MONOJ LAL SEAL AND OTHERS versus OCTAVIOUS TEAAND INDUSTRIES LTD.
[2015] 6 S.C.R. 791, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2015] 6 S.C.R. 791 
MON OJ LAL SEAL AND OTHERS 
v. 
OCTAVIOUS TEAAND INDUSTRIES LTD. 
(Civil Appeal No. 3786 of 2015) 
APRIL21,2015 
[M.Y. EQBALAND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
A 
B 
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 - s. 7(1) (2) c 
and (3) - Protection against eviction of tenant - Suit for 
eviction by Landlord - Tenant's applications u/s. 7(1) and 
7(2) - Trial court while allowing the application u/s. 7(1) 
directed the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent- The tenant 
instead of depositing the rent to civil court (as required uls. D 
7(1) after Amendment Act of 2005) deposited the same to 
Rent Controller -Application of tenant for permission to 
deposit the arrears of rent before civil court, when reached 
before Supreme Court, was rejected with liberty to approach 
appropriate court to decide whether non-compliance of s. 7(1) 
E 
in depositing the rent was bonafide - Thereafter application 
uls. 7(2) of tenant allowed by trial court and confirmed by 
High Court - On appeal held: Protection against eviction is 
available to the tenant only after strict compliance of statutory 
provisions - In the present case, the tenant failed to comply F 
with s. 7(1) - However in view of the decision to Supremo 
Court giving liberty to tenant to satisfy his bonafide, order 
allowing application uls. 7(2) is correct. 
Dismissing the appeal, the ~ourt 
G 
HELD: 1. The Rent Control Acts have been enacted 
in different States with the object to protect the tenants 
from illegal eviction
without obtaining the decree or order 
791 
H
792 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 6 S.C.R. 
A from a competent Court on one or more grounds 
provided in those Acts. At the same time, it is well settled 
that the benefits conferred on the tenants through those 
Rent Control Acts can be enjoyed only after strict 
compliance with the statutory provisions. [Para 28] [805-
B F-G] 
E. Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (Dead) By Lrs. and Ors. 
(2003) 1SCC123; Atma Ram vs. Shakuntala Rani(2005) 7 
SCC 211: 2005 (2 ) Suppl. SCR 1071; Sar/a Goel and 
C Others vs. Kishan Chand(2009) 7 SCC 658: 2009 (10) SCR 
481; Ba/want Singh and Others vs. Anand Kumar Sharma 
and Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 433: 2003 (1) SCR 429; Supreme 
Court Bar Association vs. Union of India and Anr. (1998) 4 
SCC 409: 1998 (2) SCR 795; Mangat Rai &Anr. vs. Kidar 
D Nath & Ors. (1981) 1 SCR 476; Pushpa Devi and Ors. vs. 
E 
Milkhi Ram (Dead) By His Lrs. (1990) 2 SCC 134: 1990 (1) 
SCR 278; Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram /chharam alias 
Brijram and Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 242: 1974 (2) SCR 544 -
referred to. 
2. 
In the instant case, the respondent-tenant 
deposited the rent as required under Section 7(1) of the 
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 with the Rent 
Controller instead of depositing the same with the Civil 
F Judge. The deposit of such rent by the tenant with the 
Rent Controller instead of Civil Judge as per the 
amendments which came into effect on 1.6.2006 was 
either deliberate or a bonafide mistake. This· may be the 
reason, this Court in the earlier special leave
petition 
G made an observation that the respondent-tenant may 
satisfy the Court that such deposit was bonafide. Having 
regard to the order passed by this Court by giving liberty 
to the tenant to satisfy that such deposit with the Rent 
H Controller instead of Civil Judge was bonafide, the

MONOJ LAL SEAL v. OCTAVIOUS TEA&JNDUSTRIES 793 
LTD. 
impugned order passed by the High Court is thus fully A 
justified. [Paras 29 and 30] [806-A-E] 
Case Law Reference 
(2003) 1 sec 123 
referred to. 
Para 12 
2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 1071 referred to. 
Para 12 
2009 (10) SCR 481 
referred to. 
Para 12 
2003 (1) SCR 429 
referred to. 
Para 12 
1998 (2) SCR 795 
referred to. 
Para 1~ 
(1981) 1 SCR 476 
referred to. 
Para 14 
1990 (1) SCR 278 
referred to. 
Para 14 
1974 (2) SCR 544 
referred to. 
Para 14 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
· 3786of2015 
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.03.2014 of the 
High Court at Calcutta in C.O. No. 914 of 2012. 
P. P. Rao, Bhaskar Gupta, Pranab Kumar Mullick, Soma 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Mullick; Sebat Kumar D. for the Appellants. 
F 
Dr.A. M. Singhvi, PinakiAddy, Dev Mukherjee, Chander 
Shekhar Ashri for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
M. Y. EQBAL, J. 1. Leave granted. 
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the 
order dated 27.3.2014 passed by the High Court of Calcutta 
G 
in C.O. No. 914 of2012 dismissing the application filed by the H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 6 S.C.R. 
A 
appellants and upholding the orders dated 19.1.2012 and 
21.2.2012 passed by 5'" Bench, Presidency Small Causes 
Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 49 of 2008-E and 
rejecting the application for review of the order passed under 
B 
Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. 
3. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. 
4. The father of Appellant No.1 was owner of a two storied 
building in a posh locality in South Kolkata (near Park Street) 
c with a covered area of about 4650 sq. ft. on the rent of only Rs. 
429/- per month. The tenancy of the Respondent was attomed 
by the Official Trustee of West Bengal in favour of Appellant 
No.1 herein and since then the respondent-tenant, which is a 
D 
E 
corporate house is occupying the entire first floor of the building. 
5. It is case of the appellants that the respondent has 
embroiled the appellants (owner-landlord) in a series of 
litigations. It had earlier tried to encroach upon the lawn 
resulting in litigation which even came up to this Court. 
6. The appellants-plaintiffs instituted a suit against the 
respondent for eviction on the ground of default in payment of 
rent and personal necessity before the Presidency Small 
Causes Court at Calcutta in respect of the suit premises. The 
F suit was contested by the respondent, who after appearance 
filed two applications, one under Section 7(1) and another 
under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 
1997 (hereinafter referred to as the '1997 Act'). On 11.4.2008, 
the application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act was allowed 
G permitting the defendant-respondent to deposit the arrears of 
rent as prayed for in the said application and thereafter month 
by month in the Court within the scheduled date as per law. 
The respondent, thereafter, alleged to have continuously 
defaulted in payment of rent despite order to pay rent was 
H passed by the Court under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act.
MONOJ LAL SEAL v. OCTAVIOUS TEA& INDUSTRIES 795 
LTD. [M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
7. Appellant's further case is that instead of depositing A 
the monthly rent before the Civil Judge, tenant had deposited 
monthly rent with the Rent Controller and on 17.6.2010, the 
respondent-tenant filed an application under Section 151 of 
the Civil Procedure Code seeking permission to deposit the 
rents for the month of April, 2008 to March, 2010 along with 
B 
current rent before the trial court. That application was rejected 
by the trial Judge. Aggrieved by the said order, respondent 
then moved a revision petition before the High Court being 
C.O. No.2964 of 2010, which was rejected by order dated 
5.1.2011 holding that the tenant was bound to comply with the C 
directions of Section 7(1) of the Rent Act. 
On 26.8.2011, 
respondent filed another application under Section 151, CPC 
before the trial Judge seeking permission to deposit the 
arrears of rent, and that application was also rejected. 
D 
8. It is worth to mention here that respondent had 
challenged High Court's order dated 5.1.2011 by way of review 
application, which was rejected by the High Court on both 
merits and delay. Thereafter, respondent moved the Apex 
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution by way of special E 
leave petition being SLP (Civil) Nos. 20181-82 of2013, which 
was dismissed on 29.7.2013 leaving it open to the SLP 
petitioner (respondent herein) to raise all questions before the 
court below where the
trial is pending including the default F 
alleged against him so as to consider whether the same can 
be treated as bonafide in order to satisfy the condition laid 
down under Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy 
Act, 1997. 
9. After disposing of application under Section 7(1 ), the G 
trial Judge disposed of the application under Section 7(2) of 
the 1997 Act on 19.1.2012 with the direction to the respondent-
tenantto deposit a sum of Rs.91,419/-within thirty days from 
the date of the order. However, plaintiffs-appellants filed an 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 6 S.C.R. 
A 
application for recall of order dated 19.1.2012. The said 
application was rejected holding that the trial Judge had no 
power to review his own order and accordingly he fixed the 
next date for framing of issues in the matter. 
B 
10. Dissatisfied appellants, therefore, preferred civil 
revision petition being C.O. No.914 of2012 against the orders 
dated 19.1.2012 and 21.2.2012, whereby the Presidency 
Small Causes Court had allowed the application of the 
Respondent tenant under Section 7(2) of the Act, thereby 
C rendering the remedy of the appellants u/s. 7(3) of the 1997 
Act, infructuous. However, this revision petition was dismissed 
by the High Court vide impugned order. Hence, the present 
appeal by Special Leave by the appellants. 
D 
11. We have heard, Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel 
appearing for the appellants and Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned 
senior counsel appearing for the respondent. 
12. After narrating the entire facts and the orders time to 
E time passed by the trial court under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of 
the Act and also the orders passed by the High Court in revision 
application and also the order passed by this Court in special 
leave petition, Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing 
for the appellants, contended that since the respondent-tenant 
F failed to comply with the statutory provisions as contained in 
Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Act, the High Court has committed 
grave error of
law in passing the impugned order holding that 
there is a compliance of the aforesaid provisions of the Act 
and submitted that in absence of strict compliance of the 
G statutory provisions, the tenant shall be held to be a defaulter. 
On this proposition, learned counsel relied upon the decisions 
passed in the case of E. Palanisamy vs. Pa/anisamy (Dead) 
By Lrs. and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 123, Atma Ram vs. 
Shakuntala Rani, (2005) 7 SCC 211, Sar/a Goel and Others 
H vs. Kishan Chand, (2009) 7 SCC 658, Ba/want Singh and
MON OJ LAL SEAL v. OCTAVIOUS TEA & INDUSTRIES 797 
LTD. [M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
Others vs. Anand Kumar Sharma and Others, (2003) 3 A 
SCC 433 and Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union 
of India and Another, (1998) 4 SCC 409. 
13. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing 
for the respondent, on the other hand submitted that as a B 
matter of fact there is no default committed by the respondent-
tenant in depositing the rent. On the first day of appearance, 
the respondent filed an application seeking a direction to penmit 
defendant-tenant to deposit the rent with the Rent Controller. 
The said prayer was allowed by order dated 11.4.2008. C 
Learned counsel submitted that the respondent-tenant 
deposited the entire rent and was continuously depositing the 
rent till 2010 without any demor or objection. Learned counsel 
conceded that by virtue of amendment, which came into effect 
from 1.6.2006, the word '
1Rent Controller'' has been substitut~-d D 
by the word "Civil Judge". With the bonafide belief that the 
rent had to be deposited with the Rent Controller, the 
respondent-tenant continuously deposited the same. 
14. Dr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel further contended E 
that in any view of the matter application under Section 7(3) of 
the Act is pending wherein prayer has been made to struck 
out the defence for the alleged non-compliance of the provisions 
of Section 7(2) of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that 
Rent Control Act is a beneficial legislation and
the Court has F 
interpreted the provisions taking into consideration the intention 
of the legislature to give protection to the tenant. 
In this 
connection learned counsel would rely upon the decisions 
passad in the case of Mangat Rai & Anr. vs. Kidar Nath & 
Ors., (1981) 1 SCR476, PushpaDevi and Others vs. Milkhi G 
Ram (Dead) By His Lrs., (1990) 2 SCC 134, and Nagindas 
Ramdas vs. Dalpatram /chharam alias Brijram and Others, 
(1974) 1 SCC 242. Lastly, Dr. Singhvi submitted that earlier 
when the matter came to this Court by way of a special leave H
798 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 6 S.C.R. 
A 
petition, this Court dismissed it on 29.7.2013 with the 
observation that the trial court shall consider the bonafide of 
the tenancy in depositing the rent. 
15. Before appreciating the submissions made by learned 
B counsel, we would like to quote here Section 7 of the West 
Bengal Tenancy Act, 1997: 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
"7. When a tenant can get the benefit of protection 
against eviction. -
(1 )(a) On a suit being instituted by the landlord for eviction 
on any of the grounds referred to in Section 6, the tenant 
shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of this 
section, pay to the landlord or deposit with the Civil Judge 
all arrears of rent, calculated at the rate at which it was 
last paid and upto the end of the month previous to that 
in which the payment is made together with interest at 
the rate often percent per annum. 
(b) Such payment or deposit shall be made within one 
month of the service of summons on the tenant or, where 
he appears in the '[suit] without the summons being 
served upon him, within one month of his appearance. 
(c) The tenant shall thereafter continue to pay to the 
landlord or deposit with the Civil Judge month by month 
by the 15th of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent 
to the rent at that rate. 
(2) if in any suit referred to in sub-section (1 ), there 1s any 
dispute as to the amount of the rent payable by the tenant, 
the tenant shall, within the time specified in that sub-
section, deposit with the Civil Judge the amount admitted 
by him to be due from him together with an application 
for determination of the rent payable. On receipt of the 
application, the Civil Judge shall, having regard to the
MON OJ LAL SEAL v. OCTAVIOUS TEA & INDUSTRIES 799 
LTD. [M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
rate at which rent was last paid and the period for which A 
default may have been made by the tenant, make, as 
soon as possible within a period notexceeding one year, 
an order specifying the amount, if any, due from the tenant 
and, thereupon, the tenant shall, within one month of the 
date of such order, pay to the landlord the amount so B 
specified in the order: 
Provided that having regard to the circumstances of 
the case, an extension of time may be granted by the 
Civil Judge only once and the period of such extension C 
shall not exceed two months. 
(3) If the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred 
to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) within the time 
specified therein or within such extended time as may D 
be granted, the Civil Judge shall order the defence 
against delivery of possession to be struck out and shall 
proceed with the hearing of the suit. 
(4) If the tenant makes deposit or payment as required 
E 
by sub-section ( 1) or sub-section (2), no order for delivery 
of possession of the premises to the landlord on the 
ground of default in payment of rent by the tenant, shall 
be made by the Civil Judge, but he may allow such cost 
as he may deem fitto the landlord: 
F 
Provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to any relief 
under this sub-section if, having obtained such relief once 
in respect of the premises, he again makes default in 
payment of rent for
four months within a period of twelve G 
months or for three successive rental periods where rent 
is not payable monthly." 
16. Section 6 of the Act lays down the provision of 
protection of tenant against eviction. Section 6 provides that H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 6 S.C.R. 
A 
a tenant shall not be evicted unless an order or decree for 
recovery of possession of any premises is made in favour of 
the landlord and against the tenant on the ground inter alia 
that the tenant has defaulted in payment of rent in three months 
within a period of twelve months, or for three rental periods 
B within a period of three years where the rent is not payable 
monthly. Section 7, as quoted above, gives further protection 
to a tenant from eviction on the ground of default in the event 
the tenant complied with the order and direction passed by 
the Court in a proceeding instituted by the landlord for eviction. 
C 
In order to get the benefit of protection against eviction, a 
tenant on an application or otherwise shall have to deposit 
with the Civil Judge all arrears of rent together with interest 
within one month from the service of summons on the tenant 
0 
as contemplated under Section 7(1) of the Act. 
E 
17. The word "Controller" in sub-section (1) of Section 7 
was substituted by the word "Civil Judge" by West Bengal 
Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2005 which came into 
effect from 1.6.2006. 
18. As noticed above, the respondent filed two 
applications, one under Section 7(1) and another under Section 
7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. By the 
said application under Section 7(1 ), the appellant made the 
F following prayer: 
"12. This application is bona fide and made for the ends 
of
justice. 
G 
Your petitioner, therefore, most humbly prays that the 
defendant may be permitted to deposit the amount of 
current monthly rent for the month of March 2008 and 
subsequent months thereafter payable by the defendant 
in the Office of the Learned Rent Controller, Calcutta and 
H 
further permit the defendant to deposit in this Learned
MON OJ LAL SEAL v. OCTAVIOUS TEA & INDUSTRIES 801 
LTD. [M. Y. EQBAL, J.) 
• 
Court the sum of Rs.27,500/- being the arrears rent for A 
23 (twenty three) months with interest@ 10% p.a. and/ 
or pass such further order or orders as your Honour may 
deem fit and proper." 
19. The said application under Section 7(1) was allowed 
B 
by the Court on 11.4.2008 permitting the respondent-tenant to 
deposit the rent as prayed in the petition. The order dated 
11.4.2008 is reproduced hereunder:-
"Defendant filed today a put up petition along with two c 
other Petition u/s 7(1) and 7(2) of the W.B.P.T.Act on the 
grounds are stated therein and a Vakalatnama. Let the 
same kept with the record. 
This case record is put up today. Learned advocate for D 
the defendant is present moved. The petition u/s 7 ( 1) is 
taken up for hearing. Perused the petition. Heard Court 
allowed. 
Defendant is permitted to deposit rent as prayed in the 
petition u/s. 7(1) at party's risks and responsibility without E 
prejudice to the rights, and contention of the party and 
thereof month by month within date as per law. 
The petition u/s. 7(2) be put up todate.Acopy served us 
the meantime." 
F 
20. The perusal of the order dated 11.4.2008 would show 
that the Court instead of directing the tenant to deposit the 
rent with the Civil Judge, as per the amendment which came 
into effect from 1.6.2006, permitted the tenant to deposit the G 
rent as prayed for in the petition. Consequently, the respondent-
.
tenant deposited the rent within 30 days as required under 
Section 7 ( 1) of the Act, but the said deposit was made with 
the Rent Controller. 
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 6 S.C.R. 
A 
21. The Suit remained pending and in the meantime, the 
appellant filed an application under Section 7(3) of the said 
Act for striking out the defence of the defendant on the ground, 
inter alia, that the respondent-tenant is not depositing the rent. 
The said application is still pending for hearing. 
In the 
B meantime, the trial Judge put up the application filed by the 
respondent under Section 7(2) of the Act for hearing. The said 
application was disposed of on 19.1.2012. 
22. The trial court held that the respondent did not comply 
C with the mandatory provisions as envisaged in Section 7 ( 1) of 
the Act by not depositing the rent before the Court where the 
Suit is pending and instead went on depositing the rent before 
the Rent Controller. The trial court, therefore, by order dated 
19.1.2012 directed the respondent-tenant to deposit 
D Rs.1, 18,919/- after deducting Rs.27 ,500/- which was already 
deposited within one month from the said order. 
23. It appears that the appellants-landlords filed an 
application for review or recall of order dated 19.1.2012. The 
E trial court considered the said application and finally rejected 
it on 21.2.2012 by passing the following order: 
F 
"Both sides are present through their lawyers. 
Petition dt. 01.2.12 filed by Plaintiff is taken up for hearing. 
Heard both sides. Perused the petition filed by plaintiff. 
Having considered the submissions of both sides and 
after going
through the case record as well as order dt. 
G 
19.01.12, I find that plaintiff through the instant petition 
prays for cancellation/rescind the purported order dt. 
19.01.12 passed by this Court. Plaintiffs have also 
prayed for the rejection of application u/s 7 (2) of W. B. P. T. 
Act, filed by defendants. 
H
MONOJ LAL SEAL v. OCTAVIOUS TEA& INDUSTRIES 803 
LTD. [M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
In view of above facts and circumstances, it appears A 
before this Court that the application U/s 7(2) of W.B. P.T. 
Act filed by defendant was disposed of in presence of 
both sides and upon contested hearing. Accordingly, the 
prayer of plaintiffs is devoid any merit. Moreover, this 
Court has no jurisdiction to review its own order. 
B 
Hence, the petition filed by plaintiffs on 01.02.12 is 
rejected on contest. 
Defendant have complied the order dt. 19.01.12 and C 
deposited the amount. Let, the Xerox copy of challan 
be kept with this record. 
Fix 20.04.12 for framing issue." 
24. These two orders dated 19.01.2012 and 21.2.2012 D 
were challenged by the appellants-landlords by filing a civil 
revision before the Calcutta High Court. The High Court after 
taking into consideration all the facts including those mentioned 
hereinabove dismissed the revision petition by holding as 
under: 
E 
"This being the position, in my view, the defendant has 
complied with the orders passed on the application under 
Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act. It may be mentioned herein 
that the said application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 F 
Act was disposed of on contests and then the defendant/ 
tenant/opposite party herein has complied with the orders 
passed therein. Under the circumstances, the order 
dated 19.01.2012 passed by the learned trial Judge, in 
my view, cannot be said to be contrary to the order passed G
by the Hon'bleApex Court ratherthe learned trial Judge, 
in my view, has disposed of the said application in 
accordance with the law. 
So far as the impugned orders are concerned, though H
804 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 6 S.C.R. 
after disposing of the application under Section 7(1) of 
the 1997 Act, the defendant/tenant was not able to comply 
with the orders, yet, if there is any default for the 
intervening period prior to the date of disposal of the 
application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act, in my 
view, the Court is free to pass appropriate orders 
calculating the arrears of rent to be paid. Such a recourse 
has been adopted by the learned trial Judge by passing 
the order dated 19.01.2012. The said order dated 
19.01.2012 has already been complied with by the 
defendant/tenant/opposite party herein by depositing the 
amount as per direction of the Court on 07 .02.2012, i.e. 
within the 30 days from the date of disposal of the 
application under Section 7(2) 0r int: 1997 Act. In my 
view, while passing the order dated 21.2.2012 for review, 
the learned trial Judge had no other alternative but to 
dismiss the said application, though he has recorded a 
different ground that he has no power to review his own 
order." 
25. It is worth to mention here that as against the finding 
of the trial court that since the respondent-tenant deposited 
the rent with the Rent Controller instead of depositing it in the 
Court respondent-tenant became a defaulter as contemplated 
F under Section 7(1) of the Act, tenant filed the review petition 
under Section 151 CPC. The said application was rejected 
and the revision petition filed against the
said order was also 
dismissed by the High Court. The review petition filed by the 
respondent in the High Court was dismissed by order dated 
G 14.2.2013. The respondent then moved before this Court 
against the order dated 14.2.2013 by fling a special leave 
petition. The said special leave petition was taken up on 
29. 7 .2013 and was dismissed with the observation that it would 
be open to the SLP pP.titioner (respondent-tenant herein) to 
H raise all questions befo:-e the Court, as to whether the alleg~d
MONOJ LAL SEAL v. OCTAVIOUS TEA& INDUSTRIES 805 
. 
LTD. [M. Y. EQBAL, J.] 
default is bona fide. The order dated 29.1:2013 passed by A 
this Court is quoted herein below: 
"We see no ground to entertain these special leave 
petitions. The special leave petitions are dismissed. 
B 
However, we leave it open to the petitioner to raise all 
questions before the Court below where the trial is 
pending including the default alleged against him so as 
to consider whether the same can be treated as bona 
fide in order to satisfy the condition laid down under c 
Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 
1997." 
26. As discussed above, the instant appeal by special 
leave is against orders dated 19.1.2012 and 21.2.2012 passed D 
by the trial court rejecting the review petition filed by the 
appellants-landlords holding that the respondent-tenant has 
complied with the order passed on the application under 
Section 7 (2) of the Act. 
27. In the background of all these facts and the sequence E 
of the orders passed by Small Causes Court up to this Court, 
we have carefully analysed the decisions of this Court referred 
by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 
28. Indisputably, the Rent Control Acts have been enacted 
F 
in different States with the object to protect the tenants from 
·illegal eviction without obtaining the decree or order fro111 a 
competent Court on one or more grounds provided in those 
Acts. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits
conferred on the tenants through those Rent Control Acts can G 
be enjoyed only after strict compliance with the statutory 
provisions. 
29. Mr. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the 
appellants, mainly contended that Section 7(1) of 1997 Act H
806 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 6 S.C.R. 
A 
shall have to be strictly complied with by the tenant by 
depositing entire rent as contemplated in the said provision 
within a fixed time. But in the instant case, there is no dispute 
that the respondent-tenant deposited the rent as required under 
Section 7(1) of the Act with the Rent Controller instead of 
B depositing the same with the Civil Judge. The deposit of such 
rent by the tenant with the Rent Controller instead of Civil Judge 
as per the amendments which came into effect on 1.6.2006 
was either deliberate or a bonafide mistake. This may be the 
reason, this Court in the earlier special leave petition made 
C an observation that the respondent-tenant may satisfy the Court 
that such deposit was bonafide. 
30. We have given our anxinw• rnn~!~eration to the matter 
and the order impugned passed by the High Court holding 
D thatthe orders dated 19.1.2012 and 21.2.2012 passed by the 
Small Causes Court need no interference. We are also of the 
same opinion that having regard to the order passed by this 
Court by giving liberty to the tenant to satisfy that such deposit 
with the Rent Controller instead of Civil Judge was bonafide, 
E the impugned order passed by the High Court is thus fully 
justified. 
F 
31. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in 
this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. 
Kalpana K Tripathy 
Appeal dismissed.