the prosecution evidence. The omission should create a serious 
doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. It is only 
the serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case 
of the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission. (See Rammi 
@ Rameshwar Vs. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649; Leela Ram 
(dead) through Duli Chand Vs. State
ofHaryana and Another, (1999) 
9 SCC 525; Bihari Nath Goswami Vs. Shiv Kumar Singh & Ors., 
(2004) 9 SCC 186; Vijay@ Chinee Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 
(20 I 0) 8 SCC 191; Sam path Kumar Vs. Inspector of Police, 
Krishnagiri, (2012) 4 SCC 124; Shyamal Ghosh Vs. State of West 
Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646 and Mritunjoy Biswas Vs. Pranab@ 
Kuti Biswas and Anr., (2013) 12 SCC-796). 
iapses in Investigation 
30. In C. Muniappan and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 
(2010) 9 SCC 567, this Court explained the law on this point in the 
following manner: 
"There· may be highly defective investigation in a case. 
However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any 
lapse by the IO and whether due to such lapse any benefit 
should be given to the accused. The law on this issue is 
well settled that the defect in the investigation by itself 
cannot be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given to such 
I
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or 
lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence 
of the people in the criminal justice administration would be 
eroded. Where there has been negligence on the part of 
the investigating agency or omissions, etc. which resulted 
in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the 
part of the court to examine the prosecution evidence dehors 
such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence 
is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to 
whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the 
truth. Therefore, the investigation is not the solitary area 
for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion of the 
trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the 
probity of investigation." 
31. In the present case, the High Court found that the testimonies 
of the eye witnesses were not reliable. In this connection, the High Court 
noted that the very claim of the witnesses that on the fateful day, the 
deceased and his daughter PWS, Lajjawati were going to their house 
situated in the north of the village for any particular reason, did not carry 
any weight in view of the fact that the deceased used to reside in his 
self-contained shelter situated nearthe tube well which was far removed 
from the Village and where he used to retire each day before sunset. 
We are not inclined
to endorse this finding of the High Court, particularly 
in light of the deposition of PWI and PWS, who stated under oath that 
on the fateful day, the deceased and PWS were going to another village 
via their village house. 
32. The High Court also noted that there was no reason for the 
deceased to go through the fretas of the accused since there was a 
straight pathway for accessing the village from the tube-well. Moreover, 
the animosity between the informant and the accused persons was so 
deep that they had put restriction upon themselves not to trespass or 
pass through the fields of their opponents. We are not in agreement with 
this observation of the High Court as well in the light of the categorical 
finding by the trial court that along the north also there were fields of the 
very same accused, meaning thereby that in either case the deceased 
while going from his tube-well to his house in the village, would necessarily 
have to pass through the fields of the accused. It has also been submitted 
by the counsel on behalf of the appellant that this was precisely the 
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reason why the deceased used to retire to his separate citadel each day 
before sunset and carry his gun and cartridge-strip with him. 
33. As far as the evidence of PW5 .is concerned, the High Court 
found that it was illogical that the dress of a child who was living with 
her parents in a different establishment would be kept in the custody of 
someone else who was living elsewhere, particularly in the light of the 
possessive attitude of children that urges them to cling to their most 
precious belongings. In this regard, it has been submitted by the counsel 
for the appellant that while the daily wears of PW5 were kept at the 
tube-well, fancy clothes for occasions were kept at the village house. 
Be that as it may, we are not inclined to agree with this reasoning of the 
High Court. Without attempting to indulge in any form of notional 
psychoanalysis of the child witness (PW5), we wish to emphasize that 
she was not subjected to any cross-examination on this point and hence 
any form of conjecture on this point would be wholly improper on our 
part. However, the learned counsel for the respondents have submitted 
that PWS was a tutored witness relying upon the fact that she had not 
taken a bath before leaving the house with her father to purportedly 
attend a marriage ceremony. We find that this contention is wholly · 
frivolous having no material bearing on the present case. 
34. The learned
counsel for the respondents has further sought to 
attack the testimony of this prosecution witness on the ground of delay 
in recording of her statement by the Investigating Officer. In support of 
this submission, learned counsel has relied upon the judgments of this 
Court in State of U.P. Vs. Ashok Dixit and Anr., (2000) 3 SCC 70; 
Vijaybhai Bhanabhai Patel Vs. Navnitbhai Patel & Ors., (2004) I 0 
SCC 583; Jagjit Singh @Jagga Vs. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 SCC 
689). However, we find that none of these cases help the case of the 
respondents since Vijaybhai Bhanabhai Patel Vs. Navnitbhai Patel 
& Ors., (2004) IO SCC 583, does not pertain to the case of a child 
witness and in State of U.P. Vs. Asbok Dixit and Anr., (2000) 3 SCC 
70, and Jagjit Singh@Jagga Vs. State of Punjab, (2005)3 SCC 689, 
delay in recording of evidence was not per se held to be fatal to the 
prosecution case but the testimony of the child witness in each case was 
found to be incredible on account of material contradictions and lack of 
independent corroboration. We find that this is not the case here. In this 
context, we may note that the Trial Court has observed that PW5 was 
cross-examined on practically every detail of the prosecutirw ~tory and
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
her statement corroborated every part thereof. Moreover, the delay in 
recording of the statement of PWS was not unexplained. It was rightly 
observed by the learned Trial Judge that the delay was on account of the 
fact that the Investigating Officer wanted to assure himself of the veracity 
of her statement and hence, she was examined after she had time to 
recover from the shock of the incident and compose herself. Under 
these circumstances, any delay in examining this witness under Section 
161 ofCr.P.C. will not prejudice the prosecution. 
35. Further, the High Court opined that when the bicycle was 
being kept regularly in the house of the deceased situated at the tube-well, 
it was very difficult to accept the explanation for the deceased to go to 
his village house. The High Court noted that this was reinforced by the 
fact that as per evidence of PWS, the brother-in-law of the deceased or 
the maternal uncle of PWS, namely, Ghanshyam was not in the village in 
the morning when the incident had occurred. However, we feel that 
there appears to be some confusion on this point. According to the 
versions of PWI and PW2, it was the brother-in-law ofRajvir (brother 
of the deceased), namely, Amar Singh who had visited the house of the 
deceased and had taken the bicycle of the deceased on the night prior to 
the date of the incident and that he was also present on the spot at the 
time of the incident.
Now, it is true that PWS had stated in her deposition 
that "Mama" (maternal uncle) had taken the bicycle, it is quite probable 
that she meant to refer to Amar Singh and not Ghanshyam (her real 
maternal uncle being the brother of her mother). Hence, there is no 
conflict in the evidence of the eyewitnesses on this point. 
36. A related contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that 
'the story of marriage was introduced for the fil"$t time by the prosecution 
witnesses during trial and the same was not even !\roved. However, we 
must note the observations of the learned Trial Judge which were to the 
effect that the statements of the prosecution witnesses, under Section 
162 Cr.P.C. were conspicuously silent on this part, thereby implying that 
the Investigating Officer did not care to inquire about it during investigation. 
Tl\us, in the light of the position of law examined above vis-a-vis effect 
oflapses in the investigation, we are not prepared to dispense with 'the 
accusation merely on this point especially when the Trial Court concluded 
that there was no material contradiction in the statements of PWl and 
PWS. 
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37. Another reason for which the High Court disbelieved the 
prosecution story is the improvement made by PW2 in the story of 
beheading of the deceased. We find it difficult to agree with this 
conclusion of the High Court in the light of the judgment of this Court in 
Leela Ram Vs. State ofHaryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525, wherein it was 
observed: 
"It is indeed necessary to note that one hardly comes across 
a witness whose evidence does not contain some 
exaggeration or embellishment - sometimes there could 
even be a deliberate attempt to offer embellishment and 
sometimes in their over anxiety they may give a slightly 
exaggerated account. The court can sift the chaff from the 
grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the 
witnesses. Total repulsion of the evidence is unnecessary. 
The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of 
trustworthiness. If this element is satisfied, it ought to inspire 
confidence in the mind of the court to accept the stated 
evidence though not however in the absence of the same." 
38. Similarly, in Subal Ghorai and Ors. Vs. State of West 
Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 607, this Court stated as follows: 
"Experience shows that witnesses do exaggerate and this 
Court has taken note of such exaggeration made by the 
witnesses and held that on account of embellishments, 
evidence of witnesses need not be discarded if it is 
corroborated on material aspects by the other
evidence on 
record." 
39. It was further noted by the High Court that the special report 
of the incident, that is, copy of the FIR had been received by the 
Magistrate l Yz months after the incident. Moreover, there was no time 
mentioned by PW8 in the relevant column as to when the inquest 
proceedings were started nor was any date or time mentioned in the 
relevant column as to when the inquest proceeding ended allegedly at 
the instruction of PW9, thus leading to an inference of antedating and 
fabrication. We find that these observations of the High Court are not 
supported by the evidence on record inasmuch as the DWI was himself 
not sanguine as to the correct date of receipt of the FIR in the present 
case. He simply stated that due to workload, the entry was made on
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
10.08.1982. Further, PW8 had stated in his deposition that PW9 must 
have spoken about the date and time of starting the Panchnama to be 
recorded in the relevant column but he could not be certain in view of 
loud noise at the place of the incident at the relevant time. In any event, 
in the light of the position of law examined above and the observation of 
the Trial Court that these merely show remissness on part of the 
investigating officer and should nofbe treated as fatal to the prosecution 
case, we are not inclined to disbelieve the prosecution story. 
40. It has been consistently held by this Court through a catena of 
judicial decisions that although in terms of Section 157 Cr.P.C., the police 
officer concerned is required to forward a copy of the FIR to the 
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence, promptly 
and without undue delay, it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal 
application that whenever there is some delay in sending the FIR to the 
Magistrate, the prosecution version becom~s unreliable and the trial stands 
vitiated. When there is positive evidence to the fact that the FIR was 
recorded without unreasonable delay and investigation started on the 
basis of that FIR and there is no other infirmity brought to the notice of 
the Court, then in the absence of any prejudice to the accused, it cannot 
be concluded that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution
story 
rendered unsupportable. [See Pala Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1972) 
2 SCC 640; Sarwan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369; 
Anil Rai Vs. State ofBihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318; Munshi Prasad & 
Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, (2002) I SCC 3 5 I; Aqeel Ahmad Vs. State 
ofU.P., (2008) 16 SCC 372; Dharamveer Vs. State ofU.P., (2010) 4 
SCC 469; Sandeep Vs. State ofU.P., (2012) 6 SCC 107]. 
41. Further, the evidentiary value of the inquest report prepared 
under Section 174 ofCr.P.C. has also been long settled through a series 
of judicial pronouncements of this Court. It is well-established that inquest 
report is not a substantive piece of evidence and cah only be looked into 
for testing the veracity of the witnesses of inquest. The object of preparing 
such report is merely to ascertain the apparent cause of death, namely, 
whether it is suicidal, homicidal, accidental or caused by animals or 
11'achinery etc. and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or 
instrument, the injuries on the body appear to have been inflicted. [See 
Pedda Narayan Vs. State of A.P., (1975) 4 SCC 153; Khujji Vs. 
State ofM.P., (1991) 3 SCC 627; Kuldip Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 
1992 Supp (3) SCC I; George and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and 
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Anr., (2008) 4 SCC 605; Suresh Rai Vs. State ofBihar, (2000) 4 SCC 
84; Amar Singh Vs. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518; Radha 
Mohan Singh Vs. State ofU.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450; Sambhu Das Vs. 
State of Assam, (2010) IO SCC 3741. 
42. In the present case, it is not the case of the accused that they 
have been prejudiced by the alleged delay in dispatch of the FIR to the 
nearest Magistrate competent to take cognizance of such offence. 
Moreover, in our opinion, the non-recording of certain relevant entries in 
the inquest report do not constitute a material defect so grave to throw 
out the prosecution story and the otherwise reliable testimonies of 
prosecution witnesses that have mostly remained uncontroverted. 
43. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents has then 
tried to create a dent in the prosecution story by pointing out 
inconsistencies between the ocular evidence and the medical evidence. 
However, we are not persuaded with this submission since both the 
Courts below have categorically ruled that the medical evide1we was 
consistent with the ocular evidence and we can safely say that to that 
extent, it corroborated the direct evidence proffered by the eye-witne$ses. 
We hold that there is no material discrepancy in the medical and ocular 
evidence and there is no reason to interfere with the judgments of the 
Courts below on this ground. In any event, it has been consistently held 
by
this Court that the evidentiary value of medical evidence is only 
corroborative and not conclusive and, hence, in case of a conflict between 
oral evidence and medical evidence, the former is to be preferred unless 
the medical evidence completely rules out the oral evidence. [See Solanki 
Chimanbhai Ukabhai Vs. StateofGujarat, (1983)2 SCC 174; Mani 
Ram Vs. State ofRa,jasthan, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 18; State ofU.P. 
Vs. Krishna Gopal & Anr., State ofHaryana Vs. Bhagirath, (1999) 
S SCC 96; Dhirajbhai GorakhbhaiNayak Vs. State of Gujarat, (2003) 
5 SCC 223; Thaman Kumar Vs. State ofU.T. of Chandigarh, (2003) 
6 SCC 380; Krishnan Vs. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56; Khambam Raja 
Reddy & Anr. Vs. Public Prosecutor; High Court of A.P., (2006) 
11 SCC 239; State of u;P. Vs. Dinesh, (2009) 11 SCC 566; State of 
U.P. Vs. Bari Chand, (2009) 13 SCC 542; Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of 
M.P., (2010) JO SCC 259 and Bhajan Singh@Harbhajan Singh & 
Ors. Vs. State, 2011) 7 SCC 421]. 
44. In the present case, we do not find any major contradiction 
either in the evidence of the witnesses or any conflict in medical or
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
[PlNAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.) 
ocular evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the respondents. 
The minor improvements, embellishments etc., apart from being far yield 
of human faculties are insignificant and ought to be ignored since the 
evidence of the witnesses otherwise overwhelmingly corroborate each 
other in material particulars. 
45. The High Court has also noted that the deceased was a person 
with crirninal antecedents and had fired at many persons, including one 
Bashira, and hence could have been targeted and killed by any of his 
enemies. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant 
that the High Court has erred on this point since there was no such 
evidence brought on record and merely certain suggestions were made 
to PWl regarding this fact during his cross-examination, which were 
denied. Moreover, it was also submitted that in the statement of the 
accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., they have stated that the 
deceased was a police mukhbir (informant) and not that he had criminal 
antecedents. Be that as it may, we would like to refrain from any form 
of conjecture on this point. In the present case, the prosecution has not 
sought to prove its claim on the basis of circumstantial evidence which 
as a rule needs to be conclusive, excluding any possible hypothesis of 
innocence of the accused. In the present case, it is not incumbent on the 
prosecution to discharge such burden to
rule out every possible hypothesis 
inconsistent with the guilt of the accused or consistent with the guilt of 
any other person. 
46. It has next been contended by the learned counsel for the 
respondents that there was no immediate motive with the respondents 
to commit the murder of the deceased. However, the Trial Court found 
that there was sufficient motive with the accused persons to commit the 
murder of the deceased since the deceased had defeated accused 
Harcharan in the Pradhan elections, thus putting an end to his position as 
Pradhan for the last 28-30 years. The long nursed feeling of hatred and 
the simmering enmity between the family of the deceased and the accused 
persons most likely manifested itselfin the outburst of anger resulting in 
the murder of the deceased. We are not required to express any opinion 
on this point in the light of the evidence adduced by the direct witnesses 
to the incident. It is a settled legal proposition that even ifthe absence of 
motive, as alleged, is accepted that is of no consequence and pales into 
insignificance when direct evidence establishes the crime. Therefore, in 
case there is direct trustworthy evidence of witnesses as to commission 
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of an offence, motive loses its significance. Therefore, ifthe genesis of 
the motive of the occurrence is not proved, the ocular testimony of the 
witnesses as to the occurrence could not be discarded only on the ground 
of absence of motive, if otherwise the evidence is worthy of reliance. 
[Bari Shankar Vs. State ofU.P., (1996) 9 SCC 40; Bikau Pandey & 
Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, (2003) 12 SCC 616; State of U.P. Vs. 
Kishanpal & Ors., (2008) 16 SCC 73; Abu Thakir & Ors. Vs. State 
ofTamil Nadu, (2010) 5 SCC 91 and Bipin Kumar Monda! Vs. State 
of West Bengal; (2010) 12 SCC 91]. 
47. The next line of contention taken by the I.earned counsel for 
the respondents is that the recovery evidence was false and fabricated. 
We feel no need to address this issue since it had already been validly 
discarded by the Trial court while convicting the respondents. In any 
case, it is an established proposition of law that mere non-recovery of 
weapon does not falsify the prosecution case where there is ample 
unimpeachable ocular evidence. [See Lakahan Sao Vs. State ofBihar 
and Anr., (2000) 9 SCC 82; State ofRa,jasthan Vs. Arjun Singh & 
Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 115 and Man.iit Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Pun.iab, 
(2013) 12 sec 746]. 
48. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the 
respondents that material questions regarding marriage, on which the 
prosecution had allegedly relied upon, were not put to the
accused under 
Section 313 Cr.P.C., thereby causing great prejudice to them. We feel 
that there is no weight in this submission of the learned counsel for the 
respondents since the purpose of Section 313 is only to bring the attention 
of the accused to all the inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an 
opportunity to offer an explanation ifhe chooses to do so. As has been 
succinctly held by this Court in Raj Kumar Singh@ Raju @ Batya 
Vs. State ofRa.iasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722: 
"In a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused 
person under Section 313 Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement 
of the principles ofnaturaljustice i.e. audi alterwn partem. 
This means that the accused may be asked to furnish some 
explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances 
associated with him, and the court must take note of such 
explanation." 
49. We feel that no such prejudice has been caused to the accused
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
on account of the failure of this Court to examine them under Section 
313 on the facts alleged by the prosecution since they were not 
incriminating in nature. In any case, Nar Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 
(201 S) 1 SCC 496, is an authority for the proposition that accused is not 
per se entitled for acquittal on the ground ofnon-compliance of mandatory 
provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. 
50. The learned counsel for the respondents has also sought to 
assail the prosecution version on the ground of lack of independent 
witnesses. We are not impressed by this submission in the light of the 
observations made by this Court in Darya Singh Vs. State of Pun.jab, 
AIR 1965 SC 328 = 1964(7) SCR 397, wherein it was observed: 
"It is well-known that in villages where murders are 
committed as a result of factions existing in the village or in 
consequence of family feuds, independent villagers arc 
generally reluctant to give evidence because they are afraid 
that giving evidence might invite the wrath of the assailants 
and might expose them to very serious risks. It is quite true 
that it is the duty of a citizen to assist the prosecution by 
giving evidence and helping the administration of criminal 
law to bring the offender to book, but it would be wholly 
unrealistic to suggest that if the prosecution is not able to 
bring independent witnesses to the Court because they are 
afraid to give evidence, that itself
should be treated as an 
infirmity in the prosecution case so as to justify the defence 
contention that the evidence actually adduced should be 
disbelieved on that ground alone without examining its 
merits." 
51. Similarly, in RaghubirSingh Vs. State ofU.P., (1972) 3 SCC 
79, it was held that the prosecution is not bound to produce al I the witnesses 
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said to have seen the occurrence. Material witnesses considered 
necessary by the prosecution for unfolding the prosecution story alone 
need be produced without unnecessary and redundant multiplication of 
witnesses. In this connection, general reluctance of an ·average villager 
G 
to appear as a witness and get himself involved in cases of rival village 
factions when tempers on both sides are running high, has to be borne in 
mind. 
52. Further, in Appabhai and Anr. Vs. State ofGu_jarat, 1988 
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Supp (I) SCC 241, this Court has observed : 
"Experience reminds us that civilized people are generally 
insensitive when a crime is committed even in their 
presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the 
vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless 
it is inevitable. They think that crime like civil dispute is 
between two individuals or parties and they should not involve 
themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is 
indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether in 
village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap 
with which the investigating agency has to discharge its 
duties. The Court, therefore, instead of doubting the 
prosecution case for want of independent witness must 
consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and 
then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to 
probability, if any, suggested by the accused." 
53. Next, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the 
respondents that the site plan belies the prosecution claim in view of the 
height of agricultural crops, as PWl, PW2 and PW5 could not have 
seen the incident and more precisely as to which accused was doing 
what. However, when we examine the deposition of PWS, it appears 
that there was some disparity in the height of the agricultural crops. 
While some crops were waist high, others were only as high as the 
knees. Hence, there is not much force
in this submission of the learned 
counsel for the respondents either. Besides, the judgment of this Court 
in Prithvi Vs. Mam Raj, (2004) 13 SCC 279, is an authority for the 
proposition that site plan is not a ground to disbelieve the otherwise 
credible testimony of eye-witnesses. 
54. Finally, it has been submitted by the counsel for the respondents 
, that the prosecution story smacked of fabrication in that it was not possible 
for the prosecution witnesses to depose accurately as to the dragging of 
the body of the deceased by the respondents by nine steps on the ground. 
We find no force in this submission in the light of the position oflaw laid 
down by this Court in Leela Ram Vs. State ofHaryana (supra). 
55. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned 
judgment passed by the High Court. Having regard to the evidence on 
record, the view expressed by the High Court, in our opinion, is not a
YOGESH SINGH v. MAHABEER SINGH & ORS. 
[PINAKJ CHANDRA GHOSE, J.] 
plausible one. On the other hand, the trial court has correctly analyzed 
the material on record in the factual as well as legal perspectives to 
arrive at its conclusion. The Judgment and order of conviction and 
sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mathura, thus stand 
restored. The respondents are hereby directed to surrender before the 
Trial Court within a week, failing which the learned Sessions Judge 
concerned shall take prompt steps to put the respondents .accused back 
in jail to undergo the sentence awarded to them. 
Devika Gujral 
Appeal allowed. 
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