M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY versus KHATOONBEE AND ANR.
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 1, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
f201712 S.C.R. 1 
· M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY 
v. 
KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
(Civil Appeal No. 2555 of2017) 
FEBRUARY 09, 2017 
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI, N. V. RAMANA 
AND DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.) 
Delay I Laches: 
Delay of 28 years - In filing claim petition uls. 166 of Motor 
Vehicles Act, 1988 - Entertained by courts below holding that.the 
1988 Act does not provide limitation for raising claim for 
compensation - On appeal, held: Even though no period of limitation 
is prescribed under 1988 Act, claim can be raised and can be 
considered to be genuine, so long it is a live and surviving claim -
Claim can be raised only within reasonable time - The question of 
reasonability would depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
case - In the present case, delay of 28 years cannot be considered 
as prima facie reasonable period - The. claim, in the facts and 
circumstances of the case, was stale and ought to have been treated 
as dead claim - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - s. 166(3). 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 A perusal of the provision of Section HOA of 
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 reveals that a period of limitation of 
six months (from the date of occurrence of the accident) was 
provided for, to· raise a claim for compensation. In the successor 
legislation, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166(3), 
as originally enacted, also provided for limitation of a period of 
six months for filing a claim petition. However, on this occasion, 
· a bar was
introduced for entertaining a claim petition, a.rising out 
of a motor accident after twelve months (from the date of 
occurrence of the accident). Obviously, the period of limitation 
provided for through Section 166(3) of the 1988 Act, could be 
relaxed upto twelve months, by demonstrating that' there was 
sufficient cause for such delay. The period of limitation provided 
under Section 166(3) aforementioned was completely done away 
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with, with effect from 14.11.1994, as Section 166(3) came to be 
deleted, from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. [Paras 4, 5, 6] [5-C-
E; 6-F-ll] 
1.2 Eve 1 though no period of limitation remains prescribed, 
after the amrndment of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 
1988, whereb: • sub-Section (3) of Section 166 came to be deleted 
yet it would be imperative to determine, whether at the juncture 
when the claimant approached the Motor Accident Claims 
Tribunal, the :laim was a live and surviving claim. A claim raised 
before the Mo •tor Accident Claims Tribunal, can be considered 
to be genuine, so long as it is a live and surviving claim. It is not 
as if, it can be c •pen to all and sundry,'to approach a Motor Accident 
Claims Tribnil d, to raise a claim for compensation, at any juncture, 
after the accid mt had taken place. The individual concerned, must 
approach the fribnnal within a reasonable time. [Paras 12 and 
13] [15-D, G- HJ 
1.3 The question of reasonability would naturally depend 
on the facts a1 d circumstances of each case. A delay of 28 years, 
even wi.thout . ·eference to any other fact, cannot be considered 
as a prima fa' ie reasonable period, for approaching the Motor 
Accident Claims Tribunal. The justification expressed at the 
behest of the 1 es pond en ts, for approaching the Tribunal, after a 
period of 28 years, that the Petitioners are poor person and they 
have no kno vi edge
about the Law, cannot be accepted. 
Undoubtedly, the claim in the facts and circumstances of the 
instant case, w is stale, and ought to have been treated as a dead 
claim, at the pc fat of time, when the respondents approached the 
Tribunal by fil1 ng a claim petition, on 23.02.2005. Thus, the claim 
raised by the respondents before the Motor Accident Claims 
Tribunal, was not a surviving claim, wJien the respondents 
approached the· said Tribunal. [Paras 14, 15, 16] [16-A-B, D-E) 
Co-rporat1 on Bank " Navin J. Shah (2000) 2 SCC 628; 
'Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank v. 
Nee/am (: 005) 5 SCC 91 : [2005] 2 SCR 424 - relied 
on. 
Dhanna/,1/ v. D.P. Vijayvargiya (1996) 4 SCC 
652:[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 417; The New India
MIS. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
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Assurance Co.Ltd. v. C. Padma (2003) 7 SCC 
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713: [2003) 3 Suppl. SCR 677 - distinguished. 
2. The appellant was directed to deposit a sum of 
Rs.25,000/- towards litigation expenses, payable to the 
respondents. The aforesaid deposit was actually made since the 
deposit was made, and was payable to the respondents, it is just 
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and appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to 
direct the Registry of this Court, to transmit the aforesaid amount 
of Rs.25,000/- to the respondents, by way of a cheque, drawn in 
the name of respondent No.I. [Para 17) [16-F-G) 
Case Law Reference 
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[1996) 2 Suppl. SCR 417 
[2003) 3 Suppl. SCR 677 
(2000) 2 sec 628 
[2005) 2 SCR 424 
distinguished 
distinguished 
relied on 
relied on 
Para 7 
Para 7 
Para 10 
Para 11 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2555 
of20I7 
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.07.2015 of the High Court 
of Bombay at Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Writ Petition No. 3647 of2007. 
Ankur Mittal, Adv., for the Appellant. 
Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Adv., for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI 1. Heard learned counsel 
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for..the rival parties. 
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2. The daughter of the respondents died in a motor accident on 
02.02.1977. A claim petition was filed, under Section 166 of the Motor 
Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1988 Act'), seeking 
compensation on account of the motor
accident, wherein the respondents' 
daughter had died, on 23.02.2005 i.e., after a period of more than 28 
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years. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 
'the Tribunal') entertained the above claim. A prayer made to reject the 
claim petition, for the reason, that the said claim had been raised 28 
years after the accident in question, was rejected. It is in these 
circumstances, that M/s Purohit and Company (the petitioner herein) 
approached the High Court, wherein, the matter was re-adjudicated. 
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Again, a prayer was made at the hands of the petitioner, that the claim 
had been made belatedly, and was not a surviving claim. The High 
Court, upheld the justiciability of the claim petition, on the short ground, 
that no period of limitation had been provided for raising a claim for 
compensation, under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The judgment 
rendered by the High Court on 07.07.2015, has been assailed by M/s 
Purohit & Company through the instant petition for special leave to 
appeal. 
3. Leave granted. 
4. While raising a cl1allenge to the impugned judgment, in the first 
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instance, a reference was made to Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles 
Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1939 Act'.), in order to 
demonstrate, that a period of limitation, at the time, was provided for, 
referable to the date when the accident had taken place. Section 11 OA 
aforementioned is being extracted hereunder: 
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"110-A. Application for compensation.- (1) An application for 
compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified 
in sub-section ( 1) of Section 110 may be made-
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( a) by the person who has sustained· the injury; or 
(aa) by th'e owner of the property; or 
(b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of 
the legal representatives of the deceased; or 
(c} by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or 
any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the
case may be: 
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the 
deceased have not joined ip any such application for 
compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for 
the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and 
the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be imp leaded 
as respondents to the application. 
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made to the 
Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the 
accident occurred, and shal I be in such form and shall contain 
such particulars as may be prescribed.
MIS. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJJ] 
Provided that where any claim for compensation under Section 
92-A is made in such application, the application shall contain a 
separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature 
of the applicant; 
(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained 
unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the 
accident: 
Provided thatthe Claims Tribunal may entertain the application 
after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied 
thatthe applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making 
the application in time." 
(emphasis is ours) 
A perusal of the provision of Section 11 OA of the 1939 Act, extracted 
above, reveals, that a period oflimitation of six months (from the date of 
occurrence of the accident) was provided for, to raise a claim for 
compensation. 
5. In the successor legislation, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act, 
1988, Section 166(3), as originally enacted, also provided for limitation 
of a period of six months for filing a claim petition. Section 166 
afore"'entioned is extracted hereunder: 
"166.Application for compensation.- (I) An application for 
compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified 
in sub-section (I) of section 165 may be made-
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or 
(b) by the owner of the property;. or 
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( c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or
any of 
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the legal representatives of the deceased; or 
( d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or a!I or 
any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case 
maybe: 
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the 
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deceased have not joined in any such application for 
compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for 
the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and 
the legal representatives who have not so joined, shal I be impleaded 
as respondents to the application. 
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(2) Every application under sub-section (I) shal I be made, at the 
option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having 
jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to 
the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction 
the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local 
limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in 
such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed: 
Provided that where no c I aim for compensation under section 
140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a 
separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature 
of the applicant. 
(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained 
unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the 
accident: 
Provided thatthe Claims Tribunal may ente1tain the application 
after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than 
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twelve months. if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented 
by sufficient cause from making the application in time. 
( 4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents 
forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of section 158 as an 
application for compensation under this Act. 
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(emphasis is ours) 
A perusal of the original provision of Section 166 of the 1988 Act, 
extracted above reveals, that once again a period of limitation of six 
months (from the date of occurrence of
the accident) was provided for. 
However, on this occasion, a bar was introduced for entertaining a claim 
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petition, arising out of a motor accident after twelve months (from the 
date ofoccurrence of the accident). Obviously, the period of I imitation 
provided for through Section 166(3) of the 1988 Act, could be relaxed 
upto twelve months, by demonstrating that there was sufficient cause 
for such delay. 
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6. It would however, be pertinent to mention, that the period of 
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limitation provided under Section 166(3) aforementioned was completely 
done away with, with effect from 14.11.1994, as Section 166(3) came to 
be deleted, from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The question which has 
arisen for consideration, in the instant appeal, is the consequence of the 
omission of sub-Section (3) of Section 166 of the 1988 Act. Does the
M/S. PUROH!T AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
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[JAGD!SH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!] 
above omission have the effect of allowing a claimant, to file a claim 
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application, at any time, and whenever he chooses? Even after a decade! 
7. The contention of the respondents-claimants to overcome the 
period of limitation was based on two judgments. Firstly, it is based on 
the judgment in Dhannalal vs. D.P.Vijayvargiya, ( 1996) 4 SCC 652, 
wherein, this Court had held as under: 
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"7.!n this background, now it has to be examined as to what is 
the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the 
Act. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said 
sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the 
sametime, there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that 
benefit of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to be 
extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation 
has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from 
Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose 
an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994 
when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one 
reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim 
or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be 
not filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of such accident? Whether 
a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by the 
Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of
twelve months which had been prescribed when sub-section 
(3) of Section 166 was in force having expired the right to prefer 
the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived 
after deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994? 
According to us, the answer should be in negative. When sub-
section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal 
has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date 
on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions 
cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions 
were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section I 66 was 
in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to 
time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the 
new Act in order to protect the interests of the victims of the 
accidents and their heirs ifthe victims die. One such amendment 
has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act 
54 of 1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of Section 158 which 
provides: 
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"158. ( 6)As soon as any information regarding any accident 
involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or 
report under this section is completed by a police officer, the 
officer in charge of the police station shall forward a copy of 
the same within thirty days from the date of recording of 
information or, as the case may be, on completion of such 
report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy 
thereof to the concerned insurer and where a copy is made 
available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt 
of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and 
Insurer." 
In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the officer 
in-charge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy 
of information/report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having 
jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the insurer 
concerned. it also requires that where a copy is made available 
to the ownerofthe vehicle, he shall within thirty days ofreceipt 
of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. 
111 this background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 
166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of 
the said section by Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the 
accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer.ciaim for 
compensation although not being preferred earlier because of
the expiry of the oeriod oflimitation prescribed, how the victim 
or the heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the 
question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is 
pending either before the Tribunal. the High Court or the Supreme 
Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has 
been pursuing from the Tribunal to this Court. His right to get 
compensation in connection with the accident in question is being 
resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filling the 
same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14.11.I 994 in 
respect of the accident which took place on 4.12.1990, view of 
the Amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, 
the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition 
which has been filed and is being pursued upto this Court cannot 
be thrown out on the ground of limitation." 
(emphasis is ours)
M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
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[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!] 
The second judgment on which reliance was placed, was The New 
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India Assurance Co.Ltd. vs. C.Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713, wherein also, 
the matter was adjudicated on the same lines by observing as under: 
"IO. The ratio laid down in Dhannalal's case (supra) applies with 
full force to the facts of the present case. When the claim petition 
was filed sub-section (3) of Section 166 had been omitted. Thus. 
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the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition without 
taking note of the date on which the accident took place. Faced 
with this situation, Mr. Kapoor submitted that Dhannalal's case 
does not consider Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act and 
therefore, needs to be reconsidered. We are unable to accept c 
the submission. Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act. 
undoubte"dly, provides that the repeal ofa provision will not affect 
the continuance of the enactment so repealed and in operation 
at the time of repeal. However. this is subject to "unless a 
different intention appears". In Dhannalal's case the reason for 
the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been set out. 
It is noted that Parliament realized the grave injustice and injury 
caused to heirs and legal representatives of the victims of 
accidents ifthe claim petition was rejected only on the ground of 
limitation. Thus "the different intention" clearly appears and 
Section 6A of the General Clauses Act
would not apply. 
11. Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant, has placed 
reliance on the decision rendered by this Court in Vinod Gurudas 
Raikar vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156. 
The facts of that case were that the appellant was injured in an 
accident, which took place on 22.1.1989. The claim petition of 
the appellant was filed on 15.3 .1990 with a prayer for condonation 
of delay. The Tribunal held that in view of sub-section (3) of 
Section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, which came into 
force on I. 7.1989, the delay of more than six months could not 
be condoned. In the facts and circumstances of that case this 
Court held that the case of the appellant was 'covered by the 
new Act and the delay for a longer period than six months could 
not be condoned. In our view, the facts of the case in Vinod 
Gurudas (supra) are different from the facts of the present case, 
as noticed above. 
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12. The learned counsel for the appellant, next contended that 
since no period of! imitation has been prescribed by the legislature, 
Article 137 of the Limitation Act may be invoked. otherwise, 
according to him, stale claims would be encouraged leading to 
multiplicitv oflitigation for non-prescribing the period oflimitation. 
We are unable to countenance the contention of the appellant 
for more than one reason. Firstly, such an Act like the Motor 
Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief 
to the victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found 
genuine. Secondly. it is a self contained Act which prescribes 
the mode of filing the application, procedure to be followed and 
award to be made. The Parliament. in its wisdom. realised the 
grave injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and legal 
representatives of the victims who suffer bodily injuries/die in 
accidents, by rejecting their claim petitions at the threshold on 
the ground oflimitation, and purposely deleted sub-section (3) of 
Section 166, which provided the period oflimitation for filing the 
claim petitions and this being the intendment of the legislature to 
give effective relief to the victims and the families of the motor 
accidents untrammeled by the technicalities of the limitation, 
invoking of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would defeat the 
intendment of the Legislature.'' 
(emphasis is
ours) 
Based on the aforesaid determination rendered by this Court, the High 
Court, by its impugned order dated 07.07.2015, arrived at the conclusion, 
that there being no period of limitation at the juncture, when the claim 
petition was filed on 23.02.2005, the same could not have been rejected, 
merely for reason of delay. 
8. Dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the High Court 
on 07.07.2015, Mis Purohit and Company has approached this Court, by 
filing the instant appeal. 
9. The solitary contention advanced at the hands of the learned 
counsel for the appellant was, that even though there may no longer be 
a defined period oflimitation, for approaching the Motor Accident Claims 
Tribunal, to raise a claim for compensation (under the provisions of the 
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), yet a claimant must approach a Court, for 
raising such a claim within a reasonable time. It was submitted, that
MIS. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!] 
after a period of time, the claim would be stale and will have to be 
treated as a dead claim. Such a claim, it was submitted, could not be 
treated as a surviving claim. To demonstrate situations when an accident's 
claim would no longer be considered to be a surviving claim, illustratively 
it was submitted, that in a. given case when the evidence to establish the 
rival claims, would not be available, for the mere reason of lapse oftime. 
Either, the witnesses would not be available, or accessible, on account 
of lapse of time, resulting in lapse of memory and a situation in which 
truthful evidence can no longer be recorded. The contention was, that in 
such background, it was imperative for the concerned Court, to determine 
whether, in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the claim 
could be considered as a surviving claim, on the date when the claim 
petition was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 
I 0. In support of the contention advanced at the hands of the 
learned counsel for the appellant, as has been noticed in the foregoing 
paragraph, learned counsel invited our attention to Corporation Bank vs . 
. Navin J.Shah, (2000) 2 SCC 628, wherein a claim for compensation had 
been raised under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, wherein also, 
there was no period oflimitation prescribed (at the time, when the claim 
wasraised). Dealing with the question in hand,
this Court had recorded 
the following observations: 
"12. We may further notice that there is another strong reason 
as to why the claim made by the respondent should not have 
been granted. The transactions in question took place in the years 
1979 and 1981. The difficulties in realisation of the amounts 
due from the consignee also became clear at the time when the 
claim was made before the Corporation and the claim had been 
made as early as on 19-12-1982. The petition before the 
Commission was filed on 25-9-1992 that is clearly a decade after 
a claim had been made before the Corporation. A claim could 
not have been filed by the respondent at this distance of time. 
!.D_Q_ced at the relevant time there was no period of limitation 
under the Consumer Protection Act to prefer a claim before 
the Commission but that does not mean that the claim could 
be made even after an unreasonably long delay. The Commission 
has rejected this contention by a wholly wrong approach in taking 
into consideration that the foreign exchange payable to Reserve 
Bank of India was still due and, therefore, the claim is alive. 
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The claim of the respondent is from the Bank. At any rate, as 
stated earlier, when the claim was made for indemnifying the 
losses suffered from the Corporation, it was clear to the parties 
about the fut ii ity of awaiting any longer for collecting such amounts· 
from the foreign bank. In those circumstances, the claim. if at all 
was to be made. ought to have been made within a reasonable 
time thereafter. What is reasonable time to lay a claim depends 
upon the facts of each case. In the legislative wisdom. three 
years' period has been prescribed as the reasonable time under . 
the Limitation Act to lay a claim for money. We think.that period 
should be the appropriate standard adopted for computing 
reasonable time to raise a claim in a matter of this nature. For 
this reason also we find that the claim made by the respondent 
ought to have been rejected by the Commission." 
(emphasis is ours) 
It would be pertinent to mention, that the claim raised under the Consumer 
Protection Act, in the above judgment, was delayed by a period of I 0 
years, and even though, no period oflimitation was prescribed, this Court 
held, that the same was not maintainable. 
11. Reliance was also placed on Haryana State Coop. Land 
Development Bank Vs. Neelam (2005) 5 SCC 91, wherein, this Court 
held as under: 
"17. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd.(2001) 6 SCC 222, a Bench of 
this Court, where S.Saghir Ahmad was a member [His
Lordship 
was also a member in Ajaib Singh (supra), opined: (SCC pp.459-
60, para 6) 
"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate 
Government to exercise its powers under Section I 0 of the 
Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of 
time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power 
is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There 
appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central 
Government has exercised powers in this· case after a lapse of 
about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent 
from service. At the time reference was made no industrial 
dispute existed or could be even said to 
have been 
apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-
MIS. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!] 
matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when 
a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. When the matter has become 
final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that ihe reference 
be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like 
the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no 
dispute pending at the time when the reference in question 
was made." 
18. It is trite that the courts and tribunals having plenary jurisdiction 
have discretionary power to grant an appropriate relief to the 
parties. The aim and object of the Industrial Disputes Act may 
be to impart social justice to the workman but the same by itself 
would not mean that irrespective ofhis conduct a workman would 
automatically be entitled to relief. The procedural laws like 
estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are equally applicable to the 
industrial proceedings. A person in certain situation may even be 
held to be bound by the doctrine of acceptance sub silentio. The 
respondent herein did not raise any industrial dispute questioning 
the termination of her services within a reasonable time. She 
even accepted an alternative employment and has been continuing 
therein from 10.8.1988. In her replication filed before the 
Presiding Officer of the Labour Court while traversing the plea 
raised by the appellant herein that she is gainfully
employed in 
HUDA with effect from 10.8.1988 and her services had been 
regularized therein, it was averred : 
"6. The applicant workman had already given replication to 
the A.L.C.-cum- Conciliation Officer, stating therein that she 
was engaged by HUDA from 10.8.1988 as clerk-cum-typist 
on daily wage basis. The applicant workman has the right to 
come to the service of the management and she is interested 
to join them." 
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19. She, therefore, did not deny or dispute that she had been 
regularly employed or her services had been regularized. She 
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merely exercised her right to join the service of the appellant. 
20. lt is true that the respondent had filed a writ petition within a 
period of three years but indisputably the same was filed only 
after the other workmen obtained the same relief from the Labour 
Court in a reference made in that behalf by the State. Evidently 
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(2017] 2 S.C.R. 
in the writ petition she was not in a position to establish her legal 
right so as to obtain a writ of or in the nature of mandamus 
directing the appellant herein to reinstate her in service. She 
was advised to withdraw the writ petition presumably because 
she would not have obtained any relief in the said proceeding . 
Even the High Court could have dismissed the writ petition on 
the ground of delay or could have otherwise refused to exercise 
its discretionary jurisdiction. The conduct of the respondent in 
approaching the Labour Court after more than seven years had, 
therefore, been considered to be a relevant factor by the Labour 
Court for refusing to grant any relief to her. Such a consideration 
on the part of the Labour Court cannot be said to be an irrelevant 
one. The Labour Court in the aforementioned situation cannot 
be said to have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction injudiciously, 
arbitrarily and capriciously warranting interference at the hands 
of the High Court in exercise ofits discretionary jurisdiction under 
Article 226 of the Constitution. 
21. The matter might have be.en different had the respondent 
been appointed by the appellant in a permanent vacancy. 
22. Both HUDA and the appellant are statutory organizations. 
The service of the respondent with the Appellant was an ad hoc 
one. She served the appellant only for a period of one year 
three months; whereas she had
been serving HUDA for more 
than sixteen years. Even if she is directed to be reinstated in the 
services of the appellant without back wages as was directed by 
the High Court, the same would remain an ad hoc one and, thus, 
her services can be terminated upon compliance of the provisions 
of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is also relevant to note that 
there may or may not now be any regular vacancy with the 
appellant-Bank. We have noticed herein before that in the year 
1996, the vacancies had been filled up and a third party right had 
been created. It has not been pointed out to us that there exists 
a vacancy. Having considered the equities between the parties, 
we are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the High 
Court should have interfered with the discretionary jurisdiction 
exercised by the Labour Court. 
23. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment 
cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. This appeal
M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
15 
[JAGDISH SINGA KHEHAR, CJ!] 
is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, 
A 
then: shall be no order as to costs." 
(emphasis is ours) 
It would be relevant to mention, that the above judgment was rendered 
in a matter, where the challenge was raised under the provisions of the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, wherein also no period of limitation is 
prescribed to approach the Industrial Tribunal. Despite the above, this 
Court arrived at the conclusion, that a claim raised after a period of 7 
years, was not a surviving ctaim. And therefore, the claim petition was 
held to be not maintainable. 
12. Drawing an analogy to the judgments rendered under the 
Consumer Protection Act, 1986, ·as also, under the Industrial Disputes 
Act, 1947, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, 
that even though no period of limitation remains prescribed, after the 
amendment of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, whereby 
sub-Section (3) of Section 166 came to be deleted (with effect from 
14.11.1994), yet it would be imperative to determine, whether at the 
juncture when the claimant approached the Motor Accident Claims 
Tribunal, the claim was a live and surviving claim. 
13. We are satisfied, that the submission advanced at the hands of; 
the learned counsel for the appellant merits acceptance. The judgments on 
·which the High Court had relied, and on which the respondents have
emphasised, in our considered view, are not an impediment, to the acceptance 
of the submission canvassed on behalfofthe appellant. We say so, because 
in Dhannalal's case (supra) the question of inordinate delay in approaching 
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, was not considered. In the second 
judgment in C.Padma's case (supra), it was considered. And in the 
C.Padma 's case, the first conclusion drawn in paragraph 12 was " ... if 
otherwise the claim is found genuine ... ". We are of the considered view, 
that a claim raised before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, can be 
considered to be genuine, so long as it is a live and surviving claim. We are 
satisfied in accepting the declared position of law, expressed in the 
judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is not as 
if, it can be open ~o all and sundry, to approach a Motor Accident Claims 
Tribunal, to raise a claim for compensation, at any juncture, after the 
accident had taken place. The individual concerned, must approach the 
Tribunal within a reasonable time. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017] 2 S.C.R. 
14. The question of reasonability would naturally depend on the 
facts and circumstances of each case. We are however, satisfied, that a 
delay of 28 years, even without reference to any other fact, cannot be 
considered as a primafacie reasonable period, for approaching the Motor 
Accident Claims Tribunal. The only justification indicated by the 
respondents, for initiating proceedings after a lapse of28 years, emerges 
from paragraph 4, contained in the application for condonation of delay, 
filed by the claimants, before the Tribunal. Paragraph 4 aforementioned 
is extracted hereunder: 
"4. That the Petitioners are poor person and they have no 
knowledge about the Law. Also the Respondent has not pay the 
single pie towards any compensation." 
15. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the justification 
expressed at the behest of the respondents, for approaching the Tribunal, 
after a period of 28 years, we are of the view, that the explanation 
tendered, cannot be accepted. Undoubtedly, the claim (pertaining to an 
accident which had occurred on 02.02.1977), in the facts and 
circumstances of the instant case, was stale, and ought to have been 
treated as a dead claim, at the point of time, when the respondents 
approached the Tribunal by filing a claim petition, on 23.02.2005. 
16. In view of the reasons recorded hereinabove, we hereby set 
aside the impugned order dated 07 .07.2015, and allow
the instant appeal, 
by holding, that the claim raised by the respondents before the Motor 
Accident Claims Tribunal, was not a surviving claim, when the 
respondents approached the said Tribunal. 
17. Before concluding this order, it is relevant to notice, that by a 
motion bench order dated 14.09.2015, the appellant herein was directed 
to deposit a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards litigation expenses, payable to 
the respondents. The aforesaid deposit was actually made (as has been 
noticed, in the motion bench order, dated 12.07.2016). Since the deposit 
was made, and was payable to the respondents, we consider it just and 
appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to direct the 
Registry of this Court, to transmit the aforesaid amount ofRs.25,000/-
to the respondents, by way ofa cheque, drawn in the name ofrespondent 
No.l. 
Kalpana K. Tripathy 
Appeal allowed.