THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. versus SMT. KALLO BAI
[2017] 4 S.C.R. 218, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
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[2017] 4 S.C.R. 218 
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. 
v. 
SMT. KALLO BAI 
(Criminal Appeal No. 932 of2017) 
MAY 08, 2017 
[N. V. RAMANA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.] 
Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969: 
s.15 - Confiscation under - Of Tractor and Trolley and the 
forest produce - Appellate authority upheld the confiscation order 
-· Revisional Court held that confiscation was not permissible unless 
the guilt of the accused is fully established - High Court affirmed 
the order of Revisional Court - On appeal, held: Criminal 
prosecution is distinct from confiscation proceedings - The two 
proceedings are different and parallel, each having distinct purpose 
~ The scheme of Adhiniyam prescribes an independent procedure 
for confiscation - Therefore, the conclusion by the Revisional Court 
and High Court was erroneous. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. In order to facilitate development of a good forest 
policy, the State of Madhya Pradesh enacted the Madhya Pradesh 
Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969. This legislation was 
enacted with an object to regulate the trade of certain forest 
prQduce in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Adhiniyam is a 
statute enacted for the purpose of preserving certain forest 
produce in the State of Madhya Pradesh.The Scheme of the Act, 
as expressed in several provisions, is to empower the authbrized 
officers of the Forest Department for proper implementation/ 
enforcement of the
statutory provisions and for enabling them to 
take effective steps for preserving these forest produce. For this 
purpose certain powers including the power of seizure, 
confiscation and forfeiture have been vested in them. [Para 11] 
[222-F-G; 223-A]. 
2. Confiscation proceedings as contemplated under Section 
15 of the Adhiniyam is a quasi-judicial proceedings and not a · 
criminal proceedings. Confiscation proceeds on the basis of the 
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THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 
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'sati.sfaction' of the Authorized Officer with regard to the 
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commission of forest offence; [Para 15] (226-G-H; 227-A] 
3. Adhiniyam as originally enacted, did not provide for 
separate confiscatory proceedings. Or~ginal enactment only had 
penal provisions. The ·newly introduced Sections from Section 
15-A to 15-D were brought in line with Indian Forest Act, as 
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amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh to provide for a separate 
confiscatory mechanism. [Para 12] [223-B-C] 
4. The broad scheme of the Adhiniyam is to punish those 
who are in contravention of the law at the hand of the criminal 
court. The confiscation being incidental and ancillary to the 
conviction, State of Madhya Pradesh, separated the process of 
confiscation from the process of prosecution. The purpose of the 
enactment seems to be that the power of the criminal court 
regarding the disposal of property is made subject to the 
jurisdiction of the authorized officer with regard to that aspect; 
the jurisdiction of criminal court in regard to the main trial remains 
unaffected. [Para 20] [229-A-B] 
Divisional Forest Officer And Anr. v. G V. Sudhakar 
And Ors. [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 680 : 1985 (4) SCC 
573; State of West.Bengal v. Gopal Sarkar [2001] 
5 Suppl. SCR 212 : 2002 (1) SCC 495; State of MP. v. 
S.P. Sales Agencies [2004] 3 SCR 640 : 2004 (4) 
sec 448 - relied on. 
5. Section 15 gives independent power to the concerned 
authority to confiscate
the articles, as mentioned there under, 
even before the guilt is completely established. This power can 
be exercised by the concerned officer if he is satisfied that the 
said objects were utilized during the commission of a forest 
offence. A protection is provided for the owners of the vehicles/ 
articles, if they are able to prove that they took all reasonable 
care and precautions as envisaged under Sub-section (5) of Section 
15 of the Adhiniyam and the said offence was committed without 
their knowledge or connivance. [Para 24] [230-H; 231-A-B] 
6. Criminal prosecution is distinct from confiscation 
proceedings. The two proceedings are different and parallel, each 
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having a dis.tinct purpose. The object of confiscation proceeding 
is to enable speedy and effective adjudication with regard to 
confiscation of the prod nee and the means used for committing 
the offen~e while the object of the prosecution is to punish the 
offender. The scheme of Adhiniyam prescribes an independent 
procedure for confiscation. The intention of prescribing separate 
proceedings is to provide a deterrent mechanism and to stop 
further misuse of the vehicle. [Para 25] [231-C-D] 
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7. The High Court as well as the Revisional Court erred in 
coming to a .conclusion that the confiscation under the law was 
not permissible unless the guilt of the accused is completely 
established. [Para 26) (231-D-E) 
Case Law Reference 
[19,85) 3 Suppl. SCR 680 
relied on 
Para 21 
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(2001) 5 Suppl. SCR 212 
(2004] 3 SCR 640 
relied on 
relied on 
Para 22 
Para23 
CRIMIN AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeiif No. 
932 of2017. 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 21.01.2014 of the High Court 
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in'M. Cr. C. No. 12750 of2013. 
Purushaindra Kumar, Mishra Saurabh, Ankit Kumar Lal,· 
Ms. Vanshuja Shukla, Ms. Am1radha Mishra, Ad vs. for the Appellants. 
Parmanand Gaur, Sameer Kumar, Ekansh Bansal, Advs. for the 
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Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Cou11 was delivered by 
N. v. RAMANA, J. I. Leave granted. 
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2. This appeal is filed assailing the judgment, dated 21.01.2014, in 
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No. 12750/2013, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh 
at Jabalpur, wherein the High Court has dismissed the appeal filed by 
the appellant State by upholding the order of the lower court, which 
through its order directed to release the confiscated vehicle during the 
pendency of the main criminal case. 
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THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 
[N. V. RAMANA, J.] 
3. Brief facts of the case in nut shell are that the respondent is the 
owner of the tractor bearing number (MP-22 AA-0736) and troiley 
bearing number (MP22AA0764). On 03.1.2012 while this vehicle was 
beiiig used to transport 1.054 cubic meters of teak wood from Saliwara · 
to Parasia Road, Reserve Forest Compartment No. 117. As the driver 
was not carrying the documents required for the transportation of teak 
wood, the staff of Fore st Development Corporation, at Dhuma District, 
Seoni, after completion ·of formalities seized the teakwood and th.e 
aforesaid vehicle, being tractor (MP-22 AA-0736) and trolley (MP 22 
AA 0764). Thereafter, the Project Range Officer registered the offence 
. under Section 5 and Section 15 of Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar 
Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969 [hereinafter 'Adhiniyam' for brevity] read 
with Section 26 and Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The.said 
case was registered as Offence No. 251/2013. In relation to this, a charge 
sheet was filed which was numbered as Criminal Case No. 269/2013 
before the triaI'court. 
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4. The Authorized Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Officer ·D 
Lakhnadone, Forest Division North (territorial), Seoni simultaneously 
initiated the confiscation proceeding under Section 15 oftheAdhiniyam. 
The same was registered as Confiscation Case No. 9/2012. 
5. In the process, the Authorized Officer-cum-Sub Divisional 
Officer Lakhnadone,
Forest Division North (territorial), Seoni, ordered 
confiscation of tractor (MP-22 AA-0736) and trolley (MP 22 AA 0764) 
and teak wood. The Authorized Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Officer held 
that the vehicle operator and his companion had deliberately transported 
the teak wood without the requisite permit or any valid document. Further, 
he held that the owner was aware of the said illegal transport. 
6. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent carried the matter 
in appeal before the Appellate Authority i.e. Appellate Authority"cum-
Chief Conservator of Forest, Seoni Circle, Seoni (M.P), who in turn 
dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the authority below by 
order dated 06.12.2012. 
7. The respondent having been unsatisfied with the order dated 6-
11-2012 preferred rev.ision before the additional sessions judge, Seoni, 
under Section 15-B of the Adhiniyam. The additional sessions judge, 
Seoni, by judgment dated 18.07.2013, allowed the revision and quashed 
the order of confiscation and directed to release the vehicle. Moreover 
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the court was of the view that unless the guilt of the accused is proved, 
there c·annot be any confiscation of the vehicle and the forest produce. 
The reasoning of the first revisional court is extracted as under: 
14. As such, the order of Authorized Officer and Sub Divisional 
Officer dated 09.04.2012 and order of Appellate Authority and 
Designated Conservator of Forests dated 06.12.2012 in Appeal 
No. 7/2012 are violation of Section 55 of the Indian Forest Act, 
1927 and also Adhiniyam, 1969. The Sub Divisional l!'orest 
officer lakhnadon and Appellate Authority without holding 
accused guilty in criminal case no. 269/2012 had no right to 
confiscate the vehicle and forest produce. 
(emphasis supfllied) 
8. The State challenged the aforesaid order of the additional 
sessions judge, Seoni, dated 18.07.2013, by filing a petition under Section 
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 being M.Cr.C No. 12750/ 
2013 before the High Comt of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. The High 
Court, by order dated 21.01.2014, dismissed the petition filed by the 
appellant/state and affinned the order of the lower court. Aggrieved by 
the order of the High Court, the appellant/state has knocked on the doors 
of this Court by way of special leave petition. 
9. Heard the learned counsel for both parties and perused the 
material available on record. 
10. Madhya Pradesh is famous for its abundant biodiversity. The 
rich
biodiversity generates minor forest produce such as tendu, harra, 
sal seed and gum etc 1• These forest prodtice are a good source of revenue 
for the state and provides employment opportunities for the people. · 
11. In order to facilitate development of a good forest policy, the 
State of Madhya Pradesh enacted the Adhiniyam in the year 1969.~ 
This legislation was enacted with an object to regulate the trade of ce1tain 
forest produce in the State of Madhya Pradesh. 3 The Adhini)-am is a 
· statute enacted for the purpose of preserving certain forest produce in 
the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Scheme of the Act, as expressed in 
. several provisions, is to empower the authorized officers of the Forest 
Department for proper implementation/enforcement of the statutory 
1 Madhya Pradesh Development Report, Planning Commission (2011). 
2 Preamble, Adhiniyam. 
3 Ibid.·
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI· 
[N. V. RAMANA, J.] 
provisions and for enabling them to take effective steps for preserving 
these forest produce. For this purpose certain powers including the power 
of seizure, confiscation and forfeiture have been vested in them. This 
position is made clear by giving overriding effect to the provisions of the 
Act QYer other statutes and laws. 
12. At this juncture it is important to have a glance at certain 
changes the Adhiniyam has undergone over the years. Sections 15 and 
22 (1) were replaced by Section 15-A to 15-D by the State Act 15 of 
1987. Adhiniyam as originally enacted did not provide for separate 
confiscatory proceedings. Original enactment only had penal provisions. 
The newly introduced Sections from Section I 5-A to 15-0 were brought 
in line with Indian Forest Act, as amended by the State of Madhya 
Pradesh to provide for a separate confiscatory mechanisr~l. 
13. Before we delve into the issue, a briefreference to the overall 
scheme of the Act is necessary. Section 2 of the Adhiniyam is the definition 
clause. Under Sub-clause (d) of Section 2 various forest produce have 
been elucidated. Section 3 oftheAdhiniyam empowers State Government 
to divide forest area into units for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 
Section 4 oftheAdhiniyam states thatthe State Government may appoint 
requisite number of agents to trade in specific forest produce. Further, 
Section 5 creates bar on individuals other than
the State Government or 
authorized officers of the State Government or an agent appointed under 
Section 4, to purchase or transport such specified forest produce in such 
area with certain exceptions as provided under Sub-section (2) of Section 
5. Furthermore, Section 7, 8 and 9 of the Adhiniyam allows the State 
Government to fix prices, prescribe procedures for opening depots, 
publication of price lists etc. at the depot. 
14. Section 10 and 11 oftheAdhiniyam prescribes registration of 
growers, manufacturers, traders and consumers of specified forest 
produce respectively. Section 12 vests discretionary powers upon the 
State Government to dispose of specified forest produce. Section 12-A 
provides for re-sale of excess specified fru:est produce by manufacturer, 
trader or consumer. Section 13 provides for the mode of retail sale of 
specified forest produce. Section 14 empowers State Government.to 
delegate powers or functions under the Act. 
15. It would be useful for the purpose of this case to reproduce 
Section 15 oftheAdhiniyam-
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15. Search and seizure of property liable to confiscation 
and procedur(l. thereof - (1) A11y Forest Officer as may be .. 
notified by the State Government or any Police Officer not below 
the rank of an Assistant Sub Inspector or any other person 
authorized by the State Govei:nment may, with a view to securing 
compliance with the provisions. of thi.s Act or t?e Rules made 
thereunder or to-satisfying himself that the said provisions have 
been complied with,-
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(i) 
stop and s~arch any person, boat, vehicle or receptacle use · 
or intended to be used for the transport of satisfied forest 
produced; 
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(ii) Enter and search any place) 
(2) When. there is reason to believe. that any officer under 
this. Act has been committed in respect of any specified forest 
produce, 3[Any Forest Officer as may be notified by.the State 
Government or any Police Officer not below the rank of an 
Assistant Sub Inspector] oi' any person authorized by the State 
Government in this behalf may, seize such specified F crest.Produce 
along with all tools, boats, vehicles, ropes, chains or any other· 
articles used in committing such offence under the provisions of 
this Act. 
(3) Any Officer or Person seizing any property under this 
SectiOn shall place on all such property a mark indicating that the 
same has been so seized and shall,, as soon as may be, either 
produce the property seized before the officer not below the rank
of an Assistant Conservator or Forest authorised by the State 
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Government in this behalf, by notification (hereinafter referred to 
as the Authorised Officer] or where it is having regard to quantity 
• or bulk or other genuine difficulty, not practicable to produce the 
property seized before the Authorised Officer, make a report about 
the seizure to the Authorised Officer, or where it is intended to 
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launch criminal proceedings against the offender imrnediately make 
report of such seizure to the Magistrate havingjurisdiction to try 
the offence account of which seizure has been made: 
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Provided that, when the specified Forest Produce with respect 
to which such offence is believed to have been committed is the 
property of Government and the offender is unknown it shall be
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. THE STATE.OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 
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[N. V. RAMANA, J.] 
· ·. sufficient if the officer make as soon as may be a report of the 
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circumstances to his official superior. 
(3A) Any forest officer of a rank not inferior to that of .a 
Ranger, who or whos~ subordinate, has seized any tools, boats, 
vehic~es, ropes, clairps or any other article as liable for confiscation, 
may release the same on the execution by the owner thereof, of a 
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security·in a form as may th~ prescribed, of an.amount equal to 
double the value of such property, as estimated by such officer, of 
the production of the property so released, whe~ so required, before 
the officer authorized order the confiscation or the Magistrate 
having jurisdietion to try the off enc~ on account of which the c 
seizure has been made. 
(4) Subject to the provisions 0f sub-section(6), where the 
authorized officer upon production before him of the specified 
forest produce or upon receipt of.report about the seizure, as the 
case may be, is satisfied that offence has been committed in 
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respect thereof, he may, by order in writing and for reasons to be 
recorded confiscate the specified forest produce so seized together 
with all tools, vehicles, boats ropes, chains or any other articles . 
used in committing such offence. A copy of order of confiscation 
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shall be forwarded without any undue delay to the ![Officer-in-
charge of Forest Circle] in which the specified forest produce 
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has
been seized. 
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. (S) No order confiscating any property shall be made under 
sub-section( 4 )unless t11e authorised officer; - ' 
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(a) sends an intimation in forms prescribed about intimation 
of proceedings for confiscation of property to the 
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Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on 
account of which the seizure has been made; 
(b) issues a notice in writing to the person from whom the 
property is seized, and to any other person who may 
appear to the authorised officer to have some interest in 
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such property; 
(c) affords an opportunity to the persons referred to in clause 
(b) of making a representation within such reasonable 
time as may be specified in the notice against the 
proposed confiscation; and 
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( d) gives to the officer or person effecting the seizure and 
the person or persons to whom notice has been issued 
under clause (b ), hearing on the date to be fixed for 
such purpose. 
(5A) When the authorised officer having the jurisdiction over the 
case is himself involved in the seizure of investigation, the next 
higher authority may transfer the case to any other officer of the 
same rank for conducting proceedings under this section.] 
( 6) No order of confiscation under sub-section ( 4) of any tools, 
vehicles, boats, ropes, chains or any other articles (other than 
specified forest produce seized) shall be made if any person 
referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (5) proves to the satisfaction 
of authorised officer that any such knowledge or connivance or 
as the case may be without the knowledge or connivance of his 
servant or agent and that all reasonable and necessary precautions 
had been taken against use of objects aforesaid for commission 
of an offence under this Act. 
( 6A) The seized forest produce or any other property, if ordered 
to be released by the authorised officer, shall continue to be under 
custody until confirmation of the order of the authorised officer 
by the Appellate Authority or until the expiry of the period for 
initiating "suomotu" action by him, whichever is earlier, as specified 
under Section 15-A. 
(7) The provisions of Sections I 02 and I 03 of the Code
of Criminal 
Procedure,. 1973 (No.2 of f9'74) relating to search and seizures 
shall so far as may be apply to searches and seizures and seizures 
under this section. 
Sub-section (I) of Section 15 empowers concerned forest officers 
to conduct search to secure compliance of the provisions of the 
Adhiniyam. On a plain reading of Sub-section (2), it is clear that the 
concerned officer may seize vehicles, ropes etc, if he has reason to 
believe that the said items were used for the commission of an offence 
under the Adhiniyam. Confiscation proceedings as contemplated under 
Section I 5 of the Adhiniyam is a quasi-judicial proceedings and not a 
criminal proceedings. Confiscation proceeds on the basis of the 
'satisfaction' of the Authorized ·Officer with regard to the commission
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 
[N. V. RAMANA, J.] 
of forest offence. Sub-section (3) of the provision lays down the 
procedure to be followed for confiscation under the Adhi11iyam. Sub-
section (3A) authorizes forest officers of rank not inferior to that of a 
Ranger, who or whose subordinate, has seized any tools, boats, vehicles, 
ropes, claims or any other article as liable for confiscation, niay release 
. the same on execution of a security worth double the ainount of the 
property so seized. This provision is similar to that of Section 53 of the 
Indian Forest Act as amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh. Sub-
section (4) mandates that the concerned officer should pass a written 
order recording reasons for confiscation, if he is satisfied that a forest 
offence has been committed by using the items marked for confiscation. · 
Sub-section (5) prescribes various procedures for confiscation 
proceedings. Sub-Section (SA) prescribes that whenever an Authorized 
Officer havingjurisdiction over the case is himselfinvolved in the seizure, 
the next higher authority may transfer the case to any other officer of 
the saine rank for conducting confiscatio11 proceedings. Sub-section ( 6) 
provides that with respect to tools, vehicles, boats, ropes, chains 
or any other article other than timber or forest-produce seized, 
confiscation may be directed unless the person referred in clause (b) of 
Sub-section S is able to satisfy that the articles were used without
his 
knowledge or connivance or, as the case may be, without the knowledge 
or connivance of his servant or agent and that all reasonable and 
necessary precautions had been taken against the use of such objects 
for commission of forest offence. 
16. Section 1 SA prov.ides the remedy of appeal against the order 
of the authorized officer under Section 1 S in confiscation proceedings. 
·Section 1 S~B of the Adhiniyam provides for revision before the ~ourt of 
Sessions against the order of the Appellate Authority in the confiscation 
proceedings. 
17. Under Section 15-C oftheAdhiniyam, a jurisdictional Bar on 
courts and tribunals have been provided for, if the confiscation 
proceedings are initiated under Section 15 oftheAdhiniyam. Moreover 
Sub-section (2) of Section 15-C provides that nothing hereinbefore 
contained shall be deemed to prevent any officer authorized in this behalf 
by the State Government from directing at any time the immediate release 
of any property seized under Section 15. The necessary proposition which 
follows such a provision is that, in a case where the Authorized Officer 
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is empowered to confiscate the seized forest produce on being satisfied 
that an offence under the Act has been committed, the general power 
vested in the Magistrate for dealing with interim custody/release of the 
seized materials under the Cr. P.C. gives way. The Magistrate while 
dealing with a case of seizure of forest produce under the Act should 
first examine whether the power to confiscate the seized forest produce 
is vested in the Authorized Officer under the Act and ifhe finds so, then 
he has no power to pass any order dealing with interim custody/release 
of the seized matedal. Such ouster of jurisdiction would aid in proper 
impl~mentation of the Adhiniyam. If in such cases the power to grant 
interim custody/release of seized forest produce is vested in the 
Magistrate, then it will defeat the very scheme of the Act. Such a 
consequence is to be avoided. 
18. Another relevant provision which needs to be discussed 'is 
Section 15-D of the Adhiniyam. It provides that: 
15-D. Confiscation of property when the produce is not the 
property of GovernmeI_It.- All specified forest produce which . 
in either case is not the property of the Government and in respect 
of which a contravention of any' provision of the Act or the rules. 
made thereunder has been committed and all tools, boats, vehicles, 
ropes, chains.or any other a11icles, in case used in committing 
such contravention shall, subject
to the provisions of Sections 15, 
15A, 15 B and 15 C be liable to confiscation upon conviction of 
the offender for such contravention. 
19. The said section makes it clear that section 15-D subjects 
itself to confiscation proceedings under Section 15, 15-A, 15-B and 15-
C of Act. Further Section 15-D speaks of confiscation of all tools, boats, 
vehicles, ropes, chains or any other articles upon conviction ofthe offender 
for such forest offence. This Section is equivalent to.Section 55 of the 
-Indian Forest Act as amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh. In this 
Section the confiscation after the conviction is subjected to separate 
confiscation proceedings as contemplated under Section 15, 15-A, 15-
C. At the cost of repetition it should be noted that if a confiscation 
proceeding under Sec.tion 15 has commenced and the confiscation has 
already occurred, then there is no question of confiscation under Section 
15-D again. If the confiscation has not taken pface under Section 15, 
thei1 the Court after finaLconviction can order confiscation under Section 
15-D of the Adhiriiyam. ·
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 
[N. V. RAMANA, J.] 
20. The broad scheme of the Adhiniyam is to punish those who 
are in contravention of the law at the hand of the criminal court. The 
confiscation being incidental .and ancillary to the conviction, State of 
Madhya Pradesh, separated the process of confiscation from the process 
of prosecution. The purpose of the enactment seems to be that the power 
of the criminal court regarding the disposal of property is made sub1e.ct 
to the jurisdiction of the authorized officer with regard to that aspect; the 
jurisdiction of criminal court in regard to the main trial remains unaffe~ted. 
21. Before we deal with the question concerned in this appeal it 
would be apt to have a look at three. cases decided by. this· court. In 
l)ivisional Forest Qfficer And Anr. Vs. G V: Sudhakar And Ors. 4, 
this Court was concerned with the question as to whether the proceedings 
. for confiscation of illegally felled timber by the respondent therein can 
be continued till the disposal of main criminal case pending against him. 
This Court after considering the various provisions of the Andhra Pradesh 
Forest Act came to the conclusion that there is no doubt that the object 
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of the legislation was to provide for two separate proceedings before · D 
two different forums and that there is no conflict of jurisdiction as Section 
45, as amended by the Amendment Act;. in turn curtails the power 
conferred on the Magistrate to
direct confiscation of timber or forest 
produce on conviction of the accused. This Court proc.eeded to observe-
The conferral ot the power of confiscation of seized timber· pt 
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forest produce and the implements, etc. on the Authorized Officer .· ... 
under Sub-section (2a) ofSectiori 44 of the Act 'on his being 
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satisfied that a forest offence had been committed)n. respect 
thereof, is not dependent upon whether a criminal prosecution for · 
commission of a forest offence has been launched against the 
offender or not. It is a separate and distinct proceeding from that 
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of a trial before the Court for commission of an offence .. Under 
Sub-section (2A) of Section 44 of the Act, where a Forest Officer 
tnakes report of seizure of any timber before the Authorized 
Officer along with a report under Section 44(2), the Authorized 
Officer can direct confiscation to .Government of such timber' or 
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forest produce and the implements, etc., if he is satisfied that ~ 
forest offence has been committed, irrespective of the fact whether 
the accused is facing a trial before a Magistrate for the commission 
of a forest offence under Section 20 or 29 of the Act. 
4 (1985)4 SCC.573 
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22. In the case of State of West Bengal vs. Gopal Sarkar, this 
Court again had an opportunity to deal with the confiscatory proceedings 
initiated for forest offences. This Court while relying on the judgment in 
Divisional Forest Officer vs G V. Sudhakar Rao (Supra) has come to 
the following conclusion: 
10. On a fair reading of the provision it is clear that in a case 
where any timber or other forest produce which is the property of 
the State Government is produced under sub-section (I) and an 
Authorised Officer is satisfied that a forest offence has been 
--committed in respect of such property he may pass order of 
confiscation of the said property (forest produce) together with 
all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing 
the offence. The power of confiscation is independent of any 
proceeding of prosecution for the forest offence committed. This 
position is manifest from the statute and has also been held by this 
Court in Divisional Forest Officer v. G V. Sudhakar Rao [(1985) 
4 sec 573 : t 986 sec (Cri) 34 : AIR t 986 sc 328] . 
23. In the case of State of MP. vs. S.P. Sales Agencies6, the 
brief facts therein were a truck was. intercepted by the police in the 
District of Gwalior. It was found that 281 cases ofKuttcha manufactured 
by Mis Harsh Food Products, r~spondent 2 therein were found in the 
E 
truck. These wood cases were being transported without requisite transit 
F
G 
' pass under Rule 3 of M.P. Transit Rules thereafter; this matter was 
reported to Sub-Divisional Forest Officer, Gwalior, who initiated 
confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of the Act. This Com1 had an 
opportl,mity to deal with the question as to whether confiscation 
proce-edings can be initiated .under section 52 of the Act only after 
launching of the criminal prosecution or is it open to the forest authorities 
upon seizure of forest produce to initiate botH or.either. This Com1 relying 
on the cases in Divisioi1al Forest Officer vs. G V. Sudhakar Rao and 
State of West Bengal vs. Gopal Sarkar, came to the conclusion that 
the power of confiscation is independent of any criminal prosecution for 
forest offences committed. · 
24. In view of the foregoing discussions, it is apparent that Section 
· 15 gives independent power to the concerned authority to confiscate the 
articles, as mentioned there under, even before the guilt is completely 
' (2002) 1 sec 495 
H 
'(2004 l 4 sec 448
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SMT. KALLO BAI 
[N. V .. RAMANA, J.] 
established. This power can be exercised by the concerned officer ifhe 
is satisfied that the said objects were utilized during the commission of a 
forest offence. A protection is provided for the owners of the vehicles/ 
articles, if they are able to prove that they took all reasonable care and 
precautions as envisaged under Sub-section (5) of Section I 5 of the 
Adhiniyam and the said offence was committed without their knowledge 
or connivance. 
25. Criminal prosecution is distinct from confiscation proceedings. 
The two proceedings are different and parallel, each having a distinct 
purpose. The object of confiscation proceeding is to enable speedy and 
effective adjudication with regard to confiscation of the produce and the 
means used for committing the offence while the object of the prosecution 
is to punish the offender. The scheme Adhiniyam prescribes an 
independent procedure for confiscation. The intention of prescribing 
separate proceedings is to provide a deterrent mechanism and to stop 
further misuse of the vehicle 
26. At the cost of repetition we clarify that confiscatory proceedings 
are independent of the main criminal proceedings. In view of our detailed 
discussion in the preceding paragraph we are of opinion that High Court 
as well as the revisional court erred in coming to a conclusion that the 
confiscation under the law was not permissible unless the guilt of the 
accused is
completely established. 
'-,_,. 
27. Consequently the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the 
High Court is set aside. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal allowed. 
231 
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.. [2017] 4 S.C .. R. Z32 
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI 
.. 
v. 
. •' .. 
. ·. 
MANAV DHARAM TRUST AND ANOTHER 
' (CivilA:ppeal'.No. 6112 of2017) 
.MAY04;i017 
. [KURlAN JOSEPH AND R. BANUMAJ:HI, JJ.). 
. . . 
. 
. 
'• 
Right to Fair Compensation ;nd if'ransparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettle1nent Act, 2013 - s.24(2) -
· C 
Subsequent purchasers/Assignees/Power of attorney holders etc -
Locus standi to file a petition for a declaration of lapse of 
acquisition proceedings u/s.24(2) - Held: The subsequent purchaser, 
the assignee, the successor in interest, the power of attorney, etc., 
are all persons who are interested in compensation/affected persons 
D 
in terms of the 2013 Act and such persons are entitled to file a case 
for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed 
by virt11e of operation of s.24(2) of the 2013 Act - It is a declaration 
/ 
qua the land wherein indisputably.they have. an interest ahd they 
; 
. 
-
. are affected. bY, s~ch acrjuisi'tion _·Land AC<j1:fiSition Act, 1894. 
E~ : 
· ·Dismissing the app
0eals, the. Co_u~t. · · · · . ' 
. 
HELDi i. Unde~'the 2013 Act, all persons claiming interest 
in compensatfon to be paid on.account of the acquisition of land 
under the 2013 Act, are perso'ns interested. Among others, any 
person whose primary source of livelihood is likely to be 
adversely affected is also a person interested. The definition of 
F 
· affected family also indicates that even a · family residing
in the 
lands souglit to be acquired; be it an owner or not, is an affected 
family, and if a family 'or a person is affected, necessarily, he has a 
right to approach the Court' to protect his interests. [Paras 18, 
G 
H 
20) [245-C; 246-~) 
2. The challenge made by the writ petitioners was not to 
the acquisition or to·the regularity of the process of acquisition 
including the taking of possession. Their only prayer was fqr a 
declaration that the proceedings qua the land referred to in the 
A~plication have lapsed by virtue of the operation of Section 
. 
. 
. 
232
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 
233 · 
24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is one thing to say that there is a challenge 
A 
to the legality or propriety or validity of the acquisition 
proceedings and yet another thing .h> say that. by virtue of 
operation of a subsequent legislatfon, the acquisition proceedings 
have lapsed •. (Paras 21, 23) [246-H; 247-A, CJ 
3. The 2013 Act has made a sea change in the approach on· · B 
the acquisition of land and compensation thereof. The: only lapse 
under the 1894 Act was under Section llA whe~ .wlJat would 
lapse is the ... "entire proceedings for the acquisition of land" 
whereas under Section 24(2) of th~ :Z013 Act, what gets lapsed is . 
the land acquisition proceedings 'initiated under the 1894 Act 
which has culminated in passing of an award under Section 11 but 
where either possession was not taken or compensation was no~ 
paid ~ithin five 'years pri~r to 01.01.2014 • In .other words, the~ 
land 'acquisition proceedings conteµiplated under Section 24(2) 
ofthe 2013 Act would take in botJi,. payment of compensation .and 
taking of possession within the five year period prior to 
!)1.01.2014. If either of them is not satisfied, the en)ire land 
acquisition proceedings would lapse under the deeming provision. 
The impact of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) is that pervasive. 
Thus, on account of the lapse, the encumbrance created in favour 
c 
D 
of the State comes to an end, and resultantly, the impediment to 
encumber the
land also comes to an end. 
[Para 25] (247-E-G; 
248-A-B] 
E 
4. The whole face of land acquisition has changed by the 
2013 Act. Section 105 of the 2013 Act has provided that the 
provisions of the Act shall not apply to the enactments specified 
F 
in the Fourth Schedule. So far, only 13 Acts have been notified 
under the Fourth Schedule. Neither Delhi Development Act, 1957 
nor Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 is included 
in the Fourth Schedule. There is a clear indication that the Act 
proposes to protect the interest of those persons, among others 
who are affected by the acquisition. The subsequent purchasers/ 
G 
successors, etc., in the cases before us, are all people affected 
by the acquisition, and therefore, also they are entitled to seek a 
declaration on lapse under the 2013 Act. [Paras 26, 27] 
[248-D, ~; 249-A] 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 4 S.C.R. 
5. The subsequent purchaser, the assignee, the successor 
in interest, the power of attorney, etc., are all persons who are 
interested in compensation/land owners/affected persons in terms 
of the 2013 Act and such persons are entitled to file a case for a 
declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed by 
virtue of operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is a 
declaration qua the land wherein indisputably they have an interest 
and they are affected by such acquisition. }'or such a declaration, 
it cannot be said that the respondents/writ petitioners do not have 
any locus standi. The appellants are given a period of six nlonths 
to exercise its liberty granted under Section 24(2) of the 2013 
Act for initiation of the acquisition proceedings afresh. (Paras 
29, 31) (249-F-G; 250-B] 
UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow Through Its Chairman and 
another v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and 
others (1996] 1 SCR 683 : (1996) 3 SCC 124; Sneh 
Prabha (Smt.) and others v. State of UP and another 
(1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 264 : (1996) 7 SCC 426; Meera 
Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others (2008] 
10 SCR 1012_: (2008) 9 SCC 177; V. Chandrasekaran 
and another v. Administrative Officer and others (2012] 
10 SCR 603 : (2012) 12 SCC 133; Rajastha11 State 
Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. 
Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur 
and others (2013] 4 SCR 978.: (2013) 5
SCC 427 -
held inapplicable. 
Suryaprakash and others v. State of Karnataka and 
others.MANUIKA/331912016 (Writ Petition No. 
10286-291 of 2014, decided on 05.12.2016) - held 
applicable. 
Delhi Development Authority v. Sukbhir Singh and 
others (2016) 8 SCALE 655 - relied on. 
Case Law Reference 
(1996] 1 SCR 683 
held inapplicable 
Para7 
H 
[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 264. 
held inapplicable 
Para7
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 
235 
[20081 10 SCR 1012 
[20121 10 SCR 603 
12013] 4 SCR 978 
(2016) 8 SCALE 655 
held inap1>licable 
held inapplicable 
held inapplicable 
relied on 
Para 7 
Para7 
Para 7 
Para 25 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6112 of 
2017. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2014 of the High Court 
of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No. 3411 of2014 
WITH 
C.A. Nos. 6113, 6115, 6118, 6120, 6123, 6128, 6131, 6134, 6136, 
6138, 6140, 6142, 6146, 6149, 6152, 6156, 6160, 6163, 6164, 6166, 6170, 
6173, 6186, 6190, 6194, 6197, 6203, 6206, 6209, 6213, 6216, 6219, 6224, 
6228,6233,6237,6240,6242,6246,6249,6260,6264,6267,6270,6272, 
6274, 6276, 6279, 6281, 6283, 6285, 6287, 6289, 6291, 6292, 6294, 6296, 
6298, 6300, 6302, 6125, 6127, 6129, 6130, 6132, 6133, 6135, 6137, 6141, ' 
6143,6145,6147,6150,6153,6155,6157,6159,6161,6167,6169,6172, 
6175,6176,6178,6180,6181,6182,6184,6185,6187,6189,6191,6193, 
6195,6198,6200,6202,6205,6207,6210,6212,6214,6217,6218,6221, 
6222,6225,6227,6230,6231,6234,6236,6239,6241,6243,6245,6248, 
6250,6252,6253,6255,6256,6259,6262,6263,6265,6266,6269,6119, 
6121,6122,6139,6144,6148,6151,6154,6158,6162,6168,6171,6174, 
6177,6179,6183,6188,6192,6196,6199,6201,6204,6208,6211,6215, 
6220,6223,6226,6229,6232,6235,6238,6244,6247,6251,6254,6257-
6258,6261,6268,6271,6273,6275,6278,6280,6282,6284,6286,6288, 
6290, 6293, 6295, 6297, 6299 and 6301 of2017. 
P. S. Patwalia, ASG, S. S. Shamshery, AAG
(Rajasthan), A. K. 
Sanghi, K. Radhakrishnan, Amrendra Sharan, A. Sharan, V. Mohana, 
"Salman Khurshid, V. Giri, Vivek Kumar Tankha, Rakesh Tiku, R. A. 
Jain, Sachin Dutta, Ravinder Sethi, A. Mariarputham, Ms. Indu Malhotra, 
Ashok Chhabra, YashankAdhyaru, Dr. Arun Mohan, P.H. Parekh, Ajit 
Kumar Sinha, Dhruv Mehta, A. K. Sanghi, Jayant Sud, Sachin Datta, 
Sr. Advs, Mohan Prasad Gupta, R. K. Rathore, R. K. Mohanty, 
Ms. Sunita Sharma, Pravesh Thakur, Kiran Bhardwaj, B. K.Prasad, 
Shailender Saini, Harish Khinchi, Meenesh Dubey, Ms. Meenakshi 
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SUPREME·COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 4 s.c.R: 
Dubey, ShadmanAli, S. N. Terda:J,Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj, Sakesh Kumar, 
Ms. Sonam Nagrath Kohli; Karunakar Mahalik, Mukul Singh, Shekhar 
Vyas, Meenesh Kumar Dubey, R. K. Rathord, Anil Hooda, Ms. Sushma 
Sharma, Raj Bahadur Yadav, M. K. Maroria, Ajay· Kumar Singh, Vikas 
Bansal, Ms. Sushma Suri, Neera:j Kr. Sharrrta, D.S. Mahra, Ms. Garirria 
Prashad, Ms. Nupur Kumar, L:B. Rai, MohitKumar Sharina, D.eekant 
Tripathi, Vijay Awana, Dr. Rajeev Sharma, Raghuvir Sharma, Vipin 
Kumar Sharma, Dharmendra Sharma, Lt. Col. (R) Arun . .Kumar, Hazi 
Salimuddin,Ashis~ Qarg, T. L Garg, Vineet Garg, R: K. Shokeen, Tarjit 
Singh, Ms. KaminiJaiswal; Ravi Mishra, Govind Goel,Ankit Goel, Shrey 
Dambhare, Ram Naresh Yadav, Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya, 
Ms. Binu Tamta, (for Mis Saharya& Co.),Ashwani Kumar, Ja:r Kumar 
Bhardwaj, Atul Kumar, Ms. Sweety Singh, Sheetanshu Shekhar, 
Ms. Bushra Parveen, Ms. Archana Kumari, Ms. Minali Deswal,.Tushar 
Duneja, Vikas Pandey, Rajiv ·Sharma, Girish Chandra, Sanchit Garg, 
Ms .. Shweta Jain, Parhlad Singh Sharma,Sandeep Singh, Satya Siddiqui, 
Sarfraz Ahmed Siddiqui, S. A. Siddiqui, M. K. Maroria, Go pal Singh, 
Manish Kumar, Ms. Varsha Po,ddar, Vibhu Shankar Mishra, R.R. Rajesh, 
Ajay Sharma, A. K. Kaul, Raj Bahadur, Ms. Garima Prashad, Kaushik 
Poddar, Shantanu Sagar, Anmol, A. Deb Kumar, Rabin Majumder, Sameer 
Jain, Ms. Anu Suha, Ms. Sanchita, Ms. Azra Rehman, B. S. Mathur,
BharatBhushan, Kaushik, N.S. Dalal, D. P. Singh, Madan Gera,Ashutosh 
Dubey, Ms. Rajshri Dubey, Abhishek Chauhan, V. S. Rawat, Aman 
Nandrajog, Ashish Tiwari, Gopal Sankara Narayanan, Zeeshan Diwan, 
Sumeer Sodhi, Arjun Nanda, T. Mahipal, R.K. Singh, Ms. Deepa Rai, 
Kedar Nath Tripathy, Arunabh Chowdhury, Anjuman Tripathy, Jayant 
Mohan, Mohan Prasad Gupta, Shadman Ali, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Rajesh 
Singh Chauhan, Mahesh Prasad, Shambhu Prasad, Ms. Ritu Singh Mann, 
Dheeraj Garg, S. K. Rout, Ms. Amit Kalkal, Jitender Choudhary, Rajesh 
Singh, P. K. Jain, Saurabh Jain, P. K. Goswami, S. P. Singh Rathore, 
Ashok Kumar Sharma, Uday Prakash Yadav, H. Arjun, Mrs. Anuradha 
Soni Venna, .swetank Shantanu, R.R. Kumar, A. Shivani, Navin Chawla, 
Ms. Nidhi Mohan Prashar, Gaurav Sarin, Mrs. Charul Sarin, 
Mrs. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Ms. Renuka Arora, Ms. S. Janani, Ms. Renuka, 
Ms. Anusuya Salwan, Bankey Bihari, Ms. Smita Maan, Naresh Maan, 
Sachin Gupta, Ankur Chawla, Ms. Meenakshi Chatterjee, Akshay Sahni, 
Vinay Shailendra, Ms. Worthing Kasar, Ms. Deepika V. Marwaha, 
Cha.ndra Bhushan Prasad, Saksham Maheshwari, J. S. Chhabra, Mohan
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 
Lal Sharma, Ms. Shikha Sharma, Gov ind Goel, D. Ramakrishna Reddy, 
Ms. Vidyottma, N. S. Vasisht, Ms. Jyoti Kataria, Pradeep Misra, Daleep 
Dhyani, Suraj Singh, Ms. Rashmi Chopra, Ms. Asiya, Ms. Rashmi Arora, 
Dr. Monika Gusain, Syed Mehdi Imam, D. K. Sharma, Shamama Anis, 
TabrezAhmed, Navras Sohrawarby, Mohd. Noorullah, Javed Muzaffar, 
Sumit Bansal, Ms. Richa Oberoi, Ms. Sumi Anand, Vikas Kuniar, Gagan 
Gupta, Manish Paliwal, P.S. Sharma, Vivek Singh, Chandra Prakash, 
Ms. Ashwarya Malik, Ms. Ashwarya Sinha, Ms. Vanshaya Shukla, 
Ms. Ritika Jhurani, Dinesh Chandra, Amit Sharma, Ankit Raj, Ms. Ruchi 
Kohli, Sumit Bansal, Ateev Mathur, Ms. Richa Oberoi, A.P.S. Sehgal, 
Vikas Kumar, Gagan Gupta, Arun K. Sinha, Ms. Alka Agrawal, Sumit 
Sinha, Mukesh Kr. Maroria, Balendu Shekhar, Ajay Singh, Rajesh Kumar, 
Sibo Sankar Mishra, Ms. Gunwant Dara, Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj, B.K. 
Prasad, Surender Kumar Gupta, Ms. Sunita Sharma, Manish Kumar, 
Madan Lal Sharma, Piyush Rayal, Ms. Smriti Vashisht, Ghan Shyam 
Vashisht, Manoj K. Mishra, Sandeep Kr. Dwivedi, Umesh Dubey, S. K. 
Pathak, Rajiv Kumar Ghawana, T. V. S. Raghavendra Sreyas, 
Ms. Gayatri Gulati, Puneet Sharma, Ms. Usha Nandini V., Jasbir Singh 
Malik, Ms. Joymoti Mize, Dhiraj Parveen, Ms. Manjul Dahiya, Pradeep 
Jatav, Rajat Bhardwaj, Gov ind Goel, Ankit Goel, Rajendra Prasad Saxena, 
N.P. Sahani, Anuj Agarwala, Anubhav Sinha, Aayush Agarwala, Gopal 
Sankarnarayanai1, Sumeer Sodhi, Arjun
Nanda, Anubhav Bhasin, Pramod 
B. Agarwala, Ms. Aruna Mathur, Avneesh Arputham, Ms. Anuradha 
Arputham, Amit Arora, Vikas Mehta, Devender Prasad, Ms. Anushree 
Menon, Ms. Esha Mazumdar, Ms. Priyanjali Singh, Rahul Rathore, Rahul 
Jarjal, Vikas Kumar, Ms. Anusuya Salwan, Ms. Renuka Arora, Anup 
Kumar, B. Tripathy, Naresh Kaushik, Randhir Pandey, Ms. Ranjeeta 
Rohtagi, Ms. Bushra Parveen, Sheetanshu Shekhar, Ms. Minali Deswal, 
Tushar Duneja, Mohit D. Ram, Monisha Handa, Bharat Beriwal, 
Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Dharamveer Khatri, Mansoor Ali, Pradeep Misra, 
Ajay Sharma, Puneet Sharma, Ms. Iti Sharma, Puneet Sharma, Rahul 
Bhatia, Kartik Bhardwaj, Manu Mridul, Ms. Anwesha Saha, Anil Kumar 
Tandale, Amitabh Kumar Verma, Rajesh, Ms. Mukti Chowdhary, Madan 
Gera, Garav M. Liberham, Ritesh Khatri, Manoj K. Mishra, Yogendra 
Kumar, Umesh Dubey, Lalit K. Rawat, Nitin Mishra, Tushar Bakshi, 
Ms. Richa Kapoor, Ms. Mallika Parmar, Gopal Jha, N. Prabhakar, 
Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Ms. Monika, Ms. Nitya Madhusoodhanan, S. 
K. Raut, D. S Kavntae, Megh Pal Singh, Ms. Farha Faiz, Ms. Rita 
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Gupta, San jay Jain, Vinay Arora, Raj Bahadur, Amit Sharma, Ms. Sushma 
Verma, D. S. Mahra, R. R. Rajesh, Shadman Ali, Rajesh Ranjan, 
Ms. Rashmi Malhotra, Sachin Sharma, Ms. Sushma Sharma, Ms. Sumi 
Anand, Ms. Anju Bhattacharya, D. P. Mohanty, Ms. Swati Bhardwaj, 
Ajay Sharma, Rajeev Sharma, Ms. Nee lam Sharma, Ms. Diksha Kukrety, 
Rajesh K. Singh, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Shailendra Saini, Shadman Ali, 
Karan Sethi, S. A. Siddiqui, Ms. Sushma Verma, Vibhu Shanker Mishra, 
Mukul Singh, Rabindra Kumar Mohanty, Yashraj Singh Deore, 
Ms. Priyadarshinee Singh, Pankaj Bhatia, Nipun Goel, Dhruv Tamta, 
B. L. Shivare, Dhruv Surana, Ashish Choudhury, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, 
M.A. Chinnasamy, K. S. Gananasambandam, C. Rubavathi, V. Senthil 
Kumar, P. Raja Ram, R. R. Rajesh, Harsh Gunchind, Azim H. Laskar, 
Sachin Das, Ms. Sampa Sengupta Ray, Abhijit Sengupta, Ms. Priya Hingo 
Rani, Bhushan Prasad, Mann Mridul, Amitabh Kumar Verma, Krishan 
Kumar, Pankaj Vivek, Mrs. Priya Puri, Puneet Sharma, Ranjay Kumar 
Dubey, Ms. Vaishali Soni, Ms. Kush Chaturvedi, Rajeev, P. Kausir 
Prabhu, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Ms. Ritika Jhurani, Dinesh Shanna, Advs. 
for the appearing parties. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
KURIAN, J. 1. Leave granted. 
2. Whether the subsequent purchasers/assignees/power of 
attorney holders, etc., have locus standi to file a petition for a declaration 
oflapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of
The Right to 
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "the 2013 Act"), 
is the only issue arising for consideration in these cases. 
3. The High Court has taken the view in favour of such people. 
Thus, aggrieved the NCT of Delhi and Delhi Development Authority 
are in appeals before th is Court. 
4. At the outset, we may note that in these cases, the land 
G 
acquisition proceedings have otherwise lapsed by the operation of Section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act since either compensation was not paid or 
possession was not taken within five years prior to 01.01.2014, the date 
of coming into force of the 2013 Act. Thus, the dispute is only on the 
locus standi. 
H
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 
[KURIAN, J.] 
5. Shri Amarendra Saran, learned Senior Counsel leading the 
arguments on behalf of the appellants submits that in all these cases, the 
transfer is in violation of The Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) 
Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Delhi Act, 1972"). The transfers 
in favour of the writ petitioners are hence void, and accordingly, the 
beneficiary of an illegal/void transaction is not entitled to file a case for 
any relief. 
6. Reliance is placed on Sections 3,4,8, and 9 of the 1972 Act, 
which read as follows: 
"3. Prohibition 011 tra11sfer of lands acquired by Central 
Govemme11t -
No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease 
or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Un ion territory 
of Delhi which has been acquired by the Central Government 
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 or under any other law 
providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose. 
4. Regulatio11 011 tra11sfer of la11ds in rehttio11 to which 
acquisitio11 proceedings have been i11itiatetl 
No person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of 
239 
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the competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale, 
E 
mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated 
in the Union territory of Delhi, which is proposed to be acquired in 
ponnection with the Scheme and in relation to which a declaration 
to the effect that such land or part
thereof is needed for a public 
purpose having been made by the Central Government under 
F 
section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Central 
Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under section 
48 of that Act. 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
8. Restrictio11s 011 registration of transfers of land -
Notwithstanding any thing contained in any other Jaw for the time 
being in force, where any document required to be registered 
under the provisions of clause (a) to clause (e) of sub-section (I) 
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[2017] 4 S.C.R. 
of section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, purports to transfer by 
sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof 
referred to in section 4, no registering officer appointed under 
that Act shall register any such document unless the transferor 
produces before such registering officer a permission in writing 
of the competent authority for such transfer. 
9. Penalty -
If any person contravenes the provisions of section 3 or section 4, 
he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may 
· extend to three years or with fine or with both." 
7. Learned Senior Counsel and other learned Counsel further 
submitted that the issue is no more res integra in view of the following 
decisions of this Com1: 
(i) U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow Through Its Chairman and another 
D 
v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and others1, 
(ii) Sneh Prabha (Smt.) and others v. State of U.P. and another, 
(iii) Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others3, 
(iv) V. Chandrasekaran and anotherv. Administrative Officer and 
E 
others4, 
(v) Rajasthan State. Industrial Development and Investment 
Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, 
Jaipur and others5 and 
F 
8. U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow (supra), is a case where this Court 
considered the consequences of a transfer of the land after issuance of 
notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 
(hereinafter referred to as
"the 1894 Act") in the State of Utter Pradesh. 
It was held that any encumbrances created by the owner after Section 
4(1) Notification is published, does not bind the Government and such a 
G 
purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. Therefore, such a 
1(1996)3SGC124 
'( 1996) 7 sec 426 
'(2008) 9 sec 1 n 
'(2012) 12 sec 133 
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'(2013)5SCC427
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 
[KURIAN, J.] 
purchaser cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity 
of the process of taking possession of the land. To quote paragraph-3: 
"3; .. : It is settled law that after the notification under Section 
4( 1) is published in the Gazette any encumbrance created by the 
owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not 
acquire any title to the property. In this case, notification under 
Section 4(1) was published on 24-3-1973, possession of the land 
admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973 and pumping station house was 
constructed. No doubt, declaration under Section 6 was published 
later on 8-7~1973. Admittedly power under Section 17(4) was 
exercised dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and on 
service of the notice under Section 9 possession was taken, since 
urgency was acute, viz., pumping station house was to be 
constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently, the land stood 
vested in the State under Section 17(2) free from all encumbrances. 
It is further settled law that once possession is taken, by operation 
of Section 1 7(2), the land vests in the State free from all 
encumbrances unless a notification under Section 48( I) is pub! ished 
in the Gazette withdrawing from the acquisition. Section 11-A, as 
amended by Act 68 of 1984, therefore, does not apply and the 
acquisition does not lapse. The notification under Section 4(1) 
and the declaration under Section 6,
therefore, remain vaiid. There 
is no other provision under the Ac~ to h.ave the acquired land 
divested, unless, as stated earlier, notification under Section 48( 1) 
was published and the possession is surre12dered pursuant thereto. 
That apart, since Mis Kalra Properties, respondent had purchased 
the land after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, 
its sale is void against the State and it acquired no right, title or 
interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot 
challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity in taking 
possession of the land before publication of the declaration under 
Section 6 was published." 
. 
9. In Sneh Prabha (supra), this Court reiterated the position that 
any alienation ofland afterthe publication of the notification under Section 
4( 1) of the 1894 Act does not bind the Government or the beneficiary 
under the acquisition. It has also been held that once the possession of 
the land is taken under Section 16 of the Act, the land vests with the 
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Government free from all encumbrances and the absolute title is vested 
in the Government. To quote from paragraph-5: 
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"5 •... It is settled law that any person who purchases land after 
publication of the notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/ 
her own peril. The object of publication of the notification under 
Section 4( l) is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is 
likely to be needed for public purpose and the acquisition 
proceedings point out an impediment to anyone to encumber the 
land acquired thereunder. It authorises the designated officer to 
enter upon the land to do preliminaries etc. Therefore, any 
alienation of land after the publication of the notification under 
Section 4(1) does not bind the Government or the beneficiary 
under the acquisition. On taking possession of the land, all rights, 
titles and interests in land stand vested in the State, under Sec.tion 
16 of the Act, free from all encumbrances and thereby absolute 
title in the land is acquired thereunder. If any subsequent purchaser 
acquires land, his/her only right would be subject to the provisions 
of the Act and/or to receive compensation for the land. In a recent 
judgment, this Court in Union of India v. Shivkumar Bhargava 
considered the controversy and held that a.person who purchases 
land ·subsequent to the notification is not entitled to alternative 
site. It is seen that the Land Pol icy
expressly conferred that right 
only on that person whose land was acquired. In other words, the 
person must be the owner of the land on the date on which 
notification under Section 4( 1) was published. By necessary 
implication, the subsequent purchaser was elbowed out from the 
policy and became disentitled to the benefit of the Land Policy." 
.I 0. In Meera Sahni (supra), this Court dealt with the provisions 
under the Delhi Act, 1972. After referring to U.P. Jal Nigam and Sn eh 
Prabha .cases (supra), in paragraph-21 of the judgment, it was held that 
... "it is by now well settled law that under the Land Acquisition Act, 
the subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition 
proceedings and that he would be only entitled to get the 
compensation". 
11. In V. Chandrasekaran (supra), this Court again addressed 
the issue as to whether the subsequent purchaser can challenge the
GOVT. OF NCI OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 
[KURlAN, J.] 
acquisition proceedings. After referring to some of the earlier judgments, 
at paragraph-18, the law has been laid down as follows: . 
"18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be 
summarised to the effect that a person who purchases land 
subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect 
to it, is not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition 
proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the 
sale deed executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any 
title and at the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his 
vendor's title." 
12. In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and 
Investment Corporation (supra), this Court held that such transactions 
after initiation of acquisition proceedings would be void and would not 
be binding on the Government. To quote paragraph-13: 
"13. There can be no quarrel with respect to the settled legal 
proposition that a purchaser, subsequent to the issuance of a Section 
4 notification in respect of the land, cannot challenge the acquisition 
proceedings, and can only claim compensation as the sale 
transaction in such a situation is void qua the Government. Any 
such encumbrance created by the owner, or any transfer of the 
land in question, that is made after the issuance of such a 
notification, would be deemed to be void and would not be binding 
on the Government. ... " 
13. On behalf of the respondents, it
has been mainly contended 
that the subsequent purchasers are persons interested and they have 
every right to file a case to protect their interests. It was also pointed out 
that under the Delhi Act, 1972, there is no absolute bar on transfer since 
under Section 5, the transfer was possible with the permission of the 
Competent Authority and. that under Section 5, the Competent Authority 
cannot refuse to grant the permission except on any of the grounds 
under sub-Section (3) of Section 5. To quote Section 5: 
"5. Application for gra11t of permission for transfer under 
section 4 -
xx.xx 
xx xx 
xxxx 
xx xx 
(3) The competent authority shall not refuse to grant the permission 
applied for under this section except on one or more of the 
following grounds, namely:-
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(i) That the land is needed or is likely to be needed for the effective 
implementation of the Scheme; 
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(ii) That the land is needed or is likely to be needed· for securing 
the objects of the Delhi Development Authority referred to in 
section 6 of the Development Act; 
(iii) That the land is needed or is likely to be needed for any 
development within the meaning of clause (d) of section 2 of the 
Development Act or for such things as public building and other 
public works and utilities, roads, housing, recreation, industry, 
business, markets, schools and other educational institutions, 
hospitals and public open spaces and other categories of public 
uses." 
14. It was also contended that the 2013 Act has not exempted the 
acquisitions under The Delhi Development Act, 1957, and forthat matter 
the Delhi Act, 1972 underthe Fourth Schedule to Section 105. 
15. Yet another contention was that in all these cases, the challenge 
was not to the acquisition proceedings but for a declaration under Section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act to the effect that by virtue of operation of the said 
provision, the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. 
16. "Person interested", under the 1894 Act, is defined under . 
Section 3(b) of the Act, which reads as follows: 
"3(b) the expression "person interested" includes all persons 
claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account 
of the acquisition ofland under this Act; and a
person shall 
be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an 
easement affecting the land;" 
. 17. Under the 2013 Act, "person interested" has been given a 
·much wider meaning under Section 3(x). To quote: 
o 
"3(x). "person interested" means-
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(i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made 
on account of the acquisition ofland under this Act; 
(ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers, 
who have lost any forest rights recognised under the Scheduled
GOVT. OF NCI OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 
245 
[KURIAN, J.] 
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition 
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of Forest Rights) Act, 2006; 
(iii) a person interested in an easement affecting the land; 
(iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant State laws 
including share-croppers by whatever name they may be 
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called; and 
(v) any person whose primary source oflivelihood is likely to be 
adversely affected;" 
18. Thus, under the 2013 Act, all persons claiming interest in 
compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition offand under the 
2013 Act, are persons interested. Among others, any person whose 
primary source of livelihood is likely to be adversely affected is also a 
person interested. 
19. "Land owner" under the 2013 Act is defined under Section 
3(r), which reads as follows: 
"3(r)"land owner" includes any person,-
(i) whose name is recorded as the owner of the land or building 
or part thereof, in the records of the authority concerned; or 
(ii) any person who is granted forest rights under the Scheduled 
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition 
afforest ·Rights) Act, 2006 or under any other law for the 
time being in force; or 
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(iii) who is entitled to be granted Patta rights on the land under 
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any law of the State including assigned lands; or 
(iv) any person who has been declared as such by an order of the 
court or Authority; 
Thus, among others, a person whose name is recorded as owner 
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of
the land or building or part thereof in the records of the Authority 
concerned, is a land owner. 
20. "Affected family" has been defined in the 2013 Act under 
Section 3( c) which reads as follows :-
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"3(c)-affected family includes-
(i) 
a family whose land or other immovable property has been 
acquired; 
(ii) 
a family which does not own any land but a member or 
members of such family may be agricultural labourers, 
tenants including any form of tenancy or holding ofusufruct 
right, share-croppers or artisans or who may be working in 
the affected area for three years prior to the acquisition of 
the land, whose primary source oflivelihood stand affected 
by the acquisition ofland; 
(iii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers 
who have lost any of their forest rights recognised under 
the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers 
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of2007) due to 
acquisition ofland; 
(iv) family whose primary source of livelihood for three years 
prior to the acquisition of the land is dependent on forests 
or water bodies and includes gatherers of forest produce, 
hunters, fisher folk and boatmen and such livelihood is 
affected due to acquisition of land; 
(v) 
a member of the family who has been assigned land by the 
State Government or the Central Government under any of 
its schemes and such land is under acquisition; 
(vi) a family residing on any land in the urban areas for preceding 
three years or more prior to the acquisition of the land or 
whose primary source oflivelihood for three years prior to 
the acquisition of the land is
affected by the acquisition of 
such land;" 
This definition ofaffected family also indicates that even a family 
residing in the lands sought to be acquired, be it an owner or not, is an 
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affected family, and if a family or a person is affected, necessarily, he 
has a right to approach the Court to protect his interests. 
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21. It is also to be specifically noted that the challenge made by 
the writ petitioners in the Miscellaneous Application filed by them is not 
to the acquisition or to the regularity of the process of acquisition including
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 
247 
[KURIAN, J.] 
the taking of possession. Their only prayer is for a declaration that the 
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proceedings qua the land referred to in the Application have lapsed by 
virtue of the operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 
22. All the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing 
for the appellants, no doubt, have categorically held that the subsequent 
purchasers do not have locus standi to challenge the acquisition 
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proceedings. But in the present case, the challenge is not to the acquisition 
proceeding; it is only for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings 
have lapsed in view of the operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, 
and therefore, the ratio in those cases has no application to these cases. 
23. It is one thing to say that thereis a challenge to the legality or c 
propriety or validity of the acquisition proceedings and yet another thing 
to say that by virtue of operation of a subsequent legislation, the acquisition 
proceedings have lapsed. 
24. In all the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the 
appellants, which we have referred to above, this Court has protected 
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the rights of the subsequent purchaser to claim compensation, being a 
person interested in the compensation, despite holding that they have no 
locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings. 
25. The 2013 Act has made a sea change in the approach on the 
acquisition ofland and compensation thereof.
The only lapse under the 
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1894 Act was under Section 1 lA where what would lapse is the ... 
"entire proceedings for the acquisition of lam:!' whereas under Section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act, what gets lapsed is the land acquisition proceedings 
initiated under the 1894 Act which has culminated in passing of an award 
under Section 11 but where either possession was not taken or 
compensation was not paid within five years prior to 01.01.2014. In 
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other words, the land acquisition proceedings contemplated ·under Section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act would take in both, payment of compensation and 
taking of possession within the five year period prior to 01.01.2014. If 
either of them is not satisfied, the entire land acquisition proceedings 
would lapse under the deeming provision. The impact of deemed lapse 
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under Section 24(2) is that pervasive. To quote R.F. Nariman, J. in Delhi 
Development Authority v. Sukbhir Singh and others6• To quote: 
" ... As is well settled, a deeming fiction is enacted so that a 
putative state of affairs must be imagined, the mind not being 
'(2016) 8 SCALE 655 
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allowed to boggle at the logical consequence of such putative 
state of affairs ... In fact, Section 24(2) uses the expression 
"deemed to have lapsed" because the Legislature was cognisant 
of the fact that, in cases where compensation has not been paid, 
and physical possession handed over to the State/vesting has taken 
place, after which land acquisition proceedings could be said to 
have been ended .... " (Paragraph-27). 
Thus, on account of the lapse, the encumbrance created in favour 
of the State comes to an end, and resultantly, the impediment to encumber 
the land also comes to an end. Even, according to the appellants, the 
transfers were illegal and void for the reason that there was an 
impediment for the transfer. Once the acquisition proceedings lapse, all 
impediments cease to exist. 
26. As we have already noted above, the whole face of land 
acquisition has changed by the 2013 Act. Section I 05 of the 2013 Act 
has provided that the provisions of the Act shall not apply to the 
enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. So far, only 13 Acts have 
been notified under the Fourth Schedule. Neither The Delhi Development 
Act, 1957 nor The Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 is 
included in the Fo1J11h Schedule. 
27. The main purpose of the 2013 Act is clearly stated in the 
preamble which reads as follows :-
"An Act to ensure, in consultation with institutions oflocal self-
government and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution, 
a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land 
acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential 
infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the least disturbance 
to the owners of the land and other affected families and provide 
just and fair compensation to the affected families whose land 
has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by 
such acquisition and make adequate provisions for such affected 
persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement and for ensuring 
that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be 
that affected persons become partners in development leading to 
an improvement in their post acquisition social and economic status 
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
GOVT. OF NCI OF DELHI v. MANAV DHARAM TRUST 
249 
[KURIAN, J.] 
There is a clear indication that the Act proposes to protect the 
A 
interest of those persons, among others who are affected by the 
acquisition. The subsequent purchasers/successors, etc., in the cases 
before us, are all people affected by the acquisition, and therefore, also 
they are entitled to seek a declaration on lapse under the 2013 Act. 
28. The High Court ofKarnataka at Bengaluru in Suryaprakash 
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and others v. State ofKarnataka and others7 has considered a situation 
of lapse and locus standi of the subsequent purchaser to file a writ 
petition for a declaration on lapse, though not under Section 24(2) of the 
2013 Act. At paragraph-16, it has been held: 
"16 .... the principle that transferee of land after the publication 
of preliminary notification cannot maintain a writ petition 
challenging the acquisition, cannot be made applicable to a case 
where the acquisition itself has been abandoned and has stood 
lapsed due to efflux of time on account of the omission and inaction 
on the part of the acquiring authority, particularly because, it is 
because of the lapse of time and the abandonment of the acquisition, 
right accrues to the original owner to deal with his property including 
by way of the sale and the purchaser will acquire right to protect 
his interest. Hence, the judgment in the case of Rajasthan State 
Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Subhash 
Sindhi Cooperative
Housing Society, Jaipur and others (2013) 5 
sec 427, will have no application to the facts of the present case." 
We are of the view that this decision, in principle, applies to the 
facts of these appeals as well. 
29. Thus, the subsequent purchaser, the assignee, the successor 
in interest, the powerofattorney, etc., are all persons who are interested 
in compensation/land owners/affected persons in terms of the 2013 Act 
and such persons are entitled to file a case for a declaration that the land 
acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of operation of Section 
24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is a declaration qua the land wherein indisputably 
they have an interest and they are affected by such acquisition. For 
such a declaration, it cannot be said that the respondents/writ petitioners 
do not hav~ any locus standi. 
30. Thus, we do not find any merit in these appeals and they are 
accordingly dismissed. All Interlocutory Applications for Impleadment 
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'MANU/KA/3319/2016 (Writ Petition No. 10286-291 of2014, decided on 05.12.2016). 
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and Intervention, other than those by Legal Representatives, are also 
rejected. Applications for Impleadment of Legal Representatives are 
allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. 
31. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, the 
appellants are given a period of six months to exercise its liberty granted 
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under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for initiation of the acquisition 
proceedings afresh. 
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32. We make it clear that we have not gone into the inter se 
disputes between the parties in some cases or other claims regarding 
the ownership. 
Devika Gujral 
Appeals dismissed.