STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI versus LALU PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD Y ADAY
[2017] 3 S.C.R. 630, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
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[2017] 3 S.C.R. 630 
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI 
v. 
LALU PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD Y ADAY 
(Criminal Appeal No. 394of2017) 
MAYOS,2017 
[ARUN MISHRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] 
Fodder Scam: 
Constitution of India: 
Art. 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, I973 - s. 300- On 
facts, large scale defalcation of public funds, fraudulei1t transactions 
and fabrication of accounts in Animal Husbandry Department of 
State of Bihm· popularly known as fodder scam - Investigation by 
CBI regarding corruption in public administration, misconduct by 
bureaucracy, fabrication of official records, misappropriation of 
public funds by independent agency - Conviction of three in one of 
the criminal cases arising out of fodder scam - Quashing of, by the 
High Court, applying Art. 20(2) and s.300 CrPC on the ground 
that they have been convicted in one of the cases for offences 
involving same ingredients with respect to Chaibasa treaswy - Held: 
Though there is one general conspiracy, offences are distinct for 
different periods - Defalcations are from different treasziries for 
different financial years by exceeding the amount of each year which 
was allocated for Animal Husband1y Department - Amount involved 
is different, fake vouchers, fake allotment letters, fake supply orders 
had been prepared with the help of different sets of accused persons 
- Separate charges for distinct offences must be framed separately 
and they cannot be clubbed together for more than one
year - Thus, 
the di-der passed by the High Court is set aside_. 
Art. 20(2) - Scope of - Held: No person to be prosecuted 
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and punished for the same offence more than once - This is called 
docti·ine of double jeopardy - Constitution bars double punishment 
for the same offence - Conviction for such offence does not bar 
for subsequent trial and conviction for another offence and it does 
not matter even if some ingredients of these two offences are common. 
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630
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
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Delay/laches - Delay in filing the appeals by CBI -
Applications for condonation of delay on account of departmental, 
administrative procedures involved in filing SLP s - Held: Delay 
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has been sufficiently explained - Considering the facts and 
circumstances of the case, gravamen of matter and Jhe -divergent 
views taken by the same Judge of the High Court in the same case · 8 
vis-a-vis different accused persons _mt same question, delay to be 
condoned so as to subserve the ends of justice. 
Doctrines - Doctrine of double jeopardy - Two f{lcet of 
doctrine of jeopardy is Autrefois convict and Autrefois acquit -
Autrefois convict means that the person. has been previously 
convicted in respect of the same offence - Autrefois acquit means 
that the person has been acquitted on a same charge on which he is 
being prosecuted. 
Judicial deprecation - Delay in filing SLP by CBI in Fodder 
scam matter - Conduct of CBI in important matters is surprising -
CBI ought to have acted with more circumspection and ought to 
have followed the CBI Manual - Lethargy on its part is intolerable 
- Director of CBI to look into the matter and saddle the responsibility 
on a concerned person - In important cases Directo1; CBI to devise 
convenient methodology or else Director, CBI cannot escape the 
responsibility for delay - Delay would be termed as inlolerable. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 Article
20(2) of the Constitution, says that no 
person shall b~ prosecuted and punished for the same offence 
more than once. This is called the doctrine of double jeopardy. 
Tbe objective of the Article is to avoid harassment, wbicb may 
be caused by successive criminal proceedings, where the person 
has committed only one crime. There is a law maxim related to 
this, nemo debet bis vexari. This means that no man shall be put 
twice' iri peril for the same offence. There are two aspects of 
doctrine of jeopardy viz. Autre/ois convict and Autre/ois "cquit. 
Autre/ois convict means that the person has been .previously 
convicted in respect of tbe same offence. Autre/ois acquit means 
that the person has been acquitted on a same charge on which he 
is being prosecuted. Constitution bars double punishment for 
the same offence. The conviction for such offence does not bar 
for subsequent trial and conviction for another offence and it does 
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[2017] 3 S.C.R. 
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not matter even if some ingredients of these two offences are 
common. [Para 17](649-G-H; 650-A-B] 
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1.2 Section 300 refers to Sections 220 and 221 Cr.P.C. No 
doubt it appears that a person who has been convicted or acquitted 
of the "same offence" cannot be tried again considering the said 
provisions. Section 220(1) provides that if one series of acts is 
so connected together as to form the same transaction, more 
offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be 
charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. Section 
221(1) is applicable where it is doubtful what offence has been 
committed. When a single act or series of acts is of such a nature 
that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be 
proved would constitute, the accused may be charged with having 
committed all or any of such offences and such charges can be 
tried together. [Paras 18, 19][651-C-D, E-G] 
1.3 When the accused is charged with criminal breach of 
trust or dishonest appropriation of money or other immovable 
property, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum or describe 
the moveable property in respect of which offence is alleged to 
have been committed, and the dates between which the offence 
is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular 
items of exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed 
to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of
Section 219 
provided that the time included between the first and last of such 
dates shall not exceed one year. A charge shall contain ·such 
particulars as to time and place of the alleged offence which is 
material and time period shall not exceed one year. [Para 21] 
(652-C-E] 
1.4 Section 219 Cr.PC provides that three offences of same 
kind within a year may be charged together. When a person is 
accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed 
within a period of one year, he may be charged with, and tried at 
one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three for same 
kind of offence under Section 219(1). It is apparent from Section 
212 read with Section 219 that there have to be separate trials 
for different years covering the period of more than one year. 
Same kind of offence is a different thing than the "same offence" 
for the purpose of Sections 219, 220 or 300. The scheme of law is
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
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PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV 
clear that separate charges for distinct offences must be framed . A 
separately and they cannot be clubbed together for more than 
one year. [Paras 22, 23)[652-E-F; 653-C-D] 
1.5 Section 218 deals with separate cbarges for distinct 
offences. Section 219 provides that three offences of the same 
kind can be clubbed in one trial committed within one year. Section 
220 s·peaks of trial for more than one offence if it is the same 
transaction. In the instant case, it cannot be said that defalcation 
is same transaction as the transactions are in different treasuries 
for different years, different amounts, different allotment letters, 
supply orders and suppliers. Thus, the provision of Section 221 
is not attracted in the instant case. There are different sets of 
accused persons in different cases with respect to defalcation. 
There may be a conspiracy in general one and a separate one. 
There may be larger conspiracy and smaller conspiracy which 
may develop in successive stages involving different accused 
persons. [Paras 31, 32] [659-C-E] 
1.6 In the instant case, offences arc not the same offence. 
There can be different trials for the same offence if tried under 
two different enactments altogether ancl comprised of two different 
offences under different Acts/statutes without violation of the 
provisions of Article 20(2) or Section 300 Cr.P.C.[Para 33] [660-
B] 
1.7 Though there was one general
charge of conspiracy, 
which was allied in nature, the charge was qualified with the 
substantive charge of defalcation of a particular sum from a 
particular treasury in particular time period. The charge has to 
be taken in substance for the purpose of defalcation from a 
particular treasury in a particular financial year exceeding the 
allocation made for the purpose of animal husbandry on the basis 
of fake vouchers, fake supply orders etc. The sanctions made in 
Budget were separate for each and every year. This Court has 
already dealt with this matter when the prayers for amalgamation 
and joint trial had been made and in view of the position of law 
and various provisions, separate trials which are being made are 
in accordance with provisions of law otherwise it would have 
p1·ejudiced the accused persons considering the different 
defalcations from different treasuries at different times with 
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[2017] 3 S.C.R. 
different documents. Whatever could be combined has already 
been done. Each defalcation would constitute an independent 
offence. Thus, by no stretch, it can be held to be in violation of 
Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 Cr.P.C. Separate 
trials in such cases is the very intendment of law. There is no 
room to raise such a grievance. Though evidence of general 
conspiracy has been adduced in cases which have been 
concluded, it may be common to all the cases but at the same 
time offences are different at different places, by different accused 
persons. As and when a separate offence is committed, it becomes 
punishable and the substantive charge which has to be taken is 
that of the offence under the P.C. Act etc. There was conspiracy 
hatched which was continuing one and has resulted into various 
offences. It was joined from time to time by different accused 
persons, so whenever an offence is committed in continuation of 
the conspiracy, it would be punishable separately for different 
periods as envisaged in Section 212(2), obviously, there have to 
be separate trials. Thus, it. cannot be said to be a case of double 
jeopardy at all. It cannot be said that for the same offence the 
accused persons are being tried again. [Para 35] [664-E-H; 665-
A-D] 
1.8 The modus operandi being the same would not make it 
a single offence when the offences are separate. Commission of 
offence
pursuant to a conspiracy has to be punished. If conspiracy 
is furthered into several distinct offences there have to be 
separate trials. There may be a situation where in furtherance of 
general conspiracy, offences take place in various parts of India 
and several persons are killed at different times. Each trial has 
· to be separately held and the accused to be punished separately 
for the offence committed in furtherance of conspiracy. In case 
there is only one trial for such conspiracy for separate offences, 
it would enable the accused person to go. scotfree and commit 
number of offences which is not the intendment oflaw. The concept 
is of 'same offence' under Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C. 
In case. distinct offences are being committed there has to be 
independent trial for each of such offence based on such 
conspiracy and in the case of misappropriation as statutorily 
mandated, there should not be joinder of charges in one trial for 
more than one year except as provided in ·section 219. One general
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
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PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV 
conspiracy from 1988 to 1996 led to various offences as such 
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there have to be different trials for each of snch offence based 
upon conspiracy in which different persons have 1Jarticipated at 
different times at different places for completion of the offence. 
[Para 39][671-C-F] 
1.9 It is apparent that it is premature to raise the plea of 
issue of estoppel before evidence is recorded for different sets 
of accusations of different offences for different periods. Then it 
is difficult to say that prosecution would be bound by the finding 
in a previous trial on a similar issue of fact and there may not be 
any contradiction if the periods are different and with respect to 
culpability for different periods and without fear of contradiction, 
separate findings can be recorded. In what manner the duty has 
been carried on for different periods would be the question of 
fact in each case and there is no question of double jeopardy in 
such a case. [Para 49][677-C-D) 
1.10 The same Judge had taken a different view in Dr. R's 
case on the basis of same facts, and same question of law in the' 
same cases. Judicial discipline requires that such a blatant 
contradiction in such an important matter should have been 
avoided. The order passed in the case of .Dr. R was on sound 
basis and though the court had noted that there was some 
overlapping of facts but the offences were different, it, however, 
has
taken a different view in the impugned order for the reasons 
which are not understandable. The court ought to have been careful 
while dealing with such matters and consistency is the hallmark 
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of the court due to which people have faith in the system and it is 
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not open to1he court to take a different view in the same matter " 
with reference to different accused persons in the same facts and 
same case. Such inconsistent decision-making ought to have been 
avoided at all costs so as to ensure credibility of the system. The 
impugned orders are palpably illegal, faulty and contrary to the 
basic principles of law and Judge has ignored large number of 
binding decisions of this Court while giving impermissible benefit 
to the accused persons and delayed the case for several years. 
Interference bad been made at the advanced stage of the case 
which was wholly unwarranted and uncalled for. Let now amends 
be made by expediting the trial without any further hindrance 
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from any quarter. [Para 50] [677-E-H; 678-A] 
State of Bihar & Anr. v. Ranchi Zila Samta Party & Anr. 
[1996] 3 SCR 663 : (1996) 3 sec 682; CBI. AHD, 
Patna v. Bra} Bhushan Prasad & Ors. [2001] 3 Suppl. 
SCR 627 : (2001) 9 SCC 432: Lalu Prasad alias Lalu 
Prasad Yadav v. State through CBI (A.HD.), Ranchi, 
Jharkhand [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 1032 : (2003) 11 SCC 
786; Laloo Prasad @ Laloo Prasad Yadav v. State of 
Jharkhand (2002) 9 SCC 372; T. T. Anthony v. State of 
Kera/a (2~01) 6 SCC 181; Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah 
v. CB.I. [2013] 6 .SCR 623 : (2013) 6 sec 348; Sidh 
Nath Awasthi v. Emperor 1920 ILR 17; Natwar Lal 
Sakar Lal Mody v. The State of Bombay 26 (1984) DLT 
64; Ranchhod Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1965 
SC 1248 : [1965] SCR 283; A P v. Cheemalapti 
Ganeswara Rao & Anr. [1964] 3 SCR 297; Sardar 
Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State -of Maharashtra (1964] 
2 SCR 378; State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte [1961] 3 SCR 
107; Gopal Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [1971] 2 
SCR 619 : (1970) 2 SCC905; Ram Lal Narang " Slate 
(Delhi Administration)~(l979) 2 SCC 322; Mohd. 
Hussain Umar Kochra etc. v. KS. Dalipsinghji & Anr. 
AIR 1970 SC 45 : [1969] 3 SCR 130; Manipur 
Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh AIR 
1965 SC 87 : [1964] SCR 123; Assistant Collector of 
Customs, Bombay & Anr. v. L.R.Melwani AIR 1970 SC 
962 : [1969] SCR 438; Pritam Singh v. The Stale of 
Punjab AIR 1956 SC 415; Emperor v. Jhabbar
Mull 
Lakkar (1922) ILR 49 Cal 924; State of Bombay v. 
Umarsaheb Buransaheb lnamdar AIR 1962 SC 1153 : 
[1962] Suppl. SCR .711; Gopal Prasad Sinha v. State 
of Bihar [1971] 2 SCR 619; Masur Khan v. Stale of 
U.P. [1974] 1 SCR 793; Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir 
Singh [2013] 1 SCR 243 : (2013) 9 SCC 245 - referred 
to. 
'· . 
S. Swamirathnam v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 340; 
Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra etc. v. KS. Dalipsinghji 
& Anr. AIR 1970 SC 45: [1969] 3 SCR 130; Srichand
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
637 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV 
K. Khetwani v. The State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 
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450 : [1967) SCR 595 - distinguished. 
Emperor v. Jhabbar Mull Lakkar 1922 ILR 49 Cal 924 
- disapproved. 
R. v. Griffith 1965 (2) AER 448; Sambasivan v. Public 
Prosecutor (1950) AC 458; Mills v. Cooper (1967) 2 
QB 459; R. v. Humph1ys (1976) 2 AER 497 - referred 
to. 
2.1 There is a delay of 113, 157 and 222 days in filing the 
respective appeals by the CBI. The applications have been filed 
for condonation of delay on account of the departmental, 
administrative procedures involved in for filing the special leave 
petition. It w.as submitted that unlike the private litigant the . 
matters relating to the Government are required to be considered 
at various levels and then only a decision is taken to file special 
leave petition and the process of referring the particular file from 
one department to another is a time consuming process and 
decisions hav~ to be taken collectively. In view of the averments 
made in the applications, delay has been sufficiently explained 
and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, gravamen 
of matter and also the divergent views taken by the same Judge 
of the High Court in the same case vis-a-vis different accused 
persons on same question, it is the duty of this Court not to throw 
away petition on the ground of delay. The explanation offered by 
the CBI of movement of file so as to condone the
delay so as to 
subserve the ends of justice, deserves to be accepted. It is 
. regrettable that majority of the special leave petitions file4 in 
this Court are barred by limitation not only on behalf of the 
Government but also by the other private litigants. Not only that 
the SL P's are preferred with the delay but in refiling also enormous 
time is consumed and this Court in order to advance substantial 
justice is not throwing away cases only on limitation. (Paras 51, 
55) (678-B-C; 679-F-H; 680-A) 
2.2 Sufficiency of cause has to be judged in ·a pragmatic 
riianner so as to advance cause of justice. No doubt about it that 
litigants are·supposed to act with circumspection within limitation 
and that there should not be delay a'lld !aches and State machinery 
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should not be differentiated vis-a-vis with the private individual 
in the matter of filing the appeals, petitions etc., however, in the 
facts and circumstances of the case and considering the averments 
in the applications, it is appropriate to condone the delay in filing 
the appeals in this Court. [Para 56)(680-B-C] 
2.3 This Court. is surprised at the conduct of the CBI in 
such important matters how such delay could take place. The 
CBI ought to have bee1i careful in filing the Special Leave 
Petitions within limitation considering the factual matrix of the 
case. The criticism made by the counsel for respondent is not 
wh'olly unjustified. CBI ought to be guided by its Manual. It is 
expected of it to be more vigilant. It has failed to live up to its 
reputation. In the instant case, lethargy on its part is intolerable. 
If CBI fails' to act timely, peoples' faith would be shaken in its 
effectiveness. The Director of CBI to look into the matter and 
saddle the responsibility on a concerned person. In important 
cases Director, CBI should devise· methodology which should 
not be cumbersome as reflected in these cases, otherwise in 
future, Director, CBI cannot escape the responsibility for delay 
in such cases to be formed as deliberate one, which is intolerable. 
Being the head of the institution it was the responsibility of the 
Director, CBI to ensure that appeals were filed within limitation.
There should not have been delay in filing special leave petitions 
at all. [Para 57)(680-D-F] 
Postmaster General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. 
&Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 503; Sta.te of UP th1: Exe. Engineer 
v. Amar Nath Yadav (2014) 2 SCC 422; Ajit Singh 
Thakur & Anr. v. State of Gujarat [1981] 2 SCR 509-: 
1981 (1) SCC 495; Pundlik Jalam Patil {DJ by Lrs. v. 
Exe. Engg. Jalgaon Medium Project & Anr. [2008] 15 
SCR 135 : (2008) 17 SCC 448; Binod Bihari Singh v. 
Union of India [1992) 3 Suppl; SCR 468 : (1993) 1 
SCC 572; Vineet Narain & Ors. v. Union of India & 
Anr. [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595 : (1998) 1 SCC 226; 
Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty [2007] 8 
SCR 582 : (2007) 7 SCC 394; Sajjan Kumar v. Union 
of India [2010] 11 SCR 669 : (2010) 9 SCC 368; State 
of Tamil Nadu v. M Suresh Rajan [2014] 1 SCR 135 :
~TATE OF IBARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v'. LALU 
. 639 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV 
(2014) 11 SCC 709; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. 
A 
v. Subrata Borah Chowlek, etc. 12010] 13 SCR 776 : 
(2010) 14 SCC 419; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & 
Ors. [2005) 3 SCR 108 : (2005) 3 SCC 752 - referred 
to. 
3. The impugned judgments passed by the High Court are 
B 
set aside. The trial court is directed to expedite the trial and to 
conclude the same within the stipulated period.[Para 581(680-G] 
Case Law Reference 
[1996) 3 SCR 663 
·-
referred to 
Pari:t2 
[2001) 3 Suppl. SCR 627 
referred to 
Para2 
c 
[2003) 2 Suppl. SCR 1032 
referred to 
Paras 
(2002) 9 sec 372 
referred to 
Para 14 
(2001) 6 sec 181 
referred to 
Para 15 
[2013) 6 SCR 623 
referred to 
Para 15 
1920 ILR 17 
referred to 
Para 15 
D 
26 (1984) DLT 64 
referred to 
Para 24 
[1965] SCR 283 
referred to 
Para25 
[1964] 3 SCR 297 
referred to 
Para 27 
(1964] 2 SCR 378 
referred to 
Para28 
[1961) 3 SCR 107 
.referred to 
Para 28 
E 
[1971) 2 SCR 619 
referred to 
Para 29 
(1979) 2 sec 322 
referred to 
Para 32 
AIR 1957 SC 340 
distinguished 
Para 36 
[1967) SCR 595 
distinguished 
Para 37 
[1969) 3 SCR 130 · 
distinguished 
Para 38 
F 
(1969) 3 SCR 130 
referred to 
Para 38 
[1964) SCR 123 
referred to 
Para 40 
{1969) SCR 438 
referred to 
Para 40 
(1950) AC 458 
referred to 
Para 40 
AIR 1956 SC 415 · 
referred to 
Para 41 
G 
1922 ILR 49 Cal 924 
disapproved 
Para 42 
[1962] Suppl. SCR 711 
referred to 
Para 43
[1971] 2 SCR 619 
referred to 
Para 44 
[1974] 1 SCR 793 
referred to 
Para 46 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
12013] 1 SCR 243 
referred to 
Para 48 
(2012) 3 SCC 503 
referred to 
Para 52 
(2014) 2 SCC 422 
referred to 
Para 52 
J1981J 2 SCR 509 
referred to 
Para 53 
120081 15 SCR 135 
referred to 
Para 53 
B 
[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 468 
referred to 
Para 53 
[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595 
referred to 
Para.53 
120071 8 SCR 582 
referred to 
Para 54 
120101 11 SCR 669 
referred to 
Para 54 
J2014J 1 SCR 135 
referred to 
Para 54 
C 
120101 13 SCR 776 
referred to 
Para 54 
J2005J 3 SCR 108 
referred to 
Para 54 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
No. 394 of2017. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2014 of the High Court 
D 
of Jharkhand at' Ranchi in Cr!. M. P. No. 1811 of 2014 
WITH 
Cr!. A. Nos. 393 and 395 of2017. 
Ranjit Kumar, SG, Tushar Mehta, ASG, Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, 
Sr. Adv., R. S. Jena, Kumar Parimal, Ms. Binu Tamta, T. A. Khan, 
E 
Mukesh Kumar Maroria, D. Shavaish, Advs. for the Appellant. 
· Ram Jethmalani, Surendra Singh, Chitranjan Sinha, Dharnidhar 
Jha, Sr. Advs., Adit S. Pujari, Surabhi Dhar, K. Awasthi, Senthil 
Jagadeesan, D.S. Parmar, Susheel Tamar, Chirag Madan, Ajay Awasthi, 
Ms. Kavitta Sharma, Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Nityanand Jha, R. K. Mishra, 
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Fauzia Shakil, Nikhil Ranjan, Snehasish. Mukherjee, Advs. for the 
Respondent. 
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The Judgment of the Com1 was delivered by 
ARUN MISHRA, J. I. The appeals arise out of three separate 
judgments and orders oflearned Single Judge of High Court.of
Jharkhand 
at Ranchi discharging three accused persons namely; Lalu Prasad Yadav, 
Sajal Chakraborty and Dr. Jagannath Mishra on the ground of their 
conviction in one of the criminal cases arising out of fodder scam of 
erstwhile State ofBihar. Applying the provision under Article 20(2) of 
the Constitution oflndia and Section 300 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 
H . 1973 (for short 'the Cr.PC'), the High Court has quashed RC No.64A/96
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, ·CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
against Lalu Prasad Yadav, four cases against Dr. Jagannath Mishra 
being RC Nos.64A/96, 4 7 A/96, 68A/96 and 38A/96 and two cases against 
Sajal Chakraborty being RC Nos.20A/96 and 68A/96 on the ground that 
they have been convicted in one of the cases for offences involving the 
same ingredients with respect to Chaibasa treasury. 
2. In the wake oflarge scale defalcation of public funds, fraudulent 
transactions and fabrication ofaccounts in Animal Husbandry Department 
of State of Bihar popularly known as fodder scam, Central Bureau of 
Investigation (for short, 'the CBI') investigation had been ordered by 
this Court in State of Bihar & Am: 1( Ranchi Zila Samta Party & Anr. 
(1996) 3 sec 682 to investigate corruption in public administratio~ 
misconduct by the bureaucracy, fabrication of official records, 
misappropriation of public funds by an independent agency. This Cou11 
directed CBI to do investigation and inform the Chief Justice of Patna 
High Court. On the re-orgnisation of the State of Bihar by virtue of 
Bihar Re-organisation Act, 2000, States of Bihar and Jharkhand were 
formed. Question arose with respect to the place of trial of cases i.e. 
whether in State of Bihar or State of Jharkhand. A Full Bench of High 
Court of Patna took the view that none of the 36 cases which were of 
Jharkhand to be transferred to Jharkhand. CBI preferred appeals before 
this Court as well
as Dr. R.K. Rana. Total 64 cases had been registered 
relating to Bihar Fodder Scam. 52 cases involved withdrawal of huge 
sums of money from Government treasuries falling within Jharkhand 
State and in 36 out of 52 cases charge-sheet had been filed by CBI 
·before the appointed day. This Court opined that the only court which 
has the jurisdiction to try offences under Prevention of Corruption Act is 
the Court of Special Judge appointed for areas withi1i which such offences 
were committed. This Comi in CBI, AHD, Patna v. Braj Bhushan 
Prasad & Ors. (2001) 9 SCC 432 has laid down thus: 
"33. For that purpose it is useful to look at Section 3( I) of the 
PC Act. It empowers the Government to appoint a Special Judge 
to try two categories of offences. The first is, "any offence 
punishable under this Act" and the second is, "any conspiracy to 
commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the 
offences specified" in the first category. So when a cou11 has 
jurisdiction to try the offencuunishable under the PC Act on 
the basis of the place where such offence was committed. the 
allied offences such as conspiracy. attempt or abetment to commit 
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that offence are only to be linked with the main offence. When 
the main offence is committed and is required to be tried, it is 
.rather inconceivable that jurisdiction of the court will be 
determined on the basis of where the conspiracy or attempt or 
abetment of such main offence was committed. It is only when 
the main offence was not committed, but only the conspiracy to 
commit that offence or the attempt or the abetment of it alone 
was committed, then the question would arise whether the Court 
of the Special Judge within whose area such conspiracy etc. 
was committed could try the_ case. For our purpose it is 
unnecessary to consider that aspect because the charges proceed 
on the assumption that the main offence 'was committed." 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
, 
3. This Court in Bra} Bhushan Prasad (supra) has laid down 
that so far as offences under section 13( I)( c) and 13( I)( d) are concerned, 
the place where the offences were committed could easily be identified 
as the place where the treasury concerned was situate and laid down 
thus: 
"37. Thus, when it is ce11ain where exactly the offence under 
Section 13 of the PC Act was committed it is an unnecessa1y 
exercise to ponder over the other areas wherein certain allied 
activities, such as conspiracy or preparation, or even the prefatoiy 
or incidental acts were done, including the consequences that 
ensued." (Emphasis Supplied) 
"42. Thus, ifthe PC
Act has stipulated any place for trial of the 
offence under that Act the provisions of the Code would stand 
displaced to that extent in regard to the pla~e of trial. We have, 
therefore, no doubtthat when the offence is under Section 13( I)( c) 
or Section 13(.l)(d) of the PC Act the sole determinative factor · 
regarding the court having jurisdiction is'the place where the 
offence was committed." 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
4. With respect to adoption of evidence in various cases as 
evidence with respect to conspiracy was to be common, this Court has 
___ observed in Bra} Bhushan Prasad (supra) thus : 
H
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
"50. To avoid the confusion and repetition of the exercise, we 
make it clear that the evidence already recorded in any of the 36 
cases will be treated as evidence recorded by the proper court 
having jurisdiction. In other words, the Special Judge need not 
call the witnesses already examined ovet again for repetition of 
what has already come on record." 
This Court has clearly observed that the place of trial has to be on 
the basis of commission of offence where the defalcation has been made 
and not on the basis of place of conspiracy. Submission to the contrary 
had been negatived. 
5. Subsequently, prayer was made for amalgamation of six cases 
which were pending before Special Courts in the State of Jharkhand. 
Matter was considered by this Comt with respect to joint trial of cases 
including RC Nos.20A/96 and 64A/96 which were pending before the 
Special Judge at Patna. This Court considered the matter iri Lalu Prasad 
alias Latu Prasad Yadav v. State through CBI (A.HD.), Ranchi, 
Jharkhand (2003) 11 SCC 786. It was urged on behalf of Lalu Prasad 
Yadav, Dr. Jagannath Mishra and others that it was a case of only a 
single conspiracy and therefore there should be amalgamation of trials 
as per the provisions contained in section 223 Cr.PC. This Court opined 
that charges were not framed at that stage. It is for trial court to decide 
the prayer for joint trial. There were large
number of accused persons. 
It was also observed that main offence was under the PC Act and 
conspiracy was an allied offence. This Court laid down thus : 
"11. .... Thus it has already been held, by a three-Judge Bench 
of this Court, that the main offences were under the Prevention 
of Corruption Act. It has been held that the offence of conspiracy 
is an allied offence to th~ main offence under the Prevention of 
Corruption Act. The cases are before the Special Judges because 
the main offences are under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 
The main offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act in 
each case is in respect of the alleged transaction in that case. As 
conspiracy is only an allied offence, it cannot be said that the 
alleged overt acts are in the course of the same transaction. We 
are bound by this decision. In any case we see no reason to take 
a different view. As it has already been held that the charge of 
conspiracy is only an allied charge and that the main charges 
(under the Prevention of Corruption Act) are in respect of 
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A 
separate and distinct acts i.e. monies siphoned out of different 
treasuries at different times, we fail to see as to how these cases 
could be amalgamated." 
"14. Before we part it must be mentioned that it had been 
complained that the appellants would be forcetl to hear the same 
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evidence 5/6 times. If the appellants or any of them feel aggrieved 
by this and if they so desire, they may apply to the Special Judges 
that evidence recorded ·in one case and documents marked as 
an exhibit in one case be used as evidence in other cases also. 
This would obviate their having to hear the same evidence in 5/ 
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6 different cases. We are sure that if such an application is made, 
the same will be considered by the Special Judge on its merit, 
after hearing all the other accused". (Emphasis Supplied) 
This Court had noted the grievance that accused persons would 
be forced to hear the same evidence 5-6 times, but ordered that they 
may apply to the Special Judges that evidence recorded in one case and 
the document marked as an exhibit in one case be used as evidence in 
other cases also. 
6. Lalu Prasad Yadav was prosecuted and convicted in RC 
No.20(A)/96 with respect to aforesaid period 1.4.1994 to 31.1.1995 
relating to Cha.ibasa treasury. The charges had been framed for 
commission of offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under section 
1208 read with sections409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477, 477 A of the
Indian 
Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'the IPC') and section 13(1)(c) read with 
section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'the 
PC Act') where defalcation/general conspiracy was alleged between 
1988 and 1996 and included various treasuries of erstwhile State ofBihar. 
However, in RC No.20(A)/96 with respect to Chaibasa treasury, the 
specific charge was with respect to the period 1.4.1994 to 31.1.1995 for 
facilitating dishonest and fraudulent withdrawal of Government funds to 
the tune ofRs.37,70,39,743/-. The case RCNo.64(A)/96 which is quashed 
relates to Deoghar whereas the amount misappropriated is Rs.85 lakhs 
as against actual allotment of funds for district ofRs.4, 73,400/- with the 
help of250 vouchers and 17 fake allotment letters. Misappropriation is 
alleged for the period 1991 to 1994. There are 38 accused persons and 
one of them is Lalu Prasad Yadav. 
7. In the case against Dr. Jagannath Mishra l\e has been sonvicted. 
in RC No.20(A)/96 with respect to Chaibasa treasury in respect of
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
645 
PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD Y ADAY [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
misappropriation of Rs.3 7. 70 crores for the period 1994-95 whereas the · A 
prosecution has been quashed with respect to RCNo.38(A)/96 relating· 
to misappropriation ofRs.3.76 crores from Dumka treasury as against 
actual allotment ofRs.1.5 lakhs with the help of96 fake vouchers in the 
financial year 1995-96. In case RCNo.47(A)/96 misappropriation alleged 
is that ofRs.139 .3 5 crores against actual allotment of Rs.1,97,90,000 by 
fake vouchers numbering 4845,502 fake allotment orders and 2367 fake 
supply orders in financial years 1991 to 1995. RC No.68(A)/96 relates 
to Chaibasa treasury regarding misappropriation of Rs.37.62 crores 
against actual allotment of Rs.7.10 lakhs with the help of 49S fake 
vouchers, 67 fake allotment letters and 3870 fake supply orders during 
the financial year 1992-93. 
8. Sajal Chakraborty had been convicted by Trial Corn1 in RC 
No.5 l(A)/96 relating to Chaibasa treasury regarding Rs.39.92 crores 
misappropriation against actual allotment ofRs.4,09,750/-with the help 
of 580 vouchers, 4 789 fake supply orders for the financial year 1993-94 
on 14.7 .2008 but acquitted by the High Court in appeal. The prosecution 
has been quashed vis a vis Sajal Chakraborty in RC No.20(A)/96 relating 
to Chaibasa Treasury and RC No.68(A)/96 relating to Chaibasa Treasury 
for misappropriation ofRs.3 7 .62 crores during the financial year 1992-93. 
9. It was
submitted on behalfofCBlthatthough the same learned 
Judge of the High Court has quashed the proceedings in the aforesaid 
cases with respect to Lalu Prasad Yadav, Dr. Jagannath Mishra and 
Sajal Chakraborty owing to their conviction in one of the cases, however, 
with respect to accused Dr. R.K. Rana, the same Judge in criminal W.P. 
No.226/2011 has declined to quash the criminal prosecution in pending 
six other cases owing to his conviction in RC No.22A/96. Prayer for 
quashing·of criminal prosecution in RC Nos.20A/96, 33A/96, 38A/96, 
47 A/96, 64A/96 and 68A/96 had been declined but the same very cases 
have been quashed by taking a contrary view in the impugned judgment . 
and order. 
I 0. It was submitted by Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor 
General appearing for CBI that as the offences relate to different 
treasuries for different financial years, for different amounts running 
into several crores with the help of different fake allotment letters, supply 
orders, different falsification of books of accounts, different suppliers, 
.Article 20(2) of Constitution of India is not attracted as the offences 
cannot be said to be the same. Similarly the provisions of section 300 
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Cr.PC are not attracted. They are different offences and transactions. 
Reliance has been placed upon section ·2 I 2(2) of the Cr.PC so as to 
contend that the period of charge for offence of misappropriation shall 
not exceed one year. There has to be different trials for different periods. 
Reference has also been made to sections 2 I 9, 220 and 221 of Cr.PC. 
There is difference between the same kind and the same offence. In 
different treasuries, distinct offences have been committed though of 
same kind by different sets of accused persons. There have to be separate 
charges for distinct offences and, therefore separate trials are required 
to be held. Principle of issue estoppel would not arise as parties are 
different, duties were differentfor different times. Judgment of conviction 
has also been placed on record by CBI. 
I 1. Prayer has also been made to condone the delay in filing the 
appeals in this Court for which reliance has been placed upon the 
affidavits/explanation which has been offered. Thus, it was urged that 
sufficient ground has been made out so as to condone the delay. 
12. It was submitted by Shri Ram Jethmalani, learned senior 
counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Lalu Prasad Yadav that the 
delay has not been satisfactorily explained. There is no sufficient cause 
so as to condone the delay. CBI has acted in flagrant violation of the 
provisions contained in CBI Manual.
Thus, no case is made out so as to 
condone the delay .. 
13. It was contended by Shri Surendra Singh, leari;ied senior 
_,... ..... -
counsel on behalf ofLalu Prasad Yadav that the charge for conspiracy 
against Lalli Prasad Yadav with respect to cases at Chaibasa, Patna, 
- Ranchi, Bhagalpur l,!nd other places ofBihar, Calcutta and Delhi, was 
not specific to the period of defalcation. The charges were general for 
the period from 1988 to 1996. Thus, it was submitted that evidence has 
been adduced with respect to the general conspiracy between 1988 and 
1996 which included the Treasuries in question in the cases where 
prosecution has been quashed. It was not the case put up under section 
313 Cr.PC that there was separate conspiracy for the period I .4. I 994 to 
30.1.1995. In RC No.64(A)/96 similar charges for conspiracy for the 
years I 988 to 1996 at Deoghar, Dumka, Ranchi, Patna and other places 
had been framed. In pursuance thereof an amount of Rs.89,27, I 64.15/-
has been withdrawn from Deogarh Treasury. As the conspiracy for 
Chaibasa and Deogarh is the same the evidence has already been 
adduced in the case relating to Chaibasa treasury. Thus for one and the
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
647 
PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, f.] 
same conspiracy respondent Lalu Prasad Yadav cannot be tried ove·r · A 
again in view of Article 20(2) and section 300 Cr.PC. It was further 
contended that the respondent is being prosecuted in two separate cases 
arising out of the Chaibasa Treasury namely R.C. No.68 (A)/1996 and 
R.C. No.20 (A)/1996. The first is when the money was siphoned out of 
the Treasury in 1992-93 and the second is for the period from 1.4.1994 
to 30.1.1995 when the money was withdrawn from the Treasury. In 
other-words, it is the prosecution case itself that between 1992-1995 
money was being regularly siphoned out of the Chaibasa Treasury. The 
charge for conspiracy also states that the conspiracy was from 1990-
1997. This is further proof of the fact that the conspiracy referred to by 
the prosecution for the Treasuries of Chaibasa and Deogarh is one and 
the same conspiracy and not different or distinct conspiracies. Counsel 
!ias also attracted our attention to the charges pertaining to the Treasuries 
ofDumka (R.C. 38 (A)/1996) and Doranda (R.S. 47A)/1996. The 
charges framed for withdrawal of money from these two treasuries is 
from 1988-1996 and 1990-1996 respectively anCi the period of conspiracy, 
has been shown from 1990-1997 and 1991-1996 respectively. 
14. It was also urged by Shri Surendra Singh, learned senior 
counsel that as per prosecution itself, there was a single conspiracy that
started in the year 1988 and continued till 1996. The result ofinvestigation 
in RC 20(A)/96 and RC 64(A)/96 conclusively proves that there was a 
single conspiracy with respect to defalcation at various Treasuries. Once 
accused has been punished for the conspiracy for the period 1988 to 
1996 he cannot be punished again for the same offence. Without much 
ado and more evidence, the trial of the accused for offence under section 
120B IPC is barred by Article 20(2) and section 300 Cr.PC. It was also 
urged that there was a core group of 20 common accused in all the 
prosecutions i.e. nine politicians and eleven senior administrative officers 
who allegedly hatched the main con~iracy to siphon off the funds from 
treasuries earmarked for Animal Husbandry Department of erstwhile 
State of Bihar. The modus operandi employed by the conspirators was 
identical for all the treasuries and funds were siphoned off a§.;rnd when 
an opportunity occurred. Since there is no evidence that .. separate 
conspiracies were hatched to defalcate the funds from different treasuries 
at different points of time second prosecution is not permissible. 
Reference has been made to Laloo Prasad@ Laloo Prasad Yadav v. 
State of Jharkhand (2002) 9 SCC 372 so as to contend that there was 
single general conspiracy, the offences of withdrawal of money from 
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different treasuries.including the treasuries of Cl1aibasa and Deogarh 
were merely offshoots of the main conspiracy as observed by this Cou1i 
while granting bail to Lalu Prasad Yadav. Learned senior counsel has 
also relied upon dec'ision in Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra etc. v. K.S. 
Dalipsinghji & Anr. ATR 1970 sc· 45, Srichand K. Khetll'ani v. The 
State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 450; and S. Swamirathnam v. 
State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 340 so as to point out that the case of 
single general conspiracy is opposed to a number of separate conspiracies. 
Since there was a single conspiracy in the instant case, accused cannot 
betried and punished for defalcations made in different periods separately. 
So far as treasury payment is concerned there is no evidence against 
Lalu Prasad Yadav. Besides, it is a case where there is no evidence 
against the accused. 
15. It was submitted"by Shri Adit S. Pujari, learned counsel 
appearing on behalf of Sajal Chakraborty, that the main case set up 
against the respondent is that he did not take any steps to find out the 
cause of heavy withdrawal of Rs.50.56 lakhs on a single day by co-
accused Dr. B.N. Sharma. He was Deputy Commissioner, Chaibasa 
from September, 1992 to July, 1995. He did not exercise control to prevent 
misappropriation of Government funds from Chaibasa treasury. The 
formal charge is identical in RC Nos.5 l(A), 20(A) and 68(A). It was 
further
alleged by the prosecution that the accused had developed a 
nexus with co-accused persons and had obtained from co-accused as a 
reward for services rendered - a laptop and two printers for himself. 
The accused Sajal Chakraborty was convicted by the. trial court for 
certain offences under sections 409, 420, 465, 467, 468,471, 477A !PC. 
His conviction has been ultimately set aside by the High Court of 
Jharkhand vi de judgment and order dated 3.8.2012 in Criminal Appeal 
No.979 of2009 in which it has been held that there was no mechanism 
with the Deputy Commissioner to check illegal withdrawal from treasury. 
Copy of allotment letter of funds to different departments was not sent 
to the petitiOner. There was no other evidence direct or circumstantial to 
establish that the accused did certain acts for facilitating other accused 
G ·to draw money illegally. There is no evidence ofnexus or· association vis 
a vis the other accused. No one had seen installation of laptop and 
computer in the residence ofthe accused and so the allegation ofreceiving 
the same was also discarded. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon 
T.T. Anthony v. State of Kera/a (2001) 6 SCC 181, Amitbhai 
H 
Anilchandra Shah v. CB.I. (2013) 6 SCC 348. He has also referred
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARON MISHRA, J.] 
to section 212. Cr.PC. FIR relating to Chaibasa is for same transactiotJS 
though for different financial years but for the bar under section 212(2) 
Cr.PC, it would have constituted one offence, as such section 300(1) 
would apply. In similar circumstances in Emperor v. Jhabbar Mull 
Lakkar I 922 ILR 924, Sidh Nath Awasthi v. Emperor 1920 !LR I 7, 
prosecution in subsequent cases had been quashed. Section 220( 1) Cr.PC 
would apply to the present case. In fact series of acts formed the same 
fransaction. Thus there cannot be subsequent trial. Ingredients of offence 
in all the 3 cases are the same as such there cannot be different trials. It 
was also submitted that the principle of issue estoppel is attracted. Same 
issues cannot be agitated afresh in the cases 'which are settled by prior 
litigation. The issue of estoppel stands merged in the principles of Autrefois 
acquit and Autrefois convict enshrined in Article 20(2) and section 300 
Cr.PC. 
16. The main question for consideration is whether in view of 
Article 20(2) of Constitution oflndia and section 300 Cr.PC, it is a case 
of prosecution and punishment for the "same offence" more than once. 
No doubt about it that the general conspiracy had.been hatched as alleged 
for the period 1988 tG 1996 but defalcations are from different treasuries 
for different financial years by exceeding the amount of each year which 
was
allocated for Animal Husbandry Department for each of the district 
for the purpose of animal husband1y. The amount involved is different, 
fake vouchers, fake i!llotment letters, fake supply orders had been 
prepared with the help of different sets of accused persons. Though 
there is one general conspiracy, offences are distinct for different periods. 
Question arises whether there is one general· conspiracy pursuant to 
which various defalcations of different amounts have been made running 
into several years from different treasuries, by different sets of accused 
persons. Whether there could have been only one trial or more than one. 
Whether legal requirement is for one trial or mo're than one in such 
cases. Article 20(2) of the Constitution is extracted hereunder : 
"20. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the 
same offence more than once." 
17. Article 20(2) says that no person shall be prosecuted and 
punished for the same offence more than once. This is called the doctrine 
of double jeopardy. The objective of the Article is to avoid harassment, 
which may be caused by successive criminal proceedings, where the 
person has committed only one crime. There is a law maxim related to 
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this, nemo debet bis vexari. This means that no man shall be put twice 
in peril for the same offence. There are two aspects of doctrine of 
jeopardy viz. Autrefois convict and Autrefois acquit. Autrefois convict 
means that the person has been previously convicted in respect of the 
same offence. Autrefois acquit means that the person has been acquitted 
on a same charge on which he is being prosecuted. Constitution bars 
double punishment forthe same offence. The conviction for such offence 
does not bar for subsequent trial and conviction for another offence and 
it does not matter even if some ingredients of these two offences are 
common. 
Section 300 Cr.P.C. is extracted hereunder : 
"Section 300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to 
be tried for same offence.-
(I) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent 
jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such 
offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, 
not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the 
same facts for any other offence for which a different charge 
fi;.om the one made against him might have been made under 
sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been 
convicted under sub- section (2) thereof. 
(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be 
afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government, for 
any distinct offence for which
a separate charge might have 
been made against him at the former trial under sub- section (I) 
of section 220. 
(3) A p~rson convicted of any offence constituted by any act 
causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted 
, a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may 
be afterwards tried for such last- mentioned offence, if the 
consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court 
. to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. 
( 4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted 
by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, 
be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence 
constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
651 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to tiy 
A 
the offence with which he is subsequently charged. 
(5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again 
for the same offence except with the consent of the Court by 
which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the 
first-1nentioned Court is subordinate. 
B 
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 
26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, (I 0 of 1897) or of section 
188 of this Code." 
18. Section 300 refers to sections 220 and 221 Cr.PC. No doubt it 
appears that a person who has been convicted or acquitted of the "same 
offence" cannot be tried again considering the aforesaid provisions. 
Section 220( 1) provides that if one series of acts is so connected together 
as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed 
by the same person, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for 
every such offence. Section 220( I) is extracted hereunder : 
"220. Trial for more than one offence.-( I) If, in one series 
of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, 
more offences than one are committed by the same person, he 
may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such 
offence." 
19. Section 221 (I) is applicable where it is doubtful what offence 
has been committed. When a single act or .series of acts is of such a 
nature
that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can 
be proved would constitute, the accused may be charged with having 
committed all or any of such offences and such charges can be tried 
together. 
20. Chapter XVII deals with the form of charges. Section 212 
deals with contents of charge, e.g., particulars of time, place and person. 
Section 212 is extracted hereunder : 
"212. Particulars as to time, place and person.-(!) The 
charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of 
the alleged offence, and the person (ifany) against whom, or the 
thing (if any) in respect of which, it was committed, as are 
reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter 
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(2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust 
or dishonest misappropriation of money or other movable 
property, It shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum or, as the 
case may be, describe the movable property in respect of which 
the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the dates 
between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, 
without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge 
so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within 
the meaning of section 219; 
Provided that the time included between the first and last of 
such dates shall not exceed one year." (Emphasis Supplied) 
21. When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust or 
dishonest appropriation of money or other immovable property, it shall 
be sufficient to specifythe gross sum or describe the moveable property 
in respect of which offence is alleged to have been committed, and the 
dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, 
without specifying particular items of exact dates, and the charge so 
framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning 
of section 219 provided that the time included between the first and last 
of such dates shall not exceed one year. A charge shall contain such 
particulars as to time and place of the alleged offence and time period 
shall not exceed one year. Time period and place of the offence
is material 
iri 'Such cases. 
22.Section 219 Cr.PC provides that three offences of same kind 
within a year may be charged together. When a person is accused of 
more offences than one of the same kind committed within a period of 
. F , ., one year, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number 
of them not exceeding three for same kind of offence under section 
219( 1 ). Section 219 is reproduced hereunder : 
"S.219. Three offences of same kind within year may be 
charged together.-
G 
(!)When a person is accused of more offences than one of the 
same kind committed within the space of twelve months from 
the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the 
same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one 
trial for, any number of them not exceeding three. 
H
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are punishable 
with the same amount of punishment under the same section of 
the Indian Penal Code ( 45 of 1860 ) or of any special or local · 
law: 
·· Provided that, for the purposes of this section, an offence 
punishable under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 
1860) shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an 
offence punishable under section 380 of the said Code, and that 
an offence punishable under any section of the said Code, or of 
any special or local law, shall be deemed to be an offence of the 
same kind as an attempt to commit such offence, when such an 
attempt is an offence.'.' 
23. It is apparent from section 212 read with section 219 that 
there have to be separate trials for different years covering the period of 
more than one year. Same kind of offence is a different thing than the 
"same offence" for the purpose of sections 2 I 9, 220 or 300. The scheme 
oflaw is clear that separate charges for distinct offences must be framed 
separately and they cannot be clubbed together for more than one year. 
24. This Court in Natwar Lal Sakar Lal Mody v. The State of 
Bombay 26 ( 1984) DLT 64 considered the question of joint trial of persons 
and offences for conspiracy as per provisions contained in section 239( d) 
of the old Cr.PC. This Court has laid down that separate trial is the rule 
and joint trial
is an exception. Joint trial would be an irregular exercise of 
discretion if a court allows innumerable offences spread over a long 
period of time and committed by a large number of persons to be under 
the protecting wings of an all-embracing conspiracy, and if each or some 
of the offences can be separately tried, it would be appropriate and 
lawful. Joint trial prolongs the trial and causes wasteofju<jicial time and 
complicates the matter which might otherwise be simple, and it would 
confuse the accused and cause prejudice to them. Court should not be 
overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences 
unless it is satisfied that the persons who committed separate offences 
were patties to the conspiracy and committed the separate acts pursuant 
to conspiracy. This Court has laid down thus : 
· "11. This discussion leads us to the following legal position. 
Separate trial is the rule and joint trial is an exception. While · 
Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a joint 
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trial of person and offences within defined limits, it is within the 
discretion of the Court to permit such a joint trial or not, having 
regard to the circumstances of e11ch case. It would certainly be 
an irregular exercise of discretion if a Court allows an innumerable 
number of offences spread over a long period of time and 
committed by a large number of persons under the protecting 
wing of all-embracing conspiracy, if each or some of the offences 
can legitimately and properly form the subject-matter of a separate 
trial; such a joint trial would undoubtedly prolong the trial and 
would be a cause of unnecessary waste ofjudicial time. It would 
complicate matters which might otherwise be simple; it would 
confuse accused and cause prejudice to them, for more often 
than not accused who have taken part in one of the minor offences 
might have not only to undergo the long strain of protracted trial, 
but there might also be the likelihood of the impact of the evidence 
adduced in respect of other accused on the evidence adduced 
against him working to his detriment. Nor can it be said that 
such an omnibus charge or charges would always be in favour 
of the prosecution for the confusion introduced in the charges 
and consequently in the evidence may ultimately benefit some 
of the accused, as a clear case against one or other of the accused 
may be complicated or confused by the attempt to put it in
a 
proper place in a larger setting. A Cgurt should not be overzealous 
to provide a cover of conspiracy for a nlllnber of offences unless 
it is~clearly satisfied on the material placed before it that there is 
evidence to prove prima facie that the persons who committed 
fil<j2arate offences were parties to the conspiracy and they 
committed the separate acts attributed to them pursuant to the 
object of the said conspiracy." (Emphasis Supplied) 
25. This Court in Ranchhod Lal 1( State of Madhya Pradesh 
AIR 1965 SC 1248 has also considered the question of joint trial in the 
case of criminal breach of trust. It has been observed that normal rule is 
that there should be a charge for each distinct offence. Court is authorized 
to lump up the various items with respect to which criminal breach of 
trust was committed and to mention the total amount misappropriated 
. within a year in the charge. When so done, the charge is deemed to be 
the charge of one offence. This Court has laid down that a separate trial 
with respect to each distinct offence of criminal breach of trust with
·-,-·~---· 
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
655 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
respect to an individual item is the correct mode of proceeding with the 
A 
trial of an offence of criminal breach of trust. This Court has laid ddwn 
thus: 
"(14.) Section 222, Cr. P.C. reads: 
"(I) The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and 
place of the alleged offence, and ·the person (if any) against 
whom, or the thing (ifany) in respect of which, it was committed, 
as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the 
matter with which he is charged. 
(2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust 
or dishonest misappropriation of money, it shall be sufficient to 
specify the gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged 
to have been committed, and the dates between which the 
offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying 
particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall 
be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of 
S.234: 
Provided that the time included between the first and last of 
such dates shall not exceed one year." 
Sub-section (2) is an exception to meet a certain contingency 
and is not the normal rule with respect of framing of a charge in 
cases of criminal breach of trust. The normal rule is that there 
should be a charge for each distinct offence as provided in S. 
233 of the Code. S. 222 mentions what the contents of the charge 
should be. It is
only when it may not be possible to specify exactly 
particular items with respect to which criminal breach of trust 
took place or the exact date on which the individual items were 
misappropriated or in some similar contingency, that the Court is 
authorised to lump up the various items with respect to which 
criminal breach of trust was committed and to mention the total 
amount misappropriated with a year in the charge. When so 
done, the charge is deemed to'be the charge of one offence. If 
several distinct items with respect to which criminal breach of 
trust has been committed are not so lumped together, no illegality 
is committed in the trial of those offences. In fact a separate 
trial with respect to each distinct offence of criminal breach of 
trust with respect to an individual item is the correct mode of 
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proceeding with the trial of an offence of criminal breach of 
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(15.) Learned counsel for the appellant also relied on S. 234, 
Code of Criminal Procedure and urged that three offences of 
criminal breach of trust could have been tried at one trial as sec. 
234 provides that when a person is accused of more offences 
than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve 
months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in 
respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and 
tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three. 
This again is an enabling provision and is an exception to sec. 
233, Code of Criminal Procedure If each of the several offences 
is tried separately, there is noth.ing illegal about it. It may also be 
mentioned that the total number of items charged in the four 
cases exceeded three. 
(16.) Lastly, reference was made, on behalf of the appellant to 
sec. 235, Code of Criminal Procedure and it was urged that all 
these offences were committed in the course of the same 
transaction, and therefore, they should have been tried at one 
trial. Assuming, without deciding, that these offences could be 
said to have been committed in the course of the same 
transaction, the separate trial of the appellant for certain specific 
offences is not illegal. This section too is an enabling section." 
26. In R. v. Griffith 1965 (2) AER 448 it has been laid down
that 
a conspiracy should be tried separately to substantive counts. The Court 
of Appeal in England has laid down thus : 
F 
"9. The practice of adding what may be called a rolled up 
conspiracy charge to a number of counts of substantive offences 
has become common. We express the very strong hope that 
this practice will now cease and that the courts will never again 
have to struggle with this type of case, where it becomes almost 
G 
impossible to explain to ajurythat evidence inadmissible against 
the accused on the substantive count may be admissible against 
him on the conspiracy count once he is shown to be a conspirator. 
We do no believe that most juries can ever really understand the 
subtleties of the situation. In our judgment, except in simple 
cases, a conspiracy count (if one is needed at all) should be tried 
H 
separately to substantive counts."
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
27. In State of A P v. Cheemalapti Ganeswara Rao & Anr. 
(1964) 3 SCR297this Court dealt with misjoinderofparties under section 
239 ofthe old Cr.P.C. This Court with respect to 'same transaction' has 
observed thus : 
"! 0. Whether a tra,nsaction can be regarded as the same would 
necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it 
seems to us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that 
which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have 
not come across a single decision of any Court which the 
Legislature has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the 
expression. But it is generally thought that where there is 
proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or 
continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible 
to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, 
not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist 
for a transaction to be regarded as the same." 
Further, it was held that: 
"Where, however, several offences are alleged to have been 
committed by several accused persons it may be more reasonable 
to follow the normal rule of separate trials. But here, again, if 
those offences are alleged not be wholly unconnected but as 
forming part of the same transaction the only consideration that 
will justify separate trials would be the embarrassment or difficulty 
caused
to the accused persons in defending themselves." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
WI1en several offences are alleged to have been committed by 
·several accused persons this Court has laid down that normal rule is of 
separate trials. 
28. In Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra · 
(1964) 2 SCR 378, this Court considered the question of conspiracy in a 
case where the accused had first defrauded one Jupiter company and 
thereafter another company called Empire. Argument was raised that 
once having been convicted of conspiracy qua the Jupiter case, he could · 
not be convicted qua company called Empire. This Court relying upon 
judgment in State of Bombay v. SL. Apte (1961) 3 SCR 107 has laid 
down thus: 
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"In the present case, applying the test laid down by this Court, 
the two conspiracies are not the same offence: the Jupiter 
conspiracy came to an end when its funds were misappropriated. 
The Empire conspiracy was hatched subsequently, though its 
object had an intimate connection with the Jupiter in that the 
fraud of the Empire was conceived and executed to cover up 
the fraud of the Jupiter. The two conspiracies are distinct 
offences. It cannot even be said that some of the ingredients of 
both the conspiracies are the same. The facts constituting the 
Jupiter conspiracy are not the ingredients of the offence of the 
Empir~ conspiracy, but only afford a motive for the latter offence. 
Motive is not an ingredient of an offence. The proof of motive 
helps a Court in coming to a correct conclusion when there is no 
direct evidence. Where there is direct offence for implicating 
an accused in an offence, the absence of proof of motive is not 
material. The ingredients of both the offences are totally different 
and they do not form the same offence within the meaning of 
Art.20(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, that Article has no 
relevance to the present case." 
29. In Gopal Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar ( 1970) 2 SCC 905 
offence was committed between two different periods when the accused 
was working as Cashier. On the basis of acquittal in the first offence, 
plea of issue estoppel was raised
for the second period during trial. This 
Court had rejected the submission thus: 
"7. In our opinion, the High Court came to the correct conclusion. 
The basic principle underlying the rule of issue-estoppel is that 
the same issue of fact and law must have been detennined in 
the previous litigation. The question then arises: Was itthe same 
issue of fact which was determined in the earlier case? A person 
may be acting as a cashier at one period and may not be acting 
as a cashier at another period, especially as in this case it was 
found that the appellant had never been appointed as a cashier. 
He was a temporary senior accounts clerk who was alleged to 
be doing the work of a cashier. If there is any likelihood of facts 
or conditions changing during the two periods which are under 
consideration then it is difficult to say that the prosecution would 
be bound by the finding in a previous trial on a similar issue of 
fact. It seems to us that the later finding must necessarily be in
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
659 
PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
contradiction of the previous determination. There can be no 
A 
such contradiction ifthe periods are different and the facts relating 
to the carrying on of the duties of a cashier are 
different."(Emphasis supplied) 
30. It is pertinent to mention here that this Court in this very case 
has negatived the contention of joint trials and amalgamation of trials in 
B 
the aforesaid decisions. When parties are different, issue of estoppel 
would not arise. The substantive offence is that of defalcation. Conspiracy 
was an allied offence to the substantive offence. 
31. Section 218 deals with separate charges for distinct offences. 
Section 219 quoted above, provides that three offences of the same kind 
c 
can be clubbed in one trial committed within one year. Section 220 speaks 
of trial for more than one offence if it is the same transaction. Jn the 
instant case it cannot be said that defalcation is same transaction as the 
transactions are in different treasuries for different years, different 
amounts, different allotment letters, supply orders and suppliers. Thus 
the provision of section 221 is not attracted in the instant case. There 
are different sets of accused persons in different cases with respect to 
defalcation. 
32. There may be a conspiracy in general one and a separate 
one. There may be larger conspiracy and smaller conspiracy which may 
develop in successive
stages involving different accused persons. In the 
instant case defalcations have been made in various years by combination 
of different accused persons. Thus, there can be separate trials on the 
basis of law laid down by this Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi 
Administration) (1979) 2 SCC 322 wherein this Court has laid down 
thus: 
"11. .... The offences alleged in the first case were Section 120-
B read with Section 420 and Section 406, Indian Penal Code, 
while the offences alleged in the second case were Section 120-
B read with Section 411, Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of 
the Antiquities and Art Treasures A ct, 1972 .......... We are clear, 
in the present case, that the conspiracies which are the subject-
matter of the two cases cannot be said to be identical though the 
conspiracy which is the subject-matter of the first case may, 
perhaps, be said to have turned out to be part of the conspiracy 
which is the subject-matter of the second case. As we mentioned 
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earlier, when investigation commenced in FIR. R.C. 4 of I 976, 
apart from the circumstance that the property involved was the 
same, the link between the conspiracy to cheat and to 
misappropriate and the conspiracy to dispose of the stolen 
property was not known." 
· 
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33. In the instant case, offences are not the same offence. There 
can be different trials for the same offence if tried under two different 
enactments altogether and comprised of two different offences under 
different Acts/statutes without violation of the provisions of Article 20(2) 
or Section 300 Cr.PC. This Couti has decided the issue in various cases:-
c 
(a) Jn Kharkan & Ors. v. The State of U.P.. (1964) 4 SCR 673 
this Comi has laid down thus : 
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"Even ifthe two incidents could be viewed as connected 
so as to form parts of one transaction it is obvious that the 
offences were distinct and required different charges. The 
assault on Tikam in fulfilment of the common object of the 
unlawful assembly was over when the unlawful assembly 
proceeded to the house ofTikam to loot it. The new common 
object to beat Puran was formed at a time when the common 
object in respect ofTikam had been fully worked out and even 
ifthe two incidents could be taken to be connected by unity of 
time and place (which they were not), the offences were distinct 
and required separate charges. The learned Sessions Judge 
was right in breaking up the single
charge framed by the 
magistrate and ordering separate trials. In this view the prior 
acquittal cannot create a bar in respect of the conviction herein 
reached." (Emphasis Supplied) 
(b) In Maqboot Hussain v. The State of Bombay (1953) SCR 
730 this Court has laid down thus: 
"Appellant had smuggled gold into India and was booked u/s 
167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, .1878 and subsequently when 
no one came t.o cl~im the gold, he was charged 11 /8 8 OfFERA. 
He challenged this as violation of Art. 20(2). The Court analysed 
the scope of Att. 20(2) and held that the "prosecution" must 
be before a court oflaw or judicial tribunal. The plea of double 
jeopardy was discarded as it was held that the Customs 
authorities were not a judicial tribunal or court. For double
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD YADAV (ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
jeopardy, the test is whether the former offence and the offence 
now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the 
facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction 
of the other and not that the facts relied on by the prosecution 
are the same in the two trials." 
(c) In State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte (1961) 3 SCR 107 a 
Constitution Bench of this Court has laid down as to the issue 
regarding.conviction under section 409 IPC and section 105 of 
Insurance Act. The submission of double jeopardy was repelled 
with respect to offences under section 11 of !PC and section 
105 of Insurance Act. It was held that the offences under both 
the Acts are distinct due to their ingredients. So as to constitute 
double jeopardy two offences should be identical. 
(d) In T.S. Baliah v. T.S. RenRachari ( 1969) 3 SCR 65, appellant 
was sought to be prosecuted under section 177 IPC and section 
52 oflncome Tax Act, 1922 for furnishing wrong information in 
his tax returns. On consideration of section 26 of General Clauses 
Act, this Court held that the provision did not provide a bar on 
trial and conviction for the same offence under more than one 
enactment in case ingredients of offences are distinct. It only 
barred double punishment and not double conviction. 
(e) In V.K. ARarwal v. Vasantraj B. Bhatia (1988) 3 SCC 467 
,the question arose whether acquittal of an accused
charged with 
having committed the offence punishable under section 111 read 
with section 135 of Customs Act, 1969 created a legal bar to the 
accused, subsequently being prosecuted under section 85 of the 
Gold (Control) Act, 1968. It was held that the ingredients of 
offence under each of the enactments were quite different. The 
Court applied the test developed in Maqbool Hussain (supra) 
and held the two offences to be different in scope and contents 
of their ingredients. The Court also relied upon S.L. Apte's decision 
(supra) and observed that what is necessary is to analyse the 
ingredients of the two offences and not the allegations made in 
two complaints. No doubt about it that there can be separate 
offences but ingredients would remain same under penal provision 
but that would also not make out a case of violating the provisions 
of Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 300 Cr.P.C. 
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( f) In case ingredients of the offences to be tried separately 
arise out of the same offence, there can be separate trials under 
two enactments, ifthe ingredients constituting two offences are 
different under different Acts, there is no bar for separate trials. 
In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Ors. ( 1988) 4 SCC 655 
it was held: 
"The expression "any act or omission which constitutes any 
offence under this Act" in Section 56 of the Wild Life 
(Protection) Act, 1972 merely imports the idea that the same 
act or omission might constitute an offence under another law 
and could be tried under such other law or laws also. Further 
held that, ifthere are two distinct and separate offences with 
different ingredients under two different enactments. a double 
punishment is not barred. The same set of facts can constitute 
offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can 
amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at the 
same time constitute an offence under any other law." 
(g) In State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh & Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 
152 this Court was dealing with vires of Rajasthan Sati 
(Prevention) Act, 1987. It was urged that sections 5 and 6 of 
new Sati Act were overlapping. It was held that with regard to 
Article 20(2) that subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment 
are not barred if the ingredients of two offences are distinct. 
There can be separate offences
from same set of facts and 
hence no double jeopardy. 
(h) In Monica Bedi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) I SCC 
284 this Court considered the meaning of the expression "same 
offence" employed in Article 20(2) and observed that second 
prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the 
offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double 
jeopardy being applicable. This Court has observed thus : 
"26. What is the meaning of the expression used in Article 
20(2) "for the same offence"? What is prohibited under Article 
20(2) is, that the second prosecution and conviction must be 
for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no 
question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable ..... 
xxxxx
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.j' 
29. It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different 
prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the 
protection afforded by Article 20(2) is not available. It is settled 
law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than 
once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients 
of both the offences are totally different and they did not form 
the same offence." 
(i) In Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of MP. (2012) 
7 SCC 621, with respect to double jeopardy, this Court has laid 
down thus: 
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"33. In view of the above, the law is well settled that in order c 
to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution i.e. 
doctrine of autrefois acquit or Section 300 Code of Criminal 
Procedure. or Section 71 Indian Penal Code or Section 26 of 
General Clauses Act, ingredients of the offences in the earlier 
case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not 
different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are 
D 
the same is not identity of the allegations but the identity of the 
ingredients of the offence. Motive for committing offence 
cannot be termed as ingredients of offences to determine the 
issue. The plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is 
shown that the judgment of acquittal in the previous charge 
necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter charge." 
.(;j).In State of Rajasthan v.
Bhagwan Das Agrawal (2013) 16 
SCC 574 there were 3 FIRs. registered with respect to illegal 
supply of explosives. Charge was under the Explosives Act. This 
Com1 held that the nature and manner of the offences committed 
by the accused persons were not identical but were different, 
and as such F!Rs. were not relating to the same offence as 
different acts happened in different places. As such the provisions 
contained in section 186 Cr.PC would not apply. 
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(k) In State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjay etc. (2014) 9 SCC 772 
G 
this Court considered the maxim "nemo debet bis vexari pro 
una et eadem causa" i.e. no man shall be put in jeopardy twice 
for one and the same offence. In case ingredients are different 
there can be separate trial for the same offence also. This Court 
has laid do.wn thus : 
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"52. It is well known principle that the rule against double 
jeopardy is based on a maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una 
et eadem causa, which means no man shall be put in jeopardy 
twice for one and the same offence. Artie le 20 of the 
Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted or 
punished for the offence more than once. However, it is also 
settled that a subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment 
has no bar ifthe ingredients of the two offences are distinct." 
34. In the light of aforesaid discussion, it is appropriate to consider 
the submissions raised by Shri Surendra Singh, learned senior counsel 
appearing on behalf ofLalu Prasad Yadav. It was submitted by learned 
senior counsel that since the conspiracy was between 1988 and 1996 
which included the period of 1994-1995, the conviction has been made 
on the charge of conspiracy from 1988 to 1996 which included all the 
treasuries of the erstwhile State ofBihar. There was no charge of separate 
conspiracy. Charges being similar in the cases which have been quashed. 
No case is made out for trial under section 120-B. Same and identical 
circuinstances are being relied upon by the prosecution. There are no 
new or additional circumstances in the cases which have been quashed. 
The conspiracies referred to are one and the same and not different 
conspiracies. Thus, in view of the trial which had concluded, there cannot. 
be
further trial on the charge of conspiracy. 
35. We are unable to accept the submissions raised by learned 
senior counsel. Though there was one general charge of conspiracy, 
which \Vas allied in nature, the charge was qualified with the substantive 
charge of defalcation of a paiticular sum from a particular treasury in 
particular time period. The charge has to be taken in substance for the 
purpose of defalcation from a particular treasury in a particular financial 
year exceeding the allocation made for the purpose of animal husbandry 
on the basis of fake vouchers, fake supply orders etc. The sanctions 
made in Budget were separate for each and every year. This Court has 
already dealt with this matter when the prayers for amalgamation and 
joint trial had been made and in view of the position of law and various 
provisions discussed above, we are of the opinion that separate trials 
which are being made are in accordance with provisions oflaw otherwise 
it would have prejudiced the accused persons considering the different 
defalcations from different treasuries at different times with different 
documents. Whatever could be combined has already been done. Each
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
defalcation would constitute an independent offence. Thus, by no stretch, 
it can be held to be in violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or 
Section 300 Cr.P.C. Separate trials in such cases is the very intendment 
oflaw. There is no room to raise such a grievance. Though evidence of 
general conspiracy has been adduced in cases which have been 
concluded, it may be common to all the cases but at the same time 
offences are different at different places, by different accused persons. 
As and when a separate offence is committed, it becomes punishable 
and the substantive charge which has to be taken is that of the offence 
under the P.C. Act etc. There was conspiracy hatched which was 
continuing one and has resulted into various offences. It was joined from 
time to time by different accused persons, so whenever an offence is 
committed in continuation of the conspiracy, it would be punishable 
separately for different periods as envisaged in section 212(2), obviously, 
there have to be separate trials. Thus it cannot be said to be a case of 
double jeopardy at all. It cannot be said that for.the same offence the 
accused persons are being tried again. 
36. Learned senior counsel has relied upon the decision of this 
Court in S. S11'a111irath11a111 (sipra) in which the charge disclosed one 
single conspiracy, although spread over several years. There was only 
one object of the
conspiracy, and that was cheating members of the 
public. The fact that in the course of years others joined the conspiracy 
or that several incidents of cheating took place in pursuance of the 
conspiracy, does not change the conspiracy and does not split up a single 
conspiracy into several conspiracies. The accused persons raised the 
submission as to misjoinder of the charges. This Court has dealt with the 
matter thus : 
"2. Both the courts below, relying on the oral and documentary 
evidence in the case, held it as a fact that there had been a 
conspiracy during 'the years 1945-48 to cheat members of the 
public between some of the accused and the approvers 
Ramaswami Mudaliar and Vellayam Pillai examined as P. Ws. 
91 ai1d 61 respectively. The method adopted for cheating was to 
persuade such members of the public, as could be persuaded, to 
part with their money to purchase counterfeit Rs. 5 currency 
notes at half their face value and after having obtained their 
money to decamp with it. When a member of the public handed 
over his money, at a certain stage, one pf the conspirators 
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pretending to be a Police Officer would arrest the man who had 
the box containing their money and take him away with the box. 
The victim was thus deprived of his money without even having 
a single counterfeit currency note in his possession in exchange 
of the genuine money paid by him. We have scrutinized with 
care the judgments of the Sessions Judge and the learned Judge 
of the High Court and find that they were amply justified, having 
regard to the state of the evidence on the record, in coming to 
the conclusion that the case of the prosecution concerning the 
existence of the conspiracy as charged to cheat the members of 
the public, had been proved. We are unable to find any special 
circumstance, arising from the evidence on the record, which 
would justify our interference with the finding of fact arrived at 
by the comts below. Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming and 
convincing to prove the case of the prOS\:CUtion that there had 
been a conspiracy in the relevant years to cheat the members of 
the public between some of the accused and the aforesaid 
approvers. 
7. On behalf of the appellant Abu Bucker it was contended that 
there has been misjoinder of charges on the ground that several 
conspiracies, distinct from each other, had been lumped together 
and tried at one trial. The Advocate for Swamirathnam, however, 
did not put forward this submission. We have examined the charge
carefully and find no ground for accepting the contention raised. 
The charge as framed, discloses one single conspiracy, although 
spread over several years. There was--only one object of the 
conspiracy and that was to client members of the public. The 
fact that in the course of years others joined the conspiracy or 
that several incidents of cheating took place in pursuance of the 
conspiracy did not change the conspiracy & did not spilt up a 
single conspiracy into several conspiracies. It was suggested 
that although the modus operandi may hove been the same, the 
several instances of cheating were not part of the same 
transaction. Reliance was placed on the case ofSharputji Sorabj i 
v. Emperor : AIR 1936 Born 154 and on the case of Choragudi 
Venkatadari In re !LR 33 Mad 592. These cases are not in point. 
In the Bombay case no charge of conspiracy had been framed 
and the decision in the Madras case was given before 
Section 120-B, was introduced into the Indian Penal Code. In
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
. the present case, the instances ofcheating were in pursuance of 
the conspiracy and were therefore pru1s of the same tra11saction." 
It is apparent from the aforesaid decision that this Court did not 
consider various provisions and question of double jeopardy did not arise 
for consideration. It was held in the facts that there was no prejudice to 
the accused persons. There was no misjoinder of the charges. On facts 
the case has no application and cannot be said to be an authority on 
ArtiCJe 20 of the Constitution and section 300 Cr.PC. 
37. In Srichand K Khetwani's case (supra), accused were tried 
for an offence punishable under section 120-B read with section 409 
and section 5(2) read with section 5(1 )(d) of the P.C. Act. They were all 
convicted by the trial court. The conviction of the appellants was upheld. 
·The prosecution case was that in pursuance of the conspiracy, a number 
of licences in the nanie of several companies which had no existence 
were prepared, some of them were actually issued and that two of those 
licences issued were in the name of M.L. Trading Co., Bombay and 
were delivered to appellant by Prabhakar Karmik. The Court held that 
the appellant received the licences issued in the name of the fictitious 
firm, therefore the appellant was a member of the conspiracy with which 
he was charged. Charge was framed for commission of offence 
punishable under
section 120-B IPC read with §~ction, 5(2) of PC Act. 
The charge framed described the conspiracy to be agreeing of the various 
persons, including the persons not put on trial, to do or cause to be done, 
illegal acts. The charge of conspiracy was not that the conspiracy was 
entered into with each bogus individual firm for the benefit of that firm 
. alone in connection with the issue oflicences to that particular firm. The 
charge was that out of the profits made from acts done in furtherance of 
the conspiracy, all the persons in the conspiracy were to benefit. This 
Court observed that the conspiracy was a general conspiracy to keep on 
issuing licence in the names of fictitious firms and to share the benefits 
arising out of those licences when no real independent person was the 
licensee. This Court held that it was not a case of conspiracy with respect 
to licences issued to one fictitious company. This Court has laid down 
thus: 
"The finding that the various finns to whom licences were issued 
were fictitious is not questioned. The conspiracy \Vas a general 
conspiracy to keep on issuing licences in the names of fictitious 
· firms and to share the benefits arising out of those licences when 
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no real independent person was the licensee. The various 
members of the conspiracy other than ttfe two public servants 
must have joined with the full knowledge of the modus operandi 
of the conspiracy and with the intention and object of sharing the 
profits arising out of the acts of the conspirators. We do not 
therefore see that the mere fact that licences were issued in the 
names of eight different companies make out the case against 
the appellant and the other conspirators to be a case of eight 
different conspiracies each with respect to the licences issued 
to one particular fictitious company." 
It is apparent that the case is quite distinguishable. In the instant 
case different accused persons exist with the help of whom amount has 
been withdrawn in different years. It is not a case that only a few persons 
had benefited each and every year, when the facts are juxtaposed. Thus, 
it would be a case of different offences. The decision has no application 
and this Court was not concerned with the provisions of Article 20 or 
section 300 Cr.PC and other provisions relating to separate trial contained 
in the Cr.P.C. 
38. Another decision relied upon by learned senior counsel is 
Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra etc. v. K.S. Dalipsinghji & Anr. AIR 
1970 SC 45. The facts indicate that 40 accused persons were at Bombay 
E 
and other places from 1.11.1956 to 2.2.1959 and were parties to a 
continuing criminal
conspiracy, to acquire possession of, carry, remove 
deposit harbor, keep concealed and deal in gold and knowingly to be 
concerned in fraudulent evasion of duty chargeable on gold am;t of the 
. 
_prohibition and restriction applicable thereto and committed an offence 
.-- :.Under section l 20B IPC read with section 167 (81) of Sea Customs Act, 
F 
1878. On other counts the accused persons were charged individually 
with offences punishable under section 167. The scheme was that 
necessary finances would be arranged, remittances to foreign countries 
would be made through Murad, gold would be sent by air from foreign 
countries to Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta and other airports and the smuggled 
G 
gold would be sold in India. There were several transactions of smuggling. 
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In 1957, other accused persons joined the conspiracy. From February, 
1958, seven or eight consignments of gold concealed in the rear left 
bathroom of the aircrafts were sent from Lori to Bombay. On 1.2.1959 
the Rani of Jhansi consignment of gold was searched by customs officers 
at the Santacruz airport Bombay and the gold was seized. It was urged
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
669 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
before this Court by the accused persons that evidence disclosed number 
·A 
of conspiracies and charge of general conspiracy was not proved. It 
was not a case of common conspiracy. This Court has laid down thus: 
"15. As to the second question the contention was that the 
evidence disclosed a number of separate conspiracies and that 
the charge of general conspiracy was not proved. Criminal 
conspiracy as defined in Section I 20A of the I.P.C. is an 
agreement by two or more persons to do or cause to be done an 
illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means. The 
agreement and the breach attracted to it the provisions .Or 
Section 167(81) of is the gist of the offence. In order to constitute 
a single general conspiracy there ~ust be a common design and 
a common intention ofall to work in furtherance of the common 
design. Each conspirator pfays his separate part in one integrated 
and united effort to achieve the con;mon purpose. Each one is 
aware that he has a part to play in a general conspiracy though 
he may not know all its secrets or the means by which the 
common purpose is to be accomplished. The evil scheme may 
be promoted by a few, some may drop out and some may join at 
a later stage, but the conspiracy continues until it is broken up. 
The conspiracy may develop in successive stages. There may 
be a general plan to accomplish the common design by such
means as may from time to time be found expedient. New 
techniques may be invented and new means may be devised for 
advancement of the common plan. A general conspiracy inust 
be distinguished from a number of separate conspiracies having 
a similar general purpose. Where different groups ofpersons 
co-operate towards their separate ends without any privity with 
each other each combination constitutes a separate conspiracy. 
The common intention of the conspirators then is to work forthe 
furtherance of the common design of his group only. The cases 
illustrate the distinction between a single general conspiracy and 
a number of unrelated conspiracies. In S.K. Khetwani v. State 
of Maharashtra ,S. Swaminatham v. State Madras the Court 
found a single general conspiracy while in R. v. Griffiths [1965] 
2 All E.R. 448 the Court found a number of unrelated and 
separate conspiracies. 
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smuggle gold into India from foreign countries. The scheme was 
operated by a gang of international crooks. The net was ·spread 
. over Bombay, Geneva, Beirut and Bahrein. Yusuf Merchant and 
Pedro Fernand.es supplied the brain power, Murad Asharanoff 
remitted the funds; Lakshmandas Kochra and Rabiyabai supplied 
the finances, Pedro Fernadez and the Shuhaibar brothers sent 
the gold from Geneva and the Middle East, carriers brought the 
gold hidden in jackets, mechanics concealed and removed gold 
·from aircrafts and others helped in contacting the carriers and 
disposing of the gold. Yusuf, Pedro and Murad and Lakshmandas 
were permanent members bf the conspiracy. They were joined 
later by Kochra, the Shuhaibar brothers and Lori and other 
associates. The original scheme was to bring the gold from 
Geneva. The nefarious design was extended to smuggling of 
gold from the Middle East. There can be no doubt that the 
continuous smuggling of gold sent by Pedro from Geneva during 
February 1956 to February 1958 formed part of a single 
conspiracy. The settlement of account between Yusuf and Pedro 
at Beirut did not end the original conspiracy. There can also be 
no doubt that the smuggling of gold from Beirut by the Shuhaibar 
brothers and from Bahrein by their agent Lori were different 
phases of the same conspiracy. The main argunient was that the 
despatch of gold from Geneva was the result of one
conspiracy 
and that the despatch of gold from the Middle East was the 
result of another separate and unrelated conspiracy. The courts 
below held, and in our opinion rightly, that there was a single 
general conspiracy embracing all the activities. Pedro had a share 
in the profits of the smuggling from Geneva. He got also a share 
ofYusuf's profits from tQ; smuggling of the Middle East gold. 
Apparently Shuhaibar brothers and Lori had no share in the profits 
from the smuggling of the Geneva gold but they attached 
themselves to the general conspiracy originally devised by Yusuf 
and Pedro with knowledge of its scheme and purpose and took 
advantage of its existing organization for obtaining finances from 
Kochra and Rabiyabai and for remittances of funds by Yusuf. 
Each conspirator profited from the general scheme and each 
one of them played his own part in the general conspiracy. The 
second contention is rejected."
STATE OF JHARK:HANb THROUGH SP, CBI v. LAL.{) 
PRASAD @LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
671 
This Court has distinguished general conspiracy from number of 
separate conspiracies having a similar general purpose. Where different · 
groups of persons co-operate towards their separate ends without any 
· privity with each other, each combination cot1stitutes a separate· 
conspiracy. It was held that in the case there was single general conspiracy 
to smuggle gold into India from foreign· countries. The contention raised 
was that separate conspiracies were raised by the accused in the facts 
of the s'aid case. The facts are quite different in the instant case. The 
question which has come up for consideration did not arise in the aforesaid 
decision and this Court has held that there was no prejudice caused to 
the accused persons by not making separate trials. 
39. The modus operandi being the same would not make it a 
single offence when the offences are separate. Commission of offence 
· pursuant to a conspiracy has to be punished. If conspiracy is furthered 
iqto several distinct offences there have to be separate trials. There 
may be a situation where in furtherance of general c01ispiracy, offences 
take place in various parts. pf India and several persons are killed at 
different times. Each trial has to be separately held and the accused to 
be punished separately for the offence committed in furtherance of 
conspiracy. In case there is only one trial for such
conspiracy for separate 
offences, it would enable the accused person to go scotfree and commit 
number of offerices which is not the intendment of law. The concept is 
of 'same offence' under ArtiCJe 20(2) and section 300 Cr.PC. Jn case 
distinct offences are being committed there has to be independentJrial 
for each of such offence based on such conspiracy and 'in the case of 
misappropriation as statutorily mandated, there should not be joinder of 
charges in one trial for more than one year except as provided in section 
219. One gen er.al conspiracy from 1988 to 1996 has led to various 
offences as such there have to be different trials for each of such offence 
based upon conspiracy in which different persons have participated at 
different times at different places for completion of the offence. Whatever 
could be combined has already been done. Thus we find no merit in the 
submissions made by learned senior counsel appearirig on behalf of 
accu~ed persons. 
40. It was also submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf . 
of Sajal Chakraborty that the principle of issue estoppel i.s attracted to · 
criminal trial and has relied upon decision in Manipur Administra(ion, 
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Manipur v. 'f_hokchom Bira Singh AIR 1965 SC 87 in which it has 
been observed that the rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial is that 
where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former 
occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such 
a finding would constitute estoppel against the prosecution. Said principle 
has been merged with the principle of Autrefois acquit as enshrined in 
section 300 Cr.PC. Learned counsel has also relied upon Assistant 
Collector qf Customs, Bombay & Am: v. L.R.Melwani AIR 1970 SC 
962 in which this Court has observed that the issue estoppel rule is but a 
facet of the doctrine of Autrefois acquit. He has also referred to the 
decision of Supreme Court of the Federation of Malaya in Sambasivan 
v. Public Prosecutor, reported in ( 1950) AC 458, where two charges 
were framed for carrying a firearm and being in possession of ammunition 
the appellant being acquitted on the second charge but being subject to a 
second trial for the first charge, the Privy Council held that : 
"The.effect ofa verdict ofacquittal pronounced by a competent 
court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely 
stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again 
for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict 
is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between 
the parties to the adjudication."
(Emphasis Supplied) 
41. In Manipur Administration (supra) this Court has affirmed 
the decision in Pritam Singh v. The State qf Punjab AIR 1956 SC 415 
which in turn relied upon decision in Sambasivan (supra). Thus it was 
contended that CBI is barred from adducing evidence in respect of the 
allegatio11s for which the respondent Sajal Chakraborty has been 
subsequently acquitted by the High Court and the conviction recorded 
by the trial court has been set aside. Finding had been recorded by the 
High Court that there was no mechanism with the respondent to check 
illegal withdrawal from treasury. Receiving of laptop and illegal 
gratification has not been proved as a reward and the accused did not 
take any step to find out causes of heavy withdrawal ofRs.50.56 lakhs 
in a single day by co-accused Dr. B.N. Sharma. Learned counsel has 
further submitted that earlier there was no such practice to send the 
yearly allocation information to the Deputy Commissioner. Thus the CBI 
cannot try the accused on the basis of same allegations de nova. There 
is no role of the accused in preparation of different fake bills. The 
prosecution of the respondent is for the same offence in RC 20A/96 and
STATE OF JHARKHAND.THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
RC 68A/96 for which he has already been acquitted in RC No.5 IA/96. 
Learned counsel had also submitted that for each separate bill, separate 
FIR should have been registered in case CBI stand is accepted. It was 
a series of acts forming part of the same transaction. It is unclear as to 
which of the several offences related to each bill during the tenure as 
District Collector was committed. Thus, there ought to be one trial only. 
Section 212 of Cr.PC does not cover those facts where the offence of 
criminal breach of trust has been clubbed with the offence of criminal 
conspiracy under section 120-B IPC. 
42. Learned counsel has referred to decision in Emperor y. 
Jhabbar Mull Lakkar reported in ( 1922) ILR 49 Cal 924 wherein the 
Court has laid down thus : 
"6. lt is conceded by the earned Counsel for the prosecution that 
the evidence which would be given in respect of the present 
charges, would be identical with the evidence given against the 
accused at the last Sessions, and the earned Counsel further 
informed me that the matter of the alleged false entries was 
investigated at the trial before my learned brother Mr. Justice 
Walmsley and the Jury. In other words, it was a part of the 
prosecution case, at the trial at the last Sessions, that the: accused 
had made the alleged false entries in the book for the purpose of 
a carrying out the alleged misappropriation, and with
the intention· 
of concealing his alleged breach of trust. 
7. Since the case was argued last Friday I have considered the 
·matter, and I have come to the conclusion that, on the facts of 
this case, the accused ought not to be put on his trial in respect 
of these charges. Ifhe were so tried, in my judgment, it would in 
effect amount to trying him again for the same offences as those 
upon winch he has already been tried and acquitted by the Jury, 
although the charges now before the Court are framed in a 
different manner. 
8. Apart from this, I am not at present satisfied that, if it had 
been thought advisable to lay beforelhe Court at the trial at the 
last Sessions, the facts as constituting offence under Section 
4 77 A as well as offences under Section 408, a form of procedure 
could not have been adopted for the purpose of carrying out 
such object. 
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9. Under these circumstances, in my judgment, it would not b: 
right to put the accused man on his trial for the second time in 
respect of the same evidence and in respect of the same matters 
upon which he has already been unanimously acquitted by the 
J.Jrry." (Emphasis Supplied) 
. The said decision has no application to facts of the cases. 
43. The counsel has referred to State of Bombay v. Umarsaheb 
Buransaheb lnamdar AIR 1962 SC 1153 dealing with the bar in section 
222 of Cr.PC, 1898 corresponding to section 212 of Cr.P.C., 1973 and 
section 235 ofold Code corresponding to section 220 ofCr.P.C. in which 
this Court has observed : 
"6. The charge could have been split up into two charges, one 
with respect to the offence of criminal breach of trust committed 
with respect to be amount embezzled between March 6, 1949 
and March 5, 1950 and the other with respect to the amount 
embezzled between March 6, 1950 and June 30, 1950. The two 
offences of criminal breach of trust could have been tried together 
in the present case; as the offences were said to have been 
committed in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy entered into 
by the accused. All the offences committed in pursuance of the 
conspiracy are committed in the course of the same transaction 
and therefore can be tried together at one trial, in view of sub-s. 
(I) of s. 235 of the Code which provides that if in one series of 
acts so
connected together as to form the same transaction, more 
offences than one are committed by the same person, he may 
be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. It 
is therefore clear that no prejudice was caused to the accused 
by the defect in the charge." (Emphasis Supplied) 
The question of amalgamation and joint trial had already been 
concluded by this Court. The question of Autrefois acquit (double 
jeopardy) was not involved in the aforesaid decision: 
44. Gopal Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar (1971) 2 SCR 619 
has als9 been relied upon for 'issue of estoppel. The Court has laid 
down:· 
"The basic principle underlying the rule of issue-estoppel is that 
the same of fact and law must have been determined in the 
previous litigation. The question then arises : Was it the same 
issue of fact which was determined in the earlier case ?A person
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
PRASAD@ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
may be acting as a cas.hier at one pe!·iod and may not be acting 
as a cashier at another period, especially as in this case it was 
found that the appellant had never been appointed as a cashier .. 
He was a temporary senior accounts clerk who was alleged to 
be doing the work of a cashier. If there is any likelihood of facts 
or conditions changing during the two periods which are under 
consideration then it is difficult to say thatthe prosecution.would 
be bound by the finding in a previous trial on a similar issue of 
fact. It seems to us that the later finding must necessarily be in 
contradiction of the previous determination. There can be no 
such contradiction ifthe periods are different and the facts relating 
to the carrying on of the duties of a cashier are different." 
. (Emphasis Supplied) 
Submission of issue of estoppel is based on presupposition that 
there is no likelihood of facts or conditions changing in different years. 
What would be the facts and conditions cannot be said before trial. Duty 
was to be performed at different times. Thus, the decision is ofno utility. 
The decision does not support the cause espoused. 
45. In the case of Mills v. Cooper ( 1967) 2 QB 459, the facts 
were that the defendant was accused of illegally camping on the highway 
under sec~ion 127 of the Highways Act, 1959. One of the primary 
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ingredients of such crime was
being a' gipsy'. There were two complaints 
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registered against him, albeit on. different dates. In the first case, he was 
accused .of being a gipsy as on 22nd December, 1965 and he was 
acquitted. In the second case, he was accused of being a gipsy and 
illegally camping on 13th March, 1966. He took.the plea of issue estoppel. 
Lord Parker, _CJ & Lord Diplock, J. saw it differently whilst disallowing 
the plea of issue estoppel. They held that the second case came later in 
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time and evidence with regard to his status as on the later date cannot 
be estopped. Being a gipsy was not a pennanent disposition. Lord Diplock 
held that issue estoppel, in criminal proceedings takes-the fonn of the 
'rule against double jeopardy'. In that sense, issue estoppel is distinct 
when applied to civil and criminal proceedings. In similar light, rejecting · G 
the application of issue estoppel to the facts of that case, Lord Parker, 
CJ held: 
"I am by no means convinced, for reasons into which r find it 
unnecessary to go, that the doctrine as applied in civil cases has any 
application in criminal cases at all. I will, however, assume for the purposes 
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of this case that it has. Even so, I am satisfied that it has no application 
in the present case, since the issue determined on the earlier occasion 
was that the defendant was not a gipsy on December 22, 1965, whereas 
the issue to be determined on the second occasion was whether he was 
a gipsy on March 13, 1966." 
46.0n the issue of estoppel, learned Solicitor General has relied 
upon Masur Kban v. State of UP. (1974) I SCR 793 thus: 
"The Appellant pleaded on the ground of i.ssue estoppel. The 
issue was regarding his citizenship. Earlier, he had been 
prosecuted by the SDM, Fatehpur u/s 14 of the Foreigners Act. 
He was then acquitted as not being a foreigner. Now he had 
been detained under Paragraph 5 of the Foreigners (Internment) 
Order, 1962. The Court dismissed the petition and therewith the 
argument of issue estoppel: "Here again it is to be remembered 
that the principle applies to two criminal proceedings and the 
proceeding with which we are now concerned is not a critninal 
proceeding. We therefore hold that there is no substance in this 
contention. 
The petition is dismissed. 
Whilst doing so, the Court retraced the jurisprudence on issue-
estoppel starting with the verdict of Lord MacDermott in 
Sambasivam v. Public, Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya, 1950 
AC. 458 as well as Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1956 
SC 415) and Manipur Admn. v. T. Bira Singh (Supra)." 
47. With respect
to issue of estoppel iri R. v. Humphrys ( 1976) 2 
AER 497, Humphrys had previously been acquitted on a charge of driving 
a motorcycle whilst being disqualified to do so. During his trial he testified 
that he hadn't at all driven a motorcycle during that year and he was 
acquitted. Later, it was found that he had lied leading to a charge of 
petjury. Their Lordships were then faced with two broad issues: first, 
whether issue estoppel operated in criminal proceedings; second, even 
if issue estoppel was not recognised by the criminal law, was the bringing 
of a charge of perjury prevented by the generality of the double jeopardy 
doctrine? On the first issue, the one that was being addressed there, the 
House was unequivocal in its view that issue estoppel had no place in 
criminal proceedings. 
48. In Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh (2013) 9 SCC 245, the 
appellant had come up in appeal against the High Court order dismissing
ST ATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBl v. LALU 
PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
his application for quashing of criminal proceedings initiated by R-1 under 
SC, ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The dispute was over some 
agriCultural land in Delhi over which multiple FI Rs. and writs were filed. 
Counsel for the appellant pleaded on the grounds of issue estoppel stating. 
that the issue had already been settled by the High Court. While allowing 
the appeal, this Court then drew a distinction between 'issue-estoppel' 
and 'double jeopardy' holding the former not to be a bar on a second 
proceeding but merely acting as estoppel qua prior findings. 
49. Thus, it is apparent that it is premature to raise the plea of 
issue of estoppel before evidence is recorded for different sets of 
accusations of different offences for different periods. Then it is difficult 
to say that prosecution would be bound by the finding in a previous trial 
on a similar issue of fact and there may not be any contradiction ifthe 
periods are different and with respect to culpability for different periods 
and without fear of contradiction, separate findings can be recorded. In 
what manner the duty has been carried on for different periods would 
be the question of fact in each case and there is no question of double 
jeopardy in such a case. 
50. We ai:e constrained to observe that the same learned Judge 
had taken a different view in Dr. R.K. Rana's case on the basis of same
facts, and same question of law in the same cases. Judicial discipline 
requires that such a blatant contradiction in such an important matter 
should have been avoided. The order passed in the case of Dr. R.K. 
Rana was on sound basis and though the court had noted that there was 
some overlapping of facts but the offences were different, it, however, 
has taken a different view in the impugned order for the reasons which 
are not understandable. The court ought to have been careful while 
dealing with such matters and corisistency is the hallmark of the court 
due to which people have faith in the system and it is not open to the 
court to take a different view in the same matter with reference to 
different accused persons in the same facts and same case. Such 
inconsistent decision-making ought to lu\Ve been avoided at all costs so 
as to ensure credibility of the system. The impugned orders are palpably 
illegal, faulty and contrary to the basic principles of law and Judge has 
ignored large number of binding decisions of this Court while giving 
impermissible benefit to the accused persons and delayed the case for 
several years. Interference had been made at the advanced stage of the 
case which was wholly unwarranted and uncalled for. Let now amends 
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be made by expediting the trial without any further hindrance from any 
quarter. 
51. Coming to the question of delay, we find that there is a delay 
of 113, 157 and 222 days in filing the respective appeals by the CBI. 
Applications have been filed for condonation of delay on account of the 
departmental, administrative procedures involved in for filing the special 
leave petition. It is submitted that unlike the private litigant the matters 
relating to the Government are required to be considered at various levels 
. and then only a decision is taken to file special leave petition. The process 
ofref.erring the particu tar file from one department to another is a time 
consuming process and decisions have to be taken collectively_, 
52. It was submitted by Shri Ram Jethmalani, learned ~enior 
counsel appearing on belialf of the respondents that delay of 157 days 
has not been satisfactorily explained. The averments made in the 
applications seeking condo11ation of delay are based upon earlier 
authorities which no longer can be said to be good law. He has relied 
upon the decisions in Postnwster General & Ors. v. Living Media 
India Ltd. & Am: (2012) 3 SCC 503 and State of UP thT: Exe. Engineer 
v. Amar Nath Yadav (2014) 2 SCC 422. His submission is that Law of 
Limitation binds everybody equally including the Government and defense 
by the Government of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology cannot be accepted in view of the modern technology being 
used and available; more so in the light of the aforesaid decisions. Delay 
in moving files from one department to another is not sufficient explanation 
for condoning abnormal delay. Condonation of delay is an exception 
and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government 
department. The case was investigated by CBI from beginning to end 
and the CBI Manual provides mechanism for filing appeal expeditiously. 
The CBI was bound by its Manual and in violation of the provisions 
contained in· Manual without sufficient explanation, the delay cannot be 
condoned. 
53. Reliance was also placed on Aiit SinRh Thakur & Am: v. 
State of Gujarat 1981 (I) SCC 495, which has been approved in Pundlik 
Jalam Patil (D) by Lrs. v. Exe. Engg. J(llgaon Medium Project & 
Anr: (2008) I 7 SCC 448 that as per the conduct of the appellants they 
are not entitled for condonation of delay, more so, in view of the decision 
in Binod Bihari SinKh v. Union of India (1993) I SCC 572 as there 
was suppression as to when the judgment was applied or received. CBI
STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 
679 
PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD YADAV [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 
Manual has a statutory force as held in Vineet Narain & Ors. v. Union 
A 
of India & Anr. ( 1998) I SCC 226 and the-guidelines as to time frame 
should have been strictly adhered to as ?bserved by this Coui1. 
54. On the other hand, learned Solicitor General has submitted 
that delay deserves to be condoned. He has relied upon the decision of 
this Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty (2007) 7. 
B 
sec 394 in which it has been observed that in serious offences, . 
prosecution is done by the State and the court of law should not throw 
a:way prosecution solely on the ground of delay. Mere delay in 
approaching a court of law would not by itself afford a ground for 
dismissing the case. He has also referred to Sajjan Kumar v. Union c 
of India (2010) 9 SCC 368 to contend that a prosecution should not be 
quashed merely on the ground of the delay. The aforesaid decisions 
cited of Japani Sahoo and Sajjan Kumar (supra) are :with respect to 
the delay in institution of the case not with respect to sufficient cause in 
filing of appeals. However, reliance on the State of Tamil Nodu v. M 
Suresh Rajan (2014) 11 SCC 709 is apt in which the time consumed in 
taking opinion on change of Government was held to be sufficient cause 
so as to condone the delay. Reliance has also been placed on i11dia11 
Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Su brat a Borah Chowlek, etc. (20 I 0) 
14 sec 419
in which there was a delay in filing the appeals in which this 
Court has observed that Section 5 owes no distinction between State 
and citizen. The Court has to ensure that owing to some delay on part of 
the machinery, miscarriage of justice should not take place. It is also 
contended that the power under Section S of the Limitation Act should 
be exercised to advance substantial justice by placing reliance 011 State 
of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 752. 
· 55. In view of the averments made in the applications we are 
satisfied that delay has been sufficiently explained and considering the 
facts and circumstances of the case, gravamen of matter and also the 
divergent views taken by the same Judge of the High Court in the same 
case vis a vis different accused persons on same question, we consider 
it our duty not to throw away petition on the ground of delay. The 
explanation offered by .the CBI of movement of file so as to condone the 
delay so as to subserve the ends of justice, deserves to be accepted. No 
doubt about it that the CBI ought to have acted with more circumspectim1 
and ought to have followed the CBI Manual. It is regrettable th'lt we are 
receiving majority of the special leave petitions filed in this Court barred 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H
680 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2017) 3 S.C.R. 
by limitation not only on behalf of the Government but also by the other 
private litigants. Not only that the special leave petitions are preferred 
with the delay but in refiling also enormous time is consumed and this 
Court in order to advance substantial justice is not throwing away cases 
only on limitation. 
56. Sufficiency of cause has to be judged in a pragmatic manner 
so as to advance cause of justice. No doubt about it that litigants are 
supposed to act with circumspection within limitation and that there should 
not be delay and laches and State machinery should not be 'differentiated 
vis a vis with the private individual in the matter of filing the appeals, 
petitions etc., however, in the facts and circumstances of the case and 
considering the averments in the applications, we deem it appropriate to 
condone the delay in filing the appeals in this court. 
57. In this case, we are surprised at the conduct of the CBI in 
such important matters how such delay could take place. The CBI•ot1ght 
to have been careful in filing the Special Leave Petitions within limitation 
considering the factual matrix of the case. The criticism made by the 
senior counsel for respondent is not wholly unjustified. CBI ought to be 
guided by its Manual. It is expected ofit to be more vigilant. It has failed 
to live up to its reputation. Jn the instant case, lethargy on its part is 
intolerable. IfCBI fails to
act timely, peoples' faith will be shaken in its 
effectiveness. Let the Director of CBI look into the matter and saddle 
the responsibility on a concerned person. In important cases Director, 
CBI should devise methodology which should not be cumbersome as 
reflected in these cases, otherwise in future, Director, CBI cannot escape 
the responsibility for delay in such cases to be termed as deliberate one, 
which is intolerable. Being the head of the institution it was the 
responsibility of the Director, CBI to ensure that appeals were filed within 
limitation. There should not have been delay in filing special leave petitions 
at all. 
58. Resultantly, we set aside the impugned judgments and orders 
passed by the High Court, allow the appeals and direct the trial court 
concerned to expedite the trial and to conclude the same as faras possible 
within a period of nine months from today. 
. Nidhi Jain 
Appeals allowed . 
, ..