Case: Zarb Adami v. Malta
Judgement date: 20 June 2006
Topic: Gender equality
Aspect: Discrimination against men to negligible percentage of women requested to undertake jury service

Summary of the facts:
From 1971 the applicant was placed on the list of jurors in Malta and remained on the list until at least 2002. Between 1971 and 1997 he served as both a juror and foreman in three different sets of criminal proceedings. In 1997 he was called again to serve as a juror, but failed to appear and was fined approximately 240 euros. As he had failed to pay the fine he was summoned before the Criminal Court. The applicant complained that he had been the victim of discrimination on the ground of sex, as the percentage of women requested to undertake jury service in Malta was negligible, and that he had been obliged to face criminal proceedings in relation to the imposition of a discriminatory civic obligation.

Summary of the Court's findings:
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) read in conjunction with Article 4 § 3 (d) (prohibition of forced labour) of the Convention. It noted in particular that the Maltese Government had argued that the difference in treatment depended on a number of factors: jurors were chosen from the part of the population which was active in the economy and in the professions; moreover, an exemption from jury service might be granted to those taking care of their family and more women than men could successfully rely on the relevant legal provision; finally, “for reasons of cultural orientation”, defence lawyers might have had a tendency to challenge female jurors. The Court doubted whether the factors indicated by the Government were sufficient to explain the significant discrepancy in the repartition of jury service. The second and third factors related only to the number of females who actually had performed jury service and did not explain the very low number of women enrolled on the lists of jurors. In any event, the factors highlighted by the Government only constituted explanations of the mechanisms which had led to the difference in treatment complained of. No valid argument had however been put before the Court in order to provide a proper justification for it. In particular, it had not been shown that the difference in treatment had pursued a legitimate aim and that there had been a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.

The facts:
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
7. The applicant is a Maltese national and lives in Attard, Malta.
8. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. The background of the case
9. The applicant is a pharmacist in Malta. From 1971 he was placed on the lists of jurors and remained on them until 2005.
10. Between 1971 and 1997, the applicant was called to serve as a juror in three different sets of criminal proceedings. On these occasions, he was called to serve both as a juror and as a foreman of the jury.
11. In 1997 the applicant was again called to appear before the Criminal Court to serve as a juror. This time he failed to attend on the requested date and on 14 April 1997 he was fined 100 Maltese liri ( (MTL) – approximately 240 euros (EUR)).
2. The constitutional proceedings
12. As the applicant failed to pay the fine, on 11 June 1997 the Registrar of the Courts of Malta submitted an application to the Criminal Court. It asked that court to summon the applicant before it and/or to convert the fine imposed into a term of imprisonment.
13. At the sitting of 26 June 1997 before the Criminal Court, the applicant raised the plea that the fine imposed on him was unconstitutional and constituted a breach of his fundamental rights. He alleged, in particular, that the sanction was discriminatory in terms of Article 45 of the Constitution and Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 § 3 (d), because it subjected him to burdens and duties to which other persons in the same position were not subjected. Moreover, the law and/or the domestic practice exempted persons of the female sex from jury service whereas, de facto, men were not offered this exemption.
14. Considering that the applicant ’ s plea was not merely frivolous and/or vexatious, on 29 September 1997 the Criminal Court referred it to the First Hall of the Civil Court.
15. Before the Civil Court, the applicant alleged that the Maltese system penalised men and favoured women, as statistical information showed that during the preceding five years only 3.05% of jurors had been women whereas 96.95% had been men. Moreover, the burden of jury service was not equitably distributed but was placed on a very small proportion of the population: in 1997 the lists of jurors represented only 3.4% of the list of voters. In practice, those who had on one occasion been placed on the lists of jurors would remain on them until they were disqualified, while others who also satisfied all the requirements were de facto exempted from such civic obligation.
16. In a judgment of 5 February 1999, the Civil Court rejected the applicant ’ s claims. It held that in stating that every Maltese citizen who had attained the age of 21 qualified to serve as a juror the law did not make any distinction between citizens. More specifically, there was no distinction between men and women. As to the practice criticised by the applicant, the latter had not substantiated his allegation that there were other persons eligible to serve as jurors who managed to avoid performing their duties. Moreover, the applicant had failed to seek exemption from jury service in accordance with domestic law.
17. The Civil Court also observed that the applicant had not proved that he was being treated differently to such an extent that the burdens and obligations imposed on him were greater than those imposed on another person. In particular, it had not been established that people who had been on the lists of jurors as long as the applicant had been removed without a valid reason, or that persons who were in a situation comparable to that of the applicant were left off the lists. The applicant had also failed to submit any evidence showing that the discrepancies between women and men called to serve as jurors were specifically attributable to an intention to discriminate between the sexes or were aimed at giving an unjust advantage to women in relation to men.
18. The applicant appealed against the judgment of 5 February 1999 to the Constitutional Court. He observed, in particular, that the existence of discrimination was clearly shown by the statistics he had produced. Given this factual background, it was unnecessary to prove an intention to discriminate on the part of the authorities.
19. In his submissions, the applicant pointed out that jury service was a burden as it required the person concerned to abandon his or her work in order to attend court hearings regularly; moreover, it imposed a moral burden to judge the innocence or guilt of a person. According to the Constitution of Malta and the Convention, social burdens should be shared by all in an equitable manner. However, statistics showed that lists of foremen were composed of 0.74% of women and 99.26% of men, and that the lists of jurors represented only 3.4% of the list of voters.
20. In a judgment of 2 November 2001, the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal and confirmed the judgment of the Civil Court.
21. The Constitutional Court reiterated that neither the law nor the administrative rules in relation to the compilation of the lists of jurors were in any way discriminatory. In fact, the statistics showed that the number of women on the lists of jurors was 145 in 1996 (almost double the number of the previous year), and that this number increased to 2,490 in 1997. Therefore, an irreversible administrative process had been set in motion in order to bring the number of women on the lists into line with that of men.
22. The Constitutional Court acknowledged, however, that the number of women actually called to serve as jurors was very low: only five per year in the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. This was clearly the result of the jury selection procedure, in which the reasons militating for and against the choice of a certain person as juror were evaluated. The results were dependant on many factors, such as the element of luck, challenges brought by the defence and exemptions granted by the courts. It was true that women were exempted from jury service for social, family and cultural reasons; however, this was perfectly legitimate and lawful when it was as a consequence of a claim by the defence, the prosecutors or the presiding judge.
23. The Constitutional Court also agreed that it appeared that the manner in which the lists of jurors were compiled favoured a situation in which when a person was placed on the lists he remained on them until the age restriction was reached. Therefore the applicant ’ s grievance that this system seemed to punish those persons who were on the lists could be justified. Thus, the Constitutional Court suggested that the system be amended and that the lists be periodically changed in order to exclude those persons who had already been called for jury service.
24. As concerned the applicability of Article 14 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court noted that jury service should be considered “ a normal civic obligation ” within the meaning of Article 4 of the Convention, and therefore Article 14 came into play. The Constitutional Court considered, however, that the applicant had not been subjected to burdensome treatment simply because he had had to serve as a juror on three occasions over a span of seventeen years. In any case, this circumstance did not entitle him to take the law into his own hands and decide to ignore the court summons. Instead, he should have made use of the ordinary remedies available to him, such as filing a request for exemption from jury service with the competent court. Had this request been refused, he could have appealed.
25. The Constitutional Court also rejected the applicant ’ s submission that the fine imposed on him was discriminatory. It observed that anyone who had been fined by the competent court was obliged by law to pay the fine and that anyone who disobeyed an order of a court was liable to be sanctioned.
3. The applicant ’ s requests for exemption from jury service
26. On an unspecified date in 2003, the applicant petitioned the Registrar of the Criminal Court. He observed that, according to the Government Gazette of 28 August 2003, his name had been registered on the List of Jurors and on the List of Special Jurors. However, as he was a lecturer at the University of Malta, he sought exemption from jury service in accordance with Article 604(1) of the Criminal Code (hereinafter “ the CC ” ).
27. By a decision of 23 October 2003, the Registrar of the Criminal Court rejected the applicant ’ s petition.
28. Having been summoned once again to serve as a juror in another trial, in 2004 the applicant requested to be exempted from jury service under Article 607 of the CC. This application was rejected by the competent domestic court.
29. On 18 April 2005 the applicant requested once again to be exempted from serving as a juror. He relied on Article 604 (1) of the CC, providing an exemption for full-time lecturers at the University. On 25 April 2005 his request was accepted.

Relevant law and the Court's assessment:
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
30. According to Article 603 (1) of the CC,
“ Every person of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, residing in Malta and being a citizen of Malta, shall be qualified to serve as a juror provided such person has an adequate knowledge of the Maltese language, is of good character and is competent to serve as a juror. ”
31. The compilation of the lists of jurors is regulated by Article 605 of the CC. The lists are drawn up by the Commissioner of Police together with two magistrates and the Registrar of the Courts. They are published in the Government Gazette in the month of August each year. Within fifteen days from the publication any person who, not possessing the qualifications required by law to serve as a juror, desires to be struck off the lists may file an application before the Criminal Court. The court shall proceed summarily on the application and the registrar shall note on the lists any correction which the court may order. Subsequently, the names of the jurors are written down on separate ballots of paper and every month ballots are drawn.
32. Article 604 of the CC provides:
“ (1) The following persons are exempted from serving as jurors:
Members of the House of Representatives, judges, clergymen, members of the Armed Forces of Malta, persons holding the office of Head of a Government Department and their deputies, the magistrates, the Registrar of Courts, officers of the Executive Police, professors of the University, teachers of the Government secondary, primary and technical schools, District Medical Officers, health inspectors, the Principal Probation Officer and Probation Officers.
(2) Moreover the court may, on an application to that effect, exempt from serving as a juror any apothecary of a village and any physician, surgeon or obstetrician actually practising his profession, and, in general, any person who has completed the sixtieth year of his age, unless, in some particular case, the court deems otherwise for the ends of justice.
(3) A person who has the care of a family or of a person who suffers from any physical or mental infirmity shall also be exempt from serving as a juror. ”
33. Article 607 of the CC provides that any person who is not qualified or liable to serve as a juror, or who may have special reasons for asking to be exempted from serving as a juror, may bring the matter before the court, by means of an application to be filed within four days after the service of a writ of summons. The court may, “ if it deems the reasons alleged to be good, ... order the registrar to cancel the name of such person ”.
34. According to Article 609 of the CC, if a summoned person ( that is, a person called to serve as a juror) fails to appear before the court at the time stated in the writ, he will be sentenced by the court to a fine and may be compelled to serve as a juror by means of a warrant of escort or arrest. The court may, on an application to that effect, remit the fine if it is satisfied that there was good cause for the non-appearance.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 4 § 3 (d)
35. The applicant considered that the way in which jury service had been imposed on him was discriminatory in nature. He relied on Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 § 3 (d).
The relevant parts of the latter provision read as follows:
“ 1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this Article the term ‘ forced or compulsory labour ’ shall not include:
...
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. ”
36. Article 14 of the Convention states:
“ The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. ”
A. Applicability of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 § 3 (d)
1. The parties ’ submissions
(a) The Government
37. The Government considered that Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 § 3 (d) was not applicable to the facts of the present case.
38. They submitted that jury service was undoubtedly a “ normal civic obligation ” based on social solidarity, which was imposed on citizens in order to ensure the democratisation of the process of the administration of criminal justice and that a person was judged by his or her peers. This had not been contested by the applicant. Therefore, service as a juror could not amount to “ forced or compulsory labour ” within the meaning of Article 4 § 2 of the Convention. The applicability of that provision was excluded by virtue of paragraph 3 (d).
39. The Government further noted that the applicant, who had only been called to serve three times as a juror over a period of seventeen years, had complained only about the procedures which led to the drawing up of the lists of those who were eligible to serve as jurors, and not about the subsequent process of selection of the persons who eventually performed jury service. However, the drawing up of the lists did not amount to “ forced labour ”, as no service was necessarily implied by the mere fact that a person ’ s name appeared on them. In fact, an exemption could be granted, the person could be challenged or it might happen that his or her name would never be selected. Therefore, the facts underlying the applicant ’ s complaint fell outside the ambit of Article 4 of the Convention, and Article 14 was not applicable.
(b) The applicant
40. The applicant pointed out that the Constitutional Court had categorically accepted that jury service was a “ normal civic obligation ”. This opinion was confirmed by the principles laid down by the Court in Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany (18 July 1994, Series A no. 291-B ) and Van der Mussele v. Belgium (23 November 1983, Series A no. 70). In the latter judgment, the Court held that the concept of “ normal civic obligation ” referred “ to all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily ”. The applicant emphasised that he had not offered himself voluntarily for jury service. On the contrary, this service had been exacted from him on pain of a fine, which could be converted into a term of imprisonment. The applicant made reference to judgments in which the United States Supreme Court dealt with issues related to jury service and discrimination in the selection of jurors ( Smith v. State of Texas, 25 November 1940, 311 US 128 (1941); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 20 May 1946, 328 US 217 (1946); and Brown v. Allen, 9 February 1953, 344 US 44 3 (1953)). It held that jury service was a civic obligation and that the jury system played a political function in the administration of the law and was fundamental in a democratic system of justice.
41. In the applicant ’ s view, as jury service was covered by paragraph 3 (d) of Article 4, the only logical conclusion was that the facts of the case fell within the scope of Article 4. As a consequence, Article 14 – a provision which did not require a violation of the substantive provision of the Convention, but only a link with it – was also applicable.
2. The Court ’ s assessment
42. As the Court has consistently held, Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to “ the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms ” safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to this extent it is autonomous – there can be no room for its application unless the facts in issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see, among many other authorities, Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1997, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, and Petrovic v. Austria, 27 March 1998, § 22, Reports 1998-II).
43. The Court reiterates that paragraph 2 of Article 4, which prohibits “ forced or compulsory labour ”, enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 4 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation ( see Siliadin v. France, no. 73316/01, § 112, ECHR 2005 -VII ). However, paragraph 3 of this provision indicates that the term “ forced or compulsory labour ” shall not include, inter alia, “ any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations ”.
44. In the case of Karlheinz Schmidt, in which only men were obliged to serve in the fire brigade or to pay a financial contribution in lieu of such service (cited above, § 22), the Court found that Article 14 was applicable and stated that:
“ ... paragraph 3 of Article 4 is not intended to ‘ limit ’ the exercise of the right guaranteed by paragraph 2, but to ‘ delimit ’ the very content of that right, for it forms a whole with paragraph 2 and indicates what ‘ the term “ forced or compulsory labour ” shall not include ’ ( ce qui ‘ n ’ est pas considéré comme “ travail forcé ou obligatoire ” ‘ ). This being so, paragraph 3 serves as an aid to the interpretation of paragraph 2. The four sub - paragraphs of paragraph 3, notwithstanding their diversity, are grounded on the governing ideas of the general interest, social solidarity and what is normal in the ordinary course of affairs ... ”
45. The Court has also emphasised that “ [t] he criteria which serve to delimit the concept of compulsory labour include the notion of what is in the normal course of affairs ... Work or labour that is in itself normal may in fact be rendered abnormal if the choice of the groups or individuals bound to perform it is governed by discriminatory factors, which was precisely what the applicant contended had occurred in the present circumstances ” ( see Van der Mussele, cited above, § 43).
46. In the present case, the Court does not see any reason to depart from its findings in the two judgments cited above. Therefore, the fact that a situation corresponds to the notion of a normal civic obligation within the meaning of paragraph 3 is not an obstacle to the applicability of Article 4 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 14.
47. Like the parties to the proceedings, the Court considers that compulsory jury service such as exists in Malta is one of the “ normal civic obligations ” envisaged in Article 4 § 3 (d). It observes further that the applicant did not offer himself voluntarily for jury service and that his failure to appear led to the imposition of a fine, which could be converted into a term of imprisonment. On account of its close links with the obligation to serve, the obligation to pay the fine also falls within the scope of Article 4 § 3 (d) (see, mutatis mutandis, Karlheinz Schmidt, cited above, § 23).
48. It is true, as pointed out by the Government (see paragraph 39 above), that in his submissions the applicant mainly criticised the procedures leading to the drawing up of the lists of jurors. However, this does not imply that his complaint is not directed against the result of these procedures, namely the fact that he was required to perform the civic obligation of jury service.
49. It follows that the facts in issue fall within the ambit of Article 4. Article 14 of the Convention is accordingly applicable.
B. Compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 § 3 (d)
1. The parties ’ submissions
(a) The Government
50. The Government observed that the applicant accepted that the relevant domestic provisions did not discriminate between men and women. His complaints seemed therefore directed against the administrative practices relating to the choice of persons for jury service.
51. However, Article 14 of the Convention could not come into play in connection with the applicant ’ s claim that a person put on the lists was not removed before he died or became exempted because of age. That alleged practice in fact applied equally to both men and women. The applicant ’ s complaints should therefore be interpreted in the sense that as a result of various factors he, as a man, was more likely to be called for jury service than a woman.
52. The Government noted that originally all women had been precluded from jury service. The law had then been modified, and women could apply to have their names placed on the lists of jurors. Nowadays, both women and men were equally liable to be called to serve as jurors or to be exempted from that social duty. Therefore, the lists of jurors had started as all- male lists, and it was only gradually that women had been added and continued to be added to them.
53. As to the statistics produced by the applicant, the Government observed that between 1996 and 1997 the number of male jurors had increased by less than 74% (from 4,298 to 7,503), while the number of female jurors had increased by 1,596% (from 147 to 2,494). In any case, it had to be borne in mind that most jurors were chosen from the part of the population which was active in the economy and professional life. Such people were in fact less likely to have family or other reasons for seeking an exemption.
54. The Government pointed out that, as the Constitutional Court had correctly stated, “ an irreversible administrative process had been set in motion in order to bring the number of women on the lists into line with that of men ”. Since 1997, when the lists of jurors were revised on a yearly basis, the Commissioner of Police had tended to substitute women in the place of men who were disqualified from service, and the objective of securing a more even distribution of jurors between the two genders was kept in mind when putting additional jurors on the lists. One of the measures that had been taken was to add government or bank employees to the lists of jurors, amongst which groups women were well- represented. University graduates had also been added to the lists on the basis that there was an equal number of men and women. The Government noted that as a result of this ongoing process, in the lists of jurors published in the Gazette of 15 November 2004, there were 6,344 women and 10,195 men. They also clarified that while there was no maximum numerical limit to the number of people included on the lists of jurors, the number actually enrolled depended on checks made by the Commissioner of Police, and on the practice of putting on the lists only qualified individuals ( men or women ) who were less likely to be entitled to an exemption.
55. It should also be noted that according to Article 604(3) of the CC (see paragraph 32 above), an exemption might be granted when a juror was a person who cared for a family or a person suffering from physical or mental infirmity. As more women than men were looking after their families, a higher number of women were disqualified on that ground. However, this was the result of socio-cultural factors rather than of the operation of the law.
56. The Government emphasised furthermore that the prosecution and the defence had the right to challenge a number of jurors. For cultural reasons, defence lawyers might have had a tendency to challenge female jurors, but this was discrimination against and not in favour of women.
57. In the light of the above, the Government concluded that the practice of selection and exemption from jury service was justifiable under Article 4 § 3 of the Convention taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.
(b) The applicant
58. The applicant complained of a two-fold discriminatory treatment. In the first place he alleged that he had been treated differently from women who, though satisfying the legal requirements, were called on to fulfil jury service in a minimal manner when compared to men.
59. Thus, the burden of jury service was placed predominantly on men, while women were de facto exempted from this social duty. The applicant referred, on this point, to the statistics he had produced in the domestic proceedings. He noted that in 1996 140,975 women and 135,527 men were enrolled on the electoral register; however, only 147 women (among whom 5 actually served as jurors) were placed on the lists of jurors, as opposed to 4,298 men (174 of whom actually served as jurors).
60. This discrimination was caused by the way in which the lists of jurors were compiled and could not be excused by social or cultural reasons or by the choice made at the beginning of the trial by the prosecutor or the defence. The crux of the matter was in fact not the number of women who actually had to serve as jurors, but the low number enrolled on the lists of jurors.
61. The applicant considered that after 1994, when women became liable to serve as jurors on the same footing as men, there was no reason in law for the continued discrepancy between the two genders. Both men and women were in theory equally liable to serve as jurors and to be exempted. However, as the overwhelming majority of people enrolled on the lists were men, the only explanation was that there had been a discriminatory administrative practice.
62. The applicant was unable to explain the increasing number of women registered as jurors from 1996 to 1997, but pointed out that the increase had only occurred three years after the 1994 amendments. The fact that the number of women selected as jurors was constantly growing might also be explained by the judgment given in his case by the Constitutional Court, in which a revision of the system of compiling the lists had been recommended. In any case, the discrimination complained of had lasted for at least twenty-six years, including the year when the applicant had lodged his complaint before the national courts.
63. As to the Government ’ s argument that the predominant number of men was a result of there being fewer women active in public and professional life, the applicant noted that the law did not require a person to be active in such fields in order to qualify as a juror. The Government ’ s argument might even be considered discriminatory against people who chose to study at university or to become housewives. The applicant also alleged that the socio-cultural factors indicated by the Government could not justify a difference in treatment especially when the law itself was amended in order to eliminate its discriminatory wording.
64. The applicant considered that the differences in treatment complained of lacked any objective and reasonable justification. Men did not have any specific abilities which might render them more fit for jury service than women. The aim of the jury system should be to ensure that the accused was tried by a sample of society. A jury predominantly composed of men would create an unbalanced system of criminal justice in relation to trials in which women were defendants, victims or witnesses.
65. The applicant further considered that he had also been discriminated against vis-à-vis other men who, though eligible for jury service, had never been summoned to serve as jurors.
66. He alleged that the way in which the laws establishing jury service were applied had led to a situation in which only a small percentage of the population was summoned to serve as jurors. Of the hundreds of thousands of persons eligible for jury service, only a few hundred were actually called for service. The lists of jurors were not compiled every year and the same names were retained on the lists. Even if the law clearly required new lists to be compiled, the practice was, as substantially admitted by the Government, to make a simple annual check of those who had become disqualified or had died during the previous twelve months.
67. In that respect, the applicant noted that the number of persons enrolled on the electoral register in 1 996 and 1997 was, respectively, 276,502 and 279,487, while the number of persons placed on the lists of jurors in the same years was 4,445 and 9,997. It followed that the burden of jury service was limited, in 1996, to 1.6% of those eligible and in 1997 to 3.57%. Moreover, in 1997 the number of male registered voters was 137,090; however, only 392 men were called to serve as foremen and 7,111 were called to serve as jurors. While accepting that only a small percentage of persons were needed every year to serve as jurors, the applicant emphasised that the burden of such service had been imposed on the same people, representing a small minority of the population, for a large number of years. In this connection, he pointed out that he had been placed on the lists for the first time in 1971 and that his name had not been removed since.
68. In the applicant ’ s view, the situation was still unsatisfactory. Even after the 2002 amendments, the lists were not drawn up de novo. The authorities confined themselves to replacing people who had become disqualified. As a result, only 6% of the population were on the lists (3.5% of men and 2.5% of women ).
69. The applicant noted that no justification had been put forward by the Government to explain the difference in treatment that he suffered vis-à-vis other men.
70. In the applicant ’ s view, a civic obligation is normal if it is enforced and administered in a just and equitable manner and it is shared by the qualified members of the society. A fair cross section of society is imperative for a just and fair jury system. On the contrary, when, as in his case, such an obligation imposes an excessive and disproportionate burden on a single individual, discrimination contrary to the Convention occurs. The applicant referred to the above-mentioned judgments in which the United States Supreme Court criticised the practices of placing the burden of jury service upon only a section of the population and of excluding an ethnic or racial group from jury service. Moreover, the case of Taylor v. Louisiana (419 US 522 (1975)) concerned a situation whereby women could not be selected for jury service unless they had previously declared in writing that they wished to serve as jurors. The Supreme Court had held that “ if it was ever the case that women were unqualified to sit on juries or were so situated that none of them should be required to perform jury service, that time has long since passed ”. The applicant submitted that the situation in Malta was similar to that in the State of Louisiana at the time of the Taylor case.
2. The Court ’ s assessment
(a) General principles
71. The Court ’ s case-law establishes that discrimination means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations ( see Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, § 48, ECHR 2002 ‑ IV). However, not every difference in treatment will amount to a violation of Article 14. It must be established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation enjoy preferential treatment and that this distinction is discriminatory ( see Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, no. 29865/96, § 49, ECHR 2004 -X ).
72. A difference of treatment is discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 if it has no objective and reasonable justification. The existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation to the principles which normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference of treatment in the exercise of a right laid down by the Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: Article 14 will also be violated when it is clearly established that there is no “ reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised ” (see, for example, Petrovic, cited above, § 30, and Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1986, § 177, Series A no. 102 ).
73. In other words, the notion of discrimination includes in general cases where a person or group is treated, without proper justification, less favourably than another, even though the more favourable treatment is not called for by the Convention ( see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 82, Series A no. 94). Article 14 does not prohibit distinctions in treatment which are founded on an objective assessment of essentially different factual circumstances and which, being based on the public interest, strike a fair balance between the protection of the interests of the community and respect for the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Convention (see, among other authorities, G.M.B. and K.M. v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 36797/97, 27 September 2001).
74. The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a difference in treatment ( see Gaygusuz v. Austria, 16 September 1996, § 42, Reports 1996 ‑ IV). The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background ( see Rasmussen v. Denmark, 28 November 1984, § 40, Series A no. 87, and Inze v. Austria, 28 October 1987, § 41, Series A no. 126), but the final decision as to observance of the Convention ’ s requirements rests with the Court. Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must, however, have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved ( see Ünal Tekeli, cited above, § 54, and, mutatis mutandis, Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, § 68, ECHR 2002 ‑ IV).
(b) Whether there has been a difference in treatment between persons in similar situations
75. The Court observes that it is accepted by the applicant that the difference in treatment complained of does not depend on the wording of the domestic provisions. As in force at the relevant time, Maltese law did not make any distinction between the sexes, both men and women being equally eligible for jury service (see Article 603 (1) of the CC, paragraph 30 above). The discrimination in issue was on the contrary based on what the applicant described as a well-established practice, characterised by a number of factors, such as the manner in which the lists of jurors were compiled and the criteria for exemption from jury service. As a result, only a negligible percentage of women were called to serve as jurors.
76. The Court has held in previous cases that statistics are not in themselves sufficient to disclose a practice which could be classified as discriminatory ( see Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, § 154, 4 May 2001). At the same time, the Court considers that a discrimination potentially contrary to the Convention may result not only from a legislative measure (see, in the ambit of social duties, Karlheinz Schmidt, cited above, §§ 24-29 ), but also from a de facto situation.
77. The Court notes that it is apparent from the statistics produced by the parties (see paragraphs 53 and 59 above) that in 1997 – the year in which the applicant was called to serve as a juror and failed to attend the court – the number of men (7,503) enrolled on the lists of jurors was three times that of women (2,494). In the previous year this difference was even more significant, as only 147 women were placed on the lists of jurors, as opposed to 4,298 men. The Court is also struck by the fact that in 1996, 5 women and 174 men served as jurors.
78. The Court considers that these figures show that the civic obligation of jury service has been placed predominantly on men. Therefore, there has been a difference in treatment between two groups – men and women – which, with respect to this duty, were in a similar situation.
79. It is true that, as the Government pointed out, since 1997 an administrative process had been set in motion in order to bring the number of women registered as jurors into line with that of men. As a result, in 2004 6,344 women and 10,195 men were enrolled on the lists of jurors, thus showing a significant increase in the number of women actually eligible for jury service. However, this does not undermine the finding that at the relevant time – when the applicant was called to serve as a juror and failed to appear – only a negligible percentage of women were enrolled on the lists of jurors and were actually requested to perform jury service.
(c) Whether there is objective and reasonable justification
80. The Court observes that, if a policy or general measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a group of people, the possibility of its being considered discriminatory cannot be ruled out even if it is not specifically aimed or directed at that group ( see McShane v. the United Kingdom, no. 43290/98, § 135, 28 May 2002). Moreover, very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before it could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of sex as compatible with the Convention ( see Willis, cited above, § 39, and Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, § 67, Series A no. 263 ).
81. In the instant case, the Government argued that the difference in treatment depended on a number of factors. In the first place, jurors were chosen from the part of the population which was active in the economy and professional life. Moreover, according to Article 604 (3) of the CC, an exemption from jury service might be granted to persons who had to take care of their family. More women than men could successfully rely on such a provision. Finally, “ for cultural reasons ”, defence lawyers might have had a tendency to challenge female jurors (see paragraphs 53, 55 and 56 above).
82. The Court has doubts as to whether the factors indicated by the Government are sufficient to explain the significant discrepancy in the distribution of jury service. It notes furthermore that the second and third factors relate only to the number of women who actually performed jury service and do not explain the very low number of women enrolled on the lists of jurors. In any event, the factors highlighted by the Government only constitute explanations of the mechanisms which led to the difference in treatment complained of. No valid argument has been put before the Court in order to provide a proper justification for it. In particular, it has not been shown that the difference in treatment pursued a legitimate aim and that there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.
83. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 4 § 3 (d) of the Convention.
84. This conclusion dispenses the Court from examining whether the applicant has also been discriminated against vis-à-vis other men who, though eligible for jury service, have never been summoned to serve as jurors.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 6
85. The applicant alleged that in relation to a civic obligation that had been imposed on him he had had to face criminal proceedings, had been ordered to pay a fine and had been threatened with imprisonment in default. He relied on Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 6. The relevant part of the latter provision reads as follows:
“ 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ... ”
A. The parties ’ submissions
1. The Government
86. The Government observed that the applicant had become liable to the payment of a fine because he had chosen to ignore his summons for jury service. He had not complained of an unfair trial or of a lack of independence or impartiality of the domestic tribunal. Nor had he complained that the situation would have been different if he had been a woman. Therefore, no discrimination on the ground of sex could be disclosed.
87. In the Government ’ s view, the applicant ’ s complaint might be understood in the sense that, as there were more male jurors, it was more likely that a male juror would become liable to a fine if he ignored his duties. To accept that argument would be tantamount to holding that laws on prostitution were in breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 6 simply because there were more female than male prostitutes. In any case, the applicant had alleged that others could be victims of the alleged violation, but not that he himself was a victim.
88. The Government were of the opinion that the complaint under Article 6 relied on the same facts as those alleged in connection with Articles 14 and 4 § 3 (d). In fact, there was a necessary link between the criminal proceedings against the applicant and the fine that had been imposed on him for ignoring the court summons calling him for jury service.
2. The applicant
89. The applicant considered that the proceedings in which the Criminal Court had been asked to convert the fine into a term of imprisonment fell within the ambit of Article 6 of the Convention. He alleged furthermore that a violation of the latter provision taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, “ necessarily [arose] as a consequence of the complaint raised under Articles 14 and 4 § 3 (d) ”. In that respect, the applicant submitted that there was a strong link between jury service and the proceedings that had been brought against him. The compilation of the lists of jurors, the summons served on the applicant, the fine imposed on him and the proceedings for its conversion were events that were mutually dependent and entirely interrelated.
B. The Court ’ s assessment
90. The Court observes that the applicant did not allege that the proceedings directed against him were in any way unfair or that any of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 had been violated. In any case, it notes that the criminal proceedings were a mere consequence of the existence of the discriminatory civic obligation. Having regard to its finding that there has been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 4 § 3 (d) (see paragraph 84 above), the Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether there has also been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 6 (see, mutatis mutandis, Karlheinz Schmidt, cited above, § 30).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
91. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“ If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party. ”
A. Damage
92. The applicant observed that his service as a juror caused him to be absent from his employment for a number of days. However, as the financial loss was difficult to quantify, he did not present any claim in this respect. The applicant also had to pay a fine of 100 Maltese liri (MTL) (approximately 240 euros ( EUR ) ), which was the direct effect of the discrimination complained of. He requested the reimbursement of this sum. As to non-pecuniary damage, the applicant left the matter to the discretion of the Court. He pointed out that his name had been kept on the lists of jurors and jury foremen published in 2005.
93. The Government did not comment on the applicant ’ s claims.
94. In so far as the repayment of the EUR 240 fine is concerned, the Court notes that this fine was imposed for non-attendance before the Criminal Court; it has not been shown that it was directly linked with the practice found to be in breach of the Convention. It further considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.
B. Costs and expenses
95. The applicant claimed MTL 723.33 (approximately EUR 1,736) for the costs incurred at the domestic level. He produced a tax-inclusive bill in this respect, issued by the Registrar of the Courts. He further claimed a total sum of MTL 2,353.04 (approximately EUR 5,648), to which EUR 368 should be added, for the proceedings before the Court, these sums covering both his lawyers ’ fees and the costs of their attendance at the oral hearing of 24 May 2005. The total sum claimed for costs and expenses was thus EUR 7,752.
96. The Government did not comment on the applicant ’ s claims.
97. According to the Court ’ s established case-law, an award can be made in respect of costs and expenses incurred by the applicant only in so far as they have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see, inter alia, Belziuk v. Poland, 25 March 1998, § 49, Reports 1998- II, and Craxi v. Italy, no. 34896/97, § 115, 5 December 2002 ).
98. In the present case, the Court considers the total amount claimed to be reasonable. It therefore awards the applicant EUR 7,752, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this sum.
C. Default interest
99. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.