GANESAN versus STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS INSPECTOR OF POLICE
[2020] 8 S.C.R. 768, Supreme Court of India, 2020
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Arguments
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GANESAN
v.
STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS INSPECTOR OF POLICE
(Criminal Appeal No. 680 of 2020)
OCTOBER 14, 2020
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, R. SUBHASH REDDY
AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 –
ss. 7 and 8 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules,
2012 – r.7(2) – Appellant- accused was tried for the offences
punishable u/s. 7 r/w. s. 8 of the POCSO Act – Relying upon the
deposition of PW-3 victim, aged 13 years the accused was
convicted for the offence u/s. 7 of the POCSO Act and sentenced
to undergo 3 years rigorous imprisonment u/s. 8 of the Act – The
accused was also ordered to pay rupees one lakh to the victim girl,
by way of compensation u/r. 7(2) of the Rules, 2012 – Before the
High Court, it was noted that there was no representation on behalf
of the appellant, therefore, a legal aid counsel was appointed –
The legal aid counsel pleaded the inability of the accused person
to pay the order of compensation and requested to set aside the
order of compensation – The High Court modified the judgment
and order passed by the trial Court with respect to compensation
to the effect that compensation amount shall be paid by the State
to the victim girl and thereafter if the State finds that the accused
has got sufficient means, the same can be recovered from the
accused under the Revenue Recovery Act – Before the Supreme
Court, the appellant-accused contended that the trial Court has
committed a grave error in convicting the accused, relying upon
the sole testimony of PW-3-victim – It was also emphasised that the
appeal was disposed of within the four days from the date of
providing legal assistance to the accused and it was very short time
for the legal aid counsel to receive the papers from the Registry
and inspect original documents – Held: It is required to be noted
that there is nothing on record that the legal aid counsel was not
having any papers – On persual of the entire judgment of the trial
Court, the PW-3-victim has fully supported the case of the
prosecution – She has narrated in detail how the incident had taken
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place and she has been thoroughly cross-examined – Her testimony
is reliable and trustworthy – The sole testimony of the PW-3 is
unblemished and evidence is of sterling quality – The trial Court
has not committed any error in convicting the accused, relying upon
the sole deposition of PW-3-victim – The High Court has rightly
convicted the accused for offence u/s. 7 of the POCSO Act and
rightly sentenced u/s.8 of the POCSO Act.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the present case, the appellant-accused has
been convicted by the trial Court for the offence under Section
7, punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. This Court
has gone through the entire judgment passed by the trial Court
as well as the relevant evidence on record, more particularly the
deposition of PW1-father of the victim, PW2-mother of the victim
and PW3- victim herself. It is true that PW2-mother of the victim
has turned hostile. However, PW3-victim has fully supported the
case of the prosecution. She has narrated in detail how the
incident has taken place. She has been thoroughly and fully cross-
examined. This Court does not see any good reason not to rely
upon the deposition of PW3 – victim. PW3 aged 15 years at the
time of deposition is a matured one. She is trustworthy and
reliable. As per the settled proposition of law, even there can
be a conviction based on the sole testimony of the victim,
however, she must be found to be reliable and trustworthy. [Para
9][774-F-H]
2. On evaluating the deposition of PW3 – victim on the
touchstone of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions, this Court is of the opinion that the sole testimony of
the PW3 – victim is absolutely trustworthy and unblemished and
her evidence is of sterling quality. [Para 9.3][780-C]
3. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the trial Court has not committed any error in convicting the
accused, relying upon the deposition of PW3 – victim. The trial
Court has imposed the minimum sentence provided under
Section 8 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, the trial Court has
already shown the leniency. At this stage, it is required to be
noted that allegations against the accused which are proved from
GANESAN v. STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
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the deposition of PW3 are very serious, which cannot be
permitted in the civilized society. Therefore, considering the
object and purpose of POCSO Act and considering the evidence
on record, the High Court has rightly convicted the accused for
the offence under Section 7 of the POCSO Act and has rightly
sentenced the accused to undergo three years R.I. which is the
minimum sentence provided under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.
[Para 9.3][780-D-F]
Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010)
8 SCC 191 : [2010] 8 SCR 1150 ; Krishan Kumar
Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130 : [2011]
8 SCR 774 ; Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT
of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 : [2012] 6 SCR 1153 –
relied on.
Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2020 SC
232 ; Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391
: [2014] 10 SCR 1050 – referred to.
CASE LAW REFERENCE
[2020] AIR 232
referred to
Para 6
[2014] 10 SCR 1050
referred to
Para 6.1
[2010] 8 SCR 1150
relied on
Para 7.1
[2011] 8 SCR 774
relied on
Para 9.2
[2012] 6 SCR 1153
relied on
Para 9.3
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 680 of 2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2019 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 844 of 2018.
Mr. G. Sivabalamurugan, AOR for the petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated
29.04.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
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Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 844 of 2018, the appellant – original
accused has preferred the present appeal.
3. That the appellant herein – original accused was tried by the
learned Fast Track Mahila Court, Dharmapuri for the offences
punishable under Section 7 read with Section 8 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as
the “POCSO Act”). That relying upon the deposition of PW3 – victim,
who at the relevant time was studying in 5th standard and aged 13 years,
convicted the accused for the offence under Section 7 of the POCSO
Act and sentenced him to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment,
which is the minimum sentence provided under Section 8 of the POCSO
Act. The learned trial Court also passed an order to pay rupees one
lakh to the victim girl, by way of compensation, under Rule 7(2) of the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2012.
4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
of conviction and sentenced passed by the learned trial Court, the
accused preferred appeal before the High Court being Criminal Appeal
No. 844 of 2018. The appeal was taken up for further hearing on
24.04.2019. The High Court noted that there was no representation on
behalf of the appellant and therefore by order dated 24.04.2019 directed
to remove the name of the appellant’s counsel and further directed the
High Court Legal Aid Committee to appoint Legal Aid Counsel for the
appellant. The
appeal was listed for further hearing on 29.04.2019. On
29.04.2019, the learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the appellant
made only submission with respect to compensation of rupees one lakh
awarded by the learned trial Court awarded to the victim girl under
Rule 7(2) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules,
2012. It was submitted on behalf of the accused that he is unable to
pay the compensation of rupees one lakh to the victim girl and pleaded
leniency and requested to set aside the order of compensation awarded
by the learned trial Court. That by the impugned judgment and order
dated 29.04.2019, the High Court partly allowed the said appeal and
modified the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court with
respect to compensation only and modified the said order to the effect
that compensation amount shall be paid by the State to the victim girl
and thereafter if the State finds that the accused has got sufficient
means, the same can be recovered from the accused under the
Revenue Recovery Act. The High Court dismissed the appeal so far
as the conviction and imposition of sentence of three years rigorous
imprisonment is concerned.
GANESAN v. STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [M. R. SHAH, J.]
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5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 29.04.2019 passed by the High Court, the original
accused has preferred the present appeal.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has
vehemently submitted that no sufficient opportunity was given to the
accused before passing the impugned judgment and order. It is submitted
that the High Court has passed the order on 24.04.2019 providing the
services of Legal Aid Counsel to represent the case of the appellant
and thereafter the learned Legal Aid Counsel was heard on 29.04.2019,
i.e., within a period of four days only and without considering the appeal
on merits the impugned judgment and order has been passed. It is
submitted that it was very short time for the Legal Aid Counsel to
receive the papers from the Registry and inspect the original documents.
It is further submitted that as observed by this Court in the case of
Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2020 SC 232 that failure
to afford hearing to the accused violates even minimum standards of
due process of law. It is submitted that it is further observed that the
legal services provided to the accused should be meaningful and not
am empty formality.
6.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused
has also pressed into service Order 41 Rule 31, CPC and the decision
of this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar (2015) 1
SCC 391.
6.2 On
merits, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
accused has vehemently submitted that as such the mother of the
victim-PW2 turned hostile and therefore the learned trial Court has
committed a grave error in convicting the accused, relying upon the
sole testimony of PW3 – victim. It is submitted that PW2 – mother of
the victim did not support the case of the prosecution and even did not
support the deposition of PW3 – victim and therefore the learned trial
Court committed a grave error in convicting the accused. It is further
submitted that in fact the learned trial Court accepted that there are
lapses on the part of the prosecution and therefore the benefit of doubt
ought to have been given to the accused.
6.3 It is further submitted that even PW1 categorically admitted
in his cross-examination that there is existence of previous enmity
between the parties. It is submitted that in that view of the matter the
learned trial Court ought not to have convicted the accused.
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7. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Yogesh
Kanna, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-State.
It is submitted that merely because the appeal was disposed of within
four days from the date of providing legal assistance to the accused, it
cannot be presumed that no fair and sufficient opportunity was given
to the accused to defend the case. It is submitted that it cannot be
presumed that the legal aid counsel was not having any material and
no papers with him. It is submitted that from the impugned order it
appears that the legal aid counsel made only one submission with
respect to compensation and in fact the same has been considered in
favour of the accused by modifying the judgment and order passed by
the learned trial Court.
7.1 On merits, it is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent-State that in the present case
the learned trial Court has not committed any error in convicting the
accused relying upon the deposition of PW3-victim whose evidence is
trustworthy and reliable. It is submitted that she has been fully cross-
examined by the defence. It is submitted that there is no reason to doubt
the testimony of the victim. It is submitted that as per the settled
proposition of law, there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of
the victim. Reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in the
case of Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8
SCC 191.
7.2 It
is further submitted that in the present case merely because
PW2-mother of the victim has turned hostile, the testimony of the PW3,
which otherwise is reliable and trustworthy, cannot be doubted. It is
submitted that even otherwise PW2 cannot be said to be the eye-witness
to the incident and therefore when PW3-victim has fully supported the
case of the prosecution, the learned trial Court has not committed any
error in convicting the accused for the offence under Section 7,
punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. It is submitted that as
such the learned trial Court has taken a very lenient view and has
awarded minimum sentence provided under Section 8 of the POCSO
Act.
7.3 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
at length.
GANESAN v. STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [M. R. SHAH, J.]
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8.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has very
much emphasised on disposal of the appeal within four days from the
date of providing legal assistance to the accused. it is the case on behalf
of the appellant-accused that on 24.04.2019, his advocate remained
absent and the High Court directed the Legal Aid Committee to provide
legal assistance to the appellant-accused and the matter was adjourned
to 29.04.2019 and on the very date, i.e., 0n 29.04.2019, the learned legal
aid counsel did not argue the appeal on merits and has confined the
appeal with respect to order of compensation awarded by the learned
trial Court. Therefore, it is the case on behalf of the accused that no
fair and sufficient opportunity was given to the accused. Heavy reliance
is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Anokhilal (supra).
However, it is required to be noted that as such nothing in on record
that the legal aid counsel was not having any papers. There cannot be
any dispute with respect to proposition of law laid down by this Court
in the case of Anokhilal (supra). However, in the facts and
circumstances of the case and considering the fact that the High Court
has given partial relief to the accused and considering the fact that out
of the sentence of three years R.I., the appellant has already undergone
two years and three months (approximately), instead of remanding the
matter to the High Court for a
fresh decision, we have called upon to
the learned counsel for the respective parties to submit the case on
merits, and the learned counsel on behalf of the respective parties have
made their submissions on merits, noted hereinabove.
9. In the present case, the appellant-accused has been convicted
by the learned trial Court for the offence under Section 7, punishable
under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. We have gone through the entire
judgment passed by the learned trial Court as well as the relevant
evidence on record, more particularly the deposition of PW1-father of
the victim, PW2-mother of the victim and PW3-victim herself. It is true
that PW2-mother of the victim has turned hostile. However, PW3-victim
has fully supported the case of the prosecution. She has narrated in
detail how the incident has taken place. She has been thoroughly and
fully cross-examined. We do not see any good reason not to rely upon
the deposition of PW3 – victim. PW3 aged 15 years at the time of
deposition is a matured one. She is trustworthy and reliable. As per
the settled proposition of law, even there can be a conviction based on
the sole testimony of the victim, however, she must be found to be
reliable and trustworthy.
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9.1 Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation
etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in
the case of Vijay alias Chinee (supra), it is observed in paragraphs 9
to 14 as under:
“9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain,
(1990) 1 SCC 550 this Court held that a woman, who is the
victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is
a victim of another person’s lust and, therefore, her evidence need
not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an
accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para
16)
“16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with
an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The
Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be
accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She
is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her
evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an
injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care
and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as
in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more.
What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and
conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a
person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled
by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that
it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule
of law or
practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar
to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for
corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place
implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look
for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short
of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The
nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony
of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult
and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a
conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be
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infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances
appearing on the record of the case disclose that the
prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve
the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no
hesitation in accepting her evidence.”
10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594 this Court held
that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue
or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to
absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established
that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of
injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to
absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be
conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court
is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other
evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of
her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12)
“12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having
been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after
the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be
acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She
stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter
case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it
is both
physical as well as psychological and emotional. However,
if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the
prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct
or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony.
Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context
of an accomplice, would do.”
11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, this
Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc.
the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity.
Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of
a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise
reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is
enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless
there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may
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look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience.
The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured
witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the
delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained,
but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof.
The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21)
“8. ... The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless
minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate
young men who were threatening her and preventing her from
raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not
conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being
able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a
ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The
prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the
negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the
credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. ... The courts must,
while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case
of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court
just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as
is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving
sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no
material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even
discrepancies in the statement of
the prosecutrix should not, unless
the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed
to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. ... Seeking
corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as
a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. ...
Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony
of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of
prudence under given circumstances. ...
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21. ... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a
case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant
discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not
of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution
case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must
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be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in
material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult
to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for
evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of
corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The
testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the
background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive
to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases
involving sexual molestations.”
(emphasis in original)
12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86, this
Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often
distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The
rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and,
therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated
in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-
examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious
infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses
had not seen the commission of the offence.
13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 this
Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other
evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before
recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed
and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix,
if her evidence inspires confidence
and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her
veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid
Khan v. State of M.P. (2010) 2 SCC 9 placing reliance on an
earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952
SC 54.
14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that
the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence
and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict
the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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9.2 In the case of Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana
(2011) 7 SCC 130, it is observed and held by this Court that to hold
an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary
evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires
confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and
should be of sterling quality.
9.3 Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt
with and considered by this Court in the case of Rai Sandeep alias
Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21. In paragraph 22,
it is observed and held as under:
“22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be
of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore,
be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness
should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the
witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the
truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What
would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement
right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when
the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the
court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the
prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any
prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should
be in a position to withstand the
cross-examination of any length
and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance
should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the
occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it.
Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one
of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the
weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific
evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should
consistently match with the version of every other witness. It
can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in
the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be
any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused
guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of
such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all 12 other
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such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness
can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be
accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on
which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version
of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should
remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral,
documentary and material objects should match the said version
in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the
offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting
materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”
On evaluating the deposition of PW3 – victim on the touchstone
of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are
of the opinion that the sole testimony of the PW3 – victim is absolutely
trustworthy and unblemished and her evidence is of sterling quality.
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned
trial Court has not committed any error in convicting the accused, relying
upon the deposition of PW3 – victim. The learned trial Court has
imposed the minimum sentence provided under Section 8 of the POCSO
Act. Therefore, the learned trial Court has already shown the leniency.
At this stage, it is required to be noted that allegations against the
accused which are proved from the deposition of PW3 are very serious,
which cannot be permitted in the
civilized society. Therefore,
considering the object and purpose of POCSO Act and considering the
evidence on record, the High Court has rightly convicted the accused
for the offence under Section 7 of the POCSO Act and has rightly
sentenced the accused to undergo three years R.I. which is the minimum
sentence provided under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.
10. Now so far as the amount of compensation awarded by the
learned trial Court is concerned, the High Court has modified the same
and has directed the State to pay the compensation to the victim and
thereafter to recover the same from the accused under the provisions
of the land revenue, if it finds that the accused has sufficient means. It
is the case on behalf of the accused that the accused is very poor and
has no property. If that be so, he is not to worry. The aforesaid has
been taken care by the High Court by modifying the judgment and order
passed by the learned trial Court.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
781
11. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this
Court in the case of Vinod Kumar (supra) and the reliance placed
upon Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is concerned, as we ourselves have heard
the appeal on merits and considering the fact that out of three years
R.I., the appellant has already undergone two years and three months
(approximately), the said decision shall not be of any assistance to the
accused.
12. In view of the above and for the reasons given above, the
present appeal deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.
Ankit Gyan
Appeal dismissed.
GANESAN v. STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [M. R. SHAH, J.]