M/S. SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS
[2015] 3 S.C.R. 829, Supreme Court of India, 2015
Outcome: Dismissed (Dismissed)
Segment: Ratio
[2015] 3 S.C.R. 829 
M/S. SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA 
A 
v. 
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRAAND OTHERS 
Civil Appeal Nos. 2475-2476 of 2015 
FEBRUARY 27, 2015 
[ M.Y. EQBAL AND KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.] 
B 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. 40 - Court receiver C 
-
Continuance of - After disposal of the appeal -
Permissibility - Held: Ordinarily the function of Receiver 
comes to an end with the final decision of the case -
However, even after the final decision the Court has 
discretion to take further assistance of the Receiver - Jn the D 
instant case, since the decree-holder had kept the decree 
in execution for recovery of possession, the executing court 
could have taken assistance of the Receiver only for 
affecting delivery of possession and not more than that. 
E 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: When a Receiver is appointed pending suit 
or appeal, the prime objective is to preserve the 
property by taking possession or otherwise and to keep F 
an account of rent and profits that may be realized by 
the Receiver and to submit it before the court till the 
lis is finally decided. Ordinarily the function of receivers 
comes to an end with the final decision of the case. 
However, even after the final decision, the Court has the G 
discretion to take further assistance of the Receiver as 
and when the need arises. In the instant case, the 
appellants have already put the decree in execution for 
829 
H
830 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
recovery of possession. Therefore, the Executing Court 
while executing the decree may take assistance of the 
Receiver or by appointing new Receiver or 
Commissioner for effecting delivery of possession in 
accordance with law and not more than that. In the facts 
B and circumstances of the case, there is no error in the 
impugned order passed by the High Court. [para 14-15] 
[836-G-H; 837-A-D] 
c 
Halsbury Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 32; Law of 
Receiver, 4th Edn. by James L. High - referred to. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 
2475-2476 of 2015. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.01.2013 of the 
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Court Receiver's 
D Report No. 25 of 2007 and Additional Report No. 383 of 
2012 in Appeal from Order No. 221 of 1980 in C. A. No. 
11569 of 1980. 
Shyam Divan, Ayaz Bilawala, Manish Parikh, Mahesh 
E Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, E. C. Agrawala, Pratush Panjwani 
for the Appellant. 
Aniruddha P. Mayee, Charuddatta Mahindrakar, A. 
Selvin Raja, Vinay Navare, Satyajeet Kumar, Keshav, Abha 
R. Sharma, Asha Gopalan Nair, Sushil Karanjkar, Ratan G. 
F Wasekar, K. N. Rai for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
M.Y. EQBAL, J. 1. Leave granted. 
G 
2. In the instant appeals by special leave the appellant 
assailed the order dated 14th January, 2013 passed by the 
learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Court 
Receiver's Report No.25 of 2007 and
Additional Report No. 
383 of 2012, whereby the High Court while disposing of the 
Report of the Court Receiver held that after the disposal of 
H First Appeal No. 767 of 1998 and dismissal of the special
SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA v. THE STATE 831 
OF MAHARASHTRA [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] 
leave petition, the Receiver deemed to have been A 
discharged. 
3. It appears that the suit property was declared as 
evacuee property and the same was purchased by the 
appellant in an auction sale as far back as on 15.6.1964. B 
In the year 1980, the appellant filed a suit being Civil Suit 
No. 37 of 1980 before the District Judge, Thane Court 
seeking specific performance of the sale of the property and 
possession and interim relief of injunction restraining the 
defendants therein from carrying on further construction on C 
the suit property. The appellant further made a prayer for 
appointment of Receiver. 
4. The trial court rejected the prayer for appointment 
of Receiver by order dated 3.5.1980 and against that, D 
appellant moved the High Court in First Appeal, which was 
finally heard and order dated 22. 7 .1980 was passed 
appointing the Court Receiver. The High Court while making 
appointment of the Receiver directed to take possession of 
the suit property. All the persons who were in actual E 
possession of any part of the suit property were continued 
to remain in possession. The Receiver was directed to 
collect rent and compensation as the case may be from all 
the persons in actual possession after verifying from them 
their present right to remain in possession. The High Court F 
further directed that the Receiver should take suitable 
direction from the court if he was
presented with any 
particular difficulty. 
5. Indisputably, the suit was finally disposed of on G 
4.2.1998. While disposing the suit, the trial court gave liberty 
to the plaintiff-appellant to move the High Court for 
directions for taking possession of the suit property from 
the Court Receiver so appointed by the High Court. 
H
832 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2015] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
6. As against the judgment and decree of the trial court, 
First Appeal was filed being F.A. No.767of1988, which was 
finally heard and dismissed by the High Court vide judgment 
dated 22.12.2004. The special leave petition filed against 
the judgment of the High Court was also dismissed on 
B 19.2.2007. 
7. It further reveals from the record that the Court 
Receiver so appointed submitted Report No.25/2007 before 
the High Court seeking directions with regard to the 
C encroachment on the suit property and handing over 
possession to the appellant. The Court Receiver also 
submitted Additional Report No.383 of 2012. The High Court 
after taking into consideration these Court Receiver's 
reports, passed the impugned order holding that the receiver 
D shall be deemed to have been discharged after the 
dismissal of the first appeal by the High Court, followed by 
dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme 
Court. 
8. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. Shyam Divan, 
E learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, 
submitted that even after the disposal of the appeal, 
affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court, the 
Court Receiver continues in his office till he is discharged 
and fulfills all the incidental obligations that are cast upon 
F him by virtue of his appointment and till he renders account 
to the Commissioner of Accounts. 
9. The short question, therefore, that falls for 
consideration is as
to whether after the disposal of the 
G appeal, the Court Receiver stands discharged or whether 
he continues in his office till an order of discharge is passed 
by the Court? 
10. The High Court in the impugned order observed: 
H 
"The directions cannot be issued only on assumption
• 
SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA v. THE STATE 833 
OF MAHARASHTRA [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] 
that this Court was monitoring the matter for all these years A 
irrespective of disposal of the Appeal from Order. That may 
be the understanding of parties, but before me nothing has 
been placed which would enable me to hold that from 1983 
till this report was filed in the year 2007, this Court had 
issued any directions or had passed any orders indicative B 
of control over the Court Receiver. In fact the Court 
Receiver's reports and paragraphs of which have been 
reproduced by me hereinabove, would indicate that it is only 
the correspondence and meetings of parties with the Court 
Receiver or his representative that have been referred to. 
C 
The Court Receiver seems to b e now for the first time 
informing the Court of such meetings and contents of letters. 
He has not sought any direction for all these decades and 
because the parties were engaging and involving him in D 
correspondence, does not mean that the Court has in any 
way continued him. If it is the understanding of parties that 
the Court Receiver continues, then, that cannot be proved 
only by his correspondence. The Court Receiver, High Court 
of Bombay, on account of his own limitation and lack of E 
understanding may be under an impression that he 
continues as a Receiver of the immovable property despite 
disposal of the Appeal from Order, main suit, First Appeal 
and thereafter, the proceedings before the Honourable
Supreme Court. If that is the understanding which he has F 
given to parties or parties have given to him and he 
entertains correspondence and holds meetings, by itself and 
without anything more cannot assist the Plaintiffs/Decree 
Holders. The Court cannot issue any directions .on such 
reports and filed belatedly. In fact the Plaintiffs/Decree G 
Holders understood that they have to proceed to execute 
and enforce the Decree for possession in their favour by 
adopting appropriate proceedings. Even then they have 
continued the correspondence and persuaded the Court 
Receiver to file reports before this Court, does not mean H
834 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 3 S.C.R. 
A that the Court is obliged to take cognizance of the same. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
To my mind these are thoroughly misconceived 
proceedings and the remedy of the Plaintiffs/Decree 
Holders lies elsewhere. They cannot insist on the Court 
passing orders only because of continued 
correspondence and meetings with the Court Receiver. 
The Court has not authorized him nor has he sought 
permission of the Court authorising him in any manner 
to continue in possession of the suit property. If parties 
and equally the Court Receiver do not deem it fit to 
approach this Court for all these years and seek its 
intervention or interference, then, all the more they 
cannot in the exercise that is now carried out, insist on 
directions to be given to the Court Receiver. Equally, 
the Court Receiver cannot pray for any direction. If the 
Court Receiver continues to be in possession and 
wants to handover possession to the parties claiming 
under the Decree, then he is at liberty to move the 
Executing Court. If the plaintiffs/Decree Holders desire 
any directions being given to the Court Receiver, then 
it is for them to seek appropriate reliefs and directions 
in the pending execution proceedings. It is open to the 
Court Receiver or parties to do so. This Court after the 
disposal of the Appeal from Order has nothing before 
it which could be said to be pending. The First Appeal 
is disposed of long time back. The Reports are filed in
proceedings which are no longer pending, but are 
disposed of finally. Neither the parties nor the Court 
Receiver sought any further directions from the Court." 
11. In paragraph 49 of the order the High Court noted 
the following:-
"Therefore, the record of that case was perused by the · 
H 
learned judge in its entirety and he found that the order
SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA v. THE STATE . 835 
OF MAHARASHTRA [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] 
was passed dischargi.ng the Court receiver on A 
26.11.1992 and at the same time continuing him for 
certain period to enable parties to file the Appeal from 
the said order. The Appeals were filed, but same were 
dismissed by a Division Bench and the Special Leave 
Petition which was filed before the Supreme Court also B 
came to be dismissed on 27.07.1993. The issue was 
whether the Court Receiver became functus officio right 
from the date when the order was passed on 
26.11.1992 discharging the Court receiver or whether 
the Court Receiver continued to be in charge of the C 
property on account of pendency of his reports before 
the Court and for the other reasons pointed out by the 
counsel for the Plaintiffs and Defendant No.2 therein." 
12. Normally, when a Receiver is appointed on an D 
interlocutory application without any limit of time, it is 
necessary to provide for the continuance of his appointment 
in the final judgment. In Halsbury Laws of England, 3r<1 Edn., 
Vol. 32 (Lord Simond) at page 386 says :-
E 
"When a receiver is appointed for a limited time, as in 
the case of interim orders, his office determines on the 
expiration of that time without any further order of the 
court, and if the appointment is 'until judgment or further 
order' it is brought to an end by the judgment in the F 
action. The judgment may provide for the continuance 
of the receiver, but this is
regarded as a new 
appointment. If a further order of the court, though silent 
as~ to the receivership, is inconsistent with a 
continuance of the receiver, it may operate as a G 
discharge." 
When a receiver has been appointed on an 
interlocutory application without any limit of time, it is 
not necessary to provide for the continuance of his H
836 
A 
B 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015) 3 S.C.R. 
appointment in the final judgment The silence of the 
judgment does not operate as a discharge of the 
receiver or determination of his powers. So also the 
appointment of a receiver by the judgment in an 
administration action need not be continued by the 
order, no further consideration." 
13. In Law of Receiver, 4th Edn. by James L. High, the 
following observation appears at page 985:-
C 
"the functions of a receiver usually terminate with the 
termination of the litigation in which he was appointed. 
And when the bill upon which the appointment was 
made is afterwards dismissed upon demurrer, the 
duties of the receiver cease as between the parties to 
o 
the action ..... And although as between the parties to 
the litigation his functions have terminated with the 
determination of the suit, he is still amenable to the 
court as its officer until he has complied with its 
directions as to the disposal the funds which he has 
E 
received during the course of his receivership .... But an 
order of discharge does not necessarily follow, in all 
cases, because of the determination of the suit, and 
the court may, upon sufficient cause shown, either 
discharge or continue the receiver, according to the 
F 
exigencies of the case." 
14. In our view, when a Receiver is appointed pending 
suit or appeal, the prime objective is to preserve the 
property by taking possession or otherwise and to keep an 
G account of rent and
profits that may be realizedoy the 
Receiver and to submit it before the court till the lis is finally 
decided. Ordinarily the function of receivers who are 
appointed comes to an end with the final decision of the 
case. However, even after the final decision, the Court has 
H the discretion to take further assistance of the Receiver as

SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA v. THE STATE 837 
OF MAHARASHTRA [M.Y EQBAL, J.] 
and when the need arises. In the instant case, admittedly, A 
the appellants have already put the decree in execution for 
recovery of possession. We are, therefore, of the opinion 
that the Executing Court while executing the decree may 
take assistance of the Receiver or by appointing new 
Receiver or Commissioner for effecting delivery of B 
possession in accordance with law and not more than that. 
15. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do 
not find any erro~ in the impugned order passed by the High 
Court. The Civil Appeals are, therefore, of no merit and are C 
dismissed. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeals dismissed.