N. RAMKUMAR versus THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 845, Supreme Court of India, 2023
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
CASE DETAILS
N. RAMKUMAR
v.
THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
(Criminal Appeal No. 2006 of 2023)
SEPTEMBER 06, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Appellant in ﬁ t of rage, dashed head of the 
victim against the wall, resulting in death of victim. Appellant convicted u/s. 
302 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. Whether judgment, 
order and sentence passed by the Sessions Court and aﬃ  rmed by the 
High Court requires to be aﬃ  rmed or the sentence is to be converted and 
punishment to be awarded u/s. 304 of IPC and if so, which part of s.304 IPC?
Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 and 304 Part II – Limited question before 
the Supreme Court regarding the aﬃ  rmation of sentence u/s. 302 IPC 
or conversion of sentence to s.304 IPC:
Held: In the instant case it can be noticed that appellant-convict and 
the deceased were in love with each other – The fact that deceased had 
stopped talking to the appellant and she was talking to her neighbour, had 
made the appellant furious and he was upset about this change of attitude 
of the deceased – Even according to the testimony of PW-1 (mother of the 
deceased), there was altercation between the appellant and the deceased 
regarding their love aﬀ air – Appellant got infuriated and in that spur of the 
moment he caught hold of her hair and banged her head to the wall which 
resulted in blood oozing out and on seeing this he ran away from the scene 
of the incident – Thus, the single
assault by the appellant coupled with the 
duration of the entire period having occurred for about 2-3 minutes would 
not be suﬃ  cient to infer that he had the intention to kill the deceased – In the 
facts of the case, it is discernible that there was no premeditation to cause 
death or the genesis of occurrence and the single assault by the accused and 
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 845 : 2023 INSC 812
845
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
duration of entire episode, were factors to adjudge the intention – Therefore, 
conviction of the appellant u/s. 302 is altered/converted to one u/s. 304 part 
II of the IPC and the appellant is sentenced to the imprisonment to the period 
already undergone and directed to be released forthwith. [Paras 20 and 21]
Penal Code, 1860 – When accused can be held guilty u/s. 302 and 
304 Part-II of IPC:
Held: Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any 
intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused 
had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can 
be held guilty under second part of s.304 IPC – It is in this background 
that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and 
“knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between 
these two expressions – The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and 
circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not 
satisﬁ ed and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the 
said Section – In order to bring a case within Part 3 of s.300 IPC, it must 
be proved that there was an intention to inﬂ ict that particular bodily injury 
which in the ordinary course of nature was suﬃ  cient to cause death. [Para 16]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 : [1956] SCR 363; 
Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of
Andhra Pradesh AIR 
2006 SC 3010 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 633; Pratap Singh @ Pikki v. State of 
Uttarakhand (2019) 7 SCC 424; Deepak v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 8 
SCC 228; Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police
in Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 – relied on.
Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289 : [2012] 7 
SCR 160 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED 
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 
2006 of 2023.
847
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR 
OF POLICE
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2015 of the High Court of 
Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRLA No. 334 of 2013.
Appearances:
M. A. Chinnasamy, Adv. for the Appellant.
V. Krishnamurthy, AAG, Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Vaidehi Rastogi, 
Ms. Richa Vishwakarma, Advs. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1. Heard.
2. This appeal is at the instance of a Convict-Accused and is directed 
against the judgement and order passed by the Madurai bench of Madras 
High Court dated 28.10.2015 in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.334 of 2013 
whereunder the High Court dismissed the appeal ﬁ led by the appellant 
herein thereby aﬃ  rming the judgement and order of conviction and sentence 
passed by the First Additional District Judge (NCR) Tiruchirappalli in Case 
No.226 of 2010.
3. The facts in brief, shorn of unnecessary details leading to the ﬁ ling 
of this appeal are as under:
4. The case of the prosecution was that the deceased Sangeetha was 
in love with the appellant and she was unhappy with the conduct of the 
appellant and her mother had also warned them in this regard. It is further 
case of prosecution that deceased stopped seeing the appellant and broke her 
relationship with the appellant and deceased was talking to her neighbour 
one Mr. Sudhakar and being agitated with the said turn of events, appellant 
is said to have trespassed into the house of the deceased on
19.06.2010 at 
about 10.30 p.m. and questioned her conduct of talking to another person. It 
is stated by the prosecution that appellant in a ﬁ t of rage, held the deceased 
by her ears and dashed her head against the wall and ﬂ ed away from the spot. 
PW-1 and PW-2 had admitted the deceased to the hospital and after three 
days the complaint was lodged resulting in registration of FIR No.1659 of 
2010 for the oﬀ ence punishable under Sections 294(b), 448, 323 and 506(1)
848
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and Section 4 
of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act against the 
appellant.
5. It is stated by the prosecution that on 28.06.2010 deceased who 
was under treatment started vomiting blood and struggled to breathe and 
expired on 29.06.2010 at 3.30 a.m. On her demise the Investigating Oﬃ  cer 
(PW-12) altered the charge to one under Sections 294(b), 448, 323, 506(1) 
IPC, and 302 IPC and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment 
of Woman Act.
6. The appellant – accused came to be tried for the said oﬀ ence and 
on the basis of the testimony of the mother of the deceased (PW-1) and also 
taking into consideration the deposition of neighbour (PW-2) who claimed to 
have seen the accused ﬂ eeing away from the scene of oﬀ ence by taking into 
consideration the attendant circumstance, learned First Additional District 
Judge convicted the accused for the oﬀ ence punishable under Sections 450 
& 302 IPC. The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment 
for ﬁ ve years and to pay a ﬁ ne of Rs.50,000/- and in default to undergo 
simple imprisonment for six months for the oﬀ ence under Section 450 and 
sentenced him and to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a ﬁ ne of 
Rs.60,000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months 
for the oﬀ ence under Section 302 IPC. The sentences were ordered to run 
concurrently.
7. The
legality of the said judgment was questioned before the High 
Court of Madras in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.334 of 2013 and on re-
appreciation of the entire evidence, the High Court aﬃ  rmed the judgment 
of the Sessions Court by arriving at a conclusion that it was the appellant 
who had caused the injury to the deceased resulting in her death and the act 
of accused in trespassing to the house of the deceased was for committing 
the murder, had been clearly established. It was also opined by the High 
Court that deceased had given up her love for the accused and she had 
developed relationship with one Mr. Sudhakar which enraged the accused 
to wreak vengeance and for this reason he had gone all the way to the house 
of the deceased with a determination to eliminate her and as such it would 
fall within the ﬁ rst limb of Section 300 IPC and thus, he was liable to be 
punished under Section 302 IPC. Hence, this appeal.
849
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR 
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
8. We have heard the arguments of learned Advocates. It is the 
contention of Shri M. A. Chinnasamy, learned counsel appearing for the 
appellant, that there has been delay in ﬁ ling the complaint and on this ground 
alone the theory of the prosecution cannot be considered as trustworthy. 
He would also contend that conviction of the accused is based on the sole 
testimony of PW-1 and the contradictions in her testimony is manifestly 
clear and is not trustworthy and cannot be relied on to convict the appellant. 
The very fact that PW-1 was against the love aﬀ air of her daughter with the 
accused having been admitted by her would disclose the inimical attitude 
against the accused. With regard to there being blood in the ﬂ oor of the 
kitchen is belied by the statement of PW-12 (investigating oﬃ  cer) and so 
also the statement of PW-5 who have not whispered a word in that regard. 
He would also draw the attention of the Court that theory of the prosecution 
as put forth in the complaint lodged by PW-1 is that the accused had punched 
her daughter on the face and she fell on the kitchen slab. However, in her 
evidence she has deposed that accused held the ears of the victim and dashed 
her against the wall. Though, PW-1 claimed that deceased was taken in an 
auto rickshaw, non-examination of the driver of auto rickshaw would create 
a doubt in the prosecution theory. Neither the clothes of the
accused nor of 
the victim was sent for chemical analysis. He would also contend that in the 
event this Court were to aﬃ  rm the ﬁ ndings of the courts below, he would 
pray for sentence being converted to the one under second part of Section 
304 of the IPC in as much as the accused had no knowledge that his act is 
likely to cause death, as such it would be culpable homicide not amounting 
to murder. 
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would support 
the impugned order and has prayed for aﬃ  rming the same. He would also 
contend that the evidence tendered by the prosecution has not been impeached 
and the prosecution witnesses have stood the test of cross-examination and as 
such the impugned order deserves to be aﬃ  rmed. He would further contend 
that the accused having been in love with the deceased was unable to digest the 
fact that she had developed intimacy with her neighbour Sudhakar and being 
dejected the accused had taken the extreme step of eliminating the deceased 
and the reasons assigned by the High Court while aﬃ  rming the judgment and 
sentence awarded by the Sessions Court would not be required to be interfered 
with. Hence, he has prayed for rejection of the appeal.
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
10. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that while issuing notice of 
this appeal on 21.11.2016, it was restricted for the purpose of conversion of 
the oﬀ ence. Hence, within this limited sphere this appeal has to be examined, 
namely, as to whether judgement, order and sentence passed by the Sessions 
Court and aﬃ  rmed by the High Court requires to be aﬃ  rmed or the sentence 
is to be converted and punishment to be awarded under Section 304 of IPC 
and if so, which part of Section 304 IPC? 
11. In the aforesaid background, it would be necessary to discern the 
evidence available on record. The ﬁ nal opinion given by the doctor for the 
cause of death as evident from exhibit P-9 reads as under:
“The deceased would appear to have died of “head injury”. (viscera 
report enclosed-alcohol in other format was not detected”).
12. The doctor (PW-11) who conducted the post-mortem of the 
deceased has deposed that he is the author of the report Ex. P-9. He has 
also deposed that injuries found therein can be inﬂ icted when a person slips 
and falls on the kitchen slab. He has admitted that two injuries which he 
had identiﬁ ed had been inﬂ icted a week before, and were in the process 
of healing. PW-10 who is the doctor at Cauvery Hospital, Trichy and had 
examined the deceased, has deposed that deceased was conscious when 
he examined her on 26.06.2010. He has also deposed that deceased was 
in a good speaking condition. In the
teeth of aforesaid medical evidence 
available on record, the testimony of eye-witness, namely, mother of the 
deceased-PW-1 requires to be examined. A perusal of the same would 
indicate she has deposed that on 19.06.2010 at 10:30 pm when she and 
her deceased daughter were at home, accused had visited their house 
and questioned her daughter as to why she was talking to the neighbour 
Sudhakar and not talking to him. She further deposes that after saying 
so, he punched on her daughter’s face and held both her ears and dashed 
her hard against the kitchen wall and immediately her daughter fell down 
and her head was broken and right ear was cut. It is thereafter she is said 
to have shifted her daughter to Geetanjali hospital and next day to KMC 
Hospital. The testimony of the uncle of the deceased – PW-2 which is 
on record would disclose that he was returning from work at 10:45 pm 
on 19.06.2010 and he saw the accused coming out of his mother in law’s 
house and heard her cry and as such he rushed to her house and saw the
851
deceased lying in a fainted condition. On enquiry, PW-1 is said to have 
informed him (PW2) about the attack made by the accused. 
13. Having given our anxious consideration as regards the genesis of 
the incident and the role attributed to the appellant herein and testimony 
of the doctors who treated her and also who performed the post-mortem of 
the deceased, discloses that doctor has noted two injuries on the deceased: 
(i) cut injury in the left ear measuring 3 centimetres and; (ii) Two wounds 
in left head roughly measuring 7 centimetres and near to that another small 
injury. The injuries, as noted in Post-Mortem Report Ex.P-9 are as under: 
“(i) Sutured wounds: - On the lobule of right ear 2 cm in length. On 
removal of the sutures, edges are irregular, 0.5 cm in breadth and 
muscle deep, on the left temporal region of the scalp, 7 cm in length. 
On removal of the sutures, edges are irregular, 2 cm in breadth and 
bone deep, on the left parietal region of the scalp, 2 cm in length. On 
removal of the sutures, edges are irregular, 1 cm in breadth and bone 
deep.
(ii) Resolving bruising of left temporal, left parietal and left side of 
occipital regions of scalp. Sub-dural haemorrhage and Sub arachnoid 
haemorrhage on both cerebral and cerebellar hemi-spheres. Fracture 
base of skull-left middle cranial fossa present.”
14. The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report as already 
noticed is “died of head injury”. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide”
is a 
genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, 
but all “culpable homicides” are not “murders” as held by this court in 
Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289. The intention 
of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but 
in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances.
15. In the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 at page 
490 the following observations have been made:
“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and 
knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an 
intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the 
act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and 
mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from 
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR 
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention 
is no doubt thin but it is not diﬃ  cult to perceive that they connote 
diﬀ erent things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are 
used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.”
16. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the 
aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two diﬀ erent 
terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are 
provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which 
is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his 
act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is 
likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in 
equal terms. They are not diﬀ erent things. Knowledge would be one of the 
circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring 
the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any 
intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had 
knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held 
guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the 
expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” 
has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two 
expressions. The act to
constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, 
would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisﬁ ed and such 
act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In 
order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved 
that there was an intention to inﬂ ict that particular bodily injury which in 
the ordinary course of nature was suﬃ  cient to cause death. In other words, 
that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be 
inﬂ icted. This Court in the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy 
vs State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 3010 has observed:
 “Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of 
intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case 
falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or 
insigniﬁ cant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel 
of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, 
may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. 
Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be 
totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may
853
be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At 
the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where 
the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting 
to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for 
the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 
302, are not converted into oﬀ ences punishable under Section 304 
Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, 
are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to 
cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few 
or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of 
the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused 
or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a 
vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing 
injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or 
sudden ﬁ ght or free for all ﬁ ght; (vi) whether the incident occurs by 
chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there 
was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) 
whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the 
cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; 
(x) whether the person inﬂ icting the injury has taken undue advantage 
or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused 
dealt a single blow or several
blows. The above list of circumstances 
is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special 
circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw 
light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.
17. This Court in the case of Pratap Singh @ Pikki v. State of Uttarakhand
(2019) 7 SCC 424 had noticed that the deceased-victim had suﬀ ered total 11 
injuries and had been convicted for oﬀ ences under Section 304 Part-II/Section 
34 IPC apart from other oﬀ ences. It was noticed that some altercation took place 
and the groups entered into scuﬄ  e without any premeditation and convicted 
accused for the oﬀ ence punishable under Section 304 Part-II/Section 34 IPC. 
Taking into consideration that the appellants therein were young boys and had 
served sentence of more than three years and ﬁ ve months and there was no 
previous enmity, persuaded this Court that the quantum of sentence is excessive 
and accordingly sentenced them to the period already undergone for the oﬀ ence 
under Section 304 Part-II/ Section 34 IPC by observing thus:
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR 
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
“27. We do ﬁ nd substance in what being submitted by the learned 
counsel for the appellant and in the ﬁ rst place, it is to be noted that the 
trial Court, while awarding sentence to the appellant has not made any 
analysis of the relevant facts as can be discerned from the judgment 
(page 96−97 of the paper book) dated 12th January, 1998. Even the 
High Court has not considered the issue of quantum of sentence. 
From the factual position which emerge from the record, it is to be 
noticed that they were young boys having no previous enmity and 
were collectively sitting and watching Jagjit Singh night. On some 
comments made to the girls sitting in front of the deceased, some 
altercation took place and they entered into a scuﬄ  e and without any 
pre−meditation, the alleged unfortunate incident took place between 
two group of young boys and it is informed to this Court that the 
appellant has served the sentence of more than three years and ﬁ ve 
months. Taking into consideration in totality that the incident is of 
June 1995 and no other criminal antecedents has been brought to 
our notice, and taking overall view of the matter, we ﬁ nd force in the 
submission of the appellant that the quantum of sentence is excessive 
and deserves to be interfered by this Court.”
18. In the case of Deepak v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2018) 
8 SCC 228 it came to be noticed by this Court that incident had taken place 
in the heat of
the moment and the assault was by a single sword blow in the 
rib cage was without any premeditation and incident had occurred at the 
spur of the moment, and thus inferred there was no intention to kill and as 
such the oﬀ ence was converted from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part 
II IPC and the appellant was ordered to be released forthwith by sentencing 
them to the period of conviction already undergone. It was held:
“7. On consideration of the entirety of the evidence, it can safely be 
concluded that the occurrence took place in the heat of the moment 
and the assault was made without premeditation on the spur of time. 
The fact that the appellant may have rushed to his house across the 
road and returned with a sword, is not suﬃ  cient to infer an intention 
to kill, both because of the genesis of the occurrence and the single 
assault by the appellant, coupled with the duration of the entire episode 
for 1½ to 2 minutes. Had there been any intention to do away with the
855
life of the deceased, nothing prevented the appellant from making a 
second assault to ensure his death, rather than to have run away. The 
intention appears more to have been to teach a lesson by the venting 
of ire by an irked neighbour, due to loud playing of the tape recorder. 
But in the nature of weapon used, the assault made in the rib-cage area, 
knowledge that death was likely to ensue will have to be attributed 
to the appellant.
8. In the entirety of the evidence, the facts and circumstances of the 
case, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellant under 
Section 302 IPC and are satisﬁ ed that it deserves to be altered to Section 
304 Part II IPC. It is ordered accordingly. Considering the period of 
custody undergone after his conviction, we alter the sentence to the 
period of custody already undergone. The appellant may be released 
forthwith if not required in any other case.
9. The appeal is therefore allowed in part with the aforesaid 
modiﬁ cation of the conviction and sentence.”
19. This Court in a recent judgement in the case of Anbazhagan 
vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal 
No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has deﬁ ned the context of the 
true test to be adopted to ﬁ nd out the intention or knowledge of the accused 
in doing the act as under:
“60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid 
discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the
question, what oﬀ ence 
the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to ﬁ nd 
out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the 
intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) 
of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a 
single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ 
comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in 
his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no diﬃ  culty 
in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, 
though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be 
of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking 
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR 
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
856
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while 
the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ 
forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ 
dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be suﬃ  cient in 
ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no diﬃ  culty 
in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inﬂ icted the particular injury found 
to be caused and that the said injury was objectively suﬃ  cient in the 
ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 
‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty 
of the oﬀ ence of murder although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall 
within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the 
accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the 
purview of murder, if the accused’s case attracts any one of the ﬁ ve 
exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling 
within any of those exceptions, the oﬀ ence would be culpable homicide 
not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the 
IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) 
to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be oﬀ ence under Part II of 
Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 
300 of the IPC. Again, the intention
or knowledge of the accused may 
be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be 
attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that 
situation also, the oﬀ ence would be culpable homicide not amounting 
to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an oﬀ ence under 
Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, 
while it would be an oﬀ ence under Part II of Section 304 if the case 
fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within 
the ﬁ rst two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in 
Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the ﬁ rst part of Section 
304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under 
the second part of Section 304. In eﬀ ect, therefore, the ﬁ rst part of 
this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the 
second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is 
‘guilty knowledge’.
857
(4) Even if single injury is inﬂ icted, if that particular injury was 
intended, and objectively that injury was suﬃ  cient in the ordinary 
course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to 
Section 300 of the IPC, are fulﬁ lled and the oﬀ ence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases 
: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 
300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when 
the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is 
covered by the expression ‘suﬃ  cient in the ordinary course of nature 
to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally 
spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall 
under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done 
with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention 
to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the diﬀ erence between the two parts of 
Section 304 of the IPC is that under the ﬁ rst part, the crime of murder 
is ﬁ rst established and the accused is then given the beneﬁ t of one 
of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second 
part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the 
purpose of holding an accused guilty of the oﬀ ence punishable under 
the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring 
his
case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more 
‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its 
not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In 
reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation 
of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge 
that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) 
and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne 
in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. 
Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable 
homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder 
would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought 
within the ﬁ ve exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though 
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR 
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
858
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
none of the said ﬁ ve exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established 
on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under 
the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 
of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails 
to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of 
Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder 
would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide 
not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause 
thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the 
particular injury inﬂ icted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely 
be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to 
be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must 
necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the 
body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the 
injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant 
on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable 
homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries suﬃ  cient 
in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable 
homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention 
to cause such
injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts 
resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inﬂ icted by the accused results in the death of 
the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the 
accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular 
injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused 
had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has 
to be determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention 
to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the 
intended injury is suﬃ  cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause 
death, then, even if he inﬂ icts a single injury which results in the death 
of the victim, the oﬀ ence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 
300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
859
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty 
intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is 
inﬂ icted by him and that injury is suﬃ  cient in the ordinary course of 
nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation 
in a sudden ﬁ ght or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the 
injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple 
injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the oﬀ ence 
would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.”
20. Thus, it emerges from the case law analysed herein-above for 
converting the sentence imposed under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II 
the facts unravelled during trial will have to be seen. In the facts of the case 
on hand, it is discernible that there was no premeditation to cause death or 
the genesis of occurrence and the single assault by the accused and duration 
of entire episode, were factors to adjudge the intention. The oﬀ ence can be 
brought clearly within the ambit of Section 304 Part-II IPC. In the instant 
case it can be noticed that appellant and the deceased were in love with each 
other. The fact that deceased had stopped talking to the appellant and she was 
talking to her neighbour Mr. Sudhakar had ignited the mind of the appellant 
to be furious about the conduct of the deceased and he was upset about 
this change of attitude of the deceased. Even according to the testimony of 
PW-1, who is
none other than mother of the deceased there was altercation 
between the appellant and the deceased and exchange of words between 
appellant and deceased with regard to their love aﬀ air. On being confronted 
by the appellant as to why the accused had stopped talking to him and as 
to why she was trying to develop friendship with Sudhakar and the answer 
given by the deceased had resulted in appellant’s getting infuriated and in 
that spur of the moment he caught hold of her hair and banged her head to 
the wall which resulted in blood oozing out and on seeing this he ran away 
from the scene of the incident. Thus, the single assault by the appellant 
coupled with the duration of the entire period having occurred for about 
2-3 minutes would not be suﬃ  cient to infer that he had the intention to kill 
the deceased. Had there been any intention to do away with the life of the 
deceased, obviously the appellant would have come prepared and would 
have assaulted the deceased with pre-meditation. Yet another factor which 
cannot go unnoticed, the appellant had obviously approached the deceased 
and intended to confront her as to why she was not talking to him though 
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR 
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
860
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
they were in love and also to clear the doubts about she being friendly with 
Mr. Sudhakar (neighbour) and in this factual scenario, heated exchange of 
words have taken place and enraged by her reply the appellant has banged 
her head on the wall in a ﬁ t of fury, which cannot be inferred that he had any 
intention to take away her life, particularly when he was in love with her.
21. In the aforesaid analysis of law and facts, we are of the considered 
view that the present appeal deserves to be allowed in part. The conviction 
of the appellant under 302 is altered/converted to one under Section 304 
part II of the Indian Penal Code for the altered conviction, the appellant is 
sentenced to the imprisonment to the period already undergone and shall 
be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
22. The appeal is partly allowed, in the above terms.
Headnotes prepared by:  
Appeal partly allowed.
Ankit Gyan