DARSHAN SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 248, Supreme Court of India, 2024
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Issues
* Author
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 248 : 2024 INSC 19
Case Details
Darshan Singh
v.
State of Punjab
(Criminal Appeal No. 163 of 2010)
04 January 2024
[B. R. Gavai, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and  
Aravind Kumar*, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt, 
the entire chain of circumstances, not leaving any link missing for 
the appellant to escape from the clutches of law.
Headnotes
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 rw s. 34 – Murder – Prosecution 
case that the appellant along with the lady with whom he 
had illicit relations, administered poison to the appellant’s 
wife, with the motive to eliminate her and caused her death 
– Conviction u/s.302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment 
– High Court upheld the order of conviction and sentence 
against the appellant while acquitted the lady – Correctness:
Held: There was no eye-witness to the incident – Prosecution case 
rested on circumstantial evidence – Presence of the appellant and 
the lady in the appellant’s house in the intervening night not firmly 
and cogently established – Several omissions and improvements 
in the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses – There 
was a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide, 
which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement u/s.313 
CrPC and is sufficient to create doubt – Furthermore, evidence of 
prosecution witnesses not sufficient to prove presence of the lady at 
the appellant’s house, as a natural corollary, such
evidence cannot 
be relied on to conclude that the appellant was present in the house 
– Also the manner in which the High Court sought to distinguish 
the case of the appellant from the lady is perverse – When the 
conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then 
there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances – Failure
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to prove a single circumstance cogently can cause a snap in the 
chain of circumstances and make the accused entitled to benefit 
of doubt – In view thereof, the concurrent findings of conviction 
set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Evidence. [Paras 
25, 30, 33, 36-38]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 161 – Examination of 
witnesses by the police – Failure of the prosecution witnesses 
to mention in their statements u/s 161 about the involvement 
of an accused – However, their subsequent statement before 
court during trial regarding involvement of that particular 
accused – Reliance upon:
Held: It cannot be relied upon – Prosecution cannot seek to prove 
a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not 
stated to police during investigation – Evidence of that witness 
regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [Para 26]
Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Evidentiary value:
Held: Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought 
to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established – Those 
circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing 
towards the guilt of the accused – Circumstances taken cumulatively 
should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from 
the conclusion, that within all human probability, the crime was 
committed by the accused and they should be incapable of 
explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of
the 
accused and inconsistent with his innocence. [Para 9]
Evidence – Rustic/illiterate witness – Evidentiary value:
Held: Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be 
treated differently from other kinds of witnesses – It cannot be 
subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry – Evidence of a rustic/
illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be 
certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition 
– Witness. [Para 27]
List of Citations and Other References
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 
[1985] 1 SCR 88: (1984) 4 SCC 116; Rohtash Vs. State 
of Haryana [2012] 6 SCR 62: (2012) 6 SCC 589; Sunil
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DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Kumar Shambhu Dayal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra 
2011 (72) ACC 699 (SC); Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur 
Vs. State of Karnataka (2004) 7 SCC 422; Vimal Suresh 
Kamble Vs. Chaluverapinake, (2003) 3 SCC 175; 
Pramila vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine 
SC 711; Periasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [1996] 6 
Suppl. SCR 757: (1996) 6 SCC 457; Bhimsingh Vs. 
State of Uttarakhand (2015) 4 SCC 281 – relied on.
Jaipal V. State of Haryana [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 714: 
(2003) 1 SCC 169; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of 
Maharashtra [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 156: (2006) 10 SCC 
681; State of U.P. Vs. Chhoteylal [2011] 1 SCR 406: 
AIR 2011 SC 697; Dimple Gupta (minor) Vs. Rajiv 
Gupta [2007] 11 SCR 213: AIR 2008 SC 239; Sidhartha 
Vashisht Vs. State of NCT of Delhi [2010] 4 SCR 103: 
AIR 2010 SC 2352 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Keywords
Murder; Acquittal; Imprisonment for life; Homicide; Suicide; Motive; 
Benefit of doubt; Circumstantial evidence; Onus of proof; Improved 
fact; Minor contradictions or inconsistencies; Omissions and 
improvements; Seen together; Rustic/illiterate witness; Reliable 
witness; Chance witness; Chemical examiner’s report; Plea of alibi.
Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and 
Appearances
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.163 
of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2009 of the High Court 
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA
No.593-DB of 2000.
Appearances:
Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Siddhant Saroha, Tushar Bathija, 
Praveer Singh, Parth Jain, Manav Bhalla, Advs. for the Appellant.
Prateek Chadha, DAG, Sreekar Aechuri, Pragya Ganjoo, Ms. Muskan 
Singla, Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, Advs. for the Respondent.
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DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court
Judgment
Aravind Kumar, J.
1.	
This appeal by special leave arises out of judgment and order dated 
23.07.2009 passed in Criminal Appeal No.593-DB of 2000 by the 
High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court has upheld the 
order of conviction and sentence, as against Darshan Singh (the 
appellant) and has allowed the appeal of Rani Kaur (Accused No. 
2), thereby acquitting her of all charges. The State of Punjab has 
not challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur by filing any special leave 
petition. It is in this background that Darshan Singh had sought 
special leave to appeal before us and leave came to be granted by 
order dated 22.01.2010. 
Case of the Prosecution: 
2.	
The facts can be summed up in brief as follows: 
The deceased, Amrik Kaur was married to Darshan Singh, 
the appellant, some time in 1988. The marriage was arranged 
through Melo Kaur (PW-3), the cousin sister of the deceased. The 
prosecution alleges that their marital relationship was strained 
owing largely to the fact that Darshan Singh had developed an illicit 
partnership with Rani Kaur (A2). Several relatives had prevailed 
on the appellant to put an end to his relationship with Rani Kaur, 
but to no avail. The illicit relationship between Darshan Singh and 
Rani Kaur is said to have lasted for at least three years before the 
fateful day. It is the case of the prosecution that on the intervening 
night of
18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999, Darshan Singh and Rani 
Kaur, with the motive of eliminating the deceased, administered 
poison and intentionally caused the death of Amrik Kaur.
3.	
On these allegations, Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur were prosecuted 
for charges under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court 
convicted both the accused persons for the offence under Section 302 
r/w Section 34 and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life.
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Findings of the Trial Court and High Court: 
4.	
The Trial Court has concluded that it was a case of homicide and 
not suicide. It has found that the appellant had a strong motive 
to commit the murder of his wife. It further held that the appellant 
and Rani Kaur were present in the house on the intervening 
night of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 and therefore, the burden 
lay on them to explain as to ‘how the body of Amrik Kaur who 
was alive on the night of 18.05.1999 turned into a corpse’ the 
next morning. The Court has completely disbelieved the theory 
of suicide sought to be advanced on behalf of appellant. It was 
noted that merely because there were no injuries on the body of 
the deceased, that by itself would not obviate the possibility of 
forceful administration of the poisonous substance. On the basis 
of the above circumstances taken together, the Trial Court held 
that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt 
against the appellant and Rani Kaur. 
5.	
In appeal, the High Court has agreed with the findings of the Trial 
Court in so far as the appellant is concerned and has acquitted 
Rani Kaur by extending her the benefit of doubt. It has found that 
there is no other evidence except the testimony of PW3 and PW4, 
to prove the presence of Rani Kaur on the intervening night of 
18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 at the appellant’s house. 
ARGUMENTS OF MR. ABHIMANYU TEWARI, COUNSEL 
APPEARING FOR
APPELLANT: 
6.	
PW3, Melo Kaur, is not a reliable witness. The presence of the 
appellant, Darshan Singh, at the house on the intervening night 
of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 is sought to be established based 
on her testimony. She has made several improvements in her 
version, and her testimony suffers from several contradictions, and 
therefore, it is not safe to rely on such a witnesses’ uncorroborated 
testimony. It would be prejudicial to the appellant to rely on only 
a part of her testimony and exclude the rest. If her testimony is 
ignored in toto, there is no other evidence to establish the key 
circumstance of appellant’s presence at the spot of crime. 
6.1	 That aluminium phosphide is rather impossible to administer 
in a deceitful manner owing to its pungent smell and odour.
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No injury marks have been found on the deceased, which 
further establishes that there could not have been any forceful 
administration of the poison. Therefore, it is submitted that it 
is nothing but a case of suicide, the driving force for which, 
was the confrontation with Melo Kaur. It is the appellants’ case 
that Amrik Kaur was having an illicit affair with Melo Kaur’s 
husband, Gurmel Singh PW4, and embarrassed with her sister 
finding out, she self-administered the poisonous substance and 
committed suicide. Counsel has submitted judgments to support 
the proposition that aluminium phosphide has a pungent smell 
similar to garlic. 
6.2	 Reliance has been placed on Jaipal V. State of Haryana – 
(2003) 1 SCC 169 wherein the Apex Court discussed the nature 
of aluminium phosphide. The relevant paragraphs have been 
extracted below for reference:
“16. According to Modi, symptoms and signs of 
poisoning by aluminium phosphide are similar to 
poisoning by zinc phosphide (p. 197, ibid.). The chief 
symptoms after the administration of zinc phosphide 
are a vacant look, frequent vomiting with retching, 
tremors and drowsiness followed by respiratory distress 
at death. Zinc phosphide acts as a slow poison and is 
decomposed by hydrochloric acid in the stomach with 
the liberation of phosphine which acts as a respiratory 
poison. Being a very fine powder zinc phosphide 
adheres firmly to the crypts in the mucous membrane
of the stomach, and a very small quantity only in the 
stomach even after vomiting is sufficient to cause death 
by slow absorption.
17. Phosphine released from zinc phosphide (rat poison) 
and from aluminium phosphide, is mainly used as a 
fumigant to control insects and rodents in foodgrains 
and fields. Liberated from the metal phosphides by the 
action of water or acids, gaseous phosphine exerts 
more potent pesticidal action, for it penetrates to all 
areas otherwise inaccessible for pesticide application. 
Pathological findings from phosphine inhalation are
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pulmonary hyperaemia and oedema. It causes both 
fatty degeneration and necrosis of liver (p. 174, ibid.).
18. Our attention was invited, as was done in the High 
Court and the trial court, to a paper entitled “Toxicology 
— Acute Aluminium Phosphide Poisoning in Northern 
India” written by Dr Mitra Basu and Prof. S.B. Siwach, 
Head, Department of Medicine, Postgraduate Institute 
of Medical Sciences, Rohtak and published in Current 
Medical Journal, Vol. I, No. 5, July 1995. The authenticity 
of this article has not been doubted by the High Court nor 
questioned either in the High Court or in this Court. The 
learned authors have noticed the aluminium phosphide 
having emerged as a major health problem in northern 
India when these cases first started coming in 1984 
and hardly any literature being available earlier on this 
malady. In Postgraduate Institute of Medical Sciences, 
Rohtak about 2000 cases were reported which were 
all suicidal.
19. We may briefly sum up the opinion of the learned 
authors from their published paper. Phosphine gas 
(active ingredient of ALP) causes sudden cardiovascular 
collapse; most patients die of shock, cardiac arrhythmia, 
acidosis and adult respiratory distress syndrome 
(ARDS). Aluminium phosphide is available in the form 
of chalky-white tablets. When these tablets are taken 
out of the sealed container, they come in contact with 
atmospheric moisture and the chemical reaction takes
place liberating Phosphine gas (PH3) which is the active 
ingredient of ALP. This gas is highly toxic and effectively 
kills all insects and thus preserves the stored grains. 
When these tablets are swallowed, the chemical reaction 
is accelerated by the presence of hydrochloric acid in the 
stomach and within minutes phosphine gas dissipates 
and spreads into the whole body. The gas is highly toxic 
and damages almost every organ but maximal damage 
is caused to heart and lungs. Sudden cardiovascular 
collapse is the hallmark of acute poisoning. Patients
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DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
come with fast, thready or impalpable arterial pulses, 
unrecordable or low blood pressure and icy-cold skin. 
Somehow these patients remain conscious till the end 
and continue to pass urine despite unrecordable blood 
pressure. Vomiting is a prominent feature associated 
with epigastric burning sensation. The patients will be 
smelling foul (garlic-like) from their breath and vomitus. 
Many of them will die within a few hours. Those who 
survive for some time will show elevated jugular venous 
pressure, may develop tender hepatomegaly and still 
later adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), 
renal shutdown and in a very few cases, toxic hepatic 
jaundice. The active ingredient of ALP is phosphine 
gas which causes extensive tissue damage. A spot 
clinical diagnosis is possible in majority of cases of ALP 
poisoning. However, ALP on account of its very pungent 
smell (which can drive out all inmates from the house 
if left open) cannot be taken accidentally.”
6.3	 It was also argued that the courts below have failed to give 
sufficient weight to the evidence led on behalf of the defence, 
in particular, the testimony of DW3 and DW4. 
6.4	 Lastly, it was argued that Rani Kaur (A2) having been 
extended benefit of doubt, it was rather anomalous to 
exclude such benefit to A1- the appellant, when the case of 
the prosecution was that both of them were present at the 
scene of crime. 
Arguments of Mr. Prateek Chaddha,
learned counsel on behalf 
of State of Punjab: 
7.	
Melo Kaur was an illiterate person who cannot be expected to 
be aware of the intricacies of law and cross examination and 
therefore, it was rather natural for minor inconsistencies to creep 
into the testimony of such a witness. The Trial Court has rightly 
appreciated her testimony by excluding the uncorroborated parts 
from the corroborated parts of her testimony. In that sense, the 
Trial Court has separated the chaff from the grain, as is expected 
to be done when it has to appreciate the evidence of a partly
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reliable and partly unreliable witness. Moreover, the accused 
himself has never denied his presence at the scene of crime. 
In his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., he has 
admitted his presence. This, coupled with the testimony of PW3, 
4 and 5, is sufficient to prove the presence of the accused at the 
spot of crime. 
7.1	 The case rests on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution 
has proved the circumstances from which an inference of 
guilt is sought to be drawn, cogently and convincingly. The 
circumstances relied on include -– (1) Motive; (2) Presence 
of the appellant at the scene of crime; (3) Cause of Death: By 
Poisoning (4) Opportunity to administer poison; (5) Conduct 
(6) False explanation in 313 Statement. 
7.2	 He has further relied on the principle laid down in Trimukh 
Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra1 to contend that 
the degree of evidence needed to prove the case resting 
on circumstantial evidence in the given facts cannot be as 
high as is normally the case. In view of Section 106 of the 
Evidence Act, the appellant was under a burden to explain the 
circumstances leading to the death of the deceased. Merely 
remaining quiet or offering a false explanation would provide 
an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it 
complete. Remaining quiet, or offering a false explanation 
would therefore provide an additional link in the chain of 
circumstances to make it
complete. He has also sought to 
distinguish the cases relied on behalf of the appellant. 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
8.	
We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and respondent 
and perused the materials on record. 
9.	
There is no eye-witness to the incident. The case of the prosecution 
rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal approach in a case 
based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from 
which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently 
1	
 (2006) 10 SCC 681
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DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of 
a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the 
accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form 
a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion, 
that within all human probability, the crime was committed by 
the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on 
any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and 
inconsistent with his innocence. [See Sharad Birdhichand Sarda 
v. State of Maharashtra2]
10.	 Let us, therefore, examine whether the prosecution had proved 
beyond reasonable doubt, the entire chain of circumstances, 
not leaving any link missing for the appellant to escape from the 
clutches of law. The circumstances which are said to have been 
proved on behalf of the prosecution is as follows: 
1.	
Motive 
2.	
Presence at the spot
3.	
False explanation in 313 statement
4.	
Death by Poisoning – Doctor’s opinion on cause of death
5.	
Conduct of the Appellant
6.	
Opportunity to administer poison.
11.	 According to the case of the prosecution, the illicit relationship 
that existed between Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur served as the 
key motive for them to jointly eliminate the deceased. The fact 
that they were in an illicit relationship has been sufficiently proved 
from the testimony of PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4. This circumstance, 
therefore, has been cogently established. 
12.	 The most
important circumstance, among all, must be the circumstance 
of the appellant and Rani Kaur having been present in the appellant’s 
house on the intervening night of 18.05.99 and 19.05.99 and they 
having been seen leaving the house in the early hours of the day. 
For, the proof of presence has the effect of triggering into operation, 
2	
 (1984) 4 SCC 116
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Section 106 of the Evidence Act and the principle laid down in the 
case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra. Even the 
circumstance that the appellant had the ‘opportunity’ to administer 
poison was strongly linked to aspect of proving the presence of the 
appellant and Rani Kaur in the appellants house. 
13.	 In Trimukh’s case, it has been held: 
i.	
“If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house 
and in such circumstances where the assailants have 
all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at 
the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be 
extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence 
to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle 
of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted 
upon by the Courts……………………Where an offence 
like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the 
initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly 
be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of 
evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot 
be of the same degree as is required in other cases 
of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of 
a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 
106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding 
burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent 
explanation as to how the crime was committed. The 
inmates of the house cannot get away by simply 
keeping quiet and offering no
explanation on the 
supposed premise that the burden to establish its 
case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is 
no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation”
14.	 In Trimukh (supra), this Court has pointed out that there are 
two important consequences that play out when an offence is 
said to have taken place in the privacy of a house, where the 
accused is said to have been present. Firstly, the standard of 
proof expected to prove such a case based on circumstantial 
evidence is lesser than other cases of circumstantial evidence. 
Secondly, the appellant would be under a duty to explain as to 
the circumstances that led to the death of the deceased. In that
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DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
sense, there is a limited shifting of the onus of proof. If he remains 
quiet or offers a false explanation, then such a response would 
become an additional link in the chain of circumstances. 
15.	 Both the Courts below have in fact applied the principle referred to 
in Trimukh’s case. Their presence having been held to be proved, 
the Court relied on Section 106 of the Evidence Act and shifted 
the onus of proof on the accused to explain the circumstances 
which led to the unnatural death of the deceased. 
16.	 Whereas the Trial Court found both the accused guilty, the High 
Court has confirmed the order of conviction only against the 
appellant and extended benefit of doubt to Rani Kaur. The appellant 
having failed to give a proper and believable explanation was, in 
fact, used as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. The 
proof of presence in that sense triggered the two consequences 
as laid down in Trimukh’s case (supra)
17.	 In this case, the presence was sought to be proved by the 
prosecution on the basis of the testimony of PW-3, PW-4, PW-5 
and the statements of the accused at the 313 stage. The Courts 
below had also relied on the testimony of PW 3 and PW 4 to 
conclude that the appellant was present in the house. Therefore, 
it becomes necessary to carefully evaluate this circumstance, 
given the consequences that flow from proof of this circumstance. 
18.	 PW-3 has deposed that her husband,
Gurmel Singh (PW-4), on 
his return home from work around 8 pm on 18.05.99, had informed 
her that he saw the appellant along with Rani Kaur present in the 
appellant’s house. He further informed her that it would not be 
appropriate to visit their house at that time since he anticipated 
the possibility of a flare up among the family members. He told 
her that they could talk to the appellant in the morning. PW-3 
stated that she visited the house of the appellant in the morning 
at around 4:45 am, only to find her sister lying dead. She states 
that she saw the appellant and Rani Kaur present in the house. 
She further states that both of them pushed her aside and left 
in a jeep, belonging to the appellant. She then states that she 
called her husband (PW-4) to the spot.
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19.	 In the cross examination of PW-3 on behalf of the appellant, several 
omissions have been brought on record by drawing her attention 
to her previous statement given to the police under Section 161 
CrPC. For instance, it has come out in the evidence that PW-3 
had omitted to state in her Section 161 statement that: (a) her 
husband had informed her that he saw the appellant and Rani 
Kaur in the appellant’s house when he was returning back home 
from work around 8 pm; (b) she had seen the appellant and Rani 
Kaur in the early hours on 19.05.99 in the appellant’s house and 
they pushed her aside before escaping in a jeep. (c) her husband 
had advised her not to visit the deceased in the night. It had been 
specifically suggested to her that she was falsely deposing and 
that the appellant was being falsely implicated on account of him 
having strained relations with PW-4, the husband of PW3. 
20.	 In the cross examination of PW-3 on behalf of Rani Kaur, it was 
elicited that PW-3 had personally witnessed the appellant and Rani 
Kaur putting poison in the mouth of the deceased. This, according 
to PW-3, was seen by her through the chinks of the door. 
21.	 PW-4 has stated that he met the appellant and Rani Kaur on his 
way home, while he was returning from work around 7.00 PM 
on 18.05.99. He stated that both of them went to the appellant’s 
house. He informed his wife that it would not be appropriate to visit 
their
house at this time since there was a possibility of a quarrel 
arising between Amrik Kaur and her husband, the appellant, since 
he had brought Rani Kaur home. Instead, he asked her to go and 
visit her sister on the next morning. In the morning, around 5.30 
am, his wife left to visit her sister at the appellant’s house after 
serving tea to him and his children. On having received a message 
from his wife, he set about to reach the appellant’s house and 
found Amrik Kaur lying dead and his wife, weeping and wailing. 
22.	 Similarly, in the cross examination of PW-4, it has been brought 
on record that PW-4 had omitted to state the following aspects 
in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. before the 
police – (a) that PW-4 had seen the appellant and Rani Kaur 
entering the house of the appellant in a jeep; (b) PW-4 had told 
PW-3 not to visit the appellant’s house since they were intoxicated
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DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
and there was a strong possibility of some dispute arising. (c) 
PW-4’s statement that PW-3 had left for the appellant’s house 
at 5.00 am in the morning on 19.05.99 after serving him tea. 
It has been specifically suggested to this witness that he had 
strained relations with the appellant, and owing to this fact, he 
has falsely implicated the appellant. It was further suggested that 
on account of the quarrel that occurred in the night on 18.05.99, 
the deceased had committed suicide by taking poison. 
23.	 PW 5 is an independent witness having no relationship with any 
of the persons involved, either as an accused or as witnesses, 
in this incident. He stated that on the morning of 19.05.99, at 
about 6.00 am, he had gone to answer the call of nature. At that 
time, he states that he saw the appellant and Rani Kaur were 
going in a jeep to Hiro Kalan and that jeep was covered with 
black cloth. He then returned to the bus stop and found a lot of 
persons having gathered and there, he heard the news that the 
appellant had murdered his wife. 
24.	 PW-5’s deposition that he had heard from persons at the bus stop 
that the appellant had murdered his wife, was an omission since 
he had not stated as such in his statement before the police. It 
has been elicited from him that the jeep came from behind and 
then passed by his side. It has been further elicited that the black 
cloth which was used to cover the jeep was
opened on both sides. 
25.	 In the face of the above evidence on record, can it be said that 
the presence of the appellant and Rani Kaur in the appellant’s 
house in the intervening night of 18.05.99 and 19.05.99, has been 
firmly and cogently established? According to us, the answer must 
be in the negative. There are several omissions that have been 
brought out in the cross examination of PW-3 and PW-4, which 
seriously dent the credibility of their testimony. 
26.	 If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements u/s 161 CrPC 
about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement 
before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular 
accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove 
a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not 
stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness
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regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [See : 
(i) Rohtash Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 (ii) Sunil 
Kumar Shambhu Dayal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011 
(72) ACC 699 (SC). (iii) Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur Vs. State 
of Karnataka, (2004) 7 SCC 422 (iv) Vimal Suresh Kamble Vs. 
Chaluverapinake, (2003) 3 SCC 175]
27.	 Of course, PW-3 claims to be an illiterate witness and therefore, 
her testimony must be interpreted in that light. We are cognizant 
that the appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to 
be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses. It cannot be 
subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought 
not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought 
out in the evidence. This Court has held that the evidence of a 
rustic/illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be 
certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition.3
28.	 However, the testimony of PW-3 suffers not merely from technical 
imperfections, there are glaring omissions and improvements that 
have been brought out in the cross-examination, which cannot 
be attributed to the illiteracy of the individual deposition. If there 
were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have 
been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location 
and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy. However, such 
is not the case here. PW-3 had
only heard from her husband that 
the appellant and Rani Kaur were seen together in the appellant’s 
house on 18.05.99. To that extent, it is merely hearsay. Moreover, 
PW-4 has omitted to state this fact to PW3 in his statement before 
the police. He has also omitted to state that he advised his wife 
(PW-3) against going to the appellant’s house in the night since 
there may arise a quarrel between all of them. If these facts are 
ignored from consideration, we only wonder as to why PW-3 
would visit the house of the appellant in the wee hours of the 
morning on 19.05.99. It seems quite unnatural for PW-3 to visit 
the house of the appellant at 430 am in the morning without any 
reason. If PW-3 was aware that the appellant and Rani Kaur 
3	
State of U.P. Vs. Chhoteylal, AIR 2011 SC 697 ;  
Dimple Gupta (minor) Vs. Rajiv Gupta, AIR 2008 SC 239
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 
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DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
were in an illicit relationship for a sufficiently long duration, there 
was no reason to suspect all of a sudden that the two of them 
would get together, administer poison and murder the deceased 
on 19.05.1999, which fact, prompted her to visit the house of 
the appellant at such odd hours in the morning. Both the Courts 
have failed to take notice of the several significant omissions and 
improvements in the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4. 
29.	 Further, PW-5 is a chance witness. He was in his village, answering 
the call of nature at 6 am, at which point he claimed to have seen 
the accused persons going in a jeep. It was elicited in his cross 
examination that he had a side-on view since he stated the jeep 
came from behind and he got a side-on glimpse. The side-on view 
would have been only for a couple of seconds at best, since they 
were travelling in a jeep. Therefore, it is not safe to rely on this 
testimony solely to prove that the appellant was escaping along 
with Rani Kaur after having murdered his wife. 
30.	 The appellant had set up a defence that the deceased had 
committed suicide. The Trial Court has disbelieved it on the 
premise that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present in the 
house, and if the deceased were to have committed suicide, it 
was but natural for the appellant to take her to the hospital and 
inform concerned persons/authorities. However, we have come 
to the finding above that the
circumstance of appellant and Rani 
Kaur being present in the house has not been convincingly 
proved beyond doubt. Therefore, the reasoning given by the Trial 
Court loses its legs to stand on. In any case, we believe that the 
appellant has raised a doubt in our minds as regards his defence 
that the deceased had committed suicide. There appears to be 
no dispute as to the fact that the death was caused by poisoning. 
The doctor’s testimony on the basis of the chemical examiner’s 
report that the cause of death was linked to aluminium phosphide 
poisoning remains unchallenged. In fact, in his 313 statement, 
even the appellant states that the deceased consumed poison 
(aluminum phosphide) and committed suicide. In Jaipal’s case, 
this Court has considered the characteristic features of death 
caused by poisoning through aluminum phosphide. Review of 
scholarly literature and research papers suggests that the nature
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DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
of this substance (aluminum phosphide) is such that it is not 
conducive for deceitful administration since it carries a pungent 
garlic-like odour, which cannot go unmissed. It was suspected 
that the substance was mixed in tea and served to the deceased 
since 200ml brownish liquid was found in her stomach as per 
the PMR. We find it doubtful that the deceased would have 
been made to consume tea deceitfully given the nature of the 
substance. Forceful administration of this substance also seems 
doubtful since there are no injury marks suggestive of a scuffle. 
In light of the evidence on record, even assuming for a moment 
that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present, it still cannot be 
said with certainty that it was a case of homicide and not suicide. 
The main principle to be satisfied in a case of conviction based 
on circumstantial evidence is that the proved circumstances must 
be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis 
than that of the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with 
his innocence- in other words, the circumstances should exclude 
every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. In this 
case, it cannot be said that the proved circumstances, even if 
presence was proved, taken with other circumstances would lead 
to an unfailing conclusion that the appellant and Rani Kaur were 
guilty of murdering his wife. There was alive a strong hypothesis 
that the deceased
had committed suicide, which explanation was 
led by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 CrPC, 
and it is sufficient to create a doubt in our minds.
31.	 This Court has held that the standard of proof to be met by an 
accused in support of the defence taken by him under Section 
313 of Code of Criminal Procedure is not beyond all reasonable 
doubt, as such, a burden lies on the prosecution to prove the 
charge. The accused has merely to create a doubt and it is for 
the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that 
no benefit can flow from the same to the accused. [See: Pramila 
vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 711]
32.	 Learned Counsel for the respondent-State has argued that no 
specific plea of alibi was taken in the statement of the appellant 
recorded under Section 313 CrPC. In fact, it is submitted that 
there is an implicit admission as to his presence in the house. It
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DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
is too well settled that the statement of an accused under Section 
313 CrPC is no ‘evidence’ because, firstly, it is not on oath and, 
secondly, the other party i.e. the prosecution does not get an 
opportunity to cross examine the accused. [ Sidhartha Vashisht 
Vs. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2010 SC 2352]
33.	 It is trite law that the statement recorded u/s. 313 CrPC cannot 
form the sole basis of conviction. Therefore, the presence of 
the appellant cannot be found solely based on his statement, 
notwithstanding the lack of independent evidence led by the 
prosecution. Further, this Court has previously considered the 
consequences when a particular defence plea was not taken by 
accused u/s 313 CrPC and held that mere omission to take a 
specific plea by accused when examined u/s 313 CrPC, is not 
enough to denude him of his right if the same can be made out 
otherwise. See: Periasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 6 
SCC 457
34.	 The case of the prosecution has, from the very start, been 
that the appellant was seen jointly along with Rani Kaur in the 
appellant’s house on 18.05.99 and they were seen leaving the 
house together on 19.05.99. They were both tried together on 
charges of having administered poison and killing the deceased 
on the intervening night of 18.05.99 & 19.05.99. Though the 
Trial Court has convicted both of them under Section 302, the 
High Court has extended the benefit of doubt to Rani Kaur
and 
acquitted her of all criminal charges. According to the High Court, 
‘apart from the evidence of Melo Kaur PW3 and Gurmel Singh 
PW4, there is no other evidence to show that she was present 
in the house on the fateful night’. However, even though it was 
the very same evidence that was sought to be used to prove the 
presence of the appellant in the house, the benefit of doubt has 
not been similarly extended to him. The High Court reasoned that 
the appellant, being the husband, it was only natural for him to 
be present in the house. 
35.	 It is important to notice that the respondent-State has not 
challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur before this Court. It has 
accepted the verdict and therefore, the acquittal has reached
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DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS
finality. The State cannot on the one hand accept the verdict of 
the Court that the presence of Rani Kaur along with the appellant 
is doubtful and at the same time, maintain its case that the two 
of them were jointly present, committed the offence together and 
escaped together. 
36.	 According to us, if the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4 was not sufficient 
to prove presence of Rani Kaur at the appellant’s house, as a 
natural corollary, such evidence cannot be relied on to conclude 
that the appellant was present in the house. The manner in which 
the High Court has sought to distinguish the case of the appellant 
from Rani Kaur is perverse and does not seem to impress us. The 
case of the prosecution has consistently been that the accused 
persons were seen present together in the house on the night 
of 18.05.99 and seen leaving together in the wee hours of the 
next morning. In fact, PW 5 has deposed that he had seen them 
together in the jeep travelling towards Hiro Kurd. If the presence 
of Rani Kaur in the house on the date of the alleged incident is 
doubtful, then, the testimony of PW 5 that he had seen her along 
with the appellant in the jeep, will also lose its strength. 
37.	 Seen in this background, we need not go further and consider 
the evidence qua other circumstances sought to be proved by 
the prosecution since the failure to prove a single circumstance 
cogently can cause a snap in the chain of
circumstances. There 
cannot be a gap in the chain of circumstances. When the conviction 
is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then there 
should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If there is 
a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. If 
some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any 
other reasonable hypothesis, then also the accused is entitled to 
the benefit of doubt. [See: Bhimsingh Vs. State of Uttarakhand, 
(2015) 4 SCC 281.]
38.	 Therefore, we allow this appeal and set aside the concurrent 
findings of conviction.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.