U. MANJUNATH RAO versus U. CHANDRASHEKAR & ANR.
[2017] 7 S.C.R. 608, Supreme Court of India, 2017
Outcome: Appeal(s) allowed (Granted)
Segment: Facts
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[2017] 7 S.C.R. 608 
U. MANJUNATH RAO 
v. 
U. CHANDRASHEKAR & ANR. 
(Civil Appeal No.9951 of2017) 
AUGUST04,2017 
[DIPAK MISRA AND A.M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.f 
Judgment - Unreasoned Judgment - Trial court directed 
rectification of the error in the partition deed - High Court copiously 
quoted from the judgment of the trial court and held that there were 
no infirmities in the findings recorded by the trial court and 
dismissed the appeal without any reasons to support the judgment 
in appeal - Held: High Court has neither analysed the evidence 
brought on record nor has answered the issues raised in law -
Reproduction of few passages from the trial court and ultimately 
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referring to certain exhibited documents in a cryptic manner, will 
not convert an unreasoned judgment to a reasoned one - There has 
been no analysis of facts or law - Analysis and reasons are to be 
manifest, when that is not done, the judgment of High Court becomes 
indefensible - Further, judgment of appellate Court must, reflect its 
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conscious application of mind and record findings supported by 
reasons, on all the issues arising along with contentions put forth, 
and passed by the parties for decision of appellate court. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. On perusal of impugned judgment, it is clearly 
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demonstrable that the High Court bas neither analysed the 
evidence brought on record nor bas it answe~ed the issues raised 
in law. Stating the facts and thereafter reproducing few
passages 
from the trial Court and ultimately referring to certain exhibited 
documents in a cryptic manner, will not convert an unreasoned 
G judgment to a reasoned one. In fact, the Judge has posed the 
question about the defensibility of the ultimate direction by the 
trial Court and thereafter proceeded to quote paragraphs from 
the trial Court judgment. Posing a question which is relevant for 
adjudication of the appeal is not enough. There bas to be proper 
analysis of the same. That apart, there are other issues they 
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U. MANJUNATH RAO v. U.CHANDRASHEKAR & ANR. 
609 
deserved to be dealt with. Therefore, the obvious conclusion is 
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that the judgment passed by the High Court is not a reasoned 
one. [Para 6] (612-B-D] 
2. It is well settled in law that the reason is the life of law. 
It is that filament that injects soul to the judgment. Absence of B 
analysis not only evinces non-application of mind but mummifies 
the core spirit of the judgment. A Judge has to constantly remind 
himself that absence of reason in the process of adjudication 
makes the ultimate decision pregnable. [Para 7] [612-E] 
3. On a perusal of the Or.XL!, r.31 Rule of CPC, it is quite 
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· clear that the judgment of the appellate court has to state the 
reasons for the decision. In the case at hand, the Judge has really 
not ascribed any reason. There has been no analysis of facts or 
law. There is no discussion with regard to the points urged. While 
agreeing with the general approval of reasons to support the 
conclusions of the judgment in appeal, the High Court has to D 
keep in view the language employed in Order XLI Rule 31 CPC 
and the view expressed in Santosh Hazari case. Analysis and 
reason are to be manifest. When that is not done, needless to 
say, the judgment of the High Court becomes indefensible. [Paras 
12, 14] [615-D; 616-E] 
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Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by 
LRs. (2001) 3 sec 179 : 120011 1 SCR 948 - relied 
on. 
State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (dead) through 
his LRs.
(2000) 5 SCC 652 : (2000] 3 SCR 958; Sarju 
Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain 
Singh AIR 1951 SC 120: [1950] SCR 781; Madhukar 
and others v. Sangram and others (2001)-4 SCC 756: 
[2001) 3 SCR 138; H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith 
(dead) by LRs. (2005) 10 SCC 243; State Bank of Jndia 
and another v. Emmson International Limited and 
another (2001) 12 SCC 174; Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao 
and another AIR 1974 SC 2044 - referred to. 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS. 
[2017] 7 S.C.R. 
Case Law Reference 
[2000] 3 SCR 95S 
referred to 
Para7 
[2001] 1 SCR 94S 
relied on 
Paras 
[1950] SCR 7Sl 
referred to 
Paras 
[2001] 3 SCR 13S 
referred to 
Para 9 
(2005) 10 sec 243 
referred to 
Para 10 
(2001) 12 sec 174 
referred to 
Para 11 
AIR 1974 SC 2044 
referred to 
Para 13 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.9951 
of2017. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.06.2014 of the High Court 
of Karnataka at Bangalore in Regular First Appeal No. 1626 of 20 l 0. 
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R.S. Hegde, Chandra Prakash, Ms. Farhat Jahan Rehmani, Rajeev 
Singh,Advs. for the Appellant. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The challenge in this appeal, by special 
leave, is to the legal acceptability of the judgment and decree dated 
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06.06.2014 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in 
Regular First Appeal No. 1626 of20 IO whereby the learned single Judge 
has declined to interfere in the appeal preferred by the first defendant 
questioning the defensibility of the judgment and decree dated 21. 06.20 IO 
passed by the learned XXVIII Additional City Civil Judge, Mayohall, 
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Bangalore in O.S. No. 16950 of2004. 
2. The narration of facts as is evincible from the impugned judgment 
are that the first defendant wa~ agi,:rrieved as he was directed by the trial 
Court to execute a rectification deed in respect of property description 
No. 2 in B-schedule in the partitiun deed dated 01.04.1981
which was 
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registered on 28.07.1981 and brought on record as Ex.P-1 and further 
granted permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering 
with the possession of the plaintiff in respect of the property in question. 
It was contended before the High Court that the trial Court had erred in 
law in decreeing the suit as the registered deed of partition had not been 
proved in accordance with law and further the schedule property formed 
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U. MANJUNATH RAO v. U.CHANDRASHEKAR & ANR. 
611 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
part of the joint family property. That apart, it was urged that the said A 
property was purchased by the defendant No. l from his own sources 
and his name had been recorded in the record of rights and there was no 
material on record to come to a conclusion that there existed a joint 
family which possessed sufficient nucleus to purchase the schedule 
property. A ground was taken that the partition deed had not seen the 
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light of the day for more than 22 years and when its genuineness was 
questioned on the basis of materials brought on record, the said issue 
had not been appositely addressed. 
3. The High Court, as the impugned judgment reveals, noted some 
of the contentions and posed the question whether the trial Court was 
justified in directing the defendants to execute a rectification deed to 
correct the error in stating the site number in the partition deed dated 
01.04.1981 marked in evidence as Ex.P-1. It took note of the fact that in 
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. the said partition deed site No. 25, which was allotted to the plaintiff, 
was erroneously described as site No. 35 and hence, relief of the 
rectification of the error in the deed had been granted by the trial Court. 
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Thereafter the learned single Judge, as is vivid, copiously quoted from 
the judgment of the trial Court and held that he did not find any infirmities 
in the findings recorded by the trial Court and certain documents brought 
on record
showed that the plaintiff was in possession of the site No. 25. 
On the aforesaid basis, the High Court dismissed the appeal preferred 
by the defendant No. l. 
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4. Pespite service of notice, there has been no appearance on 
behalf of the respondents. 
5. We have heard Mr. R.S. Hegde, learned counsel for the 
appellant. Criticising the judgment, he has submitted that the High Court 
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has dismissed the first appeal without appreciating the oral and 
documentary evidence brought on record and further not adverting to 
the assailment by the appellant therein as regards the findings recorded 
· by the trial Court. It is canvassed by him that when the plaintiff had not 
adduced any evidence to prove the existence of the joint family, the 
question of placing reliance on the deed of partition presuming that the 
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property in dispute was a joint family property and, therefore, the partition 
deed required to be rectified as an error has been crept in, is absolutely 
fallacious. Learned counsel would submit that quoting from the trial Court 
judgment and confirming the same in a cryptic manner is not a lawful 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 7 S.C.R. 
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delineation of the first appeal preferred under Section 96 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure (CPC) and, therefore, the impugned judgment can be 
stamped as an unreasoned one and should be set aside with a direction 
to the High Court to dispose of the appeal on appreciation of facts and 
the law in correct perspective. 
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6. To appreciate the submissions of Mr. Hegde, we have perused 
the impugned judgment passed by the High Court. It is clearly 
demonstrable that the High Court has neither analysed the evidence 
brought on record nor has it answered the issues raised in law. Stating 
the facts and thereafter reproducing few passages from the trial Court 
and ultimately referring to certain exhibited documents in a cryptic manner, 
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we are disposed to think, will not convert an unreasoned judgment to a 
reasoned one. In fact, as we notice, the learned Judge has posed the 
question about the defensibility of the ultimate direction by the trial Court 
and thereafter proceeded to quote paragraphs from the trial Court 
judgment. Posing a question which is relevant for adjudication of the 
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appeal is not enough. There has to have been proper analysis of the 
same. That apart, there are other issues they deserved to be dealt with. 
Therefore, the obvious conclusion is that the judgment passed by the 
High Court is not a reasoned one. 
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7. It is well settled in Jaw that the reason is the life of Jaw. It is 
that filament that
injects soul to the judi,>ment. Absence of analysis not 
only evinces non-application of mind but mummifies the core spirit of 
the judgment. A Judge has to constantly remind himself that absence of 
reason in the process of adjudication makes the ultimate decision · 
pregnable. While dealing with the first appeal preferred under Section 
96 CPC, the Court in State of Rajasthan v. Hmphoo/ Singh (dead) 
tliro11gli his LRs1 took note of the exception to the judgment passed by 
the· first appellate court by observing that there was no due or proper 
application of mind or any critical analysis or objective consideration of 
the matter, despite the same being the first appellate court. 
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8. A three-Judge Bench in Santosh Hazari v. P11r11sliottam 
Tiwari (deceased) by LRs2, while discussing about power of the first 
appellate court, has opined that it is the final court of facts and, therefore, 
pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High 
1 (2000) s sec 652 
2 (2000 3 sec 179 
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U. MANJUNATH RAO v. U.CHANDRASHEKAR & ANR. 
613 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
Court in second appeal. It is necessary to note that the Court had also 
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held thus: 
''. .. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the 
findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the 
parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein 
open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment 
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of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious 
application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on 
all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and 
pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The 
task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court c 
is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of 
the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate 
the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general 
agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is 
under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi 
v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary3). We would, however, like to 
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sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with 
the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be 
a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking 
the duty cast on it. ... " 
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[Emphasis supplied] 
The aforesaid passage has to be appositely understood. While 
reversing the finding and
conclusions of the trial Court, the duty of the 
first appellate court is different than while affirming a judgment. Be it 
stated, the Court has also held that it is a final court oflaw in the sense 
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that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be 
vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the 
jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct 
the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court 
even on questions of law unless such question of law is a substantial 
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one. In the said case, the Court, after referring to the decision in Sarju 
· Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narai11 Si11gh4, has 
further opined that: 
'AIR 1967 SC 1124 
'AIR 1951SC120 
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while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must 
come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial 
court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different 
finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that 
the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it. 
We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional 
obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 
substituted in the Code. . .. " 
The purpose of referring to the said decision is to highlight the 
responsibility cast on the first appellate court or a court hearing the first 
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9. In Madhukar and others v. Sangram and otliers5, the Court 
noticed that the High Court has framed two questions and thereafter 
had set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and allowed the 
first appeal. Discussing about the duty of the first appellate court, the 
Colllj had referred to the decision in Santosh Hazari (supra) and 
D reiterated the principles stated therein. 
I 0. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (dead) by LRs6, the two-
Judge Bench ruled: 
"The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In 
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the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions 
of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to 
address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. 
Unfortunately, the High Court, in
the present case has not recorded 
any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate 
court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues 
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and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding 
regarding title. The order of the High Court is cryptic and the 
same is without assigning any reason." 
The said principle has been reiterated in State Bank of India 
and another v. Emmsons International Limited and another7• Thus, 
G in the first appeal the parties have right to be heard both on the questions 
of facts as well as on_law and the first appellate court is required to 
address itself to all the aspects and decide the case by ascribing reasons. 
'c2001) 4 sec 756 
• c2005) 1 o sec 243 
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7 (2011)12SCC174
U. MANJUNATH RAO v. U.CHANDRASHEKAR & ANR. 
615 
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] 
11. In this context, we may usefully refer to Order XLI Rule 31 
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CPC which reads as follows: 
"Order XLI. Appeals from Original Decrees 
31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.- The judgment 
of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state-
(a) the points for determination; 
(b) the decision thereon; 
( c) the reasons for the decision; and 
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the 
relief to which the appellant is entitled, 
and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by 
the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein." 
12. On a perusal of the said Rule, it is quite clear that the judgment 
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of the appellate court has to state the reasons for the decision. It is 
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necessary to make it clear that the approach of the first appellate court 
while affirming the judgment of the trial Court and reversing the same is 
founded on different parameters as per the judgments of this Court. In 
Girijanandini Devi (supra), the Court ruled that while agreeing with 
· the view of the trial court on the evidence, it is not necessary to restate 
the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial 
court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given in the trial 
court judgment which is under appeal should ordinarily suffice. The 
same has been accepted by another three-Judge Bench in Smrtosh 
Hazari (supra). However, while stating the
law, the Court has opined 
that expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the 
judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage to be adopted 
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by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. We are disposed to 
think, the expression of the said opinion has to be understood in proper 
perspective. By no stretch of imagination it can be stated that the first 
appellate court can quote passages from the trial court judgment and 
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thereafter pen few lines and express the view that there is no reason to 
differ with the trial Court judgment. That is not the statement of law 
expressed by the Court. The statement of law made in Santosh H azari 
(supra) has to be borne in mind. 
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[2017) 7 S.C.R. 
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13. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench decision in Asha Devi v. 
D11khi Sao and another" is worthy of noticing, although the context 
was different. In the said case, the question arose with regard to power 
of the Division Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal from the judgment 
of the single Judge in a first appeal. The Court held that the Letters 
Patent appeal lies both on questions of fact and law. The purpose of 
B · referring to the said decision is only to show that when the Letters Patent 
appeal did lie, it was not restricted to the questions of law. The appellant 
could raise issues pertaining to facts and appreciation of evidence. This 
is indicative of the fact that the first appellate court has a defined role 
and its judgment should show application of mind and reflect the reasons 
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on the basis of which it agrees with the trial Court. There has to be an 
"expression of opinion" in the proper sense of the said phrase. It cannot 
be said that mere concurrence meets the requirement of law. Needless 
to say, it is one thing to state that the appeal is without any substance and 
it is another thing to elucidate, analyse and arrive at the conclusion that 
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the appeal is devoid of merit. 
14. In the case at hand, as we have noted earlier, the learned 
Judge has really not ascribed any reason. There has been no analysis of 
facts or law. There is no discussion with regard to the points urged. 
While agreeing with
the general approval of reasons to support the 
conclusions of the judgment in appeal, the High Court has to keep in 
E. view the language employed in Order XLI Rule 31 CPC and the view 
expressed in Santosh Hazari (supra). Analysis and reason are to be 
manifest. When that is not done, needless to say, the judgment of the 
High Court becomes indefensible. 
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15. In view of the aforesaid premises, we allow the appeal, set 
aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court and 
remit the matter for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The High 
Court is requested to dispose of the appeal within six months. There 
shall be no order as to costs. 
Ankit Gyan 
Appeal allowed. 
'AIR 1974 SC 2048