THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED versus KAHLON @ JASMAIL SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER
[2021] 8 S.C.R. 469, Supreme Court of India, 2021
Outcome: Case Partly allowed (Granted)
Segment: Ratio
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THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
v.
KAHLON @ JASMAIL SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED)
THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE NARINDER
KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal No. 4800 of 2021)
AUGUST 16, 2021
[NAVIN SINHA AND R. SUBHASH REDDY, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: s. 166 (a) – Compensation – Injuries
caused in a motor accident – Claimant suffered 100 per cent physical
disability in a motor accident – Claim for compensation – Award of
Rs. 1,00,000/- with 9% interest – Appeal before the High Court –
During pendency of the appeal, death of claimant, not attributed to
injuries suffered in the accident – Substitution of name of claimant’s
daughter in the appeal – High Court enhanced the compensation
to Rs 37,81,234/- – On appeal, held: The Act is a beneficial and
welfare legislation – If the legal heirs can pursue claims in case of
death, the legal representatives can also pursue claims for loss of
property akin to estate of the injured if he is deceased subsequently
for reasons other than attributable to the accident or injuries under
Clause 1(c) of s.166 – Such a claim would be completely distinct
from personal injuries to the claimant and which may not be the
cause of death – Such claims of personal injuries would undoubtedly
abate with the death of the injured – Insurer has a statutory
obligation to pay compensation in motor accident claim cases –
This obligation cannot be evaded behind the defence that it was
available only for personal injuries and
abates on his death
irrespective of the loss caused to the estate of the deceased because
of the injuries – Total compensation reassessed as Rs.28,42,175/-
with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition,
till its realisation.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation.
Section 166(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for a
statutory claim for compensation arising out of an accident by the
person who has sustained the injury. Under Clause (b),
[2021] 8 S.C.R. 469
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[2021] 8 S.C.R.
compensation is payable to the owner of the property. In case of
death, the legal representatives of the deceased can pursue the
claim. Property, under the Act, will have a much wider connotation
than the conventional definition. If the legal heirs can pursue
claims in case of death, there is no reason why the legal
representatives cannot pursue claims for loss of property akin to
estate of the injured if he is deceased subsequently for reasons
other than attributable to the accident or injuries under Clause
1(c) of Section 166. Such a claim would be completely distinct
from personal injuries to the claimant and which may not be the
cause of death. Such claims of personal injuries would undoubtedly
abate with the death of the injured. What would the loss of estate
mean and what items would be covered by it are issues which has
to engage the attention. The appellant has a statutory obligation
to pay compensation in motor accident claim cases. This obligation
cannot be evaded behind the defence that it was available only
for personal injuries and abates on his death irrespective of the
loss caused to the estate of the deceased because of the injuries.
[Para 9][475-E-H; 476-A]
1.2 The injuries suffered by the deceased in the accident
required prolonged hospitalization for six months. The extent of
disability suffered was assessed on 16.06.2000 as 100%. The
extent of disability, pursuant to physiotherapy was reassessed as
75% on 08.08.2002. In the interregnum, the injured resigned
his job on 30.09.2001 at the age of 53 years as he found movement
difficult and inconvenient without an attendant as distinct from
complete immobility. The injured was possessing professional
qualifications in labour laws and Industrial relations along with a
Diploma in Personnel Management. He may have had to suffer
some handicap in also practicing before the labour court, but
cannot be held to have suffered 100% physical disability as his
capacity for rendering advisory and other work coupled with
movement on a wheel chair with the aid of an attendant could still
facilitate a reduced earning capacity. It cannot be held that the
injured was completely left with no source of livelihood except to
deplete his estate. In assessing, what has been described as a
‘Just Compensation’ under the Act, all factors including
possibilities have to be kept in mind. [Para 17][478-C-F]
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1.3 The tribunal, on technicalities rejected his claim for
salary, medical expenses and percentage of disability and granted
a measly compensation of Rupees one lakh only by a cryptic order.
Therefore, while the claim for personal injuries may not have
survived after the death of the injured unrelated to the accident
or injuries, during the pendency of the appeal, but the claims for
loss of estate caused was available to and could be pursued by
the legal representatives of the deceased in the appeal. [Para
18][478-F-H]
1.4 Loss of estate would include expenditure on medicines,
treatment, diet, attendant, Doctor’s fee, etc. including income
and future prospects which would have caused reasonable
accretion to the estate but for the sudden expenditure which had
to be met from and depleted the estate of the injured,
subsequently deceased. However, the compensation under the
head pain and suffering being personal injuries is held to be
unsustainable and is disallowed. The High Court has not awarded
anything towards medical expenses despite hospitalisation for
six months being an admitted fact. Therefore, a sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- is awarded towards medical expenses. Hence, the
reassessed total compensation would be Rs.28,42,175/-. The
appellant is thus, directed to pay to respondent no.1 within a
period of four weeks Rs.28,42,175/- along with interest @ 9%
p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition, till its realisation.
[Para 20-22][479-B-E; 480-A]
Kanamma v. Deputy General Manager, ILR 1990
Karnataka 4300; Uttam Kumar v. Madhav and Another,
ILR 2002 Karnataka 1864; Umedchand Golcha v.
Dayaram and Others, 2002(1) MPLJ 249; Pravabati
Gosh and Another  v.  Gautam  Das and  Others, 2009(4)
GLR 64; Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another, (2011)
1 SCC 343 : [2010] 13 SCR 179; Surpal Singh
Ladhubha  Gohil  v.  Raliyatbahen  Mohanbhai  Savlia
and Ors., 2009(2) GLH 217; Munni Devi and Others
v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 103 (2003)  DLT  464;
Venkatesan v. Kasthuri, 2014 ACJ 1621; Maimuna
Begum and Others v. Taju and Others, 1989 MhLJ 352;
Parmindar Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. &
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL
SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER
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Ors., (2019) 7 SCC 217 : [2019] 8 SCR 986; Kajal v.
Jagdish Chand & Ors., (2020) 4 SCC 413; Madhuben
Maheshbhai Patel v. Joseph Francis Mewan and
Others, 2015 (2) GLH 499; Joti Ram v. Chamanlal, AIR
1985 P&H 2; Thailammai v. A.V. Mallayya Pillai, 1991
ACJ 185 (Mad) – referred to.
Case Law Reference
ILR 1990 Karnataka 4300
referred to
Para 4
ILR 2002 Karnataka 1864
referred to
Para 4
2009(4) GLR 64
referred to
Para 4
[2010] 13 SCR 179
referred to
Para 5
103 (2003) DLT 464
referred to
Para 5
[2019] 8 SCR 986
referred to
Para 5
(2020) 4 SCC 413
referred to
Para 5
2002 (1) MPLJ 249
referred to
Para 10
1989 MhLJ 352
referred to
Para 11
2014 ACJ 1621
referred to
Para 12
2009(2) GLH 217
referred to
Para 13
2015 (2) GLH 499
referred to
Para 14
AIR 1985 P&H 2
referred to
Para 14
1991 ACJ 185 (Mad)
referred to
Para 15
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.4800 of
2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.08.2019 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in FAO No.1386 of 2007.
H. Chandra Sekhar, Adv. for the Appellant.
Nikhil Goel, Adv. for the Respondents.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
NAVIN SINHA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. A  claim  arising  out  of injuries caused in  a  motor accident
that has reached its fruition more than 20 years later before this Court,
which we find extremely distressing. The original claimant and his wife,
both did not survive the ordeal to see the fruits of the litigation which is
now being pursued by their daughter.
3. The facts of the case in a nutshell are that the original claimant
was severely injured in a motor accident on 02.05.1999. He filed a claim
for compensation under Section 166(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal on 02.11.2006  awarded him a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- only with
9% interest. Dissatisfied, the original claimant preferred an appeal before
the High Court. Unfortunately, he was deceased on 06.11.2015 during
the pendency of the appeal, not attributed to the injuries suffered in the
accident. The daughter of the claimant, who was  an unmarried girl aged
21 years at the time of the accident, was substituted in the appeal. The
High Court substantially enhanced the compensation.
4. Shri H. Chandra Sekhar, learned counsel on behalf of the
appellant, submits that the cause of action being personal to the injured
abates on his death, which was not caused due to the accident. The legal
heir is entitled only to such compensation which forms part of the estate
of the deceased. Loss of
salary, future prospects, pain and suffering
along with attendant charges do not form part of the estate of the
deceased. The compensation could not have been fixed by application
of multiplier as it was not a case of death caused or occasioned by or
due to the accident. The amount awarded by the Tribunal would alone
form part of the estate of the deceased. Reliance in support of the
submissions has been placed on two Full Bench decisions of the
Karnataka High Court in Kanamma vs. Deputy General Manager,
ILR 1990 Karnataka 4300, Uttam Kumar vs. Madhav and Another,
ILR 2002 Karnataka  1864,  Umedchand  Golcha vs. Dayaram and
Others, 2002(1) MPLJ 249, Pravabati Gosh and another vs. Gautam
Das and others, 2009(4) GLR 64. The respondent being a married
daughter is not entitled to any claim for any other loss of estate of the
deceased as she was not dependent on the deceased. It is lastly submitted
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL
SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER
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that the High Court has erred in not deducting 1/3rd of the compensation
amount towards personal expenses by the deceased.
5. Shri Nikhil Goel, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent
no.1, submits that no deduction towards personal expenses can be made
as the deceased actually incurred expenses during his lifetime. The
deduction is to be made hypothetically only in a case where death has
occurred, relying on Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and another, 2011(1)
SCC 343. The submission of Shri Goel is that it is only a claim for personal
injuries that will abate with the death of the  deceased. The claims such
as loss of income, medical expenses etc. will survive as part of the loss
to the estate. He relies upon Surpal Singh Ladhubha Gohil vs.
Raliyatbahen Mohanbhai Savlia and Ors., 2009(2) GLH 217, Munni
Devi and Others vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 103(2003) DLT
464, Venkatesan vs. Kasthuri, 2014 ACJ 1621 and Maimuna Begum
and others vs.Taju and Others, 1989 MhLJ  352. Shri Goel  next submits
that the High Court has committed no error in awarding loss of income
along  with future prospects with a multiplier of 11 relying on Parmindar
Singh vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2019) 7 SCC 217
and Kajal vs. Jagdish Chand & Ors., (2020) 4 SCC 413. The injured
had suffered 100 per cent physical disability. He  was unable  to  pursue
his life and  career and had to leave his job and shift  to  his  home  town
Punjab. Despite being a law graduate and professionally qualified with a
Diploma in Labour Laws, he was unable to pursue any independent
career thereafter because of complete physical disability. The
compensation  as  enhanced  by  the  High  Court  is, therefore, not on
account of personal injuries, but as loss of the estate of the deceased,
and therefore, calls for no interference.
6. We have considered submissions on behalf of the parties. The
original claimant was travelling with his wife and unmarried daughter
when their vehicle was hit by a lorry driven rashly and negligently on
02.05.1999. The claimant was taken to the Government Hospital,
Trivandrum but the severity of the injuries required him to be shifted  to
the  Apollo  Hospital, Chennai  the next day for professionalized
management where he remained under treatment till 24.11.1999. He
suffered spinal shock, with cervical cord injury and quadriplegia with
respiratory failure. He was resuscitated and put on ventilator support
for skull traction. His  right  ankle  needed  surgery. He  required  further
treatment for anterior decompression, disc excision and bone grafting.
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His physical activity was by way of wheel chair mobilisation. The disability
certificate dated 16.06.2000 issued to him by the Government Headquarter
Hospital, Cuddalore opined 100 per cent permanent motor system
disability  with  operative  scar  on the right-side neck, right ankle, healed
scar on the left side forehead frontal region and parietal region and that
he was unable to lift all four limbs which were vested with sensory loss
present in certain places classified as quadriplegic orthopedically.
7. The claimant was a law graduate with a Diploma in Personal
Management and Labour Welfare from the Punjab University. Because
of the injuries, he found it difficult and inconvenient to continue with his
job as Deputy General Manager and resigned pre-maturely on 30.09.2001
at the age of 53 years before his scheduled superannuation on 30.04.2006.
Unable to pursue his life and career with the burden of treatment  and
family expenses in the changed circumstances in Cuddalore, he moved
this Court in T.P.(C) No. 1043 of 2003 for transfer of the claim case
filed by him in Cuddalore in the year 2000 which was allowed on
25.02.2004. The proceedings were shifted to Gurdaspur in Punjab.
8. The Tribunal in a very cursory and cryptic manner awarded a
compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- along with 9% interest. The claimant
then moved the High Court which has enhanced the compensation to
Rs.37,81,234/- by taking into account his annual salary with future
prospect applying
the multiplier of 11 including pain and suffering,
attendant’s charges.
9. The Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. Section 166(1)
(a) of the Act provides for a statutory claim for compensation arising out
of an accident by the person who has sustained  the injury. Under Clause
(b), compensation is payable to the owner of the property. In case of
death, the legal representatives of the deceased  can  pursue the claim.
Property, under the Act, will have a much wider connotation than the
conventional definition. If the legal heirs can pursue claims in case of
death, we see no reason why the legal representatives cannot pursue
claims for loss of property akin to estate of the injured if he is deceased
subsequently for reasons other than attributable to the accident or injuries
under Clause 1(c) of Section 166. Such a claim would be completely
distinct from personal injuries to the claimant and which may not be the
cause of death. Such claims of personal injuries would undoubtedly abate
with the death of the injured. What would the loss of estate mean and
what items would be covered by it are issues which has to engage our
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL
SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER [NAVIN SINHA, J.]
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attention. The appellant has a statutory obligation to pay compensation in
motor accident claim cases. This obligation cannot  be  evaded behind
the defence that it was available only for personal injuries and abates on
his death irrespective of  the  loss  caused  to  the estate of the deceased
because of the injuries.
10. In Umed Chand (supra), giving a broad liberal interpretation
to the provisions of the Act so that legal representatives do not suffer
injustice, it was observed that  the claim for personal injuries will not
survive on death of the injured unrelated to the accident but the legal
representatives could pursue the claim for enhancement of the claim
for loss of the estate which would include expenditure on medical
expenses, travelling, attendant, diet, doctor’s fee and reasonable monthly
annual accretion to the estate for a certain period. It is trite that the
income which a person derives compositely forms part of the expenditure
on himself, his family  and  the  savings  go  to  the estate. The  unforeseen
expenses as aforesaid naturally have to be met from the estate causing
pecuniary loss to the estate.
11. In Maimuna Begum (supra) the defence under Section 306
of the Indian Succession Act, 1925  on  the  old  English  Common Law
maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” was rejected opining
that it would be unjust to non-suit  the  heirs  on  that ground.
12. In Venkatesan (supra), the injured
claimant preferred an appeal
dissatisfied, but was deceased during the pendency of the appeal.
Compensation came to be awarded under the Act for loss of estate
keeping in mind the nature of the injuries, the treatment, the expenditure
incurred and loss of income.
13. In Surpal Singh (supra), Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan, C.J.
(as he then was), observed that the Act was a social welfare legislation
providing for compensation by award to people who sustain bodily injuries
or get killed. The grant of compensation had to be expeditious as
procedural technicalities could not be allowed to defeat the just purpose
of the act. The Courts in construing social welfare legislations had to
adopt a beneficial rule of construction which fulfils the policy of the
legislation favorable to those in whose interest the Act has been passed.
Judicial discipline demanded that the words of a remedial statutes be
construed so far as they reasonably admit so  as  to secure that relief
contemplated by the statute and it shall not be denied to the class intended
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to be relieved. Rejecting the maxim of “actio personalis moritur cum
persona” on  the  premise  that  it was an injury done to the person and
the claim abated with his demise it was observed:
“11. The question as to whether injury was personal or otherwise
is of no significance so far as the wrong doer is concerned and he
is obliged to  make good the loss sustained by the injured. Legal
heirs and legal representatives would have also suffered
considerable mental pain and agony due to the accident caused to
their kith and kin. Possibly they might have looked after their dear
ones in different circumstances, which cannot be measurable in
monetary terms. We are therefore in full agreement with the view
expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Gujarat
State Road Transport Corporation’s case (supra) that even after
death of the injured, the claim petition does not abate and right to
sue survives to his heirs and legal representatives.”
14. This view has subsequently been followed in a decision authored
by brother Justice M.R. Shah J., (as he then was) in Madhuben
Maheshbhai Patel vs. Joseph Francis Mewan and Others, 2015 (2)
GLH 499, holding as follows:
“12….Considering the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench
of this Court in the case of Surpal Singh Ladhubha Gohil (supra);
decisions of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of
Jenabai Widow of Abdul Karim Musa (supra) and in the case of
Amrishkumar Vinodbhai (supra); and
aforesaid two decisions of
the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, we are of
the opinion that maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” on
which Section 306 of the Indian Evidence Act (sic Indian
Succession Act) is based cannot have an applicability in all actions
even in an case of personal injuries where damages flows from
the head or under the head of loss to the estate. Therefore, even
after the death of the injured claimant, claim petition does not abate
and right to sue survive to his heirs and legal representatives in so
far as loss to the estate is  concerned,  which would include personal
expenses incurred on the treatment and other claim related to loss
to the estate. Under the circumstances, the issue referred to the
Division Bench is answered accordingly. Consequently, it is held
that no error has been committed by the learned Tribunal in
permitting the heirs to be brought on record of the claim petition
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL
SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER [NAVIN SINHA, J.]
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and permitting the heirs of the injured claimant who died
subsequently to proceed further with the claim petition. However,
the claim petition and even appeal for enhancement would be
confine to the claim for the loss to the estate as observed
hereinabove.”
15. Similar view has been taken by the Punjab & Haryana High
Court in Joti Ram vs. Chamanlal, AIR 1985 P&H 2 and the Madras
High Court in Thailammai vs. A.V. Mallayya Pillai, 1991 ACJ 185 (Mad).
16. The view taken in Kanamma (supra) and Uttam Kumar
(supra) that the claim would abate is based on a narrow interpretation of
the Act which does not commend to us. The reasoning of the Gujarat
High Court is more  in  consonance  with aim, purpose and spirit of the
Act and furthers its real intent and purpose which we therefore approve.
17. The injuries suffered by the deceased in the accident required
prolonged hospitalization for six months. The extent of disability suffered
was assessed on 16.06.2000 as 100%. The extent of disability, pursuant
to physiotherapy was reassessed as 75% on 08.08.2002. In the
interregnum, the injured resigned his job on 30.09.2001 at the age of 53
years as he found movement difficult and inconvenient without an
attendant as distinct from complete immobility. The injured was possessing
professional qualifications in labour laws and Industrial relations along
with a Diploma in Personnel Management. He may have had to suffer
some handicap in
also practicing before the labour court, but cannot be
held to have suffered 100% physical disability as his capacity for rendering
advisory and other work coupled with movement on a wheel chair with
the aid of an attendant could still facilitate a reduced earning capacity. It
cannot be held that the injured was completely left with no source of
livelihood except to deplete his estate. In assessing, what has been
described as a ‘Just Compensation’ under the Act, all factors including
possibilities have to be kept in mind.
18. The Tribunal, on technicalities rejected his claim for salary,
medical expenses and percentage of disability and granted a measly
compensation of Rupees one lakh only  by a cryptic  order. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that while the claim for personal injuries may
not have survived after the death of the injured unrelated to the accident
or injuries, during the pendency of the appeal, but the claims for loss of
estate caused was available to and could be pursued by the legal
representatives of the deceased in the appeal.
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19. In Parminder Singh (supra) compensation on the basis of
complete loss of income, the percentage of disability, future prospects
were granted applying the relevant multiplier. Again, in Kajal (supra)
the injured was assessed as 100 per cent disabled, considering all of
which compensation was awarded on the notional future prospects along
with relevant multiplier. The loss of income to the injured in the facts of
the present case has to be assessed at 75%. In view of Raj Kumar
(supra) there shall be no deduction towards personal expenses.
20. We see no reason to deviate from the consistent judicial view
taken by more than one High Court that loss of estate would include
expenditure on medicines, treatment, diet, attendant, Doctor’s fee, etc.
including income and future prospects which would have caused
reasonable accretion to the estate but for the sudden expenditure which
had to be met from and depleted the estate of the injured, subsequently
deceased.
21. However, the compensation under the head pain and suffering
being personal injuries is held to be unsustainable and is disallowed.
The High Court has not awarded anything towards medical expenses
despite hospitalisation for six months being an admitted fact. We therefore
award a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards medical expenses. Hence, the
reassessed total compensation would be Rs.28,42,175/-, calculated
hereunder:
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v. KAHLON @ JASMAIL
SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH
HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN AND ANOTHER [NAVIN SINHA, J.]

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22. The appellant is therefore directed to pay to respondent no.1
within a period of four weeks Rs.28,42,175/- along with interest @ 9%
p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition, till its realisation.
23. The appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal partly allowed.