steve earhart  with respect to cyber or other forms of attack i think that can talk in the context in which an attack occurred against the united states or our allies would be very important as we sit here today it's easy to dissect one action being disconnected from that in other fields other domains whether that be an air sea on land or whether you would contemplate a hypothetical situation involved employment of other forms weapons of mass destruction which are not nuclear weapons such as biological weapons and so i think what this in p r strives to do is to say in the context of a non nuclear attack on the united states or our allies that was strategic in nature that imposed substantial impacts to our infrastructure to our people that we would problem you know me and i we have a chart that shows some of the expenditure levels and we can bring that up here on the screen and here you see the nuclear enterprise funding that would occur over the period of the recapitalization of the u s nuclear triad nuclear tried of course consisting of i c b m s or intercontinental range ballistic missiles on land a sea based nuclear deterrent with submarine launch ballistic missiles as well as an air leg for bombers arm of cruise missiles and you see that here at the two point seven percent of the duty budget that we stand today sustaining the current triad the current infrastructure that we have in the d o d would involve two point seven percent of our budget as we project forward and you'll notice this projection goes through the year two thousand and forty on the chart you see in the dark blue the recapitalization costs and those will do the current plans the program is a record that the defense department has grow to include an additional three point seven percent of the d o d budget at its peak in and twenty nine now prior to that time as shown in the chart it's substantially less than that level and in no where they sense after that peak of course it declines and so that is the total amount for the defense department that we would see are also points out as my deputy secretary said the national imperative to improve modernize our aging infrastructure as well as continuing the work that we're doing on modernizing the stockpile itself the this is this is been mentioned in previous npr's it's but the if the resources available has not kept pace with the need to modernize to ensure that we always have the facilities that are necessary to maintain that safe reliable and effective stockpile so without i don't have the final number because we're working on the complete infrastructure plan but i will tell you because of that that that delay and that that lack of funding that's come over time it will be significant and it will need to be sustained investment over the next decade them are less enthusiastic about nuclear weapons than the united states how do you expect them to take this first of all i would not call this russia centric n p r i mean russia is one of the countries we've mentioned but we mention china we certainly mention d p r k we mentioned iran russia it's not the sole focus of this n p r by any means that's one thing we did in fact we briefed russians on this on the rollout of the n p r and  we remain i mean there is an there seems to be sometimes there is there is the impression that we don't talk to the russians we talk to the russians a lot in fact we are in the process of trying to work out another strategic stability discussion so we have ongoing discussions as i mentioned and we also need a willing partner which has been lacking but we certainly and russia russia is not an obstacle necessarily or the point of this n p r in terms of allies we've had a very good discussion with allies here of comes consultation our allies uniformally com commented on the worsened global security environment and that is in comparison to last n p r in two thousand and ten there's no question that there's a were security environment so there is agreement on that  pursuing arms control as we pointed out in the n p r that we certainly reiterate the importance of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty our ongoing commitment to it and our willingness to pursue as i mentioned arms control didn't you know one other thing to add to that is when you asked about nato allies we have had a and i hope it was noted in the statements by the deputy secretaries that we've had an ongoing dialogue throughout this process over the last year with our allies that is tony richardson from inside different i'm going to be the nuclear see launched cruise missile could you talk a little bit about the rationale for bringing that program back how much that will cost one that's expected to come online and won again the new russia now for bringing the program back in that the security environment that's discussed in the nuclear posture review one of the things that has been concerning is that over the last twenty years we've seen the growth of the role of nuclear weapons and some potential adversaries doctrine as well as growth in capabilities and and planned growth over that time period and so what was discussed in terms of the rationale in the n p r is that it's overriding purpose the overriding purpose of our nuclear arsenal is deterrence and to assure allies and as i mentioned to hedge against uncertainty and if necessary provide a credible response capability within that we've become concerned that we need a more flexible set of capabilities to in order to have tailor deterrents there's no one size fits all approach to deterrence as you know and we're not deterring a single person or in a single circumstance and so therefore a more flexible set of capabilities that is survivable  credible and can be tailored to the circumstances to maintain deterrence is the rationale behind looking at that capability now as mentioned there are two supplementary capabilities that the n p r discusses one we've already dis you're talking about severing launch cruise missile in that regard what the n p r talks about is that we will be we will begin a study of the appropriate way to pursue that and the specifics around a program in that area and so at this time i can't quote  a specific time frame in dollar figure because of the stage of that activity but it's one of the supplementary capabilities that we think is very important to pursue both to do this the survivability of submarine launched cruise missiles the flexibility that that type of platform provides and again here this would involve use of low yield nuclear weapons low yield nuclear weapons have been in the u s arsenal for decades the difference here would be and as you pointed out they we formerly in the united states have the capability to fire cruise missiles from submarines armed with nuclear weapons this would be to look at that capability again physical attack on u s infrastructure and the worst case scenario that they've come up with is a service disruption possibly last two weeks so the question is is that sort of eventuality a limited service disruption possibly lasting weeks is that this sort of  extreme circumstance that might possibly provoke a nuclear response and if not if you're working with a different worst case scenario for a cyber physical attack on u s infrastructure potentially much greater than that can you can you speak to that a little bit sure in starting at the top the declaratory policy of the united states that we would consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances the language on that that you will find in this nuclear post review is identical to what you will found that the united states would employ nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests the united states allies and partners that those words that i just spoke are the same as that appeared in the tw posture review released by president obama's administration so in that sense there is no difference in the declaratory policy with respect to what constitutes extreme circumstances and the provision of other things again i think the context in which that occurs is important and hypothetical examples of a cyber attack or biological weapons attack i think what's very important is there is no autumn a to city in this policy as to how the united states would respond we would consider the circumstances under which that occurred we would consider the context around that and the effects on the united states and our allies before determining what the appropriate response would be whether that involved nuclear weapons or purely non nuclear weapons and so the difficulty with answering hypothetical question is it's very hard to know what the circumstances surrounding that would be for example in the hypotheticals you cited without also involved the employment of biological weapons against the us population or allies would involve the use of chemical weapons against our people would involve a conventional attack in other parts of the world the context in which an attack occurred on the united states or allies would be how we would evaluate the appropriate response but i want to point make one additional point that i forgot i think i very important implied in your question to address one thing there is no lowering of the nuclear threshold in this nuclear posture review that threshold remains at an incredibly high level there has been no diminishing to that in this document is explicit stating there is nothing in this approach that isn't that will lower the nuclear threshold indeed the capabilities and the type of approach that we're pursuing is intended to raise the nuclear threshold by making the type of punishment that we can employ against an attack on the united states so high that it would not be countenanced by an adversary united states or its one of its allies is attacked by a nuclear weapon regardless of the yield there will be a nuclear response there new u s nuclear doctrine has never involved autum a to city in terms of response and there is no automatic city in this current document are declaratory policy would be that we would consider the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances obviously one of the circumstances under which you would consider that would be a nuclear attack against the united states of whatever there's no automaticity in this approach whether a nuclear use or non nuclear use against the united states or our allies now obviously i would highly discourage any nation from considering such an attack on the united states or allies that would not be in your interest to do so to state the obvious but but with respect to the declaratory policy there it is not a an autumn it is city in terms of response there is always a consideration about the context in which an attack occurred and the impact on either the united states or allies and we have these discussions as well at nato and we take very seriously our article five commitments and commitment to nato which is a nuclear alliance with capabilities also provided not by the united states but by our other allies so certainly this is be something that would meet the criteria of an extreme circumstance in which you would consider your response threatening fire in theory like the world has never seen towards north korea and mentions of a big red button and i'm wondering if you have any concerns that that kind of rhetoric is reducing support for the triad among the american population that at some point  americans might think we don't want to spend one point two trillion dollars or one trillion dollars or have you count calculated on the weapons that can be used by a single person's choice one maintaining a safe credible and effective nuclear deterrent is something that's been a bipartisan activity for many decades in this country since the dawn of the nuclear age and i think that support continues bear in mind that in that chart they were showing their number the programs to recapitalize the nuclear triad were began during the previous administration and so in that sense you've seen a bipartisan effort to recapitalise that nuclear try at funding has been requested in past years and appropriated and authorized by the congress the united states in that regard and so i think the basic point that there is support amongst the elected representatives of the american people in both parties for the role of nuclear weapons and for the nuclear try and i think is present certainly the other factor that i think affects public opinion is the world has become a more dangerous place and certainly our people are very concerned about what they hear emanating from north korea about the growth and the capabilities that that regime possesses i think all of us are concerned about some of the changes in the russian approach to nuclear weapons the growth of capabilities in china the potential for other countries to acquire nuclear weapons so i think there's been a growth amongst not only the american public but certainly allied publics about what are those security changes mean for us and the priority that must be placed on our nuclear enterprise to deter the most catastrophic potential attacks against the united states or our allies and so i think i think that kind of support will continue going forward and while we're going to work very hard to reduce the threats facing the united states and our allies through efforts like nonproliferation and arms control these are still very substantial threats that we're going to face and we need a robust credible nuclear capability in order to deter that those threats and to  assure our allies there's rhetoric as i mentioned i think in that security environment in dealing with that sort of threat that's grown to the united states there is i think a bipartisan support for much of what's being discussed here is being pushed forward in one thousand budget versus twenty budget i asked that because separation and said specifically a couple months about us nineteen is going to have a few things but all these reviews are going to really come out in the twenty twenty budgets because of the becomes catastrophic so like here that certainly in the in the f one thousand budget request the things that you see on the chart behind you for the recapitalization the triad those are programs of record you should expect to see those programs again  have a request behind them from the president to the congress to fund them i mention that to see launch ballistic missile and that supplementary capability that you'll see also in there and the reality is that all of our  activities at the defense department including what we're doing right now in some way track to a budget request of the congress and so our new budget will be coming out shortly planned releases later this month and so the specifics will be there but  this nuclear posture review will be reflected in the budget request of the congress in terms of the capabilities that we need  but talk a little bit about our process that that happens after the m p r and now that the n p r is out the basic process the into the interagen l to define the requirements and then we have the standard process for in each of our organizations for creating the plans the implementation plans on the on the do d side the military correct characteristics are defined and on our side all the technical characteristics are defined those are agreed upon in the in the through the nuclear weapons council and then through and then the resource loading of that occurs through the normal budgetary process so given the timing is as expected you he would see probably more of the of the fidelity of those plans take place over this this this year and probably be this emphasis on flexibility low yield nuclear weapons cetera do you believe that having those low yield weapons which by definition have lesser consequences for their use increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons might be used in a conflict in particular want to point to their cruise missiles nuclear tipped cruise missiles former secretary of defense perry has warned about nuclear tipped cruise missiles increasing the likelihood of a nuclear war because of confusion that might occur about whether a cruise missile is nuclear or not so do you think that these weapons both lower yield and the cruise missile increase the odds of a nuclear conflict short answer to question is no the longer answer would be that in this r you'll see that there is a discussion of maintaining deterrence and this concept that one size fits all does not work for deterrence these are very different countries say north korea versus the concerns we have about russia or china these are different countries there are different circumstances and that we need a more flexible set of capabilities in order to have tailored deterrence and i think you've correctly picked up on one area of emphasis in this n p r which is greater in the past which is a greater focus on tailor deterrence tailoring our effects tailoring our approach to the particular circumstances in which we face with a given adversary the context is very important again in which you're trying to effect deterrence in that specific circumstance and so therefore some of the flexibility the attributes of a submarine launch ballistic ballistic missile in a submarine launch cruise missile survivability heart difficulty of detection the flexibility in the range of circumstances that you have to employ such a capability where you place it how you fly it when you fly it the fact that you can have some flexibility in terms of whether you signal its presence or you don't flexibility  basing options given that most of the world surface is water all of these things help provide flexible options for taylor determines in terms of the nuclear threshold as i mentioned earlier there is no lowering of the nuclear threshold in fact this approach is intended to raise the nuclear threshold and keep it at a very high level be used to lower yield or the development of lower yield weapons how does that increase deterrence when a larger weapon could be even more devastating to an enemy how does the lower your old help when we look at some of the activities statements capabilities that adversaries or potential adversaries have pursued one of the things that we want to make sure that we maintain is a flexible set of capabilities so that they not come to the mistaken impression that there would be some ranges of situations where they might employ nuclear weapons whether they be low so called battlefield nuclear weapons things of that nature in a way that we would feel that we did not have credible response options in order to preserve deterrence as mentioned earlier the united states has had low y nuclear weapons in our arsenal for decades this would not be a new addition or a new type and it does not involve production of nuclear weapons so certainly i think we're not increasing we're not proposing an increase in the size of the u s nuclear stockpile again the purpose of these activities is a flexible set of capabilities to provide tailored deterren review is kind of specifically tailored to north korea or focus on the north korean threat and i know we you mentioned briefing russia on this was china also briefed on this review well specked in north korea the capabilities in the nuclear triad that exist today as well as the recapitalization that's discussed in the report and some of these supplementary capabilities all of those things in various circumstances would have a political ability and the type of hypothetical scenarios that we worry about with north korea unfortunately some of there are concerns that we used to have a few years ago have become quite frankly not so hypothetical anymore in terms of the threat that we