MAHESHWAR PERI & OTHERS versus HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD THROUGH  REGISTRAR GENERAL
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 213, Supreme Court of India, 2016
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 213 . 
MAHESHWAR PERI & OTHERS 
v. 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD THROUGH 
REGISTRAR GENERAL 
(Criminal Appeal No. 549of2016) 
JUNE30.2016 
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND ROHINTON FALi NARIMAN, JJ.] 
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s. 20 - Suo motu initiation of 
contempt proceedings - Period of limitation - Publication of article 
authored by the third appellant in a magazine wherein names of 
iudges allegedly involved in the case incorporated - Application 
by advocate before the High Court for initiating contempt 
proceedings on its own motion since the article caused insult to the 
higher judiciary - Petition placed before the Single Judge and 
thereafter, the Chief Justice - Four years later matter listed before 
the Division Bench of the High Court - High Court initiated suo 
motu action, and name of the petitioner was not to be shown in the 
cause list - On appeal, held: Article having been published in 2008 . 
and the High Court having initiated the suo motu action only in 
2015, the same is hit by the limitation of one year - Action uls. 15 
was initiated suo motu by the High Court - It was said that the name 
of the petitioner is not to be shown in the cause list - Apparently, it 
can only he suo motu because the application filed by the advocates, 
is without the consent in writing of the Advocate General - Only 
application other than by the Advocate General, contemplated uls. 
15, is the motion made by any person with the consent in writing of 
the
Advocate General - Constitution of India - Arts.129 and 215. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 The criminal contempt of a court subordinate to 
High Court can be initiated either suo motu or on a motion made 
by the Advocate General. The suo motu action is set in motion on 
a Reference made to it by the subordinate court. In view of the 
process involved in making the Reference by the subordinate 
court, in *Pal/av Sheth case, it has been held that the Reference 
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[2016] 3 S.C.R. 
is the starting point of the process of initiation of the action for 
contempt. Unless a court was to take s110 mot11 action, the 
proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would 
normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the 
attention of the court to the contempt having been committed. 
The application is the motion provided under Section 15 of the 
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Such a motion, by any person 
other than Advocate General, can be made only with the consent 
in writing of the Advocate General. In other words, any other 
application made by a person without the consent of the Advocate 
General, is not an application in the eyes of law. [Para 14] (218-
H; 219-A-C] 
1.2 The High Court is clear in its mind that the action under 
Section 15 of the Act is initiated suo motu by the High Court. To 
make it abundantly clear in the impugned order, it is said that the 
name of the petitioner is not to be shown in the cause list. 
Apparently, it can only be s110 motu because the application filed 
by the advocates, and which is referred to in the impugned order, 
is without the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The 
only application other than by the Advocate General, 
contemplated under Section 15 of the Act, is the motion made by 
any person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. 
Being a jurisdiction which, when exercised, is fraught with serious
consequences, the Parliament has thought it justifiably fit to 
provide for such safeguards. Thus, the impugned article, having 
been published on 10.11.2008 and the High Court having initiated 
the suo motu action only on 28.04.2015, the same is hit by the 
limitation of one year prescribed under the Act. [Para 161 [219-
G-H; 220-A]] 
*Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Others (2001) 7 SCC 
549: 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 387 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 387 
referred to 
Para 14 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 
No. 549 of 2016. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.04.2015 of the High Court 
of Judicature at Allahabad in Contempt Application (Criminal) No. 21 of 
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2008.
MAHESHWAR PERI v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT 
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ALLAHABAD THROUGH REGISTRAR GENERAL 
A. J. Bhambhani, Sr. Adv., Ms. Sumita Hazarika, Adv. for the 
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Appellants. 
Sunny Choudhary, Adv. for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
KURIAN, J. 1. Leave granted. 
2. What is the period oflimitation for suo motu initiation of contempt 
proceedings, is the short question for consideration in this case. 
3. The Outlook Magazine, in its 10.11.2008 edition, published an 
article authored by the third appellant, which mainly dealt with the 
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infamous Provident Fund Scam. The names of the Judges, \vho are 
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allegedly involved in the case, were published. 
4. On 18.11.2008, one Mr. Manoj Kumar Srivastava and Mr. Veer 
Singh, Advocates practicing in the High Court of Allahabad, filed 
Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of2008 with the following prayer: 
"It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon 'ble Court 
may graciously be pleased to proceed for initiating Criminal 
Contempt proceedings on its own motion against aforesaid opposite 
parties and they be punished accordingly under Article 215 of the 
Constitution of India and or to pass any other order which this 
Hon 'ble Court may deem fit and proper." 
5. According to them, the article "has caused great insult to the 
Higher Judiciary. The remarks are derogatory and have lowered the 
authority of the Higher Judiciary." Learned Counsel appearing for the 
respondent/High Court of Al I aha bad
submits that the petition was placed 
before a Single Judge of the High Court, and thereafter, before the Chief 
Justice. It appears, for about four years, nothing happened in the matter 
until it was listed before the Division Bench of the High Court leading to 
the impugned order dated 28.04.2015. It was held in the impugned order 
that: 
" ... The publication dated 10.11.2008 at page 56, 57, 58, 59 as 
mentioned above has caused great insult to the higher Judiciary. 
The remarks are derogatory and lower the authority of the higher 
Judiciary. 1 lence, it is a fit case to take 'suo motu' action by this 
Court. Accordingly, we take 'suo motu' action. Hence the name 
of the petitioner is not to be shown in the cause list." 
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[2016) 3 S.C.R. 
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"Let a notice be issued to contemnor opposite party no. 2,3,4, 
namely, Mr. Maheshwer Peri, Mr. 8ishwadeep Moitra, Sushri 
Chandrani Benerji through Chief Judicial Magistrate Ghaziabad 
to show cause why the charges be not framed against them for 
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committing contempt of this Court and to punish them in 
accordance with law. They shall also appear in person on the · 
next date." 
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6. Aggrieved, appellants are before this Court. 
· 7. Aswe propose to deal with the legal contention on limitation, it is 
not necessary for us to go into. the question as to whether the article 
actually constitutes contempt. 
8. The main contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the 
appellants is that the High Court, having initiated action only after four 
years of the alleged contempt, the whol.e proceedings are barred by 
Section 20 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred 
to as 'the Act') which has prescribed the period of limitation of one year 
for initiating any proceedings of contempt, be it suo motu or otherwise. 
Section 20 of the Act reads as follows: 
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt.-No court shall 
initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion ~r 
otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date 
·on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." 
9. Learned Counsel appearing for the High Court, however, contends 
that being an
action initiated by the High Court under Article 215 of the 
Constitution oflndia 1!nd since the genesis of the initiation of the contempt 
is the application dated 18.11.2008 filed by Mr. Manoj Kumar Srivastava 
and Mr. Veer Singh, Advocates, and since the High Court had considered 
the application within one year aDd had taken action by issuing notice, 
though after six years, it is within time. 
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I 0. Our attention is invited to a three-Judge Bench decision of this 
Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others1 and particular to 
paragraphs-39 an.d 40. Paragraphs 39 and 40 reads as follows:. 
"39. fo the case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the 
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1 (2001) 7 sec 549
MAHESHWAR PERI v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 
THROUGH. REGISTRAR GENERAL [KURIAN, J.] 
High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the 
subordinate com1 or on a motion made by the Advocate-General 
or the Law Officer of the Central Government in the case of a 
Union Territory. This reference or motion can conceivably 
commence on an application being filed by a person whereupon 
the subordinate court or the Advocate-General if it is so satisfied 
may refer the matter to the High Court. Proceedings for civil 
contempt normally commence with a person aggrieved bringing 
to the notice of the court the wilful disobedience of any judgment, 
decree, order etc. which could amount to the commission of the 
offence. The attention of the court is drawn to such a contempt 
being committed only by a person filing an application in that behalf. 
In other words, unless a court was to take a suo motu action, the 
proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would 
normally commence with the filing ofan application drawing the 
attention of the court to the contempt having been committed. 
When the judicial procedure requires an application being filed 
either before the court or consent being sought by a person from 
the Advocate-General or a Law Officer, it must logically follow 
that proceedings for contempt are initiated when the applications 
are made. 
40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for 
taking cognizance of criminal contempt
under Section 15 would 
be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action 
taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment 
thereafter are only steps following or succeeding such initiation. 
Similarly, in the case of a civil contempt, filing of an application 
drawing the attention of the court is necessary for further steps to 
be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971." 
11. We are afraid, the contentions adv~nced by the learned Counsel 
for the appellants cannot be appreciated. Be it an action initiated for 
contempt under Article 129 of the Constitution of India by the Supreme 
Court or under Article 215 of the Constitution oflndia by the High Court, 
it is now settled law that the prosecution procedure should be in 
consonance with the Act, as held by this Court in Pallav Sheth case 
(supra). 
12. And thus, the dispute boils down to the question of limitation 
only. 
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13. Under the Act, the action for contempt is taken by only two 
courts, either the Supreme Court or the High Court. The procedure is 
prescribed under Section 15 of the Act, which reads as follows: 
"15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.-W 
In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred 
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to in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take 
action on its own motion or on a motion made by-
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(fil the Advocate-General, or 
OU any other person, with the consent in writing to (sic of) the 
Advocate-General, or 
(£}in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, 
such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification 
in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, 
with the consent in writing of such Law Officer. 
ill In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, 
the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the 
subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General 
or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer as the 
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, 
specify in this behalf. 
ill Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify 
the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty. 
Explanation .-In this section, the expression "Advocate-General" 
means-
(fil in relation to the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General
or the 
Solicitor-General; 
OU in relation to the High Court, the Advocate-General of the 
State or any of the States for which the High Court has been 
established; 
(£}in relation to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner, such Law 
Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the 
Official Gazette, specify in this behalf." 
14. Criminal Contempt of com1 subordinate to High Court can be 
initiated either suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate General. 
The suo motu action is set in motion on a Reference made to it by the
MAHESHWARPERI v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 
THROUGH. REGISTRAR GENERAL [KURIAN, J.] 
subordinate court. In view of the process involved in making the Reference 
by the subordinate court, in Pallav Sheth case (supra), it has been held 
that the Reference is the starting point of the process of initiation of the 
action for contempt. That is why in paragraph-39, which we have 
extracted above, it has been clearly held that ... "unless a court was to 
take suo motu action, the proceeding under The Contempt of Courts 
Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an application 
drawing the attention of the court to the contempt having been committed. 
"The application is the motion provided under Section 15 of The Contempt 
of Courts Act, 1971. Such a motion, by any person other than Advocate 
General, can be made only with the consent in writing of the Advocate 
General. In other words, any other application made by a person without 
the consent of the Advocate General, is not an application in the eyes of 
law." 
15.This aspect has been succinctly discussed and subtly 
distinguished in paragraph-44 of the Pallav Sheth case (supra). To quote 
paragraph-44: 
"44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, 
that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise 
than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each 
case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo 
motu proceedings, it is the court itself
which must initiate by issuing 
a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing 
an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction 
to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, 
either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo 
motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the 
contempt is alleged to have been committed." 
16. Coming to the factual matrix of the present case, the High 
Court is clear in its mind that the action under Section 15 of the Act is 
initiated suo 1110/U by the High Court. To make it abundantly clear in the 
impugned order, it is said that the name of the petitioner is not to be 
shown in the cause list. Apparently, it can only be suo motu because the 
application filed by the advocates, and which is referred to in the impugned 
order, is without the consent in writing of the Advocate G~neral. The 
only application other than by the Advocate General, contemplated under 
Section 15 of the Act, is the motion made by any person with the consent 
in writing of the Advocate General. Being a jurisdiction which, when 
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exercised, is fraught with serious consequences, the Parliament has 
thought it justifiably fit to provide for such safeguards. Thus, the impugned 
article, having been published on I 0.11.2008 and the High Court having 
initiated the suo motu action only on 28.04.2015, the same is hit by the 
limitation of one year prescribed under the Act. 
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17. In that view of the matter, it has become unnecessary for us to 
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deal with the submissions on merits as to whether the contents of the 
article would constitute criminal contempt or not. 
18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is 
set aside. 
Nidhi Jain 
Appeal allowed.